A negotiated settlement stays out of reach. Russia's territorial claims reflected in constitutional amendments of October, 4th, 2022, leave no zone of possible agreement. Ukrainian leadership and public opinion are strongly opposing any territorial concessions. Level of mutual trust remains extremely low, and there are no visible lines along which Ukrainian-Russian relations could be arranged after the war.

Under any post-war settlement Ukraine will face an unfavorable balance of power vs. Russia, a state which will remain a geopolitical reality on Ukraine's border and a long-term threat. The experience of the current war will increase the risk of another escalation in the future. Thus, the issue of security guarantees becomes fundamental for Ukraine's future, an element of conflict management, and a key to understanding victory. Membership in NATO is widely perceived in Ukraine as a reward for protecting Europe from a threat from Russia; but on a more general level any sustainable ceasefire may need extended security guarantees for Kyiv, whether in a form of NATO membership or in any other.

NATO membership is a problematic option in this regard for at least two reasons. The first one deals with Russia's perceptions. Claims of Kremlin that expansion of NATO is a threat to Russia's security may be playing head games; but from a strategic perspective it can be a trigger for a security dilemma (Mearsheimer, 2014). From certain perspectives, in particular realist, Russia's aggressive steps can be seen as a response to its uncertainty about what NATO would do next. Uncertainty provokes worst-case scenario thinking; which, in turn, may lead to preventive actions – including war. Within such a perspective, NATO's policy towards Ukraine's aspirations for membership has been criticized as the one which maximized risks while providing no protection for Ukraine. It has taken effects of the security dilemma for the Russian leadership to their height; while opening widely a window of opportunity for Russia to attack Ukraine, while it still got no security commitments from the Alliance. If there has been a fundamental flaw with this strategy before the war, hardly conditions have changed to make it more successful.

The second reason deals with the NATO itself. The logic of the alliance implies that deterrence is assured by all of its members, and that a potential aggressor should expect a collective response. A high probability of such a response defines alliance's credibility and is a major deterrent. That is what NATO's major strength lies in. It is a well-balanced alliance: combined power potential of its members match credibility of its commitments.

Credibility of commitments is both leading to and resulting from a low probability of aggression against any of its members. A gentlemen agreement in the 1990-ies has been rumored to require any potential members to be free from territorial disputes with neighboring states. That claim seems in line with the Alliance's general logic: absence of territorial disputes with neighboring non-NATO states helped to keep the probability of any escalation requiring NATO's involvement low. No opponent was willing to test NATO's resolve for defending its members; but NATO's security commitments have also been carefully measured as to not engage allies into unnecessary conflicts (Yarhi-Milo, Lanozska, Cooper, 2016).

This logic was also functioning in dealing with Ukraine's aspirations for membership. The key difference between Ukraine and her Western neighbors, which joined NATO, is that Russia's response for Ukraine's NATO membership aspirations might go as high as a war. A high probability of Russia's aggressive response generated unnecessary risks for the Alliance: if Russia opted for a war in case Ukraine is granted membership, other members of the Alliance would have to face a choice of either confronting Russia on the battlefield or dissolving the alliance which has been the foundation of their security for decades. That seems to be a choice most of Alliance members would like to escape. That is the main reason why Ukraine has never been able to enter the door to NATO, which claimed to be constantly open.
These considerations imply that the primary prerequisite for Ukraine's invitation to join NATO is a significant decrease of probability of another Russian-Ukrainian war. That means that security commitments under NATO membership can be provided for Ukraine not before, but after the war is over and a stable peace is established.

Alternative options of providing Ukraine with security commitments are located on a bilateral level. Any country could enhance Ukraine's security by signing a mutual defense pact; however, only American guarantees seem sufficient.

That, however, may also be problematic. The US is facing a wide broad of challenges globally and may tend to more carefully manage its security commitments. There are powerful voices in favor of reshaping American grand strategy by significantly its global objectives and the decreasing the level of international involvement (Posen, 2014). Although the Russian-Ukrainian war and other symptoms of international security crisis might have changed the calculus of American grand strategy, the United States may face too many challenges simultaneously. Besides, providing security commitments to Ukraine carries high risk of directly confronting Russia, something Washington is willing to avoid. One of the lessons so far drawn from the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war is that the West is trying to limit the risks in dealing with Russia.

But not only confronting Russia is a challenge. Another factor the US would like to keep under control is its client states' policies, in particular when it comes to protracted territorial conflicts. While American power resources may be depleting, careful selection of not only allies, but enemies, is crucial. The problem with defense pacts is that they can easily involve allies into each others' security issues. With the US having issued dozens of security commitments in recent decades, these issues are becoming difficult to manage. Given intensification of struggle for international hegemony and the future of the world order, the US might be willing to secure more freedom in choosing the challenges it wish to confront. Defense pacts are narrowing that choice.

Reluctance to confront Russia on the battlefield and desire to keep more freedom of actions will be powerful preventers of any American security commitments issued to Ukraine. Instead, Washington is likely to stick to weapons supplies strategy. A more sophisticated choice would be asymmetric architecture of a defense pact, which would leave an option for the US not to directly participate in a war against Russia. Possible security guarantees for Ukraine will also be heavily impacted by the result of the current struggle for international order and general architecture of post-war international security.

Credible and firm security commitments from the West, framed as defense pacts, could qualify as an important element of victory for Ukraine as they will ensure a better prospect for its security. But this perspective is highly unlikely before the war is over and stable peace is established.

## CONCLUSION

This article has been aimed at providing frameworks for understanding how Ukraine's victory in a war against Russia might look like by addressing specific features of current wars, theoretical approaches to victory or success, and special attention to security commitments Ukraine can or can't get under realities of a protracted war against Russia.

Victory is a contested term. The way modern wars most often end does not look like a victory for one side or a defeat for another. Under lack of formally accepted victory, success can be measured in different ways, mostly taking into account the results of war, the price of participating in it, changes in the balance of power, and a better prospect. All these considerations can be applied when attempting to define what qualifies as a victory for Ukraine in its war against Russia.

At the minimal level, a victory for Ukraine would mean denying Russia's attempts to destroy its statehood or put the nation under its control. Formulated in such a way, this notion of a victory fits
the framework of asymmetric conflicts theory. A better victory would also include restoration of pre-war status quo and, in particular, regaining territories occupied by Russia. That is what President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula stands closest to; and such a notion of victory carries elements of just war theory. Another version of a better victory would not only be about restoration of status quo, but also shift the balance of power versus Russia in Ukraine's favor.

Security commitments by the West are an essential element of Ukraine's victory, given its vulnerability to Russia's military superiority. Without them it will be highly unlikely for Ukraine to get a better prospect after the war. But the way Western alliances, in particular NATO, operate under modern geopolitical conditions makes Ukraine's membership extremely unlikely, especially before the war is over. Bilateral security commitments by the US, the only credible security guarantee to deter Russia, will also be problematic, given strategic goals of US security policy and growing risks of long-term commitments. These developments make Ukraine's chances to significantly improve balance of power versus Russia extremely small.

Overall, regardless the importance of defining and measuring Ukraine's victory in the war against Russia, it remains controversial and a matter of debate. Uncertainties around this issue contribute into a lack of a long-term strategy in the war and growing risks for European and global security.

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# Focus Areas to Act upon to Enable the EU Integration Readiness of the Republic of Moldova<fnref n="1" />

MARCU-ANDREI SOLOMON<fnref n="2" />

LEIDEN UNIVERSITY (NETHERLANDS) GRADUATE

**Abstract:** As the Chisinau administration<fnref n="3" /> is currently the most pro-European in the country's history, and considering the great mobilisation towards integration on Brussels's side, it is a very relevant endeavour to analyse Moldova's main opportunities and barriers. The country's main impediments towards Europeanization and the recent solutions found towards these problems are examined here. The essay provides a set of areas to focus on to enhance the Republic of Moldova's European integration, coupled with a review of future potential geopolitical scenarios.

**Keywords:** EU, Moldova, European integration, hybrid threats

The Focus areas to act upon to enable the EU integration readiness are the following:

**1) Equal access to correct information for both Romanian and Russian speakers**

Russian disinformation is a considerable challenge. According to the latest polls released in the Republic of Moldova, there's a clear gap between the political opinions of those who answered in Romanian, as opposed to those answering in Russian. Only 20% of Russian-speaking respondents answered positively that Russia poses a security threat to Moldova, as opposed to 52% of the Romanian speakers. Confidence in Putin is at 29% among the Romanians, while the Russian speakers registered a 57% confidence. One of the clearest differences regards the EU accession: 67% of Romanian speakers support it, as opposed to 21% of the Russian-speaking population which is much more prone to Moscow's manipulated narratives.<fnref n="4" />

While it is very difficult to sway people away from their pro-Russian views, it is important for those Moldovans to receive an alternative viewpoint from a pro-Western perspective that can counterbalance Kremlin's propaganda and help them expand their information bubble. This leads to the following recommendation: to successfully prepare the integration of the Republic of Moldova into Europe, Moldovan and European authorities need to penetrate the Russian-language information sphere. This should be done through campaigns that showcase the results of European investments, the financial and educational opportunities that would be available to Moldovan citizens in the EU, contrasted to the actual financial contributions the Russian Federation has brought to the country in the latter years. In the use of Russian language, it is essential to reach currently isolated audiences and break the Russian information monopoly. The true fight for Europeanization revolves around changing the mentality of ordinary individuals and keeping a significant percentage of the population connected to the course and outcome of reforms.

**2) Act with urgency: the reform timeframe of the Maia Sandu administration is limited**

Unlike other post-Soviet countries, such as Ukraine and Georgia, where there is a large political and especially social consensus regarding the country's future, the Republic of Moldova is prone to

<footnote n="1">¹ This article is a continuation of a paper previously published in *L'Europe unie* by the same author, entitled "A Window of Opportunity with an Existential Stake: The European integration of the Republic of Moldova",</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Marcu-Andrei Solomon is an MA graduate in Russian and Eurasian Studies at Leiden University and the Research Department Coordinator of New Strategy Center, a Bucharest-based think tank. Disclaimer: the views and scenarios presented above reflect the personal views of the author and not of the organisation he represents.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ President Maia Sandu in 2023.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ “WatchDog.MD community presented the results of a sociological survey”, Watch Dog.md, February 3, 2022, URL: https://watchdog.md/en/polls/206024/comunitatea-watchdog-md-a-prezentat-rezultatele-unui-sondaj-de-opinie/</footnote>
180-degree changes in foreign policies from one electoral cycle to another. The next presidential elections will be held soon and the parliamentary elections in 2025. Moldovan society is still relatively equally divided between pro-Europeans and pro-Russians. It is important for Moldovan society to be embarked into the practical reforms within the country now, as the pro-Russian political forces can regroup at any moment.

### 3) Extensive use of European expertise in implementing institutional reform

While financial aid is definitely valuable to the Republic of Moldova, who is facing a clear economic and energy crisis, there is nothing more prized than European expertise. Civilian and official missions should become the norm through which reform can be accelerated in the candidate state, since that involves a direct implication and monitoring process.

Considering Moldova's aforementioned vulnerabilities, the following sectors could benefit the most from the expertise of European civilian/official missions:

- The monitoring of the **financial sector**, so that money laundering schemes, involving both private and state actors, can be prevented.

- The **defence sector**, especially when it comes to aerial surveillance. In the case of destabilizing acts from Russia, such as violent actions or kidnapping attempts against public officials (as revealed in official documents received by Moldova's president from Volodymyr Zelensky in February 2023)<fnref n="5" />, it is necessary for Moldova to have a modern and enhanced special forces unit that can prevent small-scale destabilizing acts.

- Legislation such as **anti-oligarch laws** to ensure that all loopholes are avoided, while also making sure the laws are tailored to the national context.

## Potential geopolitical scenarios in relation with the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war

### 1) Russian advancement:

According to analysts and military sources, the Republic of Moldova's future as an EU member and as a sovereign state will be determined to a large extent by the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war. In the case of a Russian advancement in the South, in the Odessa region, Moldova would be pinned and would most likely represent Moscow's next target.<fnref n="6" /> From that point, Russia could either increase hybrid attacks on Moldova, from protests, instigation to violence, disinformation, cyber-attacks, bomb threats etc. (either directly or by using Transnistria and gagauzia as proxies), or it could directly invade the country, whose army would not last for long. In that scenario, not much can be done. If NATO avoided a conflict with Russia after invading Ukraine, it will most likely not get involved in one for the Republic of Moldova. Thus, supporting Ukraine's war effort is significantly impacting the prospects of Moldova's reform process.

### 2) Stagnation of the front or Ukrainian advancement

If Russian advancement is blocked or if Russia loses the war, the Republic of Moldova's pathway towards the European Union is fully in its own hands. If the current flow of governmental reforms is maintained and progress in important legal cases is registered, Moldova could become an EU member in the late 2020s-early 2030s. Still, the EU will have to monitor this process carefully, as

<footnote n="5">⁵ "Maia Sandu seconds Zelensky, warning of Kremlin plans to overthrow Moldova government". Meduza, February 13, 2023, URL: https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/02/13/maia-sandu-seconds-zelensky-warning-of-kremlin-plans-to-overthrow-moldova-government</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Christine Karelska, "Odesa Defends Not Only Itself but All of South Central Europe". Visegrad Insight, July 20, 2022, URL: https://visegradinsight.eu/odesa-ukraine-russia-war-cee/</footnote>
it could lead Moldova towards being either a revitalizer of European values or a factor of instability due to its vulnerability to Russian hybrid aggression.<fnref n="7" />

**Moldova as a Trojan horse** is a clear possibility, if oligarchic influence persists and if Russia's influence in different Moldovan institutions and especially in the informational sphere persists. Furthermore, Transnistria could be considered a separate *de facto* entity in the case of EU membership (similar to the Northern Cyprus case), which would entail a relative preservation of the *status quo*, but still represent a constant threat. Gagauzia could become an even more insidious element. **There is no pro-European force within the autonomous region Gagauzia** and it could become problematic for the European Union. Thus, it is a justifiable concern of the European Union that Moldova could become a Trojan horse, an EU member state through which Russia could infiltrate in Europe and sabotage it from within. To prevent that, Moldova's separation from Russia must be comprehensive and include the more pro-Russian regions of the country, such as Gagauzia. If maybe the European ideals would not be an argument for the Russophiles or for the undecided population, then the economic incentive might be more fruitful for the integration process.

If the integration process is done correctly and in full, having **Moldova as a revitalizer of European values** is a probable scenario. In the current geopolitical climate in which, through populism, the efficiency and advantages of European democratic values are put under scrutiny in Western Europe, new Eastern European members could revitalize the European ethos. With a young, Western-educated political leadership, a large diaspora already integrated in mainly Southern and Western European countries and an ever-increasing pro-European sentiment (especially among the younger generations), Moldova could be a reminder as to what Europe stands for, and what its benefits are, as opposed to being under Russia's serfdom.

### 3) The “operation unthinkable” scenarios

This scenario category is named after the eponymous May 1945 British plan ordered by Winston Churchill, which entailed an Allied Forces attack on the Soviet Union after the defeat of Nazi Germany. Since the plan was as its name suggests, unthinkable, the next two scenarios seem very unlikely to happen, but are worth to be mentioned for an exhaustive view.

The first one would be **The Republic of Moldova's European integration by unifying with Romania**. The current government has recently accepted reforms that draw it away from Russia and closer to Romania. The clearest example is changing the official language of the country from “Moldovan” (a Soviet invention meant to create an artificial ethnic divide) to Romanian.<fnref n="8" /> Besides the clear ethnic and linguistic links between the populations of the two countries, Romania is currently the Republic of Moldova’s main commercial partner,<fnref n="9" /> donating significant funds for modernization,<fnref n="10" /> infrastructural and energy<fnref n="11" /> projects in the country, meant to reduce Chisinau’s dependency on Moscow. According to recent polls, **around a third of Moldovans support the unification with**

<footnote n="7">⁷ Thomas de Waal, “A Fragile Stability in Moldova”. Carnegie Europe, May 10, 2022, URL: https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/87099</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ “Moldovan parliament approves law on Romanian language”. Reuters, March 16, 2023, URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldovan-parliament-approves-law-romanian-language-2023-03-16/</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ “Romania, our country's main trading partner: Igor Grosu: More than 1,500 investors are operating successfully”. Radio Moldova, February 22, 2023, URL: https://radiomoldova.md/p/6644/romania-principalul-partener-comercial-al-tarii-noastre-igor-grosu-peste-1-500-de-investitori-activeaza-cu-succes</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Vitalie Călugăreanu, “Romania’s full support for the Republic of Moldova”. Deutsche Welle, March 23, 2023, URL: https://www.dw.com/ro/sprijin-total-din-partea-rom%C3%A2niei-pentru-republica-moldova/a-65095276</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ “Romania Starts Sending Natural Gas to Moldova Through Pipeline”. Radio Free Europe, December 5, 2022, URL: https://www.rferl.org/a/romania-gas-supply-moldova-ukraine-war/32162977.html</footnote>
Romania,<fnref n="12" /> the same figures being registered vice versa,<fnref n="13" /> when looking at Romania’s support for uniting with Moldova.

There is an ever-increasing percentage in the Republic of Moldova, not necessarily out of a rising national emancipation aspiration, but more like seeing Romania as a lifeboat in the current crisis situation that the country is, both economically and geopolitically. A unification would entail a European integration process from within Romania, which would be swifter and would be realized while Moldova is already considered an EU territory. Since the majority in neither of the two countries supports this scenario, it is highly unlikely, but not impossible, to see it happening.

Another scenario which has been very little discussed in Western media, some even labelling it as a possible Kremlin propaganda narrative to denigrate Ukraine,<fnref n="14" /> is a **Ukrainian intervention in Transnistria**, which could eliminate a 30-year-long, Moscow-initiated frozen conflict in the Republic of Moldova. Nevertheless, Ukrainians have neither admitted nor denied this declaring that “solving the Transnistrian problem belongs only to the Moldovan side”.<fnref n="15" /> Considering that Ukraine is in an all-out war against Russia, and that Transnistria is a separatist regime harbouring thousands of Russian soldiers, it is clear that Ukraine has had this option on its agenda since February 24th, 2022. Such a scenario, from a military perspective, is more likely to occur in the event of a great Russian defeat, which would permit opening a second frontline in Transnistria. While defeating Transnistria should not be a great challenge for Ukraine, there are other geopolitical factors to consider.

Firstly, one of Ukraine’s main advantages is its international image, mainly its rightful perception as a victim of Russian aggression. In the case of a Ukrainian attack on Transnistria, even a justified/provoked one, Ukraine could be portrayed as an aggressor and lose its credibility and public support in many nations. It could also cause other issues, since legally speaking, Ukraine would be attacking one of the Republic of Moldova’s de jure territories. Secondly, the **Moldovan side is unlikely to accept a Ukrainian intervention**, as it does not want such a process on its territory over which it has no control. That could lead to great internal problems, such as social upheavals from pro-Russian citizens outside of Transnistria or to another refugee crisis that Chisinau would have to deal with, (in a brutal economic crisis out of all situations).

Recently, at the European leaders’ summit from June 1, 2023, that took place in the Republic of Moldova, President Zelensky expressed his clearest intention so far, of solving the Transnistrian issue. He declared the following: “why is the Russian contingent still in Transnistria? The Kremlin only needs it to one day to "unfreeze" an attack on Moldova. How much longer will Europe put up with this? The question is 30 years old. It deserves an answer. There should be no place for any frozen or hot war on our continent!”.<fnref n="16" /> Ukraine is still keeping Transnistria in its sight and it remains to be seen whether Chisinau will be open to looking for solutions on the separatism issue with its neighbour.

<footnote n="12">¹² “Survey: Majority of Moldovans support EU membership, but not union with Romania”, G4Media, April 7, 2023, URL: https://www.g4media.ro/sondaj-majoritatea-cetatenilor-moldova-sustin-aderarea-la-ue-dar-nu-si-unirea-cu-romania.html</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ “POLL What Romanians think about the union with the Republic of Moldova”. G4Media, May 4, 2023, URL: https://www.g4media.ro/sondaj-ce-cred-romanii-despre-unirea-cu-republica-moldova-ce-parere-au-despre-maia-sandusi-ce-spun-despre-eventuala-invazie-a-rusiei-ar-trebui-sa-ajute-romania-militar-statul-moldoveean.html</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ “The narratives about Transnistria draw public attention away from Russia’s plans to destabilize Moldova and its defeats in Ukraine”. Veridica.ro, March 1, 2023, URL: https://www.veridica.ro/en/acf/the-narratives-about-transnistria-draw-public-attention-away-from-russias-plans-to-destabilize-moldova-and-its-defeats-in-ukraine</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ “Moscow accuses Kyiv of increasing military presence near the border with the Transnistrian region. Podolyak: "Never listen to the Russian Defence Ministry"”. Radio Moldova, February 23, 2023, URL: https://radiomoldova.md/p/6759/moscova-acuza-kievul-ca-sporeste-prezenta-militara-in-apropiere-de-granita-cu-regiunea-transnistreana-podoleak--nu-ascultati-niciodata-ministerul-ru</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ “Zelenskyi in Moldova named three steps on how Europe can help Ukraine win”. Evropeiskaya Pravda, June 1, 2023, URL: https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2023/06/1/7162836/</footnote>
If this unlikely scenario were to happen, assuming Moldova would be supported in dealing with the subsequent refugee crisis and with the reintegration process, it would help create a reintegrated country in which Russia would have significantly lower power grips. Either way, if it wants a European future, **the Republic of Moldova will have to find a solution to its dispute with Transnistria**, whether it is a diplomatic or a military one.<fnref n="17" />

## CONCLUSION

The Republic of Moldova benefits from a great window of opportunity to join the EU and this comes with a real existential stake for the determining its democratic future, prosperity, and freedom. What seemed as an unthinkable prospect just a few years ago, it is now a clear possibility, as we are witnessing the greatest and most accelerated European integration process in the history of the European Union.

The Republic of Moldova is a country with a population of 2.6 million who, unlike Ukraine, is not in an active war and thus it should be easier to deliver on reforms for integration. While the nation has a government that is determined to follow a European path and that has made tremendous reforms in that sense, **there is a sense of volatility**, and the Chisinau leadership can change from pro-Russian to pro-European from one election to another. Therefore, time is of the essence, and as the timeframe becomes shorter, it is possible that the EU will look towards an acceleration of the integration process, while the Republic of Moldova will start thoroughly analysing all options on the table. In the end, the Republic of Moldova will have to find a solution to the **Transnistrian issue, integrate Gagauzia with the rest of the country, counter the remaining influence of the oligarchs-in-exile and tackle Russian disinformation**.

Ukraine's counteroffensive measures and resistance to Russian bombardments, especially during the upcoming winter, will prove decisive not only for the war outcome in itself, but also for the European integration roadmap of both Kyiv and Chisinau. The Republic of Moldova's fate hangs in the balance and a Ukrainian failure will trickle down to the small nation as well.

Looking at the larger geopolitical framework, these European integration efforts are quintessential to the defence of a principle: the right of a free, democratic country to choose its path and future, regardless of the imperialistic geopolitical ambitions of another actor (Russia). The Republic of Moldova, but also countries other EU-aspiring post-Soviet nations, have more than a duty towards the welfare of their citizens and fighting for a better future. The Republic of Moldova could prove that there is a light at the end of the grey zone, one that is forged by determination and the strong belief in the shared values of democracy.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY/References

* "Maia Sandu seconds Zelensky, warning of Kremlin plans to overthrow Moldova government". Meduza, February 13, 2023, URL: https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/02/13/maia-sandu-seconds-zelensky-warning-of-kremlin-plans-to-overthrow-moldova-government

* "Moldovan parliament approves law on Romanian language". Reuters, March 16, 2023, URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldovan-parliament-approves-law-romanian-language-2023-03-16/

* "Moscow accuses Kyiv of increasing military presence near the border with the Transnistrian region. Podolyak: "Never listen to the Russian Defence Ministry"". Radio Moldova, February 23, 2023, URL: https://radiomoldova.md/p/6759/moscova-acuza-kievul-ca-sporeste-prezenta-militara-in-apropiere-de-granita-cu-regiunea-transnistreana-podoleak--nu-ascultati-niciodata-ministerul-ru

* "POLL What Romanians think about the union with the Republic of Moldova". G4Media, May 4, 2023, URL: https://www.g4media.ro/sondaj-ce-cred-romanii-despre-unirea-cu-republica-moldova-ce-parere-au-

<footnote n="17">17 "Ukraine's accession talks need bold action in Kyiv and Brussels". EPC.eu, March 24, 2023, URL: https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Ukraines-accession-talks-need-bold-action-in-Kyiv-and-Brussels~4f3f1c</footnote>
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"Romania Starts Sending Natural Gas to Moldova Through Pipeline". Radio Free Europe, December 5, 2022, URL: https://www.rferl.org/a/romania-gas-supply-moldova-ukraine-war/32162977.html

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# In electoral competition without a political party. Motivations, context and legal resources for independent candidates in the Republic of Moldova

ASSOC. PROF. DR. VALENTINA CORNEA

UNIVERSITY „DUNĂREA DE JOS” IN GALAȚI, ROMANIA

DR. ALIN TOMUȘ

UNIVERSITY „1 DECEMBRIE 1918” IN ALBA IULIA, ROMANIA

**Abstract:** Electoral competition is a fundamental attribute of democratic systems. Modern American-inspired democracy, essentially, has established and supported electoral competition between political blocs, capable of supporting and justifying multi-partyism as an expression of the capacity for political organization of society. In recent decades, many states have adopted regulatory frameworks and electoral rules that facilitate independent candidacies, mainly in local and regional elections. In this article we debate, in what extent does the cooperation of masses of individuals, of a subnational collectivity, influence the political goals of the electoral system, to what extent does the institutional context influence the emergence of independent candidates, to what extent do the beliefs of collectivities allow the emergence of such candidates in the Republic of Moldova.

**Keywords:** democracy; multi-party system; political party; independent candidate

## LEGITIMIZING INDEPENDENT COMPETITORS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

In democratic systems, the country's leadership and the administration of subnational collectivities are carried out by elected representatives. Administration through representatives has become necessary with the evolution of the complexity of social life and the changing role of state authorities, becoming the most widespread form of materialization of democracy. It is suspected of introducing a systematic distortion between the expectations of some and the decisions of others and is closer to a political bargain than to an ideal of rational legitimation<fnref n="1" />, representation has profound sociological connotations that justify its necessity. At least three arguments explain the goals for representation<fnref n="2" />: collective action for a common purpose becomes difficult because of the impossibility of physically and timely assembly the entire community; in a large group countertendencies are imminent; the quality of collective action will suffer because of those fatal downward leveling which conditions the cooperation of a mass. If a majority really acts together, then this will only happen in those directions which make possible a descent of the higher-placed individual to the level of the lower-placed individual. Experience shows that in a crowd gathered, the leadership will fall to the most temperamental, most radical, most noisy elements, and not to the most intellectually representative, and often the mass gatherings make the most reckless and harmful decisions. For these reasons, by choosing the most capable persons in the community, a transfer of authority occurs from a collective "we" to a nominal "they" for the achievement of the goals of the whole community. It is about a transfer of functions from the total group, of the collectivity, to a partial, smaller group.

In old democracies, considered to be authentic, the institutional mechanisms, the strong political structures, the clear electoral system, are somehow designed to make the appearance of independent candidates in the electoral competition unlikely. The systemic explanation is relatively

<footnote n="1">¹ Nelly Haudegand, Pierre Lefèbure, *Dictionnaire de probleme politice: 60 de mize ale Franţei contemporane*. Chisinau, Museum, 2002, p. 204.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Valentina Cornea, (2009) Activitatea administrației publice locale: abordare sociologică. Cahul: „Prin-Caro” SRL, pp. 43-44.</footnote>
simple, authentic democracy incubates the idea of procedures, of institutional capacity, of an infrastructure that controls the issue of the political conception within a political formation and that suppresses the traditional idea, this time, of the appearance of an independent, messianic candidate, detached from the idea of the system and that brings to the political game a new discourse considered to be outside the complicated inertia developed by the classic political parties, conformist placed to the right or left of the political spectrum.

The concern of modern sociology for such a theme is major in the context of a European continent that is currently discussing the sum of threats to democracy and the European construction. The problem of administration through legitimate representatives is likely to explain, to some extent, the complexity of social and political life within a society. In this sense, the Republic of Moldova is undoubtedly a society that allows for a deep debate on the emergence of divergent political interests in relation to the European construct that a part of the society in question particularly emotionally contests.

In the debates on the functioning of representative democracies, as well as for development projects initiated outside the target community, two fundamental questions are of interest: 1) to what extent can a person understand and represent the interests of another person or a community? and 2) how is the process of selecting representatives, subsequently invested with the power to lead, carried out.

Regarding the first aspect, there are two beliefs of the quality of representation: the belief of demographic representativeness and the belief of political representativeness. The belief of demographic representativeness assumes that the possibility of an individual to actively representing the interests of another person is all the greater the more similar the individual is to that person in terms of social position. According to this principle, it is essential that the different social categories are represented in decision-making bodies by their own members, and not by people from outside them. This theory implies that the interests of women will generally be better represented by women than by men, the interests of ethnic minorities - by members of those ethnic minorities, etc. In the sense of social psychology, we consider that belonging to a group also means a high degree of fidelity in knowledge of the group's problems, and in the sense of representativeness, we tend to choose someone whom we consider relevant in terms of understanding the problems faced by the group to which we belong.

The concept of political representativeness emphasizes not the similarity of social characteristics, but the sharing of common worldviews, communication and mutual knowledge. Thus, the key to effective representation of interests lies in identifying people with similar values (who may or may not be members of the same socio-demographic categories) and who have the necessary competence to know and communicate the life situation of those they represent, as well as the political skill necessary to negotiate their interests in the political environment.<fnref n="3" />

Regarding the selection method, in democratic societies representativeness is ensured through elections. Elections, in a narrow sense, constitute the designation by voters of their representatives in a frame of power.<fnref n="4" /> The democratic way of electing authorities is a public operation and represents the result of a value selection in which the social status, political and civic culture of the average citizen, traditions, etc. are considered. In an idealized account of the role of elections, Maravall J. M. explains how the selection process of those to whom the right to represent is delegated works: 1). Candidates compete, transmitting prospective messages about their future policies and signals about their competence; 2) Voters select those candidates closest to their ideal political positions and more capable of implementing their program; 3) Once elected to office, the people who hold elective

<footnote n="3">³ Norma M. Riccucci, & Marcia K. Meyers, Linking passive and active representation: The case of frontline workers in welfare agencies, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, vol. 14, nr. 4, 2004, pp. 585-597.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Sergiu Cornea, Introducere în politologie, Cahul, USC, 2008, p.180</footnote>
positions adopt policies and dedicate efforts to fulfill them; 4) Policies and efforts, under particular exogenous conditions, produce results that modify the well-being of citizens; 5) At the time of the next election, voters retroactively evaluate these results and attribute them to the policies and efforts of the incumbent and the influence of exogenous conditions; 6) Voters update their preferences regarding policies and candidates; 7) Voters re-elect or reject the holder. Elections, therefore, select and assess"<fnref n="5" />.

The necessary and (not always) sufficient condition for different candidates or parties to participate in the political selection process is political competition. Largely, competition for the designation of representatives acting on behalf of the state or local community has involved the entry into electoral competitions of political parties. In recent decades, many states have adopted regulatory frameworks and electoral rules that facilitate independent candidacies, especially in local and regional elections.

Open lists have increasingly become the norm in European democracies<fnref n="6" />. Even though the votes accumulated by independent candidates are sometimes significantly lower than those accumulated by parties, there is a growing interest in non-party politicians. Their role is important because:

- "change the game" and destabilizes existing political models by: 1) creating electoral competition and 2) putting specific issues on the political agenda. These two aspects are seen to ensure better representation of voter preferences.

- Encourages those who do not usually vote to vote, offering an alternative to traditional parties<fnref n="7" />.

## REQUIREMENTS AND CONDITIONS FOR INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES

Most countries that allow independents to run in elections require certain requirements for independent candidates. Beyond requirements such as age, residency, citizenship or lack of convictions, there are also requirements for supporting signatures, and proof of financial resources (financial deposit requirement) to register. The supporting signature requirement requires lists signed by a certain number of eligible voters. Signature requirements are usually not very high, but without a massive party infrastructure to collect signatures door-to-door, independent candidates may have difficulty collecting even a small number of signatures. Some countries, such as Belgium and Luxembourg, make exceptions to these requirements. In these countries, candidates without the required number of signatures can run if they have the support of a certain number of parliamentarians, a practice that inevitably favors political insiders. In Slovenia, exceptions are not made based on political connections, but on ethnicity, with independents of Italian or Hungarian origin needing fewer signatures than others.<fnref n="8" /> Deposit requirements vary from country to country. In most countries, deposits are defined in absolute terms, but in some they vary from year to year, depending on a country's average monthly wage (Lithuania) or minimum wage (Estonia). For example, in the Netherlands the deposit exceeds $15,000, and in Turkey it exceeds $30,000. The

<footnote n="5">⁵ José María Maravall, „Accountability and the Survival of Governments”, in Carles Boix, and Susan C. Stokes (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (2009; online edn, Oxford Academic, 2 Sept. 2009), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566020.003.0037, accessed 18 Sept. 2023.)</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Ehin Piret et al, *Independent candidates in national and European elections*, European Parliament, Directorate general for internal policies, p. 10,</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷Vlada Ciobanu, De ce restricțiile în participarea independenților la alegeri ne afectează democrația, 2019. Available at: https://watch.cpr.md/de-ce-restrictiile-in-participarea-independentilor-la-alegeri-ne-afecteazademocratia/, (accessed 20.06.2023).
https://watch.cpr.md/de-ce-restrictiile-in-participarea-independentilor-la-alegeri-ne-afecteaza-democratia/</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸Dawn Brancati, *Winning Alone: The Electoral Fate of Independent Candidates Worldwide!*，《The Journal of Politics》，2008，vol. 70，No. 3，p. 650.</footnote>
difficulty that candidates face in meeting the deposit requirements depends not only on the size of the deposit, but also on the level of economic development of a country. Obviously, a deposit of $1,000 in the United States is much easier to meet than a deposit of $1,000 in Turkey or Niger. As with signature requirements, some countries provide exceptions to the deposit requirements under specific conditions. In India, for example, independent candidates representing scheduled castes and scheduled tribes pay a deposit that is half that of other independent candidates. As with signature requirements, some countries offer exceptions to the deposit requirement under specific conditions. In India, for example, independent candidates representing scheduled castes and tribes pay a deposit that is half that of other independent candidates.<fnref n="9" />

The Venice Commission recommends that the number of monetary deposits, where they are prerequisites for registration, should be of a sufficient amount to deter frivolous parties and candidates, while at the same time not being so high as to prevent legitimate parties or candidates from gaining access to the vote. Furthermore, excessive amounts of monetary deposits may be considered discriminatory, as they limit the right of citizens without adequate resources to stand for election, as protected by human rights instruments. Furthermore, the deposit should be refundable if the candidate or party exceeds a certain number or percentage of votes. The amount requested should reflect the economic realities of the country. While this practice may be considered more efficient than collecting signatures, the threshold required for a refund should be reasonable.<fnref n="10" />

Although the possibility of running as an independent candidate seems to be implicit in the right to be elected, not all countries ensure this. In 13 EU countries it is allowed to run as an independent candidate, in five others there is no explicit provision about independent candidates, but in theory you can run alone on a list, in nine other countries you cannot run as an independent candidate.<fnref n="11" />

LEGAL PROVISION REGARDING THE RIGHT TO BE ELECTED

Since the declaration of independence and so far, 6 general elections have taken place in the Republic of Moldova. The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, the Electoral Code, the Labor Code, the Audiovisual Media Services Code, the Contravention, Criminal and Administrative Code of the Republic of Moldova, as well as over 20 laws and regulations provide the framework for the realization of the right to vote and to be elected. All these acts provide for the conditions that must be observed in the process of designating representatives for the legitimate exercise of power at the level of local territorial collectivities. These provisions impose age, structural, financial conditions, etc.

In art. 1 of the Electoral Code of the Republic of Moldova, by independent candidate refers to a person who is running for elected public office independently of political parties and electoral blocs and is duly registered. Political non-affiliation is the defining characteristic of all independent candidates. This is a major obstacle to their electoral success, as parties perform several functions: they reduce the cost of voting, they allow individual candidates to benefit electorally from their association with party colleagues, and they provide candidates with significant organizational and financial support. However, parties may endorse independent candidates and encourage people to vote for them, which is often the case if parties do not have their own candidates. In the most basic sense, the lack of partisan affiliation means that an independent's name appears alone on a ballot and

<footnote n="9">⁹ Brancati, op. cit. p. 650</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, Vladimir Prebilic (Raporteur). *The situation of independent candidates and the opposition in local and regional elections*, Council of Europe, p. 40 Available at: https://rm.coe.int/0900001680a5ae6f (Accessed: 25.06.2024).</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹Vlada Ciobanu, op. cit.</footnote>
not alongside a particular party. As such, independents are not affiliated with any political party. In developing their own agendas, independents often do not develop complete political programs, but compete based on single issues<fnref n="12" />, such as environmental protection, equal opportunities, operation of social institutions, etc.

In the Republic of Moldova, citizens have the right to run independently for the position of president of the country, mayor or councilor in the local council. According to the provisions of the Electoral Code (art. 164), filing a candidacy for the position of councilor is conditional on the support of 2% of the number of voters in the electoral district, divided by the number of mandates for the respective council, but not less than 50 people, and to be elected mayor – if supported by 1% of the number of voters in the constituency, but not less than 100 people. Prior to the amendments to the Electoral Code, this number was 5%. This high ceiling did not consider the recommendation of the Venice Commission according to which “the law should not provide for the collection of signatures from more than 1% of the voters in the respective constituency”. A person can run for the position of councilor both in the council of the first-level administrative-territorial unit and in the council of the second-level administrative-territorial unit. A person can run for both the position of mayor and the position of local councilor but cannot run for these positions in more than one electoral district of the same level, (art. 163, p. 5).<fnref n="13" />

In order to be elected, they become part of the local electoral process, that is, they are involved in all the activities and procedures carried out consecutively related to the organization, conduct and totalization of the results of the local elections. Local elections, by their very essence, aim to promote worthy individuals, knowledgeable about the specific problems of the localities, in accordance with the legitimate demands of the inhabitants, to the eligible positions of the local public administration<fnref n="14" />. The submission of one's own candidacy for the position of mayor and/or local councilor is carried out by applying to the district electoral councils. After submitting the application, the stage of collecting signatures by the people submitting their own candidacy follows. The signatures of support are collected in a model subscription list, issued by the electoral body, individually or by support groups established under the law. Voters can support several independent candidates for several elective positions, but they cannot support the same candidate, by signature, two or more times. Prior to the amendments to the Electoral Code, voters could support, by signature, only one candidate. The new provision, promoted and supported by Promo-LEX, facilitates the right to be elected by potential independent candidates<fnref n="15" />. Signatures are collected in the place/places within the electoral district in which the candidate is running.

A special condition for being elected is age. For the position of mayor, the legal age requirement is 23 years. Reducing it by 2 years, compared to the previous provisions, is considered reasonable and in line with international standards<fnref n="16" />. People who have reached the age of 18 can apply for the position of councilor. Also, candidates for elective positions at the local level must hold the citizenship of the Republic of Moldova, have a residence permit on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, including in the administrative-territorial unit, for no less than 3 years; have no criminal record for crimes committed intentionally; are not deprived of the right to hold public positions of responsibility by a final court decision.

<footnote n="12">¹² Dawn Brancati, op. cit. p. 654.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Codul Electoral, Published: 23-12-2022 in the Official Gazette at no. 426-427 art. 770.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Sergiu Cornea, Valentina Cornea, *Autoadministrarea colectivităților locale: aspecte teoretico-practice*, Cahul: US „B. P. Hasdeu”, 2010 pp. 84-85.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Promo-Lex, *Noutățile Codului electoral pentru alegerile locale generale din 5 noiembrie 2023*. Available at: https://promolex.md/23977-noutatile-codului-electoral-pentru-alegerile-locale-generale-din-5-noiembrie-2023/?lang=ro (Accessed: 20.09.2024)</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Ibidem.</footnote>
For the organization of the electoral campaign, independent candidates benefit from material support from the state. In this regard, candidates can take out an interest-free loan, in the amount determined by the Electoral Commission. The application for obtaining the loan is submitted to the Ministry of Finance. The interest-free loan granted to independent candidates in 2019 represented 10,000 lei for each independent candidate<fnref n="17" />. It is reimbursed by the state within three months of the election date, depending on the election results.

Briefly presented, the requirements for the registration of independent candidates for mayor, which will be presented to the district electoral council, are<fnref n="18" />:

- Written application requesting registration as an electoral competitor;

- Subscription lists with a sufficient number of signatures of the independent candidate's supporters;

- Biographical data of the candidate;

- Candidate's declaration regarding its consent to run for elective office;

- Declaration of assets and personal interests for the last year before the local elections;

- Affidavit confirming that it has not been sentenced to prison or has a criminal record and that no final findings have been issued against it;

- Declaration regarding the suspension, during the term of office, of positions incompatible with the position of mayor, if the person is elected and the mandate is validated;

- Declaration regarding the suspension from the position held since the start of the electoral campaign;

- Copy of the diploma of studies – in the case of candidates for the position of mayor, certifying that they have at least mandatory general education;

- Copy of the candidate's identity card;

Even a brief analysis of the legislation shows that the registration of independent candidates in electoral elections is sufficiently burdened with rules and requirements as complex as for parties. In addition, independent candidates also submit subscription lists with enough signatures of supporters. To register, they must appear in person at the district electoral council, where they submit the subscription lists together with the documents required for registration.

## CAPITALIZING ON THE RIGHT TO RUN INDEPENDENTLY IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

All elections in the Republic of Moldova have been held against the backdrop of developments in the national political and judicial sphere. The desire of Moldovan citizens to run as independents crystallized in a winding way - with enthusiasm in the first years after the declaration of independence, followed by a period of decline, then a substantial revival. The Republic of Moldova is among the countries where no more than 15% of candidates running for elective office are independents and they win on average between approximately 2 and 5% of the votes<fnref n="19" />. The only legislature that included independent candidates was the one elected in the February 24, 2019, elections organized under the mixed parallel system. Even so, only 3 of the 59 people who ran in 51

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Prom-Lex, Raport final „Misiunea de observare a alegerilor locale generale și parlamentare noi din 20 octombrie”, 3 noiembrie, 2019, p. 61. Available on: https://promolex.md/16461-raportul-final-misiuneade-observare-a-alegerilor-locale-generale-si-a-alegerilor-parlamentare-noi-din-20-octombrie-3-noiembrie-2019/?lang=ro. (Accessed: 26.09.2024)</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Comisia Electorală Centrală a Republicii Moldova. Official page. Available on: https://a.cec.md/ro/maine-19-septembrie-incepe-perioada-de-depunere-a-documentelor-2781_107415.html</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Dawn Brancati, D (2008), op. cit. p. 655</footnote>
single-member constituencies obtained a mandate as a deputy<fnref n="20" />. In the case of elective positions at the local level, the desire to run as an independent candidate is expressed by a larger number of citizens. In the 2019 general local elections, at least 3,778 candidates were registered for the position of mayor. The most candidates were registered in Orhei – 198, Florești – 172 and Ungheni – 161²¹. Women represented 8% of all independent candidates. For the position of councilor, compared to the general local elections of June 14, 2015, 5,353 files (over 51.4 thousand people) were registered in the 2019 elections. The most files were registered in UTAG (424), Orhei district (240) and Ungheni district (214).<fnref n="22" />

<table><caption>Tabel 1 Independent candidates elected to local public positions</caption><thead><tr><td>Independent candidates</td><td>Councilor level II</td><td>Councilor level I</td><td>Mayors</td><td>Votes</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1999</td><td>6</td><td>292</td><td>191</td><td>6.83%</td></tr><tr><td>2003</td><td>23</td><td>479</td><td>157</td><td>5.43%</td></tr><tr><td>2007</td><td>19</td><td>333</td><td>95</td><td>4.4%</td></tr><tr><td>2011</td><td>9</td><td>336</td><td>69</td><td>4.06%</td></tr><tr><td>2015</td><td>6</td><td>372</td><td>67</td><td>3.18%</td></tr><tr><td>2019</td><td>24</td><td>510</td><td>112</td><td>5.74%</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: synthesis made by the authors based on official data, Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova

Analyzing the rate of independent candidates elected to local public offices since the 1999 elections until now, in the period 2007-2015, citizens' intentions to run as independent candidates were lower compared to the previous period. The revival is attested in the 2019 general local elections. Out of 898 mayoral positions, 112 (12%) were occupied by independent candidates. Of the total number of elected mayors, 22% (195) are women, 13% (26) of whom ran as independent candidates. The 510 local councilor mandates are found in 26 local councils. The intentions to run as independent candidates for the position of councilor at level II local public authorities are limited.

The largest number of independent mayors are elected in the Găgăuzia and in the districts Ștefan Vodă, Hâncești, Edineț, Căușeni and Cahul. The intention to run independently is largely attested in villages and townships. Of the 112 elected mayors, only 7 are elected in cities and municipalities. Considering that we are talking about the 2019 general local elections, that is, until the amendments to the Electoral Code come into force, we can state that "the restrictions and discrimination of independent candidates regarding their right to run for elections are contradictory to international standards and best practices", a finding made in an interim report on the observation of local elections in the Republic of Moldova<fnref n="23" />. Perhaps, indeed, collecting several signatures that would reach the level of 5% of the total number of voters with the right to vote is an impediment, given the limited logistical resources available to independent candidates. These provisions led to the fact that in the local elections of 2015 and 2019, no independent candidate was registered for the position of mayor of Chisinau. There was an intention, but the candidate was not registered in the electoral elections, following the decision of the Chisinau District Electoral Council. The Chisinau

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Arina Kraijdan, Doina Bordeianu, Șansele candidaților și candidatelor independente de a accede în Parlamentul Republicii Moldova în cadrul sistemului electoral proporțional, CICDE Policy Brief, no. 4, p. 3. Available on: https://cicde.md/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/policy-brief_4_6867931.pdf (Accessed: 30.08.2024)</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Promo-Lex, 2019, op. cit., p. 37</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ Misiunea Internațională de Monitorizare a Alegerilor ENEMO, Alegeri Locale Generale, 20 octombrie – Moldova. Raport interimar 20 septembrie - 11 octembrie 2019. Available on: http://enemo.eu/uploads/file-manager/1stInterimReport-LocalElectionsOct_2019Moldova-13Oct_2019.pdf (Accessed: 18.09.2024)</footnote>
District Electoral Council did not validate about a thousand signatures collected by Codreanu's team from Chisinau residents<fnref n="24" />. The November 2023 election will show whether the new amendments to the Electoral Code, which reduce the number of signatures, will encourage citizens to run independently.

One of the possible explanations for the decrease in the desire to run as an independent candidate could be migration and political drift, a phenomenon fueled by the parties in power and the poor management of human resources within the party to which the mayors who obtained a mandate were members were affiliated politically. The merits and talents of people within the party were not appreciated by the party leadership. A study addressing the issue of the political affiliation of mayors shows that out of the 504 mayors re-elected in the 2015 local elections, 101 changed the political party that promoted them to the mayor's seat in 2011, 22 mayors from the ranks of independent candidates joined a political party, and 16 mayors, who belonged to a political party in 2011, preferred to run independently and won the mayor's position in 2015. During the period 2015-2017, out of the 69 independent candidates who won the mayor's position in the 2015 local elections, 16 or 23% preferred to affiliate with a political party, this being the Democratic Party of Moldova<fnref n="25" />.

One reason that can be considered a discouraging to run as an independent is unequal treatment. Sometimes, subtle repressions faced by candidates can be considered forms of discrimination, detrimental to political pluralism. Even when independent candidates are allowed to run and have a de facto chance of being elected, they may face many administrative obstacles and structural disadvantages that diminish their competitiveness against party candidates. As a result, many become discouraged. For example, before/during the 2019 local elections in the Republic of Moldova, administratively burdensome procedures for collecting an unjustified number of supporting signatures from voters (one voter could support only one candidate) reduced the chances of independents running and being elected. No such requirement was imposed on political party candidates.<fnref n="26" /> ENEMO observers found that the signature collection process was problematic in several cases. Insufficiently clear legal provisions left room for different interpretations of the terms “locality”, “municipality”, “suburb” and “territorial-administrative unit”. Due to discrepancies in the legal interpretation of the provisions of the electoral legislation, the CECEs rejected several candidates’ applications, which led to several court disputes and appeals of first instance court decisions. In several cases, the reasons for the rejection of independent candidates by the CECEs were based on minor errors, small technical mistakes and different interpretations of the law.<fnref n="27" />

The general local elections of November 5, 2023, were organized according to the new provisions of the legislation in force and in a complex political and social context, marked by intense competition between traditional political parties and independent candidates. These elections were essential for the configuration of local administrations and for determining the direction of community development in the next four years. According to the provisions of the new Electoral Code, approved on December 8, 2022, and entered into force on January 1, 2023, the most important areas were modified regarding the mandate, the age of candidates, the process of designation and registration, the method of administering electoral lists and the strengthening of the control attribution of the Central Electoral Commission.

In the report provided by the CEC, a total of 116 independent candidates were elected to the

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Codreanu a atacat în instanță decizia Consiliului Electoral prin care a fost exclus din cursă. Available on: https://tv8.md/2019/10/01/codreanu-a-atacat-in-instanta-decizia-consiliului-electoral-prin-care-a-fost-exclus-din-cursa (Accessed: 20.08.2023)</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Ion Meleştean, „Traseismul politic al primarilor în Republica Moldova (2011-2017)”, *Administrarea Publică*, 2017, nr. 3(95), pp. 153-158.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Prebilic, op. cit.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ ENEMO, op. cit., p. 10.</footnote>
position of mayor in the localities of the Republic of Moldova, 26 women and 90 men, with only 4 more candidates compared to the 2019 election, where the total number of independent candidates elected to the position of mayor was 112. A possible cause of the large difference between men and women may be the increased degree of distrust in women's ability to administer public affairs.

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES

The exercise of the positions to which independent candidates were elected requires a certain level of experience and knowledge to resolve and oversee, within the framework of the law, an important part of the public affairs of the territorial community they represent. The exercise of these powers also implies an increasingly high level of experience and knowledge, which, however, proves to be unevenly distributed among the elected officials, for reasons that are not so much related to the person as to the means available to each within its community.<fnref n="28" />

Because public data on the electoral campaigns of independent candidates are very brief, the analysis is limited to 12 independent mayors. We refer to the longest-serving mayors, who have run as an independent candidate at least once, and 6 independent mayors from Cahul district. Their profile and activity are analyzed based on the following criteria: age, education, professional experience, motivation to run as an independent candidate, assuming the role, challenges in exercising the position, and perceptions of citizens.

The data highlight that the most represented category for the position of independent mayor are people who held administrative positions before the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Moldova. In most of the analyzed situations, positions in district executives, district party committees, and councils of deputies are attested. The young mayors, who ran for the 2015 and 2019 elections, have extensive volunteer experience, work as advisors, or have worked in local public services. The average age of an independent mayor is under 50 years old.

On the administrative agenda of mayors are primarily issues related to social services, utilities and infrastructure for a decent life. They are aware that they have assumed a role of great responsibility and at the same time demanding. From the reports available in the media, the activity of independent mayors is quite intense. Even if they allocate days for the audience, where they meet with over 30 citizens, they discuss their problems outside of office hours. "I am not tied to working hours, I am tied to problems", admits a mayor (city of Cricova), "The mayor is not only a representative person, but also an executive, and the problems of the village end up on the mayor's head", "the mayor should be a village manager, and the city hall an administrative structure, not a political one" says another mayor (village of Banesti, district of Telenesti). In addition to administrative issues, they also deal with "more mundane" problems. Whether someone is beaten or kicked out of their home, someone's dog has been poisoned or neighbors are burning their garbage (mayor of Budeşti township, Chișinău city), or a mediator in love relationships (mayor of Caracusenii Vechi, Briceni)<fnref n="29" />.

Reduced budgets, the unwillingness of citizens to be more cooperative in solving local problems, political pressures are the problems they face most often. In these conditions, they must be quite "creative", good communicators and negotiators, with a keen sense of prioritization. If a city hall building or a cultural center "remains repetitive" in terms of repairs, it is because "the money went [first] to the needs of the village".<fnref n="30" />

Financial challenges are most often the result of poor relationships with institutions

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Sergiu Cornea, op. cit., p. 16.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Raisa Răzmeriță, „Forever primar”, 2017. Disponibil: https://oamenisikilometri.md/forever-primar/. (Accessed: 10.08.2024)</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Ibidem.</footnote>
responsible for distributing financial resources. Political non-affiliation is openly mentioned as a reason for financial non-support. It is a widespread phenomenon in the Republic of Moldova. Data shows that mayors politically affiliated with the ruling parties received more money than those of the opposition or independents. For example, in 2018, in the "Good Roads for Moldova Program", allocations favored jurisdictions where, based on the new mixed voting system, representatives of the Democratic Party ran. A maximum index of political clientelism was recorded in 2012, when the probability of receiving funds for capital investments from the State Budget was on average 4 times higher in local territorial collectivities where a mayor affiliated with the governing alliance was elected than in those that elected mayors affiliated with other parties<fnref n="31" />.

Financial challenges are also among the factors that affect the quality of being "independent", with mayors having to join a political party. Mayors appreciate that one of the advantages of being independent is the freedom to make decisions. However, 4 mayors from those targeted in the study migrated to several parties, arguing their gesture by the need for "political capital" to carry out projects at the local level. "Whoever will give me money for the village - I'll go with that one!" becomes a generalized expression through which city councilors explain their gestures of political transition. One mayor exercised all its mandates independently but had the support of several parties. At the same time, there are also mayors who resist the phenomenon, maintaining their independent status. 3 of the six independent mayors in Cahul district ran independently for a second term, obtaining an overwhelming number of votes. All three mayors obtained the mandate by running independently, after a term in which they were politically affiliated.

Citizens' perceptions unanimously indicate that the preference for an independent candidate is due to their "good householder" qualities and the way they are treated. The most appreciated are their "kind words", their willingness to listen, their moderation and their dignity.

Other aspects associated with the ability to manage that we can discern are the motivation and will to achieve their goals, as well as the emphasis on values, competence, devotion and sacrifice. The fact that they are more community-oriented than party-oriented helps them somewhat to defy the "Iron Law of Oligarchy", formulated by Robert Michels<fnref n="32" /> and it is precisely the skillfulness to be "political people" that ensures their re-election for a new term.

In an electoral campaign, electoral competitors try to make their programs known by distributing leaflets, but also by direct speeches to the public. Independent candidates are more reserved when it comes to promises and there is an increase in the professionalism with which they come to the political market. For them, the marketing of promises, in a way, manifests itself through awareness of the current reality. They analyze all sources so that they can then offer people what they want to hear. For example, if the community budget does not allow the construction of an access road or the start of a new aqueduct project, they avoid making promises that cannot be fulfilled within a mandate.

The success of the independent candidate's electoral campaign is largely due to the image and content strategies it follows and applies during the electoral period. "The world sees well what you are on the outside and few see what you are on the inside; and those few do not dare to contradict the opinion of the crowd (...) the people only judge what they see”<fnref n="33" />, said Machiavelli in the „Prince”. They can opt for active, passive or positive electoral strategies. Each strategy has specific characteristics, which highlight the qualities and active attitude of the independent candidate, do not emphasize attacking opponents, choose appropriate moments for action, positive speech, use

<footnote n="31">³¹ Expert Forum, *Profilul clientelismului politic în regiune: România, Moldova și Georgia, 2018*. Disponibil: https://expertforum.ro/profilul-clientelismului-politic-in-regiune/. (Accessed: 10.08.2024).</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² Robert Michels, Political parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchial Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Kitchener, Batoche Books, 2001, p. 224.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ Niccolo Machiavelli, *Principale, Bucuresti, Humanitas, 2019*, p. 26.</footnote>
messages that urge calm, balance, stability, dignified reactions to opponents' attacks. The case of Mayor Vasile Popovici, re-elected even when the opponents' election campaign flyers contained a list of reasons why he should not be re-elected, is instructive in this regard.

An eloquent example that demonstrates how a well-designed strategy works is Nicolae Dandiș, the mayor of Cahul. Before being elected mayor in 2015, beyond the big objectives that he brought to the attention of the people of Cahul, and what is within the powers of a mayor in this regard, he insisted on the fact that the biggest priority as mayor is to make people believe that the one they elect is doing everything in his power to work for the community, and for people to regain trust in what local public administration means.”<fnref n="34" /> Showing that you are not above those you represent has become a benchmark for citizens. People no longer believe in promises. In many cases, promises to create the feeling of candidates bidding for votes.

A special significance in the attitude of the independent candidate in the electoral campaign is also because they do not emphasize attacking their opponents. Campaign programs are built around questions aimed at achieving concrete results, in how long, with what means, with what efforts, what are the resources, what are the obstacles, who are they addressing, what they should say to the voters and how to send the message.

While all independent candidates are similar in their lack of political affiliation, they are different from each other in many ways. This is not the case for the individuals included in the study, but many independents are strangers to politics and have no experience in government. They are often drawn into the political arena by a single issue about which they feel passionate. Many even use their independent positions to present themselves as the only ones who can come up with solutions to collective problems, can successfully negotiate deals with different parties for the benefit of the community. Others, on the contrary, are political insiders who have previously participated in governance processes as members of certain political formations or have been part of the administrative bureaucracy. Many of these have left parties due to disputes over the direction of their parties, personal conflicts with other party members, or failure to win a seat on party lists.<fnref n="35" /> Although dominant, this view of independent candidates is not universal. A considerable number of scholars, policymakers, and activists suggest that independents enhance democracy by proposing new and innovative solutions. Others suggest that independents strengthen democracy by reducing corruption, restoring the integrity of government, and reviving citizen interest in politics.<fnref n="36" /> These things depend on their electoral strength, which varies greatly within the country.

## CONCLUSIONS

The electoral power of independent candidates is influenced by the electoral system and the administrative culture of the country. Reforms that promote candidate-centered politics have as a secondary effect a leveling of the playing field for independent candidates. The relevance of representation in a democratic state lies in the action of all members of a local territorial collectivity to elect the most suitable persons to represent them. The presence of independent candidates is an indicator of representative democracy and the affirmation in practice of the right to vote and to be elected.

In the conditions of the Republic of Moldova, one can speak of political rather than

<footnote n="34">³⁴ Radio Europa Libera Moldova, Nicolae Dandiș: „Daca vrei ca oamenii sa aiba incredere in tine, trebuie si tu sa ai incredere in ei” October 23, 2019, https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/nicolae-dandi-s-dac-C4%83-vrei-ca-oamenii-s%C4%83-aib%C4%83-%C3%AEncredere-%C3%AEn-tine-trebuie-%C8%99i-tu-s%C4%83-ai-%C3%AEncredere-C3%AEn-ei-(video)/30232050.html (Accessed: 01.08.2023)</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶Dawn Brancati, op.cit., pag. 648.</footnote>
demographic representativeness. Citizens are more likely to elect people who can solve community problems, appreciating negotiation and leadership skills. The desire to run independently has existed since the declaration of independence of the Republic of Moldova, going through a period of decline in the period 2007-2015. Currently, there is a growing trend in the involvement of candidates in electoral processes. The participation of independent candidates in local elections is a means of ensuring a functional democratic system, without diminishing the importance of parties. Electoral campaigns have become more dynamic, due to the growing number of electoral competitors. Independent candidates, who responsibly assume the role of local elected officials, are gaining ground against party representatives. The success of independent candidates, despite the unequal conditions compared to candidates with political support, is largely due to the positive electoral campaign strategies adopted. However, their independent status makes them more exposed to political pressures, the consequence in some cases being migration and political party switching.

The relevance of representation in a democratic state lies in the action of all members of a local territorial collectivity to elect the most suitable persons to represent them. The presence of independent candidates is an indicator of representative democracy and the practical affirmation of the right to vote and to be elected. At the same time, modern information and communication technologies can have the same effect, as they allow individual candidates to reach many voters at low cost, thus reducing the dependence of candidates on political campaigns of party organizations. An open question is whether the increase in the number of independent candidates is an expression of pluralism or a partisan strategy of political parties.

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# Deepfake: Implications and Solutions in the EU

AYSEGUL ZENGIN<fnref n="1" />

**Abstract:** Deepfakes are hyper-realistic videos that apply artificial intelligence to depict persons' images and voices. Deepfake came into our lives when a Reddit moderator began posting videos that used face-swapping technology to insert celebrities' likenesses into existing pornographic videos in 2017. Despite a long time having passed, there is still no legal and technical solution in the European Union(the EU) to prevent creating or viraling of deepfake videos.

This paper addresses the pressing need for effective measures to combat deepfake proliferation, acknowledging the inadequacy of existing legal and technical frameworks in the EU. Due to its technical aspects, privacy rights, intellectual rights, and criminal law are not good enough to protect the rights of persons' whose image or voice is used in deepfake videos. By undertaking a thorough examination, this study seeks to bridge the gap between the current state of technology and the legal safeguards required to protect individuals from the detrimental effects of deepfakes in the EU.

**Keywords:** Deepfake, defamation, privacy, pornography, EU.

## INTRODUCTION

Deepfakes originated in 2017. An influential Reddit user utilized open-source software from Google and other platforms to leverage scattered academic research on face-swapping. This mentioned individual uploaded the manipulated clips that featured the faces of celebrities like Scarlett Johansson, Gal Gadot, and Taylor Swift superimposed onto the bodies of adult film actresses, marking an early and controversial use of deepfake technology.<fnref n="2" />

In 2018, a viral trend emerged on the internet involving the manipulation of videos featuring Nicholas Cage's face inserted into scenes from various Hollywood films, achieved through the use of deepfake technology. Despite the initial appearance of genuine performances, none of the showcased scenes originally involved Cage. The rise of deepfakes, powered by artificial intelligence, allowed users to seamlessly replace original actors' faces in videos. Nicholas Cage's prominent role in these manipulated videos, given his history in the film "Face/Off," where characters swap faces, added a notable dimension to the phenomenon.<fnref n="3" />

In another example, a deepfake video featuring Barack Obama surfaced online, depicting him referring to the then US President Donald Trump as a 'complete dipshit.' Another deepfake video emerged, showcasing Mark Zuckerberg falsely asserting 'complete control over people's data.'<fnref n="4" /> And, finally, in October 2023, actor Tom Hanks warned fans not to fall for deepfake advert using his face and added 'I have nothing to do'<fnref n="5" />.

All these examples and also pornographic videos which are mostly used with deepfakes show how deepfake could be creative and disruptive. Because of the technology behind it, deepfakes remains unsolved and lack of specific regulations makes it harder to solve the problem. This article explains deepfakes in a comprehensive review, examines the current legal implications, and casts about for a solution in legal and technical ways in the EU.

<footnote n="1">¹ Project Assistant, Department of Law, Tallinn University of Technology, Ehitajate tee 5, 19086 Tallinn, Estonia, Email: azengi@taltech.ee</footnote>

<footnote n="2">²Catherine Kerner & Mathias Risse, "Beyond Porn and Discreditation: Epistemic Promises and Perils of Deepfake Technology in Digital Lifeworlds," in Moral Philosophy and Politics, VIII, No.2, 2020, p. 84</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³Erik Gerstner, "Face/off: 'deepfake' face swaps and privacy laws," in Defense Counsel Journal, LXXXVII, No. 1, 2020, p. 1</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴Madhura Thombre, "Deconstructing Deepfake: Tracking Legal Implications and Challenges," in International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, IV, 2021, p. 2269</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵Seehttps://news.sky.com/story/tom-hanks-warns-fans-not-to-fall-for-deepfake-advert-using-his-face-12974902 Accessed 13.03.2024</footnote>
# 1. WHAT IS DEEPFAKE?

Before deepfake, it is useful to define what synthetic media which consists deepfake as a subbranch in its family. Content categorized as synthetic media is wholly or partially crafted or altered through the application of AI or other technological methods. Deepfakes are the most advanced and realistic form of synthetic media. <fnref n="6" />

Deepfakes, a fusion of "deep learning" and "fake," are highly realistic videos digitally manipulated to portray individuals engaging in actions or utterances that never occurred in reality. This manipulation relies on neural networks, utilizing extensive data samples to emulate a person's facial expressions, gestures, voice, and tonal nuances. The process entails training a deep learning algorithm by inputting footage of two individuals, enabling it to interchange their faces seamlessly. In essence, deepfakes employ facial mapping technology and AI to substitute the face of one person in a video with that of another individual.<fnref n="7" />

The technology behind deepfake, rooted in deep learning, operates by analyzing extensive datasets of real recordings or images to learn and replicate the facial and vocal characteristics of a person. This adaptable model is then digitally imposed over another person's face seamlessly, resembling a mask. Early versions of deepfakes invoked an uncanny valley effect, generating somewhat human-like but clearly artificial outputs. However, the advent of generative adversarial networks (GANs) has significantly enhanced the sophistication and believability of deepfake outputs. GANs employ two neural networks, a generator and a discriminator, in an adversarial relationship, with the generator creating fake images and the discriminator learning to distinguish between authentic and computer-generated images. Through a continuous feedback loop, both networks improve, resulting in the generator producing highly realistic images that increasingly challenge detection by the discriminator. This reciprocal refinement process allows deepfake generators to create convincing content that closely resembles genuine images and recordings.<fnref n="8" />

# 2. BENEFITS OF DEEPFAKE

Even though there are negative examples and concerns about it, deepfake technology has numerous benefits. As like all technologies can be used for the advancement of science and society. For instance, the online gaming industry is exploring the use of deepfake technology, specifically 'artificial intelligence-generated voice skins,' to elevate the gaming experience for players. Through the incorporation of face cloning and voice cloning, the entertainment and advertising sectors can harness the full potential of this technology.<fnref n="9" />

Also, deepfake technology extends its utility to automatic and authentic voice dubbing for movies in various languages, enhancing accessibility for diverse audiences in enjoying films and educational content. Illustrated by a 2019 Malaria awareness campaign featuring David Beckham, deepfake applications successfully transcended language barriers through visual and voice-altering technology, presenting the celebrity as multilingual. Furthermore, in video conference calls, deepfake technology proves valuable by translating speech, synchronously adjusting facial expressions and mouth movements, thereby breaking down language barriers and fostering

<footnote n="6">⁶Bart van der Sloot & Yvette Wagensveld, "Deepfakes: Regulatory challenges for the synthetic society," in Computer Law & Security Review, XLVI, 2022, p. 4</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Mika Westerlund, "The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review", in Technology Innovation Management Review, IX, No.11, 2019, p. 40</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Lindsey Joost, "The place for illusions: deepfake technology and the challenges of regulating unreality", in University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy, XXXIII, No.2, 2023, p. 314</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Madhura Thombre, "Deconstructing Deepfake: Tracking Legal Implications and Challenges," in International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, IV, 2021, p. 2269</footnote>
improved communication where participants appear to be speaking the same language, enhancing eye-contact and overall engagement.<fnref n="10" />

Deepfake can serve as a tool for individuals coping with the loss of loved ones by digitally resurrecting a deceased friend, providing an opportunity for grieving loved ones to say their goodbyes. Moreover, deepfakes can digitally recreate limbs for amputees, assist transgender individuals in visualizing themselves as their preferred gender, and facilitate interactions for individuals with Alzheimer's by presenting familiar faces. Scientists are exploring the technology's potential in medical fields, including the detection of abnormalities in X-rays and the creation of virtual chemical molecules for accelerated materials science and medical discoveries. Lastly, in the business realm, deepfakes have caught the attention of brands, enabling transformative applications in e-commerce and advertising.<fnref n="11" />

### 3. THREATS OF DEEPFAKE

The prevalence of deepfake content is prominently skewed towards pornography, with a 2019 study revealing that 96% of the 14,678 deepfake videos on the internet were of a sexual nature. While initially featuring celebrities, the disturbing trend extends to ordinary individuals, turning deepfake pornography into a new form of non-consensual exploitation comparable to revenge pornography. Unlike traditional revenge porn, deepfake pornography allows perpetrators to create explicit videos using publicly available images, making virtually anyone susceptible to being victimized. Actress Scarlett Johansson highlighted the distressing reality, emphasizing the lack of control over one's image being manipulated and inserted into explicit scenarios, with potential severe consequences for victims.<fnref n="12" />

Another pervasive use of deepfake technology has the potential to sow widespread confusion and undermine the value of truth in today's world. The mere suspicion of deepfake manipulation can trigger chaos, leading to a significant erosion of trust in genuine content.

Moreover, even if the subjects immediately denounce the falseness of the content, the public may still be misled. The act of retracting the fake video often proves insufficient in countering the spread of misinformation. People's inclination to act on false information before retractions, as well as their tendency to reject evidence if it contradicts their preexisting beliefs, contributes to the persistence of misinformation.<fnref n="13" />

As deepfake content becomes increasingly prevalent, there is a heightened risk of discrediting authentic material as fake, contributing to what is termed 'the liar's dividend.' This phenomenon entails a pervasive suspicion surrounding all forms of media, creating a substantial trust deficit between public institutions and the general populace.<fnref n="14" />

Another potential threat of deepfake that offers criminals new avenues for deceiving individuals and organizations. Instances of fraud involve a CEO being duped into transferring $243,000 to a fraudster who used deepfake technology to replicate the boss's voice. Celebrities and public figures face misappropriation of their images for unauthorized advertising, such as Elon Musk impersonators promoting Bitcoin scams on Twitter and synthetic media images of BBC presenter

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Mika Westerlund, "The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review", in Technology Innovation Management Review, IX, No.11, 2019, p. 41</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Lindsey Joost, "The place for illusions: deepfake technology and the challenges of regulating unreality", in University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy, XXXIII, No.2, 2023, p. 317</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Nina I.Brown, "Deepfakes and the weaponization of disinformation", in Virginia Journal of Law & Technology, XXIII, No.1, 2020, p. 10</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Madhura Thombre, "Deconstructing Deepfake: Tracking Legal Implications and Challenges," in International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, IV, 2021, p. 2273</footnote>
Carol Kirkwood being used to endorse diet pills without her knowledge. Martin Lewis, founder of MoneySavingExpert, took legal action against Facebook for allowing thousands of fake advertisements using his name and photo to circulate on the platform, citing defamation. These deceptive practices, leveraging the trust in well-known personalities, are poised to escalate with the advancement of deepfake and synthetic media technologies.<fnref n="15" />

Lastly, deepfake technology has extended into courtrooms. A notable instance occurred in the UK, where deep fake audio was introduced as evidence in a custody battle, depicting a father as threatening. The critical concern arises in ensuring the authenticity of video, images, or audio evidence presented in legal proceedings, especially given the increasing sophistication of deep fake technology.<fnref n="16" />

## 4. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEEPFAKE

Despite the use of a technology that creates contents that closely resemble genuine images and has a big potential to create chaos and crime, current legal frameworks are still not good enough for solving the problem in the EU.

Various countries, such as India, Scotland, and the USA, have enacted laws related to information technology and data protection, criminalizing the sharing of intimate or private images online without consent. Despite these legal measures, the global proliferation of deepfake technology poses a widespread challenge that transcends borders. Dealing with the transnational nature of these crimes presents a significant hurdle, necessitating a coordinated international approach. Existing legal avenues, such as copyright protection, privacy infringement regulations in cyberspace, or defamation actions, offer only limited effectiveness and may not fully achieve their intended purposes. Once a malicious deepfake video is uploaded to the internet, eradicating all copies from the digital space becomes an exceedingly difficult task.<fnref n="17" />

In the current legal framework, in the US both federal and state laws, encompassing civil and criminal domains, are insufficient to prevent or remedy the harms caused by deepfakes, with the First Amendment complicating regulatory efforts. However, there is a need to be dealt with under existing U.S. law such as defamation, copyright infringement, pornography, and harassment. <fnref n="18" />

On the other hand, in the EU the GDPR(General Data Protection Right) that brings consent obligation for using personal data of data subjects, the European Convention on Human Rights that allows public figures to demand their privacy right to protect their name and reputation while the expectation of more tolerative, and Digital Services Act (DSA) that rules providers are obligated to take action only when there are indications that the content is unlawful, placing a significant burden on citizens or trusted flaggers.<fnref n="19" />

<footnote n="15">15 Frederick Mostert & Sheyna Cruz, “Image rights in the digital universe”, in Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, XVII, No.7, 2022, p. 7</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 Francesca Palmiotto, “Detecting Deep Fake Evidence with Artificial Intelligence: A Critical Look from a Criminal Law Perspective”, 2023, p.1</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17 Madhura Thombre, "Deconstructing Deepfake: Tracking Legal Implications and Challenges," in International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, IV, 2021, p. 2271</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 Lindsey Joost, “The place for illusions: deepfake technology and the challenges of regulating unreality”, in University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy, XXXIII, No.2, 2023, p. 320</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 Bart van der Sloot & Yvette Wagensveld, "Deepfakes: Regulatory challenges for the synthetic society," in Computer Law & Security Review, XLVI, 2022, p. 9</footnote>
Lastly, The AI Act<fnref n="20" /> which was proposed by the European Commission, the first regulation on AI in April 2021 defined the deepfake as a ‘’limited risk” AI system. Article 52 of the AI Act regulates when an AI system creates deep fake content or manipulates text for public information, the deployers must disclose that it's artificially generated, unless authorized by law for criminal investigations. The disclosure should be clear and provided during the first interaction. These rules do not override existing laws, and an AI Office will encourage codes of practice for detecting and labelling artificially generated content, subject to approval by the Commission.

It is uncertain if this regulation will be a concrete solution for the deepfake threat. The effectiveness of disclosure requirements for deepfakes relies on robust enforcement mechanisms and underscores the challenge of balancing transparency with potential restrictions on artistic expression. Also, despite being currently classified as "limited risk" under the AI Act, the harmful impacts of deepfakes warrant reconsideration, advocating for their classification as high-risk AI systems.

**4.1. Privacy and Data Protection Law**

If deepfake technology generates video content portraying an individual in private situations they would never willingly share publicly, and if this synthetic content is virtually indistinguishable from authentic material, the affected individual may argue that the impact on them is akin to a genuine invasion of privacy. Currently, deepfake technology is exploited to create non-consensual pornographic content featuring celebrities, violating their likenesses without consent. This raises concerns as obtaining and distributing such explicit footage previously required filming the individual without their consent, constitutes a clear invasion of privacy. The use of deepfake technology intensifies the ethical and legal challenges associated with privacy breaches and unauthorized exploitation of individuals.<fnref n="21" />

However, there are five borderline areas that pose challenges to existing regulations. Firstly, deepfakes can facilitate live anonymous conversations, complicating issues of identity. Secondly, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) does not apply to deceased individuals, allowing for the creation of deepfakes involving historical figures without falling under data protection laws. Thirdly, deepfakes about organizations and states are exempt from GDPR regulations. Fourthly, when deepfakes merge images or voices of multiple persons, it remains unclear whether the final result qualifies as personal data. Lastly, the creation of entirely fictitious persons through deepfake technology raises concerns about the scope of personal data and the household exemption. Also, the household exemption also presents challenges, as certain deepfake applications, such as revenge scenarios, fall outside the scope of GDPR coverage, highlighting potential gaps in legislative frameworks.<fnref n="22" />

**4.2. Intellectual Rights**

In April 2020, the YouTube creator Vocal Synthesis faced the first copyright claim for deepfaked audio content. The contested videos involved AI-generated voice impersonations of Jay-Z rapping Shakespeare and Billy Joel's songs. Jay-Z's legal team issued a DMCA takedown notice, arguing the unauthorized use of AI to mimic his voice. Initially removed by YouTube, the claim

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules On Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) And Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, Brussels, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52021PC0206</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Francesco Stellin Sturino, “Deepfake Technology and Individual Rights”, in Social Theory and Practice, XLIX, No.1, 2023, p. 164</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Bart van der Sloot & Yvette Wagensveld, "Deepfakes: Regulatory challenges for the synthetic society," in Computer Law & Security Review, XLVI, 2022, p. 9</footnote>
proved unsuccessful, and the videos were reinstated due to insufficient grounds. The incident highlighted the limited applicability of copyright law in addressing deepfake issues, as a person's general appearance or sound is typically not copyrightable, and fair use doctrines may provide a First Amendment which guarantees freedoms concerning religion, expression, assembly, and the right to petition defense for transformative content like deepfakes. The text underscores that copyright protection primarily applies to the creator of source material, making it challenging for deepfake subjects to claim infringement unless they own the content used in the deepfake creation.<fnref n="23" />

On the other hand, addressing the unwanted use of an individual's image through deepfake technology can be approached through legislative and legal measures. Some U.S. states, such as California, Texas, and Virginia, have enacted specific deepfake legislation, criminalizing actions like non-consensual pornography and deceptive political videos. Additionally, existing image rights laws may be updated to encompass deepfake instances; for example, New York amended its Civil Rights Law to include wholly computer-generated digital likenesses under post-mortem publicity rights. Deepfake litigation will necessitate applying established case law principles, with precedent evolving to adapt to new technologies. Notably, in a case involving video game depictions of college athletes, the 'transformative use' defense was not applicable when the portrayal aimed for realistic likeness. Claimants against deepfake misuse may draw analogies from the treatment of video games as expressive works subject to image rights, demonstrating the evolving nature of image rights law to confront challenges posed by emerging technologies.<fnref n="24" />

### 4.3. Tort Law

Defamation law is relevant to the threat posed by deepfakes, as the technology allows anyone's image to be manipulated, potentially causing significant harm to reputations. However, establishing defamation liability requires proving the publication of false and defamatory content. As the quality of deepfakes advances, verification of falseness may become challenging and require sophisticated technology. Deepfakes explicitly labeled as such, or presented as parody, may be protected from defamation claims, as disclaimers negate the assertion of factual accuracy. Drawing on the precedent set by the Supreme Court case Hustler v. Falwell, where a satirical ad with a disclaimer was deemed immune from defamation liability, deepfake creators can argue that their content is a form of parody and not to be taken as factual statements.<fnref n="25" />

## 5. SOLUTIONS FOR DEEPFAKE

### 5.1. Legal Solutions

The evolving landscape of technology demands a re-evaluation and expansion of legal definitions pertaining to rights, infringements, crimes, and punishments. As it stands, the current legal framework falls short in addressing issues related to emerging technologies like deepfakes, primarily due to the inadequacy of existing definitions and scopes for copyright infringements.<fnref n="26" />

<footnote n="23">²³ Lindsey Joost, ‘’ The place for illusions: deepfake technology and the challenges of regulating unreality’’, in University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy, XXXIII, No.2, 2023, p. 323-324</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Frederick Mostert & Sheyna Cruz, ‘’Image rights in the digital universe’’, in Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, XVII, No.7, 2022, p. 8</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Lindsey Joost, ‘’ The place for illusions: deepfake technology and the challenges of regulating unreality’’, in University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy, XXXIII, No.2, 2023, p. 322</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Chochia, Archil; Sicat, Eden Grace Niñalga (2023). Ethics and Modern Technologies: Example of Navigating Children’s Rights in an AI-Powered Learning Environment. In: Ramiro Troitiño, D.; Kerikmäe, T.; Hamulák, O. (Ed.). Digital Development of the European Union. (129–141). Springer, Cham. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-27312-4_9; Chochia, A.; Nässi, T. (2021). Ethics and Emerging Technologies – Facial Recognition. IDP Revista de Internet Derecho y Política, 34, 1–12. DOI: 10.7238/idp.v0i34.387466; Joamets, K.; Chochia, A. (2021). Access to Artificial Intelligence for Persons with</footnote>
There is a pressing need for a comprehensive understanding of AI, guided by the expertise of scientists, to inform a regulatory overhaul that aligns with the intricacies of artificial intelligence.<fnref n="27" />

Moreover, it is essential to establish AI-specific regulations that parallel the pace of advancements in technology, similar to regulatory frameworks in other domains affected by emerging technologies. These regulations should extend across jurisdictions, recognizing the global nature of the internet and the rapid dissemination of content. Striking a balance between the potential threats and benefits of AI is crucial, necessitating a careful consideration of the ethical and legal implications. This involves a delicate calibration of the rights of individuals and the continued development of technology, ensuring that legal safeguards are in place to mitigate risks while fostering innovation responsibly. In essence, the law must adapt to the challenges posed by AI, taking into account its unique characteristics and impact on society.

It might be considered that these solutions are long-term strategic mindsets for the framework of a new legal system in the world of AI. Therefore, here are some short-term legal solutions to find out a legal way to protect rights of people against the threats of deepfakes:

First solution might be a legal arrangement similar to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) which empowers the proprietor of intellectual property to petition hosting platforms for its removal. By complying with such requests, hosting platforms are relieved of liability.<fnref n="28" />

Additionally, exploring "marketplace solutions" as alternative strategies for controlling the creation and distribution of Deepfakes without solely relying on individual rights as a basis for regulation might be a short-term solution.<fnref n="29" />

On the other hand, an offer for a regulation that would prohibit the online dissemination of deepfake content, comparing it to the unauthorized online release of intimate videos. It suggests that the inability to permanently remove such content from the internet causes significant mental, emotional, and physical harm, justifying the need for prohibition without requiring an intent to harm. The proposed regulation would classify sending personal deepfakes as online publication, encompassing both real private videos and computer-generated deepfakes.<fnref n="30" />

Lastly, a legal regulation similar to Virginia state law which includes deepfakes in the category of "falsely created" images and videos, making their distribution a misdemeanor might be a solution to solve pornographic contents that are made by deepfake technology.<fnref n="31" />

## 5.2. Technical Solutions

Even if the legal regulations are good enough, the law is not a convenient way to stop the viraling of the contents that are made by deepfake fastly and effectively. For this reason, while the current legal system is improving, it needs to find technical solutions to cease spreading the contents.

The forefront of deepfake technology research emphasizes the use of AI detectors, with the past two years witnessing a concentrated effort to develop automated tools for detection. Various

<footnote>Disabilities: Legal and Ethical Questions Concerning the Application of Trustworthy AI. Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum, 9 (1), 51–66. DOI: 10.11590/abhps.2021.1.04.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Mazur, V.; Chochia, A. (2022). Definition and Regulation as an Effective Measure to Fight Fake News in the European Union. European Studies: The Review of European Law, Economics and Politics, 9 (1), 15–40. DOI: 10.2478/eustu-2022-0001.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Erik Gerstner, "Face/off: 'deepfake' face swaps and privacy laws," in Defense Counsel Journal, LXXXVII, No. 1, 2020, p. 9</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Francesco Stellin Sturino, "Deepfake Technology and Individual Rights", in Social Theory and Practice, XLIX, No.1, 2023, p. 161-162</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Douglas Harris, "Deepfakes: False Pornography Is Here and the Law Cannot Protect You", in Duke Law & Technology Review, XVII, 2018-2019, p. 17, 124</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Mika Westerlund, "The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review", in Technology Innovation Management Review, IX, No.11, 2019, p. 44</footnote>
techniques, such as analyzing eye blinking, face warping artifacts, heart rate estimation, and facial regions, have been proposed to ensure reliable results. However, a recent survey indicates that detection methods are still in an early stage, lacking generalization capability. Current challenges arise from the opacity of many deep fake detectors, which rely on machine or deep learning techniques, leading to algorithmic opacity. This opacity raises concerns about the introduction of potentially unreliable methods, known as "junk science," into criminal trials. Suggestions for addressing these concerns center on transparency and interpretability.<fnref n="32" />

Another solution that is offered is banning the use of these videos on their platforms by websites. Some websites, including Pornhub and Reddit, have taken measures such as removing deepfake content, with the former relying on user reports and the latter deleting the subreddit where deepfakes originated; additionally, platforms like Discord, Gy feat, and Twitter have specified a prohibition on face-swap porn without universally banning deepfake videos<fnref n="33" />.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, deepfake technology, an intricate form of synthetic media crafted through artificial intelligence (AI), introduces a spectrum of both advantages and challenges. On the positive spectrum, deepfakes demonstrate potential applications in diverse fields such as gaming, entertainment, language accessibility, medicine, and business, underscoring their capacity to contribute positively to societal advancements. However, the substantial threats associated with deepfakes, such as non-consensual exploitation, the erosion of truth, and the creation of new avenues for deception and fraud, cannot be overlooked.

The legal ramifications of deepfake technology, especially concerning privacy, intellectual property rights, and tort law, are intricate and present formidable challenges within existing legal frameworks. While certain jurisdictions have enacted specific legislation targeting deepfakes, the legal landscape remains in a state of evolution, necessitating comprehensive regulations to effectively address the multifaceted issues arising from this transformative technology. A critical emphasis is placed on the urgent need for clearly defined terms, rights, and corresponding penalties, alongside the establishment of AI-specific regulations tailored to the unique characteristics of deepfake technology.

In response to the challenges posed by deepfakes, various technical solutions, including AI detectors, are emerging to counteract the proliferation of deceptive content. However, challenges persist, notably in terms of algorithmic opacity and the potential introduction of unreliable methods into legal proceedings. As the deepfake landscape continues its evolution, a balanced approach that integrates legal, technical, and ethical considerations becomes imperative. This approach is essential for mitigating risks associated with deepfake technology while harnessing its positive potential responsibly and ethically.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. BROWN, Nina I., "Deepfakes and the weaponization of disinformation", in *Virginia Journal of Law & Technology*, XXIII, No.1, 2020, p. 1-59

2. CALDERA, Elizabeth, "Reject the evidence of your eyes and ears: deepfakes and the law of virtual replicants", in *Seton Hall Law Review*, L, No.1, p.177-206.

3. CHOCHIA, A.; NÄSSI, T. (2021). Ethics and Emerging Technologies – Facial Recognition. IDP Revista de Internet Derecho y Política, 34, 1-12. DOI: 10.7238/idp.v0i34.387466.

<footnote n="32">³² Francesca Palmiotto, "Detecting Deep Fake Evidence with Artificial Intelligence: A Critical Look from a Criminal Law Perspective", 2023, p.8</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ Elizabeth Caldera, "Reject the evidence of your eyes and ears: deepfakes and the law of virtual replicants", in *Seton Hall Law Review*, L, No.1, p.189</footnote>
4. CHOCHIA, ARCHIL; SICAT, EDEN GRACE NIÑALGA (2023). Ethics and Modern Technologies: Example of Navigating Children's Rights in an AI-Powered Learning Environment. In: Ramiro Troitiño, D.; Kerikmäe, T.; Hamulák, O. (Ed.). Digital Development of the European Union. (129–141). Springer, Cham. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-27312-4_9.

5. European Commission. (2021, April 21). *Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules On Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) And Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts.* EUR-Lex. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52021PC0206

6. GERSTNER, Erik, "Face/off: 'deepfake' face swaps and privacy laws," in *Defense Counsel Journal*, LXXXVII, No. 1, 2020, p.1-14

7. HARRIS, Douglas, "Deepfakes: False Pornography Is Here and the Law Cannot Protect You", in *Duke Law & Technology Review*, XVII, 2018-2019, p. 99-128.

8. JOAMETS, K.; CHOCHIA, A. (2021). Access to Artificial Intelligence for Persons with Disabilities: Legal and Ethical Questions Concerning the Application of Trustworthy AI. Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum, 9 (1), 51–66. DOI: 10.11590/abhps.2021.1.04.

9. JOOST, Lindsey, "The place for illusions: deepfake technology and the challenges of regulating unreality", in *University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy*, XXXIII, No.2, 2023, p.309-332

10. KERNER, Catherine & RISSE, Mathias, "Beyond Porn and Discreditation: Epistemic Promises and Perils of Deepfake Technology in Digital Lifeworlds," in *Moral Philosophy and Politics*, VIII, No.2, 2020, p. 81-108

11. MAZUR, V.; CHOCHIA, A. (2022). Definition and Regulation as an Effective Measure to Fight Fake News in the European Union. *European Studies: The Review of European Law, Economics and Politics*, 9 (1), 15–40. DOI: 10.2478/eustu-2022-0001.

12. MOSTER, Frederick & CRUZ, Sheyna, "Image rights in the digital universe", in *Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice*, XVII, No.7, 2022, p.551-558

13. PALMIOTTO, Francesca, "Detecting Deep Fake Evidence with Artificial Intelligence: A Critical Look from a Criminal Law Perspective", 2023, p.1-12

14. See https://news.sky.com/story/tom-hanks-warns-fans-not-to-fall-for-deepfake-advert-using-his-face-12974902, Accessed 13.03.2024

15. SLOOT, Bart van der & WAGENSVELD, Yvette, "Deepfakes: Regulatory challenges for the synthetic society," in *Computer Law & Security Review*, XLVI, 2022, p. 1-15

16. STURINO, Francesco Stellin, "Deepfake Technology and Individual Rights", in *Social Theory and Practice*, XLIX, No.1, 2023, p. 161-187

17. THOMBRE, Madhura, "Deconstructing Deepfake: Tracking Legal Implications and Challenges," in *International Journal of Law Management & Humanities*, IV, 2021, p. 2267-2274.

18. WESTERLUND, Mika, "The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review", in *Technology Innovation Management Review*, IX, No.11, 2019, p. 39-52
**SECTION 3**
**Building-up resilience: policies and**
**human dimensions**
# Preventive program for developing psychological resilience in people living in countries neighboring international military conflicts

ANGELIKA KLESZCZEWSKA-ALBIŃSKA, PHD<fnref n="1" />

*Abstract:* Presented paper includes description of psychological risks and protective factors connected to the threat resulting from military conflict, and description of a preventive program aimed at increasing resilience of people living in close proximity to military conflict. Such programs are crucial but currently they are not available to the public.

**Key words:** resilience, prevention, well-being, countries neighboring military conflict

## INTRODUCTION

The military conflicts have an enormous impact on physical and mental health, and general well-being of civilians who are under its direct or indirect influence. Due to lack of psychological safety and general instability an increase in levels of stress, anxiety and depression symptoms or some form of so-called survivor's guilt is observed in groups of direct survivors of the conflict and in citizens of other regions in close geographical proximity to the conflict. Usually in the literature negative social, and economic consequences of wars are mentioned together with data on increased mortality rates and significant decrease in quality of life. At the same time, there are many psychological consequences of military conflicts. There are correlations between traumatic experiences and psychological problems reported by individuals. The mental well-being of persons living in close proximity to military conflicts is lower in individuals suffering other difficulties, such as family or interpersonal problems, or not having any social support. It was also discovered that females in comparison to males experience more intensive psychological consequences of military conflicts<fnref n="2" />.

Most of the data published in the literature concerns the functioning of survivors of military conflicts, but there are study results proving the decrease in mental health of people living in neighboring countries after the escalation of military conflict in Ukraine<fnref n="3" />. Among the mental problems observed in residents of neighboring countries there were symptoms of depression, anxiety and PTSD. It is underlined in the literature that military conflicts heavily influence psychological well-being and may lead to serious, long-lasting consequences in mental health of people involved in the conflict as well as in people living in countries neighboring the conflict<fnref n="4" />. The quality of life observed in countries directly neighboring an area affected by armed conflict may decline as a result of the increased level of uncertainty and fear for one's own future and security. The standard of living may decline due to the economic, social and natural consequences of the conflict. Additionally,

<footnote n="1">¹ Education and Psychology Department, Faculty of Psychology, Management Academy of Applied Sciences, Warsaw, Poland, a.kleszczewska.wsm@gmail.com</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² R. Srinivasa Murthy, Rashmi Lakshminarayana, *Mental health consequences of war: a brief review of research findings*, in "World Psychiatry", 5(1), 25-30, February, 2006, pp. 25-28.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Angelika Kleszczewska-Albińska, Krystian Ptak, Małgorzata Wiśniewska, Agata Wziątek, *Funkcjonowanie psychologiczne wybranych studentów psychologii i bezpieczeństwa narodowego w obliczu konfliktu zbrojnego na Ukrainie*, in „Studia Społeczne”, 39(4), 7-23, 2022, pp. 7-22.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Mateusz Babicki, Krzysztof Kowalski, Agnieszka Mastalerz-Migas, *The outbreak of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war: mental health of poles and their attitude to refugees*, in "Frontiers in Public Health", 11, 1-9, June, 2023, pp. 1-7.</footnote>
environmental pollution, increased exposure to radioactive substances, heavy metals or infectious diseases can lead to increased anxiety levels.

Among other important factors leading to decrease of the mental well-being of residents of countries neighboring the areas of armed conflicts there is the feeling of helplessness. Such a feeling results from inability to modify the observed situation. It can lead to the development of depressive symptoms, especially in the long-term period. The migration of civilians from the war zone is also heavily influencing the well-being of citizens of countries neighboring the area of armed conflict. It results in an increase of stress, and can cause secondary trauma, and compassion fatigue due to the exhausting process of helping the migrants. As it was proved in previous studies, engagement in helping, providing support and compassion to people who have recently experienced traumatic events increases the risk of secondary trauma in helpers. The highest risk of secondary trauma is observed in persons with previous traumatic experiences, and people suffering from mental disorders<fnref n="5" />.

In the literature there are mentioned protective factors important in maintaining high levels of mental well-being. They include a small number of mental problems, especially lack of previous traumas experienced before the exposure to the military conflict, social support and resilience. Also helpful in sustaining good mental conditions are psychological support, engagement in religious practices, and adaptive coping strategies<fnref n="6" />. It is therefore crucial to plan and organize supportive programs aimed at increasing the levels of resilience presented by citizens of countries neighboring to the areas of armed conflicts. Such programs are crucial since mental health problems contribute to socio-economic problems of societies and result in decrease of general well-being and happiness of entire populations, but currently they are not available to the public.

## RESILIENCE ITS DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE

Resilience is defined as a process responsible for successful adaptation to difficult and challenging life experiences. It is connected to high emotional and behavioral flexibility and openness to new reactions in response to external and internal demands. Among factors responsible for high levels of resilience there are individual beliefs about oneself, others and the world, individual coping strategies, availability and quality of social resources<fnref n="7" />. According to the studies published up to date it was proved that resilience can be developed and strengthened<fnref n="8" />.

Resilience is achieved by overcoming everyday adversities, challenges and traumatic events that lead to significant stress. It is perceived as a process of recovery from difficult experiences and opportunity for personal growth. Resilience is connected with an ability to differentiate between controllable and uncontrollable situations that develops based on considerable emotional distress that an individual overcomes. It involves certain behaviors, thoughts and actions that people can learn through their lifetime.

<footnote n="5">⁵ Ali Jawaid, Magdalena Gomolka, Anastasiia Timmer, Neuroscience of trauma and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in "Nature Human Behaviour", 748-749 June, 2022, 6, pp. 748.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Emilia Zamora-Moncayo, Rochelle A. Burgess, Laura Fonseca, Mónica González-Gort, Ritsuko Kakuma, Gender, mental health and resilience in armed conflict: listening to life stories of internally displaced women in Colombia, in "BMJ Global Health", 1-13, October, 2021, 6(10), pp. 1-11.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Anat Shoshani, Michelle Slone, The resilience function of character strengths in the face of war and protracted conflict, in "Frontiers in Psychology", 1-10, January, 2016, 6, pp 1-9.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Erio Ziglio, "Strengthening resilience: a priority shared by Health 2020 and the Sustainable Development Goals", World Health Organization, Italy, 2017, pp. 4-7, 19.</footnote>
Since resilience depends mostly on social interactions and resources<fnref n="9" /> preventive programs for developing resilience should include modules aimed at increasing individuals’ knowledge about the importance of social relationships, and connections. It is important to increase individuals’ levels of empathy and skills important for active listening. Social connections are important, because they improve the quality of social support. Helpful in the process of strengthening an individual’s resilience is engagement in helping others. Therefore it is important to teach people useful tools they can apply while helping others. At the same time it is crucial to give them some tips on how to prevent their own well-being while helping others.

Strengthening resilience also requires validation of all the feelings an individual experiences. It is therefore required to offer people psychoeducation on the role and meaning of emotions and to teach them adaptive ways of coping with emotions. Data on basic self-care methods is also needed while developing resilience of an individual. It is therefore important to help people to discover their strengths and pleasurable leisure activities. Another factor helping maintain high levels of resilience is connected with an individual’s meaning of life, and having measurable short-term and long-term goals. During preventive programs aimed at developing resilience people are taught to set reasonable, measurable and achievable goals.

In order to become resilient or to sustain high levels of resilience an individual has to trust themselves in solving problems and making appropriate decisions. It is often connected with the need to see specific problems in a broad context. Additionally, resilient behaviors require some levels of positivity and optimism for the future. Therefore whenever an individual is facing adversities in their life they should have an opportunity to discuss the situation they experience. Also they need to identify their own strengths and opportunities in those challenging experiences. Since difficulties usually lead to changes in life it is important to help people to prepare for those changes. It can be helpful to underline the inevitability of change, and to find a way to use it as an asset in life.

Development and maintenance of resilience in some cases requires involvement of professionals who serve as models. They also provide necessary information, scientific data and offer specific tools helpful in the process of discovering individuals’ strengths and weaknesses, and providing adaptive coping methods useful in difficult situations. It is therefore crucial to offer people an opportunity to participate in preventive programs and supportive groups in which they will be able to discover their ways for developing resilient attitudes.

Maintenance of high levels of resilience requires high levels of awareness of individual strengths. It is connected with individuals’ beliefs about their competencies and confidence. Keeping high levels of resilience is possible for persons who stay connected with others and for those who develop and sustain healthy interpersonal relationships. It is also connected with an ability to ask for help when it is needed, and use of adaptive, and situationally adequate coping strategies and stress management techniques. It also requires constant attentiveness, awareness of difficulties and willingness to learn new methods of problem solving. Therefore, a high level of resilience is usually connected to high openness to experience, proneness to accept uncontrollable events and modify situations controlled by an individual. It also requires high levels of optimism, and a task-oriented approach in which an individual believes they are able to achieve their goals, and they take the responsibility for their actions. Resilience also correlates with highly developed abilities for planning<fnref n="10" />. All of the above mentioned factors should be strengthened in persons developing and maintaining their resilience.

<footnote n="9">⁹ Linda M. Hartling, *Strengthening resilience in a risky world: it’s all about relationships*, in “Jean Baker Miller Training Institute at the Wellesley Centers for Women”, 1-12, 2003, Paper No. 101, pp. 1-9.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Elisabeth S. Blanke, Florian Schmiedek, Stefan Siebert, David Richter, Annette Brose, *Perspectives on resilience: Trait resilience, correlates of resilience in daily life, and longer-term change in affective distress*, in “Stress Health”, 39(1), 59-73, February 2023, pp. 59-70.</footnote>
PREVENTIVE PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPING RESILIENCE IN PEOPLE LIVING IN
COUNTRIES NEIGHBORING MILITARY CONFLICTS

People living in close proximity to the military conflict suffer many psychological problems that in the long-term can lead to the general decrease in the mental well-being and quality of their lives. They can experience heightened levels of anxiety and depression symptoms. Young people and women are especially vulnerable to the development of mental problems as a result of military conflicts. Additionally, people who help and volunteer asylum seekers and refugees are at higher risk of depressive and anxiety symptoms. People helping others coming directly from the war zone are also more prone to the development of secondary traumatic stress. It is therefore important to offer those people help and support they need. As it was stated before, one of the most important factors corresponding to the mental well-being of an individual is resilience. It is then justified to develop preventive programs aimed at development and strengthening resilience of the citizens of countries neighboring military conflicts.

Preventive program devoted to the resilience of citizens of countries in close proximity to military conflicts should start with a thorough diagnosis of individuals' needs and problems. At first the conceptualization of individuals' life lines with special attention to current factors contributing to increased stress and mental health concerns should be prepared. Such diagnosis should be addressed especially to people volunteering and offering help since they are at greater risk of developing compassion fatigue<fnref n="11" />. Whenever persons helping others experience feelings of helplessness, become less empathic and sensitive, feel overwhelmed, exhausted, detached, numb or emotionally disconnected they should be offered psychoeducation on compassion fatigue and given useful tips concerning adaptive coping strategies. After the psychoeducation phase people should be offered a chance to participate in a support group. Additionally, they can be offered individual or group professional help. It is important to underline that all the above mentioned interventions cannot be obligatory. They will be more effective in situations in which people get the chance to decide for themselves whether they are interested in participating in such activities.

After people decide to join support groups, ask for individual or group help aimed at developing their resilience they should be offered a chance to better understand their strengths and weaknesses and to learn about the impact their past experiences have on their present functioning. During the activities in support groups individuals will get the chance to observe and listen to others and – based on their experiences – learn more about their own history. In therapeutic groups individuals will be offered not only the knowledge about other people’s experiences but also psychological knowledge concerning specific mechanisms described during the group meetings. Finally, during individual sessions persons will be able to discover their own beliefs based on their previous experiences and to understand an impact their past had on their present well-being. Support groups are therefore the least personalized support methods while the most individually oriented are individual sessions with a professional. At the same time it has to be underlined that the best way to increase or maintain resilience in persons living close to military conflicts would be to combine engagement in support groups and individual sessions with a professional.

The next step of developing resilience should be devoted to the recognition and application of individually fitted adaptive ways of coping. Based on previously discovered individual histories and preferences, individuals should be able to learn about coping techniques used by other people, and decide whether those methods are useful for them. While working in a group led by professional participants can receive additional psychoeducation on each coping method described by group

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Compassion fatigue is a result of helping others who experience many psychological problems and distress, and in some cases were exposed to traumatic events. It is connected with emotional exhaustion and numbness, psychological overwhelm, and deep fatigue. In the long-term it can cause emotional burnout.</footnote>
participants, while during individual work participants will be able to analyze all the advantages and disadvantages of each coping method. Additionally, while working individually, people will be able to test every coping method during the session and in real life situations and later will be able to discuss the outcomes of every method for their functioning in order to decide which of the coping strategies are the best for them.

Another important factor corresponding to the increase of resilience is self-compassion. Therefore, after gaining knowledge concerning individual strengths and weaknesses, and learning how to cope with adversities in an individually oriented manner there is a time for learning how to be kind and compassionate about oneself. During supportive group meetings individuals can therefore learn how other people deal with critical thoughts about themselves, and how they overcome unpleasant emotions about themselves. In professionally lead group interventions participants will receive additional psychoeducation concerning efficacious methods of self-compassion. During individually oriented sessions participants not only learn about self-compassion but also have the chance to practice different methods before deciding which to use on a daily basis.

Generally speaking while helping people living in close proximity to military conflicts to sustain in good mental condition and to develop resilience it is important to learn how they cope in the beginning. It is crucial to learn about their life history and previous adversities they've experienced in their lives and to recognize the main problems they are facing in the current situation, then to teach them about the most adaptive coping strategies they can apply in different conditions. In order to increase resilience levels it is necessary to develop self-compassion, develop and maintain supportive relationships with others, and learn how to ask for help from others. All the main steps needed while developing and maintaining resilience of people living close to military conflicts are given in Table 1.

<table><caption>Table 1. Elements of resilience increasing program for people living in close proximity to the military conflict</caption><thead><tr><td>Type of activity</td><td>Module</td><td>General aim of the module</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">Supportive groups</td><td>Recognizing individual strengths, weaknesses, and needs</td><td>Learning about oneself, one's needs, abilities, and its connection to the resilience</td></tr><tr><td>Developing self-supportive network</td><td>Giving individuals an opportunity to meet other people who share similar experiences and learning from them</td></tr><tr><td>Strengthening individual skills</td><td>Giving individuals an opportunity to discover and develop their skills while helping others experiencing similar difficulties</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Group work with a professional</td><td>Psychoeducation</td><td>Providing current empirically-based knowledge on compassion fatigue, burnout, coping strategies, self-compassion</td></tr><tr><td>Activities aimed at strengthening individual abilities to help others</td><td>Giving individuals an opportunity to share their knowledge with other group members, offering individuals opportunities for serving as an expert in certain domains, encouraging people to help other group members</td></tr><tr><td>Activities aimed at strengthening individual abilities for self-help and search for help from others</td><td>Giving individuals an opportunity to learn from their own experiences, encouraging individuals to ask for help from others, reinforcing individual's behaviors aimed at searching support from others</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td rowspan="7">Individual work with a professional</td><td>Diagnostic assessment</td><td>Recognition of individual strengths and weaknesses, case conceptualization</td></tr><tr><td>Recognition of individual needs</td><td>Recognition of basic problems that cause individual's emotional suffering</td></tr><tr><td>Recognition of individual styles of coping with adversities</td><td>Recognition of preferred styles of coping needed for individualized preventive programs, finding the best, most adaptive ways of solving problems adequate for an individual</td></tr><tr><td>Recognition of individual preferences in self-care</td><td>Identification of self-care methods used by an individual on a daily basis, finding the best individually fitted methods of self-care</td></tr><tr><td>Supportive sessions</td><td>Discussing the outcomes of individual sessions, identifying problems, and looking for solutions</td></tr><tr><td>Mentoring sessions</td><td>Giving individually fitted advices adequate to the needs and constitution of an individual</td></tr></table>

All of the activities described in Table 1. can be used independently or can be offered as separate parts of one complex preventive program. Independent modules can be useful especially for people that do not have much contact with military conflict abroad, for those who only hear or read about it in the media. People who are living close to the borders should be offered at least the possibility of participation in support groups and professional group interventions. All persons directly engaged in helping others and having direct contact with refugees, people seeking for shelters etc. should be offered all three types of interventions, since they are at greater risk of developing compassion fatigue, secondary stress or emotional burnout. Activities aimed at increasing or maintaining resilience can help people to sustain good mental health, overcome adversities, and model adequate coping behaviors for others. Greater resilience can serve as a factor decreasing the risk of psychological crises. Whenever simple support and activities aimed at increasing levels of resilience are not sufficient it is recommended to search for empirically-based therapeutic interventions such as cognitive-behavioral therapy.

Taking into account the number of ongoing military conflicts across the world it is necessary to plan and organize help for people indirectly engaged in war-related situations, such as citizens of neighboring countries, volunteers helping refugees etc. Offering those people support developing, increasing, and maintaining their resilience can result in an increase of the general well-being of those people as well as in other persons they're working with. Such correspondence is possible, since data published up to date proves that psychologically stable individuals helping others contribute to better functioning of persons they offer their support to<fnref n="12" />.

## DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING RESILIENCE: FINAL REMARKS

Living in a close proximity to the military conflict can cause high levels of emotional distress, symptoms of anxiety and depression and in some cases secondary traumatic stress. It is therefore important to provide citizens of countries neighboring with military conflicts with preventive programs aimed at development and maintenance of resilience. Increasing resilience is a time consuming process that includes taking necessary steps to improve social interactions, and developing social support, developing adaptive methods of coping with adversities and investing in

<footnote n="12">¹² Kathryn Bamforth, Pamela Rae, Jill Maben, Helen Lloyd, Susie Pearce, *Perceptions of healthcare professionals' psychological wellbeing at work and the link to patients' experiences of care: A scoping review*, in "International Journal of Nursing Studies Advances", 5, 1-24, December 2023, 5, pp.1-21.</footnote>
self-care techniques. Methods of work offered for persons living in a close proximity to the military conflict should be diversified according to the needs of individuals. Special attention should be given to people helping others since they can experience compassion fatigue and are at heightened risk of secondary traumatic stress. All of the methods aimed at resilience development and maintenance can be divided into self-help supportive groups, group interventions offered by professionals and individual interventions led by professionals. All of those approaches aim at the increase of individual self-awareness and self-compassion, lead to the development of efficacious coping strategies, and underline the role of social support and ability to ask for help when needed.

Regardless of the method used for supporting its development certain conditions have to be met in order to increase the levels of resilience. An individual has to experience positive, empathetic, trustworthy and compassionate interpersonal relationships, they have to feel they are not alone in difficult situations. Also important is asking for help from others and accepting the support they offer. Sometimes in order to receive adequate help and support it is helpful to be a part of a bigger group. Practicing mindfulness can increase self-awareness and self-acceptance, and decrease the symptoms of stress and anxiety that is needed for high resilience levels. In order to maintain resilience it is necessary to learn how to cope with stress and regulate emotions in an adequate way. Higher levels of resilience are observed in people perceiving their life as meaningful, so in order to sustain resilient it is important to set short-term and long-term realistic goals as well.

Crucial for well-being and high levels of resilience is also awareness of individual strengths and successes. It is important to notice any struggles and individual attempts to overcome those, and to interpret such situations as evidence of success. Whenever some anxious thoughts or catastrophic visions come to mind it is necessary to identify its irrationality, and make an effort to adopt a more balanced thinking pattern. When needed it is also recommended to modify previous goals in such a way it will be possible to fulfill it in specific socio-cultural and historical circumstances. It is also important to take into consideration past personal experiences and life events. Based on previous experiences it is possible to identify successful methods of overcoming new adversities. Finally, when all other methods and individual attempts fail it is needed to ask for professional help. Then it is recommended to engage in a therapeutic process based on empirically verified methods of work.

While providing help and support for others, e.g. refugees from war zones it is also important to be attentive not only to the needs of those people but also for one's own feelings. It is recommended to work in a group of people, to have leisure time, and some time for pleasant activities and hobbies as well. Crucial for sustaining a good mental condition is working in a community that is able to offer support when needed. It means that offering help to others requires giving attention to oneself as well, and whenever it is necessary to take care of one's own emotional and mental condition.

## CONCLUSIONS

Based on the information given in the previous sections it can be stated that resilience as a process of successfully overcoming difficulties, adaptation to challenging life events can be developed or increased during the lifetime. In order to do so an individual has to take into consideration their needs, develop optimistic instead of catastrophic expectations, develop and sustain supportive relationships. Since resilience is based on previous experiences, its development requires an ability to learn from previous situations, to have an open mind, accept changes, and practice self-compassion. It is also important to set realistic goals, work on skills development and have purpose in life. When it comes to the resilience development in the face of close military conflict it is important to pay attention to everyday activities, basic beliefs, and emotions of individuals. Different approaches and models of support can be offered for persons simply living in a country in
direct proximity to military conflict, for those living close to the borders, and others offering help and support for refugees, and other people in need in the war zone.

It should be underlined that the ideas presented in the article are theoretical. Therefore they can serve only as an introduction to the topic of resilience of people living in close proximity to the war zone and do not present fully worked out solutions to the problem. In the next steps, the focus should be directed to diagnosis of the citizens of countries neighboring military conflicts. Data concerning psychoemotional condition of people living in countries close to the war zones should be collected. It is necessary to describe the prevalence of the psychological, and emotional problems observed in people living close to the military conflict. It is justified to analyze those people functioning according to their age, gender, work experience, and other sociodemographic variables. Next, it is necessary to develop preventive programs that help them to increase their levels of resilience. In the next step short-term and long-term effectiveness of such programs should be empirically verified.

REFERENCES

1. Babicki Mateusz, Kowalski Krzysztof, Mastalerz-Migas Agnieszka, *The outbreak of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war: mental health of Poles and their attitude to refugees*, in "Frontiers in Public Health", 11, 1-9, June, 2023.

2. Bamforth Kathryn, Rae Pamela, Maben Jill, Lloyd Helen, Pearce Susie, *Perceptions of healthcare professionals' psychological wellbeing at work and the link to patients' experiences of care: A scoping review*, in "International Journal of Nursing Studies Advances", 5, 1-24, December 2023.

3. Blanke Elisabeth S., Schmiedek Florian, Siebert Stefan, Richter David, Brose Annette, *Perspectives on resilience: Trait resilience, correlates of resilience in daily life, and longer-term change in affective distress*, in "Stress Health", 39(1), 59-73, February 2023.

4. Hartling Linda M., *Strengthening resilience in a risky world: it's all about relationships*, in "Jean Baker Miller Training Institute at the Wellesley Centers for Women", Paper No. 101, 1-12, 2003.

5. Jawaid Ali, Gomolka Magdalena, Timmer Anastasiia, *Neuroscience of trauma and the Russian invasion of Ukraine*, in "Nature Human Behaviour", 6, 748-749, 2022.

6. Kleszczewska-Albińska Angelika, Ptak Krystian, Wiśniewska Małgorzata, Wziątek Agata, Funkcjonowanie psychologiczne wybranych studentów psychologii i bezpieczeństwa narodowego w obliczu konfliktu zbrojnego na Ukrainie, in „Studia Społeczne”, 39(4), 7-23, 2022.

7. Murthy R. Srinivasa, Lakshminarayana Rashmi, *Mental health consequences of war: a brief review of research findings*, in "World Psychiatry", 5(1), 25-30, February, 2006.

8. Shoshani Anat, Slone Michelle, *The resilience function of character strengths in the face of war and protracted conflict*, in "Frontiers in Psychology", 6, 1-10, January, 2016.

9. Zamora-Moncayo Emilia, Burgess Rochelle A., Fonseca Laura, González-Gort Mónica, Kakuma Ritsuko, *Gender, mental health and resilience in armed conflict: listening to life stories of internally displaced women in Colombia*, in "BMJ Global Health", 6(10), 1-13, October, 2021.

10. Ziglio Erio, "Strengthening resilience: a priority shared by Health 2020 and the Sustainable Development Goals", World Health Organization, Italy, 2017.
# Sport and foreign policy during the communist regime

TACŞA ANDREEA-MARIA

PETRU MAIOR FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND LETTERS, SL 2 DEPARTMENT

**Summary:** Sport in Romania and foreign policy are two areas which, although seemingly distinct, intersect in significant ways, especially through the prism of sports diplomacy. Sport was used as a tool to promote the country's image on the international scene, strengthening bilateral relations and contributing to Romania's soft-power. In this article, I set out to highlight how sport was the main pawn of political promotion abroad.

**Keywords:** sport, political promotion, foreign policy.

## INTRODUCTION

Sport was seen as a platform through which the regime could demonstrate the effectiveness of its political system. The performances of athletes from the Eastern Bloc, including Romania, were used to emphasize the superiority of the socialist regime over the West. These achievements were widely promoted as a symbol of the success of communism.

The Romanian Communist Party (PCR) used sport as an essential foreign policy tool, especially during the regime of Nicolae Ceausescu. In the context of the Cold War, sport was a significant platform for promoting Romania's image internationally. The PCR saw sport as an opportunity to demonstrate the superiority of the Romanian communist system and to promote a foreign policy autonomous from the direct influence of Moscow.

After the 1968 break with the line imposed by the Soviet Union, Ceausescu sought to assert Romania's independence, and the success of Romanian athletes was used to legitimize this position.

The communist regime used sport to convey the image of a strong and unified society. International sporting success was often associated with the regime's achievements. International competitions, such as the Olympic Games or World Championships, were also opportunities to show the "superiority" of socialist regimes over capitalist ones. Athletes from communist countries were often seen as "national heroes" and were used to strengthen the image of the regime.

The communist regime established a rigorous system of sports selection and training. Talented children were identified from an early age and integrated into specialized training centres. Training was intense and performance was measured in terms of a "contribution to national glory". In Romania, for example, "centers of excellence" were created where athletes trained under the supervision of experienced coaches and were supported by the state, both financially and logistically.

World Championships were used to show the strength and success of the regime.

Athletes under communist regimes were sent to international competitions to boost the prestige of the regime. For example, Romania, as part of the Eastern Bloc, sent athletes to international competitions as part of a wider plan to increase political influence. Their performances at the Olympic Games or World Championships were seen not only as personal achievements, but also as a way to promote the positive image of the regime.

They received considerable financial support from the state, but this was conditional on their performance. Training was supported by the state, and sports infrastructure was also modernized, especially in the capitals and big cities.

Athletes' personal lives were also often influenced by the totalitarian regime. Many athletes were forced to follow a strict schedule, which included not only training, but also rehearsing for various public events, promoting the regime's image or even international promotional trips.
Athletics, gymnastics, football and hockey were areas where Romania excelled. Medals won by Romanian athletes at the Olympic Games or World Championships were used to show the strength and success of the regime.

The most widespread means of propagandizing the communist regime was the results obtained at the Olympic Games, which increased Romania's prestige worldwide.

Romanian athletes who are successful internationally often become ambassadors for the country, and are a vector for Romania's image in the world. They are considered symbols of national values and identity.

Nadia Comăneci, Ilie Năstase, Gheorghe Hagi, are just a few of the athletes who have been extremely influential in promoting Romania's image internationally. Their success has helped consolidate the country's prestige on the world sporting map.

Romania made significant progress in sport during Nicolae Ceausescu's time in power between 1965 and 1989, which was reflected in outstanding performances at the Olympic Games. In the four editions held during this period - Montreal 1976, Moscow 1980, Los Angeles 1984 and Seoul 1988 - Romanian athletes achieved outstanding results, consistently ranking among the top ten nations in the world.

The communist regime particularly supported sports where outstanding international performances could be achieved. These included individual sports such as gymnastics, athletics, weightlifting, swimming and wrestling, but also team sports such as football and handball. Gymnastics, for example, was a very successful discipline for Romania during the communist period, and Romanian athletes won many Olympic and world medals.

Nadia Comăneci became a world legend and a symbol of the success of the communist regime with her 7 A's at the 1976 Olympic Games. Similar gymnastics victories were achieved by other sportswomen such as Ecaterina Szabo and Teodora Ungureanu.

Nicolae Ceausescu's regime had a profound impact on Nadea Comăneci's career and life. The Romanian Olympic Committee and the Romanian state invested heavily in gymnastics, and Nadia was considered an "ambassador" of the communist regime, being supported financially and organizationally to become a world champion. At the time, Romanian gymnasts benefited from rigorous preparation and training conditions, as well as some pressure from the authorities to bring home medals that reflected the regime's success.

Nadia came to international attention in 1976 at the Montreal Olympics, when she achieved the first perfect 10 in the history of Olympic gymnastics, a performance that sparked a real buzz and strengthened Romania's image in the world. This achievement had a considerable impact, not only in the field of sport, but also in international politics, given that Romania was a socialist country under communist rule.

Nadia was also under strict surveillance by the authorities at the time. Her career was closely linked to the imagination and manipulation of the communist regime. As Nadia became better known, the Romanian state used her achievements to promote the regime's image internationally. Sport was seen by the communist regime as a means to improve the country's prestige in the capitalist world and to showcase the achievements of socialism. In this context, Nadia and other athletes were often treated as "products" of the state, and their achievements were used to support communist ideology.

Romanian athletes also excelled in other sports such as swimming, rowing, handball and wrestling. In these fields, Romania won many medals at international competitions.

Many football clubs were associated with state institutions, such as Steaua Bucharest (military apparatus) and Dinamo Bucharest (Ministry of Interior). These teams benefited from considerable financial and administrative resources. Other long-established clubs, such as Rapid or Universitatea Cluj, were marginalized because they did not have direct links with the power institutions.
The communist regime used the performances of Romanian teams to show the superiority of the regime. Stele Bucharest's success in the 1986 European Champions Cup was presented as a triumph of the Nicolae Ceausescu regime. Players were often transformed into symbols of patriotism and devotion to the regime. Players like Gheorghe Hagi, Ilie Balaci and Helmuth Duckadam became legends of Romanian football. Footballers who wished to play abroad were often prevented from leaving until a certain age (usually 28) so as not to "leave their homeland."

After 1989, the influence of politics on football decreased and clubs had to adapt to the market economy. However, many believe that the communist period left deep marks on the organization and mentality of Romanian sport.

At the same time, the communist regime built sports facilities and athletics tracks, but also in supporting sports science, such as sports medicine and advanced training methods. However, sometimes the training methods were excessive, focused on performance at any cost. Iolanda Balaș, Maricica Puică and Doina Melinte are the most important personalities in Romanian athletics who won gold medals at the 1960, 1964 and 1984 Olympic Games. Although they achieved notable performances, there were suspicions of the use of doping substances to obtain better results, a phenomenon also seen in other communist countries. Performance was often achieved under intense pressure.

The sport of wrestling, both Greco-Roman and freestyle, has been another discipline in which Romania has been consistently successful. Romanian wrestlers such as Nicolae Martinescu and Ioan Silvășan won medals at various Olympic Games.

Romania has also excelled in weightlifting, where Romanian athletes have won numerous gold, silver and bronze medals at the Olympic Games and World Championships, with notable examples such as Ivan Ghiță and Toma Bălescu.

Romania achieved excellent results in rowing, where Romanian teams, especially in the 8 or 4 rowing events, won numerous gold and silver medals.

Athletes under the communist regime were not only athletes but also active members of the political system. Their careers were often influenced by party loyalty. Many athletes had the status of "professional workers" and were integrated into party structures or communist youth organizations. The fact that an athlete won medals at international competitions was used as a way of promoting communist ideology, and the regime made sure that they behaved according to the ideological norms it imposed. Elite athletes enjoyed certain privileges such as access to rare goods, better housing and social prestige. In return, they were closely monitored by the Securitate and had to maintain an image in line with the regime's values.

Athletes were seen as tools of political propaganda. When an athlete managed to win an Olympic medal, this victory was used to reinforce the legitimacy of the regime and communist ideology. However, athletes who failed to perform to expectations were often considered a "national disgrace" and the pressure on them was immense.

Sport was also used to show the superiority of the communist system over the West. During the Cold War, the Olympic Games became an arena of ideological competition, and the success of communist athletes against Western ones was seen as proof of the regime's efficiency and power.

Romanian athletes sometimes chose to stay abroad during competitions, fleeing the communist regime. Famous cases include footballers such as László Bölöni or gymnasts who chose not to return home.

Another form of foreign propaganda was the attempt to support less developed countries both materially and with specialists. For example, only in 1973, with the approval of the C.C.C. of the P.C.C.R. (A.N.R., Fond CC of the PCR, Propaganda and Agitation Section, file 3/1973), the C.N.E.F.S. sent several coaches, from disciplines where Romanian athletes were achieving good
results internationally, to countries with less tradition in practicing the respective sports: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Albania, Syria, Upper Volta, Libya.

In 1973, (A.N.R., Fonds CC of the PCR, Propaganda and Agitation Section, file 3/1973) Bernard Sastre, president of the French Football Federation, wrote to N. Ceauşescu asking him to intervene with "the Romanian sports authorities to allow the arrival in France of Mr. Stefan Kovacs and to strengthen the friendly relations between our two countries".

In 1977, Nicolae Ceausescu personally, while watching the competition on television, ordered the withdrawal of the women's gymnastics team from the European Championships in Prague. This was because of the abuses committed by the refereeing brigades against the Romanian gymnasts in order to favor the Soviet delegation, which "had" to show the world that the Soviet Union was "the leading country in sport" through the results obtained by its athletes. (Kukuskin G.L., 1955) The process of formation of international sports structures began in the second half of the 19th century, diversified in the inter-war period and intensified after World War II (Matache C., 2006).

International sports structures under the communist regime were also used as a propaganda tool, with national prestige often placed before sport itself. Sport was subordinated to state ideology and participation in international competitions had clear political goals. The first Romanian sports structures became affiliated to specialized international bodies in the first part of the last century, but Romania did not join the entire international competition system until the 50s.

Between the 1950s and the 1980s, Romanian athletes took part in competitions reserved for athletes from socialist countries, which were organized according to the rules of international sports federations: the military spartachiades organized in rotation in the member countries under the aegis of the Sports Committee of the Friendly Armies (CSAP) based in Moscow; spartachiades of athletes belonging to the clubs of the Ministries of the Interior, also called "Dinamoviade"; spartachiades of athletes belonging to the clubs of the craft cooperative system, competitions of trade union clubs, competitions of railwaymen from the socialist countries.

Since 1986, Romanian athletes have participated, on the basis of nominal invitations, alongside the best athletes in the world, in the "Goodwill Games", a multi-sport competition between the USA and the USSR (Russia), organized every four years, in rotation, in the middle of the Olympic cycle. The competition was the result of the loosening of Soviet-American relations after Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to the Soviet leadership (1985). The involvement of Romania, through its athletes, in this sporting competition was a desperate measure by Nicolae Ceausescu to mitigate his political isolation from both Moscow and Washington.

The most powerful blow to the Ceauşescu regime's image in the West was linked to sport. This was Romania's non-alignment with the boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, a decision accepted by all the other communist bloc states at Moscow's express request (Hoberman J, 1990).

On July 28, 1984, at the Colosseum Stadium in Los Angeles, during the opening ceremony of the XXIII edition of the Olympic Games, the Romanian delegation was given a particularly warm welcome by the 92,655 spectators. Apart from the host country team, the Romanian delegation was the most cheered delegation (Alexandrescu H, 1985).

This was part of a wider boycott organized by the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc states in response to the United States-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. The New York Times (quoted in ProSport, July 17, 2009) reported in July 2008 that the US had paid $39 120 000 to Romania not to join the boycott of other communist countries in support of its participation in the Los Angeles Olympics (Pro Sport, 2009).

The 1984 boycott was coordinated by the Soviet Union, which invited several Warsaw Pact countries (including Romania) and other communist countries not to participate in the competitions
in Los Angeles. The reasons cited were security concerns and the alleged politicization of the 1984 Olympics, as well as dissatisfaction with US foreign policy.

Romania, led at the time by Nicolae Ceausescu, chose not to participate in the boycott imposed by the Soviet Union, and Romanian teams took part in the 1984 Olympics. Romania won 53 medals at those Games, including 20 gold, 16 silver and 17 bronze, making it one of the countries that performed remarkably well.

Juan Antonio Samaranch, president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) at the time, honored Ceauşescu with the Olympic Order, a prestigious distinction awarded for outstanding contributions to the Olympic movement. Samaranch later made it clear that this decoration was not a gesture of support for Ceauşescu's authoritarian regime, but a recognition of his decision to participate in the Games, which had positive implications for the future of Olympism.

After the 1989, Revolution and the fall of the communist regime, Samaranch emphasized that the awarding of the Olympic Order was not related to Romania's domestic politics, but to its role in ensuring a more balanced participation in the Olympic Games, mitigating the effects of the Eastern boycott.

## CONCLUSION

Sport in Romania has been and continues to be an effective means of political propaganda. From the consolidation of the communist regime to gaining popular support in the post-1989 democracy, sport provides a platform for politicians to influence public opinion and associate their image with national success.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Alexandrescu H., Olimpiada californiană, Editura Sport-Turism, Bucharest, 1985, p.5-7

2. Alexe N., Enciclopedia of Physical Education and Sport in Romania, vol. I-IV, Editura Aramis, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 358-379, p. 501-503

3. Hoberman J., The Transformation of East German Sport, in Journal of Sport History, vol. 17, University of Texas, Austin, 1990, p. 43-64

4. Matache C., Romanian presentations in international sports organizations, Editura AdPoint, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 149-197

5. Postolache N., History of sport in Romania. Timeline, Vexim Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, p. 80-85

6. Raetichi G. Venirea 1990, p. Wilson E 10-25. H. The Politics of The Olympic Games, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1981, p. 89-96

7. Proceedings of the Country Conference on the Sports Movement, Editura CNEFS, Bucharest, 1973, p. 1-5.

## Author presentation

After completing master's studies, I was admitted to the Interdisciplinary Doctoral School in Brasov, in September 2022.

As a PhD student in the discipline of physical education and sport, my goal is to improve the motor and functional ability of students from non-professional specializations as well as to teach the practical elements of basic gymnastics and acrobatics to students from the specialization of physical education and sport.

For the discipline of Physical Education, together with my colleagues, I would like to lay the foundations for new sports disciplines that will attract as many students as possible in this field.
# Football, a factor of globalization

MIRCEA UNGUR¹, EDIT LAURA CIULEA¹, IRINA MIHAELA TRIFAN¹

¹"GEORGE EMIL PALADE UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE PHARMACY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FROM TĂRGU MUREŞ, ROMANIA

**Abstract:** Football, the most popular sport globally, is a global phenomenon, being considered one of the most important factors of globalization that continues to play an essential role in promoting values such as team spirit, respect and perseverance. From a simple sports game, football has become a real complex social phenomenon.

In our study, we aimed to address a phenomenon increasingly encountered both on and off the football field. Thus, we analyzed the incidents triggered during the Romania vs. Kosovo football match, which resulted in the Kosovo team leaving the field with only two minutes of play remaining. We also discussed a more severe incident that led to the outbreak of a war, the so-called "Football War." We deemed it necessary to analyze the behavior of players, as many specialists argue that the spectacle of football has turned into a stage for violence, with these violent tendencies among players being driven by the athletes' anxiety.

**Keywords:** football, global phenomenon, globalization, anxiety

Football, the most popular sport globally, is a global phenomenon, being considered one of the most important factors of globalization that continues to play an essential role in promoting values such as team spirit, respect and perseverance. From a simple sports game, football has become a real complex social phenomenon.(2)

In the current context, the focus is increasingly on inclusion, diversity and sustainability, which makes football a powerful tool for education and social cohesion. The role of the ambassadors of this sport is to inspire future generations, promote fair play and support initiatives that contribute to the development of this global phenomenon.

In his ethnological analysis, Christian Bromberger notes that football evolved into a "small but extremely serious thing", gaining "academic legitimacy" in England in the 1970s and becoming a well-defined field of research today.

Shortly before the start of the Paris 2024 Olympics, a Parisian magazine publishes detailed information about football, highlighting its links with various societies and highlighting its status as a global sport. Football is considered by some to be the most practiced sport worldwide and is perceived as a complex social phenomenon, in which the public plays an essential role.

The first researches, carried out especially by sports journalists, focused on the legends and history of football as a phenomenon of global proportions. Subsequent studies have sought to analyze the social and political impact of the sport, as well as its organizational structure and day-to-day functioning, including controversies and scandals that reflect the dynamics of society as a whole.

From this perspective, social psychology and ethnography analyze in particular themes such as "the revitalization of nationalisms", social identity, relations between different groups, the hooliganic behaviors of supporters and their involvement in the phenomenon of "collective disorder". (1)

Other research on football addresses its economic dimension, including labour migration, with a particular focus on the migration of English players between 1945 and 1995. Nowadays, football has become a topic of major interest in the fields of communication and media, being considered a global phenomenon and described as "the supreme stage of globalization."(16)

Recent studies present another aspect, namely that the game of football is perceived as a form of addiction for the public, a psychological regression, a return to archaic models or an activity characteristic of a certain social class. Also, some specialists believe that researchers tend to ignore the important role that football can play as a "cultural and symbolic binder". (3,8)
Football has become the success story that dominates the twentieth century, due to the superior valences that. (20)

Sport brings people together. At its best, it contributes to their health and happiness by breaking down barriers and creating trust and community spirit. For more than four decades, the Council of Europe has supported fair play and respect in sport, fighting corruption and contributing to the practice of sport that is safe, ethical and accessible to all. This work contributes to the creation of inclusive democratic societies that respect human rights and the state.(24)

In a society of the twenty-first century, where the principles and rules of civilization promote tolerance and respect for the fundamental rights of every person, and xenophobic, extremist and intolerant manifestations seem to be, paradoxically, more frequent than exceptional, it is no coincidence that this dark side of society often comes to light in the context of sporting events.

Initially, the Olympics represented the essence of the Olympic spirit, including games, observance of the principles of fair play, control of aggressive impulses and the establishment of a truce between opponents. Today, however, it has become a competition between individuals and nations, an opportunity to gain fame, financial gain, admiration, and the desire to dominate.

Aggressive instincts manifest themselves obviously within the limits set by the sports rules, and the social need to belong to a group is reflected in the support of a team or a representative team, often degenerating in an irrational way.

Sportsmanship has also changed, it is not necessarily the favorite team that proves to be more talented and wins the match, but rather the feeling that "we" are beating "them". The frustrations and dissatisfactions of everyday life are, in a surprising way, transferred to the sports context, and a victory in this field becomes an event of national scope.

"Games and sports in highly competitive Western societies are characterized by anything but cooperativeness."

Sport has become, in the modern world, the only activity in which violence is accepted. Therefore, in order to understand the violence associated with sport, we must not limit ourselves only to acts of interpersonal aggression on the field, but also to the mentality specific to this form of sports organization within our society.

In this context, the football match between Romania and Kosovo who met in the Nations League is also part of it, when in the minutes of extra time, at 0-0, Amir Rrahmani, the Kosovar captain and player for Napoli, had a physical conflict with Denis Alibec, who reacted in his turn. In a tense context, apparently premeditated by the visiting team, they caused an incident in the last minutes of extra time, when it was obvious that they could no longer get the victory. The behavior of the Kosovars aroused the discontent of the supporters on the pitch, who began to chant the name of Serbia, a country with which Kosovo continues to have an unresolved conflict.

This moment caused the Kosovo team, coached by Franco Foda, to leave the field, although there were only two minutes left to play.

This is where the Kosovo team's tense show began, with captain Rrahmani leading his teammates off the pitch. This gesture was perceived as a defiance of the Danish referee brigade, which refused to suspend the match. Given that only the Romanian team remained on the field, the discussions continued. At first, the Kosovar coach, Franco Foda, seemed willing to accept the resumption of the game for the remaining two minutes, and the match was to restart with a free kick in favor of Romania, from the corner of the box, on the right side.

After almost an hour of waiting, during which the Kosovo team remained in the locker rooms, and the Romanian players endured the cold, with temperatures of -2 degrees Celsius at midnight, referee Krogh returned to the field and blew the final whistle, in the absence of the Kosovars.
Amir Rrahmani, the defender of the Kosovo team, said: "After we entered the dressing room, the fans started shouting even louder 'Kosovo is Serbia'. At that moment, we decided not to return to the field," according to Telegrafi Sport.

Tensions continued at the press conference, where the visiting team maintained a provocative and confrontational attitude.

The tense relations between Romania and Kosovo seem to be getting worse, especially in the context of the September 2023 match at the National Arena, played in the Euro 2024 qualifiers.

Although Romania won 2-0, the game was marked by an incident that led to a 49-minute interruption due to chants from the stands. Before the meeting, the Romanian Football Federation had initiated a campaign calling on supporters to avoid challenges addressed to the visiting team.

The main heroes of these political disputes on the football fields become the supporters, numerous studies reporting on the emotions they experience at football shows, (23), about the way the supporters manage their emotions, feelings, (17), or the rivalry between the fans of the teams on the field.(9)

Some research has also revealed the violence on numerous levels. (21, 22)

At the press conference, coach Mircea Lucescu had a vehement reaction, criticizing a behavior that, in his opinion, should not exist at such a competitive level.

Mircea Lucescu, Romania's coach, said: "Nothing happened against them. Nothing was said about Kosovo, no banners were displayed, nothing. Their behavior shows that everything was prepared for such a situation. Certainly, it was premeditated."

The incident was also reported by the biggest sports publications in Europe. L'Equipe noted: "Romania - Kosovo, interrupted due to racist chants from the public."

The Serbian supporters of Red Star Belgrade also had numerous reactions to the incidents in Romania, at the National Arena, painting graffiti on a building in Kraljevo. The painting made by Serbian supporters represents the flags of Serbia and Romania along with the following messages: "Orthodox brothers! Kosovo and Serbia! Bessarabia is Romania!"

On November 24, 2024, the UEFA Disciplinary Committee officially announced the result of the Romania-Kosovo match in the Nations League, in which the Romanian team won 3-0, but the Romanian Football Federation was fined 128,000 euros.

Romania will play an official match without supporters in the stands, which will lead to financial losses that can reach up to one million euros.

The Kosovo players, who incited the public and displayed indecent gestures when leaving the field, were not sanctioned. The Kosovo federation was fined €6,000 for "inappropriate behaviour", without further details.

The incidents during the match took place in a very delicate political context, due to the emergence of government policies that run football both nationally and internationally.(15)

Kosovo proclaimed its independence from Serbia in 2008 after a violent conflict in the 1990s. However, not all governments recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state, among the countries that have not accepted it are Romania, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and, of course, Serbia. In this context, UEFA's decision could include measures to prevent future meetings between Romania and Kosovo, given recent events.

**Kosovo**, officially the **Republic of Kosovo**, a partially recognized state and disputed territory, located on the **Balkan Peninsula** in southeastern **Europe**, which declared its independence from **Serbia** in February 2008.

Kosovo was a province of Yugoslavia, with a long history under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and since 1918 it has been part of the federal state of Belgrade.

After its dissolution following the German-Italian occupation of 1941-1944, Kosovo was annexed to Albania, which in turn was part of fascist Italy.
After 1944, the region returned to the authority of the new Yugoslav communist state led by Josip Broz Tito, but benefited from considerable autonomy.

After Tito's death, the authorities in Belgrade began to put increasing pressure for the integration of the province into Serbia, and this step was materialized in 1989 under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević.

UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999 gave Kosovo a "significant autonomy" within Yugoslavia. Supported by most Western countries, including the United States, Kosovo forces unilaterally declared independence in 2008.

In 2010, the UN's International Court of Justice ruled that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law.

So far, 99 states out of the 193 members of the UN have recognized Kosovo, but Russia and China, permanent members of the Security Council, have not done so, thus blocking Kosovo's accession to the UN.

At the same time, five of the 27 member states of the European Union (Spain, Romania, Greece, Slovakia and Cyprus) have not recognized Kosovo's independence.

Serbian supporters reacted immediately after the events of the Romania-Kosovo match at the National Arena.

After the match, Red Star Belgrade fans made a graffiti on a street in Kraljevo, through which they wanted to express their solidarity with the Romanian supporters. The graffiti featured the flags of Serbia and Romania, accompanied by the messages: "Orthodox brothers! Kosovo and Serbia! Bessarabia is Romania!", according to the source Casual Romania. In competitions organized by UEFA, such messages are strictly prohibited.

There are also other political, military or diplomatic conflicts that prevent football matches from being played, such as Armenia – Azerbaijan, Serbia – Kosovo, Spain – Gibraltar and Russia – Ukraine.

Due to the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army on February 24, 2022, measures have been taken regarding sports competitions.

Thus, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) issued a statement asking international sports structures to cancel the events that were to be held in Russia or Belarus.

At the same time as these actions, many teams have stopped participating in sports actions in Russia, and some European and international sports federations have imposed indirect sanctions on Russia and Belarus, including the disqualification or withdrawal of football teams.

There are few studies that present the cruel truth that exists behind disputes on the football field, and present the truth about supporters, tradition, history, conflicts, Buhler and Nufer (2012), Ferrand and McCarthy (2008), because extremely complicated relationships have been created between sport and politics.

Nelson Mandela, 2000, at the first Laureus Awards ceremony "Sport has the ability to transform the world. It manages to unite people in a unique way, difficult to achieve by other means. It is a form of communication that young people understand instinctively. Sport brings hope where despair reigns and has greater power than governments in removing racial barriers. It defies any form of discrimination. The heroes that sport gives birth to are proof of this strength. They are brave not only on the ground, but also in their communities, where they inspire and offer hope to people around the world.

But unfortunately some disputes on the field even led to the outbreak of wars, the "Football War" or "Guerra del futbol" being a military conflict that broke out between El Salvador and Honduras, triggered after a football match between the two Central American teams.

Although there were some military tensions, the event that triggered the "100 Hour War" was the confrontation of June 26, 1969, held as part of the qualifiers for the 1970 World Cup.
The conflicts between the two Central American states had older roots. While in El Salvador the four million inhabitants lived on a small area of 21,146 km², a similar population in Honduras enjoyed a much more generous territory, of 112,088 km².(5)

In 1969, in the midst of the qualifying campaign for the World Cup in Mexico, Honduras and El Salvador faced each other in two play-off matches for a place in the tournament. The first game, held on June 6, 1969, in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, takes place in the context of a teachers' strike. They, as a form of protest, scatter nails on the roads, causing numerous punctures of rubber. Among those affected are the players of the El Salvador team, who interpret the incident as a deliberate act of sabotage.

The game itself was extremely tense, and the Honduran national team managed to win 1-0, thanks to a goal scored by Welsh in the last moments of the game. Enthusiastic about the victory, the hosts' supporters set fire to the stadium in celebration!

The second match took place on June 15, 1969, in San Salvador, where the Honduran team was received in an extremely hostile atmosphere. Honduras' national symbols, such as the flag and coat of arms, were desecrated, and the hotel where the players were staying was set on fire by angry locals. After moving to a new location, the footballers were kept awake all night by noisy serenades under their windows.

The victory went to the team from El Salvador and won with a score of 3-0.

The decisive match scheduled for June 27 in Mexico City attracted huge attention throughout the Central American region. Newspapers and radio stations dedicated ample space to this event, and thousands of fans from Honduras and El Salvador headed for the Mexican capital, wanting either to attend the match or to be as close as possible to the epicenter of the action.

Following a balanced confrontation marked by numerous acts of violence, El Salvador won with a score of 3-2.

An explosion of violence engulfs spectators outside the stadium, where fighting and chaos result in casualties and injuries, surpassing the capacity of Mexico City hospitals to handle the situation.

The losers launch accusations of corruption against the referees and unfair behavior against the winning team. The threats and insults, initially subtle and unofficial, quickly become direct, involving even the highest political levels of the two states. A few hours after the end of the match, Honduras decides to break diplomatic relations with El Salvador.

On July 14, the conflict known as the "football war" escalates, and El Salvador initiates military operations.

These include both ground attacks, where they mobilize 12,000 soldiers, and air strikes. Within a day, the Salvadoran army occupied several cities, but the advance was halted due to lack of fuel, after Honduras, better prepared in terms of aviation, bombed the oil depots in Acajutla.

For El Salvador, the return of refugees has caused considerable economic hardship, but it has also led to an intensification of guerrilla warfare and the outbreak of a civil war.

In 1976, the two countries agreed to resolve the conflict with the help of a Peruvian mediator.

It was not until 1980, in Lima, that a peace treaty was signed that provided for the peaceful resolution of border disputes.

There are also numerous examples of this kind, in which the football spectacle turned into a violent scene, but specialists believe that these violent outbursts of the players are determined by the anxiety of the athletes.(4)

According to the Psychological Encyclopedia (Kazdin, 2000), anxiety is defined as an emotion marked by states of tension, worrying thoughts and physiological changes, such as increased blood pressure, muscle tension, palpitations, feeling faint, headaches, nausea, feeling empty in the stomach.