# Storytelling and grand strategy in public diplomacy: A case study of the speeches of president Xi Jinping

Mitchell Hobbs, Mei Li, Zhao Alexandre Huang, Lucile Desmoulins

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Mitchell Hobbs, Mei Li, Zhao Alexandre Huang, Lucile Desmoulins. Storytelling and grand strategy in public diplomacy: A case study of the speeches of president Xi Jinping. Public Relations Review, 2025, 51 (4), pp.102594. 10.1016/j.pubrev.2025.102594. hal-05094696

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# Storytelling and grand strategy in public diplomacy: A case study of the speeches of President Xi Jinping

Mitchell Hobbs<sup>a, ∗</sup>, Mei Li<sup>a, †</sup>, Zhao Alexandre Huang<sup>b, ‡</sup>, Lucile Desmoulins<sup>b, §</sup>

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:

Storytelling

Master Plots

Grand Strategy

Public Diplomacy

Soft Power

A B S T R A C T

As nation-states seek to cultivate geopolitical advantages, they employ storytelling and strategic narratives to rally domestic and international support, shape perceptions of past and future events, and define adversaries. This study argues that stories about a nation's vision, mission, and history constitute politicized narratives central to the overarching grand strategy of the state and its leadership. It highlights the role of storytelling in public diplomacy through a case study of China's evolving soft power strategies, which must be understood in the context of increasing geopolitical tension with Western states—particularly the United States. Positioned at the intersection of public diplomacy and political public relations scholarship, this study draws on public relations frameworks for storytelling, which have largely been overlooked in this context. Analyzing key speeches by President Xi Jinping, the study reveals insights into the Chinese Communist Party's grand strategy and its broader implications. It argues that storytelling functions as an effective opening strategy in *intermesestic* public diplomacy, bridging the space between early-stage diplomatic engagement and long-term strategic objectives. As such, storytelling by a national leader can be suggestive of future actions, especially when aligned with a broader strategic vision.

1. Introduction

Since the geopolitical contest played out by Great Britain and Russia over control of Central Asia in the 18th century, the notion of a “great game” played by global powers has become a common motif in international affairs (Becker, 2012; Hartley, 2023). Just as in chess, where strategic positioning is crucial to securing an advantage, global powers employ a diverse range of strategies as they maneuver resources, bolster defenses, cultivate allies, and prepare for a potential “hot” conflict. Indeed, strategic storytelling can be an important “opening strategy”, where a strategic narrative of past events and visions of the future are used to recruit supporters and harden opinions, and is somewhat analogous to the activation and arrangement phase in chess before the more heated combat of the midgame begins. History does provide many instructive examples of strategic storytelling: from Pericles’ Funeral Oration in 431 BCE, a speech that celebrated Athenian exceptionalism

and sought to rally the citizenry for their ongoing war with Sparta, to
Adolf Hitler's demagoguery that he used to consolidate power and then
prime the Germans for war.<fnref n="1" /> The lesson from history is that leaders, even
those from more authoritarian states, must discursively engage domestic
audiences to gain support for major strategic initiatives that will prob-
ably require the citizenry to endure a level of hardship (Huang &
Arceneaux, 2024). In short, strategic stories are used in speeches and
other rhetorical texts to define an “enemy”, create solidarity, and
manufacture a *casus belli*. These framings may be subtle or overt, but
their goal is to foster identification with the speaker’s cause through
rhetorical persuasion (Burke, 1969; 2018).

Despite its power to influence public opinion, storytelling remains somewhat of an under researched aspect of public diplomacy, albeit with some notable exceptions (cf. Arceneaux, 2024; Cassinger et al. 2018). However, in public relations scholarship, stories and the act of storytelling have been systemically analyzed using rhetorical

<footnote><sup>a</sup> Discipline of Media and Communication, The University of Sydney, Australia</footnote>

<footnote><sup>b</sup> Gustave Eiffel University, France</footnote>

<footnote>* Correspondence to: Discipline of Media and Communication, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, The University of Sydney, Australia.</footnote>

<footnote>E-mail address: mei.li@sydney.edu.au (M. Li).</footnote>

<footnote n="1">¹ The idea of studying public rhetoric to predict future actions, including major strategic initiatives as part of a conflict, is not new. During World War II, analysts used content analysis to examine Nazi speeches and radio broadcasts, successfully anticipating offensives, tactical withdrawals, and the introduction of new weapons (as reviewed in de Sola Pool, 1960). This work showed that even tightly controlled propaganda can expose underlying policy priorities to those able to interpret its patterns.</footnote>
frameworks (Kent, 2015; Lane, 2023). As such, this study seeks to enrich scholarly understandings of public diplomacy by incorporating theoretical frameworks developed within public relations. In doing so, it travels a familiar path. Signitzer and Coombs (1992) noted that public relations and public diplomacy seek similar objectives and use similar tools. Moreover, Fitzpatrick et al. (2013) argued that public relations and public diplomacy share conceptual and practical foundations that are often overlooked. Similarly, Sevin (2015, p. 562) argued that the “functional similarities among these concepts encourage the use of public relations theories and models to examine the impacts of public diplomacy projects”. Indeed, practitioners of public diplomacy are often trained in the arts of public relations, from speech writing to messaging strategies (Dodd & Collins, 2017) to cultivation strategies for specific publics (cf. Ki et al., 2021; Mogensen, 2017; Signitzer & Wamser, 2006; Wang & Yang, 2020; Zaharna, 2010). Or, as L'Etang (2009) contented, public relations theories are essential for understanding public diplomacy, including government propaganda, as “the language of international affairs and political international relations is managed by directors of communication and political PR practitioners, as are the sound bites of politicians” (p. 615).

This research does, then, sit at this intersection of public diplomacy and public relations scholarship, acknowledging that the strategies and practice studied by public diplomacy scholarship often have their origins in complementing communication disciplines, especially public relations (cf. Signitzer & Coombs, 1992; Signitzer & Wamser, 2006; Vanc & Fitzpatrick, 2016). More specifically, this study is grounded in the rhetorical approach to public relations (cf. Heath & Ihlen, 2018), and it seeks to explore a method for understanding a government's worldview by analyzing the storytelling embedded in speeches delivered by the leader of a given nation-state. It also considers how such storytelling might influence public perception and forge emotional connections with strategic publics (Kent, 2015; Lane, 2023). To this end, the study analyzes four key speeches delivered by the President of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping. The research explores two primary questions: 1) How does storytelling feature in the speeches of Xi Jinping and 2) how does storytelling function as a public diplomacy strategy. We argue that storytelling operates as a discursive force that supports a nation's grand strategy (Botan, 2021; Hobbs et al., 2023). Specifically, it aims to shape domestic and international perceptions of history, employing rhetorical strategies that signal the aspirations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) within the broader international order. The following literature review builds this argument and the study's analytical framework, before turning to the case studies and the rhetorical devices within Xi's recent speeches.

## 2. Literature review

### 2.1. Storytelling as persuasive communication

Storytelling<fnref n="2" /> has long been recognized as a potent tool for persuasion. As social animals, humans have evolved to tell stories, and they animate the ancient oral traditions and philosophies of distinct cultures (Harari, 2014; Hartley, 2020). Throughout history, humans have crafted stories of powerful gods and heroes, either as demigods or ordinary individuals in extraordinary settings, to address their sense of insignificance against natural forces. Greek tragedies epitomize this, with the hero often at the mercy of the Moïraï (or “Fates” in English) — Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos — who determined destinies. Zerga (2005) illustrates how, in these narratives, the shift of responsibility from humans to fate, particularly via the Moïraïs, rationalized events like the Greco-Persian Wars as destined occurrences. This storytelling technique has historically been employed to justify notions of a nation's mission

and been a catalyst for conquest. A similar rhetorical pattern persists in contemporary international relations through concepts such as the “Thucydides Trap”<fnref n="3" />; (Allison, 2017), which describes how rising powers and established powers are often drawn into seemingly inevitable conflict due to fear, rivalry, and systemic pressures.

Moreover, in the practice of ancient rhetoric, storytelling was essential to effective oratory in the deliberative assemblies of Athens and the Roman Republic (Held, 2006). For instance, Aristotle's influential triadic model of rhetoric suggests that effective persuasion requires a logical structure (logos), emotional appeal (pathos), and the credibility of the speaker (ethos) to be clear and compelling (Aristotle, ca.350 B.C. E./2004, Chapter 1.2, 1356a). Within this model, Aristotle emphasised that pathos involves three interrelated elements: understanding which emotions are appropriate to a given situation, recognising the types of people who typically feel those emotions, and knowing the circumstances under which those emotions arise (Chapter 2, 1378a-1387b). For instance, Aristotle offers insight into how to evoke emotion through his discussion of anger, noting that it arises both from the pain caused by being wronged and from the pleasure derived from the imagined prospect of revenge (Chapter 2, 1387b). Insights such as these can of course be used by modern political speech writers of service noble or ignoble ends (depending on the motivations of the rhetor), which is why his model has been described as “morally indifferent” in its application (Marsh, 2016, p.7)

Later, the Roman politician and lawyer Cicero built on Aristotle's ideas, emphasising five elements of effective rhetoric: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery (Cicero, 2016). His model of rhetorical techniques also emphasized various forms of proof, affective language, and dramatic storytelling (Cicero, ca. 55 B.C.E./2016). Indeed, Cicero argued that a persuasive public speech should follow the structure of rational argumentation while also employing appropriate emotional appeals and stylistic devices to win the goodwill of the audience (Cicero, 2016, p 42). His view of rhetoric reflected Roman republican ideals of civic virtues and the importance of public debate. As he wrote: “It is the part of the orator, when advising on affairs of supreme importance, to unfold his opinion as a man having authority: his duty too it is to arouse a listless nation, and to curb its unbridled impetuosity” (Cicero, ca 55 B.C.E./1942, Book II, Section 35). Cicero also viewed history as an essential resource for political speechmaking, both as a source of moral instruction and as a means of shaping public memory. As he put it: “History is truly the witness of times past, the light of truth, the life of memory, the teacher of life, the messenger of antiquity; whose voice, but the orator's, can entrust her to immortality?” (Cicero, ca. 55 B.C.E./1942, Book II, Section 36). Of course, Cicero was writing in the final days of the Republic, when the very institutions he sought to defend through reasoned speech and historical example were being overtaken, first by populism and then charismatic despotism (cf. Cicero, First and Second Philippians, 44 B.C.E./2011).

In the 20th century, Kenneth Burke, 1966 built on these classical foundations, introducing the concept of terministic screens to explain how language acts as a type of symbolic filter. His point was that terms are capable of reflecting aspects of reality through selectively drawing attention, or deflecting focus and obscuring reality (Burke, 1966, p. 45). Later, Burke turned his attention to the systematic study of rhetoric, human motivations, and the use of specific rhetorical devices. As noted earlier, for Burke (1969), persuasion involves fostering a sense of identification between the audience and the speaker's message. However, Burke also explored how “division” is the counterpart to

<footnote n="2">² Storytelling and narrative are usually regarded as synonymous concepts (see Kent, 2015). This work follows this tradition.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ The concept is derived from the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who wrote of the Peloponnesian War. “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable” (Thucydides, ca. 400 B.C.E., as cited in Allison, 2017, p. 45). The term has been popularised in contemporary discussions of U.S.-China relations, particularly in debates over whether conflict between the two powers is inevitable (Allison, 2017).</footnote>
identification. Consequently, rhetoric arises from the condition of human separation and in serving to unify it can in fact polarize, as in “us” versus “them” (Burke, 1969, p. 22). In fact, Burke’s reoccurring concern in his later works was that with each “act of identification, we participate in a steady march toward conflict that can lead to destructive acts of nationalistic aggression” (Jensen, 2018, p. 385). Indeed, Burke explicitly shows how language and rhetorical devices can emphasise difference and enable collective action toward conflict. Even if a speech by a political leader does not overtly seek to vilify an enemy, “the ingredients of war [can lurk] undetected in language that may seem on its surface to be the language of peace” (Burke, 2018, p.13). In his post-humous work *The War of Words*, Burke (2018) argued that language is not merely persuasive but functions as a “logomachy”—a battlefield in which competing discourses vie for dominance. However, he also argued that such acts do not have to result in warfare if audiences learn to critically interpret and counteract the rhetoric that justifies conflict: a concept termed “rhetorical counteraction” (cf. Jensen, 2018).

Beyond the concepts of Burke, the power of rhetorical forms of persuasive storytelling is a feature of the overlapping fields of public relations, international relations and strategic communication. Robert Heath is widely recognized for his contributions to promoting the rhetorical paradigm in public relations (Heath, 1992). Central to the rhetorical tradition is the interplay between persuasive communication and the constructive, ethically grounded role of discourse in society (Heath & Ihlen, 2018). The origins of public relations have been traced to communicative efforts aimed at enhancing leadership efficacy and empowering communities, often through practices such as persuasion (Cutlip, 2013), dialogue (Kent & Taylor, 2018), responsible advocacy (Davidson, 2020), and even lobbying (Hobbs, 2020). This perspective conceptualizes public relations not simply as a practice influenced by rhetorical theory, but as a contemporary manifestation of rhetoric itself. It challenges dichotomous frameworks that position rhetoric as theoretical and public relations as purely practical (Mackey, 2013). Additionally, the rhetorical approach has been recognized as a valuable lens for analyzing public diplomacy, complementing other theoretical frameworks in the field (Signitzer & Coombs, 1992). In short, rhetoric is the “progenitor” of public relations and other contemporary forms of strategic communication (cf. Coombs, 2018).

Rhetorical storytelling also plays a central role in public diplomacy and international relations, where it serves as a tool for shaping identity, legitimacy, and strategic influence. Miskimmon et al. (2013) posited that by influencing the perspectives of both domestic and international actors, strategic narratives provide a powerful tool for political leaders to extend their influence, shape expectations, and redefine the storylines surrounding their operational environment. Similarly, in his study of US Public Diplomacy, Hayden (2013) highlighted the pivotal role of language in shaping strategic narrative and policy implementation through the government's soft power statecraft, which operates within a framework of rhetorical arguments. De Cock and Picard (2009) also discussed how the “national novel” (p. 9) concept includes cultural and political narratives selectively portraying national history to support nationalist, ethnocentric views. Blanc et al. (2013) extended this analysis, illustrating its role in influencing political strategies toward more aggressive neorealist approaches in international contexts. Collectively, these studies provide important empirical and theoretical foundations for the current study. However, we argue that existing storytelling scholarship in public diplomacy and international relations requires more finely tuned frameworks, such as the typology offered by Kent (2015), and the insights provided by Lane (2023) on its application and influence.

Kent's (2015) research focused on identifying storytelling "master plots". According to him, stories have both structural and rhetorical features, while a "plot" is the equivalent of a premise in an argument. A plot refers to a series of interconnected and coherent events, making an engaging story one that contains a relatable plot filled with interesting characters, actions, intriguing settings, conflicts, tensions, and other

stylistic elements (Kent, 2015). Based on his reading of historical stories and the various stories organizations employ to present themselves, Kent (2015) highlights 20 master plots that are common narrative devices: Quest, Adventure, Pursuit, Rescue, Escape, Revenge, Riddle/Mystery, Rivalry, Underdog, Temptation, Metamorphosis, Transformation, Maturation, Love, Forbidden Love, Sacrifice, Discovery, Wretched Excess, and Rise & Fall. Lane (2023) built on this framework, arguing that master plots allow narrators to articulate a spectrum of societal norms and expectations in a format digestible to a broad audience. She further explored the cognitive, affective and behavioral impacts of the key storytelling elements such as plots and characters.

Taken together, the frameworks developed by Kent (2015) and Lane (2023) offer a valuable foundation for analysing how the CCP mobilises narrative structures to shape audience perception and foster identification with its global vision. These models draw implicitly on classical rhetorical traditions—such as Aristotle’s appeals, Cicero’s emphasis on structure and invention, and Burke’s concept of identification—highlighting how storytelling functions not merely to persuade but to position, legitimize, and direct interpretation. Within this rhetorical context, China’s strategic narratives have evolved from modes of reassurance to more assertive claims of global leadership. The following section surveys existing public diplomacy research on China, tracing how the state has presented itself to international audiences and considering what these shifts may reveal about its broader strategic orientation.

## 2.2. Strategic narratives: From “Telling China Stories Well” to “pointing the way to global development”

The leadership of the CCP have long understood the power of storytelling and have explored various strategic narratives as part of their public diplomacy. As China's military and economic power have grown, so too have these narratives changed, moving from reassuring and ingratiation strategies to more assertive and confident tones. For instance, Kurlantzick (2006) argued that China's public diplomacy initiatives, such as media ventures and cultural exports, contributed to its global image transformation and were framed as benevolent contributions to fostering mutual understanding. Similarly, Wuthnow (2008) identified three dimensions of China's soft power: (1) initiatives aimed at projecting Chinese culture to foreign entities, (2) a focus on providing economic incentives to the developing world, and (3) efforts to demonstrate the status of a "responsible great power" to neighboring states. Again, these initiatives were publicly promoted in terms of contributing to the international order (cf. Huang & Wang, 2021; Li, 2019). Relatedly, Confucius Institutes (educational and cultural institutions) have expanded globally during this period, shaping China's cultural appeal by educating and promoting the Chinese language and culture (Huang, 2021).

However, as early as 2010, the CCP began to adopt a more assertive posture in international affairs (Johnston, 2013). This shift was reflected in public rhetoric aimed at countering persistently negative portrayals of China's intentions and global trajectory, particularly those originating in Western media and policy discourse (Li, 2019). Strategic messaging was used to justify controversial actions—such as the construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea—and to push back against criticisms concerning human rights abuses, including the treatment of political activists in Hong Kong and the repression of the Muslim Uyghur population in Xinjiang. From 2017, the Belt and Road Initiative, initially framed as a benevolent infrastructure and development program, began to draw international criticism as a potential vehicle for expanding China's geopolitical influence through debt-leverage diplomacy (Chitty et al., 2018). Between 2020 and 2023, further concerns emerged regarding China's use of punitive trade measures—such as those imposed on Australia following its calls for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19—which were seen as evidence of a more coercive turn in Chinese foreign policy (Hobbs et al., 2023). Around this time, the
rise of “wolf warrior” diplomacy emerged as a prominent feature in the public rhetoric or significant members within the CCP and was said to be indicative of China’s growing assertiveness and global trends like the diminishing soft power of the United States (Huang, 2022a). While some have questioned the legitimacy of the term “wolf warrior”—which is a rhetorical device in its own right (Chen, 2023)—there has nevertheless been a clear shift in tone of the public diplomacy of China as articulated in public statements by President Xi Jinping, as well as by high-ranking party members and media outlets such as the *Global Times*. While the official narrative of China’s rise and goals has taken a more assertive tone, storytelling has remained an important feature of the CCP’s ideological agenda.

According to Yang (2011), President Xi Jinping’s diplomatic theory, encapsulated under the slogan “Telling China’s Stories Well”, has become the central axis of Chinese propaganda since his rise to power in Beijing. Strategically, it is designed to integrate government discourse and rhetoric to persuade target publics, shaping their attitudes, perceptions, and cognitive frames of reality (Huang, 2022b). The Chinese government has thus defined public diplomacy within the framework of domestic propaganda, positioning it as an extension of the CCP’s actions both at home and abroad (Chitty, 2016; Zhou, 2018). This intersection of domestic and international communication is captured through the concept of *intermestic*, a term denoting the interconnectedness of domestic and international strategic goals and programs. Huang and Wang (2023) critically assessed Beijing’s public diplomacy using the *intermestic* lens, arguing that a “narrativized communication structure” (p. 322) disseminates government narratives that resonate both within and beyond China’s borders. This narrative, largely a story of struggle against real and imagined adversaries, seeks to win hearts and minds in pursuit of geopolitical influence. Wang (2021) notes that this narrative primarily aims to “defend the Party’s leadership and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics and defend national sovereignty and national dignity.” Xi Jinping’s vision aligns with this, as he seeks to position China as an active and influential player in global governance, asserting “Chinese wisdom, solutions, and power” in shaping the international order (Xi, 2023). This global communication strategy reflects China’s broader “grand strategy”, where public diplomacy serves as a strategic tool to assert its national rejuvenation goals amid rising geopolitical challenges (Ji, 2021).

According to Botan (2006, p. 225), the concept of a grand strategy in public relations encompasses the policy-level decisions that an organization makes regarding its goals, alliances, ethical considerations, and relationships with both publics and external forces. Botan traces the concept of grand strategy to ancient roots, particularly to the writings of Sun Tzu (c. 500 B.C.E.), where strategy is seen as a plan for achieving immediate goals, while grand strategy serves as a long-term vision aimed at specific ends. Botan illustrates this with the example of the United States’ grand strategy during the Cold War, which sought to contain the Soviet Union—a long-term strategy that resulted in specific military campaigns and the establishment of NATO. Although Botan’s model was initially developed for organizational conflicts and public relations theory, it has broader applications to strategic communication (cf. Botan, 2021). Similarly, Norton (2015) defines grand strategy as the process of linking short-term policies and actions to medium- and long-term goals through the strategic allocation of resources, as well as the use of supporting communication campaigns and statements (see also Mor, 2006). In the context of public diplomacy, grand strategy refers to the overarching policies and actions that a nation employs to advance its long-term interests and achieve its objectives in the global arena, including economic, military, and narrative domains (Denoon, 2021; Hobbs et al., 2023).

Building on these concepts, we argue that narrative storytelling supports and communicates a nation’s grand strategy. It details both the overarching plan, devised in the service of the national interest or a leader’s goals, and the specific methods of its communication. This idea is not without support. Miskimmon et al. (2013) suggested that strategic

narratives served as a mechanism for political figures to collectively shape the interpretation of past, present, and future events in global politics. Similarly, Hartley (2023) argued that strategic storytelling has two aims: “to create a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and at the same time to ascribe moral supremacy to ‘our side’ while posing ‘their side’ as an existential threat” (p.72). Indeed, storytelling primes audiences to particularly eventualities and contingencies. It animates events, from the complex to the opaque, and it gives them meaning (Kent, 2015). Storytelling in service of a grand strategy gives form to the worldview of the party or leader, and it defines their actions. It crafts an engaging narrative of actors, especially leaders, with distinct objectives and ethical dilemmas, set against a backdrop of strategic alliances, resource management, and threat navigation (Hartley, 2023). Accordingly, the following sections examine the extent to which President Xi Jinping’s speeches incorporate master plots as part of China’s narrative strategy, beginning with an outline of the methodological approach and followed by an analysis of key speeches.

### 3. Methodology

This study uses narrative analysis. In general, narrative analysis is defined as an interpretative qualitative method focused on the structured and storied nature of human communication (Riessman, 2008), or the “manifestation of a plot structure (*manifeste une structure d’intrigue*)” of public discourse (Revaz, 2009, p.137). By dissecting the structure, content, and performative elements of narratives, researchers can unearth the embedded meanings, ideologies, and power dynamics inherent in the way individuals recount experiences (Andrews et al., 2013). Applied to the study of speeches, narrative analysis allows for a deep exploration of both what is being conveyed and the subject position or worldview of the speaker. This includes examining the speaker’s chosen sequence of events, character portrayals, emotive emphasis, and the overarching narrative arcs or themes. The meticulous nature of this method aids in discerning subtle rhetorical strategies, cultural influences, and the ways speakers anticipate audience reception, making it a potent tool for comprehending the multifaceted layers present in narrative (Jones & Norris, 2005; Maingueneau, 2021).

Drawing on the theoretical frameworks on storytelling by Kent (2015), this article conducts a narrative analysis of four speeches made by Xi Jinping. These include

* The speech at the CCP’s 100th anniversary in July 2021 (hereafter referred to as the “CCP’s 100th Anniversary Speech”)

* The speech at a meeting marking the 110th anniversary of the revolution of 1911, which took place in October 2021 (hereafter referred to as “1911 Revolution Anniversary Speech”)

* The report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 16, 2022 (hereafter the “20th NCCPC Report”)

* The speech at the first session of 14th National People’s Congress on March 13, 2023 (hereafter “14th NPC Speech”).

In a similar manner to the ways in which lobbyists develop arguments in order to influence public opinion and cultivate support, all four speeches were “carefully designed to produce influence and authority” based on rhetorical criteria and an understanding of the audience (Desmoulins & Huang, 2021 pp. 226–227). They were also widely reported by both Chinese state media and international media, and provide insights into China’s grand strategy, ambitions, and future intentions.

Through these master plots, stories communicate societal standards, expectations, and outcomes in a manner that can be easily understood by a wide-ranging audience (Lane, 2023). Reading these speeches as stories, the anniversary speech conveys narratives about the CCP and its bond with the people, the struggles of the past, and the blueprint for the future. The report to the National Congress, delivered every five years by the President, tells the stories of the achievements of the past five years
under the Chinese Party's leadership, the challenges faced, and the outlook for the next five years. The 1911 revolution is the year regarded as the beginning of the Republic of China, after the overthrown of the last imperial Qing dynasty, an important milestone towards the establishment of modern China, and often has themes of struggle and growth. The first session of the 14th NPC marks the start of President Xi Jinping's third administration and was thus an occasion of personal importance as well as political significance, with China's leader seeking to bolster his domestic support with a vision of future goals. These documents serve as sources to understand the CCP's strategies in storytelling about itself, as well as China's national identity and its connection with the world.

As noted earlier, Kent (2015) argued that stories consist of plots as structural features, and storytelling is the process of developing identifiable characters and captivating storylines that will resonate with the audience of a particular social context. Accordingly, one of the authors initiated the coding process by closely reading all four speeches and identifying key master plots. In addition, the study also examined characters, narrative structure, and language as supporting elements to enhance interpretation. Preliminary findings were then shared with a second researcher, who independently coded one of the speeches. The resulting themes and codes were collaboratively reviewed and discussed to reach agreement. This process of data validation (Hoonaard, 2008) facilitated critical reflection on divergent interpretations and enabled consensus on key findings. Such validation is particularly important in qualitative research with a limited sample size and categorical data, where discrepancies may be minimal but still require careful reconciliation. As only two of the authors were fluent in Mandarin, English-language translations were used to guide thematic agreement. The results of this analysis are presented in the next section.

## 4. Research findings and discussion

This section examines the storytelling techniques employed in articulating and supporting China's grand strategy. Table 1 summarizes the master plots and provides an example of their application to the four studied texts. A deeper exploration of each plot is presented thereafter, connecting core master plots back to the theoretical framework. In doing so, this discussion follows the example of Heath and Ihlen (2018), Davidson (2020) and others from the rhetorical paradigm in public relations scholarship, by connecting contemporary rhetoric to its roots in classical thought. Public relations theory, in this view, should be seen as a modern extension of classical rhetoric (Coombs, 2018). In turn, the rhetorical framework from public relations provides a critical framework for analysing how the practice of public diplomacy—including speechwriting, message construction, and strategic storytelling—shapes legitimacy, public meaning, and international perception (cf. Arceaux, 2024; L'Etang, 2009). This discussion begins with the first of the master plots present in the sampled texts: adventure.

In all four of the speeches, **Adventure** serves as an essential plot, with the Chinese people collectively positioned as being on a journey toward becoming a prosperous and strong nation. It highlights the 'ups and downs' experienced in this transformative journey, evoking memories of the hardships faced by the country and its people throughout history. For instance, President Xi Jinping's declaration in the CCP's 100th Anniversary Speech that "we have realized the first centenary goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects", and his statement in the Report regarding external challenges such as attempts to "blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on" China, serve to remind the audience of China's remarkable achievements, eliciting a sense of pride (CCP's 100th Anniversary speech). The goal of *building a moderately prosperous society in all aspects by 2020* was established during the 18th National Congress of the CCP, illustrating the party's strategic approach encompassing long-term, mid-term, and short-term objectives. The announcement of achieving this goal affirms to the audience that the promise has been fulfilled, thereby legitimizing the CCP's leadership. By emphasizing the idea of "safeguarding China's

<table><caption>**Table 1**
The master plots present within the speeches of President Xi Jinping</caption><thead><tr><td>Plots</td><td>Explanation</td><td>Example</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Adventure</td><td>The CCP's journey in Chinese politics, with its ups and downs, can be seen as a type of political adventure.</td><td>"To save the nation from peril, the Chinese people put up a courageous fight. As noble-minded patriots sought to pull the nation together." (CCP's 100th Anniversary speech).<br>"Throughout these endeavors, we have safeguarded China's dignity and core interests and kept ourselves well-positioned for pursuing development and ensuring security." (20th NCCPC Report)</td></tr><tr><td>Quest</td><td>CCP's quest for building a prosperous and strong China under its leadership, which spans a century of history.</td><td>"There has never been an instruction manual or ready-made solution for the Chinese people and the Chinese nation to turn to as they fought to end the great sufferings endured since the advent of modern times and have moved on toward the bright future of rejuvenation." (20th NCCPC Report)<br>"They kept fighting and exploring new ways to save the nation, and they demonstrated an unbending will and defiance in the face of brutality." (1911 Revolution Anniversary Speech)</td></tr><tr><td>Rescue</td><td>While not a traditional rescue story, the speech may reference the CCP's role in saving China from perceived internal and external threats.</td><td>"Since its founding, the Communist Party of China has closely united and led the Chinese people of all ethnic groups in working hard for a century to put an end to China's national humiliation." (14th NPC Speech)<br>"We will enhance our capacity to prevent and mitigate major risks and will remain on high alert against systemic security risks. We will crack down hard on infiltration, sabotage, subversion, and separatist activities by hostile forces." (20th NCCPC Report)</td></tr><tr><td>Transformation</td><td>Transformation is a key plot, as the CCP and the nation has undergone significant changes over its century-long history.</td><td>"Through tenacious struggle, the Party and the Chinese people showed the world that the Chinese people had stood up, and that the time in which the Chinese nation could be bullied and abused by others was gone forever." (CCP's 100th Anniversary Speech)<br>"We have devoted great energy to finishing building a moderately prosperous society in all respects." (20th NCCPC Report)<br>"Chinese nation has achieved the great transformation from standing up and growing prosperous to becoming strong, and China's national rejuvenation has become a historical inevitability." (14th NPC Speech)</td></tr><tr><td>Love</td><td>While not a romantic love story, the speech may highlight the dedication and loyalty of CCP members and</td><td>"And I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to people and friends from around the world who have</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued on next page)
<table><caption>**Table 1 (continued)**</caption><thead><tr><th>Plots</th><th>Explanation</th><th>Example</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td>supporters. In international relations, it refers to the support and friendship from international forces. Thus, “love” in this context is a rhetorical form of ingratiation</td><td>shown friendship to the Chinese people and understanding and support for China's endeavors in revolution, development, and reform.” (CCP's 100th Anniversary Speech)<br>“Upholding the Party's fundamental purpose of wholeheartedly serving the people, we will stand firmly with the people, implement the Party's mass line, respect the people's creativity, and practice a people-cantered philosophy of development.” (20th NCCPC Report)<br>“We must remain committed to putting the people first. The people are the decisive force for building China into a great modern socialist country in all respects.” (14th NPC Speech)<br>“Anyone who would attempt to do so will find themselves on a collision course with a great wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people.”<sup>a</sup> (CCP's 100th Anniversary Speech)<br>“We must remain vigilant and be better prepared for adversity, maintain our revolutionary spirit and morale, and have the courage to carry out a great struggle with many new contemporary features.” (1911 Revolution Anniversary Speech)<br>“With the advent of modern times, China was reduced to a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society, when bullying by foreign powers and frequent wars tore the country apart and plunged the Chinese people into an abyss of great suffering.” (14th NPC Speech)</td></tr><tr><td>Rivalry</td><td>Rivalry with internal and external forces that undermines China's national interest</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

dignity and core interests”, the narrative portrays China as a united entity facing external challenges such as blackmail, containment, and blockade (see CCP’s 100th Anniversary speech). This readily evokes thoughts of the US trade barriers since 2018, reinforcing the perception of China contending with significant external challenges. Strategically, it also glosses over self-inflicted hardships caused by Chairman Mao Zedong’s “Great Leap Forward” (1958–1962) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), which contributed to the deaths of millions of Chinese people, as well as the political persecution of so-called ideological

enemies, including a young Xi Jinping. The Adventure theme is prone to strategic omissions and embellishments. It seeks to supplant the lived hardships of older generations—part of the collective memory and living memory of the nation—with feelings of civic pride in the nation’s economic and social success.<fnref n="4" /> As Kent (2015, p. 487) notes, “the ability to tell a compelling story is not about the content but the storyteller,” and here the CCP, as voiced by Xi Jinping, assumes the role of master narrator, framing hardship as part of a heroic national arc.

The second master plot concerns the **Quest**. In general storytelling practices, a quest refers to “the search for a person, place, or thing, tangible or intangible” emphasizing the efforts of people in the journey (Kent, 2015, p. 486). The Quest and Adventure categories overlap, as sometimes an adventure becomes a quest, depending on the storyteller. In our narrative analysis, the element of a “quest” was prominently featured in all four speeches. In the two anniversary speeches, this narrative device spans over a century, recounting the numerous battles and challenges the Chinese people faced in their quest to save the nation from peril. It portrays a collective figure of patriots who sought to unite the nation and end the great sufferings endured throughout modern times. Similarly, the 20th NCCPC Report and the 14th NPC speech tell a story of determination and resolve, where the Chinese people have moved towards a bright future of rejuvenation. In all four documents, the quest narrative evokes a sense of collective patriotism, unity, and pride among the Chinese people, underscoring their resilience in the face of historical adversities. It also emphasizes the CCP’s central role in leading the Chinese people on this transformative journey, reinforcing the party’s historical significance in the nation’s narrative. The quest narrative in these speeches not only recounts the past but also sets the stage for the future, highlighting the CCP’s continued commitment to guide the nation towards its goals. This quest narrative also exemplifies China’s broader public diplomacy agenda, in which the CCP positions itself not merely as a governing authority but as a moral guide on a civilisational mission—what Xi Jinping has framed as “telling China’s stories well” (Yang, 2011; Huang, 2022b)—to cultivate international legitimacy and domestic unity. Such storytelling aligns with China’s grand strategy to assert discursive power and shape perceptions across both domestic and international arenas (Miskimmon et al., 2013; Hobbs et al., 2023).

Following the narrative of Adventure and the determination of Quest, we transition to the third significant master plot: **Rescue**. The importance of this plot is underlined by its consistent recurrence in all the speeches and as a common theme in the CCP’s broader mythologizing. As any nation faces trials and tribulations, the role of a savior becomes paramount. In China’s narrative, the CCP assumes this pivotal role, striving for the betterment of its people and the rejuvenation of the nation. The rescue master plot emphasizes the CCP’s “mission” is to seek happiness for the Chinese people, rescuing them from poverty and exploitation, and leading the cultural rejuvenation of the nation. The same theme persists in the Report, which underscores the importance of enhancing the capacity to prevent and mitigate major risks, while cracking down on various threats, including infiltration, sabotage, subversion, and separatist activities. This narrative device serves to legitimize the CCP’s leadership by presenting it as the guardian and protector of the nation’s interests, echoing the common slogan used for China’s domestic audience, *without the Communist Party, there would be no new China*<fnref n="5" />, which is a feature of a common patriotic song. The rescue

<footnote>a A “collision course” was translated from the Chinese term “头破血流” (tóu pò xuè lú) or literally “crack heads and spill blood”. However, the idiom in Chinese context is commonly used without a violent connotation. As former Australian diplomat Colin Heseltine (2021) noted, “beaten to a pulp” might be a more appropriate idiomatic translation. In any case, the official English-language translation of the speech replaced the violent rhetoric with the less colourful “a collision course... into a wall of steel” (Heseltine, 2021).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ To what extent such strategic omissions trigger a “doublethink” cognitive process—where contradictory beliefs are simultaneously held and accepted without critical conflict (Carré, 2017)—in older Chinese citizens who lived through the turbulent years of Mao Zedong is an interesting question but beyond the scope of this particular study.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Taiwan’s economic prosperity under a democratic system of government does of course undermine the CCP’s implicit claim in this slogan that Chinese prosperity is due to the communist party and its leaders.</footnote>
master plot in these speeches not only highlights the challenges faced but also emphasizes the CCP's unwavering commitment to ensuring the security and well-being of the Chinese people and the nation. This rhetorical construction draws on classical principles: Aristotle noted that pathos is most powerfully invoked when audiences perceive the speaker as acting to relieve their suffering or defend them from harm (Aristotle, 2004, Chapter 2, 1378a-1387b), while Cicero argued that great leaders must present themselves as guardians of the republic, combining reason with visible concern for the common good (Cicero, 1942, Book II, Section 35). Burke (2018) would see this as a classic identification strategy: the Party cast as saviour, the people as victims, and redemption through unity.

Building on the themes of resilience and rejuvenation, the next master plot delves into **Transformation**. Just as a nation evolves over time, adapting to the demands of its populace and the challenges of its environment, so do the narratives it uses to talk about itself. A transformation is not just about change; it is about evolution, growth, and, in some cases, rebirth. China's transformation narrative over the past century offers a rich tapestry of such transformative moments – instances where the nation and its people pivoted from challenges to chart a new course toward prosperity and strength. In the anniversary speeches, this plot device focuses on China's transformation over the past century. It highlights the tenacious struggle and the momentous shift when the Chinese people stood up—first as part of the communist revolution and then as citizens of an emerging great power—signaling an end to the era in which China could be bullied and abused by other nations. The report, on the other hand, emphasizes the transformation in building a moderately prosperous society and the significant economic achievements attained. This narrative underscores the performance of the government and the ruling party, presenting it as a driving force behind the nation's transformation. In both documents, the “transformation” master plot serves as a unifying thread that emphasizes China's journey from adversity to strength and prosperity. It showcases the CCP's pivotal role in this transformation and reinforces its historical significance in the nation's narrative, solidifying the party's commitment to leading China toward continued progress and rejuvenation. This rhetorical structure echoes Cicero's belief that history must be used not merely to recall the past, but to instruct and inspire the public toward civic virtue and collective renewal (Cicero, 1942, Book II, 36, p. 225).

The CCP's attempt to further build a relationship with the Chinese people emerges with the master plot of **Love**. While traditionally associated with personal, romantic tales, love in the context of a nation's grand narrative speaks to bonds of loyalty, dedication, and unity (a paternalistic type of bond between the government and its citizens). Through President Xi Jinping's anniversary speech, there are glimpses of this bond—a commitment of the CCP to its people and the support China has received from the global community. For example, President Xi Jinping's expresses in the CCP's 100th Anniversary Speech: “I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to people and friends from around the world who have shown friendship to the Chinese people and understanding and support for China's endeavors in revolution, development, and reform”. This statement serves as a testament to the support he received from both the Chinese people and international partners. Furthermore, the Report emphasizes the CCP's commitment to wholeheartedly serving the people, implementing the Party's “mass line” (relying on the people and for the people), respecting the people's creativity, and endorsing a people-centered philosophy of development. The concept of the “mass line” has been a fundamental principle upheld by the CCP since its inception, highlighting the party's close connection with the Chinese people and fostering an organic sense of togetherness, as articulated in the Anniversary Speech, “This country is its people; the people are the country” (CCP's 100th Anniversary speech). As Cicero observed enduring influence depends more on good-will and affection than on fear or reward (Cicero, 1928, Book II, Sections 21–26, pp.193–198). This classical insight helps explain how the CCP, through sentimental and service-oriented rhetoric, seeks to secure loyalty not

through coercion, but through emotionally resonant appeals to unity and mutual care. In other words, the Love plot, like in the Rescue plot, uses pathos to foster “ingratiation” (cf. Heath, Cheney & Ihlen, 2018).

Transitioning from the theme of Love, which emphasizes the softer aspects of human connection and solidarity, we now turn to a more contentious yet crucial narrative element: **Rivalry**. This master plot is crucial in all the speeches. While not as frequently emphasized, this narrative device alludes to the competition and challenges faced by China, both internally and externally. President Xi Jinping mentions the significance of protecting China's core interests and maintaining firm strategic resolve against external attempts to “blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China” (CCP's 100th Anniversary Speech), and reminding people of “bullying by foreign powers and frequent wars tore the country apart and plunged the Chinese people into an abyss of great suffering” (14th NPC Speech). He also declared, “We must remain vigilant and be better prepared for adversity, maintain our revolutionary spirit and morale, and have the courage to carry out a great struggle with many new contemporary features.” (1911 Revolution Anniversary Speech). This illustrates the external rivalry and the role of the CCP in safeguarding China's interests. In the Report, the narrative highlights the CCP's commitment to confronting various challenges, such as “systemic security risks” and “infiltration, sabotage, subversion, and separatist activities by hostile forces.” These references allude to the ongoing rivalry and threats faced by China. There is a clear “us versus them” dimension intended to prime the audience to actual confrontations or conflict. Although not as explicit as other master plots, the “rivalry” element helps identify the antagonists in China's development story and again underscores the party's role in protecting the nation's interests amid an evolving global landscape. This rhetorical framing, or terministic screen (Burke, 1966), echoes Aristotle's insight that anger is roused when an audience perceives themselves (or by extension their nation) as having been wronged by an adversary (Aristotle, 2004, Chapter 2, 1378a-1380a). As Burke (2018) warned in his posthumous work *The War of Words*, even speeches that claim to promote peace can carry the “ingredients of war,” subtly preparing publics for confrontation through symbolic division. In this sense, the “rivalry” plot operates as a logomachy—a war of words—where narratives prime the audience for geopolitical struggle. This aligns with the CCP's shift toward more combative “wolf warrior” diplomacy, where language becomes both shield and weapon in defending national dignity (Huang, 2022b; Chen, 2023).

Moving away from the specifics of master plot typologies, the overarching themes in the examined texts become clear. China's strategic storytelling underscores the importance of historical narratives. As Lane (2023) argues, the persuasive power of storytelling lies in its capacity to cognitively and affectively engage audiences, and Xi Jinping strategic use of narrative encourages emotional identification with a national struggle while reinforcing a coherent worldview. Recurring rhetorical themes such as “100 years of humiliation”<fnref n="6" />; (Peerenboom, 2010) and the “glory of thousands of years of civilization” are rhetorical devices common to these speeches, and they serve to cultivate national pride, while subtly nurturing a sense of grievance based on past injustices. Rhetorical techniques like metaphors and allegories (Kent & Taylor, 2018) emphasize China's determined stance against perceived foreign threats, depicting the nation as a consolidated behind a “great wall of

<footnote n="6">⁶ The rhetorical theme of “100 years of humiliation” or “century of humiliation” and its significance for manufacturing a particular worldview has been debated. It is clearly a recurring theme in the leadership rhetoric of the CCP and an important reference in understanding China’s dominant worldview. However, in the Chinese context, like in Xi’s speeches, the keyword of “humiliation” is usually used as a reference to demonstrate China’s achievement after a dark period of history (Peerenboom, 2010). We argue the “humiliation” theme would trigger feelings of both resentment and pride, depending on the emphasis of the rhetor.</footnote>
steel” (CCP’s 100th Anniversary Speech). The portrayal of Chinese citizens as resilient and self-reliant further reinforces the themes of surmounting past challenges and aspiring toward a future filled with greatness. Ultimately, these narratives do more than reflect China’s national identity; they actively shape it and function as a strategic resource in both domestic legitimacy-building and the projection of soft power abroad.

## 5. Conclusion

Situated at the intersection of rhetorical approaches to public relations and public diplomacy, this study demonstrates that narrative storytelling can serve as an analytical lens in the context of public diplomacy. Stories from political leaders are embedded with national histories, cultural values, and aspirations, allowing these politicians to foster identification (Burke, 1969; 2018; Miskimmon et al., 2013). Rather than relying on overt persuasion, these stories often function through invitational rhetoric (Foss & Griffin, 1995), as demonstrated in this study through the themes of “rescue,” “quest,” and “transformation.” While both internal and external critiques persist, public sentiment within China remains largely supportive of the government and its strategic plans (Carter et al., 2024). While Wuthnow (2008) identifies three dimensions of China’s soft power initiatives, as discussed above, we propose that storytelling constitutes a crucial fourth dimension. Huang and Wang (2023) argue that China’s strategic communication unfolds across both domestic and international contexts. This intermestic approach positions narrative as a central tool for sustaining the leadership’s worldview and supporting its broader grand strategy. This perspective has deep cultural roots in China and echoes a remark attributed to Confucius: “The people may be made to follow a path of action, but they may not be made to understand it” (as cited in Bowen & Zhu, 2020, p. 71). The implication is that the public does not need to see the endgame or fully comprehend the leader’s strategic intent. They need only internalise the terministic screens through which the Party constructs meaning—portraying the CCP as saviour, emphasising strategic revival, recalling historical exploitation, and reinforcing themes of solidarity and mission. As Burke (2018) reminds us, identification inevitably entails division and may lead to conflict. In contemporary Chinese public diplomacy, storytelling has been strategically employed to prepare the public for potential future challenges, particularly in the context of rising tensions with the United States. The consequences of this strategic storytelling will only become clear in the fullness of time.

## Declaration of Generative AI and AI-assisted technologies in the writing process

AI tools such as ChatGPT was used to check the expression and Grammarly was also used for the identification of typographical errors.

## Declarations of Interest Statement

Funding sources: This research was supported by a grant funded by Australia-France Social Science Collaborative Research Program from the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia. Grant ID 218928. Grant title: Mapping the soft power influence strategies of France, Australia and China in the Indo-Pacific.

## Declaration of Competing Interest

Please note we have no conflicts of competing interest.

## Data Availability

Data will be made available on request.

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