# Energy policy distractions to renewable programs: a comparative assessment

Diane Kraal, Raphael J Heffron, Mohammad Hazrati, Halima Hussein, Alicia Phillips

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Diane Kraal, Raphael J Heffron, Mohammad Hazrati, Halima Hussein, Alicia Phillips. Energy policy distractions to renewable programs: a comparative assessment. Sustainable Earth Reviews, 2025, 8 (1), pp.10. 10.1186/s42055-025-00110-4. hal-05390868

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# Energy policy distractions to renewable programs: a comparative assessment

Diane Kraal¹,²*, Raphael J. Heffron², Mohammad Hazrati³, Halima Hussein² and Alicia Phillips²

**Abstract** This article reviews renewable energy programs and policies as a result of the resurgence in demand for fossil fuels. Australia and selected countries are considered through the lens of energy justice. The range of countries evidence a resurgence in demand for fossil fuels, such as coal and gas, in the wake of disruptive global events. For example, the war in Ukraine, Middle East conflicts and pandemics such as COVID, can be seen as major global disruptors of renewable energy policies and projects. While Australia's renewable energy in contrast to non-renewable energy is the focus, a mix of selected countries are chosen as comparators. The selected countries capture how governments are navigating the fiscal/economic, political and environmental tensions between renewable and non-renewable energy sources, policies, programs and laws. The two research questions ask 'What current and proposed policy and laws address the energy justice economic, environmental and political aspects of the climate-related transition plans to renewable energy?' as well as 'Can the mix of non-renewable and renewable energy resources be quantitatively ranked against economic, political and environmental pressures?' The first question adopts the method of desktop research, conducted to produce policy and legislation data that are linked together with the qualitative method of narrative. For instance, the Australian legislative focus will be taxation law. For the second question, a quantitative method using the 'energy justice metric' is adopted. In particular, the research builds and adapts the parameters of the energy justice metric for all comparator countries. The results are plotted on a ternary phase diagram. The highlights of this article include the raising of awareness of energy policy distractions to renewable programs as a result of the resurgence in demand for fossil fuels, such as coal and gas, in the wake of disruptive global events. The essence of the article points towards how energy justice principles can enable resilience in policy decisions despite these disruptor issues and countries can continue to move towards a just transition to a low carbon economy.

**Plain English summary** There are major dilemmas facing countries today in the shift towards sustainable energy policies. Issues include funding for renewable energy programs and policies, alongside the resurgence in demand for fossil fuels, such as coal and gas, due to disruptive global events (such as military conflicts, COVID-19 and extreme weather). This research considers the energy market tensions for the supply of fossil fuels, and the impact on renewable energy policies and laws. Through qualitative and metric-based questions, the trajectory of Australia, a fossil fuel rich country, is evaluated, and then its progress is compared with a range of countries including France, Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana, French Guiana, Iran, Malaysia, Kenya and Uganda. Thus, energy policy success and failures are explored from across the world. Qualitative and quantitative analysis of data using the energy justice metric shows

Full list of author information is available at the end of the article

<footnote>*Correspondence:
Diane Kraal
diane.kraal@monash.edu</footnote>
the progress of their just energy transitions. The findings indicate positive steps in the journey of a just transition to a low-carbon economy. The modelling supports the research outcomes on key dilemmas arising from energy resource policies in these selected countries. Achieving the 2015 Paris Agreement emission targets remains elusive, but a justice-framed energy policy transition is the first step for many of these fossil fuel intense nations.

**Keywords** Energy policy, Just transition, Energy justice metric, Sustainable energy, Energy supply

**Introduction and background**

In 2022 at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Egypt (COP27), their round table “Just Transition”, discussions noted it is ‘*vital to ensure a managed and just transition to an economic model based on low-emission and climate-resilient development ...*’[1]. In the following 2023 UN Climate Change Conference COP28 in Dubai, one thematic day combined energy, industry, a just transition and Indigenous peoples. COP28 noted the role of national policies and the nexus to global policies [2]. Sustainable development goal (SDG) 7 is about ensuring access to clean and affordable energy, which is key to the development of agriculture, business, communications, education, healthcare and transportation. In Baku, Azerbaijan for the COP29 in 2024, the Global South Pavilion covered SDG7 that together with its partners, provided – for the fourth consecutive year – a vital hub for discussing and showcasing efforts on clean energy. This research considers tensions in the energy market for the supply of fossil fuels, and subsequently the impact on national renewable energy programs and sustainability policies.

There are a number of policy dilemmas as a result of the resurgence in demand for fossil fuels, such as coal and gas, in the wake of disruptive global events. The research data generated for the selected countries of Australia, France, Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana, French Guiana, Iran, Malaysia, Kenya and Uganda aims to capture how national governments are navigating the economic, political and environmental dilemmas between renewable and non-renewable energy supplies, policies, programs and laws. A comparative analysis assesses these countries and their energy policy success or failure. Energy justice is the analytical tool used to throw light on the forces around the composition of the energy mix across these jurisdictions [3].

The main contribution to the literature is the analysis of policy dilemmas of the selected countries in regards to recent climate-related policies and laws for energy supply; and how those policies are falling short of delivering a just energy transition. A knowledge gap is filled through the exploration of these energy issues through the lens of energy justice theory.

A specific focus is on Australia, considered a resource-rich nation with largely a fossil fuel-based supply and demand economy. If solutions can be found for Australia, then they could be applied internationally to other

countries. The spread of comparator countries from the Asia-Pacific, Western Europe, the Caribbean, South America, the Middle East and Africa are justified as a fresh contrast to groupings of countries from other energy studies. The originality of this research is that it first builds upon the growing literature on energy policy failure. Second it explores the just energy transition for a mainly fossil fuel-based economy, which is an underexplored research area. Third, the research adds to the limited comparative research where justice is explored through a metric.

The Australian case study will show how it mirrors the energy policy problems and inaction found in many countries. For example, Australia has the sun, wind and the critical minerals needed for clean energy technologies from batteries to wind turbines yet it struggles to make progress in a just energy transition. Australia has committed to meet its Paris Agreement target of 43% below 2005 levels by 2030 and net zero by 2050 [4]. Progress is slow, despite construction having commenced on over 5,000 MW of wind and solar farms [5]. Nonetheless, these project initiatives need continued funding.

Two research questions are posed in the context of this policy dilemma of disruptions around the energy transition to a low carbon economy:

(i) What current and proposed energy policy and laws address the economic, political and environmental aspects of the climate-related transition plans to renewable energy?

(ii) Can non-renewable and renewable energy policies be ranked against economic, political and environmental pressures?

Section “Literature review” follows with a literature review, then section “Theory and methodology” provides the theory and methodology. Section “Qualitative research: results and discussion” provides the data on Australia’s energy mix, and then the results and discussion on its energy policy dilemmas. It is contrasted with energy data and policy discussion from the other selected countries. Section “Energy dilemmas across politics, environment and economics: use of a metric” provides the results and discussion on ‘energy justice metric’, [6] in support of the qualitative results for Australia and the selected countries. The article closes with the conclusion at Sect. “Conclusion and policy implications”.
## Literature review

This literature review from the selected countries (Australia, France, Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana, French Guiana, Iran, Malaysia, Kenya and Uganda) aims to highlight renewable energy policy issues. Energy justice theory has previously been used to analyze case studies of Asia-Pacific countries with extractive activities, [7] such as the distributive justice aspect in regards to the taxation of fossil fuels; [8] or the promotion of biofuels and solar energy [9]. More generally, the literature has examined the reasons behind barriers to the production of renewable energy, which is seen as a solution to climate change [10]. In the context of Australia, hydrogen is even being promoted as a 'superpower' in the transition to a low-carbon economy [11].

Trinidad and Tobago, [12] Malaysia, [13] Uganda, Guyana and Iran, [14] all produce fossil fuels, which contribute to their economic development. These economies are dependent on fossil fuels and, like Australia, with policies that remain in place to seize opportunities to exploit non-renewable energy. The fossil fuel economy poses specific problems of injustice throughout the energy life cycle, [15] from production, [16] to waste management [17]. The choice of France provides an interesting comparison given that its electricity sector is dominated by nuclear energy from which it also exports to other countries [18].

Studies on renewable energy have been on the rise. The literature shows the potential of various renewables, such as solar, [19] hydrogen, [20] and hydroelectric power [21]. These renewables are used for heating, lighting, and transport. The literature references energy legislation and budgets of Trinidad-Tobago for instance; that is subject to international pressure and support [22]. The legislation and budgets of some of the selected countries refer to the objectives and means for the development of renewable energy [23]. For Australia, the tax system is seen as the key tool for promoting renewable energy by discouraging the use of fossil fuels through the removal of tax concessions [24]. There are government support mechanisms for renewable energy development, which sometimes take the form of subsidies and grants, but across different jurisdictions [25].

Given the high economic and financial stakes involved, the quest for a low-carbon transition might seem rhetorical within the selected countries. French Guiana seems to be one of the selected countries on track to meet their 2030 targets [26]. There are many reasons for delays toward Paris Agreement targets. They range from the problem of economic and financial lobbies to the path of dependency on oil and nuclear power, especially where states have created monopoly utilities in the country [27]. There is the issue of political coherence across policy decisions. For instance, the problem of social acceptability, especially in the face of community opposition to

such projects, mainly due to the disruptive effects of new technologies to traditional ways, [28] and the shortcomings of current initiatives and policies [29]. There is also the problem of corruption [30]; and geopolitical problems, such as the US sanctions regime against Iran [31]. These sanctions were re-imposed by the Trump administration in 2018, following the United States' unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA, signed in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany), aimed to ensure that Iran's nuclear program remained exclusively peaceful in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. The reimposition of sanctions has led to a sharp decline in foreign investment, restricted access to technology, and, consequently, significant barriers to infrastructure development and international energy cooperation. In French Guiana for instance, overcoming obstacles such as territorial development and unemployment is necessary to accelerate its energy transition, which permanently slows down its growth [32].

The literature offers some insights into the impact of the post-pandemic crisis on renewable energy programs. For instance, global demand for Australia's fossil fuels has put considerable pressure on its local electricity generation industry [33]. Market tensions over fossil fuels have highlighted the problems of security and cost of supply. It would appear that the reaction of governments to the role of renewable energy varies. In general, market tensions in Australia seem to have eclipsed the objective of zero net emissions by 2050, for high international prices for gas led the Australian government to cap the pricing of domestic gas [34]. Nonetheless, in some countries, such as France, market tensions over fossil fuels are evident. Local authorities are handling their new responsibilities, and strategies to implement renewable energy projects within the framework of policy set at the European, national and regional levels [35].

Ultimately, the approach taken in this article's selected countries is to emphasise that the development of renewable energy is a global issue rather than just a national imperative. The literature points to a number of issues that need to be considered, such as the involvement of all stakeholders to ensure successful implementation [36], environmental and social assessment [37], investment financing, carbon finance, a decentralised approach [38], and international solidarity [39].

There is a gap in the literature worth investigating about policy dilemmas over Australia's renewable energy programs and policies as a result of recent, international market tensions over fossil fuels. Further, more data from this article's selected countries can give a greater dimension and depth to the exploration of this energy policy dilemma.
# Theory and methodology

## Theory

The theory that underlines this research is based on energy justice. This is a normative theory and in essence states that central to energy policy is justice, whereby there is a societal expectation that the energy sector delivers just outcomes. Energy justice research has risen over the last decade from 2013 to 2023 and has crossed today into policy making also in the United States in particular, under their Justice40 initiative [40]. Given the energy and climate goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement and the planned progress towards the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, there is a clear alignment in terms of placing justice at the forefront of the energy sector.

Energy justice has become a valuable tool in research that pushes the boundaries of energy research generally. The reason is that the energy sector has recognised weaknesses such as contributing significantly to carbon dioxide emissions, economic inequality and taxation issues. However, in energy research there was no systematic vision whereby these problems could be challenged and overcome. Energy justice provided a perspective of how to address these problems and rose in use after the adoption of the 2015 Paris Agreement and UN Sustainability Agenda. There was a collective awakening that a response was needed by the research community and that a “business and research as-usual approach” was no longer sufficient. This is in essence what has changed through energy justice research which gives a theoretical framework (detailed below) as well as providing policy solutions based around ‘justice principles’ that cover the sector in its entirety.

<table><caption>**Table 1** The energy justice principles</caption><thead><tr><td>Energy Justice Principle</td><td>Key Focus</td><td>Simple Definition</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Distributive</td><td>The finance system</td><td>The energy system should have a fairer distribution of finance, i.e., profits should be shared more fairly across all stakeholders.</td></tr><tr><td>Procedural</td><td>The legal system</td><td>The architecture of the legal system needs to produce and provide opportunity for just outcomes.</td></tr><tr><td>Restorative</td><td>Correct and prevent injustices in the system</td><td>Impacts from energy activities need to be prevented and corrected to increase justice</td></tr><tr><td>Recognition</td><td>The ‘who’ nationally and locally</td><td>All stakeholders need to be accounted for and in particular for example, vulnerable groups and Indigenous peoples.</td></tr><tr><td>Cosmopolitan</td><td>The ‘who’ internationally</td><td>All countries and private institutions need to recognise their responsibilities internationally and how these affect stakeholders nationally and locally.</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Heffron, 2023 [42]

Indeed, in energy research today, energy justice is now a common theory across all energy disciplines. The majority of research utilises the same five principles which are: distributive, procedural, restorative, recognition and cosmopolitan. The research on energy justice and its widespread use in practice today is well documented in the literature and it is not the aim to revisit further reasons for its justification [41]. Its use is widespread and no other framework in the energy sector aims to address the injustices that exist in such a comprehensive way. A useful overview of the five principles utilised by this research is detailed in Table 1 below.

The research continues research that applies energy justice at a macro level [43], and also of trying to improve justice in the energy sector in fossil fuel intensive states. This research aims to explore energy policy in a systematic way utilising both qualitative and quantitative research [44].

## Methodology

The research poses two research questions in the context of the policy dilemma of disruptions around the energy transition to a low carbon economy. The first research question asks: What current and proposed energy policy and laws address the economic, political and environmental aspects of the climate-related transition plans to renewable energy? Desktop research is the method used to produce policy and legislation data, which are linked together with the qualitative method of narrative. The legislative focus will be taxation law for the case of Australia so as to contain the length of this article.

The second research question asks: Can non-renewable and renewable energy policies be ranked against economic, political and environmental pressures? The method relies on the energy justice metric, based on descriptive statistics, for comparisons. In particular, the research generates the data for the parameters of energy justice metric for all comparator countries [45]. The parameters have been selected by the authors; the data construction is explained; and results input into a ternary plot, as shown later in this article. A ternary plot is generally used in the physical sciences to depict the interactions between three different forms of matter (ie. gas, liquid and solid) [46]. In this article the research produces a ternary plot of economics, politics and the environment for the comparator countries. It permits researchers to examine a range of countries and compare their policies. This is why there is value in selecting a range of countries and a reasonable number (i.e., five to 10 rather than just a few) as has been completed in this study.

The review of renewable and non-renewable energy policies and laws has Australia as the focus with key comparator countries. The countries of France, Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana, French Guiana, Iran, Malaysia, Kenya
and Uganda provide further insight into the effects of policy dilemmas on the transition to renewable energy. There are four key reasons for choosing these countries:

* First, the authors' in-country knowledge of these countries in the context of energy justice, and working knowledge of the energy laws and policies of these countries have led to their selection;

* Second, they also expand the numbers of countries typically subject to this type of energy policy examination;

* Third, the selected countries provide a global perspective and are situated in the regions of Europe, the Asia-Pacific, the Caribbean, South America, Africa and the Middle East; and

* Fourth, they provide a developed and developing world comparative policy aspect.

**Qualitative research: results and discussion**

We ask the question ‘What current and proposed energy policy and laws address the economic, political and environmental aspects of the climate-related transition plans to renewable energy?’ This section explores this question through data on the energy mix for Australia and the results discussion on four aspects of Australia’s energy policy dilemmas: under-taxing of exported gas; CO₂ emissions from the gas and coal; cost of capping of gas prices; and problematic growth in the renewables sector.

Contrasts are then made by considering the policies from the selected countries using a dataset that summarises each country's energy-related legislation [47].

The renewable policy dilemmas, underpinned by energy mix statistics, legislation and policy initiatives of the selected countries, are also analysed.

**Australia: Energy data**

Australia's energy mix for electricity generation from 1997 to 2023 is shown in Fig. 1 below.

The energy data shows that Australia has a clear reliance on coal for electricity generation, used domestically by both business and households. Gas is an energy used for manufacturing and building heating, however, around 93% of Australia's gas resources (82 mtpa) are converted to LNG for exports. In 2022 renewable energy was 35.9% (32.5%, 2021) of the mix for electricity generation. Further detail about each energy source is captured below in Table 2.

**Results and discussion**

The reliance on fossil fuels leads to four problematic issues that are discussed in this section: its large volumes of LNG exports with meagre tax collections, but with high CO₂ emissions; its coal pricing caps; and growth in Australia's renewables sector to meet Paris Agreement targets.

**Policy Dilemma 1: Gas Taxation**

Since 2002 Australia has collected meagre tax revenues from its petroleum resource rent tax (PRRT) [66], despite the up to AU$200 billion (US$136.3b) invested in the early 2000s for new gas (liquified natural gas or LNG) projects [67]. In 2022 there were 15 new petroleum

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1** Australian Electricity Generation: Energy Mix. Source: Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water [48] and Clean Energy Council (Australia) [49]</figcaption></figure>
<table><caption>**Table 2** Detail on the Energy Sources in Australia's Energy Mix</caption><thead><tr><th>Energy Source</th><th>Details</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>LNG</td><td>Australia is a leading, global exporter of liquified natural gas (LNG) [50]. Australia's current LNG production capacity is 88 million tonnes per annum (MTPA). The latest statistics show that 82 mtpa were exported in 2022 along with record industry revenues of AU$91 billion (US$61b) [51]. The federal government's gas tax (the PRRT) collection in 2021–22, however, was only AU$1.6 billion (US$1.1b) [52]. A negative aspect of high gas production volumes is the annual, national proportion of GHG emissions from Australian fossil fuels — mainly from LNG production — of 9.8%, or 47.9 mt CO<sub>2</sub>-e [53].</td></tr><tr><td>Coal</td><td>Australia's metallurgical coal production in 2021–22 was 174 mt. Thermal coal production in 2021–22 was 237 mt [54]; and primarily used for electricity generation in the states of NSW, Victoria and Queensland. Australia exported $112.8 billion (US$75b) worth of coal in 2021–22 [55]. In 2020, NSW coal royalty collections were AU$1.6 billion (US$1.1b), while for Queensland it was AU$4.5 billion (US$3b) [56]. The annual, national proportion of GHG emissions from the Australian coal-fired electricity sector was an alarming 32%, or 157 mt CO<sub>2</sub>-e [57].</td></tr><tr><td>Wind</td><td>Wind power is a leading source of clean energy in Australia. Wind turbines provide more than 29,892 GWh of wind generation capacity. In 2022 wind supplied 35.6 per cent renewable energy, and 12.8 percent of electricity [58]. Revenue from commercial investments in wind farms for 2022–23 is an expected $2.6 billion (US$1.8b) [59]. Federal income tax revenues are generated from commercial wind farms. There are GHG emissions from the production of wind turbine infrastructure, but generally wind energy represents zero emissions.</td></tr><tr><td>Solar</td><td>As of 2022 in Australia, over 3.36 million photovoltaic (PV) solar installations had a total power capacity of 29.7 GW [60]. PV solar generators represent most systems that have been installed under the Federal Government's Renewable Energy Target (RET) scheme that commenced in 2001. The RET is arguably funded by income tax on commercial operations [61]. Revenue to commercial solar farms in 2022–23 is expected to be $1.5 billion (US$1b) [62].</td></tr><tr><td>Hydro</td><td>Australia has more than 100 operating hydropower stations with a total installed capacity of about 7.8 GWh, and are located in the areas of highest rainfall and elevation. The largest is the Snowy Mountains scheme in New South Wales (55 per cent); and Hydro-Tasmania (29 per cent) with 30 hydro power stations [63]. Snowy Hydro is a public company with revenues of AU$3.5 billion (US$2.38) in 2022 and paid AU$48 million (US$32.6) in income tax [64]. Hydo-Tasmania is a government business enterprise that generated $1.4 billion US$1b) in revenues in 2022, but is not subject to income tax [65].</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Created by the Authors 2023

projects at the committed stage, with a value estimated at AU$46 billion (US$31.4), reflecting increasing demand for oil and gas [68].

The Australian government's Budget 2023 figures show a mere AU$2,750 million (US$1,874 m) in forecast PRRT revenue for 2023–24, which is mainly from gas produced for domestic use [69]. The Budget 2023 announced changes to the PRRT design. It included a cap on the use

of deductions that will limit LNG project deductions each year to a 90 per cent cap. The PRRT applies to offshore LNG export project gas [70]. In 2023 the Treasurer also announced yet another public consultation on the PRRT, despite two previous consultations and reports in 2017 and early 2023; both had multiple recommendations for changes to the design of the PRRT [71].

It is contended that these announced changes will prove to be ineffective as there is already $282 billion in carried forward, unused deductions from Australian LNG projects [72]. The Treasurer's action for a PRRT 90% cap will barely shift the build-up of deductions. This is a clear example of a policy dilemma that is resulting in ineffective PRRT design changes in terms of increases to the tax collection; as well as delayed decision-making. Distributive justice requires an equitable sharing of the benefits and negatives from the energy industry: and taxation is a key issue.

**Policy Dilemma 2: Carbon Dioxide Emissions** Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions, known as 'fugitive emissions' are high for the gas and coal sectors (see Sect. "Results and discussion"), with gas on an upward emissions trend. For example, an LNG project in Australia with high emissions is Chevron's 'Gorgon LNG Project', a large integrated gas-to-liquid operation, with a capacity of 15.6mtpa. The Gorgon project started operations in 2016 [73]. It extracts from two fields located off the northwest coast of Western Australia and has onshore gas facilities. Activities include a plant for processing gas into liquid for export, and some domestic gas for the state of Western Australia [74].

Environmental controls and the Gorgon project's large CO₂ carbon capture and storage (CCS) facilities have increased project costs, but all is deductible for PRRT purposes. By 2021 the project had still not met the regulated CCS obligations to lower emissions. The penalty is that the Gorgon project has had to accept a package of measures, including giving up 5.23 million GHG offsets and acquisition of a $40 million (US$27 m) investment in Western Australia's carbon lowering projects. The same levels of extraction of gas, however, for export continues. [75]. Gas activity encroaches the 4,100-hectare marine park on Barrow Island, Western Australia. The marine park is fringed by the significant Biggada Reef, but the impact from CO₂ on these areas is unreported [76].

Coal is Australia's largest fuel source for domestic electricity, and also the largest source of emissions, at 32%. There was a slight decrease of 3.1% in coal emissions to September 2022, however, which reflects the very gradual displacement of coal as a fuel source by solar and wind energy [77]. Nonetheless per capita, Australia is one of the world's highest carbon emitters from coal power [78].

In May 2023 the Isaac River coal mine in central Queensland was unexpectedly approved by the
Australian Government. It is predicted to produce for export about 500,000 tonnes of metallurgical coal per annum over five years [79]. At the time of the announcement the government minister mentioned ‘a doubling of renewable energy approvals’, in an attempt to deflect attention from the coal decision [80].

The dilemma around the Isaac River mine decision is that while it met environmental laws, the government could have delayed the decision until the new national climate change bill was passed. The Act was passed in September 2022 and is about reducing Australian emissions to meet Paris Agreement targets [81]. While Australia's new climate change legislation applies nationally, the authors contend that following cosmopolitan justice, we are all citizens of the world and we must consider the emission effects of the export coal being burnt in other countries.

**Policy Dilemma 3: Capping of Gas Prices** The introduction section revealed how market tensions around fossil fuels have forced Australian government intervention on domestic energy pricing in late 2022. In April 2023 the government acted again, and put in place a new Code of Conduct 'to secure more gas at reasonable prices for Australians' [82]. Government sought submissions from the public on the code, and has published draft regulations, effective 2023 [83]. It is retaining the price cap on gas, set at AU$12 GJ, with a review scheduled in July 2025. Federal funding has commenced to help vulnerable energy consumers via subsidised gas bills [84].

The issue of gas price caps, the mandatory code and community subsidies reflects a policy dilemma for the Australian government as its preoccupation with gas is diverting attention away from renewables policy and projects. The politics of the centre-left Australian Government now veers towards the social needs of the 'ordinary person'.

It is contended that although the Australian government seems to be following procedural justice with its public consultations, it needs to clearly pursue legislation that meets renewable energy goals and not be distracted by protracted fossil fuel industry negotiations and costly public subsidies through gas price caps. Recognition justice requires consideration of the rights of different groups that are being impacted by climate change.

**Policy Dilemma 4: Renewables and Hydrogen** Australia's renewables energy mix is directed toward the production of electricity. The composition of renewable energy in Australia has increasingly diversified as wind and more solar capacity has become operational, with the share of hydro declining. In 2022, 35.9% of Australia's electricity generated was from renewable sources of wind (12.8%), solar (14.7%), hydropower (7%) and bioenergy (1.4%).

New South Wales generated the most renewable energy of 21,765 gigawatt hours [85].

Under the October 2022 Federal Budget, AU$20 billion (US$13.7b) for low-cost finance was provided under the 'Rewiring the Nation' policy with the first tranche to support the development of Victoria's offshore wind projects. Overall, funds were allocated for the construction of electricity transmission lines between eastern states. The power grid will shift from mainly coal power to renewable energy. The federal solar policy includes funded subsidies for community batteries and a household solar program [86]. There is minor budget support to increase numbers of electric vehicles.

The later, May 2023 Federal Budget shifted to a policy called 'Powering net zero industries and jobs', which is about positioning Australia to become a 'renewable energy superpower'. Government has targeted hydrogen as the renewable for future manufacturing of green metals and other products [87].

It is contended that the shift to a policy about positioning Australia to become a 'renewable energy superpower' through hydrogen is forcing a sharp turn in renewable policy. Procedural justice has a focus on the process and the required legislation needed to deliver laws that meet energy goals. Australia needs to address its national transition to a low carbon economy. The disruption of wars, such as in Ukraine, has caused tensions in energy demands from Europe and elsewhere. The recent, heightened demands for energy should not be looked upon as an economic export opportunity by Australia at the expense of its own Paris Agreement commitments. Figure 2 shows the renewable energy mix from 1995 to 2021. The latest statistics report capacity for renewables nationally at 271,531 GWh for 2021–22 (265,554 GWH, 2020–21) [88].

**Policy dilemmas from selected countries: results and discussion**

This section provides the data, results and discussion for the selected countries of France, Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana, French Guiana, Iran, Malaysia, Kenya and Uganda. The energy statistics and sources for each country is provided in Table 3; and a full dataset is provided [90].

**France**

As stated earlier, France is the outlier in this comparative analysis of countries. In terms of moving to a low carbon economy, it could be argued that France is nearly there already in terms of its electricity sector with just 9% from a fossil fuel energy source – in this case gas at 9% (see Table 2). However, based on the data above 42.8% of overall energy use is fossil fuel (oil and gas). Therefore, progress is still needed in France and further reductions can be achieved.
<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2** Australia: Renewable Energy Mix, 1995 to 2021. Source: Australian Department of Climate Change Energy the Environment and Water [89]</figcaption></figure>

<table><caption>**Table 3** Detail on the Energy Sources in Energy Mix Analysis of Selected Countries</caption><thead><tr><td>Country</td><td>Energy Issues</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>France</td><td>France's energy mix is 40.3% nuclear, 29.4% oil, 13.4% natural gas, Biofuels and waste 8.6%, 3.4% renewables, 2.7% coal and hydro 2.2%. Renewable energy has been growing in France with Solar and Wind now accounting for 12% of electricity generation and this can be expected to rise further; nuclear remains dominant with around 68% with gas at 9% [91].</td></tr><tr><td>Trinidad & Tobago</td><td>In 2020 the country of Trinidad-Tobago's energy mix comprised 46,721 TJ for oil and gas, 566,492 TJ for natural gas and wind and solar amounted to 17 TJ [92]. In 2021 Trinidad-Tobago's crude oil production stood at 3.8mtpa, of which around 80% (or 3.1mtpa) was exported [93].</td></tr><tr><td>Guyana</td><td>In 2020 Guyana's energy mix consisted of 92% heavy fuel oil and diesel, 7% biomass, 1% solar and less than 1% was hydropower and wind [94], Guyana's economy grew by 43.5% in 2020 due to oil production and drove GDP growth to 52% in 2022 [95]. Further, Guyana's revenue from oil exports and royalties is expected to be $1.63b in 2023 [96]. The Low Carbon Development Strategy of Guyana has targeted a 70% reduction in emissions by 2030 [97], but initially the aim is to reach a 50% reduction by 2025.</td></tr><tr><td>French Guiana</td><td>In 2019 French Guiana's energy mix was 61.3% based on hydropower and some solar, with the balance from fossil fuels [98]. French Guiana is an overseas territory of France.</td></tr><tr><td>Iran</td><td>In 2020, Iran's energy mix was composed of oil and gas resources to the extent of 90% of the total. Its energy supply of 263.5 Mtoe was natural gas at 70%, followed by oil for the 28% of the energy mix [99]. Iran is located in the world's 'Solar Belt' that has high amounts of radiation from an average of 300 sunny days per year. In 2021, the installed capacity of solar and wind energy in Iran was 446 MWh, and 310 MWh respectively. Iran's hydropower plants also reached a capacity of 12,600 MWh. In 2022 the share of hydropower is around 4.5% of Iran's total energy [100].</td></tr><tr><td>Malaysia</td><td>In 2020, Malaysian energy mix composed of coal and gas resources to 80% of total. Despite various climate policies, the share of coal in the energy mix between 2010 and 2020 increased by 13%. The main reason for this trend was the notable rise in the economic viability of coal in comparison to natural gas for power generation [101]. Malaysia has a potential for renewable energy, but remains untapped. In 2020, the majority of the renewable energy supply consisted of hydropower (2.3%), with smaller contributions from biofuels (1.1%) [102].</td></tr><tr><td>Kenya</td><td>Kenya's hydropower is the largest source in the energy mix of up to 81%, supplying at least 825 MWh of energy [103]. Geothermal energy is the second largest electricity source of 799MWh [104]. Installed wind capacity is 436 MWh, with 310 MWh provided by one PPP project alone [104]. Biomass at 25 million m³, while thermal diesel power 696 MWh adds to the renewable mix [105].</td></tr><tr><td>Uganda</td><td>Uganda's energy mix is 88% biomass (wood and agri-residue). In 2020 installed hydropower capacity in Uganda was 1,023.59 MW, making it an emerging renewable energy source [106]. Bioenergy constitutes biomass (with charcoal the choice of energy in urban areas and wood and agr-residue in rural areas) and biogas [107].</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Created by the Authors 2024

In 2019, France introduced an Energy and Climate Act which aims at reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030. There is also an aim to reduce France's dependence on nuclear energy and building new renewables are seen as the replacement. Developing the grid is

also needed with the transmission system operator RTE projecting that it needs expansion by circa 30%. France also has been making consistent investment in climate friendly infrastructure with 84 billion in 2021 (across key areas such as low-carbon vehicles, energy performance
of new buildings, renewable energies and heat networks, energy innovation of buildings, low carbon transport infrastructure and nuclear energy) [108]. In France's multi-annual energy plan there is an ambition to develop solar (from 16GW now to 54–60GW by 2030) and wind (onshore from 21 to 33–35GW by 2030, and offshore from 0.5 to 4 GW by 2030) significantly by 2030 [109]. However, it is unclear currently if the finance is moving to achieve those ambitious targets. A multi-annual energy programme defines the priorities, actions and measures to be taken in the energy sector over two five-year periods (2019–2028) [110].

### Trinidad-Tobago

The oil and gas industry, once the spine of Trinidad-Tobago's economy, but due to depletion of its oil and gas fields, production has declined [111]. Yet, the country still encourages petroleum companies to find new fields [112]. Recently, Trinidad-Tobago received permission from the Biden administration to develop a major gas field in offshore Venezuela – this was needed given the US sanctions against the leadership of Venezuela [113]. This is juxtaposed with green initiatives included in the Trinidad-Tobago 2023 National Budget [114], such as the start of a solar farm project [115], and the purchase of electric buses [116]. The country has an outdated climate change policy from 2011 [117].

### Guyana

Guyana is home to the world's recent and largest oil discoveries and hopes 'to develop its mostly untapped natural gas reserves' [118], primarily to gain revenue to build its economy which has 'boomed since 2019' [119]. As for renewable energy resources, Guyana has some potential from '...solar, wind, wave, biodiesel and hydropower' [120]. Renewable energy projects are underway with the receipt of US$83.3 million in 2022 from Norway [121], and the reintroduction of hydropower projects [122]. The Low Carbon Development Strategy 2030 will underpin Guyana's renewable energy plans [123].

### French Guiana

French Guiana has made good use of hydropower for electricity production [124], as it amounts to 61.3% of its energy mix [125]. Still, 34% of energy comes from fossil fuels. As part of its renewable energy policies, the territory is set to become the home for the world's largest hydrogen plant for export to France [126]. Yet to accelerate its energy transition, it is necessary to overcome barriers, such as territory development and unemployment [127].

### Iran

There is great potential for renewable energy in Iran [128]. In 2020 renewable energy contribution to the country's overall electricity generation remains around 6.9%, including hydro (6.5%), wind (0.2%), and solar (0.17%) [129]. Iran currently operates a nuclear power reactor called the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)-Unit 1. It began operating commercially in 2013 and generated 1.61% of the country's electricity in 2020 [130]. Iran aims to expand its nuclear power program aligning with domestic-orientated nuclear initiatives [131]. The share of renewable energy in total energy consumption is less than 1% [132].

International sanctions have not only curbed Iran's transition towards a renewable and cleaner energy system, but have also contributed to increased injustice and corruption in the oil and gas sector [133]. The economic and political instability caused by these sanctions and the government's legitimacy crisis have hindered government action to implement necessary reforms in the energy sector.

### Malaysia

Malaysia maintains oil and gas as secure sources and affordable energy systems. The clean energy market in Malaysia's energy sector is currently in its early stages. Various policies to promote renewable energy sources in Malaysia include tax reduction incentives and an improved regulatory framework. Malaysia however requires substantial investment in renewables [134].

Malaysia's recently introduced National Energy Policy (NEP) 2022–2040, unveiled in September 2022, highlights a strong dedication to energy transformation [135]. The policy prioritizes the transition from fossil fuels production and consumption - to renewable energy sources. It aims to achieve a carbon neutral country by 2050. The NEP includes the Low Carbon Aspiration 2040 initiative that will increase the use of clean and renewable energy sources, with a target of 31% renewable energy installed capacity by 2025. The initiative is subject to periodic reviews to align with energy transition developments.

### Kenya

Kenya has a confused policy on transition plans from 81% to 100% renewable energy. The main sources of power are hydropower which has an installed capacity of 825 megawatts (MW); geothermal, 799 MW; and wind, 436 MW [136]. Kenya has subsidised its fossil fuel industry through the Petroleum Development Levy Fund from 1998 to 2022. Further, in 2022, it reversed renewable energy tax exemptions. The new Kenyan government has assent for the Climate Change (Amendment) Act, 2023, which proposes a policy and institutional framework to govern carbon markets. The new budget contained in
the Finance Bill 2023, which now has assent. The *Finance Act 2023* doubles taxes on kerosene and petrol, whilst exempting tax from LPG. The President has vowed to make climate change a focus of the country.

## Uganda

Uganda has a mixed policy with respect to transition plans in renewable energy. It seems committed to reduce GHG emissions by 24.7% by 2030, but has also tried to entice its 94% of population (that is reliant on biomass) to move towards LPG energy for cooking by removing taxes from that commodity. However, the government is ignoring the pressure to provide subsidies on oil due to steep price rises. Uganda has outdated energy policies and laws that cannot be relied upon for the transition to renewables. Further, the Renewable Energy Policy, 2007, and the Climate Change Policy 2015 are both policies, and not legislation, which could translate the government's vision to actionable outputs. Uganda relies mainly on biomass (wood and agri-residue) which constitutes 88% of the country's energy mix [137]. The three main sources of electricity are hydropower at 1,023.59 MW, thermal power at 100 MW and solar at 60 MW [138].

The selected countries of Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana, Malaysia and Kenya continue to look for economic opportunities for their oil and gas resources, while their renewable energy laws and policies remain weak — due to current and strong global demand for fossil fuels. Iran is a state under sanctions, but continues its reliance on petroleum exports. Uganda has outdated policies on renewables. The current energy crisis has prompted France to consider diversifying into imported hydrogen, and French Guiana is the potential supplier. The current energy crisis has disrupted renewable energy laws and policies for all the comparator countries

In summary, the first research question has thrown light on Australia's energy policy implications, specifically on recent and relatively untested climate-related laws and regulations that are not delivering pathways for a just energy transition with sufficient progress. Through the lens of energy justice theory and its associated

<table><caption>**Table 4** Parameters for the Energy Justice Metric</caption><tr><td>Economics</td><td><strong>Ease of Doing Business (X1)</strong><br>Access to Electricity (X2)<br>Clean Energy Jobs (X3)<br>Social Progress (X4)</td></tr><tr><td>Politics</td><td>Paris Agreement Targets for Emissions Reductions (Y1)<br>Net Import of Energy/- Net Export of Energy (Y2)</td></tr><tr><td>Environment</td><td>Air Quality (Z1)<br>C0<sub>2</sub> mtpa, Per Capita (Z2)<br>Carbon Tax/ Carbon Cap (Z3)<br>Major Energy or Environmental Laws Since 2015 (Z4)</td></tr></table>

Source: Created by the Authors 2024

metric, the research has compiled and considered policy dilemmas for post-2015 Paris Agreement climate-related laws and regulations of Australia. The research question gave further insights on similar renewable policy dilemmas and implications from France and the developing countries of Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana, French Guiana, Iran, Malaysia, Kenya and Uganda. Developed countries must push forward in funding a pathway to a just transition to a low carbon economy for the benefit of developing countries.

## Energy dilemmas across politics, environment and economics: use of a metric

### Data

The second research question asks whether non-renewable and renewable energy policies can be ranked against economic, political and environmental pressures. The approach utilised is to collect and plot data to determine the energy justice metric (EJM) for Australia, France, Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana, Iran, Malaysia, Kenya and Uganda; however French Guiana is excluded. There was insufficient quantitative public data available for French Guiana, nonetheless the qualitative narrative has been retained in this article (see Sect. “Policy dilemmas from selected countries: results and discussion”).

The authors decided on the EJM parameters, and collected data (2020 to 2022) for each country from public data websites, such as the World Bank, IRENA, Social Progress, Climate Watch, the International Energy Agency and IQAir. The 'dataset Tables A1 to A3' of calculations by country are provided [139]. For instance, the steps and equations used for the calculations are in the 'dataset Tables A1 to A3'. The construction of 'dataset Tables A1 to A3' and the equations closely follow the method in Heffron, McCauley and Zarazua de Rubens; and Heffron and McCauley [140]. The parameters for the EJM are listed in Table 4.

The EJM data results for each country were input into the ternary plot model. Ideally in terms of energy justice, all countries should be at the point where the energy trilemma between economics, politics and the environment come into balance. The EJM ternary plot in Fig. 3, below, demonstrates how far these countries are from this 'ideal' and just, energy transition policy.

## Results and discussion

Australia's result for energy justice is weighted more towards politics, as is evident from the slow pace of effective climate policy action at a federal level. The May 2022 change of government may accelerate a shift towards environmental concerns, but for the moment its time and attention has been distracted by the politics of high demand for its fossil fuels. The numeric results for each of economics, politics and environment are 26%, 41% and
<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3** Energy Justice Metric: Australia and a Comparative Analysis with France, Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana, Iran, Malaysia, Kenya and Uganda. Source: Created by the Authors 2023. Note: The authors' research data was input into the 'ternary plot' model using software that is now freely downloadable see https://www.ternaryplot.com/</figcaption></figure>

34% respectively. To ascertain Australia's position on the EJM, take the first figure of 26% from the line opposite the economics vertex and the Australia 'dot' intersects that line from a line parallel to that between politics (41%) and environment (34%). The metric results support the qualitative observations about the dominance of politics (Sect. "Results and discussion").

France as is noted earlier already has higher amounts of low carbon energy due to its reliance on nuclear energy so it is inevitable that it will be near to the environment dimension of the energy trilemma. Politically, energy is not as complex an issue at a national level as it is in other EU nations, and that is why the metric results for each of economics, politics and environment are 32%, 16% and 52% are understandable (Sect. "France" for supporting analysis). However, perhaps France is at a crossroads as new investment needs to happen with closure and decommissioning of nuclear energy plants to be costly over the medium to long-term. The expectation should be that economics and politics issues will rise in the near future but at a geo-political level, France should be viewed as a leader in low-carbon energy and environment issues.

The Caribbean country of Trinidad and Tobago is weighted slightly towards the politics corner. The metric results for each of economics, politics and environment are 38.6%, 38.8% and 22% respectively, which support the qualitative observations (Sect. "Trinidad-Tobago"). This is manifested in the successful navigation of the new political environment with Venezuela, which has allowed the country to receive a license from the Biden administration to develop a major gas field in offshore Venezuela. While this will benefit the economy, this umbilical dependence on this diminishing resource echoes the need for swift movement at the policy level to balance not only energy security but improved accountability relative to the effects of climate change.

The South American country of Guyana, is positioned closer to economics as opposed to politics or the environment. The metric results for each of economics, politics and environment are 38%, 31% and 31% respectively, which support the qualitative observations (Sect. "Guyana"). It is the site for major oil reserves that are to be developed. The heightened demand for petroleum is a lever for Guyana to gain future tax revenues and build its economy. Environmentally, the country is dependent on forest carbon accounting to maintain its zero carbon
emissions, while politically, the new oil discoveries have set Guyana to play an influential role in geopolitics with global powers vying to become more involved through investments.

The economic sanctions on Iran see this middle east country positioned closer to politics and economics, rather than in balance with the environment. This situation will remain unresolved for some time. The metric results for each of economics, politics and environment are 41%, 37% and 22% respectively, which support the qualitative commentary (Sect. "Iran"). The South-East Asian country of Malaysia is a major oil supplier. It is positioned closely to politics and economics. Currently the demand for Malaysia's fossil fuels continues to rise, with environmental concerns and policy at low levels. The metric results for each of economics, politics and environment are 51%, 32% and 18% respectively, which support the qualitative insights (Sect. "Malaysia").

The African country of Kenya is positioned closer to economics and the environment, rather than politics. This country has had a changeable policy on transition plans to renewable energy. While the environment has been at the forefront of its policy making, it seems that global disruptions are causing policy variations. The metric results for each of economics, politics and environment are 41%, 37% and 23% respectively, which support the qualitative material (Sect. "Kenya").

Uganda is positioned closer to economics and politics on the energy justice metric. Its environmental policies are outdated which indicates their lower priority. The metric results for each of economics, politics and environment are 37%, 35% and 27% respectively, which support the qualitative matter (Sect. "Uganda").

In summary, we have asked whether non-renewable and renewable energy policies can be ranked against economic, political and environmental pressures. Analysis of the modelling with the energy justice metric results supports the qualitative observations on renewable policy implications of slow progress towards a pathway for just energy transition. Overall, as can be seen in Fig. 3 each country's results are positioned away from the 'ideal' central point, which might be quantified as 33.3% for all the parameters. As per the SDG7 focus in the Energy Pavilion at COP27 in Egypt in 2022, a step decline in emissions is critical for our climate goals, and if nothing is done, it will tip the world over the 1.5 degrees marker of unwanted warming growth.

## Conclusion and policy implications

Two research questions were posed concerning renewable energy policy dilemmas as a result of disruptions around the energy transition to a low carbon economy: (1) 'What current and proposed energy policy and laws address the economic, political and environmental

aspects of the climate-related transition plans to renewable energy?'; and (2) 'Can non-renewable and renewable energy policies be ranked against economic, political and environmental pressures?'.

The first contribution of this article are the policy implications of how recent and relatively untested climate-related laws and regulations are not delivering a pathway for a just energy transition with sufficient progress. Through the lens of energy justice theory and its associated metric, the research has compiled and considered policy dilemmas for post-2015 Paris Agreement climate-related laws and regulations of Australia. Further research insights on similar renewable policy dilemmas and implications drew on France and the developing countries of Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana, French Guiana, Iran, Malaysia, Kenya and Uganda. Developed countries that are signatories to the Paris Agreement are now without US support, and under pressure to fund a pathway for developing countries' low carbon economies.

Second, it contributes to the literature on energy policy on the selected countries in terms of their non-renewable and renewable policies by a metric ranking of positions on energy justice against economic, political and environmental pressures. Analysis of the modelling with the energy justice metric results supports the qualitative observations on renewable policy implications of slow progress towards a pathway for a just energy transition.

Third, it contributes to the literature on energy policy by exploring the reality of the path to achieving 2015 Paris Agreement emissions targets for 2030, by considering disruptive global events. For example, as discussed, market tensions have forced Australian Government intervention on domestic energy pricing, which has overshadowed the goal of net zero emissions by 2050. Although Australia's new *Climate Change Act 2022* legislates emission targets for 2030 and sets carbon caps, any significant lowering of emissions by 2025 may be elusive if the government continues to be distracted by global events, such as the war in the Ukraine, COVID-19 and weather events.

As discussed for the selected countries, it was noted that Trinidad-Tobago and Guyana remain committed to fossil fuel development but support clean energy, but this is questionable since it inhibits development for petroleum. For French Guiana, the current limitations in the structural design of the territory hamper the plans to reach the 2030 emissions reduction objectives. By contrast, Iran is experiencing a growing sense of isolation globally, along with numerous economic and political challenges. Under this situation, Iran is neither able nor willing to transition its energy program towards renewable sources or reduce reliance on fossil fuels. For Malaysia, increased prices for its fossil fuels are placing pressure on government decision-making. It is still too
early to determine whether the Malaysian government will successfully achieve its climate targets. For Kenya, global energy disruptions have caused disquiet in the country as the cost of living is becoming unbearable. The cost of electricity is also very high, as no plans have been provided to address diesel run thermal plants providing significant power. As for Uganda, although it updated its emissions reduction target in March 2023, it is committed to exploit its recoverable petroleum reserves.

The highlights of this article include the raising of awareness of energy policy distractions to renewable programs as a result of the resurgence in demand for fossil fuels, such as coal and gas, in the wake of disruptive global events. The usefulness of energy justice principles to frame energy policy problems and solutions for a just transition to a low carbon economy. These principles support SDG 7 that is about ensuring access to clean and affordable energy. Finally, the use of ternary phase modelling for the energy justice metric across selected jurisdictions, provides insights into how energy law and associated policies are contested that arise from tensions between economics, politics and the environment.

**Acknowledgements**

We wish to acknowledge Dr de Fontenelle for his limited background insights to the authors on energy issues in France.

**Author contributions**

DK, RH, MH, HH and AP researched and wrote the main manuscript, and all authors reviewed allocated sections of the manuscript. DK reviewed the whole manuscript.

**Funding**

The authors acknowledge the research funding from the National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) France; Nouvelle-Aquitaine, Administrative Region, France; and University of Pau, France.

**Data availability**

Data is provided within the manuscript, referenced with full URL strings.

**Declarations**

**Competing interests**

The authors declare no competing interests.

**Author details**

Received: 11 November 2024 / Accepted: 18 May 2025

Published online: 15 July 2025

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