# I. Introduction: Does the Dispute Resolution Service Provide Meaningful Access
				to Remedies for Project-Affected People?

In 2020, the World Bank established the Dispute Resolution Service (DRS) to address complaints from people adversely affected by its development-funded projects. The DRS enables them to engage in problem-solving directly with borrower States responsible for project implementation, using mediation, fact-finding, and other alternative dispute resolution methods.

As outlined in this Section I, this paper examines how the DRS currently enhances project-affected people’s access to remedies for harm to which the Bank has contributed, as well as how it should further strengthen such access. Subsection A provides an overview of the DRS, including the rationale for and methodology of its evaluation. Subsection B presents the paper’s main finding: while the DRS has the potential to improve access to remedies by offering affected people a dispute resolution mechanism, its current design requires additional procedural protections to ensure that access to remedies is not compromised.

## A. The DRS Illustrates Both Achievements and Challenges in a New Era of
				“Transnational” Administrative Law

Members of the Kawaala community in Kampala, Uganda, report that Ugandan government-affiliated Kampala Capital City Authority and armed guards woke them in the early hours of 4 December 2020 and began destroying their homes and farmlands.<fnref n="1" /> Community members allege that their eviction and the ensuing destruction paved the way for the Lubigi Drainage Channel development project funded by the World Bank (hereafter, the Bank, or International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). They claim that the project began without proper consultation or plans for compensation and resettlement, and compromised their livelihoods and well-being, in violation of the World Bank’s *Environmental and Social Framework* policies (*Framework*).<fnref n="2" /> In turn, World Bank Management claimed that the project-level grievance mechanism should handle most of the Kawaala community’s concerns about resettlement, and that it was working with Kampala Capital City Authority to strengthen the resettlement plan related to the channel project.<fnref n="3" />

Dissatisfied with the World Bank’s solution to their concerns, Kawaala community members filed a complaint to the Inspection Panel (Panel) in June 2021 with the support of local and international civil society organizations.<fnref n="4" /> The Panel subsequently recommended to the Bank’s Executive Directors to investigate the complaint.<fnref n="5" /> Upon the Executive Directors’ approval of inspection,<fnref n="6" /> the Kawaala community and the Uganda government were offered the opportunity to pursue dispute resolution rather than to go forward with the compliance review conducted by the Panel, a first in the Bank’s history. Executive Directors had only recently approved the updated *Inspection Panel* *Resolution*<fnref n="7" /> and the *Accountability Mechanism* *Resolution*,<fnref n="8" /> which established the new Dispute Resolution Service, or DRS, in September 2020.

Under the DRS, those affected by Bank-funded projects (affected people, also referred to as requesters once they submit a request for inspection to the Panel) and the borrower State can now resolve a complaint brought before the Inspection Panel through joint fact-finding, mediation, and other similar alternative dispute resolution methods, provided both parties agree, as was the case with the Kawaala community and Uganda.<fnref n="9" /> According to a civil society organization supporting the Kawaala community, the dispute resolution process would provide an “appropriate forum” for the community to present their demands, which include “a new, proper land survey and identification of project affected people, provision of adequate compensation, and adequate time to resettle.”<fnref n="10" />

While scholarship has examined various aspects of the Inspection Panel at the World Bank<fnref n="11" /> and dispute resolution mechanisms at other multilateral development banks (also known as “international financial institutions”),<fnref n="12" /> this paper offers the first scholarly legal analysis of the DRS, including the initial complaints handled by the mechanism in its first few years of operation. Specifically, it considers how the dispute resolution process offered by the Bank should benefit affected people and borrower States (together, the parties). The paper also critically evaluates the dispute resolution process in light of international law requirements, the mandates of remedial mechanisms within the Bank, as well as best practices concerning access to remedies. In particular, it considers the strengths and weaknesses of the current dispute resolution process and suggests how the Bank should improve this process when it revises the *Accountability Mechanism Resolution* or the *Accountability Mechanism Operating Procedures* in the future.

A critical evaluation of the DRS within the Bank’s accountability system is essential for several reasons. First, it will provide the disputing parties with greater clarity on whether the DRS is truly the “appropriate forum” for resolving a given complaint. It will also help them anticipate procedural challenges that may arise, allowing them to navigate the process better and avoid pitfalls that could hinder access to remedies. Furthermore, the Bank, its Executive Directors, and its Accountability Mechanism could take this evaluation into account when revising the DRS. The nearly twenty other multilateral development banks, which have historically been influenced by the World Bank’s accountability practices,<fnref n="13" /> could also draw relevant insights from this analysis when developing or refining their own dispute resolution processes.

This paper engages with and contributes to global administrative law theory in its critical evaluation of the DRS. It draws on this theory in three key ways: through its (1) object, (2) methodology, and (3) goal.<fnref n="14" /> First, the paper examines the DRS, which falls within one of the five types of global administration: “administration by formal international organizations.”<fnref n="15" /> Second, it adopts an interdisciplinary methodology, combining the interpretation of positive international law with comparative legal analysis. This approach situates the DRS within the broader landscape of dispute resolution mechanisms at the other twenty multilateral development banks and international dispute resolution bodies. The analysis is further enriched by insights from sociology and international relations, drawing on approximately a dozen confidential semi-formal interviews with stakeholders who have relevant expertise and direct experience with the DRS’ initial cases. Third, consistent with the theory’s critical approach, the paper identifies the DRS’ procedural shortcomings and proposes reforms to enhance its process.

Moreover, this paper advances the global administrative law theory by positioning the DRS as a case study that illustrates both the achievements and challenges of contemporary governance. Through an analysis of the World Bank, it traces the evolution of the Inspection Panel—a frequently cited example in the scholarship<fnref n="16" />—into the broader Accountability Mechanism, which now integrates both the Panel and the newly established DRS. This detailed examination provides concrete evidence of how key administrative law principles have been adapted and operationalized in recent years.

Relatedly, the paper critically evaluates due process requirements in contemporary international dispute resolution, showing how institutional design can be adjusted to balance accountability with the need for efficiency and flexibility. This analysis contributes to the debate on appropriate normative standards and essential procedural protections that should govern dispute resolution mechanisms at multilateral development banks today.

However, unlike much of traditional global administrative law scholarship, which primarily examines institutional operations, this paper focuses on the specific political, institutional, and economic forces underlying the processes that led to the establishment of the Inspection Panel, Grievance Redress Service, and DRS. Given the scarcity of public sources, interviews are particularly valuable in shedding light on these processes. The paper suggests that a “transnational” approach provides a more nuanced understanding of enforcement mechanisms’ complex mandates and dynamics, enabling a clearer anticipation of their future trajectory and the strategic design of their reform.

## B. The DRS Falls Short of the Legal and Policy Standards for Guaranteeing
				Meaningful Access to Remedies for Affected People

Overall, the paper argues that the DRS, in its current design, has the potential to enhance access to remedies for affected people. By prioritizing party-led dispute resolution, the mechanism offers affected people the assistance of an independent neutral third party, the opportunity to participate actively in determining remedial measures, and access to effective remedies that may exceed those required by Bank policies. The DRS’ heavy reliance on mutual consent from both parties can also help maintain a significant role for the Inspection Panel, as either party retains the option to request compliance review.

However, the DRS’ reliance on consent also poses a risk: it currently allows affected people to consent to remedies that may fall short of the standards outlined in Bank policies. This risk is particularly acute when affected people, who are often vulnerable populations with limited resources and expertise relating to Bank projects, continue to suffer from the material effects of alleged policy violations while the dispute resolution process is ongoing. Moreover, since Bank Management participates in the dispute resolution process only as a technical observer and solely with both parties’ consent, it is unable to effectively contribute to ensuring meaningful remedies for affected people.

These limitations raise concerns about whether the DRS will actually enhance access to remedies for affected people or whether it might instead undermine the Inspection Panel’s mandate to ensure such access. Given these concerns, the Bank should consider revising the dispute resolution process to more directly address the power imbalance between affected people and borrower States. For instance, introducing minimum procedural protections for affected people could help ensure they are better equipped to make informed decisions regarding remedies.

The rest of the paper is structured in three sections. Section II sets out the legal and policy standards that underpin the DRS’ access to remedies. Legal standards derive primarily from the World Bank’s founding international treaty, applicable customary international law, and the Bank’s potential immunities before national courts. Policy standards, in turn, arise primarily from the mandates of the Bank’s three remedial mechanisms. First, the 1993 Inspection Panel provides a compliance review to assess whether the Bank has adhered to its policies, based on three guiding principles: accessibility, effectiveness, and independence. Second, the 2015 Grievance Redress Service facilitates corporate-level dispute resolution with Management. Third, the Bank established the DRS, asserting that its sole objective is to strengthen the Panel’s access to remedies through dispute resolution at the highest level of the organization.

Section III proposes specific improvements to the DRS for each of the three principles. To enhance accessibility, the Bank should strengthen procedural protections and expand participation opportunities for affected people, including guaranteeing a minimum standard of access to project-related materials. To enhance effectiveness, the Bank should mandate the “consistency” of dispute resolution agreements with its policies, require the default publication of agreements unless both parties agree to a summary only, and require mandatory verification of agreement implementation. To enhance independence, the Bank should offer greater flexibility in sequencing compliance review and dispute resolution processes and introduce concrete measures to reduce the influence of the DRS’ institutional interest in dispute resolution outcomes.

Section IV concludes that the Bank’s stated objective of strengthening its accountability framework may be achieved when affected people secure more substantial remedies than those required under Bank policies. However, the DRS’ procedural shortcomings cast doubt on how frequently this will occur. In its current form, the DRS aligns more with the broader shift in international law toward flexible dispute resolution. Finally, the DRS illustrates the relevance of refining global administrative law theory through a transnational approach that accounts for the distinct political, institutional, and economic forces shaping each enforcement mechanism operating across borders.

<footnote n="1">Witness Radio Uganda, “Request for Inspection by the World Bank Inspection Panel in Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure Development Project” (17 June 2021), online (pdf): <inspec tionpanel.org> [perma.cc/6T2R-FJSM].</footnote>

<footnote n="2">World Bank, “The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework” (4 August 2016), online (pdf): <worldbank.org> [perma.cc/BL3Z-3TSK] [Framework].</footnote>

<footnote n="3">World Bank, Bank Management, “Response: Second Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure Development Project (P133590)” (24 August 2021), online (pdf): <inspectionpanel.org> [perma.cc/2DME-MMRT].</footnote>

<footnote n="4">The Panel has jurisdiction to evaluate projects funded by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA) within the World Bank Group.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">World Bank, Inspection Panel, *Report and Recommendation on a request for Inspection: Second Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure Development Project (P133590)* (4 October 2021), online (pdf): <inspectionpanel.org> [perma.cc/4B8Q-CEZ8].</footnote>

<footnote n="6">World Bank, *Parties in Uganda Infrastructure Case Agree to Pursue Dispute Resolution* (7 December 2021), online (brief): <worldbank.org> [perma.cc/8K69-BSCG].</footnote>

<footnote n="7">World Bank, Inspection Panel, *Resolution No. IBRD 2020-0004 and Resolution No. IDA 2020-0003* (September 8 2020), online (pdf): <inspectionpanel.org> [perma.cc/4SJT-MBT2] [*2020 Inspection Panel Resolution*].</footnote>

<footnote n="8">World Bank, *Resolution No. IBRD 2020-0005 Resolution No. IDA 2020-0004* (8 September 2020), online (pdf): *<*inspectionpanel.org> [perma.cc/4SJT-MBT2] [*Accountability Mechanism Resolution*]. See also World Bank, *Accountability Mechanism Operating Procedures* (5 December 2022), reissued with procedural clarification (6 March 2023), online (pdf): <worldbank.org> [perma.cc/4758-238E] [*2022 Accountability Mechanism Operating Procedures*].</footnote>

<footnote n="9">Accountability Mechanism Secretary, *Notice of Agreement to Pursue Dispute Resolution: Second Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure Development Project (KIIDP-2) (P133590)* (2 December 2021), online (pdf): <inspectionpanel.org> [perma.cc/AZW7-UT4A].</footnote>

<footnote n="10">Robi Chacha Mosenda & Caitlin Daniel, “World Bank Board Approves Investigation into Community Concerns of Forced Eviction by the Lubigi Drainage Channel” (27 October 2021), online (blog): <accountabilitycounsel.org> [perma.cc/8JUP-HMU4].</footnote>

<footnote n="11">Among this vast literature, see, notably, Daniel D Bradlow, “International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel” (1993) 34:3 Virginia Journal of International Law 553; Ibrahim F I Shihata, *The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice* (2d ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Gudmundur Alfredsson & Rolf Ring, eds, *The Inspection Panel of the World Bank: A Different Complaints Procedure* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001); Dana Clark, Jonathan Fox & Kay Treakle, eds, *Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); David Hunter, “Using the World Bank Inspection Panel to Defend the Interests of Project-Affected People Perspectives” (2003) 4:1 Chicago J of Int L 201. See, more recently, World Bank, Inspection Panel, *The Inspection Panel at 25 Years* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018).</footnote>

<footnote n="12">See e.g. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Remedy in Development Finance: Guidance and Practices*, OHCHR, 2022, HR/PUB/22/1, online (pdf): <ohchr.org> [perma.cc/JF5U-DLMP]. See also Mariette van Huijstee et al, “Glass Half Full? The State of Accountability in Development Finance” (2016), online (pdf): <ciel.org> [perma.cc/R2S7-327M]; Owen McIntyre & Suresh Nanwani, eds, *The Practice of Independent Accountability Mechanisms: Towards Good Governance in Development Finance* (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2019).</footnote>

<footnote n="13">Ibrahim FI Shihata, *The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice*, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 264; Ruth Mackenzie et al, “The Inspection Panel of the World Bank” in Ruth Mackenzie et al, eds, *The Manual on International Courts and Tribunals*, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at para 17.29.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law” (2005) 68:3 Law & Contemporary Problems 15. See also Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law” (2009) 20:1 European Journal of International Law 23.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">*Ibid* at 21.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">*Ibid* at 34–35.</footnote>
# IV. Conclusion: The DRS Fits Within Shifting Trends and Responsibilities in
				Transnational Administrative Law

Section IV concludes by evaluating whether the DRS meaningfully enhances access to remedies and situates its role within broader trends in international dispute resolution and administrative law. Subsection A examines the uncertainty surrounding the DRS’ effectiveness in improving access to remedies. Subsection B highlights how many multilateral development banks increasingly transfer responsibility onto borrower States and private corporations within the broader trend toward flexible dispute resolution in international law. Subsection C argues that global administrative law theory should adopt a transnational approach to reflect the specific political, institutional, and economic forces shaping international accountability mechanisms.

## A. Substantial Doubt Remains Over Whether the DRS Enhances Access to
				Remedies

Although the Bank introduced dispute resolution to enhance access to remedies for project-affected people, after three years of operation, uncertainty remains as to whether the DRS has achieved this goal or inadvertently undermined the Inspection Panel’s mandate. The absence of publicly available information on the content of dispute resolution agreements, including those from the first two complaints settled by the disputing parties, exacerbates this uncertainty. Transparency is crucial for ensuring long-term accountability and preserving the Bank’s credibility.

Nevertheless, an analysis of the DRS mandate, procedures, and early operation reveals both benefits and drawbacks. The DRS’ structure, shaped by political compromise among decision-making stakeholders, exemplifies the adage: “A camel is a horse designed by committee.” Possible benefits include expedited complaint resolution, improved benefit-sharing arrangements related to projects, and more innovative measures to address post-resettlement impacts, making it an attractive option for affected people in certain circumstances. The benefits may be particularly attractive, for instance, to community leaders and those only moderately affected by projects, as opposed to individuals who have suffered severe bodily harm. These potential benefits are especially significant given that, for affected people, the only viable alternative—amid concerns about the DRS’ accessibility, effectiveness, and independence—is to revoke consent to dispute resolution and pursue compliance review.

However, affected people may feel pressured to make concessions for the sake of a faster resolution rather than endure the prolonged consequences of flawed projects throughout the Panel process, especially if their representatives’ ability to fully advise them on these implications is limited. Addressing power imbalances between affected people and borrower States requires the implementation of concrete and robust procedural protections within DRS procedures, rather than mere assurances that the DRS staff or a third-party neutral will recognize these imbalances.

Despite its promise, the DRS must implement procedural reforms in the three key areas identified above to fulfil its potential. At present, it appears weaker in dispute resolution than the process provided by the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman. A recent settlement it facilitated with AngloGold Ashanti in Guinea resulted in financial compensation for affected people, a trust fund for community-led development, and commitments to human rights safeguards.<fnref n="192" /> This outcome highlights the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman’s effectiveness in securing tangible remedies and reinforces the imperative for the DRS to enhance its procedural protections to achieve comparable outcomes.

## B. Concerns Exist Over Multilateral Development Banks Shouldering Their
				Responsibility Amid a Shift to Flexibility in International Dispute
				Resolution

At a systemic level, the decision-making, rule-making, and enforcement mechanisms of multilateral development banks have become increasingly complex, blending national and international law. The availability of multiple forums for affected people to raise concerns about World Bank-funded projects is valuable. These include internal Bank mechanisms—such as project-level grievance mechanisms, the Grievance Redress Service, the Inspection Panel, and the DRS—and external mechanisms through borrower States’ national administrative and judicial processes.

However, a significant gap in both scholarly and applied research concerns the ability of affected people to effectively obtain remedies through borrower States’ national legal systems for harm caused by these States in connection with Bank-funded projects. A comprehensive comparative analysis is needed to evaluate the availability and effectiveness of these avenues for remedies. At present, if borrower States believe that international organizations should not intervene between them and their citizens in addressing project-related harm,<fnref n="193" /> they must provide clear evidence of how they remediate such harm independently.<fnref n="194" />

Moreover, the financial oversight exercised by multilateral development banks and the implementation responsibilities borne by borrower States create a complex challenge in determining the appropriate allocation of substantive responsibility among them, alongside their procedural obligations to ensure that affected people have access to remedies. Part of this task is currently undertaken by the International Law Commission in its ongoing work on the “Settlement of disputes to which international organizations are parties”.<fnref n="195" />

Unlike commercial banks—which primarily extend credit without direct involvement in project execution and typically face limited lender liability under national law—multilateral development banks actively engage in project design, supervision, and oversight.<fnref n="196" /> For instance, they may suspend or withdraw financial support when projects fail to comply with their policies and procedures, even though the professional advancement structures within banks may disincentivize the cessation of projects.

At the World Bank, the Wapenhans Report identified a decline in portfolio quality in the 1990s, prompting institutional reforms aimed at strengthening risk management and accountability.<fnref n="197" /> In the decades since, scholars and practitioners have increasingly argued that multilateral development banks bear a “duty of vigilance”—an obligation to exercise due diligence to prevent their financing from contributing to harmful outcomes.<fnref n="198" />

However, multilateral development banks’ institutional commitment to development objectives may lead them to prioritize loan approvals—justified as serving the “common good”—over stringent risk management and project supervision, particularly for the limited subset of adversely affected people. This tension is further heightened by contemporary pressures to accelerate fund disbursement, particularly in response to the climate crisis and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. An even more sustainable approach would be to embed stronger safeguards directly within the project development model rather than rely on remedial mechanisms after harm has occurred.

The *Jam v IFC* case underscores both the potential and the limitations of national courts in enforcing accountability within multilateral development banks. On the positive side, following *Jam*, the International Finance Corporation restructured the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman’s reporting line, transferring it from management to the Board.<fnref n="199" /> However, the International Finance Corporation has also modified the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman procedures to state that it will only refrain from “knowingly” supporting dispute resolution agreements that contravene its policies, thereby narrowing its commitment to accountability.<fnref n="200" />

The question of multilateral development banks’ responsibility is unfolding amid shifting trends. In the European Union, corporate responsibility is increasingly enforced through robust mechanisms. Regulations such as the *French Duty of Vigilance Law*, the *European Union Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive*(*CSDDD*), and the *European Union Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive* (*CSRD*) impose binding due diligence obligations, backed by sanctions and liability.<fnref n="201" /> The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has also integrated similar principles into its *2019* *Environmental and Social Policy*, reinforcing human rights standards for responsible business conduct in development finance.<fnref n="202" /> Although sometimes portrayed as global,<fnref n="203" /> these developments remain largely European, with few comparable counterparts elsewhere, including within multilateral development banks.

Conversely, States increasingly favour flexible international dispute resolution, shifting away from binding adjudication towards consensus-driven approaches and alternative dispute resolution methods. This trend is evident in their growing reliance on non-compliance mechanisms, which prioritize facilitative implementation over compulsory enforcement.<fnref n="204" /> However, their effectiveness ultimately hinges on the willingness of powerful States or State-like actors to engage and comply. Moreover, as Malgosia Fitzmaurice aptly argues, the legitimacy of this new generation of non-compliance mechanisms in international law depends on robust procedural protections that ensure transparency, inclusive participation, and adherence to due process.<fnref n="205" />

A discernible shift toward “flexibility” and “agility” is emerging, as some multilateral development banks scale back direct accountability and transfer responsibility to borrower States and private corporations. While the World Bank claims that the DRS enhances its accountability, its dispute resolution process aligns more closely with the broader trend of flexible rule-making and dispute settlement. The Bank largely defers complaint resolution to borrower States, with its Management acting only as a technical observer. This shift is further reflected in the adoption of “borrower frameworks”<fnref n="206" /> and similar approaches under consideration by other multilateral development banks.<fnref n="207" /> It is also evident in the allowance for performance standards to be met at any point during project implementation. The shift is driven by a belief in putting greater trust in corporate social responsibility, particularly in the United States, and is likely reinforced by competition from alternative financing sources, such as Chinese-backed initiatives, which impose less stringent environmental and social safeguards.<fnref n="208" />

## C. The *Global* Administrative Law Theory
				Should Become *Transnational*

In the 1990s and early 2000s, multilateral development banks increasingly integrated robust accountability practices into their operations and assumed greater responsibility themselves for project-related harm. This trend, also observed in other international institutions and organizations, contributed to the emergence of global administrative law scholarship in the 2000s, which identified a developing “field” of administrative bodies that adhered to—and should adhere to—similar administrative law principles.<fnref n="209" />

Since then, global administrative law theory has generated substantial scholarship, frequently citing its foundational work,<fnref n="210" /> though its momentum appears to have faded in recent years. As noted in the preceding subsection, the global trend toward stringent accountability practices in multilateral development banks has partially reversed. In this context, global administrative law theory arguably overstated the “de facto independence and discretion”<fnref n="211" /> of global bodies, overlooking their deep entanglement with State power—whether through inter-State relations governed by international law or through national legislative and enforcement mechanisms.<fnref n="212" />

While global administrative law scholarship identified transparency as a defining feature of global governance, paradoxically, the opacity surrounding the creation processes of “global” bodies has kept scholars from fully appreciating the implications of such processes. However, as shown in this paper, the enforcement mechanisms of many international institutions, including the World Bank’s remedial mechanisms—the Inspection Panel, Grievance Redress Service, and Dispute Resolution Service—have emerged from intense political negotiations shaped by competing State interests, intra-institutional tensions, and broader geopolitical power dynamics. Global administrative law scholarship has largely overlooked their creation processes, leaving it relatively ill-equipped to anticipate the evolution of global bodies.

Against this backdrop, *global* administrative law theory should evolve into a *transnational*administrative law theory. As Philip Jessup first articulated in *Transnational Law* (1956), legal processes increasingly transcend the national-international divide, encompassing a continuum of interactions between State and non-State actors.<fnref n="213" /> Harold Koh’s transnational legal process theory (1996) further explained how contemporary cross-border events emerge through iterative interactions among global, regional, and national institutions.<fnref n="214" /> A transnational administrative law theory would more directly recognize the contingent nature of cross-border governance, which is continuously reshaped by geopolitical pressures, including shifting power balances between developed and emerging economies. It would also offer a more precise analysis of why specific accountability mechanisms emerge, examining the specific political, institutional, and financial constraints that define their structure and effectiveness.<fnref n="215" /> This transnational theory would enable a clearer anticipation of these mechanisms’ future trajectory and the strategic design of their reform.

A challenge in development finance remains ensuring that affected people do not bear the burden of flawed multilateral development bank practices and unmet accountability commitments. The true clients of development finance should not be the borrowing States or their finance ministers but the individuals within these States. Although multilateral development banks, borrower States, and private entities share responsibility for mitigating and remedying harm, the shift toward flexible dispute resolution risks obscuring clear lines of accountability. The DRS exemplifies this trend, offering an alternative to compliance review but lacking sufficient procedural protections to counterbalance power asymmetries between the parties. Strengthening this mechanism demands not only strategic advocacy before the World Bank’s Executive Directors but also the adaptation of transnational administrative law principles to address the nuanced challenges that arise in resolving disputes related to Bank-funded projects. This paper advanced these principles to ensure that flexibility in dispute resolution does not come at the expense of justice, and that communities like Kawaala have access to remedies when, as history sadly suggests is bound to happen again, armed guards knock on their doors one day and order them to leave their homes behind.

<footnote n="192">Inclusive Development International, “AngloGold Ashanti Agrees to Financial Settlement with ‘Area One’ Community Displaced by Its Guinea Mine” (9 October 2024), online (blog): <inclusive development.net> [perma.cc/WE7Z-GWVH].</footnote>

<footnote n="193">This point was reiterated across confidential interviews.</footnote>

<footnote n="194">Relatedly, as Professor Bradlow explain, international law has seen little evolution in governing international financial transactions, which remain largely governed by national laws. See Bradlow, *International Financial Institutions*, *supra* note 20 at 174.</footnote>

<footnote n="195">August Reinisch, Special Rapporteur, *Second Report on the Settlement of Disputes to Which International Organizations are Parties*, UNGA, 75th Sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/766 (1 March 2024) at 85.</footnote>

<footnote n="196">Athialy, *supra* note 27 at 7 (writing that “[l]egally speaking the Bank is not liable to pay anything to the fisher-people and farmers who are badly impacted. But, morally it is. Without its lending the project might not have come up.”).</footnote>

<footnote n="197">World Bank, *Effective Implementation: Key to Development Impact* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992).</footnote>

<footnote n="198">See Mac Darrow, *Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, The International Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law* (Portland: Bloomsbury, 2003) at 295–300.</footnote>

<footnote n="199">Athialy, *supra* note 27 at 6.</footnote>

<footnote n="200">See *supra* footnote 154.</footnote>

<footnote n="201">*Loi n*<sup>o</sup>*2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre*, JO, 28 March 2017, texte n<sup>o</sup> 1; EU, *Directive 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859*, [2024] OJ L 1760/1; EU, *Directive 2022/2464 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU) N*<sup>o</sup>*537/2014, Directive 2004/109/EC, Directive 2006/43/EC and Directive 2013/34/EU, as regards corporate sustainability reporting*, [2022] OJ L 322.</footnote>

<footnote n="202">The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Environmental and Social Policy* *2019* (25 April 2019), online (pdf): <ebrd.com> [perma.cc/89NC-2LA8].</footnote>

<footnote n="203">See e.g. Owen McIntyre, “The Critical Contribution of Independent Accountability Mechanisms (IAMs) to the Global Governance Paradigm” *Perspectives*(Washington: American University Washington College of Law, 2023), online (pdf): <digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu> [perma.cc/QL6N-MXXM].</footnote>

<footnote n="204">See generally Christina Voigt & Caroline Foster, eds, *International Courts versus Non-Compliance Mechanisms: Comparative Advantages in Strengthening Treaty Implementation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024).</footnote>

<footnote n="205">Malgosia Fitzmaurice, “The New Generation of Environmental Non-Compliance Procedures and the Question of Legitimacy” in Voigt & Foster, *supra* note 204 at 70.</footnote>

<footnote n="206">See *supra* notes 117–118.</footnote>

<footnote n="207">Asian Development Bank, *Environmental and Social Framework* (2023), Working Paper, online (pdf): <adb.org> [perma.cc/ZHN9-NK4P].</footnote>

<footnote n="208">See Anna Gelpern et al, “How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments” (2021) Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper N<sup>o</sup> 21–7. On the new role of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries in global economic governance, see Bradlow, *International Financial Institutions*, *supra* note 20 at 176–77.</footnote>

<footnote n="209">See *supra* notes 14–17.</footnote>

<footnote n="210">Lorenzo Casini, “Global Administrative Law Scholarship” in Sabino Cassese, ed, *Research Handbook on Global Administrative Law* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2016) at 548.</footnote>

<footnote n="211">Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, *supra* note 14 at 26.</footnote>

<footnote n="212">*Ibid* at 34.</footnote>

<footnote n="213">Philip C Jessup, *Transnational Law* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956).</footnote>

<footnote n="214">Harold Hongju Koh, “Transnational Legal Process” (1996) 75:1 Neb L R 181.</footnote>

<footnote n="215">See generally Karl-Heinz Ladeur, “Global Administrative Law: A Transnational Perspective” in Peer Zumbansen, ed, *The Oxford Handbook of Transnational Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021) 157; Stephan W Schill, “Transnational Legal Approaches to Administrative Law: Conceptualizing Public Contracts in Globalization” (2014) 1 Riv Trim Dir Pubblico 1; Eyal Benvenisti, *The Law of Global Governance*, The Hague Academy Collected Courses, vol 368 (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2014).</footnote>