# Three non-capitalist approaches of peasant economics mobilising the principle of reciprocity

Eric Sabourin

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## To cite this version:

Eric Sabourin. Three non-capitalist approaches of peasant economics mobilising the principle of reciprocity. Journal of Rural Studies, 2026, 122, pp.103992. 10.1016/j.jrurstud.2025.103992. hal-05457232

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# Three non-capitalist approaches of peasant economics mobilising the principle of reciprocity

Éric Sabourin*

Socio-anthropologist, CIRAD, UMR ART Dev, Montpellier, France and Visiting Scientist at University of Brasilia, MADER Program, Brazil

## ARTICLE INFO

**Keywords:**

Peasant societies

Moral economy

Economy of the affection

Peasant principle

Reciprocity

Economy of reciprocity

## ABSTRACT

Several socio-economic and socio-anthropological approaches associate peasant agricultures to production and redistribution systems based on other conceptions of value than this of capitalistic market exchange and on other relations than competition for the accumulation of private profit. This article examines three proposals from diverse backgrounds but sharing a common analysis of peasant farming around the notions of ethics, affection, autonomy and resistance. There are the moral economy of Scott (1976), the economy of affection of Hyden (1980) and the *peasant principle* of Ploeg (2008). These three authors also refer to the *principle of reciprocity*; thus, I propose first to analyze their contribution regarding the *theory of reciprocity* in anthropology (Scubla, 1985; Temple, 1997 and 2003, Sabourin, 2012) and, secondly, I will examine how these approaches could dialogue. The article is divided in three parts. The first proposes a reading of the three contributions; the second presents briefly the main points of the theory of reciprocity and the third one discusses commons lessons and perspectives of these approaches.

## 1. Introduction

James Scott passed away in 2024, and although his theoretical proposals, developed from his field research in peasant communities in Southeast Asia in the 1970s (Scott, 1976, 1985), are often referred to in relation to the concept of moral economy, they are now more rarely applied in the current peasant or rural environment studies (see Edelman, 2021; Cabana and Cabo, 2013) but rather to power struggles in other sectors or to analyses of the state as noted by Fassin (2009) (see for example Parker, 1988; Booth, 1993; Posusney, 1993; Orlove, 1997; Olivier de Sardan, 1999; Arnold, 2001; Hayat, 2018). However, two important researchers in the field of peasant economics have subsequently mobilised or extended Scott's work. They are Goran Hyden with the economy of affection (1980) and Jan Douwe Van der Ploeg with the peasant principle (2008). Like James C. Scott, these authors associate peasant agricultures to production and redistribution systems based on other conceptions of value than this of capitalistic market exchange and on other relations than competition for the accumulation of private profit.

I have chosen to analyze these three approaches because of their common characteristics, despite their specific inputs: i) they employ a socio-economic or socio-anthropological analysis of the peasant economy, rather than a strictly economic one; ii) they engage in a normative

critique, both political and ethical, of capitalist transitions in agricultural systems; iii) all three refer to the notions of ethics, autonomy and resistance, but also to the socio-economic principle of reciprocity, to which I have devoted a large part of my research work about peasant organisations (Sabourin, 2012). I therefore attach great importance to the contributions of these authors.

Admittedly, each of them, in their own time, has been a reference and has had an impact on the work of other researchers, particularly in the geographical areas of their seminal work: Scott in Southeast Asia, Hayden in East Africa and then Japan, and Van der Ploeg in Latin America and Europe. However, there has been no dialogue between their proposals in order to draw common conclusions and useful extensions. This is what I wish to undertake in this article, without claiming to be exhaustive in my analysis of their work.

From a methodological point of view, this article first offers a comparative reading of the three proposals, drawing also on the work of authors who have commented on or used these approaches. The comparison is based mainly on categories of analysis common to the three approaches: subsistence, resistance (including self-defense and clientelism) and reciprocity in the cooperation.

Secondly, the three approaches are compared with the framework of reciprocity in anthropology and some of its recent applications in the field of peasant economics. By the fact, these three authors also refer to

<footnote>E-mail address: eric.sabourin@cirad.fr.</footnote>
the *principle of reciprocity*.

The article contains three sections. I propose first to compare and analyze their contribution regarding the notion of reciprocity in social sciences (Scubla, 1985; Temple, 1997, 2003; Sabourin, 2012, 2023) I will examine how these approaches could dialogue. The second presents briefly the main points of the theory of reciprocity and the third one discusses commons lessons and perspectives of these approaches including the theory of reciprocity.

## 2. Three theories of peasant economy and organisation

The three approaches of peasant economics make explicit reference to reciprocity and non-market or non-capitalist transactions, in Asian and African contexts for Scott and Hayden; in European and Latin American context for Ploeg. The moral economy proposed by Scott (1976) is based on the observation of peasant resistance and rebellion in South-East Asia (Birmania, ex Tonkin in actual Viet Nam and Malaysia). The economy of affection by Goran Hyden (1980) is based on his work in Tanzania (Hyden, 1987, 2007) then taken up by Japanese researchers (Sugimura, 2007; Tsuruta, 2004, 2006).

Ploeg's peasant principle was built upon his researches mainly in Netherland, Italia and Peru.

### 2.1. The moral economy

To develop the concept of moral economy, James Scott drew on the formula used by the historian E.P. Thompson (1971) to describe the peasant revolts during the wheat wars in the eighteenth century in United Kingdom, which associates moral economy to the notion of justice. Part of the proposal is based on the thesis of Chayanov's peasant economics (1966) on subsistence strategy and the anti-risk practices: market autonomy and production diversification (*safety-first* or *risk-avoidance*). According to Scott, moral economy corresponds to the system of values that underlies the expression of emotions (Fassin, 2009). It means the centrality of the relations of reciprocity, - to structure and shape the social and moral project of rural communities in terms of justice - between peasant families, but also between them and their 'bosses or owners'.

> We can begin, I believe, with two moral principles that seem firmly embedded in both the social patterns and injunctions of peasant life: the norm of reciprocity and the right to subsistence. (...) Reciprocity, serves as a central moral formula for interpersonal conduct. The right to subsistence, in effect, defines the minimal needs that must be met for members of the community within the context of reciprocity. Both principles correspond to vital human needs within the peasant economy; both are embodied in many concrete social patterns that owe their strength and longevity to the force of moral approval or disapproval that villagers can bring to bear (Scott, 1976:167).

According to Menezes (2002), Scott's subsistence ethic encompasses a production strategy based on the needs of the family and a social strategy based on reciprocity relationships with relatives, friends, neighbours, employers and, more distantly, with the state (Scott, 1976: 27-28).

The relationship of reciprocity is observed in the daily life of families and communities, in rituals such as the communal meals in Java which celebrate the crucial moments in peasant family life (Scott, 1976:168). Reciprocity is present in the mutual aid, the provision of services and celebrations such as birthdays and weddings. Scott adds to Chayanov's minimalist considerations on the adjustment of work and family production to calorie requirements, another explanation for revolts in the event of shortages.

> The problem of exploitation and rebellion is not just a problem of calories and income but is a question of peasant conceptions of social justice, of rights and obligations of reciprocity (Scott, 1976:168).

For Scott, the concept of justice is related to the relationships of reciprocity:

> The peasant's idea of justice and legitimacy, our analysis suggests, is provided by the norm of reciprocity and the consequent elite obligation (that is peasant right) to guarantee - or at least not infringe upon- the subsistence claims and arrangements of the peasantry (Scott, 1976: 188).

Under the term "balanced reciprocity", Scott highlights relations of reciprocity between landowners and peasants in a society in agrarian transition. The relationship is balanced as long as justice, the right to subsistence and minimum cultural decencies of the peasants, are guaranteed by the boss, as well as their protection. I have observed the same kind of asymmetric reciprocity within peasant communities in Guinea Bissau, Peru and Brazil (Sabourin, 2012). Desconsi (2021) identifies these reciprocal relationships around land leasing between beneficiaries of agrarian reform and their former employers in Mato Grosso (Brazil).

In Lower Burma (Viet Nam), the majority of the population was salaried and at the mercy of the labour market. The bonds of protection and reciprocity had disintegrated, whereas in Upper Burma, these bonds still existed (Scott, 1976: 71-75).

In these (a priori asymmetrical) relations of reciprocity in rural areas, even in the most coercive class relations, there is a 'more balanced' modality of reciprocity and rights which defines the conception of the 'good' boss. This does not mean the absence of exploitation in this kind of relationship, but the legitimacy of power and hierarchies based on moral obligations (Scott, 1976: 181).

For Scott, reciprocity and obligation are a universal corollary of any situation of authority. He quotes Balandier (1971: 39), who notes that, from a general point of view, and particularly in Africa, power can be justified by the maintenance of a state of collective security and prosperity (Scott, 1976: 181).

Various authors (Booth, 1993; Arnold, 2001) consider that Scott's theory of the moral economy was conceived for pre-capitalist, pre-mercantile societies or for groups of peasants threatened by the expansion of market society, and therefore needs to be nuanced or readapted to other circumstances. In fact, asymmetrical relations of reciprocity correspond well to the hierarchical or dependent societies of Asian systems. Anyway, they can also be found in African and Latin American systems where clientelism and paternalism flourish. We will return to this dimension later in relation to the economy of affection.

The principles of safety risk and the ethics of subsistence can be interpreted according to Chayanov's laws or according to the substantive economic sense of autonomy or autarky proposed by Polanyi (1944).

For Hyden (2007), the notion of a 'moral' economy is too narrow: "It makes sense when we see it as an alternative to a hegemonic order or system, less if we want to explore the interior of the peasant economy" (Hyden, 2007: 167).

This is why he proposes a complementary concept, the economy of the affection ... "for better understanding and analysing the choices and the behaviours in the countries where capitalism did not penetrate the society yet and where the dominant form of the economic and social organization is founded on the small units and the reciprocity" (idem, p 167).

Tsuruta (2006) in a comparison between Scott and Hyden, considers that the stakes of the moral economy raised by Scott relate especially to the exploitation of the peasants by dominant external agencies and the moral outrage which follows, while the economy of the affection is a strong demonstration of their capacity to escape these powerful institutions.

According to Hyden (2007, 168), the economy of affection has in common with the moral economy the principle of reciprocity "the rule which wants that each favour requires a form of return, even if it is not specified when and in which form". But he considers that the economy of affection has a more open and pragmatic purpose.
The fact that the non formal rules and networks spread and make more and more part of the institutional landscape in all the regions of the world lets us think that the broader concept of economy of the affection, based on the investment in other people rather than in the formal institutions, is a potentially useful concept in comparative social science (idem, 2007, p 169, our translation of French original).

## 2.2. The economy of affection

Hyden (1980) coined the concept of the economy of affection to explain the resistance of Tanzanian peasants to the policies of the Nyerere government, particularly in the Ujaama villages. Geshiere (1984:15) summarised Hyden's position at the time:

> The first enemies of Tanzanian socialism are the peasants, because they were captured neither by the capitalist market during colonisation, nor by the socialist state after independence. In this country, the reality of development is not the conflict between classes linked in a single mode of production (...) but the struggle between two different modes of production: the struggle of the peasant mode of production against capitalism or socialism. Despite all these interventions, the peasants retained control of the land and the ability to preserve their own systems of production (Geshiere, 1984: 16, translated from French by the author).

According to Hyden, farmers would retain their choice of escape: despite all the government's coercive measures, they would still be able to ignore the state because they control their own subsistence production. This would be an obstacle to any form of development. The fact that the Tanzanian government is trying in vain to impose an increase in food production on the peasants is tangible proof - as is the decline in food production in Africa in general - that the peasants have still not been captured (Geshiere, 1984: 16).

For Hyden, this self-sufficiency of the peasants depends above all on the absence of production of an agricultural surplus (which could be taken by the State or the bourgeoisie), which he explains by a strategy of self-consumption maintained by rudimentary techniques associated with poorly adapted markets and support measures.

The notion of affection does not refer to an economy of feelings but to that of close social ties, an economy of proximity. According to Hyden, the economy of affection is an economy dominated by a domestic orientation (the conviction that everyone has a right to their own subsistence) and by the affective ties of descent or common residence, constituting privileged social networks:

> The prevalence of these social networks at the same time in the rural areas and in the families divided between city and countryside, explains my choice of the term 'economy of the affection' to indicate this fraction of the African economy which forms part neither of the capitalism nor of socialism. The expression does not refer to the emotions of affection. It announces the communication, interaction and solidarity networks between groups defined structurally by blood, kinship, community or some other affinity, like the religion. The economy of the affection connects in a systematic way a series of economic and social discrete units which, under other relations/ratios, have their own autonomy (Hyden, 1985, p 106, translated from French).

The economy of affection is a function of direct relations of reciprocity that can be either vertical or horizontal. These relationships can be either inclusive or exclusive.

More recently, Hyden's proposals have been taken up by Japanese researchers working in Eastern Africa, but also referring to peasant society in Japan.

Sugimura (2007, 186) says of Hyden, 1980, 2007, he recognizes with the African peasant economy a single character, approximately defined by 'socio-economic relations of reciprocity networks'. While being focused on this particular type of economy (of reciprocity), Hyden explains the relative autonomy of the lifestyle of the African peasants with regard to

the State and capitalism, while regarding this autonomy as the main cause of the underdevelopment of the continent.

He extends this analysis to Japan: "It is well-known, for example, that the ié system (ié meaning household or family is the elementary social unit in Japan) is the basic principle of the social organization of traditional Japan, from the peasant families to the modern giant corporations" (Sugimura, 2007: 186).

> "In Japan also, the social relations are strongly regulated by similar norms called gimu, (or "obligations") and on ("kindness" or "favours"). In the rural communities, in particular, if a gift or a service is offered, its equivalent must be returned shortly. Whom which does not do it, will be judged like a person without morality and will be exposed to severe re-proaches, called gimi o kaku ("he is unaware of its social obligations") or shirazu ("he is unaware of kindness of other people")" (Sugimura, 2007: 188, translated from French).

According to Hyden, the affective economy is even capable of penetrating modern sectors of post-colonial society. Urban workers, for example, remain closely attached to their village and therefore to the affective economy. They need to maintain access to family land as a kind of insurance for their retirement, and they invest a large part of their wages in informal exchange networks (Geshiere, idem, p 16).

I have observed the same type of extension of relations of family and community reciprocity in city-countryside relations between the Peruvian capital, Lima, and the Quechua and Aymara communities in Peru (Sabourin, 1982; Mayer, 2002).

> This is why, in spite of the social changes which have occurred in the rural regions at the colonial and postcolonial time, the economy of the affection has survived and has even taken importance. These organisational forms adapted successfully to the changes of situation. The group of mutual aid, the association of burial and the "tontines" (protective saving funds) have all their origin in the economy of the affection. These groups play a crucial role, often last under silence, in rural development today (Hyden, 1985: 108, translated from French).

Hyden would later (2005, 2007) generalise his theoretical approach by examining the points in common between the economics of affection, moral economics, Marxist anthropology and substantivist economics (the reciprocity according to Polanyi).

He notes that the institutions on which these four approaches are based are essentially informal and have the following characteristics (Hyden, 2007: 173).

- the players share a set of common expectations, but are not legally organised to achieve them;

- they rely on personal relationships based on simple forms of reciprocity;

- the rules are unwritten, but known and understood by each player;

- the "exchanges" are non-contractual and unspecified in time, and they are implemented in a confidential manner, without paying particular attention to the detailed objectives or methods;

- these institutions and rules are based on internal methods of self-resolution in the event of a breach of agreement.

Hyden attempts to illustrate these characteristics using four analytical categories: clientelism, charisma, self-defence and cooperation. We will develop these categories further by comparing these approaches with the theory of reciprocity in economic anthropology.

As with Hyden in Japan, direct references to Scott's work were taken up in the 2000s in Latin America (Menezes, 2002), particularly in Brazil (Sabourin, 1997; 2007), where they echoed Ploeg's main book published in 2008: *The New Peasanteries: Struggles for Autonomy and Sustainability in an Era of Empire and Globalisation*.
## 2.3. Facing the empire of agro-food industry: the peasant principle

Jan Douwe Van der Ploeg (2008) analyzes the situation, role and significance of the peasantry in an era of globalisation, particularly of agricultural markets and multinational agro-food industries, the new “empires”. The argumentation is based on three longitudinal studies (over 30 years) in Peru, Italy and the Netherlands, which offer an original material of contrasted situations in terms of rural development and evolution of agrarian structures.

The author shows how family agricultures in the North and in the South, confronted with increasing dependence of globalized markets, adopt or update forms of resistance or “distantiation” to the capitalist production logic.

These various resistance practices characterize, according to the author, a process of “repeasantization”, including in industrialized European countries where the peasant societies as described by anthropology (Wolf, 1976) or sociology (Mendras, 1976, 2000) have disappeared.

In addition, Ploeg considers that this phenomenon constitutes one of the alternatives to the economic, social, food and ecological crises to which the capitalist globalisation of markets and agricultural production systems inevitably leads.

This “repeasantization” which, at first sight, seems anachronistic and paradoxical can be explained by several factors. But it is important to understand a first paradox: why has this process been ignored by science (pp 18–19), as if it were hidden (Martins, 2003) or invisible (Sabourin, 2007).

Ploeg suggests several explanations.

First, agriculture is increasingly, but “virtually”, assimilated as an economic sector like the others (trade and industry) ignoring the reflexions of Polanyi (1944) on the limits of land and labour commoditization (p 20).

On the contrary, Ploeg notices that.

- There exist limits to the transition from the peasant mode of farming to the agricultural entrepreneur model because of essential differences (generally denied or ignored) between economic theory and the practices required by the biological - but also social and human - nature of the agricultural activity.

- Fundamental contradictions between these necessary practices and the recent identity of agricultural entrepreneur have led to deviations compared to economic modernization theories;

- The fact that these deviations, interpreted like temporary imperfections, are systematically ignored by theory has resulted in creating virtual realities and a virtual farmer model (Ploeg, 2003). Thus, public policies, designed on “virtual realities” bases, are unable to adapt to concrete situations and not very relevant for farm development.

The second explanation comes from the limits or shortcomings of “peasant studies” (p21) among other aspects, because the difficulty of apprehending peasant systems as dynamic processes characterized by heterogeneity and thus, various “degrees of peasantliness” (p. 36);

Ploeg insists on the need for a positive and substantive definition of peasants, “according to what they are and not as a negation of what they definitively are not”.

He suggests to define the *peasant condition* with six characteristics: a relation of joint production (coproduction) with nature (p. 24); construction and maintenance of a self-controlled and autonomous resource base (land, fertility, labour, capital) (p. 25–26); differentiated relations with diversified markets and the outside world allowing for autonomy (p.27); pursuit of livelihood and resistance related to the reproduction of the family unit (p.30); pluri-activity (1); cooperation and relations of reciprocity (p. 48)

It is thus the diversified expression of the heterogeneous nature of this peasant condition which leads to various peasant ways of farming,

built around common characteristics: a close relation with natural resources, which are limited (ecological capital); intensification of labour and valorisation of reciprocal mutual aid; an institutionalized “distantiation” from the capitalist market rules associated with a capacity of autonomy from the capitalist world.

However, the main interest of this proposal is that, based on this theoretical reflection and methodological criticism, with the three case studies, Ploeg manages to build the foundations for an enriched *peasant principle*, by looking further into the theoretical bases suggested at the beginning. This enrichment is enabled by the case studies which are extremely documented with richly detailed material analyzed on a long-time scale, especially of peasant practices and the reasons or justifications of these practices facing the transnational food industry system.

This peasant principle corresponds to a rustic social and economic project, although robust because tested by several millennia of practices and resistances. In this sense, it can orient the concept of peasant condition: « *The peasant condition assumes agency in order to realize the choreography ... It is only through active and goal-oriented involvement that the peasant condition will progressively unfold* » (p. 274).

Ploeg opposes this continuity and robustness of peasant systems to the fragility or precariousness of the system of agro-food industry empires which in a few decades have destroyed most agrarian natural resources of our planet. The author shows how the Parmalat Empire has also destroyed the value of peasant labour and the added-value of cooperatives or human size food industries (p. 98–99).

Among the “new” or modern answers, the peasant principle counts with endogenous technological innovations like agroecology or institutional innovations like the territorial cooperatives in Friesland, peasant-seed networks or citizens markets. These numerous initiatives are “interdependent”, bringing visibility to peasants (who create name and prestige, as in the case of product qualification) on the contrary of the Empire's structures which maintain peasants anonymous, invisible and exploited (p. 269).

Peasant principle is also associated with higher performances of the peasant way of farming compared to those of corporate agriculture in terms of efficiency of resources use (water, land, labour), of quality of products, life quality and social inclusion (p. 276 and following).

# 3. The theory of the reciprocity

## 3.1. Backgrounds

In ethnology and anthropology, reciprocity has long time designated the mutual benefit of food, goods and services between individuals and social groups (Thurnwald, 1932; Malinowski, 1922; Mauss, 1924) particularly in primitive, indigenous and peasant societies. Lévi-Strauss (1949) thus could propose a principle of reciprocity governing all the relations and kinship structures. From an anthropological point of view, the principle of reciprocity corresponds to a reflexive act between subjects, an intersubjective relationship and not to a simple swap or permutation of goods or objects such as the exchange (Temple and Chabal, 1995).

Sociology since its foundation, has attached a great importance to the concept of reciprocity considered as the base of the social relations by authors like Simmel (1898) and Mauss (1924) or as a universal social norm (H. Becker, 1956; Gouldner, 1960; L. Becker, 1986). On the other hand, these last years, contemporary sociology has shown little interest in the concept of reciprocity, perhaps because of the universalization of exchange relations, whether in their material or symbolic form (Bourdieu, 1994). So, it is rather the concept of gift which that has been revisited by the anti-utilitarian sociologists (Godbout and Caillé, 1992; Caillé, 1994) and including proposed like a third paradigm, beside individualism and holism (Caillé, 2001).

It is probably because the gift is more easily apprehended like a principle opposed to that of exchange. In fact, reciprocity, if its definition remains confined to the figure of the gift/counter-gift, is very often
confused with a symmetrical exchange. However, the great merit of the work on the revival of the gift, especially in the Anti-Utilitarian Movement in Social sciences, the M.A.U.S.S.,<fnref n="1" /> has been to institutionalize a critical reflection on the naturalization of the exchange. Highlighting the importance of the reciprocity of the gifts (*positive reciprocity*), various works make emerge the need for a central reflection on the reciprocity beside a theory of the gift (Temple, 1983, 1998; Sabourin, 2012, 2023).

Parallel to the renewal of research on the modern gift, economic anthropology and economic sociology, especially from the re-reading of Mauss (1924) and Polanyi (1944) continued to work the notion of reciprocity by applying it to the relations of private sociality or *primary sociality* (Caillé, 2001) and to the services of the so called *non trade* or *non market economy* (Laville, 2014). The reciprocity as an economic principle or category has recently been rehabilitated in particular by re- searches concerning the social economy or *solidarity* (Gardin, 2006; Miller, 2010; Servet, 2003, 2007).

## 3.2. Four elements of the theory of reciprocity

The first specific element of the theory of the reciprocity is the definition of the concept in terms of socio-anthropology. The principle of reciprocity is not limited to a relationship of gift/counter-gift between peers or symmetric groups. The reductionism of this definition that has long prevailed and still prevails sometimes in anthropology, is leading to confusion between reciprocity and symmetrical exchange. This impasse persists as reciprocity is interpreted with the binary logic that is suitable for exchange. The exchange, said *Chabal* (1996) can be reduced, ulti- mately, to a permutation of objects. *Temple and Chabal* (1995) proposed to use the ternary logic of *Lupasco* (1951) which allows: i) to show a *Third included* in the relationship of reciprocity, ii) to interpret it as the being of this relationship; and iii) to report it as the original structure of intersubjectivity, irreducible to the exchange of goods or services free of social bonds or debt.

From the economic point of view, reciprocity is not only an economic category different from market exchange as identified by Polanyi (1944), but an economic principle opposed to that of the exchange or antagonist of the exchange (Temple, 1997).

The second element of the theory, which is part of its universal character, is that reciprocity can cover many forms. Anthropology and ethnology have mostly dedicated this terminology to the *reciprocity of gifts*: offerings, shares, *potlatch*, *total social facts*, which constitute what *Temple and Chabal* (1995) refer to, as the *positive form of reciprocity*. But there is also a form of *negative reciprocity*: the cycles of revenge. Unlike the exchange with the development or extension is associated with the logic of competition and accumulation for the benefit, the logic of revenge is related to a *dialectic of honor* such as the gift is related to a *dialectic of prestige*. But the thirst for prestige (source of authority in societies of reciprocity) motivates the flooding of the gift "*the more I give, the more I am.*" Between the extreme expressions of negative and positive forms of reciprocity, human societies have therefore established various intermediate forms, in particular to control the flooding of the gift, the ostentation, the *potlatch*, the *agonistic gift*, leading to destruction of the other, to submit him, for the prestige.

Third, relationships of reciprocity can be analyzed in terms of *structures*, in the anthropological sense, and (they) are divided according to some *elementary structures*, as they were originally proposed by Mauss (1924), Lévi-Strauss (1949), Scubla (1985) and Temple (1998).

These relations of reciprocity structured under their symmetrical

form, give rise to *ethical values* such as Aristotle had identified in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1994): the relationship of reciprocity in a bilateral symmetric structure creates a sense of friendship; the structure of symmetric distribution within a group creates justice. Thus, other types of relationships in other structures may produce other specific values. This element is probably the most complex part of the theory of reciprocity proposed by *Temple and Chabal* (1995) and one that is more difficult to validate, since it concerns not only the production of material goods, but of feelings and human values. It is also the most original and interesting element of this theory, one that offers the possibility of analysis and alternative proposals regarding human economy.

The fourth element relates to the different levels of reciprocity and patterns of alienation peculiar to it. There are three levels of reciprocity: the real, the symbolic (language) and the imaginary (representations).

To summarize, there are several basic or *elementary structures of reciprocity* that create different *feelings* and thus different *values*, and there are several *forms of reciprocity* that offers to these values a different imaginary. The feeling of the original being can be captured in the imaginary of prestige or in that of vengeance, resulting in forms of positive, negative and *symmetric reciprocity*. Structures, levels, forms fit together to build systems of reciprocity.

It is essential not to enter in judgments of value and to clarify the differences of nature between the two systems; reciprocity and exchange, but also the existence of various intermediate configurations which can exist between the polarity of the exchange and that of the reciprocity. They are, of course, theoretical representations and tools for analysis above all ... it is obvious that one does not ask the peasants or other social actors of which elementary structures of reciprocity they take part.

The various uses of the concept of reciprocity in the three approaches presented above are, in my view, not coincidental but rather the result of converging observations and analysis. However, as the terms used to describe the various modalities of reciprocity are sometimes different or applied in different periods and contexts, even within the 20th century, it is necessary to deepen the analysis in order to extract common principles and perspectives for common use or extension.

# 4. Discussion of the three approaches regarding to the theory of reciprocity

The three authors studied contribute to the theory of reciprocity, both in terms of empirical depth based on observations across four continents, and useful additions in terms of analytical tools. Indeed, like all holistic proposals, the anthropological theory of reciprocity cannot claim to provide an exhaustive explanation of human phenomena.

Our examination of the contributions and perspectives between these three approaches and the theory of reciprocity will be limited here to peasant systems and their environments. It is based on an examination of three categories: subsistence, resistance and reciprocity in cooperation.

## 4.1. The principle of subsistence

The notion of a right to subsistence proposed by Scott (1976) and Hyden (1980) refers actually to an ethic of justice when it advocates the satisfaction of basic needs of all including the legitimization of the use of civil disobedience (Gandhi), rebellion or even violence to "take from the rich and redistribute to the poor" (Wolf, 1976), especially in times of famine in systems of inequality. It is the sense that Thompson (1971) gave to the moral economy.

For Hyden (1980) it is the conviction that everyone has a right to their own subsistence. This does not mean, except in situations of coercion or theft, trying to limit the production at a subsistence level.

Similarly, for Ploeg (2008), subsistence is based on co-production with nature, on the construction and maintenance of a self-controlled and autonomous resource base; but does not exempt them from

<footnote n="1">¹ See: http://www.revuedumauss.com/and http://www.journaldumauss.net.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² The detail presentation of the “modern” theory of reciprocity can be found both in French and Spanish in the bilingual website “*réciprocité, reciprocidad*” http://dominique.temple.free.fr/reciprocite.php?page=reciprocidad&id_rubrique=3.</footnote>
producing surpluses: differentiated relations with diversified markets and the outside world allow for autonomy (Stock and Forney, 2014).

In the three theories, the ethics of subsistence refers not only to the substantive definition of the economy by Polanyi (1944) in the sense of autonomy. It refers also, especially in Scott, to the work of self-restraint production for anti-risk strategy in Chayanov through the adjustment between production, work and caloric requirements of household consumption.

On this point, Samuel Popk¹,² in (1979) in his analysis of the economic behavior of peasants in Southeast Asia, disagree with Scott. He argues that Vietnamese peasants are willing to take market risks. They are as rational in economic terms as any other individual.

In fact, the applicability of Chayanov's theory depends fundamentally on the conditions under which peasant production is carried out.

Temple (1983, 2003) has established a critic of the application by Marshal Sahlins of Chayanov theses in indigenous societies and African peasant communities that, unlike the Russian tsarist or communist are not all doomed to subsistence because of the spoliation of government or domination of the patrons and owners.

> "Chayanov rule requires that we adopt a definition of economic production reserved for the production of material goods. But this restriction becomes difficult in a community of reciprocity, where "things are good to eat but to the extent that they are good to give" (Temple, 1983).

Specifically, the peasants described by Chayanov (1966) and Shanin (1971) about Tsarist Russia or by Scott (1976) in South-East Asia faced tributary systems (combining what Marxists called Peasant mode of production and Asiatic mode of production). But peasant communities dispossessed and dominated were very often found in a situation of below-subsistence. These situations, while real, are dated and do not constitute therefore easily transferable models.

## 4.2. The principle of resistance

With his book Weapons of the weak (1985), Scott demonstrates that in Malaysian peasant communities, resistance is strongly based on real material experiences of everyday life. The daily resistance of peasants mainly consists of individuals protecting themselves and avoiding symbolic or direct confrontations with authority or the norms of the elites. Among the methods of passive or semi-passive resistance developed by peasants are subtle sabotage, evasion, lies, feigning ignorance, illness and incompetence, petty theft, arson, slander and mockery of landowners.

However, Scott identifies and describes a capacity for collective action, or agency, even among social actors who lack the capital usually necessary for mobilisation.

For Hayden, the notion of self-defence refers to informal institutions that mobilise support against a common threat or enemy - real or imagined. Affection is a powerful instrument for achieving this goal because it binds people together within the confines of close-knit organisations. According to Hyden, the use of emotional reciprocity in self-defence is more pronounced in Africa than in East Asia. One major reason for this is that societies in this region have been imbued with a single religion or philosophy. For example, *Confucianism has determined social relations in China for over two thousand years* (Hyden, 2007: 177).

For Ploeg, one of the six characteristic of peasant condition is the pursuit of livelihood and resistance related to the reproduction of the family unit (p.30)

The peasant principle translates into a series of answers of farmers defending the peasant condition. The first of answers is the capacity of coordination and co-operation in order to resist to the Empire (collective & community fights, defending common natural or identity inheritances, cf p. 265 and Scott, 1976, 1986). Indeed, the Empire causes new aggressions, therefore new resistances which lead to rebuild forms of peasantry by fighting, as for example the small irrigation producers of Piura in Peru or the Landless Movement in Brazil (p. 277). In several case

studies, resistance is not limited to defending production factors but also identity and the symbolic relationship with land, which sometimes need to adopt skirting strategies via pluri-activity or migration.

Passive resistance, as identified by Scott (1976), can also take the form of patrimonialism and clientelism. It can be a form of self-defence within the framework of Hyden's economy of affection.

Hyden (2007: 174) distinguishes a positive reading of clientelism - a political boss brought in the heart of the political life a great number of followers, which facilitated the national integration - and a more negative: the neo-patrimonialism, where the political leaders treat the exercise of the power like an extension of their private field. It is for him, the ultimate form of the clientelism in policy, become the principal concept of African political science.

For Hyden, as for Bayart (1981, 1989), the importance of the clientelism in the African policy shows the weakness of the formal institutions.

There are sanctions planned for any violation of the rule of reciprocity subjacent with the relations between a patron and his customer. If the patron fails to hold his promises, the customer will seek another "protector". If the customer does not fill his share with obligation, the patron can apply sanctions able to cause him wrong. But the clientelism relates also to economic environment. It is a norm which does not disappear easily, in particular in the societies characterized by the social inequalities (Hyden, 2007: 175).

According Hyden (1985) and Bayart (1989), the importance of clientelism in African politics demonstrates the weakness of formal institutions.

> *There are sanctions planned for any violation of the rule of reciprocity subjacent with the relations between a patron and his customer. If the patron fails to hold his promises, the customer will seek another "protector". If the customer does not fill his share with obligation, the patron can apply sanctions able to cause him wrong. But the clientelism relates also to economic environment. It is a norm which does not disappear easily, in particular in the societies characterized by the social inequalities (Hyden, 2007: 175).*

Admittedly, clientelist relationships are not necessarily sustainable. However, for Hyden (2007), there is a difference between the power of the norm, on the one hand, and the social relationship it generates, on the other. This observation can be applied to the theory of reciprocity in asymmetrical relationships. Hyden simply lacks an explanation of the origin and weight of the affective and moral value generated by the symmetrical or asymmetrical reciprocal relationship.

## 4.3. The principle of reciprocity

### 4.3.1. Reference to reciprocity in Scott and Hyden

Moral economy and economy of affection correspond to the logic of generalized reciprocity (Temple, 1997), motivated by concern for others (as an indivisible member of the totalitarian "I" of the group). they also tend to ensure a redistribution to meet the basic needs of all. This element constitutes one of the foundations of the principle of reciprocity according to Temple (1997).

The economy of affection and the moral economy join Bayart (1989: 70) when he says that in Africa, economic modernization has to reckon with the requirement of community solidarity, or Chabal and Daloz (1999) that analyze the neo-patrimonial management of the State in Africa as a diversion to family, community or ethnic, elite networks. They both note the existence of other economic logic than (this of) occidental exchange, the centrality of relations of reciprocity, but they do not analyze the origin and mechanisms of this "specific relations of reciprocity economy" (Sugimura, 2007: 186).

Both approaches face the difficulties and limitations of applying the "occidental" Chayanov model of the peasant economy to Asian and African situations. They sketch, however, an attempt to break with the universality of the model of the occidental market exchange. Both
theories introduce the category of prestige as a motivation for the pro-
duction or transactions and as a source of authority. They also propose,
in particular the economy of affection, a critical reading of patronage
and clientelism; it may correspond to forms of reciprocity (cooperation,
mutual aid, redistribution), or to their alienation expression (asymmetry
and capture of the assets and the prestige).

The economic and social relations of reciprocity are considered
fundamental to peasant and rural societies in Africa and Asia. They are
well identified empirically (as in the works of Elinor Ostrom, 1998;
2003) and described as belonging to a different logic than the market
exchange or even to another form of economy, but without the recog-
nition of a genuine economic principle of reciprocity.

Hyden (2007: 178) thus refers to all forms of cooperation in groups that are organised according to voluntary, self-proclaimed principles and not sanctioned by law (...) but by adherence to unwritten rules, including criminal organisations such as mafias or Chinese flip-flops.

The family is the basic social organization of the co-operation. The African family is regarded by Hyden as extensive and opened to the co-operation with the others. However, the co-operation can it be transformed into clientelism? but the integration in the global economy means that some resources essential to its lifestyle imply transactions external to the local community. *The richest individuals of the community become brokers with respect to the outside world and make use of this role to build powerful situations* (Hyden, 2007: 178).

The conclusion of Hyden is that the moral economy and the economy of the affection produce non formal institutions which have their own sacrality, based on the reciprocity including the asymmetrical reciprocity.

These non-formal institutions (which can be structured relations of
reciprocity) are based on shared expectations concerning behaviours
different from those considered by the formal institutions.

When the state and the market did not succeed yet in penetrating the society in such a way that the usual social relations (of reciprocity) from now on are structured on these bases and that the formal institutions (bureaucracies and private agencies) prevail, one finds there some spaces more open, favourable with the development of alternatives (Hyden, 2007: 179).

For Hyden (2007,179), the alternatives can come from “the investment in relations of reciprocity (which) not only comes to be added to the formal institutions, but becomes the dominating model”. He thus expresses the “need for a broader concept to describe the entrepreneurship spirit which characterizes these alternatives to the formal institutions” Hyden (2007, 179).

4.3.2. Peasant principle and reciprocity in Ploeg

The characteristics of the peasant project for the third millennium,
rigorously synthesised by Ploeg (2008) across his three study cases,
invariably comes back to two main types of relation: cooperation and
reciprocity on the one hand, resource sharing on the other hand, which
can be considered, because of their recurrence, as social and economic
structures of the peasant world.

All case studies also refer to a series of shared values.

- Community values in Catacaos (Peru) (p.61): unity and indestructi-
  bility of the community, democratic responsibility of all members,
  equal rights and duties, access to wealth through labour, priority to
  the satisfaction of elementary needs for all, class solidarity;

- Shared values in Friesland (The Netherlands) (p. 190): force of the community, unity between man and nature, responsibility for natural resources, the territory and future generations, efficiency in the use of resources and quality of products, trust between partners and resiliency of co-operative organisations, solidarity, quality of life and friendship - “with satisfaction and joy” (p. 191) -, or esthetical values - “the beauty of being engaged in farming” (p. 275).

- Moral economy of small agricultural entrepreneurs and peasants of Parma (pp. 140, 144, 163): quality of well-done work, quality of

products, quality of life, references to tradition and to ancestral
knowledge or skills, respect of norms and of contracts (including
market ones).

For Ploeg (2008), the *peasant principle* must be considered as the capacity of the peasant condition to project itself into the future, by defending its values - material but also ethical and moral -, to defend a social project.

4.3.3. *The question of the origin of the values*

Indeed, if one examines the recent proposals of the theory of reci-
procity (Scubla, 1985; Temple, 1998, 2003; Godbout, 2007), there truly
exists a link between the relations of reciprocity (mutual aid,
co-operation, resource sharing, heritage transmission), the structures in
which they are developed (family groups, communities, associations &
cooperatives, markets of proximity and reciprocity, social control of
short chain and of diversified proximity markets) and the nature of the
ethical values which are associated to them ...

The question is to understand where these values come from, simi-
larly to the questions on the origins of social capital (Portes, 1998).
Ostrom (2003) qualifies them as “attributes of the users groups”, but how
are they attributed and by whom? (Sabourin, 2022).

According to the theory of reciprocity, these ethical values are not
culturally given or innate.

They are built, socially and politically, insofar as they are generated
and reproduced by certain forms of reciprocity. They correspond to the
relation of symmetrical reciprocity (in opposition to unequal or asym-
metrical forms of reciprocity).

These relations are developed in structures which can be binary and
bilateral (*compadrio*, fraternity, mutual aid), ternary and unilateral
 patrimonial, inheritance & solidarity transmission between genera-
tions), ternary and bilateral (responsibility or resource sharing).

Structures of generalized or multilateral reciprocity (Gardin, 2006) can also be encountered in the case of markets of reciprocity (typical of Andean or African systems) where the creation of price or of equivalence between the products is socially controlled according to the community's needs and possibilities (Yampara et al., 2007; Sabourin, 2012).

If these relations of reciprocity have maintained themselves across
centuries, being rebuilt and updated by peasants, it is because they give
special importance to the ethical and emotional values that they pro-
duce, besides material or immaterial values. Lastly, these values
contribute to the reproduction of reciprocity cycles. But we can also
consider that peasant communities defend, around these values, an
economical project, a project combining production and a style of life,
which cannot be separated from a social and human project.

5. Conclusion

The careful application of socio-anthropological European origin
peasant societies models (Chayanov, 1966; Shanin, 1971; Mendras,
1976, 2000) to Africa, Asia or even to Latin American rural societies
shows the contribution of some universal characteristics which mark a
clear difference, or even two opposite logics, between the model of
peasant or family agriculture and that of the farm enterprise and their
respective developments.

The theory of reciprocity reaches the same conclusion about the
centrality of moral values and proximity ties in the mutual relations.
One of its main and original contributions is to explain how these values
do not precede the relations in peasant societies or in other human
communities, and how these values are not given. Thus, they must be
produced or constituted by structured and symmetrical reciprocity
relationships.

How not to see the structuring character of the triple obligation “to
give, receive and return” (Mauss, 1924) to guarantee and reproduce the
social bond with the maintenance of practices and benefits, which in
addition to material values, generate ethical and affective values:
friendship, trust, responsibility, fairness, but also prestige and honor.

The contribution of the theory of reciprocity to the analysis of peasant's organisations and communities must be seen, primarily on an epistemological level, without compromising the nature of benefits and plural relations that correspond today, to such mixed systems: mix between exchange and reciprocity relationships (Sabourin, 2007, 2012).

So, we have to take care not to lock the categories as *peasant agriculture*, *peasant economy* or *family farming* in ghettos, as observed Ploeg (2008).

Similarly, across family farms or units, it is to understand the kinship systems, representations, but also the functioning of technical farming systems based on natural resources management practices.

Although the peasant and rural world has been greatly reduced in the North, it is alive and well alive in the South; its diversity and its heritage, essential to the future of the planet, give it a human, historic and heuristic importance not only for social sciences, but for the conservation of the planet and of the humanity.

In fact, nowadays, researches on peasantry and rurality have become a minority, especially in the North or these issues affect a smaller and smaller fraction of the population.

This is not the same in the South: regardless of weight or rural societies and peasant or family farming, seeking for alternatives to the excesses of the development of free trade exchange and, especially, on agricultural production systems that irremediably destroy natural resources.

How can the convergences of these three approaches and that of reciprocity theory be useful in analysing today's rural world and peasant communities and their future? Even if the mechanism of peasantisation proposed by Ploeg is a reality, it often remains a minority phenomenon in the face of the mechanisms of concentration of land, resources and capital in the agricultural world in both the North and the South (Ploeg, 2018; Gascón and Cañada, 2025). I believe that it is among the responses to the climate and environmental crisis that these proposals should be mobilised around the principles of subsistence, resistance (we would also say resilience) and reciprocity.

This involves the primacy of co-production between smallholder or family farming and nature in Ploeg's work, and that of subsistence in Hyden's. It also involves Scott's latest work on the state (2017, 2020), in particular the unsustainability of state control over nature (Abram, 2013).

It is by exploring these proposals in greater depth that we should extend and update these authors' contributions to the future of rural life and agriculture. There is a research programme already outlined by Graber and Wengrow (2021) with the idea of the ecology of freedom drawn from Scott.

## Declaration of competing interest

I have no specific interest to declare.

## Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the editors of the Journal of Rural Studies for their advice and, in particular, the two reviewers for their thorough understanding of my manuscript and their highly relevant suggestions for improving the text.

## Data availability

No data was used for the research described in the article.

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