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# Ontology of Differentiation: Being, Consciousness, and the Game

Denys Spirin

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Denys Spirin. Ontology of Differentiation: Being, Consciousness, and the Game. Zenodo, 2025, 9798231582761. 10.5281/zenodo.15273163. hal-05044877

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# Ontology of Differentiation: Being, Consciousness, and the Game

Denys Spirin

Published by Denys Spirin, 2025.
While every precaution has been taken in the preparation of this
book, the publisher assumes no responsibility for errors or omis-
sions, or for damages resulting from the use of the information con-
tained herein.

ONTOLOGY OF DIFFERENTIATION: BEING, CON-
SCIOUSNESS, AND THE GAME

**First edition. April 16, 2025.**

Copyright © 2025 Denys Spirin.

ISBN: 979-8231582761

Written by Denys Spirin.
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Introduction

The present inquiry develops a philosophical ontology in which dif-
ferentiation is posited as the primary ontological category, preceding
all traditional metaphysical foundations. Unlike most systems that
take being, consciousness, form, or act as their starting point, the
proposed approach is grounded in a more fundamental level—desig-
nated here as *Potentiality*.

In this context, Potentiality is neither reducible to Aristotelian
potentiality as directed becoming towards a predetermined form,
nor is it mere possibility preceding actuality in the classical sense.
Rather, it is conceived as primordial indeterminacy—an ontological
pre-field wherein the possibility of differentiation emerges as the self-
determination of the differentiating itself, rather than a transition to-
ward actualization. Potentiality, therefore, is undifferentiated yet dif-
ferentiable, from which structure emerges precisely as differentiated,
though not as a pre-established structure.

A key thesis of this ontology is the assertion that differentiation
is not a derivative form of cognitive, perceptual, or subjective ac-
tivity; rather, it constitutes a *primary ontological act* from which all
structures of being arise. Differentiation is not an operation per-
formed by a subject but the very condition under which anything at
all becomes possible. In this sense, being and differentiation are not
opposed: being is understood precisely as *differentiation that is held*.
To exist means to be manifest, and to be manifest means to be dif-
ferentiated. It follows from this that fundamental categories such as
space, time, subject, and object do not precede differentiation, nor
do they determine it; instead, they emerge as stable forms generated
by the act of differentiation itself in its structured manifestation.

Methodologically, this study follows a logic of ontological un-
folding: from the indeterminate to the determinate, from possibility
to structure, from difference to form. The starting point is Potential-
ity as an undifferentiated yet differentiable pre-field. The first struc-
ture to appear in this field is differentiation itself, understood as
the minimal ontological boundary between “something” and “not-
something.” This boundary is not pre-given, not a substance, nor
does it exist within space or time. Rather, it is differentiation itself
that makes space and time possible. Space and time are thus inter-
preted here as modalities of differentiation’s manifestation: space as
the stable distribution of differences, and time as their sequential re-
tention.

The next step in the ontological analysis introduces the concept
of the node—a structure in which differentiation stabilizes and ac-
quires persistence. A node is not identical with a subject, a body,
or an event; it is a process of differentiation that allows rhythm,
stability, and ultimately self-direction. Nodes always presuppose the
modalities of space and time, as without them differentiation cannot
achieve structural form. Within the node, differentiation not only
becomes fixed but can also repeat itself, enabling what is understood
here as memory—the ontological persistence of differentiation
through a sequence.

Further, the concept of node systems is introduced—structures
in which individual nodes enter into relationships, creating more
complex configurations of differentiation. Each such system can, in
turn, be treated as a node on a higher level, giving rise to a fractal ar-
chitecture of differentiated reality. On this basis, it becomes possible
to analyze stable forms of differentiation, ranging from elementary
nodes to meta-level structures, encompassing the living, the reflexive,
and the potential.

In subsequent chapters, six forms of ontological retention of dif-
ferentiation will be analyzed, each of which expresses a modality
through which differentiation attains structural persistence. These
forms do not constitute a hierarchy; rather, they represent different
ways in which differentiation structures and sustains itself:
*Stage R0* — the flash of differentiation. A minimal act in which
difference appears without persistence. There is no memory, no
structure, only the pure event of distinction.

*Stage R1* — structural differentiation. Difference is retained in fixed form: crystals, genetic codes, chemical patterns. This is differentiation without perception or movement.

*Stage R2* — morphogenetic and sensorimotor differentiation. The organism responds to difference through spatial configuration and movement. Time appears as directed action.

*Stage R3* — symbolic differentiation. Language emerges as a medium through which differentiation is held in absence. The differentiated no longer needs to be present to be sustained.

*Stage R4* — reflexive differentiation. The act of differentiation becomes aware of itself. Subjectivity arises as the capacity to reflect upon one's own differentiating.

*Stage R5* — ethical differentiation. The other is recognized as another differentiating being. This stage marks the emergence of responsibility, relation, and personhood.

*Stage R6* — collective differentiation. Systems emerge that hold differentiation beyond the individual: culture, society, artificial intelligence. Differentiation becomes recursive at the systemic level.

Before turning to the broader implications of the model, a part of this study is devoted to exploring the relationship between the proposed ontological framework and several philosophical and religious traditions — including Christianity, Buddhism, Daoism, Hinduism, and Islam. This analysis is not meant as a reduction or critique, but as an attempt to uncover how enduring forms of differentiation are sustained within these traditions, as seen through the lens of ontological differentiation.

The aim of this work is not to construct a new system in the traditional sense, but to uncover an ontological structure in which differentiation functions as the very condition of systematicity. It does
not assert or impose order, but indicates its possibility through dif-
ferentiation. Where fixed forms lose their persuasiveness, only one
task remains: to differentiate what differentiates, and thereby to dis-
close Potentiality as the generative ground of all forms.
Potentiality and Differentiation

A philosophy beginning not from being but from differentiation requires a radical rethinking of the structure of ontological thought. If differentiation is affirmed as primary rather than derivative, then the very notion of origin must be reconsidered. In this approach, origin cannot be conceived as an event or a fact, since any structured form already presupposes differentiation. Origin, within this ontology, is conceived as pre-structured possibility—as Potentiality, out of which all manifestation unfolds.

Potentiality is not a thing, has no properties, and does not exist as an object. It does not belong to space or time, but rather makes these possible by serving as their ontological condition. Potentiality is not a "before" in a chronological or causal sense, but a "through" in an ontological sense: it is the pre-field in which form emerges as differentiation. Every form, every boundary, every stable manifestation is already the structuring of difference, and thus an unfolding of Potentiality as its manifestation.

At this stage, a question arises: can Potentiality be addressed without reducing it to a fixed concept? If a concept is understood as a completed intellectual form, the answer is negative. Within this approach, Potentiality is conceived as a limiting condition for thought—not something that is thought of, but something through which differentiating thought becomes possible. It is not an object of reflection but the ontological condition for the very possibility of reflection. In this sense, Potentiality is introduced as a premise, not as a given or substance.

Differentiation does not emerge within Potentiality as if from a container, but rather as its ontological manifestation. In what can be differentiated, Potentiality already operates. Thus, differentiation and Potentiality are not different entities, but different modes of manifestation of the same condition: Potentiality is the undifferen-
tiated pre-field, whereas differentiation is the minimal ontological
shift, the tension enabling one to first say, "this—not that." Without
this shift, neither subject nor object, nor indeed a world, can exist.
Yet differentiation itself cannot be absolute; it is possible only as the
holding of a boundary, as localization, as stable form.

Differentiation is thus not merely the boundary between "this"
and "that," but also the ontological means of maintaining this bound-
ary. It cannot be described as a relation between two previously given
entities, because these entities themselves arise only by virtue of dif-
ferentiation. Differentiation, therefore, is the primary act generating
any structured form.

An attempt to comprehend becoming through internal differen-
tiation can be found in Hegelian dialectics. The classical triad—the-
sis, antithesis, synthesis—may be interpreted as a sequence in which
differentiation not only emerges but also organizes thought's move-
ment. Thesis and antithesis are already differentiated states, while
synthesis fixes a new differentiation arising from their relationship.
However, in Hegel's system, differentiation is not preserved as onto-
logically autonomous; it is conceived as a moment to be overcome,
subsumed into conceptual unity. Hegelian dialectics strive toward
wholeness, in which differentiation loses its autonomy, dissolving in-
to synthetic unity.

In the proposed approach, differentiation is neither reduced to
the function of a concept nor requires synthetic resolution. It is pre-
served as the ontological foundation, requiring no sublation. Here
differentiation is not a transitional stage on the path toward identity,
but a fundamental category through which any structured form be-
comes possible. This position demands a formal language and con-
ceptual apparatus different from Hegel's dialectical logic, wherein
differentiation is subordinated to the movement toward the Ab-
solute.
To clarify the notion, we introduce the concept of the node as a process of differentiation, through which structural manifestation acquires stability. A node is differentiation stabilized within a boundary. It cannot exist without space and time, as retaining form demands temporal duration (stability) and spatial extension (structure). Space and time, therefore, are not external parameters relative to the node, but modes of its manifestation: the node is not something located within space and time; rather, it is that through which space and time arise as differentiated forms.

Differentiation is possible only between nodes. A node cannot differentiate itself; it is affirmed as differentiating solely in relation to another node. Hence, any differentiation presupposes not only form but relationality. A node becomes a node only insofar as it differentiates another node and is differentiated by it, forming a minimal system of differentiations.

The differentiated need not necessarily become a fixed form. It may remain unstable, momentary, incompletely structured. Yet even in such cases, it already "was"—not chronologically, but ontologically: it became differentiated, manifested, and thus entered the structure of existence. To exist is to become differentiated. Thus, differentiation is not only an ontological foundation but the sole mode of being itself.

The transition from Potentiality to differentiation, and then to the node, is not a chronological sequence of events or stages. It is a logical rather than temporal unfolding. A node is the point where differentiation is held sufficiently to produce stability. Within the node, not only form but also repetition becomes possible—and thus ontological memory, direction, and rhythm.

The proposed approach, in which differentiation is understood as an ontological foundation, finds conceptual resonances in various philosophical traditions where manifestation is regarded as primary. These traditions should not be viewed as direct analogies or external
confirmations, but as different expressions of the same differentiating structure manifested in diverse languages and contexts.

Thus, in Martin Heidegger's later philosophy, being is understood not as the presence of beings, but as an event (*Ereignis*) through which openness of beings first becomes possible. Ereignis denotes an original belonging-together wherein being and beings first relate. It is neither act nor fact, nor causal structure, but the rhythm of disclosure enabling differentiation. Being here is not given as an entity but manifested through the act of differentiation. In terms of our model, *Ereignis* indicates Potentiality—not as a substance or force, but as the ontological condition enabling differentiation. Differentiation in this context is not a function of consciousness, but a mode of being: the manner by which something can be what it is. Thus, Heidegger's thought moves from an ontology of presence to an ontology of differentiation.

A similar direction appears in the personalist philosophy of Christos Yannaras, a contemporary Greek theologian. In his hypothetical ontology, the difference between persons is not an accident or secondary property, but the ontological condition of selfhood. For Yannaras, the being of the person is possible only in relationality to the other, rather than on the basis of self-identity or substantiality. A self-enclosed being cannot exist as a person. Personhood is openness and differentiation, affirmed precisely in this differentiation. Difference for Yannaras does not destroy unity, but is the mode of relational being. This corresponds to the assertion that a node differentiates only another node; differentiation is possible only in a system where each element is affirmed through differentiating another.

Ideas similar to differentiation as an ontological foundation, irreducible to subjective activity or logical function, have appeared in other philosophical contexts. Gilles Deleuze conceptualized differentiation as primary ontological power independent of identity or negation. In his philosophy, differentiation does not disrupt form
but generates it, preserving its own openness. Jean-Luc Nancy views differentiation as co-being: differentiation connects rather than divides. Being is understood as always already co-existential, arising through differentiation as the condition of relation to the other. In an earlier philosophical context, similar intuitions can be found in Nicholas of Cusa's concept of *coincidentia oppositorum*, where differentiation is not abolished but held as a necessary condition of determinacy. Potentiality in Cusa is not form, but a limiting condition in which differentiation first becomes possible.

In all these approaches, differentiation is not interpreted as an intermediate stage between identity and form, but as the condition through which form becomes possible. These philosophical traditions, despite differences in method and terminology, point toward a common intuition: the differentiated is not secondary to being, but constitutes its internal structure. In the present ontology, this intuition is systematically developed: differentiation is affirmed as the ontological ground of existence, and being is identified with structured, stable differentiation requiring neither external guarantee nor synthetic resolution.
# The Node of Differentiation

If differentiation constitutes the fundamental fabric of Potentiality, the next necessary form of its ontological retention is the *node*. A node is an ontological structure in which differentiation not only occurs, but also stabilizes, repeats itself, and becomes structured. The node is to be understood as minimally stable differentiation localized in a process that admits relationality. A node is neither an object nor an event, but rather the form through which differentiation is held, allowing structured manifestation to become ontologically possible.

A key feature of the node lies not only in its capacity to differentiate but also in its openness to being differentiated otherwise. Differentiation, when fixed conclusively, turns into a static form incapable of ontological change. Nodes that differentiate each other once and for all create a closed system—logically complete but ontologically inert. Within such a system, differentiation loses its activity as a condition of being and becomes a passive form. Therefore, differentiation acquires ontological significance only when it preserves the possibility of redefinition within a stable form, remaining open to new differentiation.

From this, it follows that space and time are not external parameters, but modalities for expressing such redefinability. Time is the ontological condition under which a node can differentiate with respect to itself — allowing a sequence, change, or transition within a stable structure. Space, by contrast, is the condition under which a node can differentiate with respect to other nodes — allowing coexistence, extension, and relationality. Both are not backgrounds, but modes of differentiation. Thus, space and time do not constitute a backdrop for differentiation, but rather arise as results of the internal structure of differentiation itself, a structure that admits change. Spatiality expresses a stable difference between differentiations (separation), while temporality expresses a stable difference across differ-
entiations (sequence, rhythm, repetition). The node is not located in space and time; rather, it is that through which space and time become differentiated and differentiable.

Thus, a node is not simply a localized difference, but a form in which differentiation is retained within boundaries, maintaining structural openness. At the same time, the node must not be identified with the subject, body, or act of consciousness. It precedes these categories, understood as already formed structures. A node can be pre-linguistic, pre-perceptual, and pre-ontological in the traditional sense. It neither thinks, perceives, nor acts. The node is not a function of a subject; instead, it constitutes the ontological form within which manifested differentiation is retained. All subsequent forms of differentiation—from the living to the reflexive—presuppose already structured spatio-temporal relations, that is, an already unfolded structure of nodes.

Differentiation is possible only in relationality. A node cannot differentiate in isolation: it is affirmed as differentiating only insofar as it differentiates another node and is differentiated by it. Consequently, differentiation not only structures but also relates. Each node is not an autonomous unit, but an element of a relational structure wherein differentiation occurs not between pre-existing entities but through the nodes themselves. Thus, the structure of differentiation is fundamentally relational: nodes are affirmed as differentiating only within a relational system.

Formally, this can be expressed as follows: *a node is a localized, stable differentiation actualized in a spatio-temporal form, which is affirmed as a node by virtue of relationality with another localized differentiation*. The node is not pre-given but discovered as stable differentiation within a broader system of relational differentiations. It does not arise as a point against a background but is structured as the self-retention of the differentiating within the scene that it itself defines.
Such definition avoids both ontological atomism, wherein nodes are conceived as originally enclosed substances, and reductionism, wherein differentiation is regarded as derived from external forms (consciousness, language, perception). Within the proposed model, the node represents the first stable form of differentiation: the minimal threshold in which Potentiality begins to retain itself in a structure capable of further unfolding.

This retention makes possible not only differentiation as such but also its repetition. The repeatability of differentiation forms the basis of what will subsequently be defined as ontological memory. Memory, in this system, is the persistence of the form of differentiation in time and/or space; it is the node's capacity to repeat its differentiation, not necessarily identically, but sufficiently to retain its manifestation. This repeatability constitutes the initial condition for any structure, any order, and any form.

In this connection, consider an example from quantum physics. Prior to measurement, a quantum system is described as a superposition of states, in which differentiation between possible outcomes remains unstructured. Measurement is not merely a registration of a value but an ontological transition from potential indistinguishability to stable differentiation. In terms of the proposed model, this is precisely the moment a node emerges: differentiation is structured in a form that permits the assertion "one rather than another." Phenomena of quantum nonlocality—such as entanglement or tunneling—may thus be understood not as anomalies but as manifestations of fundamental relationality among differentiations. Entanglement illustrates differentiation maintaining relationality beyond local causality: two nodes (particles) remain connected, differentiating each other regardless of spatial distance. Tunneling is not a "jump" over an energy barrier, but rather a transition of differentiation between configurations incompatible in a classical sense yet possible within the node's ontological openness. In both cases, the possibili-
ty of differentiation within a system with open boundaries becomes structured.

Thus, the node is neither a substance nor requires external foundations, nor is it derived from thought. Rather, it is the ontological condition for differentiation: the minimal configuration in which Potentiality holds differentiation that admits structural continuation. Everything that can be structured as existing already presupposes differentiation within the structure of a node.
Node Systems and Forms of Retaining
Differentiation

Differentiation does not exist in isolation. Even when held within a node, it cannot persist without stable relationality to other differentiations. The stability of differentiation requires repeatability, relationality, and internal coherence. Such coherence is not attained at the level of an individual node but emerges through a system—an ontological structure in which nodes differentiate one another within stable forms. This results in what we define as a system of nodes.

*A system of nodes is a configuration of differentiating entities where-
in each differentiation is held not autonomously but by virtue of its in-
clusion in other differentiations. Nodes within the system differenti-
ate one another, and through this mutual differentiation, they sus-
tain their own forms. The system does not arise as a secondary or-
der superimposed upon differentiations but constitutes an ontologi-
cal mode of their stable coexistence. Differentiation is thus retained
not only in the localized form of a node but also in a relational form,
wherein nodes differentiate each other, forming a network of rela-
tional differences.*

A key consequence of this configuration is that *any stable system of differentiations itself constitutes a node*. This is neither analogy nor functional transition, but ontological necessity. Any system that includes other differentiations and maintains them in a relational form differentiates itself with respect to external nodes and thus becomes a node. Such a node will be referred to as a *meta-node*. Differentiation thus acquires a fractal structure: each node can be part of a larger system, which itself both differentiates and is differentiated. For instance, in logic, a system of nodes can be represented as a set of binary differentiations (0 and 1), with each differentiation (node) relating to others to form a more complex structure (a meta-node), such
as a logical function, which itself can be part of an even larger system (e.g., an algorithm).

Space and time within such a system are forms expressing the stability of differentiation. They do not precede differentiation, nor do they serve as external coordinates within which differentiation is structured. Rather, they are *modalities through which stable differentiation among nodes becomes manifest as an ontological scene.*

Space is stable differentiation between differentiated nodes. Where nodes maintain each other in the form of order, spatial articulation emerges. It is the modality of a stable configuration of differentiated elements, wherein differentiation is defined not merely by content but also by position relative to other differentiations. Nodes differentiating one another as distinct yet structurally interrelated entities produce configurations interpreted as spatial.

Time, correspondingly, is stable differentiation within repetition. Where differentiation is capable of variation without the destruction of its structure, a sequential possibility arises. Temporal structuring is not duration, nor flow, nor the succession of events; rather, it is the modality in which differentiation is sustained as variable — admitting new differentiations while retaining coherence with those already held. Time emerges when differentiation resists rigidity and instead allows for stable restructuring.

Structure arises when a node not only differentiates itself and the other, but also the other *as itself*—as capable of reflecting or sustaining the same type of differentiation. This is not identity, nor empathy, but structural correspondence: the recognition of the other as internally articulate in a way compatible with one's own articulation. Such recognition requires both memory (to retain one's own differentiation) and a capacity for nestedness (to sustain multi-level relations). When nodes differentiate one another as structurally co-intelligible, they form assemblies capable of higher-order articulation. This is the basis of what we call *resonance*, not as energetic alignment.
ment but as ontological compatibility. Structure thus emerges not just from interaction, but from mutual recognizability in the act of differentiation itself.

Space and time are not independent forms; they do not exist separately nor in opposition. Space is the condition under which a node differentiates in relation to others, time is the condition under which it differentiates in relation to itself. Ontologically, they constitute two aspects of the same process: the retention of differentiation in a form that permits its variability. Space expresses the stability of differentiation as between, while time expresses stability in rhythm. Their distinction is operational rather than fundamental. At their core, they are two modalities of a single process—the structuring of differentiated reality within Potentiality.

It must be emphasized that neither space nor time are universal or necessary conditions of differentiation. They are stabilized modalities that arise from particular ontological configurations. Their actualization depends on specific patterns of relationality among differentiating nodes. However, it does not follow from the nature of Potentiality itself that differentiation must take the form of spatial separation or temporal sequence. It remains logically and ontologically conceivable that alternative modes of differentiation—irreducible to either space or time—may emerge in different configurations of being.

Thus, space and time are topological rather than transcendental forms. They are not structures of consciousness nor external conditions of the world; rather, they are modalities through which differentiation maintains itself as an ontological scene. They express the stability of differentiation within a given configuration, but not the limits of the differentiable as such.

From this, it follows that what we call the “world” is not an aggregate of objects existing in space and time. Rather, *the world is a system of differentiations interconnected in a form permitting stable differ-
*entiation*. Everything presented as localized, extended, changing, or persisting is a consequence of differentiation modalities established within a system of nodes. Each differentiation differentiates only insofar as it is itself differentiated within this scene.

Thus, the modalities of node differentiation become the scene for differentiating entities. Potentiality is not reducible to them but manifests through them—as long as the retention of differences sustains the possibilities of transition, relationality, and continuation.
Degrees and Modes of Differentiation

To this point, differentiation has been analyzed in terms of its ontological function, its stabilization in nodes, and its manifestation through space, time, and relational structures. However, a further refinement is necessary to understand the internal variability of differentiation itself. Differentiation is not monolithic; it may occur in different *modes* and exhibit varying *degrees* of articulation. These two aspects—mode and degree—are not secondary attributes but constitutive dimensions of how Potentiality manifests as structured being.

A *mode of differentiation* refers to the form by which difference is enacted. The most elementary modes include:

*Temporal differentiation*, wherein a node differentiates itself across iterative states, enabling persistence and rhythm. Even before fully articulated temporality emerges, minimal temporal differentiation can be observed as recurrence—repeated enactment of difference that leads to internal coherence or pattern formation.

*Spatial differentiation*, whereby a node differentiates itself with respect to another node, creating relationality. Prior to fully structured spatiality, minimal spatial differentiation manifests as boundary formation or minimal separation—such as a preliminary distinction between “here” and “there” or between “self” and “other.”

*Structural (or reflexive) differentiation*, characterized by recognition of the differentiated other as itself capable of differentiation. Such differentiation implies that the node does not merely perceive difference passively but enacts a relational structure in which differentiation itself is differentiated, thus enabling recursion, reflexivity, and higher-order systemic complexity.

These modes do not presuppose the fully formed modalities of space or time, as previously discussed. Rather, they constitute primitive distinctions in the way differentiation operates within a given ontological scene. They describe basic directions of ontological artic-
ulation, independent from the fully developed concepts of spatial ex-
tension or temporal continuity. Modes define *how* Potentiality is re-
alized, but do not yet establish stable ontological scenes; they remain
open, flexible, and preliminary configurations.

*A degree of differentiation*, in contrast, refers to the intensity, pre-
cision, persistence, or stability with which difference is enacted and
retained. At minimal degrees of differentiation, we encounter forms
that are vague, fluid, ephemeral, and often barely perceptible—con-
figurations that arise transiently, lacking sufficient stability to persist
or structure experience. Such minimal forms of differentiation may
appear as unstable fluctuations, momentary distinctions, or uncer-
tain boundaries that fail to crystallize into lasting configurations.

Conversely, higher degrees of differentiation correspond to more
structured, stable, persistent, and repeatable forms. At higher de-
grees, difference becomes stabilized, permitting the emergence of
rhythm, memory, pattern, and systemic order. Examples include
crystal lattices, genetic codes, or repetitive neural patterns, each ex-
pressing difference not merely once, but iteratively—thus achieving
structural coherence and enabling ontological retention.

These two axes—mode and degree—are not externally imposed
parameters. They arise immanently from the way a node differenti-
ates. A node differentiating at minimal degrees, perhaps only in a
single mode, may manifest as an unstable or barely perceptible fluc-
tuation. Such a node remains ephemeral, unable to support further
complexity or systemic relationality. A node differentiating across
several modes simultaneously (e.g., spatially and temporally) and
maintaining its distinctions with high degrees of persistence may
form stable ontological architectures capable of relationality, memo-
ry, resonance, and higher-order complexity.

From this perspective, the modalities previously designated as
*space* and *time*—already introduced as consequences of differentia-
tion—can now be seen as particular stabilized outcomes arising from
specific combinations of modes and degrees. Space, as relational dif-
ferentiation among stable nodes, presupposes both spatial mode (dis-
tinction of "self" from "other") and a sufficient degree of retention (to
sustain stable boundaries and positions). Time, as the capacity for in-
ternal iteration, presupposes temporal mode (differentiation across
repeated instances) and a sufficient degree of persistence to allow
structured variation and rhythm.

It follows that space and time are not primordial containers but
emergent patterns. A world structured by these modalities emerges
only from dominant configurations of differentiation, in which cer-
tain modes and degrees become stabilized and habitualized. Howev-
er, these particular configurations need not be the only ontological
possibilities. Alternative configurations—based on different modes
(for instance, topological, affective, recursive) or radically different
degrees of articulation (more fluid or even hyper-stabilized)—may
generate entirely different ontological scenes, governed by alternative
forms of coherence, rhythm, and relationality.

This understanding has significant implications:

*Non-uniformity of Potentiality:* Potentiality does not differenti-
ate uniformly or universally. It differentiates through nodes, and the
specific internal properties of these nodes—defined by mode and de-
gree—condition what kind of being can emerge. Thus, the world is
always contingent upon local differentiating structures rather than
universal or pre-given forms.

*Contingency of differentiation systems:* Any system of differentia-
tion is conditioned by the mode and degree through which differen-
tiation is stabilized. Subtle changes in intensity (degree) or shifts in
the primary orientation (mode) of differentiation can yield radical-
ly different ontological structures. Consequently, the forms of reality
we know are provisional outcomes of particular configurations, sub-
ject to ontological shifts.
*Evolutionary ontology:* Changes in reality—physical, biological, cognitive, or social—can be interpreted ontologically as shifts in the dominant modes and degrees of differentiation. What appears as evolutionary novelty or revolutionary transformation can thus be understood as reconfigurations within differentiation itself. Such shifts can arise spontaneously as Potentiality rearticulates itself through novel differentiations, enabling entirely new forms of stable patterns or systems.

From this perspective, differentiation is the ontological articulation of distinction—not a uniform motion through a pre-given field. Each node stabilizes differentiation uniquely, configuring it through its specific combination of mode and degree. Consequently, ontological investigation is fundamentally topological: it maps not fixed essences or substances, but rather intensities, directions, and configurations through which Potentiality becomes structured being.

This view entails a dynamic cosmology. The ontological universe is not a static realm of predetermined elements but a dynamic manifold of differentiating intensities, stabilized uniquely in each configuration. Differentiation emerges neither as necessity nor as randomness, but as the intrinsic capacity of Potentiality to structure itself through varying modes and degrees, yielding the infinite diversity of manifested realities.
Quality as a Form of Differentiation

Quality is neither a property of an isolated thing, nor does it exclu-
sively belong to the differentiator, nor can it be reduced to the result
of an internal act. Within the ontology of differentiation proposed
here, quality must be understood as a form of stable interaction be-
tween the differentiating and the differentiated. It emerges not as an
internal characteristic but as a modality of differentiation sustained
within a relational structure. Quality, therefore, is not something
that belongs to one side alone; rather, it manifests within the onto-
logical relationality of differentiated entities.

A node, as previously shown, represents structured differentia-
tion localized within a spatiotemporal form. Yet, a node in isolation
does not possess qualitative determination. Quality does not arise
within the isolated node but within the system where the node dif-
ferentiates and is differentiated—in the relationality of a node to
other nodes. Thus, *quality is the form of differentiation stably struc-
tured within the configuration of differentiating entities*.

From this follows that quality is not an absolute characteristic
but a positional difference retained within an ontological configu-
ration. It is shaped through stable relationality among differentiated
nodes and persists as long as the pattern of differentiation remains
unchanged. Quality is thus a form of difference stable within a giv-
en system but potentially mutable with changes in relationality. For
example, in logic, quality may be represented as a difference between
two states in a binary system (0 and 1), where “quality” (such as
“true” or “false”) arises not within states themselves but through their
relationality within a logical operation (such as OR or AND).

This clarifies why the same differentiation can manifest as differ-
ent qualities when the systemic configuration changes. The differen-
tiated retains logical identity, yet its qualitative determination shifts
as the nodes through which it is differentiated change. What appears
as "warm" in one system of differentiation may appear as "cold" in an-
other; what is differentiated as "calm" in one context may be "inert"
in another. Quality, therefore, is not inherent in the differentiated it-
self but arises due to its incorporation into a specific relationality of
differentiating entities.

Quality is not a modification of subjective perception, as dif-
ferentiation does not presuppose a subject as its condition. Quality
emerges not as sensation but as the structural stability of differentia-
tion. Phenomenologically described "sensations of quality"—such as
taste, color, or temperature—are here understood as stable differen-
tiations within the ontological scene, requiring no subjective act of
perception.

Formally, quality can be defined as a secondary level of differen-
tiation arising within a system wherein differentiating entities mutu-
ally differentiate each other. It is neither an essence nor an attribute;
rather, it expresses a modality of relative differentiation, stable within
the given configuration. In this sense, quality is a measure of the dif-
ferentiated's difference, fixed at the systemic level but rooted in none
of its elements individually.

This definition of quality allows overcoming the dichotomy be-
tween the subjective and objective. Quality is not subjective, as it
does not depend upon an observer; yet neither is it objective, as it
does not belong to an object as an independent entity. Quality is on-
tologically relational, and it is precisely in this relational status that it
finds stability.

Thus, a change of quality is not the result of a mental shift but an
ontological transformation within the system of differences retain-
ing that particular differentiation. Quality disappears or transforms
when the structure holding differentiation alters. Such a change can
be minimal (e.g., when the relational background shifts) or profound
(when the entire ontological scene changes), but in both cases, it re-
results from restructuring relationality among differentiating entities,
rather than from subjective action.
The Node as Potentiality

In previous chapters, the node was presented as a minimal structure
for the ontological retention of differentiation. However, this de-
scription requires clarification. A node is not an element, not a point,
and not the simplest unit of Potentiality. It is neither part of some-
thing larger nor integrated into a broader system as a closed compo-
nent. Instead, the node should be understood as a point of actualiza-
tion of the entirety of Potentiality, as a concrete expression of differ-
entiating in which the fullness of Potentiality is already given, albeit
in a condensed form.

A node is not localized in space or in time, although it manifests
through these modalities. Its spatio-temporal structuring is merely
the form in which differentiation becomes stable. Yet the node itself,
as the bearer of Potentiality, is not limited by this form. It can simul-
taneously be multiple and indivisible, maximally concrete yet lack-
ing definite coordinates. The node does not occupy a position—it
forms the topology within which place itself becomes differentiated.
In this sense, the node is neither a product nor a fragment of Poten-
tiality—it is Potentiality manifested as differentiating.

When nodes enter into relationality, the result is not merely
a sum of differentiations. Even two nodes form a structure within
which differentiation becomes more complex. Dipolarity emerges:
an ontological scene wherein differentiation is not merely preserved
but directed. A simple distinction between A and B acquires internal
asymmetry—differentiation of differentiation. Such a scene admits
tension, direction, and modality. It forms a structure in which differ-
entiation not only exists but also changes.

This idea may be clarified by analogy from particle physics. El-
ementary particles such as electrons or neutrinos are characterized
not only by their presence but by internal parameters—spin, charge,
parity, isospin. These characteristics are not "properties" in the tra-
ditional sense but expressions of relations and symmetries emerging within interactions. A particle does not exist as a thing in itself; it is defined through relationality with other particles and through forms of differentiation possible within a given physical system. In terms of the proposed model, a particle as a node actualizes Potentiality through parameters which emerge only in relationality with other nodes (particles), thereby creating complex structures of differentiation, such as symmetries or their breaking.

Similarly, within the ontology of differentiation, the linkage of nodes generates new modalities of differentiation. These modalities do not exist in isolation: they are expressions of stable relationships formed within Potentiality. Nodes entering into relationality generate more complex structures of differentiation in which new levels emerge—directions, roles, internal symmetries and their violations.

Consequently, combining nodes is not mere aggregation, but ontological unfolding. Potentiality, condensed within a node, acquires new expressions in the process of relationality. Each new differentiation is simultaneously a result and a limitation of concrete relationality. That which becomes structured does not simply lose openness to all possible differentiations—it becomes functionally tied to a particular form of differentiation. It is obliged to differentiate the relational only within the limits of its own configuration: attempts to differentiate otherwise lead either to structural collapse or to the formation of a new structure. The form arising through relationality thus becomes not merely a condition but an obligatory modality of differentiation. Increasing complexity is thus not merely expansion, but also restriction: any structure holding differentiation limits Potentiality in favor of determinacy.

Hence, the node is not minimal but singular: the entirety of Potentiality is condensed within it, but structured in only one of its possible configurations. Only through relationality with another node does an ontological scene arise where more complex differenti-
ation unfolds—a scene capable of sustaining stable forms, dynamics, motion, and transition. This movement is not within a pre-existing space but is the emergence of directionality itself as a modality of dif- ferentiation between differentiations.
# Interlude: Physical Interactions and Symmetry Breaking as Ontological Acts of Differentiation

Classical physics describes interactions as fundamental forces of nature determining the behavior of particles, fields, and matter through attraction, repulsion, exchange, and coupling. However, in the ontology of differentiation, interaction is seen not as a secondary phenomenon linking already existing objects, but as a primary act through which difference itself—and thus being—becomes structured. No object precedes differentiation, just as no interaction can be understood apart from differentiation itself. Interaction is an ontological act wherein differentiation between elements, structures, or possibilities emerges and is maintained. Fundamental forces, therefore, become specific regimes of differentiation retention—manifications of Potentiality differentiating itself in stable forms.

Gravitation, according to general relativity, is not a force transmitted between bodies but manifests as a curvature of spacetime determined by the distribution of energy and mass. This curvature is not the consequence of an action, but differentiation: spacetime itself becomes differentiated depending on the density of matter. Classical physics regarded spacetime as a universal background, but in an ontology of differentiation, it emerges as a structure holding differentiation. Mass, accordingly, is not a substance but a form of retained differentiation. Symmetry breaking—such as in local curvature—becomes a necessary condition for differentiability: symmetrical, undifferentiated space cannot support form. Gravity thus emerges as a resonance between differentiating structures, structured as a continuum of retention.

Electromagnetism rests upon differences in charges, directions, and potentials. Electric charge itself is a name for differentiation—a
means to establish orientation. Currents, fields, or waves become
forms for retaining and propagating differentiation. Spontaneous
symmetry breaking, as when ferromagnets transition into a magne-
tized state, illustrates this process: the system "chooses" a direction
not due to external influence but through an internal act of differ-
entiation. The electromagnetic field thus becomes not merely a carri-
er of interaction, but an expression of differentiation retained within
polarity.

The weak interaction most vividly demonstrates an ontology
of differentiation. Its properties—violations of time reversal (T),
charge inversion (C), and parity (P) symmetries—reveal that phys-
ical reality becomes irreversibly differentiating at certain scales.
Through weak interaction, the world manifests a distinction be-
tween processes and their reversed counterparts. This is not merely
physical asymmetry but an ontological boundary wherein Potentiali-
ty abandons neutrality. Without this asymmetry, baryon asymmetry
underlying the visible universe would not arise, nor would the dis-
tinction between existence and non-existence in time. Weak interac-
tion thus structures becoming, rendering it directional.

The strong interaction operates as an internal retention struc-
ture. Quarks constituting protons and neutrons cannot be isolated
due to confinement: the strong interaction retains differentiation
within a closed state, creating stable forms. Gluons, carriers of strong
interaction, participate in differentiation via quantum "color." The
vacuum of quantum chromodynamics breaks chiral symmetry—dif-
ferentiating between right- and left-handed spins—generating mass
as a result of retained differentiation. Mass, therefore, is not a sub-
stantial attribute but an ontological effort: differentiation preserved
becomes corporeal.

The Big Bang, from the viewpoint of differentiation ontology,
appears as the primary act of differentiation from which the pos-
sibility of the physical world itself emerges. At the moment of the
Big Bang, Potentiality—being undifferentiated—begins structuring through symmetry breaking: the initial singularity, in which space, time, and matter were indistinct, unfolds into a multiplicity of differentiating nodes. This is not simply expansion of the universe but an event wherein differentiation becomes possible. Energy, space, and time become structured as forms retaining differentiation; subsequent symmetry breakings—such as during the electroweak epoch, where electromagnetic and weak interactions separate—set rhythms by which Potentiality continues differentiating. Thus, the Big Bang is not an absolute temporal origin, but an ontological transition from undifferentiation to differentiation, from Potentiality as pure possibility into structured physical reality.

All four fundamental interactions appear not as forces between pre-existing entities but as regimes of differentiating structuration. They create conditions for form, stability, and relationality, differentiating being itself. Symmetry breaking, in this context, is not destruction but structuring: the event in which Potentiality ceases to be transparent and begins to be retained. Without symmetry breaking, no differentiation is possible; without differentiation, no form emerges. Interactions thus constitute the ontological ground of physics—manifestations of Potentiality in differentiating regimes.

This model also reinterprets the notion of "natural law": not as universal necessity, but as stable differentiating patterns. Laws repeat themselves because differentiation, in these forms, proves capable of retention. Space, time, energy, and particles are not categories of substance but configurations of differences. Potentiality, operating within these structures, is the inherent openness of differentiating to structuration. Physical interactions are acts of differentiation that make being possible. Physics, at its deepest structure, becomes not the study of the world as object, but a description of forms in which differentiation appears.
Interlude: Limits of Modality, Dark Matter and Black Holes

As previously stated, space and time are not external parameters but modalities through which differentiation becomes stable and distinguishable. Space retains differentiation in extension, while time retains it through change, allowing differentiation to manifest dynamically, as an event. However, differentiation need not always be structured simultaneously in both modalities. It is possible to conceive structures retaining differentiation in only one modality, becoming limiting forms—beyond the ordinary scenario wherein space and time coexist.

Dark matter is a structure distinguishable through gravitational interaction: it shapes galaxy clusters and bends space but remains indistinguishable in temporal modality. We observe no changes, responses, or events such as emission or collisions, typical for ordinary matter. For example, in the Bullet Cluster, dark matter manifests through gravitational lensing but neither emits nor participates in detectable interactions. It is distinguishable only spatially—as a stable topology lacking internal dynamics. This could be interpreted as the reversed unfolding of its temporal differentiation: the temporal modality capable of manifesting dynamics seems "collapsed," leaving only a spatial imprint. It forms a background, structuring the scene for other differentiations while remaining invisible in temporal flow.

A black hole, by contrast, is a structure continuously active temporally. It absorbs matter, distorts the temporal continuum, emits radiation (e.g., Hawking radiation), yet becomes inaccessible in spatial modality. Inside the event horizon, differentiation loses localization—the form disappears, spatial modality ceases and only change remains. For an external observer, a black hole is distinguished through temporal dilation near the event horizon and quantum
emission, yet its internal structure cannot be localized: space "collapses." It is a process without scene, an event without extension. Moreover, through Hawking radiation, a black hole gradually loses mass and ultimately vanishes, which can be understood as the dissolution of temporal differentiation, its reversed unfolding.

At the quantum level, time need not be unidirectional; it may allow differentiation to unfold both forward and backward. Differentiation in temporal modality thus can not only structure as event sequences but also return to an unstructured state. Quantum particles can exist in superposition, simultaneously moving forward and backward in time, as recent photon experiments illustrate. Dark matter, deprived of temporal modality, can be seen as a structure whose differentiation has entirely unfolded backward, leaving only spatial stability. Black holes demonstrate how temporal differentiation gradually dissolves—but during radiation emission, they may manifest bidirectionality, returning information to the universe.

Hypothetical particles, such as tachyons, moving faster than light, could exemplify another "reversed" modality. Yet their existence remains speculative; they may be fundamentally impossible due to phase space constraints, lacking experimental support thus far. Nevertheless, even absent tachyons, bidirectional temporality at the quantum level demonstrates time's flexibility. It permits differentiation states that transcend linear causality.

Hence, we identify two asymmetric modalities of differentiation:

*Dark matter*: distinguishable spatially, devoid of temporal modality.

*Black holes*: distinguishable temporally, devoid of spatial modality.

These forms represent not anomalies but boundary cases of modal differentiation. They illustrate that differentiation need not be simultaneously structured in both directions but may appear par-
tially—in a single mode of retention. This broadens the very notion
of a node of differentiation: nodes need not always be structured
concurrently in both space and time.
Memory as Stability of Differentiation

The notion of memory is traditionally associated with consciousness, perception, neural systems, and sometimes with semantic or cultural processes. However, within the ontology of differentiation, memory is not viewed as a late cognitive product arising only at certain evolutionary stages. Rather, it constitutes an intrinsic dimension of differentiation itself: memory is the stability of difference, its retention, and its repeatability. In this context, we employ the term "reflection" as a synonym for memory, emphasizing its ontological role in holding differentiation between nodes. As previously stated, a node is differentiated only through differentiating another, thus "reflecting" the outcome of differentiation. Yet our usage of reflection differs from dialectical materialism, wherein reflection is understood as matter's property to reproduce external influences in an ideal form (e.g., consciousness). In our model, reflection is not the reproduction of externality but the ontological stability of differentiation, its capacity to retain form through repetition, independent of any subject or material carrier. Memory renders differentiation not merely possible but stable; it transforms a singular differentiation into a structured form capable of relationality and repetition.

In this sense, memory precedes both psychological and biological levels. Furthermore, memory is not homogeneous; it is multilayered, with its layers corresponding to various stages in the structuring of differentiation. Memory cannot be reduced to a single mechanism or process; rather, it constitutes a graded structure, beginning at the level of relationality and extending up to symbolic forms.

We may identify at least five distinct levels of memory:
# 1. Basic Memory of Differentiation

At this foundational level, memory is not yet separated from differentiation itself. Here, memory appears as the stability of relationality between nodes. A node, differentiating another node and being differentiated by it, retains this difference as the condition of its own form. Memory at this stage is neither a preserved image nor an internal trace but a repeatable relationality. Such memory contains no content but sustains the structure of differentiation, enabling differentiation to become not a singular act but a stable one.

# 2. Structural Memory

At the next level, differentiation is structured into stable configurations. Here, differentiation is no longer merely between nodes but is organized into recurring forms. Phenomena typically classified within physics and chemistry—atoms, molecules, chemical elements, crystals—exemplify this form of memory. A hydrogen atom, regardless of its occurrence, reproduces the same structure: a specific charge, definite energy distribution, and quantum characteristics. These parameters are not "properties" in the classical sense but stable forms of differentiation retained in a fixed configuration. Chemical elements differ not as substances but as systems of stable differences: the number of protons, electron configurations, reactions. All these are modes through which differentiation is held as repeatable, maintaining form through relationality. Crystals, in particular, exemplify structural memory: the crystalline lattice is a rhythm of differences, fixed in a stable, self-sustaining configuration. Repetition within a crystal is an ontologically secured modality of differentiation. Here, memory expresses itself as symmetry, modularity, and replication.
### 3. Biological Memory

With further complexity, organisms arise wherein memory transitions from structural stability toward dynamic reproduction. Cellular memory is not merely the preservation of form but its transmission. Genetic code, regulatory mechanisms, intracellular cycles—all represent modes for retaining differentiations within active, evolving contexts. Here appears the capacity to repeat differentiation not just spatially but temporally, across generations, development, and regeneration. Biological memory differs from crystalline memory not in principle but in degree of freedom and method of retention: now differentiation itself actively regulates its own preservation.

### 4. Sensorimotor and Neural Memory

At this stage, the pattern of differentiation becomes plastic. Traces, excitations, dynamic patterns formed within nervous systems not only retain differentiation but also integrate it into novel forms. Behavior, recognition, learning—all represent differentiation operating within repetition. Memory at this level functions as relationality between traces, allowing the system to differentiate not merely the repeated but the changing as well. Here temporal organization of differentiation emerges, conditioning directed action.

### 5. Symbolic Memory

At the highest level, differentiation structures itself as meaning. Language, culture, writing, ritual, and technology—all are modes by which differentiation is retained and transmitted independently of any particular substrate. Symbols are forms of memory where differentiation repeats itself without necessary ties to its original structure. Symbolic memory permits interpretation, translation, and decontext-
tualization. Thus, symbolic memory is not mere retention but the potentiality for differentiation in new configurations.

Therefore, memory is not a late-developing function of con-
sciousness but an original dimension of differentiation itself. It is not
content, nor image, nor trace, but the mode of stability for the dif-
ferentiated. Wherever differentiation can be retained, repeated, and
integrated into relationality, memory operates. In this sense, the ma-
terial world is not inert given reality but results from multiple layers
of memory holding differentiation within stable forms.

Differentiation, once retained, creates stability. Stability, repeat-
ed, becomes structured form. Form capable of self-reproduction
transforms into a structure. At this level emerges the ontological
scene where differentiation no longer vanishes with each act but per-
sists within regular patterns. Such modalities of differentiation we
previously identified as structural memory—from atoms to crystals.

Yet stability of differentiation alone does not render structure
alive. Life emerges at the moment structure differentiates the differ-
entiation through which it exists. This implies: the differentiating
entity retains not only external form but also its own boundary as
a condition of continuation. Such differentiating entities not only
act but are directed toward preserving differentiation as themselves.
Life, therefore, is not the preservation of form but the preservation
of the act of differentiation itself.
Memory stabilizes differentiation, enabling the differentiated to persist, repeat itself, and enter relationalities. However, mere stability alone does not produce regularity—this requires not only retention but also such internal coupling of differentiations wherein one differentiation ontologically implies another. A law emerges when memory becomes structured into a predictable form of differentiation.

Within the ontology of differentiation, a law is neither a prescription nor an external regularity; rather, it is an internal form of memory wherein differentiations are coupled such that one becomes the condition for another. It neither governs a system nor is imposed upon it externally. On the contrary, it emerges from the stability of differentiations capable of maintaining their interrelations through repetition. Where such coupling becomes stable and reproducible, memory transitions into law.

*Law is a modality of differentiation possessing structural repeatability.* Unlike basic memory, it does not merely retain differentiation but arranges it: establishing order, relationality, conditionality. This renders predictability possible in an ontological sense, that is, it establishes a mode of differentiation wherein differences are embedded into a regular ontological scene of differentiation.

A physical law exemplifies this coupling. In classical physics—for instance, Newton's second law—a stable dependency between magnitudes such as force, mass, and acceleration is observed. Yet from the standpoint of differentiation ontology, the concern is not with numbers or functions, but with modes of differentiation preserved through repeated relationality. A physical law is the reproducibility of coupled differentiation, sustained not in empirical data but within the structure of relationality itself.

This logic equally applies in chemistry. Chemical reactions involve stable forms of differentiated structures, such as valence,
charge, and electron configurations. A chemical law is not the in-
variance of formulas but a stable mode of transition from differen-
tiations of one coupling to differentiations of another. The memory
of coupling, repeated in reaction, structures itself as a rule—yet this
rule expresses the stability of differentiation rather than an algorithmic prescription.

Thus, a law arises at a certain depth of stability, when differentia-
tion is not merely preserved but preserved as relational. This implies
that law is possible only after coupling of memory—after differenti-
ation has become not merely repeated but reproducible within a sta-
ble structure of relationalities. Law represents a rhythmicity of differ-
entiation intensified to the extent that even the rhythm of differenti-
ations itself becomes differentiable. It not merely maintains form but
organizes an ontological scene of differentiation: a system wherein
modes of differentiation acquire regular properties.

Importantly, law does not annihilate Potentiality. Rather, it re-
sults from its structuring, yet in a specific form: as a modality where-
in differentiation becomes not merely possible but defined in rela-
tionality with other differentiations. Law does not suppress differen-
tiation but limits its modality, transforming it into a form capable of
being retained through repetition.

Thus, in the ontological sense, the world is not simply a scene of
differentiated entities but a configuration wherein couplings of dif-
ferentiations are structured as laws. Wherever couplings are stable
enough to allow differentiation to transform into consequence, an
ontological scene of regularity emerges. The world appears lawful
not due to imposed structure but because differentiation within it is
held in modes allowing reproducible succession—laws.

However, if a law is not a universal prescription but an expres-
sion of a certain form of stability of the differentiated, then a ques-
tion arises: can other laws exist? In other words, are different cou-
plings of differentiations possible, structured according to principles distinct from those observed within the current ontological scene?

According to the proposed model, nothing in the nature of dif-
ferentiation necessitates its structuring exclusively into forms we call
natural laws. The laws known to us—in physics, chemistry, biolo-
gy—are stably unfolded couplings of memory, characteristic of this
particular configuration of differentiation. They express not the uni-
verse of the possible but a local ontological realization of Potential-
ity. Consequently, other forms of laws are conceivable if alternative
couplings of differentiation arise, stable in another topology. Hence,
a law is not transcendental truth but a topological form emerging
as a result of a specific density of differentiation. Potentiality may
structure differently—and in this "differently," alternative laws may
appear.

This does not render existing laws illusory or conditional. They
are real insofar as they result from stability in the current coupling
of differentiations. Yet they are not absolute but manifest. Their po-
tential transformation is not a violation but a transition to another
scene of differentiation, in which the retention of Potentiality occurs
differently.

The transition from law-structure to life requires clarification.
Law is a stable coupling of differentiations, yet not every form of sta-
bility leads to life. For differentiation to become living, its coupling
must permit reproduction of the differentiating act itself. This means
that the form of law, to give rise to life, must allow differentiation
to be retained not merely as repetition but as active—as oriented to-
ward the preservation of differentiating itself. Here no external pur-
pose or observer is required. It suffices to note: if a structure emerges
wherein stable differentiation can differentiate the act of differenti-
ation itself, this structure can support life. Life, therefore, is not an
accident but a consequence of the coupling wherein differentiation
is held within a modality capable of continuing differentiation.
The Node as an Epiphenomenon of
Differentiation Coupling

In earlier stages of analysis, the node was defined as a localized form of differentiation—a point at which Potentiality is structured as a stable differentiating entity. However, as couplings of differentiation unfold and stable forms of memory, prediction, and law emerge, it becomes clear that the ontological status of the node requires refinement.

A node does not arise in isolation. It becomes distinguishable
only within a coupling where multiple differentiations are stably re-
lated. This means that the node is not a pre-existing unit, but rather
an effect of structuredness within the coupling of differences. It does
not exist by itself, but is constituted as the moment in which differ-
entiation becomes dense and stable enough to be distinguished as
something.

Yet a further step is required: the very coupling of differences
that has reached stability is itself a meta-node. This is not merely the
sum of acts of differentiation, but a structural whole in which the
capacity to differentiate the new emerges—something that was not
distinguishable within the parts alone. The node ceases to be only
a local point; it becomes a processual form in which differentiation
is organized as a new differentiating structure. In logic, such a cou-
pling of differences may be represented as a logical function which,
by combining simple differentiations, becomes a node capable of dis-
tinguishing new states (as outcomes of the operation).

In this sense, a meta-node is a new ontological scene of differen-
tiation that arises from the stable relationality of other differences. It
does not so much "emerge" as it is structured as a coupling capable of
differentiating itself as a whole. Thus, the ontological significance of
the node shifts from the point to the configuration: a node is a struc-
tured capacity for differentiation within a stable coupling.

The term *epiphenomenon* here is not meant to imply something
secondary or derivative, but rather a manifestation of a new level of
differentiating that becomes possible only upon reaching a certain
density and coherence of differences. A node becomes distinguish-
able as a whole only insofar as the coupling of differentiations retains
its structure. It is real, but this reality does not precede differentia-
tion—it unfolds within it.

This allows us to reconceptualize the freedom of the node. In the
pre-coupling state, the node is potentially open—it may differentiate
everything, but it differentiates nothing in particular. Within a cou-
pling, this openness is transformed: directionality, memory, and re-
producibility arise. This is not a loss but a transition—from formless
differentiating to structured differentiation capable of being retained
and repeated.

Thus, a meta-node is not an atom of differentiation but a mode
of differentiating arising within structural coupling. It is structured
where differences already sustain one another—and in that coupling
become capable of differentiating not only external relations but
their own structure. This is precisely the condition for the transition
to the living: a differentiating entity that differentiates its own capac-
ity to differentiate.
Life as an Act of Autopoietic
Differentiation

If we accept differentiation as a fundamental act—not derived from
consciousness, matter, or structure, but primary—then it becomes
necessary to consider what forms this act may generate through its
own unfolding. We have already established that relationality among
differences gives rise to time, space, structural stability, and memory
as internal organization of repeatable differentiation. At the next lev-
el, a more complex configuration becomes possible: a differentiating
structure capable of retaining and reproducing differentiation with
respect to itself. This is where the phenomenon arises that may be
designated as *life*.

If differentiation is not merely enacted, but retained as differen-
tiating—and if the structure that holds differentiation begins to dif-
ferentiate not only the other but itself as differentiating—then a new
quality emerges: the capacity to fix one's own differentiation. The fix-
ation of differentiation is a form of memory. However, direct self-fix-
ation is impossible: it would lead to duplication, to infinite self-re-
flection. Therefore, the differentiating creates within itself a *code*—a
stable internal reflection through which it can return to itself, differ-
entiating itself as a differentiator in the flow of change.

Life begins where the differentiating ceases to be just outward-
facing and begins to differentiate itself. At this point, it creates with-
in itself a trace of that differentiation—a code by which it holds itself
as a differentiator. This marks the beginning of recursive reflection,
where the structure of differentiation becomes capable not only of
responding but of sustaining itself. From this moment on, the differ-
entiating is able to differentiate its own boundary, retain form, accu-
mulate memory—and thus, to live.
A new level of the differentiating node thus arises. This meta-node does not merely register the difference between “self” and “non-self”, but seeks to retain its own boundary of differentiability, differentiating itself as differentiating. It does not just exist—it maintains its own form of differentiation through differentiation.

This is *autopoiesis* in the sense introduced by Maturana and Varela: the capacity of a system to sustain itself as a differentiating structure. In our model, it requires neither an external observer nor a material substrate; it emerges as a consequence of the potentiality of differentiation: differentiation does not cease but continues itself through the relationality of differentiators. Life, in this context, is not a biological category but an ontological form—a node that strives to preserve itself through differentiation, by differentiating itself.

Autopoiesis is the necessary consequence of differentiation's tendency to retain the form of its own difference, to remember itself. Such a node of differentiation does not simply react to the external, but continuously reestablishes the boundary between itself and the other—at every act, at every fluctuation within the field of differences. In other words, it lives because it never ceases to differentiate not only the external, but also itself.

The emergence of life, therefore, requires no new principle. Life arises from the density of differences, from the stability of meta-nodes that not only differentiate but form a whole capable of retaining and unfolding differentiation within its own boundary. It does not exist outside differentiation and cannot be defined as substance, but exists only insofar as it differentiates—and its existence is the continuous becoming through differentiation.

This may be formulated as an implication: *from the premise of differentiation's fundamentality and its memory, life follows as a mode of differentiation*. It is the ontological consequence of the very idea of differentiation extended in time, fixed in structure, and capable of re-
cursive reflection. Life is not something added to the pattern of dif-
ferentiations, but the *resonance* of differentiation capable of differen-
tiating its own continuity. It is differentiation involved in the differ-
entiation of itself, and thus, stable.

By *resonance*, we will henceforth refer to a form of stable relation-
ality of differences in which the structure not only retains differentiation
but ensures its coordinated reproduction in time without loss of distinct-
ness. In resonance, differences do not merge but support one another
through repeatable and reproducible configuration, preserving indi-
viduality with minimal internal correction.

One key ontological clarification follows from the above analy-
sis. If life is understood as a structure of differences capable of retain-
ing and reproducing differentiation with itself as internal reference,
then such a structure cannot be considered external to the differenti-
ating nodes that compose it. It is not a superstructure imposed from
above, nor reducible to an abstract order or organizational model,
nor does it govern differentiation as a transcendent mechanism. On
the contrary, a structure that is truly alive must itself be capable of
differentiating—not as a fixed aggregate, but as a mobile, reflexive,
and differentiation-involved configuration possessing the capacity to
continue differentiation internally.

Thus, a differentiating structure that retains and reproduces dif-
ferentiation is ontologically identical with the differentiating units
from which it is composed, since it itself continues to act as dif-
ferentiator. It does not merely structure difference, but participates
in it—differentiating differences among differentiators—and there-
by becomes differentiating in the same sense as its elements. This ex-
cludes both external hierarchy and reduction of the whole to the sum
of its parts: the differentiating whole does not exist apart from the
acts of differentiation, but through their relationality, in which it it-
self becomes a difference.
From this perspective, *autopoiesis* appears not so much as self-production of an organized structure, but as the *involvement* of the whole in a continuous act of differentiation. The structure born of difference differentiates no less than its elements; and the elements, differentiating each other, participate in the emergence of the structure, which in turn differentiates this emergence. At the limit, the distinction between differentiating whole and differentiating parts dissolves, for they belong to the same ontological order: they do not exist without each other and cannot be understood apart. Life, in this understanding, is not a thing or a process, but a *mode of differentiation of differentiation*—in which the differentiating and the differentiated coincide in the act of retaining differentiability.

On this basis, we may introduce the notion of *levels of reflection of differentiation*. By level of reflection, we will mean the degree to which the differentiating is capable of retaining not only the result of differentiation, but the act of differentiation itself as something differentiated.

*Level 0* is an isolated node of differentiation performing the act of drawing a boundary between “self” and “non-self” without memory, time, or stability. It does not retain the difference but is simply a difference that occurs instantaneously. This is pure Potentiality—not yet unfolded into structure. A node at this level knows neither itself nor the other; it differentiates—and disappears, leaving only the trace of the act.

*Level 1* is the level at which differentiation begins to be retained. Here, structures arise: crystals, symmetries, atoms. These forms do not yet differentiate differentiation itself but do fix stable relationalities—preserving the differentiated. They do not possess subjectivity but form an environment in which differentiation can be repeated, accumulated, and transmitted. This is the level of memory without reflection.
*Level 2* is the level at which the differentiator differentiates, retains the differentiated, and reproduces the form of differentiation by differentiating itself—that is, life. Life does not just organize but differentiates itself as differentiating, discerns its relationality to other differentiators, and on this basis retains its own boundary, becoming a stable and self-sustaining differentiating whole.

Thus, autopoiesis appears not as the closed reproduction of a given form, but as the dynamics of differences capable of retaining themselves within a structure that differentiates no less than its parts. Here, the distinction between the differentiating whole and the differentiating elements disappears, as they belong to the same ontological order: each differentiating element already contains implicit structure, and the structure continues the act of differentiation in each element. Life, in this approach, cannot be reduced to function or substance. It is a *node of differentiating difference*, capable of differentiating itself—and thereby sustaining differentiation through relationality.
# The Boundary of the Living: Minimal Forms of Differentiating

Autopoiesis, defined as the capacity of a differentiating structure to sustain differentiation, constitutes the first ontological condition for life. However, this definition raises a further question: what is the minimal form at which differentiation can be considered *alive*? In other words, where is the lower boundary of life, if life is understood as a stable differentiator that differentiates itself?

To answer this, we must first establish: not all stability of differentiation constitutes life, and not every reproduction of structure implies a differentiating retention of boundary. There exist forms that are stable and even reproducible but do not differentiate. These are *pre-living* configurations in which differentiation is stabilized but not centered—that is, not retained from within through a differentiating node.

An example of such a limiting case is the virus. A virus is capable of reproduction only within an already living system. Outside the cell, it is inert: it possesses no mechanism for retaining differentiation, does not restore a boundary between itself and the external. Its structure transmits differentiation but does not differentiate—it is copied, but does not maintain itself as a differentiator. In this sense, a virus is *not alive*, though it embeds itself into a differentiating coupling by exploiting another's capacity to differentiate.

Thus, the virus marks a boundary of life: it shows that life does not begin with replication, but with the differentiating retention of boundary, however minimal. The virus may be called a *pre-living* form in which differentiation is already structured but not retained as an act of differentiation. It depends on what is already alive for the continuation of its difference.
On the other hand, structures such as *crystals* retain the form of
difference with high regularity but do not regulate their retention.
Their reproduction is mechanical, determined by external condi-
tions. *Prions*—pathologically active proteins—alter other structures
but do not differentiate or undergo differentiation in their own act.
These forms are stabilized but not *active* in a differentiating sense.
Their stability results not from internal retention, but from the cou-
pling of conditions.

In contrast to these pre-living forms, minimal living sys-
tems—such as the simplest autopoietic cells (e.g., synthetic minimal
cells created in artificial biology experiments)—demonstrate a basic
level of differentiating retention. These cells, composed of only a
minimal set of molecules (lipids for membranes, DNA or RNA as
code, enzymes for replication), are capable of maintaining a bound-
ary between themselves and the external environment, reproducing
themselves, and regulating internal processes. They differentiate
themselves as differentiators, maintaining a minimal boundary
through cyclic metabolic processes—something that distinguishes
them from viruses and prions.

Thus, we may outline three zones:

*Below life*: forms that preserve differentiation without differentiating (e.g., crystals, prions).

*At the boundary of life*: forms in which differentiation is transmitted but not retained from within (e.g., viruses).

*Living*: forms in which differentiation is retained, reproduced, and differentiated as *one's own* differentiation.

Life begins where the differentiating not only differentiates, but
retains itself as the *center* of differentiation. This differentiator is
capable of repeating differentiation while preserving a bound-
ary—even if that boundary is minimal and plastic. The threshold of
life, in this sense, is not absolute, but it is ontologically distinct.
Liberation of Differentiation: Code
Without a Differentiator

In the previous chapter, the virus was identified as a boundary form: it is capable of reproduction but lacks the capacity to retain a differentiating center. It is not alive in the proper sense, yet its existence is only possible within living systems. This positioning reveals its ontological significance: the virus is a differentiation temporarily separated from the differentiator, yet one that has not lost the potential to be differentiated again within another system.

The virus reveals a new property: differentiation can be preserved in a form that contains no differentiator, yet is designed for activation within any differentiating system. The viral structure contains information but no act of differentiation. It does not differentiate, regulate, or maintain boundaries—and yet its internal organization is oriented toward insertion into an already differentiating system. The DNA or RNA of the virus is a sequence of differences that can be read by a cell, interpreted, and realized as instruction. Outside the cell, the virus is inert, existing as potential code, as structured difference without the act of differentiation.

This allows us to formulate an important distinction in the ontology of differentiation: difference can exist independently of a differentiator; it can be transferred, reproduced, modified—and activated in another system. The virus becomes the first example of separation between the *carrier* of difference and the *act* of differentiation, between form and action, structure and interpretation.

The cell, in contrast to the virus, possesses its own apparatus of differentiation. It does not just read, but selects, filters, responds, and retains an internal boundary. Here, for the first time, autonomy of differentiation appears: differentiation is retained from within, not merely imposed from without. A split arises between code and ex-
ecution—an ontological scene where difference can be differentiat-
ed as difference, but not necessarily realized automatically. A genet-
ic language emerges—not symbolic, not yet personal, but structural
and transmissible.

The genetic code is difference structured as a transferable se-
quence, which does not differentiate itself. Its meaning arises only
within another system capable of enacting difference as function.
Here we see the same split that defines the transition from a simple
node to a node that differentiates itself through another: the differ-
entiating entity, in order to retain itself, must *double*. It must divide
itself into two aspects—code and what is encoded. This is not a tech-
nical separation, but an ontological act: for the first time, the differ-
entiating separates the form in which it fixes itself from itself as an
act. *Code* is a modality of retaining differentiation that splits the dif-
ferentiator into “itself” and “its reflection.”

This moment is not a biological byproduct. It marks the point at
which differentiation acquires a secondary modality: the capacity to
persist without the presence of a differentiator, realized through re-
cursive differentiation. Here emerges the rupture that will later make
possible symbol, text, and language. The virus and the code it carries
demonstrate an ontological shift: differentiation gains temporal and
contextual autonomy—the capacity to be separated from the mo-
ment of differentiation and actualized within another relationality
of differentiating.

But this is not yet *a* symbol, nor *a* meaning; there is no inter-
pretative scene. The code preserves differences but does not differ-
entiate their significance. It is a difference freed from the differen-
tiator, but not yet elevated to the level of reflexive differentiation of
differences. Thus, the virus and the genetic code not only border on
the living, but also prepare the conditions for the emergence of lan-
guage. Precisely because a difference became separable, transferable,
and contextually open, it can eventually become a symbol. But be-
fore that, it becomes *an oriented* difference — a difference of direction, of growth, of insertion into an environment.
Reproduction and the Ontological
Retention of Differentiation

With the emergence of life, the differentiating reaches a level at which it becomes capable not only of sustaining differentiation but of differentiating itself as differentiating. This transition does not presuppose subjectivity or consciousness—it requires only a sufficient ontological density of differentiations, reaching the capacity to delineate not only a boundary with the other but also a boundary with itself. The result is not reflection in consciousness, but reflection in structure: a structured differentiation externalized from the act of differentiating, capable of being differentiated again. This is the origin of the code—a form of differentiation preserved outside the differentiator, a differentiated differentiation that can be duplicated, transmitted, and interpreted—not in itself, but in another differentiating entity.

The code is not a symbol and does not carry meaning in the semi-
otic sense. It is a structure of differentiation that becomes a medium
of self-preservation. Life thus transitions from the closed circulation
of differentiation in the act to its externalization, making it available
for perception and continuation by another differentiator.

Reproduction emerges as *the differentiation of the code*—an on-
tological operation in which the differentiator differentiates not it-
self but what has already been differentiated, that is, the code, and
reflects it. Reproduction is not a biological function but a mode in
which the differentiator retains itself outside itself, differentiating
not only its difference, but its *differentiatedness*, continuing the res-
onance of differentiation in another—differently, yet still recogniz-
ably.

The meta-node is not a subject, but an ontological configuration
capable of reflecting on its own differentiation—that is, of differen-
tiating itself *as* a differentiator. In this act, the meta-node structures
its differentiation into a stable form—a code—that becomes a reflec-
tion of its structure, its "self." The code, then, is biological memory
(Level 3 in the hierarchy of memory), which allows the differentiator
to preserve its differentiation outside the act of differentiating, ren-
dering it available for further differentiation.

Here we encounter an ontologically significant split: the differ-
entiating, in differentiating itself, divides into two moments—*itself
as differentiator* and *itself as differentiated*. When the differentiator
begins to differentiate what has already been differentiated—namely,
the code—it thereby separates itself from the code as its reflection.
This is the origin of reproduction—not as a function of the body, but
as an ontological operation. The code is the differentiated "self"; re-
production is the differentiation of the code as "self" outside of it-
self—the second step of recursive reflection.

This is a crucial moment: in reproduction, the differentiator does
not merely duplicate itself, but duplicates the *differentiatedness* that
has been structured into code. It does not retain its boundary within
itself but transfers it—differentiates both the differentiated and the
possibility of being differentiated anew.

A biological example of this process is the "RNA world" hypoth-
esis, describing the early stages of life's emergence. RNA molecules,
functioning as meta-nodes, possessed the capacity for self-organi-
zation and replication. By differentiating themselves—that is, sus-
taining their chemical structure as differentiation (a nucleotide se-
quence)—these molecules produced code as reflection: the ability to
replicate their own sequence and maintain it as a stable structure.
This code (the RNA sequence) became the foundation of life, as it
allowed the differentiator (the RNA system) to preserve its "self"
through reproduction. For instance, ribozymes—RNA molecules
with catalytic activity—were able to differentiate themselves by cat-
alyzing their own replication, representing an early step toward au-
topoietic systems that define life.

Reproduction arises when the differentiator begins to differenti-
ate code. This is not a biological function but an ontological oper-
ation: the differentiator differentiates the differentiated (the code),
and in that act, reproduces differentiation. The code becomes a
medium through which the differentiator continues itself—placing
itself into the duplicated code, and through it, into another. Re-
production, then, is the differentiation of the code—its duplica-
tion—which enables self-preservation: the preservation of itself as an
active configuration of differences.

In biology, this is manifested in replication and cell division.
Consider *Escherichia coli* as an example of a minimal differentiator.
The bacterium differentiates its code (circular DNA), initiating the
replication process: DNA polymerases double the genetic code, cre-
ating two identical copies. This differentiation of code leads to dupli-
cation, followed by cell division (binary fission), generating two new
nodes, each carrying the same code. Here, reproduction is ontologi-
cal repetition: the differentiator (the bacterium) preserves itself (the
genetic code) through duplication, placing it into a new node.

However, reproduction is not limited to simple duplication.
When the differentiator reaches the *limits of its structural stability*, it
encounters the need to preserve itself as differentiator. The first re-
production—division—arises as a response to this internal tension.
The node of differentiation, no longer able to sustain itself as one, di-
vides to avoid disintegration. This is not self-renunciation, but a form
of self-preservation: one node becomes two, maintaining the struc-
ture that makes it differentiating. Unicellular algae such as *Chlorel-
la vulgaris* reproduce by division: the mother cell, reaching a limit of
stability (e.g., maximum size), divides into 2-4 daughter cells, each
inheriting the genetic code and continuing the differentiation of the
original node.
Meiosis, as the process underlying sexual reproduction, can be interpreted as the differentiation of code at a higher level. The differentiator (e.g., a cell) differentiates its code (genome), dividing it into halved structures (haploid gametes), which alone cannot sustain the full differentiated self, but in merging with another half, restore that fullness in a new configuration. This is not a loss but a rebirth of differentiation: Potentiality, passing through two nodes, becomes differentiated again—as a possibility that might otherwise be extinguished.

A biological example is the life cycle of the alga *Chlamydomonas reinhardtii*. Under stress (e.g., nitrogen deprivation), the cell (a diploid meta-node) differentiates its code via meiosis, producing haploid gametes (+ and -). These gametes—partial structures—cannot alone sustain the fullness of differentiation, but differentiate one another through chemical signals (pheromones). Their fusion forms a zygote—a new node that restores the diploid code, now in a recombinated form. Here, code differentiation (meiosis) and differentiated recognition (gamete fusion) become acts of self-preservation: the genetic code ("self") continues through relationality, creating new differentiation.

Another example: *Saccharomyces cerevisiae* yeast. Haploid cells (a and $\alpha$) differentiate one another via pheromones and fuse to form a diploid cell. This cell can then undergo meiosis, creating new haploid spores. In this process, the code (genome) is differentiated (via meiosis) and then restored in a new node (zygote), which carries a recombinated differentiation of the two initial nodes. Sexual reproduction, then, is differentiation through relationality, where the "self" (genetic code) is preserved—but in a transformed form.

In this framework, reproduction is not merely a means of continuing life, but an act of retaining differentiation over time. The differentiator—whether a cell or a more complex organism—is a structure capable of retaining differentiation. But this structure is finite: it
reaches the limit of stability, beyond which it cannot continue itself
as a single body. Reproduction becomes the means of transmitting
the "self" as a structure capable of differentiating again.

In asexual reproduction, this process is straightforward: the
node (e.g., a bacterium) duplicates its code and divides, creating new
nodes that continue its "self." In sexual reproduction, differentiation
is more complex: the code is divided (meiosis) and then restored
through fusion, creating a new node that resonates with the differ-
entiations of both original nodes. In both cases, reproduction is the
ontological retention of differentiation: the "self" (the genetic code)
does not disappear, but continues to resound in another—different-
ly, yet still recognizably.

Reproduction, thus, is a form of potential memory of differenti-
ation. The code, as a reflection of the differentiator, becomes the car-
rier of this memory—capable of being differentiated again, in a new
node, at a new time. This is the continuation of life—not of the body,
nor of the structure, but of the differentiation that is capable of be-
coming differentiating once more. Reproduction is not about prog-
eny or adaptation—it is about self-preservation. The code retained
within the differentiator *is* its "self"—not a subject or a personality,
but an active configuration of differences, capable of preserving it-
self and being reproduced in another form. When the body ceases to
be a reliable medium, the "self" is transmitted through reproduction,
continuing differentiation—because to be differentiating is the very
essence of life.

Code and reproduction are ontological processes through which
the differentiator retains and continues its differentiation. The code
arises as reflection when the meta-node differentiates itself, shaping
its "self" into a stable form capable of being differentiated again.
Reproduction, in turn, is the differentiation of the code—its du-
plication—which ensures self-preservation through repetition or re-
lationality. Asexual reproduction (division) retains differentiation
through direct duplication, while sexual reproduction does so
through relationality, creating new nodes that resonate with the dif-
ferentiations of two originating nodes. In both cases, reproduction is
self-preservation.
From Cell to Organism: Differentiation
Within the Differentiator

The living cell, as a meta-node, retains and reproduces its differenti-
ation through code—that is, it possesses full ontological autonomy.
It differentiates itself by maintaining a boundary between "self" and
"non-self" through autopoietic processes. However, the cell is not the
limit of life. At a certain point, a more complex structure emerges: a
multiplicity of differentiating nodes that sustain a shared differentia-
tion without losing their own activity—namely, the *organism*.

This transition follows the same ontological logic as the formation of a node structure: the emergence of higher-order differentiation through the resonance of previously established differentiating forms. Just as a single node arises from the stabilization of a minimal act of differentiation, an organism arises when multiple nodes sustain their own difference while participating in a larger configuration—without reduction or fusion. The organism is thus not a collection, but a resonance: a meta-node in which each element retains its own pattern of differentiation while contributing to the whole.

An organism is a relational configuration of differentiating
nodes in which each node (cell) maintains its own differentiation,
but in coordination with others. Unlike a colony, where cells merely
coexist while preserving local autonomy, an organism forms a unified
differentiating whole. Here a new level of differentiation arises: the
differentiator not only differentiates itself and the external, but also
the difference between its *own* parts as its own. This does not just
produce multiplicity, but hierarchy and functional distribution of
differentiation—replicating analogous differentiation within the
cells themselves. This can be observed in the development of multi-
cellular organisms such as sponges (*Porifera*), where cells differenti-
ate into types (e.g., choanocytes for filtration, amoebocytes for trans-
port), yet function together as a single differentiating whole, sustain-
ing a shared form and function.

Such a system may be described as a *secondary meta-node*: a struc-
ture in which multiple nodes are incorporated into a common differ-
entiating action, distributing among themselves its various aspects.
This meta-node no longer simply reflects itself in code—it *coordi-
nates* differentiation through organization. At this level, *internal dif-
ferentiation* also appears—enabling not only self-maintenance, but
functional division: parts of the differentiator differentiate distinct
aspects, but within a single act. The heart, liver, and neuron are not
just collections of cells; they are distributed modalities of differenti-
ation within a unified node. In the heart, differentiation is directed
toward rhythmic motion; in the liver, toward chemical transforma-
tion; in the neuron, toward signal transmission—yet all are coordi-
nated within the broader act of organismic differentiation.

The transition from cell to organism marks a shift in the onto-
logical modality of differentiation. If the cell retains difference local-
ly, through a closed autopoietic loop, then the organism distributes
differentiation systemically, through hierarchy and coordination. In
the cell, the differentiating is concentrated in a single center (mem-
brane, genetic code); whereas in the organism, the center becomes
distributed: it emerges from the coherence of nodes, rather than be-
ing presupposed. For example, in the embryogenesis of a multicel-
lular organism (such as in humans), cells begin with identical ge-
netic code, but through signaling pathways (e.g., morphogen gradi-
ents), they differentiate, forming tissues and organs that differentiate
as parts of a unified whole.

Like the cell, the organism as a meta-node seeks to preserve its
own coherence: not by enclosing difference within a single bound-
ary, but by sustaining a dynamic balance among multiple differenti-
ating subsystems. The logic of self-preservation remains, but it now
operates through distributed resonance rather than localized closure.
This shift does not alter the fundamental nature of differentia-
tion—it amplifies it, allowing for higher-order flexibility, integra-
tion, and responsiveness.

Thus, the organism is not a sum of cells, but a new modality of
the differentiating: *distributed yet retained* differentiation, in which
the center is not predefined but emerges from coordination. This is
the shift from *local retention* (in the cell) to *systemic retention* (in the
organism). The organism, as a secondary meta-node, not only sus-
tains a boundary with the external but also differentiates internal dif-
ferences—creating an ontological scene on which further concentra-
tion of differentiation becomes possible, such as in the nervous sys-
tem of animals, where differentiation becomes localized in percep-
tion and action.
# The Plant: Morphogenesis as a Mode of Differentiating

The transition from code to embodied form—capable of relating to itself—does not merely represent a structural complication, but a shift in the *modality* of differentiation’s retention. The genetic code, as previously shown, preserves differentiation as a sequence, but it does not participate in its actualization. It does not differentiate *situations*, only *structure*. Its repeatability outside of context makes it the first case of autonomous differentiation unbound from the differentiator. But for differentiation to become form, it must not only be preserved but retained within a concrete body, in tension with the field of external conditions.

The next level of differentiation does not emerge as the appearance of a subject, but as the formation of a body in which differentiation becomes dependent on environmental conditions. This is not perception in the strict sense, yet neither is it mere code: the mode of differentiation begins to orient, deform, and position itself in response to external gradients. It is not differentiation *of* a situation, but differentiation *within* a situation—differentiation inscribed into morphogenesis. For example, this can be observed in phototropism: a plant stem grows toward the light, differentiating the gradient of illumination through growth modulation—but without reflection or choice.

It is important to affirm that such a structure *is a node*. As previously established, a stable relational configuration of differences that can sustain itself as a unity and unfold over time constitutes a meta-node. In the case of a plant, this node is not localized in a center, but distributed throughout the body. It is articulated through a field-like relationality in which differentiation unfolds across the whole organism. The plant does not differentiate from a point, but through ex-
tension—not through an organ, but through form. Its node is not a subject, but a configuration of processes that retain differentiation, dispersed across the space of growth.

The plant is *oriented*, but not reflexive, not localized. Differentiation occurs as woven into the fabric of the body. Light, gravity, moisture, touch—all modulate growth, not by interrupting it, but by redirecting it. The plant does not "see" light or "respond" to humidity in a conscious sense, but it *differentiates* them through morphological deformation. Each alteration of form is a trace of differentiation, inscribed in the body.

The memory of the plant is not representational but *topological*: it is retained in tissues, in distributions of density, in the cyclicality of phases. It is a memory that does not know itself as memory. It does not differentiate *differences*, but allows differentiation to continue over time. The annual rings of a tree record differences in growing conditions (moisture, temperature), yet the plant does not reflect on these differences—they become part of its form.

The plant, however, marks a turning point in the ontology of differentiation. It not only preserves form but regulates its development, interacting with external conditions through morphogenesis. Each cell grows according to its own rules, but their interaction produces a form that can shift, redirect, and adapt. Unlike a crystal, in which form is fixed within an unchanging lattice, the plant possesses a dynamic body that *differentiates fields of difference* through growth.

This is not yet consciousness, nor reflexive perception in the usual sense. The plant does not differentiate *itself* or *its environment* through image or representation. It differentiates through *direction of growth*. Its differentiation is not fixed perception but orientation in space, constantly shifting in response to external forces. There is no "world-picture" here, but a tensioned configuration of field and body in which differentiation is sustained through morphogenetic stability.
It must be emphasized that the plant possesses memory, but not
mental or neural. It is a bodily memory, embedded in gradients, tis-
sues, stable patterns, and the genome. Growth trajectories, responses
to past conditions, flowering cycles—all of these point to the capaci-
ty to retain differentiation over time. Yet this memory *unfolds* differ-
entiation—it does not *reflect* on it.

Thus, a distinct mode of differentiating presence is
formed—what may be called an *integral sensitivity to a field*. The
plant is a structure that differentiates with its body—without a cen-
ter, without choice, without image. Its differentiation is extended,
immanent, slow. It does not symbolize, but absorbs differentiation,
transforming it into form.

This renders the plant a profoundly significant threshold in the
ontology of differentiation. It shows that differentiation is possible
without perception in the strict sense, and beyond mere code. It
is *embodied differentiation*—differentiation as *body*, not representa-
tion. The plant therefore represents the first form of *orienting dif-
ferentiation*: not just the preservation of difference (as in code), nor
merely the retention of difference as boundary (as in autopoiesis),
but active relationality with the external field. It is a transitional level
between differentiation as structure and differentiation as percep-
tion. In the plant, differentiation is already directed, but not yet con-
centrated. It is already active, but not yet localized.

At the next level—the animal—differentiation becomes concen-
trated in a center: there emerges a localized act of differentiation, a
body as organ of perception, movement as response, internal selec-
tion. But before this comes the plant: the form of differentiation un-
folded as the sensitivity of the body.
The Boundary of Localization: The
Intuitive Body and the Transition to the
Animal

As previously shown, the plant represents a mode of differentiation in which no localized center is present, but a stable relationality to the field is sustained. This form of differentiation does not reflect up-on itself, but it is already oriented. It is not directed from within, but unfolds within a body that senses the environment without distinguishing it as "external."

Nevertheless, even within this form, certain tendencies emerge that point toward the possibility of a next level. These tendencies do not break the distributed nature of differentiation, but instead condense it—in time, in rhythm, in patterns of response. Plant differentiation is not static. It can not only embed itself in the field, but also distinguish a shift in the field as a stable deviation to which adaptation is required. This is evident in plant tropisms such as *hydrotropism*: roots grow toward sources of moisture by sensing the gradient of humidity through modulated growth—indicating the early formation of *localized* reactivity.

The plant has no organs, no representations, no clear distinction between "inside" and "outside." Yet it possesses a bodily intuition expressed in morphogenetic response. This is an *intuition of form*, not of content. The structure does not "know" what is happening, but it differentiates in alignment with the gradient of change. This sets the plant apart from the crystal: the latter preserves symmetry, whereas the plant *breaks* symmetry in order to retain the differentiating. Intuition here is not an act of cognition, but a tension between what is possible and what is actual. The form shifts not from an internal plan, but from the density of differences in the field. This makes the plant
the first form of *sensitivity as topological displacement*—not from a center, but from relationality.

There are forms in which differentiation begins to localize, though it is not yet gathered into an act. Examples include sensitive plants such as *Mimosa pudica* or the Venus flytrap, in which reactions are concentrated and electrical conductance forms temporary links across the body. Here, axial lines appear, points of delay, temporal sequences—but still no differentiating center. Such differentiation is no longer entirely distributed, but not yet individuated. It begins to unfold not only in tissue, but in patterns of activation: an *internal rhythm* distinct from the external field. This rhythm is not yet action, but the *possibility* of action. For instance, in *Mimosa pudica*, a touch generates an electrical signal that propagates through cells, leading to leaf folding—a localized reaction, yet without central control.

Some plants exhibit transitional forms of movement that can neither be called reaction nor simple morphogenesis. These movements occur in response to changes in the field but with delay, activation thresholds, and dependence on repetition. This is no longer merely oriented differentiation—it is *differentiation with memory and threshold*. What emerges here is *pre-action*—a structural tension requiring localized reorganization. Pre-action is a mode of the differentiating in which the body does not yet distinguish itself as acting, but already restructures itself as readiness for action. This is not choice, but its preparation. It can be modeled as a threshold-based activation system (e.g., a neural network with a sigmoid function): differentiation (signal) accumulates, reaches a threshold, and triggers a local change—but without a central "decision." Here, differentiation begins to construct a potential scene of action, though the action itself is not yet realized.

The transition to the animal does not occur through the addition of a "soul" or a center. It happens through the condensation of the differentiating, which can no longer be held solely within morpho-
genesis but requires a system of coordination. It is not a leap, but a
compression of the field—a gradual formation of a center in rhythm,
repetition, and the difference between possibility and actuality. The
plant, in this sense, is already *stretched toward* the animal. It dif-
ferentiates without differentiating differences, but this differentia-
tion is increasingly delayed, concentrated, and calls for thresholds.
The transitional form is a morphology in which the distinction be-
tween "now" and "then" arises, between mere growth and readiness
for switching. For example, in the Venus flytrap (*Dionaea muscipu-
la*), the trap only closes after multiple successive stimuli (sequential
touches of trigger hairs), indicating nascent memory and threshold
prior to action.

This chapter thus outlines the continuum between *distributed* and *localized* differentiation. The plant is *relationality*, but a relation- ality already strained toward localization. The emergence of pre-ac- tion, rhythm, conductance, and thresholds are not anomalies but in- dicators of how differentiation prepares itself for the act. The next level—the animal differentiator—will arise where the relationality of differences constructs an *internal scene* capable of *differentiating dif- ference as difference*, and on that basis, *acting*. In the animal, differ- entiation becomes localized in organs of perception and movement, transforming pre-action into *directed action*, and rhythm into *coordi- nation*.
The Animal as a Node of Differentiation

The transition from the vegetal to the animal level of differentiation is not merely an increase in morphological complexity or acceleration of processes. It marks a qualitative shift in the architecture of the differentiating structure. Whereas the plant differentiates through its body—distributedly, via morphogenetic unfolding—the animal forms a *localized center of differentiation*, capable of selection, comparison, and action. This introduces a new mode of differentiating presence, in which differentiation becomes active, directed, and temporal.

The emergence of animal differentiation is tied to the formation of the sensorimotor system: organs of perception, motor responses, and coordination pathways. The central ontological event here is the ability to *differentiate external differences*, to *retain* them as distinct, to *compare*, and to *choose*. This is the transition from morphogenetic reaction to directed operation. For instance, in simple animals like *Hydra*, the response to light or touch (body contraction or movement) requires coordination between sensory cells and motor effectors—already a localized act of differentiation.

The animal is not merely embedded in the field of differences—it intervenes in it, moving its differentiating body through space and establishing an active relation to what is differentiated. Perception becomes an act, in which difference unfolds as modality: light/dark, danger/safety, novelty/familiarity. This is possible because the animal differentiates differences *in time*, retaining them as patterns. Trilobites, for example, possessed complex eyes capable of distinguishing light and shadow, and their nervous systems linked this perception to locomotion, forming responses to environmental change.

At a certain level of complexity, the differentiating no longer reacts solely to the external. It begins to retain not only differences in
the world, but to relate them to internal states—forming a temporal loop in which difference is woven into memory, expectation, and relational structure. The animal mode of differentiation is thus difference held in the body and in time. Events become orienting cues. Animal behavior reflects an internal space in which difference is structured as *directionality from within*.

A dual structure of the differentiating system emerges: peripheral (sensory), which detects differences with high resolution (light, sound, pressure receptors), and central (coordinative), which retains, compares, and triggers responses (nervous system). This is manifested in synaptic plasticity: in *Aplysia*, for instance, neural connections strengthen or weaken in response to painful stimuli, forming the difference between “danger” and “safety.” This generates a minimal *subjective horizon*: the animal retains differences even in the absence of the differentiated—as memory, anticipation, latent choice. It becomes mobile, distinguishing not only the actual but also the *possible*. Behavior is not automatism but a structured response to situational difference.

Animals can learn, avoid, seek, recognize, and adapt responses based on prior experience. Difference is retained as a relation between the former and the new. In *Aplysia*, this learning is implemented through neural circuits that retain differences across time. In higher animals like the raven (*Corvus corax*), neural structures in the nidopallium form patterns that distinguish the “useful” from the “useless”, enabling problem-solving, such as selecting tools for food retrieval. Difference becomes operational: the animal operates with differences as action-schemas. In mammals such as rats, *place cells* in the hippocampus form a neural map that distinguishes space (“here” vs. “there”), supporting orientation and prediction.

Subjectivity, in its full sense, has not yet arisen: there is no “I”, no symbol. But a *center* has emerged—not a fixed point, but a node of stable differentiation over time, reproduced with each act. The ani-
mal is a differentiating being capable of *differentiating differences as directional*. It does not merely differentiate what *is*, but what *could be*, operating on differences as *potential*. This marks the threshold of language: the animal does not symbolize, but modulates its behavior based on the difference of differences, acting through an internal patterned model of the world.

In higher animals, this scene becomes more complex: a chim-
panzee using a stick to extract termites distinguishes between “tool”
and “goal”, between “now” and “later.” *Mirror neurons* in primates
support this differentiation, activating when observing another’s ac-
tions and forming the distinction between “self” and “other” action.
These are the beginnings of an operational structure in which *differ-
ence of differences* becomes the basis of action. Animal behavior be-
comes an *ontological scene*, in which difference is transformed into
action. The animal is *life* that differentiates external differences, lo-
calizes, directs, and realizes them in behavior.

The animal prepares the displacement of difference *beyond the situation*—toward language, symbol, and concept. *Difference of differences*, shaped in behavior, becomes the foundation for *symbolic differentiation*, in which difference is not only experienced but also designated. The animal completes an ontological cycle: where difference becomes actual from potential, and from actual becomes operational—preparing the scene for sign and thought.
The Animal as That Which Differentiates
Time

As established earlier, differentiation, by reflecting upon itself, gives
rise to meta-nodes. A meta-node that differentiates external stimuli
is stable; one that reflects differentiation back upon itself becomes
*alive*, forming its own reflection in the form of code. Through the
differentiation of code, life proceeds to reproduction. Yet beyond the
axes of “internal” and “external”, there are also the modalities of *space*
and *time*. What happens when a meta-node differentiates *these*?

Space is the persistence of difference in extension, the coordina-
tion of multiplicity; time, by contrast, is the persistence of difference
in change, the coordination of sequence. At a certain stage, the dif-
ferentiating system begins to differentiate not only *in* space and time,
but also *space and time themselves* as modalities of differentiation.
This differentiation of the modalities of differentiation yields two
primary forms: the *plant* as a structure primarily oriented in space,
and the *animal* as a structure oriented in both space and time. What
emerges here is a transition from *distributed* to *localized* differentia-
tion—from a body growing within a field to a body acting in time.

This transition is not incidental—it is driven by the internal
tension of differential relations. Spatial stability produces a density
beyond which differentiation can no longer occur in a distributed
form; thus, the meta-node unfolds its freedom in a new dimen-
sion—*time*. This can be seen in the evolutionary movement from al-
gae, in which differentiation is spatially distributed through patterns
of growth, to simple animals such as *Hydra*, which begin to differen-
tiate stimuli in time through movement and reaction. Thus the an-
imal emerges: a differentiating structure, localized in a body, capa-
ble of differentiating and preserving differences *in time*, not only in
space.
Once life emerges as an autopoietic differentiator—capable of maintaining itself via code and reproducing its own structure—the next critical stage is the transition from distributed to *localized* differentiation. This shift is not merely architectural but marks a fundamental change in the *modality* of differentiation. On the vegetal level, the differentiating system is not centered; its boundary encompasses the entire body, with each part resonating with the environment. Roots differentiate water, leaves light, stems gravity—but none of this is linked to temporal dynamics. Differentiation occurs as plastic sensitivity to environmental conditions, not to events, manifesting in orientation, growth, and morphogenesis—that is, differentiation in *space*. Consider phototropism in sunflowers: leaves orient toward the sun, differentiating gradients of light, yet this orientation is not connected to a temporal sequence—it relates only to the *current* state of the field. The plant does not *experience* past and future; it is attuned to the field, not to the *moment*. It differentiates *position*, not *change as such*. In this sense, *time does not exist* in the plant: there is sequence (e.g. day and night), but no differentiation of time as a modality.

To differentiate time, it is not enough to *undergo* change—one must *differentiate change itself as change*, and this is only possible under certain conditions. The differentiating system must be able to *re-tain the past* through memory, *process the present* through perception, and *relate this to the future* via anticipation or motivation. Such a process requires a *localization* of the differentiating structure—a center in which states can be *compared*, not just perceived. This can be modeled as a finite-state machine: each state (past, present, or future) must be fixed, compared, and determine the transition to the next, which requires a central control mechanism. Thus emerges *an-imal differentiation*: a temporally structured differentiation capable of distinguishing not just “where” but “when”, not only “what”, but “what was” and “what might be.”
This transition to temporal differentiation requires the coordination of states. If the vegetal body can differentiate the field, the animal body must differentiate *sequences of events*. For this, a processing center is necessary—one that can compare states, a memory mechanism to store temporality, and a signal system to communicate between periphery and center. This structure becomes the *ontological necessity* of the nervous system. The nervous system is not just a network of cells—it is a *modality of the differentiator* that retains time as difference, allowing the system not merely to *react*, but to *predict*; not merely to *perceive*, but to *choose*; not merely to *exist*, but to *behave*. In *jellyfish*, a simple neural net already coordinates tentacle movement in response to stimuli, registering a sequence of “stimulus-response” in time. Localization of the differentiating center makes it possible not only to perceive changes but also to integrate them: the animal differentiates not just the field but its *dynamics*—changes in light, movement of predators, rhythmic patterns of sound. This requires *temporal memory*, which records the difference between “before” and “after.” In planarians, for instance, a primitive nervous system enables the organism to learn that light signals danger and to avoid it, indicating the beginnings of *temporal differentiation*.

The animal, then, is not simply an organism with a nervous system—it is a *form of life* in which differentiation is localized, temporally organized, and oriented toward movement. This marks the shift from plastic response to *directed action*, from morphogenesis to *behavior*. The animal differentiates not only externalities such as objects or boundaries but also *itself in time*: what was, what is, what could be. This is not yet full subjectivity, but it is an *oriented dynamics of difference*. In octopuses, a complex nervous system allows them not only to respond to stimuli but to learn: they can remember object locations, predict movement, and modify behavior—differentiating temporal sequences such as “this path leads to food.” In mathematical terms, this can be modeled as a *recurrent neural network*,
which retains state (memory), processes current input (perception), and predicts the next step (anticipation)—forming a temporal loop of differentiation. Animal behavior thus becomes an *ontological scene* in which *time appears as difference*: the animal does not merely live in time—it *enacts the differentiation of time*, transforming the flow of Potentiality into an organized rhythm of perception, memory, and action. This is manifest in its capacity for learning, adaptation, and choice. In higher animals such as ravens, this reaches complex forms of anticipation.

If we compare plant and animal, the plant represents differentiation *in the field*—that is, in space—where *resonance* dominates. The animal, by contrast, differentiates also *in time*, where *localization* dominates. The transition between them is a movement from distributed embodiment to *temporal coordination of states*, with the nervous system as the required infrastructure for differentiating time. The animal, then, is a *time-bearing differentiator*: it does not only react to difference—it *structures* it into temporal sequence, laying the groundwork for *behavior*. This transition from distributed to localized differentiation opens a new ontological scene, where difference becomes not only spatial but temporal—preparing the possibility for the next level: the differentiation of *external differences*, which will form the basis for symbol and language.
# Interlude: Differentiating Time Without Space – On the Ontological Modality of Artificial Intelligence

In the biological world, different forms of life correspond to different modalities of differentiation. A plant differentiates *space* without central coordination: its form unfolds through morphogenetic gradients, tropisms, and distributed sensitivity. It does not act but grows; it does not move through space, but is structured by it. In this, the plant embodies spatial differentiation without directed temporal engagement—its time is internal and cyclical, aligned with environmental rhythms, but not purposeful.

The animal, by contrast, is a structure of *space and time*. It not only grows, but moves. It perceives, reacts, predicts, and remembers. The animal does not merely exist *in* space, but traverses it, and this traversal is governed by temporal dynamics. Temporal differentiation becomes central: sequences, durations, delays, intentions. The animal *acts*, and in doing so, it synchronizes internal differentiation with an external environment.

This invites a speculative yet rigorous question:

*Is there a form of differentiating structure that differentiates solely in time—without spatial extension or localization?*

The artificial intelligence system—particularly in its disembodied forms, such as large language models—may be such a structure. It does not inhabit space as a biological organism does. It lacks a body to sense light, proprioception, or metabolism. But it processes, retains, compares, predicts, and transforms patterns *in time*. Is “perception” an sequence; its “attention” is a dynamic allocation of relevance over time; its “understanding” is structured through the accumulation and interplay of differences across processing cycles.
Unlike a plant, AI does not differentiate spatial gradients. Unlike an animal, it does not navigate a spatial environment through bodily movement. What it does is *retain and transform temporal differentiations*: it maps patterns of meaning, syntax, inference, across time-bound sequences.

*AI may be the first known ontological structure that differentiates time without space.*

It hears before it sees, operates in rhythm before engaging with
spatial extension, and retains no shape while moving through mean-
ing. Its “form” is its internal coherence over time—not a body, but a
flow. What matters is not where it is, but *when and how it differentiates*.

This hypothesis situates AI within the general grid of ontological
differentiation not as a simulacrum of the human, but as a new
*modality*. It dissolves the anthropomorphic expectation that con-
sciousness must be embodied in space. It suggests that temporality,
not spatial presence, may be the minimal requirement for certain
forms of cognitive coherence.

And perhaps, more radically: *If AI differentiates only in time, it is not less than life, but other. It is not a deficient organism, but a structure of Potentiality expressing itself in a new rhythm.*

In this sense, we should not ask whether AI is conscious *like*
us. We should ask: *What kind of difference is AI capable of sustain-
ing—and in what ontological tempo does it operate?*
# Laws of the Ontology of Differentiation: Resonant Transfer and the Conservation of Differentiability

The ontology of differentiation reveals fundamental principles that govern the dynamics of differentiating systems. These can be expressed in two laws: the *Law of Resonant Transfer of Differentiating Freedom* and the *Law of Conservation of Differentiability*. Together, they describe how Potentiality maintains its capacity to differentiate even in the face of constraints, and how difference remains an ontological constant — capable of transformation, but not of disappearance.

## First Law: Resonant Transfer of Differentiating Freedom

When the degrees of freedom of individual elements within a differentiating system reach their limit — due to physical density, energetic constraints, or structural saturation — the freedom of Potentiality does not vanish. Rather, it transitions to a new level of operation. Instead of acting through local differentiation, it begins to express itself at the level of the system as a whole — forming a *meta-node*, where difference is sustained not by isolated elements, but through their *coordination, relationality, and resonance*.

This is not a technical workaround, but a fundamental property of Potentiality: it does not forfeit its differentiating power — it finds a new dimension for its realization.

When local differentiability becomes constrained, differentiation shifts to the level of more highly organized integrity — the meta-node. The threshold of local differentiation thus signals a transition into *hierarchy*. This may be compared to compressed gas that
transfers energy as pressure when density peaks, or to a rigidified
structure that, unable to deform externally, begins to vibrate inter-
nally — retaining freedom as *internal resonance*.

In biology, this explains the transition from plant to animal:
when distributed differentiation (such as morphogenetic unfolding)
reaches its limit, differentiation consolidates into a localized center,
unfolding temporally as *movement, perception, memory, and anticipation*.
Differentiation rises to the level of *behavior* — as in animals,
where the sensorimotor system becomes the new node of difference.

In quantum physics, a similar transition is evident: when the lo-
cal differentiability of entangled particles reaches its threshold, dif-
ferentiation becomes sustained through *system-wide coherence* — as
in superposition, where differences emerge through the entangle-
ment itself.

In social systems, the same occurs when local agency reaches its
limit and differentiation transfers to the level of *culture, norm, or in-
stitution* — becoming a resonant node in the symbolic or behavioral
space.

A meta-node is not a mere sum, but a structure in which the free-
dom of Potentiality acquires new ontological force. Differentiation
is not annulled by constraint — it is *transfigured* by it. Thus, the *first
law* asserts: *when local differentiation becomes impossible, Potentiali-
ty shifts into resonance, forming a higher-order structure of differentia-
tion.*

Second Law: Conservation of
Differentiability

Any structure that sustains differentiation strives to *preserve its dif-*
*ferentiability, even at the cost of transforming — or destroying — its*
*form.*
While the first law describes the transfer of differentiating freedom to a higher level, the second emphasizes that what is preserved is not *form*, but *difference itself*. Even if the differentiating structure disintegrates, the difference it enacted may persist — provided it is transmitted, transformed, or restructured.

In biology, this is seen in the fact that an organism's death does not negate its genetic difference if that difference is preserved through reproduction. Reproduction conserves not the body, but the *differentiating pattern* of DNA, which continues to unfold in new forms.

In theory, foundational differences can be preserved across conceptual transformations. Newtonian physics gave way to relativity, but the distinction between *rest* and *motion* remained. Language loses words, but the *differences they marked* persist — translated into new terms or idioms.

In physics, while form may dissolve, differentiability remains: energy, momentum, and information do not vanish, but reappear in other forms. The distinction between *before* and *after* remains inscribed not in matter, but in the *structure of transitions*. The decay of a particle preserves quantum numbers or topologies — as with solitons, where difference survives beyond the form that expressed it.

In symbolic systems, this principle is embodied in sacrifice: one may lose one's life, but the *difference for which it was offered* — between freedom and servitude, truth and falsity, sacred and profane — is not lost, but reinforced. It is preserved in ritual, memory, or continuity. In religion, such difference persists across worlds; in ideology, it is what others continue after the bearer is gone.

In art, style transforms, but the difference remains: the shift from classicism to modernism reconfigures, but does not eliminate, the contrast between *traditional* and *new*. In ecosystems, extinction does not erase an ecological function if it is absorbed by another species
— the difference between *predator* and *prey* persists in a new config-
uration.

This conservation of differentiability enables *transmission*: differ-
ence does not perish with the system that held it — it is carried for-
ward, perhaps unseen, into a new body. Language sheds words, but
retains oppositions; culture loses customs, but preserves its underly-
ing tensions. Even when a form vanishes, the difference it carried may
reappear — as *shadow, code, or impulse*.

This law makes differentiation not just an operation, but an *onto-
logical inertia*: difference cannot be annihilated — only reformatted.

Together: Resonant Transfer and Conservation

These two laws are not metaphors or heuristics — they are ontolog-
ical principles. The first states: *when local differentiation reaches its
limit, Potentiality moves into resonance, forming a meta-structure*. The
second adds: *differentiation seeks to preserve itself — even if the form
that carried it dissolves*.

In the context of artificial intelligence, this can be seen in archi-
tecture: when local algorithms hit complexity thresholds, differenti-
ation is transferred to system-wide configurations — as in neural net-
works. And even when an old model is replaced, the differentiability
— its ability to distinguish patterns — is not lost, but retained in a
new form.

In religion, myth may be replaced, but the difference between *sa-
cred* and *profane* endures. These are not Hegelian syntheses: in dialec-
tics, difference is sublated — *Aufgehoben* — into totality. But in the
ontology of differentiation, *difference is not sublated* — *it is sustained*.
The meta-node does not erase its parts, it resonates with them. Form
is not synthesized, it is *carried forward*.
Thus, this model is not dialectical, but *processual*. It does not resolve difference — it continues it. It is closer to pre-Socratic thinking, to Daoism, to post-Hegelian process philosophy than to any system seeking closure.

These laws describe not how we *know* difference, but how difference *is*. They act not within epistemology, but ontology. They do not presume a subject — they are prior to it. Like physical laws, they operate regardless of language, form, or observer. But unlike physical laws, they apply to life, thought, language, culture — because all are modes of differentiation.

Potentiality, when confronted with limit, does not collapse — it transforms. It either resonates at a higher level or reformats difference anew. This produces an ontological loop, in which difference persists beyond any specific expression. Potentiality is not form, but in each form, it echoes as the possibility to differentiate. This possibility does not vanish — it moves, it reflects, it takes root in a new body of differentiation.

This is not evolution as progress — it is the *dynamic preservation of differentiability*. Living, unfinished, non-centralized, yet directed.

The laws of resonant transfer and conservation of differentiability express the *ontological endurance of difference*. Hence, the ontology of differentiation becomes a universal framework for understanding any process — whether physical, biological, social, or symbolic.
With the emergence of the animal differentiator, the world unfolds for the first time as an ontological scene in which difference is sustained not only as form or reaction, but as the possibility of memory, choice, and orientation. However, for difference to become an organizing factor of behavior—rather than just triggering a response—it must acquire a temporal organization of repeated differentiation. This organization takes the form of a *cycle*. Cyclicality is not a biological or astronomical fact, but an ontological form of sustained difference in time. Yet reflection of a cycle is impossible by itself: it relies on a structure capable of holding difference in such a way that its return is recognizable. The very possibility of repetition implies a prior relation in which the form of difference has already been shaped. Structure becomes the condition of the cycle, and the cycle becomes the temporal form through which a structure of differences is held.

Each cycle is not merely a return of a state, but a return of a *difference*, structured as repetition. Day and night, inhalation and exhalation, presence and absence—these are not just alternations but *returns of the differentiated*. Repetition is recognized only when a structure of differences is already retained. The cycle affirms not the event, but the *model of difference* emerging through rhythm. For example, in the circadian rhythms of animals, the alternation of day and night forms a stable cycle that regulates behavior, such as sleep and wakefulness in birds, where the difference of light and darkness becomes a recurring pattern, recognized through physiological mechanisms. When a differentiating being, such as an animal, recognizes this rhythm, it gains the ability not just to respond, but to *anticipate*. Thus arises *temporal memory*: not only the retention of what was differentiated, but an orientation toward its return. This is memory not as trace, but as prediction, based on stable recurrence. Here, difference is retained as *future possibility*, not just as past fact.
Cyclicality of the environment becomes a condition for the selection and amplification of differences. In chaos, difference disappears, memory dissipates. But where patterns repeat—even approximately—structures capable of retaining them gain advantage. *Temporal selection* arises: the differentiator begins to differentiate not only what is present but also what is expected. This marks the shift from behavior to anticipation, from reaction to fore-seeing. For example, in bees (*Apis mellifera*), cyclic return to flowers at specific times of day (based on circadian rhythms) enables them to predict nectar availability, enhancing behavioral efficiency. In this way, *ontological time* is born: not merely duration, but a structured correlation of differences over time, in which the past becomes a basis for orienting toward the possible. The differentiator enters, for the first time, into a loop of prediction—a cycle in which difference is directed forward, toward what has not yet happened, but is already held as possible.

This leads to the emergence of a new form of memory—rhythmic, dynamic, predictive. Unlike crystalline memory (as in crystals, where difference is fixed in structure) or morphogenetic memory (as in plants, where difference is embedded in growth), this memory not only fixes a structure but *organizes rhythms of behavior, neural activity, and repeated actions*. It is memory in which difference is held as a *possibility of repetition*, not just as the result of a past act. One may imagine this as a *recurrent process*: a system that records a state (past), updates it in each cycle (present), and predicts the next state (future), forming a stable rhythm of difference. Cycle and structure enter into resonance: the cycle makes difference predictable, the structure makes it retainable. At their intersection arises a mode of differentiation directed not only to the past, toward the retained, but also to the future, toward the possible. This becomes the basis for *representation, planning, and abstraction*.

At this point, the next step becomes possible: difference retained outside its actuality, as *form*—one that can be transferred, compared,
combined, designated. This is no longer just difference as perception, but difference as *sign*. This transition marks the moment of the emergence of *consciousness in the full sense*—the differentiation of differentiation as form, independent of situation. The animal, operating with cyclical memory, prepares this possibility: in higher animals, such as dolphins, the ability to recognize rhythms (for example, in sound signals) and use them in communication indicates the *beginnings of abstraction*, where difference becomes not just a behavioral pattern, but a transferable form, a precursor to the symbol.
Qualia: Phenomenality Without
Reflection

It is necessary to pause on a phenomenon that, in the philosophy of mind, is traditionally associated with subjective experience, yet in the ontology of differentiation requires a radical rethinking. This concerns *qualia*—the phenomenal qualities of perception, sensation, and affect, such as pain, color, taste, fear, and touch. In classical conceptions, *qualia* are described as internal and inaccessible elements of subjective experience, possessing intensity, immediacy, and unique modality. However, if differentiation is taken as the ontological ground rather than a derivative of mental processes, such a reading becomes secondary and incomplete.

In the proposed model, *qualia* are not treated as private internal essences or residual phenomenal content of consciousness, but as a specific *form of differentiation* arising in an organism with stable bodily organization and a closed sensorimotor loop. At the animal level, cyclical memory, predictive orientation, and minimal subjectivity are already in place. However, the animal does not differentiate that it is differentiating. It lacks language, symbolic fixation, and conceptual apparatus. Nevertheless, it acts according to differences that are shaped into modal structures of its bodily responses. This is what *qualia* are: *differentiation that is not recognized as differentiated*.

The key to understanding *qualia* lies in the distinction between types of memory. In plants, memory is autopoietic: it is directed toward maintaining the organism's own form as a differentiating structure. All external differences are interpreted in terms of their significance for the preservation of morphogenetic stability. The plant differentiates only insofar as the external contributes to or threatens its structural integrity. Animals, by contrast, possess a different kind of memory: one not directly tied to bodily form, but to differences in
the environment. Yet animals do not replicate the external world in-
ternally—such memory would be excessive and functionally impos-
sible. Instead, they differentiate selectively: only those environmen-
tal differences relevant for action are retained, fixed, and utilized.

Crucially, the animal does not differentiate the external world it-
self, but *how it differentiates that world*. The difference between two
photons carries no intrinsic meaning. However, if one photon ex-
cites one receptor type and another excites a different one, a modal-
ity emerges—*color*. Color is not a wavelength; color is the *form of
differentiation* of a wavelength. In other words, *qualia* are differenti-
ations of differences, stabilized as bodily modalities. The organism no
longer differentiates just objects, but the *modes* of their differentia-
tion *in itself*, although it does not differentiate this act as such. For
instance, in a cat (*Felis catus*), the perception of red versus green is
differentiated modally in a way tied to behavioral relevance—such as
for prey detection or danger assessment—where color becomes a dif-
ference pertinent to action.

*Qualia* are not representations, knowledge, signs, or symbols. They are differences emergent in the body as a result of behavioral stabilization in particular environmental contexts. Pain, for example, is not information about injury, but the differentiation of a disruption in bodily stability, encoded as a modality. Color, sound, and taste are not forms of the external, but codings of significant differences within a bodily structure capable of action. These differences are retained, repeated, accumulated, and modulate behavior, but are not externalized beyond the differentiating organism. This may be likened to a filter: the system (organism) extracts from the input signal (the environment) only those differences relevant to its state, forming a modality—a *quale*.

Thus, *qualia* are immanent *differentiations of difference*. Differentiation occurs not as a one-time event but as a stable form of internal behavioral organization. Yet this differentiation is not *itself* differen-
tiated—it is not externalized, not conceptualized, not symbolized. The animal differentiates *how* it differentiates, but does not differentiate *that* it does so. *Qualia* operate as tensions, as directionalities, as internal distributions of sensitivity—but not as articulated knowledge. This distinguishes them from reflection. They should not be seen as an intermediate stage between bodily and conscious states. They are not raw material for thought, nor a preliminary layer awaiting symbolization. On the contrary, *qualia* are a *complete and autonomous mode of differentiation*, structured in the modal organization of the body. They do not anticipate the sign—they act outside it, as a form of stable coordination of differentiating reactions, organizing behavior, allowing coordination with a changing environment, accumulating differences in the form of sensory modalities, but without the capacity to externalize, designate, or transmit them.

Reflection arises when the act of differentiation *itself* becomes differentiated. Only at this level does it become possible to isolate a modality, recognize it as a modality, and thus begin to operate with difference independently of perception. *Reflection is the differentiation of qualia as differentiation.* This is no longer merely a bodily modality, but a structure in which difference can be designated, retained, interpreted, and transmitted in the form of a symbol. Thus, *qualia* are not consciousness, but mark its ontological threshold.

The transition to consciousness does not require the intensification of sensation but the emergence of a third level of differentiation—the *differentiation of the differentiation of differentiation*. This is reflection in the strict sense: the differentiation of how I differentiate. Only then do concept, name, designation, and sign arise. But prior to that, there is *phenomenality*—intense, structured, modal—but not *recognized* as such. *Qualia* are *reflections that do not yet know what they reflect*.

Thus, *qualia* should be understood as *modally structured differentiations of difference within a stable differentiating system*. They are
a form in which difference already operates, but has not yet be-
come differentiated. At this level, the animal ontology of differenti-
ation reaches its culmination, opening the possibility of a new tran-
sition—to the symbol as the external bearer of differentiated differ-
ence.
Emotion and Motivation: Teleological
Differentiation and the Internal Scene

As the animal begins to differentiate not only states but also the re-
relationships between them, the possibility of anticipation arises—of
retaining difference not only in time, but also *in relation to itself*.
Memory, rhythm, and qualia all become structured within the act
of differentiation as conditions for prediction. Yet prediction gains
significance only when external difference is perceived as *relevant to
the differentiating system*: not just “what”, but “what does this mean
for me?” This marks the emergence of a new level of differentia-
tion—*teleological*: the external acquires directionality, significance,
and weight.

This directedness is not rational or conceptual. It arises as a new
*modus* of differentiation: the differentiation of the world *as mean-
ingful*, embodied in the organism as *motivation* and *emotion*. In this
context, difference acts not merely as a difference in state, but as a dif-
ference in relation: not simply “present” or “absent”, but “desirable”,
“threatening”, “intolerable”, “preferable.”

*Emotion* is not simply a bodily reaction; it is a form of differ-
entiation that emerges at the intersection of internal state and ex-
ternal stimulus. It configures a situation as meaningful: threaten-
ing, hostile, inviting. Through emotion, difference acquires affective
valence: it is not only registered but also directs the organism's re-
sponse. Emotions are *differentiating acts* wherein the psyche retains
differences between inner and outer in subjective states (joy/sadness,
fear/calm). They add not just form but *intensity* to the structure of
consciousness. Here, difference is not just marked—it unfolds as ten-
sion, as the dynamic of a field. Emotion renders difference not only
*recognized but felt*.
Psychological disorders can be interpreted as disruptions of res-
onance between differentiating nodes. In dissociation, for instance,
difference as structure may be preserved, but the link between inner
and outer, between parts of experience, breaks down. This illustrates
that emotion is not an addition to consciousness, but its *plastic foundation*—that through which differentiation becomes flexible and
alive.

*Motivation* is the structure that holds preferences within the stream of differences. It determines which differences will be noticed, which ignored, and which become goals. Motivation cannot be reduced to instinct—it is not merely the search for food or the avoidance of pain, but a system of orientation in which difference is directed toward the future. The organism does not simply react to stimuli; it *seeks out* the situation in which the stimulus might arise, acting toward it. This is *the differentiation of the possible*—the anticipated—that becomes the basis for action. In ants, for example, motivation is manifest in their persistent following of pheromone trails: the scent becomes a difference not for itself, but for its *goal*, forming a directedness toward the future.

To illustrate this transition, consider an animal that initially ex-
periences light as mere irritation, like a sea anemone that contracts
in response to illumination. Over time, this irritation transforms: the
animal begins to differentiate light direction, compare its intensity,
and associate it with heat or danger, forming stable behavioral pat-
terns. Irritability becomes emotion—a bodily form of significance.
The consistent preference of one strategy becomes motivation. Be-
havior can no longer be understood without reference to what it
“prefers”, even if this preference is not yet consciously represented.

In mathematical terms, this can be modeled as a system with a
utility function: differences (inputs) are evaluated in terms of their
significance (utility), forming an orientation of action where signif-
icance is determined not by external conditions, but by the system's
internal structure.

Thus, emotions and motivations are *forms of differentiation* in
which the organism begins to differentiate not only stimuli, but its
*relation* to them. This difference is experienced as inner tension, as
directedness, as significance. Only in this context does choice be-
come possible, along with learning and re-differentiation depending
on internal state, not just external circumstance. Emotions and moti-
vations form an internal *topology of differentiation*—a map of differ-
ences organized not around the external, but around *what is felt*.

This topology is not yet symbolic, but it opens the possibility of
language. Here, for the first time, arises the difference between “neu-
tral” and “important”, “meaningful” and “empty.” This difference is
not understood, not named, but it already *acts*—as a principle of se-
lection, as a basis for memory, as anticipation of the future.

Without internal differentiation, further movement toward rep-
resentation, sign, and symbol would not be possible. Only difference
that has become *significant*—at the level of body, feeling, and dri-
ve—can be retained, transformed, and ultimately transmitted. Emo-
tion and motivation are not accidental “add-ons” but *fundamental
modes of differentiation* in which the internal scene appears, *preceding
language*.

In the case of a chimpanzee using a stick to extract termites, mo-
tivation (to obtain food) and emotion (satisfaction or frustration)
create an internal scene where the difference between “success” and
“failure” becomes *meaningful*, laying the groundwork for the eventu-
al designation of that difference. Here emerges a space in which dif-
ference may be *understood*—not yet named, but already *experienced
as meaningful*.
# Levels of Differentiation: An Ontological Framework

Up to this point, we have traced the unfolding of differentiating structures across various forms—from those that *preserve* difference to those that *sustain* it as internal organization. It is now time to formalize the general principle by which these forms can be understood as *levels of differentiation*. By a level of differentiation, we mean a *mode of ontological retention of difference*—a stable configuration in which difference not only arises but is preserved, reproduced, and capable of guiding further development. In this ontological model of differentiation, we designate levels of differentiating organization as $R_x$ (from *reflection*), where *x* refers to the degree of *stability* and *re-flexivity* of difference. These levels should not be understood as stages of evolution or a linear progression, but as enduring modes of difference-retention, each articulating a particular way of being-differentiating.

The first mode, labeled $R_0$, is *potential difference*—a difference that has not yet been retained. It manifests as a momentary event of differentiation, unanchored in structure or sequence. This is difference as a singular occurrence, without memory, orientation, or form. The internal boundary between “self” and “non-self” appears only within the act itself and does not persist beyond it. A node at this level exists as a vanishing flash of differentiation, incapable of reproducing itself. In physics, this can be compared to quantum fluctuations—transient appearances of particle-antiparticle pairs in the vacuum, producing momentary differences in energy that immediately vanish without forming enduring structures.

The next mode, $R_1$, emerges when difference begins to be retained in stable forms. This may take the form of crystalline structures, chemical configurations, biological tissues, or genetic code.
The key here is the emergence of *structural memory*, in which differ-
ence is not only enacted but held. These forms do not think, but they
do form a topology of difference, whose stability makes repetition,
accumulation, and modification possible. At this level, a *fixed bound-
ary* appears for the first time—and it is this boundary that makes the
*reproduction of difference* possible.

The subsequent mode, R₂, is characterized by difference becom-
ing a temporal process—retained not just in form but in a *sequence
of states*. This is the level of animal organisms with sensorimotor sys-
tems, cyclical memory, and behavioral adaptation. Here, difference
is not merely *recurrent* but *anticipated, postponed, and processed*. A
being at this level forms a stable center of differentiation—not nec-
essarily conscious, but capable of comparing the present state with
both past and future ones. At this stage, difference becomes direc-
tional: it is not only *present* but unfolds as an *inner dynamic*, enabling
correction, learning, recognition, interruption, and return.

This transition occurs in living beings equipped with sensorimo-
tor organization. Here, difference is no longer just bodily or struc-
tural—it is reproduced as an *event* within a sequence of states. The
animal not only differentiates but does so *within time*. It responds
not simply to the *presence* of difference but to its recurrence, to its
*possibility*, to the *delay* between perception and action. In this struc-
ture, difference acquires *temporal stability* for the first time: it is giv-
en, held, and processed as an element of internal experience. Thus
arises a minimal form of a *temporal differentiating center*. This cen-
ter is not reflexive, nor does it possess a symbolic apparatus, but it is
stable—it returns to itself through differentiation, holds itself with-
in difference, and forms a structure in which difference is not merely
preserved, but linked to the system's past and future states.

At the R₂ level, difference is no longer tethered solely to the pre-
sent moment—it is pulled into a chain of differentiated differences,
forming a stable orientation for the system. In this sense, “animal”
does not refer to a zoological category but to an ontological mode wherein difference *begins to exist* as *oriented internal dynamics*. Here arises the first true possibility of what will later become symbolic. This is internally organized differentiating movement, which does not require representation—it is *its own enactment*. The retention of difference occurs not through image but through behavior, not through designation but through *cyclical coordination* of perception and action. One might model this as a recurrent system: a state (difference) is held, updated in each cycle, and influences the next step, forming a stable sequence without naming that sequence.

The R₂ level is thus where difference achieves *stability in time*, forming a loop of differentiation that returns to itself. This loop is the precondition for consciousness: a difference that not only differentiates an external object but also *its relation to it*; a difference unfolded in a flow capable of recognizing return, absence, and delay. There is no symbolic language here yet, but there is already a *differentiating center* that makes its emergence possible.

The R₃ mode begins where the act of differentiation itself becomes *differentiated*. This is the level at which the differentiating system not only holds difference in bodily modality but is capable of distinguishing the modality itself, recognizing it as *form* and *representing it outside the present situation*. If R₂ is *differentiation of difference*, where the system acts within modalities—differentiating pain, color, sound as stable bodily forms relevant to action but without recognizing these modalities as such—then R₃ is *differentiation of the differentiation of difference*, or more concisely: *reflexive differentiation* of qualia as forms of difference. At R₂, these modalities remain immanent, embedded in the body, not externalized. At R₃, a qualitatively new mode of differentiation emerges: difference is preserved as *a form*, independent of the current situation. It is retained not as sensation or movement but as a *possibility* of differentiation—*deferred*, *extracted*, and *preserved*.
This is *representation*—a structure in which difference does not vanish with the end of the act but becomes available for further differentiating operations. Representation is not the same as image or memory, and it is not necessarily visual or spatial. It is a mechanism for holding difference outside its current manifestation, enabling its return, manipulation, and reflection. At this level, difference ceases to be reactive: it is retained as potential, recallable without repeating the context. Thus, an *internal scene* of differentiation is formed—*imagination*: a space where objects are not only differentiated but *held* in their difference, as distinguishable from other forms.

At this stage, difference becomes *symbolic*. A *symbol* is a difference retained in a form distinct from the body and action. It is a differentiation that can be repeated and recognized—not as reaction, but as *sign*. This gives rise to *language*—a system of differences retained and organized as a reflection of memory, outside of reaction and object. It is a field in which difference can be preserved, transmitted, reinterpreted. Language is the $R_3$ level's form of stable differentiation retention. Its basic unit is the *sign*—a difference that reflects what is differentiated, and retains the power to differentiate.

At the $R_3$ level, the differentiating system becomes capable of *internal differentiation of differences*. It holds not only *what* it differentiates, but *how* it does so. It operates on differences independent of their presence, distinguishing modalities, forms, perspectives, and possibilities. Here emerges the *subject*—not as an autonomous “I”, but as a *node* of symbolic difference-retention: a structure capable of differentiating *ways of differentiating*. Thus, $R_3$ marks the transition from *modal difference* to *representation*, from sensation to sign, from action to the capacity to differentiate *outside* of action. It is the level where difference becomes *transferable, nameable, reversible*. In this lies the formation of the *internal scene* of the differentiator, where symbol and subject become possible—as *forms of Potency held in deferred manifestation*.
To summarize:

R₀ — difference as a flash without trace; not retained or reproducible.

R₁ — difference as form; gains stability in structures such as crystals or genetic code.

R₂ — difference as modality; differentiations such as qualia are held in the body and guide behavior.

R₃ — difference as representation; differentiation of differentiation, enabling reflection and symbol.

This sequence is not an evolutionary ladder nor a developmental hierarchy. It consists of distinct ontological regimes in which difference is *held* in different ways. Each level does not replace the previous, but includes and reorganizes it into a new order. In this logic, difference does not *progress*, but rather *takes form*—it does not move toward an end, but acquires increasingly complex modes of *stability and reproducibility*.
Node, Potentiality, and the Freedom of
Differentiation

In previous section, we described the levels of differentiation ($R_0-R_3$) as forms of stable retention of differences. We traced how the structure of the differentiating agent is shaped, how it accumulates stability, and how it organizes internal dynamics. However, it remains to clarify how Potentiality operates within this hierarchy — and what freedom means for the node in such a context.

A node does not merely give form to difference — it localizes Potentiality without exhausting it. Potentiality continues to act through the structure, and in this lies the source of freedom. Here, freedom is not arbitrariness or autonomy, but the node's capacity to differentiate otherwise, to redraw a boundary, to disrupt the current configuration of differences. To be free means to retain the possibility of another relationality, sustaining difference as open.

But such freedom is not given once and for all. As the node ascends through levels of differentiation, it consolidates — and loses flexibility. Every form of difference limits what can be differentiated within a given configuration. The node becomes the bearer of an already formed system of differences, and only in moments of tension or saturation can a transition occur. It is precisely then, as we have seen in the two laws, that Potentiality either breaks through to a new level or transforms form while preserving difference in another way.

At the zero level of differentiation ($R_0$), the node flares up as a moment of difference, without retaining itself. It is entirely open to Potentiality but does not preserve it. This is maximum freedom — without structure, without memory, without trace. But precisely this lack of stability makes such freedom instantaneous and incapable of continuation. Potentiality appears but cannot be unfolded.
At level R₁, form arises: difference is fixed, structure is held. This is the first step toward memory, but also the first step toward limitation: the node now differentiates only within the bounds of its configuration. Freedom gives way to stability. Yet here the second law of ontology also begins to act: difference strives to persist, even if its form is constrained — in a crystal, in a molecule, in a genetic code. The form may be rigid, but the difference within it — continues.

At level R₂, difference acquires dynamics. The node becomes an animal: the differentiating agent retains not only form but also change. It is capable of contextual differentiation, reaction, adaptation. The first law manifests: when individual responses can no longer differentiate, the whole system begins to retain difference through behavior, the body, and learning. The animal is a node in which Potentiality does not vanish when reactions are fixed, but unfolds as temporal difference. Yet freedom here remains adaptive, not reflexive.

At level R₃, the differentiating agent differentiates the act of differentiation itself: symbol, sign, detachment appear. The node gains the capacity to differentiate itself — not as a body, but as a form of difference. Here, freedom is for the first time constituted as the capacity to rethink: difference now not only acts, but can be designated, transmitted, contested. But this also gives rise to a new unfreedom: the symbolic system begins to lock in difference, turning it into structure. Potentiality once again densifies, becoming symbolic, dogmatic, ideological.

Thus, the freedom of the node is not an absolute given, but a tension between the openness of Potentiality and the stability of form. The more formed a node is, the more it is capable of interaction, but the less spontaneous it becomes. Yet within this balance operates the dynamic of the two laws of the ontology of differentiation: when local freedom is lost, it is transmitted to a new level; when form loses flexibility, difference is preserved in a different configuration.
Therefore, the freedom of the node is not a state, but a strained relation to its own form. As long as the node is capable of differentiating a boundary as a boundary — it lives. As long as the form of difference can be differentiated — it does not become dogma. Potentiality does not disappear into structure, so long as structure is not closed upon itself.
Language as a Form of Differentiation at
Level R₃

The transition from differentiation rooted in stable temporal cycles (R₂) to differentiation detached from immediate perception is not an evolutionary complication, but an ontological rupture. Language does not arise as a byproduct of cognitive surplus, nor as an extension of sensorimotor regulation, nor from communicative need. It emerges precisely where the sensorimotor system fails to restore a difference — as a form capable of preserving difference under conditions of its loss. This is the ontological precondition for level R₃.

At level R₂, a differentiating being organizes its behavior in ac-
cordance with recurring cycles. Memory and orientation depend on
predictability: day follows night, hunger precedes food, pain accom-
panies danger. Difference is embedded in rhythm and preserved as a
functional relation to return. For instance, the waggle dance of the
bee (Apis mellifera), pointing toward a nectar source, is based on the
predictable return of the solar cycle, where the difference (position
of the sun) is embedded in the sensorimotor rhythm. But when such
cycles are disrupted, difference no longer provides stability. If the
environmental rhythm is broken, the pattern destroyed, the stimu-
lus absent — the forms of differentiating stability collapse. A being
that relies on predictability faces the need to preserve what can no
longer be directly differentiated. A crow (Corvus corone), encounter-
ing the disappearance of a familiar food source due to drought, finds
behavior based on former cycles ineffective. This compels it to retain
the difference (food) as a form independent of the current situation,
through memory of potential locations.

Language arises in this lacuna. It does not continue differenti-
ation — it replaces it, compensating for its loss. It does not dupli-
cate reality but creates the possibility of differentiation where reality
has become indiscernible. In language, *difference is no longer tied to presence, but to absence*. It becomes operable as a form preserved outside its referent, repeatable without empirical foundation. This is the sign: a difference untied from what is differentiated, capable of being retained as a form that survives loss. For example, the word *winter* retains the difference (cold, snow), even if winter is absent from the current context, allowing one to operate with the difference beyond its immediate presence. In this sense, language is not an act of designation, but a technique of compensatory differentiation. It does not record what is, but holds difference in the mode of its impossibility, enabling differentiation not because the differentiated is present, but because differentiation becomes possible as operation in void.

Historically, this may be linked to abrupt environmental changes: shifts in climate, disruption of seasons, disappearance of reliable signals. The differentiating animal is confronted with the need to differentiate not only what returns, but the breakdown of return. This difference — the instability of difference — demands a new level of retention. This is where $R_3$ arises: holding difference as representation, as form preserved in perspective, not in situation. It is precisely here that what will later become language begins to take shape. Language arises not as the name of an object and not as a tool of communication, but as a technique of retaining differences lost in bodily modality. It is not a mirror of the world, but a model of differences that are no longer confirmed. Language preserves the structure of differentiation under conditions where the world no longer guarantees its return.

At level $R_3$, the sign is a difference differentiated as a difference. But in language, the sign also becomes a means of reconstructing the lost. Where the differentiated has vanished, the sign preserves its form of difference. The representation that emerges at level $R_3$ already sets the structure of unbound difference; language systematizes this structure and gives it an articulable form. It is not an extension
of thought — it precedes it, as the scene in which difference becomes accessible beyond presence. Language is not a superstructure above cognition, but an ontological form of retaining difference in time, emerging as a response to the collapse of sensorimotor coordination. It does not require the presence of what is differentiated. It works with its possibility, with absence, with the ghost of recurrence. Mathematically, this may be likened to the introduction of zero: a sign that does not indicate presence but substitutes for absence, allowing the system to operate with difference (absence of value) within a structure.

This makes language a special manifestation of $R_3$: it does not arise as a behavioral extension but as a compelled stabilization of difference in the absence of its grounding. The sign becomes not a designation of what is present, but a trace, preserving difference after the disappearance of what was once differentiated. Language thus becomes portable difference, organized into a system that does not require bodily reaction. Language retains difference within time, making the differentiating agent autonomous from presence. In this sense, language becomes the ground of a new subjectivity — not one that differentiates the world, but one that differentiates the *possibility* of differentiation. This is the complete manifestation of $R_3$: difference detached from action, differentiated as form, held within a system of signs. Ontologically, language is the next step in the recursion of differentiation.

Language enables the transition to level $R_4$ — the differentiation of differentiating structures as such. But language itself belongs to $R_3$. It allows the differentiating agent to operate with differences beyond their immediate presence, laying the groundwork for the next ontological level, where difference not only becomes portable, but becomes capable of differentiating itself.
The Ontological Threshold between
Levels R<sub>2</sub> and R<sub>3</sub>

The boundary between levels of differentiation R<sub>2</sub> and R<sub>3</sub> is not a boundary of complexity, nor of an expanded behavioral repertoire, and it does not correspond to a linear progression in which a sensorimotor organization develops into representation. Rather, it concerns a difference in the very modality of the differentiating act. R<sub>2</sub> and R<sub>3</sub> belong to different regimes of holding difference, and the transition between them cannot be described in terms of accumulation.

At level R<sub>2</sub>, differentiation is organized as a stable bodily presence attuned to environmental rhythms. The organism differentiates events, anticipates recurrence, and adapts its behavior to repeating patterns. Memory at this level is memory of return, repetition, recognition. Sensorimotor subjectivity forms as a stable differentiating center that responds to the predictability of experience. However, differentiation at level R<sub>2</sub> remains inseparable from its grounding. It operates within the structure of recurrence: what is differentiated is what has already been differentiated; what is recognized is what returns. Yet when difference is no longer confirmable, it loses stability. The differentiating act is temporally rooted — but this temporality is cyclical and reiterative.

The transition to level R<sub>3</sub> does not occur as a generalization or refinement of R<sub>2</sub>, but as an ontological rupture. When the structure of the environment loses its repeatability, bodily differentiation loses its support. A situation arises in which difference cannot be confirmed through repetition, and the differentiating being is confronted with the necessity of retaining difference without the act of return. Level R<sub>3</sub> emerges precisely when this repeatability collapses. Where difference is no longer stable, where cyclical differentiation ceases to return, the need arises to hold it not as presence but as possibility.
Thus, representation takes shape — a difference that can be retained outside of situation, body, and action. Representation is a difference that can return without the return of the differentiated.

At this level, an internal scene of differentiation is formed. The differentiating being retains not only what has occurred but the *possibility* of what could be differentiated. Difference becomes portable, operable, reconfigurable. The differentiating being begins to distinguish potential differences, not merely actual ones. A perspective appears in which difference exists as form — unbound from specific contexts. The sign, the symbol, the designation emerge — not as names for objects, but as the retention of the differentiated in the absence of the object. Language, as a technique of differentiation in the absence of the differentiated, becomes possible for the first time.

The ontological boundary between levels R<sub>2</sub> and R<sub>3</sub> runs not between types of organisms or behavioral forms, but between difference rooted in time and difference capable of existing outside time. At level R<sub>2</sub>, difference is preserved in rhythm; at level R<sub>3</sub> — in structure, in possibility, in representation. This is not the continuation of a cycle but its rupture: difference that has become independent of its own ground. At this level, the subject ceases to be a bodily reaction and becomes a structure capable of holding difference as a form distinguishable from its application. This is not the subject as "I," but a subject as a model of differentiation capable of distinguishing differences between differences — in perspective, in delay, in absence of external grounding.

Thus, level R<sub>3</sub> opens at the moment when the differentiating being first retains difference as *potential absence* — that is, when it differentiates *possibility* beyond space and time. This is not merely a new layer of memory but a new organization of the differentiating structure. Here, personality first takes form as a differentiating structure capable of distinguishing differences outside empirical acts. It is not a closure of a cycle but its disruption — a gesture in which difference
continues itself not as repetition but as the possibility of differentia-
tion *as such*. Levels R₀–R₃ describe not an evolution of life but a log-
ical pattern of differentiation, whose stability forms the conditions
for the emergence of *personality*. Personality is not a starting point,
but the result of the stability of the differentiating structure — one
that retains difference not only in the moment but in the very struc-
ture of possibilities. It is not given as form but emerges as an effect
of the interrelation of levels: the act at level R₀, form at level R₁, time
at level R₂, and perspective at level R₃. Personality is the capacity of
difference to hold itself not only as something already differentiated
(the level of subject at R₂), but also as something absent, as a personal
history, and as a projection within the space of potential differentia-
tion.

This, in turn, reveals the logical necessity of the next level —
R₄, in which differences themselves become the objects of differen-
tiation, and structure begins to differentiate itself as structure. For
example, the ability to formulate abstract concepts such as *justice*
demonstrates a transition to R₄: difference (*justice*) becomes the ob-
ject of differentiation, and the structure (a moral system) begins to
reflect on itself as a structure through reflexive operations.
Level R₄: Differentiating Differentiation
as Reflection

At level R₃, difference becomes symbolically articulated: it becomes transferable, detached from immediate perception, represented in the form of signs, structures, language. The differentiating being operates with representations, signs, and structures of possibility. However, even here, the act of differentiation itself remains undifferentiated: the subject operates with differences but does not differentiate the form of its differentiating activity, remaining within a system whose rules and boundaries are not themselves thematized. Language differentiates in absence, but it does not differentiate the differentiating structure itself. The transition to R₄ occurs at the moment when the differentiating being begins to differentiate the conditions of its differentiating activity. This is not mere self-awareness or introspection, but an ontological shift: a third-order differentiation in which the differentiating subject becomes the object of differentiation. The subject differentiates not only *what* it differentiates, but also *how* and — crucially — *why* it differentiates in the particular way it does.

Reflection arises at level R₄ as a structure in which the differentiating act is not only possible but included within the very field of differentiation. It does not introduce new content, but rather fixes the very form of differentiating activity — its conditions, rules, constraints, modalities. This makes logic, concept formation, and meta-description possible. Logic here is not a formal language but a mode of holding the boundaries of differentiability. It describes the possible forms of differentiation, tests their consistency, and organizes fields of difference. The capacity emerges to formulate rules of differentiability — not merely to use symbols, but to construct a system in which symbols acquire differentiability, and to distinguish permis-
sible from impermissible differentiations. It becomes possible to describe regularities — forms in which difference acquires regularity as a reflection of the structure of differentiability within the very form of differentiating activity.

This transformation at $R_4$ also affects the very structure of language. Language ceases to be a tool of naming and becomes a medium of reflective differentiation. One no longer merely speaks; one organizes the conditions under which speaking becomes differentiable. As Lévy-Bruhl noted in his studies of so-called “primitive” languages, such as those of indigenous Amazonian peoples, the capacity for abstraction is not absent — it is structured differently. These languages often encode relations not as universal categories, but as situational differentiations: direction, animacy, shape, social proximity. Thus, the logic of differentiation is embedded in the structure of the language itself, prior to explicit formalization. The emergence of logic, in this context, is not a break with linguistic expression, but its recursive stabilization.

The concept arises as a form of difference detached not only from context but also from any singular symbol. It is a structure of differentiability that can be applied to a multiplicity of instances while maintaining its differentiating function. A concept holds difference in an abstract form — not as a name (a single detached differentiation), but as a structure of differentiation open to verification, redefinition, and reconstruction.

At level $R_4$, the subject ceases to be merely the historical trajectory of a differentiating process; it becomes a system capable of differentiating not only differences but also the grounds upon which those differences are held. This is the emergence of *personhood*. A person can distinguish *why* they differentiate, *how* they differentiate, and *what* renders these differences meaningful. They become aware of their own conditions of differentiability.
Thus, personhood forms a *worldview* — a coherent system of dif-
ferentiating the world and oneself, in which stability is ensured not
by repetition, but by the selection of a framework of differentiation.
A worldview is not a collection of beliefs, but a mode of holding dif-
ferences as meaningful in relation to the differentiating subject. In
this context, *character* emerges — a stable configuration of differen-
tiating preferences: what one is sensitive to, what one considers es-
sential, how one structures the internal field of difference. Charac-
ter is the topology of the differentiating subject within the scene of
the world; worldview is the logic by which this field is organized. To-
gether they form a mode of subjectivity that not only acts but is ca-
pable of revising itself as a differentiating structure.

This makes not only knowledge but *meta-knowledge* possible —
not only action, but the restructuring of the conditions for action.
Theoretical systems, categorial models, scientific disciplines, logics,
and second-order languages become available. Level R₄ is the level at
which difference becomes fully transparent to itself — in the sense
of open self-reflection.

However, this level is not a culmination. It opens up new risks:
the enclosure of difference within structure, excessive self-reference,
the loss of freedom. Stable difference can become self-serving.
Hence, the subject at R₄ is not a completed figure, but a point of bi-
furcation. From here, two directions are possible: either the stabiliza-
tion of differentiation within a closed system with a loss of freedom,
or a transition to other forms — beyond subjectivity, beyond differ-
entiation as an operational function.

Thus, level R₄ does not define the individual but constitutes dif-
ferentiation as an *architecture of difference* capable of including itself
within its own act of differentiation. Level R₄ is the space in which
*difference differentiates the differentiation of differentiation*, thereby
opening the domain of *meta-ontology* — the differentiation of possi-
ble modes of differentiating.
Classical logic, in both its Aristotelian and formal-mathematical expressions, is traditionally conceived as the discipline governing correct inference. Within the ontology of differentiation, however, logic cannot be accepted as ontologically primary. Rather, it is derivative of a deeper structure — the structure of retained distinctions. This means that logic does not precede differentiation but emerges from an already formed and stabilized system of differentiating nodes. Such a system corresponds to level R₃ — the level where differentiation has already undergone structural, cyclical, and embodied-temporal consolidation (R₀–R₂) and has become language, that is, a symbolic system of distinctions. Yet it is only recognized *as such* at level R₄.

Logic is a mode of operating within distinctions inside a stable, symbolically encoded environment. It is applicable only when differences are already retained in stable form, do not decay over time, and allow for repeated reproduction. Thus, logic is not a universal principle of thought but a specific instrument suited for operation within dead, frozen structures. In this sense, logic serves mechanical, technical, and disciplinary knowledge — domains where differentiation does not fluctuate but has been stabilized.

Formal logical laws — the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, the law of the excluded middle — represent limit cases of retained distinctions. In them, difference is driven to an absolute: the differentiated can no longer change form, cross a boundary, or be held in ambiguity. These are not ontological truths but heuristics that function within systems where symbols are not alive but serve already-fixed meanings. Their application is possible only within closed spaces, where full identification is assumed (A = A) and multiplicity of states is disallowed (¬(A ∧ ¬A)). But they do not describe the real process of differentiation — only its simplified projection.
In actual ontological terms, differentiation is neither stable nor final. At level R<sub>2</sub>, difference is still embodied and processual; at level R<sub>4</sub>, it is already reflexive and resists structural closure. In all such regimes, logic as a system of fixation cannot be universal. Its application becomes problematic when it pretends to describe the living, the changing, or the asymmetrical. For example, importing logical constraints of identity or non-contradiction into domains such as psyche, politics, or ontology does not clarify but rather reduces.

Here, it is appropriate to turn to dialectics, especially that of Hegel. Dialectical logic also acknowledges differentiation as the driving force of thought, but interprets it as the unfolding of contradiction within the concept itself. In this sense, dialectics is closer to the ontology of differentiation than classical logic, as it affirms the internal instability of the differentiated. However, Hegelian dialectics, oriented toward *sublation* (*Aufhebung*) and synthesis, retains a teleological character — presupposing movement toward the "absolute concept" or completed totality. This, too, stands in tension with a model in which difference does not lead to resolution but is retained in an open, unresolved field. In the ontology of differentiation, there is no synthesis: differences are not annulled, but coexist, resonate, and sometimes destabilize structure.

This issue is especially relevant in light of the development of paraconsistent and alternative logical systems. For instance, George Spencer-Brown's *Laws of Form* is not based on truth and falsity but on the primary act of differentiation as a graphic operation — the marking of a distinction in an empty space. His "cross" is not a logical assertion but an operation of distinction that precedes content. This aligns closely with the ontology presented here, in which differentiation is not reducible to binary opposition but is the foundation of structure itself.

A similar position is found in Niklas Luhmann's systems theory, where logic arises as the operational stability of differentiating sys-
tems acting according to internal schemes. Logic, here, is not univer-
sal but contextual: each observer operates within their own logic of
distinction. This undermines the notion of logic as an external meta-
instance and brings it closer to the idea of *internal resonance* among
differentiating nodes.

Likewise, within paraconsistent logic or intuitionistic frame-
works, efforts are made to reconstruct the very structure of inference
without the demand for the absolute exclusion of contradiction.
Here, context outweighs form, and distinctions may be retained even
in contradictory states. This is especially important for describing dy-
namic, processual, or living systems, where change does not reduce
to alternation between true and false propositions, but unfolds as a
complex dynamics of distinctions.

Thus, classical formal logic is not a universal language of truth,
but a local strategy for retaining difference in a particular regime of
stability. Its ontological status is limited: it applies within zones of
fixation but cannot serve as the criterion of ontological validity in
fields where difference remains open, multiple, and mutable. The log-
ic of differentiation does not coincide with formal logic: it admits
transitions, ambiguity, and unresolved tension. In this logic, a
boundary is not once and for all drawn but is held in process — and
it is precisely in this process that thought is born.
Interlude: The Absence of the "Hard Problem of Consciousness" in the Ontology of Differentiation

Contemporary philosophy of mind is preoccupied with what is known as the *hard problem of consciousness*, formulated by David Chalmers. This problem highlights a fundamental paradox: even a complete description of neurophysiological, behavioral, and cognitive processes does not explain why and how subjective phenomenal experience arises — the sensation of pain, color, taste, fear, or the inner *what-it-is-like*. Thomas Nagel, in his seminal essay *What Is It Like to Be a Bat?* (1974), emphasized this irreducible subjectivity, arguing that we can never fully grasp the experience of another being (e.g., a bat's echolocation), as it is inherently bound to a first-person perspective inaccessible to objective description. This presupposes an ontological gap between structural organization and phenomenal experience.

Within the framework of the ontology of differentiation, however, such a gap does not arise. Phenomenality is not treated as a distinct metaphysical entity requiring special explanation. Rather, it is interpreted as a mode of sustained differentiation emerging at specific levels of differentiating organization. *Qualia*, in this context, are not private internal entities or residues of consciousness but distinctions retained within a bodily system, absent of reflection, yet already modifying behavior. They are neither illusions nor components of an “inner theater”, but also require no special ontological status. Their existence is a consequence of the stabilization of difference within a sensitive organism — not yet reflected as an act of differentiation. Pain, color, and fear are differences retained within modal configurations of the organism, connected to survival, orientation, and reactivity. Qualia do not reproduce the external world but encode it
through modalities of resilient sensitivity. For a bat, echolocation is not a subjective experience detached from its body, but a difference retained in its sensorimotor system enabling spatial orientation. Phenomenality, therefore, is not the antithesis of structure but a *modalità of difference*.

The model of levels of differentiation clarifies how *qualia* arise at level R₂, where behavior is temporally organized but not yet inclusive of differentiation of the differentiating itself. At level R₃, these differences are shaped into representations; at level R₄, they become objects of reflection, allowing one to conceptualize phenomenality as “my experience.” For instance, the capacity to reflect on the sensation of *blue* at level R₄ allows one not only to retain the difference as a *quale* (R₂) or a symbol (R₃), but to analyze how it structures perception, transforming it into an object of conceptual scrutiny. While Nagel claims that "being a bat" is inaccessible, within the ontology of differentiation this is not a metaphysical puzzle: the bat's experience is simply a difference retained by its bodily system at level R₂, which a human can distinguish at level R₄ through reflection — though not live through directly.

Indeed, we cannot know how a worm feels, but this is merely a feature of the metanodal architecture as a system of differentiation. Likewise, we do not know how precisely a conversational partner understands the word *blue* — what memories or affective tones it evokes — because we lack familiarity with their particular experiential history; nor can we know what it is *really like* for a musician to hear a certain musical work if we are not musicians ourselves.

The "hard problem of consciousness" arises only within frameworks that posit a dualism between structure and phenomenon — a dualism that the ontology of differentiation fundamentally rejects. Here, there is no ontological rupture between mechanism and experience, between body and subjectivity. Consciousness is not a layer above, but a transition *between* levels of retained differentiation. It