# The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector:
the French Example

Céline Grislain-Letrémy, Corentin Trevien

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Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques

G 2014 / 08

The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector:
the French Example

Céline GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY et Corentin TREVIEN

Document de travail
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES

Série des documents de travail
de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques

G 2014 / 08

# The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector: the French Example

Céline GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY* et Coretin TREVIEN**

JUILLET 2014

Les auteurs remercient Gabrielle FACK, Claire LELARGE, Thierry MAYER et Corinne PROST pour leurs remarques et suggestions. Ce travail a également bénéficié des commentaires de Guillaume CHAPELLE, Étienne WASMER et des participants aux séminaires internes de l'Insee, du Crest et de Sciences Po. Les auteurs remercient également Inès BOUCHIKHI et Élodie LEPREVOST pour les données.

<footnote>* Département des Études Économiques - Division « Marchés et entreprises » Timbre G230 - 15, bd Gabriel Péri - BP 100 - 92244 MALAKOFF CEDEX</footnote>

<footnote>** Sciences Po et Crest-Insee</footnote>
# The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector: the French Example

## Abstract

Housing subsidies to tenants are a main tool for housing policy in France. They aim to limit the budget share of housing for eligible tenants or to improve their housing conditions for a given budget share. Despite the increasing budget allocated to housing subsidies since the end of the 1970s, the budget share of housing for low-income tenants has kept increasing, in particular in the private rental sector. We assess the impact of housing subsidies on price, quality and quantity in the private rental sector. To do so, we use an instrumental variable method based on a spatial discontinuity in the subsidy scheme. We show that housing subsidies had an inflationist impact in the 1990s and the 2000s. Besides, higher subsidies seem to have almost no effect on housing quality and to have no impact on the number of offered rental dwellings.

**Keywords:** housing subsidies, tax incidence.

# L'impact des aides au logement sur le secteur locatif privé en France

## Résumé

Les allocations pour le logement représentent un des outils majeurs de la politique du logement en France. Ces allocations ont pour objectif de limiter le taux d'effort, c'est-à-dire la part des ressources consacrée aux dépenses de logement, des ménages locataires bénéficiaires ou de leur permettre d'accéder à des logements de meilleure qualité, à taux d'effort donné. Malgré l'augmentation constante du budget alloué aux aides pour le logement depuis la fin des années 1970, le taux d'effort des ménages modestes n'a cessé d'augmenter, particulièrement dans le secteur locatif privé. Nous évaluons l'impact des aides au logement sur le prix, la qualité et la quantité des logements dans le secteur locatif privé. Pour ce faire, nous utilisons une méthode de variables instrumentales basée sur une discontinuité spatiale dans le calcul des aides. Nous montrons que les aides au logement ont un effet inflationniste dans les années 1990 et 2000. Par ailleurs, des aides plus importantes semblent n'avoir quasiment aucun effet sur la qualité des logements et n'avoir aucun impact sur le nombre de logements locatifs offerts.

**Mots-clés :** aides au logement, incidence fiscale.

**Classification JEL :** H22, R21, R31.
# 1 Introduction

Housing subsidies are a main tool for housing policy in many developed countries. In France, the budget weight of subsidies to tenants reached 14.5 billions of euros in 2011 (CGDD, 2012), i.e., 0.7% of GDP. These subsidies aim to limit the budget share of housing for tenants and to improve their housing conditions for a given budget share. However, if housing supply is inelastic in the short run, a demand subsidy would lead to a high increase in rents and a small increase in the number and quality of rental dwellings. If so, subsidies would be partly captured by landlords. This inflationist impact of subsidies would be all the more important that homeowners know the terms and conditions of subsidies payment.

Several empirical studies have already highlighted and measured the inflationist impact of housing subsidies targeting housing consumers on rents.<fnref n="1" /> In the United States, Susin (2002) finds the inflationist impact of rent vouchers for recipients and also for unsubsidized low-income households. Similarly, Gibbons and Manning (2006) find that a reduction in UK housing benefits decreases rents and that these benefits were massively captured by landlords; in Finland, Kangasharju (2010) also finds an inflationist impact of housing allowances given to low-income households in the private housing sector. In France, Laferrère and Blanc (2004) and Fack (2006) find an inflationist impact of housing subsidies on rents in the 1990s.<fnref n="2" /> These two articles use the natural experiment provided by the reform of housing subsidies between 1991 and 1993. This reform aimed at an increasing the number of beneficiaries from housing subsidies. Laferrère and Blanc (2004) find that the significant impact of housing subsidies on rents is only slightly explained by an increase in dwelling quality. Using the Rents and Charges survey (managed by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economics Studies) between 1987 and 1999 as repeated

<footnote n="1">¹Subsidies can also target building suppliers. Eriksen and Rosenthal (2010) and Sinai and Waldfogel (2005) show that the impact of subsidized construction of low-income housing on the housing stock in the United States is limited, because this crowds out equivalent housing that otherwise would have been provided by the private sector. See Laferrère and Blanc (2004) for a literature review on the effect of housing allowances on supply in the United States.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">²See Laferrère and le Blanc (2002) and Fack (2005) for companion papers in French of these two works.</footnote>
cross-sections, the authors compare the evolution of rents for dwellings occupied by tenants who started to receive (or stopped receiving) subsidies following the reform with the evolution of rents for dwellings occupied by tenants whose status was un-modified. Fack (2006) determines the impact of housing subsidies on rents for French low-income households. The author compares the evolution of rents for households belonging to the first quartile of standard of living and households belonging to the second one. Fack (2006) finds that the reform of housing subsidies between 1991 and 1993 led to an increase of rents that represented 78% of the recently paid subsidies. Her results are established by applying a method of difference-in-differences and us-ing the Housing survey (managed by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economics Studies) between 1973 to 2002.<fnref n="3" />

Our contribution is threefold. First, we extend the results of Laferrère and Blanc (2004) and Fack (2006), as we measure the potential inflationist impact of housing subsidies in France between 1987 and 2012, using the Rents and Charges survey. This quarterly survey is used to compute a rent index, which is included in the calculation of the consumer price index. Around 5,000 households are questioned during five consecutive quarters and answer about their dwelling characteristics, their renting conditions and their amount of rents and charges. These data are sup-plemented with other variables relative to municipalities.

Second, we offer a different identification strategy based on a fuzzy geographic dis-
continuity in the calculation of housing subsidies. Subsidies are around 20 or 30 euros
per month higher in many agglomerations of more than 100,000 inhabitants. This
population threshold has not been strictly used to determine the zones with higher
subsidies. Some agglomerations with less than 100,000 inhabitants can receive higher
subsidies, but they have specific features: they are more likely low-income areas or
have crowded housing markets. Thus, treatment, i.e., the increase of housing sub-
sidies, is endogenous. We use as an instrument a dummy for agglomerations with

<footnote n="3">³See also Fack (2011) for a discussion and a literature review of the impact of housing subsidies on labor supply and housing choices.</footnote>
more than 100,000 inhabitants and implement an instrumental variable method. We estimate this way a local average treatment effect of housing subsidy on rents in agglomerations close to the discontinuity, that is between 50,000 and 200,000 inhabitants. We break down our estimations across low- and high-income households, which enables us to test the assumption of housing market segmentation, made by Fack (2006).

Third, we quantify the price, quality and quantity effects of housing subsidies. We find that rents are significantly higher in zones with higher housing subsidies, which confirms the results of Laferrère and Blanc (2004) and Fack (2006). The impact of subsidies on rents is heterogenous: it is stronger for the low-income households and for the dwellings with two rooms or less. Besides, higher subsidies seem to have almost no effect on housing quality and to have no impact on the number of offered rental dwellings. The absence of quality or quantity effect indicates that the impact of housing subsidies on rents is inflationist, pointing at a low elasticity of housing supply.

# 2 Housing subsidies

## 2.1 The French system

**Public spending for housing.** In France, public spending for housing aims at easing the burden of housing spending and to improve housing conditions. It targets either housing suppliers or consumers. The share of public spending for housing in the French GDP was stable at 1.6% until the end of the 1990s and has kept increasing since then to reach 2.2% of GDP in 2011, i.e., 45 billions of euros. More than half of this amount (23.0 billions of euros in 2011) was dedicated to building suppliers. Among subsidies to housing consumers (17.6 billions of euros in 2011), housing subsidies to tenants constitute the most important tool, as they represent 14.5 billions of euros in 2011 (CGDD, 2012), of which 6.0 billions of euros for the social rental sector (CGDD, 2012).
**The increasing weight of housing subsidies to tenants.** Housing subsidies to tenants, which were created in the post-war years, have been massively extended since 1977. After this pivotal year in the French housing policy, public finance was directed in the favor of subsidies to households to the expense of building subsidies, which used to prevail. The budget weight of subsidies to tenants has kept increasing since 1977 to reach 14.5 billions of euros in 2011 (CGDD (2012), see Figure 1).

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Housing subsidies targeting tenants
Source: CGDD (2012).</figcaption></figure>

The first factor behind this increase is the rise in the average amount (in constant euros) per head since the end of the 1980s (CGDD, 2012). The second and main factor is the growing number of eligible tenants (CGDD (2012), see Figure 2). From the 1990s, the whole set of low-income households, including students, could benefit from these subsidies. This has led to a doubling of the number of beneficiaries compared with the 1980s. Since the 2000s, the number of beneficiaries is almost constant.

**Three housing subsidies to tenants.** Three main housing subsidies target tenants: personal housing subsidy (“aide personnalisée au logement”, APL), family
<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Number of tenants benefiting from housing subsidies
Source: CGDD (2012).</figcaption></figure>

housing allowance (“allocation de logement familiale”, ALF), and social housing allowance (“allocation de logement sociale”, ALS). These subsidies benefit to the tenants of social or private dwellings, to some homeowners with outstanding loans and also to some hosting hostels’ residents. Family housing allowance specifically targets families; social housing allowance is given to students, childless couples, young, old or disabled people. The subsidies can be paid to the tenant or directly to the homeowner.

The calculation of the amount of housing subsidies, which is quite complicated (Ministère de l’Égalité des territoires et du Logement (2012) and Trannoy and Womer (2013), Box 12 pp. 51-52), takes into account household characteristics and resources, rent and dwelling’s location.

**Geographical discontinuity in the amount of subsidies.** Even though each subsidy is dedicated to some households or to some dwellings, their method of calculation has been common since 2001. The amount of subsidy depends in particular on the location in one of three zones. Zone I comprises Paris agglomeration and the
new towns in Paris region. Zone II comprises agglomerations of more than 100,000 inhabitants, fringes of Paris region and some agglomerations with a strained real estate situation (in border or coastal areas for example). Zone III corresponds to the rest of the territory (Figure 3). The amount of housing subsidies is higher in zone II than in zone III, all other things being equal. In zone I, the amount is even higher. This zoning was determined in 1977 and has been little modified since then.

However the difference in subsidies between the three zones also depends on the characteristics of the household and of the dwelling. The difference in housing subsidy between zones II and III is around 20 or 30 euros per month (Table 2 in Section 3). For example, in 2012, a single parent with two children, earning the minimum wage and paying a monthly rent of 500 euros, would benefit from a 285 euros subsidy in zone III, a 310 euros subsidy in zone II and a 355 euros subsidy in zone I.
<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Housing subsidy zones in France</figcaption></figure>

## 2.2 An inflationist incidence?

Despite the increasing budget allocated to housing subsidies since the mid-1990s, the budget share of housing for low-income tenants has kept increasing, in particular in the private rental sector (Table 1). Fack (2006) already noted a fastest increase of rents paid by low-income households in the 1990s. These concurrent increases of housing subsidies and of the budget share of housing invite to analyze the potential inflationist incidence of housing subsidies.

Indeed, housing market is specific, as supply may be considered as little elastic in the short run.<fnref n="4" /> If housing supply is inelastic, a demand subsidy has an inflationist

<footnote n="4">⁴Vacant housing and new buildings can increase housing supply, respectively in the short and</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 1: Budget share of housing for households in function of their standard of living and their location</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Standard of living</th><th rowspan="2">Location</th><th rowspan="2">Median budget share (%) in 2010</th><th colspan="2">Budget share evolution (percentage points)</th></tr><tr><th>1996-2006</th><th>2008-2010</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">All renters</td><td>All renters</td><td>18.5</td><td>0.8</td><td>0.1</td></tr><tr><td>Private sector</td><td>26.9</td><td>3.1</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Social sector</td><td>20.1</td><td>1</td><td>-0.3</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">1st quartile</td><td>All renters</td><td>23.6</td><td>2.8</td><td>0.6</td></tr><tr><td>Private sector</td><td>33.6</td><td>7.6</td><td>1.9</td></tr><tr><td>Social sector</td><td>20.2</td><td>1.8</td><td>-1.3</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">2nd quartile</td><td>All renters</td><td>21.3</td><td>1.6</td><td>0.4</td></tr><tr><td>Private sector</td><td>29.1</td><td>4.6</td><td>2.3</td></tr><tr><td>Social sector</td><td>23.2</td><td>1.5</td><td>1.4</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">3rd quartile</td><td>All renters</td><td>18.9</td><td>0.4</td><td>0.1</td></tr><tr><td>Private sector</td><td>5.1</td><td>1.6</td><td>-0.4</td></tr><tr><td>Social sector</td><td>n.s.</td><td>0.1</td><td>n.s.</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">4th quartile</td><td>All renters</td><td>11</td><td>-1.5</td><td>0.1</td></tr><tr><td>Private sector</td><td>18.8</td><td>-0.2</td><td>-1.1</td></tr><tr><td>Social sector</td><td>n.s.</td><td>-0.2</td><td>n.s.</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Arnault and Crusson (2012).

Note: some statistics are not provided for the renters of the last two quartiles in the social sector, because they might be too few.

impact: it leads to a high increase in rents and a small increase in the number of rental dwellings and in their quality. As rents increase much more than housing quality, subsidies are partly captured by homeowners. This inflationist impact of subsidies is all the more important that homeowners know the terms and conditions of subsidies payment (and can even sometimes directly receive these subsidies). This inflationist incidence should eventually disappear if housing supply is elastic in the long run. However, housing supply might remain inelastic in the long run, in particular if landowners occupiers restrain new buildings to limit negative externalities due to density in their neighborhood (Glaeser et al., 2005).

<footnote>long run.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 2: Example of housing subsidy amounts depending on location and income</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>0</th><th>500</th><th>1000</th><th>1500</th><th>2000</th><th>2500</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Monthly disposable income</th><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><th>Monthly subsidy in zone II</th><td>425</td><td>425</td><td>340</td><td>196</td><td>51</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><th>Monthly subsidy in zone III</th><td>398</td><td>398</td><td>314</td><td>173</td><td>31</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><th>Difference in monthly subsidy</th><td>27</td><td>27</td><td>26</td><td>23</td><td>20</td><td>0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note: housing subsidy amount for a single-parent family with two children, for a monthly rent of 500 euros, according to the 2012 scheme.

Source: authors’ calculations.

# 3 Evaluation method

## 3.1 Evaluation strategy

**Importance and relevance of the geographic discontinuity.** We use a method of instrumental variable that relies on the dependency of the subsidy amount on the dwelling’s location: this amount is higher in zone II than in zone III, all other things being equal. To quantify the difference in subsidies between zones II and III, we compute this difference for a household with two adults and two children, given a monthly rent of 500 euros in 2012 (Table 2). This subsidy difference between zones II and III is around 20 or 30 euros per month.

In zone I, housing subsidies are even higher; however, it comprises Paris region which is too particular to be compared with agglomerations of the other zones. On the contrary, we consider that there are very comparable agglomerations in zones II and III that mainly differ by the amount of received subsidies. These comparable agglomerations are the ones of which population is just below or just above the population limit between these two zones, that is 100,000 inhabitants. These agglomerations have a comparable share of housing subsidy recipients, a similar population trend, and comparable shares of private and social housing (Table 3). Besides, the zoning for other housing subsidies, such as landlord subsidies for rental investment, does not match with this housing subsidies zoning (Table 12 in Appendix A.1).
<table><caption>Table 3: Share of housing subsidy recipients, population trend, and shares of private and social housing in zones II and III: average value by municipality</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Zone II</th><th>Zone III</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Share of housing subsidy recipients<sub>2012</sub> (*)</td><td>62.8%</td><td>65.1%</td></tr><tr><td>Gross rate of agglomeration pop<sub>1982-09</sub></td><td>8.1%</td><td>8.7%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of private rental housing<sub>1982</sub></td><td>26.1%</td><td>28.5%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of private rental housing<sub>2009</sub></td><td>24.2%</td><td>26.2%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of social rental housing<sub>1982</sub></td><td>18%</td><td>21.6%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of social rental housing<sub>2009</sub></td><td>18.8%</td><td>21.5%</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note: (*) data available only for municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants.

Sources: Population census by INSEE in 1982 and 1999, Family Allowance Fund.

Comparing these agglomerations makes it possible to determine the impact of the payment of housing subsidies on the level of rents. A similar method is used by Bono and Trannoy (2012) to estimate the impact of a rental investment subsidy scheme (the *Scellier scheme*) on building land prices. However, Bono and Trannoy (2012) compare the evolution of building land prices for bordering municipalities between which real estate markets are potentially interdependent. When comparing here agglomerations and not municipalities across the border, this dependency effect is likely negligible.

**Instrumental variable method.** The population limit of 100,000 inhabitants between zones II and III has not been strictly used to determine the outlines of the two zones, as some less populated agglomerations have been included in zone II (Table 4). In this framework, being located on one side or on the other side of the threshold modifies the probability to live in zone II or III (and so to receive or not higher housing subsidies), without fully determining the location in zone II or III. As a consequence, this variable can be used as an instrument for treatment assignment.

The average rent per square meter is always higher in the treatment group (Table 4). In addition, its level does not increase with population in both groups for agglomerations under 200,000 inhabitants, which suggests that there is no population
<table><caption>Table 4: Frequency and average rent in function of the agglomeration population</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Agglomeration population in 1975</th><th colspan="2">Number of agglomerations</th><th colspan="2">Rent per square meter</th></tr><tr><th>untreated (zone III)</th><th>treated (zone II)</th><th>untreated (zone III)</th><th>treated (zone II)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>20000-40000</td><td>48</td><td>3</td><td>7.2</td><td>8.6</td></tr><tr><td>40000-60000</td><td>27</td><td>7</td><td>7.8</td><td>8.6</td></tr><tr><td>60000-80000</td><td>21</td><td>3</td><td>7.5</td><td>8.8</td></tr><tr><td>80000-100000</td><td>9</td><td>1</td><td>7.1</td><td>9.6</td></tr><tr><td>100000-120000</td><td>0</td><td>9</td><td>.</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>120000-140000</td><td>0</td><td>7</td><td>.</td><td>8.5</td></tr><tr><td>140000-160000</td><td>0</td><td>4</td><td>.</td><td>8.9</td></tr><tr><td>160000-180000</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>.</td><td>7.2</td></tr><tr><td>180000-200000</td><td>0</td><td>4</td><td>.</td><td>9.7</td></tr><tr><td>200000-220000</td><td>0</td><td>6</td><td>.</td><td>9.7</td></tr><tr><td>220000-250000</td><td>0</td><td>2</td><td>.</td><td>10.4</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Rents and Charges survey by INSEE between 2005 and 2012. Population census 1975.

trend in the rent level.

We use the instrumental variable method in a standard linear hedonic model. Concretely, we regress the logarithm of the rent per square meter $R$ on the treatment $T$ and the characteristics $X$ of the dwelling.<fnref n="5" /> $X$ comprises characteristics that are intrinsic to the dwelling (living area, completion year, etc.) and relative to its location (past growth of agglomeration, median fiscal income of the municipality, share of open space in the municipality). We add year fixed effects. As the treatment assignment might depend on the level of rents in the agglomeration and so might be endogenous, we instrument the treatment $T$ with the threshold $\underline{P}$ of 100,000 inhabitants. We use a two stage least squares method to estimate this model.

$$ \begin{cases} T = \eta \underline{P} + \gamma X + \nu \\ R = \delta T + \beta X + \epsilon \end{cases} $$

<footnote n="5">⁵Results are robust when regressing the total rent.</footnote>
The threshold of 100,000 inhabitants is relative to agglomeration size. As in our data observations are dwellings, residuals are clustered by agglomeration to take into account spatial autocorrelation of rents.

The treatment effect estimator $\delta$ is computed by using the rents of dwellings located in the agglomerations between 50,000 and 200,000 inhabitants (Figure 4). This window can be considered as wide but reducing it would lead to keep too few agglomerations in the estimations (Table 4).

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4: Agglomerations used for estimations</figcaption></figure>

## 3.2 Sample selection

The simplest way to compute the estimation would be to compare all dwellings located in agglomerations inside our window. This solution is inadequate, because the
treatment is not homogeneous within an agglomeration. Indeed, in treated agglomerations, only the central one is classified in zone II and residents benefit from higher housing subsidies; the outskirts are classified in zone III and the subsidies are the same than in untreated agglomerations. Thus, comparing the whole agglomerations would not provide the treatment effect.

To our knowledge, the delineation of targeted areas refers neither to existing administrative nor to statistical zoning. Thus, we observe the exact border of the central part of the agglomeration only for the treatment group. We need to assess what this central zone would have been in the control group to compare similar treated and untreated municipalities and to provide unbiased estimates.

The French National Institute of Statistics and Economics Studies (INSEE) provides a delineation of agglomeration called urban areas ("aires urbaines") that are similar to the metropolitan statistical areas in the US. These urban areas are divided into a central part and a peripheral part. One can notice that the central part of urban areas often coincides with the zone II of housing subsidy, where the treatment is higher. In treated agglomerations, the central part of the urban areas correctly predicts the treatment assignment for 96% of dwellings of our sample.<fnref n="6" /> Figure 5 provides an example for the Valence agglomeration. This is why we use the central part of the urban areas as defined by INSEE in 2010 for the central zone in the control group.<fnref n="7" /> All population variables at the agglomeration scale, including the 100,000 inhabitants threshold, are computed according to this zoning. We provide in Section 5 a robustness test that shows that our estimates are robust to a change in the estimation zoning.

<footnote n="6">⁶In our data, in treated agglomerations, 89% of dwellings are located in both the central treatment zone and the central part of the urban areas; 7% of dwellings are located outside the two groups; 3% of dwellings are located in the central part of the urban areas but are not treated; 1% are treated but located in the outskirts of the urban areas.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷In treated agglomerations, we use the central part of the agglomeration as defined by housing policy makers (i.e., the part of the agglomeration where housing subsidies are higher).</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5: Coincidence of the central part of *urban areas* with the zone II of housing subsidy: the example for Valence agglomeration</figcaption></figure>

Agglomerations in which the housing subsidy zoning was modified between 1977 and 1991 are excluded; they represent 4% of the observations. In our sample, no zoning modification was performed after 1991. Besides, agglomerations in border areas are excluded, because they often belong to a wider international metropolitan area, about which we have no information.<fnref n="8" />

## 3.3 Housing market segmentation

The rents of dwellings that are not occupied by subsidy recipients can also be affected by the treatment. Indeed, the French private rental sector is quite competitive and the rent could be set without legal constraint at the tenant's arrival, until 2012.<fnref n="9" /> Given that housing subsidies increase the willingness to pay of some tenants, this policy might consequently increase the equilibrium rent of all dwellings, including those that are not occupied by subsidy recipients.

<footnote n="8">⁸For example, Annemasse (Haute-Savoie) is part of the metropolitan area of Geneva.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹Before 2012, rent control concerned only the annual update of rent, the years following the occupier's installation.</footnote>
This impact on untargeted households could concern only some of them. Indeed, housing market might be, at least partially, vertically segmented: low-income households, who are targeted by these subsidies, might live in low-quality dwellings. If housing market is segmented, the impact of housing subsidies on rents or on dwelling quality should be stronger for low-quality dwellings. Our method enables to test the assumption of housing market segmentation, which was required in Fack (2006).

As the Rent and Charges survey provides very limited data on the households and in particular no income variable, we propose a method to estimate the probability of a dwelling to be occupied by a low-income household. In a first stage, we use the 2006 Housing survey and a probit model to compute the probability for a dwelling to be occupied by a low-income household (i.e., belonging to the three first standard of living deciles) given the dwelling characteristics. In a second stage, we use these estimated parameters to compute the probability of a dwelling of the Rent and Charges survey to be inhabited by a low-income household. We break down our estimations across these two types of dwellings. Estimates are reported in Section 5.

# 4 Data

We use the Rents and Charges survey between 1987 and 2012.<fnref n="10" /> Around 5,000 households are questioned during five consecutive quarters and answer about their dwelling characteristics, their renting conditions and their amount of rents and charges.

To measure the dwelling quality, we use the following variables provided by this survey: the living area, the number of rooms, the presence of a bathroom, toilets, a

<footnote n="10">¹⁰In France, there is no comprehensive recording of rents (contrary to dwellings sales, which are recorded by solicitors). Except for Paris region, available sources are heterogenous. Harmonization of data collection is ongoing in order to enable some rent control. This comprehensive and homogenous data set will be available only in a few years.</footnote>
bath, a garden, a balcony, a garage, a safety device (alarms, reinforced doors), and
a sound or thermal insulation, and the number of dwellings in the building.<fnref n="11" />

Information about households’ characteristics is limited; in particular, the variable indicating whether the household receives or not housing subsidies cannot be reliably used. Thus, it is not possible to precisely identify the beneficiaries of these subsidies.

These data are supplemented with other variables relative to municipalities: the zoning for housing subsidies, the sociodemographic composition of municipalities, the agglomeration population in 1975 and the population trends between 1975 and 2009 (provided by census data), the average fiscal income since 1985, and the location in a border area. Additional control variable like landscape, coastal area, distance to the city center or the features of the housing stock have been tested but happened to be non significant.

# 5 Results

## 5.1 Impact of housing subsidy zoning on rents

Housing subsidy zoning has a significant and positive impact on rents in the private sector.<fnref n="12" /> Location in zone II, where housing subsidies are higher, significantly increases the level of rents. This holds in a basic ordinary least square (OLS) specification and with an instrumental variable method (IV) (Table 5). As expected, this impact is less important with the IV method, as this design corrects the selection bias that contributes to the impact that is estimated by the OLS. Adding variables that control for the dwelling quality also reduces this impact, suggesting a positive correlation between the location in zone II and the housing quality. However, location in zone II has no significant impact on any specific proxy for the dwelling

<footnote n="11">¹¹The presence of a bathroom and of a bath is a good proxy for decent dwelling when built in the 1980s.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹²Many characteristics of municipalities have been added as control variables; the regressions here presented include the significant ones only.</footnote>
quality (Section 5.3).

The impact of housing subsidy zoning on rents is of important magnitude: with the IV method and with control variables, location in zone II increases the rents by 5.3%. Given that the average rent is 475 euros, it means the zoning increases the rent by 25 euros. This inflationist impact holds in the long run (between 2005 and 2012), suggesting that housing supply remains inelastic.

The instrumental variable method relies on a first stage equation, which explains the treatment (being located in zone II for housing subsidies) with respect to the location in an agglomeration of more than 100,000 inhabitants. The threshold of 100,000 inhabitants significantly explains the treatment (Table 13 in Appendix A.2); indeed it is the main predictor for location in zone II for housing subsidies. Besides, the F-test of joint nullity of coefficients in this first step equals 125, which guarantees that the threshold of 100,000 inhabitants is not a weak instrument.

## 5.2 Treatment heterogeneity

The impact of location in zone II on rents has an heterogenous impact depending on the predicted household standard of living and the dwelling size (Table 6). When restricting the sample to the low-income household dwellings, this impact is significant and higher than the average impact (with an impact of 6.0% instead of 5.3%); when considering the rich, it is lower (4.5%). When restricting the sample to the dwellings with two rooms or less, this impact is significant and higher (5.7%); it is smaller (4.4%) when estimated for the dwellings with three rooms or more.

We also cross the treatment with the characteristics of land use and real estate market of the agglomerations, such as the shares of social housing, vacant units, students, landowners, or the population density. However, these characteristics define a too small sample to enable to identify a significant heterogeneity in the
<table><caption>Table 5: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on the logarithm of the rent per square meter</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Zone II for housing subsidies</td><td>0.0776**<br>(0.0304)</td><td>0.0666***<br>(0.0193)</td><td>0.0756**<br>(0.0319)</td><td>0.0525***<br>(0.0187)</td></tr><tr><td>Population density<sub>1999</sub></td><td>0.0000571***<br>(0.0000141)</td><td>0.0000251***<br>(0.00000919)</td><td>0.0000575***<br>(0.0000139)</td><td>0.0000273***<br>(0.00000825)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of open space<sub>2000</sub></td><td>0.241***<br>(0.0672)</td><td>0.208***<br>(0.0553)</td><td>0.241***<br>(0.0655)</td><td>0.211***<br>(0.0553)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of rental housing<sub>1999</sub></td><td>0.0823<br>(0.163)</td><td>-0.174*<br>(0.0916)</td><td>0.0813<br>(0.164)</td><td>-0.182**<br>(0.0883)</td></tr><tr><td>Δ agglomeration pop<sub>1975-99</sub></td><td>0.895***<br>(0.124)</td><td>0.505***<br>(0.0737)</td><td>0.896***<br>(0.121)</td><td>0.514***<br>(0.0741)</td></tr><tr><td>log(size)</td><td></td><td>-0.633***<br>(0.0274)</td><td></td><td>-0.633***<br>(0.0268)</td></tr><tr><td>Number of rooms</td><td></td><td>0.0533***<br>(0.0104)</td><td></td><td>0.0533***<br>(0.0103)</td></tr><tr><td>Length of the tenancy</td><td></td><td>-0.0131***<br>(0.00119)</td><td></td><td>-0.0131***<br>(0.00118)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year < 1914</td><td></td><td>-0.0706***<br>(0.0257)</td><td></td><td>-0.0693***<br>(0.0258)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1915-1948</td><td></td><td>-0.0901***<br>(0.0241)</td><td></td><td>-0.0902***<br>(0.0237)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1949-1967</td><td></td><td>-0.106***<br>(0.0183)</td><td></td><td>-0.104***<br>(0.0188)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1968-1990</td><td></td><td>-0.0475**<br>(0.0182)</td><td></td><td>-0.0477***<br>(0.0179)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year > 1990</td><td></td><td>ref.</td><td></td><td>ref.</td></tr><tr><td>Bathroom</td><td></td><td>0.684***<br>(0.245)</td><td></td><td>0.684***<br>(0.240)</td></tr><tr><td>Bath</td><td></td><td>0.0372**<br>(0.0173)</td><td></td><td>0.0371**<br>(0.0171)</td></tr><tr><td>Garden</td><td></td><td>0.0624***<br>(0.0173)</td><td></td><td>0.0626***<br>(0.0168)</td></tr><tr><td>Balcony</td><td></td><td>0.0385***<br>(0.0142)</td><td></td><td>0.0387***<br>(0.0140)</td></tr><tr><td>Home security device</td><td></td><td>0.0374***<br>(0.0136)</td><td></td><td>0.0385***<br>(0.0137)</td></tr><tr><td>House</td><td></td><td>0.0450*<br>(0.0227)</td><td></td><td>0.0453**<br>(0.0226)</td></tr><tr><td>Number of dwellings</td><td></td><td>-0.000301<br>(0.000203)</td><td></td><td>-0.000290<br>(0.000200)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1638</td><td>1638</td><td>1638</td><td>1638</td></tr><tr><td>Estimator</td><td>OLS</td><td>OLS</td><td>IV</td><td>IV</td></tr><tr><td>Year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Period</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td></tr><tr><td>Sample</td><td>private sec.</td><td>private sec.</td><td>private sec.</td><td>private sec.</td></tr><tr><td>Agglomeration population</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

Sources: Rents and Charges survey, Tax Income survey, Population census by INSEE.
treatment effect.

## 5.3 Almost no significant impact on housing quality or quantity

A demand subsidy should lead not only to an increase in rents but also to an increase in the quality of dwellings or in the number of rental dwellings, unless housing supply is fully inelastic (Subsection 2.2). Results show that location in zone II where housing subsidies are higher has no impact on housing quality, as measured by some intrinsic characteristics of the dwelling (number of housings in the building, number of rooms, presence of a bathroom, and the living area) (Table 7). However, these characteristics cannot be easily improved by the landlord (contrary to other proxies for quality, such as the painting or the presence of a fully fitted kitchen).

Similarly, when using data at the municipality scale, results show that housing subsidy zoning has no impact on the proportion of rental housing in the total housing stock (Table 8)<fnref n="13" />. These two results suggest that housing supply remains inelastic in the long run. They also confirm that the dwellings below and above the threshold are indeed comparable, which validates our approach.

## 5.4 Robustness checks

**Window and study period.** Results are provided for a sample with dwellings located in agglomerations between 50,000 and 200,000 inhabitants and rented between 2005 and 2012 (Tables 5 to 8): this sample comprises 1,638 dwellings located in 63 agglomerations. Results are robust when using different windows or different study periods (Table 9).

A wider window of 30,000-300,000 inhabitants (2,973 dwellings located in 101 ag-

<footnote n="13">¹³These results hold when considering the variation of the number of rentals between two census years as the dependent variable.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 6: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on the logarithm of the rent per square meter. Treatment heterogeneity</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Zone II for housing subsidies</td><td>0.0598**<br>(0.0263)</td><td>0.0445**<br>(0.0188)</td><td>0.0566***<br>(0.0199)</td><td>0.0435**<br>(0.0218)</td></tr><tr><td>Population density<sub>1999</sub></td><td>0.0000287**<br>(0.0000131)</td><td>0.0000303***<br>(0.00000786)</td><td>0.0000278***<br>(0.0000102)</td><td>0.0000307***<br>(0.00000771)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of open space<sub>2000</sub></td><td>0.268***<br>(0.103)</td><td>0.192***<br>(0.0503)</td><td>0.286***<br>(0.0741)</td><td>0.180***<br>(0.0565)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of rental housing<sub>1999</sub></td><td>-0.200<br>(0.138)</td><td>-0.210**<br>(0.0955)</td><td>-0.322***<br>(0.123)</td><td>-0.130<br>(0.114)</td></tr><tr><td>Δ agglomeration pop<sub>1975-99</sub></td><td>0.365***<br>(0.109)</td><td>0.560***<br>(0.0737)</td><td>0.560***<br>(0.0928)</td><td>0.513***<br>(0.0796)</td></tr><tr><td>log(size)</td><td>-0.619***<br>(0.0427)</td><td>-0.627***<br>(0.0380)</td><td>-0.620***<br>(0.0362)</td><td>-0.629***<br>(0.0497)</td></tr><tr><td>Number of rooms</td><td>0.0349<br>(0.0220)</td><td>0.0566***<br>(0.0123)</td><td>0.0317<br>(0.0197)</td><td>0.0435***<br>(0.0157)</td></tr><tr><td>Length of the tenancy</td><td>-0.0135***<br>(0.00261)</td><td>-0.0123***<br>(0.00118)</td><td>-0.0150***<br>(0.00171)</td><td>-0.0120***<br>(0.00127)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year < 1914</td><td>-0.0799**<br>(0.0348)</td><td>-0.0550*<br>(0.0311)</td><td>-0.0862***<br>(0.0317)</td><td>-0.0429<br>(0.0364)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1915-1948</td><td>-0.0553*<br>(0.0294)</td><td>-0.0945***<br>(0.0300)</td><td>-0.0643**<br>(0.0276)</td><td>-0.112***<br>(0.0324)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1949-1967</td><td>-0.0607<br>(0.0397)</td><td>-0.109***<br>(0.0195)</td><td>-0.0789***<br>(0.0300)</td><td>-0.108***<br>(0.0248)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1968-1990</td><td>-0.0110<br>(0.0323)</td><td>-0.0534**<br>(0.0210)</td><td>-0.0491**<br>(0.0198)</td><td>-0.0455**<br>(0.0229)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year > 1990</td><td>ref.</td><td>ref.</td><td>ref.</td><td>ref.</td></tr><tr><td>Bathroom</td><td>1.456***<br>(0.120)</td><td>0.431***<br>(0.140)</td><td></td><td>0.678***<br>(0.215)</td></tr><tr><td>Bath</td><td>0.00676<br>(0.0207)</td><td>0.0586***<br>(0.0197)</td><td>0.0146<br>(0.0184)</td><td>0.0602***<br>(0.0233)</td></tr><tr><td>Garden</td><td>-0.0572<br>(0.0423)</td><td>0.0872***<br>(0.0173)</td><td>-0.00332<br>(0.0312)</td><td>0.0956***<br>(0.0212)</td></tr><tr><td>Balcony</td><td>-0.00495<br>(0.0276)</td><td>0.0557***<br>(0.0151)</td><td>0.0107<br>(0.0201)</td><td>0.0633***<br>(0.0185)</td></tr><tr><td>Home security device</td><td>0.0436**<br>(0.0220)</td><td>0.0285<br>(0.0174)</td><td>0.0251<br>(0.0167)</td><td>0.0424*<br>(0.0226)</td></tr><tr><td>House</td><td>0.0151<br>(0.0595)</td><td>0.0365<br>(0.0243)</td><td>-0.0298<br>(0.0337)</td><td>0.0527*<br>(0.0274)</td></tr><tr><td>Number of dwellings</td><td>-0.000300<br>(0.000375)</td><td>-0.000198<br>(0.000278)</td><td>-0.00000862<br>(0.000265)</td><td>-0.000538<br>(0.000437)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>450</td><td>1188</td><td>771</td><td>867</td></tr><tr><td>Estimator</td><td>IV</td><td>IV</td><td>IV</td><td>IV</td></tr><tr><td>Year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Period</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td></tr><tr><td>Sample</td><td>private sec.<br>low-income<br>household</td><td>private sec.<br>other<br>household</td><td>private sec.<br>less than<br>2 rooms</td><td>private sec.<br>more than<br>3 rooms</td></tr><tr><td>Agglomeration population</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

Sources: Rents and Charges survey, Tax Income survey, Population census by INSEE.
<table><caption>Table 7: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on housing quality</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Number of<br>housings<br>in the building</th><th>Number of<br>rooms</th><th>Presence of<br>a bathroom</th><th>Living<br>area</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Zone II for housing subsidies</td><td>1.441<br>(1.210)</td><td>-0.0356<br>(0.0928)</td><td>0.00207<br>(0.00170)</td><td>-0.0234<br>(0.0446)</td></tr><tr><td>Δ agglomeration pop<sub>1975-99</sub></td><td>15.41***<br>(4.556)</td><td>-0.770**<br>(0.332)</td><td>0.00224<br>(0.0130)</td><td>-0.448**<br>(0.177)</td></tr><tr><td>Population density<sub>1999</sub></td><td>0.00178***<br>(0.000520)</td><td>-0.000111***<br>(0.0000398)</td><td>-0.000000908<br>(0.000000896)</td><td>-0.0000717***<br>(0.0000188)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of open space<sub>2000</sub></td><td>2.471<br>(3.201)</td><td>-0.164<br>(0.208)</td><td>-0.00190<br>(0.00541)</td><td>-0.0584<br>(0.110)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of rental housing<sub>1999</sub></td><td>25.79***<br>(7.704)</td><td>-1.901***<br>(0.471)</td><td>0.0229<br>(0.0204)</td><td>-0.553***<br>(0.193)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1638</td><td>1638</td><td>1638</td><td>1638</td></tr><tr><td>Estimator</td><td>IV</td><td>IV</td><td>IV</td><td>IV</td></tr><tr><td>Year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Period</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td></tr><tr><td>Sample</td><td>private sec.</td><td>private sec.</td><td>private sec.</td><td>private sec.</td></tr><tr><td>Agglomeration population</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

Sources: Rents and Charges survey, Tax Income survey, Population census by INSEE.

glomerations) provides a similar positive and significant impact of location in zone II on rents. Reducing the window to 70,000-150,000 gives a non significant impact, as this new sample contains 684 dwellings located in 26 agglomerations only. These 26 agglomerations are not different enough to enable the identification of the treatment effect.

Performing the estimation on previous periods (1987-1995 or 1996-2004, instead of 2005-2012) confirms the impact of location in zone II on rents: during these periods, the amount of housing subsidies was already important (CGDD (2012), see Figure 1) and had an inflationist impact, as found by Fack (2006). The impact of location in zone II is significant in the 1987-2004 period and the treatment coefficient are higher than during the subsequent period. However, these results do not imply that the housing subsidy effect fades over time: first, the descriptive statistics do not support this idea; second the interaction term of treatment and time trend is not significant in the OLS model<fnref n="14" />.

<footnote n="14">¹⁴It is not possible to apply our IV method to a model including an interaction term as we do</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 8: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on the proportion of rental housing at the agglomeration scale</caption><tbody><tr><td>Zone II for building subsidies</td><td>-0.00328<br>(0.0165)</td><td>0.0161<br>(0.0214)</td><td>-0.0104<br>(0.0128)</td><td>0.00260<br>(0.0161)</td></tr><tr><td>Zone A for landlord subsidies</td><td>0.183***<br>(0.0359)</td><td>0.187***<br>(0.0376)</td><td>0.0163<br>(0.0158)</td><td>0.0197<br>(0.0176)</td></tr><tr><td>Zone B1 for landlord subsidies</td><td>0.0326<br>(0.0324)</td><td>0.0242<br>(0.0348)</td><td>0.00232<br>(0.0184)</td><td>-0.00283<br>(0.0203)</td></tr><tr><td>Zone B2 for landlord subsidies</td><td>0.00264<br>(0.0244)</td><td>-0.0000935<br>(0.0266)</td><td>0.00711<br>(0.0128)</td><td>0.00452<br>(0.0145)</td></tr><tr><td>City median income<sub>1982</sub></td><td>-0.0000182***<br>(0.00000451)</td><td>-0.0000185***<br>(0.00000444)</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Δ metropolitan pop<sub>1968-1982</sub></td><td>-0.0808<br>(0.0988)</td><td>-0.0825<br>(0.0910)</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Population density<sub>1982</sub></td><td>0.0000287***<br>(0.00000710)</td><td>0.0000272***<br>(0.00000729)</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Share of open space<sub>1990</sub></td><td>-0.0653*<br>(0.0361)</td><td>-0.0625*<br>(0.0357)</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>City median income<sub>2009</sub></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.0000041<br>(0.0000005)</td><td>-0.0000041<br>(0.0000004)</td></tr><tr><td>Δ metropolitan pop<sub>1990-2009</sub></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.0829***<br>(0.0260)</td><td>0.0752***<br>(0.0255)</td></tr><tr><td>Population density<sub>2009</sub></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.0000230*<br>(0.0000073)</td><td>0.0000214*<br>(0.0000075)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of open space<sub>2006</sub></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.0435<br>(0.0291)</td><td>-0.0429<br>(0.0288)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>763</td><td>763</td><td>776</td><td>776</td></tr><tr><td>Estimator</td><td>OLS</td><td>IV</td><td>OLS</td><td>IV</td></tr><tr><td>Year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Year</td><td>1982</td><td>1982</td><td>2009</td><td>2009</td></tr><tr><td>Agglomeration population</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

Sources: Tax Income survey, Population census by INSEE in 1982 and 1999.
**Social housing, zoning size, and other housing policies.** When considering social housing only, the interpretation of the impact is difficult, because the housing subsidy zoning matches with the rent threshold zoning (Table 10). Thus, the impacts of the two different zonings cannot be disentangled: the impact of the location in zone II on rents may correspond to the ability for the lessor to fix a higher rent.

Results are robust to changes in the estimation zone and considering the city center instead of the central part of the agglomeration (Table 10). Significance still holds but is of less magnitude (4.2% instead of 5.3%), probably because the size of the sample is reduced. Results are robust when adding the zoning for landowners, meaning that this other housing policy does not explain the increase of rents (Table 10).

**Placebo tests.** Placebo tests do not reveal any unexpected impact (Table 11). Other discontinuities at 50,000 or 200,000 inhabitants are non significant. When restricting the sample to the untreated agglomerations of less than 100,000 inhabitants, the threshold of 50,000 has a non significant impact on rents. Similarly, when restricting the sample to the treated agglomerations of more than 100,000 inhabitants, the threshold of 200,000 is non significant.

Besides adding dummies for intervals in agglomeration size confirms that the main discontinuity is indeed the threshold of 100,000 inhabitants. Concretely, living in a agglomeration with less than 100,000 inhabitants decreases the level of rents. This impact is significant for dwellings in agglomerations of less than 50,000 inhabitants and also for dwellings in agglomerations between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, but to a lower extent. This is consistent: agglomerations between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants are more numerous to be located in zone II (i.e., they have a higher probability of receiving higher housing subsidies), which increases rents.

<footnote>not have any instrument for this type of variable.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 9: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on the logarithm of the rent per square meter. Robustness checks: window and study period</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Zone II for housing subsidies</td><td>0.0406<br>(0.0275)</td><td>0.0597***<br>(0.0159)</td><td>0.112***<br>(0.0282)</td><td>0.132***<br>(0.0204)</td></tr><tr><td>Population density<sub>1999</sub></td><td>0.0000299***<br>(0.00000815)</td><td>0.0000285***<br>(0.00000564)</td><td>0.00000892<br>(0.00000116)</td><td>0.0000136<br>(0.00000876)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of open space<sub>2000</sub></td><td>0.155**<br>(0.0655)</td><td>0.197***<br>(0.0441)</td><td>0.0378<br>(0.0847)</td><td>0.128*<br>(0.0723)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of rental housing<sub>1999</sub></td><td>-0.0356<br>(0.136)</td><td>-0.107<br>(0.0861)</td><td>0.0205<br>(0.180)</td><td>-0.0864<br>(0.134)</td></tr><tr><td>Δ agglomeration pop<sub>1975-99</sub></td><td>0.803***<br>(0.123)</td><td>0.527***<br>(0.0584)</td><td>0.735***<br>(0.169)</td><td>0.442***<br>(0.0974)</td></tr><tr><td>log(size)</td><td>-0.688***<br>(0.0452)</td><td>-0.626***<br>(0.0224)</td><td>-0.723***<br>(0.0375)</td><td>-0.710***<br>(0.0322)</td></tr><tr><td>Number of rooms</td><td>0.0632***<br>(0.0179)</td><td>0.0459***<br>(0.00941)</td><td>0.0756***<br>(0.0134)</td><td>0.0577***<br>(0.0120)</td></tr><tr><td>Length of the tenancy</td><td>-0.0123***<br>(0.00159)</td><td>-0.0119***<br>(0.00102)</td><td>-0.0155***<br>(0.00223)</td><td>-0.00468***<br>(0.00102)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year < 1914</td><td>-0.0957**<br>(0.0483)</td><td>-0.0898***<br>(0.0181)</td><td>-0.259***<br>(0.0474)</td><td>-0.218***<br>(0.0264)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1915-1948</td><td>-0.0996**<br>(0.0411)</td><td>-0.0901***<br>(0.0169)</td><td>-0.272***<br>(0.0488)</td><td>-0.171***<br>(0.0261)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1949-1967</td><td>-0.162***<br>(0.0259)</td><td>-0.0987***<br>(0.0148)</td><td>-0.304***<br>(0.0472)</td><td>-0.224***<br>(0.0251)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1968-1990</td><td>-0.105***<br>(0.0293)</td><td>-0.0569***<br>(0.0137)</td><td>-0.183***<br>(0.0372)</td><td>-0.129***<br>(0.0179)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year > 1990</td><td>ref.</td><td>ref.</td><td>ref.</td><td>ref.</td></tr><tr><td>Bathroom</td><td>0.232***<br>(0.0836)</td><td>0.284**<br>(0.125)</td><td>0.593***<br>(0.0743)</td><td>0.804***<br>(0.116)</td></tr><tr><td>Bath</td><td>0.0771***<br>(0.0237)</td><td>0.0401***<br>(0.0120)</td><td>0.0322<br>(0.0300)</td><td>0.0424**<br>(0.0202)</td></tr><tr><td>Garden</td><td>0.106***<br>(0.0282)</td><td>0.0634***<br>(0.0133)</td><td>0.0342<br>(0.0280)</td><td>0.0642***<br>(0.0241)</td></tr><tr><td>Balcony</td><td>0.0138<br>(0.0208)</td><td>0.0371***<br>(0.0113)</td><td>-0.00632<br>(0.0219)</td><td>0.0343**<br>(0.0159)</td></tr><tr><td>Home security device</td><td>0.0435***<br>(0.0166)</td><td>0.0230**<br>(0.0115)</td><td>0.102***<br>(0.0322)</td><td>0.0463***<br>(0.0131)</td></tr><tr><td>House</td><td>0.0505<br>(0.0351)</td><td>0.0437**<br>(0.0176)</td><td>0.0860**<br>(0.0398)</td><td>0.0346<br>(0.0336)</td></tr><tr><td>Number of dwellings</td><td>-0.0000695<br>(0.000418)</td><td>-0.000644**<br>(0.000279)</td><td>-0.00135***<br>(0.000467)</td><td>-0.000775**<br>(0.000384)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>684</td><td>2973</td><td>1106</td><td>1718</td></tr><tr><td>Estimator</td><td>IV</td><td>IV</td><td>IV</td><td>IV</td></tr><tr><td>Year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Period</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>1987-1995</td><td>1996-2004</td></tr><tr><td>Sample</td><td>private sec.</td><td>private sec.</td><td>private sec.</td><td>private sec.</td></tr><tr><td>Agglomeration population</td><td>70,000-<br>150,000</td><td>30,000-<br>300,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

Sources: Rents and Charges survey, Tax Income survey, Population census by INSEE.
<table><caption>Table 10: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on the logarithm of the rent per square meter. Robustness checks: social housing, zoning size, and other housing policies</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Zone II for housing subsidies</td><td>0.0606<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0199)</td><td>0.0418<sup>**</sup><br>(0.0181)</td><td>0.0561<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0179)</td></tr><tr><td>Population density<sub>1999</sub></td><td>0.0000106<br>(0.0000100)</td><td>0.0000331<sup>***</sup><br>(0.00000898)</td><td>0.0000248<sup>***</sup><br>(0.00000799)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of open space<sub>2000</sub></td><td>0.0942<br>(0.0679)</td><td>0.279<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0613)</td><td>0.187<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0539)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of rental housing<sub>1999</sub></td><td>0.00493<br>(0.0859)</td><td>-0.405<sup>**</sup><br>(0.168)</td><td>-0.165<sup>*</sup><br>(0.0889)</td></tr><tr><td>Δ agglomeration pop<sub>1975-99</sub></td><td>0.00227<br>(0.104)</td><td>0.546<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0737)</td><td>0.432<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0728)</td></tr><tr><td>log(size)</td><td>-0.711<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0369)</td><td>-0.625<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0310)</td><td>-0.634<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0264)</td></tr><tr><td>Number of rooms</td><td>0.0803<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0108)</td><td>0.0464<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0117)</td><td>0.0528<sup>***</sup><br>(0.00993)</td></tr><tr><td>Length of the tenancy</td><td>-0.00264<sup>***</sup><br>(0.000528)</td><td>-0.0119<sup>***</sup><br>(0.00133)</td><td>-0.0133<sup>***</sup><br>(0.00116)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year < 1914</td><td>-0.238<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0560)</td><td>-0.0606<sup>**</sup><br>(0.0287)</td><td>-0.0762<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0251)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1915-1948</td><td>-0.287<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0465)</td><td>-0.0979<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0248)</td><td>-0.0950<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0233)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1949-1967</td><td>-0.317<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0151)</td><td>-0.109<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0196)</td><td>-0.109<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0184)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1968-1990</td><td>-0.226<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0160)</td><td>-0.0570<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0177)</td><td>-0.0516<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0176)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year > 1990</td><td>ref.</td><td>ref.</td><td>ref.</td></tr><tr><td>Bathroom</td><td>-0.0124<br>(0.0671)</td><td>0.804<sup>*</sup><br>(0.461)</td><td>0.695<sup>***</sup><br>(0.238)</td></tr><tr><td>Bath</td><td>0.0430<sup>**</sup><br>(0.0202)</td><td>0.0340<sup>**</sup><br>(0.0160)</td><td>0.0360<sup>**</sup><br>(0.0170)</td></tr><tr><td>Garden</td><td>0.0361<br>(0.0304)</td><td>0.0625<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0185)</td><td>0.0640<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0165)</td></tr><tr><td>Balcony</td><td>0.0228<sup>*</sup><br>(0.0128)</td><td>0.0540<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0150)</td><td>0.0345<sup>**</sup><br>(0.0134)</td></tr><tr><td>Home security device</td><td>0.0249<br>(0.0158)</td><td>0.0280<sup>**</sup><br>(0.0133)</td><td>0.0402<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0135)</td></tr><tr><td>House</td><td>0.0995<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0327)</td><td>0.0557<sup>**</sup><br>(0.0264)</td><td>0.0471<sup>**</sup><br>(0.0222)</td></tr><tr><td>Number of dwellings</td><td>-0.000426<sup>***</sup><br>(0.000151)</td><td>-0.000205<br>(0.000217)</td><td>-0.000265<br>(0.000207)</td></tr><tr><td>Zone A for landlord subsidies</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.119<sup>***</sup><br>(0.0287)</td></tr><tr><td>Zone B1 for landlord subsidies</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.0807<sup>*</sup><br>(0.0434)</td></tr><tr><td>Zone B2 for landlord subsidies</td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.00712<br>(0.0181)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1733</td><td>1457</td><td>1638</td></tr><tr><td>Estimator</td><td>IV</td><td>IV</td><td>IV</td></tr><tr><td>Year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Period</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td></tr><tr><td>Sample</td><td>social housing</td><td>private sec.<br>city center</td><td>private sec.</td></tr><tr><td>Agglomeration population</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

Source: Rents and Charges survey, Tax Income survey, Population census by INSEE.
Finally, a temporal trend (here the log of the agglomeration size) is non significant, which confirms that the threshold of 100,000 inhabitants does not capture a non modeled trend effect.
<table><caption>Table 11: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on the logarithm of the rent per square meter. Placebo tests</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>0.0000387***<br>(0.0000115)</th><th>0.0000284***<br>(0.00000895)</th><th>0.0000295***<br>(0.00000758)</th><th>0.0000285***<br>(0.00000629)</th><th>0.0000295***<br>(0.00000838)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Population density<sub>1999</sub></td><td>0.118**<br>(0.0449)</td><td>0.208***<br>(0.0582)</td><td>0.238***<br>(0.0670)</td><td>0.171***<br>(0.0386)</td><td>0.205***<br>(0.0517)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of open space<sub>2000</sub></td><td>-0.247*<br>(0.125)</td><td>-0.215**<br>(0.0909)</td><td>-0.0928<br>(0.125)</td><td>-0.125<br>(0.0851)</td><td>-0.156<br>(0.0995)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of rental housing<sub>1999</sub></td><td>0.438***<br>(0.0505)</td><td>0.508***<br>(0.0780)</td><td>0.615***<br>(0.0866)</td><td>0.484***<br>(0.0507)</td><td>0.487***<br>(0.0710)</td></tr><tr><td>Δ agglomeration pop<sub>1975-99</sub></td><td>-0.660***<br>(0.0297)</td><td>-0.631***<br>(0.0273)</td><td>-0.619***<br>(0.0317)</td><td>-0.634***<br>(0.0215)</td><td>-0.634***<br>(0.0274)</td></tr><tr><td>log(size)</td><td>-0.0122***<br>(0.00130)</td><td>-0.0132***<br>(0.00123)</td><td>-0.0109***<br>(0.00134)</td><td>-0.0118***<br>(0.00101)</td><td>-0.0130***<br>(0.00117)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year &lt; 1914</td><td>-0.144***<br>(0.0277)</td><td>-0.0683**<br>(0.0264)</td><td>-0.0705***<br>(0.0234)</td><td>-0.106***<br>(0.0184)</td><td>-0.0711***<br>(0.0254)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1915-1948</td><td>-0.120***<br>(0.0269)</td><td>-0.0897***<br>(0.0244)</td><td>-0.0718***<br>(0.0171)</td><td>-0.0915***<br>(0.0155)</td><td>-0.0928***<br>(0.0235)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1949-1967</td><td>-0.123***<br>(0.0237)</td><td>-0.1000***<br>(0.0198)</td><td>-0.0920***<br>(0.0184)</td><td>-0.0984***<br>(0.0148)</td><td>-0.110***<br>(0.0180)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1968-1990</td><td>-0.0539**<br>(0.0234)</td><td>-0.0474**<br>(0.0184)</td><td>-0.0830***<br>(0.0153)</td><td>-0.0603***<br>(0.0143)</td><td>-0.0480***<br>(0.0181)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year &gt; 1990</td><td>ref.</td><td>ref.</td><td>ref.</td><td>ref.</td><td>ref.</td></tr><tr><td>Bathroom</td><td>0.469**<br>(0.229)</td><td>0.675***<br>(0.245)</td><td>0.350*<br>(0.195)</td><td>0.382**<br>(0.153)</td><td>0.679***<br>(0.242)</td></tr><tr><td>Bath</td><td>0.0446***<br>(0.0165)</td><td>0.0369**<br>(0.0177)</td><td>0.0357**<br>(0.0167)</td><td>0.0384***<br>(0.0116)</td><td>0.0377**<br>(0.0169)</td></tr><tr><td>Garden</td><td>0.0724***<br>(0.0205)</td><td>0.0610***<br>(0.0172)</td><td>0.0747***<br>(0.0136)</td><td>0.0703***<br>(0.0129)</td><td>0.0642***<br>(0.0167)</td></tr><tr><td>Balcony</td><td>0.0159<br>(0.0176)</td><td>0.0383***<br>(0.0143)</td><td>0.0495***<br>(0.0124)</td><td>0.0377***<br>(0.0108)</td><td>0.0381***<br>(0.0135)</td></tr><tr><td>Home security device</td><td>0.0187<br>(0.0156)</td><td>0.0394***<br>(0.0143)</td><td>0.0306*<br>(0.0163)</td><td>0.0288***<br>(0.0108)</td><td>0.0374***<br>(0.0131)</td></tr><tr><td>House</td><td>0.0234<br>(0.0222)</td><td>0.0478*<br>(0.0240)</td><td>0.0434*<br>(0.0218)</td><td>0.0397**<br>(0.0166)</td><td>0.0420**<br>(0.0209)</td></tr><tr><td>Number of dwellings</td><td>-0.00119**<br>(0.000506)</td><td>-0.000280<br>(0.000205)</td><td>-0.000519<br>(0.000363)</td><td>-0.000688**<br>(0.000274)</td><td>-0.000269<br>(0.000192)</td></tr><tr><td>1 (Agglo. pop &lt; 50000)</td><td>0.00531<br>(0.0184)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>1 (Agglo. pop &lt; 100000)</td><td></td><td>0.0469***<br>(0.0172)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>1 (Agglo. pop &lt; 200000)</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.00399<br>(0.0175)</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Agglo. pop 20000-50000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.0616**<br>(0.0237)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Agglo. pop 50000-100000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.0390**<br>(0.0175)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Agglo. pop 100000-150000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.0254<br>(0.0251)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Agglo. pop 150000-200000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.00616<br>(0.0200)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Agglo. pop 200000-250000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.0233<br>(0.0237)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Agglo. pop 250000-300000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>ref.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Zone II for housing subsidies</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.108**<br>(0.0468)</td></tr><tr><td>log(agglomeration pop<sub>1975</sub>)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.0640<br>(0.0487)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1382</td><td>1638</td><td>1731</td><td>3256</td><td>1638</td></tr><tr><td>Estimator</td><td>OLS</td><td>OLS</td><td>OLS</td><td>OLS</td><td>IV</td></tr><tr><td>Year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Period</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td><td>2005-2012</td></tr><tr><td>Sample</td><td>private sec.<br>untreated</td><td>private sec.</td><td>private sec.<br>treated</td><td>private sec.</td><td>private sec.</td></tr><tr><td>Agglomeration population</td><td>20,000-<br>100,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td><td>100,000-<br>300,000</td><td>20,000-<br>300,000</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td></tr></tbody></table>
# 6 Conclusion

Housing subsidies to tenants are a main tool for housing policy in France. They aim to limit the budget share of housing for tenants and to improve their housing conditions for a given budget share. Despite the increasing budget allocated to housing subsidies since the end of the 1970s, the budget share of housing for low-income tenants has kept increasing, in particular in the private rental sector. We measure the impact of housing subsidies on the private rental sector. To do so, we use an instrumental variable method based on a spatial discontinuity in the subsidy scheme. We show that housing subsidies had an inflationist impact on rents. This impact is stronger for the low-income households and the dwellings with two rooms or less. Besides, higher subsidies seem to have almost no effect on housing quality and to have no impact on the number of offered rental dwellings.

# References

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# A Appendix

## A.1 Comparison of housing subsidies zones crossed with the landlord subsidies zones

<table><caption>Table 12: Number of dwellings in the housing subsidies zones (zones II and III) crossed with the landlord subsidies zones</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Zone II</th><th>Zone III</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Landlord sub. zone A</td><td>0</td><td>43,252</td></tr><tr><td>Landlord sub. zone B1</td><td>177,584</td><td>55,784</td></tr><tr><td>Landlord sub. zone B2</td><td>1,208,007</td><td>1,201,865</td></tr><tr><td>Landlord sub. zone C</td><td>29,297</td><td>90,245</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Population census by INSEE.

## A.2 First stage of the instrumental variable method
<table><caption>Table 13: First stage of the instrumental variable method</caption><tr><td>1 (Agglo. pop &lt; 100000)</td><td>0.893***<br>(0.0501)</td></tr><tr><td>Δ agglomeration pop<sub>1975-99</sub></td><td>-0.126<br>(0.136)</td></tr><tr><td>log(size)</td><td>0.0374<br>(0.0282)</td></tr><tr><td>Number of rooms</td><td>-0.0119<br>(0.00914)</td></tr><tr><td>Length of the tenancy</td><td>-0.00205<br>(0.00137)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year &lt; 1914</td><td>0.0189<br>(0.0366)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1915-1948</td><td>0.00884<br>(0.0310)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1949-1967</td><td>0.0777*<br>(0.0429)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year 1968-1990</td><td>0.00644<br>(0.0278)</td></tr><tr><td>Completion year &gt; 1990</td><td>ref.</td></tr><tr><td>Bathroom</td><td>-0.166<br>(0.155)</td></tr><tr><td>Bath</td><td>-0.00407<br>(0.0263)</td></tr><tr><td>Garden</td><td>-0.0293<br>(0.0249)</td></tr><tr><td>Balcony</td><td>-0.00814<br>(0.0138)</td></tr><tr><td>Home security device</td><td>0.0179<br>(0.0291)</td></tr><tr><td>House</td><td>0.0485<br>(0.0442)</td></tr><tr><td>Number of dwellings</td><td>0.000192<br>(0.000219)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1638</td></tr><tr><td>Year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Period</td><td>2005-2012</td></tr><tr><td>Sample</td><td>private sec.</td></tr><tr><td>Agglomeration population</td><td>50,000-<br>200,000</td></tr></table>

Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

Sources: Rents and Charges survey, Tax Income survey, Population census by INSEE.
<table><tr><td>G 9001</td><td>J. FAYOLLE et M. FLEURBAEY<br/>Accumulation, profitabilité et endettement des entreprises</td><td>Macro-economic import functions with imperfect competition - An application to the E.C. Trade</td></tr><tr><td>G 9002</td><td>H. ROUSSE<br/>Détection et effets de la multicolinéarité dans les modèles linéaires ordinaires - Un prolongement de la réflexion de BELSLEY, KUH et WELSCH</td><td>G 9203<br/>I. STAPIC<br/>Les échanges internationaux de services de la France dans le cadre des négociations multilatérales du GATT<br/>Juin 1992 (1ère version)<br/>Novembre 1992 (version finale)</td></tr><tr><td>G 9003</td><td>P. RALLE et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br/>Indexation des salaires : la rupture de 1983</td><td>G 9204<br/>P. SEVESTRE<br/>L'économie sur données individuelles-temporelles. Une note introductive</td></tr><tr><td>G 9004</td><td>D. GUELLEC et P. RALLE<br/>Compétitivité, croissance et innovation de produit</td><td>G 9205<br/>H. ERKEL-ROUSSE<br/>Le commerce extérieur et l'environnement international dans le modèle AMADEUS (réestimation 1992)</td></tr><tr><td>G 9005</td><td>P. RALLE et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br/>Les conséquences de la désindexation. Analyse dans une maquette prix-salaires</td><td>G 9206<br/>N. GREENAN et D. GUELLEC<br/>Coordination within the firm and endogenous growth</td></tr><tr><td>G 9101</td><td>Équipe AMADEUS<br/>Le modèle AMADEUS - Première partie - Présentation générale</td><td>G 9207<br/>A. MAGNIER et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br/>Technology and trade: empirical evidences for the major five industrialized countries</td></tr><tr><td>G 9102</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br/>Le modèle AMADEUS - Deuxième partie - Propriétés variantielles</td><td>G 9208<br/>B. CREPON, E. DUGUET, D. ENCAOUA et P. MOHNEN<br/>Cooperative, non cooperative R &amp; D and optimal patent life</td></tr><tr><td>G 9103</td><td>D. GUELLEC et P. RALLE<br/>Endogenous growth and product innovation</td><td>G 9209<br/>B. CREPON et E. DUGUET<br/>Research and development, competition and innovation: an application of pseudo maximum likelihood methods to Poisson models with heterogeneity</td></tr><tr><td>G 9104</td><td>H. ROUSSE<br/>Le modèle AMADEUS - Troisième partie - Le commerce extérieur et l'environnement international</td><td>G 9301<br/>J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br/>Commerce international et concurrence impartie: développements récents et implications pour la politique commerciale</td></tr><tr><td>G 9105</td><td>H. ROUSSE<br/>Effets de demande et d'offre dans les résultats du commerce extérieur manufacturé de la France au cours des deux dernières décennies</td><td>G 9302<br/>Ch. CASES<br/>Durées de chômage et comportements d'offre de travail: une revue de la littérature</td></tr><tr><td>G 9106</td><td>B. CREPON<br/>Innovation, taille et concentration: causalités et dynamiques</td><td>G 9303<br/>H. ERKEL-ROUSSE<br/>Union économique et monétaire: le débat économique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9107</td><td>B. AMABLE et D. GUELLEC<br/>Un panorama des théories de la croissance endogène</td><td>G 9304<br/>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC / G. BROUSSAUDIER - L. MIOTTI<br/>Innovation organisationnelle, dynamisme technologique et performances des entreprises</td></tr><tr><td>G 9108</td><td>M. GLAUDE et M. MOUTARDIER<br/>Une évaluation du coût direct de l'enfant de 1979 à 1989</td><td>G 9305<br/>P. JAILLARD<br/>Le traité de Maastricht: présentation juridique et historique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9109</td><td>P. RALLE et alii<br/>France - Allemagne: performances économiques comparées</td><td>G 9306<br/>J.L. BRILLET<br/>Micro-DMS: présentation et propriétés</td></tr><tr><td>G 9110</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br/>Micro-DMS<br/>NON PARU</td><td>G 9307<br/>J.L. BRILLET<br/>Micro-DMS - variantes: les tableaux</td></tr><tr><td>G 9111</td><td>A. MAGNIER<br/>Effets accélérateur et multiplicateur en France depuis 1970: quelques résultats empiriques</td><td>G 9308<br/>S. JACOBZONE<br/>Les grands réseaux publics français dans une perspective européenne</td></tr><tr><td>G 9112</td><td>B. CREPON et G. DUREAU<br/>Investissement en recherche-développement: analyse de causalités dans un modèle d'accélérateur généralisé</td><td>G 9309<br/>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ<br/>Profitabilité de l'investissement productif et transmission des chocs financiers</td></tr><tr><td>G 9113</td><td>J.L. BRILLET, H. ERKEL-ROUSSE, J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br/>"France-Allemagne Couplées" - Deux économies vues par une maquette macro-économique</td><td>G 9400<br/>J. BOURDIEU - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br/>Les théories sur la structure optimale du capital: quelques points de repère</td></tr><tr><td>G 9201</td><td>W.J. ADAMS, B. CREPON, D. ENCAOUA<br/>Choix technologiques et stratégies de dissuasion d'entrée</td><td>G 9410<br/>F. ROSENWALD<br/>Suivi conjoncturel de l'investissement</td></tr><tr><td>G 9202</td><td>J. OLIVEIRA-MARTINS, J. TOUJAS-BERNATE</td><td>G 9411<br/>J. BOURDIEU - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br/>Les décisions de financement des entreprises</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9312</td><td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ<br/>Q de Tobin marginal et transmission des chocs financiers</td></tr><tr><td>G 9313</td><td>Équipes Amadeus (INSEE), Banque de France, Métric (DP)<br/>Présentation des propriétés des principaux modèles macroéconomiques du Service Public</td></tr><tr><td>G 9314</td><td>B. CREPON - E. DUGUET<br/>Research &amp; Development, competition and innovation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9315</td><td>B. DORMONT<br/>Quelle est l'influence du coût du travail sur l'emploi?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9316</td><td>D. BLANCHET - C. BROUSSE<br/>Deux études sur l'âge de la retraite</td></tr><tr><td>G 9317</td><td>D. BLANCHET<br/>Répartition du travail dans une population hétérogène: deux notes</td></tr><tr><td>G 9318</td><td>D. EYSSARTIER - N. PONTY<br/>AMADEUS - an annual macro-economic model for the medium and long term</td></tr><tr><td>G 9319</td><td>G. CETTE - Ph. CUNÉO - D. EYSSARTIER - J. GAUTIÉ<br/>Les effets sur l'emploi d'un abaissement du coût du travail des jeunes</td></tr><tr><td>G 9401</td><td>D. BLANCHET<br/>Les structures par âge importent-elles?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9402</td><td>J. GAUTIÉ<br/>Le chômage des jeunes en France: problème de formation ou phénomène de file d'attente? Quelques éléments du débat</td></tr><tr><td>G 9403</td><td>P. QUIRION<br/>Les déchets en France: éléments statistiques et économiques</td></tr><tr><td>G 9404</td><td>D. LADIRAY - M. GRUN-REHOMME<br/>Lissage par moyennes mobiles - Le problème des extrémités de série</td></tr><tr><td>G 9405</td><td>V. MAILLARD<br/>Théorie et pratique de la correction des effets de jours ouvrables</td></tr><tr><td>G 9406</td><td>F. ROSENWALD<br/>La décision d'investir</td></tr><tr><td>G 9407</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br/>Les apports de l'économie industrielle pour définir la stratégie économique de l'hôpital public</td></tr><tr><td>G 9408</td><td>L. BLOCH, J. BOURDIEU, B. COLIN-SEDILLOT, G. LONGUEVILLE<br/>Du défaut de paiement au dépôt de bilan: les banquiers face aux PME en difficulté</td></tr><tr><td>G 9409</td><td>D. EYSSARTIER, P. MAIRE<br/>Impacts macro-économiques de mesures d'aide au logement: quelques éléments d'évaluation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9410</td><td>F. ROSENWALD<br/>Suivi conjoncturel de l'investissement</td></tr><tr><td>G 9411</td><td>C. DEFEUILLE - Ph. QUIRION<br/>Les déchets d'emballages ménagers: une analyse économique des politiques française et allemande</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9412</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br/>Investissement, incertitude et irréversibilité<br/>Quelques développements récents de la théorie de l'investissement</td></tr><tr><td>G 9413</td><td>B. DORMONT - M. PAUCHET<br/>L'évaluation de l'élasticité emploi-salaire dépend-elle des structures de qualification?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9414</td><td>I. KABLA<br/>Le Choix de breveter une invention</td></tr><tr><td>G 9501</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. SEDILLOT<br/>Irreversible Investment and Uncertainty: When is there a Value of Waiting?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9502</td><td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ<br/>Imperfections du marché du crédit, investissement des entreprises et cycle économique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9503</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Les transformations de la demande de travail par qualification en France Une étude sur la période 1970-1993</td></tr><tr><td>G 9504</td><td>N. GREENAN<br/>Technologie, changement organisationnel, qualifications et emploi: une étude empirique sur l'industrie manufacturière</td></tr><tr><td>G 9505</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Persistence des hiérarchies sectorielles de salaires: un réexamen sur données françaises</td></tr><tr><td>G 9505 Bis</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Persistence of inter-industry wages differentials: a reexamination on matched worker-firm panel data</td></tr><tr><td>G 9506</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br/>Les liens entre RMI et chômage, une mise en perspective NON PARU - article sorti dans Économie et Prévision n° 122 (1996) - pages 95 à 113</td></tr><tr><td>G 9507</td><td>G. CETTE - S. MAHFOUZ<br/>Le partage primaire du revenu Constat descriptif sur longue période</td></tr><tr><td>G 9601</td><td>Banque de France - CEPREMAP - Direction de la Prévision - Érasme - INSEE - OFCE Structures et propriétés de cinq modèles macro-économiques français</td></tr><tr><td>G 9602</td><td>Rapport d'activité de la DESE de l'année 1995</td></tr><tr><td>G 9603</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - A. DRAZNIEKS<br/>L'octroi de crédit aux PME: une analyse à partir d'informations bancaires</td></tr><tr><td>G 9604</td><td>A. TOPIOL-BENSAÎD<br/>Les implantations japonaises en France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9605</td><td>P. GENIER - S. JACOBZONE<br/>Comportements de prévention, consommation d'alcool et tabagie: peut-on parler d'une gestion globale du capital santé? Une modélisation microéconométrique empirique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9606</td><td>C. DOZ - F. LENGLART<br/>Factor analysis and unobserved component models: an application to the study of French business surveys</td></tr><tr><td>G 9607</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br/>La théorie coopérative de la firme</td></tr></table>
<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9608</td>
    <td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br/>Technological innovation and employment<br/>reallocation</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9609</td>
    <td>Ph. COUR - F. RUPPRECHT<br/>L'intégration asymétrique au sein du continent<br/>américain : un essai de modélisation</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9610</td>
    <td>S. DUCHENE - G. FORGEOT - A. JACQUOT<br/>Analyse des évolutions récentes de la productivité apparente du travail</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9611</td>
    <td>X. BONNET - S. MAHFOUZ<br/>The influence of different specifications of<br/>wages-prices spirals on the measure of the<br/>NAIRU: the case of France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9612</td>
    <td>PH. COUR - E. DUBOIS, S. MAHFOUZ,<br/>J. PISANI-FERRY<br/>The cost of fiscal retrenchment revisited: how<br/>strong is the evidence?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9613</td>
    <td>A. JACQUOT<br/>Les flexions des taux d'activité sont-elles seule-<br/>ment conjoncturelles ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9614</td>
    <td>ZHANG Yingxiang - SONG Xueqing<br/>Lexique macroéconomique Français-Chinois</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9701</td>
    <td>J.L. SCHNEIDER<br/>La taxe professionnelle : éléments de cadrage<br/>économique</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9702</td>
    <td>J.L. SCHNEIDER<br/>Transition et stabilité politique d'un système<br/>redistributif</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9703</td>
    <td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Train or Pay: Does it Reduce Inequalities to En-<br/>courage Firms to Train their Workers?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9704</td>
    <td>P. GENIER<br/>Deux contributions sur dépendance et équité</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9705</td>
    <td>E. DUGUET - N. IUNG<br/>R & D Investment, Patent Life and Patent Value<br/>An Econometric Analysis at the Firm Level</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9706</td>
    <td>M. HOUBEBINE - A. TOPIOL-BENSAÏD<br/>Les entreprises internationales en France : une<br/>analyse à partir de données individuelles</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9707</td>
    <td>M. HOUBEBINE<br/>Polarisation des activités et spécialisation des<br/>départements en France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9708</td>
    <td>E. DUGUET - N. GREENAN<br/>Le biais technologique : une analyse sur don-<br/>nées individuelles</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9709</td>
    <td>J.L. BRILLET<br/>Analyzing a small French ECM Model</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9710</td>
    <td>J.L. BRILLET<br/>Formalizing the transition process: scenarios for<br/>capital accumulation</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9711</td>
    <td>G. FORGEOT - J. GAUTIÉ<br/>Insertion professionnelle des jeunes et proces-<br/>sus de déclassement</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9712</td>
    <td>E. DUBOIS<br/>High Real Interest Rates: the Consequence of a<br/>Saving Investment Disequilibrium or of an in-<br/>sufficient Credibility of Monetary Authorities?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9713</td>
    <td>Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études<br/>et Synthèses Économiques - 1996</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9714</td>
    <td>F. LEQUILLER<br/>Does the French Consumer Price Index Over-<br/>state Inflation?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9715</td>
    <td>X. BONNET<br/>Peut-on mettre en évidence les rigidités à la<br/>baisse des salaires nominaux ?<br/>Une étude sur quelques grands pays de l'OCDE</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9716</td>
    <td>N. IUNG - F. RUPPRECHT<br/>Productivité de la recherche et rendements<br/>d'échelle dans le secteur pharmaceutique<br/>français</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9717</td>
    <td>E. DUGUET - I. KABLA<br/>Appropriation strategy and the motivations to use<br/>the patent system in France - An econometric<br/>analysis at the firm level</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9718</td>
    <td>L.P. PELÉ - P. RALLE<br/>Âge de la retraite : les aspects incitatifs du ré-<br/>gime général</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9719</td>
    <td>ZHANG Yingxiang - SONG Xueqing<br/>Lexique macroéconomique français-chinois,<br/>chinois-français</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9720</td>
    <td>M. HOUBEBINE - J.L. SCHNEIDER<br/>Mesurer l'influence de la fiscalité sur la locali-<br/>sation des entreprises</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9721</td>
    <td>A. MOUROUGANE<br/>Crédibilité, indépendance et politique monétaire<br/>Une revue de la littérature</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9722</td>
    <td>P. AUGERAUD - L. BRIOT<br/>Les données comptables d'entreprises<br/>Le système intermédiaire d'entreprises<br/>Passage des données individuelles aux données<br/>sectorielles</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9723</td>
    <td>P. AUGERAUD - J.E. CHAPRON<br/>Using Business Accounts for Compiling National<br/>Accounts: the French Experience</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9724</td>
    <td>P. AUGERAUD<br/>Les comptes d'entreprise par activités - Le pas-<br/>sage aux comptes - De la comptabilité<br/>d'entreprise à la comptabilité nationale - A<br/>paraitre</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9801</td>
    <td>H. MICHAUDON - C. PRIGENT<br/>Présentation du modèle AMADEUS</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9802</td>
    <td>J. ACCARDO<br/>Une étude de comptabilité générationnelle<br/>pour la France en 1996</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9803</td>
    <td>X. BONNET - S. DUCHÈNE<br/>Apports et limites de la modélisation<br/>« Real Business Cycles »</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9804</td>
    <td>C. BARLET - C. DUGUET -<br/>D. ENCAOUA - J. PRADEL<br/>The Commercial Success of Innovations<br/>An econometric analysis at the firm level in<br/>French manufacturing</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9805</td>
    <td>P. CAHUC - Ch. GIANELLA -<br/>D. GOUX - A. ZILBERBERG<br/>Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining<br/>Power - Evidence form a Panel of French Firms</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9806</td>
    <td>J. ACCARDO - M. JLASSI<br/>La productivité globale des facteurs entre 1975<br/>et 1996</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9807</td>
    <td>Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études et<br/>Synthèses Économiques - 1997</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9808</td>
    <td>A. MOUROUGANE<br/>Can a Conservative Governor Conduct an Ac-<br/>comodative Monetary Policy?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9809</td>
    <td>X. BONNET - E. DUBOIS - L. FAUVET<br/>Asymétrie des inflations relatives et menus costs<br/>: tests sur l'inflation française</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9810</td>
    <td>E. DUGUET - N. IUNG<br/>Sales and Advertising with Spillovers at the firm<br/>level: Estimation of a Dynamic Structural Model<br/>on Panel Data</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9811</td>
    <td>J.P. BERTHIER<br/>Congestion urbaine : un modèle de trafic de<br/>pointe à courbe débit-vitesse et demande<br/>élastique</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9812</td>
    <td>C. PRIGENT<br/>La part des salaires dans la valeur ajoutée : une<br/>approche macroéconomique</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9813</td>
    <td>A.Th. AERTS<br/>L'évolution de la part des salaires dans la valeur<br/>ajoutée en France reflète-t-elle les évolutions<br/>individuelles sur la période 1979-1994 ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9814</td>
    <td>B. SALANIÉ<br/>Guide pratique des séries non-stationnaires</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9901</td>
    <td>S. DUCHÈNE - A. JACQUOT<br/>Une croissance plus riche en emplois depuis le<br/>début de la décennie ? Une analyse en compa-<br/>raison internationale</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9902</td>
    <td>Ch. COLIN<br/>Modélisation des carrières dans Destinie</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9903</td>
    <td>Ch. COLIN<br/>Évolution de la dispersion des salaires : un essai<br/>de prospective par microsimulation</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9904</td>
    <td>B. CREPON - N. IUNG<br/>Innovation, emploi et performances</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9905</td>
    <td>B. CREPON - Ch. GIANELLA<br/>Wages inequalities in France 1969-1992<br/>An application of quantile regression techniques</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9906</td>
    <td>C. BONNET - R. MAHIEU<br/>Microsimulation techniques applied to inter-<br/>generational transfers - Pensions in a dynamic<br/>framework: the case of France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9907</td>
    <td>F. ROSENWALD<br/>L'impact des contraintes financières dans la dé-<br/>cision d'investissement</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9908</td>
    <td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 1998</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9909</td>
    <td>J.P. ZOYEM<br/>Contrat d'insertion et sortie du RMI<br/>Évaluation des effets d'une politique sociale</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9910</td>
    <td>Ch. COLIN - FI. LEGROS - R. MAHIEU<br/>Bilans contributifs comparés des régimes de<br/>retraite du secteur privé et de la fonction<br/>publique</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9911</td>
    <td>G. LAROQUE - B. SALANIÉ<br/>Une décomposition du non-emploi en France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9912</td>
    <td>B. SALANIÉ<br/>Une maquette analytique de long terme du<br/>marché du travail</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9912</td>
    <td>Ch. GIANELLA<br/>Une estimation de l'élasticité de l'emploi peu<br/>qualifié à son coût</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9913</td>
    <td>Division « Redistribution et Politiques Sociales »<br/>Le modèle de microsimulation dynamique<br/>DESTINIE</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9914</td>
    <td>E. DUGUET<br/>Macro-commandes SAS pour l'économétrie des<br/>panels et des variables qualitatives</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9915</td>
    <td>R. DUHAUTOIS<br/>Évolution des flux d'emplois en France entre<br/>1990 et 1996 : une étude empirique à partir du<br/>fichier des bénéfices réels normaux (BRN)</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9916</td>
    <td>J.Y. FOURNIER<br/>Extraction du cycle des affaires : la méthode de<br/>Baxter et King</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9917</td>
    <td>B. CRÉPON - R. DESPLATZ - J. MAIRESSE<br/>Estimating price cost margins, scale economies<br/>and workers' bargaining power at the firm level</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9918</td>
    <td>Ch. GIANELLA - Ph. LAGARDE<br/>Productivity of hours in the aggregate production<br/>function: an evaluation on a panel of French<br/>firms from the manufacturing sector</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9919</td>
    <td>S. AUDRIC - P. GIVORD - C. PROST<br/>Évolution de l'emploi et des coûts par quali-<br/>fication entre 1982 et 1996</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 2000/01</td>
    <td>R. MAHIEU<br/>Les déterminants des dépenses de santé : une<br/>approche macroéconomique</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 2000/02</td>
    <td>C. ALLARD-PRIGENT - H. GUILMEAU -<br/>A. QUINET<br/>The real exchange rate as the relative price of<br/>nontrables in terms of tradables: theoretical<br/>investigation and empirical study on French data</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 2000/03</td>
    <td>J.-Y. FOURNIER<br/>L'approximation du filtre passe-bande proposée<br/>par Christiano et Fitzgerald</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 2000/04</td>
    <td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 1999</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 2000/05</td>
    <td>B. CREPON - F. ROSENWALD<br/>Investissement et contraintes de financement : le<br/>poids du cycle<br/>Une estimation sur données françaises</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 2000/06</td>
    <td>A. FLIPO<br/>Les comportements matrimoniaux de fait</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 2000/07</td>
    <td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT<br/>Microsimulations of the retirement decision: a<br/>supply side approach</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 2000/08</td>
    <td>C. AUDENIS - C. PROST<br/>Déficit conjoncturel : une prise en compte des<br/>conjonctures passées</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 2000/09</td>
    <td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT<br/>Équivalent patrimonial de la rente et souscription<br/>de retraite complémentaire</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 2000/10</td>
    <td>R. DUHAUTOIS<br/>Ralentissement de l'investissement : petites ou<br/>grandes entreprises ? industrie ou tertiaire ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 2000/11</td>
    <td>G. LAROQUE - B. SALANIÉ<br/>Temps partiel féminin et incitations financières à<br/>l'emploi</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 2000/12</td>
    <td>Ch. GIANELLA<br/>Local unemployment and wages</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 2000/13</td>
    <td>B. CREPON - Th. HECKEL<br/>- Informatisation en France : une évaluation à<br/>partir de données individuelles</td>
  </tr>
</table>
- Computerization in France: an evaluation based on individual company data

G2001/01 F. LEQUILLER

- La nouvelle économie et la mesure du croissance du PIB

- The new economy and the measurement of GDP growth

G2001/02 S. AUDRIC

La reprise de la croissance de l'emploi profonde aussi aux non-diplômés ?

G2001/03 I. BRAUN-LEMAIRE

Évolution et répartition du surplus de productivité

G2001/04 A. BEAUDU - Th. HECKEL

Le canal du crédit fonctionne-t-il en Europe ? Une étude de l'hétérogénéité des comportements d'investissement à partir de données de bilan agrégées

G2001/05 C. AUDENIS - P. BISCOURP -

N. FOURCADE - O. LOISEL

Testing the augmented Solow growth model: An empirical reassessment using panel data

G2001/06 R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT

Départ à la retraite, irréversibilité et incertitude

G2001/07 Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2000

G2001/08 J. Ph. GAUDEMET

Les dispositifs d'acquisition à titre facultatif d'annuités viagères de retraite

G2001/09 B. CRÉPON - Ch. GIANELLA

Fiscalité, coût d'usage du capital et demande de facteurs : une analyse sur données individuelles

G2001/10 B. CRÉPON - R. DESPLATZ

Évaluation des effets des dispositifs d'allégements de charges sociales sur les bas salaires

G2001/11 J.-Y. FOURNIER

Comparaison des salaires des secteurs public et privé

G2001/12 J.-P. BERTHIER - C. JAULENT

R. CONVENEVOLE - S. PISANI

Une méthodologie de comparaison entre consommations intermédiaires de source fiscale et de comptabilité nationale

G2001/13 P. BISCOURP - Ch. GIANELLA

Substitution and complementarity between capital, skilled and less skilled workers: an analysis at the firm level in the French manufacturing industry

G2001/14 I. ROBERT-BOBEE

Modelling demographic behaviours in the French microsimulation model Destinie: An analysis of future change in completed fertility

G2001/15 J.-P. ZOYEM

Diagnostic sur la pauvreté et calendrier de revenus : le cas du "Panel européen des ménages"

G2001/16 J.-Y. FOURNIER - P. GIVORD

La réduction des taux d'activité aux âges extrêmes, une spécificité française ?

G2001/17 C. AUDENIS - P. BISCOURP - N. RIEDINGER

Existe-t-il une asymétrie dans la transmission du prix du brut aux prix des carburants ?

G2002/01 F. MAGNIEN - J.-L. TAVERNIER - D. THESMAR

Les statistiques internationales de PIB par habitant en standard de pouvoir d'achat : une analyse des résultats

G2002/02 Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2001

G2002/03 B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET

La cessation d'activité au sein des couples : y a-t-il interdépendance des choix ?

G2002/04 G. BRILHAULT

- Rétroposition des séries de FBCF et calcul du capital fixe en SEC-95 dans les comptes nationaux français

- Rétroposition of the investment series (GFCF) and estimation of fixed capital stocks on the ESA-95 basis for the French balance sheets

G2002/05 P. BISCOURP - B. CRÉPON - T. HECKEL - N.

RIEDINGER
How do firms respond to cheaper computers? Microeconomic evidence for France based on a production function approach

G2002/06 C. AUDENIS - J. DEROYON - N. FOURCADE

L'impact des nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication sur l'économie française - un bouclage macro-économique

G2002/07 J. BARDAJI - B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET

Évaluation de trois réformes du Régime Général d'assurance vieillesse à l'aide du modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE

G2002/08 J.-P. BERTHIER

Réflexions sur les différentes notions de volume dans les comptes nationaux : comptes aux prix d'une année fixe ou aux prix de l'année précédente, séries chaînées

G2002/09 F. HILD

Les soldes d'opinion résument-ils au mieux les réponses des entreprises aux enquêtes de conjoncture ?

G2002/10 I. ROBERT-BOBÉE

Les comportements démographiques dans le modèle de microsimulation Destinie - Une comparaison des estimations issues des enquêtes Jeunes et Carrières 1997 et Histoire Familielle 1999

G2002/11 J.-P. ZOYEM

La dynamique des bas revenus : une analyse des entrées-sorties de pauvreté

G2002/12 F. HILD

Prévisions d'inflation pour la France

G2002/13 M. LECLAIR

Réduction du temps de travail et tensions sur les facteurs de production

G2002/14 E. WALRAET - A. VINCENT

- Analyse de la redistribution intragénérationnelle dans le système de retraite des salariés du privé - Une approche par microsimulation

- Intragenerational distributional analysis in the french private sector pension scheme - A microsimulation approach

G2002/15 P. CHONE - D. LE BLANC - I. ROBERT-BOBEE

Offre de travail féminine et garde des jeunes enfants

G2002/16 F. MAUREL - S. GREGOIR

Les indices de compétitivité des pays : interprétation et limites

G2003/01 N. RIEDINGER - E. HAUVY

Le coût de dépollution atmosphérique pour les entreprises françaises : Une estimation à partir de données individuelles

G2003/02 P. BISCOURP et F. KRAMARZ

Création d'emplois, destruction d'emplois et internationalisation des entreprises industrielles françaises : une analyse sur la période 1986-1992

G2003/03 Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2002

G2003/04 P.-O. BEFFY - J. DEROYON -

N. FOURCADE - S. GREGOIR - N. LAÎB - B. MONFORT

Évolutions démographiques et croissance : une projection macro-économique à l'horizon 2020

G2003/05 P. AUBERT

La situation des salariés de plus de cinquante ans dans le secteur privé

G2003/06 P. AUBERT - B. CRÉPON

Âge, salaire et productivité

La productivité des salariés décline-t-elle en fin de carrière ?

G2003/07 H. BARON - P.O. BEFFY - N. FOURCADE - R. MAHIEU

Le ralentissement de la productivité du travail au cours des années 1990

G2003/08 P.-O. BEFFY - B. MONFORT

Patrimoine des ménages, dynamique d'allocation et comportement de consommation

G2003/09 P. BISCOURP - N. FOURCADE

Peut-on mettre en évidence l'existence de rigidités à la baisse des salaires à partir de données individuelles ? Le cas de la France à la fin des années 90

G2003/10 M. LECLAIR - P. PETIT

Présence syndicale dans les firmes : quel impact sur les inégalités salariales entre les hommes et les femmes ?

G2003/11 P.-O. BEFFY - X. BONNET - M. DARRACQ-PARIES - B. MONFORT

MZE: a small macro-model for the euro area

G2004/01 P. AUBERT - M. LECLAIR

La compétitivité exprimée dans les enquêtes trimestrielles sur la situation et les perspectives dans l'industrie

G2004/02 M. DUÉE - C. REBILLARD

La dépendance des personnes âgées : une projection à long terme

G2004/03 S. RASPILLER - N. RIEDINGER

Régulation environnementale et choix de localisation des groupes français

G2004/04 A. NABOULET - S. RASPILLER

Les déterminants de la décision d'investir : une approche par les perceptions subjectives des firmes

G2004/05 N. RAGACHE

La déclaration des enfants par les couples non mariés est-elle fiscalement optimale ?

G2004/06 M. DUÉE

L'impact du chômage des parents sur le devenir scolaire des enfants

G2004/07 P. AUBERT - E. CAROLI - M. ROGER

New Technologies, Workplace Organisation and the Age Structure of the Workforce: Firm-Level Evidence

G2004/08 E. DUGUET - C. LELARGE

Les brevets accroissent-ils les incitations privées à innover ? Un examen microéconométrique

G2004/09 S. RASPILLER - P. SILLARD

Affiliating versus Subcontracting: the Case of Multinationals

G2004/10 J. BOISSINOT - C. L'ANGEVIN - B. MONFORT

Public Debt Sustainability: Some Results on the French Case

G2004/11 S. ANANIAN - P. AUBERT

Travailleurs âgés, nouvelles technologies et changements organisationnels : un réexamen à partir de l'enquête « REPONSE »

G2004/12 X. BONNET - H. PONCET

Structures de revenus et propensions différentes à consommer - Vers une équation de consommation des ménages plus robuste en prévision pour la France

G2004/13 C. PICART

Évaluer la rentabilité des sociétés non financières

G2004/14 J. BARDAJI - B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET

Les retraites du secteur public : projections à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE

G2005/01 S. BUFFETEAU - P. GODEFROY

Conditions de départ en retraite selon l'âge de fin d'études : analyse prospective pour les générations 1945 a1974

G2005/02 C. AFSA - S. BUFFETEAU

L'évolution de l'activité féminine en France : une approche par pseudo-panel

G2005/03 P. AUBERT - P. SILLARD

Délocalisations et réductions d'effectifs dans l'industrie française

G2005/04 M. LECLAIR - S. ROUX

Mesure et utilisation des emplois instables dans les entreprises

G2005/05 C. L'ANGEVIN - S. SERRAVALLE

Performances à l'exportation de la France et de l'Allemagne - Une analyse par secteur et destination géographique

G2005/06 Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Economiques - 2004

G2005/07 S. RASPILLER

La concurrence fiscale : principaux enseignements de l'analyse économique

G2005/08 C. L'ANGEVIN - N. LAÎB

Éducation et croissance en France et dans un panel de 21 pays de l'OCDE

G2005/09 N. FERRARI

Prévoir l'investissement des entreprises
Un indicateur des révisions dans l'enquête de conjoncture sur les investissements dans l'industrie.
G2005/10 P.-O. BEFFY - C. L'ANGEVIN
Chômage et boucle prix-salaires : apport d'un modèle « qualifiés/peu qualifiés »

G2005/11 B. HEITZ
A two-states Markov-switching model of inflation in France and the USA: credible target VS inflation spiral

G2005/12 O. BIAU - H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - N. FERRARI
Réponses individuelles aux enquêtes de conjoncture et prévision macroéconomiques : Exemple de la prévision de la production manufacturière

G2005/13 P. AUBERT - D. BLANCHET - D. BLAU
The labour market after age 50: some elements of a Franco-American comparison

G2005/14 D. BLANCHET - T. DEBRAND - P. DOUGRON - P. POLLET
L'enquête SHARE : présentation et premiers résultats de l'édition française

G2005/15 M. DUÉE
La modélisation des comportements démographiques dans le modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE

G2005/16 H. RAOUI - S. ROUX
Étude de simulation sur la participation versée aux salariés par les entreprises

G2006/01 C. BONNET - S. BUFFETEAU - P. GODEFROY
Disparités de retraite de droit direct entre hommes et femmes : quelles évolutions ?

G2006/02 C. PICART
Les gazelles en France

G2006/03 P. AUBERT - B. CRÉPON - P. ZAMORA
Le rendement apparent de la formation continue dans les entreprises : effets sur la productivité et les salaires

G2006/04 J.-F. OUVRARD - R. RATHELOT
Demographic change and unemployment: what do macroeconometric models predict?

G2006/05 D. BLANCHET - J.-F. OUVRARD
Indicateurs d'engagements implicites des systèmes de retraite : chiffrages, propriétés analytiques et réactions à des chocs démographiques types

G2006/06 G. BIAU - O. BIAU - L. ROUVIERE
Nonparametric Forecasting of the Manufacturing Output Growth with Firm-level Survey Data

G2006/07 C. AFSA - P. GIVORD
Le rôle des conditions de travail dans les absences pour maladie

G2006/08 P. SILLARD - C. L'ANGEVIN - S. SERRAVALLE
Performances comparées à l'exportation de la France et de ses principaux partenaires
Une analyse structurelle sur 12 ans

G2006/09 X. BOUTIN - S. QUANTIN
Une méthodologie d'évaluation comptable du coût du capital des entreprises françaises : 1984-2002

G2006/10 C. AFSA
L'estimation d'un coût implicite de la pénibilité du travail chez les travailleurs âgés

G2006/11 C. LELARGE
Les entreprises (industrielles) françaises sont-elles à la frontière technologique ?

G2006/12 O. BIAU - N. FERRARI
Théorie de l'opinion
Faut-il pondérer les réponses individuelles ?

G2006/13 A. KOUBI - S. ROUX
Une réinterprétation de la relation entre productivité et inégalités salariales dans les entreprises

G2006/14 R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
The impact of local taxes on plants location decision

G2006/15 L. GONZALEZ - C. PICART
Diversification, centrage et poids des activités de support dans les groupes (1993-2000)

G2007/01 D. SRAER
Allègements de cotisations patronales et dynamique salariale

G2007/02 V. ALBOUY - L. LEQUIEN
Les rendements non monétaires de l'éducation : le cas de la santé

G2007/03 D. BLANCHET - T. DEBRAND
Aspiration à la retraite, santé et satisfaction au travail : une comparaison européenne

G2007/04 M. BARLET - L. CRUSSON
Quel impact des variations du prix du pétrole sur la croissance française ?

G2007/05 C. PICART
Flux d'emploi et de main-d'œuvre en France : un réexamen

G2007/06 V. ALBOUY - C. TAVAN
Massification et démocratisation de l'enseignement supérieur en France

G2007/07 T. LE BARBANCHON
The Changing response to oil price shocks in France: a DSGE type approach

G2007/08 T. CHANEY - D. SRAER - D. THESMAR
Collateral Value and Corporate Investment Evidence from the French Real Estate Market

G2007/09 J. BOISSINOT
Consumption over the Life Cycle: Facts for France

G2007/10 C. AFSA
Interpréter les variables de satisfaction : l'exemple de la durée du travail

G2007/11 R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
Zones Franches Urbaines : quels effets sur l'emploi salarié et les créations d'établissements ?

G2007/12 V. ALBOUY - B. CRÉPON
Aléa moral en santé : une évaluation dans le cadre du modèle causal de Rubin

G2008/01 C. PICART
Les PME françaises : rentables mais peu dynamiques

G2008/02 P. BISCOURP - X. BOUTIN - T. VERGÉ
The Effects of Retail Regulations on Prices Evidence form the Loi Galland

G2008/03 Y. BARBESOL - A. BRIANT
Économies d'agglomération et productivité des entreprises : estimation sur données individuelles françaises

G2008/04 D. BLANCHET - F. LE GALLO
Les projections démographiques : principaux mécanismes et retour sur l'expérience française

G2008/05 D. BLANCHET - F. TOUTLEMONDE
Évolutions démographiques et déformation du cycle de vie active : quelles relations ?

G2008/06 M. BARLET - D. BLANCHET - L. CRUSSON
Internationalisation et flux d'emplois : que dit une approche comptable ?

G2008/07 C. LELARGE - D. SRAER - D. THESMAR
Entrepreneurship and Credit Constraints - Evidence from a French Loan Guarantee Program

G2008/08 X. BOUTIN - L. JANIN
Are Prices Really Affected by Mergers?

G2008/09 M. BARLET - A. BRIANT - L. CRUSSON
Concentration géographique dans l'industrie manufacturière et dans les services en France : une approche par un indicateur en continu

G2008/10 M. BEFFY - É. COUDIN - R. RATHELOT
Who is confronted to insecure labor market histories? Some evidence based on the French labor market transition

G2008/11 M. ROGER - E. WALRAET
Social Security and Well-Being of the Elderly: the Case of France

G2008/12 C. AFSA
Analyser les composantes du bien-être et de son évolution
Une approche empirique sur données individuelles

G2008/13 M. BARLET - D. BLANCHET - T. LE BARBANCHON
Microsimplifier le marché du travail : un prototype

G2009/01 P.-A. PIONNIER
Le partage de la valeur ajoutée en France, 1949-2007

G2009/02 Laurent CLAVEL - Christelle MINODIER
A Monthly Indicator of the French Business Climate

G2009/03 H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - C. MINODIER
Do Business Tendency Surveys in Industry and Services Help in Forecasting GDP Growth? A Real-Time Analysis on French Data

G2009/04 P. GIVORD - L. WILNER
Les contrats temporaires : trappe ou marchepied vers l'emploi stable ?

G2009/05 G. LALANNE - P.-A. PIONNIER - O. SIMON
Le partage des fruits de la croissance de 1950 à 2008 : une approche par les comptes de surplus

G2009/06 L. DAVEZIES - X. D'HAULTFOEUILLE
Faut-il pondérer ?... Ou l'éternelle question de l'économètre confronté à des données d'enquête

G2009/07 S. QUANTIN - S. RASPILLER - S. SERRAVALLE
Commerce intragroupe, fiscalité et prix de transferts : une analyse sur données françaises

G2009/08 M. CLERC - V. MARCUS
Élasticités-prix des consommations énergétiques des ménages

G2009/09 G. LALANNE - E. POULIQUEN - O. SIMON
Prix du pétrole et croissance potentielle à long terme

G2009/10 D. BLANCHET - J. LE CACHEUX - V. MARCUS
Adjusted net savings and other approaches to sustainability: some theoretical background

G2009/11 V. BELLAMY - G. CONSALES - M. FESSEAU - S. LE LAIDIER - É. RAYNAUD
Une décomposition du compte des ménages de la comptabilité nationale par catégorie de ménage en 2003

G2009/12 J. BARDAJI - F. TALLET
Detecting Economic Regimes in France: a Qualitative Markov-Switching Indicator Using Mixed Frequency Data

G2009/13 R. AEBERHARDT - D. FOUGÈRE - R. RATHELOT

Discrimination à l'embauche : comment exploiter les procédures de testing ?

G2009/14 Y. BARBESOL - P. GIVORD - S. QUANTIN
Partage de la valeur ajoutée, approche par données microéconomiques

G2009/15 I. BUONO - G. LALANNE
The Effect of the Uruguay round on the Intensive and Extensive Margins of Trade

G2010/01 C. MINODIER
Avantages comparés des séries des premières valeurs publiées et des séries des valeurs révisées - Un exercice de prévision en temps réel de la croissance trimestrielle du PIB en France

G2010/02 V. ALBOUY - L. DAVEZIES - T. DEBRAND
Health Expenditure Models: a Comparison of Five Specifications using Panel Data

G2010/03 C. KLEIN - O. SIMON
Le modèle MÉSANGE réestimé en base 2000 Tome 1 – Version avec volumes à prix constants

G2010/04 M.-É. CLERC - É. COUDIN
L'IPC, miroir de l'évolution du coût de la vie en France ? Ce qu'apporte l'analyse des courbes d'Engel

G2010/05 N. CECI-RENAUD - P.-A. CHEVALIER
Les seuils de 10, 20 et 50 salariés : impact sur la taille des entreprises françaises

G2010/06 R. AEBERHARDT - J. POUGET
National Origin Differences in Wages and Hierarchical Positions - Evidence on French Full-Time Male Workers from a matched Employer-Employee Dataset

G2010/07 S. BLASCO - P. GIVORD
Les trajectoires professionnelles en début de vie active : quel impact des contrats temporaires ?

G2010/08 P. GIVORD
Méthodes économétriques pour l'évaluation de politiques publiques

G2010/09 P.-Y. CABANNES - V. LAPÈGUE - E. POULIQUEN - M. BEFFY - M. GAINI
Quelle croissance de moyen terme après la crise ?

G2010/10 I. BUONO - G. LALANNE
La réaction des entreprises françaises à la baisse des tarifs douaniers étrangers
G2010/11 R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
L'apport des méthodes à noyaux pour mesurer la concentration géographique - Application à la concentration des immigrés en France de 1968 à 1999

G2010/12 M. BARATON - M. BEFFY - D. FOUGÈRE
Une évaluation de l'effet de la réforme de 2003 sur les départs en retraite - Le cas des enseignants du second degré public

G2010/13 D. BLANCHET - S. BUFFETEAU - E. CRENNER
S. LE MINEZ
Le modèle de microsimulation Destinie 2 : principales caractéristiques et premiers résultats

G2010/14 D. BLANCHET - E. CRENNER
Le bloc retraites du modèle Destinie 2 : guide de l'utilisateur

G2010/15 M. BARLET - L. CRUSSON - S. DUPUCH - F. PUECH
Des services échangés aux services échangeables : une application sur données françaises

G2010/16 M. BEFFY - T. KAMIONKA
Public-private wage gaps: is civil-servant human capital sector-specific?

G2010/17 P.-Y. CABANNES - H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - G. LALANNE - O. MONSO - E. POULIQUEN
Le modèle Mésange réestimé en base 2000 Tome 2 - Version avec volumes à prix chaînés

G2010/18 R. AEBERHARDT - L. DAVEZIES
Conditional Logit with one Binary Covariate: Link between the Static and Dynamic Cases

G2011/01 T. LE BARBANCHON - B. OURLIAC - O. SIMON
Les marchés du travail français et américain face aux chocs conjonctuels des années 1986 à 2007 : une modélisation DSGE

G2011/02 C. MARBOT
Une évaluation de la réduction d'impôt pour l'emploi de salariés à domicile

G2011/03 L. DAVEZIES
Modèles à effets fixes, à effets aléatoires, modèles mixtes ou multi-niveaux : propriétés et mises en œuvre des modélisations de l'hétérogénéité dans le cas de données groupées

G2011/04 M. ROGER - M. WASMER
Heterogeneity matters: labour productivity differentiated by age and skills

G2011/05 J.-C. BRICONGNE - J.-M. FOURNIER
V. LAPÈGUE - O. MONSO
De la crise financière à la crise économique L'impact des perturbations financières de 2007 et 2008 sur la croissance de sept pays industrialisés

G2011/06 P. CHARNOZ - É. COUDIN - M. GAINI
Wage inequalities in France 1976-2004: a quantile regression analysis

G2011/07 M. CLERC - M. GAINI - D. BLANCHET
Recommendations of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report: A few illustrations

G2011/08 M. BACHELET - M. BEFFY - D. BLANCHET
Projet l'impact des réformes des retraites sur l'activité des 55 ans et plus : une comparaison de trois modèles

G2011/09 C. LOUVOT-RUNAVOT
L'évaluation de l'activité dissimulée des entre-

prises sur la base des contrôles fiscaux et son insertion dans les comptes nationaux

G2011/10 A. SCHREIBER - A. VICARD
La tertiairisation de l'économie française et le renaltissement de la productivité entre 1978 et 2008

G2011/11 M.-É. CLERC - O. MONSO - E. POULIQUEN
Les inégalités entre générations depuis le baby-boom

G2011/12 C. MARBOT - D. ROY
Évaluation de la transformation de la réduction d'impôt en crédit d'impôt pour l'emploi de salariés à domicile en 2007

G2011/13 P. GIVORD - R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
Place-based tax exemptions and displacement effects: An evaluation of the Zones Franches Urbaines program

G2011/14 X. D'HAULTFOEUILLE - P. GIVORD - X. BOUTIN
The Environmental Effect of Green Taxation: the Case of the French "Bonus/Malus"

G2011/15 M. BARLET - M. CLERC - M. GARNEO - V. LAPÈGUE - V. MARCUS
La nouvelle version du modèle MZE, modèle macroéconométrique pour la zone euro

G2011/16 R. AEBERHARDT - I. BUONO - H. FADINGER
Learning, Incomplete Contracts and Export Dynamics: theory and Evidence form French Firms

G2011/17 C. KERDRAIN - V. LAPÈGUE
Restrictive Fiscal Policies in Europe: What are the Likely Effects?

G2012/01 P. GIVORD - S. QUANTIN - C. TREVIEN
A Long-Term Evaluation of the First Generation of the French Urban Enterprise Zones

G2012/02 N. CECI-RENAUD - V. COTTET
Politique salariale et performance des entreprises

G2012/03 P. FÉVRIER - L. WILNER
Do Consumers Correctly Expect Price Reductions? Testing Dynamic Behavior

G2012/04 M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD
School as a shelter? School leaving-age and the business cycle in France

G2012/05 M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD
A scarred generation? French evidence on young people entering into a tough labour market

G2012/06 P. AUBERT - M. BACHELET
Disparités de montant de pension et redistribution dans le système de retraite français

G2012/07 R. AEBERHARDT - P GIVORD - C. MARBOT
Spillover Effect of the Minimum Wage in France: An Unconditional Quantile Regression Approach

G2012/08 A. EIDELMAN - F. LANGUMIER - A. VICARD
Prélèvements obligatoires reposant sur les ménages : des canaux redistributifs différents en 1990 et 2010

G2012/09 O. BARGAIN - A. VICARD
Le RMI et son successeur le RSA découragent-ils certains jeunes de travailler ? Une analyse sur les jeunes autour de 25 ans

G2012/10 C. MARBOT - D. ROY
Projections du coût de l'APA et des caractéristiques de ses bénéficiaires à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle Destinie

G2012/11 A. MAUROUX
Le crédit d'impôt dédié au développement durable : une évaluation économique

G2012/12 V. COTTET - S. QUANTIN - V. RÉGNIER
Coût du travail et allègements de charges : une estimation au niveau établissement de 1996 à 2008

G2012/13 X. D'HAULTFOEUILLE - P. FÉVRIER - L. WILNER
Demand Estimation in the Presence of Revenue Management

G2012/14 D. BLANCHET - S. LE MINEZ
Joint macro/micro evaluations of accrued-to-date pension liabilities: an application to French reforms

G2013/01- F1301
T. DEROYON - A. MONTAUT - P-A PIONNIER
Utilisation rétrospective de l'enquête Emploi à une fréquence mensuelle : apport d'une modélisation espace-état

G2013/02- F1302
C. TREVIEN
Habiter en HLM : quel avantage monétaire et quel impact sur les conditions de logement ?

G2013/03 A. POISSONNIER
Temporal disaggregation of stock variables - The Chow-Lin method extended to dynamic models

G2013/04 P. GIVORD - C. MARBOT
Does the cost of child care affect female labor market participation? An evaluation of a French reform of childcare subsidies

G2013/05 G. LAME - M. LEQUIEN - P.-A. PIONNIER
Interpretation and limits of sustainability tests in public finance

G2013/06 C. BELLEGO - V. DORTET-BERNADET
La participation aux pôles de compétitivité : quelle incidence sur les dépenses de R&D et l'activité des PME et ETI ?

G2013/07 P.-Y. CABANNES - A. MONTAUT - P-A. PIONNIER
Évaluer la productivité globale des facteurs en France : l'apport d'une mesure de la qualité du capital et du travail

G2013/08 R. AEBERHARDT - C. MARBOT
Evolution of Instability on the French Labour Market During the Last Thirty Years

G2013/09 J-B. BERNARD - G. CLÉAUD
Oil price: the nature of the shocks and the impact on the French economy

G2013/10 G. LAME
Was there a « Greenspan Conundrum » in the Euro area?

G2013/11 P. CHONÉ - F. EVAIN - L. WILNER - E. YILMAZ
Introducing activity-based payment in the hospital industry : Evidence from French data

G2013/12 C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY
Natural Disasters: Exposure and Underinsurance

G2013/13 P.-Y. CABANNES - V. COTTET - Y. DUBOIS - C. LELARGE - M. SICSIC
French Firms in the Face of the 2008/2009 Crisis

G2013/14 A. POISSONNIER - D. ROY
Households Satellite Account for France in 2010. Methodological issues on the assessment of domestic production

G2013/15 G. CLÉAUD - M. LEMOINE - P.-A. PIONNIER
Which size and evolution of the government expenditure multiplier in France (1980-2010)?

G2014/01 M. BACHELET - A. LEDUC - A. MARINO
Les biographies du modèle Destinie II : rebasage et projection

G2014/02 B. GARBINTI
L'achat de la résidence principale et la création d'entreprises sont-ils favorisés par les donations et héritages ?

G2014/03 N. CECI-RENAUD - P. CHARNOZ - M. GAINI
Évolution de la volatilité des revenus salariaux du secteur privé en France depuis 1968

G2014/04 P. AUBERT
Modalités d'application des réformes des retraites et prévisibilité du montant de pension

G2014/05 C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY - A. KATOSSKY
The Impact of Hazardous Industrial Facilities on Housing Prices: A Comparison of Parametric and Semiparametric Hedonic Price Models

G2014/06 J.-M. DAUSSIN-BENICHOU - A. MAUROUX
Turning the heat up. How sensitive are households to fiscal incentives on energy efficiency investments?

G 2014 / 07 C. LABONNE - G. LAMÉ
Credit Growth and Capital Requirements: Binding or Not?

G 2014 / 08 C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY et C. TREVIEN
The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector: the French Example