the roots through radical cultural and political change. In Vanuatu, the dialectic of tradition through the perpetuation of charismatic forces has a real protest dynamic that anthropologists interested in continuity would do well to identify more clearly. The integration of Vanuatu's history into the anthropology of revolutions certainly requires the completion of the decolonization of anthropology.

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Divided societies? The Pacific Way spirit of consensus:
Samoa (1962), Aotearoa New Zealand (2018)

SergeTcherkezoff

I. “Divided” societies<fnref n="1" />

The title is convenient for brevity, but it must be specified from the outset. It is common
in the vocabulary of English-speaking political science<fnref n="2" />, which has placed under
this notion of “divided societies” cases as diverse, historic or contemporary, as South
Africa, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ireland, etc., Canada itself, and closer to us, Fiji or New
Caledonia. This is something of a catch-all, because it leads the reader to see in this
last example only what is common to the others: deep-rooted oppositions. And this is
in reference either to “ethnicity”, or, even worse, by invoking questions of “race”; less
ethically problematic when the reference is to religion (Ireland), but no less problematic
in terms of the consequences in terms of lives lost in the bombings; or, this time closer
and less dramatic, when the reference is to linguistic division (Canada: Anglophone/
Francophone), but no less dramatic when the whole history of the situation of First
Nations is also added.

In short, the title is a catch-all. Moreover, it is conceptually clumsy, because, from a
holistic sociological point of view, that I would define Maussian, it must be admitted
that there is no divided society: it is a contradiction in terms. If there is “society”, there

<footnote n="1">1 An initial version of this text in French was presented for a plenary lecture given at the colloquium “La Nouvelle-Calédonie: un projet multi-culturel?” (November 2018) which was organised in Noumea by the TROCA centre, which I would like to thank again for its invitation (see the program on https://troca.unc.nc/la-nouvelle-caledonie-un-avenir-multiculturel/). This colloquium did not result in a publication. The expanded and updated text provided here, in the spirit of the educational publication on the theme of the Pacific Way - 50 years, incorporates a large amount of new development, numerous notes and bibliographical sources to enable the reader who so wishes to become more familiar with this field of research.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 Cf. the numerous works by Donald Horowitz (see https://law.duke.edu/fac/horowitz), Arend Lijphart on "consociationalism" (agreement between opposing parties which, in order to reach a decision by vote, adapt the rule of simple majority) in "divided" societies (https://polisci.ucsd.edu/people/faculty/faculty-directory/emeriti-faculty/lijphart-profile.html), Guelke (2012) and many others; and, with a specialisation on the Pacific, Jon Fraenkel of Victoria University of Wellington (see a list of publications, more than thirty articles over the last ten years, in https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jon_Fraenkel; see also https://insidestory.org.au/authors/jon-fraenkel/). The concept has even become the name of a political science department at King's College London (https://www.kcl.ac.uk/research/centre-for-the-study-of-divided-societies).</footnote>
is necessarily a level of value that refers to the whole of that society, where the unity of
living together makes sense<fnref n="3" />.

But, of course, any unity implies that somewhere - I prefer to say less vaguely: "at a lower level of value" - there is room for distinctions, divisions, fragmentations. In this sense, and contrary to what I have just said, there is no society that is not "divided", if only by what we call social classes, not to mention so-called "ethnic" or geographical divisions in the population. But there is a society (or there will be a society if we are still in an "un-achieved society" as Patrice Godin said for New Caledonia in a recent conference [see note 1 above]) if and only if there is a level of value that makes a totality and which, as a result, has the capacity to include (encompass in the strong sense) the levels where the divisions unfold.

We could discuss this concept of society in terms of the French holistic sociological tradition: Durkheim, Mauss, Louis Dumont. But today it is more useful to examine concrete examples. I will talk about the process that allowed the creation of a single citizenship at the time of independence (in 1962) of what is today the State of Samoa; then we will talk about some of the difficulties of the biculturalism that is promoted as a supreme value in Aotearoa New Zealand, this time considering very recent years.

## II. The creation of the State of Samoa and a single citizenship

### 1. The German period

The settlement of adventurer-traders in the 19th century in Samoa was mainly in one place: a bay suitable for anchoring ships, with its small village, Apia, in the middle of the northern coast of Upolu. The result was a trading post and then a small town that is now the capital of the state of Samoa, still named Apia. At the end of the 19th century, this trading post was home to dozens of Samoan villages. It had a foreign or mixed population (unions of foreign men with Samoan women), more or less organised by a system of "consuls" representing the main nationalities (English, German, American) and a "municipal" council. In 1899, following the major colonial divisions decided in the western capitals, the western part of the archipelago (i.e. 9/10ths of the country in surface area and 3/4ths in population) became German (the eastern part was placed under American control and remains so today, with numerous adjustments:

<footnote n="3">³ See also in this symposium the paper by Patrice Godin. Since many years, we have both cared for this Maussian definition.</footnote>
American Samoa). In the west, German colonisation ended when, at the outbreak of the First World War, Germany lost all its overseas possessions. Deutsche Samoa was then administered by New Zealand, and was designated as Western Samoa which became independent in 1962.

Germany and then New Zealand had, which may seem unexpected at first, a common vision that could be described as “museum-like” and bordering on racism. The Samoan “race” was said to be one of the last “pure Polynesian races” left but in danger of disappearing. German intellectuals of the time constantly compared Samoa to Hawaii, where, according to them, the “traditional culture” had vanished<fnref n="4" />. Such a catastrophe had to be avoided in Samoa. To avoid this, it was necessary to “preserve the Samoan race” from mixing. The Germans therefore not only made a sharp distinction between “natives” and “aliens” among the local population<fnref n="5" />, but they also distinguished between “natives” and people of mixed origin. The subsequent New Zealand administration did not change this distinction.

In the French language presentation, I used the word “Métis”, adding a capital letter to keep it at the same level of respect. I will retain the same word in this English version, to keep a sense of distance with the overused and unpleasant terminology of “half-caste”. The Germans spoke of *halbblut* and *mischlings* but in English of *halfcaste* (as in the whole British Empire), a terminology that became official under the New Zealand administration and was incorporated by the Samoans into their own language (*Afakasi*)<fnref n="6" />.

<footnote n="4">⁴ See, among others, the words of the German ethnographer Krämer (1902: Preface), quoted also, and with other German references, by Tobin (2015: 142).</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Regardless of the German terminology (Eingeborener / Fremd etc.; see Winter 2017: 6), communication with the local community was mainly in English (native/alien).</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ The variety of terms used by Europeans should not obscure the underlying ideological unity of “race”. There was the reference to blood (*halbblut* “half-blood”, thus “mixed-blood”), often explicitly associated with the idea of “race” (mixed-race), or the “mixture” *mischlings*, mixed from which the French term métis derives in reference to “mixité” (from the Latin *mixtus*, mixed, but passed through the Portuguese and Spanish colonial vocabulary mestizo designating the children of European fathers and Amerindian women, to become successively métice mestif métis in French), which certainly has the advantage of not specifying whether we are talking about physical or other mixes (but obviously at the time it was about the physical: blood, bodies, race, “skin colour”); or the very particular term of the British Empire “half-caste”, stemming from a long history (Latin *castus*, “maintained in its integrity, pure” in the sense of “without mixture”; later, in the Portuguese colonial world *casta raça* “pure race”, then in colonial English applied to India, castes, then half-caste for European-Indian half-breeds, then generalisation in the British Empire for anyone “of mixed race” (see for Samoa - and the bibliography of these articles for other regions -, Aspinall 2013, Luker 2008, Salesa 2000, 2011, Shankman 2001, Tobin 2015: chap. 5, Wareham 2002, Wildenthal 2001, Winter 2017 and, for New Caledonia, Muckle and Trepied 2017).</footnote>
The Germans had made distinctions along the lines defined by the local "consuls" of the second half of the 19th century. Mixed-race children from a duly recognised marriage (the vast majority were the case of a foreign man who had married a Samoan woman) were given the status of their father; the marriage was recognised if their father had been able to register his marriage at a consulate<fnref n="7" />. They then became "residents with foreign status", known as "European Métis" (in reference to their father). But Métis children from an illegitimate marriage (not registered at a consulate, no papers) could not inherit their father's status. Since they could not be "foreigners", they were necessarily "indigenous". Thus, in the end, two categories were created: "Métis European" and "Métis indigenous". (In 1947, the word "indigenous" was systematically replaced by "Samoan" in New Zealand government documents.)

In addition to the internal classification imposed on the Métis, the de facto distinction between the Métis in general and the Europeans on the one hand, and between the Métis in general and the Samoans on the other, must be stressed. The officials of the German colony, the prominent businessmen who came in, especially since the 1870-1880s (sent by companies already existing in Europe or elsewhere in the Pacific), with the "consuls" (positions began to exist in the 1840s and 1850s), not to mention the Protestant missionaries present since 1836, all these European men came to Samoa with their European wives, unlike the adventurers and small settler-merchants who came alone, throughout the nineteenth century since the end of the 1820s. They had a two-fold contempt for the Métis. On the one hand, they considered that a European who married a Samoan woman was "indulging himself in savagery", becoming a "savage"<fnref n="8" />. On the other hand, as we have said, some of them considered that this European admixture endangered the "purity of the Samoan race".

## 2. The New Zealand Administration

In 1914, a small New Zealand contingent took possession of Samoa on behalf of England. Then the League of Nations gave New Zealand an administrative "mandate"

<footnote n="7">⁷ Later, however, various Samoans descended from "European Métis" could not receive a passport recognising their status as citizens of their father's or forefather's country of origin because they did not have sufficient official proof.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ The Germans called it verkanakern, "to become a Kanak". The term used for the indigenous people of New Caledonia had become a trans-Pacific colonial-racist term; a sad irony of history when one considers that the term was originally used by Polynesian crews on European trading ships to mean simply "men [are in sight]" (tagata, kanaka), but was interpreted/applied by the captains as a derogatory term for the "savages" or "naturals" of the place, giving rise to "les Canaques" in French. (until the reversal of value by Jean Marie Tjibaou: the pride to be "Kanak").</footnote>
(Trusteeship, not Colony). Things did not change with the establishment of this administration in the 1920s and 1930s: the idea remained that "half-castes form the greatest social problems of the country". This was also the time when the Samoan word *Afakasi* became predominant. The word "half-caste" could be said in Samoan *totolua*, meaning "two bloods". But it was the word *afakasi*, a transcription of the English word half-caste, that became dominant in the early New Zealand period. This notion does not so much indicate the degree of mixing ("half" or not) as the social fall, the exit from the "pure" category in which one should have remained.

The "Afakasi" group in Samoa was thus the result of several combined Euro-centric ideologies, one patrilineal, the other both class-based and "race"-based. There was a desire to distinguish between Indigenous and European people and also to preserve the "purity" of this distinction. Let us first discuss the patrilineal ideology. During the nineteenth century, since the establishment of "consuls" in the 1850s, children of mixed marriages (generally the mother being Samoan) were - as has been said - registered at the father's consulate, if there was one, and were "indigenous" only if they had not been able to access the father's status. A strictly patrilineal ideology obviously dominated in the minds of European officials, even though it did not correspond at all to Samoan ideology, which recognises kinship on all sides and often places great importance on the maternal link. Secondly, class and race. The missionaries and consuls arrived "in Polynesia", and therefore in societies "with chieftaincy or kingship" according to what they had read. They therefore systematically sought to deal with the "great chiefs" of the country, and they even constantly tried, from 1860 to 1899, to bring about a single "royalty". All of this created a superior statutory relationship between some Samoans and some Europeans, a relationship that at first did not include intermarriage between them. As a result of this relationship, both sides had a certain contempt for the Métis who were mostly small-scale adventurer-traders<fnref n="9" />.

<footnote n="9">⁹ We have discussed the issue of the Métis in the relationship between "Samoans" and "Europeans". We must not forget the history of two other "métissages", one of Chinese origin, the other "Melanesian". Before the German period, various Chinese men came to Samoa (as in other Polynesian archipelagos) to seek their fortune, often through working on a merchant ship where they had found employment on departure from China. They were often successful in the local trade and married Samoan women. As early as 1880, some European settlers, in order to avoid this competition, urged (unsuccessfully) the Samoan consuls and chiefs to prohibit further Chinese immigration. At the same time, plantations run by settlers were expanding and needed labour. The Samoans were not interested. After 1900, under the German administration, German planters brought in employees from the German colonies in the Melanesian Pacific (some of these "Melanesian" employees found it more difficult to marry Samoan women). The other settlers did not have this possibility and turned to China, recruiting hundreds of Chinese workers (some 3,800</footnote>
This was the situation at the end of the first New Zealand period (1921-1945)¹⁰ when, at the end of the Second World War, the creation of the decolonisation programme within the United Nations Council, together with the will of the New Zealand Labour government (which had come to power in 1935), very quickly led to set in motion a reflection on the future independence of Western Samoa. What was the position of the Métis? Some of them, classified as "Europeans", were reluctant to merge with the rest of the Samoans. However, the division created since the German period between the "European Métis" and the "Indigenous Métis" prevented the formation of a unified Métis opposition. On the other hand, even the "European Métis" group was not unitary: the differences in wealth and lifestyles were enormous. More than half of them were often unemployed, without wealth, living on the most unhealthy lands west of the city centre, while a handful of merchant families had established a fortune in the late nineteenth century, during the German period or just afterwards, when German property was confiscated and sold off (Davidson 1967: 195). In addition, the "European Métis" suffered from having been systematically side-lined politically and economically by the German and then New Zealand administrations, which had imposed a "resident alien" status on them, making people born on Samoan soil from Samoan mothers "aliens" in their own country. Finally, we mentioned their reaction of

between 1900 and the end of the German period; more than 2,000 were still there in 1914), who were subjected to quasi-slavery conditions: forbidden to leave the plantation, in some plantations punishment by whipping for any misbehaviour, etc., unions with local women officially forbidden by the German administration (for the reasons already mentioned), often tolerated by the settlers if they were sufficiently discreet. The New Zealand administration, first military (1914-1920) and then civilian, organised the forced return to China, despite the opposition of those concerned and the colonists; it managed to embark about a thousand, i.e. half of those on the spot. There was a combination of the British ban on Chinese workers in all the dependencies and New Zealand's concern to continue the "preservation" of the "Samoan race". Subsequently, under pressure from the settlers, recruitment from China was reopened, in small numbers, but the administration ensured forced repatriation at the end of each contract. (see Tom 1986, Meleisea 1980, 1987).

I summarise this background to return to the painful issue of the Metis. A number of these Chinese workers started families with a Samoan partner and were able to escape forced return (sometimes by jumping overboard from the ship once they were out of Apia Bay and managing to swim back to shore). Three generations later, the gap remains. Chinese-Samoan "Afakasi" descendants are (sometimes or often) referred to in the local population as *mata seina* ("Chinese eyes"); Melanesian-Samoan descendants are referred as (at best) *tama uli* ("black child") and (at worst) *mea uli* ("black thing"), while European-Samoan Afakasi have no such nickname. In one extended family I know, a visitor might wonder about the constant hostility of an A branch against a B branch, both being respectively the descendants of (A) a sister and (B) a brother who are children of a high chief. The woman on side A had, at a fairly young age, "fallen out" with a "Chinese eye" (son of one of the Chinese workers who had children with a Samoan woman) and had to marry him. Her brother, on the B side (and chief matai), never missed an opportunity to mock the "Chinese eyes" of all the descendants. At family gatherings, the sister and brother were obviously seated in the places of honour, the brother's wife in the middle position as befits a wife (Tcherkézoff 2017), but the sister's husband ("Chinese eyes") was relegated to the junior seating side. The children in branch B were deeply marked by this and still talk about it today, more than half a century after their childhood.

10 We do not mention here the long struggle of the Mau movement, led by Samoans and Métis, to resist the New Zealand administration. One of the issues at stake was precisely to break the fixed and museum-like framework in which the administration enclosed Samoa and to oppose the way in which the administration prevented the development of a local business sector driven by the Métis (see Davidson 1967, Field 1991, Meleisea 1987).
withdrawal in the face of the contempt of European officials. Hence, a good number
of Métis acquired a certain aspiration for national independence that would allow
them to play a role.

It was this combination of factors that made the march to independence relatively easy. The majority of the Métis eventually accepted that they could be united with the Samoans in a single status of "Samoan citizens" of the future state. In turn, this acceptance of a "Samoan" national unity conceptually and politically allowed for the opening up of secondary levels in value, to allow for the perpetuation of certain differences.

3. Citizenship and nationality(ies)

There were ten years of negotiations with the UN missions between 1947 and 1957. The Mission took it for granted that dual racial status was maintained by the New Zealand administration "in the first instance to protect the Samoans", but added that this protection was no longer necessary as the Samoans were about to be given full control "of their own affairs". What should the future be? It should be a "common Western Samoan citizenship which will be related not to race, but to loyalty and allegiance to Western Samoa". The paragraph ends with the Mission expressing the hope that, after the promulgation of a single citizenship, the people themselves would express the desire to abolish all racial differences, in keeping with the spirit of the UN Trusteeship System whose programme, as the Mission recalls, included "the elimination of discriminations based on race"<fnref n="11" />.

Needless to say, this whole context is very particular in the history of decolonisations. In
1921, New Zealand received a "mandate" from the League of Nations to administer
Samoa, a mandate that did not include settlement. In the 1935 New Zealand
national elections an anti-colonial Labour government was elected which remained
in power until 1950¹². Finally, in the 1950s, the independence process was managed

<footnote n="11">11 "The Mission is confident, however, that the Samoans, on due reflection and after seeing the future position with regard to citizenship, will wish to remove the present distinction in domestic status based on race." (UN 1959: 9 §67). See also https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/history/international-trusteeship-system-and-trust-territories.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 See https://nzhistory.govt.nz/first-labour-government-wins-power. In 1945, this government initiated an upgrade of the economic and social status of the Māori (https://nzhistory.govt.nz/people/peter-fraser). The Prime Minister (Peter Fraser) was strongly committed to the creation of the United Nations and to supporting small states within it (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Fraser).</footnote>
by international commissioners (from UN Missions) who were deeply committed to an anti-racist and anti-colonial ideology<fnref n="13" />, and to the political model of parliamentary democracy<fnref n="14" />.

The rest of the story became indeed the creation of a single citizenship with, nevertheless, a secondary arrangement for those already holding another nationality, and then also leaving a secondary space for differentiation in land rights and political representation. Let us take a closer look at these arrangements established at a secondary level of value within the “total” society.

The issue was resolved by a joint Working Committee that included both Métis and non-Métis Samoans. Among the latter local chiefs who were chosen by and were already members of the local Territorial Assembly were prominent. This Assembly had been established shortly before, in 1948, and was a forerunner of the future state parliament. In addition to the officials, it included 11 Samoans elected by the Fono of Faipule (a kind of customary senate dating from 1875 representing the various districts throughout the country) and 5 “Europeans” elected by the “European” community. In the Working Committee, the UN added two “advisers” who were academics: a historian, J.W. Davidson, known for his knowledge of regional colonial history (Pacific, British Empire) and a jurist, C. Aikman, known for his expertise in constitutional law<fnref n="15" />.

Although we have only Davidson's (1967: 362-3) very brief account, it is nevertheless illuminating. Davidson tells us that the Samoans (he does not specify the views of the “European” members of the Committee) tended to see the problem in terms of the rule or rights of blood, and that he and Aikman promoted another view, in terms of the

<footnote n="13">13 At least as “anti-colonial ideology” was constituted, with its limitations, at the end of the Second World War.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 Paradoxically, it is only on this point that there was strong friction: the UN commissioners were horrified by the Samoan demand for independence with a constitution that would organise the election of Parliamentarians by limiting suffrage to the matai “chiefs” (the heads of the large aiga families). The Commissioners had a (false) vision of a class of “nobles” seeking to maintain their authority over the “common people”, but had to accept local determination; however, the constitutional advisers Davidson and Aikman (see below) were careful to introduce into the text of the constitution what would allow for a subsequent move towards “universal suffrage”, the only desirable model in their eyes (Tcherkézoff 1998, 2000, 2003: chap. 6).</footnote>

<footnote n="15">15 Their role was decisive in some of the fundamental choices that guided the drafting, so it is useful to say a word about these two advisers. James Wightman Davidson (1915-1973), a graduate of New Zealand University (Victoria University of Wellington VUW) and then of Cambridge with a doctorate (1942) on European penetration in the Pacific, was a member of the British Admiralty's secret service during the war and then taught at Cambridge, before being appointed to a chair of history at the Australian National University in 1949, at the same time as he was appointed to the Samoa Working Committee (as a historian, he later became the main architect of the new Australian school of Pacific history developed from the perspective of the islanders: See Lal 2007). After his Samoan period, he served on other constitutional committees in the Pacific (Cook Islands, Nauru, etc.) and was working with the future Papua New Guinea on the eve of his death. Colin Aikman (1919-2002), from the same Victoria University, then from the London School of Economics for his PhD, was working for New Zealand Foreign Affairs when he was appointed to the Samoan Committee. He was then Professor of Law in Victoria, then represented his country abroad as High Commissioner and then Ambassador, and was also, until his death, special adviser to the Parliament of his country on legal-legislative matters.</footnote>
rights of soil<fnref n="16" />. The Samoans would have liked any individual of Samoan descent to have the opportunity to acquire citizenship if they so desired - which immediately raised the issue of Samoans in American Samoa (the small eastern part of the archipelago). Some would have liked to see only those of Samoan descent who were living according to the principles of classification as “Samoan” to be given this opportunity, but this would have rendered stateless the many “Europeans” in Samoa who did not have a passport from the country of their European ancestor, and some would never have been able to get one because they do not have the necessary papers. Samoans would also have liked to see anyone who already held another nationality prevented from becoming a Samoan citizen - which posed the problem of various members of the local “European” community who were born in Samoa but had been able to retain the nationality of their European ancestor and whose whole lives were rooted there.

In response to these arguments, Davidson and Aikman “explained that citizenship relates to a person’s place of birth (and to that of his father), not to ethnic origin”. They also stated that consideration could be given to the strictest possible conditions for obtaining Samoan citizenship for those who had another nationality, but that Samoa had no control over the status a person might have in another country. In short, one could exclude from membership of the future state, but one could not force a person to give up the status they had elsewhere. Finally, special arrangements could be made for individuals from American Samoa who wished to migrate to Western Samoa, without defining such access in racial terms. Since the Samoans on the Committee, many of whom were more or less close to local “European” circles, had no wish to exclude these families and their businesses, there was only one solution: to define a single citizenship status, with all the rights and duties that go with it, without racial exclusion, but accepting that some “Europeans” might have dual nationality while making it clear that this other nationality did not give any additional rights within Samoa.

The text was drafted and accepted by all<fnref n="17" />. A “citizen” is a person who was born on Samoan soil or whose father is a citizen by birth (or the mother if the child’s parents are

<footnote n="16">16 « had tended to see it in terms of “race” “The draft bill gave expression to Samoan wishes, in the form in which Aikman and I had explained was practicable” (ibid.).</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17 The body of legislation on this issue in the decade around independence includes the 1959 Ordinance, the 1963 Samoan Status and Elections Acts, and the 1972 Citizenship of Western Samoa Ordinance 1959, Samoan Status Act 1963, Samoan Electoral Act 1963, Samoan Citizenship Act 1972; see Davidson 1959, Powles 1993, and the compendium of juridical texts *Government of Samoa's Western Samoa Statutes Reprint 1920-1977* published by the Samoan Government.</footnote>
not married). A foreigner who has been a permanent resident for more than five years
may also apply for naturalisation<fnref n="18" />. Samoan law thus carries the weight of Western
ideology in this area: the right of soil and patrilineal emphasis. Even today, a child born
abroad to a Samoan father married to a foreign woman is automatically Samoan; but
a child born abroad to a foreign father married to a Samoan woman must apply for
naturalization. This provision, so inconsistent with the logic of the Samoan kinship system
as it has been known since the earliest sources, shows how the intervention of Davidson
and Aikman was undoubtedly decisive. Finally, it was clarified that a Samoan citizen
who took another nationality would not automatically lose his Samoan nationality.
Thus, today many Samoans who have settled in New Zealand or were even born there,
and who are residents or even citizens of that country, are also Samoan citizens<fnref n="19" />.

4. Adaptations at a secondary level

The question of land tenure

The fundamental point is that land tenure was subordinated to the question of citizenship. It was declared that only a Samoan citizen could hold, and therefore buy and sell, land under private law. The long-standing fear of land grabbing by foreigners was thus allayed at the same time as the de facto situation created in the 19th century was recognised. The land that had been recognised as being under the "ownership" of a "European" settler at that time remained under the "private property" land regime; anyone could own it, regardless of origin, but on the express condition that they were a Samoan citizen.

The question of the electoral system

The 1959 UN Mission, after stressing the importance of defining a single citizenship, indicated that it was necessary to recognise for the Samoans their attachment to the matai "chief" system but also to recognise "the different way of life of many persons in the public service, in commerce and in other employments" - which was the professional background of the "Europeans" (but these are no longer named as such).

<footnote n="18">18 And even after three years if from a Commonwealth country (1972 decision).</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 The 1959 Ordinance and the Constitutional text only included the notion of "citizen". The 1972 Act clarified what had become obvious: the terms "Samoan" / "European" in the 1921 and 1944 Acts no longer had any legal existence.</footnote>
It was a call to subordinate differences to a national unity and to characterise
differences by abandoning racial, territorial and even national vocabulary, in order to
limit oneself to the social mode. The differentiated group, this time not by origins but
by the social mode of interacting, were the following. 1) On the one hand, those who
are within the "tradition" faaSamoa, thus within the matai (chief) system (the faamatai
- each individual is above all a member of a clan [a family-extended aiga] and thus
a "supporter" of his matai who is therefore meant to represent in all circumstances the
members of this aiga). 2) on the other hand, those who are "outside" this tradition and
thus legitimately wish to make their individual voice heard.

The Mission realised, with great regret, that it would not succeed in establishing a
system of universal suffrage for parliamentary elections because the Samoan demand
that every Samoan be represented by his matai (chief), head of extended household
was so strong and consequently suggested that this difference in social mode could
be expressed in the electoral system. On the one hand, seats for voting by extended
families represented by their matai (chiefs), and on the other, seats for a register of
"individual voters", in proportion to the number of individuals who identify with one or
the other system respectively.

The outcome was as follows. The future parliament will comprise 45 seats "in the Samoan tradition" faaSamoa, to which would be added 5 "European" seats elected by universal suffrage of those who opted for this logic of "individual vote". For the seats faaSamoa, the electoral method will be "for the moment" that followed by the Fono customary senate of the Faipule. In each district, only the matai [chiefs] vote and choose among themselves who will sit in the parliament, on the condition that they provide a list showing a majority of signatures in favour of the same name; in case of disagreement, there would be a secret ballot among the matai at that district level. The distinction between "Samoans" and "Europeans" thus continued, but in a limited way, transferred and limited to the electoral level only.

The country became independent under this system. The constitution specified the
existence of two electoral arrangements: the 45 territorial constituencies would each
elect their own MPs<fnref n="20" />; other MPs would be elected by "persons whose names appear

<footnote n="20">20 "One member elected for each of forty-five territorial constituencies" (Western Samoa Constitution: §44-1). There are 41 constituencies to be exact. Four of these had two seats. There were 5 "European" seats (under the system decided in 1957). In subsequent years, it was decided to give two MPs to two other large constituencies.</footnote>
on the individual voters' roll”<fnref n="21" />. This roll was opened everywhere, and some individuals could register and thus vote directly, in their own name, instead of delegating their vote to a matai leader. After one year, and every five years thereafter, the officer in charge of the electoral registers would have to calculate the number of seats “to be elected by the persons whose names appear on the register of individual voters” by maintaining a proportion between the number of inhabitants related to this “individual” election (a number obtained by multiplying the number of registered voters by three, a way of predicting what would happen next: two children per individual)<fnref n="22" /> and the seats to be filled, which is comparable to the proportion between the overall population (reduced by three times the number of people on the individual register and reduced by the number of non-citizen residents) and the 45 seats “to be elected by territorial constituencies”<fnref n="23" />. The only constitutional requirement to be a member of parliament was to “be a citizen”<fnref n="24" />.

Independence was declared in 1962. A Samoan Status Act in 1963 specified that, in order to hold a title of matai (chief) and thus have rights to so-called “customary” land, one had to be not only a citizen but also to have a share of Samoan blood<fnref n="25" />. This partial return to the right of blood may be surprising. It must be understood in the context of the constant concern to protect land rights. It was a way of prohibiting a foreigner who came to settle in Samoa, became naturalised and then eventually obtained the title of matai from his Samoan wife's family, from eventually exercising authority over a portion of the territory (in the Samoan tradition, each extended family can choose to give a title, secondary or even the main title, to a non-consanguine if this person is married into the extended family). Here again one can see the way to place a contradiction to the main value at a secondary level. The effort of the councillors was to remove from the Constitution a prevalence of the right of blood to create a

<footnote n="21">21 Western Samoa Constitution: § 44.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 This rule, spelt out in the Constitution, indicates a statistical prediction: the “European” population was to be two children for every adult over the age of 21 (the figure was also intended to take account of those who failed to register); see Tufuga (1988: 32).</footnote>

<footnote n="23">23 Western Samoa Constitution: Second Schedule. In 1959, just prior to independence, according to Aikman (quoted in Fepulea'i 1994: 126), the “European population” (without specifying the definition) was 6% of the population. According to Tufuga (1988: 31), it was around 6,000 (referring to the population to be represented by the individual vote), compared to 100,000 Samoans. In the 1966 census, just after independence, 89% of the inhabitants declared themselves to be “Samoans”, 10% “half-Samoans” and 1% “European, other Pacific Islanders, other” (Powles 1970: 52 and Appendix “Land, Titles and Suffrage”, p. ii).</footnote>

<footnote n="24">24 Western Samoa Constitution: § 45.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">25 “A person who is a citizen of Western Samoa; and has any Samoan blood”. This phrase now defined “Samoan”, a term used to define those who can hold a title of matai chief with all the customary rights attached, and to define those who can claim to be concerned in some way with customary land (thus falling within the 80% of the country defined as customary land, formerly “Samoan land”); see Powles (1993: 400, 422), Vaai (1995: 166).</footnote>
notion of universal “Samoan” citizenship regardless of one’s “mixed blood” history. This
was ultimately fully embraced and supported by Samoans. But once this principle had
been established at the main level (the Constitution), it was then possible for Samoans
to reintroduce the right of blood in the limited context of access to a matai title by a
simple legislative act.

The issue was important because a (main) matai is the manager of the land of the
extended family, and as such can give part of it to any family group from elsewhere
(but remaining within the kinship network). The main matai would give to that person a
secondary title-name (every family has a stock of “title-names”, any matai can create
another matai position, provided he has the agreement of all)<fnref n="26" />.

This was the logic of Samoan national identity constructed at independence, a logic
partly built in the previous ten years in dialogue with the West, partly built just afterwards
and, this time, autonomously.

Let us add a remark: the spirit of consensus (so central in the ideology of the “Pacific
Way”—see also the paper by George Carter in this symposium), can go quite far, if
and when one wants to promote it. When it came to thinking about the appointment
of the Head of State of this new state, Western Samoa, historical evidence and
contemporary status pointed to the heads of the two great extended families (aiga)
who had dominated local history in the 19th century and had also dominated
interaction with the Europeans and the conduct of the first consultative territorial
assembly. Everyone told the UN commissioners that there must be no risk of reviving
old rivalries, irreconcilable for a century, no question of risking to returning to wars of
the distant past. Thus, they told the UN Commissioners that the country would become
independent on condition that it could have “two heads of state”, simultaneously and
with equal authority (the main “chief” of each of the two great aiga). Then when one

<footnote n="26">26 This whole logic of matai management of land also applied later, when Samoa's international development brought in the foreign notion of leasing, with an insidious evolution, from the 1990s and especially 2008, driven by a de facto connivance between a Samoan government that made "development" its main watchword and foreign investors, to give signature authority to the matai without requiring the agreement of tens (sometimes hundreds) of extended-family members (Tcherkezoff 2022b). The debate has recently become very virulent locally (see https://samoaglobalnews.com/ltc-amendment-bill-removes-court-assessors11/;
https://samoaglobalnews.com/sls-bills-fundamentally-technically-defective/;
and for a more detailed analysis :
https://www.lowynstitute.org/the-interpreter/samoa-s-constitutional-crisis-undermining-rule-law;
https://devnet.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/latilati. Controversial Land Legislation in Samoa: It's not just about the land. pdf; and this debate is spreading internationally (see the June 2020 position papers of the International Bar Association (https:// www.ibanet.org).</footnote>
died the other would continue until his death. Only then would the new Constitution
be followed and the election of the head of state by parliament be introduced.

Again, as with the question of a limited suffrage restricted to matai chiefs for
Parliamentary seats, the UN Commission had to accept this exception (unique in the
world, it seems), knowing that it would only last for one generation. It so happened
that one of the two chiefs-now-Heads-of-Sate died of illness a few years later and
the other remained the (now sole) head of state of Western Samoa for almost half
a century, until his passing in 2007, after which the constitutionally mandated system
came into effect.

## II. New Zealand: “dual heritage, shared future”<fnref n="27" />

### 1. An official website for a national commemoration

New Zealand is, more or less officially, a 'bicultural' country. The government website (https://teara.govt.nz/en/biculturalism/print) presents their vision of history, speaking of a first biculturalism (at the time of the first settlers), which became a monoculturalism for a century and a half, before becoming bicultural again from the 1980s onwards, and presents the current debates as oscillating between "not bicultural enough" and "too bicultural"<fnref n="28" />.

Even today, at least from what I could see in 2018, tensions are sometimes high between those who speak as tangata whenua ("children of the land"), as Māori<fnref n="29" />, and those who speak as Pākehā (European). Professor Dame Anne Salmond, Pākehā but raised partly in Māori circles, is arguably New Zealand's most celebrated academic, a linguist, anthropologist and historian who, with her team, has conducted a twenty-year effort to gather all the existing documents that trace early encounters between Europeans and Māori (see Two Worlds 1991, and then Between Worlds 1997)<fnref n="30" />. She made the following call in the local Gisborne Herald newspaper (8 October 2018):

<footnote n="27">27 What follows is the data that was available to me in November 2018. A brief update is added in the conclusion.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">28 There is little French-language work on this issue: see David (Corinne) 2009, Pellini 2015. See Yann Nicolas' (https://bbf.enssib.fr/consulter/bbf-2004-03-0079-003) thorough analysis of the official bicultural definition of the National Library of New Zealand from the 1990s. See the comparison between Canada, Australia and New Zealand in Germain et al. 2010, and Canada, New Zealand, Basque country in Schwimmer 2001 (study mainly on Basque institutions, the other two cases are briefly mentioned). See the posts by David (Amélie) (2015) on the New Zealand flag, and Castellet (2018) on the Māori in Auckland.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">29 We will write the word invariably, following an increasingly common trend in Aotearoa- New Zealand (cf. the way 'Kanak' is written today).</footnote>

<footnote n="30">30 The author has also contributed much to the study of early encounters in Tahiti, and, very much also to the study of Māori traditions.</footnote>
"dual heritage, shared future", a "dual" (hence divided) heritage, but a call for a "shared" future, a common destiny one might say. One can see why these words on the ground in New Zealand can also be part of a symposium commemorating the call half a century ago for a Pacific Way aiming at a shared future for communities born out of dual or multiple heritages.

Let us take a closer look at the difficult context in which Anne Salmond made this call and why she did so from Gisborne. At stake was a programme of commemorations. In 2016 the New Zealand government had launched a programme with a considerable budget to celebrate in October 2019 the 250th anniversary of the first meeting between Europeans and Māori. On the Pākehā side, this first encounter is usually referred to as "Captain Cook's arrival in New Zealand". It took place on 8 October 1769, in the bay bordering what is now the town of Gisborne. A commemorative site was set up: https://mch.govt.nz/tuia-encounters-250.

The video that came on the screen when the "Binding together" link was selected, announced that it would illustrate the unity. It used English and Māori but in a different way: it scrolled through lyrics sung in Māori in the background and presented in print lyrics written only in English: "Come on a voyage of discovery, as we mark our first meetings, these are our stories, let us navigate the future together". Despite this linguistic imbalance, the written text insisted on sharing: "our shared future" with this "dual heritage", as well as the idea of a logo that "refers to the waka hourua (double-hulled voyaging dugout) and the topgallant rigging of a ship", and finally the dual name "Tuia-encounters", with the Māori word tuia "referring to the idea of intertwining and working together [...]".

## 2. The commemoration of Cook's arrival?

The aim was to commemorate a first encounter, on 8 October 1769, which took place in the bay named on contemporary maps as Poverty Bay. This name is itself two hundred and fifty years old because it was given by Cook. "Poverty"? A rather surprising name for a geographical location, with a very negative connotation, but apparently if a name has been given by Cook, it is intangible; in fact it remained on all official maps until 2019, as we shall see. Cook explained in his diary: "this place has given us nothing of profit". Indeed, the encounter was even dramatic.
The commemoration prepared for 2019 of the 1769 encounter wanted to highlight the *Tuia*, the community established by working together that came out of that (first) “encounter”. But the organising committee had perhaps overlooked the risk of amalgamation with another “tradition”, that of the founding aspect (for the *Pākehā*) of Captain Cook's arrival. Indeed, for a long time, at the initiative of local or national *Pākehā* authorities, people celebrated not so much an encounter but the arrival, in particular by gathering at the foot of a monument erected in 1906 in Gisborne and called “the Captain Cook monument”. For some (mostly *Pākehā*), the commemoration planned for 2019 extended a fine tradition that paid tribute to a civilising hero symbolising the beginnings of New Zealand (from England, the mother country). This view, widely reported in the press, caused others (mostly *Māori*), to speak up and say that there was no question of commemorating the arrival of that Captain Cook, because that arrival “was that of a murderer” (see below). There was much heated discussion and the effort of the committee and local authorities during 2018 was to give as much of a shared aspect to the commemoration as possible: it would no longer be Cook's arrival, it would be honouring the tradition of the trans-Pacific voyage, where *Māori* and *Pākehā* each made great achievements.

Since 1990, the land site has been enlarged and embellished, and the old sign, which used only English, “Cook Landing Site National Historic Reserve”, has incorporated the local name of the place: “Puhi Kai Iti/Cook Landing National Historic Reserve”<fnref n="31" />.

But the beginning of the accompanying text has not changed:

On 8 October 1769, Cook and his party made their historic landing in New Zealand. Local Māori were mystified by what they saw. They thought the Endeavour was an enormous bird with wings of great size and beauty – the longboats were smaller birds – while Cook and his men were atua (gods). Cook was eager to make friendly contact with the Māori people. However, a series of unfortunate encounters, both on the day of the landing and the next day, resulted in the deaths of several Māori. The following day Cook took his leave and the Endeavour headed south. Initially, Cook had planned to call the bay he landed in, Endeavour Bay, but instead, he named it Poverty Bay “because it afforded us no one thing we wanted”.

<footnote n="31">³¹ A detailed presentation is given on the government's national parks website: https://www.doc.govt.nz/parks-and-recreation/places-to-go/east-coast/places/gisborne-area/cook-landing-national-reserve/</footnote>
In August 2019, there was a major redesign that gave a large (and indeed prominent) place to Māori agency, with a plan developed in partnership with the local Māori clan (Ngati Oneone), the centrepiece of which is a huge series of large woven panels evoking the construction of traditional Māori dugout canoes and houses.

### 3. 8 October 1769

Let us go back to October 1769. Thanks in particular to Anne Salmond's books, those who want to know today what happened at the time of these first encounters have the opportunity to do so (Salmond 1991:119 ff.)

The English landing party was in very small numbers. One group went in one direction, to explore the surrounding area, while four young sailors remained by the canoe. The Māori had seen the English arrive for two days, and had lit large fires. There, on the shore, four Māori arrived, one brandishing a large spear. A sailor evidently believing in an attack fired over his head, thinking he is expressing explicitly the summons to stop. The Māori evidently heard only a deafening noise, and did not yet know the degree of threat. He stepped forward again and the sailor killed him with a bullet. The other Māori left. In the following days, there have been several violent clashes, and in total nine Māori have been killed.

Anne Salmond had written in her book that, appealing to later ethnography, we know beyond doubt that the Māori arrival with the spear was not an attack. Had it been so, the Māori would have come in large numbers, and without waiting to brandish their spears before throwing them (which was the case in the following days, when the context became one of confrontation following the initial misunderstanding). This initial gesture of waving a spear is well recorded as a traditional way of greeting an arriving group, signifying that it was necessary to lay down one's arms and enter into a relationship. But the English sailors obviously did not have this interpretation, they thought they were being attacked and killed before they were killed: first contacts, double misunderstanding, first deaths (on the Māori side), as in the context of so many other first encounters between Pacific Islanders and Europeans (see for a comparative view in relation to Polynesia, Tcherkezoff 2022a: 236-248).
4. The debate: debunking a certain vision of the past?

For a long time, in addition to the 1906 obelisk, statues representing Cook have been erected in the city (and in many places in New Zealand<fnref n="32" />). For a number of New Zealanders (mostly Pākehā) these statues represent the original link to a significant source: the link to Britain. But for others (mostly Māori), since the details of the historical context are now known (and, it seems, some Māori oral traditions had maintained the memory, right down to the very name of the first Māori killed), this day represents the first time Māori were killed by Europeans. For these opponents, Cook's statues should be "debunked" (there is no need to remind the reader of the topicality of this kind of debate nowadays, in Europe, the US, Australia, etc.). The local Gisborne Herald newspaper headlined on 31 July 2016: In recent weeks, Cook statues have been "repeatedly defaced". The article shows how some statues of Cook have been painted red to remind people of the bloodshed Cook caused, or ridiculing the Captain by turning him into a bikini-clad tourist on the beach.

The newspaper reported in July 2016:

Many residents have taken to social media to express their opinions in which Cook is described as a “murderer” and “crooked Cook”. Other posts call for one of the statues to be pulled down, saying it is insulting to local Māori. Nick Tupara, spokesman for the Ngati Oneone tribe, said, according to historical records, Cook’s crew shot nine Māori men of his tribe, including Tupara’s ancestors. Six of the men are believed to have died. Even though there is some contention as to whether the first statue is an accurate representation of Cook, Tupara says the English explorer is a undeniable part of Gisborne’s “story”. He has urged the community to embark on a calm and measured discussion of their history, instead of carrying out “wasteful” acts of vandalism. “We are part of Cook’s lineage, that is a fact, and defacing our city is a poor method of showing dissension with our past.” he said. [...] Tupara [added]: “It is clear from the recent vandalism and heated social media discussion that historical wounds run deep and there is more healing that needs to happen – and I do think there should be more balance in the portrayal of our history. (Gisborne Herald, 31 July 2016)

<footnote n="32">³² The official list can be found at https://teara.govt.nz/en/interactive/32558/memorials-to-captain-cook.
The first monument was erected in 1906, in Gisborne (see above). Three more were unveiled in the first half of the 20th century,
and a further ten in the second half.</footnote>
Two years later, in the on-line NZ news:

[...] the Gisborne District Court decided it was time to take the statue down and replace it with "cultural designs" that represent the stories of tangata whenua. The statue will be re-homed at Tairāwhiti Museum.

Tupara said the statue's removal will mean a more balanced version of the area's history can be told. We can "celebrate the Māori history of this area and the ancestors who arrived here before Captain Cook," he said. Councillor Meredith Akuhata-Brown also said the move would allow "our heritage stories being told from both sides, but also truth, which is what we want—we want honest narrative."33

Let us now read some of the comments that have been made, both in the press and on the web. Firstly the solemn appeal made by Anne Salmond in the local paper, written in response to various polemical letters sent to the *Gisborne Herald* by Gisborne residents. Salmond made this call in 2018, choosing to have it published on 8 October. In it, she stresses the importance of restoring the full truth, making all the contexts explicit, putting back into the picture what was the respective view of the English and the Māori. She also summarises the history of the first shootings, the reasons for the misunderstanding, the deaths on the Maori side that cannot be forgotten: "those shootings have not been forgotten; they still echo across the bay". She recalls the progress, mentioning that the schools today do not teach anymore what they used to teach in October 1969, i.e. that New Zealand was "discovered by the English", that the Māori arrived by chance in Aotearoa thanks to some ocean currents, and that no consideration was given to Māori oral literature. Anne Salmond concludes by calling for dialogue:

> What is less explicable is when, after almost 250 years of shared history, we still treat each other as strangers. Some of *The Herald*'s correspondents write with almost as little understanding of Māori life as those first Europeans, and with less empathy and respect. Not surprisingly, this breeds resentment and anger, making it difficult for those bitter memories to heal. From what I have heard, however, the vast majority of people in our community want to live together in friendship and mutual respect. In a world full of fragmented, violent societies, that's a future

<footnote n="33">33 https://www.vice.com/en_nz/article/598wqa/captain-cook-statue-to-be-removed-from-a-sacred-gisborne-mountain (3 oct 2018-11-24, NZ news).</footnote>
worth fighting for. The Tuia 250 vision of "dual heritage, shared future" points towards a country in which all of our children and grandchildren can stand tall and proud. That's the real opportunity of October 2019 — a time to listen to all of the stories, good and bad, learn from the mistakes of the past, decide to head down a better track, and do so in style. (Gisborne Herald 8 October 2018)

The press, both national and international, reported on the debate<fnref n="34" /> NOTE 31.

> We can have a summary look at the open letters exchanged on the spot and printed in the local press (all following quotes from Gisborne Herald) see http://gisborneherald.co.nz/opinion/3666749-135/keep-the-cook-plaza-and-statue ; and more

Some readers inveighed against each other, calling each other racist. There were
several debates: whether to leave the name Poverty Bay on the maps or to make a
dual place name with a local Māori term attached to it; whether or not to debunk the
Cook statues.

One correspondent, Alain Jorion, laments the debates over renaming the bay to a
solely Māori name, arguing that there is no clear majority for either name and that,
although the result sounds strange, perhaps a dual name should be chosen (which it
eventually will be). He considered that it would be "racist" to decide to remove the
Cook statues, raised the spectre of an "apartheid regime like South Africa", stressed
that "the only solution is a balanced, intermingling of all races", and ended by renewing
his appeal: "please leave the Cook statue where it is".

I really hesitated writing about this issue as I fear being labelled a racist — which
I certainly am not.

A small number of activists are claiming racism at every chance, which is really
sad. Not very long ago we all lived in perfect harmony and got on well with one
another. I am so sad that this has changed.

There are many examples of racism all over the world. I can also give examples of
people living in Gisborne who are white, black and coloured who have first-hand
experiences of racism.

<footnote n="34">34 https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/te-manu-korihi/400279/emotions-run-high-ahead-of-tuia-250-in-gisborne;
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49958027</footnote>
One just escaped the Holocaust where about 6 million Jews were exterminated. Another has first-hand experience of apartheid in South Africa. A fishing mate's family came from Croatia, where "ethnic cleansing" saw Muslims buried in pits.

Here in Gisborne I see seeds being sown that could lead to atrocities in our paradise.

Cook's landing here in the Endeavour has certainly improved lives and standards of living. Modern discoveries over time have made life pretty good.

Gisborne District Council has not helped by doing biased surveys for a name change to historical Poverty Bay (such as at a Waitangi Day event, where it was mostly Māori in attendance). Its results were opposite to an overwhelming Gisborne Herald webpoll where people made clear they didn't want a change of name.

Now the NZ Geographic Board has supported the GDC in accepting its proposal of a dual name of Turanganui- a-Kiwa/Poverty Bay. The board said it had received 609 submissions of which one quarter preferred Turanganui- a-Kiwa and another quarter preferred just Poverty Bay, while the other half offered "ambiguous support or were neutral".

Sounds fishy to me, but perhaps a dual name is a fair outcome. [...]

Tourists appreciate Māori culture, which is wonderful. But an important part of what we are in 2019 is our history as the first landing place of Europeans in Aotearoa, where Māori and Europeans first met and where we now live together in equal numbers.

My beautiful South African "coloured" friend (of mixed parentage) commented to me about the Cook statue debate, comparing it to apartheid in South Africa.

"Sad, sad, sad," she said to me.

"The thing is, no matter what symbols you remove, you can't erase history. If the people of Gisborne allow this, be prepared for what will follow."

Also, a historian and author based in Wellington has said: "If this situation by extremists continues, they will only have themselves to blame if we become an apartheid state in the future."
The real solution of course is a balanced, intermingling of all races, creating peace, friendship and understanding. So please leave Cook's statue on the hill for all to see, including tourists who want to learn all about Tairawhiti, Turanganui-a-Kiwa, Gisborne and Poverty Bay.

(Alain Jorion, 2 October 2018)

Others (such as Lloyd Gretton) did not believe the version of a ritual welcome.

Perhaps Anne Salmond can give an example of two Māori tribes in pre-Christian times, unknown to each other, meeting unexpectedly and initially engaging in a happy wero. I also want a written record of it, not a waiata. I Googled Te Maro and couldn't find anything there.

(November 24, 2018 Lloyd Gretton)

This was supported by Colin Francis who added his view on the "great day" of Cook's arrival:

"A spear throw can hardly be commented on as a friendly gesture, and the use of a musket in legitimate defence is entirely understandable and justified. Sad as these events were, it was a great day for New Zealand when Cook arrived. The 250th anniversary is certainly an occasion for huge celebration. My Union Jack will be flying high from my terrace overlooking Auckland Harbour [...]"

Anne Salmond responded in detail a few days later in the Press.

Others (like "Pat") instead thanked Anne Salmond for encouraging "a shared future in our region in a positive way",

Kia ora Anne, thank you for writing this column. It is this kind of truth, wisdom, understanding, respect and genuine empathy that truly has the capacity to encourage a positive shared future in our region. I hope this sentiment opens closed minds and permeates those who choose to spread ignorant, bigoted views that seek to divide and mislead. Nga mihi nui.

(October 2018)

to which others (G.R. Webb) responded right after
[...] what is "shared" about the idea of debunking Cook's statues? Isn't this replacing a reliquary of closed minds with another of the same kind?

Many more letters of the same kind were printed.

An additional debate surfaced. It was the question of the right to take so-called uninhabited land, recalling the infamous "terra nullius" debate about Aboriginal Australia. A correspondent, after having had some words about the right of the English to occupy uninhabited land, returns with an apology.

I thank Dame Anne Salmond for her reply and support for truth and fact. I agree I got my facts a little wrong, and I hereby quote direct from Cook's secret Admiralty orders.

"You are also, with the consent of the natives, to take possession of convenient situations in the country in the name of the King of Great Britain; or, if you find the country uninhabited, take possession for His Majesty by setting up proper marks and inscriptions as first discoverers and possessors (Given &c the 30th of July, 1768, Ed. Hawke, Py. Brett, C. Spencer)".

Clearly Cook did not have permission from "the natives" to lay claim to any "convenient situations" (individual spots or locations). It seems to me he was directed to claim uninhabited lands, and New Zealand certainly was not. I should have been more careful in what I wrote, and for that I am grateful to Dame Anne and her expertise.

(Roger Handford, 21 August 2018)

But Lloyd Gretton (see above for his rejection of Anne Salmond's historical explanations) made a big deal of quoting these English instructions of the time, slipping from "uninhabited" to "80% uninhabited", and from "with the consent of the natives" to "not to be resisted". He wrote:

> The proportion of human inhabited land in New Zealand was very small in 1769. Even now about 80 percent of New Zealand land is uninhabited. The Admiralty's Orders were practical. Cook could take possession of areas where he did not encounter native resistance. There was no Government of New Zealand in 1769, nor one until 70 years later.
Another quote from the *Gisborne Herald* sums up the difficulty of imagining a shared future:

> "Dual heritage, shared future" - how is the shared future going to work if the country is being divided between the Crown and Māori? Unfortunately the current approach is leading to a divided future, because a cultural and economic divide is being created between the two groups.

(Vince, from Auckland)

But it is appropriate to conclude with the words by one Māori, John Marcon from district Te Kauwhata:

> Many of us carry legitimate hurts from the past when a combination of confusion, ignorance, arrogance, stupidity, even carelessness resulted in an injustice that continues to cause pain. We can decide to let that pain burn within us, that injustice demand everything from revenge to retribution. To heal that past we can recognise it for what it is, make restoration where practical, bring forgiveness and absolution to the fore - not to minimise the justifiable anger, but to prevent it from controlling our lives for the future. Listening carefully to others who have suffered, respectfully accepting their reality and seeking to bring a harmonious resolution that is satisfying as far as possible to all parties. I can't alter the fact that I live in the colonisers' world primarily, whose culture and law are largely my own. Neither can I alter the cultural heritage of Māori particularly and other peoples who have arrived since Māori. I can only appeal to our common heritage of humanitarian attitudes and trust that our common sense and mutual goals can find sufficient unity to enable a functional society, without assuming that Māori will simply assimilate into what I find culturally comfortable.

## 5. Conclusion

On 8 October 1769, Cook landed in New Zealand. Five years later, he arrived on shores that reminded him of his beloved "Caledonia" (a name used by the Romans, incidentally, for part of what is now Scotland<fnref n="35" />, and he recorded the name "New Caledonia". And there one can hear now the debate, as in Gisborne, between a

<footnote n="35">35 Name found in classical texts; historians believe that a dominant local tribe, the Caledonii, is the origin of the word; a proto-Celtic etymology is discussed: those with sturdy feet.</footnote>
dual name or a single one. In Gisborne: will the name of the bay where Cook landed be Tūranganui-a-Kiwa - Poverty-Bay? (Finally officially approved in February 2019³⁶). And will "Caledonia" be perhaps "Kanaky / New-Caledonia"?

On 8 October 2019, the commemoration took place. In the months leading up to it, care was taken to make the commemoration a celebration of travel. It had already moved from "Cook's arrival" to "the meeting of Māori and Europeans" and then to a celebration of all Pacific navigators, historical and contemporary, both Polynesian and European. Flotillas of "traditional" Polynesian boats from several countries gathered, the Tahitian Tupaia was also celebrated, etc. The British High Commissioner officially expressed her country's "regrets" for the violence of 1769; but, the BBC noted, she did not go so far as to formally apologise<fnref n="37" />.

The website dedicated to the commemoration that took place in October 2019 continues to exist in 2020. It is renamed: https://mch.govt.nz/tuia250. It announces: "Tuia te muka tangata ki uta. Weaving people together for a shared future".

On a linguistic level, linguistic division is always a formidable obstacle in schools and elsewhere, which New Caledonia knows well<fnref n="38" />. A country like Samoa has the chance to be united, but linguistic unity does not prevent social division. In Samoa, even if the debates in parliament are still all spoken and broadcast in Samoan, and every citizen follows (radio, now internet) and comments in Samoan, the local political situation has seen a socio-economic divide develop over the last thirty years. From the 1990s, Samoa has been further split each year by social class distance, in a country where a section of the political staff, having become alienated from the tradition of the founding chiefs, has monopolised the system and created a political-business oligarchy. New difficulties arose: urban and peri-urban delinquency, poor suburbs, obligation to buy food to feed oneself but insufficient monetary means, with a frightening unemployment rate and heated debates on the future of the country in relation to the choices to be made, in particular on land tenure, between leaving the "traditional" regime in

<footnote n="36">36 After petitions initiated in October 2018: https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/wellington/107554529/dual-name-tranganui-a-kiwa-poverty-bay-gets-support</footnote>

<footnote n="37">37 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49958027</footnote>

<footnote n="38">38 It is well known how the fact that the English version of the 'Treaty of Waitangi' prevailed over the Māori version enabled all the land disposessions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Tcherkezoff 2003: 103-107).</footnote>
place (where 80% of the land is 'customary') or moving towards Western-style private property (Tcherkezoff 2022b)<fnref n="39" />.

There are too many questions left unanswered. Does Samoa retain the unity of faaSamoa (language-and-culture) but, socio-economically, is less and less a united society? Will New Zealand, with an irremovable "dual heritage", even if only linguistic, which constantly forces one to weigh up the place given to English or Maori, be a society with a truly "shared future"? And what about (Kanaky-?) New Caledonia, a society still "un-achieved", as Patrice Godin said in 2018 ("Nouvelle-Calédonie 2018: la société inachevée") in the symposium referenced above (see note 1), but forced, with no possible way out, to imagine and build a "common destiny"?

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## Pacific Island universities in the past, present, and future:
the potential for a Pacific Way forward

Elisabeth Worliczek

BOKU University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna

My personal interest in the role of university education in the Pacific Islands started when I wrote my Master thesis on the cultural dimension of university students from Wallis Island (from the French Overseas Territory Wallis and Futuna) who come to the University of New Caledonia for their education (Worliczek 2007). Ever since, I have been highly interested in the role of higher education institutions in the Pacific Islands, and how they determine the individual trajectories of young people. Over the years, I have had plenty of opportunities to discuss this matter, in particular with young people from New Caledonia, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia. Furthermore, I was intrigued by numerous accounts from Pacific Islanders who were at that time either at the active stage of their professional lives, or already retired. What they all had in common was a past that included university studies overseas, and I was intrigued to listen to their life stories and to learn what made their life different from the majority of their community of origin.

It soon became clear that these intuitions had a massive impact on people's lives – for a lot of the students, obtaining a university degree meant that there was no going back into their place / village of origin, and that a degree induced a certain rupture with the rather “traditional” lifestyle of their family. This observation led to a process of reflection on the role of higher education institutions in the Pacific Islands, and how the development of universities at a national level proved to be a game changer.

This paper will focus on the overall role of universities in the Pacific Islands – not so much on individual examples, but rather on the common thread that links these institutions and that may lead towards a future where they will face similar challenges and objectives, with the potential for collaboration and synergies.
A colonized past

Universities are an imported concept from Western countries. The initial idea defines a degree ("conferred by colleges and universities to indicate the completion of a course of study or the extent of academic achievement" (Britannica 1998)) according to standardized criteria, where the relationship between teacher and student plays a secondary role and where the training can be upscaled in terms of numbers. A curriculum can be reproduced and is not inherently flexible. Disciplines are defined<fnref n="1" />, and only recently the idea of inter- or transdisciplinarity has reached global recognition in academia (Mazzocchi 2019, Lawrence & Després 2004). The definition of which disciplines (and what defines a discipline) are worth teaching at a university has its roots in a Europe of the past and is slow to evolve.

This approach is opposed to traditional ways of knowledge transmission in the Pacific Islands, where the relationship between “teacher” and “student” is crucial. For example, in New Caledonian Kanak society, knowledge is only shared when the person responsible for the transmission of knowledge feels that his / her student is ready to receive it. Thus, the personal relationship and the estimation of a student’s ability and progress is judged solely by this person (or, sometimes, a defined group of people), and cannot be reproduced or pushed into a quantifiable curriculum. Furthermore, knowledge can sometimes be considered as secret - depending of the content / skill / knowledge concerned passed on. Thus, it is not conceived for egalitarian access, but only for a small, specified audience (often related to gender or blood lineages) - see for example Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo (1992) for the Solomon Islands.

These above-mentioned aspects are only two out of a range of aspects in the transmission of knowledge that are inherently different from Western education systems – and, as specified forms of knowledge, from higher education at universities and colleges. However, ideas of learning evolve over time, and nowadays it is widely accepted that different ways of learning are appropriate for different types of knowledge.

Starting from the middle of the 20th century – when the Pacific was a sea of colonies – the idea of making university education accessible to Pacific Islanders slowly took

<footnote n="1">¹ See for example Morris (1966) for the initial recommendations of disciplines for USP.</footnote>
root, the most visible result being the foundation of USP in 1968 (for the chronological sequence of priority education and academic sectors in the 20th century, see Crocombe & Meleisea (1989)). It was first and foremost the churches that supported the idea of a local intellectual leadership – however, this leadership of course had to be developed within the religious framework. Furthermore, quite often, following a long missionary tradition, young men were sent overseas in order to obtain their education in seminaries and returned as priests. They not only brought formal training with them, but also a reinforced sense of identity, also broaching the issue of existing inequalities in the colonial contexts - as for example in the Kanak leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou. A slightly different path was taken for example by Epeli Hau'ofa, who, although born from missionary parents, chose an academic career (including studies abroad) and influenced future generations of Pacific Islanders intellectually with his writings (see for example Hau'ofa 1993).

Several colonial powers then created opportunities in particular for the training of civil servants, teachers and medical staff (Crocombe & Meleisea 1989, Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo 1992), and in the second half of the 20th century, the first engineers, doctors and scientists established themselves professionally, some of them having gone through local training (Teasdale 1993).

However, students in those days had two big challenges to overcome. First, there were no local role models. With few exceptions, they were the first generation to go down that path that was full of obstacles, requiring a lot of determination and a supportive environment. Second, pursuing a university degree automatically meant going away from home. And going away always meant leaving the country for a destination that was very distant – in most cases Australia, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom, France or some distant Pacific Island destination like for example Fiji. This not only meant physical distance in times before the internet, social media and affordable phone calls, but usually also the adaptation to a rough climate, an urban lifestyle without the support of a family network and the adaptation to a completely new culture with very different values. In addition, the networks of regular and affordable means of transport between the islands and the place of study (usually on airplanes, sometimes by boat) were just in the process of being developed, so going abroad to study could mean not seeing the family or being able to get back home for a number of years.
## In the wake of independence

The call for political independence in the Pacific Islands went hand in hand with a call for intellectual independence, as is discussed during this colloquium.

Most of the higher education institutions that operate nowadays in the Pacific Islands have existed for a long time before their establishment as recognized universities – the dates rarely coincided with their actual foundation as an education institution. They started as teachers colleges, or schools of training. Over time, their structural and institutional framework, as well as the political buy-in evolved and starting from the 1980/90s, there was a strong push towards the establishment of national universities (except for the University of the South Pacific (USP)) which was officially founded as the regional university in 1968)<fnref n="2" />. The recognition as a university however is an important step towards the professionalization of their curricula and their reputation, at a local as well as at an international level. Below is a list of the current PIURN (Pacific Islands Universities Research Network, further elaborations below) members, giving an overview over the Pacific Islands university landscape (this list is not exhaustive and does not include non-PIURN members):

<table><thead><tr><td>Country</td><td>University</td><td>established / recognised in:</td><td>Beginnings</td><td>Year of national independence</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td>University of the South Pacific (USP)</td><td>1968</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>FJ</td><td>Fiji National University (FNU)</td><td>2010</td><td></td><td>1970</td></tr><tr><td>PF</td><td>Université de la Polynésie Française (UPF)</td><td>1999</td><td>1987</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>NC</td><td>Université de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (UNC)</td><td>1999</td><td>1987</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>FJ</td><td>University of Fiji</td><td>2004</td><td></td><td>1970</td></tr><tr><td>PNG</td><td>University of Papua New Guinea</td><td>1983</td><td>1965</td><td>1975</td></tr><tr><td>PNG</td><td>Divine World University</td><td>1996</td><td></td><td>1975</td></tr><tr><td>PNG</td><td>University of Goroka (UOG)</td><td>1997</td><td>1961</td><td>1975</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote n="2">² It seems that there was a particular interest in this research topic in the 1990s, coinciding with the growth of Pacific research institutions. Since then the body of research has diminished.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 1: PIURN members foundation data</caption><tr><td>PNG</td><td>Pacific Adventist University (PAU)</td><td>1997</td><td>1983</td><td>1975</td></tr><tr><td>PNG</td><td>Papua New Guinea University of Natural Resources and Environment</td><td>1997</td><td>1965</td><td>1975</td></tr><tr><td>PNG</td><td>Papua New Guinea University of Technology</td><td>1973</td><td>1965</td><td>1975</td></tr><tr><td>WS</td><td>National University of Samoa</td><td>1984</td><td></td><td>1962</td></tr><tr><td>SI</td><td>Solomon Islands National University</td><td>2013</td><td>1984</td><td>1978</td></tr><tr><td>VU</td><td>National University of Vanuatu</td><td>2019</td><td></td><td>1980</td></tr></table>

The development of the universities happened at different speeds in different countries due to the individual circumstances, but most of them have in common that they were created out of already existing institutions that received an “upgrade” to a university in their structure and recognition – usually well after independence. This often goes hand in hand with the prestige that a national university brings.

These universities all had to face similar challenges: bridging geographical distances, attracting the right personnel for teaching, and a steady funding structure – as well as national political endorsement and the creation of a common vision that corresponded to the perceived needs of each country.

The importance of these local structures cannot be emphasized enough. For the first time, students had the opportunity to pursue their studies in their home country (flexible remote learning options emerged only later). Even when studying in one's country of origin, there was still the requirement to live in a university dorm or find an arrangement for staying with relatives living in the respective city, but the distances to bridge were nothing compared to going overseas, while staying in a familiar cultural setting with the possibility of returning home frequently. Another advantage was that the student body mainly consisted of students from the same country, going
through similar experiences and constituting future local networks. However, Pacific Island universities have also always attracted students from other Islands, with the USP being the hotspot for students from almost all Pacific Island nations. These networks can be powerful resources for the future – as Teasdale (1993) stated, in the 1990s there was already a number of political leaders and senior public servants from across the Pacific that lived, worked and played together at USP as students. These shared experiences utterly shape relationships in a professional context, patterns of friendship and affiliation are visible at regional gatherings and have the potential to resolve conflict. The massive potential of remote learning will be discussed below; however, remote learning deprives students from the creation of individual networks, which are a major source of power and influence.

## The present day

Nowadays, most of these universities are well-established in the region, with the University of Vanuatu being the last one created in 2019, filling a gap and thus also giving Ni-Vanuatu students the possibility to pursue their studies locally. There is now a plethora of possible studies available locally across the Pacific, offering new possibilities to prospective students. Usually, these universities are more accessible financially<fnref n="3" />, and through family networks a lot of students have the possibility of living with relatives of the extended family, thus also cutting the costs. Previously, most students relied on scholarships from the host countries or universities; the Pacific Island universities are thus a step further towards the democratization of education. Most local universities also offer scholarships to prospective students.

A number of Pacific Island universities pursue a multi-campus strategy, which offers multiple advantages: distribution of infrastructure, economic benefits and specialization across the country or multiple islands; and, in the case of USP, even across countries. USP, having a special status among all Pacific Island Universities, is particularly interesting for countries that do not have the financial means (or critical number of potential students) to run a university by themselves; being integrated into this large regional structure allows for the students to benefit from an established and recognized educational system within the framework of an internationally recognized

<footnote n="3">³ An analysis of the exact financial requirements is yet to be made. Also, the various scholarship systems are worth a systematic analysis.</footnote>
institution. This arrangement is particularly interesting for the Micronesian nations, where, so far, only one national university exists: Guam.

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Location of USP Campuses (USP, Google Earth)</figcaption></figure>

## Universities with a special status

Consideration should be given to two universities in the French<fnref n="4" /> Pacific: The University of New Caledonia and the University of French Polynesia. Initially founded together in 1987 as “the French University of the Pacific”, they were constitutionally split into two independent universities in 1999, developing their own curricula. However, they are still part of the French higher education system, and their diplomas are accredited by the French Ministry of Higher Education. Their ties remain tight, as can be seen in the joint “Pacific doctoral school”. This sets them apart from other universities, but there may be other examples that are remainders of the past, which translate into a privileged collaboration nowadays. As for the students at these universities, being a French citizen

<footnote n="4">⁴ “French” meaning here in this context: French speaking (= teaching) at university and having a special status within the French Republic.</footnote>
also gives them access to the French universities; a possibility that is actively pursued
and supported by numerous scholarships, in particular for MA and PhD programs.

The University of Hawai'i also stands apart: As a union of three universities and ten colleges, it is integrated into US academia, thus following the rules and procedures of a university system that is globally recognized and where competitive high-performance research is conducted.

The previous examples show how the colonial past as well as the current status of dependency frame how university systems work locally. France as well as the USA set the rules; this can be considered as an advantage or a downside, depending on the context. However, within this framework, local curricula have evolved and have gained a relatively prominent status, just like in the independent countries' universities.

The University of Guam is not part of PIURN, hence no focus in this contribution. Cenderawasih University in Jayapura, Papua Province in Indonesia would also call for special attention in this section, as it is located on the Melanesian Island of New Guinea, and even more so because it is one of the oldest institutions in the region. However, given the current political circumstances, it has not been part of this analysis.

## What is the Pacific Way in academia?

Scanning through the curricula of the various universities, there is an emphasis on economy, finance, tourism, STEM, and teaching<fnref n="5" />, with a shift towards applied studies since the 1980s. This seems to be a common thread that responds to local requirements, and has historical roots (Teasdale 1993). However, almost all universities also offer at least one program that focuses on local cultures and / or local languages. This is an achievement, given that in the colonial context, in a lot of Pacific Island countries / territories local language and / or culture were for a long time commonly considered as not desirable to pursue, or at least the opposite of what education and qualification means – up until the middle of the 20th century. So, integrating these elements into university curricula is a milestone, it even seems like a logical step in the evolution of Pacific Island nations. Indeed, universities in New Zealand<fnref n="6" /> have been the forerunner

<footnote n="5">5 This analysis is not completed yet and has to be researched in detail.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6 I am fully aware that given the size of the Pacific Islander populations in New Zealand and in Australia, as well as the complex university structure (partly focusing on Pacific Island issues) in these two countries, a thorough research on subjects taught in these two countries would be necessary.</footnote>
in this regard, not only proposing language and culture studies, but also going a step further with, for example, Pacific Health studies at Auckland or Otago University – a subject that is also researched and taught at the University of Hawai'i.

However, attention should be given not only to the curricula for students, but also to the implications of culture and norms in Pacific Island societies that play an important role in the academic development of young people. Other than the fact that this way of transmitting knowledge is quite different compared to the indigenous systems of education (Scaglion 2015), there are various challenges that have to be overcome. This includes the fact that the language at university (usually English or French) is not the students' first language, and that the role of seniority, respect and peer groups can be quite distinct in Pacific Island societies and differ from the dominating Western understanding of student life (Uehara et al. 2017, Worliczek 2007).

## Research

So far, this paper had a strong focus on the curricula offered to the students. However, the mere definition of a university also includes research. So, what do these universities offer in terms of research? In the past, scientific research on Pacific matters was done in the Pacific RIM or in Europe. Nowadays, there is a strong move towards studies that are conceived and implemented locally, a tendency that is more and more emphasized by international research funders, development agencies and by the nations themselves where research takes place. In some countries, research permits / visa have become a requirement in order to know and to filter what kind of research is undertaken by foreigners. This brings Pacific universities in an advantageous position; in particular USP has taken on a very important role as a regional partner on an international scale, despite recurring tensions concerning the university itself.

However, Pacific Island universities also suffer from a brain drain. Scientists trained abroad often get good offers to pursue their careers in the host country, whereas qualified positions in the home country are sometimes rare. International travel from the islands is even more complicated and expensive when it comes to scientific conferences, and access to subscription journals is often too expensive for the smaller universities, as are high-tech equipment and analyses for laboratories. These obstacles can be attenuated by partnerships which often rely on personal contacts, personal investment, and a knowledge of the funding landscape. However, the
local advantages can prime over the constraints – when research is done locally (in particular in the fields of culture or language, but also other fields like biology or local finance). This is however not true for all disciplines, and very often a choice of being a scientist at a small Pacific Island university is against an international scientific career (which still seems to be the gold standard in academia<fnref n="7" />). Nevertheless, the covid 19 pandemic has shaken up global academia; virtual collaboration has become very common among consortium members, and future digitalization may open up even new opportunities.

This may be a turn of the tide for Pacific universities, where the geographical distance, as well as the costs associated with it, may become less important, thus putting the local competences on the international map.

## Digitalization, pandemic and remote work: Game changers?

USP was a trailblazer in the region with the establishment of USPNet in 1973, a satellite-communication network that allowed for distance and flexible learning; by 2008, more than half of USP's students made use of this offer, which has been improved ever since (Duncan & McMaster 2008).

The covid 19 pandemic has accelerated digitalization in the Pacific and elsewhere. In a way, it has prepared Pacific academia a new level playing field, where the above-mentioned perceived disadvantages of the Pacific Island universities diminish. Both research and teaching are concerned: online meetings have become very common over the last few years, and virtual collaboration is the new gold standard – in particular for researchers who are already well connected (which, in turn, is easier to do when for example having (post)graduate experience from overseas).

But also teaching is adapting: universities in Guam and in French Polynesia are currently exploring options for opening small branches of their universities spread across the main islands of their archipelagos, usually in the form of one or two rooms attached to a secondary education institution. These mini-campuses (which are run by a teaching assistant on site and where courses take place online) facilitate access even more and offer the opportunity to follow a degree at least for one or two years not only in one's own country, but very likely on the main atoll of an archipelago!

<footnote n="7">⁷ This statement may open a discussion about values, evaluation and standards of excellence in international academia.</footnote>
This scenario was unimaginable even a few years back. High-speed internet is being
rolled out across the Pacific, and the combination of pandemic and digitalization
have pushed for new developments, resulting in unforeseeable impacts. Students are
quick to adapt, seemingly faster than appropriate teaching materials, and the younger
generation even more so (Reddy & Sharma 2018). Access to devices and connection
varies depending on the location, but the potential for online modes of content delivery
(and also for remote collaborative research) cannot be overestimated. (Johnson et al.
2021) The covid 19 pandemic has pushed for new ways in academia, putting Pacific
universities in an advantageous situation that almost eradicates the major pitfall of the
past, which were the big geographical distances.

Is this really the Pacific Way?

The previous lines are an analysis of the current functioning of global academia, and
an attempt to place Pacific universities in this landscape. However, this leaves the
potential for “a Pacific Way” underexposed.

Pacific Studies in particular challenge academia and call for its decolonization, and
these Pacific voices have been articulate for quite some time (e.g. Thaman 2003).
Indeed, all Pacific Island universities were founded on the premise of a Western mode of
knowledge transmission and with predetermined norms about intellectual leadership.
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the call for intellectual independence
could hence lead us to question the status quo of academia in a lot of ways: Is this
division into (old) disciplines really useful – nowadays and in particular in a Pacific
context? What role should Pacific Island universities fulfill? Is being part of the global
competition for funding and excellence really the ultimate goal? Is this even desirable?
What does this mean for future generations? What about other knowledge systems
that are based on tradition – should they be integrated into the current system of
university education? Is there a way to become independent from external funding?
What are the skills that should be taught to young Pacific Islanders and by whom? What
exactly is the worth of diplomas and degrees? Do we want them to be recognized
internationally and if so, by whom? Who are the privileged partners?

These questions may sound provocative in some ways, but they are worth asking. The
Pacific Island universities have the advantage of being reasonably young and thus less
caught in traditional university structures. Even though some of them struggle with more
basic issues like funding, financial misconduct or political influence, it may be worth
to pursue this intellectual exercise once more – give it an update and reflect on the
last decades. The number of alumni from these universities is growing, and they have
already shaped one generation of future leaders. It may be a good moment to revisit
the fundamental values and to reevaluate the direction of the region's development
in higher education.

This exercise may be done by one university alone; but in the sense of a Pacific way it
may be worth to sit down on a mat and explore the issue together.

Collaboration pathways

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: members of PIURN (PIURN website)</figcaption></figure>

Attempts for more regional collaboration and synergies in the tertiary sector are not new.
In the 1990s, the Consortium on Pacific Education (COPE) was the first network of this
kind and was established at a time where old forms of externally imposed regionalism
gave way to pragmatic networks (Packer 1993). The next notable wave of activity
in this regard took place with PACE-Net (plus)<fnref n="8" /> under the European Framework Program 7 (2010-2016), with one of the results being the creation of The Pacific Islands Universities Research Network<fnref n="9" /> (PIURN), founded in 2014. These networks do not seem to question the underlying assumptions of global academia, but they highlight the existing need for collaboration and the creation of a Pacific-specific network. It could be argued that this is due to a void that USP does not fill as a regional integrating force (Crossley & Louisy 1994) or that USP and these initiatives (which USP partly participates in) create a lively landscape of actors that collaborate in different contexts. In any case, these initiatives rely on funding - an effort that can definitely be upscaled. An evaluation of PIURN (Pirodeau 2017) showed that among the researchers of member universities, there is a perceived lack of dynamics in collaboration activities. Indeed, in addition to the obstacles mentioned above, differences in legal frameworks, objectives and language barriers add to the structural issue of physical distance. Furthermore, there is quite often a dedicated focus on local issues that binds a lot of resources and daily research routine does not always encourage collaboration abroad. Finally, lack of knowledge of collaboration opportunities also hinders progress in international collaboration. However, based on my experience in international research collaboration, this is a challenge for research networks in general - usually to be solved with a strategic decision to invest in human resources to keep a network alive and active. Local political buy-in as well as the network of CROP agencies in the region can play in favour of the universities; the latter should reinforce their role as a steppingstone for the region.

The last years have not been a smooth ride for the Pacific Islands; a shift in the global power landscape, a pandemic, a growing interest in the region in particular for resources and for strategic reasons, instability in the region's leading bodies – all these factors increase the importance of a common strategy in the university sector, for the sake of future generations. Robust local higher education and locally lead quality research are the best tools to face the upcoming challenges; even more so if they follow a common vision.

<footnote n="8">8 PACE-Net: Pacific-Europe Network for Science, Technology and Innovation (pacenet.plus)</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9 PIURN - Pacific Islands Universities Research Network</footnote>
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# Is Micronesia Free Under the Weight of the Compact of Free Association?

Gonzaga Puas

Professor at Pacific Islands University (Guam)

Director of the Micronesian Institute of Research and Development (MIRAD)

This paper will discuss the underlying issues as experienced by the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) under the Compact of Free Association (Compact). It will do so by reviewing the economic, social, constitutional, and political debate affecting its development and thus future-outlook. It will then present its answer in relation to the topical question: Is the FSM free under the weight of the Compact of Free Association between the US and the FSM?

## The Compact of Free Association

The Compact is a bilateral treaty between the US and FSM arising from shared historical experiences post WWII. It was first implemented in 1986, renegotiated in 2001, and extended to 2023. The FSM is currently negotiating the Compact to secure more financial assistance from the US to sustain itself post 2023. The scaling down of American financial assistance to the FSM may open up opportunities for other external powers to extend their influence in the region. China, some scholars argued, will fill the economic gaps that may be left in the event the US will not provide a suitable financial package to meet the growing needs of FSM economically.

The FSM is therefore going through an intense economic and political transition in preparation for the reduction of Compact funds post 2023. Since the implementation of the Compact in 1986, the US has provided over US$2 billion dollars to the FSM Government in return for granting the US power to deny access to the islands to third parties, ostensibly to preserve regional security, but in reality, a strategic denial to potential enemies of US national interests. (*The Compact of Free Association Between the Federated States of Micronesia and The United States of America, 2003, 93–101*). A
trust fund was set up for the FSM under the Compact, supposedly to replace Compact funds after 2023. However, it is uncertain whether the proceeds from the trust fund will be enough to sustain the FSM. (Mori, *State of the Nation Address*, 2012, 4-5).

There is speculation that China is likely to pay more attention to the FSM post 2023 due to its own interests in the region. China has been assisting the FSM in many areas such as the building of infrastructure, educational scholarships, training for FSM citizens to learn the Chinese language and social system, concessional loans, and small-scale grants for community development. (Weidong, *Interview*, 2011). For the FSM, the key concern will be preserving and extending its autonomy in these circumstances. The Compact has been the major source of the FSM Government's income since 1986. It is often referred to as being a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is seen as a saviour in that it prevents the FSM from bleeding to death from economic collapse, while on the other hand, it is seen as handicapping the FSM's progress both internationally and domestically by creating dependency on Compact monies. Despite this, Micronesians are aware of the fact that reliance on someone else's money is not economically viable long term. The nation is embarking on a balancing act to ensure its future economic survival. (Illon, *Interview*, 2011; Lorin Robert, *Interview*, 2015).

The supporters of the amended Compact of 2003 have welcomed US oversight of the distribution of funds, with the hope that this will stop the misspending of funds earmarked for essential sectors such as the private sector, education, health and public infrastructure. (Micronesian Foun, "The Compact is a Done Deal - Our Leadership Should Start Thinking About Economic Development", http://www.micronesiaforum.org/; Naich, James, *Sustaining the Spirit of the Compact Partnership*, 5-6). The Joint Economic Management Compact Office (JEMCO) has conducted audits of the Compact funds and, on occasion, withheld certain funds, pending their satisfaction that the necessary checks and balances have been put in place by the FSM Government. With this new auditing measure, both sides are studying their next move before the year 2023. It remains uncertain as to whether the Compact will be extended for a third time. If so for how long?

Optimists perceive the Compact as a means of maintaining the important connection between the US and FSM. They feel the FSM should not 'cut its nose off to spite its face' even though the US has been unwilling to compromise on many occasions.
The Compact, they argue, is a safety net as it has provided the financial means to enable the building of the nation's political and economic capacity. ("The Compact is a Done Deal - Our Leadership Should Start Thinking About Economic Development", http://www.micronesiaforum.org/;

Naich, James, Sustaining the Spirit of the Compact Partnership, pp. 5-6). The US's presence in the FSM has brought stability to the nation and regional security. Moreover, it has allowed Micronesians to live, work and seek education in America—a good opportunity to release the population pressure through emigration, an additional benefit of which has been remittances. (ibid)

The FSM is weighing its options and ability to tap into alternative sources of funding to replace the Compact funds. Many observers have predicted that the FSM is heading towards economic hardship in the years ahead, with a reduced living standard compared to that currently enjoyed under the Compact. Many Micronesians have expressed concerns as to what will happen after 2023. Some want to revert back to traditional subsistence using the sea and land from which they have been sustained historically. Others have expressed the desire to look for employment overseas or to join their families who have already established themselves in the US. (Naich, *Op.cit*, 5-6; Elizabeth Grieco, The Federated States of Micronesia: The Push to Migrate, July, 2003, 10). The challenge is whether the FSM will survive politically without economic assistance from the US.

## Political and Economic Challenges

The US, after WWII under the UN trusteeship agreement, was tasked with developing the islands but failed to carry out its mandate. After Micronesia pushed for a new political status, the US poured millions of dollars into Micronesia to compensate for years of neglect. (Hanlon, David, 2012, 90-91). This sudden injection of money resulted in the creation of the classic model of economic dependency. This model characterises Micronesians as being incapable of fending for themselves due to a lack of economic infrastructure, a social system that hinders capitalism and an unfriendly legal system that discourages foreign investment necessary to stimulate economic activities to promote the trickle-down effect. (Asian Development Bank, *Federated States of Micronesia*
Development Framework 2012. Looking to the Future: A Foundation for Discussion at the FSM Development Partners Forum, 4-7). The problem with this analysis is that it applies a neoclassical economic model, which is better suited to big economies, not Micronesia. It is therefore not surprising that the trickle-down effect has not been very effective in Micronesia.

The Micronesian social system, which is the backbone of Micronesian survivability, continues to be misunderstood by outside economists. It should be remembered that the implantation of any economic philosophy that requires the dismantling of the central pillar of indigenous life—communal and kinship support—is doomed to fail. The nature of the Micronesian economic system as inherently opposed to wholesale capitalism should be subject to further studies to ensure the development of a suitable economic model to sustain continuity.

Micronesians have tried to grapple with what development entails ever since the traditional social system came into contact with the colonial economic system. Theories of economic development are far removed from the realities of day-to-day life for most Micronesians. (Sitn, Peter, Interview; Samo, Marcus, Interview, March-December 2020). What they know is that their subsistence lifestyle provides sustenance and keeps the extended family together. By comparison, Western economic development seems abstract and unrelated to the life they have been accustomed to since their ancestors made the islands their home. Those that do not move into the wage economy and remit money are often on the margins of this system and still rely, in part, on clanship for support. The Western mode of economic production based on mass commercial consumerism is not suitable for the FSM's circumstances due to a lack of appropriate technology. To Micronesians, development is about protecting and sustaining their subsistence way of life and safeguarding their traditional practices with small-scale technology that may complement their lifestyle.

Foreign Relations

Foreign relation is one of the key indicators of FSM's success as it will define the extent to which Micronesia interacts with the outside world and the benefits that flow from such interactions. For example, opportunities for capacity building provided by other
governments, particularly in the areas of technology and economic development
assistance, need to be maintained. However, Micronesia will only deepen its relations
with countries empathetic to Micronesian causes such as the impact of climate
change on the islands, respect for the FSM's EEZ and airspace, and a commitment to
the principle of non-interference in the FSM's internal political affairs.

FSM's relation with the outside world is dictated by its Constitution. It says, the FSM extend(s) to all nations what it seeks from each: peace, friendship, cooperation, and love in our common humanity. This policy is deliberate in its design for the purpose of portraying an image of neutrality to promote FSM's own interests globally. The desire is not to depend primarily on US charity, but to diversify its diplomatic relations with other countries for development purposes. It is acutely aware of the interdependency between nations and therefore makes the effort to increase its diplomatic relations globally.

At this stage, there are still some outstanding legal issues that need to be resolved before
the FSM can conduct itself effectively and independently on the international scene.
The ongoing debate between US and FSM leaders over the issue of the security of the
US in the Asia-Pacific region under the terms of the Compact will remain a challenge.
(Naich, Op.Cit., 1-6). However, it needs to be noted that in recent years, the primacy
of the FSM's Constitution over the Compact has not been fully articulated by FSM
officials when the Compact is at issue. Further, the FSM Congress at times usurps the
function of the executive branch in terms of foreign relations. For example, Congress
was involved in the renegotiation of the Compact, which was seen as a responsibility
of the executive branch. The function of the executive branch is expressed in Article
X, Section 2 (a) and (b), which stipulates that the President is 'to faithfully execute and
implement the provisions of (the) Constitution and all national laws' and 'to conduct
foreign affairs and the national defence in accordance with national law'. (The
Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, 1979).

Conversely, it has been argued that the above sections contradict provisions of the
Compact. For example, Article II, Section 123(a) of the Compact states:

in recognition of the authority and responsibility of the Government of the United
States under Title Three (Defence and Security Relations), the Government of ...
the Federated States of Micronesia shall consult, in the conduct of their foreign
affairs, with the Government of the United States. (Compact of Free Association Between the Federated States of Micronesia and the United States of America, 1986).

Section 123(a) is being used by the US to assert its right to veto decisions by the FSM Government in relation to the conduct of its foreign affairs if the decisions are not seen to be in the interests of the US. This is an area of significant debate and tension between the two governments.

The Compact is a treaty delegating major authority over the FSM's defence to another country, the US, which has been permitted under the Constitution. It is within this legal context that the US asserts the primacy of the Compact over the Constitution in particular the US's right to veto decisions by the FSM Government in relation to third parties that are perceived to threaten US security. However, one can argue that the US cannot blindly rely on the Compact to pursue its objectives at the expense of Micronesian sovereignty and national interests. This is because the Constitution can limit the power of the Compact if the Compact exceeds the power bestowed upon it by the Constitution. Should there be a need to terminate the Compact, Article XIV, Section 1 may be invoked. (The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, Article XI, Section 4). The FSM Foreign Affairs Department will have to monitor its duties under the Constitution and escalate issues when any violation arises to ensure Micronesians stand firm on the issue of sovereignty.

## The EEZ

The FSM's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) remains the biggest single hope for the nation's future, particularly at the end of many Compact fundings post 2023. The EEZ covers an area of 2,978,000 square kilometres. (D'Arcy, Paul, "The Lawless Ocean? Voluntary Coppliance Regme and OffShore Resources Exploiation in the Pacific in Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies V.1, No.2 2014 , 3) . It has significant wealth in marine biota and likely mineral resources under and on its seabed. Peter Wilson, a fisheries expert whose consultancy work includes work for the governments of Papua New Guinea and the former TTPI, conducted a study of the tuna industry worldwide. He estimated that approximately 60 per cent of the total tuna harvest in the world comes from the western Pacific nation states of Palau, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. (Wilson, Peter, "A Tuna Industry in
*Micronesia?*, 66, Micronesian Counselor, April 2007, 3-10). The FSM contributes 28 per cent of this harvest. The study noted that the main beneficiaries of the fishery harvests were Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, the US, South Korea and China.

Like many Pacific Island countries, the FSM faces problems of illegal fishing in its EEZ by foreign fishing vessels. To combat this problem, the FSM has joined with the Marshall Islands and Palau to pool their resources to effectively patrol their waters. The Australian Government has provided patrol ships and been involved in the ongoing training of maritime surveillance activities with these three nations. The fishing industry is the main FSM resource capable of replacing some of the financial shortcomings in the Compact. (Sitan, *The Development of the Tuna Industries*, 17-19).

Tuna fishery licensing fees are being adopted, but those fees need to be increased substantially to turn sufficient profit for the nation. It is argued that there should be a correlation between the license fees and market value of the fish caught in the FSM's EEZ. That is because foreign fishing companies haul in hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of fish caught in the Pacific Islands' EEZs yet only a fraction of their profits are received by the island states. D'Arcy conservatively estimated that in 1998, Pacific Island nations received approximately US$60 million in fishing access fees from fleets that declare an annual catch sale price of approximately US$1.3-1.9 billion. (D'Arcy, "*The Lawless Ocean?*", pp. 3-4). This shortfall between actual and potential income for the host country is staggering.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III, 1982) established the legal regimes that protect the rights of coastal nations, like Micronesia, from unscrupulous illegal harvesters. (Ibid) The regimes cover the exploitation of economic resources within the designated EEZ, which covers 200 nautical miles (370.4 kilometres) from the shores of the islands that form the outer limit of the archipelagos. The economic resources include fishing and extraction of mineral resources both on and beneath the ocean floor, bearing in mind the sustainability of the resources. (Ibid). Notwithstanding these international legal principles, illegal fishing by foreign fleets continues. The FSM needs to seek new international partnerships for the purposes of expanding its capacity to build its future economic and social programs.
## Conclusion

In discussing the issues above, the question remains: Is Micronesia free under the weight of the Compact of Free Association? This paper argues that the FSM is neither free nor politically imprisoned. It has adapted well historically and has managed itself impressively under four colonial powers. Maintaining the fluidity of the traditional systems is the foundation for Micronesians' future survival. It is an evolving system that has been at the heart of Micronesian history. It has adapted, transformed, and rearticulated itself, even under the stresses caused by ongoing engagement with the outside world and the current tides of globalisation.

Successive waves of colonial regimes attempted to undermine the traditional systems by inserting their own brands of development and different regimes of governance, all of which were largely unsuccessful. Micronesian countermeasures were adopted through the process of adaptation, which arrested alien practices that could not be assimilated into its indigenous cultural practices. That is, Micronesians only accepted the essential elements of colonialism that ensured indigenous continuity. The current relatively new Micronesian Government has the task of ensuring that its modern legal, political, social, and economic institutions perpetuate relevant traditional historical doctrines that define how Micronesia's future should be shaped.

## Bibliography

* Asian Development Bank, *Federated States of Micronesia Development Framework 2012. Looking to the Future: A Foundation for Discussion at the FSM Development Partners Forum*, 2012, http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cobp-fsm-2014-2016-oth-01.pdf

* Compact of Free Association Between the Federated States of Micronesia and The United States of America*, Palikir, Pohnpei.

* Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia*, Pohnpei, Palikir, 1979.

* D'Arcy, Paul, "The Lawless Ocean? Voluntary Coppliance Regime and Offshore Resources Exploiation in the Pacific in Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies V.1, No.2 2014*, 3.
Elizabeth Grieco, *The Federated States of Micronesia: The "Push" to Migrate*, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/federated-states-micronesia-push-migrate

Hanlon, David, *Remaking Micronesia: Discourses Over Developent in a Pacific Island Territory, 19444-1982*, University of Hawaii, 1988.

Illon, Epel, Advisor to the President of the FSM President Emmanuel Mori, *Interview, Palikir, Pohnpei*.

Sitan, Peter, Chief Execuiv Officer, The FSM Fisheries, *Interview, Weno, Chuuk, 2020*.

Lorin Robert, Secretary of F SM Foreing Affairs, *Interview, Palikir, Pohnpei*.

Micronesia Forum, "The Compat is a Done Deal - Our Leadership Should Start Thinking About Economic Development", <http://www.micronesiaforum.org/>.

Mori, Emmanuel, *State of the Nation Address ot the Congress of Micronesia 2012*, Palikir, Pohnpei.

Naich, James, *Sustaining the Spirit of the Compact Partnership*, Wasigton DC, USA, (Unpubished Paper).

Samo, Marcus, *Interview, Secretary of FSM Health, Koloi, Pohnpei, March 2020*.

Sitan, Peter, President of the FSM Fisheries, Weno, Chuuk, February 2020.

Sitan, Peter, *Commercial Fisheries in the Federated States of Micronesia*, http://www.fsmgov.org/nfc/

Weidong, Zhang, China Ambassador to the FSM, *Interview, Palikir, Pohnpei 2011*.

Wilson, Peter, "A Tuna Industry in Micronesia?", 66, in *Micronesian Counselor*, Micronesia Semiar, Kolonia, Pohnpei.
# The Implications of 21st Century Geopolitical Competition for the “Pacific Way”

## Dr. Iati Iati (PhD)

Senior Lecturer – Politics and International Relations
Pacific Security Fellow – Centre for Strategic Studies
Victoria University of Wellington

The “Pacific Way” can mean many things, but in the international relations of the Pacific, it refers to respect for Pacific island countries’ (PICs) sovereignty. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara used it in this way when defending Fiji against Australia’s and New Zealand’s paternalistic and condemnatory response to the 1986 coups. In the face of Australia’s and New Zealand’s “lambasting” of Fiji, the PICs remained silent as Fiji tried to solve its internal problems. The Melanesian countries: Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, went further and publicly stated their preference for protecting Fiji’s sovereignty (Dobell 2008). Thus, the PICs demonstrated, particularly to Australia and New Zealand, what the Pacific Way meant in the international relations of the region: respecting, protecting, and promoting their sovereignty and autonomy. This dimension of the Pacific Way has often been undermined by the actions of the region’s traditional benefactors. However, the emergence of China as a key player in regional geopolitics changes this. This paper examines the implications of this geopolitical competition on the international relations dimension of the Pacific way.

Since the late 1980s, Western aid donors like Australia and New Zealand have, in different ways, undermined the sovereignty and autonomy of PICs. Bilaterally, their “aid conditionality” has controlled to an extent what PICs could do, largely in favour of donor interests. In regionalism, the same pattern of influence emerged. The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), originally intended to decolonize regionalism, has arguably become an instrument through which Australia and New Zealand exercise disproportionate influence in regional affairs. From the independence period to the 2000s, relations between PICs and former colonial powers have, in many respects, become neo-colonial – the latter exercised control over the former. However, China’s emergence
as a major player, in the early 2000s changed this, giving PICs options they previously
did not enjoy. China balances the influence of the West in the Pacific, giving PICs the
opportunity to strengthen their voice in regional and international affairs, manifest most
recently in policies such as the Blue Pacific narrative and the Boe Declaration. This paper
critically analyses the impact of China's rise on regional geopolitical affairs, focusing
on how this has affected the sovereignty and autonomy of PICs, not only in terms of
offering alternative models and development pathways, but in counterbalancing the
disproportionate influence exercised by Western donors.

China and the Pacific

China first established diplomatic ties in the Pacific in 1975, with Samoa and Fiji. China's presence and influence has increased significantly. China was initially interested in the Pacific in order to pursue the One-China policy. After it assumed control of the China seat in the United Nations, from Taiwan, it sought diplomatic recognition from the PICs to counter Taiwan's efforts to do the same. PICs, for their part, welcomed China as an option for their development aspirations. The metropolitan (Western) countries, despite initially being ambivalent and even opposed to China's presence in the region, later welcomed it as a counterbalance to the possibility of increased Soviet presence in the Pacific. China's Pacific interests have since expanded, as well as its presence and influence.

By the turn of the century, Western scholars expressed concern that China would
challenge Western countries' dominance of the Pacific, and that it might become the
regional hegemon. In a seminal piece outlining China's potential threat to Western
interests, Henderson and Reilley (2003) contended that in the post-Cold War period,
the United States and its allies left a "political vacuum" that China was occupying. By
increasing its diplomatic presence and financial assistance, China was becoming a
strategic competitor to the United States, and that its goal was to become "a major
Asia-Pacific power" (Henderson and Reilley 2003:94). For their part, the PICs welcomed
China as a donor and development partner.

By the late 2010s, media and governments in the region were also deploying a narrative
that can best be described as the China threat. The claims involved considerable fear-
mongering China was militarizing the region and deliberately creating debt distress
for PICs to ultimately control them through financial obligations, otherwise known
as “debt-traps”. Despite no credible evidence of China building let alone desiring
military infrastructure in the Pacific, the narrative was adopted and deployed by
Western government policy makers. Unverified claims that China had approached
Vanuatu about building a permanent military presence (Wroe 2018) was followed by
New Zealand Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, publicly declaring that her country was
opposed to the “militarisation of the Pacific” (Walters 2018). Oddly, her statement
was made despite her own uncertainty about the validity of the report. Moreover,
her statement was made despite the Vanuatu government’s denials of having an
interest in “any sort of military base” (George 2018). By the start of 2022, China has not
built a permanent military base or presence in Vanuatu, or the Pacific for that matter.
Nevertheless, the narratives continued being deployed.

In May 2022, media and academics leaked an alleged draft security agreement
between the Solomon Islands government and China. The Solomon Islands government
later signed a security agreement with China, and while this has not been made public
by the time of this writing, it is understood to be similar to the draft. The response to
both, particularly by Western media, academics, and government was similar to their
response to the Vanuatu allegations. Prime Minister Ardern once again deployed the
narrative of not wanting the Pacific militarized. Given the context, the message was
clear: the security deal was a possible gateway to the militarization of the Pacific by
China, and New Zealand opposed it. Similar narratives were deployed by Australia
and the United States. Then Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, said a military
base in the Solomon Islands would be their “red line” (Hitch 2022). Not to be outdone,
then Defence minister, Peter Dutton seemed to channel something from the movie
John Wick 3: Parabellum, stating, “The only way you can preserve peace is to prepare
for war…” (Thompson 2022).

The Western allies' response was ironic and hypocritical. In February 2020, Russia started a "special military operation" in the Ukraine under the premise that the latter's inclusion in NATO presented an unacceptable threat. Russia's red line was crossed. Australia and other Western countries criticized Russia's position and action and defended Ukraine's sovereign right to enter any military treaty they wished. Their response to the Solomon Island - China agreement showed they did not believe that PICs could exercise their sovereignty in the same way. Furthermore, it demonstrated that in relation to the
China-US competition, New Zealand would move closer to its Western allies. Moreover, it demonstrated the extent of Western countries' opposition to China extending its Pacific presence beyond aid, trade, and economic development. Western countries, in particular the United States, Australia, and New Zealand are increasingly united against China with the intention of containing China's presence and influence in the Pacific, even if this undermines the sovereignty of the PICs.

## Sovereignty and Autonomy of Pacific Island Countries

Many PICs gained independence in the 1960s and 1970, starting with Samoa in 1962. There are three types of states in the Pacific: independent countries, countries in free association, and dependencies. Countries in free association are independent countries that have traded some aspects of their sovereignty or autonomy to their former colonizer, normally for financial benefits. The Cook Islands and Niue are in free association with New Zealand. The Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau are in free association with the United States. Dependencies are de facto colonies that have never gained independence – the metropole has jurisdiction in these countries. France has three dependencies: French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna. The United States has three dependencies in the Pacific: Guam, the Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. These are also known as United States territories – they have a measure of internal self-governance but are subject to United States federal law. The other PICs are independent, and have, at least, de jure sovereign status. Whether they have de facto sovereignty is debatable.

Whether full sovereignty was obtained at independence is questionable. Constitutional conventions determined the political systems adopted at independence. Although these conventions might have followed democratic processes, certain outcomes were predetermined. Ghai correctly notes that the constitutions were “essentially imposed from above”, (Ghai 1988:3) because anything other than a Western “democratic” model, either based on the Westminster model or the Presidential system, was not an option. Given this background, it is doubtful that PICs had full control over their future. Herr makes a useful distinction between two dimensions of sovereignty: domestically, the nation-state must be in control of their affairs; internationally it must have freedom from unwanted foreign influence and intervention (Herr 1988:183). It is doubtful that PICs, even the independent ones, have achieved either.
The post-independence period has been marked by issues of neo-colonialism both nationally and regionally. Neo-colonialism refers to a situation where ostensibly sovereign countries are controlled in whole or in part by external actors. The constitution making process and its outcomes ensured that colonial powers continued their influence into the independence period. And colonial powers influenced the process for their geopolitical pursuits, even if this meant subordinating PICs. This was evident in Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands, where the United States sought constitutional arrangements that were designed specifically to accommodate their strategic and foreign interests (Ghai 1988:27). The United States signed the Compacts of Free Association with these countries to ensure "indefinite U.S. authority for defense and security matters" and denial of access to potential foreign adversaries of the United States to this area. In turn, these countries receive favourable immigration rights to the United States, as well as significant financial assistance. Geopolitically, the Compacts and the territories give the United States immeasurable control over Micronesia; it has the right to conduct any activities and operations required for the exercise of its authority and responsibility (Grossman 2019:20). Where direct neo-colonial influence was not evident, indirect influence probably was. Ghai notes that the "constitutions are so structured as to transfer authority to an educated, Westernized elite, who speak a common language with the departing colonialists and think and play within frameworks common to both" (Ghai 1988:11). He also notes that the constitutions adopted at independence "can be regarded as setting the stage for neo-colonialism, nurturing new forms of dependency" (Ghai 1988:49) The Micronesian cases demonstrate one type of neo-colonialism.

Neo-colonialism is also evident in the use of aid to unduly influence PICs. Immediately beset with the challenge of economic development, newly independent PICs became heavily dependent on aid donors, many of which were the former colonial powers. Donors, seizing the opportunity to take advantage of countries desperate for financial assistance imposed criteria and conditions for their aid in what became known as "aid conditionality". Recipient countries that did not comply with donor wishes and demands risked losing the aid they became dependent on. In extreme cases, donors blatantly flouted international rules in the Pacific to exploit these countries. This was exemplified in a 1982 case involving American fishing boats.
The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was created in 1979 to help PICs regulate fishing in their 200-mile exclusive economic zones, as set out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). American tuna-boat owners regularly flouted the regulations. When the Solomon Islands arrested an American boat in June 1984, the United States government threatened it with sanctions. The Solomon Islands remained steadfast in its position and eventually forced the Reagan administration to rein in the illegal activity of American fishing boats operating in the Pacific (Herr 1988:188). The Solomon Islands case was probably helped by probing USSR interests in the region at that time. Although the episode ended well for the Solomon Islands, it exposed a long-running issue of exploitation and threats that former colonial powers placed on the PICs. Other countries, such as Papua New Guinea and Kiribati, were not as fortunate as the Solomon Islands, and subsequently entertained closer "fishing" ties with the USSR (Herr 1988:188-9). In the 2022 Pacific Island Forum, United States Vice President, Kamala Harris, announced additional funding for the FFA (Dziedzic 2022). This may or may not smooth over the history of troubled relations, but indicates that aid is important in regulating post-colonial relations between Western powers and PICs.

In addition to or because of neo-colonialism, it is not uncommon for Western powers to treat PICs condescendingly. This was highlighted in New Zealand's response to a security agreement between the Solomon Islands and China. In March 2022, media reports surfaced about a leaked draft security agreement between the two countries that was circulating on social media (Tuilaepa-Taylor 2022). Both the Australian and New Zealand governments publicly voiced their opposition to a potential deal, arguing that it was unnecessary and that they and the "Pacific family" was able to provide the necessary security for the Solomon Islands (Tuilaepa-Taylor 2022). However, common sense suggests that the Solomon Islands understand their security situation better than Australia, New Zealand or other countries in the "Pacific family". Consequently, the Solomon Islands is best placed to formulate policies to address their security needs. Australia and New Zealand did not see it this way, although both would defend to the hilt their own sovereign right to make such determinations. Their condescending and hypocritical treatment of PICs was on full display.

New Zealand has strengthened its defence and security cooperation with China over the past decade. In fact, New Zealand actively seeks closer defence cooperation
with China, and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). In 2014, General Fan Changlong, Vice Chairman of China's Central Military Commission, visited New Zealand in a move that strengthened the defence links between the two countries. Defence links had been developing over the previous decade and included "reciprocal naval visits" (CSS 2014). Changlong's visit culminated in the issuance of a joint statement with New Zealand's Defence Minister, Jonathan Coleman, in which both agreed that the development of defence ties was important to their bilateral relationship (Sinclair 2014). In 2015, New Zealand's Defence Minister, Gerry Brownlee, not only sought "further cooperation" with the PLA in the areas of Humanitarian and Assistance and Disaster Relief, but also security and stability operations in the Pacific (Brownlee 2015). In 2019, New Zealand's Defence Minister, Ron Mark and China's Minister of National Defence, General Wei Fenghe signed a Memorandum of Arrangement Concerning Defence Cooperation. It strengthened their relationship in dealing with key security issues in the Pacific (Mark 2019). Strangely, New Zealand has no problems advancing cooperation and agreements with China but finds the Solomon Islands efforts to shore up its security with China's help unacceptable.

Australia has a similar approach to New Zealand. It also has a history of security and defence cooperation with China. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) have a policing partnership that stretches back to 1999, when the AFP formally established an office in Beijing. Since then, Australian, and Chinese law enforcement agencies have worked collectively in fighting transnational crime (Australia Federal Police 2019). In 1997, the Australia-China Defence Strategic Dialogue was first held and since then has become an annual fixture. The Dialogue brings together top officials from Australia's Department of Defence and the PLA to discuss security matters in the Asia-Pacific region (Australian Government 2019). These partnerships are intended to meet the security needs of both countries. If Australia considers working with China an important part of their security set-up, it is curious why they oppose the Solomon Islands doing the same.

To be sure, there are differences between the Solomon Islands – China security agreement and security and defence relations between New Zealand and Australia, and China. Nevertheless, the raison d'être in all cases is the same – all countries have security needs that their respective agreements address. More importantly, each country understands their respective security needs better than others. This fact is
lost on Australia and New Zealand who consistently claim that they know what the Solomon Islands security needs are, better than the Solomon Islands itself. In response to the signing of the Solomon Islands – China security agreement, New Zealand's Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, stated "We see no need for this agreement. We are concerned about the militarisation of the Pacific and we continue to call on the Solomons to work with the Pacific with any concerns around their security that they may have" (Ensor 2022). Ardern's message was supported by New Zealand's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nanaia Mahuta, who stated that the agreement was "both unwelcome and unnecessary" (Ensor 2022; Radio New Zealand 2022b). Presuming that the deal might lead to the establishment of a naval base in the Solomon Islands, the Australian government said, that this would be a "red line" not only for itself, but also for the United States (McHugh 2022). After explicitly trying to interfere with the Solomon Islands sovereign right to make its own security policies, ironically, Australia Deputy Prime Minister Barnaby Joyce warned the Solomon Islands that it was putting its sovereignty at risk by signing the agreement with China (Hitch 2022).

In the true spirit of neo-colonialism, Australia and New Zealand have shown that the rules and expectations which they apply to themselves, and other Western countries do not apply equally to PICs. In September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States signed an agreement, known as the Australia United Kingdom United States (AUKUS) Alliance for the supply of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. If there were reasons for concern about the militarization of the Pacific, AUKUS contains plenty. Apart from the nuclear-powered submarine dimension, it was announced months later that AUKUS would also involve hypersonic weapons (Sabbagh and Hurst 2022). Unlike the Solomon Islands – China draft, when AUKUS was first announced New Zealand received it in a positive light. With reference to it, Ardern welcomed the "increased engagement of the UK and the US" in the region (Ensor 2021). When the missile dimension was later added, the New Zealand government was silent. The fears Ardern later expressed in relation to the militarization of the Pacific via the Solomon Islands – China draft were completely absent from her response to AUKUS. But this should not be surprising given that the militarization of the region by Western countries, such as the 2021 deal between the United States and the Federal States of Micronesia to build a military base in the latter (Ligaiula 2021; Cagurangan 2021) is never seen in
that light. New Zealand and Australia appear to have lost none of their paternalism in
the treatment of PICs.

Is regionalism decolonized?

Neo-colonialism also pervades regionalism. The Pacific Island Forum (PIF) has been a
conduit through which Australia and New Zealand exercise disproportionate influence
over the regional agenda. The financial support provided by Australia and to a lesser
extent New Zealand means they are best placed to "shape regionalism" (Bryant-
Tokalau and Frazer 2006:2). Australia and New Zealand would probably argue that all
members, including themselves, have enjoyed equal standing and influence. There
is a different view. As the Cold War entered its final stages, one long time analyst of
Pacific politics noted, "It can be argued that during the 1980s regionalism has become
an increasingly important instrument of the global interests of metropolitan powers.
Pressures on island leaders to conform to Western perceptions of security have been
filtered through the regional framework, lubricated by trade and other economic
assistance" (Tarte 1989:194). In neo-realist terms, it is not unreasonable to expect that
Australia's and New Zealand's influence in the PIF should be anything other than
commensurate with the money they provide. The problem is that the PICs created the
PIF with the intention of decolonizing regionalism, which meant limiting membership
to the PICs: Australia and New Zealand initially participated only as "observers" (Tarte
1989:184). The intention is well and truly dead. If, in the 1980s, neo-colonialism was
starting to flower in the PIF, it would blossom further in the succeeding decades.

In the 1990s Australia and New Zealand promoted policies such as the Pacific Plan,
which built on various declarations and PIF commitments that were predominantly
sponsored by Australia and New Zealand, and ultimately served their interests more
than those of PICs (Huffer 2006:158). Scholars of Pacific regionalism have noted this.
Writing in 2006, Bryant-Tokalau and Frazer note, "What has not changed at all is the
dominant role played by the two metropolitan states, Australia and New Zealand,
in setting the regional agenda and continuing to shape the region's response to
globalisation and international security concerns" (Bryant-Tokalau and Frazer 2006:175).
The politics of regionalism in the 2010s supports this idea. In 2015, Fijian Prime Minister,
Frank Bainimarama, refused to attend the PIF because of the "undue influence" of
Australia and New Zealand (Fox 2015). He also called for the two countries to be
removed from the PIF. In response, then New Zealand Prime Minister, John Key, signified that the relationship between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand, and the PICs on the other, was one of donor-recipient: "A Pacific Forum without Australia and New Zealand would be an interesting thing I suppose, in that those leaders would be able to talk about things. ... But exactly where would they get the money to do anything, and the answer is nowhere" (Marwick 2015). The suggestion is that Australia and New Zealand run the show. As if to confirm the donor-recipient model relationship between the two sides, then Samoan Prime Minister, Tuilaepa Malielegaoi stated, ""The Forum is made up of 14 very poor nations and then these two nations who fund the plans by these 14 very poor nations. ... Now John Key is right. He has hit the mark because that's why New Zealand and Australia came in, they fund our stuff"" (Lesa 2015). The hope that the PIF would be the vehicle for decolonizing regionalism apparently has not materialized, and it is arguable that the PIF continues to be a key cog in a regional infrastructure that maintains the hegemony of Australia and New Zealand.

## China and the decolonization of the Pacific

There is a popular view, particularly in the West, that China's rise will lead to the spread of authoritarianism globally. At the White House-organized Summit for Democracy, in December 2021, President Biden stated that the "push back on authoritarianism" was one of the goals (Biden 2021). Although he did not mention any country, it was clear before the Summit that the United States was targeting China and Russia (neither of whom were invited to participate) (Williams 2021; Briggs 2021; Magnier 2021; The Economic Times 2021). China got the message and responded. On 4 December 2021, China's State council Information Office released a white paper titled, "China: Democracy that Works" (China's State Council Information Office 2021). The following day, it put out a report titled, "The State of Democracy in the United States", which discussed how the United States "admitted" involvement in "regime changes" in other countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China 2021). These were supplemented by other defensive actions against what China viewed as (another) United States provocation (Ohlberg 2021; Moritsugu 2021). Whether China is authoritarian is a debate that will linger in Western circles, but, ironically, the Biden White House is coming under similar criticisms (Faria 2021; Editorial Board 2022; Kornick 2021; Raleigh 2022). On the question of whether China is exporting "authoritarianism" – there is no evidence of this happening in the Pacific.
Nevertheless, the narrative that China is exporting “authoritarianism” has been deployed to the Pacific. John Coyne, of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), for example argues that if Chinese police have a greater role in the Pacific, they will help export authoritarian practices to the region. Ironically, his view is largely based on how police in colonial times (including Australian police) conducted themselves. In what might be a case of projecting one’s own experience or guilt onto another, he states, “The police of the day [colonial times] were, for the most part, focused on dominating communities and being accountable to the regime and not the people. This sort of policing has strong similarities to the role and accountability of China’s police today” (Coyne 2022). The Australian government has identified rising authoritarianism in the Pacific as a problem (Starting 2020). Since Kiribati switched its allegiance back to China, from Taiwan, in 2019, it is alleged to be moving towards authoritarianism (Needham 2022b). Interestingly, Australia itself has been accused of being authoritarian (Starting 2020), as well as the PICs in their response to the Covid pandemic (Robie 2020). Nevertheless, China is clearly the focus of accusations about authoritarianism in the region. There is no evidence to support these.

What is clear is that the attraction of China is primarily economic. It offers hope to a region that is desperate for solutions to development problems for which traditional benefactors have been unable to or refused to address. Despite having an abundance of natural resources, including gold, copper, fisheries, and oil, the Pacific has perennially featured in the worst global development statistics. Despite or because of their efforts, traditional benefactors have had little success in generating economic development in the Pacific. Resource exploitation in colonial and independence periods has created many of the development problems in the Pacific. Endemic corruption has also proved to be a significant problem. In the 1990s, bilateral donors and multilateral development organizations highlighted issues with “good governance” or “poor governance”, whatever the case may be. Many of these, however, were and are not uncommon in newly independent countries, particularly those that are largely creatures of Western colonialism for whom the idea and practice of the nation-state status is new. This does not excuse many of the governance issues in PICs, such as corruption, but perspective is important. It should be remembered that PICs have been expected to achieve within the space of approximately 60 years what the colonial states took centuries to adopt, like democracy underpinned by full suffrage and sustainable economic
development. China's BRI offers a new approach to address development problems and PICs are increasingly convinced of its potential to better their economic situations. Ten PICs have signed BRI Memorandums of Understanding.

However, China is also attractive because it offers liberation for PICs from the neo-colonial structures that prevail in the region. One renowned scholar of Pacific geopolitics observes that China's increasing presence and influence in the Pacific challenges Western hegemony and colonial structures of dominance. In 2006, Wesley-Smith noted that despite the end of colonialism, Western powers continue to control the region. Countries like Australia, for example, acted as if they had the right, if not the duty, "to speak for the inhabitants of this region, to represent them to themselves and to others, to lead, and to manage them" (Wesley-Smith 2007:27). He also noted that China disturbed this situation in favour of the Pacific: "At least for the moment, China appears to broaden the menu of options for these island states, whose leaders are well accustomed to operating in a world controlled by great powers". Wesley-Smith's analysis is important in light of donor-engineered policies like the Pacific plan, and more recently Australia's, New Zealand's, and the United States' response to the Solomon Islands – China agreement. These show that colonial states' paternalist attitude towards PICs persists. But the fact that this agreement was signed despite their protests shows that PICs are no longer bound to do their bidding, and China has played a significant part in giving PICs this freedom.

Ironically, it appears that the neo-colonial approach by Western countries has helped China to increase its influence in the Pacific. In March 2018, New Zealand's Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Winston Peters, announced the Pacific Reset, a new foreign policy approach to the Pacific. The Reset was intended to regain New Zealand's influence in the region, apparently from China (Iati 2021). In what was an indirect admission of how New Zealand has lost this influence, the Reset was predicated on changing New Zealand's approach to the Pacific from one of "donor/recipient", to "mature political partnerships" (Peters 2018a). The fact that New Zealand was moving to a mature partnership model indicates that this relationship did not exist previously, even after more than 100 years of engagement. It could be argued that the "donor/recipient" model is a polite way of saying neo-colonialism, or at the very least that New Zealand was just one of the countries that funds the Pacific's stuff.
Wesley-Smith's analysis of the regional architecture and who it does and does not favour is revealing in relation to the Solomon Islands – China agreement. First, if the Solomon Islands needed additional security, particularly after the riots in Honiara in November 2021, it is intriguing that it did not seek this through a security agreement with New Zealand, similar to the one it has with Australia (Australian Government 2017). New Zealand was an integral part of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), and along with Australia deployed troops to address the November riots (New Zealand Herald 2021; Radio New Zealand 2021a). Yet, faced with the prospect of further unrest, (Radio New Zealand 2021b) the Solomon Islands did not seek a stronger security agreement with New Zealand. New Zealand, along with military and police from other PICs, deployed its troops under what is known as the Pacific-led Solomon Islands International Assistance Force. Why the Solomon Islands chose to do this is unclear. It might have come out of suspicion about Western powers' interference in local politics, something which the Solomon Islands Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, alluded to (Rising and McGuirk 2021). More importantly, it shows that China is seen as a viable security partner in the Pacific. This is a big step up from China's traditional role as aid donor and trade partner. If stronger security measures are required for China's Belt and Road Initiative, particularly in countries where these services are limited, (Gordon et al 2020) the increase of PICs signing up to the BRI could lead to more security arrangements with China.

Second, and relatedly, China's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, visited ten PICs in May 2022, and clearly indicated that China is interested in a stronger security role in the Pacific. Before the visit, a "draft communique and five-year action plan" was apparently sent by Beijing to its Pacific partners. According to Reuters, which claimed to have cited the relevant documents, the communique and plan covered "security and trade" between China and Pacific Islands and would "represent a shift in Beijing's focus from bilateral relationships to dealing with the Pacific on a multilateral basis" (Needham 2022a). The security dimension was extensive, covering things such as cyber security and protection of national security. Although a multilateral deal was not reached, the deal is not off the table, and Wang's visit was ultimately a success. China signed over 50 bilateral deals with various PICs covering matters from economics to Covid recovery and to climate change, the latter being the number one existential threat to the region according to the Boe Declaration Manch 2022). While Wang did
not get the region-wide deal signed, (Shepherd 2022; Radio New Zealand 2022a) the 50-plus bilateral agreements put China – Pacific relations on a stronger platform than where it was previously. Clearly, the Pacific is welcoming China's widening agenda in the region and the options this provides.

In response, Western countries are desperately trying to retain their hegemonic position, going so far as to deploy unfounded allegations that potentially could undermine PICs development and autonomy. In 2019 Kiribati switched back its diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China. The West was, typically, unsettled and a fear-mongering campaign soon followed. Kiribati plans to "reclaim land from lagoons" was weaved into a narrative of 'destroying coral reefs' and 'China's strategic interests in the Pacific', and in particular the prospect of 'Chinese military bases or initially dual-use facilities' that would give China control over prime tuna fishing grounds as well as a presence near United States military bases (Raaymakers 2020). In 2021, Kiribati moved to open up its marine reserve, the Phoenix Islands Protected Area. Again, Western media, academics and governments fanned the flames of China fears in relation to this decision with claims that China was the instigator and that it was probably done for strategic interests. Other narratives included China's intentions to re-develop infrastructure on Kanton island (one of 21 populated islands in Kiribati) for military purposes (Goldenziel 2022). All this largely ignored or downplayed repeated explanations by the Kiribati government that the decisions were made for economic development purposes (Dreaver 2021). Kiribati's views and explanations were submerged beneath the China threat narratives.

Kiribati's views, however, appear to be founded in fact while those deployed by the West are based on speculation. The fact that Kiribati is one of two countries worldwide that has consistently been touted as most at risk from rising sea levels and has a GDP per capita ranking of 209 out of 229 countries (this includes territories) (Central Intelligence Agency, United States Government) could explain Kiribati's land reclamation plans. Years before Kiribati and China re-established diplomatic ties, the Kiribati government made it clear that it needed economic development. In the Kiribati Development Plan 2016-2019, the government stated that its second key priority area was economic growth and poverty reduction (Government of Kiribati (A) – Publication date not provided). Furthermore, this relied on tourism, and the
development of Kanton Island airport would be a key part of revitalising this industry. In fact, in the Kiribati National Tourism Action Plan 2009-2014, (Government of Kiribati (C) – Publication date not provided) the government stated that Kanton Airport would be a key piece of infrastructure and a “cornerstone of tourism development”. In the Kiribati National Fisheries Policy 2013-2025, (Government of Kiribati (B) – Publication date not provided) the government stated, “Kiribati has few options for economic growth apart from its marine resources”, and its tuna fisheries resources were central to this. Kiribati’s development plans, including that of Kanton, were in the pipeline at least a decade before it re-established ties with China.

The Western allies' (those operating in the Pacific) treatment of Kiribati's efforts to develop is symptomatic of how they treat PICs in general. Policies intended to better PICs are interpreted and treated in the light of what is best for Western interests. When the Solomon Islands diplomatically recognized China, then United States Vice President, Mike Pence cancelled plans to meet with Prime Minister Sogavare. A senior United States government official is reported to have explained the cancellation in the following terms: "the decision by the Solomon Islands to change its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China has consequences. They're hurting a historically strong relationship by doing this." If one stopped reading there, one might be forgiven for thinking he was referring to the Solomon Islands – Taiwan relationship. That was not what he meant. He continued, "It's a setback, and it's prioritizing short-term gain with China over long-term commitment with the U.S" (Rampton 2019) When Western allies are not framing Pacific-China relations in terms of their strategic interests, they fall back on the paternalistic strategy. This was best summed up by former Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Dame Meg Taylor: "it is often difficult to engage in meaningful dialogue over relations with China without being labelled "pro-China" or perhaps even as naïve" (Taylor 2019). One might argue that arguments in favour of China's increasing presence would fall victim to similar accusations. This ignores the probability that these decisions are made to enhance PICs economic development and secure their sovereignty. Importantly, these arguments could influence the policy and security narrative in the region to the extent that they hurt the countries that need development and respect for their sovereignty the most.
## Conclusion

Ever since the Pacific Way was coined by Fiji's first Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, it has taken on various meanings and become the subject of much debate about how it defines and shapes the Pacific. Key values associated with it are mutual respect, inclusivity, consultation, consensus, and compromise. In the international relations of the Pacific, these are manifest in the principle of sovereignty and the goal of economic development. Mutual respect, consultation and consensus require countries to engage each other as sovereign equals and not as donors and recipients. The latter requires a measure of economic development. PICs have struggled to realise the sovereignty and autonomy they legally gained at independence and have struggled to develop economically.

The geopolitical competition that has developed in the Pacific, between Australia, New Zealand and their Western allies on the one hand, and China on the other presents both advantages and disadvantages in terms of the Pacific countries' ability to gain more autonomy and increase their prospects for economic development. Despite or because of Western countries' political and economic policies in the region, PICs remain disproportionally influenced by the former's interests and policies. The current regional situation, both formal and informal, favours Western countries' interests more than those of the PICs. China's increasing presence unsettles this balance or more accurately, imbalance. Both bilaterally and multilaterally, China is giving PICs options. Moreover, it presents PICs with new options and routes to become more politically and economically independent. Unfortunately, traditional benefactors appear determined to counter these, but in doing so are undermining the hope embodied in concepts like the Pacific Way.
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