# Work as Imagined vs Work as Done: The Case of an Under Development Risk and Resilience Research Centre During the Antonov An-12 Crash Emergency in Greece

Ioannis M. Dokas, Anastasia K. Paschalidou, Konstantinos Chouvardas, Ilias Petrou, Kyriaki Psistaki, Sofia Christoforou, Valkaniotis Sotiris, Panagiotis Argyrakis, Apostolos Zeleskidis, Stavroula Charalabidou, et al.

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## To cite this version:

Ioannis M. Dokas, Anastasia K. Paschalidou, Konstantinos Chouvardas, Ilias Petrou, Kyriaki Psistaki, et al.. Work as Imagined vs Work as Done: The Case of an Under Development Risk and Resilience Research Centre During the Antonov An-12 Crash Emergency in Greece. 7th International Conference on Information Technology in Disaster Risk Reduction (ITDRR), Oct 2022, Krisitansand, Norway. pp.185-196, 10.1007/978-3-031-34207-3_12. hal-04680533

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Work as Imagined vs Work as Done: The Case of an
Under Development Risk and Resilience Research Centre
During the Antonov An-12 Crash Emergency in Greece

Ioannis M. Dokas<fnref n="1" />[0000-0002-3765-5217], Anastasia K. Paschalidou<fnref n="2" />[0000-0001-5354-7198], Konstantinos Chouvardas<fnref n="3" />, Ilias Petrou<fnref n="2" />[0000-0002-7406-9911], Kyriaki Psistaki<fnref n="2" />, Sofia Christoforou⁴, Valkaniotis Sotiris<fnref n="1" />[0000-0003-0003-2902], Panagiotis Argyrakis<fnref n="1" />[0000-0001-6517-7665], Apostolos Zeleskidis<fnref n="1" />[0000-0003-1330-7215], Stavroula Charalabidou<fnref n="1" />[0009-0009-4960-0166], Aopoulos Vasileiou<fnref n="1" />[0000-0003-3396-1484]

**Abstract.** The Risk and Resilience Assessment Center (RiskAC) of East Macedonia and Thrace Region (REMTH) is a research project aiming at supporting decision-making on the repression and prevention of disasters in the geographical region of REMTH in Greece. The project's objective is to establish a new, properly equipped, and organized research center up to the Technological Readiness Level 5 (TRL5) by August 2023, dedicated to risk and resilience assessment studies of possible hazardous scenarios within REMTH. This paper will present the gaps identified between work as imagined vs. work as done by the RiskAC center, which is currently under development, during a plane crash emergency in REMTH in July 2022. Although RiskAC analyses related to the plane crash emergency validated that the project achieved the goal of creating a center that reached the TRL 5 maturity level, it identified points for further improving its processes. Lastly, the paper highlights the importance of considering safety via creating Concept of Operation Documents, among other things, as early as possible as essential aspects in effective operating such systems.

**Keywords:** RiskAC, Plane Crash Emergency, Antonov A-12, Risk Assessment, Air Pollution, ALOHA, ADMS5

# 1 Introduction

The Risk and Resilience Assessment Center (RiskAC) of the Region of East Macedonian and Thrace (REMTH) in Greece is a 30-month research project aiming at

<footnote n="1">¹Civil Engineering Department, Democritus University of Thrace, (Greece)
idokas, @civil.duth.gr</footnote>

<footnote n="2">²Department of Forestry and Management of the Environment and Natural Resources, Democritus University of Thrace, (Greece).
apascha@fmenr.duth.gr</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³Civil Protection Agency REMTH
chouvi@gmail.com</footnote>

<footnote>General Directorate of Inspectorate, North Greece
s.christoforou@prv.ypeka.gr</footnote>
establishing, by the mid of 2023, a new properly equipped, and organized research cen-
ter up to the Technological Readiness Level 5 (TRL5) to support decision-making on
the repression and prevention of disasters in the geographical region of REMTH in
Greece.

Creating a research infrastructure on natural hazard risk assessments and their effects
is not new. Well-established and successful research teams specializing in specific haz-
ards (i.e., earthquakes, floods, forest fires, meteorological hazards, etc.) exist in Greek
institutions. However, what is missing **is a system** to truly enhance risk and resilience
assessment studies, where the output of a specific hazard assessment scenario created
by one team could affect the analysis or could be considered as input to the assessment
scenario of other hazards created by another team in the same geographical area region.
The RiskAC project has the ambition to fill this gap. Because such a goal was consid-
ered ambitious from the beginning, it was decided to set TRL5 as a goal that could
realistically be achieved within 30 months by the RiskAC team.

The novelty of the RiskAC project is that it adopts a holistic approach to risk and
resilience studies for a specific region. This means that RiskAC adopts the view that,
in many cases, natural and technological hazards within a specific geographical region
have causal relationships over time. For instance, a forest fire during summertime in a
region may be a causal factor for landslides during springtime in that region. Thus,
experts in different types of hazards should be “encouraged” via a new type of system,
in this case, the RiskAC research center, to monitor and study a specific region and
together establish the necessary culture to achieve seamless collaboration and exchange
of information between them, and through that to effectively support decision-makers
in being proactive about the challenges that expected due to the climate crisis.

One task of the research team during the end of 2021 was to begin creating a high-
level description document on the needs, assumptions, and procedures that should be
defined, monitored, and be in place, so that the RiskAC center continues operating and
fulfilling its aims after the end of the project, together with a description of the pro-
cesses and interactions between RiskAC elements (humans and technological elements)
when the center will be in “active mode”. That is, when the Civil Protection Agency of
REMTH, for instance, or some other organization request RiskAC's contribution for
decision support. At the General Assembly of the RiskAC consortium in December
2021, an initial draft of the document was presented, discussed, and accepted as the
basis for more detailed analysis, possibly in the form of a Concept of Operations Doc-
ument. That document represented a rough and imaginary sketch of how RiskAC re-
search center will operate when it is in “active mode” (i.e., work as imagined - WAI)
when it reaches the appropriate maturity level.

Around April 2022 major project supplies, such as sensors, instruments, computers,
consumable reagents, servers, and software began to arrive on site. By the end of June
2022, most supplies were received. In addition, the training sessions of members of the
research group on specific software, such as the Air Pollution Modeling Software
ADMS-5, were completed. Given that major components of the RiskAC research center were on site, the assembly and configuration of the research center began at the end of June. During the same period, the team began the process of devising the scenarios based on which the basic elements of the RiskAC center will be tested in a 'simulated' or somewhat realistic environment to validate that the center has reached the TRL 5 maturity level.

That process was interrupted when on the night of the 16th of July, a cargo Antonov An-12 aircraft carrying 11.5 tons of munitions from Serbia to Bangladesh crashed in the region of Kavala in REMTH [1]. Regardless that RiskAC center was “under construction” a request was made to assess the direction and dispersion of the air pollutant byproducts of the crash. That was not a test on a simulated environment, it was a real case for decision support. As a result, the research team engaged for the first time in the “active mode” of the RiskAC research center. This paper will present the gaps identified between the work described in the document presented in the RiskAC General Assembly in December 2021 against the work done (i.e., work as done – WAD) during the Antonov An-12 plane crash emergency.

Although the analyses of RiskAC researchers related to the plane crash emergency validated that the project achieved the goal of creating a center that outreached TRL 5 maturity level, points for further improving its processes have been identified.

## 2 Previous Works

A distinction between the system task description, or WAI, and the cognitive tasks, or WAD was proposed in 1983 by [2]. That played a role in the early discussions about resilience engineering. WAI stipulates how work should be done to achieve the intended results and WAD refers to how such work is actually done under varying circumstances [3]. In the emergency management literature, works like the ones of [4], [5], and [6] examine to what extent procedures and steps described in written documents, such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), were implemented or omitted when a sociotechnical system operates to address real emergencies or operates in a simulated environments or during periodic emergency management drills.

In the same rationale [7] utilized the Event Management SOP TimeLine (EMSTL), as a method to visualize the gaps between the SOP of the event under emergency management conditions and the activities carried out in the field during periodic exercises utilizing data gathering and experiences from real operational situations to raise awareness of the need for cultural change in the organization. The same authors found that only about one-third of the steps of emergency SOPs were carried out as prescribed and made a call for a change in the system.

On the other hand, works such as, [8] and [9] point out that organizational traits like overreliance on rules and written procedures, excessive specialization of tasks, failure
to learn from near misses, and absence of shared perception of urgency hinder organizational personnel from behaving and reacting to emergencies naturally without tram-meling resulting from hindering WAD from being displayed during exercises or real emergencies.

Studies on the gap between WAI and WAD indicate that the variability of a system during its operational phase is typically much greater than the variability implied in the task descriptions in its SOP documents. In short, the actual work is often more complex than the work described in written procedures. Nonetheless, identifying these gaps can help organizations introduce better guidelines and SOPs' and possibly initiate a cultural transformation of the system itself.

## 3 RiskAC: Research Groups and Physical Deliverables

RiskAC is comprised of 10 research groups, as shown in Table 1. Each group has one coordinator/director who holds academic staff position in a university or is a senior researcher in a research institute with track record and expertise in the scientific field that the group is focused at. Young researchers were also members of each group. By the first year of the project most of the 53 positions for young researchers which were required to support the needs of each RiskAC group were filled.

<table><caption>**Table 1.** The ten groups of RiskAC.</caption><thead><tr><th>Logo</th><th>Group Name</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td>Project Coordination and Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Fire Hazard</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Air Pollution and Meteorology</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Hydrological Hazard</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Engineering Infrastructure</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>ICT</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Cultural Capital</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Human Health and Land Microbiology</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Geotechnical - Geological Hazard and GIS</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Seismic Hazard</td></tr></tbody></table>

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RiskAC has a modular structure by design. This means that additional groups specialized in a domain (e.g., radiological hazards group), can be included, depending on the hazard, risk, and resilience analysis needs of the authorities and organizations of REMTH in the future. The 10 groups shown in Table 1 were initially chosen based on the:

a) Frequency of occurrence of a hazard in REMTH in the past, such as floods, forest fires, landslides and rockfalls, and industrial accidents that may disperse toxic fumes.

b) Hazards that may be characterized as being of low in frequency but high in negative consequences, such as climate change, and earthquakes.

c) Things that may be affected by a hazard occurrence in REMTH, such as public and environmental health, cities and critical infrastructures, human activities, and cultural monuments.

d) Teams that provide the necessary technological resources, hardware, and information processing support to the entire RiskAC system.

Two are the main physical deliverables of the project. The first is a data fusion and analysis room, which has the look of a control room. The second, is a mobile data collection unit in the form of a trailer. The trailer unit is designed to be equipped with sensors, solar panels, batteries, hardware, and software. Its purpose is to collect sensor data from specific geographical locations, when needed, like in the cases of technological accidents, and transmit them to the data fusion and analysis room to be analyzed by the research groups. The data fusion and analysis room will be a 100m² approximately room located in the Civil Engineering Department of Democritus University of Thrace, equipped with the necessary ICT networks, double monitor workstations, server to store and process large volume of sensor data, control room displays in the wall to monitor multiple data and information streams, and shared space for coordinated - collaborative work during emergencies.

## 4 Work as Imagined

Three operational modes for the RiskAC research center were identified in the December 2021 document that presented a high-level description of its needs, assumptions, and procedures. These modes are presented in Table 2.

The December 2021 document also described the processes and interactions between RiskAC elements when the center would be in an Active operational Mode. To enter in Active Mode, a request for decision support by a public or private organization should be received by RiskAC (See Fig. 1). In the case, however, where there is a forecast for a hazardous event by let's say the National Meteorological Service, then the forecast could act as trigger for RiskAC to change its operational mode to Active Mode. The request, when is received, or when a forecast is perceived, is communicated to the Lead Coordinator who first validates the request or the forecast and then activates the most
relevant RiskAC groups based on the nature and characteristics of the hazard that occurred or forecasted. The ICT group Coordinator is also informed.

<table><caption>**Table 2.** RiskAC operational modes.</caption><thead><tr><td>No.</td><td>Operational Mode Name</td><td>Description</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>Idle Mode</td><td>No hazard or other event occurs in REMTH, nor is there a forecast for occurrence. During this period the RiskAC personnel should: a) monitor the environment for events or signs indicating the occurrence of a hazard, b) upgrade/maintain the equipment and instruments of the center, c) gain new knowledge and skills. A hazardous event occurred or is expected to occur in REMTH. A request for decision support by private or public organizations is received. In this operational mode, the personnel of RiskAC is active in gathering and analyzing data and information to produce as soon as possible scientifically sound assessments and deliver them to those who request them.</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>Active Mode</td><td>After Active Operational Mode ends, the personnel of RiskAC engages in activities aiming at validating the outcomes of the produced assessments. In addition, reflect on how work was done during Active Mode to identify aspects that can be further improved. Evaluate the overall performance of the RiskAC center.</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>Validation and Performance Evaluation Mode</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.** Description of RiskAC's Active Operational Mode.</figcaption></figure>
The Lead Coordinator meet physically or remotely with the Coordinators of the ac-
tivated RiskAC groups to assess, based on the information and data at hand, if what has
been requested has been studied in the past as possible hazard scenario and its assess-
ment already exists in the servers of RiskAC, or new assessment must be conducted by
RiskAC group/s to respond to the request. The Coordinator of the ICT group partici-
pates in the meeting.

If the requested assessment has been analyzed in the past as a possible scenario and
exists in the server, then it is extracted from the server and reviewed. The Coordinator
of the group responsible for the assessment recommends to the Lead Coordinator
whether the results from the retrieved assessment are sound and valid for the requested
case or not. If the recommendation of the Coordinator is that the outputs of the assess-
ment are valid for the case at hand then the Lead Coordinator grants the “publication”
of the assessment or its submission to the organization that requested the support of
RiskAC. The “publication” of the assessment is executed by the ICT group which de-
pending on the file types of the assessment could be uploaded to the WebGIS server of
RiskAC, if the files are GIS compatible or submitted to a specific server, medium, or
channel.

If what is requested hasn't been analyzed by RiskAC groups in the past, then the
Coordinator/s of the groups involved recommend if a new assessment can be fulfilled
or not for the case at hand during the meeting with the Lead Coordinator and the Tech-
nical Support Coordinator. If a new assessment cannot be fulfilled, then the Lead Co-
ordination contacts the organization who requested the support of RiskAC explaining
why their request cannot be supported. If a new assessment can be done, then the Lead
Coordinator informs the organization who requested the support of RiskAC that the
request can be supported but with a time delay. If the specified time delay is not an
issue, then all actions necessary to produce the assessment are executed by the RiskAC
groups. When the assessment has been completed its results are reviewed and the Co-
ordinator/s of the group/s involved in the assessment recommends to the Lead Coordi-
nator whether the results are sound and valid or not. If the recommendation of the Co-
ordinator/s is that the outputs of the assessment are valid for the case at hand, then the
Lead Coordinator grants the “publication” of the assessment or its submission to the
organization who requested the support of RiskAC.

5 Work as Done: The Case of Antnonov An-12 Crash

5.1 The Crash

On Saturday, 16th July 2022, a cargo Antonov An-12 aircraft transporting 11.5 tons of ammunition and flying from Serbia to Bangladesh crashed due to engine problems killing all eight crew members in the region of Kavala in REMTH very close to Palaiochori and Antifilippoi villages. The aircraft was flying from Serbia to its final destination Bangladesh. The aircraft crashed at around 23:54 EEST.
The fire department and the police deployed to the area immediately. Initially, it was
known that the plane cargo is classified as “dangerous”. After a while it become known
that the plane was carrying ammunition. At first, they removed civilians who were pre-
sent close to the crash site to offer assistance, since many assumed that the plane was a
passenger aircraft. Then sealed the perimeter of the crash site since the toxicity of the
fumes from the fire and smoke was unknown.

Several fires scattered around the point of the crash were burning for about an hour and the area was covered by thick smoke. Two firefighters operating close to the crash site experienced respiratory problems and were transferred to the General Hospital of Kavala. A message from the 112 national mobile phone alert service was sent to the approximately 1500 residents of the area to stay in their homes and wear masks and close their doors. Army Pyrotechnicians and a special biohazard unit were also called to the site to scan the area under the first light. After few hours from the time of the crash the Serbian company that commissioned the transport informed Greek authorities that the Antonov carried training mortar projectiles and illuminating mortar shells.

## 5.2 The Activation of RiskAC Center

The process of tweet monitoring over events occurring in REMTH made key mem-
bers of the RiskAC team aware of the crash from its very first moments. As result, the
Lead Coordinator, among other members of RiskAC, followed the news to gain as good
as possible understanding of the situation at the site and the wider area of the crash. The
next day at around 9 a.m. a member of the Geotechnical - Geological Hazard and GIS
group uploaded satellite images from Sentinel-2 (10m resolution) to the Discord server
of RiskAC, where a representative of the Civil Protection Agency of REMTH has ac-
cess, showing the exact location of the crash and how many meters the plane crawl to
the ground during its crash.

At noon, the Lead Coordinator received a call from the Civil Protection Agency of REMTH. The talk focused on assessing, given its under construction status, if RiskAC can contribute to the situation with useful scientific support. Based on the nature and characteristics of the event, the interactions between the Lead Coordinator with the Co-ordinators of the Groups that can contribute to the situation at hand, and the state of the infrastructure of the center at that point in time, a decision was made to provide scien-tific support in relation to the dispersion of air pollution to the area during the first hours from the time of the crash.

The decision which was made resulted ad changing the operational mode of the Air Pollution and Meteorology Group from Idle to Active Mode and of specific members of the Geotechnical - Geological Hazard and GIS team to Standby Mode so as to be ready to act when needed via the provision of data and resources, such as raster GIS files of Digital Elevation Models (DIM) of the area, satellite images, uploading files to the RiskAC's WebGIS server.
After working with her team for a couple of hours the Coordinator of the Air Pollution and Meteorology Group informed the Lead Coordinator about their decision to proceed with the creation of a potential chemical release model for the first hour from the crash, utilizing Meteorological data which were immediately available for the area by the National Observatory of Athens together with the US EPA software ALOHA [10].

After the review of ALOHA software results, the group was planning to utilize the ADMS5 software [11] to model the dispersion of particles with diameters that are generally 2.5 micrometers and smaller (PM<sub>2.5</sub>) at the ground level for the first 4 hours from the crash. A major factor to utilize ALOHA first was the estimated time needed to create and review the model, which was significantly shorter compared to the alternative of utilizing ADMS5.

On Sunday afternoon the 17th, the results from ALOHA software were ready to be reviewed. At 21:40 EEST a virtual meeting was held between the members of the Air Pollution and Meteorology Group the Lead Coordinator and a representative from the Civil Protection Agency of REMTH for this purpose. After about 30 minutes of discussion on the model, its assumptions, and its results, the output of the assessment (see Fig. 2) was accepted, and the results were submitted to the Civil Protection Agency of REMTH to be used for decision support

<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2.** Indicative representation of the ALOHA analysis results.</figcaption></figure>

The Group then focused its attention on the creation of PM<sub>2.5</sub> dispersion model, utilizing the recently acquired ADMS5 software. In this case, DIM raster file depicting the elevation and topography around the crash site was integrated into the ADMS5. At 18:00 on the 18th of July the results of the ADMS5 analysis were scheduled to be reviewed. A virtual meeting was held at 18:00 with the same participants as with the virtual meeting a day before. The Coordinator of the Group expressed the need to
further refine the model, and everybody agreed with her. On Thursday the 21st another meeting was held where it was decided that the results of the ADMS5 model (see Fig. 3) are acceptable, and the results were sent to the Civil Protection Agency of REMTH for decision support. In addition, it was decided to upload the results of the analysis to the WebGIS server of RiskAC.

In overall the results of the analyses indicated that the depression of the air pollution was covering an area with a hart like shape of 4.6 km² northeast to the point of the crash away from the two villages nearby.

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 3. Indicative representation of the ADMS5 analysis results.</figcaption></figure>

# 6 Conclusions

## 6.1 Identified Gaps

The Antonov An-12 crash was the first time where RiskAC behaved as a center for decision support. Regardless of being in under-construction phase, the interaction of RiskAC members between them and between software and hardware was flawless. In addition, the communication and collaboration between RiskAC and the Civil Protection Agency of REMTH were carried out without any problems.

There were, however lessons learned to further improve the document describing the Active Mode of operations. One aspect that was missing and revealed through the RiskAC reaction to the crash was the need to introduce the notion of Standby Mode into the document. Indeed, certain members of the Geotechnical-Geological Hazard
and GIS Group were standing by their phones to react and provide support in specific time periods during the timeline of the process. But their actions and support at those specific points in time were of importance. For example, the immediate provision of the DIM GIS raster file to the Air Pollution and Meteorology Group was of importance to properly create an acceptable PM2.2 desperation model.

Thus, while one Group can be in Active Mode, members of other groups can be in Standby Mode and other groups in Idle Mode. In addition, the Geotechnical-Geological Hazard and GIS Group, in this case, were acting in a supporting role similar to what was imagined and expected by the ICT group. The ICT group would have been very active in this case if the trailer mobile data collection unit was assembled and ready to be deployed at the scene of the crash. But unfortunately, the trailer was not entirely constructed and wasn't ready to be deployed.

A point of improvement for RiskAC based on the crash case is the time duration required to produce reliable results when utilizing specific modeling tools and approaches. For instance, while the ALOHA model produced acceptable results within a few hours after the accident, the ADMS5 model results took several days to be produced. This delay can be explained, however, due to the fact that the Meteorological Group members finished their training on the ADMS5 software a few weeks before the crash and didn't have the time to gain the ideal level of experience on its use. Thus, the crash highlighted the need to constantly gain experience and training in using RiskAC software models and resources.

Lastly, a significant lesson learned through this case was the need to establish collaboration with organizations that own calibrated sensor data in REMTH, which can be accessed and utilized without major time delays. In the case of the crash, the meteorological data to be used in the models were acquired after a few hours of the crash by the open sensor network data of the National Observatory of Athens. If that data were unavailable or received after several days, then it would not be possible for RiskAC to offer valuable service in this case.

## 6.2 Validation and Impact

RiskAC was officially invited to present the results of its assessments in a meeting with the stakeholders involved in managing the incident on Friday the 22nd of July in the city of Kavala. In that meeting, the RiskAC assessment results were validated in a way, by the decision of authorities to seal an area around the crash site like the area shown in Fig. 3 during the first days of the crash. Furthermore, the RiskAC air pollution dispersion maps are utilized by environmental inspectors to set up the soil and leaf sample plans for detailed chemical analysis.

Overall, the reaction and behavior of the RiskAC project team in the Antonov An-12 crash have shown that the project, within approximately 19 months, developed a system whose basic components were capable of providing decision support in real
emergencies within REMTH. The performance of RiskAC in the Antonov An-12 crash indicates that the research center has reached and overshot the target of the TRL 5 maturity level. Much work needs to be done by the team, however, so the RiskAC center, as a system, to reach a higher level of maturity. The lessons learned and the experience gained from this event contribute to its continuous improvement and development.

Having also a brief description of how the RiskAC system will behave to provide
decision support in case of such events has also helped to produce the outputs it pro-
duced in this case. It was as if everybody within RiskAC knew how to interact and
when to act. That highlights the importance of having in place as early as possible a
Concept of Operations document for such systems.

Acknowledges

We acknowledge support of this work by the project "Risk and Resilience Assessment Center -Prefecture of East Macedonia and Thrace -Greece." (MIS 5047293) which is implemented under the Action "Reinforcement of the Research and Innovation Infrastructure", funded by the Operational Programme "Competitiveness, Entrepreneurship and Innovation" (NSRF 2014-2020) and co-financed by Greece and the European Union (European Regional Development Fund).

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