# Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from Mélèze model

Benoît Campagne, Aurélien Poissonnier

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Benoît Campagne, Aurélien Poissonnier. Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from Mélèze model. 2016. hal-05416907

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Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques

G 2016 / 06

Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers:
lessons from Mélèze model

Benoît CAMPAGNE et Aurélien POISSONNIER

Document de travail

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>

Insee
Mesurer pour comprendre

Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES

Série des documents de travail
de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques

G 2016 / 06

Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers:
lessons from Mélèze model

Benoît CAMPAGNE* et Aurélien POISSONNIER**

JUILLET 2016

The authors would like to thank Jean-Guillaume SAHUC for his fruitful discussion and advice on a first version of this paper, as well as all participants to the D2E seminar at the Insee and to the 2015 ICMAIF conference.

<footnote>* Département des Études Économiques - Division « Études Macroéconomiques » Timbre G220 - 15, bd Gabriel Péri - BP 100 - 92244 MALAKOFF CEDEX
Crest - LMA</footnote>

<footnote>** Commission européenne. L'auteur était en poste à l'Insee et affilié au Crest-LMA et École Polytechnique au moment de la rédaction de ce document.</footnote>
# Courbes de Laffer et multiplicateurs budgétaires à partir du modèle Mélèze

## Résumé

Cet article utilise une modélisation DSGE de la zone euro développée à l'Insee dans un but d'évaluation *ex ante* de réformes budgétaires. Les principales caractéristiques de ce modèle sont comparables aux modèles standards utilisés dans les principales organisations internationales et banques centrales. À l'aide de courbes de Laffer généralisées, nous constatons que les niveaux effectifs de taxation sont en deçà de ceux maximisant les revenus du gouvernement. Toutefois, ce résultat dépend du niveau de compétition monopolistique sur le marché des biens. Nous étudions aussi les multiplicateurs budgétaires de court- et long-terme pour divers instruments budgétaires. Nos résultats sont comparables avec ceux obtenus dans d'autres modèles DSGE mais aussi avec ceux obtenus dans le modèle macroéconométrique Mésange. Néanmoins, selon le comportement des autorités monétaires et budgétaires et l'instrument considéré, les multiplicateurs budgétaires de court- terme varient substantiellement de 0,2 à 1 point autour du multiplicateur moyen dans les cas les plus extrêmes. De manière plus générale, il existe une marge de manœuvre importante pour des politiques budgétaires dites mixtes.

**Mots-clés** : multiplicateur budgétaire, courbe de Laffer, modèle DSGE, union monétaire

## Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from Mélèze model

## Abstract

We use the two country DSGE model of the Euro area Meleze developed at Insee to perform *ex ante* fiscal reforms evaluations. The main features of the model compare with standard tools developed in international institutions and central banks. In practice, tax rates are below the government revenues maximizing rate identified by generalized equilibrium Laffer curves in the model. The extent of this result nevertheless depends on the degree of monopolistic competition on the goods market. We also analyse short and long term multipliers for numerous fiscal tools. These compare to standard DSGE simulations as well as to the macroeconometric model Mésange. However, depending on the behaviour of fiscal and monetary authorities, short-term fiscal multipliers variations are substantial, from 0.2 up to 1 point around the baseline in the most extreme case. All in all, there exists room of manoeuvre for so called mixed-strategies fiscal policy.

**Keywords:** fiscal multiplier, Laffer curve, DSGE model, monetary union

**Classification JEL** : E10, E62, F45
# 1 Introduction

Since the beginning of the great recession, fiscal policy has either been investigated as a short term solution out of the crisis or now through the scope of fiscal consolidation.

Fiscal reforms or consolidation have already been assessed through DSGE models. In the European context many works were conducted on the Quest III model (D'Auria et al., 2009; Roeger and in't Veld, 2010; Vogel, 2012; Annicchiarico et al., 2013; in't Veld, 2013). Coenen et al. (2008b) investigate fiscal consolidation in the New Area Wide Model (NAWM). Clinton et al. (2011) provide similar insights in the case of an international model (GIMF). Coenen et al. (2012) give an extensive review of the size of fiscal multipliers in the main institutional models.

Most of these papers plead in favour of so called *mixed strategies*. Actually, they advocates for fiscal consolidations based on an immediate, sharp but transitory increase in taxes along with a permanent but gradual decrease in government spendings. Such packages simultaneously ensure a permanent and immediate decrease in public deficits but also minimize the negative impact on activity, both in the short and long run.

However, they also highlight that the evaluation and the design of efficient fiscal packages is not a straightforward task. Factors such as the monetary environment, the competition level, the international setting or the heterogeneity of households influence the success of consolidation or stimulation policies. However, the large number of available fiscal tools allows for some room of manoeuvre in the design of programs, and fiscal authorities and policy-makers must rely on detailed evaluations of all possible reform scenarios.

In the present paper, we aim to give a French outlook and compare the effect of transitory or permanent fiscal reforms in a standard feature DSGE model for France within the Euro Area.

First, we derive generalized equilibrium Laffer curves as specified in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Contrary to Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), our model includes monopolistic imperfections which we find responsible for a sizeable increase in the potential additional revenues from capital taxation. Also, French tax rates are below the revenue maximizing rates.

In a second step, we simulate increases in public spending, transfers or decreases in various tax rates calibrated to 1% of pre-stimulus output. The resulting fiscal multipliers are compared to the main existing DSGE models based on the results provided in Coenen et al. (2012), and to the French macroeconomic model Mésange developed at Insee (Klein and Simon, 2010). We find that our model gives comparable multipliers for transitory shocks but highlight that these measures of the fiscal multipliers crucially depend on their timing and the way both fiscal and monetary authorities commit or react to
the stimulus. Short-term fiscal multipliers variations range from 0.2 up to 1 point around the baseline
in the most extreme case, with therefore very different implications in terms of policy-making.

It is noteworthy that for transitory measures, public spending fiscal multipliers can range from 0.7 to
1.3; cuts on distorting tax rates provides lower multipliers; coordination across countries in a monetary
union leads to larger fiscal multipliers. This compares to empirical work on the French public spending
multiplier as presented in Cléaud et al. (2013). Estimating an SVAR over the period 1980-2010, and
following a one quarter shock, they exhibit a 1.1 instantaneous multiplier, close to our corresponding
simulation.

The model Meleze used in this paper stems from Campagne and Poissonnier (2016) and features the standard modelling choices of the two country monetary union literature. The modelling elements are those generally embedded in large scale models developed in central banks and international institutions among which are GEM at the IMF (Bayoumi et al., 2004), NAWM at the ECB (Coenen et al., 2008a) or in open economy EAGLE (Gomes et al., 2012), QUEST III at the European Commission (Ratto et al., 2009) and its R&D version (Roeger et al., 2008).

Regarding the behaviour of fiscal authorities, the government uses public spending to stimulate and
monitor economic activity. It can also exogenously modify its fiscal policy along different axes: lump-
sum transfers and taxes on consumption, labour, capital income or dividends. As detailed below, we
implement a traditional budget rule with government expenditures reacting to the output gap and past
deficits. We also propose an alternative to traditional budget rules used in the literature, and derive a
forward-looking optimizing behaviour for the government.

In Meleze, we replicate two different settings: France against the rest of the Eurozone, and a sym-
metric calibration for the Euro area.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives a short presentation of the model and its
calibration. Section 3 analyses long term fiscal properties of the model through Laffer curves. Section 4
and 5 study transitory and permanent fiscal reforms respectively. The technical reader may refer to the
companion paper (Campagne and Poissonnier, 2016).

## 2 Outline of the model: Meleze

This section gives a short presentation of the main features of the model, namely: a model of two
countries in monetary union, comparing with standard tools developed in international institutions
and central banks (Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2003). A more detailed description of the
model, the first order conditions, their steady state and linearisation is given in the companion paper
(Campagne and Poissonnier, 2016).
## 2.1 General framework

The model consists of two countries where continuum of firms and households interact on the goods, labour and capital market. Both firms and households are consider immobile across countries.

As advocated by Mankiw (2000) in the context of fiscal analysis, we distinguish between two types of households. A fraction of these households is *Ricardian*, that is not financially constrained. They hold financial asset (or debt), own capital which they lend to firms in their country (once installed capital is assumed to become immobile) and also own financial intermediation firms. Therefore, they receive interests and dividends. These *Ricardian* households also choose their investment each period by arbitrating between capital and the risk free asset. *Non Ricardian* households on the contrary are financially constrained and do not hold any asset.

Both types of households also provide labour on a monopolistically competitive market. For this reason, households are paid with a mark-up over their marginal disutility. Wage rigidities are added over the cycle following Erceg et al. (2000), and each household can only reset its wage in adequateness with his optimal consumption-leisure arbitrage with an exogenous probability. In this framework, there is no involuntary unemployment and labour adjusts only at the intensive margin (hours worked).

Households finally consume both domestic and imported goods which are also partial substitutes. For the *Ricardian* households, being non financially constrained allows them to smooth their consumption over time. *Non Ricardian* households on the contrary cannot. Once their wage level is set, their labour supply is given by firms demand, their income ensues which they consume entirely within the same quarter.

Firms produce partially substitutable goods from a standard constant returns to scale production function. Production factors are labour and capital. Total factor productivity is exogenous and growing at the same pace across countries. At each period firms optimize their relative demand in capital and labour to minimize their production cost, taking the aggregate wage and capital rental cost as given. Partial substitutability across goods allows firm to price a mark-up over their marginal cost. Over the cycle, with an exogenous probability each firm can reset its price to maximize its expected discounted profits, while internalising its market power. Those price rigidities lead to a New Keynesian Phillips curve.

The modelling of governments' behaviour is conducted along two lines. First, we implement a traditional budget rules with government consumption reacting to the output gap and past deficits. Second, and as an alternative to these rules, we also consider here forward-looking optimizing governments. Their objective is to maximize households' intertemporal utility derived from public spending in partial information as an approximation for the exact Ramsey problem. We consider public consumption as a proxy for actual public spendings, public investment, public employment and production of public
services altogether. For this reason public spendings are purchased from domestic producers only. In a discretionary manner, governments collect taxes on wages, capital interests, dividends, consumption and investment. They can distribute transfers to both types of households. They also hold debt both at the steady state and over the cycle.

In addition to the production of real goods by the firms, a union wide financial market produces financial intermediation services for both households and governments. Financial intermediaries deduct from the interest rate set by the central banker a fee under the form of a debt elastic spread which is akin to fisim. There are no risk or agency issues in our model so that this fee is not to be interpreted as a risk premium of any kind. In practice, these financial intermediaries ensure the closing of the model as exposed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and have a very small production compared to NFCs.

## 2.2 A focus on fiscal authorities

By and large, the purpose of governments is to stimulate domestic production, labour and individual consumption, as well as to provide with public and collective goods and services. In the real world, fiscal policy is implemented through a large number of instruments summarized here into exogenous taxes on consumption, labour and capital incomes, exogenous lump-sum transfers to households and endogenous public expenditures encompassing all dimensions of public intervention in the absence of public production or employment in the present model.<fnref n="1" />

Lump-sum transfers are endogenised in Section 5.2 to ensure the long-run convergence of public debt when public consumption does not.

Public consumption dimmed endogenous is modelled in two alternative ways. We either follow a traditional modelling with the implementation of budget rules or we propose an alternative to the Ramsey problem and model a welfare-optimizing government under bounded rationality.

### 2.2.1 Budget rule

Budget rules can be implemented in different ways all relying on the *ad hoc* description of governments’ spendings as a function of observable endogenous variables. Following Corsetti et al. (2010), we implement a resembling contra-cyclical budget rule in the following form:

$$ \hat{G}_{t}^{i}=0.9 \hat{G}_{t-1}^{i}-\frac{0.01}{g y^{i}} \hat{y}_{t-1}^{i}+0.02 \frac{\overline{p a}^{i}}{g \hat{y}^{i}} \hat{p} \hat{a}_{t-1}^{i} \quad (2.1) $$

where $\hat{G}_{t}^{i}$, $\hat{p} \hat{a}_{t}$ and $\hat{y}_{t}^{i}$ respectively denote the deviation of public consumption, the public asset to GDP ratio, and production from their steady state value. In addition, $\overline{p a}$ denotes the long-term debt to GDP

<footnote n="1">¹A complete and detailed description of fiscal authorities is given in Campagne and Poissonnier (2016)</footnote>
ratio target and $\bar{g}y$ the share of public consumption in GDP.<fnref n="2" /> This approach is standard in the institutional modelling literature and taken on in models such as Quest III, GIMF, NAWM, etc.

### 2.2.2 Optimizing government: a simplified approach to the Ramsey problem

**Rationale** The introduction of rationality in DSGE models historically and naturally leads to the definition of an optimal government behaviour as a normative benchmark, namely the Ramsey policy. Indeed, in a internally consistent DSGE approach, governments seek to maximize the welfare of their domestic households, and it is therefore natural to define the objective of fiscal authorities as the maximization of the utility of households. In the presence of rationality, this maximisation is indeed subject to the public budget constraint but also to the full set of model constraints. In particular, when choosing the optimal level of public expenditures $G_t$, the government internalizes its indirect impact on households’ consumption and labour supply, and therefore households’ utility. One strength of this standard Ramsey approach is its robustness to the Lucas critique as it defines a structural behaviour consistent with the hypotheses of the model. In addition, as we introduce government spending in the utility function in *MELEZE*, this Ramsey approach appears to be even more strongly justified.

However, solving a Ramsey problem is both analytically and numerically complex (when not infeasible) in large models, especially within the business cycle, as well as unrealistic as it does not embody political choices observed in the real world that may depart from optimality. This reason underlies the classical choice of *ad hoc* budget rules in DSGE models.

As an alternative to these rules, we propose a new approach based on a simplified version of the Ramsey problem where the government still maximizes households’ utility subject to its transfers/tax revenues budget constraint, however not taking into account all other constraints. Concretely, the government solves the Ramsey problem taking endogenous variables other than public expenditures (such as $C_T^i(\tau)$ and $L_T^i(\tau)$ here) as given. As a result, such a government focuses only on the utility derived by households through the direct action of the government rather than through second turn effects on other endogenous variables. As for budget rules, this remains inconsistent with the DSGE approach of a full knowledge of economic mechanisms by agents. However, this may also be interpreted as a difficulty for fiscal authorities to exactly assess the impact of its policies on the economy.

Closer to the full Ramsey problem, we believe this approach to be more robust to the Lucas critique than traditional budget rules as it partially micro-found the behaviour of the government. However, both approaches suffer from the same paradoxes when embedded in a general equilibrium model solved under rational expectations. First, in order to solve for such a model, expectations of all agents are assumed formed through the entire model. It is then paradoxical to assume that either the government maximizes its objective under a subset of constraints or maximizes an implicit objective through a rule

<footnote n="2">²As $\bar{p}a$, the long-term value of the public asset to GDP ratio, is negative, this indeed implies that public spending decrease when public debt increases so as to ensure the long-term solvency of the government.</footnote>
defined outside the model. Second, both modelling are only simple descriptions of fiscal authorities and do not encompass real-world phenomena such as the will of authorities to get reelected that may induce sub-optimal behaviours.<fnref n="3" />

**Program and objective of the government** As the government now seeks to maximise the intertemporal flow of utility of households, the analytical government's program at date t is as follows:

$$ \max_{G_T^i, PA_T^i} E_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta_g^i T-t \mathcal{U}(C_T^{R,i}, C_T^{NR,i}, L_T^{R,i}, L_T^{NR,i}, G_T^i) \quad (2.2) $$

$$ \text{s.t. } PA_t^i = \left( R_{t-1} - \psi^g \left( \frac{PA_{t-1}^i}{P_{t-1}^i \bar{Y}^i Tr_{t-1}} \right) \right) PA_{t-1}^i + \nu_t^{w,i} W_t^i L_t^i + \nu_t^{k,i} r_t^{k,i} CPI_t^i K_{t-1}^i \\ + \nu_t^{c,i} CPI_t^i (C_t^i + I_t^i) + \nu_t^{D,i} D_t^i + \nu_t^{FD,i} FD_t^i - P_t^i G_t^i - \Phi_t^i \quad (2.3) $$

where $\mathcal{U}$ is a weighted average of households' utility based on Ricardian ($C^{R,i}$) and non Ricardian households ($C^{NR,i}$) consumptions, labour supplies ($L^{R,i}$ and $L^{NR,i}$) and public consumption ($G^i$). In addition, $PA_t^i$ denotes the nominal public assets of country $i$ at the end of period $t$, $R_t^i$ the nominal interest rate, $W_t^i$ real hourly wages, $r_t^{i,k}$ the interest rate paid on physical capital, $K_{t-1}^i$ the capital stock available at the end of period $t-1$, $CPI_t^i$ the relative price of consumption, $C_t^i$ consumption, $I_t^i$ investment, $D_t^i$ dividends paid by non financial firms, $FD_t^i$ financial intermediation dividends, $P_t^i$ the production price, and $\Phi_t^i$ are nominal transfers to households. $\nu^{c,i}$, $\nu^{w,i}$, $\nu^{k,i}$, $\nu^{D,i}$ and $\nu^{FD,i}$ respectively denote the tax rate level on consumption, wages, capital revenues, dividends and financial dividends. $\beta_g^i$ is the government discount factor and $\psi^g$ is a financial intermediation spread paid by the government depending on its real past net financial position.

Solving for the previous program yields a Euler equation for government consumption that define the behaviour of fiscal authorities in MELEZE.

## 2.3 Steady state and calibration

In the present quarterly model, growth is exogenous. In the long run, all real variables grow at the same rate, that of TFP common to both countries. A full description of the steady state, the associated relationships and the calibration is also given in the companion paper (Campagne and Poissonnier, 2016).

Taking into account all these relationships imposes crucial restrictions on structural parameters, endogenous ratios to GDP, as well as on endogenous variables in level. We calibrate our model as to match the situation of France within the Eurozone over the period 1995-2007, and as to stay coherent with the traditional DSGE literature<fnref n="4" /> for structural parameters. Tables 1 and 2 in the companion paper

<footnote n="3">³See for instance, the public choice theory literature.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), Roeger et al. (2008), Martin and Philippon (2014), Smets and Wouters (2002), Annicchiarico et al. (2013), Vogel (2012), Coenen et al. (2012), Eggertsson et al. (2014), Ratto et al. (2009), Everaert and Schule (2008), Bayoumi et al. (2004), Høj et al. (2007), Kaplan et al. (2014), Bussiere et al. (2011), European Commission's Quest III R&D model for France</footnote>
present actual data for France and the Euro Area and their corresponding values at steady state, along with the values of the corresponding structural parameters.

## 3 Laffer curves

First highlighted by Laffer at the end of the 70's, the homonymous curves linking financial revenues to the level of taxation appear as a good outlook of the room for manoeuvre for raising tax revenues in order to reduce indebtedness. As such, we perform a standard analysis of the Laffer curves generated by the model in line with the general equilibrium approach of Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) (T&U henceforth). Their general equilibrium approach has the advantage of taking into account the full model setting when computing tax revenues.

More precisely, to allow comparability with T&U, variations in one tax rate are conducted at constant public transfers. In Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), this type of simulations is referred as g-Laffer curves (as opposed to s-Laffer curves where tax variations are conducted at constant government spending). Meanwhile, other tax rates are left unchanged, and therefore, the clearing of the government budget constraint is ensured through endogenous public expenditures and debt level modelled in a budget rule. This choice corresponds to the standard behaviour of our model.

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>VAT</th><th>Labour income tax</th><th>Capital income and dividend tax</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Tax base (= <span style="text-decoration: overline;">TB</span>)</td><td><span style="text-decoration: overline;">RPC</span>(<span style="text-decoration: overline;">C</span> + <span style="text-decoration: overline;">I</span>)</td><td><span style="text-decoration: overline;">RPC</span>(1 + <span style="text-decoration: overline;">v</span><sup>c</sup>)(1 + <span style="text-decoration: overline;">v</span><sup>w</sup>)<span style="text-decoration: overline;">RW</span><span style="text-decoration: overline;">L</span></td><td><span style="text-decoration: overline;">RPC</span><span style="text-decoration: overline;">R</span><sup>k</sup><span style="text-decoration: overline;">K</span> + <span style="text-decoration: overline;">d</span><span style="text-decoration: overline;">Y</span></td></tr><tr><td>Tax revenues</td><td><span style="text-decoration: overline;">v</span><sup>c</sup><span style="text-decoration: overline;">T</span><span style="text-decoration: overline;">B</span><sup>VAT</sup></td><td><span style="text-decoration: overline;">v</span><sup>w</sup><span style="text-decoration: overline;">T</span><span style="text-decoration: overline;">B</span><sup>Labour</sup></td><td><span style="text-decoration: overline;">v</span><sup>k</sup><span style="text-decoration: overline;">T</span><span style="text-decoration: overline;">B</span><sup>Capital</sup></td></tr></tbody></table>

<caption>Table 1: Tax bases and associated tax revenues at steady state</caption>

Analytically, at the steady state, tax bases and their associated tax revenues are given by Table 1. Note that as VAT, our model allows the labour tax rate v^w to be higher than 100%. This directly reflects the fact that v^w is actually paid by firms and represents the tax rate on net wages.<fnref n="5" /> In terms of compensation of employees RPC(1 + v^w)(1 + v^c)R̄W̄L, the labour tax rate will therefore be (v^w)/(1+v^w) and indeed strictly lower than one. To allow comparison with T&U, labour income tax Laffer curves plotted below are expressed on compensation of employees.

<footnote>* Tax on financial dividends are in practice negligible as the tax base is very small.</footnote>

<footnote>Real values are expressed with respect to the deflator of public consumption that is the production price.</footnote>

<footnote>X̄ indicates steady state values and T̄B^X the steady state tax base for tax X. RPC stands for relative price of consumption, C and I for consumption and investment, RW for purchasing power of wages VAT included, L for hours worked, K for the capital stock, Y for production and d for the profit ratio (non financial dividends). v^c corresponds to the consumption tax rate, whereas v^w and v^k are the labour and capital revenues tax rates.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵That is after-tax wages paid by firms and actually received by households.</footnote>
Initial tax rates in both models are given in Table 2, showing comparable calibrations. The large difference in capital income tax rate between the two models is a consequence of different tax bases. Actually, we choose to tax profits in *MELEZE* as we are unable to distinguish between dividends (*D*) and revenues from physical capital ($\bar{r}^K \bar{K}$) in the data. Absent of dividends in T&U, their capital tax base is therefore smaller and requires a higher tax rate to match data.

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th><em>MELEZE</em></th><th><em>Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)</em></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Consumption tax</td><td>20.3%</td><td>18.0%</td></tr><tr><td>Labour income tax</td><td>39.1%</td><td>46.0%</td></tr><tr><td>Capital income tax</td><td>21.0%</td><td>35.0%</td></tr></tbody></table>

Labour income tax corresponds to the tax rate on compensation of employees. In *MELEZE*, this rate is given by $v^{w}/1 + v^{w}$.

<caption>Table 2: Tax rates in France</caption>

Figure 1 and Table 3 present and describe the steady state Laffer curves in *MELEZE*. Our calibration shows that France is evolving far from the maximum of the Laffer curves. All tax rates stand on the left side of the maximum, that is increasing the tax rate will yield higher tax revenues. The Laffer maximum threshold on the labour tax rate on compensation of employees is around 72%, with additional revenues up to 17%. For capital income taxes, the maximum tax rate is 43% with potential additional tax revenues of 3%. For VAT, as demand for goods persists even at high tax-included prices, tax bases decrease at a moderate pace so that the Laffer curve does not reach a maximum for reasonable values of $v^c$.

Comparing with Laffer curves derived for France in T&U's neoclassical exogenous growth model, they find a flatter labour Laffer curve with maximum additional revenues of 5% corresponding to a threshold tax rate of 44%. On the contrary, for capital income tax, their calibration shows a maximum tax threshold with additional revenues close to zero.

These differences across models may arise from two different potential causes, namely the choice of calibration and the structure of the model.

**Calibration of the models** First, the authors stress the importance of the Frisch elasticity, that is the elasticity of hours worked to the wage rate, on the shape of the Laffer curves. They show that a decreased Frisch elasticity, that is a more inelastic labour supply, leads to higher potential maximum tax rates. In *MELEZE*, the Frisch elasticity is equal to 1/2, that is equal to T&U baseline calibration. As such, this cannot explain the differences across models.

Similarly, T&U explicit a, yet minor, influence of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. Recalibrating our model as to match $\sigma_c = 1$ as in T&U does not lead to major changes in our results.
<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>(a) Consumption tax</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>(c) Labour income tax on gross wages</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>(e) Capital income tax</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>(b) Consumption tax</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_8.png" /><figcaption>(d) Labour income tax on gross wages</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>(f) Capital income tax</figcaption></figure>

<caption>Figure 1: Laffer curves - Tax bases and revenues in France</caption>
<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Model</th><th>Variation</th><th>Maximum tax rate</th><th>Maximum additional revenues</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="5">Labour income tax</td><td>T&amp;U</td><td>baseline</td><td>63%</td><td>5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">MELEZE</td><td>baseline</td><td>72%</td><td>17%</td></tr><tr><td>θ<sup>1</sup> = ∞</td><td>77%</td><td>27%</td></tr><tr><td>θ<sup>1</sup><sub>w</sub> = ∞</td><td>72%</td><td>17%</td></tr><tr><td>μ<sup>1</sup> = 0</td><td>72%</td><td>16%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="5">Capital income tax</td><td>T&amp;U</td><td>baseline</td><td>44%</td><td>0%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">MELEZE</td><td>baseline</td><td>43%</td><td>3%</td></tr><tr><td>θ<sup>1</sup> = ∞</td><td>24%</td><td>0%</td></tr><tr><td>θ<sup>1</sup><sub>w</sub> = ∞</td><td>43%</td><td>3%</td></tr><tr><td>μ<sup>1</sup> = 0</td><td>43%</td><td>4%</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>c<sup>1</sup><sub>c</sub> = 1</td><td>43%</td><td>3%</td></tr></tbody></table>

T&U refers to Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).

In both models, the inverse Frisch elasticity ($\sigma_I$) is equal to 2. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is calibrated to $\sigma_c = 1$ in T&U against 1.13 in MELEZE.

Labour income tax corresponds to the tax rate on gross wages. In MELEZE, this rate is given by $v^w/1+v^w$.

The maximum tax rate and additional revenues correspond to the rate at the maximum of the Laffer curve, and to the revenues at this maximum in comparison to initial calibration revenues.

The case $\theta^1 = \infty$ (resp. $\theta^1_w = \infty$) corresponds to the absence of real rigidities on prices (resp. on wages), that is the absence of mark-ups. The case $\mu^1 = 0$ corresponds to a zero share of non Ricardian agents.

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Laffer curves - Revenues' sensibility to the structure of the model</figcaption></figure>
Concerning the rest of the calibration, *MELEZE* and T&U compare in terms of the share of public
consumption or transfers in GDP, the depreciation rate, the inflation rate, the TFP growth rate, the
interest rate and the share of capital in the production function. Debt to GDP ratios differ substantially
but are explicitly not identified by T&U as a factor influencing the Laffer curves.

**Structure of the models** One differentiation between *MELEZE* and T&U is the introduction of a fully-fledged open economy framework. T&U introduce open economy effects in a simplified way and stress themselves the weakness of their model in this regard. However, Auray *et al.* (2011) extends T&U framework in a two country setting and show no major differences in Laffer curves induced by trade openness.<fnref n="6" />

An other point of differentiation is the neoclassical structure of T&U model. T&U model is a neo-
classical framework with firms trading on perfectly competitive markets. In *Meleze*, the neo-Keynesian
structure with the introduction of monopolistic competition leads to a distorted steady state.

As depicted on Figure 2a, the existence of price mark-up distorsions at steady state in *MELEZE* implies considerable changes for the Laffer curves, increasing observed differences with T&U. With perfectly substitutable goods ($\theta^i = \infty$), price mark-ups disappear and we observe an increase in the maximum labour income tax rate and additional revenues, as well as a decrease for the maximum capital income tax rate and additional revenues. Indeed, as distortions decrease, profits and dividends disappear resulting in a smaller tax base for capital and therefore a lower tax potential. Simultaneously, labour supply increases leading to higher fiscal labour income tax revenues.

On the contrary, monopolistic competition on the labour market (wage mark-up), and the presence
of *non Ricardian* agents are of minor influence on the results.

One should also be cautious about the interpretation of these Laffer curves for policy analysis. In-
deed, in our model, (*installed*) capital is considered immobile across countries and therefore no tax
base evasion and international fiscal competition takes place. Though to a lower extent, the same phe-
nomemon for labour is also excluded from our model. In addition, DSGE models including *MELEZE*
rarely model tax evasion to the grey economy. In all, these Laffer curves may reflect more favourable
tax environments than reality with larger maximum thresholds and potential tax revenues.

Lastly, Fève *et al.* (2013) highlight the importance of market completeness for the previous results
to hold. Indeed, in an incomplete market setting with heterogeneous agents and a government budget
constraint adjusted through debt, they obtain S-shaped Laffer curves arising for crowding out effects
of private assets by public ones. In this case, identical tax revenues can be associated to up to three
different tax rates with concrete implications for policy decisions.

<footnote n="6">⁶Note that this is mainly conditional to the fact that both *MELEZE* and Auray *et al.* (2011) models assume internationally immobile factors of production.</footnote>
# 4 Transitory stimuli and fiscal multipliers

We perform a second standard policy exercise, namely the simulations of fiscal reforms focusing in particular on the size of fiscal multipliers. To better understand the mechanisms at work, we compare our model to other institutional DSGE models for Europe developed at the IMF, the OECD, the ECB and the European Commission. Based on these models, Coenen et al. (2012) implement and compare various fiscal stimulus packages and measure instantaneous fiscal multipliers for these models, concluding to strong similarities across models. However, and although our model is in line with these benchmarks, this section aims at giving a deeper understanding of factors influencing the size of fiscal multipliers.

## 4.1 Fiscal multipliers dependency to the model class

We implement a two-years increase in public spendings amounting to 1% of *ex-ante* output, with no monetary accommodation. Classically, we define the instantaneous fiscal multiplier as the ratio of the change in output to the 1% increase *ex ante*.

Following this stimulus, we find that the fiscal multiplier is lower than one both for our model and the R&D version of QuestIII (Figure 3a). This result is in line with other DSGE models (Figure 3b) with multipliers ranging from 0.8 to 0.9 in all *European* models (namely OECD's Fiscal, EC's Quest, ECB's NAWM and IMF's GIMF).

With the macroeconometric model *Mésange* (Klein and Simon, 2010) however, the instantaneous fiscal multiplier is larger than one making this model more *Keynesian* than the otherwise *neo-Keynesian* DSGEs. First of all, the smaller size of the fiscal multiplier in DSGE models compared to *Mésange* model comes from the central bank's response (interest rates being exogenous in *Mésange*). In traditional DSGE models, an increase in final demand by the government represents a potentially inflationary pressure and the central bank's Taylor rule advocates an increase in the nominal interest rate that mitigates the favourable effects of the public spendings stimulus. As we show in the next section, in the presence of monetary accommodation, that is when the nominal interest rate is kept temporarily constant, fiscal multipliers increase further in our model (and in other DSGE models) and compare to the size observed in the *Mésange* model.

More generally, the backward structure of macroeconometric models<fnref n="7" /> does not allow the design of complex Taylor rules based on inflation expectations. However one can implement rules similar to the one in *Meleze* based on contemporary inflation. In the case of *Mésange* and as France shares a common monetary policy with other Eurozone members, the absence of economic spillovers and feedbacks with other members limits the impact of a Taylor rule as France represent only a fifth of the Eurozone.

<footnote n="7">⁷With the exception of a few hybrid models such as the FRB-US at the FED including expectations.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>(a) ... in Meleze, QuestIII R&D, and Mésange</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>(b) ... in QuestIII, NAWM, GIMF and OECD's Fiscal</figcaption></figure>

Government spendings increase for 2 years by 1 percent of ex ante output. In the upper figure, fiscal multipliers are plotted for France only in Meleze and Mésange, and both France and the Euro Area for QUEST III R&D. The lower figure is taken from Coenen et al. (2012). Note that for Quest III, responses are annualized in the bottom panel.

<caption>Figure 3: Instantaneous fiscal multipliers for a two-year increase in government consumption</caption>
## 4.2 Policy implementation sensitivity of fiscal multipliers

We now turn to a sensitivity analysis of the size of fiscal multipliers with respect to the policy implementation of the shock. In particular, we focus on the dependency to the duration of the shock and the behaviour of both the government and the central bank.

**Monetary and fiscal accommodation** Fiscal multipliers depend on the way both the fiscal and monetary authorities respond to the stimulus, that is the way they are modelled. We consider three different variants for a two years increase in public spendings equal to 1% of pre-stimulus output: (i) the benchmark case where the government and the central bank set their decisions as usual (no accommodation), (ii) the case where monetary policy accommodates the fiscal authority's decision by keeping its interest rate at the steady state level and (iii) the case where the government also commits to its decision by not reacting to the transitory increase in public debt. We run these simulations with either our forward looking optimizing government or with an acyclic budget rule taken from Corsetti et al. (2010) (Figure 4a).

Monetary accommodation, by not raising the interest rate following an inflationary increase in final demand, magnifies the fiscal multiplier (Figure 4a). Indeed, as the nominal interest rate remains unchanged, the increase in inflation expectations lowers the real interest rate therefore fostering private consumption and investment. When the government commits to the increase in public spendings and the central bank is accommodative, the fiscal multiplier is now larger than one with an order of magnitude comparable to the *Mésange* model but with a different timing likely due to the absence of expectations in *Mésange*. In particular, and up until the end of the transitory shock, the fiscal multiplier remains high in *Mésange*, whereas it decreases before the end of the shock in *Mélèze* due to the anticipated recession by households.

Moreover, when the government is modelled as forward looking and with our calibrations, it compensates its own spending shock through the endogenous level of public spending more rapidly than with a budget rule, which mitigates the fiscal multiplier. It does so by anticipation of higher future debt.

**Duration** The duration of the shock mitigates the size of the fiscal multiplier (Figure 4b). With a one quarter (unexpected) increase in public spendings, the fiscal multiplier is larger than one. The longer is the fiscal stimulus, the smaller is the multiplier and the larger is the after effect when the reform is abrogated. This compares to empirical work on the French public spending multiplier as presented in Cléaud et al. (2013). Estimating an SVAR over the period 1980-2010, and following a one quarter shock, they exhibit a 1.1 instantaneous multiplier, close to our corresponding simulation.

This stems from both the need for the government to decrease spendings after the end of the stimulus to reimburse past deficits, and from today's expectations of households about this changes in the fiscal stance.
<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Coenen et al.</th><th colspan="2">MELEZE</th></tr><tr><th>US</th><th>EU</th><th>EA</th><th>FR</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Government consumption</td><td>1.55</td><td>1.52</td><td>1.66</td><td>0.99</td></tr><tr><td>Targeted Transfers (to non Ricardians)</td><td>1.30</td><td>1.12</td><td>1.58</td><td>0.68</td></tr><tr><td>Consumption taxes</td><td>0.61</td><td>0.66</td><td>0.46</td><td>0.53</td></tr><tr><td>General transfers</td><td>0.42</td><td>0.29</td><td>0.66</td><td>0.27</td></tr><tr><td>Corporate income taxes</td><td>0.24</td><td>0.15</td><td>0.09</td><td>0.04</td></tr><tr><td>Labour income taxes</td><td>0.23</td><td>0.53</td><td>0.59</td><td>0.58</td></tr></tbody></table>

We assume that fiscal stimuli of 1 percent of *ex ante* output are implemented for 2 years. The first two columns correspond to Coenen et al. (2012, Table 3).

<caption>Table 4: Average first-year instantaneous multipliers from different types of fiscal stimulus</caption>

All in all, we stress that one should be particularly cautious to identify the underlying policy im-
plementation when referring to fiscal multipliers. Indeed, the mere quantification of fiscal multipliers
is hard to directly transpose into policy evaluations, timeliness and the political context being crucial
determinants of their size.

## 4.3 Fiscal multipliers of other policy instruments

We evaluate the fiscal multipliers of other fiscal stimulus with the same method as for government
spendings: we implement a fiscal stimulus (decrease in tax rate or increase in transfers) equal to 1% of
*ex ante* output for two years. Results presented in Table 4 are compared with equivalent simulations for
Europe presented in Coenen et al. (2012). As Coenen et al. did, we average out the fiscal multipliers
of the first year over the different simulations we have run (accommodative fiscal and/or monetary
policy, budget rule or forward looking optimizing government). We also perform equivalent stimulus
in the Euro Area as a whole by implementing the same shock in the two countries of our symmetric
calibration. The comparison of the fiscal multipliers in this case and in the France only case measure
the benefits of coordination of fiscal stimuli in a monetary union.<fnref n="8" />

By and large, fiscal multipliers for the Euro Area computed with *Meleze* compare with the results
from Coenen et al. (2012) presented in the Table, as well as with Roeger and in't Veld (2010). A first
result robust through the models is that only the fiscal multipliers to government spendings or transfers
can be larger than one. This is only the case when the central banker accommodates the demand shock
by temporarily keeping its interest rate unchanged. An other robust result is the low impact of fiscal
stimuli targeted on capital (corporate income tax) relative to other stimuli directly affecting households.

When implemented in the Euro Area as a whole (closed economy) the fiscal multipliers are systemat-
ically larger than when the fiscal stimulus is implemented only in France (except for VAT). Coordination
is thus an important aspect of fiscal policies to improve their efficiency.

<footnote n="8">⁸The results remain conditional to the immobility of labour and capital throughout the monetary union.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>(a) ... depending on monetary policy accommodation and government's behaviour</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>(b) ... lasting from one quarter to 3 years</figcaption></figure>

We assume that government spendings are increased by 1 percent of *ex ante* output. In the upper figure, we compare the fiscal multiplier in *Meleze* for France, in the cases where the ECB maintain its interest rate constant or not and whether the government is forward looking or follows a budget rule. We also consider a transitory perfect commitment to public expenditures in which case the government does not react to its spending shock. In the lower figure, we compare the fiscal multiplier in our model for France for 1 quarter, 1,2 or 3 years stimuli.

<caption>Figure 4: Instantaneous fiscal multiplier to a transitory increase in government spending by 1% of initial output</caption>
However these numbers hide large disparities across simulations. Without considering a deeper sensitivity analysis (with respect to elasticity parameters in particular) there is already a 0.2 to 1 point variability around the baseline for each multiplier.

# 5 Permanent fiscal reforms

Having looked at transitory fiscal stimuli, we now turn to the effect of permanent fiscal reforms on the economy.

## 5.1 Tax hikes

In this first part, we look at three different tax hikes, namely, permanent increases in the labour income tax rate, the value added tax rate and the capital income tax rate. We calibrate the reforms to an increase in *ex ante* tax receipts of 1% of initial GDP. In order to allow comparison with the standard macroeconomic model for France *Mésange*, simulations are conducted at constant public expenditures.<fnref n="9" />

**Labour income tax** In this paragraph, we look at a permanent increase in the labour income tax of 1% of initial GDP. In *MELEZE*, we name labour income tax, the only taxation that applies to labour and paid by firms. As such, unable to actually distinguish between income tax, or social contributions, we compare the results to a weighted combination of four different simulations obtained in *Mésange* regarding permanent increases in the labour income tax, employers’-, employees’- or generalized social security contributions. Results are presented in Table 5.

Following the increase in the labour income tax, households’ revenues decrease and therefore private consumption. This decrease affects production and decrease imports relatively more than exports as foreign demand is only affected by second round price effects. As such, the trade balance temporarily improves. Moreover, this increased taxation of compensations paid by firms to workers transmits negatively to wages, decreases labour supply, and further weights on production.

In the long run, the increased taxation of labour revenues permanently distorts the consumption-leisure arbitrage and depletes labour supply, consumption and production. Spillover effects are negligible.

All in all, the impact on the economy compares with the econometric model *Mésange*. Nevertheless, we observe differences in the magnitude of responses with stronger recessionary effects in the short run but weaker ones in the long run.

<footnote n="9">⁹This corresponds to simulations in the budget rule version of *MELEZE*, where the budget rule is shut down for a large number of period. As a consequence of this choice, we approach permanent shocks by the No Terminal Condition method described in Roeger (1999). Indeed we simulate a quasi permanent shock to allow intermediary convergence to the new *after reform* steady state.</footnote>
<table><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="6">in % deviation from steady state</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>1Y</th><th>2Y</th><th>3Y</th><th>5Y</th><th>10Y</th><th>LR</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="7"><em>MELEZE</em></td></tr><tr><td>GDP (France)</td><td>-0.95</td><td>-1.05</td><td>-0.82</td><td>-0.62</td><td>-0.60</td><td>-0.62</td></tr><tr><td>GDP (RoE)</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.00</td><td>-0.01</td><td>-0.01</td><td>-0.02</td></tr><tr><td>Consumption</td><td>-1.47</td><td>-1.60</td><td>-1.36</td><td>-1.23</td><td>-1.25</td><td>-1.29</td></tr><tr><td>Net real wages</td><td>-0.88</td><td>-1.47</td><td>-1.73</td><td>-1.89</td><td>-1.92</td><td>-1.95</td></tr><tr><td>Hours worked</td><td>-1.44</td><td>-1.52</td><td>-1.06</td><td>-0.66</td><td>-0.60</td><td>-0.59</td></tr><tr><td>Return on capital</td><td>-0.44</td><td>-0.94</td><td>-0.59</td><td>-0.16</td><td>-0.07</td><td>0.00</td></tr><tr><td>Investment</td><td>-1.38</td><td>-2.16</td><td>-1.85</td><td>-1.04</td><td>-0.74</td><td>-0.69</td></tr><tr><td>Euribor</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.00</td></tr><tr><td>Inflation</td><td>0.08</td><td>-0.12</td><td>-0.06</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.00</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance</td><td>0.15</td><td>0.22</td><td>0.22</td><td>0.19</td><td>0.18</td><td>0.17</td></tr><tr><td colspan="7"><em>Mésange</em></td></tr><tr><td>GDP (France)</td><td>-0.36</td><td>-0.74</td><td>-0.89</td><td>-0.98</td><td>-1.04</td><td>-1.27</td></tr><tr><td>Consumption</td><td>-0.72</td><td>-1.49</td><td>-1.73</td><td>-1.75</td><td>-1.73</td><td>-1.92</td></tr><tr><td>Net real wages</td><td>-0.86</td><td>-1.08</td><td>-1.25</td><td>-1.40</td><td>-1.50</td><td>-1.79</td></tr><tr><td>Investment</td><td>-0.49</td><td>-0.90</td><td>-1.04</td><td>-1.08</td><td>-1.05</td><td>-1.34</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance</td><td>0.19</td><td>0.35</td><td>0.34</td><td>0.26</td><td>0.18</td><td>0.10</td></tr></tbody></table>

Y stands for year and LR for long run. RoE means Rest of the Eurozone.

SSC stands for Social Security Contributions.

For these simulations, public expenditures are kept exogenous and growing at the rate of TFP. As such, debt convergence is not ensured and public liabilities diverge, so that we set $\psi = \psi^g = 0$ to avoid feedbacks through explosive financial spreads. In addition, we set $r^y = 0$ to implement a strict inflation-targeting rule.

Some lines are kept unreported for *Mésange* as they do not exist (e.g. foreign GDP) or do not easily compare with *MELEZE* (e.g. labour supply).

In *MELEZE*, the distinction between labour income taxes, employers', employees' and generalized social contributions being impossible, we report a linear combination of all the corresponding simulations in *Mésange*. Weights are as follows: employer's SSC (44.4%), employees' SSC (23.7%), generalized SC (15.3%) and labour income tax (16.6%), corresponding to their share in total revenues in 2007. Disaggregated simulations results for *Mésange* are presented in Klein and Simon (2010).

<caption>Table 5: Responses to a permanent labour income tax increase for 1% of initial GDP</caption>
**VAT** In this paragraph, we look at a permanent increase in the value added tax of 1% of initial GDP. Comparison with *Mésange* is here straightforward. Results are presented in Table 6.

As VAT increases, households' revenues decreases as net real wages drop. Hence, private consumption, labour supply and production decreases. The VAT hike also negatively affects imports (relatively to exports) and therefore the trade balance improves in the short and long term.

In the long run, the reform remains recessionary as labour supply, consumption and investment are permanently decreased. Spillover effects are negligible.

Again, the results compare qualitatively to *Mésange*. More generally, the recessionary impact of the reform is stronger in *MELEZE*.

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="6">in % deviation from steady state</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>1Y</th><th>2Y</th><th>3Y</th><th>5Y</th><th>10Y</th><th>LR</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="7"><em>MELEZE</em></td></tr><tr><td>GDP (France)</td><td>-0.76</td><td>-0.58</td><td>-0.50</td><td>-0.53</td><td>-0.63</td><td>-0.93</td></tr><tr><td>GDP (RoE)</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.00</td><td>-0.01</td><td>-0.01</td><td>-0.03</td></tr><tr><td>Consumption</td><td>-1.41</td><td>-1.10</td><td>-0.97</td><td>-1.03</td><td>-1.14</td><td>-1.51</td></tr><tr><td>Net real wages</td><td>-1.12</td><td>-1.29</td><td>-1.39</td><td>-1.50</td><td>-1.58</td><td>-1.85</td></tr><tr><td>Hours worked</td><td>-1.14</td><td>-0.77</td><td>-0.52</td><td>-0.39</td><td>-0.36</td><td>-0.29</td></tr><tr><td>Return on capital</td><td>-1.10</td><td>-0.70</td><td>-0.34</td><td>0.04</td><td>0.31</td><td>1.12</td></tr><tr><td>Investment</td><td>-1.71</td><td>-2.62</td><td>-2.65</td><td>-2.43</td><td>-2.31</td><td>-2.13</td></tr><tr><td>Euribor</td><td>0.02</td><td>-0.01</td><td>-0.01</td><td>-0.01</td><td>-0.01</td><td>0.00</td></tr><tr><td>Inflation</td><td>-0.28</td><td>-0.12</td><td>-0.01</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.00</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance</td><td>0.25</td><td>0.33</td><td>0.34</td><td>0.31</td><td>0.29</td><td>0.24</td></tr><tr><td colspan="7"><em>Mésange</em></td></tr><tr><td>GDP (France)</td><td>-0.33</td><td>-0.54</td><td>-0.76</td><td>-0.96</td><td>-0.95</td><td>-0.84</td></tr><tr><td>Consumption</td><td>-0.54</td><td>-0.94</td><td>-1.25</td><td>-1.39</td><td>-1.43</td><td>-1.45</td></tr><tr><td>Net real wages</td><td>-0.81</td><td>-0.65</td><td>-0.99</td><td>-1.43</td><td>-1.88</td><td>-1.98</td></tr><tr><td>Investment</td><td>-0.61</td><td>-0.80</td><td>-0.99</td><td>-1.21</td><td>-1.13</td><td>-1.18</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance</td><td>0.25</td><td>0.26</td><td>0.26</td><td>0.22</td><td>0.16</td><td>0.25</td></tr></tbody></table>

Y stands for year and LR for long run. RoE means Rest of the Eurozone.

For these simulations, public expenditures are kept exogenous and growing at the rate of TFP. As such, debt convergence is not ensured and public liabilities diverge, so that we set $\psi = \psi^g = 0$ to avoid feedbacks through explosive financial spreads. In addition, we set $r^y = 0$ to implement a strict inflation-targeting rule.

Some lines are kept unreported for *Mésange* as they do not exist (e.g. foreign GDP) or do not easily compare with *MELEZE* (e.g. labour supply).

Simulations results for *Mésange* are presented in Klein and Simon (2010).

<caption>Table 6: Responses to a permanent VAT increase for 1% of initial GDP</caption>

**Capital income tax** In this paragraph, we look at a permanent increase in the capital income tax of 1% of initial GDP. No comparison with *Mésange* is conducted due to the absence of such a simulation
in Klein and Simon (2010). Results are presented in Table 7.

Following an increase in the taxation of capital, investment is logically strongly penalized both in the short and long run. In the short run, the increase in the capital income tax translates into consumption and labour supply decreases. Given sluggish adjustments in wages and in the stock of capital, this fall in the labour (supply) implies a fall in the return on capital (as the marginal productivity of capital falls). All in all, labour, consumption, investment and output decrease.

Moreover, the decrease in investment implies a permanent decrease in revenues for Ricardian households. As such, in the long run, consumption decreases and labour supply stagnates. As a result the impact of the reform is strongly recessive. Spillover effects are still small but stronger than for labour income tax and VAT hikes.

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="6">in % deviation from steady state</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>1Y</th><th>2Y</th><th>3Y</th><th>5Y</th><th>10Y</th><th>LR</th></tr><tr><th></th><th colspan="6">MELEZE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>GDP (France)</td><td>-0.83</td><td>-0.82</td><td>-0.79</td><td>-0.98</td><td>-1.27</td><td>-2.26</td></tr><tr><td>GDP (RoE)</td><td>0.20</td><td>0.10</td><td>0.04</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.02</td><td>-0.07</td></tr><tr><td>Consumption</td><td>-1.04</td><td>-0.69</td><td>-0.53</td><td>-0.72</td><td>-1.07</td><td>-2.24</td></tr><tr><td>Net real wages</td><td>-0.11</td><td>-0.45</td><td>-0.71</td><td>-1.02</td><td>-1.27</td><td>-2.12</td></tr><tr><td>Hours worked</td><td>-1.21</td><td>-0.95</td><td>-0.59</td><td>-0.30</td><td>-0.21</td><td>0.00</td></tr><tr><td>Return on capital</td><td>-1.22</td><td>-0.83</td><td>-0.13</td><td>0.90</td><td>1.75</td><td>4.34</td></tr><tr><td>Investment</td><td>-4.06</td><td>-6.89</td><td>-7.48</td><td>-7.28</td><td>-6.99</td><td>-6.46</td></tr><tr><td>Euribor</td><td>-0.01</td><td>-0.03</td><td>-0.04</td><td>-0.04</td><td>-0.03</td><td>0.00</td></tr><tr><td>Inflation</td><td>-0.41</td><td>-0.21</td><td>-0.03</td><td>0.05</td><td>0.04</td><td>0.00</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance</td><td>0.36</td><td>0.53</td><td>0.56</td><td>0.50</td><td>0.44</td><td>0.28</td></tr></tbody></table>

Y stands for year and LR for long run. RoE means Rest of the Eurozone.

For these simulations, public expenditures are kept exogenous and growing at the rate of TFP. As such, debt convergence is not ensured and public liabilities diverge, so that we set $\psi = \psi^g = 0$ to avoid feedbacks through explosive financial spreads. In addition, we set $r^y = 0$ to implement a strict inflation-targeting rule.

<caption>Table 7: Responses to a permanent capital income tax increase for 1% of initial GDP</caption>

## 5.2 Increase in public spendings

We now turn to the response of the economy to a *permanent* increase in government spendings by 1% of *ex ante* output. Contrary to a transitory fiscal stimulus financed by debt (but leaving the long term debt target unchanged), a permanent stimulus raises the question of long-term financing. This can be achieved either by raising taxes, increasing the long-term debt to GDP ratio or decreasing lump-sum transfers to households. In the present section and to allow comparison with Coenen et al. (2012), the long-term additional cost induced by higher public spendings is financed through lower lump-sum transfers. These transfers adjust following an *ad hoc* rule inspired by Quest III (R&D) model, and
<table><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="6">in % deviation from steady state</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>1Y</th><th>2Y</th><th>3Y</th><th>5Y</th><th>10Y</th><th>LR</th></tr><tr><th colspan="7">MELEZE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>GDP (France)</td><td>0.80</td><td>0.51</td><td>0.44</td><td>0.54</td><td>0.78</td><td>0.77</td></tr><tr><td>GDP (RoE)</td><td>-0.09</td><td>-0.04</td><td>-0.01</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.00</td><td>-0.01</td></tr><tr><td>Consumption</td><td>-0.12</td><td>-0.52</td><td>-0.78</td><td>-1.02</td><td>-0.84</td><td>-0.62</td></tr><tr><td>Net real wages</td><td>-0.08</td><td>-0.07</td><td>-0.11</td><td>-0.19</td><td>-0.06</td><td>0.07</td></tr><tr><td>Labour supply</td><td>1.24</td><td>0.79</td><td>0.69</td><td>0.81</td><td>0.88</td><td>0.75</td></tr><tr><td>Return on capital</td><td>1.16</td><td>0.74</td><td>0.60</td><td>0.58</td><td>0.23</td><td>0.00</td></tr><tr><td>Investment</td><td>-0.03</td><td>-0.18</td><td>-0.02</td><td>0.91</td><td>1.56</td><td>0.82</td></tr><tr><td>Euribor</td><td>0.00</td><td>-0.01</td><td>-0.02</td><td>-0.04</td><td>-0.04</td><td>-0.04</td></tr><tr><td>Inflation</td><td>-0.01</td><td>-0.03</td><td>-0.03</td><td>-0.04</td><td>-0.04</td><td>-0.04</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance</td><td>-0.06</td><td>-0.05</td><td>-0.02</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.00</td></tr></tbody></table>

Y stands for year and LR for long run. RoE means Rest of the Eurozone.

For these simulations, public expenditures (increase included) are kept exogenous and growing at the rate of TFP. Debt convergence is ensured through endogenous public transfers such as specified in the text.

<caption>Table 8: Responses to a permanent increase in public expenditures for 1% of initial GDP</caption>

respond to changes in the debt gap from its long-term target and changes in growth rate of deficit.<fnref n="10" />

$$ \bar{\phi}^1(\hat{\phi}_t^1 - \hat{\phi}_{t-1}^1) = \frac{0.01}{\bar{p}a^1} \hat{p}a_{t-1}^1 + \frac{0.1}{\bar{p}a^1} (\hat{p}a_t^1 - \hat{p}a_{t-1}^1) \quad (5.1) $$

where $\hat{p}a_t$ represents public assets, and $\hat{\phi}_t$ lump-sum transfers to households, deviations from their steady-state values. $\bar{\phi}$ and $\bar{p}a$ respectively are the steady state transfers to GDP and public assets to GDP ratios.

Responses of the economy are given in Table 8, whereas instantaneous and cumulative<fnref n="11" /> fiscal multipliers computed in Coenen et al. (2012) are given in Figure 5.

Following an increase in government spendings, production increases. The mechanism is identical to the one presented in Baxter and King (1993). Indeed, as government expenditures increases, transfers are reduced creating a negative wealth effect. This in turn creates an incentive for households to consume less and to supply more labour. As labour supply increases, so does both labour and the marginal productivity of capital, also leading to an increase in investment/capital. In the long-run, output demand increases as government demand increases more than households consumption decreases (in part due to the shape of the marginal utility of consumption). Also, as labour and capital also increase, output supply increases. All in all, at equilibrium, this implies a permanent increase in production.

<footnote n="10">¹⁰However, and contrary to Quest III, we do not include an additional adjustment through endogenous variations in the labour income tax rate.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹See Uhlig (2010).</footnote>
As exposed in Baxter and King (1993), this mechanism crucially relies on the financing of govern-
ment spendings. Indeed, in the present case, as expenditures are financed through lump-sum taxes,
the decrease in transfers only leads to a wealth effect but does not distort the economy. Financing ex-
penditures by increases in the income tax rate, as is also common in the DSGE literature, introduces
distortions in the labour supply that decrease employment. As such, labour can decrease at equilibrium,
but also investment and capital as the marginal productivity of capital will be lower. All in all, the effect
on output can turn to be negative in the long-run.

Quantitatively, we obtain an instantaneous first quarter fiscal multiplier of 0.9, close to that of a two-year stimulus (see Figure 4a). However, due the previously mentioned negative wealth effect induced by lower transfers in the medium and long-run, the average first-year multiplier decreases to 0.8. In the long-run, a positive fiscal multiplier of 0.77 remains. Those results are close to simulations for Europe presented in Coenen et al. (2012) and for France presented in Kilponen et al. (2015) with a long-run multiplier of 0.82.

Additional simulations financing public expenditures with an increase in the income tax rate leads to an adverse outcome with a long-run multiplier of -1.30 close to -1.28 obtained for France in Kilponen et al. (2015). In addition, the presence of public consumption in the utility function tends to mitigate the short-run multiplier but with no effect on the long-run one.

**5.3 Implications for fiscal consolidation**

As public debt levels remain high in the Eurozone, one can naturally wonder what are the implications
of previous simulations for the design of fiscal consolidation programs. Indeed, we can easily compare
Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 and see that different fiscal adjustment tools have different short-term and long-term
effects. For instance, increasing labour income taxes is more detrimental to short- and medium-term ac-
tivity than a consumption tax increase.<fnref n="12" />

More generally, a large number of papers shows short-term weaker but long-term stronger recessionary effect of distortionary tax increases in comparison to expenditure-based fiscal consolidations. As such, Clinton et al. (2011), Roeger and in't Veld (2010), Erceg and Lindé (2013), Coenen et al. (2008b), Annicchiarico et al. (2013), D'Auria et al. (2009) all plead in favour of so called *mixed strategies*. Actually, they advocate for fiscal consolidations based on an immediate, sharp but transitory increase in taxes along with a permanent but gradual decrease in government spendings. Such packages simultaneously ensure a permanent and immediate decrease in public deficits (and therefore long-term debt) but also minimize the negative impact on activity. On top of that such a design allows to benefit from the long-term positive impact of debt service reduction, without the detrimental effect of permanent

<footnote n="12">¹²However, in *MELEZE* and as opposed to larger models, this results is inverted after 10 years. This relies to the fuzzy definition of labour taxes in our model that are ultimately borne by both firms and households. Larger models usually introduce a distinction between households and firms labour taxation. As such, an increase in labour taxes fully weights on households with a stronger recessionary effect.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_15.png" /></figure>

Coenen et al. (2012) assume a permanent increase in government spendings by 1 p.p. of *ex ante* output. The increase in government expenditures is financed through either a decrease in lump-sum transfers to households or labour taxes depending on the adjusting fiscal tool in each model.

<caption>Figure 5: Fiscal multiplier for a permanent increase in government expenditures</caption>
higher distortionary taxes.

However, Clinton et al. (2011), Roeger and in't Veld (2010), Erceg and Lindé (2013) also insist on the importance of government credibility for the implementation of mixed strategies. Indeed, fiscal consolidation packages relying on transitory increase in taxes need to be perceived as such, and households must expect a decrease in taxation in the long-run. However, data tends to show that this might not always be the case, and the potential lack of public commitment might severely hinder the benefits of mixed strategies.

As an additional and concluding remark, the two country setting of MELEZE also shows that spillovers from fiscal consolidation within the Eurozone are relatively small, corroborating Forni et al. (2010) results. However, these results might differ when considering a full international model as in Clinton et al. (2011) extended to non-euro countries, as global reduction in public debt levels can lead to a permanent decrease in the real interest rate generating strong spillovers. As such, the international dimension of policy coordination should not be overlooked.

# 6 Conclusion

In a neo-Keynesian model for France within the Euro-Area, we analyse the impact of fiscal reforms. Our model includes the traditional *ingredients* of modern large-scale institutional DSGE models such as real and nominal rigidities, capital adjustment costs, *non Ricardian* agents, and a detailed public finance block, and therefore easily compares to the existing literature.

First, we derive generalized equilibrium Laffer curves as specified in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Contrary to their paper, our model includes monopolistic imperfections which we find responsible for a slight increase in the potential additional revenues from capital taxation. In the end, French tax rates are found to be below the revenue maximizing rates.

In a second step, we simulate both transitory and permanent shocks for various fiscal instruments. The fiscal multipliers are comparable to existing institutional DSGEs as summarized in Coenen et al. (2012) but also to the macroeconometric model *Mésange* (Klein and Simon, 2010). However, depending on the specification of fiscal and monetary authorities, fiscal multipliers variations are substantial, from 0.2 up to 1 point around the baseline in the most extreme case, with therefore very different implications in terms of policy-making.

All in all, the evaluation and the design of efficient fiscal packages is not a straightforward task. The monetary environment, the competition level, the international setting or the heterogeneity of households are only a few of the factors influencing the success of different policies. However, the large
number of fiscal tools within the scope of policy-makers allows for some room of manoeuvre in the
design of better programs, as advocated in the *mixed strategies* literature.

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JACOBZONE<br/>Les grands réseaux publics français dans une perspective européenne</td></tr><tr><td>G 9112</td><td>B. CREPON et G. DUREAU<br/>Investissement en recherche-développement : analyse de causalités dans un modèle d'accélérateur généralisé</td><td>G 9309 L. BLOCH - B. CŒURE<br/>Profitabilité de l'investissement productif et transmission des chocs financiers</td></tr><tr><td>G 9113</td><td>J.L. BRILLET, H. ERKEL-ROUSSE, J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br/>"France-Allemagne Couplées" - Deux économies vues par une maquette macro-économétrique</td><td>G 9310 J. BOURDIEU - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br/>Les théories sur la structure optimale du capital : quelques points de repère</td></tr><tr><td>G 9201</td><td>W.J. ADAMS, B. CREPON, D. ENCAOUA<br/>Choix technologiques et stratégies de dissuasion d'entrée</td><td>G 9311 C. DEFEUILLEY - Ph. QUIRION<br/>Les déchets d'emballages ménagers : une analyse économique des politiques française et allemande</td></tr><tr><td>G 9202</td><td>J. OLIVEIRA-MARTINS, J. TOUJAS-BERNATE</td><td>G 9312 L. BLOCH - B. CŒURE<br/>Q de Tobin marginal et transmission des chocs financiers</td></tr><tr><td>G 9313</td><td>Équipes Amadeus (INSEE), Banque de France, Métric (DP)<br/>Présentation des propriétés des principaux modèles macroéconomiques du Service Public</td><td>G 9313 B. CREPON - E. DUGUET<br/>Research & Development, competition and innovation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9314</td><td>B. DORMONT<br/>Quelle est l'influence du coût du travail sur l'emploi ?</td><td>G 9315 B. DORMONT<br/>Quelle est l'influence du coût du travail sur l'emploi ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9316</td><td>D. BLANCHET - C. BROUSSE<br/>Deux études sur l'âge de la retraite</td><td>G 9316 D. BLANCHET - C. BROUSSE<br/>Deux études sur l'âge de la retraite</td></tr><tr><td>G 9317</td><td>D. BLANCHET<br/>Répartition du travail dans une population hétérogène : deux notes</td><td>G 9317 D. BLANCHET<br/>Répartition du travail dans une population hétérogène : deux notes</td></tr><tr><td>G 9318</td><td>D. EYSSARTIER - N. PONTY<br/>AMADEUS - an annual macro-economic model for the medium and long term</td><td>G 9318 D. EYSSARTIER - N. PONTY<br/>AMADEUS - an annual macro-economic model for the medium and long term</td></tr><tr><td>G 9319</td><td>G. CETTE - Ph. CUNÉO - D. EYSSARTIER - J. GAUTIÉ<br/>Les effets sur l'emploi d'un abaissement du coût du travail des jeunes</td><td>G 9319 G. CETTE - Ph. CUNÉO - D. EYSSARTIER - J. GAUTIÉ<br/>Les effets sur l'emploi d'un abaissement du coût du travail des jeunes</td></tr><tr><td>G 9401</td><td>D. BLANCHET<br/>Les structures par âge importent-elles ?</td><td>G 9401 D. BLANCHET<br/>Les structures par âge importent-elles ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9402</td><td>J. GAUTIÉ<br/>Le chômage des jeunes en France : problème de formation ou phénomène de file d'attente ?<br/>Quelques éléments du débat</td><td>G 9402 J. GAUTIÉ<br/>Le chômage des jeunes en France : problème de formation ou phénomène de file d'attente ?<br/>Quelques éléments du débat</td></tr><tr><td>G 9403</td><td>P. QUIRION<br/>Les déchets en France : éléments statistiques et économiques</td><td>G 9403 P. QUIRION<br/>Les déchets en France : éléments statistiques et économiques</td></tr><tr><td>G 9404</td><td>D. LADIRAY - M. GRUN-REHOMME<br/>Lissage par moyennes mobiles - Le problème des extrémités de série</td><td>G 9404 D. LADIRAY - M. GRUN-REHOMME<br/>Lissage par moyennes mobiles - Le problème des extrémités de série</td></tr><tr><td>G 9405</td><td>V. MAILLARD<br/>Théorie et pratique de la correction des effets de jours ouvrables</td><td>G 9405 V. MAILLARD<br/>Théorie et pratique de la correction des effets de jours ouvrables</td></tr><tr><td>G 9406</td><td>F. ROSENWALD<br/>La décision d'investir</td><td>G 9406 F. ROSENWALD<br/>La décision d'investir</td></tr><tr><td>G 9407</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br/>Les apports de l'économie industrielle pour définir la stratégie économique de l'hôpital public</td><td>G 9407 S. JACOBZONE<br/>Les apports de l'économie industrielle pour définir la stratégie économique de l'hôpital public</td></tr><tr><td>G 9408</td><td>L. BLOCH, J. BOURDIEU, B. COLIN-SEDILLOT, G. LONGUEVILLE<br/>Du défaut de paiement au dépôt de bilan : les banquiers face aux PME en difficulté</td><td>G 9408 L. BLOCH, J. BOURDIEU, B. COLIN-SEDILLOT, G. LONGUEVILLE<br/>Du défaut de paiement au dépôt de bilan : les banquiers face aux PME en difficulté</td></tr><tr><td>G 9409</td><td>D. EYSSARTIER, P. MAIRE<br/>Impacts macro-économiques de mesures d'aide au logement - quelques éléments d'évaluation</td><td>G 9409 D. EYSSARTIER, P. MAIRE<br/>Impacts macro-économiques de mesures d'aide au logement - quelques éléments d'évaluation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9410</td><td>F. ROSENWALD<br/>Suivi conjoncturel de l'investissement</td><td>G 9410 F. ROSENWALD<br/>Suivi conjoncturel de l'investissement</td></tr><tr><td>G 9411</td><td>C. DEFEUILLEY - Ph. QUIRION<br/>Les déchets d'emballages ménagers : une analyse économique des politiques française et allemande</td><td>G 9411 C. DEFEUILLEY - Ph. QUIRION<br/>Les déchets d'emballages ménagers : une analyse économique des politiques française et allemande</td></tr></table>

ii

<table><tr><td>G 9412</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br/>Investissement, incertitude et irréversibilité<br/>Quelques développements récents de la théorie de l'investissement</td></tr><tr><td>G 9413</td><td>B. DORMONT - M. PAUCHET<br/>L'évaluation de l'élasticité emploi-salaire dépend-elle des structures de qualification ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9414</td><td>I. KABLA<br/>Le Choix de breveter une invention</td></tr><tr><td>G 9501</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. SEDILLOT<br/>Irreversible Investment and Uncertainty: When is there a Value of Waiting?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9502</td><td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ<br/>Imperfections du marché du crédit, investissement des entreprises et cycle économique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9503</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Les transformations de la demande de travail par qualification en France<br/>Une étude sur la période 1970-1993</td></tr><tr><td>G 9504</td><td>N. GREENAN<br/>Technologie, changement organisationnel, qualifications et emploi : une étude empirique sur l'industrie manufacturière</td></tr><tr><td>G 9505</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Persistance des hérarchies sectorielles de salaires: un réexamen sur données françaises</td></tr><tr><td>G 9505 Bis</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Persistence of inter-industry wages differentials: a reexamination on matched worker-firm panel data</td></tr><tr><td>G 9506</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br/>Les liens entre RMI et chômage, une mise en perspective<br/>NON PARU - article sorti dans Économie et Prévision n° 122 (1996) - pages 95 à 113</td></tr><tr><td>G 9507</td><td>G. CETTE - S. MAHFOUZ<br/>Le partage primaire du revenu<br/>Constat descriptif sur longue période</td></tr><tr><td>G 9601</td><td>Banque de France - CEPREMAP - Direction de la Prévision - Érasme - INSEE - OFCE<br/>Structures et propriétés de cinq modèles macro-économiques français</td></tr><tr><td>G 9602</td><td>Rapport d'activité de la DESE de l'année 1995</td></tr><tr><td>G 9603</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - A. DRAZNIEKS<br/>L'octroi de crédit aux PME : une analyse à partir d'informations bancaires</td></tr><tr><td>G 9604</td><td>A. TOPIOL-BENSAÎD<br/>Les implantations japonaises en France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9605</td><td>P. GENIER - S. JACOBZONE<br/>Comportements de prévention, consommation d'alcool et tabagie : peut-on parler d'une gestion globale du capital santé ?<br/>Une modélisation microéconométrique empirique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9606</td><td>C. DOZ - F. LENGLART<br/>Factor analysis and unobserved component models: an application to the study of French business surveys</td></tr><tr><td>G 9607</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br/>La théorie coopérative de la firme</td></tr></table>
<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9608</td>
    <td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br/>Technological innovation and employment<br/>reallocation</td>
    <td>G 9714</td>
    <td>F. LEQUILLER<br/>Does the French Consumer Price Index Over-<br/>state Inflation?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9609</td>
    <td>Ph. COUR - F. RUPPRECHT<br/>L'intégration asymétrique au sein du continent<br/>américain : un essai de modélisation</td>
    <td>G 9715</td>
    <td>X. BONNET<br/>Peut-on mettre en évidence les rigidités à la<br/>baisse des salaires nominaux ?<br/>Une étude sur quelques grands pays de l'OCDE</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9610</td>
    <td>S. DUCHENE - G. FORGEOT - A. JACQUOT<br/>Analyse des évolutions récentes de la producti-<br/>vité apparente du travail</td>
    <td>G 9716</td>
    <td>N. IUNG - F. RUPPRECHT<br/>Productivité de la recherche et rendements<br/>d'échelle dans le secteur pharmaceutique<br/>français</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9611</td>
    <td>X. BONNET - S. MAHFOUZ<br/>The influence of different specifications of wages-<br/>prices spirals on the measure of the NAIRU: the<br/>case of France</td>
    <td>G 9717</td>
    <td>E. DUGUET - I. KABLA<br/>Appropriation strategy and the motivations to use<br/>the patent system in France - An econometric<br/>analysis at the firm level</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9612</td>
    <td>PH. COUR - E. DUBOIS, S. MAHFOUZ, J. PISANI-FERRY<br/>The cost of fiscal retrenchment revisited: how<br/>strong is the evidence?</td>
    <td>G 9718</td>
    <td>L.P. PELÉ - P. RALLE<br/>Âge de la retraite : les aspects incitatifs du régime<br/>général</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9613</td>
    <td>A. JACQUOT<br/>Les flexions des taux d'activité sont-elles seule-<br/>ment conjoncturelles ?</td>
    <td>G 9719</td>
    <td>ZHANG Yingxiang - SONG Xueqing<br/>Lexique macroéconomique français-chinois,<br/>chinois-français</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9614</td>
    <td>ZHANG Yingxiang - SONG Xueqing<br/>Lexique macroéconomique Français-Chinois</td>
    <td>G 9720</td>
    <td>M. HOUDEBINE - J.L. SCHNEIDER<br/>Mesurer l'influence de la fiscalité sur la locali-<br/>sation des entreprises</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9701</td>
    <td>J.L. SCHNEIDER<br/>La taxe professionnelle : éléments de cadrage<br/>économique</td>
    <td>G 9721</td>
    <td>A. MOUROUGANE<br/>Crédibilité, indépendance et politique monétaire<br/>Une revue de la littérature</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9702</td>
    <td>J.L. SCHNEIDER<br/>Transition et stabilité politique d'un système<br/>redistributif</td>
    <td>G 9722</td>
    <td>P. AUGERAUD - L. BRIOT<br/>Les données comptables d'entreprises<br/>Le système intermédiaire d'entreprises<br/>Passage des données individuelles aux données<br/>sectorielles</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9703</td>
    <td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Train or Pay: Does it Reduce Inequalities to En-<br/>courage Firms to Train their Workers?</td>
    <td>G 9723</td>
    <td>P. AUGERAUD - J.E. CHAPRON<br/>Using Business Accounts for Compiling National<br/>Accounts: the French Experience</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9704</td>
    <td>P. GENIER<br/>Deux contributions sur dépendance et équité</td>
    <td>G 9724</td>
    <td>P. AUGERAUD<br/>Les comptes d'entreprise par activités - Le pas-<br/>sage aux comptes - De la comptabilité<br/>d'entreprise à la comptabilité nationale - A<br/>paraitre</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9705</td>
    <td>E. DUGUET - N. IUNG<br/>R &amp; D Investment, Patent Life and Patent Value<br/>An Econometric Analysis at the Firm Level</td>
    <td>G 9801</td>
    <td>H. MICHAUDON - C. PRIGENT<br/>Présentation du modèle AMADEUS</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9706</td>
    <td>M. HOUDEBINE - A. TOPIOL-BENSAÏD<br/>Les entreprises internationales en France : une<br/>analyse à partir de données individuelles</td>
    <td>G 9802</td>
    <td>J. ACCARDO<br/>Une étude de comptabilité générationnelle<br/>pour la France en 1996</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9707</td>
    <td>M. HOUDEBINE<br/>Polarisation des activités et spécialisation des<br/>départements en France</td>
    <td>G 9803</td>
    <td>X. BONNET - S. DUCHÈNE<br/>Apports et limites de la modélisation<br/>« Real Business Cycles »</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9708</td>
    <td>E. DUGUET - N. GREENAN<br/>Le biais technologique : une analyse sur données<br/>individuelles</td>
    <td>G 9804</td>
    <td>C. BARLET - C. DUGUET -<br/>D. ENCAOUA - J. PRADEL<br/>The Commercial Success of Innovations<br/>An econometric analysis at the firm level in<br/>French manufacturing</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9709</td>
    <td>J.L. BRILLET<br/>Analyzing a small French ECM Model</td>
    <td>G 9805</td>
    <td>P. CAHUC - Ch. GIANELLA -<br/>D. GOUX - A. ZILBERBERG<br/>Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining<br/>Power - Evidence form a Panel of French Firms</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9710</td>
    <td>J.L. BRILLET<br/>Formalizing the transition process: scenarios for<br/>capital accumulation</td>
    <td>G 9806</td>
    <td>J. ACCARDO - M. JLASSI<br/>La productivité globale des facteurs entre 1975 et<br/>1996</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9711</td>
    <td>G. FORGEOT - J. GAUTIÉ<br/>Insertion professionnelle des jeunes et processus<br/>de déclassement</td>
    <td>G 9807</td>
    <td>Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études<br/>et Synthèses Économiques - 1997</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9712</td>
    <td>E. DUBOIS<br/>High Real Interest Rates: the Consequence of a<br/>Saving Investment Disequilibrium or of an in-<br/>sufficient Credibility of Monetary Authorities?</td>
    <td>G 9808</td>
    <td>A. MOUROUGANE<br/>Can a Conservative Governor Conduct an Ac-<br/>comodative Monetary Policy?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9713</td>
    <td>Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études<br/>et Synthèses Économiques - 1996</td>
    <td>G 9809</td>
    <td>X. BONNET - E. DUBOIS - L. FAUVET<br/>Asymétrie des inflations relatives et menus costs<br/>: tests sur l'inflation française</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9810</td>
    <td>E. DUGUET - N. IUNG<br/>Sales and Advertising with Spillovers at the firm<br/>level: Estimation of a Dynamic Structural Model<br/>on Panel Data</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9811</td>
    <td>J.P. BERTHIER<br/>Congestion urbaine : un modèle de trafic de<br/>pointe à courbe débit-vitesse et demande<br/>élastique</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9812</td>
    <td>C. PRIGENT<br/>La part des salaires dans la valeur ajoutée : une<br/>approche macroéconomique</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9813</td>
    <td>A.Th. AERTS<br/>L'évolution de la part des salaires dans la valeur<br/>ajoutée en France reflète-t-elle les évolutions<br/>individuelles sur la période 1979-1994 ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9814</td>
    <td>B. SALANIÉ<br/>Guide pratique des séries non-stationnaires</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9901</td>
    <td>S. DUCHÈNE - A. JACQUOT<br/>Une croissance plus riche en emplois depuis le<br/>début de la décennie ? Une analyse en compa-<br/>raison internationale</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9902</td>
    <td>Ch. COLIN<br/>Modélisation des carrières dans Destinie</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9903</td>
    <td>Ch. COLIN<br/>Évolution de la dispersion des salaires : un essai<br/>de prospective par microsimulation</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9904</td>
    <td>B. CREPON - N. IUNG<br/>Innovation, emploi et performances</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9905</td>
    <td>B. CREPON - Ch. GIANELLA<br/>Wages inequalities in France 1969-1992<br/>An application of quantile regression techniques</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9906</td>
    <td>C. BONNET - R. MAHIEU<br/>Microsimulation techniques applied to inter-<br/>generational transfers - Pensions in a dynamic<br/>framework: the case of France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9907</td>
    <td>F. ROSENWALD<br/>L'impact des contraintes financières dans la dé-<br/>cision d'investissement</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9908</td>
    <td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 1998</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9909</td>
    <td>J.P. ZOYEM<br/>Contrat d'insertion et sortie du RMI<br/>Evaluation des effets d'une politique sociale</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9910</td>
    <td>Ch. COLIN - FI. LEGROS - R. MAHIEU<br/>Bilans contributifs comparés des régimes de<br/>retraite du secteur privé et de la fonction publique</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9911</td>
    <td>G. LAROQUE - B. SALANIÉ<br/>Un décompte du non-emploi en France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9912</td>
    <td>B. SALANIÉ<br/>Une maquette analytique de long terme du<br/>marché du travail</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
    <td>G 9912</td>
    <td>Ch. GIANELLA</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9807</td>
    <td>Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques - 1997</td>
    <td>Bis</td>
    <td>Une estimation de l'élasticité de l'emploi peu qualifié à son coût</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9808</td>
    <td>A. MOUROUGANE<br/>Can a Conservative Governor Conduct an Ac-<br/>comodative Monetary Policy?</td>
    <td>G 9913</td>
    <td>Division « Redistribution et Politiques Sociales »<br/>Le modèle de microsimulation dynamique<br/>DESTINIE</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9809</td>
    <td>X. BONNET - E. DUBOIS - L. FAUVET<br/>Asymétrie des inflations relatives et menus costs<br/>: tests sur l'inflation française</td>
    <td>G 9914</td>
    <td>E. DUGUET<br/>Macro-commandes SAS pour l'économétrie des<br/>panels et des variables qualitatives</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9810</td>
    <td>E. DUGUET - N. IUNG<br/>Sales and Advertising with Spillovers at the firm<br/>level: Estimation of a Dynamic Structural Model<br/>on Panel Data</td>
    <td>G 9915</td>
    <td>R. DUHAUTOIS<br/>Évolution des flux d'emplois en France entre<br/>1990 et 1996 : une étude empirique à partir du<br/>fichier des bénéfices réels normaux (BRN)</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9811</td>
    <td>J.P. BERTHIER<br/>Congestion urbaine : un modèle de trafic de<br/>pointe à courbe débit-vitesse et demande<br/>élastique</td>
    <td>G 9916</td>
    <td>J.Y. FOURNIER<br/>Extraction du cycle des affaires : la méthode de<br/>Baxter et King</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9812</td>
    <td>C. PRIGENT<br/>La part des salaires dans la valeur ajoutée : une<br/>approche macroéconomique</td>
    <td>G 9917</td>
    <td>B. CRÉPON - R. DESPLATZ - J. MAIRESSE<br/>Estimating price cost margins, scale economies<br/>and workers' bargaining power at the firm level</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9813</td>
    <td>A.Th. AERTS<br/>L'évolution de la part des salaires dans la valeur<br/>ajoutée en France reflète-t-elle les évolutions<br/>individuelles sur la période 1979-1994 ?</td>
    <td>G 9918</td>
    <td>Ch. GIANELLA - Ph. LAGARDE<br/>Productivity of hours in the aggregate production<br/>function: an evaluation on a panel of French firms<br/>from the manufacturing sector</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9814</td>
    <td>B. SALANIÉ<br/>Guide pratique des séries non-stationnaires</td>
    <td>G 9919</td>
    <td>S. AUDRIC - P. GIVORD - C. PROST<br/>Évolution de l'emploi et des coûts par quali-<br/>fication entre 1982 et 1996</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9901</td>
    <td>S. DUCHÈNE - A. JACQUOT<br/>Une croissance plus riche en emplois depuis le<br/>début de la décennie ? Une analyse en compa-<br/>raison internationale</td>
    <td>G 2000/01</td>
    <td>R. MAHIEU<br/>Les déterminants des dépenses de santé : une<br/>approche macroéconomique</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9902</td>
    <td>Ch. COLIN<br/>Modélisation des carrières dans Destinie</td>
    <td>G 2000/02</td>
    <td>C. ALLARD-PRIGENT - H. GUILMEAU -<br/>A. QUINET<br/>The real exchange rate as the relative price of<br/>nontrables in terms of tradables: theoretical<br/>investigation and empirical study on French data</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9903</td>
    <td>Ch. COLIN<br/>Évolution de la dispersion des salaires : un essai<br/>de prospective par microsimulation</td>
    <td>G 2000/03</td>
    <td>J.-Y. FOURNIER<br/>L'approximation du filtre passe-bande proposée<br/>par Christiano and Fitzgerald</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9904</td>
    <td>B. CREPON - N. IUNG<br/>Innovation, emploi et performances</td>
    <td>G 2000/04</td>
    <td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 1999</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9905</td>
    <td>B. CREPON - Ch. GIANELLA<br/>Wages inequalities in France 1969-1992<br/>An application of quantile regression techniques</td>
    <td>G 2000/05</td>
    <td>B. CREPON - F. ROSENWALD<br/>Investissement et contraintes de financement : le<br/>poids du cycle<br/>Une estimation sur données françaises</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9906</td>
    <td>C. BONNET - R. MAHIEU<br/>Microsimulation techniques applied to inter-<br/>generational transfers - Pensions in a dynamic<br/>framework: the case of France</td>
    <td>G 2000/06</td>
    <td>A. FLIPO<br/>Les comportements matrimoniaux de fait</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9907</td>
    <td>F. ROSENWALD<br/>L'impact des contraintes financières dans la dé-<br/>cision d'investissement</td>
    <td>G 2000/07</td>
    <td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT<br/>Microsimulations of the retirement decision: a<br/>supply side approach</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9908</td>
    <td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 1998</td>
    <td>G 2000/08</td>
    <td>C. AUDENIS - C. PROST<br/>Déficit conjoncturel : une prise en compte des<br/>conjonctures passées</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9909</td>
    <td>J.P. ZOYEM<br/>Contrat d'insertion et sortie du RMI<br/>Evaluation des effets d'une politique sociale</td>
    <td>G 2000/09</td>
    <td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT<br/>Équivalent patrimonial de la rente et souscription<br/>de retraite complémentaire</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9910</td>
    <td>Ch. COLIN - FI. LEGROS - R. MAHIEU<br/>Bilans contributifs comparés des régimes de<br/>retraite du secteur privé et de la fonction publique</td>
    <td>G 2000/10</td>
    <td>R. DUHAUTOIS<br/>Ralentissement de l'investissement : petites ou<br/>grandes entreprises ? industrie ou tertiaire ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9911</td>
    <td>G. LAROQUE - B. SALANIÉ<br/>Un décompte du non-emploi en France</td>
    <td>G 2000/11</td>
    <td>G. LAROQUE - B. SALANIÉ<br/>Temps partiel féminin et incitations financières à<br/>l'emploi</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9912</td>
    <td>B. SALANIÉ<br/>Une maquette analytique de long terme du<br/>marché du travail</td>
    <td>G2000/12</td>
    <td>Ch. GIANELLA<br/>Local unemployment and wages</td>
  </tr>
</table>
G2000/13 B. CREPON - Th. HECKEL
- Informatisation en France : une évaluation à partir de données individuelles
- Computerization in France: an evaluation based on individual company data

G2001/01 F. LEQUILLER
- La nouvelle économie et la mesure de la croissance du PIB
- The new economy and the measure ment of GDP growth

G2001/02 S. AUDRIC
La reprise de la croissance de l'emploi profite-t-elle aussi aux non-diplômés ?

G2001/03 I. BRAUN-LEMAIRE
Évolution et répartition du surplus de productivité

G2001/04 A. BEAUDU - Th. HECKEL
Le canal du crédit fonctionne-t-il en Europe ? Une étude de l'hétérogénéité des comportements d'investissement à partir de données de bilan agréées

G2001/05 C. AUDENIS - P. BISCOURP - N. FOURCADE - O. LOISEL
Testing the augmented Solow growth model: An empirical reassessment using panel data

G2001/06 R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT
Départ à la retraite, irréversibilité et incertitude

G2001/07 Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2000

G2001/08 J. Ph. GAUDEMET
Les dispositifs d'acquisition à titre facultatif d'annuités viagères de retraite

G2001/09 B. CRÉPON - Ch. GIANELLA
Fiscalité, coût d'usage du capital et demande de facteurs : une analyse sur données individuelles

G2001/10 B. CRÉPON - R. DESPLATZ
Évaluation des effets des dispositifs d'allégements de charges sociales sur les bas salaires

G2001/11 J.-Y. FOURNIER
Comparaison des salaires des secteurs public et privé

G2001/12 J.-P. BERTHIER - C. JAULENT
R. CONVENEVOLE - S. PISANI
Une méthodologie de comparaison entre consommations intermédiaires de source fiscale et de comptabilité nationale

G2001/13 P. BISCOURP - Ch. GIANELLA
Substitution and complementarity between capital, skilled and less skilled workers: an analysis at the firm level in the French manufacturing industry

G2001/14 I. ROBERT-BOBEE
Modelling demographic behaviours in the French microsimulation model Destinie: An analysis of future change in completed fertility

G2001/15 J.-P. ZOYEM
Diagnostic sur la pauvreté et calendrier de revenus : le cas du "Panel européen des ménages »

G2001/16 J.-Y. FOURNIER - P. GIVORD
La réduction des taux d'activité aux âges extrêmes, une spécificité française ?

G2001/17 C. AUDENIS - P. BISCOURP - N. RIEDINGER
Existe-t-il une asymétrie dans la transmission du prix du brut aux prix des carburants ?

G2002/01 F. MAGNIEN - J.-L. TAVERNIER - D. THESMAR
Les statistiques internationales de PIB par habitant en standard de pouvoir d'achat : une analyse des résultats

G2002/02 Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2001

G2002/03 B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET
La cessation d'activité au sein des couples : y a-t-il interdépendance des choix ?

G2002/04 G. BRILHAULT
- Rétropolation des séries de FBCF et calcul du capital fixe en SEC-95 dans les comptes nationaux français
- Retropolation of the investment series (GFCF) and estimation of fixed capital stocks on the ESA-95 basis for the French balance sheets

G2002/05 P. BISCOURP - B. CRÉPON - T. HECKEL - N. RIEDINGER
How do firms respond to cheaper computers? Microeconometric evidence for France based on a production function approach

G2002/06 C. AUDENIS - J. DEROYON - N. FOURCADE
L'impact des nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication sur l'économie française - un bouclage macro-économique

G2002/07 J. BARDAJI - B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET
Évaluation de trois réformes du Régime Général d'assurance vieillesse à l'aide du modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE

G2002/08 J.-P. BERTHIER
Réflexions sur les différentes notions de volume dans les comptes nationaux : comptes aux prix d'une année fixe ou aux prix de l'année précédente, séries chaînées

G2002/09 F. HILD
Les soldes d'opinion résument-ils au mieux les réponses des entreprises aux enquêtes de conjoncture ?

G2002/10 I. ROBERT-BOBÉE
Les comportements démographiques dans le modèle de microsimulation Destinie - Une comparaison des estimations issues des enquêtes Jeunes et Carrières 1997 et Histoire Familliale 1999

G2002/11 J.-P. ZOYEM
La dynamique des bas revenus : une analyse des entrées-sorties de pauvreté

G2002/12 F. HILD
Prévisions d'inflation pour la France

G2002/13 M. LECLAIR
Réduction du temps de travail et tensions sur les facteurs de production

G2002/14 E. WALRAET - A. VINCENT
- Analyse de la redistribution intragénérationnelle dans le système de retraite des salariés du privé - Une approche par microsimulation
- Intragenerational distributional analysis in the french private sector pension scheme - A microsimulation approach

G2002/15 P. CHONE - D. LE BLANC - I. ROBERT-BOBEE
Offre de travail féminine et garde des jeunes enfants

G2002/16 F. MAUREL - S. GREGOIR
Les indices de compétitivité des pays : interprétation et limites

G2003/01 N. RIEDINGER - E.HAUVY
Le coût de dépollution atmosphérique pour les entreprises françaises : Une estimation à partir de données individuelles

G2003/02 P. BISCOURP et F. KRAMARZ
Création d'emplois, destruction d'emplois et internationalisation des entreprises industrielles françaises : une analyse sur la période 1986-1992

G2003/03 Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2002

G2003/04 P.-O. BEFFY - J. DEROYON - N. FOURCADE - S. GREGOIR - N. LAÎB - B. MONFORT
Évolutions démographiques et croissance : une projection macro-économique à l'horizon 2020

G2003/05 P. AUBERT
La situation des salariés de plus de cinquante ans dans le secteur privé

G2003/06 P. AUBERT - B. CRÉPON
Age, salaire et productivité
La productivité des salariés décline-t-elle en fin de carrière ?

G2003/07 H. BARON - P.O. BEFFY - N. FOURCADE - R. MAHIEU
Le ralentissement de la productivité du travail au cours des années 1990

G2003/08 P.-O. BEFFY - B. MONFORT
Patrimoine des ménages, dynamique d'allocation et comportement de consommation

G2003/09 P. BISCOURP - N. FOURCADE
Peut-on mettre en évidence l'existence de rigidités à la baisse des salaires à partir de données individuelles ? Le cas de la France à la fin des années 90

G2003/10 M. LECLAIR - P. PETIT
Présence syndicalale dans les firmes : quel impact sur les inégalités salariales entre les hommes et les femmes ?

G2003/11 P.-O. BEFFY - X. BONNET - M. DARRACQ-PARIES - B. MONFORT
MZE: a small macro-model for the euro area

G2004/01 P. AUBERT - M. LECLAIR
La compétitivité exprimée dans les enquêtes trimestrielles sur la situation et les perspectives dans l'industrie

G2004/02 M. DUÉE - C. REBILLARD
La dépendance des personnes âgées : une projection à long terme

G2004/03 S. RASPILLER - N. RIEDINGER
Régulation environnementale et choix de localisation des groupes français

G2004/04 A. NABOULET - S. RASPILLER
Les déterminants de la décision d'investir : une approche par les perceptions subjectives des firmes

G2004/05 N. RAGACHE
La déclaration des enfants par les couples non mariés est-elle fiscalement optimale ?

G2004/06 M. DUÉE
L'impact du chômage des parents sur le devenir scolaire des enfants

G2004/07 P. AUBERT - E. CAROLI - M. ROGER
New Technologies, Workplace Organisation and the Age Structure of the Workforce: Firm-Level Evidence

G2004/08 E. DUGUET - C. LELARGE
Les brevets accroissent-ils les incitations privées à innover ? Un examen microéconométrique

G2004/09 S. RASPILLER - P. SILLARD
Affiliating versus Subcontracting: the Case of Multinationals

G2004/10 J. BOISSINOT - C. L'ANGEVIN - B. MONFORT
Public Debt Sustainability: Some Results on the French Case

G2004/11 S. ANANIAN - P. AUBERT
Travailleurs âgés, nouvelles technologies et changements organisationnels : un réexamen à partir de l'enquête « REPONSE »

G2004/12 X. BONNET - H. PONCET
Structures de revenus et propensions différentes à consommer - Vers une équation de consommation des ménages plus robuste en prévision pour la France

G2004/13 C. PICART
Évaluer la rentabilité des sociétés non financières

G2004/14 J. BARDAJI - B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET
Les retraites du secteur public : projections à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE

G2005/01 S. BUFFETEAU - P. GODEFROY
Conditions de départ en retraite selon l'âge de fin d'études : analyse prospective pour les générations 1945 à 1974

G2005/02 C. AFSA - S. BUFFETEAU
L'évolution de l'activité féminine en France : une approche par pseudo-panel

G2005/03 P. AUBERT - P. SILLARD
Délocalisations et réductions d'effectifs dans l'industrie française

G2005/04 M. LECLAIR - S. ROUX
Mesure et utilisation des emplois instables dans les entreprises

G2005/05 C. L'ANGEVIN - S. SERRAVALLE
Performances à l'exportation de la France et de l'Allemagne - Une analyse par secteur et destination géographique

G2005/06 Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques - 2004

G2005/07 S. RASPILLER
La concurrence fiscale : principaux enseignements de l'analyse économique

G2005/08 C. L'ANGEVIN - N. LAÎB
Éducation et croissance en France et dans un panel de 21 pays de l'OCDE
G2005/09 N. FERRARI
Prévoir l'investissement des entreprises
Un indicateur des révisions dans l'enquête de
conjoncture sur les investissements dans
l'industrie.

G2005/10 P.-O. BEFFY - C. L'ANGEVIN
Chômage et boucle prix-salaires :
apport d'un modèle « qualifiés/peu qualifiés »

G2005/11 B. HEITZ
A two-states Markov-switching model of inflation
in France and the USA: credible target VS
inflation spiral

G2005/12 O. BIAU - H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - N. FERRARI
Réponses individuelles aux enquêtes de
conjoncture et prévision macroéconomiques :
Exemple de la prévision de la production
manufacturière

G2005/13 P. AUBERT - D. BLANCHET - D. BLAU
The labour market after age 50: some elements
of a Franco-American comparison

G2005/14 D. BLANCHET - T. DEBRAND -
P. DOURGNON - P. POLLET
L'enquête SHARE : présentation et premiers
résultats de l'édition française

G2005/15 M. DUÉE
La modélisation des comportements démographiques dans le modèle de microsimulation
DESTINIE

G2005/16 H. RAOUI - S. ROUX
Étude de simulation sur la participation versée
aux salariés par les entreprises

G2006/01 C. BONNET - S. BUFFETEAU - P. GODEFROY
Disparités de retraite de droit direct entre
hommes et femmes : quelles évolutions ?

G2006/02 C. PICART
Les gazelles en France

G2006/03 P. AUBERT - B. CRÉPON - P. ZAMORA
Le rendement apparaît de la formation continue
dans les entreprises : effets sur la productivité et
les salaires

G2006/04 J.-F. OUVRARD - R. RATHELOT
Demographic change and unemployment:
what do macroeconometric models predict?

G2006/05 D. BLANCHET - J.-F. OUVRARD
Indicateurs d'engagements implicites des
systèmes de retraite : chiffrages, propriétés
analytiques et réactions à des chocs
démographiques types

G2006/06 G. BIAU - O. BIAU - L. ROUVIERE
Nonparametric Forecasting of the Manufacturing
Output Growth with Firm-level Survey Data

G2006/07 C. AFSA - P. GIVORD
Le rôle des conditions de travail dans les
absences pour maladie

G2006/08 P. SILLARD - C. L'ANGEVIN - S. SERRAVALLE
Performances comparées à l'exportation de la
France et de ses principaux partenaires
Une analyse structurelle sur 12 ans

G2006/09 X. BOUTIN - S. QUANTIN
Une méthodologie d'évaluation comptable du
coût du capital des entreprises françaises : 1984-
2002

G2006/10 C. AFSA
L'estimation d'un coût implicite de la pénibilité du
travail chez les travailleurs âgés

G2006/11 C. LELARGE
Les entreprises (industrielles) françaises sont-
elles à la frontière technologique ?

G2006/12 O. BIAU - N. FERRARI
Théorie de l'opinion
Faut-il pondérer les réponses individuelles ?

G2006/13 A. KOUBI - S. ROUX
Une réinterprétation de la relation entre
productivité et inégalités salariales dans les
entreprises

G2006/14 R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
The impact of local taxes on plants location
decision

G2006/15 L. GONZALEZ - C. PICART
Diversification, recentrage et poids des activités
de support dans les groupes (1993-2000)

G2007/01 D. SRAER
Allègements de cotisations patronales et
dynamique salariale

G2007/02 V. ALBOUY - L. LEQUIEN
Les rendements non monétaires de l'éducation :
le cas de la santé

G2007/03 D. BLANCHET - T. DEBRAND
Aspiration à la retraite, santé et satisfaction au
travail : une comparaison européenne

G2007/04 M. BARLET - L. CRUSSON
Quel impact des variations du prix du pétrole sur
la croissance française ?

G2007/05 C. PICART
Flux d'emploi et de main-d'œuvre en France : un
réexamen

G2007/06 V. ALBOUY - C. TAVAN
Massification et démocratisation de
l'enseignement supérieur en France

G2007/07 T. LE BARBANCHON
The Changing response to oil price shocks in
France: a DSGE type approach

G2007/08 T. CHANEY - D. SRAER - D. THESMAR
Collateral Value and Corporate Investment
Evidence from the French Real Estate Market

G2007/09 J. BOISSINOT
Consumption over the Life Cycle: Facts for
France

G2007/10 C. AFSA
Interpréter les variables de satisfaction :
l'exemple de la durée du travail

G2007/11 R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
Zones Franches Urbaines : quels effets sur
l'emploi salarié et les créations
d'établissements ?

G2007/12 V. ALBOUY - B. CRÉPON
Aléa moral en santé : une évaluation dans le
cadre du modèle causal de Rubin

G2008/01 C. PICART
Les PME françaises : rentables mais peu
dynamiques

G2008/02 P. BISCOURP - X. BOUTIN - T. VERGÉ
The Effects of Retail Regulations on Prices
Evidence form the Loi Galland

G2008/03 Y. BARBESOL - A. BRIANT
Économies d'agglomération et productivité des
entreprises : estimation sur données individuelles
françaises

G2008/04 D. BLANCHET - F. LE GALLO
Les projections démographiques : principaux
mécanismes et retour sur l'expérience française

G2008/05 D. BLANCHET - F. TOUTLEMONDE
Évolutions démographiques et déformation du
cycle de vie active : quelles relations ?

G2008/06 M. BARLET - D. BLANCHET - L. CRUSSON
Internationalisation et flux d'emplois : que dit une
approche comptable ?

G2008/07 C. LELARGE - D. SRAER - D. THESMAR
Entrepreneurship and Credit Constraints -
Evidence from a French Loan Guarantee
Program

G2008/08 X. BOUTIN - L. JANIN
Are Prices Really Affected by Mergers?

G2008/09 M. BARLET - A. BRIANT - L. CRUSSON
Concentration géographique dans l'industrie
manufacturière et dans les services en France :
une approche par un indicateur en continu

G2008/10 M. BEFFY - É. COUDIN - R. RATHELOT
Who is confronted to insecure labor market
histories? Some evidence based on the French
labor market transition

G2008/11 M. ROGER - E. WALRAET
Social Security and Well-Being of the Elderly: the
Case of France

G2008/12 C. AFSA
Analyser les composantes du bien-être et de son
 évolution
Une approche empirique sur données
individuelles

G2008/13 M. BARLET - D. BLANCHET -
T. LE BARBANCHON
Microsimuler le marché du travail : un prototype

G2009/01 P.-A. PIONNIER
Le partage de la valeur ajoutée en France,
1949-2007

G2009/02 Laurent CLAVEL - Christelle MINODIER
A Monthly Indicator of the French Business
Climate

G2009/03 H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - C. MINODIER
Do Business Tendency Surveys in Industry and
Services Help in Forecasting GDP Growth?
A Real-Time Analysis on French Data

G2009/04 P. GIVORD - L. WILNER
Les contrats temporaires : trappe ou marchepied
vers l'emploi stable ?

G2009/05 G. LALANNE - P.-A. PIONNIER - O. SIMON
Le partage des fruits de la croissance de 1950 à
2008 : une approche par les comptes de surplus

G2009/06 L. DAVEZIES - X. D'HAULTFOEUILLE
Faut-il pondérer ?... Ou l'éternelle question de
l'économètre confronté à des données d'enquête

G2009/07 S. QUANTIN - S. RASPILLER - S. SERRAVALLE
Commerce intragroupe, fiscalité et prix de
transferts : une analyse sur données françaises

G2009/08 M. CLERC - V. MARCUS
Élasticités-prix des consommations énergétiques
des ménages

G2009/09 G. LALANNE - E. POULIQUEN - O. SIMON
Prix du pétrole et croissance potentielle à long
termes

G2009/10 D. BLANCHET - J. LE CACHEUX - V. MARCUS
Adjusted net savings and other approaches to
sustainability: some theoretical background

G2009/11 V. BELLAMY - G. CONSALES - M. FESSEAU -
S. LE LAIDIER - É. RAYNAUD
Une décomposition du compte des ménages de
la comptabilité nationale par catégorie de
ménage en 2003

G2009/12 J. BARDAJI - F. TALLET
Detecting Economic Regimes in France: a
Qualitative Markov-Switching Indicator Using
Mixed Frequency Data

G2009/13 R. AEBERHARDT - D. FOUGÈRE -
R. RATHELOT
Discrimination à l'embauche : comment exploiter
les procédures de testing ?

G2009/14 Y. BARBESOL - P. GIVORD - S. QUANTIN
Partage de la valeur ajoutée, approche par
données microéconomiques

G2009/15 I. BUONO - G. LALANNE
The Effect of the Uruguay round on the Intensive
and Extensive Margins of Trade

G2010/01 C. MINODIER
Avantages comparés des séries des premières
valeurs publiées et des séries des valeurs
révisées - Un exercice de prévision en temps réel
de la croissance trimestrielle du PIB en France

G2010/02 V. ALBOUY - L. DAVEZIES - T. DEBRAND
Health Expenditure Models: a Comparison of Five
Specifications using Panel Data

G2010/03 C. KLEIN - O. SIMON
Le modèle MÉSANGE réestimé en base 2000
Tome 1 – Version avec volumes à prix constants

G2010/04 M.-É. CLERC - É. COUDIN
L'IPC, miroir de l'évolution du coût de la vie en
France ? Ce qu'apporte l'analyse des courbes
d'Engel

G2010/05 N. CECI-RENAUD - P.-A. CHEVALIER
Les seuils de 10, 20 et 50 salariés : impact sur la
taille des entreprises françaises

G2010/06 R. AEBERHARDT - J. POUGET
National Origin Differences in Wages and
Hierarchical Positions - Evidence on French Full-
Time Male Workers from a matched Employer-
Employee Dataset

G2010/07 S. BLASCO - P. GIVORD
Les trajectoires professionnelles en début de vie
active : quel impact des contrats temporaires ?

G2010/08 P. GIVORD
Méthodes économétriques pour l'évaluation de
politiques publiques
G2010/09 P.-Y. CABANNES - V. LAPÈGUE - E. POULIQUEN - M. BEFFY - M. GAINI Quelle croissance de moyen terme après la crise ?

G2010/10 I. BUONO - G. LALANNE La réaction des entreprises françaises à la baisse des tarifs douaniers étrangers

G2010/11 R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD L'apport des méthodes à noyaux pour mesurer la concentration géographique - Application à la concentration des immigrés en France de 1968 à 1999

G2010/12 M. BARATON - M. BEFFY - D. FOUGÈRE Une évaluation de l'effet de la réforme de 2003 sur les départs en retraite - Le cas des enseignants du second degré public

G2010/13 D. BLANCHET - S. BUFFETEAU - E. CRENNER S. LE MINEZ Le modèle de microsimulation Destinie 2 : principales caractéristiques et premiers résultats

G2010/14 D. BLANCHET - E. CRENNER Le bloc retraites du modèle Destinie 2 : guide de l'utilisateur

G2010/15 M. BARLET - L. CRUSSON - S. DUPUCH - F. PUECH Des services échangés aux services échangeables : une application sur données françaises

G2010/16 M. BEFFY - T. KAMIONKA Public-private wage gaps: is civil-servant human capital sector-specific?

G2010/17 P.-Y. CABANNES - H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - G. LALANNE - O. MONSO - E. POULIQUEN Le modèle Mésange réestimé en base 2000 Tome 2 - Version avec volumes à prix chaînes

G2010/18 R. AEBERHARDT - L. DAVEZIES Conditional Logit with one Binary Covariate: Link between the Static and Dynamic Cases

G2011/01 T. LE BARBANCHON - B. OURLIAC - O. SIMON Les marchés du travail français et américain face aux chocs conjoncturels des années 1986 à 2007 : une modélisation DSGE

G2011/02 C. MARBOT Une évaluation de la réduction d'impôt pour l'emploi de salariés à domicile

G2011/03 L. DAVEZIES Modèles à effets fixes, à effets aléatoires, modèles mixtes ou multi-niveaux : propriétés et mises en œuvre des modélisations de l'hétérogénéité dans le cas de données groupées

G2011/04 M. ROGER - M. WASMER Heterogeneity matters: labour productivity differentiated by age and skills

G2011/05 J.-C. BRICONGNE - J.-M. FOURNIER V. LAPÈGUE - O. MONSO De la crise financière à la crise économique L'impact des perturbations financières de 2007 et 2008 sur la croissance de sept pays industrialisés

G2011/06 P. CHARNOZ - É. COUDIN - M. GAINI Wage inequalities in France 1976-2004: a quantile regression analysis

G2011/07 M. CLERC - M. GAINI - D. BLANCHET Recommendations of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report: A few illustrations

G2011/08 M. BACHELET - M. BEFFY - D. BLANCHET Projeter l'impact des réformes des retraites sur l'activité des 55 ans et plus : une comparaison de trois modèles

G2011/09 C. LOUVOT-RUNAVOT L'évaluation de l'activité dissimulée des entreprises sur la base des contrôles fiscaux et son insertion dans les comptes nationaux

G2011/10 A. SCHREIBER - A. VICARD La tertiarisation de l'économie française et le ralentissement de la productivité entre 1978 et 2008

G2011/11 M.-É. CLERC - O. MONSO - E. POULIQUEN Les inégalités entre générations depuis le baby-boom

G2011/12 C. MARBOT - D. ROY Évaluation de la transformation de la réduction d'impôt en crédit d'impôt pour l'emploi de salariés à domicile en 2007

G2011/13 P. GIVORD - R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD Place-based tax exemptions and displacement effects: An evaluation of the Zones Franches Urbaines program

G2011/14 X. D'HAULTFOEUILLE - P. GIVORD - X. BOUTIN The Environmental Effect of Green Taxation: the Case of the French "Bonus/Malus"

G2011/15 M. BARLET - M. CLERC - M. GARNEO - V. LAPÈGUE - V. MARCUS La nouvelle version du modèle MZE, modèle macroéconométrique pour la zone euro

G2011/16 R. AEBERHARDT - I. BUONO - H. FADINGER Learning, Incomplete Contracts and Export Dynamics: Theory and Evidence form French Firms

G2011/17 C. KERDRAIN - V. LAPÈGUE Restrictive Fiscal Policies in Europe: What are the Likely Effects?

G2012/01 P. GIVORD - S. QUANTIN - C. TREVIEN A Long-Term Evaluation of the First Generation of the French Urban Enterprise Zones

G2012/02 N. CECI-RENAUD - V. COTTET Politique salariale et performance des entreprises

G2012/03 P. FÉVRIER - L. WILNER Do Consumers Correctly Expect Price Reductions? Testing Dynamic Behavior

G2012/04 M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD School as a shelter? School leaving-age and the business cycle in France

G2012/05 M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD A scarred generation? French evidence on young people entering into a tough labour market

G2012/06 P. AUBERT - M. BACHELET Disparités de montant de pension et redistribution dans le système de retraite français

G2012/07 R. AEBERHARDT - P GIVORD - C. MARBOT Spillover Effect of the Minimum Wage in France: An Unconditional Quantile Regression Approach

G2012/08 A. EIDELMAN - F. LANGUMIER - A. VICARD Prélèvements obligatoires reposant sur les ménages : des canaux redistributifs différents en 1990 et 2010

G2012/09 O. BARGAIN - A. VICARD Le RMI et son successeur le RSA découragent-ils certains jeunes de travailler ? Une analyse sur les jeunes autour de 25 ans

G2012/10 C. MARBOT - D. ROY Projections du coût de l'APA et des caractéristiques de ses bénéficiaires à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle Destinie

G2012/11 A. MAUROUX Le crédit d'impôt dédié au développement durable : une évaluation économique

G2012/12 V. COTTET - S. QUANTIN - V. RÉGNIER Coût du travail et allègements de charges : une estimation au niveau établissement de 1996 à 2008

G2012/13 X. D'HAULTFOEUILLE - P. FÉVRIER - L. WILNER Demand Estimation in the Presence of Revenue Management

G2012/14 D. BLANCHET - S. LE MINEZ Joint macro/micro evaluations of accrued-to-date pension liabilities: an application to French reforms

G2013/01- F1301 T. DERROYON - A. MONTAUT - P-A PIONNIER Utilisation rétrospective de l'enquête Emploi à une fréquence mensuelle : apport d'une modélisation espace-état

G2013/02- F1302 C. TREVIEN Habiter en HLM : quel avantage monétaire et quel impact sur les conditions de logement ?

G2013/03 A. POISSONNIER Temporal disaggregation of stock variables - The Chow-Lin method extended to dynamic models

G2013/04 P. GIVORD - C. MARBOT Does the cost of child care affect female labor market participation? An evaluation of a French reform of childcare subsidies

G2013/05 G. LAME - M. LEQUIEN - P.-A. PIONNIER Interpretation and limits of sustainability tests in public finance

G2013/06 C. BELLEGO - V. DORTET-BERNADET La participation aux pôles de compétitivité : quelle incidence sur les dépenses de R&D et l'activité des PME et ETI ?

G2013/07 P.-Y. CABANNES - A. MONTAUT - P.-A. PIONNIER Évaluer la productivité globale des facteurs en France : l'apport d'une mesure de la qualité du capital et du travail

G2013/08 R. AEBERHARDT - C. MARBOT Evolution of Instability on the French Labour Market During the Last Thirty Years

G2013/09 J.-B. BERNARD - G. CLÉAUD Oil price: the nature of the shocks and the impact on the French economy

G2013/10 G. LAME Was there a « Greenspan Conundrum » in the Euro area?

G2013/11 P. CHONÉ - F. EVAIN - L. WILNER - E. YILMAZ Introducing activity-based payment in the hospital industry : Evidence from French data

G2013/12 C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY Natural Disasters: Exposure and Underinsurance

G2013/13 P.-Y. CABANNES - V. COTTET - Y. DUBOIS - C. LELARGE - M. SICSIC French Firms in the Face of the 2008/2009 Crisis

G2013/14 A. POISSONNIER - D. ROY Households Satellite Account for France in 2010. Methodological issues on the assessment of domestic production

G2013/15 G. CLÉAUD - M. LEMOINE - P.-A. PIONNIER Which size and evolution of the government expenditure multiplier in France (1980-2010)?

G2014/01 M. BACHELET - A. LEDUC - A. MARINO Les biographies du modèle Destinie II : rebasage et projection

G2014/02 B. GARBINTI L'achat de la résidence principale et la création d'entreprises sont-ils favorisés par les donations et héritages ?

G2014/03 N. CECI-RENAUD - P. CHARNOZ - M. GAINI Évolution de la volatilité des revenus salariaux du secteur privé en France depuis 1968

G2014/04 P. AUBERT Modalités d'application des réformes des retraites et prévisibilité du montant de pension

G2014/05 C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY - A. KATOSSKY The Impact of Hazardous Industrial Facilities on Housing Prices: A Comparison of Parametric and Semiparametric Hedonic Price Models

G2014/06 J.-M. DAUSSIN-BENICHOU - A. MAUROUX Turning the heat up. How sensitive are households to fiscal incentives on energy efficiency investments?

G2014/07 C. LABONNE - G. LAMÉ Credit Growth and Capital Requirements: Binding or Not?

G2014/08 C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY et C. TREVIEN The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector: the French Example

G2014/09 M. LEQUIEN et A. MONTAUT Croissance potentielle en France et en zone euro : un tour d'horizon des méthodes d'estimation

G2014/10 B. GARBINTI - P. LAMARCHE Les hauts revenus épargnent-ils davantage ?

G2014/11 D. AUDENAERT - J. BARDAJI - R. LARDEUX - M. ORAND - M. SICSIC Wage Resilience in France since the Great Recession

G2014/12 F. ARNAUD - J. BOUSSARD - A. POISSONNIER - H. SOUL Computing additive contributions to growth and other issues for chain-linked quarterly aggregates

G2014/13 H. FRAISSE - F. KRAMARZ - C. PROST Labor Disputes and Job Flows
G2014/14 P. GIVORD - C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY - H. NAEGELE
How does fuel taxation impact new car purchases? An evaluation using French consumer-level dataset

G2014/15 P. AUBERT - S. RABATÉ
Durée passée en carrière et durée de vie en retraite : quel partage des gains d'espérance de vie ?

G2015/01 A. POISSONNIER
The walking dead Euler equation
Addressing a challenge to monetary policy models

G2015/02 Y. DUBOIS - A. MARINO
Indicateurs de rendement du système de retraite français

G2015/03 T. MAYER - C. TREVIEN
The impacts of Urban Public Transportation: Evidence from the Paris Region

G2015/04 S.T. LY - A. RIEGERT
Measuring Social Environment Mobility

G2015/05 M. A. BEN HALIMA - V. HYAFIL-SOLELHAC
M. KOUBI - C. REGAERT
Quel est l'impact du système d'indemnisation maladie sur la durée des arrêts de travail pour maladie ?

G2015/06 Y. DUBOIS - A. MARINO
Disparités de rendement du système de retraite dans le secteur privé : approches intergénérationnelle et intragénérationnelle

G2015/07 B. CAMPAGNE - V. ALHENC-GELAS - J.-B. BERNARD
No evidence of financial accelerator in France

G2015/08 Q. LAFFÉTER - M. PAK
Élasticités des recettes fiscales au cycle économique : étude de trois impôts sur la période 1979-2013 en France

G2015/09 J.-M. DAUSSIN-BENICHOU, S. IDMACHICHE, A. LEDUC et E. POULIQUEN
Les déterminants de l'attractivité de la fonction publique de l'État

G2015/10 P. AUBERT
La modulation du montant de pension selon la durée de carrière et l'âge de la retraite : quelles disparités entre assurés ?

G2015/11 V. DORTET-BERNADET - M. SICSIC
Effet des aides publiques sur l'emploi en R&D dans les petites entreprises

G2015/12 S. GEORGES-KOT
Annual and lifetime incidence of the value-added tax in France

G2015/13 M. POULHÈS
Are Enterprise Zones Benefits Capitalized into Commercial Property Values? The French Case

G2015/14 J.-B. BERNARD - Q. LAFFÉTER
Effet de l'activité et des prix sur le revenu salarial des différentes catégories socioprofessionnelles

G2015/15 C. GEAY - M. KOUBI - G. de LAGASNERIE
Projections des dépenses de soins de ville, construction d'un module pour Destinie

G2015/16 J. BARDAJI - J.-C. BRICONGNE - B. CAMPAGNE - G. GAULIER
Compared performances of French companies on the domestic and foreign markets

G2015/17 C. BELLÉGO - R. DE NIJS
The redistributive effect of online piracy on the box office performance of American movies in foreign markets

G2015/18 J.-B. BERNARD - L. BERTHET
French households financial wealth: which changes in 20 years?

G2015/19 M. POULHÈS
Fenêtre sur Cour ou Chambre avec Vue ?
Les prix hédoniques de l'immobilier parisien

G2016/01 B. GARBINTI - S. GEORGES-KOT
Time to smell the roses? Risk aversion, the timing of inheritance receipt, and retirement

G2016/02 P. CHARNOZ - C. LELARGE - C. TREVIEN
Communication Costs and the Internal Organization of Multi-Plant Businesses: Evidence from the Impact of the French High-Speed Rail

G2016/03 C. BONNET - B. GARBINTI - A. SOLAZ
Gender Inequality after Divorce: The Flip Side of Marital Specialization - Evidence from a French Administrative Database

G2016/04 D. BLANCHET - E. CAROLI - C. PROST - M. ROGER
Health capacity to work at older ages in France

G2016/05 B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER
MELEZE: A DSGE model for France within the Euro Area

G2016/06 B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER
Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from Mélèze model