# Competition, Profit Share and Concentration

Jocelyn Boussard, Raphaël Lee

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Competition, Profit Share and Concentration

Jocelyn BOUSSARD - Raphaël LEE
<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>
Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques

G2020/04

# Competition, Profit Share and Concentration

Jocelyn BOUSSARD* Raphaël LEE**

Septembre 2020

Département des Études Économiques - Timbre G201

88, avenue Verdier - CS 70058 - 92541 MONTROUGE CEDEX - France

Tél. : 33 (1) 87 69 59 54 - E-mail : d3e-dg@insee.fr - Site Web Insee : http://www.insee.fr

Ces documents de travail ne reflètent pas la position de l'Insee et n'engagent que leurs auteurs.
Working papers do not reflect the position of INSEE but only their author's views.

We thank the economic studies department at INSEE for funding part of this research. We thank Julien Prat, Jean-Baptiste Michau, Matthieu Lemoine, Olivier Simon, Lisa Kerdehlué, Barbara Rico-Castillo, and all participants at the INSEE Economic Studies Seminar and for their useful comments.

<footnote>* Banque de France. Email: jocelyn.boussard@banque-france.fr. Website: https://sites.google.com/site/jocelynboussardhome/</footnote>

<footnote>** Insee - Crest. Email : raphaël.lee@insee.fr</footnote>
# Concurrence, part des profits et concentration des entreprises

## Résumé

Cet article étudie les effets distributionnels de la concurrence de type « winner-takes-most » (ou effet superstar), et son rôle dans les récentes tendances macroéconomiques des économies avancées. Nous documentons une corrélation positive entre les variations au niveau sectoriel des parts du travail et du capital dans la valeur ajoutée, et une corrélation positive entre les variations de la part des profits et la concentration sectorielle. Toutefois, en mobilisant des données sectorielles procurant des informations sur la distribution des marges au niveau des entreprises, nous trouvons une corrélation négative entre la concentration et de nombreux quantiles de cette distribution. Nous proposons un modèle d'équilibre général avec des entreprises hétérogènes selon lequel une augmentation de la concurrence, c'est-à-dire ici une augmentation de la sensibilité des consommateurs aux prix relatifs des différentes variétés d'un même bien, et donc une diminution du taux de marque des entreprises, conduit à une augmentation de la concentration sectorielle, une diminution des parts des profits au niveau des entreprises mais une augmentation des parts des profits au niveau sectoriel. Nous étudions l'effet d'un changement d'environnement compétitif sur le sentier de croissance équilibré (SCE). Contrairement aux modèles à entreprise représentative, la concurrence réduit la probabilité de succès à l'entrée et donc la diversité des produits. Si les consommateurs valorisent cette dernière, nous montrons que la croissance, le taux d'intérêt naturel et le bien-être décroissent avec le niveau de concurrence.

**Mots-clés** : Concurrence, croissance, part du travail, taux de marque

# Competition, Profit Share and Concentration

## Abstract

This paper investigates the distributional impact of 'winner-takes-most' competition and its role in shaping recent macroeconomic trends in advanced economies. We document a positive correlation between variations in industry labor and capital shares, and a positive correlation between variations in industry profit shares and industry concentration levels. However using micro-based industry data on firm-level profit margins, we find a negative correlation between industry concentration and a wide range of moments from the distribution of profit shares. We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms, in which an increase in competition, whereby consumers become more price-sensitive and firm markups decrease, leads to a rise in concentration, a decrease in *firm-level* profit shares but an increase in *industry-level* profit shares. We study the effect of a change in the competitive environment on the Balanced Growth Path (BGP). In contrast with representative firm models, competition reduces the probability of successful entry and product diversity. If consumers value product diversity, we show that output growth, the natural interest rate, and welfare decrease with competition.

**Keywords:** Competition, growth, labor share, markup.

**Classification JEL** : E10 ; E22 ; E25 ;
# 1 Introduction

The forces of globalization and new technologies have changed the nature of competition (Van Reenen, 2018) and while the effects of competition on innovation and growth (Aghion et al., 2005) or on the sharing of the economic surplus among producers and consumers have been widely studied, more recent work has begun to examine the impact of a rise in competition on the distribution of value-added among workers, capital owners, and firm owners.

A large body of work has documented a decline in the aggregate labor share of GDP in many advanced economies since the beginning of the 1990s (Elsby et al., 2013; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Piketty and Zucman, 2014; Dao et al., 2017). In the USA, Autor et al. (2020) show that larger firms have lower labor shares and that the fall in industry-level labor shares is mainly attributable to a reallocation of market shares from high-labor-share firms to low-labor-share firms, while the labor share for the *average* firm has in fact been on the rise. Lashkari et al. (2019) find similar evidence for France. These authors also document a positive correlation between decreases in the labor share and the rise in concentration and a negative correlation between firm size and labor share. Specifically, Bessen (2017) documents a rise in concentration in the US since 1980, and Autor et al. (2020) suggest that 'winner-takes-most' competition drives these changes. Traditional aggregate neoclassical analysis of the distribution of aggregate income cannot account for these patterns because in this framework, labor share variations occur within industry-level representative firms.

In this paper, we explore the claim that labor shares have decreased and profit shares have increased in advanced economies. We find substantial heterogeneity across industries and countries, and we document important evidence of a positive correlation between variations in concentration and *industry-level* profits but a negative correlation between variations in concentration and *firm-level* profits, using micro-based industry-level data for the largest countries of the Eurozone.

To rationalize these facts, we extend the framework in Autor et al. (2020) and build a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model which features firm heterogeneity and endogeneous entry à-la Melitz (2003), and a cross-sectional positive correlation between firm size and profit share. We perform a simple calibration exercise and study the response of the model in moving from a low to a high competition environment. We show that an increase in product market competition decreases *firm-level* profit shares, which contributes negatively to the aggregate profit share (*within-firm* effect), and increases concentration, which, together with the fact that larger firms have higher profit shares, contributes positively to the aggregate profit share (*reallocation* effect). We show that when market shares are distributed according to a Pareto law, the *reallocation* effect is stronger than the *within-firm* effect. Moreover, our model predicts that a rise in competition decreases business dynamism and aggregate output growth in the long run.

In our model, an increase in competition is captured by an increase of the elasticity of substitution across goods, which leads to a decrease in firm level markups. This type of competition is in fact an increase in "market toughness" from the point of view of firms, meaning that consumers react more
strongly to variations in prices, and should not be confused with a decrease in barriers to entry or
stronger antitrust laws as in Gutiérrez and Philippon (2018). An increase in market toughness could
stem from technology if marketing and now internet platforms made price comparison easier for
consumers, from globalization, if international competition reduced firm level markups, or, keeping
with our model, from preferences if varieties are simply now more substitutable to the consumer
than before.

Prior works by Barkai (2020) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2018) have emphasised that the fall in labor shares has not been accompanied by a rise in the productive capital share of GDP, but by a rise in the 'factorless' share of income, therefore casting further doubt on the contribution of the automation of tasks performed by workers (Acemoglu et al., 2016), or of substitution away from labor following a fall in the price of capital (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Piketty and Zucman, 2014). In particular, for substitution to explain a fall in the labor share of income, the aggregate elasticity of substitution has to be above 1, an assumption that is not in line with the bulk of the empirical literature (Lawrence, 2015; Oberfield and Raval, 2014). Another strand in the literature has focused on the role of firm-level markups in advanced economies to explain that the rise in the profit share of aggregate income, and find that there has been a significant reallocation of market share from low to high markup firms, together with a fattening of the upper tail, and that the aggregate profit share increased, both in the US and in advanced economies. (De Loecker et al., 2020; De Loecker and Eeckout, 2018). The role of competition behind these evolutions has however seldom been studied, with the exception of Berkowitz et al. (2017), who use firm-level data from China to show that product-market deregulation can explain the majority of the decline in labor shares through a decline in political pressure to protect employment in state-owned enterprises. There is controversy over the degree to which the fall in the labor share is attributable to measurement issues, for instance the treatment of non salaried workers (Elsby et al., 2013), and housing capital (Rognlie, 2015) or intangible capital (Elsby et al., 2013; Rognlie, 2015; Koh et al., 2015).

The macroeconomic consequences of firm heterogeneity have been the focus of much recent work
in the trade and business cycle literature. For instance, because of firm productivity heterogeneity,
exposure to trade has important implications on the extensive as well as the intensive margin
of exports, leading to important reallocation towards more productive firms and efficiency gains
(Melitz, 2003; Eaton et al., 2011). Gabaix (2011) shows that idiosyncratic firm-level shocks explain
an important part of aggregate variations of output growth. Importantly, Luttmer and Luttmer
(2007) shows that random growth of firms, selection and imitation by entrants with entry and
innovation frictions lead to fat-tailed distribution of firm market shares, and that about half of
output growth can be attributed to selection. Moreover, the possible negative impact of competition
has been documented by among others Aghion et al. (2005); Goettler and Gordon (2014), who both
document a inverted U relationship between competition and innovation, and show in different
settings that this relationship can be rationalized by the fact that competition discourages laggard
firms from innovating. We add to these contribution by showing that despite the increase in
aggregate profits, competition reduces the probability of successful entry and product diversity.
If consumers value product diversity, we show that output growth, the natural interest rate, and
welfare decrease with competition.

In this paper, we do not take a stance on the underlying forces behind a broad increase in product market competition. For instance, on the demand side, price comparison websites can increase consumer willingness to substitute for slightly different but cheaper options. Conversely, on the supply side product standardization can increase the comparability of similar goods. We will use the terms 'competition' and 'market toughness' interchangeably throughout this paper.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our methodology for computing aggregate profit shares and key empirical facts about the distribution of income, Section 3 presents our key empirical facts about the relationship between profits and concentration. Section 4.1 discusses the main elements of our theory, and Section 4.2 presents the calibration results, then Section 5 concludes.
# 2 Facts

## 2.1 Measuring the Profit Share

In this section, we describe our methodology to compute the aggregate shares of income accruing to labor, capital and finally to firm owners, and we document a positive correlation between the labor and the capital share at the country and industry level, suggesting that a large part of the variation in factor shares are attributable to shifts in the total cost share, and therefore to shifts in the aggregate profit share. Profit shares have been increasing dramatically in the US from 1990 to 2015 across a wide selection of sectors. In France, the profit share is humped-shaped with a maximum around the year 2000, and industry level profit share variation are not homogeneous.

By definition, at the country level, total nominal value added or income PY equals the sum of payments to labor WL, payments to capital R^K K and economic profits V earned by firm owners selling the output of the firm at a price that exceeds the average cost of production.

$$R = WL + R^K K + V. \quad (1)$$

Dividing both sides by R to express each component as a share of income, we obtain the profit share of income V/R as the residual of Equation (1).

First, to measure total payments to labor we need to go beyond the accounting definition of compensation of employees which does not encompass all payments to labor, for instance when accounting profits are used as compensation for the work of self-employed or sole proprietors. We follow Jäger (2017) and make the assumption that the imputed hour wage of non-employees is the observed average hourly wage of employees of the same industry i. Letting $W_i^{emp}$ be the hourly wage in industry i, $L_i^{emp}$ hours worked by employees, and $L_i^{nonemp}$ hours worked by non-employees, we can express total payments to labor WL at the country level as:

$$WL = \sum_{i} W_{i}^{emp} (L_{i}^{emp} + L_{i}^{nonemp}). \quad (2)$$

Second, to measure total payments to capital requires measuring the returns to productive capital R^K. Jäger (2017) assumes that there is no economic profit at the industry level and uses that assumption to back out R^K from Equation (1). Because our goal is precisely to measure the profit share, we follow Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and Barkai (2020) and make the following assumptions:

**Assumption 1.** Households are indifferent between owning productive capital and government bonds.

**Assumption 2.** Firms are indifferent between renting from households and owning their productive capital stock.

Let there be J different asset types of productive capital. Assumption 1 implies that if government
bonds yield a nominal rate $R^n$, type $j$ asset whose current investment price is $P^j$ and depreciates is $\delta^j$ has a nominal return $R^j$ to households of:

$$R^j = P^j [R^n + \delta^j - E[\Pi^j]], \quad (3)$$

where $E[\Pi^j]$ is the expected inflation of $P^j$, which reflects either the resale value of capital at the end of the next period, or the opportunity gain of investing now instead of during the next period.<fnref n="1" /> This assumption in particular implies that investing in productive capital is not riskier than investing in government bonds. Assumption 2 implies that this return applies also to capital owned by firms. We observe $K_i^j$ the total capital stock of type $j$ used in production in industry $i$, therefore total payments to capital at the country level are:

$$R^K K = \sum_i R_i^K K_i = \sum_i \sum_j R^j K_i^j, \quad (4)$$

where we define $K_i$ (and $K$) as the chained volume index of the aggregate capital stocks across all types of asset (and industries). The EU KLEMS database (Jäger, 2017) provides aggregate data from National Accounts on value added at factor costs, investment, investment price, and capital stock for 10 types of capital, including intangible capital, as well as wages, employment and hours worked for employed and non-employed workers, at for 27 industries covering the whole economy of 20 countries of the European Union and the United States (USA), with varying historical depth.<fnref n="2" />

Figure 1 displays compensation of employees and total labor payments including compensation of self-employed workers as a share of value added in France, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and the USA, from 1987 to 2015, for the market economy.<fnref n="3" /> The decline of the labor share observed in the USA starting in 2000, is not a shared feature of those four countries. In France, compensation of employees as a share of value added actually is broadly stable, and the decrease of the labor share from 1985 to 2000 is mainly driven by the decrease in the share of payments to non salaried workers, which given our assumption about the wages of non salaried workers, reflects a structural shift toward salaried employment; in 2015 payments to labor in the market economy as a share of value added had almost recovered their mid-80s level, with the 2009 recession appearing to have no discernible impact on this trend. In the UK, despite strong fluctuations in 1990's, overall payments to both employees and total labor appear stable over the period but for a decline in 2014 and 2015. In Germany<fnref n="4" /> the pattern resembles what occurred in the USA, with a decline in the labor share beginning around the first half of the 1990's and a leveling since the great recession.

Figure 4 displays the capital share for those same four countries, at the market economy level, using

<footnote n="1">¹The proof of this equation will be straightforward in Section 4.2.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">²Data availability is summed up in Appendix C.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³We restrict our analysis to industries outside the public sector where the National Accounts make stringent assumptions about the capital share in order to measure the non-market value-added, namely that capital payments are equal the cost of depreciation, which correspond to $R = 0$ and $E[\Pi^j] = 0$ in Equation 3.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴Pre-1991 data for Germany back-casted based on West Germany aggregate data.</footnote>
a five year moving average for the investment price per type of capital as a proxy for $E[\Pi^j]^5$, and long-term or short-term bond rates from the OECD as a proxy for $R^n$. Long-term interest rates refer to government bonds maturing in ten years. Short-term interest rates are based on three-month money market rates. Both rates are implied by the prices at which the government bonds are traded on financial markets, not the interest rates at which the loans were issued, in order to reflect current information available and the effective opportunity cost of capital for investors. Both definitions yield similar result and as a convention we will use long term rates in the remainder of the paper. Aggregate productive capital data starts in 1995 in Germany and 1997 in the UK. Contrary to labor shares, capital shares have been decreasing in all four economies. In all countries they amount to around 15% of value-added in 2015. In Germany, the capital share fell from 25% to 30% in 1996, in the UK from 20% in 1998, and in the USA it fell from 25% to 30% in 1985 to almost 10% in 2005 before recovering around the 2008 recession. In France, the capital share increased from 19% in the mid-80s to 22% in 1990, and then decreased to 15% in 2015, with a hump around 2010.

These results are consistent with existing evidence from other research. Autor et al. (2020) document falls in labor shares in the US and advanced economies, and their measures for the USA, at the aggregate and detailed per broad industries are very close to the patterns described here. However, our measure of the labor share in France shows a rise at the end of the time period that is not apparent in Autor et al. (2020). We attribute this difference to the fact they use employee compensation as a measure for payments to labor, while we also include imputed payments to self employed workers. Cette et al. (2019) show that this correction is especially important in the context of France. Barkai (2020) shows that for the US, the aggregate capital share fell from close to 30% in 1985 to around 15% in 2014, and that the profit share rose from 2% to 15% in the same period. Although their is a difference in the level of the profit share, which we attribute to the fact that Barkai (2020) computes the after tax profit share, the trends are very similar. De Loecker and Eeckout (2018) computes aggregate markups from micro data on publicly traded firms in many countries and find substantial increases everywhere. De Loecker et al. (2020) also shows an increase of aggregate markups using more exhaustive data for the USA. This evidence is consistent with an increase in aggregate profit shares. Finally, Gutiérrez and Philippon (2018) measure the profit share as gross operating surplus over value added or output, a different measure than in this paper, where we distinguish between capital and profit. First, consistently with our analysis of the labor share, they find a slight increase in the profit plus capital share in Europe, although not as big as in the USA. In our paper, the European modest rise in aggregate profit shares is in fact more driven by the fall in capital shares than by the fall in labor shares.

We further explore the contributions to these variations in capital shares. A popular explanation of the fall in labor shares is that capital and labor are substitutes and that a fall in the price of capital is accompanied by a rise in the capital stock which more than offsets the fall in price, such that the total capital shares increases. Given that we find that capital shares are broadly falling, our

<footnote>$^5E_t[\Pi^j] = \frac{1}{5} \sum_{\tau=t-2}^{t+2} \Pi_{\tau}^j$</footnote>
analysis provides some insight about where this substitution may be failing. Rewriting Equation (4) in share of nominal value added PY, we obtain an expression for the capital share:

$$ \frac{R^K K}{PY} = \sum_i \sum_j \frac{P^j K_i^j}{PY} [R^n - E[\Pi] + \delta^j - (E[\Pi^j] - E[\Pi])] \\ = \left( \underbrace{R^n - E[\Pi]}_{\text{Real Interest Rate}} + \sum_j \underbrace{\frac{K^j}{K}}_{\text{Composition}} \underbrace{\frac{P^j}{P^K} [\delta^j - E[\Pi^j - \Pi]]}_{\text{Net Replacement Cost}} \right) \underbrace{\frac{K}{Y}}_{\text{Intensity}} \underbrace{\frac{P^K}{P}}_{\text{Relative Price}} , \quad (5) $$

where $K^j = \sum_i K_i^j$ is aggregate stock of type j capital across all industries, $P^K$ and $K$ are the chained price and volume indexes and of aggregate investment and capital across all types of capital and all industries, and $\Pi$ is value-added price inflation. We do an "accounting" decomposition of aggregate variations in the capital share into five components:

1. Real interest rate: a decrease in the real interest rate reduces the opportunity cost of investing into productive capital, and therefore reduces the required return for all types of capital.

2. Composition: Because of higher depreciation or lower resale price inflation, some asset types are more user-costly than others. When the composition of the aggregate capital stock shifts towards those asset types, the aggregate rate of return mechanically increases.

3. Net Replacement Cost: holding the composition of the capital stock constant, when one or several type of capital are expected to lose value at a faster rate, investors ask for a higher rate of return.

4. Relative Price: the nominal rate of return is the product of the real rate of return and the price of investment. All other things equal, when the price of investment is lower, the nominal rate is lower.

5. Intensity: holding the nominal rate constant, a lower stock of capital relative to value added reduces the capital share.

Figure 5 reports the contributions of each component to the capital share (computed with long term interest rate) for France, Germany, the UK and the USA.<fnref n="6" /> In all countries, the real interest rate and the relative investment price both contributed, in accounting terms, to the fall in the

$$ \Delta Z_x^c = f[Z_1^c, (Z_0^{c'})_{c' \in C \setminus \{c\}}] - f[Z_0^c, (Z_0^{c'})_{c' \in C \setminus \{c\}}]. $$

The sum of contributions does not therefore perfectly equal the aggregate variation.

<footnote n="6">⁶Let $X_t = f[(Z_t^c)_{c \in C=\{1,5\}}]$ be the capital share at time $t$ as a function of each component $Z^c$ in Equation (5). The contribution $\Delta Z_x^c$ of component $Z^c$ to the variation $\Delta X = X_1 - X_0$ between periods 0 and 1 is given by:</footnote>
capital share. With the exception of the UK, the composition of the capital stock contributed to a rise, indicating that the composition of productive capital shifted towards assets that depreciate more quickly or lose value more quickly, and for which investor ask for a higher rate. On the other hand, this composition effect is mostly offset by the fact that those types of capital became less and less costly to replace. Finally, in the US and the UK, capital intensity increased steadily, while it decreased then increased in France, and remained broadly stable in Germany, which does not suggest that substitution towards capital played a substantial role in the fall in the labor share.

We now provide evidence that these declining trends in capital share evolution were not offset by similar increasing trends in labor shares, suggesting significant evolution in profit share over the period, and that that capital and labor shares tend to move together at the industry level in most advanced economies. Figures 6 and 7 show the correlations between four year variations in smoothed labor shares and smoothed capital shares for a wider sample of countries of the European Union plus the USA, for 30 industries of the market economy. The grey line draws the frontier at which the profit share is stable, we report below each scatter plot the results of separate regressions of capital share variations on labor share variations for each period. First, except in the run-up to and after the great recession, most countries and industries have experienced increases in profit share. Second, in the last 25 years, the correlation between variations in factor shares is never significantly negative. At the country level, the correlation is positive and significant at least at the 10% level half of the time (1992-1996, 2000-2004 and 2004-2008), and non significant the remaining half. At the industry level, labor and capital shares variations were uncorrelated only in the aftermath of the great recession.

Because variations in factor shares tend to be correlated, these variations are reflected in variations of the profit share. Figures 8 and 9 show the evolution of the smoothed profit share of income resulting from the capital and labor shares previously calculated, in France and in the US for a selection of broad industries and for the whole market economy, either as a share of value added or output. Profit shares have been increasing in most US industries, and therefore in the entire market economy, while in France patterns differ across industries and the evolution of the aggregate profit share is hump-shaped. Therefore, we find no evidence in favor of the explanation of the decline in labor shares as a result of substitution towards capital.

To what are these profit share patterns attributable to? Our profit measure captures all that is not included in measured payments to labor or capital. For instance non produced assets such as land and natural resources are not included in the measure of productive capital. Profits here are the sum of *Ricardian rents*, i.e., the returns to fixed, firm-specific, inimitable factors that distinguish firms from one another, and to assets whose quantity is constant and cannot be accumulated.

Capital may also be a riskier asset than government bonds, contrary to assumption 1, and the profit share patterns we observe may then include risk premium variations. However, as the next section will show, most of our results related to profit shares variations remain (with an opposite sign) when we relate them to labor shares, which suggest that most of the patterns we aim to explain
here are driven by true cost variations rather than risk premium variations. Profits fluctuate with many factors related to the competitive environment, such as competition, product differentiation, market size, returns to scale or monopolistic power, and we will now focus on these determinants.

# 3 Industry Concentration and Profit Shares

In this section, we study further the link between profit share variations and the competitive environment, and show that variations in industry-level concentration are positively (resp. negatively) correlated with variations in industry level profit shares (resp. factor shares), but are negatively correlated with variations in firm-level profit shares, which suggests that some strong reallocation forces are at play: if firms which gain market shares both are larger and have higher profit shares, then we will both observe a rise of concentration and an increase in the aggregate profit share, holding firm level profit constant. In fact, we document evidence that in European countries, increases in concentration were accompanied by decreases in firm level profit profits.

The CompNet (Competitive Research Network) database provides micro-based data on the distribution of firm market shares and profit shares at the two-digit NACE level for 14 European countries (di Mauro and Lopez-Garcia, 2015).<fnref n="7" /> While the CompNet database does not provide the micro data on which it is based, it provides information on selected percentiles (p1, p5, p10, p25, p50, p75, p90, p95 and p99), as well as weighted and unweighted means from 2000 to 2012 for most industries and countries.

We begin our analysis by investigating how variations in industry-level factor shares, as computed in the previous section, are correlated with variations in industry-level concentration. For an industry k in country c at time t, we apply regressions of the form:

$$ Concentration_{kct} = \alpha Share_{kct} + FE_{kc} + FE_{t} + \epsilon_{kct}, \quad (6) $$

where $Concentration_{kct}$ denotes a measure of industry level concentration, $Share_{kct}$ denotes labor, capital, or profit shares, $FE_{kc}$ stands for a flexible set of industry-country fixed effects, and $FE_{t}$ denotes year fixed-effects.

Table 1 reports the coefficient $\alpha$ for separate regressions corresponding to the specification in equation 6, where concentration is either the share of total industry turnover of the largest 1% or 5% of firms, or the logarithm of the ratio of the 99th or 95th percentile of market share to the median market share, and where factor and profit shares are in ratio of industry value added or industry output. Industry-level labor share variations are negatively correlated with industry-level variations in concentration : an increase of the aggregate labor share of value added (resp. of output) of 1 percentage point is associated with a decrease of the market share of the largest 1% of firms of around 0.05% (resp. 0.08%), a decrease of market share of the largest 5% of firms of around

<footnote n="7">⁷For more detail on CompNet data coverage, see Appendix C.</footnote>
0.11% (resp. 0.23%). The ratios of the 99th and 95th percentile to the median market share also decrease. The correlation between capital shares and concentration is less strong, but overall, the correlation between industry level profit share variations and variations in concentration is strongly positive : an increase of the aggregate profit share of 1 percentage point is associated with an increase in concentration of around 3% to 12%.

We now ask whether this pattern is still true at the firm level. The CompNet database provides information on the distribution of firm-level profit shares, computed as one minus the ratio of costs to firm turnover, with two alternative measures for total costs, one that only includes labor and intermediary inputs, and one that includes also a proxy similar to ours for capital costs, but at the level of the firm. For an industry k in country c at time t, we apply regressions of the form:

$$Concentration_{kct} = \alpha FirmShareIndex_{kct} + FE_{kc} + FE_{t} + \epsilon_{kct}, \quad (7)$$

where $Concentration_{kct}$ denotes a measure of industry level concentration, $FirmShareIndex_{kct}$ denotes an element of the distribution of firm-level profit shares, $FE_{kc}$ stands for a flexible set if industry-country fixed effects, and $FE_{t}$ denotes year fixed-effects.

Table 2 reports the coefficient $\alpha$ for separate regressions corresponding to the specification in equation 7, where concentration is measured as in table 1, and firm-level profits shares of value added are proxied by the unweighted mean profit share, the median, the 95th percentile or the 99th percentile of the distribution of profit shares. Table 2 shows a mostly negative relationship between shifts of the distribution of the profit share and industry level concentration. The only exception is for the 99th percentile of the distribution, where increases in concentration are associated with increases of the top 1% profit shares.

A possible interpretation of the fact that higher concentration is associated with higher industry level profit share but with lower firm-level profit share (with the exception of firms in the top 1% of profit shares) is that the profit share decreased over the period at the firm level but this decrease was more than offset by the effects of a reallocation of market shares towards firms with higher profit shares, which increases the profit share at the industry level, and with higher market shares, which increases concentration. We now explore the possible drivers of the positive correlation between aggregate profit shares and concentration, between a reallocation of market shares towards larger firms, or an increase in top profit shares. Because the CompNet data does not provide information on the joint distribution of profit shares and size, an exact decomposition is not possible, but we can assess how quantitatively important each driver is. For an industry k in country c at time t, we apply regressions of the form:

$$ProfitShare_{kct} = \alpha TopProfitShare_{kct} + \beta TopMarketShare_{kct} + FE_{kc} + FE_{t} + \epsilon_{kct}, \quad (8)$$

where $ProfitShare_{kct}$ denotes the aggregate profit share, $TopProfitShare_{kct}$ denotes the top per-
centile of profit shares, and *TopMarketShare*_{kct} denotes the share of larger firm in total industry sales. Tables 3 and 4 show that the correlation with the share of larger firms is two orders of magnitude higher than the correlation with top profit shares, which suggests that reallocation toward larger firms is a more important driver of the rise in aggregate profit shares. In the next section, we will characterize conditions on the heterogeneity of firms for which a variation in competition explains these two facts.
# 4 Theory

In this section, we provide a theory that rationalizes the empirical facts that we uncovered in the previous section. The core of the model is a simple industry equilibrium with heterogeneous firms and monopolistic competition à-la Melitz (2003) where the underlying distribution of firm productivities determines the extent to which increasing industry competition, captured by the industry level unique demand elasticity, leads to an increase or a decrease in aggregate profit shares: when productivity is Pareto-distributed, the aggregate profit share increases with competition. We discuss in Section 4.1 the intuition behind our result in partial equilibrium, and then in Section 4.2 we construct a general equilibrium model with a capital good sector and balanced growth that matches the empirical facts uncovered in the previous section in order to examine the long run macroeconomic implications of increasing competition.

## 4.1 Partial Equilibrium

In this section, we describe the economic environment of the final good industry, and show that the three stylized facts from the previous section can be replicated with a simple model of industry imperfect competition. This partial equilibrium reproduces all the facts regardless of general equilibrium forces.

### Economic Environment

Consider an industry with a continuum of goods indexed by $i$. We assume that consumers choose their bundle $\{q_i\}_{i \in I}$ to maximize instantaneous utility $Q$ according to the following CES aggregator:

$$Q = \left( M^{\frac{\nu-1}{\rho}} \int_{i \in I} q_i^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} di \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}, \quad (9)$$

where $M$ is the mass of available goods and is equal to the measure of the set $I$, the parameter $\nu \in [0; 1]$ captures the extent to which consumer value increased diversity as in Felbermayr et al. (2011),<fnref n="8" /> and the elasticity of substitution $\rho$ verifies the restriction $\rho > 1$. Given prices $\{p_i\}_{i \in I}$, total consumer expenditure $R$ in the industry is:

$$R = \int_{i \in I} r_i di, \quad (10)$$

where $r_i = p_i q_i$ is expenditure in good $i$. This program yields optimal expenditure decisions for

<footnote n="8">⁸Consider the symmetric case where all firms produce $q$ units of each good. Then $Q = M^{1+\frac{\nu}{\rho-1}} q$. If $\nu = 0$, then consumer utility is the same whether she consumes $M$ different goods in quantity $Q/M$ or $2M$ different goods in quantities $Q/2M$, therefore good diversity has no increasing impact on consumer utility. If $\nu = 1$, the production function takes the conventional Dixit-Stiglitz form. The ratio $\frac{\nu}{\rho-1}$ can also be interpreted as the degree of aggregate economies of scale in the economy.</footnote>
individual good i pinned down by the share $\psi_i$ of each good in total expenditure :

$$ \psi_i \equiv \frac{r_i}{R} = \frac{1}{M} \left( \frac{p_i}{\tilde{p}} \right)^{1-\rho}, \qquad (11) $$

where $\tilde{p}$ is a measure of the average price, which we define as:

$$ \tilde{p} \equiv \left( \frac{1}{M} \int_{i \in I} p_i^{1-\rho} di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \equiv M^{\frac{\nu}{\rho-1}} P, \qquad (12) $$

where P is the CES price index of the bundle P that verifies $R = PQ$.

## Firm's problem

There is continuum of firms in the industry, each choosing to produce a different good i. Firm i has technology such that the cost of producing quantity $q_i$ is the sum of a fixed cost f and a variable cost $\frac{\mathcal{C}(q_i, W)}{z_i}$. The variable cost function $\mathcal{C}$ is common to all firms belonging in the same industry and depends on production and the vector W of production factors rental costs, that is the wage and the cost of capital. We assume that the variable cost function exhibits constant returns to scale such that the marginal cost of a given firm is does not vary with its output $q_i$.<fnref n="9" /> Firms differ by their productivity level $z_i$.

As in Equation (1), each firm has profit $v_i$ defined as the revenue from production $q_i$ sold at price $p_i$ minus the cost:

$$ v_i \equiv r_i - f - \frac{\mathcal{C}(q_i, W)}{z_i} = p_i q_i - f - \frac{c q_i}{z_i}. \qquad (13) $$

Firms are in monopolistic competition and therefore choose their price and production in order to maximize their profit, under the constraint given by Equation (11). Given that the demand elasticity is the same for all firms the profit maximization program of all firms results in the same pricing rule, where the price is fixed at a markup over marginal cost:

$$ p_i(z_i) = \frac{\rho}{\rho - 1} \frac{c}{z_i}. \qquad (14) $$

## Industry equilibrium

An industry-equilibrium will be characterized by a mass M of firms (and hence M different goods) and an endogenous distribution $h(z)$ of productivity levels. We assimilate each firm to its productivity level, and assuming moments of order $\rho-1$ of the ex-post productivity distribution $h(.)$ exist, we can rewrite Equations (11), (12), and (13) in terms of the productivity distribution, and com-

<footnote n="9">⁹See Appendix D</footnote>
bine with Equation (14). The average price, and the revenue and profit of firm with productivity $z$ become:

$$ \tilde{p} = \left( \int_{0}^{\infty} p(z)^{1-\rho} h(z) dz \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} = c \frac{\rho}{\rho-1} \tilde{z}^{-1}, \quad (15) $$

$$ r(z) = \psi(z)R = \frac{R}{M} \left(\frac{z}{\tilde{z}}\right)^{\rho-1}, \quad (16) $$

$$ v(z) = \frac{r(z)}{\rho} - f = \frac{R}{M\rho} \left(\frac{z}{\tilde{z}}\right)^{\rho-1} - f, \quad (17) $$

where $\tilde{z}$ is a measure of industry average productivity:

$$ \tilde{z} = \left( \int_{0}^{\infty} z^{\rho-1} h(z) dz \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}. \quad (18) $$

First, Equations (16) and (17) show that firms with higher productivity enjoy higher revenue, market share and profit relative to firms with lower productivity. Second, they show that because of fixed costs of production, there exists a positive productivity cutoff level $z^*$ below which profits are always strictly negative. The cut-off level is endogenously determined at the industry level and is the same for all firms.

Profits of a firm at the cutoff level $v(z^*)$ are equal to zero, a condition from which we derive firm revenue at the cut-off: $r(z^*) = \rho f$. From Equation (16), we have that the ratio of any two firms' revenue is a function of the ratio of their productivities, therefore:

$$ \frac{r(z)}{r(z^*)} = \left(\frac{z}{z^*}\right)^{\rho-1}. \quad (19) $$

We have therefore two simpler expressions for firm-level revenue and profits:

$$ r(z) = \rho f \left(\frac{z}{z^*}\right)^{\rho-1}, \quad (20) $$

$$ v(z) = f \left[ \left( \frac{z}{z^*} \right)^{\rho-1} - 1 \right], \quad (21) $$

which we can integrate to obtain average revenue $\tilde{r}$ and average profit $\tilde{v}$:

$$ \tilde{r} = \frac{R}{M} = \int_{0}^{\infty} r(z)h(z)dz = \rho f \left(\frac{\tilde{z}}{z^*}\right)^{\rho-1}, \quad (22) $$

$$ \tilde{v} = \frac{V}{M} = \int_{0}^{\infty} v(z)h(z)dz = f \left[ \left( \frac{\tilde{z}}{z^*} \right)^{\rho-1} - 1 \right] = \frac{\tilde{r}}{\rho} - f. \quad (23) $$

Next, we assume that there is a large and unbounded pool of prospective entrants into the industry. To enter, firms must make an unobserved initial irreversible investment $f_e$, then draw a productivity
level $z$ from known distribution $g(z)$ with support $[0; +\infty]$, and decide whether to produce or to exit the industry without producing. Firms that draw a productivity level below $z^*$ exit and never produce. Conditional on successful entry, the resulting productivity distribution $h(z)$ is therefore:

$$h(z) = \begin{cases} \frac{g(z)}{1-G(z^*)} & \text{if } z \ge z^*, \\ 0 & \text{if } z < z^*. \end{cases} \qquad (24)$$

This defines the average productivity level as a function of the cutoff productivity level:

$$\tilde{z}(z^*) = \left( \frac{1}{1-G(z^*)} \int_{z^*}^{\infty} z^{\rho-1} g(z) dz \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}, \qquad (25)$$

and from there all other average quantities (profit, revenue and price).<fnref n="10" /> The net value of attempting entry is equal to the probability of successful entry $1-G(z^*)$ multiplied by the expected profit conditional on successful entry, minus the cost of entry. We assume that free entry implies that the net value of attempting entry is zero, therefore we obtain a condition linking average profits and the cutoff productivity level:

$$(1 - G(z^*))\tilde{v} = f_e, \qquad (26)$$

where $f_e$ can also be thought of as a barrier to entry. To sum up, the industry partial equilibrium is entirely characterized by three variables: average productivity level $\tilde{z}$ among producing firms, threshold productivity level $z^*$, average profit level $\tilde{v}$; and by the following three equations: the definition of average productivity, the zero-cutoff-profit condition stating that the marginal firm entering earns zero profit, and the zero-expected-profit condition stating that firms will attempt to enter until expected profits from production cover the fixed cost of entry.

$$\tilde{z}(z^*) = \left[ \int_{z^*}^{\infty} z^{\rho-1} \frac{g(z)}{1-G(z^*)} dz \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}} \qquad (\text{Avg Prod})$$

$$\tilde{v} = f \left[ \left( \frac{\tilde{z}(z^*)}{z^*} \right)^{\rho-1} - 1 \right] \qquad (\text{ZCP})$$

$$\tilde{v} = \frac{f_e}{1 - G(z^*)} \qquad (\text{ZEP})$$

The solution to this equilibrium is not straightforward. However, the right-hand-side of Equation (ZEP) is an increasing function of $z^*$, the right hand side of Equation (ZCP) is a monotonically decreasing function of $z^*$ for several common families of distribution: lognormal, exponential, gamma, Weibull and truncations of normal, logistic, extreme value and Laplace.<fnref n="11" /> Figure 12 draws

<footnote n="10">¹⁰Note that at this point, we are considering a partial equilibrium, therefore total expenditure $R$, the mass of firms $M$, and the utility $Q$ are not pinned down.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹In fact, it is decreasing for all distributions verifying that $zg(z)/(1-G(z))$ is increasing, see Melitz (2003).</footnote>
the case of a Lognormal productivity distribution. In the case of a Pareto distribution Equation (ZCP) becomes constant and the system can be solved in closed form.

## Effects of Increased Competition

In this section, we are interested in rationalizing the stylized facts uncovered in Sections 2 and 3. To this end, we take a direct look at what determines concentration, firm-level profit shares and industry-level profit share. Studying the effects of an increase in competition through a variation of the elasticity of substitution is a modelling choice that is not innocuous. Autor et al. (2020) study the implications of an increase of the elasticity of substitution in a static model. This type of competition is in fact an increase in "market toughness" from the point of view of firms, meaning that consumers react more strongly to variations in prices, and should not be confused with a decrease in barriers to entry or stronger antitrust laws as in Gutiérrez and Philippon (2018). This increase in market toughness could stem from technology if marketing and now internet platforms made price comparison easier for consumers, from globalization, if international competition reduced firm level markups, or, keeping with our model, from preferences if varieties are simply now more substitutable to the consumer than before.

We find that an increase in competition will increase concentration and decrease firm-level profit shares. The effect on the aggregate profit share is ambiguous: while the profit share of the typical firm decreases, the fact that more productive and therefore larger firms have higher profit shares means that the reallocation of market shares towards those firms has a positive effect on the aggregate profit share. We find that if the underlying productivity distribution is Pareto, the reallocation effect is stronger than the within firm effect.

From the equilibrium, we have firm revenues and profits and compute any index of concentration, as well as firm-level and industry-level average profit shares. In particular, firm-level profit share is given by :

$$ \frac{v(z)}{r(z)} = \frac{1}{\rho} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{z^*}{z} \right)^{\rho-1} \right], \quad (27) $$

and given $z^*$, the profit share of firms grows with $z$ and converges to $\frac{1}{\rho}$. We simulate the equilibrium from six different productivity distributions : Pareto, Uniform, Lognormal, Exponential, Gamma and Weibull.

Figure 13 shows the effect of an increase in competition corresponding to a decrease of the industry markup $\mu = \frac{1}{\rho-1}$ from $\mu_1 = 33\%$ to $\mu_1 = 25\%$ on the profit share of firms along percentiles of the productivity distribution. The y-axis is in percentages compared to before shock profit share. First, the least productive active firm has zero profit after the shock while it had positive profit before the shock, showing that the cutoff level increased: competition makes entry harder. Second, competition decreases firm-level profit shares across the entire distribution, but the decrease is smaller for
larger firms. Regardless of the distribution and moving along the productivity distribution towards the most productive firms, effect of a rise in competition on firm-level profit share converges to the a level of around -20% ≈ $\frac{\rho_1}{\rho_2} - 1 = \frac{\mu_1^{-1}+1}{\mu_2^{-1}+1} - 1$, equal to the decrease in the firm-level markup.

Figures 14 and 15 display the relationship between concentration at the industry equilibrium and the level of competition, proxied by the industry markup. In Figure 14, concentration is proxied by the share of industry revenue of the 1% and 5% largest firms, while in Figure 15 it is proxied by the logarithm of ratio of the 99th and 95th percentiles to the median revenue, as in the CompNet dataset we use in Section 3. In all cases, concentrations monotonically increases with the level of competition, that is, when the markup decreases.

Finally, Figure 16 report the relationship between the average industry profit share at the industry equilibrium and the level of competition. In the Pareto case only, average profit share increases with competition, indicating that in that case only is the positive reallocation effect stronger than the within firm negative effect.

To sum up, the positive correlation between concentration and aggregate profit shares, the negative correlation between concentration and firm-level profit shares, and the fact that this negative correlation is stronger for less productive than for more productive firms, which are our facts documented in Sections 2 and 3, are replicated by our theory as responses to an increase in competition, as long as there is a strong heterogeneity between firms, in particular if the distribution of firms productivity follows a Pareto distribution, as opposed to the other distributions studied here that do not exhibit large tails.

The next section shows that in the Pareto case, the partial equilibrium conclusions regarding concentration, and aggregate and firm level profit shares are not affected when we take into account general equilibrium effects. However, but those are important to understand the effects that increased competition has on the determination of the mass of firms, aggregate output and revenue. We study the dynamic implications of increased competition by constructing a general equilibrium model of a monopolistically competitive industry, where firms productivities are distributed according to a Pareto law.

## 4.2 General Equilibrium

In order to study the macroeconomic implications of increased competition on firm entry and growth, we move to a dynamic model in which at each period new goods are endogenously introduced by firms while existing varieties exit at a constant rate. The representative household smooths consumption through capital accumulation. We assume that upon entry, the productivity at which each good is produced is drawn from a Pareto distribution and that all varieties are renewed each period. We assume a unitary long-run elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and compute the Balanced Growth Path (BGP) of the resulting economy. We show that the macroeconomic effects of increased competition are a reduction of the labor share, of the growth
rate and the level of the real interest rate.

## Households

Households maximize intertemporal utility subject to financial wealth and capital accumulation. There are $L_t = L_0 e^{nt}$ households who each inelastically provide one unit of labor in exchange for the nominal wage $w_t$. Households consumes $C_t$ at price $P_t$ and invest $I_t$ at price $P_t^K$. The nominal rate on assets is $r_t$, each unit of capital has return $r_t^K$. The capital stock $K_t$ depreciates with rate $\delta$ and total household financial assets are in zero net supply $A_t = 0$. Finally, households also collect the flow of profit $V_t$ from firms. The representative household's program is:

$$ \begin{array}{l} \max_{(c_t),(i_t),(a_t),(k_t)} U_T = L_T \int_T^\infty e^{-(\beta-n)t} \frac{c_t^{1-\theta}-1}{1-\theta} dt, \\ \text{s.t} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \dot{a}_t + P_t c_t + P_t^K i_t = (r_t-n)a_t + w_t + r_t^K k_t + v_t, \\ \dot{k}_t + (\delta+n)k_t = i_t, \end{array} \right. \end{array} \quad (28) $$

where lower case variables are per capita. As is standard in the neoclassical growth literature, per capita consumption growth is proportional to the real interest rate minus the discount rate, and inversely proportional to risk aversion $\theta$; and at equilibrium the nominal return of capital must be equal to the user-cost of capital where $\pi_t^K = \dot{P}_t^K / P_t^K$ is investment price inflation and $\pi_t = \dot{P}_t / P_t$ is consumption price inflation:

$$ \begin{align} \frac{\dot{c}_t}{c_t} &= \frac{1}{\theta}(r_t - \pi_t - \beta), \tag{29} \\ r_t^K &= P_t^K (r_t + \delta - \pi_t^K). \tag{30} \end{align} $$

## Final good sector

Final goods are produced by firms that differ only in their productivity level. The core economic environment is the one described in Section 4.1. We add the following elements to the economic environment: labor and capital as production factors, determination of the equilibrium mass of firms.

All firms in the final good sector have the same production function, except for random productivity variable $z$. We assume that capital and labor elasticity of substitution is unitary in the long-run so that the production function is Cobb-Douglas, and that each factor are perfectly mobile across firms: $q(z, k, l) = z.k^\alpha l^{1-\alpha}$. First firms choose their capital/labor ratio by equalizing the marginal rate of transformation to the relative cost of labor with respect to capital, common to all firms.
$$ \frac{k_t(z)}{l_t(z)} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{w_t}{r_t^K}. \qquad (31) $$

Defining $mc_t(w_t, r_t^K)$ as the cost of the capital-labor bundle for a given wage and user cost of capital:

$$ mc_t = \left( \frac{r_t^K}{\alpha} \right)^{\alpha} \left( \frac{w_t}{1-\alpha} \right)^{1-\alpha}. \qquad (32) $$

We posit that firms also face fixed costs $fmc_t$, such that total cost are $C_t(z) = mc_t(\frac{q_t(z)}{z} + f)$. As in Section 4.1, the pricing rule of the firm is $p_t(z) = \frac{\rho}{\rho-1} \frac{mc_t}{z}$. We have that aggregate output, aggregate revenue and aggregate value are:

$$ Q_t = \left( M_t^{\frac{\nu-1}{\rho}} \int_0^{\infty} q_t^{\frac{\nu-1}{\rho}} h_t(z) dz \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} = M_t^{1+\frac{\nu}{\rho-1}} \tilde{q}_t, \qquad (33) $$

$$ R_t = P_t Q_t = M_t \tilde{r}_t, \qquad (34) $$

$$ V_t = M_t \tilde{v}_t. \qquad (35) $$

Firms make an unobserved initial investment $mc_t f_e$ measured in units of the capital-labor bundle. They then draw their productivity level from a Pareto distribution with scale $z_t^0$ and shape $k > \rho-1$, where we assume that the scale parameter grows at rate $g$. We assume that firms that are hit by a bad shocks exit and lose their initial investment $mc_t f_e$. The ex ante productivity density function is then:

$$ g_t(z) = \begin{cases} k(z_t^0)^k z^{-k-1} & z \ge z_t^0, \\ 0 & z < z_t^0. \end{cases} $$

Upon entry with a low productivity draw, a firm may decide to immediately exit and not take part in production. Otherwise, she produces for one period, earning profit $v_t(z)$. The ex post productivity density function is also Pareto,<fnref n="12" /> with scale $z^*$:

$$ h_t(z) = \begin{cases} k(z_t^*)^k z^{-k-1} & z \ge z_t^*, \\ 0 & z < z_t^*. \end{cases} $$

As in Section 4.1, average productivity is thus proportional to the cut-off quality level, and average price and revenue are given by:

$$ \tilde{z}_t = \left( \frac{k}{k-(\rho-1)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}} z_t^*, \qquad (36) $$

$$ \tilde{p}_t = \frac{\rho mc_t}{\rho-1 \tilde{z}_t}, \qquad (37) $$

$$ \tilde{r}_t = \rho(\tilde{v}_t + mc_t f), \qquad (38) $$

$$ \tilde{r}_t = \tilde{p}_t \tilde{q}_t, \qquad (39) $$

<footnote n="12">¹²A truncated Pareto distribution remains a Pareto distribution.</footnote>
The average profit becomes:

$$ \tilde{v}_t = \frac{\tilde{r}_t}{\rho} - mc_t f = \left(\frac{\tilde{z}_t}{z_t^*}\right)^{\rho-1} \frac{r_t(z_t^*)}{\rho} - mc_t f = mc_t f \left(\frac{\rho-1}{k-(\rho-1)}\right). \quad (40) $$

The free entry condition implies that expected profits $\tilde{v}_t(1 - G_t(z_t^*))$ are equal to the investment cost $mc_t f_e$ required for entry. Moreover, the mass of firms at equilibrium equals the mass of firms attempting entry $M_t^e$ multiplied by the probability of successful entry:

$$ \tilde{v}_t = mc_t f_e \left( \frac{z_t^*}{z_t^0} \right)^k, \quad (41) $$

$$ M_t = \left( \frac{z_t^0}{z_t^*} \right)^k M_t^e. \quad (42) $$

## Investment Good Sector and Equilibrium

We assume that the investment good sector is in perfect competition. The representative firm in that sector transforms one unit of final good into $z_t^K$ units of investment goods, with productivity $z_t^K$ growing at rate $g^K$. Equality of the marginal product to the marginal costs yields the price of the investment good:

$$ P_t^K = \frac{P_t}{z_t^K}. \quad (43) $$

Because all firms have the same production function and choose the same capital-labor ratio $k/l$ defined in Equation (31), one can define the capital-labor bundle supplied by households to final good firms:

$$ (k/l)_t^\alpha L_t = (K_t/L_t)^\alpha L_t = K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}. $$

The aggregate capital-labor bundle is used for production in the final good sector, and is sunk by prospective entrants. We can therefore write the equilibrium condition on the capital-labor bundle market as the sum for all firms of firm-level usage of the bundle, which equal to total firm-level cost (ie. revenue minus profit) divided the bundle marginal cost, plus the sum for all prospective entrants of the sunk cost:

$$ K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha} = \underbrace{\int_0^\infty [mc_t^{-1}(r_t - v_t)] M_t h_t(z) dz}_{\text{Intermediary Good Sector}} + \underbrace{f_e M_t^e}_{\text{Entrants}} \\ \Rightarrow mc_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha} = R_t - V_t + mc_t f^e M_t^e. \quad (44) $$

Equilibrium on the final good market closes the model:
$$Q_t = L_t c_t + \frac{I_t}{z_t^K}. \qquad (45)$$

## Comparative Statics

Along the unique BGP driven by three exogenous sources of growth in the model: quality and productivity growth $g$ and $g^K$, and demographic growth $n$,<fnref n="13" /> the mass of available goods grows at rate:

$$g_M = \left[1 - \alpha \left(1 + \frac{\nu}{\rho - 1}\right)\right]^{-1} \left[\alpha(g + g^K) + (1 - \alpha)n\right]. \qquad (46)$$

The average firm's productivity grows at rate $g$, as does the quantity it produces. Aggregate output and consumption grow at rate:

$$g_Q = \left(1 + \frac{\nu}{\rho - 1}\right) g_M + g, \qquad (47)$$

Productivity growth in the investment good or intermediary good sectors increases the available quantity of capital goods, and population growth increases the available quantity of labor. Both tend to increase the growth rate of the economy size, as production factors become more abundant. An important parameter governing the dynamics of the model is the economies of scale parameter $\nu/(\rho - 1)$. Because a rise in $\rho$ tends to decrease entry and diversity, this will decrease the growth of final good output directly, but it also has a negative effect on $g_M$ via the investment channel: because aggregate output growth decreases, aggregate investment good growth also decreases, which decreases the growth of the available quantity of capital goods to the intermediary good sector. This effect can not be too big or there is no non-degenerate balance growth path. The parameter restriction is:

$$\nu < \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha}(\rho - 1).$$

Finally the steady-state real interest rates is:

$$r = \theta(g_Q - n) + \beta. \qquad (48)$$

As long as $\nu$ is even slightly positive, $g_M$, $g_Q$ and $r$ are decreasing with $\rho$<fnref n="14" />. Moreover, from Equations (34), (35), (38) and (40), we can compute the aggregate profit share:

$$\text{Profit} = \frac{V}{R} = \frac{1}{k} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\rho}\right) = \frac{1}{k(1 + \mu)}, \qquad (49)$$

where $\mu = \frac{1}{\rho - 1}$ is the markup common to all intermediary firms. In the case of a Pareto productivity distribution, the aggregate profit share can be computed in closed form and is decreasing with the markup. Turning to concentration, we obtain from Equations (11), (14), (36), and (37) that a firm

<footnote n="13">¹³see Appendix D for a derivation of the BGP and the steady-state.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴The usual neoclassical result with Hicks-neutral productivity is obtained when there is perfect substitution $\rho \to +\infty$, and one good only $g^K = 0$. This yields long-term output growth: $g_Q = \frac{g}{1-\alpha} + n$.</footnote>
market share at time t, $\Psi_t$, follows a Pareto distribution with shape $k/(\rho - 1)$ and scale $\psi_t^*$, with the cumulative density function $F_t$ given by:

$$ 
\begin{aligned}
F_t(\psi) &= \mathbf{P}(\Psi_t \le \psi) = \mathbf{P}\left(Z_t \le (M_t \psi)^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}} \tilde{z}_t\right) \\
&= 1 - \left(\frac{(M_t \psi)^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}} \tilde{z}_t}{z_t^*}\right)^{-k} \\
&= 1 - \left(\frac{M_t k}{k - (\rho - 1)} \psi\right)^{-\frac{k}{\rho-1}} \\
&= 1 - \left(\frac{\psi}{\psi_t^*}\right)^{-\frac{k}{\rho-1}},
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\psi_t^*$ is the market share of the cut-off firm. The tail index of the distribution of market shares decreases with the level of competition, which means that concentration increases with competition. For instance, keeping the same definitions as in Sections 3 and 4.1, the ratio of the 1-p-th percentile of market share to the median market share is given by:

$$ \text{Top}_{p\%}/\text{Median} = (2p)^{1-\frac{\rho-1}{k}}, \qquad (50) $$

while the share of total revenues in firms with market share above the 1-p-th percentile is given by:

$$ \text{Top}_{p\%} = \int_{F_t^{-1}(1-p)}^{\infty} \psi M_t dF_t(\psi) = M_t \psi_t^* \frac{p^{1-\frac{\rho-1}{k}}}{1-\frac{\rho-1}{k}} = p^{1-\frac{\rho-1}{k}}. \qquad (51) $$

The right-hand side of Equation (50) increases with $\rho$ when $p < 1/2$ and the right hand side of Equation (51) increases with $\rho$. This means that when competition increases, the upper half of the distribution of firm market shares gain market shares relative to the bottom half and the market share taken up by larger firms increases.

To sum up, our model predicts that an increase in market toughness will:

1. Decrease firm-level profit shares;

2. Increase concentration;

3. Increase the aggregate profit share;

4. Decrease output growth;

5. Decrease the real interest rate.

We now look at the effect that a decrease in $\rho$ has on aggregate welfare. The main channels through which it affects welfare are the price level and output growth. The price level depends on
the mass of firms and on firms individual prices, while output growth depends on the growth of
the mass of firms. Additionally, how households value future output growth against current output
will also depend on the intertemporal substitution elasticity: the higher θ is, the more households
value an increase in future output against a decrease in current output. We compare the effect
of changes in competition for three different calibrations of our model. From Equation (28), we
can compute the representative household welfare assuming that the economy will stay on a BGP,
and compare different BGPs when competition ρ varies. Table 5 shows the baseline calibration of
model parameters. We use average population and output growth, capital relative price deflation,
the capital and profit shares of value added, the ratio of investment to capital, and the real interest
rate from KLEMS and OECD for the weigthed average aggregate market economy of France and
Germany after 2000 and before 2007. We calibrate the Pareto-tail index for the distribution of
market shares using the Compnet data on top market share quantiles in France and calculate the
tail index of the market share distribution $\frac{k}{\rho-1}$ using the ratio of the top 1% over the top 5%.
We calibrate the intertemporal substitution elasticity and fixed cost of production to 1, and the
probability of successful entry to 0.7. This allows us to back out depreciation δ, automation α, the
underlying total factor productivity growth in the intermediate good sector g, the discount rate β,
the fixed cost of entry $f_e$, the tail index for the productivity distribution k, and the initial level of
competition ρ.

We simulate a change in competition (ie a decrease or increase in ρ) around the calibrated value,
leaving all other parameters unchanged. Results are displayed in Figures 17, 18 and 19, for three
different values of the returns to product diversity ν, which is the key parameter. Regardless of its
value, the probability of successful entry and diversity decreases when competition increases, while
concentration and profit shares increase.

When there are no economies of scale, an increase in competition has no effect on output growth
and the real interest rate; but more competition increases consumption per capita, increases welfare
through a parallel increase in per capita consumption along the BGP. Here, because the slope of
output is unchanged by competition, welfare always increases with competition regardless of the
intertemporal elasticity θ.

However, with economies of scale, output growth is decreasing in competition: both the mass of
firms and mass of firms growth decline with competition and because the number of intermediate
firms has a positive effect on productivity of the final good sector, output growth is lower. Welfare
becomes decreasing in competition when competition is low. The same pattern is observed for
different intertemporal elasticities θ.

An increase in competition leads to increases in aggregate profit shares and concentration through
a reallocation of market shares towards more productive firms. Entry becomes harder and the mass
of firms decreases. If households value diversity, or alternatively, if there are economies of scale in
the aggregation of the final goods, then an increase in competition can lead to decreased output
growth and interest rates, with possible negative effects on welfare.
# 5 Conclusion

In this paper, we presented a novel mechanism through which an increase in market toughness explains, within each industry, both a positive correlation between concentration and profit shares, and a negative correlation between concentration and moments of the firm-level distribution of profit shares. The main channel is that while an increase in competition decreases firm-level profit shares, it shifts market shares towards more productive firms, who tend to be both larger and with higher profit shares, and decreases business dynamism, proxied by the rate of successful entry of firms. Moreover, we provided a simple theoretical dynamic general equilibrium model of industry growth to study the aggregate implications of positive returns to diversity when competition increases. In particular, we showed that the decrease in business dynamism results in a decrease in output growth, real interest rates and welfare.

It is important to note that an increase in market toughness, by increasing concentration, can have an additional effect if the top firms that benefit from the 'winner-takes-most' dynamics also exhibit increasing anti-competitive behavior. This is not the focus of this paper, a choice that is motivated by the fact documented in Section 2 that variations in aggregate profit shares are not strongly positively correlated with variations the top profit shares, but this channel may have an importance in certain industries and for welfare purposes. Further research should focus on the role of oligopolistic competition and a departure from the iso-elastic demand framework to better study the welfare implications of an increase in market toughness.

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A Tables

<table><caption>Table 1: Correlation between Industry Concentration and Factor Shares</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Top 1% Share</th><th>Top 5% Share</th><th>Top 1% / Median</th><th>Top 5% / Median</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Labor Share</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Labor Share of Value Added</td><td>-0.0469<br>(0.0131)</td><td>-0.1127<br>(0.0210)</td><td>-1.0189<br>(0.1879)</td><td>-0.5402<br>(0.1329)</td></tr><tr><td>Labor Share of Output</td><td>-0.0759<br>(0.0284)</td><td>-0.2337<br>(0.0454)</td><td>-1.8679<br>(0.4065)</td><td>-0.8739<br>(0.2874)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.9512</td><td>0.9510</td><td>0.9009</td><td>0.9007</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Capital Share</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Capital Share of Value Added</td><td>-0.0430<br>(0.0193)</td><td>0.0057<br>(0.0311)</td><td>0.3200<br>(0.2778)</td><td>-0.4991<br>(0.1950)</td></tr><tr><td>Capital Share of Output</td><td>-0.0173<br>(0.0485)</td><td>0.0893<br>(0.0781)</td><td>1.9691<br>(0.6955)</td><td>-0.4757<br>(0.4907)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.9510</td><td>0.9508</td><td>0.8988</td><td>0.8989</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Profit Share</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Profit Share of Value Added</td><td>0.0336<br>(0.0093)</td><td>0.0552<br>(0.0150)</td><td>0.4365<br>(0.1340)</td><td>0.3881<br>(0.0941)</td></tr><tr><td>Profit Share of Output</td><td>0.0496<br>(0.0221)</td><td>0.1228<br>(0.0355)</td><td>0.7198<br>(0.3182)</td><td>0.6286<br>(0.2238)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.9512</td><td>0.9510</td><td>0.8998</td><td>0.8997</td></tr></tbody></table>

*Note:* This table reports the results of within industry-country correlations between concentration on the left-hand-side and industry level labor, capital, and profit shares of industry value-added or output on the right-hand-side. Top x% Share is the turnover market share of the x% largest firms, top x% /Median is the logarithm of the ratio of the 100-x quantile of market share to the median market share. Data source for factor shares is KLEMS, data source for concentration indexes is CompNet. Each observation is one of the 27 KLEMS level industry for 14 European Countries covered in CompNet in a given year (see Appendix C for data coverage). Concentration indexes are computed at the 2-digit level and averaged into the 34 industries, weighing by industry value added. A flexible set of industry-country and year fixed effects are included.
<table><caption>Table 2: Correlation between Industry Concentration and Firm-Level Profit Shares</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Top 1% Share</th><th>Top 5% Share</th><th>Top 1% / Median</th><th>Top 5% / Median</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>Unweighted Mean Profit Share</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Profit Share (excl. capital cost)</td><td>0.0452<br>(0.0084)</td><td>-0.0089<br>(0.0109)</td><td>-0.0692<br>(0.0878)</td><td>-0.1556<br>(0.0650)</td></tr><tr><td>Profit Share (incl. capital cost)</td><td></td><td>-0.0212<br>(0.0077)</td><td>-0.0422<br>(0.0099)</td><td>-0.4646<br>(0.0797)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>8,079</td><td>8,118</td><td>8,079</td><td>8,118</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.9518</td><td>0.9516</td><td>0.9354</td><td>0.9354</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>Median Profit Share</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Profit Share (excl. capital cost)</td><td>-0.1982<br>(0.0179)</td><td>-0.4152<br>(0.0227)</td><td>-3.3889<br>(0.1834)</td><td>-1.1425<br>(0.1384)</td></tr><tr><td>Profit Share (incl. capital cost)</td><td></td><td>-0.2162<br>(0.0211)</td><td>-0.4431<br>(0.0259)</td><td>-3.7483<br>(0.2144)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>8,079</td><td>6,086</td><td>8,079</td><td>6,086</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.9524</td><td>0.9565</td><td>0.9382</td><td>0.9460</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>Top 5% Profit Share</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Profit Share (excl. capital cost)</td><td>-0.0371<br>(0.0087)</td><td>-0.0116<br>(0.0112)</td><td>-0.4773<br>(0.0902)</td><td>-0.0652<br>(0.0668)</td></tr><tr><td>Profit Share (incl. capital cost)</td><td></td><td>-0.0380<br>(0.0097)</td><td>-0.0134<br>(0.0122)</td><td>-0.4599<br>(0.1006)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>8,118</td><td>6,086</td><td>8,118</td><td>6,086</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.9517</td><td>0.9558</td><td>0.9353</td><td>0.9431</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>Top 1% Profit Share</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Profit Share (excl. capital cost)</td><td>-0.0074<br>(0.0059)</td><td>0.0499<br>(0.0075)</td><td>0.1181<br>(0.0613)</td><td>0.1136<br>(0.0453)</td></tr><tr><td>Profit Share (incl. capital cost)</td><td></td><td>-0.0216<br>(0.0068)</td><td>0.0336<br>(0.0084)</td><td>-0.0703<br>(0.0701)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>8,118</td><td>6,086</td><td>8,118</td><td>6,086</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.9516</td><td>0.9557</td><td>0.9356</td><td>0.9433</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note: This table reports the results of within industry-country correlations between concentration on the left-hand-side and measures of firm-level profit share, including or excluding a proxy for capital costs, on the right-hand-side. Top x% Share is the turnover market share of the x% largest firms, top x% /Median is the logarithm of ratio of the 100-x quantile of market share to the median market share. Data source is Compnet, each observation is a 2-digit sector for 14 European Country covered in CompNet in a given year (see Appendix C for data coverage). A flexible set of industry-country and year fixed effects are included.
<table><caption>Table 3: Aggregate Profit Shares Decomposition at the Top</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="3" style="text-align: center;">Aggregate Profit Share</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>Top 1%</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Top Share of Sales</td><td>0.2856<br>(0.0802)</td><td></td><td>0.2814<br>(0.0801)</td></tr><tr><td>Top Percentile Profit Share</td><td></td><td>-0.0019<br>(0.0008)</td><td>-0.0019<br>(0.0008)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.8791</td><td>0.8785</td><td>0.8796</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>Top 5%</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Top Share of Sales</td><td>0.1891<br>(0.0490)</td><td></td><td>0.1671<br>(0.0498)</td></tr><tr><td>Top Percentile Profit Share</td><td></td><td>-0.0283<br>(0.0094)</td><td>-0.0224<br>(0.0095)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.8793</td><td>0.8788</td><td>0.8798</td></tr></tbody></table>

*Note:* This table reports the results of correlations between industry level profit shares of value-added on the left-hand-side and the top share of sales and/or the top percentile of the distribution of firm profit shares (excluding a proxy for capital costs) on the right-hand-side. Data source is Compnet, each observation is a 2-digit sector for 14 European Country covered in CompNet in a given year (see Appendix C for data coverage). A flexible set of industry-country and year fixed effects are included.
<table><caption>Table 4: Aggregate Profit Shares Decomposition at the Top</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="3" style="text-align: center;">Aggregate Profit Share</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>Top 1%</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Top Share of Sales</td><td>0.2856<br>(0.0802)</td><td></td><td>0.2963<br>(0.0801)</td></tr><tr><td>Top Percentile Profit Share</td><td></td><td>-0.0061<br>(0.0021)</td><td>-0.0065<br>(0.0021)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.8791</td><td>0.8787</td><td>0.8799</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>Top 5%</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Top Share of Sales</td><td>0.1891<br>(0.0490)</td><td></td><td>0.1801<br>(0.0497)</td></tr><tr><td>Top Percentile Profit Share</td><td></td><td>-0.0192<br>(0.0112)</td><td>-0.0124<br>(0.0113)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td><td>1,499</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.8793</td><td>0.8782</td><td>0.8794</td></tr></tbody></table>

*Note:* This table reports the results of correlations between industry level profit shares of industry on the left-hand-side and the top share of sales and/or the top percentile of the distribution of firm profit shares (including a proxy for capital costs) on the right-hand-side. Data source is Compnet, each observation is a 2-digit sector for 14 European Country covered in CompNet in a given year (see Appendix C for data coverage). A flexible set of industry-country and year fixed effects are included.
<table><caption>Table 5: Calibration</caption><thead><tr><th>Parameter</th><th></th><th>Value</th><th>Source</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><em>Observed</em></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Population growth</td><td>n</td><td>1.9%</td><td>KLEMS</td></tr><tr><td>Output growth</td><td>g<sub>Q</sub></td><td>3.0%</td><td>KLEMS</td></tr><tr><td>Capital relative price deflation</td><td>g<sup>K</sup></td><td>1.0%</td><td>KLEMS</td></tr><tr><td>Profit share</td><td>V/R</td><td>5.0%</td><td>KLEMS, OECD</td></tr><tr><td>Capital share</td><td>α(1 - V/R)</td><td>20.0%</td><td>KLEMS, OECD</td></tr><tr><td>Investment ratio</td><td>I/K</td><td>12.0%</td><td>KLEMS</td></tr><tr><td>Real interest rate</td><td>r</td><td>3.0%</td><td>KLEMS, OECD</td></tr><tr><td>Market Share Pareto-tail index</td><td><sup>k</sup>/<sub>ρ-1</sub></td><td>1.3</td><td>Compnet</td></tr><tr><td>Probability of entry</td><td>(z*)<sup>-k</sup></td><td>0.7</td><td>OECD</td></tr><tr><td><em>Calibrated</em></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Intertemporal substitution elasticity</td><td>θ</td><td>1.0</td><td>Assumption</td></tr><tr><td>Fixed cost of production</td><td>f</td><td>1.0</td><td>Assumption</td></tr><tr><td><em>Inferred</em></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Depreciation rate</td><td>δ</td><td>9.0%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Automation</td><td>α</td><td>21.1%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Intermediary good sector productivity growth</td><td>g</td><td>0.2%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Discount rate</td><td>β</td><td>2.2%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Substitution Elasticity</td><td>ρ</td><td>15.4</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Productivity Pareto-tail index</td><td>k</td><td>18.7</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Fixed cost of entry</td><td>f<sub>e</sub></td><td>2.3</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Note: Sources are the value added weighted average of France's and Germany's market economy from 2000 to 2007. Inferred parameters are solved simultaneously using the steady-state equations in appendix D.
B Figures

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Labor Shares</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure reports payments to labor as a share of value added in the market economy for France, Germany, the UK and the US. Employee compensation share excludes payments to non-salaried workers. Data source is KLEMS.
<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Smoothed Labor Shares, US</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure plots variations in smoothed labor shares for broad industries and the market economy in the US. Smoothed labor shares are calculated using a trend-cycle decomposition from an HP filter with smoothing parameter 6.25, as in Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Data source is KLEMS.
<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Smoothed Labor Shares, France</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure plots variations in smoothed labor shares for broad industries and the market economy in France. Smoothed labor shares are calculated using a trend-cycle decomposition from an HP filter with smoothing parameter 6.25, as in Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Data source is KLEMS.
<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4: Capital Share</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure reports payments to capital as a share of value added in the market economy for France, Germany, the UK and the US. Long term and short term rates are used to compute the returns to capital. Data sources are KLEMS and OECD.
<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5: Contributions to Capital Share</figcaption></figure>

Note: This figure reports the decomposition from equation 5 of the capital share in the market economy for France, Germany, the UK and the US. Data sources are KLEMS and OECD.
<figure><img src="image_8.png" /><figcaption>Figure 6: Country Level Correlations between Factor Shares Variations</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure plots four year variations in smoothed capital and labor shares for the market economy in 28 European Union countries and the US. Smoothed labor and capital shares are calculated using a trend-cycle decomposition from an HP filter with smoothing parameter 6.25, as in Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Data sources are KLEMS and OECD.
<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>Figure 7: Industry Level Correlations between Factor Shares Variations</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure plots four year variations in smoothed capital and labor shares for 30 industries in the market economy in 28 European Union countries and the US. Smoothed labor and capital shares are calculated using a trend-cycle decomposition from an HP filter with smoothing parameter 6.25, as in Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Data sources are KLEMS and OECD.
<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>Figure 8: Smoothed Profit Shares, US</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure plots variations in smoothed profit shares for broad industries and the market economy in the US. Smoothed profit share is calculated as the residual in equation 1 where smoothed labor and capital shares are calculated using a trend-cycle decomposition from an HP filter with smoothing parameter 6.25, as in Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Data sources are KLEMS and OECD.
<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>Figure 9: Smoothed Profit Shares, France</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure plots variations in smoothed profit shares for broad industries and the market economy in France. Smoothed profit share is calculated as the residual in equation 1 where smoothed labor and capital shares are calculated using a trend-cycle decomposition from an HP filter with smoothing parameter 6.25, as in Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Data sources are KLEMS and OECD.
<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>Figure 10: Concentration and Firm-Level Profit Share, France</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure plots variations in industry level concentration and median firm-level profit share, for broad industries and the market economy in France. Data source is CompNet, concentration index and median profit shares are computed are the 2-digit industry level and averaged across industries weighted by their share in aggregate value added.
<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>Figure 11: Concentration and Firm-Level Profit Share, Germany</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure plots variations in industry level concentration and median firm-level profit share, for broad industries and the market economy in Germany. Data source is CompNet, concentration index and median profit shares are computed are the 2-digit industry level and averaged across industries weighted by their share in aggregate value added.
<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>Figure 12: Partial Equilibrium</figcaption></figure>

Note: This figure displays the determination of the industry level equilibrium from equations Avg Prod, ZCP and ZEP. Distribution of productivity is log-normal, and industry-level calibrated parameters are in table 5.
<figure><img src="image_15.png" /><figcaption>Figure 13: Effect of Increase in Competition on Firm-Level Profit Share</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure displays the reduction of profit shares of firms of different sizes following an increase in competition resulting in a decrease in markups from 33% to 25% on the industry level equilibrium from equations Avg Prod, ZCP and ZEP, for different distributions of productivities. Industry-level calibrated parameters are in table 5.
<figure><img src="image_16.png" /><figcaption>Figure 14: Relationship between Competition and Industry Concentration</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure displays relationship between the firm-level markup and industry concentration at the industry equilibrium from equations Avg Prod, ZCP and ZEP, for different distributions of productivities. Concentration is defined as the share of revenues accruing to the largest 1% or 5% of firms. Industry-level calibrated parameters are in table 5.
<figure><img src="image_17.png" /><figcaption>Figure 15: Relationship between Competition and Industry Concentration</figcaption></figure>

Note: This figure displays relationship between the firm-level markup and industry concentration at the industry equilibrium from equations Avg Prod, ZCP and ZEP, for different distributions of productivities. Concentration is defined as the log ratio of the 99th or 95th percentile of market share over the median market share. Industry-level calibrated parameters are in table 5.
<figure><img src="image_18.png" /><figcaption>Figure 16: Relationship between Competition and Industry-Level Profit Share</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure displays relationship between the firm-level markup and industry average profit share at the industry equilibrium from equations Avg Prod, ZCP and ZEP, for different distributions of productivities. Industry-level calibrated parameters are in table 5.
<figure><img src="image_19.png" /><figcaption>Figure 17: Effect of change in competition, $v = 0$</figcaption></figure>

Note: This figure displays relationship between competition (ie $\rho$) and selected variables at the general equilibrium. Calibrated parameters are in table 5, when the value of increased diversity is equal to 0.
<figure><img src="image_20.png" /><figcaption>Figure 18: Effect of change in competition, $v = 0.5$</figcaption></figure>

Note: This figure displays relationship between competition (ie $\rho$) and selected variables at the general equilibrium. Calibrated parameters are in table 5, when the value of increased diversity is equal to 0.
# C Data

## C.1 KLEMS Database

The 2017 release of the KLEMS database is based on National Accounts (ESA 2010) for all 28 member states of the European Union and the United States up to 2015. Data on labor compensation, hours, capital stock, investment price and depreciation rates is available for up to 42 NACE 2 industry levels. Table 6 displays the number of industries and years at the country level for which we were able to construct the profit share with the procedure described in Section 2.1, with the addition of long term government bond 10-year rates taken from OECD.

<table><caption>Table 6: KLEMS 2017 data on labor compensation, hours and capital services</caption><thead><tr><th>Countries</th><th>Indutries</th><th>Year min</th><th>Year max</th><th>Obs</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Austria</td><td>27</td><td>1997</td><td>2014</td><td>486</td></tr><tr><td>Czech Rep.</td><td>27</td><td>2001</td><td>2014</td><td>378</td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>24</td><td>1997</td><td>2014</td><td>432</td></tr><tr><td>Denmark</td><td>27</td><td>1989</td><td>2014</td><td>702</td></tr><tr><td>Greece</td><td>27</td><td>1998</td><td>2014</td><td>459</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>24</td><td>1980</td><td>2014</td><td>840</td></tr><tr><td>Finland</td><td>27</td><td>1989</td><td>2014</td><td>702</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>24</td><td>1980</td><td>2014</td><td>840</td></tr><tr><td>Hungary</td><td>11</td><td>2010</td><td>2014</td><td>55</td></tr><tr><td>Ireland</td><td>11</td><td>1998</td><td>2013</td><td>176</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>24</td><td>1997</td><td>2013</td><td>408</td></tr><tr><td>Lithuania</td><td>11</td><td>2001</td><td>2013</td><td>143</td></tr><tr><td>Luxemburg</td><td>18</td><td>1997</td><td>2014</td><td>324</td></tr><tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>24</td><td>2000</td><td>2014</td><td>360</td></tr><tr><td>Poland</td><td>11</td><td>2003</td><td>2013</td><td>121</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>27</td><td>2000</td><td>2013</td><td>378</td></tr><tr><td>Sweden</td><td>25</td><td>1995</td><td>2013</td><td>475</td></tr><tr><td>Slovenia</td><td>12</td><td>2004</td><td>2014</td><td>132</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>27</td><td>2004</td><td>2014</td><td>297</td></tr><tr><td>UK</td><td>27</td><td>1999</td><td>2014</td><td>432</td></tr><tr><td>USA</td><td>25</td><td>1987</td><td>2014</td><td>700</td></tr><tr><td>TOTAL</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>8840</td></tr></tbody></table>
<figure><img src="image_21.png" /><figcaption>Figure 19: Effect of change in competition, $v = 1$</figcaption></figure>

*Note:* This figure displays relationship between competition (ie $\rho$) and selected variables at the general equilibrium. Calibrated parameters are in table 5, when the value of increased diversity is equal to 0.
## C.2 CompNet

The CompNet firm-level balance sheet database comprises 17 Countries and 56 industries within the manufacturing and service sectors over the period 1995-2012. The concentration and markup module of the database starts in 2000 for 15 countries, and is based on the full sample of firms available within each country. Comparisons between countries may be biased because of specific methodologies and samples but within country estimates should be consistent.<fnref n="15" />

<table><caption>Table 7: CompNet 4th round data on industry concentration</caption><thead><tr><th>Countries</th><th>Indutries</th><th>Year min</th><th>Year max</th><th>Obs</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Italy</td><td>53</td><td>2001</td><td>2012</td><td>636</td></tr><tr><td>Estonia</td><td>53</td><td>2000</td><td>2012</td><td>689</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>53</td><td>2006</td><td>2012</td><td>371</td></tr><tr><td>Slovenia</td><td>53</td><td>2000</td><td>2012</td><td>689</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>53</td><td>2001</td><td>2011</td><td>583</td></tr><tr><td>Finland</td><td>53</td><td>2000</td><td>2012</td><td>689</td></tr><tr><td>Belgium</td><td>53</td><td>2001</td><td>2011</td><td>583</td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>45</td><td>2000</td><td>2012</td><td>585</td></tr><tr><td>Poland</td><td>53</td><td>2005</td><td>2012</td><td>424</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>53</td><td>2000</td><td>2012</td><td>689</td></tr><tr><td>Latvia</td><td>53</td><td>2006</td><td>2012</td><td>371</td></tr><tr><td>Romania</td><td>53</td><td>2003</td><td>2012</td><td>530</td></tr><tr><td>Austria</td><td>50</td><td>2000</td><td>2012</td><td>650</td></tr><tr><td>Lithuania</td><td>53</td><td>2001</td><td>2011</td><td>583</td></tr><tr><td>TOTAL</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>8072</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵The reader must be aware that data collection rules and procedures across countries are different, and out of CompNet's control. Hence, despite all efforts made to improve sample comparability across countries (including the use of population weights), some country samples might still suffer from biases.</footnote>
# D Proofs

## Constant Returns to Scale

We show that if variable costs exhibit constant returns to scale, the marginal cost of the firm is constant.

*Proof.* Let $C(q, W)$ be the variable cost function, not specific to firm $i$. Let $\epsilon$ be the elasticity of variable cost with respect to production $q$, the assumption of constant returns to scale is that variable costs increase by 1% for each increase in production of 1%, for all levels of production $q$:

$$ \epsilon(q) \equiv \frac{\partial C}{\partial q}(q, W) \frac{q}{C(q, W)} = 1, $$

which implies that total variable cost is the product of marginal cost and production:

$$ C(q, W) = q \frac{\partial C}{\partial q}(q, W). $$

Taking the derivative with respect to $q$ shows that the marginal cost does not depend on $q$ and is equal to $c(W)$, and that total variable cost is a linear function of production:

$$ C(q, W) = c(W)q. $$

□
Equilibrium and Steady State

Equilibrium is characterized by the determination of the path of the 19 following endogenous variables $K_t$, $I_t$, $c_t$, $P_t^K$, $r_t$, $r_t^K$, $w_t$, $P_t$, $Q_t$, $R_t$, $V_t$, $\tilde{p}_t$, $\tilde{q}_t$, $\tilde{r}_t$, $\tilde{v}_t$, $M_t$, $M_t^e$, $\tilde{z}_t$, $z_t^*$, from Equations (9) to (45). This is done by first expressing all variables in ratio over factor cost $mc_t$, effectively using the capital-labor bundle as the numeraire. One can solve for average profit $\tilde{v}_t$ using the zero cutoff profit condition in Equation (40).

Using the free entry condition (41), Equation (36), and the pricing rule (37) one obtains the cut-off produc-
tivity level $z_t^*$, the average quality level $\tilde{z}_t$, and the average price level $\tilde{p}_t$. From Equations (38) and (39) one
also obtains average revenue $\tilde{r}_t$ and production $\tilde{q}_t$. Aggregates $P_t$, $Q_t$, $R_t$, $V_t$, defined in Equations (12) and
(33) to (35) can all be expressed as functions of $M_t$ and average variables that have all already been solved,
as can the mass of prospective entrants in Equation (42). Equation (44) links $M_t$ to aggregate capital $K_t$
and equilibrium on the final good market (45), together with capital accumulation (28), gives a relationship
between $K_t$ and $c_t$, so all aggregate variables, including $P_t$ and $K_t$ are now defined as functions of $c_t$.

From there, we obtain a first relationship between $c_t$ and $r_t^K$ using the factor cost frontier in Equation (31)
and the cost of the capital-labor bundle in Equation (32). Finally, the Euler equation (29), and investment
(43) and user-cost of capital (30), together with consumption price $P_t$ expressed as a function of $c_t$ yield a
second relationship between $c_t$ and $r_t^K$.

To prove the existence of the steady-state one first needs to find a balanced growth path (BGP) on which all 19 variables must grow at constant rates in the long-run. The three exogenous sources of growth in the model are the two sectoral quality and productivity growth $g$ and $g^K$, and demographic growth $n$. Writing $g_x$ the constant long-run growth rate of variable $x$, the 19 Equations (28) to (45) (Equation (34) includes in fact two equations) imply that:

$$
\left\{
\begin{array}{l}
g_I = g_K \\
g_c = \theta^{-1}(r - \pi - \beta) \\
g_{r-\pi} = 0 \\
g_{r^K} = g_{P^K} = \pi^K \\
\pi = g_{\tilde{p}} - \frac{\nu}{\rho-1} g_M \\
g_w = g_K - n + \pi^K \\
g_{mc} = \alpha \pi^K + (1-\alpha) g_w \\
g_Q = \left(1 + \frac{\nu}{\rho-1}\right) g_M + g_{\tilde{q}} \\
g_R = \pi + g_Q = g_M + g_{\tilde{r}} \\
g_V = g_M + g_{\tilde{v}}
\end{array}
\right.
\quad /*
$$

$$
\left\{
\begin{array}{l}
g_{\tilde{z}} = g_{z^*} \\
g_{\tilde{p}} = g_{mc} - g_{\tilde{z}} \\
g_{\tilde{r}} = g_{\tilde{v}} = g_{mc} \\
g_{\tilde{r}} = g_{\tilde{p}} + g_{\tilde{q}} \\
g_{\tilde{v}} = g_{mc} \\
g_{z^*} = g \\
g_M = g_{M^e} \\
g_{P^K} = \pi - g^K \\
g_{mc} + \alpha g_K + (1-\alpha)n = g_R = g_V = g_{mc} + g_{M^e} \\
g_Q = n + g_c = g_I - g^K
\end{array}
\right.
$$

It is straightforward to verify that this system has a unique solution with zero price inflation $\pi = 0$, which
we describe below. Replacing variables in Equations (28) to (45) with their stationary counterparts $x_t \leftarrow
x_t \exp(-g_x t)$ and assuming the economy is on the BGP, one can solve for the steady-state:
$$
\left\{
\begin{array}{l}
P^K = 1 \\
r = \theta(g_Q - n) + \beta \\
r^K = r + \delta + g^K \\
z^* = \left( \frac{f}{f_e} \frac{\rho-1}{k-(\rho-1)} \right)^{\frac{1}{k}} \\
\tilde{z} = \left( \frac{k}{k-(\rho-1)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}} z^* \\
\tilde{q} = \tilde{z} f(\rho-1) \left( \frac{\tilde{z}}{z^*} \right)^{\rho-1} \\
M = \left[ \tilde{z} \frac{\rho-1}{\rho} \tilde{q}^{\alpha-1} \left( \frac{r^K}{\alpha} \right)^{-\alpha} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha(1+\frac{\nu}{\rho-1})}} \\
mc = \tilde{z} \frac{\rho-1}{\rho} M^{\frac{\nu}{\rho-1}} \\
\tilde{p} = M^{\frac{\nu}{\rho-1}} \\
\tilde{r} = \tilde{q} \tilde{p}
\end{array}
\right.
$$

$$
\left\{
\begin{array}{l}
\tilde{v} = \frac{\tilde{r}}{\rho} - mcf \\
Q = M^{1+\frac{\nu}{\rho-1}} \tilde{q} \\
R = M\tilde{r} \\
V = M\tilde{v} \\
K = \left(\frac{Q}{mc}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \\
I = (g_Q + g^K + \delta)K \\
C = Q - I \\
w = (1 - \alpha)mcK^{\alpha} \\
M^e = (z^*)^k M
\end{array}
\right.
$$

Finally, along the BGP, the distribution of de-trended productivity is also stationary, Pareto with scale z*
and shape k. Its cumulative density function is:

$$
H(z) = \mathbf{P} \left( \frac{Z}{z_t^0} \leq z \right) = 1 - \left( \frac{z^*}{z} \right)^k
$$
Liste des documents de travail de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques

<table><tr><td>G 9001</td><td>J. FAYOLLE et M. FLEURBAEY<br/>Accumulation, profitabilité et endettement des entreprises</td><td>G 9202</td><td>J. OLIVEIRA-MARTINS,<br/>J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br/>Macro-economic import functions with imperfect competition - An application to the E.C. Trade</td><td>G 9310</td></tr><tr><td>G 9002</td><td>H. ROUSSE<br/>Détection et effets de la multicolinearité dans les modèles linéaires ordinaires - Un prolongement de la réflexion de BELSLEY, KUH et WELSCH</td><td>G 9203</td><td>I. STAPIC<br/>Les échanges internationaux de services de la France dans le cadre des négociations multilatérales du GATT<br/>Juin 1992 (tête version)<br/>Novembre 1992 (version finale)</td><td>G 9311</td></tr><tr><td>G 9003</td><td>P. RALLE et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br/>Indexation des salaires : la rupture de 1983</td><td>G 9204</td><td>P. SEVESTRE<br/>L'économie sur données individuelles- temporales. Une note introdutive</td><td>G 9313</td></tr><tr><td>G 9004</td><td>D. GUELEC et P. RALLE<br/>Cognitivité, croissance et innovation de produit</td><td>G 9205</td><td>H. ERKEL-ROUSSE<br/>Le commerce extérieur et l'environnement international dans le modèle AMADEUS (réestimation 1992)</td><td>G 9314</td></tr><tr><td>G 9005</td><td>P. RALLE et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br/>Les conséquences de la désindexation. Analyse dans une maquette prix-salaires</td><td>G 9206</td><td>N. GREENAN et D. GUELEC<br/>Coordination within the firm and endoge nous growth</td><td>G 9315</td></tr><tr><td>G 9101</td><td>Équipe AMADEUS - Première partie<br/>Le modèle AMADEUS - Deuxième partie -Présentation générale</td><td>G 9207</td><td>A. MAGNIER et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br/>Technology and trade: empirical evidences for the major five industrialized countries</td><td>G 9316</td></tr><tr><td>G 9102</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br/>Le modèle AMADEUS - Deuxième partie -Propriétés variantielles</td><td>G 9208</td><td>B. CREPON, E. DUGUET, D. ENCAOUA et P. MOHINEN<br/>Endogenous growth and product innovation</td><td>G 9317</td></tr><tr><td>G 9103</td><td>D. GUELEC et P. RALLE<br/>Endogenous growth and product innovation</td><td>G 9209</td><td>B. CREPON, E. DUGUET<br/>Research and development, competition and innovation; an application of pseudo maximum likelihood methods to Poisson models with heterogeneity</td><td>G 9318</td></tr><tr><td>G 9104</td><td>H. ROUSSE<br/>Le modèle AMADEUS - Troisième partie - Le commerce extérieur et l'environnement international</td><td>G 9301</td><td>B. CREPON et E. DUGUET<br/>Commerce international et concurrence impartie - développement récents et implications pour la politique commerciale</td><td>G 9318</td></tr><tr><td>G 9105</td><td>H. ROUSSE<br/>Effets de demande et d'offre dans les résultats du commerce extérieur manufacturé de la France au cours des deux dernières décennies</td><td>G 9302</td><td>Ch. CASES<br/>Durées de chômage et comportements d'offre de travail : une revue de la littérature</td><td>G 9319</td></tr><tr><td>G 9106</td><td>B. CREPON<br/>Innovation, taille et concentration : causalités et dynamiques</td><td>G 9303</td><td>H. ERKEL-ROUSSE<br/>Union économique et monétaire : le débat économique</td><td>G 9319</td></tr><tr><td>G 9107</td><td>B. AMABLE et D. GUELEC<br/>Un panorama des théories de la croissance endogène</td><td>G 9304</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELEC / G. BROUSSAUDIER - L. MIOTTI<br/>Innovation organisationnelle, dynamisme technologique et performances des entreprises</td><td>G 9319</td></tr><tr><td>G 9108</td><td>M. GLAUDE et M. MOUTARDIER<br/>Une évaluation du coût direct de l'enfant de 1979 à 1989</td><td>G 9305</td><td>P. JALLARD<br/>Le traité de Maastricht : présentation juridique et historique</td><td>G 9405</td></tr><tr><td>G 9109</td><td>P. RALLE et alii<br/>France - Allemagne : performances économiques comparées</td><td>G 9306</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br/>Micro-DMS : présentation et propriétés</td><td>G 9406</td></tr><tr><td>G 9110</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br/>Micro-DMS<br/>NON PARU</td><td>G 9307</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br/>Micro-DMS - variantés : les tableaux</td><td>G 9407</td></tr><tr><td>G 9111</td><td>A. MAGNIER<br/>Effets accéléré et multiplicateur en France depuis 1970 : quelques résultats empiriques</td><td>G 9308</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br/>Les grands réseaux publics français dans une perspective européenne</td><td>G 9408</td></tr><tr><td>G 9112</td><td>B. CREPON et G. DUREAU<br/>Investissement en recherche-developpement : analyse de causalités dans un modèle d'accélérateur généralisé</td><td>G 9309</td><td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ<br/>Profitabilité de l'investissement productif et transmission des chocs financiers</td><td>G 9409</td></tr><tr><td>G 9113</td><td>J.L. BRILLET, H. ERKEL-ROUSSE, J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br/>"France-Allemagne Couplees" - Deux économies vues par une maquette macro-économétique</td><td>G 9410</td><td>F. ROSENMALD<br/>La décision d'investir</td><td>G 9409</td></tr><tr><td>G 9201</td><td>W.J. ADAMS, B. CREPON, D. ENCAOUA<br/>Choix technologiques et stratégies de dissuasion d'entrée</td><td>G 9410</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br/>Les liens entre RMI et chômage, une mise en perspective<br/>NON PARU - article sorti dans Économie et Prévision n° 122 (1996) - pages 95 à 113</td><td>G 9410</td></tr><tr><td>G 9411</td><td>C. DEFEUILLEY - Ph. QUIRION<br/>Les déchets d'emballages ménagers : une analyse économique des bagages français et allemande</td><td>G 9412</td><td>W. QUIRION<br/>Investissement, incertitude et irréversibilité Quelques développements récents de la théorie de l'investissement</td><td>G 9411</td></tr><tr><td>G 9412</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br/>Investissement, incertitude et irréversibilité Quelques développements récents de la théorie de l'investissement</td><td>G 9413</td><td>B. DORMONT - M. PAUCHET<br/>L'évaluation de l'elasticité emploi-salaire dépend-elle des structures de qualification ?</td><td>G 9412</td></tr><tr><td>G 9413</td><td>B. DORMONT - M. PAUCHET<br/>L'évaluation de l'elasticité emploi-salaire dépend-elle des structures de qualification ?</td><td>G 9414</td><td>I. KABLA<br/>Le Chois de breveter une invention</td><td>G 9413</td></tr><tr><td>G 9414</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. SEDILLOT<br/>Irreversible investment and Uncertainty: When is there a Value of Waiting?</td><td>G 9501</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. SEDILLOT<br/>Irreversible investment and Uncertainty: When is there a Value of Waiting?</td><td>G 9414</td></tr><tr><td>G 9502</td><td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ<br/>Impfections du marché du crédit, investissement des entreprises et cycle économique</td><td>G 9502</td><td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ<br/>Impfections du marché du crédit, investissement des entreprises et cycle économique</td><td>G 9502</td></tr><tr><td>G 9503</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Les transformations de la demande de travail par qualification en France</td><td>G 9503</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Les transformations de la demande de travail par qualification en France</td><td>G 9503</td></tr><tr><td>G 9504</td><td>N. GREENAN<br/>Technologie, changement organisationnel, qualifications et emploi : une étude empirique sur l'industrie manufacturière</td><td>G 9504</td><td>G. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Persistance des hérarchies sectorielles de sa- laires, un réexamen sur données françaises</td><td>G 9504</td></tr><tr><td>G 9505</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Persistance des hérarchies sectorielles de sa- laires, un réexamen sur données françaises</td><td>G 9505</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Persistance des inter-industry wages differentials: a reexamination on matched worker-firm panel data</td><td>G 9505</td></tr><tr><td>G 9506</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br/>Les liens entre RMI et chômage, une mise en perspective<br/>NON PARU - article sorti dans Économie et Prévision n° 122 (1996) - pages 95 à 113</td><td>G 9506</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br/>Les liens entre RMI et chômage, une mise en perspective<br/>NON PARU - article sorti dans Économie et Prévision n° 122 (1996) - pages 95 à 113</td><td>G 9506</td></tr><tr><td>G 9507</td><td>G. CETTE - S. MAHFOUZ<br/>Le partage primaire du revenu<br/>Constat descriptif sur longue période</td><td>G 9507</td><td>G. CETTE - S. MAHFOUZ<br/>Le partage primaire du revenu<br/>Constat descriptif sur longue période</td><td>G 9507</td></tr><tr><td>G 9601</td><td>Banque de France - CEPREMAP - Direction de la Prévision - Érasme - INSEE - OFCE<br/>Structures et propriétés de cinq modèles macro-économiques français</td><td>G 9601</td><td>Banque de France - CEPREMAP - Direction de la Prévision - Érasme - INSEE - OFCE<br/>Structures et propriétés de cinq modèles macro-économiques français</td><td>G 9601</td></tr><tr><td>G 9602</td><td>Rapport d'activité de la DESE de l'année 1995</td><td>G 9602</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - A. DRAZNIKS<br/>L'octroi de crédit aux PME : une analyse à partir d'informations bancaires</td><td>G 9602</td></tr><tr><td>G 9603</td><td>L. BOURDIEU - A. DRAZNIKS<br/>L'octroi de crédit aux PME : une analyse à partir d'informations bancaires</td><td>G 9603</td><td>A. TOPIOL-BENSAID<br/>Les implantations japonaises en France</td><td>G 9603</td></tr><tr><td>G 9604</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br/>Les implantations japonaises en France</td><td>G 9604</td><td>P. GENIER - S. JACOBZONE<br/>Comportements de prévention, consommation d'alcool et tabagie, peut-on paier d'une gestion globale du capital santé ?</td><td>G 9604</td></tr><tr><td>G 9605</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br/>Comportements de prévention, consommation d'alcool et tabagie, peut-on paier d'une gestion globale du capital santé ?</td><td>G 9605</td><td>Une modélisation microéconométrique empirique</td><td>G 9605</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9310</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br/>Les théories sur la structure optimale du capital : quelques points de repère</td><td>G 9310</td></tr><tr><td>G 9311</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br/>Les décisions de financement des entreprises françaises : une évaluation empirique des théories de la structure optimale du capital</td><td>G 9311</td></tr><tr><td>G 9312</td><td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ<br/>Q de Tobin marginal et transmission des chocs financiers</td><td>G 9312</td></tr><tr><td>G 9313</td><td>Équipes Amadeus (INSEE), Banque de France, Métric (DP)<br/>Presentation des propriétés des principaux modèles macroéconomiques du Service Public</td><td>G 9313</td></tr><tr><td>G 9314</td><td>G. CREPON - E. DUGUET<br/>Research & Development, competition and innovation</td><td>G 9314</td></tr><tr><td>G 9315</td><td>B. DORMONT<br/>Quelle est l'influence du coût du travail sur l'emploi ?</td><td>G 9315</td></tr><tr><td>G 9316</td><td>D. BLANCHET - C. BROUSSE<br/>Deux études sur l'âge de la retraite</td><td>G 9316</td></tr><tr><td>G 9317</td><td>D. BLANCHET<br/>Répartition du travail dans une population hétérogène : deux notes</td><td>G 9317</td></tr><tr><td>G 9318</td><td>D. EYSSARTIER - N. PONTY<br/>AMADEUS - an annual macro-economic model for the medium and long term</td><td>G 9318</td></tr><tr><td>G 9319</td><td>G. CETTE - Ph. CUNÉO - D. EYSSARTIER<br/>J. GAUTIÉ<br/>Les effets sur l'emploi d'un abaissement du coût du travail des jeunes</td><td>G 9319</td></tr><tr><td>G 9401</td><td>D. BLANCHET<br/>Les structures par âge importent-elles ?</td><td>G 9401</td></tr><tr><td>G 9402</td><td>J. GAUTIÉ<br/>Le chômage des jeunes en France : problème de formation ou phénomène de file d'attente ?<br/>Les éléments du débat</td><td>G 9402</td></tr><tr><td>G 9403</td><td>P. QUIRION<br/>Les déchets en France : éléments statistiques et économiques</td><td>G 9403</td></tr><tr><td>G 9404</td><td>D. LADIRAY - M. GRUN-REHOMME<br/>Lissage par moyennes mobiles - Le problème des extrémités de série</td><td>G 9404</td></tr><tr><td>G 9405</td><td>V. MAILLARD<br/>Théorie et pratique de la correction des effets de jours ouvrables</td><td>G 9405</td></tr><tr><td>G 9406</td><td>F. ROSENMALD<br/>La décision d'investir</td><td>G 9406</td></tr><tr><td>G 9407</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br/>Les apports de l'économie industrielle pour de finir la stratégie économique de l'hôpital public</td><td>G 9407</td></tr><tr><td>G 9408</td><td>L. BLOCH, J. BOURDIEU,<br/>B. COLIN-SEDILLOT, G. LONGUEVILLE<br/>Du défaut de paiement au dépôt de bilan : les banquiers face aux PME en difficulté</td><td>G 9408</td></tr><tr><td>G 9409</td><td>D. EYSSARTIER, P. MAIRE<br/>Impact macro-économiques de mesures d'aide au logement - quelques éléments d'évaluation</td><td>G 9409</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9410</td><td>F. ROSENMALD<br/>Suivi conjointurel de l'investissement</td></tr><tr><td>G 9411</td><td>C. DEFEUILLEY - Ph. QUIRION<br/>Les déchets d'emballages ménagers : une analyse économique des bagages français et allemande</td></tr><tr><td>G 9412</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br/>Investissement, incertitude et irréversibilité Quelques développements récents de la théorie de l'investissement</td></tr><tr><td>G 9413</td><td>B. DORMONT - M. PAUCHET<br/>L'évaluation de l'elasticité emploi-salaire dépend-elle des structures de qualification ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9414</td><td>I. KABLA<br/>Le Chois de breveter une invention</td></tr><tr><td>G 9501</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. SEDILLOT<br/>Irreversible investment and Uncertainty: When is there a Value of Waiting?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9502</td><td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ<br/>Impfections du marché du crédit, investissement des entreprises et cycle économique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9503</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Les transformations de la demande de travail par qualification en France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9504</td><td>N. GREENAN<br/>Technologie, changement organisationnel, qualifications et emploi : une étude empirique sur l'industrie manufacturière</td></tr><tr><td>G 9505</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Persistance des hérarchies sectorielles de sa- laires, un réexamen sur données françaises</td></tr><tr><td>G 9505</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br/>Persistance des inter-industry wages differentials: a reexamination on matched worker-firm panel data</td></tr><tr><td>G 9506</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br/>Les liens entre RMI et chômage, une mise en perspective<br/>NON PARU - article sorti dans Économie et Prévision n° 122 (1996) - pages 95 à 113</td></tr><tr><td>G 9507</td><td>G. CETTE - S. MAHFOUZ<br/>Le partage primaire du revenu<br/>Constat descriptif sur longue période</td></tr><tr><td>G 9601</td><td>Banque de France - CEPREMAP - Direction de la Prévision - Érasme - INSEE - OFCE<br/>Structures et propriétés de cinq modèles macro-économiques français</td></tr><tr><td>G 9602</td><td>Rapport d'activité de la DESE de l'année 1995</td></tr><tr><td>G 9603</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - A. DRAZNIKS<br/>L'octroi de crédit aux PME : une analyse à partir d'informations bancaires</td></tr><tr><td>G 9604</td><td>A. TOPIOL-BENSAID<br/>Les implantations japonaises en France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9605</td><td>P. GENIER - S. JACOBZONE<br/>Comportements de prévention, consommation d'alcool et tabagie, peut-on paier d'une gestion globale du capital santé ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9605</td><td>Une modélisation microéconométrique empirique</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>G 9606</td><td>C. DOZ - F. LENGLART<br>Factor analysis and unobserved component models; an application to the study of French business surveys</td></tr><tr><td>G 9607</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br>La théorie coopérative de la firme</td></tr><tr><td>G 9608</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br>Technological innovation and employment reallocation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9609</td><td>Ph. COUR - F. RUPPRECHT<br>L'intégration asynétique au sein du continent américain: un essai de modélisation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9610</td><td>S. DUCHENE - G. FORGEOT - A. JACQUOT<br>Analysis of evolutions récentes de la productivité apparente du travail</td></tr><tr><td>G 9611</td><td>X. BONNET - S. MAHFOUZ<br>The influence of different specifications of wages-prices spirals on the measure of the NAIRU: the case of France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9612</td><td>PH. COUR - E. DUBOIS, S. MAHFOUZ, J. PISANI-FERRY<br>The cost of fiscal retrenchment revisited: how strong is the evidence?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9613</td><td>A. JACQUOT<br>Les flexions des taux d'activité sont-elles seulement conjoncturielles ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9614</td><td>ZHANG Yingxiang - SONG Xueqing<br>Lexique macroéconomique Français-Chinois</td></tr><tr><td>G 9701</td><td>J.L. SCHNEIDER<br>La taxe professionnelle : éléments de cadrage économique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9702</td><td>J.L. SCHNEIDER<br>Transition et stabilité politique d'un système redistributif</td></tr><tr><td>G 9703</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br>Train or Pay: Does it Reduce Inequalities to Encourage Firms to Train their Workers?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9704</td><td>P. GENIER<br>Deux contributions sur dépendance et équité</td></tr><tr><td>G 9705</td><td>E. DUGUET - N. IUNG<br>R & D investment, Patent Life and Patent Value</td></tr><tr><td>G 9706</td><td>M. HOUDEBINE - A. TOPIOL-BENAID<br>Les entreprises internationales en France: une analyse à partir de données individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G 9707</td><td>M. HOUDEBINE<br>Polarisation des activités et spécialisation des départements en France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9708</td><td>E. DUGUET - N. GREENAN<br>Le biais technique : une analyse sur données individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G 9709</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Analysing a small French ECM Model</td></tr><tr><td>G 9710</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Formalizing the transition process: scenarios for capital accumulation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9711</td><td>G. FORGEOT - J. GAUTIÉ<br>Insertion professionnelle des jeunes et proces-sus de déclassement</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9712</td><td>E. DUBOIS<br>High Real Interest Rates: the Consequence of a Saving Investment Disequilibrium or of an insufficient Credibility of Monetary Authorities?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9713</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br>La théorie coopérative de la firme</td></tr><tr><td>G 9714</td><td>F. LEQUILLER<br>Does the French Consumer Price Index Over-state Inflation?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9715</td><td>X. BONNET<br>Peut-on mettre en évidence les rigidités à la baisse des salaires nominale?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9716</td><td>N. IUNG - F. RUPPRECHT<br>Productivité de la recherche et rendements d'échelle dans le secteur pharmaceutique français</td></tr><tr><td>G 9717</td><td>E. DUGUET - I. KABLA<br>Appropriation strategy and the motivations to use the patent system in France - An econo metric analysis at the firm level</td></tr><tr><td>G 9718</td><td>L.P. PELÉ - P. RALLE<br>Àge de la retraite : les aspects incitatifs du ré-gime général</td></tr><tr><td>G 9719</td><td>ZHANG Yingxiang - SONG Xueqing<br>Lexique macroéconomique français-chinois, chinois-français</td></tr><tr><td>G 9720</td><td>M. HOUDEBINE - J.L. SCHNEIDER<br>Mesurer l'influence de la fiscalité sur la localisation des entreprises</td></tr><tr><td>G 9721</td><td>A. MOUROUGANE<br>Crédibilité, indépendance et politique monétaire<br>Une redevance à la littérature</td></tr><tr><td>G 9722</td><td>P. AUGERAUD - L. BRIOT<br>Les données comptables d'entreprises<br>Le système intermédiaire d'entreprises<br>Passage des données individuelles aux données sectorielles</td></tr><tr><td>G 9723</td><td>P. AUGERAUD - J.E. CHAPRON<br>Using Business Accounts for Compiling National Accounts: the French Experience</td></tr><tr><td>G 9724</td><td>P. AUGERAUD<br>Les comptes d'entreprise par activités - Le passage aux comptes - De la comptabilité nationale - A paraître</td></tr><tr><td>G 9801</td><td>H. MICHAUDON - C. PRIGENT<br>Presentation du modèle ACADEUS</td></tr><tr><td>G 9802</td><td>J. ACCARDO<br>Une étude de comptabilité générationnelle pour la France en 1996</td></tr><tr><td>G 9803</td><td>X. BONNET - S. DUCHENE<br>Apports et limites de la modélisation « Real Business Cycles »</td></tr><tr><td>G 9804</td><td>C. BARLET - C. DUGUET - D. ENCAOUA - J. PRADEL<br>The Commercial Success of Innovations<br>An econometric analysis at the firm level in French manufacturing</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9805</td><td>P. CAHUC - Ch. GIANELLA - D. GOUX - A. ZILBERBERG<br>Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining in Power - Evidence form a Panel of French Firms</td></tr><tr><td>G 9806</td><td>J. ACCARDO - M. JLASSI<br>La productivité globale des facteurs entre 1975 et 1996</td></tr><tr><td>G 9807</td><td>Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques - 1997</td></tr><tr><td>G 9808</td><td>X. MOUROUGANE<br>Can a Conservative Governor Conduct an Ac-commodative Monetary Policy?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9809</td><td>X. BONNET - E. DUBOIS - L. FAUVET<br>Asymétrie des inflations relatives et menus costs : tests sur l'infographique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9810</td><td>E. DUGUET - N. IUNG<br>Sales and Advertising with Spillovers at the firm level: Estimation of a Dynamic Structural Model on Panel Data</td></tr><tr><td>G 9811</td><td>J.P. BERTHIER<br>Congestion urbaine : un modèle de trafic de pointe à courbe débît-vitesse et demande élastique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9812</td><td>C. PRIGENT<br>La part des salaires dans la valeur ajoutée : une approche macroéconomique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9813</td><td>A.Th. AERTS<br>L'évolution de la part des salaires dans la valeur ajoutée en France reflète-elle les évolutions individuelles sur la période 1979-1994 ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9814</td><td>B. SALANIÉ<br>Guide pratique des séries non-stationnaires</td></tr><tr><td>G 9901</td><td>S. DUCHENE - A. JACQUOT<br>Une croissance plus riche en emplois depuis le début de la décennie ? Une analyse en comp-aison internationale</td></tr><tr><td>G 9902</td><td>Ch. COLIN<br>Modélisation des carrières dans Destine</td></tr><tr><td>G 9903</td><td>Ch. COLIN<br>Évolution de la dispersion des salaires : un essai de prospective par microsimulation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9904</td><td>B. CREPON - N. IUNG<br>Innovation, emploi et performances</td></tr><tr><td>G 9905</td><td>B. CREPON - Ch. GIANELLA<br>Wages inequalities in France 1969-1992</td></tr><tr><td>G 9906</td><td>C. BONNET - R. MAHIEU<br>Microsimulation techniques applied to inter-generational transfers - Pensions in a dynamic framework: the case of France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9907</td><td>F. ROSENWALD<br>L'impact des contraintes financières dans la dé-cision d'investissement</td></tr><tr><td>G 9908</td><td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 1998</td></tr><tr><td>G 9909</td><td>J.P. ZOYEM<br>Contrat d'insertion et sortie du RMI<br>Évaluation des effets d'une politique sociale</td></tr><tr><td>G 9910</td><td>Ch. COLIN - FI. LEGROS - R. MAHIEU<br>Bilans contribuables comparés des régimes de retraite du secteur privé et de la fonction publique</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9911</td><td>G. LAROQUE - B. SALANIÉ<br>Une décomposition du non-emploi en France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9912</td><td>B. SALANIÉ<br>Une maquette analytique de long terme du marché du travail</td></tr><tr><td>G 9912</td><td>Ch. GIANELLA<br>Une estimation de l'élasticité de l'emploi peu qualifié à son coût</td></tr><tr><td>G 9913</td><td>Division « Redistribution et Politiques Sociales »<br>Le modèle de microsimulation dynamique DESTIMIE</td></tr><tr><td>G 9914</td><td>E. DUGUET<br>Macro-commandes SAS pour l'économétrie des panels et des variables qualitatives</td></tr><tr><td>G 9915</td><td>R. DUHAUTOIS<br>Évolution des flux d'emplois en France entre 1990 et 1996 : une étude empirique à partir du fichier des bénéfices réels normaux (BRN)</td></tr><tr><td>G 9916</td><td>J.Y. FOURNIER<br>Extraction du cycle des affaires : la méthode de Baxter et King</td></tr><tr><td>G 9917</td><td>B. CRÉPON - R. DESPLATZ - J. MAIRESSE<br>Estimating price cost margins, scale economies and workers' bargaining power at the firm level</td></tr><tr><td>G 9918</td><td>Ch. GIANELLA - Ph. LAGARDE<br>Productivity of hours in the aggregate production function: an evaluation on a panel of French firms from the manufacturing sector</td></tr><tr><td>G 9919</td><td>S. AUDRIC - P. GIVORD - C. PROST<br>Évolution de l'emploi et des coûts par qualification entre 1982 et 1996</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/01</td><td>R. MAHIEU<br>Les déterminants des dépenses de santé : une approche macroéconomique</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/02</td><td>C. ALLARD-PRIGENT - H. GUILMEAU - A. QUINET<br>The real exchange rate as the relative price of nontrables in terms of tradables: theoretical investigation and empirical study on French data</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/03</td><td>J.-Y. FOURNIER<br>L'approximation du filtre passe-bande proposée par Christiano et Fitzgerald</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/04</td><td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 1999</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/05</td><td>B. CREPON - F. ROSENWALD<br>Investment et contraintes de financement : le poids du cycle</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/06</td><td>Une estimation sur données françaises<br>A. FLIPO<br>Les comportements matrimoniaux de fait</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/07</td><td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT<br>Microsimulations of the retirement decision: a supply side approach</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/08</td><td>C. AUDENS - C. PROST<br>Déficit conjoncturel : une prise en compte des conjonctures passées</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/09</td><td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT<br>Équivalent matrimonial de la rente et souscription de retraite complémentaire</td></tr></table>
G 2000/10 R. DUHAUTOIS

Ralentissement de l'investissement : petites ou grandes entreprises ? industrie ou tertiaire ?

G 2000/11 G. LAROQUE - B. SALANIÉ

Temps partiel féminin et incitatives financières à l'emploi

G2000/12 Ch. GIANELLA

Local unemployment and wages

G2000/13 B. CREPON - Th. HECKEL

- Informalisation en France : une évaluation à partir de données individuelles

- Computerization in France: an evaluation based on individual company data

G2001/01 F. LEQUILLER

- La nouvelle économie et la mesure de la croissance du PIB
- The new economy and the measure

- The new economy and the measure

G2001/02 S. AUDRIC

La reprise de la croissance de l'emploi profite-t-elle aussi aux non-riploèmes ?

G2001/03 I. BRAJUN-LEMAIRE

Évolution et répartition du surplus de productivité

G2001/04 A. BEAUDU - Th. HECKEL

Le canal du crédit fonctionne-t-il en Europe ? Une étude de l'hapérologie des comportements d'investissement à partir de données de bilan agrégées

G2001/05 C. AUDENIS - P. BISCOURP -

N. FOURCADE - O. LOISEL
Testing the augmented Solow growth model: An empirical reassessment using panel data

G2001/06 R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT
Départ à la retraite, irréversibilité et incertitude

G2001/07 B. CREPON - Ch. GIANELLA

Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2000
J. Ph. GAUDEMET
Les dispositifs d'acquisition à titre facultatif d'annuïtés viagères de retraite

G2001/08 B. CRÉPON - Ch. GIANELLA

Fiscalité, coût d'usage du capital et demande de facteurs : une analyse sur données individuelles

G2001/09 B. CRÉPON - Ch. GIANELLA

Fiscalité, coût d'usage du capital et demande de facteurs : une analyse sur données individuelles

G2001/10 B. CRÉPON - R. DESPLATZ

Évaluation des effets des dispositifs d'aliègements

de charges sociales sur les bas salaires

G2001/11 J.-Y. FOURNIER

Comparaison des salaires des secteurs public et privé

G2001/12 J.-P. BERTHIER - C. JAULENT

R. CONVENEVOLE - S. PISANI

Une méthodologie de comparaison entre consommations intermédiaires de source fiscale et de comptabilité nationale

G2001/13 P. BISCOURP - Ch. GIANELLA

Substitution and complementarity between capital, skilled and less skilled workers: an analysis at the firm level in the French manufacturing industry

G2001/14 I. ROBERT-BOBEE

Modelling demographic behaviours in the French

G2001/15 J.-P. ZOYEM

Diagnostic sur la pauvreté et calendrier de revenus : le cas du "Panel européen des ménages »

G2001/16 J.-Y. FOURNIER - P. GIVORD
La réduction des taux d'activité aux âges extrêmes, une spécificité française ?

G2001/17 C. AUDENIS - P. BISCOURP - N. RIEDINGER
Existe-t-il une asymétrie dans la transmission du prix du brut aux prix des carburants ?

G2001/02 F. MAGNIEN - J.-L. TAVERNIER - D. THESMAR
Les statistiques internationales de PIB par habitant en standard de pouvoir d'achat : une analyse des résultats

G2002/01 F. MAGNIEN - J.-L. TAVERNIER - D. THESMAR
Les statistiques internationales de PIB par habitant en standard de pouvoir d'achat : une analyse des résultats

G2002/02 B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET

La cessation d'activité au sein des couples : y a-t-il interdépendance des choix ?

G2002/04 G. BRILHAULT
- Rétrogradation des séries de FBCF et calcul du capital fixe en SEC-95 dans les comptes nationaux français

- Retropagation of the investment series (GCF) and estimation of fixed capital stocks on the ESA-95 basis for the French balance sheets

G2002/05 P. BISCOURP - B. CREPON - T. HECKEL - N. RIEDINGER
How do firms respond to cheaper computers? Microeconomique evidence for France based on a production function approach

G2002/06 C. AUDENIS - J. DEROYON - N. FOURCADE

L'impact des nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication sur l'économie française - un bouclage macro-économique

G2002/07 J. BARDAJI - B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET

Évaluation de trois réformes du Régime Général d'assurance vieillies à l'aide du modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE

G2002/08 J. BARDAJI - B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET

Résultats sur les différentes notons de volume dans les comptes nationaux : comptes aux prix d'une année fixe ou aux prix de l'année précédente, séries chaînées

G2002/09 J.-P. BERTHIER

Réflexions sur les différentes notons de volume dans les comptes nationaux : comptes aux prix d'une année fixe ou aux prix de l'année précédente, séries chaînées

G2002/09 F. HILD

Les soldes d'opinion résument-ils au mieux les réponses des entreprises aux enquêtes de conjoncture ?

G2002/10 I. ROBERT-BOBEE

Les comportements démographiques dans le modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE - Une comparaison des estimations issues des enquêtes Jeunes et Carrières 1997 et Histoire Famillelle 1999

G2002/11 J.-P. ZOYEM

La dynamique des bas revenus : une analyse des entrées-sorties de pauvreté

G2002/12 F. HILD

Prévisions d'inflation pour la France

G2002/13 M. LECLAIR

Réduction du temps de travail et tensions sur les facteurs de production

G2002/14 E. WALRAET - A. VINCENT

- Analyse de la redistribution intragénérationnelle dans le système de retraite des salariés du privé - Une approche par microsimulation - Intragenerational distributional analysis in the french private sector pension scheme - A microsimulation approach

G2002/15 P. CHONE - D. LE BLANC - I. ROBERT-BOBEE
Offre de travail féminine et garde des jeunes enfants

G2002/16 F. MAUREL - S. GREGOIR

Les indices de compétitivité des pays : inter-prétation et limites

G2003/01 N. RIEDINGER - E. HAUVY

Le coût de dépollution atmosphérique pour les entreprises françaises: Une estimation à partir de données individuelles

G2003/02 P. BISCOURP et F. KRAMARZ

Création d'emplois, destruction d'emplois et internationalisation des entreprises industrielles françaises : une analyse sur la période 1986-1992

G2003/03 Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2002

G2003/04 P.-O. BEFFY - J. DEROYON - N. FOURCADE - S. GREGOIR - N. LAIB - B. MONFORT

Évolutions démographiques et croissance : une projection macro-économique à l'horizon 2020
P. AUBERT
La situation des salariés de plus de cinquante ans dans le secteur privé

G2003/05 P. AUBERT
Age, salaire et productivité

G2003/06 La productivité des salariés décline-t-elle en fin de carrière ?

G2003/07 H. BARON - P.O. BEFFY - N. FOURCADE - R. MAHEU
Le renforcement de la productivité du travail au cours des années 1990

G2003/08 P. O. BEFFY - B. MONFORT
Patrimoine des ménages, dynamique d'allocation et comportement de consommation

G2003/09 P. BISCOURP - N. FOURCADE

Peut-on mettre en évidence l'existence de rigidités à la baisse des salaires à partir de données individuelles ? Le cas de la France à la fin des années 90

G2003/10 M. LECLAIR - P. PETIT

Présence syndicale dans les firmes : quel impact sur les inégalités salariales entre les hommes et les femmes ?

G2003/11 P. O. BEFFY - X. BONNET - M. DARRACO-PARIES - B. MONFORT
P. AUBERT - M. LECLAIR
La compétitivité exprimée dans les enquêtes trimestrales sur la situation et les perspectives dans l'industrie

G2003/11 P. O. BEFFY - X. BONNET - M. DARRACO-PARIES - B. MONFORT
M. LECLAIR - M. LECLAIR
La compétitivité exprimée dans les enquêtes trimestrales sur la situation et les perspectives dans l'industrie

G2004/01 P. AUBERT - M. LECLAIR
La compétitivité exprimée dans les enquêtes trimestrales sur la situation et les perspectives dans l'industrie

G2004/02 M. DUÈE - C. REBILLARD

La dépendance des personnes âgées : une projection à long terme

G2004/03 S. RASPILLER - N. RIEDINGER

Régulation environnementale et choix de localisation des groupes français

G2004/04 A. NABOULET - S. RASPILLER

Les déterminants de la décision d'investir: une approche par les perceptions subjectives des firmes

G2004/05 N. RAGACHE

La déclaration des enfants par les couples non mariés est-elle fiscalement optimale ?

G2004/06 M. DUÈE

L'impact du chômage des parents sur le devenir scolaire des enfants

G2004/07 P. AUBERT - E. CAROLI - M. ROGER
New Technologies, Workplace Organisation and the Age Structure of the Workforce: Firm-Level Evidence

G2004/08 E. DUGUET - C. LELARGE

Les brevets acquis-ils les incitations privées à innover ? Un examen microéconométique

G2004/09 S. RASPILLER - P. SILLARD

Affiliating versus Subcontracting: the Case of Multinationals

G2004/10 J. BOISSINOT - C. L'ANGEVIN - B. MONFORT
Public Debt Sustainability: Some Results on the French Case

G2004/11 S. ANANIAN - P. AUBERT

Travailleurs âgés, nouvelles technologies et changements organisationalistes : un réexamen à partir de l'enquête « REPONSE »

G2004/12 X. BONNET - H. PONCET

Structures de revenus et propensions différentes à consommer - Vers une équation de consommation des ménages plus robuste en prévision pour la France

G2004/13 C. PICART

Évaluer la rentabilité des sociétés non financières

G2004/14 J. BARDAJI - B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET
Les retraites du secteur public: projections à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE

G2005/01 S. BUFFETEAU - P. GODEFROY

Conditions de départ en retraite selon l'âge de fin d'études: analyse prospective pour les générations 1945 à 1974

G2005/02 C. AFSA - S. BUFFETEAU

L'évolution de l'activité féminine en France : une approche par pseudo-panel

G2005/03 P. AUBERT - P. SILLARD

Délocalisations et réductions d'effectifs dans l'industrie française

G2005/04 M. LECLAIR - S. ROUX
Mesure et utilisation des emplois instables dans les entreprises

G2005/05 C. L'ANGEVIN - S. SERRAVALLE

Performances à l'exportation de la France
<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/06</td>
    <td>Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Economiques - 2004</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/07</td>
    <td>S. RASPILLER<br/>La concurrence fiscale : principaux enseignements de l'analyse économique</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/08</td>
    <td>C. L'ANGEVIN - N. LAIB<br/>Éducation et croissance en France et dans un panel de 21 pays de l'OCDE</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/09</td>
    <td>N. FERRARI<br/>Prévoir l'investissement des entreprises<br/>Un indicateur des révisions dans l'enquête de conjoncture sur les investissements dans l'industrie.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/10</td>
    <td>P.O. BEFFY - C. L'ANGEVIN<br/>Chromage et boucle prix-salaires :<br/>apport d'un modèle « qualifiés/peu qualifiés »</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/11</td>
    <td>B. HEITZ<br/>A two-states Markov-switching model of inflation in France and the USA: credible target VS inflation spiral</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/12</td>
    <td>O. BIAU - H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - N. FERRARI<br/>Réponses individuelles aux enjuvés de conjoncture et prévision macroéconomiques :<br/>Exemple de la prévision de la production<br/>manufacture</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/13</td>
    <td>P. AUBERT - D. BLANCHET - D. BLAU<br/>The labour market after 50: some elements of a Franco-American comparison</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/14</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET - T. DEBRAND -<br/>P. DOUGRON - P. POLLET<br/>L'enquête SHARE : présentation et premiers résultats de l'édition française</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/15</td>
    <td>M. DUÉE<br/>La modélisation des comportements démographiques dans le modèle de microsimulation<br/>DESTINE</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/16</td>
    <td>H. RAOUI - S. ROUX<br/>Étude de simulation sur la participation versée aux salaires par les entreprises</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/01</td>
    <td>C. BONNET - S. BUFFETEAU - P. GODEFROY<br/>Disparités de retraite de droit direct entre hommes et femmes : quelles évolutions ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/02</td>
    <td>C. PICART<br/>Les gazelles en France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/03</td>
    <td>P. AUBERT - B. CRÉPON - P. ZAMORA<br/>Le rendement apparent de la formation continue dans les entreprises : effets sur la productivité et les salaires</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/04</td>
    <td>J.-F. OUVRARD - R. RATHELOT<br/>Demographic change and unemployment:<br/>what do macroeconomic models predict?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/05</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET - J.-F. OUVRARD<br/>Indicateurs d'engagements implicites des systèmes de retraite : chiffrages, propriétés analytiques et reactions à des chocs démographiques types</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/06</td>
    <td>G. BIAU - O. BIAU - L. ROUVIERE<br/>Nonparametric Forecasting of the Manufacturing Output Growth with Firm-level Survey Data</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/07</td>
    <td>C. AFSA - P. GIVORD<br/>Le rôle des conditions de travail dans les absences pour maladie</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/08</td>
    <td>P. SILLARD - C. L'ANGEVIN - S. SERRAVALLE<br/>Performances comparées à l'exportation de la France et de ses principaux partenaires<br/>Une analyse structurelle sur 12 ans</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/09</td>
    <td>X. BOUTIN - S. QUANTIN<br/>Une méthodologie d'évaluation comptable du coût du capital des entreprises françaises : 1984-2002</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/10</td>
    <td>C. AFSA<br/>L'estimation d'un coût implicite de la pénibilité du travail chez les travailleurs âgés</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/11</td>
    <td>C. LELARGE<br/>Les entreprises (industrielles) françaises sont-elles à la frontière technologique ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/12</td>
    <td>O. BIAU - N. FERRARI<br/>Théorie de l'opinion<br/>Faut-il pondérer les réponses individuelles ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/13</td>
    <td>A. KOUBI - S. ROUX<br/>Une réinterprétation de la relation entre productivité et inégalités salariales dans les entreprises</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/14</td>
    <td>R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD<br/>The impact of local taxes on plants location decision</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/15</td>
    <td>L. GONZALEZ - C. PICART<br/>Diversification, recensement et poids des activités de support dans les groupes (1995-2000)</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/01</td>
    <td>D. SRAER<br/>Allegements de cotisations patronales et dynamique salariale</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/02</td>
    <td>V. ALBOUY - L. LEQUIEN<br/>Les rendements non monétaires de l'éducation : le cas de la santé</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/03</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET - T. DEBRAND<br/>Aspiration à la retraite, santé et satisfaction au travail : une comparaison européenne</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/04</td>
    <td>M. BARLET - L. CRUSSON<br/>Quel impact des variations du prix du pétrole sur la croissance française ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/05</td>
    <td>C. PICART<br/>Flux d'emploi et de main-d'œuvre en France : un réexamen</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/06</td>
    <td>V. ALBOUY - C. TAVAN<br/>Massification et démocratisation de l'enseignement supérieur en France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/07</td>
    <td>T. LE BARBANCHON<br/>The Changing response to oil price shocks in France, a DSGE type approach</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/08</td>
    <td>T. CHANEY - D. SRAER - D. THESMAR<br/>Collateral Value and Corporate Investment<br/>Evidence from the French Real Estate Market</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/09</td>
    <td>J. BOISSINOT<br/>Consumption over the Life Cycle: Facts for France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/10</td>
    <td>C. AFSA<br/>Interpréter les variables de satisfaction : l'exemple de la durée du travail</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/11</td>
    <td>R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD<br/>Zones Franches Urbaines : quels effets sur l'emploi salarié et les créations d'établissements ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/12</td>
    <td>V. ALBOUY - B. CRÉPON<br/>Aléa moral en santé : une évaluation dans le cadre du modèle causal de Rubin</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/01</td>
    <td>C. PICART<br/>Les PME françaises : rentables mais peu dynamiques</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/02</td>
    <td>P. BISCOURP - X. BOUTIN - T. VERGÉ<br/>The Effects of Retail Regulations on Prices Evidence form the Loi Galland</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/03</td>
    <td>Y. BARBESOL - A. BRIANT<br/>Économies d'agglomération et productivité des entreprises : estimation sur données individuelles françaises</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/04</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET - F. LE GALLO<br/>Les projections démographiques : principaux mécanismes et retour sur l'expérience française</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/05</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET - F. TOUTLEMONDE<br/>Évolutions démographiques et deformation du cycle de vie active : quelles relations ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/06</td>
    <td>M. BARLET - D. BLANCHET - L. CRUSSON<br/>Internationalisation et flux d'emplois : que d'une approche comptable ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/07</td>
    <td>C. LELARGE - D. SRAER - D. THESMAR<br/>Entrepreneurship and Credit Constraints - Evidence from a French Loan Guarantee Program</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/08</td>
    <td>X. BOUTIN - L. JANIN<br/>Are Prices Really Affected by Mergers?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/09</td>
    <td>M. BARLET - A. BRIANT - L. CRUSSON<br/>Concentration géographique dans l'industrie manufacturière et dans les services en France : une approche par un indicateur en continu</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/10</td>
    <td>M. BEFFY - É. COUDIN - R. RATHELOT<br/>Who is confronted to insecure labor market histories? Some evidence based on the French labor market transition</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/11</td>
    <td>M. ROGER - E. WALRAET<br/>Social Security and Well-Being of the Elderly: the Case of France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/12</td>
    <td>C. AFSA<br/>Analyser les composantes du bien-être et de son évolution<br/>Une approche empirique sur données individuelles</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/13</td>
    <td>M. BARLET - D. BLANCHET - T. LE BARBANCHON<br/>Microsimumer le marché du travail : un prototype</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/01</td>
    <td>P.-A. PIONNIER<br/>Le partage de la valeur ajoutée en France, 1949-2007</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/02</td>
    <td>Laurent CLAVEL - Christelle MINODIER<br/>A Monthly Indicator of the French Business Climate</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/03</td>
    <td>H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - C. MINODIER<br/>Do Business Tendency Surveys in Industry and Services Help in Forecasting GDP Growth?<br/>A Real-Time Analysis on French Data</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/04</td>
    <td>P. GIVORD - L. WILNER<br/>Les contrats temporaires : trappe ou marchéied vers l'emploi stable ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/05</td>
    <td>G. LALANNE - P.-A. PIONNIER - O. SIMON<br/>Le partage des fruits de la croissance de 1950 à 2008: une approche par les comptes de surplus</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/06</td>
    <td>L. DAVEZIES - X. D'HAULTFOUEUILLE<br/>Faut-il pondérer ?... Ou l'éternelle question de l'économètre confronté à des données d'enquête</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/07</td>
    <td>S. QUANTIN - S. RASPILLER - S. SERRAVALLE<br/>Commerce intragroupe, fiscalité et prix de transferts: une analyse sur données françaises</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/08</td>
    <td>M. CLERC - V. MARCUS<br/>Élastiques-prix des consommations énergétiques des ménages</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/09</td>
    <td>G. LALANNE - E. POULIQUEN - O. SIMON<br/>Prix du pétrole et croissance potentielle à long terme</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/10</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET - J. LE CACHEUX - V. MARCUS<br/>Adjusted net savings and other approaches to sustainability: some theoretical background</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/11</td>
    <td>V. BELAMY - G. CONSALES - M. FESSEAU - S. LE LAIDÉ - É. RAYNAUD<br/>Une décomposition du compte des ménages de la comptabilité nationale par catégorie de ménage en 2003</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/12</td>
    <td>J. BARDAJI - F. TALLET<br/>Detecting Economic Regimes in France: a Qualitative Markov-Switching Indicator Using Mixed Frequency Data</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/13</td>
    <td>R. AEBERHARDT - D. FOUGÈRE - R. RATHELOT<br/>Discrimination à l'embauche: comment exploiter les procédures de testing?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/14</td>
    <td>Y. BARBESOL - P. GIVORD - S. QUANTIN<br/>Partage de la valeur ajoutée, approche par données microéconomiques</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/15</td>
    <td>I. BUONO - G. LALANNE<br/>The Effect of the Uruguay round on the Intensive and Extensive Margins of Trade</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2010/01</td>
    <td>C. MINODIER<br/>Avantages comparés des séries des premières valeurs publiées et des séries des valeurs révisées - Un exercice de prévision en temps réel<br/>de la croissance trimestrielle du PIB en France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2010/02</td>
    <td>V. ALBOUY - L. DAVEZIES - T. DEBRAND<br/>Health Expenditure Models: a Comparison of Five Specifications using Panel Data</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2010/03</td>
    <td>C. KLEIN - O. SIMON<br/>Le modèle MÉSANGE réestimé en base 2000<br/>Tome 1 - Version avec volumes à prix constants</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2010/04</td>
    <td>M. É. CLERC - É. COUDIN<br/>L'IPC, miroir de l'évolution du coût de la vie en France ? Ce qu'apporte l'analyse des courbes d'Engel</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2010/05</td>
    <td>N. CECI-RENAUD - P.-A. CHEVALIER<br/>Les seuils de 10, 20 et 50 salariés : impact sur la taille des entreprises françaises</td>
  </tr>
</table>
G2010/06

National Origin Differences in Wages and Hierarchical Positions - Evidence on French Full-Time Male Workers from a matched Employer-Employee Dataset

G2010/07

S. BLASCO - P. GIVORD
Les trajectoires professionnelles en début de vie active : quel impact des contrats temporaires ?

G2010/08

P. GIVORD
Méthodes éconétriques pour l'évaluation de politiques publiques

G2010/09

P.-Y. CABANNES - V. LAPÈGUE - E. POULIQUEN - M. BEFFY - M. GAINI
Quelle croissance de moyen terme après la crise ?

G2010/10

I. BUONO - G. LALANNE
La réaction des entreprises françaises à la baisse des tarifs douaniers étrangers

G2010/11

R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
L'apport des méthodes à noyaux pour mesurer la concentration géographique - Application à la concentration des immigres en France de 1968 à 1999

G2010/12

M. BARATON - M. BEFFY - D. FOUGÈRE
Une évaluation de l'effet de la réforme de 2003 sur les départs en retraite - Le cas des enseignants du second degré public

G2010/13

D. BLANCHET - S. BUFFETEAU - E. CRENNER
S. LE MINEZ
Le modèle de microsimulation Destinie 2 : principales caractéristiques et premiers résultats

G2010/14

D. BLANCHET - E. CRENNER
Le bloc retraites du modèle Destinie 2 : guide de l'utilisateur

G2010/15

M. BARLET - L. CRUSSON - S. DUPUCH - F. PUECH
Des services échangés aux services échangeables : une application sur données françaises

G2010/16

M. BEFFY - T. KAMIONKA
Public-privée wage gaps : is civil-servant human capital sector-specific?

G2010/17

P.-Y. CABANNES - H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - G. LALANNE - O. MONSO - E. POULIQUEN
Le modèle Mésange réestimé en base 2000

G2010/18

R. AEBERHARDT - L. DAVEZIES
Tome 2 - Version avec volumes à prix chaînes between the Static and Dynamic Cases

G2011/01

T. LE BARBANCHON - B. OURLIAC - O. SIMON
Les marchés du travail français et américain face aux chocs conjonctuels des années 1986 à 2007 : une modélisation DSGE

G2011/02

C. MARBOT
Une évaluation de la réduction d'impôt pour l'emploi des salariés à domicile

G2011/03

L. DAVEZIES
Modeles à effets fixes, à effets aléatoires, modeles mixtes ou multi-niveaux : propriétés et mises en œuvre des modélisations de l'hétérogénéité dans le cas de données groupées

G2011/04

M. ROGER - M. WASMER
Heterogeneity matters : labour productivity differentiated by age and skills

G2011/05

J.-C. BRICONGNE - J.-M. FOURNIER
V. LAPÈGUE - O. MONSO
De la crise financière à la crise économique L'impact des perturbations financières de 2007 et 2008 sur la croissance de sept pays industrialisés

G2011/06

P. CHARNOZ - É. COUDIN - M. GAINI
Wage inequalities in France 1976-2004: a quantile regression analysis

G2011/07

M. CLERC - M. GAINI - D. BLANCHET
Recommendations of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report: A few illustrations

G2011/08

M. BACHELET - M. BEFFY - D. BLANCHET
Projet l'impact des réformes des retraites sur l'activité des 55 ans et plus : une comparaison de trol modèles

G2011/09

C. LOUVOT-RUNAVOT
L'évaluation de l'activité dissimulée des entreprises sur la base des contrôles fiscaux et son insertion dans les complexes nationaux

G2011/10

A. SCHREIBER - A. VICARD
La terlisation de l'économie française et le ralentissement de la productivité entre 1978 et 2008

G2011/11

M.-É. CLERC - O. MONSO - E. POULIQUEN
Les inégalités entre générations depuis le baby-boom

G2011/12

C. MARBOT - D. ROY
C. MARBOT - D. ROY
Évaluation de la transformation de la réduction d'impôt en crédit d'impôt pour l'emploi de salariés à domicile en 2007

G2011/13

P. GIVORD - R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
Place-based tax exemptions and displacement effects: An evaluation of the Zones Franches Urbaines program

G2011/14

X. D'HAULT-FOUEUILLE - P. GIVORD - X. BOUTIN
The Environmental Effect of Green Taxation: the Case of the French "Bonus/Malus"

G2011/15

M. BARLET - M. CLERC - M. GARNEO - V. LAPÈGUE - V. MARCUS
La nouvelle version du modèle MZE, modèle macroéconométrique pour la zone euro

G2011/16

R. AEBERHARDT - I. BUONO - H. FADINGER
Learning, Incomplete Contracts and Export Dynamics: Theory and Evidence form French Firms

G2011/17

C. KERDRAIN - V. LAPÈGUE
Restrictive Fiscal Policies in Europe: What are the Fiscal Effects?

G2012/01

P. GIVORD - S. QUANTIN - C. TREVIE
A Long-Term Evaluation of the First Generation of the French Urban Enterprise Zones

G2012/02

N. CECI-RENAUD - V. COTTET
Politique salariale et performance des entreprises

G2012/03

P. FEVRIER - L. WILNER
Do Consumers Correctly Expect Price Reductions? Testing Dynamic Behavior

G2012/04

M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD
School as a shelter? School leaving-age and the business cycle in France

G2012/05

M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD
A scarred generation? French evidence on young people entering into a tough labour market

G2012/06

P. AUBERT - M. BACHELET
Disparities de montant de pension et redistribution dans le système de retraite français

G2012/07

R. AEBERHARDT - P. GIVORD - C. MARBOT
Spillover Effect of the Minimum Wage in France: An Unconditional Quantile Regression Approach

G2012/08

A. EIDELMAN - F. LANGUIMIER - A. VICARD
Prélevements obligatoires reposant sur les menages : des canaux redistributifs différents en 1990 et 2010

G2012/09

O. BARGAIN - A. VICARD
Le RMI et son successeur le RSA décuragent-ils certains jeunes de travailer ? Une analyse sur les jeunes autour de 25 ans

G2012/10

C. MARBOT - D. ROY
Projections du coût de l'APA et des caractéristiques de ses bénéficiaires à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle Destine

G2012/11

A. MAUROUX
Le crédit d'impôt dédié au développement durable : une évaluation éconétrique

G2012/12

V. COTTET - S. QUANTIN - V. RÉGNIER
Coût du travail et allégements de charges : une estimation au niveau établissement de 1996 à 2008

G2012/13

X. D'HAULT-FOUEUILLE - P. FEVRIER - L. WILNER
Demand Estimation in the Presence of Revenue Management

G2012/14

D. BLANCHET - S. LE MINEZ
Joint macro/micro evaluations of accrued-to-date pension liabilities: an application to French reforms

G2013/01- F1301

T. DEROYON - A. MONTAUT - P-A PIONNIER
Utilisation rétrospective de l'enquête Emploi à une fréquence mensuelle : apport d'une modélisation espace-étab

G2013/02- F1302

C. TREVIEN
Haber en HLM : quel avantage monétaire et quel impact sur les conditions de logement ?

G2013/03

A. POISSONNIER
Temporal disaggregation of stock variables - The Chow-Lin method extended to dynamic models

G2013/04

P. GIVORD - C. MARBOT
Does the cost of child care affect female labor market participation? An evaluation of a French reform of childcare subsidies

G2013/05

G. LAME - M. LEQUIEN - P-A. PIONNIER
Interpretation and limits of sustainability tests in public finance

G2013/06

C. BELLEGO - V. DORTET-BERNADET
La participation aux pôles de compétitivité : quelle incidence sur les dépenses de R&D et l'activité des PME et ETI ?

G2012/04

M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD
School as a shelter? School leaving-age and the business cycle in France

G2012/05

M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD
A scarred generation? French evidence on young people entering into a tough labour market

G2012/06

P. AUBERT - M. BACHELET
Disparitions de montant de pension et redistribution dans le système de retraite français

G2012/07

R. AEBERHARDT - P. GIVORD - C. MARBOT
Spillover Effect of the Minimum Wage in France: An Unconditional Quantile Regression Approach

G2012/08

A. EIDELMAN - F. LANGUIMIER - A. VICARD
Prélevements obligatoires reposant sur les menages : des canaux redistributifs différents en 1990 et 2010

G2012/09

O. BARGAIN - A. VICARD
Le RMI et son successeur le RSA décuragent-ils certains jeunes de travailer ? Une analyse sur les jeunes autour de 25 ans

G2012/10

C. MARBOT - D. ROY
Projections du coût de l'APA et des caractéristiques de ses bénéficiaires à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle Destine

G2012/11

A. MAUROUX
Le crédit d'impôt dédié au développement durable : une évaluation éconétrique

G2012/12

V. COTTET - S. QUANTIN - V. RÉGNIER
Coût du travail et allégements de charges : une estimation au niveau établissement de 1996 à 2008

G2012/13

X. D'HAULT-FOUEUILLE - P. FEVRIER - L. WILNER
Demand Estimation in the Presence of Revenue Management

G2012/14

D. BLANCHET - S. LE MINEZ
Joint macro/micro evaluations of accrued-to-date pension liabilities: an application to French reforms

G2013/01- F1301

T. DEROYON - A. MONTAUT - P-A PIONNIER
Utilisation rétrospective de l'enquête Emploi à une fréquence mensuelle : apport d'une modélisation espace-étab

G2013/02- F1302

C. TREVIEN
Haber en HLM : quel avantage monétaire et quel impact sur les conditions de logement ?

G2013/03

A. POISSONNIER
Temporal disaggregation of stock variables - The Chow-Lin method extended to dynamic models

G2013/04

P. GIVORD - C. MARBOT
Does the cost of child care affect female labor market participation? An evaluation of a French reform of childcare subsidies

G2013/05

G. LAME - M. LEQUIEN - P-A. PIONNIER
Interpretation and limits of sustainability tests in public finance

G2013/06

C. BELLEGO - V. DORTET-BERNADET
La participation aux pôles de compétitivité : quelle incidence sur les dépenses de R&D et l'activité des PME et ETI ?

G2013/07

P.-Y. CABANNES - A. MONTAUT - P-A. PIONNIER
Évaluer la productivité globale des facteurs en France : l'apport d'une mesure de la qualité du capital et du travail

G2013/08

R. AEBERHARDT - C. MARBOT
Evolution of instability in the French Labour Market During the Last Thirty Years

G2013/09

J.-B. BERNARD - G. CLÉAUD
Oil price: the nature of the shocks and the impact on the French economy

G2013/10

G. LAME
Was there a « Greenspan Conundrum » in the Euro area?

G2013/11

C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY
Natural Disasters: Exposure and Underinsurance

G2013/12

G. BARGAIN - A. VICARD
Le RMI et son successeur le RSA décuragent-ils certains jeunes de travailer ? Une analyse sur les jeunes autour de 25 ans

G2013/13

C. MARBOT - D. ROY
Projections du coût de l'APA et des caractéristiques de ses bénéficiaires à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle Destine

G2013/14

A. MAUROUX
Le crédit d'impôt dédié au développement durable : une évaluation éconétrique

G2013/15

V. COTTET - S. QUANTIN - V. RÉGNIER
Coût du travail et allégements de charges : une estimation au niveau établissement de 1996 à 2008

G2014/01

X. D'HAULT-FOUEUILLE - P. FEVRIER - L. WILNER
Demand Estimation in the Presence of Revenue Management

G2014/02

D. BLANCHET - S. LE MINEZ
Joint macro/micro evaluations of accrued-to-date pension liabilities: an application to French reforms

G2014/03

G. CECI-RENAUD - P. CHARNOZ - M. GAINI
Evolution of the volatilité des revenus salariaux du secteur privé en France depuis 1968

G2014/04

G. CECI-RENAUD - P. CHARNOZ - M. GAINI
Evolution of the volatilité des revenus salariaux du secteur privé en France depuis 1968

G2014/05

C. TREVIEN
Haber en HLM : quel avantage monétaire et quel impact sur les conditions de logement ?

G2014/06

A. POISSONNIER
Temporal disaggregation of stock variables - The Chow-Lin method extended to dynamic models

G2014/07

P. GIVORD - C. MARBOT
Does the cost of child care affect female labor market participation? An evaluation of a French reform of childcare subsidies

G2014/08

G. LAME - M. LEQUIEN - P-A. PIONNIER
Interpretation and limits of sustainability tests in public finance

G2014/09

C. BELLEGO - V. DORTET-BERNADET
La participation aux pôles de compétitivité : quelle incidence sur les dépenses de R&D et l'activité des PME et ETI ?
<table><tr><td>G2014/10</td><td>B. GARBINTI - P. LAMARCHE<br>Les hauts revenus epargnent-ile davantage ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/11</td><td>D. AUDENAERT - J. BARDAJI - R. LARDEUX -<br>M. ORAND - M. SICNIC<br>Wage Resilience in France since the Great<br>Recession</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/12</td><td>F. ARNAUL - J. BOUSSARD - A. POISSONNIER -<br>H. SOAL<br>Computing additive contributions to growth and<br>other issues for chain-linked quarterly<br>aggregates</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/13</td><td>H. FRAISSE - F. KRAMARZ - C. PROST<br>Labor Disputes and Job Flows</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/14</td><td>P. GIVORD - C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY<br>- H. NAEGELE<br>How does fuel taxation impact new car<br>purchases? An evaluation using French<br>consumer-level dataset</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/15</td><td>P. AUBERT - S. RABATÉ<br>Durée passée en carrière et durée de vie en<br>retraite : quel partage des gains d'éspérance de<br>vie ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/01</td><td>A. POISSONNIER<br>The walking dead Euler equation<br>Addressing a challenge to monetary policy<br>models</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/02</td><td>Y. DUBOIS - A. MARINO<br>Indicateurs de rendement du système de retraite<br>français</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/03</td><td>T. MAYER - C. TREVIEN<br>The impacts of Urban Public Transportation:<br>Evidence from the Paris Region</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/04</td><td>S.T. LY - A. RIEGERT<br>Measuring Social Environment Mobility</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/05</td><td>M. A. BEN HALINA - V. HYAFIL-SOLELHAC<br>M. KOUBI - C. REGAERT<br>Quel est l'impact du système d'indemnisation<br>maladie sur la durée des arrêts de travail pour<br>maladie ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/06</td><td>Y. DUBOIS - A. MARINO<br>Disparités de rendement du système de retraite<br>dans le secteur privé, approches intergénéra-<br>tionnelle et intragénérationnelle</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/07</td><td>B. CAMPAGNE - V. ALHENC-GELAS -<br>J.-B. BERNARD<br>No evidence of financial accelerator in France</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/08</td><td>Q. LAFFÉTER - M. PAK<br>Élasticités des recettes fiscales au cycle<br>économique : étude de trois impôts sur la<br>période 1979-2013 en France</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/09</td><td>J.-M. DUASSIN-BENICHOU, S. IDMACHICHE,<br>A. LEDUC et E. POULIQUEN<br>Les déterminants de l'attractivité de la fonction<br>publique de l'État</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/10</td><td>P. AUBERT<br>La modulation du montant de pension selon la<br>durée de carrière et l'âge de la retraite : quelles<br>disparités entre assurés ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/11</td><td>V. DORTET-BERNADET - M. SICNIC<br>Effet des aides publiques sur l'emploi en R&D<br>dans les petites entreprises</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2015/12</td><td>S. GEORGES-KOT<br>Annual and lifetime incidence of the value-added<br>tax in France</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/13</td><td>M. POULHÈS<br>Are Enterprise Zones Benefits Capitalized into<br>Commercial Property Values? The French Case</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/14</td><td>J.-B. BERNARD - Q. LAFFÉTER<br>Effet d'activité et prix sur le revenu salarial<br>des différentes catégories socioprofessionnelles</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/15</td><td>C. GEAY - M. KOUBI - G de LAGASNERIE<br>Projections des dépenses de soins de ville,<br>construction d'un module pour Destinie</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/16</td><td>J. BARDAJI - J.-C. BRICONGNE -<br>B. CAMPAGNE - G. GAULIER<br>Compared performances of French companies<br>on the domestic and foreign markets</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/17</td><td>C. BELLÉGO - R. DE NUJ<br>The redistributive effect of online piracy on the<br>box office performance of American movies in<br>foreign markets</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/18</td><td>J.-B. BERNARD - L. BERTHET<br>French households financial wealth: which<br>changes in 20 years?</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/19</td><td>M. POULHÈS<br>Fenêtre sur Cour ou Chambre avec Vue ?<br>Les prix hédoniques de l'immobilier parisien</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/01</td><td>B. GARBINTI - S. GEORGES-KOT<br>Time to smell the roses? Risk aversion, the<br>timing of inheritance receipt, and retirement</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/02</td><td>P. CHARNOZ - C. LELARGE - C. TREVIEN<br>Communication Costs and the Internal<br>Organization of Multi-Plant Businesses: Evidence<br>from the Impact of the French High-Speed Rail</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/03</td><td>C. BONNET - B. GARBINTI - A. SOLAZ<br>C. Gender inequality after Divorce: The Flip Side of<br>Marital Specialization - Evidence from a French<br>Administrative Database</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/04</td><td>D. BLANCHET - E. CAROLI - C. PROST -<br>M. ROGER<br>Health capacity to work at older ages in France</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/05</td><td>B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER<br>MELEZE: A DSGE model for France within the<br>Euro Area</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/06</td><td>B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER<br>Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from<br>Mélèze model</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/07</td><td>B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER<br>Structural reforms in DSGE models: a case for<br>sensitivity analyses</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/08</td><td>Y. DUBOIS et M. KOUBI<br>Relevement de l'âge de départ à la retraite : quel<br>impact sur l'activité des seniors de la réforme des<br>retraites de 2010 ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/09</td><td>A. NAQUAS - M. ORAND - I. SLIMANI HOUTI<br>Les entreprises employant des salaires au Smic:<br>quelles caractéristiques et quelle rentabilité ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/10</td><td>T. BLANCHET - Y. DUBOIS - A. MARINO -<br>M. ROGER<br>Patrimoine privé et retraite en France</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/11</td><td>M. PAK - A. POISSONNIER<br>Accounting for technology, trade and final</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2017/01</td><td>D. FOUGÈRE - E. GAUTIER - S. ROUX<br>Understanding Wage Floor Setting in Industry-<br>Level Agreements: Evidence from France</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/02</td><td>Y. DUBOIS - M. KOUBI<br>Regles d'indexation des pensions et sensibilité<br>des dépenses de retraites à la croissance<br>économique et aux chocs démographiques</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/03</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ - F. GODET<br>L'éspérance de vie en retraite sans incapacité<br>sèvère des générations nées entre 1960 et<br>1990 : une projection à partir du modèle Destinie</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/04</td><td>J. BARDAJI - B. CAMPAGNE -<br>M.-B. KHDER - Q. LAFFÉTER - O. SIMON<br>(Insee)<br>A-S) DUFERNEZ - C. ELEZAAR -<br>P. LEBLANC - E. MASSON -<br>H. PARTOUCHE (DG-Trésor)<br>Le modèle macroéconométrique Mésange :<br>rés estimation et nouveautés</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/05</td><td>J. BOUSSARD - B. CAMPAGNE<br>Fiscal Policy Coordination in a Monetary<br>Union at the Zero-Lower-Bound</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/06</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ -<br>A. GODZINSKI<br>Effects of the one-day waiting period for sick<br>leave on health-related absences in the<br>French central civil service</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/07</td><td>P. CHARNOZ - M. ORAND<br>Qualification, prog ress technique et marchés<br>du travail locaux en France, 1990-2011</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/08</td><td>K. MILIN<br>Modélisation de l'inflation en France par une<br>approche macrosectorielle</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/09</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER - R. LARDEUX<br>Homeownership and labor market outcomes:<br>disentangling externality and composition<br>effects</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/10</td><td>P. BEAUMONT<br>Time is Money: Cash-Flow Risk and Export<br>Market Behavior</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/01</td><td>S. ROUX - F. SAVIGNAC<br>SMES' financing: Divergence across Euro<br>area countries?</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/02</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER - A. LUCIANI<br>Computerization, labor productivity and<br>employment: impacts across industries vary<br>with technological level</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/03</td><td>R. MONIN - M. SUAREZ CASTILLO<br>L'effet du CICE sur les prix : une double<br>analyse sur données sectorielles et<br>individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/04</td><td>R. LARDEUX<br>Who Understands The French Income Tax?<br>Bunching Where Tax Liabilities Start</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2018/05</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER<br>Financial constraints of innovative firms and<br>sectoral growth</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/06</td><td>R. S.-H. LEE - M. PAK<br>Pro-competitive effects of globalisation on<br>prices, productivity and markups: Evidence<br>in the Euro Area</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/07</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER<br>Consumption inequality in France between<br>1995 and 2011</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/08</td><td>A. BAUER - B. GARBINTI -<br>S. GEORGES-KOT<br>Financial Constraints and Self-Employment<br>in France, 1945-2014</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/09</td><td>P. BEAUMONT - A. LUCIANI<br>Prime à l'embauche dans les PME :<br>évaluation à partir des déclarations<br>d'embauche</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/10</td><td>C. BELLÉGO - V. DORTET-BERNADET -<br>M. TÉPAUT<br>Collaboration de deux dispositifs d'aide à la<br>R&D collaborative public-privé</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/11</td><td>R. MONIN - M. SUAREZ CASTILLO<br>Replication et rapprochement des travaux<br>d'évaluation du effet du CICE sur l'emploi<br>en 2013 et 2014</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/12</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ - F. GODET -<br>V. LIN<br>L'introduction d'un gradient social dans la<br>maltrité au sein du modèle Destinie 2</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/01</td><td>M. ANDRÉ - A.-L. BIOTTEAU<br>Effets de moyen terme d'une hausse de TVA<br>sur le niveau de vie et les inégalités : une<br>approche par microsimulation</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/02</td><td>A. BOURGEOIS - A. BRIAND<br>Le modèle Avionic : la modélisation<br>Input/Output des comptes nationaux</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/03</td><td>A. GODZINSKI - M. SUAREZ CASTILLO<br>Short-term health effects of public transport<br>disruptions: air pollution and viral spread<br>channels</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/04<br>F1903</td><td>L. AEBERHARDT - F. HATIER -<br>M. LECLAIR - B. PENTINAT - J.-D. ZAFAR<br>L'économie numérique fausse-t-elle le<br>partage volume-prix du PIB?</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/05</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ - E. YILMAZ<br>Dans quelle mesure les incitations tarifaires<br>et la procédure de mise sous accord<br>préalable ont-elles contribué au<br>développement du chirurgie ambulatoire?</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/06</td><td>J.-P. CLING - S. EGHBAL-TEHERANI -<br>M. ORZONI - C. PLATEAU<br>The Differences between EU Countries for<br>Sustainable Development Indicators:<br>It is (mainly) the Economy!</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/07</td><td>P. CHONÉ - L. WILNER<br>Competition on Unobserved Attributes: The<br>Case of the Hospital Industry</td></tr></table>
G2019/08 P. PORA - L. WILNER
Child Penalties and Financial Incentives: Exploiting Variation along the Wage Distribution

G2019/09 E. GAUTIER - S. ROUX - M. SUAREZ
CASTILLO
Do Minimum Wages make Wages more Rigid? Evidence from French Micro Data

G2019/10 M. ANDRÉ - A. SIREY JOL
Imposition des couples et des familles: effets budgétaires et redistributifs de l'impôt sur le revenu

G2019/11 K. MOHKAM - O. SIMON
L'empreinte matière de l'économie française: une analyse par matiŁre et catégorie de produits

G2019/12 S. BUNEL - B. HADJIBEYLI
Évaluation du crédit d'impôt innovation

G2019/13 C. BONNET - F. GODET - A. SOLAZ
Gendered economic determinants of couple formation over 50 in France

G2019/14 P. GIVORD - M. SUAREZ CASTILLO
Excellence for all? Heterogeneity in high schools' value-added

G2019/15 G. CETTE - L. KOEHL - T. PHILIPPON
Labor Share in Some Advanced Countries

G2020/01 J. SILHOL - B. VENTELOU
Les zones d'intervention prioritaire reflètent- elles des écarts de pratiques des médecins généralistes?

G2020/02 B. BOUCHTENIK - R. LARDEUX
The Take-Up of Unemployment Benefit Extensions

G2020/03 J-M. GERMAIN
A Welfare Based Estimate of "Real Feel GDP" for Europe and the USA

G2020/04 J. BOUSSARD - R. LEE
Competition, Profit Share and Concentration