numerous sectors from common competition law while retaining entire sectors of the
economy under administrative control (price controls, quotas, occupational licences,
etc.).

60 - Progressive adaptation to local conditions should imply a progressivity of sanctions, from simple warnings up to huge financial penalties. Considering the Pacific Way could involve initially seeking prevention through informing economic agents and ensuring companies comply with the law, then favouring negotiated procedures, such as accepting commitments and other codes of conduct, if it does not involve favouritism for friendly companies or, conversely, coercion to accept behaviours favourable to government bodies. Finally, sanctions can be imposed, showing increasing severity as the rules are known and integrated. This is what happened in many countries, for instance in France where coercive law was preceded by a long period of acclimatization of thirty years through the intervention of a merely advisory commission.<fnref n="28" />

61 - This approach aligns with the teachings of jurists and economists on the necessary gradual implementation of the new law by the independent authority overseeing its application. However, it carries the risk of the law never being applied in its strictest form. Therefore, it is up to the competition authority officials to effectively manage the interaction between social norms and the new law, finding the right path toward complete law enforcement within the framework of maximum acceptance by the citizens.

d. Importance of soft law (guidelines, etc.)

62 – As Pape’s article suggests (Pape, note 37, p. 459): “It would be useful to further explore how soft law instruments could be flexibly applied as a first step in introducing international competition rules without initially resorting to a rigid and detailed codification. Soft law, or flexible law devoid of binding force, which plays an increasingly important role in competition law (Idot, 2007), also triggers a more participatory and inclusive legislative process, with greater legitimacy, especially because less formalism allows for greater openness of the legislative process to other stakeholders within civil society, such as non-governmental organizations, etc.”.

<footnote n="28">28 French antitrust law started by prohibiting anticompetitive agreements (1953), then abuses of dominance much later (1977), the third pillar only appearing when coercive law was introduced in 1986.</footnote>
63 - Therefore, Pacific competition authorities must follow the example of authorities with extensive experience in issuing guidelines and other informational materials. As an example, the Polynesian Competition Authority (APC) published in 2020 a guide on agreements for local businesses based on real-life examples in which entrepreneurs can recognize themselves. This guide, drafted by the APC's "general rapporteur", considers the most common situations, from union meetings to price agreements, including public procurement allocations.

### 3. Appropriation of rules by local actors

64 - Ultimately, the success of antitrust law, in the PICs as elsewhere, requires genuine adherence from local actors, as they gradually become convinced that these rules are an essential means of overall improvement.

65 -. We have seen that the antitrust rules are defined in terms broad enough to be easily and effectively adapted to all local situations. As noted by Geradin and Petit (2003): "It may be simpler to choose a pre-existing model of competition rules (such as European law), and consider, at the implementation level, the local circumstances of the economic system in question. Indeed, competition rules are generally drafted quite broadly and leave significant discretion at the implementation level." Therefore, more than the rules themselves, it is the authority responsible for their application that will determine the quality of the necessary adherence of the economic agents concerned.

#### a. Trust in the supervisory authority

66 - Public adherence primarily relies on trust in the institution responsible for enforcing the law and in the individuals who compose it. From this perspective, independence from the government and economic actors, as well as the impartiality of those responsible for law enforcement, are fundamental elements. Progress in these two areas still seems significant in the Pacific countries and territories. Impartiality requires either that professional judges decide cases after investigations and dossier instructions within the administration, or that the specialized agency strictly separates the investigative branch from the decision-making body. This implies, in terms of appointments of members of the board and recruitment of agents, choices of qualified and honest
individuals. In any circumstance, the government must keep as far away as possible
from the internal workings of the institution.

67. In countries and territories like the small Pacific islands, the dual requirement for competence in competition law on one hand, and the absence of ties with the government and businesses on the other hand, explain the temptation to seek individuals from outside. However, while this might be justified for one or two officials of the institution (for example president and head of the investigative service in a French-style system), it can only be a limited and temporary solution. In any case, entrusting decision-making responsibilities to foreign individuals carries risks. The quality of advice and decisions of the authority requires a thorough understanding of the local economy, a factor in the adherence of all actors to competition policy. From this perspective, recruiting agents and appointing board members among qualified indigenous individuals is a necessity for enhancing the integration of rules by local actors (provided that these individuals are trained in a modern and effective approach to antitrust law as opposed to an out-dated, sometimes political, or populist approach to the same law).

68. Knowledge of the terrain allows those authority figures to avoid overly mechanical transpositions of decisions established in vastly different contexts. Such a lack of discernment in applying rules to local conditions risks becoming a major obstacle to understanding new rules and their acceptance by the parties concerned.

b. Information, transparency, and authority accountability

69 -. The integration of competition rules and adherence to the system requires that laws and the authority's opinions and decisions be widely disseminated, presented, and discussed. During the introduction phases of a new law, it is normal for the public to have, at best, an approximate knowledge. Therefore, the authority must make efforts in information dissemination and pedagogy to familiarize the public with the rules. It must also accept debates surrounding these rules and the decisions it makes.

70. The opinions and decisions of authorities are generally published on their websites. The facts and especially the reasons that led to the opinion or decision are not always clearly explained or, on the contrary, risk being lost in esoteric language, nearly inaccessible to most interested individuals. In the French system as transposed in the
Pacific (New-Caledonia and French Polynesia), readers may benefit from formalism imported from the metropolis after years of practice. But this methodological importation risks reinforcing an easy tendency to copy-paste decisions established in different contexts, as mentioned above.

71. A competition authority can only perfectly accomplish its mission if it seizes all opportunities to explain its actions, not only to economic actors (government, public authorities in general, businesses, consumer organizations) but more broadly to the entire population. It is important that it assumes this educational role by presenting (for example, on its website) the details of cases handled, showing how competition law was applied and played a beneficial role for the entire community. In this way, competition law can gain public acceptance (World Bank, 2019).

72. The dissemination of information about the law and the authority's opinions and decisions, as well as transparency about its functioning and activity, fully serve the integration of rules by local actors only if this mass of information is analysed, discussed, and even criticized in specialist forums, by legal experts, economists, and within debate platforms such as meetings of employers' unions or consumer associations. The evolution of antitrust laws in advanced countries has greatly benefited from these forums supported by universities, major international organizations, and large law and consulting firms. Small island states and territories have more difficulties establishing these types of debates. However, understanding the system and the adherence of economic agents depend on sustained efforts in this field. It is the responsibility, for example, of elected officials in democratic institutions in small Pacific Island countries to take up these issues and organize training sessions and debates on competition-related matters.

## Conclusion

74 – The observation of the weak performance in the development of competition law in small Pacific Island countries is consistent with its recent introduction in different territories. The same challenge must be faced by all countries that need to ensure the transition from an administered economy to a market economy. Substantive rules do not seem to be the issue as long as they are limited to the three (or even two)
pillars of competition law in the strictest sense and do not blur the message by adding other contradictory measures (price controls) or those far from its objective, which is the proper functioning of the market, as is the case with the law regulating contracts between suppliers and distributors (the so-called "small", or "false", competition law in France) and worse still with the commercial development controls.

75 – The room for improvement lies in the modalities of applying this new law. Competition, as a progress vector, and the rules that promote it, can only be accepted by acquiring the deep adherence of local populations. To achieve this, instilling a spirit of competition requires a progressive and consistent application of the rules. Time is essential: if the learning time is long, the procedural time must be as short as possible so that any potential sanctions have a genuinely educational and deterrent effect (interest of non-contestation procedures). Time goes hand in hand with adaptation in terms of the action to be taken. Negotiated procedures allow consideration of the efforts that companies are willing to make to evolve, and if sanctions are necessary, it is probably more effective in the long term to start with moderate (or even symbolic) penalties and gradually move towards greater severity. Finally, the application of rules must be entrusted to an institution that is impeccable in terms of its independence and ready to tirelessly explain its positions. This universal requirement is even more prevalent in territories where the multiplicity of networks, due to the narrowness of the Pacific islands, too often undermines public trust. Perhaps therein lies the Pacific Way of competition law.
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# The Pacific Way and French Polynesia

## Sémir AL WARDI

Professor of Political Science
University of French Polynesia - GDI.

The concept of the *Pacific Way*, introduced by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, was taken up in numerous speeches and conferences by the entire political class of Fiji: a veritable Oceanian *mantra*. Initially, the idea was to include all communities, regardless of creed, race, opinion or culture, in the nascent Fijian nation, with the sole objective of the general interest in governance "without rancour or guile". It has to be said that Fiji was divided between Indians and indigenous peoples. This initial approach to the *Pacific Way* does not really seem to apply to French Polynesia, where the Polynesian community forms the vast majority of the population, speaks its own languages and elects its own leaders.

On the other hand, there is a double definition, which follows on from the first, given by the ethnologist Michel Panoff, a definition taken up by Elise Huffer (1991:10): it relates to "an attachment to a consensual approach to internal affairs and the desire to resolve regional problems by remaining within the community in the face of possible intervention by non-Oceania powers" (Panoff 1991: 3). However, Epeli Hau'ofa (2014: 10, note) explains that "the proliferation of violent conflicts in Oceania (riots and clashes in New Caledonia, coups d'état in Fiji, the Bougainville crisis and Papua New Guinea, the dockers' strike in Papeete in 1987) has undermined the Pacific Way philosophy".

Thus, by detailing this definition, we will first deal with the impossible consensus in the internal order in French Polynesia, and sometimes in Oceania, in other words demonstrate that the consensual approach advocated by the *Pacific Way* for internal affairs is a utopia (1). In regional affairs, we are going to talk about the deep-rooted desire of Polynesians and, more broadly, of Oceanians, to be among themselves,
a desire which seems, despite being a strong desire, to be a myth (II). Indeed, the presence of regional powers and even major world powers, much to the chagrin of the Oceanians, remains unavoidable in Oceanian affairs. In any case, Epeli Hau'ofa has noted that the "unifying ideology" of the Pacific Way has been shattered: "the Pacific Way was a superficial ideology that was swept away in the 1980s by the rising tide of regional disunity... (in particular) by the introduction of neo-Marxism which, in essence, was fundamentally hostile to any form of regionalism" (Hau'ofa id.: 8). We can add a historical explanation raised by a former Polynesian Minister of Culture, Heremoana Maamaatuaiatapu: it was the nuclear tests carried out by all the world powers (the United States, the United Kingdom and France) in the 1960s that "divided the Oceanians through no fault of their own"<fnref n="1" />. So there are several reasons to deconstruct the myth.

So, will the 21st century be more favourable to the return of this narrative? The problems of global warming, the rise of the oceans, the plundering of marine resources and waste, the confrontations between the powers, etc. all require a common strategy. Indeed, the states and territories of Oceania cannot face these challenges alone. In fact, since 2019, the Pacific Islands Forum has required that meetings with outside powers should only be attended by all members. It is better to unite to confront or cooperate with the world. The former President of French Polynesia, Edouard Fritch, explains the need to "unite and remain solid in the face of those greater than ourselves"<fnref n="2" />. This attitude is in keeping with the Pacific Way. But geostrategic pressures are mounting, and the Pacific Way narrative is being challenged by grand strategies such as the New Silk Roads and the Indo-Pacific. The time has come for island states to choose between these two geostrategies: didn't President Macron say: "woe betide the small, woe betide the isolated, woe betide those who will suffer the influences and incursions of hegemonic powers who will come looking for their fish, their technologies and their economic resources"<fnref n="3" /> (III). Similarly, these new geostrategic realities oblige France to maintain its presence in the region; it is a categorical imperative.

## I) Internal order: the consensual approach - a utopia?

Democracy can be interpreted in two ways, one by the majority and the other by consensus. Let's take the example of Arend Lijphart's definitions:

<footnote n="1">1 Interview with the former Minister of Culture in French Polynesia, Heremoana Maamaatuaiatapu, on 7 October 2022.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 Interview with the former President of French Polynesia, Edouard Fritch, October 2022</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3 Speech by the President of the Republic in Papeete, 28 July 2021. « www.Elysee.fr «</footnote>
The difference between these two types of democracy can be described schematically as the difference between the concentration of power in the hands of a small majority on the one hand, as opposed to the sharing, dispersion and limitation of power on the other, which can take different forms. Another similar difference is that the system of majoritarian democracy is exclusive, competitive and conflictual, whereas the system of consensus democracy is characterised by inclusion, negotiation and compromise. (Lijphart 2014/1, 21:13).

The first type, which characterises today's democracies, is seen as a system for resolving the inevitable conflicts that can arise between the groups that make up a society by letting the majority rule. The second is a consensual system where the conversion of all to the common interest should lead to unanimity. This latter definition would correspond more closely to the definition of the *Pacific Way*.

In French Polynesia, it is the first definition that prevails: the assembly is elected by direct universal suffrage and it is from this assembly that the executive is elected. Elections are held under a proportional representation system with a strong majority bonus that excludes small parties from the redistribution of seats. The fundamental rules of democracy are not contested, as they are in much of Oceania. We are in a democracy that recognises conflicts of opinion and the clash of ideas in a pronounced split between autonomists and independentists. When there is unanimity, it even becomes suspect. It is therefore a small number of representatives who express the will of the majority. There is therefore rarely consensus, or not any. Gaston Flosse, the autonomist leader and President of French Polynesia for many years, says of his governance that the Pacific Way in the internal order "is not my style". He points out that he does make proposals and initiate discussions on a subject, asking for opinions, but at the end of the process, he alone will make the decision: "I make the decision and we go for it... it's not very Pacific Way", he admits. This is an inevitable trend: as the President of French Polynesia is the keystone of the institutions and holds all the powers (the ministers receive their powers by delegation), he can govern and decide alone.

Still far from consensus, there are the political instabilities that have been seen in French Polynesia, but also in so many states in Oceania. Indeed, throughout the region, we find political lives made up of chronic instability, political nomadism and unfinished

<footnote n="4">4 Interview with Gaston Flosse, former President of French Polynesia, on 10 October 2022.</footnote>
mandates (Agniel 2008: 4, 127, 135 et ff.). Regardless of the type of colonisation or
political and legal system, political instability is often the norm. There is no shortage
of examples in the Cook Islands, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands,
Tuvalu<fnref n="5" />, Tonga<fnref n="6" />, etc. In all these islands, elections are just one moment among many,
because a party that wins an election can lose power fairly quickly if there are no
electoral deadlines (Al Wardi 2008). A great deal is invested in the elections, but as
soon as they are over, the various opposition political parties are constantly on the
lookout for “nomads” to regain power (ibid.). We even have the example in Samoa
of an elected woman Prime Minister who was refused access to Parliament to take
the oath of office<fnref n="7" />. In French Polynesia, there have been 15 governments since 2004,
i.e. in 18 years. Admittedly, the voting system has changed, making it impossible to
overthrow a government, but this does not mean that there is consensus. Political life
in French Polynesia is made up of autonomists and independentists, but also of several
branches of autonomists and independentists, who are genuinely opposed to each
other and do not seek to reach a consensus.

In Oceania as a whole, Guy Agniel argues that we are also witnessing the decline of the Pacific Way, because the “Oceanian consensus no longer holds sway”. And he explains:

> these days, rival “clans” are fighting for power, not to implement a programme governed by reason and the well-being of the population, but rather to obtain the attributes of power and the benefits that go with it... with the new rulers having to “return the favour” to those who brought them to power through unbridled clientelism<fnref n="8" />.

And yet there is an “Oceanian way” of doing politics. Talks can be endless in Oceania. To take just one example, discussions within the FLNKS in New Caledonia are lengthy because the aim is to reach a consensus on every point raised. But this way of doing

<footnote n="5">⁵ In Tuvalu, after several months of political crisis, a motion of no confidence overthrew Willy Telavi on 2 August 2013 in favour of Enele Sopoaga, who was elected three days later. It should be noted that it was Governor General Sir Italeli Iakoba who demanded the opening of the debates in Parliament, as his Speaker Kamuta Latasi wanted to adjourn the debates for six weeks. To sum up Tuvalu's situation as a micro-State with a high degree of political instability, between 1985 and 2006 there were 19 motions of censure, 4 of which were successful. Mose Saitala explains that over 13 years, all the governments have had difficulty completing their four-year term (Satalai, 2007).</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ On 8 October 2012, a motion of no confidence was tabled to overthrow Prime Minister Lord Tu'ivakano. He held on by the fragile score of 13 to 11 votes. Three ministers had previously resigned.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ See TV Polynesie 1ère, 23 May 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Guy Agniel (op. cit: 145). He adds that "this is what the people of Vanuatu call Wantok (or Oceanian-style nepotism, where power is confiscated for the benefit of the tribe or sibling from which the elected official comes)".</footnote>
politics can be considered natural. President Edouard Fritch, for example, asserts that the Pacific Way concept has never influenced him because this behaviour is deeply rooted in him, stems from his own life, and comes from his childhood:

> The Pacific Way has not influenced my political life. But I'm in that frame of mind. I'm all for listening and dialogue. What's more, I've long held the values of solidarity, fraternity and sharing on the one hand, and I am deeply attached to my Oceanian and island roots on the other. I grew up on an island, Tubuai. As a result, I'm steeped in a way of life where "faa-oromai" and "faa-tura" structure relationships between people in the local community<fnref n="9" />. In Tubuai, I grew up in simplicity. When you live on an island, you are also called upon to respect and be humble in the face of nature. It's this background that has shaped my personality and my relationships with the local people. If, for you, "faa-oromai, faa-tura and simplicity" are also a form of the Pacific Way, then why not? But I learnt them by myself and from my life experiences<fnref n="10" />.

So this would be a profoundly Polynesian and Oceanian attitude.

In fact, the cognitivist approach, which asserts that thought “selects all information in the environment and processes it to construct an internal representation, enabling it to regulate its behaviour on the basis of its representations”, raises the question of the ideal discourse on internal order in Oceania (Kernalegenn 2017, 1, 38: 69). It is the voluntary and repeated interpretation of the ideal Oceanian world that gives this idea of consensus. It is a doxa in the sense given to it by Pierre Bourdieu: “all that is taken for granted” (Bourdieu 1993: 50). But has this idea really existed? Historically, no, not even in pre-European times, a fairly violent period as Michel Panoff describes. And yet this belief is presented as a certainty. This is the difference between the imaginary and the often brutal reality, a difference we find in political ideologies and religions.

## II) The external order: the Pacific Way in regional affairs between Oceanians; a myth?

Michel Panoff (op. cit.) explains that the underlying philosophy of the Pacific Way is “solidarity between Pacific peoples and negotiation”. But it is not just about coming together; there’s a method to this concept. President Edouard Fritch explains that

<footnote n="9">⁹ Translation: Faaoromai (to take upon oneself, to endure or be patient without complaining) and Faatura (to respect, to be respectful).</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Interview with Edouard Fritch, former President of Polynesia, October 2022.</footnote>
the concept emphasises the primacy of dialogue and the search for consensus to resolve any problems that may arise in the region, in a peaceful manner, in the Oceanian way. Hence the constant search for consensus to avoid votes, which are seen as divisive" <fnref n="11" />.

Unlike the internal order, international relations require negotiation and consensus.

But the first question is: consensus with whom? The Polynesians or the Melanesians or, more generally, the Oceanians? Oceania has several regional organisations, and the first or “infra” layer is made up of organisations that are strictly Polynesian (such as the GLP) or exclusively Melanesian (such as the Spear Head) or even Micronesian. It is only in the “supra layer” that we find truly Oceanian organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum. For the Polynesian world, the concept of the “Polynesian triangle” is one of the founding myths, in the sense proposed by Paul Geyer, of “the formation of identities and questions of legitimisation” (Geyer 2007 in Al Wardi 2015). This set of myths, shared cultural practices, navigation techniques and settlement history reinforce the Polynesian identity, as well as that of Oceania. From then on, the desire to come together has been a constant in the history of this area, which has a high degree of cultural and linguistic homogeneity (Feinberg and Mc Pherson 2002). At the Pacific Islands Forum summit in Auckland in September 2011 the Samoan Prime Minister brought together the leaders of Tuvalu, Tonga, Niue and Cook to promote the idea of a Polynesian reunion, an idea that had been desired for several years. On 17 November 2011, in Apia, under the name of the Polynesian Leaders Group (in French GLP, Groupe des Leaders Polynésiens), the dream of Samoan leader Malietoa Tanumafili II, according to the Samoan Prime Minister, came true<fnref n="12" />. Moreover, Paul de Deckker adds that during his time as Secretary of State, Gaston Flosse, having met most of the leaders of the South Pacific, “met with his greatest success with his Polynesian brothers with whom he felt culturally very close”, citing in particular Tupou IV, King of Tonga, Sir Tom Davis, Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, and Vaai Kolone, Prime Minister of Samoa. Gaston Flosse confirmed during our interview that he had special ties with the King of Tonga and the Prime Ministers of the Cook Islands and Samoa<fnref n="13" />.

<footnote n="11">11 Interview with the President of French Polynesia, Edouard Fritch, October 2022.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 Talamua Media and Publications, Samoa, 18 November 2011 in Al Wardi, op.cit).</footnote>

<footnote n="13">13 Interview with Gaston Flosse, Ibid.</footnote>
All the regional groups emphasise their cultures and identities. Are these groups based on ethnicity? No doubt, according to the Samoan media outlet Talamua, the aim is clearly to "unite all Polynesian ethnic groups"<fnref n="14" />. It is curious to see these entities, the two Polynesian groups (GLP and GPP Groupe des Parlementaires Polynésiens <fnref n="15" />), the Micronesia Challenge and the Melanesian Spearhead Group, named according to a geography inherited from the colonial era. Before Serge Tcherkézoff's remarks (2008), Cluny Mc Pherson and Richard Feinberg (2002) raised the question of the limits of Polynesia: beyond the famous Polynesian triangle, they note, there are a number of islands considered Polynesian in the Melanesian or Micronesian space, such as Tikopia, Bellona or even Anuta in the Solomon Islands and Nukumanu in Papua New Guinea (Feinberg and Mc Pherson, 2002: 192).

Referring to Michael Keating and Rogers Brubaker, Tudi Kernalegenn argues that "ethnicity is therefore a way of looking at the world, understanding and identifying oneself, making sense of one's problems, identifying one's interests and orienting one's actions" (Kernalegenn op. cit: 66), even if this is most often unconscious. He reminds us that regionalism is characterised "by a horizontal division of the world, of social reality, i.e. a division based on territorial and/or cultural criteria, more than on socio-economic criteria" (id.: 60). So one can be Polynesian and Oceanian at the same time.

So is it Polynesian, Melanesian, Micronesian or Oceanian solidarity? Whatever, once again, one does not preclude the other. This Oceanic link is indisputable: Epeli Hau'ofa (ibid.) insists that "the Ocean is within us" and that "the Ocean is no longer a frontier that separates the Oceanian peoples from each other and locks them up on their islands". For example, Heremoana Maamaatuaiatapu, a former minister and former director of the Maison de la Culture, rejects the Polynesia/Melanesia division and says he recognises himself in the Oceanian family. He wanted to "recreate the pirogue route" by setting up a festival of Oceanian films and documentaries (FIFO) with the help of Wallès Kotra, as well as supporting book fairs to "recreate the link". Manuel Terai, Director of International Relations for French Polynesia, also talks of a "strong cultural link, we understand each other"<fnref n="16" />. He adds that when French Polynesia joined the

<footnote n="14">14 Talamua Media and Publications, Samoa, 18 November 2011.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">15 Created in 2013 at a meeting in French Polynesia (American Samoa, Cook Islands, Niue, Tonga, Tuvalu and French Polynesia and the two «observen» members, Wallis and Futuna and Easter Islands); but modified in 2019 to become the Pacific Islands Parliaments Group (PIPG) (Fiji, Hawaii, Easter Islands, Cook Islands, Niue, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Palau, French Polynesia, Samoa, American Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Vanuatu and Wallis and Futuna), which meets every year (2023 : Tonga).</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 Interview with Manuel Terai, Director of the Delegation for International, European and Pacific Affairs at the Office of the</footnote>
Pacific Islands Forum as a "full member", "the Oceanian spirit prevailed". Indeed, the members really did change or "lighten" the membership criteria to enable Polynesia and New Caledonia to become "full members". However, Manuel Terai adds a nuance: it was thanks to the insistence of the Polynesian clan, which supported this membership from the outset, that membership was possible.

For former President Fritch,

> Pacific leaders like to say that we share the same ocean, the same sky, the same aroha, the same taro, the same pirogue. These commonalities mean that we share a common history. This necessarily creates links. The values that bind our island communities together are those of Solidarity, Cohesion, Fraternity and Peace.<fnref n="17" />

Epeli Hau'ofa adds that "as we travel, we notice that Polynesians, Melanesians and Micronesians have the same reflexes and the same sense of humour". President Fritch welcomed the Group of Pacific Island Parliaments <fnref n="18" /> with the words "the Pacific family" reunited at last. He added: "We must stop thinking of ourselves as small island territories, but as the blue continent of the Pacific".

So there is indeed an Oceanian way of approaching things. But is it institutionalised? No, because, once again, it's said to be in the essence of the society! Michel Panoff, a specialist in Oceania as well as Polynesia, says of the *Pacific Way* that "Tahitians have been practising it for a long time, both among themselves and in their relations with other peoples". This is confirmed by the former President of French Polynesia, Edouard Fritch:

> Our actions, our attitudes and our relationships with others have not been dictated or inspired by the idea of a Pacific Way. We are not conditioned to act by a Pacific Way. Dialogue is part of our methods. It's in our DNA. Consensus is sought, but it is not a necessary or obligatory condition [...] this accumulation of sociological and historical singularities could lead us to say that we have a Pacific Way. But for all that, no one has defined, shared or enshrined this concept as a political objective among the Pacific countries.

<footnote>President of French Polynesia, on 12 October 2022.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17 Interview with President Edouard Fritch.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 Tahiti Infos on 5 October 2022.</footnote>
What's more, since French Polynesia has been a member of the Pacific Islands Forum, this concept, he says, has not been the subject of "any particular reflection or work among the region's leaders". However, he notes that dialogue and the search for consensus are "sacred" within the Forum: "When certain decision-makers try to deviate from the rule of consensus, they are called to order and the subject is postponed to another date". But he concedes that "within the Forum, this is a decision-making rule. It's a decision-making 'mode' whose sole objective is to remain at peace with oneself first and with others as a result".

So why is it a myth? There is the inevitable intervention of regional powers. We keep coming back to the desire to get together as Oceanians, and only as Oceanians. But is this possible? What about regional powers? Territorially, the regional powers are also in the South Pacific. And culturally, aren't these regional powers also part of Oceanian culture thanks to their original peoples? Are ethnic criteria therefore relevant?

Epeli Hau'ofa (op. cit.: 24) felt that "the independence of the Pacific Forum was compromised from the outset by the inclusion, for financial reasons, of Australia and New Zealand". This is because the island states have few financial resources. He adds that these regional powers have "complicated the development of a post-colonial regional identity" in the South Pacific Commission and the Forum, given that Australians and New Zealanders are not *Pacific Islanders*. Élise Huffer (op. cit.: 10) also confirms that the *Pacific Way* "is also a way of imposing cultural values and asserting the identity of island societies vis-à-vis the major regional powers, especially Australia and New Zealand, but also France, Great Britain, the United States and Japan". Still on this subject, Nathalie Mrgudovic notes a certain frustration on the part of the Melanesians with regard to the Forum. In fact, they were already very frustrated with the Secretariat General of the Pacific Community (SPC), where no political discussion was possible, which is why the Pacific Forum was created. And so it is another frustration that has created the Spearhead, with the desire to be among islanders, among Melanesians, without the regional powers, without Australia and New Zealand. Nathalie Mrgudovic (2003: 177) writes that "the Groupe Mélanésien du fer de Lance (GMLF) was born, one might say, out of a double frustration". It is true that the presence on the SPC of France, the United States and the two regional powers posed a number of problems for the small states of the South Pacific. The presence of Australia and New Zealand in the
Forum also caused embarrassment and led the Melanesians to create the Spearhead group. Michael O'Keefe confirms this impression: "There was also a growing perception that regionalism in the Pacific was not up to scratch... Regionalism was also seen as a buffer and a brake on the interests of outside powers and the domination of powerful Pacific states" (O'Keefe 2015: 128).

Besides, powers can be in rivalry. Gaston Flosse, for example, recalls the coup d'état in Fiji in 1987 when he was Secretary of State for the South Pacific. He says that the Fijian Rabuka asked for his help. He travelled with Manuel Terai and the Admiral commanding French forces in the Pacific to Fiji at a time when New Zealand and Australia were strongly denouncing the coup. Rabuka wanted France to at least partially take the place of the regional powers. Manuel Terai confirmed that "orders had been given to save Rabuka, who had been abandoned by the Australians and New Zealanders". He accompanied Ratu Kamisese Mara to Paris. Was this an attempt to counter the States opposed to the nuclear tests and the situation in New Caledonia? There was no real follow-up to this diplomacy.

Lastly, a more recent difficulty arises. Heremoana Maamaatuiahutapu recounts how, in discussions between Oceanians, some island states can no longer really express themselves freely because they are being watched by "their backers". This includes China. Indeed, beyond the regional powers, the new global geostrategies place Oceania in the Indo-Pacific/New Silk Roads competition.

### III) The Pacific Way and the new challenges facing Oceania

We have seen that the Pacific Way concerns both the internal and external order. But the world, and Oceania in particular, are facing new challenges. What is the contribution of the Pacific Way? Has realism affected all the players? First of all, as Polynesia is French, what is France's place in Oceania? Do Australians and New Zealanders accept the French presence? What impact does France's presence in the Indo-Pacific have on French Oceanians? Do the people of Oceania need the great and middle powers to meet the new global challenges?

Following the end of nuclear testing and the launch of the decolonisation process in New Caledonia, France's presence is no longer in question. Nic Maclellan explains that
Australia has increasingly supported France's regional role and has proposed that territories such as New Caledonia become full members of the forum, even before their final political status has been determined. This significant policy shift was endorsed in the 2013 Morauta Review of the Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration, which argues that the forum's original priorities such as decolonisation and a nuclear-weapon-free Pacific "have been resolved or moved to other platforms for debate and determination" (MacLellan 2015: 264).

France, for its part, has seized the opportunity to have real "aircraft carriers" in the Pacific, allowing it to claim to be part of the Indo-Pacific. Because one has to be physically in the Pacific to claim to be part of the Indo-Pacific. To remain a player in the world, to maintain its role as a global power, France must be in the Indo-Pacific. The former Minister for Overseas France, Victorin Lurel, said that this region "will orchestrate the course of the world in the 21st century"<fnref n="19" />. So France is very much a part of this new geostrategy. For its part, Polynesia, being part of France and therefore part of the Indo-Pacific, seems particularly well equipped to face the challenges of this century. France thus has a dual diplomacy: directly or through its territories. This is not a new approach for France, but it is exacerbated by relations between China and the United States. It was Michel Rocard who came up with the idea of the territories as a bridgehead between metropolitan France and the rest of the Pacific. This idea was taken up by Jacques Chirac and developed at the 2003 France-Oceania summit in Papeete. In 2013, the former Minister for Overseas France, Victorin Lurel, pointed out that "France is anchored in the Pacific and has a duty, through its local authorities, to interact constantly with the near abroad. It encourages the establishment of direct relations between French entities and these friendly countries" (ibid.). This is a particularly Pacific way of being when the Minister adds that

France is proud and happy to have these Polynesian and Melanesian worlds in its midst, which resonate with their Aboriginal and Maori neighbours. Through the affirmation of their culture, identity and customs, they help to make France more present, more diverse and richer (ibid.).

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Closing of the symposium on 17 January 2013, Senate, Information report, Senate Delegation for Overseas France, n°293, p. 135.</footnote>
He affirms that "France intends to play its full part, in close cooperation with its allies, for the greatest benefit of the people of New Caledonia, Polynesia and Wallis". Delphine Allès (2016: 45) demonstrated the success of diplomatic work based on "interpersonal relations". What better way to make diplomatic progress in Oceania than to take advantage of relations between Oceanians?

Then there are the major global challenges that Oceania cannot ignore. For example, at a summit of the GPIP (the group of the Pacific parliaments) in 2019, representatives of the assemblies of the 15 member countries met in Papeete. With the "Tarahoi Declaration", this grouping formalised a "Pact for a Sustainable Blue Economy": "*the waters that are inexorably rising will be at the doors of our homes, at the ankles of our children, nibbling away at our shores and our coastline. What will become of our resources, our island lifestyles and our ocean?*" The aim is to encourage the preservation of the oceans through managed marine areas and to protect territories against rising sea levels; to encourage the sustainable development of fisheries resources; to help reduce marine pollution from ships; to promote responsible and clean fishing; and to promote innovation in favour of a sustainable blue economy.

Former President Edouard Fritch details the vast range of problems facing all Oceanians. Today,

the Pacific is united around a common set of issues. These include the consequences of climate change; the preservation of ocean resources; the surveillance of our respective EEZs; common health pathologies such as obesity, arbovirosis, etc.; the production of renewable energy; the treatment of waste from modern consumption such as plastic; and regional international transport<fnref n="20" />.

Given the scale of the challenges, he recognises that the help of regional or global powers is essential:

the Pacific countries are looking for partnerships with major countries that can provide us with solutions or support us in tackling these issues that affect the daily lives of our populations. Eliminating our waste and being less dependent on fossil fuels are everyday concerns.

In his view, this realistic approach concerns virtually all states and territories:

<footnote n="20">20 Interview with Edouard Fritch, op. cit.</footnote>
the Pacific countries united within the Pacific Forum want to work with all the major countries of the world. The driving force behind international relations is the triptych of "cooperation, partnership and development". And we are succeeding. The very recent dialogue between the world's smallest countries and the world's largest in Washington is proof of this.

The competition between the Indo-Pacific and the New Silk Roads makes Oceania attractive to all the major powers.

If we can imagine a return of the Pacific Way, the Oceanians need to group together to claim their place in the concert of nations in order to combat the problems that affect them directly and that concern humanity as a whole, such as global warming, rising sea levels and the pollution of water tables by rising sea levels. But here too there is the problem of unity: Heremoana Maamaatuaiahutapu, who attended the summits in Hawaii, Lisbon and many others, notes that China favours bilateral agreements in order to divide Oceania, while the Americans and the French prefer a common strategy<fnref n="21" />. The Pacific Way urges these small states and territories to unite within the Pacific Islands Forum to confront the world's big players. The 2023 meetings in Papua New Guinea and South Korea clearly demonstrated this.

By way of conclusion, it should be stressed once again that the Indo-Pacific powers, and even China, are attaching greater importance to this once forgotten Oceania. It should also be noted that at regional and international level, it is primarily budgetary and financial problems that are forcing the small island states to move closer to the medium-sized or major powers. The financial reality is stronger than the desire to be among oneself. A former Polynesian minister explains that, apart from the rhetoric, there is another difficulty for these small states: "European funds are virtually inaccessible, too complicated to set up, whereas China can respond financially quickly" (ibid.). This is China's chequebook policy. These difficulties may work against the Indo-Pacific, because the budgetary emergencies of small island states are real.

All the climatic and geostrategic challenges are linked. Edouard Fritch notes that

the Indo-Pacific Axis will only have meaning and reality in the Pacific if France and Europe accompany our countries in the problems... The Indo-Pacific Axis must

<footnote n="21">21 Interview with Culture Minister Heremoana Maamaatuaiahutapu, 7 October 2022.</footnote>
be an axis of solutions for our small countries and island states. Good solutions will
always find a consensual welcome with our friends in the Pacific.

France, Australia, India and the United States (which has brought together the states
and territories of the Pacific Islands Forum in Washington in 2022) are strengthening
their presence. The voice of the Oceanians, on behalf of the Indo-Pacific, should
now count for something. But how? Of course, the major powers are now showing
themselves to be generous and attentive to the problems of the Oceanians, but the
privileged exchanges, or those hoped for, will remain those between the Oceanians
themselves. After Jacques Chirac's dream that French Oceanians would be the voice
of France in Oceania, Heremoana Maamaatuiahutapu adds the same idea for all
Oceanians: "there is no better ambassador for Polynesia in Washington than Hawaii
and there is no better ambassador for Polynesians than Hawaii". Indeed, it was in
Hawaii that the Pacific Islands Forum met before going to Washington. In other words,
faced with the challenges of the 21st century, the Oceanians need the rest of the
world more and more but, in line with the Pacific Way, they also have an interest
in forming a united bloc. However, the security agreement between China and the
Solomon Islands shows that this is not always feasible. So we keep coming back to the
deconstruction of the myth, facing the need to be linked to the medium and major
powers in the Pacific.

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