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# ANNEXES

## Coding for Market Entry Regulation Index and Market Conduct Regulation Index (IHS, 2003)

### Market Entry Regulation Index

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Category/Variables</th><th>Coding</th><th>Scale</th><th>Weighting1</th><th>Weighting2</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ER</td><td>Entry regulation (general)</td><td>ERLC*0.40+<br>ERED*0.40+<br>ERQT*0.20</td><td>0 to 6</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ERLC</td><td>Licensing<br>Number of exclusive and<br>shared exclusive tasks</td><td>0 = 0<br>1 = 1.5<br>2 = 3<br>3 = 4.5<br>4 or more = 6</td><td>0 to 6</td><td></td><td>40%</td></tr><tr><td>ERED</td><td>Requirements in<br>education/does only apply in<br>cases of licensing; if no<br>licensing: "0"</td><td>ERED1*0.30+<br>ERED2*0.40+<br>ERED3*0.20+<br>ERED4*0.10</td><td>0 to 6</td><td></td><td>40%</td></tr><tr><td>ERED1</td><td>Duration of special<br>education/university or other<br>higher degree</td><td>0 to ≥ 6 years</td><td>0 to 6</td><td>30%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ERED2</td><td>Duration compulsory practising</td><td>0 to ≥ 6 years</td><td>0 to 6</td><td>40%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ERED3</td><td>Number of professional exams</td><td>(0 to ≥ 3)*2</td><td>0 to 6</td><td>20%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ERED4</td><td>Number of entry routes to<br>profession (inv. scale)</td><td>(0 = 4 or more routes;<br>1=3 routes;<br>2=2 routes;<br>3=1 route)*2</td><td>0 to 6</td><td>10%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ERQT</td><td>Quotas/economic needs test</td><td>0=no<br>6=yes</td><td>0 or 6</td><td></td><td>20%</td></tr></tbody></table>
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Conduct Regulation Index

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Category/Variables</th><th>Coding</th><th>Scale</th><th>Weight -ing 1</th><th>Weight -ing 2</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>CR</td><td>Conduct Regulation (general)</td><td>MCPR*0.25+<br>MCAD*0.15+<br>MCLOC*0.15+<br>MCDIV*0.20+<br>MCIC*0.25</td><td>0 to 6</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>MCPR</td><td>Regulations on prices and fees</td><td>0 = no regulations<br>1 = non binding reference prices on some services<br>2 = non binding reference prices on all services<br>3 = maximum prices on some services<br>4 = maximum prices on all services<br>5 = minimum prices on some services<br>6 = minimum prices on all services</td><td>0 to 6</td><td></td><td>25%</td></tr><tr><td>MCAD</td><td>Regulations on advertising</td><td>0 = no spec. regulations<br>2 = some forms forbidden (like comparative price advertising, direct mailing etc.)<br>4 = most forms are forbidden (advertising only in very narrow margins allowed)<br>6 = all forms of advertising are forbidden</td><td>0 to 6</td><td></td><td>15%</td></tr><tr><td>MCLOC</td><td>Regulations on location</td><td>0 = location not restricted<br>6 = location restricted</td><td>0 to 6</td><td></td><td>15%</td></tr><tr><td>MCDIV</td><td>Regulations on diversification</td><td>0 = no specific regulations<br>3 = diversification under specific preconditions allowed (branch office head is a professional, maximum number of branch offices etc.)<br>6 = diversification not allowed in any case</td><td>0 to 6</td><td></td><td>20%</td></tr><tr><td>MCIC</td><td>Regulations on form of business and interprofessional co-operation (general)</td><td>MCIC1*0.5+<br>MCIC2*0.5</td><td>0 to 6</td><td></td><td>25%</td></tr><tr><td>MCIC1</td><td>MCIC1 Regulations on form of business</td><td>0 = all forms (incl. incorporation allowed in any case)<br>2 = partnership allowed, incorporation only allowed in specific cases (regulations on ownership etc.)<br>5 = incorporation forbidden in any case<br>6 = partnership and incorporation forbidden in any case; only sole practitioners etc. allowed.</td><td>0 to 6</td><td>50%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>MCIC2</td><td>MCIC2 Regulations on interprofessional co-operation</td><td>0 = all forms allowed<br>3 = with all professions but no incorporation; or only with comparable professions in all forms allowed etc.<br>4.5 = only with comparable professions and no incorporation<br>6=generally forbidden</td><td>0 to 6</td><td>50%</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>
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# ANNEXES

## Annex 1: OECD Questionnaire for notarial regulatory indicator (OECD, 2024)

### ENTRY REGULATION: GENERAL

**Question A (Exclusive rights):** Do notaries have exclusive or shared exclusive rights to provide any of the activities listed below?<fnref n="46" />

Exclusive right = 1; shared exclusive right or subset of exclusive right = 0,5

- Unprotected professional title and no exclusive rights: 0

- No exclusive and protected professional title: 1

- Sum of exclusive rights ≤ 1: 2

- Sum of exclusive rights ≤ 2: 3

- Sum of exclusive rights ≤ 3: 4

- Sum of exclusive rights ≤ 4: 5

- Sum of exclusive rights ≥ 5: 6

**Question B (Pathways):** How many pathways are there to obtain the qualifications to legally practice the profession?

- No exclusive right / Three or more pathways: 0

- Two pathways: 3

- Only one pathway: 6

**Question C (Professional exam):** Is there a requirement to pass one or more professional examinations in order to legally practice the profession or to obtain the professional title when it is protected by the law

- Two pathways or more: 0

- Only one pathway + Professional examination: 6

**Question D (Quotas and economic needs tests):** Is the number of notaries allowed to practice in your country limited by law or self-regulation by professional bodies (or a combination of the two)?

- No: 0

- Yes, but only in some areas after an assessment of regulation: 1

- Yes: 6

**Question E (Professional organization):** Is it compulsory to be a member of a professional organization for an individual in order to legally practice as a notary or to obtain the professional title when this is protected by the law?

- No: 0

- Yes: 6

### ENTRY REGULATION: FOREIGN ENTRY

**Question F: Is nationality or citizenship required for a notary to practice in your country?**

**Question Fa (Mutual recognition):** Do laws or regulations establish a clear and transparent process for recognizing education titles that have been earned abroad in the case of notaries?

- Nationality / Citizenship is not required and there is no process for recognizing education titles that have been earned abroad: 0

- Drawing up legal documents (such as contracts and wills)

- Advice on matters predominantly regulated by domestic law

- Advice on matters predominantly regulated by international law

- Advice on matters predominantly regulated by foreign law

- Transferring of title to real estate (conveyancing)

- Regulation of family matters

- Tax advice

- Insolvency practice

- Management consulting and other business advisory services

- Advice and representation on patent law

- Business incorporation

- Administering oaths and certificating legal documents

- Others

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶ The different activities are:</footnote>
- Nationality / Citizenship is not required and there is a clear and transparent process for recognizing education titles that have been earned in some countries: 1,5

- Nationality / Citizenship is not required and there is a clear and transparent process for recognizing education titles that have been earned abroad: 3

- Nationality / Citizenship is required, but some countries are excluded; there is a clear and transparent process: 3

- Nationality / Citizenship is required, but some countries are excluded; there is a clear and transparent process, but some countries are excluded: 4

- Nationality / Citizenship is required, but some countries are excluded; there is no clear and transparent process: 5

- Nationality is required: 6

**Question Fb (Local examination): Are notaries that have acquired their qualifications in a foreign country required to take a local examination in order to practice?**

- Nationality / Citizenship is not required and there is no local exam: 0

- Nationality / Citizenship is not required and there is a local exam for some countries: 1,5

- Nationality / Citizenship is not required and there is a local exam: 3

- Nationality / Citizenship is required, but some countries are excluded; there is no local exam: 3

- Nationality / Citizenship is required, but some countries are excluded; there is a local exam with some excluded countries: 4

- Nationality / Citizenship is required, but some countries are excluded; there is a local exam: 5

- Nationality is required: 6

## CONDUCT REGULATION: FEES AND CHARGES

**Question G (Fees and Tariffs): If fees/tariffs are regulated or self-regulated, what is the nature of these regulations?**

- Not regulated and no quotas nor economic needs tests: 0

- Non-binding recommended fees/tariffs for some activities: 1

- Non-binding recommended fees/tariffs for all activities: 2

- Binding maximum fees/tariffs for some activities OR limitation of the number of professionals allowed to practice without price regulation: 3

- Binding maximum fees/tariffs for all activities: 4

- Binding minimum or fixed fees/tariffs for some activities: 5

- Binding minimum or fixed fees/tariffs for all activities: 6

**Question H (Advertising): Provided that advertising is neither false, misleading nor deceptive, are there restrictions on advertising and marketing by notaries and/or notarial firms (whether imposed by law or self-regulation by professional bodies, or a combination of the two)?**

- No (all forms of advertising and marketing are allowed): 0

- Yes (some form of advertising and marketing are prohibited): 3

- Yes (all forms of advertising and marketing are prohibited): 6

## CONDUCT REGULATION: PROFESSIONAL FIRMS

**Question I (Legal Form of business): Are there restrictions on the legal form of business (whether imposed by law or self-regulation by professional bodies, or a combination of the two)?**

- No restrictions on legal form: 0

- Incorporation allowed, but no/limited trading of shares on stock market: 1

- Limited liability allowed, but not incorporation: 3

- Limited liability allowed, but only for some professionals: 4

- No limited liability allowed: 5

- Only sole proprietorship/personally-owned enterprise : 6

**Question G (Inter-professional cooperation): Are there restrictions on inter-professional business co-operation between notaries and other professionals (e.g. partnerships, joint ventures) whether imposed by law or self-regulation by professional bodies, or a combination of the two?**

- All forms of cooperation allowed: 0

- Some restrictions to avoid conflicts of interest: 2

- Explicit ban on business cooperation with some professions: 4

- Explicit ban on business cooperation with all other professions: 6

**Question H (Ownership-type interest): Can non-notaries have an ownership-type interest in a notarial firm?**

- Yes, up to 100% of the capital: 0
- Yes, anyone up to 74% of the capital / yes, only some other professionals up to 74% of the capital: 2

- Yes, anyone up to 49% of the capital / yes, only some other professionals up to 49% of the capital: 4

- No: 6

**Question I (Ownership-type interest 2): Are there restrictions on which firms can have an ownership-type interest in a notarial firm (whether imposed by law or self-regulation by professional bodies or a combination of the two)?**

- Any firm can have an interest in a notary firm that covers more than 49% of the capital: 0

- Any firm can have an interest in a notary firm that covers up to 49% of the capital: 2

- Only notary firms can have an interest in a notary firm that covers more than 49% of the capital (other firms cannot): 3

- Only notary firms can have an interest in a notary firm that covers up to 49% of the capital (other firms cannot): 4

- No firms can have an interest in a notary firm: 6

**Question J (Voting rights): Can non-notaries have voting rights in a notarial firm?**

- Yes, up to 100% of the voting rights: 0

- Yes, anyone up to 74% of the voting rights/yes, only some other professionals up to 74% of the voting rights: 2

- Yes, anyone up to 49% of the voting rights/yes, only some other professionals up to 49% of the voting rights: 4

- No: 6

**Question K (Voting rights 2): Are there restrictions on which firms can have voting rights in a notarial firm (whether imposed by law or self-regulation by professional bodies, or a combination of the two)?**

- Any firm can have more than 49% of the voting rights in a notary firm: 0

- Any firm can have up to 49% of voting rights in a notary firm: 2

- Only notary firms can have more than 49% of voting rights in a notary firm (but other firms cannot): 3

- Only notary firms can have up to 49% of voting rights in a notary firm (other firms cannot): 4

- No firms can have any voting rights in a notary firm: 6

**Annex 2: IHS Questionnaire for notarial regulatory indicators (IHS, 2003)**

<table><thead><tr><th>WEIGHTS</th><th>QUESTIONAIRE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>100 %</td><td>MARKET ENTRY REGULATION INDEX</td></tr><tr><td>40 %</td><td>Licensing: Number of exclusive and shared exclusive tasks<ul><li>0 = 0</li><li>1 = 1.5</li><li>2 = 3</li><li>3 = 4.5</li><li>More = 6</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>40 %</td><td>Requirements in education (does only apply in cases of licensing; if no licensing: "0")</td></tr><tr><td>30 %</td><td>Duration of special education/university or other higher degree</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>0 to 6 years</td></tr><tr><td>40 %</td><td>Duration of compulsory practicing</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>0 to 6 years</td></tr><tr><td>20 %</td><td>Number of professional exams</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>(0 to 3)*2</td></tr><tr><td>10 %</td><td>Number of entry routes to profession (inv. scale)<ul><li>0 = 4 or more routes</li><li>2=3 routes</li><li>4=2 routes</li><li>6=1 route</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>20 %</td><td>Quotas and economic needs tests<ul><li>No = 0</li><li>Yes = 6</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>100 %</td><td>MARKET CONDUCT REGULATION INDEX</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td>25 %</td><td>Regulations on prices and fees<ul><li>0 = no regulations</li><li>1 = non-binding reference prices on some services</li><li>2 = non-binding reference prices on all services</li><li>3 = maximum prices on some services</li><li>4 = maximum prices on all services</li><li>5 = minimum prices on some services</li><li>6 = minimum prices on all services</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>15 %</td><td>Regulations on advertising<ul><li>0 = no spec. regulations</li><li>2 = some forms forbidden (like comparative price advertising, direct mailing etc.)</li><li>4 = most forms are forbidden (advertising only in very narrow margins allowed)</li><li>6 = all forms of advertising are forbidden</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>15 %</td><td>Regulations on location<ul><li>0 = location not restricted</li><li>6 = location restricted</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>20 %</td><td>Regulations on diversification<ul><li>0 = no specific regulations</li><li>3 = diversification under specific preconditions allowed (branch office head is a professional, maximum number of branch offices etc.)</li><li>6 = diversification not allowed in any case</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>25 %</td><td>Regulations on form of business and interprofessional co-operation (general)</td></tr><tr><td>50 %</td><td>Regulations on form of business<ul><li>0 = all forms (incl. incorporation allowed in any case)</li><li>2 = partnership allowed, incorporation only allowed in specific cases (regulations on ownership etc.)</li><li>5 = incorporation forbidden in any case</li><li>6 = partnership and incorporation forbidden in any case; only sole practitioners etc. allowed.</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>50 %</td><td>Regulations on inter-professional co-operation<ul><li>0 = all forms allowed</li><li>3 = with all professions but no incorporation; or only with comparable professions in all forms allowed etc.</li><li>4.5 = only with comparable professions and no incorporation</li><li>6 = generally forbidden</li></ul></td></tr></table>
<table><caption>Annex 3: Correlation matrix for PMR indicator of notarial regulation, 2024</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>SCORE RIGHTS</th><th>PATHWAYS</th><th>PROF_EXAM</th><th>PROF_ORG</th><th>QUOTAS</th><th>LEGALFORM_BUSINESS</th><th>OWNERSHIP_NONNOTARIES</th><th>RESTRICTIONS_OWNERSHIP</th><th>VOTING_NONNOTARIES</th><th>RESTRICTIONS_VOTING</th><th>RESTRICTIONS_INTERPROF</th><th>LEE_REGULATION</th><th>ADVERTISING_REG</th><th>TITLE_RECON</th><th>LOCAL_EXAM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>SCORE RIGHTS</td><td></td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td></tr><tr><td>PATHWAYS</td><td>NS</td><td></td><td>0.77***</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>-0.29*</td></tr><tr><td>PROF_EXAM</td><td>NS</td><td>0.77***</td><td></td><td>NS</td><td>0.29*</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.35***</td><td>0.29*</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td></tr><tr><td>PROF_ORG</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.29*</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.29*</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td></tr><tr><td>QUOTAS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.29*</td><td>0.29*</td><td></td><td>0.33*</td><td>0.53***</td><td>0.58***</td><td>0.53***</td><td>0.58***</td><td>0.55***</td><td>0.49***</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.39**</td></tr><tr><td>LEGALFORM_BUSINESS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.33*</td><td></td><td>0.53***</td><td>0.66***</td><td>0.53***</td><td>0.66***</td><td>0.55***</td><td>0.46***</td><td>0.47***</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td></tr><tr><td>OWNERSHIP_NONNOTARIES</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.53***</td><td>0.53***</td><td></td><td>0.76***</td><td>1***</td><td>0.76***</td><td>0.67</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.46***</td></tr><tr><td>RESTRICTIONS_OWNERSHIP</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.35**</td><td>NS</td><td>0.58***</td><td>0.66***</td><td>0.76***</td><td></td><td>0.76***</td><td>1***</td><td>0.86***</td><td>0.35**</td><td>0.29*</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td></tr><tr><td>VOTING_NONNOTARIES</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.29*</td><td>0.53***</td><td>0.53***</td><td>1***</td><td></td><td>0.76***</td><td>0.67***</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.46***</td></tr><tr><td>RESTRICTIONS_VOTING</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.35**</td><td>NS</td><td>0.58***</td><td>0.66***</td><td>0.76***</td><td>1***</td><td>0.76***</td><td></td><td>0.86***</td><td>0.35**</td><td>0.29*</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td></tr><tr><td>RESTRICTIONS_INTERPROF</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.29*</td><td>NS</td><td>0.55***</td><td>0.55***</td><td>0.67***</td><td></td><td>0.86***</td><td>0.34***</td><td>0.34***</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td></tr><tr><td>FEE_REGULATION</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.37**</td><td>0.49***</td><td>0.46***</td><td>0.35**</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.34**</td><td></td><td>0.50***</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td></tr><tr><td>ADVERTISING_REG</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.29*</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td></tr><tr><td>TITLE_RECON</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.66***</td></tr><tr><td>LOCAL_EXAM</td><td>NS</td><td>-0.29*</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>0.39**</td><td>0.39**</td><td>0.46***</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td><td>NS</td></tr></tbody></table>
<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>Annex 4: PMR Notarial Regulation's distribution in 2024</figcaption></figure>