# Do the companies of the future have a future? A case-based overview of the structure, development and limitations of delivery platforms

Sterenn Lebayle

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Sterenn Lebayle. Do the companies of the future have a future? A case-based overview of the structure, development and limitations of delivery platforms. Work Organisation, Labour & Globalisation, 2025, 19 (3), pp.462-483. 10.13169/workorgalaboglob.19.3.0008. hal-05422853

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# Do the companies of the future have a future?

A case-based overview of the structure, development and limitations of delivery platforms

Sterenn Lebayle

**Sterenn Lebayle** is Post-doctoral Researcher in Analyse des Crises et Transitions at the University of Paris 13, France.
E-mail: sterenn.lebayle@univ-grenoble-alpes.fr
ORCID: 0009-0009-0834-1161

## ABSTRACT

On-demand service platforms like Uber, Deliveroo and Foodora have operated for over a decade. Yet, they have still not achieved profitability. Do these challenges stem from the particular aspects of their business models, such as two-sided markets and digital platforms, or do they reveal deeper structural issues? This article analyses Deliveroo's financial statements and synthesises data from its key stakeholders – restaurants, delivery couriers and consumers. It aims to examine the company's economic framework, track its trajectory since 2018, and highlight the constraints on its growth. The findings show that Deliveroo's cost structure is dominated by variable costs, while revenue from restaurants and consumers remains relatively stable. Since 2022, the two main drivers of profitability – platform growth and reductions in courier compensation – have stagnated, while rising inflation has created substantial obstacles to the financial sustainability of these platforms.

## KEY WORDS

on-demand delivery; uberisation; Deliveroo; multi-sided platform; digital innovation

DOI: 10.13169/workorgalaboglob.19.3.0008
Introduction

On-demand service platforms emerged in the mid-2010s, focusing on mobility and
home delivery, and experienced rapid growth in the following years. Their defining
feature is an employment model that relies on a flexible, self-employed workforce, often
earning hourly wages below the minimum wage in the countries where they operate – a
phenomenon now commonly referred to as ‘uberisation.’ While these employment
arrangements, characterised by task-based compensation and algorithmic management
(Rosenblat, 2018), remain a relatively small segment of the overall labour market,<fnref n="1" /> they
are seen as a significant shift in the employment relationship (see, for example,
Dieuaide, 2019; Durand, 2020; Huws, 2015; Scholz, 2013; Schor et al., 2020). Some
scholars predict that these business models may continue to expand into other
economic sectors (Montalban et al., 2019).

Another notable yet less frequently examined characteristic of these companies is their persistent difficulty achieving profitability, leading to substantial financial losses. For example, Uber has reported losses totalling over $32.8 billion since its inception (Uber, 2023:19), while Deliveroo's losses had surpassed $6 billion by 2021 (Daugareilh et al., 2021). These challenges should ostensibly limit the appeal of these platforms as models to emulate. Nonetheless, they are often linked to the innovative aspects of digital platform business models (Evans & Schmalensee, 2017; Parker et al., 2017). This persistent unprofitability remains poorly understood, particularly given the low wages paid to their workers. This lack of analysis complicates an objective evaluation of the platform's business performance.

This article aims to document the economic structure of these companies through a
detailed case study of Deliveroo. It employs mixed methods, including an analysis of
the company's financial reports, a review of existing empirical literature, and a series of
13 semi-structured interviews with restaurant owners. It seeks to explain the reasons
behind platforms' ongoing struggle for profitability and to assess whether this issue is
likely to be temporary or permanent. Additionally, the article examines the impact of
resurgent inflation, which has created an unprecedented macroeconomic environment
for these companies.

In the on-demand service economy, home delivery stands out as one of the
fastest-growing<fnref n="2" /> and most labour-intensive<fnref n="3" /> segments, justifying a close examination.
This sector has notable similarities with mobility platforms, particularly in the high
weighting of variable costs and in its profitability dynamics, suggesting that insights

<footnote n="1">1 In France, for example, a major market for mobility and delivery platforms, fewer than 100,000 workers would be directly affected by this status, according to the hearing of Pierre Ranain, Director General of Labour at the Ministry of Labour, heard on this subject by the parliamentary commission of inquiry before the French National Assembly (report n°8, 9 March 2023). https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/organes/autres-commissions/commissions-enquete/ce-uber-files/documents?typeDocument=crc [accessed 11 November 2024]</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 As the evolution of the Uber platform's sales highlights: the share of delivery rose from 13% to 34% of sales between 2018 and 2022, while that of mobility declined relatively, from 84% to 44% over the same period (Uber, 2020, 2023).</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3 Employment figures for the gig economy are still estimates. In France, Deliveroo and Uber Eats are estimated to employ 20,000 and 65,000 couriers, respectively (with potential overlap), for a total estimated volume of 100,000 gig economy jobs.</footnote>
from this case study may also be relevant to adjacent activities. However, there are some
differences compared to mobility platforms. First, the costs and assets borne by workers
are significantly higher in mobility, shaping a different relationship between workers
and platforms. Second, the mobility market involves only two parties – the driver and
the passenger – resulting in simpler pricing dynamics. Lastly, bypassing the ‘cab rent’
makes the mobility market more solvent. For these reasons, achieving profitability
appears more attainable for mobility platforms, despite their economic features
remaining closely aligned with those of the delivery sector.

This article aims to clarify the structure and economic dynamics of these platforms,
using Deliveroo's annual reports, which provide data spanning six years of the
platform's activity, from 2018 to 2023. The Deliveroo platform examined in this article
is a British on-demand delivery company founded in 2013 and publicly listed in 2021.<fnref n="4" />
Its business model is typical of the sector: the platform engages self-employed couriers,
paid per task, to operate direct deliveries between independent restaurants and
consumers.<fnref n="5" /> Monetisation relies on a dual revenue stream: a commission charged to
restaurants (typically 20–30% of the order value); and direct fees billed to consumers.
Deliveroo was selected for this case study due to the availability of data since its IPO in
March 2021, which is not accessible for unlisted platforms or those integrated into
larger groups (such as Foodora, now a subsidiary of Takeaway). Additionally,
Deliveroo's exclusive focus on the on-demand delivery sector provides relatively precise
data, unlike multi-service platforms such as Uber or Meituan. Analysing Deliveroo's
business model, which is similar to most on-demand delivery platforms, offers valuable
insights into the organisation of this industry.

Key findings include the following observations. First, the prominence of variable
costs in the platform's cost structure shows that, contrary to platform narratives, its
activity will remain low-margin. Second, the identification of stagnation of revenue
streams on consumers and restaurants from 2018 to 2022 raises doubts about the capacity
of these models to generate profits. Third, it sheds light on the identification of the main
causes of the improvement in profitability, only half of which seems to be linked to
growth, with the other half attributable to the impoverishment of couriers. Fourth, it
makes it possible to study the integration of the post-pandemic context, particularly the
role of resurgent inflation in shaping the platform's performance since 2022.

The article is organised as follows: The next section examines how the specific
characteristics of on-demand platforms are shaped by financial dynamics, and discusses
how existing literature has addressed the narratives developed by these firms. This is
followed by a section that presents the methodology used for the case study. The next
section investigates the structural constraints on Deliveroo's profitability, focusing on its
cost structure and revenue evolution since 2018. The final section explores the recent

<footnote n="4">4 Since May 2025, Deliveroo has been involved in a takeover process by the Doordash platform. The £2.9 billion offer could be finalised in autumn 2025.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">5 Since 2018, the platform has also expanded its activities to include grocery delivery. This continues to represent a small, albeit growing, proportion of the company's business. In the second half of 2024, the value of shopping baskets transported reached 16% of the platform's total gross value (Deliveroo, 2025:3). Although the growth rate of this segment has been modest so far, it could continue to rise in the future.</footnote>
improvements in platform operating results, analysing the contributing factors and the
shifting dynamics associated with the return of inflation from 2022 onward.

## Context and literature review

On-demand service platforms emerged in the early 2010s, claiming to transform sectors such as ride-hailing, delivery, and housekeeping by outsourcing labour and resources – a process commonly referred to as ‘uberisation.’ Their development coincided with a period of expansive monetary policy introduced in the aftermath of the financial crisis, which played a key role in shaping both the specific features of these platforms and their rapid rise.

This financial background created highly favourable conditions for venture capital: first by generating an influx of capital seeking high returns; and second by contributing to the rise of stock markets that offered attractive exit opportunities for startups via Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) (Dubocage & Rivaud-Danset, 2006). These financial conditions were instrumental in shaping not only platforms’ funding strategies but also the narratives they developed to attract capital.

Venture capital seeks to fund innovative, high-risk activities that exhibit three key characteristics. First, they rely on technological infrastructures with high fixed costs and strong potential for increasing returns. Second, they must be scalable on a global level, promising substantial growth. Finally, they often operate within network industries that favour monopolistic, winner-takes-most market consolidation (Armstrong, 2006).

The combination of these characteristics leads to a typical three-stage development model. The initial phase is both risky and costly, requiring significant investment to overcome the chicken-and-egg problem (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003). Once a critical mass of users is achieved, the company enters a rapid growth phase, aiming for monopolistic consolidation. In the mature phase, the company is expected to generate high profitability due to increasing returns and market dominance, which create significant barriers to entry for competitors and substantial exit costs for consumers. A key feature of this model is the time lag between investment and returns.

To fit into this funding ecosystem, on-demand platforms have had to develop narratives aligned with investor expectations. This has resulted in two key features of their models.

First, these platforms emphasise their technological dimension in order to dissimulate the labour-intensive nature of their operations. They present themselves as tech firms that develop matchmaking software, rather than as service providers. Algorithmic management plays a central role in achieving this aim, as it allows them to outsource labour by portraying their workers as entrepreneurs consuming platform software as production tools (Rosenblat, 2018). By doing so, they not only reduce costs but also align their presentation with investor expectations, framing their core business as a high-risk, high-profit technological venture, with success hinging on its growth dynamics – exactly the type of investment venture capital seeks. In this context, Uber’s reputation is less about the uniqueness of its service and more about being one of the
first to adopt these narrative strategies, branding itself as 'a global tech platform serving multiple multi-trillion dollar markets with products leveraging our core technology and infrastructure' (Uber, 2020:2).

Second, on-demand service platforms prioritise growth in massive markets over targeting a limited, solvent market. This is because venture capitalists prioritise start-up growth over short-term profitability, as they make their profits from the resale of shares rather than from dividends (Cherif, 2008). Consequently, platforms justify their negative financial results as temporary, attributing them to the early stage of a network-driven business model. They continuously raise funds to subsidise consumers and facilitate their growth, which in turn facilitates the success of future fundraising efforts – a speculative strategy that can indeed be regarded as a relevant investment strategy when companies are expected to generate substantial returns as they mature.

Such an approach relies on the premise that scaling will eventually lead to profitability – a belief widely supported in the economic literature. Many studies have viewed platforms as disruptive innovations (Brodeur & Nield, 2018; Christensen et al., 2015; Cramer & Krueger, 2016; Rivares et al., 2019), interpreting their current lack of profitability as a temporary feature of an emerging business model (Belleflamme, 2017; Belleflamme & Neysen, 2017; Carballa Smichowski, 2018; Cusumano et al., 2019; Evans & Schmalensee, 2017). However, this perspective often underemphasises critical elements such as the platforms' actual cost structures and the solvency of the markets they operate in – factors that are essential for determining whether on-demand platforms can adhere to this development model.

Meanwhile, critical research has challenged the technological narrative promoted by platforms. It has been shown that algorithmic management enables platforms to avoid standard employment costs while exerting tight control over a formerly independent workforce. Thus, worker misclassification emerges as the key cost-reduction mechanism (Bernard, 2020; Montalban et al., 2019; Schor et al., 2020; Van Doorn & Chen, 2021). However, these studies have confined their conclusions to the field of labour relations, without addressing the paradoxical lack of profitability of these models – a crucial feature when assessing the potential for such marginal forms of employment to expand throughout the broader economy.

Sector-specific studies have begun to address this gap. In the ride-hailing sector, some have challenged the idea of a digital comparative advantage, showing that cost structures closely resemble those of traditional taxi services (Horan, 2017; 2019; Sauviat, 2019). Similarly, research on delivery platforms has questioned their operational efficiency, noting that professionalising the courier workforce generates costs similar to those of conventional services (Belhaj & Paché, 2020; Buldeo Rai et al., 2017), while additional structural inefficiencies include decentralised logistics, reliance on outsourced vehicles, and limited economies of scale (Qi et al., 2018). These studies suggest that the digital organisation of these services does not improve – instead, often worsening – their economic fundamentals. The platforms' persistent lack of profitability thus stems primarily from structural inefficiencies.

This article aims to further this line of inquiry by offering a detailed analysis of on-demand platform business models, grounded in financial data. We advance three key arguments. First, the economic model of on-demand service platforms more closely
resembles that of traditional and low-margin service firms than that of high-tech companies. In doing so, we challenge both the ‘techno-exceptionalism’ (Rosenblat, 2018) and the ‘platform disruption’ narratives that dominate current discourse. Second, we argue that platform losses are not transitional but structural, reflecting the ongoing difficulty of creating sufficient value to offset costs. Third, we show that post-pandemic macroeconomic shifts are reshaping the funding environment for these still-unprofitable firms in a paradoxical way, improving their financial performance while limiting their ability to raise additional funds – an issue that has received limited attention despite its growing significance.

Methodology

This article presents a case study based on an analysis of the documentation published by Deliveroo, a delivery platform listed on the London Stock Exchange in March 2021. We chose this platform for two main reasons. First, Deliveroo provides relatively detailed data on its activities, going back to 2018. Second, this information relates to a single business segment – restaurant food delivery<fnref n="6" /> – ensuring greater clarity in the income statements. Comparisons with data from competing platforms, such as Uber Eats and Meituan, further support the generalisability of the observations made in the Deliveroo case.

The analysis was conducted in two stages, using mixed methods. First, we analysed the company’s financial reports to identify relevant accounting indicators that could describe the business’s economic structure on a global scale – as this is the only scale at which all costs, including depreciation and amortisation, can be included in the analysis. Deliveroo’s documentation gave us access to data covering the period from 2018 to 2023.

Second, we connected these insights to field data on stakeholders, namely couriers, restaurant managers, and consumers. Our data collection focused specifically on the French market, a dynamic and important market for the platform economy. France represents Deliveroo’s largest market outside the UK, accounting for approximately 16% of its global revenue and 40% of its revenue outside the UK and Ireland. In France, Deliveroo’s main competitor is Uber Eats, which generates around 18% of its global revenue there.<fnref n="7" /> Concentrating on a single national market enabled us to gather precise and detailed information, which helped contextualise the trends identified in the financial reports and assess the limits of the platform’s value capture from each stakeholder group.

<footnote n="6">6 Grocery deliveries, introduced in 2018, accounted for just 8% of gross order value in 2021, and 10% in 2022. In the second half of 2023, it reached 13% and then 16% in the second half of 2024. For this reason, we consider the impact of grocery delivery to be marginal on the platform’s overall economy over the period covered by this article (2018–2023).</footnote>

<footnote n="7">7 The sales figures were taken from the financial statements of Uber Eats SAS France (2022) and Deliveroo SAS (2021) and were compared with the sales figures communicated in the financial reports of Deliveroo (2021) and Uber (2022 – in the latter case, only the sales declared for the delivery segment were considered). The exchange rate on 1 January 2020 was used for Deliveroo and the exchange rate on 31 December 2021 was used for Uber Eats.</footnote>
For couriers, we mainly focused on tracking changes in hourly pay and working conditions – key indicators for assessing whether improvements in platform finances stem from increased productivity or from a deterioration in couriers’ livelihoods. The latter would suggest stricter limitations on the platforms’ future capacity to capture value. Our analysis drew on sources available on the French market, documenting the evolution of courier pay and working conditions. We relied on two quantitative surveys conducted at different times but following comparable methodologies, that is, administering a questionnaire to large samples of couriers recruited on the street (Dablanc et al., 2021; Rème-Harnay, 2020), as well as data disclosed by the platforms themselves, as required by French law.<fnref n="8" /> These were further complemented by grey literature, including data gathered by courier unions<fnref n="9" /> and minutes from a parliamentary commission hearing.<fnref n="10" />

The way restaurants integrate delivery platforms is generally less documented (Zhang, 2021). To explore how restaurants have integrated delivery into their business models and understand the factors behind variations in commission rates, we conducted thirteen semi-structured interviews – six with traditional restaurants and seven with fast-food establishments. The value of this kind of panel lies in its ability to capture consistent observed practices rather than statistical representativeness (Blanchet & Gotman, 2001). When constructing the sample, we aimed to reflect social realities while ensuring that a diverse range of profiles was included, capable of illustrating the various conditions under which the activity is carried out, regardless of their frequency within the population. Accordingly, we selected restaurants with varied characteristics, taking into account segment type (traditional or fast-food), establishment size and geographic location. Particular attention was given to the latter by including restaurants from Paris, three other metropolitan areas, and a medium-sized city (population 60,000). These interviews, carried out between November 2020 and March 2021, were recorded, fully transcribed, and subjected to thematic analysis. More detailed results of this survey are presented in another paper (Lebayle, 2024).<fnref n="11" />

<footnote n="8">8 In France, since 2021, and in accordance with the Mobility Orientation Law of 26 December 2019 platforms are required to report a series of indicators regarding courier services: average duration of deliveries, average income per delivery, and average waiting time between deliveries. Handling this data requires caution, as, although the indicators must follow the guidelines set by decree, they are subject to limited administrative oversight. For example, these indicators do not take into account the approach time or the waiting time in front of restaurants. The figures can be accessed at the following addresses. For the data published in 2022 by Deliveroo: https://web.archive.org/web/20220323094059/https://riders.deliveroo.fr/fr/indicateurs碗 activite For the data published in 2023 by Deliveroo: https://web.archive.org/web/20230329094412/https://riders.deliveroo.fr/fr/indicateurs碗 activite For Uber Eats: https://www.uber.com/fr/blog/indicateurs-dactivite-des-plateformes -pour-lannee-2021/</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9 An important source is the union website 'La rue est notre usine,' which listed the minimum rates charged by Deliveroo in all the cities covered by the platform at the time of the transformation of rates in the summer of 2018. https://larueestnotreusine.wordpress.com/2018/09/15/deliveroo-et-la-nouvelle-tarification-que-risquons -nous/ [accessed on 5 July 2025]</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10 All the hearing transcripts can be downloaded from the following page: https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr /dyn/16/organes/autres-commissions/commissions-enquete/ce-uber-files/documents?typeDocument=crc [accessed on 11 November 2024]</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11 Although the interviews took place during a period of administrative restrictions linked to the pandemic, this seems to have had a limited impact on how deliveries were handled by the restaurants. Indeed, during lockdowns, many traditional restaurants chose to close and rely on public support, as delivery alone was not</footnote>
This research allows us to consider the limits of value capture by platforms on the restaurant side.

On the consumers' side, Deliveroo's available documentation did not include sufficient data to track changes in consumer pricing. In fact, it did not split revenues between revenues derived from restaurants and those derived from consumers, meaning that their respective trends were largely unknown. To compensate for these data limitations – and given our resource constraints – we assembled a small sample of consumer receipts. This dataset consists of 62 bills (excluding promotions and subscriptions) collected from nine Deliveroo and Uber Eats users in France. Although the sample size did not allow for rigorous statistical analysis, it enabled a detailed examination of price variations over time, particularly when key factors such as address and consumption habits remained consistent. Despite its exploratory nature and limited scope, this approach produced interesting findings that merit further investigation.

Overall, despite the various limitations of these data sets and the imbalance between stakeholder groups, combining these different sources enables us to provide a general and comprehensive analysis of the trends observed in the financial reports.

## Main features of delivery platform activity

In line with venture capitalists' expectations, the outsourcing of the workforce and the adoption of the concept of the 'three-sided platform' narrative have allowed delivery platforms to portray their operations as a mere facilitation of interactions among independent market participants: restaurants, consumers, and couriers. Following this narrative, these three customer groups would be able to attract each other, driving exponential growth. The platform's role in this model would be limited to managing a digital application, which incurs mainly fixed costs, while its revenues scale up with increased participation across the network.

However, an analysis of Deliveroo's financial statements clearly presents a different picture of the platform's business organisation. It highlights two critical features: first, the predominance of variable costs in its cost structure; and second, stagnating revenue per order over time. These findings call into question two fundamental narratives: that growth would lower costs and that network externalities would increase revenue.

## An activity with high variable costs

Variable costs, which rise in relation to the company's activity, resist economies of scale. They structurally limit returns, and, for this reason, activities with high variable costs are not best suited for venture capital investors. Yet, an analysis of Deliveroo's income statements reveals that these costs dominate the economic structure of delivery platforms. They represent mainly courier remuneration. Since the platform directly

<footnote>profitable for them. Meanwhile, fast-food establishments generally passed platform commissions on to consumers through price increases. The survey did not focus specifically on the impact of the pandemic, as the primary objective was to understand broader business dynamics connected to delivery.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_2.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 1:** Deliveroo results, based on the company's published income statements. Cost of sales essentially covers courier remuneration. Administrative expenses include costs internalised by the platform: IT, marketing, support functions. Vertical axis values are expressed in £ millions. Graph produced by the author, based on Deliveroo's annual reports</figcaption></figure>

manages payments to couriers – regardless of whether they are classified as employees or independent contractors – labour costs are reflected in the company's financial statements and must be incorporated into pricing. Between 2018 and 2021, courier compensation consistently represented 70% to 80% of total revenue, as illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the parallel progression of total revenue and courier compensation (recorded as 'cost of sales'). This is a significant difference compared to payments to restaurants, which pass through the platform but do not appear in its accounts, as the platform does not purchase dishes or restaurant services. This challenges the platform's narrative that couriers are equivalent to other 'users' of the app, such as consumers or restaurants, and instead highlights their central role in the company's cost structure (Figure 1).

This cost structure is not unique to Deliveroo and is also present in other platforms. For instance, the Chinese platform Meituan has provided specific data about its delivery business for several years, allowing us to analyse its cost structure over this period. In a much larger market that has allowed the company to achieve profitability by spreading out fixed costs, labour expenses still account for a similar proportion, approximately 70% of sales (Meituan, 2020; 2021, 2022).

High variable costs reflect the labour-intensive nature of platform operations, resulting in rigid returns and limited profitability. This cost structure questions the scalability narrative and the viability of their financing strategies, as their profitability is less dependent on growth, instead hinging more on the ability to allocate relatively rigid costs between consumers and restaurants.
<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 2:** Average sales per order. Graph produced by the author, based on Deliveroo's annual reports</figcaption></figure>

## Stagnant revenues

Contrary to the 'network externality' paradigm, platform revenues stagnated between 2018 and 2022, as shown by trends in the average revenue per order: in 2018, the platform received an average of £6.61 per order, and, despite some narrow oscillations with a peak during the 2020's COVID-19 crisis, it still received £6.60 five years later. Although the platform does not break down revenues into commissions taken from restaurants and consumer charges, analysing each side helps identify the sources of this stagnation (Figure 2).

## Restaurants

The first revenue component consists of commissions charged to restaurants. Revenue per order depends on two factors: the order's total value and the commission rate agreed upon between the platform and each restaurant. In the following section, we will revisit the trends in the values of delivery orders (which remained stable until 2021 but have played a significant role in the recent profitability improvements of the platforms). Here, we will focus exclusively on the commission rate, analysing the factors that limit any future increase.

The commission rate, negotiated between the platform and each restaurant, varies by establishment, and the platform does not disclose any data to track how these rates have evolved over time. To identify the factors influencing commission levels, we conducted semi-structured interviews with restaurant managers in France. The findings reveal that the same platform service affects fast-food and traditional restaurants in qualitatively different ways. Consequently, the logic behind how commission rates are set differs significantly between these two types of establishments.
Traditional sit-down restaurants use delivery services to optimise their under-utilised production capacity and raise additional cash, with limited risk of cannibalising their core business. They are willing to accept high commission rates, which in France have stabilised at the standard level of 30% of order value since at least 2018. This rate aligns closely with the gross margins that traditional restaurants typically earn on individual dishes, effectively representing an upper limit for commission rates. In fact, these restaurants generate relatively low volumes through delivery platforms (typically less than ten orders a day), and their profitability does not rely on this 'opportunist' activity. If commissions exceed the established gross margin ceiling, they can choose to suspend their participation or decline to join the platform altogether. For instance, one restaurant owner interviewed declined a partnership at a 35% commission rate but later agreed to a partnership at the standard 30% rate. Consequently, the 30% commission rate functions as a ceiling, as it corresponds to a well-defined accounting benchmark for restaurateurs.

In contrast, fast-food restaurants benefit from significantly lower commission rates, ranging from 20% to 27% according to those who responded to our inquiries. Large franchised chains may even secure lower rates, although they did not provide us with specific data (some data can be found in Vanson-Magalhães Da Silva, 2021). In this case, delivery serves as a growth lever for these businesses, although the risk of cannibalising their core activity is also higher, since dine-in and takeaway services tend to appear more substitutable. Restaurateurs aim to protect their margins by consistently passing on commissions into their sales prices – a strategy seldom seen among traditional restaurant managers. Consequently, the competitiveness of these restaurants on delivery platforms and their capacity to leverage the platform effectively is directly tied to the commission levels, which are aggressively negotiated. These fast-food establishments find themselves in a symbiotic relationship with the platforms: they must offer delivery to stay competitive, in a context of strong substitutability between sales channels and competitors, while the platforms depend on the fast-food sector to generate high volumes during peak demand periods, which is essential for achieving a critical mass of deliveries in specific regions.

Considering these factors, which are influenced by the economic strategies and constraints of restaurants as well as their relationships with platforms, an increase in commission rates favouring the platform appears unlikely. Restaurateurs are not willing to pay more as the platform expands. On the one hand, commissions cannot rise on the traditional restaurant side, where they already align with what players regard as an accounting threshold. On the other hand, the increasing contribution of fast-food restaurants to sales volume – though challenging to quantify without detailed data – could even potentially lead to a decline in average commissions due to the generally lower rates applied in that sub-segment. This is particularly likely if the growth of platforms continues, as this growth could depend more on the contribution of fast-food restaurants.

## Consumers

The second revenue component comes from consumer billing. These fees have become variable (in France, this happened in 2018) and are now divided into service fees
(linked to the order value) and delivery fees (linked to the delivery distance). The same policy is also adopted by competing platforms, such as Uber Eats.

In the disclosed data, Deliveroo does not split revenue between commission and consumer billing. As a result, accurately tracking the evolution of prices addressed to consumers is as challenging as monitoring the average commission applied in restaurants. Based on our research with restaurant owners, we can rule out the possibility of an increase in restaurant commissions over this period. The stability of the platform's revenue at around £6.60 per order from 2018 to 2022 can therefore be explained by two alternative hypotheses: either stable commissions and delivery charges; or a slight increase in delivery charges offsetting a decline in average commissions.

Given the scope of the markets, as well as the evolution and complexity of the billing model – which involves a variety of factors, including subscriptions and promotions – a comprehensive study of delivery charge trends that could definitively identify the correct hypothesis is beyond the scope of this research. In the absence of more detailed data, we conducted an exploratory analysis using a limited sample of bills from French consumers, helping to document commission trends. This analysis suggests that fees charged to consumers (excluding promotions and subscriptions) have generally risen since the end of flat rates in 2018 (which were €2.50 per delivery at that time). Additionally, it reveals the presence of price discrimination, as orders of similar value and distance are charged differently for different consumers, indicating the platforms' efforts to increase consumer contributions without impacting order volume. These observations are so far limited to the French market and to a narrow scope of observations, which would call for complementary research.

At the same time, the platforms have introduced subscription packages aimed at fostering customer loyalty by waiving all or part of the delivery fees for subscribers. The subscription price is very low, currently between €2.99 and €5.99 for a French consumer. Although Deliveroo does not disclose the exact number of accounts subscribed to its 'Deliveroo Plus' formula, it does report a rapid increase in membership. Moreover, while these subscription models certainly cater to a relatively small percentage of consumers, they primarily target the most frequent customers, which may negatively impact overall revenues.

Overall, it is important to highlight that both platforms competing in the French market (Deliveroo and Uber Eats) have seen an upward trend in rates charged to non-subscribing consumers, along with the availability of largely similar subscription offerings. Thus, while it is challenging to determine the precise evolution of revenues from each side, this exploratory data suggests that the platform employs a strategy to increase the rates charged to consumers, possibly using advanced techniques such as price discrimination. Nevertheless, these initiatives appear to encounter a certain rigidity in rates, as reflected by the parallel increase in the number of subscribers to the subscription model, which appears to be necessary in order to maintain and increase volumes. Furthermore, even if these efforts were successful in increasing consumer contributions, they would only serve to compensate for the decline in commission income.

Ultimately, whether on the consumer side or the restaurant side, there do not appear to be any factors indicating an increase in the willingness to pay for the service over time.
# Factors for improvement of the profitability of delivery platforms

In the previous section, we showed that the platform faces relatively high variable costs that are difficult to cover – particularly since, on the revenue side, it encounters a ceiling on commission rates and limited consumer purchasing power at the large scale it is targeting. Yet, despite these constraints, the platform has experienced a significant increase in profitability since 2018. While Deliveroo's operating profit has consistently remained negative throughout the period, there has been a steady improvement, with profitability rising from –54% in 2018 to –2% in 2023. This apparently fed the scalability narrative of these platforms. In this section, we examine more closely what has caused this change and whether it is sustainable or merely temporary (Figure 3).

Two distinct periods emerge. From 2018 to 2021, two main drivers of profitability are evident: first, the company's growth, which allowed for the dilution of fixed costs; and second, the reduction in courier compensation. In 2022, these dynamics reached their limits: business growth plateaued, and courier pay hit a minimum – two trends confirmed by 2023 data. From 2022 onwards, inflation took over as the primary profitability driver, mainly through higher food prices. However, this improvement in profitability has a paradoxical effect on the platforms' financing methods, as we will discuss in the final sub-section.

## The role of growth and diluting fixed costs

Delivery platforms experienced significant growth during our observation period, with Deliveroo quadrupling its sales since 2018. The lockdown measures associated with the pandemic likely encouraged the continued adoption of the service without marking a clear break in its growth trajectory: growth in value reached 62% in 2019, 54% at the height of the pandemic in 2020, and 53% in 2021. In any event, this growth facilitated

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 3: Deliveroo operating profits (operating income/sales).**
Graph produced by the author, based on Deliveroo's annual reports</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 4:** Number of Deliveroo orders in active markets. Graph produced by the author, based on Deliveroo's annual reports</figcaption></figure>

the dilution of fixed costs related to application development, support services, and advertising. These costs, categorised as 'administrative expenses,' decreased from 73% to 45% of sales between 2018 and 2022.

However, platform growth seems to have plateaued in 2021, at the level of 300 million orders a year, as shown in the graph below. Although the 2022 slowdown may be due to withdrawal from two markets (the Netherlands and Australia), the 2023 contraction also corresponds to a slight decline in volumes in the remaining markets (Figure 4).

This slight contraction marks the platform's first decline since its launch. Due to this stabilisation, administrative expenses have remained between 38% and 45% of sales over the past three years. However, with variable costs at around 70% of sales, administrative expenses would need to fall below 30% for the platform to achieve profitability. Thus, while growth has had a notable impact, it appears to have been insufficient to establish a sustainable business model for the platform.

## Cost reduction through lower courier pay

Reduced courier compensation is the second major factor behind the platform's improved performance. This trend is clearly reflected in the average 'cost of sales,' which primarily consists of payments to couriers: from £5.35 per order in 2018, this steadily declined to a low of £4.41 per order in 2021 — a 17.5% reduction in cost per order (Figure 5).

This decline can be attributed to two factors, each having distinct implications for the platform's ongoing momentum.

First, the decrease in couriers' remuneration may be linked to enhanced productivity, as indicated by an increase in the number of deliveries completed within
<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 5:** Average cost of sale per order. Graph produced by the author, based on Deliveroo's annual reports</figcaption></figure>

the same time frame. The platform internalises this improvement, as intensified work leads to a reduction in the unit cost of deliveries. In this scenario, the price reduction improves the platform's economic balance without theoretically impacting couriers' hourly earnings.

This trend is observable in the early years of a delivery platform's operation. When first launched, these platforms typically attract small and unpredictable order volumes, making it challenging to establish a stable workforce of couriers. In such cases, couriers are often compensated with a fixed hourly rate. For instance, in France, the initial pay structure for couriers included an hourly rate of €7.50 along with an additional €2 to €4 per delivery (Daugareilh et al., 2021). Similarly, in the UK, an hourly pay system, ranging from £6 to £8, continued in areas where order volumes remained consistently low (Cant, 2020). As the urban network gradually improves – reflected in the increased number of orders and restaurant density – this optimisation of couriers’ working time and reduction in travel distance lead to a gradual shift towards strict piece-rate compensation. In France, for instance, pure task-based compensation replaced the previous payment system in the summer of 2016. This new remuneration model, which is based on a minimum rate per delivery, allowed the platform to reduce the unit cost of deliveries while also creating the potential for improved hourly wages for couriers if they increased their work pace (Lemozy, 2018). It is important to note that while the profitability gains achieved through this model are linked to enhancements within the platform, stemming from the quality of its network, they contradict the platform's narratives that portray their growth as beneficial for their ‘users’ and particularly for couriers. In reality, these observations indicate that the gains are primarily internalised by the platform, leading to greater work intensity for couriers without tangible benefits in terms of compensation.

Second, the decrease in couriers' compensation may also be directly related to their impoverishment, as the reduction in the unit price of deliveries is not compensated by
an increase in work intensity. Various observations indicate that this trend clearly overtook productivity improvements, and it did so relatively early in the process. In France, for instance, where the platform has been operational since 2015, this transition can be traced back to the summer of 2018. This coincided with the implementation of a new remuneration system. The new system involved a widespread reduction in minimum payment rates, geographical variations in compensation, and a significant increase in the complexity of the calculation methods, making the rate-setting process less transparent. Quantitative studies conducted by various research teams, employing the same methodology of administering questionnaires to couriers approached on the streets of Paris, reveal a declining trend in remuneration over time. An initial survey of 103 couriers in the spring of 2017 and 2018 found the average hourly compensation to be €11.40 (Rème-Harnay, 2020). In contrast, a subsequent survey of 517 couriers in early 2021 indicated that their gross earnings had dropped to approximately €10.50, with 40% of the respondents earning no more than €7.35 (Dablanc et al., 2021). These findings are further supported by remarks made by the Managing Director of Deliveroo France during a parliamentary commission inquiry in 2023. According to her remarks, based on the platform's internal data, couriers receive an average monthly compensation of €899 for an average of 29 hours of connection per week. This translates to a gross hourly wage of €7.19, calculated over 125 hours of work per month.<fnref n="12" /> These observations indicate significant impoverishment of the workforce. They align with international studies that illustrate a broader transformation of the gig-labour market, characterised by the replacement of previously student workers by foreign workers who often lack residence permits (Altenried, 2024).

The growth strategies employed by the platforms in the most recent period further contribute to this trend of impoverishment. As major metropolitan markets become saturated, business expansion increasingly targets less densely populated secondary towns. In its home market of the UK, Deliveroo has expanded its service coverage from 53% to 77% of the population between 2021 and 2022 (Deliveroo, 2022:4). This strategy results in longer delivery distances and a decrease in the average number of trips per hour, ultimately harming couriers' earnings, as this decline is typically not compensated by a return to guaranteed hourly wages.

From 2018 to 2022, we calculated that the decline in the share of courier compensation in Deliveroo's revenue contributed almost as much to the company's profit improvement as the dilution of fixed costs. Specifically, maintaining the proportion of administrative expenses at the 2018 level would have resulted in an additional £560 million loss in 2022, while keeping courier compensation at 80% of revenue would have represented, all else being equal, an additional £550 million loss. However, in this period of time, these declines appear to be more closely related to the impoverishment of the workforce than to an increase in delivery efficiency.

Will this trend continue? It seems to face a certain rigidity in labour remuneration. Starting in 2021, the downward trajectory in rates is likely to stabilise. Since 2021, the average cost of sales, meaning courier remuneration per order, has been stable.

<footnote n="12">¹² Numerous costs, such as social security contributions, taxes and fuel when couriers are motorised, still need to be deducted from this amount.</footnote>
Additionally, the significant role of worker impoverishment has made this trend more vulnerable to economic downturns, leading to potential social tensions (increased conflicts over payment methods and levels) and legal risks (possibility of reclassifying contracts). Moreover, if a significant disparity exists between local market minimums and current wages, any legal adjustments to couriers' pay could have even more adverse consequences for the platforms.

## Rising revenue: The inflation paradox

Thus, up until 2021, improvements in Deliveroo's operating result were attributable in roughly equal measure to lower delivery fees and the dilution of fixed costs. The period leading up to 2022 is characterised by two significant events: first, an unprecedented stabilisation in the order volumes processed by the platform; and second, the end of the downward trend in courier compensation. That is to say, the two main factors contributing to the platform's earnings growth were exhausted. Nevertheless, Deliveroo's profitability continued to rise, approaching breakeven by 2023. What explains the persistence of this trend?

Starting in 2022, the improvement in the platform's profitability is no longer linked to decreasing costs but to increasing revenues. Specifically, while the cost per order has decreased significantly since 2018 and revenue has remained stable, we observe a break in 2022 when costs stopped decreasing while revenue began to rise. These factors are contributing to a reduction in the disparity between costs and revenues, which can be seen in the graph below (Figure 6).

We can likely attribute this trend to the macroeconomic environment, particularly the resurgence of inflation in the markets where the platform operates – especially in Ireland and the UK, which account for half of its business. While pressure on workers

<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>Figure 6: Comparison between revenue and total cost per order. Graph produced by the author, based on Deliveroo's annual reports</figcaption></figure>
remains strong and their compensation stable, the average order value has increased by over a pound. Between 2022 and 2023, it increased from £22.89 to £24.03 on average across all markets. This rise, likely driven by higher food prices in restaurants, results in an improvement in commission income: average revenues per order now surpass those of 2020, a year that set records during the lockdowns.

From an operational standpoint, the inflationary environment is widening the gap between revenues and costs. The rise in revenues is complemented by efforts to control fixed costs, particularly marketing expenses, which decreased by 14% between 2022 and 2023. This enables the platform to approach profitability, although this progress appears largely independent of the typical challenges associated with growth and scaling. These insights suggest that these companies share more similarities with personal services firms, whose profitability is heavily influenced by the difference between worker compensation and customer purchasing power, than with high-tech companies, whose profitability primarily relies on growth and reducing fixed costs.

However, the improvement in the platform's operational performance is not without financial challenges. The return of inflation, if accompanied by rising interest rates, tends to constrain speculative activities previously allowed by the more permissive environment. Moreover, while there may be no direct causal link, falling volumes accompany rising prices. This situation limits the platforms' ability to raise capital, especially when it positions them as mature businesses with limited future growth potential to offer investors. This paradox highlights the ambiguity of using a funding model designed for tech ventures to finance a business that fundamentally operates more like a personal services company.

The return of inflation, coinciding with the maturation of platforms, raises the fundamental question of their future prospects. Their survival will depend on how swiftly they can transition from growth to profitability. Given the high turnover of their capital, and in particular the fact that the platforms receive payment from the consumer well before they themselves have to pay the couriers and reimburse the restaurant owners, cash flow needs should theoretically remain manageable. However, in order to achieve profitability before depleting their reserves and to stabilise this low-margin model, the social dimension – specifically the platforms' ability to sustain courier wages and status – remains a critical factor in their trajectory.

## Conclusion: Uberisation as a failed revolution?

Work platforms have presented themselves as key agents of transformation in service-based economies, claiming to improve service productivity through digitalisation and a reconfiguration of employment models. While critical literature challenges this narrative, it has, somewhat paradoxically, contributed to reinforcing the notion that these platforms embody a profound shift in the nature of labour relations by emphasising their disruptive effects.

However, based on the analysis presented in this article, we seriously question the scalability and viability of these organisational models. Gig-work organisation is primarily suited to labour-intensive, low-mechanisation activities – conditions that
precisely enable the blurring of boundaries between self-employment and wage labour, market and firm. Such conditions are typically found in personal service sectors, which often struggle to access a solvent mass market. Despite shifting to a precarious workforce, the platform model has not overcome the structurally low profitability of the services it offers and has failed to improve competitiveness in these activities.

As a result, most of these platforms have failed to achieve profitability and increasingly appear unsustainable – even from the perspective of their own investors. So the £6 billion invested in Deliveroo by 2021 now represents a market capitalisation of less than £3 billion – a devaluation of more than 50%, discouraging further capital inflows. The initial belief that scale would eventually lead to profitability has largely faded. Instead of resolving the core issue of market solvency, platforms have simply increased the volume of personal services being offered. Even if some operational profitability were to be reached, it would not overcome the systemic constraints that limit returns, and these companies would remain structurally low-margin businesses.

Hence, while some theories portray on-demand platforms as key actors in the service economy and post-growth capitalism, our research suggests that platform business models are more closely tied to the characteristics of the post-2008 monetary regime than to a transformation of capitalism itself. Their inability to valorise their own capital sustainably, combined with ongoing shifts in the monetary regime, calls into question their viability – and, by extension, their capacity to represent a reproducible economic model. Rather than transformative and disruptive agents, they thus appear as limited and unstable actors whose business models struggle to deliver on their promises.

## COPYRIGHT

© 2025, Sterenn Lebayle. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence (CC BY) 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

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