# Infrared Borderlands: Belt and Road Initiative and local planning - Khorgos interdependencies, imaginaries and territorial realities

Isabella Damiani, Marie Hiliquin

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Isabella Damiani, Marie Hiliquin. Infrared Borderlands: Belt and Road Initiative and local planning - Khorgos interdependencies, imaginaries and territorial realities. Geoprogress journal, 2025, 12 (2), pp.31-56. 10.20373/2384-9398/71. hal-05486194

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INFRARED BORDERLANDS: BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND
LOCAL PLANNING - KHORGOS INTERDEPENDENCIES, IMAGINARIES
AND TERRITORIAL REALITIES

Isabella Damiani*, Marie Hiliquin*

Abstract

This article examines the role of Khorgos, a special economic zone located on the border between China and Kazakhstan, within the framework of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In less than a decade, Khorgos has become a strategic hub for rail freight between China and Europe, increasing from 25 trains in 2013 to more than 8,700 in 2024, reflecting China's efforts to strengthen overland connectivity and establish alternative corridors to maritime trade. This paper, drawing on satellite data and spatial analysis through remote sensing, focuses on three main dimensions. First, it analyses the peripheral urbanisation of the city of Khorgos, which is embedded in China's territorial strategies to connect the western region to the rest of the country through infrastructure development, securitisation, and territorial control. Second, it situates Khorgos within a regional scale, namely the Khorgos-Yining-Qingshuihe economic complex. This analysis highlights the functional division of employment between Yining, the true administrative centre, Qingshuihe as the production core, and Khorgos, which remains primarily a transit point for Chinese exports, thereby illustrating an asymmetry in cross-border exchanges with Kazakhstan. Third, the paper examines territorial production and environmental differentiation. Remote sensing analyses reveal pronounced asymmetries in land use and ecological transformations between the Chinese and Kazakh sides of the border: China has developed a diversified and tightly regulated territorial model, combining urban and agricultural infrastructures, whereas the Kazakh side remains less structured and less developed. Chinese ecological initiatives, such as photovoltaic projects and urban greening policies, further reinforce cross-border territorial asymmetries and raise critical questions about the actual impacts of the BRI and the associated "win-win" cooperation rhetoric.

**1. Introduction**

In less than a decade, China–Europe rail freight has shifted from a small pilot initiative to strategic infrastructures reshaping global trade routes. In this transformation, Khorgos<fnref n="1" /> has emerged as a key node, going from 25 trains annually in 2013 to over

<footnote>* Isabella Damiani, LIMEEP-PS (UR 20204/OVSQ), Paris-Saclay University, UVSQ, E-mail address: isabella.damiani@uvsq.fr</footnote>

<footnote>* Marie Hiliquin, IRSEM Europe, TVES (ULR 4477), University of Lille, E-mail address: marie.hiliquin@univ-lille.fr</footnote>

<footnote n="1">¹ The name of the city of Khorgos, in simplified Chinese 霍爾果斯 (Huò'ěrguǒsī); in Uyghur: قور عاس, (Qorğas), is also known as Huoerguosi, Huocheng, Khorgos, Chorgos or Gorgos. On the Kazakh side, the Kazakh city is also called Khorgos, in Kazakh: Копрак, (Qorğas); in Russian: Xoproc, (Khorgos).</footnote>
8,700 in 2024 (General Administration of Customs, 2025). Khorgos' growth highlights China's effort to accelerate overland connectivity and create alternative corridors in case of issues with the maritime roads. Yet this logistical ascent raises a deeper question: beyond throughput and transit, what structural role is assigned to Central Asian spaces, such as Khorgos, within China's reconfiguration of globalisation? Are these territories autonomous actors, peripheral facilitators, or extensions of inland Chinese dynamics?

Khorgos Special Economic Zone (SEZ), also known as Khorgos International Centre for Boundary Cooperation (ICBC), is a special economic zone located on the border between China and Kazakhstan (Figure 1). It was established to promote cross-border trading, investments, and economic cooperation between the two countries, as part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which was launched in 2013.

<figure><img src="image_2.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Urban borderlands in Khorgos region.</figcaption></figure>

Source: Copernicus, 2024.

The zone is located in the Khorgos Gateway, a strategic point on the China-Kazakhstan border in Xinjiang², 370 km from Almaty in Kazakhstan and 670 km from Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang province in China. Khorgos SEZ key objective is facilitating the transport of goods between China and Central Asia to Europe, passing through Kazakhstan, with a focus on rail and road transport. Khorgos SEZ mainly handles electronics, machinery, textiles and agricultural products. In order to do so, the zone is equipped with logistics facilities such as rail terminals, warehouses and custom clearance services, mostly on the Chinese side of the border (Khorgos Gateway, 2023).

To simplify reading, the English transliterations “Khorgos” (for both the Chinese and Kazakh cities) and “Huocheng” (for the county and industrial park) will be used throughout the article.

² Officially the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), 新疆维吾尔自治区, (Xīnjiāng Wéiwú'ěr Zizhiqū) we will refer to it in the text as a province, region and Xinjiang
Despite being a key cross-border trading hub between China and Kazakhstan, Khorgos, is more intricately linked to Xinjiang's economic and logistical complex, especially with Yining<fnref n="3" /> and Qingshuihe<fnref n="4" /> than with the Kazakh side. This fact challenges the prevailing Chinese discourse emphasizing a “win-win” cooperation with Kazakhstan.

Yining, the largest city in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, serves as the regional administrative, cultural, and economic centre<fnref n="5" />. It is a hub for agriculture and light manufacturing, supplying essential goods to both Khorgos and Qingshuihe. Qingshuihe, a smaller town near Khorgos, functions as a secondary logistics and manufacturing hub. Located between those two towns, Huocheng Industrial Park is a key industrial zone specialising in manufacturing and logistics, complementing Khorgos's trade and logistics activities. Khorgos acts as the primary gateway for cross-border trade, leveraging the outputs of Yining and Qingshuihe. All three locations are interconnected with roads and railways, facilitating the transport of goods. Khorgos's dry port and logistics facilities are supported by Yining's distribution networks and by the industrial park manufacturing capabilities. This dynamics creates employment opportunities connected to trading and logistics and manufacturing. Khorgos is a flagship project under China's Belt and Road Initiative, while Yining and Qingshuihe play supporting roles in regional development. Together, they form a cohesive economic corridor linking China to Central Asia and Europe. This corridor is part of the broader New Eurasian Land Bridge, which aims to enhance connectivity and trade between Europe and Asia. Hence, how does the economic relationship between Khorgos, Yining, and Qingshuihe influence regional development?

This article aims to examine the Khorgos border area from a different scalar perspective. Over the past thirty years, this territory has experienced highly specific developmental processes, shaped by both geopolitical and geoeconomic dynamics. These changes are significant not only at the global scale—particularly in relation to the BRI—but also at the local scale due to the bilateral border with Kazakhstan, and, finally, at the regional scale within China's Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture. Khorgos' border area, often studied as a gateway to the West, is actually not an isolated territory. In fact, it benefits from a regional, urban, and rural hinterland that supports

<footnote n="3">³ Yining, 伊宁市 (Yīníng), formerly known as Ghulja (غولجا) in Uyghur and Kazakh, is a county-level city under the direct administration of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture. Not to be confused with Yining County 伊宁县 (Yīníng Xiàn), a separate rural jurisdiction neighboring the city, or Ili Prefecture (伊犁州, Yīlí Zhōu), which includes both Yining City and Yining County, among other subdivisions. “Yining” is the standard Chinese administrative term, while “Ghulja” is commonly used by local Uyghur and Kazakh populations to refer both to the city and its surrounding rural area. Historically, Ghulja referred to what is today Yining City. The current county (Yīníng Xiàn) forms the rural periphery of Yining City but is often included in the local use of the term “Ghulja.”</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Qingshuihe, 清水河 (Qīngshuǐhé)</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Ghulja was the capital of the Ili region even during the tsarist period (1871-1881). In 1881, the Russian and Chinese empires signed the Treaty of St. Petersburg, in which Russia returned part of the Ili region, east of the Khorgos River, to China. The Khorgos River would become a new political border between the Russian and Chinese empires.</footnote>
the efficient functioning of its border system. This situation has resulted in a highly
effective cross-border territorial network, both in relation to Kazakhstan and within
the broader continental framework of the BRI. This study will analyse the entire
territory also with the help of multi-level planning document satellite imagery. A series
of analyses from remote sensing, particularly those focusing on infrared data, will
enhance understanding of territorial transformations, such as urban sprawl and changes
in vegetation. Additionally, by analysing the thermal bands, we will carry out
temperature analysis changes in the region.

This article is structured in three parts. First, we will study the planning of Khorgos as a geopolitical node, by analysing it within China's broader strategy of integrating Xinjiang through infrastructure, surveillance and territorial control. Secondly, we will examine the functional integration of Khorgos in the regional logistic complex under the BRI. Finally, we will analyse the territorial transformations, addressing their development asymmetries, ecological impacts and the limits of the cross-border cooperation.

## 2. Peripheral Urbanisation: Planning Khorgos as a Geopolitical Node

Integrated in China’s broader territorial strategies, Khorgos emerged as a pivotal node in the BRI. The transformation of Xinjiang, going from a marginal borderland to a logistical corridor, reflects state-led efforts to align its national planning with security issues and international connectivity. The following part examines how Khorgos has been conceptualised, planned and governed in those reconfigurations.

### 2.1. *China's western area integration*

Since the late 1990's, China's western region spatial planning has been articulated into the national economy by adapting classical models of regional development to suit the authoritarian system. China's "Go West" 西部大开发, (Xībù Dàkāifā) policy, was a major national development initiative launched in 2000 to boost economic growth in China's western regions. This policy aimed to reduce regional disparities, promote infrastructure, and integrate the less-developed western provinces with the more prosperous eastern coast (Fan, Kanbur, Zhang, 2011). The state's approach to Xinjiang has drawn heavily on the core-periphery logic and regional polarisation approach which contends that disparities in development are a consequence of an uneven distribution of capital and infrastructure (Qin, Zou, Wang, 2021). In the Chinese context, this model has been redeveloped to justify the concentration of investments in border regions as a strategic intervention by the central state, and not as a natural result of market and economic dynamics (Abulimiti, Simayi, Yang, Chai, Yan, 2022). In this framework, the "point-axis theory" conceptualises development diffusing from infrastructural corridors, punctuated by nodal cities. Those cities concentrate logistic, industrial and administrative functions (Lu, 2024). The Belt and Road Initiative aims at emphasising this spatial logic through railways, highways, pipelines and airlines. In Xinjiang, the cities of Khorgos, Kashgar and Ürümqi, play the role of pivot to anchor activities in what used to be a marginal zone (Chen et al., 2014). It also aligns with China's growth pole strategy to stimulate peripheral regions by clustering capital and connectivity in selected urban centres. Here Khorgos is not a simple peripheral
recipient of China's capital flows, but a laboratory of planning experimentation (Damiani, 2024). It embodies geopolitical aspirations from the BRI through logistical infrastructures but also opens selected new forms of territorialities. Khorgos and connected areas then become an observatory for the intensification of state presence and integrated space production.

## 2.2. Planning, security and border

China's controlled globalisation in Khorgos is a space where infrastructures, regulations and technology create a lens to analyse China's strategy of economic integration, territorial governance and security control. The development of Khorgos as a hub has an impact on domestic stability and international influence. Zhang Yunling qualifies this tension as an emphasis between sovereignty and openness, where global flows remain state directed (Holslag, 2010; Kohlenberg, Godehardt, 2021; Zhang, 2021). Khorgos cross-border free trade zone is also nonetheless restricted to spontaneous economic development. Indeed, if encouraged, the trade is still monitored and under surveillance of the regime and infrastructural governance (Qin et al., 2021; Campana, 2024). Finally, another dimension completes this picture with the importance of global stability, social pacification and ethnic stabilisation for economy to uplift. While Kashgar, mostly populated by Uighurs, suffers from political tensions, Khorgos lacks ethno-political volatility. Hu Angang highlights here the importance of stability for prosperity, Khorgos objective is to render the frontier governable and profitable through logistical integration (Hu, 2023). If Khorgos is a geopolitical node, its territorialisation is also the result of an institutional architecture to plan the control of infrastructures at the border. For Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, it creates an asymmetric influence, questioning the “win-win” rhetoric of the BRI (Hu, 2018; Grant, 2020; Thorez, Colin, Savchuk, 2024).

Khorgos and its area development must be analysed as a territory where infrastructures are not neutral, but as an extension of state power and a spatial projection of China's objectives. With the construction of the dry port, cross-border cooperation centre, train station, and even a museum, Khorgos aligns with our previous point on the zone's openness and dependency to Beijing's fiscal subjections. On the other hand, it also aligns with the concept of a “three-dimensional border”: physical, virtual and socio-economic. Physically, Khorgos operates as an optimised trade gateway while digitally, surveillance and blockchain tracked flows were implemented, following China's national cyber-sovereignty strategy (Cathcart et al., 2020). Moreover, the International Centre for Border Cooperation (ICBC), opened in 2016, is also a place of surveillance, with numerous cameras on the Chinese side, allowing traffic flows to be observed.

“Safe Cities” 平安城市, (Píng'ān Chéngshì) have been increased in Xinjiang since 2017 legitimated by China's fight against terrorism. Nevertheless, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee and Emir Yazici argue that “unrest among China's Uyghur population that escalated in 2008–09; the CCP's shift toward a more assimilationist minority policy; and the leadership of Chen Quanguo, who became XUAR party secretary in 2016. These factors provide important context for understanding the CCP's recent security buildup and repression in Xinjiang”. Moreover, Xi Jinping's vision of “social stability and enduring peace” in border region such as Xinjiang deployed “an internal security strategy that had three notable features: escalated use of collective
detention, intensive ideological re-education, and the application of intensified coercion to the Uyghur diaspora.” (Greitens, Lee, Yazici, 2020). Socio-economically, labour and capital are institutionally handled by provincial and state authority, so the bordering conception aligns with global theories of infrastructural power and border performativity, adapted to China’s authoritarian governance model (Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013). Borders are not fixed lines and are continuously evolving through infrastructures, performances and daily activities, also named as “border work” (Malm, Green, 2013; Reeves, 2014). Madeleine Reeves also highlights that “infrastructure projects are undermining indigenous socialities, informal practices of resource regulation, and local structure of dispute resolution” (Reeves, 2014). In this framework, regions that are historically resistant to state control can be subjects to new forms of spatial legibility and regulatory integration. In Khorgos, border control process, and with it one form of regional control, unfolds not through an overt constraint, but through infrastructural territorialisation. The construction of roads, platforms and more broadly cities embed the state strategy into spatial fabric (Diener, 2015; Wastl-Walter, 2016).

### 2.3. Khorgos dynamics of spatial fabric

To enhance Khorgos functioning, a spatial division was planned for the different zone functions needed. The division of labour, seen here as the separation of tasks to enable efficiency, is applicable to border nodes development and interdependency. The urban and infrastructural development operates within a planned triadic system composed of Khorgos, Yining and Qingshuihe. Khorgos, adjacent to the Kazakh border concentrates customs infrastructure, dry port operations and symbolic architecture. As a showcase of the global project, it functions as the international interface. Located on the south-east, Qingshuihe serves as the industrial and processing hinterland with large-scale housing, warehousing and state-supported industrial parks. Finally, Yining, the prefectural capital, offers the administrative, service core and residential facilities while supporting mobilities and urban consumption. This spatial organisation is designed to optimise Khorgos as a logistical hub within the BRI, in a distributed urban system that assigns differentiated tasks to each node (Graham, Marvin, 2002; Brenner, 2004).

This process of infrastructural regionalisation reconfigures space around functional corridors and nodes rather than administrative units. This triad reflects this logic creating a constellation oriented towards an efficient circulation of goods but also its control by the state (Grant, 2018; Wiig, Silver, 2019). Furthermore, this organisation aligns with the point-axis theory where Khorgos aligns as a “point” along China-Europe freight corridor, with the support of Yining and Qingshuihe. As an example, Yining airport, renamed in 2024 as Yining international airport, opened a new line to Almaty in 2025 (Kemelova, 2025). Chinese state reconfigures its borderlands not only through infrastructure but also through the rationalisation of urban forms and inter-urban functions. Core cities manage peripheral logistics and industrial zones to reinforce internal coherence (Zhang, Zhang, Wu, Mai, 2021). Indeed, Qingshuihe can operate as a productive buffer by absorbing overflows from Khorgos and supporting the logistic chain. It also avoids an over-concentration of capital directly at the border. Functional differentiation is then not only economically efficient but also geopolitically stabilising (Song, Cheng, Liu, Liu, 2017; Lu, 2024). This top-down
planning with spatial clustering is not reserved to border regions in China, it aligns
with the model of urbanisation with Chinese characteristics. This model highlights
among other things the importance of urban spaces as sites of circulation but also for
internal cohesion and spatial discipline (Wu, 2020; Liu, Xia, 2023).

3. Khorgos-Yining-Qingshuihe Economic Complex: Territorial Integration in Practice

Despite the governmental communication made on Khorgos within the framework of the BRI, in 2024 Yining City remains the economic and demographic heart of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture. Its population of 778,047 inhabitants is the largest in the prefecture<fnref n="6" />, with an annual GDP of $5.89 billion, followed by Yining County with 365,300 inhabitants and a GDP of $1.73 billion (Ili Prefecture, 2025)<fnref n="7" />. On the other hand, Khorgos, records a population of 71,466 and a GDP of ¥ $2.80 billion, illustrating its high economic output relative to its demographic scale. Further reinforcing this hierarchy, Qingshuihe and Huocheng Industrial Park, with respectively 90,000 and 60,000 inhabitants, depending on migration flows, function as specialised production satellites, contributing combined GDPs of $2.76–3.45 billion to the prefecture’s industrial core (Statistic Bureau of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, 2024; Xinjiang - Ili Huocheng Xian, 2024). Meanwhile, the newly established Kekedala City<fnref n="8" />, with 105,200 inhabitants and 264,000 in its extended administrative division, is emerging as a growing urban centre within the prefecture (Kekedala Government, 2023). Since the launch of the BRI, this zone has seen its population grow by 20% with an annual GDP expansion of 12%, triple China’s national average (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2025). State planning and Xinjiang’s 14th Five-Year Plan drive the territorial development by prioritising the creation of an urban-industrial node and therefore attracting new investments and workforce migration (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 2023).

3.1 *A strategic interconnexion*

Since the 1990's and the Western Development policy, the region has undergone a connectivity transformation aiming to integrate Xinjiang's province from a peripheral border to a multimodal hub. Rail and road infrastructures complete the Chinese “dual circulation” strategy, and this section presents the resulting freight flows increasing the economic integration. Xinjiang province is landlocked in the northern part by the Altai Mountain range and in the south by the Tian Shan range. This configuration makes Khorgos a privileged location for transporting goods from the province capital Ürümqi to the West.

The following map (Figure 2) illustrates the main linear and punctual transport connections and infrastructures within the region. The Western Europe–Western China Highway (WE-WC), completed in 2018, links Saint Petersburg and the Baltic

<footnote n="6">⁶ At the end of the year 2023, the Xinjiang region had a permanent population of 25.98 million, including 15.39 million urban permanent residents (Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture Statistics Office, 2025).</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ All calculations were performed by the authors. Unless otherwise noted, all GDP figures refer to annual totals.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ 可克达拉 (Kěkèdálā)</footnote>
region to Lianyungang, a strategic Chinese port on the Yellow Sea. This major Eurasian route traverses the region, connecting not only both sides of the border but also the strategic nodes of China's internal transport network. The railway network is depicted in orange. On the Kazakhstani side, the Almaty-Khorgos line and the Altynkol station connect with the Chinese Jingyihuo railway, the Khorgos station, and provide a direct link to Urumqi and the broader Chinese rail network. The railway also passes through other strategic Chinese cities in the region.

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Regional scale transports map.
Source: Copernicus, 2024.</figcaption></figure>

Khorgos-Yining-Qingshuihe area integration was supported by a rapidly modernised transport network. Between 2015 and 2023, the G218 National highway connecting Yining to Khorgos has seen a 40% increase in freight traffic with volumes reaching 8 million tonnes annually in 2024 (Transport Department of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, 2025). In 2024, the Khorgos railway station recorded the passage of 8,730 freight trains, marking a 12.5% increase compared to the previous year. These trains transported a total of 12,084 million tonnes of goods, reflecting a 10.9% year-on-year growth (Khorgos municipality government, 2025). Despite the growth of those numbers, the traffic remains inferior compared to European hubs. Nevertheless, for the first time in May 2025, a train connected Tianjin in North-East China to Tashkent. 50 containers were transported, mostly loaded with auto parts, machinery and equipment, construction materials and household appliances (China Railway, 2025). While Yining Airport handles a significant 3.5 million passengers per year, air freight remains marginal, constituting just 1% of regional cargo due to high costs and limited logistics infrastructure. The development of intermodality could however extend the opportunities. As an example, in January a road connection from Shenzhen,
in the South of China, to Khorgos was launched, then connecting Almaty and Tbilisi by plane. The total transportation time was 7 days for 15 tons of goods transported, mainly electronic products (Khorgos municipality government, 2025).

We can also highlight that Khorgos is not operating because of cross-border interdependence but it is acting as a logistical checkpoint to process Chinese regional flows. Indeed, the customs data from Khorgos reveals a marked asymmetry between the main bonded zone and the International Cooperation Centre between China and Kazakhstan. The bonded logistics area processes most trade flows, with over 2 billion USD in both imports and exports between January and April 2025 (General Administration of Customs, 2025). The outbound volume far exceeds the inbound, underlining Khorgos's primary function as a conduit for Chinese exports to Central Asia and Europe. The cooperation centre handles minor trade flows, consistent with its symbolic function space for small-scale bilateral commerce. Finally, those disparities highlight the structural imbalance of Khorgos's integration into the BRI: rather than fostering balanced regional exchanges, it reinforces China's export-oriented logistical dominance through Xinjiang.

## 3.2 Functional interdependencies to an integrated economic corridor

Khorgos SEZ is supported by an increasingly interdependent industrial logistics complex analysed on Figure 1. Each node has a specific function and division of labour contributing to support the primary gateway. This initial representation of the studied territory is based on a “natural colour” composite processing of bands 4, 3, and 2 from the Sentinel-2A satellite, with a spatial resolution of 10 meters, which passed over the region in August 2024. The “natural colour” composite enables us to visualize the territory as it would appear to the human eye, as it combines the three visible spectrum bands in the following order: red, green, and blue. This mosaic image provides a small-scale view of the Khorgos region, facilitating the analysis of territorial dynamics within both a cross-border and a regional context. The main conurbations, highlighted in red in the illustration, reveal the territorial continuity and the networked structure of spaces, particularly within the cross-border context intensified by the BRI project. However, the disparity in urban development on either side of the border is striking. The significant border asymmetry, which has already been widely discussed at the scale of the city of Khorgos (Islamjanova, Iddrisu, Suy, Bekbauova, Suleiman, 2017; Damiani, Bachelet, 2018; Bennett, 2020; La Mela, 2021; Hiliquin, 2023; Damiani, 2024), is also evident at the regional level.

The Chinese urban areas in the region constitute various nodes of a highly efficient local development network, with the city of Yining—capital of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture and home to over 500,000 inhabitants—clearly serving as the network's centre. At this scale, Khorgos thus becomes the border interface of a much more complex Chinese regional system. In contrast, the Panfilov district, the Kazakhstani administrative equivalent at the department level, with its 130,000 inhabitants across the entire district, remains far below the demographic figures of its Chinese neighbour (Agency for Strategic planning and reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2025).

Yining functions as the agro-industrial and commercial backbone and embodies a model of “industry-city integration”, combining residential, educational, financial,
medical, and commercial infrastructure with strategic industrial development. Over
1,800 enterprises are registered in the zone, including 142 industrial firms. Its key
sectors are coal-based chemicals, agricultural product processing, construction
materials, and modern biotechnology. It also supplies raw and semi-processed goods
(grain, cotton, coal derivatives) to downstream hubs and receives imported Kazakh
resources from Khorgos for value-added transformation (Yining Municipal People's
Government, 2023). The administrative functions of Yining are also supported by the
new city of Kekedala, officially established in 2015. Kekedala's goal was to develop
a modern city for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)<fnref n="9" />, also
known as *Bingtuan*, and exemplifies the strategic urbanisation of the region. Located
approximately 30 km from Khorgos, the city serves multiple purposes: it stabilises the
border, facilitates the demographic engineering of the region by implanting Han
settlers associated with the XPCC, and fosters a new urban-industrial landscape
focused on light manufacturing, agriculture, and cross-border logistics (Li, Dong, Liu,
Yang, 2022; Kekedala Government, 2023).

On the other hand, Huocheng Industrial Park serves as the region's light manufacturing and export-processing node. It specialises in electronics assembly, textile and apparel production, and e-commerce fulfilment. The park benefits from bonded warehouse infrastructure, streamlined customs procedures, and VAT exemptions for re-export goods. Its logistical dependence on Khorgos for cross-border movement is matched by its reliance on Yining and Urumqi for the provision of manufacturing inputs (particularly cotton, foodstuffs, and components) (Huocheng County, 2025).

Khorgos, meanwhile, operates as the logistical and customs linchpin of the corridor. Its infrastructure includes a dry port, the cross-border International Centre, and dedicated rail terminals on both sides of the border. The zone applies preferential tax and customs regimes, within the Special Economic Zone. The well-documented asymmetry of development between the two countries is evident, as is a greater diversity of land use on the Chinese side. The following large-scale, natural colour composite satellite image enables detailed analysis of the Khorgos border area (Figure 3). The mosaic, derived from Pléiades 1B satellite imagery acquired over Khorgos in June 2024, offers an ultra-high spatial resolution of 50cm, allowing for the identification of numerous morphological details across the territory. A detailed color-coded categorization facilitates the differentiation of land uses on both sides of the border.

Urban areas are marked in red, on the Chinese side, these are distinguished from the Bingtuan zones. Transboundary spaces dedicated exclusively to commercial exchange, including the presence of the ICBC, are shown in green and are primarily located in the north. The two railway stations—Altynkol on the Kazakhstani side and Khorgos on the Chinese side—are shown in dark blue; these stations provide connections to the New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor of the (BRI). Industrial and logistical zones, shown in light blue, are mainly situated near the railway

<footnote n="9">⁹ Created in 1954 the Bingtuan is a unique Chinese state-military organisation located and operating in Xinjiang. It combines paramilitary, administrative and economic functions managing different kinds of infrastructures from cities and farm to police with its own court. This organ played a key role to settle Han populations, a minority in the province, while contributing to secures its border and acting as a tool of state-governance. Up-to-date population numbers for the Bingtuan are now not included in the general demographic statistics of Xinjiang but its population was estimated about 2.8 million in 2016, 12% of Xinjiang’s population (Cappelletti, 2020).</footnote>
stations. The diversity of border control infrastructures, highlighted in purple, is particularly notable on the Kazakhstani side. Control zones may take the form of checkpoints or commercial customs areas.

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Khorgos borderlands development.</figcaption></figure>

Source: Pléiades © CNES 2024.

Two internal borders exist within Kazakhstan. The first one is a highway toll north of Altynkol station, costing 6,500 tenge (approximately 13 euros), which grants access to the *Nur Joly* checkpoint (data collected on site in 2023). *Nur Joly* (Path of Light), inaugurated in 2018, is the principal road border checkpoint in the region. The name evokes the major infrastructure development reform launched by the former President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, in 2014. The objective of the reform was to modernize the logistical apparatus of a Eurasian and multi vector Kazakhstan, ready to break out of its isolation, connecting it with the rest of Eurasia, and opening itself to new linkages (Damiani, 2023, 2024). Considering that the average monthly salary in Kazakhstan is 700 euros, it can be asserted that an economic barrier has been erected between Kazakhstan and the border. This barrier thus limits the possibility of engaging in cross-border trading and capitalizing on the geo-economic opportunities presented by the much-celebrated opening of Khorgos (Damiani, 2024).

The second internal barrier is a road checkpoint north of the ICBC customs area, which monitors road traffic towards the Kazakhstani city of Khorgos, located three
kilometres away. Access at this checkpoint is restricted to those possessing a special "commerce" permit. In recent years, the list of Kazakhstani border sites inaccessible to foreigners has been reduced by Resolution No. 600 of July 2015, amended in 2017 and 2021 (Kazakhstan's digital legislative registry, 2024). Nevertheless, the Kazakhstani city of Khorgos, remains a sensitive area inaccessible to foreigners and to Kazakhstani citizens without special authorization (data collected on site in 2023). In this context, the city may be considered a public space that has been effectively privatized by border control mechanisms, accessible only to visitors contributing to the commercial operations of the BRI.

The border manifests itself in this political space through areal features, as described above; through linear features, as the border is physically demarcated along this sector; and through point features, indicated in yellow on the image. The punctual border is represented in Khorgos by elements with differing temporalities. In the north and in the ICBC the presence of Soviet-era miradors, while further south, border stones and country names reflect more recent demarcation efforts—these latter features are the result of agreements between the People's Republic of China and the independent Kazakhstan, finalized in 2002. The identification of these specific border elements was carried out thanks to field works, OpenStreetMap cartographic sources and the analysis of satellite images by photo interpretation.

## 4. Territorial Production and Environmental Differentiation at Khorgos: remote sensing analyses

The following section draws on remote sensing data to visualise spatial evolution that shape Khorgos border region. By examining land use, vegetation cover and thermal variations, it highlights China's investment on the zone and the generation of distinct environmental and infrastructural development.

### 4.1 Dissymmetry of development at the border: integration and disintegration of local tissue

The most common use of infrared images for Earth observation is the false-colour infrared composites. This approach involves combining “near-infrared” (NIR) bands with those from the visible spectrum—specifically, the red and green bands. The image is thus assembled as follows: the red channel is assigned to the NIR band, the green channel to the red band, and the blue channel to the green band. The S065 sensor on the American Apollo 9 satellite, which passed over the Arizona desert in 1969, was the first to utilize NIR bands in conjunction with the visible spectrum for Earth observation (Schowengerdt, Slater, 1972; Ghirardi, Sourbès-Verger, Verger, 1997). On the figure 4 the mosaic of images originates from the Sentinel-2A satellite, which has a spatial resolution of 10 meters and passed over the region in August 2024. The bands used for this composite are 8A (a narrower variant of the near infrared), 4, and 3.
<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4: False-Colour Infrared Composite of the Khorgos Region: Land Use and Vegetation Patterns.</figcaption></figure>

Source: Copernicus, 2024.

The primary contribution of this composition is its ability to highlight the reflectance of near-infrared wavelengths. NIR bands enable the categorization of three types of land cover:

* Vegetation, which appears in various shades of red depending on the species, health status, or developmental stage of the plant, as vegetation strongly reflects NIR;

* Natural or anthropogenic mineral elements, such as built-up areas, which moderately reflect NIR and are represented in shades of blue or cyan;

* Water bodies, which absorb almost all light and are depicted in black or very dark blue, depending on depth, soil moisture, or water purity.

At the regional scale, the first notable observation is the different land uses on the two sides of the border, with agricultural development being significantly more advanced on the Chinese side. Large Chinese urban agglomerations are surrounded by agricultural activities, particularly cereal and vegetable production, in contrast to the Kazakhstani side, which is much less developed agriculturally and where even non-anthropized areas exhibit very low levels of vegetation. A significant difference can also be observed in the agricultural exploitation of the water resources of the Ili River, which crosses the border at the southern part of the image. However, the presence of red-toned vegetation does not necessarily indicate agricultural development; for example, on the Kazakhstani side, spontaneous vegetation typical of steppe landscapes
is widespread. A more reliable criterion for distinguishing between cultivated and natural vegetation in this image may be the morphology of the plots: more regular geometric shapes indicate the presence of agricultural activities.

On the Chinese side, the large-scale Western Development Strategy, primarily led by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps has produced these territorial expected outcomes. All sectors of production, from agriculture to industry, are managed by state farms—six in the Khorgos district alone—which specialize in cereals, fruits, vegetables, the textile and sugar industries, as well as lavender production (Tuerxun, Tashi, 2015).

On the Kazakhstani side, the cyan area north of the Altynkol railway station is not steppe, but rather sandy desert. This desert area, mostly covered with black tarps to prevent sand from encroaching on the highway, is designated for the development of future logistical infrastructure to facilitate the westward transport of Chinese goods. Between the desert and the border, lighter linear cyan elements represent the fluvial zone of the Khorgos River, which has a very low flow rate.

The following composite (figure 5) utilizes the spectral bands of red and shortwave infrared (SWIR). The data employed are from Sentinel-2A, acquired in August 2024; specifically, bands 12 and 11 are used for SWIR, and band 4 for the red. The composite has a spatial resolution of 10 meters.

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5: Urban False Color Composite of Khorgos Region: Differentiation of Urban and Non-Anthropogenic Spaces.</figcaption></figure>

Source: Copernicus, 2024.

The combination of SWIR and red bands enables the clear identification of urbanized areas, which are represented in shades of violet, grey, and white, depending on the
various building materials, and allows for a sharper distinction from non-
anthropogenic spaces, which appear predominantly in light green, while water bodies
are depicted in dark blue. A significant difference from the standard false-color
infrared composition is the clearer differentiation, in the Kazakhstani border area of
Khorgos, between zones developed for transport infrastructure (shown in light violet)
and the non-anthropogenic areas, steppe and desert (shown in light green). Urban
sprawl on the Chinese side is readily visible, as are agricultural plots, which appear in
dark green.

## 4.2 *The ambiguity of Green Development*

An insightful analysis of the Khorgos region can be conducted through the calculation of temperatures using the climatic variable Land Surface Temperature (LST) (Figures 6). The spectral bands required for this calculation are the red band, Near-Infrared (NIR), and Thermal Infrared bands (also known as Long Wave Infrared - LWIR). We utilized data from Landsat satellites 8 (July 2013, July 2014) and 9 (July 2023, July 2024), both equipped with thermal infrared sensors. The specific bands employed were 4, 5, 10, and 11 for both satellites, featuring a spatial resolution of 30 meters. LST calculation was performed using the QGIS SPT plugin, which implements the Split-Wind Algorithm (SWA). This method is the most widely used for LST retrieval as it leverages the difference in atmospheric absorption between the two thermal infrared bands (Wang et al., 2019). LST was computed at a local scale for three urban areas within the transboundary region: Khorgos, Qingshuihe with the Huocheng Industrial Park, and the Yining/Ghulja urban agglomeration. Calculations were performed for two reference years to enable a diachronic analysis of temperature evolution.

<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>Figures 6: Land Surface Temperature in the Khorgos Border Region: Spatial Effects of Urbanisation and Land Use (July 2013 and July 2023)
Sources: Landsat, 2013, 2023.</figcaption></figure>

By analysing the Land Surface Temperatures (LST) of Khorgos in 2013, the year the BRI was formalized, and in 2023, it is evident that the typical dry continental climate of this part of Central Asia allows maximum temperatures to rise above 50 degrees Celsius. The steppe and desert area on the Kazakhstani side, which remains
undeveloped, is the hottest part of the region. The asymmetry in border development between Kazakhstan and China also results in a thermal asymmetry, as the Kazakhstani side is significantly warmer than the Chinese side, with built-up areas contributing less to heat than the desert on the Kazakhstani side. The most notable finding is the temporal comparison: ten years of modifications and artificialization of the border area following the implementation of the BRI have led not only to a general increase in temperatures on the Chinese side due to urban sprawl, but also to a general rise of three degrees in maximum temperatures and four degrees in minimum temperatures. Despite China's commitments to decarbonization and more environmentally sustainable projects, the BRI currently accounts for approximately 28% of global carbon dioxide emissions (Southerland, 2019).

Regarding the LST of the other two areas, the results are completely reversed as we can observe on Figure 7 and 8. Between July 2014 and 2024, temperatures have decreased in both Qingshuihe and Yining, despite the expansion of urban areas and even the Huocheng industrial park, a vertical extension to the north of Qingshuihe city. Around the urban area of Yining, there has also been significant development of peri-urban agricultural zones, which have likely contributed to the decrease in land temperatures. These results are not surprising when considering urban planning policies aimed at greening cities and combating urban heat islands that have been implemented in the People's Republic of China in recent years.

<figure><img src="image_8.png" /><figcaption>Figure 7: Land Surface Temperature in the Qingshuihe and Huocheng Industrial Park Zone (July 2014 and July 2024).</figcaption></figure>

Sources: Landsat, 2014, 2024.
<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>Figure 8: Land Surface Temperature in the Yining / Ghulja Zone (July 2014 and July 2024).</figcaption></figure>

Sources: Landsat, 2014, 2024.

The analysis reveals a distinct environmental penalty for the strictly border area of Khorgos compared to the other urban spaces in the region. While Khorgos experienced significant warming linked to BRI development, Qingshuihe and Yining demonstrated cooling trends associated with urban greening initiatives. This highlights the contrasting environmental outcomes within the transboundary region over the study period. Those images highlight differences in land-use planning, industrial density, and greening policies manifest thermally. Chinese side illustrates controlled urbanisation with efforts at surface cooling via vegetation or reflectivity standards while the Kazakh side presents a more uniform thermal landscape, indicating lower intervention levels or less diversified surface cover.

A last remote sensing analysis specifically concerns vegetation and the spatial distribution of specific elements across the territory. The NDVI (Normalized Difference Vegetation Index) used in Figure 9 facilitates the analysis of the presence and development of vegetation within an area by correlating the red band of the visible spectrum with the near-infrared bands.

$$NDVI = \frac{NIR - Red}{NIR + Red}$$
<caption>Figure 9: Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) formula</caption>

The data used for this analysis also originates from the Sentinel-2A satellite, which passed over the region in August 2024. The bands that were used—band 4 for red and band 8 for near-infrared (NIR) have a spatial resolution of 10 meters. Higher values, approaching 1, indicate areas with dense, chlorophyll-rich vegetation, signifying healthy ecosystems or regions undergoing vegetative growth during the summer period. Values around 0 correspond to territories with little to no vegetation, such as steppes, deserts, or entirely barren mineral zones. More pronounced negative values, such as -0.30, are indicative of water bodies.

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>Figure 10: Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) in the Khorgos Region
(Sentinel-2, 2024).</figcaption></figure>

Source: Copernicus, 2024.

The NDVI results for the region confirm the asymmetry in vegetation development on either side of the border, with significantly more intensive agricultural exploitation on the Chinese side, both in the northern area near Khorgos and, even more so, in the southern area around the Ili River, which is the region's main water resource.
As a main result, we can highlight that thermal and spatial data underscore the marked contrast imposed by the international border. On the Chinese side, land use patterns are more diversified, with a mix of urban infrastructure and agricultural plots that contribute to localised cooling effects through vegetative covering. In contrast, the Kazakhstani side displays a more uniform thermal profile, indicative of less diversified land use and greater surface heat retention. This asymmetry highlights not only
different planning strategies but also unequal environmental outcomes, where territorial production on each side of the border reflects distinct state priorities and abilities.

4.3 Local Planning resulting from state-led ambitions

Within the official discourse of the BRI, investments in infrastructures, logistics, and energy sources are presented not only as economic stimuli but also as contributions to low-carbon development. The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture has been actively promoting them in line with China's national ecological civilisation. Priorities have been divided between forest, grassland, wetland and water conservation and anti-desertification measures (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, 2021). In this framework, the ICBC and the SEZ exemplify this ambition with electrified freight systems, solar-integrated warehouses, and AI-based logistics optimisation (Khorgos Gateway, 2023). In early 2025, a 5 GW high-efficiency photovoltaic cell manufacturing project by China Pingmei Shenma Holding Group was launched in the Khorgos-Yining Economic Development Zone. The project aims to establish a vertically integrated photovoltaic industrial chain cell fabrication, module assembly, and material processing. Indeed, Xinjiang is a major hub for photovoltaic production in China, contributing significantly to the country's solar manufacturing (Pingmei Shenma Group, 2025). On the other hand, Xinjiang's polysilicon relies on coal-based electricity, raising emissions concerns. These projects also generate new tensions. Land competition with pastoralists has sparked debate on agrivoltaics to enable dual land use. Privatisation of land in this region, and more generally China border region, has been a sensitive issue for decades now (Li, Hruska, Talinbayi, Li, 2018). Moreover, dust storms frequently reduce panel efficiency, necessitating high-maintenance technologies such as robotic cleaning systems (Fan, Wang, Shi, Cheng, 2017).

On the Chinese side of the border, Khorgos has been positioned as a model BRI smart hub. Green infrastructure initiatives include LEED-certified buildings, paperless customs platforms, and a pilot microgrid system combining solar and wind power. According to the 2025 Khorgos Activity Report, these measures contributed to an improvement in air quality with 100% of recorded days meeting “excellent” standards. The efforts to eliminate coal-fired boilers were also intensified as part of broader emissions reductions. While the report underlines a 100% compliance rate for clean air benchmarks and improved surface and groundwater quality, the ecological transition remains heavily dependent on public subsidies and alignment with central planning priorities. Those financial supports finance urban-rural integration, infrastructures to create a techno-ecological development. The document also highlights the role of the ICBC but doesn't mention any discussion for regulatory or ecological coordination, neither joint planning mechanisms (Municipal People's Government of Horgos, 2025).

As we previously demonstrated, integration with the Kazakh infrastructures is indeed limited, hindered by regulatory divergence and fragmented energy standards. On the Kazakh side, planning under the *Nurly Jol* initiative has focused on logistics and urban extension rather than ecological integration. Jarkent remains a small city, primarily agricultural with a minor trade role. The initiative mostly focuses on rebuilding roads for corridors passing through the territory (Iimi, 2022). Unlike Chinese planning,
however, Kazakh development places little emphasis on green infrastructure or
ecosystem coordination, reinforcing infrastructural and regulatory asymmetries and
limiting substantive cross-border ecological governance. In 2019, China and
Kazakhstan endorsed a Green Silk Road memorandum to foster renewable energy
cooperation and acknowledge biodiversity protection. However, the document also
remains largely declaratory, lacking actionable provisions for species-specific
corridors. Similarly, the purported 2021 "Transboundary Protected Areas Agreement"
which gestures toward an eco-zone around Khorgos, signals a growing ecological
intent but remains in its nascent stages without a fully operational ecological
governance framework (Sharifli, 2024). Finally, while China and Kazakhstan maintain
a bilateral framework on the transboundary water cooperation, centered around the
2001 agreement on the Protection and Utilisation of Transboundary Rivers, this accord
remains limited in scope and enforceability (Ho, 2017). The Ili River, which originates
in Xinjiang's Ili Prefecture and flows into Kazakhstan's Lake Balkhash, is particularly
contentious, with Kazakh authorities expressing concern over reduced flows linked to
Chinese upstream development (Weinthal, 2002; Zhupankhan, Tussupova,
Berndtsson, 2017).

Spatial data, thermal indicators and planning analysis presented in this section
underline the persistent asymmetries structuring Khorgos border region. Far from
developing a coherent transboundary zone, the area reveals contrasting territories and
uneven environmental transformations. These key findings invite us to furthermore
question political and infrastructural logics underpinning the Belt and Road Initiative
objectives and impacts.

5 Conclusion

This article aimed to investigate how Khorgos functions within the local and
transregional dynamics of the BRI, asking how its economic and spatial relationships
with Yining and Qingshuihe reshape our understanding of cross-border integration and
territorial development between China and Kazakhstan. With the use of planning
documents, statistical data and remote sensing analysis, we can present three key
results. First, we showed that Khorgos is framed as a bilateral cross-border hub but
also embedded in China's national territorial strategies to globally integrate Xinjiang's
to the national territory through infrastructure, securitisation and development. On a
second hand, we highlighted the functional interdependencies, on a regional scale,
between Khorgos, Yining and Qingshuihe, notably revealing a labour spatial division.
This organisation situates Khorgos as a logistical interface of Xinjiang's regional
complex, rather than a transboundary project with Kazakhstan. Finally, our satellite
imagery analyses expose asymmetries in land use, urban morphology and network,
and ecological transformations. China has a diverse and managed territorial pattern
while the Kazakhstani side remains less structured, vegetated and more thermally inert.
If the win-win discourses have already been discussed by academics, we can
apprehend the border development differences also due to an unequal state-led policy.
China dominates the border thanks to investments and planning but also because of a
global territorial production and integration. These dynamics are not unique to
Khorgos. They resonate with the increasing amount of traffic in strategic nodes at
Xinjiang's border, such as Alashankou located 200km to the northeast of Khorgos.
China also secures its traffic roads and central Asian partnerships with the
development of the China-Kirghizstan-Uzbekistan railway. With an estimated
construction period of six years, the corridors could be finished in 2031 and could
significantly enhance connectivity by providing an alternative east-west route
bypassing Russia to Europe in one week instead of two. If Khorgos used to be an
experimental laboratory for the Belt and Road Initiative, it is now becoming a key hub
in China's global strategy to go west beyond its west.

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