historically expressed reservations in the ratification of, for example, the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. In response to multiple pressures, however, France has become more flexible since the 1980s in its recognition of its internal pluralism, including in the organisation of its overseas territories, collectively referred to as the *Outre-mer* (Gohin 2002; Palayret 2004).<fnref n="2" />

Much of the national debate in France on citizenship and national identity has oriented towards the question of migration, given its extensive population from former French colonies (see Cooper 2005; Cooper and Stoler 1997). The *Outre-mer* has tended to occupy a more obscure place in the national debate, despite a population of around 2 million people (Trépied 2011).

The New Caledonian context exhibits many of the global challenges of citizenship. In particular, how does equal citizenship permit the recognition of difference within the same political community? This a key question in relation to New Caledonia's possible future independence. The Kanak independence cause rejects the assumption often voiced by its anti-independence opponents that only France is capable of integrating such a diverse population. Pro-independence leaders have emphasised the importance of placing the Kanak *au centre du dispositif*, or re-imagining the political community in light of the Kanak right to self-determination. Most anti-independence voices remain sceptical of the pluralist potential of Kanak independence and see in it an exclusive form of ethno-nationalism.

## 20.3 A History of Decolonisation

Citizenship as legal status versus lived experience (Rawlings 2012) has featured as an important historical and contemporary dimension of New Caledonian decolonisation. From 1887, the French colonial administration governed the territory through the *Code de l'indigénat*, a legal regime that restricted the indigenous Kanak population to reserves, subjected the population to a head tax and forced labour, and enabled the administration to nominate their own chiefs (Merle 2002). In addition to Kanak subjects, New Caledonia received thousands of Asian indentured labourers whose legal position was determined by their work contracts, the large majority of whom were excluded from legal citizenship (Merle and Muckle 2019).

When the French State granted the Indigenous Kanak people formal citizenship in 1946, just as they did in other parts of the Empire to other Indigenous, colonised peoples, it was framed as a universal horizon to which all mankind should aspire. Many Frenchmen viewed this as the fulfilment of the French civilising mission, legitimising the supposedly virtuous presence of France as a colonial power. But it opened up many questions and conflicts, especially as former colonised subjects began to demand full equality and full recognition for their respective customs and cultures. How could the Jacobin Republic, famous for its assimilationist ideals, integrate an Empire of “100 million citizens” (Cooper 2005, p. 100)?

This tension was lived out in the early life of the Fourth Republic (1946–1958) through the creation of the French Union. The end of colonial subjection gave way to an inherently political problem. Most French political leaders recognised the critical role played by the colonies in supporting the war effort against both Nazi Germany and the collaborationist Vichy regime, both in terms of its manpower and its resources. It was at the famous meeting at Brazzaville in the Congo in 1944 where the Free French government under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, leading the Resistance from London, committed to reforming the Empire's governance and extending citizenship to colonial subjects (though rebuffed any talk of independence) (Yacono 1985, p. 54). However, many metropolitan French political leaders and the small settler communities living throughout the Empire perceived the immediate granting of universal suffrage as a threat to their power.

The French Fourth Republic (1946–1958) was plagued with debates on what full and equal citizenship meant for the relationship between metropole and the colonies that became overseas departments, territories and associated states of the French Union. The post-war democratic institutions of France reinforced metropolitan power and failed to put ex-colonial representatives on an equal footing. In certain settler colonies such as Algeria and New Caledonia, the French government sanctioned the reconfiguration of electoral boundaries to ensure that minority settler populations remained in power. Failure to resolve the inherent contradiction between full legal citizenship and inferior political rights for many indigenous populations undermined the integrity of the French Union from the outset and in part led to its demise towards the end of the Fourth Republic.

French law maintained a distinction derived from the colonial era between ordinary citizens whose civil status remained under common law and certain Indigenous populations who retained a personal status, allowing them to remain subject to their “traditional” customs and institutions. In New Caledonia and elsewhere, the French government was petitioned by indigenous leaders to ensure that their “traditional” power

<footnote n="2">²The *Outre-mer*, or Overseas, refers to various former colonies, distinct from the French mainland (“the Metropole”), integrated into the Republic following the Second World War. They are defined in Titles XII and XIII of the French Constitution (XIII defines the transitional arrangements for New Caledonia), today referred to constitutionally as *territorial collectivities*.</footnote>
structures were recognised and valorised (Kurtovitch 2000a,
pp. 118–122), a policy supported by the local Communist
Party that briefly succeeded in gaining traction among the
clans (Kurtovitch 2000b). Recognition of the roles of chiefs
and legal enforcement of the inalienability of customary lands
aroused the anger of settlers who persistently expressed the
distorted view that the indigenous populations were
privileged.

Even though only Guinea voted for independence in the
1958 referendum on the new Constitution of the Fifth
Republic, much of the once vast French Empire whittled
away by 1960 (Aldrich and Connell 1992). The exception
was the island, overseas departments and territories, or
“DOM-TOMs”, which remained in the Republic. In the
Pacific region, New Caledonia and French Polynesia (for-
merly known as the *Etablissement français d’Océanie* or
EFO) became overseas territories. In 1962, Wallis and Futuna
voted to cease its protectorate status and become an overseas
territory, and in doing so received French citizenship. The
Condominium of New Hebrides, which France co-
administered with the United Kingdom, remained excluded
from much of these changes (and its indigenous population
unable to obtain French citizenship) until its independence in
1980 as Vanuatu (Rawlings 2012). New Caledonia’s status of
overseas territory permitted a degree of political autonomy
within France, but this remained essentially subject to French
control and at the whims of the government of the day.
Following the introduction of the Constitution of the Fifth
Republic under President Charles de Gaulle in 1958, the
French government gradually removed some of the territo-
ry’s autonomy against most local political leaders’ wishes.
This proved to be one of the underlying causes of the emer-
gence of the independence struggle in the territory (Le
Borgne 2005).

## 20.4 The Emergence of Kanak Independence

New Caledonia already possessed a highly diverse popula-
tion in 1946 (Kurtovitch 2000a). However, French colonisa-
tion depended on significant social segregation, especially
between the Kanak and non-Kanak populations. Political
changes (namely, the end of the *Code de l'indigénat* and an
end to Kanak isolation in reserves) and economic changes (a
large increase in French government funds for economic
development and the expansion of the nickel industry) saw a
large number of Kanak move to the Nouméa agglomeration
and other small urban centres, which had hitherto been
barred to Kanak.

Even though the Kanak people had become *de jure* citi-
zens of the Republic in 1946, they remained heavily margin-
alised socially, economically and politically in the post-war

period. The increasing presence of Kanak in Nouméa and the
towns only accentuated these inequalities (Barbançon 1992,
p. 37). For the first two decades following the war, the major-
ity of Kanak supported the *Union Calédonienne* (UC), a
political party formed in the early 1950s mostly from church-
affiliated associations and union organisations (Trépied
2010). Those Europeans in the UC tended to support New
Caledonian autonomy within France and challenged the eco-
nomic dominance of the large family-owned corporate inter-
ests. The UC, whose motto was “two colours, one people”,
strongly promoted improved welfare, access to infrastructure
and economic development of Kanak communities. While
some customary chiefs and individuals who had gained
important positions in the churches had attained some prom-
inence in the party, political power in the Territorial Assembly
remained largely in the hands of Europeans. The economic
marginalisation of the Kanak became more evident in the
wake of the territory’s “nickel boom” (1967–1972), which
brought an unprecedented level of wealth to the territory as
global nickel prices rose.

By the end of the 1960s, disenchantment with the status
quo among Kanak had already led to the emergence of new
political parties, such as the *Union Multiraciale de la
Nouvelle-Calédonie* led by Yann Celenei Uregei. Young
Kanak students, the first to receive university education,
returned from France and brought with them various ideo-
logical influences borne out of the student protest move-
ments that characterised France during the period, above all
May ’68 (Chappell 2014).

Arguably the most significant impact of the boom was the
sudden surge in the numbers of migrants from France and
French territories in the Pacific. Many Wallisians and
Futunians, who only became citizens in 1962, allowing them
to circulate freely across the Republic, moved to New
Caledonia *en masse*, quickly becoming the third largest eth-
nic community in the territory. The Kanak population
declined as an overall population from 51.1% in 1956 to
42% in 1976 (ISEE 2018; Kowasch 2010, p. 63; Vivier 2009,
p. 22). Seeing the seeds of Kanak discontent grow at a time
where France faced challenges from other indigenous popu-
lations and independence movements within the Republic,
not to mention international pressure to decolonise, the
French government actively encouraged and weaponised
migration as a means of “drowning” the Kanak electorate. In
May 1972, French Prime Minister Pierre Messmer penned a
letter to his Secretary of State for the Overseas, Xaviera
Deniau, in which he noted that:

> New Caledonia, colony of settlement, although destined to be a
> multiracial melting pot, is probably the last non-independent
> tropical territory where a developed country may send its nation-
> als...In the short and medium term, the massive emigration of
> French citizens must allow the avoidance of the danger of the
> pro-independence cause through the maintaining and improving
of the numerical balance of the communities. In the long-term, the indigenous nationalist cause will only be avoided if the non-indigenous communities represent a democratic majority mass. (cited in Besset 1998, p. 76)

This policy was supported by many in the business community as a means of attracting the skills and expertise required for the economic development of the territory, but rejected by the UC as a threat to local jobs. Simultaneously, the French government retracted elements of New Caledonia's post-war autonomy through a series of laws, including in the important area of nickel (Le Borgne 2005, p. 395).

While we might question the extent to which immigration occurred as a direct result of government policy, a clear nexus had emerged between New Caledonia's demography, namely, the balance between the Kanak and non-Kanak populations and local politics. This has continued to cast a shadow over New Caledonian political life beyond the emergence of the independence movement and into the Nouméa Accord period.

## 20.5 Migration and the Victims of History

When the Kanak independence movement emerged during the mid-1970s, opposition to immigration from France and other territories in the Pacific was a major political issue. However, there was no legal distinction between French citizens and New Caledonian locals, and no legal barriers preventing or hindering the movement of French metropolitans, Wallisians, Futunians and Polynesians with French citizenship to the territory.

The principle of democratic self-determination that framed decolonisation in much of the world and had become enshrined in a growing body of international law presented a dilemma in the New Caledonian case. For the *Front Indépendantiste* (FI), the indigenous Kanak people alone had the right to self-determination. But this excluded the majority of the population, including the European community whose descendants had lived in the territory for several generations. For the French government and loyalist parties such as the *Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la République* (RPCR),<fnref n="3" /> depriving a section of French citizens from democratic participation contravened the political rights guaranteed by the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. However, it should be noted that in the referendums of self-determination in both the cases of the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas (1974, now Djibouti) and the Comoros Islands (1975), voting was restricted to the *popula-

tions intéressées* (Aldrich and Connell 1992, p. 70); i.e. those with a minimum of 3 years local residence, which excluded temporary French public servants on rotation in the respective territory. Therefore, what were the boundaries of self-determination in the New Caledonian case?

In July 1983, the French socialist government convened a roundtable at the French town of Nainville-les-Roches, bringing together leaders from both the FI, the RPCR and a moderate party, the *Federation pour une Nouvelle Société Calédonienne* (FNSC), which formed a coalition government with the FI in 1982 (Barbançon 2008). Georges Lemoine, the Secretary of State for the Overseas, hoped to strike a political agreement between the two intransigent positions held by the FI and the RPCR. The meeting failed to produce a consensus, with the RPCR rejecting the final declaration. However, the FI and the FNSC agreed in principle to self-determination that included both the Kanak people and those labelled the “victims of history”, referring to non-Kanak with a deep historical connection to New Caledonia (the term “victim” evoking the experience of Frenchmen who arrived as part of French colonisation, either as convicts or labourers).

What this translated to in terms of a referendum of self-determination nevertheless remained problematic. The various elements of the FI, which in 1984 formed a loose coalition known as the *Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste* (FLNKS),<fnref n="4" /> considered that this should restrict participation to those with at least one parent born in New Caledonia. The RPCR rejected the very idea of “victims of history” as an insult and a denial of French legitimacy and identity. The FLNKS found little support outside the indigenous Kanak population for such a significant restriction of the right to vote for the referendum. On 13 September 1987, when the conservative French government organised a referendum of self-determination, it put in place a 3-year residency requirement, far short of what was demanded by the FLNKS, leading to their boycott and a 98.3% vote in favour of remaining in the Republic.

It was not until the 1988 Matignon-Oudinot Accords that an agreement was finally struck on who could participate in the referendum of self-determination forecast for 1998, but subsequently postponed until 2014 and 2018 following the Nouméa Accord. The text stipulated that only those residents in New Caledonia at the time of the referendum approving the Matignon-Oudinot Accords (i.e. 6 November 1988) would be eligible; in other words, a residency requirement of approximately 10 years. The Nouméa Accord would ultimately extend the residency requirement to a minimum of 20 years.

<footnote n="3">³Formed in 1977 under the leadership of Jacques Lafleur, it remained the dominant anti-independence or loyalist political party in New Caledonia until soon after the signing of the 1998 Nouméa Accord (see page 9).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴The FLNKS, proclaimed on 24 September 1984, was formed from several independence parties. Today, the two dominant parties of the “umbrella party” FLNKS are the UC and the *Parti de libération kanak* (PALIKA).</footnote>
## 20.6 The Nouméa Accord

On 5 May 1998, the FLNKS, the RPCR and the French government signed the Nouméa Accord. One of the central elements of the agreement was the creation of a “citizenship of New Caledonia” – an electoral body with the exclusive right to vote in the elections for the provincial assemblies and the Congress.

The idea of a distinct body of citizens of New Caledonia (the text refers to a citizenship of New Caledonia, not a New Caledonian citizenship) within the French Nation emerged a decade earlier during the negotiations for the Matignon-Oudinot Accords but did not see the light of day, deemed to be too sensitive at the time and likely to undermine commitment to a consensual solution (Christnacht 2009, p. 112). The historical and political reasons for this new citizenship were articulated in the delicately worded Preamble to the Accord:

> [Section 4] "It is today necessary to establish the foundations for a citizenship of New Caledonia, permitting the original people to form a human community with the men and women who live there, affirming its common destiny".

Citizenship of New Caledonia responded to the historical questions of legitimacy and belonging that emerged out of its colonial past. Affirming their exclusive right to self-determination, the FLNKS in turn recognised the legitimacy of certain sections of the non-Kanak population as fellow members of the political community. The Nouméa Accord should therefore be viewed as a continuation of the debate that began at Nainville-les-Roches in 1983.

Section 5 of the Accord equally states that:

> During this period, symbols will gradually recognise a citizenship of New Caledonia translating the chosen community of destiny, and able to transform into a nationality at the end of the period, if that is what is decided.

The noted distinction between “citizenship”, on the one hand, and “nationality”, on the other, speaks to ongoing sensitivities surrounding the language used in New Caledonian identity politics (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008; Faberon 2013). The Nouméa Accord does not refer to a New Caledonian “nation” and avoids any perceived erosion of the “one and indivisible” nature of the French Nation.<fnref n="5" /> New Caledonia can only become a nation, with its own distinct nationality, in the event that they accede to independence and break away from the French Republic.

Even though the Accord introduced a distinction between citizens of New Caledonia and other French nationals (though New Caledonians remain French nationals), this distinction is limited to the right to vote for provincial elections and the Congress and provisions promoting local employ-

ment. Otherwise, there is virtually no formal differentiation between them, despite the efforts to expand its scope beyond those two areas identified in the Nouméa Accord. Despite the political furore around migration, the Accord did not put in place any restrictions on the numbers of French citizens entering the country, though the promotion of local employment is undoubtedly a disincentive to prospective migrants. For the FLNKS and other pro-independence parties, citizenship is and remains a critical mechanism for protecting its electoral weight from being undermined by people they see as illegitimate. Further, it constitutes the centrepoint of a new political community, placing the Kanak at the centre, and reconstructs their relations with non-Kanak communities from this perspective, rather than shared French citizenship. Most political leaders accept the principle of local citizenship, often noting that New Caledonia's small population and landmass, and the limited scale of its economy render some sort of restriction justifiable (as noted in Section 4 of the Preamble to the Nouméa Accord). However, the traditional anti-independence parties have vociferously opposed the more severe restrictions on voting rights and local employment (see next section) as contrary to the spirit of the Accord and damaging to the economy.

Nevertheless, some parties successfully mobilised citizenship as a discursive means of distinguishing themselves and challenge the *Rassemblement* movement that had hitherto dominated New Caledonia's anti-independence politics under the leadership of Jacques Lafleur. During the 2004 provincial elections, RPCR dissidents formed *Avenir Ensemble*, which succeeded in toppling the RPCR as the largest anti-independence party in the Congress, with Marie-Noëlle Thémereau elected as President of the New Caledonian Government. In her maiden speech, Thémereau invoked citizenship as an important mechanism for realising the common destiny and suggested certain policy initiatives that would lend it greater significance (Thémereau, 17 August 2004). *Calédonie Ensemble*,<fnref n="6" /> led by Philippe Gomès, became the largest party in the Congress following the 2014 provincial elections, mobilising citizenship as a central theme of its political discourse. Gomès has unashamedly referred to New Caledonia's place within France as a "small nation in a large nation", crossing a threshold (i.e. referring to New Caledonia as a nation) previously considered anathema by many anti-independence actors (Robertson 2018, pp. 148-149). The resonance of a strong "multi-ethnic New Caledonian identity within France" might in part explain the success of *Calédonie Ensemble* in recent years.<fnref n="7" />

<footnote n="5">⁵Note that the word “nation” is capitalized in French when referring to France, *la Nation*.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶Formed in 2009, mostly from *Avenir Ensemble* and *Rassemblement* dissidents.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷Soon after this article's submission, *Calédonie Ensemble* experienced a considerable defeat in the May 2019 provincial elections, losing its dominance to the more traditional anti-independence coalition, currently known as the *Républicains (Avenir en confiance)*.</footnote>
Apart from the matter of voting rights, the politics of citi-
zenship has been most visible in disagreements over the
adoption of new symbols to represent the country. While
New Caledonia has adopted a new anthem, banknote designs
and a motto,<fnref n="8" /> political leaders have failed to reach consensus
on changes to two of arguably the most significant symbols
identified in the Accord: the flag and the country name
(Robertson 2018, pp. 244–255). To this day, New Caledonia
flies two flags: the French tricolour and the flag of the
FLNKS. The recognition of the FLNKS flag in 2011, the
result of a surprising move by the anti-independence
Rassemblement-UMP to symbolise the “Melanesian iden-
tity” of the territory was roundly opposed by Calédonie
Ensemble and other anti-independence parties but supported
by both the FLNKS and then President Nicolas Sarkozy
(Lindenmann 2004, pp. 11–15). Unlike the other French ter-
ritories of the Pacific, French Polynesia and Wallis and
Futuna, New Caledonians have failed to rally around a single
flag marking their identity. Political leaders have largely
sidelined the matter of the country name, despite some pro-
independence leaders referring to “Kanaky” or “Kanaky-
New Caledonia”, the former being the name invoked by
Jean-Marie Tjibaou in the early 1980s.

20.7 The Right to Vote

The stakes surrounding the referendum on self-determination
only reinforced the importance of voting rights. Kanak pro-
independence parties have sought the exclusion of more
recently arrived French nationals in order to counterbalance
non-Kanak dominance at the ballot box. The French law offi-
cially forbade any deprivation of citizens' rights, especially
democratic equality. For this reason, the FLNKS has often
appealed to international law to aide their cause, especially
UN General Assembly resolutions 1514 and 1541 on the
right to self-determination for colonised peoples. The crux of
the question remained "who" held such a right to self-
determination and how this determined the parameters of
suffrage, a question finally resolved by the 1988 Matignon-
Oudinot Accords.

In rendering New Caledonia *sui generis*, the Nouméa
Accord paved the way for expanding suffrage restrictions
beyond the referendum alone. The Constitutional Bylaw of
15 March 1999⁹ enumerated enrolment criteria for the spe-
cial electoral list of citizens of New Caledonia, including
continuous residence in New Caledonia prior to 8 November

1998 (i.e. the date of the Nouméa Accord referendum).<fnref n="10" />
Those who did not have the minimum residency period were
placed on an auxiliary roll<fnref n="11" /> until they reached 10 years of
continuous residency. Exceptions were granted to those
whose residence was interrupted for valid educational, pro-
fessional or medical reasons. The date on which residency in
New Caledonia commenced was not the date of arrival *per se*
but the date on which the individual enrolled on the general
electoral list at their local municipal town hall – a point that
would become problematic for certain metropolitan French
who arrived in New Caledonia but failed to take the neces-
sary steps to change their enrolment details.

The seemingly innocuous creation of the auxiliary roll
produced major political division. On 19 March 1999,
France's highest legal body, the Constitutional Council,
determined that the auxiliary roll would be renewed for each
election. This interpretation of the Constitutional Bylaw
meant that any person would be eligible to enrol on the spe-
cial electoral list of New Caledonian citizens as long as they
had 10 years' continuous residency, regardless of their arrival
date (see Clinchamps 2008; Chauchat 2008, 2012).
According to the FLNKS, this contravened the underlying
intent of New Caledonian citizenship, which was to prevent
new arrivals from having an undue influence in the balance
of power in the provincial assemblies and Congress. Instead,
they demanded the auxiliary roll be fixed, meaning that only
persons who had arrived in New Caledonia prior to 8
November 1998 "and" had 10 years of residence would be
eligible and individual who arrived after this date excluded.
Predictably, anti-independence leaders considered the per-
manent exclusion of new arrivals as the deprivation of demo-
cratic rights associated with French citizenship and contrary
to the spirit of the Nouméa Accord.

The French government at the time, led by Prime Minister
Lionel Jospin, criticised the Constitutional Council for its
interpretation, supporting the FLNKS view that the negotia-
tions had favoured a reading in favour of a “frozen electorate”
(Maclellan 1999, p. 249). The conservative President Jacques
Chirac committed to revise the Constitution in line with
FLNKS views (Maclellan 2010), while anti-independence
political leaders lobbied their political allies in Paris in a bid
to maintain the more open definition of New Caledonian
citizenship.

Chirac convened a Congress<fnref n="12" /> of the French Parliament in
February 2007, which overwhelmingly adopted a revision of
the Constitutional Bylaw of 15 March 1999. New Caledonia's
two deputies in the National Assembly and the single senate

<footnote n="8">⁸The New Caledonian Government organized a local competition in 2007 to determine a shortlist for the anthem, bank notes and country motto.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹Fr. *la loi organique du 15 mars 1999*.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰The various criteria render the voting rights matter very complex. For the sake of brevity, the author has simplified it considerably. For more detailed analyses by legal scholars, see Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz (2008) and Clinchamps (2008); see also Robertson (2018).</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹Fr. *Tableau annexe*.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹²A joint sitting of the French National Assembly and the Senate.</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 20.1** Electoral list figures</caption><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>1998</th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>General list</td><td>112,946</td><td>175,989</td><td>210,105</td></tr><tr><td>Provincial</td><td>104,078</td><td>152,462</td><td>169,635</td></tr><tr><td>Auxiliary register</td><td>8868 (7.8%)</td><td>23,527 (13.4%)</td><td>24,335 (13.4%)</td></tr></tbody></table>

representative (all from the RPCR) voted against the measures. The alteration of the text froze the special electoral list, meaning that any individual who arrived in New Caledonia after 8 November 1998 would be excluded from voting in elections for the provincial assemblies and the Congress until the Nouméa Accord period ended (Table 20.1).

Despite the overwhelming adoption of the revised text in the Congress, citizenship remained as polarising as ever in New Caledonia, due in large part to its importance for determining the balance of power in the Congress and its favouring of Kanak populations (and therefore the pro-independence vote). Despite the changes, the FLNKS did not succeed in obtaining a majority in the legislature in both the 2009 and 2014 provincial elections, even though its results did improve marginally over this period (23 seats in 1999; 18 in 2004; 23 in 2009; 25 in 2014).

The makeup of the special electoral list, distinct from the general electoral list of all French citizens, became an intensely bitter point of contention, fought out in the courts, especially in the lead up to the 2014 provincial elections. From 2010, pro-independence parties appealed on numerous occasions to have certain individuals removed from the special electoral list who they suspected did not have the requisite residency requirements. Anti-independence parties in turn committed resources to assisting voters to defend themselves in the courts. The FLNKS lay considerable blame on municipal governments responsible for admitting individuals on to both the general and special electoral lists for circumventing the enrolment criteria (Chauchat 2016).<fnref n="13" /> The issue became so important that in 2016 then Prime Minister Manuel Valls commissioned legal expert Félix Mélin-Soucramanien to investigate the true extent of the number of les indûment inscrit ("unduly enrolled") persons (Premier Ministre 2016). Political leaders eventually agreed to Mélin-Soucramanien's recommendation to re-examine some 1062 cases and that the matter of enrolment on the special list was "politically closed", though his report failed to restore trust in the electoral enrolment process among most pro-

independence leaders and court disputes on persons incorrectly admitted to the list continued (Robertson 2018, pp. 189–190).

The creation of the special electoral list had the unintended side effect of excluding a considerable number of Kanak voters as well (see Pantz and Robertson 2018; Robertson 2018, pp. 180–186). Since enrolment on the special electoral list was not automatic and required submitting the relevant paperwork proving the residency required, many Kanak did not undertake these steps. Alternatively, considerable numbers originally from the Loyalty Islands who moved to the urban agglomeration of Nouméa did not update their enrolment details, meaning they were excluded in their commune of residence (Pantz 2015; Robertson 2018, pp. 180–186). For certain Kanak living in "squat" communities in Nouméa, it was often difficult to find the necessary paperwork enabling their enrolment. Maximising Kanak participation in the South Province was a political necessity for the FLNKS. Dominant in the North and the Islands due to Kanak demographic dominance, the FLNKS considered that it could greatly improve its overall representation in the Congress should the increasing Kanak population in the South turn out in sufficient numbers. The FLNKS Commission recognised this and sought to reach out to Kanak voters to encourage everyone to verify their enrolment. Despite their efforts, right up until the 2018 referendum, pro-independence parties have maintained that thousands of Kanak remain excluded from voting, both in the provincial elections and in the referendum itself. Any significant absence of Kanak voters could certainly undermine the democratic legitimacy of a political settlement between pro and anti-independence parties.

The battle in the courts concerning New Caledonian citizenship created a similar debate on the 2018 referendum. While it is beyond the scope of this article to deal directly with the referendum (see Chap. 18 by Fisher in this book), there are noteworthy parallels between the two different electorates, even if the criteria for voting in the referendum are slightly different.<fnref n="14" /> To qualify for the special electoral list for the referendum, an individual needed to have had continuous residency in New Caledonia since 1994 or a parent who satisfied this criterion. Additional provisions allowed for some who are born in New Caledonia and could demonstrate a durable attachment to the territory to also be enrolled. In both cases, legitimacy and belonging resulted in competing notions of who should and should not be eligible to vote.

For these reasons, New Caledonia's political leaders have deliberated at length on which categories of persons, if any, should be automatically enrolled on the special electoral list

<footnote n="13">¹³Each of the municipalities has a special administrative commission that oversees the revision of electoral lists. In New Caledonia, these commissions consist of a five-person panel: The representative of the mayor, a magistrate, a representative of the State and two representatives from each of the main political parties. The FLNKS considers that in Greater Nouméa's municipalities the bias of mayoral delegate and the State would mean their delegate's views would be rejected out of hand, likely three against two.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴For a full discussion on the legal cases dealing with this issue see Chauchat (2016).</footnote>
for the referendum – an issue that dominated both the 2016 and 2017 Committee of Signatories meetings. The FLNKS originally maintained that only persons of “customary status”, essentially the Kanak, should be automatically enrolled. However, following anti-independence opposition to the idea of elevating one segment of the population above another, a compromise agreement was achieved on both Kanak and those born in New Caledonia. The enrolment debate continued beyond the 2018 consultation and remains a key point of discord in the lead up to the second consultation, scheduled for 4 October 2020.<fnref n="15" />

The ongoing sensitivity of the definition of citizenship, with all its political consequences, prompted France to eventually accept the FLNKS demand for United Nations oversight over the enrolment process. Since 2016, the UN Special Committee for Decolonisation has sent teams of experts to observe the special administrative commissions, as well as the conduct of the 2018 referendum. The yearly reports submitted by the UN thus far have highlighted the inconsistent approaches within and across the special administrative commissions, though arguably not to the extent claimed by the FLNKS (UN 2014, 2016, 2017).

## 20.8 Employment and Social Rights

Local employment restrictions have been another important, though less salient, dimension of citizenship in New Caledonia. The Nouméa Accord prescribed that citizenship of New Caledonia would, in addition to the right to vote, serve as a basis for the promotion of local employment. In other words, the Accord recognised the importance of finding some mechanism to lend an advantage to “New Caledonians” in the labour market. Demands for protecting local employment against foreign workers had existed in New Caledonia since the colonial period. For example, following the Second World War and the granting of French citizenship, local settlers demanded the repatriation of Asian and Pacific Islander indentured labourers who arrived in New Caledonia on private work contracts (see Adi 2014; Kobayashi 1992; Merle 1995, p. 203). Similarly, following the nickel boom (1967–1972) local labour unions mobilised against efforts by large businesses to encourage skilled migration to the territory (Barbançon 1992, p. 195).

As New Caledonia entered the twenty-first century, it remained highly dependent on the economic prosperity brought both by its nickel industry, not to mention French state investment. The nickel industry, historically dominated by French state-owned companies such as Société le Nickel

(SLN), transformed from the late 1990s, largely in response to local political pressure from pro-independence groups to break up the monopoly of the French giant Eramet (the parent company of SLN). Multinational companies including Falconbridge (Canada), Inco (Canada), Xstrata (Switzerland), Glencore (Switzerland), and Vale (Brazil), invested in new and existing mining projects Nickel prices rose considerably once more at the turn of the new millennium in response to China's growing demand, and with it, increased attraction for both French metropolitans and foreigners alike to move there. New Caledonia's increasing exposure to the free market and its requirement for the free movement of labour juxtaposed with its strong orientation towards local protectionism.

Through introducing a legal distinction between local citizens and non-citizens, the Nouméa Accord paved the way for stronger protections of New Caledonia's labour market. Section 4 of the Preamble to the Accord states that “the size of New Caledonia, its economic and social balance do not permit a significant opening of the labour market and justifies measures of local employment protection”. And further, “in order to take into account the tightness of the labour market, mechanisms will be defined in order to prioritise access to local employment for persons durably settled in New Caledonia”. This text recognised New Caledonia's geographical position as an island with a small population and the economic and social consequences associated with migration. However, the underlying disagreement on the boundaries of New Caledonian citizenship hindered any political consensus to implement the local employment agenda, while some anti-independence leaders opposed in principle any discrimination in the labour market and emphasised the importance of an open market in order to attract those with the best skills.

The first attempts at passing a law protecting local employment occurred in 2005 under the Avenir Ensemble government of Marie-Noëlle Thémereau, who came to power in 2004 after splitting with the RPCR. However, her government's proposed law, limited to the public sector, failed to pass through France's Conseil d'Etat because it was ruled to overstep the parameters pertaining to New Caledonian citizenship in the Constitutional Bylaw of 15 March 1999 (Gavard 2013).

It was not until 2012 when political leaders passed a bill on protecting local employment in the private sector (Gavard 2013). A separate law was created in 2016 for the public sector. Neither law made New Caledonian citizenship, strictly speaking, the basis for local employment. Instead, the private sector law created a mechanism that favoured those with longer durations of residence. The government publishes a detailed table of professions and attaches a mandatory duration of residence required to fill a position in the role, with the maximum duration required

<footnote n="15">¹⁵This chapter was originally submitted prior to the 2018 referendum, and subsequently revised in early 2020. The evolution of the voting rights debate beyond 2020 is not detailed here.</footnote>
for a profession being ten years.<fnref n="16" /> The greater the difficulty of filling the role locally, the lower the duration of residence required and, conversely, the easier a role can be filled by local labour, the higher the residency threshold. In effect, the mechanism sought to ensure that in the hypothetical scenario of two individuals with equal skills, qualifications and experience, the individual with the greater duration of residency would fill the role. Reflecting the political divisions on the issue, it struck a middle ground between demands for the protection of local employment, especially from unions, and concerns over preventing higher skilled individuals from coming to New Caledonia (Robertson 2018, pp. 198–221).

To oversee and enforce the mechanism, the legislation created a special committee, known as the *Comité paritaire d'emploi local* or CPEL, half consisting of union representatives and the other half, employer organisations, which deliberated on contentious cases brought by aggrieved parties. However, it is widely acknowledged that the lack of enforcement powers of the CPEL has enabled most companies to sidestep the laws (Robertson 2018, pp. 205–206).

A separate law in 2016 introduced local employment preferences in the New Caledonian public service, working according to a similar principle to the private sector. The delay in passing this law, despite the first attempt occurring ten years beforehand, was in part due to the courts cautioning the need to stay within the confines of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which guarantees French citizens equal access to the public service.

In neither the private nor public sector laws protecting and promoting local employment did citizenship of New Caledonia as defined in the Constitutional Bylaw of 15 March 1999 become the basis for defining locals and non-locals. Rather, local employment continues to reflect the multiple and contested notions of citizenship, not to mention the kind of economic model New Caledonia should pursue and how it engages with the global economy.

## 20.9 Turning to the Future

On 4 November 2018 and 5 October 2020, New Caledonians went to the ballot box to vote on the following question:

*Do you wish for New Caledonia to become fully sovereign and become independent?*<fnref n="17" />

In the first referendum, 56% of the population rejected independence, which proved a closer result than polls expected. In the second referendum, the result was even closer, with 53% of voters rejecting independence. A final third consultation is possible under the Nouméa Accord. The higher than expected vote for independence demonstrated the potential of the Kanak electorate, which participated in greater numbers than ever before, and has given supporters of independence some hope that victory is possible in the next ballots (see Pantz and Robertson 2018).

The surprising closeness of the result will only add to the importance of citizenship and voting rights. Indeed, the continued exclusion of certain French citizens from voting in local elections gathered renewed following the second referendum. The Nouméa Accord foresaw these referendums as the “exit” (fr. *la sortie*) from the period of transition and will address the full transfer of sovereign powers to New Caledonia, the transformation of citizenship into nationality and the accession to a full international status. In short, in the event of a “yes” vote, New Caledonia will become an independent state. With this in mind, three key dimensions of the citizenship question should be considered. What would happen to French citizenship/nationality? Who would be a New Caledonian citizen? Finally, what would happen to other parts of the French Pacific and their relations to New Caledonia?

The problem confronting voters is the lack of certainty in the event of a vote for or against independence. The French government has expressed its openness to respect New Caledonians’ democratic decision and work with them to implement a way forward.

No French political leader has explicitly stated that New Caledonians would lose their French nationality in the event of independence, and France remains a country where dual nationality is possible. Even pro-independence leaders have accepted that an ongoing link to France is possible. For example, the UC projet de société articulating their vision of what an independent New Caledonia looks like for the 2018 referendum suggests that a form of double nationality would be desirable if France agreed (UC 2017, p. 12). They state that French nationals who do not qualify for or want to acquire New Caledonian nationality are permitted to remain according to the conditions of the law. It is important to highlight that this is very different to the much more rigid approach taken by the independence movement in, for example, the 1987 FLNKS Constitution of Kanaky, which rejects dual nationality (FLNKS 1987). This may suggest that at least some pro-independence leaders are more favourable to an ongoing partnership of sorts with France in the long-term. It might be possible to introduce some form of free circulation of citizens, similar to that which existed in the aftermath of the 1962 Evian Accords with the newly independent Algeria, though the details would likely need to be worked

<footnote n="16">¹⁶The table, referred to as the *tableau des activités professionnelles* can be found at: https://dtenc.gouv.nc/sites/default/files/documents/emploi_local/tableau_des_activites_professionnelles.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷“Voulez-vous que la Nouvelle-Calédonie accède à la pleine souveraineté et devienne indépendante?”.</footnote>
out, as would the consequences for the population's European citizenship enjoyed by virtue of their belonging to France.

There is certainly no shortage of examples in the Pacific that could inspire New Caledonia's path forward, ranging from Cook Islands' self-government in free association with New Zealand or the Micronesian states' compacts with the United States. While the resident population of the Cook Islands are New Zealand citizens, this is not the case in the United States compact states, although the resident populations possess various legal privileges around living and working in the United States. This willingness to maintain links between France and New Caledonia, even in the event of independence, has not prevented some sections of the anti-independence camp from stating that independence would mean the deprivation of French nationality. Is it possible to guarantee that France, which is facing its own economic difficulties amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, would commit to ongoing forms of economic assistance or free access to an independent New Caledonia.<fnref n="18" />

Arguably the biggest challenge in regard to citizenship is simply that there remains no internal political agreement on its boundaries. The 2007 revision of the Constitutional Bylaw defining citizenship of New Caledonia remains very much contested. Indeed, France's Constitutional Council noted that New Caledonia's provincial electoral lists can only remain “frozen” until the end of the Nouméa Accord period, since it would be constitutionally difficult to justify permanent exclusion of French citizens from the right to vote (ECHR 2005). This view of course assumes that the two referendums thus far, or the third referendum that may follow, marks the end of the decolonisation process and a moral and legal justification for a restricted electorate. New Caledonia's anti-independence parties, especially those affiliated to *Les Républicains calédoniens*, have often repeated that the conditions for acquiring citizenship need to be changed. The approximately 13% of the local population without New Caledonian citizenship at present is likely to be unsustainable long-term.

Any new status would also need to take into account the relationship between New Caledonia and the rest of the French Pacific, especially Wallis and Futuna (Robertson 2018, pp. 155–160). More than 10% of the New Caledonian population identifies as Wallisian or Futunian, and there continue to be important customary, economic and religious links between the two countries. New Caledonia remains a primary destination for Wallisians and Futunians seeking more advanced health treatment, with a special arrangement

existing between the French Government, New Caledonia's major hospital and Wallis and Futuna. Historically, most of the Wallisian and Futunian community has supported anti-independence parties and helped ensure their democratic majority in the Congress. As the “third community” of New Caledonia, their support has been important for anti-independence parties maintaining a democratic majority. For the provincial elections in May 2019, a new political party, *L'Éveil océanien*, secured 8.56% of the South Province vote, and three seats in the Congress (four in the South Province Assembly) (see Chap. 18 by Fisher in this book). With an agenda focused squarely on supporting the needs and aspirations of the Wallisian and Futunian communities in New Caledonia, *L'Éveil océanien* reinforced the political importance of the Wallisian and Futunian community as “king-makers” in New Caledonian politics. Despite its anti-independence platform, the party surprised many when it threw its support behind UC-FLNKS leader Roch Wamytan for Congress president, demonstrating its willingness to assert its own interests (Vili 2019).

The different views of citizenship among New Caledonia's political leaders and the population at large are a reflection of competing notions of decolonisation. For many Kanak people with sympathetic views on independence, citizenship is primarily a vehicle for re-affirming their primacy within New Caledonia and ensuring they are not victims of any future demographic and democratic marginalisation. Some anti-independence parties view citizenship of New Caledonia as a political necessity. Further, citizenship lends legitimacy to the non-Kanak population as co-citizens of the political community. Perhaps the sole point of agreement is that citizenship is a language in which realise the “common destiny”. Indeed, New Caledonian citizenship invites a re-thinking of what it means both to belong to both New Caledonia and to France and endeavours to reconcile New Caledonia's multi-ethnic character with the particular claims of the Kanak people to constitute the basis of a self-determining political community. Whether it survives the Nouméa Accord process remains to be seen.

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<figure><img src="image_90.png" /></figure>
Simon P. J. Batterbury, Séverine Bouard, Christine Demmer, Denise Fisher, Matthias Kowasch, Isabelle Leblic, Pierre-Christophe Pantz, and Eddie Wayuone Wadrawane

**Abstract**

This multi-authored chapter covers some statements and reflections on the geopolitical but also environmental, societal and economic futures in the aftermath of the third referendum in 2021 on political independence, and after the visit of French President Macron to New Caledonia-Kanaky in July 2023. While for the current French government, the future of the country lies within the French Republic, pro-independence parties see the decolonisation process as unfinished and continue fighting for indepen-

dence from French authority. The political landscape thus remains strongly divided. References to historical events and social and ethnic aspects of voting patterns complete some of the reflections. We also highlight the profound changes which are taking place in rural communities, the future of the nickel sector, and educational reforms.

**Keywords**

Independence · Nouméa Accord · Decolonisation · Nickel sector · Rural economy · Education

This short chapter offers reflections by some of the book's authors, in the form of short statements, on the geopolitical but also environmental, societal and economic futures for New Caledonia-Kanaky in the aftermath of the third referendum in 2021 on political independence, which was largely boycotted<fnref n="1" /> by pro-independence supporters. The visit of President Macron to the archipelago in July 2023 was an important further development.

**Simon P.J. Batterbury** This book has revealed how, caught at the intersection of geopolitical and economic interests, New Caledonia-Kanaky's political path has never been smooth. The focus on political negotiations in several chapters should not detract from recognising that they also have significant effects on everyday livelihoods and lifeways. Uncertainty persists and the “future together” or “shared destiny” enshrined in some political discourse is still a long way off. The work of Anaïs Duong-Pedica (2023), for example, shows how “the colonial and racial divide persists in structuring selves and society by corroding relationships to space, land, and people; erasing histories; and regulating life”. This is particularly the case for mixed-race (*métis*) Kanak-White people who traverse boundaries of identity that are imposed

S. P. J. Batterbury
University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia
Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
e-mail: simonpjb@unimelb.edu.au

S. Bouard
New Caledonian Institute of Agronomy, Nouméa, New Caledonia
e-mail: bouard@iac.nc

C. Demmer
French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), Centre Norbert Elias, Marseille, France
e-mail: christine.demmer@univ-amu.fr

D. Fisher
Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
e-mail: denise.fisher@anu.edu.au

M. Kowasch (✉)
University College of Teacher Education Styria, Graz, Austria

Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Hamar, Norway
e-mail: matthias.kowasch@phst.at

I. Leblic
Lacito, French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), Paris, France
e-mail: isabelle.leblic@cnrs.fr

P.-C. Pantz
University of New Caledonia (UNC), Nouméa, New Caledonia
e-mail: pierrepantz@gmail.com

E. W. Wadrawane
University of New Caledonia (UNC), Nouméa, New Caledonia
e-mail: wayuone-eddie.wadrawane@unc.nc

<footnote n="1">¹Pro-independence leaders avoided the term “boycott” and called for “non-participation”.</footnote>
and reproduced in political discourse and in everyday life. Troubling a “binary political landscape” will never be easy, in formal politics or at a personal level.

While acknowledging the sensitivity of racial differences and the need for negotiation in what he called a “profound, sincere political exchange”, President Macron’s visit to New Caledonia-Kanaky in July 2023 reaffirmed France’s intention to remain a significant force in the Pacific and across the archipelago, not least because of continuing tensions resulting from Chinese expansionism. His conciliatory visit to the North Province and to Tiouandé and Touho was followed by a speech back in Nouméa where he asserted that “New Caledonia is French because it has chosen to remain French”. To many observers, this statement was inaccurate, given that the third referendum on independence in 2021 was widely boycotted and conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic (Kowasch et al. 2022). It is unfortunate that this “economy with the truth” was not challenged more widely, having passed with barely a ripple of dissent across the Pacific and Australia, a powerful neighbour. Australia has a centre-left labour government, which treads carefully with its renewed support for France after a period of diplomatic tensions, but at the same time, it has developed strong support for Indigenous self-recognition across its Pacific neighbours, appointing the first Australian Ambassador for First Nations People, Justin Mohamed. In addition, Australia saw a major campaign and a national referendum for constitutional amendments to recognise and establish its own Indigenous government assembly, something its Pacific neighbour has had since 1999. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong visited New Caledonia-Kanaky in April 2023. A year earlier, she said she was “determined to see First Nations perspectives at the heart of Australian foreign policy” (in Wadrawane et al. 2023), but during her visit, she had to remain neutral on the archipelago’s disputed governance arrangements.

During his own visit, President Macron reversed some of his government's earlier statements. He wishes to replace the Nouméa Accord with a new agreement in 2024, which means amending the French Constitution, to open up electoral rolls to allow more French citizens to vote on island affairs, and his administration supports an increase in military training on Grande Terre. In this speech and in draft documents, he is following a hard line on French interests, and in my view, this is really bad news for independence supporters and for the process of decolonisation. As this book goes to press, we are waiting to see if they will really be implemented “from above” in Paris from 2024 onwards, continuing a tradition of imposed governance that dates back over 170 years.

**Séverine Bouard** What do environmental, societal and economic futures hold in the aftermath of the third referendum on political independence?

As elections, meetings, referendums and presidential visits (the last in July 2023) come and go, on the ground, the Kanak domestic economy continues to change and evolve. Recent studies show that agricultural activity is holding up rather well in the communities, and the gamble taken by the Kanak leadership in the North Province on the large KNS (Koniambo Nickel SAS) nickel project has increased opportunities for marketing (Sourisseau et al. 2021).

The resilience of the rural economy will enable increasing autonomy, which is helpful given the rising cost of living experienced even in rural communities. However, it is still difficult to know whether the non-market economy will eventually dissolve completely as commodification and urban development advances and whether it will be able to meet the need for food self-sufficiency, particularly in the particularly tense geopolitical context of the Pacific. The spread of salaried employment in the nickel sector and climate change are disturbing semi-subsistence food production as well as traditional cultural practices. Socially, part of the Kanak rural world and the functioning of households is undergoing profound changes with the development of women's employment, particularly in the mining industry. Households in the villages located close to the mines, as well as those further afield, sometimes supply large numbers of women who now find it very difficult to fulfil the traditional gender roles assigned to Kanak women (Bouard and Demmer 2023). Under these conditions, after several years working in mining, some of the men and women employed choose to return to the domestic economy. But given the pressures to increase nickel output to feed the global demand in recent years, it is unclear whether small-scale family farming can be sustained, given its labour intensity and the attraction of paid employment.

Political independence and decolonisation are central to the economic and social needs of Caledonian and particularly, Kanak society. They will enable the continued evolution and maintenance of territorial heritage (including resilient social and cultural practices, mobility, and non-market exchanges). There are important aspects of culture and heritage that must be part of Kanaky-New Caledonia's future.

**Christine Demmer** At a time when a new coalition of anti-independence parties (the “Loyalist Union”) has announced, without reference to the colonised people, that the decolonisation process must be considered completed, the FLNKS (Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front) has declared that it wants to negotiate with the State. Their part of the independence movement is still requesting full sovereignty. The political path towards “decolonisation within the Republic”, introduced by former Prime Minister Michel Rocard in 1988, never extinguished the struggle for independence. In this small Pacific archipelago, where Kanak as a
group forms the largest percentage of the total population, the idea of a “federal solution” or a “differentiated solution” has been rejected. The State continues to remain deaf to the Kanak desire to create a multicultural nation (with a common civil and customary status), as a partner with France. Accepting this demand would show that the definition of colonisation as a “crime against humanity”, as Emmanuel Macron asserted in Algeria in 2017, was not just his electoral slogan, but a commitment to truly come to terms with the colonial past. How can we move forward to another political solution now, 7 years later, given Kanak’s determination to achieve full political independence?

**Denise Fisher** The compromise political framework under which New Caledonia has operated peacefully for 30 years has expired, reopening uncertainty about the territory's future governance and relationship with France. Sadly, the final independence vote guaranteed by that framework was politically nullified by an effective boycott by Indigenous independence supporters, after France declined their request to postpone the vote to enable their cultural grieving practices after the devastating impact of COVID-19. Early discussion between France and loyalist and independence groups is essential. But these groups are more polarised than ever, and talks must necessarily focus on areas of deepest difference. These include whether or not to hold yet another independence referendum, special citizenship rights of employment and voting eligibility for longstanding residents, governance institutions themselves, key powers including foreign affairs and defence, distribution of nickel revenues and genuine engagement of all young people in social, economic and civil life. Talks will inevitably redefine the territory's relationship with France, with implications for the fragile immediate geographical neighbourhood, and the wider South Pacific region where Western interests, including major French national interests, are undergoing strategic challenges.

**Matthias Kowasch** Macron's second presidency has to deal with the deep distrust of Kanak communities in New Caledonia-Kanaky. In 2022, Macron was re-elected as French president (winning in New Caledonia-Kanaky with 61% of support against 39% for Le Pen). Since then, the decolonisation process in the French overseas territory has been on an unofficial "stand-by". From 1 to 4 June 2023, France's Interior and Overseas Minister Gérald Darmanin visited Nouméa. To revive the dialogue and to cajole some cooperation, he made three proposals: (a) a promise of self-determination within one or two generations, a timeline which was immediately rejected by pro-independence leaders; (b) France did not rule out the transfer of further political competences including sovereign powers (defence, currency, law and order, foreign politics); c)

the restriction of voter eligibility in local provincial elections will – at present – not be changed (essentially confined to those already resident in 1988 and their descendants) (Fisher 2023). As of late 2023, there was little sign of a way forward for the political status of the archipelago, following the historic visit by President Macron in July 2023 and draft legislation on constitutional reform.

Mining is intimately linked to the colonial history of the country and the marginalisation of Indigenous Kanak people on Grande Terre. The dominant nickel sector may contribute economically to the wealth of the country, but it also makes New Caledonia-Kanaky one of the world's largest CO₂ emitters per capita. The nickel and transport sector are emitting 84% of all greenhouse gases (Energy Observer 2023). There is now some action to reduce CO₂ emissions: Mining companies are required to cut emissions by 50% by 2035 and be zero neutral before 2050.

While the Koniambo project in the North Province has a clear geopolitical objective dating back decades, having been initiated by supporters of economic emancipation from France (Batterbury et al. 2020), as of 2023, Goro Nickel is preparing to supply Tesla with nickel for battery manufacturing. Tesla wants to secure and control its supply chain but is also insisting on tighter environmental standards and social responsibility. The critique is that some “greenwashing” is taking place –Tesla’s electric cars are mostly bought by environmentally conscious affluent consumers, who sometimes overlook the conditions of production and the CO₂ embedded in the supply chain. In addition, the Goro Nickel smelter has a long history of accidents including heavy environmental damage. Therefore, the future will reveal if Goro Nickel serves as a cautionary example of how difficult it is to achieve true sustainability – sustainability that is an important approach (but also a buzzword) to deal with global environmental changes and to preserve the outstanding marine and terrestrial biodiversity of the archipelago. In the beginning of 2024, all three nickel smelters in the country (Koniambo, Goro Nickel and the over 100 years old Doniambo) are in financial difficulties, they have a combined deficit of €1.4 billion (NC la 1ère, 2024) which emphasises the social-economic risks of dependence on the commodities sector. The activities at Koniambo are currently even suspended.

**Isabelle Leblic** It is not fair to reduce the independence vote to a vote along ethnic lines. The independentists have taken up the “bet on intelligence” made by Jean-Marie Tjibaou in the 1980s. Since the Matignon-Oudinot Accords in 1988, or even since the round table of Nainvilles-les-Roches in 1983, the hands extended by the Kanak towards the non-Kanak for the construction of an independent country are innumerable. On the other hand, the non-independence positions are becoming increasingly clear-cut, close to racism, and political leaders do everything to thwart a positive evolution of the
country. They even brought forward the third and final referendum to ensure a “no” vote in 2021, against all decency in the face of Kanak mourning, refusing to postpone it (Leblic 2021a, b). All this happened with the help of the French State, moving away from its declared position of impartiality. Today, the pro-independence activists are still trying to break the deadlock, but they no longer believe in promises that are never kept. They demand strong action. There is no indication that this will come. However, the future of a democratic Kanaky-New Caledonia, concerned with balanced development respecting the environment and with social and economic justice that allows well-being for all, whatever their origin, means this is a small price to pay.

Pierre-Christophe Pantz Electoral ethnicization, reinforced during the first and second referendums on independence from France, was confirmed during the third consultation in 2021, and this has proven to be a dead end. The cold reality of 30 years of elections, then referendums, has left the broad contours of the vote unchanged: Kanak people continue to vote essentially for independence while the bulk of non-Kanak people continue to reject it massively. The ethnic border has largely remained unchanged despite appeals on all sides for an intelligent vote. Since the electorate is frozen, the quest for a majority (for or against independence) is dependent on relatively marginal demographic movements. And it is clear that the evolution of the balance of power seems to be deeply crystallised and stabilised, unchanged by the 2021 consultation. Overall, given the impermeability of the political allegiance of the Kanak and non-Kanak blocs of the New Caledonian population, the majority vote of one camp over the other solves nothing and looks more like a Pyrrhic victory.

Eddie Wayuone Wadrawane In 2006, Carole Reynaud Paligot wrote in her book *La République raciale (1860-1930)*: “...the racial mixing of settlers and Indigenous people should create a ‘tropical race’, adapted to the tropical climate, and which will compensate for the inability of White people to acclimatise. [...]” (p. 57). If physically people were “colored” following such miscegenation, this was symbolic since their heads remained European. The results of the various referendums in the contemporary period have sufficiently shown resistance to changing this state of mind to create an emancipated and sovereign country.

Schooling continues to build and shape minds, giving new generations a sovereign and emancipated spirit. Knowledge gained at school should promote an emancipatory cognitive challenge for students, and not their ideological enslavement. Back in 2001, at the presentation of the new curricula for primary school education in New Caledonia, Marie-Noëlle Themereau, former New Caledonian President,

declared: “In the city, the village or the community, schools should take the first step towards families. This is the indispensable mark of respect for our public service”.

Almost 16 years later, the New Caledonian Educational Project voted by the parliament in January 2016 was a major institutional advance, because fundamental elements of Kanak culture were included in the curriculum. This inclusion offers a bridge of intercultural understanding and could contribute to overcoming social inequalities. However, fundamental elements of Kanak culture introduced into schooling need strengthening in the social world as well, in order to promote a change of mentalities.

## References

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Bouard S, Demmer C (2023) Mining workforce experience: changes in femininities and resistances in masculinities through the example of a very feminized mine, KNS, Mining Encounter Research Seminar, MINERAL, UQ, CNRT Nickel, PACSEN, August 22–23, 2023, The University of Queensland, Brisbane (AU)

Duong-Pedica A (2023) Mixed-race Kanak in “a world cut in two”: contemporary experiences in Kanaky/New Caledonia. J Crit Mixed Race Stud 2(1). https://doi.org/10.5070/C82161755

Energy Observer (2023) New Caledonia: a considerable carbon footprint. https://www.energy-observer.org/resources/new-caledonia-carbon-footprint

Fisher D (2023) Uncertainty in New Caledonia. The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/uncertainty-new-caledonia

Kowasch M, Batterbury SPJ, Bouard S (2022) The third independence referendum in New Caledonia – a fallback to colonialism? Pac Geogr 57:11–15. https://doi.org/10.23791/571115

Leblic I (2021a) Référendum 2021 : Le « non » a perdu 5 783 voix. Le Club de Mediapart. https://blogs.mediapart.fr/aisdpk-kanaky/blog/131221/referendum-2021-le-non-perdu-5-783-voix

Leblic I (2021b) Moi, française anticolonialiste, je ne suis pas fière ce soir. Le Club de Mediapart. https://blogs.mediapart.fr/aisdpk-kanaky/blog/121221/moi-francaise-anticolonialiste-je-ne-suis-pas-fiere-ce-soir

NC la 1ère (2024) Prony Resources : un sursis pour les finances del’usine du Sud. 5 January 2024. Available online at: https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/nouvellecaledonie/province-sud/prony-resources-un-sursis-pour-les-finances-l-usine-du-sud-1454801.html

Reynaud Paligot C (2006) La République raciale (1860–1930). Collection: Science, histoire et société. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris

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Wadrawane EW, Merle I, Kowasch M, Batterbury SPJ (2023) New Caledonia has had an indigenous body advise government since 1999. What can Australia learn? The Conversation. Available online at: https://theconversation.com/new-caledonia-has-hadan-indigenous-body-advise-government-since-1999-what-can-australia-learn-204906
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<figure><img src="image_91.png" /></figure>
A

Academy of Kanak languages (ALK), 6, 155, 159, 173, 175, 253

Accumulation by dispossession, 86, 87

Adaptive radiation, 23, 24

Aengeni hnameneng ceremony, 185, 186

Agency for Rural Development and Regional Planning (ADRAF),
5, 63, 121–124, 127–129, 151

Agency for the Development of Kanak Culture (ADCK), 150,
152–155, 159, 173, 253

Agricultural monetary income, 63

Agricultural production, 62, 63, 121

Aid programme, 241

Airport's extension, 209–210

Allocated spaces, 127

Araucaria, 22, 23, 26

Artillery district, 142

Assisted economy, 65

Associated state, 254, 261

AUKUS, 247

Austronesian language family, 164

Autochthonous vegetation, 24–25

Autochtone de souche, 220

Autonomies, 7, 14, 16, 80, 185, 205, 229, 230, 238, 240, 259, 262,
263, 274

B

Bachelor's degree in Oceanic languages and cultures (LLCER), 172

Baco community, 124–126

Ballande, 109, 111

Banana, 63–65, 67, 69, 254

Basal angiosperms, 23, 24, 27, 28

Basel and Waigani Conventions, 82

Belep Islands, 22, 54

Benthic habitats, 34–38, 40

Bercy agreement, 93, 231

Between-ness, 89

Binary identity, 256

Biodiversity conservation, 15, 17

Biodiversity hotspot, 2, 4, 13, 28, 74

Biodiversity research hotspot, 19

Biological diversity, 3, 13, 16

Boat owners, 50

Bougainville Agreement, 245

Boundaries, 16, 120, 122, 127, 259, 261, 263, 267, 269, 273

C

Cantonnement, 120, 151

Capitalism, 86, 87, 256, 257

Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI), 80

Chemical pollution, 81

Chinese colony, 242

Chinese smelters, 111

Christnacht, A., 240, 259, 264

Citizenship, 6, 86, 120, 171, 182, 190, 204, 231, 240, 241, 245,
259–269, 275

Clan geographical relations, 186

Climate change, 6, 22, 29, 42, 82, 123, 246, 260, 274

CO₂, 7, 14, 275

Collegial government, 231, 232

Colonial relationship, 7, 205

Colonisation, 24, 29, 56, 61, 62, 67, 119, 129, 163, 164, 173, 181, 257

“Comité Environnemental Koniambo” (CEK), 88, 95–99

Comité paritaire d'emploi local (CPEL), 268

Commercialisation, 68

Committee of Signatories, 110, 113, 232, 234, 235, 239, 267

Committee on Foreign Trade in Mining (CCEM), 111

Common destiny, 3, 6, 8, 140, 143, 177, 178, 190, 231, 253–259,
264, 269

Communitarians, 260

Community agricultural activity, 65

Community of citizens, 104, 113, 114

Conflit des rouleurs, 111, 113

Conifer species, 22, 23, 27

Consensual school locations, 180

Constitutional Council, 265, 269

Consultative Customary Environmental Committee (CCCE), 88, 94,
95, 97–99

Continental shelf, 33, 34

Coral habitat, 37

Coral Sea Natural Park (CSNP), 19, 33, 35–38, 42

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), 86

Cosmopolitan agglomeration, 143

COVID-19, 238, 269

COVID-19 pandemic, 17, 225, 238, 269, 274

Covid-free status, 236

Crop rotations, 65

Crustaceans, 35, 41, 52

Cultivated biodiversity, 67

Cultural association “Vee Caa”, 157

Cultural dimension, 68, 259

Cultural diversity, 159

Custom, 4, 78, 149, 152, 183, 185–187, 197, 198, 203, 204, 207,
209–213, 254, 255, 261

Customary authorities, 16, 18, 94, 96, 97, 99, 109, 127, 129, 208, 209

Customary ceremony, 16, 52, 56, 127, 130, 185

Customary gifts, 210

Customary lands, 4, 5, 62, 63, 119–131, 151, 229, 262

Customary practices, 129, 155, 185, 187, 209

Customary purposes, 54, 67

Customary rules, 41, 56, 212
Customary Senate, 6, 141, 156, 175, 198, 200, 240, 253, 257

Customary values, 61, 67

## D

Decision-making, 14, 58, 88, 99, 127, 128, 205, 208, 209, 211

Decolonisation, 2–6, 48, 86, 88, 96, 99, 130, 150, 153, 155, 179, 198, 212, 231, 238, 243, 245, 246, 253, 255, 256, 259–263, 267, 269, 274, 275

Decolonisation within the Republic, 212

Defferre's Framework Law, 104

Degraded habitats, 25

Deixonne Law, 154, 171, 177

Demographic increase, 40, 41

Demographic transition, 134–135

Didactization, 176

Dijoud's plan, 121

Discrimination, 87, 151, 199, 204, 233, 254, 256, 267

Domestic waste, 77–78

Drehu, 153, 154, 165–167, 171–173, 176, 177

Drubea-Kapumë country, 150–152

Dry forests, 17, 21, 27, 28

Du Bouzet, 56, 120

## E

East Camp prison, 141

Eco-contribution, 80

Economic nationalism, 103–105

Economy of the common good, 257

Electoral body, 264

Electoral legitimacy, 209

Endemic flora, 21, 24

Endemicity, 26–29, 35, 179

Endemism richness, 4, 13

Ensemble Pour La Planète (EPLP), 15

Entrepreneurship, 64, 129

Environmental agents, 88

Environmental justice (EJ), 4, 5, 86–88, 94, 97

Environmental management provisions, 88, 98, 99

Environmental policies, 4, 5, 7, 13–19, 42, 74, 83, 95

Environord, 88, 96–99, 150

Equal footing, 99, 261

Ethnic disparities, 143

Ethnic inequalities, 142, 253

Ethnic redistribution, 5, 134, 143

Eurocentrism, 176

Eveil Océanien, 269

Événements, 163, 217, 230

Exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 3, 4, 7, 13, 18, 19, 33, 34, 42, 195, 246

## F

Fagauvea, 165–167, 207, 210

Falconbridge, 2, 93, 267

Family consumption, 53

Family farming, 4, 61–69, 257, 274

Federation of Melanesian Women's Associations of New Caledonia, 197

Federation of Small Kanak Miners, 112

Feillet plan, 62

Feminism, 4, 196, 197, 199

Ferronickel, 89

Fifth Republic, 262

54-member Congress, 232

First referendum, 143, 234–236, 242, 245–247, 268

Fish aggregation devices (FAD), 53

Fishers on foot, 57

Fishing licence, 49, 57

Fishing practices, 4, 42, 48, 49, 53, 56

Fishing vessels, 42, 58

FLNKS, 5, 96–99, 103–107, 109–114, 164, 180, 196, 198, 199, 217, 230–232, 234–236, 241, 243, 256, 263–269, 274

Former chieftaincy, 157

Franconesia, 219

French citizens, 3, 138, 204, 262–264, 266, 268, 269, 274

French Fourth Republic, 261

French political calendar, 239

French Polynesia, 195, 197, 210, 235, 242, 245, 246, 262, 265

French presidential elections, 97, 230, 256

Full sovereignty, 234, 238–241, 243, 253, 254, 274

Fundamental elements of Kanak culture (EFCK), 6, 171, 173, 177, 179, 183, 276

## G

Gender politics, 6

General electoral list, 265, 266

Geometry, 67, 187

Gilets Jaunes, 255

Globalized corporations, 87

Gondwana, 22

Gorodey, D., 6, 173, 196, 198, 199

Goro nickel plant, 237

Goro Nickel project, 87, 89, 90, 92, 94, 97, 98, 112

Greater Nouméa, 5, 16, 65, 74, 78, 93, 134, 136–143, 145, 164, 166–170, 187, 266

Greater Nouméa inter-municipal service, 78

Green sea turtle, 36

Group of Kanak and Exploited Women in Struggle (GFKEL), 196, 200

Groupement de droit particulier local (GDPL), 64, 122–125, 127, 128, 130

## H

Haeke, 150, 152, 155–157, 166

Hawkers, 53, 54

High Commissioner, 236, 238, 239

Historic dualism, 4, 119, 120, 127, 130

Hook and line fishing, 51

Horticultural know-how, 62

Household garbage, 75

Humaa-gué, 5, 98, 150, 157–159

Human rights, 93, 190, 233, 260

Hydrometallurgical process, 89

Hyper-centralisation, 134–138

## I

Iaai, 158, 166, 167, 172, 207, 210

Iaai customary council, 209

IAC survey, 64, 65, 67

Iconic species, 4, 34, 38, 39

“Inclusive” economy approach, 5, 131

Indigenous Code, 62, 134, 139, 151, 153

Indigenous Customary Negotiating Body (ICAN), 92, 95, 97–99

Indigenous identities, 6, 119

Indigenous Kanak knowledge, 5, 176, 179

Indigenous Kanak scholars, 3
Indigenous Natural Resources Management Committee (CAUGERN), 218

Indigenous rebellion, 230

Indigenous rights, 3, 97, 120, 199, 260

Indonesia, 89, 229, 245, 247

Indo-Pacific plan, 242

Industrial Strategic Committee, 110

Informal fishing, 41, 53, 57

Intangible wealth, 56

Intellectual property rights, 223

Intersectionality, 196, 199

Invasive species, 15, 17, 18, 29, 153

IUCN Red List, 28

J

Juxtaposition of the two institutional systems, 56

K

Kaméré peninsula, 140, 142

Kanak communities, 2, 4, 15, 48, 50, 51, 55, 58, 62–65, 75, 81, 87, 92, 96, 97, 99, 109, 112, 121–125, 127, 130, 141, 151, 156, 166, 176, 187, 257, 262, 275

Kanak cultural heritage, 5, 149–159

Kanak entrepreneurship, 105

Kanak farming systems, 64–68

Kanak houses, 151–153

Kanak identity, 6, 15, 143, 149, 152, 159, 164, 235, 253

Kanak kinship system, 139

Kanak Language Academy (ALK), 173

Kanak languages, 6, 149, 150, 153–155, 158, 159, 163–173, 175–177, 179, 188, 190, 223, 253

Kanak languages and culture (LCK), 166, 171, 253

Kanak petroglyphs, 187

Kanak university lecturers, 234

Kanak women leaders, 196

Kanakydeal, 158

Kaneka music, 5, 149, 157–159

Koné, 36, 40, 64, 65, 69, 107, 122, 124, 128, 150, 168, 205, 212

Koné-Tiwaka transversal route, 64

Koniambo, 2, 5, 7, 15, 65, 75, 86, 87, 89–96, 107, 109, 128, 138, 231, 233

Koniambo Nickel SAS (KNS), 88, 89, 93, 95–99, 107, 233, 274

Koniambo project, 3, 86, 89, 92, 93, 95–97, 99, 254, 275

Kouaoua, 168, 235

L

Land legitimacies, 5, 88, 123, 127, 128

Land Office, 122, 123, 151

Land reform, 4, 5, 119–131, 151

Language teaching, 176, 180

Law on plastics, 74

Lecornu, S., 237–239, 243

*Les événements*, 230

Liberal conceptions, 260

Lifou island, 22, 55

Local council, 6, 203–213

Local Kanak Schools (EPK), 154, 163, 164, 171, 179, 180

Local market, 18, 54, 69, 130

London Missionary Society, 176, 180

Loueckhote amendment, 198, 199

Loyalty Islands languages, 166

M

Machoro, E., 105

Macron, E., 3, 7, 97, 113, 177, 238, 239, 242–244, 246, 247, 255, 256, 273–275

Mangrove areas, 29, 36

Mangroves, 15, 28, 29, 35, 36, 41, 51, 52, 82, 158

Manta ray, 38

Mapou, L., 8, 237, 255

Maquis, 21–29

Marginalisation, 5, 61–63, 87, 138–143, 199, 262, 269, 275

Marine protected areas (MPAs), 18, 19, 38, 39, 42, 48

Marine recreational activity, 41

Marine species, 16, 35, 37, 38

Marxist leaders, 254, 256

Matignon-Oudinot Accords, 7, 62, 92, 104–106, 110, 120, 123, 125, 138–140, 143, 164, 175, 230–231, 254, 263–265, 275

Matrimonial and political alliances, 164

Mayor of Ouvéa, 207–209, 212

Melanesia 2000, 200

Melanesian identity, 265

Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), 235, 237, 238, 243, 245, 246

Messmer, P., 221, 230, 262

Metaphorical spiral configuration, 186

Mining activities, 14, 15, 26, 29, 40, 41, 74, 85, 87, 94, 108, 109, 133, 256

Mining waste, 5, 76, 82

Minke whale, 40

Missionaries, 62, 153, 164, 176–178, 180, 181, 205, 207, 229

Missionary dresses, 207

Modified vegetation, 24, 25

Montane forests, 27

Mortality, 48, 243, 255

Mosquito species, 18

Mourning ceremonies, 187, 243

Multilingual, 165

Municipalities, 2, 5, 15, 50, 54, 64, 73, 77–81, 83, 93–95, 122, 124, 127, 128, 151, 164, 165, 168–170, 187, 203–210, 212, 266

N

Näcaao (Nechaot), 180, 182

Nainvilles-les-Roches, 275

National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations, 177

Nationality, 238–241, 256, 260, 264, 268, 269

Native regulations, 203, 204, 212

Natural habitats, 13, 21

Natural Park of the Coral Sea, 7, 13, 18, 74

Néaoutyne, P., 128

Nengone language, 180, 184

Neoliberalism, 86, 87, 255

Netchaot, 156, 166, 180, 182

New Caledonian Educational Project (PENC), 182, 276

New Century Resources, 92, 236, 237

Niaouli, 25

Nickel, 13, 21, 65, 74, 86, 103, 121, 134, 179, 218, 229, 255, 262, 274

Nickel boom, 121, 179, 262, 267

Nickel doctrine, 110–112

Nickel mining, 2, 5, 14, 82

Nickel ores, 29, 89, 90

Non-participation, 3, 242–245
Non-self-governing territories, 2, 230, 231, 239, 245

Nouméa Accord, 2, 3, 16, 62, 73, 121, 123, 125, 149, 154, 164, 171, 175, 177, 178, 182, 190, 198, 231–241, 243–247, 253, 254, 257, 259, 263–269, 274

Nouméa peninsula, 140, 141

Nuclear capacity, 246

Numèè language, 150, 152, 157–159

O

ŒIL, 88, 94, 95, 97–99

Opération Café, 62

Organic law, 73, 78, 123, 231, 233

Outrigger canoes, 51

Ouvéa, 6, 16, 33, 41, 48, 63, 78, 80, 164–166, 168, 203–213, 230

P

Pacific archipelago, 1, 89, 255, 274

Pacific Experimentation Centre (CEP), 219

Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), 7, 233, 234, 237, 238, 245–247

Pacific Islands region, 82, 195, 196, 200

Pact for Sustainable Development of the Big South, 94, 95, 109

Païc-Èmuhi country, 150, 152, 153, 156

Papua New Guinea Parliament, 200, 245

Parity, 6, 195–201

Parti Travailliste (PT), 232, 234, 236

Pelagic species, 33

Personal mining autorisation, 112, 114

Philippe, E., 232, 234, 236, 238–240, 242

Physical pollution, 85

Pidjot, R., 106, 107

Plastic products, 82

“Pluriactive” fishers, 50

Pluriactivity, 53, 56–58, 65, 68

Plurilingualism, 153

Political arena, 6, 203–213

Political community, 259–261, 264, 269

Political marginalisation, 138–143

Politics of place, 127

Port-de-France, 133

POSCO, 107

Post-mining landscapes, 85

Poum, 5, 48, 52, 54, 93, 120, 124, 127, 128, 166, 168, 172

Power relationships, 64, 211, 256

Practice-image-speech trilogy, 187

Professional fishers, 48, 53, 54, 56, 57

Professionalisation, 56, 58, 207

Professional politicians, 206–208, 210, 213

Projet de société, 268

Prony Resources, 92

Protest movements, 262

Provincial assemblies, 6, 195, 198, 231, 232, 240, 241, 264–266

Provincial Plan for Waste Prevention and Management, 79

R

Rainforests, 21, 24, 26, 27

Rebalancing, 5, 74, 92, 121, 125, 159, 178–180, 254

Recreational fishing, 34, 41, 48, 50, 51

Recycling, 5, 76–79, 81, 82, 257

Reef fish, 50, 52

Reef habitats, 36, 41

Reef lagoon fishers, 50

Relict lineages, 21

Resistance, 87, 99, 150, 158, 176, 180, 199, 230, 261, 276

Resource curse, 87

Rhéébù Nùù, 15, 88, 92, 94, 96–99, 218, 224

Rhô community, 176, 177, 180

Rhô school, 180

Roch Wamytan, 232, 236, 237, 241–243

Rural municipalities, 77, 139

S

SAEML Grand Projet VKP, 125

Scalar geographies, 7

Schéma de Mise en Valeur des Richesses Minières, 109

Schools, 52, 79, 124, 135, 150, 163, 175, 204, 253, 276

Sculptor, 157

Sea snakes, 35, 40

Seagrass habitats, 36

2nd FLNKS Congress, 180

Second referendum, 104, 109, 195, 234–238, 255, 268, 276

Settlement, 1, 4, 7, 14, 24, 61, 63, 87, 119–121, 124, 130, 164, 229, 233, 253, 262, 266

Sishè language, 166

Small-scale commercial fishers, 53

Small-scale fishers, 47, 58

Social indicators, 142

Social license to operate, 97

Social peace, 253

Société Le Nickel (SLN), 3, 15, 87, 93, 104, 231, 233, 235, 267

Société Minière du Pacifique Sud (SMSP), 88, 92, 93, 105

Socio-economic development, 5, 120, 125, 128, 130

SOFINOR, 92, 97

Soil excavation, 14

South Pacific neighbourhood, 247

Sovereign powers, 231, 240, 244, 259, 268, 275

Special Electoral Consultation List (LESC), 222

Special electoral list, 265, 266

Sponge species, 35

State machinery, 212

Subsistence fishers, 53, 57

Suburbs, 74, 166, 233

Superinsularity, 78

Survey, 5, 34, 35, 38, 41, 48, 50, 51, 56, 63–65, 69, 130, 152, 154–156, 219, 238

Sustainability, 40, 58, 61, 67, 68, 99, 176, 257, 275

T

Taxonomic disharmony, 24

Technical innovations, 68

Tesla, 7, 97, 275

Thémereau administration, 199

The Rob Mission, 8

The Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), 82

Third referendum, 6, 234, 235, 237–247, 256, 269, 273, 274

Thu-ni stage, 184

Titch, 124, 127

Tjibaou cultural centre, 6, 155, 173, 253

Tjibaou, J.-M., 5, 96, 105–107, 119, 131, 151, 152, 154, 155, 182, 199, 200, 205, 212, 230, 231, 240, 253, 265, 275

Toponyms, 3, 5, 149, 155, 156, 159

Touaourou community, 98, 153, 158

Trafigura, 92, 95

Transposition, 179, 183, 185, 187

Turnout, 234, 237, 243
U

Ultramafic soils, 1, 22–24
Ultramafic substrate, 21, 23–26, 28, 29
Uncommon destiny, 257
UNC Teacher Training School, 177
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 87, 109, 218, 219, 261

Unemployment rate, 65, 140–142, 178, 179

UNESCO World Heritage Sites, 4, 7, 16, 17, 79, 205

UN General Assembly resolutions, 265

*Union Calédonienne* (UC), 111, 124, 205, 207, 230, 255, 262, 263, 268

University of New Caledonia (UNC), 4, 125, 172, 175, 177, 182

UN Special Committee for Decolonisation, 2, 97, 267

Urban growth, 7, 93

Useful Agricultural Area, 128

*“Usine du Sud = Usine Pays”*, 92, 95, 97, 98

V

Vavouto peninsula, 93

Vernacular languages, 154, 163–168, 172

Vice Rectorate, 172, 177

Victims of history, 263

Voh, 41, 64, 122, 168

Voh-Koné-Pouembout (VKP) area, 41, 65, 78, 93, 98, 124, 125, 127, 128, 138, 139, 151, 155

Volcanic islands, 37, 38

W

*Waetea*, 185

Waste collection, 75–78, 81

Waste generation, 74, 75, 77, 80

Waste governance, 73, 76, 81–83

Waste legacies, 76

Waste regulation, 73, 76, 80

Women councillors, 207, 208, 210, 211

Women's political representation, 195, 196, 200

Y

Yam calendar, 183, 188–190

Yams, 62, 64–69, 81, 152, 153, 158, 183, 185, 186

Yes/no paper, 238, 240, 241