Kanak joined the ranks of the independentists. What is inter-
esting is that the results also confirmed that the Kanak's drive
for independence has not waned despite the improvement in
their socio-economic conditions in recent decades and the
diversification of their social trajectories (inclusion into the
wage economy, increased schooling, urbanisation, etc.)
(Trépied 2018b).

In the aftermath of both referendums, the independen-
tists rushed to mobilise their supporters and were appeal-
ing to voters for the third referendum. One of the
challenges for the independentists was to convince those
who abstained in the 2020 referendum to vote – especially
those from the Loyalty Islands (Maré, Lifou and Ouvéa),
traditionally an independence stronghold populated
almost exclusively by Kanak.<fnref n="30" /> It was also certainly a
matter of trying again to convince non-Kanak to join the
pro-independence camp.

Taking into account the contextual elements described
here, one thing was certain despite the optimism generated
by the outcome of the 2018 and 2020 referendums and the
position that the Kanak have acquired in recent decades
within governance institutions: the path to full sovereignty
was paved with obstacles, and the Kanak could hardly
achieve this alone as they were 41.2% of the total popula-
tion, which translates into 18,000 fewer votes than non-
Kanak (Trépied 2018b). In addition, they were divided
among themselves on the issue.<fnref n="31" /> This has been the whole
point of a long period of reflection based around “common
destiny” in recent years (Faugère and Merle 2010; Graille
2018; Le Meur 2017; Salaün and Vernaudon 2009).

This is also, in my view, one of the reasons for the explo-
ration of an “Indigenous strategy” by a segment of the Kanak
population. For a number of them, given their demographic
context, it is a question of ensuring, at best, the recognition
and consideration of their customs and languages as well as
the existence of mechanisms guaranteeing their presence in
various sectors and institutions in tomorrow’s New
Caledonian society.

17.6 The New Era of the Nouméa Accord

The 1998 Nouméa Accord, “explicitly defined in its pream-
ble as a ‘decolonisation Accord’” (Guyon and Trépied 2013,
p. 109), has made possible the emergence of Indigenous

claims in at least three ways. First, by paving the way for
large-scale industrial mining operations as part of the eco-
nomic rebalancing between the provinces, the Nouméa
Accord raised unprecedented environmental concerns (see
Chap. 8 by Kowasch and Merlin in this book).

Second, by officially recognising “Kanak identity” and
strengthening the weight of customary authorities, lands and
law, it initiated a set of measures to promote institutions and
structures described as “customary”, including the creation
of a Customary Senate (Guyon and Trépied 2013, p. 110).
The Customary Senate – created by organic law 99-209 of 19
March 1999, to reflect upon institutional arrangements meant
to take into account Kanak culture (Demmer 2018a) – has
been behind a set of relatively new reflections and actions
within the French Republic concerning the promotion of the
teaching of Kanak languages and arts, the protection of intel-
lectual property rights over traditional knowledge, but also
the codification of customs in order to strengthen institu-
tional legal pluralism (Demmer 2007; Demmer and Salomon
2017; Horowitz 2012). It should be noted that “since the
1990s, civil litigation between Kanak of customary status is
decided by professional judges (almost all French metropoli-
tan) and Kanak customary assessors (...), who explain what
‘custom’ provides and judge in its name” (Trépied 2018a,
p. 66). The “customary status”, renamed by the Nouméa
Accord, was called “special civil status” before 1998. It cor-
responds to the maintenance, after the extension of citizen-
ship to the Kanak in 1946, of the civil status of “native
subjects” in colonial times.<fnref n="32" /> This “differentialist” project
(Demmer 2018a) was enshrined in the “Charter of the Kanak
People: A Common Foundation of the Fundamental Values
and Principles of Kanak Civilization”, adopted by a signifi-
cant number of officially recognised Kanak customary
authorities in April 2014, following a consultation process
led by the Customary Senate.<fnref n="33" /> In this Charter, the signato-
ries – notably “[g]uided by the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and by the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted on
13 September 2007” (Preamble, p. 8) – strongly assert the
collective rights of the Kanak people as New Caledonia’s
Indigenous people, and affirm their commitment “to work
for the affirmation of legal pluralism” (Preamble, p. 11). The
Customary Senate has thus become the rear base of the
Indigenous movement in New Caledonia.

<footnote n="30">³⁰Turnout was only 61.17% in 2018 and 74.72% in 2020. For an explanation for 2018, see Trépied (2018b). Internal divisions among independentists seem to largely explain the situation.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹There is indeed a stable “‘Loyalist’ Kanak minority” (Trépied 2013). But the independence option received strong support for elections from Kanak voters over time, with between 70 and 80% of the vote (Soriano 2001).</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³²For details on the *indigénat* regime that took place in New Caledonia from 1887 to 1946, see Merle and Muckle (2019).</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³On the consultation process that led to the adoption of the Charter of the Kanak People and the ways in which it sketches the contours of “legal pluralism” in New Caledonia, see Dickins Morrison (2016). The Charter can be accessed online on the Customary Senate website: https://www.senat-coutumier.nc/phocadownload/userupload/nos_pub-lications/charte.pdf. Accessed 19 Dec 2023.</footnote>
Finally, by moving FLNKS activists into elected positions and management – the provincialisation of the New Caledonian archipelago has given them authority over the North and Loyalty Islands Provinces through the ballot box – the Nouméa Accord has reconfigured power relationships within the “Kanak people” and Kanak political representation. In recent years, some customary leaders have been critical of elected Kanak officials, saying they lack authority to speak on behalf of all Kanak people (for details, see Demmer and Salomon 2017). This excerpt from a press release by Rhéébù Nùù in May 2006, when it was still arguing against Goro Nickel and speaking as the representative of the customary authorities of the far south of New Caledonia<fnref n="34" /> (see Chap. 8 by Kowasch and Merlin in this book), illustrates the conflict of legitimacy at work:

> Ask yourself the question: which elected official, which president, which mayor, which political party will be able tomorrow to stand up and say stop to pollution, stop looting our wealth when the damage is done and when the factory is operational? [...] The elected officials have a partial responsibility corresponding to their mandate. Chiefdoms and clans will be accountable in more than a hundred years to their descendants and future generations.

If the dissensions might have decreased during the period of the referendums, in recent years, Demmer and Solomon (2017, p. 131–132) note that some customary authorities overtly criticise the Kanak elected officials whom they consider incapable of improving the lot of the Kanak people. Some of them “are rather hostile to the struggle for independence, which they accuse of causing a ‘loss of young people’s bearings’, and more broadly of having questioned a certain moral and political order in the [Kanak] community” (ibid 2017, p. 131–132). The 2014 Charter of the Kanak People clearly affirms that the legitimacy of customary authorities prevails over the legitimacy of democratically elected authorities (see Preamble, article 55, and chapter 3). Internal splits, however, are nothing new, and the French state has exploited them in the past. Back in the 1980s, the “Great Chiefs” Council, for example, was promoted by the

French State and loyalist parties in opposition to independence. Some loyalist Kanak customary leaders were behind it: those who owed their power to the indirect administrative structures put in place during colonisation (for details, see Demmer 2016; Demmer and Salomon 2017).

## 17.7 Conclusion

The relevance of “Indigenous identity” and the “Indigenous strategy” in New Caledonia is a product of its unique colonial situation. Indigenous identity is largely relational and becomes – or does not – an attractive strategy in particular contexts of struggle. In the French territories of Oceania, the partial success of the Indigenous movement and the struggle for Indigenous rights are unique to the New Caledonian context. There is no equivalent in French Polynesia, for instance. French Polynesia’s history differs from New Caledonia’s in many respects. There is no such official recognition of Polynesian or Mā’ohi customs or of any kind of official “customary status” for the descendants of the Indigenous people. In civil matters, a large proportion of them have been formally subject to the Civil Code since 1880 and all of them since 1945 (for details, see Gagné et al. 2018). As I mentioned elsewhere (Gagné 2015, p. 389), in addition to the differences in timing, this may partly explain why the environmental concerns raised by nuclear testing in French Polynesia – in contrast with those caused by the new mining project of the 2000s in New Caledonia – have not worked as a catalyst for the formation of a strong Indigenous movement. This could also explain the very limited success in the political arena of people whose demands have centred on the reestablishment of customary institutions or the restoration of hereditary monarchy or chiefdoms, even if they enjoy a certain sympathy because of what they represent culturally. These initiatives are usually met with opposition since French Polynesians generally favour democratic legitimacy – beginning with the ballot box (e.g. see Gagné 2020, p. 152–153; Saura 2010, 2015). The exceptionalism of New Caledonia relative to French Polynesia also arises from its history of settlement, and the way it impacted on the demographic weight of the Kanak population in the archipelago through time. Kanak people now represents only 41.2% of New Caledonians. This situation is very different from that of the population of Indigenous origins in French Polynesia, which is almost 83%<fnref n="35" /> of the population.

However, even if New Caledonia as a political entity began as a settler colony, the context in which the Kanak live

<footnote n="34">³⁴As underlined by Horowitz, if Rhéébu Nùù was successful at first “in publicly winning customary authorities’ support for its activities and reinforcing its legitimacy through this association” (2017, p. 89), during 2006, customary authority’s support for Rhéébu Nùù began to erode (ibid 2017, p. 91). Customary authorities then expressed their disagreements regarding Rhéébu Nùù’s violent actions as well as regarding the ends the organisation was trying to achieve, since they fear that they could jeopardize the processing plant project altogether while “employment with the mining project would be in the best interest of the next generation” (ibid 2017, p. 93). Some even felt used. Even though Rhéébù Nùù succeeded in convincing the customary authorities to sign the “Pact for sustainable development in the Great South” in 2008, the disagreements persisted between Rhéébu Nùù and customary authorities thereafter (for details see Horowitz 2017, and chapter by Kowasch and Merlin in this book).</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵This percentage comes from the 1988 census, the last to have measured ethnic identity. According to this census, about 12% of the population is of European origin, and about 5% are of Asian origin, mainly of Chinese origin (see Merceron 2005).</footnote>
also differs radically from the context of other groups that are emblematic of the category “Indigenous peoples”, especially in the States of the former British Empire in Oceania. Specifically, it is characterised by the particularities of French national political history and by the demographic weight of the Indigenous population. Both in Australia and New Zealand, the relatively low demographic weight of the Māori people (17,4% of the New Zealand Population, Stats NZ 2022) and of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples (3.2% of the total Australian population, Census 2021) alone tends to make full sovereignty a solution that is difficult to envisage. This situation makes the path of the promotion and assertion of Indigenous rights all the more attractive.

To return to the third referendum held on 12 December 2021, the “No” to independence won a massive victory, with 96.49% of the votes cast, against a backdrop of a record low turnout.36 This was the result of the call for “non-participation” by the pro-independence parties in the face of the French government’s refusal to postpone the third consultation, as they requested because of the COVID-19 pandemic that hit the archipelago hard from September 2021.37 (see Chap. 18 by Fisher in this book) Because of its intransigence, the French state betrayed its commitments of more than 30 years to a peaceful and inclusive decolonisation, by organizing a referendum without the participation of a large part of the Kanak people. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the referendum, the independentists did not recognise the outcome as legitimate.

After what can be considered a failure of the self-determination process set up by the Matignon-Oudinot and Nouméa Accords, what's next for New Caledonia? As provided for in the Nouméa Accord, in the event of a third “No” victory, “political partners will meet to examine the situation thus created”. At the time of writing, discussions, in which the independentists finally agreed to participate, are currently underway with a view to arriving at an institutional project for New Caledonia within France. Negotiations took place in 2023 but are not resolved. The aim is now to establish a new status for New Caledonia by March 2024, but the possible unfreezing of the electorate body and restrictions on the right to self-determination are among the stumbling blocks in the negotiations. Does this mean that New Caledonia is necessarily done with independence? Will the Indigenous strategies end up being essential or could new convergences between both strategies emerge? Interestingly, until now, the struggles for independence in New Caledonia

have coexisted with the Indigenous strategy which, according to the UN frameworks on Indigenous rights, allows for the development of areas of sovereignty within the institutions of the colonial situation. It remains to be seen if and how this dual strategy of self-determination, which reveals a certain ambivalence concerning decolonisation, will influence the future of the Kanak people and of New Caledonia as a whole. Is it not even possible to imagine that new paths to self-determination could emerge?

**Acknowledgements** An Insight Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) made the research possible. I thank all the research participants who so generously shared their time with me for discussions and interviews. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer, as well as the editors of this volume, whose suggestions have been helpful in developing this chapter.

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<figure><img src="image_87.png" /></figure>
Abstract

New Caledonia has been under French tutelage from 1853. From the early-twentieth-century local parties have sought increasing autonomy, and some, mainly indigenous Kanaks, independence, culminating in a civil war in the 1980s. The 1988 Matignon-Oudinot Accords ended the violence and, together with the 1998 Nouméa Accord, delayed a promised independence referendum by 30 years, in return for increased autonomy with scheduled handovers of certain responsibilities by France, and more equitable distribution of nickel returns, in a common destiny across communities. The final, self-determination phase of these agreements is now formally complete, with three independence referendums held in 2018, 2020, and 2021. The first two votes, returning a slim and narrowing majority for staying with France, revealed the continuing deep ethnic divide over independence. A call for nonparticipation by indigenous leaders, after the devastating effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on their communities, widely heeded, effectively nullified the political effect of the final December 2021 vote, again favouring staying with France. Independence leaders are now calling for another vote. This paper reviews the historical context, the next steps, and key issues in the ongoing self-determination process, including issues engaging important geostrategic interests for France and, briefly, some implications for the South Pacific region.

Keywords

New Caledonia · France · South Pacific · Indo-Pacific ·
Independence referendum · Kanak · Kanaky

**18.1 Introduction**

The French overseas territory of New Caledonia has for-
mally concluded a long-promised referendum process to
decide its future after decades of compromises to end civil
conflict over independence in the 1980s, amidst continuing
controversy. New Caledonia alone of France's overseas pos-
sessions has a special sui generis status within France<fnref n="1" /> with
autonomies that are irreversible. This paper will examine the
circumstances leading to this special status, the self-
determination process currently under way to define future
governance, and the issues at stake for New Caledonia,
France, and the wider South Pacific region.

France took possession of New Caledonia in 1853 (the
following brief history is drawn from Fisher 2013 and
Chappell 2013). Missionaries were the first French residents
followed by the arrival of settlers and the establishment of a
penal colony from 1864 to 1897. Encouragement of free
settlement in the late nineteenth century saw the disposses-
sion of Kanak clans from their customary lands on the main
island of Grande Terre (see also Merle and Muckle 2019).
From 1887 an "indigénat" (native) scheme was imposed
confining the country's indigenous Kanak peoples to certain
areas and restricting their movement and economic activity,
remaining in force until 1946.

Nickel was discovered in 1874. Experts from other parts
of France and immigrant labour from then Indochina
(Vietnam), Indonesia, and Japan came into New Caledonia
to develop the resource. New Caledonia's reserves today rep-
resent at least 25% of world reserves (see Bencivengo 2014).

<footnote>D. Fisher (✉)
Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
e-mail: denise.fisher@anu.edu.au</footnote>

<footnote n="1">¹New Caledonia has the legal status of “pays sui generis”. The other French Pacific possessions include the “collectivities” of French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna and the uninhabited Clipperton Island in the Pacific, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Martin, and Saint Barthélemy. Elsewhere, France has five overseas “departments” with the same status as those in mainland France: Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana, Reunion, and Mayotte and the “territory” of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands.</footnote>
Apart from early indigenous resistance to French domina-
tion and a major indigenous rebellion in 1878, contemporary
local moves for more autonomy from France began in 1932,
initially by the locally born white settlers or Caldoches.
These efforts only developed momentum from the 1940s;
when in the early years of World War II, local personalities
challenged the Vichy Governor. During the war Nouméa
became the US South Pacific headquarters from which major
battles such as Guadalcanal and the Coral Sea were launched.
The presence and experience in Nouméa of large numbers of
Americans, including black Americans, heightened the
awareness of the Kanak people about what might be possible
for them. Some Kanaks could vote by 1946, with universal
indigenous suffrage introduced in 1956.

Early political activity coalesced largely around the *Union Calédonienne* (UC), a party of Kanaks and Caldoches, which was formed in 1953 from two indigenous associations created in 1946 by the Catholic and Protestant churches, respectively (the Catholic Union of Indigenous Caledonian Friends of Liberty in Order and the Protestant Association of Indigenous Caledonians and French Loyalty Islanders). The motto of the UC, which still operates today, was then “two colors, one united people”. Calls for greater autonomy were treated within French President De Gaulle’s larger post-war policy of forming a French “community” of dependencies, with a promise of increased autonomy. France, therefore, refused to allow its overseas territories to be considered as non-self-governing territories in the newly formed United Nations. Against the background of promised further autonomy, in a 1958 referendum, 98% of New Caledonians who voted (77% of the then 35,163 registered voters) chose to stay with France (Journal Officiel 1958).

In the 1960s, nickel exploitation was expanding, and the local people wanted to invite a Canadian company, INCO, to develop the resource. To counter this, France began to roll back some of the autonomies it had promised. It brought in French experts to develop the nickel industry and others from the metropolitan and other overseas French territories specifically to outnumber the local indigenous people, many of whom wanted independence. On 17 July 1972, French Prime Minister Pierre Messmer wrote to his Secretary of State for the Overseas Territories and Departments that indigenous nationalist claims could only be avoided if residents coming from elsewhere in metropolitan or Overseas France became the democratic majority (Sanguinetti 1985, p. 26; Tutugoro 2020, p. 13). There was a veritable waltz of statutes, with some 10 statutes introduced from 1957 to 1988, most restricting local autonomies and certainly not responding to calls for independence.<fnref n="2" />

By the late 1970s, the unitary UC had fragmented. Some Kanaks had formed autonomist parties (among them the *Foulards Rouges* (Red Scarves) in 1969 and the *Union multiraciale* (Multiracial union) in 1975). When in 1977 the UC supported independence, many Europeans left the party. In 1977, Jacques Lafleur formed the loyalist *Rassemblement pour la Calédonie*, which became in 1978 *Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la République* (RPCR, Rally for Caledonia in the Republic), and was to remain the principal loyalist party for decades. In 1984, a coalition of independence groups was formed, known as the *Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste* (FLNKS, Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front), which endures to this day, with the UC as one of its constituent members. Key related issues were pro-independence parties' concern about immigration and distribution of nickel revenues.

Tensions grew and by 1984, New Caledonia was in a state of civil unrest, a period euphemistically called *les événements* (the events). In 1987, an independence referendum was boycotted by the FLNKS because it allowed residents of only 3 years standing to vote. FLNKS calls for independence and protests accelerated and, by 1988, became enmeshed in France's national presidential election process. An attack on French police and hostage-taking at Gossanah (Ouvéa island) in April 1988, in between the two rounds of the presidential elections, led to a forceful French strike back on 5 May, resulting in the deaths of 19 Kanaks, 4 police, and 2 military personnel. Eye-witness accounts note the excess of brutality exercised by French forces engaged in the events at Gossanah (Fisher 2012).

## 18.2 Matignon-Oudinot Accords: A Path to Peace

Immediately after the French presidential elections, the newly re-elected François Mitterrand sent a mission to New Caledonia to end the bloodshed. The resultant Matignon/Oudinot Accords were signed in June 1988 by FLNKS leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou and RPCR leader Jacques Lafleur. Negotiations for these Accords were difficult. The agreements provided for a redistribution of economic benefits throughout the territory, beyond the wealthy mainly European southern area around Nouméa into the mainly Kanak north and islands areas, with specific provision for the north to participate in nickel production and revenues. They created three provinces, South Province, around Nouméa, and North and Loyalty Islands Provinces in the Kanak heartlands. Each province had an assembly, with representatives voted for by a restricted electorate, essentially those resident in 1988 and their descendants, who would also vote in an independence referendum to be held within 10 years. A training program for Kanaks, called 400 cadres, was initiated.

<footnote n="2">²The 1957 Defferre Law, 1963 Jacquinot Law, 1969 Billotte Law, 1976 Stirn Statute, 1979 Dijoud Law, 1984 Lemoine Law, 1985 Pisani Plan, 1985 Fabius Plan, 1986 Pons I Statute, 1988 Pons II Statute, each briefly summarized in Fisher (2013 Appendix 2).</footnote>
Support for the agreements was fragile, evident in the assassination, less than a year later, of Tjibaou by a radical FLNKS supporter.

The Accords presided over 10 years of general growth and development, but tensions remained. Both independence and loyalist parties were contending with extremists opposed to the compromises. In 1991, Lafleur proposed a "consensual solution" to head off an independence referendum, citing sensitivities and the risk of returning to war (Chappell 1998, p. 441). In 1993, the FLNKS took up the idea of a "negotiated independence" (Fisher 2013, p. 69; Mohamed-Gaillard 2010, p. 149). Politically both sides were experiencing fragmentation. The loyalist RPCR was dealing with splinter groups including the right-wing *Front National* (National Front) and the more centrist *Calédonie pour Tous* (Caledonia for All). The independence side likewise fragmented into a loose coalition, the UC-led *Fédération des Comités de Coordination des Indépendantistes* (FCCI, Federation of Independentist Coordination Committees), and including a new, mainly Wallisian *Rassemblement Démocratique Océanien* (RDO, Democratic Oceanic Party). Eventually all parties came to agree to the idea of deferring the potentially explosive referendum. The independence side hoped that with more time they could develop the expertise and experience needed to manage an independent New Caledonia or Kanaky as they saw it. The loyalists saw an extension as providing time for further development and re-balancing of economic activity in the hope that those who sought independence would come to see the benefits of remaining with France.

## 18.3 The Nouméa Accord: A Common Destiny

On 5 May 1998, the French State and leading personalities from the loyalist and independence parties signed the Nouméa Accord (Nouméa Accord 1998) extending the date of the referendum to 2018. An Organic Law was gazetted by France on 21 March 1999 to give it effect (Organic Law 1999).

The Nouméa Accord for the first time specifically acknowledged the Kanak people and their particular link with the land (Preamble 1) and stated that colonisation had attacked the dignity of the Kanak people and deprived them of their identity (Preamble 3). It referred to a New Caledonian citizenship affirming a common destiny for its people (Preamble 4), meaning that the Kanak people and all other communities, including long-resident European, Wallisian, and Asian residents, shared a rightful place in New Caledonia.

The principal provisions of the Accord were for the following:

* A Congress drawn from the provincial assemblies to be elected by an electorate confined essentially to those with 10 years' residence to 1998, every 5 years for the duration of the Accord, with a collegial government or cabinet

* A scheduled handover of a number of specified powers, with France retaining the five "regalien" or key sovereign powers (defence, foreign affairs, currency, law and order, and justice)

* A self-determination referendum process to begin in the final term of the Nouméa Accord (by November 2018), which would address New Caledonia's future international status, the remaining five regalien powers, and citizenship issues (essentially preserving employment and voting rights for long-term New Caledonian residents) (Article 5)

Uniquely for France's overseas possessions, New Caledonia has the power to legislate on its own in areas that fall within its powers, albeit subject to appeals to the French constitutional courts (Article 2.1).

The Accord was underpinned by "economic re-balancing" to address economic inequities. The related 1998 Bercy Agreement, building on an earlier engagement of the main Kanak North Province in the nickel industry, enabled that province to own a majority share (51%) in a new multibillion dollar nickel processing plant at Koniambo. At the same time, a massive new plant would be constructed at Goro in the South Province (see Chap. 8 by Kowasch and Merlin in this book; also Batterbury et al. 2020; Kowasch 2018; Pitoiset and Wéry 2008).

A share of the 150-year old nickel production plant at Doniambo on the outskirts of Nouméa was also granted to New Caledonia, through its Territorial Company for Industrial Participation. New Caledonia was allocated 30% of shares in SLN (Société le Nickel), the company running the plant, and 5.1% of shares in the French parent company Eramet. While this did not meet the 51% sought by the pro-independence groups, it was a beginning. Within a few years of signing the accord, New Caledonia's share of SLN rose to 34.1%. Eramet, owned partly by the French state (30%) and the French Duval Family (37%), currently owns 56% of SLN, and Nishin Steel Japan, 10%.

A further related undertaking was secured, at the demand of the pro-independence group, that France would acknowledge its responsibility to report on New Caledonia as a non-self-governing territory to the United Nations Decolonisation Committee (C24) as administrating authority (personal communication to author 2017). It began to report annually to the UN after signature of the Nouméa Accord and thereafter became subject to UN decolonisation principles, prescribing one of three outcomes: (a) Emergence as a sovereign independent state (b) Free association with an independent state (c) Integration with an independent state" (UNGA 1960).
## 18.4 Implementation of the Accord 1999–2018

The 1988 and 1998 accords have undoubtedly presided over 30 years of stability and, subject to the volatilities of the nickel market, economic growth in New Caledonia.

The fledgling new political institutions, based on collegial government, have generally worked well, although remain fragile, especially given the increasing fragmentation of both loyalist and independence groups since 1999. Five-year elections return provincial assemblies in the North and Loyalty Islands Provinces, which are predominantly Kanak, and the main European South Province. The Congress is made up of 54 seats, drawn from 32 of South Province's 40 provincial assembly seats, 15 of the North Province's 22 provincial assembly seats, and 7 of the Loyalty Islands Province's 14 provincial assembly seats (Nouméa Accord Article 2.1). The North and Loyalty Islands Provinces have remained predominantly Kanak and the political base of the pro-independence groups. The South Province remains centred on Nouméa and its surrounds and is predominantly European, although with significant increased inflows of Kanaks in recent years.

Over the first four elections held from 1999 to 2014, the pro-France groups retained the majority, albeit reducing, in Congress, with the independence groups correspondingly gaining strength. By 2014, of the 54 Congress seats, the strength of representation of the pro-France groups declined from a maximum of 36 seats in 2004 to 29 seats, with that of independence groups increasing from 18 to 25 seats in the same period.

The two main political groups became more divided, the loyalists seriously so. Lafleur's RPCR disintegrated into a number of different parties and coalitions. The 2014 elections (Government of New Caledonia 2014) returned the loyalists 29 seats; 15 of which were held by their largest party, Philippe Gomès' Calédonie Ensemble (CE, Caledonia Together). Their remaining 13 seats were held by a range of smaller parties including what remained of Lafleur's RPCR (renamed the Rassemblement-UMP (R-UMP Rally-Union for a Popular Movement, with just 5). The loyalist side saw various realignments and coalitions over the 20 years of the Nouméa Accord. As late as November 2017, a new hardline loyalist party (Sonia Backès' Les Républicains calédoniens, LRC Caledonian Republicans) emerged, which was soon to displace Gomès group (see Outremers 360 (2018) and below on the 2019 provincial elections).

The pro-independence FLNKS has remained a loose coalition, marked by the dissidence of elements of the UC, divided mainly on a north-south geographical line. A new small radical independentist party, the Parti Travailliste (PT, Labour Party) emerged in 2007. In the 2014 elections, the pro-independence side won 25 seats of which the UC/FLNKS won 15 (consisting of Roch Wamytan's core FLNKS

with 6 and the UC element, 9), the Parti de Libération Kanak (PALIKA, Kanak Liberation Party) won 7, the PT, UC Renouveau (Renewed UC), and the Libération Kanak Socialiste (Socialist Kanak Liberation) one seat each.

Such division put pressure on the collegial “government” which is the political Cabinet reflecting the proportionate party strength in the 54-member Congress. Members can decide the number of government members but have agreed on 11 members since 1999. From 1999 to early 2021, loyalists held the majority in the 11-member government. As the work of government picked up pace from 1999, necessarily demanding votes on key issues, inevitably a majority pro-France vote prevailed over the collegiality designed by the Accord. However, the proportionate composition of the Government demanded ongoing collaboration and consultation, a strong basis for discussion and cooperation in the preparation for the referendum.

Collegiality has succeeded in another way. While the fledgling institutions generally worked well, there were strains. Issues such as which flags to fly, nickel exports to China, and even the election of a president, at times caused the Government to be moribund for months at a time. Indeed, divisions over electing a president ground Government to a halt at the end of 2017, less than a year before the final referendum. The deadlock, caused by intra-loyalist rivalry, was broken, as in past ruptures, not by loyalist unity but by support from the pro-independence side. Such collaboration reflects the fundamental spirit of the Nouméa Accord and may provide a basis for productive consultation on the future beyond the Accord.

In addition to these political institutions, a critical element of the Nouméa Accord political machinery has been the generally annual meetings of the Committee of Signatories to the Accord, chaired by the French Prime Minister and usually held in Paris. The committee process, including a range of sub-committees focusing inter alia on implementing aspects of the Accord, developing the nickel industry in an equitable way, and more recently, preparation for the final referendum, has generally worked well, albeit with the occasional withdrawal of one or other member to express dissidence. Because the committee has expanded to include newer political leaders who had not signed the Accord, including numerically more loyalist leaders owing to the fragmentation of that side, it has been limited by the fact that it does not reflect electoral strength.

Despite the limitations, the Government and the Congress, and the Committee of Signatories, have been able to deliver many changes, securing the handover to the local government, and sharing, of many of the responsibilities as provided for under the Accord. Differences remained over many issues, including the handover of responsibility for land distribution, as well as the so-called Article 27 responsibilities. These were responsibilities for broadcast media, tertiary
education, and aspects of administration and control of the communes and provinces, which under Article 27 of the Organic Law could have been handed over with agreement of the Congress. By early 2018, it was clear that local authorities would not be able to agree on these transfers, suggesting that they will be part of the subject matter of negotiations defining New Caledonia after the referendum.

New Caledonia was also slow to take up some powers shared with France under the Nouméa Accord, for example, in foreign policy, where the Accord allows New Caledonia to engage in regional diplomacy and membership of some international organisations in its own right. Agreement on an Economic Arrangement with Australia and a cooperation agreement with Vanuatu were speedily concluded, in 2002. Thereafter, New Caledonia's external engagement stalled for years. Still, by the end of 2017, it was a member of major regional organisations including the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the Secretariat for the Pacific Community, many of the associated Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific technical organisations, as well as of the World Health Organisation and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. New Caledonia has had a diplomatic delegate of its own in the French Embassy in Wellington New Zealand from 2012. After years of dispute over further appointments, nominees have since been attached to French Embassies in Australia, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Fiji (Government of New Caledonia 2019). New Caledonia's External Affairs Unit was run by a French senior Overseas France Ministry official, François Bockel for 9 years to 2019.

The promise of more equitable sharing of nickel production and revenue has generally been kept. As noted, 34% of the revenues of the longstanding SLN company in Nouméa has been granted to New Caledonia, and 51% of the nickel project at Koniambo to the North Province Government. Dominique Katrawa, the first Kanak Chairman of the long-standing colonial company operating on the outskirts of Nouméa, SLN, was appointed in 2017. There has been investment of over $US 5b in each of two major new plants, at Koniambo in the North (Koniambo Nickel SAS 2020) and Goro in the South ($US 4.3 b. construction costs, (French 2009), with Vale committing $US 500 m., MiningCom 2018). Despite major technical problems at each site, and against the background of extreme volatility in global nickel markets, each is finally in production (see Chap. 9 of Demmer, and Chap. 8 by Kowasch and Merlin in this book). At times of plunging nickel prices, the French state stepped in with major fiscal support, shoring up confidence as the referendum date approached.

Despite the general success of the Accord in underpinning stability and growth, there have been some serious weak points. There have been ongoing concerns about the specially-defined restricted electorates negotiated under the Accords, which were fundamental to reassuring Kanak pro-

independence groups, fearful of being outnumbered after years of concerted immigration policies. The Nouméa Accord restricted the electorate for the Provincial elections essentially to only those with 10 years' residence to 1998. Within the very first term, pro-France groups challenged this interpretation, claiming that the real intent was for voters to have 10 years' residence to the year of each 5-year election (i.e. 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019). Pro-independence concern was immediate and bitterly expressed. It took years for this to be sorted out. Only in 2007 did the French clarify the interpretation via legislative amendment, in favour of the pro-independence fixed 1998 interpretation, and this only after loyalists had taken the issue to the EU and the International Courts of Human Rights, both of which endorsed the pro-independence view (Fisher 2013, p. 103; Chauchat 2007, p. 57) (see Chap. 17 by Gagné in this book). The lengthy process to resolve such a core issue raised concerns among the pro-independence groups about the good faith of the loyalists and indeed of the French State.

Another fundamental area of weakness in the implementation of the Nouméa Accord has been ongoing social and security concerns. Longstanding ethnic violence continued at St Louis, on the outskirts of Nouméa, involving Kanak and Wallisian groups, in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The ethnic differences at the time were controlled only when the French State resettled the Wallisians elsewhere. But the St. Louis area remains troubled, with ongoing outbursts of violence by local Kanak youth. The community occupies a strategic position, straddling the main arterial road between Nouméa and the Mont Dore dormer suburbs inhabited mainly by wealthy Europeans. Continued sporadic violence there, and in other regional towns on the main island, is symptomatic of deeper problems experienced by young Kanaks.

The most significant failure of the period of the Accords has been the inability to achieve full integration of many Kanaks, particularly Kanak youth, into the economic life of the territory. Forrest and Kowasch (2016) addressed issues of belonging and identity. Kanak young people living in communities find it difficult to succeed in the rigid metropolitan French education system that operates in New Caledonia, with consequent socio-economic disparity and ongoing ethnic discrimination (Kowasch 2010; Ris 2013), as basic as discrimination in employment, with young Kanaks paid less than Europeans for doing the same job (Gorohouna 2011). Dropping out, turning to drugs and to music and wafting between communities and Nouméa's squatter settlements is the fate of many, with some turning to petty crime. A visiting UN Special Rapporteur James Anaya gave a devastating account of the social place of Kanaks in his 2011 Report, even after years of implementation of the special "400 Cadres" training programme, noting.
“There are no Kanak lawyers, judges, university lecturers, police chiefs or doctors, and there are only six Kanak midwives registered with the State health system, out of a total of 300 midwives in New Caledonia”… “The Kanak people are experiencing poor levels of educational attainment, employment, health, over-representation in government-subsidised housing, urban poverty, … and at least 90 per cent of the detainees in New Caledonian prison are Kanak, half of them below the age of 25” (Anaya 2011, pp. 15 and 16).

Very little has changed since his visit. Clearly, Kanaks are involved in successfully running the North and Loyalty Island Provinces, although there remain numbers of French administrators. Kanak university lecturers and lawyers remain extremely rare (this author is aware of just three lecturers – Edouard Hnawia, Samuel Gorohouna, Suzie Bearune – and one Kanak advocate, Francky Dihace). Somewhat belatedly, at recent Committee of Signatories meetings and during the November 2017 visit to Nouméa by French Prime Minister Édouard Philippe, all parties acknowledged the problems in engaging Kanak youth, and committed to working together to address the underlying issues (Government of New Caledonia 2017).

Working on inclusiveness for young Kanaks will undoubtedly be a major subject of discussion about New Caledonia after the Nouméa Accord. But meanwhile, there was an escalating pattern of violence, mainly perpetrated by Kanak youth, involving burglary, stoning of cars and motorbikes, and even rape, against middle class Europeans and others on the outskirts of Nouméa and in major town centres (see Fisher 2019a, p. 12; La Depêche 2018). Independence parties condemned the violence describing it as being perpetrated by individual offenders and reject broad labelling stigmatising Kanak youth. By March 2018, the FLNKS was warning that the “Kanaky-Nouvelle-Calédonie” vision should not be undermined by the acts of a few individuals (FLNKS 2018b).

All of this made for a fragile underlying security situation as the final self-determination phase of the Nouméa Accord began in late 2018.

## 18.5 The First Referendum: 4 November 2018

The Nouméa Accord (Article 5) provided for an independence referendum process to begin any time after the election of the 2014 Congress, on the basis of 3/5 support of that Congress. The process involves the holding of a referendum on independence. If the answer were no in the first vote, a second referendum could be held within 2 years, with 1/3 support of the Congress, and a third on the same basis. If the answer remained no after three votes, the parties must dis-

cuss the situation. Thus, the process extended over years, with the remaining, most bitterly divisive issues between the major political groups that had been set aside for 30 years, front and centre.

Indeed, the independence and loyalist parties could not agree to initiate the process until the very latest time possible (April 2018), finally agreeing to a first referendum on 4 November 2018. Differences over the question to be put (which was the same for each of the three potential referendums) were such that only at a 15-hour marathon meeting in Paris chaired by the French Prime Minister Édouard Philippe could the parties even agree to the wording, which was: “Do you agree that New Caledonia should accede to full sovereignty and become independent?”

One consequence of the late agreement on the date for the first referendum was that local provincial elections became a distraction that hardened the positions of both sides for that referendum. The Nouméa Accord had envisaged that if the 2014 Congress had agreed immediately to initiate the first referendum, the 4-year process would have been complete by the end of 2018. New Caledonia would have been independent, or have decided on future governance after 2018, by then. In the event, with the first referendum taking place only in November 2018, to pursue the remaining processes, it was necessary to hold provincial elections in May 2019 to renew the Congress at the expiration of its 5-year mandate.

Local parties were positioning themselves for those elections in the lead-up to the referendum, in the knowledge that it would be the May 2019 provincial elections that would define the political balance for the remaining critical phases of the Accord. Just a few days before the referendum, some loyalists called for the cancellation of a second and third referendum and the restricted electorates, seemingly revoking critical elements of the Nouméa Accord (L'Obs 2018), and one radical independence group had earlier called for a boycott of the referendum because of allegedly inaccurate voter lists (Parti Travailliste 2018).

Because of the importance of the restricted electorate, the voter lists were themselves a sensitive subject, having been challenged for years by both independence and loyalist groups. The UN sent supervising missions to oversee the list preparation process in the 2 years before the referendum. France also made unique provisions for voters to appeal their eligibility even up to the day of the vote. To ensure non-contestability of the process, France invited UN and PIF missions, and over 100 international journalists, to observe and report.

In the event, the turnout for the referendum was a recent historic high of 81.01%, giving legitimacy to the result. For comparison, New Caledonia's turnouts for the 2014 European elections had been 27%; for French legislative elections, around 40%; and, for the previous local (provincial) elections, 69%. The result of the vote was 56.7% in favour of
staying with France, and 43.3%, supporting independence (Government of New Caledonia 2018b).

Many were surprised by the relatively high level of support for independence, as a number of polls (albeit with high margins of error and questionable samples) had pointed to at least 60% favouring staying with France (NC la 1ère 2018; I-Scope 2017). Some loyalist parties had predicted a 70% “stay” vote (Le Figaro 2018). However, the result is consistent with the trend in provincial elections since 1999, with the disposition of seats in the 2014 Congress 53.7% loyalist and 46.3% pro-independence.

The real shock in the results, for France and for loyalists alike, was the clear, overwhelming ethnic division, whereby virtually all of the pro-independence vote were indigenous Kanaks (see Pantz 2018). While some non-Kanaks may well have voted “yes”, one well-placed senior French official told this author that a map of the “yes” voting pattern almost completely matched a demographic map of Kanak areas (Private communication 2019). The “yes” vote to independence reached as high as 80%-90% in the Kanak heartlands (the Loyalty Islands and North Province’s north and eastern communes), and the “no” vote equally reached as high as 80-90% in some wealthy European communes in South Province, with about 26% “yes” votes in the communes around Nouméa with a Kanak population (Government of New Caledonia 2018b). The undeniable reality was that after 30 years of compromise, concessions, and power handovers, the vast majority of Kanaks, including the many young Kanaks who were evident in the televised queues at polling stations, had voted for independence.

This result was difficult for loyalists to accept. Some called for removal of the restricted electorates for the remaining provincial elections and possible future referendums. France speedily reconfirmed the continued application of the Nouméa Accord provisions in a Committee of Signatories meeting in early December 2018 (Relevé de conclusions 2018), although some loyalists maintained their opposition.

In the years leading to the first referendum, independence parties had paid great attention to young Kanaks, in community meetings and through travelling campaigns, to encourage them to vote and to support independence. They had also specifically courted non-Kanak islander support among Wallisians, Vanuatu and French Polynesian voters, even visiting Vanuatu and French Polynesia to urge clan influence in their favour. French Polynesian independence leader Oscar Temaru was in New Caledonia supporting the independence side in the campaign, and the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), comprising Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and New Caledonia's FLNKS independence coalition, also gave its support (Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes (LNC) 2018a).

The first referendum had the effect of heightening loyalist fears about the future. While voting took place peacefully, a major achievement in itself, as soon as polls closed, there were burnings of cars and buildings and blockades at the troubled Saint-Louis area but also in the Païta area along the main highway north of Nouméa, which involved throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails, and even shooting on police, by young Kanaks.

There was also a degeneration in an ongoing dispute at an SLN mining site at Kouaoua on the eastern coast, in the months before the referendum. Some young Kanaks disagreed with their elders over SLN activity in the area, for environmental reasons and because they claimed they had not been sufficiently included in consultations (Salenson 2018). They had engaged in numerous arson attempts on the pipeline at the site at Kouaoua for 2 years before the referendum. They imposed a blockade there from August 2018 until voting day itself, with independence leader Paul Néaoutyine publicly describing SLN as prone to blackmailing New Caledonia just weeks before the vote (Radio New Zealand 2018). Arson attacks there, and continuing petty burglaries and assaults on middle-class Europeans and others more generally, continued into 2019.

## 18.6 May 2019 Provincial Elections

Before a decision could be made for a second referendum, the scheduled May 2019 provincial elections intervened. These elections determined the composition of the Congress for the final self-determination stages under the Accord.

Loyalists were divided. The then largest loyalist party, *Calédonie Ensemble* (CE), ran on a platform of dialogue with independence groups to negotiate a new agreement that would obviate the need for a second and third referendum (Calédonie Ensemble 2019). The hardline *Les Républicains Calédoniens* (LRC) under Sonia Backès organised a coalition called *Avenir en Confiance* (AEC, Future with Confidence), drawing in many remaining loyalist parties, but not the CE, which had been a leading force in local and French political institutions since 2014. The AEC favoured bringing on a second referendum as soon as possible. While not ruling out dialogue with independence groups, Backès said that discussions would be “firm” and without “unilateral concessions”. In apparent challenge to Nouméa Accord recognition of the Kanak identity, she said that “no one community” should have an advantage. The AEC platform statement opposed restricted electorates (Avenir en Confiance 2019 and see LNC 2019c).
While independence parties had their differences (see Tutugoro 2020), they were able to agree on one list in the mainly loyalist South Province, gaining support there. However, the loyalist parties could not agree on single lists in either of the mainly pro-independence Kanak North and Island provinces. In the event, only the AEC won some small loyalist representation in the North Province.

The final outcome (Elections-NC 2019) reflected the serious lack of unity on the loyalist side. Their representation in the Congress dropped from 29 to 25 seats. Independence groups increased their support from 25 to 26 seats, for the first time winning more seats than the loyalists. A new Wallisian-based party, *L'Éveil océanien* (LEO, Pacific Awakening), claiming not to be aligned with any major side, won the remaining three seats. Reflecting loyalist concern heightened by support for independence in the first referendum, the more hardline AEC displaced the moderate CE as the largest loyalist party, winning 18 Congress seats to the CE's 7 (as opposed to CE's 15 previously). The two groups immediately said they would work together, although failed to do so 2 weeks later when electing a president of Congress (Radio New Zealand 2019), replicating the many unsustained efforts at loyalist coalitions over the last 20 years.

Independence leaders expressed themselves satisfied with the results, with Roch Wamytan (FLNKS) noting the low participation rate (64% in North Province) but indicating that young Kanaks did not generally vote in provincial elections, favouring the referendums. Key leaders Paul Néaoutyine (PALIKA), Daniel Goa (UC), and Roch Wamytan (FLNKS) retained their support bases (Fisher 2019b).

While independence parties maintained their representation in the South Province, and AEC won two seats in the North Province, loyalists did not win any seats in Loyalty Islands. Moreover, the three LEO seats increased loyalist vulnerability. LEO leader Milakulo Tukumuli claimed his Wallisian-based party was “French” but emphasised the goal of protecting the community spirit within New Caledonia (LNC 2019a). Independence leader Roch Wamytan noted, early, the inclusion of former independence supporters in the LEO (LNC 2019b). The kingmaking role of the LEO was soon demonstrated, when after a loyalist impasse over the election of the President of the Congress, the LEO cast its support behind Wamytan, who won (Radio New Zealand 2019).

European loyalist fears were heightened by strong Kanak support for independence in the November 2018 referendum, continuing social unease, and increased pro-independence representation in the Congress after the May 2019 provincial election at the expense of their own numbers. Their fears will have been reinforced by the stance of the hardliners who now had the ascendance in loyalist ranks and the power-broking role of the Wallisian-based LEO.

## 18.7 The Second Referendum: 4 October 2020

In June 2019, the newly elected local Congress, with the necessary 1/3 support, this time led by the loyalist AEC, duly called for a second referendum. There were differences over the date, the AEC preferring an early vote, in August or September 2020, and independence parties as late as possible. After initially deciding on September 2020, with the advent of the COVID pandemic, restricting movement and requiring the postponement of municipal elections, in May 2020 Prime Minister Édouard Philippe deferred the vote to 4 October 2020.

Independence parties, invigorated by their relatively strong showing in the first referendum and their gains in the 2019 provincial elections, campaigned actively. Their campaign was boosted with the decision by an extreme left component, the *Parti Travailliste* (PT Labour Party), which had boycotted the first referendum, to participate in the vote. Independence leaders decried a decision by France to allow loyalist parties to use the French flag in their campaign. However, independence leaders were able score points on two major territory-wide fronts: health and nickel.

In May, in an open letter, UC leader Daniel Goa demanded the removal of the French High Commissioner, invoking serious health concerns about the handling of the COVID pandemic. Goa accused him of siding with loyalists in the lead-up to the referendum. He accused the French government of ignoring local government powers over health under the Nouméa Accord, including by not closing its borders to the rest of France despite New Caledonia's COVID-free status, and variable application of local quarantine requirements, putting locals at risk. He likened France's approach to the mass deaths of Kanaks from influenza after the arrival of French colonialists (Goa 2020). The High Commissioner responded with seriatum rejections of the claims (Haut-commissariat 2020b), but Goa's letter had had its effect. In May 2021, the High Commissioner was replaced well before the end of the usual term.

Meanwhile, nickel once again became the subject of political activity. In December 2019, the owner of the large nickel plant in the south, Vale Brazil, announced its intention to sell. An Australian company, New Century Resources, was considering the purchase. In July and August, independence party leaders made public calls for local, New Caledonian ownership rather than foreign control. In September 2020, just weeks before the second referendum, New Century Resources withdrew its interest. On 10 September, independence supporters marched against foreign control of the plant. In a separate development, on 23 September, days before the second vote, young Kanaks blocked a mine at Népoui.
As in the first vote, independence leaders were supported by French Polynesian independence leaders and the MSG. Notwithstanding the effects of the COVID pandemic, the UN once again supervised preparation of voter lists in February 2020 and sent observers, complying with local quarantine requirements, to the October vote. Owing to COVID restrictions, the Pacific Islands Forum designated its members with local resident missions (Australia, New Zealand, Vanuatu) as observers.

On 4 October, the vote was held, returning 53.26% no to independence and 46.74% yes, with just 9970 votes separating the two sides (as opposed to 18,000 in 2018). The turnout was a massive 85.6%. The vote took place peacefully, although loyalist parties complained at allegedly intimidatory tactics at some Nouméa voting booths by groups of independence party supporters (Steinmetz 2020). The electoral commission subsequently reviewed their concerns but said that these activities had been unlikely to have changed the result (NC la 1ère 6 October 2020).

The outcome of the second referendum deepened division between the two sides and heightened loyalist concerns (RJPENC 2020, pp. 75–159; Léoni 2020).

## 18.8 Preparation for the Third Referendum: 12 December 2021

Preparation for a third referendum began in this deeply divided climate. Ongoing division within the loyalist camp compounded their growing concern at the trend of strengthening independence inroads into their political majority. Independence groups were re-energised by their consecutive successes in increasing their support over the first two referendums and in the local Congress after the May 2019 election. They were also conscious that this would be the last vote under the restricted electorates that have boosted their position.

Both groups targetted the 25,881 eligible voters who abstained in 2020, with a view to overcoming the 9970 difference in support for the two sides. The results of the 2019 census, released in mid-2020, added a new element, showing a net emigration from the territory for the first time. From 2014 to 2019, even before the effects of the COVID pandemic, there was a net outflow of 2000 people per year (ISEE 2020). If this trend continued over 2020 to 2022, the final deadline for a vote under the Nouméa Accord, a further 6000 departures could potentially dent the pro-France vote, since those leaving are less likely to be indigenous Kanaks.

Again, nickel management was an arena of political contest. After the withdrawal of Australia's New Century Resources from the purchase of the southern nickel plant, independence leaders in North Province proposed a venture

with a Korean company, which was opposed by loyalist parties in South Province, who favoured European investment proposals. At the end of December and early into 2021 protests and demonstrations took place, led by Kanak independence party supporters, including road blockages, and throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at police. These protests intensified, and protesters invaded the high-tech Goro plant offices, setting fire to buildings and destroying equipment.

On 2 February 2021, the two main independence coalitions withdrew from the collegial local Government, or Cabinet, citing inter alia concerns over the lack of implementation of collegiality and mishandling of the nickel plant sale issue (NC la 1ère 2 February 2021a). In the subsequent re-election, independence parties displaced the loyalists as the majority in the local Government for the first time. They were less successful in agreeing on who among their number should be elected president of the Government, grinding government to a halt for 5 months and requiring France to step in to pass a budget. On 2 July 2021, they agreed to elect PALIKA leader Louis Mapou, as president of the Government.

To address differences over the sale of the Goro nickel plant, French Overseas Minister Lecornu convened consultations with loyalist and independence party leaders in Paris. On 4 March, a compromise was reached, whereby New Caledonia would retain 51% share in the plant, with the shares of a Swiss-based investor set at just 19%, and a newly formed French company Compagnie financière de Prony, the remaining 30% (LNC 2021a). The change was a significant win for independence leaders in their push for local control of the nickel resource.

At this point, the independence side duly implemented Nouméa Accord provisions allowing for a third referendum. Independence parties held well over the 1/3 of Congress seats (18) necessary, and on 8 April 2021, their 25 representatives supported the call, but with all loyalist parties abstaining.

Independence leaders scored another political success on 28 July 2021 when their candidate for president of the local Congress, Roch Wamytan of the UC, won after disputing loyalist parties failed to agree over a candidate. This meant that for the first time, independence parties dominated both the Government and the Congress.

### 18.8.1 France's Role Organising the Referendum

France responded to the call to organise the third referendum amidst the growing confidence and institutional influence of the independence parties and disarray among the loyalists.
These factors, together with the decisive nature of this last vote under the Nouméa Accord, saw a more concerted effort by France to highlight the risks of supporting independence and thereby encourage voters to vote to stay with France, albeit while working for neutrality in overseeing the practical arrangements for the vote. France continued to exert considerable effort, so far fruitless, to encourage dialogue among all parties about the shape of New Caledonia's future the day after the Accord ended.

France has been in a delicate position as organiser of the referendum process (Fisher 2017b). The poor history of numerous statutes altering autonomy provisions from the 1970s to 1980s, the violence of those decades and the boycotted 1987 referendum preceding the calamitous hostage situation in early 1988 were all events closely watched and condemned by Melanesian and wider regional neighbours. The MSG was formed in the mid-1980s specifically to support the Kanak independence movement. PIF members had played a major role in having New Caledonia put on the UN decolonisation agenda in 1986 and subject to UN oversight, over French opposition. The UN was thus also watching, passing resolutions on New Caledonia every year since.

While clearly favouring New Caledonia staying with France, France has often had to play the arbiter when implementing the Nouméa Accord. It knew the referendums had to be seen as impeccable, for a durable inclusive long-term future shared by independence and loyalist parties alike, and to sustain international scrutiny to maintain support for France as a power in the region and beyond. Thus, France engaged the UN in finalising voter lists and invited UN and PIF observers and international journalists to the first two referendums.

While seeking to project impartiality (Fisher 2018), France toughened its approach from mid-2020. First, French President Emmanuel Macron replaced all senior officials involved in handling the New Caledonia portfolio. For the first vote, it was the French Prime Minister, then Édouard Philippe, who led the process. He personally engaged in negotiating agreement over preparations and to address key issues of governance beyond the Nouméa Accord, choosing to by-pass the regular meetings of the Committee of Accord Signatories, the steering group for implementation of the Nouméa Accord, but nonetheless engaging a wide number of party leaders. He initiated a series of dialogue processes with limited success, as various parties on occasion withdrew. In July 2020, Macron replaced Philippe with Jean Castex and also appointed a new minister for Overseas France, Sébastien Lecornu, the first Overseas Minister in 9 years who did not come from a French overseas territory. It was the Minister of the Overseas, not the new Prime Minister, who was charged with overseeing the third referendum process.

Lecornu took up his position in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. He visited Nouméa in October, just

after the second referendum, holding online zoom meetings while quarantining. He hand-picked just five independence and five loyalist leaders to meet, a smaller group than involved in Philippe's dialogue efforts, on the island of Leprédour. He had no more success than Philippe in maintaining the cohesion of the dialogue group. There was no conclusive outcome, and independence members, at that time protesting against the Goro nickel sale, withdrew.

Responding to the 8 April call for a third referendum from the Congress, Lecornu again selected a small group of leaders to come to Paris from 25 May to 1 June 2021, to consider the date of the vote, and discuss the “institutional future” and expectations of France in the period immediately afterwards, whatever the outcome. France’s most senior representative in New Caledonia, the High Commissioner, was replaced on 19 May just days before the meeting.

Immediately before the meeting, France also sought to shape public opinion in New Caledonia, focusing on the negative aspects of a yes vote (Maclellan 2021a). On the eve of the meeting, the territory-wide daily newspaper published the results of a survey the French government had commissioned, underlining that 94% of respondents saw the link with France as important, 43% opposed independence and 31% favoured it. The survey projected the departure of between 10,000 and 24,000 people in the event of independence, with a further 59,000 unsure about staying (in a total population of 271,407 people) (LNC 2021b). The daily also published a leaked, 46-page French paper detailing the respective consequences of a yes and no vote (see section on yes/no paper below). It highlighted in some detail the negative impacts of a yes vote, notably the significant loss of funding and French personnel, threats to French nationality, and flagging the departure of 10,000 to 70,000 individuals (LNC 2021c). Literally on the eve of the Paris meeting, another French government-commissioned survey was released showing that 66% of metropolitan French people favoured full sovereignty for New Caledonia. All of these undoubtedly heightened local concerns at the likelihood, and negative consequences, of a yes vote.

The meeting was difficult. Divisions between the parties were acute, particularly over the date of the final referendum. The loyalists wanted a vote as early as possible. They cited the two earlier outcomes favouring staying with France and saw an early final vote to confirm that result as essential for the sake of the economy and investment, which had stagnated in view of the uncertainties about the future. Independence leaders preferred as late a date as possible, in October 2022, to give them the maximum chance of securing majority support.

While UC representatives attended, senior leaders of PALIKA declined to participate, saying the agenda was “fluid and ambiguous”. This group had flagged in the past that it preferred bilateral talks with France. A senior loyalist
leader, Pierre Frogier, also withdrew, refusing even to con-
sider the idea of a date beyond 2021, for the final vote.

Some limited progress was made. Daniel Goa, leader of
the UC, signalled a change in position when he said the party
would consider partnership with France in the event of a yes
to independence (Goa 2021). PALIKA leader Paul
Néaoutyine had announced his party's consideration of the
option of "full sovereignty in partnership with France" in
November 2017 (later elaborated in PALIKA 2018). The
Paris group considered a French paper on consequences of a
yes/no vote, which was expanded upon after discussion, but
not released publicly. The paper was a discussion paper only,
not an agreed statement.

18.8.2 Declaration About the Future

A short declaration was agreed, setting out some parameters
for the future (Declaration 2021). Those present (and it must
be emphasised, as indicated earlier, that some key indepen-
dence leaders did not attend) endorsed working together for
a common future, with an 18-month transition period to fol-
low the vote. This was a compromise by independence
groups, who had previously proposed up to 3 years for tran-
sition in the case of independence. Territorial partition was
ruled out. In the case of independence, the declaration identi-
fied some immediate transitions (such as curtailed financial
transfers), longer-term transitions in sensitive areas such as
justice and law and order, and some access (not defined) to
double nationality. Efforts towards a partnership with France
were agreed, although heavily qualified as "without guaran-
tee of success". In the case of a no to independence, the right
to self-determination would remain, New Caledonia would
stay on the UN list of non-self-governing territories for the
transition period, responsibilities already transferred would
remain, and France would continue its support.

Most significantly for independence groups, in the case of
a no to independence, the restricted electorate, which had
underpinned their electoral success throughout the Nouméa
Accord period, would be “partially opened”. Details were
not provided.

The declaration noted that there would also be a “référen-
dum de projet”, or “programme referendum” at the end of
the 18-month transition period, whatever the outcome of the
third referendum. It is unclear what this “programme refer-
endum” refers to after an independence outcome. Such a
vote is understandable in the case of a no vote, against inde-
pendence, as it would be consistent with French practice, to
endorse in French law whatever future governance provi-
sions are agreed after the lapsing of the Nouméa Accord. But
in the case of independence, given the restricted electorate
for the third and final vote under the Accord, it is difficult to
see independence leaders agreeing to a further territory-wide

vote, where they would no longer benefit from eligibility of
longstanding residents only, to endorse independence at the
end of what would be likely to be a disruptive transition period.

18.8.3 Date of the Referendum

The meeting was unable to agree on the date of the third
vote. On 3 June, Overseas Minister Lecornu announced that
the date of the final vote would be 12 December 2021, over
the opposition of independence leaders. He did so unapolo-
getically, noting that the decision was not by consensus, but
lay within his statutory powers, and was taken to secure the
end of the Nouméa Accord (NC la 1ère 2 June 2021b).

No doubt one consideration for Macron’s administration
would have been the timing of presidential and national par-
liamentary elections in April and June 2022, respectively.
The tragic hostage-taking event between two presidential
election rounds in 1988 highlighted the potential for the
French political calendar to impact New Caledonia. Although
New Caledonia’s future is not on the national agenda,
national parties have links with particular local parties and
could take positions on a New Caledonian referendum cam-
paign, entangling the two sets of campaigns. On the other
hand, consequences from a December referendum could
conceivably impact national campaigns if, for example, a yes
outcome were seen as the “loss” of New Caledonia or in the
event of violence in New Caledonia.

It seems that the calculation underlying an early date was
that of a more likely vote to stay with France, and a prefer-
ence to hold the vote while the current administration was in
power. In this respect, the need to minimise the distraction of
other elections was underlined by the subsequent poor per-
formance of Macron's *La République en Marche* party in
French regional elections at the end of June 2021.

Independence leaders noted that the decision on the date
was unilateral, and they did not support it. On 23 June, the
Congress endorsed the referendum date, with loyalists vot-
ing for it and independence parties abstaining or opposing.
Leaders later referred to remarks by the French Prime
Minister Edouard Philippe after a Committee of Signatories
meeting in 2019, reporting collective agreement not to hold
any third vote between September 2021 and August 2022, to
separate the New Caledonian vote from national French
presidential and legislative elections in April and June 2022
(LNC 2021f).

18.8.4 Paper on Consequences of a Yes/
No Vote

On 16 July 2021, the French High Commissioner publicly
released an expanded version of the French document outlin-
ing the consequences of a yes/no vote. Here, French practice has again differed compared to the first two referendums. The French Government is statutorily required for such referendums to issue a document explaining to voters the consequences of their vote. In the first two cases, short non-controversial three-page papers simply setting out likely consequences, with equal space to each side, were published without fuss (Government of New Caledonia 2018a; Haut-commissariat 2020a). Since the second vote, the paper became a discussion paper, evolving into 40 pages by the time of the Paris meeting, and by July, a 101-page document. For this final vote, France wanted discussion and clarification of what local parties saw as France's immediate future role, whatever the outcome.

### 18.8.5 Earlier Work on Re-shaping New Caledonia's Post-Accord Future

France had already invested considerable resources in consulting local party leaders and reflecting on options for a future for New Caledonia after the Nouméa Accord. The French State formed two separate commissions focusing on legal and political questions, respectively. In 2013, two French jurists, Jean Courtial and Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien, prepared a report on the Institutional Future of New Caledonia as a basis for discussion by the parties. In this paper, the two jurists set out the legal consequences and requirements under four possible future options: full sovereignty, partnership with France, extended autonomy, and continued autonomy or the status quo (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2013). These options were consistent with UN principles (UNGA 1960).

The French State also set up a commission, from 2015, headed by a founding negotiator of the Matignon and Nouméa Accords, Alain Christnacht. The commission made numerous visits to New Caledonia, to listen to all political parties both on a round-table and one-on-one basis, in order to identify the principal areas of agreement and of difference.

Christnacht's report noted that all parties agreed on maintaining the current three provinces, albeit with pro-independence groups wanting a separate election for members of the territory-wide Congress (currently determined by members of the provincial assemblies) (Christnacht 2016). Pro-independence groups and some pro-France groups wanted the more grassroots communes to belong to the New Caledonian government rather than to be run by the French State as is currently the case. All groups favoured continuing the current collegial system of “gouvernement”, or Cabinet, with membership proportionate to party representation in the Congress. One pro-France group supported a majority supplement to boost the representation of the major-

ity party, and one pro-independence group wanted to include a member of the Customary Senate.

All parties supported continued economic re-balancing between the mainly European south and the mainly Kanak North and Loyalty Islands provinces, although pro-France groups wanted an adjustment of the formula of Congress seats to reflect better the influx of people into the south.

Significant differences centred on citizenship (see Chap. 20 by Robertson in this book), with pro-independence groups favouring full nationality and pro-France groups preferring a New Caledonian citizenship within France. But even here, all groups agreed on a “clear and accessible citizenship” to replace the current (temporary) fixed definition of citizenship limiting the number of those who could vote in provincial elections.

On the five key sovereign powers (defence, foreign affairs, currency, justice, and law and order), which remain with France currently, unsurprisingly, differences were wide. Pro-independence groups wanted to create a new state that would then decide on what partner might take up these powers, whether it be France or some other state, inspired by assassinated leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou, who said a fundamental demand was the “right to choose with whom we shall be interdependent” (Tjibaou 1996 transl. 2005, p. 66). Pro-France groups instead preferred a sharing with France of such powers as foreign affairs, justice, and public order, with guarantees on public freedom.

Christnacht found some agreement on defining common New Caledonian values, drawing on both Christian and Melanesian traditions. The team drafted a seven-page Charter of Values that could shape any new arrangement. However, in 2018 when a Dialogue on the Future Group set up by French Prime Minister Édoaurd Philippe prepared a Draft Charter of Caledonian Values (Charte des valeurs calédoniennes 2018), it was rejected by the hardest-line loyalists who later formed the AEC, now the dominant loyalist group in the local Congress.

Another statement that may underpin future discussion on the independence side is the Charter of Kanak Values agreed by customary (Kanak) leaders in 2014 (Charte du Peuple Kanak 2014). For their part, in 2018 the FLNKS presented an updated version of their proposal for Kanaky-New Caledonia (FLNKS 2018a).

### 18.8.6 The July 2021 Yes/No Argument

France's yes/no paper released in July 2021 (Ministère des Outre-mer 2021), 6 months before the final vote, appeared to be at the least unbalanced. It included 41 pages of detailed consequences of a yes to independence, as opposed to just 10 pages in the case of a no vote, with a further 44 pages of detailed annexes, principally related to a yes vote. The yes
section consisted entirely of precise detail of multifarious aspects of governance, specifying financial support from France that would need to be met somehow once withdrawn and projecting the numbers of personnel and others who would depart an independent New Caledonia. The areas covered include health, education and land management, together with significant sovereignty powers not yet delegated, such as defence, foreign affairs, currency, law and order and justice. Options and questions around the sensitive issue of the future of French (and EU) nationality were raised. Discussion points after each section raised questions about how the new state would operate the existing programmes and flagged the need for special bilateral negotiations and treaties with France for programmes to continue. While the paper claimed to be spelling out implications for the French State after a vote, nonetheless in its repeated references to negotiating links with France, it bordered on the prescriptive for a newly independent country.

Annexes presented various consequences of independence for French nationality; analogous arrangements made in other territories on independence, albeit in different conditions, such as Comoros and even Algeria (which became independent only after years of blood war); a paper on currency presenting only the options of a new currency or continued attachment to a French Pacific currency and the euro, with no mention of adopting an existing alternative currency such as the $US, $A or $NZ; and 10 pages of further financial detail about the 1.5 billion € French support granted to New Caledonia annually that would be withdrawn, followed by a brief list of the far lower amounts (in the millions or tens of millions at most) granted to now-independent territories under France's aid programme. Vanuatu was cited, to whom France gave aid worth 3.16 m. euros in 2019.

The no section flagged in general terms the need, notwithstanding the irreversibility of transfers of powers under the Nouméa Accord, to address, on its lapsing, necessary future changes. It noted that the restricted electorates and employment protection for longstanding residents would be incompatible with the French constitution after the Accord expired and that parties would need to redefine voter eligibility and employment rights consistent with the French constitution and international treaty commitments. The no section only briefly referred to these and other complex, fundamental areas needing to be addressed, including the very continuation of the existing governance institutions themselves (e.g. the Congress, provincial assemblies), the current collegiality of the executive, and the distribution of responsibilities between territory and provincial governments. No detailed options were presented. It flagged possible new transfers of responsibilities, including so-called Article 27 responsibilities (tertiary education, media and local administration) which could already have been handed over but on which local parties had not been able to agree. It referred to a con-

tinued right of self-determination and role for the UN at least in the transition period.

What is clear from the yes/no paper is that regardless of the outcome of the December referendum, extensive negotiations were foreshadowed in the subsequent 18-month transition period, between local political leaders and France. While the referendum question was formally “Do you want New Caledonia to accede to full sovereignty and become independent?”, the paper in fact posited a choice for voters between independence with a network of partnerships with France, or staying with France with re-negotiated governance provisions.

Since the paper was released, the territory-wide daily newspaper regularly released articles highlighting in detail consequences of a yes vote in sensitive areas (potential effects on French citizenship, higher education and health).

### 18.8.7 Reaction of Loyalist and Independence Leaders to the Yes/No Document

Loyalist parties endorsed the document. At a meeting in August 2021, they decided to unite under a new banner, *Voix du Non* (Voices for No). They extolled the virtues of the yes/ no paper which, they said, would “make the difference” (LNC 2021d). Christopher Gygès, director of the campaign, said that they would be focusing on those who had abstained, the undecided and newly registered voters, armed with the yes/no document to convince voters. The loyalist-led South Province said it would post the paper in every letterbox in the province.

While the major independence groups within the FLNKS coalition initially in principle welcomed the “partnership with France” aspect of the paper’s yes section, consistent with their support for an ongoing relationship with France after independence, independence leaders at a meeting of the FLNKS Congress in August slammed the yes/no document as favouring the loyalist position (FLNKS 2021a). Roch Wamytan said that the FLNKS coalition “did not want to reject France, it is a great nation. We simply want to change our links, our relationship with her”. However, various FLNKS leaders referred to the “destabilising actions by the administering state during this last stage of the Nouméa Accord” through the “taking of sides in the yes/no document which is nothing more than an indictment against the yes case”. A leader of a more extreme group, the *Union syndicale des travailleurs Kanak et Expoités* (Federation of Unions of Kanak and exploited workers), referred to the French government’s “sinister moves… This document produced by the State, against the yes, reveals its support of the no and its undeniable support of the loyalists in this campaign” (LNC 2021e).

FLNKS Spokesman Daniel Goa called for unity to respond to the challenges put by France in the document.
Anthony Lecren (UC) referred to the document as “no more
nor less than propaganda for the no”. He said that a number
of working groups were considering questions raised in the
document and would respond. Other teams were working on
the FLNKS’ own version of a yes document.

18.8.8 The Vote and France's Security
Guarantee

France, at the highest level, just months before the vote, also
sought to underline the potential effect on New Caledonia’s
security should it, or others of France’s territories, vote for
independence.

In the preceding two referendums, external security high-
lighting the threat of a rising China in the region to any inde-
pendent small island government had played a role. Indeed,
President Macron had opened the referendum campaign for
the first vote in 2018 when he visited New Caledonia by
defining for the first time his Indo-Pacific vision for France,
in which he based France's claim in the Indo-Pacific squarely
on its territorial sovereignty in the two oceans. But he also
directly raised the threat of a hegemonic China (Macron
2018).

The theme was enthusiastically taken up by loyalist lead-
ers in the final weeks of the three referendum campaigns,
warning of the risks of China taking France's place if the
independence side won. For example, loyalist leader Philippe
Gomès suggested New Caledonia was at risk of becoming a
Chinese colony in the event of independence (LNC 2020).

Before the third vote, on 29 July 2021, during a visit to French Polynesia, President Macron gave a speech (Macron 29 July 2021a). While the purpose of his visit was to address outstanding issues relating to French compensation for victims of its nuclear testing there from the 1970s to the 1990s, the timing of the visit and key elements of his speech were designed to send a clear message about security to New Caledonia, to the other French territories, and indeed to the rest of the region.

Early in his speech he expressed great confidence in New
Caledonia's future, "in their capacity to pursue the dialogue
which had begun 30 years ago". Referring to the 12 December
vote, he noted that the document he had commissioned to
clarify the choice between independence or staying with
France had been "discussed for the first time and made pub-
lic". Taking up a comment he had made when opening the
first referendum campaign in Nouméa in May 2018 (see
France in the region section below), he repeated that "France
will be less beautiful without New Caledonia". He said that
before June 2023 (the end of the 18-month transition period),
new sustainable institutions would need to be constructed,
for a future which must remain a common one.

After reviewing France's support for French Polynesia in
his speech, Macron lingered on the crucial role of that terri-

tory, through past nuclear testing there, in ensuring France's
nuclear deterrence capability, which he said well served both
France and French Polynesia.

He concluded by referring to his Indo-Pacific strategy in
which French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Wallis and
Futuna played “an essential part”. France was an Indo-Pacific
power, he said, and after years of seeing its overseas territo-
ries as sources of confrontation, France now appreciated the
unique opportunity to be at the heart of zones where “the
world was being made”. In the Pacific “confrontation
between the two major global powers was playing out”.

He warned “Woe betide the small, woe betide the iso-
lated”, who were facing influence and attacks from “hege-
monic powers who will come for their fish, their technology,
their economic resources”. He said that “to be French here,
in this context, is an opportunity… For we have an Indo-
Pacific plan”, which would protect them, including through
partnerships France had built with allies including Australia
(“an essential partner”), New Zealand, India, and Japan. “Let
us tie ourselves to the mast and hold on”.

The China threat was also invoked by the publication, just
before the third referendum, of a small section on New
Caledonia, of a massive 646-page report by France's Military
Research Institute on China's activities in France (IRSEM
2021). The comments on New Caledonia were prominently
publicised. They warned that an independent New Caledonia
would be under Chinese influence, and part of a broader
Chinese strategy in the Pacific, highlighting independence
party engagement in the local Sino-Caledonian society.

Whereas the China threat has been used politically by
loyalists and France in the referendum campaigns, this
should not be misunderstood as the independent side favour-
ing Chinese engagement in New Caledonia (Morini 2022).
Roch Wamytan responded to Macron's 2018 introduction of
an Indo Pacific policy by noting that independence groups
had pursued a regional concept for New Caledonia for years
and that New Caledonia had a place in the region regardless
of whether it stayed French or became independent (LNC
2018b). In December 2021, responding to news reports
focusing on China's interest in New Caledonia, senior UC
official Johanito Wamytan said: "We know that China, like
Russia, once they penetrate the space, it is difficult to get
them out, we know that, we're not stupid. We can make
choices" (France Info 2021).

18.8.9 Impact of COVID: Independence
Leaders' Call for Postponement, Then
Non-participation

Preparation for the third referendum, as for the second, took
place during the COVID pandemic. The pandemic had little
impact on the referendum campaign before early September
2021, although on 12 August France banned entry into the
territory except for those residents being repatriated and visits other than for undefined "motifs impérieux" (compelling reasons) until 31 December, effectively restricting visits from outside New Caledonia until after the third vote.

Owing to strong local measures taken and good compliance, New Caledonia had not experienced any mortalities from COVID to early September 2021. Then, the delta variant of COVID started to have a serious effect, resulting in deaths. By October, deaths exceeded 200 (of a population of 270,000), many, indeed most, in Kanak areas. On 4 October, independence leaders requested a postponement of the vote on the basis of the impact of the many deaths from COVID-19 in their community and their cultural practice involving lengthy mourning ceremonies of up to 12 months, impeding the capacity to campaign and vote (FLNKS 2021b).

The call for postponement was supported by numerous regional Pacific dignitaries, including Polynesian independence leader Oscar Temaru, Vanuatu's Prime Minister Loughman and several former leaders of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia who wrote a letter to President Macron (Maclellan 2021b). The PNG Ambassador to the UN publicly sought postponement on behalf of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (World Today 2021). Pacific leaders emphasised the need to respect indigenous wishes and the need for fairness and credibility.

Overseas Minister Lecornu visited New Caledonia in October, a direct French intervention not seen in the lead-up to the first two referendums. He listened to all views. Still, France decided to proceed with the 12 December date for the vote (LNC 2021g). Independence leaders then called for peaceful non-participation in the referendum (FLNKS 2021c). They took pains to eschew the term "boycott" with its resonance of the 1987 vote and its disastrous consequences. On 10 December, independence leader Roch Wamytan briefed a specially convened meeting of the UN Decolonisation Committee on the reasons for the call for non-participation.

## 18.8.10 Result of Third Referendum

The vote was duly held on 12 December. It was conducted peacefully, with pro-independence mayors quietly organising polls in their areas, as instructed by independence leaders when they made the call for calm non-participation. The turnout was 43.87%, almost half that of the previous two referendums. The exceedingly low turnout in Kanak areas indicated that the non-participation call was heeded by independence supporters (Pantz 2021). Unsurprisingly, the vote returned a minuscule support for independence: only 3.5%, with 96.5% support for staying with France. The low turnout and virtually nil support for independence, in their dramatic departure from the trends of the first two referendums (see Table 18.1), effectively nullified the political effect of the third vote (Pantz 2021; Kowasch et al. 2022).

<table><caption>Table 18.1 Results of the three referendums on independence</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>2018</th><th>2020</th><th>2021</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Eligible voters</td><td>174,165</td><td>180,799</td><td>184,364</td></tr><tr><td>Number voting</td><td>141,099</td><td>154,918</td><td>80,899</td></tr><tr><td>Turnout</td><td>81.01%</td><td>85.69%</td><td>43.87%</td></tr><tr><td>Votes for staying with France</td><td>78,734</td><td>81,503</td><td>75,720</td></tr><tr><td>Percentage for staying with France</td><td>56.67%</td><td>53.26%</td><td>96.50%</td></tr><tr><td>Votes for independence</td><td>60,199</td><td>71,533</td><td>2747</td></tr><tr><td>Percentage for independence</td><td>43.33%</td><td>46.74%</td><td>3.50%</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Résultats définitifs des consultations de 2018, 2020 et 2021 at nouvelle-caledonie.gouv.fr

## 18.8.11 Reactions to the Referendum Result

Independence parties rejected the referendum result and declined to participate in discussions with anti-independence leaders. They said they would only discuss future arrangements with a renewed French administration and, then, only after national presidential elections in April 2022 (Comité stratégique indépendantiste de non-participation 2021). Since independence parties had invoked a 12-month mourning period from the time of the effect of COVID-19 deaths (9 September 2021) as the principal reason for their non-participation on 12 December, they would be unlikely to engage in formal discussion or other major political activity locally before September 2022.

Independence leaders have asked for a further referendum. Palika proposed a new vote under UN auspices, saying they will not accept yet another statute or agreement (LNC 2022a). The UC called for a fourth referendum and the continuation of restricted electorates (NC la 1ere 2022a).

For their part, the anti-independence groups have claimed their third victory, indicating their preparedness for discussions while agreeing that discussions would not be optimal during national presidential or legislative campaigns, i.e. before June 2022 (Backès 2021). They saw the independence parties as instrumentalising Kanak cultural practices to undermine the referendum which, in the anti-independence view, they could not win after a turbulent year of violence over the nickel resource causing a collapse of the government and delays in reinstating it and the evident critical role of France in managing the COVID pandemic (Personal communication by senior loyalist signatory to Nouméa Accord, December 2021). Since the vote, anti-independence parties have organised meetings with civil society (which have not included independence groups) to plan for a common future.

France has, like the loyalists, presented the result as voters "freely deciding" to stay within the Republic. Initially, President Macron said that voters had "massively" pronounced against acceding to full sovereignty and indepen-
dence, albeit “in a context of strong abstention” (Macron 2021b).

Since then, he has simply claimed that the three referen-
dums supported staying with France (NC la 1ère 2022b,
Macron 2023). He promoted Overseas Minister Lecornu to
become Defence Minister. Minister for Interior Gérald
Darmanin took over the handling of New Caledonia. He also
appointed hardline loyalist Sonia Backès to a national minis-
terial position as Secretary of State for Citizenship, to the
bitter criticism of independence leaders (LNC 2022b).

18.9 Next Steps

New Caledonia appears to be at an impasse. Independence leaders want a further independence vote and refuse discussions with loyalists. They are wary of France after its disregard for their cultural and other concerns and its clear efforts to shape the result of the third vote. Among loyalists there is fear and concern about the gathering political weight of the pro-independence side, as shown in Congress, in the nickel arena, in the first two referendum outcomes and in the strong indigenous heeding of the call for non-participation in the third referendum. Positions, already polarised, have hardened.

While the local Congress, now dominated by the indepen-
dence side and with an independence leader as president,
continues to operate even as the Nouméa Accord upon which
it is based has technically expired, it has become increas-
ingly dysfunctional since the third referendum. Loyalists
abstained on the budget and withdrew from some govern-
ment (cabinet) meetings in March 2022.

The Nouméa Accord provides for discussions of the situ-
ation obtaining after any three votes favouring staying with
France (Article 5). Although the Accord provided for the
irreversibility of powers already transferred by France to
New Caledonia, other aspects of the Accord have now lapsed.
These include the governance institutions themselves, their
composition and powers, and even their mode of election,
with restricted voter eligibility again a major question.

Since December 2021 to the time of writing, the French government has unsought unsuccessfully to convene numerous dialogues to secure agreement about future governance, or at least to alterations to the restricted electorate to enable provincial elections by May 2024, including by threatening to impose a solution if parties could not agree (see LNC 2023). Some FLNKS elements have maintained their opposition to participating in trilateral talks with both the French government and loyalists (UC 2023). Loyalists have dug in over their push to remove or significantly modify the restricted electorate (NC la 1ère 2022c).

To assist discussion, in mid-2023 France released two
broad documents, an Audit on Decolonisation (Audit 2023)

and an Institutional, Administrative and Financial Review of
the Nouméa Accord (Bilan 2023). These reviews received a
muted reaction from the FLNKS, which reaffirmed its com-
mitment to independence negotiated bilaterally with France,
irreversible decolonisation and independence (FLNKS
2023).

President Macron visited Noumea in July 2023 and spoke in conciliatory tones of a “path of forgiveness”. Still, he reaffirmed the three referendums in favour of staying in France, and urged tripartite discussions to agree on a new statute for the future, reminding his audience of French economic support, particularly for the three nickel plants, none of which he noted was viable (Macron 2023). He received a resounding welcome from loyalists, but independence leaders described the visit as a “one-man show” and his speech as “paternalistic, imperialist, neocolonial” (cited in Fisher 2023a).

The FLNKS were re-energised by two important victo-
ries. They won a national Senate seat on 24 September 2023
(Fisher 2023b), while loyalist leader Sonia Backès lost, sub-
sequently resigning her ministerial portfolio. The win fol-
lowed the re-election of independence leader Roch Wamytan
as President of the Congress on 30 August in a bitter
contest.

France presented a draft document on the institutional
future in September 2023 (NC la 1ère 2023a), but ongoing
differences deepened. Interior Minister Darmanin was
obliged to cancel a planned visit in early December, while
renewing threats to impose a solution on the restricted elec-
torate if there was no progress by year's end (NC la 1ère
2023b). In response to a question in the French Senate, loyal-
ist Senator Georges Naturel referred to provincial elections
possibly being held some time before the end of 2024 (rather
than by May) (DNC 2023a).

So the future beyond the third referendum remains uncer-
tain. Dialogue and negotiation in the spirit of past Accords
will be required if tension and violence are not to re-emerge
now that the Nouméa Accord has expired.

The recent history of attempts at dialogue is not promis-
ing. Moreover, in this highly polarised political climate, the
focus of dialogue, as suggested by independence positions,
the Paris declaration and the yes/no document, will necessar-
ily be on the most complex and divisive elements of future
governance and of self-determination including the
following:

* The question of whether or not a further independence referendum will be held

* The three subjects which the Nouméa Accord (Article 5) specifically states must be addressed in its final process:

- The disposition of the final five core sovereign powers of defence, foreign affairs, currency, justice and law and order
- The precise future international status and powers of New Caledonia, including whether or not it will have a UN seat

- The definition of New Caledonian citizenship and ways to protect employment and voting rights of long-standing New Caledonian residents

* The nature and operation of the key political institutions (the three provinces, the Congress, the Government) and the electorate voting for them

* The remaining Article 27 powers of tertiary education, broadcast media and provincial and communal administration

* The handling of nickel and hydrocarbons development and revenues

* The control of immigration

* The future of the land distribution agency

* Redressing the social isolation of young Kanaks

## 18.10 Some Regional Implications

The new uncertainties in New Caledonia, a Melanesian archipelago that has been stable for the last 30 years, will impact its Melanesian neighbourhood and the wider region.

The South Pacific island countries have long held a close interest in French policy in their region. In the 1970s, they avidly opposed France's nuclear testing in French Polynesia and its handling of independence demands from its territories. Indeed, the PIF was formed (initially as the South Pacific Forum) because France banned discussion of its policies in the South Pacific Commission (now Secretariat for the Pacific Community), which is headquartered in Nouméa (Cordonnier 1995). The PIF is now the region's pre-eminent political forum. It was Pacific island states who sponsored a successful resolution in the United Nations General Assembly in 1986 placing New Caledonia on the UNGA's list of non-self-governing territories, over France's opposition. The UN General Assembly has unanimously passed a resolution watchful of New Caledonia every year since. In a surprise move, Pacific islanders similarly secured the re-listing of French Polynesia in 2013, again over strong French opposition, with similar annual resolutions of concern.

PIF interest in New Caledonia's de-colonisation process has been enduring. The PIF sent missions to New Caledonia in 1999, 2001 and 2004, to report on implementation of the Nouméa Accord. The Forum observed all three referendums and, in a historical first, the May 2019 provincial elections (Pacific Islands Forum Ministerial Committee 2018). After the first two referendums, PIF observer teams simply submitted their reports to the PIF, who in turn submitted them to the UN. In the case of the third referendum, however, the seven-member PIF observer team issued an early public

statement. On 14 December, it noted the significant non-participation rate in the third vote and the importance of civic participation as an integral component of any democracy. It noted that the spirit in which the referendum was conducted "weighs heavily" on the Nouméa Accord and the self-determination process (Pacific Islands Forum Ministerial Committee 2021).

The PIF observer mission issued their report on the third referendum in July 2022. It concluded by saying "The result of the referendum is an inaccurate representation of the will of registered voters and instead can be interpreted as a representation of a deep-seated ethnic division in New Caledonia, which the Committee fears has been exacerbated by the State's refusal to postpone the referendum" (Maclellan 2022).

Closer to home for New Caledonia, the MSG was formed in the early 1980s primarily to monitor decolonisation in New Caledonia (Maclellan and Chesneaux 1998, p. 197; Bates 1990). The various steps of the self-determination process were closely watched by the MSG and are not irrelevant to other Melanesian separatist demands. The MSG supported the independence groups during all three referendum campaigns in New Caledonia (LNC 2018a; Daily News 2020). As indicated, it called for postponement of the third referendum in New York. When that vote proceeded, the MSG issued a communique describing it as transgressing Article 1 of the UN Charter and UN Resolution 1514 on self-determination. The MSG warned against imposing the result on the Kanak people and called on the UN to engage with France and New Caledonia (MSG 2021). In August 2023 the MSG formally reiterated its "united" support for New Caledonia's decolonisation (MSG 2023).

New Caledonia's self-determination coincides with a similar process on the Papua New Guinea island of Bougainville. PNG is a member of the MSG. The 1998 Bougainville Agreement suspended secessionist demands on this island, whose wealth was based around copper production. The Agreement is based in part on the Nouméa Accord, setting aside differences pending an independence referendum. Their referendum was held from 23 November to 7 December 2019, when voters overwhelmingly (97.7%) supported independence. Uncertainties remain about the future, as this result must now be considered by the Papua New Guinea parliament (Batley 2019).

Meanwhile, a longstanding West Papuan separatist movement in a part of Indonesia that also engages mining interests is pursuing secession and seeking MSG support (May 2021). The MSG is divided over the application for full membership by the United Liberation Movement of West Papua (ULMWP), with Indonesia now an observer. After an attack in West Papua just a month after New Caledonia's first referendum, a West Papuan Liberation Army leader called for a referendum for West Papua (Chauvel 2018).
The situation in the Solomon Islands, also an MSG member, is at a fragile stage. For 14 years, a complex Regional Assistance Mission, led by Australia at the Solomons' invitation, restored peaceful administration after serious ethnic-based separatism. The Mission concluded in 2017 (Sloan et al. 2019). In April 2022, China and the Solomon Islands signed a 5-year security agreement, sparking regional concern at the potential for China to establish a military base there (PRC MFA 2022; Australian DFAT 2022).

Any instability around New Caledonia's unfolding referendum process has the potential to influence the management of these separatist challenges, and any related Chinese forays, in its immediate region. The MSG and PIF countries retain a close watching brief on France and developments in New Caledonia following the expiration of the Nouméa Accord, and as their recent stances have shown, advocate an approach respectful of the commitments made so far and particularly respectful of the indigenous Kanak people. As in the past, members of these regional forums, like the local independence groups, will continue to invoke the support of the United Nations as necessary.

The divisive and ultimately politically inconclusive result of the third referendum heightens instability and uncertainty, not only in New Caledonia but in the immediate region. Because fundamental issues such as the future governance and status of New Caledonia remain in dispute, with the large indigenous minority standing firm on its demand for independence, a redefining of the nature of France's sovereign base in the South Pacific is inevitable. This engages broader strategic interests in the region.

## 18.10.1 France in the Region

For France, as described by Macron in Papeete in 2021, the stakes are high. Whatever is decided for New Caledonia can be sought by French Polynesia and potentially others of its overseas territories around the globe, and France does not want to lose these territories. As numerous French strategic assessments in recent years have shown (enumerated in Fisher 2017a, p. 43), it is France's overseas' possessions in the three oceans (Atlantic, Indian and Pacific) which underpin its status as a global power, one of only five permanent members of the UN Security Council, leader of the EU, member of NATO and US ally. France is number two world maritime power (after the United States and before Australia) by virtue of its extensive exclusive economic zone surrounding its overseas possessions, particularly in the Pacific, which alone contribute over 7 m. square hectares of France's 11 m. square hectare EEZ (Fisher 2013, p. 50). France's presence in New Caledonia gives it a valuable strategic listening post in the Pacific, its regional military headquarters, access to its minerals and fisheries, a basis for its scientific and technical

expertise, and its contribution to the European space programme, and a place in regional Pacific, Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific forums at a time when the influence of a newly emerging Pacific power, China, is rising (Fisher 2015).

In his keynote speech opening the first referendum campaign when visiting New Caledonia in May 2018, President Macron acknowledged these assets, which he framed within his Indo-Pacific strategic vision. He pointed to New Caledonia's contribution to France's status, and inviting a continued New Caledonian role, as part of France (Macron 2018). He came as close as he had ever done to saying he wanted New Caledonia to remain in France. This was despite having claimed explicitly that the French State would not take a position on the outcome of the independence referendum and that France's aim was instead to hold an incontestable referendum seen to be legitimate by the territory, the region and the UN (Macron 2018). He said that the referendum process was one of "constructing a sovereignty within a national sovereignty" and argued that France would be less without New Caledonia. Invoking in Gaullist terms the power and global role of France in the Indo-Pacific, which was underpinned by its overseas possessions in the two oceans, he invited New Caledonia to become part of this Indo-Pacific strategy. He referred to three strong benefits. The first was France's security and protection, as he said the US had turned its back on the region; China was seeking regional hegemony; and with Britain leaving the EU, France was the last European power in the Pacific. The second was French support in economic development, promising to strengthen the nickel and tourism sectors, to build food production, energy, forestry and marine exploitation. The third was support for New Caledonia in dealing with climate change.

Macron elaborated on these arguments when he visited Papeete in 2021 (see earlier section), as indicated, sending a message to New Caledonia but also firmly situating French Polynesia within his Indo-Pacific strategy and in effect cautioning both about the risks of losing French protection. By invoking the role of France's nuclear capacity, founded on tests in French Polynesia, and the limits of small island defence capability, he projected a message of French protection to the wider region.

From the late 1990s, France had embarked on a number of initiatives to improve its standing and acceptance in the South Pacific (Fisher 2017a). It finally stopped its nuclear testing there in 1996, and with the conclusion of the Matignon and Nouméa Accords by 1998 to better address New Caledonian decolonisation demands, it was able to build more constructive relations in the region. It contributes to maritime surveillance and sharing of fisheries intelligence and emergency activity under the 1992 France Australia and New Zealand (FRANZ) arrangement. France actively participates in regional technical organisations and provides modest bilateral aid, worth about $US 100 m. a year. It con-
ducts defence and military cooperation including with Australia, New Zealand and the US in quadrilateral talks and defence ministers' meetings. It engages these countries and other regional island partners (Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Fiji) in regular defence exercises in the region. It has also led a larger EU role in the Pacific.

So far, France's enhanced engagement in the region has been welcomed by island countries. But France's involvement, like that of Australia and New Zealand, is taking place in a region which itself is changing. The impact of structures of the PIF and the SPC, which routinely engage Australia and New Zealand, is being diluted by the increasing tendencies, and necessity, of independent island countries to work with new partners. In multilateral organisations, the island governments tend to relate more frequently with other island countries around the globe than Australia and New Zealand. Within the region, the islands' economic vulnerability and potential to offer support in their numbers in the UN has led them to welcome new relationships with partners as varied as Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and others (Fisher 2015, p. 26). But some key partners such as the EU (led by France) and China have preferred bilateral arrangements rather than through the existing cooperative structures of the PIF or the SPC that have prevailed from the 1970s to early 2000s. The ascendance of China's presence in the region also inevitably brings with it new pressures and disruptions as this major global power seeks to shore up its resource sources and influence (most recently canvassed in Institute for Regional Security 2020 and see also Shie 2007; Yang 2012; Yu 2014). The region's renewed engagement with France and its territories must be seen in this context.

China's increased visibility in the region coincided with uncertainties arising from the mercurial US presidency of Donald Trump and the departure from the European Union of the United Kingdom, one of the largest financial contributors to the EU, which is a major regional aid partner. The most recent Chinese agreement with Solomon Islands, and its proposal for similar agreements with other Pacific island countries, have added to the mix of fragility and uncertainty.

As indicated, in his address to New Caledonians before their first referendum, Macron drew on these trends to argue for a vote favouring continued French sovereignty in New Caledonia (Macron 2018). In his Papeete speech before the third independence vote, he was more direct in warning of the threat to “the small and isolated” from hegemonic powers (Macron 2021a). He repeated the theme in July 2023 when he visited Nouméa, offering France’s Pacific territories “true” independence, that of “the respect of the Republic”, while “not ceding to hegemonies and imperialisms”, with France offering a refuge and a future (Macron 2023).

There is no doubt that leading regional countries Australia and New Zealand see France as a useful ally and resource in

the South Pacific neighbourhood. Both have concluded enhanced strategic arrangements with France, largely centred on defence cooperation in the Pacific. Both were quietly supportive of the full implementation of the Nouméa Accord, including the final referendums which they expected France to conduct with impartiality (Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs 2020; New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2020). While the Ministers for Foreign Affairs for Australia and New Zealand, respectively, welcomed the peaceful conduct of the third referendum, each underlined the importance of self-determination and pointedly referred to the need for talks and continued cooperation between the parties (Mahuta 2021; Payne 2021).

At a time of increased Chinese presence in the immediate region, Australia and New Zealand will want continued constructive French engagement in the South Pacific, and indeed in the wider Indo-Pacific. Both Australia and New Zealand prioritise the peace, stability and prosperity of their immediate region. They would be concerned at any re-emergence of violence or instability in New Caledonia.

Australia's relationship with France came under strain in September 2021 when United States President Biden announced a new cooperation arrangement between the US, the UK and Australia (AUKUS), which would extend military technology sharing with Australia, including through the construction of eight nuclear submarines. For Australia this meant rupturing a 2016 contract with France's government-owned Naval Group to build 12 diesel-powered submarines (Australian Department of Defence 2016), albeit at a planned contractual decision-point. France's Foreign Minister reacted strongly, expressing bitterness and anger at the announcement. While France's disappointment is understandable, its substantive interests in collaborating with Australia to advance shared strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific are enduring.

France declined to participate in a June 2022 meeting of its allies the US, the UK, Japan, Australia and New Zealand as part of US President Biden's Blue Partnership initiative. Still, French Defence Minister Lecornu hosted the 2023 Meeting of Pacific Islands Defence Ministers in December. On the eve of the meeting, 1500 indigenous independence supporters marched in central Noumea against the “remilitarisation of New Caledonia”. Senior union leader André Forest described the meeting as a “heavy provocation” while New Caledonia was on the way to emancipation, referring to Lecornu, former Overseas Minister who had presided over the third referendum, as one of the saboteurs of the Nouméa Accord (DNC 2023b).

Regional expectations of France and the local parties in New Caledonia are therefore high, at a time of change. After a divisive third and final referendum bringing the 30-year Matignon-Oudinot/Nouméa Accords process to an end in a politically inconclusive way, it is not a foregone conclusion
that France can retain the strategic support it wants for a
place in the Pacific if it does not succeed in securing peaceful
agreement about the future of its pre-eminent overseas
territory.

18.11 Conclusion

New Caledonia's recent history of stability, economic devel-
opment and peace, and therefore its contribution to regional
stability, has been based on compromise and the relatively
successful implementation of fragile agreements by France,
pro-independence and pro-France groups over three decades.
That predictability is at an end. The people of New Caledonia,
now deeply polarised, are facing the challenge of surmount-
ing their differences over self-determination to continue
peacefully to redefine their relationship with France and
their participation in the Pacific region. The process will not
be straightforward and will continue to be watched with
interest and concern by regional neighbours and the United
Nations.

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**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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<figure><img src="image_88.png" /></figure>
**Abstract**

This chapter critically reflects the notion of “common
destiny” in Kanaky-New Caledonia. I argue that the
binary political landscape also leads to binary social
arrangements, which have the effect of hampering “living
together”. The capitalist economic growth model adopted
by both pro- and anti-independence parties promotes
rationalism to the detriment of social and cultural coexis-
tence and reinforces inequalities. There is currently a lack
of viable alternatives to this “uncommon destiny”, and
strong environmental protection measures and economic
models based on solidarity are, at present, not on the
agenda of political authorities. A broader vision of social
and cultural change involves sustainable appropriation of
the commons.

**Keywords**

Common destiny · Kanaky-New Caledonia ·
Referendums · Commons · Ethnic pluralism ·
Inequalities

**19.1 Introduction**

“Common destiny”, a widely used term in Kanaky-New
Caledonia to signal a shared sense of belonging and inclu-
sion, is part of a desire for social peace. The Matignon-
Oudinot Accords in 1988 – putting an end to a situation of
civil war (1984–1988), and then, the Nouméa Accord in
1998 have led to the sharing of political sovereignty with
France, in a decolonisation process leading towards full sov-
ereignty. Other chapters explain (see Chaps. 17, 18, 20, by

Gagné, Fisher and Robertson in this book) that the question of access to full sovereignty (or political independence) was unsuccessfully put to the test in three referendums between 2018 and 2021. The Nouméa Accord also promoted a greater recognition of Kanak identity. With Indigenous Kanak customary status recognised by civil law, new institutions have been created. Over the past 20 years, these have included an Academy of Kanak Languages, the Agency for the Development of Kanak Culture (ADCK), the Tjibaou Cultural Centre, a Customary Senate, and the inclusion of Kanak languages and culture in schools (see Chaps. 13 and 14 by Leblic and Wadrawane in this book). Nevertheless, studies reveal that social-economic and ethnic inequalities persist (related in particular to participation in higher education, employment levels and housing availability) (Gorohouna 2011).

In spite of its solid historical foundations, the concept of common destiny shared by the different ethnic groups is opaque, as I explore in this chapter. Is there really a New Caledonian politics conducive to the construction of a “common world” or “common future”, with plurality, diversity and respecting personhood (Arendt 1958)? According to Achille Mbembe and in contrast to Carl Schmitt (Schmitt 1992, cited in Mbembe 2018), politics discriminates between friends and enemies and often through magnifying topical issues like terrorism threats, the settlement of migrants or the dangers of communitarianism found in Melanesian societies.

European ethno-nationalism,<fnref n="1" /> for example, becomes xenophobic when the “other” threatens social peace through aspiring to a European standard of living, with its supporters assuming this will be detrimental to European’s own comfort. The “common destiny” is really a nostalgic vision of politics, a creator of the “common” as Hannah Arendt (1958)

<footnote>J.-M. Guiart (✉)
Independent Writer, Nouméa, New Caledonia
e-mail: guiartjeanmichel@gmail.com</footnote>

<footnote n="1">¹ I do not use the term “populism” which is a misnomer, in the sense that populism gives power back to the people regardless of race. However, in the rise of European populism, the question of race seems to be a *sine qua non*. This is why the use of the term “ethno-nationalism” seems more appropriate to describe this phenomenon.</footnote>
argued, and also promoted by the political class of Kanaky-New Caledonia.

## 19.2 The Referendum Series

A series of three referendums on the access to full sovereignty has taken place in Kanaky-New Caledonia (Kowasch et al. 2022; see also Chaps. 17, 18, 20 in this book). Loyalists were always in favour of remaining with France. They have focused their arguments on the fact that it is important to retain the chance to be French (travelling to Europe without a visa, etc.). But they have not developed a strong political project in over 25 years of the Nouméa Accord. From their point of view, independence would be a break in the pseudo-filial connection with metropolitan France. This is shown in the loyalist electoral campaigns promoting pathos, essentially fear, arguing that independence will result in a “banana republic”. Loyalist speeches reveal a certain discrimination through the objectification of Kanak communitarianism, also stigmatizing the sovereignty project of Kanak independence leaders. An example was an electoral video clip published before the last referendum in 2021 by the collective of “No” voices, which has since been withdrawn because it was discriminatory. The choice of “No to independence” reaffirms a pre-established social order, a kind of colonial footprint.

However, France has been promoting a social-ethnic politics of rebalancing in Kanaky-New Caledonia since the Matignon-Oudinot Accords in 1988, by subsidising for example training programmes aimed at establishing a Kanak middle class. These include the *Cadre avenir* (Future economic and political leaders) programme. The programme allows the former colonial power (France) to institute, through meritocracy, its manifest goodwill, with the aim of “colouring” the administrations to some extent, and to train executives who believe they have improved their social or economic status. I question if this is an effort to wash away certain social and racial ills, caused by the colonial hierarchy and the widespread prejudices that Kanak people suffered. We cannot overlook the real violence endured by Kanak people during the colonial period in Kanaky-New Caledonia nor the plight of their Aboriginal neighbours in Australia.

The pro-independence leaders, on the other hand, defend a multilateral project, meaning that everything is a question of managing interdependencies. They try to reassure their detractors, not all of whom are against independence, but there is a concern that the pro-independence leaders are not ready (yet) to assume office. For these detractors, the financial health and the success of the Koniambo project (a live issue in 2024, see Chaps. 8 and 9 by Kowasch and Merlin, and Demmer in this book) are indicators of the reliability of

the independence project and its leaders. The Kanak independence project adopts Marxist ideas, similar to the early leaders of independence in former African colonies. They have adopted a policy of appropriating the means of (nationalized) production in order to realise added value. This is an emancipatory project, to release Kanak peoples from the French state. However, it is worth remembering that a net trade deficit, ongoing social inequalities and financial debts thwarted the emancipatory ambitions of many African countries by the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, the initial Kanak independence project that wanted a return to an agrarian society has shifted considerably once control of mining revenues became involved. Mining revenues can fuel Dumazedier’s leisure society (2018), with productivity and wage labour obtained thanks to technologies that allow societies to release more time for leisure, thereby centring custom and cultural events in a very different way.

The expression of Kanak or French social and political projects varies according to the different parties proposing these frameworks but against a background of ethnocentrism. This tends to make the debate a “dialogue of the deaf”. Moreover, both Kanak and French ethnocentric sentiments are subject, particularly because of the engagement in corporate mining and global markets, to an overarching political economy guided by neoliberalism.

Despite alliances between pro- and anti-independence parties, the political landscape is characterized by a dualistic partisanship of the local political class. For the loyalists (some of the conservative parties come close to extreme right-wing viewpoints), the dualistic partisanship starts with preconceived notions of an insoluble civilisational differential, based on the claim that Kanak are ontologically opposed to a “white” society and its ideals. There is a hint of determinism here, denying intermarriages and political alliances and also refusing a possible associated State (Kanaky-New Caledonia) as a compromise or third way between political independence and a future as an integral entity of the French Republic. The pro-independence leaders, on the other hand, denounce a racialisation of the figure of the other, as a source of social exclusion (at least of certain social strata). In the current state of affairs, living together in Kanaky-New Caledonia is hampered by an electoral ambition that reinforces political and social tensions. Identity construction is thus parasitised by binary electoral issues. The series of three referendums became political matches (as did other territorial elections). The question remains, how can people be united when the referendums feel like a defamation of the other, with celebration of “victory” and “defeat”? In this difficult context, the construction of a New Caledonian identity and “living together” is solidly linked to politics and political institutions and appears to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
## 19.3 French Political Parenthood

At the third and last referendum on political independence in December 2021, the abstention of the pro-independence proponents followed the refusal of France to postpone the referendum date (see Chap. 18 by Fisher in this book). The independence cause was confined in the meanders of French bureaucracy, so that the pro-independence parties felt forced to opt for an empty chair policy. The independence leader's request for postponement was justified by an outbreak of COVID-19 infections which impacted the whole island and led to a rapid increase in mortality (Kowasch et al. 2022; Leblic 2021). Mourning the dead, like any other cultural ceremony in Melanesian society, needs time for custom to take on its full, collective meaning. The cards of the independence question were dealt by a twist of fate, a conjunction of events, and the pro-independence movement did not seem to be up to the challenge. For example, the ruckus in December 2020 related to the selling of the Vale nickel smelter, in the south of Grande Terre impacted the serenity of the independence campaign (see Chaps. 8 and 9 in this book). Dissent between two independence parties PALIKA (Parti de Libération Kanak) and UC (Union Calédonienne) over the election of the first ever pro-independence candidate as President of the New Caledonian government in Spring 2021 was only resolved after several months of negotiation. Of course, the hand that feeds is the hand that leads, and the French government reshuffled and controlled the cards of the New Caledonian political game. It was difficult for the pro-independence parties to assert their claims in this context. The latter are still political outsiders in their own territory. They did achieve a solid result in the second referendum. But gaining the presidency of the 17th government of Kanaky-New Caledonia, now led since July 2021 by the PALIKA member Louis Mapou, seems to be a meagre consolation prize for the pro-independence movement, which is not a homogeneous block.

The position of the French president, Emmanuel Macron, towards (ethnic) pluralism is outdated, as his visit to the archipelago in 2023 revealed. Nevertheless, he began fine-tuning his communication towards minorities through a full-scale charm offensive during his first term in office. At the last France-Africa summit in Montpellier on 8 October 2021, he made paternalistic announcements, covering the entire continent. In the francophone Pacific, it was difficult to imagine the French government indulging the request of the pro-independence movement to delay the third and last referendum, given that France has an interest in keeping this South Pacific archipelago and its resources under its yoke. One reason for this is the maritime zone, with large minerals resources on the seabed, which ensure a strategic position for France. The

presence of France in a region where the US and China have strategic (military and economic) interests, is another argument for France to keep Kanaky-New Caledonia, the largest of the French overseas territories in the Pacific region.

It is debatable whether the term “independence” means so much in a context where the Pacific is enmeshed in global networks and relations. Neoliberalism is also a colonial project. Some pro-independence leaders have suggested that “association” (or independence-association) could characterise future governance arrangements with France, partly placating some of their loyalist detractors. Other sceptics see independence association as similar to the unequal relations between France and African nations, characterised by a neo-colonial pyramidal system of domination, which has endured well past so-called “liberation”. The history of relationships between France and its former colonies gives a glimpse of an institutionalised form of neo-colonialism: a façade of administrative decolonisation but with a stranglehold on some resources. In addition, rebel operations in Mali and Burkina Faso and a military coup in Niger have not been solved by French military intervention, and a French currency bloc remains in place: there is widespread dissatisfaction with elements of the ongoing neo-colonial relationship.

## 19.4 The Management of French Pluralism Leaves Something to Be Desired

The French political class knows the potential threats from referendums. There was the resignation of General De Gaulle on 28 April 1969 following his earlier referendum on the creation of regions and the renovation of the Senate in France, and on 29 May 2005, the vote against the establishment of a European Constitution. Although the majority of French voters were against, the Treaty of Rome was signed a year later and the result of the referendum was not respected. In 2018, the Gilets Jaunes movement proposed a citizens' initiative referendum, with a pro-citizen constitutional change, but their ideas were dismissed. Emmanuel Macron tried to organise a referendum on the climate issue but this foundered in the French Senate in 2021 (France24 2021).

In 2021, the Macron government therefore broke its “neutrality” promises established in earlier decades (Kowasch et al. 2022). The government commissioned a study to shed light on the effects and consequences of possible independence for Kanaky-New Caledonia (Ministère des Outre-Mer 2021). The 104-page study, published in July 2021, was hardly objective or, at the least, unbalanced. It focused “on the financing granted by France over the last 30 years and offered only historical reminders (now rather
dated) to illustrate the effects of independence in its most
visible aspects, for example on nationality” (Kowasch et al.
2022, p. 14). The results and consequences of the study were
discussed by French and international researchers, especially
after the third referendum in December 2021 (e.g. David and
Tirard 2022; Fisher, 2021; Trépied 2021; see also see Chap.
18 in this book). Trépied (2021), for example, explained that
the study highlighted the expense of the “yes”. David and
Tirard (2022) noted that it underlined the reduction of French
financial support for New Caledonia in case of indepen-
dence. The French government is thus rehabilitating an
image of good Samaritan, by flying to the rescue of the New
Caledonian archipelago.

Apart from the administrative conveniences (passport,
diplomas, etc.) linked to the fact that New Caledonians
remain French, the vision that the territory cannot evolve
without France remains. This perception was supported by
the disagreements over the selling of the Vale smelter and
mine. A peaceful and harmonious future seemed to be far
away at that time. And in 2024, New Caledonian society is
still struggling to create its own identity. The French govern-
ment intends to give birth to this identity by forceps.

At the same time, the shadow of the Chinese ogre floats
over the territory and China seems to be keen to bite into the
archipelago. Staying French is all very well, but what exactly
does “being French” really mean? At the last French presi-
dential elections in particular, the electoral campaigns were
struggling with the question of national identity, impacted by
a shift to the right of the political landscape and later of the
new Macron government. The electoral campaigns some-
times showed a contest of hatred towards minorities. And
under the guise of assimilation, national identity actually
allows ethno-nationalists to promote cultural hegemony.
There are valid reasons to be sceptical about the develop-
ment of a Caledonian identity under French tutelage. France
often uses electoral clientelism towards its national sub-
groups (including Africans, Arabs, and also Kanaks),
although recognising communitarianism (seeing a commu-
nity of people in a given place). Minorities, in the collective
imagination, participate in the glory of the nation in pro-
scribed ways, for example, through performances in interna-
tional sports. However, identities and cultures, rightly or
wrongly, mix and evolve in line with reality which means
that national identity is never immutable.

19.5 A Model of Society Yet to Be Built

Kanaky-New Caledonia has begun a process of decolonisa-
tion, apparently stuck in a kind of institutional marasmus.
The Matignon-Oundinot and Nouméa Accords appear to
have locked the country into developing some political com-
petencies through transfers from France (e.g. primary school
education, labour laws, etc.). In addition, appropriating the

means of production with local infrastructure, heavy indus-
tries and a productive labour force as the base of a Caledonian
society has been the project of Marxist intellectuals and
leaders.

The binary referendum choices from 2018 to 2021 reflect
the political landscape described above. Bipartisanism, as a
norm, permeates the society, determining power relation-
ships. Loyalist vs. independentist political identities thus
appear as fixed social representations. In binary social
arrangements, one group is always subject to the will of the
other. Questioning this binary identity would also call into
question the very identity of the individual, who constructs
her- or himself inside this intrinsic political scheme.
Therefore, referendums lock individuals into political identi-
ties linked to the question of the future political status but do
not deal with the construction of a common identity. A crys-
tallised political identity takes precedence and holds back a
unitary common destiny.

Domination by democratic means has occurred as the
result of the referendum cycle. The political institutions
allow the elected representatives to claim defence of the
people, while at the same time enjoying the privileges
linked to their official functions. Indeed, voters feel unrep-
resented. Political and economic leaders do not like to give
up their privileges or have their positions challenged.
Moreover, almost all of them support an economic growth
model that ultimately contributes to global environmental
change, biodiversity loss and global warming (Kopnina
2020; Rockström 2015; Washington 2015). Omnipresent
mining activities of course make Kanaky-New Caledonia a
major emitter of greenhouse gases. However, the trickle-
down theory of economic growth appears to be a dogma.
Therefore, I argue that decolonisation is also about decon-
structing a form of capitalism that establishes an individu-
alistic rationalism, challenging a certain dollar-chasing
mentality.

To build a common identity and to establish greater inter-
cultural connections, we should first of all deconstruct
notions such as “colonisation” and “equality”. We should be
aware that the various forms of discrimination (in hiring, in
access to rental housing, in health care, etc.) are often suf-
fered by the same individuals. Others would say that we need
to have the courage to question our current economic model.
One way to emerge from the abyss of capitalism and increas-
ing social inequalities can be a reappropriation of the
commons.

19.6 A Reappropriation of the Commons

The pro-independence umbrella party *Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste* (FLNKS) has the vocation of being a revolutionary party and to create a bulwark against economic imperialism.
The pro-independence leaders have copied an economic growth model to promote local economic development and political emancipation (see Chap. 9 in this book). There is no alternative offered to ensure a (slow and not brutal) transition and/or a co-existence of Kanak traditional activities (such as subsistence farming and fishing) and mining on an industrial scale. However, the range of possibilities for promoting and valorising traditional activities and sustainability measures is vast. There are, for example, plant nurseries, sandalwood cooperatives and small-scale coffee farms. Moreover, the agricultural know-how of communities and clans can be promoted as well as organising traditional Kanak pharmacopoeia through women's cooperatives. Paul Fokam's *Mutuelles de Croissance Communautaires* (MC2) was established in Cameroon in the 1990s, offering micro-credit specifically for African villagers. They can submit a traditional cultural relic as a guarantee in order to get a small loan for buying land or agricultural tools. The emphasis here is on the symbolic aspect of cultural items as leverage to invest reasonable sums of money, from the perspective of an economy of the common good (Felber 2018). On Pentecost island in Vanuatu, there is an initiative called the Tangbunia Bank. The bank is run by the Indigenous Turaga movement and uses traditional currencies, such as handwoven mats, shells or pig tusks. It was set up in accordance with the national government's support for customary community economies. There are opportunities in Kanaky-New Caledonia to establish similar initiatives to support local customary activities.

The pro-independence project focuses on managing interdependence, without empowering its militant base. Therefore, pro-independence representatives mainly focus on strengthening public institutions and income streams to promote a Kanak nation in potential development. Some young pro-independence activists feel disconnected from the institutions governing them, and struggle to find any real meaning in the fight for independence. The agrarian character of traditional Kanak communities is not promoted, although it could play a major role in food sovereignty. Family farming still supports good nutrition in Pacific island communities, but the impact of imported food – and malnutrition – is growing fast and is present in Kanaky-New Caledonia too. Although the independence movement is not a homogeneous bloc, subsistence activities, food self-sufficiency and environmental issues more generally are not its central foci.

The role of the Customary Senate, created with the Nouméa Accord in 1998, is a guardian of the land and Kanak culture. However, the Senate seems to be caught up with gaining a greater institutional role, including legislative powers. Moreover, the representativeness of Senate members is sometimes contested, often based on conflicts over customary legitimacy.

Collective memory is essential to remember the real history of colonisation and its ongoing repercussions: The territory cannot get bogged down in amnesia. Indigenous Kanak culture is not a brake on social-economic development and well-being. Faced with global environmental crises and the climate emergency, we cannot remain impassive. We need to move beyond endless consumption, promoted by globalisation, leading to environmental damage and overproductivity. The New Caledonian identity debate is hampered by its economic growth model, which promotes modernity and rationalism to the detriment of social and cultural issues.

## 19.7 Conclusion

Given the climate crisis, the fate of Kanaky-New Caledonia should not be decided at the ballot box, because the three referendums have highlighted the bipolar character of the political landscape and increased the gap between the different (ethnic) communities. It is based on the idea that the stability of democracy will emerge from homogeneity. However, democracies thrive on difference, pluralism and diversity. Citizens mobilise through demonstrations and awareness-raising actions to express their points of view, to resist and to take social responsibility. Activism and demonstrations are a form of bottom-up movement essential to engage in political debate and discussion. For citizens, these social actions consist of reappropriating public debates in a democratic dynamic, with reformist overtones.

The lack of viable alternatives to the “uncommon destiny” that is evolving in Kanaky-New Caledonia is the source of its ills. In this sense, citizen initiatives found in other island economies should multiply via a social economy of solidarity in Kanaky-New Caledonia and not only to reduce the climate crisis (local chains of production, recycling centres, food banks, etc.). Kanaky-New Caledonia’s questioning of its identity is stymied by its pro-industrial model of society. A “common destiny” imposes on subaltern peoples a voluntary servitude towards the capitalist system. To qualify “destiny” as “common” is paradoxical, because capitalism still profits from competition between individuals.

At the same time, certain citizen aspirations are reflected in the appearance of new political parties, such as *Construire Autrement* or *Souveraineté Calédonienne*. They present themselves as ruptures or complements to the traditional parties. They illustrate a reappropriation by civil society of political and social-economic issues in order to engage and participate in political dialogue. In this respect, Kanaky-New Caledonia needs to free up its voice, to find a way out of the political and cultural divide through talk, and by accepting difference. And as Marx (1888 [1845]) underlined, it is no longer a question of understanding the world, but of transforming it.
**Acknowledgements** I am very thankful to the anonymous reviewer for her/his fruitful comments and to both the editors Simon Batterbury and Matthias Kowasch for their comments, translations and proof reading to improve this paper and to make it understandable for anglophone readers.

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<figure><img src="image_89.png" /></figure>
**Abstract**

A “citizenship of New Caledonia” has proven to be one of the most significant yet polarising aspects of the 1998 Nouméa Accord. Citizenship of New Caledonia restricted who could vote in provincial elections and for the Congress but also shaped efforts to promote local employment. In the Accord, it is the political and moral basis for New Caledonia’s common destiny and endeavours to transcend pro- and anti-independence divisions. This chapter outlines the historical roots of the notion of citizenship within New Caledonia and how it has emerged within competing understandings of decolonisation and self-determination. Citizenship of New Caledonia rejects the universal assumptions of French decolonisation in favour of a new political community with the Kanak people at its centre. This chapter highlights the difficulties of agreeing to boundaries of citizenship due in part to citizenship’s role as a political mechanism to achieve balance between the two opposing forces.

**Keywords**

Citizenship · New Caledonia · Nouméa Accord · Electoral list · Referendums · Kanak independence · Victims of history

## 20.1 Introduction

New Caledonia's place within the French Republic, or its legally recognised “autonomy”, has evolved over time, often in accordance with the prevailing metropolitan French politics of the day. However, following the signing of the 1998

Nouméa Accord, New Caledonia became a *sui generis* territorial community of the French Republic,<fnref n="1" /> bestowing on it a unique status and allowing the gradual and irreversible acquisition of sovereign powers in line with the wishes of local, democratically elected representatives. This highly complex and politicised debate on New Caledonia’s legal status has mirrored the sociological differentiation between “New Caledonians” and the rest of the Republic’s *body politic*.

The creation of a “citizenship of New Caledonia” under the Nouméa Accord emerged as one of the most polarising issues and continues to be so despite the consultations of 4 November 2018 and 5 October 2020 that marginally rejected independence. For this reason, it has been the subject of considerable scholarly interest, though heavily dominated by legal scholars (see Chauchat 2008; Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008; Garde 2011; Faberon 2013). The matter of citizenship, like much political and geographical division in New Caledonia, has its roots in the colonial experience (Christnacht 2009). This chapter examines these historical origins of the citizenship question, before considering its formal appearance as a key element of the Nouméa Accord. The historical, social and cultural dimensions of citizenship in New Caledonia have challenged the highly territorial notion of French nationhood and citizenship as the “one and indivisible Republic”. It is argued that citizenship in New Caledonia cannot be understood without grasping the difficulties associated with New Caledonian decolonisation and the contested boundaries of the political community. Despite its strong rhetorical connection to the “common destiny” theme that many political leaders appeal to, citizenship’s manipulation as a political tool has undermined its potential to be a unifying concept beyond the pro-/anti-independence divide.

<footnote>S. Robertson (✉)
Australian National University (ANU), Canberra, ACT, Australia
e-mail: bobbo28189@gmail.com</footnote>

<footnote n="1">¹In French, a *collectivité d'outre-mer sui generis*.</footnote>
## 20.2 Theoretical Approaches to Citizenship

Ideas and practices associated with citizenship are often tied to the sovereign nation-state. Although the seeds of modern citizenship emerged in Ancient Greece and Rome, citizenship appears a far more real and tangible idea in the present day largely because state borders also appear more real than ever. States can mobilise an array of technologies and forces to regulate the comings and goings of citizens and non-citizens, their behaviour and the means by which foreigners accede to full or partial membership of the political community in another country. For example, for many people, citizenship becomes much more real when they present their passport or are required to present identity papers at a border crossing or try to access services in a new country. Citizenship grants membership of the state and emerges as a key basis for claiming rights, seeking protection and regulating various social norms and practices (Isin and Wood 1995).

While there is little doubt that the state is the primary basis for citizenship in the contemporary world, our understanding of it has evolved considerably in recent times in response to the phenomenon widely called globalisation (see Isin and Turner 2002). The interaction between our local and global context is constantly shifting as we travel, work and live in territories other than those in which we were born. The legal regimes that mediate states and citizens reflect, in part, various external influences. We have seen the emergence of the European Union and the complex layers of rights and responsibilities that regulate the behaviour of its member states including the departure of the UK in 2020. International human rights have continued to play a critical role by imbuing a sense of human connectedness beyond state citizenship and adopting a language of global citizenship in response to major issues such as climate change, health security and economic justice (Benhabib 2016).

In its simplest form, citizenship can be viewed as a legal status bestowing particular rights and responsibilities upon the individual, though these vary greatly from place to place. Though we tend to think of citizenship status as a universal phenomenon – i.e. we are all citizens of somewhere – it is also true that the lived experience of citizenship is by no means universal. While citizenship might enable people in France or Australia access to the welfare state, public healthcare and free education, in many parts of the world, this is simply not the case. Moreover, as history has proven time and time again, legal citizenship does not necessarily ensure that human beings are treated as equals by the government or by their co-citizens (Brubaker 2010). It is certainly true that some people might not think their citizenship means much at all. But there can be little doubt as to its importance as an organising principle for nation-states, especially evident in the recent refugee crises arising from conflicts in Syria, sub-

Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe. For the millions of people around the world who are officially “stateless” and denied membership by sovereign states, citizenship can be a matter of life and death. It is for this reason, Article 15 for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares a “right to a nationality” for all people.

In Western political thought, much of the conversation on citizenship has been between liberal and communitarian conceptions. Liberals have tended to emphasise individual liberty and expressed caution toward according any rights to distinct social groups within a political community (Kymlicka 1995). Communitarian theories of citizenship became increasingly popular in response to the end of the Cold War and proliferation of ethnic conflicts in Africa and Eastern Europe. But they also emerged in part due to identity political movements, such as the US civil rights movement, indigenous and feminist activism, among others, which rejected the exclusion of particular marginalised groups in liberal societies (see Balibar 1988). Communitarians view individuals as inherently constituted by their place within social groupings, and citizenship is understood through the lens of belonging to such groups. Communitarians favour the recognition of the layering of human identity through such groups as essential to human flourishing and citizenship. In one of the most well-known critiques of liberal conceptions of citizenship, Iris Marion Young (1989) argued that liberal views of citizenship, in attempting to promote equality by ignoring social differences, tended to exacerbate inequality. Individuals, Young argued, must be viewed as embedded within particular groups. A “differentiated citizenship” has to take into account how identification with the political community is mediated by these various social groupings. While many liberal scholars recognise the importance of social groups, they are wary of undermining the social cohesion deemed necessary for a democratic nation-state to flourish, and they express concern about the potential for a contagious identity politics to emerge that erodes national identity (Carens 2000, p. 193). One of the most common objections to, for example, recognising specific indigenous rights in Western societies, has been that it reinforces social divisions between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples and fails to address disadvantage.

We will not enter into these debates in any detail here, but it is important to situate the New Caledonian case within the broader politics of citizenship, particularly in France and its evolution over time. In particular, the politics of identity and the decolonisation process in New Caledonia has collided with the strong republican ideology that has driven French nationalism since the French Revolution. This ideology overrode various sub-national and regional political claims, often in defence of the “one and indivisible” Republic enshrined in the various iterations of its Constitution. Thus, France has