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Article

# The Ecological Community: The Blind Spot of Environmental Virtue Ethics

Rémi Beau

Institute of Ecology and Environmental Sciences, Sorbonne Université, F-75005 Paris, France; remi.beau@cnrs.fr

**Abstract:** Since their emergence in the 1980s, environmental virtue ethics (EVEs) have aimed to provide an alternative to deontological and consequentialist approaches for guiding ecological actions in the context of the global environmental crisis. The deterioration of the ecological situation and the challenges in addressing collective action problems caused by global changes have heightened interest in these ethics. They offer a framework for meaningful individual actions independently of the commitment of other actors. However, by shifting the focus onto individuals, EVEs appear to grapple with the tension between anthropocentrism and respect for nature, as well as between self-flourishing and concern for other living beings. This article argues that this difficulty is rooted in the neglect within EVEs of the communitarian aspect of ancient virtue ethics. Drawing from Baird Callicott's ecocentric approach and Val Plumwood's works, this paper explores the possibility of conceiving ecological communities as collective frameworks in which both public and private virtues are defined and practiced.

**Keywords:** environmental virtue ethics; ecological community; collective virtues; relational self; egocentrism; ecocentrism; self-realization

## 1. Introduction

Since the 1980s, environmental ethics have significantly echoed the revival of virtue ethics in moral philosophy [1]. While deontological and consequentialist approaches struggled to show concrete effects on the deterioration of the ecological situation, environmental virtue ethics (EVEs) emphasized the role of character and flourishing in the environmental movement. Remaining faithful to the Aristotelian idea that "by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust" [2] (1103b15), EVEs aim to extend this moral approach to our transactions with Earth others. These reflections took the form of a series of studies aimed at identifying dispositions for action that could be described as 'environmental virtues' (e.g., humility, frugality, and attentiveness) [3-5]. Several approaches emerged in this regard. Some followed the path of eudaimonist virtue ethics, aiming to demonstrate how respect for the environment was a necessary condition for human flourishing [6]. Others pursued agent-centered approaches, which sought to identify the motivations found in the actions of exemplary individuals that enable virtuous acts to be defined. The goal was to illustrate how some of the great figures in environmentalism (such as Henry David Thoreau, Aldo Leopold, and Rachel Carson) embodied a particular environmental virtue [7].

Now firmly established in the field of environmental ethics, virtue ethics are facing the most pressing questions that permeate the discipline, particularly those related to global changes. How do we define moral virtues aimed at protecting a nature that is constantly changing? How do we care for ecological communities in the Anthropocene, that is, in a world where climate change and the erosion of biodiversity continue to accelerate? This article will begin by showing in Section 2 how EVEs address these questions by proposing a response to the problem of collective action that lies at the heart of the "moral storm" [8] triggered by global change. Section 3 will analyze two strong objections to this response,

**Citation:** Beau, R. The Ecological Community: The Blind Spot of Environmental Virtue Ethics. *Philosophies* 2023, 8, 112. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8060112

Academic Editors: Sylvie Pouteau and Gérald Hess

Received: 7 October 2023
Revised: 20 November 2023
Accepted: 21 November 2023
Published: 23 November 2023

<figure><img src="image_16.png" /></figure>

**Copyright:** © 2023 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
claiming that it amounts to a return to an anthropocentric and individualistic ethical
framework. The following two sections will examine how some EVEs have attempted
to escape this criticism by demonstrating how the relational nature of the self implies
consideration of Earth others in self-realization. However, after pointing out the limitations
of these relational approaches in light of the works of Val Plumwood and Baird Callicott,
Section 5 advocates for shifting the focus away from the self to explore collectives in
which environmental virtues can be exercised. Finally, Section 7 demonstrates how the
de-individualization of EVEs can involve characterizing collective virtues conceived on the
scale of ecological communities.

2. A Response to the Problem of Collective Action

Virtue ethics have grown in significance within environmental discourse as the global dimension of the ecological crisis has become one of the primary challenges to environmental action. Indeed, on a global scale, environmental issues present a particularly challenging “collective action problem”. This type of problem, extensively discussed in moral and political philosophy, characterizes situations in which cooperation that would benefit all parties involved is hindered by the risk that some agents may opt not to act, prioritizing their individual self-interests over the common good. An early formulation of this is to be found in David Hume’s *Treatise on Human Nature* published in 1739:

> "Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because it is easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the whole project. But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons should agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expence, and would lay the whole burden on others". [9] (p. 538)

In this light, climate change emerges as an immense challenge for cooperation, as it
affects all inhabitants of Earth and spans multiple generations. Furthermore, as philosopher
Stephen Gardiner has pointed out, the characteristics of this global problem, particularly the
spatial and temporal dispersion of its causes and effects, foster forms of ‘moral corruption’
and free-riding strategies among individual or collective actors [8]. In the absence of
binding regulations enforced by an international institution capable of sanctioning non-
compliance, the prospect that the commitment of some may not be reciprocated by others
fosters a sense of inaction. Without cooperation, the calculation of costs and benefits does
not necessarily support committing to action, as it may be more disadvantageous to combat
climate change than to do nothing in a world where cooperative partners are not reliable.

At various levels, this issue prompts the question of the significance of ecological com-
mitment. Particularly at the individual level, recognizing the imperative need to profoundly
transform the production and consumption patterns of industrial societies, alongside the
observation of collective inertia, threatens to undermine the definition of an ethical life
project. Why should I change my way of living, eating, moving, traveling, or housing
myself if I know that these changes will not have any impact on global changes? In this
context, virtue ethics provide a solution by no longer tying motivation for ecological action
to the success of cooperation. Instead, they advocate for the development of dispositions for
action, seen as intrinsic qualities of virtuous individuals, and therefore pursued regardless
of the actions of others. As noted by American philosopher Dale Jamieson, in the context
of climate change, virtues "give us the resiliency to live meaningful lives even when our
actions are not reciprocated [10]". Therefore, virtue ethics prove particularly relevant due
to their ability to guide individual behavior in a context where environmental disruptions
pose new moral challenges that cannot be solved on an individual basis.
### 3. Back to Anthropocentrism and Individual-Centered Approach?

However, an ethical response similar to Jamieson's, in turn, raises an important question. Does it ultimately lead to a departure from the realm of collective action, embodying an individual retreat into ethics, partly motivated by the failure of climate and environmental policies? Thus, EVEs may not truly offer a solution to the problem of collective action in environmental matters. Instead, they might lead to giving up on attempting to address it and pose the question of the possibility for individuals to lead a good life, knowing that we have failed to address global environmental issues. In doing so, it would result in a refocusing of environmental ethics on human individuals.

In *Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World* [11], Carolyn Merchant schematized the shift in ethical thinking brought about by the environmental ethics movement, describing a progression that began with an egocentric stance and moved towards ethics centered on relationships among members of the same eco-community. In light of what has just been said, would the emergence of EVEs lead us to travel in the opposite direction?

In fact, from the outset, the resurgence of virtue ethics starting in the 1960s generally faced criticism that viewed this movement as a focus on self-concern at the expense of concern for others. To put it simply, some virtue ethics were accused of theorizing a form of moral selfishness. Canadian philosopher Thomas Hurka argued in this regard that Aristotelian-inspired virtue ethics were, at their core, egoistic because they ultimately made the individual pursuit of eudaimonia the central core of ethics [12]. In such a framework, he believed that the ultimate reasons for moral action always relate to one's own flourishing and not to the flourishing of others. According to him, they would fail to escape a form of moral solipsism: the idea that by placing the self at the center of ethics, they render concerns for others secondary or even inconsequential.

Within the field of environmental ethics, these approaches centered on moral agents presented a second issue. The pursuit of individual flourishing, as theorized by eudaimonistic ethics, also seemed to narrow the sphere of moral consideration, limiting concerns to humans alone. From this perspective, virtue ethics represented a return to moral anthropocentrism. For many proponents of the intrinsic value of nature, this focus disqualified them from their claim to be an alternative to non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. In this regard, Holmes Rolston highlighted the limitations of these approaches in the field of environmental ethics:

> Environmental virtues, as achieved by humans, will initially involve concern for human quality of life. But our deeper ethical achievement needs to focus on values as intrinsic achievements in wild nature. These virtues within us need to attend to values without us. Perhaps one starts with a love of nature that is tributary to self-love. Later one discovers that this self-love is quite inclusive, for the health of myriad nonhumans is implicated, entwined with ours. One is called to an active concern and positive engagement with the object of encounter. The other cannot be seen simply as a source of personal transformation. We must make the model at least an ellipse with two foci: human virtue and natural value.
> 
> [13] (p. 69)

For Rolston, the reflection on human virtues can indeed demonstrate how self-concern can benefit others, especially non-human beings. The flourishing of humans indirectly involves, without being aimed at as a moral end, the flourishing of other forms of life. However, according to him, this position, which resembles a weak anthropocentrism, cannot replace the moral imperatives that stem from the recognition of the intrinsic value of nature insofar as it requires respecting other Earth beings, even if they do not contribute to any human's self-flourishing.

In his discussion of EVE, Callicott, in a similar line, critiques the strictly individualistic approach adopted by their theoreticians. He writes as follows:

> The Aristotelian cast of the contemporary revival of virtue ethics, consistent with the hyper-individualism of Modern moral philosophy, renders contemporary
environmental virtue ethics supportive of the first prong of the virtue ethics at which Leopold hints, the self-respect of the individual. [1] (pp. 255–256)

In summary, EVEs would represent a significant regression toward anthropocentrism and individualism compared to the ambitious thinking carried out in environmental ethics since the 1970s.

## 4. Relational Approaches

Faced with these criticisms, EVEs could rely on the arguments put forth by virtue ethics theorists to counter the objection of egoism. One of the most robust responses is based on the assertion that the flourishing sought by the virtuous individual is fundamentally relational. This involves affirming the primacy of relationships in the pursuit of flourishing. This is, for example, clearly articulated by the philosopher Christopher Toner in his response to John Hare’s formulation of the self-centered objection:

> This, then, is the template for a non-self-centred eudaimonistic virtue ethics: the agent seeks to live a life of virtue, where the virtues are simply those traits the possession and exercise of which constitute flourishing for a rational agent of that sort, where to flourish is to stand in the right relation to ‘objects’ according to their degrees and kinds of goodness, and where the right relation is that which acknowledges the nature or status of each relatum, in such a way that it is held in regard at least in part for its own sake. It is not self-centred to seek one’s own flourishing because such flourishing is essentially relational. Attachment to others is not secondary as Hare alleges, but is of the essence of flourish. [14] (p. 613)

Toner responds point by point to the previous objections. Because virtues are relational dispositions, they necessarily entail extending consideration to others than oneself. Furthermore, because a relationship cannot be considered good if it only contributes to the flourishing of one of the two related beings, virtue ethics must take into account the specificity of the good for each of these beings. The flourishing of others, which presupposes the recognition of their existence as moral agents who matter for themselves, no longer appears as secondary but as a necessary correlate of one’s own flourishing.

The scope of this theoretical reflection on virtue ethics, in general, quite explicitly extends to the specific domain of environmental ethics. Indeed, taking into account the flourishing of others for their own sake appears to open up virtue ethics to considering the intrinsic value of non-human beings. In his proposal for EVEs, Ronald Sandler responds precisely in this manner to the objection that “a Virtue-Oriented Approach Cannot Value Environmental Entities for Their Own Sake [6] (p. 114)”. The relational approach allows him to refute this criticism because, as he writes regarding certain environmental virtues:

> They are not excellent in themselves, abstracted from the rest of the world. They are excellences in relating to the world. The facts about us (the sort of beings we are) and our world (the sort of demands there are for beings like us) are what make particular character traits virtues or vices. The bases of the virtues, therefore, in elude entities with inherent worth and values “without us”. Moreover, they justify responsiveness to all sorts of environmental entities, including landscapes, ecosystems, living things, and sentient beings. Thus, there is no danger of environmental virtue losing touch with values or worth in the natural world. [6] (pp. 112–113)

This conception of ethical inquiry strongly resonates with Arne Naess’s moral perfectionism. The theory of the ecological self that he unfolds in his works appears indeed as a relational approach to the self. It asserts that the self is not a social atom separate from the relationships it forms with the world but rather that it is fundamentally constituted by its relationships with others and with nature. In this framework, making self-realization the goal of ethics would not signify a retreat into a form of egoism and anthropocentrism. Instead, it would involve defining ethical work as a practice aimed at continually improving one’s connection to the world. Naess writes:
The greater our comprehension of our togetherness with other beings, the greater the identification, and the greater care we will take. The road is also opened thereby for delight in the well-being of others and sorrow when harm befall them. We seek what is best for ourselves, but through the extension of the self, our ‘own’ best is also that of others. The own/not-own distinction survives only in grammar, not in feeling. [15] (p. 175)

In summary, proponents of relational approaches counter the criticisms of EVEs by arguing that these objections hold true only if one assumes a flawed conception of what constitutes a moral agent. In an atomistic ontology, a moral theory does not seem capable of simultaneously being agent-centered and other-centered. However, they contend that this apparent contradiction dissipates when one adopts a relational conception of the self.

## 5. Redefining or Decentering the Self

However, while they may offer an elegant response to the objections of egoism and anthropocentrism, relational approaches to virtues maintain a certain ambiguity concerning how they seem to describe the merging of personal interests and the interests of others. According to these propositions, the risk of theorizing a form of moral egoism dissipates when one understands that self-realization entails the realization of the others who constitute this self. In Naess's terms, self-realization cannot be selfish if it pertains to an ecological self. But how can we ensure that this is indeed an overcoming of egoism and not merely a resolution of the tension that may exist between self-flourishing and the flourishing of others through the absorption and dissolution of others' interests?

Analyzing the discussion between Naess and the existentialist philosopher Peter Reed on this matter, Val Plumwood highlights the indecisive nature of self-realization:

> On first glance, Naess's account does not appear to appeal to either fusion or to egoism—since we are supposed to defend not the self but the big Self as ‘the totality of our identifications’. But, says Reed, there seem to be inconsistent requirements hidden here: we are supposed to retain a sense of our individuality as we work to save the big Self from destruction—but at the same time we are supposed to lose interest in our individuality as we cultivate our identification with the big Self. We are required to be egoists and also not egoists, to retain the intensity and defence drive of egoism, but also to abandon certain key differentiations between ourselves and others, in order to establish that equivalence between self and other which enables a transfer of our selfregarding motives. Naess's position, on closer inspection, ultimately is based on a kind of self-interest and upon a form of fusion or expulsion of difference—taking the form, as Naess explains in his reply, of identity of interests. [16] (p. 199)

According to Plumwood, the model of identification that guides the realization of the ecological self ultimately leads not to a critique of egoism but to its extension through this expansion of the self.

In an article on the concept of self-realization in Naess's philosophy, Callicott presents a similar critique by arguing that Naess's thought has evolved from a genuinely relational conception of the self that was emerging in the foundational article on deep ecology [17] to a monist conception inspired by Hinduism. Regarding the former, he writes:

> What is an ecological approach to being in the world? In the context of ‘The Shallow and the Deep’ article Self-realization is a relational conception of the self and, more importantly, an experience of oneself in relational terms. One is and one experiences oneself to be a ‘knot in the biospherical net of intrinsic relations.’ Or better: as a node or nexus in a skein of internal socio-environmental relations. One experiences ‘the beauty and complexity of nature [as] continuous with [one]sel[f]’. [18] (p. 239)
However, according to Callicott, this conception fades later on, particularly in *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle* [15]. In this work, he observes a unification and merging of selves that he finds problematic and describes as follows:

> In the metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta, the atman or Self at the core of oneself is equated with Brahman, the one universal Being at the core of all other selves (jivas) and indeed at the core of all phenomena whatsoever. In short, there is a unity in multiplicity and that unity is Atman-Brahman. There is, thus, an actual, literal common identity that oneself shares with other selves. My Self is also your Self; my Self and your Self are not two (advaita); they are one and the same. All Selves are one and the same Self. [18] (p. 244)

From this perspective, it becomes apparent that relational approaches can lead ethical reflection into what Plumwood refers to as the “Ocean of continuity [19] (p. 155)”, which no longer allows for the recognition of the distinct differences of each moral agent. If everyone is directed on an ethical path that leads from the ego to the Self, this process takes the form of a “one-place relationship” [16] (p. 197) that does not acknowledge other beings as centers of resistance with their own interests and goods. Consequently, ethical reflection may fail to break free from the monological relationship between the self and nature that characterizes centric constructions of ethics. In the end, EVEs that follows this path would fall under the previous charge of defending egocentrism.

For Plumwood, this is the reason why virtue ethics should redirect the focus from self-flourishing towards interpersonal relations. Virtues, especially environmental virtues, are, in her view, dispositions to act against “the oppressive ideologies of domination and self-imposition that have formed our conceptions of both the other and ourselves” [16] (p. 194). She calls them counter-hegemonic virtues. Through the exercise of these virtues, moral agents cultivate a form of decentering that involves attention and openness to the alterity of the diversity of Earth others. The horizon of this virtue ethics is a world without a single center, in which beings, acting as nodes in the biospheric network, are recognized in their specificity.

## 6. From Counter-Hegemonic to Collective Virtues

Against the holistic view of the merging of the moral self into a vast, undifferentiated whole, Plumwood and Callicott emphasize the plurality of selves and non-human agents. From this perspective, they assert that adopting a relational ontology does not imply the absorption of divergent interests or their alignment toward a single process of flourishing. Furthermore, they argue that EVE's central concern should not be the flourishing of individual agents but rather the characterization of a state of the community to which they belong. conducive to establishing a coexistence that respects the diversity of interconnected beings.

In that sense, Callicott assesses that EVE's main shortcoming is precisely that it failed to draw on what ancient philosophy offered in terms of thinking about virtues not merely as individual or even relational traits but as attributes of collectives. Collective virtues, in his view, represent the unexplored dimension of the contemporary revival of virtue ethics in the environmental domain.

In his own analysis of the potential of virtue ethics to address environmental issues, Callicott outlines three levels: personal, professional, and societal [1] (p. 158). The latter two differ from the first in that they refer to institutions or collective actors. Professional virtues are associated with ways of excelling in the practice of a profession. Societal virtues, on the other hand, characterize an entire community capable of cultivating traits that enable self-respect. According to Callicott, these virtues are particularly important because they allow us to address environmental problems at the collective level. However, EVEs, including their relational versions, have not been able to provide satisfactory answers because they have primarily focused on personal virtues.

What exactly does Callicott mean by collective virtues? A rich philosophical debate on the definition or even the existence of this type of virtue and the nature of the groups
capable of exercising them has emerged [20,21]. This debate intersects with the theoretical
discussions initiated by Margaret Gilbert’s work on collective actions and beliefs [22].
Without going into the details of this discussion, it is sufficient to mention here that the
concept of collective virtue does not imply granting personhood status to groups. Following
Ryan and Meghan Byerly’s proposal, a collective virtue can be defined as follows:

A collective C has a virtue V to the extent that the members of C are disposed,
qua members of C, to behave in ways characteristic of V under appropriate
circumstances. [21] (p. 46)

The collective dimension of these virtues is expressed in the fact that individuals or
agents exercise them as members of a community to which these virtues are attributed.

But what communities are we referring to here? In his discussion, Callicott mainly
mentions the ancient model of the polis. His references are to Aristotle and Plato [1] (pp.
259–261). However, this anchoring raises serious difficulties, first of all, because these social
forms no longer exist, and moreover, their highly unequal structure makes them difficult to
mobilize as a normative horizon within contemporary societies. These difficulties are at
the heart of Alasdair McIntyre’s work. How can we revive a virtue ethics that depends on
social conditions that have disappeared? The analysis of this question takes an aporetic
turn in *After Virtue* [23]. McIntyre does not believe that modern nation-states can embody
social forms conducive to the development of a communal life oriented toward a common
ideal of a good life that would allow for the definition of private and public virtues. He
then retreats to small face-to-face communities that he believes are the only remaining
spaces for the development of virtue ethics.

However, does the idea of public virtues necessarily lead to this pessimistic and
politically conservative conclusion? A first response can emphasize that virtue ethics
may not be destined to embody the type of moral authority capable of ordering society, as
McIntyre aspires to. In a version more compatible with democracy, it can be conceived more
modestly as an ethical reflection that engages in public discourse about the organization
of common life. A second response can draw inspiration from the critique addressed by
Plumwood to McIntyre, in which she asserts that virtue ethics are not necessarily linked to
the attempt to resurrect social structures from the past but can accompany the invention
or recognition of other more emancipatory social forms [19] (p. 186). Such a proposition
allows us to redirect the discussion on environmental virtues toward the identification of
collective virtues that can be exercised within ecological communities.

7. Collective Virtues within Ecological Communities

Critiquing the individualistic approach of EVEs, Callicott calls for a shift in thinking
by suggesting that environmental virtues could pertain to collectives or communities.
This notion prompts us to delve further into two questions: At what collective scale is it
relevant to locate environmental virtues? Which environmental virtues can be defined
as collective virtues?

The first question has the merit of drawing attention to the contextualization of the
reflection on environmental virtues. While the theorization of individual virtues has often
leaned towards the abstract characterization of virtuous environmental individuals, the
approach through collective virtues appears as a way to reposition ethical reflection within
a specific place and among a community of members who feel at least partially responsible
for the decisions and actions of this community. In this regard, Plumwood repeatedly
emphasizes the contextual dimension of the virtue ethics she describes.

Because spatial proximity promotes attention to the ecological consequences of our
actions, small-scale communities seem to provide an especially conducive framework for
practicing ethics that value the care given to the relationships that bind the diversity of
living beings. Plumwood appears to align with McIntyre in this regard by focusing on
small face-to-face communities. In her discussion of bioregionalism, she acknowledges how
the movement has effectively highlighted the invisibilization of ecological relationships
resulting from the remoteness of chains of production and distribution and the benefits
of relocalizing production activities. She also subscribes to the idea that decentralizing
decision making, on the contrary, encourages the consideration of the effects of these
decisions on the environment. Finally, she argues that true participatory democracy can
only occur at this local level. She writes on this subject:

Democracy can only be truly participatory at the level of the small, face-to-face community, people will be in a position to have the knowledge and motivation as well as the democratic and communicative means to make good ecological decisions, decisions that reflect their own extended long-term and familiar interests as well as those of their local ecologically-defined communities. [16] (p. 74)

In summary, Plumwood's analysis leads us to consider that local socio-ecological
communities represent a good scale for the collective practice of environmental virtues.
However, she also cautions against the risks of becoming confined to localism that could
generate other forms of invisibility. She observes that the proximity to nature facilitated by
small-scale communities does not necessarily guarantee "the first condition of the bioregionalist, the transparency to inhabitants of ecological relationships and dependencies [16] (p. 76)". From this perspective, while McIntyre tended to focus on goods internal to communities, Plumwood's concerns also revolve around embedding these communities within the broader network of socio-ecological relationships. According to her, environmental virtues must precisely help cultivate a "critical sense of place that can situate local relationships and communities in relation to wider communities" [16] (p. 77).

This leads us to the second question raised concerning the identification of collective and environmental virtues. What kind of trait or disposition to action could members of an ecological community cultivate as members of that community and be described as an environmental virtue? Among the list of virtues identified by Plumwood, solidarity emerges as an interesting candidate in this context. Thus, while this reflection will need to be broadened by considering other collective virtues, such as conviviality, the end of this section will focus on the concept of solidarity, which has already found significant resonance in ecological thought [24].

While she does not explicitly define it as a collective virtue herself, solidarity does
indeed meet the criteria of a virtue that characterizes a collective rather than an individual.
One would describe a community as “solidary” if the members of that community act
and make decisions that demonstrate empathy towards others and an acknowledgment
of the interdependent situation in which all members of that community find themselves.
As noted by Byerly, there is no individual-level analogue to solidarity, which is why it
constitutes a specifically collective virtue [21].

Plumwood assigns a pivotal role to solidarity in her virtue ethics. She carefully
distinguishes it from unity in her concern for respecting differences. Analyzing the central
role of this concept in Plumwood's work, Chaone Mallory writes:

Political solidarity for Plumwood is a relation in which one (or, as is more suitable for our purposes, the collective) does not claim an identification with the other— political solidarity describes a relation in which beings are motivated to act on behalf of others with whom one admits one does not (necessarily) share experiences, interests, worldviews, or subjectivity. However, those standing in solidarity become joined both with the object of solidarity and others involved in struggling for change through the shared recognition of injustice and oppression and through acting to change it. [25] (p. 8)

As Mallory suggests, ecological solidarity is a form of political solidarity in Plum-
wood's philosophy. It is indeed a collective and public virtue, in the sense of being a
"character trait[s] that bring[s] us into virtuous relationships with our communities and
environments" [26] (p. 18).

This approach has the merit of undoing most binary distinctions that seemed to render
EVEs ineffective, particularly the dichotomies between the individual and the collective,
the private and the public, or ethics and politics. In addition, rather than in opposition to
the realization of an ecological self, the work on collective virtues can be interpreted as a
process through which members of an ecological community care for the flourishing of the
diversity of living beings within it.

8. Conclusions

During their initial phase of development, EVEs were associated, both by their the-
orists and their critics, with the solitary practice of virtues that exemplified what a life
respectful of the diversity of living beings on Earth could be. This analytical framework
aligned with a common way of narrating the history of environmental conservation, which
successively invokes the prominent figures of the environmental cause, such as Thoreau,
Muir, Leopold, and Carson. Despite their claims to the contrary, these individualistic
approaches to EVEs are seen by many of their critics as a form of depoliticization of
environmental action.

However, the contributions of Plumwood and Callicott to this debate introduce
a different perspective within EVEs. By reintroducing social forms and ecological
communities in which environmental virtues can be practiced, they demonstrate how a
virtue ethics approach can, on the contrary, resonate with new forms of politicization of
ecological issues.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not applicable.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.

**Data Availability Statement:** No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

**Acknowledgments:** The author thanks two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

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Article

# Mutual Flourishing: A Dialogical Approach to Environmental Virtue Ethics

Esteban Arcos

CIRE (Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherche en Éthique), University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland; esteban.arcos@unil.ch

**Abstract:** Environmental virtue ethics is about how things (nature) matter, and this is explicated through the virtues (character and dispositions of the agent). It has been suggested that human virtue should be informed by what constitutes our flourishing and by what constitutes nonhuman entities flourishing. Our flourishing, in other words, involves recognising their flourishing and autonomy. My purpose in this paper is to elucidate the notion of mutual flourishing through a study on the relational space that a recognising attitude or disposition of a loving and caring subject creates in its interactions with ‘earth others’.

**Keywords:** mutual flourishing; recognition; autonomy; love (of nature); relational space; relational ontology; dialogical ethics

## 1.

It has been suggested that human virtue should be informed by what constitutes our flourishing and by what constitutes others' flourishing. As the scholar Robin Wall Kimmerer [1] likes to say: 'all flourishing is mutual'. This mutual flourishing paradigm is beautifully illustrated in the parable of the Three Sisters [1] (pp. 128–140). The Three Sisters refer to three plants: corn, beans and squash. Together they form a garden, which represents a place of possibilities for mutual flourishing: 'There are layers upon layers of reciprocity in this garden between the bean and the bacterium, the bean and the corn, the corn and the quash, and, ultimately, with the people' [1] (p. 134). The parable of the Three Sisters captures the basic intuition of the mutual flourishing approach to environmental virtue ethics that I will outline in this essay. Philosopher John O'Neill [2] formulates the issue nicely:

> For a large number, although not all, of individual living things and biological collectives, we should recognize and promote their flourishing as an end itself. Such care for the natural world is constitutive of a flourishing human life. The best human life is one that includes an awareness of and practical concern with the goods of entities in the nonhuman world. [2] (p. 24; see also pp. 78, 153 and p. 155)

I highlight the term 'recognition' as a central concept of our enquiry. My suggestion is that a *recognising attitude of nature* creates a *relational space* in which natural beings can be seen as independent, legitimate, others; that is, as free beings with their own 'projects' and 'ends'. It is because there are individuated others that there can be reciprocity, and thus mutual flourishing. I will make the hypothesis that the *recognition of nature's autonomy* is a necessary condition for an environmental virtue ethics based on mutual flourishing. In arguing for the recognition of nature's autonomy as the foundation of an ethic of mutual flourishing, I intend to continue Val Plumwood's [3,4] philosophical project, that is, to elaborate a counter-hegemonic strategy to replace 'monological relationships with nature by dialogical ones that are responsive to the other on their own terms' [3] (p. 111). In a dialogical, subject–subject, methodology, 'the other is always encountered as a potentially

**Citation:** Arcos, E. Mutual Flourishing: A Dialogical Approach to Environmental Virtue Ethics.
*Philosophies* 2024, 9, 6. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9010006

Academic Editors: Sylvie Pouteau and Gérald Hess

Received: 5 October 2023
Revised: 20 November 2023
Accepted: 26 December 2023
Published: 29 December 2023

<figure><img src="image_17.png" /></figure>

**Copyright:** © 2023 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
communicative other' [3] (p. 190). Communicability, then, in Plumwood's view, means respecting 'earth others' as agents, as subjects, viz. 'intentional beings' [3] (pp. 182–183 and sq.).

This project, in V. Plumwood's work, takes the form of what she calls 'weak panpsychism', that is, the idea that elements of mind are widespread in nature ([3] (p. 178) and [4] (p. 133)). This thesis, however, raises the following issue, eloquently put by Bryan Bannon [5]: 'if nature is to have properties and agency, then it must be a substantial being with mind-like properties' (p. 44); but, B. Bannon notes, '[a]ttributing certain *properties* [author's italics] to nature without altering how nature is initially defined is not sufficient to overcome the crisis of rationality she [Plumwood] describes so eloquently.' (p. 41). Hence, B. Bannon suggests moving away from traditional *substantial* accounts of nature as a being with teleological properties to *relational* accounts of nature as a web of relations and processes (pp. 40–41)¹. B. Bannon is right to make the case for a shift in ontology, and like him, I also take a place-based ethics approach. I therefore share the general view, central to the relational framework that I will adopt, that place is a composite of relations between affective bodies [6] (p. 270)².

However, the problem with this, and similar accounts [7], is that they lead to an ontology of events in which, because intentionality is blocked from the start, autonomy and agency become difficult, if not impossible, to conceive. Indeed, in this approach, 'our description of the world can only refer to the state of processes without a subject' [8] (p. 32). What is generally missing here is the question of the subject as 'being-for-oneself [du pour soi]'; to-be-for-oneself means to be the end of oneself; and this self-finality, at the level of the living, comes with a world of its own, namely the presentation, representation and relation of what is represented in the constitution of a singular world [9] (pp. 196–201) [10]. In other words, the natural world is populated by a multitude of beings who produce their own singular worlds and perspectives [11] (pp. 204–207)³. The state of the question of the subject as being-for-oneself is not of immediate importance to our purpose here. Rather, our focus is on the concept of the subject *necessary* for a *dialogical*, *subject–subject*, *ethic*. Only then, when this point has been adequately addressed, can we fully appreciate, as an illustration of a mutual flourishing environmental virtue ethic, R. W. Kimmerer's assertion:

> Individuality is cherished and nurtured, because, in order for the whole to flourish, each of us has to be strong in who we are and carry our gifts with conviction, so they can be shared with others'. [1] (p. 134)

In the Three Sisters parable, 'each plant does what it does in order to increase its own growth. But as it happens, when the individuals flourish, so does the whole.' [1] (p. 134). Based on this intuition, I will, as a starting point, make the following assumption: the autonomy of nature, that is, conceiving natural entities as subjects, as agents, is a necessary condition for a dialogical methodology and a mutual flourishing virtue ethics.

## A Grammatical Approach to the Subject: Toward a Narrative Environmental Virtue Ethics

We require a concept of the subject that does not lead to a substantial account of nature, and at the same time is compatible with a relational ontology framework. In particular, we need a concept of the subject that allows us to see 'earth others' as agents without conceiving of nature in terms of substances and properties. This concept, I argue, is the concept of the subject as an agent, i.e., the concept of a 'concrete individual endowed with causal powers' [8] (p. 34). I therefore adopt French philosopher Vincent Descombes' [8] grammatical approach in which the subject is defined as a *suppôt*, i.e., a substrate of action and change. As V. Descombes puts it: it is 'the individual such that he can play an actancial role in a story, so that one can ask whether he [/she/it] is the subject of what happens [agent], or if he [/she/it] is the object [patient], or if he [/she/it] is the recipient [beneficiary]' [8] (p. 14; see also pp. 16, 28–29, 121–124). This syntactic model of the subject might hold the key to ground a dialogical methodology for a mutual flourishing environmental virtue ethics in line with V. Plumwood's philosophical project.
V. Descombes' syntactic model of the subject, I argue, can help develop a communica-
tive interspecies ethics in terms of a *narrative ethic*, which does not require the substantiation
of nature but still recognises the autonomy of nature. As V. Plumwood [3] puts it: 'narrative
ethics, supplying context and identity, can help us configure nature as a realm of others
who are independent centres of value' (p. 188). The grammatical approach I take here,
following then V. Descombes, allows us to distinguish between two ways of speaking about
properties or qualities: one *attributive*, the other *verbal*. He gives the following example:
1. 'L'herbe est verte [the grass is green]', and 2. 'L'herbe verdoie [grass green]'. The first
sentence is an attributive sentence, and the second is a verbal sentence. The important
point here is that 'not everything that is presented as an action is an action, but this means
that there is a way of presenting something *as if it were* [author's italics] an action' [8]
(p. 73). This is the case in the second phrase 'L'herbe verdoie [green grass]', where the phrase
suggests the notion of an internal active force that is at the origin of the tree's foliage (ibid.).
This, I think, gives full expression to V. Plumwood's statement that 'intentional description
[my italics] is in turn crucial to legitimating rich narrative description [my italics] of the
non-human sphere' [3] (p. 188). In this regard, Amitav Ghosh's *The Nutmeg's Curse* [12] is
a compelling illustration of this narrative description of the non-human sphere in which
natural entities are presented as subjects, or agents, viz. as 'protagonists in their own right,
fully capable of generating forms of narrative and meaning' [12] (p. 96). Additionally,
I claim that this narrative approach aligns with V. Plumwood's project of establishing conti-
nuity within difference in a counter-hegemonic strategy. In the Anthropocene framework,
for example, establishing continuity takes the form of overcoming the great divide between
natural history and human history [13,14]. Here, again, A. Ghosh's *The Nutmeg's Curse* [12]
perfectly illustrates the varied interactions, continuities and 'enmeshments' of human and
non-human forms of agency.

The syntactic model of the subject can therefore help determine the intentionality or
agency of nature without presupposing a substantial account of nature. In this sense, the
narrative approach can help convey the ideas of flourishing and of mutual flourishing,
which, I argue, are part of an environmental virtue ethic. Environmental virtue ethics is
about the character dispositions that we should have towards nature. As Ronald Sandler
puts it: 'Indeed, how one interacts with the environment is largely determined by one's
disposition toward it [...] In this way proper character [i.e., the virtues] is indispensable for
facilitating right action and behavior' [15] (p. 253). In the context of environmental virtue
ethics, narratives can inspire, motivate and help in the transmission of the virtues [16]
(p. 371). As Brian Treanor has shown, narratives can help us see things from a different
perspective, from a sort of 'virtual' or 'as if' experience [16] (pp. 369-370): 'We use
narratives to experiment with possibilities, exploring different situations and different
ethical responses' (ibid.). In addition, narratives are also central in a dialogical methodology.
As V. Plumwood puts it: 'To treat the other as a potentially intentional and communicative
being and narrative subject is part of moving from monological modes of encounter [...]to dialogical modes of encounter' [3] (p. 190)⁴. To this I propose to add: the dialogical
encounter between human and other-than-human entities necessarily depends on the
existence of a *relational space*. It is within this space that humans and 'earth others' relate,
interact, as equally agents, patients and beneficiaries sharing common histories and stories.
It is within this relational space that virtues can be cultivated, and that flourishing and
mutual flourishing can take place as a result of living together in a relational space.

2.

I have argued that we do not require a substantial account of nature in order to conceive
of nature's agency. Nature's *subjectivity* can be conveyed by a grammatical, syntactic, model
of the subject as agent. However, this account is not yet an account of the *recognition* of
nature's intentionality, which is how V. Plumwood presents her philosophical project of a
communicative interspecies ethics [3] (pp. 182-183). Thus, my purpose now is to elucidate
the idea of a recognising attitude of nature. I will argue that a recognising attitude of nature
creates a relational space in which nature can emerge as a legitimate other, that is, as an autonomous being.

## 2.1. *A Recognising Attitude of Nature Based on Love as a Form of Adequate Recognition*

The idea that we can understand our relationship with nature in terms of a theory of recognition is not generally accepted [17] (p. 276) [18] (p. 61). The reason can be traced back to the mutual recognition paradigm as the central explanatory and normative principle of the concept of recognition. This paradigm requires that 'only recognizers can be recognized' [19] (p. 320)⁵, which then blocks nature from the start. However, in an adequate regard insight, adequate (and not mutual or interpersonal) recognition is about responding to the normatively relevant features of the other, any other [19] (p. 326)⁶. This unrestricted view of recognition opens up the way to think of a recognising attitude of nature. Thus, I suggest that we can define this recognising attitude of nature in terms of love (of nature) as a form of adequate recognition [20]. I use the term 'love' in Humberto Maturana's sense: 'love is the domain of those relational behaviours [my italics] through which another arises as a legitimate other [my italics] in co-existence with oneself' [21] (p. 55). The particularity of this definition is that, as an embodied characteristic of human beings (of the human bodyhood or body-self), it reveals the self as a relational-self, that is, a self that is constituted by the different kinds of relations (dependencies and interdependencies) it enters into (an embodied and embedded self). A recognising attitude of nature based on love as a form of adequate recognition means then that the other (nature) arises as a legitimate other (read: is recognised), without necessarily being an active participant (read: a recogniser)⁷. In short, the idea of a recognising attitude of nature based on love as a form of adequate recognition means the recognition of nature's otherness, viz. of nature's autonomy or capacity of agency.

## 2.2. *The Relational Space of a Mutual Flourishing Environmental Virtue Ethics*

Maturana's concept of love, which I have used to formulate a recognising attitude of nature, holds the key to develop the idea of a relational space in which the idea of mutual flourishing can be conceived and serve as a foundation of a dialogical ethic. I propose then to look closer into Maturana's concept of love. Emotions create relational spaces that constitute ways of living. As Maturana puts it: 'Emotions as domains of relational behaviours constitute the relational space in which they exist and are conserved' [21] (p. 56). For Maturana, emotions are realised in themselves in the relational space that constitutes them: '[e]motions create the systemic relational dynamics which conserves them' [21] (p. 55). This is highly reminiscent of Aristotle's description of the acquisition of virtues: 'For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them [...] so too we become just by doing just acts [...]' [22] (NE II 1 1103a). In a similar way, then, the emotion of love is realised in loving [21] (p. 55). What is important here is that the emotional dynamic of love as an embodied characteristic of a relational self creates a relational space in which flourishing, the cultivation of virtues, and as we shall see, mutual flourishing and collaboration become possible⁸. In other words, the recognition of nature's subjectivity is only possible in a relational space that emerges from the recognising attitude of an embodied, relational self. I propose to summarise my purpose so far as follows: a recognising attitude of nature based on love as a form of adequate recognition creates a relational space in which the othering of nature is recognised as an autonomous other living in coexistence with oneself⁹.

## 2.3. *Ascription: Conceiving Nature's Autonomy or Capacity for Agency*

I suggested that the recognition of the othering of nature as a legitimate other means the recognition of nature's autonomy: the recognition of 'earth others' as intentional beings, that is, as agents. I claimed that recognising the autonomy of nature is a necessary condition for a dialogical ethic based on mutual flourishing. However, in order to avoid a substantial account of nature that risks prolonging the oppositional definition of nature [5] (p. 41), I have suggested adopting a grammatical, syntactic, model of the subject, which, from a
narrative ethics perspective, allows us to conceptualise nature's agency without endorsing a metaphysical ontology in terms of substances and properties.

Moreover, the introduction of the concept of recognition, reformulated as an adequate response based on love, can not only be used, as we have seen, to conceptualise the relational space of a dialogical ethics, but it can also help elucidate the question of how the intentionality and, in general, other capacities of nature can be recognised. The question is this: does the act of a recognising attitude of nature *prescribe* or *describe* (a priori) qualities of nature? The question is analogous to the epistemic problem of knowing whether the act of recognition 'attributes' or 'reproduces' *a priori* qualities of the individual's identity (Honneth). In the case of a recognising attitude of nature, the latter seems to imply a substantial account of nature, whereas the former seems to imply a strong anthropocentric perspective.

In order to overcome this difficulty, and to understand in what sense we can speak of nature's agency, I propose to introduce Paul Ricœur's [23] concept of 'attestation', which defines the epistemic mode of assertions having to do with capacities (pp. 91–92). There are two interesting aspects of the concept of 'attestation' that might be relevant to our study here: first, attestation challenges the opposition between description and prescription. As Ricœur puts it: 'Capacities are not observed to be true, but attested [23] (pp. 148–149). Second, attribution, as part of the meaning of intentional action, is called 'ascription', and, as Ricœur notes: 'The term *ascription* [author's italics] points to the specific character of attribution when this has to do with the connection between action and its agent [...] [23] (p. 98). By analogy, then, I propose that, with respect to nature, nature's intentionality is not (theoretically) observed to be true, (much less as an inherent property or quality), but is attested; we therefore *ascribe* intentionality or agency to nature; or: in our interaction with nature, we practically attest nature's capacity of agency. I therefore use ascription and attestation in a similar way to Ricœur: as practical categories that assert capacities, that is, in the case of nature, nature's intentionality or varied capacity of agency. With respect to nature, however, ascription must give up its reflective character. Indeed, we cannot say, as we do when we speak of human agents, that 'ascription is directed to the agent's capacity to designate him- or herself as someone who does or who has done this' [23] (p. 98). Therefore, regarding nature, I will align my interpretation of ascription with the structure of the emotion of love. We have seen that love is unidirectional, other-directed. Similarly, ascription, with respect to nature, is other-directed. It is other-directed because attestation of the varied capacities of nature depends on a recognising stance.

Ascription is the practical act of attesting, in our recognising relationship with nature, nature's subjectivity. In other words, the attestation of nature's autonomy depends on the emotional dynamic taking place in the *relational space* in which nature emerges as a legitimate other in coexistence with oneself through a recognising stance of a relational self. Here, then, I join B. Bannon, who, referring to Neil Evernden, speaks of our relationship to individual beings so as to *let them be* [5] (p. 47). B. Bannon understands letting a being be as requiring that 'we abandon representations of beings in order to free the being from the limitations imposed by the representation' [5] (p. 47). Thus, B. Bannon sees the attribution of intentionality to nature as contrary to the liberating goals at the heart of V. Plumwood's project, implied in the stance of letting a being be. However, as we have seen, the attribution of properties, or rather *capacities* (of which intentionality, or agency), to nature is not a form of 'making nature ours' (Bannon (*ibid*. ) quoting Evernden). As a matter of fact, if we understand the attribution of capacities (intentionality or agency) as ascription, in P. Ricœur's sense, then attribution is a *practical act of attesting* how nature, in our interaction with it, just *is*; it self-realises its subjectivity, that is, its varied capacity of agency.

3.

We have seen that recognising nature's intentionality means the practical ascription of agency to nature. The ascription of intentionality to nature and, in general, the attestation of the varied capacities of nature's agency, depends on the emotional dynamic of a relational space of interaction brought about by the other-directed recognising stance of a relational
self. In what follows, I propose that this relational space created by the emotional dynamic
of a recognising attitude of nature of a relational self can be categorised in two different
and complementary ways—as a moral space and as an ontological and ethical place.
Interactions with nature in the relational space defined as a moral space allow us to
conceive the self-realisation of an ecological or environmental identity; defined as an ethical
place, interactions with nature in the relational space allow us to conceive the autonomy of
nature and, from there, the idea of mutual flourishing.

3.1. *The Relational Space as a Moral Space: Toward an Ecological Identity*

An ecological or environmental identity is like any other collective identity: a social construction and a motivating force, with the difference that it is also the product of an interaction with nature¹⁰. As psychologist Susan Clayton [24] puts it: ‘an environmental identity is one part of the way in which people form their self-concept’ (p. 45). Thus, an environmental identity refers to the idea that nature must be part of the way we form our self-concept, that is, of the way we define what the good life is, since selfhood and the good, as Charles Taylor [25] argues, are intertwined themes (p. 3).

To develop this point, I suggest referring to Charles Taylor’s [25] understanding of
modern identity. C. Taylor defines identity as ‘the commitments and identifications which
provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is
good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it
is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand.’ [25] (p. 27). What is interesting
here is that C. Taylor conceives identity as having to orient oneself within a ‘moral space’.
As he puts it: ‘To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which
questions arise of what is good or bad’ [25] (p. 28). To these questions, C. Taylor argues, we
respond through ‘framework-definitions’, or ‘qualitative distinctions’, of what is good, of
what meaningful life is.

I suggest using this definition of identity to interpret the current ecological crisis as a crisis of disorientation within the moral space that provides the frame within which we define our identity. Thus, in this light, the idea of an environmental identity conveys the idea that the self-realisation of personal identity requires that we orient ourselves within a moral space in which nature is valued as a constitutive relation of our self-concept and a qualitative distinction of the good life. However, to understand how nature can be valued as a qualitative distinction of the good, this moral space needs to be coupled with an ontological and ethical place where place is regarded as constitutive of one's sense of selfhood.

3.2. *The Relational Space as an Ontological and Ethical Place: Toward a Mutual Flourishing Environmental Virtue Ethics*

It is at this point that I re-join B. Bannon’s project of a place-based environmental ethics.
Indeed, to understand the idea that place is constitutive of one’s self-concept, we need
to define place in relational terms as the product of all beings participating through their
openness to affection and their affection of other bodies [5] (p. 50). This is more than saying
that there is reciprocal influence between self and place; rather, place here is constitutive of
the self. As Edward S. Casey [26] puts it: ‘The relationship between self and place is [...] of
constitutive coingredience: each is essential to the being of the other [...] there is no place
*without self and no self without place* [author’s italics]’ (p. 684). This concept of place allows
redefining nature, from a relational ontology perspective, as the common production of
relations between bodies [5] (p. 48), and because these are relations of affective bodies, it is
then easy to see how place, that is nature, can be constitutive of individual identity.

More importantly, however, a place-based ethic so defined, can help clarify the idea of
mutual flourishing: because of this mutual affectivity of bodies, ‘all flourishing is mutual’ [1]
(p. 15). Going back to the parable of the Three Sisters, each plant, as an affective body,
contributes to the flourishing of the other plants, which, as affective bodies, contribute,
reciprocally, to the other plant’s own flourishing. However, here I do not follow B. Bannon’s
interpretation, because the idea of mutual flourishing requires, by hypothesis (*supra* I), the concept of the subject. This does not mean, as we have seen, that we attribute teleological properties to nature defined as a substance, but rather that we ascribe to nature, as practical categories that assert capacities, intentionality, that is, varied capacities of agency.

The plant does what it does *in order to* increase its own growth. This ‘in order to’ is not a teleological quality of the plant as a substance, rather the *practical* attestation of a capacity—e.g., the capacity of the beans plant to produce nutrients from nitrogen necessary for the other plants, whose own individual flourishing contributes to the bean’s flourishing, for example, by providing support (from the corn’s height) and shade (from the squash’s leaves); and we *practically* ascribe this capacity in our interaction, as embodied and relational observers, in the garden defined as a relational space in which the recognition of the plant’s mutual flourishing ultimately means the recognition of their contribution to our own flourishing in terms of the ‘universal language: food’ [1] (p. 129). The idea of mutual flourishing therefore requires the concept of the subject: of individual agency, or autonomy. Indeed, it is the recognition of individuality, that is, of the capacities or, in R. W. Kimmerer words, of the ‘gifts’ of the individual that, when they are cultivated, can be shared in order for the whole to flourish. Based on this idea of mutual flourishing, we can then conceive a dialogical ethics, that is, an ethics of solidarity and collaboration.

### 3.3. *Being(s) Together: An Illustration*

To illustrate the idea of an environmental virtue ethic based on mutual flourishing, that is, a dialogical ethics of solidarity and collaboration, I will draw on the current exhibition at the Ethnography Museum of Geneva (MEG), ‘being(s) together’¹¹. The exhibition explores the relationships between humans and nature and, through different portraits of humans, animals, plants, and the relationship between them, tackles the question of communication and understanding among different species. I will present, as one illustration, one portrait that is highly representative of the type of dialogical ethic that I have outlined here, and in particular of the idea of nature’s subjectivity.

The portrait is that of photographer and zoologist Stefano Unterthiner¹². Stefano looks at the daily life of animals in ‘tales of wildlife’. His documentary work carefully reproduces the individualities and specific moments of each animal. In the Alps he had several encounters with foxes and established a special form of intimacy with them. This is how the curators of the exhibition describe this relationship: ‘Fred, Beauty and Rourounette [names that Stefano gave to the foxes] fed his imagination. For many months, man and the foxes spied on and tamed each other [...]’.

> [Stefano:] *And these encounters were...let's say a way of deepening knowledge that in this close contact with a wild animal created the desire to learn to get to know a very fascinating animal better. [...] In fact, he's a character. The fox, when you meet him, you understand he has a lot to tell you. What I like doing is getting to know an individual. In this case the fox, not as a species, but as this specific subject, this individual. And so learn its habits, its behaviour, its character, I mean...the animal's personality. Jokingly with my wife, we often say they're my 'anima friends', but we really do become friends. So, in this context, ethics are something natural. I work on the principle that I respect my friends. If a fox is unbelievably beautiful and has a particular attitude, I call it Beauty. If on the contrary, the fox is dominant in its territory with maybe a scar on its nose, I remember, we nicknamed hi the Boss. [...] So, these are little nicknames, which in fact enable us, on the one hand, to break down a bit the barrier between me and the other species. For example, I didn't see a fox, but I saw the Boss who was doing this or that. And so the story begins there.*

This practical relationship between Stefano and the foxes perfectly illustrates the type of dialogical ethic that I have outlined in this essay in terms of an environmental virtue ethic based on mutual flourishing. In particular, it illustrates the idea that for this form of communication ethics to be possible, we need the concept of the subject, of nature’s
autonomy—in this case the recognition of the fox’s individuality as a being, a subject, with a capacity for agency. When Stefano describes his encounter with the fox (‘*let’s say a way of deepening knowledge that in this close contact [...] created the desire to learn to get to know [...]*’), I am tempted to say that this encounter, as he describes it, was dependent on a participatory attitude that I have called ‘a recognising attitude of nature’ based on love as an adequate form of recognition. I have argued that this other-directed stance of an embodied relational self creates a relational space in which interaction, coexistence, and dialogical methodologies become possible (‘*The fox, when you meet him, you understand he has a lot to tell you*’). This dialogical relationship is narrative in essence (‘*For example, I didn’t see a fox, but I saw the Boss who was doing this or that*’). Here, the attribution of agency is in terms of ascription: practical categories that assert capacities and explain that we can consider the fox as a subject, as a being with capacity of agency (‘*And so learn its habits, its behaviour, its character, I mean... the animal’s personality*’). Ascription helps then to create the portrait of the animal as an individual, as a subject, in our coexistence with it (‘*If a fox is unbelievably beautiful and has a particular attitude, I call it Beauty*’), and to establish continuity (‘*these are little nicknames, which in fact enable us, on the one hand, to break down a bit the barrier between me and the other species*’). Moreover, because this relational space as an ethical place is, from a relational ontology, a composite of relations between affective bodies, we can readily see that ‘man and the foxes spied on and tamed each other’ as a result of their affective interaction. Defined as a moral space, the interaction with nature, with the foxes, in the relational space leads Stefano to consider the foxes as friends (‘*but we really do become friends*’): from this we are not far from envisaging the possibility of the self-realisation of an environmental or ecological identity in the form of an ecological ethos: an attitude of respect and care for the environment (‘*So, in this context, ethics are something natural. I work on the principle that I respect my friends*’).

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not applicable.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.

**Data Availability Statement:** No new data were created or analyzed in this study.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

## Notes

<footnote n="1">1 The expression ‘substantial account of nature’ means, according to B. Bannon’s interpretation, that natural entities have mind-like properties (intentionality, agency, etc.); that is, that they have ‘teleological purposiveness’. Bannon counters this with a relational account in which it is not intentionality but processes and relations that best explain the basis of non-dualistic environmental ethics.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 In this approach, place, therefore, supplants nature: ‘beings all participate in the creation of a place to the extent that they contribute to it through their openness to affection and their affection of other bodies’ [5] (p. 50).</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3 Taking Jacob von Uexküll’s example, Virginie Maris [11] illustrates her purpose thus: ‘Whereas the world-for-the-bear, stretching for hundreds of kilometres, is made up of rivers, fish, paths, plants and caves, the world-for-the-tick is made up of branches, hair, skin and blood. It is as complete a world for the tick as the world-for-the-bear is for the bear.’ (pp. 204–205).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4 Today, in the epoch of the Anthropocene, this encounter takes the form of *the uncanny*: ‘It is surely no coincidence that the word *uncanny* has begun to be used, with ever greater frequency, in relation to climate change [...] No other word comes close to expressing the strangeness of what is unfolding around us [...] the uncanny and improbable events that are beating at our doors seem to have stirred a sense of recognition, an awareness that humans were never alone, that we have always been surrounded by beings of all sorts who share elements of that which we had thought to be most distinctively our own: the capacities of will, thought, and consciousness’ [12] (p. 35).</footnote>

<footnote n="5">5 Indeed, ‘there always needs to be two-way recognition for even one-way recognition to take place’ [19] (p. 319).</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6 As Arto Laitinen notes, recognition is not only a matter of attitudes: ‘It can be a matter of acting, emoting, expressing the attitudes or emotions, a matter of statuses, relations, etc.’ [19] (p. 335).</footnote>
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11. Maris, V. *La Part Sauvage Du Monde: Penser La Nature Dans l'Anthropocène*; Anthropocène Seuil; Éditions du Seuil: Paris, France, 2018.

12. Ghosh, A. *The Nutmeg's Curse: Parables for a Planet in Crisis*; University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL, USA, 2021.

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14. Chakrabarty, D. The Anthropocene and the Convergence of Histories. In *The Anthropocene and the Global Environmental Crisis, Rethinking Modernity in a New Epoch*; Hamilton, C., Bonneuil, C., Gemenne, F., Eds.; Routledge: New York, NY, USA, 2015.

15. Sandler, R. Environmental Virtue Ethics. In *Environmental Ethics, The Big Questions*; Keller, D.R., Ed.; Wiley-Blackwell: Malden, MA, USA; Oxford, UK, 2010.

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17. Rosa, H. *Resonance: A Sociology of Pur Relationship to the World*; James Wagner, J., Translator; Polity Press: Cambridge, UK, 2019.

18. Honneth, A.; Butler, J.; Geuss, R.; Lear, J.; Jay, M. *Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea*; The Berkeley Tanner Lectures; Oxford University Press: Oxford, NY, USA, 2008.

19. Laitinen, A. On the Scope of "Recognition": The Role of Adequate Regard and Mutuality. In *The Philosophy of Recognition: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*; Schmidt am Busch, H.-C., Zurn, C.F., Eds.; Lexington Books: Lanham, MD, USA, 2010.

<footnote n="7">7 This is because love, in Maturana's sense, is unidirectional, that is, is other-directed and does not require mutual loving: 'the loved one arises as a legitimate other through the behaviour of the lover without necessarily being an active participant in a loving or any other relation with the lover' [21] (p. 55).</footnote>

<footnote n="8">8 Thus, virtues, I argue, can be cultivated only when a relational space exists that then makes the cultivation of virtues possible.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9 At this point, the following question inevitably arises: moral subjectivity entails responsibility. If nature's subjectivity involves recognising its capacity for intentionality and agency, then what about nature's responsibility (e.g., when a snake bites me, or a rock hits me on the head...)? Is not responsibility an important feature of subjectivity? This is a very important question that deserves a thorough examination. However, I will give the following tentative answers: often responsibility is indeed ascribed (on this see the following section) to an animal, as when we attribute to the wolf the responsibility for killing the sheep (and, in most cases, it is hunted to death as a result). More importantly, I think that from a place-based ethics perspective, the question of responsibility is closely linked to the question of limits. First, knowing 'our' limits: the snake bites me, but did I step into the snake's place? The rock hits me on the head, but was I in 'my' place when I climbed the mountain? Sometimes animals step into 'our' place. This last point is reminiscent of V. Plumwood's example: in this case, '[f]or example, the ethical perplexities and strategies for dealing with a strange highly venomous snake who has just moved onto your veranda may not be all that different from those involved in dealing with a difficult human stranger who has done the same' [3] (p. 170). Ultimately, as V. Plumwood argues, this is a question of interspecies distributive justice: sharing the earth with other species [3] (p. 117). Of course, sometimes tragedy happens at the crossing of boundaries, at the interface of places. I am very grateful to one attentive reviewer of this essay for raising this important question.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10 I use the term 'environmental identity' in a narrower sense than what we might call, following Arne Naess, 'an ecological self', that is, a metaphysical reality in which I participate on the basis of a subjective experience of identification with nature. In short, it is the extension and the transformation of the ego into a broader understanding of the self in which ecological dependencies and interdependencies are constitutive of identity ('my' self-realisation is then the self-realisation of an ecological self). This rather (eco)phenomenological perspective, although at the heart of our subject matter here, goes beyond the scope of the place-based approach that I have chosen to develop here. It is for this reason that I will now turn to C. Taylor's understanding of modern identity.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11 Available online: https://www.meg.ch/en/expositions/beings-together (accessed on 20 November 2023).</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 Available online: https://www.stefanounterthiner.com/ (accessed on 20 November 2023).</footnote>
20. Arcos, E. Autonomy as the self-realisation of an environmental identity. *Environ. Values* **2023**, *09632719231214311*. [CrossRef]

21. Maturana Romesín, H.; Verden-Zöller, G. *The Origin of Humanness in the Biology of Love*; Imprint Academic: Upton Pyne, UK, 2012.

22. Aristotle; Ross, W.D.; Brown, L. *The Nicomachean Ethics*; Oxford University Press: Oxford, NY, USA, 2009.

23. Ricœur, P. *The Course of Recognition*; Institute for Human Sciences Vienna Lecture Series; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2005.

24. Clayton, S. Environmental Identity: A Conceptual and an Operational Definition. In *Identity and the Natural Environment, The Psychological Significance of Nature*; Clayton, S., Opotow, S., Eds.; The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA; London, UK, 2003.

25. Taylor, C. *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1989.

26. Casey, E.S. Between Geography and Philosophy: What Does It Mean to Be in the Place-World? *Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr.* **2001**, *91*, 683–693. [CrossRef]

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Article

# Virtue Ethics and the Ecological Self: From Environmental to Ecological Virtues

Gérald Hess

Institute of Geography and Sustainability, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland;
gerald.hess@unil.ch

**Abstract:** This article examines how a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics can truly avoid an anthro-
pocentric bias in the ethical evaluation of a situation where the environment is at stake. It argues that
a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics capable of avoiding the pitfall of an anthropocentric bias can only
conceive of the ultimate good—from which virtues are defined—in reference to an ecological self.
Such a self implies that the natural environment is not simply a condition for human flourishing,
or something that complements it by adding the proper good of animals, organisms or ecosystems.
Fulfilment is not that of a human self, but that of an ecological self: the natural environment or
nature is not an external but an internal good. Therefore, the virtues or character traits that such
an ecological self must nurture and develop leads us ultimately to distinguish—without opposing
them—three different forms of virtue ethics applied to the environment, depending on whether it is
anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric and whether nature is considered extrinsically or intrinsically.
Such distinctions are also crucial to determine how we conceive of the political community and the
collective goals that virtuous citizens assign to it (for instance, to preserve biodiversity, to tackle
climate change, and so on).

**Keywords:** ecological self; human flourishing; ultimate good; ecological virtue; environmental virtue; virtue ethics

**1. Introduction**

Since the 1970s, many proponents of environmental ethics have essentially set for
themselves the task of justifying duties towards nature based on the intrinsic value of
nature itself [1]. For over 40 years, they have been calling for a moralisation of the human
relationship with the environment by means of obligations and prohibitions. The prag-
matist approach objected that they were wrong to raise theoretical problems (for example,
regarding the intrinsic value of nature). Hence, in so doing, they would distract from the
essential task of seeking a consensus on the urgent environmental policies that are the
responsibility of governments and prevent an effective response to the ecological crisis. So
far, the moralisation has not yet materialised at the political level¹.

Based on a virtue ethics approach, Philip Cafaro [3] notes that environmental ethics has
neglected another ethical question, which is just as important as that of human duties and
responsibility toward nature: the question of how to achieve the quest for the good that a
virtuous person chooses to pursue. For virtue ethics, certain character traits or dispositions
of a person (virtues)—to which are added representations and affects—motivate her or him
to act in a particular way, as long as these traits are stable, are the result of a deliberate choice
and contribute to the person's self-fulfilment [4]. Such an approach focuses traditionally
on character traits such as courage, benevolence, temperance, etc., but can also aim at an
action insofar as it is evaluated according to good, evil and certain dispositions (or character
traits). In so doing, it seems better able to take into consideration the motivation of the
agent than deontological or consequentialist forms of ethics which judge the morality of
an action according to norms or objective reasonings to be followed. Thus, one may ask:

**Citation:** Hess, G. Virtue Ethics and the Ecological Self: From Environmental to Ecological Virtues.
*Philosophies* **2024**, *9*, 23.
https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9010023

Academic Editor: Arran Gare

Received: 25 December 2023

Revised: 4 February 2024

Accepted: 6 February 2024

Published: 9 February 2024

<figure><img src="image_19.png" /></figure>

**Copyright:** © 2024 by the author.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
would a virtue-based approach be more effective than more traditional forms of deontology or consequentialism?

A number of proposals for an environmental virtue ethics have emerged to tackle this issue over the last twenty years [5–8]. But the renewed interest in virtue ethics for environmental issues also raises a dilemma of principles. On the one hand, by seeking to formulate moral principles and duties towards nature, environmental ethics had opened up a way out of the moral anthropocentrism that characterises classical ethics. On the other hand, virtue ethics seemed to head back to a fundamentally anthropocentric ethics since it is focused on human flourishing or happiness (*eudaimonia*) that constitutes the ultimate good—that good which is no longer a means to another end but an end in itself—namely, a good, quality life (*eû zên*) [9] (p. 5 [1095a 17–18]; p. 11 [1097b 1–2]). It follows that a perspective on (non-anthropocentric) environmental ethics based on (anthropocentric) virtue ethics seems hardly compatible with its initial intention [10]. In this article, I will look at several ways of dealing with this dilemma.

To this end, I will distinguish two ways of looking at the relationship between virtue ethics and the natural environment.

* Extrinsically. The environment is a condition either for the exercise of virtues or for human flourishing; it is not part of the human flourishing itself. Moreover, one could possibly extend virtue ethics to other goods that are not strictly related to human happiness. In this case, one could speak of environmental virtues that contribute to the “good life” of an individual, whether human or non-human, such as temperance, for instance.

* Intrinsically. The environment is part of the human good and not just a condition of that good. This means that humans are not external to nature; they are part of it in such a way that, by virtue of an intrinsic relationship between humans and the environment proper to an ecological self, the flourishing of humans is neither separate from nor independent of the flourishing of nature. In other words: nature is not external to our existence; it constitutes it. Therefore, in this case the ultimate good of a virtue ethics is not the flourishing of human self but that of an ecological self.

I will develop this distinction in the next three sections. In Section 2, I will first clarify the characteristics of virtues ethics. In Section 3, I will examine how an extrinsic relationship translates into environmental virtues and show the limits of this conception. In Section 4, I will explore how an intrinsic relationship allows us to reach beyond these limits based on the notion of the “ecological self”, a notion already defended by the deep ecology of Arne Næss and by the ecofeminism of Val Plumwood or Freya Mathews. I will reckon that certain virtues are fundamentally ecological and not simply environmental, because they are ascribed, strictly speaking, to an ecological identity. That is, when the relationship with the environment remains extrinsic, the virtues developed are at best environmental virtues; when the relationship with the environment becomes intrinsic, by returning to the lived experience of the world, the virtues are truly ecological. Finally, I will conclude that this proposal can overcome the anthropocentric bias underlying environmental virtue ethics. What is at stake in identifying this anthropocentric bias is not simply to emancipate ourselves from the *centred* character of moral anthropocentrism, which limits itself to taking account of humans and humans alone. It is a question of overcoming the *centric* character of moral anthropocentrism, which reduces the world to the human perspective alone.

## 2. The Characteristics of a Virtue Ethics

Generally speaking, a virtue ethics does not seek to answer the question, “What should I do?” but rather the question, “What kind of human being do I want to become?” The virtuous person strives towards a life that she or he considers good, a life of quality (*eû zên*) or of flourishing (*eudaimonia*). This requires the exercise of certain dispositions in the pursuit of excellence, namely virtues. These practical dispositions are called virtues when they are sufficiently stabilised to be perceived by an agent as motivating his action. In this respect, virtues define the character traits of an individual: goodness, generosity, humility,
etc. But not every character trait is a virtue. For it to be a virtue, it must be related to the ultimate good and aimed at for its own sake, i.e., in the aim of what the agent considers to be a flourishing life. Virtues are therefore character traits in the pursuit of excellence, in the sense that they contribute to and are even a part of happiness and a fulfilled human life. In virtues, beliefs, affective orientations, perceptual dispositions and behavioural tendencies are inextricably linked [11] (p. 14–15). These general considerations require two clarifications. The first concerns the relationship between virtues and duty. In truth, an ethics of virtues is not opposed to an ethics of duty, in the sense that in its own way it also aims to act, but with reference to virtues and not according to an obligation or moral principle. The second point concerns the ultimate good, i.e., human flourishing, a fulfilled human life. While it is true that a character trait is a moral virtue because of its contribution to human flourishing, virtue does not relate strictly to the virtuous agent’s own flourishing; it also concerns other humans and, possibly, other non-humans.

For Aristotle, to whom we owe a systematic study of the ethics of virtues, a good or fulfilled life depends on the effective performance of what is inherently human. Just as a “good” eye depends on the eye’s ability to see without distortion, the “good” human being depends on the human’s ability to act virtuously. For Aristotle, what defines a well-functioning human being is the exercise of reason [9] (p. 103–107 [1139a and b—1140b 1–10]). Indeed, the human good necessarily has to do with what makes us human, and what distinguishes us as humans from other species is the use of reason. Thus, it would follow that it is reason that enables us to live a good human life [12] (p. 6). To be virtuous, and therefore to live a flourishing life, as Philippa Foot puts it, rational will must be translated into purposeful, voluntary actions [13] (p. 66–67, 69–70).

Today, however, it seems increasingly difficult to define the highest good in reference to a human nature. Irene McMullin distinguishes two ways of conceiving of the ultimate good [11] (p. 24). The first way is from a subjective perspective in terms of the agent himself: a fulfilled human life is what each person decides it to be; fulfilment then comes down to the agent's evaluation of her or his experience, independently of its content, which is no longer relevant in terms of defining that good. This first perspective responds to a modern vision of a plurality of conceptions of what is good but runs counter to the widespread—and indeed self-evident—idea that there are basic goods on which everyone can agree, such as healthy food, a good education, a social life, and so on.

The second perspective sees the human good not from the subjective perspective of the agent, but from an objective point of view. In this case, the good is considered in relation to biological functions such as survival, the continuity of the species, a pain-free state and the successful functioning of the social group [14] (p. 153–154). The definition of what is good must then be based on physiology, biology and ethology; this is, strictly speaking, the naturalistic point of view of science. But to leave it at this point would be to reduce human flourishing to externally observable traits of human reality, while overlooking the fact that these traits are—at least in part—experienced by human beings, i.e., that each human being appropriates them and lives them from her or his own perspective.

This is why, rather than opposing the two conceptions—subjective and objective—of a good or fulfilled life, McMullin suggests “reconceptualizing the self” [11] (p. 30). The human self whose fulfilment we seek is not simply myself; it includes the self of other humans and the self of the human community to which I belong, i.e., its values and ends. A person’s character cannot be assessed simply by observing him or her from the outside as an organism with objectively defined ends (survival, continuity of the species, etc.). But the subjective perspective seems just as flawed if the agent is simply judged from the angle of his subjective experiences (positive or negative), with himself and the others, independently of what constitutes his biological basis, of scientific knowledge in general and of the community to which she or he belongs [11] (p. 31). Thus, the self is a reality that must be approached in its unity, both as a subjective, lived experience and, so to speak, as an “object”.
Ultimately, self-realisation in the world, from the point of view of happiness or a fulfilled life, must be approached, according to McMullin, from three complementary perspectives. From a first-person perspective, it operates on the basis of what is specific to me (my identity, what defines me, my unique perspective). From a second-person perspective, it includes everything that stems from my relationship with others (their needs, vulnerability, interests, etc.). From a third-person perspective, self-fulfilment in the world is motivated by scientific knowledge and by certain values shared by the community to which I belong (freedom, equality, friendship, and so on) [11] (p. 37; 40–64).

This contemporary redefinition of the good or flourishing human life both renews and extends the classical—Aristotelian—tradition of virtue ethics. Yet it is striking to note that this redefinition in no way refers to the natural environment as an aspect of self-realisation in the world. The natural environment as moral patient is absent from McMullin’s discussion. In this respect, the concepts that define virtue ethics seem to lend support only to a moral anthropocentrism².

### 3. Environmental Virtues: The Extrinsic Relationship between Virtue Ethics and the Environment

Ronald Sandler’s thinking is one of the most accomplished contributions to date that addresses this blind spot and endeavours to take the natural environment into account in virtue ethics [7]. In his approach, he examines the different ways by which the environment can contribute to a virtuous life. Firstly, the environment can be seen as a condition for human flourishing (moral anthropocentrism). Secondly, it can be considered for its own good (moral non-anthropocentrism).

#### 3.1. Moral Anthropocentrism

According to Sandler, the anthropocentric perspective can make sense of the environment in virtue ethics in two ways: as a condition for a person to be virtuous, or as a condition for human happiness³.

In the first case, a healthy environment would be necessary for the exercise of virtues. This would mean, for example, that a degraded environment would prevent us from being virtuous. But if this degradation were compensated for by technological innovation or other artificial goods, it would no longer be a problem. On closer examination, this argument is not convincing, because it is difficult to objectively assess the threshold at which the ecological conditions would cease to enable virtue, if such a threshold even exists. Does a severely degraded environment really prevent gratitude, love or frugality, for example? Experience seems to show the opposite: it is often in difficult times, such as war, that certain virtues—frugality or solidarity, for example—motivate people’s behaviour. Furthermore, the latter part of this argument implies that technology could, if available, easily compensate for degraded environmental conditions. This presupposes the utilitarian meaning attributed to the environment, but ignores all the very real values—aesthetic, cultural, patrimonial, and so on—that individuals or communities ascribe to their environment, and that commit those people to protecting it, regardless of its utility.

But—and this is the second case—it is easy to see the environment as a condition for human flourishing. There is no doubt that in many situations the quality of the natural environment contributes to a good human life. A healthy soil means that we can produce good quality food in sufficient quantity; unpolluted air means that we can maintain good health, and so on. A healthy environment also encourages social cohesion and cooperation between communities. The inverse is also true: the virtues of justice and concern for the people in our community and between communities, for example, help to promote good environmental conditions.

The two ways by which virtue ethics can make sense of the environment with an anthropocentric perspective assume that there is an extrinsic relationship to be found between the environment and humans.
When nature is seen as a simple condition for a good human life, such a vision remains dependent at worst on an ontological dualism between man and his environment, and at best on an epistemological dualism between the knowing subject and the object to be known. Let us begin with the objection posed by ontological dualism. Ontological dualism implies that the human being stands out from the environment, a classic opposition established by modernity between a material reality (nature) and a spiritual reality (culture), harshly criticized today by anthropologists⁴. This ontological dualism provides a justification for a moral dualism. If the environment is no more than a means to the end of achieving human good, it has only an instrumental value in the service of human flourishing, whereas the latter is intended for its own sake, and therefore has its own intrinsic value. The difference between the instrumental value of nature and the intrinsic value of human life duplicates an ontological difference between an environment that is fundamentally inert and devoid of value in itself and human beings who are both the source and the repository of value.

Admittedly, the conception of the human being standing out from nature has been undermined by the advent of scientific ecology and the theory of evolution, among others, which state that human beings actually belong to nature and have evolved from it. However, epistemological dualism raises a second objection. From the point of view of scientific knowledge, while humans are ontologically reintegrated into nature, they nonetheless remain outside it as knowing subjects. The epistemological model of a disembodied knowing subject, external to the object it seeks to understand, guarantees objectivity in science. It provides the basis for a third-person approach to the world and has structured the development of scientific knowledge until now. This second objection is more difficult to unpick in the context of virtue ethics and is usually not given sufficient attention. This can be further clarified by considering the way Sandler tries to escape the anthropocentric bias in virtue ethics.

## 3.2. Moral Non-Anthropocentrism

Without departing from scientific naturalism, Sandler believes that a virtuous life is not limited to the pursuit of human flourishing in the sense developed above. Virtue ethics, he says, is also able to take into account the natural environment, not only as a condition for human flourishing but as an end in itself. He explains that what makes certain character traits virtuous need not necessarily be a function of human happiness alone, for what makes a character trait a virtue has to do also with ends other than human happiness, insofar as these virtues too are considered ends in themselves. Thus, if it is acknowledged that animals and organisms have their own immanent good independent of that of humans (the satisfaction of an animal's own desires or needs, for example), certain character traits can be seen as virtues in relation not only to human ends (happiness), but also to desires or needs of animals, to ecosystemic health and even to ecological integrity [7] (chap. 3).

Sandler's proposal therefore seeks to extend virtue ethics to considerations that are no longer solely concerned with the human good, but with a good that is specific to the natural environment or to its elements. In this respect, an ethics of virtues would become compatible with the attempts of environmental ethics to overcome the moral anthropocentrism underlying classical ethics. Some aspects of the environment are then no longer simply a condition for human flourishing; they take on a properly moral value, based on their own good. Temperance, for example, which traditionally aims to control our desire for pleasure in areas such as food or sexuality, would become an appropriate character trait for moderating the consumption of natural resources, where this consumption is detrimental to animal welfare, the well-being of certain organisms or the ecological integrity or health of an ecosystem. Hence the virtue of temperance, initially conceived in relation to human happiness and flourishing, now has a new goal: the promotion of the good of certain aspects of the environment. Thus, here we see a traditional virtue which, when applied to environmental issues, becomes an environmental virtue.

Applying virtue ethics to the environment is undoubtedly useful in everyday practice. However, as long as the emphasis is on the character of a person in relation to human
happiness and the good of the environment, this confrontation will meet numerous conflicts of interest in which human happiness is very likely, depending on the circumstances, to relegate what is good for the environment to second place. For example, the benevolence that encourages me to visit my sick grandmother, who lives thousands of miles away, contrasts with the temperance that encourages me to avoid long plane journeys. Or, within a virtue such as love, for example, love for my sick grandmother is opposed to my love for nature, a love that strives to avoid an act that is harmful to the environment (air travel). No doubt benevolence will win out here over temperance, or love for my grandmother over love for nature. As long as the moral agent is considered to be a human subject (i.e., a moral subject), according to the logic of virtue ethics, the good of non-human patients will often be evaluated in favour of the human patients who are human subjects too and therefore moral subjects. This is because an environmental virtue ethics remains subject to an epistemological subject-object model. Such a model underlies the structure of the ethical relationship between moral subject and moral patient. What makes a human subject a moral subject is determined, as Philippa Foot shows, by the fact that the human subject possesses a rational will. Naturalism may strive to define objectively, from the outside, the properties of the object likely to make it a moral patient (for example, the happiness of other human beings, the well-being of animals, the good of organisms, etc.) and the properties of the subject likely to make it a moral agent (for example, the rational will of the human). However, decision in the sphere of moral assessment and behaviour will ultimately be determined by the human will: the rational will always choose itself over that which differs from it. This preference ultimately results from the subject-object structure underlying naturalism, which defines what is a human subject (a moral subject) as opposed to what is merely an object—or, at most, a moral patient.

To address this anthropocentric bias, we need to turn to a level that escapes the human subject/object or moral subject/moral patient structure. This level is that of a lived experience which, as we shall see, has not yet fixed on an intentional relationship to an object or to a moral patient.

### 3.3. *The Remaining Anthropocentric Bias*

In order to fully grasp the sense of this objection, we need to clarify what anthropocentrism means. An initial distinction can be made between epistemic anthropocentrism and moral anthropocentrism. The anthropocentric bias referred to above does not fall under moral anthropocentrism, since, as we have seen, environmental virtue ethics is apt to considering non-human moral patients. The objection therefore concerns epistemic anthropocentrism (see Figure 1, below). But this expression can remain a relatively vague concept and needs to be clarified.

<table><caption>**Figure 1.** Epistemic anthropocentrism.</caption><tr><td>1<br>Kind of<br>Anthropocentrism</td><td colspan="2">Epistemic anthropocentrism</td></tr><tr><td>2<br>Human Mind</td><td>Mental dimension<br>Psycho-physiological functionnality</td><td>Physical dimension<br>Physical body, brain</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">3<br>Human Subjectivity</td><td>Ontological Perspective<br>(in first person)</td><td>Epistemic Perspective<br>(in third person)</td></tr><tr><td>Non-objectified</td><td>Objectified</td></tr><tr><td>Subject,<br>self-consciousness</td><td>Reason, affectivity, belief, interest</td></tr><tr><td>Lived experience</td><td>Personal identity</td></tr></table>

In a first approximation, epistemic anthropocentrism means that human consciousness must be presupposed for knowledge and evaluation of nature. Without human conscious-
ness, there could possibly be a reality, but it would be perceived and thought of differently than it is by the human species. The idea underlying epistemic anthropocentrism has two dimensions, physical and mental. The physical aspect consists of the physical body by which reality is apprehended, in particular the brain. The mental aspect, on the other hand, comprises the psycho-physiological functions that the body and brain enable (cognition, affectivity, conation, consciousness). These two aspects together form what we might call the mind⁵. On a third level of epistemic anthropocentrism, the mental aspect of the mind can be approached from a strictly epistemic angle, i.e., from an external, third-person point of view, as reason, affects, interests, beliefs, desires, and so on. However, it can also be approached from an ontological angle, from an interior, first-person point of view. It is then a conscious subject, aware of himself, who thinks and acts rationally, exercises his will, has interests, desires, etc., in relation to his social and natural environment. Viewed from both inside and outside, the mind comes to constitute, so to speak, the personal identity of a human being or, in other words, the subject (knowing subject, moral subject, etc.).

Having said that, can we reduce the mind to a personal identity? In fact, this reduction can only result from an objectification of the subject, whether this objectification is done by himself or by other subjects. For apart from a constituted self—that is, insofar as we strive not to objectify the subject—lived experience seems, on the contrary, to attest that it is much more fluid and diffuse, without precise limits. It suggests relationships rather than objects or subjects. Co-extensive with experience, the mind is then no longer limited to the human subject and his body; it is still neither truly subject nor truly object, but traverses what surrounds our lived bodies in a multitude of ways through the beings we encounter (humans, animals, plants, ecosystems, etc.)⁶. The anthropocentric bias then refers precisely to the ignorance or exclusion of this underlying—non-objectified—dimension of mind that precedes any representation of humans and non-humans as subjects or objects, of moral (human) agents and of moral (human and non-human) patients.

As Figure 1 shows, anthropocentrism is hardly questionable at the first and second levels [epistemic (1), human mind (2)]. On the other hand, in order to avoid falling into an anthropocentric bias, we must—at the third level, i.e., human subjectivity (3)—not reduce our understanding of the concept to that objectified part of the subjectivity that lets its non-objectified part slip away. For it is within this non-objectified part that reside the meaningful relationships between humans and non-humans that are likely to motivate action, before they crystallise and become fixed in a personal identity through character traits.

For the moment, we can therefore draw the following conclusion. In order to avoid an anthropocentric bias in the ethical evaluation of a situation based on virtues (and vices), it is necessary to reconsider the subject–object model and also to relativise the scope of naturalism in the definition of the ultimate good. For while naturalism ensures objectivity in the definition of the human and non-human good, it is also naturalism that justifies the human subject in his exclusive role as a moral agent in relation to moral patients. Thus, before any objectification by science (subject/object) or morality (agent/patient) in a third-person perspective, we must first remember that we are dealing with lived relationships between selves or agents (human and non-human) in a first-person perspective. Such a first-person perspective avoids the pitfall of the epistemological dualism underlying naturalism; it allows access to the *relational* dimension of lived experience which is an experience *with* nature and no longer an experience *of* nature.

In other words, self-realisation in the world can no longer be seen simply as that of a human subject or agent in relation to objects or patients (human and non-human). Before any recourse to naturalism, before any objective consideration, it must be approached, first and foremost, from a subjective perspective that provides access to the natural environment from the inside, without remaining outside it. The promotion of a moral non-anthropocentrism in virtue ethics, such as Sandler's, does not escape an anthropocentric bias. The latter is ultimately based on an epistemological dualism in which the relationship between humans and their environment remains extrinsic.
This leads to shift the emphasis from environmental virtues to ecological virtues. As we shall see, in an ethics of ecological virtues, the good life, or the good to which these virtues are attached, needs to be considered as that of an ecological self, i.e., the self that must be considered from a first-person perspective.

# 4. Ecological Virtues: The Intrinsic Relationship between Virtue Ethics and the Environment

## 4.1. *A Relational Ontology, beyond the Epistemological Subject-Object Model*

Returning to a subjective, first-person perspective involves an awareness that the object of experience does not exist independently of the intentional relationship of the subject established through that subject's experience. For example, when I see a tree through the window, I may become aware that the tree does not exist in itself, but that it appears to me in the perception I have of it, i.e., in my perceptual relationship with the tree. However, if the subject is in an intentional relationship with the environment, the latter can be seen in two different ways. First, it can be seen as a spatially constituted object (empirical or conceptual). For example, a tree can be seen as a cherry tree whose tasty fruit I eat in summer. We are dealing with a relation of meaning, but of a meaning that has already been formed. Here, the subject-object model continues to permeate the relationship with nature.

The second way aims to get rid of the subject-object structure. The subject's intentional relationship with the environment is then no longer with an already constituted object, but with an object as it appears in the present experience. It is that of an *appearance of the object*, of its genesis in experience, *before* the division into subject and object, i.e., below the objectifying and spatialising subject-object structure [18] (p. 103–104). In this case, the environment does not pre-exist the *event* through which I encounter it In the life-world. Indeed, through my body, I belong to the life-world. I constitute this world as much as it constitutes me. Now, this co-constitution is event-based and precedes both the “subject” and the “object” [19] (p. 726–727); it relates to the temporal structure of consciousness. It follows that, in this respect, the value of the environment belongs neither to the realm of physical reality (object) nor to the realm of mental reality (subject); it is neither subjective nor objective. It comes from a reality—the life-world—that is fundamentally relational: a field of consciousness that pre-exists a valued object and the subject who values it. To take the previous example, the tree in my garden is experienced in the event of the shimmering branches of the cherry blossom that I see waving in the spring breeze, in the event of the deep red colour of the cherries when they are picked up, or in the event of their tender, sweet flesh when I taste them.

In the latter case, the “de-objectification” is radical. This de-objectification is radical in the sense that it frees us from the epistemological subject-object model and definitively turns our backs on an ontology that conceives of the entities of the world as separate from one another. This other, relational ontology is neither an ontology of the object (materialism) nor of the subject (idealism), but of a relational field in which the value of nature is above all an event. Both the evaluator and what is being evaluated depend on this event, which is the origin of practical dispositions—character traits or virtues—that motivate us to act.

Consequently, the natural environment is not simply a condition of the human good but is itself an aspect of the good. In other words, it is a constituent of flourishing, of a realisation that is not exclusively that of the human self but encompasses everything with which human beings are in relationship: other humans, but also nature (animals, living things, soil, air, natural things like rivers or mountains, landscapes, and so on). The supreme good that an ecological virtue ethics must pursue is thus not that of a human self, but of a self that defines itself in relation to its environment. As we have seen, the character traits that make up the virtues, according to Sandler, are not only a function of human good (happiness), but also of ends immanent to non-human natural entities (their own good). However, if the self is not what we think it is, then the good, flourishing life is not what we think it is either. A self extended to the environment is an ecological self, not a human self. It is not defined as an entity separate from its environment, but as a
node of relationships within a relational network. The realisation of such a self means the crystallisation of a knot of relationships constituting the environment, in which true happiness is achieved. It follows that a virtuous human being must be judged according to a renewed understanding of fulfilment: that of an ecological self, not a human self.

Before taking a closer look at what the flourishing of an ecological self means, let us briefly note some advantages of an ecological ethics of virtue, in other words, a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics, which the above development makes it possible to highlight. Compared with an environmental virtue ethics, such as Sandler’s, which seeks to extend the scope of certain classical virtues to the good of the environment, an ecological virtue ethics defends the idea of properly ecological virtues. These virtues presuppose an acute awareness of the anthropocentric bias that constantly threatens our day-to-day practice and that Sandler’s approach cannot avoid. In an ecological virtue ethics, however, awareness of an anthropocentric bias invites us to return again and again to the events of our lived experience of nature, within which our multiple relationships to the environment are born and renewed.

Moreover, ecological virtues are not limited to natural entities that have a proper good, a good in and for itself, but can allow us to take into account all the constituent elements of the natural environment, without having to worry about the (theoretical) question of whether such and such an entity actually has its own good or ecological integrity. An ecological virtue ethics is able to do this because it is based on a relational ontology—where the entities of nature (including ourselves) exist through the relationships they enter into with each other—and not on a naturalistic ontology in which the entities exist separately from and are independent of each other.

An ecological ethics of virtue finally makes explicit a deeper living dimension of human experience than that of perception, which motivates and guides our actions and, more generally, our behaviour. In the environmental virtue ethic model, on the other hand, virtues are applied to objectified entities which, unlike the relationships we have as humans with other humans, leave little room for the affectivity inherent in the experience that permeates our motivations. By escaping epistemological dualism, the ecological self can also hope to escape the anthropocentric bias.

## 4.2. *The Good Life, or the Ultimate Good of an Ecological Self*

The ecological self is not a new idea. It was proposed in the 1980s by the philosopher Arne Næss [20] and [21] (p. 171–183), developed later theoretically by Freya Mathews [22] and then taken up again, with certain nuances, in the ecofeminism of Val Plumwood, among others [23] (ch. 6). In the philosophical tradition of phenomenology [24], let us say that the ecological self refers, in a first approximation, to a relational self whose realisation includes, among its own primary ends and through different modes of participation, the fulfilment of other beings on earth. In this context, I examine how to make sense of the three-dimensional model that McMullin uses to define human flourishing (see above).

Adapted to the concept of an ecological self, the first-, second- and third-person perspectives can be replaced, respectively, by those of interiority (a relationship to oneself), exteriority (a relationship with nature or the environment in general) and objectivity (scientific concepts validated intersubjectively).

* First-person perspective. Considered primarily from the point of view of interiority, the realisation of the ecological self—its flourishing or fulfilment—no longer operates on the basis of a personal and social identity of its own, but on the basis of a decentring of oneself, or, so to speak, a “dying” to oneself. This implies a return to the impersonal layer of my existence, to that of the lived body, the body that feels and lives in the space-time and temporality of consciousness. It is through such a body that we can grasp the otherness of natural beings and act virtuously towards them at the very heart of this relationship with the other. The self refers not to the *ego* but to a dimension of being deeper than that of the beliefs, desires, interests and feelings with which I usually identify. The decentring of oneself therefore concerns not the self but what
defines the self socially and personally as an *ego* who does not reflect on and transform
that self.

*   Second-person perspective. From the point of view of exteriority, the realisation of the ecological self includes everything that can be accessed through the various ways of participating in nature. This participation can take various forms. For example, through empathic participation with an animal, I am able to respond to its sensitive, affective and even, in some cases, conative life. Meanwhile, in a form of participation that I describe as ‘enactive’ (because of the finality immanent in every organism that produces its environment), I am able to respond to the vital activity of an organism, as it manifests itself in metabolism (feeding, breathing) and movement (desiring). And in a ‘trajective’ participation (in which I project my body into the environment), I can grasp, as part of a human community, the characteristics of my environment and of the particular space-time within which my existence takes place: the climate, the aridity or fertility of the soil, the presence or absence of an animal or plant population, the singular beauty of a landscape, and so on. And, in so doing, I can also respond to the particularities of the natural environments in which other human communities live.

* Third-person perspective. Finally, from the perspective of objectivity, the flourishing of the ecological self is also motivated by the knowledge developed over time through scientific research, which, in the context of ecological awareness, aims to gain a better understanding of the non-human animal, the living and the plant world in particular, so as to have a more accurate view of ecosystems and, more fundamentally, a more complete understanding of reality. As we can see, the third-person perspective of scientific naturalism has not been abandoned. But it is relativised in relation to a first- and second-person perspective.

An ecological virtue ethics can only be developed on the basis of an ecological self. Nevertheless, in the context of this article, it is not possible to identify and describe ecological virtues any further. In the final part of this section, I shall confine myself to illustrating what an ecological virtue could be on the basis of a well-known figure in environmental thought. Drawing on her personal experience, the philosopher and ecofeminist Val Plumwood insists on the development of a relational ethics, based on our lived participation in the environment.

4.3. *An Ecological Virtue: Vigilance or Attentiveness*

In February 1985, Val Plumwood set off on an excursion to Arnehm Land, east of Kakadu National Park in Australia's Northern Territory. While crossing a river in a canoe in the monsoon rain, she was surprised by a saltwater crocodile. Suddenly, the crocodile pounced on the boat, biting her leg and trying to drown her, but miraculously, albeit wounded, Plumwood managed to escape the predator and flee. With the benefit of hindsight, this traumatic episode became a crucial event in Plumwood's life. It enabled her, she says, to become truly aware, in her own flesh, of the very relative place of the human species in nature, when confronted with a predator. But that is not the whole story.

Afterwards, she asked herself: “Why did I do such dangerous things and not perceive
my danger? Why did I not see myself as subject to these kinds of dangers in this place?” [25]
(p. 14). When she set out to cross a river infested with sea crocodiles, she thought she was
safe. She thought this was her world, a world she knew and was familiar with.

Yet, as I looked into the eye of the crocodile, I realised that my planning for
this journey upriver had given insufficient attention to this important aspect of
human life, to my own vulnerability as an edible, animal being. [25] (p. 10)

One way of answering these questions lies in my background in a certain kind
of culture, my background relationship to the land I was visiting and the land
of home. My relationship, in other words, to place. I was in a place that was not
my own and which was very different from my own place. An important part of
place is one's sense of the large predators for placing us. [25] (p. 20)
Plumwood did not realise the risk she was taking by paddling a canoe on a river she knew to be inhabited by crocodiles. Basically, she failed to be vigilant. By failing to pay attention to a habitat that was not her own, she failed to realise that she was sharing it with other animals, not least her own predators. The importance of this sense of “the large predators”, or vigilance, is also what Plumwood has in mind when she comes to the end of her story, recalling the forest fires in the south-east of Australia where she lives:

> The southerly change really is Cool. [...] I dig out a sweater; lyrebirds are singing again; grasses greening. [...] The dripping forest feels good now, but I know it's not over yet until we get a lot more rain. [...] You must be able to look at the bush you love and also imagine it as a smoking, blackened ruin, and somehow come to terms with that vision. I am trying to make my house fire-ready, but in the cool moist airstream of the moment I am finding it hard to sustain the sense of urgency and inevitability [...]. But I know I will have to meet the fire monster face-to-face one day. [25] (p. 21)

Vigilance is a disposition that translates into attention to the world around us, which comes to us through our experience of it: the beauty of the nature around us, but also the anticipation of the fire that might destroy it.

The virtue of vigilance, as it emerges from this story, is a truly ecological virtue. For it emerges from an identity that does not see itself as separate from the environment in which it evolves. This self is an ecological self, in the sense that this identity is lived and experienced in relation to the place it inhabits, its climate and the other animal and plant species that live there with it: the wildfires, the humid air of the ocean, the lyre birds and the trees of the forest. It is precisely this intimacy with the natural environment that leads it to develop a vigilant attitude to the dangers of fire.

I think that such a virtue of vigilance, understood from the point of view of an intrinsic relationship with the environment, differs from the meaning it would take on in an environmental virtue ethic. Viewed as part of the development of an ecological self, vigilance here reflects an amplified experience of nature in which the threat of an attack by a predator or a forest fire is placed in the context of a lived proximity to the environment—for example, an acute attention to those who share our habitat or to the singular climate of a region. This presupposes the ability to imagine a reality different from the one we are currently experiencing and to anticipate the behaviour it implies. In an extrinsic relationship with the environment, however, it is precisely this amplification of lived experience closely associated with imagination and anticipation that is lacking. In this case, the anthropocentric bias and objectification of the lived experience encourages us to focus our attention on the predator (which we are going to eliminate) or the fire (which we are going to fight) without seeing them as events inherent in the environment we inhabit and with which we must learn to live.

Through the narrative of Plumwood, the virtue of vigilance illustrates its meaning as an ecological virtue. It differentiates itself from the sense it would take as an environmental virtue within an environmental virtue ethics where the relationship to nature is extrinsic and not intrinsic.

The three forms of virtue ethics applied to the environment can now be distinguished in the figure below (Figure 2) according to moral anthropocentrism or moral non-anthropocentrism in virtue ethics and according to the extrinsic or intrinsic relationship with nature.

Figure 2 shows the differences between the three forms of virtue ethics, depending on whether they are founded in moral anthropocentrism or not and whether they are intrinsic or extrinsic to the environment. An environmental virtue ethics is close to an ecological virtue ethics in terms of their common, non-anthropocentric perspective. But it is close to a classical virtue ethics in terms of the extrinsic nature of the relationship to the environment. Only an ecological virtue ethics is both non-anthropocentric and intrinsically committed to nature. In so doing, it avoids the pitfall of anthropocentric bias that constantly threatens an environmental virtue ethics.
<table><caption>Figure 2. Three forms of virtue ethics applied to environment.</caption><thead><tr><th>Moral Anthropocentrism</th><th colspan="2">Moral Non-Anthropocentrism</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Classical virtue ethic</td><td>Environmental virtue ethic</td><td>Ecological virtue ethic</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">Extrinsic relationship to nature</td></tr><tr><td>Human flourishing</td><td>Human flourishing + the « good » of the environment</td><td>Flourishing of an ecological self</td></tr><tr><td>Classical virtues (benevolence, love, etc.)</td><td>Environmental virtues (temperance, etc.)</td><td>Ecological virtues (vigilance, etc.)</td></tr></tbody></table>

## 5. Conclusions

The aim of this article was to sketch out a response to the dilemma inherent in a virtue ethics that endeavours to take account of the natural environment. I have tried to propose a non-anthropocentric version, an ecological ethics of virtue, although not an environmental virtue ethics. I have tried to show that the individual who operates on the basis of environmental virtues has an extrinsic relationship with his environment in which the good of the environment is added, so to speak, to human happiness from the outside. This individual remains subject to a dualist subject-object epistemological model that is unable to account for the relationships it has with its environment. In this approach, the environment is at worst a mere object, useful or useless in satisfying human needs and desires; at best, it is a moral patient whose value must be taken into account by a human moral agent who himself has a value and who is responsible for the moral assessment of a situation. This is the inevitably anthropocentric bias of this model applied to environmental ethics.

Unlike environmental virtues, ecological virtues are those of a genuine ecological self whose relationship with its natural environment is intrinsic, not extrinsic. In this case, the relationship we have with nature prevents it from being assimilated to a mere object or to something radically different from ourselves, just as much as it avoids reducing it to ourselves [26]. The relationship with nature strives—through participative relationships—to preserve nature in what constitutes it in its own right: its own experience (animals), its life (organisms) and the environments in which human and non-human communities live, which are always unique (ecosystems).

It will be objected that this conceptual clarification may seem futile in practical terms. After all, in everyday situations where the environment is at stake, it is highly likely that a virtuous person animated by environmental virtues will often act in a similar way to one animated by ecological virtues. In fact, it is not a question of pitting the three versions of virtue ethics that I have proposed in this article against each other. Each has legitimacy at some level of our relationship with the environment. From an anthropocentric perspective, classical virtue ethics can be favourable to the environment. Think of benevolence towards non-human animals or, more generally, love of nature. But here the relationship with the environment remains fairly superficial. From a non-anthropocentric perspective, an environmental virtue ethics makes it possible to consider nature or certain aspects of it morally by redefining certain virtues specifically in relation to the environment, such as temperance. Ultimately, an ethics of ecological virtues is one that probes deeply into our relationship with the environment by aiming at the stratum of lived relationships with nature, before any implementation of the subject-object epistemological model. Ecological virtues are also redefined in relation to the environment, but they are redefined on the basis of our lived experience of it, and not on the basis of the properties of objectified natural entities, identified as belonging to their good.

As Plumwood's example of vigilance illustrates, the character traits of an ecological self presuppose a different experience of how humans belong to their natural environment and a different way of perceiving and behaving in it. An amplified experience of nature, such as Plumwood's, takes account of human and non-human interests alike, aiming for the fulfilment of a whole to which a person is aware of belonging. Furthermore, those
differences inevitably have an effect on the way we conceive of the political community and the collective goals we assign to it. This will inevitably determine the contents, the demands and even the radical nature of environmental policies on, for example, the preservation of biodiversity, climate change or energy transition that are put in place democratically and ultimately accepted by virtuous citizens. I think, for example, that political management of a predator like the wolf, based on ecological virtues, is significantly different from management based on environmental virtues. There is always a risk that the anthropocentric bias, coupled with an immoderate objectivation of the environment, will favour a policy that gives more weight to human fulfilment (in this case, that of livestock farmers and mountain farmers) than to that of an ecological self. The latter will consider a priori the legitimacy of wolves living in a territory they share with farmers. This means considering farmers and wolves together as part of the same ecological reality, while taking account of the interests of both sides—thanks above all to the various forms of participation in nature and that ecological knowledge can complement. Wolves are not just livestock predators (objectivation) that need to be eliminated (anthropocentric bias), and farmers are not just livestock owners (objectivation) that need to be protected (anthropocentric bias). In this way, the solution cannot be subsumed to a norm (apart from that of being virtuous) or be the result of objective reasoning; it is adapted to situations that are always singular. And this is something that only ecological virtues or character traits can address.

The task now ahead is to identify which character traits constitute authentic ecological virtues. This can be achieved through a more precise description of the ways in which humans participate in nature<fnref n="7" />.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not applicable.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

## Notes

## References

1. Hess, G. *Éthiques de la Nature*; PUF: Paris, France, 2013.

2. Light, A.; Katz, E. (Eds.) *Environmental Pragmatism*; Routledge: London, UK, 1996.

3. Cafaro, P. Thoreau, Leopold and Carson: Toward an Environmental Virtue Ethics. In *Environmental Virtue Ethics*; Sandler, R., Cafaro, P., Eds.; Rowan & Littlefield: Lanham, MA, USA, 2004; pp. 31–44.

4. Pelluchon, C. *Éthique de la Considération*; PUF: Paris, France, 2018.

5. Van Louke, W. *Dirty Virtues. The Emergence of Ecological Virtues*; Humanity Books: New York, NY, USA, 1999.

6. Sandler, R.; Cafaro, P. (Eds.) *Environmental Virtue Ethics*; Rowan & Littlefield: Lanham, MA, USA, 2004.

7. Sandler, R. *Character and Environment. A Virtue-Oriented Approach to Environmental Ethics*; Columbia UP: New York, NY, USA, 2007.

8. Cafaro, P.; Sandler, R. (Eds.) *Virtue Ethics and the Environment*; Springer: Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2010.

9. Crisp, R. (Ed.) *Aristoteles Nicomachean Ethics*; Cambridge UP: Cambridge, UK, 2014.

<footnote n="1">1. See the arguments in Andrew Light and Eric Katz [2].</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2. Aristotelian ethics and the tradition associated with it—which for the purposes of this debate I will refer to as “classical virtue ethics”—do not envisage the human being separated from his environment; however, the external nature within which the human being flourishes is nonetheless a condition for his flourishing, and no moral value is attributed to it. It is an ethics of and for human beings: it concerns them and is addressed to them. We could say that such a moral anthropocentrism is an anthropocentred ethic, but not necessarily an anthropocentric ethic. Moral anthropocentrism will become anthropocentric in modernity with the ontological and epistemological dualism (see Section 3 below).</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3. For a discussion of these two arguments, see Ronald Sandler [7] (p. 43–55).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4. See, for instance, Philippe Descola [15].</footnote>

<footnote n="5">5. See the very insightful paper of Max Velmans [16].</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6. In the field of environmental ethics, see Gérald Hess [17], especially p. 77–83.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">7. I would like to thank Marine Bedon for drawing my attention to her useful formulation of the distinction used in Note 2, and Sylvie Pouteau for her comments and her suggestions to the clear structuring of this article.</footnote>
10. Dzwonkowska, D. Is Environmental Virtue Ethics Anthropocentric? *J. Agric. Environ. Ethics* **2018**, *31*, 723–738. [CrossRef]

11. McMullin, I. *Existential Flourishing. A Phenomenology of the Virtues*; Cambridge UP: Cambridge, UK, 2019.

12. Kraut, R. Aristotle's Ethics. In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*; Zalta, E.N., Nodelman, U., Eds.; Stanford University: Stanford, CA, USA, 2022.

13. Foot, P. *Natural Goodness*; Oxford UP: Oxford, UK, 2001.

14. Hursthouse, R. *On Virtue Ethics*; Oxford UP: Oxford, UK, 1999.

15. Descola, P. *Beyond Nature and Culture*; Chicago UP: Chicago, IL, USA, 2013.

16. Velmans, M. Reflexive Monism: Psychophysical Relations among Mind, Matter and Consciousness. *J. Conscious. Stud.* **2012**, *19*, 143–165.

17. Hess, G. Le dernier homme et la valeur de la nature. In *Routley, R.S. Aux Origines de l'Éthique Environnementale*; Hess, G., Ed.; PUF: Paris, France, 2019; pp. 57–85.

18. Hess, G. De l'éthique environnementale à l'écophénoménologie et retour. *Cités* **2018**, *76*, 97–108. [CrossRef]

19. Gilliand, C. Experiencing Values in the Flow of Events: A Phenomenological Approach to Relational Values. *Environ. Values* **2021**, *30*, 715–736. [CrossRef]

20. Næss, A. Self-Realisation. An ecological approach to Being in the World. *Trumpeter* **1987**, *4*, 35–42.

21. Næss, A. *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle*; Cambridge UP: Cambridge, UK, 2003.

22. Mathews, F. *The Ecological Self*; Routledge: London, UK, 1991.

23. Plumwood, V. *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*; Routledge: London, UK, 1993.

24. Hess, G. *Conscience Cosmique. Pour une Écologie en Première Personne*; Dehors: Bellevaux, France, 2023.

25. Plumwood, V. *The Eye of the Crocodile*; Shannon, L., Ed.; Australian National University E Press: Canberra, Australia, 2012.

26. Plumwood, V. Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism. *Hypatia* **1991**, *6*, 3–27. [CrossRef]

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Article

# Ecological Virtuous Selves: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Environmental Virtue Ethic?

Damien Delorme <fnref n="1" />,*, Noemi Calidori <fnref n="2" /> and Giovanni Frigo <fnref n="3" />

**Citation:** Delorme, D.; Calidori, N.; Frigo, G. Ecological Virtuous Selves: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Environmental Virtue Ethic? *Philosophies* 2024, 9, 11. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9010011

Academic Editors: Sylvie Pouteau and Gérald Hess

Received: 3 October 2023
Revised: 12 December 2023
Accepted: 26 December 2023
Published: 9 January 2024

<figure><img src="image_20.png" /></figure>

**Copyright:** © 2024 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

**Abstract:** Existing predominant approaches within virtue ethics (VE) assume humans as the typical agent and virtues as dispositions that pertain primarily to human-human interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the main accounts in the more specific area of environmental virtue ethics (EVE) tend to support weak anthropocentric positions, in which virtues are understood as excellent dispositions of human agents. In addition, however, several EVE authors have also considered virtues that benefit non-human beings and entities (e.g., environmental or ecological virtues). The latter correspond to excellent character dispositions that would extend moral consideration and care for the benefit of non-human beings, entities, or entire ecosystems. In this direction, a few authors have argued that EVE could be considered non-anthropocentric insofar as it could: (a) promote non-human ends, well-being, and the flourishing of non-human beings and entities; (b) involve significant relations to non-humans. Drawing from different traditions, including ecofeminism and care ethics, we argue for a broader notion of self and a decentered notion of virtues. The broader notion of selfhood corresponds to the “ecological self”, one that can be enacted by both human and non-human beings, is embedded in a network of relations, and recognizes the more-than-human world as fundamental and yet indispensable otherness. We suggest that this broader notion of agency allows for an expansive understanding of virtues that includes a moral functional ecological virtues, which can be exercised not only by humans but also by certain non-human beings. This alternative understanding of selfhood and ecological virtues within EVE could have several theoretical and practical implications, some of which may enable different types of agencies and transform collective action.

**Keywords:** ecological self; ecofeminism; care ethics; environmental virtue ethics; non-anthropocentrism; ecological virtues; agency

## 1. Introduction

A cautious but philosophically reasonable answer to the leading question of this collection—"Is Environmental Virtue Ethics a Virtuous Anthropocentrism?"—might be "It depends". Of course, it depends on the specific meaning of some of these loaded terms (e.g., "virtue" or "anthropocentrism"). However, the response is also based on some underlying theoretical assumptions, such as the type of agent or actor that is considered capable of demonstrating virtues, and regarding who or what may potentially benefit from certain virtues. In this paper, we question some assumptions regarding the notion of agency and virtue elaborated so far in environmental virtue ethics (EVE) and, as an alternative approach to EVE, we explore non-anthropocentric notions of subjectivity and agency that are not yet moralized. More specifically, we propose that it is possible to answer "Not necessarily" to the question above, provided that the notions of agency and virtues are decentered from human subjectivity, that is, when they become *de*-anthropocentrized. Our aim is to explore the metaphysical, ontological, and ethical conditions for including

<footnote n="1">¹ Faculty of Geosciences and Environment (FGSE), Institute of Geography and Sustainability (IGD), University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Department of Law, Roma Tre University, 00154 Rome, Italy; ncalidori@uniroma3.it</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS), Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), 76131 Karlsruhe, Germany; giovanni.frigo@kit.edu</footnote>

<footnote>* Correspondence: damien.delorme@unil.ch</footnote>
non-anthropocentric perspectives within EVE. Our research question is the following: Can a broader notion of self combined with an extended notion of virtues constitute the preconditions for developing a non-anthropocentric approach in environmental virtue ethics? Alternatively, one may ask: can non-anthropocentric notions of agency and virtue become the basis for virtuous non-anthropocentrism in EVE?

Most EVE accounts that have emerged over the past twenty years tend to be weakly anthropocentric. Although this may depend on several reasons, here we suggest that it hinges on assumptions regarding both the notion of agency and that of virtue. First, even though most EVE scholars acknowledge that the human exercise of some virtues may benefit non-human¹ beings and entities (i.e., environmental or ecological virtues), they do not go so far as to claim that *non-human agents* can exercise virtues. This may depend on the metaphysical assumption that only humans are *normative agents* or on the fact that there is a long-standing tradition of thinking primarily about *human virtues*. Second, most accounts in EVE may have consistently assumed a narrow notion of virtue as *moral virtue*, which is a normative human endeavor or an exclusively human disposition or practice. Let us now consider existing alternatives to these views.

*Agency*. Although, within EVE scholarship, there seems to be no account that explicitly proposes that non-human agents can exercise virtues, some authors in the broader field of environmental ethics have already suggested extended notions of agency and selfhood (e.g., ecological self) that could be considered also in the context of EVE. Thinkers related to ecofeminist and care ethic traditions have often suggested more expansive and relational notions of selfhood and agency. Val Plumwood, for example, writes that “the ecological self recognises the earth other as a centre of agency or intentionality having its origin and place like mine in the community of the earth, but as a different centre of agency, which limits mine.” [1] (p. 159). Thus, it is possible to conceive of agency beyond human agency.

*Virtue*. In EVE literature, “environmental or ecological virtues”² have been primarily conceptualized as types of excellent dispositions or behaviors that are exercised by human agents and benefit non-human beings and entities. However, there are at least two possible alternatives to the above-mentioned majority view in EVE. On the one hand, since Aristotle proposed that virtue can also be a quality of non-human beings (e.g., horse) or entities (e.g., knife), it seems possible to conceive of virtues in moral, a-moral, or functional ways. In this sense, a sharp knife is *functionally virtuous* insofar as it cuts the paper well, or the horse is *functionally virtuous* because of being courageous in (human) battle. In this view, however, the knife and the horse are functionally virtuous while only the human person is potentially capable of being morally virtuous. On the other hand, an alternative option could come from cultural/natural anthropology. Drawing upon Descola’s anthropology of nature [3,4] and what we might call “non-modern (or non-naturalistic) cultures” (i.e., animism, analogism and totemism), certain virtues may not need to be exclusive to certain agents but could be shared among humans and non-humans within a specific context.

Building on these suggestions, we argue that broadening the notion of self and decentering that of virtues—both in non-anthropocentric terms—would represent the preconditions for developing accounts of non-anthropocentric EVE. Although we do not believe that this is necessarily a fruitful path forward, we suggest that it is important to consider how promising and doable such accounts might be [5]. At the core of the paper, we argue that the notion of self can broaden to become an “ecological self”, while that of virtue can expand to include functional ecological a-moral virtues that can also be exercised by non-human agents. Envisioning virtuous agency in non-anthropocentric terms allows for a likewise non-anthropocentric broadening of “ecological virtues”, which would represent types of excellent dispositions that can be exercised also by non-human agents. Of course, this is possible because the notion of self is conceptualized as an ecological self. This focus on the ecological self is in line with what Callicott writes when affirming that “the nature of the self—or better how to conceive of and to experience the self—is the central philosophical question of environmental ethics and indeed of ecophilosophy” [6] (p. 11). In this sense, both agency and virtue are decentered or de-anthropocentrized. These theoretical alternative assumptions or proposed theoretical
changes may represent the basis for developing consistent non-anthropocentric accounts in
EVE. Given the previous discussion, it should be clear that our thesis challenges the notion of
agency in VE (and EVE), as well as the notion of ecological virtues elaborated so far in EVE.

In practice, we maintain that the ecological self can be either a human person or a
non-human being and that, while the former can exercise both moral and a-moral virtues,
certain species within the latter may only be capable of exercising a-moral virtues. The two
reconceptualized notions of “ecological self” and “ecological virtue” would antagonize
the separatist function of the so far hegemonic anthropocentric EVE discourse and foster
a theoretical and practical precondition for reconnecting human and non-human entities
and beings. In this sense, we present an “extensionist” strategy, a theoretical proposal
that decenters and broadens both the notion of selfhood and that of virtue, allowing for
a compositionist (or non-separatist) framing. This may serve as the ground on which to
build non-anthropocentric accounts of EVE that imagine and devise environmental and
climate policies differently.

Section 2 illustrates four different ways in which both human and non-human agents
could exercise virtues that may benefit either human or non-human subjects or ends.
Section 3 describes how it is possible to broaden the notion of self to ecological self. Section 4
develops our proposal to consider functional ecological virtue as a way to transform EVE
in a non-anthropocentric perspective and considers some objections. In conclusion, we
highlight the benefits of thinking critically about agency and ecological virtues for (human)
ethics generally, and we discuss some implications of our proposal for EVE specifically.

## 2. Variations of Agency Regarding Virtue

Virtue theory has long emphasized the polysemy of the concept of virtue. Leaving
aside ulterior types of virtues, such as intellectual or epistemic virtues, here we focus on
virtues within the virtue ethics tradition. Reflecting on a possible core concept to establish a
coherent virtue ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre distinguished “three very different conceptions
of a virtue [...]: a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to discharge his or her
social role (Homer); a virtue is a quality which enables an individual to move towards the
achievement of the specifically human telos, whether natural or supernatural (Aristotle, the
New Testament, and Aquinas); a virtue is a quality which has utility in achieving earthly
and heavenly success (Franklin)” [7] (p. 122). MacIntyre then notes that each conception
refers to a pre-requisite conception of what constitutes a practice, the telos of a human life,
and a moral tradition.

This diagnosis seems to reveal an axiom of virtue ethics; virtues are not only exercised
by humans, but they express the superior powers of human normativity, which also
distinguish them from non-humans and insist on their sovereignty via their practical
wisdom. We could call this axiom, in a nod to Routley, the BHC (basic human chauvinism)
of VE.

Can we contest this axiom? If we neutralize the anthropocentric assumptions—that
practice, telos of a human life, and moral traditions, not only concern specifically human
beings but also characterize their metaphysical supremacy—what would be a potentially
core conception of (non-anthropocentric) virtue? Different strategies can be found in
VE’s distinctions.

We first consider the distinction between moral/non-moral virtues [8,9]. This distinc-
tion is usually used to question the supposed inherent relation between virtue and morality,
leading, for instance, to consider contra-moral virtues [8] and not, as far as we know, to
potentially expand the attribution of virtues to non-human agents.

We can also consider the distinction between eudaimonistic (Aristotelian tradition) and
intuitionist accounts (Humean tradition) [10,11]. According to Huang, “the former explains
virtue as *the character traits that contribute to human flourishing*, while the latter describes it
as the *character traits that are simply admirable*” [12]. However, once again, this distinction
remains within the prejudice that only humans could be virtuous. For instance, exploring a
Daoist perspective on virtue ethics and following Zhuang Zhe, Huang only defined human
virtues; whereas, in our understanding, the principle Daoist virtue, namely a differentialist virtue: “respect diverse ways of life” [12], could endorse a non-anthropocentric meaning.

Another relevant strategy to consider the attribution of virtue to non-human traits of characters and actions could be suggested by the pluralistic virtue ethics developed by Christine Swanton [13]. She adopted a broad definition of virtue as “a good quality of character, more specifically a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way” [13] (p. 19). However, this disposition to respond well to the demands of the world is, implicitly and as far as we know, restricted to human agents, even though Swanton explained that her pluralistic view of virtue “avoids the problem of anthropocentrism” [13] (p. 50). In this sense, Swanton suggested that virtues might not be necessarily anthropocentric, and yet, she does not go as far as to propose that non-human beings can act virtuously (i.e., she does not challenge the exclusivity of human agency in VE).

Could a-moral virtue or functionalist virtue and the intuitionist account (recognizing excellences of different kinds) be extended to non-human agents as excellent dispositions capable of responding well to the world? Importantly, Aristotle already pointed out the linkages and differences between “areté” and “ethike areté”³. While the former is defined as “a perfect adaptation” [15] (p. 46) and can be applied to non-human beings, the latter denotes moral virtues that pertain to human morality. Interestingly, the BHC perspective assumes that *ethike areté* is superior to *areté*, but could we avoid a supremacist attitude and envision the exercise of virtuous dispositions as something that humans may share with other species? To illustrate how such an extension might be possible, we list the following four main ways to specify agency and the subject(s) affected by its exercise of both moral and a-moral virtues.

(a) *Human agency affecting human(s)*. As anticipated above, this corresponds to the more traditional VE but is present also in EVE. To better understand it, consider the example of the human eye as presented by Aristotle. Such conception of virtue is typically weakly anthropocentric and is displayed in character traits such as compassion, attentiveness, attention, care, justice, etc., toward humans. According to Naess, embracing this type of moral orientation (i.e., "protecting Nature is protecting ourselves") could constitute a motivation for pragmatic ecological ethics.

(b) *Non-human agency affecting human(s)*. In this case, the agent is a non-human being that is capable of exercising a virtue that has an effect on humans. It is interesting to point out that such a virtue would be described as an a-moral virtue when considering the non-human agent but potentially also as a moral virtue when considered from the point of view of the beneficiary (i.e., human(s)). For example, Aristotle described this version of virtuous behavior through the case of the brave horse, and it can be easily expanded to other instrumental relationships between animals and humans (e.g., animal labor/working force, food production, care labor). More broadly, this variation can be found in a lot of so-called “ecological services”, or “nature’s contribution to people” [16], or examples of symbiotic processes that benefit humans (for instance, see Margulis [17], Haraway [18]): breathing, digesting, pollination, filtration, providing food and shelter, and so forth. Accordingly, one might say that non-human agents that affect humans characterize every non-human precondition for human subsistence and flourishing. Often, these ecological capacities are turned toward human ends or made more efficient and productive through technical and technological means (e.g., devices, systems, processes). It goes without saying that many of such relationships are ambivalent and, like the Greek *pharmakon*, can designate either a poison or a medicine/cure (e.g., auto-immune diseases).

(c) *Human agency affecting non-human(s)* (i.e., beings and entities). This option corresponds to EVE's distinctive contribution through the notion of “ecological virtues”. Often, the effect(s) of such virtue(s) run the risk of being anthropomorphic in the sense that they may favor a human-centered conception of the “good/bad ends”, excluding more pluralistic conceptions (i.e., from the point of view of the non-human(s) affected). This
approach comprises virtues similar to (a) but that affect non-human(s). A further risk of prioritizing non-human ends that has been highlighted several times in environmental ethics literature is that it could favor misanthropic, too radical, or eco-fascist conducts (e.g., some forms of radical environmentalism or Foreman's rewilding proposal). Although the potential sacrifices by humans and even of humans could cohere with the recognition of the intrinsic value of non-human beings and entities, this remains extremely controversial. Later, we suggest that human selves as ecological selves can act virtuously in favor of ecological ends, the ecological worth of which could be studied scientifically.

(d) *Non-human agency affecting non-human(s)* (i.e., beings and entities). In line with our thesis, it is possible to consider non-human beings as agents of a-moral functional ecological virtues that affect non-human beings, entities, or even ecosystems. Here, the distinctive and perhaps original element resides in the fact that the notion of self is broadened to include non-humans as potential agents (like in [b]), and the notion of virtue is decentralized as ecological virtue (like in [c]). In other words, non-human beings can act as ecological selves and are therefore considered agents capable of virtuous actions and behaviors that affect non-humans⁴. Similarly to [c], non-human beings can act virtuously by exercising a-moral functional ecological virtues and, similarly to [c], can affect positively different ecological dimensions and ends. As mentioned in [c], the “goodness” of these effects is a-moral and could be studied scientifically.

In the next two sections, we delve into the expanded notion of self as ecological self (Section 3) and that of virtue as non-anthropocentric ecological virtue (Section 4).

**3. Broadening the Notion of Agency as Ecological Self**

**3.1. *Three Traditional Conceptions of "Ecological Self" in Environmental Philosophy***

At a basic level, adopting an ecological self means moving beyond a detached notion of selfhood towards one that acknowledges the fundamental importance of relationships among different species and to the ecosystems they live in. Put in the words of Karen J. Warren, in the *Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy*, recognizing the ecological self means recognizing that “the self is not an isolated, immaterial Cartesian ego, soul or psyche in a physical body (lampooned as “the ghost in the machine”); rather, it is constituted by its relationships with others—just as in ecology the characteristics of various species are constituted by their relationships with other species and the abiotic environment” [19] (p. 231). From at least the late 1980s onwards, different versions of the ecological self have been developed. These have challenged the prevailing notion of selfhood found in European and North American philosophy, which hinges on atomistic metaphysical assumptions [20]. Instead, these alternative proposals are grounded on metaphysical assumptions that recognize the self—or perhaps better, a multitude of selves—as necessarily relational. In this view, humans are part of nature and deeply interconnected with natural beings, entities, and processes.

Despite these general and shared premises about the ecological self, here we discuss three main versions that have been elaborated so far. First, Arne Naess introduced the concept of the ecological self in a seminal article of 1987 entitled "Self-realisation: An ecological approach to Being"⁵. Among others, he drew from the *Gestalt* theory, Spinoza, and Eastern spiritual wisdom to offer a conceptualization of the ecological self based on the "process of identification" with others [22] (p. 35). He explained this process through an example doomed to become famous: once, Naess was looking through a microscope and a flea landed in the acid chemicals he was observing. Within a few minutes, the flea died, and Naess witnessed closely the flea's torturous attempts to live. He explains in these terms what he felt:

> "what I felt was naturally, a painful compassion and empathy. But the empathy was not basic, it was the process of identification, that 'I see myself in the flea'.
If I was alienated from the flea, not seeing intuitively anything even resembling
myself, the death struggle would have left me indifferent. So there must be
identification in order for there to be compassion [...]" [21] (p. 36).

Naess proposed that the concept of the self extends beyond the traditional understand-
ing of it as simply an "ego" or a "social self". For ecological relationships to become part of
our internal relationships, the process/phenomenon of identification is needed. As a result,
for Naess, the pursuit of self-realization naturally leads human beings to take a greater
interest in and concern for environmental issues. Thus, defending nature is equivalent to
defending one-(ecological)-self.

A second account of ecological self was offered by J. Baird Callicott, who criticized Naess on several points (2017), such as the eclectic sources Naess drew upon or the fact that he ignored the cutting-edge science of ecology to inform the ecological self. He proposed, instead, the concept of the ecological self that explicitly recalls the tradition of the Kyoto School of Japanese Buddhism in conjunction with the potential implications of current ecological knowledge. Callicott suggested an *ecological* notion of the self "as a knot, nexus, or node in a skein of social and environmental relationships" [23] (p. 235). Since these relationships are internal (the self), to undo them would mean to undo the self, and nothing left would remain (he used the Buddhist expression *topos* of *mu*, place of nothing). Using his own words:

"[...] the ecological self is constituted by its internal socio-environmental relations. Untie the knot that is oneself in the socio-biospherical net or field of internal relations, and there's nothing left of the self" [23] (p. 241).

More recently, Callicott suggested that it is possible to find conceptual foundations
for such an ecological self in existing notions elaborated within both natural sciences and
western scholarly traditions [6].

A third perspective on the notion of ecological self is that proposed by Christian Diehm. After analyzing Naess's work on the ecological self, he suggested a different idea of identification with others (including non-human others). According to Diehm, the "process of identification"—central in Naess' ecosophy because it makes possible the very development of the ecological self—should be understood as "a response, just one mode of an ongoing dialogue in which we attempt to find ways to articulate ourselves properly to others, a way of recognizing and assuming responsibility, of being responsive" [24] (p. 34).

A fourth and final option for the notion of ecological self can be found within ecofem-
inist scholarship. For instance, in her book *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, Plum-
wood wrote about the ecological self as a relational self, essentially characterized by
non-instrumental relationships to others. These relationships are not part of the self since
they are "incorporated" or "assimilated" within it nor because their flourishing contributes
to the well-being of the self. In contrast, for Plumwood, ecological selves represent indepen-
dent centers of intentionality and agency, which impose limits on the self, thus constituting
it. The "earth others" [1] are in constant dialogue with each other, every one of them with
its own center. These ecological selves exist in and from this dialogue, made of recognition
and awareness (of others and differences)⁶. She wrote:

"The ecological self can be viewed as a type of relational self, one which includes the goal of the flourishing of earth others and the earth community among its own primary ends, and hence respects or cares for these others for their own sake" [1].

In the context of environmental philosophy, Naess, Callicott, Diehm, and Plumwood
offered four main conceptions of the ecological self. In the next section, we illustrate our
position in comparison to these approaches.

3.2. *Our Position on the Ecological Self*

Despite some differences, these positions share a number of aspects. First, the previous
conceptions of the ecological self assumed a subjective identity, implying that they tend to
offer a polarized notion that oscillates between the same and the other. For example, Naess
started from the modern ego and social self separated from nature and thus extended it to
a metaphysical ecological self, focusing on the identity of the ecological *human* self, with
ecological relationships. Adopting another strategy, Plumwood started from a critique of
the hegemonic "master perspective" [25] (p. 99) and suggested that the otherness of and
within ecological relations facilitates entering into a relationship. Second, all the positions
presented above consider the ecological self as something peculiar to human beings, thus
assuming an anthropocentric conceptualization of the self.

A notable exception to this trend can be found in Freya Mathews' *Ecological Self*. In her work, the author adopted a non-anthropocentric conception of the self that can be applied to organisms but also to the cosmos, and to some extent to ecosystems:

"The paradigm instance of the self-realizing system—or ‘self’—is the organism. But the geometrodynamic universe as a whole also qualifies for selfhood. A self-realizing being is one which, by its very activity, defines and embodies a value (viz., its value-for-itself.) Since self-realization is a function of ecological interconnectedness, the property of intrinsic value is likewise a function of such connectedness." [20] (p. 101).

Mathews inferred from that premise that "The individual is thus in a very real sense a microcosm of the wider self in which it occurs" [20] (p. 101), and that would imply an egalitarianism regarding the "intrinsic value" of substances in such a complex systemic metaphysical cosmic order. This normative consequence seems at first converge with "a bio- or eco-centric ethic" [20] (p. 103) that would have, as a principle, to "'tread lightly' on this earth, taking from it only what we must satisfy our 'vital needs'" [20] (p. 103). However, Mathews later emphasized the spiritual dimension of this "ethics of care" [20] (p. 105) and came back to describe human virtues of "awareness" and "love":

"Meaningfulness is to be found in our spiritual capacity to keep the ecocosm on course, by teaching our hearts to practise affirmation, and by awakening our faculty of active, outreaching, world-directed love. Though a tendency to 'tread lightly' on the earth, and to take practical steps to safeguard the particular manifestations of Nature, will inevitably flow from such an attitude, the crucial contribution will be the attitude itself, a contribution of the heart and spirit." [20] (p. 113).

In other texts, she speaks about virtues of “commitment” and “loyalty” toward the
earth community [26], which mean recognizing or being aligned with the conativity of the
systems, working with it in a mutualistic and relational way, and promoting “grace” as an
embodiment of the principle of “least resistance” [27] (p. 22)—inspired by the Taoist virtue
known as *wuwei*.

Building on Mathews's conception, we propose a conceptualization of the ecological
self that underscores the intrinsic connections and the various relationships in which
all beings are meshed. In particular, we stress that both humans and non-humans can
be/embody ecological selves. This relies on a relational ontology that seems common to
Naess, Plumwood, Callicott, and Mathews [6] (p. 24). Regardless of distinct strategies to
promote practical ways for humans to be aware of the ecological self (e.g., Naess' expansion
or Plumwood's recognition of our inner relation to otherness), at this ontological level, the
ecological self constitutes a fundamental premise of the self itself.

This conception of the ecological self can find a scientific ally in biologist and neurolo-
gist Francisco Varela's conception of organisms. Indeed, according to Varela, an organism
is "a multiplicity of regional selves, all of them having some mode of self-constitution,
and in their overall assemblage giving rise to an organism" [28] (p. 80). Varela described
different regions of a "self" or "selves" that could also be useful in conceptualizing our
version of "ecological selves". These are: "(1) a minimal or cellular unity, (2) a bodily
self in its immunological foundations, (3) a cognitive perceptuo-motor self associated to
animal behavior, (4) a socio-linguistic 'I' of subjectivity, and (5) the collective social multi-
individual totality". Considering the functioning of such systems, we do not need to assert
the autonoetic consciousness (region 4) as a necessary condition for selfhood. The forms of autonomy and self-constitution that give rise to an organism (especially in regions 1 to 3 characterized by an autopoietic organization) allow us to speak of a mesh of relations among “selfless selves” [28] (p. 80), hence, other-than-human—“ego”—subjective selves.

Therefore, our conception of the ecological self includes, but is not limited to, the human self. We assume that the ecological self can be expressed both by humans and some non-humans at different levels (organisms, ecosystems, and even cosmos). Ecological selves could be identified in a symbiotic relationship acting within a web/field of ecological interdependencies in a process of self-realization (which may imply key dimensions such as conativity, agency, identity, and some forms of intelligence). Our ecological self aims to decenter and relocate the notion of selfhood in a less anthropocentric way. This does not mean that we deny differences between species and individuals. Rather, we stress the fact that some non-human beings can also express an ecological self, living in a web of relationships, in which they actively pursue their self-realization and interact accordingly. The processes of communication (release information, encode information, decode information) shared amongst living beings could be the source of multiple examples of such ecological self expressions. For instance, some birds may behave unusually when a storm or an earthquake is coming; some octopi are capable of constantly mimicking their surroundings and have developed very refined hunting strategies; bacteria develop resistance to antibiotics; and some trees like acacias may alter their composition when eaten and release different chemicals to communicate this information to other members of their species [29]. Our perspective on the ecological self highlights a connection rather than a disconnection between humans and other-than-human beings, recognizing in the human self something that is also expressed in other beings but in other forms and maybe pursuing other ends. Why and how can these ontological considerations about the ecological self affect our understanding of environmental virtue ethics?

## 4. Towards Functional Ecological Virtues

The aim of this paper is to challenge the modern western hegemonic tendency to interpret the anthropological difference—sometimes expressed in terms of “virtue” and *a fortiori* of “moral virtue”—as a criterion of human supremacy and uniqueness. We claim that it is possible to recognize an ontological analogy between humans and non-humans through the above-mentioned conception of the ecological self (e.g., a self that is expressed by both humans and non-humans caught in their web of interrelations). We call these “mastering skills” *functional ecological virtues*, i.e., a-moral virtues that can be exercised both by humans and non-humans. This perspective tries to consider, in a new way, the continuity and discontinuity between humans and non-humans, not as sharing an inanimate physicality or materiality, but as sharing agentivity and, in some cases, ecological virtues (excellences while being an ecological self). Hence, we could say that we tend to emphasize the *analogical*⁷ potentialities of virtue ethics rather than its human *supremacist* tendency. However, does it make sense to speak of functional ecological *virtue* to describe certain excellences of these ecological selves? If so, what would it mean to consider non-human agents as potentially expressing (functional) ecological virtues, and how would this transformative⁸ conception of ecological virtue influence human behaviors, especially facing planetary ecological crises?

### 4.1. *Step by Step: What Do We Mean by (Functional) Ecological Virtue?*

In Section 3, we explained that both humans and non-humans could be considered ecological selves. In their interconnections and relationships to others, plants, animals, and other living beings actively pursue self-realization. If we consider classical moral virtue—strongly or weakly anthropocentric, expressed by a (human) moral agent and pursuing a moral end—it seems that it would be a category error to try to apply virtue language to non-human ecological selves. We respond to some objections later, but what
if we start by reconsidering virtue in a different way, namely as excellent behaviors and actions at a *functional level*?

The first strategy is to consider functional ecological virtues in relation to an ecological good, the assessment of which depends on scientific criteria, which are often contested and dependent on the theory, the methodology, the scale considered, the system studied, etc. Actions that contribute to a contextual ecological good or the flourishing of a local ecosystem could be qualified as “ecological virtues” in a non-moral (a-moral) sense. For instance, drawing from Leopold’s *Land Ethics* and considering the ecocentric duty to consider and respect other-than human “citizens”, Bill Shaw proposed to characterize “land virtues”: “The attitudes and practices that serve the ultimate good in this new paradigm—land virtues—tend to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of natural systems. Vices tend to destabilize and to destroy these characteristics of natural systems” [30]⁹. Fundamentally, this strategy is not satisfactory because either it supposes a heavy set of metaphysical assumptions to consider that evolution is inherently and morally good, but this position is obviously very contested (cf. [31] for instance). Or, it must confront itself with blurred notions of normative criteria to characterize what is *ecologically* good (biodiversity, ecological health, resilience, integrity, connectivity, etc.).

The second strategy could be to characterize *functional ecological virtues* as *expressed by an ecological self*. They might be characterized as excellence in interacting with the environmental context, flourishing and self-realizing within a mesh of interdependencies. For instance, Michael Marder spoke about the “wisdom of plants” [32] and showed that plants are particularly excellent in “living-with” [32] (p. 51) the elements and threats constituting their middle of life. In this sense, plants express a specific virtue in seeking and soaking water and minerals in their surroundings, amongst other excellences [33]. These abilities can be considered *virtuous* because they can develop and perfect themselves according to specific vital ends, or they can fail and lead to some vital failure. On this account, functional ecological virtues are not necessarily (new) specific human qualities or attitudes that we (humans) need to develop in order to face the practical inertia or the non-reaction, which seems common among people in front of the ongoing ecological crisis [34].

Though not restricted to human agents, functional ecological virtues are (ecological) “agent-focused” [11] in the sense that they express the ecological self’s excellence in specific ecological contexts. For example, a domestic dog named *Gaïa* can be regarded as capable of caring within a familial ecosystem¹⁰. Moreover, these virtues are “target-based”, in the sense that certain actions and behaviors can be considered virtuous in that they succeed “in responding well to the demands of the world” [35]. Examples of this are quinoa, which can resist drought, very high salinity, and poor soil [36], or Burmese Pythons, which adapt so well to the anthropogenic warming of Florida Everglades’ ecosystem that they become a threat to some native species, such as medium-sized mammals [37]). If we try to transpose Swanton’s pluralistic categories to virtue [13], four of them might make sense applied to functional ecological virtues, which can be:

1. **“Value-based”**. When ecological selves value and enhance at least some *vital values* (e.g., engagement and caring relationships between emperor penguin’s parents and their chicks express some valuation of continuing life, or the Vogelkop bowerbird (*Amblyornis inornata*) in West Papua that builds a hut and decorates it to convince reproductive female values the creation and organization of an adjusted habitat).

2. **“Bond-based”**. When ecological virtues express a fine attunement to the mesh of interdependencies of the world (e.g., macaroni penguin faithful couples that reunite about 3 months each year to reproduce, give birth, and raise their chicks before living on their own the rest of the year express a notable virtuosity in forging lasting ties; or mycorrhizal symbiosis, for example, between oak trees and truffles, express a very refined and fructuous biochemical and molecular dialog that co-benefit the individuals and species involved, the soil, the forest, etc.).
3. *“Flourishing-based”*. When non-humans seem able to act for the good of others (e.g., any cooperative action, such as feeding techniques or common hunt by a wolf pack or a group of humpback whales chasing krill to the surface with bubbles of air, that demonstrates a sense of collectiveness within a specific group; symbiotic relationships, as mentioned before, would demonstrate co-flourishing virtue).

4. *“Status-based”*. When the recognition of social or hierarchical relationships, expressed in the non-human world, activates the ability to perform accordingly and to play with them (e.g., understanding of territorial signatures, respect, or contestation of the pack organization seem to be current occasions in wolf lives that express such virtues; the relationship between the beehive and its queen may express some virtues of protection, reproduction, or unification of the hive).

Of course, not all non-humans can exercise ecological virtues, and not every action performed well may correspond to a functional ecological virtue. Our proposal is just an exploration of a rarely navigated field of research (e.g., can other-than-human beings act virtuously?). What we aim to show is that, depending on how we define (ecological) virtues, there are potentially a lot of examples of non-human beings that can exercise and master ecological virtues. Although recognizing that non-humans can “master ecological virtues” (at least in some specific contexts¹¹) does not imply a direct normative judgement (i.e., it does not prescribe anything), it does contribute to thinking about the human functional and moral sphere differently.

## 4.2. Functional Ecological Virtues and Moral Ecological Virtues

Why is it important to specify that such ecological virtues are *functional*? Classically, virtue is defined in relation to a *function* (*ergon* in Aristoteles' philosophy). Therefore, it could seem redundant to qualify ecological virtue as *functional*, but we do so explicitly in order to clarify and at the same time challenge the traditional (in VE and EVE) identification of virtue with “moral virtue”. Indeed, opening up the notion of virtue may question and disrupt the anthropocentric, dualistic, and naturalistic ontology that has become predominant in VE debates. We would like to explore the possibility of conceiving, in the first step, *a-moral virtues*, meaning virtues that are not yet considered from any moral perspective and virtues that qualify excellence defined in reference to a functional end (which could end up being morally good or bad). It does not mean that these virtues are necessarily anti-moral (like it is commonly understood when virtue ethicists discuss non-moral virtues, e.g., the excellence in killing furtively for a hitman). Functional ecological virtues are considered before any definition of any moral good and bad in order to (1) bring more complexity and nuances in our spontaneous understanding of what is ecologically good or bad and also to (2) contest and deconstruct rooted assumptions. Using the concept of virtue as a decentering tool, we question the dualistic naturalistic anthropocentrism in western cultures and suggest that virtuous dispositions and behaviors might be more shared or distributed amongst living beings than previously thought or admitted.

How do functional ecological virtues enter the *human* moral sphere? By stressing “human”, we do not wish to exacerbate any separation between non-humans and humans. We just want to investigate the implication of our proposal (functional ecological virtues) within a virtue ethical theory, that, by definition, is for humans. In other words, what are the moral implications (for humans) of this new kind of virtue? Adopting functional ecological virtues could have important consequences:

(i) The transformative function of these ecological virtues for humans. The acknowledgment of an ontological closeness to other beings (because of this shared ecological self) and how non-human beings can master this condition of interrelations with others can originate or stimulate in humans interest, sensitivity, care, attention, etc., towards non-humans, towards “the other-than-humans”. The recognition of functional ecological virtues would eventually reinforce moral ecological virtues in humans.

(ii) Another possible moral return of functional ecological virtues for humans is the educational aspect. Recognizing “virtues” in non-humans means recognizing complexity
and excellences beyond the human world, and at the same time, it means to stress the human participation to a shared ecological world animated by the active self-realization of multiple other ecological selves. Once again, this could have an influence on how humans relate to non-humans and could reinforce moral ecological virtues in children as well as in adults.

(iii) A third moral implication of this reconfiguration of the field of virtues could be to reconnect naturalistic modern cultures with other non-modern cultures, while recognizing a potentially common ground to compose a common world, contesting the arrogant modern presupposition that the progress of knowledge and civilization is to de-animate the non-human world, and considering that all non-humans only react to a mechanistic determinism. It could then open the way for "partnerships ethics", whose principles, as stressed by Carolyn Merchant [39–41], can rule relationships with non-human agents as well as with other cultures.

### 4.3. *Possible Objections*

We are aware that the thesis proposed in this paper can raise more than one objection. In the following section, we address some of these potential criticisms.

(1) The application of "virtue language" to describe the behaviors and attitudes of non-human beings is counterintuitive and potentially wrong. Other-than-human beings or more-than-human beings have been classically identified as non-moral agents or, at most, as moral patients. Indeed, the status of moral agency in modern western cultures is attributed to human *only*, insofar as humans can allegedly conduct their own behavior according to autonomous norms and practical reasoning [42], while virtues designate acquired excellences and not endowments. Thus, although one might agree with recognizing ecological selves in non-human behaviors, it still remains unclear how it would be possible to speak about virtues for them; whether they are considered as ecological selves or not, they would still fall under the category of moral patients, potentially protected or cared for by the expression of environmental virtues (exercised by human agents) but not as potential virtuous agents. However, as we have stressed, we are not talking about moral ecological virtues for non-humans. We rather suggest an extension of the space and meaning of ecological virtues on the basis of ontological considerations about the self. Functional ecological virtues are not virtues in any traditional moral sense; they are a-moral virtues that express mastering skills of ecological selves that can affect either humans, non-humans, or both (see Section 2 above).

(2) A second objection might be put as a question: why use (and possibly distort) the concept of virtue instead of drawing upon another concept to describe such excellences or mastering skills? As we mentioned above, excellence and mastering skills are already historically part of the concept of virtue. These different concepts are not mutually exclusive but embedded in a mutual understanding in the history of ideas. The intellectual challenge of this paper was to question provocatively a well-accepted assumption of environmental virtue ethics (e.g., that the language of virtues is limited to human beings) and see what this could bring about. Using a usually (anthropocentric) moral term in an a-moral way is a strategy to expand and deconstruct dualistic inherited and rarely questioned structures or engrained theoretical assumptions. Moreover, if it were possible to consider a-moral excellences in terms of virtues, this may have a reinforcing positive impact on human moral ecological virtues, in the way explained in (i), (ii), and (iii) (see previous Section 4.2 on pp. 10–11).

(3) One might say that a virtue, by definition, assumes the intentionality of the (human) moral agent as a prerequisite. This is, for example, the objection proposed by Holmes. He contested the extension of virtues to non-human beings, arguing that virtues are "achievements not endowments", "acquired excellences" not "genetics endowments" [43] (p. 69). Holmes preferred to speak about "values as intrinsic achievements in wild nature" (ibid.) rather than using the concept of animal virtue.