# Conspiracy beliefs and analytical thinking in COVID-19 information web search

Nathan Vital, Aline Chevalier, Cheyenne Dosso, Bastien Trémolière

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Nathan Vital, Aline Chevalier, Cheyenne Dosso, Bastien Trémolière. Conspiracy beliefs and analytical thinking in COVID-19 information web search. Computers in Human Behavior Reports, 2025, 20, pp.100804. 10.1016/j.chbr.2025.100804. hal-05328385

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# Conspiracy beliefs and analytical thinking in COVID-19 information web search

Nathan Vital<sup>a, *, †</sup>, Aline Chevalier<sup>a</sup>, Cheyenne Dosso<sup>c, ‡</sup>, Bastien Trémolière<sup>a, b, d</sup>

## ARTICLE INFO

### Keywords:

- Conspiracy beliefs

- Reasoning

- COVID-19

- Information searching

- Exploration/exploitation

## ABSTRACT

The phenomenon of conspiracy theories has seen a considerable increase in popularity on the internet, especially in the health domain. Surprisingly, despite a substantial body of research, none has directly examined the information-search process of conspiracists as they navigate on the Internet. This study examines how conspiracy theorists search for online information (through the Exploration/Exploitation trade-off), using a simulated COVID-19 fact-finding task on vaccine side effects presenting official and conspiracy webpages. The study investigates how conspiracy levels and analytical thinking predict navigational strategies and the acquisition of new knowledge. Results show that analytical thinking predicts the use of exploratory navigation strategies. Analytic thinkers gather more useful information from official webpages and have more confidence in this information. Conversely, conspiracists gather more novel information from conspiracy webpages and have more confidence in these sources. This study offers a novel approach by combining the psychology of belief, reasoning, and Internet information search.

## 1. Introduction

In recent years, an increase in conspiracy theories on the Internet has been observed, facilitated by a shift from traditional top-down media to a more horizontally exchanged information approach (Bronner, 2013; Ruggieri et al., 2023). This shift has contributed to the proliferation of epistemically suspect beliefs, such as conspiracy theories, most of which lack a scientific basis (Trémolière & Djeriouat, 2019; Srol, 2022). Since late 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic has further fueled the rise of conspiracy theories (Bavel et al., 2020; Liu & Huang, 2020). The extensive information dissemination during this crisis is commonly referred to as an 'infodemic' (Pian et al., 2021; World Health Organization: WHO, 2020). This term highlights the spread of misleading information, including denial of the crisis and attribution to man-made biochemical weapons, among others, which not only undermines public health responses but also challenges the credibility of measures taken to control the virus (WHO, 2020).

### I. Conspiracy theories and conspiracy mentality

A conspiracy theory is “an explanation of an event (or historical events) based on the causal role of a small group of individuals acting in secret.” (Keeley, 1999, p. 109). This definition captures the phenomenon both in its verified forms (i.e., conspiracies that have been proven real) and its imagined ones (i.e., a systematic tendency to interpret diverse events through the lens of conspiracy). However, it does not provide criteria to distinguish between factual reality and fabrication. Although actual conspiratorial endeavors may occur (e.g., Watergate, tobacco industries), beliefs in conspiracy theories differ in their epistemological structure. It is indeed generally part of a conspiracy theory to integrate in its narratives the reasons why evidence for conspiracy is lacking (e.g., “The government is intentionally hiding the evidence”). Hence, more recently, Douglas and Sutton (2023) propose a comprehensive definition of consensual criteria defining conspiracy theories: “A conspiracy theory is a belief that two or more actors have coordinated in secret to achieve an outcome and that their conspiracy is of public interest but not public knowledge. Conspiracy theories (a) are oppositional, which means they oppose publicly accepted understandings of events; (b) describe malevolent or forbidden acts; (c) ascribe agency to individuals and groups

<footnote><sup>a</sup> CLLE, Université Toulouse Jean Jaurès & CNRS, Toulouse, France</footnote>

<footnote><sup>b</sup> Département de Psychologie, Université du Québec à Trois Rivières, Trois Rivières, Canada</footnote>

<footnote><sup>c</sup> LAPCOS, Université Côte d'Azur, Nice, France</footnote>

<footnote><sup>d</sup> Institut universitaire de France (IUF), France</footnote>

<footnote>* Corresponding author.</footnote>

<footnote>E-mail addresses: nathan.vital@univ-tlse2.fr (N. Vital), aline.chevalier@univ-tlse2.fr (A. Chevalier), cheyenne.dosso@univ-cotedazur.fr (C. Dosso), bastien.trémolière@univ-tlse2.fr (B. Trémolière).</footnote>
rather than to impersonal or systemic forces; (d) are epistemically risky, meaning that though they are not necessarily false or implausible, taken collectively they are more prone to falsity than other types of belief; and (e) are social constructs that are not merely adopted by individuals but are shared with social objectives in mind, and they have the potential not only to represent and interpret reality but also to fashion new social realities.” (Douglas & Sutton, 2023, p. 282).

In recent decades, research on conspiracy theories has gained momentum, with numerous studies focusing on identifying the demographic and psychological profiles of individuals predisposed to hold such beliefs. However, the conceptual foundations of conspiracist thinking were laid much earlier with the introduction of conspiracy mentality (Goertzel, 1994; Imhoff et al., 2022; Moscovici, 1987). This concept describes the monological structure underlying conspiracy theory endorsement. Conspiracy mentality refers to a belief system rooted in a latent personality trait that leads individuals to interpret their political and social environment through a conspiratorial lens. This framework accounts for the tendency of conspiracy theorists to endorse multiple, sometimes unrelated, conspiracy theories. The main argument for this framework being an endorsement in one particular conspiracy theory predicts the most accurately endorsement in any other conspiracy theory (Brotherton et al., 2013; Dieguez et al., 2015; Swami, Weis, Lay, Barron, & Furnham, 2016; Wagner-Egger et al., 2018). Although the homogeneity of conspiracy endorsers is debated (see Imhoff et al., 2022; Klein et al., 2019), monological structure seems a solid construct to interpret the heuristic nature of conspiracy beliefs. Although the concept of conspiracy mentality provides valuable insight into how individuals come to interpret their environment through a conspiratorial lens, it does not fully address the psychological motives underlying the adoption of such beliefs. To better understand why people turn to conspiracy theories, Douglas et al. (2019) proposed a motivational framework identifying three core psychological needs—existential, social, and epistemic—that conspiracy beliefs may help fulfill. Existential needs refer to the desire to feel safe and in control of one's environment. When this sense of control is threatened, especially in times of crisis, individuals may become more susceptible to conspiracy beliefs. These beliefs are also linked to feelings of anomie, which encompass institutional distrust, perceived personal decline, and a diminished sense of control (Douglas et al., 2019). Social needs involve the drive to maintain a positive self-image and social identity. Research has shown that conspiracy beliefs are associated with individual traits such as narcissism and the need for uniqueness (Cichocka et al., 2016; Lantian et al., 2017), as well as with group-level phenomena such as collective narcissism—the belief that one's ingroup is exceptional but unfairly under-valued by others (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), which usually characterizes conspiracy theorist social groups (Rahmil, 2022). Finally, epistemic needs reflect the fundamental human desire to understand one's world. Conspiracy theories often provide simple, coherent explanations for complex sociopolitical events, especially when cognitive resources are strained. In such contexts, conspiratorial narratives may offer a sense of order and clarity that is cognitively appealing, even if misleading (Douglas et al., 2019).

This epistemic function (providing cognitively efficient explanations for complex sociopolitical realities) suggests that conspiracy beliefs may also have to do with how people process information and reason. Conspiracy theories may be supported by heuristics, as they reflect a cognitive tendency to reduce complexity through intuitive, effortless thinking. Empirical findings support this approach, showing consistent associations between an intuitive reasoning style and increased belief in conspiracy theories (Garrett & Weeks, 2017; Pennycook et al., 2015; Swami et al., 2014). In this view, conspiracy theories act as cognitive shortcuts that help individuals make sense of uncertain environments without engaging in more demanding analytic processing. Considering this possibility therefore suggests individual differences in adherence to these theories, depending on the way in which individuals reason, and ultimately makes it possible to question the way in which conspiracy

theorists obtain information.

Hence, analytical thinking, defined as critically evaluating one's innate intuitions and challenging them when necessary (Pennycook et al., 2015), emerges as a significant cognitive safeguard against questionable beliefs. Much of the literature operationalizes this link through the observation of correlations between cognitive reasoning style and conspiracist ideation. A well-established negative correlation suggests that individuals who engage in more analytical thinking are less likely to endorse conspiracy beliefs. This finding holds across both general and specific measures of conspiracy beliefs, as well as across hetero-reported measures of reasoning (e.g., Cognitive Reflection Test; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016) and self-reported measures (e.g., Rational-Experiential Inventory; Norris & Epstein, 2011). For a detailed overview of these effects, see the meta-analysis by Yelbuz et al. (2022). These results suggest that analytical thinking may help individuals resist the apparent simplicity of conspiratorial explanations for complex events (van Prooijen, 2017).

Beyond correlational evidence, literature has also begun to explore the causal identification of factors underlying belief in conspiracy theories (Sassenberg et al., 2023). Specifically, some studies have sought to experimentally manipulate reasoning styles to assess their impact on conspiratorial belief endorsement. However, experimentally inducing analytical reasoning to observe beneficial effects remains largely unexplored (Večkalov et al., 2024). Swami et al. (2014), still one of the only cited studies in this area, demonstrated that prompting individuals to adopt an analytical reasoning style via a verbal fluency task (containing words related to analytical thinking, such as “analyze,” “reason,” “think,” “rational,” and “reflect”) led to a reduction in conspiracy beliefs. The authors attributed this effect to the idea that analytical thinking promotes deliberate and effortful information processing (Chaiken, 1989; Gjoneska, 2021), increasing individuals' sensitivity to logical fallacies and factual inaccuracies inherent in conspiracy theories while inhibiting intuitive responses and cognitive biases. However, more recent work by Večkalov et al. (2024) failed to replicate this effect in a highly powered study. Despite the early stage of research on analytic thinking induction, it remains essential to examine how these variables interact in online information searching contexts, where most individuals gather information.

## 1.1. Conspiracy theorists and the search for information

Although significant research has delved into how conspiracy theorists think, perceive their environment, and the impact of cognitive biases (such as confirmation bias) on the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs (Rizeq et al., 2021; van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018), there is still a gap in understanding how conspiracy theorists search for information in real-life situations, especially on the Internet, and how they acquire new knowledge, whether accurate or not. Information searching on the Internet is a multifaceted problem-solving activity that involves processes such as comprehension, reasoning, and decision making, and individuals employ diverse strategies to achieve their goals (Dosso et al., 2023; Sharit et al., 2015). While research works on online information search has proposed detailed cognitive models describing how individuals engage with digital environments, these frameworks rarely consider the impact of reasoning style or conspiracist ideation on search behavior. Yet, such individual differences may affect each stage of the information search process. According to cognitive models of Internet search (Sanchiz, Chevalier, & Amadieu, 2017, Sanchiz et al., 2019; Sharit et al., 2015), this process unfolds through three main stages: planning the search, evaluating and selecting results from Search Engine Results Pages (SERPs), and engaging in deeper processing of documents, this process operates as a cyclical loop involving these three main stages.

Planning involves the initial mental representation of the search problem, drawing on task instructions, prior knowledge, and perceived knowledge gaps. This step is particularly sensitive to pre-existing beliefs, which may influence how individuals frame their queries and prioritize
information. For instance, individuals with conspiracist beliefs may formulate search queries in ways that favor confirmatory evidence (Stall & Petrocelli, 2023). Evaluation refers to the assessment of the relevance of the retrieved results, which depends on the alignment between presented information and the individual's internal representation of the problem. Finally, document processing involves deep reading and integration of selected information to update working memory and fill previous knowledge gaps.

As highlighted by Douglas et al. (2017), distrust toward institutions may shape individuals' information-searching behaviors by leading them to systematically avoid official or institutional web pages. This institutional skepticism can push individuals with conspiratorial idea- tion to preferentially attend to alternative sources of information, particularly those aligned with conspiratorial narratives. Furthermore, such individuals might be more attracted to conspiracy-related websites because the simplified and coherent explanations they provide are more likely to fulfill the epistemic needs of intuitive thinkers (Douglas et al., 2017). In this context, the interplay between intuitive reasoning style and epistemic motivation may drive the reach, selection, and processing of information that confirms pre-existing beliefs while avoiding content perceived as complex, ambiguous, or originating from distrusted authorities.

A useful framework for understanding how individuals implement these stages (planning, evaluation, and processing) in ecological contexts is the exploration-exploitation trade-off in information search strategies (Dosso et al., 2023) which has been extensively studied regarding how people gather and acquire new information (Gómez-Zará, Liu, Neves, Shah, & Bos, 2024). The exploration strategy involves expanding the search space by formulating multiple queries and exploring numerous links, while the exploitation strategy involves fully exploiting the information within a document or delving deeper into a specific search topic by analyzing a website in detail or accessing different webpages within the same website. The trade-off between Exploration and Exploitation is relevant at two levels of analysis: Navigational and Thematic.

Navigational exploration involves the exploration of Search Engine Results Pages (SERPs) and multiple sources while exploitation involves the deep processing of documents, corresponding to the navigational choices individuals make to satisfy their information needs (Chin et al., 2015; Sanchiz et al., 2020). For instance, opening multiple links from a search engine result page reflects exploratory behavior, whereas repeatedly visiting pages within the same website reflects exploitation behavior (Chin et al., 2015; Sanchiz et al., 2019). Exploratory navigation across diverse sources is cognitively demanding, as each new site requires understanding its structure and evaluating the relevance of its content.

At the thematic level, the trade-off is defined by how individuals manage the semantic scope of their queries when pursuing a task (Dosso, 2023). Exploration is reflected in queries that broaden or shift the semantic space, while exploitation corresponds to queries that remain semantically close to previous ones (e.g., Ghosh et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2017). For example, a user focusing on different topics tends to generate different queries (e.g., 1st query: symptoms of COVID-19 and 2nd query: advice on COVID-19 vaccine), reflecting a thematic exploration strategy. In contrast, when focusing on the same topic, they may formulate closed queries (e.g., 1st query: symptoms COVID-19 vaccine and 2nd query: headache COVID-19 vaccine), indicating an exploitation thematic strategy. In sum, the navigational dimension refers to how individuals move between webpages, while the thematic dimension reflects how they vary or narrow the content of their search queries. Both strategies are observable through various behavioral indicators such as the number of new pages opened, revisits, or the diversity of keywords used.

## 1.2. *The current research*

To the best of our knowledge, no study has examined how belief in

conspiracy theories and analytical thinking influence the use of different strategies when searching for information on the internet. However, the existing literature suggests the relevance of such research. First, there is evidence that conspiracy theorists exhibit confirmation bias, showing a greater tendency to seek out and adhere to information that supports their opinions (Rizeq et al., 2021; van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). This suggests that conspiracy theorists may prefer an exploitation strategy, especially when encountering information that is consistent with their existing beliefs, to avoid contradictory evidence.

Analytical thinking is likely to play a role in the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and the use of exploitation strategies. Analytical thinking leads individuals to use more cognitive resources to understand and evaluate information when searching for information on the internet (Kelley, Hurley-Wallace, Warner, & Hanoch, 2023; Zarro, 2012). Furthermore, research on reasoning has found a robust positive association between open-mindedness (the willingness to consider arguments that contradict initial beliefs; Mellers et al., 2015; Stenhouse et al., 2018) and analytical thinking (Baron et al., 2015; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017). The literature has shown that individuals with a more analytical reasoning style tend to demonstrate greater discernment when evaluating information (Kelley et al., 2023; Svedholm-Häkkinen et al., 2025). According to this, we may also expect that such individuals will be more likely to assess relevance and credibility thoroughly, ultimately leading them to dismiss information found on conspiratorial webpages.

In parallel, individuals with higher levels of conspiracist ideation are likely to show the opposite pattern. Indeed, previous research has highlighted a strong link between conspiracy beliefs and confirmation bias, which is a cognitive tendency to search for, interpret, and remember information that confirms pre-existing beliefs (Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Rizeq et al., 2021). In the context of information search, this could translate into a preference for exploitation strategies: focusing intensively on a smaller number of sources that align with their prior views rather than exploring a diverse set of perspectives. Therefore, the presence of a confirmation bias among conspiracy believers may lead them to show greater will to defend their beliefs and then overexploit familiar or ideologically congruent sources, reinforcing their existing convictions rather than challenging them. This is further supported by research showing a negative relationship between conspiracist beliefs and open-mindedness (Stenhouse et al., 2018; Swami et al., 2014; Yelbuz et al., 2022).

By integrating two areas of research (reasoning and beliefs on the one hand and information searching on the other), the present study aimed to explore how conspiracy beliefs and analytical thinking are related to information searching activities on the Internet. Specifically, we investigated the links between conspiracy beliefs, cognitive reflection, and information searching strategies within the framework of the Exploration/Exploitation trade-off and how conspiracy beliefs may influence the acquisition of new accurate knowledge in an information searching context when individuals are interacting with a web browser. We deliberately chose not to manipulate reasoning in our study. Given that experimental manipulations of reasoning remain in their infancy, we opted for a cautious methodological approach.

Our hypotheses are based on cognitive models of information searching (Sanchiz, Chevalier, & Amadieu, 2017), information searching can be described as a sequence of planning (formulating queries), evaluation (assessing the relevance of results), and information processing (integrating selected information). At each of these stages, individuals may display exploration-exploitation strategies, which in our protocol is operationalized through query generation (thematic strategies) and webpage opened (navigational strategies).

Accordingly, we hypothesized that participants who are more analytical will perform better on the information searching task in terms of reporting reliable information (H1). Participants with higher levels of conspiracy beliefs will show a lower performance on the information searching task in terms of reporting reliable information (H2).
Participants with high levels of conspiracy beliefs are expected to visit more conspiratorial webpages (H3), adopt more exploitation strategies both in navigation (H4) and in query formulation (H5) than participants with lower levels of conspiracy beliefs. In contrast, participants with higher analytical reasoning were expected to show less exploitation in navigation strategies, reflecting a greater tendency toward exploration (H6).

## 2. Method

### 2.1. Open science practices

The full description of the material, variable coding, and data are available at the following anonymous link: https://osf.io/ys924/?view_only=ad5d487c228e48fbb176dace1f3ac4b1.

This study was reviewed and approved by the Toulouse Ethics Committee with the approval number: 2023_737, dated December 14, 2023. Participation was voluntary, and written informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in this study.

### 2.2. Sensitivity power analysis

Although no a priori power analysis was conducted, we performed a sensitivity analysis to assess the minimum detectable effect size with our sample size (N = 216), a significance threshold of α = .05, and a desired power of 95 %. Using the pwr. r.test function (Champely, 2020) in R software (R Core Team, 2025), the analysis indicated that our study was sufficiently powered to detect correlations of r ≥ 0.24 (two-tailed). This means that, under these conditions, our design was adequately sensitive to detect medium associations according to conventional benchmarks (Cohen, 1988).

### 2.3. Participants

A total of 353 French-speaking participants completed an online survey between March and June 2023. The final sample consisted of 221 participants after excluding individuals who did not complete the questionnaire or who did not meet our inclusion criteria (i.e., individuals over the legal age of consent and fluent in French and without any language-related disorders). We principally recruited participants through social media (i.e., LinkedIn, Facebook, Discord, and Telegram). We also recruited participants through the bonus system offered by the university for undergraduate students, which allows them to earn bonus points for their methodology course grades by actively participating in a psychology experiment and submitting a report to validate the bonus. The final sample included 159 females, 60 males, and 2 individuals who identified as “other,” ranging in age from 18 to 81 years (M = 35.8, SD = 15.9). Participants reported an average education level of 6.16 (SD = 1.79), which corresponds to approximately a bachelor’s degree (range = 0–9). Reported levels ranged from no diploma to higher education, including lower secondary certificate (“Brevet des collèges”), vocational certificate (“BEP/CAP”), high school diploma (“Baccalauréat”), one year postsecondary (Bac+1), two-year postsecondary/associate’s degree (Bac+2), Bachelor’s equivalent (Bac+3), first year of Master’s (Bac+4), Master’s equivalent (Bac+5), and studies beyond a doctoral or other postgraduate level (Supérieur à Bac+5).”

### 2.4. Material<fnref n="1" />

Conspiracy beliefs were measured using the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS; Brotherton et al., 2013). This scale consists of 15

items assessing an individual's generic conspiratorial beliefs, including statements such as "Secret organizations communicate with extraterrestrials but conceal this fact from the general public". Participants respond using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Certainly not true) to 5 (Certainly true). A composite mean score was calculated to obtain an average measure of conspiracy beliefs (Cronbach's α = .94).

Analytical thinking was measured using a 7-item version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). The CRT assesses people's motivation and ability to inhibit an erroneous intuitive response and adopt a more thoughtful response. For example, when asked, "How long will it take one hundred machines to make one hundred objects if five machines take 5 min to make five objects?", one might be tempted to answer 100 min (an appealing but incorrect response). Therefore, this response needs to be inhibited to reach the correct response (i.e., 5 min). A composite score of correct responses was calculated to provide an average measure of analytical thinking.

Information Searching tasks involved participants in a simulated task using screenshots of Google's search engine. A fact-finding task, requiring participants to locate specific information about the side effects of the COVID-19 vaccine, was designed with the goal of providing the most accurate and reliable information.

The first phase started with a measure of pre-existing knowledge about vaccine side effects. To this end, participants were asked to report COVID-19 vaccine side effects that they already knew about. They were then instructed to write down an initial set of keywords (as many as they wished) for a Google search on the topic. This step is considered as Planning from the cognitive model of information retrieval and will allow us to measure the first thematic exploration/exploitation strategies indicator. Participants were then presented with a simulated Google search results page containing two official and two conspiracy websites (the order was kept constant across participants). Participants were allowed to navigate through these sites up to eight times. These steps are considered as Evaluation and Processing from the cognitive model of information retrieval and will allow us to measure the first of navigational exploration/exploitation strategies indicator.

Once participants felt they had gathered enough relevant information and wanted to move on, they were asked to indicate whether they had visited each site. If they answered "Yes"<fnref n="2" /> to visiting a webpage, participants were asked to indicate the reason for visiting the webpage using a multiple-choice question. They then used 5-point Likert scales to rate the amount of useful and new information obtained from the site, the amount of effort expended in processing the webpage (ranging from 1, Very little, to 5, Very important), the ease of understanding the content (ranging from 1, Very easy to 5, Very difficult), and the confidence in the information from the webpage (ranging from 1, Not at all trustworthy, to 5, Totally trustworthy).

In the second phase, participants generated a new set of keywords (i. e. the second time they engaged in the Planning step, which refers to our second thematic exploration/exploitation strategies indicator) by imagining that their first requests (i.e., initial search) were unsuccessful, which prompted them to provide additional keywords. Then, similar to the first phase, they were presented with a new simulated Google search results page containing new webpages (two official and two conspiracy webpages from real websites).

After navigating the webpages (i.e. the second time they engaged in the Evaluation and Planning steps, which refers to our second navigational exploration/exploitation strategies indicator) and rating them as in the first phase, participants provided a third and final set of keywords (i.e. Third time they engaged in the Planning step, which refers to our

<footnote n="1">¹ We also incorporated a COVID-19 Health Literacy measure into our study; however, due to technical issues associated with Qualtrics, we opted to exclude it from the final analyses.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² For “No” responses to a specific webpage, they could justify their choice on a multiple-choice questionnaire, using the provided response modalities such as site relevance, credibility, time constraints, or a personal rationale. This was not used in our analyses.</footnote>
third thematic exploration/exploitation strategies indicator). Finally, participants responded to the initial instructions (post-information searching measure) by providing the most reliable information they had gathered from the information searching task.

## 2.5. Measures relatives to the information searching task (ISM)

- ISM1: The navigational exploration percentage was calculated by combining unique clicks (reflecting exploration) and reclicks (reflecting exploitation). The resulting percentage was determined by multiplying the number of unique clicks by 100 and dividing by the total number of clicks.

- ISM2: The thematic exploitation percentage was calculated by categorizing queries as either exploratory or exploitative and expressing the ratio as a percentage by multiplying the number of exploitation queries by 100 and dividing by the total number of queries. For both ISM1 and ISM2, the sum of exploration and exploitation behaviors is equal to 100 % of a participant's navigational and thematic behaviors. User queries were analyzed at the semantic level. The repeated use of similar terms or synonyms was taken as an indication that participants remained within the same thematic space (which refers to exploitation strategy), while the introduction of new and distinct keywords suggested a shift to different semantic areas (referring as exploration strategy; Capra et al., 2018; Sanchiz et al., 2020). For instance, a participant entering "Covid-19 vaccine side effects" followed by "Covid-19" illustrates an exploration strategy, as the two queries differ semantically and broaden the scope of the search.

- Other ISMs: To assess the accuracy of reported COVID-19 vaccine side effects theories, ratios of true/false pre-RI knowledge (ISM3), post-RI knowledge (ISM4), and new post-RI knowledge (ISM5) were evaluated. These metrics involved assigning scores ranging from -100 to +100 and calculating the ratio based on the greater number of true or false information. For example, a score of -100 corresponds to a participant who provided only incorrect answers, whereas a score of +100 indicates the opposite. In addition, the total number of conspiratorial sites accessed (ISM6) and the total number of official sites accessed (ISM7) were quantified by counting the number of times the conspiratorial and official websites were accessed, respectively, throughout the task.

## 2.6. Procedure

Participants were initially given the study information sheet and informed consent form. They completed sociodemographic information, including age, first language, presence of language disorders, gender, and current activity. They also answered questions about their Internet habits and use (a more detailed procedure is available in the supplementary material on OSF). Participants then completed the information search task, the conspiracy beliefs scale, and the analytical thinking scale (see Fig. 1). The average completion time for the study was approximately 45 min.

# 3. Results

Our primary goal was to assess how conspiracy beliefs and cognitive reflection predicted navigational strategies and information searching behaviors. Bivariate Pearson's correlations (see Table 1) showed a negative relationship between analytical thinking and the navigational exploitation measure, *r* (214) = -0.230, *p* < .001, 95 % CI [0.099, 0.352]. However, we did not find any significant association between thematic strategies (exploitation or exploration) and reasoning *r* (212) = 0.072, *p* = .293, 95 % CI [-0.063, 0.204].

Furthermore, we did not observe any significant association between conspiracy beliefs and exploitation navigational strategies *r* (213) = -0.102, *p* = .135, 95 % CI [-0.233, 0.032] or thematic strategies *r* (212) = -0.106, *p* = .122, 95 % CI [-0.237, 0.029]. Conspiracy belief levels were negatively associated with the number of official webpages visited, *r* (213) = -0.305, *p* < .001, 95 % CI [-0.422, -0.179]. In addition, conspiracy beliefs were negatively associated with the acquisition of new true knowledge in the post-information search stage, *r* (204) = -0.285, *p* < .001, 95 % CI [-0.406, -0.154]. Analytical thinking, however, was not significantly associated with the acquisition of new true knowledge in the post-information search stage, *r* (205) = 0.033, *p* = .637, 95 % CI [-0.104, 0.169].

## 3.1. Exploratory analyses

We further explored the relationship between conspiracy beliefs, reasoning, and information-searching measures by examining the processing and evaluation of information obtained from official and unofficial webpages (see Table 2).

Bivariate Pearson's correlations showed that analytical thinking was negatively associated with the perceived usefulness of the information obtained from conspiracist webpages. Participants with higher scores on the CRT found information from conspiratorial webpages less useful, *r* (124) = -0.293, *p* < .001, 95 % CI [-0.445, -0.125] than participants who scored lower on the CRT. Participants who scored higher on the GCBS gained more new information from conspiratorial webpages *r* (123) = 0.239, *p* = .007, 95 % CI [0.066, 0.398] and found information provided by conspiratorial webpages more useful *r* (123) = 0.453, *p* = .001, 95 % CI [0.301, 0.582] than participants who scored lower on the GCBS. They also found information provided by official webpages less useful *r* (208) = -0.241, *p* = .001, 95 % CI [-0.364, -0.109] than participants who scored lower on the GCBS. Consistent with this, participants scoring higher on the GCBS allocated more effort to conspiratorial webpages *r* (123) = 0.197, *p* = .027, 95 % CI [0.023, 0.361].

Finally, we observed a significant association between the amount of trust assigned to information on webpages and both scores on the CRT and the GCBS. Participants who scored higher on the CRT were more confident in the information provided by the official webpages *r* (208) = 0.209, *p* = .002, 95 % CI [0.075, 0.334] and less confident in the information provided by the conspiracist webpages *r* (124) = -0.265, *p* = .003, 95 % CI [-0.421, -0.095] than participants with an intuitive style. In contrast, participants scoring higher on the GCBS were less

<figure><img src="image_2.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 1. Procedure for the information-searching task.</figcaption></figure>
<table><caption>**Table 1**
Pearson's bivariate correlations between our variables of interest (CRT and GCBS) regarding information searching strategies.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>1.</th><th>2.</th><th>3.</th><th>4.</th><th>5.</th><th>6.</th><th>7.</th><th>8.</th><th>9.</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>CRT</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>GCBS</td><td>-0.259***</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Thematic Exploitation measure</td><td>0.072</td><td>-0.106</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Navigational Exploitation measure</td><td>-0.230***</td><td>-0.102</td><td>-0.004</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Total of Official Webpages Opened</td><td>0.121</td><td>-0.305***</td><td>0.027</td><td>0.447***</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Total of Conspiracist Webpages Opened</td><td>0.064</td><td>0.105</td><td>-0.017</td><td>0.347***</td><td>0.273***</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>True Knowledge in pre-information searching Task</td><td>0.007</td><td>-0.143*</td><td>0.129</td><td>0.025</td><td>0.093</td><td>0.020</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>True Knowledge in post-information searching Task</td><td>0.045</td><td>-0.311***</td><td>0.039</td><td>0.227***</td><td>0.347***</td><td>-0.022</td><td>0.165*</td><td>-</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>New True Knowledge in post-is Task</td><td>0.033</td><td>-0.285***</td><td>0.034</td><td>0.215**</td><td>0.298***</td><td>-0.053</td><td>0.071</td><td>0.917***</td><td>-</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

<table><caption>**Table 2**
Pearson's bivariate correlations between our variables of interest (CRT and GCBS) and our exploratory variables.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>1.</th><th>2.</th><th>3.</th><th>4.</th><th>5.</th><th>6.</th><th>7.</th><th>8.</th><th>9.</th><th>10.</th><th>11.</th><th>12.</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>CRT</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>GCBS</td><td>-0.259***</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Official Information<br>Usefulness</td><td>0.040</td><td>-0.241***</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Official New Information<br>Quantity</td><td>0.000</td><td>-0.107</td><td>0.675***</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Official Efforts</td><td>0.107</td><td>-0.056</td><td>0.166*</td><td>0.375***</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Official Content<br>Understanding</td><td>0.008</td><td>0.000</td><td>-0.151*</td><td>0.045</td><td>0.203**</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Official Perceived<br>Confidence</td><td>0.209**</td><td>-0.408***</td><td>0.643***</td><td>0.450***</td><td>0.162*</td><td>-0.091</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Conspiracist Information<br>Usefulness</td><td>-0.293***</td><td>0.453***</td><td>-0.022</td><td>0.077</td><td>-0.070</td><td>0.001</td><td>-0.172</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Conspiracist New<br>Information Quantity</td><td>-0.167</td><td>0.239**</td><td>0.073</td><td>0.109</td><td>-0.002</td><td>0.059</td><td>-0.073</td><td>0.707***</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Conspiracist Efforts</td><td>-0.171</td><td>0.197*</td><td>-0.143</td><td>-0.038</td><td>0.120</td><td>0.057</td><td>-0.250**</td><td>0.440***</td><td>0.414***</td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Conspiracist Content<br>Understanding</td><td>0.049</td><td>-0.101</td><td>0.042</td><td>0.037</td><td>0.132</td><td>0.219*</td><td>0.032</td><td>-0.046</td><td>0.115</td><td>0.206*</td><td>-</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Conspiracist Perceived<br>Confidence</td><td>-0.265**</td><td>0.363***</td><td>-0.074</td><td>0.031</td><td>0.011</td><td>0.110</td><td>-0.143</td><td>0.679***</td><td>0.483***</td><td>0.364***</td><td>-0.100</td><td>-</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

confident in the information provided by official webpages *r* (208) = -0.408, *p* < .001, 95 % CI [-0.515, -0.289], and more confident in the information provided by conspiracist webpages *r* (123) = 0.363, *p* < .001, 95 % CI [0.200, 0.506] than participants who scored lower on the GCBS.

## 4. Discussion

This study aimed to bridge three research areas that rarely intersect: the psychology of conspiracy beliefs, reasoning, and information searching strategies on the internet (exploration-exploitation tradeoff). Using a fact-finding task on the topic of COVID-19 vaccines, we sought to explore how individual cognitive differences could be linked to information searching strategies. Understanding the mechanisms by which conspiracy beliefs affect information-searching behavior is a critical societal issue, particularly when they concern high-stakes situations, such as the health domain, with potential harmful consequences for both individual and collective levels (Bierwiazonek et al., 2020; Teovanović et al., 2021; Yang et al., 2021). We developed a protocol that allowed us to directly observe how individuals search for information. This approach enabled us to examine the relationship between information searching behavior and individual differences, such as conspiracist beliefs and cognitive reflection, ultimately allowing for precise predictions.

### 4.1. Relationship between cognitive reflection and information searching strategies and knowledge acquired

This study aimed to determine whether cognitive reflection could be

positively linked to the amount of true knowledge gained in a post-information search task. We predicted that more analytical participants would exhibit better performance on the information searching task in terms of reporting reliable information (H1). The results obtained did not support this hypothesis regarding the positive link between analytical thinking on performance on the information searching task. This was inconsistent with Soane et al. (2015), who observed a positive effect of analytical thinking on information searching performance. This discrepancy may be explained by the nature of the task we used, a single fact-finding task that does not require a deep understanding and processing of information (the goal is simply to locate a set of target information; Monchaux et al., 2015; Marchionini, 2006; Soufan et al., 2022). Since the effects of analytical reasoning are particularly observed in cognitively complex tasks (Pehlivanoglu et al., 2021; Pennycook & Rand, 2019), simply listing the side effects of the COVID-19 vaccine may not prove to be a sufficiently complex task to highlight the effects of analytical thinking on information searching performance (see our limit section for further details).

We also hypothesized that participants with greater analytical reasoning would adopt less navigational exploitation strategies than navigational exploration strategies (H6). Participants who were more analytical visited a greater variety of webpages, suggesting that they were more likely to adopt a navigational exploration strategy. This finding supports the well-established positive correlation between active open-mindedness (i.e., people's disposition to consider arguments that may contradict their initial beliefs; Mellers et al., 2015; Stenhouse et al., 2018) and reasoning style (see Baron et al., 2015; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017). Possibly, open-mindedness may promote the exploration of a greater number of different webpages with different viewpoints.
## 4.2. Relationship between conspiracy beliefs and information searching strategies and acquired knowledge

Another goal of our research was to explore the relationship between conspiratorial beliefs and information searching behaviors. We expected that people who endorse conspiracy theories more would show a preference for sources that promote conspiracy narratives (H3). The results showed that individuals who endorsed higher levels of conspiracy beliefs visited fewer official webpages. This finding is consistent with the observation that people who endorse conspiracy theories more are less likely to search for information from mainstream websites (Wagner-Egger et al., 2022), i.e., the official webpages in our study. It also aligns with prior research highlighting the strong distrust of institutions among conspiracy theorists (Douglas et al., 2019), which likely discourages engagement with official sources. More broadly, this result is consistent with the literature examining the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and the type of media consulted (e.g., Wagner-Egger et al., 2022), although it does not specifically focus on the information searching context, it also supports the negative relationship between conspiracy ideation and performance on the information searching task that we observed (H2). Since accurate information in our experimental context is located on official web pages, conspiracy theorists who visit these web pages less frequently miss out on this information. This results in poorer performance on the information searching task.

Contrary to our hypothesis, conspiratorial beliefs were not associated with the adoption of navigational exploitation strategy (H4) or the adoption of thematic exploitation strategy (H5). Given the exploratory nature of our current work, particularly with respect to information searching activity, we used basic indicators such as reclicks and simulated query reformulation. Participants may not have had a real incentive to reclick on the same source or reformulate queries regardless of their level of conspiracy belief. These indicators are typically used in more ecological settings, in which the amount of information provided by search engines often requires users to reclick on the same web pages or reformulate queries to find new documents (Dosso et al., 2023; Sanchiz et al., 2020). In our case, the use of these simplified indicators was a methodological choice aimed at reducing the complexity of the task. Moreover, another possible explanation lies in the results of our sensitivity analysis, which indicated that our study was sufficiently powered to detect correlations of $r \ge 0.24$ (two-tailed). It is therefore possible that the study lacked the statistical power needed to detect these specific effects.

## 4.3. Exploratory analyses

Exploratory analyses revealed that participants with a more analytical thinking style perceived information from conspiratorial webpages as less useful and expressed less confidence in their credibility. In contrast, they reported higher levels of trust in information provided by official sources. These findings are consistent with the observation that analytical thinkers are less likely to express confidence in fake news sources and demonstrate superior skills in detecting fake news (Pehlivanoglu et al., 2021; Pennycook & Rand, 2019). Furthermore, these exploratory results are consistent with one of our main findings and prior literature (i.e., analytic thinking is negatively associated with navigational exploitation and prior findings from literature linking analytic thinking to open-mindedness). This suggests that analytic thinkers are more willing and cognitively equipped to process and reject belief-inconsistent information, since our exploratory measures were based on participants engaging with the webpages they were asked to evaluate.

We also observed that participants with greater conspiratorial beliefs gather more new information from conspiratorial webpages, are more confident about the information on conspiratorial webpages, and devote more effort to them. Conversely, they are less confident about the

information on official webpages. These findings are consistent with the sense of anomie, which is defined as “a feeling of personal unrest and lack of understanding of the social world” (Douglas et al., 2019, p. 8). This feeling manifest itself, in particular, through individuals’ distrust of institutions—a recurring theme in the discourse of conspiracy theorists.

This institutional distrust is also reflected in the sources individuals rely on for information. Wagner-Egger et al. (2022) found that conspiratorial beliefs are negatively associated with the use of mainstream media websites and newspapers for news consumption. Similarly, Cheng and Nishikawa (2022) observed that belief in misinformation, anti-vaccine sentiments, and COVID-19-related conspiracy theories were all linked to increased reliance on non-traditional and less credible sources. These patterns of information consumption further illustrate the distancing from institutional narratives that characterize the conspiratorial worldview. This aligns with our experimental context, in which official webpages were mostly sourced from institutional websites (e.g., WHO), and supports previous research showing that individuals endorsing conspiracy beliefs tend to be less trusting of health experts and political actors (De Coninck et al., 2021).

## 4.4. Limitations and future directions

This study offers novel findings that contribute to the intersection of research on reasoning, conspiracy beliefs, and strategies developed to find information on the internet. However, several limitations should be acknowledged.

First, the original design incorporated a second information search task, similar to the first one, which focused on the effects of lockdown. Although this task had the potential to capture additional effects, particularly by reducing curiosity-driven behavior due to repeated exposure to multiple SERPs, it was decided to remove it after pilot participants reported excessive completion time and loss of motivation. Given the online format of this study, this could have compromised data quality. In future lab-based studies, adding a second task may be more feasible, as it would reduce the impact of artificial curiosity and increase the variability of SERPs exposure.

Second, the ecological validity of the task was limited by both the number of SERPs presented and the method used to simulate the search environment. Only four SERPs were shown per query—fewer than the ten typically displayed by search engines like Google—due to difficulties in identifying relevant and credible conspiratorial webpages within a narrow topic (e.g., COVID-19 vaccine side effects). In addition, the simulation relied on static screenshots rather than a dynamic, interactive interface. This methodology was relevant here because it was the first experimental study to observe how people with different levels of conspiratorial beliefs and different reasoning styles interact with the internet. This approach, although necessitated by technical constraints in Qualtrics, excluded key interaction features (e.g., hyperlinks, navigation), which are also essential to accurately capturing the exploration-exploitation trade-off (Chin et al., 2015; Sanchiz et al., 2019). Future research should aim to both expand the number of SERPs and implement more interactive, ecologically valid tools.

Third, although online surveys provide flexibility and wide reach, in-lab experimentation would help address the lack of interactivity noted above. However, simulating the presence of conspiratorial sources remains necessary, as these are less likely to be encountered organically through traditional search engines. Controlled simulation ensures consistent exposure across participants and valid comparisons between source types. Because this study represents, to the best of our knowledge, a novel attempt to examine the influences of cognitive reflection and conspiratorial beliefs on information searching strategies, we opted for a simple and controlled experimental paradigm. As a result, we provide an initial exploratory framework that could pave the way for more ecologically valid and cognitively demanding designs in future research.

Fourth, considering the overrepresentation of women and
undergraduate student in our sample, we also examined whether the relationship between CRT and GCBS could be confounded by participants' educational level or by the overrepresentation of women in our sample. To address this concern, we ran a general linear model that included education, gender, and their interactions with CRT. Neither education level nor gender showed robust main effects in this model. Importantly, none of the interaction terms were significant, all *ps* > 0.16, all η²p ≤ .01, indicating that neither education nor gender moderated the relationship between CRT and GCBS. While this does not rule out the possibility of more complex patterns in broader and more representative samples, our data suggest that these variables did not shape the associations observed in this study.

## 4.5. Conclusion

The present research was an original attempt to understand information searching strategies used in the context of health information searching based on individuals' beliefs in conspiracy theories and cognitive reflection, which, to the best of our knowledge, has been overlooked to date. While bearing in mind the correlational nature of our study, we view this work as a preliminary but meaningful step toward bridging cognitive psychology and conspiracy belief research in the area of online information searching. Our findings are encouraging in that they suggest an interplay between cognitive dispositions and information-searching behaviors—what deserves further empirical attention. A better understanding of how cognitive reflection and conspiratorial beliefs shape individuals' approaches to information could provide valuable insights for designing more effective interventions aimed at promoting critical engagement with online content, particularly in sensitive contexts such as health information. Finally, while our study highlights patterns in information searching behaviors, we remain cautious about making direct and major practical recommendations at this stage. Future research is needed to replicate these findings and further clarify the factors that shape online information retrieval. In the meantime, this type of experimental protocol can instead be considered a solid foundation for more advanced studies aimed at testing the robustness of these findings and refining our understanding of the underlying mechanisms. Nevertheless, we believe that our results may eventually contribute to informing interventions and designing considerations intended to promote more balanced engagement with online content. Building on these findings, we cautiously note that some minor design considerations could be envisioned. For instance, search interfaces and informational platforms might benefit from subtle features that encourage exposure to a wider range of sources or that highlight the credibility of official content. Our recommendations align with recent research showing that even subtle design cues, such as credibility labeling or visually enhanced presentation of fact-checked content, can improve users' critical evaluation of online information (Bhuiyan et al., 2021; Hettiachchi et al., 2023, pp. 751–761). While such recommendations remain preliminary, they illustrate how insights from this type of research could eventually inform small but meaningful adjustments to the design of online information environments.

### CRediT authorship contribution statement

**Nathan Vital:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Validation, Supervision, Software, Resources, Project administration, Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization.
**Aline Chevalier:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Validation, Supervision, Resources, Project administration, Methodology, Conceptualization.
**Cheyenne Dosso:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Supervision, Software, Resources, Methodology, Conceptualization.
**Bastien Trémolière:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Validation, Supervision, Resources, Project administration, Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis,

Conceptualization.

### AI statement: statement

During the preparation of this work the authors used ChatGPT 4o in order to correct grammar mistakes and improve the overall fluency of the text. After using this tool/service, the authors reviewed and edited the content as needed and takes full responsibility for the content of the published article.

### Data availability statement

The full description of the material, variable coding, and data are available at the following anonymous link: https://osf.io/ys924/?view_only=ad5d487c228e48fbb176dace1f3ac4b1.

### Funding statement

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

### Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

## Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chbr.2025.100804.

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