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# The Issue of Chinese Migrants in Kyrgyzstan

Amantour Japarov

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Amantour Japarov. The Issue of Chinese Migrants in Kyrgyzstan. The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 2008, 7 (1), pp.79-91. halshs-05286485

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# The Issue of Chinese Migrants in Kyrgyzstan

Amantur Zhaparov*

## ABSTRACT

Perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union opened a new era of relations between China and independent Kyrgyzstan. Geographic proximity and dynamic socio-economic development played essential roles in the establishment of good neighbor relations. Interstate treaties were signed and diplomatic relations initiated deeper development of bilateral relations. But the major part of trade ties with China is related to Chinese migrants, legal as illegal. This article therefore focuses on these Chinese migrants and petty traders working at Kyrgyz markets, in commercial centers or small enterprises. Chinese migrant entrepreneurs feel Beijing's support in promoting their business plans through various mechanisms of social and financial incentives. This plays an important role in their activities in the Kyrgyz market, where local citizens cannot compete and some of them feel compelled to migrate to other countries.

Keywords • Chinese Migrants • Kyrgyzstan • Shuttle Trade

## Introduction

The issue of Chinese migration to Kyrgyzstan must be analyzed within the context of historical relations between Central Asia and China. During the early Middle Ages, both areas actively developed diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations. However in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Kyrgyz experienced a difficult period in their relations with China. Several waves of migration from Kashgaria to Central Asia complicated relations with the Qing Empire. The first took place at the beginning of the 18th century, when Xinjiang was experiencing civil wars that ended in its subordination to the Djungar state. In the middle of the 18th century, the latter fell under the domination of the Qing Empire, initiating significant waves of new migration to the Kazakh steppes and Russia.<fnref n="1" /> Migrations also occurred during the 19th century. In 1877, the Chinese defeated the Yakub-Beg state, forcing thousands of people to

<footnote>* Amantur Zhaparov is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz Republic.</footnote>

<footnote n="1">¹ Sergei Abashin, *Natsionalism v Srednei Azii* [Nationalism in Central Asia] (Saint-Petersburg, 2007), p. 53.</footnote>
escape to Tsarist Central Asia. As recorded in the report of a Russian official, "At the end of 1877 (...) around 12,000 Kashgaris and Dungans immigrated to our territories. Approximately 7,000 of them went to Semirechie region whereas the others went through Osh to the Fergana Valley."<fnref n="2" />

Migratory movement from China continued through the early 20th century. Referring to the problems of resettlement to the Fergana Valley, Sofia S. Gubaeva stated that thousands of Uyghurs, Dungans, and Chinese came there in search of employment. They worked as day laborers in coal mines and cotton mills, and as seasonal workers in cotton and rice fields. Many of them settled in the Fergana Valley permanently, started families, and brought back relatives from Kashgaria.<fnref n="3" /> At the same time migratory flows moved in the other direction. Some of the population of present day Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Dungans, and Uyghurs) fled to China, seeking to flee Tsarist persecution during the 1916 rebellion and Communist oppression during 1930s collectivization.<fnref n="4" /> After the Second World War, Soviet-Chinese relations developed unevenly, with good neighbor relations until the beginning of the 1960s and mistrust thereafter.<fnref n="5" /> In 1950s and 1960s, the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" policy in China provoked a new wave of migration to the Soviet Union of the population living in border areas.<fnref n="6" /> Most of these migrants from Xinjiang worked on rented land and grew crops, and some were employed by collective farms in Soviet Central Asia. Many did not have passports.

Perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union opened a new era of relations between China and independent Kyrgyzstan.<fnref n="7" /> Geographic proximity and dynamic socio-economic development played essential roles in the establishment of good neighbor relations. Interstate treaties

<footnote n="2">² *Ibid.*, p. 54.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Sof'ia S. Gubaeva, "Uigury i Dungane Ferganskoi doliny" [Uyghurs and Dungans of the Fergana Valley], *Sovremennoe razvitie etnicheskikh grupp Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana* [Contemporary Development of the Ethnic Groups of Central Asia and Kazakhstan] (Moscow, 1992, vol. 2), pp. 121-122.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ K. Usunbaev, *Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirgizii* [The Rebellion of 1916 in Kyrgyzia] (Frunze, 1967), D. M. Budianskii, *Istoriia bezhentsev-kyrgyzov (1916-1927 g.)* [The History of Kyrgyz Refugees (1916-1917)] (Bishkek, 2006).</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Muratbek Imanaliev, *Ocherki o vneshnei politike Kyrgyzstana* [Essays on the Foreign Policy of Kyrgyzstan] (Bishkek, 2002).</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Kh. Yusupov, *Pereselenie dungan v Semirech'e* [Dungan migration to Semirechie] (Frunze, 1961).</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Nur M. Omarov, "Kitai vo vneshnei politike suverennogo Kyrgyzstana: osnovnye tendentsii i perspektivy" [China in the Foreign Policy of the Independent Kyrgyzstan: Basic Tendencies and Perspectives], *Vestnik Kyrgyzsko-Rossiiskogo Slavianskogo Universiteta*, 4 (2004); R. K. Sabirov, "Stanovlenie kyrgyzsko-kitaiskikh otnoshenii v nachale 1990-kh g." [The Formation of Kyrgyz-Chinese Relations at the Beginning of the 1990s], *Voprosy Kyrgyzskoi istorii*, 2 (2007).</footnote>
were signed and diplomatic relations initiated deeper development of bilateral relations. The development of trade ties during this decade was promoted by the creation of many Kyrgyz-Chinese joint ventures within the framework of intergovernmental agreements. For instance in August 2000, the joint Kyrgyz-Chinese enterprise Aloolon started to produce domestic matches. The corporation Dunyuy invested almost 800,000 US dollars in equipment and raw materials. Another example of a joint partnership is the stock company Salkyn, the former Belovodsk brewery that a Chinese businessman transformed into a modern production facility. The Chinese also expressed interest in the mining, metallurgical, and fuel industries.<fnref n="8" /> At present Kyrgyz-Chinese joint ventures are mainly based in the Chui and Osh regions, as well as in the cities of Bishkek and Osh, involving both local and Chinese workers. But the major part of trade ties with China is related to Chinese migrants and the Kyrgyz market economy.

## Migrants and Traders after the Collapse of the Soviet Union

In the late 1980s migration from China to Kyrgyzstan intensified. Migrants coming mainly from Xinjiang rented irrigated land to work as farmers, cultivating vegetables. They spent a few months in Kyrgyzstan before returning to their homeland. These migrants established themselves in some parts of the Chui region and areas close to Bishkek. In particular Chinese people worked in the state farms Kuibyshev and Tash Moynok in the Alamedin district. Large losses of crops and the incapacity to fully furnish agro-industrial complexes prompted the Ministry of Agriculture of the Kyrgyz Soviet Republic to attract workers from neighboring countries on three years contracts. It aimed to improve the country's vegetable supply. At this time Chinese workers coming to Kyrgyzstan under such contracts were staying from spring to autumn and returned back to China after the harvest. This was therefore a temporary migration related to the growing season.

Other Chinese migrants were engaged in commercial activity, especially in shuttle trade. They sold clothes and other everyday consumer goods “made in China” and did not stay in Kyrgyzstan for a long time. The first stores with Chinese goods, such as Artush and Kashgar, opened in Naryn, which is on the road to the Chinese border Torugart. Migrants and traders brought shortage products like sugar and rice, and made high profits from Chinese spirits like vodka and beer. Some of them also purchased clothes and household items from the Kyrgyz population. For example in the early 1990s, in the Spartak stadium in Bishkek, they organized the purchase of thick Astrakhan coats

<footnote n="8">⁸ T. Koychuev, “KNR – strategicheskii partner Kyrgyzstana” [The PRC is Kyrgyzstan’s Strategic Partner], Vestnik ISITO, 2 (2004).</footnote>
and hats (considered as prestigious gifts during weddings or other festivities) to be sold in Xinjiang. These Chinese traders were actually the first to establish trade and economic ties with the Kyrgyz population and contributed to the development of local Chinese markets. The details of their migration included a short-term stay abroad and a floating kind of migratory movement.

At the same time at the beginning of the 1990s, shuttle traders from Kyrgyzstan started to discover China. They often traveled by buses or airplanes to buy goods in order to provide local markets with clothing, and audio and video equipment. Using the wealth they earned, some of these businessmen were able to launch political careers. Karganbek Samakov, originally from Naryn, first came to China as a part of an official delegation. He then established business contacts to fulfill many orders from acquaintances, relatives, and friends, some of whom paid in advance. In addition to clothing and other consumer goods, he started bringing in televisions, tape recorders, telephones, and other equipment. This shuttle trade helped him to build initial capital, and played an important role in his further economic and political plans when he became a deputy in the Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament).<fnref n="9" />

These shuttle trade activities engaged many women, compelled to take up this business because of the dramatic impoverishment of families during this period.<fnref n="10" /> The growing presence of women in this activity also resulted from the fact that they could pass more easily through customs than men, who were subject to more detailed searches. To pass the customs checkpoints at Torugart and Irkeshtam, Kyrgyz traders, often with only 300 or 400 dollars to spend, usually created a group of traders crossing together the border by bus to transport their Chinese goods. During the mid-1990s, shuttle traders have developed a higher level of organization. Kyrgyz merchants began to cooperate as eight to ten person groups, sending only one person to purchase goods, which was more rational. They started hiring trucks to transport goods purchased in China and special companies providing transportation services then appeared.

However since the second half of the 1990s, it became more difficult for Kyrgyz traders to compete with Chinese businessmen who had signed trade contracts with manufacturers in China and were therefore able to deliver goods at a cheaper price. The Chinese were present in shuttle trade with Kyrgyzstan since 1989, but rapidly became more organized. Small-scale Kyrgyz entrepreneurs thus lost their economic niche, and traveled less frequently to China. Some began to buy Chinese goods from

<footnote n="9">⁹ Interview by the author with Karganbek Samakov.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ A. Kh. Karasaeva, K. A. Kushnazarova, “Chelnochnaia torgovlia sel’skikh zhenshchin Kyrgyzstana” [Shuttle trade business of country women in Kyrgyzstan], *Vestnik Kyrgyzsko-Rossiiskogo Slavianskogo Universiteta*, 4 (2004), p. 52.</footnote>
Chinese traders based in Kyrgyzstan, other were forced to give up this
business due to its lack of profitability. Leili Zhaparova, who transports
goods from Urumqi to Karasuu and is engaged in wholesale trade,
explains that this concurrence continued to grow during the current
decade. "Over the past year, the number of Kyrgyz traders has decreased
considerably, resulting from the fact that the Chinese bring and sell their
own products. Obviously, they sell goods much cheaper than our
businessmen, it being easier for a Chinese to get products from his own
country. And Kyrgyz entrepreneurs were forced to close their business
and go to Russia, freeing up space for the Chinese traders".<fnref n="11" />

Chinese Migrants at Kyrgyz Markets

Chinese migrants have been trading for nearly a decade at major
Kyrgyzstan markets such as Dordoi, located in the city of Bishkek, and
Karasuu, near Osh, which became the main vector of economic
development for the Kyrgyz part of the Fergana Valley. At Dordoi
shopkeeper migrants from China are concentrated in the part of the
market that sells household appliances and electrical goods, this area
being called Dordoi-Dzhunkhai. In most cases, local Dungans work as
assistants to Chinese traders. Since 2002, Madina, a specialized market of
textile products manufactured in China, has also become one of the most
important commercial centers of Bishkek. Here Uyghurs from Xinjiang
engage in commercial activities. Uyghur traders have a relatively long
experience in Kyrgyzstan, as they began to engage actively in trade there
just after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They came to Madina in 2001,
after the freight center at Turbaz burned down. A similar fire occurred in
April 2008 in the Chinese section of Dordoi-Dzhunkhai. Madina has a
direct impact on other markets of Bishkek, primarily on Dordoi. Indeed,
the textiles sold at Madina are used to manufacture a large portion of the
clothing delivered for sale in Dordoi. This means that the garment
industry—some of the products of which are exported to Kazakhstan,
Russia and other countries—depends to a certain extent on the successful
performance of Madina.

At the Madina market, Uyghurs usually participate as a part of a
group of merchants who work together and take turns. Some of them are
sent to Kyrgyz markets for four to eight months and then go back to
Xinjiang to supply goods for Central Asia. During the interviews I
conducted in Madina, almost all Uyghur respondents explained that all
the goods they sell are brought from the interior provinces of China,
Xinjiang being only a platform of re-exportation. The majority of small

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Ulugbek Babakulov, “Svoimi glazami. Velikii shelkovyi put’ segodnia. Kitaizatsiia” [With my own eyes. The Great Silk Road Today. Sinicization], *Ferghana.ru*, November 30, 2007, <www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=5498> (October 12 2008).</footnote>
groups of Uyghur businessmen consist of closely related people. For instance a Uyghur trader born in Artush (Xinjiang) engaged in commercial activity in Madina, came to Bishkek through his uncle from mother's side, who had started trade activity in Turbaz during the second half of the 1990s. He usually works at Madina for three to four months, after which he spends the same amount of time with his family in Artush. During these months his brother replaces him at Madina. During their stays in Bishkek, Uyghurs merchants live together in rented apartments with colleagues in the "East-5" suburb of Bishkek. Uyghurs thus serve as mediators between Han Chinese and Kyrgyz sellers; their Turkic-speaking language has helped them to enter the Central Asian business sector. Loaders and other workers tend to be Kyrgyz citizens.

The most significant figures of entrepreneurial activity in the Madina market are businessmen from China, mostly Hans, who own and supply large quantities of goods. These people engage in only leadership and coordinating activities. Many small traders buy goods from them at wholesale prices and sell them at the market, or even borrow from them the amount of money equivalent to a given product they will sell. Such large businessmen are called *loben* or *bashlik*. They are extremely difficult to find at the market, as they operate at higher levels. They have partners from the Kyrgyz side who have political and economic networks, and are able to solve problems related to customs, administrative, and financial issues. The patronage-client phenomenon is therefore reflected in trading activity.

Unlike Kyrgyz traders, the Chinese ones have real support from their state. This is reflected in the liberalization of economic activity, free access to soft loans, ability to buy goods at cost, low taxes, and financial incentives for successful businessmen. As a result Chinese traders have excellent opportunities to expand the market of manufactured goods in Central Asia. This directly impacts the numbers of Chinese migrants in the region, including those employed as unskilled laborers. In Karasuu, for instance, numerous migrants from China work to load and move freight. The increasing presence of the Chinese elicits negative reactions from local Kyrgyz merchants, who organized rallies to protest against this trend and called on government agencies to react. It therefore seems that the competitive environment and the better position of Chinese migrants partly influence the migratory movement of Kyrgyz abroad.

There is a similar problem concerning the issue of the transportation of goods. The overwhelming majority of products are brought in large trucks from China via Xinjiang, and through the two custom posts of Torugart and Irkeshtam. The new Kyrgyz government, which formed after the events of March 24, 2005, allowed Chinese heavy vehicles to deliver goods from China to their final destination in Kyrgyzstan, whereas Kyrgyz drivers do not have the right to drive their vehicles into
Chinese territory. Under President Askar Akaev, Chinese trucks were allowed to drive to the capital. In the south of Kyrgyzstan, Chinese drivers can go only to the customs terminal Irkeshtam-Dorozhnyi, where supply companies load the cargo and send it to Karasuu and Osh.<fnref n="12" /> These rights of entry granted to Chinese cars actually leave the majority of Kyrgyz large vehicle drivers without jobs. This is due to the decisions of political authorities, but also to the technical limits of their vehicles. The towing capacity of Kyrgyz drivers' vehicles is up to 20 tons, but Chinese trucks can transport goods weighing from 50 to 70 tons. In such circumstances traders prefer to hire powerful cars that are much more efficient in all respects, including financial costs related to the payment of the drivers and loaders. Protests of drivers involved in the transport of Chinese goods in the south of the country did not bring any positive results. Many Kyrgyz drivers have thus been forced to find niches in other economic sectors at home and abroad. Some of them are now involved in delivering private orders, and shipping Chinese construction materials such as stone, gravel, sand, clay, and brick.

## Chinese Migrants and Commercial Centers

Migrants from China have opened commercial centers, cafes, restaurants, and casinos. Many Chinese citizens concentrate near the GOIN and Taatan shopping centers, the latter of which specializes on the sale of furniture. Customs clearance of these goods enables merchants to sell goods through a network of outlets in Bishkek, at Dordoi, and in the commercial complexes of Taatan and GOIN.

Usually Chinese traders employ citizens of Kyrgyzstan, especially Kyrgyz students. The latter appreciate the workplace and spend all their free time in the markets, even though Chinese entrepreneurs have more official rather than friendly attitude to local employees. These students have the opportunity to earn money and therefore take over a part of the financial costs of university. They also expect to improve their Chinese language through everyday practice with their employers. Their first and foremost interest is in the Chinese language, which can give them the opportunity to work in China. Many graduates of the state universities who completed the course of Chinese study then try to go to Urumqi, Guangzhou, and Shanghai. They are attracted by the working conditions for foreigners and laws considered to be much better than those at home. Security is an important element that drives educated youth to choose such a path.

<footnote n="12">¹² Ulugbek Babakulov, “Svoimi glazami. Velikii shelkovyi put’ segodnia. Doroga” [With my own eyes. The Great Silk Road today. The Road], Ferghana.ru, November 21, 2007, <http://www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=5480> (October 12 2008).</footnote>
Many Chinese businessmen hire young people from the local Dungan population as their assistants.<fnref n="13" /> This preference is likely due to the fact that linguistic closeness enables them to understand each other without a translator. Dungans also tend to speak Russian well, which is important for business. Moreover in recent years the Dungan part of the population of Kyrgyzstan has increased commercial activities with their Hui counterparts in China.<fnref n="14" /> In Kyrgyzstan they sell goods produced mainly in China, open shops, cafes, and restaurants, and endeavor to establish small businesses for processing vegetables, which can bring in a decent profit.

Labor contracts between Chinese employers and employees from Kyrgyzstan are usually based on verbal agreements. They mainly discuss wages, a commission on sold goods, and the work schedule. Students working here earn about 100 dollars per month plus 4 percent of the value of each product sold. In the commercial center of Taatan, Chinese traders and employees have one day off per month. There are safety issues, sometimes resulting in serious injuries, for which employers do not bear legal responsibility. No trade union protecting the interests of the personnel has been established yet. Almost all those to whom I spoke pointed out that Chinese migrants tolerate a very limited number of holidays and have a high capacity for work. Qualities such as endurance, hard work, and the ability to tolerate less than comfortable conditions are a decisive factor in making the Chinese competitive in the labor market. In fact our respondents told us that in China, the attitude is more respectful toward those who like working.

The Taatan shopping center, a Chinese-Kyrgyz joint venture, has a representative office in the south of the country, in Osh, and sells various types of furniture, household appliances, and other products that are manufactured in Guangzhou, Shanghai, and other cities in China. In summer 2007, President Kurmanbek Bakiev visited the Taatan-Osh center during its construction. At that time the representatives of the Kyrgyz-Chinese joint venture reported that they had invested 50 million dollars in it, which enabled them to establish 500 trading areas inside the building, and to create enterprises for the production of construction

<footnote n="13">¹³ On the Dungan history and culture, see M. H. Sushanlo, *Dungane* [The Dungans] (Frunze, 1971); L. T. Shinlo, *Kul’tura i byt sovetskikh dungan* [The Culture and Everyday Life of Soviet Dungans] (Frunze, 1965); A. A. Dzhon, *Obychai, obriady i pover’ia dungan* [Social Practices, Rituals and Belief of Dungans] (Bishkek, 2007); Elisabeth Allès, “The Chinese-speaking Muslims (Dungans) of Central Asia: A Case of Multiple Identities in a Changing Context”, *Asian Ethnicity*, 6, 2 (2005), pp. 121-134.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Din Khun, M. Kh. Imazov, *Khueitszu Kitaia* [The Hue in China] (Bishkek, 1999); Rashid U. Yusupov, “Chislennost’ i rasselenie dungan (khueitszu) v Kitaе” [The Population and Migration of Dungans (Hui) in China], *Dialog uchenykh na velikom shelkovom puti* [The Dialogue of Scholars on the Great Silk Road] (Bishkek, 2002), pp. 39-47.</footnote>
materials and assembling of agricultural and household appliances.<fnref n="15" /> One Chinese businessman at Taatan noted that in 2008, the demand for almost all types of goods decreased compared to the previous year. The narrowness of the Kyrgyz market means it is supplied only with essential goods. Therefore some Chinese businessmen seek to develop new and broader markets in Kazakhstan and Russia, even if they are less attractive for foreign investors and the rights of foreign workers. According to the scholar Rashid U. Yusupov, from the National University in Humanities, the investment climate is better in Tajikistan, where Chinese entrepreneurs strive to migrate to expand their activities in commerce, production, and the delivery of services to the population and other sectors of the economy.

## Chinese Migrants and Small Enterprises

Small and medium-sized enterprises producing bricks, cement, and iron products also employ Chinese migrants. According to a young trader named Yusup, who works at Taatan, there are a dozen of small brick factories, and six or seven small businesses for smelting iron in Chui region. No more than twenty or thirty people work in each of them. Citizens of Kyrgyzstan working in these companies deliver melted scraps of metal, stack bricks, and guard the facility, whereas only Chinese workers perform the most dangerous tasks. There are two reasons for this. The Chinese do not reveal the technological features of production, which are important in the competition for implementation of these products. In addition if a Chinese migrant worker is heavily injured because of safety issues, or even dies, it will be easier for the firm to manage the problem. Chinese migrants are more ready to accept the risk of an accident; some are illegal, and their safety and health issues are not considered to be a problem. If a tragedy happens to a Kyrgyz citizen, a trial asked by the victim's relatives would be unavoidable.

The Chinese have also started working on construction sites. In particular the government asked Chinese constructors to quickly build public facilities for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) leaders' summit in August 2007. At a press conference, President Kurmanbek Bakiev praised the Chinese builders, noting that they have been working day and night without rest while the local Kyrgyz builders could not meet the deadline because they were relatively lazy. This presidential speech provoked a mixed attitude from society. Some felt the leader of the country unduly underestimated the ability of the workers, revealing a degree of nihilism. At that time Chinese construction

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ “President Kurmanbek Bakiev posetil v Oshe stroitel’stvo kompleksa Taatan-Osh” [In Osh President Kurmanbek Bakiev visited the Taatan Complex], Akipress, July 7, 2007, <www.fergana.akipress.org/_ru_f_news.php?id=24224> (September 22 2008).</footnote>
companies were the only ones who offered to construct low income housing complexes.

## Chinese Migrants' Attitude to Corruption

Chinese traders complain about the corruption of Kyrgyz officials, which according to some, prevents Kyrgyzstan from rapidly improving its socio-economic situation. One of the businessmen interviewed complained of having been fined 300 dollars, saying he simply did not understand the reason and deeply doubted that this amount would be paid to the state treasury, believing that it would be rather kept by the corrupt official. According to the admissions of some Chinese entrepreneurs, officials of different levels and representatives of law enforcement agencies often find ways to get their money. They mention this factor to their Kyrgyz employees, stressing that it is difficult to develop the country in such a way. At the same time, migrants do not always appeal to the official structures of the executive and judiciary, believing that this would be a waste of time and fearing that these officials would also request bribes. In addition, some of these entrepreneurs do not have all of the necessary legal documents to run their businesses in Kyrgyzstan. One Chinese entrepreneur, Hayrulla Samat, petitioned the court regarding extortion by the 9th Main Office of the Kyrgyz Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs. In this case, two police officials demanded a fine of 250 dollars under the pretext that his passport was not stamped in the Madina market. The entrepreneur-migrant refused to pay this amount and appealed to the Chinese Embassy to get a new identity card and then returned to China.<fnref n="16" />

Several of respondents reported that, as a consequence of minor harassment and a decline in purchasing activities, some Chinese traders have gone back to China. Since the opening of the Kyrgyz-Chinese border, businessmen from neighboring countries have often faced threats, extortion, and fraud. An attack on a group of merchants was reported and some Kyrgyz businessmen were accused of not returning money that they had taken from Chinese entrepreneurs. The establishment of joint ventures did not insulate the migrants-entrepreneurs from such risks, as some Kyrgyz co-sponsors strove to oust their Chinese partners using various illegal tactics. They attempted to grasp all the profit and become full founders and owners of the businesses. As a result many Chinese businessmen have refused to establish joint ventures; however, some Chinese that have lived in Bishkek for about ten years have a greater

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ “Grazhdanin Kitaia napisal zaiavlenie o tom, chto u nego vymogol den’gi nachal’nik 9-ogo Glavnogo Upravleniia MVD Kyrgyzstana” [A Chinese citizen complained that the head of the 9th section of the Interior Ministry asked him for a bride], 24.kg, September 12, 2008, <www.24.kg/investigation/2008/09/12/92393.html> (September 28 2008).</footnote>
influence among their countrymen. They play an important role, as they have already adapted to new environments, have a lot of friends among pertinent officials, and know the channels through which to promote their projects. Corruption at various levels, adversely affecting investment incentives, does not prevent many Chinese businessmen from succeeding in Kyrgyzstan. This is achieved due to their skill of acquiring and expanding their networks of social relations, in particular with officials of medium and high rank.

## Numbers and Locations of Chinese Migrants

When the Kyrgyz border opened to Chinese citizens, mainly Turkish-speaking peoples crossed, among them Kyrgyz and Uyghurs from Xinjiang. The presence of Uyghur relatives or friends in Kyrgyzstan might have helped these migrants. There were 29,817 Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan in 1979, and 36,779 in 1989. The number of Chinese registered there during the same years was respectively 489 and 576 people.<fnref n="17" /> Most Chinese who moved to Kyrgyzstan during the Soviet era dispersed all over the country, although there were a few compact groups living in small areas. At one session of the Jogorku Kenesh on migration, labor, social assistance, and health care, the chairman of the Border Service of Kyrgyzstan informed the deputies that there were about 60,000 Chinese people living in Kyrgyzstan at the beginning of 2008.<fnref n="18" /> According to the State Committee for Migration and Employment, during the same period about 8,000 Chinese were in the country illegally.<fnref n="19" /> Although the majority of migrants were at one time Uyghurs, the number of Han migrants has sharply increased during the last four to five years.

These Han migrants enter in the country on a tourist visa and often attempt to stay. They generally settle in Chui and Osh regions. Most of them are in the cities of Bishkek and Karasuu, and live together in groups of five or six people in rented apartments. One can explain the desire to live compactly in a single block mainly by the need to ensure security, so that each businessman feels more secure than he would in a dispersed settlement. In their free time Chinese migrants call relatives and friends living in China, listen to music, go to restaurants, and go out for tours. Some of migrant entrepreneurs also gamble in casinos. Most of them have lunch or dinner in a restaurant owned by compatriots, such as in the

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Kyrgyzstandyn kalky. Kyrgyz Respublikasynyn 1999-zhyldagy birinchi uluttuk el kattoosunun zhyiyntyktary tablitsalarda [The Population of Kyrgyzstan. Results from the 1999 first national census of the Kyrgyz Republic] (Bishkek, 2000, vol. 2), p. 70.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ “V Kyrgyzstane nakhoditsia bole 60,000 grazhdan Kitaia” [More than 60,000 Chinese citizens are in Kyrgyzstan], 24.kg, January 30, 2008, <www.24.kg/community/2008/01/30/75133.html> (September 30 2008).</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Information given by Taalai Azimov, senior researcher at the Department for External Labor Migration of the State Committee for Migrations and Works.</footnote>
restaurant located on Prospect Chui, in the “East-5” neighborhood. Some Chinese migrants have residence cards.

It is said that some young Chinese marry local Kyrgyz girls, though these relationships are not always openly displayed. Such a marriage would naturally provide an opportunity to obtain Kyrgyzstani citizenship. However, it should be mentioned that such inter-ethnic marriages remain rare today. Chinese Migrants from China working in the Taatan and GOIN commercial centers try to rent apartments near their working places. A small Chinese town seems to be emerging near the GOIN center, where in most cases apartments are purchased through Kyrgyz fronts. These facts related to marriage and the purchase of private homes or apartments in multi-occupancy buildings are plausible and, to some extent, natural in the context of globalization. It is still difficult to argue that some Chinatowns are permanently establishing themselves in Bishkek, especially compared to the large settlement of Chinese migrants in Western Europe and the United States.

## Conclusions

The migratory movement of Chinese citizens to Kyrgyzstan is influenced by several factors: historically rooted Kyrgyz-Chinese relations; the geographic location of the two countries, which share a border and customs points on highways; the collapse of the Soviet Union and the severe economic crisis of the 1990s, which objectively led to further development of trade involving Chinese migrants; and the consequences of economic development in China and globalization process in general. The narrowness of the Kyrgyz market is not a barrier to Chinese migrants, since Kyrgyzstan is often just a transit place for export products to other countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. At the same time goods re-export, mainly in the form of raw materials, flow in the opposite direction thanks to the networks of high level officials who organize business with China and have transnational contacts with Chinese firms in search of raw materials.

Chinese migrant entrepreneurs feel Beijing's support in promoting their business plans through various mechanisms of social and financial incentives. This plays an important role in their activities in the Kyrgyz market, where local citizens cannot compete and some of them feel compelled to migrate to other countries. The high levels of corruption of Kyrgyz officials and other factors prevent the Kyrgyz state from carrying out protectionist policies to support its national entrepreneurs. Paternalism is also present in the establishment of business projects, where bureaucratic, visa, financial, and other issues are resolved by important people using their Kyrgyz counterparts. This increases the number of illegal migrants, helps them to stay longer, and prompts
Chinese entrepreneurs to solve problems through bribery and kickbacks, which is detrimental to the Kyrgyz economy in the long-term.