<figure><img src="image_1.png" /></figure>

HAL
open science

# Justice In Global Intellectual Property Governance

Annabelle Lever, Timmerman Cristian

► To cite this version:

Annabelle Lever, Timmerman Cristian. Justice In Global Intellectual Property Governance. Justice in Global Economic Governance, pp.215-224, In press, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/jj.27775767.10.3366/jj.27775767.25 . hal-05270858

HAL Id: hal-05270858

https://hal.science/hal-05270858v1

Submitted on 20 Sep 2025

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.

<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>

Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Chapter Title: JUSTICE IN GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GOVERNANCE

Chapter Author(s): Annabelle Lever and Cristian Timmermann

Book Title: Justice in Global Economic Governance

Book Subtitle: Normative and Empirical Perspectives on Promoting Fairer Globalisation

Book Editor(s): Axel Berger, Clara Brandi, Eszter Kollar

Published by: Edinburgh University Press. (2025)

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/jj.27775767.25

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>

This book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). To view a copy of this license, visit
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /></figure>

JSTOR

*Edinburgh University Press* is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Justice in Global Economic Governance*
# JUSTICE IN GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GOVERNANCE

*Annabelle Lever and Cristian Timmermann*

## INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century has seen a striking expansion in the scope, application and geographic reach of intellectual property rights (IPR) – that is, of legal rights that enable the rights holder to use, withhold, license and transfer ideas for profit, in exchange for registering them publicly. There is widespread consensus that the Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS, 1994) in the World Trade Organization marked a turning point in the globalisation of minimum standards of intellectual property protection applicable to all countries after a ten-year transition time (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2003). By linking intellectual property protection to trade agreements, exclusive rights holders from strong economies gained the ability to enforce the protection of their interests through trade sanctions, rather than, as previously, through lawsuits for infringement of property rights. Countries building up their industries are now prevented from designing intellectual property policies that are tailored to their stage of technological development although, historically, countries in the Global North had significantly different IP policies as they industrialised. (Boyle, 2008; Khan, 2005; May 2007 see Cartwright & Morin, Chapter 18 in this volume).

These developments highlight the fluidity but also the political and economic significance of IPRs and remind us that an ethical evaluation of their properties is important for global justice broadly conceived. In this chapter, we identify the different stakeholders in IPRs, examine their conflicting interests, and analyse shortcomings in deliberation processes over IPRs. We also sketch ways to address several problems with the current IP regime.

## STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR CONFLICTING INTERESTS

A widely held philosophical justification of intellectual property rights appeals to a hypothetical contract between society and innovators, where
society grants innovators temporary exclusivity about the information on how to replicate their invention (Murray, 2006). In this view, innovators should be allowed to recoup their costs and make profits during the time they enjoy market exclusivity and, in return society benefits by having more information become part of the public domain. Yet, as philosophers reflecting on the nature and limits of mutually beneficial consensual exchanges argue, even mutually beneficial consensual exchanges can have adverse effects on others.

For IPRs to be consistent with demands of justice, whether domestically or globally, they ought to reflect the legitimate interests of the following groups, at least:

*Innovators (producers of new ideas)* have an interest (i) in being recognised as authors, (ii) in the material benefits coming from the invention, (iii) in the diffusion of the invention, and (iv) in participating in scientific advancement (for example, follow-up innovation, access to science).

*Consumers of those ideas* have an interest (i) in accessing the invention, (ii) in the availability of creative solutions for their problems, and (iii) in socially, environmentally and scientifically responsible innovation.

*Investors* have an interest (i) in a return on their investments, (ii) in the fulfilment of their legitimate expectations, and (iii) in the freedom to engage in mutually beneficial joint ventures.

*People outside the global market:* who (i) want to maintain their knowledge-exchange practices (for example indigenous seed exchange networks, open-source software), and (ii) do not want to be exposed to appropriation of their knowledge by outsiders. The fourth group is often overlooked but their legitimate interests deserve attention. Those people, usually the very poor but also some marginalised indigenous groups, neither use nor benefit from the global market and their various contributions to the creation of ideas/products remain largely unrecognised by the market.

As we discuss in what follows, the interests of the different groups affected by IPR regimes may diverge and sometimes conflict.

*Investors:* Current global property regimes are heavily slanted towards the interests of innovators and investors in high-income countries and against consumers both in developing countries and in high-income ones. Among the advantaged groups, current rules favour investors over innovators, insofar as the producers of patentable ideas are generally employees of corporations and usually have to cede IP rights to their employers as part of their contract (Lemley, 2012).

*Innovators*, that is producers of ideas, have an interest in being recognised as creators, an interest in preventing unconscionable uses of their ideas,
as they see fit, and an interest in promoting uses of ideas that they favour (Timmermann, 2020). These non-material interests of innovators are poorly protected by existing intellectual property regimes, even when their material interests are safeguarded. Formally, creative workers have a right to attribution of authorship and to the integrity of expressive work. However, institutional support to enforce such rights is often unavailable, leaving early-career scientists in academia, smallholders and indigenous people vulnerable to the misattribution and misappropriation of their intellectual contributions by others. Legally, when it comes to the future use of exclusive rights, the moral interests of authors are understood in a highly restricted sense (Prifti, 2016). For example, permitting usurious licensing practices, and indifference to the needs of the worst-off by current patent holders, regardless of the desires and hopes that may have animated inventors.

Moreover, copyright laws make it all but impossible for innovators to experiment with Samuel Becket's plays, for example, however brilliant, respectful and appealing those experiments, because copyright protection extends to seventy years after the death of an author and means that the author's estate can withhold permission to directors and productions that do not meet with their approval (Wyver, 2020). Innovators can find themselves constrained by patent law because the institutions in which they work may seek to prevent the sharing of samples and ideas with peers, or the timely publication of research results, to protect the patentability of research.

Material and non-material interests in being recognised as authors, autonomy in deciding how the invention is used and diffused, and creative freedom to cooperate with others and reuse inventions have a role in explaining the moral case for IPR (Drassinower, 2008; Biron, 2012; Lametti, 2012). Existing rules for global IP fail adequately to protect these interests, in part because of the way that the creative industries are currently structured (Demuijnck, 2012), and because the costs of seeking and enforcing licences are prohibitive. As Hettinger says ‘In our society . . . most patents and copyrights are owned by institutions . . . Independent authors or inventors who earn their living by selling their writings or inventions to others are increasingly rare’ (Hettinger, 1989, p. 46).

Consumers of inventive ideas are often greatly disadvantaged by existing IP rules, even in rich countries (Boyle, 2008). Although medicines, like surgical techniques, used to be unpatentable (Noonan, 1995), their patentability has facilitated the creation of life-saving knowledge, at the cost of rendering their price prohibitively expensive for a large part of the global population. Lack of access to life-saving medicines for those most affected by ill health is a major ethical challenge. It highlights the problem that a large part of the world population does not suffer from unavoidable (natural) threats to their health but from the avoidable (human-made) consequences of an institutional order that gives insufficient weight to their interests and
leaves their basic needs unfulfilled (Pogge, 2005; Jaggar, 2010). Patents interfere with the mechanism of market'demand' as a vehicle for signalling needs that are particularly evident (Pogge et al., 2010). For example, patents may adversely affect the development of much-needed products, including medicines, because patent-holders may simply refuse to develop products themselves or to license them to others. (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Hall et al., 2012).

Moreover, pressures on farmers to use patented seeds, which need to be bought each year, can exacerbate problems of precarity, indebtedness and food security, especially in the Global South. Farmer suicides in India testify to the tragic results of seeds that cannot be reused from year to year with often unscrupulous sales practices, and unrealistic claims made about the benefits of such products (Thomas & De Tavernier, 2017). Although IP rights are thought to limit *use*, not *access* to ideas, controlling use necessarily limits access to ideas by those who cannot set aside resources to purchase the end products, go to patent offices, access their online sites or whose academic institutions cannot afford expensive copyrighted books and prohibitively priced journals.

Intellectual property governance can neither ignore existing inequalities in terms of financial, legal and scientific resources, nor the urgency with which some major global challenges need to be confronted by widely diffusing technological innovations. In a world of extreme inequality of purchasing power, innovators from the Global South have few chances of benefiting from the IP system to market their inventions. Moreover, reliance on intellectual property regimes, as opposed to other ways of protecting and promoting ideas, inherently constrains public choice and accountability concerning the legal definition of property, and over the direction and access to research and technology (Resnik, 1997; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002; Lever, 2008; Dutfield, 2012).

## WAY FORWARD

The first way forward builds on the idea that, conceptually and normatively, we can distinguish rights of recognition and control over one's ideas from rights to profit from using those ideas oneself or from licensing them to others (Biron, 2012). We must recognise and use the flexibility inherent in IPR rights which, like other property rights, can be thought of as a bundle of different rights rather than as an indissoluble whole (Munzer, 2001; Waldron, 2020). Thus, as John Christman suggested, we can distinguish two large groups of property rights for conceptual, moral and political purposes – *control* rights, which determine our ability to use, alienate, destroy and transform objects, and *income* rights, which are rights to profit from the use of our control rights (Christman, 1994). In the IP context, we might also want to distinguish rights
to license or not to license one's invention – given that one does not presuppose the other conceptually or normatively, and their relationship is at stake in arguments over compulsory licensing.

We might also consider the scope for the compulsory licensing of inventions to international agencies on especially favourable terms, without supposing that inventors must otherwise lack strong rights in their ideas (Wilson, 2012; Christman, 2012). There is nothing in the concept of IP itself that precludes fairly stringent regulations of intellectual property rights to better reflect the legitimate claims of those who are ignored or poorly protected under existing legal and political arrangements (Beitz, 2005). Even those legal conventions that treat intellectual property rights as human rights, such as the protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, acknowledge that these rights are not absolute and that they must be protected by other rights

Indeed, the flexible character of IP rights, and scope for improved protection of legitimate global claims, can be seen in the international legal recognition granted to traditional knowledge (TK) (Christman, 2012; Munzer, 2012). Of course, granting IP rights over indigenous knowledge is not sufficient to ensure that the legitimate claims of indigenous communities to use, transmit and profit from their knowledge are adequately protected. However, IP rights in TK reflects abhorrence at the idea of Western countries patenting the fungicidal properties of the Neem tree and then legally excluding indigenous communities, who had identified the tree's potential for agricultural pest control, from using their knowledge as before (Hamilton, 2006). Indigenous communities should not be induced to sell their patents on severely disadvantageous terms and, by that means, be prevented from using their knowledge because the licence fees are beyond their means. It might be unreasonable to say that IP rights in traditional knowledge can never be sold, only licensed. However, it seems clear that the case of indigenous knowledge shows both the scope for improving IP law and the urgency of improving the protections for indigenous peoples.

The dramatic power differentials that characterise our world are a crucial barrier to designing legal permissions, duties and claims that would safeguard the legitimate interests of the worst-off. The dramatic neglect and exploitation of indigenous knowledge is the result of centuries of colonial rule. Colonisation not only imposed foreign rule on and extracted raw materials from the colonised. It also created a global hierarchy of human values with some cultures, knowledge and ways of life considered to have less value than others. Indigenous farming communities' centuries-old methods have been discounted or ignored as forms of knowledge (Altieri & Toledo, 2011). In addition to minimising political and economic power differentials, then, there is a need to rethink colonial biases in the global hierarchy of knowledge production and to properly recognise formerly marginalised methods and cultures.
The second way forward addresses the problem that the costs of protect-
ing against patent infringement, or of arguing for rights of legal access to
ideas, are prohibitive for many producers, consumers and investors in ideas,
whether they are members of rich or poor countries, and whether the claims
that they seek to vindicate are national or international. It is particularly
unfair that groups who do not use or benefit directly from the IP system need
to spend scarce resources to protect their knowledge and expressions from
appropriation by setting up large databases to show prior art (Kidd, 2012). It
is necessary, then, to rethink the ways that IP rights are enforced to prevent
large companies from bullying smaller companies or weaker governments
and to ensure adequate protection for individual consumers, producers and
investors in ideas. Particularly when property boundaries between different
patent owners are unclear, as is the case in patents involving genes (Safrin,
2004), large companies can use their superior economic and legal strength to
threaten smaller companies over infringement and to create delays to court
cases that drain their opponents' resources.

At national and international levels this might suggest a centralised
agency, akin to a public prosecutor and defender, to ensure that moral and
legal claims over intellectual property are fairly protected. The agency could
be financed from a combination of national taxation and a graduated tax on
IP receipts by rights holders. Such an agency could also be required to pro-
pose measures to prevent 'nuisance' lawsuits amongst companies that turn
IPRs into a tool of business competition at the cost of their ability to recognise
and support creative ideas. Markets in intellectual property rights themselves
have become dissociated from the protection and use of the products —
inventions, expressions and distinguishing marks — whose encouragement,
access and use formed their *raison d'être*. Speculative markets in IPRs can
threaten future funding for research, as companies are bought and sold for
their patent portfolio rather than for their present and future capacities to
innovate (Bessen et al., 2011) and access to knowledge becomes one more
asset in existing forms of casino capitalism.

The third way forward addresses the problem of *political injustice* in
designing the rules of IP governance. Our globally enforced IP regimes
are not the result of careful deliberation about the interests of industri-
alised, emerging and subsistence economies. Instead, the powerful get to
impose their interets against those of the less powerful, often in conflict
with global priorities, such as the rapid diffusion of green technologies.
Political power was used to shift debates on IP to more advantageous
forums and superior legal expertise, and political connections facilitated
the exclusion of dissenting voices in increasingly complex negotiations
(Kuyper, 2015).

To address this political injustice, the rules covering IPR at the national
and international levels need to be determined in circumstances that are
more open, inclusive and accountable than they currently are (Lever, 2008). Doing so can help to prevent prolonged fights over the morality of particular patentable inventions (Liddell, 2012), over the consequences of patent rights granted for cultural norms in the Global South, and prevent biopiracy in cases that are not as self-evidently abusive as the recent effort by a US company to patent traditional basmati rice (Orozco & Poonamallee, 2014). Furthermore, mechanisms need to be established so that provisions to protect the interests of vulnerable populations, such as the right to issue compulsory licences, remain in place and are not rescinded when negotiating binational and regional trade agreements (Dutfield, 2008).

## CONCLUSIONS

At present, there is relatively little scope for distinctly moral considerations in the adjudication of IP claims (Liddell, 2012), in part because of the legal assumption that there must be *no* morally acceptable use for an idea if it is to be denied IP protection. The justification for such a high standard is that governments are perfectly free to determine what patent and copyright holders are then entitled to do – or not do – with their IP-protected ideas. This distinction looked like a helpful way to recognise the creation of innovative ideas and expressions, while (at least in principle) creating considerable flexibility in regulating their use in light of concerns for their morality, safety or efficacy – though TRIPS has effectively prevented that. However, to focus only on that aspect of current rules misses the point that some objections to IP are motivated by the belief that some things should not be treated as *private* property, and therefore seen as subject to the exclusive use and control of anyone (Ossorio, 2002). In other cases, the concern is that IP rights treat and turn into property things that should not be thought of as property to begin with. (Lever, 2008). Both worries about the moral implications of IP can be found in opposition to patents on human genes and other life forms, on medicines as well as surgical techniques and in the treatment of TK, and point to the ways that implicit ideas of morality underpin the discovery/invention distinction which provides the central criterion of patentability (Liddell, 2012; Wilson, 2012).

There is wide support for the idea that some goods need to be considered *public goods* normatively (cf. O'Neill, 2018), such that nobody ought to be excluded from benefiting from them, and that at least some inventions fall under that rubric. This was also the understanding that was defended by Jonas Salk who developed the first polio vaccine (van den Belt & Korthals, 2013), and that explains the urgency felt by John Sulston and others who wanted the sequence of the human genome to be freely available to all (Sulston & Ferry, 2002; Ferry 2018). More recently, the idea that some inventions should be treated as public goods morally, given their importance to human rights,
figured in arguments for lifting exclusive rights over the Covid-19 vaccines to
allow wider access to them (Club de Madrid, 2021). In other cases, consid-
erations of *intergenerational justice* combined with the urgency of addressing
climate change, raise concerns about the way IP rights might prevent the rapid
introduction and use of green innovations and technologies in poor, as well
as rich, countries. (Biddle, 2016). We simply do not have the time to wait for
patents to expire – let alone copyrights – before making energy-saving as well
as green energy technologies more widely available.

In short, some innovations are not merely commodities for private con-
sumption but concern the prerequisites and necessities of human life. IP, at
least as currently constituted, makes it extremely difficult adequately to rec-
ognise and act on this morally fundamental distinction. It is therefore urgent
to establish suitably inclusive, deliberative settings at national and interna-
tional levels to address ethical problems in our current IP regime. This is nec-
essary to prevent the unreflective global imposition of what are, at best, only
some amongst a potentially infinite set of morally permissible norms of IP.
And it is necessary to prevent the worst: where global rules of IP actively fos-
ter and enforce immoral and dangerously misguided ideas about the worth
of human lives, capacities, activities and relationships with each other and
with the non-human world.

REFERENCES

Altieri, M. A., & Toledo, V. M. (2011). The Agroecological Revolution in Latin America: Res-
cuing Nature, Ensuring Food Sovereignty and Empowering Peasants. *Journal of Peasant
Studies, 38*(3), 587–612.

Beitz, C. R. (2005). The Moral Rights of Creators of Artistic and Literary Works. *Journal of Political Philosophy, 13*(3), 330–58.

Bessen, J., Ford, J., & Meurer, M. J. (2011). The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls.
*Regulation, 34*, 26–35.

Biddle, J. B. (2016). Intellectual Property Rights and Global Climate Change: Toward Resolv-
ing an Apparent Dilemma. *Ethics, Policy & Environment, 19*(3), 301–19.

Biron, L. (2012). Public Reason, Communication, and Intellectual Property. In Lever, A. (ed.),
*New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property*, 225–60. Cambridge University
Press.

Boyle, J. (2008). *The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind*. Yale University Press.

Christman, J. (1994). *The Myth of Property: Toward an Egalitarian Theory of Ownership*. Oxford University Press.

Christman, J. (2012). Autonomy, Social Selves, and Intellectual Property Claims. In Lever, A. (ed.), *New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property*, 33–57. Cambridge University Press.

Club de Madrid. (2021). *Former Heads of State and Nobel Laureates Call on President Biden to Waive Intellectual Property Rules for COVID Vaccines*.

Demuijnck, G. (2012). Illegal Downloading, Free Riding, and Justice. In Lever, A. (ed.), *New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property*, 261–83. Cambridge University Press.
Drahos, P., & Braithwaite, J. (2003). *Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?* New Press.

Drassinower, A. (2008). Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity of Copyright vis-à-vis Patent and Trade-Mark. *Michigan State Law Review*, 199–232.

Dutfield, G. (2008). Delivering Drugs to the Poor: Will the TRIPS Amendment Help? *American Journal of Law & Medicine*, 34(2–3), 107–24.

Dutfield, G. (2012). 'The Genetic Code Is 3.6 billion Years Old: It's Time for a Rewrite': Questioning the Metaphors and Analogies of Synthetic Biology and Life Science Patenting. In Lever, A. (ed.), *New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property*, 172–202. Cambridge University Press.

Ferry, G. (2018). John Sulston (1942–2018). *Nature*, 555(7696), 588–9.

Hall, B. H., Helmers, C., von Graevenitz, G., & Rosazza-Bondibene, C. (2012). A Study of Patent Thickets: Final Report Prepared for the UK Intellectual Property Office. *Report, National Institute of Social and Economic Research*.

Hamilton, C. (2006). Biodiversity, Biopiracy and Benefits: What Allegations of Biopiracy Tell Us about Intellectual Property. *Developing World Bioethics*, 6(3), 158–73.

Heller, M. A., & Eisenberg, R. S. (1998). Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research. *Science*, 280(5364), 698–701.

Hettinger, E. C. (1989). Justifying Intellectual Property. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 18(1), 31–52.

Jaggar, A. M. (2010). *Thomas Pogge and His Critics*. Polity Press.

Khan, B. Z. (2005). *The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in American Economic Development*, 1790–920. Cambridge University Press.

Kidd, I. J. (2012). Biopiracy and the Ethics of Medical Heritage: The Case of India’s Traditional Knowledge Digital Library. *Journal of Medical Humanities*, 33(3), 175–83.

Kuyper, J. (2015). Deliberative Capacity in the Intellectual Property Rights Regime Complex. *Critical Policy Studies*, 9(3), 317–38.

Lametti, D. (2012). The Virtuous P(eer): Reflections on the Ethics of File Sharing. In Lever, A. (ed.), *New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property*, 284–306. Cambridge University Press.

Lemley, M. A. (2012). The Myth of the Sole Inventor. *Michigan Law Review*, 110, 709–60.

Lever, A. (2008). Is It Ethical to Patent Human Genes? In Gosseries, A., Marciano, A., & Strowel, A. (eds.), *Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice*, 246–64. Palgrave Macmillan.

Liddell, K. (2012). Immorality and Patents: The Exclusion of Inventions Contrary to Ordre Public and Morality. In Lever, A. (ed.), *New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property*, 140–71. Cambridge University Press.

May, C. (2007). The Hypocrisy of Forgetfulness: The Contemporary Significance of Early Innovations in Intellectual Property. *Review of International Political Economy*, 14(1), 1–25.

Munzer, S. R. (ed.). (2001). *New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property*. Cambridge University Press.

Munzer, S. R. (2012). Corrective Justice and Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge. In Lever, A. (ed.), *New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property*, 58–87. Cambridge University Press

Murray, K. N. (2006). Rules for Radicals: A Politics of Patent Law. *Journal of Intellectual Property Law*, 14, 63–110.

Noonan, W. D. (1995). Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures. *Journal of the Patent & Trademark Office Society*, 77, 651–64.

Nozick, R. (1974). *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. Basic Books.
Nuffield Council on Bioethics. (2002). The Ethics of Patenting DNA: A Discussion Paper. *Nuffield Council on Bioethics*.

O'Neill, John. 2018. 'Food, Needs and Commons'. In Vivero-Pol, J. L., Ferrando, T., De Schutter, O., & Mattei, U. (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Food as a Commons*, 103–20. Routledge.

Orozco, D., & Poonamallee, L. (2014). The Role of Ethics in the Commercialization of Indigenous Knowledge. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 119, 275–86.

Ossorio, P. N. (2002). Property Rights and Human Bodies. In Magnus D., Caplan, A., & McGee, G. (eds.), *Who Owns Life?*, 223–42. Prometheus Books.

Pogge, T. (2005). Symposium on World Poverty and Human Rights. *Ethics and International Affairs*, 19(1). https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2005.tb00484.x

Pogge, T., Rimmer, M., & Rubenstein, K. (eds.). (2010). Incentives for Global Public Health: Patent Law and Access to Essential Medicines. *Cambridge University Press*.

Prifti, V. (2016). Die Rolle des öffentlichen Interesses an Pflanzenpatenten: Eine europäische Perspektive. In *Biopatente*, 55-74. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.

Resnik, D. B. (1997). The Morality of Human Gene Patents. *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*, 7(1), 43–61.

Safirin, S. (2004). Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnological Promise: The International Conflict to Control the Building Blocks of Life. *American Journal of International Law*, 98(4), 641–85.

Sulston, J., & Ferry, G. (2002). *The Common Thread: A Story of Science, Politics, Ethics, and the Human Genome*. Bantam Press.

Thomas, G., & De Tavernier, J. (2017). Farmer-Suicide in India: Debating the Role of Bio-technology. *Life Sciences, Society, and Policy*, 13, 8.

Timmermann, C. (2020). *Social Justice and Agricultural Innovation*. Springer.

Van den Belt, H., & Korthals, M. (2013). The International Patent System and the Ethics of Global Justice. In Arapostathis, S., & Dutfield, G. (eds.), *Knowledge Management and Intellectual Property: Concepts, Actors, and Practices from the Past to the Present*, 235–51. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Waldron, J. (2020). Property and Ownership. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Wilson, J. G. S. (2012). On the Value of the Intellectual Commons. In Lever, A. (ed.), *New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property*, 122–39. Cambridge University Press.

Wolff, J. (1991). *Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State*. Polity Press.

Wyver, K. (2020). Not Waiting for Godot: New Show Tackles Beckett’s Ban on Women. *The Guardian*, 18.