future VEI = 3 or greater magnitude eruptions (Mothes et al. 2016a).

## Monitoring Cotopaxi

Cotopaxi has long been a producer of swarms of LP's, and Ruiz et al. (1998) hypothesized that they were related to the interaction of the hydrothermal system with heat ascending from depth. During unrest in 2001–2002 thousands of long period, volcano-tectonic and distal volcano-tectonic seismic events were registered and magma was hypothesized to have ascended to shallow levels in the center of the edifice (Molina et al. 2008). Its flanks also experienced deformation from magma input estimated at ~20 Mm³ from modeling of EDM data (Hickey et al. 2015). But, observable superficial manifestations were meager, no magma erupted and the volcano returned to a relatively quiet state with only short-lived LP swarms (Lyons et al. 2012) and sporadic VLP events being registered until April, 2015 (Márquez 2012; Arias et al. 2015).

The IGEPN has monitored Cotopaxi volcano since 1986. Subsequently, over the years the monitoring coverage has become denser and more robust (Fig. 2) (Kumagai et al. 2007, 2009, 2010). Presently there are approximately 60 telemetered geophysical sensors operating on its flanks. Cotopaxi hazard maps have been published in several versions since 1976, with the newest version published in late 2016 (Mothes et al. 2016a). The IGEPN has carried out a long-term program of community education for areas that are at highest risk, although as noted by Christie et al. (2015), the attention over such a vast area (≈2000 km²), was uneven.

Cotopaxi was a VUELCO target volcano from 2013 to 2015. As part of the VUELCO project, in November 2014 a simulation exercise was carried out with the purpose of presenting a timeline of potential unrest and expected events and to test the communication between scientists, decision-makers and the public (www.vuelco.net). This present contribution is written in the spirit of holistically documenting this recent and most

serious unrest of Cotopaxi to date—since 1942, when slight ash emissions and mild explosive activity were then reported (Siebert et al. 2010). Here we present the macro patterns of seismic, gas, deformation and visual observation monitoring data associated with the awakening volcano. The data are provided by the monitoring networks operated by the IGEPN. We avoid dwelling on details, as forthcoming contributions dedicated to exploiting specific datasets are in preparation. We also provide comment on selected actions in which IGEPN scientists participated to make the overall societal outcome more favorable in case Cotopaxi produced a major eruption. We impart with the philosophy, stated in Marzocchi et al. (2012) that “sound scientific management of volcanic crises is the primary tool to reduce significantly volcanic risk in the short-term”. We also maintain that a constant and rapid analysis of the monitoring data is key to giving forecasts that include reasonable scenarios. Some of the IGEPN actions were guided by experiences gained in the VUELCO project, since one of the scenarios in the simulated eruptions was that the volcano would wake up, be active then return to repose.

The 14th of August, 2015 explosions and subsequent emissions pushed the first evidence of new magma to the surface, although in a limited way (Gaunt et al. 2016). Documentation of the geophysical signals and observations that we registered through late 2015 leads to the depiction of what transpired—mainly of an intrusion, which stayed deep, although the signs of intrusions that stall at depth may be very similar to those produced by intrusions that finally do erupt (e.g. Moran et al. 2011).

## Synthesis of the Geophysical Fingerprints of the Unrest

Having passed 13 years with low levels of activity since cessation in 2002 of its last reactivation, in mid-April 2015 Cotopaxi began departing from background levels: higher seismic energy release, gas outputs and superficial manifestations transpired. The height of activity was
COTOPAXI VOLCANO MONITORING NETWORK
INSTITUTO GEOFISICO-EPN

<figure><img src="image_100.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2** Map of the instrumental monitoring network around Cotopaxi volcano, April 2016</figcaption></figure>
Daily RMS values of BREF seismic station-vertical component

<figure><img src="image_101.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_102.png" /></figure>

**Fig. 3** a Plot showing RMS values of seismic data that has been segmented into 1 min windows and smoothed with a 31-point median filter. Of note is the calm period from January to April 2015, than a slight increase in seismic energy release in May. The increase in June is associated with greater emissions and strong tremor. A sharp decline in early August and later the notable increase in August and September represents the 14th of

August explosions/emissions and subsequent ash emissions and emission tremor. Accumulated seismic energy values through the end of 2015 show a marked decline.

b Number of daily seismic events versus accumulated seismic energy of these events. The acronyms for different seismic events are: LP Long Period; HB Hybrid; VT Volcano-tectonic; TREM High Frequency Emission Tremor; EXP Explosion; VLPs Very Long Period

a series of 5 explosions/energetic emissions on the 14th of August, which expulsed preexisting conduit plug material, ash and gases, but whose size did not surpass VEI = 1. By late September 2015, activity mostly died back and RSAM

values showed a decline except for brief hikes in October and in November, when light ashfalls occurred. By December 2015 nearly all monitoring parameters were down to background levels (Fig. 3a), except for a protracted
<figure><img src="image_103.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4** Registry of VT and LP seismic events at Cotopaxi since May 1996 to 31 December, 2015. The 2001–2002 period was the only other period with a marked jump in seismic activity before the 2015 episode</figcaption></figure>

volcano-tectonic (VT) seismic swarm that began on 10 September, 2015 and continued through March 2016, albeit displaying low levels of seismic energy release (Fig. 3b). This swarm produced nearly 15,000 VT events.

## Geophysical Registry of Cotopaxi's Restlessness in 2015

From 2002 to April, 2015, seismic registry of mostly long period (LP) seismic events averaged around 10 events/day. In April 2015 the monthly tally was about 630 earthquakes, then rose to 3000 events in May (Fig. 4), with a jump to about 180 events/day registered on 23 May (Fig. 4).

Of significance also was the notable increase in very long period seismic events (VLPs) recorded since late May 2015. VLPs are often interpreted to signify magma movement (Zobin

2012; Jousset et al. 2013; Maeda et al. 2015; Kumagai et al. 2010; Arias et al. 2015). VLP events are believed to be generated by volume changes and movements of magmatic-hydrothermal fluids (e.g., Chouet and Matoza 2013). Between June 2006 and October 2014, 106 confirmed VLP events were identified at Cotopaxi (Márquez 2012; Arias 2015). In 2015 Cotopaxi, VLPs rarely passed 11 events/day (Fig. 5), but commonly had magnitudes of 2–3. The recent VLP events that were located under the Cotopaxi's edifice, occurred in sectors of the volcano where VLP's had been previously located by Molina et al. (2008) (Fig. 6). The greatest number of VLPs, of the 114 located events, were registered during the third week of July up to the explosions on the 14th of August. While most were between 1 and 2 magnitude, some were greater than 2.5 (Fig. 5a). The relationship between the great number of LPs which started the awakening process at Cotopaxi and
<figure><img src="image_104.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5** a Occurrence of VLP events in 2015 at Cotopaxi. Black arrow represents 14 August hydromagmatic explosions. b Accumulated seismic energy from VTs, LPs and VLPs in 2015–2016 at Cotopaxi</figcaption></figure>

afterwards the stalling out of these events to be
followed immediately by the strong VLPs is
another possible indicator of the precursory nat-
ure of this type of volcanic earthquake before the
discrete eruptions on 14 August (Fig. 5b).

Most VLP events had frequencies between 0.1
and 1 Hz and had strong P and S waves, such as
the example given for 04 August, 2015 which
was located 3 km below summit on the NE flank
of the volcano (Fig. 6).
<figure><img src="image_105.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 6** Waveform of VLP registered on 04 August, 2015 15h27 GMT is one of the largest events registered at Cotopaxi (local magnitude 2.5) and was located 3 km beneath the crater on the NE flank</figcaption></figure>

The locations of earthquakes (of all types) from January to December, 2015 were at two levels: at depths of about 3–5 km below the crater (Fig. 7a) and at a deeper level of 7–15 km below the crater. Most events were aligned with the conduit. However some distal VTs were registered about 15 km due north of the volcano (Fig. 7b) and were interpreted as fault slips due to stress transfer from the volcano (White and McCausland 2016). Distal VTs were also important in the reactivation of Pinatubo volcano (Harlow et al. 1996).

Overall, there was a marked increase of LP events from April to late May, followed by high frequency tremor episodes (Fig. 8) which lasted until the onset of high frequency tremor related to gas emissions and which became prominent from 04 June and lasted to the second week of August (represented by black bars), and could have been related to the boiling of the volcano’s hydrothermal system, and coincided with the high water vapor and SO₂ flux then emitting from the crater (Bernard et al. 2016). In Fig. 8, the VLPs that were important especially in July
<figure><img src="image_106.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7** Top-Locations of seismic events from a–01 April to 30 June, 2015 and Base—01 July to 31 August, 2015. Most are aligned with the conduit, however the SE flank is favored for harboring event locations</figcaption></figure>

to mid-August are masked by this tremor signal, but can be observed in Fig. 3 and their accumulative energy levels are shown in Fig. 5.

The increase in SO₂ gas emissions, rose to 3000 ton/day by the end of May with a clear SO₂ signal progressively more notable through late May into June (Fig. 9) (Hidalgo et al. 2016). For example, on the 22nd–23rd of May odors of sulphur were very evident above the 5700 m level on the volcano's northern flank, as reported by Cotopaxi Park personnel.

GPS stations on the W and S flanks showed horizontal displacements of almost 16 ± 0.5 mm toward the W and SW. GPS stations on the NE and E flanks showed displacements to the N at a reduced velocity (Fig. 10). The vertical component registered a maximum uplift of 15 ± 2.3 mm. The movement to the west could have been accentuated by the volcano's morphology, as the W flank is poorly buttressed and sits upon Inter-Andean Valley volcaniclastic fill. In comparison the east and northern part of the cone
<figure><img src="image_107.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7** (continued)</figcaption></figure>

**Fig. 8** a Comparative graph of LP seismic events (orange bars) and high frequency tremor (black bars) possibly related to the boiling of the hydrothermal system and gas movements from 01 April to 14 August, 2015. Ash and gas emission-related tremor (pink bars) abruptly

lies upon a thick lava package and basement crystalline metamorphic rock and may be more resistant to lateral movement. Data processing employed the program GAMIT/GLOBK (Herring et al. 2015) and used a local reference frame with respect to fixed South America (Nocquet et al. 2014. We also defined a long-term displacement model for each GPS site by estimating a trend and

began the second week of August, 2015, after the ▶ hydromagmatic explosions on the 14th. **b** Seismogram (11 June, 2015) of BREF station showing registry of spasmodic tremor related to internal fluid movements in the upper part of the edifice

annual and semi-annual components using all available data between 2008 and 2015. The transient displacements identified during the 2015 unrest period are with respect to this model. In a second step, we applied a common-mode filtering estimated from the average time series residuals for sites ~50 km away from the volcano. Short-term repeatabilities are of the order of 1–2 mm on the
<figure><img src="image_108.png" /><figcaption>(b)
EC.BREF.BHZ 2015-06-11</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_109.png" /></figure>
SO2 Emissions of Cotopaxi- Jan. 2015- Jan 2016

<figure><img src="image_110.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 9** Registry of SO₂ values for Cotopaxi, January 2015 until 05 January 2016, with a significant increase in SO₂ observed since early May. Data was processed daily using a single wind speed and direction obtained from the</figcaption></figure>

NOAA and VAAC alerts. Graph included in Cotopaxi Special Report, No. 1, 2016: http://www.igepn.edu.ec/cotopaxi/informes-cotopaxi/coto-especiales/coto-e-2016/14074-informe-especial-cotopaxi-n-01/file

horizontal components and 3 mm on the vertical component, enabling us to extract the small GPS signal observed during the unrest period.

Due to the westward movement on the GPS station PSTO, which is 22 km W of the crater (Fig. 10), we surmised that the source was deep. Subsequent modeling of the data suggested a source of about 24 km deep located under the SE flank with a volume of $42 \pm 26 \text{ Mm}^3$ (Mothes et al. 2016b). Nonetheless, as mentioned in Sect. 3.1, analysis of the erupted ash suggests that the magma source is shallow, as least for the initial small volume that was emitted.

Data from a tiltmeter (VC1G on Fig. 2) installed in a thick lava package and located 6 km NE of the crater, showed a strong inflationary pattern that had started in April, 2015 on both axis. This tilt anomaly coincided with the notable increase in seismicity (Mothes et al. 2016b). Generally, when LP seismicity and

tremor were both strong, a positive tilt signal predominated.

Hydromagmatic Explosions/Strong Emissions of 14 August, 2015

On the evening of 13 August, a swarm of VT and LP seismic events was registered between 20h03 (GMT) on the 13th to 08h55 (GMT) in the early hours of the 14th, antecedent of the explosion events (Fig. 11). At 09h02, 09h07 and later at 15h25, 18h45 and 19h29 (UT) five small explosions/strong emissions were registered at Cotopaxi which served to unblock the conduit and led to ejection of degassed altered conduit plug material and scarce juvenile components. Although infrasound from these explosions did not exceed 4 Pascals (Pa) at stations located approximately 6 km from the vent, the first two
<figure><img src="image_111.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 10** GPS vectors for stations around Cotopaxi's cone and one to the west for October, 2015. Displacements are expressed with respect to the North Andean Silver and</figcaption></figure>

represent the comparison of GPS data collected from 01 January to 01 October, 2015 at the 7 station Cotopaxi CGPS network

explosions were heard by climbers in the Refuge on Cotopaxi's north flank, where lapilli-size fallout reached the Cotopaxi Refuge.

Two months earlier public and authorities had been forewarned in the special IGEPN reports (No. 3 and 4) that phreatic explosions would be a likely phenomenon in precursory eruptive activity (http://www.igepn.edu.ec/cotopaxi/informes-cotopaxi/coto-especiales/coto-e-2015/12990-informe-especial-cotopaxi-11-06-2015/file).

With these explosions the eruption column at 15h25 rose to 9 km above the crater rim and was clearly visible from the SW (Fig. 12a, b). Infrasound values of the explosions were less than 10 Pa at station BNAS (5 km from the crater), but the seismic source amplitudes of the tremor associated with the first two explosions were greater than those of most Cotopaxi LP events and also of some explosions registered at Tungurahua volcano (Kumagai et al. 2015). The initial explosions had evidence of water involvement. In previous weeks a small lake was observed in the crater's bottom; this was

totally evacuated by the explosions. Observers also reported that the fallout had a “wet aspect” and many of the fragments were agglutinated by a fine clay-size patina. The eruption is categorized as hydromagmatic, since the rapid interaction with water caused overpressures beneath the plug, raising lithostatic pressures that overcame the capacity of the altered conduit plug rock. After these main vent-opening events, the presence of hydrothermally altered material gradually waned and possible juvenile material became more prevalent (Gaunt et al. 2016).

The ash emissions from this first activity covered agricultural lands to the NW and W of the volcano with a $\leq 1$ mm thick dusting of altered silt to sand lithic grit and crystals (Fig. 13a) and caused poor visibility along major highways that enter Quito from the south. This ash emission mantled over 500 km$^2$ with more than 80 gr/m$^2$ and amounted to a volume of 118,000 m$^3$, keeping it within the range of a VEI = 1 (Bernard et al. 2016) (Fig. 13b).
<figure><img src="image_112.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 11** Registry of VT-LP seismic swarm which begin late 13 August, 2015 and was followed by the 5 small explosions/strong emissions on 14 August, all indicated with red arrows. Seismograms are of the IGEPN's monitoring network</figcaption></figure>

**Post 14 August, 2015: Open Conduit Degassing and Ash Emissions**

Ashfalls were prevalent towards the N and NW after 14 August into October and became scarce in late November (Fig. 14). A common scene

was that of the ash and gas plume cascading down the W flank, with only the initial pulse rising to <1 km upon emitting from the crater (Fig. 14).

Emission tremor of varying amplitudes accompanied the ash emissions and permitted IGEPN monitoring scientists to forecast if the
<figure><img src="image_113.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 12** Left Cotopaxi's 14 August, continuing emission —view of the volcano from SW at 14h10UT. *Photo* E. Pinajota, IGEPN. Right- The 15h25UT strong emission</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_114.png" /><figcaption>produced a column that ascended 6–8 km above the summit. *Photo* by Santiago Tapia, at the Novacero company grounds, 20 SW of the volcano</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_115.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_116.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 13** a Ashfall from 01 September emissions accumulated in cultivated fields near El Chaupi town. b Ash fallout map associated with the eruptive activity of Cotopaxi on the 14th–15th of August, 2015. Map projection WGS 84, coordinates in UTMs. Values expressed in isomass of grams/m². *Source* Bernard et al. (2016)</figcaption></figure>

rate of ash falls was increasing during frequent foggy, overcast conditions (Bernard et al. 2016). On the 14th of August, after the explosions, SO₂ levels reached 16,400 ton/day as registered by the satellite sensor OMI (http://so2.gsfc.nasa.gov/pix/daily/ixxxza/loopall3.php?yr=15&mo=08&dy=15&bn=ecuador) (Fig. 15). Subsequently, SO₂ levels were particularly high on the

15th and 24th of August, when OMI measurements gave readings of 6500 and 6600 ton/day, respectively.

In early September ash columns still rose to over three kilometers height above the vent and carried fine ash particles to cities on the piedmont of the coastal plain, such as Santo Domingo de los Colorados, located 120 km W of the volcano,
<figure><img src="image_117.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 14** Left Photo with view toward south taken from Autopista Ruminahui (SE of Quito) on 20 August. Photo-C. Zapata- EPN. Right Photo taken on the 23rd of August,</figcaption></figure>

2015, from the north side of Cotopaxi. A low gas and ash column trending to the NW is observed. *Photo* P. Mothes, IGEPN

essentially situated under the red swath trending W in Fig. 15.

Ashfall was still prevalent in mid-October, but had all but terminated the third week of November where it was seen W-NW of the volcano. VAAC Washington again reported suspended fine ash above Santo Domingo as well as in Los Rios province to the SW. The ash column generally rose to only 1 and 3 km above the summit and had a velocity between 6 and 10 m/s and lasted about one week. Fieldwork permitted the estimation of a mass and volume total of $3.49 \times 10^7$ kg (22,100 m$^3$) for this late, waning period (Bernard et al. 2016). The total ashfall dense rock equivalent (DRE) volume for the entire eruption was calculated in $0.5 \text{ Mm}^3$ (Bernard et al. 2016).

## Ash Componentry

Analysis of ash beneath both binocular and scanning electron microscope showed clearly that there was an evolution in ash componentry from the eruption's beginning on 14 August and later. The first ash from 14 August had more hydrothermal lithics (pyrite, scoria with vesicles filled with altered material and hydrothermal quartz). As the eruptions progressed we saw an increase in more fresh magmatic components, such as free crystals, glass particles with low vesicularity and a high percentage of microlites,

which implied low magma ascent rates and stiffening of magma in the upper part of the column (Gaunt et al. 2016).

Ashes collected on the 20th of October, had a high concentration of dense microcrystalline material. Although there is evidence of few vesiculated clasts (diktytaxitic texture); about 65% of the ash is considered possibly juvenile. Gaunt et al. (2016) suggest that the origin of the ash is the top of a degassed magma column which had ascended from about 3 km below the crater.

## Seismicity

For most of the post explosive period after mid-August, seismic hypocenters still remained located at the two depths mentioned above (Fig. 7). Most relevant was the sporadic occurrence of VT events with magnitudes of 3 or greater that occurred. Sometimes spasmodic tremor was registered and continued for hours, as for example, that registered on 02 September, 2015.

Starting on 10 September, a swarm of VT seismic events kicked in with a rate of approximately 100 events/day and a daily registry of coeval small internal explosions which has associated infrasound signatures, (shown in green color in Fig. 16). This swarm lasted past the New Year, but the overall seismic energy release was low (Figs. 3b and 5).
<figure><img src="image_118.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 15** Registry of SO₂ (16,400 ton/day) from satellite as detected by the OMI sensor on the 14th of August, 2015</figcaption></figure>

**Visual Observations and Secondary Effects**

Thermal images (August/2015) showed the presence of new thermal anomalies (~15 °C) inside the crevices on the N side glaciers, at the same time fumarolic gases were observed coming out from those fractures. The highest temperature obtained was about 200 °C (Fig. 17) from gases ascending the crater.

On September 3, water emerging from the basal fronts on the northern glaciers was clearly observed, and countless new crevices in the majority of glacier ends and on the upper flanks were evident. All this led to the conclusion that an abnormal process was producing increased melting of the glaciers. Starting in mid September it was possible to observe the presence of

small secondary lahars descending several streams and we estimated that many of them were due to increased glacier melting.

Orthophotos made on August 18 and then again on October 8, show a decrease of about 0.49 km² of the area covered by glaciers. This represents a very high rate of glacier melting, not explained exclusively by climate change (Cáceres et al. 2016).

We estimate that small volumes of magma reached surface levels in the volcano conduits causing increased circulation of hot fluids inside the edifice, apparently reaching the basal area of the glaciers and producing increased melting. It is necessary to further investigate the hazard due to instability in the melting glaciers and their eventual collapse that could lead to greater secondary lahars. Numerical modeling by
<figure><img src="image_119.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 16** Registry of overall seismicity at Cotopaxi volcano from 01 January 2015 to 01 April, 2016. Most notable is the presence of LP earthquakes in the first semester of 2015, later followed by emission tremor and</figcaption></figure>

finally with the advent and continuance of frequent VT seismic events with accompanying internal explosions that had no superficial manifestation, except infrasound registry

Hemmings et al. (2016) has shown the importance of hydrotthermal perturbations at Cotopaxi in generating watery flows.

Incandescence was also occasionally observed on cold still nights with a thermal camera or by simple vision. These events were considered to have been caused by pulses of hot gases.

The glacier around the crater, on the W and N flanks, became partially covered by ash. This coating of dark ash decreased the glacier albedo and consequently increased the absorption of solar rays. Therefore expedite melting of the glacier tongues increased, leaving obvious melt water channels issuing from the glaciers' base.

As a result of the afternoon melting by insolation and perhaps also by higher temperatures of the rock beneath the glaciers, runoff increased, especially off the W flank glaciers

and there were frequent small secondary lahars. Those lahars that have been especially associated with rain storms obtained the highest discharges—on the order of 10–30 m³/sec (D. Andrade-IGEPN, Pers, Comm, 2015). The Agualongo channel, on Cotopaxi’s W side was frequently flooded by lahars and on three occasions they covered partially the main road giving access to the volcano.

## Interpretation and Model

As shown in Fig. 16, LP events gradually increased starting in April, 2015, beginning with small magnitudes and low energy levels (Fig. 3). We interpret the LPs to imply fluid movement occurring at 10–12 km below the crater and then up to shallower levels (Fig. 7). There were only
<figure><img src="image_120.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 17** Thermal image taken on 03 September, 2015 looking toward the SE sector of the upper cone. The infrared camera detected temperatures of 200 °C associated with emission from the crater and lower temperatures</figcaption></figure>

from fractures below the summit rim. Photo P. Ramón, IGEPN. Source http://www.igepn.edu.ec/cotopaxi/informes-cotopaxi/coto-especiales/coto-e-2015/13529-informe-especial-no-14/file

scarce VTs that occurred in concert with the LPs. In late May VLPs were registered (Fig. 5) and were interpreted to be possible mass magma transport processes as reported by Arias et al. (2015). Often VLPs are identified as eruption precursors, e.g. at Redoubt (Power et al. 2012), for example. In hindsight, vigorous VLPs were also registered in 2009–2010 at Cotopaxi and correlated with recoverable deformation patterns at borehole tilt stations (Mothes et al. 2010), but did not result in an extended seismic crisis or magmatic activity on the surface.

Nonetheless, LP and VLP events registered in April–August, 2015 were apparently responding to a slow ascent of a small magma slug and associated fluids and in April 2015 deformation recorded by tilt and GPS stations began almost synchronically with the jump in LP seismicity,

implying that there may already have been magma ascent from a deeper depth to a shallower reservoir in order to show changes on the most proximal tiltmeters. The GPS stations begin to show minor displacements at the same time, particularly on the W-SW flank, where no strong evidence was detected in seismicity, but to the contrary seismicity was concentrated more on the E-SE flanks (Fig. 7). In sum, we registered both shallow and deep seismic activity. A leading hypothesis for this pattern likely was the interaction between fluids being released by a deep-seated source, say at 24 km depth as proposed in our geodetic model. These fluids ascended and perturbed a preexisting shallow-seated source, which may be the magmatic remnant that drove the 2001–2002 unrest reported by Hickey et al. (2015).
With more new magma in Cotopaxi's system, SO₂ output became prevalent in mid-May, one month after the hike in seismicity. Background SO₂ levels of <500 ton/day were surpassed and rose to over 3000 ton/day. The strong onset of bands of tremor about the 1st of June, were conjectured to be related to continual fluid movement within the edifice and perhaps to the boiling of the hydrothermal system and was a signal that more overall heat was circulating within the edifice.

Along with the rise in SO₂ there was also a trend in production of more VLP's since 114 of these events were registered between May and mid-August, 2015. Of great significance is that the largest VLPs were registered in the last 3 weeks before the hydromagmatic explosions. Afterwards too there were infrequent VLP's (Fig. 5).

With the highest energy levels of the VLPs being logged before the explosions, these events seem to have been one of the detonators of the explosions (Fig. 5b). They seemed to herald that magma/fluids were ascending. Of particular note was the VT/LP swarm of the 13th–14th of August that began 12 h before the hydromagmatic eruptions on the morning of 14 August (Fig. 11). The swarm comprised of some 40 VTs and >50 LPs was the most energetic of any seismic swarm registered at Cotopaxi since 2002 and was a warning in hindsight which presaged the subsequent explosions/strong emissions some hours later. These seismic trends and the higher SO₂ flux, would indicate that magma was working in the upper part of the system—at least in the 0 to 6 km level below the crater.

The initial explosions had a phreatic component since water was available in the small pond at the crater's base, sub-glacial melting and from pore water within the hydrothermal system. Nonetheless, Gaunt et al. (2016) argued that the most likely driving force of the initial explosions was magmatic heat interacting with the hydrothermal system providing energy to trigger hydromagmatic eruptions at Cotopaxi. Textural evidence for this process was only preserved in the deposits of the initial eruptions, but not subsequent ones. Later emissions were likely the

result of the repeated formation and destruction of a shallow magmatic plug by brittle fragmentation through mechanical stresses and decompression. Gas overpressure must have been accumulating beneath the conduit plug and may have contributed to the flank deformation, particularly as registered by the tiltmeters. In the succeeding post-explosion days SO₂ output rose to 16,000–18,000 ton/day (Hidalgo et al. 2016), a likely testimony to the accumulated gas that had been trapped in the plumbing system.

The expulsed material showed evidence of strong hydrothermal alteration and there was initially little evidence of juvenile components. There was also a low pH (3.6–5.1) and high sulfate- SO₄ concentrations (up to 13,000 mg/kg) in the expulsed ashes of the 14th to 25th of August, as detected by leachate analysis (P. Delmelle, Pers. Comm, 2015). Later, as described above, the percentage of juvenile components increased through time, to the last erupted material collected in late November, 2015.

After the explosions and strong emissions of the 14th of August, the conduit lost its retaining plug and remained open and continual fluid movement was facilitated, although pulsatile superficial activity continued, and few shallow explosions occurred. After the explosions LP events were initially high (>200 events/day), but dropped to <20 events/day by the first week of September, where they remain at this writing.

While the LPs diminished, to the contrary the VT events rose notably. Around the 1st of September 15–20 LP events/day were registered. By the third week of September these increased to >200 events/day (Fig. 16), and subsequently this value decreased to 50–100 events/day, but in all totaled nearly 15,000 events. In the last 3 months of 2015 persistent VT daily activity was registered as well as waning tilt and GPS offsets. Even with the VT swarm overall seismic energy levels decreased compared to the levels registered in May to August, which may be due to the overall successful degassing of the system, but could also be explained by closing of the conduit by a degassed magma column, thus impeding freer liberation of gases. Between
<figure><img src="image_121.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 18** Cartoons synthesizing the internal and superficial processes observed from April to December, 2015</figcaption></figure>

October 2015 through April, 2016 internal explosions of deep providence were registered at a rate of 20–30 such events/month. These explosions could be interpreted as gas passing

through restrictive areas within the conduit. While displaying only minimal infrasound and no detectable superficial vestiges, these explosions may be occurring due to pressurization
<figure><img src="image_122.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 18** (continued)</figcaption></figure>

deep within the system (e.g. Valentine et al. 2014).

A synthesis of the 2015 unrest at Cotopaxi, the hypothesized driving forces and possible paths taken are shown in the following schematic cartoons (Fig. 18).

## The Science-Society Interface

Strong evidence points to a magmatic component in Cotopaxi's 2015 reactivation and that this may be a precursor for future episodes, given that the bulk of the new magma that

perturbed the system remained at depth. As a comparison, the 2001–2002 restless period had essentially been internal with only the weakest of superficial manifestations. For the 2015 reactivation IG scientists took the warnings very seriously and put all their collective experience to the test to make interpretations of the monitoring data and to manage successfully the great expectations of the public and authorities during the crisis period described above. Overall IGEPN volcanologists wrote 23 special reports that were disseminated via multiple media (www.igepn.edu.ec). Given the low levels of acceleration of seismic energy, small ground
displacements and visual observations, eruption scenarios that the IGEPN formulated stayed within the realm of VEI 1–2 levels and clearly stated that the least likely scenarios was the generation of a paroxysmal eruption in which PDC’s, voluminous ashfalls and giant lahars would be formed.

With each convincing sign that Cotopaxi was displaying stronger activity, IG scientists were proactive in improving and strengthening all monitoring systems while simultaneously helping to prepare the populations and authorities for what a major eruption of Cotopaxi could mean. Work by Christie et al. (2015) (an earlier VUELCO contribution) had shown that residents of the Chillos valley, to the east of Quito, were particularly ill-prepared to confront lahar hazards due to their recency of living in that valley. On the other hand, residents of the Latacunga valley had a clearer memory of lahar hazards, since many of their distant relatives had lived through Cotopaxi eruptions and their collective memory is better preserved. Nonetheless, social media, both beneficial and alarming, steered perceptions and actions of residents. The area of influence by the volcano, especially with respect with lahars, includes four important provinces, several counties and Quito’s jurisdiction. It was particularly difficult to meet the demands and expectations and provide the personal attention of monitoring scientists to the authorities in each of these different municipalities as well as to meet with other community groups and respond to their uncertainties. There were also the constant attacks on social media of several particularly meany-intentioned individuals who constantly tried to steer attention away from the IGEPNs scientific work by saying that it was operating with poor instrumentation or that the monitoring work at IGEPN was “carried out by amateurs”.

All told, IGEPN scientists provided abundant custom guidance to local and national officials and residents with regards to volcano hazards and the proposed scenarios. A total of about 125 talks were given by IGEPN personal during the unrest period. Additionally, there was broad coordination with Ecuador’s Secretary for Risk

Management at all levels and participation in guiding eruption simulations. Some of the discussions with them were based on what had been reviewed in the VUELCO workshop-simulated eruption exercises carried out in late 2014 in Quito. The IGEPN also greatly benefitted by the strong collaboration and presence of members of the USGS/USAID Volcano Disaster Assistance Team who led informed discussions on the trends of the geophysical precursors and also helped to reinforce the lahar-detection network. Personal from Chalmers University of Technology (Sweden), JICA (Japan), IRD (France) and NASA (USA), DEMEX-EPN with help in SEM, LMU-Germany with grain size x-ray diffraction and UCL (Belgium) with leachates, also collaborated during the crisis.

As the eruption process waned, it was obvious that high-risk populations were tired of being constantly alert and didn’t want to be perpetually attentive to volcanic processes that could threaten their livelihoods and families. This issue will have to be acknowledged and dealt with in future reactivations.

## Conclusions

Seismic activity and its evolution in event types, energy release, shallowing depths and locations, elevated degassing and ash emissions and flank deformation typified the restlessness of Cotopaxi during 2015. The important accumulative energy release first of LPs than followed by registry of an important suite of large VLP’s was a significant geophysical pattern indicating fluid movement, followed then by a more convincing transfer up conduit of small slugs of magma and gases to beneath the conduit plug. In the late hours of the 13th of August this plug fractured and ruptured, evidenced by the vigorous swarm of VTs and LPs before the hydromagmatic explosions that occurred early on the 14th of August 2015. Minor ground deformation, the small, limited explosions in August and subsequent ash emission suggest that the ascended magma volume was small, and indeed as calculated by Bernard et al. (2016), was only about
0.5 Mm³ DRE. This value is far inferior to the
possible volume of 42 ± 26 Mm³, which is
hypothesized to be at depth based on modeling
of the observed GPS displacements (Mothes
et al. 2016b). A second energetic magmatic
pulse did not arise, and certainly not one with a
sufficient volume to produce a VEI 3 or 4
eruption, which was one of the least likely sce-
narios, but nonetheless dreaded by the society
and scientists.

Following the 14 August explosions and
subsequent ash emissions we did not observe a
new phase of outward GPS displacement trends
in the deformation data, which could have
implied a new magma input to cause another
phase of deformation. The post-explosion VT
seismic swarm which lasted 5 months was
indicative of persistent internal perturbation but
did not transpire in a new phase of deformation,
thus we assumed that we were dealing with a
small magma volume. The magma that tipped off
the 2015 unrest may have been a remnant of that
which provoked the 2001–2002 episode and was
reported by Hickey et al. (2015). This residual
magma could have been disturbed by the
ascending heat and fluids from the new magma
input at depth (~24 km) whose source was
possibly under the SE flank, and which provoked
the recorded ground deformation and the LP and
VLP seismicity.

The volcano was benevolent and had awak-
ened to only a VEI 2 level. No major damage
was imparted upon the population or on liveli-
hoods, except for temporary local economic
depression, increased anxiety of the population,
mild crop losses and premature selling of live-
stock due to fears of future losses. Overall, the
volcano's manifestations served as a warning to
everyone to keep attentive of Cotopaxi's capacity
to cause destruction and possible severe ruin by
lahar transit down major drainages which are
heavily populated and host important strategic
infrastructure.

An eruption process can last months to dec-
ades, and we need only to look at Tungurahua, an
andesitic stratocone also in Ecuador's Cordillera
Real, with ongoing eruptions for 17 years
(Mothes et al. 2015a, b), or Soufrière Hills on

Montserrat (Sparks and Young 2002) to suggest
that the next round of Cotopaxi eruptions could
last more than just several months. In the case of
Tungurahua, activity started gradually in 1999
and displayed oscillating low-level behavior over
the years to finally generate a rapid-onset VEI 3
eruption in 2006 (Hall et al. 2013). Such long
waits test the population's resilience, but is also a
time for monitoring scientists to become
acquainted with the volcano's eruption style.
During a reactivation period of a long dormant
volcano there are many uncertainties and this
demands stringent work and continual mindful-
ness by monitoring scientists and frequent
ongoing interactive and personal communication
with local communities and authorities.

During the 2015 unrest period at Cotopaxi,
people living in high-risk zones (i.e. Latacunga
and Valle de los Chillos) were swayed by spec-
ulation, rumors and lies concerning the status of
the volcano. Some people also tended to
weigh-in toward imprecise information posted on
Facebook or Twitter and heed pseudo volcanol-
ogists and detractors, rather than rely on infor-
mation from official channels. It was not
uncommon to receive telephone calls from hys-
terical residents in either of these population
centers inquiring if a Cotopaxi eruption was im-
minent? All told the IGEPN put out 3 reports
each day about the volcano's activity and more
than 24 special reports, all which are available on
the IG website (www.igepn.edu.ec). The number
of followers on the IGEPN's Facebook page
grew to >1 million. To help stem the flow of bad
information at the community level Ecuador's
911 system, in coordination with IGEPN per-
sonal, formed a pan-volcano vigía network
comprised of volunteer observers who report via
radio several times a day about their visual and
audible observations of Cotopaxi or the rivers
that are borne on it. This network with 55 vol-
unteers, is in many ways a replica of the suc-
cessful community-based vigía system that has
functioned at Tungurahua volcano since 2001
(Stone et al. 2014; Mothes et al. 2015b). The
information provided by the vigía volunteers
compliments the ongoing geophysical monitor-
ing and also serves to strengthen their capacities
as community leaders and guides during volcano crisis (Espín Bedón et al. 2016).

A hypothesis for a future trend in activity weighs heavily towards hydromagmatic to Vulcanian explosions which may have a rapid onset, similar to the 14th of August episode, then evolve to sub-Plinian to Plinian eruptions of VEI 3-4 magnitude, if enough magma has accumulated at a relatively shallow depth (maybe 0-7 km below the crater) as shown in Fig. 7 for the upper level seismicity, and can make it to the surface before degassing. Vulcanian eruptions have been prominent in the volcano's historical activity (Gaunt et al. 2015). Unraveling the story will be difficult.

As the volcano is well-monitored 24 h/day/365, we anticipate that the IGEPN will provide early warnings to the public and officials before onset of important eruptive activity. This 2015 "dry run" allowed for diversification and hardening of Cotopaxi's monitoring network, frequent preparation and reappraisal of eruption scenarios and for the creation of a society-wide discussion of the possible consequences of a large Cotopaxi eruption. Some of these steps were facilitated by previous work in a VUELCO workshop. Essentially, attending to the 2015 activity was an opportunity to test the level of preparedness of the scientists and of the Ecuadorian society. All IGEPN scientists strived hard to be ready to "call it right", had the occasion arisen and a large eruption was in preparation. Since so little new magma erupted and there was no detectable subsequent shallow magmatic recharge, we consider the eruption as extremely small, and that the residual magma is in repose until a future time. Overall, the crisis was an important opportunity for learning about Cotopaxi's restlessness, with particular recognition of the increase in the VLP events and their energy levels just weeks before the mid-August explosions and the synchronous but progressive ground deformation signals, albeit small, that coincided with the increased seismicity. These two patterns more than any other geophysical signals, announced the ascent of Cotopaxi's magma, although finally only a small quantity breached the surface.

In all likelihood little or no evidence of the 2015 restless period will be preserved in the geological record. We know from written chronicles (1534-1877) that Cotopaxi often had weeks to months of ramping up before unleashing VEI 3 or 4 eruptions, i.e. there were probably several poorly preserved 2015-sized like events, and therefore unrest has been poorly documented. In this recent case, scientists had the benefit of observing and analyzing the geophysical monitoring output during the entire episode and knowing what level of activity the volcano was at. But, monitoring scientists, just like the citizens of Ecuador, experienced the anxiety of pondering what could be the volcano's next steps, i.e., the possible rapid intrusion of a new batch of volatile-rich magma or returning to calm. Fortunately, in this time around, the first scenario did not transpire. However, this training opportunity that we experienced could prove invaluable for when the next scenario is played out.

**Acknowledgements** This work was supported by a grant from European Commission FP 7 program (ENV.2011.1.3.3-1; grant no: 282759; VUELCO). We would like to thank the IGEPN staff for keeping all monitoring operations at Cotopaxi volcano optimally functioning. Members of the IGEPN's Volcanology group gave most of the talks and explanations of eruptions scenarios to authorities, community groups and wherever was necessary during the crisis. We acknowledge the VUELCO project for opportunities to share opinions about future eruptive crisis scenarios. Also, we are grateful for the support of the VDAP/USAID team during the crisis. The EPN, SENESCYT and SENPLADES provided funding for much of the instrumentation and daily operations. Support by JICA instrumentation and guidance is also noted. The Ecuadorian military provided overflights of Cotopaxi, while IGM provided ortophotos. The LMI project was instrumental in carrying out near real time petrologic monitoring. Thanks to Viviana Valverde for preparation of several figures. Recognition is given to the expressions of interest by STREVA project members on the societal implications of eruptive activity at Cotopaxi.

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<figure><img src="image_123.png" /></figure>
# Volcanic Unrest Simulation Exercises: Checklists and Guidance Notes

R. J. Bretton, S. Ciolli, C. Cristiani, J. Gottsmann, R. Christie and W. Aspinall

## Abstract

When a volcano emerges from dormancy into a phase of unrest, the civil protection authorities charged with managing societal risks have the unenviable responsibility of making difficult decisions balancing numerous competing societal, political and economic considerations. A volcano that is threatening to erupt requires sound risk assessments incorporating trusted hazard assessments that are timely, relevant and comprehensible. Foreseeable challenges arise when the inevitable uncertainties of hazard assessment and communication meet societal and political demands for certitude. In some regions that host volcanic hazards, it would be

both realistic and prudent to adopt three working assumptions. The complex legal and administrative infrastructures of risk governance will be largely untested and possibly inadequate. Many volcano observatory scientists, and probably even more risk managers and at-risk individuals/communities, will have inadequate recent experience of the challenges of hazard communication during a period of unrest. And lastly, the scientists may also have inadequate practical experience of the needs and management capacities of the risk-mitigation decision makers with whom they must communicate. “Practice doesn’t make perfect. Practice reduces the imperfection.” (Beta 2011). If this statement is correct, volcanic unrest simulation exercises (VUSE) have a vital role to play within the complex processes of volcanic risk governance. Consistent with the broad approach of the Sendai Framework for Risk Reduction 2015–30, this chapter argues that practical knowledge of VUSE can and should be analysed and recorded so that key lessons can be shared for the widest possible benefit. This chapter investigates five recent simulation exercises and presents six complementary checklists based upon data, insights and practice pointers derived from those exercises. The use of checklists, supported by guidance notes, is commended as a pragmatic way to create, test and develop acceptable standards of governance practice.

R. J. Bretton (✉) · J. Gottsmann · W. Aspinall
School of Earth Sciences, University of Bristol,
Bristol, UK
e-mail: Richard.Bretton@bristol.ac.uk

R. J. Bretton · J. Gottsmann · R. Christie
W. Aspinall
The Cabot Institute, University of Bristol,
Bristol, UK

S. Ciolli · C. Cristiani
Dipartimento della Protezione Civile (DPC),
Rome, Italy

R. Christie
School of Sociology, Politics and International
Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
It is argued here that well planned and executed simulation exercises are capable of informing and motivating a wide range of risk governance stakeholders. They can identify process and individual shortcomings that can be mitigated. Simulation exercises can and should play a vital role in reducing volcanic risks.

**Keywords**

Volcanic unrest • Risk governance •
Simulations • Exercises • Training •
Communication

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Simulation Exercises and the Sendai Framework

This chapter is about reconstructions of the evolution of past, and realistic simulations of hypothetical future, volcanic unrest events. They will be referred to as Volcanic Unrest Simulation Exercises (VUSE). A simulation is “a learning experience that occurs within an imaginary or virtual system or world” and involves role-play, which has been defined as “the importance and interactivity of roles in pre-defined scenarios” (van Ments 1999; Errington 1997, 2011; Dohaney et al. 2015). A fuller working description is set out in Sect. 3.1.

The Sendai Framework prioritises mitigation of risks before response and recovery. It also recognises the importance of “building the knowledge of, inter alia, government officials… through sharing experiences, lessons learned, good practices, and training and education on disaster risk reduction” (UN/ISDR 2015, 15). Mutual learning, dialogues and cooperation between risk governance stakeholders are encouraged. The Sendai Framework also identifies a need for quality standards.

The principal purpose of this chapter is to accept the challenge of the goals of the Sendai

Framework and to share knowledge derived from several recent simulation exercises with a wide audience.

## 1.2 The Managerial and Scrutiny Dimensions of Risk

### 1.2.1 Managerial Dimension

When a volcano emerges from dormancy into a phase of unrest, the civil authorities in charge of managing volcanic risks have to make challenging decisions (Fiske 1984; Dohaney et al. 2015). Decisions balancing safety and cost typically must be made with limited information (Sparks et al. 2012a, b; Marzocchi et al. 2012; Jenkins et al. 2012) and in real time and under uncertainty, in a context of intense pressure (Marrero et al. 2015, 2). While the primary objective is to minimise the loss and damage from any volcanic event, the socio-economic losses resulting from false alarms and evacuations must also be considered” (Woo 2008; Hincks et al. 2014, 2; Donovan and Oppenheimer 2014).

Poorly handled unrest periods cause social, economic and political problems, even without an eruption. Ill-considered responses may facilitate the release of inappropriate advice and emergency declarations, and may lead to unwarranted media speculation and the premature cessation of economic activity and community services (Johnston et al. 2002, 228).

Recent crises, including the 2010 Icelandic Eyjafjallajökull eruption, have highlighted the difficulty of co-ordinating and synthesising scientific inputs from many different disciplines and institutions, and translating these into useful policy advice at very short notice (Harris et al. 2012; Dohaney et al. 2015). Effective communication, collaboration and cooperation are necessary between many expert and technical advisors, emergency management agencies and lifeline organisations (Doyle et al. 2015).

Jordan et al. (2011) have emphasised the need for scientists to have a clear role, a clear and authoritative voice and effective communication skills. The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2015) has identified the need for scientific advisers to have: (1) permanent authoritative structures; (2) a central contact point; (3) clear reporting procedures; (4) a pre-defined public communication strategy; and, when necessary, (5) ways to coordinate their actions internationally.

Although civil protection “authorities may have theoretical knowledge of volcanos, few have any practical experience of eruptions” (Solana et al. 2008, 312). Furthermore, the timescales of periods of volcanic unrest, especially bigger ones, do not correlate well with the tenures of political and senior management appointments (Donovan and Oppenheimer 2012; Mothes et al. 2015).

The term ‘standard equivocality’ relates to the “absence of commonly recognised standards capable of guiding, measuring and evolving acceptable practice” (Hood 1986; Bretton 2014; Bretton et al. 2015; Rothstein 2002). It is suggested here that there are no readily accessible standards regarding how hazard communication should be conducted during a period of volcanic unrest.

### 1.2.2 Scrutiny Dimension

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and United Nations Development Programme (2015) (IFRC/UNDP) legal checklist requires national laws to establish and promote the training of public officials and relevant professionals.

There is an emerging international law duty upon sovereign states to have substantive regulatory systems to ensure that risks from natural hazards are mitigated so that they do not endanger human lives. States must inform at-risk communities of the potential of unmitigated risks and establish sufficient co-ordination and cooperation between administrative authorities. This is an onerous duty and it is argued here that it would be prudent to assume that the general duty includes several more specific subsidiary duties. One would be to consider the merits of simulation exercises as a way of satisfying: (1) the specific requirements of national laws; (2) the general expectations of international law; (3) the education, training and knowledge-sharing goals of the Sendai Framework; and (4) the requirements of the IFRC/UNDP legal checklist.

## 1.3 Academic Support for Training and Simulation Exercises

The experience and levels of expertise of observatory scientists are critical to making accurate forecasts and training is important (McGuire and Kilburn 1997). In the context of volcanic risks, Doyle et al. (2015) undertook a review of the literature on emergency management team response, decision making, mental models and situation awareness and exercising. They argue that science agencies and science advisory groups must embark on a suite of training activities to enhance their response during a disaster. These should include exercise and simulation programmes within their own organisations rather than participation solely as external players in emergency management activities. Structures, resources and time must be provided for these programmes.

It is further argued by Doyle et al. (2015) that training will enhance the future response capabilities of both scientists and risk-mitigation agencies in several ways.

## 2 Methodology

This chapter reviews five simulation exercises (four of which were conducted as part of the VUELCO project), which for ease of reference are summarised in Table 1. It investigates the ways in which these exercises were planned and undertaken. By design, it does not address in any detail: (1) the features of the various and varying volcanic settings in which the exercises were conducted; or (2) the nature, scope or analysis of the monitoring data that were painstakingly created for the volcanic hazard scenarios that underpinned them.

This chapter draws from ethnographic observational data (recorded in hand written field notes) collected during five simulation exercises from the perspectives of overt non-participant
<table><caption>**Table 1** Brief details of the analysed five volcanic unrest simulation exercises</caption><thead><tr><th>Name</th><th>Hosting organisations country/when</th><th>Volcanic hazard scenarios and interpretation of observables</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Colima</td><td>VUELCO<br>Mexico (Colima)<br>17–23/11/2012</td><td>Volcan de Colima—evidence of moderate effusive activity alternating with moderate explosive events; escalating unrest, dome growth, some explosions, a 2 km + eruptive column, ash-fall, possible evolutions included: effusive dome growth alone, a large explosive eruption after dome collapse, partial flank collapse, a mixed ‘Merapi type’ event and cessation of dome growth; culmination in risk sufficient to require the evacuation of a single small town—La Becerrera</td></tr><tr><td>Campi Flegrei</td><td>VUELCO<br>Italy (Rome)<br>11–12/02/2014</td><td>Campi Flegrei—conflicting evidence of either a rise of magma from about 7 km or an increase in shallow hydrothermal activity; further evolution involving a possible 3 km sill or continued shallow fluid migration; further rapid evolution raised the possibility of phreatic explosions and small volume magmatic eruptions in the eastern sector; further dramatic evolution made explosions and eruptions likely within days or weeks in the Bagnoli-Solfatara area and small offshore eruptions were not excluded; culmination in eruption between Bagnoli and Monte Spina and a sustained eruptive column, ash fall and pyroclastic flows south and east</td></tr><tr><td>Mount Teide</td><td>Presidencia del Gobierno de Canarias and Instituto Geográfico Nacional (IGN), Ministerio de Fomento, Gobierno de España<br>Tenerife, Spain (Santa Cruz de Tenerife)<br>25/04/2014</td><td>Teide-Pico Viejo—evidence of rumbling noises, small debris avalanches and no seismic/deformation changes; further evolution with more rumbling noises, small swarm of seismic events; further evolution with swarm of small high-frequency VT, an explosive event, new thermal events and ash emissions with LFs and tremors; further evolution with pronounced SO₂ decrease interpreted as near-surface sealing of rising magma with high probability of eruption; culmination in eruption</td></tr><tr><td>Cotopaxi</td><td>VUELCO<br>Ecuador (Quito)<br>13/11/2014</td><td>Cotopaxi—evidence of anomalous seismic activity with returns to background levels and no physical-chemical changes; possible local tectonic activity, fluctuating gas emissions, some deformation, further evolution with many long-period events, increasing released energy, sub-vertical fault in NE flank, increasing deformation, high gas emissions, increased fumarolic activity, increased thaw in upper parts of the edifice; further evolution to sporadic vulcanian explosions, eruptive columns &lt;5/8 km plus tephra; further evolution with escalating seismic activity, inflation and degassing changes; culmination in eruption</td></tr><tr><td>Dominica</td><td>VUELCO<br>Dominica (Roseau)<br>14–15/05/2015</td><td>Southern volcanic region including Trois Piton—evidence of elevated seismicity, landslides and small hydrothermal changes; further evolution with many VT events and landslides, a return to hydrothermal background levels plus Boiling Lake drainage; further evolution with more VT events and hybrids followed by VT decrease with hybrids dominating, continuing geochemical background levels, no recent deformation and contraction in some areas, indications of a deeper source than in the early unrest phases, possible pressurisation of deep seated magmatic system or hydrothermal activity; culminated in the consideration of a lowering of the Alert level</td></tr></tbody></table>
observers and, to a very limited but recorded extent, of participant-observers. Four exercises relate to VUELCO volcano unrest simulations in Mexico, Italy, Ecuador and Dominica. Detailed analysis of the documents prepared before, during and after these exercises was undertaken. The challenges of avoiding researcher bias and unintended observer effects were recognised.

Additional observational and documentary data were acquired by the lead author during the Tenerife (Spain) exercise as an invited external non-participant observer commissioned to prepare a post-exercise evaluation at the request of the Presidencia del Gobierno de Canarias. No ethical agreement was signed before or during that exercise. Data from that exercise and extracts from the post-exercise report are included by kind written permission of the Presidencia del Gobierno de Canarias.

Within the main body of this chapter, no attempt is made to provide complete details of the five exercises listed in Table 1. Essential background information and additional reading sources are to be found in additional files A–E which, for ease of reference, have deposited at the ‘Collaborative volcano research and risk mitigation’ (VHUB) website under reference “Volcanic Unrest Simulation Exercises: checklists and guidance notes—Additional files A-E”. The additional reading sources are also listed at the end of the references for this chapter.

# 3 Background

## 3.1 VUELCO Themes and Goals

As VUSE are purpose-driven learning activities, each will have tailored goals and an overall design based upon the needs of its participants. Consistent with VUELCO's stated goals, the principal purpose of each VUELCO exercise was to present a realistic simulation of the evolution of past and hypothetical future volcanic unrest events associated with a host volcano or wider volcanic setting. In the manner of a film set, a simulated volcanic event is the dynamic backdrop against which a selection of risk governance

infrastructures, policies, procedures and people is tested.

The VUELCO exercises involved the provision of raw or partially analysed monitoring data and information to geo-scientists. Their role was to undertake a scientific analysis of the data with the purpose of passing on characterisations of likely volcanic hazard scenarios, by means of hazard communications, to risk mitigation decision-makers (civil protection authorities and the representatives of at-risk individuals) and the mass media. The civil protection authorities, having considered not only societal issues but also political, economic and other values, made and communicated risk mitigation decisions. In some exercises, representatives of at-risk communities, emergency services and relevant government entities played active roles in testing emergency, law and order, rescue, medical and evacuation procedures.

## 3.2 Checklists and Guidance Notes

### 3.2.1 Checklists

The checklists within this chapter are presented in response to the perceived importance of such documents as sources of good practice in the eyes of recent commentators (e.g. Gawande 2010; Newhall 2010; IAVCEI 2015). For example, within the ‘Safe Surgery Saves Lives’ project, which started in 2007, the World Health Organisation (WHO) introduced a Surgical Safety Checklist developed by Dr. Atul Gawande based, inter alia, upon the success of pre-flight checklists in enhancing safety within the aviation industry. “A systematic review and meta-analysis of the effect of the WHO checklist” strongly suggests a related “reduction in post-operative complications and mortality” (Bergs et al. 2014, 150; Treadwell et al. 2014).

Drawing upon the research of Gawande (2010), this chapter’s checklists aim to incorporate several critical features that are output and outcome-focussed. As far as reasonably practicable, the authors’ aim has been to ensure that each checklist is: (1) concise and preferably short as well; (2) simple, precise and unambiguous;
(3) targeted by addressing only evidence-based priorities that are considered either critical or significant to risk governance; and (4) non-prescriptive and non-comprehensive. Checklists may encourage rational, systematic (i.e. both consistent and complete), routine and transparent practices whilst recognising the importance of, and encouraging careful attention to, a wide variety of constraints and expectations. However, it is not envisaged that they should be used as a regulatory device, an enforceable legal requirement, or part of a blame-avoidance strategy (Hood 2011; OECD 2015).

The checklists presented in this chapter address the general planning, funding and execution of purposeful simulation exercises. The exercises also highlighted the many challenges of hazard communication and the difficulties that may result if the needs of other stakeholders are not identified and responded to.

This chapter presents six checklists namely: (1) Planning; (2) Logistics; (3) The Volcano team; (4) The Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC); (5) The Risk Managers - Civil Protection Authorities (CPA); and (6) The Observers/ Auditors. The first two relate to exercise 'phases' and the other four relate to 'roles'. It is not suggested that these checklists will be relevant to all simulation exercises, however, they will provide an indication of some of the critical phases and major roles that must be considered.

The checklists inevitably reflect the fact that VUELCO's exercises placed particular emphasis on the scientific analysis of monitoring data, the communication of hazard characterisations to risk managers, and interactions between scientists, risk managers, the media and the general public. It is accepted that future exercises may have other goals for which more or different checklists may be helpful.

The 'Planning' checklist encourages the identification of goals and objectives, and the need for clear leadership, careful design and realistic financing.

The 'Logistics' checklist is probably the most important. The actual task of arranging the 'planned' exercise may have many benefits in its own right as it will require the careful

identification of key laws, policies, procedures and people.

The 'Volcano team' has the very difficult obligation to craft and deliver monitoring data consistent with realistic volcanic hazard scenarios. The data must be suitable to meet the hazard analysis challenges confronted by the experts within the 'Scientific Advisory Committee' (SAC). It is noted here that, in some situations, the roles of monitoring and analysis may be undertaken by the same team or with substantial personnel overlaps. This chapter retains the separation to cover circumstances where there are distinct group remits, functions and responsibilities.

The SAC receives and handles the data provided utilising, as appropriate, a variety of soft skills (including those of analysis, deliberation and communication), tools (including expert elicitation and probabilistic models) and established procedures and protocols.

The 'Risk Managers - Civil Protection Authorities' (CPA) make risk mitigation decisions based in part upon scientific communications received from the SAC or, where the existence of a SAC is not foreseen within the relevant governance system, the Volcano team. An important part of the CPA role is usually the challenging duty, not only to advise individuals and entities driven by political values, but also to interact with members of the public and respond to mass and social media demands. The press and social media "can play an important role in the dissemination of information, true or false" and social media can rapidly ferment public, anxiety, distrust or dissent (OECD 2015, 37).

Simulation exercises are learning/training exercises and, accordingly, the importance of 'Observers' should not be underestimated. If properly briefed, observers and auditors will not only contribute their own candid views about all aspects of the exercise but also encourage other participants to be reflective about their own contributions and actions.

### 3.2.2 Guidance Notes

To support and supplement the checklists, it is suggested here that guidance notes should be
issued from time to time to provide a dynamic
and helpful knowledge and innovation resource.
Their aim should be: (1) to gather together,
record and share the accumulated experience of
other practitioners in relevant fields of expertise;
and (2) to suggest ways to find optimal solutions
to the most critical issues.

It is readily accepted that the observations
within the guidance notes are inevitably subjec-
tive. They are not intended to be in any respect
either comprehensive or prescriptive. They are
presented as options to be considered along with
other issues that will be found within best prac-
tice guidelines such as those identified in Doyle
et al. (2015).

4 Checklists (in bold italics)
and Guidance Notes (in normal
font)

**4.1 Planning**

Leadership

Who (individual and entity) has overall
responsibility for planning and delivering the
exercise?

The choice of exercise leaders should be dic-
tated by the planned goals and activities of the
exercise. If a significant involvement of civil
protection authorities is planned (for example,
where risk mitigation decisions are to be made
and/or related mitigation measures are to be tested)
those authorities should probably take the lead.

The VUELCO exercises have suggested that
overall responsibility for a VUSE should be
assigned to just one person within the risk gov-
ernance stakeholder (e.g. the civil protection
authority) likely to gain most from it. That per-
son, who will need suitable and sufficient support
from a working team or steering group, should
have the gravitas, personality, authority, experi-
ence and resources (both human and financial)
needed to plan and handle a complex high profile
project that will inevitably attract political, soci-
etal and media attention.

The MIAVITA Handbook (2012, 118) sug-
gest that it is good practice for “a steering group

to be in charge of co-ordination and leadership of
the various preparatory activities”.

After one VUELCO exercise it was suggested
that at least “a full-time scientist” should be
dedicated to preparing any exercise that focusses
on scientific analysis.

Purpose and Goals

What is the overall purpose of the VUSE?

What are the short and long term goals of
the exercise and its players?

A VUSE is a learning activity and the prin-
cipal reasons for it must be identified and stated.
It should respond to the perceived core needs of
the participating stakeholders and, like any
learning activity, be carefully planned with stated
assumptions, aims, objectives and themes.

Before the exercise, each and every partici-
pant should know what they will learn from the
exercise. Thought should also be given to how
and by whom the success of the exercise will be
evaluated and what will be done by whom to
build upon the exercise.

The assumptions, aims, objectives and themes
should be set out in the pre-exercise briefing note
referred to in Sect. 4.2 of this checklist.

Scope

Which parts of the risk governance process
are going to be tested?

A VUSE should be focussed, purpose-driven
and planned accordingly.

No VUSE can realistically attempt to replicate
all aspects and phases of, and all stakeholders
interested in, a societal risk governance regime. It
is possible that more regular exercises, which
concentrate upon very carefully defined aspects
of the system (e.g. communicating in real time
with the general public and the mass media), may
be more cost-effective and beneficial.

Consideration might be given to those issues
and functions that require the most
inter-stakeholder planning, cooperation and col-
laboration and accordingly excellent means of
communication. A VUSE can and should be a
learning exercise in communication between
many key players such as:
* Geoscientists and other geoscientists.

* Geoscientists and risk governance advisers (e.g. weather forecasters, aviation and marine space managers, communication specialists etc.).

* Geoscientists and other stakeholders (e.g. individuals within civil protection authorities, interested and affected members of the public, representatives of community, religious, public utility and commercial interests, and representatives of international, national, regional, municipal and other levels of government).

* Local geoscientists (e.g. volcano observatory staff) and visiting scientists (e.g. academics contributing to a scientific advisory committee) and visiting researchers.

* Hazard analysts (e.g. local and visiting geoscientists) and experts in risk assessment and management.

* All scientific analysts/risk decision makers and (1) the general public and (2) the mass media.

In 1999 several of these interactions were addressed by IAVCEI's Subcommittee for Crisis Protocols, which issued a report entitled “Professional conduct of scientists during volcanic crises” (Newhall et al. 1999). In the context of the governance of the risks of volcanic hazards, this paper represents a rare, if not unique, example of an attempt to offer authoritative practice guidance based on past events and an extensive literature review. It was concerned principally with personal and institutional interactions during a volcanic crisis.

Consideration should also be given to whole or part of an exercise being in 'degraded mode'. The MIAVITA Handbook (2012, 118) suggests that exercises should be planned to test system level capabilities of response when some parts of the system are not fully operative. By this means, depending upon which aspects are being tested, allowance can be made for, inter alia, holidays, the malfunctioning or destruction of monitoring or telecommunication equipment, blocked escape or rescue routes, and weather conditions.

By way of illustration of needs that an exercise might seek to target, Exercise Capital Quake

identified eleven functions—”Public Information Management, Governance, National Financial System, Logistics and Other Support Co-ordination, International Assistance and Liaison, Rescue, Health, Welfare, Building Safety, Restoration of Access and Restoration of Lifelines” (NZ/MCDEM 2008).

Another possible example comes from the “Metodo Augustus”, the organisation of emergency management, used at the Italian Department of Civil Protection. That organisation provided several support functions including technical-scientific, health and veterinary assistance, mass-media and information, volunteers, means and materials, transportations and mobility, telecommunications, essential services, damage assessment, operational structures, local administrations, dangerous materials, people assistance, cultural heritage and coordination (Galanti et al. 2006).

VUELCO chose a science-orientated focus for its four exercises concentrating upon the interfaces between:

* Hazard monitoring and hazard assessment:

* Long-term monitoring

* The host volcano's main precursors of volcanic unrest.

* The host volcano's short-term monitoring resources (e.g. equipment, employed staff and volunteers etc.), the nature, adequacy and timing of the data output, and their capacity to respond to changing demands.

* Hazard assessment and risk assessment

* As the period of unrest evolves: (1) real time characterisations of the host volcano's possible and most likely hazards and their temporal, physical and spatial parameters; and (2) other advice e.g. the merits/safety of further/different short-term monitoring.

* The communication of scientific analysis (with its inherent assumptions, limitations, complexities and uncertainties) to a variety of stakeholders each possibly having different requirements and expectations and related communication challenges.
If an exercise focusses predominantly upon scientific issues, it may be very difficult to engage participants from civil protections agencies and more ‘risk’ related functions.

A VUSE can be a good opportunity to test the processes by which scientific analysis is integrated into risk assessment agencies, such as civil protection authorities, that do not have embedded scientists.

**What is the proposed active participant scope?**

In a VUSE, if time and resources permit, a wide range of stakeholders can be represented and actively involved including, but not limited to:

* the host volcano as the source of scientific and visual data, which are provided sequentially in discrete pre-planned “phase” briefings/reports (hereinafter called the Volcano team);

* host volcano observatory scientists (the VOS);

* local and external scientists (collectively called the scientific advisory committee or SAC);

* risk assessors and managers possibly from a range of national, federal, state, regional and municipal tiers of government (hereinafter called civil protection authorities or CPA);

* the media;

* interested and affected members of the public.

In a more sophisticated exercise, it may be worthwhile ensuring that a “dissenting/minority view” and/or “maverick” scientists are represented to test robustly relevant democratic and communication processes.

The MIAVITA Handbook (2012, 114–116) details the benefits of informing, sharing and training involving: (1) national, regional and local authorities; (2) scientists; (3) volunteers; (4) the media; (5) pupils and students; and (6) the public.

The VUELCO Colima exercise incorporated the planned evacuation of an at-risk community. A VUSE can usefully focus upon the real time implementation of the risk mitigation strategies that result from the dynamic characterisation of an evolving unrest. However, the time and resources required to identify and engage multiple stakeholders, including members of the public, should not be underestimated.

Care must be exercised if one of the hazard scenarios will result in the need for the evacuation of representatives of at least one vulnerable community. Of course, this will have to be organised and announced well in advance of the start of the exercise. This may affect (i.e. make rather implausible) other parts of the exercise which may depend upon realistic and continuing uncertainty as to the future evolution of the initial hazard.

**What is the proposed passive participant (e.g. observers and monitors) scope?**

In the VUELCO exercises, very valuable contributions were made by monitors and observers. They can be from the participating organisations or entirely ‘independent’. Monitors and observers (particularly with experience of previous exercises and the practices of countries other than the host country) can play a critical role in providing both hot and cold feedback whilst also gaining invaluable personal experience to assist in the planning of future exercises.

VUSE are invariably observed by local and visiting students and early career academics. With careful planning, it may be possible for less experienced scientists and civil protection authority decision makers to be involved directly (as happened in the Campi Flegrei VUSE) or indirectly in the ‘shadow’ SAC and CPA teams.

Reference should be made to the separate Observers/Auditors checklist in Sect. 4.6.

**What is the proposed geographical scope?**

The geographic scope of a VUSE should be considered carefully. A balance must be achieved between the spatial parameters that produce a risk exposure area that is realistic in the context of the host volcano and those that create an area that is too large in terms of the duration of the exercise, data production and/or the roles of the active participants.

**What is the proposed administrative scope?**

National laws tend to identify, authorise and fund risk governance bodies (e.g. government departments and agencies, public corporations) and public officials (e.g. individuals such as governors, mayors, prefects and village heads) within a coherent legal and administrative framework—a risk governance infrastructure.
These laws often use and build upon existing entities with existing administrative frameworks that have multi-level national, regional, district, municipal etc. political divisions and subdivisions (Bretton et al. 2015).

The MIAVITA Handbook (2012, 118) suggests that it is good practice for an exercise to “be based on the regulations and laws of the [host] country”.

The administrative scope of a VUSE should be considered carefully and it is likely this scope will be related to those parts of the risk governance process selected for review and testing. It may be very difficult to involve actively all levels of governance and therefore a decision will have to be made as which levels will participate and which will merely observe.

It is likely that a good starting point will be a complete flow diagram of the existing societal risk governance infrastructure for the host volcanic region. This can then be annotated to indicate which national, regional, local bodies and individuals will participate and their respective roles (both active and passive) in the exercise.

For the SAC and CPA at least, consider setting out clearly its respective:

* legal status;

* legal remit and reporting lines; and

* the rights, responsibilities and liabilities of its members.

## Duration and type

### How long will the exercise last and why?

This is a very important issue with funding, resources, logistical and many other implications.

VUSE vary greatly in length as shown by the data in Table 1. Much will depend upon the critical decisions that must be made about scoping—process, participants, geographical area and administrative levels.

## What type of exercise will be undertaken and why?

There are many types of management exercises including: (1) full-scale; (2) reduced; (3) orientation; (4) drill; (5) table-top/discussion; and (6) functional (see Doyle et al. 2015).

Exercises can be also announced or unannounced depending upon their objectives. It has been suggested that the use of unannounced exercises is necessary to verify the real strength of systems and levels of preparedness, when people do not expect them (MIAVITA 2012, 116–117)

## How frequently should exercises be held?

The MIAVITA Handbook (2012, 116) notes that exercises are fundamental for testing existing procedures, plans, and preparedness and for maintaining the attention of stakeholders “on the spot”. It also argues that exercises should be scheduled frequently with the frequency depending upon several factors including: (1) the behaviour of the host volcano; (2) the social-economic context; (3) the levels of risk perception; and (4) the democratic trend.

## Finance

### What are the planned budgets for all phases of the exercise including:

* Before?

Consider planning, field trips, printed field guides, data and scenario creation, documentation etc.

* During?

Consider venue, catering, data/scenario communication etc.

* After?

Consider feedback (hot and cold) and follow up meetings, reports, presentations, interviews, actions.
**Who is funding:**

* **The exercise?**

* **The participants, including invited guests, experts and invited observers/auditors (including travel, accommodation, field trips, other expenses etc.)?**

Consider whether there should be an underwriter of last resort for any unplanned deficiencies.

**Do the funders have any demands, expectations etc. as to any aspects of the exercise?**

If yes, these must be understood by the
organiser, planned and budgeted for.

**4.2 Logistics**

**How long will the planning stage take?**

It would be easy to underestimate the time that
will be needed for, and the complexity of, the
planning stage upon which the whole success of
the exercise will depend. It may be prudent to
speak to the organisers of other VUSE to discuss
this and other financial/practical issues. Reference
could also be made to Dohaney et al. (2015).

The MIAVITA Handbook (2012, 118) notes that planning an announced exercise takes time and states “six to twelve months are necessary to prepare a full-scale exercise. If the promoted exercises are repeated on a fixed schedule, three can be sufficient”. We consider these to be the minimum planning periods.

*Will every participant/observer receive in advance a full briefing note covering:*

* **Purpose**

Refer to the Sect. 4.1 regarding the overall
purpose of the training exercise.

* **Scope**

Refer to the Sect. 4.1 regarding scoping.
Issues covered may include processes, partici-
pants, geographical, administrative etc.

* **Themes**

If some important themes have been identified
for particular attention (e.g. expressions (nu-
merical and narrative) of likelihood, expressions

of analytical/diagnostic confidence, dealing with
communication network failures, using social
media etc.), it might make sense to mention these
in advance to encourage pre-exercise thought and
preparation.

* **Models, methods and protocols to be used/made available for use**

The VUELCO exercises have proved that VUSE can be used successfully to test in simulated real time the merits of probabilistic methods and tools such as BET_EF (Bayesian Event Tree for Eruption Forecasting), HASSET (Hazard Assessment Event Tree) and QVAST (Quantifying Volcanic Susceptibility) (Sandri et al. 2009; Sobradelo and Bartolini 2014; Bartolini et al. 2013).

In advance of the exercise, there must be
communication between the modellers and the
Volcano team. This should ensure that all
appropriate monitoring data (perhaps deliberately
not all the data) is available for all relevant
phases of the exercise scenario including periods
between phases.

Feedback from the VUELCO exercises sug-
gests that input from the modellers during each
step of an exercise may be welcomed by other
participants. Testing simultaneous integration
was a specific VUELCO goal. However, if this is
to be done, it must be carefully planned and
sufficient time allocated within the timetable.

It is important to state in advance of the
exercise, for example in the briefing documents,
what role the models, tools etc. will play during
the exercise. Consideration should be given to
whether the results will be available in real time
to the participating SACs and CPAs. If yes, how
and when will the results be communicated? If
no, when will feed back regarding the utility of
the items tested be communicated?

VUSE can also be used to give SAC's the
opportunity to use formal expert elicitation
(EE) methods. EE may provide formality and
direction to the deliberation of monitoring data,
assist the framing of likely hazard scenarios, and
facilitate the drafting of expressions of temporal
certainty and analytical/diagnostic confidence.
EE were conducted in the VUELCO exercises in Colima and Campi Flegrei.

The Somma Vesuvio MESIMEX exercise undertaken in 2006 was used to conduct a before and after volcanic risk perception survey (Ricci et al. 2013).

### Players (participants, observers etc.):

- by name and organisation

- by role in the exercise

It is very likely that a large number of people will be involved from a wide range of organisations and, perhaps, several countries. It would be prudent to assume that nobody will be known to all of the other participants. Consider the use of name badges stating Name, Organisation, and Exercise Role. As found during the Campi Flegrei exercise, colour coding for teams and active/passive roles might also be helpful. The scheme adopted should be explained carefully to save time during the start of exercise when valuable time can be lost easily.

By way of illustration, more than 100 participants from over 10 European and Latin American countries attended the VUELCO Campi Flegrei exercise. The respective figures for the VUELCO Cotopaxi exercise were about 50 participants from 13 countries.

After the Dominica exercise it was suggested that, at the very start of the exercise, introductions would have been helpful “to establish who each person was and what their role was…It was challenging accepting information from a person whom we did not know or have any clue as to their background or capabilities. Also the scientist [s] must be aware of who the[y] are working with in order to frame their advice appropriately”.

For numerous purposes (before, during and after the exercise) a comprehensive, up-to-date and accurate email list containing all participants will be necessary. Inadequate email lists caused difficulties during several VUELCO exercises.

### Teams

Consider how many teams will be required and how and when their members will be allocated. For the sake of simplicity, it may be

necessary to ask representatives of several different organisations to work together. By way of illustration, this chapter refers to four teams (Volcano, SAC, CPA and Observers) but others can and should be used as dictated by the specific goals of the planned exercise.

Consideration should also be given to the use of a technical team to support the SAC’s deliberations in respect to issues such as real time GPS mapping, model trials and expert elicitations. The time needed for these complex matters must be considered particularly during short exercises. In VUELCO’s Campi Flegrei simulation, a technical team composed of civil protection personnel operated continuously with the aim of supporting the SAC’s simulated ‘real-time’ deliberations. The team’s results were only presented at the end of the exercise because they lagged behind the ‘real time’ evolution of the phases of the exercise’s hazard scenarios.

### Venue (full address, plan, transport and contact details)

- Sub-venues for all aspects of the exercise (including any evening events) with a plan

- Layout for the plenary sessions

- Layout for any breakout sessions

These critical issues should not be overlooked. The exercise organiser should decide in advance, in respect for each phase of the exercise, which ‘team’ will sit where and why, probably by reference to which other participants they will have to communicate with. For the sake of intended realism, consider whether they should be near or far apart and by what means they will communicate.

Consider whether, in a real emergency, participants would speak to each other face to face. Consider whether it would be more realistic to separate some teams physically in order to force the use of video conferences, emails and phone calls in team interactions. At the planning stage it will be necessary to allow more time for this nuance, which may highlight the challenges of long-distance communication, data sharing, data analysis, collaboration, consensus building and decision-making.
Feedback from the VUELCO exercises specifically mentioned the problems associated with having too many people in the same room and failing to plan in advance who should be where and near to whom.

It is worth considering that each refreshment break will take longer than expected unless refreshments are either provided in all rooms or available at all times. Will working lunches simulate the difficulties of a tense period of emerging unrest? For a short period of intense training, is a degree of inconvenience and/or discomfort in fact to be encouraged?

* **Timetable**

- **Dates for each part of the exercise and timings for each day addressing:**

- **Registration (including perhaps the handing out of name badges in accordance with the stated scheme)**

This will need very careful planning and resourcing to avoid a late start on Day 1.

- **Start, finish**

Start and finish promptly.

- **Food/drink breaks (if needed!)**

Refer to the above guidance about the need for these in an exercise that attempts to simulate real time challenges.

- **Evening events, banquets etc.**

Consider how long it will take participants to return to their accommodation before evening events. Give clear advice about the dress code, if any, and other cultural expectations (e.g. the use of cameras or the need for modest clothes and head coverings).

- **Venue tours**

It is likely that many of the participants will expect/request a tour if the exercise takes place in a major risk management/communication centre. Allow plenty of time for this and consider making these visits part of the pre-exercise field trip to avoid wasting time when all of the participants (and probably the media) are present.

- **Greetings, Introductions, Reviews, Thank you's etc.**

- **Presentations to or by representatives of central, local government, etc.**

Predicting accurate timings for these two components is notoriously difficult and careful planning in advance and strict control on the day will be necessary. Consider carefully whether these are really necessary. Consider whether it would be better for relevant entities to be given formal active or passive roles within the exercise itself and be appropriately involved in that way.

- **Dissemination of new data**

Consider when, by whom, to whom and how. During the VUELCO exercises, difficulties arose due to format incompatibilities and internet access issues.

- **Deliberation of new data**

The time necessary for deliberation may depend upon the amount/ format of the data, the need to communicate with other participants, expectations about output deliverables (e.g. written reports) etc. As a general rule, allow plenty of time within the context of the realism that the exercise seeks to simulate.

- **Dissemination of 'injects'**

Consideration should be given to the timing and drafting of 'inputs' (for example, requests for local, national and international media interviews or briefings with concerned public officials, unwelcome social media exchanges, etc.), which will be distributed to the participants at planned stages during the exercise. Participants might be asked to think about how they would respond and who would be delegated to meet these urgent requests.

- **Outputs from the SAC and other teams**

As a general rule, allow plenty of time for the dissemination of outputs within the context of the realism that the exercise seeks to simulate.
Will information about current CPA mitigation actions, risk alert levels etc. be provided at any time during the exercise?

If yes, why, what, when and to whom?

Feedback from the VUELCO exercises suggests that scientists benefit greatly from improved knowledge of civil protection authority systems and in particular better appreciation of those hazard parameters that are most relevant to risk mitigation decisions.

### Factual background and related resources

Consider whether a field trip is necessary before Day 1 of the exercise so that all of the participants can gain a basic grasp of the topography, geography, geology (including major structures, faults, tectonic plates, existing volcanic and other hazards, and aquifers), geo-history (a time-line of major events is often helpful), infrastructures and other essential information.

All the VUELCO exercises incorporated well-planned and informative pre-exercise field trips that were supported by printed, carefully researched field guides with relevant histories, maps, reading lists etc.

A field guide can be supplemented by more detailed essential information about the monitoring history, thresholds etc. Feedback from VUELCO exercises suggests that the briefing pack should include maps showing the positions of all relevant observatories, monitoring equipment and stations, GPS positions, cameras, sample sources etc.

In addition to a field trip, it may be helpful to have a day/half-day of short presentations about the host volcano with careful oblique references to features that will be relevant during the exercise.

### Real/assumed legal/regulatory framework and related duty holders

Each participant must have a clear and comprehensive understanding of their role, the roles of all other participants and all planned lines and methods of communication. To ensure a higher degree of realism, these roles should accurately

reflect the governance infrastructures, roles and duties required by:

- the national laws of the host country as encouraged by the UN Sendai Framework and the IFRC legal checklist;

- any regional emergency management or response arrangements, such as those in the Caribbean involving the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Agency (CDEMA), which are set out in inter-country agreements, memoranda of understanding and protocols; and

- any applicable international law standards.

### Information Technology (IT) including disseminating/sharing data*

This critical issue should not be underestimated based upon difficulties encountered during VUELCO exercises.

It is inevitable that most of the participants will wish to have easy access to the internet. Ensure that the Wi-Fi network has sufficient capacity and range to allow easy access.

Consideration should be given to the format requirements of the computer models and probabilistic tools that will be tested during the exercise.

### Language arrangements*

Consider the dominant language for the exercise and its documents (particularly the pre-exercise briefing pack) and what arrangements can be made, if any, for translations/translators.

Feedback from the VUELCO exercises suggests that some participants (e.g. locally based risk managers and members of the emergency services) may become bored and disengaged if they cannot understand fully what is going on and contribute.

### Other equipment*

Consider whether it will be necessary, for the purposes of training, publicity or planning future exercises, to use other equipment including:

- Display screens, smart boards and white boards
- Fixed and roving microphones

A shortage of roving microphones caused irritation at several VUELCO exercises.

- Visual and audio recording equipment

- A projector for PowerPoint presentations

Feedback sessions are enhanced by such presentations, if time allows for their preparation.

- Laser pointers

- Video conference links

### Presentations of data, results etc.*

How, why and when will the data, results etc. be presented?

Consider imposing a strict timetable to avoid timing problems.

### Requirements regarding pre-Day 1 reading, preparation, queries etc.

Consider stating clearly that there will no lengthy introductions or briefings at the start of Day 1 because the participants are required and expected: (1) to read in advance the pre-exercise briefing pack; and (2) to raise any queries before Day 1 with the exercise organiser.

### Procedures for daily and end of exercise feedback.

If daily feedback or announcements are necessary, consider in advance what issues are likely to be covered, who will give them and allow adequate time within the timetable.

### Note

It is accepted that during a real emergency these facilities may not be readily available. Accordingly, any difficulties encountered during an exercise may provide helpful insights into the challenges that would be encountered during a fast evolving crisis.

**Will role/team leaders receive in advance?**

### A full pre-exercise briefing note about the overall legal/regulatory infrastructure for the exercise?

### Checklists for the main aspects of the exercise?

#### Day 1 (Start of exercise)

Ensure that registration does not delay a prompt start, which will thereby set the standard for all other timings during the exercise.

Who will lead the exercise and ensure that the timetable is adhered to strictly?

Consider giving this role to a person (probably supported by an assistant) who does not have any other role in the exercise and therefore can move easily from room to room and deal promptly with any difficulties that arise.

Is there a need for a short introduction? If yes, why, who will give it and how long will it last?

Is there a need for a short end of day summary? If yes, why, who will give it and how long will it last?

#### Day 2 etc. (Continuation of exercise)

Is there a need for a short introduction? If yes, why, who will give it and how long will it last?

Is there a need for a short end of day summary? If yes, why, who will give it and how long will it last?

#### Day (End of exercise)

Is there a need for a short introduction? If yes, why, who will give it and how long will it last?

Is there a need for a short end of exercise summary? If yes, why, who will give it and how long will it last?

## 4.3 The Volcano Team

### Membership

**Who will lead the team and why?**

**Who will be the other Volcano members?**

VUELCO's exercises indicated that considerable time, exceptional skills and infinite patience are required to write any coherent and challenging hazard scenario.

Members of the Volcano team must: (1) be selected and appointed at a very early stage in the planning process; and (2) be aware of, understand and accept the needs and goals of the exercise.
The overall hazard scenario and its planned phases must be tailored to fit within the agreed timetable for the exercise. The Volcano team will need to work very closely with the exercise leader and the steering group as soon as it is formed.

Where the Volcano team is the host volcano's actual monitoring team, a chance to test the monitoring team in 'real time' action will be lost.

## Preparation

How long will be needed to prepare:

* the scenario/s?

* all of the briefing documents?

* the pre-exercise field trips?

## The exercise

What will be the time scale in months/years covered by the exercise?

VUELCO's exercise scenarios varied greatly in length—Colima (2 months), Campi Flegrei (7 years), Cotopaxi (5 years) and Dominica (2 years).

The period of time covered by the simulation, the number of phases and the length of the intervals between the phases, must take into account the needs and goals of the exercise. For example, consideration must be given to the time that will be required for data to be delivered, entered and assimilated, and for probabilistic models to be run.

How many exercise phases will be needed to cover the period of years chosen?

Each phase will involve, and must be allocated sufficient time for, the delivery, entry, analysis and modelling of the monitoring data and the drafting and delivery of any expected outputs (e.g. reports, press releases etc.).

VUELCO's exercise scenarios had between 3 and 6 phases - Colima (2 months in 4 phases over 10 h spread over 5 days), Campi Flegrei (7 years in 4 phases over 3 days), Cotopaxi (5 years in 6 phases in 1 day) and Dominica (2 years in 3 phases over 2 days).

As already stated, the precise specifications for the phases must be agreed with the exercise leader taking into account the needs of the modellers and other technical teams.

What data will be provided?

The monitoring data must be suitable and sufficient to test the whole range of geo-scientific disciplines represented in the SAC. Feedback from the VUELCO exercises identified the temptation to favour the overprovision of seismic data at the expense of adequate geochemical, geodetic, petrological and other data.

Although this might reflect real situations or even the architecture of existing monitoring networks, careful consideration should be given to the consequences of having experts from some disciplines having insufficient data to occupy them and therefore becoming disengaged from the exercise.

It may also be necessary to provide in the briefing pack related historical data and background information (such as historical thresholds) to allow the data used during an exercise to be considered in context.

The data must remain coherent, albeit deliberately unclear and uncertain, over the full duration of the scenario including periods of inactivity. Feedback after the Dominica exercise praised the quality of the data and the design of the scenario. The following expressions illustrate some of the features of a successful scenario—very realistic unsure signals creating a state of limbo, non-linearity, phreatic evidence that was not a precursor of magmatic activity, complex data and realistic missing data.

During some phases of the exercise scenario it is possible that the data will be incomplete (some critical data may be held back deliberately to await a request for more data) and/or difficult to analyse because it may be a stated objective of the exercise to test the SAC's ability to handle uncertainty, disagreement, monitoring inadequacies etc. and/or to request data from additional or different monitoring.

If data is provided for the periods between scenario phases, it is likely that the longer the inter-phase period the more complete the data will be. Time will have to be planned for data delivery and analysis. A large amount of data may also create very great difficulties for the utility of probabilistic tools such as BET.
The Volcano team should communicate with the exercise leader and modellers well before the exercise to avoid unnecessary surprises regarding the format and quantum of the monitoring data and the timing of their release. In the Colima exercise, three BET nodes were passed before Phase 1 of the exercise scenario and this degraded the utility of the BET trial.

**How will the years between the periods that are covered by the data be described?**

This difficult issue should not be overlooked. In the absence of data, what will the participants assume in absence of guidance? An absence of data may also create very great difficulties for the utility of probabilistic tools such as BET.

Consider issuing, along with the monitoring data for the next phase, a brief summary of the ‘missing periods’ in terms of volcanic activity, precursor evidence and/or the risk mitigation decisions and actions of civil protection authorities.

**Will the exercise scenarios be (1) entirely fictitious; (2) based on suitably disguised real events; or (3) a mix of the two?**

During the VUELCO exercises feedback suggested that:

* it may be very difficult to create realistic scenarios that are entirely fictitious because the data, under the very close expert analysis that they will receive, may appear to be inconsistent and improbable;

* a coherent and plausible chronology for the scenario is essential;

* after a period of sudden emerging unrest, a period of reducing unrest or quiescence may form the basis of a challenging scenario as proved during the Dominica exercise;

* in order to simulate reality, the Volcano team should provide monitoring data to the SAC without any form of analysis or interpretation, however the provision of tables comparing data sets may be helpful;

* the amount, relevance and format of the monitoring data provided should be considered carefully.

**Will the exercise introduce secondary hazards (e.g. forest fires, contaminated aquifers, etc.)?**

During the Mount Teide exercise, considerable attention was paid to secondary hazards. If secondary hazards are to be included, what data need to be provided before, at and after the start of the exercise?

**Will plans be needed showing geographical, geological or societal features?**

**Will the exercise use fixed/dynamic data about weather, ground conditions etc.?**

If yes, what data need to be provided before, at and after the start of the exercise? Will plans be needed showing geographical, geological or societal features?

Relevant weather/ground water data will be essential if ash dispersion and fall-out simulations are to be included within the exercise.

**When, how and to whom will the monitoring data be disseminated:**

* Before the start of the exercise?

* At the start of the exercise?

* During the exercise?

This is a critical issue and important lessons were learned during the VUELCO exercises. During a VUSE, reliance on a limited Wi-Fi link may be very problematical.

In the Dominica exercise, monitoring information was provided within separate ‘phase-specific’ documents in password-protected pdf format and emailed before the start of exercise to all of the participants. At the beginning of each scenario phase, the relevant password was released. This solution worked very well.

During the Cotopaxi exercise, Wi-Fi and other communication difficulties were identified by the civil protection authorities and, as a result, they were better placed to improve their existing systems and resources.

Consideration should be given to the format requirements of the computer models and probabilistic tools that will be tested during the exercise.

Feedback from the VUELCO exercises suggests that when data are provided they should not duplicate data that have already been provided.
**Will the SAC be able to ask for further monitoring data?**

If yes, when and how can it be requested? If yes, when and how will it be provided?

**Will any player other than the SAC be able to ask for monitoring data?**

If yes, by whom, why, when and how can it be requested? If yes, when and how will it be provided?

**Will anything other than monitoring data be provided?**

Consider whether the SAC and CPA should be given, or have access to when they request it, fixed/dynamic data about weather, ground conditions etc.?

If yes, why, what, when and to whom?

## 4.4 The Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC)

**Is a SAC necessary in every exercise?**

Careful consideration should be given to this important question. It is appreciated that advice to civil protection authorities may only be provided by the head of the local volcano observatory, who is not, and would never be supported by a SAC.

Feedback from VUELCO exercises suggests that it makes good sense for exercises to simulate existing risk governance structures as far as reasonably practicable. It follows that a SAC team should be included in an exercise only: (1) where one exists, or could exist, in a period of evolving unrest or (2) where the civil protection authorities wish to test the utility of one.

If an exercise SAC is simulating the actions of a real SAC, the brief to the SAC and the briefing note for the exercise should set out clearly the SAC's constitution, mandate, responsibilities and powers.

**Legal status and duties**

A VUSE can be a good opportunity to consider the legal status of scientific committees and their full-time, part-time and seconded members.

Consideration should be given to the taking of appropriate steps to avoid or reduce managerial

risks by the inclusion of disclaimers and exclusion statements in hazard assessments. A VUSE may serve as, at least, a prompt for committees to seek legal advice from a competent local lawyer.

During the Dominica exercise, a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee sought legal advice from the lead author about: (1) the wording of a liability disclaimer for the benefit of visiting scientists; and (2) the way in which 'risk-related' advice could be passed to civil protection authorities without liability for subsequent risk mitigation decisions. In respect of the first, it is likely that a visiting scientist will have little or no control in respect of either the absence or adequacy of monitoring data and the selection and competence of other committee members. Based upon this advice, a disclaimer was included in the Phase 1 hazard assessment report and the Phase 2 and 3 reports were more carefully worded.

**Membership**

**Who will be leading the SAC and why?**

The SAC will require a leader who should be identified in advance.

Feedback from the VUELCO exercises suggests the role of Chairperson of the SAC may be critical to the success of an exercise.

Consider whether a deputy Chairperson should be identified in advance of the exercise.

In several of the VUELCO exercises, it became evident that the Chairperson should not be given, or retain, prime responsibility for the initial drafting of the hazard assessment report.

**Who will be the other SAC members?**

Consider whether it is desirable to have a range of experts to simulate the issues that might arise during a real period of emerging unrest. Consider the inclusion of: (1) local volcano observatory scientists; (2) other host country scientists; (3) host country academics (4) non-national observatory scientists; (5) non-national academics; and (6) young researchers.

The involvement of non-local and foreign scientists may represent an opportunity to share knowledge and to have access to a wider range of opinions uninfluenced by local social contexts, non-scientific values or entrenched scientific assumptions or preconceptions.
Consideration should be given to the need for rules regarding the nature and extent of the interactions between local and non-local/foreign scientists.

During the Campi Flegrei exercise a number of young researchers were co-opted in rotation onto the SAC. This worked well and gave them a unique learning experience.

**Which geoscience disciplines (e.g. geo-physics, geochemistry, geodetics, geo-history, and petrology) will be covered within the SAC?**

If the monitoring data resources of the host volcano permit, ensure that the Volcano team provides sufficient monitoring data to keep each discipline engaged and, if possible, challenged throughout the exercise.

**Will any geoscience disciplines not be covered? Why?**

Consider whether this is a realistic representation of what might happen in a real period of emerging unrest.

**Will the SAC have local members who are usually based near or at the host volcano?**

Consider whether the briefing pack should refer to the IAVCEI protocol mentioned above.

**Will the SAC have international members who are not based in the host country?**

Consider whether the briefing pack should refer to Newhall et al. (1999) mentioned above.

**Will the SAC be realistic in size, too big or too small?**

**Will any attempt be made to deal with the issue of ‘maverick’ scientists?**

If yes, how? If no, why?

A VUSE may present a good opportunity to consider and test procedures for dealing very difficult issues such as this.

## Inputs

**When and in what format will the SAC get the monitoring data?**

This is a critical issue. During a VUSE, reliance on a limited Wi-Fi link may be very problematical.

**Will the SAC be able to ask for further monitoring data?**

If yes, when and how can it be requested? If yes, when and how will it be provided?

**Will the SAC get anything other than monitoring data?**

Consider whether the SAC should be given, or have access to on request, fixed/dynamic data about weather, ground conditions etc.?

**If yes, what data need to be provided before, at and after the start of the exercise? Will plans be needed showing geographical, geological or societal features?**

## Deliberations

**Will the SAC’s meetings/deliberations follow standardised operating procedures (SOPs) and/or use a standardised reporting template?**

Feedback following the Dominica exercise advocated the use of SOPs and the keeping of a log recording and timing, inter alia, main data inputs and analytical decisions, assumptions, outputs and communications.

Careful consideration should be given to the SAC adopting working assumptions that:

* All hazard communications, including all hazard assessments, in their format, content and delivery must be focussed upon: (1) facilitating informed risk mitigation decisions that may not only be difficult but also based upon many sources of knowledge and social, political, economic and other influences; and (2) responding to the identified needs and expectations of their makers.

* Before acting as hazard communicators, hazard analysts must (by means of active and careful two-way dialogue) canvass, note and respond to the needs and expectations of the risk decision makers and the legitimate foreseeable demands of mass and social media and allow sufficient time to do this.

* The utility of hazard communications (i.e. the outputs of hazard analysis) must be judged by empirical evidence of the sentiments and actions of risk decision-makers (i.e. the outcomes of hazard analysis within wider risk mitigation processes).

* No assumptions will be made as to what risk decision-makers know about: (1) the science of volcanic hazards and in particular its complexities, uncertainties and limitations;
(2) the role of scientists and the many tem-
poral, financial, legal and other constraints
under which they operate particularly during
periods of emerging volcanic unrest; and
(3) the role, benefits and limitations of
long-term and short-term monitoring.

* No assumptions will be made about what risk decision-makers either need or want and, accordingly, the widest possible range of reasonably practicable options for not only hazard communication but also hazard analysis should be offered and discussed.

* No assumptions will be made that risk decision-makers know what general and/or bespoke analysis, information, data, advice and guidance scientists may be able to provide if asked and given adequate resources.

*Will any guidance be given as to how the
data should be considered (e.g. expert elicita-
tion, probabilistic tools etc.)?*

If an expert elicitation is a possibility or is
actively encouraged/required, timetable enough
time for this as it is likely that a briefing will be
necessary before the elicitation starts to ensure
that everyone is fully aware of what will be
involved. Do not underestimate the amount of
time that a worthwhile elicitation will take.

Consider providing essential information in
the form of an elicitation toolkit in advance. Who
will prepare this toolkit?

Can the SAC take into consideration any
societal factors such as high societal exposure in
a particular area? If yes, what ‘exposure’ and
‘vulnerability’ data will be provided, when and
how? Do not underestimate the amount of time
that this will take.

Consider how and when the results of prob-
abilistic models will be delivered to the SAC and
thereafter considered. Do not underestimate the
amount of time that this will take.

Feedback after VUELCO's Dominica exer-
cise showed that scientists involved in exercises
need to be briefed about: (1) the claimed benefits
offered by the probabilistic models being used;
(2) their limitations; (3) when and in what form
their results will be presented; and (4) how it is

envisaged their results will be integrated within
the overall analysis of relevant hazard scenarios.

Consider including in the pre-exercise briefing
pack an additional file containing essential
background information about expert elicitations
and modelling.

*Will the SAC have to liaise with any non-SAC players?*

If yes, when and how will this be done?

During the Dominica exercise, sub-team
leaders of the SAC were asked to attend early
parts of the CPA's deliberations. In the
post-exercise feedback, it was suggested that all of
the SAC scientists would have benefitted greatly
from hearing the CPA's deliberations which were
often very critical of the scientific analysis upon
which risk decisions had to be made.

Outputs—Hazard communications

What outputs (e.g. oral and written reports,
written minutes etc.) will be required from the
SAC?

The quality of the dialogue between risk
management stakeholders, and the provision of
information and advice, depends upon a mutual
understanding by those stakeholders of their
respective needs, responsibilities, functions
demands and roles, and their capacity to antici-
pate other stakeholders’ demands and decision
needs (Salas et al. 1994; Ronan et al. 2008;
Lipshitz et al. 2001; Paton and Jackson 2002;
Doyle and Johnston 2011a, b; Doyle et al. 2014).

"Without knowing the concerns" and under-
standings "of the targeted audience, communi-
cation will not succeed" (Renn 2008, 147).

Careful consideration should be given to this
critical issue. Based upon the VUELCO exer-
cises, it may be very unwise to provide any
guidance whatsoever as to how the outputs of the
hazard analysis must be communicated to the
CPA and other exercise participants. This may
encourage the type of two-way dialogue referred
to under the above heading "Deliberations". By
providing guidance of any sort, a unique learning
opportunity may be lost.

Consider briefing the observers in advance
about this important issue, so that they can make
an early invention if unwarranted assumptions
are made about what risk decision makers know,
need or want.

*Will the SAC be required to communicate with teams representing:*

* **The CPA?**

* **The public?**

* **The media?**

* **Representatives of local/central government?**

If yes, when and where?

A VUSE is a good opportunity to practise hazard communications and to consider the needs and expectation of risk decisions and their makers. Reference should be made to Doyle et al. (2015).

Consider how, when and by whom the needs and expectations of risk decision-makers will be sought.

**4.5 The Risk Managers—Civil Protection Authorities (CPA)**

*Role*

It is critical for the role of the CPA to be
considered very carefully during the planning
stage.

Feedback from the VUELCO exercises sug-
gests that the CPA’s role must be:

* clearly defined and integrated within the design of the hazard scenario;

* sufficiently interesting and demanding to keep the participants engaged; and

* known to all other participants.

The geoscientists will be engaged predomi-
nantly with the prompt analysis of monitoring
data and this will lead subsequently to the
delivery of hazard assessments in some form to
the CPA. Depending upon the goals of the
exercise, it is likely that, whilst this is being
done, the CPA team must have something
worthwhile to do.

Consideration might be given to a require-
ment within both the briefing pack and the
timetable that representatives of the SAC discuss
with the CPA:

* the timing, format, content etc. of hazard reports, communication channels and protocols (the preparation of a template was suggested after the Campi Flegrei exercise), and/or

* the arrangements for a possible mock joint press conference later in the exercise. A joint press conference might involve another press/media team (possibly made up of individuals from the CPA's public relations department) and/or invited observers from local and national press organisations.

Membership

Will the CPA represent a real/fictional entity?

Who will be leading the CPA and why?

Who will be the other CPA members?

Inputs

What inputs will the CPA get?

Will the CPA get monitoring data?

If yes, why?

Deliberations

Will any guidance be given as to how the
CPA inputs should be considered?

Will the CPA have to liaise with any
non-CPA players?

If yes, when and how will this be done?

Outputs

What outputs will be required from the CPA?

Will the CPA be required to communicate
with teams representing:

* The SAC?

* The public?

* The media?

* Representatives of local/central government?

A simulated press conference, which involves
both scientists and CPA officials within the same
panel, can serve a number of useful purposes. In a potentially hostile environment, scientists will have to communicate effectively complex geo-scientific concepts and explain issues such as uncertainty and analytical/diagnostic confidence. They may also have to avoid being drawn into sensitive areas involving societal issues and risk decisions. Risk decision makers will have to demonstrate an understanding of complex hazard scenarios and to explain what risk mitigation decisions they have taken and the reasons for them.

Open and convincing displays of collaboration and agreement between different authorities and key individuals during real crises can build trust with representatives of the media and general public. Panel question and answers sessions involving key personnel, who will have ‘communication’ roles, can and should be practised during VUSE because it is likely that related training and resource needs will be identified.

The VUELCO Dominica exercise included three very realistic but successful simulated press conferences.

## Feedback

The processes of hazard analysis and hazard communication should be outcome focussed and driven by the expectations and needs of risk decisions and risk decision-makers.

Consideration should be given to measuring the extent to which the exercise and its participants addressed: (1) the needs and expectations of the CPA; (2) the steps, if any, the SAC took to identify those needs and expectations; and (3) the extent to which the SAC satisfied those needs; and identified actions that might lead to improvements.

The VUELCO exercises identified the value of civil protection authorities having an internal technical-scientific structure: (1) to support the SAC in technical analysis (mapping, elicitation, models); and: (2) to improve interactions with the SAC.

## 4.6 Observers/Auditors

### Is it necessary to have observers and/or auditors?

In the VUELCO exercises a very valuable contribution was made by monitors and observers. They can be from the participating organisations or entirely ‘independent’. Monitors and observers (particularly with experience of previous exercises and the practices of countries other than the host country) can play a critical role in providing both hot and cold feedback whilst also gaining invaluable personal experience to assist in the planning of future exercises.

VUSE are invariably observed by local and visiting students and early-career geoscience academics. With careful planning, it may be possible for less experienced scientists and civil protection authority decision makers to be involved directly (as happened in the Campi Flegrei VUSE) or indirectly in ‘shadow’ SAC and CPA teams. The participation of young researchers in this kind of exercise represents a great chance to train future generations of advisory scientists.

### What role will be played by nominated observers and auditors?

Consider whether it would be worthwhile differentiating between: (1) observers who might have responsibility for capturing and presenting immediate unstructured feedback; and (2) auditors who would compile a more formal report possibly in a format and using audit criteria agreed by the main participants in advance.

### Would something be gained by having an ‘independent’ observer/auditor who is not part of any organisation taking part in the exercise?

Independent observers played a very useful role in the VUELCO exercises in Campi Flegrei, Cotopaxi and Dominica and the author was an invited external auditor of the Tenerife exercise.

During the Campi Flegrei exercise, it was recorded that undertaking the role of observer is particularly helpful for senior civil protection authority managers who are thinking of planning an exercise in their own locality.
**Who will be nominated and/or invited to be observers/auditors?**

This will depend largely upon the roles which have been chosen and whether some of the observers/auditors should be ‘independent’.

## Format

**At the end of the exercise will there be a 'hot' feedback session?**

The MIAVITA Handbook (2012, 118, 179) recommends an “on the spot debriefing straight after the exercises with the participants and another one approximately one month later with the exercise organisers, evaluators, observers, and a representative of the general public”.

If yes, why, who will lead it and how long will it last?

When and how will the results be recorded, promulgated and acted upon?

**Will there be 'cold' feedback meetings, surveys or questionnaires?**

If yes, why and who will be responsible for their design and implementation?

When and how will the results be recorded, promulgated and acted upon?

**Will a more formal audit of the exercise be undertaken?**

If yes, consider whether it might address issues such as the identification of the need for better or additional:

* structures of risk governance

* information sources and resources

* long-term monitoring resources

* consideration of the role of tectonics and resulting faults and features

* geo-history data

* training

* financial, personnel and other resources

* documented procedures

* communication plans and equipment

* media response plans

* easily accessible database catalogues, which may be important and needed urgently during a crisis, of:

– existing data (e.g. seismic, geodetic, gas, water geochemistry and geospatial) and common archiving procedures for newly acquired datasets; and

– information (e.g. geographical information systems ‘GIS’ digital bases, overlays, metadata, geological maps, remote-sensing images, background levels of unrest indicators, such as seismic energy release rates, normal rates on inflation/deflation, aqueous and geochemistry and fluxes).

* post-exercise actions to review and revise existing procedures in particular those for any future exercises.

**Will the observers give real-time feedback during the exercise?**

Consideration should be given to this difficult issue. A balance must be achieved between, on the one hand, unhelpful and intrusive interventions and, on the other, allowing the exercise to proceed in ways that may waste valuable time and/or miss or diminish valuable learning opportunities.

During the Dominica exercise, the three ‘independent’ observers gave brief feedback to the SAC at the end of Phases 1 and 2 of the exercise. They also gave spontaneous suggestions to the CPA. The participants indicated that they found this helpful and there was clear evidence that suggestions for change were understood and put into practice immediately.

## Preparation

**Will instructions be given to the observers/auditors in advance?**

Consider giving the observers/auditors a clear brief before the start of the exercise.

Experience from the VUELCO exercises suggests that providing observers with a list of more specific considerations, to include within their more general observations, may result in more focussed outputs.

**Will instructions be given to the participants in advance of the exercise to facilitate richer feedback?**

Consider asking each participant and/or each team (1) to list their main roles, responsibilities and tasks and (2) to keep a written list of needs that would help them accomplish their tasks covering for example better/different information, training, guidance, software, communication
equipment, other equipment, personnel, and so on. These lists can then be used during the hot and cold feedback sessions.

*Will the participants be told in advance about the planned arrangements for observing/ auditing?*

If yes, when? Consider whether the pre-exercise briefing pack is the best place to set out the planned arrangements and time table and what might be required from the participants in this regard.

# 5 Discussion

The checklists presented in this chapter are dedicated to the organisers and participants of the five exercises that this chapter has investigated. The checklists record and build upon the successes, experiences, occasional oversights, misjudgements and mistakes of a few in order to provide readily accessible sources of knowledge, learning and inspiration for others.

This chapter has identified a number of themes:

* VUSE are purpose-driven learning/training activities. Vital knowledge is acquired not only during but also before and after each exercise (see Doyle et al. 2015).

* VUSE must have clear recorded goals based upon the needs and expectations of their participants.

* VUSE are complex and require clear and firm leadership, and very careful planning, funding and execution. This finding is supported by the work of Dohaney et al. (2015), which contains very helpful guidance on design and evaluation methods.

* During the ‘planning phase’, the critical issues of leadership, purpose, scope, duration, type and financing should be considered.

* The mere planning of a VUSE will provide invaluable knowledge of the wider legal and administrative infrastructures in which it is framed.

* The ‘logistics’ phase will ensure that the execution of the exercise is not undermined by avoidable technical, communication and other related difficulties. The importance of a comprehensive and comprehensible pre-exercise briefing note and exercise plan cannot be overstated.

* A pre-VUSE field trip will serve numerous purposes including those of introducing relevant geographical, geological, cultural and governance histories and providing an opportunity for relationships to develop between the exercise participants.

* VUSE require and depend upon numerous acts of communication between a wide range of stakeholders with a variety of knowledge, expertise, experience, needs and expectations within many types of formal/informal relationships/associations (see Doyle et al. 2015).

* VUSE are not judged in terms of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ but rather in terms of whether relevant knowledge has been generated, recorded, considered and utilised.

* Whenever possible, VUSE simulate:

- ‘existing’ risk governance arrangements, or those being considered for the future, with real policies, processes and people rather than contrived unrealistic governance scenarios and false role-play; and

- volcanic hazard scenarios based upon, and significant within, the context of the host volcano region, which may experience other relevant or related natural hazards such as tectonic and weather-related hazards.

* VUSE provide unique opportunities:

- to address many known challenges including those of inter-scientist deliberation, scientific uncertainty, analytical/diagnostic confidence, unorthodox/maverick science sources, hazard communication, and mass media and social networking relations and communications (see Doyle et al. 2015);
- to test new/prototype risk arrangements and tools, models and protocols for analysis/communication.

* Great care should be taken to ensure that comprehensive feedback and goal-related knowledge can be captured during and after each exercise and disseminated as widely as possible.

# 6 Conclusions

"Practice doesn't make perfect. Practice reduces the imperfection". None of the five exercises considered in this chapter was completely perfect. They involved not only well-intentioned yet imperfect policies and procedures capable of improvement but also dedicated yet not infallible people keen to seek further knowledge, training and experience. Careful analysis of these exercises shows that, as suggested by Doyle et al. (2015), with very careful planning, execution and review, worrisome periods of emerging volcanic unrest and the dynamics of real-time hazard assessments and risk decisions can be simulated for a wide variety of worthwhile purposes.

However this chapter does not attempt to dictate how future exercises must be organised. Based upon a review of the published records of four exercises and the authors' personal experiences of the five further exercises listed in Table 1, it is believed that these lists will assist the organisers of future exercises to meet the specific challenges of the volcanic hazards they face and the societal, political, economic and legal contexts in which difficult and timely risk decisions have to be made.

The authors hope that the checklists will be considered and used, and, above all, improved. Candid feedback from future exercises will ensure that the guidance notes evolve and will be supplemented by the addition of further detailed exercise studies. Will these checklists facilitate more effective future exercises and improve

volcanic risk mitigation? This question can be answered only if they are used and relevant evidence is generated within future post-exercise empirical studies.

The Sendai Framework sets ambitious goals for quality standards, learning, knowledge exchange, education and training. The paramount goal of this chapter is to ensure that the pooled experiences of the few, who have had the advantages and privilege of being exercise participants, will be accessible to the widest possible audience, to encourage future exercises and thereby to improve the governance of volcanic risks.

# Disclaimer

The content of this paper reflects the authors' views and not necessarily the opinion of the organisations to which they belong. The authors and their organisations are not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.

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Dominica Exercise Plan

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<figure><img src="image_124.png" /></figure>
# Appendix
## Volcanic Unrest: Terminology and Definitions

Servando De la Cruz-Reyna, Ana Teresa Mendoza Rosas, Joachim Gottsmann

## Motivation and Background

This document provides a set of definitions of scientific and legal terminologies used in the context of volcanic unrest. The underpinning research behind this document was performed at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México—Geophysics Institute (Instituto de Geofísica, IGEF-UNAM) in collaboration with the National Center for Disaster Prevention (Centro Nacional de Prevención de Desastres, CENAPRED, Secretaría de Gobernación) and Colima University (Universidad de Colima, UCOL). Therefore, many definitions of the relevant legal terminology are based on Mexican law and may not be applicable *verbatim* to other jurisdictions. However, this document has been designed carefully to provide a common set of terms that are fundamental for volcanic unrest crisis management. This should provide a common platform for the interaction amongst different actors and stakeholders involved in the management of volcanic crises. The proposed definitions inherently follow on from investigations and interactions between scientists and decision-makers within the VUELCO project. It is not our intention to impose

these definitions on volcanic unrest risk communication world-wide. However, we expect this compilation to instigate a dialogue and a shared platform of relevant terminologies between the different actors and stakeholders of volcanic risk governance [see also (Bretton et al. 2017)].

Analysis of past volcanic disasters shows that one of their causes were communication failures amongst stakeholders (Fiske 1984; Hall 1990; Tiling 2009; Fearnley et al. 2017). Some failures resulted from different perception of the meaning of terms used to describe or define the level of volcanic hazard or risk. This is in fact a problem related to semiotics. Definitions of scientific, social and legal concepts that are fundamental for volcanic crisis management having semantic contents that can be translated into other languages are a necessary first step to homogenize terminologies and improve risk communications. It is thus necessary to develop efficient communication protocols that univocally use the same meaning of the terminology (semantic content), integrate that meaning into a communication code that can be understood by all stakeholders (syntactic content), and translate the effects and consequences that volcanic activity may cause (pragmatic content). The following sections provide some context for a shared terminology.

S. De la Cruz-Reyna
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM),
Mexico City, Mexico

A. T. Mendoza Rosas
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM),
Mexico City, Mexico

J. Gottsmann
School of Earth Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
Scientific Terminology

<table><thead><tr><th>Term (English)</th><th>Término (Español)</th><th>Meaning</th><th>Significado</th><th>Further reading</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Unrest (volcanic)</td><td>Activación; reactivación; agitación (volcánica)</td><td>A deviation from a background or baseline level behavior of a volcano which might be a prelude to an eruption, or to another hazardous event</td><td>Incremento del nivel de actividad volcánica respecto a un nivel de fondo o nivel base, el cual puede ser preludio de una erupción o de alguna otra manifestación peligrosa</td><td>Phillipson et al. (2013)</td></tr><tr><td>Crisis (volcanic)</td><td>Crisis (volcánica)</td><td>Situation during which a volcano shows signs of unrest, that can be interpreted as indication for potential impending eruptive activity and associated hazard. A crisis may or may not culminate in a dangerous eruption, but it may cause anxiety and socioeconomic unrest among the affected population</td><td>Situación en la que un volcán muestra signos de agitación que pueden interpretarse como precursora de actividad eruptiva inminente y de los peligros que conlleva. Una crisis volcánica puede o no culminar en una erupción peligrosa, pero puede producir ansiedad e inquietud socioeconómica en la población afectada</td><td>Tilling (1989)</td></tr><tr><td>Volcanic hazard (H)</td><td>Peligro volcánico (H)</td><td>Potentially damaging pre-eruptive, syn-eruptive or post- eruptive phenomena such as pyroclastic flows, windborne ash, lava flows, volcanic gases, lahars, ground deformation, major volcano-tectonic earthquakes, and landslides. In probabilistic assessments, “hazard” is sometimes referred to the probability that a specific volcanic manifestation or phenomenon will occur in a given area, within a given time frame (i.e., a threat)</td><td>Fenómenos potencialmente dañinos pre- eruptivos, co- eruptivos o post-eruptivos, como los flujos piroclásticos, ceniza transportada por el viento, flujos de lava, gases volcánicos, deformación del suelo, lahares, sismos volcano-tectónicos de magnitud considerable y deslizamientos. Para la evaluación probabilística, a veces “peligro” es la probabilidad de que una manifestación volcánica específica ocurra en una zona determinada, en un intervalo de tiempo dado</td><td>De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling (2008)</td></tr><tr><td>Volcanic Risk (R)</td><td>Riesgo volcánico (R)</td><td>Probable loss (assets such as lives, property, productive capacity, etc.) in the event of the manifestation of a volcanic hazard. It is a conditional probability resulting from the product of the probability (P) that a specific volcanic hazard will occur (i.e., a threat) times the value (L) of the exposed assets times their vulnerability (V): R=P*L*V</td><td>Pérdida probable (de activos como vidas, propiedades, capacidad productiva, infraestructura, etc.) en un área sujeta a un peligro volcánico. Es la probabilidad condicional que resulta de multiplicar la probabilidad (P) de que una manifestación o fenómeno volcánico específico ocurra en un área y en un tiempo determinados (peligro), por el valor (L) de los activos por: R=P*L*V</td><td>Tilling (1989)<br>De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling (2008)</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><thead><tr><td>Term (English)</td><td>Término (Español)</td><td>Meaning</td><td>Significado</td><td>Further reading</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Acceptable risk</td><td>Riesgo aceptable</td><td>Risk that an individual or community is willing to accept, or that a public official is prepared to allow persons in his or her charge to accept. Acceptable risk is a function of the benefits of risk mitigation (safety and avoided losses) and its costs (losses of jobs and business, community disruption, the costs of transportation, housing, and food for evacuees, and costs of any structures to divert hazards). Tolerance for risk varies considerably, mainly because the benefits and costs of mitigating risks vary greatly from individual to individual and community to community</td><td>Riesgo que un individuo o comunidad están dispuestos a aceptar, o que un funcionario público puede permitir que las personas bajo su responsabilidad acepten. La aceptación del riesgo depende de los beneficios de su mitigación (seguridad y pérdidas evitadas) y su costo (pérdida de trabajos y negocios, disfunción de la comunidad, gastos de transporte, alojamiento y alimento para evacuados, y costos de estructuras para reducir peligros). La tolerancia al riesgo es muy variable, ya que los beneficios y costos de mitigación de riesgos pueden ser muy diferentes entre individuos y entre comunidades</td><td>Peterson (1988)</td></tr><tr><td>Vulnerability</td><td>Vulnerabilidad</td><td>The susceptibility of physical and human systems to be affected by a natural hazard. It can be expressed as a probability of damage, or as the proportion of the total exposed assets expected to be affected by a given manifestation. In probabilistic assessment “vulnerability” is the expected loss of the exposed value should a hazardous manifestation occur (i.e., the probability of loss)</td><td>La susceptibilidad de sistemas físicos y humanos que pueden ser afectados por fenómenos naturales peligrosos. Se puede expresar como una probabilidad de daño, o como la proporción del total de activos expuestos a daño por una manifestación determinada. Para evaluación probabilística, “vulnerabilidad” es el porcentaje esperado de pérdida de los valores expuestos dado que una manifestación o evento volcánico ocurra (es decir, probabilidad de pérdida)</td><td>Jolly and De la Cruz-Reyna (2015)<br>De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling (2008)</td></tr><tr><td>Preparedness</td><td>Preparación</td><td>A state of readiness or preparation for use or action in the case of volcanic activity or any other threat. It involves a clear understanding by the population and authorities of the natural phenomena and their destructive effects. Series of measures to reduce vulnerability</td><td>Estado de preparación y conciencia para prevenir y actuar en el caso de alguna actividad volcánica o cualquier otra amenaza. Involucra una clara comprensión de los fenómenos naturales y de sus efectos destructivos por parte de la población y las autoridades. Serie de medidas para reducir la vulnerabilidad</td><td>Jolly and De la Cruz-Reyna (2015)<br>De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling (2008)</td></tr><tr><td>Volcanic disaster</td><td>Desastre volcánico</td><td>An event or a series of events marked by a significant loss of life and/or other assets that exceed(s) the local response capacity and results from one or more volcanic hazards</td><td>Evento o serie de eventos caracterizados por una pérdida significativa de activos y del valor, que excede la capacidad de respuesta local y que resultan de uno o más peligros volcánicos</td><td>Jolly and De la Cruz-Reyna (2015)</td></tr><tr><td>Alert</td><td>Alerta</td><td>A condition of heightened watchfulness or preparation for</td><td>Condición de atención, vigilancia y preparación para la acción. Un</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><thead><tr><td>Term (English)</td><td>Término (Español)</td><td>Meaning</td><td>Significado</td><td>Further reading</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td></td><td>action. A warning method or system to make people aware of impending danger</td><td>método o sistema de aviso para que la gente perciba un peligro inminente</td><td>Jolly and De la Cruz-Reyna (2015)</td></tr><tr><td>Alert code</td><td>Código de Alerta</td><td>A set of rules or a system used for transmitting alert messages requiring brevity and clarity. The symbolic arrangement of instructions in a warning system</td><td>Un conjunto de reglas o un sistema utilizado para la transmisión de mensajes de alerta breves y claros. Estructura simbólica de instrucciones en un sistema de alerta.</td><td>Jolly and De la Cruz-Reyna (2015)</td></tr><tr><td>Consensus</td><td>Consenso</td><td>General agreement in the diagnostics and the prognosis of the majority of scientists involved in the study of an episode of volcanic activity. Consensus of the involved scientists is important for the decision making of authorities</td><td>Acuerdo general en el diagnóstico y el pronóstico de la mayoría de los científicos involucrados en el estudio de un episodio de actividad volcánica. El consenso de los científicos involucrados es muy importante para la toma de decisiones de las autoridades</td><td>Jolly and De la Cruz-Reyna (2015)</td></tr><tr><td>Crisis</td><td>Crisis</td><td>An unstable situation of increased danger. A crucial stage in the course of volcanic unrest, when the threat of an eruption, or the possibility of an eruption, exceeds some threshold or reference level</td><td>Una situación inestable de amenaza en aumento. Etapa crucial en el curso de una reactiviación/agitación volcánica en que la amenaza de una erupción, o la posibilidad de una erupción exceden un nivel de referencia</td><td>Jolly and De la Cruz-Reyna (2015)</td></tr><tr><td>Pre-event</td><td>Pre-evento</td><td>Period of time when there is significant evidence that a hazard could occur</td><td>Período de tiempo en que se tiene evidencia significativa de que un fenómeno potencialmente causante de daños puede ocurrir</td><td>Jolly and De la Cruz-Reyna (2015)</td></tr><tr><td>Volcanic Traffic Light Alert System (VTLAS)</td><td>Semáforo de Alerta Volcánica</td><td>A basic communications protocol that translates volcanic threat into seven levels of preparedness for the emergency-management authorities, but only three unambiguous levels of alert for the public (color coded green–yellow–red). The changing status of the volcano threat is represented as the most likely scenarios according to the opinions of an official scientific committee that analyzes all available data</td><td>Protocolo de comunicación básica que traduce las amenzas volcanicas en siete niveles de preparación para las autoridades de gestión de emergencias, pero en solo tres niveles de alerta sin ambigüedades para el público (código de colores verde–amarillo–rojo). Los cambios en el estado del volcán se representan como los escenarios de riesgo más probables de acuerdo al consenso de un Comité Científico oficial que analiza los datos disponibles</td><td>Fearnley (2013)</td></tr><tr><td>Seismic swarm</td><td>Enjambre sísmico</td><td>A group of many earthquakes of similar size occurring closely clustered in space and time with no dominant main shock</td><td>Grupo de múltiples sismos de tamaño similar estrechamente agrupados en el espacio y en el tiempo sin evento principal dominante</td><td>McNutt and Roman (2015)</td></tr><tr><td>Forecast</td><td>Pronóstico</td><td>A general description of future events, including rough estimates of time, location, and likely activity</td><td>Una descripción general de eventos futuros incluyendo estimaciones de tiempo, localización y actividad probable</td><td>Connor et al. (2015)</td></tr></tbody></table>

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<table><thead><tr><td>Term (English)</td><td>Término (Español)</td><td>Meaning</td><td>Significado</td><td>Further reading</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Precursor</td><td>Precursor</td><td>A geological event that occurs prior to an eruption and is related to the preparation processes of the forthcoming eruption</td><td>Un evento geológico que se produce antes de una erupción y se relaciona con los procesos de preparación de la próxima erupción</td><td>National Academies of Sciences, Engineering Medicine (2017)</td></tr><tr><td>Prediction</td><td>Predicción</td><td>A specific description of future events, including time, size, type, location, and formal errors for each</td><td>Una descripción específica de los acontecimientos futuros, incluyendo el tiempo, el tamaño, el tipo, la ubicación y los errores formales para cada uno</td><td>National Academies of Sciences, Engineering Medicine (2017)</td></tr><tr><td>Probabilistic</td><td>Probabilístico</td><td>A statement of the relative likelihood of an event based on study of a population of similar events that have occurred in the past</td><td>Una declaración de la probabilidad relativa de un evento basado en el estudio de una población de eventos similares que han ocurrido en el pasado</td><td>Connor et al. (2015)</td></tr></tbody></table>

## Legal Terminology

<table><thead><tr><td>Term (English)</td><td>Término (Español)</td><td>Meaning</td><td>Significado</td><td>Further reading</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Accident (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Sinestro (definición legal, México)</td><td>Critical and harmful situation caused by the incidence of one or more hazards in a building or facility affecting the occupants and installations, with possible effects on surrounding facilities</td><td>Situación crítica y dañina generada por la incidencia de uno o más fenómenos perturbadores en un inmueble o instalación afectando a su población y equipo, con posible afectación a instalaciones circundantes</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción LV (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section LV)</td></tr><tr><td>Alert (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Alerta (definición legal, México)</td><td>Warning of the proximity of an anthropogenic or natural hazard, or of the increase of risk associated to it</td><td>El aviso de la proximidad de un Fenómeno Antropogénico o Natural Perturbador, o el incremento del Riesgo asociado al mismo</td><td>Reglamento de la Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Artículo 2, Fracción I (Bylaws of the General Civil Protection Law, June 6, 2012, 2nd Article, Fraction 1)</td></tr><tr><td>Brigade (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Brigada (definición legal, México)</td><td>Basic Civil Protection Unit. A group of people organized within a facility trained in basic emergency response functions such as: first aid, fighting fires, evacuations, search and rescue; designated in the Internal Civil Protection Unit as responsible for the development and implementation of prevention, rescue and</td><td>Grupo de personas que se organizan dentro de un inmueble, capacitadas y adiestradas en funciones básicas de respuesta a emergencias tales como: primeros auxilios, combate a conatos de incendio, evacuación, búsqueda y rescate; designados en la Unidad Interna de Protección Civil como encargados del</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción VI (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section VI)</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><thead><tr><td>Term (English)</td><td>Término (Español)</td><td>Meaning</td><td>Significado</td><td>Further reading</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td></td><td>recovery based on the provisions of the internal civil protection program of the facility</td><td>desarrollo y ejecución de acciones de prevención, auxilio y recuperación, con base en lo estipulado en el Programa Interno de Protección Civil del inmueble</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Disaster (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Desastre (definición legal, México)</td><td>A consequence of the occurrence of one or more severe (and/or extreme) hazards, associated or not, with a natural origin, or caused by human activity, or from outer space that cause an amount of damage in a given time and in a determined area that exceeds the response capacity of the affected community</td><td>Resultado de la ocurrencia de uno o más agentes perturbadores severos y/o extremos, concatenados o no, de origen natural, de la actividad humana o aquellos provenientes del espacio exterior, que cuando acontecen en un tiempo y en una zona determinada, causan daños que por su magnitud exceden la capacidad de respuesta de la comunidad afectada</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción XVI. (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XVI)</td></tr><tr><td>Disaster area (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Zona de desastre (definición legal, México)</td><td>Specified area upon which a competent authority formally declares a temporal condition of disrupted social structure, which precludes the normal community activities. Such declaration may involve funding from FONDEN (A special federal fund that can be only used to finance the recovery of disaster areas.)</td><td>Espacio territorial determinado en el tiempo por la declaración formal de la autoridad competente, en virtud del desajuste que sufre en su estructura social, impidiéndose el cumplimiento normal de las actividades de la comunidad. Puede involucrar el ejercicio de recursos públicos a través del Fondo de Desastres</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción LIX (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section LIX)</td></tr><tr><td>Disruptive natural phenomenon (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Fenómeno natural perturbador (definición legal, México)</td><td>Hazard of natural origin</td><td>Agente perturbador producido por la naturaleza</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción XXII (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XXII)</td></tr><tr><td>Early warning systems (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Sistemas de alerta temprana (definición legal, México)</td><td>A set of elements providing timely and efficient information, allowing individuals exposed to a threat to take avoidance actions aimed to prevent or reduce risk, and to be prepared for an effective response. Early Warning Systems include</td><td>El conjunto de elementos para la provisión de información oportuna y eficaz, que permiten a individuos expuestos a una amenaza tomar acciones para evitar o reducir su riesgo, así como prepararse para una respuesta efectiva. Los</td><td>Reglamento de la Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Artículo 2, Fracción XIII (Bylaws of the General Civil Protection Law, June 6, 2012, 2nd Article, Fraction XIII)</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><thead><tr><th>Term (English)</th><th>Término (Español)</th><th>Meaning</th><th>Significado</th><th>Further reading</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td></td><td>hazard recognition and mapping; monitoring and forecasting of impending events; processing and dissemination of warnings or alerts understandable to authorities and population and adopting appropriate and timely response actions to such alerts</td><td>Sistemas de Alerta Temprana incluyen conocimiento y mapeo de amenazas; monitoreo y pronóstico de eventos inminentes; proceso y difusión de Alertas comprensibles a las autoridades y población; así como adopción de medidas apropiadas y oportunas en respuesta a tales Alertas</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Emergency (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Emergencia</td><td>Abnormal situation in which damage to society is likely, posing an excessive risk to the safety and integrity of the general population, generated or associated with the presence, imminence, or high probability of occurrence of a hazard</td><td>Situación anormal que puede causar un daño a la sociedad y propiciar un riesgo excesivo para la seguridad e integridad de la población en general, generada o asociada con la inminencia, alta probabilidad o presencia de un agente perturbador</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción XVII (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XVII)</td></tr><tr><td>Evacuee (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Evacuado (definición legal, México)</td><td>Person who withdraws or is removed from a place of residence in a situation of emergency or likelihood of disaster, as a preventive and temporal measure to assure his or her safety and survival</td><td>Persona que, con carácter preventivo y provisional ante la posibilidad o certeza de una emergencia o desastre, se retira o es retirado de su lugar de alojamiento usual, para garantizar su seguridad y supervivencia</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción XIX (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XIX)</td></tr><tr><td>Geological phenomenon (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Fenómeno geológico (definición legal, México)</td><td>Hazard caused by actions and movements of the earth's crust. This category includes earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, unstable slopes, flows, landslides, terrain sinking and subsidence, and ground cracks</td><td>Agente perturbador que tiene como causa directa las acciones y movimientos de la corteza terrestre. A esta categoría pertenecen los sismos, las erupciones volcánicas, los tsunamis, la inestabilidad de laderas, los flujos, los caídos o derrumbes, los hundimientos, la subsidencia y los agrietamientos</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción XXIII (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XXIII)</td></tr><tr><td>Hazard (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Peligro (definición legal, México)</td><td>Probability of occurrence of a potentially damaging and disruptive phenomenon with a certain intensity, in a specific region and in a given time interval</td><td>Probabilidad de ocurrencia de un agente perturbador potencialmente dañino de cierta intensidad, durante un cierto periodo y en un sitio determinado</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción XXXVII (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XXXVII)</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><thead><tr><td>Term (English)</td><td>Término (Español)</td><td>Meaning</td><td>Significado</td><td>Further reading</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Help (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Auxilio (definición legal, México)</td><td>Support to people at risk or victims of a mishap, emergency or disaster, as a response by official or private specialized groups, or by internal civil protection units, as well as actions to protect other exposed people and valued non-human assets</td><td>Respuesta de ayuda a las personas en riesgo o las víctimas de un siniestro, emergencia o desastre, por parte de grupos especializados públicos o privados, o por las unidades internas de protección civil, así como las acciones para salvaguardar los demás agentes afectables</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo 1 Artículo 2, Fracción V (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section V)</td></tr><tr><td>High-risk zone (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Zona de riesgo grave (definición legal, México)</td><td>Human settlement located within an area of high risk caused by a hazard</td><td>Asentamiento humano que se encuentra dentro de una zona de grave riesgo, originado por un posible fenómeno perturbador</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo 1, Artículo 2, Fracción LXI (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section LXI)</td></tr><tr><td>Imminent (impending) risk (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Riesgo Inminente (definición legal, México)</td><td>A risk situation that, according to a specialized technical body, requires immediate actions as there are conditions or increased probabilities of adverse effects on an endangered person or valued non-human asset</td><td>Aquel riesgo que según la opinión de una instancia técnica especializada, debe considerar la realización de acciones inmediatas en virtud de existir condiciones o altas probabilidades de que se produzcan los efectos adversos sobre un agente afectable</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo 1, Artículo 2, Fracción L (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section L)</td></tr><tr><td>Incident (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Incidente (definición legal, México)</td><td>A minor event that may be considered normal and not necessarily caused by hazards, but that may generate conditions for the occurrence of a mishap, an emergency or a disaster</td><td>El suceso que sin constituir una situación anormal ni haber sido provocado por fenómenos perturbadores severos, puede crear condiciones precursoras de Siniestros, Emergencias o Desastres</td><td>Reglamento de la Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Artículo 2, Fracción XI (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XXVIII)</td></tr><tr><td>Injured party (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Damnificado (definición legal, México)</td><td>Person affected by a hazard who suffered damage to their person or to their property in such a degree that requires external assistance for his subsistence, remaining is such condition as long as the emergency persists, or the pre-disaster normality is restored</td><td>Persona afectada por un agente perturbador, ya sea que haya sufrido daños en su integridad física o un perjuicio en sus bienes de tal manera que requiere asistencia externa para su subsistencia; considerándose con esa condición en tanto no se concluya la emergencia o se restablezca la situación de normalidad previa al desastre</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo 1, Artículo 2, Fracción XIV (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XIV)</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><thead><tr><td>Term (English)</td><td>Término (Español)</td><td>Meaning</td><td>Significado</td><td>Further reading</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Integrated management of risks (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Gestión integral de riesgos (definición legal, México)</td><td>Set of actions aimed to the identification, analysis, evaluation, control and reduction of risk, considering that it has a multifactorial origin, and that it is a process in continuous construction. Such actions involve all of the three levels of government, and all other sectors of society promoting the design and implementation of public policies, strategies and procedures that, within a sustained development scheme, reduce the disaster-prone structural vulnerabilities, and increase the resilience or strength of society. It involves identification of risks and their sources, and development of prevention, prevention, mitigation, preparedness, relief, recovery and reconstruction schemes</td><td>El conjunto de acciones encaminadas a la identificación, análisis, evaluación, control y reducción de los riesgos, considerándolos por su origen multifactorial y en un proceso permanente de construcción, que involucra a los tres niveles de gobierno, así como a los sectores de la sociedad, lo que facilita la realización de acciones dirigidas a la creación e implementación de políticas públicas, estrategias y procedimientos integrados al logro de pautas de desarrollo sostenible, que combatan las causas estructurales de los desastres y fortalezcan las capacidades de resiliencia o resistencia de la sociedad. Involucra las etapas de: identificación de los riesgos y/o su proceso de formación, previsión, prevención, mitigación, preparación, auxilio, recuperación y reconstrucción</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción XXVIII (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XXVIII)</td></tr><tr><td>Internal Civil Protection program (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Programa interno de Protección Civil (definición legal, México)</td><td>Planning and operational tool circumscribed to an agency, or organization public or private and social sector, which is composed by the operating plan for the Internal Civil Protection Unit, the plan for continuity of operations and contingency plan, and aims to mitigate the previously identified risks and define preventive and response to be able to meet the event of an emergency or disaster</td><td>Es un instrumento de planeación y operación, circunscrito al ámbito de una dependencia, entidad, institución u organismo del sector público, privado o social; que se compone por el plan operativo para la Unidad Interna de Protección Civil, el plan para la continuidad de operaciones y el plan de contingencias, y tiene como propósito mitigar los riesgos previamente identificados y definir acciones preventivas y de respuesta para estar en condiciones de atender la eventualidad de alguna emergencia o desastre</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción XLI (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XLI)</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><thead><tr><td>Term (English)</td><td>Término (Español)</td><td>Meaning</td><td>Significado</td><td>Further reading</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Mitigation (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Mitigación (definición legal, México)</td><td>Any action aimed to reduce the impact or damage by a hazard on a person or valued non-human asset</td><td>Es toda acción orientada a disminuir el impacto o daños ante la presencia de un agente perturbador sobre un agente afectable</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción XXXVI (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XXXVI)</td></tr><tr><td>Monitoring systems (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Sistemas de monitoreo (definición legal, México)</td><td>A set of elements allowing detection, measurement, processing, prediction and study of the behavior of hazards, in order to assess them and their risks</td><td>El conjunto de elementos que permiten detectar, medir, procesar, pronosticar y estudiar el comportamiento de los agentes perturbadores, con la finalidad de evaluar Peligros y Riesgos</td><td>Reglamento de la Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Artículo 2, Fracción XIV (Bylaws of the General Civil Protection Law, June 6, 2012, 2nd Article, Fraction XIV)</td></tr><tr><td>National Risk Atlas (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Atlas Nacional de Riesgos (definición legal, México)</td><td>Integral geographic information system of threats and expected damages, resulting from a spatial and temporal analysis of the interaction between hazards, vulnerability and exposure of affected entities</td><td>Sistema integral de información sobre los agentes perturbadores y daños esperados, resultado de un análisis espacial y temporal sobre la interacción entre los peligros, la vulnerabilidad y el grado de exposición de los agentes afectables</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción IV (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section IV)</td></tr><tr><td>Prevention (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Prevención (definición legal, México)</td><td>Group of actions implemented in advance of the occurrence of hazards aimed to foresee and reduce the related risks, identifying, reducing or eliminating them, and to avert or reduce their destructive impact on populace, property, infrastructure, as well as prevent the social construction of risks</td><td>Conjunto de acciones y mecanismos implementados con antelación a la ocurrencia de los agentes perturbadores, con la finalidad de conocer los peligros o los riesgos, identificarlos, eliminarlos o reducirlos; evitar o mitigar su impacto destructivo sobre las personas, bienes, infraestructura, así como anticiparse a los procesos sociales de construcción de los mismos</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción XXXIX (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XXXIX)</td></tr><tr><td>Prevision (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Previsión (definición legal, México)</td><td>To acquire awareness of the risks, and of what is needed to face them through defined steps of risk identification, prevention, mitigation, preparedness, emergency response, recovery and reconstruction</td><td>Tomar conciencia de los riesgos que pueden causarse y las necesidades para enfrentarlos a través de las etapas de identificación de riesgos, prevención, mitigación, preparación, atención de emergencias, recuperación y reconstrucción</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo I, Artículo 2, Fracción XL (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XL)</td></tr></tbody></table>

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<table><thead><tr><td>Term (English)</td><td>Término (Español)</td><td>Meaning</td><td>Significado</td><td>Further reading</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Reconstruction (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Reconstrucción (definición legal, México)</td><td>Transient actions aimed to recover the social and economic environment that prevailed among people before suffering the effects of a hazard in a given area or jurisdiction. This process should be aimed as much as possible to reduce existing risks, ensuring that no new risks would be created, so improving the pre-existing conditions</td><td>La acción transitoria orientada a alcanzar el entorno de normalidad social y económica que prevalecía entre la población antes de sufrir los efectos producidos por un agente perturbador en un determinado espacio o jurisdicción. Este proceso debe buscar en la medida de lo posible la reducción de los riesgos existentes, asegurando la no generación de nuevos riesgos y mejorando para ello las condiciones preexistentes</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo 1, Artículo 2, Fracción XLIV (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XLIV)</td></tr><tr><td>Recovery (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Recuperación (definición legal, México)</td><td>Process starting during an emergency, consisting of actions aimed to return to the normality of the affected community</td><td>Proceso que inicia durante la emergencia, consistente en acciones encaminadas al retorno a la normalidad de la comunidad afectada</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo 1, Artículo 2, Fracción XLV (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XLV)</td></tr><tr><td>Regulation (legal definition, Mexico, as opposite to disruption)</td><td>Agente regulador (definición legal, México)</td><td>Set of actions, tools, standards, works and more generally everything intended to protect people, property, strategic and productive infrastructure and the environment, and to reduce risk and control and prevent adverse effects from a hazard</td><td>Lo constituyen las acciones, instrumentos, normas, obras y en general todo aquello destinado a proteger a las personas, bienes, infraestructura estratégica, planta productiva y el medio ambiente, a reducir los riesgos y a controlar y prevenir los efectos adversos de un agente perturbador</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo 1, Artículo 2, Fracción I. (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section I)</td></tr><tr><td>Resilience (legal definition, Mexico)</td><td>Resiliencia (definición legal, México)</td><td>It is the ability of a hazard-exposed system, community or society to resist, assimilate, withstand and quickly and efficiently recover from damaging effects, preserving and recovering its basic and functional structures, and achieving a better protection and improved risk reduction for the future</td><td>Es la capacidad de un sistema, comunidad o sociedad potencialmente expuesta a un peligro para resistir, asimilar, adaptarse y recuperarse de sus efectos en un corto plazo y de manera eficiente, a través de la preservación y restauración de sus estructuras básicas y funcionales, logrando una mejor protección futura y mejorando las medidas de reducción de riesgos</td><td>Ley General Protección Civil, 6 junio 2012, Capítulo 1, Artículo 2, Fracción XLVIII (Mexican Civil Protection General Law, 6 June 2012, Chapter 1, 2nd Article, Section XLVIII)</td></tr></tbody></table>

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