joint commitment of the parties (Descombes, 2000). The same remark
concerns money, which cannot be reduced to a social link between con-
tractors, since it does not only contribute to the latter: it constitutes it
(Searle, 1995). Yet one cannot buy one's own property (by paying oneself),
or play chess against oneself: it would not really be a purchase or a game
of chess. On the other hand, one can walk alone; and even walk alone
while acting as if one was walking with somebody: is "walking together"
not the paradigm of an *intersubjective* relationship, rather than strictly
social (Descombes, 2014)?

2. On the political level, the Gilbertian theory does not generate the same type of difficulties. It is indeed specifically modern, in that it belongs to the liberal and nominalist matrix, in many respects constitutive of the nascent social sciences and political theory (Hobbes, Rousseau) which was its breeding ground: the plural subjects are thus thinkable from individual interactions. By representing society as founded on an assemblage of wills, it also joins an extremely powerful imagination during the French and American revolutions of the 18th century. If the model of the plural subject clashes with the case of collectives in Us on a large scale (of the 'our nation' type), it remains anchored to a fundamentally emancipatory ideal: individuals remain indeed the active subjects of the plural collective constituted.

3 General Will and Individual Autonomy

The political crux of the problem, in connection with citizenship as a rela-
tion to a society (nation-state for example), is that the logical Us from which
the institutions originate differs from the empirical We who is the recipient.
Weighted with its modern and liberal perspective, Gilbert's model perfectly
reflects the logical Us. A collective such as a nation can indeed be apprehended
logically so that one imagines members co-engaged by an act of will. This cor-
responds to a certain reality, the modernity of nations having effectively eman-
cipated individuals from certain ties hindering their freedom. But beyond this
logical Us, there remains the weight of uses and social relations pre-existing to
the establishment of this Us.

3.1 *Contributions and Limits of the Contractualist Analysis*

The problem arises in particular when the logical Us claims to have authority
over individuals.
joint commitment of the parties (Descombes, 2000). The same remark
concerns money, which cannot be reduced to a social link between con-
tractors, since it does not only contribute to the latter: it constitutes it
(Searle, 1995). Yet one cannot buy one's own property (by paying oneself),
or play chess against oneself: it would not really be a purchase or a game
of chess. On the other hand, one can walk alone; and even walk alone
while acting as if one was walking with somebody: is "walking together"
not the paradigm of an *intersubjective* relationship, rather than strictly
social (Descombes, 2014)?

2. On the political level, the Gilbertian theory does not generate the same type of difficulties. It is indeed specifically modern, in that it belongs to the liberal and nominalist matrix, in many respects constitutive of the nascent social sciences and political theory (Hobbes, Rousseau) which was its breeding ground: the plural subjects are thus thinkable from individual interactions. By representing society as founded on an assemblage of wills, it also joins an extremely powerful imagination during the French and American revolutions of the 18th century. If the model of the plural subject clashes with the case of collectives in Us on a large scale (of the 'our nation' type), it remains anchored to a fundamentally emancipatory ideal: individuals remain indeed the active subjects of the plural collective constituted.

3 General Will and Individual Autonomy

The political crux of the problem, in connection with citizenship as a rela-
tion to a society (nation-state for example), is that the logical Us from which
the institutions originate differs from the empirical We who is the recipient.
Weighted with its modern and liberal perspective, Gilbert's model perfectly
reflects the logical Us. A collective such as a nation can indeed be apprehended
logically so that one imagines members co-engaged by an act of will. This cor-
responds to a certain reality, the modernity of nations having effectively eman-
cipated individuals from certain ties hindering their freedom. But beyond this
logical Us, there remains the weight of uses and social relations pre-existing to
the establishment of this Us.

3.1 *Contributions and Limits of the Contractualist Analysis*

The problem arises in particular when the logical Us claims to have authority
over individuals.
The Us of the community, whether it takes the empirical form of the nation-state, the royal majesty or the spokesmen of the Public, can declare war, sign a treaty, refuse trade agreements, defend a common ideal, etc. Submitted by definition to the authority of this Us, individuals do not have the cognitive and political means to oppose an alternative interpretation. (Kaufmann, 2002, p. 306)

In France, post-1789 revolutionaries wanted to give the community the power to determine its own institutions. Thus they deregulated the social totalities existing until then, in particular the royal power and its Us of majesty which gave way to the Us of society: "the linguistic and symbolic dispossession of the monarch is consecrated when the Us of civil society openly accede, especially in the lists of grievances of 1789, to the status of an enunciative subject" (Kaufmann, 2003, p. 103). This Us of society can be considered as a plural subject, in the sense that it refers to an "upward movement [...] of 'collectivisation'" (Kaufmann, 2010, p. 359). Gilbertian contractualism (assembly of wills) can thus describe the realisation of the political project of revolutionary emancipation.

However, when the revolutionaries want to establish 'the soul of the Republic', the Us is not ascending, but descending. The emancipatory operation of dereifying collectives is abandoned, in favour of a realistic attitude towards republican institutions, considered at that time as "a given whose 'self-evidence' escapes individual, if not collective, action" (Kaufmann, 2003, p. 126). The soul of the Republic is then imposed on individuals in the form of a language (French), a civil religion of public salvation, and morals resulting from a policy that relies on the omnipotence of the law to make the people conform to its principles.

It is precisely the modalities of implementation of this artifice, consisting in making the logical Us and the empirical Us coincide, which complicate the objective of global citizenship, considered by some researchers and policy makers as the essential element of citizenship education from an international perspective. Indeed, discussions on this subject revolve around the question of whether citizenship without territorial anchoring, without common morals and without an associated government is possible, even as an ideal or ethical horizon, knowing that to date, no 'world government', 'world society' or 'world sovereignty' exist.

And yet, these discussions are inseparable from the representations, be they holistic or nominalist, that we have of society. The Durkheimian response was sometimes nuanced (from the point of view of the sociological method), sometimes cavalier (the collective consciousness of society that it was important to
The Us of the community, whether it takes the empirical form of the nation-state, the royal majesty or the spokesmen of the Public, can declare war, sign a treaty, refuse trade agreements, defend a common ideal, etc. Submitted by definition to the authority of this Us, individuals do not have the cognitive and political means to oppose an alternative interpretation. (Kaufmann, 2002, p. 306)

In France, post-1789 revolutionaries wanted to give the community the power to determine its own institutions. Thus they deregulated the social totalities existing until then, in particular the royal power and its Us of majesty which gave way to the Us of society: "the linguistic and symbolic dispossession of the monarch is consecrated when the Us of civil society openly accede, especially in the lists of grievances of 1789, to the status of an enunciative subject" (Kaufmann, 2003, p. 103). This Us of society can be considered as a plural subject, in the sense that it refers to an "upward movement [...] of 'collectivisation'" (Kaufmann, 2010, p. 359). Gilbertian contractualism (assembly of wills) can thus describe the realisation of the political project of revolutionary emancipation.

However, when the revolutionaries want to establish 'the soul of the Republic', the Us is not ascending, but descending. The emancipatory operation of dereifying collectives is abandoned, in favour of a realistic attitude towards republican institutions, considered at that time as "a given whose 'self-evidence' escapes individual, if not collective, action" (Kaufmann, 2003, p. 126). The soul of the Republic is then imposed on individuals in the form of a language (French), a civil religion of public salvation, and morals resulting from a policy that relies on the omnipotence of the law to make the people conform to its principles.

It is precisely the modalities of implementation of this artifice, consisting in making the logical Us and the empirical Us coincide, which complicate the objective of global citizenship, considered by some researchers and policy makers as the essential element of citizenship education from an international perspective. Indeed, discussions on this subject revolve around the question of whether citizenship without territorial anchoring, without common morals and without an associated government is possible, even as an ideal or ethical horizon, knowing that to date, no 'world government', 'world society' or 'world sovereignty' exist.

And yet, these discussions are inseparable from the representations, be they holistic or nominalist, that we have of society. The Durkheimian response was sometimes nuanced (from the point of view of the sociological method), sometimes cavalier (the collective consciousness of society that it was important to
pass into the child's soul). It was centred on the nation, but we will see that it
had a cosmopolitan aspect, waving towards the world. It is therefore necessary
to resume the Durkheimian work from scratch, updating its whole approach
not only on education, but also on the state, the Republic (*res publica*), division
of labour and the growing pluralism of modern societies.

3.2 *Collectives, Collective Decision and (Global) Citizenship*

In order to do this, we formulate a way of associating the analysis of collective entities with their political content. If, as has been said, the principle of analytical parsimony claimed by the approaches in terms of collective intentionality (Gilbert, Pettit) has a political counterpart, similarly, the holistic analysis of the collective decision outlined above has the political counterpart of identifying the purposes of the collective entities themselves and therefore specifying what founds the general will. This must be done without confusing it, on the one hand, with pre-intentional established practices, in which case one would fall back into conservative culturalism; and without reducing it, on the other hand, to majority decisions (such as votes), because society is not an aggregation of individual wills.

This is an important point for understanding citizenship. Why does one feel obliged to comply with national, regional, municipal decisions, or the decisions of the collective entities that make up one's professional world? Why does this feeling of obligation often persist even if one personally does not agree with these decisions? In addition, why may one believe these decisions are not legitimate, in the sense that they do not seem to correspond to the purposes of a given entity? As we can see, the problem is inextricably analytical and political.

If a majority vote is not enough for a collective decision to oblige us, it must
however fit the purposes of the collective entity. To illustrate this, imagine an
ETS department that brings together as many people trained in sociology as
people trained in didactics. The recruitment of the next lecturer is crucial: will
it be a didactician or a sociologist? The members of the department must write
a job description, and each side will try to defend its field, leaving aside other
issues such as the actual needs in teaching, the laboratory policy, the pool of
candidates and the potential quality of the candidacies. Thus, the decision
has little chance of corresponding to the specific purposes of the department.
It will be a decision, probably made by a short majority that, despite appear-
ances, will not be the decision of the collective entity, but that of the majority
members within that entity.

Let us now use a documented example. The historian Ernst Kantorowicz,
although non-communist, refused in the midst of McCarthyism to take an
pass into the child's soul). It was centred on the nation, but we will see that it
had a cosmopolitan aspect, waving towards the world. It is therefore necessary
to resume the Durkheimian work from scratch, updating its whole approach
not only on education, but also on the state, the Republic (*res publica*), division
of labour and the growing pluralism of modern societies.

3.2 *Collectives, Collective Decision and (Global) Citizenship*

In order to do this, we formulate a way of associating the analysis of collective entities with their political content. If, as has been said, the principle of analytical parsimony claimed by the approaches in terms of collective intentionality (Gilbert, Pettit) has a political counterpart, similarly, the holistic analysis of the collective decision outlined above has the political counterpart of identifying the purposes of the collective entities themselves and therefore specifying what founds the general will. This must be done without confusing it, on the one hand, with pre-intentional established practices, in which case one would fall back into conservative culturalism; and without reducing it, on the other hand, to majority decisions (such as votes), because society is not an aggregation of individual wills.

This is an important point for understanding citizenship. Why does one feel obliged to comply with national, regional, municipal decisions, or the decisions of the collective entities that make up one's professional world? Why does this feeling of obligation often persist even if one personally does not agree with these decisions? In addition, why may one believe these decisions are not legitimate, in the sense that they do not seem to correspond to the purposes of a given entity? As we can see, the problem is inextricably analytical and political.

If a majority vote is not enough for a collective decision to oblige us, it must
however fit the purposes of the collective entity. To illustrate this, imagine an
ETS department that brings together as many people trained in sociology as
people trained in didactics. The recruitment of the next lecturer is crucial: will
it be a didactician or a sociologist? The members of the department must write
a job description, and each side will try to defend its field, leaving aside other
issues such as the actual needs in teaching, the laboratory policy, the pool of
candidates and the potential quality of the candidacies. Thus, the decision
has little chance of corresponding to the specific purposes of the department.
It will be a decision, probably made by a short majority that, despite appear-
ances, will not be the decision of the collective entity, but that of the majority
members within that entity.

Let us now use a documented example. The historian Ernst Kantorowicz,
although non-communist, refused in the midst of McCarthyism to take an
oath of non-allegiance to communism before his academic peers, at the risk of being given notice. He felt that the votes of his university's board of regents in favour of the oath of non-allegiance were too narrow, indicating that they did not match the university's purposes:

> If the board of regents can become the arena of a “numerical balance of forces” between two groups bent on imposing or defeating the requirement of the oath, it is because the question of the oath involves the institution for which that board is supposed to make decisions. (Urfalino, 2021, p. 312)

The board of regents thus claims to make a collective decision, valid for any professor at the University of California, but Kantorowicz regards it as the decision of a clan. The majority does not have the legitimacy to affect the nature of what binds the majority and the minority (academic competence, professional ethics), in other words the *institution* to which they belong and for which they act together.

Thus, by combining philosophy and sociology, we can return to Durkheim's intuitions. In modern societies, the individual takes part in reaching objectives of collective entities. These purposes are not his own but he is entitled to assert them, as a member of these entities (cf. pizza of the month), or to refuse them if he considers that the procedure that defined them is not legitimate. If individuals are part of *sui generis* collective entities that define them in return, it is because the human person is capable of collective intentions. However, here it is not the liberal Us of Gilbert that is at stake, it is the 'structural holism' that places individuals within an institution: the teacher and the student, the tennis player and her opponent, etc., that can thus be represented by dyads (and not 'Gilbert pairs') in a complementarity relationship provided for by a rule.

The collective decision approach in question is relatively flexible, based on the rhetorical model of one or more speaker(s) facing an audience (Urfalino, 2022). The conditions for making a collective decision are therefore not as strict and unrealistic as in the dialogical model of Habermas' 'communica- tive rationality', conveying an idealised image of deliberative bodies. But what about nations, persistent frameworks of citizenship? Can we jump from the above models to the national scale? The task is not obvious, but it involves similar issues. Already Marcel Mauss, in writing *The Nation*, wanted to counter the liberal illusion, both in sociology and in political theory: he sought to "fill the national idea with a positive content to complete liberalism and prevent it from turning once again into its opposite" (Callegaro, 2014, p. 341).

This is why the republican thought, more precisely critical republicanism, in the wake of Pettit, remains essential. It allows for the reintroduction of a
oath of non-allegiance to communism before his academic peers, at the risk of being given notice. He felt that the votes of his university's board of regents in favour of the oath of non-allegiance were too narrow, indicating that they did not match the university's purposes:

> If the board of regents can become the arena of a “numerical balance of forces” between two groups bent on imposing or defeating the requirement of the oath, it is because the question of the oath involves the institution for which that board is supposed to make decisions. (Urfalino, 2021, p. 312)

The board of regents thus claims to make a collective decision, valid for any professor at the University of California, but Kantorowicz regards it as the decision of a clan. The majority does not have the legitimacy to affect the nature of what binds the majority and the minority (academic competence, professional ethics), in other words the *institution* to which they belong and for which they act together.

Thus, by combining philosophy and sociology, we can return to Durkheim's intuitions. In modern societies, the individual takes part in reaching objectives of collective entities. These purposes are not his own but he is entitled to assert them, as a member of these entities (cf. pizza of the month), or to refuse them if he considers that the procedure that defined them is not legitimate. If individuals are part of *sui generis* collective entities that define them in return, it is because the human person is capable of collective intentions. However, here it is not the liberal Us of Gilbert that is at stake, it is the 'structural holism' that places individuals within an institution: the teacher and the student, the tennis player and her opponent, etc., that can thus be represented by dyads (and not 'Gilbert pairs') in a complementarity relationship provided for by a rule.

The collective decision approach in question is relatively flexible, based on the rhetorical model of one or more speaker(s) facing an audience (Urfalino, 2022). The conditions for making a collective decision are therefore not as strict and unrealistic as in the dialogical model of Habermas' 'communica- tive rationality', conveying an idealised image of deliberative bodies. But what about nations, persistent frameworks of citizenship? Can we jump from the above models to the national scale? The task is not obvious, but it involves similar issues. Already Marcel Mauss, in writing *The Nation*, wanted to counter the liberal illusion, both in sociology and in political theory: he sought to "fill the national idea with a positive content to complete liberalism and prevent it from turning once again into its opposite" (Callegaro, 2014, p. 341).

This is why the republican thought, more precisely critical republicanism, in the wake of Pettit, remains essential. It allows for the reintroduction of a
form of holism in order to think about the relationship of individuals to the nation-state, beyond the fiction that sees the state as the ultimate field objectified by sociologists (Bourdieu); or the more complex vision, a society as a reservoir of *topoi* that can be mobilised by individuals who rebuild its coherence in test situations thanks to their critical skills (Boltanski & Thévenot). It seems we must go further in the direction of social totality for a reason that lies, as suggested in the introduction, in the specificity of our object grasped in an international comparative perspective: the public school as a place of general education crystallising the highest value ideas of a society.

An important question remains: how is critical republicanism holistic? Admittedly it is not quite so. Philip Pettit has already drawn some criticism against him from Charles Larmore, according to whom critical republicanism is a version of negative freedom (which Pettit fully recognises) and therefore of political liberalism, which Pettit is less inclined to recognise since he wants to emphasise the originality of his approach. For our part, it seems that one can place Pettit quite clearly on the side of holists in the sense that he rejects the individualistic idea according to which humans have timeless faculties in determining the state's role and limits. Rather, he considers with Durkheim and Mauss that it is society, as the provider of a political status, which gives form to the individual. We are mentioning here, not Pettit's social philosophy, which is nominalist and therefore very different from that of Durkheim and Mauss, but rather his political and in this case holist philosophy because it derives individual liberty from freedom as non-domination within states, themselves not dominated. This is the junction between Durkheim, Mauss and Pettit.

> Although the republican tradition, in its Roman sources, is just as attached to the independence of individuals as the liberal tradition is, the former does not think of individual freedom in the same terms as the latter. Liberals, like Locke or Kant, see freedom as a kind of natural power that both determines the role of the state (that of guaranteeing natural rights) and sets its limits (that of not encroaching on these inalienable rights). Conversely, as Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit have shown, the republican tradition, from Cicero to Rousseau, derives the freedom of the citizen not from a natural state, but from the political status that makes it possible. (Guérard de Latour, 2015, p. 77)

If political liberalism and republicanism converge on many points, the distinction between their respective ontologies will prove crucial to think of global citizenship, in the second part of the book. The coordinates of the problem are the following. If freedom is a natural, individual power that determines
form of holism in order to think about the relationship of individuals to the nation-state, beyond the fiction that sees the state as the ultimate field objectified by sociologists (Bourdieu); or the more complex vision, a society as a reservoir of *topoi* that can be mobilised by individuals who rebuild its coherence in test situations thanks to their critical skills (Boltanski & Thévenot). It seems we must go further in the direction of social totality for a reason that lies, as suggested in the introduction, in the specificity of our object grasped in an international comparative perspective: the public school as a place of general education crystallising the highest value ideas of a society.

An important question remains: how is critical republicanism holistic? Admittedly it is not quite so. Philip Pettit has already drawn some criticism against him from Charles Larmore, according to whom critical republicanism is a version of negative freedom (which Pettit fully recognises) and therefore of political liberalism, which Pettit is less inclined to recognise since he wants to emphasise the originality of his approach. For our part, it seems that one can place Pettit quite clearly on the side of holists in the sense that he rejects the individualistic idea according to which humans have timeless faculties in determining the state's role and limits. Rather, he considers with Durkheim and Mauss that it is society, as the provider of a political status, which gives form to the individual. We are mentioning here, not Pettit's social philosophy, which is nominalist and therefore very different from that of Durkheim and Mauss, but rather his political and in this case holist philosophy because it derives individual liberty from freedom as non-domination within states, themselves not dominated. This is the junction between Durkheim, Mauss and Pettit.

> Although the republican tradition, in its Roman sources, is just as attached to the independence of individuals as the liberal tradition is, the former does not think of individual freedom in the same terms as the latter. Liberals, like Locke or Kant, see freedom as a kind of natural power that both determines the role of the state (that of guaranteeing natural rights) and sets its limits (that of not encroaching on these inalienable rights). Conversely, as Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit have shown, the republican tradition, from Cicero to Rousseau, derives the freedom of the citizen not from a natural state, but from the political status that makes it possible. (Guérard de Latour, 2015, p. 77)

If political liberalism and republicanism converge on many points, the distinction between their respective ontologies will prove crucial to think of global citizenship, in the second part of the book. The coordinates of the problem are the following. If freedom is a natural, individual power that determines
the role and limits of the state, then the notion of global citizenship can make
sense. It consists, in a way, in identifying the universal human faculties, then in
seeking to deduce from them a universal, global society. However, if freedom
derives from a political status, itself framed by the state, then the idea of global
citizenship requires thinking more resolutely about the latter. The opinions
of the GlobalSense international consortium are divided between these two
different ontologies when it comes to thinking about citizenship education.
Are they reconcilable?

4 Holism and (Global) Citizenship Education

The second part of the book will develop these points in relation to discourses (political, educational and academic) that promote ‘global citizenship education’ and claim to broaden the usual framework of the political community by addressing its members: teacher trainers, teachers, students, future citizens, researchers. The task is all the more complex because universities, whose organisation into disciplines can be quite easily relaxed to make room for ‘education towards’ (sustainable development, global sensitivity, etc.), are privileged recipients of this type of discourse and *a fortiori* so are the carriers of Erasmus+ projects (Barthes & Lange, 2022b).

In spite of a decidedly holistic approach, taking into account the encom-
passing aspect of the ideal citizen, let us point out that encompassing does
not mean imposing. On this point, it is useful to return to Walzer's Liberal-
Republican thinking: "There can be no society of free individuals without pro-
cesses of socialisation and without a culture of individuality, without a political
regime that comes to defend the whole and that citizens themselves would
be willing to defend, if necessary" (Walzer, 2008, p. 17). The totality — here
described as a society, a culture, a political regime — is therefore a resource for
individuation, in the same way that the common higher principles of Boltanski
and Thévenot satisfy a meta-principal, that of common humanity. That is why
there is no 'ethnic city' in their model, which would be based on hierarchies of
origin or race.

Let us take the measure of this gesture, which signs Walzer's influence
(Thévenot, 1996). The authors deliberately exclude existing motifs of coordina-
tion on the grounds that they cannot claim legitimacy in our liberal societies.
Their purpose is therefore proto-normative: it is not satisfied with a descrip-
tion of coordination between people, but wants to separate potentially legiti-
mate principles from those that are not. In short, not all authorities are equal,
hence the use of political philosophy. The use of classical texts in this field
the role and limits of the state, then the notion of global citizenship can make
sense. It consists, in a way, in identifying the universal human faculties, then in
seeking to deduce from them a universal, global society. However, if freedom
derives from a political status, itself framed by the state, then the idea of global
citizenship requires thinking more resolutely about the latter. The opinions
of the GlobalSense international consortium are divided between these two
different ontologies when it comes to thinking about citizenship education.
Are they reconcilable?

4 Holism and (Global) Citizenship Education

The second part of the book will develop these points in relation to discourses (political, educational and academic) that promote ‘global citizenship education’ and claim to broaden the usual framework of the political community by addressing its members: teacher trainers, teachers, students, future citizens, researchers. The task is all the more complex because universities, whose organisation into disciplines can be quite easily relaxed to make room for ‘education towards’ (sustainable development, global sensitivity, etc.), are privileged recipients of this type of discourse and *a fortiori* so are the carriers of Erasmus+ projects (Barthes & Lange, 2022b).

In spite of a decidedly holistic approach, taking into account the encom-
passing aspect of the ideal citizen, let us point out that encompassing does
not mean imposing. On this point, it is useful to return to Walzer's Liberal-
Republican thinking: "There can be no society of free individuals without pro-
cesses of socialisation and without a culture of individuality, without a political
regime that comes to defend the whole and that citizens themselves would
be willing to defend, if necessary" (Walzer, 2008, p. 17). The totality — here
described as a society, a culture, a political regime — is therefore a resource for
individuation, in the same way that the common higher principles of Boltanski
and Thévenot satisfy a meta-principal, that of common humanity. That is why
there is no 'ethnic city' in their model, which would be based on hierarchies of
origin or race.

Let us take the measure of this gesture, which signs Walzer's influence
(Thévenot, 1996). The authors deliberately exclude existing motifs of coordina-
tion on the grounds that they cannot claim legitimacy in our liberal societies.
Their purpose is therefore proto-normative: it is not satisfied with a descrip-
tion of coordination between people, but wants to separate potentially legiti-
mate principles from those that are not. In short, not all authorities are equal,
hence the use of political philosophy. The use of classical texts in this field
to model social ‘worlds’ (Saint-Augustin, Saint-Simon, Rousseau, Smith, etc.) marks the underlying cultural aspect. It is a western European thinking that people are supposed to master, in line with their ‘critical skills’.

If Boltanski and Thévenot are not holists in the sense that they would have produced a true reflection on *sui generis* collective entities, they are indeed holists in the sense that they presuppose a shared cultural framework, although implicit, which goes beyond and gives form to the specific grammars of ‘cities’. Being liberals as they recently admitted, they are keen to preserve a separation between different worlds (civic, domestic, industrial, inspired, opinion, market) while denouncing the illegitimate encroachment that one can exert on another, for example the merchant world on the civic world under a “undue transportation of magnitude”. This sociological perspective is therefore pragmatic in the sense that it pays attention to how people, by justifying their action and challenging that of others, can navigate between different registers of greatness. Nevertheless, it remains anchored to a powerful postulate in political philosophy, which in turn helps to situate the endeavour:

> The question of justice was strongly armed [in France] by a history of centralised state and institutional Catholicism, while the question of pluralism was confined to a few political devices of debate that had little to do with morality because of the absence of a culture of political liberalism. (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2022, p. 28)

This is how the authors justify their gesture politically, in the service of pluralism and liberalism. This meta-reflection is crucial. It serves as a reminder that sociology of justification is inevitably included in its own object: when sociology tries to account for the logics of justification, it is difficult for it not to register itself in such a process, because sociological knowledge must be publicly justified.

Liberalism thus understood, which is also our assumption (Lantheaume & Urbanski, 2023), is part of the ‘ideology of the moderns’, to speak like Dumont, which sociology cannot easily shake off. Sociology is indeed the product of this ideology, and even its potential expression when the actors themselves take up its results. In short, modern societies are deeply affected by liberalism and this is precisely what makes them united, under the auspices of what Walzer calls the *culture of individuality*. Durkheim had also glimpsed this in his attempts to link, on the one hand, ‘collective consciousness’ and ‘social brain’ (on the side of unity), and on the other hand ‘division of labour’ and ‘organic solidarity’ (on the side of individuality and pluralism). It is thus in a similar way that the liberal
to model social ‘worlds’ (Saint-Augustin, Saint-Simon, Rousseau, Smith, etc.) marks the underlying cultural aspect. It is a western European thinking that people are supposed to master, in line with their ‘critical skills’.

If Boltanski and Thévenot are not holists in the sense that they would have produced a true reflection on *sui generis* collective entities, they are indeed holists in the sense that they presuppose a shared cultural framework, although implicit, which goes beyond and gives form to the specific grammars of ‘cities’. Being liberals as they recently admitted, they are keen to preserve a separation between different worlds (civic, domestic, industrial, inspired, opinion, market) while denouncing the illegitimate encroachment that one can exert on another, for example the merchant world on the civic world under a “undue transportation of magnitude”. This sociological perspective is therefore pragmatic in the sense that it pays attention to how people, by justifying their action and challenging that of others, can navigate between different registers of greatness. Nevertheless, it remains anchored to a powerful postulate in political philosophy, which in turn helps to situate the endeavour:

> The question of justice was strongly armed [in France] by a history of centralised state and institutional Catholicism, while the question of pluralism was confined to a few political devices of debate that had little to do with morality because of the absence of a culture of political liberalism. (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2022, p. 28)

This is how the authors justify their gesture politically, in the service of pluralism and liberalism. This meta-reflection is crucial. It serves as a reminder that sociology of justification is inevitably included in its own object: when sociology tries to account for the logics of justification, it is difficult for it not to register itself in such a process, because sociological knowledge must be publicly justified.

Liberalism thus understood, which is also our assumption (Lantheaume & Urbanski, 2023), is part of the ‘ideology of the moderns’, to speak like Dumont, which sociology cannot easily shake off. Sociology is indeed the product of this ideology, and even its potential expression when the actors themselves take up its results. In short, modern societies are deeply affected by liberalism and this is precisely what makes them united, under the auspices of what Walzer calls the *culture of individuality*. Durkheim had also glimpsed this in his attempts to link, on the one hand, ‘collective consciousness’ and ‘social brain’ (on the side of unity), and on the other hand ‘division of labour’ and ‘organic solidarity’ (on the side of individuality and pluralism). It is thus in a similar way that the liberal
postulate of Boltanski and Thévenot informs what makes the principles of justi-
fication hold together: the social worlds are distinct, incommensurable, but legit-
imate *a priori*, while being put in equivalence and questioned by social actors.

Because of its deep connection with the individualistic ideology of the moderns, the holism in question is not causal, only structural, and not in the Marxian or Foucaulian sense, but in the sense of ordinary language specific to the grammar of a society. This is to say that the culture of individuality of which Walzer speaks is not to be understood as having a causal effect on individuality; nor is it to be understood as having an inverse causal effect in the sense that the culture carried by the social totality would crush authentic individuals (those who would somehow escape this culture).

The aforementioned complexities of individualism will be analysed, in the
second part of the book, in studies and recommendations on global citizenship
education. We will also scrutinise an individualistic bias, apprehended as an
emanation of the 'liberal-nominalist' motif from which escape, in our opinion,
both the (holist) social philosophy of Durkheim and the (republican) political
philosophy of Pettit. Armed with these clarifications, how can we more closely
approach the notion of citizenship in its relationship with institutions such
as the public school? Where should we place, among the terms of the equa-
tion outlined, constantly invoked collective entities such as 'society', 'nation',
or 'global society' or even 'global political community'? These questions will
benefit from an updated Durkheimian perspective, inseparably neo-holist and
neo-republican.

Note

1 The conciliation of the Weberian nominalist and Durkheimian holist views is done in Gilbert's work in a clever way. She shows that ordinary thinking is spontaneously Durkheimian, in the sense that people easily talk about groups that 'think' this or 'do' that; but Durkheim recommends breaking away from ordinary thinking (prenotions). Weber, on the other hand, recommends taking very seriously the concepts by which social life is lived, but given his insistence on technical concepts such as social action (cyclists *supra*), he has doubts about ordinary holistic thinking. Gilbert's approach therefore consists in saying that understanding ordinary holist thinking, if subjected to conceptual analysis, can be useful for scientific description, and not only for interpretation. In this context, Durkheimian holistic intuitions can provide a fulcrum; but as Weber argues, understanding ordinary concepts remains fundamental: to break with them in the Durkheimian way would be harmful. In this, Gilbert reconciles Weberian understanding with Durkheimian holism, in order to analyse, among other things, the ordinary first-person of the plural discourse, a potential indicator of collective intentionality in the form of plural subjects.
postulate of Boltanski and Thévenot informs what makes the principles of justi-
fication hold together: the social worlds are distinct, incommensurable, but legit-
imate *a priori*, while being put in equivalence and questioned by social actors.

Because of its deep connection with the individualistic ideology of the moderns, the holism in question is not causal, only structural, and not in the Marxian or Foucaulian sense, but in the sense of ordinary language specific to the grammar of a society. This is to say that the culture of individuality of which Walzer speaks is not to be understood as having a causal effect on individuality; nor is it to be understood as having an inverse causal effect in the sense that the culture carried by the social totality would crush authentic individuals (those who would somehow escape this culture).

The aforementioned complexities of individualism will be analysed, in the
second part of the book, in studies and recommendations on global citizenship
education. We will also scrutinise an individualistic bias, apprehended as an
emanation of the 'liberal-nominalist' motif from which escape, in our opinion,
both the (holist) social philosophy of Durkheim and the (republican) political
philosophy of Pettit. Armed with these clarifications, how can we more closely
approach the notion of citizenship in its relationship with institutions such
as the public school? Where should we place, among the terms of the equa-
tion outlined, constantly invoked collective entities such as 'society', 'nation',
or 'global society' or even 'global political community'? These questions will
benefit from an updated Durkheimian perspective, inseparably neo-holist and
neo-republican.

Note

1 The conciliation of the Weberian nominalist and Durkheimian holist views is done in Gilbert's work in a clever way. She shows that ordinary thinking is spontaneously Durkheimian, in the sense that people easily talk about groups that 'think' this or 'do' that; but Durkheim recommends breaking away from ordinary thinking (prenotions). Weber, on the other hand, recommends taking very seriously the concepts by which social life is lived, but given his insistence on technical concepts such as social action (cyclists *supra*), he has doubts about ordinary holistic thinking. Gilbert's approach therefore consists in saying that understanding ordinary holist thinking, if subjected to conceptual analysis, can be useful for scientific description, and not only for interpretation. In this context, Durkheimian holistic intuitions can provide a fulcrum; but as Weber argues, understanding ordinary concepts remains fundamental: to break with them in the Durkheimian way would be harmful. In this, Gilbert reconciles Weberian understanding with Durkheimian holism, in order to analyse, among other things, the ordinary first-person of the plural discourse, a potential indicator of collective intentionality in the form of plural subjects.
PART 2

*Global Citizenship Education: A Durkheimian*
*Perspective*

::
PART 2

*Global Citizenship Education: A Durkheimian*
*Perspective*

::
Introduction to Part 2

That we cannot do without a homeland is what appears to me obvi-
ous: for we cannot live outside an organised society and the high-
est organised society that exists is the homeland. Therefore, in this
sense, anti-patriotism has always seemed absurd to me. But there
is another question with a less easy solution: it is knowing what
kind of homeland we must want. Undoubtedly, we have obligations
towards the already constituted homeland, of which we are a part
in fact, from which we do not have the right to free ourselves. How-
ever, above this homeland, there is another that is being formed,
that envelops our national homeland; it is the European homeland,
or the human homeland. But to what extent should we want this
homeland? [...] There would be a theoretical solution to the prob-
lem; it is to imagine humanity itself organised as a society. Yet, is
it necessary to say that such an idea, if not entirely unachievable,
must be rejected in such an indeterminate future that there is really
no need to consider it. [...] Nevertheless, there is a way to recon-
cile these two feelings. It is that the national ideal merges with the
human ideal; it is that particular states become themselves, each in
their own strength, the organs by which this general ideal is real-
ised.

DURKHEIM (1900–1908/2020, pp. 133, 241)

∴
∴
∴

The first part of the book showed that the work between sociology and philo-
ophy, in the service of ETS, requires a simultaneous analysis of ideals, norms
deriving from them and analytical tools of social reality. However, a common
objection comes to mind: should social sciences not simply describe and
explain people's actions, as well as the subjective aspect of their representa-
tions, without being burdened with costly reflection on ideals?

We do not believe so, for two main reasons. On the one hand, as we have
seen, sociology does not escape normative judgments based on the ideals of
the researcher, as a member of a given society (or even a political commu-
nity). On the other hand, we make our own Durkheim's reflection according
to which ideals are real objects, which can be analysed sociologically, though
Introduction to Part 2

That we cannot do without a homeland is what appears to me obvi-
ous: for we cannot live outside an organised society and the high-
est organised society that exists is the homeland. Therefore, in this
sense, anti-patriotism has always seemed absurd to me. But there
is another question with a less easy solution: it is knowing what
kind of homeland we must want. Undoubtedly, we have obligations
towards the already constituted homeland, of which we are a part
in fact, from which we do not have the right to free ourselves. How-
ever, above this homeland, there is another that is being formed,
that envelops our national homeland; it is the European homeland,
or the human homeland. But to what extent should we want this
homeland? [...] There would be a theoretical solution to the prob-
lem; it is to imagine humanity itself organised as a society. Yet, is
it necessary to say that such an idea, if not entirely unachievable,
must be rejected in such an indeterminate future that there is really
no need to consider it. [...] Nevertheless, there is a way to recon-
cile these two feelings. It is that the national ideal merges with the
human ideal; it is that particular states become themselves, each in
their own strength, the organs by which this general ideal is real-
ised.

DURKHEIM (1900–1908/2020, pp. 133, 241)

∴
∴
∴

The first part of the book showed that the work between sociology and philo-
ophy, in the service of ETS, requires a simultaneous analysis of ideals, norms
deriving from them and analytical tools of social reality. However, a common
objection comes to mind: should social sciences not simply describe and
explain people's actions, as well as the subjective aspect of their representa-
tions, without being burdened with costly reflection on ideals?

We do not believe so, for two main reasons. On the one hand, as we have
seen, sociology does not escape normative judgments based on the ideals of
the researcher, as a member of a given society (or even a political commu-
nity). On the other hand, we make our own Durkheim's reflection according
to which ideals are real objects, which can be analysed sociologically, though
not soluble in the subjective judgment: “a value judgment expresses the rela-
tionship of a thing with an ideal. But the ideal is given just like the thing, albeit
in a different manner” (Durkheim, 1924/2014, p. 98). Admittedly, the author is
not always convincing, notably when he takes a step further by establishing
a difference between the value judgments *actually* made by individuals, and
those that fall under what values are *in principle*, in their objective aspect: “The
gap is enormous between the way values are, in fact, estimated by the ordinary
individual and this objective scale of human values on which, in principle,
our judgments must be settled” (Durkheim, 1924/2014, p. 98). The pitfall here
would be to attempt to persuade that the sociologist has access to this objec-
tive scale of human values.

Without going as far as this last Durkheimian claim, implicitly extended by
Bourdieu, but strongly contested by Boltanski and Thévenot who anchor the
debates on values at the centre of their analysis, we will continue on the path
outlined in the first part, about collective entities in their inseparable socio-
logical and political aspects. Furthermore, this way takes a particular mean-
ing in ETS: far from being an arbitrary addition of academic disciplines, ETS
explicitly articulate an aim of knowledge with a practical aim and a political
ideal (Malet, 2021). All the more reason to revisit and update the position of
Durkheim, professor of sociology and education science, who tried to articu-
late science and political action.
not soluble in the subjective judgment: “a value judgment expresses the rela-
tionship of a thing with an ideal. But the ideal is given just like the thing, albeit
in a different manner” (Durkheim, 1924/2014, p. 98). Admittedly, the author is
not always convincing, notably when he takes a step further by establishing
a difference between the value judgments *actually* made by individuals, and
those that fall under what values are *in principle*, in their objective aspect: “The
gap is enormous between the way values are, in fact, estimated by the ordinary
individual and this objective scale of human values on which, in principle,
our judgments must be settled” (Durkheim, 1924/2014, p. 98). The pitfall here
would be to attempt to persuade that the sociologist has access to this objec-
tive scale of human values.

Without going as far as this last Durkheimian claim, implicitly extended by Bourdieu, but strongly contested by Boltanski and Thévenot who anchor the debates on values at the centre of their analysis, we will continue on the path outlined in the first part, about collective entities in their inseparable socio-logical and political aspects. Furthermore, this way takes a particular mean-ing in ETS: far from being an arbitrary addition of academic disciplines, ETS explicitly articulate an aim of knowledge with a practical aim and a political ideal (Malet, 2021). All the more reason to revisit and update the position of Durkheim, professor of sociology and education science, who tried to articu-late science and political action.
Science and Political Action

One of Durkheim's conceptual tools was to distinguish between normal and pathological. The formula may seem provocative to our contemporary ears. Normal was understood as synonymous of general: in this frame, crime and suicide are normal. On the other hand, an exceptionally high rate of selfish or anomic suicide would be pathological, as well as sudden variations in these rates. Thus, it becomes possible to develop courses of action.

Can the solution to this pathological situation [indicated by the rise of selfish and anomic suicide] that European societies are going through [at the beginning of the 20th century] come from the old institutions? Could these (state, religion and family) regain their socialising role? Durkheim's answer is negative. The loss of influence of the three institutions of the family, religion and state is due to their inadequacy to the new conditions of social life; they can no longer effectively play their socialising functions. In a modern society with organic solidarity, socialisation must be made through difference. But the state is too far from the special problems of particular groups to take action in this regard; religious society is no more adapted: its integrating power comes from the fact that it limits the free thought of the individual, which is perfectly contradictory with the movement of modern society; finally, family which is more and more often reduced to the conjugal group, of which we know the weak power of preservation in the matter of suicide, does not allow to hope for a solution. If these institutions can no longer fully play their socialising role in the society with an organic solidarity, we must resolutely turn to the creation of new social forms. (Steiner, 2018, p. 76)

Among these new social forms, the most salient is that of occupational
groups organised on a national basis, likely to provide a moral discipline to the
economic activity, which is subject to the pathologies of the division of labour.
This course of action is certainly not directly related to the subject we are deal-
ing with here (citizenship education) since it first constitutes a reaction to the
deregulation of the economy, generating the amorality of social ties. However,
it allows us to reflect on new ways of organising these professional groups that
are teacher trainers and teachers in the making, in a context of international
division of labour: Europeanisation and globalisation of higher education,
Science and Political Action

One of Durkheim's conceptual tools was to distinguish between normal and pathological. The formula may seem provocative to our contemporary ears. Normal was understood as synonymous of general: in this frame, crime and suicide are normal. On the other hand, an exceptionally high rate of selfish or anomic suicide would be pathological, as well as sudden variations in these rates. Thus, it becomes possible to develop courses of action.

Can the solution to this pathological situation [indicated by the rise of selfish and anomic suicide] that European societies are going through [at the beginning of the 20th century] come from the old institutions? Could these (state, religion and family) regain their socialising role? Durkheim's answer is negative. The loss of influence of the three institutions of the family, religion and state is due to their inadequacy to the new conditions of social life; they can no longer effectively play their socialising functions. In a modern society with organic solidarity, socialisation must be made through difference. But the state is too far from the special problems of particular groups to take action in this regard; religious society is no more adapted: its integrating power comes from the fact that it limits the free thought of the individual, which is perfectly contradictory with the movement of modern society; finally, family which is more and more often reduced to the conjugal group, of which we know the weak power of preservation in the matter of suicide, does not allow to hope for a solution. If these institutions can no longer fully play their socialising role in the society with an organic solidarity, we must resolutely turn to the creation of new social forms. (Steiner, 2018, p. 76)

Among these new social forms, the most salient is that of occupational
groups organised on a national basis, likely to provide a moral discipline to the
economic activity, which is subject to the pathologies of the division of labour.
This course of action is certainly not directly related to the subject we are deal-
ing with here (citizenship education) since it first constitutes a reaction to the
deregulation of the economy, generating the amorality of social ties. However,
it allows us to reflect on new ways of organising these professional groups that
are teacher trainers and teachers in the making, in a context of international
division of labour: Europeanisation and globalisation of higher education,
international recommendations on citizenship education, and on social and
civic skills. The Lifelong Learning Recommendation, 2006/962/EC, includes
eight key competences, the sixth of which is described as follows: "Social and
civic competences: the ability to participate effectively and constructively in
social and professional life and to engage in active and democratic civic partic-
ipation, especially in increasingly diverse societies".¹

1 Reasoning about the State

The Durkheimian perspective also allows the combination of science and
action, by taking into account the evolutions of the state. Indeed, according to
Durkheim, if the state is part of the ancient order on which one cannot rely to
prevent pathologies of the division of labour, it remains nevertheless a lever of
liberation of the individual, in that it makes it possible to go beyond local par-
ticularisms while giving free rein to the development of specialised segments in
society. In its new form implied by the division of labour, the state can become
the place of clarification of the collective consciousness, like a ‘social brain’
envisaged, internally,² as an organ of social thought. By penetrating ‘the deep
layers of society’ and by giving individuals the means to make it more reflective
via advice, assemblies and renewed communication processes, the state as a
social brain avoids the pathologies of modernity by remaining attentive to new
social aspirations, and thus facilitates the development of organic solidarity.

Biological metaphors are by definition limited, but illuminating. The more
animals' bodies are differentiated, the more their brains are developed; the
same is true of differentiated societies that require the active presence of the
state as an integrating and regulating organ. This biological metaphor also
makes it possible to distinguish on the one hand, state administrations, assim-
ilated to the muscular system in charge of movements; and on the other hand,
the state *per se*, in charge of deliberations.

The whole life of the state *per se* takes place not in external actions, in
movements, but in deliberations, that is, in representations. The move-
ments are others, it is administrations of all kinds that are responsible
for it. We see the difference between them and the state; this difference
is also the one that separates the muscular system from the central ner-
vous system. The state is, rigorously speaking, the very organ of social
thought. Under the present conditions, this thought is turned towards a
practical and not speculative goal. The state, at least in general, does not
think solely to think, to build systems of doctrines, but to direct collective
international recommendations on citizenship education, and on social and
civic skills. The Lifelong Learning Recommendation, 2006/962/EC, includes
eight key competences, the sixth of which is described as follows: "Social and
civic competences: the ability to participate effectively and constructively in
social and professional life and to engage in active and democratic civic partic-
ipation, especially in increasingly diverse societies".¹

1 Reasoning about the State

The Durkheimian perspective also allows the combination of science and
action, by taking into account the evolutions of the state. Indeed, according to
Durkheim, if the state is part of the ancient order on which one cannot rely to
prevent pathologies of the division of labour, it remains nevertheless a lever of
liberation of the individual, in that it makes it possible to go beyond local par-
ticularisms while giving free rein to the development of specialised segments in
society. In its new form implied by the division of labour, the state can become
the place of clarification of the collective consciousness, like a ‘social brain’
envisaged, internally,² as an organ of social thought. By penetrating ‘the deep
layers of society’ and by giving individuals the means to make it more reflective
via advice, assemblies and renewed communication processes, the state as a
social brain avoids the pathologies of modernity by remaining attentive to new
social aspirations, and thus facilitates the development of organic solidarity.

Biological metaphors are by definition limited, but illuminating. The more
animals' bodies are differentiated, the more their brains are developed; the
same is true of differentiated societies that require the active presence of the
state as an integrating and regulating organ. This biological metaphor also
makes it possible to distinguish on the one hand, state administrations, assim-
ilated to the muscular system in charge of movements; and on the other hand,
the state *per se*, in charge of deliberations.

The whole life of the state *per se* takes place not in external actions, in
movements, but in deliberations, that is, in representations. The move-
ments are others, it is administrations of all kinds that are responsible
for it. We see the difference between them and the state; this difference
is also the one that separates the muscular system from the central ner-
vous system. The state is, rigorously speaking, the very organ of social
thought. Under the present conditions, this thought is turned towards a
practical and not speculative goal. The state, at least in general, does not
think solely to think, to build systems of doctrines, but to direct collective
conduct. Nevertheless, its essential function is to think. (Durkheim,
1900/2020, p. 106)

This means that the pluralism of societies requires – at first glance paradox-
ically – for the state to take an increasingly important place. For by managing
to make the “collective psychic life” reflexive in “the whole extent of the social
body”, the social brain is animated by a principle of differentiation.

When the state thinks and decides, it should not be said that society
thinks and decides through it, but that it thinks and decides for soci-
ety. It is not a simple instrument of pipelines and concentrations. It is,
in a certain sense, the organising centre of the subgroups themselves.
(Durkheim, 1900/2020, p. 106)

Therefore, the state exists for society, not the other way round. By emphasising this point, sociology broadens political and legal thinking by re-inscribing freedom in History, including pre-modern (Callegaro, 2018). It is a question of thinking the essential distinction between state and society and their joint dynamics, without reducing the former to a broad administration or to a group of specialised officials (deputies, ministers, rectors, inspectors, etc.). For it is indeed the societal process of the division of labour, accompanied by the various reactions of the social body (anomia, selfishness, deepening of moral individualism, organic solidarity), that makes it possible to situate the place of the state.

Thus, against Habermas who inscribed individualistic morality in the letter
of a European constitution, through his famous ‘constitutional patriotism’, the
neo-Durkheimian approach anchors the cult of the person in the social aspira-
tions resulting from the division of labour: that which, when properly integrated
and regulated, generates new forms of solidarity. Habermas certainly joins
Durkheim on the cosmopolitan idea, but the latter anchors it more firmly in the
work that societies carry out on themselves. This point is useful to think about
citizenship in an international perspective, between national prescriptions, pro-
motion of national values, and aspirations of future teachers via an activity on
international awareness, anchored in their practices during their training.

2 Cosmopolitan Patriotism: The Political Purpose of ETS Enlightened by Durkheim

The articulation between theoretical and empirical aspects can therefore be
summarised as follows. As citizens, members of modern and differentiated
conduct. Nevertheless, its essential function is to think. (Durkheim,
1900/2020, p. 106)

This means that the pluralism of societies requires – at first glance paradox-
ically – for the state to take an increasingly important place. For by managing
to make the “collective psychic life” reflexive in “the whole extent of the social
body”, the social brain is animated by a principle of differentiation.

When the state thinks and decides, it should not be said that society
thinks and decides through it, but that it thinks and decides for soci-
ety. It is not a simple instrument of pipelines and concentrations. It is,
in a certain sense, the organising centre of the subgroups themselves.
(Durkheim, 1900/2020, p. 106)

Therefore, the state exists for society, not the other way round. By emphasising this point, sociology broadens political and legal thinking by re-inscribing freedom in History, including pre-modern (Callegaro, 2018). It is a question of thinking the essential distinction between state and society and their joint dynamics, without reducing the former to a broad administration or to a group of specialised officials (deputies, ministers, rectors, inspectors, etc.). For it is indeed the societal process of the division of labour, accompanied by the various reactions of the social body (anomia, selfishness, deepening of moral individualism, organic solidarity), that makes it possible to situate the place of the state.

Thus, against Habermas who inscribed individualistic morality in the letter
of a European constitution, through his famous ‘constitutional patriotism’, the
neo-Durkheimian approach anchors the cult of the person in the social aspira-
tions resulting from the division of labour: that which, when properly integrated
and regulated, generates new forms of solidarity. Habermas certainly joins
Durkheim on the cosmopolitan idea, but the latter anchors it more firmly in the
work that societies carry out on themselves. This point is useful to think about
citizenship in an international perspective, between national prescriptions, pro-
motion of national values, and aspirations of future teachers via an activity on
international awareness, anchored in their practices during their training.

2 Cosmopolitan Patriotism: The Political Purpose of ETS Enlightened by Durkheim

The articulation between theoretical and empirical aspects can therefore be
summarised as follows. As citizens, members of modern and differentiated
societies, a large part of pre-service teachers have a diffuse awareness of the potential contradiction between, on the one hand, the ideal content of a citizenship potentially open to all and on the other hand, its real empirical manifestations as well as the national prescriptions articulated around relatively local values – values of the Republic in France, British values in Great Britain, Christian values in Poland, etc. (Urbanski, 2022b). This approach materialises a deliberate choice, by favouring the critical Durkheimian and Republican line. However, we will see that the concrete framing and the first results of the GlobalSense study suggest the empirical plausibility of these postulates.

What broad and precise framework could provide a clear conceptual tool-
box with sufficiently fine methodological principles? The challenge is all the
more crucial because collecting the material was the result of a compromise
between teams from five different countries (Germany, Belgium, United States,
France, Israel) whose vocabulary on citizenship is already highly differentiated,
for reasons not only academic, but also political and cultural (see Section 3
below).

Exploiting the lines of convergence between a holistic sociology and a
republican philosophy allows a revival of sociology through philosophy. The
GlobalSense field, relating to citizenship from an international perspective, is
a lever to meet this interdisciplinary challenge. In the quotation highlighted at
the start of this second part, Durkheim considers cosmopolitan patriotism as
a prerequisite for a projection towards the ‘human homeland’. Let us now look
at the other side of the coin. As things stand, citizen relates mainly to national
patriotism. What is the link between the latter and cosmopolitan patriotism?

This [cosmopolitan] patriotism does not exclude, if need be, any national
pride; the collective personality, or the individual personalities, cannot
exist without having of themselves, of what they are, a certain feeling,
and that feeling is always personal. As long as there are states, there will
be social self-esteem, and nothing is more legitimate. But societies can
put their self-esteem, not to be the greatest or the wealthiest, but to be
the most just, the most organised, to have the best moral constitution.
(Durkheim, 1900/2020, p. 133)

The emphasis on feelings, such as national pride, might put off the reader
attracted to the cosmopolitan ideal. However, Durkheim does not say that
pride would be necessary; he simply does not exclude it. Moreover, the sociol-
ogist's gesture has a philosophical scope that avoids two pitfalls. On the one
hand, the Kantian pitfall that anchors morality in the individual and makes the
societies, a large part of pre-service teachers have a diffuse awareness of the potential contradiction between, on the one hand, the ideal content of a citizenship potentially open to all and on the other hand, its real empirical manifestations as well as the national prescriptions articulated around relatively local values – values of the Republic in France, British values in Great Britain, Christian values in Poland, etc. (Urbanski, 2022b). This approach materialises a deliberate choice, by favouring the critical Durkheimian and Republican line. However, we will see that the concrete framing and the first results of the GlobalSense study suggest the empirical plausibility of these postulates.

What broad and precise framework could provide a clear conceptual tool-
box with sufficiently fine methodological principles? The challenge is all the
more crucial because collecting the material was the result of a compromise
between teams from five different countries (Germany, Belgium, United States,
France, Israel) whose vocabulary on citizenship is already highly differentiated,
for reasons not only academic, but also political and cultural (see Section 3
below).

Exploiting the lines of convergence between a holistic sociology and a
republican philosophy allows a revival of sociology through philosophy. The
GlobalSense field, relating to citizenship from an international perspective, is
a lever to meet this interdisciplinary challenge. In the quotation highlighted at
the start of this second part, Durkheim considers cosmopolitan patriotism as
a prerequisite for a projection towards the ‘human homeland’. Let us now look
at the other side of the coin. As things stand, citizen relates mainly to national
patriotism. What is the link between the latter and cosmopolitan patriotism?

This [cosmopolitan] patriotism does not exclude, if need be, any national
pride; the collective personality, or the individual personalities, cannot
exist without having of themselves, of what they are, a certain feeling,
and that feeling is always personal. As long as there are states, there will
be social self-esteem, and nothing is more legitimate. But societies can
put their self-esteem, not to be the greatest or the wealthiest, but to be
the most just, the most organised, to have the best moral constitution.
(Durkheim, 1900/2020, p. 133)

The emphasis on feelings, such as national pride, might put off the reader
attracted to the cosmopolitan ideal. However, Durkheim does not say that
pride would be necessary; he simply does not exclude it. Moreover, the sociol-
ogist's gesture has a philosophical scope that avoids two pitfalls. On the one
hand, the Kantian pitfall that anchors morality in the individual and makes the
state a means for the latter to flourish, resulting in an individualistic position producing a negative solidarity threatened by its own jurisdiction (Callegaro, 2018). On the other hand, Durkheim avoids the reactionary pitfall that, trying to formulate a pseudo-holist solution to the Kantian problem, seeks to reunite minds divided by the progress of division of labour by operating a confusion (mystical, romantic, etc.) between state and political society.

Durkheim thus joins the neo-republican thought that shows the limits of a disembodied cosmopolitanism without falling back onto nationalist essentialisation (Appiah, 2020). More specifically, the holistic sociology of Durkheim makes it possible to hold a “cosmopolitan patriotism as a civic ideal” (Erez & Laborde, 2020, p. 191) whose elements we will unfold.

The state is therefore primarily, for Durkheim, an organ of thought. As such, it requires the deployment of secondary groups, including professional groups comprising teachers and their trainers. For if the state inevitably exercises a collective force, the latter must be balanced by other forces, including in a confrontational way.

> The collective force which is the state, in order to be liberating for the individual, itself needs counterweights; it must be contained by other collective forces, namely by these secondary groups. [...] And it is from this conflict of social forces that individual freedoms are born. [...] [Secondary groups] do not only serve to settle and administer interests within their jurisdiction. They have a more general role; they are one of the indispensable conditions of individual emancipation. (Durkheim, 1900/2020, p. 121)

## 3 GlobalSense, Research and Training in Five Countries

GlobalSense is a research focused on teacher training that allows the elaboration of an original scientific questioning, in the wake of the professor of philosophy *and* (republican) professor of sociology *and* professor of education science that was Emile Durkheim. Below are the first milestones of *GlobalSense – Developing Global Sensitivity among Student-Teachers*.

The investigation focuses on a field that is international in two aspects: on the one hand, because of the countries involved in the research; and on the other hand, because of the very notion that is worked on, namely global citizenship education.
state a means for the latter to flourish, resulting in an individualistic position producing a negative solidarity threatened by its own jurisdiction (Callegaro, 2018). On the other hand, Durkheim avoids the reactionary pitfall that, trying to formulate a pseudo-holist solution to the Kantian problem, seeks to reunite minds divided by the progress of division of labour by operating a confusion (mystical, romantic, etc.) between state and political society.

Durkheim thus joins the neo-republican thought that shows the limits of a disembodied cosmopolitanism without falling back onto nationalist essentialisation (Appiah, 2020). More specifically, the holistic sociology of Durkheim makes it possible to hold a “cosmopolitan patriotism as a civic ideal” (Erez & Laborde, 2020, p. 191) whose elements we will unfold.

The state is therefore primarily, for Durkheim, an organ of thought. As such, it requires the deployment of secondary groups, including professional groups comprising teachers and their trainers. For if the state inevitably exercises a collective force, the latter must be balanced by other forces, including in a confrontational way.

> The collective force which is the state, in order to be liberating for the individual, itself needs counterweights; it must be contained by other collective forces, namely by these secondary groups. [...] And it is from this conflict of social forces that individual freedoms are born. [...] [Secondary groups] do not only serve to settle and administer interests within their jurisdiction. They have a more general role; they are one of the indispensable conditions of individual emancipation. (Durkheim, 1900/2020, p. 121)

## 3 GlobalSense, Research and Training in Five Countries

GlobalSense is a research focused on teacher training that allows the elaboration of an original scientific questioning, in the wake of the professor of philosophy *and* (republican) professor of sociology *and* professor of education science that was Emile Durkheim. Below are the first milestones of *GlobalSense – Developing Global Sensitivity among Student-Teachers*.

The investigation focuses on a field that is international in two aspects: on the one hand, because of the countries involved in the research; and on the other hand, because of the very notion that is worked on, namely global citizenship education.
## GlobalSense

The consortium includes universities from Germany, Belgium, the United States, France and Israel. A description of the six workpackages is attached in the annex. In addition to the bearer (Sébastien Urbanski) and the scientific coordinator (Lucy Bell), the consortium members are: Aviv Cohen, Yifat Kolikant, Julia Resnik, Micah Sapir (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Claudia Bergmueller-Hauptmann, Gregor Lang-Wojtasik, Mirjam Hitzelberger (Weingarten University of Education), Emmanuelle Danblon, Lucie Donckier, Odile Gilon (Free University of Brussels), Tim Patterson, Joseph Eisman (Temple University in Philadelphia), Gaïd Andro, Céline Chauvigné, Pascal Guibert, Tanguy Philippe (Nantes University).

Why is it relevant to study GCE and train secondary school teachers? Let us start with relatively consensual remarks. Like every citizen, (future) teachers and their trainers apprehend issues that potentially have a global aspect: migration, climate change, religions, cultural plurality, terrorism, wars, etc. While liberal countries' curricular approaches on citizenship education show similarities (attachment to individual freedom, promotion of tolerance, etc.), each state tends to address these 'global' themes in a culturally and politically specific perspective. As a result, secondary school teachers and pre-service teachers are invited to follow recommendations that fit a relatively local (national) conception of the type of citizens students are expected to become.

The GlobalSense team acknowledges the complexity that stems from the composite nature of the notion of liberal citizenship itself. Indeed, though it is centred on principles claimed to be universal, it is nevertheless the product of national histories. It is specifically a question of exploring the mutual enshrinements of liberal citizenship and national belonging. Whilst doing so, we must consider that in an increasingly interconnected world, teachers should be able to reflect, in a very practical perspective, on the complex relationships between nation and liberal principles that form the substance of the idea of (possibly global) citizenship, framed increasingly by transnational legal and political regulatory structures.

The project has been to implement, over the course of three years, an interactive training system to enable future secondary school teachers to tackle the following issues:

1. Different *conceptions of citizenship* from other countries of the consortium in order to enrich their own;

2. Though *issues relating to citizenship* (reception of migrants, acceptance of religious plurality and freedom of conscience, etc.) may seem consensual
## GlobalSense

The consortium includes universities from Germany, Belgium, the United States, France and Israel. A description of the six workpackages is attached in the annex. In addition to the bearer (Sébastien Urbanski) and the scientific coordinator (Lucy Bell), the consortium members are: Aviv Cohen, Yifat Kolikant, Julia Resnik, Micah Sapir (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Claudia Bergmueller-Hauptmann, Gregor Lang-Wojtasik, Mirjam Hitzelberger (Weingarten University of Education), Emmanuelle Danblon, Lucie Donckier, Odile Gilon (Free University of Brussels), Tim Patterson, Joseph Eisman (Temple University in Philadelphia), Gaïd Andro, Céline Chauvigné, Pascal Guibert, Tanguy Philippe (Nantes University).

Why is it relevant to study GCE and train secondary school teachers? Let us start with relatively consensual remarks. Like every citizen, (future) teachers and their trainers apprehend issues that potentially have a global aspect: migration, climate change, religions, cultural plurality, terrorism, wars, etc. While liberal countries' curricular approaches on citizenship education show similarities (attachment to individual freedom, promotion of tolerance, etc.), each state tends to address these 'global' themes in a culturally and politically specific perspective. As a result, secondary school teachers and pre-service teachers are invited to follow recommendations that fit a relatively local (national) conception of the type of citizens students are expected to become.

The GlobalSense team acknowledges the complexity that stems from the composite nature of the notion of liberal citizenship itself. Indeed, though it is centred on principles claimed to be universal, it is nevertheless the product of national histories. It is specifically a question of exploring the mutual enshrinements of liberal citizenship and national belonging. Whilst doing so, we must consider that in an increasingly interconnected world, teachers should be able to reflect, in a very practical perspective, on the complex relationships between nation and liberal principles that form the substance of the idea of (possibly global) citizenship, framed increasingly by transnational legal and political regulatory structures.

The project has been to implement, over the course of three years, an interactive training system to enable future secondary school teachers to tackle the following issues:

1. Different *conceptions of citizenship* from other countries of the consortium in order to enrich their own;

2. Though *issues relating to citizenship* (reception of migrants, acceptance of religious plurality and freedom of conscience, etc.) may seem consensual
within a given country, they can become controversial from a supranational (or even worldwide) point of view;

3. The inherently global nature of issues (such as migration or climate change) raised by the interconnection between countries, which therefore need to be considered from this *global perspective*;

4. Students are not necessarily long-time members of the nations in which they are educated and/or *sometimes identify with nations* different from (or even in conflict with) those where they are educated. The case of Israel, a member of the consortium, is paroxysmal in this regard since it educates students and future teachers of the Palestinian minority (although Israeli) who are part of the experiment.

For each of these components, elements are put in italics in order to suggest the complexity of GCE, which is an umbrella-notion (Tarozzi & Torres, 2016, p. 3). In spite of differences of opinion among the consortium members regarding GCE, they do agree that an *in abstracto* reflection on these issues is insufficient. This is why interactions are organised online (via zooms), then in attendance through the Erasmus+ programme, allowing (mostly secondary) pre-service teachers to work together and reflect on common, or at least co-constructed, lesson plans on citizenship. It also gives teacher trainers the opportunity to consider more reflective ways of working, perhaps distancing themselves from the prescriptions and politico-cultural frameworks to which they are accustomed. The general training system is therefore unanimously approved and can be summarised as follows.

So far, 312 students have participated in the experiment, making it possible to gradually build up our corpus, composed in January 2024 of:

- 106 lesson plans;

- 36 international zoom sessions of two hours each, during which the class sequences are presented to (and discussed by) peers from other countries;

- 13 *ex-post* group interviews (i.e. focus groups) with 62 pre-service teachers who gave in-depth feedback;

- 151 responses to a preparation questionnaire (prompt) on global citizenship, migration, pre-service teachers' origin and religion;

- 212 self-reflections in which pre-service teachers explained what they had learnt by taking part in GlobalSense;

- 10 students took part in an on-site exchange (4 pre-service teachers from Nantes met 5 peers in Weingarten, accompanied by an EST Master student from Nantes who interviewed them and observed them during the exchange).

In this book, we concentrate on the analysis of prompts and self-reflections, which allows for a nuanced exploration of the pre-service teachers' experiences,
within a given country, they can become controversial from a supranational (or even worldwide) point of view;

3. The inherently global nature of issues (such as migration or climate change) raised by the interconnection between countries, which therefore need to be considered from this *global perspective*;

4. Students are not necessarily long-time members of the nations in which they are educated and/or *sometimes identify with nations* different from (or even in conflict with) those where they are educated. The case of Israel, a member of the consortium, is paroxysmal in this regard since it educates students and future teachers of the Palestinian minority (although Israeli) who are part of the experiment.

For each of these components, elements are put in italics in order to suggest the complexity of GCE, which is an umbrella-notion (Tarozzi & Torres, 2016, p. 3). In spite of differences of opinion among the consortium members regarding GCE, they do agree that an *in abstracto* reflection on these issues is insufficient. This is why interactions are organised online (via zooms), then in attendance through the Erasmus+ programme, allowing (mostly secondary) pre-service teachers to work together and reflect on common, or at least co-constructed, lesson plans on citizenship. It also gives teacher trainers the opportunity to consider more reflective ways of working, perhaps distancing themselves from the prescriptions and politico-cultural frameworks to which they are accustomed. The general training system is therefore unanimously approved and can be summarised as follows.

So far, 312 students have participated in the experiment, making it possible to gradually build up our corpus, composed in January 2024 of:

- 106 lesson plans;

- 36 international zoom sessions of two hours each, during which the class sequences are presented to (and discussed by) peers from other countries;

- 13 *ex-post* group interviews (i.e. focus groups) with 62 pre-service teachers who gave in-depth feedback;

- 151 responses to a preparation questionnaire (prompt) on global citizenship, migration, pre-service teachers' origin and religion;

- 212 self-reflections in which pre-service teachers explained what they had learnt by taking part in GlobalSense;

- 10 students took part in an on-site exchange (4 pre-service teachers from Nantes met 5 peers in Weingarten, accompanied by an EST Master student from Nantes who interviewed them and observed them during the exchange).

In this book, we concentrate on the analysis of prompts and self-reflections, which allows for a nuanced exploration of the pre-service teachers' experiences,
## Pedagogical Design

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>FIGURE 1 Pedagogical design of the GlobalSense training device (Source: GlobalSense)</figcaption></figure>
## Pedagogical Design

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>FIGURE 1 Pedagogical design of the GlobalSense training device (Source: GlobalSense)</figcaption></figure>
offering insights into the transformative impact of the GlobalSense program. This focused approach highlights the participants' reflections and contributes to the overall research findings.

As for the many differences between members of the consortium, though they sometimes constitute obstacles such as misunderstandings, they also constitute working resources. Indeed, since the GlobalSense project is specifically intended to bring out conceptual, political and educational tensions internationally, not rushing into predetermined definitions has been beneficial. Thereby, we are inspired by Pierre Rosanvallon's remarks on the link between conceptual analysis and political action. While some lament the lack of a belief in social progress, what we also lack today is a discussion on words. As such, the notion of global citizenship runs the double risk of being reduced to a slogan and a dissolving consensus, due to the avoidance of intellectual deepening of an idea (Rosanvallon, 2006).

In view of this intellectual deepening, here are some questions that cannot be avoided:

1. Is the question, according to the title of the project submitted to the European Commission, to develop the global sensitivity of teachers in training?

2. Is it about developing education at the global level (global learning, global education)?

3. Is citizenship itself global (global citizenship), and therefore requires an 'education towards' that citizenship?

4. Will citizenship become global once citizenship education becomes global?

It is not about splitting hairs, but about generating possible answers. It can also be a case of finding that no answers are given because the questions, for certain members of the consortium, are considered irrelevant due to the country they belong to, their disciplinary anchoring, or their political presuppositions (in the broad sense of the term: liberalism, communitarianism, etc.) For though GlobalSense is a research that takes social phenomena as its object, it is no less positioned in society, just as any social science. Moreover, it claims to meet societal challenges and that is why the demand for reflexivity, via the internal criticism of the consortium, is crucial.

For instance, we saw in the first part of this book the importance of religion in the shaping of political liberalism, if only through the work of John Rawls. It is because liberalism, in many ways, is a solution to the religious wars that tore Europe apart and to the civil war between sects that was threatening the United States, before it was endowed with a constitution placing non-establishment
offering insights into the transformative impact of the GlobalSense program. This focused approach highlights the participants' reflections and contributes to the overall research findings.

As for the many differences between members of the consortium, though they sometimes constitute obstacles such as misunderstandings, they also constitute working resources. Indeed, since the GlobalSense project is specifically intended to bring out conceptual, political and educational tensions internationally, not rushing into predetermined definitions has been beneficial. Thereby, we are inspired by Pierre Rosanvallon's remarks on the link between conceptual analysis and political action. While some lament the lack of a belief in social progress, what we also lack today is a discussion on words. As such, the notion of global citizenship runs the double risk of being reduced to a slogan and a dissolving consensus, due to the avoidance of intellectual deepening of an idea (Rosanvallon, 2006).

In view of this intellectual deepening, here are some questions that cannot be avoided:

1. Is the question, according to the title of the project submitted to the European Commission, to develop the global sensitivity of teachers in training?

2. Is it about developing education at the global level (global learning, global education)?

3. Is citizenship itself global (global citizenship), and therefore requires an 'education towards' that citizenship?

4. Will citizenship become global once citizenship education becomes global?

It is not about splitting hairs, but about generating possible answers. It can also be a case of finding that no answers are given because the questions, for certain members of the consortium, are considered irrelevant due to the country they belong to, their disciplinary anchoring, or their political presuppositions (in the broad sense of the term: liberalism, communitarianism, etc.) For though GlobalSense is a research that takes social phenomena as its object, it is no less positioned in society, just as any social science. Moreover, it claims to meet societal challenges and that is why the demand for reflexivity, via the internal criticism of the consortium, is crucial.

For instance, we saw in the first part of this book the importance of religion in the shaping of political liberalism, if only through the work of John Rawls. It is because liberalism, in many ways, is a solution to the religious wars that tore Europe apart and to the civil war between sects that was threatening the United States, before it was endowed with a constitution placing non-establishment
among its superior principles (although they are questioned today). Yet the notion of GCE, as it is defended by many of its promoters, has an obvious liberal connotation: the principles it values are individual autonomy, tolerance towards others, non-discrimination, freedom of choice, etc. It is also clear that the nations and societies' conceptions of citizenship are influenced by the religions that were historically dominant. This is why GlobalSense, on the proposal of the Nantes team, wanted to make the participating student teachers work on religions and secularism.

However, during consortium research meetings, some partners expressed the opinion that they did not consider religion to be a global issue. Nonetheless, according to the Nantes team, article 18 of the Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights, which specifically addresses this issue, has a global impact (so much so that alternative declarations have been elaborated, such as the Declaration of Human Rights in Islam), and states and NGOS refer to it to defend causes related to the freedom of citizens. These discussions were informative to understand how each team of researchers perceives the global character of certain topics. An agreement was finally reached between the five countries, but only quite late in the project.

Therefore, the first topic that the student teachers were asked to work on was migration. It was easier for the whole consortium to see it as a global issue, although some members of GlobalSense pointed out that there are many different national ways to promote or prohibit migration, so that we could finally ask ourselves whether there are themes that are more global than others. In fact, this probably depends not on the subjects themselves but on how they are problematised. That being said, it is possible to consider that migration is an important topic to approach in CGE, since it has logically been linked to the issue of borders, which have to be reconsidered in the perspective of a global citizenship.

The consortium includes a continuum between, on the one hand, those who think that the notion of GCE has already been demonstrated; and, on the other hand, those who wish to deploy a real exchange on this subject as a tool for international comparison. Where do these differences stem from? In addition to the obvious different political cultures in the five countries, we must take into account that the Weingarten and Jerusalem teams are far more integrated into the field of education sciences than the Nantes and Brussels' teams, the latter's approach being more rooted in the contributory disciplines: history, sociology, anthropology, philosophy. Consequently, the Belgian and the French pre-service teachers' tend to ask elementary questions – or naive questions depending on the point of view adopted – on the relevance of using the term citizenship, when there is to date no global political community, nor global society, except at the margin for certain specific rights and duties.
among its superior principles (although they are questioned today). Yet the notion of GCE, as it is defended by many of its promoters, has an obvious liberal connotation: the principles it values are individual autonomy, tolerance towards others, non-discrimination, freedom of choice, etc. It is also clear that the nations and societies' conceptions of citizenship are influenced by the religions that were historically dominant. This is why GlobalSense, on the proposal of the Nantes team, wanted to make the participating student teachers work on religions and secularism.

However, during consortium research meetings, some partners expressed the opinion that they did not consider religion to be a global issue. Nonetheless, according to the Nantes team, article 18 of the Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights, which specifically addresses this issue, has a global impact (so much so that alternative declarations have been elaborated, such as the Declaration of Human Rights in Islam), and states and NGOS refer to it to defend causes related to the freedom of citizens. These discussions were informative to understand how each team of researchers perceives the global character of certain topics. An agreement was finally reached between the five countries, but only quite late in the project.

Therefore, the first topic that the student teachers were asked to work on was migration. It was easier for the whole consortium to see it as a global issue, although some members of GlobalSense pointed out that there are many different national ways to promote or prohibit migration, so that we could finally ask ourselves whether there are themes that are more global than others. In fact, this probably depends not on the subjects themselves but on how they are problematised. That being said, it is possible to consider that migration is an important topic to approach in CGE, since it has logically been linked to the issue of borders, which have to be reconsidered in the perspective of a global citizenship.

The consortium includes a continuum between, on the one hand, those who think that the notion of GCE has already been demonstrated; and, on the other hand, those who wish to deploy a real exchange on this subject as a tool for international comparison. Where do these differences stem from? In addition to the obvious different political cultures in the five countries, we must take into account that the Weingarten and Jerusalem teams are far more integrated into the field of education sciences than the Nantes and Brussels' teams, the latter's approach being more rooted in the contributory disciplines: history, sociology, anthropology, philosophy. Consequently, the Belgian and the French pre-service teachers' tend to ask elementary questions – or naive questions depending on the point of view adopted – on the relevance of using the term citizenship, when there is to date no global political community, nor global society, except at the margin for certain specific rights and duties.
4 Taking Criticisms against GCE into Account

Though these elementary questions can be perceived as scholastic, the ambigu-
ity, fragility, even the ‘structural theoretical poverty’ of the notion of GCE as rec-
ognised by major figures in education sciences means they must be addressed.

The tension between liberal and universal cosmopolitism [...] created
a fruitful debate about the implication of the global dimension in citi-
zenship education. [...] Discussions on cosmopolitanism and its critics,
as well as its implications for education policies and practices [...] rep-
resented a theoretical root for the conceptualization of the subsequent
notion of GCE which some have noted has a structural theoretical pov-
erty [...] GCE is blamed for its naïve internationalism, aiming at pursuing
a vague ‘international awareness’, if not even the expression of a dis-
guised colonialism. Not surprisingly, some scholars have observed that it
is unclear whether the very notion of ‘global citizenship’ is a metaphor, a
paradox, or simply an oxymoron. (Tarozzi & Torres, 2016, pp. 9, 17)

This passage contains three crucial elements:

- The concept of GCE is highly problematic;

- Debate on this concept is necessary;

- Terminology may affect educational policies and practices.

These difficult issues are a long-term collective undertaking. To this end, it
is useful to provide an overview of recurring criticisms of the expression GCE.
They may seem sharp, but the horizon of this enterprise is to *overcome* these
criticisms. And this, for a very simple reason: if we adhere, to some extent,
to cosmopolitanism, and perhaps also to the cosmopolitanism sketched by
Durkheim and Pettit (the latter is commented below), then why deprive our-
selves of a slogan which could, in this perspective, provide a point of support,
even because of its popularity in some international academic and political
networks, as well as international educational networks?

Let us start with fragilities.

1. Rather than ‘citizenship’, why is the notion of ‘human rights’ not used? Because defending a specific humanitarian right (right to flee a war, right not to be submerged under water due to climate change) does not equate to treating the recipients of this right as fellow citizens (but as similar persons), let alone grant them citizenship. It is certainly very important that educational approaches to global citizenship address the *de facto* central issue of migration and hospitality. Nevertheless, hospitality, for
4 Taking Criticisms against GCE into Account

Though these elementary questions can be perceived as scholastic, the ambigu-
ity, fragility, even the ‘structural theoretical poverty’ of the notion of GCE as rec-
ognised by major figures in education sciences means they must be addressed.

The tension between liberal and universal cosmopolitism [...] created
a fruitful debate about the implication of the global dimension in citi-
zenship education. [...] Discussions on cosmopolitanism and its critics,
as well as its implications for education policies and practices [...] rep-
resented a theoretical root for the conceptualization of the subsequent
notion of GCE which some have noted has a structural theoretical pov-
erty [...] GCE is blamed for its naïve internationalism, aiming at pursuing
a vague ‘international awareness’, if not even the expression of a dis-
guised colonialism. Not surprisingly, some scholars have observed that it
is unclear whether the very notion of ‘global citizenship’ is a metaphor, a
paradox, or simply an oxymoron. (Tarozzi & Torres, 2016, pp. 9, 17)

This passage contains three crucial elements:

- The concept of GCE is highly problematic;

- Debate on this concept is necessary;

- Terminology may affect educational policies and practices.

These difficult issues are a long-term collective undertaking. To this end, it
is useful to provide an overview of recurring criticisms of the expression GCE.
They may seem sharp, but the horizon of this enterprise is to *overcome* these
criticisms. And this, for a very simple reason: if we adhere, to some extent,
to cosmopolitanism, and perhaps also to the cosmopolitanism sketched by
Durkheim and Pettit (the latter is commented below), then why deprive our-
selves of a slogan which could, in this perspective, provide a point of support,
even because of its popularity in some international academic and political
networks, as well as international educational networks?

Let us start with fragilities.

1. Rather than ‘citizenship’, why is the notion of ‘human rights’ not used? Because defending a specific humanitarian right (right to flee a war, right not to be submerged under water due to climate change) does not equate to treating the recipients of this right as fellow citizens (but as similar persons), let alone grant them citizenship. It is certainly very important that educational approaches to global citizenship address the *de facto* central issue of migration and hospitality. Nevertheless, hospitality, for
example, is very different from citizenship, and seems to require on the
contrary some *absence* of fellow citizenship to be practised.

2. Does the promotion of global citizenship not involve the risk of serving the interests of globalised capitalism by promoting so called ‘multicultural’, emotional, cognitive and communicative skills as supports for good performance in large transnational companies, thus accentuating inequalities to the detriment of children from working-class backgrounds who remain confined to a national education less in touch with this pseudo-multiculturalism (Dugonjic-Rodwin, 2022)?

3. If “the goal of equipping learners with the skills to work in a globalised world hides two different perspectives, [...] one neoliberal, the other emancipatory” (Tarozzi & Torres, 2016, p. 14), then how can neoliberal exploitation be avoided? This is all the more difficult since we know the skill with which the dominant ideology utilises progressive perspectives for its own benefit, including that of researchers through a “trial in provincialism against field surveys and monographs in favour of ‘world’ or ‘global’ approaches, strongly backed up by simple compilation work and second-hand sources through a reformulation of the problems in conceptual canvases simplified and easily transposable in various universes and which are suddenly imposed as real generative grammars of (bad) questions” (Christin & Deschamp, 2016, p. 17).

The implementation of effective, frank, sometimes tense but always warm communication within GlobalSense is therefore a condition of the project. The teacher trainers, who are also researchers, can make an international comparison of their frames of thought, views and practices. They do not hesitate to contradict certain stereotypes that emanate from external visions of their country, and this enables them in turn to better understand the background framing their national or local work practices. Consequently, we have been gradually testing and improving our international cooperation practices, in accordance with the European Commission's programme Key Action 2 – Cooperation Partnerships in Higher Education.

5 Liberal Nationalism and (Liberal) Global Citizenship

This endeavour is in close articulation with the status of collective entities,
studied in the first part, because the problem is the one Mauss articulated:
nations do not live in an environment superior to themselves despite uto-
pians generally ignoring this point of view according to him. This is why an
example, is very different from citizenship, and seems to require on the
contrary some *absence* of fellow citizenship to be practised.

2. Does the promotion of global citizenship not involve the risk of serving the interests of globalised capitalism by promoting so called ‘multicultural’, emotional, cognitive and communicative skills as supports for good performance in large transnational companies, thus accentuating inequalities to the detriment of children from working-class backgrounds who remain confined to a national education less in touch with this pseudo-multiculturalism (Dugonjic-Rodwin, 2022)?

3. If “the goal of equipping learners with the skills to work in a globalised world hides two different perspectives, [...] one neoliberal, the other emancipatory” (Tarozzi & Torres, 2016, p. 14), then how can neoliberal exploitation be avoided? This is all the more difficult since we know the skill with which the dominant ideology utilises progressive perspectives for its own benefit, including that of researchers through a “trial in provincialism against field surveys and monographs in favour of ‘world’ or ‘global’ approaches, strongly backed up by simple compilation work and second-hand sources through a reformulation of the problems in conceptual canvases simplified and easily transposable in various universes and which are suddenly imposed as real generative grammars of (bad) questions” (Christin & Deschamp, 2016, p. 17).

The implementation of effective, frank, sometimes tense but always warm communication within GlobalSense is therefore a condition of the project. The teacher trainers, who are also researchers, can make an international comparison of their frames of thought, views and practices. They do not hesitate to contradict certain stereotypes that emanate from external visions of their country, and this enables them in turn to better understand the background framing their national or local work practices. Consequently, we have been gradually testing and improving our international cooperation practices, in accordance with the European Commission's programme Key Action 2 – Cooperation Partnerships in Higher Education.

5 Liberal Nationalism and (Liberal) Global Citizenship

This endeavour is in close articulation with the status of collective entities,
studied in the first part, because the problem is the one Mauss articulated:
nations do not live in an environment superior to themselves despite uto-
pians generally ignoring this point of view according to him. This is why an
anthropological approach is ontologically incompatible with the idea of
a world-society,³ whose existence many supporters of GCE affirm is either
proven or in the making. They define a 'world-society' in a liberal-nominalist
perspective, because their thinking tools lead them to describe society mainly
as a set of individuals. When one concedes this liberal-nominalist gesture, it is
then easy to consider that a world-society exists: it would suffice to conceive
what an individual is (no doubt inspired by the way individuals exist in our
country), before projecting this reality onto a global scale, taking care to add
nation-states in the form of containers that hold and frame individuals. How-
ever, this type of error that confuses the individual-value and the empirical
individual can be avoided by a rereading of Durkheim, Mauss and Dumont.

Does this mean that Mauss would not be cosmopolitan? The question is not relevant because, contrary to what some proponents of global citizenship education claim, cosmopolitanism (the ancient ideal) and global citizenship (the recent slogan) are *a priori* two different things. It is nevertheless worth unfolding the proper sociological reason of why Mauss preferred to call himself an internationalist, as we saw in the introduction.

A society is an individual, other societies are other individuals. Between them it is not possible – as long as they remain individualised – to constitute a higher individuality. This observation of fact and common sense is generally lost on utopians [...]. If the formation of social groups larger than our great nations still falls entirely within the domain of an idea, and of an ideal, however, the importance and awareness of the relationship phenomena between nations and societies of all kinds have increased to unforeseen degrees. [...] And therefore extremely numerous conditions are given for the practical solution to a practical problem to become, if not immediately possible, at least conceivable. (Mauss, 1953/2013, p. 120)

In other words, what is crucial is the awareness within nations of the phenomena of inter-social relations (that is, between societies). Moreover, it is not certain that the projection towards world citizenship will make it possible to carry out this gesture without reintroducing dubious confusions. Indeed, this projection risks making us believe that the ideal of world citizenship is an individual characteristic. This admittedly is not false: individuals can believe they are citizens of the world, and that all humans are called to be citizens of the world. However, this falls under the moral individualism of which Durkheim, clarified by Dumont, had described the societal emergence.

The risk is, therefore, as we saw in the introduction, to confuse the empirical
individual and the moral individual (or value-individual to speak like Dumont).
anthropological approach is ontologically incompatible with the idea of
a world-society,³ whose existence many supporters of GCE affirm is either
proven or in the making. They define a 'world-society' in a liberal-nominalist
perspective, because their thinking tools lead them to describe society mainly
as a set of individuals. When one concedes this liberal-nominalist gesture, it is
then easy to consider that a world-society exists: it would suffice to conceive
what an individual is (no doubt inspired by the way individuals exist in our
country), before projecting this reality onto a global scale, taking care to add
nation-states in the form of containers that hold and frame individuals. How-
ever, this type of error that confuses the individual-value and the empirical
individual can be avoided by a rereading of Durkheim, Mauss and Dumont.

Does this mean that Mauss would not be cosmopolitan? The question is not relevant because, contrary to what some proponents of global citizenship education claim, cosmopolitanism (the ancient ideal) and global citizenship (the recent slogan) are *a priori* two different things. It is nevertheless worth unfolding the proper sociological reason of why Mauss preferred to call himself an internationalist, as we saw in the introduction.

A society is an individual, other societies are other individuals. Between them it is not possible – as long as they remain individualised – to constitute a higher individuality. This observation of fact and common sense is generally lost on utopians [...]. If the formation of social groups larger than our great nations still falls entirely within the domain of an idea, and of an ideal, however, the importance and awareness of the relationship phenomena between nations and societies of all kinds have increased to unforeseen degrees. [...] And therefore extremely numerous conditions are given for the practical solution to a practical problem to become, if not immediately possible, at least conceivable. (Mauss, 1953/2013, p. 120)

In other words, what is crucial is the awareness within nations of the phenomena of inter-social relations (that is, between societies). Moreover, it is not certain that the projection towards world citizenship will make it possible to carry out this gesture without reintroducing dubious confusions. Indeed, this projection risks making us believe that the ideal of world citizenship is an individual characteristic. This admittedly is not false: individuals can believe they are citizens of the world, and that all humans are called to be citizens of the world. However, this falls under the moral individualism of which Durkheim, clarified by Dumont, had described the societal emergence.

The risk is, therefore, as we saw in the introduction, to confuse the empirical
individual and the moral individual (or value-individual to speak like Dumont).
This second aspect can only be grasped in a holistic approach: indeed, it is *societies* that give substance to the idea of citizenship, including the idea of global citizenship, which is in tune with the individualistic ideology of the moderns as understood by Dumont. This can lead to the following reasoning:

- Individuals in the world are all equal in dignity,

- Which means equality is a characteristic of individuals,

- Therefore citizenship must be conceivable starting from individuals,

- Consequently, there is a truly global citizenship that brings people together.

We will see that this bottom line emerges in the nominal-liberalist motif in GCE, challenging the social totalities on the principle of the modern individualist ideology that, nevertheless, gives substance to the idea of GCE. That is why the purpose of this book is to give oneself the means to become better acquainted with “the modern system of ideas and values which we believe to know all about because it is in it that we think and live” (Dumont, 1991, p. 20).

Of course, it would be better for this to mobilise anthropological tools fully. This would have been possible if the GlobalSense consortium had included a country from the Global South. Since this is not the case, we shall confine ourselves here to reviewing the genesis of our liberal ideas, which liberal nationalists highlight: “Liberals take too little account of the process by which societies described today as robustly liberal have precisely become so” (Miller, 2020, p. 35). Liberalism and the national idea, far from being contradictory, call out for each other, giving meaning to the expression liberal nationalism.⁴ Moreover, it is *against* this idea combining nationality and citizenship that a neo-liberal conception, ‘earned citizenship’, arises, linked to merit and/or money (purchase of passports, etc.), making citizenship more conditional and increasingly linked to the *individual* attributes of people, apprehended from an atomistic perspective (Joppke, 2021).

What about the educational field? The valorisation of the national idea in Durkheim's work is known. But it is worth remembering that John Dewey's position, a typically liberal author, was quite close to Durkheim's, *modulo* school pedagogy, which is not the main object of this section.⁵ Describing nationalism as a mixture of good and evil, Dewey called for developing its positive aspects in the educational field (moral community, solidarity, inclusion) and for fighting, on the contrary, its illiberal aspects. Thus liberal nationalism, through public school education, could be the ally of internationalism.

We are now faced by the difficulty of developing the good aspect of nationalism without its evil side; of developing a nationalism which is the
This second aspect can only be grasped in a holistic approach: indeed, it is *societies* that give substance to the idea of citizenship, including the idea of global citizenship, which is in tune with the individualistic ideology of the moderns as understood by Dumont. This can lead to the following reasoning:

- Individuals in the world are all equal in dignity,

- Which means equality is a characteristic of individuals,

- Therefore citizenship must be conceivable starting from individuals,

- Consequently, there is a truly global citizenship that brings people together.

We will see that this bottom line emerges in the nominal-liberalist motif in GCE, challenging the social totalities on the principle of the modern individualist ideology that, nevertheless, gives substance to the idea of GCE. That is why the purpose of this book is to give oneself the means to become better acquainted with “the modern system of ideas and values which we believe to know all about because it is in it that we think and live” (Dumont, 1991, p. 20).

Of course, it would be better for this to mobilise anthropological tools fully. This would have been possible if the GlobalSense consortium had included a country from the Global South. Since this is not the case, we shall confine ourselves here to reviewing the genesis of our liberal ideas, which liberal nationalists highlight: “Liberals take too little account of the process by which societies described today as robustly liberal have precisely become so” (Miller, 2020, p. 35). Liberalism and the national idea, far from being contradictory, call out for each other, giving meaning to the expression liberal nationalism.⁴ Moreover, it is *against* this idea combining nationality and citizenship that a neo-liberal conception, ‘earned citizenship’, arises, linked to merit and/or money (purchase of passports, etc.), making citizenship more conditional and increasingly linked to the *individual* attributes of people, apprehended from an atomistic perspective (Joppke, 2021).

What about the educational field? The valorisation of the national idea in Durkheim's work is known. But it is worth remembering that John Dewey's position, a typically liberal author, was quite close to Durkheim's, *modulo* school pedagogy, which is not the main object of this section.⁵ Describing nationalism as a mixture of good and evil, Dewey called for developing its positive aspects in the educational field (moral community, solidarity, inclusion) and for fighting, on the contrary, its illiberal aspects. Thus liberal nationalism, through public school education, could be the ally of internationalism.

We are now faced by the difficulty of developing the good aspect of nationalism without its evil side; of developing a nationalism which is the
friend and not the foe of internationalism. Those concerned with educa-
tion should withstand popular clamour for a nationalism based on hys-
terical excitement or mechanical drill, or a combination of the two. We
must ask what a real nationalism, a real Americanism, is like. For unless
we know our character and purpose we are not likely to be intelligent in
our selection of the means to further them. [...] To nationalize American
education is to use education to promote our national idea – which is the
idea of democracy. (Dewey, 1916, p. 203)

This captures the deeply interdisciplinary aspect of our approach. Anthro-
pologists, historians and philosophers can remind sociologists that individ-
ualism as a value is the product of particular societies, often nations. If the
value given to the individual is obvious, it is precisely because we live in the
sort of society where this value has found the conditions for its elaboration,
its implementation, its codification in law and its dissemination. The point is
emphasised by Durkheim, but more so by Louis Dumont, whose anthropolog-
ical perspective makes it possible to grasp the specificity of different societies,
including ours,⁶ by avoiding the projection of a particular experience onto the
world level. The Dumontian gesture also allows us to grasp the phenomenon of
nationalism in a less polemic, less pejorative and more in-depth perspective.

Someone opposes nationalism to individualism, without explanation; undoubtedly, it must be understood that nationalism fits a group feeling that is opposed to ‘individualist’ sentiment. In reality, the nation in the precise, modern sense of the term, and nationalism – distinguished from simple patriotism – have historically been linked to individualism as a value. The nation is precisely the type of global society that corresponds to the reign of individualism as a value. Not only does it accompany it historically, but the interdependence between the two is necessary, so that one can say that the nation is the global society composed of people who consider themselves as individuals. (Dumont, 1991, pp. 21–22)

If we admit these points, then the consequences are crucial. They do not
enable us to easily imagine a 'leap' towards global citizenship, favoured by organ-
isations of quasi-global influence such as UNESCO. Thus, this book defends the
relevance of a debate that consists in enriching the discussions on GCE by inte-
grating a bi-disciplinary approach (sociology and philosophy) to serve ETS, as
well as taking seriously the ethical and political, and therefore educational, per-
spectives of GCE supporters: "The call for GC [global citizenship], beyond the
friend and not the foe of internationalism. Those concerned with educa-
tion should withstand popular clamour for a nationalism based on hys-
terical excitement or mechanical drill, or a combination of the two. We
must ask what a real nationalism, a real Americanism, is like. For unless
we know our character and purpose we are not likely to be intelligent in
our selection of the means to further them. [...] To nationalize American
education is to use education to promote our national idea – which is the
idea of democracy. (Dewey, 1916, p. 203)

This captures the deeply interdisciplinary aspect of our approach. Anthro-
pologists, historians and philosophers can remind sociologists that individ-
ualism as a value is the product of particular societies, often nations. If the
value given to the individual is obvious, it is precisely because we live in the
sort of society where this value has found the conditions for its elaboration,
its implementation, its codification in law and its dissemination. The point is
emphasised by Durkheim, but more so by Louis Dumont, whose anthropolog-
ical perspective makes it possible to grasp the specificity of different societies,
including ours,⁶ by avoiding the projection of a particular experience onto the
world level. The Dumontian gesture also allows us to grasp the phenomenon of
nationalism in a less polemic, less pejorative and more in-depth perspective.

Someone opposes nationalism to individualism, without explanation; undoubtedly, it must be understood that nationalism fits a group feeling that is opposed to ‘individualist’ sentiment. In reality, the nation in the precise, modern sense of the term, and nationalism – distinguished from simple patriotism – have historically been linked to individualism as a value. The nation is precisely the type of global society that corresponds to the reign of individualism as a value. Not only does it accompany it historically, but the interdependence between the two is necessary, so that one can say that the nation is the global society composed of people who consider themselves as individuals. (Dumont, 1991, pp. 21–22)

If we admit these points, then the consequences are crucial. They do not
enable us to easily imagine a 'leap' towards global citizenship, favoured by organ-
isations of quasi-global influence such as UNESCO. Thus, this book defends the
relevance of a debate that consists in enriching the discussions on GCE by inte-
grating a bi-disciplinary approach (sociology and philosophy) to serve ETS, as
well as taking seriously the ethical and political, and therefore educational, per-
spectives of GCE supporters: "The call for GC [global citizenship], beyond the
extension of the citizen's concept from the national to the global level, certainly
has an ethical and political value and, by implication, educational significance"
(Tarozzi & Torres, 2016, p. 11).

6 GCE, a Horizon Compatible with Different Ethics

GlobalSense research can therefore deal with several approaches at the polit-
ical level; but more importantly, taking the variety of approaches seriously is
what is most likely to meet the comparative challenge. Indeed, many authors
insist that GCE is an ideal and a horizon. Yet, what are the ways to achieve it?
They are probably multiple, since each country's realities on the ground and
room for (educational, institutional) manoeuvre are narrow, which cannot fail
to question the different versions, or even the merits, of the ideal in sight.

This is why supporters of GCE, aware of the notion's fragility, fall back on a
defensive register to save their approach: “GCE is a key notion as a general hori-
zon or as a psycho-social framework for collectiveness and world conscious-
ness” (Tarozzi & Torres, 2016, p. 11). Nevertheless, at the same time, we feel
that what is described as a general horizon needs to be delineated. Let us take
the spatial metaphor literally. Lost in the desert, should one fix the horizon or
rather the next dune? To what extent does the horizon provide me with a refer-
ence point? Since the horizon is distant, is it not better to consider a closer
reference point, which could be identified by means of critical national-liberal
or republican approaches (for instance), materialising steps towards the global
level?

However, as mentioned above, some proponents of GCE are quite willing to
accept sometimes virulent criticism against the very notion of GC – as being
contradictory, vague, utopian, weak, misleading. To respond, they write:

GC does not provide any legal status. Lacking a 'legal bite' represents its
weakest condition and is a sort of contradiction in terms. [...] In our view,
however, [GC] is an ethos, an educational *paideia*, a framing paradigm
that embodies new meaning for education and its role in developing
knowledge, values, attitudes for securing tolerance, diversity recognition,
inclusion, justice and sustainability across the world and in local commu-
nities. As such, it requires an ethical status as much as formal member-
ship which may impact legal frameworks. (Tarozzi & Torres, 2016, p. 14)

From a political philosophy point of view, the clarification is slightly dis-
appointing: we learn that the notion of citizenship *actually* meant something
extension of the citizen's concept from the national to the global level, certainly
has an ethical and political value and, by implication, educational significance"
(Tarozzi & Torres, 2016, p. 11).

6 GCE, a Horizon Compatible with Different Ethics

GlobalSense research can therefore deal with several approaches at the polit-
ical level; but more importantly, taking the variety of approaches seriously is
what is most likely to meet the comparative challenge. Indeed, many authors
insist that GCE is an ideal and a horizon. Yet, what are the ways to achieve it?
They are probably multiple, since each country's realities on the ground and
room for (educational, institutional) manoeuvre are narrow, which cannot fail
to question the different versions, or even the merits, of the ideal in sight.

This is why supporters of GCE, aware of the notion's fragility, fall back on a
defensive register to save their approach: “GCE is a key notion as a general hori-
zon or as a psycho-social framework for collectiveness and world conscious-
ness” (Tarozzi & Torres, 2016, p. 11). Nevertheless, at the same time, we feel
that what is described as a general horizon needs to be delineated. Let us take
the spatial metaphor literally. Lost in the desert, should one fix the horizon or
rather the next dune? To what extent does the horizon provide me with a refer-
ence point? Since the horizon is distant, is it not better to consider a closer
reference point, which could be identified by means of critical national-liberal
or republican approaches (for instance), materialising steps towards the global
level?

However, as mentioned above, some proponents of GCE are quite willing to
accept sometimes virulent criticism against the very notion of GC – as being
contradictory, vague, utopian, weak, misleading. To respond, they write:

GC does not provide any legal status. Lacking a 'legal bite' represents its
weakest condition and is a sort of contradiction in terms. [...] In our view,
however, [GC] is an ethos, an educational *paideia*, a framing paradigm
that embodies new meaning for education and its role in developing
knowledge, values, attitudes for securing tolerance, diversity recognition,
inclusion, justice and sustainability across the world and in local commu-
nities. As such, it requires an ethical status as much as formal member-
ship which may impact legal frameworks. (Tarozzi & Torres, 2016, p. 14)

From a political philosophy point of view, the clarification is slightly dis-
appointing: we learn that the notion of citizenship *actually* meant something
else: ethos, framing paradigm, *paideia*. Nonetheless, if the objective is to influ-
ence legal frameworks, then we can better perceive the potential impact in
terms of citizenship. However, even reworded in this way, the ideal remains
somewhat intimidating. Are we able to promote, as the authors say, a "new
meaning for education and its role throughout the world and in local com-
munities", serving "knowledge, justice, inclusion, recognition of diversity, tol-
erance and sustainable development"? Are we able to do this by relying mainly
on an educational ethos?

In our case, the five countries gathered in GlobalSense represent a small part of the world. Additionally, the central protocol, which consists in studying the ways in which pre-service teachers develop class sequences on citizenship, before discussing them with peers from other countries, does not clearly require registration under the GCE label. The reality is indeed pluri-national because the lesson plans must comply with national or local curriculum. Still, the fact is that as a slogan accompanying globalisation policies, GCE accommodates almost all political perspectives – multiculturalism, republicanism, Marxism, neo-liberalism, interreligious dialogue, etc.

These multiple tones of GCE are part of the broader framework of education policies at an international level, according to “an approach that is individualising, competitive and adaptive, as well as weakly societal” (Malet, 2023, p. 52), via the lexicon of global citizenship, well-being or sustainable development. These are captured not through the lens of the co-operative transnationalism of the 1970s, but under the influence of the current dominant movement of skills that qualify the employability of the individual or even their human capital. The result is “a tacit conception of quality, success and professional and personal realisation” (*idem*) which requires, in our view, a very Durkheimian vigilance, perceiving in the hyper-individualism one of the main pathologies of division of labour when the state is no longer able to fulfil its integrative and regulatory role. For if moral individualism is an asset to our modern societies, the “disintegration of holistic representation by individualism” (Dumont, 1991, p. 185) is a slippery slope.

7 **Giving a Political Meaning to the Knowledge and Values Involved in**
**'Educations Toward'**

It is possible to orient oneself in this complexity by returning to a model worked
on in ETS at the service of the critical thinking of trainers, teachers and stu-
dents. Firstly, it is important to take into account the more or less important
gaps in any curriculum in its six dimensions. These are what is: prescribed,
else: ethos, framing paradigm, *paideia*. Nonetheless, if the objective is to influ-
ence legal frameworks, then we can better perceive the potential impact in
terms of citizenship. However, even reworded in this way, the ideal remains
somewhat intimidating. Are we able to promote, as the authors say, a "new
meaning for education and its role throughout the world and in local com-
munities", serving "knowledge, justice, inclusion, recognition of diversity, tol-
erance and sustainable development"? Are we able to do this by relying mainly
on an educational ethos?

In our case, the five countries gathered in GlobalSense represent a small part of the world. Additionally, the central protocol, which consists in studying the ways in which pre-service teachers develop class sequences on citizenship, before discussing them with peers from other countries, does not clearly require registration under the GCE label. The reality is indeed pluri-national because the lesson plans must comply with national or local curriculum. Still, the fact is that as a slogan accompanying globalisation policies, GCE accommodates almost all political perspectives – multiculturalism, republicanism, Marxism, neo-liberalism, interreligious dialogue, etc.

These multiple tones of GCE are part of the broader framework of education policies at an international level, according to “an approach that is individualising, competitive and adaptive, as well as weakly societal” (Malet, 2023, p. 52), via the lexicon of global citizenship, well-being or sustainable development. These are captured not through the lens of the co-operative transnationalism of the 1970s, but under the influence of the current dominant movement of skills that qualify the employability of the individual or even their human capital. The result is “a tacit conception of quality, success and professional and personal realisation” (*idem*) which requires, in our view, a very Durkheimian vigilance, perceiving in the hyper-individualism one of the main pathologies of division of labour when the state is no longer able to fulfil its integrative and regulatory role. For if moral individualism is an asset to our modern societies, the “disintegration of holistic representation by individualism” (Dumont, 1991, p. 185) is a slippery slope.

7 **Giving a Political Meaning to the Knowledge and Values Involved in**
**'Educations Toward'**

It is possible to orient oneself in this complexity by returning to a model worked
on in ETS at the service of the critical thinking of trainers, teachers and stu-
dents. Firstly, it is important to take into account the more or less important
gaps in any curriculum in its six dimensions. These are what is: prescribed,
recommended, intermediate (textbooks for example), real (what is actually
done in class), produced (what students learn) and, finally, possible, referring
to the “principles of development of what could be justified by a reference sys-
tem through exploratory and prospective research work” (Barthes, 2022, p. 599).

Since GlobalSense focuses on the pedagogical device, we will focus on the
recommended curriculum, the intermediate curriculum and the possible
curriculum. The real curriculum is therefore not taken into account (because
the pre-service teachers will not be testing their productions in class) and the
prescribed curriculum will only be taken into account for comparative pur-
poses: for example by noting that GCE is part of the prescribed curriculum in
Germany, but not in France where this education is recommended, at most
(very implicitly).

However, we must accurately scrutinise the learning process of teachers
in training. The focus will be placed on curriculum guidelines, making it pos-
sible to "move from a formal curriculum to a real curriculum by borrowing
precise, chosen and conscious goals and values", knowing that these goals
can take political, didactic, strategic and programmatic aspects (Barthes
& Lange, 2022a, p. 43). The first two aspects are obvious to the GlobalSense
team. Students (pre-service teachers) may view global citizenship as a very
clear or very misleading notion, including for political reasons. It is also obvi-
ous that pre-service teachers, during their involvement in the international
device, adopt various didactic approaches, depending on the country, previ-
ous training, etc. Nonetheless, the last two points, *strategic* and *programmatic*,
are equally important and refer, for example, to how the pre-service teachers
in France reconcile the GCE framework with the Moral and civic education
framework. In this mobilisation of curriculum guidelines, the GCE slogan is
important but it can just as well be a support, as it can be an object of criticism
for pre-service teachers and/or their trainers, depending precisely on the pur-
poses and values they adopt in their (future) professional practice.

The goal therefore is not to make pre-service teachers understand what
global citizenship *a priori* stands for. Rather, if we contribute to the establish-
ment of education towards global citizenship, this first requires that we agree
on what 'education towards' is. However, far from being a way of getting teacher
trainers, teachers and students to commit to a vision more or less preconceived
by academics within international networks, education towards is, primarily,
a means of restoring political sense to educational work. Universities, in par-
ticular, have considerable flexibility to welcome themes from the political or
social sphere, whose values overwhelm knowledge. Therefore, the GlobalSense
consortium, made up of universities, is also an object of study.
recommended, intermediate (textbooks for example), real (what is actually
done in class), produced (what students learn) and, finally, possible, referring
to the “principles of development of what could be justified by a reference sys-
tem through exploratory and prospective research work” (Barthes, 2022, p. 599).

Since GlobalSense focuses on the pedagogical device, we will focus on the
recommended curriculum, the intermediate curriculum and the possible
curriculum. The real curriculum is therefore not taken into account (because
the pre-service teachers will not be testing their productions in class) and the
prescribed curriculum will only be taken into account for comparative pur-
poses: for example by noting that GCE is part of the prescribed curriculum in
Germany, but not in France where this education is recommended, at most
(very implicitly).

However, we must accurately scrutinise the learning process of teachers
in training. The focus will be placed on curriculum guidelines, making it pos-
sible to "move from a formal curriculum to a real curriculum by borrowing
precise, chosen and conscious goals and values", knowing that these goals
can take political, didactic, strategic and programmatic aspects (Barthes
& Lange, 2022a, p. 43). The first two aspects are obvious to the GlobalSense
team. Students (pre-service teachers) may view global citizenship as a very
clear or very misleading notion, including for political reasons. It is also obvi-
ous that pre-service teachers, during their involvement in the international
device, adopt various didactic approaches, depending on the country, previ-
ous training, etc. Nonetheless, the last two points, *strategic* and *programmatic*,
are equally important and refer, for example, to how the pre-service teachers
in France reconcile the GCE framework with the Moral and civic education
framework. In this mobilisation of curriculum guidelines, the GCE slogan is
important but it can just as well be a support, as it can be an object of criticism
for pre-service teachers and/or their trainers, depending precisely on the pur-
poses and values they adopt in their (future) professional practice.

The goal therefore is not to make pre-service teachers understand what
global citizenship *a priori* stands for. Rather, if we contribute to the establish-
ment of education towards global citizenship, this first requires that we agree
on what 'education towards' is. However, far from being a way of getting teacher
trainers, teachers and students to commit to a vision more or less preconceived
by academics within international networks, education towards is, primarily,
a means of restoring political sense to educational work. Universities, in par-
ticular, have considerable flexibility to welcome themes from the political or
social sphere, whose values overwhelm knowledge. Therefore, the GlobalSense
consortium, made up of universities, is also an object of study.
What can be done with knowledge over-determined by values imported
from the political or social sphere, into disciplinary frameworks, in the
recipient universities? [...] The weakening of the legitimacy of knowledge
in universities creates a space of opportunities in which variable political
strategies are expressed that claim to replace, or at least complete and/
or reinforce this legitimacy. In any case, it makes it possible to evacuate
questions, because it uses scientific knowledge as alibis, which serve to
justify good practices that in reality depend on the choice of values [...].
The central issue of the search for political meaning, when it comes to
striving towards collective and informed ownership of public affairs (in
this case, related to curriculum development) involves reflexivity and
critical analysis of the meaning of situations rather than individual or
collective standardisation. It is a question of fully restoring their func-
tion to ETS [...] so that they can propose collective scientific practices
rather than ones that are only managerial or engineering. To give political
meaning supposes to link together, beyond curricular study, the elements
in order to understand the interests (divergent or not) which animate the
actors of curriculum development. (Barthes & Lange, 2022b, pp. 390–391)

In short, the critical skills of trainers and pre-service teachers should be
given priority, even if this may call into question the validity, operability, time-
liness or relevance of the slogan in question (GCE). The interest of curriculum
guidelines is also to associate a teaching theme (GCE) with how it can unfold in
terms of problematisation, comparison of sources, and validity of the content
involved (Barthes, 2022). These tags also have a number of 'levels' for compari-
son purposes. Thus, the pre-service teacher can think at first that being a global
citizen is quite an attractive notion (level 1, descriptive), will then try to define
the notion, wondering where it comes from (level 2, identification of prob-
lems and sources), before questioning whether the sources illustrating this
notion are coherent (level 3, sources discussed, deconstruction of demand),
and assessing the debates that may arise around the cosmopolitan ideal (level
4, risks and prospective).

Ultimately, it is through these critical questions, potentially carried by
pre-service teachers and oriented by conscious political, axiological, program-
matic and didactic purposes, that curriculum guidelines make it possible to
consider the transition from a recommended curriculum to a real curriculum.
This is how we may grasp, on the sociological level, certain aspirations emanat-
ing from the social body. In this case, it is a group of pre-service teachers (some
in primary but most in secondary), being trained in five different countries.
What can be done with knowledge over-determined by values imported
from the political or social sphere, into disciplinary frameworks, in the
recipient universities? [...] The weakening of the legitimacy of knowledge
in universities creates a space of opportunities in which variable political
strategies are expressed that claim to replace, or at least complete and/
or reinforce this legitimacy. In any case, it makes it possible to evacuate
questions, because it uses scientific knowledge as alibis, which serve to
justify good practices that in reality depend on the choice of values [...].
The central issue of the search for political meaning, when it comes to
striving towards collective and informed ownership of public affairs (in
this case, related to curriculum development) involves reflexivity and
critical analysis of the meaning of situations rather than individual or
collective standardisation. It is a question of fully restoring their func-
tion to ETS [...] so that they can propose collective scientific practices
rather than ones that are only managerial or engineering. To give political
meaning supposes to link together, beyond curricular study, the elements
in order to understand the interests (divergent or not) which animate the
actors of curriculum development. (Barthes & Lange, 2022b, pp. 390–391)

In short, the critical skills of trainers and pre-service teachers should be
given priority, even if this may call into question the validity, operability, time-
liness or relevance of the slogan in question (GCE). The interest of curriculum
guidelines is also to associate a teaching theme (GCE) with how it can unfold in
terms of problematisation, comparison of sources, and validity of the content
involved (Barthes, 2022). These tags also have a number of ‘levels’ for compari-
son purposes. Thus, the pre-service teacher can think at first that being a global
citizen is quite an attractive notion (level 1, descriptive), will then try to define
the notion, wondering where it comes from (level 2, identification of prob-
lems and sources), before questioning whether the sources illustrating this
notion are coherent (level 3, sources discussed, deconstruction of demand),
and assessing the debates that may arise around the cosmopolitan ideal (level
4, risks and prospective).

Ultimately, it is through these critical questions, potentially carried by
pre-service teachers and oriented by conscious political, axiological, program-
matic and didactic purposes, that curriculum guidelines make it possible to
consider the transition from a recommended curriculum to a real curriculum.
This is how we may grasp, on the sociological level, certain aspirations emanat-
ing from the social body. In this case, it is a group of pre-service teachers (some
in primary but most in secondary), being trained in five different countries.
## 8 Presentation of the Five Systems

We have situated this work in the field and epistemology of comparative education research. It is based on contextually grounded comparisons: building on academic resources and data collected in the GlobalSense project, the following description centres on the three local (Baden-Württemberg in Germany, Wallonia-Brussels in Belgium and Pennsylvania in the USA) and two national (Israel and France) education and training systems in and for which the GlobalSense pre-service teachers are being trained.

Linking these systems to their political and social contexts, our objective is to enlighten the various contents of citizenship education curricula, as well as the way pre-service teachers are trained, before analysing the data we collected on their representations of GCE before and after taking part in exchanges with peers from the other participating countries, as well as the potential change in their pedagogical practices.

### 8.1 *The German Education System*

#### 8.1.1 Governance and Administrative Organisation

The German education system is organised at a federal level by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, BMBF). It operates under the framework of the German constitution, named the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The BMBF plays a coordinating and supporting role in education matters. It provides funding for research projects and institutions and sets general educational policy.

The BMBF has seven departments, in addition to the central department that is responsible for administrative tasks:

- Office 1: Strategies and Policy Issues

- Office 2: European and international cooperation in education and research

- Office 3: Vocational Training and Lifelong Learning

- Office 4: Science

- Office 5: Key Technologies – Research for Innovation

- Office 6: Life Sciences – Research for Health

- Office 7: Provision for the Future – Research on Culture, Basic Science and Sustainability

In spite of the BMBF's responsibilities, a large part of educational policy in Germany is decided at the state level, strongly limiting the influence of the ministry in educational matters. Each of Germany's sixteen federal states has its own Ministry of Education or equivalent authority responsible for education policy and legislation within its jurisdiction. These state-level authorities
## 8 Presentation of the Five Systems

We have situated this work in the field and epistemology of comparative education research. It is based on contextually grounded comparisons: building on academic resources and data collected in the GlobalSense project, the following description centres on the three local (Baden-Württemberg in Germany, Wallonia-Brussels in Belgium and Pennsylvania in the USA) and two national (Israel and France) education and training systems in and for which the GlobalSense pre-service teachers are being trained.

Linking these systems to their political and social contexts, our objective is to enlighten the various contents of citizenship education curricula, as well as the way pre-service teachers are trained, before analysing the data we collected on their representations of GCE before and after taking part in exchanges with peers from the other participating countries, as well as the potential change in their pedagogical practices.

### 8.1 *The German Education System*

#### 8.1.1 Governance and Administrative Organisation

The German education system is organised at a federal level by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, BMBF). It operates under the framework of the German constitution, named the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The BMBF plays a coordinating and supporting role in education matters. It provides funding for research projects and institutions and sets general educational policy.

The BMBF has seven departments, in addition to the central department that is responsible for administrative tasks:

- Office 1: Strategies and Policy Issues

- Office 2: European and international cooperation in education and research

- Office 3: Vocational Training and Lifelong Learning

- Office 4: Science

- Office 5: Key Technologies – Research for Innovation

- Office 6: Life Sciences – Research for Health

- Office 7: Provision for the Future – Research on Culture, Basic Science and Sustainability

In spite of the BMBF's responsibilities, a large part of educational policy in Germany is decided at the state level, strongly limiting the influence of the ministry in educational matters. Each of Germany's sixteen federal states has its own Ministry of Education or equivalent authority responsible for education policy and legislation within its jurisdiction. These state-level authorities
determine many aspects of education, including curriculum, teacher qualifications, and school organisation.

Education systems, curricula and forms of schools therefore diverge. However, the Standing Conference of Ministers of Education of the Länder (Kulturministerkonferenz [KMK]) ensures the conformity or comparability of education and qualifications. According to the IEA,⁷ "In 2003, the Standing Conference established national educational standards (Bildungsstandards), which all 16 states have committed to implementing. These educational standards specify the curricular elements for core subjects and serve as binding objectives for all states". The respective Ministries of Education and Cultural Affairs in each state publish the curricula as compulsory for teachers, but they are formulated in a general way which allows teachers considerable freedom with regard to content, objectives, and teaching methods.

### 8.1.2 Teacher Training and Employment

Because education is a state matter, each federal state has its own regulations and training concepts, for example regarding the choice and combinations of subjects. However, they all have in common that the teacher training course depends on the type of school chosen, and that each pre-service secondary teacher must study at least two subjects that they will teach later. On top of these, teacher training in Germany includes studying didactic methodology, having pedagogic courses and doing internships in schools. Depending on the state and the university, one can conclude one's studies with a bachelor's or master's degree, or a state examination. The first phase of studies always ends with an internship.

According to Eurydice, "Following successful completion of their preparatory service, newly-qualified teachers can apply for permanent employment at public-sector schools".⁸ Teachers are usually employed by the Ministry of Education for the state and, as civil servants, have a job for life after a certain period (verbeamtet). However, this practice depends on the state: in those that used to constitute what was East Germany, teachers are less often beamter and more often employees of the schools.

In GlobalSense, the pre-service teachers in Germany are studying at the Weingarten University of Teacher Education, in the state of Baden-Württemberg. Because the teacher training programs vary from one state to another, students at Weingarten plan to pursue their teaching career in the state of Baden-Württemberg.

According to the state government's website, the state's Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport is in charge of teacher training.⁹ The first step to become a teacher is obtaining a university degree, before taking part in a preparatory service (Vorbereitungsdienst) in order to acquire the pedagogical
determine many aspects of education, including curriculum, teacher qualifications, and school organisation.

Education systems, curricula and forms of schools therefore diverge. However, the Standing Conference of Ministers of Education of the Länder (Kulturministerkonferenz [KMK]) ensures the conformity or comparability of education and qualifications. According to the IEA,⁷ “In 2003, the Standing Conference established national educational standards (Bildungsstandards), which all 16 states have committed to implementing. These educational standards specify the curricular elements for core subjects and serve as binding objectives for all states”. The respective Ministries of Education and Cultural Affairs in each state publish the curricula as compulsory for teachers, but they are formulated in a general way which allows teachers considerable freedom with regard to content, objectives, and teaching methods.

### 8.1.2 Teacher Training and Employment

Because education is a state matter, each federal state has its own regulations and training concepts, for example regarding the choice and combinations of subjects. However, they all have in common that the teacher training course depends on the type of school chosen, and that each pre-service secondary teacher must study at least two subjects that they will teach later. On top of these, teacher training in Germany includes studying didactic methodology, having pedagogic courses and doing internships in schools. Depending on the state and the university, one can conclude one's studies with a bachelor's or master's degree, or a state examination. The first phase of studies always ends with an internship.

According to Eurydice, “Following successful completion of their preparatory service, newly-qualified teachers can apply for permanent employment at public-sector schools”.⁸ Teachers are usually employed by the Ministry of Education for the state and, as civil servants, have a job for life after a certain period (verbeamtet). However, this practice depends on the state: in those that used to constitute what was East Germany, teachers are less often beamter and more often employees of the schools.

In GlobalSense, the pre-service teachers in Germany are studying at the Weingarten University of Teacher Education, in the state of Baden-Württemberg. Because the teacher training programs vary from one state to another, students at Weingarten plan to pursue their teaching career in the state of Baden-Württemberg.

According to the state government's website, the state's Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport is in charge of teacher training.⁹ The first step to become a teacher is obtaining a university degree, before taking part in a preparatory service (Vorbereitungsdienst) in order to acquire the pedagogical
and subject-didactic knowledge and skills necessary for professional practice.¹⁰ The preparatory service concludes with a state examination organised by the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport's Teacher examination office (*Landeslehrerprüfungsamt im Ministerium für Kultur, Jugend und Sport*).

The GlobalSense pre-service teachers studying in Weingarten University of Education are training to work in primary or secondary schools. During their teacher training course, all students complete educational content (educational science, psychology, sociology, basic questions of education, inclusion and speech training) as well as the two subjects German and mathematics (one of the subjects is in-depth). Pre-service secondary teachers also choose another elective subject (English, Protestant theology/religious education, Islamic theology/religious education, Catholic theology/religious education, Art, Music, Scientific and technical teaching, Social science teaching or Sports), that they will later teach.¹¹

According to the University's website, for pre-service primary teachers “The bachelor's degree in primary school teaching prepares [students] optimally for a career in education dealing with children. The course is geared towards the requirements of education and upbringing for the age group of 5 to 12-year-old children, taking into account fundamental aspects of didactics at the primary level and initial lessons”. For pre-service secondary teachers,

> With the master's degree in secondary level 1 teaching and the trainee-
> ship, students can qualify to work as secondary level 1 teachers. The bach-
> elor's and master's teacher training courses at the Weingarten University
> of Education are coordinated in such a way that they offer very good con-
> ditions for successful pedagogical training. [...]. You will gain in-depth
> knowledge of educational sciences and research methods. Internships
> and the bachelor's thesis round off the course.¹²

Once pre-service teachers have completed their course, they may register
on Online Teacher Baden-Württemberg (*Lehrer Online Baden-Württemberg*),
“the internet platform for teachers in Baden-Württemberg with the job adver-
tisement process and modules for hiring and transferring teachers”.

8.1.3 Civic and Citizenship Education in Germany
According to the Federal state's Interior Ministry,

Since the Federal Republic of Germany was first founded, civic education
has evolved into an independent task with two main objectives:
and subject-didactic knowledge and skills necessary for professional practice.¹⁰ The preparatory service concludes with a state examination organised by the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport's Teacher examination office (*Landeslehrerprüfungsamt im Ministerium für Kultur, Jugend und Sport*).

The GlobalSense pre-service teachers studying in Weingarten University of Education are training to work in primary or secondary schools. During their teacher training course, all students complete educational content (educational science, psychology, sociology, basic questions of education, inclusion and speech training) as well as the two subjects German and mathematics (one of the subjects is in-depth). Pre-service secondary teachers also choose another elective subject (English, Protestant theology/religious education, Islamic theology/religious education, Catholic theology/religious education, Art, Music, Scientific and technical teaching, Social science teaching or Sports), that they will later teach.¹¹

According to the University's website, for pre-service primary teachers "The bachelor's degree in primary school teaching prepares [students] optimally for a career in education dealing with children. The course is geared towards the requirements of education and upbringing for the age group of 5 to 12-year-old children, taking into account fundamental aspects of didactics at the primary level and initial lessons". For pre-service secondary teachers,

> With the master's degree in secondary level 1 teaching and the trainee-
> ship, students can qualify to work as secondary level 1 teachers. The bachel-
> or's and master's teacher training courses at the Weingarten University
> of Education are coordinated in such a way that they offer very good con-
> ditions for successful pedagogical training. [...]. You will gain in-depth
> knowledge of educational sciences and research methods. Internships
> and the bachelor's thesis round off the course.¹²

Once pre-service teachers have completed their course, they may register
on Online Teacher Baden-Württemberg (*Lehrer Online Baden-Württemberg*),
“the internet platform for teachers in Baden-Württemberg with the job adver-
tisement process and modules for hiring and transferring teachers”.

8.1.3 Civic and Citizenship Education in Germany
According to the Federal state's Interior Ministry,

Since the Federal Republic of Germany was first founded, civic education
has evolved into an independent task with two main objectives:
- to ensure that individuals have the knowledge and skills they need to form independent opinions and make informed decisions; and

- to enable them to reflect on their own situation, recognise and meet their own responsibilities to society and play an active role in social and political processes.

Civic education in Germany is non-partisan but not impartial; it is grounded in the values and interpretation of democracy found in [...] the Basic Law.

According to F. Klaus Koopman,

Most civic education frameworks are based on a broad range of social, economic, and political content covering thematic strands like social relationships, the foundations of democracy, the political system of Germany, economics, the social structure of Germany, how to participate in public policy, the European Union, media, international relations, peace keeping, comparing political systems, environmental problems ...

Students of all school types take civic education courses [...] lasting 1 or 2 hours a week, starting at grade 5 or 7, depending on the state as well as on the type of school.

In spite of the wide diversity of civic education frameworks, subjects, contents [...], there is a general consensus on the main goals of civic education at German schools: Primary goal is to help young people evolving into self-determined, autonomous and critical citizens in a humane and democratic society being able

- to analyse social and political situations, problems, conflicts

- to obtain and apply appropriate analytical methods and skills

- to make informed and reasoned judgements and decisions on social and political issues

- to recognise and handle constructively and tolerantly controversial issues as well as alternative perspectives and views in a culturally diverse society

- to participate reflectively and democratically in public policy processes [...].

These goals, of course, are normative constructions [...]. There is reason enough to assume that the normative goals and concepts are not at all identical with classroom practice. (Koopman, 2004, p. 2)
- to ensure that individuals have the knowledge and skills they need to form independent opinions and make informed decisions; and

- to enable them to reflect on their own situation, recognise and meet their own responsibilities to society and play an active role in social and political processes.

Civic education in Germany is non-partisan but not impartial; it is grounded in the values and interpretation of democracy found in [...] the Basic Law.

According to F. Klaus Koopman,

Most civic education frameworks are based on a broad range of social, economic, and political content covering thematic strands like social relationships, the foundations of democracy, the political system of Germany, economics, the social structure of Germany, how to participate in public policy, the European Union, media, international relations, peace keeping, comparing political systems, environmental problems ...

Students of all school types take civic education courses [...] lasting 1 or 2 hours a week, starting at grade 5 or 7, depending on the state as well as on the type of school.

In spite of the wide diversity of civic education frameworks, subjects, contents [...], there is a general consensus on the main goals of civic education at German schools: Primary goal is to help young people evolving into self-determined, autonomous and critical citizens in a humane and democratic society being able

- to analyse social and political situations, problems, conflicts

- to obtain and apply appropriate analytical methods and skills

- to make informed and reasoned judgements and decisions on social and political issues

- to recognise and handle constructively and tolerantly controversial issues as well as alternative perspectives and views in a culturally diverse society

- to participate reflectively and democratically in public policy processes [...].

These goals, of course, are normative constructions [...]. There is reason enough to assume that the normative goals and concepts are not at all identical with classroom practice. (Koopman, 2004, p. 2)
### 8.1.4 GCE in the German Education System

In 2007, the Standing Conference of the German Ministers of Education and Culture (KMK) adopted the Curriculum Framework for Education for Sustainable Development. In June 2015, the KMK adopted a new edition of the Framework. According to then Minister of state Brunhild Kurth, in between the two editions, this Framework had

been implemented in many projects of the German federal states, partly supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). [...] The Curriculum Framework shall continue to provide conceptual support to the education systems and to the federal states' development of curricula, to teacher training on all levels, to textbook authors and editors of school supplies.

The Framework is made of six chapters that deal with interconnected yet separate subjects:

- Chapter 1: Conceptual foundations of the Framework

- Chapter 2: Basic conditions at schools and educational challenges

- Chapter 3: Competencies, themes, standards, design of lessons and curricula

- Chapter 4: Implementation in school subjects and on different education levels

- Chapter 5: Sustainable Development as task for the whole school

- Chapter 6: The learning area Global Development in teacher education

Each state adapts the way it applies the curriculum. In the state of Baden-Württemberg, where the Weingarten pre-service teachers are studying, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport has developed a "Guide for Democracy Education" (Leitfaden Demokratiebildung), which all schools have had to implement since September 2019.¹³

The aim of the guide is to offer teachers of all subjects and types of schools, from primary school to upper secondary level, reliable guidance for acquiring democracy-related skills in schools and lessons. The guide follows a comprehensive and holistic understanding of democracy education, and views it as a task and added value for everyone involved and all subjects in the school. In the four fields of action of the guide, the interrelationships between the subjects and the guide are presented as examples. This means that the guideline for democracy education does not replace educational plans, but supplements them and in this respect represents an in-depth look. This also applies to the guiding perspectives anchored in the educational plans of general schools, to which the guideline refers as an example. This also makes the added value of
### 8.1.4 GCE in the German Education System

In 2007, the Standing Conference of the German Ministers of Education and Culture (KMK) adopted the Curriculum Framework for Education for Sustainable Development. In June 2015, the KMK adopted a new edition of the Framework. According to then Minister of state Brunhild Kurth, in between the two editions, this Framework had

> been implemented in many projects of the German federal states, partly supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). [...] The Curriculum Framework shall continue to provide conceptual support to the education systems and to the federal states' development of curricula, to teacher training on all levels, to textbook authors and editors of school supplies.

The Framework is made of six chapters that deal with interconnected yet separate subjects:

- Chapter 1: Conceptual foundations of the Framework

- Chapter 2: Basic conditions at schools and educational challenges

- Chapter 3: Competencies, themes, standards, design of lessons and curricula

- Chapter 4: Implementation in school subjects and on different education levels

- Chapter 5: Sustainable Development as task for the whole school

- Chapter 6: The learning area Global Development in teacher education

Each state adapts the way it applies the curriculum. In the state of Baden-Württemberg, where the Weingarten pre-service teachers are studying, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport has developed a "Guide for Democracy Education" (Leitfaden Demokratiebildung), which all schools have had to implement since September 2019.¹³

The aim of the guide is to offer teachers of all subjects and types of schools, from primary school to upper secondary level, reliable guidance for acquiring democracy-related skills in schools and lessons. The guide follows a comprehensive and holistic understanding of democracy education, and views it as a task and added value for everyone involved and all subjects in the school. In the four fields of action of the guide, the interrelationships between the subjects and the guide are presented as examples. This means that the guideline for democracy education does not replace educational plans, but supplements them and in this respect represents an in-depth look. This also applies to the guiding perspectives anchored in the educational plans of general schools, to which the guideline refers as an example. This also makes the added value of
the guide clear: it offers an overarching, coherent concept for strengthening
democracy education in schools and lessons, which schools and teachers can
follow regardless of the type of school and the subjects taught. Extracurricular
learning venues and collaborations are also taken into account.

For example, regarding the use of geography to approach democracy edu-
cation, schools are asked to study historical conditionality of today's democ-
racies: in order to do so, they are encouraged to review the possibilities of
political participation and their formation in the different epochs of history
(e.g. Greek *Poleis*, Roman Republic, Medieval cities, etc.).

The guide must be implemented in all public and private general education and vocational schools in Baden-Württemberg. Training courses, accompanying teaching materials, practical examples and information on possible cooperation partners are developed by the state to provide additional support for schools in implementing the guidelines.

## 8.2 *The Belgium Education System*

8.2.1 Governance and Administrative Organisation

Belgium is a federal state

with two kinds of entities: communities, whose constituent element is
culture and language, and regions whose determining element is terri-
tory. There are three communities, the French Community, the Flemish
Community and the German Community. They are administratively
divided over the territory into three regions: the Walloon Region, the
Flemish Region and the Brussels Capital Region. Belgian federalism is
based on two pillars, communities and regions, which cannot be super-
imposed. (de Bouttemont, 2004, p. 101)

The School Pact of November 1958 defines two major educational networks: the official network, whose organising power is a legal body governed by public law (one of the three communities, or a province or municipality); and the free network, whose organising power is a legal body governed by private law. The free network is roughly structured as a free confessional network (with a large Catholic majority) and a free non-confessional network (especially present in higher education). A third minority network exists: the private network, whose organising power is a legal body governed by private law, in this case parental authority. The child, in this case, is home-schooled, or sent to a private school chosen by the parents. The first two networks (official and free) are subsidised by the communities.
the guide clear: it offers an overarching, coherent concept for strengthening
democracy education in schools and lessons, which schools and teachers can
follow regardless of the type of school and the subjects taught. Extracurricular
learning venues and collaborations are also taken into account.

For example, regarding the use of geography to approach democracy edu-
cation, schools are asked to study historical conditionality of today's democ-
racies: in order to do so, they are encouraged to review the possibilities of
political participation and their formation in the different epochs of history
(e.g. Greek *Poleis*, Roman Republic, Medieval cities, etc.).

The guide must be implemented in all public and private general education and vocational schools in Baden-Württemberg. Training courses, accompanying teaching materials, practical examples and information on possible cooperation partners are developed by the state to provide additional support for schools in implementing the guidelines.

8.2 *The Belgium Education System*

8.2.1 Governance and Administrative Organisation

Belgium is a federal state

with two kinds of entities: communities, whose constituent element is
culture and language, and regions whose determining element is terri-
tory. There are three communities, the French Community, the Flemish
Community and the German Community. They are administratively
divided over the territory into three regions: the Walloon Region, the
Flemish Region and the Brussels Capital Region. Belgian federalism is
based on two pillars, communities and regions, which cannot be super-
imposed. (de Bouttemont, 2004, p. 101)

The School Pact of November 1958 defines two major educational networks: the official network, whose organising power is a legal body governed by public law (one of the three communities, or a province or municipality); and the free network, whose organising power is a legal body governed by private law. The free network is roughly structured as a free confessional network (with a large Catholic majority) and a free non-confessional network (especially present in higher education). A third minority network exists: the private network, whose organising power is a legal body governed by private law, in this case parental authority. The child, in this case, is home-schooled, or sent to a private school chosen by the parents. The first two networks (official and free) are subsidised by the communities.
Each region (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) has a Ministry of education, which organises all levels of education of the territory, subsidises schools regardless of the network they belong to (except the private or independent network which receives no subsidies), and sets a number of measures (the key competences to be mastered by students, enrolments, etc.). Finally, in Belgium, each school depends on an ‘organising power’: it is either the natural person, legal person or institution responsible for organising and managing the school.

### 8.2.2 Teacher Training and Employment

The reform of Initial Teacher Training (Réforme de la Formation Initiale des Enseignants [RFIE]) of September 2023 aims to strengthen teachers’ professional practice and the acquisition of academic skills. This is why, from September 2023, students who begin teacher training (preschool, primary and lower secondary) commit to four years of study, including one year of master’s degree.

To teach in sections 1, 2 and 3, teachers must train in a higher-education college, and obtain a bachelor and their first year of master's degree specialising in:

- preschool teaching (section 1), for students who wish to teach in kindergarten and up to the second year of primary school (with pupils from 2½ to 8 years old),

- primary school teaching (section 2), for students who want to teach from the third year of kindergarten and up to the sixth year of primary school (with pupils from 5 to 12 years old)

- lower secondary school teaching (section 3), for students who want to teach from the fifth year of primary school to the third year of secondary (with pupils from 11 to 15 years old): teachers must obtain a specific title, the Aggregation of lower secondary education (*agrégation de l'enseignement secondaire inférieur*, AESI) and choose which subject they will teach (mathematics, arts, humanities, etc.).

To teach in sections 4 or 5, with pupils from the fourth to the sixth year of secondary (aged 15 to 18 years old), teachers must have successfully completed graduate studies (at university, higher education college or college of arts), whatever the field, as well as a master's degree in a particular subject (ancient Greek and Latin, modern languages, biology, etc.). This master's degree must be followed by the Aggregation of upper secondary education (*Agrégation de l'enseignement secondaire supérieur* [AESS]).

More specifically, in the case of GlobalSense, pre-service teachers from Belgium who have taken part in the project are students at the Free University
Each region (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) has a Ministry of education, which organises all levels of education of the territory, subsidises schools regardless of the network they belong to (except the private or independent network which receives no subsidies), and sets a number of measures (the key competences to be mastered by students, enrolments, etc.). Finally, in Belgium, each school depends on an ‘organising power’: it is either the natural person, legal person or institution responsible for organising and managing the school.

### 8.2.2 Teacher Training and Employment

The reform of Initial Teacher Training (Réforme de la Formation Initiale des Enseignants [RFIE]) of September 2023 aims to strengthen teachers’ professional practice and the acquisition of academic skills. This is why, from September 2023, students who begin teacher training (preschool, primary and lower secondary) commit to four years of study, including one year of master’s degree.

To teach in sections 1, 2 and 3, teachers must train in a higher-education college, and obtain a bachelor and their first year of master's degree specialising in:

- preschool teaching (section 1), for students who wish to teach in kindergarten and up to the second year of primary school (with pupils from 2½ to 8 years old),

- primary school teaching (section 2), for students who want to teach from the third year of kindergarten and up to the sixth year of primary school (with pupils from 5 to 12 years old)

- lower secondary school teaching (section 3), for students who want to teach from the fifth year of primary school to the third year of secondary (with pupils from 11 to 15 years old): teachers must obtain a specific title, the Aggregation of lower secondary education (*agrégation de l'enseignement secondaire inférieur*, AESI) and choose which subject they will teach (mathematics, arts, humanities, etc.).

To teach in sections 4 or 5, with pupils from the fourth to the sixth year of secondary (aged 15 to 18 years old), teachers must have successfully completed graduate studies (at university, higher education college or college of arts), whatever the field, as well as a master's degree in a particular subject (ancient Greek and Latin, modern languages, biology, etc.). This master's degree must be followed by the Aggregation of upper secondary education (*Agrégation de l'enseignement secondaire supérieur* [AESS]).

More specifically, in the case of GlobalSense, pre-service teachers from Belgium who have taken part in the project are students at the Free University
of Brussels, training to become English teachers (round 1) or philosophy teach-
ers (rounds 2 and 3) in higher secondary education. Though some of them
were not affected by the 2023 reform, having begun studying before it came
into effect, they have all had to obtain a Master's degree, as well as the AESS.

Once they have the relevant titles, teachers can apply for a position at a
specific school, a school board or organising body (responsible for the proper
functioning of one or more schools), a school group or an education network
(community education or subsidised official education for the official edu-
cational networks, and subsidised private education for the free educational
network).

8.2.3 Civic and Citizenship Education in Belgium

Each region's ministry of education is in charge of elaborating a curriculum in civic and citizenship education. Because the pre-service teachers taking part in the project are studying at the Free University of Brussels, to work with secondary students, we will be focusing here on the curriculum of the Wallonia-Brussels federation, which they are training to teach.

According to the Wallonia-Brussels Federation, secondary school students
are taught a Philosophy and citizenship course that takes a philosophical
approach to the issues and practice of citizenship. This weekly course, that
lasts an hour, is based on philosophy, its practices (philosophical debate and
discussion, philosophers' colloquia, reading texts, etc.) and its history, and
takes into account the contributions of other disciplines, in particular human-
ities (*humanités*), social sciences and history of religions and secularism.

The objectives of the Philosophy and citizenship course are to train stu-
dents in the various issues of citizenship and to bring them to:

- recognise the plurality of forms of reasoning, conceptions of the world as well as the plurality of norms and values;

- be able to argue a position in relation to other possible positions;

- explain and problematise the broad categories and conceptual oppositions that structure and determine our ways of thinking, most often without our awareness or thought;

- to think for themselves while developing the share of inventiveness and cre-
ativity that is expected of the citizen in a society democratic.

Thus the point is not to train pupils in philosophy in and for itself, but to
train them in a philosophical approach to citizenship issues and practices.

Citizenship can be defined positively from a legal and institutional point of
view. This implies a certain number of rights: civil rights (freedoms and rights
fundamental), political rights (right to vote, right of association, etc.), and
of Brussels, training to become English teachers (round 1) or philosophy teach-
ers (rounds 2 and 3) in higher secondary education. Though some of them
were not affected by the 2023 reform, having begun studying before it came
into effect, they have all had to obtain a Master's degree, as well as the AESS.

Once they have the relevant titles, teachers can apply for a position at a
specific school, a school board or organising body (responsible for the proper
functioning of one or more schools), a school group or an education network
(community education or subsidised official education for the official edu-
cational networks, and subsidised private education for the free educational
network).

8.2.3 Civic and Citizenship Education in Belgium

Each region's ministry of education is in charge of elaborating a curriculum in civic and citizenship education. Because the pre-service teachers taking part in the project are studying at the Free University of Brussels, to work with secondary students, we will be focusing here on the curriculum of the Wallonia-Brussels federation, which they are training to teach.

According to the Wallonia-Brussels Federation, secondary school students
are taught a Philosophy and citizenship course that takes a philosophical
approach to the issues and practice of citizenship. This weekly course, that
lasts an hour, is based on philosophy, its practices (philosophical debate and
discussion, philosophers' colloquia, reading texts, etc.) and its history, and
takes into account the contributions of other disciplines, in particular human-
ities (*humanités*), social sciences and history of religions and secularism.

The objectives of the Philosophy and citizenship course are to train stu-
dents in the various issues of citizenship and to bring them to:

- recognise the plurality of forms of reasoning, conceptions of the world as well as the plurality of norms and values;

- be able to argue a position in relation to other possible positions;

- explain and problematise the broad categories and conceptual oppositions that structure and determine our ways of thinking, most often without our awareness or thought;

- to think for themselves while developing the share of inventiveness and cre-
ativity that is expected of the citizen in a society democratic.

Thus the point is not to train pupils in philosophy in and for itself, but to
train them in a philosophical approach to citizenship issues and practices.

Citizenship can be defined positively from a legal and institutional point of
view. This implies a certain number of rights: civil rights (freedoms and rights
fundamental), political rights (right to vote, right of association, etc.), and
socio-economic rights (social security, unemployment, etc.). It presupposes institutions, public and private: Parliament, courts and tribunals, trade unions, etc. It covers various practices: elections, demonstrations, etc. The Philosophy and citizenship course's mission is to teach students these characteristics of citizenship in Belgium. But it is not content to hear citizenship in this narrow, strictly legal and institutional sense. It is more deeply a question of forming a citizenship that is sensitive and open to the issues that question and constantly transform it: political (national and international), ethical and bioethical, socio-economic, societal, environmental, cultural issues, anthropological, etc.

In this sense, if the philosophical approach is at the centre of the learning in the Philosophy and citizenship course, it must be nourished by contributions from other disciplines, giving it an indispensable insight to the challenges of contemporary citizenship: above all humanities, political and social sciences, but also natural and applied sciences, and sciences of religions and secularism.

The Philosophy and citizenship course thus bases citizenship training on a strong and active conception of democracy: democracy refers less to an instituted regime than to the collective capacity of citizens to reflect on principles, modes of operation, and the forms of citizenship.

### 8.2.4 GCE in Belgium

According to the Wallonia-Brussels Federation, GCE is founded on a series of texts, including Article 7 of the Development Cooperation Act of 19 March 2013 that states: "The Belgian Development Cooperation [...] ensures that the Belgian citizen is made aware through information and education of the stakes, the problematic and the achievement of the objectives of development cooperation and international relations".

Following this, a cooperation agreement was signed in 2017 between the Federal state and the French Community for the framing of Global Citizenship Education. This convention aims to further promote and anchor education for global and inclusive citizenship in francophone schools and more specifically to:

- foster bridges, mutual knowledge and the exchange of information between actors in global citizenship education and actors in compulsory education;

- continue and strengthen the recognition of education initiatives for global citizenship and solidarity in schools and promote operational partnerships between actors of education for global citizenship and actors of mandatory education;

- strengthen the coherence of the policies, strategies and actions proposed by the actors of education for global citizenship and solidarity and the actors
socio-economic rights (social security, unemployment, etc.). It presupposes
institutions, public and private: Parliament, courts and tribunals, trade unions,
etc. It covers various practices: elections, demonstrations, etc. The Philosophy
and citizenship course's mission is to teach students these characteristics of
citizenship in Belgium. But it is not content to hear citizenship in this narrow,
strictly legal and institutional sense. It is more deeply a question of forming
a citizenship that is sensitive and open to the issues that question and con-
stantly transform it: political (national and international), ethical and bioeth-
ical, socio-economic, societal, environmental, cultural issues, anthropological,
etc.

In this sense, if the philosophical approach is at the centre of the learning in
the Philosophy and citizenship course, it must be nourished by contributions
from other disciplines, giving it an indispensable insight to the challenges of
contemporary citizenship: above all humanities, political and social sciences,
but also natural and applied sciences, and sciences of religions and secularism.

The Philosophy and citizenship course thus bases citizenship training on a
strong and active conception of democracy: democracy refers less to an insti-
tuted regime than to the collective capacity of citizens to reflect on principles,
modes of operation, and the forms of citizenship.

8.2.4 GCE in Belgium

According to the Wallonia-Brussels Federation, GCE is founded on a series of
texts, including Article 7 of the Development Cooperation Act of 19 March
2013 that states: "The Belgian Development Cooperation [...] ensures that
the Belgian citizen is made aware through information and education of the
stakes, the problematic and the achievement of the objectives of development
cooperation and international relations".

Following this, a cooperation agreement was signed in 2017 between the
Federal state and the French Community for the framing of Global Citizenship
Education. This convention aims to further promote and anchor education for
global and inclusive citizenship in francophone schools and more specifically
to:

- foster bridges, mutual knowledge and the exchange of information between actors in global citizenship education and actors in compulsory education;

- continue and strengthen the recognition of education initiatives for global citizenship and solidarity in schools and promote operational partnerships between actors of education for global citizenship and actors of mandatory education;

- strengthen the coherence of the policies, strategies and actions proposed by the actors of education for global citizenship and solidarity and the actors
of compulsory education in the field of education for global citizenship and
solidarity in schools;

- evaluate policies and strategies for global citizenship and solidarity educa-
tion and make recommendations.¹⁴

Enabel, the Belgian development agency, is in charge of coordinating and implementing the federal GCE program and SDGS, notably through the federal education program for global citizenship named Showing the colours (*Annoncer la couleur*). The program aims to anchor and strengthen global citizenship education in Belgian education. To this end, it offers strategic support to the education sector, strengthens teaching practices (including teacher training courses recognised by continuing training organisations) and positions itself as a centre of knowledge, innovation and expertise in GCE.

Other actors, private or public, specialised or not, also intervene in schools
in education for global citizenship and solidarity: some non-profit organisa-
tions and private initiatives of international solidarity, institutional actors
such as universities, the Royal Museum of Central Africa, etc.¹⁵

Thus, though the curricula do not specifically mention GCE or SDGS, stu-
dents in Belgium are not only given the tools to approach the question of citi-
zenship in a philosophical way, but also learn about global issues, thanks to the
involvement of actors outside the education system.

8.3 *The United States of America Education System*

8.3.1 Governance and Administrative Organisation
The American education system is highly decentralised.

[The] state involvement in education is a relatively recent phenomenon
of the 20th century. Until then, local communities had nearly exclusive
control on education and the action of legislators in most cases was
limited to extending best practices to the more backward communities.
(Viarengo, 2010, p. 5)

Public education thus involves shared responsibilities and a division of
functions among the three levels of government (national, state and local lev-
els). At the national level, the government oversees education issues through
the Department of Education. Since the 1950s, the federal government has
promoted equal educational opportunity, with the implementation of racial
desegregation following the Supreme Court decision on *Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation*. Its official mission being “to promote student achievement and prepa-
ration for global competitiveness by fostering educational excellence and
of compulsory education in the field of education for global citizenship and
solidarity in schools;

- evaluate policies and strategies for global citizenship and solidarity educa-
tion and make recommendations.¹⁴

Enabel, the Belgian development agency, is in charge of coordinating and implementing the federal GCE program and SDGS, notably through the federal education program for global citizenship named Showing the colours (*Annoncer la couleur*). The program aims to anchor and strengthen global citizenship education in Belgian education. To this end, it offers strategic support to the education sector, strengthens teaching practices (including teacher training courses recognised by continuing training organisations) and positions itself as a centre of knowledge, innovation and expertise in GCE.

Other actors, private or public, specialised or not, also intervene in schools
in education for global citizenship and solidarity: some non-profit organisa-
tions and private initiatives of international solidarity, institutional actors
such as universities, the Royal Museum of Central Africa, etc.¹⁵

Thus, though the curricula do not specifically mention GCE or SDGS, stu-
dents in Belgium are not only given the tools to approach the question of citi-
zenship in a philosophical way, but also learn about global issues, thanks to the
involvement of actors outside the education system.

8.3 *The United States of America Education System*

8.3.1 Governance and Administrative Organisation
The American education system is highly decentralised.

[The] state involvement in education is a relatively recent phenomenon
of the 20th century. Until then, local communities had nearly exclusive
control on education and the action of legislators in most cases was
limited to extending best practices to the more backward communities.
(Viarengo, 2010, p. 5)

Public education thus involves shared responsibilities and a division of
functions among the three levels of government (national, state and local lev-
els). At the national level, the government oversees education issues through
the Department of Education. Since the 1950s, the federal government has
promoted equal educational opportunity, with the implementation of racial
desegregation following the Supreme Court decision on *Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation*. Its official mission being “to promote student achievement and prepa-
ration for global competitiveness by fostering educational excellence and