# Scientific diplomacy and the climate emergency: Young researchers' perspectives on the COP

Nawel Belkessa, Abir Khribich

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Nawel Belkessa, Abir Khribich. Scientific diplomacy and the climate emergency: Young researchers' perspectives on the COP. Les Cahiers Espace, Environnement, Risques et Résilience, 2025, 3. hal-05354445

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Scientific diplomacy and the climate emergency: Young researchers'
perspectives on the COP

Une prise de position de Nawel Belkessa<fnref n="1" />, Abir Khribich<fnref n="2" />

Reçu le 13 octobre 2025, publié en novembre 2025

One year ago, the Conference of Parties on climate change COP29, held in Azerbaijan in November 2024, highlighted the deep divisions and inconsistencies within the multilateral climate framework. Today, thirty years after the first COP in 1995 marked the beginning of global commitments to reduce CO2 emissions, negotiations continue to reveal the structural weaknesses of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the limitations of a process where economic interests often dominate scientific priorities.

The year 2024 marked a major turning point in the global climate crisis. After an exceptionally hot 2023, when the global average temperature exceeded pre-industrial levels by 1.45 ± 0.12°C, 2024 became the first year in which the +1.5°C threshold was unambiguously crossed. The threshold, deemed critical by the Paris Agreement, was intended to limit the most severe risks and impacts of climate disruption (Belkessa and Khribich, 2025). This unprecedented observed rise was accompanied by record concentrations of greenhouse gases, intensified extremes in air and ocean temperatures, and a proliferation of devastating climate events: destructive wildfires, catastrophic floods, and unbearable heatwaves. Among the most notable in 2025 were: wildfires in Southern California (January), massive floods in Bolivia (March), Cyclone Remal in Bangladesh and India (May), deadly floods in South Africa's Eastern Cape province (June), wildfires in İzmir, Turkey (June–July), fires and storms across the Balkans (June–July), floods in Pakistan (June–July), a heatwave in Western Europe (June–July), a heatwave in eastern China (July), and catastrophic flooding in Central Texas (July), causing hundreds of deaths and tens of thousands of displaced people (Voices Earth, 2025).<fnref n="1" />

The mismatch between effort and outcomes should prompt serious reflection. The climate challenge is not “magical” or “automatic” (Laurent, 2023); it calls for coordinated transformations, bold political choices and a collective awakening proportionate to the crisis.

It is hard to square today's realities with yesterday's labels. For example, China is now a top industrial power and the largest annual greenhouse-gas emitter; allowing it to hold onto a blanket "developing" status strains fairness and effectiveness because it blurs who should shoulder which responsibilities. We think a better approach would be to match obligations to current capabilities and responsibilities, that is, who has the resources and who contributes most to emissions today. On that basis, China should be among the countries that are expected to provide stable climate finance, support climate adaptation in

<footnote n="1">¹ Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, ICN, Nice, France</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Université Côte d'Azur, GREDEG, Nice, France & Université de Carthage, École Polytechnique de Tunisie, LEGI, Tunisie</footnote>

<footnote n="1">¹ https://voices.earth/insights/the-top-10-climate-catastrophes-of-2025-so-far/.</footnote>
vulnerable states, and accelerate technology transfer. What is necessary is to align roles with present-
day power and impact so the world can move faster and more fairly toward its climate goals.

This example illustrates, in our view, the urgent need to reform the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to reflect current economic and environmental realities.

The imbalance between industrialized and developing countries complicates the situation. Wealthier countries, historically responsible for the majority of emissions, tend to preserve their economic models while offering insufficient support to vulnerable countries that are nevertheless bearing the brunt of climate impacts. This raises fundamental questions of climate justice, whether in terms of more equitable financing or potentially the targeted degrowth of advanced economies.

Across much of the world, basic needs (subsistence, protection, and freedom) are largely met. But this is far from universal: The United Nations estimates 731 million people still struggle to satisfy the most elementary needs.<fnref n="2" /> Meanwhile, in high-income countries, many who have secured the basics are shifting toward hedonic consumption (Liao, 2021).

The link is stark: higher living standards, higher environmental pressure. Globally, the richest 10% generate nearly half of greenhouse-gas emissions, while the poorest 50% account for just 12% (Chancel et al., 2022).

Shifting our development models demands much firmer commitments, not just praising “good” behaviors such as purchasing electric cars or eating vegetarian diets; we need an environmental architecture that blends binding rules with smart incentives, calibrated to real economic and social disparities. Policy must widen access to sustainable options so they do not become the preserve of a privileged few (Khribich, 2024).<fnref n="3" />

Gender equality has also emerged as a contested theme, with some states resisting its integration into climate policies despite clear evidence of women's heightened vulnerability. Scientific research consistently shows that women express more favorable attitudes toward the environment than men (Ahmad et al., 2021; Eagly, 1987; Rainisio et al., 2022). Yet our present-day relationship to technology and the environment is shaped by a long history of gendered role assignments. The result? Women, despite being highly engaged with environmental issues, are routinely sidelined from decision-making on sustainable development and the uptake of green technologies. Persistent stereotypes that equate “tech” with masculinity continue to reinforce this exclusion (Sovacool et al., 2022; Standal et al., 2020). These findings make one point unmistakably clear: countries that still resist embedding gender equality in policy are undermining their own climate response. Climate change is universal in its reach; a storm does not pause to ask who it harms. Ensuring women’s full participation is not only fair, it is a necessary prerequisite for effective, lasting climate solutions.

Beyond these structural issues, the role of science remains marginal in the face of the weight of geopolitical and economic agendas. While scientists emphasize tipping points and irreversible impacts such as melting ice caps, ocean acidification, and biodiversity collapse, negotiations often focus on compromises designed to preserve the competitiveness of states. Findings such as large-scale permafrost thaw, and Amazon rainforest dieback rarely translate into binding diplomatic commitments. Instead, negotiations tend to prioritize state sovereignty, economic competitiveness, and energy security, leading to diluted compromises rather than transformative action. According to Lenton et al. (2019), crossing several tipping thresholds could trigger cascading and self-reinforcing feedback processes, yet these warnings are often sidelined when they conflict with short-term national or industrial interests. The

<footnote n="2">² https://www.un.org/en/exhibits/page/sustainable-development-goals.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Khribich, A. (2024). Peut-on être trop heureux pour se préoccuper du climat ? The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/peut-on-etre-trop-heureux-pour-se-preoccuper-du-climat-220429.</footnote>
strong influence of lobbying groups, especially from the fossil fuel industry, weakens the credibility of climate negotiations that should be guided by science (Brulle, 2019). As a result, we notice that COP agreements often represent minimal compromises between geopolitical blocs instead of reflecting the ambitious action that scientists recommend. It is therefore urgent to strengthen the link between science and diplomacy, for example, by improving collaboration between the IPCC and the UNFCCC, creating independent expert panels, and using science-based criteria to monitor progress. These measures are essential to rebuild trust and ensure that climate governance is grounded in solid scientific evidence.

As the international community now turns toward COP30, to be held in November 2025 in Belém (Brazil), expectations are particularly high. Situated in the Amazon, the summit carries both symbolic and practical weight: it will not only test the capacity of negotiators to deliver more ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and operationalize the new climate finance framework, but will also place forests, biodiversity, and the rights of vulnerable communities at the heart of global climate diplomacy. COP30 coincides with a new cycle in which countries are required to submit updated and more ambitious NDCs under the Paris Agreement (2015). Current pledges remain insufficient to align with the 1.5°C trajectory. The summit is therefore expected to deliver not only greater national commitments but also a clearer and more equitable framework for international cooperation.

At COP29 in Baku, governments agreed to a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) for climate finance. Set at $1.3 trillion annually by 2035, with at least $300 billion dedicated to developing countries (WRI, 2025), the challenge will be not only to mobilize this unprecedented sum but also to ensure fair access, transparency, and a balance between mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage funding.

Reflecting on the outcomes of COP29, we believe that real progress will only come when science truly shapes political decisions rather than being constrained by them. We hope COP30 in Belém will mark a turning point, as an opportunity for renewal, a chance for countries to move beyond symbolic commitments and embrace genuine cooperation grounded in equity, transparency, and shared responsibility.

## References:

Ahmad, N., Ullah, Z., Arshad, M.Z., Kamran, H. waqas, Scholz, M., Han, H., 2021. Relationship between corporate social responsibility at the micro-level and environmental performance: The mediating role of employee pro-environmental behavior and the moderating role of gender. Sustainable Production and Consumption 27, 1138–1148. 10.1016/j.spc.2021.02.034

Belkessa, N., Khribich, A., 2025. Regards croisés de jeunes chercheuses sur la diplomatie scientifique et l'urgence climatique à la COP climat. Les Cahiers Espace, Environnement, Risques et Résilience.

Brulle, Robert. (2019). Networks of Opposition: A Structural Analysis of U.S. Climate Change Countermovement Coalitions 1989–2015. Sociological Inquiry. 91. 10.1111/soin.12333.

Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., Zucman, G., 2022. Rapport sur les inégalités mondiales 2022. Seuil.

Eagly, A.H., 1987. Sex Differences in Social Behavior: A Social-role interpretation. Psychology Press, New York.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203781906

Laurent, É., 2023. Économie pour le XXIe siècle. Manuel des transitions justes. La Découverte.
https://doi.org/10.3917/dec.laure.2023.01

Lenton, T. M., Rockström, J., Gaffney, O., Rahmstorf, S., Richardson, K., Steffen, W., Schellnhuber, H. J., 2019.
*Climate tipping points — too risky to bet against.* Nature, 575(7784), 592–595

Liao, Y., 2021. The Sources and Influencing Factors of Hedonistic Consumption. Psychology 12, 660–674.
https://doi.org/10.4236/psych.2021.124041
Rainisio, N., Boffi, M., Pola, L., Inghilleri, P., Sergi, I., Liberatori, M., 2022. The role of gender and self-efficacy in domestic energy saving behaviors: A case study in Lombardy, Italy. Energy Policy 160, 112696.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112696

Sovacool, B.K., Barnacle, M.L., Smith, A., Brisbois, M.C., 2022. Towards improved solar energy justice: Exploring the complex inequities of household adoption of photovoltaic panels. Energy Policy 164, 112868.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2022.112868

Standal, K., Talevi, M., Westskog, H., 2020. Engaging men and women in energy production in Norway and the United Kingdom: The significance of social practices and gender relations. Energy Research & Social Science 60, 101338. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.101338

World Resources Institute (WRI). (2024). *How to Reach $300 Billion — and the Full $1.3 Trillion — Under the New Climate Finance Goal*. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.