# A generic marine protected area model, challenged by indigenous peoples and local communities: How can the model be adapted or reinvented?

Jean-Eudes Beuret, Anne Cadoret, Newton José Rodrigues da Silva

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Jean-Eudes Beuret, Anne Cadoret, Newton José Rodrigues da Silva. A generic marine protected area model, challenged by indigenous peoples and local communities: How can the model be adapted or reinvented?. Marine Policy, 2025, 181 (105862), 10.1016/j.marpol.2025.106852. hal-05219617

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# A generic marine protected area model, challenged by indigenous peoples and local communities: How can the model be adapted or reinvented?

Jean-Eudes Beuret<sup>a, *, †</sup>, Anne Cadoret<sup>b, †</sup>, Newton José Rodrigues Da Silva<sup>c</sup>

## ARTICLE INFO

### Keywords:

Biodiversity

Conflict

Conservation

Marine protected area

Political ecology

## ABSTRACT

Many Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) face difficulties of social acceptance. This comparative analysis of 13 MPAs spanning five continents aims to explain these problems by comparing their localization processes in order to identify possible recurring mechanisms. Analyzing their trajectories and the conflicts they cause reveal the existence of a generic model of Marine Protected AreaS which is mostly implicit and applied everywhere. It enables us to identify 7 components of this model: who decides, what legitimizes the decision, the decision's temporalities and vectors, and then, inside the action modalities, the relationship with the area, with nature, with exchange and the action presentation and organization. Laying bare this model makes it possible to explain the misunderstandings that arise and many acceptance problems that lead to conflict and inefficiency. Based on observations of local adaptations or reinventions of the MPA model, proposals are made for a global overhaul of the model, to make it more flexible and open to multiple ways of thinking about nature and conservation.

## 1. Introduction

There are currently over 18,000 Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in the world, covering more than 8% of seas and oceans. While international commitments call for 30% coverage by 2030, the effectiveness of MPAs has been questioned by some. Despite local successes, global analyses show that their expansion – which is quite recent – has had few significant results for biodiversity until now [1], and case studies reveal the difficulties of locally anchoring MPAs that were designed for global policies and objectives [2–6].

By analyzing correlations between implemented means and outcome indicators, inefficiencies (i.e. the gap between the results obtained and those expected in terms of marine biodiversity) can be attributed to three causes. Gill et al. [7] associate them with insufficient capacity and means. Zupan et al. [8] show a correlation between an MPA's effectiveness and the existence of specific regulations. In an article entitled “participation, not penalties”, Fidler et al. [9] link MPAs' effectiveness to local community involvement, as do Giakoumi et al. [10]. Each of these research findings, in fact, questions the capacity of governing bodies of MPAs to boost local stakeholder involvement, whether to contribute to a policy lacking resources, overcome regulatory shortcomings linked to problems of social acceptance, or build co-management.

Local participation is sometimes affected by a discrepancy between the MPA design and some local cultural norms, as shown by, among others, Gaspar and Bambridge [11] in Moorea, French Polynesia. More broadly, studies in political ecology denounce a cultural recognition in protected areas that is often limited to respect for culture, without modifications of the modern paradigm that serves as a framework and without active recognition of different ontologies and forms of knowledge [12–14]. Based on these references and on previous case studies [3], the central hypothesis of the CALM (Conservation of Coastal and Marine Areas) Project is that the extreme diversity of statutes, worldwide, hides a generic model for MPAs that is partly implicit and that hinders local adoption of MPAs, where it is neither understood nor accepted.

A ‘model’ is a coherent set of characteristics that can be replicated, while ‘generic’ means that this model can be applied whatever the set of situations (in this case, all the MPAs in the world). In this study, we do not suggest any model or framework, as some scientists do, but we observe reality in order to see if recurring patterns emerge in the design of MPAs based on explicit or implicit elements that make up, de facto, a model. These elements are then so commonly accepted that they are taken for granted by those who design conservation policies, which

<footnote><sup>a</sup> Institut AGRO Rennes-Angers, UMR ESO 6590, 65 rue de Saint Brieuc, Rennes Cedex 35042, France</footnote>

<footnote><sup>b</sup> Aix Marseille Univ, UMR CNRS TELEMMe 7303, Aix-en-Provence, France</footnote>

<footnote><sup>c</sup> Coordenadoria de Assistencia Tecnica Integral, Avenida Bartolomeu de Gusmão, 192, Santos, Estado de São Paulo, Brazil</footnote>

<footnote>* Corresponding author.</footnote>

<footnote>E-mail addresses: beuret@agrocampus-ouest.fr (J.-E. Beuret), anne-cadoret@univ-amu.fr (A. Cadoret), newtonrodrigues@cati.sp.gov.br (N.J.R. Da Silva).</footnote>
contributes to their composing a generic model. To test the hypothesis of the existence of such a model, thirteen MPAs visited on five continents were used as case studies for an international comparative analysis.

As responses to global biodiversity conservation objectives, officially recognized MPAs are mostly the result of top-down dynamics: they must find a place in a crowded institutional landscape and build their local acceptance through localization processes. As a process by which economic and other activity is embedded in places [15], the localization of an MPA aims for it to be locally adopted, anchored in territorial proximities [16], and with local stakeholders positioned in a new governance of commons [17]. The processes of MPAs' localization are the CALM project's object of study, with a focus on the conflicts that mark them, a second hypothesis being that conflict analysis reveals discrepancies between the specific (local) and the generic, and thus the components of the generic model.

In its report on biodiversity erosion, IPBES [18] highlights the major role that indigenous peoples and local communities will have to play in responding to this crisis. All our case studies involve local communities, including officially recognized indigenous (Rapa Nui in Chile, Orika in Colombia, Maori in New Zealand) or traditional (Caïçara in Brazil) communities, in four cases. The confrontation between a possible exogenous model and the values of these peoples and communities is a focus of the analysis.

After presenting the methodology and areas of study, the answers provided by the case studies to our research questions are presented: does a generic – largely implicit – model of Marine Protected Area (MPA) exist, and if so, what are its components? What does conflict analysis tell us about the components of this model and how it can be adapted or reinvented, locally or globally? In the discussion, these results are put into perspective with regard to the literature on colonialities and decolonial ecology.

# 2. Materials and methods

## 2.1. Theoretical framework

Political ecology is an interdisciplinary field that provides an approach for testing our hypotheses in MPAs, combining the study of ecological problems with the study of their economic, cultural and political determinants [19], [20]. In MPAs, political ecology examines power relations over access to governance and decision-making, the selection of ideas translated into conservation measures and the distribution of benefits, costs and power inherent in implementing conservation measures. This has led several authors [21], [22], [23], to highlight conflicts, as well as feelings of dispossession and loss of power experienced by local groups.

Many of these studies explore the complex relationship between exogenous (external to the site) and endogenous references, highlighting, among other things, the risk of idealizing one or the other [24], the challenge being to open up a dialogue between them. According to Helmcke [25], political ecology has played an important role in debunking theories and environmental narratives that have been taken for granted by the actors who shape environmental governance: our objective is to expand upon existing studies to make explicit ways of acting in MPAs, which are not discussed but which shape a model.

Several disciplines are combined. First, geography, with the analysis of conflicts, defined as manifest oppositions between two or more stakeholders, the land or maritime area being the object, medium or issue of contestations [26]. They weaken MPAs' implementation [27], often leading to the reduction of conservation measures [28]. Grasping and overcoming opposition to take advantage of what it reveals [29], [30], is a challenge for MPA developers. Another geographic object of study is social acceptance: this refers to the agreement of an individual or a social group to a project or measures under a public policy [31]. Then comes the economics of institutions, with a focus on organized proximities [16], that the MPA must create to foster its acceptance and

localization. This constitutes a capital that agents can activate to coordinate, and relates to a logic of belonging (to the same organization, formal or informal) or similarity (reference to the same social norms, languages, etc.). Their dynamics were studied by mobilizing the actor-network-theory [32], through retrospective analysis of the history of the protected area [33]. Lastly, and secondarily, in order to shed some light on the roots of the model, we bring into the discussion literature on colonialities that is part of political ecology, drawn from various disciplines (history, anthropology, sociology, etc.).

## 2.2. Comparative analysis: sample and data collection

The cross-sectional analysis of 13 MPAs visited between 2017 and 2019 on 5 continents makes it possible to conduct a diachronic analysis of MPA localization processes that involve global and local scales (of policy design and implementation). The purpose is to explore how various actors and processes influence and shape power relations through interaction between local and distant spaces across scales [19]. It aims to identify patterns that underpin a reality, made up of a set of ideas, knowledge and logical rules [34], [35], [36].

The sample includes MPAs from different geographical areas (Mediterranean, Asia, Polynesian Arc, Latin America, West Africa) (Fig. 1), selected to maximize the diversity of situations (culture, anthropic pressures, MPA statutes). The selection logic is that of replication (not representativeness), with sampling aimed at highlighting mechanisms that are either similar (literal replication) or contrasted for known reasons (theoretical replication) [35]. Diversity is used here to identify recurrent patterns. To guarantee the comparability of situations, the case studies meet several criteria: there are anthropic pressures, the MPA includes a land-sea interface and has a maritime surface area of more than 50 km², the MPA project was launched more than 5 years ago (which makes it possible to compare localization processes). With no objective of representativeness, the size of the sample (13 MPAs) is a compromise (restricted by the resources available)<fnref n="1" /> between two opposing objectives: maximizing the diversity of situations studied (partly correlated with the number of MPAs) and maximizing the time spent in each field.

The scientific rigor of the case study is built not on a quantitative analysis but through the combined use of several sources [35]: in addition to *in-situ* observation (analysis of the landscape, activities, signs opposing certain MPAs, observation of key moments of consultation in six MPAs), documentary analysis (MPA reference documents, gray literature associated with its governance, reviews of scientific or press articles), 201 semi-structured interviews (1–2.5 h) were conducted with various categories of stakeholders (Fig. 2), based on the same guide and analysis grid. The interview guide covers the following topics: the steps involved in setting up the MPA; modes of governance and citizen involvement; conflictual issues, arguments and conflict dynamics; rules of use (legal, unwritten, traditional); the challenges of the MPA for the community and the territory; the MPA in the multi-level governance. In each case, we met officials from the authority responsible for defining and implementing the conservation policy, elected representatives or officials from the MPA management authority, and interlocutors from different stakeholder categories (representatives of local communities, economic players, elected representatives or officials from local public authorities, and environmental associations). The number of interviews per case study varied according to the heterogeneity of stakeholders' points of view. It was also, sometimes, affected by difficulties in accessing stakeholders (South Korea, India, Greece): this is a limitation of the study.

Two of the authors carried out the observations and interviews on all

<footnote n="1">¹ Excluding some countries such as Canada or US, with a significant experience in creating protected areas (and in indigenous-led conservation, notably in Canada), which represents a limitation of the study.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 1. The case study sample: 13 MPAs in diverse contexts.</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 2. Categories of actors interviewed and number of interviews per case study.</figcaption></figure>

the sites. This is rarely the case with international comparative analyses based on peer-reviewed publications analysis [37] or on an analytical framework that researchers are invited to use in their own case study [38]. We assume a sensitive research stance where, beyond the process of objectification, we consider both the perception of places and social relationships, and what is expressed non-verbally. In this paper, as priority is given to an overall analysis of the recurrences observed, it will not be possible to present the particularities of each MPA, socio-ecosystem or localization process, except for a few issues in Table 1.

## 3. Results

Analyzing the conflicts that punctuate the trajectories of MPAs has enabled us to identify dissatisfactions expressed repeatedly: their analysis reveals the implicit components of a generic model of conservation through MPAs [39].
<table><caption>**Table 1**
MPAs studied: main issues and acceptance difficulties.</caption><thead><tr><td>Case study</td><td>Main conservation issues</td><td>Acceptance difficulties</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Zakynthos, Greece,<br/>National Marine Park</td><td>Caretta caretta<br/>(loggerhead) sea turtle</td><td>Fishers: The Park is trying to<br/>renew a dialogue that has<br/>been interrupted for several<br/>years</td></tr><tr><td>Port Cros, France,<br/>National Park</td><td>Marine fauna,<br/>Posidonia meadow,<br/>rocky or sandy beds,<br/>forest, avifauna</td><td>Acceptance of conservation<br/>measures remains delicate<br/>among professional and<br/>recreational fishers, tourist<br/>operators and local<br/>residents.</td></tr><tr><td>Isla Grande de<br/>Atacama, Chile, Multi-<br/>use Marine and Coastal<br/>Protected Area</td><td>Marine biodiversity,<br/>wetlands, fossils,<br/>geology</td><td>Problems with illegal<br/>fishing and tourism. The<br/>process of establishing<br/>governance and rules has<br/>not been completed.</td></tr><tr><td>Tyre, Lebanon,<br/>Coast Nature Reserve</td><td>Birds, turtles,<br/>underwater<br/>archaeological sites</td><td>Struggle between two<br/>political groups in favor of<br/>or opposed to the reserve</td></tr><tr><td>Gulf of Mannar, India,<br/>Biosphere Reserve/<br/>Marine National Park</td><td>Marine biodiversity:<br/>coral, sea grass beds,<br/>mangrove</td><td>Rejection by seaweed<br/>collectors and small-scale<br/>fishers whose livelihood is<br/>threatened</td></tr><tr><td>Koh Rong Archipelago,<br/>Cambodia, Marine<br/>Fisheries Management<br/>Area</td><td>Coral, fish, mangrove,<br/>sea grass beds tg</td><td>Fishers oppose the creation<br/>of a new MPA that<br/>accompanies a tourism<br/>development project</td></tr><tr><td>Taean Haean, South<br/>Korea,<br/>National Park</td><td>Sand dunes,<br/>landscapes, 17<br/>endangered species,<br/>water quality</td><td>Conflict with<br/>environmentalists who<br/>want the MPA to focus more<br/>on environmental issues</td></tr><tr><td>Hauraki Gulf, New<br/>Zealand,<br/>Marine Park</td><td>Marine biodiversity,<br/>fishery resources</td><td>Non-acceptance by sectoral<br/>administrations that want to<br/>retain exclusive<br/>prerogatives</td></tr><tr><td>Moorea, French<br/>Polynesia,<br/>Maritime Space<br/>Management Plan</td><td>Coral ecosystems</td><td>Strong opposition from<br/>fishes when the plan was<br/>revised: conflict and<br/>renegotiation</td></tr><tr><td>Rapa Nui/Motu Motiro<br/>Hiva, Chile, Multi-use<br/>Marine and Coastal<br/>Protected Area/Marine<br/>Park</td><td>Coral reefs, fishery<br/>resources</td><td>Rejection of the Marine<br/>Park, then acceptance of the<br/>Marine and Coastal<br/>Protected Area following a<br/>long dispute</td></tr><tr><td>Corrales del Rosario y<br/>San Bernardo,<br/>Colombia, National<br/>Natural Park</td><td>Coral reefs, marine<br/>biodiversity</td><td>The Afro-descendant<br/>indigenous community<br/>demands to be included in<br/>park management</td></tr><tr><td>Barra Do Una/Littoral<br/>Centro/Jureia Itatins,<br/>Brazil Sustainable<br/>Development Reserve/<br/>Marine Coastal Park/<br/>Patchwork of<br/>conservation units</td><td>Atlantic coastal forests,<br/>coastal landscapes,<br/>marine and coastal<br/>ecosystems</td><td>The local community resists<br/>eviction attempts.<br/>Stalemate, no management<br/>plan</td></tr><tr><td>Delta du Saloum,<br/>Senegal,<br/>Biosphere Reserve/<br/>National Park</td><td>Mangrove, marine<br/>avifauna</td><td>Following an inter-<br/>institutional conflict, the<br/>Biosphere Reserve is giving<br/>way to a patchwork of<br/>actions accepted because<br/>they are locally anchored</td></tr></tbody></table>

### 3.1. Behind conflicts: dissatisfactions revealing elements of a generic model

Conflicts have been observed at each phase of the MPA's life (emergence, definition of the project, administrative and legal validation, construction of the management plan, implementation, revision, etc.). Their characterization shows that their object is rarely conservation (for or against) but the design and content of the conservation action, which is often misunderstood. Systematic conflict identification and analysis reveals that, most often, conservation brings people

together: it is the way of thinking about it that divides.

Analyzing the arguments then reveals that although each conflict focuses on a specific object, they are fueled by dissatisfactions that seize upon the various sources of conflict, and resurface recurrently. They bring into play personal elements such as attachment to place, which is difficult to expose in a deliberative model that favors the expression of interests [40]: this model distances both the expression of intimate attachments and groups unfamiliar with the languages and forms of expression that it requires. They were expressed recurrently during interviews, despite the heterogeneity of the contexts, with feelings of:

* Dispossession,<fnref n="2" /> with or without legal grounds: this involves expulsions in the cases studied in Brazil and Cambodia, but is often more subtle with populations from whom familiar and often food-producing areas are taken away. Attachment is at the heart of the feeling of dispossession, as is the case in Moorea, where the population denounces the social group's broken connection to nearby maritime areas, a place of education in the sea for children.

* Injustice and unequal efforts to protect the environment, from constrained and sanctioned local uses on one side, and uses or external effects uncontrolled on the other: thus, in the cases studied in Colombia or French Polynesia, the inhabitants denounce the confiscation of fishing gear, with a controllable artisanal fishery, whereas the effects of pollution from land-based sources, industrial fishing or tourist frequentation are uncontrolled.

* Misunderstanding of and contempt for differentiated representations of the world. A radical lack of understanding of an institutional and/or conservation model sometimes contradictory to local community references is expressed.

Because they cannot be expressed in public arenas, these feelings are often expressed violently, a *posteriori*. In Moorea, they arise during the revision of the management plan after years of the MPA's operation. Violence can mask arguments: for example, in Colombia, the destruction of a national park office by a community was the response to a fit of anger but left no room for the expression of arguments and feelings. However, analysis of the data collected through interviews enables us to establish a link between the dissatisfactions expressed and the modes of action they call into question, which form the basis of an MPA conservation model. Here are several examples:

* "One group manages the land, one group manages the sea... it's a model for conflict"<fnref n="3" />: the multiplication of management authorities combined with the break in land-sea continuity is challenged.

* "Before, the government imposed things on you, but you could claim. Now they tell you we consulted you, you can't say anything anymore"<fnref n="4" />: limited forms of participation are challenged by leaders who see themselves as the ones in charge of "our home" and want to incorporate<fnref n="5" /> themselves into the conservation action.

* "Why do you do MPAs where there are plenty of fish, why not do them where there are few?"<fnref n="6" /> In the three Polynesian case studies, the creation of no-fishing zones, the definitive nature of which is "inconceivable"¹⁷ in the local culture, moreover in areas rich in fish where temporary closures always targeted degraded areas, is contested.

<footnote n="2">² Already observed in Tanzanian MPAs [22,23]. West's work [41] in Papua New Guinea is also important to grasp the mechanisms of dispossession.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ According to a Rapa Nui leader, Eastern Island.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Idem.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ "Meterse en," a strong term used by the Afro-descendant community in the San Bernardo archipelago, Colombia.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ A fisherman from Moorea, French Polynesia</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Idem</footnote>
* "We have a different way of looking at the sea, fishing, conservation, than the Park. Nature and us, we are together, we are not separate": the non-recognition of a social group's belonging to a localized space recurs.

These examples illustrate the way in which the discourses born of conflicts reveal the components of the generic model, and therefore the way in which these components have been characterized.

## 3.2. Components of the generic model

The generic model is about how to decide, on one hand, and how to act on the other. Identifying the components of the model and their discrepancies with certain local realities (final column of Table 2) allows us to understand why this model, when implemented in a place belonging to a local community, especially in the case of indigenous people, gives rise to concerns, misunderstandings and conflicts. Each component of the model is presented, mobilizing, additionally, scientific literature that echoes our field observations.

### 3.2.1. Component 1: who decides?

A specific authority, a fragmented decision: an MPA generally has a specific management authority. Otherwise it risks being qualified as a "paper park", characterized by failing management [42]. This fragments decision-making prerogatives, which is inconceivable for groups attached to a single territorial management authority, often covering both land and sea.

Participation and consultation: integrated into the model, the requirement for stakeholder consultation and participation can create proximities, learning and positive effects, on the condition that there is intensive communication [43], but can also result in only symbolic cooperation, according to Arnstein's scale [44], creating a feeling of exclusion identified by as the first source of conflict in MPAs [37]. These are indeed "plastic words" [45], marked by a positive connotation but an absence of definition that authorizes a minimal implementation. Communities claim the right to be incorporated into the decision-making process and oppose deliberative models that are alien to them.<fnref n="9" />

### 3.2.2. Component 2: what legitimizes the decision?

The utilitarian doctrine: the decision may be based on a vote, either in elected bodies, or because the sole decision-maker's legitimacy stems from a vote (representative democracy). However, the majority decision for the greatest happiness of the greatest number, considered fair in the utilitarian doctrine [46], is not considered as such by societies that systematically seek the acceptability of the decision by all, to avoid decisions that harm the unity of the group.

Hegemonic scientific knowledge: in our case studies, traditional ecological knowledge [47] or experiential knowledge [48] are exploited only where scientific resources are lacking, particularly in Senegal. This reflects an implicit hierarchization, without dialogue between complementary forms of knowledge. In the Colombian case study, Duran [49] refers to the marginalization of those who live in the wilderness, as modern science silences their experience as subjects of knowledge.

### 3.2.3. Component 3: decision temporalities and vectors

Fixed rules: the fixed nature of statutes, zoning and associated regulations is difficult to understand for local communities that observe the environment and adapt their rules according to what they see, in a logic of fluidity [12]. The fixedness of no-take or no-go zones is particularly misunderstood when it breaks a link between a community and an area that is its own, that it takes care of and uses to educate its children in a nature of which it is a part.

The law versus evolving social agreements: in the generic model, rules are equated with laws, so much so that some scientists [8] equate the absence of legal rules with the absence of any specific rules. Tacit behavioral rules or negotiated agreements are ignored, even though they are often better respected than fixed and exogenous laws, as a Rapa Nui leader points out: "the Rapa Nui does not necessarily respect the law, it respects social agreements", which is confirmed by Aburto and Gaymer [50] who mention legal rules little respected because disconnected from local values, interests, beliefs and institutions.

### 3.2.4. Component 4: relationship to places

#### 3.2.4.1. Geometric representation and land-sea discontinuity.
The land-sea distinction is part of the generic model, even where there is continuity in the appropriation of land and sea areas close to the shore. In Moorea, this continuity, both cosmogonic and spatial [11], is ignored by the Maritime Area Management Plan, to which another tool on land, the General Land-Use Plan, responds. Moreover, the generic model considers boundaries based on a geometric representation of places, neglecting other representations – topo-centric (a resource point determines a sphere of influence) or odologic (based on pathways) – specific to certain social groups.

#### 3.2.4.2. Substitutable areas.
The generic model is based on a relationship with spaces that can be substituted for one another. When a no-fish or no-go zone is created, it is assumed that this area, used until now, can be replaced by another area. A Moorea resident explains that the population affected by this zoning "is not going to ride their bike 3 kilometers to go fishing somewhere else, because somewhere else is not their home". The generic model clashes with place attachment.

### 3.2.5. Component 5: relationship with nature

#### 3.2.5.1. Nature, distinct from human beings.
The generic model is based on a representation of human beings acting on nature (whether they degrade or protect it), which differs from that of communities that see themselves as part of nature [51]. This explains why, during interviews, several indigenous leaders objected to the fact that stakeholders involved in uses participate in MPAs, whereas they consider it should be up to the social group that is part of this nature to manage it, independently of any use.<fnref n="10" />

#### 3.2.5.2. Nature as a biodiversity reservoir versus a "larder" and "home" to be managed.
creating no-take zones where biodiversity is abundant is implicit in the generic model. However, this is not self-evident for communities used to creating no-take areas where resources and the environment are degraded. As a backdrop to this, there are different representations of nature, seen either as a reservoir of biodiversity, or as a larder and home to be looked after (and reconstituted in case of damage).

### 3.2.6. Component 6: relationship to economic exchange

#### 3.2.6.1. A development model based on homo-oeconomicus.
The sustainable development model proposed in all the MPAs studied is aimed at greater market integration and wealth creation for the individual, detached from the social group. This contrasts with what communities say when interviewed: they emphasize a desire for permanence in a place, no matter the cost. Their resistance observed in our Brazilian and Cambodian case studies, where attempts have been made to expel them

<footnote n="8">⁸ A community leader from the Orika community, Isla del Rosario, Colombia</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ In New Zealand, a Maori leader speaks of a "western approach" that stifles the indigenous voice.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ A Rapa Nui leader stated: "The MPA project worked with the fishermen's unions: why them? It is up to the Rapa Nui people to decide" (...) "The fishermen, they might as well be Japanese..."</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 2**
The generic MPA conservation model highlighted by analyzing 13 MPAs: components and examples of opposition.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Components</th><th>Sub-components</th><th>Sometimes in opposition to (indigenous people and/or local community references)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="5">The decision</td><td>1. Decision- makers: who decides? Who participates</td><td>A specific management authority: fragmentation of prerogatives<br>Participation and consultation as plastic references: limited participation</td><td>Unified territorial authority</td></tr><tr><td>2. Legitimacy: the decision is based on...</td><td>Utilitarian model of decision making, use of majority voting<br>Hegemonic scientific knowledge based on measurement campaigns</td><td>Dialogue between group members, incorporated into decision making<br>Systematic search for consensus on what can be accepted by all<br>Local knowledge: decision based on continuous observation</td></tr><tr><td>3. Decision temporalities and vectors</td><td>Management based on fixed statutes and rules<br>Legal rules</td><td>Adaptive management based on observation<br>Social agreements</td></tr><tr><td>4. Relationship to places</td><td>Geometric representation (linear boundaries) and land-sea distinction<br>Substitutable areas</td><td>Territorial continuities, especially land-sea</td></tr><tr><td>5. Relationship to nature</td><td>Nature as a source of utility: ecosystem services provided to human groups<br>Biodiversity on a global scale: conserving biodiversity where it is abundant</td><td>Attachment to non-substitutable places and areas<br>The human group is part of nature</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">The action</td><td>6. Relationship to economic exchange</td><td><i>Homo oeconomicus</i>: self-interest and methodological individualism<br>Commoditization of nature: the property regime</td><td>Locally, regenerate resources and habitats where they are degraded<br>Individual interests cannot be dissociated from those of the group</td></tr><tr><td>7. The way we act together</td><td>The project cycle: action is determined by its funding<br>The language of the project: procedures, accountability, etc.</td><td>Non-marketable nature: the regime of possession<br>Permanent, continuous action, independent of specific funding<br>Common language</td></tr></tbody></table>

(either explicitly or by breaking economic or social ties), shows that these are not just words. In the Colombian case, Duque Rico and Torres Gomez [52] evoke a desire for permanence and quiet coexistence unlike that of the individualistic and maximizing *homo oeconomicus*.

### 3.2.6.2. From possession to ownership, the commodification of nature.
The private property regime, a condition for the commodification of nature associated with the liberal framework of conservation policies [53], is put forward even where rejected by communities that pertain to a possession regime. This regime establishes rights by defining who can use an asset, when and for how long. According to Steppacher [54], a possession regime is based on a socio-ecological reason that aims to distribute resources in such a way as to satisfy the minimum needs of each person, using culturally specific values and knowledge. It is associated with an authority jointly assured by members of society, relations of reciprocity, interdependence and mutual coercion [55]. The generic model, by ignoring this regime where it prevails, is opposing a culturally embedded conception of life in society and in relation to nature.

### 3.2.7. Component 7: the way we act together

#### 3.2.7.1. Cycles and eclipses.
a project is defined as an anticipatory and finalizing image of the ordered sequence of operations likely to lead to a new state of reality [56]. It embodies our modern society's relationship with time, disconnected from natural cycles. Omnipresent in MPAs, this reference remains alien to people attached to natural cycles, who do not understand the eclipses suffered by the action when, for lack of funding, the project fades away.

#### 3.2.7.2. Project language.
the project format is accompanied by a language (objectives, planning, strategy, etc.) denounced during interviews in many of the case studies as non-inclusive. It contributes to the feeling of marginalization expressed by some interviewees.

## 3.3. National hybridizations, local adaptations and reinventions

### 3.3.1. Hybridizations first

The great diversity of MPAs, worldwide, is linked to the fact that the components of the generic model do not cover all aspects of the MPAs. But another factor is that, although these components of the generic

model can be found in all the MPAs studied, the model is not applied identically everywhere, as it is superimposed, in each country, on references anchored in national public policies. The result is – sometimes paradoxical – hybridizations. For example, the reference to participation is sometimes superimposed onto military and authoritarian cultures of conservation policies, with paradoxes observed in our Cambodian, Indian and Senegalese case studies, as confirmed by the literature in each of these countries [57], [58], [59].

Paradoxical compromises are constructed, for example, in the form of standardized participatory mechanisms used to relay actions decided by the authorities. In the Indian case study, the 252 eco-development committees and 2596 self-development groups announced by the manager all have the same organization and role. In the Cambodian case study, it is the reduction of participation to administrations that authorities consider representative of the populations,<fnref n="11" /> which allows the paradoxical hybridization of national and exogenous references. The coexistence of antinomic references, for example to conservation and preservation, is sometimes more conflictual as illustrated by several Brazilian cases [33]. The result is composite, singular models that conform – ostensibly – to the generic model.

Unable to emancipate themselves from a generic model that creates forms of rejection, MPA managers often try to adapt or even reinvent it locally. Our comparative analysis identifies recurring forms of adaptation and reinvention, with four categories.

### 3.3.2. Normative adaptations

In almost all our case studies (10/13), the MPA authority adapts the model by prioritizing some rules: it selects rules that it enforces and/or the areas that it protects, while abandoning other rules and/or areas, depending on the ecological stakes and the acceptability of each regulation. In some cases, in response to the rejection of the MPA, new types of norms are invented. These are place-based norms, anchored in local customs and the recognition of a specific link between an area and a social group. In Rapa Nui, the community has thus obtained an exclusive right to fish in line with Rapa Nui fishing practices and gear.

<footnote n="11">¹¹ This was stated in interviews and is confirmed by Lei and Gret (2012)</footnote>
### 3.3.3. Managerial adaptations

When some groups protest non-inclusive governance and limited participation, adapting the model may involve innovative forms of representation or dialogue. One example is the creation of fisheries committees in Moorea, with fishers demanding effective involvement rather than marginal participation. Another example is the *ad-hoc* group created in Port Cros National Park, which has moved away from procedural formats and bodies to imagine more informal forums for dialogue, capable of creating proximities between parties.

### 3.3.4. Strategic adaptations

To adapt, MPAs are redefining themselves thematically and/or spatially. In the first case, the MPA invests in new topics by going beyond the model to which it conforms. Thus, in the South Korean case, the Park redefined itself by investing in dune protection following a conflict, and the issue of water quality following an oil spill. An MPA can also be spatially redefined. When not locally accepted, the MPA departs from the statutes associated with the model to innovate: in the Brazilian case, the result is a statute made up of a patchwork of conservation units designed to allow the contiguity of areas with no anthropic uses, and areas of sustainable development.

### 3.3.5. Paradigmatic adaptations

The paradigm shift is achieved by acting on the founding components of the model. For example, challenging the hegemony of scientific knowledge: new models are being developed for MPA design based on traditional and experiential knowledge, sometimes with new statutes such as the Community Marine Protected Areas status in Senegal. Another example is challenging the principle of fragmenting prerogatives: a new model is invented that does not create an organization with specific prerogatives in the area. The Hauraki Gulf Marine Park is a forum where sectoral and territorial policies are discussed, with the aim of integrating environmental objectives into all policies.

### 3.3.6. The driving forces behind adaptations

These local adaptations and reinventions are the result of four mechanisms: either pragmatic decisions or consultation processes aimed at fostering acceptance, for generally minor adaptations, conflicts or the collapse of the model for major changes. The collapse of the model can result from an ecological disaster (an oil spill in South Korea) or from governance crises that render the MPA ineffective and almost absent from the field, which opens up the possibility for re-creation without a predefined model, as observed in the Senegalese case [59].

Conflict is very often the driving force behind major changes. Buckles and Rusnak [60] emphasize its transformative potential and state that "for marginal groups seeking to redress injustices or extreme inequities in resource distribution, conflict is an inherent feature of their struggle for change": this is what has been observed in MPAs, with a model that distributes access to information, decisions and resources very unevenly.

# 4. Discussion

## 4.1. Indigenous people and local communities

The generic model is particularly problematic in the presence of indigenous or traditional peoples (as the examples illustrate), as it is antinomic to some of these peoples' ways of thinking and categorise reality. Nature and natural elements as external to humans is not in the way they conceive of their existence among all entities (biologically living and non-living). In this case, when co-management is implemented, Gambon and Botazzi [12] highlight a communicative disjunction between interlocutors whose perceptions and thinking differ but who are unaware that they are organizing different worlds. The challenge for MPAs is to go beyond mere respect for culture, and try to integrate different ways of thinking about the world, nature and exchanges between humans, and between humans and nature.

However, the generic model creates difficulties in all the cases studied, whatever the nature of the local communities involved. The lack of recognition of experiential knowledge, of management practices based on continuous observation of the environment, of attachment to non-substitutable places, of aspirations different from those of development equated with accumulation, of needs for proximity in forums, etc... all create the same feeling of marginalization in very different contexts.

## 4.2. Challenging the model, decolonizing practices

Locally, governing bodies of MPAs try to adapt the generic model to promote their acceptance, but these adaptations and reinventions are often thwarted by other public administrations that refer to the generic model. In New Zealand, for example, the Hauraki Gulf Forum is struggling to build its legitimacy in the face of administrations that, in order to remain unchanged, emphasize the (fragmented) prerogatives offered to them by the model. In Brazil, the spatial redefinition initiated by the MPA authority has been blocked by other public players for over ten years. This is why, in addition to local adaptations, a global reflection on the flexibilization and/or overhaul of the model is necessary.

This is impossible without examining the power relations that enable the generic model to impose itself. We note that most of the model's components, such as utilitarianism or the disconnection between human beings and nature, stem from Eurocentric<fnref n="12" /> thinking. This model has a universalist, expansionist (accumulating areas classified as MPAs) and even civilizing (educating people about nature) aim reminiscent of colonial expansion. While colonialization used to qualify the subjuga- tion of one state by another, the role of states has been reduced in favor of other forces (market, lobbies, transnational actors, etc.), hence the development of very different forms of colonialism [64].

Within the MPAs, one of the model's vectors is its support by transnational projects to which funding is linked. One MPA manager told us that he had "done a bit of everything" when he listed the tools attached to the programs funded by the European Union, while speaking of a "complex relationship" between the need to create processes adapted to local specificities and the need to obtain funding to which guidelines and methods are attached. The model is supported by a network that consolidates as it expands [32], and imposes itself on the basis of commitments, funding lines, recommendations and best practice guides: these are all elements of soft law, made up of non-binding instruments of a normative nature used in contemporary international relations [65].

In all our case studies, the generic model is also supported by three variants of coloniality: the coloniality of power [66], which conservationists hold at a higher level and take in territories that are not their own; the coloniality of knowledge, corresponding to the fact of hierarchizing modes of knowledge production and elevating Western philosophy and science to the rank of paradigms that make other knowledge subordinate [62,67]; the coloniality of being [68], based on the relegation of the identity of the other, on whom a "civilizing" model is imposed.

These observations lead us to speak of soft colonialism (based on soft law). However, this does not mean it is free of violence. Explicit in several of the studied MPAs (shooting at inhabitants violating rules, confiscating means of subsistence, female seaweed gatherers forced to grant favors to the guards in order to gain access to fishing zones), it is denounced in interviews as dispersed in the area and time, as described

<footnote n="12">¹² defined as an attitude, a conceptual apparatus or a set of beliefs that make Europe the main architect of world history, the bearer of universal values and reason, the model of progress [61]. Eurocentrism supports a colonial type of domination exercised by so-called Western countries. It refers specifically to forms of negation of knowledge and identities in scientific [62] and cultural [63] fields.</footnote>
by Nixon [69]. This colonialism is described as both green (because it is legitimized by an environmental imperative) and blue (with the appropriation of prerogatives at sea), and both external and internal [70] because it brings into play not only international but also infra-national relations of domination. Our research aims to characterize its mechanisms in order to stimulate reflection on the decolonialization of models and practices [71].

## 5. Conclusion

Indigenous peoples and local communities are called upon by the IPBES [18] or the Convention on Biological Diversity to play a major role in responding to the biodiversity crisis: but the generic model of conservation through MPAs, which has been characterized, hinders the involvement of these players and, on the contrary, marginalizes them. Various ways in which the generic model can be adapted and reinvented locally have been observed, but these cannot conceal the need for a global overhaul.

Studies in decolonial ecology explore avenues for overhauling the model. These involve backtracking on the hegemony of science (notably economic) based on universal reason [72], neglecting attachments, aspirations and identities. They involve cognitive justice [12] to open up spaces of dialogue between this science and other forms of knowledge based on other ways of being in nature and of making society, by substituting the idea of the universal with the idea of the pluriversal [63], [73]. They involve a co-production of knowledge and priorities for conservation arising from social organization rather than an exogenous intervention in particular societies [71]. We have seen this at work in the processes of reinventing the model in Chile (Rapa Nui) or Senegal, made possible by the rejection or collapse of the model, and by conflicts. It presupposes working on making explicit both the conflicts and the dissatisfactions that fuel chronic conflicts in order to exploit the transformative potential of conflictuality.

Political ecology offers us a reading of the political and societal nature of the conflicts we observe. Our case studies reveal that they are fueled by shared mechanisms. Resistance to underlying forms of power and domination (by imposing an MPA design, even if it includes participatory processes) is sometimes silent and expressed with ‘ordinary’ weapons (dissimulation, false conformity, feigned ignorance, etc.) [74]. Mitigating these conflicts involves considering the existence of asymmetrical power and the politicized nature of environmental issues [75], as well as seizing on conflicts as an avenue for change, or reinventing a model whose effectiveness depends on it.

The limitations of our research lie in the number of case studies and, in some cases, interviews, as well as in the temporality of the research (allowing retrospective analysis without longitudinal follow-up), which preclude any generalization or quantification of the mechanisms studied. However, the analysis does enable us to qualify them. This is a first step that opens up the prospect of more systematic analyses, using an analytical grid based on the components of the model and the types of adaptations identified.

### CRediT authorship contribution statement

**Jean-Eudes BEURET:** Project administration, Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Methodology, Funding acquisition, Conceptualization, Investigation, Formal analysis. **Anne CADORET:** Investigation, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Data curation, Writing – original draft, Conceptualization, Writing – review & editing, Methodology. **Newton José RODRIGUES DA SILVA:** Methodology, Formal analysis, Conceptualization, Writing – original draft, Investigation, Data curation.

### Declaration of Competing Interest

None.

### Acknowledgements

The authors are particularly grateful to all those who, in each of the marine protected areas studied, devoted their time to exchanging and sharing their knowledge. This work benefited from the scientific support of the authors' partner research institutes, as well as funding from Grand Angle Initiatives de Recherches.

### Data availability

The data come from 201 interviews conducted using the same interview guide, which can be shared as the cross-analysis grid. The transcript of each interview is confidential.

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