# The Groupfeel syndrome: a theory of a counterproductive group emotion

Christophe Haag

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Christophe Haag. The Groupfeel syndrome: a theory of a counterproductive group emotion. Frontiers in Social Psychology, In press, 4, 10.3389/frsps.2026.1669672. [https://hal.science/hal-05511800v1](https://hal.science/hal-05511800v1)

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University of Bergamo, Italy

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Christophe Haag
✉ haag@em-lyon.com

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PUBLISHED 03 February 2026

CITATION
Haag C (2026) The Groupfeel syndrome: a
theory of a counterproductive group emotion.
*Front. Soc. Psychol.* 4:1669672.
doi: 10.3389/frsps.2026.1669672

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# The Groupfeel syndrome: a
theory of a counterproductive
group emotion

Christophe Haag*

Emlyon, Lyon, France

Groups often display shared emotional climates that shape collective behavior and decision-making. While emotional contagion and groupthink have been extensively studied, less is known about how high-intensity and normatively regulated group emotions can become counterproductive. This paper introduces the concept of the Groupfeel syndrome—a dysfunctional group-level emotional dynamic characterized by intense shared emotions, pressure to maintain emotional positivity, and the absence of emotionally intelligent regulation. Drawing on two revelatory qualitative cases—a former member of a closed spiritual community and a former financial trader operating in a high-pressure market environment—I identify three antecedent conditions that foster this syndrome and propose eight testable hypotheses. Groupfeel impairs critical thinking, suppresses dissent, and biases collective decision-making by locking groups into rigid affective trajectories. Grounded in psychological and organizational literature and supported by qualitative data from contrasted high-stakes contexts, the model integrates mechanisms of emotional contagion, normative emotion regulation, and social conformity. This conceptual development paper advances research on group emotion by specifying when shared affect shifts from a resource to a liability and outlines implications for organizational behavior, leadership, and future empirical testing.

## KEYWORDS

collective decision-making, conformity, emotional contagion, emotional intelligence, group dynamics, group emotion, social influence, Groupfeel

## 1 Introduction

Scandals involving large corporations such as Vivendi, Enron, Worldcom, or Tyco have brought the dysfunctions of top management teams into the public spotlight. Yet, despite their importance, media and scholarly accounts rarely explore the emotional underpinnings of such dysfunctional group dynamics. Under Jean-Marie Messier's leadership, for example, one could argue that Vivendi's top executives fell victim to an overly optimistic emotional climate. This collective mood may have driven them to pursue a series of risky acquisitions, eventually leading to massive financial losses and forced divestitures. Similarly, testimonies from former financial traders suggest that exuberant collective emotions on trading floors—especially during bubbles or periods of exceptional gains—can fuel excessive risk-taking and collective blindness to warning signals (Barth, 2011; Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2006).

Post-crisis testimonies from Vivendi's former executives suggest that the atmosphere in the boardroom remained buoyant and overly confident until the very end. Despite
mounting external criticism, Messier reportedly kept board
members anchored in a state of enthusiastic overconfidence,
delivering “Don’t worry, be happy”-style speeches that minimized
risk perception and discouraged dissent.

These examples highlight what may be considered the dark
side of group emotion. Understanding how group emotion can
contribute to flawed decision-making is essential for uncovering
the deeper roots of collective failure. This article seeks to fill a
gap in the literature by exploring how shared emotional states can
become counterproductive, leading to impaired group dynamics
and judgment.

Over the past two decades, emotions have become a central
topic in psychology and organizational behavior, fueling what
has been termed the “Affective Revolution” (Barsade et al., 2003;
Ashkanasy and Humphrey, 2011; Clarke et al., 2007; Härtel et al.,
2007; Diener et al., 2020; Haag et al., 2023). Recent reviews further
underscore that positive emotions at work can produce both
adaptive and maladaptive outcomes depending on contextual and
regulatory conditions (Diener et al., 2020). Since the 1990s, scholars
have increasingly investigated emotion at the group level (Barsade
and Gibson, 1998; Bartel and Saavedra, 2000; Barsade and Knight,
2015; Knight and Eisenkraft, 2015; Hinsz and Bui, 2023; Smith and
Mackie, 2016), recognizing that emotional phenomena do not exist
solely within individuals but often emerge collectively in teams.
Contemporary syntheses highlight the need to integrate both the
benefits and potential liabilities of group-level affective processes in
modern organizational contexts (Hinsz and Bui, 2023).

Group emotion refers to situations in which most members
of a group experience a similar emotional state, resulting in a
form of affective convergence (Barsade and Gibson, 1998). While
early research emphasized the benefits of positive group emotion
for cohesion and performance (e.g., Cameron et al., 2003), the
emerging literature increasingly acknowledges that shared affective
states may, under certain conditions, hinder analytical thinking,
reinforce conformity pressures, and impair collective functioning.

The aim of this article is to propose an explanatory theory
(Sutton and Staw, 1995) of the dark side of group emotion.
I focus on the conditions, mechanisms, and processes that
transform group emotion into a liability for collective functioning.
I identify three such conditions that contribute to what I term
the Groupfeel Syndrome—a state in which group emotion impairs
decision quality, inhibits critical thinking, and fosters dysfunctional
group dynamics. This article is best understood as a conceptual
development paper grounded in qualitative material. It builds
a theoretical model of dysfunctional group emotion, illustrated
through two extreme, information-rich cases: a secluded spiritual
community and a high-pressure financial trading team.

In the following section, I trace the roots of the Groupfeel
syndrome by reviewing the literature on emotional climate and its
evolution into the concept of group emotion.

Accordingly, this article should be read as a theory-building
contribution that delineates a conceptual framework and a set
of testable hypotheses. The Groupfeel syndrome is not presented
as an empirically established construct, but as a theoretically
grounded proposal that invites systematic empirical investigation
across methods, samples, and collective contexts.

2 Group emotion

## 2.1 From emotional climate to group emotion

The origins of the concept of group emotion lie in early research
on emotional climate, which initially focused on national and
organizational levels of analysis. Emotional climate was first defined
as a collective phenomenon characterized by the widespread
presence of shared emotional states across a population or an
organization (Conjero et al., 2004; de Rivera, 1992; Paéz et al., 1995,
1997). de Rivera (1992) conceptualized emotional climate as an
objective phenomenon—something that can be collectively sensed
and felt—not simply as a sum of individual feelings or behaviors,
but as an emergent emotional way of relating among people.

Soon after, this concept was extended to the organizational
context. Emotional climate in organizations has been defined as
the predominance of one or more emotions experienced by a
significant portion of organizational members (Ashkanasy and
Nicholson, 2003; Ostroff, 1993; Scherer and Tran, 2001). For
instance, when fear is the dominant affective experience, we may
speak of a “climate of fear.”

However, the notion that emotional climate is uniformly
distributed across an organization has been challenged. Research
has shown that emotional climates are often localized and
heterogeneous, with “climatic pockets” emerging within different
subunits of the same organization (Anderson and West, 1998;
Patterson et al., 1996; Payne, 1990). Emotional climates are
most likely to develop in smaller, more bounded contexts where
individuals interact intensively and regularly, such as departments,
cliques, or teams (Patterson et al., 1996; Anderson and West, 1998).

These insights prompted a shift from macro-level analysis to
a more micro-level focus on teams—defined by George (2002, p.
184) as “a group in which there is a high level of interaction among
members, and members work intensively together to achieve
a common goal.” Teams are especially fertile ground for the
emergence of emotional convergence because their members often
share intense, frequent experiences that foster a co-construction of
affective perceptions (Barsade et al., 2000).

Numerous studies have demonstrated the tendency for
emotions to align within teams. Totterdell et al. (1998, p. 1513)
showed that “people’s moods can be influenced by the collective
mood of their teammates at work in such a way that moods appear
to be linked over time within teams.” George (1996, p. 82) similarly
notes that “individuals may be infected by the affect of those
around them,” while Barsade and Gibson (1998, p. 82) observe that
“emotions are an inherent part of group life.”

Building on this foundation, van Kleef and Côté (2022) review
extensive evidence showing that emotional expressions shape
observers' affect, cognitions, and behaviors in interpersonal and
group settings, underscoring that shared affective patterns are
central drivers of collective behavior.

Several terms have been used in the literature to refer to this
same concept: team affective climate (Pirola-Merlo et al., 2002),
group emotion (Barsade and Gibson, 1998), group mood (Bartel
and Saavedra, 2000), and group affective tone (George, 1996). To
avoid confusion, I use the term group emotion throughout this
article to refer to these related constructs.

More recent syntheses emphasize that group-level affective
processes are dynamic, relational, and shaped by both interpersonal
and contextual forces, requiring theoretical approaches that
integrate both their benefits and their potential liabilities (Hinsz
and Bui, 2023).

## 2.2 Two approaches to how group emotions emerge

The concept of group emotion has gained increasing attention
in applied psychology and organizational studies over the past
decade. Group emotions emerge when most members of a group
experience and share similar emotional states. The emotional
valence—whether positive or negative—indicates the prevailing
tone of the group’s affective experience, while the intensity reflects
how strongly these emotions are felt. Two main theoretical
perspectives offer complementary insights into how these shared
emotions develop: the demographic and the cognitive approaches.

The demographic approach posits that group emotion arises
from the aggregation of individual emotional traits or dispositions
brought into the group by its members (Barsade and Gibson,
1998; George, 1996; Barsade et al., 2000). According to this view,
when group members have similar affective tendencies—such as
mood, emotional intelligence, or dispositional affect—they are
more likely to create a uniform emotional atmosphere. George
(1996) introduced the term group affective tone to describe this
convergence, arguing that a shared emotional baseline among
members facilitates emotional homogeneity. Barsade and Gibson
(1998, p. 88) emphasize that group emotion can be understood as
“the sum of its parts,” shaped by individual affective contributions
and moderated by factors such as the emotional variance within the
group and the influence of emotionally extreme members.

In contrast, the cognitive approach views group emotion as
a product of collective interpretation and reaction to external,
emotionally salient stimuli (Bartel and Saavedra, 2000). Though
Bartel and Saavedra refer to this as group mood, the emphasis
on specific triggers makes the term group emotion more accurate
in this context. Emotions, unlike moods, are typically linked
to discrete and identifiable stimuli. In this view, one or more
group members may respond emotionally to an event, and if
their emotional response is behaviorally visible—through facial
expressions, tone of voice, or posture—it may serve as a new
stimulus for others, initiating a process of emotional contagion.

Recent reviews further show that emotional contagion occurs
across multiple methodologies and contexts, highlighting that it
should be understood not only as automatic mimicry but also as a
broader form of social influence shaping group interpretation and
coordinated behavior (Herrando and Constantinides, 2021).

Emotional contagion is the mechanism by which emotions
expressed by one group member (the sender) are transferred
to others (the receivers) (Barsade, 2002; Hatfield et al., 1993;
Schoenewolf, 1990). This process can occur through two pathways.
First, it can be automatic and unconscious, driven by mimicry and
emotional empathy—individuals involuntarily mirror the sender's

affective cues. Second, contagion can be strategic and conscious,
when individuals deliberately align their emotional responses with
a higher-status individual (e.g., a leader), following the logic of
social comparison (Barsade, 2002).

Recent theoretical developments grounded in the Emotion-
as-Social-Information (EASI) model emphasize that emotional
expressions serve not only as affective signals but also as
social-functional cues that shape group members’ inferences,
expectations, and behavioral responses (van Kleef and Côté,
2022). This perspective positions emotional contagion as both an
automatic and a strategic process embedded within group norms
and status hierarchies.

Although the demographic and cognitive approaches
emphasize different mechanisms, they are not mutually exclusive.
In practice, both can operate simultaneously, reinforcing one
another. Whether emerging from shared dispositions or from
collective interpretation of affective cues, group emotion ultimately
results from the convergence of emotional experiences among
members. Yet, as the next section argues, this convergence is not
always beneficial.

I now turn to the limitations of current research on
group emotion.

## 2.3 Some limitations of research on group emotion

Despite growing interest in group emotion, much of the
existing literature has focused on its positive outcomes, often
neglecting the potential downsides of emotional convergence in
groups (Bartel and Saavedra, 2000; George, 1990, 1996). Two main
assumptions dominate this optimistic view. The first is that the
mere emergence of group emotion—regardless of its valence—is
inherently beneficial. The second is that positive group emotions
specifically lead to favorable group outcomes. Both assumptions
warrant closer scrutiny.

The first assumption posits that the development of any
shared emotional state contributes to positive group dynamics.
For example, Bartel and Saavedra (2000) found that the presence
of group emotion was positively related to team characteristics
such as task and social interdependence, membership stability,
and shared norms regarding emotional expression. However, even
researchers like Barsade and Gibson (1998), who predominantly
emphasize the advantages of group emotion, acknowledge its
potential downsides. They note that emotional convergence may
also foster unrealistic optimism, excessive euphoria, groupthink,
lethargy, or even counterproductive caution. These observations
echo earlier work on group dynamics showing that traits often
considered desirable—like cohesiveness—can paradoxically lead
to flawed decision-making processes (Janis and Mann, 1977;
Janis, 1982). Recent work has further highlighted that positive
group affect may have nonlinear or context-dependent effects,
strengthening cohesion or performance in some circumstances
while impairing analytical rigor or dissent in others (Diener et al.,
2020).

The second assumption centers on emotional valence,
suggesting that positive (pleasant) group emotions lead to positive
outcomes. Because it is methodologically difficult to capture
the full range of discrete emotions or to assess the intensity of
emotional convergence, many studies rely on broad classifications
like valence (George, 1996; Walter and Bruch, 2008). Consistent
with the positive psychology movement, this line of research has
emphasized that positive (pleasant) group emotions enhance group
performance, increase coordination, and improve interpersonal
dynamics (George, 1990; Hackman, 1991; Williams and Sternberg,
1988). For instance, George (1990) showed that positive group
affect in sales teams was associated with lower absenteeism.

However, evidence for the uniformly beneficial impact of
positive group emotion remains inconclusive. Sy et al. (2005) found
that while a leader's positive mood can foster positive emotional
contagion and coordination among team members, it may also lead
to reduced task effort. Such mixed results highlight the need to
move beyond the simplistic dichotomy of positive vs. negative affect
and instead consider contextual factors, emotional intensity, and
the specific mechanisms through which group emotions operate.

Recent research demonstrates that emotional-display norms
can strongly shape how teams regulate affect, sometimes
suppressing the expression of negative emotions that might be
functionally necessary for accuracy or vigilance (Hong and Kim,
2023).

Moreover, research at the individual level has already
demonstrated the adaptive potential of negative (unpleasant)
emotions. For example, George and Zhou (2002) showed that
negative emotions can enhance creativity and persistence. This
suggests that even aversive emotions may play a constructive role in
group settings, depending on how they are managed and channeled.
Several scholars have called for a broader investigation of emotional
effects beyond valence alone (Forgas, 1995; Lerner and Keltner,
2000). Their arguments apply equally well to group-level research.

Moreover, research grounded in social identity theory
emphasizes that group emotions are not merely aggregates of
individual states but are tied to members' identification with the
group and its norms (Haslam et al., 2011; Smith and Mackie, 2016).
When people strongly define themselves in terms of their group
membership, they are more likely to adopt the group's prescribed
emotional stance, to defend it against dissonant information,
and to sanction deviants. This identity-based alignment can
amplify both the constructive and destructive effects of group
emotions, especially under high cohesion and normative pressure.
This is consistent with identity-based models of group emotion
showing that emotional alignment often reflects collective appraisal
processes tied to shared identity rather than individual affective
states (Smith and Mackie, 2016).

Recent work argues that group emotionality should be
understood as a product not only of interpersonal contagion
but also of structural and contextual factors—including social
infrastructure, shared cognition about emotions, and collective
interaction patterns—which jointly shape both the intensity and
duration of group emotions (Goldenberg, 2024).

Taken together, these observations reveal a significant
theoretical gap: while existing research has richly documented how
shared emotions arise and how they influence group processes,
far less attention has been devoted to the conditions under which
emotional convergence becomes restrictive, normatively enforced,
or detrimental.

While emotional contagion describes a process through
which emotions spread between individuals, Groupfeel refers
to a broader group-level configuration in which emotional
convergence becomes normatively enforced, resistant to correction,
and consequential for collective judgment. Conceptualizing these
dynamics solely through the lens of emotional contagion would
obscure the role of positivity norms, social sanctions, and the
absence of emotional regulation mechanisms that transform shared
affect from a transient state into a persistent and dysfunctional
group dynamic.

To address this gap, the next section introduces the Groupfeel
Syndrome, a conceptual framework that specifies the antecedent
conditions under which shared affect may shift from a resource to
a liability.

3 Methodological approach: a
two-case comparative strategy

As good theory springs from engagement with real-life
phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Hambrick
and Mason, 1984; Mintzberg, 1979), this exploratory study draws
on the lived experience of two individuals who were exposed to
intense and often counterproductive group emotions. The first,
Nicolas (a pseudonym), is a former Zen Buddhist monk who lived
for several years in a secluded spiritual community; the second,
David (a pseudonym), is a former financial trader who spent several
years working on a high-stakes trading floor. This qualitative
material is used throughout the presentation of the Groupfeel
syndrome to illustrate, ground, and enrich theoretical propositions
(Taylor and Bogdan, 1984).

Although based on two revelatory cases, this approach is
consistent with theory-building research that uses extreme or
information-rich settings to surface novel mechanisms with
broader organizational relevance (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Eisenhardt,
1989; Baxter and Jack, 2008). The use of case study methodology
is especially appropriate when the research objective is to
explore a complex, poorly understood phenomenon in a real-life
context (Yin, 2003). Case studies offer an in-depth, contextualized
understanding of psychological and social mechanisms, allowing
the researcher to generate insights that are theoretically rich and
practically relevant. In particular, a small number of carefully
chosen cases can serve as powerful heuristics when the settings
are unusually revelatory, extreme, or information-rich (Flyvbjerg,
2006).

Studying extreme settings to understand behavioral
mechanisms that may be transferable to more conventional
organizational contexts is a long-standing tradition in social
sciences and organizational behavior (Janis, 1972; Coget et al.,
2011; Lane et al., 2012; Melkonian and Picq, 2010; Sala and Haag,
2016). Religious cults, extremist groups, and other high-intensity
collective settings are especially useful for observing the emergence
of shared emotional norms, emotional contagion, and identity-
based conformity under pressure. Similarly, financial trading
rooms and other high-pressure economic arenas have been used to
examine extreme risk-taking, emotional contagion in markets, and
collective illusions of control (Barth, 2011; Zeelenberg and Pieters,
2006).
Accordingly, the present study investigates the psychological and emotional dynamics within two high-intensity environments—a small, high-control spiritual community and a high-pressure financial trading team—through the lens of former insiders.

## 3.1 Data collection

The qualitative material analyzed in this study was collected through in-depth narrative interviews and asynchronous video/audio responses. Nicolas and David were recruited through distinct but complementary pathways, reflecting an opportunistic and theoretically driven sampling strategy aimed at accessing revelatory insider perspectives rather than representative group samples.

Nicolas was initially interviewed in the context of a separate book project addressing a different theme unrelated to the present research. In the course of responding to these initial questions, he spontaneously disclosed having spent several years embedded in a high-control spiritual community that he retrospectively described as sectarian. This unexpected disclosure prompted a second, dedicated data-collection phase explicitly focused on collective emotional dynamics and group functioning. Nicolas agreed to participate in this second phase with full awareness of the research objective.

David, by contrast, is a former alumnus of the academic institution where I teach and had previously shared professional testimony several years earlier regarding his experience in financial trading environments. Given his extensive experience in high-pressure, high-stakes collective settings, he was recontacted and invited to contribute to the present study. His recruitment was motivated by the theoretical relevance of trading floors as emotionally intense professional contexts rather than by any prior involvement in the present research.

To promote reflective, experience-based responses while minimizing social desirability bias and interactional pressure, both participants responded to open-ended prompts asynchronously. Nicolas provided eight self-recorded video segments totaling approximately 100 min, while David submitted a series of audio messages.

The use of asynchronous video and audio responses is consistent with qualitative research practices that emphasize participant-centered, flexible data-collection methods, particularly when investigating emotionally sensitive or socially complex phenomena. Similar approaches have been used in video-elicitation and video-commentary interviews to foster reflective engagement, narrative depth, and emotional authenticity while reducing impression management and interpersonal pressure (Henry and Fetters, 2012).

Importantly, neither participant was presented with the concept of Groupfeel Syndrome prior to the interviews, nor were they informed of the hypotheses developed in the manuscript. The prompts were exploratory and non-directive, designed to elicit experiential descriptions rather than to confirm theoretical expectations.

David was asked questions such as whether specific events had a strong emotional impact on the trading desk; whether the emotional reactions of a head of desk had influenced collective

behavior or decision-making; whether certain traders could shift the group's emotional atmosphere; whether expressing doubt felt difficult or risky; whether experiences of ostracism occurred; and whether some individuals were capable of calming the group during emotionally intense situations.

Nicolas was first asked contextual questions regarding his age at entry, duration of involvement, group size, hierarchical organization, and the symbolic role of the leader. He was then invited to describe the emotional intensity of the group and any elements relevant to its affective climate. A second set of questions explicitly addressed collective emotional processes, including whether intense shared emotions impaired sensitivity to contradictory information, whether specific events triggered strong collective emotions, the influence of the leader's emotional expressions, the role of emotionally extreme members, pressure to display positivity, fear of rejection, and the presence or absence of emotionally intelligent individuals capable of regulating collective affect.

This qualitative approach is consistent with theory-building research that relies on revelatory insider accounts to surface latent psychological and emotional mechanisms in extreme or high-intensity contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2006). The aim was not to reconstruct group behavior exhaustively or to claim representativeness, but to understand how collective emotional dynamics were subjectively experienced, interpreted, and retrospectively made sense of by former group members.

All procedures adhered to ethical research standards, including informed consent, pseudonymization, and secure handling of audio and video files. Particular attention was paid to issues of retrospective narration, emotional vulnerability, and participant autonomy, in line with recent ethical guidelines for qualitative research involving human participants (Sindhuri and Dongre, 2023).

While the phenomenon under study is collective by nature, the analytic focus of the present study is deliberately placed on individual sensemaking of group-level emotional dynamics. This approach follows a long tradition in social psychology and organizational research in which insider narratives are used to theorize collective processes, particularly in contexts where direct observation or multi-actor access is not feasible (e.g., Janis, 1972; Weick, 1995; Flyvbjerg, 2006). Rather than treating individual accounts as exhaustive representations of group behavior, they are used here as analytical lenses through which collective emotional mechanisms become intelligible. In this sense, the unit of observation is individual experience, but the unit of theorization remains the group-level emotional dynamic.

This methodological choice implies clear limitations, notably the reliance on retrospective, single-informant accounts. These limitations are acknowledged and discussed in the Discussion section, as the objective of the study is theoretical elaboration rather than empirical generalization.

## 3.2 Case description: the story of Nicolas

To explore the Groupfeel syndrome, we relied on the rich and introspective testimony of Nicolas, a former Zen Buddhist monk who lived in a secluded spiritual community in southern France
for over 8 years. Born in 1976, Nicolas joined the temple in 2009 at the age of 33 and left the group in 2017. Throughout his time in the temple, he held the position of operational coordinator, in charge of infrastructure, administrative and legal tasks, and daily management of monastic life.

The group operated as a hierarchical micro-society under the authority of a charismatic leader, referred to as the master, and attracted international followers. During peak moments, the community included up to 100 participants, although a core group of a dozen resident monks ensured daily functioning.

The emotional climate of the temple was characterized by high intensity and strong affective alignment, especially during rituals, collective retreats, or moments of conflict. Emotional expression followed implicit norms, often dictated by the leader's mood or spiritual framing. The close quarters, strict roles, and frequent emotional rituals made this context particularly suitable for studying the emergence and escalation of shared emotional states at the group level.

Given the sensitive nature of Nicolas's experience, limited identifying details are provided. The research respects his anonymity and emotional well-being, in accordance with ethical guidelines.

## 3.3 Case description: the story of David (former financial trader)

The second case centers on David (a pseudonym), a former market professional with extensive experience in credit and derivatives trading as well as portfolio management, who spent several years working on trading floors within large international financial institutions. Born in 1972, his career unfolded across multiple major financial centers, including Europe and Asia, and involved progressively senior responsibilities in high-stakes market environments.

The trading floor functioned as a tightly coupled, high-velocity environment where decisions involving millions of euros were made in seconds. Information flowed continuously through multiple screens, chat channels, and verbal exchanges, creating a constant state of arousal. This combination of time pressure, financial exposure, and dense interaction rendered the environment particularly conducive to the emergence of high-intensity collective emotional states. Successes and failures were highly visible, and bonuses were closely tied to short-term performance, heightening both individual and collective emotional stakes.

According to David, the emotional climate of the trading room oscillated between euphoria and anxiety, often synchronizing rapidly across desks during major market movements. These emotional shifts were not confined to isolated individuals but were experienced as shared fluctuations shaping collective tempo and attention. Displays of enthusiasm, confidence, and “coolness under pressure” were implicitly rewarded, while visible fear or hesitation tended to be stigmatized. Over time, an informal norm emerged in which traders were expected to project optimism and risk appetite, especially in front of managers and clients.

His asynchronous audio testimony revealed how these emotional norms were internalized and how affective pressure contributed to risk amplification and conformity behaviors even in the absence of explicit emotional injunctions. Importantly, David's later career trajectory—spanning portfolio management, sustainability-oriented finance, and advisory roles in Asia-Pacific contexts—provides retrospective distance on how such emotional dynamics shape decision-making under pressure.

It should be noted that David sometimes uses the term “emotion” in a broad, practitioner-oriented sense, referring less to discrete affective states than to collective arousal, loss of critical distance, or deviations from analytical benchmarks. This usage is itself informative, as it reflects how emotional dynamics are framed, perceived, and retrospectively interpreted within professional trading contexts.

As with Nicolas, only limited identifying details are provided to protect David's anonymity and professional relationships. The focus of the analysis is on the emotional dynamics of the trading team rather than on specific institutions or individuals.

## 4 Exploration of the Groupfeel syndrome

The central proposition of this article is that group emotion can, under certain conditions, shift from a resource to a liability. Although Groupfeel dynamics can theoretically emerge around emotions of any valence, the present framework places particular emphasis on positively valenced group emotions. Positive emotions are less likely to be questioned, more easily moralized, and more prone to normative enforcement, making them especially susceptible to becoming collectively dysfunctional.

I define this dysfunctional state as the Groupfeel Syndrome: a configuration in which emotional convergence impairs evaluative processes, reinforces conformity pressures, and ultimately leads to flawed collective decisions. The syndrome is hypothesized to emerge when three antecedent conditions align—high emotional intensity, normative pressure toward positivity, and limited emotional intelligence (EI) and emotion regulation capacity. Emotional intensity constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition: it is the normative valorization of positivity that transforms intense shared affect into a self-reinforcing and potentially dysfunctional group dynamic. Taken together, these conditions create a fertile ground for impaired collective functioning.

### 4.1 Condition 1: high emotional intensity

According to Peña-Sarrionandia et al. (2015), emotions can become maladaptive when experienced at an inappropriate intensity. At the individual level, the effectiveness of decision-making critically depends on emotional intensity. At moderate levels, emotions serve an advisory function, providing information about the desirability of potential outcomes (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003; Schwarz and Clore, 1983, 1996). For instance, moderately positive emotions have been shown to enhance cognitive flexibility and intuitive reasoning. Individuals in a
positive mood generate more creative associations between words (Isen et al., 1985), make better intuitive judgments (Bolte et al., 2003), and perform more effectively in complex decision-making tasks, such as choosing a car or making medical decisions (Estrada et al., 1997; Isen and Means, 1983).

However, at higher intensities—whether positive or negative—
emotion consistently impairs decision-making (Forgas, 1995).
Individuals experiencing such intense emotional states often report
feeling out of control or acting against their long-term interests
(Baumeister et al., 1994; Bazerman et al., 1998; Loewenstein,
1996). Intense emotions possess an imperative quality: they
interrupt cognitive processing, restrict attention to the emotional
stimulus, and impair the ability to consider competing or nuanced
information (Frijda, 1986). As a result, individuals may engage in
actions they later regret, even when fully aware of potential negative
consequences. Clinical conditions such as addiction (Loewenstein,
1996) and phobias (Barlow, 1988) offer prototypical examples of
this mechanism.

4.1.1 Illustrative example 1

An episode from Nicolas' experience offers a vivid
illustration of how intense group emotion can override critical
reasoning and lead to flawed collective decisions. During a
celebratory gathering intended to mark a spiritual milestone,
the guru delivered an emotionally charged speech filled
with transcendental metaphors and apocalyptic promises. As
Nicolas recounts:

"I looked around, and everyone was glowing. Eyes wide open, some crying, some chanting. The master was saying things like, 'We're entering the final phase of awakening'... and people believed it. You could feel the electricity in the air. I knew it didn't make much sense logically, but in that moment, you just went with it. It felt too good to question anything."

This collective emotional high culminated in a radical decision:
to suspend the temple's routine activities and redirect all energy
toward preparing for this supposed awakening. The shift was
immediate, uncritical, and emotionally driven. Nicolas reflected:

"We dropped everything. Projects, finances, even legal issues — all set aside for that 'final push'. It was like we were on a cloud. And once the emotional wave passed, we were stuck with messes to clean up. But no one questioned it at the time — the energy was too high."

This episode highlights how a group can become cognitively
"sealed off" by a collective emotional high. The emotional intensity
acted as a perceptual anchor, monopolizing attention and filtering
out any emotionally neutral or dissonant stimuli (e.g., logistical
risks, dissenting voices). This process mirrors well-known cognitive
biases such as anchoring or focalism, where individuals overly rely
on a salient emotional cue and fail to adjust sufficiently in their
judgments (Schkade and Kahneman, 1998; Tversky and Kahneman,
1974). In this case, the anchor was not a number or a figure, but an
emotionally saturated moment that inhibited the group's ability to
deliberate rationally.

4.1.2 Illustrative example 2

David provided a parallel illustration from the trading floor,
describing how collective emotional intensity during periods of
extreme market stress distorted judgment. He referred to the
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, a major global
financial shock triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers—
then one of the largest investment banks in the world—which
precipitated a sudden loss of confidence, extreme market volatility,
and widespread panic across global financial markets. Referring to
this event, he explained:

"During the Lehman collapse, we sometimes pushed credit protection prices to levels that were clearly disconnected from reference values. It was not fully rational, but we were reacting to an emotionally charged market context. Everyone was caught in the same movement."

Importantly, David's account illustrates how emotional
dynamics in professional settings are often recognized
retrospectively through their effects on judgment rather than
through explicit emotional labeling. This does not weaken the
emotional interpretation; instead, it highlights how group emotions
can operate implicitly, shaping collective behavior without being
consciously named as such.

"We knew prices were extreme, but part of it was also about testing how far market panic could go. Once the emotion took over, it became very difficult to step back."

Together, these episodes from a spiritual community and
a trading floor suggest that high-intensity group emotion—
whether rooted in transcendence, fear, or market panic—can
narrow collective attention and promote decisions made with
reduced critical distance. Consistent with this pattern, the following
hypothesis is proposed:

**Hypothesis 1 (H1)**: High-intensity group emotion—whether positive or negative—impairs the quality of group dynamics and decision-making by preventing members from attending to emotionally neutral or contradictory stimuli.

We now discuss the three main sources of high-intensity group
emotions: (1) affective events, (2) the leader's emotions and (3) the
most emotionnally extreme groupmember.

4.1.3 Major affective events

Major affective events—defined as highly emotionally charged
occurrences (Weiss and Cropanzano, 1996)—represent a critical
class of external emotional triggers that can destabilize a group’s
affective equilibrium. These events, marked by their high salience
and emotional intensity (Frijda, 1986), often disrupt routine
social dynamics, prompting amplified emotional reactions and
widespread emotional contagion among group members. While
the affective events theory has primarily addressed individual
outcomes—such as performance fluctuations or changes in job
satisfaction—its implications for group-level phenomena are
increasingly recognized (Pirola-Merlo et al., 2002).

Several mechanisms may underlie the ability of such events to
induce intense group emotions. A sudden influx of emotionally
charged information, the disruption of expected rituals, and a spike
in uncertainty or ambiguity can collectively foster a synchronized
emotional response. When the group lacks the tools or structures
to process such stimuli, the shared affect becomes a dominant
organizing force, shaping group behavior.

4.1.3.1 Illustrative example 1

Nicolas describes one particularly disruptive affective event: the unexpected departure of a central group member—a woman seen as emotionally close to the master and symbolically important to the community. The announcement came without context or preparation, during a communal meal.

"I heard the news while peeling carrots. She had left — just like that. No one had seen it coming. The atmosphere shifted instantly. Everyone around me was silent. It felt like a spiritual earthquake."

The lack of explanation or opportunity for collective processing amplified the emotional intensity, producing a wave of confusion, sadness, and collective instability. As Nicolas recounted, the silence spread like a contagion, and over the following days, the group entered a state of shared withdrawal. Interactions became mechanical, voices hushed. The unresolved nature of the event magnified its emotional impact, fostering a form of silent cohesion built around collective anxiety.

4.1.3.2 Illustrative example 2

Another moment of extreme emotional disruption occurred
during a group ceremony when the master suddenly unleashed a
violent verbal outburst at a disciple in front of everyone.

"He screamed at her. The whole room froze. She stood still, eyes wide open. Everyone felt it. It was as if the walls were shaking. My heart was racing, but I didn't move. No one did. We were all paralyzed."

This emotionally charged act produced instantaneous emotional synchronization across the group. What followed was not an open confrontation or discussion, but a collective shutdown: silence, stiffness, and a lingering emotional residue that shaped group dynamics for weeks. Eye contact was avoided. Conversations became functional. The event, though not openly discussed, acted as an emotional anchor—a moment everyone remembered and oriented themselves around. It signaled both the power of the leader and the emotional costs of deviance.

4.1.3.3. Illustrative example 3

David similarly described how abrupt and unexpected market events instantaneously synchronized emotions across the trading desk:

"Chain bankruptcies, starting with Lehman, immediately changed the atmosphere. Panic spread across the entire market, and you could see it directly in price movements. Everyone was reacting at the same time, emotionally and behaviorally."

Such sudden shocks function as emotional catalysts, rapidly
aligning group members' affective states and reinforcing
synchronized behavioral responses.

These events highlight the power of major affective events to reshape emotional climates at the group level by creating abrupt, shared emotional reference points that override routine sensemaking processes. Whether through shock, grief, fear, or euphoria, their emotional intensity rapidly spreads across members, synchronizing internal states and behaviors. This synchronized affect becomes the foundation of group cohesion—but also a mechanism for emotional conformity that may suppress reflection or dissent.

**Hypothesis 2 (H2)**: Major affective events are likely to trigger intense group emotions.

4.1.4. The leader's emotions

The emotions expressed by a group's leader play a central role in shaping collective emotional dynamics and can serve as powerful internal triggers for the emergence of intense group emotions. As Kisfalvi and Pitcher (2003) suggest, a CEO's emotional reactions "color" the quality of interactions within top management teams. Likewise, Conley (2012), reflecting on personal leadership experience, estimates that a leader's emotional state may influence between 50% and 70% of a work group's overall emotional tone.

A robust body of empirical research supports the contagious nature of leader emotions, showing their tendency to spread across group members and recalibrate the emotional climate (Anderson et al., 2003; Cherulnik et al., 2001; Haag and Laroche, 2009; Haag and Getz, 2016; Sy et al., 2005). Even non-verbal signals such as an intense smile can elicit a mirroring emotional response in followers (Cherulnik et al., 2001). Based on CEO case studies, Haag and Getz (2016) propose that following a major emotional disruption, a leader's verbal framing of the event significantly shapes the way emotions are absorbed and reinterpreted by the group.

One key explanation for this asymmetrical emotional contagion lies in social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954): followers, aware of their subordinate status, may align their emotional expressions with those of the leader—either to avoid dissonance or to strategically signal loyalty and cohesion (Barsade, 2002; Haag and Laroche, 2009). As such, leaders become emotional anchors: their affect not only sets the group's emotional tone but also narrows the spectrum of acceptable emotional responses.

4.1.4.1 Illustrative example 1

In Nicolas' experience, the leader's emotions acted as a barometer for the group's collective state. Whether euphoric, irritable, or despondent, the master's emotional expressions quickly spread throughout the community, synchronizing members' moods and behaviors.

"When he was euphoric, we all felt euphoric. When he was tense or furious, no one dared to breathe. You could feel the atmosphere densify—like emotional fog."

This affective dominance was especially visible following emotionally charged speeches. The master often delivered intense monologs filled with apocalyptic rhetoric or mystical urgency, designed to provoke immediate emotional reactions.
> "He came in shouting, 'You don't understand the gravity of the situation! If we don't act now, the whole mission will fail!' People started rushing around, taking notes, organizing new schedules. I didn't believe a word of it, but I still got pulled in. His emotion was stronger than logic."

Even when some members remained cognitively skeptical, they found themselves emotionally swept up. This illustrates the asymmetric contagion mechanism proposed by Festinger (1954) and Barsade (2002): the leader's elevated symbolic status reduced the space for alternative emotional interpretations.

> "We mirrored him. Not because we were convinced, but because it was the only emotional reality allowed."

The leader's affect became the group's emotional axis. His elation triggered collective excitement; his anger led to collective paralysis. Such affective synchronization occurred not through persuasion or reasoning, but through emotional absorption. As a result, a single individual's emotional state could dominate the collective's trajectory, sometimes to the detriment of critical reasoning or dissent.

#### 4.1.4.2 Illustrative example 2

David's experience on the trading floor illustrates a more subtle but nonetheless influential form of emotional contagion driven by leadership. Rather than public emotional outbursts, the desk manager's emotional stance was primarily conveyed through risk tolerance, monitoring practices, and informal interventions.

> "The role of the head of desk is very important. He's the one who manages the level of risk traders are willing to take, and who controls what traders are doing."

Emotional influence was therefore not always expressed openly, but circulated through observation and implicit signaling. David explains that even private interactions between the desk head and individual traders could shape the broader emotional climate:

> "I've seen heads of desk not get angry publicly, but take a trader aside and reframe him. And we're all aware of what's happening around us, so it can have an influence."

Although David found it difficult to identify a single dramatic episode of emotional contamination, he emphasized that traders constantly monitor leadership reactions to calibrate their own behavior:

> "There were moments of contagion within the team, yes, but giving precise examples is difficult. Still, everyone is aware of what's going on around them."

In this context, the leader's emotional influence operates less through explicit emotional expression than through implicit norms of risk, vigilance, and acceptable behavior, which nonetheless synchronize group responses under pressure.

Importantly, the trading case suggests that leader-driven emotional intensity does not necessarily rely on overt emotional

expressivity. Instead, emotional intensity at the group level may emerge through implicit signaling, risk framing, and normative regulation of behavior, even when leaders display emotional restraint.

Together, these two cases illustrate how leaders' emotions can serve as powerful internal triggers of group emotion. Through mechanisms of status-based contagion and social alignment, a leader's affect can rapidly synchronize group members' emotional states and constrain alternative interpretations of ongoing events.

**Hypothesis 3 (H3):** The intense emotions displayed by the perceived leader are induced into group members, generating an intense group emotion.

### 4.1.5 The most extreme group member

Emotional contagion within groups is not exclusively driven by formal leaders. Intense group emotions may also emerge from emotionally extreme group members who, through the salience and intensity of their affective displays, exert a disproportionate influence on the group's emotional climate. Barsade and Gibson (1998) refer to such individuals as maximum affective group members: individuals whose emotional expressiveness, volatility, or symbolic positioning makes them powerful affective reference points for others.

Crucially, these individuals do not need to occupy formal leadership positions to shape collective affect. As emphasized by Barsade and Knight (2015), group-level emotions are often structured around highly expressive or emotionally salient members whose affective displays function as coordination signals for others, even in the absence of hierarchical authority. Their influence stems from emotional intensity and visibility rather than formal power.

Empirical work further shows that even a single emotionally extreme group member can disproportionately affect collective emotions, coordination, and group functioning (Felps et al., 2006; Barsade and Knight, 2015). Such individuals may become informal emotional anchors, around whom others implicitly adjust their own affective expressions and behaviors.

#### 4.1.5.1 Illustrative example 1

In Nicolas' experience, emotional dominance did not always originate from the leader. He described a particular disciple whose emotional volatility and symbolic proximity to the master made her a powerful affective catalyst within the group.

> "She was always watching. Competing. When the master paid attention to someone else, she would visibly tense up. You could feel her jealousy in the room. Everyone became cautious."

Although she held no formal authority, her emotional reactions quickly reshaped the group's atmosphere. During one ritual, she accused another disciple of spiritual betrayal:

> "She said, 'You're contaminating the energy here.' She didn't shout—she whispered. But everyone froze. No one spoke after that."
Nicolas explained that her presence alone altered group behavior:

> "When she was there, people spoke more softly. They avoided eye contact. She could poison the space just with a look."

This example illustrates how emotionally extreme non-leaders can function as informal emotional anchors (Barsade and Knight, 2015), synchronizing group emotions and constraining behavior without issuing commands or arguments. Emotional alignment emerged through intensity and salience, not authority.

#### 4.1.5.2 Illustrative example 2

David explained that trading desks are composed of individuals with very different temperaments, ranging from highly impulsive to very introverted. Some traders, due to their experience, confidence, or reputation, naturally become informal reference points for others.

> "Yes, there are traders who have more impulsive or extreme personalities than others. Some are quite introverted. There are certain traders who become models for the others, so that can have an impact on the group's behavior."

According to David, these traders' reactions—particularly in moments of uncertainty or market stress—can shape how others interpret the situation and adjust their own behavior.

> "There are a lot of tensions between traders, a lot of strong exchanges."

In such contexts, emotionally salient traders contribute to the collective atmosphere not necessarily through explicit leadership, but through visibility, credibility, and behavioral cues that others implicitly monitor. Their confidence, risk appetite, or agitation may thus amplify collective reactions, especially when market signals are ambiguous.

Importantly, this case suggests that the influence of emotionally extreme group members is context-dependent. In highly regulated and professionalized environments such as trading floors, emotional extremity tends to be partially constrained by institutional norms, risk controls, and performance accountability. Nevertheless, even in such settings, emotionally salient individuals can function as informal affective reference points, subtly shaping collective interpretations and behavioral alignment.

**Hypothesis 4 (H4):** The intense emotions displayed by emotionally extreme group members, even when they do not occupy formal leadership positions, are likely to trigger intense group emotions of the same nature.

## 4.2 Condition 2: normative pressure toward positivity

While the previous section examined how emotional intensity disrupts group cognition, this second condition focuses on emotional persistence—that is, the motivation or pressure

to maintain a certain emotional tone within the group. In particular, we examine how the desire to preserve a positive or emotionally “acceptable” atmosphere can distort group dynamics and impair decision-making.

### 4.2.1 Hedonistic bias and its consequences

Groups, like individuals, tend to gravitate toward emotional comfort. Research shows that people in favorable moods are motivated to sustain that state, whereas those in negative affective states seek to return to equilibrium (Isen and Geva, 1987; Isen et al., 1988). This hedonistic drive—the preference for pleasure over discomfort—extends to collective settings. When a group experiences a positive emotional climate, there is often an unspoken norm to protect it.

However, this seemingly benign tendency can have adverse consequences. First, it may inhibit constructive conflict, an essential ingredient of sound group decision-making. While conflict is often seen as disruptive, task-related disagreement enhances performance by encouraging members to question assumptions and offer alternative viewpoints (Baron, 1991, 1997; Cosier and Dalton, 1990). The desire to “keep the mood light” can discourage such engagement, suppress dissent, and erode critical discourse.

Second, focusing on preserving emotional harmony may shift attention away from task execution. When affective smoothness becomes a priority, groups risk neglecting logistical challenges, minority opinions, or contradictory evidence (Tice et al., 2001). Emotional comfort takes precedence over functional effectiveness.

These dynamics parallel the findings of Barsade and Gibson (1998), who showed that collective emotional norms often promote positive expressions and discourage negativity. In this sense, group members may engage in a form of collective emotional labor (Hochschild, 1983), aligning their emotional displays with group expectations rather than with situational demands.

Recent field research on collective emotion regulation further shows that when norms of emotional regulation become institutionalized, team members tend to align their emotional displays with shared expectations rather than with their private appraisals. Such alignment discourages the expression of critical or dissonant emotions and narrows the range of perspectives voiced during collective deliberation, thereby fostering surface harmony at the expense of analytical depth (Desmarais and Agassiz, 2024).

Importantly, this form of normative emotional alignment does not necessarily rely on explicit injunctions to “be positive.” As illustrated below, similar mechanisms may operate through implicit professional norms, anticipatory self-censorship, and reputational concerns—even in contexts that explicitly value rational debate.

### 4.2.2 Consensus without complexity

The desire to maintain a pleasant emotional climate can also distort cognition by producing a false sense of agreement. George and King (2007) argue that groups driven by emotional positivity may construct overly consensual realities, filtering out alternative views. This convergence reduces cognitive diversity and leads to shallow, yet overconfident, decision-making.

In tightly bonded groups, this emotional consensus may override rational warning signals. The group becomes trapped in a
positive feedback loop, where the motivation to preserve cohesion
leads to the suppression of dissent, which in turn reinforces the
illusion of harmony. What emerges is not genuine agreement, but
emotional alignment sustained by avoidance of discomfort.

4.2.3 Illustrative example

David explained that, on trading desks, expressing doubt or pessimism was formally accepted and sometimes even valued. However, he also noted a more subtle emotional pressure operating beneath this norm:

"Yes, expressing doubts is possible. But there's always that apprehension — maybe you misunderstood, maybe you lack experience. You don't want to be the one who slows things down for no good reason."

This illustrates how consensus can emerge not from
explicit coercion, but from anticipatory self-monitoring
and emotional caution. Even when dissent is allowed in
principle, emotional alignment may still occur through fear
of appearing illegitimate, inexperienced, or misaligned with the
group's tempo.

4.2.4 Escalating commitment to preserve group identity

Such dynamics resemble what Bion (1961) described as basic
assumption groups, in which members unconsciously adopt shared
defense mechanisms that protect cohesion at the expense of task
focus. In parallel, research on escalation of commitment shows
that groups often persist in failing courses of action to avoid the
psychological and identity-related costs of acknowledging error
(Staw, 1976, 1981; Ross and Staw, 1993).

When positive emotional alignment becomes tied to group
identity, questioning decisions is no longer perceived as a cognitive
act, but as an emotional or moral threat.

4.2.5 Illustrative example 1

In sectarian contexts, this pressure to maintain positive
emotional alignment can become both normative and coercive.
According to Nicolas, members acted as informal “guardians of
positivity,” enforcing emotional conformity and suppressing even
the mildest forms of dissent.

"I said, 'Maybe we don't need to do this ceremony tomorrow — we're all exhausted, and we're missing materials.' But instead of discussing it, someone turned to me and said, 'Don't bring down the energy. You know how that affects the group.' Just like that. I was silenced."

This episode exemplifies emotional pathologization: dissenting
views are not debated—they are reframed as emotional threats.
The emotional script is sacred, and deviation from it is treated
as contamination.

"Whenever someone expressed discomfort or asked critical questions, the answer was always something like 'You need to trust the process' or 'That's your ego resisting.' There was no room for disagreement — only reframing your doubt as a personal failing."

Here, positive slogans act as emotional shields, blocking
complexity and reinforcing conformity. Maintaining a “smooth”
emotional surface becomes a moral duty, rather than a
shared aspiration.

4.2.6 Social rejection as an emotional threat

The need to sustain positive group emotions is closely
intertwined with another fundamental psychological mechanism:
the fear of social exclusion. In highly interdependent groups,
the cost of being labeled as “negative,” “difficult,” or “skeptical”
can be high. Group members may therefore suppress doubts
or objections—not necessarily out of genuine agreement, but to
preserve their position within the group and avoid relational or
symbolic sanctions.

4.2.6.1 Example 1

Nicolas described this dynamic as an internalized process of emotional self-censorship driven by constant monitoring of others' affective alignment:

"Sometimes I felt like something was wrong. I wanted to raise my hand, to ask a question, but I didn't. I looked around, saw the others nodding, smiling... and I told myself: stay quiet. Don't mess it up."

Beyond this internal inhibition, Nicolas recalled how group
members who repeatedly expressed doubts or critical thoughts were
progressively marginalized, reinforcing the perceived emotional
cost of dissent:

"He asked too many questions. One day he wasn't invited to a meeting. Then people stopped talking to him. He hadn't done anything wrong, but he was out. That scared me. After that, I didn't ask anything anymore."

In this context, conformity was not enforced through
explicit sanctions but through subtle social signals—withdrawal
of attention, exclusion from informal interactions, and emotional
distancing. Dissent was not debated on its merits; instead, it
was reframed as an emotional or moral failing, threatening
group harmony.

4.2.6.2 Example 2

David's experience on the trading floor reveals a more
attenuated but still meaningful form of social constraint. Unlike
the sectarian context, expressing doubt or pessimism was not
formally prohibited and could even be valued as a sign of
independence or competence. However, this apparent openness
coexisted with a strong implicit norm favoring confidence,
optimism, and decisiveness, particularly under conditions of
uncertainty and time pressure. David emphasized that voicing
objections was nonetheless emotionally costly, particularly for less experienced traders:

> "...it happens to be perceived as the one who slows things down or who doubts. Of course, there's always a bit of apprehension—maybe you misunderstood something, maybe you have less experience, maybe you're not as used to the market."

This apprehension did not stem from explicit pressure to maintain positivity, but from concerns about credibility, expertise, and symbolic legitimacy within the group. In this sense, positivity operated less as an overt injunction than as a professionalized emotional norm associated with competence, control, and confidence. Junior or less confident traders, in particular, might hesitate to express concerns for fear of revealing ignorance or misjudgment:

> "That's always something that holds you back, and emotionally it's not easy to deal with."

David noted that over time, trust built with the head of desk could mitigate this fear, allowing traders to speak more freely. Nevertheless, in moments of uncertainty or high stakes, the emotional cost of standing apart from the group remained salient, encouraging cautious self-regulation rather than open confrontation. Here, emotional alignment emerges not from explicit injunctions, but from anticipatory self-monitoring shaped by perceived social and professional costs.

In both contexts, emotional alignment emerges not from explicit injunctions, but from anticipatory self-monitoring shaped by perceived social costs.

Together, these two cases illustrate how fear of social rejection—whether explicit and coercive, as in the sectarian context, or implicit and status-based, as in the trading environment—can sustain emotional alignment within groups. In both cases, individuals monitor not only information but also the emotional reactions of others, adjusting their own expressions to avoid social or symbolic penalties.

This pattern aligns with classic findings on conformity and ostracism. Asch (1951) experiments demonstrated that individuals may deny even unambiguous facts to avoid social isolation. Neuroscientific research further shows that social rejection activates brain regions associated with physical pain, such as the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula (Slavich et al., 2010). As Maslow (1943) argued, the need to belong is a fundamental human motive.

In this light, the maintenance of positive group emotion should not be understood merely as a shared preference or ideal, but as a defensive strategy: a way for individuals to protect their place within the group by minimizing emotional deviation. Such defensive alignment contributes to the persistence of Groupfeel dynamics by discouraging emotional heterogeneity and constraining the expression of doubt precisely when critical evaluation would be most needed.

In popular discourse, such dynamics are often referred to as “toxic positivity.” The present framework provides a social-psychological articulation of this intuition by specifying the

emotional, normative, and regulatory mechanisms through which enforced positivity becomes collectively dysfunctional. Rather than dismissing the notion, the Groupfeel Syndrome offers a theoretically grounded account of when and why positivity turns toxic at the group level.

## 4.3 Synthesis and hypotheses

These mechanisms—emotional hedonism, pathologization of dissent, and rejection avoidance—form a self-reinforcing emotional ecosystem that prioritizes harmony over truth. What emerges is not genuine consensus, but emotional alignment through suppression, often to the detriment of decision quality and collective insight.

From this analysis, two hypotheses emerge:

**Hypothesis 5 (H5):** The motivation or pressure felt to create or maintain positive group emotions impairs the quality of group decision making.

**Hypothesis 6 (H6):** The common human fear of being rejected felt by group members sustains the pressure to maintain a positive group emotion.

## 4.4 Condition 3: limited emotional intelligence and regulation capacity

The intensity of group emotions, as well as the pressure to maintain a positive affective climate, can escalate when left unregulated. While emotional contagion affects all individuals to varying degrees, some are particularly vulnerable—typically those who combine strong emotional empathy with limited emotional self-regulation (Riess, 2017). Emotional empathy refers to the capacity to detect and resonate with others' emotions both emotionally and cognitively.

Conversely, emotionally intelligent individuals are equipped to modulate the spread of emotional states within a group. Emotional intelligence (EI) is defined as the ability to perceive, understand, manage, and use emotions effectively (Mayer and Salovey, 1997).

Early work on group emotional competence similarly suggests that teams can develop shared capabilities to recognize, express, and regulate emotions at the collective level, and that such “emotionally competent groups” are more likely to engage in constructive conflict and high-quality decision processes (Druskat and Wolff, 2001a,b; Wolff et al., 2006).

Research also demonstrates that emotionally intelligent leaders can shape team members' interpretations of emotionally charged events, helping to stabilize collective responses (Haag and Getz, 2016). Haag and Wolff (2024) further show that leaders with medium EI scores tend to overuse positive affect in crisis communication, overrepresenting emotional themes such as optimism—perhaps in an effort to motivate colleagues, but at the cost of emotional realism and rational deliberation.

Indeed, one of the core functions of EI is not only to regulate one's own emotions but also to influence the emotional states of others (Gross, 2009; Kozubal et al., 2023). Individuals with high EI are better equipped to modulate both the valence (positive or
negative) and intensity of shared emotions. They can function as buffers, preventing the unchecked escalation of collective affect and promoting more balanced group dynamics and decision-making (Haag et al., 2025).

When such figures are absent, the group is left without an internal moderator. Emotional escalation—whether rooted in fear, euphoria, or pressure to appear positive—goes unchallenged, often resulting in premature consensus or impulsive decisions.

### 4.4.1 Illustrative example 1

Nicolas recalled a disciple who continuously radiated a form of exaggerated optimism, particularly in uncertain or stressful situations. Rather than helping the group regain balance, her relentless enthusiasm added to the emotional inflation already present:

> "She was always saying things like, 'Everything is perfect,' or 'This is a blessing in disguise,' even when people were clearly exhausted or confused. At first, it seemed reassuring. But soon, you just couldn't express anything real around her."

This over-optimism discouraged honest emotional expression. Members who felt uncertain began to self-censor, fearing they would appear spiritually deficient:

> "If you said, 'I'm not sure this is working,' she would smile and say, 'That's your ego talking.' You felt like the problem wasn't the situation — it was you. So you stopped talking."

In the absence of an emotionally intelligent figure who might validate diverse feelings and reintroduce nuance, her emotional stance became both performative and coercive—masking concerns rather than resolving them.

### 4.4.2 Illustrative example 2

More broadly, Nicolas emphasized the group's chronic lack of emotionally intelligent individuals capable of offering reflective pause during emotionally intense episodes:

> "There was no one to say, 'Let's take a step back.' No one to slow things down when it got out of hand. Everyone just echoed the excitement — or the fear — without ever questioning it."

This led to critical decisions being made under emotional duress. For example, when the guru announced a sudden community relocation:

> "It was a huge logistical and financial risk. But people clapped. They cried. They said, 'It's the will of the universe.' And that was it — decision made. No one asked: how are we going to afford it? Where are we going to live? We were carried by the wave."

In both cases, the absence of emotional friction—often introduced by emotionally intelligent individuals who dare to question or decelerate the group—allowed emotional excess

to dominate. Emotional consensus replaced critical discussion, producing impulsive and often costly outcomes.

### 4.4.3 Illustrative example 3

...

**Hypothesis 7 (H7):** The absence of emotionally intelligent individuals (low collective EI) within a group—regardless of their formal status—allows the intensification of both emotional contagion and the pressure to sustain positive group emotions, thereby undermining group dynamics and the quality of group decisions.

## 4.5 Combined effects of the three conditions

The Groupfeel Syndrome is hypothesized to emerge when all three conditions co-occur. High intensity increases contagion, positivity norms suppress dissent, and limited EI prevents correction. In this configuration (1) shared emotion becomes rigid rather than adaptive, (2) group members stop questioning the emotional trajectory, and (3) decision processes become increasingly insulated from reality.

Recent work also shows that emotional synchrony can emerge not only from contagion processes but from attentional and motivational alignment, reinforcing rigid affective convergence in groups (Menges and Kilduff, 2015).

Empirical and theoretical work suggests that these three conditions may exert synergistic rather than merely additive effects. High emotional intensity has been shown to amplify emotional contagion within groups (Barsade, 2002), while strong normative pressures—particularly those favoring harmony or positivity—tend to suppress dissent and critical evaluation (Janis, 1982). At the same time, groups with low collective emotional intelligence struggle to reappraise or regulate shared affective states, making them especially vulnerable to affect-driven biases (Jordan and Troth, 2009). Leadership research further indicates that emotional norms and leader displays can lock groups into rigid affective trajectories, particularly when regulation capacities are weak (Walter et al., 2011). Taken together, these findings support the idea that the co-occurrence of high emotional intensity, positivity norms, and low collective EI creates a self-reinforcing affective configuration that increases the risk of impaired collective judgment.

**Hypothesis 8 (H8):** Figure 1 presents an integrative representation of the Groupfeel Syndrome and its three antecedent conditions. The joint presence of high emotional intensity, strong positivity norms, and low collective EI increases the likelihood that group emotion will impair collective decision quality.

## 5 Discussion

This study investigated what I term the Groupfeel syndrome—a maladaptive form of collective emotional experience characterized by excessive intensity and a normative emphasis on positive valence—and its negative impact on group dynamics and group decision-making. I identified three key conditions that contribute
<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>FIGURE 1</figcaption></figure>

The Groupfeel syndrome model. The model illustrates the three antecedent conditions (emotional intensity, positivity norms, and collective EI), the seven hypotheses (H1–H7), and the synergistic configuration leading to impaired group dynamics and decision quality (H8).

to the emergence of Groupfeel syndrome: (1) high-intensity group emotion; (2) strong pressure to maintain positive emotion; and (3) absence of emotionally intelligent individuals capable of regulating the group's emotional state. Qualitative data from two high-pressure environments—a sect and a financial trading team—combined with an emerging literature, provided empirical grounding for this theoretical construct.

## 5.1 Intense group emotion and decision-making impairment

Research consistently demonstrates that intense emotions, regardless of valence, impair decision-making at both individual and group levels (Forgas, 1995; Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). Intense emotions disrupt cognitive processes, limiting attention to relevant information and increasing reliance on emotional heuristics (Frijda, 1986). The testimonies collected demonstrate that emotional intensity often overrides informational salience, leading to a kind of ‘collective tunnel vision’ where only affectively congruent inputs are processed. In the cases examined, intense positive emotion, while outwardly uplifting, negatively impacted group dynamics and decision-making by fostering unquestioning belief, impulsivity, and suppression of critical thought. This suggests that intense collective emotion acts as a perceptual barrier—both cognitive and affective—impeding the group’s capacity to integrate dissonant information or entertain alternative interpretations.

Importantly, the present findings indicate that intense group emotion does not always emerge gradually through routine interaction or slow emotional convergence. In both cases examined, major affective events—sudden, emotionally charged disruptions—acted as powerful catalysts that instantaneously synchronized emotions and reoriented group attention. These events functioned as emotional inflection points, abruptly shifting the group into a high-intensity affective state before any reflective sensemaking could occur. In this respect, the present work extends affective events theory (Weiss and Cropanzano, 1996) by suggesting that

such events may operate not only at the individual level but also as collective emotional shocks, triggering immediate group-level affective convergence and narrowing the scope of deliberation.

Importantly, the convergence of evidence from a spiritual community and a trading floor indicates that such mechanisms are not restricted to “closed” or explicitly charismatic settings. Rather, whenever groups operate under high stakes, strong identification, and emotionally salient cues, Groupfeel-like processes may emerge.

## 5.2 The pressure to maintain positivity and its consequences

The second critical condition involves the motivation or pressure to maintain a consistently positive group emotion. This pressure discourages dissent and constructive conflict, thereby hindering the robust information exchange and critical evaluation vital for high-quality decisions (Baron, 1991, 1997; Cosier and Dalton, 1990). Beyond its surface-level appeal, positivity can become a performative norm that replaces deliberation with emotional compliance.

The prioritization of group harmony over critical assessment can lead to groupthink—where alternative perspectives are ignored and a false sense of consensus emerges (Janis, 1972, 1982; George and King, 2007). This tendency is rooted in our fundamental human need for belonging and acceptance, clearly observable in the cases studied where the fear of rejection silenced dissenting voices. Moreover, emotional norms privileging positivity may lead to a climate of ‘affective surveillance’, whereby members self-monitor and police others’ emotional expressions, reinforcing conformity not through logic but through emotional signaling.

The present findings further suggest that major affective events play a critical role in crystallizing such positivity norms. Following emotionally disruptive moments—such as public humiliation, sudden loss, or collective shock—groups often respond by intensifying normative pressure to restore emotional coherence. In this sense, positivity norms may function as a defensive response to affective disruption, transforming short-term emotional shocks
into long-term emotional rigidity. What initially emerges as an
attempt to stabilize the group emotionally may thus evolve into a
persistent suppression of dissent and emotional nuance.

Our examples revealed that the pressure to maintain positive
group emotions impairs decision-making by overriding rational
judgment and silencing emotional nuance. Emotional uniformity
becomes the goal, rather than collective reflection or evidence-
based deliberation. This dynamic appeared both in a spiritual
context—where doubt was framed as lack of faith—and in a
financial context—where caution could be interpreted as weakness
or lack of commitment to the team’s risk appetite.

## 5.3 The crucial role of emotional intelligence

The third condition highlights the critical role of emotional
intelligence (EI) in regulating group emotional states. Emotionally
intelligent individuals—able to regulate both their own and others’
emotions—act as buffers against escalating affect and promote
more balanced decision-making (Mayer and Salovey, 1997; Haag
et al., 2025; Haag and Getz, 2016). Such individuals act as
“emotional moderators”, introducing necessary dissonance or
reflective pauses that allow groups to recalibrate rather than
escalate emotionally.

This moderating effect is particularly crucial in high-pressure
environments prone to emotional contagion (Haag and Getz,
2016; Hatfield et al., 1993; Sy et al., 2005). The absence of such
individuals allows emotional escalation to proceed unchecked,
significantly impairing group dynamics and decision quality.
Moreover, distinguishing between authentic emotional intelligence
and performative positivity is essential, as the latter—often
encouraged in charismatic or competitive settings—may amplify
Groupfeel by discouraging emotional heterogeneity.

Our findings further indicate that emotionally intelligent
individuals are especially critical in the immediate aftermath
of major affective events. When such individuals are absent,
emotionally charged shocks remain unprocessed, allowing
collective affect to consolidate rather than dissipate. In this sense,
low collective EI does not merely amplify emotional contagion; it
prevents emotional recovery following affective disruption, thereby
locking groups into rigid affective trajectories.

Research suggests that individuals with moderate EI levels may
inadvertently exacerbate Groupfeel syndrome by overemphasizing
positive emotions in an attempt to motivate others, a strategy
that can be counterproductive in complex decision-making
contexts (Haag and Wolff, 2024). The cases examined here
suggest that cultivating emotionally intelligent “circuit breakers”—
individuals authorized and encouraged to name, question, and
recalibrate collective affect—may be a crucial protective factor
against Groupfeel.

## 5.4 Limitations and future directions

This study's qualitative design, based on the rich testimonies
of two former group members, offers deep insights but limits

generalizability. Future research should seek to validate the
Groupfeel model quantitatively across diverse organizational
settings, including political movements, military units, and
corporate teams. Investigating the moderating effects of group size,
task complexity, and organizational culture would further enrich
our understanding.

In particular, systematic empirical validation is now required
to assess the reliability, boundary conditions, and predictive
validity of the Groupfeel Syndrome, using multi-method designs
(e.g., experiments, longitudinal field studies, multi-informant
data) capable of capturing group-level emotional dynamics
over time.

Future research could also experimentally manipulate the
occurrence of major affective events (e.g., sudden symbolic
losses, public emotional transgressions, or abrupt leadership
interventions) to examine their causal impact on group emotional
synchronization and decision-making quality. Such designs would
allow researchers to distinguish between chronic affective climates
and acute affective shocks as distinct pathways to dysfunctional
group emotion.

Additionally, the intersection of Groupfeel with known
decision-making biases (e.g., anchoring, escalation of
commitment) offers promising avenues for exploration.
Neurophysiological measures of emotional synchronization—
such as heart rate coherence or galvanic skin response—may also
help empirically validate the existence and intensity of shared
emotional states. Integrating social identity measures (e.g., degree
of identification with the team or organization) could clarify how
identity processes and Groupfeel interact, potentially explaining
why some groups are more vulnerable than others.

Thirty-six years ago, psychologist Janis (1972, 1982)
conceptualized groupthink—a phenomenon that prevents
highly cohesive groups from realistically appraising alternative
courses of action. Over the years, this concept has been
challenged due to inconclusive empirical support and the
need for emotional integration in its explanatory power
(Aldag and Fuller, 1993; Turner et al., 1992; Kramer, 1998).
In line with these calls, we propose that Groupfeel syndrome
may be understood as an emotionally driven variant—or
precursor—of groupthink, where emotional intensity precedes
cognitive convergence. Researchers are thus invited to explore
conceptual bridges between group emotion dynamics and classic
collective biases.

Unlike classic groupthink models, which emphasize cognitive
convergence as the primary source of collective failure, the
Groupfeel syndrome highlights how emotional shocks may
precede and shape cognitive alignment. In this sense, major
affective events constitute an emotional entry point into
collective dysfunction.

Accordingly, this article should be read as a conceptual
development grounded in qualitative illustration rather than as
a definitive empirical test. Its contribution lies in clarifying
mechanisms, articulating boundary conditions, and generating
hypotheses that invite future multi-level and multi-actor empirical
investigation. Robust empirical validation is now needed to
examine the prevalence, causal dynamics, and boundary conditions
of the Groupfeel Syndrome across different group types, emotional
configurations, and institutional contexts.
## 5.5 Implications

In organizational settings, early signs of Groupfeel might include overuse of positive slogans, suppression of disagreement, or sudden shifts in collective emotion following a leader's speech. Identifying emotionally intelligent “moderators” within teams could mitigate such risks.

The Groupfeel syndrome presents a significant challenge to effective group functioning and decision-making. Understanding the interplay of emotional intensity, the drive for positivity, and the role of emotional intelligence is crucial to mitigating this phenomenon. Organizations and team leaders may leverage these insights to develop interventions that foster emotional metacognition—i.e., the ability to recognize and reflect upon collective affective states.

Developing group norms that promote constructive conflict and emotional authenticity, while identifying and empowering emotionally intelligent individuals, may prove particularly effective. Ultimately, fostering emotional awareness and regulation at the group level could enhance both the quality of decisions and the emotional health of collective environments.

### Data availability statement

The raw data supporting the conclusions of this article will be made available by the authors, without undue reservation.

### Ethics statement

The studies involving humans were approved by Emlyon Business School Ethical Review Board (ERB). The studies were conducted in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. The participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study. Written informed consent was obtained from the individual(s) for the publication of any potentially identifiable images or data included in this article.

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### Author contributions

CH: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Resources, Software, Supervision, Validation, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing.

### Funding

The author(s) declared that financial support was not received for this work and/or its publication.

### Conflict of interest

The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

### Generative AI statement

The author(s) declared that generative AI was not used in the creation of this manuscript.

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