# The Privilege of Mobility in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Moral Positions and Ambivalences of International Residents

Clio Chaveneau

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Clio Chaveneau. The Privilege of Mobility in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Moral Positions and Ambivalences of International Residents. Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 2024, vol. 40 - n°2 et 3, 10.4000/138id. hal-04964847

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# The Privilege of Mobility in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Moral Positions and Ambivalences of International Residents

*Positionnements et ambivalences face au privilège de mobilité des « internationaux » dans les territoires palestiniens occupés*

*Posiciones y ambivalencias ante el privilegio de la movilidad del personal internacional en los territorios palestinos ocupados*

Clio Chaveneau

Translator: Clio Chaveneau

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OpenEdition
Journals

**Electronic version**

URL: https://journals.openedition.org/remi/27748
DOI: 10.4000/138id
ISSN: 1777-5418

**This article is a translation of:**

Positionnements et ambivalences face au privilège de mobilité des « internationaux » dans les territoires palestiniens occupés - URL : https://journals.openedition.org/remi/26243 [fr]

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Université de Poitiers

**Printed version**

Date of publication: October 1, 2024
ISBN: 978-23-81940-27-4
ISSN: 0765-0752

**Electronic reference**

Clio Chaveneau, "The Privilege of Mobility in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Moral Positions and Ambivalences of International Residents", *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* [Online], vol. 40 - n°2 et 3 | 2024, Online since 01 December 2024, connection on 04 February 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/remi/27748; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/138id

This text was automatically generated on February 4, 2025.

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# The Privilege of Mobility in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Moral Positions and Ambivalences of International Residents

*Positionnements et ambivalences face au privilège de mobilité des « internationaux » dans les territoires palestiniens occupés*

*Posiciones y ambivalencias ante el privilegio de la movilidad del personal internacional en los territorios palestinos ocupados*

Clio Chaveneau

Translation : Clio Chaveneau

<footnote n="1">1 The unique political and economic context of the Occupied Palestinian territories (OPT), comprising the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, has facilitated the emergence of international mobility primarily composed of young professionals, often highly educated, coming from Europe and North America to reside and work in major Palestinian cities. This context has been shaped by the Oslo Accords, a series of agreements signed between September 1993 and 1995 between the Israeli state and the Palestine Liberation Organization. In support of this peace process, starting in October 1993, forty-three states committed to assisting in the reconstruction and development of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, thereby promising $2.5 billion from 1994 to 1998 (Brynen, 1996). This assistance program was built on the assumption of the conflict nearing its end (Bocco and Mansouri, 2008), but as the political and economic situation in the Palestinian territories worsened, foreign states continued to allocate millions of dollars annually for emergency and development aid. While many authors have analyzed in detail the socio-economic and political effects and implications of international financial aid on Palestinian society (Brynen, 2000; Keating et al., 2005; Le More, 2005;</footnote>
Bocco and Mansouri, 2008; Sbeih, 2014), few have focused on the human faces of this aid.

2 Employed by international and local organizations, those locally referred to as “internationals” benefit from professional opportunities arising from international aid and cooperation (secondments, missions, and local offices, as well as grants to local organizations). Some have pursued professional opportunities that brought them to the OPT, while others have chosen to live there out of solidarity, love for a Palestinian partner, or intellectual interest in the region or in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Chaveneau, 2016). Nevertheless, this second category consists of jobs created through international aid funds. Although the reasons for their presence vary, the study of their socio-economic profiles reveals a relatively homogeneous population: aged between twenty and forty-five, hailing from the upper middle classes of Western countries, highly educated (holding master's degrees or higher), and already possessing significant international capital (bilingual/trilingual, foreign experiences, mixed couples, etc.). Thus, several thousand foreigners reside for several years in the main cities of the OPT (East Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Nablus, and also Gaza City), where they frequent the same consumption spaces (restaurants, bars, shops) and live in the same neighborhoods and housing as the local population.

3 If they share a certain daily life with the Palestinians, this should not obscure the privileged status of these migrants. Their privileges manifest on an international scale (powerful passports, high socioeconomic status) and on a local level, in professional, symbolic, or political terms. This is particularly visible in a context of colonization and occupation of the Palestinian Territories, where since the 1990s and 2000s, the Israeli-Palestinian territorial space has become polymorphic and polysemic.¹ It is both a continuous and fluid space for Israeli citizens and a discontinuous, unstable, and highly controlled space for Palestinians (Parizot, 2009 and 2010). The “internationals”, thanks to their foreign passports and their “non-Palestinian” status, enjoy the same mobility privileges as Israelis while living and working among Palestinians. As Twine and Gardener (2013: 9) emphasize, the notion of privilege reveals “a very specific type of power that is often rendered invisible, at least to those who benefit from it”. In the case studied, they are aware of their privileged situation. For some foreigners, mobility is a legitimate right, an opportunity for freedom and openness, but for others, it is a source of moral and political difficulties that force them to navigate and make choices. Thus, the situation studied allows for an understanding of the possible modulations of privilege and the ambivalences in emotions, as well as in the practices of privileged migrants.

4 This article is based on an ethnographic study conducted over twenty-three months between 2010 and 2015 as part of my doctoral research. I conducted semi-structured interviews (N = 90) with foreigners of all nationalities² and professional profiles. As a foreigner residing in the OPT, I employed the method of participant observation in the West Bank,³ primarily in Ramallah and East Jerusalem. This allowed me to experience foreign mobility during my own travels⁴ within the OPT and those of the individuals interviewed, as well as the experience of Palestinian mobility during public transport or personal vehicle (Palestinian license plate) trips with Palestinians from Jerusalem and the West Bank. Finally, I undertook short fieldtrips to update my data on circulation practices in the West Bank (July 2022 and 2023).⁵
# Considering the Privilege of Mobility: A Concept in the Palestinian Context

## International Migrations and Privileges

5

The concept of privilege serves as a reflective tool that allows us to question the inequalities of rights and the treatment of individuals based on their belonging to significant social categories within a given society. In the scientific literature, five elements are widely agreed upon to define the boundaries of this concept. Privilege is thus: 1) a particular advantage; 2) granted, given, and not earned; 3) linked to a superior status or rank; 4) beneficial to its holder; and 5) often unrecognized by those who benefit from it (Black and Stone, 2005). Depending on the context, privileges can be related to race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, or socioeconomic class.

6

Over the past fifteen years, the link between international migrations and privileges has been explored both theoretically and empirically by numerous researchers. In a variety of fields, sociologists and geographers highlight how the lives of migrants are shaped by the advantages they receive: on the one hand, due to their affiliation with powerful states on a global scale (Croucher, 2009; Karkabi, 2013; Twine and Gardener, 2013; Le Renard, 2019), and on the other hand, due to their whiteness (Leonard, 2010; Andrucki, 2013; Lundstrom, 2014; Cosquer, 2018). Indeed, citizens of Northern countries enjoy very favorable migration conditions upon their arrival in Southern countries, whether in administrative, professional, economic, or even symbolic terms. While these power inequalities can be observed at the individual level, they must be understood within the broader framework of the asymmetric relations between Southern and Northern countries (Croucher, 2012; Kunz, 2016). Privileged migrations, situated within complex postcolonial relations, serve to reinforce and reaffirm systemic inequalities, as Benson (2013) reminds us.

7

When applied to spatial questions, the concept of privilege sheds light on mobility practices that may appear natural, as they are legitimized by the fundamental freedom to move. However, when situated within a socially divided space, mobility becomes both a marker and a product of social position. For example, in Leonard's work (2010 and 2013) in South Africa and Hong Kong, we see that the planning and access to space are mechanisms through which racialized positions are constructed and privileges secured. These inequalities, whether social, ethnic, or gendered, exist only in the interaction between at least two social groups benefiting from differing rights or living conditions. In the Palestinian context, privilege is rooted in the asymmetry of mobility rights within the same territory among Israeli, foreign, and Palestinian populations due to the Israeli occupation of the OPT. In this regard, the concept of privilege must be utilized from an interactionist perspective, where advantages gain meaning in the interaction between those who possess them and those who are deprived, as well as the social and relational effects produced by this differential situation. It becomes clear that unimpeded movement is not a privilege in itself, but that it becomes a privilege in *situ*, in light of the multidimensional obstacles imposed on Palestinians.
Fragmentation, Separation, and Mobility Inequalities in the Israeli-
Palestinian Space

8 Since the onset of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Palestinian context has been marked by territorial fragmentation, separation, and restrictions on the spatial and residential mobility of the Palestinian population. The Palestinian refugees of 1948 (approximately 700,000 people) were the first group to experience significant restrictions on their mobility, including residential mobility, with, as early as 1948, the prohibition of their return to their villages and the creation of movement passes (Abu-Zahra and Kay, 2013). During the Six-Day War in 1967, a second wave of refugees (300,000 people) was forced into exile, and the State of Israel began its military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, annexing the eastern part of Jerusalem.⁶ That year, a census of the Palestinian population was conducted by Israel, and two types of identity documents were issued: those residing in Jerusalem received a revocable blue identity card known as “permanent resident”, while those living in the Gaza Strip and West Bank received a green identity card.

9 The First Intifada (1987-1993) marked the beginning of increased control over Palestinian mobility, with repeated closures of the West Bank, curfews imposed on Palestinians, the establishment of checkpoints on roads and at the entrances to Palestinian cities (Parizot, 2010), as well as the implementation of a magnetic card system for exiting the Gaza Strip (Abu-Zahra and Kay, 2013). This territorial fragmentation was affirmed in the Oslo Accords (1993-1995), as Parizot and Latte-Abdallah (2017: 8) remind us, “the dissociation of two territorial and administrative entities, Israeli and Palestinian, is seen as a necessary evolution to lay the foundations for future borders between the two peoples”. Consequently, it was decided that the West Bank would be divided into three zones, each with varying degrees of autonomy from Israel. Zone A, representing 18% of the West Bank, is under the civil and security authority of the Palestinian Authority (though the Israeli army retains the right to enter for “security” reasons). Zone B, representing 22% of the West Bank, is under the civil authority of the Palestinian Authority. Finally, Zone C, representing 60% of the West Bank, is under total Israeli control. Designed as temporary and transitional, this division remains in place thirty years later and has multiple impacts on daily and residential mobility.

10 The Second Intifada (2000-2008) led to Israel's reoccupation of Palestinian autonomous enclaves and the establishment of hundreds of checkpoints and control infrastructures on the roads. This period also saw the construction of the "separation wall", an eight-meter-high concrete barrier or multi-layered fences. With a length of over 700 kilometers, the wall separates Israel from the West Bank, disregarding the Green Line and to the detriment of Palestinians, as 85% of the wall is located on West Bank territory.⁷ East Jerusalem is thus situated on the other side of the wall and checkpoints. This separation has significant implications for Palestinian society in cultural, political, and religious terms, as well as practical ones (housing difficulties for Jerusalemites, lack of access to the best hospitals or foreign consulates for West Bank and Gaza residents). The mobility control infrastructures were not dismantled after the end of the Second Intifada; rather, they have been further perpetuated and sophisticated. The UN agency OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) counted 417 fixed obstacles on the roads, 228 partial obstacles, and 107 mobile checkpoints
deployed weekly in 2023.⁸ The continued construction of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem has been encouraged by successive Israeli governments. In 2021, there were more than 200 settlements, where, in violation of international law, 465,000 Israeli settlers resided in the West Bank and 230,000 in East Jerusalem. Daily mobility between the settlements and Israeli territory is facilitated by a road network consisting of tunnels, bridges, and so-called bypass roads, designed by the Israeli state to prevent settlers from passing through Palestinian cities; a significant portion of this network is prohibited to vehicles with Palestinian license plates. Thus, a territorial and human separation is established by Israel without any consideration for ending the occupation and colonization of the OPT.

11 Obstacles to mobility also affect the Gaza Strip. Since the 1990s, mobility to Gaza has been regulated with the establishment of a single entry point at Eretz and a permit policy for residents of the West Bank or Israel wishing to travel to Gaza (Le More, 2005). Since the imposition of the Israeli blockade in 2006, akin to a military siege (Winter, 2016), this region, home to 2 million Palestinians, has been cut off from the rest of the OPT (with the closure of the Eretz checkpoint), as well as from the world, with the sporadic opening of the Rafah border crossing to Egypt.⁹ In this context, it is extremely difficult to enter or exit the Gaza Strip, even for humanitarian reasons, and the fundamental conventional rights of freedom of movement and the right to respect for family life are violated for Gazans (Baumgarten-Sharon et al., 2014).

12 Thus, the Israeli-Palestinian territorial space should not be perceived as composed of areas separated by borders, but rather as complex territorial forms where filtering systems have been established, creating a gradation and hierarchy of spaces and individuals. For Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli mobility system “makes the right to movement an exception and the restriction of movement a rule. This is all the more so as this system extends to manage the movements of Palestinians deep into the West Bank” (Parizot, 2010: 135). While it is undoubtedly complex, this mobility regime regulates, within the same territorial space, the movements of two main groups of actors, each with distinct rights and freedoms: Israelis and Palestinians.¹⁰

13 The “internationals”, a third group present in this territorial space, benefit from the mobility rights held by Israelis while residing among Palestinians, in Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem and in Area A of the West Bank or even in Gaza. Indeed, it is the “non-Palestinian” status that is decisive in the mobility regime. The possession of a foreign passport (regardless of nationality), conditioned on the absence of Palestinian identity documents, allows one to benefit from Israeli privileges.¹¹ Therefore, Palestinian dual nationals do not enjoy these privileges, as their second nationality is not “recognized” by Israel.¹²

14 In practice, “internationals” can purchase or rent an Israeli car, travel on the entire Israeli road network, and cross checkpoints without hindrance. Consequently, they have access to all of the West Bank, particularly to Area C, which is under total Israeli military control. There are many natural sites from which Palestinians have been expropriated, such as nature reserves¹³ with water springs and hiking trails (e.g., Ein Prat, Qumran Park), historical tourist sites like the Tomb of Rachel, the Herodian, or the Tomb of the Patriarchs, as well as the three beaches along the West Bank coast of the Dead Sea.¹⁴ Foreigners can also visit the numerous settlements established throughout the West Bank:
"I take my visitors to show them. I have an Israeli license plate car, I'm blonde, it's easy." (Ariane, French, employee of an international NGO, resident of Ramallah)

15 Mobility to East Jerusalem is particularly revealing of the privilege of mobility. While the permit system¹⁵ (tasrih) allows certain Palestinians (who have a green identity card) to temporarily reintegrate this space into their mobility practices, this is not the case for the majority. In contrast, “internationals” regularly travel to East Jerusalem and Israel for professional or personal reasons. Finally, some can enter the Gaza Strip for professional reasons (primarily humanitarian workers, diplomats, or journalists) thanks to a work visit permit issued by the Israeli authorities. This results in movements that are impossible for Palestinians, with weekly travels between Gaza, Jerusalem, and Ramallah. Consequently, the privileges of mobility have allowed “internationals” to become more familiar with the entire territory in comparison to Palestinians, who are disconnected from the mobility practices known to older generations (before the 1990s).

16 The modes of circulation are also different and have significant consequences on the relationship to space and time. The ability to travel on Israeli roads in both the West Bank and Israel and to cross all road checkpoints results in foreign mobility being more fluid, faster, and less exposed to violence (from soldiers or settlers). For example, to travel from Ramallah to Bethlehem (see Map 1), a foreigner will pass through Jerusalem, while a Palestinian from the West Bank must take a route that circumvents Jerusalem, the wall, and Israeli settlements. This route can take between one and a half hours and several hours, depending on checkpoint controls and traffic conditions.
<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>Map 1: Comparative Mobilities for the Journey from Ramallah to Bethlehem between an Israeli or Foreign Citizen (Blue Route) and a Palestinian Holding a Green Identity Card (Red Route)</figcaption></figure>

Credit: Map background: © Contributors to Open Street Map, Carto DB light, 2024; Map Projection: WGS84/Pseudo Mercator (EPSG: 3857); Design and execution: C. Chaveneau and N. Martin (CNRS, Université de Poitiers, Migrinter), 2024.

Sources: Fieldwork of C. Chaveneau, 2010-2023; Google Maps, 2024; OCHA OpT, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2024; Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, Archives Directorate (geographical division), 2018; Palestine, un peuple, une colonisation, *Le Monde diplomatique*, 2018, [online]. URL: https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cartes/palestine-routes

17. Finally, “internationals” have the option of using Israel’s main airport. Located just fifty kilometers from Ramallah, Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv-Jaffa, which is used by millions of tourists each year, has been off-limits to Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the 1990s,¹⁶ even if they hold a foreign passport. Lacking access to an airport, they are required to transit through Egypt (for Gazans) or through the airport in Amman, Jordan (for West Bank residents). To reach these locations, they must go through the Allenby/Malik Hussein border crossing, which, although not bordering Israel, is controlled by Israeli authorities who determine the entry and exit from the West Bank.¹⁷ This crossing is more expensive, lengthy, and tedious (involving multiple buses, ticket counters, long lines at each stage, opening hours, etc.) than traveling via Tel Aviv (Bontemps, 2012a and 2014). As a result, the practices and experiences of traveling abroad are very different for Israelis and “internationals” on one side, and Palestinians on the other.

## Control of Foreign Mobility and Versatility of Privileges

18. However, “internationals” are not on equal footing with Israelis in this mobility regime, as their privileges can be revoked at any time by the Israeli authorities. Over the past fifteen years, significant restrictions have been imposed on several categories
of foreigners, rooted in a broader context of increased control over incoming mobility to the Palestinian territory. The 2000s and the Second Intifada saw the arrival of observers, volunteers, or activists in solidarity with the Palestinians, as exemplified by the International Solidarity Movement (Andoni et al., 2004). Since then, this policy has persisted, and many foreigners have been denied a visa upon arrival at the airport or at Allenby (Chaveneau, 2015 and 2016).

19 To limit the freedom of movement of “internationals” who obtain a visa, in 2009 the Israeli authorities implemented a stamp reading “*Palestinian Authority Only*”, affixed to the official Israeli visa. This constrains them to “the same movement restrictions experienced by Palestinians living in the West Bank: it requires them to limit their travel to ‘territories under Palestinian Authority,’ thereby prohibiting access to Israel and East Jerusalem” (Bontemps, 2012b: 2). This stamp was replaced at the end of 2012 with a new designation: “*Judea and Samaria*.”¹⁸ This term appears on visas and affects three categories of foreigners: spouses of Palestinians, foreigners of Palestinian origin, and employees of local NGOs. While the terminologies and procedures change over the years,¹⁹ it is evident that the privileges of “internationals” can become a point of contention for the Israeli authorities, who do not hesitate to reject certain categories of foreigners deemed too politically, personally, or professionally close to the Palestinians.

## Ambivalences and Contrasting Uses of Privileges by the “Internationals”

> “I can only imagine how West Bankers feel to see us breezing over to Jerusalem or even Tel Aviv, but these trips have an allure for visitors from the West, who can be somewhere more like home just half an hour away. In my experience, these guilty pleasures are also popular among young Palestinians with the necessary ID.” (Excerpt from Monks, 2011)

20 By referring to these outings as “guilty pleasures” in his article, Monks (2011) highlights the ambivalence felt by the “internationals” regarding the privilege of mobility, while their Palestinian colleagues, friends, and neighbors are subjected to the Israeli mobility regime. Furthermore, the difference in economic resources (high salaries and expatriate packages for many of them) enhances their ability to engage in leisure and mobility practices in Israel. Observing mobility practices in a context of significant inequalities allows for an understanding of the diversity of positions and how privileged actors sometimes attempt to resolve their political and moral dilemmas.

## Enjoyment: Seizing the Right to Mobility to Relax and Explore

21 Whether living in Ramallah, Bethlehem, or Nablus, many “internationals” regularly travel to Israel and Jerusalem for work²⁰ or leisure. The ability to move freely is perceived as a privilege, an opportunity to fully experience life abroad and enjoy both societies. Having a drink, attending a concert, eating sushi, biking, spending a day at the beach, or shopping at organic stores are all part of the cultural, sporting, and consumption activities they engage in:

> “With my husband, we went to Tel Aviv for dinner, and there, they really live! There are wide boulevards, restaurants, people biking—it’s refreshing.” (Sophie, French, teacher, resident of Ramallah)
22 For some respondents, the city of Tel Aviv represents a familiar, Western, and reassuring living environment. Time spent in Israel seems like a “disconnected” moment, where the Palestinian political context is set aside. Although they leave the occupied territories several times a year, most express a regular need to reconnect with leisure and urban practices they enjoy. The apparent dissonance between their choice to relax in Israel and their daily life in territories occupied by Israel is acknowledged by the respondents, as seen in the remarks of two French individuals working in Ramallah and Gaza:

> "At first, I hated going to Tel Aviv because it felt like Disneyland; people live there as if the occupation doesn't exist. But now, I've learned to live with it, and when I go to Tel Aviv, it's a break—I'm on vacation!" (Lise, French, journalist, resident of Ramallah)

> "You have a feeling of sympathy for the Palestinians, and you feel close to them for what they experience, but Tel Aviv is Zen, peaceful, and I don't go there to meet people. I wake up early, read, go for a run, go to the beach, stroll around, go to restaurants, to the market." (Sébastien, French, humanitarian worker, resident of Gaza)

23 This pursuit of personal pleasure can even contradict the values expressed in their professional sphere: one respondent went skiing in the Israeli settlements on the occupied Golan Heights:

> Hervé: "It's completely at odds with my work. I'm here to promote international law and human rights, and I went skiing in the occupied Golan; I'm funding the ski lifts of the occupation of Syria!"

> C. Chaveneau: "Why did you do it if you're uncomfortable with it?"

> Hervé: "I really wanted to ski!" (Hervé, Swiss, diplomat, resident of Jerusalem, working in Ramallah)

24 Privilege is viewed as a tool available to its holder to help them find a balance in their personal well-being. Some respondents mention their “mental health,” making the Israeli lifestyle a sine qua non condition for their ability to perform at work or maintain their residence in the occupied territories. Women express this need to regularly return to a more Western lifestyle even more strongly. Indeed, while Palestinian society is relatively secular and open to the world—especially in Ramallah or Bethlehem—daily life remains constrained by gender norms, even for foreign women. Several respondents share sentiments similar to those of Germain (2004: 165), who describes herself as “happy to be able to walk around dressed as I please, in complete freedom, without the risk of being stared at” during her shopping outings in West Jerusalem. The focus on individual well-being is also evident in the remarks of humanitarian workers in Cambodia studied by Fechter (2012). While the quality of life afforded by their high salaries can be a source of discomfort, some of these respondents condition their ability to do this work in these living conditions, emphasizing the necessity of a “comfort zone” or personal and family well-being that allows for residence abroad (Fechter, 2012: 1483-1484). Similarly, an American respondent working in a Palestinian NGO stated that her freedom to go to Israel was essential for her “mental balance” and her ability to “cope” with her daily life in the West Bank.
Meeting, Understanding, Socializing: Maintaining Access to Israeli Society

25
The second reason often cited by respondents to explain their mobility is curiosity and the desire to engage with Israeli society. About one-third of them know and interact with Israelis. Living in Jerusalem facilitates contact, particularly through social venues, but some respondents living in Jerusalem have no Israeli contacts, while conversely, some residing in the West Bank or Gaza Strip have Israeli friends or even romantic partners.

"I try to have Israeli friends. I try to understand the other side of the story. I want to understand them; I don't want to boycott and avoid the other side. I know where I stand and who the victims are, but I still want to understand." (Daniel, Spanish, humanitarian worker, resident of Ramallah)

"I don't see how one can claim to understand what's happening here while refusing to see Israelis. To see how diverse society is and to put oneself in the shoes of others for just a moment doesn't mean making excuses but understanding." (Sophie, French, teacher, resident of Ramallah)

26
The privilege of mobility allows them to navigate between the two spaces and adopt an open stance. Intellectual curiosity is presented as a quality lacking in other "internationals" who do not wish to travel to Israel or socialize with Israelis. Some envision themselves as mediators or bridges, wishing to change the perception Israelis have of Palestinians. Others even invite their Israeli friends to "show them the other side" and to go out to bars in Ramallah and Bethlehem, often without the knowledge of the Palestinian participants.

27
Thanks to their privilege of mobility, “internationals” can maintain, in their discourse, a distant relationship with the territory and the Palestinian experience, positioning themselves as neutral and external to the conflict. While this is an individual choice, it is also a product of a professional ideology linked to the recent evolution of the development field, where professionalism is constructed in opposition to activism (Siméant, 2001; Sbeih, 2014). As Autesserre (2014) illustrates from various contexts, thematic competencies are increasingly valued at the expense of local competencies (knowledge of language, history, and local context). Among the respondents, those most likely to travel to Israel for leisure and enjoyment are primarily those who fit the profile of “expatriates” in humanitarian and international cooperation, changing countries every three to five years. For them, the Palestinian Territories are just one destination among others in their careers, and while they express sympathy for the Palestinian situation during interviews, they view themselves as individually external to the ongoing socio-political issues. James, who works in Gaza and frequently moves between the Gaza, West Bank, and Israeli spaces, is indicative of this mindset:

"When you are here, you know that the issue of mobility is a key question. But that is not likely to change in the near future, so I think it's a problem that affects Palestinians, but they manage and cope with it. So, I don't really pay attention to it. I understand that they are frustrated, and we are too, but after that, you can't really do anything about it." (James, Irish, engineer, resident of Gaza)

28
Just like another respondent who does not see himself as "unable to navigate regularly between both sides," their privilege of mobility is considered natural, and as such, they wish to use it to engage with Israelis or to make their daily lives more enjoyable.
Restricting Oneself: Being in Accordance with One's Values and
Political Positions

Another segment of the “internationals,” however, maintains more complicated and critical relationships with this type of mobility. Although they work in the same professional sectors (mainly humanitarian aid/development, international cooperation, or teaching/research), they are a heterogeneous population in terms of political and activist backgrounds. While some were already close in Europe or North America to so-called pro-Palestinian solidarity networks (Chaveneau, 2020), for others, arriving in the OPT serves as an opportunity to discover the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Chaveneau, 2018). Thus, their political culture and activist socialization, along with the place that the Palestinian cause occupies within it, influence their relationship to the territory and their perception of their role there. Nationality, gender, age, or profession do not serve as explanatory variables for these differences in positioning. The duration of residence²¹ also appears to have no effect on the adopted position, as both “old-timers” and “newcomers” can be found on both sides of the spectrum. In contrast, political socialization, prior “activist capital” (before settling), as well as the intensity and nature of emotional ties created with Palestinians, seem to be decisive factors.

For this second group, their freedom of movement is a source of discomfort and unease, and their political or moral dilemmas rest on two main reasons: a sense of embarrassment and guilt for having more rights than the Palestinians, and a political disagreement with the normalization of the Israeli occupation. These two elements are reflected in Alicia's discourse:

> "Going to Tel Aviv feels like going to another country; it's unsettling. It's really an unpleasant experience. I'm not emotionally capable of compartmentalizing my life like that. When I see the farmers I work with trying to reach their lands, I can't separate that from going to the beach in Tel Aviv. [...] There's also an element of guilt when someone asks you what you did this weekend, and you say you were in Jerusalem, and your colleagues say 'niyalek' [lucky you]; it's horrible." (Alicia, American, employee of a foreign NGO, resident of Nablus)

These dilemmas concern both their own values and the image they would project to the Palestinians. They are aware of their privileged position compared to Palestinians immobilized by the Israeli occupation, which generates discomfort and guilt. Furthermore, some do not wish to contribute to normalizing the current political situation:

> "For me, going to Israel is a bit like being in South Africa during apartheid and spending the weekend with the whites... It feels like betrayal. It's very nice to be at the beach, and at the same time, it's strange because we see it as a bubble; we breathe and think these people live in an illusion, they don't want to know what's happening next to them. I don't really want to endorse that and spend my money there." (Flore, Swiss, humanitarian worker, resident of Ramallah)

While some respondents express a desire to meet people in Israel, others are hesitant due to profound political disagreements. This is highlighted by Maxime, a humanitarian worker residing in East Jerusalem, who references the right of return for Palestinian refugees. His partner, Lucie, also shares her discomfort in socializing with Israelis, given that they have all served in the Israeli army.²² These feelings can be exacerbated during periods of high-intensity conflict, as was the case during the war in
Gaza in 2014. During these times, the political gap²³ becomes more pronounced, leading some “internationals” to question their mobility practices or residential choices. One respondent thus left Jerusalem, where she was working, to settle in Ramallah, “unable to socialize with Israelis anymore.”

33

Yet, despite their discomfort, most foreigners continue to travel to Israel. They fly through Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, and many need to go to Jerusalem (including West Jerusalem) as part of their work or for various administrative tasks (consulate, car registration, technical inspection, etc.). To align with their values and opinions, some rationalize their movements and impose moral and economic limits on themselves.

34

Thus, they seek to be “without impact” during their visits to Israel, and many respondents aim to spend as little money as possible in Israel - so as not to break the economic boycott they support (Chaveneau, 2016). Before heading to the beach, they fill up on gas and buy supplies in the West Bank to avoid spending anything locally. They also emphasize that they only go to areas with a high Palestinian population:

> *“At the same time, what is Israel? It's Acre, it's Nazareth, it's Haifa, it's Tiberias, it's Jaffa; it's all Palestinian!”* (Marie, Swiss, employee of a local NGO, resident of Bethlehem)

35

Some impose on themselves to go only with Palestinian friends:

> *“We go with friends who have Jerusalem ID cards or permits. I can't go any other way.”* (Valeria, Spanish, teacher, resident of Ramallah)

36

The presence of their Palestinian friends allows them to feel less at odds with their opinions. Some even present this mobility as a continuation of a political stance, like Anna, who points out that the Mediterranean Sea also belongs to the Palestinians:

> *“I went there a lot last summer, but with my Palestinian friends who had permits. Because it's their sea!”* (Anna, French, humanitarian worker, resident of Ramallah and working in Jerusalem)

# The Privileges in Question: Resistance, Moral Work, and Symbolic Violence

## Mobilizing Privileges in Service of the Palestinians

37

By limiting their mobility to professional necessities or Palestinian locations in Israel, “internationals” recognize the political significance and implications of their privileged status, and they then attempt to distance themselves and renegotiate the terms of that privilege. Benson (2013) also observes practices of resistance or questioning of privileges by American migrants in Panama. They are aware of the socioeconomic effects of their presence in Panama and engage locally in charitable actions—although this engagement is itself made possible by their privileged position. According to Benson, this nonetheless indicates that they are not merely passive agents but also individuals capable of using their privileged position to partially overturn their negative impacts on the host territory.

38

Some respondents view privilege as a tool they can leverage for the benefit of the Palestinians. Numerous services can be provided to Palestinians who cannot obtain an Israeli permit (tasrih), such as submitting a visa application at a consulate in East Jerusalem, sending or retrieving a package from the Israeli post office, or bringing back hard-to-find or inaccessible products to the West Bank (medications, for example), etc. By putting their mobility privilege to the service of Palestinians, “internationals”
engage in what Fechter (2016) refers to as “moral work.” This concept refers to the work carried out by international aid workers in the face of complex moral dilemmas that arise. While it does not produce anything material or tangible, it nonetheless creates consequences: the actions performed or not performed by the actors.

39 This same moral work is engaged when respondents take Palestinian colleagues or friends who have obtained a permit into Israel. Thanks to their cars with yellow or white Israeli plates, they can move quickly and smoothly, allowing their loved ones to make the most of their permits, which are often issued for a short period and with specific schedules to adhere to.

“We went to Jerusalem, Jaffa, and the Sea of Galilee with a friend because he had a one-day permit. He wanted to do and see everything, so we spent the day driving around, and he was super happy. But when we were sitting by the Sea of Galilee, all the joy of the day turned into sadness. It was hard to see, but it was still nice to share that with him, to have been able to drive him everywhere.” (Alicia, American, employee of an international organization, resident of Nablus)

40 Some continue this approach in their professional sphere: they submit permit requests as part of their work to allow West Bank and Gaza partners to come to Jerusalem. These outcomes align with those of Parizot (2014): by studying the role of foreign consulates in maintaining the borders of Jerusalem as mediators between Palestinians and Israelis, he shows that foreign employees independently try to help Palestinians regain mobility rights.

41 These moral questions are widely present in both private and public conversations, thus demonstrating that moral work is undertaken collectively (Fechter, 2016). Among themselves, but also with Palestinians, “internationals” question their own actions and those of others: should they use their privileges, and to what extent? Should they voice a critical perspective within the foreign community, or is this solely a personal choice? Like Anna, engaged foreigners (on pro-Palestinian or postcolonial issues, for example) are critical of those who navigate between Palestinian and Israeli social spaces:

“I constantly question the issue of compromise. Should you just leave others alone, enjoying this situation where they go jogging on Friday mornings, to the beach in Tel Aviv in the afternoon, and to a club in Jerusalem at night? [...] I don't want to be in that somewhat vague category of foreigners who take advantage.” (Anna, French, humanitarian worker, resident of Ramallah)

42 This respondent, who chose to work in the West Bank out of militant commitment, elaborated on the difficulty of being conflated with those she considers to be there out of professional opportunism. She was also apprehensive about how Palestinians might perceive her as someone who travels to East Jerusalem for work every day. Like Anna, several respondents, who are relatively well integrated into Palestinian society (many local friends, a romantic relationship, at least partial mastery of the Palestinian dialect, good political knowledge of the Palestinian situation, etc.), tend to distance themselves from other foreigners, not wishing to be seen as disconnected from the political significance of these privileges.

## On the Symbolic Violence of Mobility: Palestinians between Anger, Frustration, and Disappointment

“I am working in a refugee camp in Nablus, and a large portion of them are originally from Jaffa and the Mediterranean coast. You work with people who have never been able to see the places they come from, while you, as an American, have the right to go there as much as
you want.” (Chelsea, American, employee of a local NGO, resident of Nablus and Ramallah)

43 Since the 1990s, Israeli policies restricting Palestinian mobility have meant that the vast majority of Palestinians under thirty in the West Bank and Gaza have never been able to enter Israel. Most of them are refugees from Palestinian towns and villages located within Israeli territory. In 2022, the Occupied Palestinian Territories contained over 2.5 million refugees registered with the UN agency UNRWA:²⁴ 900,000 in the West Bank and 1.6 million in the Gaza Strip. They represent nearly 50% of the population of the OPT, with 30% of West Bank residents and 68% of Gazans being refugees.

44 Thus, the mobility practices of “internationals” represent a political and symbolic violence for Palestinians, in the Bourdieusian sense of a non-material, invisible, normalized violence that operates without being perceived as such. Yet, as Braud (2007: 4) points out, “any symbolic violence leads to the perception, whether ephemeral or lasting, of humiliation, fragility, and powerlessness.” The free mobility of foreigners (and Israelis) reminds Palestinians of their past expulsion (the Nakba, or “catastrophe” of 1948) and their current imposed immobility. This is particularly palpable among the youth (born after 1985), as they have only known the Israeli restrictions on their mobility and the ultra-fragmented Palestinian territories. However, this generation is also the most in contact with “internationals,” whether in professional or personal contexts, which further reinforces the contrast in rights. During my research in the West Bank, I frequently witnessed²⁵ the frustration of young Palestinians and their reproaches directed at foreigners accused of “playing both sides,” residing among Palestinians while enjoying the privileged Western lifestyle in Israel. In 2012, an open letter was published in the magazine *This Week in Palestine*, which sparked lively discussions among “internationals.” The issue focused on international solidarity, and the letter’s author, a young American-Palestinian writer and poet, published a piece titled “*I am not the local, you’re the foreigner. An open letter to foreigners in Palestine*,” from which here is an excerpt:

> "Many of you meet in nice coffee shops in Ramallah [...]. Then you pack your overnight bag and have a relaxing day on the beach in Tel Aviv. [...] You know, a few weeks ago, I was in Jaffa, from where I am originally (after miraculously finding a way to enter [Israel]), and I met an eighty-four-year-old man who knew my family. My family, which lives all over the world because they were forced to leave in 1948 and have never been able to return. [...] I cried all the way back. [...] You will never understand what it means to grow up knowing that every trace of you was raised in Jaffa and your city doesn't even recognize you, and that your father might die without ever coming back, and that your mother was buried so far from where her heart was." (Tala Abu Rahmeh, excerpt from *This Week in Palestine*, November 2012)

45 In this text, the author reflects on the ambivalence of the position of foreigners who live in the West Bank and are exposed daily to Palestinian suffering, yet do not share the history and deprivation of rights experienced by Palestinians. Abu Rahmeh points to their (immutable) foreignness and the privileged nature of this status, which allows for a mobility marked by emotional detachment. This symbolic violence appears to be even stronger for Palestinians with more privileged profiles, like the author herself. While they possess equal or superior economic, cultural, and social capital and are often in contact with “internationals,” the disparity between the rights of each group is even more striking.
46

Foreign mobility is also a source of tension, as it raises questions about Palestinian expectations regarding the political engagement and solidarity of foreigners. An episode of the satirical television program *Watan 3a watar* (2013) mocks the relationships between foreigners and Palestinians and reveals one of the political stakes of this privilege. Comedian Imad Farajin plays a newspaper vendor who sits at the table of a foreign woman in a trendy café in Ramallah while she is having lunch with a bottle of wine. While drinking, he begins a long monologue, in a mix of Arabic and broken English, where he talks to her about the occupation, Palestinian domestic politics, marriage, and family. Increasingly drunk, he exclaims: "*They come here on Fridays, they go to Bi'lin*²⁶, [shouting] 'Freedom Palestine!' and on Saturdays, they go to Tel Aviv to swim with the Jews.'"²⁷ His remarks denounce the supposedly "double life" led by foreigners, who would navigate between solidarity activities with Palestinians and leisure activities in Israel. Spatial and social mobility is perceived as insensitivity, even contempt, toward the Palestinian situation.

47

Before the 1990s or during the Second Intifada, most foreigners were supportive of the Palestinian cause; however, massive financial investment following the Oslo Accords has allowed a more diverse range of profiles to arrive, for whom professional opportunities are more decisive in choosing to come rather than political solidarity (Chaveneau, 2016). In this regard, the gap between Palestinian expectations and reality creates resentment, even anger. This is expressed in private spaces or online, such as on the Tumblr account "*Ajanebed out*",²⁸ or through artistic means, with a fake unsigned poster created in 2014 by Palestinian artist Omarius Ioseph Filius Dinae. This poster mimics an official document with a fake stamp from the Palestinian Authority and a header reading "*Consistory for the Regulation of Foreign Bodies in Occupied Palestine.*" In this text, foreigners are reminded that they should not remain seated on the bus between Ramallah and Jerusalem during inspections by Israeli soldiers, given that Palestinians must disembark and pass through the checkpoint on foot. It is noted that it is the responsibility of the foreign individual to understand that their privileges are a product of Israeli oppression: "This note is a courtesy and a reminder. It is your responsibility, as a visitor in Occupied Palestine, to know that your privileges here are part and product of Israel's system of injustice, apartheid, and oppression."

48

Thus, the moral work undertaken by some foreigners regarding their privilege has little visibility among Palestinians—and therefore little political impact. However, the media and artistic examples presented show that at least some Palestinians expect a positioning and recognition of the context of oppression that enables this mobility. In this way, moral work and the questioning of privileges must be collective and participatory, fully including the perspective of those who are deprived of them.

## Conclusion

49

The singular situation studied allows for an examination of the differentiated uses of the privilege of mobility in a territory marked by fragmentation, separation, and legal inequalities among various populations within the same geographical space. A new group of actors emerges in this diptych, where the highly limited and controlled mobility of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is contrasted with the ultra-mobility of Israelis permitted across the entire Israeli-Palestinian territory. Analyzing the positions and ambivalences of the "internationals" reveals contrasting uses and
demonstrates that privilege is subject to moral scrutiny, negotiations, and critiques
from both beneficiaries and those who are deprived of it. Uncovering the hesitations,
questions, and tensions does not diminish the privilege and its real impact; rather, it
highlights how a privilege is co-constructed, reinforced, or reversed, revealing the
individual and collective choices made within an unequal context.

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NOTES

1. Balibar (1994: 187) describes the term “border” as polysemous, meaning that “borders never exist in the same way for individuals belonging to different social groups”.

2. Almost all the respondents held at least one passport from a European, North American, South African, or Australian country. The interviews were conducted in English or French, depending on the language chosen by the respondent.

3. Access to the Gaza Strip has been very limited since 2006 (Israeli permit required), and I was unable to conduct on-site observations. However, through several contacts, I was able to conduct about ten interviews with foreigners—humanitarian workers or spouses of Palestinians—residing in the Gaza Strip. These interviews took place online or in person in Jerusalem or Ramallah.
4. I benefited from the freedom of movement for a large part of my investigation, but I was subsequently restricted in my movements when the designation “Judea and Samaria” was affixed to my one-year residency visa (as the wife of a Palestinian from the West Bank). I could no longer travel to East Jerusalem or Israel. Now that I no longer reside there, I have tourist visas with no geographical limitations, allowing me to move throughout the entire Israeli-Palestinian space.

5. The writing of this article and my fieldwork preceded the start of the Israel-Gaza war (2023-present). Therefore, I will not discuss the major obstacles to the incoming and outgoing mobility of Gazans and foreigners in the Gaza Strip since October 2023.

6. In 1967, Israel took control of East Jerusalem and incorporated it, along with an area of sixty-four square kilometers surrounding it, into the boundaries of the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem. The Israeli Jerusalem Law of 1980 declared “unified Jerusalem” as the capital of the State of Israel, formalizing the annexation of East Jerusalem. This decision has been condemned by several United Nations resolutions, and East Jerusalem is still regarded by the international community as the capital of the Occupied Palestinian territories or the future capital of a future Palestinian state.

7. The demarcation line resulting from the 1948 combat between the Hebrew State and the Kingdom of Jordan during the signing of the armistice agreement in 1949. Although it is not a border, it has long been considered a reference point for a possible delineation between the Israeli state and a future Palestinian state.

8. Map of the West Bank, May 2023: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/west-bank-access-restrictions-may-2023

9. This border crossing was controlled by Israel from 1982 to 2005, and following the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, responsibility for the crossing was transferred to the Palestinian Authority, and then to the Hamas government in 2006 (Navone, 2014). Although Israeli forces are not physically present, they still exercise control over the border as part of security coordination with Egypt. Finally, a third border crossing, Kerem Shalom, located near Rafah at the junction of the three territories, is controlled by Israel and is dedicated to the passage of goods.

10. It should be noted that two categories of Palestinians benefit from freedom of movement (but not necessarily residency): those residing in Jerusalem who possess a resident card (blue identity card) and those who hold Israeli citizenship (locally referred to as “48 Palestinians”), residing in Israel.

11. Israeli law prohibits Israeli civilians from entering Area A of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 2006. Large red signs stating, “This road leads to Area ‘A’. The entrance for Israeli Citizens Is Forbidden, Dangerous To Your Lives, And Is Against Israeli Law”, guide Israelis to avoid this area. Only the Israeli army controls these roads (not the Palestinian Authority). In practice, Israeli citizens who wish to do so (such as peace activists or those of Palestinian origin) can visit Palestinian cities located in Area A. Finally, this prohibition does not apply to Israeli soldiers who regularly operate in Area A.

12. Holding a foreign passport does not improve the mobility rights of a Gazan or a West Banker. However, a foreign individual from the Palestinian diaspora (without Palestinian identification papers) may benefit from this mobility. Nevertheless, for this category of foreign individual, the challenge primarily lies in obtaining an Israeli visa (for tourism or work).

13. They are managed by the national agency “Israel Nature and Parks Authority” and represent 7% of the West Bank, according to the Israeli NGO Peace Now.

14. For more information, see Abu-Baker and Farah (2020).

15. Palestinians who hold a green identity card must obtain a permit to enter Israel or Jerusalem, whether for work, medical care, family visits, or other reasons. This permit, which is very difficult to obtain, can be granted for a duration ranging from one year to one day and may be suspended or revoked at any time.
16. There are no operational airports in the TPO (Territories of Palestine and Occupied Territories). The Qalandia Airport, located between Jerusalem and Ramallah, was built in the 1920s and was annexed and closed by Israel in 2000. The Yasser Arafat International Airport in Gaza, funded by several foreign countries and inaugurated by Bill Clinton, opened in 1998 and was bombed three years later by the Israeli Air Force.

17. For instance, Israel denied the exit of more than 1,400 Palestinians between June and July 2014 (see http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.611227).

18. "Judea and Samaria" is an Israeli administrative term of biblical origin, used exclusively by Israeli authorities to refer to the West Bank, excluding Jerusalem.

19. At the end of 2022, the Israeli authorities published a sixty-one-page document outlining a new and highly restrictive procedure regulating the stay or residence of foreigners in the West Bank.

20. Many international organizations have their headquarters in Jerusalem (East or West) or hold meetings and conferences there.

21. The duration of residence for the surveyed individuals varies between one and forty years. However, the majority falls between three and ten years. The difficulty in obtaining residence visas issued by Israel is one of the obstacles faced by some "internationals" wishing to stay longer.

22. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, military service has been mandatory for Israeli youth at the age of eighteen, with men serving for three years and women for two years. Arab Israelis who are not Druze (i.e., the Palestinian population that remained in 1948) are not subject to this requirement. Upon completing military service, each soldier is assigned to a reserve unit.

23. By way of example, a survey conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute and Tel Aviv University in mid-July 2014 indicated that more than 90% of Israeli Jews believed that the operation against Gaza was justified, while only 4% thought that the firepower used by the Israeli army was excessive (source: http://en.idi.org.il/about-idi/news-and-updates/july-2014-peace-index/).

24. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

25. I have not conducted formal interviews with Palestinians on the subject, but I am relying here on participant observation carried out over several years, primarily in Ramallah and Bethlehem, with refugee families, Palestinian students, and young professionals.

26. The village of Bi'lin was a symbol of the struggle against the separation wall. For more than a decade, peaceful gatherings have been organized there every Friday since February 2005. Many substantial injuries, among both Palestinians, Israeli activists, and international participants, have been reported over the year due to the shooting of rubber bullets and gas canisters at demonstrators. In 2009, a Palestinian villager was killed after being hit in the chest by a high-velocity tear gas canister.

27. The Arabic word yahoud (Jews) is frequently used by Palestinians to refer to Israeli Jews, a term that carries meaning both in the historical context of interethnic relations between Palestinians and Jews prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948 (and thus Israeli citizenship) and in the framework of Israel's self-definition as a Jewish state and the nation-state of the Jewish people.

28. The title is a play on words between ajaneb, meaning "foreigners" in Arabic, and an English grammatical form (-ed out) that signifies being fed up or tired of something. The translation of ajanebed out would therefore be "tired (or fed up) with foreigners". An example of a post: "FYI foreigners in the West Bank: 'I was in Tel Aviv' is not the right answer to 'Hey, I haven't seen you for a while! Where have you been?'" (source: http://ajanebedout.tumblr.com/).
ABSTRACTS

Since the mid-1990s, the geopolitical and economic dynamics of the Occupied Palestinian Territories have facilitated the influx of highly qualified young workers from Europe and North America, who come to reside, work, or study in major Palestinian cities for a limited duration. Benefiting from their respective passports, they enjoy unrestricted movement across the Israeli-Palestinian territory. This mobility holds significant symbolic value for Palestinians, as it grants access to recreational spaces, leisure activities, and enhanced international mobility. Drawing on a survey conducted over twenty-three months between 2010 and 2015 — comprising interviews (N=90) and participant observation in the West Bank —, this study examines the daily manifestations of mobility privilege in the Palestinian context and the varied stances adopted by the surveyed population. These different uses expose divisions and tensions between “internationals” and Palestinians.

À partir du milieu des années 1990, le contexte géopolitique et économique des territoires palestiniens occupés a permis l'arrivée de jeunes actifs, venus d'Europe et d'Amérique du Nord, pour travailler et résider quelques années dans les principales villes palestiniennes. Grâce à leurs passeports étrangers, ils bénéficient d'une liberté de mouvement sur l'ensemble du territoire israélo-palestinien. Cette mobilité, à forte charge symbolique pour les Palestiniens, leur offre accès à des lieux de détente, des activités de loisirs et une mobilité internationale facilitée. En s'appuyant sur une enquête menée pendant vingt-trois mois entre 2010 et 2015 — entretiens (N=90) et observation participante —, l'auteur analyse la forme que prend le privilège de mobilité au quotidien dans le contexte palestinien et les différents positionnements et usages face à cette situation inégalitaire. Ces usages différenciés viennent révéler des désaccords et des tensions entre « internationaux » et avec les Palestiniens.

Desde mediados de los años noventa, la evolución del contexto geopolítico y económico de los territorios palestinos ocupados ha atraído a jóvenes trabajadores, mayoritariamente provenientes de Europa y Norteamérica, que venían para trabajar y vivir durante algunos años en las principales ciudades palestinas. La posesión de pasaportes extranjeros les otorgaba libertad de circulación en todo el territorio palestino-israelí, les daba acceso a lugares de descanso, actividades de ocio y facilitaba la movilidad internacional. A través de una encuesta realizada durante veintitrés meses entre 2010 y 2015 — entrevistas (N=90) y observación participante —, se analiza la manifestación de este privilegio de movilidad en la vida cotidiana en Palestina. El estudio explora las posiciones adoptadas por los implicados ante esta situación desigual, las formas de utilización de este privilegio y revela desacuerdos y tensiones tanto entre los "internacionales" y los palestinos como entre los individuos con pasaportes extranjeros.
INDEX

**Geographical index:** Cisjordanie

**Mots-clés:** privilège, mobilité, migration privilégiée, privilège de mobilité, travail moral, territoires palestiniens occupés

**Keywords:** privilege, mobility, privileged migration, mobility privilege, moral labor, Occupied Palestinian Territories, West Bank

**Palabras claves:** privilegio, movilidad, migración privilegiada, privilegio de movilidad, trabajo moral, territorios palestinos ocupados, Cisjordania

AUTHORS

CLIO CHAVENEAU

Sociologist, Associate Professor, Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi, SAFIR, CEFREPA, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1237-5793; clio.chaveneau[at]sorbonne.ae