research-training projects, such as GlobalSense, whose aim it is to promote the
reflexivity of future teachers and their trainers.

4 The State at the Service of Social Thinking

The Durkheimian approach thus contributes to the transformation of prac-
tices, without becoming prescriptive. Indeed, though the role of the state is not
to summarise society's thought, but to "add to it a more meditated thought",
as Durkheim said, it remains that the latter is anchored in secondary groups.
Society's thoughts are mediated by the state in a continuous communication
process, clarifying the obscure feelings that affect society to help it achieve a
higher degree of reflexivity (Steiner, 2018). Nevertheless, nothing is so simple.
We have already suggested above that the Durkheimian sociology of the state
is as innovative as it is ambiguous. Therefore, before putting it to the test, let us
answer some of the criticisms against it.

When social conflicts are important and hinder the healthy deployment of organic solidarity, Durkheim does not imagine that the state can forge privileged links with certain groups more powerful than others: “the existence of classes or castes such as those with high socio-economic inequalities have no influence in his eyes on the nature of the state, which probably derives its ‘strength’ from its rationality alone” (Birnbaum, 1976, p. 252). Similarly, when Durkheim theorises democracy as a process of communication between state and society, “he does not take into account the possibility of a strategic manipulation of the second by the first” (Sintomer, 2011, p. 408).

Conversely, while the state becomes a “hotbed of new, original represen-
tations, which must put society in a position to behave with more intelli-
gence than when it is simply driven by the obscure feelings that impact it”
(Durkheim, 1900/2020, p. 150), society is not really a counter power, but rather
a space where ‘counterweights’, such as professional corporations, become
partners, which the state must enter and control – the crucial question being:
to what extent? The emancipation movement is therefore carried out pref-
erentially from the state to society: “Individuals can, without contradicting
themselves, be the instruments of the state, because to realise individuals is
what the state’s action tends towards” (Durkheim, 1900/2020, p. 127).

In short, the development of professional corporations is both a guarantee
of democracy (as intermediate forces between the state and individuals) and a
potential limit to it. If Durkheim is in favour of them, it is because they exercise,
through their trade, what is an already social way of thinking, while he distrusts
groups of individuals gathered under the *aegis* of a common interest (local
research-training projects, such as GlobalSense, whose aim it is to promote the
reflexivity of future teachers and their trainers.

4 The State at the Service of Social Thinking

The Durkheimian approach thus contributes to the transformation of prac-
tices, without becoming prescriptive. Indeed, though the role of the state is not
to summarise society's thought, but to "add to it a more meditated thought",
as Durkheim said, it remains that the latter is anchored in secondary groups.
Society's thoughts are mediated by the state in a continuous communication
process, clarifying the obscure feelings that affect society to help it achieve a
higher degree of reflexivity (Steiner, 2018). Nevertheless, nothing is so simple.
We have already suggested above that the Durkheimian sociology of the state
is as innovative as it is ambiguous. Therefore, before putting it to the test, let us
answer some of the criticisms against it.

When social conflicts are important and hinder the healthy deployment of organic solidarity, Durkheim does not imagine that the state can forge privileged links with certain groups more powerful than others: “the existence of classes or castes such as those with high socio-economic inequalities have no influence in his eyes on the nature of the state, which probably derives its ‘strength’ from its rationality alone” (Birnbaum, 1976, p. 252). Similarly, when Durkheim theorises democracy as a process of communication between state and society, “he does not take into account the possibility of a strategic manipulation of the second by the first” (Sintomer, 2011, p. 408).

Conversely, while the state becomes a “hotbed of new, original represen-
tations, which must put society in a position to behave with more intelli-
gence than when it is simply driven by the obscure feelings that impact it”
(Durkheim, 1900/2020, p. 150), society is not really a counter power, but rather
a space where ‘counterweights’, such as professional corporations, become
partners, which the state must enter and control – the crucial question being:
to what extent? The emancipation movement is therefore carried out pref-
erentially from the state to society: “Individuals can, without contradicting
themselves, be the instruments of the state, because to realise individuals is
what the state’s action tends towards” (Durkheim, 1900/2020, p. 127).

In short, the development of professional corporations is both a guarantee
of democracy (as intermediate forces between the state and individuals) and a
potential limit to it. If Durkheim is in favour of them, it is because they exercise,
through their trade, what is an already social way of thinking, while he distrusts
groups of individuals gathered under the *aegis* of a common interest (local
communities, social movements, social classes). The fragility of the Durkheimian edifice is thus revealed. Rather elitist, it requires an educator-state to prevent political communication from society overwhelming it. Indeed, the state is supposed to ensure its mission through a completely neutral body of officials, in order to strip them of their personal interests and put them at the service of this highly elaborate concept that the state is.

This is why, seeing that civil servants embodying the state are also private
persons, Durkheim considered that they should neither unionise nor go on
strike as mentioned previously, thus constricting them to his political sociology.
This view disregards unionism's political power to challenge the possible arbi-
trariness of the state administration, allowing it therefore to assume this role of
'counterweight' of which Durkheim speaks. Nonetheless, the author does not
choose this path, instead depicting democratic deliberation as being disentan-
gled from the social context. Can democratic deliberation, once rid of private
interests thanks to the supposed impartiality of the state, truly reflect 'society'?

These fragilities are the reasons why the Durkheimian proposals must
be read today in a more liberal, pluralistic perspective, adapted to modern
democracies (Guérard de Latour, 2014). This is all the more feasible because
criticisms of Durkheim's political sociology are not necessarily salient regard-
ing the object considered here. Teacher training indeed remains a state pre-
rogative, one that Durkheim fulfils in Chapter IV of *Education and Sociology*,
a course addressed to pre-service secondary teachers at the Faculty of Litera-
ture of Paris University. In short, though Durkheimian political sociology is a
bit fragile, its assumptions around a state-led teacher training could be tested
accurately, especially since we now benefit from a Rawlsian rereading of his
work.

5

A Two-Fold Rawlsian Reading of Durkheim

How can secondary groups create new rules in close connection with the
state, without enduring its weight? Here appears the usefulness of the sociol-
ogist Anne Rawls' reading of Durkheim in a liberal perspective. The proxim-
ity between her father John Rawls and Durkheim lies, among other things, in
the Rawlsian distinction between summary and constitutive rules. The former
regulate activities that already exist (cooking recipes, traffic regulations); the
latter are institutional facts, in that they create the possibility of carrying out
the activity in question, such as playing chess or making a promise.

Let us illustrate this point. Though one can cook without following a recipe,
and drive without following traffic regulations, one cannot keep a promise for
communities, social movements, social classes). The fragility of the Durkheimian edifice is thus revealed. Rather elitist, it requires an educator-state to prevent political communication from society overwhelming it. Indeed, the state is supposed to ensure its mission through a completely neutral body of officials, in order to strip them of their personal interests and put them at the service of this highly elaborate concept that the state is.

This is why, seeing that civil servants embodying the state are also private
persons, Durkheim considered that they should neither unionise nor go on
strike as mentioned previously, thus constricting them to his political sociology.
This view disregards unionism's political power to challenge the possible arbi-
trariness of the state administration, allowing it therefore to assume this role of
'counterweight' of which Durkheim speaks. Nonetheless, the author does not
choose this path, instead depicting democratic deliberation as being disentan-
gled from the social context. Can democratic deliberation, once rid of private
interests thanks to the supposed impartiality of the state, truly reflect 'society'?

These fragilities are the reasons why the Durkheimian proposals must
be read today in a more liberal, pluralistic perspective, adapted to modern
democracies (Guérard de Latour, 2014). This is all the more feasible because
criticisms of Durkheim's political sociology are not necessarily salient regard-
ing the object considered here. Teacher training indeed remains a state pre-
rogative, one that Durkheim fulfils in Chapter IV of *Education and Sociology*,
a course addressed to pre-service secondary teachers at the Faculty of Litera-
ture of Paris University. In short, though Durkheimian political sociology is a
bit fragile, its assumptions around a state-led teacher training could be tested
accurately, especially since we now benefit from a Rawlsian rereading of his
work.

5

A Two-Fold Rawlsian Reading of Durkheim

How can secondary groups create new rules in close connection with the
state, without enduring its weight? Here appears the usefulness of the sociol-
ogist Anne Rawls' reading of Durkheim in a liberal perspective. The proxim-
ity between her father John Rawls and Durkheim lies, among other things, in
the Rawlsian distinction between summary and constitutive rules. The former
regulate activities that already exist (cooking recipes, traffic regulations); the
latter are institutional facts, in that they create the possibility of carrying out
the activity in question, such as playing chess or making a promise.

Let us illustrate this point. Though one can cook without following a recipe,
and drive without following traffic regulations, one cannot keep a promise for
utilitarian reasons: the result may be the same, but it will not be a kept promise. Indeed, one can only keep a promise if the action carried out, is carried out because of the promise made, not because of external and contingent circumstances (such as usefulness) on which the promised action depends. Yet this distinction intersects the Durkheimian distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity. In modern societies, summary rules still exist, but increasingly give way to constitutive rules.

As Anne Rawls strongly emphasises, contrary to current interpretations, Durkheim did not cease to emphasise that, in modern societies, differentiated, diversified, individualised, upset in their morphology by the division of social work, collective consciousness can no longer – and must no longer – [...] rely on the primacy of this first type of [summary] rules. [...] A form of social solidarity has become necessary (and desirable), which now proceeds from below and not from overhanging institutions, that does not depend on the authority of collective beliefs, but rather on a shared commitment towards ‘practices’ – as understood by John Rawls – based on forms of internal, horizontal self-regulation, in short on constitutive rules. (Chanial, 2019, p. 21)

This is where the well-known Durkheimian proposal of professional corporations, as secondary, self-regulated groups, interwoven between the state and individuals, makes sense: the corporate model that Durkheim advocates for must bring together workers from different companies – or working in the same workplace – who share common work practices (Rawls, 2021). These aspirations are perceivable in the students’ self-reflections.

By being a part of a global community, we are able to share our interactions with various institutions and how they affect our classrooms, and how they can affect those in other places. Additionally, this showed me the importance of teaching cooperatively. As seen with this particular activity, we are able to teach students about a global issue, such as migration, by working with others who experience it differently. (Blake, pre-service teacher in social studies, TUP)

The objective, according to Durkheim, is for the state to assume its role as the social brain (cf. Chapter 4), formalising the constitutive orders that emerge in society as the division of labour deepens. In this sense, as has been said, the state is primarily an organ of thought; if it must act, it is to ensure the
utilitarian reasons: the result may be the same, but it will not be a kept promise. Indeed, one can only keep a promise if the action carried out, is carried out because of the promise made, not because of external and contingent circumstances (such as usefulness) on which the promised action depends. Yet this distinction intersects the Durkheimian distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity. In modern societies, summary rules still exist, but increasingly give way to constitutive rules.

As Anne Rawls strongly emphasises, contrary to current interpretations, Durkheim did not cease to emphasise that, in modern societies, differentiated, diversified, individualised, upset in their morphology by the division of social work, collective consciousness can no longer – and must no longer – [...] rely on the primacy of this first type of [summary] rules. [...] A form of social solidarity has become necessary (and desirable), which now proceeds from below and not from overhanging institutions, that does not depend on the authority of collective beliefs, but rather on a shared commitment towards ‘practices’ – as understood by John Rawls – based on forms of internal, horizontal self-regulation, in short on constitutive rules. (Chanial, 2019, p. 21)

This is where the well-known Durkheimian proposal of professional corporations, as secondary, self-regulated groups, interwoven between the state and individuals, makes sense: the corporate model that Durkheim advocates for must bring together workers from different companies – or working in the same workplace – who share common work practices (Rawls, 2021). These aspirations are perceivable in the students’ self-reflections.

By being a part of a global community, we are able to share our interactions with various institutions and how they affect our classrooms, and how they can affect those in other places. Additionally, this showed me the importance of teaching cooperatively. As seen with this particular activity, we are able to teach students about a global issue, such as migration, by working with others who experience it differently. (Blake, pre-service teacher in social studies, TUP)

The objective, according to Durkheim, is for the state to assume its role as the social brain (cf. Chapter 4), formalising the constitutive orders that emerge in society as the division of labour deepens. In this sense, as has been said, the state is primarily an organ of thought; if it must act, it is to ensure the
necessary conditions for the deployment of constitutive practices: coopera-
tion, reciprocity, equality of access, communication, internal self-regulation
of practices. From a methodological point of view, an interactionist interpre-
tation of Durkheim's approach emerges, and the inquiry consists in asking
whether people are able (or not) to produce social facts recognisable by all,
under the conditions that are theirs. That is the meaning of the adjective 'con-
stitutive'. The rules constitute social facts, just as the rules of chess constitute
the collective action of playing chess.

To produce social facts in this way, it is necessary, to varying degrees, to estab-
lish trust (Garfinkel), a working consensus (Goffman) and a joint commitment
(Gilbert). These models, purified and anchored in the sociological tradition
(not only Durkheimian but also interactionist), reveal the capacities to create
social facts which, deployed by members of secondary groups, are essential in
societies marked by the rapid deepening of the division of labour. Sociology is
in charge of studying these capacities and new forms of social facts; the state is
in charge of formalising the new constitutive rules – according to Anne Rawls –
elaborated by secondary groups. This interpretation of the Durkheimian
perspective extends the gesture of political philosophy. Indeed, Durkheim
insisted that sociology was not intended to discover an existing but unexplored
continent (the ‘social’, *le social*), since it was motivated by an already political
intention: to study the ‘social’ was also, *ipso facto*, to constitute it (Callegaro &
Marcucci, 2018).

However, we must take care to not misinterpret the notion of state. The
point is not to evoke a hypertrophied macro-actor, or a neutral and reason-
able power that would turn the confused feelings of the people into ‘clear’
thoughts and speeches. Birnbaum and Sintomer’s aforementioned criticisms,
as well as Cuin, Déloye and Dubet’s remarks about Durkheim must therefore
be taken into account. Moreover, a state is not exclusively national. A chal-
lenge for GlobalSense is, precisely, to activate an interstate lever, if only as a
co-financer (the European Commission), in order to develop a new framework
that matches the latent aspirations of society, such as the cosmopolitan patri-
otism Durkheim already sensed as a European horizon calling for a new form
of government. In this perspective, we want to capture “that part of the uncon-
scious that first escapes the state because it refers to the changing aspirations
of political society impacting the law” (Callegaro, 2018, p. 220).

The simple fact of internationalising teacher training, within the frame-
work of GlobalSense, is a way of supporting the division of labour, since higher
education is becoming Europeanised, as evidenced by the European Commis-
sion framework Cooperation partnerships in Higher Education. To use the
necessary conditions for the deployment of constitutive practices: coopera-
tion, reciprocity, equality of access, communication, internal self-regulation
of practices. From a methodological point of view, an interactionist interpre-
tation of Durkheim's approach emerges, and the inquiry consists in asking
whether people are able (or not) to produce social facts recognisable by all,
under the conditions that are theirs. That is the meaning of the adjective 'con-
stitutive'. The rules constitute social facts, just as the rules of chess constitute
the collective action of playing chess.

To produce social facts in this way, it is necessary, to varying degrees, to estab-
lish trust (Garfinkel), a working consensus (Goffman) and a joint commitment
(Gilbert). These models, purified and anchored in the sociological tradition
(not only Durkheimian but also interactionist), reveal the capacities to create
social facts which, deployed by members of secondary groups, are essential in
societies marked by the rapid deepening of the division of labour. Sociology is
in charge of studying these capacities and new forms of social facts; the state is
in charge of formalising the new constitutive rules – according to Anne Rawls –
elaborated by secondary groups. This interpretation of the Durkheimian
perspective extends the gesture of political philosophy. Indeed, Durkheim
insisted that sociology was not intended to discover an existing but unexplored
continent (the ‘social’, *le social*), since it was motivated by an already political
intention: to study the ‘social’ was also, *ipso facto*, to constitute it (Callegaro &
Marcucci, 2018).

However, we must take care to not misinterpret the notion of state. The
point is not to evoke a hypertrophied macro-actor, or a neutral and reason-
able power that would turn the confused feelings of the people into ‘clear’
thoughts and speeches. Birnbaum and Sintomer’s aforementioned criticisms,
as well as Cuin, Déloye and Dubet’s remarks about Durkheim must therefore
be taken into account. Moreover, a state is not exclusively national. A chal-
lenge for GlobalSense is, precisely, to activate an interstate lever, if only as a
co-financer (the European Commission), in order to develop a new framework
that matches the latent aspirations of society, such as the cosmopolitan patri-
otism Durkheim already sensed as a European horizon calling for a new form
of government. In this perspective, we want to capture “that part of the uncon-
scious that first escapes the state because it refers to the changing aspirations
of political society impacting the law” (Callegaro, 2018, p. 220).

The simple fact of internationalising teacher training, within the frame-
work of GlobalSense, is a way of supporting the division of labour, since higher
education is becoming Europeanised, as evidenced by the European Commis-
sion framework Cooperation partnerships in Higher Education. To use the
terminology of Anne Rawls, the objective of training-research is to provide
actors with an updated professional framework for the creation of social facts
according to constitutive rules. This is a partly spontaneous order, just as in
the corporations of which Durkheim speaks, since the pre-service teachers,
in principle at least, are fully interested in this device and benefit from huge
flexibility to suggest ideas and express their aspirations.

Yet it remains to be seen how constitutive rules can be promoted whilst
avoiding any prescriptive imposition on the part of the state and/or supra-
national bodies, thus ensuring the conditions of self-regulation of the profes-
sional group(s) composed of pre-service teachers and teacher trainers. It also
remains to be seen what the place of the recapitulative rules is (as opposed to
constitutive ones), since habits, grammars of citizenship, and conceptions of
the profession are very prominent.

This liberal interpretation of Durkheim provides a methodological frame-
work to clarify the vagueness of the GCE slogan. As the debates about it show,
global citizenship does not really make sense in the current state of things,
except as a distant and abstract ideal. Durkheim had perceived, as suggested
in the second part of this book, that in order to be truly coherent, a cosmopol-
itan citizenship would require imagining humanity itself organised as a soci-
ety. However, Durkheim considered this idea so unimaginable that it did not
even come into play. Whatever one thinks of his pessimism or his realism, the
crucial point is that the sociologist-philosopher and professor of education sci-
ence did not abandon the ideal of a finally unified humanity, because he knew
that this was the ultimate ideal of the modern.¹

Indeed, the irreversible deepening of the division of labour parallels the
increasingly demanding affirmation of the cult of the human person: organic
solidarity no longer requires similarities between individuals and it is the indi-
vidual, as an ideal, who ultimately remains an object of worship.

In modern societies, individuals, Durkheim judged, are constantly dif-
ferentiating themselves, to the point that they potentially only have one
thing in common: the fact that they are human beings. The moral founda-
tion of these societies could therefore, in his eyes, only be individualism,
understood as the sacralisation of the human person. Yet, this individ-
ualism implies “sympathy for all that is man, a wider pity for all pains,
for all human miseries, a greater need to fight and soften them, a greater
thirst for justice” [*Individualism and intellectuals*], which potentially has
no limits. The result is that the moral individualism of modern societ-
ies leads to the rise of a “broad conception of humanity” [*The division of
labour*], that is, of a moral cosmopolitanism. (Truc, 2012, p. 61)
terminology of Anne Rawls, the objective of training-research is to provide
actors with an updated professional framework for the creation of social facts
according to constitutive rules. This is a partly spontaneous order, just as in
the corporations of which Durkheim speaks, since the pre-service teachers,
in principle at least, are fully interested in this device and benefit from huge
flexibility to suggest ideas and express their aspirations.

Yet it remains to be seen how constitutive rules can be promoted whilst
avoiding any prescriptive imposition on the part of the state and/or supra-
national bodies, thus ensuring the conditions of self-regulation of the profes-
sional group(s) composed of pre-service teachers and teacher trainers. It also
remains to be seen what the place of the recapitulative rules is (as opposed to
constitutive ones), since habits, grammars of citizenship, and conceptions of
the profession are very prominent.

This liberal interpretation of Durkheim provides a methodological frame-
work to clarify the vagueness of the GCE slogan. As the debates about it show,
global citizenship does not really make sense in the current state of things,
except as a distant and abstract ideal. Durkheim had perceived, as suggested
in the second part of this book, that in order to be truly coherent, a cosmopol-
itan citizenship would require imagining humanity itself organised as a soci-
ety. However, Durkheim considered this idea so unimaginable that it did not
even come into play. Whatever one thinks of his pessimism or his realism, the
crucial point is that the sociologist-philosopher and professor of education sci-
ence did not abandon the ideal of a finally unified humanity, because he knew
that this was the ultimate ideal of the modern.¹

Indeed, the irreversible deepening of the division of labour parallels the
increasingly demanding affirmation of the cult of the human person: organic
solidarity no longer requires similarities between individuals and it is the indi-
vidual, as an ideal, who ultimately remains an object of worship.

In modern societies, individuals, Durkheim judged, are constantly dif-
ferentiating themselves, to the point that they potentially only have one
thing in common: the fact that they are human beings. The moral founda-
tion of these societies could therefore, in his eyes, only be individualism,
understood as the sacralisation of the human person. Yet, this individ-
ualism implies “sympathy for all that is man, a wider pity for all pains,
for all human miseries, a greater need to fight and soften them, a greater
thirst for justice” [*Individualism and intellectuals*], which potentially has
no limits. The result is that the moral individualism of modern societ-
ies leads to the rise of a “broad conception of humanity” [*The division of
labour*], that is, of a moral cosmopolitanism. (Truc, 2012, p. 61)
Under these conditions, the professional groups directly involved, including pre-service teachers and their trainers, anticipate the stakes of the GCE if only because they know, more or less confusedly, that

- Citizenship is a human ideal rather than a narrowly national one;

- The boundaries between states are arbitrary regarding the worship of the human person;

- Students and their families nowadays can identify with extra national and/or transnational communities;

- Ecological issues are inherently global (etc.).

This implies a new international division of labour in citizenship education. However, it is necessary to accompany this process in order to avoid a pathological division of labour (anomic or constrained), contrary to the development of organic solidarity that secondary groups are supposed to promote. This is why the promotion of 'good practices' and non-reflexive training engineering are not solutions but obstacles (Barthes, 2017a). To avoid them, GlobalSense must return to the sociological tradition, itself anchored in political philosophy, and examine certain concrete conditions that might allow professionals to establish new constitutive rules in favour of citizenship education in an international perspective. In particular, we are interested in collectivisation procedures: modes of cooperation, communication tools, spaces for discussion, exchanges of practices, joint work.

That being said, the 'social facts' thus created cannot hide other more massive and more durable phenomena: historically and culturally settled definitions of citizenship, habits, conception of the profession, its reality in a given society in terms of esteem, prestige, status, recognition ... The Rawlsian interpretation of Durkheim is therefore an interesting tool, but it cannot hide the persistence of summary rules or even mechanical solidarity in our modern societies (Mauss, 1968, p. 105).

## 6 Cosmopolitanism: A Modern Ideal

Using Durkheimian tools updated by socialists (Karsenti, Lemieux), republicans (Pettit, Guérard de Latour) and liberals (Rawls), we can return with more precision to the debates on GCE. Let us first give an illustration of the French case, which is the country where Durkheim's thought was first developed. As Durkheim is a founder of sociology, this specific illustration can be insightful to clarify the debate on GC, which occurs in other countries. In France, some versions of the republican project tend towards authoritarian nationalism, if
Under these conditions, the professional groups directly involved, including pre-service teachers and their trainers, anticipate the stakes of the GCE if only because they know, more or less confusedly, that

- Citizenship is a human ideal rather than a narrowly national one;

- The boundaries between states are arbitrary regarding the worship of the human person;

- Students and their families nowadays can identify with extra national and/or transnational communities;

- Ecological issues are inherently global (etc.).

This implies a new international division of labour in citizenship education. However, it is necessary to accompany this process in order to avoid a pathological division of labour (anomic or constrained), contrary to the development of organic solidarity that secondary groups are supposed to promote. This is why the promotion of 'good practices' and non-reflexive training engineering are not solutions but obstacles (Barthes, 2017a). To avoid them, GlobalSense must return to the sociological tradition, itself anchored in political philosophy, and examine certain concrete conditions that might allow professionals to establish new constitutive rules in favour of citizenship education in an international perspective. In particular, we are interested in collectivisation procedures: modes of cooperation, communication tools, spaces for discussion, exchanges of practices, joint work.

That being said, the 'social facts' thus created cannot hide other more massive and more durable phenomena: historically and culturally settled definitions of citizenship, habits, conception of the profession, its reality in a given society in terms of esteem, prestige, status, recognition ... The Rawlsian interpretation of Durkheim is therefore an interesting tool, but it cannot hide the persistence of summary rules or even mechanical solidarity in our modern societies (Mauss, 1968, p. 105).

## 6 Cosmopolitanism: A Modern Ideal

Using Durkheimian tools updated by socialists (Karsenti, Lemieux), republicans (Pettit, Guérard de Latour) and liberals (Rawls), we can return with more precision to the debates on GCE. Let us first give an illustration of the French case, which is the country where Durkheim's thought was first developed. As Durkheim is a founder of sociology, this specific illustration can be insightful to clarify the debate on GC, which occurs in other countries. In France, some versions of the republican project tend towards authoritarian nationalism, if
not racialism (Fassin, 2013). This raises concerns that call for a cosmopolitan ideal. Yet this process can lead to an under-theorisation of the totalities, often national, at the principle of the deepening of the ideal of individual autonomy. In Dumont's words, mentioned above, the nation is a global society composed of people who consider themselves as individuals.

However, is the Dumontian remark still valid today? Is it not obvious that the nation-state is less powerful today under the combined effects of world markets, international treaties, relations of worldwide economic competition, communication networks whose speed far exceeds that of the 20th century? Therefore, can we still consider the nation-state as the ultimate framework for autonomy? In short: is the holistic approach still relevant? Yes, because it evolves; moreover, regarding our research more specifically, we can see that it is not necessary to go beyond the national framework to understand curriculum changes regarding citizenship in an international perspective. The national French curriculum, which we have outlined above (concerning the level of *collège*, i.e. middle school), includes elements on global citizen engagement (global issues, global engagement). Though this is not specifically global citizenship, which in any case is 'only' a horizon, this French curriculum does have a global perspective. Indeed, it takes note of the insertion of the nation-state in frameworks that go beyond it and could even possibly 'threaten' it: ECHR, UN, NGOS and international conventions.

The neo-Durkheimian approach is not, in fact, incompatible with the common idea in GCE according to which global citizenship does not replace national citizenship. Nevertheless, although this idea is obvious, it is very diversely interpreted; so that holism will lead us, *infra*, to challenge the 'nominalist motif' in GCE. Revisiting classical sociology implies relying on a theory of modernity, rendering useless the hypothesis that we have entered a radically different 'new era', a 'new world' and a 'new civilizational situation', to use expressions used by postmodern thinkers. Indeed, the truly modern ideals (freedom, autonomy, emancipation, equality, etc.) still animate us, including in GCE, and that is why it is important to continue to use classical sociology.

In this case, by explaining the fundamental *modernity* of the cosmopolitan attitude, Durkheim avoids the nominalist pitfall oblivious to the (often national) totality, by following the principle of individualism as a value. However, this oversight is precisely what favours the instrumentalisation of the cosmopolitan ideal, in favour of market ideologies of a globalisation without borders (Nussbaum, 2019). The question that remains is: how does the cosmopolitan ideal manage (or not) to project itself onto a global citizenship (as an ideal or a reality) that legitimises GCE? In some of its influential versions, the multiculturalist ideal in GCE is fundamentally *nominalist*, preventing one from
not racialism (Fassin, 2013). This raises concerns that call for a cosmopolitan ideal. Yet this process can lead to an under-theorisation of the totalities, often national, at the principle of the deepening of the ideal of individual autonomy. In Dumont's words, mentioned above, the nation is a global society composed of people who consider themselves as individuals.

However, is the Dumontian remark still valid today? Is it not obvious that the nation-state is less powerful today under the combined effects of world markets, international treaties, relations of worldwide economic competition, communication networks whose speed far exceeds that of the 20th century? Therefore, can we still consider the nation-state as the ultimate framework for autonomy? In short: is the holistic approach still relevant? Yes, because it evolves; moreover, regarding our research more specifically, we can see that it is not necessary to go beyond the national framework to understand curriculum changes regarding citizenship in an international perspective. The national French curriculum, which we have outlined above (concerning the level of *collège*, i.e. middle school), includes elements on global citizen engagement (global issues, global engagement). Though this is not specifically global citizenship, which in any case is 'only' a horizon, this French curriculum does have a global perspective. Indeed, it takes note of the insertion of the nation-state in frameworks that go beyond it and could even possibly 'threaten' it: ECHR, UN, NGOS and international conventions.

The neo-Durkheimian approach is not, in fact, incompatible with the common idea in GCE according to which global citizenship does not replace national citizenship. Nevertheless, although this idea is obvious, it is very diversely interpreted; so that holism will lead us, *infra*, to challenge the 'nominalist motif' in GCE. Revisiting classical sociology implies relying on a theory of modernity, rendering useless the hypothesis that we have entered a radically different 'new era', a 'new world' and a 'new civilizational situation', to use expressions used by postmodern thinkers. Indeed, the truly modern ideals (freedom, autonomy, emancipation, equality, etc.) still animate us, including in GCE, and that is why it is important to continue to use classical sociology.

In this case, by explaining the fundamental *modernity* of the cosmopolitan attitude, Durkheim avoids the nominalist pitfall oblivious to the (often national) totality, by following the principle of individualism as a value. However, this oversight is precisely what favours the instrumentalisation of the cosmopolitan ideal, in favour of market ideologies of a globalisation without borders (Nussbaum, 2019). The question that remains is: how does the cosmopolitan ideal manage (or not) to project itself onto a global citizenship (as an ideal or a reality) that legitimises GCE? In some of its influential versions, the multiculturalist ideal in GCE is fundamentally *nominalist*, preventing one from
thinking about citizenship in a satisfactory manner. However, it is also important to reject the conservative response that denies any relevance to the notion of global citizenship. In doing so, it is possible to sketch out a third educational path and its practical consequences in a particular environment.

ETS are a privileged actor of the training of teachers and educational staff, and as such are at the crossroads of these issues. They embody a project of society, more or less related to state prescriptions, whose expected results they seek to translate and/or criticise, whose declinations they wish to trace, whose modalities of circumvention of national rules they try to identify, whilst themselves being framed by international recommendations, inter-state treaties, etc. ETS thus handle various orders of discourse – administrative, political, scientific – whose respective specificities they must understand, from the perspective of an articulation closer than in other disciplines, with ethical and socio-political questions, in terms of aims and social projects (Albero & Barthes, 2022). This justifies the mobilisation of several disciplines by returning to their foundations in order to unfold the many registers around the notion of GCE.

## 7 Escaping the Consensus Rhetoric

Durkheim also formulated a social project. It took into account both the national totality and the processes of individuation in modern societies, through the notion of organic solidarity. The more differentiated the functions (especially professional ones) are, the more people are united, because they need each other within the framework of an important division of labour, provided that the latter is integrated and regulated. The European pre-service teachers and senior education advisors – as opposed to the US and Israeli participants – mention how taking part in GlobalSense has led them to this realisation:

> In France global issues are usually taught by history/geography teacher, but now I see it can be taught by other teachers. Bringing teachers and students around a global issue [...] could bring cohesion. (Eline, senior education advisor, NU, France)

> It is important for a teacher to be aware that their students come from different backgrounds. As a teacher of English and German, I will address these topics in my classroom. But talking to the philosophy teachers has made me aware that it can be difficult. (Sofia, pre-service teacher, WUE, Germany)
thinking about citizenship in a satisfactory manner. However, it is also important to reject the conservative response that denies any relevance to the notion of global citizenship. In doing so, it is possible to sketch out a third educational path and its practical consequences in a particular environment.

ETS are a privileged actor of the training of teachers and educational staff, and as such are at the crossroads of these issues. They embody a project of society, more or less related to state prescriptions, whose expected results they seek to translate and/or criticise, whose declinations they wish to trace, whose modalities of circumvention of national rules they try to identify, whilst themselves being framed by international recommendations, inter-state treaties, etc. ETS thus handle various orders of discourse – administrative, political, scientific – whose respective specificities they must understand, from the perspective of an articulation closer than in other disciplines, with ethical and socio-political questions, in terms of aims and social projects (Albero & Barthes, 2022). This justifies the mobilisation of several disciplines by returning to their foundations in order to unfold the many registers around the notion of GCE.

## 7 Escaping the Consensus Rhetoric

Durkheim also formulated a social project. It took into account both the national totality and the processes of individuation in modern societies, through the notion of organic solidarity. The more differentiated the functions (especially professional ones) are, the more people are united, because they need each other within the framework of an important division of labour, provided that the latter is integrated and regulated. The European pre-service teachers and senior education advisors – as opposed to the US and Israeli participants – mention how taking part in GlobalSense has led them to this realisation:

> In France global issues are usually taught by history/geography teacher, but now I see it can be taught by other teachers. Bringing teachers and students around a global issue [...] could bring cohesion. (Eline, senior education advisor, NU, France)

> It is important for a teacher to be aware that their students come from different backgrounds. As a teacher of English and German, I will address these topics in my classroom. But talking to the philosophy teachers has made me aware that it can be difficult. (Sofia, pre-service teacher, WUE, Germany)
As a future English teacher, I don't feel I have the necessary training to go in depth in global issues, and I need the help of a rhetoric/philosophy teacher. However, it is still an interesting topic for English classes and can help sensitise students. (Zineb, pre-service teacher, FUB, Belgium)

The quotes illustrate Durkheim's theory on the organic solidarity that emerges from interdependence. Teachers from various disciplines, such as history/geography, English, German, and philosophy, collaborate and learn from each other. This cross-disciplinary interaction fosters a collective understanding of global issues and promotes a sense of cohesion, reflecting the organic solidarity Durkheim describes. The shared learning experiences contribute to a more comprehensive and interconnected educational approach, reinforcing the idea that the collective knowledge of educators enriches the overall educational system.

In practice, cross-disciplinary collaboration among educators reflects Durkheim's organic solidarity theory. This fosters cohesion and a collective understanding, while Durkheim's theory underscores the state's role in acknowledging and embracing societal differences. Indeed, far from homogenising the social body, the state as a social brain was destined, as an organ of thought, "to concentrate the diffuse psychic life at work within society by supplementing the form of unconscious regulation which operates there through a conscious regulation [and thus to render] society conscious of its own diversity" (Guérard de Latour, 2009, p. 226). Thus, to use the title of the work quoted here, Durkheim gives a nod to *The Republic of Differences*.

These are intra-national differences, recalling that neo-Durkheimian republicanism is in no way opposed to a multicultural society; but what about the supra-national level? How can the republican ideal, which centres on the notion of state, hold in a cosmopolitan perspective that transcends state borders, in a far more globalised era than that of Durkheim? Many solutions have been proposed within the French School of Sociology, including by Mauss who envisioned an organic solidarity between nations. In addition, many important authors who do not explicitly subscribe to holism, such as Deweyan pragmatists and liberal sociologists, continue to think of citizenship essentially within the national framework, despite what they may say.

And this is hardly surprising if we recall the observations made above: insofar as modern ideology is individualistic, it is natural to make its collective dimension implicit. This we have seen, with Dumont and Descombes, in the introduction of this typescript and we extend these remarks here by briefly echoing Kitcher's general comments on education, also mentioned at the beginning of this book.
As a future English teacher, I don't feel I have the necessary training to go in depth in global issues, and I need the help of a rhetoric/philosophy teacher. However, it is still an interesting topic for English classes and can help sensitise students. (Zineb, pre-service teacher, FUB, Belgium)

The quotes illustrate Durkheim's theory on the organic solidarity that emerges from interdependence. Teachers from various disciplines, such as history/geography, English, German, and philosophy, collaborate and learn from each other. This cross-disciplinary interaction fosters a collective understanding of global issues and promotes a sense of cohesion, reflecting the organic solidarity Durkheim describes. The shared learning experiences contribute to a more comprehensive and interconnected educational approach, reinforcing the idea that the collective knowledge of educators enriches the overall educational system.

In practice, cross-disciplinary collaboration among educators reflects Durkheim's organic solidarity theory. This fosters cohesion and a collective understanding, while Durkheim's theory underscores the state's role in acknowledging and embracing societal differences. Indeed, far from homogenising the social body, the state as a social brain was destined, as an organ of thought, "to concentrate the diffuse psychic life at work within society by supplementing the form of unconscious regulation which operates there through a conscious regulation [and thus to render] society conscious of its own diversity" (Guérard de Latour, 2009, p. 226). Thus, to use the title of the work quoted here, Durkheim gives a nod to *The Republic of Differences*.

These are intra-national differences, recalling that neo-Durkheimian republicanism is in no way opposed to a multicultural society; but what about the supra-national level? How can the republican ideal, which centres on the notion of state, hold in a cosmopolitan perspective that transcends state borders, in a far more globalised era than that of Durkheim? Many solutions have been proposed within the French School of Sociology, including by Mauss who envisioned an organic solidarity between nations. In addition, many important authors who do not explicitly subscribe to holism, such as Deweyan pragmatists and liberal sociologists, continue to think of citizenship essentially within the national framework, despite what they may say.

And this is hardly surprising if we recall the observations made above: insofar as modern ideology is individualistic, it is natural to make its collective dimension implicit. This we have seen, with Dumont and Descombes, in the introduction of this typescript and we extend these remarks here by briefly echoing Kitcher's general comments on education, also mentioned at the beginning of this book.
## 7.1 *The Deweyan Society, a Classic Vision of Citizenship*

Kitcher is interesting in this respect because he does not claim to be either republican or Durkheimian, but liberal in the lineage of Mill, Rawls and Dewey, though his approach to citizenship is not so different from that of claimed holists. The difference between Kitcher and holists is, above all, that they accept and want to explicit the collective dimension of modern ideology. For the rest, the American philosopher *de facto* feeds a fruitful tension between individual autonomy and inscription in a totality. He places himself in the perspective of an egalitarian Deweyan society, secular and operating independently from the outside. The challenge, inseparably philosophical and political, is to provide an educational 'Deweyan' localised experiment within identifiable boundaries, which other societies, seduced by this experimentation, would replicate. This operation cannot be entirely summarised here, which is why we will focus on the citizenship approach.

To introduce his fourth chapter titled “Citizenship”, Kitcher uses what he considers a significant example: an American colony that founded the city of Guilford in Connecticut. Admittedly, he says, the situation has changed because the pioneers of the 17th century faced imminent dangers (territorial conflicts, hunger and seasonal hazards) that forced them to remain members of a cohesive and supportive community. Nevertheless, they undoubtedly had the prototypical experience of a true democracy that Tocqueville had witnessed, where each person’s problems were discussed in a careful, inclusive way, respectful of others’ position, and where solutions were the object of genuine collective deliberation. Kitcher’s reflection is therefore fraught with tensions, between the past reality of a community of citizens and its future ideal.

*Perhaps* that was the way things were in Guilford. For, although it is possible to see the deliberations of the communities of New England as a step towards democracy [...], it is also possible that cooperation was only done between supposed ‘equals’ such as fathers, [but not] women, young people, servants or, of course, slaves. The model citizens of New England never existed – they are a utopian fantasy for today’s world. Nevertheless, one of the fundamental tasks of education is to create – or recreate – the best possible approximation of such citizens. (Kitcher, 2022, 118)

Though this society was imperfect, this does not prevent the author from using it as a model. Thus, citizenship is weighted with a community anchor, in the sense of a political community in this case very restricted. Too restricted? Undoubtedly, but it would be difficult to denigrate Kitcher’s thinking as communal, nationalistic and inattentive to the problems of the world as a whole.
## 7.1 *The Deweyan Society, a Classic Vision of Citizenship*

Kitcher is interesting in this respect because he does not claim to be either republican or Durkheimian, but liberal in the lineage of Mill, Rawls and Dewey, though his approach to citizenship is not so different from that of claimed holists. The difference between Kitcher and holists is, above all, that they accept and want to explicit the collective dimension of modern ideology. For the rest, the American philosopher *de facto* feeds a fruitful tension between individual autonomy and inscription in a totality. He places himself in the perspective of an egalitarian Deweyan society, secular and operating independently from the outside. The challenge, inseparably philosophical and political, is to provide an educational 'Deweyan' localised experiment within identifiable boundaries, which other societies, seduced by this experimentation, would replicate. This operation cannot be entirely summarised here, which is why we will focus on the citizenship approach.

To introduce his fourth chapter titled “Citizenship”, Kitcher uses what he considers a significant example: an American colony that founded the city of Guilford in Connecticut. Admittedly, he says, the situation has changed because the pioneers of the 17th century faced imminent dangers (territorial conflicts, hunger and seasonal hazards) that forced them to remain members of a cohesive and supportive community. Nevertheless, they undoubtedly had the prototypical experience of a true democracy that Tocqueville had witnessed, where each person’s problems were discussed in a careful, inclusive way, respectful of others’ position, and where solutions were the object of genuine collective deliberation. Kitcher’s reflection is therefore fraught with tensions, between the past reality of a community of citizens and its future ideal.

*Perhaps* that was the way things were in Guilford. For, although it is possible to see the deliberations of the communities of New England as a step towards democracy [...], it is also possible that cooperation was only done between supposed ‘equals’ such as fathers, [but not] women, young people, servants or, of course, slaves. The model citizens of New England never existed – they are a utopian fantasy for today’s world. Nevertheless, one of the fundamental tasks of education is to create – or recreate – the best possible approximation of such citizens. (Kitcher, 2022, 118)

Though this society was imperfect, this does not prevent the author from using it as a model. Thus, citizenship is weighted with a community anchor, in the sense of a political community in this case very restricted. Too restricted? Undoubtedly, but it would be difficult to denigrate Kitcher’s thinking as communal, nationalistic and inattentive to the problems of the world as a whole.
The author indeed claims his cosmopolitanism, and this is one of the reasons why Martha Nussbaum considers his latest work as an “imposing achievement worthy of being placed next to the classical works of John Dewey, John Stuart Mill and Rabindranath Tagore”.²

For cosmopolitanism cannot ignore the psychological anchorages of humans, whose ethical virtues are first cultivated within the family, neighbourhood or nation – in short, in relative proximity (Nussbaum, 2019). At the same time, the ideal of cosmopolitanism is to say that “nothing that is human is foreign to me”; or, to paraphrase Montesquieu, that we must strive to consider what is useful to the homeland as a crime, if it is detrimental to Europe. To manage this tension between proximity and distance, Montesquieu defended an argumentation in concentric circles.

> If I knew something that was useful to me and detrimental to my family, I would reject it from my mind. If I knew something that was useful to my family and not to my homeland, I would try to forget it. If I knew something that was useful to my homeland and harmful to Europe, or that was useful to Europe and harmful to the human race, I would regard it as a crime. (Montesquieu, 1949, p. 981)

## 7.2 Singular Interpretations of Convergent Phenomena

However, these circles that go from the local level, where ethical virtues are cultivated, towards the global level as a legitimate horizon (the “human race”), are hardly taken into account in the ‘consensus rhetoric’ of the global level. If the aims of education systems can converge under the effect of globalisation policies, an important trend of comparative education, called hermeneutic, invites us to explain how societies, as interpretive communities, react to these policies.

> The requirement to take into account the intensification of the flow of culture and people and the reciprocal influence between distant socio-cultural contexts results less in an improbable transnational standardisation of social models than in singular forms of appropriation by ‘interpretative communities’ of convergent phenomena. (Malet, 2005, p. 178)

Thus, GCE could identify these convergent phenomena materialised if only by UNESCO's recommendations in this area. Nevertheless, GCE cannot be *in itself* an interpretative modality to be favoured in the various socio-cultural contexts. For one of the risks of GCE is to promote the expert position as governments, meanwhile, seize the idea from a market development perspective in which the citizens most open to 'global diversity' are the most competitive, the point being for them to take part in world trade.
The author indeed claims his cosmopolitanism, and this is one of the reasons why Martha Nussbaum considers his latest work as an “imposing achievement worthy of being placed next to the classical works of John Dewey, John Stuart Mill and Rabindranath Tagore”.²

For cosmopolitanism cannot ignore the psychological anchorages of humans, whose ethical virtues are first cultivated within the family, neighbourhood or nation – in short, in relative proximity (Nussbaum, 2019). At the same time, the ideal of cosmopolitanism is to say that “nothing that is human is foreign to me”; or, to paraphrase Montesquieu, that we must strive to consider what is useful to the homeland as a crime, if it is detrimental to Europe. To manage this tension between proximity and distance, Montesquieu defended an argumentation in concentric circles.

> If I knew something that was useful to me and detrimental to my family, I would reject it from my mind. If I knew something that was useful to my family and not to my homeland, I would try to forget it. If I knew something that was useful to my homeland and harmful to Europe, or that was useful to Europe and harmful to the human race, I would regard it as a crime. (Montesquieu, 1949, p. 981)

## 7.2 Singular Interpretations of Convergent Phenomena

However, these circles that go from the local level, where ethical virtues are cultivated, towards the global level as a legitimate horizon (the “human race”), are hardly taken into account in the ‘consensus rhetoric’ of the global level. If the aims of education systems can converge under the effect of globalisation policies, an important trend of comparative education, called hermeneutic, invites us to explain how societies, as interpretive communities, react to these policies.

> The requirement to take into account the intensification of the flow of culture and people and the reciprocal influence between distant socio-cultural contexts results less in an improbable transnational standardisation of social models than in singular forms of appropriation by ‘interpretative communities’ of convergent phenomena. (Malet, 2005, p. 178)

Thus, GCE could identify these convergent phenomena materialised if only by UNESCO's recommendations in this area. Nevertheless, GCE cannot be *in itself* an interpretative modality to be favoured in the various socio-cultural contexts. For one of the risks of GCE is to promote the expert position as governments, meanwhile, seize the idea from a market development perspective in which the citizens most open to 'global diversity' are the most competitive, the point being for them to take part in world trade.
There are more risks than these, but this remark is enough to emphasise
that GCE is confronted with the tensions of comparative education in general:
scholarly esotericism, political decision support, pedagogical support?

It is, at the very least, difficult to find a balance between, on the one hand,
a scientific isolationism, anxious to preserve the field from the academic
impurity of the expert discourse, which will then be conveniently placed
in the heading 'international education', in opposition to 'comparative
education' [...] and, on the other hand, a healthy openness and confron-
tation, yet likely to endanger the theoretical basis and academic legiti-
macy of the specialty. (Malet, 2005, p. 175)

Constantly balancing between scientific isolationism, expertise activity and
attempts at a healthy confrontation, academics must at least carry out a reflex-
ive approach towards their own commitment. And this is all the more crucial
in GCE because researchers are already globalised, in the sense that they are
people who travel from one conference to another, constantly communicate
via email or videoconference with colleagues located on the other side of the
planet, while nevertheless sharing a rather similar social and professional con-
dition. In other words, the experience of researchers is already in affinity with
the global citizenship slogan.

How then do they study, analyse and promote GCE with the necessary dis-
tance? The most radically reflexive critics affirm that this globalised experi-
ence makes the promoters of GCE very sensitive, in a romantic perspective, to
the figure of the globalised migrant crossing borders, so that the image of the
latter could constitute a mirror in which some Westerners indulge (Papasteph-
anou, 2018). The criticism certainly is brutal, but it is all the more interesting
to formulate it because it comes from the *Palgrave Handbook of Global Citizen-
ship and Education*: thus it is not an external criticism, but internal, intended
to advance the cosmopolitan ideal and the notion of global citizenship – even
if it means criticising it head-on.³

Similarly, if we value global citizenship, how can we not implicitly devalue
local citizenship? Attempts to bring about conciliation certainly emerge, by
means of a portmanteau word, 'glocal'. That being said, is the impression that
the global level is nobler, more inclusive, multicultural or even more human
than the local level a consequence of our (local) position as hyper-connected
researchers from North America or Western Europe for instance? In other
words, is the academic trend towards the global level

the sign of intellectual progress, of a better understanding of a world that
has truly changed – that is, we used to be in the local, now in the global
There are more risks than these, but this remark is enough to emphasise
that GCE is confronted with the tensions of comparative education in general:
scholarly esotericism, political decision support, pedagogical support?

It is, at the very least, difficult to find a balance between, on the one hand,
a scientific isolationism, anxious to preserve the field from the academic
impurity of the expert discourse, which will then be conveniently placed
in the heading 'international education', in opposition to 'comparative
education' [...] and, on the other hand, a healthy openness and confron-
tation, yet likely to endanger the theoretical basis and academic legiti-
macy of the specialty. (Malet, 2005, p. 175)

Constantly balancing between scientific isolationism, expertise activity and
attempts at a healthy confrontation, academics must at least carry out a reflex-
ive approach towards their own commitment. And this is all the more crucial
in GCE because researchers are already globalised, in the sense that they are
people who travel from one conference to another, constantly communicate
via email or videoconference with colleagues located on the other side of the
planet, while nevertheless sharing a rather similar social and professional con-
dition. In other words, the experience of researchers is already in affinity with
the global citizenship slogan.

How then do they study, analyse and promote GCE with the necessary dis-
tance? The most radically reflexive critics affirm that this globalised experi-
ence makes the promoters of GCE very sensitive, in a romantic perspective, to
the figure of the globalised migrant crossing borders, so that the image of the
latter could constitute a mirror in which some Westerners indulge (Papasteph-
anou, 2018). The criticism certainly is brutal, but it is all the more interesting
to formulate it because it comes from the *Palgrave Handbook of Global Citizen-
ship and Education*: thus it is not an external criticism, but internal, intended
to advance the cosmopolitan ideal and the notion of global citizenship – even
if it means criticising it head-on.³

Similarly, if we value global citizenship, how can we not implicitly devalue
local citizenship? Attempts to bring about conciliation certainly emerge, by
means of a portmanteau word, 'glocal'. That being said, is the impression that
the global level is nobler, more inclusive, multicultural or even more human
than the local level a consequence of our (local) position as hyper-connected
researchers from North America or Western Europe for instance? In other
words, is the academic trend towards the global level

the sign of intellectual progress, of a better understanding of a world that
has truly changed – that is, we used to be in the local, now in the global
– or is this a way of expressing the experience of those who travel from conference to conference at an increasing speed and are, moreover, seized by the ease with which they can communicate with their colleagues around the world, thanks to the Internet? I have argued that the situation I have just described may well explain this new intellectual trend – I am thinking of the experience of academic elites, itinerant intellectuals, an experience that is relayed by the representations given by CNN and other international media and by the more spontaneous representations offered by media executives, politicians, diplomats and heads of jet set-tised non-governmental organisations. This speech therefore indicates a point of view. It is that of globalisation elites who maintain a distanced relationship with the planet of consumption and reification. Seen from Sirius, the world appears to them as a multi-ethnic bazaar or an exotic neighbourhood and they marvel at this extraordinary bric-a-brac of cultures so diverse, and present in this space. Hybridity is therefore the sensual and above all visual appropriation of a space that is rich in cultural differences. It is the space of one who observes it, or rather consumes it, appropriates it. (Friedman, 2000, pp. 195–196)

This anthropologist's criticism should invite any researcher to commit to an important work of reflexivity. Nonetheless, it must be nuanced: researchers who support GCE are not all globalised in the same way. Many African researchers, for example, are dominated in the university market (lower wages, more limited access to books, travel bans), so that the caste of itinerant elites who travel from one conference to another does not necessarily correspond to those who actually promote GCE. On the contrary, the networking of researchers at the global level could be a way to decline the vague notion of global citizenship in multiple ways.

This is why the aforementioned handbook aims to display the great geographical variety of its contributors, from all continents, and not just those from the most prestigious, globalised and influential universities. The very scope of GCE therefore gives way to fruitful debates, prudence and hesitations. Consequently, the political aim of GCE is not obsolete, provided that it is approached from a *realistic* perspective.

## 8 Return of Collective Entities

The term ‘realistic’ is used here with a double meaning. The first consists in refusing a closely nominalist posture that *strips of their reality* certain collective
– or is this a way of expressing the experience of those who travel from conference to conference at an increasing speed and are, moreover, seized by the ease with which they can communicate with their colleagues around the world, thanks to the Internet? I have argued that the situation I have just described may well explain this new intellectual trend – I am thinking of the experience of academic elites, itinerant intellectuals, an experience that is relayed by the representations given by CNN and other international media and by the more spontaneous representations offered by media executives, politicians, diplomats and heads of jet set-tised non-governmental organisations. This speech therefore indicates a point of view. It is that of globalisation elites who maintain a distanced relationship with the planet of consumption and reification. Seen from Sirius, the world appears to them as a multi-ethnic bazaar or an exotic neighbourhood and they marvel at this extraordinary bric-a-brac of cultures so diverse, and present in this space. Hybridity is therefore the sensual and above all visual appropriation of a space that is rich in cultural differences. It is the space of one who observes it, or rather consumes it, appropriates it. (Friedman, 2000, pp. 195–196)

This anthropologist's criticism should invite any researcher to commit to an important work of reflexivity. Nonetheless, it must be nuanced: researchers who support GCE are not all globalised in the same way. Many African researchers, for example, are dominated in the university market (lower wages, more limited access to books, travel bans), so that the caste of itinerant elites who travel from one conference to another does not necessarily correspond to those who actually promote GCE. On the contrary, the networking of researchers at the global level could be a way to decline the vague notion of global citizenship in multiple ways.

This is why the aforementioned handbook aims to display the great geographical variety of its contributors, from all continents, and not just those from the most prestigious, globalised and influential universities. The very scope of GCE therefore gives way to fruitful debates, prudence and hesitations. Consequently, the political aim of GCE is not obsolete, provided that it is approached from a *realistic* perspective.

## 8 Return of Collective Entities

The term ‘realistic’ is used here with a double meaning. The first consists in refusing a closely nominalist posture that *strips of their reality* certain collective
entities (political society, nation). We wish to underline that in sociology, the realistic posture is opposed to nominalism. The nominalist academic, such as the French sociologist Raymond Boudon, will say that ‘the State’, ‘the socialist party’ and ‘the Church’ neither think nor act for themselves. The reason for this being that these entities are not truly real since they are solely names, used out of convenience. Only individuals who are members of these fictional entities can think and act. On the contrary, the realist, such as Emile Durkheim, will say that collective entities are endowed with a capacity to think and act of their own.

As for Pierre Bourdieu, he was a nominalist, despite appearances and his opposition to Raymond Boudon regarding methodological individualism and ‘holism’. Indeed, the habitus dear to Bourdieu is an individual attribute (although formed in a social structure), as are people’s tastes in *Distinction*, as well as their cultural capital, etc. This remark may be surprising, because Bourdieu is generally thought of as a holist (are fields not totalities?). Nonethe- less, this point was clarified in the introduction (regarding the notion of state). Furthermore we can for instance recall, in Bourdieu’s work, the constructivist imprint of the spokesperson creating groups since

> the group does not exist before a representative emerges to become the spokesperson [within the framework of] a conception closely dependent on an individualistic ontology [...][that] reveals an originally dissociated understanding of the individual, or that accesses the social only through the ‘magic’ of group building. (Heurtin, 2022, p. 310)

On the contrary Durkheim, a realist, envisaged a fact such as suicide as a strictly social, non-individual phenomenon, showing that “sociological regularities do not correspond to psychological regularities [...]. [Therefore] adopting a Durkheimian view on Bourdieu’s *Distinction* implies challenging the concept of habitus” (Magni-Berton, 2008, pp. 302, 312). Ultimately, beyond the (false) quarrels around ‘holism’ that have marked Francophone sociology, realism suggests a return to Durkheim, in order to take seriously the social realities that a reflection on citizenship in an international perspective cannot circumvent: groups, collectives, nations. These realities form the anchoring of interpretive communities, whose seriousness is essential in comparative education, especially in the so-called hermeneutic approach.

The second sense of the realistic posture claimed here consists in taking into account the reality of teacher training in the different countries by not assuming the inevitability of globalisation processes (of which GCE is a stakeholder) and by emphasising the various ways in which actors interpret,
entities (political society, nation). We wish to underline that in sociology, the realistic posture is opposed to nominalism. The nominalist academic, such as the French sociologist Raymond Boudon, will say that ‘the State’, ‘the socialist party’ and ‘the Church’ neither think nor act for themselves. The reason for this being that these entities are not truly real since they are solely names, used out of convenience. Only individuals who are members of these fictional entities can think and act. On the contrary, the realist, such as Emile Durkheim, will say that collective entities are endowed with a capacity to think and act of their own.

As for Pierre Bourdieu, he was a nominalist, despite appearances and his opposition to Raymond Boudon regarding methodological individualism and ‘holism’. Indeed, the habitus dear to Bourdieu is an individual attribute (although formed in a social structure), as are people’s tastes in *Distinction*, as well as their cultural capital, etc. This remark may be surprising, because Bourdieu is generally thought of as a holist (are fields not totalities?). Nonethe- less, this point was clarified in the introduction (regarding the notion of state). Furthermore we can for instance recall, in Bourdieu’s work, the constructivist imprint of the spokesperson creating groups since

> the group does not exist before a representative emerges to become the spokesperson [within the framework of] a conception closely dependent on an individualistic ontology [...][that] reveals an originally dissocial-ised understanding of the individual, or that accesses the social only through the ‘magic’ of group building. (Heurtin, 2022, p. 310)

On the contrary Durkheim, a realist, envisaged a fact such as suicide as a strictly social, non-individual phenomenon, showing that “sociological regularities do not correspond to psychological regularities [...]. [Therefore] adopting a Durkheimian view on Bourdieu’s *Distinction* implies challenging the concept of habitus” (Magni-Berton, 2008, pp. 302, 312). Ultimately, beyond the (false) quarrels around ‘holism’ that have marked Francophone sociology, realism suggests a return to Durkheim, in order to take seriously the social realities that a reflection on citizenship in an international perspective cannot circumvent: groups, collectives, nations. These realities form the anchoring of interpretive communities, whose seriousness is essential in comparative education, especially in the so-called hermeneutic approach.

The second sense of the realistic posture claimed here consists in taking into account the reality of teacher training in the different countries by not assuming the inevitability of globalisation processes (of which GCE is a stakeholder) and by emphasising the various ways in which actors interpret,
appropriate and even circumvent ideas that circulate in a transnational way. This time, realism is opposed not to nominalism, but to abstraction. In this perspective, we start from the principle already mentioned according to which GCE is a vague notion susceptible to various uses. It therefore points to a more general phenomenon, linked to changes in education systems as a result of globalisation policies. What should guide us in the first place is not so much GCE, as the observation that the school "can no longer rely on the assurance on which it was built, that of a convergence between the culture of which it is the bearer and which develops inside it, and the contemporary forms of social and political integration of individuals" (Malet, 2012, p. 75).

To refer to a student-teacher's reflection that we have quoted previously, when a country's civic and citizenship education curriculum is no longer entirely relevant in regards to the reality of the society in which students evolve, and the questions they ask themselves about it, it becomes, in part, up to their teachers to go beyond the curriculum in order to give their students the knowledge and analytical skills to address this reality.

GCE therefore is one way among others to promote 'social participation' in an evolving space-time marked by globalisation policies. Consequently, the question in this perspective is not to educate towards global citizenship as such. GCE is first and foremost a 'narrative' whose objectives are potentially broader (Tarozzi & Torres, 2016), falling within 'social inclusion' and 'skills capitalisation', including the 'social and civic skills' valued by the European Commission. Therefore, teachers and their trainers are caught up in tensions that need to be explored.

A double injunction is [indeed] addressed to them: the transmission of a common good and the fulfilment of equal rights, in an ideal of integration, and at the same time the realisation of the individual in his potentialities, in a concrete project of capitalisation of skills and social participation. The abstract ideal of emancipation is replaced by a concrete ambition for social inclusion. School and its teachers have, in short, become uncertain regarding a mission of cultural transmission, under the influence of globalisation policies [...]. These inherent phenomena of mediation [and adaptation] are linked to 'educational traditions' and the conservatisms that impact the teachers of the countries concerned ('enable teachers to widen their perspectives to see beyond the influences that have traditionally shaped their behaviour', CERI [Centre for Educational Research and Innovation - OECD], 1998). It is obviously a pragmatic way of setting out the issues, not to ask ourselves about meaning. What is at stake in the forms of adaptation (or inadequacy) of national schools and their
appropriate and even circumvent ideas that circulate in a transnational way. This time, realism is opposed not to nominalism, but to abstraction. In this perspective, we start from the principle already mentioned according to which GCE is a vague notion susceptible to various uses. It therefore points to a more general phenomenon, linked to changes in education systems as a result of globalisation policies. What should guide us in the first place is not so much GCE, as the observation that the school "can no longer rely on the assurance on which it was built, that of a convergence between the culture of which it is the bearer and which develops inside it, and the contemporary forms of social and political integration of individuals" (Malet, 2012, p. 75).

To refer to a student-teacher's reflection that we have quoted previously, when a country's civic and citizenship education curriculum is no longer entirely relevant in regards to the reality of the society in which students evolve, and the questions they ask themselves about it, it becomes, in part, up to their teachers to go beyond the curriculum in order to give their students the knowledge and analytical skills to address this reality.

GCE therefore is one way among others to promote 'social participation' in an evolving space-time marked by globalisation policies. Consequently, the question in this perspective is not to educate towards global citizenship as such. GCE is first and foremost a 'narrative' whose objectives are potentially broader (Tarozzi & Torres, 2016), falling within 'social inclusion' and 'skills capitalisation', including the 'social and civic skills' valued by the European Commission. Therefore, teachers and their trainers are caught up in tensions that need to be explored.

A double injunction is [indeed] addressed to them: the transmission of a common good and the fulfilment of equal rights, in an ideal of integration, and at the same time the realisation of the individual in his potentialities, in a concrete project of capitalisation of skills and social participation. The abstract ideal of emancipation is replaced by a concrete ambition for social inclusion. School and its teachers have, in short, become uncertain regarding a mission of cultural transmission, under the influence of globalisation policies [...]. These inherent phenomena of mediation [and adaptation] are linked to 'educational traditions' and the conservatisms that impact the teachers of the countries concerned ('enable teachers to widen their perspectives to see beyond the influences that have traditionally shaped their behaviour', CERI [Centre for Educational Research and Innovation - OECD], 1998). It is obviously a pragmatic way of setting out the issues, not to ask ourselves about meaning. What is at stake in the forms of adaptation (or inadequacy) of national schools and their
teachers to globalisation policies is however more complex and is due
to five sets of issues in tension, which are distinctly national even if they
are declined at an international level [...] [One of them concerns] the
function, which is at the heart of the action of education, of linking the
subject of education and training to a cultural community and of trans-
mitting cultural goods in the project of forming an educated and critical
citizenship. (Malet, 2010, pp. 98–100)

Although GCE is part of a multi issue system, it should be noted that it is not a policy of globalisation in the strong sense of the word. GCE is rather a diffuse and multifaceted narrative that manifests itself in very different ways depending on the country. Germany and Great Britain, for example, are much more affected by these requirements than France is. Does this mean that teacher training in Germany is more global, open, inclusive, universal than it is in France? If so, should France emulate Germany?

These are not pertinent questions, but they make it possible to emphasise
that, in the GlobalSense consortium, the German team is able to handle GCE
vocabulary at the same time as a *prescription* that legitimises its educational
action, an *analytical tool* that justifies its academic function, and as a *politi-
cal aim* that legitimises its underlying ethics. Such a harmonious interweaving
deserves to be taken as a research object since it concerns the alignment of
expertise, research, policy and the role of universities (Barthes, 2017b). Let us
unfold this point.

GCE is an intervention in search of a theory [...] I conceptualize it as a
'multi-vocal' symbol. The anthropologist Victor Turner explains that
multi-vocal symbols are capable of being interpreted in multiple ways
by different actors and, in some cases, can become the site of conflict
as different interest groups compete to have their own interpretations
accepted as the dominant one. [...] As a matter of fact, GCE is character-
ized in multiple ways. [...] Who is in charge of promoting GCE and who
is in charge of evaluating its effectiveness are important questions, and
require an alterity between the UN system, the global system, and the
nation-state systems. There are many typologies but not a single theory
that can encompass all the different interpretations in a holistic way. I
believe what we need now is a meta-theory. (Torres & Bosio, 2020, p. 107)

If GCE is looking for a theory, or even a meta-theory, it is because it needs a
framework to permanently unravel the intersection, or even the telescoping,
between political and educational incentive, scientific challenge, political aim
teachers to globalisation policies is however more complex and is due
to five sets of issues in tension, which are distinctly national even if they
are declined at an international level [...] [One of them concerns] the
function, which is at the heart of the action of education, of linking the
subject of education and training to a cultural community and of trans-
mitting cultural goods in the project of forming an educated and critical
citizenship. (Malet, 2010, pp. 98–100)

Although GCE is part of a multi issue system, it should be noted that it is not a policy of globalisation in the strong sense of the word. GCE is rather a diffuse and multifaceted narrative that manifests itself in very different ways depending on the country. Germany and Great Britain, for example, are much more affected by these requirements than France is. Does this mean that teacher training in Germany is more global, open, inclusive, universal than it is in France? If so, should France emulate Germany?

These are not pertinent questions, but they make it possible to emphasise
that, in the GlobalSense consortium, the German team is able to handle GCE
vocabulary at the same time as a *prescription* that legitimises its educational
action, an *analytical tool* that justifies its academic function, and as a *politi-
cal aim* that legitimises its underlying ethics. Such a harmonious interweaving
deserves to be taken as a research object since it concerns the alignment of
expertise, research, policy and the role of universities (Barthes, 2017b). Let us
unfold this point.

GCE is an intervention in search of a theory [...] I conceptualize it as a
'multi-vocal' symbol. The anthropologist Victor Turner explains that
multi-vocal symbols are capable of being interpreted in multiple ways
by different actors and, in some cases, can become the site of conflict
as different interest groups compete to have their own interpretations
accepted as the dominant one. [...] As a matter of fact, GCE is character-
ized in multiple ways. [...] Who is in charge of promoting GCE and who
is in charge of evaluating its effectiveness are important questions, and
require an alterity between the UN system, the global system, and the
nation-state systems. There are many typologies but not a single theory
that can encompass all the different interpretations in a holistic way. I
believe what we need now is a meta-theory. (Torres & Bosio, 2020, p. 107)

If GCE is looking for a theory, or even a meta-theory, it is because it needs a
framework to permanently unravel the intersection, or even the telescoping,
between political and educational incentive, scientific challenge, political aim
of a discipline (ETS), and all this according to the values of the researcher, that is to say those oriented towards truth, which give shape to four norms as specified by Merton: universalism, communalism, disinterest, organised scepticism – a set of norms deemed constraining but perhaps less so with University's managerial mutations.

## 9 What Political Philosophy?

To avoid this kind of asymmetry between countries, and between national prescriptions that more or less match the rhetoric of globalisation, the analysis must refocus on the experience of teacher trainers and pre-service teachers by clearly separating prescriptions (or slogans) from research issues.

Admittedly, an educational ideal carried by ETS could be better achieved if it was prescribed by a ministry. Therefore, the point is not to reject, on principle, slogans that give substance to prescriptions. Nevertheless, ETS must be able to develop their own ideals, with full academic autonomy, without unquestioned political keywords interfering with them. This is what is at stake in our proposition to turn towards Durkheim's approach. It allows us to re-appropriate a classical questioning, anchored in our disciplines, in order to maintain our autonomy in regard to slogans. This is the meaning of Torres' call on the need for a (meta-)theory to channel the narrative of GCE.

Above all, if we want to seriously consider GCE as an object of study and not simply as a prescription that educators and trainer-researchers are in charge of implementing, then we must be able to dissociate it, even temporarily, from any particular political philosophy. In other words, a truly comparative approach should be able to take into account several perspectives in political philosophy.

Indeed, despite some appearances conveyed by GCE narratives, there is no obvious logical link between what is 'global', 'diversity' and 'multiculturalism'. Neo-liberalism is also global, although not genuinely multicultural, at least not according to Nancy Fraser for example. Similarly, the Islamic State bases its actions on the (global) *Ummah* while offering its members a citizenship under Islamic law. Admittedly, the neo-liberal perspective should be rejected, and even more so the ideology of the Islamic State. However, focusing on the global level is not necessarily the best way to achieve this, since it does not have the monopoly on social justice, openness to others or tolerance (Joppke, 2021).

Essentially, despite what many of its proponents may say, GCE is much more about scale than it is about a particular philosophy. Here is a list, established by
of a discipline (ETS), and all this according to the values of the researcher, that is to say those oriented towards truth, which give shape to four norms as specified by Merton: universalism, communalism, disinterest, organised scepticism – a set of norms deemed constraining but perhaps less so with University's managerial mutations.

## 9 What Political Philosophy?

To avoid this kind of asymmetry between countries, and between national prescriptions that more or less match the rhetoric of globalisation, the analysis must refocus on the experience of teacher trainers and pre-service teachers by clearly separating prescriptions (or slogans) from research issues.

Admittedly, an educational ideal carried by ETS could be better achieved if it was prescribed by a ministry. Therefore, the point is not to reject, on principle, slogans that give substance to prescriptions. Nevertheless, ETS must be able to develop their own ideals, with full academic autonomy, without unquestioned political keywords interfering with them. This is what is at stake in our proposition to turn towards Durkheim's approach. It allows us to re-appropriate a classical questioning, anchored in our disciplines, in order to maintain our autonomy in regard to slogans. This is the meaning of Torres' call on the need for a (meta-)theory to channel the narrative of GCE.

Above all, if we want to seriously consider GCE as an object of study and not simply as a prescription that educators and trainer-researchers are in charge of implementing, then we must be able to dissociate it, even temporarily, from any particular political philosophy. In other words, a truly comparative approach should be able to take into account several perspectives in political philosophy.

Indeed, despite some appearances conveyed by GCE narratives, there is no obvious logical link between what is 'global', 'diversity' and 'multiculturalism'. Neo-liberalism is also global, although not genuinely multicultural, at least not according to Nancy Fraser for example. Similarly, the Islamic State bases its actions on the (global) *Ummah* while offering its members a citizenship under Islamic law. Admittedly, the neo-liberal perspective should be rejected, and even more so the ideology of the Islamic State. However, focusing on the global level is not necessarily the best way to achieve this, since it does not have the monopoly on social justice, openness to others or tolerance (Joppke, 2021).

Essentially, despite what many of its proponents may say, GCE is much more about scale than it is about a particular philosophy. Here is a list, established by
Oxley and Morris (2013), of currents associated *de facto* with GCE. A tag author is associated with each of them, in order to offer a clearer indication of these currents' meaning.

- cosmopolitan democracy (Rawls)

- human rights (Kant)

- international development (Hayek)

- globalisation of arts, media, languages, sciences and technologies (Nietzsche)

- global civil society (Habermas)

- postcolonial agenda (Marx, Saïd)

- critical pedagogy (Freire)

- sustainable development agenda (Dobson)

- caring, loving, spiritual and emotional connections (Bible, Quran, religious texts).

This overview shows that the scope of GCE is about as broad as the field of citizenship education in general. Far from being limited to values of openness, tolerance, peace or connection between people, GCE is primarily a consequence of the change in the scale of action of nation-states in the context of globalisation policies. Additionally, this movement is far from unambiguous, because the nation tends to slip back in through the window when it is chased out the door, as the French saying goes.

The notion of global citizenship is not without its critics, having been criticized as being unpractical and 'too abstract' to generate the emotional and moral energy needed to galvanize action and make changes. The idea of a world state is further problematized, with Parekh arguing that such an entity is more likely than not to be "remote, bureaucratic, oppressive and culturally bland". [...] [The] recognition of citizenship as the primary mode of individual and collective identity and the tangible duties it entails [makes it necessary to] ground the 'free floating' global subject in space and time. Globally oriented citizenship thus parallels national citizenship on two counts. First, it refers to political activity and empirical assumptions to do with law, justice and rights. Second, it depends on an 'imagined community' of people sharing the same transcendent human values of humanitarianism, respect, justice and nonviolence [...]. For some theorists this means uncoupling nationality from citizenship and promoting global citizenship and responsibility. For others it demands a deepening of one's democratic citizenship of a nation. (Matthews & Sidhu, 2005, p. 55)
Oxley and Morris (2013), of currents associated *de facto* with GCE. A tag author is associated with each of them, in order to offer a clearer indication of these currents' meaning.

- cosmopolitan democracy (Rawls)

- human rights (Kant)

- international development (Hayek)

- globalisation of arts, media, languages, sciences and technologies (Nietzsche)

- global civil society (Habermas)

- postcolonial agenda (Marx, Saïd)

- critical pedagogy (Freire)

- sustainable development agenda (Dobson)

- caring, loving, spiritual and emotional connections (Bible, Quran, religious texts).

This overview shows that the scope of GCE is about as broad as the field of citizenship education in general. Far from being limited to values of openness, tolerance, peace or connection between people, GCE is primarily a consequence of the change in the scale of action of nation-states in the context of globalisation policies. Additionally, this movement is far from unambiguous, because the nation tends to slip back in through the window when it is chased out the door, as the French saying goes.

The notion of global citizenship is not without its critics, having been criticized as being unpractical and 'too abstract' to generate the emotional and moral energy needed to galvanize action and make changes. The idea of a world state is further problematized, with Parekh arguing that such an entity is more likely than not to be "remote, bureaucratic, oppressive and culturally bland". [...] [The] recognition of citizenship as the primary mode of individual and collective identity and the tangible duties it entails [makes it necessary to] ground the 'free floating' global subject in space and time. Globally oriented citizenship thus parallels national citizenship on two counts. First, it refers to political activity and empirical assumptions to do with law, justice and rights. Second, it depends on an 'imagined community' of people sharing the same transcendent human values of humanitarianism, respect, justice and nonviolence [...]. For some theorists this means uncoupling nationality from citizenship and promoting global citizenship and responsibility. For others it demands a deepening of one's democratic citizenship of a nation. (Matthews & Sidhu, 2005, p. 55)
The statement echoes previous investigations on collective entities. To what extent is it possible to uncouple citizenship from national reality, even if it is enlarged (federation, international conventions)? What are the consequences of an under-theorisation of this aspect, resulting in a GC described as “remote, bureaucratic, oppressive and culturally bland”?

Debates on the Republic, multiculturalism and liberalism revolve around these issues. Some consider that post-industrial societies are based on a new mode of integration making traditional nation-building institutions obsolete (Luhmann, Beck). Others continue to see national integration as a key element of democratic identity (Durkheim, Joppke). In GCE debates, we have the choice to explore one or the other of these avenues. However, the work tools developed in this book invite us to go down the second one. Hence, the agenda is not just to convene political liberalism to

criticise republican dogmatism in light of [post-national] identity claims. It is also a question of considering the capacity of republican thought to reveal the limits of the liberal perspective and to offer its own way to meet the challenge of multiculturalism. [...] Among these works [falling under this renewed republicanism], the most relevant to clarify the nature of the 'societal culture' and its role in the actualisation of citizenship are those that do not dissociate the issue of ethnic [and cultural] diversity from the problem of national integration. (Guérard de Latour, 2009, p. 24)

A general analysis of the pre-service teachers' and senior education advisors' reflections, after they took part in the GlobalSense exchanges, can illustrate this point by showing that the focus of these reflections tends to vary depending on the participants' context of training. In the following excerpt from a self-reflection, a student teacher analyses the different ways they and their peers from another country (in this instance, the US) handled the instruction to imagine a lesson plan on migration:

> To me it felt like the Americans were trying to stay on the surface of the matter and avoid any heated debate, where I wanted to engage my students in a core discussion, and examine the complexity of the issue. I guess the differences has to do with the question of how sensitive the topic is in the public view. (Noa, pre-service teacher, HUJI, Israel)

Depending on the countries, as has already been mentioned, participants either focused essentially on the influence of the national context on the way people approach the topic of migration (participants of NU (France), TUP
The statement echoes previous investigations on collective entities. To what extent is it possible to uncouple citizenship from national reality, even if it is enlarged (federation, international conventions)? What are the consequences of an under-theorisation of this aspect, resulting in a GC described as “remote, bureaucratic, oppressive and culturally bland”?

Debates on the Republic, multiculturalism and liberalism revolve around these issues. Some consider that post-industrial societies are based on a new mode of integration making traditional nation-building institutions obsolete (Luhmann, Beck). Others continue to see national integration as a key element of democratic identity (Durkheim, Joppke). In GCE debates, we have the choice to explore one or the other of these avenues. However, the work tools developed in this book invite us to go down the second one. Hence, the agenda is not just to convene political liberalism to

criticise republican dogmatism in light of [post-national] identity claims. It is also a question of considering the capacity of republican thought to reveal the limits of the liberal perspective and to offer its own way to meet the challenge of multiculturalism. [...] Among these works [falling under this renewed republicanism], the most relevant to clarify the nature of the ‘societal culture’ and its role in the actualisation of citizenship are those that do not dissociate the issue of ethnic [and cultural] diversity from the problem of national integration. (Guérard de Latour, 2009, p. 24)

A general analysis of the pre-service teachers' and senior education advisors' reflections, after they took part in the GlobalSense exchanges, can illustrate this point by showing that the focus of these reflections tends to vary depending on the participants' context of training. In the following excerpt from a self-reflection, a student teacher analyses the different ways they and their peers from another country (in this instance, the US) handled the instruction to imagine a lesson plan on migration:

> To me it felt like the Americans were trying to stay on the surface of the matter and avoid any heated debate, where I wanted to engage my students in a core discussion, and examine the complexity of the issue. I guess the differences has to do with the question of how sensitive the topic is in the public view. (Noa, pre-service teacher, HUJI, Israel)

Depending on the countries, as has already been mentioned, participants either focused essentially on the influence of the national context on the way people approach the topic of migration (participants of NU (France), TUP
(USA) and HUJI (Israel)); or on the necessity to use emotions such as empathy and sensitivity (FUB (Belgium) and WUE (Germany)).

It is interesting to underline the fact that the participants all express a certain awareness of the limits of a national framework, though those from Brussels and Weingarten are less constrained by them, going directly to an emotion-based approach indicating they do not feel limited by a strong national narrative. However, from a deeper analysis of the data consisting in noting what the participants' second point of focus was, distinctions emerge inside these two groups. Concerning the former one, we notice that NU participants tend to mention developing their students' critical thinking and the benefits of using an interdisciplinary approach to global issues, whereas HUJI and TUP participants rather comment on the importance of using emotion, primarily empathy, to approach global issues in the classroom. While this is in part due to an influence of their teacher training, we notice an evolution in their approaches after the international exchanges.

Nonetheless, in the other group (FUB and WUE), characterised by a main emphasis on this use of emotion, participants then either focus on the need to develop students' critical thinking and the relevance of an interdisciplinary approach (FUB) or, in the case of WUE participants, on the importance of facts and rational thinking. The NU participants are the only ones who do not develop an emotion-based approach on migration. This is due to a specific training in disciplinary didactics linked to the fact that history and geography teachers are, in France, those usually in charge of Moral and civic education, the field that is most in line with the GCE ideals. The place of emotions is less important in history and geography than in other disciplines, which includes notably religion (WUE), social studies (TUP), philosophy (FUB).

## 10 Student Teachers' Nuanced Perspectives in Global Education: Balancing Emotions and Critical Thinking across National Context

The reflections of the participants following the online student exchanges highlight a divergence in focus based on their training contexts. Participants from different countries exhibit distinct emphases: those from NU (France), TUP (USA), and HUJI (Israel) concentrate on the influence of the national context on addressing migration issues, while participants from FUB (Belgium) and WUE (Germany) prioritise the use of emotions such as empathy and sensitivity.

Exchanging with peers from other countries in order to grasp different, less local ways of apprehending global issues seems to them an interesting and stimulating idea:
(USA) and HUJI (Israel)); or on the necessity to use emotions such as empathy and sensitivity (FUB (Belgium) and WUE (Germany)).

It is interesting to underline the fact that the participants all express a certain awareness of the limits of a national framework, though those from Brussels and Weingarten are less constrained by them, going directly to an emotion-based approach indicating they do not feel limited by a strong national narrative. However, from a deeper analysis of the data consisting in noting what the participants' second point of focus was, distinctions emerge inside these two groups. Concerning the former one, we notice that NU participants tend to mention developing their students' critical thinking and the benefits of using an interdisciplinary approach to global issues, whereas HUJI and TUP participants rather comment on the importance of using emotion, primarily empathy, to approach global issues in the classroom. While this is in part due to an influence of their teacher training, we notice an evolution in their approaches after the international exchanges.

Nonetheless, in the other group (FUB and WUE), characterised by a main emphasis on this use of emotion, participants then either focus on the need to develop students' critical thinking and the relevance of an interdisciplinary approach (FUB) or, in the case of WUE participants, on the importance of facts and rational thinking. The NU participants are the only ones who do not develop an emotion-based approach on migration. This is due to a specific training in disciplinary didactics linked to the fact that history and geography teachers are, in France, those usually in charge of Moral and civic education, the field that is most in line with the GCE ideals. The place of emotions is less important in history and geography than in other disciplines, which includes notably religion (WUE), social studies (TUP), philosophy (FUB).

## 10 Student Teachers' Nuanced Perspectives in Global Education: Balancing Emotions and Critical Thinking across National Context

The reflections of the participants following the online student exchanges highlight a divergence in focus based on their training contexts. Participants from different countries exhibit distinct emphases: those from NU (France), TUP (USA), and HUJI (Israel) concentrate on the influence of the national context on addressing migration issues, while participants from FUB (Belgium) and WUE (Germany) prioritise the use of emotions such as empathy and sensitivity.

Exchanging with peers from other countries in order to grasp different, less local ways of apprehending global issues seems to them an interesting and stimulating idea:
I also learned from these exchanges how, considering different countries,
we all deal differently facing migration issues. But in every case, it raised
my views showing me different faces of these issues. On geographical,
economic, political points, every country has its particularity so we can
have a wider view of our own when considering the others. (Victor, grad-
uate student in Philosophy, FUB, Belgium)

Through the international exchange, I became aware that a country's law
and morality are bound to each other and that this has to be addressed
accordingly in the classroom as well. (Saskia, WUE, Germany)

Conversely, a student teacher underlines the fact that official curricula can
be framed at a national or local level, giving teachers little flexibility in the
content of their teaching.

The only issue is in Belgium regarding GC we have to follow programs.
And they are too old for what we are facing today. I will try to even if it
isn't in the program. (Manon, graduate student in Philosophy, FUB)

An observation emerges regarding awareness of national frameworks: par-
ticipants from Brussels and Weingarten see them as limitations, while those
from Nantes, Jerusalem, and Philadelphia do not.

The Belgian and German focus on the use of emotions suggests their inter-
est in approaching issues from a global scale for several reasons. By prioritis-
ing emotions such as empathy and sensitivity in approaching global issues,
they indicate a recognition of the interconnectedness of diverse cultures and
experiences on a global scale. Understanding and incorporating emotions in
discussions about global challenges implies a desire to bridge cultural gaps
and connect with individuals from different backgrounds. Furthermore, by
expressing insights gained through the international online exchanges, such
as recognising the interconnectedness of a country's law and morality, they
express an understanding of the global implications of local decisions and the
need to address these interconnections in the context of education.

A deeper analysis of participants' secondary focuses reveals distinctions
within the two main groups. Nantes University (NU, France) participants pri-
oritise developing students' critical thinking and advocating for an interdis-
ciplinary approach, whereas Hebrew University of Jerusalem (HUJI, Israel)
and Temple University of Philadelphia (TUP, USA) participants emphasise
the importance of emotion, particularly empathy. In the second group, cen-
tred firstly on emotional engagement, Free University of Brussels' (FUB,
I also learned from these exchanges how, considering different countries,
we all deal differently facing migration issues. But in every case, it raised
my views showing me different faces of these issues. On geographical,
economic, political points, every country has its particularity so we can
have a wider view of our own when considering the others. (Victor, grad-
uate student in Philosophy, FUB, Belgium)

Through the international exchange, I became aware that a country's law
and morality are bound to each other and that this has to be addressed
accordingly in the classroom as well. (Saskia, WUE, Germany)

Conversely, a student teacher underlines the fact that official curricula can
be framed at a national or local level, giving teachers little flexibility in the
content of their teaching.

The only issue is in Belgium regarding GC we have to follow programs.
And they are too old for what we are facing today. I will try to even if it
isn't in the program. (Manon, graduate student in Philosophy, FUB)

An observation emerges regarding awareness of national frameworks: par-
ticipants from Brussels and Weingarten see them as limitations, while those
from Nantes, Jerusalem, and Philadelphia do not.

The Belgian and German focus on the use of emotions suggests their inter-
est in approaching issues from a global scale for several reasons. By prioritis-
ing emotions such as empathy and sensitivity in approaching global issues,
they indicate a recognition of the interconnectedness of diverse cultures and
experiences on a global scale. Understanding and incorporating emotions in
discussions about global challenges implies a desire to bridge cultural gaps
and connect with individuals from different backgrounds. Furthermore, by
expressing insights gained through the international online exchanges, such
as recognising the interconnectedness of a country's law and morality, they
express an understanding of the global implications of local decisions and the
need to address these interconnections in the context of education.

A deeper analysis of participants' secondary focuses reveals distinctions
within the two main groups. Nantes University (NU, France) participants pri-
oritise developing students' critical thinking and advocating for an interdis-
ciplinary approach, whereas Hebrew University of Jerusalem (HUJI, Israel)
and Temple University of Philadelphia (TUP, USA) participants emphasise
the importance of emotion, particularly empathy. In the second group, cen-
tred firstly on emotional engagement, Free University of Brussels' (FUB,
Belgium) participants stress the need for critical thinking and interdisciplin-
ary approaches, while Weingarten University of Education (WUE, Germany)
participants highlight the significance of facts and rational thinking.

In short, the participants' self-reflections reveal nuanced perspectives. Student teachers from FUB (Belgium) and WUE (Germany) emphasise a global scale through emotions, whilst also highlighting the need for rational and critical thinking. On the other hand, participants from NU (France), TUP (USA), and HUJI (Israel) focus on the national context, especially migration, while also (in the case of the two latter), also acknowledging the importance of an emotion-based approach to global issues. This diversity in approaches reflects nuanced understandings.

Notes

1 Compared to Durkheim, who died in 1917, we have seen the emergence of quasi-global bodies dedicated to peace, such as the League of Nations in 1920, and the UN in 1945. But we also have the memory of a second world war, followed by an equally global cold war, the consequences of which are still felt today, including in our concerns about a third world war, the UN Security Council being divided to say the least. As for Mauss, who had witnessed the League of nations, he clearly preferred internationalism to cosmopolitanism, since "the subject of socialism is the democratic, internationalist nation in proportion to its democratic character since democracies are societies that are more open to the international civilising exchange" (Tarot, 2003, p. 90).

2 This quotation was taken from the back cover of *The Main Enterprise of the World – Rethinking Education*.

3 As external critics, some recall that migrants, a crucial theme in GCE since it engages a reflec-
tion on the arbitrariness of borders, represent about 5% of humans in distress in the world,
the remaining 95% not having the means to migrate even though they would like to (Joppke,
2021). The persistence of borders in human lives contrasts with the political and media
prominence of migrations, pleading for a relative decoupling of the notions of territory and
citizenship that question, via certain uses of the slogan GCE, the classically modern notion
of the latter.
Belgium) participants stress the need for critical thinking and interdisciplin-
ary approaches, while Weingarten University of Education (WUE, Germany)
participants highlight the significance of facts and rational thinking.

In short, the participants' self-reflections reveal nuanced perspectives. Student teachers from FUB (Belgium) and WUE (Germany) emphasise a global scale through emotions, whilst also highlighting the need for rational and critical thinking. On the other hand, participants from NU (France), TUP (USA), and HUJI (Israel) focus on the national context, especially migration, while also (in the case of the two latter), also acknowledging the importance of an emotion-based approach to global issues. This diversity in approaches reflects nuanced understandings.

Notes

1 Compared to Durkheim, who died in 1917, we have seen the emergence of quasi-global bodies dedicated to peace, such as the League of Nations in 1920, and the UN in 1945. But we also have the memory of a second world war, followed by an equally global cold war, the consequences of which are still felt today, including in our concerns about a third world war, the UN Security Council being divided to say the least. As for Mauss, who had witnessed the League of nations, he clearly preferred internationalism to cosmopolitanism, since "the subject of socialism is the democratic, internationalist nation in proportion to its democratic character since democracies are societies that are more open to the international civilising exchange" (Tarot, 2003, p. 90).

2 This quotation was taken from the back cover of *The Main Enterprise of the World – Rethinking Education*.

3 As external critics, some recall that migrants, a crucial theme in GCE since it engages a reflec-
tion on the arbitrariness of borders, represent about 5% of humans in distress in the world,
the remaining 95% not having the means to migrate even though they would like to (Joppke,
2021). The persistence of borders in human lives contrasts with the political and media
prominence of migrations, pleading for a relative decoupling of the notions of territory and
citizenship that question, via certain uses of the slogan GCE, the classically modern notion
of the latter.
# The Progress of Modernity

## Nominalism, Conservatism, Socialism

As mentioned above, the point of this work – and of debates on GCE in general – is neither to uncritically adopt GCE, nor to rigidly reject it. Rather, our objective is to include prescriptions and recommendations on GCE, as well as their promoters, in our analysis. We wish to identify the political criteria that give substance to what remains for now a vague notion, in order to prevent its co-optation by interests and ideologies.

To progress on this aspect, we turn to Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge to distinguish three typical motifs of modernity: liberal, conservative and socialist. This triptych provides an overview of the process of modernising societies, as modernity progresses¹ through an educational shift towards the global level, as expressed by GCE. We will show that part of the debate on GCE crystallises around the Mannheim triptych; and we will then suggest, with Karsenti and Lemieux, that the socialist motif has a more reflective status than the other two. This will allow us, in the end, to justify our whole posture: our relation to values, critical republicanism, an inseparably sociological and philosophical approach, and a society project which is clearly situated in ETS.

The argument can be summarised as follows: many GCE proponents adopt a nominalist motif, which, by de-emphasising the national totality, and though it is a vector of the ideal of individual autonomy, does not try hard enough to think about the conditions of this autonomy, thus potentially aligning with a neoliberal fantasy (Kaufmann, 2010). In reaction, some thinkers embrace a conservative motif, arguing that global citizenship does not exist, even as an ideal. According to them, the mere idea is absurd. However, in doing so, they overemphasise the national reality, using a pseudo holism that refuses to question the arbitrary link between citizenship and nation (Spector, 2021), made even more manifest by current globalisation policies. A posture that questions both previous motifs, has richer resources to interrogate the postures of the educator and the researcher. The critical republican motif, as a version of the socialist motif, thus emerges.

Yet, instead of the liberal motif in Mannheim's work, we shall discuss a liberal-nominalist motif, to distinguish it from general political liberalism. For as we have said, the latter is hard to separate, in several of its versions, from critical republicanism and it admits the principled existence of collective
# The Progress of Modernity

## Nominalism, Conservatism, Socialism

As mentioned above, the point of this work – and of debates on GCE in general – is neither to uncritically adopt GCE, nor to rigidly reject it. Rather, our objective is to include prescriptions and recommendations on GCE, as well as their promoters, in our analysis. We wish to identify the political criteria that give substance to what remains for now a vague notion, in order to prevent its co-optation by interests and ideologies.

To progress on this aspect, we turn to Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge to distinguish three typical motifs of modernity: liberal, conservative and socialist. This triptych provides an overview of the process of modernising societies, as modernity progresses¹ through an educational shift towards the global level, as expressed by GCE. We will show that part of the debate on GCE crystallises around the Mannheim triptych; and we will then suggest, with Karsenti and Lemieux, that the socialist motif has a more reflective status than the other two. This will allow us, in the end, to justify our whole posture: our relation to values, critical republicanism, an inseparably sociological and philosophical approach, and a society project which is clearly situated in ETS.

The argument can be summarised as follows: many GCE proponents adopt a nominalist motif, which, by de-emphasising the national totality, and though it is a vector of the ideal of individual autonomy, does not try hard enough to think about the conditions of this autonomy, thus potentially aligning with a neoliberal fantasy (Kaufmann, 2010). In reaction, some thinkers embrace a conservative motif, arguing that global citizenship does not exist, even as an ideal. According to them, the mere idea is absurd. However, in doing so, they overemphasise the national reality, using a pseudo holism that refuses to question the arbitrary link between citizenship and nation (Spector, 2021), made even more manifest by current globalisation policies. A posture that questions both previous motifs, has richer resources to interrogate the postures of the educator and the researcher. The critical republican motif, as a version of the socialist motif, thus emerges.

Yet, instead of the liberal motif in Mannheim's work, we shall discuss a liberal-nominalist motif, to distinguish it from general political liberalism. For as we have said, the latter is hard to separate, in several of its versions, from critical republicanism and it admits the principled existence of collective
entities, such as ‘the people’ (Rawls, 1999). In addition, we have suggested that the question remains open as to whether a Republican such as Pettit would not rather be a Liberal who ‘internally’ problematises his own tradition, by rewording the liberal egalitarianism of Rawls or Dworkin (Larmore, 2001). In short, refusing to associate liberalism and nominalism too closely, the focus here will be on the liberal-nominalist motif as a subcategory of the liberal motif.

1 The Liberal-Nominalist Motif: Become a Competent Global Citizen!

Within GCE, diverse currents and controversies exist. The point here is not to synthesise them, but to detect the clashing of the three aforementioned motifs. To this end, let us explore James Banks’ arguments, one of the most prominent figures of multiculturalism in GCE, considered a ‘founding father’ of so-called multicultural education. Banks emphasises the importance of “helping students acquire cosmopolitan perspectives and values, necessary for global equality and justice”. To this end, he emphasises four dimensions of citizenship: civic, political, social and cultural. Under the latter, the author includes many elements, including race.

Citizenship education should also help students to develop an identity and attachment to the global community and a human connection to people around the world. Global identities, attachments, and commitments constitute cosmopolitanism [...]. As citizens of the global community, students also must develop a deep understanding of the need to take action and make decisions to help solve the world's difficult problems. [...] A transformative citizenship education also helps students to interact and deliberate with their peers from diverse racial and ethnic groups. A transformative citizenship education also recognizes and validates the cultural identities of students. [...] Equal status between groups in inter-racial situations has to be deliberately structured by teachers or it will not exist. (Banks, 2008, p. 135)

The author’s point is, with the laudable goal of ‘structuring’ an equal status between racial groups, to make them visible by organising interactions in class on the basis of the racial parameter, legitimised as the cultural identity of the students that the teacher must ‘validate’.

Two issues remain unclear. Firstly, the exact link between cultural identity and racial belonging is ambiguous. Skin colour can be considered as a culture (one can claim one's black culture as an effect of one's black skin, by taking
entities, such as ‘the people’ (Rawls, 1999). In addition, we have suggested that the question remains open as to whether a Republican such as Pettit would not rather be a Liberal who ‘internally’ problematises his own tradition, by rewording the liberal egalitarianism of Rawls or Dworkin (Larmore, 2001). In short, refusing to associate liberalism and nominalism too closely, the focus here will be on the liberal-nominalist motif as a subcategory of the liberal motif.

1 The Liberal-Nominalist Motif: Become a Competent Global Citizen!

Within GCE, diverse currents and controversies exist. The point here is not to synthesise them, but to detect the clashing of the three aforementioned motifs. To this end, let us explore James Banks’ arguments, one of the most prominent figures of multiculturalism in GCE, considered a ‘founding father’ of so-called multicultural education. Banks emphasises the importance of “helping students acquire cosmopolitan perspectives and values, necessary for global equality and justice”. To this end, he emphasises four dimensions of citizenship: civic, political, social and cultural. Under the latter, the author includes many elements, including race.

Citizenship education should also help students to develop an identity and attachment to the global community and a human connection to people around the world. Global identities, attachments, and commitments constitute cosmopolitanism [...]. As citizens of the global community, students also must develop a deep understanding of the need to take action and make decisions to help solve the world’s difficult problems. [...] A transformative citizenship education also helps students to interact and deliberate with their peers from diverse racial and ethnic groups. A transformative citizenship education also recognizes and validates the cultural identities of students. [...] Equal status between groups in inter-racial situations has to be deliberately structured by teachers or it will not exist. (Banks, 2008, p. 135)

The author’s point is, with the laudable goal of ‘structuring’ an equal status between racial groups, to make them visible by organising interactions in class on the basis of the racial parameter, legitimised as the cultural identity of the students that the teacher must ‘validate’.

Two issues remain unclear. Firstly, the exact link between cultural identity and racial belonging is ambiguous. Skin colour can be considered as a culture (one can claim one’s black culture as an effect of one’s black skin, by taking
into account the ways it is perceived in a given environment), but this is far
from always the case. Secondly, how can the goal of removing race as a per-
tinent public criterion – ultimate objective of any anti-racist policy – coexist
with such strong emphasis being put on it in the classroom (Sabbagh, 2011)?
These questions are challenging and specific to the United States' context; fur-
thermore, it is not our intention to solve them. Nonetheless, on a more general
level, Banks seeks to find what is a difficult balance for multicultural nation-
states. On the one hand, under the praiseworthy pretext of not essentialising
cultural and racial identities, the latter are defined, from an explicitly post-
modern perspective, as fluid, multiple and moving.² On the other hand, the
insistence on the need for recognition and validation of these identities (by
the teacher) tends to stabilise them.

Banks' educational ideal is therefore placed under the sign of the recog-
nition of students' 'diversity', in order to make them aware of the fact that
self-identity and identity of others are 'co-relative' and 'co-creative'. This would
make them likely to engage in the world as global citizens. Yet it begs the ques-
tion of what allows students to nurture a relationship of choice regarding iden-
tities? To clarify this point, the author establishes a scale of identities, from
the 'cultural' to the 'national' and then the 'global'. The first link, cultural, is
considered subnational.

Only when the national civic culture is transformed in ways that reflect
and give voice to the diverse ethnic, racial, language, and religious com-
munities that constitute it will it be viewed as legitimate by all of its
citizens. Only then can citizens develop clarified commitments to the
nation-state and its ideals. [...] Students cannot develop thoughtful and
clarified national identifications until they have reflective and clarified
cultural identifications, and they cannot develop a global or cosmopoli-
tan identification until they have acquired a reflective national identifi-
cation. (Banks, 2004, p. 302)

This passage is underpinned by a liberal, and therefore national, conception of
diversity (ethnic, racial, linguistic and religious) that must be able to express itself
in society ('give voice'). Nevertheless, according to the same passage, a reverse
movement must also take place: the nation-state proceeds from this diversity
(ethnic, religious, etc.) once it has been recognised and 'reflected' in civic culture
and once the students have clarified their 'cultural' identifications. This state-
ment is interesting, but leads to the following question: how can one clarify one's
cultural identity without an already established relationship with individualism
as a characteristic value of modern societies, in other words, of nations?
into account the ways it is perceived in a given environment), but this is far
from always the case. Secondly, how can the goal of removing race as a per-
tinent public criterion – ultimate objective of any anti-racist policy – coexist
with such strong emphasis being put on it in the classroom (Sabbagh, 2011)?
These questions are challenging and specific to the United States' context; fur-
thermore, it is not our intention to solve them. Nonetheless, on a more general
level, Banks seeks to find what is a difficult balance for multicultural nation-
states. On the one hand, under the praiseworthy pretext of not essentialising
cultural and racial identities, the latter are defined, from an explicitly post-
modern perspective, as fluid, multiple and moving.² On the other hand, the
insistence on the need for recognition and validation of these identities (by
the teacher) tends to stabilise them.

Banks' educational ideal is therefore placed under the sign of the recog-
nition of students' 'diversity', in order to make them aware of the fact that
self-identity and identity of others are 'co-relative' and 'co-creative'. This would
make them likely to engage in the world as global citizens. Yet it begs the ques-
tion of what allows students to nurture a relationship of choice regarding iden-
tities? To clarify this point, the author establishes a scale of identities, from
the 'cultural' to the 'national' and then the 'global'. The first link, cultural, is
considered subnational.

Only when the national civic culture is transformed in ways that reflect
and give voice to the diverse ethnic, racial, language, and religious com-
munities that constitute it will it be viewed as legitimate by all of its
citizens. Only then can citizens develop clarified commitments to the
nation-state and its ideals. [...] Students cannot develop thoughtful and
clarified national identifications until they have reflective and clarified
cultural identifications, and they cannot develop a global or cosmopoli-
tan identification until they have acquired a reflective national identifi-
cation. (Banks, 2004, p. 302)

This passage is underpinned by a liberal, and therefore national, conception of
diversity (ethnic, racial, linguistic and religious) that must be able to express itself
in society ('give voice'). Nevertheless, according to the same passage, a reverse
movement must also take place: the nation-state proceeds from this diversity
(ethnic, religious, etc.) once it has been recognised and 'reflected' in civic culture
and once the students have clarified their 'cultural' identifications. This state-
ment is interesting, but leads to the following question: how can one clarify one's
cultural identity without an already established relationship with individualism
as a characteristic value of modern societies, in other words, of nations?
Banks is well aware of the problem, but answers it in an allusive way: “A delicate balance of diversity and unity should be an essential goal of democratic nation-states .... Cultural, national, and global experiences and identifications are interactive and inter-related in a dynamic way” (Banks, 2004, pp. 296, 301). However, this type of evidence needs to be clarified. For the question remains of how diversity proceeds from unity and vice versa. It is not clear that the answer in terms of “delicate balance” of “interactions” and “dynamic interrelationships” is sufficient. Rather, it may actually blur the issue.

## 1.1 *The Overlooked Reckoning of Individualism as a Value*

Indeed, if the ‘global community’ is the educational horizon (“help students develop an identity and attachment to the global community”), it remains that the relationship of choice with regard to identities (co-construction, co-creation, fluidity, etc.) does not take place within the framework of such a vast totality as the global community. Rather, it happens within a more restricted entity that provides its grammar, such as the characterised American political community, in a manner similar to the societies of Western Europe, through hyper-individualism and the cult of the person referred to by Tocqueville, Durkheim and Dumont.

Admittedly, individuals may choose identity elements (cultural, etc.) from all over the world; but the world community, assuming it exists (as Banks argues it does), is not individualistic to the same degree, nor in the same way as societies of Western Europe and North America, unless western individualism is projected onto the world community, at the risk of adopting a colonial perspective under the guise of diversity. Moreover, to choose elements of one's identity (such as cultural), is to have towards them an individualistic relationship, thus standardised by a liberal society. The identities of which Banks speaks, are in fact transcended by the individualistic ideology that makes up the body of our particular societies: these identities have become objects that one can choose.

Therefore, Banks' educational model presents a gap between the totality and its parts. The national totality provides one side of the argument, making it possible to place identities under the sign of individualism; while the other side of the statement features a world community that is not characterised by the cult of the person, typical of western societies. This hiatus is certainly not prohibitive; on the contrary, it might be fruitful. Nonetheless, is it enough to approach it by invoking a vague balance between unity and diversity?

Balancing unity and diversity is a continuing challenge for multicultural nation-states. Unity without diversity results in hegemony and oppression; diversity without unity leads to Balkanization and the fracturing of
Banks is well aware of the problem, but answers it in an allusive way: “A delicate balance of diversity and unity should be an essential goal of democratic nation-states .... Cultural, national, and global experiences and identifications are interactive and inter-related in a dynamic way” (Banks, 2004, pp. 296, 301). However, this type of evidence needs to be clarified. For the question remains of how diversity proceeds from unity and vice versa. It is not clear that the answer in terms of “delicate balance” of “interactions” and “dynamic interrelationships” is sufficient. Rather, it may actually blur the issue.

## 1.1 *The Overlooked Reckoning of Individualism as a Value*

Indeed, if the ‘global community’ is the educational horizon (“help students develop an identity and attachment to the global community”), it remains that the relationship of choice with regard to identities (co-construction, co-creation, fluidity, etc.) does not take place within the framework of such a vast totality as the global community. Rather, it happens within a more restricted entity that provides its grammar, such as the characterised American political community, in a manner similar to the societies of Western Europe, through hyper-individualism and the cult of the person referred to by Tocqueville, Durkheim and Dumont.

Admittedly, individuals may choose identity elements (cultural, etc.) from all over the world; but the world community, assuming it exists (as Banks argues it does), is not individualistic to the same degree, nor in the same way as societies of Western Europe and North America, unless western individualism is projected onto the world community, at the risk of adopting a colonial perspective under the guise of diversity. Moreover, to choose elements of one's identity (such as cultural), is to have towards them an individualistic relationship, thus standardised by a liberal society. The identities of which Banks speaks, are in fact transcended by the individualistic ideology that makes up the body of our particular societies: these identities have become objects that one can choose.

Therefore, Banks' educational model presents a gap between the totality and its parts. The national totality provides one side of the argument, making it possible to place identities under the sign of individualism; while the other side of the statement features a world community that is not characterised by the cult of the person, typical of western societies. This hiatus is certainly not prohibitive; on the contrary, it might be fruitful. Nonetheless, is it enough to approach it by invoking a vague balance between unity and diversity?

Balancing unity and diversity is a continuing challenge for multicultural nation-states. Unity without diversity results in hegemony and oppression; diversity without unity leads to Balkanization and the fracturing of
the nation-state. A major problem facing nation-states throughout the
world is how to recognize and legitimize difference and yet construct an
overarching national identity that incorporates the voices, experiences,
and hopes of the diverse groups that compose it. Many ethnic, language,
and religious groups have weak identifications with their nation-states
because of their marginalized status and because they do not see their
hopes, dreams, visions, and possibilities reflected in the nation-state or in
the schools, colleges, and universities. (Banks, 2008, p. 133)

It is hard to disagree with these generous words. However, they do not suf-
fice to dismiss the ideal of political liberalism, which Banks criticizes for too
often implying ‘assimilationism’. Indeed GCE takes, under his pen, a pseudo
radical appearance, dismissing “assimilationist, liberal and universalist”
approaches, accused of not taking sufficient account of the migratory pro-
cesses and of requiring citizens to “give up their first languages and cultures
to fully participate in the civic community of the nation-state” (Banks, 2008, p.
130). However, by failing to scrutinise the conditions that make individualism
possible – and though this provides the basis of the argument on postmodern
identities – it becomes difficult to identify the originality and coherence of the
multiculturalist path advocated by Banks in the field of GCE (Levinson, 2010).

1.2 *Multiculturalism's Propensity for Nominalism*

Granted, universalism, liberalism and assimilationism can go hand in hand and it is legitimate to denounce any assimilationist perspective that dons the robes of universalism, in order to better hide its conservatism. However, if the word liberalism has any meaning, it seems unlikely that it could be both assimilationist and liberal, or assimilationist and universalist, or liberal while requiring that citizens abandon their first languages and cultures. Banks implicitly concedes this point, suggesting the impossibility of circumventing the liberal values of his own nation: “The national community should embody democratic ideals and values, such as those set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights” (Banks, 2004, p. 299).

However, failing to further conceptualise the civic community (ultimately
referred to as the world community), Banks' multiculturalist apparatus leads
him to portray a fairly individualised global-citizen commitment. For it is the
individual himself who in the end is supposed to become the promoter or even
the guardian of world justice, from the moment he has acquired the expected
skills in terms of global citizenship and has carried out his work of identity
co-construction. It is why Banks embraces a *de facto* nominalist perspective.
the nation-state. A major problem facing nation-states throughout the
world is how to recognize and legitimize difference and yet construct an
overarching national identity that incorporates the voices, experiences,
and hopes of the diverse groups that compose it. Many ethnic, language,
and religious groups have weak identifications with their nation-states
because of their marginalized status and because they do not see their
hopes, dreams, visions, and possibilities reflected in the nation-state or in
the schools, colleges, and universities. (Banks, 2008, p. 133)

It is hard to disagree with these generous words. However, they do not suf-
fice to dismiss the ideal of political liberalism, which Banks criticizes for too
often implying ‘assimilationism’. Indeed GCE takes, under his pen, a pseudo
radical appearance, dismissing “assimilationist, liberal and universalist”
approaches, accused of not taking sufficient account of the migratory pro-
cesses and of requiring citizens to “give up their first languages and cultures
to fully participate in the civic community of the nation-state” (Banks, 2008, p.
130). However, by failing to scrutinise the conditions that make individualism
possible – and though this provides the basis of the argument on postmodern
identities – it becomes difficult to identify the originality and coherence of the
multiculturalist path advocated by Banks in the field of GCE (Levinson, 2010).

1.2 *Multiculturalism's Propensity for Nominalism*

Granted, universalism, liberalism and assimilationism can go hand in hand and it is legitimate to denounce any assimilationist perspective that dons the robes of universalism, in order to better hide its conservatism. However, if the word liberalism has any meaning, it seems unlikely that it could be both assimilationist and liberal, or assimilationist and universalist, or liberal while requiring that citizens abandon their first languages and cultures. Banks implicitly concedes this point, suggesting the impossibility of circumventing the liberal values of his own nation: “The national community should embody democratic ideals and values, such as those set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights” (Banks, 2004, p. 299).

However, failing to further conceptualise the civic community (ultimately
referred to as the world community), Banks' multiculturalist apparatus leads
him to portray a fairly individualised global-citizen commitment. For it is the
individual himself who in the end is supposed to become the promoter or even
the guardian of world justice, from the moment he has acquired the expected
skills in terms of global citizenship and has carried out his work of identity
co-construction. It is why Banks embraces a *de facto* nominalist perspective.
This is a recurring problem in the postmodern current with which the author sides. Indeed,

> The postmodern perception of culture, nation or even society as potentially essentialist is based on their definition as a collection of identical individuals, a radically individualistic and reductionist definition. Because it is then within the individual body that the different cultural traits (ideas, subjective morality, relationship to objects, and even physical physiognomy) can mix. (Vibert, 2015, p. 129)

This point must be emphasised because it is customary to think that multiculturalism is necessarily anti-nominalist. Does it not consist in recognising collective entities such as cultural, religious, ethnic communities, etc.? Certainly, but authors who start from a postmodern postulate, such as Banks, take for granted the radical individualisation of identities (while admitting the existence of tribalisation phenomena as a perverse effect of hyper-individualism). Therefore, under the guise of talking about groups, they refer to differences that can be expressed on the surface once the value of moral individualism has been fully shared.³

As we have seen, this value is truly societal, even if its content refers to the individual. Failing to realise that may entail the risk of portraying a non-social individual, typical of postmodern multiculturalism. The communities referred to by Banks, promoter of GCE who succumbs to the nominalist bias, are thus collections of primarily non-social individuals.

> The concept of ‘community’, far from being an outdated archaism, therefore follows as its shadow – a shadow that appears intermittently – the process of individualisation that characterises the deployment of “modern ideology” [Dumont, 1983], a set of representations and value-ideas centred on the primacy of a moral, autonomous and primarily non-social individual. (Vibert, 2004, p. 362)

Essentially, postmodern multiculturalists, as well as nominalist liberals, stage a *posteriori* collectives (Kaufmann, 2010) whose political realities are reduced to the interplay of intersubjective and therefore inter individual relations. In doing so, they conceal the *a priori* collectives that nevertheless make the very notion of the individual imaginable, notion that Durkheim saw emerging in the cult of the person, proper to modern societies.

This inability to consider *a priori* collectives invites us to wonder if global citizenship education is not a vague slogan, at the crossroads of different
This is a recurring problem in the postmodern current with which the author sides. Indeed,

> The postmodern perception of culture, nation or even society as potentially essentialist is based on their definition as a collection of identical individuals, a radically individualistic and reductionist definition. Because it is then within the individual body that the different cultural traits (ideas, subjective morality, relationship to objects, and even physical physiognomy) can mix. (Vibert, 2015, p. 129)

This point must be emphasised because it is customary to think that multiculturalism is necessarily anti-nominalist. Does it not consist in recognising collective entities such as cultural, religious, ethnic communities, etc.? Certainly, but authors who start from a postmodern postulate, such as Banks, take for granted the radical individualisation of identities (while admitting the existence of tribalisation phenomena as a perverse effect of hyper-individualism). Therefore, under the guise of talking about groups, they refer to differences that can be expressed on the surface once the value of moral individualism has been fully shared.³

As we have seen, this value is truly societal, even if its content refers to the individual. Failing to realise that may entail the risk of portraying a non-social individual, typical of postmodern multiculturalism. The communities referred to by Banks, promoter of GCE who succumbs to the nominalist bias, are thus collections of primarily non-social individuals.

> The concept of ‘community’, far from being an outdated archaism, therefore follows as its shadow – a shadow that appears intermittently – the process of individualisation that characterises the deployment of “modern ideology” [Dumont, 1983], a set of representations and value-ideas centred on the primacy of a moral, autonomous and primarily non-social individual. (Vibert, 2004, p. 362)

Essentially, postmodern multiculturalists, as well as nominalist liberals, stage a *posteriori* collectives (Kaufmann, 2010) whose political realities are reduced to the interplay of intersubjective and therefore inter individual relations. In doing so, they conceal the *a priori* collectives that nevertheless make the very notion of the individual imaginable, notion that Durkheim saw emerging in the cult of the person, proper to modern societies.

This inability to consider *a priori* collectives invites us to wonder if global citizenship education is not a vague slogan, at the crossroads of different
discourses that can be mobilised, among others, by government lobbies that have an interest in highlighting two elements. On the one hand, the inevitability of globalisation as it has occurred (since citizenship is called ‘global’ under the *aegis* of a ‘world community’ that supposedly already exists); and on the other hand, the importance of training citizens adapted to this new reality, from a cultural and economic point of view. It may then be that GCE, in some of its versions,

> ironically turns out not to be a global project for all, but a more localised political project, led by some countries promoting the social imaginary of globalisation for their own purposes [...] by transcending and concealing other local alternatives and perspectives: non-global or anti-globalisation. (Mannion, Biesta, Priestley, & Ross, 2011, p. 450)

## 2 Conservative Motif: Against Cosmopolitan Abstraction, Be One with the Nation!

The lack of conceptualisation of the (usually national) political community that shapes conceptions of (global) citizenship education explains why in return, proponents of the Conservative motif absolutely reject the idea of global citizenship. They argue that the only viable educational framework is the nation, whose principled reality guarantees a system of rights and duties towards well identifiable fellow citizens, who can therefore not be projected onto the indeterminate field of the world.

### 2.1 *Legitimate Reminder of the Political Society*

The principle of the welfare state is often invoked in this regard. By guaranteeing a certain fairness on a territory, thus being an undeniable lever of true citizenship, this principle involves reciprocal social compensation, depending on each person's contribution, that is to say on the contribution of each fellow citizen as an identifiable member of the political society. As a result, social aid granted to certain categories of economic migrants is based on the principle of reciprocity between contribution and compensation in variable territories. These are sometimes European (hence the idea of European citizenship) and sometimes global but, in the latter case, there are also conditions of competence and/or financial autonomy as in the typically globalised Australian, Canadian or British point systems (Joppke, 2021). The contours of national and federal political societies, and the shadows they cast on a global scale, are clearly outlined here.
discourses that can be mobilised, among others, by government lobbies that have an interest in highlighting two elements. On the one hand, the inevitability of globalisation as it has occurred (since citizenship is called ‘global’ under the *aegis* of a ‘world community’ that supposedly already exists); and on the other hand, the importance of training citizens adapted to this new reality, from a cultural and economic point of view. It may then be that GCE, in some of its versions,

> ironically turns out not to be a global project for all, but a more localised political project, led by some countries promoting the social imaginary of globalisation for their own purposes [...] by transcending and concealing other local alternatives and perspectives: non-global or anti-globalisation. (Mannion, Biesta, Priestley, & Ross, 2011, p. 450)

## 2 Conservative Motif: Against Cosmopolitan Abstraction, Be One with the Nation!

The lack of conceptualisation of the (usually national) political community that shapes conceptions of (global) citizenship education explains why in return, proponents of the Conservative motif absolutely reject the idea of global citizenship. They argue that the only viable educational framework is the nation, whose principled reality guarantees a system of rights and duties towards well identifiable fellow citizens, who can therefore not be projected onto the indeterminate field of the world.

### 2.1 *Legitimate Reminder of the Political Society*

The principle of the welfare state is often invoked in this regard. By guaranteeing a certain fairness on a territory, thus being an undeniable lever of true citizenship, this principle involves reciprocal social compensation, depending on each person's contribution, that is to say on the contribution of each fellow citizen as an identifiable member of the political society. As a result, social aid granted to certain categories of economic migrants is based on the principle of reciprocity between contribution and compensation in variable territories. These are sometimes European (hence the idea of European citizenship) and sometimes global but, in the latter case, there are also conditions of competence and/or financial autonomy as in the typically globalised Australian, Canadian or British point systems (Joppke, 2021). The contours of national and federal political societies, and the shadows they cast on a global scale, are clearly outlined here.
Acknowledging this association between citizenship and territory, itself a reflection of a historical and political sedimentation, the conservative motif in citizenship education hardly consists in 'recognising', and even less in 'validating', students' identities. The question is first to admit the principled fact of the nation-state, itself likely to spare the expression of cultural and ethnic identities within the framework of a more general system of rights and duties: non-discrimination, freedom of thought, freedom of worship, compulsory schooling under so-called national values, etc.

Let us be clear: conservative does not necessarily mean right-wing, xenophobic or assimilationist. The retained meaning, more nuanced and deeper, is Mannheim's: it is a question of preserving the 'social' as modernity threatens to break it down. The conservative motif is therefore properly modern in the sense that it attempts, like the socialist and liberal-nominalist motifs, to understand and accompany the social. A conservative stance, in this sense, is not necessarily conservative in the strictly political sense.

The question then remains to what extent the culture associated with the state can be 'preserved' and legitimately recognised. If the proponents of the conservative motif criticise the notion of global citizenship because it operates a denial of the national totality, it remains to be seen how they give consistency to the latter, not only from a descriptive point of view, but also normative.

## 2.2 *Illegitimate Reminder of the Ethical and Cultural Community*

As in the previous section, the point here is not to synthesise the debates, but to focus on a typical author whose work has undeniable resonance: in this case, David Miller. Being a philosopher gives him an external position to social sciences, from which he rejects the idea of global citizenship, because of the primordial nature of the duties due to one's co-nationals as members of the same 'ethical community', separate from human beings as such who are outside of it (Miller, 2002). The conservatism of the argument is fully revealed in its appreciation of the majority religion that the state would be entitled to recognise as a symbolic guardian of its legitimacy, including in the eyes of religious minorities who, according to the philosopher, would perceive the recognition of a particular religion by the state as an act of esteem towards religious values in general (Miller, 2020).

Although this argument is presented as belonging to liberal nationalism, which is enduring in the Anglophone context, it is similar to the so-called French 'republican' arguments of Pierre-André Taguieff and Dominique Schnapper, already criticised in their time in the name of a critical republican perspective (Laborde, 2001). In fact, just as Miller assumes that the nation-state can explicitly rely on a majority religious identity, the French
Acknowledging this association between citizenship and territory, itself a reflection of a historical and political sedimentation, the conservative motif in citizenship education hardly consists in 'recognising', and even less in 'validating', students' identities. The question is first to admit the principled fact of the nation-state, itself likely to spare the expression of cultural and ethnic identities within the framework of a more general system of rights and duties: non-discrimination, freedom of thought, freedom of worship, compulsory schooling under so-called national values, etc.

Let us be clear: conservative does not necessarily mean right-wing, xenophobic or assimilationist. The retained meaning, more nuanced and deeper, is Mannheim's: it is a question of preserving the 'social' as modernity threatens to break it down. The conservative motif is therefore properly modern in the sense that it attempts, like the socialist and liberal-nominalist motifs, to understand and accompany the social. A conservative stance, in this sense, is not necessarily conservative in the strictly political sense.

The question then remains to what extent the culture associated with the state can be 'preserved' and legitimately recognised. If the proponents of the conservative motif criticise the notion of global citizenship because it operates a denial of the national totality, it remains to be seen how they give consistency to the latter, not only from a descriptive point of view, but also normative.

## 2.2 *Illegitimate Reminder of the Ethical and Cultural Community*

As in the previous section, the point here is not to synthesise the debates, but to focus on a typical author whose work has undeniable resonance: in this case, David Miller. Being a philosopher gives him an external position to social sciences, from which he rejects the idea of global citizenship, because of the primordial nature of the duties due to one's co-nationals as members of the same 'ethical community', separate from human beings as such who are outside of it (Miller, 2002). The conservatism of the argument is fully revealed in its appreciation of the majority religion that the state would be entitled to recognise as a symbolic guardian of its legitimacy, including in the eyes of religious minorities who, according to the philosopher, would perceive the recognition of a particular religion by the state as an act of esteem towards religious values in general (Miller, 2020).

Although this argument is presented as belonging to liberal nationalism, which is enduring in the Anglophone context, it is similar to the so-called French 'republican' arguments of Pierre-André Taguieff and Dominique Schnapper, already criticised in their time in the name of a critical republican perspective (Laborde, 2001). In fact, just as Miller assumes that the nation-state can explicitly rely on a majority religious identity, the French
republicans who advocate the conservative motif have hardly taken note of the catholic-secular imbalance, favourable to compromises with Christianity (private schools under contract with the Ministry of education, exceptional status of Alsace-Moselle) but much stricter regarding Islam, especially since the prohibition of the ostensible wearing of religious signs by students of publics schools (Laborde, 2008). Thus, figures of French classical republicanism,⁴ despite their displayed secular commitments, join arguments expressed in the name of liberal Anglo-Saxon nationalism. For the former as well as the latter, adopting the same conservative motif, citizenship can in no case be global.

The Conservative argument is not irrelevant. Its advantage is that it is factual, precise and careful in its choice of terms, especially with Miller as an analytical philosopher. The factual background provided does not make it easier to identify these ‘global’ citizenship and community that some claim to seek and/or bring about – not to mention those who believe they have already found a global community. Indeed, lawful and regulatory systems are at best federal or international. One can deplore this reality: is it not despairing that states, even associated, are not able to ‘globally’ face global challenges? However, does this current disability in itself prove that another (global) scale would be more relevant?

Liberal nationalists have doubts about this. In 2019, Yael Tamir published a book entitled *Why Nationalism?* Her answer was clear and provocative: because nothing else work.

> Though it seems reasonable to assume that global challenges demand global institutions, in reality, international collaboration starts with the state. To begin with, it is important to note that presently, there are no effective global institutions. [...] The fact that no state is powerful enough to make a global difference does not prove that any other political entity can replace it. (Tamir, 2020, p. 540)

Certainly, GCE proponents do not argue that a global entity should ‘replace’ nation-states. However, Tamir’s argument that “international collaboration starts with the state” reminds us, against the nominalist motif, that the main actors at the global level are not individuals but states. On the other hand, if burning problems have a global dimension (wars, climate change, nuclear proliferation, migration, access to water), then it is these problems, not citizenship, that are global. Thus, they deserve to be treated on a global scale, which is why citizens around the world need to be sensitive to them, becoming globally concerned citizens – but not global citizens.

Finally, while some subjects need to be dealt with on a global scale, others are likely to be better dealt with on a national scale, allowing for instance the
republicans who advocate the conservative motif have hardly taken note of the catholic-secular imbalance, favourable to compromises with Christianity (private schools under contract with the Ministry of education, exceptional status of Alsace-Moselle) but much stricter regarding Islam, especially since the prohibition of the ostensible wearing of religious signs by students of publics schools (Laborde, 2008). Thus, figures of French classical republicanism,⁴ despite their displayed secular commitments, join arguments expressed in the name of liberal Anglo-Saxon nationalism. For the former as well as the latter, adopting the same conservative motif, citizenship can in no case be global.

The Conservative argument is not irrelevant. Its advantage is that it is factual, precise and careful in its choice of terms, especially with Miller as an analytical philosopher. The factual background provided does not make it easier to identify these ‘global’ citizenship and community that some claim to seek and/or bring about – not to mention those who believe they have already found a global community. Indeed, lawful and regulatory systems are at best federal or international. One can deplore this reality: is it not despairing that states, even associated, are not able to ‘globally’ face global challenges? However, does this current disability in itself prove that another (global) scale would be more relevant?

Liberal nationalists have doubts about this. In 2019, Yael Tamir published a book entitled *Why Nationalism?* Her answer was clear and provocative: because nothing else work.

> Though it seems reasonable to assume that global challenges demand global institutions, in reality, international collaboration starts with the state. To begin with, it is important to note that presently, there are no effective global institutions. [...] The fact that no state is powerful enough to make a global difference does not prove that any other political entity can replace it. (Tamir, 2020, p. 540)

Certainly, GCE proponents do not argue that a global entity should ‘replace’ nation-states. However, Tamir’s argument that “international collaboration starts with the state” reminds us, against the nominalist motif, that the main actors at the global level are not individuals but states. On the other hand, if burning problems have a global dimension (wars, climate change, nuclear proliferation, migration, access to water), then it is these problems, not citizenship, that are global. Thus, they deserve to be treated on a global scale, which is why citizens around the world need to be sensitive to them, becoming globally concerned citizens – but not global citizens.

Finally, while some subjects need to be dealt with on a global scale, others are likely to be better dealt with on a national scale, allowing for instance the
levying of taxes intended for the redistribution of wealth, the construction of public infrastructure, and even the development of armies capable of defending liberal countries (and therefore liberal principles).⁵

> I do not want to deny that the responsibilities of citizenship change as we move into a world in which co-ordination at a global level on issues like climate change becomes increasingly vital. So we do need to reconceive citizenship, though not, I have argued, by changing the central arenas in which it is practiced. Not the global citizen, but the globally concerned citizen, is the ideal we should be aiming to promote. (Miller, 2012, p. 242)

However, the argument has its limits, because this “central arena” of citizenship depends on how states are able or not to defend individual rights. What are the duties towards the nation as an “ethical community” (Miller) if the nation fails to respect the rights of minorities because of their ethnicity, their (non-)religion or their sexual orientation? The conservative motif here reveals its weaknesses. What to do when social aspirations are not satisfied with ‘liberal nationalism’, as practised in a given state? The nation-state is in fact only one ‘ethical community’ among others and this is reinforced by transnational flows of people promoting commitments to transnational communities.

Hence, what is lacking in the conservative motif is the dynamics of modern societies and the evolution of the aspirations of their members under the effect of deepening individualism. The conservatives fail to grasp the status of the state as an organ of social thought and not as a mere community, elements that the members of the French School of Sociology had however perceived.

### 3 Questioning the Citizenship Framework

To complete Mannheim's triptych, we have to identify the missing motif, in other words the socialist one, which one could also label the critical republican motif, in view of the issues addressed here. Its strength, according to Karsenti and Lemieux, is that it is the product of a reaction to the other two, the conservative and the liberal-nominalist, while they emerge in reaction to a single motif.

Indeed, if one follows Mannheim, liberal-nominalism opened the adventure of modernity, as a reaction to traditionalism. It showed that collective entities (the state, the monarchy) are not inscribed in a timeless order, but are human conventions that can be questioned and even eliminated. Conservatism is, secondly, a reaction to liberal-nominalism: the point being to preserve
levying of taxes intended for the redistribution of wealth, the construction of public infrastructure, and even the development of armies capable of defending liberal countries (and therefore liberal principles).⁵

> I do not want to deny that the responsibilities of citizenship change as we move into a world in which co-ordination at a global level on issues like climate change becomes increasingly vital. So we do need to reconceive citizenship, though not, I have argued, by changing the central arenas in which it is practiced. Not the global citizen, but the globally concerned citizen, is the ideal we should be aiming to promote. (Miller, 2012, p. 242)

However, the argument has its limits, because this “central arena” of citizenship depends on how states are able or not to defend individual rights. What are the duties towards the nation as an “ethical community” (Miller) if the nation fails to respect the rights of minorities because of their ethnicity, their (non-)religion or their sexual orientation? The conservative motif here reveals its weaknesses. What to do when social aspirations are not satisfied with ‘liberal nationalism’, as practised in a given state? The nation-state is in fact only one ‘ethical community’ among others and this is reinforced by transnational flows of people promoting commitments to transnational communities.

Hence, what is lacking in the conservative motif is the dynamics of modern societies and the evolution of the aspirations of their members under the effect of deepening individualism. The conservatives fail to grasp the status of the state as an organ of social thought and not as a mere community, elements that the members of the French School of Sociology had however perceived.

### 3 Questioning the Citizenship Framework

To complete Mannheim's triptych, we have to identify the missing motif, in other words the socialist one, which one could also label the critical republican motif, in view of the issues addressed here. Its strength, according to Karsenti and Lemieux, is that it is the product of a reaction to the other two, the conservative and the liberal-nominalist, while they emerge in reaction to a single motif.

Indeed, if one follows Mannheim, liberal-nominalism opened the adventure of modernity, as a reaction to traditionalism. It showed that collective entities (the state, the monarchy) are not inscribed in a timeless order, but are human conventions that can be questioned and even eliminated. Conservatism is, secondly, a reaction to liberal-nominalism: the point being to preserve
the collective entities that hold the social body together, which is irreducible to individuals. It is important to understand that both motifs are profoundly modern. The mistake would be to say that Liberal-nominalists ‘destroy’ the social order and that Conservatives are ‘reactionaries’ in the pejorative sense of the word.⁶

This understanding allows us to study from a greater distance the arguments exchanged between some supporters of GCE (become a competent global citizen!) and their conservative opponents (against cosmopolitan abstraction, be one with the nation!). The third motif, socialism, has a different status.

> The trihedral they form [liberal-nominalism, conservatism and socialism], is modernity itself. The point therefore is not to choose between them, to privilege one by hoping that it wins and erases the others. The trihedral is necessary, and in it the question is to know which dominant is marked, knowing that its hegemony can never go so far as to erase the presence of the other two, each being determined by this relationship. [...] One of these ideologies, socialism, tends to produce more reflexivity than the others [...] Socialism is neither the project of a despotic state, nor that of a state's downfall, but that of a state that is constantly democratising itself [...] to render this utopia possible that can be called 'the self-direction of society'. (Karsenti & Lemieux, 2019, pp. 142, 156)

Therefore, the question is not to find a median, lukewarm and comfortable way. The challenge is rather to rehabilitate an overlooked notion, covered by the first two reasons described above, and to find a Durkheimian track that has the means, in education, to handle the imperative of reflexivity that is specific to the socialist motif, to which critical republicanism belongs. Two steps are therefore necessary. The first is to identify the reflexivity tools within GCE. The second is to place, with Durkheim, the educational ideal at the centre of the approach. Because the triple figure of the philosopher, professor of sociology and professor of education science is not due to an institutional coincidence: it has a true coherence.

## 3.1 *Making Multicultural Education Coherent*

The socialist motif in GCE appears as we unfold the apparent paradox between individuation, totality and plurality, in a Durkheimian vein already established in political theory (Guérard de Latour, 2014). To approach the socialist motif, we must first refuse the conservative reaction. The identities of which Banks speaks (multiple, diverse, hybrid) do not reveal a maladjusted relationship to national citizenship that the conservative motif intends to restore under the
the collective entities that hold the social body together, which is irreducible to individuals. It is important to understand that both motifs are profoundly modern. The mistake would be to say that Liberal-nominalists ‘destroy’ the social order and that Conservatives are ‘reactionaries’ in the pejorative sense of the word.⁶

This understanding allows us to study from a greater distance the arguments exchanged between some supporters of GCE (become a competent global citizen!) and their conservative opponents (against cosmopolitan abstraction, be one with the nation!). The third motif, socialism, has a different status.

> The trihedral they form [liberal-nominalism, conservatism and socialism], is modernity itself. The point therefore is not to choose between them, to privilege one by hoping that it wins and erases the others. The trihedral is necessary, and in it the question is to know which dominant is marked, knowing that its hegemony can never go so far as to erase the presence of the other two, each being determined by this relationship. [...] One of these ideologies, socialism, tends to produce more reflexivity than the others [...] Socialism is neither the project of a despotic state, nor that of a state's downfall, but that of a state that is constantly democratising itself [...] to render this utopia possible that can be called 'the self-direction of society'. (Karsenti & Lemieux, 2019, pp. 142, 156)

Therefore, the question is not to find a median, lukewarm and comfortable way. The challenge is rather to rehabilitate an overlooked notion, covered by the first two reasons described above, and to find a Durkheimian track that has the means, in education, to handle the imperative of reflexivity that is specific to the socialist motif, to which critical republicanism belongs. Two steps are therefore necessary. The first is to identify the reflexivity tools within GCE. The second is to place, with Durkheim, the educational ideal at the centre of the approach. Because the triple figure of the philosopher, professor of sociology and professor of education science is not due to an institutional coincidence: it has a true coherence.

## 3.1 *Making Multicultural Education Coherent*

The socialist motif in GCE appears as we unfold the apparent paradox between individuation, totality and plurality, in a Durkheimian vein already established in political theory (Guérard de Latour, 2014). To approach the socialist motif, we must first refuse the conservative reaction. The identities of which Banks speaks (multiple, diverse, hybrid) do not reveal a maladjusted relationship to national citizenship that the conservative motif intends to restore under the
auspices of (a more or less liberal) nationalism. The profusion of identities in question rather attests to the deepening of individualism specific to modern societies: to be able to choose one's identity. However, before being the sign of alterities that the teacher should recognise and validate (as advocated by Banks), identities can only take place within the framework of the totality, that is, the political society, which makes them possible as individual attributes. Indeed, "we are told that our identities are plural. But I can only have several identities if it is me – one and only individual – who owns them" (Descombes, 2017, p. 17).

This is precisely what Banks' approach fails to emphasise, and is the reason multicultural education remains a "conceptual mess" (Levinson, 2010, p. 428). Brought to fruition, the logic of the recognition and 'validation' of identities reduces social relations to intersubjective relationships (Rochex, 2020), which refers, despite the insistence on 'communities' and 'cultures', to a liberal-nominalist approach. It is therefore necessary to prioritise the objectives of this type of educational approach. What would the criteria be for 'validating' the identity of students "coming from a culture that values 'assertive' or 'macho' boys but denigrates girls for being 'authoritarian' or 'aggressive'?" (Levinson, 2010, p. 431). Counter-intuitively, 'recognising' and 'validating' minority cultures could be easier in culturally segregated environments, since the teacher can then adapt to their audience; while "the more a class of students is culturally diverse, the harder it becomes to teach in a culturally congruent manner" (Levinson, 2010, p. 431).

Certainly, any multicultural thinker would be highly dismayed by the argument that (ethnic and/or social) segregation might actually facilitate multicultural education. However, it is the conclusion that logically imposes itself as long as we consider individualism more as a given than as the product of a political society – or even a societal culture if we follow Louis Dumont. By failing to grasp this reality, the risk is to project oneself onto a totality that does not exist (the world community) and to find on arrival what had been "postulated at the beginning: the global individual, detached, free, light ... and empty" (Vibert, 2015, p. 129). In short, a global individual, but not a citizen.

Thus, the question shifts. As presented by Karsenti and Lemieux, the socialist motif, as a reaction to the two other constitutive ideologies of modernity, offers an additional reflexivity. How can it be implemented? First, by admitting that students already know how to distance themselves from society to feature (cultural, ethnic, etc.) sub-groups to which they belong or wish to belong. In doing so, they are in line with individualism as a value making up the substance of our liberal societies, whilst testing the current framework of citizenship. Being in line with 'a whole' on the one hand, putting it to the test on the
auspices of (a more or less liberal) nationalism. The profusion of identities in question rather attests to the deepening of individualism specific to modern societies: to be able to choose one's identity. However, before being the sign of alterities that the teacher should recognise and validate (as advocated by Banks), identities can only take place within the framework of the totality, that is, the political society, which makes them possible as individual attributes. Indeed, "we are told that our identities are plural. But I can only have several identities if it is me – one and only individual – who owns them" (Descombes, 2017, p. 17).

This is precisely what Banks' approach fails to emphasise, and is the reason multicultural education remains a "conceptual mess" (Levinson, 2010, p. 428). Brought to fruition, the logic of the recognition and 'validation' of identities reduces social relations to intersubjective relationships (Rochex, 2020), which refers, despite the insistence on 'communities' and 'cultures', to a liberal-nominalist approach. It is therefore necessary to prioritise the objectives of this type of educational approach. What would the criteria be for 'validating' the identity of students "coming from a culture that values 'assertive' or 'macho' boys but denigrates girls for being 'authoritarian' or 'aggressive'?" (Levinson, 2010, p. 431). Counter-intuitively, 'recognising' and 'validating' minority cultures could be easier in culturally segregated environments, since the teacher can then adapt to their audience; while "the more a class of students is culturally diverse, the harder it becomes to teach in a culturally congruent manner" (Levinson, 2010, p. 431).

Certainly, any multicultural thinker would be highly dismayed by the argument that (ethnic and/or social) segregation might actually facilitate multicultural education. However, it is the conclusion that logically imposes itself as long as we consider individualism more as a given than as the product of a political society – or even a societal culture if we follow Louis Dumont. By failing to grasp this reality, the risk is to project oneself onto a totality that does not exist (the world community) and to find on arrival what had been "postulated at the beginning: the global individual, detached, free, light ... and empty" (Vibert, 2015, p. 129). In short, a global individual, but not a citizen.

Thus, the question shifts. As presented by Karsenti and Lemieux, the socialist motif, as a reaction to the two other constitutive ideologies of modernity, offers an additional reflexivity. How can it be implemented? First, by admitting that students already know how to distance themselves from society to feature (cultural, ethnic, etc.) sub-groups to which they belong or wish to belong. In doing so, they are in line with individualism as a value making up the substance of our liberal societies, whilst testing the current framework of citizenship. Being in line with 'a whole' on the one hand, putting it to the test on the
other: holding both sides of the problem is not easy. This is evidenced by the fact that this tension, explored by Durkheim, has been concealed in sociology, a discipline that has largely embraced nominalism (Callegaro & Giry, 2020; Rochex, 2020; Urfalino, 2021).

In summary, the risk with ‘identity recognition’ and the vague promotion of ‘diversity’ is of reducing social relations to inter subjectivity. Therefore, one must overcome the opposition between, on the one hand, liberal-nominalists forgetful of the ‘third-party registry’ under the pretext of identity recognition, and on the other, conservatives hypostasising this reality in the form of identity nationalism.

## 3.2 Reflexive Postures in GCE

We have emphasised above that GCE is not particularly multiculturalist, neo-liberal, Marxian, postcolonial, religious (etc.), since approaches to global citizenship extend across the spectrum of political opinions. In this, Banks' approach is not sufficiently reflective, because it equates GCE and multiculturalism. Admittedly, politically, it is better to be open, tolerant, to fight injustice and accept 'diversity' than to be neo-liberal – although these various orientations can also be combined (Joppke, 2017). However, on a conceptual level, associating GCE with the multiculturalist ideal is confusing. How is neo-liberals' approach of citizenship less 'global' than Banks'? To solve this sort of problem, social science research might explicit its specific socialist gesture, especially when it comes to thinking about education.

Sociology, in France at least, has seen its destiny linked to pedagogy and education. Durkheim was a teacher of pedagogy throughout his career, which is not a coincidence. [...] In this regard, the extreme modernity of socialism lies in the fact that its educational ambition is to ensure that every individual, whatever their place in society, is able to study the practices of the groups in which he or she participates, with an autonomous judgment oriented towards the question of social justice. The ambition is also that, by doing so, this individual is able to demonstrate a minimum of reflexivity on his or her groups and on those of others. Thus conceived, access to education becomes the means for all to learn to distance themselves from the heritage received – not in order to reject it, but to relate to it differently. (Karsenti & Lemieux, 2019, pp. 157–158)

The socialist motif differs here from the liberal-nominalist one, emphasising “the heritage received” that governs modern societies. However, these elements of totality are not rigorously conceptualised in Banks’ work, even
other: holding both sides of the problem is not easy. This is evidenced by the fact that this tension, explored by Durkheim, has been concealed in sociology, a discipline that has largely embraced nominalism (Callegaro & Giry, 2020; Rochex, 2020; Urfalino, 2021).

In summary, the risk with ‘identity recognition’ and the vague promotion of ‘diversity’ is of reducing social relations to inter subjectivity. Therefore, one must overcome the opposition between, on the one hand, liberal-nominalists forgetful of the ‘third-party registry’ under the pretext of identity recognition, and on the other, conservatives hypostasising this reality in the form of identity nationalism.

## 3.2 Reflexive Postures in GCE

We have emphasised above that GCE is not particularly multiculturalist, neo-liberal, Marxian, postcolonial, religious (etc.), since approaches to global citizenship extend across the spectrum of political opinions. In this, Banks' approach is not sufficiently reflective, because it equates GCE and multiculturalism. Admittedly, politically, it is better to be open, tolerant, to fight injustice and accept 'diversity' than to be neo-liberal – although these various orientations can also be combined (Joppke, 2017). However, on a conceptual level, associating GCE with the multiculturalist ideal is confusing. How is neo-liberals' approach of citizenship less 'global' than Banks'? To solve this sort of problem, social science research might explicit its specific socialist gesture, especially when it comes to thinking about education.

Sociology, in France at least, has seen its destiny linked to pedagogy and education. Durkheim was a teacher of pedagogy throughout his career, which is not a coincidence. [...] In this regard, the extreme modernity of socialism lies in the fact that its educational ambition is to ensure that every individual, whatever their place in society, is able to study the practices of the groups in which he or she participates, with an autonomous judgment oriented towards the question of social justice. The ambition is also that, by doing so, this individual is able to demonstrate a minimum of reflexivity on his or her groups and on those of others. Thus conceived, access to education becomes the means for all to learn to distance themselves from the heritage received – not in order to reject it, but to relate to it differently. (Karsenti & Lemieux, 2019, pp. 157–158)

The socialist motif differs here from the liberal-nominalist one, emphasising “the heritage received” that governs modern societies. However, these elements of totality are not rigorously conceptualised in Banks’ work, even
though they underlie his model, exposed from then on to the severe criticisms
of Levinson. Conversely, conservatives do not accept that one can distance
oneself from the national heritage received. One can note this in Miller's sup-
port for the recognition by the state of a majority religion. It can also be found
in Schnapper's backing – as president since 2018 of the Council of Elders on
Secularism (French Ministry of National Education) – of the prohibition of
ostensible wearing of religious signs by parents accompanying school trips,
thus supporting a majority heritage rigidified by the state.

However, leaving the field of GCE to find reflexive resources pointing to
the socialist motif is unnecessary. They primarily involve a critical relation-
ship between researchers and trainers themselves, with respect to the catego-
ries they use. Such an approach comes from the *Palgrave Handbook of Global
Citizenship and Education*, which consists in recalling that global citizenship,
often legitimised by the cosmopolitanism of Diogenes, has local roots, not
only Greek, but also marked by the perspective in *I* of the famous sentence
attributed to the latter: "I am a citizen of the world". The subject of the sen-
tence is centred on the (European) individual who is supposed to integrate the
world from his own perspective. The cosmopolitan paradox here is obvious. It
consists, from a localised point of view, in separating the world into several cat-
egories. On the one hand, individuals who claim to not be rooted, and on the
other, rooted individuals. Yet, is cosmopolitanism not about bringing people
together? Let us be clear, this is not necessarily an *impasse*, but it is at the very
least a serious paradox that needs to be dealt with as such.⁷

Moreover, the focus of many GCE currents on migration and the right to
universal hospitality ignores the fact that

> I owe to some arrivals more than hospital treatment; furthermore, the
> framework of hospitality obscures what we might owe to those who, hav-
> ing remained rooted, are never met [by the cosmopolitan] as newcomers [...].
> Cosmopolitan reflections around hospitality fail to ask research
> questions that would challenge both narcissistic and empathetic identi-
> fications of the western 'I' (self-described or self-prescribed as nomadic)
> with the fellow traveller (the moving other). (Papastephanou, 2018, p. 182)

This critical analysis alone cannot resolve the tensions mentioned above.
However, the point of it is to question internally, in the *Handbook* dedicated
to the subject, GCE itself, by asking: to what extent could GCE be the fruit of a
particular vision of the world? The question therefore is not about being for or
against GCE, because such a question replays the foreseeable oppositions, per-
ceived by Karsenti and Lemieux, between proponents of the liberal-nominalist
though they underlie his model, exposed from then on to the severe criticisms
of Levinson. Conversely, conservatives do not accept that one can distance
oneself from the national heritage received. One can note this in Miller's sup-
port for the recognition by the state of a majority religion. It can also be found
in Schnapper's backing – as president since 2018 of the Council of Elders on
Secularism (French Ministry of National Education) – of the prohibition of
ostensible wearing of religious signs by parents accompanying school trips,
thus supporting a majority heritage rigidified by the state.

However, leaving the field of GCE to find reflexive resources pointing to
the socialist motif is unnecessary. They primarily involve a critical relation-
ship between researchers and trainers themselves, with respect to the catego-
ries they use. Such an approach comes from the *Palgrave Handbook of Global
Citizenship and Education*, which consists in recalling that global citizenship,
often legitimised by the cosmopolitanism of Diogenes, has local roots, not
only Greek, but also marked by the perspective in *I* of the famous sentence
attributed to the latter: "I am a citizen of the world". The subject of the sen-
tence is centred on the (European) individual who is supposed to integrate the
world from his own perspective. The cosmopolitan paradox here is obvious. It
consists, from a localised point of view, in separating the world into several cat-
egories. On the one hand, individuals who claim to not be rooted, and on the
other, rooted individuals. Yet, is cosmopolitanism not about bringing people
together? Let us be clear, this is not necessarily an *impasse*, but it is at the very
least a serious paradox that needs to be dealt with as such.⁷

Moreover, the focus of many GCE currents on migration and the right to
universal hospitality ignores the fact that

> I owe to some arrivals more than hospital treatment; furthermore, the
> framework of hospitality obscures what we might owe to those who, hav-
> ing remained rooted, are never met [by the cosmopolitan] as newcomers [...].
> Cosmopolitan reflections around hospitality fail to ask research
> questions that would challenge both narcissistic and empathetic identi-
> fications of the western 'I' (self-described or self-prescribed as nomadic)
> with the fellow traveller (the moving other). (Papastephanou, 2018, p. 182)

This critical analysis alone cannot resolve the tensions mentioned above.
However, the point of it is to question internally, in the *Handbook* dedicated
to the subject, GCE itself, by asking: to what extent could GCE be the fruit of a
particular vision of the world? The question therefore is not about being for or
against GCE, because such a question replays the foreseeable oppositions, per-
ceived by Karsenti and Lemieux, between proponents of the liberal-nominalist
motif and the conservative motif. As a way out of this quarrel, it is necessary to
include the prescriptions and recommendations on GCE and their promoters
in the analysis.

4 A Republican Interventionism Limited to the Educational Sphere

In short, critical republicanism differs from the liberal-nominalist motif as well
as the conservative motif, and signals towards the third path of socialism. What
then of Durkheimian republicanism? Deeply anti-nominalist, Durkheim was
not satisfied with an opposition between the individual and society, because
the deepening of the 'cult of the human person', according to him, was a matter
of social totality via organic solidarity that was supposed to reconcile differ-
entiation and interdependence. If the resulting diversity was, for Durkheim,
especially professional, there is no need to confine it to this aspect. Cultural
diversity is also an element of the evolution of social solidarity and we can
consider it, in return, as "the engine of a profound transformation of national
identity" (Guérard de Latour, 2009, p. 240).

However, a point of divergence between conservative and critical republi-
cans lies precisely in their reading of Durkheim. According to Schnapper, the
latter had not foreseen that forms of mechanical solidarity, of the pre-modern
type, could resurface in societies marked by a major division of labour. How-
ever, according to Guérard de Latour, the problem of our liberal societies does
not lie in the supposed return of undesirable mechanical solidarity: in reality,
the problem is that the division of labour is not integrated and regulated in a
sufficiently coherent way.

On the one hand, discriminations (in employment, housing, educational
guidance) are not compatible with a harmonious division of labour, because
their persistence is due to rules that correspond to a previous state of division
of labour. On the other hand, the need to be recognised for who we are – and
what we do – is heightened, writes Durkheim, when the division of labour is
important. Therefore, citizen manifestations of recognition of cultural authen-
ticity, racial identity (etc.), do not go against organic solidarity but are on the
contrary an effect of the latter. That is why there is no need to play the republi-
can ethic against the supposed return of mechanical solidarity. The challenge
is rather to best accompany the inevitable deepening of the division of labour,
by promoting the 'communication circuit' mentioned previously between
state and society.

In other words, if Durkheim had clearly seen the pathologies of modern
society, he did not think it appropriate to explain them by posing the costly
motif and the conservative motif. As a way out of this quarrel, it is necessary to
include the prescriptions and recommendations on GCE and their promoters
in the analysis.

4 A Republican Interventionism Limited to the Educational Sphere

In short, critical republicanism differs from the liberal-nominalist motif as well
as the conservative motif, and signals towards the third path of socialism. What
then of Durkheimian republicanism? Deeply anti-nominalist, Durkheim was
not satisfied with an opposition between the individual and society, because
the deepening of the ‘cult of the human person’, according to him, was a matter
of social totality via organic solidarity that was supposed to reconcile differ-
entiation and interdependence. If the resulting diversity was, for Durkheim,
especially professional, there is no need to confine it to this aspect. Cultural
diversity is also an element of the evolution of social solidarity and we can
consider it, in return, as “the engine of a profound transformation of national
identity” (Guérard de Latour, 2009, p. 240).

However, a point of divergence between conservative and critical republi-
cans lies precisely in their reading of Durkheim. According to Schnapper, the
latter had not foreseen that forms of mechanical solidarity, of the pre-modern
type, could resurface in societies marked by a major division of labour. How-
ever, according to Guérard de Latour, the problem of our liberal societies does
not lie in the supposed return of undesirable mechanical solidarity: in reality,
the problem is that the division of labour is not integrated and regulated in a
sufficiently coherent way.

On the one hand, discriminations (in employment, housing, educational
guidance) are not compatible with a harmonious division of labour, because
their persistence is due to rules that correspond to a previous state of division
of labour. On the other hand, the need to be recognised for who we are – and
what we do – is heightened, writes Durkheim, when the division of labour is
important. Therefore, citizen manifestations of recognition of cultural authen-
ticity, racial identity (etc.), do not go against organic solidarity but are on the
contrary an effect of the latter. That is why there is no need to play the republi-
can ethic against the supposed return of mechanical solidarity. The challenge
is rather to best accompany the inevitable deepening of the division of labour,
by promoting the ‘communication circuit’ mentioned previously between
state and society.

In other words, if Durkheim had clearly seen the pathologies of modern
society, he did not think it appropriate to explain them by posing the costly