Conclusion

L'objectif central de ce travail était d'examiner les conséquences que l'ontologie morale peut avoir sur l'image scientifique du monde. Pour cela, nous avons commencé par déterminer quelle est l'ontologie morale correcte (chapitres 1-3).

Dans le chapitre 1, nous avons vu que le concept éthique fondamental est le concept de raison et que, par conséquent, la propriété ou la relation éthique fondamentale est la relation de raison. Ce qui nous a notamment amené à établir cela c'est, d'une part, le fait que les raisons ne peuvent être ramenées aux devoirs en raison d'une asymétrie entre ceux-ci et les raisons. D'autre part, les problèmes de parcimonie et de neutralité auxquels font face les positions qui accordent une priorité aux valeurs.

Puis, dans le chapitre 2, nous avons montré que les relations de raison ne peuvent pas être naturalisées, c'est-à-dire qu'il n'est pas possible de les identifier ou de les réduire aux faits naturels. En effet, le naturalisme moral analytique et le naturalisme moral synthétique font disparaître les faits moraux plutôt que de les localiser dans l'ontologie naturelle, tandis que ceux qui tentent de réduire les raisons aux désirs ne s'en sortent pas mieux.

Ensuite, dans le chapitre 3, nous avons vu que les relations de raison sont objectives, c'est-à-dire qu'elles existent indépendamment de toute attitude ou de toute perspective qui est prise ou peut être prise à leur égard. Le point crucial qui nous a conduit vers cette conclusion est que seul l'objectivisme moral peut faire justice à nos intuitions universalistes.

À la suite des analyses menées dans les trois premiers chapitres, nous avons conclu que l'ontologie morale correcte est un non-naturalisme robuste en ce qui concerne les raisons normatives. Ce non-naturalisme se distingue de certains non-naturalismes par le fait qu'il met en son centre les relations de raison, mais il se différencie aussi du réalisme moral détendu de Parfit, de Scanlon ou encore de Skorupski, puisqu'il défend que celles-ci existent de manière robuste, comme Charles Larmore (2021) l'a également avancé.

En vertu de cette conclusion, nous avons pu ensuite passer, dans le chapitre 4, à l'impact de ce non-naturalisme sur l'image scientifique du monde. Nous avons vu que le non-naturalisme falsifie l'image scientifique du monde, car celle-ci a pour ambition d'être complète. Toutefois, nous avons également montré qu'il existe de bonnes raisons de soutenir
une image scientifique du monde allégée et que celle-ci est parfaitement compatible avec le non-naturalisme moral.

Enfin, dans les chapitres 5 et 6, nous avons répondu à deux objections qui auraient pu nous amener à réviser notre ontologie morale de même que les conclusions du chapitre 4, à savoir le problème de la survenance morale, ou plutôt faudrait-il dire les problèmes de la survenance morale, et le problème de la motivation morale. Nous avons notamment vu que le non-naturalisme en ce qui concerne les raisons est particulièrement bien placé pour résister à celles-ci.

Ainsi, si ce que nous avons dit et défendu jusqu'ici est correct, il semble que nous ayons de bonnes raisons de penser que le monde possède sa propre structure normative et que celle-ci consiste en des relations de raison<fnref n="206" />.

<footnote n="206">²⁰⁶ L'idée de parler des raisons comme ce qui constitue la structure normative du monde nous vient de certains passages du livre de Charles Larmore *Morality and metaphysics*, en particulier de deux extraits que nous reproduisons ici : (1) « It is a metaphysics that recognizes that reasons, irreducibly normative in character, also form part of the structure of reality. » (Larmore, 2021, p. 11); (2) « The task is thus to develop another metaphysics according to which reasons form part of the structure of reality, that is, of the world itself (...) » (Larmore, 2021, p. 131).</footnote>
Bibliographie

Alston, W. P. (1996). *A realist conception of truth*. Cornell University Press.

Alvarez, M. (2016). Reasons for action: justification, motivation, explanation. Dans E. N. Zalta (dir.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Anscombe, G. E. M. (2000). *Intention* (2e éd.). Harvard University Press.

Apel, K.-O. (1980). *Towards a transformation of philosophy* (traduit par G. Adey et D. Frisby). Routledge. (Ouvrage original publié en 1973)

Arpaly, N. (2023). Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist. *Philosophical Issues*, 33(1), 22-32.

Arneson, R. J. (2010). Good, Period. *Analysis*, 70(4), 731-744.

Asarnow, S. et Taylor, D. (2022). Judgment internalism. Dans M. Vargas et J. M. Doris (dir.), *The Oxford handbook of moral psychology* (p. 139-157). Oxford University Press.

Atiq, E. H. (2020). Supervenience, repeatability, & expressivism. *Noûs*, 54(3), p. 578-599.

Ayer, A. J. (1971). *Language, truth and logic*. Penguin Books.

Bader, R. (2017). The grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism. Dans R. Shafer-Landau (dir.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* (vol. 12, p. 106-134). Oxford University Press.

Bandini, A. (2012). *Wilfrid Sellars et le mythe du donné*. Presses Universitaires de France.
Bennett, K. et McLaughlin, B. (2023). Supervenience. Dans E. N. Zalta (dir.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Berker, S. (2014). Does evolutionary psychology show that normativity is mind-dependent?
Dans J. D'Arms et D. Jacobson (dir.), *Moral psychology and human agency: philosophical essays on the science of ethics* (p. 215-252). Oxford University Press.

Berker, S. (2019). Mackie was not an error theorist. *Philosophical Perspectives, 33*(1), 5-25.

Bien. (s. d.). *Dans Dictionnaire Larousse en ligne.*
https://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/bien/9151

Blackburn, S. (1971). Moral realism. Dans J. Casey (dir.), *Morality and moral reasoning* (p. 101-124). Methuen.

Blackburn, S. (1984). *Spreading the word*. Oxford University Press.

Blackburn, S. (1985). Supervenience revisited. Dans I. Hacking (dir.), *Exercises in analysis* (p. 47-68). Cambridge University Press.

Blackburn, S. (1993). *Essays in quasi-realism*. Oxford University Press.

Blackburn, S. (1998). *Ruling passions*. Oxford University Press.

Blackburn, S. (2000). Relativism. Dans H. LaFollette (dir.), *The Blackwell guide to ethical theory* (p. 38-52). Blackwell.

Blackburn, S. (2016). *Oxford dictionary of philosophy* (3e éd.). Oxford University Press.

Boghossian, P. (2010). Three kinds of relativism. Dans S. D. Hales (dir.), *A companion to relativism* (p. 53-69). Wiley-Blackwell.
Boghossian, P. (2022). Realism and relativism about the normative. *Inquiry*, 1-20.

BonJour, L. (1985). *The structure of empirical knowledge*. Harvard University Press.

Bourget, D. et Chalmers, D. (2023). Philosophers on philosophy: the 2020 PhilPapers survey. *Philosophers' Imprint*, 23(11), 1-53.

Bouveresse, J. (2021). *Les foudres de Nietzsche et l'aveuglement des disciples*. Hors d'atteinte.

Boyd, R. (1988). How to be a moral realist. Dans G. Sayre-McCord (dir.), *Essays on moral realism* (p. 181-228). Cornell University Press.

Boyd, R. (1989). What realism implies and what it does not. *Dialectica*, 43(1/2), 5-29.

Brandom, R. (1994). *Making it explicit*. Harvard University Press.

Brink, D. O. (1986). Externalist moral realism. *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 24, 23-41.

Brink, D. O. (1989). *Moral realism and the foundations of ethics*. Cambridge University Press.

Brink, D. O. (1997). Moral motivation. *Ethics*, 108(1), 4-32.

Brock, S. et Mares, E. (2007). *Realism and anti-realism*. Acumen.

Broome, J. (2004). Reasons. Dans J. Wallace, P. Pettit, S. Scheffler et M. Smith (dir.), *Reason and value: themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz* (p. 28-55). Oxford University Press.

Broome, J. (2018). Reason fundamentalism and what is wrong with it. Dans D. Star (dir.), *The oxford handbook of reasons and normativity* (p. 275-297). Oxford University Press.
Brown, C. (2011). A New and improved supervenience argument for ethical descriptivism.

Dans R. Shafer-Landau (dir.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* (vol. 6, p. 205-218). Oxford University Press.

Campbell, A. J. (2022). *How to be a relaxed realist*. [thèse de doctorat inédite]. Université de Caroline du Nord.

Chalmers, D. (1996). *The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory*. Oxford University Press.

Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. *Journal of philosophy*, 78(2), 67-90.

Churchland, P. M. (1988). *Matter and consciousness*. MIT Press.

Churchland, P. S. (1986). *Neurophilosophy: toward a unified science of the mind/brain*. MIT Press.

Clavier, P. (2010). *Qu'est-ce que le bien ?* Vrin.

Copp, D. (1995). *Morality, normativity, and society*. Oxford University Press.

Copp, D. (1997a). Belief, reason, and motivation: Michael Smith's 'The moral problem'. *Ethics*, 108(1), 33-54.

Copp, D. (1997b). Does moral theory need the concept of society? *Analyse & Kritik*, 19(2), 189-212.

Copp, D. (2008). Darwinian skepticism about moral realism. *Philosophical issues*, 18, 186-206.

Copp, D. (2019). How to avoid begging the question against evolutionary debunking arguments. *Ratio*, 32, 231-245.
Cova, F. (2008). La morale au-delà du devoir : le problème de la surérogation. *Le philosophoire*, 30(2), 55-74.

Cuneo, T. (2007). *The normative web: an argument for moral realism*. Oxford University Press.

Dancy, J. (1993). *Moral reasons*. Blackwell.

Dancy, J. (2000). Should we pass the buck? Dans A. O'Hear (dir.), *Philosophy, the good, the true and the beautiful*. Cambridge University Press.

Dancy, J. (2004). *Ethics without principles*. Oxford University Press.

D'Arms, J. et Jacobson, D. (2000a). Sentiment and value. *Ethics*, 110(4), 722-748.

D'Arms, J. et Jacobson, D. (2000b). The moralistic fallacy: on the 'appropriateness' of emotions. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 61(1), 65-90.

Darwall, S. (1997). Reasons, motives, and the demands of morality: an introduction. Dans S. Darwall, A. Gibbard et P. Railton (dir.), *Moral discourse and practice: some philosophical approaches* (p. 305-312). Oxford University Press.

Descartes, R. (2011). *Méditations métaphysiques* (traduit par J.-M. Beyssade et M. Beyssade). Flammarion. (Ouvrage original publié en 1641)

Devitt, M. (1991). Aberrations of the realism debate. *Philosophical studies*, 61(1/2), 43-63.

Devitt, M. (1997). *Realism and truth* (2e éd.). Princeton University Press.

deVries, W. (2005). *Wilfrid Sellars*. Acumen Publishing.
Dreier, J. (1992). The supervenience argument against moral realism. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 30(3), 13-38.

Dreier, J. (2000). Dispositions and fetishes: externalist models of moral motivation. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 61(3), 619-638.

Dreier, J. (2019). Is there a supervenience problem for robust moral realism? *Philosophical Studies*, 176(6), p. 1391-1408.

Dummett, M. (1978). *Truth and other enigmas*. Harvard University Press.

Dummett, M. (1993). The seas of language. Oxford University Press.

Dunaway, B. (2018). Realism and objectivity. Dans T. McPherson et D. Plunkett (dir.), *The Routledge handbook of metaethics* (p. 135-150). Routledge.

Drake, N. (2016). A Humean constructivist reading of J. S. Mill's utilitarian theory. *Utilitas*, 28(2), 189-214.

Dworkin, R. (1996). Objectivity and truth: you'd better believe it. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 25(2), 87-139.

Dworkin, R. (2011). *Justice for hedgehogs*. Harvard University Press.

Elstein, D et Hurka, T. (2009). From thick to thin: two moral reduction plans. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 39(4), 515-535.

Enoch, D. (2011). *Taking morality seriously*. Oxford University Press.

Enoch, D. et McPherson, T. (2017). What do you mean "This isn't the question"? *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 47(6), 820-840.
Esfeld, M. (2017). *Philosophie des sciences* (3e éd.). Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes.

Esfeld, M. (2020). *La philosophie de l'esprit : une introduction aux débats contemporains* (3e éd.). Armand Colin.

Esfeld, M. (2020). *Sciences et liberté*. Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes.

Esfeld, M. et Deckert, D.-A. (2017). *A minimalist ontology of the natural world*. Routledge.

Faraci, D. (2017). Hybrid non-naturalism does not meet the supervenience challenge. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 12(3), p. 312-318.

Faraci, D. et McPherson, T. (2018). Ethical judgment and motivation. Dans T. McPherson et D. Plunkett (dir.), *The Routledge handbook of metaethics* (p. 308-323). Routledge.

Fassio, D. et Meylan, A. (2018). Passing the epistemic buck. Dans C. McHugh, J. Way et D. Whiting (dir.), *Metaepistemology* (p. 46-66). Oxford University Press.

Foster, J. et Schroeder, M. (2023). Defining moral realism. Dans P. Bloomfield et D. Copp (dir.), *The oxford handbook of moral realism* (p. 3-17). Oxford University Press.

Frege, G. (1956). The thought: a logical inquiry. *Mind*, 65(259), 289-311.

Field, H. (1989). *Realism, mathematics, and modality*. Blackwell.

Fine, A. (1986). Unnatural attitudes: realist and instrumentalist attachments to science. *Mind*, 95(378), 149-179.

Fine, K. (1994a). *Essence and modality*. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 8, p. 1-16.
Fine, K. (1994b). Senses of essence. Dans W. Sinnott Armstrong, D. Raffman et N. Asher (dir.), *Modality, morality and belief. Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus* (p. 53-73). Cambridge University Press.

Fine, K. (2002). Varieties of necessity. Dans T. S. Gendler et J. Hawthorne (dir.), *Conceivability and possibility* (p. 253-281). Oxford University Press.

Firth, R. (1952). *Ethical absolutism and the ideal observer*. *Philosophy and phenomenological research*, 12(3), 317-345.

FitzPatrick, W. (2014). Why there is no Darwinian dilemma for ethical realism. Dans M. Bergmann et P. Kain (dir.), *Challenges to moral and religious belief: disagreement and evolution* (p. 237-255). Oxford University Press.

FitzPatrick, W. (2015). Debunking evolutionary debunking of ethical realism. *Philosophical studies*, 172, 883-904.

FitzPatrick, W. (2016). Scientific naturalism and the explanation of moral beliefs: challenging evolutionary debunking. Dans K. J. Clark (dir.), *The Blackwell companion to naturalism* (p. 588-608). Wiley-Blackwell.

FitzPatrick, W. (2017a). Human altruism, evolution and moral philosophy. *Royal Society Open Science*, 4, 1-13.

FitzPatrick, W. (2017b). Why Darwinism does not debunk objective morality. Dans M. Ruse et R. J. Richards (dir.), *The Cambridge handbook of evolutionary ethics* (p. 188-201). Cambridge University Press.

Geach, P. T. (1956). Good and Evil. *Analysis*, 17(2), 33-42.

Geach, P. T. (1965). Assertion. *Philosophical Review*, 74, 449-465.
Gibbard, A. (2003). *Thinking how to live*. Harvard University Press.

Gibbard, A. (2006). Normative properties. Dans T. Horgan et M. Timmons (dir.), *Metaethics after Moore* (p. 319-338). Oxford University Press.

Goff, P. (2007). A non-eliminative understanding of austere nominalism. *European Journal of Philosophy*, 16, p. 43-54.

Haack, S. (1987). Realism. *Synthese*, 73(2), 275-299.

Haack, S. (1993). *Evidence and inquiry: towards reconstruction in epistemology*. Wiley-Blackwell.

Habermas, J. (1983). *Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln*. Suhrkamp.

Habermas, J. (1991). *Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik*. Suhrkamp.

Halais, E. (2006). *Individualité et valeur dans la philosophie morale anglaise*. Presses Universitaires de France.

Hare, R. M. (1952). *The language of morals*. Oxford University Press.

Hare, R. M. (1981). *Moral thinking: its levels, method, and point*. Oxford University Press.

Harman, G. (1975). Moral relativism defended. *The philosophical review*, 84(1), 3-22.

Harman, G. (1977). *The nature of morality: an introduction to ethics*. Oxford University Press.

Harman, G. (1986). Moral explanations of natural facts – can moral claims be tested against moral reality? *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 24, 57-68.
Horgan, T. (1993). From supervenience to superdupervenience: meeting the demands of a material world. *Mind*, **102**, p. 555-586.

Horgan, T. et Timmons, M. (1991). New wave moral realism meets moral twin earth. *Journal of Philosophical Research*, **16**, 447-465.

Howard, C. (2023). Fitting attitude theories of value. Dans E. N. Zalta (dir.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Huemer, M. (2005). *Ethical intuitionism*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Hume, D. (1978). *A treatise of human nature*. Clarendon Press.

Jackson, F. (1998). *From metaphysics to ethics. A defence of conceptual analysis*. Oxford University Press.

Jackson, F. et Pettit, P. (1995). Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, **45**(178), 20-40.

Jaquet, F. et Cova, F. (2019). *Internalisme et externalisme : le problème de la motivation morale*. Dans O. Desmons, S. Lemaire et P. Turmel (dir.), *Manuel de métaéthique* (p. 335-366). Hermann.

Johnston, M. (1989). Dispositional theories of values. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian society*, **61**, 139-174.

Joyce, R. (2001). *The myth of morality*. Cambridge University Press.

Joyce, R. (2006). *The evolution of morality*. MIT Press.

Joyce, R. (2007). Moral anti-realism. Dans E. N. Zalta (dir.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
Joyce, R. (2021). Moral anti-realism. Dans E. N. Zalta (dir.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Kant, E. (1994). *Métaphysique des moeurs I : Fondation, Introduction* (traduit par A. Renaut). GF Flammarion. (Ouvrage original publié en 1785)

Karimi, P. (2024). Relaxed realism and normative belief: a functionalist account. *The philosophical Quarterly*.

Kearns, S. et Star, D. (2009). Reasons as evidence. Dans R. Shafer-Landau (dir.), *Oxford studies in metaethics* (vol. 4, p. 215-242). Oxford University Press.

Kelsen, H. (1991). *General theory of norms* (traduit par M. Hartney). Oxford University Press.

Kim, J. (1984). Concepts of supervenience. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 45(2), p. 153-176.

Kim, J. (1987). “Strong” and “global” supervenience revisited. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 48(2), p. 315-326.

Kim, J. (1988). Supervenience for multiple domains. *Philosophical Topics*, 16(1), 129-150.

Kim, J. (1990). Supervenience as a philosophical concept. *Metaphilosophy*, 21(1/2), p. 1-27.

Kim, J. (1998). *Mind in a physical world*. MIT Press.

Kim, J. (2005). *Physicalism, or something near enough*. Princeton University Press.

Kirchin, S. (2017). *Thick evaluation*. Oxford University Press.

Kirk, R. (1999). *Relativism and reality: a contemporary introduction*. Routledge.
Kitcher, P. (2011). *The ethical project*. Harvard University Press.

Klagge, J. C. (1988). Supervenience: ontological and ascriptive. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 66(4), p. 461-470.

Korsgaard, C. (1996). *The sources of normativity*. Cambridge University Press.

Kramer, M. (2009). *Moral realism as a moral doctrine*. Wiley-Blackwell.

Kripke, S. (1980). *Naming and necessity*. Harvard University Press.

Larmore, C. (2008). *The autonomy of morality*. Cambridge University Press.

Larmore, C. (2021). *Morality and metaphysics*. Cambridge University Press.

Leary, S. (2017). Non-naturalism and normative necessities. Dans R. Shafer-Landau (dir.), *Oxford studies in metaethics* (vol. 12, p. 76-105). *Oxford University Press*.

LeBar, M. (2008). Aristotelian constructivism. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 25(1), 182-213.

Leuenberger, S. (2008). Supervenience in metaphysics. *Philosophy Compass*, 3(4), p. 749-762.

Lillehammer, H. (1997). Smith on moral fetishism. *Analysis*, 57(3), 187-195.

Lipton, P. (1994). Truth, existence, and the best explanation. Dans A. A. Derksen (dir.), *The scientific realism of Rom Harré* (p. 89-111). Tilburg University Press.

Little, M. O. (1997). Virtue as knowledge: objections from the philosophy of mind. *Noûs*, 31(1), 59-79.
Logins, A. (2022). *Normative reasons: between reasoning and explanation*. Cambridge University Press.

Loux, M. J. (2003). Realism and anti-realism: Dummett's challenge. Dans M. J. Loux et D. W. Zimmerman (dir.), *The oxford handbook of metaphysics* (p. 633-664). Oxford University Press.

Lutz, M. (2024). Moral naturalism. Dans E. N. Zalta (dir.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Lyons, T. D. (2003). Explaining the success of a scientific theory. *Philosophy of science*, *70*(5), 891-901.

Mabrito, R. (2005). Does Shafer-Landau have a problem with supervenience? *Philosophical Studies*, *126*(2), p. 297-311.

Mackie, J. L. (1977). *Inventing right and wrong*. Penguin Books.

Majors, B. (2009). The Natural and the normative. Dans R. Shafer-Landau (dir.), *Oxford studies in metaethics* (vol. 4, p. 29-52). Oxford University Press.

Mankowitz, P. (2023). Good people are not like good knives. *Noûs*, 1-25.

Massin, O. (2019). Survenance et fondations morales. Dans O. Desmons, S. Lemaire et P. Turmel (dir.), *Manuel de métaéthique* (p. 271-306). Hermann.

Maxwell, G. (1962). The ontological status of theoretical entities. Dans H. Feigl et G. Maxwell (dir.), *Scientific explanation, space, and time: Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science* (p. 181-192). University of Minnesota Press.

McDowell, J. (1978). Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives? *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, *52*, 13-29.
McDowell, J. (1979). Virtue and reason. *The Monist*, 62(3), 331-350.

McDowell, J. (1981). Non-cognitivism and rule-following. Dans S. H. Holtzman et C. M. Leich (dir.), *Wittgenstein: to follow a rule* (p. 141-162). Routledge.

McDowell, J. (1994). *Mind and world*. Harvard University Press.

McDowell, J. (1998). *Mind, value, and reality*. Harvard University Press.

McFetridge, I. G. (1985). Supervenience, realism, necessity. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 35(140), p. 245-258.

McHugh, C. et Way, J. (2016). Fittingness first. *Ethics*, 126(3), 575-606.

McNaughton, D. (1988). *Moral vision: an introduction to ethics*. Blackwell.

McPherson, T. (2011). Against quietist normative realism. *Philosophical studies*, 154(2), 223-240.

McPherson, T. (2012). Ethical non-naturalism and the metaphysics of supervenience. Dans R. Shafer-Landau (dir.), *Oxford studies in metaethics* (vol. 7, p. 205-234). Oxford University Press.

McPherson, T. (2019). Supervenience in ethics. Dans E. N. Zalta (dir.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Miller, A. (2003). *An introduction to contemporary metaethics*. Polity Press.

Miller, A. (2008). Realism and antirealism. Dans E. Lepore et B. C. Smith (dir.), *The oxford handbook of philosophy of language* (p. 983-1005). Oxford University Press.

Miller, A. (2017). Moral supervenience: a defence of Blackburn's argument. *Dialectica*, 71(4), p. 581-601.
Miller, A. (2019). Realism. Dans E. N. Zalta (dir.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Millikan, R. (1984). *Language, thought and other biological categories*. MIT Press.

Milo, R. (1995). Contractarian constructivism. *The journal of philosophy*, 92(4), 181-204.

Mitchell, C. (2017). Mixed-up about mixed worlds? Understanding Blackburn's supervenience argument. *Philosophical Studies*, 174, p. 2903-2925.

Moore, A. W. (2002). Quasi-realism and relativism. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 65(1), 150-156.

Moore, G. E. (1903). *Principia ethica*. Cambridge University Press.

Moore, G. E. (1912). *Ethics*. Williams & Norgate.

Moore, G. E. (1922). *Philosophical studies*. K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.

Morton, J. (2022). Normative principles and the nature of mind-dependence. *Philosophical Studies*, 179(4), 1153-1176.

Musgrave, A. (1988). The ultimate argument for scientific realism. Dans R. Nola (dir.), *Relativism and realism in sciences* (p. 229-252). Kluwer.

Nagel, T. (1970). *The possibility of altruism*. Oxford University Press.

Nagel, T. (1986). *The view from nowhere*. Oxford University Press.

Nagel, T. (1993). Moral luck. Dans D. Statman (dir.), *Moral luck* (p. 141-166). State University of New York Press.
Nagel, T. (1997). *The last word*. Oxford University Press.

Ogien, R. (2011). Les normes. Dans F. Hulak et C. Girard (dir.), *Philosophie des sciences humaines* (vol. 1, p. 39-68). Vrin.

Ogien et Tappolet (2009). *Les concepts de l'éthique : faut-il être conséquentialiste ?* Hermann.

Olson, J. (2018). The metaphysics of reasons. Dans D. Star (dir.), *The oxford handbook of reasons and normativity* (p. 255-274). Oxford University Press.

O'Neill, O. (1989). *Constructions of reason*. Cambridge University Press.

Papineau, D. (2001). The rise of physicalism. Dans C. Gillett et B. Loewer (dir.), *Physicalism and its discontents* (p. 3-36). Cambridge University Press.

Parfit, D. (2011a). *On what matters* (vol. 1). Oxford University Press.

Parfit, D. (2011b). *On what matters* (vol. 2). Oxford University Press.

Pigden, C. R. (1990). Geach on 'Good'. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, *40*(159), 129-154.

Piller, C. (2006). Content-related and attitude-related reasons for preferences. *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*, *59*, 155-182.

Platts, M. (1980). Moral reality and the end of desire. Dans M. Platts (dir.), *Reference, truth and reality: essays on the philosophy of language*. Routledge.

Psillos, S. (1999). *Scientific realism: how science tracks truth*. Routledge.

Putnam, H. (1975a). *Mathematics, matter and method: philosophical papers, volume 1*. Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, H. (1975b). *Mind, language and reality* (vol. 2). Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, H. (1981). *Reason, truth and history*. Cambridge University Press.

Raatikainen, P. (2014). Realism: metaphysical, scientific and semantic. Dans K. R. Westphal (dir.), *Realism, science and pragmatism* (139-158). Routledge.

Rabinowicz, W et Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2004). The strike of the demon: on fitting pro-
attitudes and value. *Ethics*, **114**(3), 391-423.

Railton, P. (1986). Moral Realism. *The Philosophical Review*, *95*(2), 163-207.

Railton, P. (1989). *Naturalism and prescriptivity*. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, *7*(1), 151-174.

Rashdall, H. (1907). *The Theory of Good and Evil*. Oxford University Press.

Rawls, J. (1999). *A theory of justice* (2e éd.). Harvard University Press.

Ridet, A. (2021). *La dépendance des faits moraux aux états mentaux moraux irréductibles et autonomes : une réponse à l'objection de la survenance morale métaphysique*. [mémoire de maîtrise inédit]. Université de Lausanne.

Ridge, M. (2007). Anti-reductionism and supervenience. *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, *4*(3), p. 330-348.

Roberts, D. (2018). Thick concepts. Dans T. McPherson et D. Plunkett (dir.), *The Routledge handbook of metaethics* (p. 211-225). Routledge.

Rochefort, P.-Y. (2022). *Hilary Putnam et la question du réalisme*. Les Presses de l'Université de Laval.
Rocheleau-Houle, D. (2019). Le réalisme moral non réductionniste et le problème de l'explication. Dans O. Desmons, S. Lemaire et P. Turmel (dir.), *Manuel de métaéthique* (p. 233-269). Hermann.

Romano, C. (2010). *Au coeur de la raison, la phénoménologie*. Gallimard.

Romano, C. (2019). *Les repères éblouissants : renouveler la phénoménologie*. Presses Universitaires de France.

Romano, C. (2020). *De la couleur*. Gallimard.

Rorty, R. (1979). *Philosophy and the mirror of nature*. Princeton University Press.

Rosati, C. S. (2018). Mind-dependence and moral realism. Dans T. McPherson et D. Plunkett (dir.), *The Routledge handbook of metaethics* (355-370). Routledge.

Rosen, G. (1994). Objectivity and modern idealism: what is the question? Dans M. Michael et J. O'Leary-Hawthorne (dir.), *Philosophy of mind* (p. 277-319). Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Rosen, G. (2018). Metaphysical relations in metaethics. Dans T. McPherson et D. Plunkett (dir.), *The Routledge handbook of metaethics* (p. 151-169). Routledge.

Rosen, G. (2020). What is normative necessity. Dans M. Dumitru (dir.), *Metaphysics, meaning and modality: themes from Kit Fine*. Oxford University Press.

Rosenberg, J. (1980). *One world and our knowledge of it*. D. Reidel.

Ross, W. D. (1930). *The Right and the Good*. Clarendon Press.

Ross, W. D. (1939). *Foundations of Ethics*. Clarendon Press.
Rossi, M. (2019). *Primauté des raisons ou des valeurs ? Dans O. Desmons, S. Lemaire et P. Turmel (dir.).* *Manuel de métaéthique* (p. 307-334). Hermann.

Rossi, M. et Tappolet, C. (2017). The evolutionary debunker meets sentimental realism. Dans G. Marchetti et S. Marchetti (dir.), *Facts and values: the ethics and metaphysics of normativity* (p. 176-195). Routledge.

Rowland, R. (2016). In defence of good simpliciter. *Philosophical studies*, 173(5), 1371-1391.

Rowland, R. (2019). The normative and the evaluative: the buck-passing account of value. Oxford University Press.

Ruse, M. (1986). Evolutionary ethics: a phoenix arisen. *Zygon*, 21(1), 95-112.

Russell, B. (2014). *Review of Being realistic about reasons*. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/being-realistic-about-reasons/

Sankey, H. (2002). Realism, method and truth. Dans M. Marsonet (dir.), *The problem of realism* (p. 64-81). Ashgate.

Sankey, H. (2022). Objective facts. *Metaphysica*, 23(1), 117-121.

Sayre-McCord, G. (1988a). The many moral realisms. Dans G. Sayre-McCord (dir.), *Essays on moral realism* (p. 1-23). Cornell University Press.

Sayre-McCord, G. (1988b). Moral theory and explanatory impotence. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 12(1), 433-457.

Scanlon, T. (1998). *What we owe to each other*. Harvard University Press.

Scanlon, T. M. (2014). *Being realistic about reasons*. Oxford University Press.
Scanlon, T. (2017). Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane, Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 47(6), 877-897.

Schechter, J. (2023). Five kinds of epistemic arguments against robust moral realism. Dans P. Bloomfield et D. Copp (dir.), *The oxford handbook of moral realism* (p. 345-369). Oxford University Press.

Schofield, P. (2015). On the existence of duties to the self (and their significance for moral philosophy). *Philosophy and phenomenological research*, 90(3), 505-528.

Schroeder, M. (2007). *Slaves of the passions*. Oxford University Press.

Schroeder, M. (2010a). *Noncognitivism in ethics*. Routledge.

Schroeder, M. (2010b). Value and the right kind of reason. Dans R. Shafer-Landau (dir.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* (vol. 5, p. 25-55). Oxford University Press.

Schroeder, M. (2015). Being realistic about reasons, by T.M. Scanlon. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 93(1), p. 195-198.

Schroeder, M. (2021a). *Reasons first*. Oxford University Press.

Schroeder, M. (2021b). The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism. *Philosophical Studies*, 178(10), 3107-3127.

Sellars, W. (1963). *Science, perception and reality*. Ridgeview Publishing Co.

Sellars, W. (1997). *Philosophical Perspectives: Metaphysics and Epistemology*. Ridgeview Publishing.
Sellars, W. (2002). La philosophie et l'image scientifique de l'homme (traduit par Y. Bouchard et D. Boucher). Dans D. Fisette et P. Poirier (dir.), *Philosophie de l'esprit : psychologie du sens commun et sciences de l'esprit* (p. 55-115). Vrin.

Shafer-Landau, R. (2003). *Moral realism: a defence*. Oxford University Press.

Shafer-Landau, R. (2012). Evolutionary debunking, moral realism and moral knowledge. *Journal of ethics and social philosophy*, 7(1), 1-37.

Sidgwick, H. (1962). *The Methods of Ethics* (7e éd.). Palgrave Macmillan.

Skorupski, J. (2007). Buck-passing about goodness. Dans D. Egonsson, J. Josfesson, B. Petersson et T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (dir.), *Hommage à Wlodek: Philosophical Essays in Honour of Wlodek Rabinowicz*. Lund University.

Skorupski, J. (2010). *The domain of reasons*. Oxford University Press.

Sliwa, P. (2016). Moral worth and moral knowledge. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 93(2), 393-418.

Smart, J. J. C. (1963). *Philosophy and scientific realism*. Routledge.

Smith, M. (1994). *The moral problem*. Blackwell.

Smith, M. (1997). In defense of ‘The moral problem’: a reply to Brink, Copp, and Sayre-McCord. *Ethics*, 108(1), 84-119.

Snedegar, J. (2016). Reasons, oughts and requirements. Dans R. Shafer-Landau (dir.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* (vol. 11, p. 155-181). Oxford University Press.

Sobel, J. H. (2001). Blackburn's problem: on its not insignificant residue. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 62(2), p. 361-383.
Sober, E. (1982). Realism and independence. *Noûs*, 16(3), 369-385.

Stevenson, C. (1937). The emotive meaning of ethical terms. *Mind*, 46, 14-31.

Strandberg, C. (2004). *Moral reality. A defence of moral realism*. [thèse de doctorat inédite]. Université de Lund.

Stratton-Lake, P. (2002). Introduction. Dans W. D. Ross, *The Right and The Good*. Oxford University Press.

Stratton-Lake, P. (2005). How to deal with evil demons: comment on Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen. *Ethics*, 115(4), 788-798.

Stratton-Lake, P. (2006). G. E. Moore. Dans J. Shand (dir.), *Central Works of Philosophy* (vol. 4, p. 20-37). Acumen.

Stratton-Lake, P. (2018). Reasons fundamentalism and value. Dans D. Star (dir.), *The oxford handbook of reasons and normativity* (p. 275-297). Oxford University Press.

Stratton-Lake, P. et Hooker, B. (2006). Scanlon versus Moore on Goodness. Dans T. Horgan et M. Timmons (dir.), *Metaethics after Moore*. Oxford University Press.

Street, S. (2006). A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value. *Philosophical studies: an international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition*, 127(1), 109-166.

Street, S. (2008). Reply to Copp: naturalism, normativity, and the varieties of realism worth worrying about. *Philosophical issues*, 18, 207-228.

Street, S. (2010). What is constructivism in ethics and metaethics? *Philosophy compass*, 5(5), 363-384.
Street, S. (2012). Coming to terms with contingency: Humean constructivism about practical reason. Dans J. Lenman et Y. Shemmer (dir.), *Constructivism in Practical Philosophy* (p. 40-59). Oxford University Press.

Streumer, B. (2013). Can we believe the error theory? *Journal of Philosophy*, **110**, 194-212.

Sturgeon, N. (1986). What difference does it make whether moral realism is true? *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, **24**, 115-141.

Sturgeon, N. (1988). Moral explanations. Dans G. Sayre-McCord (dir.), *Essays on moral realism* (p. 229-255). Cornell University Press.

Suikkanen, J. (2005). Reasons and value – in defence of the buck-passing account. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, **7**(5), p. 513-535.

Suikkanen, J. (2010). Non-naturalism: the Jackson challenge. Dans R. Shafer-Landau (dir.), *Oxford studies in metaethics* (vol. 5, p. 87-110). Oxford University Press.

Svavarsdóttir, S. (1999). Moral cognitivism and motivation. *The philosophical Review*, **108**(2), 161-219.

Tappolet, C. (2000). *Emotions et valeurs*. Presses universitaires de France.

Tappolet, C. (2004). Les dilemmes moraux et les devoirs prima facie. Dans M. Canto-Sperber (dir.), *Dictionnaire d'éthique et de philosophie morale* (4e éd.). Presses universitaires de France.

Tappolet, C. (2005). Scanlon et la tentative d'élimination du bien. Dans S. Lapointe et al. (dir.), *Acte du Congrès de la Sopha*. Philosophia Scienta.

Tappolet, C. (2011). La normativité des concepts évaluatifs. *Philosophiques*, **38**(1), 157-176.
Tappolet, C. (2019). Les sentimentalismes moraux. Dans O. Desmons, S. Lemaire et P. Turmel (dir.), *Manuel de métaéthique* (p. 163-190). Hermann.

Thomson, J. J. (1992). On some ways in which a thing can be good. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 2, 96-117.

Thomson, J. J. (1994). Goodness and Utilitarianism. *Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association*, 67(4), 7-21.

Thomson, J. J. (2008). *Normativity*. Open Court.

Thomson, J. J. (2013). Goodness. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 87(2), 467-475.

Tiefensee, C. (2021). Metasemantics for the relaxed. Dans R. Shafer-Landau (dir.), *Oxford studies in metaethics* (vol. 16, p. 108-133). Oxford University Press.

Toppinen, T. (2018). Essentially grounded non-naturalism and normative supervenience. *Topoi*, 37, p. 645-653.

van Fraassen, B. C. (1980). *The scientific image*. Clarendon Press.

van Roojen, M. (2023). Moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism. Dans E. N. Zalta (dir.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Väyrynen, P. (2018). The supervenience challenge to non-naturalism. Dans T. McPherson et D. Plunkett (dir.), *The Routledge handbook of metaethics* (p. 170-184). Routledge.

Väyrynen, P. (2025). Thick ethical concepts. Dans E. N. Zalta (dir.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

von Wright, G. H. (1951). *An essay in modal logic*. North-Holland.
Warren, M. D. et Thomasson, A. L. (2023). Prospects for a quietist moral realism. Dans P. Bloomfield et D. Copp (dir.), *The oxford handbook of moral realism* (p. 526-553). Oxford University Press.

Way, J. (2012). Transmission and the wrong kind of reason. *Ethics*, 122(3), 489-515.

Way, J. (2013). Value and reasons to favour. Dans R. Shafer-Landau (dir.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* (vol. 8, p. 27-49). Oxford University Press.

Wedgwood, R. (2007). *The nature of normativity*. Oxford University Press.

Wedgwood, R. (2009). Intrinsic values and reasons for action. *Philosophical Issues*, 19(1), 321-342.

Wiggins, D. (1998). *Needs, values, truth* (3e éd.). Oxford University Press.

Williams, B. (1979). Internal and external reasons. Dans R. Harrison (dir.), *Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science*. Cambridge University Press.

Williams, B. (1981). *Moral luck*. Cambridge University Press.

Williams, B. (1985). *Ethics and the limits of philosophy*. Harvard University Press.

Williams, R. (1985). *Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society*. Oxford University Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1993). *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (traduit par G. G. Granger). Gallimard.
(Ouvrage original publié en 1922)

Wong, D. B. (2006). *Natural moralities: a defense of pluralistic relativism*. Oxford University Press.

Wright, C. (1992). *Truth and objectivity*. Harvard University Press.
Yablo, S. (2000). Red, bitter, best. *Philosophical Books*, 41, 13-23.

Zangwill, N. (1995). Moral supervenience. *Midwest Studies In Philosophy*, 20, p. 240-262.

Zangwill, N. (1997). Explaining supervenience: moral and mental. *Journal of Philosophical Research*, 22, p. 509-518.

Zangwill, N. (2008). Besires and the motivation debate. *Theoria*, 74, 50-59.

Zangwill, N. (2018). Brutalist non-naturalism and Hume's principle. *Dialectica*, 72(3), p. 365-383.