# A Not-so-Simple Rule for ‘I’

Tadeusz Ciecierski, Jakub Rudnicki

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Tadeusz Ciecierski, Jakub Rudnicki. A Not-so-Simple Rule for ‘I’. Philosophical Quarterly, 2023, 73, pp.1100 - 1119. 10.1093/pq/pqad025. hal-05439685

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# A NOT-SO-SIMPLE RULE FOR ‘I’

BY TADEUSZ CIECIERSKI AND JAKUB RUDNICKI

Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford’s arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context as the person responsible for a particular speech act. From this analysis, we exclude a particular class of uses of ‘I’, uses that we believe are best understood as demonstrative.

**Keywords:** indexicals, demonstratives, semantics, context-sensitivity, first-person pronoun.

## I. INTRODUCTION

It is widely believed that the reference of the uses of the first-person indexical ‘I’ is determined by a rule, a rule that links the referent to the agent parameter of the context of use. This belief has recently been called into question. Maximilian de Gaynesford<fnref n="1" /> gives what is probably the most detailed critique in his book *I: The Meaning of the First Person Term* (2006). He accepts that ‘I’ is a referring expression.<fnref n="2" /> Yet, he also claims that '[n]o reference rule is sufficient to determine the reference of every use of I' (de Gaynesford 2006: 30).<fnref n="3" /> de Gaynesford’s primary argument in favour of this claim is based on the

<footnote n="1">¹ Carlo Penco (2021) discusses de Gaynesford’s view in some detail.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² This is contrary to other critics of the standard semantic account of ‘I’ who deny its referential character (cf. Anscombe 1975).</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ A sympathetic interpretation must hold that such a rule cannot be given for ordinary, literal uses of ‘I’. This is how we interpret de Gaynesford.</footnote>
following three observations<fnref n="4" />:

1. Several diverse formulations of the reference rule for ‘I’ are available in the literature (de Gaynesford 2006: 37).

2. The reference rule for ‘I’ is ambiguous with respect to its form (de Gaynesford 2006: 37). This is because it allows, at least, three schematic readings:

(R1) $\forall x [x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \Rightarrow \exists y (y \text{ uses/produces } x \wedge x \text{ refers to } y)]$,<fnref n="5" />

(R2) $\forall x \forall y (x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \wedge y \text{ uses/produces } x \Rightarrow x \text{ refers to } y)$,

(R3) $\forall x \forall y \{x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \wedge y \text{ uses/produces } x \Rightarrow [\exists z x \text{ refers to } z \Rightarrow (\forall z' x \text{ refers to } z \Leftrightarrow z' = y)] \}$.<fnref n="6" />

3. There are two competing interpretations of the reference rule (in any of R₁–R₃): (a) in terms of the user of ‘I’ and (b) in terms of the producer of ‘I’. Neither is universally valid. de Gaynesford therefore wonders ‘whether any reference rule for “I” can succeed in distinguishing genuine referents from mere producers, users, etc. on all occasions of its use while remaining simple…’ (2006: 37).

The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to discuss de Gaynesford’s scepticism regarding the widespread belief that the reference of the first-person indexical ‘I’ is given by a rule that links the reference of a particular use of ‘I’ to the agent parameter of the context of use; and, secondly, to propose a formulation of the rule for ‘I’ free from the problems de Gaynesford highlights.

In Sections II–IV, we discuss de Gaynesford’s arguments. In Section V, we discuss two prominent proposals for solving the problem of ‘I’: intentionalism and conventionalism. We conclude that they are not successful. Section VI is devoted to our proposed rule for ‘I’. We take the referent of the use of ‘I’ to be the object (person) responsible for the speech act containing that use of

<footnote n="4">⁴ To be precise, de Gaynesford attacks not only the view—that he dubs *Rule Theory*—about the existence of the rule providing the meaning of ‘I’ and fixing the reference of its uses, but also two other claims that are often made regarding the first-person pronoun: *The Guarantee* and *Independence*. The former states that every use of the pronoun *successfully* secures reference thanks to its meaning and the latter states that the users of the pronoun do not need to identify the referent themselves in order to successfully refer. de Gaynesford is probably right to note that these two further claims logically entail *Rule Theory* but for *Rule Theory* to entail the other two, further assumptions about the existence of exactly one object satisfying the property specified in the simple rule for every use of the pronoun need to be made (de Gaynesford 2006: 27). We do briefly discuss the existential assumptions in Section III, but for the most part remain interested only in de Gaynesford’s attack on *Rule Theory* as it remains largely independent of the other two theses he targets.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ ‘y uses/produces x’ is shorthand for saying that y is involved in the use/production of the token of ‘I’ that is part of x.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Note that de Gaynesford’s original formulation of R₃ is incorrect. It reads $\forall x \forall y ((x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \wedge y \text{ uses/produces } x \wedge \exists z x \text{ refers to } z) \rightarrow z = y)$. This formula contains the free variable z in the consequent, which makes the formulation uninterpretable.</footnote>
‘I’. In Section VII, we suggest treating a class of uses of ‘I’ as demonstrative. This renders that class exempt from our reference rule. In Section VIII, we compare our view with that of Dodd & Sweeney (2010). We argue that our view overcomes various problems faced by Dodd and Sweeney’s view.

## II. THE DIVERSITY OF FORMULATIONS

Many believe that the linguistic meaning of pure indexicals can (at least, partially) be analysed in terms of rules specifying how the reference of their uses is determined relative to the context of use. Roughly, the rule for ‘now’ states that its uses refer to the time at which ‘now’ is uttered; the rule for ‘here’ states that its uses refer to the place where ‘here’ is uttered; and the rule for ‘I’ states that uses of ‘I’ refer to the person who uses ‘I’. The rules probably originated in Husserl’s (1970) *Logical Investigations*. In most contemporary debates, they are represented as characters of respective expressions. If we assume that indexicals are directly referential, then these rules can be equated with functions from contexts of utterance to referents.<fnref n="7" /> That is, they are represented as non-constant functions from formal representations of contexts of utterance to contents (Kaplan 1989).

de Gaynesford correctly observes that the phrasing of the rule for ‘I’ varies greatly. He mentions interpretations by Jon Barwise and John Perry, Bertrand Russell, Sydney Shoemaker, Peter Strawson, Lucy O’Brien, Christopher Peacocke, Hugh Mellor, John Campbell, Carol Rovane, David Kaplan, Ingar Brinck, Richard Larson, and Gabriel Segal (de Gaynesford 2006: 37).<fnref n="8" />

The formulations differ in some respects. The referent is identified in terms of a variety of categories. These include ‘user’, ‘producer’, ‘utterance maker’, ‘speaker’, or ‘writer’. How the exact form of the rule is understood also differs (see Section III). Some even deny the claim that the reference rule exhausts the linguistic meaning of ‘I’.

However, in itself, the diversity of formulations of the reference rule cannot constitute an argument against its existence nor against the correctness of any

<footnote n="7">⁷There are some minor complications that we are ignoring here. ‘Now’, for example, is sometimes interpreted as an operator rather than a singular term.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸The list can be supplemented with numerous other examples such as (we assume that the stated rules governing the meanings of ‘I’ are also meant as reference rules; in some cases, for example, Husserl’s, this interpretation is explicitly defended by the quoted authors themselves; in others, alternative interpretations of the formulations are possible):‘It is the universal semantic function of the word “I” to designate whoever is speaking’ (Husserl 1970: 219).‘I’ means the same as ‘the person who utters this token’ (Reichenbach 1947: 284).‘I’ means the person uttering ‘I’’ (Burks 1949: 678).‘I’ . . . contribute(s) an individual to the interpretation, it is almost always the speaker’ (Nunberg 1993: 20).‘The category first-person is the grammaticalization of the speaker’s reference to him- or herself, that is, the participant role with speaker inclusion’ (Huang 2006: 137).‘I’ is the word that English speakers use to refer to themselves as themselves’ (Sainsbury 2008: 254; also see Bermudez 2017: 127).</footnote>
of the formulations. Most of the authors listed above would probably concede that theirs is only a rough approximation of the rule. In fact, the works from which the quotations are taken are not solely devoted to the form and content of the reference rule for ‘I’. de Gaynesford’s point rests, therefore, fully on ambiguity issues revolving around (1) the logical form of the reference rule and (2) the nature of the relevant aspect of context used in the rule.

### III. THE AMBIGUITY

According to de Gaynesford’s correct observation, the formulations of the reference rule in the literature represent three general readings.

The first reading is as follows:

$$ (R_1) \forall x [x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \Rightarrow \exists y (y \text{ uses/produces } x \wedge x \text{ refers to } y)] $$

(R1) is the existentially strongest reading. For every use of ‘I’, the existence of the user/producer (and the referent) is secured.

The second reading is as follows:

$$ (R_2) \forall x \forall y (x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \wedge y \text{ uses/produces } x \Rightarrow x \text{ refers to } y) $$

By itself, (R2) does not exclude cases where uses of ‘I’ fail to refer. Yet, (R2) does entail that the referent is the user/producer when (1) there is a user/producer of a token of ‘I’ and (2) the action of using ‘I’ occurs.

The difference between (R1) and (R2) may appear insignificant. It is perhaps natural to assume that, for every use of an expression, there must be an agent who has used/produced the relevant token. This line of thinking is a direct consequence of the following general argument:

P1. Every (intentional) action has an agent.

P2. The action of using/producing a token of an expression is an (intentional) action.

C. Every action of using/producing a token of an expression has an agent.

This argument works in conjunction with the terminological decision to call the relevant agent a ‘user/producer’. If we also assume that every action has a single agent (which could be a group agent), then we might equate (R1) and (R2). We can then reinterpret (R1) thus:

$$ (R_1)^* \forall x [x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \Rightarrow x \text{ refers to } up(x)] $$

Here, *up* is the function that assigns an agent to the action of using/producing the token of ‘I’ involved in x.
The third reading is as follows:

$$ (R_3) \forall x \forall y \{x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \wedge y \text{ uses/produces } x \Rightarrow [\exists z \text{ refers to } z \Rightarrow (\forall z' x \text{ refers to } z' \Leftrightarrow z' = y)] \} $$

Given the assumption that actions have single agents, (R₃) might be reformulated as follows:

$$ (R_3)^* \forall x \forall y \{x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \Rightarrow [\exists z \text{ refers to } z \Rightarrow (\forall z' x \text{ refers to } z' \Leftrightarrow z' = up(x))] \} $$

(R₃)* gives us a weaker interpretation of the reference rule; one that enables vacuous uses of 'I'.

We do not intend to defend (R₁)* or (R₃)*. In Section VI, we shall opt for a different version of the rule. That said, it is interesting to note (on methodological grounds) that interpreting the reference rule as something like (R₃)* offers its most charitable, robust interpretation. Thus, the ambiguity of form in the interpretation of the reference rule should be unproblematic. Critics should concentrate on the (R₃)* interpretation.

#### IV. THE USER/PRODUCER DISTINCTION

The user/producer distinction is identifiable in both (R₁)* and (R₃)*. Following Maciej Głowacki (2021), we might consider two versions of (R₃)*:

$$ (RP_3)^* \forall x \forall y [x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \Rightarrow (\exists z \text{ refers to } z \Rightarrow (\forall z' x \text{ refers to } z' \Leftrightarrow z' = p(x)])] $$

$$ (RU_3)^* \forall x \forall y [x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \Rightarrow (\exists z \text{ refers to } z \Rightarrow (\forall z' x \text{ refers to } z' \Leftrightarrow z' = u(x)])] $$

Here, *u* denotes a function that assigns users as agents of the contexts of uses of 'I', and *p* denotes a function that assigns producers as agents of the contexts of uses of 'I'.<fnref n="9" />

The problem is that there are counterexamples to both versions of (R₃)*. This is most obvious in (RP₃)*. I might, for example, use a note written (i.e., produced) by my officemate that says, 'I will be back in 5 minutes'. It is, however, clear that the 'I' involved refers to me (the user) and not to my officemate (the producer).

The case of (RU₃)* is less obvious. The following scenarios do however highlight the problem:

<footnote n="9">⁹ De Gaynesford (2006: 41) also considers a disjunctive interpretation. He correctly observes, however, that such an interpretation cannot do the job because it leaves the issue of reference undetermined.</footnote>
*Office hours:* Joe is not in his office one day, and Ben notices that a number of students keep approaching his door and knocking. They then stand around and look bemused for a while before leaving. Taking pity on these poor souls wasting their time, Ben decides to attach his 'I am not here today' note to Joe's door. (Corazza *et al.* 2002: 5)

*Executor:* 'Suppose I am the executor of your will and thus sole user of the signed requests you have produced legitimizing various necessary funerary arrangements—"I wish that my body be given to science".' (de Gaynesford 2006: 41)

If the intuitions generated by the scenarios (i.e., that Ben successfully referred to Joe and that the executor is a user of 'I' but not the referent of the first-person pronoun) are correct, then (RU3)* is straightforwardly refuted. (RP3)* and (RU3)* also provide wrong predictions in the following example (quoted in full from Dodd and Sweeney 2010: 344):

*Sentry:* When a king sends his sentry to another king, who delivers his message 'I surrender; let's discuss terms', it may be the sentry who is speaking, but the king is the agent of the context and the one who is really communicating with the receiving king. That's why the receiving king doesn't think it's the sentry who is surrendering, but the enemy king.

In this case, it is the sentry who is both the user and the producer of 'I'. However, the referent is clearly the king, whom the sentry merely represents.

## V. OTHER ATTEMPTS AT CAPTURING THE NOTION OF THE AGENT OF THE CONTEXT

There are two strategies one might follow to save the reference rule. The first is to accept at least some of the counterexamples, and then reformulate the rule accordingly. The second is to question the counterexamples. We shall follow a combination of both strategies because we shall try to reformulate the rule in a way that allows one to capture some of the problematic predictions just provided, but we shall also claim that some of the potential counterexamples should be exempt from the analysis in terms of the reference rule for 'I'.

We are, of course, not the first to set out to reinterpret the notion of the agent of the context. Theories that have attempted to do so tend to adopt this general schema:

(A) $\forall x \forall y [x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \Rightarrow (\exists z x \text{ refers to } z \Rightarrow (\forall z' x \text{ refers to } z' \Leftrightarrow z' = (\iota y) (yRx)))].$

Accounts differ on how they construe the relation *R*.

The first theory—intentionalism—follows Stefano Predelli (1998) in anchoring 'indexical expressions to the intended context of interpretation' (114). This gives the following interpretation of the reference rule:
$$(RI_3)^* \forall x \forall y [x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \Rightarrow (\exists z \text{ x refers to } z \Rightarrow (\forall z' \text{ x refers to } z' \Leftrightarrow z' = ia(x)))$$

Here, ia is the function that assigns the intended agent to the particular use of 'I'. This account successfully blocks all the counterexamples given earlier because the intended relevant agents will be Joe (in *Office hours*), the author of the will (in *Executor*), and the king (in *Sentry*). This is the expected result. There is a problem, however. It seems that the mere intention to make someone the agent of the context of the use of 'I' cannot suffice in fixing that person as the referent (Corazza *et al.* 2002: 8–9). Contra intentionalism, the user of 'I' cannot simply turn whoever they want into the agent of their use of 'I'. In *Executor*, for example, the executor's use of 'I' cannot successfully refer to anyone other than the author of the will even if the executor has other intentions, for whatever reason.

The second strategy—conventionalism—avoids this problem by anchoring the use of 'I' to the social or conventional setting, a setting that is supposed to determine the relevant agent (Corazza *et al.* 2002). This setting primarily applies to specific practices for using and interpreting utterances (like the practice of interpreting written notes or recorded messages). It is assumed that we can speak of the determination of the agent only relative to such practices. At the same time, Eros Corazza & colleagues (2002) claim that a communicative intention must be present for an utterance to occur at all. This helps to classify as non-utterances cases in which, intuitively, we have no reference (such as when the written note was discarded by its author but accidently ended up attached to the door of Joe's office) (Corazza *et al.* 2002: 15–6). Conventionalism assumes (1) that there is some way to classify utterances into types governed by different corresponding conventions and (2) that agent assignments are type-of-utterance-relative. Consider:

$$(RC_3)^* \forall x \forall y [x \text{ is the use of 'I' } \Rightarrow (\exists z \text{ x refers to } z \Rightarrow (\forall z' \text{ x refers to } z' \Leftrightarrow z' = a_\tau(x))]$$

This conventionalist formulation of the reference rule applies if we assume that $a_τ$ is the function assigning agents to utterances according to their type $τ$.

Conventionalism does have its problems, however, three of which stand out.

First, as Komerine Romdenh-Romluc (2006: 268–70) points out, conventionalism cannot explain how 'I' can be employed in contexts where there is no established convention regarding relevant usage (e.g. when answering machines first entered the market).

Secondly, it seems that one can use the same type of communication mechanism—a sticky note, for example—in ways that are not governed by a single convention. Predelli (2002: 314) points out that one can write a note stating 'I am on leave today' to inform the reader that the author is away on the day of reading. But, if one writes 'Today the Dean is getting on my nerves',
then the note only expresses one's annoyance on the day of writing, regardless of when it is read.

Thirdly (although this relates to the previous point), imagine the following modification of *Office hours*:

*Modified office hours:* Ben and Joe occupy the same office. Joe is absent. As in the original, Ben sticks the ‘I am not here today’ note on the door (their shared door this time). Regarding his motivations, he might have done so either to help the students looking for Joe or because he did not want to be bothered by his own students. We do not know which.

As long as Ben's motivation remains hidden, there are no clear intuitions regarding to whom Ben's use of 'I' refers. If the example specified the first intention as being the case, then the clear intuition would be that he referred to Joe; if it specified the second, then the verdict would be that he referred to himself. In such sticky note cases, therefore, it cannot be the convention supposedly governing usage that determines the reference of the indexical written on the note.

In sum, it seems that it is not only the reference rule given in terms of use/production that is prone to counterexamples. Intentionalist and conventionalist reinterpretations of the notion of the agent of the context do not help either.

## VI. THE RESPONSIBILITY VIEW

Given the above, our proposal for the reference rule for ‘I’ is as follows:

RR (short version): The referent of the use of 'I' is the object (person) responsible for the speech act of which that use of 'I' is a part.

Or, more specifically:

RR (long version): The referent of the use of 'I' is the object (person) responsible for the satisfaction of the felicity conditions of the speech act of which that use of 'I' is a part as being the speech act of the particular illocutionary type.

This needs some unpacking. By 'felicity conditions', we mean something like the Austinian or Searlean understanding, *viz* conditions that need to be met for a particular speech act to be performed successfully and felicitously. Austin (1962) famously listed three types of felicity conditions: convention-related conditions (type A), actuality-related conditions (type B), and intentionality-related conditions (type Γ; cf. Oishi 2006). Type A requires (1) a general convention governing the type of speech act and (2) its satisfaction by a performance of that type of speech act. Type B demands that the speaker deliver the utterance
in the correct and complete way. Type Γ demands that the speaker possess
appropriate mental states (such as thoughts or intentions).

Searle's (1969) analysis of what it takes for a speech act to be felicitous—
i.e., performed sincerely and non-defectively—is more detailed. It involves, at
least, four different types of conditions: (1) propositional content conditions,
(2) preparatory conditions, (3) sincerely related conditions, and (4) essential
conditions. Type 1 imposes restrictions on the content of certain types of
speech acts. Type 2 specifies the circumstances of the speech situation that
need to be met and the speakers' required beliefs about it. Type 3 describes
speakers' mental states that are required for the sincerity of the speech act. Type
4 demands that speakers have the intention to perform actions characteristic
of the performed speech act. We are mostly concerned with Searle's analysis
here.

Consider the propositional content condition (type 1) for a speech act of
requesting an action A. For Searle, this condition states that one should only
request an action to be performed in the future. One should not request that an
action to be performed in the past or at the time of the speech act. Regarding
preparatory conditions (type 2), the requestee should be capable of performing
A, and the requester should believe that the requestee is capable of A. When it
comes to sincerity conditions (type 3), the requester should want the requestee
to perform A. The essential condition (type 4) requires that the requester intend
that the speech act function as an attempt to make the requestee perform A
(Searle 1969: 66).

RR contains the key notion of *responsibility*. The responsibility we have
in mind is brought about by (1) an attempted performance of a speech act
and (2) being held to blame if the felicity conditions are not satisfied.<fnref n="10" /> Some
felicity conditions concern properties of their addressee (as in the above case of
requests that require the addressee to be capable of performing the requested
action). On our account, this should not, however, be interpreted as imposing
any speech-act-related responsibilities on the addressee. In such cases, it is still
the author of the speech act (e.g. the requester) that is obliged not to direct
their speech act at an ineligible person.<fnref n="11" />

There are two further issues regarding the formulation of the meaning rule
that should be clarified.

First, it is natural to think that, in some cases, responsibility for the felicity
of a speech act is dispersed among several participants in the communicative
situation. Take the case of assertions made by a witness during testimony in

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ William Alston (1991: 60–1) introduced a similar idea, the idea that taking responsibility involves laying oneself open to blame. He considers this constitutive of performing speech acts in general.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Alston (1964: 141–2) discusses the difference between laying oneself open to blame regarding the satisfaction of certain conditions and actually being blameworthy when those conditions are not met.</footnote>
court. On the one hand, it seems that some responsibilities (having evidence for the asserted claims, and so on) lie with the witness. On the other hand, it seems that some responsibilities (e.g. ensuring that the testimony conforms to proper legal proceedings) lie with the judge (and/or other legal figures involved). This is where the ‘as being the speech act of the particular illocutionary type’ phrase from RR (long version) comes into play. In this case, the speech acts under discussion are assertions. Thus, responsibilities relevant to the determination of the uses of ‘I’ performed during the testimony are those related to the assertive nature of the speech act. They are not those related to the speech acts’ testimonial character. In other words, the referentially relevant responsibilities lie with the asserter—with the witness—rather than with judge (or anyone else, for that matter).

Secondly, it might be tempting to incorporate responsibilities or commitments that *result from* performing a speech act into the meaning rule. Typical cases would be commitments that result from making promises or assertions (cf. Brandom 1983). We think that this option is problematic, and that those advantages it does have are captured by our approach anyway. The problem is that commitments stemming from the successful execution of some speech acts (e.g. a command or an order) are created for the addressee rather than the addressor. This is clearly problematic for a semantic analysis of ‘I’ along the suggested lines.

Nonetheless, such commitments might stem from the combination of some felicity conditions (the commitments and the conditions would be like two sides of the same coin). For instance, the commitment to perform an ordered task stems from (1) the presumed authority of the addresser (which is a part of the preparatory condition for the speech act) and (2) the addresser's intention that the speech act should count as an attempt to make the addressee perform the ordered task (which is the essential condition for the speech act).

In the case of assertions, the asserter's commitment to defend her claim also originates from the preparatory condition and the essential condition. The former states that one should have evidence for what one asserts. The latter states that one should intend the assertion to represent a true state of the world. It seems then that even on our view one can (to some notable degree) capture commitments resulting from a speech act. This is achieved even if we incorporate into the analysis only, the commitment to satisfy the felicity conditions of making the speech act. This could also be employed when analysing certain atypical and highly conventionalized speech acts. These would include speech acts made in court on the part of minors, where a legal guardian uses ‘I’ on the minor’s behalf (we analyse one such case in Section VI).

On our view, felicity conditions tied to different types of speech acts naturally create social facts of responsibility, facts that are related to the proper execution of those speech acts. Such facts are essentially extrasemantic in the sense that
Let us now look at what predictions our proposed rule makes. It has no problem providing the correct prediction for typical cases of assertion in which the expected referent also plays the role of the speaker. Paraphrasing Searle (1969: 66), we can list the following felicity conditions for the speech act of asserting that *p*:

> The asserter should (1) have evidence for the truth of *p*, (2) believe that *p*, and (3) intend that the assertion that *p* counts as an attempt to represent an actual state of affairs that *p*.

These requirements seem to correctly predict the kind of responsibilities one has regarding the felicity of asserting, for example, ‘I am hungry’. Here, ‘I’ clearly refers to the utterer, that is, to the person bearing the pertinent responsibilities.

The above point can be clearly seen if we return to the doubt heuristic. Consider the following two dialogues (the first questioning the satisfaction of the preparatory condition, therefore AP, and the second of the sincerity and essential conditions, therefore AS/E, where ‘A’ stands for ‘assertion’), which are natural only under the condition that the addressee targets their response at the speaker/asserter and not someone else:

(AP) S: I am hungry.

A: Are you sure? Remember that you have polyphagia and you have just eaten.<fnref n="13" />

(AS/E) S: I am hungry.

A: Are you really or are you just trying to make me cook for you?

As announced, in AP, the satisfaction of the preparatory condition is questioned. In AS/E, the sincerity condition and the essential condition are questioned. These two dialogues are natural only under the condition that the addressee targets their response at the speaker/asserter and not at someone else. Thus, the doubt heuristic correctly predicts that it is the speaker/asserter who is responsible for the satisfaction of the relevant felicity conditions, and our reference rule for ‘I’ that it is the speaker/asserter who is the referent of the relevant use of ‘I’.

Things are just as simple with typical cases of other kinds of speech acts. Paraphrasing Searle again, the felicity conditions for the speech act of asking whether *p* are as follows: (1) one should not know the answer as to whether *p*, (2) one should want the answer, and (3) one should intend that the question counts as an attempt to get the answer as to whether *p* from the addressee. Let

<footnote n="13">¹³ There may be something pragmatically awkward about asking for evidence regarding assertions about someone's internal states. This example, and many others involving 'I' in the subject position, may therefore sound somewhat unnatural. That said, what is relevant is that the addressee's reactions would seem ill-addressed if targeted at someone other than the original speaker.</footnote>
us say that one asks a friend 'should I stay or should I go now?' Both tokens of 'I' refer to the speaker because the speaker is clearly responsible for making sure that the conditions are satisfied. Let us apply the doubt heuristic:

(QP)<fnref n="14" /> S: Should I stay or should I go now?
A: You know perfectly well that you should go given how late it is.

(QS/E) S: Should I stay or should I go now?
A: It doesn't matter, I know that you will go no matter what I say.

A's responses to the question sound natural only when targeted at the speaker and so the speaker is responsible for the satisfaction of the felicity conditions of the relevant speech act. Our view, therefore, correctly predicts that the uses of 'I' refer to the speaker.

Let us now return to the case of *Sentry*. Searle (1969) does not discuss felicity conditions for the act of surrendering. It should nonetheless be clear (at least in military cases) that one must have the requisite authority (like being the king or the president) to successfully surrender. Furthermore, sincerity demands that one should want to surrender. The essential condition might state that one should intend for the surrender to count as ending the war. Regardless of the details of the conditions, the use of 'I' in the sentry's utterance can refer only to the sentry's king. He, and not the sentry, is the only person who must satisfy the conditions of the speech act by which the kingdom is surrendered. The doubt heuristic nicely accounts for the contrast between the king's responsibility and the sentry's lack of responsibility. Consider:

(SP)<fnref n="15" />
Sentry (in the name of his king): I surrender the kingdom; let's discuss terms.

Enemy king: Does your king have the authority to single-handedly surrender your kingdom? I've heard there are constitutional issues about such matters in your kingdom.

(SP)*
Sentry (in the name of his king): I surrender the kingdom; let's discuss terms.

Enemy king: Do you have the authority to surrender your kingdom?
Sentry: No, I am speaking on behalf of my king.

(SS/E)
Sentry (in the name of his king): I surrender the kingdom; let's discuss terms.

Enemy king: Does your king really intend to surrender?

(SS/E)*
Sentry (in the name of his king): I surrender the kingdom; let's discuss terms.

Enemy king: Do you really intend to surrender?
Sentry: I don't, but my king does.

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ 'Q' is short for 'question'.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ 'S' is short for 'Sentry'.</footnote>
The above two pairs of dialogues show that there is a natural progression of the conversation in cases in which the enemy king assumes that the sentry's king is responsible for satisfying the felicity conditions of the speech act the sentry is performing. At the same time, in (SP)* and (SS/E)*, in which the enemy king wrongly thinks that the sentry is responsible for satisfying the felicity conditions, the development is natural only when the sentry corrects the enemy king's incorrect assumption to this effect. This illustrates how the sentry's king, and not the sentry, is responsible for the satisfaction of the felicity conditions of the speech act in question. As before, our view correctly predicts the king to be the referent of the use of 'I'.<fnref n="16" />

All of the above shows that our rule for ‘I’ accounts not only for typical cases of assertions but also other speech acts as well as for some atypical ones (as in *Sentry*).

To end this section, we shall discuss speaking in court on behalf of a minor who has no legal capacity. In one possible scenario, an adult legal guardian may be supposed to relinquish an inheritance on behalf of a minor. The procedure demands that the adult say, ‘I hereby relinquish the inheritance’. Our analysis of the meaning rule of ‘I’ is, we think, unique in that it is able to provide the correct prediction that the use of ‘I’ refers to the child rather than to the adult utterer, because a preparatory condition for the speech act of relinquishing an inheritance is that one be the legal heir of the inheritance. In this case, the demand is clearly on the child rather than the legal guardian. Once again, this comes out nicely when the doubt heuristic is applied. Suppose that the judge asks the adult whether she can prove that she is the legal heir of the inheritance. The adult would naturally reply that her legal status regarding the inheritance is not relevant. It is the child’s legal status that matters. This shows that our view predicts that the use of ‘I’ uttered by the guardian refers to the child.

## VII. DEMONSTRATIVE USES OF ‘I’

As mentioned, we think that some of the problematic uses of ‘I’ should be exempt from the reference rule. These cases should be analysed as involving demonstrative uses of ‘I’. One clear candidate is *Office hours* where it seems natural to analyse the action of attaching the note to the office door as constituting a demonstration aimed at fixing the reference of the token of ‘I’. A real-life example is when we see public buses displaying ‘I Am Ecological’ inscriptions (meant to convey that the buses are low-emitting vehicles). Here, the action of painting the inscriptions on the buses demonstrates the intended referent of the tokens of ‘I’.

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Compare this discussion with the Alston quotation in footnote 12.</footnote>
This idea is well grounded in the fact that the pertinent actions evince the four main characteristics of typical demonstrative gestures.

1. They are clearly intentional. They are aimed at conveying the intended referent to an audience via the action (or its result) of placing the token on an object. The object on which the token is placed is involved in realizing the intention to refer to the object the speaker wants to refer to.

2. The products of those actions—the demonstrations resulting from the action of demonstrating—are physically available to the audience at the time of their contact with the utterance. One can think of typical demonstrations as being composed of two parts: (1) the movement of the arm and (2) holding the arm out while pointing in some direction. These two parts can also be distinguished in ‘I’-accompanying demonstrations: (1) the movement aimed at attaching the inscription and (2) the inscription remaining on the object (similar to a held-out arm).

3. Like typical demonstrations performed via pointing gestures, demonstrations with the use of tokens of ‘I’ are ambiguous. When one points at a particular part of the bus, one also points at the paint, at the material the bus is made of, and at the bus as a whole. The inscription ‘I am ecological’ is likewise potentially ambiguous between referring to that part of the bus, to the paint, to the material, or to the bus as a whole.

4. Like typical demonstrations, demonstrations accompanying uses of ‘I’ have the potential to hold Nunbergian qualities (Nunberg 1993) regarding deferred reference. This is clear in *Office hours*. The note containing ‘I’’s attachment to the door serves as the demonstration. It fixes the reference to the person being in the contextually relevant relation of occupying the office pointed out by the demonstration.

The above four features can be brought out by *Modified office hours* from Section V. Recall that Ben and Joe share the same office. Joe is absent, and Ben sticks the ‘I am not here today’ note onto the office door (either to help Joe’s students or to discourage his own students from bothering him).

1. Regardless of the intended referent, Joe places ‘I’ on the office door to realize the intention to refer to either Joe or himself.

2. The demonstration—the presence of the note as placed on the door—is available to readers at the time of their contact with the message.

3. Placing the note on the door leaves the use of ‘I’ ambiguous between referring to Joe and to Ben.<fnref n="17" />

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ This description of the case remains purposefully neutral regarding the details related to the question of the reference of Ben’s use of ‘I’. The options are that his use of ‘I’ refers determinately to one of the office mates or it remains referentially undetermined between them. Regarding the former possibility, one could supplement the demonstrative semantic story with a further component specifying the person Ben intends as the referent. Here, one could adopt the</footnote>
4. The use of ‘I’ is to refer either to Joe or to Ben. Yet, the demonstration is targeted at the door (or perhaps at the office). This is therefore a case of deferred reference to an object remaining in a contextually relevant relation of occupying the office behind the door.

In sum, we contend as follows:

> Any utterance incorporating a token of 'I' that involves an action of placing 'I' on some object is demonstrative if that action evinces the four features mentioned above.<fnref n="18" />

This allows one to distinguish demonstrative from typical written uses of ‘I’ (such as those placed in diaries, letters, and the like). The key difference is that the latter do not evince feature 1 (and therefore also feature 3 and most probably feature 4). The action of physically placing the token of ‘I’ on (or rather in) a diary instead of on some other object has nothing to do with the intention to refer. The typical written uses of ‘I’ involve the intention to refer via the use of the token. In contrast, demonstrative uses involve the intention to refer via the *placing* of the token (or via the use of the token as located on a particular object remaining in a contextually relevant relation to the intended referent).

Our demonstrative approach fares well—and, in fact, better than conventionalism—with the mentioned cases involving an intuitive lack of reference, such as when the ‘I am not here today’ note ends up attached somewhere by accident. To press the point, let us again modify *Office hours*.

> *2nd modified office hours:* As before, Ben attaches the note to the office door. He does so intentionally to say something about Joe, who inhabits the office. However, this time, unbeknown to Ben, the note falls off the door and ends up in the trash bin.

Intuitively, ‘I’ referred to Joe as long as the note remained attached to the door and stops referring to Joe once it becomes detached and finds its way into the bin.

In *second modified office door*, the conventionalist will need to appeal to the existence of the communicative intention (or lack thereof) of the author of the note. This presents a problem. Ben is not aware that the note has become

moderate-intentionalist approach of Jeffrey King (2014) or Andreas Stokke (2010). Regarding the latter possibility, one would presumably claim that demonstrations merely constrain the set of possible referents in cases of demonstrative uses of ‘I’. The final referent is resolved via a further pragmatic or pragmasemantic interpretative process. Such a view would correspond to Kent Bach’s (2017) view on the semantics of demonstratives. It is also similar to Tadeusz Ciecierski & Piotr Makowski’s (2022) recent account of demonstratives and demonstrations. Attempting to resolve these contentious issues about the semantics of demonstratives would take us too far from the main topic of this paper. Nonetheless, it should be clear from the above discussion that our account of demonstrative uses of ‘I’ is compatible with prominent views on the semantics of demonstratives in the topical literature.

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Some may still doubt that placing a token of an indexical might constitute a case of demonstrating. In response, think of the uses of the demonstrative ‘this’ on online social media platforms. Such uses are often aimed at expressing agreement with comments or opinions located next to where the token of ‘this’ has been intentionally placed. This is done to mark what one is agreeing with (cf. O’Madagain 2021: 748).</footnote>
detached from its rightful location. Therefore, he surely still intends the token of 'I' to refer to Joe given that he has no reason to correct his mental states regarding the utterance. This shows that conventionalism's predictions regarding reference are wrong.

In contrast, our demonstrative approach seems tailored to account for cases of this sort in an elegant way. Our view predicts that the demonstrative use of 'I' refers for as long as there is a demonstration accompanying it. In *second modified office hours*, a demonstration exists only for as long as the note is attached where it is supposed to, and it ceases to exist once it falls off the door. This provides the exactly correct prediction.

The final thing to explain is how we can reasonably claim to be defending the idea of a reference rule for 'I' in the general methodological spirit of Kaplan (1989) while retaining a second demonstrative way of using 'I' that is not governed by RR. The answer is straightforward. Following Michael Bennet (1978), Kaplan thinks that some indexicals have demonstrative uses that differ from prototypical, automatic ones (e.g. 'in two weeks, I will be here [pointing at a city on a map]'). Thus, what might appear to be a departure from Kaplan's methodology is, in fact, an extension of it. His simple-rule approach prevails as long as the characters provided by the semantic theory apply consistently to non-demonstrative uses of indexicals.

## VIII. OUR VIEW VERSUS ITS CLOSEST COMPETITOR

We now discuss the differences between our proposal and its closest competitor. We judge this to be the view expressed in Dodd & Sweeney (2010). Like us, Dodd and Sweeney believe that some reference rule for 'I' can be defended by identifying the correct analysis of the agent of the context. For Dodd & Sweeney (2010: 345–7), the agent of the context is the object (person) satisfying the two following criteria: (1) the object is the initiator of the relevant expression of content (or the relevant piece of communication) and (2) once the content is expressed, it must be incorrect (or implausible) for that person to say 'I didn't say that'.

Furthermore, agents are contrasted with what Dodd and Sweeney call 'mechanisms of communication', viz. elements that play some role in the chain of events leading from the initiation of the expression of the content to its fruition. Such mechanisms can include letters, postcards, written notes, answering machines, speech synthesizers, and, interestingly, also other human beings. Such a wide understanding allows analysis of several cases discussed in the literature (e.g. the answering machine problem and sticky notes). It also allows the analysis of cases where one person—the de facto agent—asks another to act as a messenger (where 'I' intuitively refers to the initiator rather than
the speaker conveying the thoughts of the initiator, as in *Sentry*). Here, the messenger plays the role of a mechanism of communication.

We are sympathetic to Dodd and Sweeney's account, which closely mirrors our responsibility-view. That said, we think our view provides a more detailed analysis of the notion of the agent by drawing on speech act theory. The main difference, however, is that Dodd and Sweeney believe that they can successfully account for *all* uses of 'I'. We do not think that they succeed. One has to dissociate demonstrative uses of 'I'. This is illustrated in the following passage from Dodd & Sweeney (2010):

> If Mike, seeing a queue of people outside Sarah's door, uses his own initiative and puts a note on the door saying 'Sarah is not here now' he will express a proposition. Mike is the agent of the context in which this proposition about Sarah is produced. And, if Mike sees the queue of people and puts a note on Sarah's door that says 'I am not here now', he has certainly communicated something. He has produced a sentence. He has even communicated something potentially useful. But in this case there is no proposition expressed. When using the personal indexical 'I', a potential agent other than the referent can only be involved as part of the mechanism of communication. And the role of the mechanism is to carry out orders, not to have communicative intentions (346).

Attempting to unify all uses of 'I' leads Dodd and Sweeney to posit a robust semantic difference between the two cases discussed in this passage. Yet, the two cases differ only inasmuch as the former involves the use of 'Sarah' while the latter involves the use of 'I'. This difference is supposed to justify analysing the former case as involving the expression of a proposition (and treating Mike as the agent, as the initiator of the speech act) and the latter case as involving failure to express a proposition (and treating Mike as, at best, a mechanism of communication).

This seems decidedly *ad hoc*. After all, in both cases, Mike clearly initiates the communicative behaviour himself. He is not inspired, asked, or coerced to produce the message. As evident in the final sentence of the quoted passage, Dodd and Sweeney recognize that what distinguishes the agent from the mechanism of communication is the possession of relevant communicative intentions. In both scenarios, Mike clearly has such intentions. As mentioned, these intentions differ only in terms of the choice of referential vehicle Mike makes. In sum, we see no principled way of justifying the above claim of Dodd and Sweeney that '[w]hen using the personal indexical 'I', a potential agent other than the referent can only be involved as part of the mechanism of communication'. Dodd and Sweeney also try to defend this claim as follows:

> We analyse a variant of the king-sentry case similarly. If the king sends the sentry to say 'I surrender' but the sentry in his role as spokesperson says instead 'I will eat your liver tonight with fava beans', the 'I' refers to neither the king nor the sentry, for the sentry as a mere means of production is trying to get the king to say something he doesn't say. (2010, fn. 14)
We do not think this move works either. We see no tenable analogy between the cited variant of *Sentry* and the scenario involving Mike's use of 'I'. As mentioned, Mike clearly initiates the speech act himself (even in the 'I' version). The sentry, in contrast, retains his role as the mechanism of communication. He is a mouthpiece for his ruler (even if the words he utters might not match the script he was given). It is only the sentry's disobedience that exempts the king from the role of initiating agent, thereby leaving the role vacant.<fnref n="19" />

This shows that there is a limit to how far one can go equipped with Dodd and Sweeney's type of reference rule. The line that we drew between indexical and demonstrative uses of 'I' allows us to avoid the problems posed by cases like *Office hours* and Mike's use of 'I'. Not only does this shine light on where the view of Dodd and Sweeney falters, it also appears to nicely carve linguistic reality at its joints.

## IX. CONCLUSION

In and of itself, the diversity of formulations of the reference rule does not delegitimize every attempted formulation. From a methodological point of view, the logical form of the rule should follow the most robust interpretation. Authors such as de Gaynesford are correct that formulating the reference rule in terms of an agent who is the producer or the user of 'I' fails. We have offered an alternative that appeals to *responsibility* for a speech act containing the use of 'I'. As argued, this formulation avoids the problems faced by intentionalism and conventionalism.

To boot, acknowledging the existence of the demonstrative uses of 'I' means that our view does not face the problems we identified in Dodd and Sweeney's view. de Gaynesford may be right that no reference rule is sufficient to determine the reference of *every* use of 'I'. There is, however, no reason to believe that no such rule exists for *every indexical use* of 'I'.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The paper benefitted greatly from the comments of Dominik Dziedzic, Geoff Georgi, Paweł Grabarczyk, Katarzyna Kijania-Placek, Piotr Makowski, Maria Matuszkiewicz, Joanna Odroważ-Sypniewska, Carlo Penco, Alex Radulescu, Indrek Reiland, and Piotr Wilkin. Ideas presented in the paper have been discussed at *Indexicals and Demonstratives I & II* (University of Warsaw), *6th Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association* (University of St Andrews), and *6th Philosophy of Language and Mind Conference*. We would like to

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ The interpretation would be different if the sentry completely abandoned his role of messenger. He is, after all, able to make speech acts in his own name. For instance, he can order food in a tavern on his way to meet the enemy king, as long as he is not fulfilling his professional duties at that moment.</footnote>
thank the participants of these events for their comments. Additionally, we
express our gratitude to the anonymous reviewers for *Philosophical Quarterly* for
their valuable feedback.

FUNDING

Work on this article was funded by a National Science Center, Poland, Grant under award number 2018/29/B/HS1/01868.

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