developing countries in forming bargaining coalitions in the climate negotiation.

The final cluster structure reveals that developing countries are grouped into nine clusters, which are very different from each other depending on some crucial characteristics. The principal driving forces forming the clusters are related to the energy system, the climate vulnerability and the economic development level.

It is worth noting that these are all crucial variables for climate change negotiations and might help better understanding the reasons behind bargaining positions of these countries, as well as the effective impacts of a potential climate agreement on heterogeneous interests.

Turning to the specific results of this statistical analysis, four out of the nine clusters deserve particular attention. A first group represents large energy exporting countries, mainly formed by OPEC countries. A second group very closely to the first one is formed by small energy exporting countries. Even though this second group has different structural features from the first one, the driving force played by the particular vulnerability to climate agreement caused by the dependency on energy exports might influence this second cluster to make a coalition with the large energy exporters, thus influencing substantially the negotiations outcome. The first policy suggestion for climate governance is to refine the criteria to protect energy exporting countries in order to account for their relative dependence on fossil fuels export with respect to their economic sustainability.

The third cluster gathers the largest number of countries, grouping together the Least Developed Countries in Africa South East Asia. This group is characterized by a high vulnerability degree to climate change and a low responsibility in GHGs emissions. This explains why LDCs ask for a stringent agreement including emerging economies. In terms of climate governance, this group might influence the final agreement in the direction of a challenging mitigation action but they also need a strong financial support for recovering climate damages. This particular double interests position might reduce their bargaining influence in the climate negotiations since they will not contribute to mitigation costs and they will benefit the most from international assistance.

On the contrary, the fourth cluster reveals that there are countries whose structural features put them in a contrasting position with respect to any potential climate agreement outcome. More specifically, these are poor and vulnerable countries with a strong economic dependency from fossil fuels export. This means that if a challenging mitigation action will be settled, they will be negatively influenced by the reduction in international energy demand. At the same time, if the current GHGs emission pathway is not corrected by a climate agreement, these are countries that would face several damages caused by global warming. This can lead these countries to advocate different interests, joining alternative bargaining coalitions (LDCs as well as fossil fuel producers) during different COPs. Given that whatever the results in negotiations, they always lose as they have to sacrifice an improvement in terms of vulnerability in favour of economic benefits or vice versa, this specific group represents a source of particular uncertainty in the climate governance process.

The results obtained by applying a statistical cluster method to group developing countries involved in climate negotiations help highlighting the specific features driving vulnerability as well as bargaining positions. This brings to suggest to policy makers that in order to facilitate climate governance is highly recommended to take into account the largest number of vulnerability sources to climate issues, in order to design specific complementary measures necessary to minimize costs for every country.

P-4409-09

Renewable energy: past trends and future growth in 2 degrees scenarios

W. Crijns-Graus (1)

(1) Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, Department of innovation, environmental and energy sciences, Utrecht, Netherlands

Many studies agree that a transition to a sustainable energy supply is needed in order to safeguard the supply of energy for future generations and abate greenhouse

gas emissions. Limiting the average global surface temperature increase to 2°C, compared to pre-industrial average, is commonly regarded as an adequate means of avoiding dangerous climate change. In many scenarios that envision a development of energy supply that would be in line with a 2 degrees target, a large component of the solution consists of renewable energy and energy efficiency. Renewable energy would be in the range of 200-300 EJ in 2050, equivalent to 40-80% of total primary energy supply in 2010. This means an increase by a factor of 3 to 4 compared to 74 EJ in 2012 (IEA, 2014).

In spite of a significant increase in the use for renewable energy in the period 2000 to 2012 (from 54 EJ to 74 EJ), the share of renewable energy in total energy use has remained constant at 13%. A reason can be found in the growth of total energy use and hence non-renewable energy use, which increased likewise.

This research explores past growth rates for different types of renewable energy and required future growth rates in available 2 degrees scenarios. For this purpose past trends in renewable energy use in the period 1971 to 2012 are analysed and future contributions are explored.

From the analysis of past trends it becomes clear that in spite of comparatively high growth of renewable energy in the period 2000-2012, the share of renewable energy stayed the same due to similar increases in non-renewable energy use. Only a few countries managed to increase the share of renewable energy in their fuel mix. Most notably Germany demonstrated an effective increase in renewable energy from 3% in 2000 to 11% in 2012. This was achieved by a high overall growth rate for renewable energy of 11%/yr and a decrease in primary energy use of 0.7%/yr. Energy and climate policies in EU28 overall showed an effect by increasing the share of renewable energy from 6% in 2000 to 11% in 2012 with slightly decreasing energy use. China and India showed decreasing shares of renewable energy due to a high growth rate for total energy use combined with more moderate overall growth rates of renewable energy.

The overall increase in renewable energy amounted to 2.2%/yr in the period 1971-2012 and 2.6%/yr in the period 2000-2012. In order to be consistent with a 2 degrees pathway these growth rates would need to increase to 3-5%/yr. Biomass is at the moment the largest source of renewable energy used globally, equivalent to 10% of total primary energy use in 2012, followed by hydro power responsible for 2%. A transition of energy supply in order to help achieve a 2 degrees target would not only require a strong growth of renewable energy in absolute and relative sense, but also a strong shift to other renewable energy sources than biomass and hydro. Especially high growth would be required for wind, solar and geothermal in the order of 10%/yr. This would lead to a change in the mix of renewable energy used, with a much higher share of variable renewable energy sources (VRES). Overall wind and solar energy use would need to increase by as much as a factor of 30-60 in 2050, in comparison to 2012 (from 3 EJ to 58-155 EJ). The share of renewable energy would be in the range of 40-80% of energy use, with the share of wind and solar amounting to 25-54% of renewable energy use.

However most notable from the assessment of future needed growth rates is, the strong difference in the required energy use for renewable energy, compared to past trends. For decades primary energy use needs to consistently decrease by 0.1-0.5%/yr for OECD regions. A decrease in energy use has not occurred in the past 40 years in OECD countries, except for a couple of years during a time of recession. This would therefore require a breach from past trends. But especially for non OECD regions the needed change is large. Regional growth rates for energy use in the period 2000-2012 range from 1.5%/yr to 5.5%/yr and should decrease to be within the range of -0.2%/yr to 0.9%/yr. Therefore, a main challenge, besides increasing the uptake of renewable energy, would lie in the decrease of energy use growth rates in non-OECD countries.

P-4409-10

Routes to an ambitious climate agreement in 2015

C. de Perthuis (1); PA. Jouvet (2)

(1) Climate Economics Chair, PARIS, France; (2) Paris Ouest Nanterre University, Economics, Nanterre, France
As shown by the collective action for the protection of the ozone layer under the Montreal Protocol, the success of a multilateral agreement rests on three pillars: strong political commitment, an independent and rigorous monitoring system, and economic instruments that transmit the right incentives. For it to be a success, the 2015 Paris climate conference will need to make progress on each of these three pillars. The Climate Economics Chair has focussed its research efforts on the pillar of economic instruments.

* The Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC states unequivocally that from 2020 all major emitters of greenhouse gas emissions must participate in the global effort to reduce emissions and limit average warming to no more than 2°C.

* In order to drastically curb emission trajectories, global carbon pricing should be rapidly introduced, so as to put pressure on governments to act cooperatively and to encourage economic actors to reduce emissions at the lowest cost.

* To encourage governments to reach a global agreement, a bonus-malus carbon pricing system, calculated on the basis of emissions per capita, could be introduced at a rate of $7-9 per tonne of CO2 equivalent from 2020.

* The most realistic way of introducing an international carbon price into the global economy is to lay the foundation, between 2015 and 2020, of a transcontinental carbon market, based on prototypes developed in Europe, China and the United States.

* The introduction of double carbon pricing would be subject to the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", aimed at reconciling joint action on climate change and the priority of access to development.

## How to increase mitigation? Some lessons from the Montreal Protocol on the protection of the ozone

J. De Sepibus (1)

(1) University of Benr, Law Faculty, Bern, Switzerland

The necessity to increase mitigation efforts, while addressing carbon leakage and generating climate finance, represents one of the most daunting challenges of the future climate regime. We argue that these goals could be achieved through the adoption of an agreement (hereafter the "Agreement") by a group of countries that set ambitious mitigation targets for specific sectors and impose border tax adjustments on commodities from non-parties that do not meet comparable carbon standards. The institutional architecture of such an agreement would be construed along the lines of the Montreal Protocol on the protection of the ozone layer, i.e. it would contain rules that assure that non-participants lose more from being outside the agreement than they gain. Moreover, to induce countries to participate, carrots would be offered in the guise of financial and technical assistance, based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

As the Montreal Protocol the new Agreement would a) provide for majority voting for the adoption of amendments b) have effective compliance mechanisms and c) rules ensuring due process of law. It would depart from the model of the Montreal Protocol insofar as 1) it would not address a progressive phase-out of specific substances, but aim at a progressive tightening of mitigation goals in specific carbon-intensive sectors, 2) it would not use trade bans of controlled substances from non-parties but adopt carbon taxes at the border 3) it would principally depend on the revenue of carbon taxes to pay financial and technical assistance. To ensure the comparability of mitigation efforts the Parties would inter alia develop common rules for sector data requirements, measurement, reporting and verification practices, methodologies underlying the calculation of the level of BCA from non-parties.

## Does fragmentation pay? Multiple international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

A. Hagen (1); K. Eisenack (1)

(1) Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg, Oldenburg, Germany

While the negative effects of greenhouse gas emissions and the global climate change are relatively well acknowledged amongst scientists, solutions for what should and could be done are difficult to make these problems are less agreed upon. Spillovers and the absence of clear property rights make it difficult to reach effective cooperation through international environmental agreements (IEAs). In light of the slow progress in international climate negotiations, the idea of climate clubs is getting increasing attention while the aim of negotiating one single universal agreement is identified as one primary obstacle to a global treaty within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric countries can sign multiple parallel environmental agreements. In a two-stage game, countries first choose whether they sign one agreement, or to be a non-signator. In the second stage, each coalition acts as a unitary actor in a non-cooperative Nash game between the coalitions and the non-signatories. We compare emissions abatement and coalition stability in the multiple IEAs case with the standard case where not more than one IEA is possible. After solving the model for the case of constant marginal benefits from abatement and constant marginal costs of abatement with two agreements we relax our assumptions and allow for multiple coalitions with multiple types of asymmetric countries. We then analyze the effect of multiple coalitions for the case of increasing marginal costs of abatement as well as for decreasing marginal benefits of abatement more generally. The results are sensitive to the assumptions on the benefits from abatement. For constant marginal benefits, the possibility of multiple agreements increases the number of cooperating countries and total abatement (compared to the standard case with a single agreement). For decreasing marginal benefits, total emissions are independent of the number of admitted agreements.

The comparison of the different cases shows that the effect of climate clubs substantially depends on the qualitative properties of abatement benefit functions. However, we can generally show for the above made assumptions that climate clubs are at least not detrimental to global cooperation. This paper also shows how different assumptions lead to different effects of country clubs. It is thus a consequent stepping stone towards a more detailed understanding of the determinants for beneficial or detrimental effects of climate clubs. In any case, it has to be concluded that the idea of climate clubs enhancing global climate protection has to be taken with precaution, but that it clearly deserves more analytical attention.

## Adapting, transforming, strategising: A conceptual capacities framework for resilience of climate governance

K. Hölscher (1); N. Frantzeskaki (2); D. Loorbach (3)

(1) DRIFT (Dutch Research Institute for Transitions), Rotterdam, Netherlands; (2) Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Netherlands; (3) Dutch Research Institute for Transitions, Rotterdam, Netherlands

Climate change will profoundly shape the future of human societies (IPCC 2014, Smith et al. 2011). Addressing climate change requires sustainability transitions of deeply entrenched drivers of climate change (Meadowcroft 2009). Uncertainties, the likelihood of surprises, non-linear and extreme impacts resulting from climate change demand managing social-ecological resilience across scales and times (Pelling 2011; Nelson 2011; Wise et al. 2014, Jäger et al. 2012). From the integration of transitions and resilience scholarships, we developed a conceptual framework for dealing with high uncertainty contexts and navigating through high level of complexity found in these contexts (Hölscher et al. 2014). The developed
governance framework conceptualises about the different types of agency capacities needed so as to reorient and/or transform on-going processes towards sustainability while fostering system's resilience, transience.

Transilience governance requires scale- and time- dependent stabilising and maintaining of system functions (adapting), creating of fundamentally new system structures and functions (transforming) and strategising towards sustainability within environmental and social preconditions. The governance capacities reside in public and private actors at local, regional, national and international levels and their abilities to "define the content of public goods and to shape the social, economic, and political processes by which these goods are provided" (Knil and Lehmkuhl 2002:43). In this paper we will address the following research question: How do certain agency factors shape the capacities for transilience governance?

We approach this question by developing and testing a conceptual capacities framework that is based on a literature review of transition studies, resilience thinking, social-ecological systems and climate change literatures. Our framework encompasses adaptive, transformative and strategic capacities that together enable transilience governance (Table 1). We conceptualise that the capacities are interrelated (Marshall et al. 2012, Wilson et al. 2013). The capacities are produced by the collective abilities of actors (individuals, organisations, networks) in social- ecological-technological systems. One actor can also enact different capacities.

<table><caption>Table 1: Definition of adaptive, transformative and strategic capacities</caption><thead><tr><td>Adaptive capacity</td><td>Transformative capacity</td><td>Strategic capacity</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>The ability to adapt system structures in order to maintain and stabilise system functions, reduce and/or enable coping with disturbances and/or operate upon origins and attributes of disturbances</td><td>The ability to transform system structures and functions in order to create fundamentally new system structures and functions when limits of adaptation are met and/or to operate upon origins and attributes of disturbances</td><td>The ability to strategise towards sustainability goals within environmental and social preconditions to orientate, balance and build adaptive and transformative capacities.</td></tr></tbody></table>

The collective abilities of actors to adapt, transform and strategise are determined by actors' willingness and skills and the strategies they employ to mobilise (human, mental, natural, artifactual, financial) resources (Adger et al. 2004, Armitage and Plummer 2010, Avelino 2011, Brown and Westaway 2011, Farla et al. 2012, Folke et al. 2002, Moore and Westley 2011, Westley et al. 2013). Adaptive skills and strategies accumulate resources, e.g. building reserves for protection or recovery of infrastructure, densifying networks, or institutionalising. Transformative skills and strategies draw and/or appropriate resources and/or mobilise latent or unused resources through e.g. networking, innovating, creating disturbances or visioning. Strategic skills and strategies orientate, divest and/or invest resources through e.g. goal-setting, bridging across scales and time, encouraging stakeholders participation and designing contingency plans for those losing from trade-offs.

We test our capacities framework by conducting an exploratory, comparative case study (Yin 1994) of the Rotterdam Climate Initiative and New York City's PlaNYC programme. Both programmes are set up to establish and implement sustainability and resilience policy goals in important urban deltas adversely affected by climate change. We explore how agency factors shape the capacities to transilience governance. This yields insights on how the three capacities interrelate over time and how climate governance could be facilitated.

## Co-producing climate change responses: incorporating practitioner knowledge in the IPCC Process

### C. Howarth (1)

(1) Global Sustainability Institute, Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, United Kingdom

The process and flow of information and expertise on climate change is complex. The multiple interfaces existing between scientists, policymakers and practitioners are far too well understood to adequately assess and refine strategies for climate adaptation. The gathering of evidence from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports is an exercise conducted primarily by the scientific and political communities, and does not take into account the needs, and the role, of the experts working on the ground. Although increasing efforts are being made to improve the science-policy interface, the disconnection between science and practitioners remains a key barrier to progress in climate change adaptation.

The latest findings from Working Group 2 on Impacts and Adaptation of Climate Change remain largely inaccessible to practitioners and do not fully incorporate their ongoing work on climate change issues. This is mainly the result of the IPCC process being highly academic-oriented and based on the newer mechanism with long lag times, and communication challenges, including different language and cultural interpretations. Building on the IPCC's recent review of how to make its reports more accessible going forward, this research assesses the extent to which models of co-production can capture the depth and breadth of the practitioner community's work and effectively incorporate this into the IPCC process. For example the practitioner community is starting to adopt the term "resilience" instead of adaptation.

The premise for adopting models of co-production acknowledges that knowledge from different stakeholders (e.g. academics, policy, media, NGO, business, public, and practitioners) can be seen as 'useful frames for capturing different approaches to knowledge production'. Such a process would ensure that future IPCC reports are more up-to-date, robust and complete in their analysis and that the climate change resilience solutions proposed incorporate the most practically viable research.

Through a series of workshops and interviews with academics, policy officials and practitioners in the United Kingdom this research focuses on the following three questions:

1. Can a co-production process facilitate the incorporation of practitioner expertise in IPCC reports?

2. What are the limits and opportunities from (i) adopting such an approach and (ii) incorporating practitioner based evidence?

3. How can the role of those involved in this process ensure better communication of the IPCC and wider climate messages and better co-design climate resilience?

This presentation will outline preliminary findings from these workshops and interviews and will provide valuable insights into how a co-production approach and the incorporation of practitioner based evidence could improve the production, dissemination and use of IPCC WG2 reports going forward in designing strategies for climate resilience.

## Closing the emission price gap

M. Jakob (1) ; O. Edenhofer (2) ; F. Creutzig (3) ; C. Flachsland (4) ; S. Fuss (5) ; M. Kowarsch (1) ; K. Lessmann (2) ; L. Mattauch (1) ; J. Siegmeier (1) ; J. Steckel (6)

(1) Mercator Research Institute for Global Commons and Climate Change, Berlin, Germany; (2) Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Potsdam, Germany; (3) Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change, Land use, transport and infrastructures, Berlin, Germany; (4) Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC), Berlin, Germany; (5) Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change
(MCC). Resources and International Trade, Berlin, Germany;
(6) Mercator Research Institute for Global Commons and
Climate Change, Climate and Development, Berlin, Germany

Even without internationally concerted action on climate
change mitigation, there are important incentives for
countries to put a price on their domestic emissions,
including public finance considerations, internalizing
the climate impacts of their own emissions, and on-
benefits, such as clean air or energy security. Whereas
these arguments have been mostly discussed in separate
strands of literature, this article carries out a synthesis that
exemplifies how policies to put a price on emissions can
be conceptualized in a multi-objective framework. Despite
considerable uncertainty, empirical evidence suggests that
different countries may face quite different incentives for
emission pricing. For instance, avoided climate damages
and co-benefits of reduced air pollution appear to be the
main motivation for emission pricing in China, while for the
US generating public revenue dominates and for the
EU all three motivations are of intermediate importance.
We finally argue that such unilateral incentives could
form the basis for incremental progress in international
climate negotiations toward a realistic climate treaty based
on national interest and differentiated emission pricing
and describe how such an agreement could be put into
practice.

P-4409-16

Adaptation of Legal Framework to Combat
Climate Change in India

KN. Joshi (1)

(1) Institute of Institute of Development Studies, Natural Resources Management and Environment (Remote Sensing), Jaipur, Rajasthan, India

India is facing challenge of sustaining rapid economic
growth while dealing with the global threat of climate
change. The threat mainly is from increasing greenhouse
gas due to industrialization, automobile, intensive
agriculture, reduction in green cover and high consumption
life styles. This phenomenon may alter the distribution and
quality of India's natural resources and adversely affected
the livelihood of its people. With the economy closely tied
to its natural resource base and climate-sensitive sectors
such as agriculture, water and forestry, India may face a
major threat because of the projected climate change.
Recognizing this fact and knowing that climate change is a
global challenge, India has initiated a number of multilateral
negotiations in the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, in positive, constructive and forward-looking
manner.

India signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC) on June10, 1992 and ratified it on November 1, 1993. It ratified the Kyoto Protocol on August 26, 2002, with the objective to establish an effective, cooperative and equitable global approach based on the principal of common but differentiated responsibility, enshrined in the UN framework.

India is of the leading developing countries in so far
as having incorporated into its Constitution the specific
provisions for environmental protection in year 1950.
Article 48A of the Constitution of India provides that
"the State shall endeavor to protect and improve the
environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of
the country." Similarly, Article 51A (g) makes it obligatory
for every citizen of India, 'to protect and improve the
natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and
wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures.'
Despite the fact that India's contributions to greenhouse
gas emissions are very small, the Government of India
has taken many measures to improve the situation in
this regard. India has initiated several climate-friendly
measures, particularly in the area of renewable energy. It
has one of the most active renewable energy programmes
besides having a dedicated Ministry for non-conventional
energy sources in general and mitigation of greenhouse
gases in particular.

This paper is an attempt to provide an overview of the
legal framework for combating climate change in India and
to examine the existing environmental law and policies
which can reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It reviews
existing national legislation, relevant overarching policies
in the environmental field so as to reduce their impact
specifically on climate change.

P-4409-17

Climate Diplomacy from the Perspective of
the Emerging 'Climate Security Paradigm'

M. Katriona (1) ; B. Mohamed (2) ; O. Barriere (3)

(1) Fellow, Ecologic Institute, Berlin, Germany; (2) Head,
Research Laboratory on Territorial Governance, Human
Security and Sustainability (LAGOS), Public law department,
faculty of law, economics and social sciences of adariz,
Agadir, Morocco; (3) Researcher in Environmental Law and
Anthropology, Institute of Research for Development (IRD),
Urm espace-dev, Montpellier, France

Within the UNFCCC process, various efforts have been made to craft a regulatory system for managing climate change, which gave birth to a complex of tangentially connected regimes and various bilateral and unilateral initiatives from top-down and bottom-up approaches. To engage effectively with this complex framework, state actors are supposed to go beyond conventional and reactive forms of diplomacy to take an approach that merges climate and foreign policy in creative, proactive, and preventive ways. At the upcoming UNFCCC meeting in Paris 2015, it is hoped that nations will commit to a new and binding agreement on climate. At present, the goal of climate diplomacy is to build a mobile, political conditions to make this goal achievable. However, the current failure to agree on how to limit dangerous climate change through an effective and equitable regime is generally pointed out as one of the greatest ongoing failures in modern diplomacy. Many observers consider the weak political will and leadership among main carbon emitters and the lack of trust within the international community as the key factors behind this failure. This has been heightened by the fact that some nations have backtracked on their commitments to reduce emissions or to provide assistance to countries with limited adaptive capacities, while other nations' efforts to reduce emissions have gone unacknowledged. This fractured political environment hinders advanced commitments and deepens the North-South divide, especially with regard to the question of how to best allocate the critical global mitigation responsibility.

Within this context, climate diplomacy may present a
way to overcome existing dilemmas since it is essentially
an interface between national interest debates and
international cooperation. It is capable of ensuring the
accurate assessment of other countries' interests and
intentions, and finding the needed space for agreement.
To do this it must interpret conflicting national interests
around many issues such as climate vulnerability, low carbon
business opportunities, high carbon, asset
exposure, sovereignty and perceived fairness. Climate
diplomacy must ensure national priorities are reflected
and understood in the often abstract world of international
climate change agreements. It is indeed the role of climate
diplomacy to deliver the timely construction of international
climate regime, ensure its effective operation, and shape
its evolution to address emerging challenges.

To deal with the internal and external challenges to success, climate diplomacy must draw on the best practice of modern diplomacy and also innovate new approaches, especially as it is evolving in scope and complexity as the climate regime shifts its focus from target setting to implementation and climate risk management. This shift has prompted better integration of climate change into broader foreign policy and geopolitical discussions, a proliferation of overlapping alliances between both state and non-state actors, and new approaches to shaping a global dialogue on the consequences of, and solutions to, climate change. However, and in order to boost the evolution of climate diplomacy within this perspective, while anchoring commitment to climate change at the highest level on the international political agenda and raising the level of ambition for an efficient global climate governance, the security implications of climate change - from human, economical, environmental, and geopolitical perspectives - should be widely recognized and mainstreamed.

Based on these assumptions, this research aims to
investigate the following topics:

- What is the relevance level of the 'climate security discourse' and in which areas further research and investigation should undertake to qualify the 'climate security paradigm' as a referential for building an effective climate regime?
* Are there any risks of linking climate change to security such as the ones which assume that framing climate change as a security issue may overshadow important social and environmental concerns and sending ironically fear-based and disturbing messages to relevant decision making processes?

* To what extent the mainstreaming of climate security as a prior in the theory of climate diplomacy can narrow or otherwise broaden, the scope and scale of action internationally and domestically?

* What kind of adjustments to be undertaken on all levels to make the 'climate security approach' relevant and effective in terms of climate governance?

P-4409-18

## Critical Mass Governance: How Unilateral Climate Actions Create Global Impacts

L. Kemp (1)

(1) Australian National University, Fenner School of Environment and Society, Canberra, ACT, France

The current practice of UN based climate multilateralism under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), focuses upon broad, consensus based legal treaties that cover a large number of issues. It is an approach that is creating diminishing returns over time. Despite this, it appears that the next climate agreement to be decided upon at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UNFCCC, will also prioritise the construction of a treaty with 'universal participation'. This paper argues that a switch towards smaller treaties which attempt to work by coalitions of the willing are a more viable approach forward. By drawing together ideas from a range of fields such as 'The Theory of Critical Mass' from sociology, 'Bandwagoning' and 'Norm Cascades' from international relations, plurilateral proposals for both the climate and trade regimes, and practical examples from the EU and Kyoto Protocol, a theory of 'Critical Mass Multilateralism' for climate change is developed. These disparate ideas and examples all deal with the notion of 'positive feedback': that a single action can cause further effects which amplify it over time. Accordingly, there is both a theoretical foundation and precedence for the mitigation actions of a few states to spread to others. This conceptual framework is then applied to case studies of both the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Kyoto Protocol and Montreal Protocol. The theory of 'Critical Mass Multilateralism' would suggest the next climate agreement should focus on facilitating and linking strong unilateral and plurilateral actions, instead of seeking a universal and consensual deal with the ratification of all major players including the US. The future of climate multilateralism, should, and most likely will, be in a number of smaller, more focused treaties, regardless of whether the Paris negotiations succeed or fail. The primary challenge of a future climate treaty is not to address free-riding and carbon leakage concerns, but to enable a critical mass of action that will generate the necessary feedbacks in terms of market prices, norms and political will. Addressing climate change internationally is not a matter for a global deal, but simply a critical mass of progressive actors.

P-4409-19

## Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation: Consequences and Incentives

U. Kornek (1); K. Lessmann (1); M. Pahle (2); G. Schwerhoff (3)

(1) Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Sustainable Solutions, Potsdam, Germany (2) Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Potsdam, Germany
(2) Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Potsdam, Germany

So far, the UNFCCC climate negotiations have not delivered a decrease in global greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast to this lack of ambition at the global level, several local, national, and regional initiatives have emerged in the past decade. More ambitious unilateral abatement targets – for example the European Union or California – and more initiatives can be expected to emerge in the future. This comes as a surprise in view of classical theory, which suggests that ambitious unilateral provision of a global public good is never beneficial for the actor performing the abatement. Instead, global emissions tend to increase

as a consequence of unilateral action, reducing the effectiveness of the abatement and resulting in losses for the leader. Recent academic advances in climate leadership have however revealed diverse consequences of unilateral emission reductions that lead to decreases as well as increases in global emissions. Taking all negative and positive reactions into account, leadership in ambitious abatement efforts could pay off for some actors, at least in expectation. The ongoing debate on the effectiveness of climate change mitigation and the scope and scale of the academic, the political as well as the public sphere emphasizes the importance of a clear and comprehensive understanding of the net consequence of unilateral action.

We analyze all major channels through which countries are influenced by unilateral abatement of a climate leader and derive functions for the resulting reaction in emissions. Carbon leakage effects are included by considering that (i) countries increase their emissions because more of the public good is provided, which decreases the demand for the individual production of the public good of all other countries, (ii) the leader decreases demand for emission intensive energy carriers which decreases their global price and leads to increasing demand in other countries and hence higher emission, and (iii) emission intensive production relocates from the leading country to countries with less stringent policies and hence emissions increase abroad. The negative carbon leakage effects are counterbalanced by several positive reaction functions, in which countries decrease their emissions in response to unilateral abatement. First, the leading country will develop new technologies to decrease its emissions in the face of ambitious abatement targets. Through technological spill-overs to other countries global emissions decrease even without additional emission policies by other countries. Second, the leading country decreases its emissions at a cost uncertainty by performing ambitious emission reductions. Risk-averse countries will in turn increase their emissions reduction targets after learning about the costs of the leader. Third, through the process of policy emulation, policies diffuse to and are adopted by other countries because of their normative and socially constructed properties instead of their objective characteristics. Fourth, countries may have an incentive to recalculate to the ambitious actions of a leader. Lastly, a leading country may signal to other countries that it is implementing the cooperative effort, inducing other countries to adopt an analogous effort.

The common modeling framework for each of the above described effects enables us to identify the critical parameters that shape the overall reaction to unilateral emission abatement and allows us to distinguish in how far the reactions differ among following countries and for the leading actor. The analysis suggests that effective leadership in climate action is facilitated by (i) high visibility and credibility in the actions of the potential leader, (ii) a strong international connectedness, both in economic and political terms, (iii) a leader whose emitting sectors are similar to those of the main global emitters, and (iv) the capacity and infrastructure to develop technology effectively.

However, due to the number of channels of interaction between leader and others, each of which is only imperfectly known, we expect the actual reactions of countries without ambitious targets to be highly uncertain. We show that despite this, leadership may be profitable (in expectation) for the leading country if it has a high valuation for the public good or exists little risk aversion. Our analysis can thus produce rationales for observed ambitious abatement of current climate policy leaders and their future abatement policies, and help to identify possible future leaders in the abatement of greenhouse gases.

P-4409-20

## Soft and/or Hard - What Set-Up for a Future Governance System to Implement a New Climate Deal?

M. Kuhner (1)

(1) Maastricht University, Political Science, Maastricht, The Netherlands

A new climate regime is not only about the nature, reach and ambition of such an international agreement, but also about effective arrangements to ensure its implementation. This presentation will analyse the existing governance
system under the Kyoto Protocol (KP). By shedding light on how implementation of the emission reduction targets under that regime have been monitored so far, the aim is to understand what elements of the governance mechanism were useful for fostering compliance and why. In particular, the role of facilitative elements is assessed. Building on existing literature on reasons for non-compliance/ lack of implementation and ways to best achieve compliance/implementation, advantages and disadvantages of incentive and other approaches are addressed both from a theoretical and practical angle.

Empirically, enforcement has often, although not always, been rather successful in achieving compliance with commitments under the KP. However, many states have shown not to be inclined to subscribe to such 'hard' measures. Therefore, knowing about the (perceived) usefulness of 'soft' elements is sufficient to facilitate compliance of states is of high relevance, especially when discussing a new governance system for compliance/implementation.

The presentation will start by outlining the current compliance system under the KP, focusing in particular on the interplay between facilitative and enforcement elements. Lessons learned will be developed by drawing on empirical findings of usefulness perceptions held by different stakeholders, in particular of the 'soft' components of compliance monitoring. These insights will be used to develop different scenarios for a future governance system. The talk will finish with an outlook of plausible and desirable governance set-ups post-2020.

## P-4409-21

# The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions: A Comparative Analysis of Multiple Integrated Assessment Models

K. Lessmann (1); U. Kornek (2); V. Bosetti (3); R. Dellink (4); J. Emmerling (5); J. Eyckmans (6); M. Nagashima (7); Z. Yang (8)

(1) Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Potsdam, Germany; (2) Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Sustainability Solutions, Potsdam, Germany; (3) Fondazione Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italy; (4) OECD, Paris, France; (5) FEAM, Milano, Italy; (6) KU Leuven, Center for economics and corporate sustainability (cedon), Brussels, Belgium; (7) Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth (RITE), Kyoto, Japan; (8) State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of economics, Binghamton, NY, United States of America

International climate policy suffers from the adverse incentive structure of public good provision, and it is well known that non-cooperative behavior results in under-provisions of such goods. How much a climate coalition improves upon this dilemma depends on the costs and benefits of the individual nations. It is particularly dependent on their heterogeneity and whether nations can compensate each other, i.e. the existence of transfer schemes. In this study, we investigate coalition formation with real-world heterogeneity and various transfer schemes for the first time using an ensemble of five numerical models.

Numerical models give particularly valuable insights beyond those of their analytical counterparts, when the analysis depends on regional heterogeneity in costs and benefits, quantitative estimates, or detailed representations of reaction functions. The models in this study are diverse both in their modeling approaches and in the data sources used for calibration, representing a range of estimates for the costs and benefits of real-world regions and their dynamics. We make these differences in cost and benefit assumption comparable through two new indicators measuring the abatement potential and climate change damages for key countries and world regions. We find that the five models frequently differ in the assumed costs/benefits structure of specific countries or regions, with stronger disagreement about regional damages and better agreement about mitigation costs, which mirrors the large uncertainty in our knowledge about climate change impacts.

Consequently, the models do not necessarily agree in their assessment of the stability of specific coalitions. Remarkably, however, the models are very consistent in translating the cost/benefit by the indicators into whether or not a region supports a climate

agreement, i.e. coalitions with similarly characterized signatories are stable in all models. Thus, the reason why a specific coalition is found to be stable only in a subset of models is traced back to the cost/benefit assumptions.

We also assess the potential of transfers that redistribute the surplus of cooperation to foster the stability of climate coalitions. In contrast to much of the existing analytical game-theoretic literature, our model is based on self-entrepreneurial climate coalitions in most models that close much of the abatement and welfare gap between complete absence of cooperation and full cooperation. This more positive message follows from the use of appropriate transfer schemes that are designed to counteract free riding incentives. By comparison, transfers that specifically take the incentive to sign a climate agreement into account frequently differ from the transfers implicit in common normative and pragmatic burden sharing schemes, which are found to be comparatively high in volume and often to transfer payments in the wrong direction.

## P-4409-22

# Using the theory of planned behaviour to understand and promote stakeholder engagement in local adaptation to climate change

S. Luis (1); M. Lima (1); C. RosetPalma (2); N. Rodrigues (3); F. Alves (3); L. Sousa (3); A. Lillebe (2); F. Freitas (3); C. Parrod (4); V. Jolivet (4); S. Poulos (5); G. Alexandrakis (6); T. Parama (5)

(1) Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE - IUL), CIS-IUL, Lisbon, Portugal; (2) Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE - IUL), BRU-IUL, Lisbon, Portugal; (3) Universidade de Aveiro (UA), CESAM, Lisbon, Portugal; (4) Acteon, Colmar, France; (5) National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Faculty of Geology and Geoenvironment, Laboratory of physical geography, Athens, Greece; (6) Institute of Applied and Computational Mathematics, Foundation of Research and Technology, Hellas, Greece

Most policy documents on climate change highlight the need for stakeholder engagement on policy making regarding local adaptation to climate change. There appear to different rationales for this. Engagement is promoted as way to achieve greater acceptance of policies and environmental awareness and to improve quality in decision making. In parallel, engagement ensures democratic legitimacy because citizens have a right to be included in climate-change related decisions that affect their lives (Lee et al., 2013). However, the levels of engagement in climate change issues are not typically high (e.g., Few, Brown, & Tompkins, 2006) and more research is needed to learn how engagement can be increased and improved.

The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985) can be used to understand and promote engagement in adaptation to climate change. Even if several theories explain human behaviour and decision-making, this is one of most influential and powerful, both for its ability to predict and explain behaviour and for its contribution towards framing and evaluating behaviour change interventions (Nosek et al., 2010). Previous studies have used it to understand climate change mitigation (e.g., Tikir & Lehnemann, 2012). In this study, we explored its usefulness to understand stakeholder engagement in adaptation to climate change. The theory of planned behaviour is a useful conceptual framework that incorporates central concepts in the social and behaviour sciences. It postulates that behaviour is motivated by situation-specific beliefs about the likely consequences of the behaviour (behavioural beliefs), beliefs about the normative expectations of others (normative beliefs), and beliefs about the presence of factors that may influence performance of the behaviour (control beliefs). Behavioural beliefs create a favourable or unfavourable evaluation of the behaviour (attitude toward the behaviour); normative beliefs produce the perceived social pressure regarding the behaviour (subjective norm); and control beliefs create the perceived ability to perform the behaviour (perceived behavioural control). Behavioural intention, which is the immediate antecedent of behaviour, is formed based on the attitude towards the behaviour, subjective norm, and perception of behavioural control.

Based on previous research and on a literature review, we explored different types of behavioural beliefs (e.g., costs and benefits of adaptation, attitudes towards public participation), normative beliefs (descriptive and
injunctive) and control beliefs (e.g., information on climate change and public participation, stakeholder salience). Stakeholders from different case studies in the Mediterranean were surveyed (e.g., policymakers, elected officers, researchers). Results show that the behavioural intention to engage in the process of planning adaptation to climate change was significantly predicted by particular variables of the theory of planned behaviour, depending on the characteristics of the case studies. Furthermore, descriptive results indicate that specific beliefs should be stressed in future interventions to promote stakeholder engagement.

This work has received funds from the ADAPT-MED project (CIRCLE2-MED).

### References

Ajzen, I. (1985). From intentions to actions: A theory of planned behavior. In J. Kuhl & J. Beckman (Eds.), Action-control: From cognition to behavior (pp. 11–39). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.

Lee, M., Armeni, C., Cendra, J., Chaytor, S., Lock, S., Maslin, M., Redgwell, C. & Rydin, Y. (2013). Public Participation and Climate Change Infrastructure. Journal of Environmental Law, 25, 33–62.

Few, R., Brown, K., & Tompkins, E. L. (2007). Public participation and climate change adaptation: avoiding the illusion of inclusion. Climate Policy (Earthscan), 7, 46–59.

Nosek, B. A., et al. (2010). Cumulative and career-stage citation impact of social-personality psychology programs and their members. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 1283–1300.

Tikir, A., & Lehmann, B. (2011). Climate change, theory of planned behavior and values: a structural equation model with mediation analysis. Climatic Change, 104, 389–402.

## P-4409-23

### Framing a post-Kyoto Climate Accord

J. Mathews (1)

(1) Macquarie University, Macquarie Graduate School of Management, Sydney NSW, France

The forthcoming Paris conference of the parties under the UNFCCC, to be staged in November 2015, is tasked with developing a global climate agreement focused on carbon reduction, as successor to the Kyoto Protocol. If this "Paris Protocol" (if such to be its name) is to be effective it will need to go beyond a list of countries committing to make reductions in carbon emissions, to incorporate measures needed to address the promotion of green industry and its diffusion around the world. A putative Part II to the Paris Protocol could be addressed to the WTO, and list green products or processes that are agreed will lead to reduced carbon emissions – and as such provide countries with justifiable "exemption" from the rules of fair trade for a designated period. It is argued that such a bold step is needed to reduce the severity and frequency of trade disputes over green industrial policies and clear the way for the carbon reductions anticipated to come to fruition.

## P-4409-24

### Who governs local climate adaptation? A comparative analysis of governance arrangements in urban areas

H. Mees, (1)

(1) Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, Utrecht university, Utrecht, Netherlands

The allocation of responsibilities between public and private actors has become a key urban governance issue for adaptation to the impacts of climate change. While this issue has been explored conceptually to some extent, empirical studies are scarce and have not yet been performed in a systematic manner. This paper addresses the research question of who governs urban climate adaptation, by offering a synthesis of three empirical studies in which governance arrangements between public and private actors are analysed and compared. Each study contains an in-depth comparative case-study analysis of arrangements for adaptation measures in frontrunner cities in Europe and North America: 1) green roofs for storm-water retention purposes, 2) adaptive flood risk measures for water safety purposes, and 3) a selection of measures

for heat stress prevention. In total, 20 governance arrangements were analysed and compared based on data derived from over 100 policy documents; from 97 in-depth interviews; and from two multi-stakeholder workshops. The meta-analysis offers insights into emerging patterns of urban climate adaptation governance arrangements. Furthermore, it offers a first evaluation of the performance of those governance arrangements in terms of effectiveness, legitimacy and fairness. Finally, conclusions related to the types of responsibilities of local public authorities are drawn, showing how indispensable they are for both adaptation planning and action.

## P-4409-25

### Fostering Socio-Ecological Resilience to Climate Change by Shifting from National to Negotiated Law-Making Approach

B. Mohamed (1); O. Barriere (2)

(1) Head, Research Laboratory on Territorial Governance, Human Security and Sustainability (LAGOS), Public law department, faculty of law, economics and social sciences of agadir, Agadir, Morocco; (2) Researcher in Environmental Law and Anthropology, Institute of Research for Development (IRD), Umr espace-dev, Montpellier, France

International and national laws constitute a legal positivism which, by definition, excludes any form of legal pluralism. At these scales, we remain exogenous to territorialized communities since regulatory frameworks are mostly enacted on international or national levels. Face to climate change challenge, it is increasingly important to investigate how local communities can be involved in climate actions if we assume that existing top-down regulatory frameworks will not fully consider socio-ecological adaptations and resilience as highly crucial for local communities to persist and maintain their identities.

The interrelations between governance scales cannot exclude local territories. At the local level, communities tend to adapt and build their resilience to climate change by regulating the relations among groups and individuals and between social and ecological systems. Therefore, the idea of a law emerging from the bottom is becoming increasingly relevant in order to enhance the bottom-up approach as an appropriate coping strategy. In other terms, the law-making processes will no longer remain exclusively vertical but will evolve in a horizontal mode, thus abandoning the power relations to embrace the logic of negotiation.

Two examples of negotiated law-making will be presented in this research: the first pertains to the ongoing construction of a socio-ecological resilience pact in the Moroccan High Atlas involving two tribes (including four rural communities and regions); and the second case concerns the formalization of an already-implemented pastoral pact being adopted in the French Cévennes and involving sixteen counties (including one department and one region). In each case, the co-construction process is put forward and analyzed on the basis of a territorial project. The three-dimensionality aspect of the project (involvement of agro-pastoral actors, decision makers and experts) is presented as the core pillar of the design and implementation of concerned regulatory frameworks. These frameworks, materializing a territorial law perceived and formalized in a solemn text labeled "territory pact", fully integrate national laws by local deliberation.

## P-4409-26

### Why establish a climate legislation to address climate change in a Latin American context?

P. Moraga (1); N. Kugler (2)

(1) University of Chile, Faculté of Law, Santiago, Chile; (2) Aix-Marseille Université, Faculté de droit, Aix-Marseille, France

The most ambitious Latin American countries have had a sustained political commitment with regards to the climate change issues as it can be seen in the public policies elaborated since the signature of the UNFCCC – especially in the commitment of 2009 – and the current resourceful position during international negotiations.

In this context, the initiative of a climate legislation seems
to be an adequate way for institutional strengthening and coordination of climate change at national, regional and local level. This is relevant in the current context of the national contributions' definition with regards to the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris in 2015.

The overall objective of this presentation is to demonstrate the necessity and viability of climate change legislation for Latin American countries and outline the recommended basic content of such a law to support the determination of the countries' Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) which are to be presented to the UNFCCC secretariat in the lead-up to the 21st COP in Paris in 2015. At a time when strengthening public policy on climate change can be a cause for concern in certain sectors of society, the results of this presentation will ground the debate on climate change legislation in objective terms and will deliver concrete inputs and tools to demonstrate the need and viability of such legislation.

## P-4409-27

# Ex-post evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol: Four key lessons for the 2015 Paris Agreement

M. Morel (1) ; J. Shishlov (1)

(1) CDC Climat, PARIS, France

Agreed in 1997, following the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol (KP) is the first international tool focused on greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation involving as many countries: in its final configuration, thirty six developed countries committed to reduce their emissions by 4% between 1990 and 2008-2015. The first commitment period (CPI) is April 2014, the door then the CPI was officially published. This report thus presents the first comprehensive ex-post analysis of the first period of the KP.

Based on the results of this report, it is possible to draw four key lessons from the Kyoto experience for the establishment of a new global agreement that is expected to be signed in Paris in 2015:

1. Expanding the coverage: striking a balance between overall environmental integrity and flexibility for specific circumstances

2. Removing the virtual specter of internationally legally binding commitments and limiting the focus on methods of compliance

3. Focusing on MRV processes

4. Providing flexibility in the agreement and its adoption process

## P-4409-28

# Medium term implications for Africa's adaptation planning in Agriculture

V. Orindi (1) ; J. Kinyangi (2) ; S. Kinguyu (3)

(1) National Drought Management Authority, ADA consortium, Nairobi, Kenya; (2) ILRI, Ccafs east Africa, Nairobi, Kenya; (3) Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources, Climate change secretariat, Nairobi, Kenya

Many of the sustainable development goals to 2030 recognize the role agriculture can play in ending hunger, assuring food and nutrition security as well as promoting healthy lives with a sustained income and economic growth thereby reducing poverty globally. For Africa, a post 2015 agreement presents the opportunity to merge a shared vision on sustainable development with that which stipulates a pathway to a low carbon transition of food systems. However, it is unlikely, given the short time available to prepare an agreement in Paris in 2015, that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) subsidiary bodies and work streams will conclude discussions on agriculture to pave way for a new climate deal.

The national adaptation plan (NAP) process was established in 2010, under the Cancun Adaptation framework of the UNFCCC. It was intended as a mechanism for countries to address their vulnerability to the impacts of climate

change, building their capacity to adapt to current and future climatic changes. A key focus is to integrate climate change adaptation into development planning processes and strategies across all sectors and at local to national scales. Under this framework NAPs address medium to longer term needs building on the experiences of Least Developed Countries (LDC) National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPAs). If we examine the state of the negotiations, the subsidiary body on implementation (SBII) is currently considering guidelines for the formulation of NAPs. The LDC Expert Group (LEG) has identified the need to fast track the application of NAP guidelines emphasizing integrated development planning as a key consideration. Through the adaptation planning process, we examine how Africa is dealing with agriculture.

Since NAPA experiences are being incorporated into a new set of guidelines for NAPs, it is expected that any emerging protocol will highlight specific agriculture, fisheries and forestry actions. The result is that agriculture and food security, which is to a great extent reflected in proposed and ongoing country NAPA programmes, receives greater attention in defining the medium and long-term issues around food security and food consumption. Because these issues are not yet well understood, and are often bundled with concerns about trade and commerce and non-food products from alternative land uses such as with bio fuels, it is important to foster dialogue for the parties as they prepare for the upcoming COP21 in order to reach agreement on how to treat agriculture in a new global deal on climate.

Under the NAP process, many countries have conducted some or other form of impact assessment, usually on a sectoral basis. There exist guidelines for initiating and completing risk and vulnerability assessments of the agriculture sector and particularly as it relates to the impacts of climate change on agriculture as well as the impacts of agriculture as a contributor to climate change. In many cases too, the economic impacts of climate related risks has not been enumerated therefore compromising the design of effective adaptation strategies and measures at the national level. The inclusion of 'national planners' is therefore critical to this NAP process, such as from the ministries of finance and the support for LDCs under the Global Support Programme (GSP) is crucial to advancing the NAP process. In addition, the identification and procurement of funding for adaptation is only nascent and limited to early action, therefore it is not expected that agricultural adaptation will receive significant funding commitments in the foreseeable medium term period post 2015 and pre-2020.

## P-4409-29

# The Road to Paris and beyond: Prospects for International Climate Policy

H. Ott (1) ; L. Hermwille (2) ; W. Obergassel, (2)

(1) Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy, The President's Office, Berlin, Germany; (2) Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy, Energy, Transport and Climate Policy, Wuppertal, Germany

All commentators agree that the climate conference in Lima (COP20) left a great deal of work for diplomats on the road to Paris later this year. The talks produced a query of language the negotiators can choose from. What was a mere agreement to the Climate Action was further expanded in a first round of intersessional meetings in Geneva in February and formally adopted as a negotiating text. Narrowing down the options will be the major task for the upcoming sessions. While the progress on the post-2020 agreement (Workstream 1) was perceived as slow and tedious, somewhat surprisingly the developments in Workstream 2 (pre-2020) were rather positive and a development into a forum of open exchange, thus establishing a new and fruitful mode of collaboration within the UNFCCC process.

Our analysis is guided by a structuralist regime model (Arts, 2000). This model assumes that the UNFCCC institutional system serves as part of the structure that guides the agency of firms and individuals within those socio-technical systems that are responsible for driving global climate change. The UNFCCC structures behave via the implementation of formal treaties in the respective national law of the Parties to the treaty, but also directly by providing signification and legitimization to transnational and subnational institutions to govern climate change, and immediately to corporations and consumers to develop
more sustainable behavioural routines.

Based on this model, we analyse the „Lima Call for Climate Action", the negotiating text formally adopted in Geneva in February 2015, and other developments in Lima and thereafter. We look into the elements that have been tabled for the new global treaty to be agreed in Paris in 2015 and discuss their potential contributions. From this we derive recommendations for a fair and effective treaty.

Our analysis shows that the UNFCCC hitherto failed to provide an adequate impulse to act on climate change. It has become increasingly obvious that the UNFCCC institutional system as it is designed now is not delivering what it is supposed to do according to Article 2 UNFCCC: to prevent a dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. This is due in large part to the consensus-based approach, which does not work well with a quantity-based system of commitments but rather calls for other forms of cooperation. The concept of Multi-Dimensional Commitments developed by the Wuppertal Institute might offer a way out of this dilemma. Furthermore, the article explores a fresh start, options to supplement the UNFCCC system with an alliance of countries that want substantial progress on climate protection – an alliance of the ambitious or a forerunner club. Such a special treaty outside of the UN framework, if appropriate feedback mechanisms are established within UNFCCC, could help injecting some of the much-needed dynamic that is required to bring our civilization on a path compatible with earth's ecological limits.

P-4409-30

Climate Governance in two non-independent Caribbean Insular Territories: two different or similar trajectories?

J. Priam (1)

(1) Servicios Científicos y Técnicos, Doctoral student, San Juan, Puerto Rico

This contribution shows how two non-independent islands of the Caribbean reflect the multiple scales dynamics for Climate Governance. For Puerto-Rico, the adopted solutions must be understood through USA relation and for Guadeloupe, through Europe and France.

To do so, this work synthesizes the first initiatives regarding wind energy on both islands; and the recent ones/- or projects since 2009. We explore then the emerging representation of climate change issues inside those two insular territories by exploring the local press, interviews and news of local political driving next door wind farms in Puerto-Rico and Guadeloupe.

Both territories indeed trade the integration of the international level conceptualization as they become "laboratories for experimentation" to demonstrate successful transformative solutions to transfer to other insular territories or even to their metropolis. We present here some international key documents or political discourses in Puerto-Rico and Guadeloupe that contribute in understanding climate governance within islands.

P-4409-31

Multilevel climate governance, between deliberative system, precaution and shared responsibilities

B. Reber (1)

(1) CNRS-Sciences Po Paris, Centre de recherche politique de Sciences po (Cevipof), PARIS, France

This paper aims at being relevant to the overarching theme of the Day 4 (themes: Climate Governance, Transforming Science to Transform Society, Information for Decision-Making, Mediating Climate Change Dialogue, Transformational Solutions, Adaptation, Governance, Equity and Responsibility, Collective Action, Climate Movements, SDGs and Climate Agreement). It could be relevant for Day 3 too (themes: Innovation, Technology Deployment and Policies; Climate Policies; Governance and Justice; Conflicts and Climate Change).

If climate sciences requires interdisciplinary approaches (Jeandel and Mosseri, 2011), it is the same for climate multilevel governance (Winter, 2011; Brondizio, et alii,

2009; Bache I. and Flinders M., 2004). We have to explore transformative solutions to climate change from a cross-sectorial perspective in order to reach integrated solutions especially through collaboration. This collaboration concerns different levels. 1) The actors level covering the complex and inter-related socio-political and human aspects (individuals, associations, institutions), 2) The level of different kinds of responsibilities, 3) The level of different sources of knowledge. The latter concerns the climate governance (description and forecast) as well as normative justifications and decisions (political, economical, legal and ethical). We have the entities, their respective responsibilities and the disciplines, more or less relevant to treat the different problems. To lead to transformative pathways to climate change challenges, we have not only to make up solutions across a range of stakeholders and sectors that encompass technological, institutional, economic and behavioural changes, but across disciplines, they are descriptive and predictive or normative and prescriptive. To be complete, we have to consider multiple scales (spatial and temporal). The governance perspective of this paper is not only multi-lateral, managing different entities from a political perspective, but multi-disciplinary to explore the wide range of topics that cut across climate change issues, from physical feedbacks to social and economic impacts. Indeed to reach relevant, responsible and high quality collective decision-making, the level of responsibility, the level to take into account these three levels and match them carefully.

We need new concepts to match these three different levels. We have chosen here three promising ones: deliberation, precaution (precautionary principle) and responsibility.

Deliberative system is promising in the democratization of global climate governance (Stevenson, Dryzek, 2014). Precautionary Principle has the potential to combine both sides of assessment, scientific and normative in case of uncertainty (Gardiner, 2006; Reber, 2015). Moral responsibility help to make the link between mitigation and adaptation and the two kinds of justice entailed (corrective and distributive) that is not already done in UNFCCC. The common climate requires a common approach according a balanced cooperation between the three levels of governance, that can be constructed through the combination of inclusive and deep deliberation among actors (humans, publics and institutions), balanced between scientific and normative assessments, in a «conversation» among distributed responsibilities.

Bache, I. and Flinders M., (2004). Multilevel Governance, Oxford University Press: Brondizio, E.S., Osborn, Young, (2009), Connectivity and the Governance of Multilevel Social-Ecological Systems: The Role of Social Capital. Annual Review of Environment and Resource, 34: 253-278; Gardiner, S., A., (2006). Core Precautionary Principle. The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 14, Number, 33-60; Jeandel, C., and Mosseri, R., (ed.), (2011). Le climat à déécouvert, Outils et méthodes en recherche climatique, Paris, CNRS-Éditions, Reber, B., (2015). Governance between precaution and pluralism. Special Issue, Interpreting social. Responsibility in International Social Sciences Journal, N° 208, Oxford, Wiley/Blackwell, Unesco (forthcoming); Stevenson H., and Dryzek, J., S., (2014), Democratizing Global Climate Governance, Cam., Cambridge University Press; Winter, G., (ed.), (2011). Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change. Perspectives from Science, Sociology and Law, Cam., Cambridge University Press.

P-4409-32

Unlocking deadlocked negotiations: The relevance of group pressure and policy learning in the global climate negotiations

K. Rietig (1)

(1) Department of Politics and Public Policy, De Montfort University Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom

The UNFCCC negotiations have been deadlocked for over 20 years due to incompatible national interests. At the same time, the objective of avoiding dangerous climate change drifts out of reach as we near the end of this decade. Yet, there is increasing scope to break up this deadlock, for which mutual learning, policy diffusion and capacity building will be central. Initial evidence suggests that learning is a key-multiplying factor in accelerating policy diffusion and learning. Learning can be a helpful factor to progress along transformative pathways
to sustainable development, in particular effective climate mitigation and adaptation. Within the UNFCCC negotiations, countries can learn from each other's successes in low carbon economic development, share knowledge on designing domestic climate legislation that is co-beneficial for sustainable development and even come to understand that addressing climate change is an opportunity to create a green industrial revolution, thus entering on transformative pathways towards sustainable development. Realizing that there are long-term benefits from acting on climate change can even influence how actors understand the issue and result in readjustments to negotiation positions based on altered national interests. In combination with group pressure, these experience, knowledge and belief-based types of learning are currently altering the negotiation dynamics within the UNFCCC. Transgovernmental city networks and non-governmental organizations are creating non-negotiation settings for governmental representatives about each other's low carbon economic development plans and climate legislation within (UNFCCC) non-negotiation forums and increasingly formal negotiations. Mutual learning and policy entrepreneurial strategies of key negotiators helps to create positive competition towards more ambitious climate legislation on the national level. Presenting these national climate policies in the UNFCCC creates group pressure among countries to review their negotiation positions towards improving action on mitigating climate change to avoid being branded as 'laggards'. The key implication of this research points towards the importance of better understanding underlying learning mechanisms, which can contribute to overcoming negotiation deadlocks by helping countries shape their national interests over time towards increasing cooperation on sustainable development.

P-4409-33

Climate change governance in Small Island developing States

M. Scobie (1)

(1) The University of the West Indies, Institute of International Relations, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago

Climate change governance in Small Island developing States (SIDS) is a pressing priority to preserve livelihoods, biodiversity and ecosystems for the next generations. Understanding the dynamics of climate change policy integration is becoming more crucial as we try to measure the success of environmental governance efforts and governmental representatives about each other's long-term goals for successful development. At the international level, climate change policy has evolved from single issue to integrated approaches towards achieving sustainable development. New actors, new mechanisms and institutions of governance with greater fragmentation in governance across sectors and levels make integration of policy in the area of climate change governance even more of a challenge today. What are the best frameworks to achieve successful climate change policy integration in environmental governance - especially as the complex interconnectivity of new actors, institutions and mechanisms make the process of integration even more challenging? Are the same climate change policy coherence frameworks useful or indeed applicable for environmental governance in developing states more generally and for SIDS in particular? This article reviewed the debates around policy coherence for climate change governance, creates a framework to test or measure policy coherence and examines how relevant this has been to actual regional climate change governance processes in Caribbean States. The findings fill a gap in the literature on climate change governance through policy coherence in SIDS.

P-4409-34

Review of the experience with monitoring uncertainty requirements in the Clean Development Mechanism

I. Shishlov (1) ; V. Belassen (2)

(1) CDC Climat, Research, Paris, France; (2) INRA, Research, Dijon, France

In order to ensure the environmental integrity of carbon offset projects, emission reductions certified under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have to be 'real, measurable and additional', which is ensured inter alia through the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) process. MRV, however, comes at a cost that ranges from several cents to EUR 20 and above per ton of CO2e depending on the project type. This article analyzes monitoring uncertainty requirements for carbon offset projects with a particular focus on the trade-off between monitoring stringency and cost. To this end, existing literature is reviewed, overarching monitoring guidelines, as well as the 10 most-used methodologies are scrutinized, and finally three case studies are analyzed. It is shown that there is indeed a trade-off between the stringency and the cost of monitoring, which if not addressed properly may become a major barrier for the implementation of offset projects in some sectors. It is then demonstrated that this trade-off has not been systematically addressed in the overarching CDM guidelines and that there are only limited incentives to reduce monitoring uncertainty. Some methodologies and calculation tools as well as some other offset standards, however, do incorporate provisions for a trade-off between monitoring costs and stringency. These provisions take the form of discounting emissions reductions based on the level of monitoring uncertainty - or more implicitly through allowing a project developer to choose between monitoring a given parameter and using a conservative default value.

P-4409-35

Designing monitoring rules in climate policy: the uncertainty issue

I. Shishlov (1) ; V. Belassen (2) ; F. Lecocq (3)

(1) CDC Climat, Research, Paris, France; (2) INRA, Research, Dijon, France; (3) Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement, Nogent sur Marne, France

This paper assesses the environmental and economic efficiency of three different approaches to treat monitoring uncertainty in climate policy, namely no special rules, minimum certainty thresholds and discounting proportional to uncertainty. Our microeconomic model of the behavior of profit-maximizing agents demonstrates that under the simplest of assumptions - likely representative of many practical cases - the regulator has no interest in reducing unbiased monitoring uncertainty. However, in the presence of information asymmetry monitoring uncertainty may hamper the integrity of climate policy. We find that in that case applying discounting proportional to monitoring uncertainty is preferable to setting minimum certainty thresholds or not enforcing any constraints at all, as it is currently practiced in most carbon pricing mechanisms.

P-4409-36

Forecasting the Paris Agreement

D. Sprinz (1) ; G. Bang, (2) ; J. Hovi, (3) ; S. Kallbekken, (2) ; A. Underdal, (3)

(1) PIK - Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Transdisciplinary Concepts & Methods, Potsdam, Germany; (2) CICERO, Oslo, Norway; (3) University of Oslo, Political science, Oslo, Norway

International negotiations are under way to conclude a 2020+ agreement in Paris in December 2015 within the confines of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Neither are the contours of such an agreement presently clear nor whether any agreement will be concluded by the end of this year. To fill this void, we undertake a prediction of select dimensions of the present negotiations with the Predictorian's Game (Bueno de Mesquita 2009a).

The Predictorian's Game builds on three decades of model development. In essence, it is an advanced expected utility negotiation model with incomplete information between N parties who make bilateral negotiation offers and counteroffers. Based on knowledge of who the actors (or stakeholders) are, their basic influence in world politics, the salience of the specific issue under negotiation (see
below), the actors position on the issue, as well as their flexibility on that position, the Predictorian's Game forecasts the negotiated outcome round-by-round until no additional utility can be gained on average. The model has been used to predict outcomes on a wide range of governance and policy issue. The Predictorian's Game correctly predicted the outcome of the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of the Parties - despite high expectations for a cooperative outcome at the time (Bueno de Mesquita 2009b).

For the conference "Our Common Future Under Climate Change," we will undertake a prediction of the likely common mitigation goal of the parties negotiating under the auspices of the UNFCCC. We will concentrate on the most important country actors and pertinent negotiations groups. In addition, we will undertake a prediction of the likely outcome of the present negotiations on "loss and damage" and its potential inclusion in a Paris agreement.

In order to calibrate our input data, we will draw, on the one hand, on the expertise provided by CICEP Norwegian Center for Excellence in Research - Strategic Challenges in International Climate and Energy Policy, which comprises CICERO, the University of Oslo, and the Fritdjoof Nansen Institute, and PIK - Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, on the other hand.

The analysis will be undertaken in April-June 2015 in lieu of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), corroborated by a broad range of robustness checks to both reflect uncertainty about input values and external shocks on the negotiation dynamics.

Initial test calibrations of the model suggest that the common mitigation goal will not substantially differ from those discussed at Lima in late 2014, an agreement will be reached after late 2015, and an extension of the "loss and damage" negotiations towards a compensation fund will not materialize in the near future.

### References

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2009a. The Predictorian's Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future. 1st ed. New York: Random House.

—. 2009b. «Recipe for Failure - Why Copenhagen Will Be a Bust, and Other Prophecies from the Foreign-Policy World's Leading Predictorian.» Foreign Policy.

## P-4409-37

### Transparency and Accountability in Climate Finance Governance

#### AS. Tabau (1)

(1) Université de La Réunion, Faculté de droit et d'économie, Saint Denis, La Réunion, France

Climate finance, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or to adapt to the harmful effects of climate change, remains one of the central issues of current international negotiations. Progress in the fulfilment of the developed countries collective commitment, adopted in 2009 in Copenhagen and set out, the following year, in the Cancun Agreements, to provide new and additional resources to developing countries, in the range of 100 billion dollars by 2020, may determine the conclusion of an inclusive and ambitious agreement in 2015.

However, some developed countries advanced the argument of the economic crisis to postpone the provision of public finance, to ask for the efficiency of funds provided in terms of climate change mitigation, and to consider that a major part of the climate finance will come from the private sector. Many developing countries, more preoccupied by the effectiveness of climate finance, conditioned their participation within a 2015 agreement to the actual disbursement of funding and consideration of adaptation to climate change, as well as capacity building, to estimate their needs. Finally, voices had been raised against inter alia human rights infringements resulting from previous climate projects, putting emphasis on the need for the integrity of climate finance.

These demands for efficiency, effectiveness and integrity of climate finance plea for transparency and accountability at all stage of the funding cycle, that is to say from its mobilisation to its disbursement and administration. Indeed, transparency and accountability are core democratic values, linked to the procedural rights to

information, participation in decision-making and access to justice that should apply to the overall governance of climate finance. These elements, participating to public scrutiny in the field of climate finance, are particularly important to enhance developing countries' confidence by ensuring that developed countries respect their commitment and to evaluate, progressively, developing countries' needs in order to take up the challenge of dealing with climate change. They also appear crucial to adopt a holistic approach of climate action by avoiding deleterious side effects of internationally funded projects, and more broadly favouring public acceptance of the efforts needed.

Yet, the assessment of the provided and received financial support, its new and additional character or its effects on the ground raises numerous difficulties. Despite the establishment of a Green Climate Fund (GCF), meant to centralize as much as possible the financial mechanism of the international climate regime, and the setting up of a Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), intended to encourage the coordination of climate finance, governance in this domain remains highly fragmented. Different scales of decision and action are mobilized (international, regional, national and local), within the climate regime (UNFCCC) as outside. Climate funds are functioning, moreover, according to different rules and are not all managed by the same institutions. This is even truer if one takes into account private climate finance next to public climate finance.

Therefore setting up a transparency and accountability system in climate finance constitutes a major challenge, as related rules and procedures are currently incomplete and inconsistent. That is why, to elaborate such a system, the SCF and the GCF are being made from relatively unprecedented way, in particular by encouraging involvement of all "stakeholders". Initiatives from multilateral banks of development, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and some non-governmental organisations, like Transparency International, are also relevant in this regard. From then on, it is especially interesting to study in details this process of normative production that could apply to other fields of climate governance.

Indeed, it first favours a better understanding of the mapping of the current transparency and accountability systems relevant for climate finance, which is necessary to compare them, in order to identify their harmonisation and/or articulation potential. This presentation aims to analyse these four stages to improve the overall climate finance governance.

## P-4409-38

### The Continental Approach to Climate Change: An Analysis of the European Union's Emissions Trading System

#### J. Wellman (1)

(1) London School of Economics and Political Science, Geography and Environment, London, United Kingdom

The European Union's Emissions Trading System stands as a model for managing a changing climate in a complicated international environment. As the international community prepares for negotiations on a post-Kyoto climate regime, an understanding of players and their performance in the EU's governance system is essential to validating the potential success of emissions markets. Concerns that wealthy countries will purchase permits, rather than reduce their real emissions, have created skepticism about emission trading's potential for success.

In this study, I examine ambition exhibited by countries in using less than maximum levels of offsets to achieve Phase II reductions. Through fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, I explore a number of variables including an economic growth, Green Party representation, public opinion, and renewable energy investment to construct a model explaining variety in exhibited ambition among ETS countries. Results show that renewable energy and public opinion play the most significant role in explaining a country's use of offsets. Specific case studies demonstrate wide variance in explanation for member state performance, tied closely to business group influence and early environmental action.
K-4410-01

New norms and institutional practices
towards radical political changes

YC. Zarka (1)

(1) Université Paris Descartes, SHS, Paris, France

The theme of my lecture will be the relationship between cosmopolitan citizenship and political citizenship faced with climate change. The questions considered will touch as much on general principles as on an examination of concrete examples of collective action in local and national contexts. In the age of the Anthropocene, the urgent and indispensable norms and modes of regulation to save our species have not yet been clearly formulated. The deep reasons for the gaps between diagnoses and action have their roots in various levels of the way in which societies function.

It is by mobilising the collective action of citizens in each state, as well as of human beings as citizens of the world, that we shall probably find a large part of the answers. Our discussions will thus be situated on two levels: cosmopolitan and political. We are in fact living in a time when political citizenship can no longer ignore the status of every individual as a citizen of the world; that is to say, our responsibility with regard to the present and the future of the earth and of the whole living world.

K-4410-02

The political economy of decarbonisation

A. Pegels (1) ; L. Wilfried (1) ; T. Altenburg (1) ; V. Georga (1)

(1) German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Sustainable economic and social development, Bonn, Germany

What and how we produce and consume is largely shaped by markets. However, markets fail to solve many of the environmental challenges we are facing. Therefore, we need governments to intervene, thus reclaiming the primacy of public policy in setting and implementing societal objectives. While safeguarding the sustainability of human life on our planet makes this kind of government intervention a highly normative undertaking, its economic case is strong as well – the success stories of such 'green' frontrunners as Germany and Denmark demonstrate the competitiveness potential of the new technologies.

However, as shown by decades of discussion on industrial policy, government intervention almost invariably brings about risks of political capture and government failure. Government intervention towards sustainability is thus not only governed by ethical norms, but also by politics. The risks of failure are magnified by the urgency and scale of today's global environmental challenges, requiring particularly bold, comprehensive and well-orchestrated government intervention under high uncertainty. By highlighting lessons learned from practical cases of both success and failure, we show how these risks can be, and have been, managed. In particular, we submit that a broad-based social vision and contract need to be forged – supported by change coalitions and coupled with policy process safeguards, openness to policy learning, and an alignment of transformative policies with market mechanisms.

K-4410-03

Urban narratives and collective mobiliza-
tions in the field of adaptation to climate
change

N. Blanc (1)

(1) CNRS, LADYSS 7533, Paris, France

With the exception of climate skeptics who appreciate
climate change only as a natural phenomenon to the
exclusion of all human causes, climate change is not
referred to nature. Climate change as a whole refers to
an abstract scientific phenomena and/or a disruption of
the natural order by human activities. Characterized by
science, climate change involves a complex interpretative
framework linked to a network of measurements, statistics
and modeling, combined with scientific judgments about
their relevance. It is therefore important to understand
how these changes are part of the natural and built
environments both in terms of representations and of
social practices. We seek to address the interests of
narratives regarding these issues, in particular, adaptation
to climate change in urban space. Our collection of city-
dwellers stories in urban situations of various constraints
and resource levels as well as the CSO narratives framing
their action tells us about adaptation to climate change.
The capabilities require to take into account both the
constraints and the resources with which people have
to live and operate daily to adapt to changes of various
kinds. The important thing is that it is possible to develop
a reflection on the capabilities from ordinary stories. This
means to explore sustainable practices in everyday life.
These practices will allow us to envision social convention
of new forms of action support or resistance to normative
injunctions in the field of adaptation to climate change.
The problematic issue is to see if the exploration of
capabilities through stories can be a path to a sustainable
culture.

O-04410-01

Reinvigorating International Climate Policy:
A Comprehensive Framework for Effective
Non-state Action

S. Chan (1) ; H. Van Asselt (2) ; H. Thomas (3) ; K. Abbott (4) ; M. Beisheim (5) ; M. Hoffmann (6) ; B. Guy (7) ; N. Höhne (8) ; A. Hsu (9) ; P. Battberg (10) ; P. Pauw (11) ; C. Ramstein (12) ; O. Widerberg (10)

(1) German Development Institute, Bonn, Germany; (2) Stockholm Environment Institute, Oxford, United Kingdom;

(3) Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford, United Kingdom;

(4) Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, United States of America; (5) German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, Germany; (6) University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada;

(7) Natural Resources Defense Council, New York, United States of America; (8) NewClimate Institute, Köln, Germany;

(9) Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, New Haven, United States of America; (10)

IU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands;

(11) German Development Institute, DIE, Bonn, Germany;

(12) Institut du développement durable et des relations internationales, Paris, France

As countries strive to negotiate a new climate agreement in time for the Paris climate summit in December 2015, a different kind of climate politics is emerging as cities, regions, businesses, and civil society groups take mitigation and adaptation actions, independently and together with each other and with national governments and international institutions. In Paris, governments have an historic opportunity to develop a framework to catalyze, support, and steer these initiatives. Social science research highlights the need for a comprehensive approach that promotes ambition, experimentation and accountability, and avoids unnecessary overlaps. This contribution specifies the functions of and design principles for a comprehensive framework for non-state climate actions that could build positive linkages and provide effective coordination.

Drawing empirical lessons learned from sustainable
development governance (in particular 'Partnerships for
Sustainable Development' and 'SD in Action'), we envisage
a comprehensive framework as a long-term program to
support, strengthen, and orchestrate non-state initiatives
that contribute to international climate goals, targets and
agreements.

Designing a concrete framework will not be simple, but
current social science research on non-state action suggests
three clear guidelines for that process. First, design and
maintenance of the framework must be collaborative, and the framework itself must be jointly 'owned' by the UNFCCC secretariat and participating non-state actors and initiatives. Second, a comprehensive framework should include a global clearinghouse, bringing together existing sources of information. The clearinghouse should build upon existing registries maintained by a network of non-state actors in partnership with the UNFCCC. Finally, as climate actions are heterogeneous, the platform should define a low thresholds for inclusion with a layered structure that would provide increased visibility – coupled with increased levels of accountability – for particularly significant actions.

The road to Paris offers a unique opportunity to ratchet up ambition, mobilize action and engage more actors in climate action. Governments and non-state actors can create a robust, capable, and long-term comprehensive framework that orchestrates and supports non-state initiatives to contribute to internationally agreed climate outcomes, and that counteracts the inefficiencies of a fragmented governance landscape. Yet pursuing this approach we need to avoid repeating the mistakes of previous frameworks.

## O-4410-02

# Community Renewable Energy in Australia – examining and comparing an emerging social movement

F. Mey (1)

(1) Institute of Environmental Studies – University of New South Wales, Sydney, School of Biological, Earth and Environmental Sciences, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Local action for global problems finds expression in the growing field of Community Renewable Energy (CRE). Community actors develop and own renewable energy projects and play an increasingly important role in the transformation of energy system providing local solutions (del Rio & Burguillo, 2009; Hicks & Ison, 2011; Rogers, Simmons, Convery, & Weatherall, 2012; trend:research GmbH & Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, 2013; Walker & Cass, 2007; Walker & Devine-Wright, 2008; Walker, Hunter, Devine-Wright, & Evans, 2007).

Australia is a relative newcomer to this development, yet many communities are becoming increasingly enthusiastic about the Community Renewable Energy. However the country's communities seem to face particular challenges when it comes to implementation due to a limited support by the national government and a rather complex energy market (Hicks & Ison, 2011).

The CRE movement in Australia counts currently (as of October 2014) around 60 groups attempting to develop projects and 10 operating projects across the country (ISF, 2014).

The presentation will present results of two national surveys of community energy projects in Australia and provides insights into the "scope, scale and character" of this nascent community energy movement. The surveys were created and conducted in 2012 and 2014 by members of the Coalition for Community Energy, which included the two authors of this article.

The results of the survey have been analysed in a similar vein to that offered of the UK by Seyfang et al. (2013). Like them, we use the STEEP (social, technical, environmental, economic, political) and SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) frameworks as the foundation of our analysis. We discuss the key issues for the further development of community energy in Australia in its socioeconomic and political context.

However, we take our analysis a step further to reflect on how this emergence in Australia has been different from other countries and what this means for different understandings of the nature and role of community energy.

For this component we employ existing concepts of community energy (Walker & Cass, 2011; Walker & Devine-Wright, 2008; Walker et al., 2007) and social movement theory (Davis et al., 2005; Schnelberg & Lounsbury, 2008; Seyfang & Smith, 2007). We drawn on a literature review and historical data from other countries such as Denmark, Germany and the UK.

## O-4410-03

# Collective national and transnational action towards «green grabbing»

S. Vigil (1)

(1) FNRS Research Fellow, CEDEM University of Liège, Liège, Belgium

Land remains the most fundamental productive asset for the vast majority of populations in the Global South. Agriculturalists' pre-existing vulnerabilities are not only compounded by climate change impacts and lack of socioeconomic assets, but also by large-scale land acquisitions that have risen since the convergence of multiple global crises (financial, environmental, energy & food) (Borras & Franco 2012). If we were to compare the phenomenon to colonial times, the fact that climate change legitimises a large part of such acquisitions is a main novelty. Since the neoliberal turn, there is a widespread belief that the market is synonymous to development leading to the commodification of the ecological commons through so called "green" market solutions such as carbon trading, emissions offsets and biofuels (McMichael 2010). Whilst the proponents refer to these transactions as "direct investment in agriculture", highlighting their potential for agriculture modernisation, employment creation, local food security, energy production, the re extractors point to the various threats that these deals can actually pose to the environment, to local food security and to traditional livelihoods. Furthermore, such projects stimulate the industrialization of agriculture, which is at the basis of many of our environmental problems today.

Local communities and grass root organizations have protested in several countries around the world. Yet, corruption, military intervention and landlessness are all factors which are creating obstacles for effective local collective action. Land activists are still facing considerable threats of imprisonment and murder by corrupt governments that are aligned with corporate interests. Several local and transnational NGO's and academics have been actively drawing attention to the social and environmental threats that these large scale landholdings conducted in both Senegal and Cameroon are already vulnerable communities. Despite persisting obstacles to effective local collective action, the demands of transnational grass root organizations have been key in the development of international "good governance" norms. As a result of these pressures, multilateral organizations such as the WB, the EU and the FAO have developed codes of conduct and principles for responsible agricultural investment. Transparent negotiations, respect for existing land sharing of benefits, environmental sustainability, and adherence to national trade policies, are the most frequently addressed challenges in order to attain "win-win" outcomes. All of them seem to suggest that good governance norms would diminish negative socio environmental impacts. Yet, despite the well-intended rationale behind such principles, they still fail to question agro-industrial development per se, as if other possible development pathways, such as smallholder agriculture and family farming, would not be better suited to address our social and environmental challenges. In a world where climate change impacts are expected to considerably reduce the resilience of already vulnerable populations, there is a need to rethink our whole model of neoliberal development and to promote other types of investment asides from corporate investment. Furthermore, the voluntary nature of such principles makes the implementation process difficult, making arduous or impossible to track down and penalize those who fail to follow such principles. Even in cases where such guidelines are legally institutionalised at the national level, practical implementation remains scarce or inexistent. The principles are still too vague in a context where governments and elites of developing nations often take the side of investors for purposes of personal enrichment or supposedly national development. Drawing from field work conducted in both Senegal and Cameroon, this presentation will shed light on the actions of citizens, NGOs and activists in pressuring governments and donors whilst shaping and contesting a model of development that has often resulted in further environmental stress and recurrent Human Rights violations. Based on field evidence this presentation will highlight cases in which collective action has resulted in positive outcomes and cases in which local demands have remained largely overlooked. The aim of this presentation will be to thus highlight the key variables that determine positive collective action
outcomes as well as to underline the obstacles that persist in the implementation of socio-environmentally sustainable agricultural development projects.

## 4410 - POSTER PRESENTATIONS

### P-4410-01

#### Strengthening the climate action movement: strategies from histories

L. Delina (1); M. Diesendorf (2)

(1) Independent Scholar, South Cotabato, Philippines; (2) Institute of Environmental Studies, Sydney, Australia

Since many governments lack the motivation to lead deep emission reduction initiatives, the climate action movement must strengthen its campaigns. This paper offers strategies for the movement derived from historical analysis of mechanisms that achieved effective social change in the past. Common elements of climate action with past social change movements, together with some differences are identified. Although technologies, strategies and tactics vary, climate action groups can agree to support a shared common goal: effective climate mitigation, that can be accomplished not only through outward-oriented tactics, but also by forms of climate activism that are prefigurative – that is, based on action within local communities. Furthermore, the diverse campaigns that take place on a variety of scales and spaces, conducted by heterogeneous groups, should be integrated by establishing national and international hubs to facilitate coordination and communication.

### P-4410-02

#### "Re-Imagining Radical Climate Justice for the Post-Paris World"

F. John (1)

(1) University of California, Santa Barbara, Sociology, Santa Barbara, United States of America

The science is not in question: climate change is here now, not in the future,[1] and it is already having devastating effects on people's lives. That's the bad news, of course.

Even worse, the massive social, economic, and political inequalities already generated by neoliberal capitalism would seem to set the social and natural worlds on a collision course which the elites cannot win -- even on their own terms -- without destroying the basis for all human life. To put it bluntly, the climate crisis is perilous, our 500 year-old economic system cannot see us through it safely, the window for resolving this dilemma is closing inexorably, and the forces arrayed against our common survival are strong, very strong.

The good news is that there's a global climate justice movement which is growing in numbers, reach, strength, and inventiveness. This movement is impossible to encompass easily, because it consists of literally thousands of organizations at every level - community, city, bio/region, nation, and the global - interlinked in a vast network of networks.[2]

The next few years will be the years that those of us in the climate justice movement must scale up our efforts toward the end of mounting irresistible pressure of all kinds on our governments and on the corporations, banks, and all the institutions of national capitalization that they serve. We must force them to take the decisive steps we all need and want, such as a fair and binding global climate treaty and a deeply sustainable post-capitalist society free of structured violence and run democratically by the ninety-nine percent.

Consider the following:

Parts of the radical left are turning their attention to climate change (System Change Not Climate Change in North America), while many members of the radical climate justice movement are turning their attention to anti-capitalist politics.

At the same time, the Big Green environmental organizations (the Sierra Club in the US), the mainstream global climate justice movement (CAN), and the biggest

climate social movement organization (350.org) are all radicalizing.

The same can be said of climate science in general (The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report etc.) and particular climate scientists, such as Kevin Anderson, Alice Bows-Larkin, Michael Mann, James Hansen, et al.

Finally, there is an enormous push coming up from young people, and indigenous forces on all of these levels.

The question is: what are the prospects for synergy and movement building among all these forces? What is the way forward?

It appears evident that we will need to assemble the greatest social movement the world has ever seen to achieve these ends. The global climate justice movement is growing steadily, but it is still far too weak to win - at least for the moment.

This essay will trace some of what it has accomplished so far, asking where the major points of impact lie at the moment, and what strategic decisions must be faced moving forward.

[1] IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change], "Summary for Policymakers," pp. 1-28 in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by T.F. Stocker, D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, U. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex, and P.M. Midgley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WGIAR5_SPM_FINAL.pdfhttp://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WGIAR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf.

[2] Paul Hawken makes the claim that the movement organizations number in the thousands: Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and Why No One Saw It Coming (New York: Viking, 2007). For a partial, annotated list of some of the key climate justice movements and resources of which I am aware, see "The Global Justice Movement On-line" at www.iicat.org.

### P-4410-03

#### Climate Change and Ebola Outbreaks: Are they connected?

D. Kassie (1); M. Bourgarel, (1); F. Roger (1)

(1) Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement (CIRAD), Environnements et Sociétés (ES) / UR AGIRs - Animal et Gestion Intégrée des Risques, Montpellier, France, France

The climate factors have an impact on pathogens (resistance, selection, etc.), hosts (biology like immunity, ecology like migration movements, etc.), vectors (ecological niches, vector capacity) and epidemiological dynamics. The climate can affect the rate of transmission, the way in which pathogens are dispersed, contact networks between individuals and between different species, community structures. Livestock farming methods, or biodiversity and its ambivalent role in disease emergence are also depending of climate factors. The diseases most sensitive to climate factors are parasitic diseases with external life-cycle, vector-borne diseases and infectious diseases passed on by water or micro-mammals including bats. Most of them are zoonosis.

For a zoonosis like Ebola, several potential drivers are suspected to connect climate change to ecosystems, virus transmission to Human and health care policies:

1. Ecology and behaviour of the bat species suspected to be Ebola virus reservoir could be affected by climate change: population density, migration, habitat utilisation, reproduction, feeding behaviour, and nature or intensity of inter-specific contacts. All those parameters would have an impact on the ecology of the Ebola virus. Therefore research for understanding the role of viruses in maintenance, circulation and transmission and for identifying reservoir and bridge species need to address the correlations between Ebola foci and its environmental factors, including climatic factors.

2. Human contamination by Ebola virus can occur through close or direct contact while hunting or through eating meat from wildlife. Climate changes can for one side, favour
contact between wildlife and humans by impacting the natural habitats of the reservoir species and by influencing their movements. For other side, climate evolution may also exacerbate food insecurity, which can in turn modify human behaviour, particularly by prompting people to look for alternative food sources, such as bushmeat.

3. Low-income countries must reinforce their health systems to detect and control infectious zoonotic diseases and control outbreaks, by taking into consideration potential impact of climate change in their sanitary strategy and policy. Indeed, health systems are structurally inadequate in the least advanced countries, where they endure rather than anticipate climatic conditions and their variations. The recent Ebola epidemic in West Africa bears witness in particular to the need to step up the early detection and management of the emergence of zoonosis taking into account accurate environmental, social and climatic data.

Research and health management regarding these 3 items should be carried out through the “One Health” concept. This holistic approach includes both animal health and human health in their shared environment. The implementation of a multidisciplinary and intersectoral approach requires above all an awareness of its benefits and greater involvement of the scientific and policy makers. The issue of climate change and its impacts on viral diseases may be an axis of reflection on this integrated approach, and Ebola disease is a topical issue.

Our poster presents some examples of North-South collaboration between teams which are fighting together against both climate change and Ebola crisis.

P-4410-05

Localised Climate Smart Agricultural
Practices from the Global Permaculture
Movement: Examples from the Semi-Arid
Little Karoo in the Western Cape Province
of South Africa

E. Kruger (1)

(1) University of the Witwatersrand, Department of Social
Anthropology, Johannesburg, Gauteng, South Africa

A growing global social movement under the banner of permaculture is aimed directly at responding to the effects of climate change and mitigating human impact on our environment, in particular the consequences of unrestrained resource extraction and consumption and non-sustainable agriculture. Permaculture, a conceptual framework that originated in Australia in the 1970s, and now practiced across the globe, provides guidelines for the design of human living environments and the activities that we carry out in those environments. The underlying aim of permaculture design is to create productive anthropogenic landscapes of benefit to both humans and the environments that we inhabit – living and non-living by reducing the negative impacts of our actions through considered design. In the process, the intention is to also have an actively beneficial impact on those environments.

A principal focus in permaculture is the localisation of resilient food production systems which mimic and integrate with local ecologies and ecosystems, and are designed in anticipation of the climatic extremes expected to occur with climate change as well as reduced access to fossil fuels.

This presentation will introduce central approaches to agriculture and food production in the permaculture framework, and draw upon case studies from anthropological fieldwork conducted at a permaculture project located in the semi-desert Succulent Karoo biome of the Western Cape province in South Africa. In particular, the discussion will consider the design methods and technologies that have been employed to provide water and food in a highly degraded landscape of climatic extremes, and in the process contribute towards improved ecological resilience and biodiversity. Examples here include the use of water harvesting earthworks such as keylines, swales and tree pan systems, as well as employing a diverse range of climate specific and resilient productive species grown together to create micro-climates more amenable to food production and human habitation.

Some points that will be considered in this oral presentation are: What is climate smart agriculture? - Some central concerns around climate change and agriculture. What

agricultural practice is not smart? What is permaculture?
- Case studies of permaculture food production at a semi-
avid permaculture in South Africa. How does permaculture
address the concerns raised in climate change debates?
What lessons can we learn from the permaculture paradigm
of climate smart agriculture?

P-4410-05

The Prevalence of HIV/AIDS amongst the
Pastoral Communities over Kenya, Uganda,
Tanzania and Ethiopia

G. Otieno (1)

(1) university of nairobi, meteorology, nairobi, kenya

The Human Immune Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) have been identified as a major threat to pastoral communities over East Africa. The regional governments have given little attention to this problem due to the perception that Pastoralisms is economically inefficient and environmentally destructive. The study was carried over Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda to assess the current state of HIV/AIDS prevalence amongst the pastoral communities using desktop review and expert judgment opinion. In Kenya, about 8million people of Kenyan population depend on pastoralism. In Tanzania the livestock sector contributes about 6.1% to the national Gross Domestic Products (GDP), in Uganda 17% of GDP is accounted for by the sector and about 9% of the national GDP in Ethiopia.

In the pastoral districts the average prevalence of HIV/
AIDS amongst the community is estimated at 5.7% with
this figure expected to increase. The infection rates are
being accelerated by factors related to human rights
and genetic diversity, cultural environment and lack of HIV/
AIDS awareness and stigmatisation. The HIV/AIDS is not
recognized at policy level as a major problem facing
Pastoralisms yet the statistics show increasing population
of HIV/AIDS victims.

The communities refuse to admit the presence and impact of HIV/AIDS within their families with high stigma attached to the affected and infected. The number of livestock has been diminishing through sales to pay the medical expenses when the pastoralists are affected. The study recommends for budgetary support and HIV/AIDS campaign amongst the pastoral districts to reduce the stigma and curb the decreasing number of livestock.

P-4410-06

Now You See It

L. Perrin (1)

(1) Lola Perrin, London, United Kingdom

I have spent the last year sourcing and interviewing
campaigners, inventors and innovators at the frontline
of climate justice and placing their words within a music
composition for piano and recorded spoken words. The
project is a device to drive population awareness of the
issues. Interviews range from grassroots mitigation
experts in Africa to Costa Rican media agitators to
campaign for the Arctic. Please note that as of today,
The Guardian newspaper is currently picking up on my
work, being released end March 2015. I propose for you a
Q&A, to be discussed, following a performance featuring
my work – as a musician/layperson/mother of two boys/
deeply concerned about our future. I will be situated at
a music keyboard/acoustic piano, performing with my
artistic, pre-recorded spoken word presentation created
from my interviews with major international voices in the
climate justice movement, delivered through PA system.

Here follows my press release. I hope to hear back from you: music is an important social device to communicate between expert witnesses and ordinary people and I would like to collaborate with you to create the perfect performance for your vital initiative. I live in London.

TITLE: 'NOW YOU SEE IT'

FOR PIANO AND AN ORCHESTRA OF WORDS RECORDED
FROM ACTIVISTS & INNOVATORS AT THE FRONTLINE OF
CLIMATE JUSTICE

2 min PROMO
watch?v=EsHnQJ1A54

https://www.youtube.com/
# Fiddling while the roof burns? Tales of coal, justice and grassroots opposition to energy boom in Turkey

E. Turhan (1) ; AC. Gundogan (2)

(1) Istanbul Policy Center, Sabancı University, Istanbul, Turkey; (2) King's College London, London, United Kingdom

What links a local group of activists, struggling with few resources to save their communities from the ills of coal-fired power plants to broader social movements to save the planet from burning? And what, in turn, connects global processes of climate change to local livelihoods' demands for spatial and environmental justice? Climate justice, as Pellow and Park (2009) observe, begins with an acknowledgement of climate injustice and views this problem not as an unfortunate byproduct of climate disruption but as one of its core elements, and that one must be confronted if climate crisis is to be halted and reversed. Even though the notion of climate injustice implicates need, care and community, proposals for the Anthropocene remains limited to property rights and market ideas of justice. However climate justice offers a fresh approach which in practice means energy access for those who do not adequate and sustainable access to the services of energy, workplace justice and occupational health for those who produce energy sources and remediate justice those who are affected by the impacts of hydrocarbon burning. This provides a good entry point to investigate the case of Turkey, which has witnessed exacerbating ecological conflicts since 1990s. Economic growth, rapid urbanization and hydrocarbon-dominated energy policy preferences in the past 2 decades placed immense pressure on the socio-ecological systems in Turkey. These pressures often manifested themselves as ecological conflicts due to land use changes, energy production, mining and associated neoliberal legislative changes. At the peak of these conflicts, Gezi protests of 2013 became the landmark of ecological conflicts in framing climate-energy nexus as a matter of (in)justice for and by the most vulnerable communities. Yet failure of the Turkish government to take a binding emissions reduction target as the OECD country with the highest rate of emissions increase since 1990 and its ambiguous position in the global climate regime makes it a curious case. Hence in an attempt to demystify the 'energy-hungry nation' idea, this paper focuses on the cases of three local movements (Aliağa, Karabiga and Yalova) against coal-fired power plants, their changing discourses and the national energy planning under climate change in stitching the gap between developmentalism, energy production and defense of rural-urban commons in Turkey.

# 4411 - Can the Green Economy save the climate?

## ORAL PRESENTATIONS

### K-4411-01

#### Green Economy as a Technocratic Concept: Genealogy and Agenda

J. Foyer (1)

(1) CNRS, ISCC, Paris, France

In 1972 in Stockholm, the environment was considered as a set of constraints, imposing various biophysical limitations on economic activity. At Rio in 1992, the advent of sustainable development introduced changes in this representation: economic development or growth was considered as possibly compatible with environmental protection. In 2012 at Rio, the Green Economy was supposed to represent a further step in the environment-market reconciliation, since through this notion, the environment was no longer considered as a reality to be taken into account, and even less as a constraint, but rather as an opportunity. Thus, within 40 years, the discourse has moved from the assertion of a fundamental contradiction and the search for a balance between the environment and the economy, to that of potential synergy.

This presentation aims both at tracing a genealogy of the

concept of Green Economy and a precise analysis of the moment of its international agenda setting at Rio +20. Our core hypothesis is that the concept of green economy, while conveying a very liberal and economic worldwide, is primarily a technocratic concept that did not stem from the private sector, but that emerged at the interface between academia and international institutions. We also want to analyze the role of the Rio+20 Summit in agenda setting and testing ground for the concept, as a moment of controversy and violent confrontation over its definition and vehement criticism on the scope it should be granted.

### K-4411-02

#### CARBON EMISSIONS AND RESOURCE PRODUCTIVITY: Why reviving growth requires a rapid de-carbonization of the global energy system

M. Molitor (1)

(1) SciencesPo, Paris School of International Affairs, Paris, France

Most governments believe that any attempts to reduce their emissions will require giving up on some future economic growth and this has served as the principal barrier to getting global collective action on reducing
the growing risks associated with climate change. This is true despite the fact that numerous economic studies have shown that the future reductions in growth required to keep global surface temperature increases to less than 2 degrees C will be small relative to the overall increases in growth over time. What no one has questioned is whether it is possible to meet the economic growth requirements of a human population on its way to 9.5 billion people in 2050 by using fossil fuels as the primary basis of delivering both stationary and transport energy.

The global economy requires exponential growth to function properly and this, in turn, requires an exponential improvement in overall resource productivity. Resource productivity refers to the efficiency with which all forms of capital (human intellectual, hard assets, and money), energy and natural resources are deployed. There is a growing gap between the increasing levels of resource efficiency now required and the levels which we have been able to achieve. Locating, recovering, transporting, refining, and combating fossil fuels requires increasing amounts of capital, energy and natural resources. Not only has the resource productivity of fossil fuels been declining for decades but, as energy touches every segment of the global economy, fossil fuels have had a negative impact on global resource productivity as well.

The OECD estimates that global GDP must increase from approximately US$70 trillion today to US$305 trillion by 2050 in order to meet the growing aspirations of an expanding human population. This is an unprecedented level of growth requiring extraordinary improvements in resource productivity. Many large-scale economic activities in operation today are deploying capital, energy and natural resources at levels of resource productivity that will make it nearly impossible to achieve the higher levels of growth now required. The most compelling evidence of this is the waste produced by these activities as waste is the best indicator of resource inefficiency. At 36 billion metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent and growing, the waste produced through the combustion of fossil fuels is the most robust evidence of the least resource productive activity on the planet.

Getting to US$305 trillion is not possible if we continue to rely on fossil fuels as our primary source of delivering useful energy. Fortunately, there are existing and emerging energy technologies, new business models and new models for producing and distributing energy which are capable of delivering the large improvements in resource productivity now required. Furthermore, the level of capital investment required is no more than the amount that would have been deployed to continue using fossil fuels. The old narrative...

> "Reducing carbon emissions requires deciding to be a little bit poorer in the future"

is not only out of date but completely inaccurate. The new narrative is...

> "Reducing carbon emissions is the only pathway to restoring growth at scale and on time"

## K-4411-03

### Green economy and its alternatives

**K. Mcafee (1)**

(1) San Francisco State University, San Francisco, United States of America

Global environmental policy is increasingly framed by discourses of 'green economy'. Green economy is meant to foster economic growth while decoupling that growth from environmental decline. Its advocates hope that monetary valuation of environmental assets and deficits, economic rationality, and market mechanisms can mute the most ecologically damaging effects of unfettered, globalized capitalism. Some contend that this approach can surmount the North-South conflicts over climate-change liabilities and obligations that have bedeemed environmental negotiations.

To this end, green economy has been advanced as a successor to sustainable development. Its proponents endorse markets in nature as both a conservation strategy and a means to foster economic development in the context of resource scarceries and shrinking ecological space. In this view, international carbon trading would compensate developing countries for the costs of

averting GHG emissions and ensuring conservation, while payments for ecosystem services might ease growing conflicts over land and resource rights. Advocates hope that green economy, informed by scientific expertise, can thus position environmental governance above the political fray.

Nevertheless, international climate negotiations remain highly politicized. The G7 governments reject green economy as likely to undermine their sovereignty and reinforce longstanding patterns of global inequality. Some denounce carbon markets as 'environmental neocolonialism' yet remain dependent on absolutism and fossil-fuel-based growth. In contrast, emerging critiques 'from below' challenge the foundational assumptions of mainstream green economy, extractivism, and the growth imperative.

New peasant and indigenous social movements and their intellectual allies reject the construction of ecological limits as absolute scarcity, focusing less on the finitude of resources and carbon sinks than on the anti-entropic, life-giving relationship among human labor, water, soil, sun, and the activities of other species. They question the implicit equations of development with growth, well-being with growth, consumption, and conservation with market rationality. Instead of growth they speak of buen vivir, sumak kawsay, lek'il külxelaj, ubuntu, radical ecological democracy, etc. These concepts conflate living well and living cooperatively both socially and ecologically.

These visionaries do not exclude trade, much less the reduction of material deprivation, but they reject narrow productivity that is blind to ecological consequences and distributive outcomes. Instead, they pursue endogenous strategies aimed at reduced dependence on external markets and capital, reorganizatization, and equitable urban-rural relationships. In place of standardized scientific categories and universally commensurable values, they are informed by relational ontologies: understandings of human-nature linkages that are diverse, dynamic and specific to particular territories, times, and ecosocial systems.

Can such visions and strategies overcome the apparent conflict between the need for greater material well-being and the impoverishing, diversity-destroying results of globalized growth along current trajectories? Given the scope of the climate-change challenge in an unequal world, counter-hegemonic discourses to green economy under the broad headings of buen vivir, mainly in the global South, and degrowth, mainly in the global North, merit our attention.

## O-4411-01

### Sustainable energy and development in a dichotomous economy: South Africa

**A. Hughes (1); T. Caetano (1); H. Trollip (1); B. Merven (1)**

(1) University of Cape Town, Energy research centre, Cape Town, South Africa

Currently South Africa is ranked amongst the top 20 emitters in terms of global GHG emissions. Energy consumption, which is heavily coal dependent, is expected to grow significantly in the future as the economy grows and the South African economy continues to grow. Unless commitments to decrease GHG emissions are prioritised, GHG emissions will increase dramatically in the medium to long term. Energy modeling in the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios showed, for example, a four fold increase in GHG emissions by 2050 under a scenario of Growth Without Constraints (ERC, 2007).

In terms of Economic development and GDP, SA is considered to be an upper middle income country, with a per capita GNI in purchasing power parity terms of 12240US$ (World Bank, 2015). However, society in South Africa remains very unequal. The GINI coefficient is 0.69 (StatsSA 2014) and the MDG poverty line of $1.25 (2005ppp) shows that 7.4 percent of South Africans are currently living in extreme poverty, using a poverty line at $5 (2005ppp) per day, this number increases to 29.2% (StatsSA 2013). Lower income households also experience a large degree of energy poverty, despite the high levels of electrification. For example the Department of Energy found that over a third of South African households are energy poor (DOE 2013). Poverty is largely due to low levels of unemployment in the formal sector and low levels of informal sector activity. Using a broad definition of
unemployment which includes all those currently without work that would like to work, 34.6% of South Africans are currently unemployed (StatsSA 2015).

South Africa is committed to a development path which is both inclusive (reducing inequality, unemployment and poverty), and "green" (reducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing the sustainability of both the production and consumption of energy). Impacting low carbon development aspirations is heavy reliance of industry and electricity production on coal. Questions currently being grappled with are: how can we decouple GDP growth and coal use in the economy?, encourage more efficient and equitable use of energy and follow a growth path which promotes job creation in sectors that are less energy intensive, thereby lowering emissions. This needs to be done without negatively impacting aspirations for high GDP growth and increased employment, both of which are economic development priorities which underpin current development policies such as the National Development Plan, and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Plan.

The question for this paper is therefore: What could a sustainable energy future under a scenario of inclusive growth look like for South Africa?

The paper uses a bottom up energy model of South Africa, SATIM, to explore possible energy pathways and deep decarbonisation, looking specifically at the energy needed for the economy and the likely fuel mix and GHG emissions associated with this until 2050. A CGE model is used to assess how close we are to meeting development objectives, and ultimately whether development and decarbonisation can be complimentary objectives.

### References

Energy Research Centre. (2007). Long Term Mitigation Scenarios: Technical Summary, Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism, Pretoria, 2007.

DOE, 2013. A survey of energy-related behaviour and perceptions in South Africa.

StatsSA, 2013. Millennium Development Goals Country Report 2013.

StatsSA, 2014. Poverty Trends in South Africa.

StatsSA, 2015. Statistical release Quarterly Labour Force Survey Q4 2014,

World Bank. (2015). http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD, accessed March 01 2015

## O-4411-02

### Can "Green Growth" Guide us into a Sustainable Future?

J. Zalpyte (1); MS. Rhozey, (2)

(1) Eberswalde University for Sustainable Development, Faculty of Forestry and Environment, Leipzig, Germany; (2) Eberswalde University for Sustainable Development, Faculty of forestry and environment, Berlin, Germany

Prevailing political economy is failing to maintain environmental, social, political and economic coherence. A deep changeover into a new economy is needed "where the acknowledged priority is to sustain human and natural communities" (GTI, 2011: 1). Therefore, it is widely accepted that the current linear so-called "take- make-dispose" economy is not sustainable and that solutions need to be found in order to decrease both the input of limited resources as well as the output of human waste in any form. This paper examines in how far the ideas of "green growth" are capable to cope with this problem since they promise material welfare while reducing the impacts on the environment. Even though the underlying approaches like a "circular economy", "zero- emissions economy" or "Factor x" seem to be desirable, there is reasonable scepticism in how far advances in resource efficiency can ensure a sustainable future while industrialised societies got used to constantly raising living standards. We show that there is an intrinsic contradiction within the desire for "green growth" guiding the way towards a sustainable future.

## O-4411-03

### Environmental Justice and Conceptions of the Green Economy

T. Ehresman (1); C. Okereke (2)

(1) University of the South--Sewanee, Department of Politics, Sewanee, Tennessee, United States of America; (2) University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom

Abstract: Green economy has become one of the most fashionable terms in globalenvironmental public policy discussions and forums. Despite this popularity, and its beingselected as one of the organizing themes of the United Nations Rio720 Conference inBrazil, June 2012, its prospects as an effective mobilization tool for global environmentalsustainability scholarship and practice remain unclear. A major reason for this is that muchlike its precursor concepts such as environmental sustainability and sustainable development,green economy is a woolly concept, which lends itself to many interpretations. Hence, rather than resolve long-standing controversies, green economy merely reinvigoratesexisting debates over the visions, actors and policies best suited to secure a moresustainable future for all. In this review article, we aim to fill an important gap in scholarshipby suggesting various ways in which green economy may be organized and synthesized as a concept, and especially in terms of its relationship with the idea of social andend environmental justice. Accordingly, we offer a systemization of possible interpretations of green economy mapped onto a synthesis of existing typologies of environmental justice.This classification provides the context for future analysis of which, and how, variousiations of green economy link with various conceptions of justice.

## O-4411-04

### Greenovation and Sustainable Manufacturing: A Case Study of the Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industry in Nigeria

J. Adelegan (1); OJ. Professor Adelegan (2)

(1) Global Network for Environment and Economic Development Research, Department of Environment and Sustainable Development, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria, Federal Republic of; (2) Lead City Government, Economics, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria, Federal Republic of

Addressing a paucity of research about industrial adoption of green innovation in Africa and, more generally, in tropical developing countries, we examined the Nigerian chemical and pharmaceutical industry as a case study. Qualitative interviews with one hundred and forty upper echelon executives representing thirty five Nigerian firms challenge conventional expectations that energy intensive industries in developing markets operate amid highly pollution-intensive conditions, within weak or non-existent formal environmental regulatory frameworks, and with limited institutional capacity. Our findings suggest a strong positive relationship between green innovation and financial performance and positive relationship between green innovation and sustainable manufacturing of African firms.

## O-4411-05

### Impacts of mitigation policies on labor markets and welfare

C. Grottera (1); W. Willis (2)

(1) COPPE/UFRJ, Energy planning, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; (2) COPPE/UFRJ, Energy Planning, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil

The increasing need to reduce GHG emissions gives rise to new environmental regulations and market instruments, which present the potential to transform economies over the next decades. Production and consumption patterns are about to experience major changes as the world's carbon emissions must decrease in order to meet safe carbon concentration levels in the atmosphere.

The transition to a low carbon economy offers many opportunities to create green and decent jobs in developing countries, especially in sectors related to renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, forestry and waste management. Meanwhile, sectors like oil and gas, mining and energy-intensive industry may experience significant losses.
Since sectors differ in labor skill requirements and remuneration levels, shifting to this new profile will have major implications for workers among various sectors. To the extent that this affects workers' income, changes in inequality and poverty levels are expected. In that sense, seeking a fair transition and the preservation of decent jobs is arguably necessary.

This work uses a hybrid Computable General Equilibrium model (IMACIM-RR) to assess the impacts of mitigation options in various sectors, ranging from AFOLU to waste management, energy and industry sectors. The model is divided in 6 energy sectors, 7 industrial sectors, apart from the agriculture and livestock, transport and services sectors, and represents the Brazilian economy for a 25-year period, from 2005 to 2030.

The household sector is divided in 3 income classes, according to their total income measured in base-year minimum wages (2005). Household consumption and income levels were calibrated using the 2003 National Household Budget Survey (POF), undertaken by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The first income class represents the 16% poorer households, the second the 60% intermediary ones, and the third class represents the 24% rich households.

The long-term scenarios depicted in the study were built through a participative process that engaged more than 70 stakeholders from different areas, including government, private sector, the scientific community and civil society agents. In order to simulate quite ambitious mitigation scenarios, a set of mitigation options was identified, contemplating the possibilities in the AFOLU, industrial, transport, residential and services, energy and waste sectors. The inputs provided by the stakeholders and sectorial experts included different mitigation options, investment requirements, GHG abatement potential and marginal abatement costs, among other aspects.

After defining a set of mitigation options, stakeholders were interested in checking what would be the influence of the implementation policy on macroeconomic and social indicators. To assess those effects, two implementation policies were tested – a normative scenario (command and control) and a normative scenario plus a carbon tax (100 US$/tCO2e).

Since several of those options present low and even negative abatement costs, our results show that their implementation do not jeopardize total output and jobs, even though there are winning and losing sectors. For example, jobs in oil, coal and carbon intensive sectors decrease whilst jobs in the biomass and services sectors increase. The former usually employs high-skilled labor, while workers in the latter are usually less skilled and hence poorer. Therefore, the results indicate a greater evolution in poor workers' income, relative to high-skilled ones, leading to a better income distribution in the long run.

### O-0441-06

#### Low Carbon Economy versus Ecological Civilisation: Polarization and Consensus of China's environmentalism

C. Goron (1)

(1) Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK, United Kingdom

China's Climate Strategy proclaims the ultimate objective to transform its economic model towards "green and low carbon development" (Ivse ditan fazhan) (China Climate Strategy 2014-2020). This strategy is often equated with the concept of "green growth", which the Chinese government has supported in the UN, mirroring its success in becoming the world's largest manufacturer of green technologies (REN report 2013) and the world's largest "green market" (IGEA 2014)[1]. Indeed, both concepts emphasise the bottom line requirement that environmental protection may never mean a "growth ban" and on the contrary can be a motor of economic growth (Pan, J. et al, 2010; Jacobs, M. 2013). However, this economic interpretation of sustainability, and the marketization policies it entails, have been challenged, not only internationally, but also within China. In my paper, I brings evidence of this domestic debate and assess the relative importance, within it, of "green growth" as an enabler and inhibitor of actions against climate change. Based on an extensive review of Chinese media, NGOs and academic publications, as well as policy documents, I discuss how

issues of principle have informed two "low carbon policies": the introduction of carbon markets and the promotion of "low carbon cities" in the 12th Five-Year-Plan (2011-2016). I argue that the rhetoric of "low carbon development" has served mainly to cut through a polarized debate regarding the responsibility for the provision environmental public goods in China. Amongst them, nationalists still view "Low Carbon" as a western plot to contain China's rise (Gou, 2010)[2] and blame foreign capitalists for destroying China's resources and public health for the benefit of western consumers (Wen, Dale, 2015). On the contrary, socialist interpretations of the concept of "ecological civilization" (Shengtai wenming), which was included in the Constitution of the Communist Party in November 2012, target the government as principal agent of change, and reject the focus on economic growth as corrupted and "western" (Yu, Keping, 2003; Pan, Yue, 2007)[4]. But as implementing successful climate actions in China remains contingent on strong government support, success relies on creative accommodation of the official rhetoric of balancing economic and environmental priorities.

[1] International Green Economy Association guoji Ivse jingxi jiexiu, in their invitation to the first Global Green Technology Conference - China in Beijing on 29-30 January 2015. See http://www.igea-un.org/news/bencandy.php?id=213&id=899

[2] Gou's book Low Carbon Plot - China's vital war with the UE and Europe, published in 2010, had a frank success in China and was glossed upon for months on Chinese social media. Shengtai wenming, (2010), Ditan yinmou: Zhongguo yu oumei de shengsi zhihu, Low Carbon Plot - China's vital war with the UE and Europe, Shanxi Edition Publishing (In Chinese)

[3] «The Party must promote all-around economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress in accordance with the overall plan for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics.»

[4] Pan Yue, as deputy director of China's State Environmental Protection Administration, published in 2007 a high-profile essay on "Socialist Ecological Civilization". Pan Yue, Shengtai Wenming Jian Cujing Zhongguo Tese Sheshui Zhuyi Jianshe. (On Socialist Ecological Civilisation). China Economic Times on September 26, 2006 (In Chinese)

### O-0441-07

#### Co-performance: the making of ecological modernization theory and EU climate politics

S. Aykut (1); B. Gabrielle (2)

(1) LISIS, Université paris-est, Marne-la-Vallée, France; (2) Irtesta, Cestas, France

Scholars in comparative political science generally acknowledge that the European Union took the lead in issues of environmental protection and in global climate politics in the late 1990s. They attribute the legislative and diplomatic activism of the European Union in environmental issues to the prevalence of ecological modernization beliefs within the European Commission and some Member States heralded as leaders in this domain (Weale 1992; Pridham and Cini 1994; Cini 1995; Hajer 1995; Weale, Pridham et al. 2000). Taking the EU as an example, this contribution aims at questioning the role of norms and beliefs in the development of ambitious climate policy by (supra-)state actors.

We argue that ecological modernization discourse and EU environmental politics co-evolved and co-produced a narrative of environmental performance. This occured through a twofold process: (1) ecological modernization is not only discourse but a narrative with performative consequences; (2) the evolution of EU climate policy shaped the development of ecological modernization theory. We first explore the intellectual and political context within which the discourse on ecological modernization became an influential narrative in the EU environmental politics. We situate this context in the post-cold war history of transatlantic relations. We then relate discursive affinities between narrative and contingent features in the EU environmental politics. This enables us to disclose how EU environmental politics and the narrative on ecological modernization reinforced and shaped each other. Finally, we explore recent developments in both EU climate policy and ecological modernization theory and ask how they relate to the emergence of the concept of «Green Economy».
Why We Should Make RICE NICE: The
Importance of Intragenerational Inequali-
ties for the Economics of Climate Change

M. Fleurbæy (1) ; M. Budolfson, (2) ; F. Dennig (2) ; A. Siebert, (3) ; R. Socolow (4)

(1) Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton, United States of America; (2) Princeton University, Uchv/wws, Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America; (3) Princeton University, Climate futures initiative, Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America; (4) Princeton University, Mechanical engineering, climate futures initiative, Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America

RICE and leading IAMs focus on aggregate economic growth, which has the effect of downplaying important detrimental effects of climate change on the poorest populations. In this paper we introduce a variant of the RICE model in which income distributions at a sub-regional level are modeled. We call the new model NICE, for Nesting Inequalities, Climate and Economy. By reframing the model with the above income disaggregation (in our case into income quintiles), we strive to address these issues of temporal urgency and intraregional equity more thoroughly.

When the degree of inequality aversion (embodied in the elasticity of marginal utility) is increased in RICE, the prescribed mitigation effort is reduced quite significantly. The underlying reason is the Ramsey equation:

discount rate = pure time preference + inequality aversion
x growth rate.

With the positive (and often significant) growth rates of
such models, an increase in the elasticity simply leads to
more discounting.

However, if inequality aversion is a good reason to
discount future damages to wealthier individuals relative
to equivalent mitigation costs to the less affluent present,
it should also be a good reason to be more concerned
about damages (and costs) to poorer individuals than
rich individuals, regardless of the time in which they
take place.

In NICE sub-regional income distributions are explicitly modeled. We combine these with several point estimates from the literature on the distribution of climate damages across income groups. Once these are incorporated, the picture of the richer future benefiting from the effort of the relatively poor present disappears. We find that for some reasonable damage distributions the poorest income groups in some regions could be worse off than their predecessors even under the low damage estimates from the IAM literature. The effect on the policy prescription is that much more aggressive mitigation is warranted to avoid damaging those vulnerable groups. Furthermore, the effort is increasing in the degree of inequality aversion in the social objective for some damage assumptions.

Explicit incorporation of distributional concerns in the
evaluation of a public good such as climate change
mitigation can be criticized for making an inefficient use
of policy instruments. Ideally, the public good should
be provided considering aggregates, and distributional
concerns dealt with by more efficient redistributive policies.
We consider such a possibility in NICE, and find that the
redistributive policies required to substitute for the strong
mitigation policy are well beyond what can be considered
politically feasible. If income redistribution from rich to
poor is performed within regions (with no transfers across
regions), an additional 65% marginal tax rate would have
to be levied and redistributed in order to alleviate the
same (modeled) economic damages to the poor as might
be alleviated by the welfare optimal mitigation rate. We
also examine transfers between regions. "Overseas" aid
from other regions would have to be particularly efficient

at targeting only the poor to be an adequate substitute at
all, and even so, it would have to be significantly greater
than currently accepted levels.

The climate responsibilities of industrial
carbon producers

P. Frumhoff (1) ; R. Heede (2) ; N. Oreskes (3)

(1) Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, United States of America; (2) Climate Accountability Institute, Snowmass, CO, United States of America; (3) Harvard University, Department of the history of science, Cambridge, MA, United States of America

Responsibility for climate change lies at the heart of
social debate over actions to address it. The United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) established the principle of «common but
differentiated responsibilities» among nations, suggesting
that industrialized nations that had produced the greatest
share of historic emissions bore particular responsibility
for preventing dangerous interference with the climate
system.

But climate responsibilities can be distributed in other ways as well. Here, we consider the distinctive responsibilities of the major investor-owned producers of fossil fuels, assessing the actions these companies took and could have taken to act upon the scientific evidence of climate change.

Recently published data show that just 90 entities have produced the fossil energy responsible for 63 percent of the world's industrial emissions of CO2 and methane of these, 50 are investor-owned companies. As the scientific evidence became clear, many of these companies sought sow doubt about the science linking their products to global warming, and today are seeking new and increasingly carbon-polluting sources of fossil fuels

We conclude that major investor-owned fossil energy companies carry significant responsibility for climate change. It is still possible for these companies to effectively contribute to a solution. Significant progress in reducing emissions and limiting climate change could be achieved if companies 1) unequivocally communicate to the public, shareholders, and policymakers of the climate risks resulting from continued use of their products, and therefore the need for restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions consistent with the 2°C global temperature target; 2) firmly reject contrary claims by industry trade associations and lobbying groups; and, 3) accelerate their transition to the production of low-carbon energy. Evidence from history strongly suggests that a heightened societal focus on their climate responsibilities may hasten such a transition.

Equity, Justice, and Security in Global Clime-
mate Governance

D. Michel (1)

(1) The Stimson Center, Environmental Security Program,
Washington, DC, United States of America

Global climate change presents the international community with a seemingly intractable collective action problem. Growing greenhouse gas emissions are projected to raise global temperatures, shift precipitation patterns, and increase extreme weather events. The emerging repercussions of climate changes already underway threaten the livelihoods and security of countries and communities everywhere. Both the drivers and the impacts of transcend traditional state boundaries and governance structures. No single state can counter or avert the impacts of climate change on its own. But any country that moves to reduce its emissions shares the climate benefits with every other nation while bearing the cost of taking action alone. Those states which do nothing to combat climate change can “free ride” on the efforts of those that do. The
UNFCCC has become the global platform for international negotiations to agree and coordinate climate policies among nearly 200 sovereign states. But ongoing debates over the effectiveness and equity of mitigation measures, adaptation, technologies and funding suggest the need for re-evaluation. The future of greenhouse governance depends on innovation towards new type(s) of climate regime. Does the architecture of universal agreement constitute the way forward, or are other channels more suited for climate action? Could the emerging landscape of regional, multi-sectoral, and non-state institutional structures open fruitful potential options and practices for advancing more effective climate governance? Can new governance mechanisms simultaneously ensure climate security and justice, efficiency and accountability, technology innovation and dissemination, or must decision makers and stakeholders inevitably navigate trade-offs between these goals?

In preparation for the 70th anniversary of the United Nations in 2015, the Hague Institute for Global Justice and The Stimson Center have convened a high-level Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, to enhance global understanding and capacity and to advance practical recommendations for innovative collaborative action to address critical global challenges such as climate change. Co-chaired by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Foreign Minister Ibrahim Gambari of Nigeria, commission members include Yoriko Kawaguchi, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Environment of Japan; Shyam Saran, former Foreign Secretary and chief climate negotiator of India; and Erna Witoelaer, Founder of the Indonesian Environmental Forum. The Commission will conclude its report in June 2015. This contribution will provide the opportunity to present and discuss the Commission's analysis and recommendations.

O-4412-01

A novel approach for analysing how equi-
table and ambitious countries' national
policy actions and targets are in the
light of the forthcoming Intended National
Determined Contributions (INDCs)

MR. Rocha (1); N. Höhne (2); H. Fekete, (2); B. Hare (1)
; M. Schaeffer, (1); M. Hagemann, (2); ML. Jeffery (3); J.
Gütschow (3); F. Sfera (1); Y. Deng (4); K. Wouters, (4);
BP. Van (4); F. Comaty (4); K. Blok (4)

(1) Climate Analytics, Berlin, Germany; (2) NewClimate Institute, Cologne, Germany; (3) Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Potsdam, Germany; (4) Ecofys, Cologne, Germany

Countries are currently working on preparing measures to
conquer climate change at many frontiers. They are
developing policies that will lead to emission reductions
in the short and medium term, they are considering
aspirational long-term targets that provide guidance
to policy-makers and stakeholders, and they are preparing
submissions to the UNFCCC, in the form of Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), committing
to legally-binding targets (e.g. emissions reductions
below base year) for the post-2020 period. The sum of
the initially proposed national actions at a global level so
far falls short of what is required to keep global warming
below 2 degree above pre-industrial level. More action will
be needed and major questions remaining include: which
countries are doing their fair share?, which ones increase their
effort?

To answer these questions, global 2 degree-compatible
emission pathways have to be broken down to country-
level, fair emissions allowances. This can be achieved
using effort-sharing methodologies. A wide variety of such
approaches exist and their different underlying criteria
and assumptions can lead to very different outcomes
and a large range of emissions allowances for different
countries. Here, we propose a methodology that allows the
comprehensive assessment of countries' fair level of effort
in a 2-degree world, which integrates the many views put
forward by countries and the scientific community, without
bias towards specific methodologies.

This methodology builds on previous work for the IPCC
Fifth report that gathered and categorized existing effort
sharing studies. The categories provided there serve as
the basis for our analysis framework as they represent

the broad range of possible 'principles' that could be
applied to effort sharing. With the goal of extracting a
unified benchmark system from the various approaches
and categories for countries, we used these 'principles' to
develop a framework that enables the rating of countries
current level of effort against their fair level of effort.
In addition the framework takes account of countries'
mitigation potentials and aspects such as finance provided
and the conditionality of targets on external parameters.
These categories are introduced that describe the countries'
overall effort level: inadequate, medium, sufficient and
role model.

Under this proposed framework, the ambition of a large
number of countries that have put forward targets so far
are rated as inadequate or medium according to the scale
developed here. One of the major emitters, China, has
pushed emissions no later than 2030. The Climate Action
Tracker quantifies resulting emissions of up to 15Gt
in 2030, and rates this as inadequate, as only the least
stringent effort sharing category is achieved at this level.
The currently announced target of the USA of 26 – 28%
below 2005 in 2025 results in a rating of medium, meaning
that this target is within the range of a number of effort-
sharing categories, but the level of ambition would only
be sufficient at the global level, if other countries moved
into the more ambitious end of their effort sharing ranges.
The submitted INCDC of the EU of reducing emissions by
40% below 1990 also receives the rating inadequate. Effort
sharing approaches demand a stronger change in trends
of the EU, in order for it to contribute in a fair manner to
the global target.

O-4412-02

Quantifying Development Needs: An energy-centered approach to climate justice

N. Rao (1) ; W. Lamb (2)

(1) IIASA, Energy, Luxenburg, Austria; (2) Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, School of Mechanical, Aerospace and Civil Engineering, University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom

Despite the vast literature on global climate justice, there is a surprising lack of studies that attempt to quantify the emissions impact of basic human development, even though many of these frameworks aim, either implicitly or explicitly, to shield basic human development from the costs of mitigation.[1] Broadly, the literature that frames development categories is introduced that describes how to relate these rights to development needs, making them susceptible as claims of 'hot air'. Proposals that aim to differentiate nations' capacity to mitigate define relatively arbitrary, universal thresholds of exemption,[2] typically in terms of income[3] or emissions, which ignore the heterogeneity in countries' energy sectors, and consequently their mitigation costs.[4] Yet, achieving climate stabilization at 450 ppm or less would significantly restrict global growth in energy, whose sufficiency for even basic development is not known.[5]

This paper presents a new basis for differentiating
countries' mitigation responsibilities based neither on
emissions rights nor income differences, but directly
linking human development needs to greenhouse gas
emissions through energy. Drawing on the well-known
linkages between energy and human development, this
paper prescribes a theoretical and empirically grounded
quantification of countries' energy needs for achieving
basic human development. Using different indicators of
human development (HD), including life expectancy and
a composite (new) basic needs indicator, the historical
relationship between countries' energy consumption and
HD are estimated, and then projected into the future. The
methodology also estimates historical decoupling between
HD and income, and the relationship between HD and
energy for technological progress. Carbon intensities of energy are then separately
projected based on different scenarios of the future,
incorporating co-benefits and other future incentives for
low-carbon development.

The cumulative emissions budgets for countries, so
calculated, provide country-specific estimates of
development needs for a universal set of HD standards,
which can serve as a basis for deriving countries'
mitigation responsibility. The paper discusses how the
underlying analysis enables claims of basic development
to be incorporated into both country-specific aggregate
emissions targets, as well as into sector-specific cross-
country mitigation regimes.
This work builds on a forthcoming publication in Global Environmental Change [6] and presents preliminary ideas from research commencing shortly as part of a European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant entitled 'Decent Living: Energy: energy and emissions thresholds for providing decent living standards to all'.

[1] Rao, N. 2011. Climate change and equity: different metrics and views. In A Handbook on Climate Change and India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, India

[2] Rao, N. 2013. International and intranational equity in burden-sharing agreements for climate change mitigation. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Diplomacy, 14(2) 129:146.

[3] Baer, P., Kartha, S., Athanasiou, T., Kemp-Benedict, E. 2009. The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework: Drawing Attention to Inequality within Nations in the Global Climate Policy Debate. Dev. Change 40, 1121-1138

[4] Chakravarty, Shoibal, et al. «Sharing global CO2 emission reductions among one billion high emitters.» Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2009): pnas-0905232106.

[5] Steckel, JC, et al. 2013. Development without energy? Assessing future scenarios of energy consumption in developing countries, Ecological Economics. 90, 53-67

[6] Lamb, W., & N. D. Rao, forthcoming. Human development in a climate-constrained world: what the past says about the future, Global Environmental Change.

## O-4412-03

# Legal Strategies to Accelerate Climate Action

### N. Amerasinghe (1)

(1) Center for International Environmental Law, Climate & Energy Program, Washington DC, United States of America

Climate change is occurring at a faster pace than the international negotiations to address the problem. In the absence of meaningful progress to reach an ambitious and binding global agreement on climate change, we need new strategies to accelerate climate action. Strategic legal challenges are a powerful tool in effecting transformative change, a tool that groups around the world are already starting to explore.

There are a variety of legal challenges that could be used to hold culpable actors responsible for causing climate-related harms. While the types of legal claims and corresponding evidentiary burdens will vary across jurisdictions, they typically involve a plaintiff with a particularized harm, and a defendant who is responsible and potentially liable for causing that harm. Thus, two primary hurdles in bringing these kinds of claims are identifying those responsible for climate change and connecting their actions to the harms suffered by climate-affected individuals and communities.

Scientific evidence plays a critical role in addressing these hurdles by providing the information needed to identify potential defendants and to link actions to harms (i.e. demonstrating causation). For example, in 2014, the scientific journal Climatic Change published new research that traces nearly two-thirds of all industrial emissions of greenhouse gases to only 90 carbon producing entities (including 50 investor-owned entities). This groundbreaking research provides an identifiable set of defendants whose impact can be quantified at the global level. Coupled with ongoing research to connect specific extreme weather events to the human contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations, the research adds a vital link in the causal chain essential to all successful litigation: connecting the actions of identifiable defendants to the harms suffered by identifiable plaintiffs. Scientific research can also show if climate harms can be redressed and quantify the remedy if the harms cannot be redressed.

This presentation will explore potential legal theories to hold culpable actors, particularly the major carbon producers, responsible for their contributions to climate change and its resulting harms. It will also discuss the importance of integrating scientific research into emerging legal strategies and, conversely, how legal strategies can inform and shape litigation-relevant science.

## O-4412-04

# Beyond Burden-Sharing: The Potential for Peace and Reconciliation Processes in Climate Equity Debates

### S. Klinsky (1)

(1) Arizona State University, School of Sustainability, Tempe, AZ, United States of America

Geopolitical changes combined with the increasing urgency of ambitious climate action have re-opened long-standing debates about equity in the international climate arena. Tensions about historical responsibility have been particularly difficult and have the potential to intensify as climate impacts and losses become more severe, and as developing countries face mounting pressure to take mitigation action. Resolving conflicts about the role of historical responsibility may be necessary to enable a global transition to a regime capable of facilitating the depth of collective action required. This paper presents an alternative to burden-sharing and suggests that a peace and reconciliation approach – in which the focus is on balancing efforts to address historically rooted injustices with a future-oriented collective direction and narrative – may have utility in the climate context.

Although substantial policy experience has been gained through efforts to address other complex conflicts at the interface of historical responsibility and imperatives for new collective futures – such as the transition from apartheid in South Africa – lessons from these processes have not been examined in the climate context. The contexts are profoundly different but international climate policy debates share three key similarities with conflicts in which peace and reconciliation processes have been pursued: a) unavoidable interdependence and mutually harmful consequences of not finding an agreement; b) limited ability to address justice concerns through existing jurisdictional processes; and c) profound disagreements about how the past and future should relate in a period of transition.

This paper provides an overview of insights from existing peace and reconciliation processes and focuses on the importance of negotiating a balance between addressing historical injustices and moving into a new, collective future. These two approaches now approaching climate equity from this angle could productively refocus the discussion in particularly important areas for international negotiations, including loss and damage, financial support and capacity building.

## 4412 - POSTER PRESENTATIONS

### P-4412-01

# Atmospheric CO2 increase from 1990 to 2010 from emissions traced to major industrial carbon producers

B. Ekwurzel (1); M. Allen 0; M. Dalton (2); P. Frumhoff (3); R. Heede (4); R. Mera (1)

(1) Union of Concerned Scientists, Climate & Energy, Washington, United States of America; (2) Dalton Consulting, Brooklyn, United States of America; (3) Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, United States of America; (4) Climate Accountability Institute, Snowmass, CO, United States of America

Financial regulators and shareholders from communities around the world are calling for increased reporting of direct greenhouse gas emissions during production and manufacture by major industrial carbon producers. Requests are also growing for increased disclosure of risks to the infrastructure owned by these entities from climate change consequences. Another approach that has emerged is to account for the emissions traced to 90 major industrial carbon producers (Marland et al., 2011, Heede, 2014). Emissions traced to these producers over the period from 1854 to 2010 were incorporated into an energy-balance, carbon-cycle climate model to assess their relative contribution to atmospheric carbon dioxide and the global mean surface temperature. The UNFCCC was formed in 1988 and 1990 became the reference year for comprehensive reporting by nations for greenhouse gas inventories of emissions. Emissions traced to the 90
major carbon producers account for more than half of the atmospheric CO2 increase in 2010 relative to 1990. The emissions traced to the top major carbon producers will be discussed in terms of the consequences in atmospheric CO2 and global mean surface temperature increase. Such calculations are one factor among many other factors that can inform public discussions as to who may be held accountable to contribute to climate mitigation, adaptation, and compensation for damages.

P-4412-02

The climate-pension deal

N. Jaakkola (1); F. Dennig (2); VB. David (3)

(1) Ifo Institut, Munich, Germany; (2) Princeton University,

Uchi/wws, Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America;

(3) Copenhagen Economics, Copenhagen, Denmark

'Reducing carbon emissions is costly for current generations, and only benefits people living in the faraway claims lists.' This are common in the popular discourse on climate policy. However, they are mistaken: it is well known that, with overlapping generations, the beneficiaries of climate policies (future generations) can compensate those undertaking the effort (current generations). In other words, there exist climate policies which tackle the externality and leave everybody better off.

What is required for this is a 'climate-pension deal'. Such a deal involves current generations reducing emissions, while pension adjustments shift the benefits of abatement from future generations to the present, as compensation for the abatement costs. This compensation ensures that consumption of the current generations does not fall, and may even increase. In this way current generations are not made worse off, even if they don't live long enough to experience the climate benefits. The counterpart of the pension transfers is lower investment in physical capital: in effect, the portfolio of saving is allocated from (private) physical capital to (public) natural capital.

We characterise the required 'climate-debt deal' which moves society to some Pareto-efficient point. Using an overlapping-generations model, augmented with a climate externality, we assess the intergenerational distributional consequences of Pareto-improving climate policies and compare the fiscal burden due to the required transfers to existing debt and pension burdens. In this way, we assess whether intergenerational compensation is a 'big deal' or not.

We also propose a new framework to assess the distributional consequences of climate policies. Typically, Pareto-efficient points are obtained using a welfare function. A common choice is the weighted utilitarian sum, often with discount factors as weights. These weights are an opaquae device, difficult to relate to the to the distributional consequences.

We propose an alternative which focuses on the distributional consequences. Efficient climate policy generates a surplus: we employ the idea of intergenerational bargaining over how this surplus is divided between which generations. For example, one Nash bargain would involve the generations splitting the surplus over the business-as-usual outcome evenly amongst themselves. Alternative bargaining outcomes incorporate the effect of sunk investments and split the surplus in favour of future generations, recognizing that full compensation for past investments may not be politically achievable. We present and compare several alternative bargaining notions, all of which share the feature that all generations must benefit from the bargain. We also consider an overlapping generations economy equivalent to the standard infinitely-lived agent economy and compare the results of our intergenerational bargains with those resulting from typical assumptions in the integrated assessment literature.[1]

In addition to assessing the magnitude of the flow of intergenerational compensation in the Pareto-efficient climate policies, our analysis also shows that the intergenerational distributional effects of climate policy can be corrected for, and are thus a secondary issue compared to questions about the international burden-sharing.

[1] Nordhaus, W. (2011): Estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon: Background and Results from the RICE-2011 Model, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1826; Stern, N. (2006): The Stern Review, Cambridge University Press.

P-4412-03

Quantification of Effort-Sharing Principles: Policy Choices and Data Uncertainty

ML. Jeffery (1); Y. Robiou Du Pont (2); M. Meinshausen, (3) and J. Gutschow (1)

(1) Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Potsdam,

Germany; (2) Australian-German College of Climate & Energy

Transitions, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia;

(3) University of Melbourne, Australian-german college of climate & energy transitions, school of earth sciences, Melbourne, Australia

A fundamental principle of the UNFCCC negotiations is that of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-CR). Organizing this principle remains a core challenge in the development of a new international agreement, in part due to the nuances of national circumstances, which cannot be readily resolved without negotiation. However, the scientific and non-governmental community can contribute by providing quantitative interpretations of effort-sharing proposals in terms of emission mitigation targets and financial contributions.

Previous quantifications of burden-sharing proposals differ significantly, and a collation of existing studies identified a wide-range of targets for any individual Party or region (Höhne et al., 2014; IPCC WGIII, 2014). The ranges in reduction targets are partly due to differences in the fundamental underlying principle used to determine the fair-share distribution of emissions. For example, equal cumulative per capita emissions or a convergence toward equal per capita emissions. However, the ranges also result from different choices made in the method of quantification, global target emissions pathway, underlying data, and assumptions regarding future emissions growth and socioeconomic development. These differences in data and key assumptions complicate any comparison of results or understanding of the key factors determining fair-share allowances.

Using the PRIMAP (Potsdam Real-time Integrated Model for probabilistic Assessment of emissions Paths) Emissions Module we generate and assess a suite of effort-sharing scenarios resulting from multiple policy and data options within the Greenhouse Development Rights effort-sharing regime (Baer et al., 2008). The Greenhouse Development Rights regime requires emissions, GDP, and population data projections, and incorporates multiple policy options, thereby providing a consistent framework for comparing these scenarios and generating the effort-sharing scenarios generating emissions projections from the IPCC AR5 and LIMITS databases, and socioeconomic data from the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) developed from the IPCC 5th Assessment, all down scaled to the national level.

The generated scenarios are assessed in terms of the resulting 2025 and 2030 mitigation targets for individual countries and regions. We identify the key factors that make a quantitative difference in a countries' fair-share mitigation target. Analysis of these factors allows the identification of areas of convergence and divergence from the perspective of different policy options, and the underlying effort-sharing principles.

Using the suite of effort-sharing scenarios, we explore several key policy questions including: What is the difference in ambition required for a 1.5°C or 2°C limit in global temperature change? For a given country, does the start year of historical accounting, or the balance of capability and responsibility have a greater impact on the fair-share allocation? What does it mean for 2030 mitigation targets if pre-2020 ambition is not increased? From a quantitative perspective, which of these issues is the most important?

Finally, we highlight how quantification methods can be improved to minimize the impact of data and scenario projection uncertainty on the evaluation of fairly distributed emissions targets.

References:

Baer, P., T. Athanasiou, S. Kartha, and E. Kemp-Benedict (2008) The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework: The right to development in a climate constrained world; second edition.

Höhne, N., M. den Elzen, and D. Escalante (2014)
P-4412-04

## Global Climate Ethics: A View Based on Chinese Philosophy

X. Liu (1); Z. Wang (2); J Wu (2)

(1) management institute of shenzhen university, shenzhen, China; (2) Institute of Policy and Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

The Ethical Factors have been recognized now in the scientific researches on the Climate Change. These researches can be more efficient and effective when studies on economic realities and ethic contexts are involved. Referring the Chinese traditional ethic values, this essay introduces a new Climate Ethic System applicable to inter-national discussions, with pursuit of "harmony" and the practice of "operation on ranking and grouping". It probes into the assessment principles of Climate Ethics-Equity, Justice and wellbeing based on the explication of the ethic connotations of Equity and Justice in the Climate Protection, and further into the Justice in climate negotiations. As an ethic principle for the international climate negotiations, this essay suggests: all the measures against the Climate Change should keep in line with the social and economic development of all the participating countries, paving the way for the GAP improvements in each participant while reducing the gaps among them, without depressing the social individuals, which are being poor, deeper into poverty.

P-4412-05

## Intergenerational equity under catastrophic climate change

A. Méjean (1); S. Zuber (2); M. Fleurbaey (3); A. Potier (1)

(1) CIRED, Nogent-sur-Marne, France; (2) Paris School of Economics, Paris, France; (3) Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton, United States of America

Climate change raises the issue of intergenerational equity, as catastrophes may unfairly affect some generations. As climate change threatens irreversible and dangerous impacts (IPCC, 2014), possibly leading to economic collapse, the tradeoff is no longer between present and future consumption, but between present consumption and the possible future extinction of civilization (Weitzman, 2009). This paper aims at identifying public policies that can reduce unfairness and strike a compromise between present and future generations when the potential impact of catastrophic climate change on the economy is accounted for. It explores the impact of inequality aversion and the impact of the attitudes towards population size on optimal climate policy when that catastrophic risk is accounted for.

We use an integrated assessment model which simulates the future joint evolution of the economy and the climate. The Response model is a dynamic optimization model (Potier et al., 2015), which belongs to the tradition of compact integrated assessment models such as DICE. It combines a Ramsey-like macroeconomic module and a climate module, and can be used to determine the original climate policy by comparing the original costs and avoided climate damages. We account for the risk of exogenous due to climate change, first by assuming an exogenous probability of extinction, then by assuming a probability of extinction that depends on the temperature and on the level of economic output. We assume that the states of the world where people are wealthy will show enhanced resilience to climate damages, and will therefore face a lower probability of extinction under a given level of climate damages.

Integrated assessment models can reveal the policy implications of various normative choices through the use of social welfare functions. Ideally, social welfare criteria should (i) account for inequality aversion (it should thus differ from the utilitarian criterion, which does not

account for the distribution of utilities), (ii) satisfy the Pareto principle (i.e. it should account for the preferences of individuals) and (iii) be separable (i.e. the situation of past generations should not impact the evaluation). The 'Expected Prioritarian Equally Distributed Equivalent' (Fleurbaey and Zuber, 2014) accounts for the inequality aversion of the social planner and respects a weak form of Pareto, but is not separable under risky prospects (but we will not consider past generations in our analysis). This criterion includes a critical level of consumption which can be interpreted as the level of subsistence.

In order to reveal the impact of inequality aversion on optimal climate policy, we consider various isoelastic functions φ, which translate the inequality aversion of the social planner, and various isoelastic functions u, which translate the risk aversion of the social planner. Inequality aversion here relates to the average consumption by individual at time t. Preliminary results using Response in the certain case (with no risk of extinction), and using the standard discounted utilitarian criterion, show that the optimal policy (i.e. the timing of optimal abatement) is identical for equal discount rates r = φ + ηg, whatever the values of the pure time preference rate p and the degree of inequality aversion η. In the risky case, the degree of inequality aversion has a significant impact on the optimal climate policy. In order to reveal the impact of the attitudes towards population size N (which refers to the total number of individuals in all generations), welfare is weighted by the population size through xN, which is a bounded increasing sequence of N. In this case, the criterion gives priority to large populations.

Fleurbaey, M., Zuber, S., 2014. Discounting, beyond Utilitarianism (Economics Discussion Papers No. 2014-40). Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

IPCC, 2014. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers.

Pottier, A., Espagne, E., Fabert, B.P., Dumas, P., 2015. The Comparative Impact of Integrated Assessment Models' Structures on Optimal Mitigation Policies. Environ Model Assess 1-21.

Weitzman, M.L., 2009. On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change. Review of Economics and Statistics 91, 1-19.

P-4412-06

## Attribution of extreme heat events in the western US to emissions sourced from major industrial carbon producers

R. Mera (1); B. Ekwurzel (1); D. Rupp (2); P. Frumhoff (3); P. Mote (4); M. Allen (1); F. Otto (5); N. Massey (5); D. Mitchell (5)

(1) Union of Concerned Scientists, Climate and energy, Washington, United States of America; (2) Oregon State University, Oregon climate change research institute, Corvallis, United States of America; (3) Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, United States of America; (4) Oregon State University, Earth, ocean, & atmospheric sciences, Corvallis, Oregon, United States of America; (5) University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom

There exist highly-vulnerable populations facing detrimental climate impacts within a developed nation like the United States. There is a growing need for accountability for the damages incurred as well as funding for mitigation infrastructure. The concept of responsibility for climate change impacts is central to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and calls for acknowledgement by industrialized nations for their greater share of emissions. However, it has been argued that major industrial carbon producers should recognize the impact of their activities (Heede 2014). Nearly two-thirds of carbon pollution released into the atmosphere can be traced to carbon extracted from the earth by 90 major industrial carbon producers. Recent advances in climate attribution have allowed scientists to link extreme weather events to rising levels of greenhouse gases due to human emissions. Our research uses very large ensembles of regional model simulations to explore the fractional attribution of extreme heat events in the western US to emissions traceable to 90 major industrial carbon producers. The results show that record-setting high temperatures during July in the Central Valley of California were 3 times as likely to occur in the decade of the 2000s compared to a simulated world without industrial anthropogenic greenhouse emissions. The next
phase of the project is to explore the increased risk of heat extremes attributable to major carbon producers.

P-4412-07

## The contribution of emissions traded to major carbon producers to changes in meteorological and health risks during extreme events

D. Mitchell (1); F. Otto (1); S. Sparrow (1); M. Allen (2); P. Marfuth (3)

(1) University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom; (2) University of Oxford, School of Geography and Environment and Dept of Physics, Oxford, United Kingdom; (3) Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, United States of America

Recent studies have shown that ~63% of cumulative, world wide emissions of CO2 have come from only 90 major carbon producers (hereafter, "carbon majors"). Here, we use this result to model a hypothetical climate where the carbon majors never existed.

Specifically, we use a unique modelling capability to perform massive ensembles of climate model simulations ("climateprediction-dot-net: CPDN"), which enables assessment of any changing scenarios of particular meteorological extremes of interest. We use results from a sister study which compares scenarios representing the year 2003 (i) as it actually was (i.e. where both natural and anthropogenic conditions are used to drive the climate model; "scenario 1"), and (ii) as it could have been, if humans had not altered atmospheric gas composition (i.e. with only natural conditions; "scenario 2"). This type of scenario comparison is commonplace in probabilistic event attribution analyses. However, here, we go one step further by considering an intermediate third scenario to address the question: "how would the frequency of a 2003-like heat wave change if the carbon majors never existed in 2003?" ("scenario 3").

A feature of CPDN is that each global simulation contains a high-resolution "nested" regional climate model centred on Europe. This high-resolution modelling capability allows us to perform much of the analysis at the city level. In our sister study we use Scenario's 1 and 2, and show how heat-related mortality changed over Paris during 2003. In this study, we then discuss the implications for such a change given our Scenario 3, which involves only the 90 carbon majors.

P-4412-08

## Distributing the global RCP2.6 emissions: five versions of 'fair' country level allocations

Y. Robiou Du Pont (1); M. Meinshausen, (2); ML. Jeffery (3)

(1) Australian-German College of Climate & Energy Transitions, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia;

(2) University of Melbourne, Australian-german college of Climate & energy transitions, school of earth sciences, Melbourne, Australia; (3) Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Potsdam, Germany

Current climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework on Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) aim to limit global warming to 2°C. The distribution of the corresponding greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation burden among countries is a major block in progress toward an international agreement on binding commitments. Scientists and national experts have proposed and quantified several equity principles to distribute the international mitigation burden (Baer, Fieldman, Athanasiou, & Kartha, 2008; BASIC experts, 2011; Jacoby, Abikir, Paltsev, & Reilly, 2008; Nabel et al., 2011). Studies modelling these principles distribute different GHG emissions of diverse global emissions pathways. However, these global emissions pathways may not achieve GHG mitigation at optimal cost and result in different temperature responses making cross-studies comparisons difficult.

The distribution of the annual GHG emissions of a global cost optimal scenario has not yet been compared across a set of approaches representative of the international equity debate. The Fifth Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC AR5) introduced the

Representative Concentration Pathway 2.6 (RCP2.6), a cost optimal pathway that has a likely (greater than 66%) chance of limiting global warming to 2°C (IPCC, 2013; Meinshausen et al., 2011). The international distributions of the emissions associated with RCP2.6 following different equity principles would provide decision makers with a consistent comparison. What sets of national GHG emission pathways would reflect the proposed equity principles while matching the physical emissions of RCP2.6 at each time step? What would then be the regional and national GHG mitigation targets for 2025 and 2030 according to each effort sharing approach?

The IPCC AR5 presented regional 2030 mitigation targets collated from over forty studies and grouped into five categories according to the distributive justice concepts applied: 'equality', 'equal cumulative per capita', 'responsibility-cashability-need', 'capability', and 'staged approaches' (IPCC WGIII, 2014). We model five approaches representative of these five categories using the PRIMAP (Potsdam Real-time Integrated Model for Probabilistic Assessment of emissions Paths) Emissions Module (Nabel et al., 2011). Each of these approaches distributes the emissions of RCP2.6 amongst all UNFCCC parties. Consequently, the aggregation of the national emission pathways of each approach matches the emissions of RCP2.6 at each time step. For each approach, pathways are calculated for a range of parameters that account for transition period to the 'allocation start', historical emissions, historical and projected population data, and GDP projections.

At the next Conference of the Parties (CoP) in December 2015, the international community aims to establish a binding agreement to limit climate warming. Part 2 of the UNFCCC and the intended National Determined Contributions (INDCs) ideally by March 2015. Our analysis informs the debate on equitable mitigation burden sharing amongst the international community. In particular, it should help decision makers and the public to appreciate the consistency between INDCs and the global goal of limiting warming to 2°C according to the various concepts of equity.

P-4412-09

## A Dynamic Interpretation of the Principle of Equity in the Next Climate Change Regime: Equity as a force of gravity

M. Rosa (1)

(1) University of Oslo, PluriCourts, Oslo, Norway

Equity will play a crucial role in designing the post-2020 climate change policy. The principle of equity is intrinsically tied to sustainable development as an expression of inter and intra generations equity. The next climate agreement has to be felt as equitable in order to be signed by a majority of country states. So far Climate Equity has been interpreted through the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities as encompassed in Art.3 UNFCCC. The current interpretation has brought the so-called firewall between developed and developing countries, where the first are bound to all the emission cuts. In the latest years some developing countries have become major emitters. The current division of mitigation efforts can therefore not be regarded as equitable and should be changed. A dynamic treaty interpretation of the principle of equity could be one way to overcome this division.

This research demonstrates that the concept of equity should be interpreted dynamically because of its own intrinsic dynamics.

Since its early formulation in Art 38 of the ICJ's Statute, equity principle has created a creative role in the public international law. Indeed core international law principles like pacta sum servanda and unjust enrichment have arisen from equity considerations. In this manner equity acts as a force of gravity, dragging new contents into a treaty. In Climate discourse a dynamic approach to equity would highlight national circumstances rather than responsibility for global warming as a criteria for designing commitments. Equity dynamism calls also for flexibility and variety. The next Climate Agreement should be shaped as a flexible agreement in its contents, settings and outcomes. Mitigation commitments should be tailored to what a country is willing and able to afford. This would bring different commitments to different countries.