reflects this expectation. The challenge is therefore to successfully integrate the French Pacific collectivities into multilateral dialogue by strengthening their capacity for action in the field of international relations.

## Notes

(1) Defined by law no. 61-814 of 29 July 1961, which has only been amended from time to time since then, the status of Wallis and Futuna does not include a formal obligation to consult or, a fortiori, a time limit for consultation, but these consultations do take place by reference to article 4 of the aforementioned law.

(2) Information report No. 519 (2008-2009) by Mr Doligé, on behalf of the Mission commune d'information outre-mer, submitted on 7 July 2009, p. 248.

(3) Since 2001, New Zealand and the Cook Islands have stated in a joint declaration that «in the conduct of its foreign affairs, the Cook Islands maintains relations with the international community as a sovereign and independent state» (Joint Centenary Declaration of the Principles of the Relationship between New Zealand and the Cook Islands, 11 June 2001).

(4) The SPC's financial statements for 2020 show that the four Western powers that are members of the SPC (the United Kingdom will not rejoin the SPC until 2021) contributed 7,682,000 euros to its budget out of a total of 9,744,000 euros, i.e. almost 80%. New Caledonia, which hosts the headquarters of the SPC, contributed 485,000 euros, the fifth largest contribution after the Western States.

(5) Mme Bertile, ambassadrice délégué à la coopération régionale, explains that it is a «win-win strategy because France comes out stronger with an even stronger influence and so do our overseas collectivities without there being any conflict or opposition».

(6) When the President of Polynesia holds the Indo-Pacific Axis and China [the Silk Roads] at equidistance, hailing "these two initiatives [which] are tools for cooperation that each of our island countries can use in the sustainable interest of its development (in Alwardi (Semir) and Regnault (Jean-Marc), 2021. L'Indopacifique et les Nouvelles Routes de la soie, Université de la Polynésie française, 5-7 Nov. 2019, ApiTahiti éditions and Société française d'histoire de l'outre-mer, pp. 11-14), French President Emmanuel Macron re-plied "You can't be French one day and Chinese the next" to oppose an aquaculture farm project in Hao promoted by Chinese interests (28 July 2021).
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*The search for a national identity claim alongside
the “Pacific Way” through the emergence
of National Universities of the Pacific:*

*The case of the National University of Vanuatu*

**Jean-Pierre Nirua,**

Currently Vice-Chancellor of the National University of Vanuatu, Minister of Education and Training of Vanuatu (2016-2020), Director of Administration and Finance of the Melanesian Spearhead Group Secretariat (2009-2015), Director of the University of the South Pacific Distance Learning Centre and then ‘Emalus’ Campus in Port Vila (1994-2009), Director of the National Planning and Statistics Office (1990-1994).

**Anne-Sophie Vivier**

lives in Vanuatu since 2007. She has held various positions in the education and cooperation sector there, and in particular supported the emergence of the National University of Vanuatu as international technical expert between 2017 and 2022. She currently continues to support the NUV.

When it was proposed to me to contribute to this "Pacific Way" symposium, I immediately welcomed the idea with keen interest. Having myself embraced this concept as a Ni-Vanuatu who has grown up and started my career in the era of decolonization, I immediately wondered about the relevance of my contribution in view of the so recent emergence of the National University of Vanuatu which I have been leading since September 2020 with the support, in particular, of my collaborator Anne-Sophie Vivier, also present at this symposium and of the University Council as well as close colleagues from the Ministry of Education and Training, and the university team that supports me. The desire to share the unique experience we live in our Pacific archipelago finally overcame our reservations and setbacks. Thus, this communication is first and foremost a testimony to an ongoing process of institutionalizing academic
bilingualism, and then multilingualism, in a minority context through the promotion of a
distinctive Vanuatu identity in the Pacific region.

The presence of French and English languages in the education system of Vanuatu is the result of its historical heritage as a country colonized by France and England until its independence on 30 July 1980¹. Thus, article 3 of the Vanuatu Constitution clearly states that there are three national languages: Bislama<fnref n="2" />, French and English, and two main languages of education: French and English. In the Pacific region, where this particularity added to the highest linguistic density<fnref n="3" /> in the world is an exception, the Government could have chosen, for both operational and political reasons, to keep only the English language in the reform of its education system initiated in 2015 integrating higher and technical education in the work axes of the Ministry of Education and Training<fnref n="4" />. Yet the new university structure is based on the existence of bilingual higher education courses, accessible to both French and English-speaking students. The current institutionalization process is also based on the structuring of a tertiary education sector, which exists in particular with collaborations set up through agreements and programs linking the Ministry of Education and Training, NUV and international partner universities.

This paper will present the steps that led Vanuatu, a small island state in the South Pacific, to develop the project of creating a national university with the specificity of being bilingual and plurilingual, and then analyse the challenges that it represents in societal, linguistic, political and economic terms at the national and regional levels.

I. The genesis of the national bilingual university project: an historical and political issue

During the 1970s, the leadership of the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu) was not immune to the decolonization trend in the Pacific region. Leaders followed and closely adhered to the advocacy of self-determination and decolonization models, as well as the anti-nuclear testing campaigns in the Pacific and internationally. Father Walter Lini, Donald

<footnote n="1">1 For a historical overview of Vanuatu up to independence, see Jeremy MacClancy (1981).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 Bislama is a pidgin with an English lexical base, also the lingua franca of the archipelago.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3 Vanuatu is said to have 117 vernacular languages according to linguistics research, see François, Alexandre et al. (2015).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4 Reform that created a Directorate of Tertiary Education including higher and technical education</footnote>
Kalpokas, Peter Taurakoto, Barak Tame Sope and their relatives were closely following these developments, inspired by their counterparts in Samoa, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands in their quest for independence.

The "Pacific Way" was then seen as a concept to claim a mythical identity for Pacific Island peoples. I remember the academic days of the early 1980s when the "Pacific Way" was used as a slogan to distinguish our Pacific Island cultures and norms from those introduced or rather "imposed" on Pacific peoples. Realizing that the Pacific Path was a rather mythical concept put forward to mobilize attention to Pacific regionalism, but which in reality was more economically beneficial to the Fiji and Eastern Pacific context, which along the way also gave rise to "Fa'a Samoa" in Polynesia, the three Melanesian Prime Ministers of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, together with FLNKS representatives from New Caledonia agreed to set up a Melanesian sub-regional organization known as the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). The MSG was formed at an informal meeting in Goroka, Papua New Guinea, on 17 July 1986.

The regional institutions created under the Pacific Way campaign then include the current Pacific Islands Forum, SPREP, USP, Air Pacific and a few others. Most, if not all, are based in Fiji, and even the Noumea-based SPC has a "regional office" in Fiji. Gradually, the independent Pacific island countries began to establish their own national entities such as airlines, banks, teacher training institutions, and universities, which are the focus of our paper today. Thus, the National University of Vanuatu was born, following the trends of Samoa, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Tonga.

**I.1 Review of regional Higher Education in the South Pacific**

Until the recent development of the project to create a national university with a bilingual dimension, Vanuatu's French-speaking elite was mainly trained at the University of New Caledonia (UNC) while the vast majority of the English-speaking elite was trained at the University of the South Pacific (USP) and at the universities of Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. The University of the South Pacific (USP) is a regional university established in 1968 with twelve Pacific island member states: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
The UNC, a French university, developed in a political context of self-determination. Created in 1987 as a component of the French University of the Pacific, whose administrative headquarters were in Tahiti, the two centres became two autonomous universities and the Caledonian branch became the University of New Caledonia in 1999. It receives its funding from the French State and must meet the requirements of French higher education as a public scientific, cultural and professional institution governed by the Act of 26 January 1984⁵. At the same time, it also aims to train a Kanak elite in priority sectors for New Caledonia. Thanks to a network of French research laboratories present in the territory, numerous investments and the development of a Cooperation Consortium for Research, Higher Education and Innovation (CRESICA) bringing together all the locally based research institutes, UNC is a magnet for New Caledonian students, three thousand two hundred and seventy-nine of whom were enrolled in 2019, as well as for ni-Vanuatu students, whose numbers have increased steadily since 2005, from one hundred and fourteen to three hundred and eighty in 2019.

Headquartered in Fiji, USP has a network of campuses and training centres throughout the member countries and operates mainly with funding from these states with grants from Australia and New Zealand. As a centre of excellence in the region for the past 50 years, USP has answered the call of the Pacific Way and offers an extensive English language training facility with a number of 30 547 students enrolled in 2021⁶ among whom approximately 16,000 are full-time students. Over the course of its existence, USP has developed close links with countries such as Australia and New Zealand, which also contribute significantly to its funding. It also maintains an extensive network of partnerships with several universities and institutions in the Oceania region and internationally. The Vanuatu campus offers a face-to-face law course and has over time developed a French-language course based on the translation of courses from English into French and the use of French-speaking tutors<fnref n="7" />.

The University of the South Pacific is a major political and linguistic influence in the Pacific region through the training of the future elites of the island countries and through research at the regional level, in particular through its *Journal of Pacific Studies*, a

<footnote n="5">5 Established by Decree No 99-445 of 31 May 1999</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6 Data found in USP annual report 2021 https://www.usp.ac.fj/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/USP-Annual-Report-2021_V4.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="7">7 The courses offered in French include a master's degree course for secondary school teachers and a so-called "second chance" course to enable students to resume their studies with a view to entering university.</footnote>
multidisciplinary scientific journal focusing on development issues in the Pacific, to which
many researchers from the region have contributed since 1975. Since the appointment
in 2018-2019 of the Vice-Chancellor of the University of the South Pacific, the university
has experienced some institutional and political difficulties within its structure between
its Management and its Council, but also between its staff, the student association
and the Board as well as between the main administration and the host country (Fiji)
which expelled its Vice-Chancellor from Fiji; the latter had to operate from Nauru and
then Samoa. This instability has also caused friction between USP member countries,
and Fiji's decision to cease payment of its statutory contributions to USP since 2020
threatens the regional cohesion around this prestigious Pacific institution and the
understanding of other USP member countries which are also threatening to reduce
their contributions to USP whose headquarters remain in Suva, Fiji.

## 1.2 The parallel development of national universities in the region

The existence of USP has been accompanied by the parallel desire of some of its
member states with the largest populations to have their own national university as an
expression of their own identity. The following can be cited in the chronological order
of their appearance:

- National University of Samoa established in 1984

- Fiji National University in 2010⁸

- Solomon Islands National University in 2013⁹

These universities have different outlines but the essence of their creation is based on
the same principles expressed by Professor Fui Le'apai Tu'ua 'Īlaoa Asofou So'o, then
President of the National University of Samoa: "the University of the South Pacific was
established in 1968 to cater for the needs of the South Pacific region. However, along
with the wave of decolonisation came the realisation among some of the Pacific Island
countries that in order to be true to the democratic principle of self-determination,
each country must have its own institution of higher learning"<fnref n="10" />.

<footnote n="8">8 Act passed by Parliament in 2009</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9 Act passed by Parliament in 2012</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10 The full speech can be found on the National University of Samoa homepage, https://www.nus.edu.ws/s/index.php/free-extensions-3/university</footnote>
For example, the establishment of the national university was a "dream" of the founding fathers of the State of Samoa at independence in 1962, but it was not until 1983 that the idea took shape when the government of the day took into consideration the problems faced by Samoan students studying abroad and expressed a desire to ensure that graduates would be able to meet the specific labour needs of the country. The Bachelor of Education degree was the first degree course established in 1987 followed by the Bachelor of Humanities and Literature. The first students graduated in 1990. In 1997, an amendment to the University Establishment Act of 1984 replaced foreign members of the Board of Governors with local members appointed by the Head of State on the recommendation of the Cabinet. In 2010, the University of Samoa had about two thousand students; in 2022 and after the merger of several higher education institutions including the Polytechnic Institute in 2006, six faculties coexist in the following disciplines: education, health, science, arts, commerce, technical education as well as a maritime training school.

The creation of the Fiji National University followed a different process from Samoa in that it was established in 2010 on the basis of the merger of six pre-existing higher education institutions<fnref n="11" />. Thus, the Government of Fiji wanted to structure its tertiary education system across the country with the ambition of becoming the premier university in Fiji and the Pacific region and a national centre of excellence in training and productivity<fnref n="12" />. After more than ten years of existence, the Fiji National University also aims to be a vehicle for economic and social development by promoting the employability of its students and applied research for the benefit of Fijian society<fnref n="13" />. In line with the original vision, it is now the largest university in the South Pacific with an enrolment of about 27,000 students and five institutes covering all scientific disciplines<fnref n="14" />.

The third national university in the Pacific region, the Solomon Islands National University (SINU), was established in January 2013 after a bill for its establishment was passed by parliament in late 2012. Following the same process as in Fiji, Solomon Islands already

<footnote n="11">11 The six institutions are: Fiji Institute of Technology, Fiji School of Nursing, Fiji College of Advanced Education, Lautoka Teachers College, Fiji School of Medicine and Fiji College of Agriculture</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 Vision and Mission that can be found in the 2014 Annual Report https://www.fnu.ac.fj/new/images/dpd/Annual_Report_2014.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="13">13 Vision and mission enshrined in the latest 2018 annual report available at https://www.fnu.ac.fj/new/images/FNU_Annual_Report_2018.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 College of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, College of Business, Hospitality and Tourism Studies, College of Engineering, Science and Technology, College of Humanities and Education, College of Medicine, Nursing and Health Sciences</footnote>
had a network of educational institutions, some of which existed before independence
in 1978. In 1984, a law adopted by the Parliament allowed the creation of the National
Institute of Higher Education, but the need to diversify the fields of training and to have
them recognized internationally led the Government to develop the university project
from 2008. SINU currently has about 4,000 students enrolled and is comprised of five
schools<fnref n="15" />, mainly offering bachelor's degrees.

Some states in the region have chosen not to join USP, such as Papua New Guinea, which has six universities, four of which are public and two private, as well as numerous higher education institutes. New Caledonia, a French territory, has established the previously mentioned UNC.

**I.3. The proposed National University of Vanuatu as a symbol of "national unity and social cohesion**

In this regional context, where the importance of a national university project for
the emancipation of these young States can be perceived, the arrival of a new
Government in Vanuatu in January 2016, whose Prime Minister, Mr Charlot Salwai
Tabimasmas, was a French-speaker, gave new impetus to the project of creating a
national university. In the Government's 100-day plan, several actions related to higher
education and research were mentioned, including the development of a program
for the establishment of a National University of Vanuatu.

The National Sustainable Development Plan 2016-2030 commonly referred to as the "People's Plan" has a vision of a stable, sustainable and prosperous Vanuatu and is based on three pillars: societal, environmental and economic. Within this framework, the societal pillar provides for "an inclusive, equitable and quality education system with lifelong learning for all" and aims to expand opportunities for higher education, including vocational and technical education. The plan is also in line with the global framework of the United Nations' seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, of which Goal 4 calls for access to quality education<fnref n="16" />.

<footnote n="15">15 School of Business and Management, School of Technology and Maritime Studies, School of Nursing and Allied Health Sciences, School of Natural Resources and Applied Sciences, School of Education and Humanities</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 "Target 4.3 Ensure that, by 2030, women and men have equal access to affordable quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university education," https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/fr/education/</footnote>
This requirement to offer quality and affordable access to higher education to the many young people wishing to pursue their studies locally has been acutely recognized by the Ministry of Education and Training in charge of proposing reforms. With a view to considering its linguistic particularity and gradually offsetting the imbalance in terms of university provision between English and French-speaking courses, the Ministry thus undertook, as of 2015, to create a tertiary education department responsible for developing higher and technical education in Vanuatu and, in particular, for creating a national university that would include bilingual programs and courses. This commitment of the Government was unanimously agreed by the political class through several decisions of the Council of Ministers on 13 May and 4 August 2016, 31 August 2017, 31 August 2018 and 30 October 2019.

In this emerging context, a reflection was also undertaken in 2016 to establish a list of higher education streams to be developed as a priority, which led to the formulation of a report in July 2016¹⁷ highlighting four sectors that are essential for Vanuatu's development: tourism, agriculture, environment and IT. Since then, several franchised degrees offered in the framework of international partnerships with French and English-speaking universities<fnref n="18" /> have been opened, with nearly four hundred students in 2022, which are now an integral part of the national university in the framework of international co-graduation.

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>Launching of the 2020 academic year with partners universities</figcaption></figure>

In the official press release issued on the occasion of the new academic year ceremony

<footnote n="17">17 Synthesis on the establishment of a National and Bilingual Institutional Structure of Higher Education and Research, July 2016</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 In 2022, the partner universities are: Toulouse 1 Capitole University, the University of New Caledonia, Toulouse 2 Jean-Jaurès University, Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand), Taylor's University (Malaysia) and James Cook University (Australia).</footnote>
in February 2019, the Minister of Education was keen to reiterate the importance of the
national university project in the following terms: "Vanuatu needs to strengthen its elites
and develop its own bilingual cadres. With the development of the university and the
enrichment of qualification levels, a dynamic conducive to social advancement is
underway, which will act on all sectors."

## II. The main axes of the emerging university

II.1 A bilingual university to ensure a future for the French language in the Pacific region

Vanuatu has a population of about two hundred and eighty thousand in 2017¹⁹ of which it is generally said that about 35% is French speaking and 65% English speaking<fnref n="20" />. As a member of both the Commonwealth and the International Organization of La Francophonie, it has consistently asserted since the early 1990s the importance of maintaining and building on the linguistic heritage of the Franco-British colonial presence between 1907 and 1980²¹. Thus, after an initial complex period from independence to 1991, when the French-speaking community was rather associated with the colonial power by the first Government led by Mr Walter Lini, the Prime Minister Maxime Carlot Korman, who was elected in 1991, spoke of the importance of the French-speaking community as a tool for regional and international influence, in accordance with the text of the Constitution of Vanuatu: "According to the Constitution, which the Vanuaaku party signed, the English and French languages should be treated equally and, in particular, taught in all schools" (Howard Van Trease, 1995, 169).

The commitment to the promotion of the French language has since varied according
to the political majorities in power, but no one has ever really challenged the binary
structure of the primary and secondary education system, relying instead on this
particularity that Vanuatu has in the Pacific region where the only other francophone
territories are New Caledonia, the closest neighbour, Wallis and Futuna as well as
French Polynesia. However, the education reform under way since 2016 has a more
inclusive approach through learning in the vernacular languages and in Bislama in the
early years of study, followed by the gradual integration of French and English.

<footnote n="19">19 Source: World Bank</footnote>

<footnote n="20">20 There is no reliable data on the language distribution in Vanuatu.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">21 The New Hebrides Condominium was a Franco-British colony in the New Hebrides archipelago of present-day Vanuatu from 2 December 1907 until its independence on 30 July 1980.</footnote>
This particularity constitutes a structuring anchor of the young national university whose model is based on the coexistence and promotion of bilingualism and multilingualism as formulated in Article 3 of Law No. 34 of 2019 establishing the NUV: "The purpose of the University is to provide advancement in higher education and lifelong learning through academic and professional excellence through training, instruction and learning in the two official languages of English and French, and through research and international cooperation."

## II.2 A federative university integrating existing training institutions

Following the model of Fiji National University and Solomon Islands National University, the National University of Vanuatu is intended to be a focal point for the existing technical training institutions, namely the Vanuatu Institute for Teacher Education, the Institute of Technology, the School of Nursing, the Maritime College, the College of Agriculture and the Police College. To this end, it is necessary first to bring them under the Ministry of Education and Training to ensure that their level of qualification is raised<sup>22</sup>. The current characteristic of these institutions is the heterogeneity of the training offered, which ranges from level 1 to 4 certificates according to the Vanuatu Qualification Framework<sup>23</sup>, i.e. a secondary technical level. The various ministries (health, agriculture, etc.) that manage most of these institutes have no expertise in the field of training and are therefore unable to support them in implementing the necessary reforms. The desired transition to the Ministry of Education and Training will make it possible to establish a strategy with appropriate supervision by the Department of Higher and Technical Education, a teacher training plan and the establishment of partnerships to support these institutions with a view to ensuring their gradual integration into the national university. As part of this evolution, the Institute of Teacher Education was the first institution to integrate the NUV in March 2021 by Ministerial order as provided for by the act governing the university. The new School of Education is gradually becoming part of the university.

In parallel to this development, the Ministry of Education and Training started in 2013 to develop general bilingual courses in collaboration with foreign universities. The first

<footnote n="22">22 Currently, only the Institute of Technology and the former IFEV are under the supervision of MOET.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">23 The Vanuatu Qualifications Framework includes levels 1 to 10. Entry to higher education begins at level 4.</footnote>
program was initiated thanks to the technical and financial support of the French Embassy in Vanuatu and the local branch of the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie following a feasibility study carried out in 2011, which had demonstrated the importance of offering a multidisciplinary higher education program for young French-speaking people in particular, in order to avoid them having to move abroad to pursue their studies in French. Thus, the first delocalized Bachelor's degree in Economic and Social Administration was created at the beginning of the 2013 academic year in partnership with the Université Toulouse 1 Capitole. At that time, the content was taught only in French; little by little, awareness of the importance of introducing courses in English made it possible to review the contractual framework and led in 2017 to the signing of a new agreement between UT1 Capitole University and the Ministry of Education providing for at least 30% of the courses to be taught in English.

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /></figure>

November 2017: launch of the bilingual tourism and hospitality degree in the presence of members of the Government and representatives of partner universities

Two other Master's courses were gradually added to this first course in 2017, including a Master's degree in Economic and Social Sciences as an extension of the AES degree and a Master's program in town planning and development of Oceanian territories in partnership with the University of New Caledonia. In 2018, a new bilingual bachelor's degree course in tourism and hospitality was introduced with a consortium of four partner universities, the University of New Caledonia, Toulouse 2 Jean-Jaurès University, Victoria University of
Wellington (New Zealand) and Taylor's University (Malaysia). In order to ensure the consensus of the political class on the setting up of higher education in the country's leading economic sector representing 40% of the GDP, the proposal formulated by the universities after a public tender process was approved by the Council of Ministers and the launch of the first bilingual tourism-hospitality degree, even led to an interruption of the parliamentary session in November 2017 so that the Prime Minister and all the Members of Parliament could be present, the first strong sign of a commitment by the political class to support the process underway.

Following the priorities set by the Vanuatu National Sustainable Development Plan 2016-2030, of which the environment is one of the three pillars, the latest degree in environmental science was introduced in 2020 through a partnership with the University of New Caledonia and James Cook University. Finally, according to the results of a feasibility study commissioned in November 2019 by NUV, two new homegrown courses should be introduced in 2023 in the areas of IT and new technologies and humanitarian action and climate resilience. All of the above sectors address Vanuatu's priorities, but regional resonance is also an ambition, albeit a secondary one.

### II.3. A tool for economic, social and cultural development

By its ambition to be fully integrated into the economic and societal reforms initiated by the Government of Vanuatu, the national university is contributing to the emancipation of this country. Thus, by taking into account the specificities clearly expressed in the People's Plan 2016-2030, but also in the recently introduced National Human Resources Development Plan, it will be able to respond to the shortage of qualified manpower capable of implementing the desired vision of a "stable, sustainable and prosperous" Vanuatu. This human resource gap was stated by the Prime Minister, Mr Charlot Salwai Tabimasmas, in the National Human Resource Development Plan, launched in November 2019, which "recognises the need for a more skilled workforce in Vanuatu, particularly professional technical and associate qualifications<fnref n="24" /> ".

Research is also at the heart of the current reflections. In order to be a pole of attraction for research institutes in the region, one of the university's major axes is indeed based on innovation as expressed in the university's values in its 2021-2030 strategic plan<fnref n="25" />. In

<footnote n="24">24 https://ogcio.gov.vu/images/nsdp/Vanuatu2030-FR.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="25">25 https://www.univ.edu.vu/en/structure/overview</footnote>
this regard, there is a renewed interest in Vanuatu from French research institutes based
in New Caledonia, in particular the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement
(IRD) and the Institut Pasteur, which have expressed their desire to participate in the
development of the research component within the university by setting up ambitious
projects. The strategic plans of these institutions foresee an opening to the Pacific
and Vanuatu represents, by its bilingualism, an undeniable asset in the perspective of
French cooperation.

Two approaches have been adopted to date to train the researchers of tomorrow: training of PHD students through the establishment of partnerships with doctoral schools in the region, in particular the Pacific doctoral school attached to the University of New Caledonia and the University of French Polynesia; grant of scholarships for their further studies and promoting research by organizing annual symposiums on the country's fundamental development challenges. In 2018, a seminar on university bilingualism entitled "From linguistic plurality to university bilingualism, realities and issues" was held<fnref n="26" />, in 2019, a symposium organized by UT1 Capitole in Vanuatu and entitled "Which tax system for Vanuatu?" and more recently in 2021, the first symposium organized by the NUV on the themes of Education, Cultures and Identity bringing together researchers from the country and the region. These events, which focused on issues that are crucial to Vanuatu's future, have attracted a great deal of interest from government authorities, the private sector and civil society. To date, Vanuatu has been the site of much research, but little of it has been conducted in response to local needs and even less has been publicly reported. The first publication of the proceedings<fnref n="27" /> of the 2021 symposium is in this sense a first achievement for the promotion and structuring of national research.

### III. The future is still uncertain

#### III.1 Issues related to the presentation of the law to Parliament

The drafting of the Act establishing the National University of Vanuatu was a long
collaborative effort between the Ministry of Education and Training and the State Law

<footnote n="26">26 Proceedings of the seminar published by the Vanuatu Cultural Centre in 2019, ISBN 9789829178756</footnote>

<footnote n="27">27 "Proceedings of the International Symposium in Vanuatu Education, Cultures, Identity" UNV publication, Vanuatu Cultural Centre, Ministry of Education and Training ISBN 9 789821 012461</footnote>
Office, the originality of which was recognized by the Parliamentary Counsel during
one of the consultation meetings held between late 2017 and 2019. Thus, the shape
of the university was really designed in consultation with the national bodies in order
to consider the particularities of the country and the region while counting on the
support of foreign experts.

The National University of Vanuatu Act was introduced in Parliament on 17 December 2019 during the last parliamentary session of the Salwai government's term. This was therefore the last opportunity for the Education Minister Jean-Pierre Nirua to support the project before his peers. The members of parliament studied the 37 provisions in great detail. Some of the opposition objections questioned the timing of the bill, saying that Vanuatu was not yet ready for a national university, that the cost of building the university would be exorbitant, and that the recruitment of teachers would be a problem. The Opposition Leader then reiterated the importance of providing Vanuatu with its own academic horizon on the eve of the 40th anniversary of its independence. During the debates, the Minister had argued and assured that the university project was home grown without external pressure or influence. He further justified that a national university for Vanuatu would strengthen the foundations of the LDC-graduating state and serve as a needed pillar to grow the new developing state to come. The bill was finally passed unanimously by all fifty-two members of Parliament and the law was published in the official gazette on January 24, 2020²⁸.

This unanimous agreement of the political class, beyond its differences of principle,
highlights the good timing of the project and makes the university one of the major
advances in a process aimed at restoring the linguistic balances within the population.

The university not only has bilingual streams but also has a hybrid institutional model.
Largely inspired by the Anglo-Saxon model for its administrative management, this
allows it to generate funds thanks to registration fees that do not, however, reach
the prohibitive amounts that can sometimes be charged by private universities, and
thus to reap all the benefits of the development expected of an institution of higher
education at the national level. But can this model really be sustainable given the
geopolitical situation of Vanuatu, a small island country landlocked in a predominantly
English-speaking region? Time will tell, but we have a spirit of optimism with the unfailing
support of the government and partners who want to see the university succeed.

<footnote n="28">28 National University of Vanuatu Act No. 34 of 2019, enacted on 10 January 2020 and effective from 24 January 2020</footnote>
### III.2 English-French bilingualism in question

The reflection on the linguistic aspects and the desire to restore the balance between the English-speaking majority and the French-speaking minority has been at the origin of a well-considered vision of the 2016-2020 government which has made this university project one of its priorities. This priority is to lay a solid foundation for nation building by creating the socio-educational pillar of national higher education in the country itself. However, there is no denying of the reluctance of some Anglophone political actors who still question the cost and feasibility of establishing a bilingual English-French higher education system, especially for the integration of young Anglophones. Others question the place of Bislama, the third national language and lingua franca, in this scheme, as expressed by Leslie Vandeputte, anthropolinguist, specialist in Bislama, at the seminar organized in July 2018 by the Directorate of Higher Education on university bilingualism: "What image do we want to show of Vanuatu? That of a national university where the national language is excluded? Or that of inclusion as a witness to the full consideration and need to use Bislama (and local languages) as an integral part of the country's languages" (Vandeputte, 2019,49), as well as by Robert Early, linguist and former director of the Pacific Language Centre at USP, who at the same event spoke in these terms:

> Of course, there are specific English and French competencies that provide necessary skills for external interaction and international engagement, but more is hoped from tertiary education than just this, and specifically characterising the new university as bilingual, or limiting access to the learning it offers only to students who have facility in both languages may appear to be unnecessarily restrictive. (Early, 2019, 27).

In response to Leslie Vandeputte and Robert Early, the then Minister of Education, who was entrusted by the government with the delicate task of leading the assembly and installation of the National University of Vanuatu, said:

> We have a heavy responsibility in building our national university to create a high quality tertiary institution the values and standards of which will be measured against international standards. The specific value of this National University of Vanuatu will be measured by the level of academic and professional competence
that will emerge from its graduates qualified in the two international UN languages, not from a language that has no common vocabulary or grammar.

That said, it is important to remind ourselves of the need for Vanuatu to assert its place in the regional and international community as a newly developing nation that will graduate from the group of least developed countries in December 2020. A university is a place of advanced culture of intelligence and international learning and the French and English languages are clearly identified as "languages of instruction" in the Constitution, and it is imperative that they are used simultaneously for the teaching and learning of the Ni-Vanuatu elites of tomorrow. Bislama and national vernaculars will be researched, documented grammatically and taught for local and sub-regional business or preservation when properly documented. Finally, a bilingual or multilingual university is what Vanuatu needs to reflect its own identity. As a place of social cohesion, a bilingual university offers the most inclusive environment for young Ni-vanuatu who aspire to become international citizens and key players for development and evolutionary innovation.

These concerns, as expressed, do not call into question the benefits of the French language for Vanuatu, but they do raise questions about the place of Bislama in the bilingualism claimed by the university project. However, the bilingual nature of the university does not mean that Bislama and the vernacular languages cannot be represented within the university. The law provides that the university will have a school called the School of Vanuatu Arts, Languages and Cultures, which will be responsible for providing training and research programs related to linguistic and cultural issues specific to Vanuatu. The existence of a language centre attached to NUV and the development of a language policy for the university also demonstrate its commitment to this field of study, which is the university's third priority as expressed in its 2021-2030 strategic plan<fnref n="29" />. Furthermore, the title chosen for the university is translated into the three national languages, i.e. Nasonal Yunivesiti blong Vanuatu - National University of Vanuatu - Université Nationale de Vanuatu. The use of Bislama is not only symbolic but also reflects a desire to ensure it has a place in the emerging university system, as an object of study as well as a vehicle for learning in certain disciplines.

<footnote n="29">²⁹ The third strategic priority is entitled "Cultivating our uniqueness" and is broken down into three objectives. https://www.univ.edu.vu/en/structure/overview</footnote>
The bilingual nature of the university means that programs of study are offered in bilingual versions whenever possible. As required, some programs may be offered only in English and/or French. Bilingualism is an asset for Vanuatu and makes it a unique country in the Pacific region. Its qualified bilingual human resources set it apart from other countries in the region and can be a factor of economic development, particularly through the possibility of attracting large-scale French-speaking businesses and industries. Bilingualism is also a major factor in attracting tourists and businesses, as tourism accounts for 40% of Vanuatu's GDP. At this stage, the question of the languages to be used in the national university is above all a process in which the strength of conviction and communication play a major role. It cannot be denied that bilingualism is a challenge for Vanuatu, particularly in terms of cost. In this regard, it is not insignificant that Canada, a large state known for the bilingualism of its population, has made the majority choice of unilingualism in secondary and tertiary education. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind the social and economic benefits that Vanuatu will derive from this. This political choice is ambitious, of course, but it is also a founding one and will give Vanuatu a unique position on the regional and international scene, which could be of interest for the establishment of partnerships with universities that are members of the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie and the Commonwealth Universities Agency.

### III.3. Quality, the only guarantee of success for the university

The quality of the training programs offered at the university will be the fundamental element of its sustainability and its recognition at the national and international levels. This is why the project places the partnerships set up with foreign universities for the operation of general higher education courses in a long-term vision through the perspective of sharing knowledge leading to co-graduation, National University of Vanuatu – partner universities. This system should also contribute to facilitating the mobility of students who plan to pursue their studies abroad. In this sense, the bilingual aspect of the university is an undeniable asset in multiplying the opportunities for graduate students who will be able to apply for courses offered by both English and French speaking universities. The links with the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie and the Commonwealth, such as the Agence Universitaire de la
Francophonie (AUF) and the Agency for Commonwealth Universities (ACU), also ensure that the university has an international profile as well as possibilities for technical support and solid partnerships that are absolutely essential in the current phase of implementation and structuring.

These partnerships, however relevant they may be, cannot suffice to engage the university in a process of ensuring local training by local faculty when there are barely more than a dozen ni-Vanuatu PhDs in 2022. In this regard, one of the major challenges is to put in place a training plan to promote the pursuit of higher education at the doctoral level in order to address the shortage of qualified local human resources. More generally, the training of PHD students raises the question of research, which can be described as embryonic in Vanuatu due to the lack of a supervisory structure and the significant funding needs associated with it. The project to set up a Vanuatu doctoral unit associated with partner doctoral schools, including the Pacific Doctoral School<fnref n="30" />, is a first step in structuring research. Support for students wishing to pursue their studies through the allocation of doctoral scholarships is also an essential support to which the Government of Vanuatu should allocate significant funding in addition to that already provided by donors. The national university will have to equip itself with lecturers and researchers who will enable it to play its role as a vector of innovation and to develop research themes at the service of national and regional societal issues; for example, issues related to climate change, languages and culture, sustainable development, etc. To do this, the State will have to make the necessary investments and federate the various stakeholders, universities in the region, research laboratories, and potential donors.

Finally, the question of the professional integration of graduates is also at the heart of the reflections on the emergence of the national university. It is indeed essential that they represent the pool from which the public and private sectors will draw their next resources. In this perspective, NUV has already signed several agreements with government departments in the environmental sector as well as with the tourism sector to ensure the employability of young people at the end of their studies. The university has also partnered with the AUF and a local incubator to promote entrepreneurial training sessions and internships for students in all fields of study. These activities are in line with its missions and objectives as expressed in its strategic plan 2021-2030.

<footnote n="30">30 The Pacific doctoral school associates the University of New Caledonia and the University of French Polynesia.</footnote>
## Conclusion

From the all too brief overview presented above, it is clear that Vanuatu is indeed writing a new page in its history, forty-two years after independence, and even concretely building its institution of high-level thinking, through the emergence of its national university, a unique, complex but rich project.

Linking back to the spirit of the Pacific Way symposium, it is proven that one major aspect to safeguard our common interests is to accept that our Pacific is a bilingual/multilingual region and therefore the best way of realizing that is to "bilingualise the Pacific". The linguistic solution of the Pacific Way is to nurture our "bilingual Pacific culture and space" and to cherish it as a concrete living experience. Citizens of the region must be given an opportunity to study in the two main international languages (English and French) that we have inherited to be ours in the Pacific, so that we can embrace a more common Pacific linguistic pathway for Pacific citizens in the future. This is part of the mission that the National University of Vanuatu adopts in its teaching and learning model.

Short-term success cannot be measured because it will take time to develop proper methods and tools to become instruments for training elites. It requires a long and laborious process of structuring our thinking with methods to use in a changing geo-political context. In the Vanuatu context, the challenge goes beyond the first few years of the university's establishment; but the National University of Vanuatu works to ensure that Vanuatu assumes full ownership of its own plans and objectives to train its own elites who aspire to become Pacific and global citizens.
# REFERENCES

## Articles

- François A. (2015), "The exceptional linguistic density of Vanuatu", in A. François, S. Lacrampe, M. Franjieh & S. Schnell, *The Languages of Vanuatu: Unity and Diversity* [archive], Canberra, Asia Pacific Linguistics Open Access, coll. 'Studies in the Languages of Island Melanesia (no. 5).

- Carlot Korman M. (1995), 'Time for a change', in Howard Van Trease, *Melanesian politics: Stael blong Vanuatu, Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury and Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva*, pp. 167-174

- Pipite J. (2004), « La francophonie au Vanuatu », in *Francophonie et mondialisation*, Hermès, La Revue 2004/3 (n° 40), C.N.R.S. Editions, P.302-307

## Works

- Bonnemaison J., *Les Fondements d'une identité. Territory, history and society in the Vanuatu archipelago (Melanesia) t. I: «L'arbre et la pirogue»*; t. II: «Tanna: Les hommes lieux», Paris, Éd. ORSTOM, coll. Travaux et Documents, 1986.

- Charpentier J.-M., *Le Pidgin bislama et le multilinguisme aux Nouvelles-Hébrides, Société d'études linguistiques et anthropologiques de France*, preface Claude Hagège, Paris, 1979.

- Lasseur M. (1997), *La francophonie au Vanuatu, géographie d'un choc culturel, Collection Mémoires et documents de l'UMR PRODIG, Grafigéo 1997-7*

- MacClancy Jeremy. 1981. *To kill a bird with two stones : a short history of Vanuatu*. Port-Vila, Vanuatu Cultural Center Publications, n°1.

## Communication

- Early R. (2017), "Language policy Issues", in *From linguistic plurality to university bilingualism, realities and issues: proceedings of the seminar organised by the Directorate of Higher Education of the Ministry of Education and Training, Vanuatu, Port-Vila, 16-17 July 2017*, pp.27-28.
- Vandeputte L. (2017), "Bislama bae I go wea? Place du Bislama dans la mise en place d'une politique linguistique de l'enseignement supérieur: enjeux idéologiques et pragmatiques», in De la pluralité linguistique au bilinguisme universitaire, réalités et enjeux: actes du séminaire organisé par la direction de l'enseignement supérieur du Ministère de l'éducation et de la formation, Vanuatu, Port-Vila, 16-17 juillet 2017, p.27-28.

## Web page

- Vanuatu Ministry of Education and Training (2019), press release on the occasion of the start of the academic year in March 2019, available at

- https://moet.gov.vu/docs/press-releases/ministry/Rentr%C3%A9e%20Universitaire%202019_03_2019.pdf

- https://www.univ.edu.vu/en/structure/overview

## Official documents

- Ben Tofor for the Vanuatu Ministry of Education and Training, Synthesis on the establishment of a National and Bilingual Higher Education and Research Institutional Structure, July 2016

- Vanuatu 2030, People's Plan, National Sustainable Development Plan 2016 to 2030, available at: https://ogcio.gov.vu/images/nsdp/Vanuatu2030-FR.pdf

- Vanuatu 2030, National Human Resource Development Plan to achieve the goals of the NDPD 2016-2030

- National University of Vanuatu Act No. 34 of 2019, enacted on 10 January 2020 and effective from 24 January 2020

- National University of Vanuatu Strategic Plan 2021-2030, freely available on the UNV website https://www.univ.edu.vu/en/structure/overview
# The Pacific Way: O au o matua fanau, the case for Pacific children and young people in Aotearoa New Zealand

## Fonomaaitu Samoatele Tuvalu Fuimaono

Principal Advisor Pacific
Oranga Tamariki - Ministry of Children
Wellington, New Zealand.

### The Pacific Way: O au o matua fanau.

In many Pacific cultures one would find proverbial expressions that embed the fundamental principle of children as being the most important treasure of the parents, village, and society for they represent the present, the past and the future. Hence, one could argue that it is the Pacific Way dictated by our ancient cultural knowledge that children are the most important taonga/treasure within our societies for they hold within their hands the survival of our histories, narratives, stories, genealogies, cultural capital and to an extent our very existence as people of the Pacific. Like the Pacific Ocean, it is so vast and challenging to navigate the complex cultural lens of each of the islands of the Pacific. Therefore, I will only attempt to expand on the meaning of children as being the most important treasure from the lens of a Samoan parent and matai.

O au o matua fanau is a proverbial expression that one hears frequently as a child growing up in a Samoan family. However, in order to understand the intent and deep meaning of the proverb, there is a need to explore the meanings of three particular words “Āu”, “mātua” and “fānau”. Āu is the Samoan word that has a dual meaning which translates to “darling”, it is usually an expression only reserved for a couple in a really intimate relationship or to showcase profound love between two people. Mātua is the Samoan word for parent or elder in the Samoan language and fānau is the word for children. It could be suggested from a parent's perspective that the proverb
places children as being the apex of their love/alofa. The proverbial expression draws on the Samoan worldview that without parents there are no children, without children there is no future, and the word Āu encapsulates the love/alofa that dictates and guides the vā (sacred relational space) and relationship between the mātua (parent) and fānau (child).

Hence, this paper aims to provide a glimpse of the landscape for Pacific children in New Zealand through the experiences of their forebears who navigated the difficulties of migration and note some of the challenges faced by Pacific peoples in relation to low social economic factors. Additionally, the paper will touch on the challenges that the New Zealand government faces in balancing the children's best interest and that of their cultural heritage and propose ethnic specific cultural models of care as a practical way forward to support better outcomes when engaging with Pacific children and their families.

## Pacific migration

Pacific Islanders migrating to New Zealand began as early as the 1850s when Anglican missionaries brought with them students from the New Caledonia, Vanuatu and other islands (Te Ara, 2022). Although others would argue that the first Pacific Islanders to reach Aotearoa/New Zealand where Polynesians from your sacred lands where we are currently standing in Tahiti Nui. Hence, as a manuhiri/guest in your lands, I am inclined to support the mau/view of the tagata fanua (people of this great land). However, according to historians, Maori who are the indigenous people of Aotearoa New Zealand arrived around 1250 AD which is roughly 800 years ago (Te Ara, 2022). Arguably, it could be said that not only did people from the Pacific discover Aotearoa/ New Zealand but later migrations have been assimilated to become part of the fabric of New Zealand society.

Although later migrations in the 1960s and 1970s would bring Pacific Islanders who settled and formed communities mainly around the Auckland area, this allowed a village community to develop whereby churches became the centre of identity in relation to maintaining the language and customs. These early Pacific migrants came mainly from the islands that were once territories and protectorates of New Zealand such as Samoa, Niue, the Cook Islands and Tokelau.
## Pacific Population

According to the 2018 census Pacific peoples in New Zealand make up 8% of the total population<fnref n="1" />. It is estimated that by 2043 Pacific peoples in New Zealand will make up almost 11% of the total population (Statistic New Zealand, 22). Furthermore, the population of Pacific peoples in Aotearoa/New Zealand is a diverse group with Samoans making up almost half of the total population (47.9%), Tongans (21.6%), Cook Island Maori (21.1%), Niuean (8.1%, Fijian (5.2%), Tokelauans (2.3%), Tuvaluan (1.2%), i-Kiribati (0.8%), Tahitian (0.5%) and other Pacific nationalities (Pacific Peoples in Aotearoa Report.), with the majority of Pacific peoples living in the North Island of New Zealand and smaller pockets of Pacific populations growing in certain parts of the South Island.

It is of significant interest to note that 66% of people who identify as Pacific peoples are New Zealand born with almost 76.9% being below age 30 (Pacific Peoples Report in Aotearoa, 2022). Pacific peoples have a median age of 23 years and 34% of that population is under the age of 15. Pacific children and young people have a crucial role to play in the economic, social and political development of Aotearoa/New Zealand in the coming years.

## The current landscape for Pacific in Aotearoa New Zealand.

The New Zealand Government has introduced strategic policy to ensure that outcomes for Pacific peoples are elevated across the determinants of wellbeing. This includes the recently launched Lalanga Fou All of Government Pacific Wellbeing Strategy (hereon known as Lalanga Fou Strategy) and the Pacific Language Strategy 2022-2032; aimed at aligning efforts by the government in relation to measuring, monitoring and evaluating outcomes for Pacific peoples.

Pacific peoples in New Zealand have some of the worse outcomes in relation to health, income, education and equities related to social outcomes. In some cases, their outcomes are only slightly better than the Maori population who are the indigenous people of Aotearoa/New Zealand. Many Government departments including my own, seek to improve Pacific outcomes through established Pacific strategies, however the

<footnote n="1">1 Pacific Aotearoa Status Report, A snapshot 2020. Retrieved from: https://www.mpp.govt.nz/assets/Reports/Pacific-Peoples-in-Aotearoa-Report.pdf</footnote>
recently launched Lalanga Fou Strategy provides a platform that aligns a government
sector approach to measuring wellbeing for Pacific peoples.

## Pacific children and wellbeing in New Zealand

To understand the challenges that Pacific children face in Aotearoa New Zealand I will
use my own children as an example.

I have three children, Chloe my daughter is the eldest, Ativalu Aleczander my son is the middle child and my youngest Manulua.

Based on the current Pacific statistics for Pacific women, my daughter Chloe will
experience the following:

- She will live 5.5 years (79 years) less compared to a non-Pacific.

- She will earn on average 21.2% less pay when compared to non-Pacific

- She is less likely to achieve University Entrance when compared to her peers (32.3% compared to 59.2% Pakeha and 69.9% Asians).

Based on the current Pacific statistics for Pacific men, my two boys will experience the
following:

- They will live 5.6 years less compared to a non-Pacific.

- They will have an increased likelihood of being incarcerated (11.5% of Prison population is Pacific).

- They are less likely to achieve University Entrance than their peers.

Based on current Pacific statistics all three children will experience the following:

- 26.1% of Pacific Children live in households that reported going without 6 or more of the 17 basic needs.

- Pacific children are six times more likely to experience severe housing deprivation rates.

- 37% of Pacific people live in damp and mouldy households the highest of any population group.
- 45% of Pacific children live in households where food runs out 'sometimes' or 'often'.

- Pacific and Maori children living in the poorest areas are three times more likely to die (Child and Youth Mortality Review Committee: 15th data report: 2015-2019).

On a positive note, a longitudinal study completed on Pacific young people has found that 86% of Pacific young people between the ages of 7-13 years feel strongly connected to their culture and 93% feel that having strong connections to their culture is important. The findings also state that they feel connected to their culture through family engagement, understanding of cultural knowledge, practices, values, language and through their church and community (Pacific Youth Talk About Culture, 2022). These findings provide insights that perhaps the Pacific way of resolving and elevating our own outcomes as Pacific peoples lies within our culture, language and identity.

## New Zealand Lalanga Fou - All of Government Pacific Wellbeing Strategy

As previously noted, the Lalanga Fou Strategy aims to shift and elevate Pacific outcomes by focussing on four high-level specific goal areas:

- Thriving Pacific Languages, Cultures, and Identities

- Prosperous Pacific Communities

- Resilient Healthy Pacific Peoples

- Confident, Thriving & Resilient Pacific Young People

In essence the four goals of the strategy aim to measure the wellbeing of Pacific peoples by monitoring the outcomes related to the number of Pacific peoples that can speak their language and feel secure in their identity and culture. Pacific peoples are no different to other minority groups across the world with a migration story: their culture and identity are greatly impacted when they settle in a new country.

The Pacific identity in New Zealand is a very important topic as the term "Pacific peoples" was coined to describe and to include all Pacific peoples, all who have ancestral links to the islands of the Pacific. However, one could argue that this term fosters inequities
in that it lumps all brown people into one box and New Zealand's history in relation to the treatment of this group through the Dawn Raid period is not without blemish and is one example that comes to mind of past grievances. In fact, the New Zealand Government only recently apologized through a *Ifoga* which is a Samoan cultural process whereby the guilty party seeks forgiveness from the oppressed or injured party. One could commend the New Zealand government for using an ancient mediatory process to seek forgiveness, but one must do so with caution as the process was only completed 50 years later and only when there is a Minister of Government at the helm who is of Pacific heritage. Although, this is a very important and interesting *talanoa*, due to the time constraints, I will humbly challenge with my anthropologist friends in the room to continue the dialogue and further research on this matter.

The second goal seeks to improve the economic prosperity of Pacific peoples by focusing on eliminating inequities related to housing needs, income security and pay disparity. As an example, Pacific women have the highest pay gap inequity in New Zealand, they are paid 21.2% less compared to their male counterparts. Although Pacific peoples have one of the lowest rates of home ownership New Zealand, we have seen an increase to 21% of the population owning their property over the last five years (Statistics New Zealand 2016; Beehive, 2022). On a positive note, quantitative findings from the New Zealand Treasury report states that Pacific peoples provide "27,000 hours per week volunteer labour" and Pacific not-for-profit organisation such as churches hold $640 million in assets (Treasury, 2018).

The third goal aims to support better housing and provide access to services to support healthy Pacific peoples. Pacific peoples have some of the highest rates of diabetes, smoking rates and obesity. They have been identified as living overcrowded homes and have been self-reported as experiencing higher rates of racism and discrimination.

The final and fourth goal aims to increase the rates of Pacific young people accessing education and attaining higher qualifications. This goal aligns with the aspirations of the Child and Youth Wellbeing Strategy which aims to make New Zealand the best place in the world for children and young people to live. However, some of the indicators that have been measured through the Child Poverty Indicators reports have shown that Pacific children have the greatest need in accessing quality housing and are three times more likely than non-Pacific children to experience food insecurity. In
addition, Pacific children have the highest potentially avoidable hospitalisations rates when compared to non-Pacific children.

## Oranga Tamariki and the current state

Oranga Tamariki or otherwise known as the Ministry of Children is the New Zealand government agency whose purpose is to ensure that all tamariki are in loving families and communities where oranga can be realised. Oranga has been defined by the organisation as "the wellbeing we want to help the children we work with to have" (Oranga Tamariki, 2022). Consequently, they have a dual role to be a highly trusted statutory care protection and youth justice agency and an enabler for Maori and Communities to empower them to put in place the support, the solutions, and the services they know will work for their people to prevent tamariki (children) coming into the care of the state (Oranga Tamariki, 2022).

Historically, Oranga Tamariki is an incarnation of previous government departments that have all claimed to share the same aspirations and goals. It currently operates under legal frameworks of the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 or what was previously known as the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 (Oranga Tamariki, 2022). The later was influenced by the Puao-Te-Ata-Tu Report produced by the Ministerial Advisory Committee on Māori Perspective for the Minister of Social Welfare in 1988. The report made strong recommendations for direct Māori involvement in relation to social welfare policy and social work practices to improve the outcomes for Māori tamariki who were significantly overrepresented at the time and continue to do so today (Maori Perspective Advisory Committee, 1988; Kapa-Kingi, 2018).

Sadly, the legislation changes introduced in 1989 did not realise Māori aspirations and ambitions, which was to devolve power, nor did it create a pathway for Māori to care for their own tamariki using their Maori cultural framework (Kapa-Kingi, 2018). In 2019, s7AA was added to include a requirement whereby the organisation must partner with the whanau (family) and hapu (extended families) to align with the obligations of the Crown in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi (Keddell, 2019). Equally important, was the requirement for the New Zealand Government to report and measure the outcomes for the Māori tamariki in care. Currently the organisation is moving in a new direction
which aims to devolve power to iwi and build stronger partnerships with community
and recognises the importance of using culturally appropriate social work practices
that empower the mana of children and that of their families.

Pacific Children in Care and Vaaifetu Practice Framework.

The Pacific population is recognised as a priority group due to the overrepresentation
of children in the care of the state. As a response, the Oranga Tamariki Pacific Strategy
2021-2024 has been endorsed and includes five strategic priority areas related to
building effective and sustainable relationships with Pacific communities, elevating
the importance of culture and language in relation to social work practice, workforce
development and strengthening data and evidence-base decision making to inform
policies.

On 30 June 2022, Pacific children made up 17% (797) of children in the care of the
state:

- 34% identified as Samoan

- 28% identified as Cook Island Māori

- 10% identified as Tongan

- 2% identified as Tokelauan

- 6% identified as Fijian

- 6% identified as Niuean

- 5% identified with other Pacific Islands or Pacific not further defined.

- 10% identified with Multiple Pacific Ethnicities

Statistics for Pacific children are almost identical in the Youth Justice system. Youth Justice is for children and young people who have or are alleged to have committed an offence (Oranga Tamariki, 2022). To support social workers when interacting with Pacific families and tamariki, a group of Pacific Staff led by Dr Karanina Sumeo created the Vaaifetu Social Work Practice tool (hereon known as Vaaifetu). Vaaifetu provides a Pacific lens for the application of duties and powers of Oranga Tamariki in accordance with the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 (Oranga Tamariki, 2022). Vaaifetu is a cultural practice framework that incorporates ethnic specific models to support social workers to practice in a culturally safe and appropriate way.
As an example, the Samoan Cultural Framework model for Social Work Practice within Vaaifetu is called the Tautua. It centres around the concept of the Samoan kava bowl, each leg of the kava bowl represents a specific value such as Alofa (love, compassion and empathy), Fa'aaloalo (respect), Faiā (genealogical connections), gagana (language), Vā Tapuia (scared inter-relationships), Va fealoa'i (dignified and harmonious relationships in face to face engagement between people) and Tofā mamao (A long term vision and insight of wellbeing).

## Using Samoan Culture with Samoan Families.

In my current role as Principal Pacific Advisor, I spend most of my time informing policy by providing a Pacific lens which at times can be quite challenging as many of my peers have limited understanding of Pacific cultures and at times are confused about the differences in the ethnic makeup of Pacific in New Zealand. However, in certain situations I am called upon to provide a Samoan cultural lens in relation to a particular case. I will briefly provide an example:

Oranga Tamariki unfortunately breached the privacy of a particular family. Certain information was released in the media, although the family members were not named specifically. However, the location of where they live and certain information could mean the family could be easily identified.

I was called to try and resolve the situation as the local office needed support with the language translation and cultural support as the father of the child involved was a well-known *tulafale* (orator). Using Samoan cultural knowledge and language, I was able to resolve the situation with the family by doing the following.

- The location of the meeting between the family and Oranga Tamariki was at the residence of a Church Minister. This is a vital aspect in the resolution process as every Samoan understands that the house of the Faifeau/Church Minister is a sacred place, and one must know the va tapuai (sacred relationship) when you enter the house of the Church Minister. Samoans have embedded Christianity in all spheres of Samoan society whereby the Church Minister now occupies the role of Feagaiga (Sacred Covenant).
- Understanding the *fa'alupega* (Honorific Salutations) of the family and *matai* titles held by members of the family is essential in building the relationship. Samoans connect through family genealogies and many disputes can be resolved by using these ancient genealogical connections (value of *Faiā*).

- Using the Samoan *Fa'amatai* oratory as the vehicle to seek forgiveness from the family and acknowledging what we have done (using the value of *Va fealoa'i*).

- Lastly using the value of *Fa'ataualofa* (reciprocity) by offering the family a monetary gift in good faith to reciprocate their *alofa* and forgiveness. It is important to note that this is not a payment or compensation. In Samoan culture an apology as in the case of *Ifoga* is always followed by a cultural presentation (*Su'a Fa'atamali'i*).

## Role of Church and Fa'asamoa in Child Protection.

In recent years I have come to know a village approach collaboration, led by two prominent community champions who dedicate their lives to the protection of children and supporting families who are experiencing difficulties and challenges. Their names are Afioga Patele Paulo Filoialii and Afioga Su'a Tagaloa Su'a (they have given their permission to be named); one is a Catholic Priest and the other is high ranking *matai* and retired Social Worker/Counsellor. They provide support to children and families who self-identify. Their support is on volunteer basis and confidentiality and privacy is guaranteed, which in Samoan villages is not anything easy to do.

They use the *Fa'asamoa* to advocate against the abuse of children and family violence and use the culture to navigate taboo topics such as sexual violence and abuse in the family which Pacific families are not immune to. They do this by using a *Fa'asamoa/ Christianity* approach, whereby Father Paulo uses his experience as Church Minister to provide spiritual and cultural guidance that is balanced and sometimes challenged by Afioga Su'a Tagaloa's professional support of being a social worker and counsellor. This is one of many examples where Samoan cultural capital is used in a positive way to support Samoan families to realise their own potential and ensure their children remain within their own care whilst accessing support from the community.
**Conclusion.**

I would like to conclude this paper by drawing on the Samoan proverb E fōfō e le alamea le alamea – the solutions lie within our own communities. This paper strongly advocates that it is the Pacific Way to look within communities for the solution. As in the case of the proverb cited above, it refers to the traditional knowledge of a Samoan fishermen that if one is stung by the spines of the alamea (crown of thorns starfish) then only the alamea can heal the wound as it carries within its body the antidote.

An important insight for government is to incorporate into their thinking that the use of Pacific culture, language and identity is vital to engagement and elevating outcomes for Pacific families and children. Recognising that answers and solutions lie within the communities rather than with the policy makers can create a shift at the grassroots level. It is only with a collective approach, the Pacific Way, that we can ensure that the future of our tamaiti/children is secure and to perpetuate our very own existence as peoples of the Pacific.
"Community of destiny" or "parallel paths"?
The difficult breakthroughs of a Pacific
Way unique to New Caledonia.

Anthony Tutugoro

Eleven days after the restitution of his sovereignty to the brand new State of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamesese Mara gave his famous speech on 21 October 1970 to the 25th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, from which the following extract is of particular interest.

Many speakers have spoken of our peaceful progress towards independence, and we for our part are deeply grateful for the good fortune that has enabled us to achieve it. But this is not a unique experience in the Pacific. Other accessions to independence have taken place in the same calm and orderly fashion, in Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, Nauru and Tonga. We would like to think that this is the Pacific Way, and that it seems necessary to make the voice of the Pacific heard within this assembly, both geographically and ideologically. To the extent that our friends and neighbours will allow us - and we don't pretend to be leaders - we hope to serve as representatives and spokespersons (Organisation des Nations-Unies, 1970).

The difficulties of waging an armed struggle for independence in the Pacific can be explained by obvious variables such as isolation and geographical realities, or by the lack of human and material resources. According to the original Prime Minister of the State of Fiji, there is another independent variable to this phenomenon, which lies in the cultural attractions of the populations living in the Pacific basin. The countries of this region of the world would have much to gain, and to help others gain, by exporting, or at least proposing, a way of conceiving politics.
However, it is with humility that the political player explains that there is no miracle
solution to achieve this state of affairs without violence. Each situation must of course
be examined on a case-by-case basis.

But in setting standards, we must not assume that there are universal solutions to
problems in every part of the world. Each individual case, each different problem,
requires a special diagnosis and treatment. Certainly, in general terms, tolerance,
harmony and justice must be universal standards, and there is no doubt that this
is the goal we are pursuing in our small land of Fiji, with its multi-racial society.
But to achieve these goals, we have had to find our own solution and develop
our own political framework. This is what the different communities have done,
with concessions and goodwill on both sides, and with the encouragement,
understanding and assistance of the United Kingdom (Organisation des Nations-
Unies, 1970).

In the light of this precondition formulated by Ratu Sir Kamesese Mara, we shall attempt
here to explore what might be the case for New Caledonia, a Pacific collectivity whose
sovereignty remains in the hands of the French Republic. The contemporary history
of this archipelago shows that political tendencies can flirt with hypothetical armed
struggles, sometimes to obtain independence, sometimes to fight it. The most striking
events in this temptation, linked to the context of political violence in the archipelago,
were supposedly ratified following the assault on the Watëtö cave in Ouvéa. Since then,
the various political agreements signed by representatives of the pro-independence
and non-independence camps appear to be an attempt to establish a Pacific Way
for New Caledonia, but still within a framework of French sovereignty. However, this
tentative is based on a fragile foundation. The assassinations of Jean-Marie Tjibaou,
Yéiwéné Yéiwéné and, at the same time, Djubelly Wéa demonstrated the difficulty of
guaranteeing the pacification of a so-called "divided" society. There is nothing in New
Caledonia to guarantee that the troubles will not return.

Can the clarification of a Pacific Way specific to New Caledonia help to reconcile the
archipelago with its history and its memories?

To provide some answers to this question, we will use concepts from public law,
sociology, anthropology, history and Caledonian politics. We will also draw on our own
research in political science, using extracts from interviews and field notes collected
during our surveys in New Caledonia.
In letter and in spirit, the Nouméa Accord set out a number of hopes on the part of the signatories, which could give the illusion of a semblance of a shared destiny and allow us to believe in the existence of a Pacific Way specific to New Caledonia (§1). However, the persistence of antagonisms revolving around the strategies for regaining sovereignty makes it difficult to establish this process specific to the archipelago (§2). There are, however, bridges that need to be explored to enable the hypothetical invention of a Pacific Way *sui generis* for New Caledonia (§3).

**1 - The spirit of the Nouméa Accord of 5 May 1998: "the essential place of the country's Kanak identity in the community of destiny accepted"** (Légifrance, 1998)

The Nouméa Accord provides for a number of measures that will enable the construction of an identity specific to New Caledonia to be outlined, a non-exhaustive portrait of which is given below.

**A- Identity signs as a link between Kanak identity and the community of destiny**

The political partners met in Nouméa for two hundred hours<fnref n="1" />. The aim was to extend the peace protocol initiated by the Matignon-Oudinot agreements of 1988 by shaping the body and soul of a new social contract. From the outset, the FLNKS delegation stated its desire to make the Kanak identity the cement of this new political agreement. Jean-Marie Tjibaou's teams had focused in particular on the economic aspects of the previous agreements and on rebalancing the archipelago. The delegations in 1998, on the other hand, intended to give more substance to what could form the basis of the archipelago's own identity. The underlying idea was to establish the progressive pillars of a nation in the making. The referendum consultations ask the citizens registered on the Special Electoral List for the Consultation (LESC) about their desire to see New Caledonia regain sovereign powers. This process entails a transition from the status of a *sui generis* collectivity to that of a new State. It is therefore envisaged that the new State, which will finally be able to take its place in the concert of Pacific nations, will already have its own identity and sense of belonging. This is how the drafters of the Nouméa Accord intend to give substance to this desire.

<footnote n="1">¹ Information given by Jean-Louis D'Anglebermes in an interview on 25 October 2019 in Nouméa. Jean-Louis D'Anglebermes is a member of the FLNKS delegation authorised to lead the Nouméa Accord negotiations with the State and the non-independence parties.</footnote>
Full recognition of the Kanak identity means clarifying customary status and its links with the civil status of persons governed by ordinary law, providing for the place of customary structures in institutions, in particular through the establishment of a Customary Senate, and protecting and promoting the Kanak cultural heritage, to put in place new legal and financial mechanisms to respond to the demands expressed with regard to the link to the land, while encouraging its development, and to adopt identity symbols expressing the essential place of the country's Kanak identity in the accepted community of destiny.

(...)

During this period, signs will be given of the gradual recognition of a citizenship of New Caledonia, which should reflect the community of destiny chosen and which could be transformed, after the end of the period, into a nationality, if so decided (Légifrance, 1998).

Under the agreement, New Caledonia will adopt a number of identity signs, which will enable it to develop preliminary national attractions. A total of five identity signs may be developed by New Caledonia. These are a new design for banknotes, a national anthem, a national motto, a flag to identify the country internationally, and a national name. Of these five signs, three were adopted during the terms of the Nouméa Accord. The graphics on the banknotes were changed. The country's motto: "Terre de parole, terre de partage" (Land of words, land of sharing) was adopted. The country's anthem, as well as the motto and banknote designs, were adopted in the form of a competition open to New Caledonia's civil society. Since 2010, the anthem "Soyons unis devenons frères" (Let's be united, let's become brothers), composed in French and Nengone (Baltzer, 2008) has been sung or performed at all sporting ceremonies involving New Caledonia's national teams.

The process for adopting these identity signs is that of an open competition. The contest was open to "any natural person with an address for service in New Caledonia" (Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, 2008). At the instigation of Dewé Gorodey<fnref n="2" />, the member of the New Caledonian government responsible for culture at the time, this competition provided an opportunity, ten years after the signing of the Nouméa Accord, to put in place the identifying markers of a special "citizenship".

<footnote n="2">² Déwé Gorodey died on Sunday 14 August 2022 while preparing for the Pacific Way's 50th anniversary symposium. We pay tribute to her work for the country and the region.</footnote>
The claim to identity here has always been present alongside the political claim. So the cultural question is at the heart of the political debate in this country. Since the Nouméa Accord, which is the framework for the emancipation and decolonisation of this country, states in its preamble that it is: "necessary to recognise the Kanak identity in order to build citizenship (Déwé Gorodé, 5 Questions pour Île en Île, 2009).

In order to be built, this citizenship must be nourished by the recognition of the Kanak identity, which appears to be a constitutive element of the decolonisation process set in motion in New Caledonia by the political agreements.

## B- The beginnings of a Pacific Way unique to New Caledonia?

The spirit of the pro-independence proponents, before perhaps establishing a Pacific Way specific to New Caledonia by negotiating the Nouméa Accords, is mainly to have the colonial fact recognised. In the categorisation of the colonial fact, the non-independentists during the negotiations hope that this unilateral recognition by the State will not extinguish the "lights<fnref n="3" />" of the colonial era. In an interview given to the magazine *Négociations* in 2008, Alain Christnacht explains the content of this statement.

The FLNKS demanded that the State recognise the colonial fact and its tragedies, in a unilateral declaration, rather like the one Queen Elizabeth II made to the Maoris of New Zealand.

We realised fairly quickly that a declaration involving only the State and the Kanak would be inadmissible to non-Kanak. They would have the impression that the declaration had been drawn up behind their backs, whereas it could call into question the honour of their ancestors and, as a result, the legitimacy of their presence in New Caledonia today. It was therefore essential to arrive at a text that would form part of the future agreement and as such would be signed by the State, the independentists and the non-independentists (Christnacht, 2008).

<footnote n="3">³ The expression is taken from the famous statement in point 3 of the preamble to the Nouméa Accord: "*The time has come to acknowledge the shadows of the colonial period, even if it was not without light*".</footnote>
New Caledonia's "divided" society is governed by other legal mechanisms, such as the proportional distribution of seats in the provincial assemblies and the Congress of New Caledonia. The aim is to ensure that all ethnic components of the archipelago's population are politically representative. This system of suffrage means that lists including so-called minority parties can hope to win seats at election time. As Carine David explains, the case of divided societies implies that influential elites are representative, which does not encourage citizen participation in political or public decision-making.

As a result, there is a tendency in divided societies for decisions to be taken by a small group of influential elites, resulting in a process that is often non-participatory and non-transparent. In fact, it is towards such a solution that New Caledonia's elected representatives once again seem to be moving. Discussions are currently taking place within the framework of the "committee of signatories", made up of the signatories of the Nouméa Accord, to whom certain political figures have been added. Assisted by experts - qualified personalities appointed by the French state - this structure has no popular legitimacy and sidesteps the issue of structuring citizen participation, with each political party contenting itself with organising information forums on their vision of the institutional future (David, 2017).

The proportional representation system gives a large number of elected representatives democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, it is difficult to build solid majorities and lasting political visions because of the interplay of alliances it creates.

Another example of the beginnings of a Pacific Way in New Caledonia is the widespread use of the "customary gesture" in inter-institutional relations. In his general policy speech of 25 November 2021, the President of the Government of New Caledonia, Louis Mapou, affirmed his collegial government's desire to see the "customary gesture" become widespread throughout the institutions (Mapou, 2021). As Benoit Carteron points out, it seems to be being used more and more widely by the institutions.

The customary gesture is thus institutionalised beyond the Kanak world, identifying one of their ways of doing things with the whole country. (...) Today, all major events are marked by a customary gesture. For example, when an official New

<footnote n="4">4 What is referred to in this public discourse as the "customary gesture" refers to the protocol in force in Kanak culture to be adopted for each delegation visiting a given territory. This protocol, designed to say "hello" and ask the host for permission to "set foot on his land", is gradually being transposed to the institutional level.</footnote>
Caledonian delegation visited New Zealand for the first time at a tourism trade fair in early March 2007, they introduced themselves by making the customary gesture. By becoming a widely publicised image of Kanak traditions, the customary gesture is becoming folklorised, as it is inevitably assimilated to a picturesque traditional ritual, but of no real importance to those who do not have an intimate knowledge of Caledonia. For the locals, however, the gesture retains its strong symbolism, and the adoption of the gesture by Caledonians demonstrates the link established between communities and a form of recognition of Kanak culture (Carteron, 2015, pp. 150–151).

It is therefore a question of making official what now appears to be a practice of use. Nevertheless, will the use of the "customary gesture", which is increasingly being appropriated by the communities that have settled in the territory over the long term, and the various elements mentioned here, be enough to see the emergence of this *Pacific Way* in New Caledonia?

## 2 - "Parallel paths": a two-speed Pacific Way?

While common ground is gradually emerging in the course of implementing the Nouméa Accord, obstacles remain. It is now time to examine the areas in which the development of a *Pacific Way* specific to New Caledonia is an arduous undertaking within the framework of this political agreement.

### A- Unfinished business and growing political antagonism as the referendum phase of the Nouméa Accord approaches

At the end of the Nouméa Accord process, only three of the five identity signs have been adopted by the political partners of the different mandates. The common flag has not been adopted and, since 2010, the tricolour and the Kanaky flag have flown side by side on public buildings. The latter was adopted following a competition initiated internally by the FLNKS. It was raised for the first time on 5 December 1984 at La Conception in the commune of Le Mont-Dore. Since 2010, it has been officially used to represent the Kanak people, and has been renamed the "Kanak flag" rather than the "flag of Kanaky" for institutional purposes. The name of the country has not
been adopted either. While the consensus reached to adopt the anthem, banknote designs and the country's currency remains stable, the same cannot be said for the two identity signs mentioned above. The reasons for this are intrinsically linked to the referendum consultations in which voters registered on the LESC are asked whether or not they wish to see the archipelago regain its sovereignty. For non-independence supporters, adopting a new flag would be a further step towards a sovereignty they do not want. For the independentists, on the other hand, the new flag would mean implicitly abandoning the banner that has led the struggle to regain sovereignty from the creation of the national liberation movement in September 1984 to the present day. Although competitions have been initiated by various groups in civil society to impose a consensus on a common flag from below since 1998, a new development has arisen. In 2010, Pierre Frogier, MP for New Caledonia's 2nd constituency, embarked on a project to fly side by side the French and Kanak flags officially. This initiative took place during a visit to Nouméa by François Fillon, Prime Minister at the time, in July. This political decision undermines the various attempts to adopt a common flag in the long term. With the "blue, red and green" flag<fnref n="5" /> now hoisted at the top of public buildings, the choice of lowering it appears to be politically difficult, unless a third flag is added, possibly and more unofficially, to be defined. Generally speaking, since 2010, the question of the country flag has been left in abeyance. As for the name of the country, no political agreement<fnref n="6" /> has been reached to adopt it. One possible reason for this is that a change of name would automatically transform citizenship into nationality in the popular unconscious.

During the referendum period, New Caledonia is once again experiencing socio-political upheaval. Against the backdrop of the sale of the Vale NC nickel processing plant to a multinational, the archipelago is once again experiencing visible tensions. Conflicts linked to the creation of this industrial facility with the traditional authorities and environmental organisations in the south of New Caledonia are resurfacing. The customary authorities of the Drubéa-Kapoumë area, whose land is affected by this resale, have organised themselves and created the Instance Coutumière Autochtone de Négociation (ICAN). The aim of this organisation is to bring pressure to bear on the choice of foreign buyer in the process of buying the plant. The movement called

<footnote n="5">⁵ Name occasionally given to the Kanak flag. Listen for example to (Humaa-Gue, 2008)</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ The Nouméa Accord (point 1.5 of its policy document) requires a qualified majority of three-fifths of the elected members of the Assembly of the Congress of New Caledonia. This majority remains very difficult to obtain.</footnote>
"Usine du Sud = Usine Pays" (USUP) contrasts with the course of the first two referendum consultations held on 4 November 2018 and 4 October 2020. The mobilisation took to the streets of Nouméa, Koné and Poindimié, bringing together activists from pro-independence political parties belonging to the FLNKS and the Parti Travailliste, trade unions such as the Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Kanak et des Exploités (USTKE) and the Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Pacifique (CNTP), and other civil society groups. The phenomenon became a social movement, flooding the streets of Nouméa and the territorial highways with repeated peaceful marches. As the grievances of this social movement went unanswered, blockades and counter-blockades were set up in the colourful style of the 1980s. The spectre of political violence resurfaced. The Kanak flag was flying on the blockades set up by the USUP activists. At the same time, the tricolour flag was flying at the spontaneous counter-barricades set up in the communes of Païta and Mont-Dore to protest against the repeated road blockades by members of the USUP collective. Social networks have revealed the presence of weapons at these roadblocks and counter-roadblocks, making these areas veritable powder kegs. The intervention of all the political partners in the Nouméa Accord - independence fighters, non-independence fighters and the State - after a 10-hour round table discussion, finally brought this sequence to a close by finding a buyer for the Sud factory and satisfying some of the demands of the social movement (Nouvelle-Calédonie la 1ère, 2020).

Finally, the third referendum of 12 December 2021 stands in stark contrast to the previous ones, given the global health context. The organisation of the referendum did much to erode the social fabric of the archipelago. Indeed, with the covid-19 epidemic having crossed the coral reef, more than 400 families were busy burying their deceased at the end of 2021, in accordance with the current health protocol. However, the French government turn a deaf ear to the requests for postponement made by all the pro-independence political groups and certain civil society groups in tribunes and letters co-signed by public figures, politicians and academics. The decision was therefore taken to maintain the date of the referendum at 12 December 2021. This decision involved the pro-independence movement in a publicly declared strategy of an empty chair to mark the delegitimisation of the referendum. Since the re-election of Emmanuel Macron as its leader, this situation has led the French government to step up its attempts to resume dialogue with the pro-independence
movement. With the three successive referendums giving, in its view, a negative result, the aim is to impose the negotiations provided for in the Nouméa Accord, and thus to "discuss the situation thus created" (Légifrance, 1998). This desire never seems to call into question a ballot in which the "No" side won by 96.50% of the votes, i.e. 75,720 voters, against an abstention rate of 56.13%, i.e. a total of 103,483 voters who did not go to the polls. This political situation highlights the political antagonism between those citizens who wish to mark their attachment to the French Republic at all costs, and those who prefer to let the time of "Kanak mourning" declared by the Customary Senate run its course (Whaap and Madec, 2021). The State does not seem to take into account the abstentions of voters who understand the solemnity of this position and show their solidarity by not going to vote.

### B- The difficulties inherent in the Nouméa Accord's "community of destiny": when saying is not necessarily doing

This political fact, which encompasses the third referendum vote under the Nouméa Accord, leaves indelible traces. For Gérard Larcher, President of the French Senate, the citizens of New Caledonia have not succeeded in creating the common destiny so prized by the Nouméa Accord. His speech, read by a member of a Senate mission at the inauguration of the "Place de la Paix" in Nouméa, evokes a form of republican vision of a Pacific Way desired by the State.

The work accomplished may not yet have built the common destiny you wish to achieve. But it has enabled you to face up in recent years to what we might call the pressure of history, in other words, the shock of several referendum consultations. I am aware of the antagonistic visions that cross the Caledonian people. But it seems to me that this handshake symbolising the reciprocal recognition of the two legitimacies compels us to devote all our energy to pursuing and deepening the dialogue that alone will enable us to define the path of this country (Replay. Poignée de main entre Jean-Marie Tjibaou et Jacques Lafleur : l'inauguration de la statue sur Nouvelle-Calédonie la 1ère, 2022).

In this extract, it is interesting to note that it is a representative of the State and, in the
tripartite Nouméa Accord, the president of an institution based in mainland France who states that the objective of a "common destiny" has not been achieved in New Caledonia. In an interview conducted in May 2022 with Victor Tutugoro, a signatory of the Nouméa Accord on behalf of the Union Progressiste en Mélanésie (UPM), the political player describes his vision of this antagonism. In his view, these cleavages have persisted throughout New Caledonia's history, making its population citizens who travel along "parallel paths"<fnref n="7" />.

But it's still a long way from our common destiny. It's hard. Some people tell you: "But if we have a common destiny every day, that's because we used to talk to each other! Yes, we used to talk, but we stayed in parallel. There aren't things we do together. (...) Everyone stays on their own, alas ... parallel! And so yes, from that situation, I say that we should welcome the small gestures that are gradually leading us towards something common (...). We can appreciate the small steps that are being taken.<fnref n="8" />

Patrice Godin's remarks at a symposium in Nouméa in 2018 warned of the gap between establishing a political will from the top, a sort of top-down factory of living together, and observing its actual application from the bottom.

As an anthropologist, I have never been convinced that the provisions contained in the agreement were sufficient on their own to establish genuine cultural pluralism in New Caledonia. This requires much more than legal provisions, it requires collective support, and this cannot be decreed. On the other hand, I believe that the difficulties encountered in their full deployment are contributing to jeopardising the construction of the community of destiny outlined by the agreement by giving rise to misunderstandings, disappointments and resentments (Godin and Passa, 2018, p. 115).

(...)

Thus, the Nouméa Accord recognises the right of the predominantly pro-independence Kanak community to self-determination and decolonisation. But with the creation of the community of destiny, it is also reminded of its obligation,

<footnote n="7">7 The title of this chapter is borrowed from this interview extract.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">8 Interview with Victor Tutugoro on 2 May 2022 in Nouméa.</footnote>
in the name of democratic ideology, not only to make room for the other
communities and their rights - which has been the case since 1988 - but also
to make the exercise of its right to self-determination subject to the approval
of these other populations, which now have a majority electorate, but which
have not themselves been colonised. I know that many of the participants in
this symposium will tell me that this is a settled question, but as an anthropologist
I think that this is in fact far from being the case for many Kanak people (Godin
and Passa, 2018, p. 121).

These various stages in New Caledonia's complex process, which have been very briefly described, now invite us to consider the conditions that need to be met if New Caledonia is to be able to achieve its own Pacific Way.

- 3 The possible advent of the Pacific Way in New Caledonia: identifying bridges to begin a process of reconciliation

How, by drawing on endogenous and possibly exogenous cultural resources, can we
identify the remedies and resources for a Pacific Way specific to the archipelago?

A- Common goals put to the test by heterogeneous visions

If we are to sum up the positions in New Caledonia in a succinct and caricatural
way, there are two opposing poles, not so much in terms of the means employed
as in terms of the expected outcome. In fact, all the parties seem to agree that the
archipelago should undertake a process of general reconciliation. However, the
means of achieving this seem to be diametrically opposed. There is a clash of logics,
both within and outside French sovereignty.

Indeed, the desire of the independence movement as a whole is to achieve reconciliation between the peoples of New Caledonia. However, this process involves a stage of unification within Ernest Renan's<fnref n="9" /> concept of the Nation-State, based on the subjective criteria of nationalism. This process inevitably leads to a "Yes" majority to the question of whether or not the archipelago wishes to regain its sovereignty. The

<footnote n="9">⁹ See the speech at the Collège de France recounted in his book (Renan, 1882).</footnote>
citizenship of New Caledonia provided for by the Nouméa Accord in the minds of the pro-independence movement is thus a first transitional stage towards nationality<fnref n="10" />. For Paul Néaoutyine, a signatory of the Nouméa Accord on behalf of the Kanak Liberation Party (Palika), there is a tendency among non-Kanak citizens of New Caledonia to move towards this desire for reconciliation outside French sovereignty.

On the ground, that's not what I hear. They say: "No, but those people who talk a lot (...), they come from somewhere else, they're going to go somewhere else. But we were born here, we don't want to go elsewhere. So it's better that we move forward together. Now that's something new! We've been talking about "UNI<fnref n="11" /> " for four terms. But this is really the first time I've heard people come up to us and say: "I've never voted with you, but I understand you". And once you've spoken to them, they say: "Well yes! We're not afraid. Our young people discuss things together, they do...". I say: "But everyone has their political opinions, but are we going to get out of France, and then sort out our problems amongst ourselves? We can do it!<fnref n="12" />

As for the non-independence proponents, their desire is to see New Caledonia reconcile itself with its past and look to the future. Moreover, the economic argument regularly appears as an inextricable corollary to this need. Gil Brial, 2nd vice-president of the South Province and president of the Mouvement Populaire Calédonien (MPC), a component of the Confédération Loyaliste Ensemble, sums up the situation.

It's true that we've lost time, but there are several reasons for maintaining this objective. For once we are being given a perspective, we have been kept waiting for thirty years. Above all, Caledonia is dying today. The economy is complicated.

(...)

When Caledonians said no to independence, they said no to independence-association and to any form of independence. And I think the Minister was clear on this. He said that France is New Caledonia. But it is the France of New

<footnote n="10">10 See the book by Paul Néaoutyine (Néaoutyine, 2006).</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11 The Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance (UNI) was founded in 1995. Its aim is to present a list for the provincial elections in the Northern Province of New Caledonia, embodying this common approach, firstly within the Matignon-Oudinot agreements of 1988, then within the citizenship of the Nouméa Accord of 1998. The creation of this political group thus offers this option to Europeans and non-Kanak wishing to participate in the construction of this citizenship without, however, displaying the "Palika" or "FLNKS" label and heritage.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 Interview with Paul Néaoutyine on 25 February 2020 in Poindimié.</footnote>
Caledonia with our differences. We are New Caledonians, and we must be proud to be Caledonians. We must strive to develop a true identity while being proud to be French. And for me, these are not two things that should be opposed. And the project for society that we must pursue must be along these lines (...). And once again, we are French today not because the independentists boycotted the third referendum. We are French because the majority of Caledonians want to remain within the French Republic. And we, I'm convinced, we Loyalists, are convinced that this is what's best for the entire population of New Caledonia (Gil Brial fait le point sur la visite de Jean-François Carengo, le Ministre délégué aux outre-mer, 2022).

According to Gil Brial, the new social contract must and can take place within the French Republic, taking into account the specific characteristics of New Caledonia. However, it is the "Caledonian identity" that is emphasised, rather than the cultural attractions inherent in each of the archipelago's communities. As Pierre Breteignier, a former member of the Rassemblement Pour la Calédonie dans la République (RPCR), said on Nouvelle-Calédonie la Première on the very day that the "Place de la Paix<fnref n="13" />" is due to be inaugurated in 2022.

(...) I believe that to achieve peace, (...) you have to understand each other, so first you have to recognise the other person, empathise with them and put yourself in their place. (...) It's when you have empathy like that that you can find a solution (...). Because it's true that, in a way, we've forced the Kanaks to understand Western culture, French culture in this case, but the reverse hasn't been true enough in the end. In other words, no attempt was made to make the Europeans, the whites in inverted commas, understand what Kanak customs were. On the other hand, it's true that the Kanak live their customs quite secretly. Now we can see that we've entered a modern era where all the customs have been developed, and that's great (Replay. Poignée de main entre Jean-Marie Tjibaou et Jacques Lafleur : l'inauguration de la statue sur Nouvelle-Calédonie la 1ère, 2022).

The "step towards the other" is a rhetoric often used in public debate in New Caledonia.

<footnote n="13">13 Koo Wè Joka (translated as "the place where they made peace") in the Nââ Numèè language (Cochin and Rédactions de NC la 1ère, 2022).</footnote>
The difficulty of delving into the history and traumas of colonisation is a recurrent theme in the public arena. The utilitarianism of peace is thus a constant mantra that consists of constantly achieving a pacified result by putting the veil on the dark areas of the colonial history of human relations in the archipelago.

The difficulty of setting up a Truth and Justice Committee in New Caledonia is a case in point. It represents a decisive political strategic point in the trajectories of the two political blocs. From the point of view of the non-independence movement, it can represent a real threat to the utilitarianism of the peace discourse by highlighting the abuses committed in New Caledonia. For the State, it could undermine its utilitarian position as a peacemaker, given the colonial crimes<fnref n="14" /> that could be revealed and made official. Finally, for the independence movement, it could pose a threat to its political strategy of regaining sovereignty. With the results of the three “No” votes now confirmed by the State, there is a risk that the independence movement will be forced to accept the hypothesis that the process of decolonisation has been completed internally. The political movement is genuinely wary of the risks of a shift towards internal sovereignty for the Kanak people. Such a changeover would constitute a shift away from the demand for independence towards a demand for the rights of indigenous peoples governed by the United Nations. For the Kanak people, such a shift would be tantamount to abdication. The reason for its existence is the return of political sovereignty to the archipelago. For the time being, these two means of struggle coexist in a parallel and complementary manner, as we have already attempted to reveal in a previous development (Tutugoro, 2021).

The amnesty laws deliberated and passed between 1988 and 1990¹⁵ are another obstacle preventing the citizens of New Caledonia from delving into their past. Preventing history from coming to light, they are like a lid on the pot.

A recent film made about the Waan Yaat ambush on 5 December 1984 is very interesting in this respect. This film recounts, 38 years later, the sequence and aftermath

<footnote n="14">14 See the report by Benjamin Stora (Stora, 2021). The production of this type of report, transposed to the colonial violence committed in New Caledonia, could shed light on little-known areas of its history, in addition to the many works produced by local, national and foreign historians.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">15 Article 1 of Law no. 90-33 of 10 January 1990 granting amnesty for offences committed in connection with events occurring in New Caledonia provides that: "Offences committed before 20 August 1988 on the occasion of events of a political, social or economic nature relating to the determination of the status of New Caledonia or the land tenure system of the territory, by the persons mentioned in the second paragraph of article 80 of law no. 88-1028 of 9 November 1988 on statutory provisions and preparations for the self-determination of New Caledonia in 1998, are amnestied".</footnote>
of an ambush on pro-independence activists at Waan Yaat in the Hyehen valley. In this film, for the first time since the media statements made during the various trials that followed the affair, testimonies are given by one of the perpetrators and by the brother of another perpetrator of the ambush (Waan'Yaat – Sur une terre de la république, 2022). When Jess Lapetite is questioned separately on camera about what he did, he gives a very revealing account of the lid he put on the pot, explaining that he never mentioned the sequence to anyone.

After all that, it's clear that when we went to trial, there were regrets. We know all these people. Because in all of this, nobody came out the winner. But I very rarely talk about it. I don't even talk about it at the end of the day (...). Not even to my family. We don't talk about it (...) You can't always say to people: "I don't feel well because of all this". You go on living. What does that lead to? The facts are there, something happened, it's done, it's done, you can't fix it. The thing to do is to get in touch and find something constructive, to get closer to each other. Reconciliation is also possible. And to share, to say things intelligently (Waan'Yaat – Sur une terre de la république, 2022).

In the course of the film, an initial attempt is made by the two surviving protagonists, Joseph Sineiméné, brother of Robert Sineiméné, one of the instigators of the ambush, and Jess Lapetite, who was involved in the ambush, to make contact with one of the descendants of the victims of this assault, Emmanuel Tjibaou, nephew of Louis and Vianney Tjibaou, who were killed in the attack. In this interview, Emmanuel Tjibaou invites the protagonists to share their story.

Your children are going to grow up with this stuff hanging over them. (...) I say to myself that if we're respectful, if we say we're talking about custom, you shouldn't be afraid to tell your story (Waan'Yaat – Sur une terre de la république, 2022).

The comments made earlier by Jess Lapetite reveal a recurring tendency in New Caledonia to deliberately silence memory on the pretext of maintaining a peace supposedly achieved through political agreements<fnref n="16" />. This desire to protect the family gives rise to a stance that settles nothing in the long term. Silence and time cannot consign an act, for which we have archives and testimonies, to oblivion. Emmanuel

<footnote n="16">16 On this subject, see the blog post by Isabelle Merle (Merle, 2022).</footnote>
Tjibaou, in this first attempt at dialogue initiated by the protagonists, invites them, on the contrary, to tell this story by drawing attention to the “customary gesture” made and the sacredness of the spoken word. From the moment that an initiative is undertaken through the prism of custom, it becomes inevitable, in the face of the visible and the invisible, to take the process to its logical conclusion. We need to take a close look at what this potential reconciliation suggested in the film might look like. The use of this example allows us to consider the final question of this reflection, namely how the *Pacific Way* in New Caledonia could be set in motion on the *sine qua non* condition of reconciliation.

## B- The Pacific Way in New Caledonia put to the preliminary test of reconciliation: which mediator to use to reconcile which histories and/or memories?

It is clear that reconciliation, even if it is not envisaged in the same way by the various protagonists in New Caledonia, can only be achieved through the intermediary of mediators. These mediators may hypothetically be endogenous or exogenous to the archipelago.

To support our first analysis, we will draw on elements given in a major lecture “Régulation des conflits en pays Kanak” (Tjibaou and Kona, 2018) given by Emmanuel Tjibaou and Yvon Kona at the Jean-Marie Tjibaou cultural centre in 2018. In this presentation, the lecturers explain the mechanisms that give rise to and bring to an end conflicts between different Kanak territories during the colonial period. This enables them, through the collection of oral tradition, to identify this type of process carried out in the pre-colonial period. Analysis of the transcripts of the interviews conducted as part of their study reveals a discreet function that nonetheless played a major role in regulation, one that they call the “peacemaker”. In the aftermath of a conflict, it is the clan or tribe that has been called upon to take part in the conflict and that has not done so because of prior alliances already forged with the protagonists, that is called upon to play an important role. As Yvon Kona explains, this is a difficult role to play, as it involves “renewing ties that have been burnt by fire” (Tjibaou and Kona, 2018). In the aftermath of the conflict, those clans that did not wish to take part in the conflict will be encouraged to play this role, subject to a number of conditions. The researchers set out three conditions. Firstly, they had to wait for a “cold spell” (Tjibaou and Kona, 2018)
which would be conducive to restarting a dialogue after a period of war. Secondly, both parties need to recognise the legitimacy of the mediator. This legitimacy is based on an intrinsic link between the two groups through marriages linking the different clans involved, alliances, common origins, myths or shared histories or ancient alliances. The third condition is trust. His words must be recognised as those of a moderator. His skills as an orator during customary ceremonies must already have been observed in the past. The researchers go on to explain that when these three conditions are met, mediation can begin. We will not go into the technical and anthropological aspects of this mediation, which are already well developed in this conference, but will focus on the conditions that need to be met in order to implement it. This example shows that New Caledonia has its own endogenous methods of conflict resolution, which can be drawn from the foundations of Kanak civilisation.

The second element of analysis that we will use here concerns the potential existence of such a mediator in the archipelago. In New Caledonia, the population as a whole is confronted with a memory that is still very marked, as we saw earlier. It is difficult to identify a player who could play the role of “peacemaker” within the archipelago, as the colonial dispute affects the whole of society. Since the phase of the political peace agreements, the State in New Caledonia has constantly sought to position its role as that of a mediator or arbitrator. However, Louis Le Pensec, Minister for the Overseas Departments and Territories, in a media statement on 20 August 1988, a few hours before signing the Oudinot agreement, made a statement that is fundamental to our study.

> In his "Letter to all French people", the President of the Republic wrote that "the only guarantor of peace in New Caledonia can be the French Republic, that there is no other arbitrator". France can only be an arbitrator if its word inspires confidence (Le Pensec, 1988).

As we showed earlier, the period of the fifth mandate of the Nouméa Accord broke the bonds of trust between one of the partners, the pro-independence movement, and the State. By maintaining the date of the third referendum, this player has disqualified himself from positioning himself as a potential arbitrator or mediator with a view to initiating this reconciliation. The condition of trust mentioned above is no longer present. Furthermore, according to Michèle Guillaume-Hofnung, mediation is defined as "a
except perhaps in Australia and a little in New Zealand, especially in the cities. The "Pacific way of life" is our way of being, our way of seeking consensus rather than having people vote to reach agreement, it's also this kind of respect that people have for each other. Throughout the Pacific, respect and gestures of respect are fundamental; and from the point of view of the pace of life too, it's something of capital importance: people have time to live, and it's this that is appreciated by the new inhabitants of the Pacific. To the extent that they bring industrialisation to the Pacific, it's possible that by the year 2000 we too will be racing like the West; but for the moment, people appreciate their own way of life, and would like to keep it. We're trying to imbue social relations and work organisation with our way of life, which takes the sun into account...

I launched the idea of "Pacific new home"; it was a bit of a way of making political objectives integral to the planning of the Territory, to the organisation of the city, of work, our Oceanian way of life, so that industrialisation doesn't spoil too much the chance we have of being able to spend quietly in the sun this space of time that there is between birth and death (laughs)! (Tjibaou, 1996, pp. 167-168)

For the sake of brevity, we have not been able to deal with all the constituent elements of the Pacific Way as conceptualised in New Caledonia in the mind of Jean-Marie Tjibaou. Consensus and the search for a decision accepted by all without resorting to a vote could, in themselves, be the subject of another development. We have confined ourselves to observing how the dimension of "respect that people have for one another" (Tjibaou, 1996, pp. 167-168) evoked by Jean-Marie Tjibaou in 1985 could be framed with a view to enduring in the public arena.

37 years after this interview and 47 years after the Melanesia 2000 Festival organised in New Caledonia in 1975, the Government of New Caledonia is organising the Caledonia Festival from 22 to 25 September 2022 on the same site as the current Jean-Marie Tjibaou Cultural Centre. This Festival is a further expression of the government's desire, under the presidency of Louis Mapou,

to promote encounters between all these entities. We want to create a first major meeting of Caledonians with themselves in the spirit of the Melanesia 2000 festival, organised by Jean-Marie Tjibaou in 1975 to affirm the existence of Kanak culture. This event, which could be called the "Caledonia Festival", would be created in
2022 to become the annual meeting place for all the country's cultures, as well as a sounding board for our identity in the Pacific. (Mapou, 2021).

During the opening speeches, this dichotomy in the path towards New Caledonia's own Pacific Way was once again evident. The new Member of Parliament for the 2nd constituency, Nicolas Metzdorf, with the Ensemble platform, a non-independence coalition created during the 2022 legislative elections, gave a speech that highlighted the social ties that exist in New Caledonia.

> There's something we can't define, there are words we can't put to things that exist. An invisible link that binds us together. And I think it's the job of this Festival (...) to put words to this invisible link. What is it that keeps us here today, despite the political context, loving this moment and sharing it?<fnref n="19" />

As for Louis Mapou, President of the Government of New Caledonia, his speech called for the pillars of a nation in the making to be consolidated, so that the trajectories of the other communities that have settled in the archipelago can be linked to them.

These questions respond to the need to identify the link in order to forge the connection that is necessary to establish all discussions on a shared page. This is no more and no less than what the Caledonia Festival is calling on us to do, because we need to tie what is new around the ancestral links that make us belong to this country, to this land. This is the connection we need to make if we are to open up a discussion based on what he has to say. And what binds us together is belonging to this country. This is the price that syncretism will have to pay (Mapou, 2022).

This Caledonia Festival builds on the work done since the beginning of the 17th New Caledonian government's term of office, following the example of the exhibition "Les Kanak et le bagne" (The Kanaks and the penal colony), and invites the population of the archipelago to reflect on the contours of its identity (Les Kanak et le bagne, une exposition pour découvrir une histoire commune [en ligne], 2022). However, this reflection does not exempt the population from first taking a step back to read or reread the colonial history of the archipelago. This extract from an interview with Fote

<footnote n="19">19 Nicolas Metzdorf, Speech by the Member of Parliament for the second constituency of New Caledonia. Opening ceremony Caledonia Festival (personal recording and notes), Centre Culturel Jean-Marie Tjibaou, Nouméa, 2022.</footnote>
Trolue<fnref n="20" /> invites all communities to delve into history in order to dispel the relations of domination that have taken root in the archipelago.

But the problem is that everyone is shouting that New Caledonia is a multicultural country. But when you look at the reality, it's a multicultural country, but always with a relationship of domination and alienation. In other words: "Yes, it's multicultural (...), provided you don't become perfect little Frenchmen". And that will never be accepted by the Kanak people because it's as if they were giving up on all the strategies of reconquest. And (...) the outstretched hand that they have always extended (...) even if sometimes it wasn't grasped. So the problem is, how do we ensure that history is not forgotten, but that we can close the door on history so that it stops poisoning us in our search for a common destiny? And for that, everyone needs to go back into (...) history so that we can understand, some people understand, why the Kanak people are demanding sovereignty. Because the Kanak has understood why the other refuses his claim to sovereignty, but it's also up to the others to come to terms with it. And to do that, they have to go back into history themselves. And I say, there are so many points of antinomy that you have to tear yourself away from your own emotions, your own states... it's terrible! But Kanak did it, so that means other people can do it. Even if it's... we know it's very difficult. But if someone refuses to let go of their own emotions, then we're going to keep the problem going. And that's what history will tell us tomorrow, how history develops. But the problem is that people have to make an effort. People have to get away from the old concepts of colonisation, the concept of a superior race and an inferior race, the concept that the only way to achieve emancipation is in fact to embrace the concepts of a State which, until now, has been considered by the Kanak people as the source of everything, of our traumas and then of our misunderstandings.<fnref n="21" />

The challenge facing New Caledonia in the first quarter of the 21st century is therefore to choose between two options: to reconcile with its history, or to reconcile by abandoning it. However, this decisive phase can also become the precondition for new potential conflicts. Emmanuel Tjibaou already warned the population in 2018 on the eve of the first referendum.

<footnote n="20">20 Retired magistrate and member of the first Committee of Wise Men created by the State in 2018, Fote Trolue was part of the spontaneous Red Scarf movement created in 1969 and subsequently became the first Kanak to wear a magistrate's robe.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">21 Interview with Fote Trolue on 9 June 2021 in Nouméa.</footnote>
(...) we Caledonians too often look at each other. But we have to realise that the work we do here is also the work of others. I'm not even talking about political agreements, but ceremonies like the one (...) with the family of Djubelly Wéa, with Yéiwéné Yéiwéné, Daniel Fisdiepas and then Jean-Marie Tjibaou (...). In the region, the process of conciliation, even the process of bringing events to an end, is looked on with great suspicion, because people say to themselves: "But how did they manage to reconcile beyond the deaths on both sides? (...) We have to face up to things, not just for ourselves, we have to face up to them for ourselves, but also for those who will come after us. (...) Our conclusion is also to say that it's up to us and we have to bear in mind that even if the years go by, even if this history of violence (...) and tensions is still latent, we have to face up to it. And then (...) if it needs to get out, that's a good thing, it doesn't matter! Of course, at some point we're going to have to redefine new points of balance. And for that, there are all these little indicators, all these little ways of doing things that we wanted to share with you, that will ensure that tomorrow, after 5 November<fnref n="22" />, we continue to be reasonable (Tjibaou and Kona, 2018).

The Pacific Way in New Caledonia therefore appears to be still a work in progress and, in the light of this study, does not appear to be an impossible undertaking. It is up to the various protagonists to delve back into history, to re-examine the memories held by their respective communities in order to sketch out the outlines of a possible new social contract that is accepted, shared and reconciled.

## References

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Carteron, B. (2015) *Identités culturelles et sentiment d'appartenance en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Sur le seuil de la maison commune*. L'Harmattan. Paris (Portes Océanes).

<footnote n="22">²² The speaker is referring to the first consultation on 4 November 2018 provided for in the Nouméa Accord.</footnote>
Chauchat, M. (2022) La résolution de l'ONU du 16 juin 2022 sur la question de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, Laboratoire de Recherches Juridique Economique. Available at: https://larje.unc.nc/fr/la-resolution-de-lonu-du-16-juin-2022-sur-la-question-de-la-nouvelle-caledonie/ (Accessed: 2 October 2022).

Christnacht, A. (2008) 'Les Accords de Matignon vingt ans après. L'Accord de Nouméa, dix ans plus tard. Entretien réalisé par Aurélien Coulson en juillet 2008', *Négociations*, 10(2), pp. 89-103. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3917/neg.010.0089.

Cochin, C. and Rédactions de NC la 1ère (2022) *En Nouvelle-Calédonie, une place de la Paix, entre devoir de mémoire et chemin vers l'avenir, Nouvelle-Calédonie la 1ère*. Available at: https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/nouvellecaledonie/province-sud/noumea/en-nouvelle-caledonie-une-place-de-la-paix-entre-devoir-de-memoire-et-chemin-vers-l-avenir-1298656.html (Accessed: 2 October 2022).

David, C. (2017) 'Les transitions politiques en Mélanésie, éléments de réflexion pour la préparation du « jour d'après » en Nouvelle-Calédonie', *Revue française de droit constitutionnel*, 110(2), pp. 367-386. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3917/rfdc.110.0367.

Déwé Gorodé, 5 Questions pour Île en Île (2009). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xX0VS2vO3FM (Accessed: 30 August 2022).

Gil Brial fait le point sur la visite de Jean-François Carengo, le Ministre délégué aux outre-mer (2022). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6y38jhE37p4 (Accessed: 29 September 2022).

Godin, P. and Passa, J. (2018) 'La Nouvelle-Calédonie est-elle une société multiculturelle ?', in G. Giraudeau et al. (eds) *L'avenir institutionnel de la Nouvelle-Calédonie : actes du colloque universitaire des 17 & 18 novembre 2017*. Nouméa: Presses universitaires de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (LARJE), pp. 113-124.

Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (2008) 'Règlement du concours pour la conception de trois signes identitaires'. Available at: https://melodia.nc/hymne/reglementconcours.pdf (Accessed: 21 September 2022).

Guillaume-Hofnung, M. (2007) *La médiation*. 4ème édition. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (Que sais-je).
Humaa-Gue (2008) *Peace and love*. Nouméa: Mangrove.

Le Pensec, L. (1988) ‘Déclaration de Louis Le Pensec, ministre des DOM-TOM’. Available at: https://www.mncparis.fr/uploads/accords-de-matignon_1.pdf (Accessed: 2 October 2022).

Légifrance (1998) *Accord sur la Nouvelle-Calédonie signé à Nouméa le 5 mai 1998*. Available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000000555817/ (Accessed: 10 August 2020).

Les Kanak et le bagne, une exposition pour découvrir une histoire commune [en ligne] (2022).
Nouméa: Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes. Available at: https://www.lnc.nc/videos/les-kanak-et-le-bagne-une-exposition-pour-decouvrir-une-histoire-commune (Accessed: 5 October 2022).

Mapou, L. (2021) *Discours de politique générale du président du 17ème gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Discours officiel. Centre culturel Tjibaou, Nouméa: Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, p. 67.

Mapou, L. (2022) *Discours du président du gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Calédonie. Ouverture de la 1ère édition du Festival Caledonia*. Centre Culturel Jean-Marie Tjibaou, Nouméa, p. 4.

Merle, I. (2022) *Dire l'histoire ou la taire ? L'Affaire de Hienghène revisitée, Mediapart*. Available at: https://blogs.mediapart.fr/isabelle-merle/blog/270722/dire-l-histoire-ou-la-taire-l-affaire-de-hienghene-revisitee (Accessed: 2 October 2022).

Metzdorf, N. (2022) *Discours du député de la deuxième circonscription de la Nouvelle-Calédonie. Cérémonie d'ouverture du Festival Caledonia (enregistrement et notes personnels)*. Centre Culturel Jean-Marie Tjibaou, Nouméa.

Mrad Fati, B. (2012) ‘Définir la médiation parmi les modes alternatifs de régulation des conflits’, *Informations sociales*, 2012/2(170), pp. 11–19.

Néaoutyine, P. (2006) *L'indépendance au présent. Identité kanak et destin commun. Entretien avec Jean-François Corral et André Némia*. Paris: Syllepse.

Nouvelle-Calédonie la 1ère (2020) ‘Usine du Sud : dix heures de table ronde, et un consensus’, *Nouvelle-Calédonie la 1ère*, 3 December. Available at: https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/nouvellecaledonie/province-sud/noumea/usine-du-sud-seconde-table-ronde-a-noumea-899248.html (Accessed: 30 September 2022).

Organisation des Nations-Unies (1970) *Verbatim du discours de Kamesese Ratu Mara à la*
25ème session de l'assemblée générale de l'Organisation des Nations-Unies prononcé le 21 octobre 1970. New York: Organisation des Nations-Unies.

Renan, E. (1882) Qu'est-ce qu'une nation ? Conférence faite en Sorbonne le 11 mars 1882. Calmann-Lévy. Paris: Ancienne Maison Lévy Frères.

Replay. Poignée de main entre Jean-Marie Tjibaou et Jacques Lafleur : l'inauguration de la statue sur Nouvelle-Calédonie la 1ère (2022). Nouvelle-Calédonie la 1ère. Available at: https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/nouvellecaledonie/province-sud/noumea/poignee-de-main-entre-jean-marie-tjibaou-et-jacques-lafleur-l-inauguration-de-la-statue-a-suivre-en-direct-sur-nouvelle-caledonie-la-1ere-1298332.html (Accessed: 20 September 2022).

Stora, B. (2021) Les questions mémorielles portant sur la colonisation et la guerre d'Algérie. Paris: Président de la République, p. 160. Available at: https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/files/rapport/pdf/278186.pdf (Accessed: 20 September 2022).

Tjibaou, E. and Kona, Y. (2018) Régulation des conflits en pays kanak. Nouméa: Médiathèque de l'Agence de Développement la Culture Kanak (Les rencontres de la médiathèque). Available at: http://mediatheque.adck.nc/ (Accessed: 7 September 2022).

Tjibaou, J.-M. (1996) La présence Kanak. [version PDF]. Edited by A. Bensa and É. Wittersheim. Paris: Odile Jacob.

Tutugoro, A. (2021) ‘Incompatible Struggles? Reclaiming Indigenous Sovereignty and Political Sovereignty in Kanaky and/or New Caledonia’, Department of Pacific Affairs [en ligne] [Preprint], (DP2020/05). Available at: https://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/7915/dp-202005-incompatible-struggles-reclaiming-indigenous (Accessed: 1 October 2022).

Waan'Yaat – Sur une terre de la république (2022). Foulala Productions, Nouvelle Calédonie la 1ere.

Whaap, B. and Madec, A. (2021) Le sénat coutumier décrète un ‘deuil kanak’ d’une année et se positionne en faveur du report du référendum, Nouvelle-Calédonie la 1ère. Available at: https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/nouvellecaledonie/le-senat-coutumier-decrete-un-deuil-kanak-d-une-annee-et-se-positionne-en-faveur-du-report-du-referendum-1149691.html (Accessed: 21 December 2021).
Audio documentation

Humaa-Gue (2008) *Peace and love*. Nouméa: Mangrove, vol.Cémwâ gi a nâdre..

Metzdorf Nicolas, *Speech by the Member of Parliament for the second constituency of New Caledonia. Opening ceremony Caledonia Festival (personal recording and notes)*, Centre Culturel Jean-Marie Tjibaou, Nouméa, 2022.

Interviews conducted by the author and used in this chapter

Interview with Jean-Louis D'Anglebermes in Nouméa on 25 October 2019.

Interview with Paul Néaoutyine on 25 February 2020 in Poindimié.

Interview with Fote Trolue on 9 June 2021 in Nouméa.

Interview with Victor Tutugoro on 2 May 2022 in Nouméa.
# THE KANAK PATH TO INDEPENDENCE

> *A problem created cannot be solved by thinking
> in the same way as it was created*

Albert Einstein (1879-1955)

Dr Patrice Godin

UNC

To introduce this paper devoted to the Kanak independence movement, I propose to start with an extract from the conclusion of “The Elementary Forms of Religious Life” in which Durkheim sets out what I consider to be one of the major lessons of his sociology.

A society can neither create nor recreate itself without, at the same time, creating some form of ideal. This creation is not for it a kind of supererogatory act, by which it would complete itself, once formed; it is the act by which it is periodically made and remade. Thus, when we oppose the ideal society to the real society as two antagonists who would lead us in opposite directions, we are making and opposing abstractions. The ideal society is not outside the real society; it is part of it. Far from being divided between them as between two poles that repel each other, we cannot hold to one without holding to the other. For a society is not simply constituted by the mass of individuals who make it up, by the land they occupy, by the things they use, by the movements they carry out, but, above all, by the idea it has of itself. (Durkheim 1912/1979: 603)

SINCE THE SPACE OF AN ACADEMIC PAPER IS BY DEFINITION LIMITED, I DO NOT INTEND TO SERIOUSLY SHOW HOW, FOR MORE THAN FIFTY YEARS, KANAK SOCIETY - AND NOT ONLY THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT THAT HAS EMERGED FROM IT - HAS NOT CEASED TO CREATE AND RECREATE ITSELF THROUGH ITS IDEAL OF DECOLONISATION AS WELL AS THROUGH THE EFFORTS MADE TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES PLACED IN THE WAY OF THE REALISATION OF THIS IDEAL - OBSTACLES WHICH, IT SHOULD BE NOTED, STILL SEEM TO BE LARGELY LAVISHED ON IT TODAY. MORE MODESTLY, I PROPOSE TO RETURN TO THE MEANING OF THE NOUMÉA ACCORD FOR THE KANAK PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AND TO THE CURRENT CHALLENGES OF THE EXIT PROCESS ORCHESTRATED BY THE
MACRON II GOVERNMENT. THE APPROACH WILL NOT BE THAT OF A HISTORIAN, EVEN LESS OF A POLITICAL SCIENTIST, BUT THAT OF AN ETHNOLOGIST WORKING ON THE PRODUCTION OF SOCIAL LINKS IN NEW CALEDONIA AND WHO, IN FORTY YEARS, WILLINGLY OR NOT, HAS BECOME A WITNESS TO THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ARCHIPELAGO.

## The Nouméa Accord and the construction of a new social bond.

- For the sake of clarity, the objectives explicitly pursued by the signatories of the Nouméa Accord can be reduced to five:

- Decolonise New Caledonia

- To build a "community of destiny" (communauté de destin)<fnref n="1" /> uniting all the cultural and historical components of its population.

- Laying the foundations of a local democracy

- Restore the Kanak culture to its rightful place

- Relaunch the socio-economic development of the country and reduce the multiple inequalities - social, economic, educational, geographical, health, etc. - through various rebalancing operations.

It should also be noted that these objectives were indissolubly linked. They formed a whole, at least in the eyes of the signatories, the socialist government and of the independence parties. Generally speaking, there can be no democracy without decolonisation; no real decolonisation without a minimum of economic autonomy and, as Jean-Marie Tjibaou would have said, without the capacity to negotiate interdependencies; no real democracy when social and economic inequalities are strong and the source of deep social fractures; no community of destiny is possible when social and economic inequalities and "ethnic" cleavages overlap, when the colonial "dispute" has not been settled at least at the institutional, if not the "ideological" level, and when the culture of the colonised indigenous people remains marginalised; no community of destiny is possible without democracy either.

<footnote n="1">¹ It is the notion of « common destiny » (destin commun) : « It is now necessary to lay the foundations for New Caledonian citizenship, enabling the original people to form a human community with the men and women who live there, affirming their common destiny [Il est aujourd'hui nécessaire de poser les bases d'une citoyenneté de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, permettant au peuple d'origine de constituer avec les hommes et les femmes qui y vivent une communauté humaine affirmant son destin commun] » (Accord de Noumea, §4).</footnote>
But beyond this simple logic, it must be said that the quasi-organic nature of these
objectives was even more relevant in the New Caledonian context. As I tried to
show in an article written in collaboration with Jone Passa, New Caledonia can
be classified as one of those societies that sociologists and anthropologists have
described as “composite”, “fragmented” or even “plural”. Culturally divided (here
we would say “ethnically” divided), these societies are also highly stratified; there is a
close overlap between community differentiation, socio-economic inequalities and
political antagonisms. Moreover, as settlements, they retain, whether independent
or not, a strong material and political dependence on their “metropolis” - which is
largely maintained by the latter; and the Europeans who live there, although often in
small numbers, exert a dominant influence, out of all proportion to their demographic
weight. Their language is imposed on all. The public space, education, information and
the media in general, cultural institutions, justice, the management of the economy,
administration, etc., are all dominated by their language. The whole society, in the
socio-anthropological sense, is organised on the European model. Finally, and this is
not the least of the paradoxes, this dependence on the “metropolis” is at the same time
what ensures a semblance of unity to local society and what prevents its emergence
as a “society” by exacerbating its contradictions. In fact, a composite, fragmented or
plural society is not really a “society”. The social bond is not the expression of a collective
identity, even less of a political will, but the result of an institutional framework imposed
“from outside”. If we dare to make a zoological comparison, we could speak of a
society with an “external skeleton”. Internally, this society is riddled with contradictions
and conflicts, partly inherited from colonisation, partly from the ambivalent relations
that the communities have not only with each other, but also with the representatives
of the state and the “metropolis”.

In the New Caledonian context, these features have been amplified by a historical
fact that is important to underline: after the Second World War, New Caledonia
experienced a promising first attempt at decolonisation, but this was interrupted by
a unilateral decision by the State that continues to have an impact to this day. The
reasons for this decision are diverse, but all stem from General De Gaulle's desire to
give France back its weight in international relations. Allow me to reprint here in English
few lines that I had published earlier in French:
On the scale of human history, a plural or composite society is a relatively recent political and economic structure inherited, as I said, from colonisation. In Africa and Asia, this structure emerged massively in the 1940s and was gradually transformed with the accessions to independence. In the New Caledonia of the 1970s, it persisted because of a conflicting political history that has left deep wounds to this day. Although its population voted massively in 1958 to maintain its status as an Overseas Territory under the institutions of the Fifth Republic, and its representatives, who were mostly autonomists, solemnly declared their opposition to independence, between 1962 and 1970 New Caledonia saw the achievements of the framework law governing it gradually dismantled and the French state took over the running of its affairs. Let us mention here the Jacquinot law of 21 November 1963 which "abolished the ministers in New Caledonia, against the advice of the local assembly" and led the High Commissioner of the Republic "to take back the main part of the executive under his sole responsibility". Let us also mention that the State took back under his sole authority secondary education in 1965 or the "Billotte laws" of 1969 which "reduce the competences of the territory in terms of management of the mining domain and generalise the State communes [communes d'Etat]", thus taking them out of "the control of the territorial authorities, while reinforcing the local establishment of the State administration by the creation of administrative subdivisions, on the model of the sub-prefectures" in mainland France. I refer those who are interested in the details of the process to Le Borgne's book, *Nouvelle-Calédonie 1945-1968: la confiance trahie*, published in 2005, which gives a very precise account. With the takeover by the State and the dismantling of the framework law, New Caledonia lost much more than its internal autonomy. It was a whole social and political evolution that was stopped dead in its tracks. The embryonic social contract that had been building up democratically between the different components of its population since the end of the Second World War was destroyed. At the same time, this social contract was confronted with the massive waves of immigration desired and orchestrated by the State, waves that from the beginning of the 1960s made the Kanak a minority in the population and consequently in the New Caledonian electorate (Godin and Passa 2018: 117).
IN REALITY, THE AUTHORITARIAN TAKEOVER OF NEW CALEDONIA BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY 1960S NOT ONLY UNDID THE EMBRYONIC SOCIAL CONTRACT THAT HAD BEEN FORGED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR, BUT ALSO MADE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE A DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION TO THE NEW CALEDONIAN PROBLEM, AT LEAST IF DEMOCRACY IS REDUCED TO VOTING. IT ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO INTENSIFYING THE ANTAGONISTIC DIMENSION OF THE NEW CALEDONIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE. THE NEW CALEDONIA OF THE LATE 1970S, WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE RISE OF THE KANAK DEMAND FOR INDEPENDENCE, BECAME A DIVIDED SOCIETY, FRACTURED BETWEEN TWO CULTURAL AND POLITICAL IMAGINATIONS OF ADVERSITY. BY INSCRIBING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A "COMMUNITY OF DESTINY" BRINGING TOGETHER ALL THE CULTURAL COMPONENTS OF THE LOCAL POPULATION, THE NOUMÉA ACCORD AIMED TO REDUCE THE DIVIDE AND LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT.

## Nainville-les-Roches

In fact, as all those who follow Caledonian news know, it took time to begin to sketch a way out of the trap, to build a fragile, temporary but viable political agreement between the different components of the local chessboard, and this was not done without clashes and errors. It is not useless to dwell on this. At the institutional level, the process can be summarised by breaking it down into three stages:

Stage 1: the Nainville-les-Roches Round Table. The first two pillars of a provisional social contract were formulated there, even though several adjustments were made later. On the one hand, the "colonial fact" and the right of the Kanak people to self-determination were recognised, and on the other hand, the Kanak people officially recognised the legitimacy of a significant part of the populations that came in the wake of colonisation - the "victims of history" - to remain for good in New Caledonia and to decide on its institutional and political future. However, this first step forward was not without ambiguity. For the independentists, the two pillars formed a whole. In their eyes, the integration of voters from other communities in the country could not be done against the Kanak right to self-determination. On the contrary, for some of those who are described as "victims of history", there is no doubt that this appeared as a way to prevent the country from becoming independent one day.

This first step must be emphasised. The link between "decolonisation" and "the construction of a multicultural and democratic society" is not a novelty, even less a concession to the French government, but a leitmotif of Kanak political discourse. Two quotations to convince us of this, if we need them. The first one dates back to a
time when the demand for independence did not yet exist and I borrow it from the
declaration made by Evenor de Greslan, Secretary General of the Union Calédonienne,
at the Tiaoué (Koohnê) Congress in 1963.

By taking as its motto "Two colours, but one people" the Union Calédonienne wanted to express in a few words the essential content of its action and its goals: to achieve the unification of New Caledonia in order to ensure by peaceful means the transition from a colonial regime to a modern regime of freedom, equality and fraternity" (De Greslan 2004: 1).

And De Greslan added for the benefit of his party's European Caledonian activists:

"If the natives were to carry out the work of decolonisation without us, on what could our claims be based in the future? Only those who have contributed to the struggle for the transformation of the country will be able to recognise each other as compatriots and children of the same native island." (ibid.)

The second quotation is taken from a preparatory document for the Xth Congress of the Union Calédonienne held in Hienghène in September 1979. The text is signed by Jean-Marie Tjibaou and also deals with the place of Caledonians of European origin - indeed, more broadly, of all non-Kanak people - in the struggle for the decolonisation of New Caledonia.

The alternative for non-Kanaks is to know whether they want to continue to ratify the act of taking possession, to perpetuate the dominant-dominated relationship and thus continue to deny the existence of the Kanaks with their legitimate claims, or to assume the fact that they live in the country of the Kanaks and not in Tahiti, Wallis, France, the West Indies or elsewhere [...]

And Jean-Marie Tjibaou shortly afterwards evoked the stakes of such an alternative:

To become fully aware of the fact that fighting for Kanak independence means assuming one's existence in Kanak country [...] This movement of nation-building is what shapes the new Kanak people to stand in solidarity, to be multiracial and fraternal. (personal archives)

These two quotations alone show that the conclusions of the Nainville-les-Roches round table are part of the continuity of the decolonisation movement led by the
Kanak. Since the entry of the Kanak into politics shortly after the end of the Second World War, since the constitution - for the 1953 elections to the General Council - of the first official "Union Calédonienne" list led by Maurice Lenormand, since the publication in 1954 of the first issue of *Avenir Calédonien*, the weekly newspaper of the Union Calédonienne party, the stated objective was clearly the decolonisation of New Caledonia, but - and this is the point to be emphasised - this demand could not, in the eyes of the Kanak and Caledonian militants of the time, be dissociated from the creation of a multicultural and democratic society. In 2018, the Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance, led by the Palika, still says so in its "contribution to the determination of the political and institutional future of New Caledonia". Kanaky-New Caledonia is called upon to become a "multicultural", "democratic", "secular" and "united" nation (UNI 2018). At the very most, the UNI document insists more clearly on "the principle of hospitality, an essential value of Kanak civilisation", which means that the independence movement

agrees to extend its right to self-determination to the other communities that history has durably established in New Caledonia, and consequently their legitimacy to be the nationals of the future independent country as children of the country who have contributed to its construction (UNI 2018: 15)<fnref n="2" />.

To emphasise the continuity of Kanak political discourse should not, however, mask the discontinuity between Evenor de Greslan's declaration and the working document written by Jean-Marie Tjibaou. This is entirely contained in the meaning to be given to the word "decolonisation". In 1963, the Caledonian Evenor de Greslan and the "Union Calédonienne" were still in favour of a broad "autonomy" within the institutional framework of the French Republic. By 1979, the old "Union Calédonienne" had already been officially "independentist" for two years and many Caledonian militants of European origin had deserted its ranks to join those of the local right wing.

<footnote n="2">² Still in the same vein, Evenor de Greslan's letter was reproduced in issue no. 1035 of *L'Avenir Calédonien*, published in March 2004, and the same issue also contained «extracts from the foreword to the Union Calédonienne programme for the May 2004 provincial elections» written by President Pascal Naouna, who spoke of the community of destiny called for by the Nouméa Accord: « This first and constant commitment of the Union Calédonienne is reflected in the willingness of the Kanak to share their right to self-determination with the non-Kanak, whether through the notion of 'victims of history' at Nainville-les-Roches in 1983, or by freezing the electoral body at the Matignon Accord in 1988, which was to become the reference point for the Nouméa Accord in 1998, thus defining the population concerned, which will be called to determine the country's future» (Naouna 2004: 4).</footnote>
THE BREAK CAME, AS MENTIONED ABOVE, FROM A DESIRE FOR THE STATE TO TAKE BACK THE CONTROL OF NEW CALEDONIA. A DEPARTMENTALISATION PROJECT WAS EVEN BEING PLANNED. IT DID NOT SEE THE LIGHT OF DAY BUT OFFERED THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE RECOLONISATION OF THE ARCHIPELAGO. TO FULLY UNDERSTAND THE EVOLUTION OF THE KANAK VISION, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT THE BILLOTTE LAWS OF 1969 NOT ONLY REINFORCED THE RECENTRALISATION OF THE JACQUINOT STATUTE OF 1963, BUT ALSO WITHDREW FROM NEW CALEDONIA ALL POWER IN TERMS OF LEGISLATION, REGULATIONS AND MINING TAXATION. ARTICLE 20 OF LAW 69-5 REMOVED THE PUBLIC LAW LEGAL PERSONALITY OF INDIGENOUS TRIBES AND DISTRICTS AND DEPRIVED THEM OF THE RIGHT TO SUE (THE CAPACITY TO SUE, AS IN BRINGING A LAWSUIT). AFTER 1969, THERE WERE NO LONGER ANY KANAK COMMUNITIES IN THE EYES OF FRENCH LAW. ARTICLE 75 OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH IN PRINCIPLE GUARANTEED KANAK CUSTOMARY STATUS, WAS PURELY AND SIMPLY VIOLATED, WITHOUT ANY FURTHER PROCESS.

## Violence and dialogue

The RPCR, Jacques Lafleur's right-wing party, as we know, refused to sign the agreement reached in Nainville-les-Roches and even left the table to mark its opposition to the prospect of self-determination outlined in the initial text. As for the Lemoine Statute, which claimed to strengthen the autonomy of New Caledonia, it displeased the Front Indépendantiste, which found nothing in it of the decolonisation promises of François Mitterrand, candidate for the Presidency of the Republic. It is not necessary to recount here the birth of the FLNKS (Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste), the boycott of the Lemoine referendum that followed and what is called with euphemism the "Events" of the 1984-1988 period. I will limit myself to a brief remark. The insurrectionary actions of 1984 and 1988 have sometimes been seen as the beginnings of a revolutionary movement that was then stifled by the Political Agreements signed in 1988 and 1998 with the colonial state. I confess that I do not subscribe to such a vision, essentially because I find in the uses that the FLNKS makes of political violence during this period practices observed in a completely different context, that of land and customary conflicts within Kanak society. The rules of "respect" that are imposed within this society require that disputes between individuals as well as between families, between "clans" and between "chieftaincies" are resolved by talking and negotiating until a consensus is reached. Violence usually only breaks out when one of the parties involved refuses to dialogue, insults the other, claims to impose his point of view unilaterally or breaks his promises. It can sometimes explode in a way that seems quite sudden to an outsider, but usually an in-depth study shows that it is in fact the
result of a long rotting of social relations. As far as land is concerned, the absence of a customary land registry, Joseph Goromido tells us,

serves the social dynamic because it allows for discussion, gathering and finding a consensual solution. The social dynamic around land tenure is unifying in the community, even if tensions may exist, it creates social ties. It allows people to sit around the table despite the dissensions that can arise [...] the essential thing is to always be together, in community, to support each other in both good and bad situations. (Joseph Goromido 2004).

In fact, as Sonia Grochain quite rightly writes, conflict appears in Kanak society as an institutional means of creating and recreating social ties and community (Grochain 2013: 106-107). And it is this dynamic that we find after the rejection of the Lemoine Statute and, shortly afterwards, in the confrontation with the government of Jacques Chirac. Aware of the weakness of the forces at their disposal, but also faithful to their ideal, the Kanak leaders only had open confrontations with the state when it seemed impossible to negotiate with it on the progress of the decolonisation process and the guarantees that they proposed to offer to non-Kanak after independence.

## Matignon-Oudinot and Nouméa

Let us now turn to the other two stages of political development.

- The Matignon-Oudinot Accords: the desire for socio-economic rebalancing, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a very concrete desire for the recognition of Kanak culture are added to the first two pillars mentioned above. The scope of this progress must nevertheless be put into perspective. If these Accords reinforced the process of decolonisation and social integration begun in Nainville-les-Roches and continued in the framework of the Fabius-Pisani Statute, it must also be said that they were a clear step backwards compared to the project of Independence-Association initially proposed by Edgar Pisani.

- The Nouméa Accord: the actions in favour of rebalancing are reinforced and even developed on many points that had been neglected until then, but the originality of the Accord lies elsewhere: in the will to make it possible to build a real democratic space
in New Caledonia. This involves: the introduction of New Caledonian citizenship; a strengthening of the provincialisation process and of the powers of the local executive and Congress; the retrocession - with the exception of regal competences - of all political competences necessary for the autonomous governance of the country; the promise of a concerted planning and development plan; an accepted restriction of the electorate; the creation of a customary Senate, etc. Furthermore, the State is in relative retreat from the Caledonian debate and officially only retains a position of support and arbitration in the event of resurgence of open and violent conflicts.

The guiding idea is as simple as it is ingenious: To suspend the question of the country's independence for twenty years and to give the Caledonian populations the means to imagine and then decide for themselves on their social organisation, in the hope that at the end of the Accord a political consensus could be found on the country's institutional future, or failing that, that a clear majority would emerge, either in favour of independence or in favour of keeping the country within France, but a majority that would overcome the political and cultural cleavages resulting from colonisation and crystallised by De Gaulle's takeover of the 1960s.

SIGNED IN 1988, THIS NOUMÉA ACCORD CONSTITUTED, UNTIL RECENTLY, A SOCIAL CONTRACT WHICH, ALTHOUGH TRANSITIONAL AND IMPERFECT, NONETHELESS CONFERRED ON NEW CALEDONIA A UNITY THAT WAS NO LONGER EXOGENOUS AND ARTIFICIAL. DECOLONISATION, COMMUNITY OF DESTINY, MULTICULTURALISM, DEVELOPMENT AND REDUCTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES: THE UNITY OF THE COUNTRY COULD BE ACHIEVED, IT WAS THOUGHT, THROUGH THE DYNAMICS OF THE RETROCESSION OF COMPETENCES OPERATED BY THE STATE AND THE DYNAMICS OF LOCAL REFORMS.

## The exit from the Nouméa Accord

There is no need to take stock of the political process initiated by the Matignon-Oudinot Accords and continued by the Nouméa Accord. This was done twice at the request of the pro-independence movement, which no doubt wanted to verify the State's commitment to the decolonisation process, and it speaks for itself, to say the least, and is in favour of the Agreement signed in 1998. The New Caledonian society of 2022 hardly resembles the one of 1980. Nevertheless, it seems useful to me to point out two possible aporias in the conception of the Nouméa Accord that have not only weakened its implementation, but also make an honourable exit from the Nouméa
Accord problematic.

The first aporia is ideological. Is it possible to claim to be building a society piecemeal, i.e. without even a minimal agreement on a project for society, without a global vision of the type of society that one intends to build? Perhaps this was a utopia. It is still difficult to assess. In any case, as Jone Passa and I have shown, the development of the Nouméa Accord has constantly placed its signatories in contradictory situations, without them always being able to understand how to extricate themselves from them.

The majority pro-independence Kanak community was recognised by the Nouméa Accord as having an inalienable right to self-determination and decolonisation. But with the successive enlargements of the restricted electoral body, it has also been constantly reminded of its obligation, in the name of democratic principles, not only to make room for the other communities and their rights, but also to subordinate the exercise of its right to self-determination to the approval of these other populations, who are in the majority electorally, but who have not themselves been colonised. In the minds of some, the innate and active right to self-determination became conditional, turned into an obligation to convince others. In other words, the Kanak often felt that what was conceded with one hand was taken away with the other.

The Caledonians (non-Kanak citizens), the majority of whom are non pro-independence, were promised the preservation of their rights as French citizens, but de facto were also told that they are obliged to shoulder the burden of colonisation almost single-handedly - even though they were not its main instigators - and to negotiate a solution to the colonial dispute with the Kanak nationalist representatives, which they found difficult to see how it would not radically disrupt their way of life, not to say their privileges. Experience has shown that this was undoubtedly the main obstacle to the Agreement's momentum<fnref n="3" />.

For its part, at least apparently, the French State too was not spared the ideological dilemmas, since in the name of the principles of the Republic and in the eyes of the international community, it was imperative that it respect its commitments, decolonise (which it is often criticised for not knowing how to do), preserve the rights of its nationals, respect its Constitution and try to maintain as much as possible the French position in the Pacific. A position that is today summarised under the label of "Indo-Pacific Axis".

<footnote n="3">³ [from the editors] These last two paragraphs were underlined in bold in the original French text.</footnote>
The second aporia is political. Could the State, which is the colonising power in New Caledonia, seriously claim to be neutral and to play the role of arbiter? But given the local situation in 1998, could it claim a better position than that? I'm not sure, but it had to stick to it. However, the State made several mistakes that raised doubts about its neutrality and had undeniable consequences for the post-Nouméa Accord. I will mention only two. The first is its indifference to the abandonment by local politicians of the *Plan d'Aménagement et de Développement NC 2025* (Land Use and Development Plan NC 2025). This plan was an integral part of the Nouméa Constitutional Agreement and the State was its guarantor, since in principle no plan contract requested by the country's various local authorities could be financed if it did not meet the NC 2025 plan's objectives. This position should have been adhered to. The NC 2025 Plan occupied a central place in the country's unification, development and democratisation process. Its elaboration was an opportunity to bring out a real global social project [un veritable projet de société], to create a local consensus. It is true that by allowing the country to be built in a truly autonomous manner, there was the risk of weakening certain “French hexagonal” interests, for example by seeing SLN's predatory policy threatened...

A second mistake made by the State is that it kept quiet about its own interests in the country. At no time did the State put them on the table: geostrategic, military, economic, cultural interests. If it had done so, it might have made it possible to envisage a political evolution that would not be a rupture, but a progressive change in the country's relations with France and consequently an equally progressive change in relations between the Kanak people and the other communities. Having failed to do so throughout the duration of the Accord, the State had an opportunity to do so at the time of the three referendum consultations for the exit. Rather than a "dry and divisive" referendum, it was in fact possible, as the UNI had suggested, to invite the electorate to vote on the country's future status (pure and simple independence, independence as a partnership, a federated state, etc.) and the State could then have confirmed its desire to leave the colonial balance of power behind in order to enter into a different relationship based on reciprocity and mutual understanding. One alternative way was to not put en bloc the question of independence, but to invite the electorate to vote on evolutions in the management of sovereign powers, and here again the State could have expressed France's wishes and expectations. But none of this happened.
On the contrary, with the involvement of the current Minister for Overseas Territories, we have witnessed a demolition of a rare brutality of the social contract so hard built in 30 years of political agreements. Is this due to a lack of knowledge of New Caledonian realities? Is this due to a lack of experience and information? Flippancy? Contempt for the local population?

I will refrain from answering. What is certain, however, are the socially and politically catastrophic consequences of government action.

The Nouméa Accord had its own organisation, its own meetings and rituals, and the Minister immediately showed his desire to break away from these by organising consultations on a model that suited him. From this point of view, the constitution of a Leprédour group is most revealing. It was done without respecting the rules that had been so difficult to establish and without any awareness of the way political decisions are made in this country, particularly within the Kanak world. The result was the withdrawal of President Paul Néaoutyine from the consultation and the growing hostility of the independentists towards the government, without the Minister even questioning his share of responsibility for the deterioration of the political dialogue in New Caledonia.

The state had to maintain a high degree of political neutrality. Instead, it showed its bias by openly siding with maintaining the country within France. And having displayed his ideological preferences, the Minister for Overseas Territories also publicly displayed his personal sympathies and close ties with local political leaders in favour of remaining in France, even during the period of strict confinement due to the Covid-19 pandemic. In doing so, the Minister has shattered what little remained of the political cohesion established by the Nouméa Accord. The supporters of keeping the country within France no longer had to pretend to discuss with their pro-independence counterparts. All they had to do was cultivate their proximity to the government and wait for the dividends of this position to be served to them on a platter.

The State also demonstrated its partiality in the affair of the south industrial plant. In this case, it supported a solution that openly went against the pro-independence positions (the famous Nickel doctrine) and, even worse, against some of the local economic interests. This is not surprising when one considers that the "loyalist" majority of the country held the reins of the local government until last year and was able to lead
the country to near-bankruptcy without the State finding fault with it. On the contrary, the state continues to fuel the country's economic crisis through a policy of loans that increase the country's dependence.

The same bias was found in the preparation of the last of the three exit consultations. Asked to inform this consultation, the government published and distributed a biased document on the consequences of 'yes' and 'no'. This document may have been legally impeccable, but it was completely questionable on the political level and it was deleterious to the serenity of the debate on the exit from the Nouméa Accord, which, having the value of a social contract, called for a gradual and negotiated exit. It was felt by the majority of Kanak and many Caledonians as an act of contempt, signifying that they can do nothing, that they are nothing without France.

Finally, the State was supposed to remain neutral, but in the face of the Covid epidemic, it clearly chose not to listen to the independentists, not to invite the partners of the Nouméa Accord to reflect on another date for the last exit consultation. It did so undoubtedly in order to respond to the demands of internal French politics, even though the Prime Minister had officially committed himself to ensuring that there would be no interference between local and "metropolitan" politics. It also did so in ignorance of what mourning represents in Kanak society, of its social, material and time cost. For a family, a clan and its allies, a Kanak bereavement means a year of preparation and work. This ignorance, if it is indeed ignorance, was once again perceived as contempt. This is all the more so as the arguments put forward by the Minister had no chance of convincing: as if going back on the word of a Prime Minister to avoid any overlap between the local and hexagonal political calendars is in no way anti-democratic; but asking for the postponement of a ballot for reasons of pandemic and mourning is, on the contrary, totally anti-democratic - except in "Metropolitan France", where, for similar reasons, the postponement of regional and departmental elections could still be envisaged in 2021.
DOUBLE STANDARDS. WE UNDERSTAND ONLY TOO WELL HOW THE KANAK RECEIVED THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS FOR DIALOGUE.

THE REACTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE MINISTER FOR OVERSEAS TERRITORIES ON THE EVENING AND THE DAY AFTER THE LAST REFERENDUM WERE CERTAINLY NOT HELPING TO CONVINCE THEM OF THE GOOD INTENTIONS BY FRANCE. BY AFFIRMING THAT NEW CALEDONIA REMAINED IN FRANCE, THE FORMER CHOSE, IN THE EYES OF THE INDEPENDENTISTS, TO ANNOUNCE THE END OF THE DECOLONISATION PROCESS, TO UNRAVEL THE FIVE INDISSOCIABLE PRINCIPLES OF THE NOUMÉA ACCORD (SEE ABOVE) IN FAVOUR OF THE MAJORITY PRINCIPLE ALONE. THIS IS SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THIS PRINCIPLE IS AT THE ORIGIN OF THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AND THE FIRST KANAK UPRISING OF 1984. IT IS UNDENIABLE THAT THE “NO” VOTE WON OVER THE “YES” VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE IN THE THREE CONSULTATIONS ON THE NOUMÉA ACCORD, BUT IT IS ALSO OBVIOUS THAT THE KANAK PEOPLE, THE COUNTRY'S COLONISED PEOPLE, SHOWED BY A VERY LARGE MAJORITY AND BY EVEN ABSTAINING FROM VOTING, THEIR DESIRE TO BREAK AWAY FROM FRENCH TUTELAGE. TO THINK THAT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE CAN BE PLAYED AGAINST THE KANAK PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, TO IMAGINE, AS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO DO, THAT THE KANAK PEOPLE AND OTHER PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIVISTS WILL SUBMIT TO THE RESULTS OF THE THREE CONSULTATIONS AND DISCUSS THE CONTENT OF A REFERENDUM ON A PROJECT THAT WOULD MEAN THE END OF THE DECOLONISATION PROCESS IS NOT SERIOUS. THE INDEPENDENTISTS, AS AN OLD KANAK INDEPENDENCE LEADER CONFIDED TO ME A FEW WEEKS AGO, ARE READY TO SHARE THEIR BIRTHRIGHT, NOT TO SELL IT AND GIVE IT UP.

## Conclusion

How can we conclude, given that the process of exiting the Nouméa Accord has not yet really begun? The prevailing feeling is that the French government is about to replay the same score that was played by the government of General de Gaulle in the early 1960s. The embryonic social contract so dearly elaborated during the last thirty years of political agreements has been undermined, not to say dramatically broken. In a carefree mood, slowly but surely, a process of re-fracturing of New Caledonian society is taking place. In the post-referendum silence and in the greatest insouciance of the “Loyalists” who think they are “victorious” in their fight against independence, we see social and political antagonisms re-crystallising, signs of future confrontations. The mistrust of young people and a good part of the Kanak population towards the historical pro-independence leaders and parties - which was predicted a little too quickly to lead to a triumphant victory of the “no” - is now well and truly taking hold. Moreover, the pro-independence leaders and parties will undoubtedly be the first to
bear the brunt of the tensions that are now running through the Kanak world, before
the crisis erupts on the scale of global society, aggravated by an economic situation
that is frightening to say the least. To be convinced of this, one only has to see how the
customary chiefs of the Loyalties are now taking advantage of the fragility of Kanak
politics.

The crisis is here, I fear, even if we cannot yet really measure the extent of the field of ruin and battle.

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Alain Babadzan (Babadzan, 2013, 154-6) has incisively highlighted the extent to which the “Pacific Way” referred to by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara (1920-2004) (Mara (1970), 1997, 117) and Ronald Gordon Crocombe (1929-2009) (Crocombe, 1976) is rooted in the ideology and geopolitics of the 1970s, even though this way of being (i.e., socio-economic) and that way of acting (i.e., diplomatic) is supposed to be the result of customs dating back to the dawn of time. It is indeed this paradoxical chronological attribute that can, “50 years later”, challenge the historian who is interested in the Contact period.

The relatively narrow framework of Contact (between the late 18th century and the early 19th century) prevents any serious investigation of the invention of a “collective” tradition – following Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger’s exegesis (Hobsbawn-Ranger, 1983, ?). Rather, it encourages us to place ourselves at the level of the individual singularity of experience. In Tahiti, where the first contact – in this specific part of the Pacific – took place, three personalities from the Polynesian side played a key role and are particularly prominent as the main sources of historical information: Ahutoru at the time of the Tahitian stopover of Bougainville’s voyage around the world, Tupai’a, on the occasion of Cook’s first voyage in the Pacific and Mai (Te Tupia Mai, named Omai by the Europeans), finally, during Cook’s 2nd and 3rd voyages.

These three men were not only protagonists of the Contact in Tahiti, but each took, in these circumstances, the first step initiative. Even more specially, they have each actively contributed, in other areas of the Pacific, to Contact between Europeans and other Oceanians. Personifications of the great “Elsewhere” of Europe, which the
Polynesian world represented in the second half of the 18th century, their conduct – and the very different values that guided them – have struck observers (Fullagar, 2020, empl. 3397, 3401).

To what extent do we keep an exact trace and therefore a faithful memory of a
typically Oceanian behavior? This reflection can be made on two levels. On the one
hand, in a synchronic way, by asking ourselves precisely how we can construct its
history. The memory of these characters and their "different" actions is the subject of
investigations and currently present an epistemological challenge for specialists. Yet,
on the other hand, the question arises diachronically: just what to do with this history?
On a "societal" scale, the problem of these characters' commemoration arises, as
evidenced by the controversy in 2019 around the celebration of the 250th anniversary
of Cook's first voyage.

In any case, this contribution does not fit in with the purpose of this conference in more
than one respect.

On the one hand, the terms of reference are limited to Eastern Polynesia, that is to
say they are restricted to the Society archipelago and cannot claim to extent to the
Pacific world as a whole. On the other hand, and above all, there is that blatant
contradiction with the terms the "Pacific Way", resulting from the most recent analyses
of Contact. Well beyond the deadly shoot-out that took place in Matavai Bay just
a few days after the arrival of the *Dolphin*, under the command of Samuel Wallis,
the first European ship to anchor in Tahiti in 1767, Contact was in no way "peaceful"
It was characterized by violence on several levels (Jolly-Tcherkézoff-Tyron, 2009, 21-
Igler, 2015, 16). The asymmetry in the use of firearms – as well as of iron and writing –
echoes, in an even more devastating way, the immune asymmetry that resulted in the
"Microbial Shock" and its long-term consequences, whose exact extent and scope
have perhaps not yet been taken into account (Conte-Molle, 2022, 89-138).

Undeniably, the transmission of knowledge from before Contact, and of experience
"during" it, has been hampered or blurred on the Oceanian side. In any case, the
information is predominantly of European origin. Conditions of access to specific
Oceanian experience of these historical events – not to say the disruption – that Contact
brought about – are tenuous but not non-existent. The achievements of microstoria
(Ginzburg, 1989, 139-80) and the heuristic power of historical anthropology (Dening,