# Global Citizenship Education

Sébastien Urbanski, Lucy Bell

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Sébastien Urbanski, Lucy Bell. Global Citizenship Education: Modern Individualism under the Test of Cosmopolitanism. BRILL, 2024, Comparative and International Education: Francophonies, 978-90-04-70117-5. 10.1163/9789004701175. hal-04562581

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<figure><img src="image_1.png" /></figure>
Global Citizenship
Education

Modern Individualism under
the Test of Cosmopolitanism

Sébastien Urbanski and Lucy Bell

<figure><img src="image_1.png" /></figure>
Global Citizenship
Education

Modern Individualism under
the Test of Cosmopolitanism

Sébastien Urbanski and Lucy Bell

<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>
Global Citizenship Education
Global Citizenship Education
Comparative and
International Education

FRANCOPHONIES

Series Editors

Régis Malet (Université de Bordeaux, France)

Allan Pitman (University of Western Ontario, Canada)

Suzanne Majhanovich (University of Western Ontario, Canada)

VOLUME 1

The titles published in this series are listed at *brill.com/caiefr*
Comparative and
International Education

FRANCOPHONIES

Series Editors

Régis Malet (Université de Bordeaux, France)

Allan Pitman (University of Western Ontario, Canada)

Suzanne Majhanovich (University of Western Ontario, Canada)

VOLUME 1

The titles published in this series are listed at *brill.com/caiefr*
Global Citizenship
Education

*Modern Individualism under the Test of
Cosmopolitanism*

By

Sébastien Urbanski and Lucy Bell

<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>

BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON
Global Citizenship
Education

*Modern Individualism under the Test of
Cosmopolitanism*

By

Sébastien Urbanski and Lucy Bell

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>

BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON
<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>

This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license, which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. Further information and the complete license text can be found at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

The terms of the CC license apply only to the original material. The use of material from other sources (indicated by a reference) such as diagrams, illustrations, photos and text samples may require further permission from the respective copyright holder.

This publication is supported by the European Commission (Grant number 2021-1-FR01-KA220-HED-000027524) and the Pays de la Loire Region (Grant number CREN-NU-158661).

Cover illustration: iStock.com/Yakobchuk

All chapters in this book have undergone peer review.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Urbanski, Sébastien, 1985- author. | Bell, Lucy (Postdoctoral researcher), author.

Title: Global citizenship education : modern individualism under the test of cosmopolitanism / by Sébastien Urbanski and Lucy Bell.

Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2024. | Series: Comparative and international education. Francophonies, 2949-8805 ; volume 1 | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2024011903 (print) | LCCN 2024011904 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004701151 (paperback) | ISBN 9789004701168 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004701175 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: International education. | World citizenship in education. | Cosmopolitanism.

Classification: LCC LC1090.U83 2024 (print) | LCC LC1090 (ebook) | DDC 370.116--dc23/eng/20240403

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024011903

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024011904

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: "Brill". See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN 2949-8805

ISBN 978-90-04-70115-1 (paperback)

ISBN 978-90-04-70116-8 (hardback)

ISBN 978-90-04-70117-5 (e-book)

DOI 10.1163/9789004701175

Copyright 2024 by Sébastien Urbanski and Lucy Bell. Published by Koninklijke Brill BV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill BV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Brill Wageningen Academic, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress.

Koninklijke Brill BV reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.
<figure><img src="image_4.png" /></figure>

This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license, which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. Further information and the complete license text can be found at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

The terms of the CC license apply only to the original material. The use of material from other sources (indicated by a reference) such as diagrams, illustrations, photos and text samples may require further permission from the respective copyright holder.

This publication is supported by the European Commission (Grant number 2021-1-FR01-KA220-HED-000027524) and the Pays de la Loire Region (Grant number CREN-NU-158661).

Cover illustration: iStock.com/Yakobchuk

All chapters in this book have undergone peer review.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Urbanski, Sébastien, 1985- author. | Bell, Lucy (Postdoctoral researcher), author.

Title: Global citizenship education : modern individualism under the test of cosmopolitanism / by Sébastien Urbanski and Lucy Bell.

Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2024. | Series: Comparative and international education. Francophonies, 2949-8805 ; volume 1 | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2024011903 (print) | LCCN 2024011904 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004701151 (paperback) | ISBN 9789004701168 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004701175 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: International education. | World citizenship in education. | Cosmopolitanism.

Classification: LCC LC1090.U83 2024 (print) | LCC LC1090 (ebook) | DDC 370.116--dc23/eng/20240403

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024011903

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024011904

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: "Brill". See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN 2949-8805

ISBN 978-90-04-70115-1 (paperback)

ISBN 978-90-04-70116-8 (hardback)

ISBN 978-90-04-70117-5 (e-book)

DOI 10.1163/9789004701175

Copyright 2024 by Sébastien Urbanski and Lucy Bell. Published by Koninklijke Brill BV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill BV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Brill Wageningen Academic, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress.

Koninklijke Brill BV reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.
# Contents

Acknowledgements 1X

Introduction 1

1 Sociology, Philosophy, and Education and Training Sciences (ETS) 3

2 Holisms 5

3 Collective Entities: Societies, Nations, States 6

4 Comparative Education 7

5 Structure of the Book 9

## PART 1

### Global Citizenship at the Crossroads of Education Sciences, Sociology, and Political Philosophy

Introduction to Part 1 19

1 Historical Roots and Conceptual Tensions of Global Citizenship 21

1 The International Bureau of Education as a Matrix of Educational Cosmopolitanism 21

2 Avenues for Conceptual Solutions in the Philosophy of Education 28

3 Methodological Individualism and Moral Individualism 30

4 The Social Totality in Practice 35

5 Sociological Holism and Comparative Education 37

2 Education and Training Sciences within Social Sciences 45

1 Sciences Reduced to Their Object? 45

2 A Field Reduced to Its Contributory Disciplines? 46

3 The Questioning of Three Disciplines 49

4 Why Religion? 52

5 Symmetrising Religions 53

6 Political Liberalism and Critical Republicanism 56

7 Disaggregating Religion 61
# Contents

Acknowledgements 1X

Introduction 1

1 Sociology, Philosophy, and Education and Training Sciences (ETS) 3

2 Holisms 5

3 Collective Entities: Societies, Nations, States 6

4 Comparative Education 7

5 Structure of the Book 9

## PART 1

### Global Citizenship at the Crossroads of Education Sciences, Sociology, and Political Philosophy

Introduction to Part 1 19

1 Historical Roots and Conceptual Tensions of Global Citizenship 21

1 The International Bureau of Education as a Matrix of Educational Cosmopolitanism 21

2 Avenues for Conceptual Solutions in the Philosophy of Education 28

3 Methodological Individualism and Moral Individualism 30

4 The Social Totality in Practice 35

5 Sociological Holism and Comparative Education 37

2 Education and Training Sciences within Social Sciences 45

1 Sciences Reduced to Their Object? 45

2 A Field Reduced to Its Contributory Disciplines? 46

3 The Questioning of Three Disciplines 49

4 Why Religion? 52

5 Symmetrising Religions 53

6 Political Liberalism and Critical Republicanism 56

7 Disaggregating Religion 61
3 The Question of Citizenship in Social Sciences 69

1 Collective Entities 70

2 Plural Subjects and Feeling of Obligation 72

3 General Will and Individual Autonomy 74

4 Holism and (Global) Citizenship Education 79

PART 2

*Global Citizenship Education: A Durkheimian Perspective*

Introduction to Part 2 85

4 Science and Political Action 87

1 Reasoning about the State 88

2 Cosmopolitan Patriotism: The Political Purpose of ETS
Enlightened by Durkheim 89

3 GlobalSense, Research and Training in Five Countries 91

4 Taking Criticisms against GCE into Account 97

5 Liberal Nationalism and (Liberal) Global Citizenship 98

6 GCE, a Horizon Compatible with Different Ethics 102

7 Giving a Political Meaning to the Knowledge and Values Involved
in 'Educations Toward' 103

8 Presentation of the Five Systems 106

5 Global Citizenship: A Commitment in the Search of a Theory 131

1 Being a Citizen, Belonging to a Society 131

2 Global Citizenship as a Type of Citizenship 134

3 The Multiple Paths of Cosmopolitanism 136

4 Teachers, Citizenship, the State 137

5 Undertaking the Necessary Reflexivity in Research and
Training 138

6 GlobalSense Pre-Service Teachers: Which Scale Is Pertinent to
Approach Global Issues? 141

6 The Educator State in the Context of Globalisation 149

1 Reacting to Liberal Nominalism without Giving in to
Conservatism 150

2 Overcoming Plain Liberalism: Yes, but How? 151

3 Moral Individualism as a Collective Ideology 152

4 The State at the Service of Social Thinking 154
3 The Question of Citizenship in Social Sciences 69

1 Collective Entities 70

2 Plural Subjects and Feeling of Obligation 72

3 General Will and Individual Autonomy 74

4 Holism and (Global) Citizenship Education 79

PART 2

Global Citizenship Education: A Durkheimian Perspective

Introduction to Part 2 85

4 Science and Political Action 87

1 Reasoning about the State 88

2 Cosmopolitan Patriotism: The Political Purpose of ETS
Enlightened by Durkheim 89

3 GlobalSense, Research and Training in Five Countries 91

4 Taking Criticisms against GCE into Account 97

5 Liberal Nationalism and (Liberal) Global Citizenship 98

6 GCE, a Horizon Compatible with Different Ethics 102

7 Giving a Political Meaning to the Knowledge and Values Involved
in 'Educations Toward' 103

8 Presentation of the Five Systems 106

5 Global Citizenship: A Commitment in the Search of a Theory 131

1 Being a Citizen, Belonging to a Society 131

2 Global Citizenship as a Type of Citizenship 134

3 The Multiple Paths of Cosmopolitanism 136

4 Teachers, Citizenship, the State 137

5 Undertaking the Necessary Reflexivity in Research and Training 138

6 GlobalSense Pre-Service Teachers: Which Scale Is Pertinent to Approach Global Issues? 141

6 The Educator State in the Context of Globalisation 149

1 Reacting to Liberal Nominalism without Giving in to
Conservatism 150

2 Overcoming Plain Liberalism: Yes, but How? 151

3 Moral Individualism as a Collective Ideology 152

4 The State at the Service of Social Thinking 154
5 A Two-Fold Rawlsian Reading of Durkheim 155

6 Cosmopolitanism: A Modern Ideal 159

7 Escaping the Consensus Rhetoric 161

8 Return of Collective Entities 166

9 What Political Philosophy? 170

10 Student Teachers' Nuanced Perspectives in Global Education: Balancing Emotions and Critical Thinking across National Context 173

7 The Progress of Modernity: Nominalism, Conservatism, Socialism 176

1 The Liberal-Nominalist Motif: Become a Competent Global Citizen! 177

2 Conservative Motif: Against Cosmopolitan Abstraction, Be One with the Nation! 182

3 Questioning the Citizenship Framework 185

4 A Republican Interventionism Limited to the Educational Sphere 190

Conclusion 206

References 211

Index 221
5 A Two-Fold Rawlsian Reading of Durkheim 155

6 Cosmopolitanism: A Modern Ideal 159

7 Escaping the Consensus Rhetoric 161

8 Return of Collective Entities 166

9 What Political Philosophy? 170

10 Student Teachers' Nuanced Perspectives in Global Education: Balancing Emotions and Critical Thinking across National Context 173

7 The Progress of Modernity: Nominalism, Conservatism, Socialism 176

1 The Liberal-Nominalist Motif: Become a Competent Global Citizen! 177

2 Conservative Motif: Against Cosmopolitan Abstraction, Be One with the Nation! 182

3 Questioning the Citizenship Framework 185

4 A Republican Interventionism Limited to the Educational Sphere 190

Conclusion 206

References 211

Index 221
Acknowledgements

We wish to start by thanking the members of the research GlobalSense – Developing Global Sensitivity in Student-Teachers, conducted by Nantes University with the help of four partner universities, located on three different continents.

We also want to highlight the support of the European Commission, the Pays de la Loire Region, and the International Relations Office at Nantes University (Direction Europe et International), which supported and accompanied the project and continue to provide it with new perspectives, notably within the EUniWell European University. Finally, we thank the editors of the Brill series *Comparative and International Education: Francophonies* for expressing their interest in our projects and engagements.
Acknowledgements

We wish to start by thanking the members of the research GlobalSense – Developing Global Sensitivity in Student-Teachers, conducted by Nantes University with the help of four partner universities, located on three different continents.

We also want to highlight the support of the European Commission, the Pays de la Loire Region, and the International Relations Office at Nantes University (Direction Europe et International), which supported and accompanied the project and continue to provide it with new perspectives, notably within the EUniWell European University. Finally, we thank the editors of the Brill series *Comparative and International Education: Francophonies* for expressing their interest in our projects and engagements.
# Introduction

The republican ideal, as a way towards liberty and democracy, has been debated for centuries. Anchored in the Greek and Roman Antiquities, it was notably revived during the American and French Revolutions of the 18th century, with a far-reaching influence on many countries in the world. In parallel, the idea of teaching global citizenship is highly discussed. Its vagueness, idealism, and even incoherence are frequently criticised. However, its timeliness makes no doubt, provided it is operationalised in a genuine cosmopolitan, liberal, and democratic way.

In this context, one of the main goals for educational scholars is to find ways to sustain the umbrella notion of global citizenship, with the help of firm foundations in political philosophy and social sciences. This book offers an original path for this, linking sociological holism with philosophical republicanism. It is inspired by several attempts to establish a lively link between the sociologist Emile Durkheim and the republican philosopher Philip Pettit, currently practicing at Princeton University (Spitz, 2005; Guérard de Latour, 2014). We attempt to go further, keeping in constant touch with the field and the qualitative and quantitative surveys that put our concepts to the test. Indeed, the interdisciplinary junction between sociology, philosophy, and education and training sciences must, as far as possible, be realised in concrete acts, from conceptual and methodological angles as well as an institutional one.

Conducted in this spirit, our proposal unfolds the notion of citizenship, taking into account the growing differentiation of modern societies and the correlative deepening of moral individualism. To do so, we draw on the republican and holistic thinking of Durkheim, extended by Mauss, and enriched by Pettit's liberal republicanism (also called 'critical'). Though this is a topical gesture (Kaufmann, 2011), it would benefit from being operationalised through educational practices relating to citizenship. That is why, through the empirical study of teachers' activities and teacher-training devices, we explore a nagging, yet little addressed, paradox in comparative education, which lies at the heart of the links between holism as a principle of analysis, on the one hand, and citizenship, on the other.

Taking the theme of 'global citizenship', strongly promoted by UNESCO, this paradox can be summarised as follows. Placing the individual at the top of a hierarchy of values (human rights, autonomy, responsibility) can lead to seeing society itself as an aggregation of individuals. This is why sociology is riven by recurrent debates on the relevance of referring to collective entities: do the latter not run the risk of colliding with the ideal of individual freedom and for this
Introduction

The republican ideal, as a way towards liberty and democracy, has been debated
for centuries. Anchored in the Greek and Roman Antiquities, it was notably
revived during the American and French Revolutions of the 18th century, with
a far-reaching influence on many countries in the world. In parallel, the idea
of teaching global citizenship is highly discussed. Its vagueness, idealism, and
even incoherence are frequently criticised. However, its timeliness makes no
doubt, provided it is operationalised in a genuine cosmopolitan, liberal, and
democratic way.

In this context, one of the main goals for educational scholars is to find ways
to sustain the umbrella notion of global citizenship, with the help of firm foun-
dations in political philosophy and social sciences. This book offers an original
path for this, linking sociological holism with philosophical republicanism. It
is inspired by several attempts to establish a lively link between the sociolo-
gist Emile Durkheim and the republican philosopher Philip Pettit, currently
practicing at Princeton University (Spitz, 2005; Guérard de Latour, 2014). We
attempt to go further, keeping in constant touch with the field and the quali-
tative and quantitative surveys that put our concepts to the test. Indeed, the
interdisciplinary junction between sociology, philosophy, and education and
training sciences must, as far as possible, be realised in concrete acts, from
conceptual and methodological angles as well as an institutional one.

Conducted in this spirit, our proposal unfolds the notion of citizenship,
taking into account the growing differentiation of modern societies and the
correlative deepening of moral individualism. To do so, we draw on the repub-
lican and holistic thinking of Durkheim, extended by Mauss, and enriched by
Pettit's liberal republicanism (also called 'critical'). Though this is a topical ges-
ture (Kaufmann, 2011), it would benefit from being operationalised through
educational practices relating to citizenship. That is why, through the empiri-
cal study of teachers' activities and teacher-training devices, we explore a nag-
ging, yet little addressed, paradox in comparative education, which lies at the
heart of the links between holism as a principle of analysis, on the one hand,
and citizenship, on the other.

Taking the theme of ‘global citizenship’, strongly promoted by UNESCO, this
paradox can be summarised as follows. Placing the individual at the top of a
hierarchy of values (human rights, autonomy, responsibility) can lead to seeing
society itself as an aggregation of individuals. This is why sociology is riven by
recurrent debates on the relevance of referring to collective entities: do the lat-
ter not run the risk of colliding with the ideal of individual freedom and for this
reason, should a parsimonious, methodologically individualistic approach not
be favoured? These are fundamental questions, which typically pit realists –
who recognise the existence of collective thinking and acting entities – against
nominalists, who claim that only individuals can think and act (Bouvier, 2019).
If realism can lead to political conservatism, considering ‘the nation’, for exam-
ple, as an unsurpassable collective entity, the fact remains that the nominal-
ist approach can stand in the way of the cosmopolitan ideal when it leads to
reasoning along the lines of (1) all individuals in the world are equal in terms
of dignity, (2) therefore equality is a characteristic of individuals, (3) therefore
citizenship must be conceivable on the basis of individuals, (4) therefore there
is a properly global citizenship that brings individuals together.

To escape this fallacy underlying many studies on ‘global citizenship educa-
tion’ (Banks, 2008), we need to reinvest sociological holism. On the one hand,
the normative individual, the one who has no social ties other than those to
which he has consented and from which he can always emancipate himself,
can by definition only be global (Descombes, 2014). On the other hand, the
individualist ideology is supported by particular societies, against a back-
drop of differentiation between individuals as the division of social labour
deepens. This was the intuition of Durkheim, a philosopher and professor of
sociology and education science. It is being put to the test in concrete terms
in the European GlobalSense project, for which we are responsible. One of the
aims of this research and teacher-training project, conducted in five countries
(Belgium, France, Germany, Israel, USA), is to update the holism of the French
School of Sociology, coupled with the critical republicanism initiated by Pettit
on an international level (Pettit, 2016; Erez & Laborde, 2020).

While anchored in a republican political theory which is widely known –
although very differently interpreted – in Francophone countries that are at
the core of the present Brill series *Comparative and International Education: Francophonies*, the avenues explored in the book concern first and foremost the
very notion of global citizenship. Highly emphasised in 2012 by United Nations
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon during his Global Education First Initiative, it
nevertheless remains torn between being an oxymoron or an umbrella slogan
that can receive varied and sometimes contradictory meanings (Torres, 2017).
Regarding Global citizenship as an oxymoron: what is the framework for global
citizenship if the world itself is not a society? Unless a rather anarchic assem-
blage of nations in permanent competition, sometimes at war with each other,
can be defined as a society? Marcel Mauss’ answer was that there is no society
beyond nations and from this, he deduced that cosmopolitanism was largely
‘utopian’, which is why he preferred to call himself an internationalist. This
Maussian perspective seems to have lost none of its relevance (Lemieux, 2021).
reason, should a parsimonious, methodologically individualistic approach not
be favoured? These are fundamental questions, which typically pit realists –
who recognise the existence of collective thinking and acting entities – against
nominalists, who claim that only individuals can think and act (Bouvier, 2019).
If realism can lead to political conservatism, considering ‘the nation’, for exam-
ple, as an unsurpassable collective entity, the fact remains that the nominal-
ist approach can stand in the way of the cosmopolitan ideal when it leads to
reasoning along the lines of (1) all individuals in the world are equal in terms
of dignity, (2) therefore equality is a characteristic of individuals, (3) therefore
citizenship must be conceivable on the basis of individuals, (4) therefore there
is a properly global citizenship that brings individuals together.

To escape this fallacy underlying many studies on ‘global citizenship educa-
tion’ (Banks, 2008), we need to reinvest sociological holism. On the one hand,
the normative individual, the one who has no social ties other than those to
which he has consented and from which he can always emancipate himself,
can by definition only be global (Descombes, 2014). On the other hand, the
individualist ideology is supported by particular societies, against a back-
drop of differentiation between individuals as the division of social labour
deepens. This was the intuition of Durkheim, a philosopher and professor of
sociology and education science. It is being put to the test in concrete terms
in the European GlobalSense project, for which we are responsible. One of the
aims of this research and teacher-training project, conducted in five countries
(Belgium, France, Germany, Israel, USA), is to update the holism of the French
School of Sociology, coupled with the critical republicanism initiated by Pettit
on an international level (Pettit, 2016; Erez & Laborde, 2020).

While anchored in a republican political theory which is widely known –
although very differently interpreted – in Francophone countries that are at
the core of the present Brill series *Comparative and International Education: Francophonies*, the avenues explored in the book concern first and foremost the
very notion of global citizenship. Highly emphasised in 2012 by United Nations
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon during his Global Education First Initiative, it
nevertheless remains torn between being an oxymoron or an umbrella slogan
that can receive varied and sometimes contradictory meanings (Torres, 2017).
Regarding Global citizenship as an oxymoron: what is the framework for global
citizenship if the world itself is not a society? Unless a rather anarchic assem-
blage of nations in permanent competition, sometimes at war with each other,
can be defined as a society? Marcel Mauss’ answer was that there is no society
beyond nations and from this, he deduced that cosmopolitanism was largely
‘utopian’, which is why he preferred to call himself an internationalist. This
Maussian perspective seems to have lost none of its relevance (Lemieux, 2021).
Considering global citizenship as an umbrella slogan: what is the meaning of global citizenship if actors promote its education from neoliberal, Marxian, socialist, postcolonial or religious perspectives (Oxley & Morris, 2013)? It is crucial that we analyse these ambiguities, but it would be equally regrettable to abandon this slogan. Certainly, some philosophers intend to deconstruct it and argue that the expression ‘global citizenship’ should be abandoned altogether (Miller, 2012). Yet we firmly disagree with this position, in the wake of the French anthropologist (and Durkheim’s nephew) Marcel Mauss, according to whom the social scientist must be on the lookout for new movements in societies, in order to sketch out their theory (Mauss, 1968). From this perspective, the multi-faceted success of the ‘global citizenship’ slogan is indicative of a new social and educational aspiration in our morally individualistic societies.

Global citizenship education is therefore neither a well-formed concept, nor an educational ideal that can be hastily defended without a risk of sliding into utopia (to use Mauss' expression). However, it is a slogan to which aspiring teachers are sensitive, sometimes annoyed by it, other times enthusiastic, often interested. It is this social phenomenon we wish to grasp: how does the deployment of an international pedagogy, in five countries, reveal the aspirations of members of morally individualistic societies, whose ideology – in the non-pejorative sense (Dumont, 1992) – increasingly disregards borders and differences in status between human persons, making them variously receptive to the slogan of global citizenship? This question arises from the GlobalSense protocol, and the book proposes to unfold it gradually, on theoretical, methodological, and empirical levels.

# 1 Sociology, Philosophy, and Education and Training Sciences (ETS)

As suggested above, the present work is based on a sociologist approach marked by philosophy, and framed by education and training sciences. The point is to show how citizenship education in an international perspective can be enlightened by an approach that is at the crossroads of these three academic fields. Philosophers have something to tell us about the concept of citizenship and the potential paradoxes it conceals, starting with its place of localised exercise, linked to a given territory (often national), while its meaning is generally presented as universal. Sociologists remind us that it is social contexts that allow citizenship to take shape: what indeed is the meaning of the latter, if it remains accompanied by a lived experience of discrimination, academic failure or lack of employment prospects? Education and training sciences remind us that citizenship requires the shaping of a certain knowledge,
Considering global citizenship as an umbrella slogan: what is the meaning of global citizenship if actors promote its education from neoliberal, Marxian, socialist, postcolonial or religious perspectives (Oxley & Morris, 2013)? It is crucial that we analyse these ambiguities, but it would be equally regrettable to abandon this slogan. Certainly, some philosophers intend to deconstruct it and argue that the expression ‘global citizenship’ should be abandoned altogether (Miller, 2012). Yet we firmly disagree with this position, in the wake of the French anthropologist (and Durkheim’s nephew) Marcel Mauss, according to whom the social scientist must be on the lookout for new movements in societies, in order to sketch out their theory (Mauss, 1968). From this perspective, the multi-faceted success of the ‘global citizenship’ slogan is indicative of a new social and educational aspiration in our morally individualistic societies.

Global citizenship education is therefore neither a well-formed concept, nor an educational ideal that can be hastily defended without a risk of sliding into utopia (to use Mauss' expression). However, it is a slogan to which aspiring teachers are sensitive, sometimes annoyed by it, other times enthusiastic, often interested. It is this social phenomenon we wish to grasp: how does the deployment of an international pedagogy, in five countries, reveal the aspirations of members of morally individualistic societies, whose ideology – in the non-pejorative sense (Dumont, 1992) – increasingly disregards borders and differences in status between human persons, making them variously receptive to the slogan of global citizenship? This question arises from the GlobalSense protocol, and the book proposes to unfold it gradually, on theoretical, methodological, and empirical levels.

# 1 Sociology, Philosophy, and Education and Training Sciences (ETS)

As suggested above, the present work is based on a sociologist approach marked by philosophy, and framed by education and training sciences. The point is to show how citizenship education in an international perspective can be enlightened by an approach that is at the crossroads of these three academic fields. Philosophers have something to tell us about the concept of citizenship and the potential paradoxes it conceals, starting with its place of localised exercise, linked to a given territory (often national), while its meaning is generally presented as universal. Sociologists remind us that it is social contexts that allow citizenship to take shape: what indeed is the meaning of the latter, if it remains accompanied by a lived experience of discrimination, academic failure or lack of employment prospects? Education and training sciences remind us that citizenship requires the shaping of a certain knowledge,
supported by educational institutions and dedicated subjects, as well as modes
of participation in the community (in class and school).

These preliminary indications are, of course, simplistic and incomplete.
Firstly, because the objects treated by each discipline are far more numerous
than those outlined above. Secondly, because this description is marked by
a school tropism, though it could be considered that citizenship education
begins in the family environment and that it includes adult education through-
out life, for instance in the workplace. Finally, the division between disciplines
is not so tight in reality. Philosophers consider social contexts, sociologists con-
ceptualise, and all are interested in education and training, which is, in many
ways, consubstantial to citizenship.

In any event, the purpose of this introduction, which is deliberately narrow,
is to highlight the main issues justifying the objectives of our method:

- On the one hand, to take school 'education towards' citizenship as a research object, taking into account its international developments: exchanges are increasingly globalised, whether they are economic, political, migratory, cultural (etc.);

- On the other hand, to question the disciplinary separation of work between sociologists, philosophers and ETS scholars, since they all take part in the same disciplinary field, humanities and social sciences.

With this in mind, disciplinary separations will not be avoided in this work,
neither will obstacles be ignored. We must ensure that we do not privilege one
discipline over another, as researchers can do. Some sociologists for instance
consider that their discipline goes beyond philosophy (Joly, 2018), whilst cer-
tain philosophers wonder why sociologists, under the pretext of restoring the
complexity of the field, seem conceptually undemanding. These reciprocal
accusations can be founded. However, they remain too expeditious, especially
if we agree to recognise that "classical sociology is configured [...] as an internal
subversion of political philosophy", so that if there was indeed a 'sociological
revolution' at the beginning of the 20th century, it was in no way in an external
face-to-face with philosophy (Callegaro & Giry, 2018, p. 316).

To achieve this tri-disciplinary party, the issue is to converge disparate and,
in some respects, incomplete attempts. In this case, after attempting to imple-
ment, in an international research project, the controversial and polyphonic
notion of global citizenship education, we propose a holistic framing in sociol-
ogy and neo-republican philosophy. The junction between these two currents
has never really been established. Certainly, the philosopher Philip Pettit, sail-
ing between Durkheim, Rawls and Habermas, has characterised himself as
supported by educational institutions and dedicated subjects, as well as modes
of participation in the community (in class and school).

These preliminary indications are, of course, simplistic and incomplete.
Firstly, because the objects treated by each discipline are far more numerous
than those outlined above. Secondly, because this description is marked by
a school tropism, though it could be considered that citizenship education
begins in the family environment and that it includes adult education through-
out life, for instance in the workplace. Finally, the division between disciplines
is not so tight in reality. Philosophers consider social contexts, sociologists con-
ceptualise, and all are interested in education and training, which is, in many
ways, consubstantial to citizenship.

In any event, the purpose of this introduction, which is deliberately narrow,
is to highlight the main issues justifying the objectives of our method:

- On the one hand, to take school 'education towards' citizenship as a research object, taking into account its international developments: exchanges are increasingly globalised, whether they are economic, political, migratory, cultural (etc.);

- On the other hand, to question the disciplinary separation of work between sociologists, philosophers and ETS scholars, since they all take part in the same disciplinary field, humanities and social sciences.

With this in mind, disciplinary separations will not be avoided in this work,
neither will obstacles be ignored. We must ensure that we do not privilege one
discipline over another, as researchers can do. Some sociologists for instance
consider that their discipline goes beyond philosophy (Joly, 2018), whilst cer-
tain philosophers wonder why sociologists, under the pretext of restoring the
complexity of the field, seem conceptually undemanding. These reciprocal
accusations can be founded. However, they remain too expeditious, especially
if we agree to recognise that "classical sociology is configured [...] as an internal
subversion of political philosophy", so that if there was indeed a 'sociological
revolution' at the beginning of the 20th century, it was in no way in an external
face-to-face with philosophy (Callegaro & Giry, 2018, p. 316).

To achieve this tri-disciplinary party, the issue is to converge disparate and,
in some respects, incomplete attempts. In this case, after attempting to imple-
ment, in an international research project, the controversial and polyphonic
notion of global citizenship education, we propose a holistic framing in sociol-
ogy and neo-republican philosophy. The junction between these two currents
has never really been established. Certainly, the philosopher Philip Pettit, sail-
ing between Durkheim, Rawls and Habermas, has characterised himself as
being both republican and holistic. Nevertheless, social science practitioners, or philosophers who are close to them, have often challenged the relevance of this holism (Descombes, 2014). Similarly, in his highly commented book *The Republican moment in France* (*Le moment républicain en France*), the philosopher Jean-Fabien Spitz, in line with Philip Pettit, specified the links between the latter and Durkheim for example, by suggesting to analyse French republicanism of the early 20th century in the light of the neo-republican works that appeared more recently in the United States. However Spitz, a philosopher, remains confined here to the history of ideas.

Should we not go further? If we draw a link between Pettit and Durkheim, then we must develop a research protocol that is both holistic and critical republican, having in mind the objective of conducting empirical investigations. We therefore formulate the following question, which will animate the present work: how can one be Pettitian in sociology (even when Pettit is a philosopher) while being Durkheimian in philosophy? By asking this question and operating this crossing, we thus relaunch sociological questioning. This issue can only be addressed in an interdisciplinary setting, the one that education and training sciences provide.

## 2 Holisms

The difficulty is compounded by the fact that holism can mean at least two things. It can be ontological: in which case, we believe that collective entities (the state, the nation, thinking and acting groups) exist beyond the manifestations of their individual members. Holism can also be methodological, if in spite of believing that no collective entities exist we act as if they do, since individuals believe in them and adapt their behaviour accordingly (meaning that, in our analysis, we must assume their existence). Finally, and this is a point that complicates our endeavour, we can detect in the collective ideology of modern societies an ideal of moral individualism.

Indeed, the individuals who make up society are in many ways products of a collective history, those histories of the so-called ‘modern’ societies, in which the division of social work is important. This division sometimes gives rise to what Durkheim called organic solidarity; and other times to the pathologies of hyper-individualism – inequalities, withdrawal into self, and certain forms of suicide to use one of the classic works of sociology – when the division of social work is not sufficiently integrated and regulated. Ideology is therefore not understood here in a pejorative sense, but anthropologically (Dumont,
being both republican and holistic. Nevertheless, social science practitioners, or philosophers who are close to them, have often challenged the relevance of this holism (Descombes, 2014). Similarly, in his highly commented book *The Republican moment in France* (*Le moment républicain en France*), the philosopher Jean-Fabien Spitz, in line with Philip Pettit, specified the links between the latter and Durkheim for example, by suggesting to analyse French republicanism of the early 20th century in the light of the neo-republican works that appeared more recently in the United States. However Spitz, a philosopher, remains confined here to the history of ideas.

Should we not go further? If we draw a link between Pettit and Durkheim, then we must develop a research protocol that is both holistic and critical republican, having in mind the objective of conducting empirical investigations. We therefore formulate the following question, which will animate the present work: how can one be Pettitian in sociology (even when Pettit is a philosopher) while being Durkheimian in philosophy? By asking this question and operating this crossing, we thus relaunch sociological questioning. This issue can only be addressed in an interdisciplinary setting, the one that education and training sciences provide.

## 2 Holisms

The difficulty is compounded by the fact that holism can mean at least two things. It can be ontological: in which case, we believe that collective entities (the state, the nation, thinking and acting groups) exist beyond the manifestations of their individual members. Holism can also be methodological, if in spite of believing that no collective entities exist we act as if they do, since individuals believe in them and adapt their behaviour accordingly (meaning that, in our analysis, we must assume their existence). Finally, and this is a point that complicates our endeavour, we can detect in the collective ideology of modern societies an ideal of moral individualism.

Indeed, the individuals who make up society are in many ways products of a collective history, those histories of the so-called ‘modern’ societies, in which the division of social work is important. This division sometimes gives rise to what Durkheim called organic solidarity; and other times to the pathologies of hyper-individualism – inequalities, withdrawal into self, and certain forms of suicide to use one of the classic works of sociology – when the division of social work is not sufficiently integrated and regulated. Ideology is therefore not understood here in a pejorative sense, but anthropologically (Dumont,
1992): how was it formed? How did this aspect of the modern individualistic ideology, which enshrines, for instance, freedom of conscience as a concept and as a right, come about?

Without trying to account for all its historical threads, we must avoid the pitfall of losing sight of the holistic framework, collectively constituted, which enshrines the individualistic ideology of the modern. Let us take one example. Freedom of conscience, as a right, was formalised in a Christian framework that was in the process of being secularised. Moreover, a very important driver of freedom of conscience comes from Protestantism, which shares with Catholicism the idea of a faith-belief, and even of an inner faith, a 'faith-conscience'. However, Protestantism pushes this idea further, typically, in the name of the freedom to individually interpret biblical texts. It is also within Protestantism, according to Louis Dumont, that a capital surge of moral individualism takes place: by placing God out of the world, the individual has free rein in this world and the Church becomes conceivable as an association composed of individuals. We see to what extent individuals are the product of society, and even of particular societies, which are in increasingly close relationship with each other. This has crucial consequences in the field of global citizenship education.

## 3 Collective Entities: Societies, Nations, States

It is remarkable to see how religion and secularism are important themes in the work that renews republicanism, and therefore political liberalism. It is obvious in Laborde's work, but it was already so with Pettit's, and before that with Durkheim's. However, let us leave this aspect to move towards citizenship as such.

As mentioned above, one problem that seems crucial to tackle is the link between holism and republicanism, which we can here express in a slightly different way as the link between holism and citizenship. In our modern societies, citizenship is readily viewed in an individualistic way, in the moral sense: citizens are autonomous, they can make informed choices, decide to join a group and conversely, decide to leave it. The problem, in the intellectual sense of the term, is that these possibilities are offered to citizens in a societal framework, often that of the nation and furthermore only specific nations. However, once we have said that citizens are autonomous, we may be tempted to try to analytically reconstruct this societal framework (society) starting from individuals.

This, in a way, is what theories of social contract such as Hobbes' have tried to do. Individuals are thought of at the state of nature, leading authors to
1992): how was it formed? How did this aspect of the modern individualistic ideology, which enshrines, for instance, freedom of conscience as a concept and as a right, come about?

Without trying to account for all its historical threads, we must avoid the pitfall of losing sight of the holistic framework, collectively constituted, which enshrines the individualistic ideology of the modern. Let us take one example. Freedom of conscience, as a right, was formalised in a Christian framework that was in the process of being secularised. Moreover, a very important driver of freedom of conscience comes from Protestantism, which shares with Catholicism the idea of a faith-belief, and even of an inner faith, a 'faith-conscience'. However, Protestantism pushes this idea further, typically, in the name of the freedom to individually interpret biblical texts. It is also within Protestantism, according to Louis Dumont, that a capital surge of moral individualism takes place: by placing God out of the world, the individual has free rein in this world and the Church becomes conceivable as an association composed of individuals. We see to what extent individuals are the product of society, and even of particular societies, which are in increasingly close relationship with each other. This has crucial consequences in the field of global citizenship education.

## 3 Collective Entities: Societies, Nations, States

It is remarkable to see how religion and secularism are important themes in the work that renews republicanism, and therefore political liberalism. It is obvious in Laborde's work, but it was already so with Pettit's, and before that with Durkheim's. However, let us leave this aspect to move towards citizenship as such.

As mentioned above, one problem that seems crucial to tackle is the link between holism and republicanism, which we can here express in a slightly different way as the link between holism and citizenship. In our modern societies, citizenship is readily viewed in an individualistic way, in the moral sense: citizens are autonomous, they can make informed choices, decide to join a group and conversely, decide to leave it. The problem, in the intellectual sense of the term, is that these possibilities are offered to citizens in a societal framework, often that of the nation and furthermore only specific nations. However, once we have said that citizens are autonomous, we may be tempted to try to analytically reconstruct this societal framework (society) starting from individuals.

This, in a way, is what theories of social contract such as Hobbes' have tried to do. Individuals are thought of at the state of nature, leading authors to
then analyse how they go on to build a society. Margaret Gilbert, the influen-
tial philosopher, tries something quite similar, claiming her work to be in line
with Durkheim's and rereading it under an interactionist perspective (Gilbert,
2013). Nevertheless, like Hobbes, she only partially succeeds, though she has
true sociological claims. At some point, she makes the mistake of thinking that
it is possible to start from interactions between individuals, however complex
they may be, to account for collective entities such as 'the nation'.

To avoid this error, we must move more resolutely towards a Durkheimian perspective, which postulates that, from a logical point of view, society exists before individuals. Society provides the collective ideology of individual autonomy (Callegaro & Marcucci, 2018). This can disturb or even shock us, since we might be reluctant to think a 'collective consciousness' exists, to speak like Durkheim. This is precisely because we strongly adhere to the idea that individuals are autonomous, so much so that we readily imagine society, or at least political society, as an aggregation of inter individual actions and decisions, which are then framed by the state.

There is in fact no contradiction in saying that, on the one hand, there is a collective consciousness holding us, which on the other hand, allows us to be autonomous. Indeed, the morally individualistic societies of which Durkheim speaks are not just any societies; they are differentiated societies in which a form of organic solidarity reigns: people support each other because they are both different and interdependent.

Once one admits this idea, sometimes overshadowed by certain liberal
philosophies and nominalist sociologies (that is, who do not easily admit the
existence of collective entities), we can spot the fallacy that runs through the
political and academic slogan of global citizenship. For citizenship to be global,
the world must be a society. Alternatively, we must try to build a citizenship
starting from individuals, and incrementally expand it, with the help of states,
until it is global. However, in a republican perspective coming from Pettit, and
a holist perspective coming from Mauss, this is not possible. Citizens can only
be free if they live in a free state and in a specific type of society, one where
organic solidarity is integrated and regulated by the state.

4 Comparative Education

The interest of this approach is to open a field of investigation according to
an innovative approach: to circumscribe an empirical object of investigation,
which is citizenship education in an international, even 'global' perspec-
tive. Its field is teacher training, in five countries: Germany (Weingarten),
then analyse how they go on to build a society. Margaret Gilbert, the influen-
tial philosopher, tries something quite similar, claiming her work to be in line
with Durkheim's and rereading it under an interactionist perspective (Gilbert,
2013). Nevertheless, like Hobbes, she only partially succeeds, though she has
true sociological claims. At some point, she makes the mistake of thinking that
it is possible to start from interactions between individuals, however complex
they may be, to account for collective entities such as 'the nation'.

To avoid this error, we must move more resolutely towards a Durkheimian
perspective, which postulates that, from a logical point of view, society exists
before individuals. Society provides the collective ideology of individual auton-
omy (Callegaro & Marcucci, 2018). This can disturb or even shock us, since
we might be reluctant to think a 'collective consciousness' exists, to speak like
Durkheim. This is precisely because we strongly adhere to the idea that indi-
viduals are autonomous, so much so that we readily imagine society, or at least
political society, as an aggregation of inter individual actions and decisions,
which are then framed by the state.

There is in fact no contradiction in saying that, on the one hand, there is a
collective consciousness holding us, which on the other hand, allows us to be
autonomous. Indeed, the morally individualistic societies of which Durkheim
speaks are not just any societies; they are differentiated societies in which a
form of organic solidarity reigns: people support each other because they are
both different and interdependent.

Once one admits this idea, sometimes overshadowed by certain liberal
philosophies and nominalist sociologies (that is, who do not easily admit the
existence of collective entities), we can spot the fallacy that runs through the
political and academic slogan of global citizenship. For citizenship to be global,
the world must be a society. Alternatively, we must try to build a citizenship
starting from individuals, and incrementally expand it, with the help of states,
until it is global. However, in a republican perspective coming from Pettit, and
a holist perspective coming from Mauss, this is not possible. Citizens can only
be free if they live in a free state and in a specific type of society, one where
organic solidarity is integrated and regulated by the state.

4 Comparative Education

The interest of this approach is to open a field of investigation according to
an innovative approach: to circumscribe an empirical object of investigation,
which is citizenship education in an international, even 'global' perspec-
tive. Its field is teacher training, in five countries: Germany (Weingarten),
Belgium (Brussels), France (Nantes), the United States (Philadelphia) and Israel (Jerusalem).

It is obviously impossible, in the context of a book, to restore the complexities that are inherent to the legal, professional and cultural frameworks of these five countries and the five training sites involved. The book will therefore have a more general aim, likely to serve investigations in other fields and to provoke a discussion about the multiple conceptions of global citizenship. This book centres on the contention, to be developed, that the Durkheimian perspective is essential, in comparative education, to understand the slogan of global citizenship education (GCE) and its place in teacher training. This place varies because the GCE slogan has two sides: one of them falls under our modern ideology (moral individualism); the other, under our indigenous or 'ordinary' way of apprehending society.

Here, sociology and philosophy intersect again. We are right to think, from a philosophical point of view, that global citizenship must be based on the individualistic ideal: it is indeed relevant to consider that human rights must not depend on any particular society, nation or civilisation. This idea is in the range of philosophy, joining humanism and cosmopolitanism. However, we are wrong if, from this philosophical position, we deduce that a 'worldwide society' can be created from individuals or states composed of individuals. Yet this mistake runs through part of the studies promoting global citizenship. In order to allow their individualistic bias, these studies must postulate that existing interstate regulations could lead to a global society. However, Durkheim and Mauss demonstrated that regulation is not enough to make a society. What is more, this mistake by the 'nominalist' promoters of global citizenship generates a conservative reaction from people who simply want to get rid of the term 'global citizenship', such as David Miller who claims it is absurd. From the specific point of view of an analytical philosopher such as him, the notion of global citizenship is somewhat like a squared circle, a logical impossibility. However, it is not sufficient to leave it at that. The idea of global citizenship must be given a practical content: practical for empirical surveys, as well as for training teachers in Education and Training Sciences (ETS).

In this sense, ETS go beyond philosophy. It allows the demonstration, in the perspective we defend, that it is crucial for teachers and their trainers to experience a division of labour more in line with what our moral individualism dictates, which tends quite naturally towards cosmopolitanism. In this sense, the European Commission's Erasmus+ actions, including the GlobalSense research, are interesting. They allow us to build courses on citizenship that are carried out by several countries, questioning new, international regulations in teacher training.
Belgium (Brussels), France (Nantes), the United States (Philadelphia) and Israel (Jerusalem).

It is obviously impossible, in the context of a book, to restore the complexities that are inherent to the legal, professional and cultural frameworks of these five countries and the five training sites involved. The book will therefore have a more general aim, likely to serve investigations in other fields and to provoke a discussion about the multiple conceptions of global citizenship. This book centres on the contention, to be developed, that the Durkheimian perspective is essential, in comparative education, to understand the slogan of global citizenship education (GCE) and its place in teacher training. This place varies because the GCE slogan has two sides: one of them falls under our modern ideology (moral individualism); the other, under our indigenous or 'ordinary' way of apprehending society.

Here, sociology and philosophy intersect again. We are right to think, from a philosophical point of view, that global citizenship must be based on the individualistic ideal: it is indeed relevant to consider that human rights must not depend on any particular society, nation or civilisation. This idea is in the range of philosophy, joining humanism and cosmopolitanism. However, we are wrong if, from this philosophical position, we deduce that a 'worldwide society' can be created from individuals or states composed of individuals. Yet this mistake runs through part of the studies promoting global citizenship. In order to allow their individualistic bias, these studies must postulate that existing interstate regulations could lead to a global society. However, Durkheim and Mauss demonstrated that regulation is not enough to make a society. What is more, this mistake by the 'nominalist' promoters of global citizenship generates a conservative reaction from people who simply want to get rid of the term 'global citizenship', such as David Miller who claims it is absurd. From the specific point of view of an analytical philosopher such as him, the notion of global citizenship is somewhat like a squared circle, a logical impossibility. However, it is not sufficient to leave it at that. The idea of global citizenship must be given a practical content: practical for empirical surveys, as well as for training teachers in Education and Training Sciences (ETS).

In this sense, ETS go beyond philosophy. It allows the demonstration, in the perspective we defend, that it is crucial for teachers and their trainers to experience a division of labour more in line with what our moral individualism dictates, which tends quite naturally towards cosmopolitanism. In this sense, the European Commission's Erasmus+ actions, including the GlobalSense research, are interesting. They allow us to build courses on citizenship that are carried out by several countries, questioning new, international regulations in teacher training.
It is crucial though to be vigilant and avoid moralism. Moral individualism comes from the fact that people in our societies are different, and consequently, that the only thing they have in common is that they are human persons. The development of organic solidarity replaces mechanical solidarity, based on similarity, which is typical of traditional societies. In this Durkheimian perspective, injunctions to become tolerant and multicultural are of little help. The crucial issue is rather to think of a labour organisation, on our teacher-training sites, that is more in line with the ideological cosmopolitanism of the modern. This is why we will give here the framing of an object of empirical study, with an adapted methodology: questionnaires, interaction analyses, cross-interviews.

In the context of this work, not all results can be detailed and not all survey techniques will be presented, because the question above all is to frame the way in which ideals (liberalism, republicanism, democracy), an empirical investigation (teacher training in particular societies) and a society project (global citizenship) can be articulated and put into action. An institutional anchoring in education and training sciences makes it possible to take some distance, while benefiting from the help of philosophy and sociology as disciplines that are not only contributory, but also constitutive of ETS in the sense that they were part of their foundation. The figure of the philosopher and sociologist Emile Durkheim perfectly illustrates this point. Professor of education science at the Sorbonne in 1906, then of education science and sociology in 1913, Durkheim articulated the three disciplines and addressed, in education science, themes similar to those we wish to develop (Republic, secularism, nation, citizenship). Furthermore, as a sociologist, he provided a framework for thinking about the notions we propose to reinvest (individualism, beliefs, religion, collective entities).

Thus, this work can be read as a Durkheimian gesture, on three levels: the convergence of disciplines, the revision of sociological concepts, and the holistic perspective intimately linked to an educational project when it is conceived, within public education, as a way of involving students in an entity that transcends them (society, nation, world). Education and training sciences have an important contribution to make here, for though they need philosophy and sociology, the reciprocal is also true.

5

Structure of the Book

We shall now present the structure of this work, which comprises two main parts. The first part presents the interdisciplinary framing, while the second
It is crucial though to be vigilant and avoid moralism. Moral individualism comes from the fact that people in our societies are different, and consequently, that the only thing they have in common is that they are human persons. The development of organic solidarity replaces mechanical solidarity, based on similarity, which is typical of traditional societies. In this Durkheimian perspective, injunctions to become tolerant and multicultural are of little help. The crucial issue is rather to think of a labour organisation, on our teacher-training sites, that is more in line with the ideological cosmopolitanism of the modern. This is why we will give here the framing of an object of empirical study, with an adapted methodology: questionnaires, interaction analyses, cross-interviews.

In the context of this work, not all results can be detailed and not all survey techniques will be presented, because the question above all is to frame the way in which ideals (liberalism, republicanism, democracy), an empirical investigation (teacher training in particular societies) and a society project (global citizenship) can be articulated and put into action. An institutional anchoring in education and training sciences makes it possible to take some distance, while benefiting from the help of philosophy and sociology as disciplines that are not only contributory, but also constitutive of ETS in the sense that they were part of their foundation. The figure of the philosopher and sociologist Emile Durkheim perfectly illustrates this point. Professor of education science at the Sorbonne in 1906, then of education science and sociology in 1913, Durkheim articulated the three disciplines and addressed, in education science, themes similar to those we wish to develop (Republic, secularism, nation, citizenship). Furthermore, as a sociologist, he provided a framework for thinking about the notions we propose to reinvest (individualism, beliefs, religion, collective entities).

Thus, this work can be read as a Durkheimian gesture, on three levels: the convergence of disciplines, the revision of sociological concepts, and the holistic perspective intimately linked to an educational project when it is conceived, within public education, as a way of involving students in an entity that transcends them (society, nation, world). Education and training sciences have an important contribution to make here, for though they need philosophy and sociology, the reciprocal is also true.

5

Structure of the Book

We shall now present the structure of this work, which comprises two main parts. The first part presents the interdisciplinary framing, while the second
part, which is longer, develops a Durkheimian perspective on GCE and puts it
to the test with help of empirical data.

Chapter 1 immediately enters into the tensions or even contradictions that
are at the heart of the debates on GCE, by exploring the dual aim of the Inter-
national Bureau of Education (IBE), in the interwar period, in connection with
the League of Nations (which became the United Nations). A precursor of
UNESCO, the IBE was first a technical bureau dedicated to education in 1925
before being fully integrated into UNESCO in 1969. This historical origin was
already fraught with tensions. Indeed though the neutrality of Switzerland,
where the IBE was established, was initially beneficial since peace could mean
not taking sides, it proved to be complex at a time when it could be seen as
a compromise, since it allowed relatively close relations with authoritarian
or even totalitarian regimes (Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany). Nevertheless, the
actors of this part of History were more or less aware of these problems that
also refer to conceptual tensions, requiring the lens, in particular, of political
philosophy as a lever for ETS.

Therefore, taking note of the differences between philosophy and ETS, we
question in Chapter 2 the identity of the latter and their place in social sci-
ences. ETS are a part of human and social sciences (HSS) because they face the
same questions and challenges. Furthermore, ETS can accompany the trans-
formation of educational action driven by a political concern, in the sense of a
political philosophy. Ultimately, the question is to grasp how ETS, being exter-
nal to sociology and philosophy, can question the relations between them and,
while focusing on a particular object, contribute to this common movement
within HSS of providing individuals with the conditions of their autonomy.

This brings us to propose a critical approach in comparative education.
Comparing the French approach of ETS shows that it is more integrative
than in Germany notably, or the UK. This integrative aspect however renders
a distinction between ETS and contributory disciplines difficult. It requires
the institutionalisation of ETS, defending them against criticism and giving
them their own identity through epistemological reflection. ETS being made
of a plurality of scientific disciplines, it is difficult to unify them. Whilst a rap-
prochement with older disciplines or rewarding professional fields might be
tempting, the risk is to put ETS at the service of expertise activities rather than
actual research activities.

Therefore we need to reconnect the field with its contributive disciplines
in a reflective way. More specifically, articulating political philosophy with
sociology ensures the avoidance of prescriptive considerations on questions
approached here regarding secularism and religion, which are key issues in the
development of political liberalism. More specifically, the view adopted in this
part, which is longer, develops a Durkheimian perspective on GCE and puts it
to the test with help of empirical data.

Chapter 1 immediately enters into the tensions or even contradictions that
are at the heart of the debates on GCE, by exploring the dual aim of the Inter-
national Bureau of Education (IBE), in the interwar period, in connection with
the League of Nations (which became the United Nations). A precursor of
UNESCO, the IBE was first a technical bureau dedicated to education in 1925
before being fully integrated into UNESCO in 1969. This historical origin was
already fraught with tensions. Indeed though the neutrality of Switzerland,
where the IBE was established, was initially beneficial since peace could mean
not taking sides, it proved to be complex at a time when it could be seen as
a compromise, since it allowed relatively close relations with authoritarian
or even totalitarian regimes (Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany). Nevertheless, the
actors of this part of History were more or less aware of these problems that
also refer to conceptual tensions, requiring the lens, in particular, of political
philosophy as a lever for ETS.

Therefore, taking note of the differences between philosophy and ETS, we
question in Chapter 2 the identity of the latter and their place in social sci-
ences. ETS are a part of human and social sciences (HSS) because they face the
same questions and challenges. Furthermore, ETS can accompany the trans-
formation of educational action driven by a political concern, in the sense of a
political philosophy. Ultimately, the question is to grasp how ETS, being exter-
nal to sociology and philosophy, can question the relations between them and,
while focusing on a particular object, contribute to this common movement
within HSS of providing individuals with the conditions of their autonomy.

This brings us to propose a critical approach in comparative education.
Comparing the French approach of ETS shows that it is more integrative
than in Germany notably, or the UK. This integrative aspect however renders
a distinction between ETS and contributory disciplines difficult. It requires
the institutionalisation of ETS, defending them against criticism and giving
them their own identity through epistemological reflection. ETS being made
of a plurality of scientific disciplines, it is difficult to unify them. Whilst a rap-
prochement with older disciplines or rewarding professional fields might be
tempting, the risk is to put ETS at the service of expertise activities rather than
actual research activities.

Therefore we need to reconnect the field with its contributive disciplines
in a reflective way. More specifically, articulating political philosophy with
sociology ensures the avoidance of prescriptive considerations on questions
approached here regarding secularism and religion, which are key issues in the
development of political liberalism. More specifically, the view adopted in this
book is one of critical republicanism, as an updated version of political liber-
alism. It is an interdisciplinary approach that aims to distinguish the political
proposal inside Global citizenship education, and spell it out. In other words,
we aim at making our relationship to values explicit, focusing on political lib-
eralism as a core framework for global citizenship education. Its principles are
discussed and we focus on the debate between liberalism and republicanism,
which notably highlights the relationship between religion and secularism.
The meaning of secular liberalism is to consider all religions equally. It is pos-
sible to consider religions as equal under the common criterion of liberal prin-
ciples, for liberalism is just as compatible with Islam as with Christianity for
instance. Political liberalism does not belong to a specific culture or religion. If
religious people must translate their thoughts into a secular language in order
to be understood by all (Rawls), this does not *ipso facto* mean they are treated
worse than non-religious people.

Hence, following Philip Pettit, we assume a renewed republican approach
as part of a larger liberal framework. Accordingly, religious phenomena should
be approached through non-religious categories, with tools from law and polit-
ical theory. These can help disaggregate religion into three components and
lead to the frame that a religion that belongs in the public sphere must make
intelligible epistemic propositions, non-encompassing conceptions of the good
life, and non-divisive collective identities. This approach can be adapted to
non-religious phenomena, i.e. disaggregation symmetrises religious and non-
religious phenomena. These elements form the framework of a relationship to
values that we make explicit in favour of a transparent conception of political
liberalism, inseparable, as we shall see, from the notion of global citizenship.

Chapter 3 focuses on the question of citizenship in social sciences. It relies
on sociology of beliefs and social philosophy to question what social totality is,
and distinguish what characterises collective decisions (one that people feel
compelled to respect). The chapter references Margaret Gilbert's definition, on
a political level, of society as a collective of members engaged by an act of
will. Nevertheless, since there must be uses and social relations that pre-exist
the establishment of this collective, the choice made in this book is to rely on
Durkheim's holism: society makes people, not the other way round; further-
more, the modern society is mainly centred on the nation, though according to
Durkheim it can have a cosmopolitan aspect. This frames the question of the
empirical reality of global citizenship, with no territorial anchoring, common
morals or government. Through an approach based on critical republicanism,
the chapter delves into the relationship of individuals towards the nation-state.

Admittedly, critical republicanism is not quite holistic, since Pettit for instance
believes individual freedom is derived from freedom as non-domination,
book is one of critical republicanism, as an updated version of political liber-
alism. It is an interdisciplinary approach that aims to distinguish the political
proposal inside Global citizenship education, and spell it out. In other words,
we aim at making our relationship to values explicit, focusing on political lib-
eralism as a core framework for global citizenship education. Its principles are
discussed and we focus on the debate between liberalism and republicanism,
which notably highlights the relationship between religion and secularism.
The meaning of secular liberalism is to consider all religions equally. It is pos-
sible to consider religions as equal under the common criterion of liberal prin-
ciples, for liberalism is just as compatible with Islam as with Christianity for
instance. Political liberalism does not belong to a specific culture or religion. If
religious people must translate their thoughts into a secular language in order
to be understood by all (Rawls), this does not *ipso facto* mean they are treated
worse than non-religious people.

Hence, following Philip Pettit, we assume a renewed republican approach
as part of a larger liberal framework. Accordingly, religious phenomena should
be approached through non-religious categories, with tools from law and polit-
ical theory. These can help disaggregate religion into three components and
lead to the frame that a religion that belongs in the public sphere must make
intelligible epistemic propositions, non-encompassing conceptions of the good
life, and non-divisive collective identities. This approach can be adapted to
non-religious phenomena, i.e. disaggregation symmetrises religious and non-
religious phenomena. These elements form the framework of a relationship to
values that we make explicit in favour of a transparent conception of political
liberalism, inseparable, as we shall see, from the notion of global citizenship.

Chapter 3 focuses on the question of citizenship in social sciences. It relies
on sociology of beliefs and social philosophy to question what social totality is,
and distinguish what characterises collective decisions (one that people feel
compelled to respect). The chapter references Margaret Gilbert's definition, on
a political level, of society as a collective of members engaged by an act of
will. Nevertheless, since there must be uses and social relations that pre-exist
the establishment of this collective, the choice made in this book is to rely on
Durkheim's holism: society makes people, not the other way round; further-
more, the modern society is mainly centred on the nation, though according to
Durkheim it can have a cosmopolitan aspect. This frames the question of the
empirical reality of global citizenship, with no territorial anchoring, common
morals or government. Through an approach based on critical republicanism,
the chapter delves into the relationship of individuals towards the nation-state.

Admittedly, critical republicanism is not quite holistic, since Pettit for instance
believes individual freedom is derived from freedom as non-domination,
making it a negative freedom, therefore a version of political liberalism. How-
ever, if political liberalism defines freedom as a natural, individual power that
determines the role and limits of the state, critical republicanism derives free-
dom from a political status, itself framed by the state. Thus with this version of
political liberalism, the notion of global citizenship can make sense; it consists
in identifying universal human faculties, then deducing from them a universal
society that would be global. However, with critical republicanism, the idea of
global citizenship requires thinking more resolutely about the state.

In the second part of the book, which is longer than the first one, we present
a Durkheimian approach on GCE. Durkheim's intuition was that since what
modern societies have in common is that they are deeply affected by liber-
alism, then collective consciousness can be linked to social brain, for unity;
and division of labour can be linked to organic solidarity, for pluralism. In this
perspective, Chapter 4 presents GlobalSense, its challenges (such as those
linked to the ambiguity of the umbrella notion that is GCE and how members
of the team interpret it differently), and the pedagogical design of the train-
ing device. It delves into the importance Durkheim's theory gives to second-
ary social groups such as occupational groups, which must be organised on
a national level, in order to integrate groups and individuals, the state being
too far from them to do so. The secondary groups studied in this book are the
professional groups of teacher-trainers and pre-service teachers, in a context
of Europeanisation and globalisation of higher education and of international
recommendations on citizenship education.

The GlobalSense project insists on the relevance of studying GCE at an inter-
national level, to compare the ways each state tends to address these ‘global’
themes in a culturally and politically specific perspective. Furthermore, the
point of training pre-service teachers on this topic is to enable them to reflect
on the complex relationships between a nation and the liberal principles that
form the substance of the idea of citizenship. To avoid hyper-individualism,
which according to Durkheim is one of the main pathologies of the division of
social work, cosmopolitanism must not just be about individuals developing
competences in sustainable development, global citizenship and well-being.
Rather, ‘educations towards’ global citizenship gives a political meaning to
knowledge and values. Therefore, the ultimate goal is not to make students
understand what GCE is; but to restore political sense to educational work and
encourage pre-service teachers to analyse the GCE slogan, its aims and values.

Ultimately, it is through these critical questions, potentially carried by
pre-service teachers, that curriculum guidelines make it possible to consider
the transition from a recommended curriculum to a real curriculum. Through-
out Chapters 5 and 6 notably, we propose illustrations related to the five
making it a negative freedom, therefore a version of political liberalism. How-
ever, if political liberalism defines freedom as a natural, individual power that
determines the role and limits of the state, critical republicanism derives free-
dom from a political status, itself framed by the state. Thus with this version of
political liberalism, the notion of global citizenship can make sense; it consists
in identifying universal human faculties, then deducing from them a universal
society that would be global. However, with critical republicanism, the idea of
global citizenship requires thinking more resolutely about the state.

In the second part of the book, which is longer than the first one, we present
a Durkheimian approach on GCE. Durkheim's intuition was that since what
modern societies have in common is that they are deeply affected by liber-
alism, then collective consciousness can be linked to social brain, for unity;
and division of labour can be linked to organic solidarity, for pluralism. In this
perspective, Chapter 4 presents GlobalSense, its challenges (such as those
linked to the ambiguity of the umbrella notion that is GCE and how members
of the team interpret it differently), and the pedagogical design of the train-
ing device. It delves into the importance Durkheim's theory gives to second-
ary social groups such as occupational groups, which must be organised on
a national level, in order to integrate groups and individuals, the state being
too far from them to do so. The secondary groups studied in this book are the
professional groups of teacher-trainers and pre-service teachers, in a context
of Europeanisation and globalisation of higher education and of international
recommendations on citizenship education.

The GlobalSense project insists on the relevance of studying GCE at an inter-
national level, to compare the ways each state tends to address these ‘global’
themes in a culturally and politically specific perspective. Furthermore, the
point of training pre-service teachers on this topic is to enable them to reflect
on the complex relationships between a nation and the liberal principles that
form the substance of the idea of citizenship. To avoid hyper-individualism,
which according to Durkheim is one of the main pathologies of the division of
social work, cosmopolitanism must not just be about individuals developing
competences in sustainable development, global citizenship and well-being.
Rather, ‘educations towards’ global citizenship gives a political meaning to
knowledge and values. Therefore, the ultimate goal is not to make students
understand what GCE is; but to restore political sense to educational work and
encourage pre-service teachers to analyse the GCE slogan, its aims and values.

Ultimately, it is through these critical questions, potentially carried by
pre-service teachers, that curriculum guidelines make it possible to consider
the transition from a recommended curriculum to a real curriculum. Through-
out Chapters 5 and 6 notably, we propose illustrations related to the five
countries involved in the GlobalSense research. We focus in particular on the preliminary conceptions that the participating student-teachers (also alternatively called pre-service teachers throughout the book) have regarding GC and related topics (notably migrations), as well as on their perceptions of their participation in this international training device. We show how these perceptions seem to relate to their local and/or national context of training.

The aim of Chapter 5 is to develop a sociological theory regarding global citizenship. If being a citizen means taking part in the goals of a collective entity such as a nation and being obliged by its decisions, then what does citizenship become if one tries to broaden its scope (internationally) or even reformulate it (GCE)? Our answer is Durkheimian. It consists in stressing that a non-pathological division of labour deepens the autonomy of individuals, whose social aspirations are in turn likely to challenge the established order. This holistic line, considering that society is at the principle of deepening individualism, provides a guideline for thinking cosmopolitanism. Specifically, Chapter 5 underlines how critical republicanism considers patriotism as the first step to cosmopolitanism. This chapter explains that conservatism, which can sometimes be national-conservatism, is a reaction to liberal nominalism, the expression of a need to integrate and regulate the division of social work as a reaction to unbridled liberalism. The challenge is to draw an alternative, socialist response to the (neo)liberal and nominalist motif that values globalisation and blurred borders in the name of the principled autonomy of individuals.

For Durkheim, only the state¹ can ensure a ‘normality’ by making society aware of itself and, consequently, of the new rules and standards that correspond to the irreversible deepening of the division of social work. Relying to some extent on the spirit of nationalist demands can help bring out the socialist third way. Therefore, the Durkheimian gesture suggested in this book is to articulate critical republicanism with the holistic perceptive and try to grasp the social aspirations emerging from the deepening division of social work, making it possible to raise awareness of its expression at the state level. This implies developing, in teacher training, new working methods at the service of a communication circuit between societies and states (Callegaro & Marcucci, 2018) that promote new professional rules.

Chapter 6 focuses on the role of states in adapting globalisation policies in education. In the GlobalSense (GS) project, all countries are from the global north, but official requirements, such as a framework for citizenship training, remain marked by a national level. If Durkheim was in favour of secondary groups, it is because they exercise, through their trade, what is an already social thinking. The state then mediates social thinking in a continuous communication process. In this spirit, GS has the goal of promoting the expression of new
countries involved in the GlobalSense research. We focus in particular on the preliminary conceptions that the participating student-teachers (also alternatively called pre-service teachers throughout the book) have regarding GC and related topics (notably migrations), as well as on their perceptions of their participation in this international training device. We show how these perceptions seem to relate to their local and/or national context of training.

The aim of Chapter 5 is to develop a sociological theory regarding global citizenship. If being a citizen means taking part in the goals of a collective entity such as a nation and being obliged by its decisions, then what does citizenship become if one tries to broaden its scope (internationally) or even reformulate it (GCE)? Our answer is Durkheimian. It consists in stressing that a non-pathological division of labour deepens the autonomy of individuals, whose social aspirations are in turn likely to challenge the established order. This holistic line, considering that society is at the principle of deepening individualism, provides a guideline for thinking cosmopolitanism. Specifically, Chapter 5 underlines how critical republicanism considers patriotism as the first step to cosmopolitanism. This chapter explains that conservatism, which can sometimes be national-conservatism, is a reaction to liberal nominalism, the expression of a need to integrate and regulate the division of social work as a reaction to unbridled liberalism. The challenge is to draw an alternative, socialist response to the (neo)liberal and nominalist motif that values globalisation and blurred borders in the name of the principled autonomy of individuals.

For Durkheim, only the state¹ can ensure a 'normality' by making society aware of itself and, consequently, of the new rules and standards that correspond to the irreversible deepening of the division of social work. Relying to some extent on the spirit of nationalist demands can help bring out the socialist third way. Therefore, the Durkheimian gesture suggested in this book is to articulate critical republicanism with the holistic perceptive and try to grasp the social aspirations emerging from the deepening division of social work, making it possible to raise awareness of its expression at the state level. This implies developing, in teacher training, new working methods at the service of a communication circuit between societies and states (Callegaro & Marcucci, 2018) that promote new professional rules.

Chapter 6 focuses on the role of states in adapting globalisation policies in education. In the GlobalSense (GS) project, all countries are from the global north, but official requirements, such as a framework for citizenship training, remain marked by a national level. If Durkheim was in favour of secondary groups, it is because they exercise, through their trade, what is an already social thinking. The state then mediates social thinking in a continuous communication process. In this spirit, GS has the goal of promoting the expression of new
aspirations in the field of cosmopolitan patriotism of two professional groups, teacher-trainers and pre-service teachers, while taking into account the fact that they are marked by moral individualism. GS uses a sociological approach rooted in political philosophy to examine the concrete conditions that might allow these professionals to establish new constitutive rules in favour of citizenship education in an international perspective, whilst taking into account these secondary groups' national contexts, with each state then formalising the constitutive rules.

If the aims of education systems can converge under the effect of globalisation policies, this chapter wishes to consider how societies, as interpretive communities, react to these policies. This requires taking into account the reality of teacher training in the different countries, by not assuming the inevitability of globalisation processes and by emphasising the various ways in which actors interpret, appropriate and even circumvent ideas that circulate in a transnational way.

Chapter 7, centred on ‘The progress of modernity’, does not argue for or against GCE, but rather for the inclusion of prescriptions and recommendations on GCE, as well as their promoters, in the analysis led in GlobalSense. The point is to identify the political criteria that give substance to the vague notion of GCE, in order to prevent its co-optation by interests and ideologies. Based on the three typical motifs of modernity sketched by Mannheim (liberal-nominalist, conservative, and socialist), this chapter argues that the socialist one is better suited to analyse GCE, for its educational ambition is to ensure that every individual is able to study the practices of the groups in which he or she participates. For the socialist motif, people’s profusion of identities is not a reaction to national citizenship, but a deepening of individualism specific to modern societies.

In fact, the higher the division of labour, the more people need to be recognised as individuals. Durkheim saw the deepening of the 'cult of the human person' as a matter of social totality via organic solidarity that was supposed to reconcile differentiation and interdependence. However, this 'cult of the person' must be acknowledged as being specific to modern societies. Furthermore, it requires the inclusion in a political community, de facto national, of citizens who have reflexive capacities. The chapter proceeds to compare how the secondary groups of teacher trainers and pre-service teachers in the different countries receive and analyse the GlobalSense protocol. This comparison is linked to the presence of the states (rules, administration, curriculum) in teacher training. The methodology puts the overall framework to the test on different levels (student-teachers' reactions, designing of lesson plans, international encounters, self-reflections, collective reflections) and paves the way for a renewed approach to GCE.
aspirations in the field of cosmopolitan patriotism of two professional groups, teacher-trainers and pre-service teachers, while taking into account the fact that they are marked by moral individualism. GS uses a sociological approach rooted in political philosophy to examine the concrete conditions that might allow these professionals to establish new constitutive rules in favour of citizenship education in an international perspective, whilst taking into account these secondary groups' national contexts, with each state then formalising the constitutive rules.

If the aims of education systems can converge under the effect of globalisation policies, this chapter wishes to consider how societies, as interpretive communities, react to these policies. This requires taking into account the reality of teacher training in the different countries, by not assuming the inevitability of globalisation processes and by emphasising the various ways in which actors interpret, appropriate and even circumvent ideas that circulate in a transnational way.

Chapter 7, centred on ‘The progress of modernity’, does not argue for or against GCE, but rather for the inclusion of prescriptions and recommendations on GCE, as well as their promoters, in the analysis led in GlobalSense. The point is to identify the political criteria that give substance to the vague notion of GCE, in order to prevent its co-optation by interests and ideologies. Based on the three typical motifs of modernity sketched by Mannheim (liberal-nominalist, conservative, and socialist), this chapter argues that the socialist one is better suited to analyse GCE, for its educational ambition is to ensure that every individual is able to study the practices of the groups in which he or she participates. For the socialist motif, people’s profusion of identities is not a reaction to national citizenship, but a deepening of individualism specific to modern societies.

In fact, the higher the division of labour, the more people need to be recognised as individuals. Durkheim saw the deepening of the 'cult of the human person' as a matter of social totality via organic solidarity that was supposed to reconcile differentiation and interdependence. However, this 'cult of the person' must be acknowledged as being specific to modern societies. Furthermore, it requires the inclusion in a political community, de facto national, of citizens who have reflexive capacities. The chapter proceeds to compare how the secondary groups of teacher trainers and pre-service teachers in the different countries receive and analyse the GlobalSense protocol. This comparison is linked to the presence of the states (rules, administration, curriculum) in teacher training. The methodology puts the overall framework to the test on different levels (student-teachers' reactions, designing of lesson plans, international encounters, self-reflections, collective reflections) and paves the way for a renewed approach to GCE.
The conclusion underlines the potentialities of fruitful collaboration
between philosophy and social sciences, in order to confront theoretical con-
structions with the complexities of social phenomena. This interdisciplinarity
can help in the difficult task of studying stabilised political principles and their
translation into real-life situations, whilst also offering a balance between col-
lective entities and individual freedoms. This is crucial for the study of GCE in
its historical complexities throughout the 20th century (International Bureau
of Education, UNESCO), which are also conceptual complexities. Data analysis
shows how pre-service teachers are sensitive to the concept of GC and aspire
to be cosmopolitan. However, many of them are also conscious of the limits
of GC, such as the fact that this concept is situated nationally and socially
within societies that promote a collective individualistic ideology. Therefore,
a conundrum arises from understanding that it is specifically the belonging to
one's society that makes one receptive to the concept of globalised citizenship,
which by definition overcomes national citizenship.

Note

<footnote n="1">1 We choose to use lowercase letter here although some republican, but also Rawlsian liberal philosophers, prefer to write ‘the State’.</footnote>
The conclusion underlines the potentialities of fruitful collaboration
between philosophy and social sciences, in order to confront theoretical con-
structions with the complexities of social phenomena. This interdisciplinarity
can help in the difficult task of studying stabilised political principles and their
translation into real-life situations, whilst also offering a balance between col-
lective entities and individual freedoms. This is crucial for the study of GCE in
its historical complexities throughout the 20th century (International Bureau
of Education, UNESCO), which are also conceptual complexities. Data analysis
shows how pre-service teachers are sensitive to the concept of GC and aspire
to be cosmopolitan. However, many of them are also conscious of the limits
of GC, such as the fact that this concept is situated nationally and socially
within societies that promote a collective individualistic ideology. Therefore,
a conundrum arises from understanding that it is specifically the belonging to
one's society that makes one receptive to the concept of globalised citizenship,
which by definition overcomes national citizenship.

Note

<footnote n="1">1 We choose to use lowercase letter here although some republican, but also Rawlsian liberal philosophers, prefer to write ‘the State’.</footnote>
# PART 1

## Global Citizenship at the Crossroads of Education Sciences, Sociology, and Political Philosophy

::
# PART 1

## Global Citizenship at the Crossroads of Education Sciences, Sociology, and Political Philosophy

::
# Introduction to Part 1

A philosophy must criticise the individualistic illusion if it is to think of social life starting from the institution. However, it is in order to raise the question of the institution that it is necessary to introduce concepts such as ‘tradition’ and ‘education’. Here we do not have a particular feature of certain societies nor an optional philosophical ideal, but rather a social necessity which affects any system based on the transmission of its institutions through the educational route, in other words, any human society: this system will have to *impose* on individuals a conception of the collective good, and this even in the case of an individualistic society whose definition of the common good would be the imperative to ensure the autonomy of each person.

DESCOMBES (2013, p. 154)

∴
∴
∴

In this first part, we analyse the complexities of the multifaceted concept that is global citizenship, by using a threefold approach that sheds light on its historical foundations, theoretical frameworks, and contemporary implications. The stage for discussing Global Citizenship Education is set by exploring the historical tensions within the International Bureau of Education during the interwar period. This historical context prompts us to examine conceptual tensions through a philosophical perspective, thus giving a new impetus to education and training sciences.

Indeed, as long-term promoters of international education and of a form of global citizenship, the nascent Education and Training Sciences greatly contributed to the prefiguration of UNESCO. Certainly, at the beginning of the 20th century, their institutionalisation was not as developed as it is today. However, the great thinkers of education, Jean Piaget and John Dewey, were precursors of the ideals of UNESCO, which still have very current resonance through the promotion, increasingly affirmed and shared over time, of global citizenship education. Nevertheless, to go beyond the simple defence of a supposedly common ideal, we must dare to enter the debate around this vague notion by firmly reconnecting Education and Training Sciences to classical sociology and political philosophy. It is in fact on this condition that cosmopolitanism
Introduction to Part 1

A philosophy must criticise the individualistic illusion if it is to think
of social life starting from the institution. However, it is in order to
raise the question of the institution that it is necessary to introduce
concepts such as ‘tradition’ and ‘education’. Here we do not have a
particular feature of certain societies nor an optional philosophical
ideal, but rather a social necessity which affects any system based
on the transmission of its institutions through the educational
route, in other words, any human society: this system will have to
*impose* on individuals a conception of the collective good, and this
even in the case of an individualistic society whose definition of the
common good would be the imperative to ensure the autonomy of
each person.

DESCOMBES (2013, p. 154)

∴
∴
∴

In this first part, we analyse the complexities of the multifaceted concept that is global citizenship, by using a threefold approach that sheds light on its historical foundations, theoretical frameworks, and contemporary implications. The stage for discussing Global Citizenship Education is set by exploring the historical tensions within the International Bureau of Education during the interwar period. This historical context prompts us to examine conceptual tensions through a philosophical perspective, thus giving a new impetus to education and training sciences.

Indeed, as long-term promoters of international education and of a form of
global citizenship, the nascent Education and Training Sciences greatly con-
tributed to the prefiguration of UNESCO. Certainly, at the beginning of the 20th
century, their institutionalisation was not as developed as it is today. However,
the great thinkers of education, Jean Piaget and John Dewey, were precursors
of the ideals of UNESCO, which still have very current resonance through the
promotion, increasingly affirmed and shared over time, of global citizenship
education. Nevertheless, to go beyond the simple defence of a supposedly
common ideal, we must dare to enter the debate around this vague notion
by firmly reconnecting Education and Training Sciences to classical sociology
and political philosophy. It is in fact on this condition that cosmopolitanism
and its implementation can be discussed on solid foundations and therefore
better shared.

This then brings us to exploring the identity of Education and Training
Sciences within the realm of Human and Social Sciences. Through compara-
tive analysis, we examine the challenges of maintaining the integrity of Edu-
cation and Training Sciences amid evolving educational landscapes. Lastly, we
investigate the essence of the concept of citizenship in social sciences, focus-
ing on collective decisions and the empirical reality of global citizenship. By
examining the interplay between critical republicanism and political liberal-
ism, we seek to understand the dynamics of freedom, citizenship, and the role
of the state.
and its implementation can be discussed on solid foundations and therefore
better shared.

This then brings us to exploring the identity of Education and Training
Sciences within the realm of Human and Social Sciences. Through compara-
tive analysis, we examine the challenges of maintaining the integrity of Edu-
cation and Training Sciences amid evolving educational landscapes. Lastly, we
investigate the essence of the concept of citizenship in social sciences, focus-
ing on collective decisions and the empirical reality of global citizenship. By
examining the interplay between critical republicanism and political liberal-
ism, we seek to understand the dynamics of freedom, citizenship, and the role
of the state.
# Historical Roots and Conceptual Tensions of Global Citizenship

This chapter would like to take seriously the hybrid aspect of GCE, between historical aspirations and conceptual tensions. As we will see in a brief synthesis of the International Bureau of Education's actions, as a matrix of educational internationalism (Hofstetter & Erhise, 2022), the two dimensions are not dissociable. Founded almost a century ago in 1925 in Geneva in line with the Rousseau Institute which later became part of the University of Geneva, the IBE symbolised a shared aspiration for peace.

Just like the League of Nations, also based in Geneva, tensions between internal actors as well as with the main external partners (governments, international organisations, teachers' unions) were sharp. Nevertheless, a common horizon of peace and global cooperation through education managed to emerge as seen today through the actions in favour of global citizenship of UNESCO, the UN and the European Commission (among others).

What was the object of these tensions? We will first explore them from a historical point of view, before studying whether they currently find a political expression. This is a difficult task, since defining the notion of global citizenship is problematic, as even UNESCO admits in its reports. Finally, we will propose, in order to help overcome this justified struggle, a framework of political philosophy that we will develop in the following chapters, empirically as well as operationally, through the GlobalSense research.

## 1 The International Bureau of Education as a Matrix of Educational Cosmopolitanism

Since its foundation, the IBE has wanted to spread the idea of international cooperation in education. Study trips were promoted, as well as meetings with international educators and trainers, and interschool correspondence via mail, at a time when email and online exchanges did not exist. But what strikes a historian is the startling contrast between “dithyrambic statements – part of a legitimation strategy – and the alarmist observations that punctuate the daily exchanges” within the IBE (Hofstetter, 2022, p. 101).
# Historical Roots and Conceptual Tensions of Global Citizenship

This chapter would like to take seriously the hybrid aspect of GCE, between historical aspirations and conceptual tensions. As we will see in a brief synthesis of the International Bureau of Education's actions, as a matrix of educational internationalism (Hofstetter & Erhise, 2022), the two dimensions are not dissociable. Founded almost a century ago in 1925 in Geneva in line with the Rousseau Institute which later became part of the University of Geneva, the IBE symbolised a shared aspiration for peace.

Just like the League of Nations, also based in Geneva, tensions between internal actors as well as with the main external partners (governments, international organisations, teachers' unions) were sharp. Nevertheless, a common horizon of peace and global cooperation through education managed to emerge as seen today through the actions in favour of global citizenship of UNESCO, the UN and the European Commission (among others).

What was the object of these tensions? We will first explore them from a historical point of view, before studying whether they currently find a political expression. This is a difficult task, since defining the notion of global citizenship is problematic, as even UNESCO admits in its reports. Finally, we will propose, in order to help overcome this justified struggle, a framework of political philosophy that we will develop in the following chapters, empirically as well as operationally, through the GlobalSense research.

## 1 The International Bureau of Education as a Matrix of Educational Cosmopolitanism

Since its foundation, the IBE has wanted to spread the idea of international cooperation in education. Study trips were promoted, as well as meetings with international educators and trainers, and interschool correspondence via mail, at a time when email and online exchanges did not exist. But what strikes a historian is the startling contrast between “dithyrambic statements – part of a legitimation strategy – and the alarmist observations that punctuate the daily exchanges” within the IBE (Hofstetter, 2022, p. 101).
These tensions are not only related to the funding deficit of the institution, nor to the peculiar approach of some of the advocates of world peace, such as Adolphe Ferrière, who adopted a spiritualist approach, perceiving the world as an essential totality, or even a mystical approach under the sign of astrology, and was gradually discarded in favour of more scientific profiles such as Jean Piaget, director of the IBE for four decades (from 1929 to 1968). They are also linked to political or even geopolitical parameters, in times of structuring of an East-West axis whose two centres of gravity were the United States on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. In this context, peace and neutrality are perceived by the Federation of Education Workers as a way for the IBE "to consciously or not deceive educators, to make them believe that one can, through neutrality, suppress class warfare and achieve social harmony" (Apletine, quoted in Christian et al., 2022, p. 534).

This is why some members of the IBE were wary of being too closely associated with the League of Nations, and others wished to initiate bilateral meetings, without its relay, with foreign governments, stressing that cooperation in education does not indicate support for authoritarian regimes. Thus the IBE gradually became an intergovernmental body by binding itself first to countries where progressive education, the pedagogical spearhead of the IBE under the sign of activity, creativity and spontaneity of children and adolescents (which itself found a scientific counterpart in Piaget's psychology), was well established (Poland, Ecuador), then to countries whose governments were much less in tune with the liberal spirit, such as 1930s Germany. To solve this tension, the IBE valued a "strictly scientific universalist internationalism" but this was not enough to avoid discredit. When the world is torn between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes, is universal cooperation at a global level truly possible?

Thus, in 1939, a fateful year, the delegates of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy used the IBE, of which they were members, as a platform to declare: "It is to the extent that each will base education on the genius of its people, that peoples will come to better understand and respect one another [...], for without a sense of the nation there can be no true humanity" (cited by Hofstetter & Boss, 2022, p. 152). These sentences are not absurd in themselves, since philosophers who are now critical of GCE have similar positions (whose blind points we will be describe later), but one can guess, with the comfort of hindsight, the intention and true meaning of these words.

That being said, the IBE initiated here a fruitful practice of not thwarting any national educational movement. It is through the wealth of national experiences, the development of knowledge and national experience in each country, that the IBE believes it can coordinate and drive educational reforms
These tensions are not only related to the funding deficit of the institution, nor to the peculiar approach of some of the advocates of world peace, such as Adolphe Ferrière, who adopted a spiritualist approach, perceiving the world as an essential totality, or even a mystical approach under the sign of astrology, and was gradually discarded in favour of more scientific profiles such as Jean Piaget, director of the IBE for four decades (from 1929 to 1968). They are also linked to political or even geopolitical parameters, in times of structuring of an East-West axis whose two centres of gravity were the United States on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. In this context, peace and neutrality are perceived by the Federation of Education Workers as a way for the IBE “to consciously or not deceive educators, to make them believe that one can, through neutrality, suppress class warfare and achieve social harmony” (Apletine, quoted in Christian et al., 2022, p. 534).

This is why some members of the IBE were wary of being too closely associated with the League of Nations, and others wished to initiate bilateral meetings, without its relay, with foreign governments, stressing that cooperation in education does not indicate support for authoritarian regimes. Thus the IBE gradually became an intergovernmental body by binding itself first to countries where progressive education, the pedagogical spearhead of the IBE under the sign of activity, creativity and spontaneity of children and adolescents (which itself found a scientific counterpart in Piaget's psychology), was well established (Poland, Ecuador), then to countries whose governments were much less in tune with the liberal spirit, such as 1930s Germany. To solve this tension, the IBE valued a "strictly scientific universalist internationalism" but this was not enough to avoid discredit. When the world is torn between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes, is universal cooperation at a global level truly possible?

Thus, in 1939, a fateful year, the delegates of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy used the IBE, of which they were members, as a platform to declare: "It is to the extent that each will base education on the genius of its people, that peoples will come to better understand and respect one another [...], for without a sense of the nation there can be no true humanity" (cited by Hofstetter & Boss, 2022, p. 152). These sentences are not absurd in themselves, since philosophers who are now critical of GCE have similar positions (whose blind points we will be describe later), but one can guess, with the comfort of hindsight, the intention and true meaning of these words.

That being said, the IBE initiated here a fruitful practice of not thwarting any national educational movement. It is through the wealth of national experiences, the development of knowledge and national experience in each country, that the IBE believes it can coordinate and drive educational reforms
around the world (Hofstetter & Boss, 2022, p. 149). Ultimately, we must accept dealing with national realities at the risk of falling into hegemonic, standardising and impoverishing goals – those that the current notion of GC is sometimes accused of conveying. Piaget, in a note about the relationship between the IBE (which he was leading) and the SDN, indicated that: “The IBE therefore does not aim to standardise education by means of conventions, but rather to strengthen the characteristics of each country’s educational systems by closing them” (cited by Hofstetter & Boss, 2022, p. 152).

In this context, the notion of global citizenship education is developed with all its tensions and its contradictions but also, given the highly liberal and cosmopolitan inspiration of its promoters, its richness. On the one hand, the IBE's general secretary regretted, in retrospect, that the Bureau had not clearly objected to the Nazi occupation. Neutrality indeed backfired cruelly against the promoters of global citizenship education, and even the place of practice of the IBE, Switzerland, was called into question. The post-1945 period was incompatible with neutrality, making the IBE seem compromised. However, on the other hand, the ideals it carried did not weaken. The ideal of a democratic, humanitarian and non-belligerent education kept all its meaning at a time when large and relatively pushy nations, such as France, claimed to be on the side of victors and took advantage of this position to impose discriminatory norms, in the colonies for example, through what cannot be called an emancipatory education. In this, the obstinate but tireless internationalism of the IBE not only anticipated the future UNESCO, a United Nations' body dedicated to science, culture and education; as an intergovernmental centre for comparative education, it actually foreshadowed it, becoming one of its cardinal agencies in 1952 before fully integrating it in 1969 (Hofstetter & Schneuwly, 2022, p. 542).

The political and conceptual challenge was therefore significant: it was about strengthening the internationalist and pacifist spirit while rooting education in particular nations. It was also about claiming to lead a strictly scientific approach, despite the IBE having been formed by more or less scrupulous supporters of ‘progressive education’, which values the creativity of children, their spontaneity and curiosity (to serve their ‘natural development’), while investing new generations with a redemptive mission for future humanity. Certainly, the figure of Piaget was useful to reconcile the scientific claims on human psychology with progressive pedagogical methods. The IBE’s major comparative surveys also provided relatively objective documentation on national education systems. Nevertheless, “the IBE claim[ed] not to defend any pedagogical doctrine, but rather consider[ed] that these principles are attested by scientific investigations. Does science tend to be a guarantor of the convictions of the IBE partners?” (Hofstetter & Schneuwly, 2022, p. 552).
around the world (Hofstetter & Boss, 2022, p. 149). Ultimately, we must accept dealing with national realities at the risk of falling into hegemonic, standardising and impoverishing goals – those that the current notion of GC is sometimes accused of conveying. Piaget, in a note about the relationship between the IBE (which he was leading) and the SDN, indicated that: “The IBE therefore does not aim to standardise education by means of conventions, but rather to strengthen the characteristics of each country’s educational systems by closing them” (cited by Hofstetter & Boss, 2022, p. 152).

In this context, the notion of global citizenship education is developed with all its tensions and its contradictions but also, given the highly liberal and cosmopolitan inspiration of its promoters, its richness. On the one hand, the IBE's general secretary regretted, in retrospect, that the Bureau had not clearly objected to the Nazi occupation. Neutrality indeed backfired cruelly against the promoters of global citizenship education, and even the place of practice of the IBE, Switzerland, was called into question. The post-1945 period was incompatible with neutrality, making the IBE seem compromised. However, on the other hand, the ideals it carried did not weaken. The ideal of a democratic, humanitarian and non-belligerent education kept all its meaning at a time when large and relatively pushy nations, such as France, claimed to be on the side of victors and took advantage of this position to impose discriminatory norms, in the colonies for example, through what cannot be called an emancipatory education. In this, the obstinate but tireless internationalism of the IBE not only anticipated the future UNESCO, a United Nations' body dedicated to science, culture and education; as an intergovernmental centre for comparative education, it actually foreshadowed it, becoming one of its cardinal agencies in 1952 before fully integrating it in 1969 (Hofstetter & Schneuwly, 2022, p. 542).

The political and conceptual challenge was therefore significant: it was about strengthening the internationalist and pacifist spirit while rooting education in particular nations. It was also about claiming to lead a strictly scientific approach, despite the IBE having been formed by more or less scrupulous supporters of ‘progressive education’, which values the creativity of children, their spontaneity and curiosity (to serve their ‘natural development’), while investing new generations with a redemptive mission for future humanity. Certainly, the figure of Piaget was useful to reconcile the scientific claims on human psychology with progressive pedagogical methods. The IBE’s major comparative surveys also provided relatively objective documentation on national education systems. Nevertheless, “the IBE claim[ed] not to defend any pedagogical doctrine, but rather consider[ed] that these principles are attested by scientific investigations. Does science tend to be a guarantor of the convictions of the IBE partners?” (Hofstetter & Schneuwly, 2022, p. 552).
In fact, educational internationalism with psychological connotations can
be “mystifying [and of] astounding naïveté” (Hofstetter & Schneuwly, 2022,
p. 555), when nationalisms and major geopolitical divides are exacerbated. It is
the case with the opposition between the proletarian internationalism of the
20th century and civilising cosmopolitanism or, more recently, between liberal
democracies and the great emerging authoritarian nations, from Russia to Iran
to China. These conflicts are made even thornier by the complex positions of
states at the world level concerning the conflict between Russia and Ukraine,
replaying to some extent the East-West opposition, or regarding the conflict
between Israel and Palestine.

Moreover, according to Hofstetter and Schneuwly, educational interna-
tionalism and its pedagogy generate highly popular theses and comfortable
political cant. Who could be opposed to the generous idea that ‘the future of
humanity is at stake in education’ or disagree with the fact that it would be
good for ‘youth to become aware of their civic responsibilities’? Essentially,
educational internationalism is supported by a mental geography rooted in a
hybrid synthesis of scientific data, geopolitics linked to the involved govern-
ments (in the IBE then UNESCO) and a reformist so-called progressive ped-
agogy around activity, creativity and cooperation between children at a class
level, as a prelude to cooperation between humans on a global scale. As Piaget,
who at the time was UNESCO’s Acting Assistant Director-General, said:

it is only from a set of active methods, which puts at the forefront joint
research (teamwork) and the social life of the students themselves
(self-government) that the study of national and international attitudes
as well as the difficulties of their coordination can take on concrete sig-
nificance. [...] international life is the forum, on a completely different
scale, of the same conflicts of reciprocity and of the same incomprehen-
sion as any social life. [...] as soon as a social life is organised among the
pupils themselves, it becomes possible to extend it in the direction of
international exchanges and even study groups dealing with interna-
tional problems. (Piaget, 1949, pp. 50–51)

The terms are clearly set, but they are insufficient to circumscribe the inter-
national and scientific education that the IBE was calling for. The path traced
by Piaget is to be taken again, tirelessly, and we propose to do it with other
disciplines than his, those of which we are specialists: sociology, anthropology
and philosophy, as stakeholders of ETS.

Before proceeding with this task, in the company notably of Durkheim,
Mauss and Pettit, it is important to acknowledge these contradictions. UNESCO
itself does so today, regarding the notion of global citizenship: “there are a
In fact, educational internationalism with psychological connotations can
be “mystifying [and of] astounding naïveté” (Hofstetter & Schneuwly, 2022,
p. 555), when nationalisms and major geopolitical divides are exacerbated. It is
the case with the opposition between the proletarian internationalism of the
20th century and civilising cosmopolitanism or, more recently, between liberal
democracies and the great emerging authoritarian nations, from Russia to Iran
to China. These conflicts are made even thornier by the complex positions of
states at the world level concerning the conflict between Russia and Ukraine,
replaying to some extent the East-West opposition, or regarding the conflict
between Israel and Palestine.

Moreover, according to Hofstetter and Schneuwly, educational interna-
tionalism and its pedagogy generate highly popular theses and comfortable
political cant. Who could be opposed to the generous idea that ‘the future of
humanity is at stake in education’ or disagree with the fact that it would be
good for ‘youth to become aware of their civic responsibilities’? Essentially,
educational internationalism is supported by a mental geography rooted in a
hybrid synthesis of scientific data, geopolitics linked to the involved govern-
ments (in the IBE then UNESCO) and a reformist so-called progressive ped-
agogy around activity, creativity and cooperation between children at a class
level, as a prelude to cooperation between humans on a global scale. As Piaget,
who at the time was UNESCO’s Acting Assistant Director-General, said:

it is only from a set of active methods, which puts at the forefront joint
research (teamwork) and the social life of the students themselves
(self-government) that the study of national and international attitudes
as well as the difficulties of their coordination can take on concrete sig-
nificance. [...] international life is the forum, on a completely different
scale, of the same conflicts of reciprocity and of the same incomprehen-
sion as any social life. [...] as soon as a social life is organised among the
pupils themselves, it becomes possible to extend it in the direction of
international exchanges and even study groups dealing with interna-
tional problems. (Piaget, 1949, pp. 50–51)

The terms are clearly set, but they are insufficient to circumscribe the inter-
national and scientific education that the IBE was calling for. The path traced
by Piaget is to be taken again, tirelessly, and we propose to do it with other
disciplines than his, those of which we are specialists: sociology, anthropology
and philosophy, as stakeholders of ETS.

Before proceeding with this task, in the company notably of Durkheim,
Mauss and Pettit, it is important to acknowledge these contradictions. UNESCO
itself does so today, regarding the notion of global citizenship: “there are a
number of ongoing tensions with the concepts of global citizenship and global citizenship education" (UNESCO, 2015, p. 10). By officially making global citizenship one of its main education goals for 2014–2021, UNESCO acknowledges, through its Assistant Director-General for Education, that there is no “consensus on the meaning of global citizenship and therefore what GCE should promote” (Tang, 2015, p. 5).

International organisations therefore tend to fall back on a common denominator, which has the merit of being unifying, yet remains unclear; and we know that vagueness is unable to resolve certain recurring tensions. GCE would thus be a framework fostering “the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes learners need for securing a world which is more just, peaceful, tolerant, inclusive, secure and sustainable”. It would call for “a conceptual shift in that it recognises the relevance of education in understanding and resolving global issues in their social, political, cultural, economic and environmental dimensions”, through values and skills that “facilitate international cooperation and promote social transformation”, such as “communication skills and aptitudes for networking and interacting with people of different backgrounds, origins, cultures and perspectives” (UNESCO, 2015, p. 9). These elements are both mobilising and troubling.

Mobilising, because we perceive a continuity, coherent and cumulative, with the initiatives of the IBE as a matrix of educational internationalism. The horizon outlined today for GCE is thus firmly anchored in the history of the democratic nations as well as the intellectual and associative movements that gave rise, to a certain extent, to current international organisations: the League of Nations and the IBE, as precursors to the UN and UNESCO. In addition, the emphasis on communication skills and network building takes on a special meaning in GlobalSense since online (videoconferences) and face-to-face interactions (Erasmus+ student mobilities) are an important part of the project. However, the elements of definition mentioned above are also troubling because the question, essentially, is to promote an education whose advocates generally admit the indefinite nature. This raises a rather noticeable quandary, as we shall see, for the most nuanced promoters of GCE. There are at least two aspects to this quandary.

Firstly, it is not clear to what extent education systems need UNESCO to achieve the above objectives, if it is also noted that “GCE can be delivered as part of an existing course (such as civic education or citizenship education, social, environmental, geographical or cultural studies)”. How do existing courses fail to meet the aforementioned GCE goals in terms of the values and behaviours learners need to ensure the emergence of a more just, peaceful, tolerant, inclusive, safe and sustainable world? That the expected results are not up to the stakes is one thing, and it will be easy to agree that the world should
number of ongoing tensions with the concepts of global citizenship and global citizenship education" (UNESCO, 2015, p. 10). By officially making global citizenship one of its main education goals for 2014–2021, UNESCO acknowledges, through its Assistant Director-General for Education, that there is no “consensus on the meaning of global citizenship and therefore what GCE should promote” (Tang, 2015, p. 5).

International organisations therefore tend to fall back on a common denominator, which has the merit of being unifying, yet remains unclear; and we know that vagueness is unable to resolve certain recurring tensions. GCE would thus be a framework fostering “the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes learners need for securing a world which is more just, peaceful, tolerant, inclusive, secure and sustainable”. It would call for “a conceptual shift in that it recognises the relevance of education in understanding and resolving global issues in their social, political, cultural, economic and environmental dimensions”, through values and skills that “facilitate international cooperation and promote social transformation”, such as “communication skills and aptitudes for networking and interacting with people of different backgrounds, origins, cultures and perspectives” (UNESCO, 2015, p. 9). These elements are both mobilising and troubling.

Mobilising, because we perceive a continuity, coherent and cumulative, with the initiatives of the IBE as a matrix of educational internationalism. The horizon outlined today for GCE is thus firmly anchored in the history of the democratic nations as well as the intellectual and associative movements that gave rise, to a certain extent, to current international organisations: the League of Nations and the IBE, as precursors to the UN and UNESCO. In addition, the emphasis on communication skills and network building takes on a special meaning in GlobalSense since online (videoconferences) and face-to-face interactions (Erasmus+ student mobilities) are an important part of the project. However, the elements of definition mentioned above are also troubling because the question, essentially, is to promote an education whose advocates generally admit the indefinite nature. This raises a rather noticeable quandary, as we shall see, for the most nuanced promoters of GCE. There are at least two aspects to this quandary.

Firstly, it is not clear to what extent education systems need UNESCO to achieve the above objectives, if it is also noted that “GCE can be delivered as part of an existing course (such as civic education or citizenship education, social, environmental, geographical or cultural studies)”. How do existing courses fail to meet the aforementioned GCE goals in terms of the values and behaviours learners need to ensure the emergence of a more just, peaceful, tolerant, inclusive, safe and sustainable world? That the expected results are not up to the stakes is one thing, and it will be easy to agree that the world should
be fairer, more peaceful, etc.; nevertheless, the real added value of the notion of GCE to achieve these objectives is another. This once again, is fully admitted: "Some ways forward to resolve these tensions are suggested, whilst maintaining that challenges around theoretical elements of GCE should not undermine its practice" (UNESCO, 2015, p. 10). This justifies our work, in this book, to solve these theoretical problems, or at least take them seriously, for purposes of a larger 'practice', or appropriation.

Secondly, UNESCO remains the site of significant tensions, and the countries represented in GlobalSense partly illustrate this. The United States left UNESCO in 1984 to protest against the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), which aimed to regulate access to quality information in the world through different points, notably "Include communication as a fundamental right; [r]educe imbalances in the new structures of communication; [s]trengthen a global strategy for communication while respecting cultural identities and individual rights". Then, under the leadership of France and Canada, UNESCO worked on the defence of cultural diversity in the world, in order to respond to the risks of cultural standardisation related to globalisation. In 2005, the General Conference submitted for approval to the Member States a draft Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. It passed almost unanimously, "with only two states, the United States [who had rejoined in 2003] and Israel, voting against it" (Maurel, 2009, p. 137). These last two States are represented in GlobalSense but have no longer been a part of UNESCO since 2018, considering it too multilateral.

In fact, the added value of UNESCO lies less in its capacity to resolve societal debates (although this aspect is also important in view of the many researchers, consultants and political leaders mobilised in its fold) that in its contribution to make meetings between members of countries from the global north and global south happen. Indeed, the organisation can offer welcome financial assistance to "stimulate exchanges between the various countries of the world and encourage the sharing of knowledge in order to bridge the gap between developed and poor countries" (Maurel, 2009, p. 133). As for the GlobalSense research, funded mainly by the European Commission, it concerns only countries from the global north. Nonetheless, the stakes are just as high in terms of citizenship education. They concern, in pedagogical terms, decentralisation defined as a

gradual process of expanding the focus of learners from their local realities to include, connect them to, and provide them with a vision of other realities and possibilities. This concept sees the *local* vs. *global* as a continuum and is an effort to bridge the gap between the two. (UNESCO, 2015, p. 20)
be fairer, more peaceful, etc.; nevertheless, the real added value of the notion of GCE to achieve these objectives is another. This once again, is fully admitted: "Some ways forward to resolve these tensions are suggested, whilst maintaining that challenges around theoretical elements of GCE should not undermine its practice" (UNESCO, 2015, p. 10). This justifies our work, in this book, to solve these theoretical problems, or at least take them seriously, for purposes of a larger 'practice', or appropriation.

Secondly, UNESCO remains the site of significant tensions, and the countries represented in GlobalSense partly illustrate this. The United States left UNESCO in 1984 to protest against the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), which aimed to regulate access to quality information in the world through different points, notably "Include communication as a fundamental right; [r]educe imbalances in the new structures of communication; [s]trengthen a global strategy for communication while respecting cultural identities and individual rights". Then, under the leadership of France and Canada, UNESCO worked on the defence of cultural diversity in the world, in order to respond to the risks of cultural standardisation related to globalisation. In 2005, the General Conference submitted for approval to the Member States a draft Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. It passed almost unanimously, "with only two states, the United States [who had rejoined in 2003] and Israel, voting against it" (Maurel, 2009, p. 137). These last two States are represented in GlobalSense but have no longer been a part of UNESCO since 2018, considering it too multilateral.

In fact, the added value of UNESCO lies less in its capacity to resolve societal debates (although this aspect is also important in view of the many researchers, consultants and political leaders mobilised in its fold) that in its contribution to make meetings between members of countries from the global north and global south happen. Indeed, the organisation can offer welcome financial assistance to "stimulate exchanges between the various countries of the world and encourage the sharing of knowledge in order to bridge the gap between developed and poor countries" (Maurel, 2009, p. 133). As for the GlobalSense research, funded mainly by the European Commission, it concerns only countries from the global north. Nonetheless, the stakes are just as high in terms of citizenship education. They concern, in pedagogical terms, decentralisation defined as a

gradual process of expanding the focus of learners from their local realities to include, connect them to, and provide them with a vision of other realities and possibilities. This concept sees the *local* vs. *global* as a continuum and is an effort to bridge the gap between the two. (UNESCO, 2015, p. 20)
This is a gradual shift: it means that the realities explored, although different, are marked by strong commonalities. In this case, the five countries of the consortium, located on three continents, are marked by a modern ideology, in the sense of the anthropologist Louis Dumont (1992). It is a moral individualism, which naturally tends towards a cosmopolitanism that requires a relative erasure, in collective consciousness, of differences in status and boundaries. As Durkheim saw, the cosmopolitanism inherent to the idea of global citizenship has been linked with the 'sacred' figure of the individual in the more or less harmonious development of 'organic solidarity' in societies marked by a strong division of social work. It is why in this book we will devote a prominent place to theoretical questions, trying to distinguish between what is, on the one hand, the mobilising slogan whose usefulness we do acknowledge, and on the other hand, the conceptual framework that the idea of global citizenship deserves.

In our view, this framework can only be established with a firm foothold in humanities and social sciences, particularly sociology, anthropology, social philosophy and political philosophy. These disciplines thus contribute fully to ETS. Let us illustrate this point with an example of a mobilising discourse that becomes, from a sociological point of view, the indicator of a social aspiration that must be analysed. Highlighting a UNESCO cardinal document on GCE, Chernor Bah, Chair of the Global Education First Initiative's (GEFI) Youth Advocacy Group, declared:

> As a citizen you get your rights through a passport/national paper. As a global citizen, it is guaranteed not by a State but through your humanity. This means you are also responsible to the rest of humanity and not the State alone. (quoted in UNESCO, 2015, p. 14)

This passage is interesting for at least two reasons. Firstly, by giving humanity the ability to guarantee rights, it puts it on the same level as a political society, which is often framed by a state or federation of states. This is the cosmopolitan ideal of the modern, the one that our student-teachers in GlobalSense share to some extent and in multiple variations: humanity is not a society, yet it does confer rights.

Secondly, in the aforementioned discourse, which entity is supposed to be responsible for humanity? Surely it cannot be humanity itself, since there is no world state or world federation of states. Therefore, it is no longer a collective entity that is responsible for the rights conferred to the world citizen, but individuals: 'you', that is, the young people to whom Chernor Bah talks. Yet the status of this 'you' is ambiguous. It refers both to a collection of individuals who constitute 'humanity', and to a moral ideal, that of the autonomous
This is a gradual shift: it means that the realities explored, although different, are marked by strong commonalities. In this case, the five countries of the consortium, located on three continents, are marked by a modern ideology, in the sense of the anthropologist Louis Dumont (1992). It is a moral individualism, which naturally tends towards a cosmopolitanism that requires a relative erasure, in collective consciousness, of differences in status and boundaries. As Durkheim saw, the cosmopolitanism inherent to the idea of global citizenship has been linked with the 'sacred' figure of the individual in the more or less harmonious development of 'organic solidarity' in societies marked by a strong division of social work. It is why in this book we will devote a prominent place to theoretical questions, trying to distinguish between what is, on the one hand, the mobilising slogan whose usefulness we do acknowledge, and on the other hand, the conceptual framework that the idea of global citizenship deserves.

In our view, this framework can only be established with a firm foothold in humanities and social sciences, particularly sociology, anthropology, social philosophy and political philosophy. These disciplines thus contribute fully to ETS. Let us illustrate this point with an example of a mobilising discourse that becomes, from a sociological point of view, the indicator of a social aspiration that must be analysed. Highlighting a UNESCO cardinal document on GCE, Chernor Bah, Chair of the Global Education First Initiative's (GEFI) Youth Advocacy Group, declared:

> As a citizen you get your rights through a passport/national paper. As a global citizen, it is guaranteed not by a State but through your humanity. This means you are also responsible to the rest of humanity and not the State alone. (quoted in UNESCO, 2015, p. 14)

This passage is interesting for at least two reasons. Firstly, by giving humanity the ability to guarantee rights, it puts it on the same level as a political society, which is often framed by a state or federation of states. This is the cosmopolitan ideal of the modern, the one that our student-teachers in GlobalSense share to some extent and in multiple variations: humanity is not a society, yet it does confer rights.

Secondly, in the aforementioned discourse, which entity is supposed to be responsible for humanity? Surely it cannot be humanity itself, since there is no world state or world federation of states. Therefore, it is no longer a collective entity that is responsible for the rights conferred to the world citizen, but individuals: 'you', that is, the young people to whom Chernor Bah talks. Yet the status of this 'you' is ambiguous. It refers both to a collection of individuals who constitute 'humanity', and to a moral ideal, that of the autonomous
modern individual. Yet the latter is a product of the history of ‘liberal’ societies, who were the instigators, for example, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. This text itself was based on the specific model of the Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights of 1789, rooted in French history (there were also other multiple influences for the UDHR from Christian contexts in the process of becoming secularised).

The conceptual node that we must work on is therefore situated in the gap between the moral individual – the object of our collective ideals – and the empirical individual whom we are told would constitute, once aggregated with his fellow men, humanity and related rights. Indeed, as soon as these two plans are confused, the risk is to fall into an a-political conception of citizenship in which “the alter ego is still me, a self distant infinitely” (Descombes, 1996, p. 85). Hence, the fierce debates, the content of which must be restored, on the very notion of global citizenship, accused in turn of naive abstraction, neo-liberalism or inconsistency, in the continuity of the fruitful tensions in which the members of the IBE had been immersed since 1925. By working on these tensions and even contradictions, we place ourselves in the lineage of an educational internationalism to which we want to contribute in a new way.

## 2 Avenues for Conceptual Solutions in the Philosophy of Education

To demonstrate this, we will commence the general framing by drawing on the words of a philosopher, Philip Kitcher, John Dewey Professor at Columbia University. According to Kitcher, education is the most important business in the world, according to the title of his latest book, *The Main Enterprise of the World – Rethinking Education*. The author invites education scholars to clarify, refute or amend his own philosophical theses, which he admits to be very general. How can we, in this perspective, draw upon Education and training sciences?

In a first approach, ETS seem well equipped since they allow to question “the relationship between the development of knowledge (purpose of the field of research) and its social utility (purpose of the field of practice), each being linked to a society project (political purpose)” (Albero, 2019, p. 25). However, we still need to specify the possible articulation between these three poles, in connection with the research objects announced. To do this, we will emphasise that Kitcher’s philosophical thought articulates a question of social sciences (holism), a question of politics (citizenship) and a question of social utility (education as the central mission of society). Kitcher indeed wrote:

> We become who we are through a dialogue in which the growing person learns from and gives back to a broader social group [...]. Moreover,
modern individual. Yet the latter is a product of the history of ‘liberal’ societies, who were the instigators, for example, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. This text itself was based on the specific model of the Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights of 1789, rooted in French history (there were also other multiple influences for the UDHR from Christian contexts in the process of becoming secularised).

The conceptual node that we must work on is therefore situated in the gap between the moral individual – the object of our collective ideals – and the empirical individual whom we are told would constitute, once aggregated with his fellow men, humanity and related rights. Indeed, as soon as these two plans are confused, the risk is to fall into an a-political conception of citizenship in which “the alter ego is still me, a self distant infinitely” (Descombes, 1996, p. 85). Hence, the fierce debates, the content of which must be restored, on the very notion of global citizenship, accused in turn of naive abstraction, neo-liberalism or inconsistency, in the continuity of the fruitful tensions in which the members of the IBE had been immersed since 1925. By working on these tensions and even contradictions, we place ourselves in the lineage of an educational internationalism to which we want to contribute in a new way.

## 2 Avenues for Conceptual Solutions in the Philosophy of Education

To demonstrate this, we will commence the general framing by drawing on the words of a philosopher, Philip Kitcher, John Dewey Professor at Columbia University. According to Kitcher, education is the most important business in the world, according to the title of his latest book, *The Main Enterprise of the World – Rethinking Education*. The author invites education scholars to clarify, refute or amend his own philosophical theses, which he admits to be very general. How can we, in this perspective, draw upon Education and training sciences?

In a first approach, ETS seem well equipped since they allow to question “the relationship between the development of knowledge (purpose of the field of research) and its social utility (purpose of the field of practice), each being linked to a society project (political purpose)” (Albero, 2019, p. 25). However, we still need to specify the possible articulation between these three poles, in connection with the research objects announced. To do this, we will emphasise that Kitcher’s philosophical thought articulates a question of social sciences (holism), a question of politics (citizenship) and a question of social utility (education as the central mission of society). Kitcher indeed wrote:

> We become who we are through a dialogue in which the growing person learns from and gives back to a broader social group [...]. Moreover,
understanding fulfillment through contribution to something larger (and more enduring) than the individual self helps connect the capacity for fulfillment to the capacity for citizenship [...]. Education should be viewed as a central mission of society (if not the central mission) [...]. My answer is to favor an educational program in which identification with the aspirations of fellow citizens is cultivated. Promoting solidarity should be an aim of education. This [...] should not presuppose our ability to devise a system of education capable of producing citizens inclined to engage with any of their fellows, let alone cosmopolitans who reach out to all humanity. Rather it argues for orienting education toward expanding propensities for understanding and learning from others, seeing that expansion as compatible with a commitment to individual autonomy. (Kitcher, 2022, pp. 7, 75, 140)

Each of these sentences deserves discussion, but it will be enough, for now, to identify the contribution of each discipline to the issues raised, in order to give substance to an interdisciplinary and international research project:

- “Contribution to something larger (and more enduring) than the individual self”. In the extension of Durkheimian intuitions, social philosophy makes it possible to specify the modes of affiliation with social groups or identification with entities broader than the individual self. By what mechanisms do individuals act according to the perspective of the ‘we’, irreducible to the isolated ‘I’ (Gilbert, 2013)? How do people manage to ‘decide together’ so that these decisions are attributable not to individuals, but to the collectives they compose?

- “This [...] should not presuppose our ability to devise a system of education capable of producing citizens inclined to engage with any of their fellows”. Sociology reminds us that identification or belonging to a broader group (nation, fellow citizens, etc.) requires certain social conditions. If this discipline is riddled with heated debates between Marxians and supporters of approaches more favourable to the recognition of identities, we will at least agree on the following premise: there can be no national integration without social and educational equity. This requires investigating schools with audiences that present different social characteristics (Bell, 2021).

- “Favor an educational program in which identification with the aspirations of fellow citizens is cultivated”. Because of their links to practitioners and teacher training institutions, Education and training sciences can make such an ideal, reality. If Kitcher expresses the wish to transform ‘society’ in a way that he admits to be too vague, we will explore the conditions of possibility of this transformation, mobilising research on teachers’ work and its links with training (Majhanovich & Malet, 2015).
understanding fulfillment through contribution to something larger (and more enduring) than the individual self helps connect the capacity for fulfillment to the capacity for citizenship [...]. Education should be viewed as a central mission of society (if not the central mission) [...]. My answer is to favor an educational program in which identification with the aspirations of fellow citizens is cultivated. Promoting solidarity should be an aim of education. This [...] should not presuppose our ability to devise a system of education capable of producing citizens inclined to engage with any of their fellows, let alone cosmopolitans who reach out to all humanity. Rather it argues for orienting education toward expanding propensities for understanding and learning from others, seeing that expansion as compatible with a commitment to individual autonomy. (Kitcher, 2022, pp. 7, 75, 140)

Each of these sentences deserves discussion, but it will be enough, for now, to identify the contribution of each discipline to the issues raised, in order to give substance to an interdisciplinary and international research project:

- “Contribution to something larger (and more enduring) than the individual self”. In the extension of Durkheimian intuitions, social philosophy makes it possible to specify the modes of affiliation with social groups or identification with entities broader than the individual self. By what mechanisms do individuals act according to the perspective of the ‘we’, irreducible to the isolated ‘I’ (Gilbert, 2013)? How do people manage to ‘decide together’ so that these decisions are attributable not to individuals, but to the collectives they compose?

- “This [...] should not presuppose our ability to devise a system of education capable of producing citizens inclined to engage with any of their fellows”. Sociology reminds us that identification or belonging to a broader group (nation, fellow citizens, etc.) requires certain social conditions. If this discipline is riddled with heated debates between Marxians and supporters of approaches more favourable to the recognition of identities, we will at least agree on the following premise: there can be no national integration without social and educational equity. This requires investigating schools with audiences that present different social characteristics (Bell, 2021).

- “Favor an educational program in which identification with the aspirations of fellow citizens is cultivated”. Because of their links to practitioners and teacher training institutions, Education and training sciences can make such an ideal, reality. If Kitcher expresses the wish to transform ‘society’ in a way that he admits to be too vague, we will explore the conditions of possibility of this transformation, mobilising research on teachers’ work and its links with training (Majhanovich & Malet, 2015).
Kitcher also examines the question of religion and secularism in a chapter entitled “A role for religion?”. Indeed, if education must induce the feeling of belonging to something broader than the individual, then is there not a reason to make religions contribute to it, capable of representing communities around shared beliefs and rituals? Kitcher’s answer is negative, although it admits exceptions. Only the so-called ‘refined’ religions have an educational utility, that is to say those which offer examples of morality (stories, parables, tales, poetry) as ‘reminders’ or ‘tools’, strictly illustrative, serving a social and moral discussion that can only be secular. This goes to show that ecumenism is not enough. Furthermore, these precise conditions require the enlightenment of political philosophy (Laborde, 2017).

The interdisciplinary investigation (social philosophy, political philosophy, sociology, education and training sciences), should allow, in the long term, to specify to what extent and under what conditions ETS constitute, on the subjects which occupy us, an original epistemic field and not just a chance meeting between several disciplines.

If the subjects treated and the disciplinary fields must be mutually rethought, it is because the academic disciplines are themselves affected by the evolutions of nation-states in a global context, insofar as they have been actors in their development and in the modern project of individual autonomy. This concerns philosophy, sociology (Callegaro & Marcucci, 2018) but also comparative education (Malet, 2011), to which our international perspective intends to contribute. These points are developed in the first part of this work.

In addition, a model of citizenship, historically built on the nation-state (initially in Europe), has spread through cultural and commercial exchanges but especially colonial enterprises, affecting the regions of the world in different manners, and the ways in which people belong to their political community. What are the consequences in terms of citizenship education? Is it only possible, if not desirable, to decouple citizenship from its national framework? What are the conditions for the development of a cosmopolitan citizenship, of which Durkheim saw the emergence as a modern ideal? These points are dealt with in the second part along with the findings of the GlobalSense research.

## 3 Methodological Individualism and Moral Individualism

To understand the complex links between individuals and society, mentioned as one of the most important conceptual tensions to be considered in the perspective of global citizenship education (UNESCO, 2015), we must clarify the terms by distinguishing methodological individualism and moral
Kitcher also examines the question of religion and secularism in a chapter entitled “A role for religion?”. Indeed, if education must induce the feeling of belonging to something broader than the individual, then is there not a reason to make religions contribute to it, capable of representing communities around shared beliefs and rituals? Kitcher’s answer is negative, although it admits exceptions. Only the so-called ‘refined’ religions have an educational utility, that is to say those which offer examples of morality (stories, parables, tales, poetry) as ‘reminders’ or ‘tools’, strictly illustrative, serving a social and moral discussion that can only be secular. This goes to show that ecumenism is not enough. Furthermore, these precise conditions require the enlightenment of political philosophy (Laborde, 2017).

The interdisciplinary investigation (social philosophy, political philosophy, sociology, education and training sciences), should allow, in the long term, to specify to what extent and under what conditions ETS constitute, on the subjects which occupy us, an original epistemic field and not just a chance meeting between several disciplines.

If the subjects treated and the disciplinary fields must be mutually rethought, it is because the academic disciplines are themselves affected by the evolutions of nation-states in a global context, insofar as they have been actors in their development and in the modern project of individual autonomy. This concerns philosophy, sociology (Callegaro & Marcucci, 2018) but also comparative education (Malet, 2011), to which our international perspective intends to contribute. These points are developed in the first part of this work.

In addition, a model of citizenship, historically built on the nation-state (initially in Europe), has spread through cultural and commercial exchanges but especially colonial enterprises, affecting the regions of the world in different manners, and the ways in which people belong to their political community. What are the consequences in terms of citizenship education? Is it only possible, if not desirable, to decouple citizenship from its national framework? What are the conditions for the development of a cosmopolitan citizenship, of which Durkheim saw the emergence as a modern ideal? These points are dealt with in the second part along with the findings of the GlobalSense research.

## 3 Methodological Individualism and Moral Individualism

To understand the complex links between individuals and society, mentioned as one of the most important conceptual tensions to be considered in the perspective of global citizenship education (UNESCO, 2015), we must clarify the terms by distinguishing methodological individualism and moral
individualism, which will then allow us to address the related issue of holism. In sociology, individualism is often associated with a method: methodological individualism, which was popularised by James Coleman, followed by Raymond Boudon. It consists in assuming that people's actions are understandable and rational, so that the aim of sociology must be to reconstruct, if necessary by the method of ideal types, the sequences of reasoning leading to certain behaviours – such as how families choose a school – or certain beliefs, for example the differential diffusion of Christianity in the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages (Boudon, 2001).

The strength of this type of approach is, notably, that it seeks to explain a phenomenon in a minimum of hypotheses. With this approach, there is no need to assume that there are 'cultures', 'civilisations' or even a 'spirit of these times' to understand and explain most human behaviours in society. Even Max Weber's famous 'spirit of capitalism' is conceived by Coleman and Boudon as a simple metaphor that veils the transparency of Calvinist reasoning: if God is omnipotent, then he must be insensitive not only to offerings but also to any institution claiming to link (in this case according to the economy of sin and reward) the believer to the afterlife. He must also be insensitive to faith and love (as Luther believed) and it remains for the faithful, in absolute subjection to God, to only work for the glorification of the latter in the world and to seek in it the signs of his election, like enrichment that is valued as such. There is no 'spirit of capitalism' as such here, but an aggregation of rational individual behaviours, reconstructed in an ideal-typical way by the sociologist and forming in the long run what nominalists can call 'therefore with quotation marks' – the 'spirit' of capitalism (and it doesn't matter if this Weber thesis was disputed: what is at stake here is the method).

Nevertheless, this sociologist position, is not in fact solely methodological. Like Karl Popper before him, Raymond Boudon promoted moral individualism while claiming that it was essentially a matter of method. This shift is noticeable in France in the highly publicized *Sociological danger (Danger sociologique)*, published in 2017. Its authors, Gérald Bronner and Étienne Géhin, criticise the ill-considered use of collective entities in social sciences by claiming that this explanatory mode risks drying up the belief in individual responsibility, morality and merit. In doing so, the authors refer to a set of moral principles – and not only methodological ones – around the value of individual autonomy, which, as a typical requirement of our modern societies, is fundamentally holistic (Dumont, 1992).

Thus, our individualistic principles form an ideology, without any derogatory connotation. Ideology, in the anthropological sense, is essentially the hierarchy of values of a society, knowing that a value of a higher level can, without
individualism, which will then allow us to address the related issue of holism. In sociology, individualism is often associated with a method: methodological individualism, which was popularised by James Coleman, followed by Raymond Boudon. It consists in assuming that people's actions are understandable and rational, so that the aim of sociology must be to reconstruct, if necessary by the method of ideal types, the sequences of reasoning leading to certain behaviours – such as how families choose a school – or certain beliefs, for example the differential diffusion of Christianity in the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages (Boudon, 2001).

The strength of this type of approach is, notably, that it seeks to explain a phenomenon in a minimum of hypotheses. With this approach, there is no need to assume that there are 'cultures', 'civilisations' or even a 'spirit of these times' to understand and explain most human behaviours in society. Even Max Weber's famous 'spirit of capitalism' is conceived by Coleman and Boudon as a simple metaphor that veils the transparency of Calvinist reasoning: if God is omnipotent, then he must be insensitive not only to offerings but also to any institution claiming to link (in this case according to the economy of sin and reward) the believer to the afterlife. He must also be insensitive to faith and love (as Luther believed) and it remains for the faithful, in absolute subjection to God, to only work for the glorification of the latter in the world and to seek in it the signs of his election, like enrichment that is valued as such. There is no 'spirit of capitalism' as such here, but an aggregation of rational individual behaviours, reconstructed in an ideal-typical way by the sociologist and forming in the long run what nominalists can call 'therefore with quotation marks' – the 'spirit' of capitalism (and it doesn't matter if this Weber thesis was disputed: what is at stake here is the method).

Nevertheless, this sociologist position, is not in fact solely methodological. Like Karl Popper before him, Raymond Boudon promoted moral individualism while claiming that it was essentially a matter of method. This shift is noticeable in France in the highly publicized *Sociological danger (Danger sociologique)*, published in 2017. Its authors, Gérald Bronner and Étienne Géhin, criticise the ill-considered use of collective entities in social sciences by claiming that this explanatory mode risks drying up the belief in individual responsibility, morality and merit. In doing so, the authors refer to a set of moral principles – and not only methodological ones – around the value of individual autonomy, which, as a typical requirement of our modern societies, is fundamentally holistic (Dumont, 1992).

Thus, our individualistic principles form an ideology, without any derogatory connotation. Ideology, in the anthropological sense, is essentially the hierarchy of values of a society, knowing that a value of a higher level can, without
contradiction, encompass its opposite. Thus in Genesis, the masculine encompasses the feminine, in the image of Eve born from the rib of Adam, himself created in the image of God. At the higher hierarchical level, Eve (a part) is inferior to Adam (the whole). One might point out that actually, a woman is equal to a man, and even sometimes superior to him; but it remains that in the aforementioned myth, if Woman is equal to Man, it is at a determined hierarchical level, in this case a lower one. In other words, the oppositions “woman > man” and “woman = man” are here hierarchically inferior to the opposition “woman < man”. We can also refer to Bourdieu’s ancient but famous study of the Kabyle house and the oppositions between high and low, above and below, public and private (etc.) that accompany the opposition – falsely symmetrical – between masculine and feminine (Bourdieu, 1970).

The difficulty we sometimes experience in grasping these points comes from the fact that under the effect of individualism, itself favoured by the division of social work, the moderns pay less and less attention to the hierarchy of values. This is why there are many debates on the equality according to the moderns. Does it imply ‘recognition of differences’, or rather their neglect, or their subordination in the name of the *de facto* superior modern value, that of egalitarian individualism?

In short, as moderns, the content of our collective ideology is individualistic (responsibility, autonomy, universal human rights), but we have difficulty perceiving it because this ideology, in the same gesture that enshrines the pre-eminent value of the individual, tends to deny the idea that this value comes from society as a whole. Moreover, by placing the individual at the top of our hierarchy of values, we may tend to consider society as an aggregation of individuals, even if they are united by a state as defined by artificialist theories (but symptomatic of individualistic ideology) of the social contract tearing humans away from the state of nature. It is precisely this anthropological reflexivity that Popper or Boudon lacked, and that many of their successors still lack, blinded by the confidence they have in the individualist (liberal) ideology. For finally, “why would the social life of a modern society be fully consistent with the representation it gives of itself in its ideology?” (Descombes, 2009, p. 48).

However, this field of ‘liberal sociology’, which sometimes overlaps with that of ‘analytical sociology’ (Bronner & Di Ioro, 2018), remains eminently interesting if we consider its moral side. The principle of parsimony allowed by methodological individualism has a political counterpart. In essence, it is quite wrong to think, at an ontological level, that collectives are created from individuals; and yet, at a political level, we must in part act as if this were the case.

In other words, the principle of analytical parsimony, which aims to reduce the number of beings necessary to explain a phenomenon and
contradiction, encompass its opposite. Thus in Genesis, the masculine encompasses the feminine, in the image of Eve born from the rib of Adam, himself created in the image of God. At the higher hierarchical level, Eve (a part) is inferior to Adam (the whole). One might point out that actually, a woman is equal to a man, and even sometimes superior to him; but it remains that in the aforementioned myth, if Woman is equal to Man, it is at a determined hierarchical level, in this case a lower one. In other words, the oppositions “woman > man” and “woman = man” are here hierarchically inferior to the opposition “woman < man”. We can also refer to Bourdieu’s ancient but famous study of the Kabyle house and the oppositions between high and low, above and below, public and private (etc.) that accompany the opposition – falsely symmetrical – between masculine and feminine (Bourdieu, 1970).

The difficulty we sometimes experience in grasping these points comes from the fact that under the effect of individualism, itself favoured by the division of social work, the moderns pay less and less attention to the hierarchy of values. This is why there are many debates on the equality according to the moderns. Does it imply ‘recognition of differences’, or rather their neglect, or their subordination in the name of the *de facto* superior modern value, that of egalitarian individualism?

In short, as moderns, the content of our collective ideology is individualistic (responsibility, autonomy, universal human rights), but we have difficulty perceiving it because this ideology, in the same gesture that enshrines the pre-eminent value of the individual, tends to deny the idea that this value comes from society as a whole. Moreover, by placing the individual at the top of our hierarchy of values, we may tend to consider society as an aggregation of individuals, even if they are united by a state as defined by artificialist theories (but symptomatic of individualistic ideology) of the social contract tearing humans away from the state of nature. It is precisely this anthropological reflexivity that Popper or Boudon lacked, and that many of their successors still lack, blinded by the confidence they have in the individualist (liberal) ideology. For finally, “why would the social life of a modern society be fully consistent with the representation it gives of itself in its ideology?” (Descombes, 2009, p. 48).

However, this field of ‘liberal sociology’, which sometimes overlaps with that of ‘analytical sociology’ (Bronner & Di Ioro, 2018), remains eminently interesting if we consider its moral side. The principle of parsimony allowed by methodological individualism has a political counterpart. In essence, it is quite wrong to think, at an ontological level, that collectives are created from individuals; and yet, at a political level, we must in part act as if this were the case.

In other words, the principle of analytical parsimony, which aims to reduce the number of beings necessary to explain a phenomenon and
thus to eliminate the ontologically doubtful entities that are collective
individuals, is the scientific counterpart of a true political 'obsession'.
Even if such an obsession tends to confer [...] a highly problematic indi-
vidualistic bias on reflections concerning collective intentionality, the
latter have the merit of relaunching the investigation into two questions
that are essential for social sciences: the question of the ontology of col-
lectives, that is, their mode of existence, as well as the question of the
specifically political properties to which only certain collectives would
be entitled to claim. (Kaufmann, 2010, p. 334)

This work will return to the notion of collective intentionality, but it will
suffice for the moment to say that it is a type of ‘micro-holism’ with an indi-
vidualistic basis; or, if we prefer, a ‘parsimonious holism’ that makes sure not
to multiply the collective entities that can surreptitiously clash with our insep-
arably modern and individualistic (in the moral sense) ideals. This micro-
holism, which can also be found in Simmel or Goffman’s works, is exploited in
particular by Margaret Gilbert and Philip Pettit, two social philosophers who
intend to revisit, in their own ways, the holistic heritage of Durkheim.

As a version of political liberalism, critical republicanism is also caught
between the parsimonious explanatory aim and the political concern of the
moderns. This is highly noticeable in the work of Pettit, who is a social as well
as a political philosopher (trying to make ‘individualistic holism’ and ‘republi-
canism’ converge). Indeed, a sociology of secularism, but also of the Republic
and more broadly of political liberalism, must be parsimonious in the sense
that it cannot assume, a-critically, the existence of many collective entities that
would impose themselves on the individual: common belief, religious culture,
community identity; phenomena that instituted religions display as prevailing
over individual consciences. But to succeed with this wager, while avoiding the
aforementioned pitfalls of nominalist sociology, we must remember Dumont’s
lesson by assuming the individualist ideology as it presents itself in our West-
ern societies, in its egalitarian form. In doing so, we thus recognise that we are
constantly confronted with two different figures: on the one hand, the empiri-
cal individual in charge of sociology; on the other hand, the moral individual in
charge of political philosophy. Is this a mixing of *genres*? No, because the inter-
sections between sociology and political philosophy are inevitable (Boltanski
& Thévenot, 2006). The challenge is precisely to provide sufficient reflexivity
to unravel their entanglements.

As such, a major French reference for thinking secularism, in an insepa-
rably parsimonious and individualistic perspective, is Catherine Kintzler,
very early discussed by Cécile Laborde (2001). Kintzler’s perspective, inspired
by Condorcet (philosopher, mathematician and president of the French
thus to eliminate the ontologically doubtful entities that are collective
individuals, is the scientific counterpart of a true political 'obsession'.
Even if such an obsession tends to confer [...] a highly problematic indi-
vidualistic bias on reflections concerning collective intentionality, the
latter have the merit of relaunching the investigation into two questions
that are essential for social sciences: the question of the ontology of col-
lectives, that is, their mode of existence, as well as the question of the
specifically political properties to which only certain collectives would
be entitled to claim. (Kaufmann, 2010, p. 334)

This work will return to the notion of collective intentionality, but it will
suffice for the moment to say that it is a type of ‘micro-holism’ with an indi-
vidualistic basis; or, if we prefer, a ‘parsimonious holism’ that makes sure not
to multiply the collective entities that can surreptitiously clash with our insep-
arably modern and individualistic (in the moral sense) ideals. This micro-
holism, which can also be found in Simmel or Goffman’s works, is exploited in
particular by Margaret Gilbert and Philip Pettit, two social philosophers who
intend to revisit, in their own ways, the holistic heritage of Durkheim.

As a version of political liberalism, critical republicanism is also caught
between the parsimonious explanatory aim and the political concern of the
moderns. This is highly noticeable in the work of Pettit, who is a social as well
as a political philosopher (trying to make ‘individualistic holism’ and ‘republi-
canism’ converge). Indeed, a sociology of secularism, but also of the Republic
and more broadly of political liberalism, must be parsimonious in the sense
that it cannot assume, a-critically, the existence of many collective entities that
would impose themselves on the individual: common belief, religious culture,
community identity; phenomena that instituted religions display as prevailing
over individual consciences. But to succeed with this wager, while avoiding the
aforementioned pitfalls of nominalist sociology, we must remember Dumont’s
lesson by assuming the individualist ideology as it presents itself in our West-
ern societies, in its egalitarian form. In doing so, we thus recognise that we are
constantly confronted with two different figures: on the one hand, the empiri-
cal individual in charge of sociology; on the other hand, the moral individual in
charge of political philosophy. Is this a mixing of *genres*? No, because the inter-
sections between sociology and political philosophy are inevitable (Boltanski
& Thévenot, 2006). The challenge is precisely to provide sufficient reflexivity
to unravel their entanglements.

As such, a major French reference for thinking secularism, in an insepa-
rably parsimonious and individualistic perspective, is Catherine Kintzler,
very early discussed by Cécile Laborde (2001). Kintzler’s perspective, inspired
by Condorcet (philosopher, mathematician and president of the French
revolutionary assembly in 1792), is indeed extremely parsimonious, recognis-
ing in principle only individuals, a pledge of their equal treatment, and going
so far as to promote a 'principle of untying' at the foundation of political asso-
ciation. The author's concern is thus, unlike Régis Debray (2004), to think
secularism radically detached from any religious model. Kintzler deployed a
sharp critical lucidity to understand the pitfalls of a 'teaching of the religious
fact' (enseignement du fait religieux) that would not be reflexive enough. The
sociologist Jean-Paul Willaime himself became mired in these pitfalls, despite
Baubérot's clarification who reproached him his closeness with Nicolas
Sarkozy's position on secularism, which was too conciliatory towards religions
as such (Baubérot, 2009).

Nonetheless, it is risky to favour Kintzler's parsimony inspired by Condorcet.
Too radically and too abstractly individualistic, Kintzler is now more and more
clearly espousing conservative views on the supposed dangers of 'wokism'
or on the prohibition of the ostensible wearing of religious signs for parents
accompanying students during school trips. As it happens, the pendulum
effect between exacerbated individualism and conservative pseudo-holism
had already been identified by Dumont. In addition, before that, Mauss and
Fauconnet had indicated the danger, in Condorcet's work, of hypostasising
a metaphysical individual serving a philosophy of history (at a stage before
sociology) from which, moreover, certain personalities claiming to do sociol-
ogy such as Herbert Spencer, did not escape (Mauss & Fauconnet, 1968, p. 19).

Fundamentally, if Kintzler's republican thought has the merit of raising
well-circumscribed points of vigilance about the French public school, it
nevertheless contains the defects of classical republicanism. It is also called
'official' republicanism, in the sense that several of its aspects are taken up
in mainstream French political discourses and decisions, of which the prohi-
bition of the ostensible wearing of religious signs is a particularly illustrative
example (Laborde, 2008). The republican thinking of Philip Pettit, individ-
ualist and holist, or, if one prefers, parsimoniously holist, constitutes in this
respect an exceedance. Certainly, Pettit's social philosophy is fragile (Urfalino,
2022), but what interests us is the way he questions the existence of groups
in the Republic; in other words, we are interested in his political philosophy,
taken over and refined by Laborde (2017).

Yet, to say this, is to still depend on philosophy. The latter is not an end in
itself, but a means to revive sociological questioning. Sociology was not merely
constituted in the wake of philosophy; however, when it wanted to empower
itself as a science, it lost sight of certain ways of questioning the Republic, the
nation and citizenship. These approaches were 'preserved' by philosophers,
so that they guide social sciences on new issues, as modernity advances, by
revolutionary assembly in 1792), is indeed extremely parsimonious, recognis-
ing in principle only individuals, a pledge of their equal treatment, and going
so far as to promote a 'principle of untying' at the foundation of political asso-
ciation. The author's concern is thus, unlike Régis Debray (2004), to think
secularism radically detached from any religious model. Kintzler deployed a
sharp critical lucidity to understand the pitfalls of a 'teaching of the religious
fact' (enseignement du fait religieux) that would not be reflexive enough. The
sociologist Jean-Paul Willaime himself became mired in these pitfalls, despite
Baubérot's clarification who reproached him his closeness with Nicolas
Sarkozy's position on secularism, which was too conciliatory towards religions
as such (Baubérot, 2009).

Nonetheless, it is risky to favour Kintzler's parsimony inspired by Condorcet.
Too radically and too abstractly individualistic, Kintzler is now more and more
clearly espousing conservative views on the supposed dangers of 'wokism'
or on the prohibition of the ostensible wearing of religious signs for parents
accompanying students during school trips. As it happens, the pendulum
effect between exacerbated individualism and conservative pseudo-holism
had already been identified by Dumont. In addition, before that, Mauss and
Fauconnet had indicated the danger, in Condorcet's work, of hypostasising
a metaphysical individual serving a philosophy of history (at a stage before
sociology) from which, moreover, certain personalities claiming to do sociol-
ogy such as Herbert Spencer, did not escape (Mauss & Fauconnet, 1968, p. 19).

Fundamentally, if Kintzler's republican thought has the merit of raising
well-circumscribed points of vigilance about the French public school, it
nevertheless contains the defects of classical republicanism. It is also called
'official' republicanism, in the sense that several of its aspects are taken up
in mainstream French political discourses and decisions, of which the prohi-
bition of the ostensible wearing of religious signs is a particularly illustrative
example (Laborde, 2008). The republican thinking of Philip Pettit, individ-
ualist and holist, or, if one prefers, parsimoniously holist, constitutes in this
respect an exceedance. Certainly, Pettit's social philosophy is fragile (Urfalino,
2022), but what interests us is the way he questions the existence of groups
in the Republic; in other words, we are interested in his political philosophy,
taken over and refined by Laborde (2017).

Yet, to say this, is to still depend on philosophy. The latter is not an end in
itself, but a means to revive sociological questioning. Sociology was not merely
constituted in the wake of philosophy; however, when it wanted to empower
itself as a science, it lost sight of certain ways of questioning the Republic, the
nation and citizenship. These approaches were 'preserved' by philosophers,
so that they guide social sciences on new issues, as modernity advances, by
inviting them to take a reflexive and distanced look at the latter. The solution lies, in this case, via the philosophical detour, in the more direct reinvestment of the work of the French school of sociology (Durkheim, Mauss) and those who followed.

## 4 The Social Totality in Practice

These issues of distinguishing holism, individualism, liberalism and republicanism are crucial for mapping the “conceptual framework” (UNESCO, 2015, p. 10) that constitutes the dynamic notion of global citizenship education, which itself deserves “conceptual clarity” (Tang, 2015, p. 6). Education professionals, whatever their specific logic of actions, are to a large extent the guarantors of “a conception of the collective good [...] in an individualistic society [whose] definition of the common good is the imperative of ensuring the autonomy of each person” (Descombes, 2013, p. 154).

In sociology, Boltanski and Thévenot's approach makes it possible to explore two aspects mentioned above. One aspect is the aspirations of individuals imbued with individualistic morality, as evidenced by the 'worlds' (civic, domestic, industrial, inspired, opinion, market) typified around Smith, Rousseau, Saint Augustine, etc. The other aspect is the modes of construction of what is common, based on individual interactions within situations where the hierarchy of beings in presence – and sometimes the definition of these situations – is played out, since people, with similar critical skills to sociologists', can question social reality on the basis of a 'world' or 'city' as a typified reserve of *topoi* prevalent in a given society (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006).

However, the crystallisation points mentioned above must still be brought into coherence in regard to the privileged field, namely the (public) school. It is indeed a very specific, regulating and integrative institution, whose congruence with the model of Boltanski and Thévenot can be questioned. It is on this level that their approach must be completed and amended by Durkheimian neoholism, but also the studies of Mauss on the nation and certain perspectives of political philosophy that attempt, to say it concisely, to connect the holistic and individualistic aspects of the ideology of the moderns. Thus, the expression liberal nationalism (Gustavsson & Miller, 2020), although discussed, at least clearly poses the terms of the problem. Indeed, liberal, egalitarian individualism, to which we all participate to some degree, including Human and social sciences researchers as part of their academic activity, relates to the idea of nation.

Is there not, however, a risk in developing such a burning theme as the nation in sociology? Certainly this discipline is marked by interactionism,
inviting them to take a reflexive and distanced look at the latter. The solution lies, in this case, via the philosophical detour, in the more direct reinvestment of the work of the French school of sociology (Durkheim, Mauss) and those who followed.

## 4 The Social Totality in Practice

These issues of distinguishing holism, individualism, liberalism and republicanism are crucial for mapping the “conceptual framework” (UNESCO, 2015, p. 10) that constitutes the dynamic notion of global citizenship education, which itself deserves “conceptual clarity” (Tang, 2015, p. 6). Education professionals, whatever their specific logic of actions, are to a large extent the guarantors of “a conception of the collective good [...] in an individualistic society [whose] definition of the common good is the imperative of ensuring the autonomy of each person” (Descombes, 2013, p. 154).

In sociology, Boltanski and Thévenot's approach makes it possible to explore two aspects mentioned above. One aspect is the aspirations of individuals imbued with individualistic morality, as evidenced by the 'worlds' (civic, domestic, industrial, inspired, opinion, market) typified around Smith, Rousseau, Saint Augustine, etc. The other aspect is the modes of construction of what is common, based on individual interactions within situations where the hierarchy of beings in presence – and sometimes the definition of these situations – is played out, since people, with similar critical skills to sociologists', can question social reality on the basis of a 'world' or 'city' as a typified reserve of *topoi* prevalent in a given society (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006).

However, the crystallisation points mentioned above must still be brought into coherence in regard to the privileged field, namely the (public) school. It is indeed a very specific, regulating and integrative institution, whose congruence with the model of Boltanski and Thévenot can be questioned. It is on this level that their approach must be completed and amended by Durkheimian neoholism, but also the studies of Mauss on the nation and certain perspectives of political philosophy that attempt, to say it concisely, to connect the holistic and individualistic aspects of the ideology of the moderns. Thus, the expression liberal nationalism (Gustavsson & Miller, 2020), although discussed, at least clearly poses the terms of the problem. Indeed, liberal, egalitarian individualism, to which we all participate to some degree, including Human and social sciences researchers as part of their academic activity, relates to the idea of nation.

Is there not, however, a risk in developing such a burning theme as the nation in sociology? Certainly this discipline is marked by interactionism,
pragmatism, methodological individualism, constructivism and Marxism, approaches that all tend to define human relationships as relatively disenfranchised of the national totalities that give them meaning (Karsenti & Lemieux, 2017). Therefore, is it not an outdated object, that Durkheim and Mauss worked on explicitly only because they lived in an era eminently marked by national phenomena, including the horror of the great wars?

It is more likely that the founders of sociology had sufficient reflexivity not to write only under the effect of the conjuncture. In fact, the nation is always implicitly present, to varying degrees, in sociological work. We have mentioned methodological individualism, sometimes confused with moral individualism, because its proponents do not dare to formulate clearly the terms of modern ideology, carried mainly by societies in the form of nations (Mauss, 1953/2013). Let us give another example, at the other end of the spectrum of sociological controversies, still in the form of a symptom: the metamorphosis of Pierre Bourdieu concerning the republican public school. After having undermined its foundations, denounced as ‘cultural arbitrariness’ associated with ‘symbolic state violence’, he turned around in the 1990s to defend the state – obviously national – and rehabilitate many aspects of the old order against neo-liberalism.

Sociology, however, was invested with a Herculean mission, properly embodied by Bourdieu's 'heroic' perspective. For, though the state was for him the ideal place to grasp the field of fields, it is (his) sociology that ultimately made it possible to objectify this field. Society as such then disappears behind the fields seized from the perspective of the state, as objectified by the sociologist's critical competence. Essentially, though Bourdieu in his last work did not fully admit his 'Durkheimism' (since it would have been incompatible with a critical sociology), the fact remains that he made the state "the embodiment of the collective" by remaining dependent of French republican history, embodied even in the very identity of the sociologist, "an official son of civil servants who feels that the social world in which he lived is ending" (Fabiani, 2016, pp. 216, 241).

That is why the publication of *On justification (De la justification)* in 1991, translated in English in 2006, is crucial. The work takes up suggestions made by Bourdieu himself, who explained that he wanted to think of fields by referring to the "plurality of worlds" consisting of "commonplaces, irreducible topics" that make the "plurality of logics corresponding to different worlds" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 21). The author, however, did not lead this endeavour and it is Boltanski and Thévenot who fully give back to actors their critical skills and thus reintroduce, we believe, the idea of global society, the one that Durkheimians and Maussians holists scrutinise. For if Durkheim was a republican devoted to the state as a potential place of truth, free of any social peculiarities (he thought in
pragmatism, methodological individualism, constructivism and Marxism, approaches that all tend to define human relationships as relatively disenfranchised of the national totalities that give them meaning (Karsenti & Lemieux, 2017). Therefore, is it not an outdated object, that Durkheim and Mauss worked on explicitly only because they lived in an era eminently marked by national phenomena, including the horror of the great wars?

It is more likely that the founders of sociology had sufficient reflexivity not to write only under the effect of the conjuncture. In fact, the nation is always implicitly present, to varying degrees, in sociological work. We have mentioned methodological individualism, sometimes confused with moral individualism, because its proponents do not dare to formulate clearly the terms of modern ideology, carried mainly by societies in the form of nations (Mauss, 1953/2013). Let us give another example, at the other end of the spectrum of sociological controversies, still in the form of a symptom: the metamorphosis of Pierre Bourdieu concerning the republican public school. After having undermined its foundations, denounced as ‘cultural arbitrariness’ associated with ‘symbolic state violence’, he turned around in the 1990s to defend the state – obviously national – and rehabilitate many aspects of the old order against neo-liberalism.

Sociology, however, was invested with a Herculean mission, properly embodied by Bourdieu's 'heroic' perspective. For, though the state was for him the ideal place to grasp the field of fields, it is (his) sociology that ultimately made it possible to objectify this field. Society as such then disappears behind the fields seized from the perspective of the state, as objectified by the sociologist's critical competence. Essentially, though Bourdieu in his last work did not fully admit his 'Durkheimism' (since it would have been incompatible with a critical sociology), the fact remains that he made the state "the embodiment of the collective" by remaining dependent of French republican history, embodied even in the very identity of the sociologist, "an official son of civil servants who feels that the social world in which he lived is ending" (Fabiani, 2016, pp. 216, 241).

That is why the publication of *On justification (De la justification)* in 1991, translated in English in 2006, is crucial. The work takes up suggestions made by Bourdieu himself, who explained that he wanted to think of fields by referring to the "plurality of worlds" consisting of "commonplaces, irreducible topics" that make the "plurality of logics corresponding to different worlds" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 21). The author, however, did not lead this endeavour and it is Boltanski and Thévenot who fully give back to actors their critical skills and thus reintroduce, we believe, the idea of global society, the one that Durkheimians and Maussians holists scrutinise. For if Durkheim was a republican devoted to the state as a potential place of truth, free of any social peculiarities (he thought in