# Depoliticised environmental policies: Low-carbon action in the Paris urban region

Olivier Coutard, Caroline Gallez

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Olivier Coutard, Caroline Gallez. Depoliticised environmental policies: Low-carbon action in the Paris urban region. Urban Studies, 2025, 62 (9), pp.1850-1875. 10.1177/00420980251324112. hal-05479710

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# Depoliticized environmental policies: low-carbon action in the Paris urban region

Olivier Coutard

CNRS-LATTS, Marne-la-Vallée, France

Caroline Gallez

Univ. Gustave Eiffel, Marne-la-Vallée, France

## Acknowledgments

The authors would like to warmly thank: researchers involved in the VITE research project on which this article is based; the participants of the seminar on ‘Infrastructures as urban solutions. Critical perspectives on transformative socio-technical change’ (Limburg, 20-24 Sept. 2021) for inspiring discussions that helped shape the paper’s argument; Jonathan Rutherford for his careful and decisive reading of an early draft of the article; and *Urban Studies* editors and anonymous referees for extremely valuable comments. Of course, the responsibility for the analyses developed in this article remain entirely ours.

The authors also wish to acknowledge the financial support of the French National Research Agency (ANR) to the research projet VITE (*Ville et transitions énergétiques: enjeux, leviers, processus et évaluation prospective pluridisciplinaire. Application à la région Île-de-France*; Research grant #ANR-14-CE22-0013) on which this article is based.
# Depoliticized environmental policies: low-carbon action in the Paris urban region

## Abstract

(173 words)

In this article, we explore the politics of urban-regional energy and climate action. Based on a six-year interdisciplinary project combining qualitative social sciences surveys and quantitative urban modelling to explore the complex mix of national, regional and sub-regional land use, transport and building energy efficiency policies that play a key part in energy and climate action, the article offers a three-step assessment of the dynamics of low-carbon transition processes in the French capital region, Île-de-France. (1) First, we present the orientations of the regional strategy, highlight the extent to which this strategy prioritizes infrastructural developments, and document the gap, especially in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, between stated ambitions and observed outcomes. (2) Second, we foreground three main factors contributing to this gap: piecemeal infrastructural solutionism, unaddressed tensions in regional policies, and overlooked dynamics of practices. (3) Third, we argue that these shortfalls all derive to a large extent from variegated forms of depoliticization. In the conclusion, we briefly discuss the implications of these findings for (a much needed democratic repoliticization of) environmental or sustainability policies more generally.
The latest IPCC report notes that greenhouse gas emissions ‘that can be attributed to urban areas’ have increased between 2015 and 2020 both in absolute terms (by an estimated 16%, when the world total urban population increased by only 10%) and in relative terms (rising from 62% to an estimated 67-72% of world total emission, when the urban population rose from 54 to 56% of the world population during the same period (IPCC, 2022: 8). Of course, both per capita levels of emissions and their evolution vary considerably across, and even within, world regions. However, it can hardly be denied that, globally, ‘cities’ have failed to keep the promise to be at the forefront of climate change mitigation action, even if such promises are regularly reasserted (op. cit.: 39-40). In Europe, the Covenant of Mayors initiative notes that ‘greater effort is necessary for signatories to advance in the implementation of their action plans and achieve the emission reduction targets they have set’ for 2030 (Melica et al. 2022: 4).

In this article, we question the factors underlying this ‘delivery gap’ by focusing on how local public authorities seek to attain the ambitious objectives of reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions set for them by higher-tier institutions*. We draw on the case of the Paris region in France, where, despite the involvement of local and national authorities in high-profile climate initiatives (C40, 2015 Paris Agreement), the developments observed do not achieve the strategic objectives<fnref n="1" />. While we are aware that in the ongoing ‘third wave’ of climate urbanism, ‘the challenge of addressing climate change is recognised as deeply connected to wider issues of sustainable development and social justice’ ( Bulkeley 2021:

The authors also wish to acknowledge the financial support of the French National Research Agency (ANR) to the research projet VITE (Ville et transitions énergétiques: enjeux, leviers, processus et évaluation prospective pluridisciplinaire. Application à la région Île-de-France; Research grant #ANR-14-CE22-0013) on which this article is based.

<footnote>* The authors would like to warmly thank: researchers involved in the VITE research project on which this article is based; the participants of the seminar on ‘Infrastructures as urban solutions. Critical perspectives on transformative socio-technical change’ (Limburg, 20-24 Sept. 2021) for inspiring discussions that helped shape the paper’s argument; Jonathan Rutherford for his careful and decisive reading of an early draft of the article; and Urban Studies’ editors and anonymous referees for extremely valuable comments. Of course, the responsibility for the analyses developed in this article remain entirely ours.</footnote>

<footnote n="1">¹ For earlier discussions of the value of an urban-regional focus in studies of sustainability transition policies, see, e.g., Hodson and Marvin (2009), Coutard and Rutherford (2010), or Bulkeley et al. (2011).</footnote>
266), we nevertheless consider that low-carbon policies remain a powerful lens into the politics of how this challenge is shaped and addressed and into the associated tensions.

The key argument developed in this paper is that various forms of *depoliticization* (Kuzemko 2016) affect the political capacity to implement low-carbon policies and, as a consequence, reduce the scope and scale of their impacts. We substantiate this argument by (1) examining the conditions under which local energy transition policies are designed and implemented and (2) exploring the longer-term implications of these policies on GHG emissions, in relation with the often invisibilized socio-spatial inequalities that they produce or reproduce. In fact, we consider that such invisibilization is not only a sign of the depoliticization at play, but also an obstacle to the implementation of fully effective low carbon policies, in two ways: by differentially affecting the capacity of local residents to adapt to the consequences of climate disruption and by increasing the probability of strong opposition to local energy transition policies.

Our demonstration rests on an mixed methods approach combining qualitative social science methodologies and quantitative urban modelling. In particular, we consider, and hope to convincingly illustrate in this article, that quantitative modelling approaches have unique value for the exploration of the more indirect, large-scale and longer term outcomes of prominent policy measure – especially when informed by the insights of qualitative research on the design and implementation of such policies.

This article is structured as follows. We start by situating our approach within current research on the politics, and more specifically the depoliticization, of energy, climate and other environmental policies; we also present the mixed methods approach used. We then conduct a three-step analysis of the dynamics of energy and low-carbon transition processes in Paris region. First, we present the orientations of the regional ‘climate-air-energy’ strategy, documenting the gap between the stated ambitions, especially in terms of GHG emissions, and the observed outcomes. Second, we highlight factors that directly contribute to this ‘delivery gap’. Third, we argue that these factors express variegated forms of *depoliticization* at play in low-carbon action in the Paris Region. To conclude, we briefly discuss the merits and possible forms of a *repoliticization* of energy-climate policies.

Researching the politics of urban-regional environmental policies
*Politicizing studies of ‘sustainability transitions’*

Over the past twenty years, academic debates about sustainability policies have increasingly emphasized the importance of going beyond early contributions from the sociotechnical transitions literature (e.g., Geels, 2002) in order to grasp the politics at play (Shove and Walker, 2007). As ‘cities’ were increasingly considered as key sites, spaces, or instruments of sustainability, energy, or low-carbon transitions, the *urban politics* of such transitions attracted academic interest (e.g., Hodson and Marvin (2009); Monstadt, 2009; Coutard and Rutherford, 2010). Adopting a sociotechnical lens, Rutherford and Coutard (2014) foreground the ‘mutually recursive change … of energy systems or infrastructures and particular spaces and places’ (p. 1354) and conclude that

the urban processes and implications of energy transitions are, finally, inherently of a political nature, simultaneously reflecting, reinforcing and transforming existing institutional and governance arrangements, consensual or conflictual relationships between different actors and the unequal distribution of power within and among social groups and interests’ (p. 1369).

This urban politics of transitions, however, doesn’t only involve local interests. Indeed, early on, Bulkeley and Betsill (2003) emphasized the inherently multilevel processes at play, opening the way to a relational understanding of urban transition processes. In this article, we reflect upon one particular expression of the urban politics of transitions, *active depolicization*, which resonates to some extent with observations about national energy policy, e.g., in the UK (Kuzemko, 2016) or in Germany (Marquardt, 2024)

*Depoliticization, from a mode of government to a democratic denial*

The depoliticization of policy-making, or governing more generally, has been extensively studied since the 2000s (Burnham, 2001), and especially over the last decade (Wood and Flinders, 2014; Robert, 2021). In the field of political science, this term was first applied to a governing mode, aimed at relieving governments and their representatives of decisions
for which they could be blamed (Flinders and Buller, 2006). In Burhnam's words,
'depoliticisation as a governing strategy is the process of placing at one remove the political
character of decision-making' (2001: 128). Wood and Flinders (2014: 152) argue for
extending the notion beyond its governance-centered acceptation in order 'to acknowledge
and trace those deeper social and discursive shifts that frequently buttress or underpin
institutional reforms and governmental decisions'. Drawing on Hay (2007), they identify
three faces of depoliticization: *governmental depoliticization* refers to the delegation by public
actors of a set of functions to para-public experts or private stakeholders; *societal
depoliticization* refers to the degradation of social deliberation around a political issue, in the
sense that the choices concerning this issue are not debated, thus referring to the idea of a
'democracy without choice'; finally, *discursive depoliticization* occurs 'when *the debate*
surrounding an issue becomes technocratic, managerial, or disciplined towards a single
goal, and hence changed in content' (Wood and Flinders, 2014, 161).

The last two dimensions broadly correspond to what, following Rancière's (1995, 1998)
reflections on post-democracy (see also Crouch, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2011), some critical
thinkers have termed 'post-politics' (e.g., Swyngedouw, 2009), associated with the end of
ideologies and the erosion of democracy. According to philosopher Jacques Rancière, the
post-democratic consensual arrangement has reduced politics to the preservation of public
order and managerial decision-making (Rancière, 1995). Yet democratic politics in this
tradition is not limited to the struggle for power and the exercise of that power: it 'is the
arena where the principle of equality is tested in the face of a wrong experienced by "those
who have no part"'" (Swyngedouw, 2009, 605). Rather than being an ideal to move towards,
equality is for Rancière the only political universal.

These theoretical considerations have been applied to many policy domains, including
environmental and energy policy, in particular through the critique of notions such as 'the
Anthropocene' or 'energy transition'.

Eco-politics as *simulative, depoliticized, or post-democratic politics*

According to Blühdorn (2007), for example, a 'post-ecologist turn' can be observed since
the 1990s. This turn, Blühdorn argues, cannot be simply attributed to the victory of the
neoliberal ideology ‘successfully ... imposed by free-market strategist’ (p. 262). Rather, it reflects

a complex cultural transformation in which much more inclusive understandings of eco-politics are superseded by technical and managerial approaches which are symbolically empty, i.e. which deal with short term and narrowly defined problems, but are no longer inspired by any comprehensive ecological alternative to the established socio-economic system (Blühdorn, 2007, 262, 264).

This evolution paved the way for the advent of ‘simulative politics’, which Blüdhorn describes after Meyer (1994: 140) as ‘an exercise in which the fusion of presentation (Darstellung) and imagination (Vorstellung) of politics replaces its production (Herstellung)’. For Blüdhorn, contemporary simulative eco-politics amounts to a societal strategy aimed at ‘sustaining the unsustainable’, namely the late-modern ‘ecologically exploitative and destructive system of democratic consumer capitalism’ (op. cit.: 264).

Blühdorn’s critical perspective can be fruitfully applied to a discussion of energy transition strategies, which play a key part in climate strategies. Meadowcroft (2009) thus notes that the notion of energy transition conveys the misleading vision of a smooth trajectory towards a future state of equilibrium, and stresses that the process of energy transformation could turn out to be messier and more open-ended than expected. Refuting the very idea that energy transitions in the sense of the replacement of one source of primary energy by another have already occurred in the past, Fressoz (2024) highlights that primary energy sources have rather tended to accumulate other time. The current resurgence of the notion of an energy transition, he argues, is thus based on a ‘false history’ fueling futile hopes for the possibility of rapid change in response to global warming.

This leads to contrasting views about the political work achieved by the notion of the Anthropocene. According to Bonneuil and Fressoz (2016), the notion of the Anthropocene challenges the idea of a transitory ‘environmental crisis’ calling for short-term responses, just as it renders obsolete ‘the irenic and reassuring project of sustainable development’ (p. 36). They call for a political investment in this notion, in order to ‘overcome the contradictions and limitations of a model of modernity that has been globalised for two centuries, and explore ways of rapidly and equitably reducing the ecological footprint of societies’ (p. 40). For their part, Ernstson and Swyngedouw (2019a) consider that the notion of the Anthropocene contributes to the depoliticization of the
environment, by feeding the consensus around the need to act, while invisibilising the
damage caused to people and living environments by the perpetuation of destructive
modes of production and living. They use the convoluted neologism Anthropo-obScene to
describe the litteral off-staging of crucial issues that is performed, they argue, by the use of
the notion of Anthropocene. Swyngedouw (2022) further argues that ‘apocalyptic
imaginaries are extraordinarily powerful in disavowing or foreclosing social conflict and
antagonisms’ (p. 22) and in reinforcing the idea that preserving the present socio-ecological
arrangements is desirable and only possible with “‘proper” techno-institutional
management’ (p. 20).

*The implications of depoliticization in energy- or climate-orientated policies*

Several authors have explored the implications of forms of depoliticization of energy transition processes. In her study of British national energy policy, Kuzemko (2016) shows how various forms of depoliticization have progressively ‘destroyed’ the political capacity of state institutions, making them unable to ‘question or reach far beyond market liberal orthodoxies’ (p. 109) and leading to changes that ‘have been insufficient in terms of timing, profundity and quality to have sufficient impact in terms of a sustainable, secure and affordable energy transition’ (p. 108). In a different vein, Marquardt (2024) argues that largely due to changes in Green party politics, the energy transition in Germany ‘got depoliticized, social conflicts were marginalized, and radical alternatives to the status quo disappeared over the years’ between 1980 and 2021 (p. 2). Depoliticization is also detrimental to the consideration of justice issues. Concerns for ‘who wins’ and ‘who loses’ from specific socioecological transformations have been at the heart of, especially, urban political ecology studies from their inception (Heynen et al., 2006). Yet despite the renewal of debates on environmental justice (Schlosberg, 2007; Walker, 2012) and on environmental mobilisations (Agyeman et al., 2016; Martinez-Alier et al., 2016), issues of justice related to urban transformations or transitions have until recently remained underexplored little elaborated. Over the last few years, however, plural perspectives on urban or social justice have flourished (see, e.g., Castán Broto and Westman, 2019).
‘Cities’ have been increasingly acknowledged as both targets of energy and low-carbon transition strategies (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Bulkeley et al., 2011) and relevant levels for their implementation. As a consequence, the role of urban actors has gradually asserted itself in the transformation of energy systems, historically dominated by national actors (e.g., Hodson and Marvin, 2010; Jaglin and Verdeil, 2013; Rutherford and Coutard, 2014). Indeed, based on the analysis of 885 European cities, Reckien and al. (2018) showed that 66% have a mitigation Local Climate Plan (75% in France).

However, the mere existence of a plan is no guarantee for its effectivity. While *et al.* (2010) underline the tensions inherent to national or supranational ‘carbon control’ policies on urban authorities, which are subject to unprecedented emission reduction targets but diversely equipped to deal with them. Van den Bergh (2020) points out additional limitations, such as the weight of urban forms and ‘material legacies’ and the existence of rebound effects associated with gains in energy efficiency. In their book’s presentation, Luque-Ayala et al. (2018) highlight a technological bias in urban energy transition strategies and argue that ‘the low carbon transition [rather] requires a shift in the mode and politics of urban development … [and in the] way of thinking about collective futures’. Building on Blühdorn’s (2007; 2011) notion of ‘politics of unsustainability’, Higgins (2013) compares the low-carbon strategies of London and Hong Kong. He shows that despite both cities’ awareness of the unsustainability of their current development patterns and their commitment to ambitious decarbonisation objectives, the policies implemented are locked into a technological and economic approach that mostly aims to reproduce and reinforce existing lifestyles through the development of renewable energies, recycling and waste reduction policies.

In spite of such contributions, the belief that urban action based on infrastructural development and technological innovation can solve environmental problems<fnref n="2" /> is still dominating in energy- and climate-orientated policy-making. This is perhaps all the more

<footnote n="2">² For a critical appraisal, in this journal, of a recent manifestation of such infrastructural solutionism, the ‘urban nexus’, see Monstadt and Coutard (2019).</footnote>
true for so-called climate change experiments. For example, three quarters of the experiments studied by Castán Broto and Bulkeley (2013) concern infrastructure sectors broadly construed: urban infrastructure, built environment, and transport (Fig. 2, p. 97). On a more qualitative level, Quitzow and Rohde (2022) conclude from their recent study of a Berlin smart grid experiment that '[urban] laboratories are explicitly envisioned as places for advancing “urban Energiewende innovations” ... such as virtual power plants, heating and cooling networks, vehicle-to-grid technologies or other (micro-)smart grid technologies' (p. 353), thus supporting

> dominant imaginaries of smart grid technologies in the city ... grounded in a techno-optimistic approach to urban development that are foreclosing more subtle alternatives or perhaps more radical change towards low-carbon energy systems (p. 341; see also Evans and Karvonen, 2014).

The persistence of an infrastructural bias, as well as the correlative understatement of the cultural dimension (i.e., social practices, ways of living, shared norms of consumption, discourses and imaginaries) of the sweeping changes explicitly pursued by energy or low-carbon transition strategies, are powerful forms of depoliticization (see also Bulkeley et al., 2014).

This dominant *infrastructural solutionism* is also reflected in scientific production. A majority of studies addressing urban and regional climate or energy policies have focused on technological developments and associated policy instruments aimed at fostering novel infrastructures for energy supply, improving energy and carbon efficiency in buildings or transportation systems. While numerous studies highlight the rebound effects often linked to enhancing vehicle or building performance, the primacy of the concept of energy efficiency over sufficiency itself is seldom questioned. More generally, most studies of low-carbon and energy transitions have tended to downplay, blackbox or altogether ignore the *cultural* dimension of such transitions, even as various authors emphasized the need to go beyond the technological fix paradigm (e.g., Luque-Ayala et al., 2018) and to view climate change as a 'systemic issue deeply embedded in the working of the economy, sociotechnical systems, the urban infrastructure and the cultures, routines, and practices of daily life' (Bulkeley, 2021: 270). Both in policy and much research, focusing on energy efficiency as an achievement in itself thus rules out the potential of energy *sufficiency*
approaches to foster a decrease in energy consumption through changes in mode of
production and consumption and lifestyles.

Rearticulating climate urbanism and urban production

Critical researchers and thinkers emphasize the importance of jointly addressing climate-orientated policies and the (unsustainable) logics that characterise dominant processes of urbanization. Whitehead thus points out that the ‘carbonisation’ of urban policy ‘is actively shaped and conditioned by the evolving spatial logics of urbanization’ (Whitehead 2013, 1363). Stating that urbanization processes are linked to systems of economic and political power, he asserts that urban strategies are influenced by a neoliberal urban environmentalism, which both generates problems and promotes market-based solutions to them. According to other authors, this influence goes beyond policy-makers to reach much academic work. For example, Long and Rice (2019: 1005) caution researchers about the concept of climate urbanism, which may be limited to ‘a climate-focused infrastructural development regime that will almost certainly exacerbate social inequalities and perpetuate environmental degradation’. Castán Broto and Westman (2022) discuss the ambivalence of the concept of ‘urban transformation’, which is attracting interest from both scientists and decision-makers. They show that the ideas and proposals that make the most progress in the literature are those that support the principles of existing economic agendas. In an exploration of the political work achieved by policy experiments, Nciri and Levenda (2019) highlight ‘the material and discursive strategies mobilised by dominant actors to selectively circulate knowledge that defines an urban experiment’s success or failure’ in order to promote ‘sustainability fixes’ in line with these actors’ interests; this perspective arguably sheds new light on the political implications of the ‘experimental hype’ that has also affected the academic community.

These authors invite to not only question energy- or climate-orientated policies, but the
sometimes closely intricated scientific production that addresses these policies. Drawing on
Rancière's conception of politics, Ernstson and Swyngedouw (2019b) more generally
contend that the only antidote to the techno-scientific logic that dominates climate and
environmental research and policy-making is to 'politicize the environment' rather than just
environmentalise public policy.
With these considerations in mind, we now turn to the analysis of ‘climate-air-energy’
policies in the Paris region. Beyond the confirmation of the priority given to technological
and infrastructural solutions, we consider in particular how these policies address three
main issues:

(i) As the French capital region, Île-de-France pursues strategies of economic development and territorial attractiveness. How are they articulated with the objectives of reducing energy consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions?

(ii) To what extent do climate-energy strategies in Île-de-France effectively integrate changes in practices of production and consumption and in established ways of life?

(iii) How does the implementation of energy transition policies in urban planning, housing or transportation diversely and unequally affect communities?

Exploring energy and climate action in the Paris Region: a mixed methods,
multilevel approach

This article is based on the results of a six-year interdisciplinary research project involving a
team of around twenty researchers with expertise ranging from architecture to sociology
and political science, and from transport and land-use modelling to socio-economics and
urban planning (Gallez and Coutard, 2023). Our approach is based on a mixed methods
approach, iteratively combining qualitative surveys based on interviews, direct observation
and the consultation of secondary sources, with a computer-aided exploration,
complementary to what can be achieved through qualitative surveys, consisting in the
quantitative modelling and simulation of the potential outcome of a selection of key policy
measures targeting transport, land use, and the energy efficiency of buildings<fnref n="3" />. Our surveys

<footnote n="3">³ One comment here: the development of low-carbon or decarbonized energy supply infrastructures, in particular district heating networks using geothermal or other renewable energy sources, also features as a key regional climate/energy policy measure. Thus we could also have included it in our study based on a ‘most likely case’ approach, i.e., an approach consisting in discussing infrastructural solutionism in the climate/energy domain by studying ‘solutions’ based precisely on the development of energy infrastructures.</footnote>
were conducted as the Greater Paris metropolitan area was being created, an institutional overhaul that played a not insignificant part in our story.

Qualitative analyses articulated surveys on a regional and subregional level. Two inter-municipal territories were chosen as case studies, both displaying strong political determination in implementing energy and climate policies and active involvement of civil society: Est Ensemble (9 municipalities) in the dense area and Grand Paris Seine et Oise (73 municipalities) in the outer suburbs. Subregional foci were essential to grasp the vicissitudes in everyday policy implementation; but the project had no comparative ambition. Surveys are based on two types of materials:

(i) secondary materials: legislative and regulatory documents on national policy; planning documents and strategies (climate-air-energy strategies, development master plans, transport strategies) developed at different scales; statistical studies and cartographic documents, expert reports, media coverage, public consultations...;

(ii) materials gathered or produced through participation in thematic meetings, visits of relevant sites, and campaigns of semi-directive interviews<fnref n="4" /> with local stakeholders: local authorities (elected officials and technicians), urban operators in different energy-related sectors, design offices, leaders of civil society initiatives, etc.

The modelling part combined different modelling strategies, so as to further learn from differences in outputs and reflect on the most effective mixed methods<fnref n="5" />. It involved:

(i) A set of statistical models used to simulate the impacts of key land-use or transport policies on motorized travel, energy consumption and emissions of GHGs and pollutants for the Paris region: a four-step multimodal travel model (MODUS) widely used by regional administrations, which simulates the impacts of infrastructure projects and

We have not taken that approach, yet we hypothesize that a case study of energy infrastructures would not have gone against our key observations (piecemeal infrastructural solutionism, overlooked energy-related practices) and the factors explaining this observation (insufficient democratic politicization).

<footnote n="4">⁴ About 80 semi-interviews were conducted with actors at national, regional and infra-regional levels.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Interestingly, recent work in transitions studies has also developed mixed methods approaches (e.g., Köhler et al., 2018); however, it is often framed in terms of ‘social acceptance’ and ‘political feasibility’ of technological innovations and developments (Geels et al., 2020).</footnote>
transport policies; a land-use model (NEDUM), which simulates real estate development and households' residential location choices according to different demographic and employment scenarios (Viguié and Hallegatte, 2012; Viguié et al., 2014); a model simulating the spatialized emissions of pollutants linked to road traffic and energy use in buildings (OLYMPUS) (Elessa Etuman and Coll, 2018); and a chemistry-transport model<fnref n="6" /> for the prediction and analysis of air quality (CHIMERE), which, coupled with the previous models, allows to simulate the release, evolution and transport in space of atmospheric pollutants (Mailler et al., 2017);

(ii) A disaggregate model used to simulate the impact of changes in housing supply on the redistribution of populations (density, diversity, socio-spatial disparities), thus providing insights in terms of social inequalities in housing and residential mobility (ASHA model, see Lévy et al., 2017);

(iii) A disaggregate model used to simulate household energy behaviour based on the characteristics of housing and its occupants (Bourgeois et al., 2017; Lévy and Belaïd, 2018);

(iv) A technical-economic model used to estimate the energy performance of new and renovated building.

The selection of policies studied and the simulations carried out were based on an in-depth analysis of the planning documents (the regional climate air energy plan - SRCAE - and lower-tier territorial plans - PCAET - as well as the associated sectoral planning documents: urban planning, transport, housing, etc.) and joint discussions within the multidisciplinary team. The objective was both (i) to analyze the conditions for implementing prioritized levers for action and to assess their overall impacts, and (ii) to reveal gaps, overlooked aspects, and invisible elements in regional and local climate-air-energy strategies. For climate actions, we focused on three repeatedly emphasized priorities of the regional climate-air-energy strategy: thermal renovation of housing, transport decarbonization, and urban densification and intensification.

Additionally, two models — one on regional settlement dynamics and another assessing domestic energy behaviours — enabled us to highlight the social and spatial inequalities

<footnote n="6">⁶ i.e., a model combining simulations of the chemical transformation of pollutants and how they diffuse in the atmosphere.</footnote>
linked to households' residential situations. These inequalities, which reflect the differentiated abilities of various social groups to choose their residential location within the urban region, are not accounted for in climate-air-energy policies, yet they constitute a crucial political issue.

Lastly, we used modeling to explore the potential contradiction between urban densification goals, aimed at reducing travel needs, and increased exposure to air pollution.

This mixed methods, multi-model and multilevel approach allowed to explore aspects of a range of major policies that were not directly observable with the sole tools of qualitative social sciences. Confronting the insights of qualitative surveys with the outputs of quantitative simulations hence helped to explore the overwise invisible effects of these policies, not only in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, the key policy objective, but also in terms of (detrimental) unintended consequences and the (uneven) distribution of benefits and costs associated with these policies.

## Setting the scene: climate and energy policies in the Paris region (2012-2020)

In this section, we summarize the Île-de-France energy transition strategy and compare the observed evolution of GHG emissions with those prescribed in this strategy.

### A climate strategy that prioritizes infrastructural development

The regional low-carbon strategy is described in the regional strategy for climate, air quality and energy (SRCAE, 2012⁷). It is explicitly articulated with the region's masterplan (SDRIF<fnref n="8" />) elaborated during the same period (SDRIF, 2013, vol. 2: 30 ff.; SRCAE, 2012: 287 ff.). The region adopted additional measures in 2018 (Île-de-France, 2018), in line with the revised national climate strategy (Plan climat) adopted in 2017 after the Paris 2015 COP

<footnote n="7">⁷ SRCAE : Schéma régional climat air énergie.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ SDRIF : Schéma directeur de la Région Île-de-France.</footnote>
agreement; and full updates of the region's masterplan and climate, air and energy strategies
are due in 2024.

According to SRCAE (2012), the regional government should comply to the four following
'principles': the substantial reduction of energy demand through sufficiency (*sobriété* in
French) and efficiency; a strong reduction in emissions of air pollutants; the rapid and
massive development of renewable energy; and local adaptation to climate change
(SRCAE, 2012: 96). The combination of reduced demand and growing renewables is
assumed to lead to the expected reduction in levels of GHG emissions: -28% in 2020 from
1990; -75% ('factor 4') in 2050 from 1990, in line with the target set by article 2 of the 2005
energy act (SRCAE, 2012: 77). Three 'main priorities' are highlighted by regional
authorities in their foreword to the SRCAE: improved energy efficiency of buildings; the
development of district heating; and the reduction of emissions associated with road traffic
(ibid.: 1-2)<fnref n="9" />. The primacy of infrastructural<fnref n="10" /> and technological developments is clearly
asserted in those priorities<fnref n="11" />, even if some measures address land use issues, such as spatial
planning measures promoting densification, multi-polarity and functional diversity (ibid.:
287-9.).

Only symbolic measures aim at substantial changes in practices. For example, the SRCAE
mentions (p. 252 sq) several examples of the 'behavioural' changes in mobility or of the
changes in the use of various transport modes (from carbon-intensive to low- or zero-
carbon modes) that would be needed to reach a 'factor 4' objective by 2050 in that sector;
but these examples are evoked evasively, generally presented as an expected consequence
of infrastructural developments (and, in a few cases, of evolutions in spatial planning). In

<footnote n="9">⁹ In parallel, investment in public transport was provided for in two major strategies: the *Grand Paris Express* (GPE) scheme decided in 2011 and the urban-regional mobility strategy (PDUI) elaborated concomitantly with SRCAE and adopted in 2014. The planned (estimated) investments are massive: 35 billion euros for the state-led GPE and 15,5 billion euros for region-led infrastructural developments (Île-de-France Mobilité, 2018: 14).</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ The term ‘infrastructures’ in this article encompasses energy generation and supply systems; transportation systems (roads, public transport systems, logistics systems); and buildings for all purposes. The phrase ‘infrastructural developments’ designates the building of new infrastructures, but also the extension, transformation or renovation of existing infrastructures.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Road traffic reduction is not even mentioned in relation to the third objective.</footnote>
addition, the regional strategy fails to address practices in many areas that are important energy-wise (in particular food, air travel, or the use of digital technologies).

The national low-carbon strategy – updated after the 2015 Paris Agreement – implies an 85% reduction in national GHG emissions between 1990 and 2050, from 520 to 80 MtCO2e (with compensation measures for residual emissions), far beyond the ‘factor 4’ (-75%) target previously considered<fnref n="12" />. The 2018 update of the regional climate and energy strategy reflects this evolution of the national ambition to reach zero (territorial) emissions by 2050. The regional strategy emphasizes four main priorities: increased energy sufficiency, more renewables, reduced dependency on energy imports (through increased energy autonomy), and the development of carbon capture and storage. While the last three priorities explicitly consist in the development of new infrastructures, the first one suggests a broader approach, including land use measures (consistent with the scheduled development of the public transportation system) and a reduction of energy-intensive practices. A closer examination of the measures aiming at ‘a more sober [energy-wise] Île-de-France’ (p. 24-28), however, reveals that most measures presented as energy sufficiency measures are in fact energy *efficiency* measures, consisting in further technological and infrastructural developments: promoting clean, especially electric vehicles; developing public transport; or implementing massive energy renovation of housing and office buildings.

*A mixed record so far*

<footnote n="12">¹² It is interesting to note that the 2018 updated strategy does not specify the emissions trajectory apart from the 2050 ‘zero emissions’ target. This may mean that it implicitly endorses the intermediary national target (set by the 2015 act for ‘an energy transition for green growth’), i.e. a reduction of 40% of emissions in 2030 compared to 1990. More specifically, the 2018 strategy aims to ‘tend to carbon neutrality’ by 2050 (Île-de-France, 2018: 11) without specifying the implications of this commitment in terms of residual gross regional GHG emissions.</footnote>
There is now some hindsight on transition strategies and policies initiated in the 2000s nationally and in the 2010s regionally. Insofar as the available statistics can be relied upon, the outcomes of the French national and Paris region strategies so far are mixed.

At the national level, the evolution of territorial GHG emissions appears satisfactory at first glance: it has been until 2019<sup>13</sup> in line with the trajectory prescribed by the national low-carbon strategy, or SNBC (for *stratégie nationale bas carbone*; see SNBC, 2020) and emissions have been reduced by 21% in 2019 (435 MtCO2e) from 2005 (551 MtCO2e) (Citepa, 2023: 45). Yet, in order to reach carbon neutrality by 2050 (as per the same SNBC), the rate of decarbonation will, or would, have to be tripled from 2019 to 2050 (-5.3% per year on average, from 435 to 80 MtCO2e) compared to the -1.7% average yearly rate from 2005 (550 MtCO2e) to 2019 (435 MtCO2e) (Citepa, 2023: 80.) This appears as particularly challenging for three main reasons. First, final energy consumption decreases more slowly than prescribed. Hence the 2019 energy and climate act postponed to 2023 the objective initially<sup>14</sup> set for 2018 to reduce energy consumption by 7% from its 2012 level, while preserving the next target of -20% by 2030<sup>15</sup>. To reach the 2030 target, assuming that the 2023 target has been reached, the rate of diminution of energy consumption from 2023 to 2030 will, or would, also have to be tripled compared to 2012-2023 (from 0.7% to 2.1% per year). Second, the share of renewable energy in final energy consumption was also below the legal target: 17.2% in 2019 against 12.1% in 2009, when EU legislation called for a share of 23% in 2020. Third, the decrease in GHG emissions observed between 2005 and 2019 was in (large) part related to the deindustrialization of the country over the same period, when France aims to reindustrialize in the coming decades<sup>16</sup>.

<footnote n="13"><sup>13</sup> Due to the global crisis generated by the covid pandemic, the levels of emissions in 2020, 2021 and even 2022 are more difficult to assess.</footnote>

<footnote n="14"><sup>14</sup> In the multiannual energy program adopted in 2016.</footnote>

<footnote n="15"><sup>15</sup> https://www.observatoire-climat-energie.fr/energie/consommation-denergie/ (Last accessed 7 May 2023)</footnote>

<footnote n="16"><sup>16</sup> Let us add two elements to this already dull record. First, the French High Council on Climate (HCC, 2022) recently noted that carbon capture through land use, land use change and, especially, forestry has steadily reduced over the last decade, ranging from -10 to -20 MtCO2e per year from 2017 to 2020, to be compared with values ranging from -40 to -50 MtCO2e in the previous 15 years (p. 77, fig. 2.3.1). Second,</footnote>
At a regional, Île-de-France level, the evolution of energy consumption has been more favourable: - 15%, against - 8% nationally, between 2005 and 2019 (ROSE, 2022: 20). Furthermore, the share of renewables in regional energy production is 67% in 2020, against 17% nationally in 2019 – but Île-de-France is dependent on extra-regional supplies for more than 85% of its energy consumption (ROSE, 2022: 35). In spite of these favourable elements, direct GHG emissions have followed a similar trend in Île-de-France as nationally: - 23% (compared to -21% nationally) between 2005 and 2019 (ROSE, 2022: 25). Therefore, as we observed at the national scale, the rate of reduction of emissions until 2050 would have to be tripled (from 1.7 to 5.3% per year) in order for regional targets to be attained.

Local actors readily acknowledge this ‘delivery gap’. When asked about its causes, they often highlight the institutional complexity, fragmentation and permanent reconfiguration they are confronted with. As a representative of a local ‘transitions pioneer’ put it:

> When it comes to energy strictly speaking, we no longer have our place. We must still put in place a territorial climate air energy plan, but the major strategic questions are the responsibility of the metropolis, the operational ones are that of the municipalities ... there is a considerable gap between what we manage to deal with in our daily lives and the objectives that we would like to address (interview with director of the environment department, Est Ensemble, March 2017).

Undoubtedly, institutional fragmentation and recent reform did not help. However, other powerful factors were at play, as we argue below.

## Accounting for the delivery gap in regional climate-energy strategies

Moving beyond strategies towards the examination of transition policies ‘on the ground’ at both regional and subregional levels, we now examine contributing factors to the gap between stated ambitions and actual outcomes. Based on the examination of a range of

<footnote>the evolution of the total consumption-based ‘carbon footprint’ of the French resident population, even though it is difficult to estimate, seems even less favourable.</footnote>
energy-climate policies, our research highlights various mechanisms that contribute to
moving away from the strategy's objectives.

*Infrastructural solutionism turned against itself*

As we noted, infrastructural development plays a key role in the Region's strategy, and the same holds for local strategies. However, due to growing financial constraints, local authorities find themselves compelled to seek additional funding sources to implement these strategies. They do so in particular through public (national or European) calls for projects that tend to favour small-scale, 'innovative' experimental endeavours rather than supporting large-scale local action:

> As now public aid on these subjects works largely through calls for projects, the logic of innovation comes into play... To be subsidized you have to be innovative, and... if you want to do something innovative, there are still additional costs... And Ademe<fnref n="17" />, the region, other traditional fund providers prefer to finance innovation rather than classic energy renovation (interview, head of water & climate mission, City of Montreuil, a municipality part of Est Ensemble, June 2017).

With limited financial and operational resources, the municipality of Montreuil chose to focus on projects that are more streamlined and better aligned with its sphere of expertise, such as monitoring exclusively the energy and water consumption of public buildings. To help finance even this more limited initiative, the municipality depended on external resources; for example, it secured competitive European funding for the renovation of several municipal schools. While the outcome proved encouraging, the experiment was not expanded, due primarily to the substantial need of dedicated human resources. Indeed, expertise and administrative resources, like financial resources, are unevenly distributed between municipalities. Thus, calls for projects also tend to penalize second-tier local authorities such as Montreuil. One of our interlocutors from Est Ensemble thus points to

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ The French [State] Agency for Ecological Transition, financially supporting public and private transition initiatives.</footnote>
the uneven capacity to handle large data sets (in this case: detailed data on occupancy and energy efficiency of the housing stock):

It was funny when we talked with our colleagues from the city of Paris, who could
rely upon ‘war machines’ [the departments of the extensive Parisian administration]
and did not always realize that no local authority other than Paris had the capacity to
process [the data] (interview with director of the local energy agency, Est Ensemble,
July 2017)

The energy transition imperative has also led to a form of regulatory zeal characterized by a continuous increase, ‘at a forced march’ (Nessi, 2023: 286) in energy performance standards, without any assessment of potential counter-productive impacts of such rapidly evolving standards in new buildings. Yet not only do they complicate the completion of projects, they also compromise the ability of stakeholders, particularly real estate developers, to keep pace with these requirements:

> We are in a regulatory context which is so fluid that ultimately, we never have time to get feedback... since six months later, things have changed (promoter interview, May 2018; cited in Nessi, 2023: 294).

Furthermore, ever higher ambitions in terms of energy performance have discriminating
spatial effects. In less attractive peripheral areas, the capacity of local authorities to impose
such ambition on developers is weakened by the need to limit the increase in prices and
avoid the loss of interest of promoters:

> So, we define levels of ambition and then we reduce the ambition during the negotiation with the promoter. The local authority will not necessarily want the building prices to increase, so it will actually agree to cut back on the environmental ambition (interview of the consultant providing assistance to the project owner, June 2018; cited in Nessi, 2023: 297).

Another similarly counter-productive mechanism is related to the sectorization of energy
performance standards, which hinders the development of beneficial forms of
coordination or mutualization, as exemplified by Benzerzour’s (2023) discussion of the
energy performance of new and renovated buildings. Benzerzour argues that the energy
gains linked to the replacement of boilers in an existing building or a major energy
renovation are respectively about three and six times higher than the energy gain linked to
the application of the French 2017 ‘positive energy building’ standards compared to the 2012 thermal standard in force until 2022, and that the corresponding cost per kWh saved is two to four times lower. Relaxing the very strict energy performance requirements imposed on new buildings, Benzerzour suggests, would cut building costs, and the savings could be reinvested in part in the renovation of existing buildings. Such mutualization measures are not favoured, or even feasible, under the currently dominant regulatory approach.

In summary, while regional and local strategies theoretically involve a substantial measure of infrastructural development, the prioritization of technological innovation and sector-specific regulatory zeal in fact hamper such developments and thus undermine their assumed transformative potential. By hindering feedback on innovative technologies, ignoring intra-urban disparities, excluding the pooling of investments (as, in our example, between new and existing buildings) or penalizing effective but non-innovative actions, these logics generally slow down infrastructural developments. This contradiction within the dominant approach results in a form of *piecemeal infrastructuralism* with necessarily limited impact on the region's energy and carbon metabolism.

## Regional policies in tension

The 2013 Paris region master plan (SDRIF) emphasizes the ‘promotion of an urban organization that responds to climate and energy changes’ (SDRIF Volume 2, 2013: 6). At the core of this initiative, a new circular automatic metro line, the Grand Paris Express (GPE), coupled with the modernization and extension of the existing rail network, is expected to alleviate environmental pressures, reduce social and spatial fragmentation, and enhance the attractiveness of the metropolitan area. While endorsing general objectives of densification of urban cores and intensification around well-connected secondary urban centres, the SDRIF, a non-prescriptive strategy, maintains flexibility regarding the local implementation of urban development guidelines throughout the regional territory.

Our research suggests that this accommodating strategy, lacking coercive measures to curtail car traffic or rigorously contain urban expansion, would fall short of the expectation that the implementation of the SDRIF will substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions
from transportation. Simulations based on various scenarios of transport and land use were
carried out by combining the MODUS and NEDUM models (for a short description of
the models, see methodological section above); they suggest only a modest environmental
impact of the current strategy (Viguié and Coulombel, 2023). Firstly, they indicate that the
regional master plan's land use strategy alone is insufficient to significantly decrease the
modal share of automobility and the resulting car traffic. Secondly, when factoring in
future projects including the Grand Paris Express (GPE) and other major extensions of
public transport infrastructure, the simulations suggest that total car traffic (measured in
veh.km) would be reduced by only 10% in the most optimistic scenario. These limitations
are partly explained by the fact, corroborated by the regional planning agency (IAU-IDF,
2019: 33-35), that current forms of land use control struggle to prevent urban sprawl in the
outer suburbs; absent more coercive measures, the completion of the Grand Paris Express,
by enhancing accessibility to employment in central areas from other parts of the region,
would therefore reinforce sprawl dynamics over time (cf. Salingue and Lévy, 2023).

Let us consider a final example of the tensions at play within regional policies, that
resulting from the rapid development of urban logistics. Experts widely agree on the
prospect of a very rapid development of e-commerce (estimated at +15% per year in the
middle of the 2020s) and associated deliveries, and there are no signs that deliveries replace
other shopping trips. Standing out as a significant issue, urban logistics furthermore lies in
principle within the reach of local authorities at various scales; and admittedly, reducing
energy use and greenhouse gas emissions of urban freight was one objective of the SRCAE
(2012: 400). Yet it was formulated in very broad terms and resulted in modest policy
implementation. Our research shows that logistics is clearly not subject to a level of
scrutiny commensurate with its contribution to the regional carbon footprint (Dablanc,
2023a; see also Dablanc 2023b). Indeed, basic data is lacking, in particular regarding the
growth in deliveries to individual customers. This lack of consistent data tends to
invisibilise the logistics issue and, arguably, to deter public authorities from the
implementation of probably effective but assuredly controversial measures, such as the
taxation of commercial vehicles.

Overlooked dynamics of daily practices
Our investigations further suggest that urban expansion on a regional scale and the associated rise in the use of individual modes of transport would be reinforced by a specific rebound effect associated with carpooling policies aiming to increase the average vehicle occupancy (AVO) rates in order to improve energy efficiency and to curb GHG emissions associated with road traffic (Delaunay et al., 2023; see also Coulombel et al., 2019). Indeed, in the Paris Region, carpooling initiatives have multiplied over the last decade following their promotion in the 2014 regional urban mobility strategy. However, this practice remains marginal in both total car traffic and the overall number of trips within the region. To explore the potential implications of widespread carpooling practices, three diffusion scenarios were simulated (Delaunay et al., 2023): a ‘moderate’ scenario (corresponding to an increase in the vehicle occupancy rate of 10% compared to the current observed value of 1.3 persons per vehicle), a ‘voluntarist’ scenario (+ 25%), and a ‘very ambitious’ scenario (+ 50%). Simulations with the MODUS-NEDUM chain revealed substantial rebound effects that might jeopardize the ‘direct’ or ‘gross’ benefits of carpooling schemes (i.e., reduced trip cost and improved traffic conditions that would be observed without factoring in these rebound effects) (see Fig. 1).

<< Fig. 1 approx. here >>

Counteracting those rebound effects would require controversial measures aimed at proactively reducing car ownership, hampering non-shared car use, and containing residential sprawl. Otherwise, carpooling policies will just be an additional means of meeting an ever-increasing demand for travel and will not lead to a significant reduction in the number of cars on the road. Carpooling schemes or similar measures should thus be based on a detailed analysis of mobility *practices*, if only to be able to better anticipate and understand their social-spatial implications.

## Depoliticized policies

*A political interpretation of the delivery gap in energy-climate action*
In the previous section, we have discussed actions which have helped create, sustain or widen a gap between strategic energy-climate objectives and the observed and anticipated outcomes of actually implemented policies. Beyond the diversity of those situations, we now wish to argue that a common process of *depoliticization* is at play in regional climate and energy policies. As we elaborate below, this depoliticization takes three main, interrelated forms: avoided debates and conflicts; ‘painless arbitrations; impossible ‘policies of less’.

*Avoiding debates and conflicts.* Undeniably, energy and climate action does spark debates. In the Paris region, they follow partisan divisions to a certain extent. For example, in the elaboration of the climate air energy strategies both at the regional (SRCAE) and inter-municipal (Est Ensemble’s PCAET) levels, Green elected representatives tried to promote voluntarist objectives, sometimes giving to strong opposition from other stakeholders. Furthermore, energy-climate policy implementation does generate conflicts in some cases, especially over new facilities. An example is provided in our research in relation with the (re)development of anaerobic digestion (Mesnil, 2023).

However, such debate is often prevented through, especially, presenting issues and measures as ‘technical’. As one of the region’s elected officials, who participated in the development of the SRCAE, told us: ‘for the document to be produced, it needed to be technical, above all not to get into politics’. As has been extensively documented (e.g., Kuzemko, 2016), such ‘technicalization’ is a powerful instrument of depoliticization. Examples abound: energy- and climate-sensitive food policies have emerged only recently and gradually; the exponentially-growing energy consumption involved in the use of digital infrastructures, devices and apps is still largely ignored; international air traffic still remains outside the scope of both national and local governments; etc. Let us note, however, that it is not always deliberate, as suggested by an environmentally concerned local actor:

> [from the point of view of] residents, everything we do remains a bit stratospheric, the development of a PCAET is stratospheric ... it remains a somewhat elitist subject, the energy transition is a bit conceptual and complex (interview with a staff member from the Environment and Urban Ecology department of Est Ensemble, March 2017).
The persistent lack of data or analyses on a given emissive sector, as exemplified above in the case of urban logistics, is also a powerful way of avoiding potentially conflictual debates on what should be done about emissions related to this sector.

*Opting for 'painless' arbitrations.* Depoliticization is more generally reflected, especially, in local policymakers' difficulty, or unwillingness, to formulate public problems related to energy and low-carbon policies, make visible the different dimensions of these problems and the trade-offs to be made, and go against established economic, bureaucratic, or other social interests, or against other public policies, when needed. This rests upon the denial of tensions and contradictions (e.g., regarding the issues raised by the continuous growth of tourism activities) or the indefinite postponement of coercive decisions that would negatively affect powerful established interests (e.g., related to land-use), when, on the other hand, interests linked to the protection of climate are generally less established<fnref n="18" />. This prevents or hinders political arbitration, especially between (dominant patterns of) metropolitan development and ecological transition measures.

*Making 'policies of less' unthinkable.* The third form of depoliticization observed in Île-de-France is the failure of policy-makers to explicitly integrate the dynamics of social practices and address the issue of, and the need for, changing practices – whether the practices of urbanites in their daily activities or the practices of professionals (in local government, utility or real estate companies, etc.) – and their organizational, institutional and even cultural dimensions<fnref n="19" />. This *impensé* leads, at the very least, to rebound effects – and more generally to ill-designed measures – that undermine the overall effectiveness and fairness of energy and climate policies (see, e.g., our discussion of carpooling).

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Recent examples abound in the French context, with decisions relaxing, postponing or altogether abandoning energy transition measures, such as carbon taxes on fuels; low emissions zones (that target air quality in densely-populated areas rather than GHG emissions); the use of pesticides in agriculture; or restrictions on rentals of low energy performance housing. And similar evolutions can be observed at the EU level.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ For a thorough critique of notions of ‘need’ or ‘use’ and further elaboration on the relation between changing practices and social change, see the writings of Elizabeth Shove and colleagues (e.g., Shove, 2010; Shove and Trentmann, 2019).</footnote>
In many, if not all, the situations studied, deliberate efforts to avoid potentially conflictual public debates have meant evading explicitly restrictive measures, ‘policies of less’ in all forms and shapes that would adversely affect powerful economic interests or established ways of life. In many instances, no explicit decision is made *against* energy or climate strategies; rather, such strategies *fail to be implemented*, especially when they involve ‘doing without’ or ‘doing with less’ (Goulet and Vinck, 2022), i.e., giving up on any aspect of prevailing standards of material prosperity.

## *Some negative implications of depoliticization for socio-spatial justice*

Clearly, depoliticized decision processes and arbitrations, in the sense that any public expression and handling of conflicts or divergent interests is avoided as much as possible, have powerful political effects. Indeed, the decisions made, unmade or, especially, not made generally reflect the preservation of established power relationships, dominant economic interests and the living standards of the more affluent or otherwise privileged social groups – to the detriment of less powerful interests, of socioecological justice and of climate or other environmental policy objectives. Avoiding to put the issue of the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of any given policy centre stage prevents public debate and confines the handling of inequalities to ex-post compensatory measures at best.

Our mixed methods approach helped to re-visibilize such overlooked issues. For example, our research shows that the densification of well-served areas in the central part of the urban region supported by the development of the GPE would accentuate gentrification processes and aggravate socio-spatial inequalities. Indeed, the analysis of the residential patterns resulting from the metropolization process, using the ASHA model (see methodological section), allowed us to investigate the social and spatial ‘sorting’ effects induced by changes in housing supply. Simulations exploring potential residential dynamics in the region until 2030 under three different demographic scenarios indicate that, in the absence of proactive and massive social housing policy in the central area, the logic of densification fostered by the SDRIF would increase the displacement of the more vulnerable or modest households, particularly young people and families, from well-served spaces to more remote spaces with lower land prices.
A second example of the justice implications of energy-climate action derives from what we have called a ‘density paradox’ (Coll et al., 2023: 166). Simulations of the impacts of SDRIF and public transport policies on air quality, realized using the NEDUM-OLYMPUS-CHIMERE chain (see the methodological section), highlight the potential contradiction between the key objective of reducing GHG emissions and the objective of reducing people’s exposure to atmospheric pollutants). In the simulations, the concentrations of fine particles (PM<sub>2.5</sub>) and nitrogen dioxyde (NO<sub>2</sub>) were estimated – two types of pollutants, emitted by road traffic and the heating of buildings, that have proven effects on health through both peak and chronic exposure. The simulations confirm that, without stringent and coercive additional measures of land use control, improvements in access to the densely populated central area by public transport are likely to fuel a sprawl dynamic that could adversely affect air quality on the outskirts of Paris. Furthermore, they highlight that in a theoretical scenario of high demographic concentration in the central part of the region, levels of exposure to atmospheric pollutants above health hazard thresholds would be observed in the dense city core, even though as a whole, less energy would be consumed and less pollutants emitted compared to more diffuse scenarios. These simulations thus confirm that, with regard to air-related health issues as well, the development of transport infrastructures should be carefully articulated with land use policy.

**Conclusion: the politics of depoliticizing energy-climate policies**

In this article, we have argued that variegated forms of *depoliticization* of energy-climate issues are at play in the delivery of low-carbon strategies, i.e. combinations of circumstances and deliberate action resulting in the prevention of public debate, the avoidance of the public expression of conflicts, the promotion of policy measures that are not detrimental to powerful interests, and the disqualification of measures promoting less resource-intensive practices. In conclusion, we will not seek to detail the implications of these findings *for* the specific policy sectors that we have studied; this would necessitate much more space than is available to do justice to the technicalities of each sector. Rather, we discuss the broader implications of the findings concerning all three sectors for the paper’s general argument.
Taken together, the forms of depoliticization observed constitute a primary factor explaining the ‘delivery gap’ between climate-energy transition strategies and actually implemented policies. In particular, local authorities often failed to implement, or even to consider, the coercive and hence controversial measures that would have been needed concomitantly to infrastructural developments in order to deliver the objectives of energy-climate strategies. In other words, these variegated forms of depoliticization have thus prevented the realization of the more general conditions allowing to achieve the objectives of the energy-climate strategies in which infrastructural developments took place, leading to what we have described as piecemeal infrastructural solutionism. Our paper thus complements the literature that addresses the shortfalls of the governance of climate/energy transitions. In a way, the paper suggests or implies that a lack of (democratic) politicization is a common ingredient to all such shortfalls and, we argue, may offer a broader explanatory framework. In other words, we contend that institutional fragmentation, the preference for small-scale experiments, the lack of sufficient resources, etc., are all the more detrimental to climate/energy transition dynamics because they are part of the general context of depoliticization that helps legitimizing specific approaches and delegitimizing others.

The inability, or unwillingness, to politicize the implementation of local energy-climate policies produces effects beyond infrastructural development.

Firstly, it goes against the (pressing) need to raise public awareness, to mobilize actors broadly, to encourage action, to coordinate initiatives and to consider more disruptive or transformative change. It hinders measures aimed at reducing, stopping, or reversing support to energy-intensive sectors or to allegedly ‘low-carbon’ infrastructural developments with ambivalent outcomes.

It also prevents much-needed debate on the contradictions within and between public policies, when such a debate would ultimately support more informed and more democratic decisions regarding the unavoidable trade-offs and facilitate the advent of a more just transition. In particular, undebated policies often have unintended negative consequences on urban socio-spatial justice that have not been anticipated by strategists and policy-makers.

More generally, in the various policies we have studied, the prevailing depoliticized approach has generally proved detrimental to the low-carbon objectives and measures
outlined in the relevant regional and local strategies as well as to the dimension of radical societal change arguably required to deliver energy transition and GHG emissions targets. These observations are in accordance with Blühdorn's (2007) critique of the (eco-)‘politics of simulation’, a major form of depoliticization, ‘by means of which late-modern society manages to sustain – at least for the time being – the unsustainable’ (p. 253); with Marquardt's (2024) conclusion that ‘even a progressive actor like the Green Party has tamed its energy transition imaginary over time through modes of depoliticization – from a radical, democratic, decentralized, people-centered alternative to the status quo to a stateled, market-oriented, technology-guided project' (p. 10); or with Swyngedouw's (2009) remark that the ‘reduction of the political to the “mode of governing” is particularly prevalent in environmental practices' (p. 605). Admittedly, such depoliticization of climate action (and environmental action beyond it) results in part from structural trends that support the advent of a ‘post-political city’, as forcefully argued by Swyngedouw (2009). However, our analysis of the actual implementation of climate policies reveals more ordinary, or contingent, forms of depoliticization, in the sense that they are initiated and enabled by local stakeholders' actions or failures to act.

Hence, the depoliticization at play in the implementation of low-carbon transition policies, and no doubt of other environmental policies, mainly results in trade-offs that are detrimental to environmental objectives and to the advancement of just transition policies. We therefore wish to close with a call for a democratic repoliticization of energy-climate action, echoing recent contributions in the field, e.g., Blühdorn and Deflorian (2021) who discuss the potential of ‘new social activism’ for ‘politicization beyond post-politics’, or Marquardt and Lederer (2022), who recommend to investigate ‘if and how current tendencies towards renationalization, populism, and post-truth act as powerful counter forces in an attempt to democratize global climate governance’ and the governance of other global environmental problems (p. 748). Possible resources for such repoliticization include civil society initiatives that challenge the unsustainability or the injustice associated with dominant policies and seek to offer concrete ways of resisting and experimenting with ways of transforming existing practices (Schlosberg et Coles, 2016; Gallez, 2023; Blanc et al.; 2024). As Healy and Barry (2017, 452) point out drawing from their study of fossil fuel divestment movements, ‘It is this reframing of our starting point as one focused on energy injustice, unsustainability (and lack of democracy) – as opposed to energy justice, sustainability and democracy – that makes the approach to energy transition a much more
radical, systemic and politically oppositional project.' In line with these two authors, we contend that some of these mobilisations foreshadow the way in which the recognition of injustices and the broadening of stakeholder groups will make it possible to reopen the debate on energy futures.
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<caption>Figure 1 - Evaluation of the rebound effects under different carpooling scenarios (Île-de-France, 2015)</caption>

Source: Delaunay et al., 2023, p. 281

(AVO : average vehicle occupancy)

<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>