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# China's Strategic Approach to Tech Diplomacy in a Time of Global Uncertainty

Zhao Alexandre Huang, Xiang Meng

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## To cite this version:

Zhao Alexandre Huang, Xiang Meng. China's Strategic Approach to Tech Diplomacy in a Time of Global Uncertainty. Global Policy, In press, 10.1111/1758-5899.70038. hal-05161336

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

OPEN ACCESS

# China's Strategic Approach to Tech Diplomacy in a Time of Global Uncertainty

Zhao Alexandre Huang¹ ID | Xiang Meng² ID

¹Laboratory DICEN-IDF, Université Gustave Eiffel, Serris, France | ²Department of English and Communication, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong

**Correspondence:** Zhao Alexandre Huang (zhao-alexandre.huang@univ-eiffel.fr)

**Received:** 31 December 2024 | **Revised:** 5 May 2025 | **Accepted:** 7 May 2025

**Funding:** The authors thank the support from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche of France's DIGISOV project (ANR-23-CE53-0009).

**Keywords:** China | policies | science diplomacy | tech diplomacy | technology diplomacy

## ABSTRACT

In the wake of U.S.-China technological competition and the COVID-19 pandemic, “tech diplomacy” has gained prominence in Chinese political and academic discourse. This concept is often ideologically framed to critique Western hegemonic narratives perceived as hindering China's technological advancement. Concurrently, China has embraced a more assertive foreign policy, aiming to increase its global influence and shape international technological norms. We use historical-discursive analysis to investigate the Chinese government's localization and institutionalization of tech diplomacy. By examining official statements and academic sources since 2018, we examine how Beijing has framed tech diplomacy as a strategic response to geopolitical challenges, seeking to legitimize and institutionalize its global technological norms.

## 1 | The Rise of Tech Diplomacy in China: Why Sinicization Matters

In the context of rising geopolitical tensions, the term “tech diplomacy” (keji waijiao, 科技外交) has gained prominence in Chinese academic and political discussions. Broadly speaking, tech diplomacy lies at the intersection of scientific and technological development, the production and dissemination of knowledge, and the practice of diplomacy to promote national interests and shape international relations. Historically, tech diplomacy has been an important avenue for scientific engagement and cooperation among sovereign states, their institutions, and scholars, addressing common global challenges and fostering constructive global partnerships (Flink and Rüffin 2019). However, with the advent of new technologies and the emergence of global crises and geopolitical conflicts, defining tech diplomacy has become more and more challenging. As Bjola and Kornprobst (2025, forthcoming) highlighted at the beginning of this special issue, the highly interdisciplinary nature of tech diplomacy as an emerging field, along with the complexity of its

practices, renders its definition somewhat tenuous. For instance, the dependence of governments on COVID-19 vaccines developed by large multinational pharmaceutical companies (e.g., Pfizer and Moderna) during the global pandemic, along with the practice of sending tech diplomats to Silicon Valley to forge partnerships with high-tech companies, has not only broadened the scope of actors involved in conventional tech diplomacy but also increased its pragmatic significance (Tung 2022; Zhang 2021). Nowadays, this concept centers on steering technological development and deployment in ways that align national interests with a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape (Garcia 2022).

However, from the perspective of Chinese officials and scholars, discussions about tech diplomacy in international political and academic communities reinforce the ideological and hegemonic narratives driven by Western countries (Liu 2023). Chinese scholars have argued that tech diplomacy discourse reflects “the international strategic needs of these countries at different times,” allowing those governments to dominate the “process of reconfiguring the global flow of science, technology, and

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2025 The Author(s). *Global Policy* published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
## Policy implications

* To analyze and comprehend China's approach to tech diplomacy, scholars need to examine China's unique political and social context, reflect on the evolution of its conceptual framework for tech diplomacy, and understand the foundational principles underpinning its policy formulation.

* A comprehensive interpretation of China's foreign policy regarding technological development requires close attention to the global expansion of Chinese technology firms. Particular emphasis should be placed on the strategies and organizational policies of major tech giants (e.g., Tencent, ByteDance, Alibaba, Huawei), which frequently receive governmental assistance.

* Understanding the progression of China's tech diplomacy necessitates examination of research and consulting reports authored by Chinese political scientists. These individuals often serve dual roles as scholars and think tank experts, and their commentary frequently reinforces Beijing's official rhetoric and policy narratives.

* Analyzing China's tech-diplomacy practices involves a thorough examination of Beijing's regional cooperation projects or initiatives to advance its tech-diplomacy objectives. This analysis should assess the extent to which concepts promoted by China are accepted within regional frameworks such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).

innovation factors” (Zhang 2023, p. 91). Since Xi Jinping's ascent to Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership as General Secretary, Beijing has consistently pursued a distinct Chinese discourse in international relations. For Xi (2014), China must “strive to create new concepts, categories, and expressions that integrate China with the rest of the world” to legitimize the world order that Beijing wants (p. 156). The perception of tech diplomacy by Chinese scholars as a hegemonic discourse originating from the West points to an effort to shift the concept toward China's defense of its own scientific and technological development and foreign policy (Wu and Gong 2024). This effort aligns with Xi's “revolutionary demand” for China to gain the initiative in international competition in science and technology (The CPC Committee of the Ministry of Science and Technology 2024, para. 5). In other words, by reconceptualizing tech diplomacy, Chinese scholars can name, rationalize and mainstream the model of science, technology, and scientific cooperation and innovation advocated and promoted by China. This strategy aims to position China to seize the initiative in technological development and create conditions in international politics and public opinion “to enhance the independence, autonomy, and security of China's development” (The CPC Committee of the Ministry of Science and Technology 2024, para. 5).

Given this distinctive perception of tech diplomacy held by China, a major power in the global arena, examining how Chinese politicians and scholars have conceptualized tech diplomacy has substantial theoretical and practical significance. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first

systematic review of Chinese scholarship on tech diplomacy. Using historical-discursive analysis (Huang 2022, 2025), we analyzed a rich body of texts from relevant official statements and speeches by political leaders, as well as 108 academic articles about tech diplomacy.

## 2 | Exploring Tech Diplomacy

Tech diplomacy scholars examine how scientific advances and technological developments influence the formulation and execution of foreign policy, agendas, and objectives. They also explore how the environment of international relations, shaped by tech diplomacy, influences ongoing scientific and technological innovation. In essence, tech diplomacy is a social action embedded within the meta-processes of technologization and scientization: how sciences and technologies shape politics, foreign policy, social life, and culture, while simultaneously being influenced by the same, in the context of international relations. This sociality dimension of tech diplomacy aligns with the definition of “science diplomacy” provided by the American Association for the Advancement of Science and The Royal Society (2010),¹ which conceptualizes science diplomacy as an exploration of the way knowledge derived from scientific research can influence the creation and execution of foreign policy. Moreover, science diplomats consider how scientific progress helps nation-states enhance international relations and engage in track-II diplomacy; when official diplomatic channels face obstacles or breakdowns, governments can turn to civil society and the scientific community to sustain dialog through “informal and non-official avenues” (Tenenbaum 2013, p. 273). This approach involves mobilizing scientists, scholars from various disciplines, and influential figures in the technology sector to participate in both formal and informal exchanges with international counterparts. Science thus creates opportunities for collaboration among scientists from different countries, regimes, and ideologies, fostering an environment of interdependence and interaction conducive to knowledge innovation.

Within this framework, tech diplomacy practices shape international relations in ways that are highly “sensitized” by scientific and technological inputs, offering “general guidelines and references” (Blumer 1954, p. 7) for actors involved in managing international affairs and navigating international practices. Those practices also direct attention to various political and social issues related to science and technology (e.g., social phenomena, structures, and institutions). From this perspective, tech diplomacy is a type of mediatization within the sphere of international relations, where meaning is conveyed through a series of mediated tools and actions. In particular, tech diplomacy not only relies on traditional diplomatic means (e.g., human interactions, negotiations, international events, and scientific cooperation) but also involves material forms of communication, including information and communication technologies (ICTs) and various scientific practices and content. This convergence reconfigured social interaction, institutional functioning, and individual behavior in everyday contexts. In essence, tech diplomacy represented a dynamic process of social collaboration and transformation—one that facilitates knowledge renewal and the evolution of international relations management toolset.
In this light, Bjola and Kornprobst (2025, forthcoming) contended that tech diplomacy exhibits a *polylateral* character. It not only intersects with traditional science diplomacy, which is primarily concerned with transnational scientific collaboration and academic exchanges, and technology diplomacy, which involves innovation and technological advancement, but also overlaps with digital diplomacy, which emphasizes the strategic deployment of data and digital technologies in international engagement. This intersection underscores the growing significance of technology as a “*mediator*” (Latour 2007, p. 37) that inherently embeds knowledge into interactive social life for communication, negotiation, and cooperation in the evolving landscape of international relations.

## 2.1 | Chinese Tech Diplomacy: An Intermestic and Ideological Form

In China, the word for “tech diplomacy” is usually *ke ji* (tech wai jiao (diplomacy). In Chinese, *ke ji* is contraction of the words for science (*ke xue*, 科学) and technology (*ji shu*, 技术), highlighting their interdependence. As a result, the meaning of *ke ji wai jiao* (literally “Science and Technology Diplomacy” or “Tech Diplomacy”) is nuanced. While *science diplomacy* (*ke xue wai jiao*, 科学外交) typically emphasizes diplomatic efforts based on systematic knowledge and scientific cooperation and exchange, *technology diplomacy* (*ji shu wai jiao*, 技术外交) emphasizes material products, tools, and capabilities derived from scientific discovery. To prevent misunderstanding, some Chinese scholars use “science and technology diplomacy” as a direct synonym for “tech diplomacy.” This variation reflects the lack of consensus on the definition of tech diplomacy within Chinese scholarship due not only to the broad range of practices that the term encompasses but also to ideological and political differences.

For the Chinese government, tech diplomacy is not merely an international practice but also a means of upholding CPC ideology. It is a set of strategies for establishing a “new development dynamic” (Xi 2022a, p. 200) amid geopolitical uncertainty, to “hold [China’s] own amid intense international competition and powerful momentum for the allocation of global resources” (Xi 2022a, p. 205). This approach reflects China’s international relations framework and its policy on tech diplomacy, contributing to its efforts to shape discourse power on the global stage (Tan 2016). Specifically, tech diplomacy in China has *intermestic* attributes (Huang and Wang 2023), functioning not only as a core component of China’s science and technology development policy—a “fundamental element of Chinese-style modernization” (Yin, quoted in Zhao 2024, para. 4)—but also as a part of the “top-level design and overall planning, and strategy for our international discourse with distinctive Chinese features [...] [to better communicate] China’s ideas, vision, and solutions to the international community” (Xi 2022b, pp. 365–366). The goal is to “require [China] to deeply integrate into the global innovation network, actively participate in global science and technology governance, and offer Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions to global challenges” (The CPC Committee of the Ministry of Science and Technology 2024, para. 9).

Although some Chinese scholars have challenged the use of tech diplomacy as a political expression reflecting Western ideology (cf. Liu 2023; Luo et al. 2021), China's own tech diplomacy initiatives back to the 1950s, subtly integrated with biological studies and biodiversity to defend China's indigenous socialist ideology while simultaneously expressing solidarity with the Soviet Union as a fellow member of the socialist bloc (Songster 2018). For instance, the panda is not only a political symbol of China's diplomacy but also a *mediator* in promoting “China's defense of communist concepts of science and scientificity” (Huang et al. 2023, p. 256). As CPC biologist Zhou Jianren noted in 1956, the study of the apparent contradiction in the panda's dietary transition from carnivore to herbivore helped advance the “scientific thinking” and “rigorous methods of investigation” championed by the regime, while simultaneously challenging the traditional Chinese cultural mindset, characterized by “superstitious and feudal thinking” (Zhou 1956, pp. 7–8). This approach aligns with the revolutionary character of the CPC regime and was a key source of the legitimacy it sought to establish for itself.

## 2.2 | Current Tech Diplomacy in the Framework of New Quality Productive Forces

The concept of “new quality productive forces” (Xinhua 2024, para. 1), a strategic term in science and technology first endorsed by the Chinese government in 2023, was formally institutionalized at the 2024 National People’s Congress. Officially defined by Beijing and originally proposed by Xi Jinping, the phrase refers to a model of industrial, economic, and technological development centered on “innovation-driven” (Xi 2023, para. 1) and “innovation-based advanced quality productive forces” (Xi 2024a, para. 5). Within this framework, innovation encompasses not only the traditional advancement of scientific, technological, managerial, and institutional research and practices but also the ways in which China has leveraged its scientific and technological advancements to assert its “discourse power and dominance” in reshaping the international order (Gao and Du 2024, para. 7). This innovation is possible through the promotion of developmental ideas, strategies, and approaches to science and technology in both domestic politics and international relations.

The term “new quality productive forces” is not a novel concept developed by the CPC leader but an extension of a Marxist-Leninist concept rooted in historical materialism: “new productive forces” (Lenin 1975; Marx 1859). For Marx, the social, political, and intellectual dimensions of life depend on modes of material production, and the development of productive forces are the primary drivers of historical change (McLellan 2000). This development often leads to contradictions with existing relations of production, ultimately resulting in social transformation. In a time of rapid technological development and pervasive digitalization, the application of new science and technology fundamentally alters production modes and social relations, reigniting cultural and ideological competition among global powers and potentially sparking conflicts over hegemony (Cox 1983, 1987).

From this perspective, the Chinese concept of “new quality productive forces” is a form of implicit hegemonic rhetoric,
also a rhetorical device enrolled by Beijing as an alternative
of the mainstream Western narrative on science and technol-
ogy. Indeed, Beijing views industries such as “new energy ve-
hicles, lithium batteries, and photovoltaic products” (Shishuo
Xinyu 2024, para. 6) as emblematic of these forces, replacing
sectors such as semiconductors, networks, robotics, aerospace,
maritime engineering, and advanced railroads, all of which
were priority industries in the *Made in China 2025* policy blue-
print released in 2013 (Kennedy 2015). This shift has been
implicitly justified by President Xi (2024a) through his concep-
tualization of “new quality productive forces,” which he argued
are a necessary departure from “traditional patterns of eco-
nomic growth and productivity development paths” (para. 5).
However, this shift in focus is largely a response to the trade war
initiated by the United States in 2018, which sought to block the
export of certain technologies to China. Historically, govern-
ment subsidies and protectionist measures have driven a large
number of China's technological advancements, encouraging
domestic manufacturers to collaborate with foreign industries
holding technological intellectual properties. By leveraging its
vast domestic market, China has aimed to exchange access to
advanced technologies and intellectual properties favorable to
Beijing and subsequently control key technologies within the
industrial chain. A prime example of this strategy is China's
high-speed rail industry, a strong example of exchanging mar-
ket access for developed technologies (Zheng et al. 2022). This
approach has enabled Chinese state-controlled companies
to acquire essential intellectual properties rapidly and accel-
erate the industrialization and commercialization of related
products through its robust and cost-effective manufacturing
sector. They then export these products at competitive prices,
supported by government subsidies and other financial in-
centives. The U.S.-China trade dispute has disrupted China's
market-for-technology strategy and largely limited the growth
of the sectors mentioned in the *Made in China 2025* policy. In
the semiconductor sector, for example, China's lack of advanced
chip-processing technology has hindered its capacity to acquire
cutting-edge semiconductor products from abroad, thereby con-
straining further industrial and economic expansion. Amid the
global ecological transformation, China's relatively mature pho-
tovoltaic industry and new energy technologies have enabled
Beijing to rationalize replacing the *Made in China 2025* diplo-
matic strategy with *the new quality productive forces* in its global
technological competition.

Moreover, the evolution of China's technology policy has signifi-
cant implications not only for its domestic political and economic
landscape but also for its diplomatic strategy. Whether through
international economic and industrial initiatives such as the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or China-led regional develop-
ment strategies such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC), the export of products adhering to Chinese techno-
logical standards and the planning of infrastructure projects
is a core geopolitical interest. Therefore, Chinese scholars per-
ceive industries associated with “new quality productive forces,”
which symbolize the “autonomy of the technological core” (Xu
and Li 2024, para. 9), as critical to China’s competitiveness in
a period of geopolitical uncertainty. The aim is not only to “re-
shape the global value chain” (Liang 2024, para. 22) but also
to redefine the “rules of international cooperation” (Gao and
Du 2024, para. 8).

In addition to its scientific and technological dimensions,
China's concept of tech diplomacy operates within the frame
of digital diplomacy. In Xi Jinping's most recent strategic vi-
sion for China's international communication, the mobilization
of digital technologies has become an important way of “ad-
vancing the restructuring of the international communication
landscape, innovating online external publicity, and building
a multi-channel, three-dimensional external communication
framework” (Xi 2024b, para. 8).

In previous research on China's digital diplomacy, scholars have highlighted a growing trend in the application of emerging technologies within diplomatic communication. Their findings indicate the synergistic network effects generated by the interaction of multiple actors engaged in this evolving process (Huang and Wang 2023; Thunø et al. 2025). While Chinese diplomats might harness it to legitimize national foreign policy agendas and cultivate international influence (Dai and Luqiu 2024), other stakeholders (e.g., media organizations, civil society actors, private enterprises, and individuals) also play a role in reshaping China's international discourse formulation through technological innovation (Chen et al. 2023; Madrid-Morales 2017; Thunø and Nielbo 2024) or the dissemination of emerging scientific advancements (Huang and Zhang 2022).

Therefore, Chinese scholars legitimized the above initiatives as
a deliberate investment by Beijing to integrate digital diplomacy
with tech diplomacy. This integrated approach not only empha-
sized the continuous development and diplomatic application of
"new technologies and new tools" (Liu 2024, para. 12) but also
sought to legitimize China's model of digital governance on the
global stage, thereby contributing to "the construction of a dig-
ital order" in which China would play a central and influential
role (Han and Wu 2024, p. 103).

To delve into the perceptions and conceptualizations of tech di-
plometry within China's political and academic spheres, we pro-
pose the following research questions:

1. How has the focus of Chinese academia on tech diplomacy changed over time?

2. What are the characteristics of Chinese tech diplomacy re-
search in terms of intellectual tradition, research context,
and governmental endorsement?

3. How have Chinese scholars conceptualized tech diplo-
macy, and how do these conceptualizations of the party-
state during the same period?

3 | Tracing China's Tech-Diplomacy Evolution:
Methods and Materials

In this study, we first used historical-discursive analysis
(Huang 2022, 2025) to analyze China's understanding of and
statements about tech diplomacy. This anthropo-sociological
method uncovers the cohesion and dynamics of discourse and
social reality by emphasizing the interplay between knowledge
and power, both of which the discourse of key social actors can
reproduce and formulate (e.g., language, speeches, and publica-
tions). This approach is particularly well-suited for analyzing
Chinese public diplomacy, including tech diplomacy, due to the distinctive tensions between political authority and scholarly inquiry in China. On the one hand, tech diplomacy, and public diplomacy in general, tends to be practice-oriented and precedes conceptual discussion in China (d'Hooghe 2007). Academic research often adds to or refines the concept after its introduction through the official statements or speeches of political leaders (Hartig 2016). The highly centralized power structure of Chinese public diplomacy (Zhao 2019), as well as the omnipresent and stringent regulation imposed on academic endeavors and publications in alignment with CPC (Tenzin 2017), has regulatory influence. For example, CPC controls the National Social Science Foundation Research Grant (Tenzin 2017), whose guidelines require applicants to “adhere to Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, ... upholding the correct political direction, values, and academic orientation ... and better serving the overall work of the Party and the country” (National Office for Philosophy and Social Science 2024, article 1). On the other hand, some scholars have influenced foreign policy making in China. For example, Zhao Kejin, deputy director of the Center for Strategic and Security Studies at Tsinghua University, allegedly advised the government to leverage the role of the first lady, Peng Liyuan, in China’s public diplomacy (Hartig 2016). Considering the “research-policy interface” (Eriksson and Norman 2011, p. 417) and the growing variety of actors in China’s public diplomacy, historical-discursive analysis can shed light on the institutional intertextuality of political and academic discourse, uncovering institutional changes related to China’s tech diplomacy.

To collect relevant Chinese studies on tech diplomacy, following the analytical approach used by Wang et al. (2024) to examine China's public diplomacy, we performed a search query in the China National Knowledge Infrastructure database (CNKI) on 21 July 2024. As the largest Chinese-language literature database in China, CNKI encompasses over 99% of Chinese academic and practical journals, ensuring the representativeness and authority of the resources (Yan et al. 2023). We used “technology diplomacy” (科技外交), “science diplomacy” (科学外交), and “digital diplomacy” (数字外交) as title words and selected “fuzzy match” and “academic journals” as searching criteria, yielding 162 articles. We opted for “fuzzy match” instead of “precise match” because the former allowed wider coverage of related articles. For instance, “precise match” would have filtered out “Think Tank Digital Public Diplomacy: Conceptual Definition and Practice Development” because “digital diplomacy” is split in the title. After deleting 3 duplicates and 51 irrelevant articles, we had 108 articles for analysis.

To answer the research questions, we coded the following variables: (a) publication year; (b) article type, including policy analysis and suggestion, academic-qualitative, academic-quantitative, and other; (c) disciplinary category according to the Chinese discipline system, including China politics and international politics (中国政治与国际政治), scientific research management (科学研究管理), economic reform (经济体制改革), theories and methods of natural sciences (自然科学理论与方法), military affairs (武器工业与军事技术), higher education (高等教育), astronomy (天文学), Chinese neoteric and modern history(中国近现代史), physical geography and topography (自然地理学和测绘学), and journalism and media (新闻与传媒);

(d) disciplinary category according to the Western discipline system, including political science, international relations, communication science, sociology, management, history, and area studies; (e) research context, including China, the United States, the European Union, Russia, Japan, India, Korea, and no specific context; (f) whether the study was supported by government funding; (g) whether the study articulated the definition of tech diplomacy; (h) diplomacy domains, including digital diplomacy, technology diplomacy, and science diplomacy (based on the different powers that each domain relies upon; Bjola and Kornprobst 2025, forthcoming); (i) subdomains, including public diplomacy, international negotiations, crisis management, data agreements, scientific advice, scientific cooperation, and other (Bjola and Kornprobst 2025, forthcoming); (j) definition of tech diplomacy (i.e., precise content of definition); (k) whether a Chinese scholar formulated the definition; and (l) nature of the definition (i.e., academic, political, or mixed); (n) government influence (studies quoting and internalizing official discourse and rhetoric in the introduction and conclusion sections).

The codebook was improved after an initial round of coding 20 articles and a discussion between the two authors. Afterwards, each author performed the coding of half of the remaining studies (i.e., 44 randomly selected articles for each author). Krippendorff’s (2019) alpha was over 0.81 for all coded variables, indicating acceptable reliability.

# 4 | Results

## 4.1 | Trends in Scholarly Attention to Digital, Technology, and Science Diplomacy

As illustrated in Figure 1, the trajectory of Chinese tech diplomacy studies began with investigations into *technology diplomacy* (*n* = 68) in 2001. This line of research progressed steadily from 2006 onwards, peaking in 2021 with nine documented studies. Technology diplomacy might have been the initial focus because “technology” (*ji shu*) is a relatively neutral term emphasizing the practical application of science and technology and the outcomes of scientific research. This phenomenon reflects not only the industrial and economic orientation shaping the strategic approach to early tech diplomacy initiatives by China’s political decision-makers but also a strategic formulation of the Going Out Policy made by Beijing in 1999 (Tang 2020), designed to promote the internationalization of Chinese-manufactured products, attract foreign investment, and introduce advanced industrial technologies to support China’s economic openness and development. Furthermore, the enthusiasm of Chinese scholars in using “technology” diplomacy underscores the instrumental role of technological transformation, application, and high-tech products in advancing China’s industrial internationalization and diplomatic efforts. Indeed, Chinese technological products and services are both the object and the subject of various diplomatic initiatives abroad (e.g., BRI and FOCAC). As objects, affordable technologies and services support economic and infrastructure development in other countries; as subjects, these Chinese-localized technologies allow Beijing to explain to global communities how its industrial and technological standards and its norms and frameworks provide
a legitimate alternative to other international scientific and technological models. For President Xi Jinping (2017a), the goal of technology-centered tech diplomacy is to enhance Beijing's "capacity for guiding the scientific and technological flow, bring opening up to a new level ... economic globalization is superficially exemplified by an extensive flow of products, capital and information, but behind such a flow is technological innovation" (p. 298). The goal in exporting Chinese technology products and services is to "build up our strength and capacity to participate in the formulation of global economic, financial, and trade rules" (p. 298).

In contrast, the term “science” (*ke xue*) is an expression entangled in ideological debates in Chinese political discourse due to its historical association with Marxism and CPC theories on scientificity. Since 2016, the Beijing government has intensified its ideological censorship, institutionalizing it within CPC doctrine. This initiative mandated that all relevant ideologies, including scientific research activities and outcomes, must “implement an overall national security strategy and strengthen the Party’s governance capacity” (Xi 2017b, p. 372). In particular, the production of such knowledge is subject to strict censorship, as research is “a propaganda tool for the Party and the Government, which must embody the Party’s will and advocacy, safeguard the authority of the CPC Central Committee” (Xi 2017c, p. 360). Consequently, scholars might have been more inclined to explore the field of technology diplomacy to avoid political exposure.

In general, Chinese scholarly investigations into science (n=12) and digital (n=28) diplomacy emerged around 2010, with limited publications during the first decade. However, research on digital diplomacy has notably increased in China since 2019, exploring the impact of digital technologies on diplomatic communication. This surge coincides with the extensive use of social media platforms by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to advance claims and narratives surrounding the trade conflict between the United States and China. Additionally, numerous Chinese embassies, consulates, and diplomats abroad have established social media accounts (e.g., Twitter), further contributing to the growth of digital diplomacy initiatives (Huang and Wang 2021). Notwithstanding, the study of science diplomacy has been relatively uncommon in China, largely due to its sensitive ideological dimensions. Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese scholars displayed limited interest in science diplomacy, while the study of digital diplomacy emerged as a predominant focus during that period (Shi and Tong 2020; Wu and Feng 2020).

## 4.2 | Research Methods and Contexts of Chinese Scholarship on Tech Diplomacy

Our analysis of the methodological characteristics reveals that the majority of studies on technology and science diplomacy are qualitative (see Table 1): 60.3% (n=41) for technology diplomacy and 66.7% (n=8) for science diplomacy. The

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>**FIGURE 1** | Number of journal articles 2001–2024 on digital diplomacy, technology diplomacy, and science diplomacy (N=108).</figcaption></figure>

<table><caption>**TABLE 1** | Research methods applied by studies on digital diplomacy, technology diplomacy, and science diplomacy.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Digital diplomacy</th><th>Technology diplomacy</th><th>Science diplomacy</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Policy analysis</td><td>10 (35.7%)</td><td>17 (25%)</td><td>2 (16.7%)</td></tr><tr><td>Qualitative</td><td>12 (42.9%)</td><td>41 (60.3%)</td><td>8 (66.7%)</td></tr><tr><td>Quantitative</td><td>5 (17.9%)</td><td>0 (0%)</td><td>0 (0%)</td></tr><tr><td>Others</td><td>1 (3.6%)</td><td>10 (14.7%)</td><td>2 (16.7%)</td></tr></tbody></table>
<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>**FIGURE 2** | Number of journal articles 2001–2024 on digital diplomacy, technology diplomacy, and science diplomacy funded by government (n=40).</figcaption></figure>

remaining works (technology diplomacy: 39.7%, n=27; science diplomacy: 33.4%, n=4) feature policy analyses or non-academic contributions, such as book reviews, industry news articles, editorials, and opinion columns. In the field of digital diplomacy, a significant number of studies are also qualitative (42.9%, n=12) or policy-driven (35.7%, n=10), though 17.9% (n=5) feature quantitative methods—an approach not found in the other two subfields (see Table 1). This difference might reflect that the study of digital diplomacy frequently involves the unique intellectual and methodological traditions of statistical, descriptive, and network analysis of social media data, using various computational research methods common in political communication.

Furthermore, our analysis revealed that most studies on technology diplomacy (54.4%, n=37) and science diplomacy (50%, n=6) are situated in the disciplines of Chinese politics and international politics, followed by scientific research management (32.4%, n=22; 33.3%, n=4, respectively). In contrast, the literature on digital diplomacy equally draws from both Chinese politics and international politics (50%, n=14) and journalism and media studies (50%, n=14), which tend to feature quantitative methods.

With regard to research contexts, the main focus of existing studies on digital and technology diplomacy is China (46.4%, n=13; 58.8%, n=40), while the main focus in studies on science diplomacy, despite their small volume, is the United States (41.7%, n=5). These five science diplomacy studies particularly highlight the pivotal role of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in shaping science diplomacy initiatives (Sun 2009; Sun and Guo 2023; Zhang 2023; Liu 2023; Zhou 2017). Furthermore, compared to exclusive coverage of the United States, China, and the European Union in the science diplomacy literature, studies on digital and technology diplomacy cover a more diverse range of research contexts, including Russia, Japan, India, and South Korea.

According to the framework proposed by Bjola and Kornprobst (2025, forthcoming), digital diplomacy centers on information power, technology diplomacy relies on innovation power, and science diplomacy revolves around knowledge power and leveraging expertise to shape political agendas. Our findings suggest that the global distribution of information and innovation power might be more decentralized, at least from the perspective of Chinese scholars, leading to a wider diversity of actors in digital and technology diplomacy. However, in the domain of science diplomacy, major powers such as the United States, China, and the European Union remain the key players due to their ability to make significant resource investments and undertake extensive fundamental research, essential actions for exercising knowledge power.

## 4.3 | Tech Diplomacy in Government-Granted Studies

To understand the process of recognizing and reconceptualizing tech diplomacy within a community of scholars closely linked to Chinese policymaking, we conducted a review of papers presenting the outcomes of government funding across three key research areas (see Figure 2). The results indicate a rapid increase in funded works on technology and digital diplomacy after 2019, suggesting a growing governmental emphasis on these domains (Table 2).

Notably, four out of five studies on science diplomacy published between 2021 and 2023 received government funding, reflecting heightened official attention to diplomatic practices involving scientific activity. This trend aligns with the recent focus of CPC on international communication and collaboration in scientific research (Yang 2023), which is increasingly crucial in the context of U.S.-China competition and foreign technology restrictions against China. According to one of these funded studies,
<table><caption>TABLE 2 | Use of official discourse among funded and unfunded studies on digital diplomacy, technology diplomacy, and science diplomacy.</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Digital diplomacy</th><th colspan="2">Technology diplomacy</th><th colspan="2">Science diplomacy</th></tr><tr><th>Funded</th><th>Unfunded</th><th>Funded</th><th>Unfunded</th><th>Funded</th><th>Unfunded</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Official discourse</th><td>6 (75%)</td><td>3 (60%)</td><td>5 (50%)</td><td>21 (70%)</td><td>1 (100%)</td><td>0 (0)</td></tr><tr><th>No official discourse</th><td>2 (25%)</td><td>2 (40%)</td><td>5 (50%)</td><td>9 (30%)</td><td>0 (0)</td><td>2 (100%)</td></tr></tbody></table>

With the development of modern science and economic globalization, science, as a tool of political diplomacy, is increasingly being used for political struggles and geopolitical interests.... In today's world, the United States exercises hegemony in global governance primarily through science and technology, emphasizing the “America First” principle and promoting the political diplomatic values of unilateralism.... In international cooperation on COVID-19 vaccines, a debate has emerged between “vaccine multilateralism” and “vaccine nationalism,” leading to the politicization and instrumentalization of vaccine development. Western countries, led by the United States, are exerting efforts in areas such as strategy, regulations, public opinion, and diplomacy, aiming to control global leadership in public health.

(Li Liang and Song 2023, pp. 162–163)

Diving deeper into the conceptualization of tech diplomacy, we found that in all three domains, most studies (73.5% or above) contained definitions of the concept, with majority of them (60% or above) either offering a unique definition or adopting conceptualizations from other Chinese scholars. We observed an intriguing pattern concerning the definition of science diplomacy in unfunded studies, where only 33.3% (n=2) present a Chinese interpretation of the concept, contrasting sharply with a 100% (n=4) rate for funded studies. This observation suggests that scholars who can contextualize the concept within a Chinese framework are more likely to receive recognition from the government. This trend aligns with the assertion of the research-policy interface in China's diplomacy, reflecting efforts by CPC and Beijing to introduce more “China plans” in international affairs (Zhao 2019) and to promote its own discourse system in the global arena, particularly in areas dominated by the United States, such as science diplomacy.

However, in a somewhat unexpected twist, we found that most definitions put forth in studies on digital and technology diplomacy are academic (digital diplomacy: 65.2%, n=15; technology diplomacy: 66.7%, n=36), regardless of government funding. Similarly, 60% of science diplomacy studies (n=6) feature an academic definition of the concept, but only half of the funded studies (n=2) do, with the remaining half presenting a mixed definition. This variance is attributable to the smaller number of studies in comparison to other domains. The following passage exemplifies a mixed definition of science diplomacy:

> As a component of overall diplomacy, science diplomacy plays a dual role by both promoting technological development and fostering closer relationships between participating countries. It organizes high-level dialogues on science diplomacy according to established objectives, collaborates with peer institutions in other countries to host thematic seminars, and conducts group visits aimed at track-II diplomacy. Its ultimate goal is not merely mutual advancement in science but rather fostering affinity through science with countries that hold differing or even opposing ideologies or social systems, building mutual trust, and enhancing understanding with these nations. Its essence remains “the science for diplomacy.” In the diplomatic realm, interactions in the realm of science and technology can be seen as a “security card.” This card is highly flexible and can serve as an option to break diplomatic deadlocks, exerting political influence.

(Sun 2009, p. 125)

To further explore the relationship between government endorsement and academic production in this field, we analyzed whether studies focusing on the China context internalize official discourse and rhetoric in their introduction and conclusion sections. According to Crosstab comparisons, five out of the 13 digital diplomacy studies specifically targeting China are not government-funded, with 60% (n=3) incorporating official rhetoric to construct their narratives. In contrast, among the remaining eight government-granted studies, 75% (n=6) employ official rhetoric in constructing their theoretical statements.

This disparity becomes even more pronounced in the domain of science diplomacy in China (n=3). Of these three studies, two neither received government funding nor incorporated official rhetoric, while the sole government-funded study utilized official statements as the foundation for conceptualizing science diplomacy, further legitimizing the integration of these statements into the definition of science diplomacy through academic discourse. Although the sample size is limited, this finding aligns with our discussion regarding the ideological undertones in the conceptualization of science diplomacy. For instance, in contextualizing and interpreting Shanghai's involvement in China's polar science diplomacy, Tang (2022) cited Xi Jinping's 2021 speech in which Xi emphasized the importance of transforming polar regions, along with deep sea, outer space, and the internet, into “new frontiers of cooperation among all parties, rather than arenas of competition and rivalry” (p. 90) to advance the vision of a
"community of shared future for mankind" (p. 90). Finally, the dynamics differ in studies of technology diplomacy in China (n = 40). Only 50% (n = 5) of government-funded studies adopt official rhetoric, whereas this proportion rises to 70% (n = 21) for unfunded works.

Regarding the subfields proposed by Bjola and Kornprobst (2025, forthcoming), the results revealed that public diplomacy was a major subdomain for both funded and unfunded studies on digital and technology diplomacy. Yet, science cooperation, as the most common activity practiced in science diplomacy, is the key subfield addressed by both funded and unfunded studies. Given the implications of government funding for academic production, Table S1A presents all of the funded studies and their conceptualization of digital, technology, and science diplomacy, providing a comprehensive view of China's academic perspectives regarding the term "tech diplomacy".

5 | Discussion and Conclusions

We examined the Chinese government's conceptualization and understanding of tech diplomacy through the lens of two key institutional discourses: political and academic. Based on our analysis, we found that China's conceptualization of tech diplomacy was polysemous, having multiple dimensions.

First, while the initial tech diplomacy conceptualization by Chinese scholars was influenced by European and American definitions of science and technology diplomacy, the divergence between Chinese and English expressions on the term “tech” led to the separation of tech diplomacy into two distinct dimensions: science diplomacy and technology diplomacy. With the growing influence of digital technology in diplomacy, Beijing has further expanded the concept to include digital diplomacy as a third dimension. This approach supports China’s science, technology, and industrial policies, particularly in the context of internationalization and public diplomacy.

Second, Chinese scholars have analyzed tech diplomacy from different perspectives. Scholars of science diplomacy have typically focused on defending the legitimacy of the scientificity, theories, and methodological approaches endorsed by the CPC, emphasizing the role of ideology in shaping and disseminating knowledge. For instance, as one of the earliest studies on science diplomacy, Wang (2009) has stressed the role of science diplomacy as a source of soft power that is intertwined with a country's culture and ideology. The author has also emphasized the necessity of “tracking the new connotations, practices, and trends regarding science diplomacy in Western countries,” in order to “strategically position China at the forefront in future collaborations, securing the nation's strategic interests to the fullest extent” (Wang 2009, p. 28).

On the other hand, scholars who adhered to the technology diplomacy framework focused on the instrumental role of technological products and services in shaping foreign policy and actions. They emphasized how Beijing's technological norms might be expressed through the promotion of Chinese technological development and the support of foreign industries,

thereby securing a competitive advantage in the global discourse on science and technology. Scholars focused on digital diplomacy, however, examined how digitalization has transformed diplomacy, exploring its mechanisms, modes, and actions from a communication perspective.

That said, scholars in both technology and digital diplomacy have acknowledged the increasingly significant role of technology companies. For example, Gao and Hao (2023), in their broad definition of technology diplomacy (see Table S1A), identified enterprises as key actors, noting that the “behavioral logic [of enterprises] lies in being a supplementary form of official scientific and technological exchanges guided by national technology diplomacy policies” (p. 555). Similarly, Wang and Zheng (2023) highlighted the critical role of digital platform companies such as Facebook (Meta) and Google, which have emerged as global gatekeepers for digital public diplomacy due to the lack of international norms and accountability mechanisms governing these practices. In response to this growing influence, the above authors also advocated for China to establish “digital ambassadors” in Silicon Valley, following the precedent set by countries such as Denmark. These agencies are contended to “coordinate communication and cooperation between the foreign ministry and platforms in security protection and information governance” (Wang and Zheng 2023, p. 55).

Finally, Chinese scholars have reinterpreted tech diplomacy from a competitive standpoint, framing it as a Western-dominated discourse and rhetoric. They criticized the monopolization of technology by the West and its efforts to block China's technological development, viewing these actions through an ideological lens. These ideologically grounded ideas have begun to shape China's geopolitical discourse, integrating into its global and regional cooperation strategies. For instance, the Beijing Declaration (2024), signed by China and the leaders of 53 African countries at the FOCAC in October 2024, reflected this shift. The declaration incorporated Xi's "new quality productive forces" (article 20) idea and advocated "jointly improve global governance of science and technology" (article 20). It also explicitly "oppose[d] all forms of neocolonialism and international economic exploitation" (article 6) and "oppose[d] attempts to decouple with others and sever supply chains, resist unilateralism and protectionism" (article 9).

Overall, through systematic analysis of Chinese political and academic discourse on tech diplomacy, we delineated the divergent trajectories characterizing China's tripartite conceptualization of tech diplomacy: digital diplomacy, technology diplomacy, and science diplomacy. Our findings reveal how these three domains of tech diplomacy have developed asymmetrically since 2001, shaped by the interplay of Marxism-Leninism, developmental imperatives, and institutional path dependencies in China's science and technology governance architecture. Those findings also demonstrate that tech diplomacy, as an emerging field, remains conceptually fluid in the Chinese context. While influenced by official discourse, it has yet to coalesce into a unified framework. Notably, among the three domains examined, technology diplomacy and digital diplomacy exhibit relatively weaker ideological confrontation characteristics, positioning them as potential focal areas for international tech diplomacy engagement with China.
This exploratory study of China's institutional discourse on tech
diplomacy has several limitations: it does not provide an in-
depth analysis of specific regional cooperation projects or initia-
tives launched by Beijing that primarily aim to advance its tech
diplomacy agenda; it also lacks a discussion of the global recep-
tion of these Chinese concepts, leaving a critical gap in under-
standing how other countries perceive and respond to China's
tech diplomacy efforts.

In the context of the ongoing U.S.–China trade conflict,
Beijing is actively adjusting its strategies for developing tech
diplomacy in response to the evolving geopolitical landscape.
Notably, *new quality productive forces* have only recently
emerged within China’s political discourse. Its conceptual-
ization and agenda-setting remain in the early stages within
Chinese academia and among diplomatic practitioners. To
address these gaps, our future research will focus on specific
geopolitical cooperation frameworks initiated by Beijing, such
as BRI and FOCAC, to provide a more detailed and case-based
examination of Beijing’s operational processes in advancing its
tech diplomacy.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest. All co-authors have re-
viewed and approved the content of the manuscript. There are no finan-
cial interests to report. We certify that the submission is original work
and has not been submitted for consideration elsewhere.

Data Availability Statement

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated
or analysed during the current study.

Endnotes

¹According to the report “New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy: Navigating the Changing Balance of Power,” science diplomacy has three variations: “science in diplomacy, diplomacy for science, and science for diplomacy” (American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Royal Society, 2010, p. vi).

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## Supporting Information

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section.