# Managing paradoxical tensions to initiate coopetition between MNEs: The rise of coopetition formation teams

Oliver Gernsheimer, Dominik Kanbach, Johanna Gast, Frédéric Le Roy

► To cite this version:

Oliver Gernsheimer, Dominik Kanbach, Johanna Gast, Frédéric Le Roy. Managing paradoxical tensions to initiate coopetition between MNEs: The rise of coopetition formation teams. Industrial Marketing Management, 2024, 118, pp.148-174. 10.1016/j.indmarman.2024.02.006. hal-04801280

HAL Id: hal-04801280

https://hal.science/hal-04801280v1

Submitted on 26 May 2025

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.

<figure><img src="image_1.png" /></figure>

Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Project Team (CPT) (Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015).

Although this organizational structure explains how MNEs implement coopetition, it leaves open the question of how they initiate and form this relationship (Gernsheimer et al., 2021; Pellegrin-Boucher et al., 2018). Indeed, existing studies have largely neglected the formation phase of coopetition, focusing instead on later phases when risks and tensions are lower and the relationship is more established (Efrat, Souchon, Wald, Hughes, & Cai, 2022). This lack of attention is surprising since formation is the first and potentially most difficult step in coopetition (Dorn, Schweiger, & Albers, 2016). In this early phase, fiercely competing MNEs must establish a trusted relationship to determine how they collaborate, share, and create value from coopetition (Dorn et al., 2016). In addition, tensions and uncertainties about the true intent and potential success of coopetition are particularly high (Tidström, 2018). Without proper governance, each MNE is free to act opportunistically and exploit the weaknesses of its potential partner (Bouncken, Clauß, & Fredrich, 2016). MNEs may initiate coopetition for the sole purpose of extracting confidential information, disrupting strategies, or weakening standing competitive practices (Galkina & Lundgren-Henriksson, 2017). These risks can cause rivaling MNEs to be overly cautious and protective of their knowledge and assets, creating strong barriers to collaborative interactions (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Jakobsen, 2020).

Those MNEs unable to navigate these challenges may feel discouraged and intentionally avoid or withdraw from coopetition midway through the formation process, forgoing its potential benefits (Raza-Ullah, 2020). A specific organizational structure to manage tensions in the formation phase seems therefore necessary to encourage MNEs to deliberately engage in coopetition and reduce conflicts at the later and more advanced phases, leading to better, more robust, and longer-lasting performance outcomes (Le Roy & Czakon, 2016). Thus far, however, the organizational structure used by MNEs to initiate new coopetitive relationships is unknown. Therefore, we raise the following research question: *How do MNEs design their organizational structure to manage tensions in the formation of coopetition?*

We address this question through a qualitative research design in the highly concentrated and fiercely competitive agrochemical industry. We investigate the three leading MNEs controlling >50 % of the sector (Phillips, 2020). Escalating costs, stricter regulations, and scientific complexities in the development of innovation have driven the three MNE rivals into numerous coopetitive relationships (Sparks & Lorsbach, 2017). Studying the formation of coopetition and associated tensions in such challenging context is therefore a particularly intriguing and exciting fit to our study. Based on thirty-four semistructured in-depth interviews with decision-making mid- and senior-level managers across the three MNEs, we unveil a new organizational design to form coopetition: Coopetition Formation Teams (CFTs).

CFTs are boundary-spanning teams of coopetition experts, continuously moving within and between competing MNEs to identify and evaluate new collaboration opportunities. By assuming an in-between position at the firm level, CFTs can tackle a mix of four paradoxical tension types unfolding at internal and external organizational levels during the formation of MNE coopetition: performing, belonging, organizing, and learning tensions. These tensions are primarily attributed to misaligned goals, incompatible values and beliefs, dysfunctional processes, and conflicts between prior and new knowledge. As separate teams that are equipped with unique capabilities to manage conflicts, CFTs combine the separation and integration principles to dynamically manage these tensions. However, when paradoxical tensions persist and start to exacerbate, CFTs rely on conciliation by top management as a critical third principle to resolve conflicts.

Our study makes several contributions to the coopetition literature. It is the first study dedicated to the formation of coopetition between MNEs (Dorn et al., 2016). We contribute by uncovering four paradoxical tension types that coopeting MNEs encounter in the initial phase of their relationship (Fernandez, Le Roy, & Gnyawali, 2014). Furthermore, we identify a specific organizational design that allows MNEs to

dynamically manage these tensions across internal and external organizational levels (Tidström & Rajala, 2016). This structure is complementary to CPTs, the organizational design previously identified for the implementation of coopetition (Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015). While it relies on the known management principles of separation and integration (Fernandez et al., 2018; Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015), we add conciliation as a critical third and new principle, emphasizing the need for intervention by top management when tensions start to exacerbate. Finally, we summarize our findings by proposing an integrated framework for the formation of coopetition between MNEs, connecting the organizational design, the four paradoxical tension types, and the three principles to manage them.

# 2. Theoretical background

## 2.1. Coopetition between MNEs

Coopetition, a blend of “cooperation” and “competition,” is a unique and revolutionary type of business-to-business relationship in which two or more firms simultaneously cooperate and compete to create mutually beneficial values (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Bouncken, Gast, Kraus, & Bogers, 2015). Whereas cooperation allows firms to access new resources, knowledge, and expertise to achieve collective interests, competition stimulates opportunistic behaviors for competitive advantage and private interests (Bengtsson et al., 2016). Therefore, coopetition is frequently portrayed as a double-edged sword that contains possibilities for positive and negative outcomes (Bouncken & Kraus, 2013; Chen, Tang, Wu, & Wang, 2021).

The co-existence of cooperative and competitive behavior renders coopetition a highly conflicting, counterintuitive, and paradoxical relationship (Bengtsson, Eriksson, & Wincent, 2010; Gnyawali & Ryan Charleton, 2018; Raza-Ullah, Bengtsson, & Gnyawali, 2020). Smith and Lewis (2011), p. 387 define paradox as “contradictory yet interrelated elements (dualities) that exist simultaneously and persist over time; such elements seem logical when considered in isolation, but irrational, inconsistent, and absurd when juxtaposed.” Indeed, a relationship of cooperation to pursue collective interests and one of competition to exploit private gains make sense separately, but when the two approaches come together in coopetition, they seem incompatible and conflicting (Bengtsson et al., 2016; Raza-Ullah, 2020). By combining cooperation and competition into one relationship, coopetition takes advantage of the synergistic benefits between the two elements and can therefore deliver greater benefits than purely collaborative or purely competitive engagements (Bengtsson, Raza-Ullah, & Srivastava, 2020).

Although MNEs are large and complex organizations with a wide range of globally dispersed resources and capabilities (Pitelis & Teece, 2018), they frequently engage in coopetition (Table 1) to compensate for missing technologies and expertise (Fernandez et al., 2021; Luo, 2004). In coopetition, MNEs access new knowledge, develop new and differentiated technologies, share costs, reduce risks, and accelerate the time to bring new products to market (Ansari, Garud, & Kumaraswamy, 2016; Nemeh, 2018). Joining forces with a rival allows MNEs to engage in large-scale, resource-intensive, and risky innovation projects, and compete in dynamic high-tech industries with short product life cycles and rapid technological advancements. The pooling of resources in coopetition enables MNEs to decrease technical and commercial uncertainties, increase efficiencies, and exploit economies of scope, all of which can enhance their competitive advantages in times of global expansion (Chen et al., 2021).

Having similar and complementary resources allows MNEs to seamlessly share, internalize, and recombine their knowledge, which, in turn, enables quick and effective learning (Quintana-García & Benavides-Velasco, 2004; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2018). This feature facilitates deep and regular knowledge exchanges that promote the development of both incremental and radical innovation (Fernandez et al., 2018). For these reasons, MNEs often pursue coopetition in
<caption>Table 1</caption>

Coopetition between MNEs literature snapshot¹.

<table><thead><tr><th>Authors (Year)</th><th>Study context</th><th>Sample</th><th>Methodological approach</th><th>Key findings</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Le Roy et al. (2021)</td><td>Innovation</td><td>1 MNE</td><td>Qualitative case study research</td><td>MNEs in oligo-coopetition (i.e., coopetition between more than two but a limited number of firms) pursue three different strategies with different organizational designs according to the levels of costs, risks, and innovativeness of the project.</td></tr><tr><td>Fernandez, Chiambaretto, Chauvet, & Engsig (2021)</td><td>Innovation</td><td>2 MNEs</td><td>Qualitative case study research</td><td>MNEs with similar knowledge and geographical proximity pursue coopetition to achieve short-term goals, when risks of knowledge leakage are higher and long-term benefits are prioritized, MNEs can prefer to develop innovation in-house.</td></tr><tr><td>Rouyre & Fernandez (2019)</td><td>Innovation</td><td>3 MNEs</td><td>Qualitative case study research</td><td>MNEs engaged in coupled innovation projects with multiple competitors rely on an independent third-party with a centralized project structure to share their knowledge.</td></tr><tr><td>Pellegrin-Boucher, Le Roy, & Guraú (2018)</td><td>Sales</td><td>3 MNEs</td><td>Qualitative case study research</td><td>MNEs engaged in selling coopetition rely on the principles of separation and integration to manage tensions; in addition, they rely on arbitration by top-management to decide whether to collaborate or compete for a specific project.</td></tr><tr><td>Fernandez, Le Roy, & Chiambaretto (2018)</td><td>Innovation</td><td>2 MNEs</td><td>Qualitative case study research</td><td>For high cost, high risk, and high innovation projects, MNEs form Coopetitive Project Teams (CPTs); for low cost, low risk, and low innovation projects, MNEs should form Separate Project Teams (SPTs).</td></tr><tr><td>Fernandez & Chiambaretto (2016)</td><td>Knowledge protection</td><td>2 MNEs</td><td>Qualitative case study research</td><td>MNEs rely on a combination of separation and integration to reduce tensions in knowledge sharing processes. Furthermore, both formal and informal control mechanisms are necessary to manage tension related to information in coopetition.</td></tr><tr><td>Chiambaretto & Fernandez (2016)</td><td>Alliance portfolio</td><td>1 MNE</td><td>Qualitative case study research</td><td>MNEs should consider a flexible alliance portfolio to adapt to changing market environments. The alliance portfolio should contain coopetitive relationships among other collaboration types.</td></tr><tr><td>Alpinar & Vincze (2016)</td><td>Firm performance</td><td>2 MNEs</td><td>Qualitative case study research</td><td>Changes in the environment can alter the type of coopetition. In coopetition with strong power differences, the powerful firm can act opportunistically which can lead to negative outcomes and break the relationship.</td></tr><tr><td>Le Roy & Fernandez (2015)</td><td>Innovation</td><td>2 MNEs</td><td>Qualitative case study research</td><td>MNEs coopeting for high innovation projects create a Coopetitive Project Team (CPT) structure based on the principles of separation, integration, and co-management to reduce conflicts.</td></tr><tr><td>Fernandez, Le Roy, & Gnyawali, (2014)</td><td>Innovation</td><td>2 MNEs</td><td>Qualitative case study research</td><td>During the implementation of an innovation project, coopeting MNEs face various internal and external tensions; a mixed organization based on both separation and integration of competition and cooperation is needed to manage these tensions. Coopetition allows MNEs to cope with major technological challenges and create technological innovation. Specific coopetition capabilities are required to achieve common goals and to gain a proportionally larger share of benefits.</td></tr><tr><td>Gnyawali & Park (2011)</td><td>Innovation</td><td>1 MNE</td><td>Qualitative case study research</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

addition to in-house innovation (Fernandez et al., 2021), either by co-developing products (Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015), joining large research and development (R&D) consortia (Yang, 2020), or connecting in complex innovation networks (Hani & Dagnino, 2021).

While MNEs engage in coopetition to collaborate, they remain fierce rivals (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). Existing studies show that MNEs compete with comparable products in similar markets for the same customers (Chen, 1996). While these features make MNEs attractive collaborators, they can also stimulate learning races, opportunism, and knowledge theft (Bonel & Rocco, 2007). Leaking sensitive know-how or unique equipment to a large competitor can have devastating consequences for an MNE's innovation capabilities, market position, and financial performance (Crick, 2019). Consequently, when MNEs join in coopetition to create common value, they simultaneously protect their core assets to capture individual value (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2018). Striking a balance between cooperation and competition throughout their relationship is therefore critical for MNEs to reap the benefits from coopetition and avoid its potentially negative consequences (Gnyawali & Ryan Charleton, 2018).

## 2.2. Paradoxical tensions in coopetition between MNEs

Although coopetition has the potential to create outcomes that are superior to those from purely collaborative or purely competitive relationships, many coopetitive MNE engagements fail to deliver the intended results and dissolve prematurely (Das & Teng, 2000). The key reason for failure is the paradoxical nature of coopetition (Raza-Ullah et al., 2020). The simultaneity of cooperation and competition triggers tensions within and between the firms (Raza-Ullah, 2020; Tidström, 2018). Tensions are defined as “stress, anxiety, discomfort, or tightness in making choices, responding to, and moving forward in organizational situations” (Putnam, Fairhurst, & Banghart, 2016, p. 5). In coopetition, tensions can be stimulating and push firms to improve their performance, but they can also upset the balance between cooperation and competition by pulling managers toward either too much cooperative or competitive behavior (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014). According to Smith and Lewis (2011), tensions that imply a persistent contradiction between two competing yet interdependent poles can be categorized into four paradoxical tension types: performing, belonging, organizing, and learning tensions.

Performing tensions are those related to balancing competing goals, expectations, and outcomes (Jarzabkowski, Lè, & van de Ven, 2013; Smith & Lewis, 2011). MNEs typically own compatible resources but have different abilities to share, internalize, and recombine newly acquired knowledge (Bouncken & Kraus, 2013; Quintana-García & Benavides-Velasco, 2004; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2018). These differences can stimulate overly protective behaviors and a pull toward competition or lead to unprotected information sharing with a pull toward cooperation (Rajala & Tidström, 2017).

Belonging tensions are those generated by diverging values, identities, and beliefs (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Coopeting MNEs must find a balance between preserving their organizational identity and simultaneously embracing a new collective mindset (Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b). Consequently, some individual MNE managers may be perceived as traitors when they actively collaborate with the enemy (Le Roy & Czakon, 2016; Pellegrin-Boucher et al., 2018). Other individuals may be overly skeptical or fearful of the consequences of coopetition, allowing competitive behaviors to prevail over collaborative actions (Galkina & Lundgren-Henriksson, 2017).

Organizing tensions are associated with processes, structures, and routines (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Coopeting MNEs must set clear rules to direct and facilitate their interactions. Such governance mechanisms can generate strong organizing tensions, pushing firms to accept joint instead of sole decision making (Bouncken et al., 2016; Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015). Similarly, MNEs in coopetition

<footnote>a For brevity only representative articles are shown and those similar to ones already mentioned are excluded.</footnote>
must engage in continuous exchange to create new technologies and simultaneously preserve their internal approach to innovation. Consequently, organizing tensions can spur defensive behavior, limiting their propensity to cooperate, or allowing complacency that reduces their eagerness to compete (Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b).

Finally, learning tensions emerge in response to adjustments, moving between old and new, innovation, and change (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Coopetition among MNEs requires openness among employees to embrace new skills, knowledge, and approaches to resolve issues (Bouncken & Fredrich, 2016; Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b). Switching from old to new ways of working may create anxiety and discomfort, pulling toward competition, but it can also be an opportunity to exchange and learn from, pulling toward cooperation (Fredrich, Bouncken, & Kraus, 2019).

Paradoxical tensions often overlap and reinforce each another (Smith & Lewis, 2011). In coopetition, they are approached as cognitive-emotional constructs experienced by the individuals engaged in pursuing the contradictions between simultaneous cooperation and competition at various organizational levels (Fernandez et al., 2014; Raza-Ullah et al., 2014). The intra-firm level covers tensions between individuals and teams within the organization, whereas the inter-firm level concerns tensions between organizations (Bengtsson et al., 2016; Raza-Ullah, 2020). Paradoxical tensions at the intra-firm level can provoke or reduce tensions at the inter-firm level, and vice versa (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014). These multi-level interdependencies suggest that paradoxical tensions cannot be approached in isolation but should rather be considered as intertwined challenges that require dynamic management approaches to lower their negative impacts while harnessing their stimulation potential (Bengtsson et al., 2016).

## 2.3. Managing paradoxical tensions in coopetition between MNEs

The literature highlights three core principles to manage tensions in coopetition between MNEs: organizational separation of cooperating and competing activities (Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011), individual integration of these activities (Chen, 2008; Oliver, 2004), and co-management of joint activities (Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015).

The separation principle (Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011) recommends a functional, temporal, or spatial division of collaboration and competition at the firm level (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). For instance, two MNEs may separate their teams from the individual companies (Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015) or use specific information systems to isolate critical and noncritical information (Fernandez & Chiambaretto, 2016). MNEs may also use separate legal entities and brands to manage coopetition (Depeyre, Rigaud, & Seraidarian, 2018). The separation of cooperation and competition is a defensive response to reduce tensions in the short-term; however, as one activity is continuously chosen over the other, the pressure from the neglected activity can eventually intensify and jeopardize coopetition success. Separation can thus lead to new tensions and has been found insufficient for managing coopetition (Chen, 2008; Oshri & Weeber, 2006).

According to the integration principle, managers must integrate collaborative and competitive thinking at the individual level (Chen, 2008; Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Oliver, 2004; Smith & Lewis, 2011). On this approach, managers perceive the benefits of contradictions and convince others to accept and embrace coopetition as a beneficial and ongoing strategy (Czakon, Klimas, & Mariani, 2020; Gnyawali & Park, 2009). MNE managers with this ability seek synergies between competing businesses by integrating the duality of coopetition into their daily work (Depeyre et al., 2018; Stadtler & van Wassenhove, 2016). They are able to dynamically move between competitive and collaborative thinking and contextually prioritise one force without ignoring the other (Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Stadtler & van Wassenhove, 2016).

The co-management principle suggests a joint project structure known as CPT, separated from the organizations and with a dual management committee to implement complex innovation projects (Le Roy et al.,

2021; Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015). In CPTs, managers from coopeting MNEs with high integration capabilities intensively collaborate and make all critical project decisions together (Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015). Co-management in CPTs relies on the integration principle to synthesize conflicts and create joint benefits (Fernandez et al., 2018).

## 2.4. Coopetition lifecycle phases

Existing studies describe coopetition as a dynamic process in which simultaneous cooperative and competitive interactions evolve over time (Bengtsson et al., 2010; Dahl, 2014; Galkina & Lundgren-Henriksson, 2017). Therefore, scholars following a lifecycle model have begun to analyze coopetition relationships across three phases (Table 2): formation, implementation, and evaluation (Dorn et al., 2016).

The formation phase includes a sequence of interdependent activities to establish coopetition: partner selection (Blanka & Traunmüller, 2020; Kraus, Meier, Niemand, Bouncken, & Ritala, 2018), the creation of a structural collaboration design, definition of the project governance and processes (Bouncken & Fredrich, 2012; Mariani, 2016), the initiation of technology and knowledge exchanges (Galkina & Lundgren-Henriksson, 2017; Jakobsen, 2020), and the conclusion of a collaboration agreement (Chiambaretto & Dumez, 2016). Once coopetition is initiated, the interactions between the firms are coordinated in the implementation phase (Dorn et al., 2016). Managing the implementation of coopetition is important to secure a balance between value creation and value capture, knowledge protection and sharing, and the creation of common and individual value (Gnyawali & Ryan Charleton, 2018). Finally, in the evaluation phase, the firms measure the outcomes of their partnership, for instance, in terms of innovation, learning, firm or sustainability performance (Gernsheimer et al., 2021).

The formation phase is recognized as critical for the success of coopetition (Efrat et al., 2022). However, despite its complex nature, scholars have largely neglected its importance and instead focused on the more advanced and less risky phases of coopetition. Very few studies address formation as an issue within broader investigations of coopetition. For instance, Galkina and Lundgren-Henriksson (2017) point out that the formation phase involves high levels of ambiguity, uncertainty, and risk. As various stakeholders begin to evaluate the opportunities and risks of coopetition, conflicts emerge and cascade through the organizations (Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b). In this phase, the most critical tasks are reducing tensions while managing the interactions within and between the participating organizations (Efrat et al., 2022).

Trust is one of the most critical determinants of coopetition formation and is deemed the “emotional foundation of collaboration” (Blanka & Traunmüller, 2020; Chin, Chan, & Lam, 2008; Raza-Ullah & Kostis, 2019). It facilitates cooperation, reduces opportunism, and stimulates knowledge exchange (Lascaux, 2020; Raza-Ullah & Kostis, 2019). Trust is built from repeated positive interactions over the lifecycle of coopetition (Lascaux, 2020; Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016a). However, establishing trust in the beginning of coopetition is difficult, particularly when the partners are large and fiercely competing MNEs that could damage each other (Jakobsen, 2020).

Formal coordination through rules and structures is seen as complementary to trust and important to managing the implementation phase (Devetag, 2009; Mariani, 2016). The implementation of coopetition projects between MNEs is usually facilitated by a specific organizational design, such as the CPTs introduced above (Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015). However, such a formal structure is unlikely to exist in the formation phase as routines and processes that facilitate interaction are only starting to be built (Czakon & Czernek-Marszalek, 2018). In the absence of formal governance, however, sharing knowledge to identify joint coopetition opportunities can be challenging and may increase the risk of unilateral plunder (Galkina & Lundgren-Henriksson, 2017). The conflicts that result cannot be escalated but must be resolved directly by the few individuals steering and driving the formation efforts.

Due to the lack of trust and formal coordination, scholars
<table><caption>**Table 2**
Coopetition lifecycle phases.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Formation phase</th><th>Implementation phase</th><th>Evaluation phase</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Objectives</th><td>Initiate a new coopetition project</td><td>Manage an established coopetition project</td><td>Assess the outcomes of a coopetition project</td></tr><tr><th>Activities</th><td><ul><li>Partner selection (e.g., Blanka & Traunmüller, 2020; Chiambaretto, Bengtsson, Fernandez, & Näsholm, 2020; Kraus et al., 2018; Lee, Fong, & Kim, 2023)</li><li>Creation of the structural collaboration design (e.g., Bouncken & Fredrich, 2012; Mariani, 2016)</li><li>Definition of the coopetition scope, governance, processes and routines (e.g., Dahl, Kock, & Lundgren-Henriksson, 2016; Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b)</li><li>Initiation of technology and knowledge exchanges (e.g., Galkina & Lundgren-Henriksson, 2017; Jakobsen, 2020)</li><li>Closure of the collaboration agreement (Chiambaretto & Dumez, 2016)</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Joint value creation and individual value capture (e.g., Bouncken, Fredrich, Kraus, & Ritala, 2020; Bouncken, Fredrich, Ritala, & Kraus, 2020; Niesten & Stefan, 2019)</li><li>Coordination of knowledge sharing and knowledge protection (e.g., Fernandez & Chiambaretto, 2016; Raza-Ullah, Stadtler, & Fernandez, 2023)</li><li>Continuous conflict management (e.g., Depeyre et al., 2018; Fernandez et al., 2014; Fernandez & Chiambaretto, 2016; Pellegrin-Boucher et al., 2018; Rouyre & Fernandez, 2019)</li><li>Development of coopetition capabilities (e.g., Bengtsson et al., 2020; Rai, Gnyawali, & Bhatt, 2022)</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Evaluating innovation performance (Guo, Yin, & Liu, 2023; Navío-Marco, Bujidos-Casado, & Rodrigo-Moya, 2019; Navío-Marco, Ibar-Alonso, & Bujidos-Casado, 2021; Pekovic, Grolleau, & Mzoughi, 2020)</li><li>Evaluating financial performance (e.g., Crick, 2019; Crick & Crick, 2021b; Lechner, Soppe, & Dowling, 2016)</li><li>Evaluating sustainability performance (e.g., Manzhynski & Biedenbach, 2023; Manzhynski & Figge, 2020; Scandelius & Cohen, 2016)</li><li>Evaluating learning in coopetition (e.g., Bouncken & Fredrich, 2016; Fredrich et al., 2019; Obul, Yang, & Hiyit, 2021)</li></ul></td></tr><tr><th>Tensions</th><td><ul><li>Unknown</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Multiple tensions (e.g., Fernandez et al., 2014; Tidström, 2014; Tidström et al., 2018)</li><li>Coopetitive Project Team (e.g. Le Roy et al., 2021; Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015)</li><li>Separation, integration, and co-management (e.g., Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015)</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Not applicable (project already completed)</li><li>Not applicable (project already completed)</li><li>Not applicable (project already completed)</li></ul></td></tr><tr><th>Organizational design</th><td><ul><li>Unknown</li></ul></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><th>Management principles</th><td><ul><li>Unknown</li></ul></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>**Table 3**
Expected patterns in coopetition formation between MNEs.</caption><thead><tr><th>Patterns</th><th>Dimensions</th><th>Expected patterns in coopetition formation</th><th>Literature sources</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="2">Tensions</td><td>Four types of tensions at the <i>intra-firm level</i>: performing, belonging, organizing, and learning tensions</td><td>High</td><td rowspan="2">Tidström et al. (2018), Fernandez et al. (2014), Lundgren-Henriksson & Tidström, 2021, Tidström (2014), Chou and Zolkiewski (2018), Tidström (2014), Lundgren-Henriksson and Tidström (2021), Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016b), Raza-Ullah (2020), Bengtsson et al. (2016), Mariani (2007), Jarzabkowski et al., 2013), Smith and Lewis (2011)</td></tr><tr><td>Four types of tensions at the <i>inter-firm level</i>: performing, belonging, organizing, and learning tensions</td><td>High</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Organizational design</td><td>Organizational design to manage tensions in coopetition formation</td><td>To emerge from the data</td><td rowspan="2">Le Roy and Fernandez (2015), Fernandez et al. (2018), Le Roy et al. (2021), Fernandez and Chiambaretto (2016), Seran, Pellegrin-Boucher, and Gurau (2016)</td></tr><tr><td>Management principles to manage tensions in coopetition formation</td><td>To emerge from the data</td></tr></tbody></table>

acknowledge that the risks, uncertainties, and tensions in the formation phase can be significantly higher and more difficult to manage than during implementation (Efrat et al., 2022; Tidström, 2018). The CPT has been identified as the organizational design used by MNEs to manage tensions in the implementation of coopetition. However, it remains unclear which organizational structure MNEs design to initiate new coopetitive relationships. Therefore, we argue that there is a need to investigate this issue.

## 2.5. Expected patterns in the formation of coopetition between MNEs

We build upon prior insights about different types of tensions (Bengtsson et al., 2016; Raza-Ullah, 2020; Tidström, 2018) and draw on existing knowledge about organizational designs and management principles for coopetition (Le Roy et al., 2021; Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015) to develop our expected pattern framework with respect to coopetition formation between MNEs (Table 3). We expect that coopetition formation involves a high degree of paradoxical tensions due to the high risks and uncertainties expressed by the low levels of trust and a lack of formal coordination. We further expect that these tensions manifest internally (intra-firm) and externally (inter-firm) (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014).

At the intra-firm level, diverging views among managers about the value of coopetition based on their past involvement, perceptions, and experiences with competitors can create performing tensions (Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b). Joining a large competitor with a different culture can also produce belonging tensions in balancing present and future identities (Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b). The formation of coopetition may also result in the adjustment of internal strategies or revision of project plans, giving rise to organizing tensions (Dahl et al., 2016; Gnyawali, Madhavan, He, & Bengtsson, 2016) while the fear of plunder can activate learning tensions (Tidström, 2014). At the inter-firm level, differing expectations about the outcome of coopetition can lead to high levels of performing tensions (Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016a). MNEs must agree on how to work and make decisions together, which may create strong organizing tensions (Mariani, 2007) and connect with the tensions of belonging among individuals who may be perceived as traitors because they work with the enemy (Le Roy & Czakon, 2016). Finally, sharing core knowledge with a competitor at the firm level may trigger strong learning tensions. We thus formulate our first expected pattern for coopetition formation as follows:

**Expected pattern 1a:** During coopetition formation between MNEs, we expect high levels of performing, belonging, organizing, and learning tensions at the intra-firm level.

**Expected pattern 1b:** During coopetition formation between MNEs, we expect high levels of performing, belonging, organizing, and learning tensions at the inter-firm level.

We also expect that a specific organizational design will be necessary to manage the various paradoxical tensions at the intra- and inter-firm levels. However, in the formation phase, a joint project structure, such as the CPT, is unlikely to exist. Instead, we expect that MNEs will use another design to initiate coopetition. We thus formulate our second expected pattern:

**Expected pattern 2:** During coopetition formation between MNEs, we expect a specific organizational design to be necessary to manage paradoxical tensions at both firm levels.

Finally, we expect that specific management principles will be relevant for MNEs to manage the tensions in coopetition formation. We thus formulate our third expected pattern:

**Expected pattern 3:** During coopetition formation between MNEs, we expect specific management principles to be necessary to manage paradoxical tensions at both firm levels.
<table><caption>**Table 4**
List of interviews.</caption><thead><tr><th>N°</th><th>Function of the interviewee</th><th>Company</th><th>Management Level</th><th>N° of coopetition projects</th><th>Years of coopetition experience</th><th>Interview length</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>I1</td><td>R&D Strategy Lead</td><td>Beta</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>10 years</td><td>1 h</td></tr><tr><td>I2</td><td>Head Regulatory &amp; Stewardship</td><td>Alpha</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>12 years</td><td>1 h 10 min</td></tr><tr><td>I3</td><td>Head Operations &amp; Supply Chain</td><td>Beta</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>11 years</td><td>1 h 02 min</td></tr><tr><td>I4</td><td>Head Global Regulatory</td><td>Alpha</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>&gt;10 projects</td><td>16 years</td><td>1 h 39 min</td></tr><tr><td>I5</td><td>Vice President Global Marketing</td><td>Alpha</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>&gt;10 projects</td><td>14 years</td><td>39 min</td></tr><tr><td>I6</td><td>Director of Marketing</td><td>Alpha</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>18 years</td><td>50 min</td></tr><tr><td>I7</td><td>Head of Strategy</td><td>Beta</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>15 years</td><td>1 h 45 min</td></tr><tr><td>I8</td><td>Director of Marketing</td><td>Gamma</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>&gt;10 projects</td><td>15 years</td><td>38 min</td></tr><tr><td>I9</td><td>Vice President Global Strategy</td><td>Alpha</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>17 years</td><td>58 min</td></tr><tr><td>I10</td><td>Global Third Party Manager</td><td>Alpha</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>5 years</td><td>1 h 21 min</td></tr><tr><td>I11</td><td>Global Third Party Manager</td><td>Gamma</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>&lt;5 projects</td><td>2 years</td><td>1 h 06 min</td></tr><tr><td>I12</td><td>Global Third Party Manager</td><td>Beta</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>3 years</td><td>1 h 15 min</td></tr><tr><td>I13</td><td>Director of Third Party Management</td><td>Alpha</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>&gt;10 projects</td><td>12 years</td><td>1 h 30 min</td></tr><tr><td>I14</td><td>Global Strategy Project Lead</td><td>Gamma</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>&lt;5 projects</td><td>10 years</td><td>58 min</td></tr><tr><td>I15</td><td>Head of Global Third Party Mgmt.</td><td>Gamma</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>&gt;10 projects</td><td>10 years</td><td>1 h 36 min</td></tr><tr><td>I16</td><td>Head of Strategy</td><td>Beta</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>14 years</td><td>1 h 25 min</td></tr><tr><td>I17</td><td>Head of Global Portfolio Mgmt.</td><td>Gamma</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>&gt;10 projects</td><td>12 years</td><td>59 min</td></tr><tr><td>I18</td><td>Head of Legal Affairs</td><td>Alpha</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>10 years</td><td>55 min</td></tr><tr><td>I19</td><td>Head of Global Third Party Mgmt.</td><td>Beta</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>&gt;10 projects</td><td>11 years</td><td>1 h 07 min</td></tr><tr><td>I20</td><td>Head of Global R&D</td><td>Beta</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>&gt;10 projects</td><td>9 years</td><td>1 h 02 min</td></tr><tr><td>I21</td><td>Vice President Business Mgmt.</td><td>Beta</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>&gt;10 projects</td><td>17 years</td><td>45 min</td></tr><tr><td>I22</td><td>Head of R&D Partnerships</td><td>Beta</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>&gt;10 projects</td><td>18 years</td><td>1 h 18 min</td></tr><tr><td>I23</td><td>Head of Business Management</td><td>Gamma</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>&gt;10 projects</td><td>18 years</td><td>56 min</td></tr><tr><td>I24</td><td>Head of Intellectual Property</td><td>Alpha</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>6 years</td><td>50 min</td></tr><tr><td>I25</td><td>Global Product Manager</td><td>Gamma</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>8 years</td><td>50 min</td></tr><tr><td>I26</td><td>Director Key Account Manager</td><td>Beta</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>&gt;10 projects</td><td>14 years</td><td>53 min</td></tr><tr><td>I27</td><td>Head of Business Management</td><td>Alpha</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>9 years</td><td>1 h 02 min</td></tr><tr><td>I28</td><td>Head of Business Management</td><td>Beta</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>12 years</td><td>1 h</td></tr><tr><td>I29</td><td>Vice President Global Strategy</td><td>Alpha</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>8 years</td><td>51 min</td></tr><tr><td>I30</td><td>Head of Global Product Category</td><td>Alpha</td><td>Mid-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>5 years</td><td>43 min</td></tr><tr><td>I31</td><td>Head of Regulatory Affairs</td><td>Gamma</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>12 years</td><td>40 min</td></tr><tr><td>I32</td><td>Head of Commercial Excellence</td><td>Alpha</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>10 years</td><td>49 min</td></tr><tr><td>I33</td><td>Head of Regional Business Mgmt.</td><td>Beta</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>14 years</td><td>58 min</td></tr><tr><td>I34</td><td>Head of Global R&D</td><td>Gamma</td><td>Senior-Level</td><td>5–10 projects</td><td>13 years</td><td>1 h 35 min</td></tr></tbody></table>

# 3. Methodology

## 3.1. Research design

We chose an exploratory research design with an in-depth single case study (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2018) to investigate the management of coopetition formation. An exploratory approach is particularly appropriate since the formation of coopetition is a complex and scarcely explored phenomenon (Efrat et al., 2022) that extends across multiple levels (Dorn et al., 2016). Deploying a qualitative research design resonates with recommendations of Bengtsson et al. (2010) and Gnyawali and Song (2016) who advocate for qualitative approaches to integrate the complexities and interdependencies of coopetition. Recent contributions have demonstrated the utility of qualitative studies for a cohesive and comprehensive exploration of the multilayered, paradoxical, and dynamic nature of coopetition (Fernandez et al., 2018; Le Roy et al., 2021).

## 3.2. Flexible pattern matching with qualitative data

We follow the recommendations of Bouncken, Qiu, and García (2021) and Sinkovics (2018) and apply a flexible pattern matching approach (FPMA). FPMA allows the development of new theory by iteratively comparing expected theoretical patterns derived from extant literature with observed empirical patterns derived from empirical data (Bouncken, Qiu, & García, 2021; Sinkovics, 2018). For qualitative data, FPMA involves the development of a set of expected patterns based on existing literature before empirical data are collected (Table 3). This step is intended to focus and guide data collection (Bouncken, Qiu, Sinkovics, & Kürsten, 2021; Sinkovics, 2018). The qualitative data is then viewed through these patterns in several iterative steps. Expected patterns might be not supported, partially supported, or fully supported by the data (Sinkovics, 2018). FPMA is thus particularly useful for research

questions that involve a context or relationship that is not well understood or where a lack of knowledge prevents the development of propositions (Bouncken, Qiu, Sinkovics, & Kürsten, 2021). When the data generates findings that refine, enrich, or alter expected patterns, new patterns emerge and theory is built (Bouncken, Qiu, & García, 2021). Due to these advantages, several coopetition studies published in this journal have begun to employ FPMA (Burström, Kock, & Wincent, 2022; Crick, Crick, & Chaudhry, 2023; Klammer, Hora, & Kailer, 2023; Le Roy et al., 2021; Smiljic, Aas, & Mention, 2022).

## 3.3. Empirical setting

We selected the agrochemical and seed industry as our empirical setting. The $100 billion sector is positioned within the life science segment of the chemical industry and dominated by a few large and fiercely competing MNEs developing and marketing pesticides (Phillips, 2020). We focus on Alpha, Beta, and Gamma, the three leading MNEs controlling >50 % of the sector.<fnref n="1" /> By focusing on the three major players of the industry, we are able to gather detailed insights and a profound understanding of how coopetition is established in such a context. All three firms operate under similar organizational structures and aggressively compete with similar products and business models in the same geographies for market shares and profits (Phillips, 2020).

Innovation is the core value driver of the sector. Alpha, Beta, and Gamma are responsible for 80 % of the sector's annual research and development (R&D) budget (Phillips, 2020). Innovative products are in high demand to protect plants from aggressively developing insects, weeds, and diseases (Sparks & Bryant, 2021). These products are the result of a long and complex R&D process marked by significant investments and high risks (Hartnell, 1996). Each firm invests more than

<footnote n="1">¹ To preserve anonymity, we disguised the company names.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_2.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 1. Summary of data structure.</figcaption></figure>

$1 billion per year in R&D, and transforming one new chemical molecule into a final agrochemical product takes up to $300 million in investment and ten years of development work (Sparks & Bryant, 2021). In addition, strict regulations limit the possibility of quickly bringing innovation to market (Nishimoto, 2019). To develop more innovation with better performance with less risks, lower costs, and in shorter times, Alpha, Beta, and Gamma forged numerous cooperative relationships (Hartnell, 1996; Sparks & Lorsbach, 2017). In cooperation, the three firms either cross-license existing technologies to develop incrementally innovative products or combine assets to develop radically new products (Sparks & Lorsbach, 2017). Reflecting the main drivers and outcomes of business-to-business cooperation relationships between large MNEs identified by Gnyawali and Park (2011), this industry represents a particularly exciting, intriguing, and promising setting for our study.

## 3.4. Data collection

Our data collection process extended over three years (2020–2022) and relied on primary and secondary data. In-depth semistructured interviews are the core source of the data, supplemented by a repertoire of secondary data, supporting the interpretation and verification of the accuracy of our interviews. First, in June 2020 and extending over a period of two months, we collected secondary data on existing collaborations involving the three MNEs. One author gained access to IHS Markit Insight, an industry-specific global database covering worldwide market intelligence in the agrochemical industry. We built our initial knowledge about the industry and cooperation in this context by searching this database for collaborations between Alpha, Beta, and Gamma published in strategic reports, press releases, market briefings, and analyst presentations issued in English during the preceding fourteen years (2007–2020). These insights allowed us to narrow our

research question and design our interview guide (Miles & Huberman, 1994).

Second, after establishing the criteria for the qualitative analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989), between November 2020 and January 2022, we conducted thirty-four semistructured interviews with mid- and senior-level managers from all three MNEs (Table 4). We followed the key informant approach to select managers who were deeply involved in the initiation of cooperation (Taylor & Blake, 2015). Respondents were first contacted based on previous professional links. Additional contacts were provided following the snowball method of sample selection (Miles & Huberman, 1994). All interviews were conducted in English via video-conference or in person and lasted between 38 and 105 min, with an average duration of 64 min. Our interview guide was used consistently for all interviews to ensure a shared understanding of the phenomenon and the purpose of the questions (Appendix 1). We continued to contact new respondents until theoretical saturation was reached. We audio-recorded and immediately transcribed the interviews verbatim to preserve the quality of the data (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008). Due to confidentiality concerns, we were instructed to redact any information about company names and products.

Third, between February and March 2022, we conducted a second round of secondary data collection from company internal and company external sources to confirm the information from our interviews. Some informants provided us with internal documents (e.g., organizational structures and presentations) to complement external information (e.g., industry studies, company annual reports, and information on company websites). This information allowed us to validate and clarify contradictory data from our interviews and supplemented secondary data from the initial stage of our research.
## 3.5. Data analysis

We used NVivo software to build our data structure by matching expected patterns with respective coding categories and descriptive codes (Fig. 1). For evidence, we followed the recommendations of Cloutier and Ravasi (2021) and substantiated each descriptive code with selected quotes from our data (Appendix 2 offers additional quotes for each code). Our expected pattern framework (see Table 3) served as our node structure. We empirically explored our framework by iteratively moving between the theoretical framework and the collected evidence, searching for matches between the expected theoretical and observed empirical patterns. Our unit of analysis was the process of formation of a coopetition relationship. We first searched and matched our interview data according to the four different types of paradoxical tensions (performing, belonging, organizing, and learning tensions) proposed by Smith and Lewis (2011). Then we classified each tension as either an intra-firm or inter-firm tension, according to its source. Next, we searched for common patterns in the management of these tensions. Our iterative comparison of theoretical knowledge about the organizational design and management principles applied by MNEs in coopetition implementation (Le Roy et al., 2021; Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015) with our empirical data on coopetition formation revealed the Coopetition Formation Teams as a new element for the management of coopetition formation. We then compared the known principles for the implementation of coopetition with those used in coopetition formation. This allowed us to theorize about the similarities and differences in the application of the separation and integration principles and to identify conciliation as a third and new principle for coopetition formation. This iterative approach aligns with existing studies that successfully applied the FPMA in qualitative data analysis (Burström et al., 2022; Crick et al., 2023; Klammer et al., 2023; Le Roy et al., 2021; Smiljic et al., 2022).

Our team of four researchers individually analyzed, discussed, and cross-checked primary and secondary data from several vantage points to ensure its internal validity and reduce interpretation biases (Gibbert et al., 2008). We compared individual findings and reexamined cases in which our interpretations differed until agreement was reached. Trianulation between the primary and secondary data further contributed to data validity (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Finally, one of the researchers presented and discussed the results with three independent industry consultants who were able to cross-check and confirm our findings from multiple perspectives, thereby further improving our study's validity and avoiding interpretation bias (Yin, 2018).

# 4. Results

## 4.1. An organizational design for coopetition formation between MNEs

The agrochemical and seed industry has recently faced significant headwinds. The rising costs and complexities of new product developments, increasing regulatory scrutiny, and growing pressure from generics have significantly weakened the ability of the three leading MNEs Alpha, Beta, and Gamma to deliver a continuous stream of innovation. Therefore, the three rivals have begun to forge strong coopetitive relationships to overcome the growing challenges in developing and launching new products. Rather than relying on a sporadic set of managers steering the formation of new coopetitive partnerships, the three rivals have implemented a specific organizational design with a dedicated team structure. Strategic groups of coopetition experts, known as third-party relations teams, have been installed in each firm to manage the day-to-day activities of forming new collaborative relationships with third parties, i.e., competitors (Fig. 2). One of our respondents explains:

> "Both from the ability to execute and having enough authority to demand the compromises to be made, that one team manages the relationship with our competitors. It's not something you in-service, it's a team you build on

> your own. With execution strength. You need to have such a much-elevated group as a truly strategic execution arm".

(19)

Third-party teams are embedded in the firm's strategy departments, reporting directly to the head of strategy and top management (Fig. 2). This hierarchically senior position is critical to the effectiveness and performance of these teams, which typically comprise three to five third-party managers, each dedicated to managing the relationship with a specific competitor (Fig. 3):

> "They are professionals with long years of experience, good knowledge of the technologies and the competitive landscape, very well connected and respected in the industry ... They are proactively scanning, looking, and initiating cooperation opportunities with competitors".

(128)

Third-party managers regularly connect with their competitor-firm counterparts to deepen their understanding of the strategic direction, organizational culture, and decision-making processes in each competing firm (Fig. 3). Through repeated interactions, they continuously strengthen personal links, familiarity, and trust. A third-party manager explains:

> "We forged good working relationships with our peers from all major competitors. We know their people, organizational structure, the portfolio, the strategic directions, and all these kinds of things, better than anyone else in our company".

(115)

Third-party managers maneuver the contradicting logics of collaboration and competition within their firm and balance the associated demands from the competitor organization. They move between their own organization and that of the competitor, representing the competitor's interests within their organization and their own organization's interests within the competitor's. In connecting fierce competitors, these managers evolve as intermediaries, assuming an in-between position at the firm level while bridging and connecting the conflicting goals of the two organizations (Fig. 3). A marketing director describes:

> "They have to ride the fence between working for the company they work for and having one foot in the camp of the competitor. It's a delicate balance between the two companies. They have to wear two hats at the same time".

(18)

Third-party teams coordinate knowledge flows within and between their firms. At the intra-firm level, they facilitate exchanges among internal departments involved or impacted by coopetition while maintaining close contact with top management. By fostering cross-functional cooperation to evaluate the risks and benefits of each new coopetition relationship, third-party teams drive organizational awareness and alignment about the goals and objectives of coopetition. At the inter-firm level, third-party managers coordinate actors, representing the primary interface and single point of contact between their firms (Fig. 3). As our respondents report, the initial step in establishing a new coopetitive relationship is typically made by top management:

> "It usually starts at the very top when management discussions happen and the view is that there must be a dozen places where we can help each other, and it makes sense to look for collaboration. And it's good to get started at the top so the senior leaders are already bought in on the idea and agree on the partner. That's already a big step. Then top management is handing it down the chain to the third-party teams".

(125)

Based on their broad expertise in the strengths and weaknesses of each competitor, third-party teams then analyze and pair innovation gaps and opportunities in each firm's portfolios. This allows to assess the strategic and financial value of each identified collaboration
<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 2. Exemplary organizational integration of third-party teams.</figcaption></figure>

opportunity:

> "We need to have the arguments why collaboration would make sense for us and our competitor. We need to look at our portfolio, the market space, our pipeline, do a full competitive analysis and see where our innovation gaps are. And then we must put ourselves in our competitor shoes to do the very same thing".

(110)

Exploring the feasibility of coopetition is complex and failure rates are high. Indeed, our respondents mentioned several restrictions including antitrust regulations as constituting significant barriers to collaborations between large competitors, as one third-party manager explains:

> "A large number of ideas will fall apart, because you will see a lot of things that are detrimental as you go further down the road. Sometimes

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 3. Third-party managers as intermediaries within and between competing MNEs.</figcaption></figure>
> there is legally no way to collaborate. Sometimes your partner has other commitments. Sometimes there is no financial fit. But if there is a true need also identified on the other side, then both are eager to get going”
(112)

## 4.2. Paradoxical intra-firm tensions

As third-party managers begin to discuss the benefits and risks of a new coopetition project within their firms, strong performing, belonging, and organizing tensions become visible. Performing tensions represent conflicts between seizing and dismissing collaboration opportunities, weighing immediate risks against future benefits, and conflicts between private and collective goals. Driven by overconfidence in their firm's own innovation capabilities, some organizational members may downplay the need and benefit to share and collaborate and instead breed internal mistrust toward technologies from competitors, diminishing the attractiveness and undermining the strategic value of coopetition:

> "You will hear internally a million of reasons not to do it. People feel uncomfortable, especially if its new ground. They don't understand the whole dynamic. It's this typical 'Let's stay on our own plate', 'Why should we share the value with a competitor? Why should we give them all the money when we own the technology?' It's the typical internal hurdle".
(14)

Other individuals can struggle to understand how to share a product with a competitor while effectively competing and capturing its full value:

> "With the decreasing number of innovation in our industry, the value of an exclusive innovation is really high. If you are an R&D company, that is basically your unique selling point, that is where you show that your DNA is healthy. You don't want to share that with a competitor without any need. The only reason why you reach out to collaborate is if you have a problem. So, the only driver for that cooperation is then desperation. And that is not a good basis for a cooperation. So, the entire perspective is, I'm not saying set up for failure, but it is set up for complication, and that makes it so difficult".
(131)

Our interviewees further indicated that R&D teams can be particularly resistant to and mistrustful of coopetition. While third-party managers seek to convince their R&D managers about the attractiveness of competitor products, they can be overly defensive and even negative toward innovation from rivals, questioning their ability to achieve individual and collective innovation goals simultaneously. They may discredit competitors' innovation, promoting their own products and protecting their R&D funds to avoid a resource drain, as one respondent notes:

> "What you have immediately against you is R&D, as a matter of fact, they will systematically think that whatever money you are using to collaborate with competitors is subtracted from their budgets. People get protective of their own function and therefore sometimes kill ideas just for that purpose alone".
(117)

R&D managers with a strong inward focus can also be overly attached to their inventions and defensive to exchanging them with a competitor, activating strong belonging tensions. These tensions entail conflicts between old and new ways of working, being self-sufficient and open to depending on others, and conflicts between own strengths and those of others. Indeed, strong loyalty to their firm often impedes the willingness of R&D teams to open up and share their discoveries with a competitor, even if sharing could increase the chances of competing more effectively in the market:

> "Our R&D team thinks that they are the best in the industry, which of course makes it very difficult, you know, to convince them of the value of collaborating with a competitor for a product where they think they have their own solution in the pipeline for a little bit later in time. And especially our R&D colleagues seem to have a very high standard. And they are rather looking a bit critically on competitor products when they are offered to us".
(119)

Accessing resources from a competitor is also associated with the fear of exposing one's own weaknesses. As the legitimacy of R&D teams is built upon their own scientific competences to create innovation in-house, relying on a rival to cover gaps in the R&D pipeline can reflect poorly on their ability to innovate, threatening their internal standing and credibility:

> "There is a lot of psychology involved here as well. There is pride, there is the 'not invented here'. Admitting that we can't do or can't afford to do it all alone, in the pride of our innovation machine. You are admitting you've failed. You are admitting you don't have all the cards. It is incredibly difficult for people to acknowledge that they are not capable themselves".
(19)

The fear of losing power also makes it difficult for some individuals to acknowledge the strengths of competitors. Instead of viewing these as a source of assistance, they may neglect and discredit their capabilities:

> "We are sometimes blindfolded based on our own processes and our own strengths. We don't acknowledge the power and the relevance of our competitors and therefore, we are trapping ourselves very often. We only believe what we see, what we think. We don't believe what they say, what they do. And then the value and the benefit of a collaboration can vanish quickly".
(132)

Finally, third-party teams face strong organizing tensions as they create the structures, processes, and practices of coopetition. These tensions represent conflicts between current benefits and future gains, short-term and long-term goals, and organizational rigidity and flexibility. Sharing technologies with a competitor can result in long-term benefits, but it can also lead to short-term costs and operational losses, which can weigh on performance ratings and reduce personal bonuses.

> "Finding the common denominator where we are willing to sacrifice a short-term position of strength for a long-term advantage is the challenge ... It's way easier to point to immediate pain and costs than to a future benefit. Making the package work is difficult and involves compromises across silos in our company. But structurally, we aren't set up to make compromises for a common good".
(17)

Consequently, business leaders measured in terms of short-term financial goals tend to reject the trade of immediate profitability for strategic long-term growth and oppose coopetition. One respondent elaborates on the issue of organizational misalignment within his firm:

> "None of our business leaders is rewarded for entering cooperations with competitors or making clever strategic decisions. On the contrary, they are rewarded to reach financial goals and would rather reject a collaboration to protect their sales budget".
(120)

As our interviews reveal, third-party managers can also struggle to obtain the necessary commitment and support from internal departments for formation activities to progress. Internal teams such as the legal department often fear to become personally blamed for negative consequences of coopetition and therefore intentionally slow or undermine the formation process, dragging and even blocking the efforts of third-party teams:
> "There are people that are structurally or functionally in our organization, whether that's legal, or IP, or whatever it is, but sometimes these people have a lot of influence. They're not looking at the bigger picture but because they're looking to protect their own KPI, their own small area of responsibility, they start to create a lot of internal churn and fight such collaborations ... This can slow things down, it can break the framework, and it can really kill the entrepreneurial opportunity that you started the discussion with".

(128)

### 4.3. Paradoxical inter-firm tensions

Third-party managers also struggle with tensions at the inter-firm level. As they begin to determine the goals and outcomes of cooperation between their firms, performing, learning, and organizing tensions can obstruct their activities and compromise formation success.

High risks and uncertainties over future value creation and the value appropriation potential of a new coopetition project can incite strong performing tensions between the firms. These tensions reflect conflicts inherent in capturing benefits today and in the future, conflicts between transforming different into congruent goals, and conflicts between individual and mutual benefits. Given the long-term nature of coopetition projects in the agrochemical industry, successful collaboration outcomes often depend on intertwined and difficult-to-predict factors, spanning considerable uncertainty and risk. A joint project might be cancelled midway through the development process or have its value diminished by the time it hits the market. As value creation and value capture remain highly uncertain and extremely difficult to quantify at the time of formation, each firm is keen to hedge its risks and reduce potential losses. One respondent explains this dilemma:

> "The value can change over time, and how can you anticipate that upfront? It's nearly impossible to anticipate. Because a lot of what we are talking about is strategic, futuristic, and its market penetration, and future value, and so on. It's always long-term. And that long-term value proposition is extremely challenging to define upfront".

(122)

Performing tensions can also arise from conflicting perceptions about each firm's value contributions. Each firm provides a specific set of resources and capabilities in the collaboration, and different perceptions about the value of these can lead to disagreements and mistrust. Some companies might feel that they provide disproportionally more assets, knowledge, or experience than their partner firm and therefore expect to capture more value from future returns:

> "The perceived values can be very different on each side. It can be that one side is a funding source for the other, that allows them to do more things. They may not need the technology, but they need the money. Or it reduces their risk. Or do they believe it brings a competitor closer to them so they have control over what that competitor is doing. The perceived values can be completely different on each side, and they won't be spoken out. Both sides are rarely equal, so how you value your benefit versus how your competitor values their benefit is where there are big challenges".

(130)

Others may focus too opportunistically on their own individual advantage without considering the needs and benefits of their collaborating partner:

> "The very notion that you are going to collaborate has to begin with the concept you are giving something up. You don't collaborate to get more than what you would have got on your own, but because you are going to net something you couldn't have done alone. And this is a concept that is often missing when we start these collaborations because we think somebody is going to give us their crown jewels so we can become better all by ourselves. And I don't think we necessarily intentionally start that way;

> we just have such a strong internal bias for ourselves that we don't start with enough consideration of the collaborator's needs and benefits".

(127)

In our interviews, learning tensions represent conflicts between sharing and protecting knowledge, prior and new knowledge, and trusting and distrusting shared knowledge. Such conflicts are particularly visible when information must be shared during early R&D when patents are not yet granted, and the risk of plunder is extremely high. Shared know-how could become immediately misappropriated and reused for other innovation projects. Our respondents mentioned that nondisclosure agreements can provide some level of protection, but may be difficult to enforce in the fuzzy context of early innovation. Consequently, some managers intentionally withheld important information at the beginning of coopetition even at the cost of jeopardizing formation success:

> "The most difficult step is always the first step. You don't want to share too much in the beginning before you have certainty that it will end up in a kind of contract. You discuss on a very high level, and it takes a lengthy time to agree on something. Both sides are really cautious about making a mistake. Sometimes competitors are also just testing you and ask questions to find out about your strategy. You have to be very careful what you share".

(13)

Another manager elaborates on the challenge of defending prior knowledge and accessing new knowledge:

> "At the early stage it is really difficult because if you freely enter into some kind of transparency on what you're doing, you basically give away where you put your research money in. And then your competitors could copycat or could jump into that patent segment, look for the white spots and whatnot".

(124)

In a similar vein, some respondents expressed concerns about the trustworthiness and intent underlying the provision of knowledge by competitors in the early phase of their engagement:

> "They might even lie to you and only pretend they want to collaborate with you ... to find out whether you are already in bed with somebody else".

(118)

While strong governance is critical to implementation, our respondents admitted that its design can raise high levels of organizing tensions during coopetition formation. These tensions entail conflicts between flexibility and control, stability and change, as well as establishing and destroying organizational ties. As firms begin to anticipate potential future conflicts, it can be increasingly difficult for them to design a structure that facilitates cooperation and competition at the same time. They may either over-formalize joint decision-making processes and paralyze collaboration or underestimate and avoid penalties for opportunistic behavior and stimulate competition:

> "As soon as you start to drill down on how you actually make it happen, you will discover a lot of problems. Everybody is becoming a bit protective when we start writing things down on paper. How will it work? Who is getting what? What happens when we do not agree? You have to be very specific about that before you actually start doing anything together".

(129)

Organizing tensions also emerge as third-party managers seek to design a stable structure in a shifting environment. As one respondent explains, unexpected changes in the competitive landscape, new product entries, or regulatory restrictions can make coopetition less attractive and even irrelevant, triggering organizing tensions:
"You start to work on an agreement together in an area which is a win for both companies. It does take time to find. And then the environment changes. The world suddenly has changed around us before we were able to finish the deal. And then all the effort, the work, trust, the structure, all becomes not as relevant and attractive anymore. It's almost like you need to design how you end the agreement before you have even started it".
(125)

Organizing tensions may also occur when third-party teams seek mechanisms to dissolve coopetition. Exploring the termination of coopetition before it has even started can increase anxiety and resentment, jeopardizing previously established commitment and trust. One respondent critically reflects on this challenge:

"In the beginning you already need to think of how it will end; how you divorce from each other. And that's something where I felt that it was difficult sometimes because it can kill a little bit the mood, because if you have a fantastic idea, you have a good starting point, and everything is nice and fancy. You want to focus on this. You don't want to think a lot about what if this goes wrong? What if that goes wrong? But I think it's very important to do so to have then longstanding success".
(118)

### 4.4. Managing inter- and intra-firm tensions

#### 4.4.1. The key role of third-party managers

Managing the paradoxical tensions requires third-party teams to plug into the intertwined conflicting interests within and between their firms. As intermediaries, third-party teams are uniquely positioned to navigate conflicting tensions simultaneously at both levels. By oscillating between the inside and the outside of their firms, they are able to acknowledge, frame, and act on paradoxical tensions to reduce internal resistance and opposition, balance external conflicts, and break tensions at both levels to successfully maneuver their firms into coopetition.

#### 4.4.2. Dedicated teams of coopetition experts

Third-party teams are specialized teams fully removed from competitive activities and focused entirely on building strategic long-term collaborative relationships with competitors. One respondent explains:

"They are not involved in the day-to-day business. They don't need to deliver sales numbers or keep a budget. They think broad and strategic, and they can think like the competitor as well as like their own company. They are flexible and agile enough to play both sides. It's difficult for other people in our company to do that because they are too much involved in the daily grind".
(18)

Distinct from other organizational members, third-party teams are not measured by short-term financial goals. Instead, they are focused on creating strategic, long-term value through coopetition. This is important since coopetition rarely creates short-term benefits but its advantages only come into effect longer-term. One of our interviewees summarizes as follows:

"They have a long-term purview and fulfill a very strategic role. They are able to step away from the existing, today's business and look at the long-term, the strategic interest of our company. Some people may not see need for a collaboration today, but in five, ten years from now, it could be critical to remain competitive. The third-party teams have this vision".
(134)

As distinct teams fully dedicated to the formation of coopetition, third-party teams have an unconstrained mandate as the single point of contact between competing firms. They gather, evaluate, and channel information internally and externally to facilitate an unbiased assessment of the possibilities and risks of each new coopetition partnership.

One respondent explains:

"Because they are separate teams, they almost act as a moderator, maybe even as mediator of sorts. Obviously, they work for our company, but they also are aware of different relationships and interests the competitor has. So, they can always help to keep the discussion in a broader perspective, a little bit like an objective person, without taking sides for one or the other".
(16)

#### 4.4.3. Integrating tensions at internal and external levels

Managing internal and external tensions requires third-party teams integrate collaborative and competitive thinking internally and externally. Therefore, third-party managers openly acknowledge the contradictory demands of coopetition and encourage their teams to recognize the synergistic linkages it can provide. A third-party manager elaborates:

"We guide our teams to align at the strategic level instead of looking too tactically, understanding that win-win requires give on both sides. Neither party can be forced into it [coopetition], that's like salt in the wound. There has to be the sense that both have the need to win and that what is being created has a neat balance and structure that doesn't need to be second guessed every day".
(111)

Third-party managers reflect on their own firm's goals without ignoring the interest of their competitor, ensuring a give-and-take relationship throughout the formation phase. By doing so, they develop a collaboration framework that advances the position of both firms without jeopardizing their competitiveness. A third-party manager explains:

"Whoever the party is who has the stronger position believes that their position is so much more valuable than it is. Everybody feels they have leverage, and that ends up not being able to progress. Therefore, we try to balance values on each side so that they become fairly and equally distributed".
(110)

Based on their experience, third-party managers instinctively know when to share and when to protect important information. They act as intermediaries and brokers, taking control of knowledge flows within and between their organizations. By channeling and disseminating information, CFTs evolve as boundary-spanners within and between competing firms:

"If you tell a scientist to collaborate with a competitor, they will either protect and not share anything, or they go overboard and share way more than you would ever imagine. They feel like they are in a research forum where they share their research just like they did in university. We have to set the expectations and boundaries of information exchanges very clearly upfront".
(11)

Third-party managers also reduce paradoxical tensions by priming actors to appreciate coopetition as standard business practice in the industry. By positioning coopetition not as a sign of weakness but as a strategic approach that will allow the firm to grow and become more competitive, third-party managers demonstrate its necessity and value. At the same time, they encourage their teams to proactively search for collaboration opportunities within their own areas of responsibility:

"We involve the R&D people from the first steps onwards and make it their project. We assure them that we treat a co-developed product as if it came out of their stable, which is an important thing because otherwise you work against half of the organization. And then, you have also access to many more allies in the organization. They will even come up with own ideas and advice with whom to collaborate and for what".
(113)

Third-party managers also provide time and space for organizational actors to connect and exchange views on how to balance competing demands, distill learnings from past coopetition successes, and jointly design measures to resolve conflicts between their firms. To that extent, third-party managers enable their teams to take on the perspective of the competitor, creating visibility for tensions on either side. Such transparency fosters a relationship of give-and-take throughout the formation phase. By helping their organizations see both sides, third-party managers create a broader, all-encompassing perspective that facilitates the acceptance of trade-offs:

> "Being able to build the bridges within the company is a very important skill. And part of this skill is to span uncertainty. Many of these collaborations are bold enough to be significant, but they are also naturally uncomfortable. The third-party teams can shepherd such frameworks, bridge, and span the vision within the organization. Almost certainly, someone in our organization is going to be compromised or have a cost or lose power by working with a competitor. Someone is going to pay a price. That needs quite a lot of skill and ambassadorship".

(19)

Third-party managers openly acknowledge the risks of coopetition. This helps build internal credibility, confidence, and trust in the capabilities of third-party teams to establish financially and strategically balanced and mutually beneficial coopetitive relationships. A third-party manager explains:

> "I have been very transparent with our organization. I did not, of course, negate the fact that cannibalism would come. I would try to make sure I make transparent ... the positive aspects, the positive NPV for the entire organization. If you are transparent and if they [internal colleagues] know you, this is important as well, then I think you have a great buy-in and a lot of trust".

(119)

### 4.4.4. Conciliation by top management when tensions persist

Despite their efforts to resolve conflicting dynamics, third-party managers can struggle to fully integrate the opposing interests within and between their firms and tensions remain high. As internal disagreements linger and the firms become unwilling to compromise on their positions, third-party managers can become increasingly stretched between internal and external demands. One of our respondents reflects on such situation:

> "I remember the head of Europe came to the CEO slamming on the table and shouting in half German and half English. He had given exclusivity for that product to some of his customers and sharing it with a competitor would mean he would lose that business and upset his customers. So, the situation was very tense, very difficult".

(114)

In a similar vein, one third-party manager points to high-ranking individuals blocking the formation of coopetition:

> "The head of R&D said 'Absolutely not. I invented the most fantastic product for you and you give it away to a company that's twice as big as us and they want to eat us alive'.

(113)

Another business manager describes a dilemma situation at the end of the formation process:

> "As the teams were discussing and getting more and more excited, there literally came a moment when they suddenly realized that to do this work, they only needed one team, because the capabilities were identical. I appreciated the advantage that the other party had, because that meant that the probability of success was so much higher than if we did it ... But

from that point, our R&D team started to describe all sorts of things that were wrong with the other company.

(123)

If such an impasse emerges, third-party managers may not be able to resolve these persistent tensions alone. Therefore, third-party managers enact conciliation by top management:

> "Ultimately you have to put it on the top management level. To take away tension and to help overcome the situation. Someone from top management with the ability to step away from the content: someone that takes it to the meta-level. You need that disruptive element to bring both sides together".

(116)

In such cases, competent and experienced top management from both firms must intervene and align opposing views by incorporating a broader strategic outlook toward the overall objectives and benefits of coopetition. At the internal level, top management can reprioritize previously defined individual objectives and realign these with the goals of coopetition. By doing so, top management can release tension among those who might be negatively affected by the consequences of coopetition:

> "Most of these conflicts are the result of misaligned KPIs between individuals. Senior leaders must take action and adjust that person's KPI that's negatively affected and change it and the conflict goes away. It can be an instant resolution".

(121)

At the external level, top management can relate among equals, serving as a conduit for consensus and common ground. By reframing conflicts and elucidating joint interests, top management is able to move beyond oppositions and catalyze the identification of common ground to achieve collaborative solutions. Their holistic view can foster creative and even unusual resolutions to persistent conflicts that may otherwise be unattainable or difficult for third-party managers to see or achieve:

> "When we got senior management involved to resolve the last issues in the collaboration agreement, they made significant efforts to structure the collaboration and the contract in a way that neither company could game the system and gain tremendous advantage, which encouraged a very unbiased way of thinking on both sides".

(115)

> "Senior management can look holistically at the overall value that is delivered to both sides... overcome siloed thinking... and eventually come up with bold and creative and sometimes even unconventional solutions that we haven't thought about or even imagined before".

(112)

## 5. Discussion

In this study, we investigate how MNEs design their organizational structure to manage the formation of coopetition. We expected high levels of performing, belonging, organizing, and learning tensions at the intra-firm level when MNEs initiate coopetition. Our data confirms this expectation except for learning tensions. Aligned with our expectations, we also identified strong performing, learning, and organizing tensions at the inter-firm level but could not confirm the presence of belonging tensions. We further observed that managing these tensions requires a dynamic organizational design and the application of specific management principles. We found dedicated teams of coopetition experts alternating between intra-firm and inter-firm levels, applying a mix of the separation, integration, and the conciliation principles to manage tensions in MNE coopetition formation (Table 5).
<table><caption>**Table 5**
Expected patterns vs. observed patterns in coopetition formation between MNEs.</caption><thead><tr><th>No.</th><th>Expected pattern</th><th>No.</th><th>Observed pattern</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1a</td><td>High levels of performing, belonging, organizing, and learning tensions at the intra-firm level.</td><td>1a</td><td>High levels of performing, belonging, and organizing tensions at the intra-firm level.</td></tr><tr><td>1b</td><td>High levels of performing, belonging, organizing, and learning tensions at the inter-firm level.</td><td>1b</td><td>High levels of performing, learning, and organizing tensions at the inter-firm level.</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>A specific organizational design is necessary to manage paradoxical tensions at both firm levels.</td><td>2</td><td>Dedicated teams managing tensions by continuously moving between intra-firm and inter-firm levels.</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">3</td><td rowspan="3">Specific management principles are necessary to manage paradoxical tensions at both firm levels.</td><td>3a</td><td>Separation is necessary to avoid internal role conflicts and ensure effective coordination of coopetition formation at the intra- and inter-firm levels.</td></tr><tr><td>3b</td><td>Integration is necessary to recognize the risks and benefits of coopetition, bridge cooperative and competitive interests, and establish a coopetitive mindset within and between the firms.</td></tr><tr><td>3c</td><td>Conciliation by top management is necessary to overcome persistent tensions by reprioritizing internal goals and reframing external conflicts.</td></tr></tbody></table>

## 5.1. Paradoxical intra-firm tensions in coopetition formation between MNEs

We identified three types of paradoxical tensions unfolding at the internal firm level: performing, organizing, and belonging tensions. In coopetition, firms typically face performing tensions from the pursuit of opposing tasks and conflicting goals, such as the competing demand of creating and capturing value (Gnyawali & Ryan Charleton, 2018; Rajala & Tidström, 2017; Tidström et al., 2018). In the formation of coopetition between MNEs, our results suggest performing tensions arise from competing demands of seizing and dismissing new collaboration opportunities, weighing immediate risks and future benefits, and the aspiration of achieving private and collective goals. Our data suggest that performing these conflicting tasks simultaneously is challenging. As MNE managers start to imagine how to pursue their own goals while supporting a competitor, they tend to primarily focus on the difficulties and negative aspects rather than the new opportunities coopetition can provide (Raza-Ullah, 2020; Raza-Ullah, 2021). Consequently, they leaned toward overly competitive behavior and intentionally avoided, discredited, or even dismissed MNE competitors as potential collaboration partners.

Belonging tensions involve conflicts associated with diverging values and beliefs (Smith & Lewis, 2011). These tensions can emerge when firms with different expertise, origins, and organizational identities join coopetition for a collective cause (Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b; Stadtler & van Wassenhove, 2016). In the formation of coopetition

between MNEs, we found similar evidence suggesting that belonging tensions manifest from the dilemma of protecting existing and embracing new ways of working. In addition, our data suggest that belonging tension can also be driven by fear of losing internal relevance, prestige, or power due to coopetition (Crick & Crick, 2021a). Our informants explained how pooling resources with a competitor can lead to the dissolution of redundant innovation structures within large MNEs. Such measure can disturb employees' sense of belonging and generate negative emotions associated with becoming isolated, rejected, or even laid off as a result of the formation of coopetition (d'Armagnac, Geraudel, & Salvetat, 2019).

Organizing tensions reflect conflicts in processes, structures, and routines (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Pattinson, Nicholson, and Lindgreen (2018) recognize coopetition as a strategic change that forces the adjustment or redesign of processes and structures. Our data revealed the negative consequences of internal routines not being altered when coopetition unfolds. Managers intentionally blocked or even sabotaged the formation of coopetition when it was in direct conflict with their personal goals or internal mission. Some MNE managers feared losing customers and their annual bonuses due to the initiation coopetition. Others struggled to assume accountability for the potential negative consequences of coopetition and subsequently delayed or disrupted the formation activities. Lundgren-Henriksson and Kock (2016a) previously highlighted conflicts between company targets as sources of organizing tensions in coopetition. Our findings refine that notion, pointing to the need for reflecting the formation of collaborations with competitors in

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4.** Management principles for coopetition formation between MNEs.</figcaption></figure>
reward systems, thereby building legitimacy and increasing the internal commitment and support for coopetition (Galkina & Lundgren-Henriksson, 2017).

## 5.2. Paradoxical inter-firm tensions in coopetition formation between MNEs

Our findings also revealed the presence of three paradoxical tension types at the company level during coopetition formation: Performing, learning, and organizing tensions. Performing tensions represent conflicts between creating and capturing value from coopetition (Volschenk, Ungerer, & Smit, 2016). In the formation phase, firms are not yet collaborating and there can only be speculation about the potential gains to each side. We found that fear that a partner's benefit could exceed a firm's own advantage or that firm's own risks might exceed those carried by its partner may inhibit or even destroy their willingness to coopete. As such, it was not conflicts about present values, but misperceptions about future values and benefits that emerged as the main driver of performing tensions in the formation of coopetition (Czakon & Czernek-Marszałek, 2021).

Learning tensions involve conflicts between old and new information (Smith & Lewis, 2011) and are known risks in the implementation of coopetition. Firms may either disclose too much or too little knowledge (Fernandez & Chiambaretto, 2016; Gast, Gundolf, Harms, & Matos Collado, 2019). During formation, managers are curious to learn and access new information, but they are especially careful to protect existing knowledge (Obul et al., 2021). We found evidence that, in the formation phase, managers need to combine existing knowledge with newly acquired information to evaluate the feasibility of coopetition. While simultaneously protecting prior knowledge and accessing new knowledge seem potentially feasible, our data showed that some managers struggle to cope with these competing endeavors in the early phase of coopetition. These individuals saw limited possibilities to either formally or informally protect their knowledge and consequently either refused to collaborate or deliberately deceived their partner (Gast et al., 2019).

Finally, we also found *organizing tensions* emerging at the inter-firm level. Coopetition is often framed by a specific project structure (Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015) and a joint governance committee to control and coordinate the behaviors between the firms (Mariani, 2016; Stadtler & van Wassenhove, 2016). As our results reveal, designing such a governance structure can both promote and inhibit organizing tensions between MNEs in coopetition formation. While it can spur disputes and halt formation efforts, it can also be an opportunity to anticipate future conflicts before they arise, enhancing the potential longevity of coopetition (Woolley, 2023).

## 5.3. Organizational design and principles for coopetition formation between MNEs

In addition to identifying different tensions during coopetition

formation, our results also reveal a new organizational design for their management. We found dedicated teams of coopetition experts oscillating within and between their firms to bridge and coordinate interactions, manage internal and external knowledge flows, and reduce tensions. As boundary-spanners between two competing MNEs (Fig. 4), these teams are uniquely positioned to perceive and simultaneously address tensions at internal and external levels. Their specific focus on the formation of coopetitive relationships allows us to refer to them as Coopetition Formation Teams (CFTs). Their role can be considered a fundamentally new managerial position for the multi-level management of tensions in coopetition.

### 5.3.1. The separation principle

Prior research highlighted the importance of separation to manage tensions in coopetition, either by isolating cooperation and competition in different domains or locations (Fernandez et al., 2018; Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015; Seran et al., 2016). For instance, in the implementation of coopetition, two MNEs form a CPT project structure that is fully removed from the rest of their organizations (Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015). Our findings confirm the importance of separation for the formation of coopetition. The key difference, however, is that for the formation of coopetition, separation occurs at the internal organizational level of each MNE (Fig. 4, Table 6).

CFTs are separate teams on each side, operating as independent teams with specialized roles and objectives (Fig. 4). Clear separation of CFTs (focused on cooperation) from operational units (focused on competition) avoids role ambiguity and cognitive distress. CFTs have a clear mandate to be the sole interface to competitors, shielding and protecting their teams from tension spilling over from the other side. CFTs also have a clear responsibility to push for the initiation of coopetition. As our results show, this mandate can create anger, frustrations, and even hostility toward CFT managers. Indeed, our data suggest that CFTs are often blamed for giving away too many valuable resources and knowledge to competitors. Without functional separation, it would be difficult for CFT managers to manage these tensions. They would not be able to perform their role and be constantly torn between collaborative and competitive behaviors, leading to ineffective interactions both within and between their organizations (Bengtsson et al., 2016; Raza-Ullah, 2021).

However, our results also reinforce important limitations of separation identified in other studies (Fernandez et al., 2018; Pellegrin-Boucher et al., 2018). CFTs cannot complete the formation process alone. They must interact with internal stakeholders and their peers at the competing firms (Fig. 4). These interactions raise tensions that cannot be overcome by separation alone. Therefore, separation is necessary but not sufficient to manage the formation of coopetition (Fernandez et al., 2014; Le Roy et al., 2021).

### 5.3.2. The integration principle

In addition to separation, CFTs rely on the principle of integration to manage the formation of coopetition (Chen, 2008; Gnyawali & Park,

<table><caption>**Table 6**
Management principles for coopetition formation between MNEs.</caption><thead><tr><td>Principle</td><td>Separation</td><td>Integration</td><td>Conciliation</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Design<br>Management approach</td><td><ul><li>Internal organizational separation</li><li>Dedicated teams removed from competing activities</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Individual integration</li><li>Specific capabilities to integrate coopetition</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Conciliation by top management</li><li>Supporting actors to resolve persistent tensions</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Managerial procedures</td><td><ul><li>Separated and specialized roles</li><li>Oscillating within and between competing firms</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Recognizing the risks and benefits of coopetition</li><li>Bridging and aligning cooperative and competitive interests</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Reprioritizing internal goals to align with the goals of coopetition</li><li>Reframing external conflicts by foregrounding shared interests</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Benefits</td><td><ul><li>Fully focused on collaboration</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Establishing a coopetitive mindset within and between the firms</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Distant stance to paradoxical tensions</li><li>Hierarchical position</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Risks</td><td><ul><li>Internal conflicts with other departments</li><li>Separation insufficient to manage and complete formation</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Difficult to integrate persistent tensions</li><li>Previous conflicts remain, new conflicts arise</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Loss of credibility and authority of CFTs</li><li>Formation failure</li></ul></td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>**Table 7**
Organizational designs across coopetition lifecycle phases.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Formation phase</th><th>Implementation phase</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Organizational design</td><td>Coopetition Formation Team (CFT)</td><td>Coopetitive Project Team (CPT)</td></tr><tr><td>Objective</td><td>Initiate a new coopetition project</td><td>Manage an established coopetition project</td></tr><tr><td>Structure</td><td>Two dedicated teams of coopetition experts in each competing firm</td><td>One dedicated team of coopetition experts with members from two competing firms</td></tr><tr><td>Characteristic</td><td>Dynamic (moving across levels)</td><td>Static (focused on project level)</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Time span</td><td>Permanent</td><td>Ad-hoc</td></tr><tr><td>Long-term</td><td>Short-term (temporary)</td></tr><tr><td>Internal tensions</td><td>Tensions within the project</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Tensions</td><td>External tensions</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Separation (internal)</td><td>Separation (project level)</td></tr><tr><td>Integration (internal + external)</td><td>Integration (project level)</td></tr><tr><td>Management principles</td><td>Conciliation (internal + external)</td><td>Co-management</td></tr></tbody></table>

2011; Oliver, 2004; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Integration is built on the cognitive capabilities of individuals to perceive the paradoxical dynamics and facilitate processes to attain and maintain moderate levels of tension in coopetition (Bengtsson et al., 2016; Bengtsson et al., 2020). According to Czakon et al. (2020), integration is the ability to recognize the importance of coopetition, identify opportunities to create value with competitors, and help others to develop a coopetitive mindset and deal with the complexities and uncertainties of coopetition (Hoffmann, Lavie, Reuer, & Shipilov, 2018).

Integration is critical for the implementation of coopetition when individuals from two MNEs are pooled into a joint team to collaborate on a complex project at the working-group level (Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015). However, our data showed that the key point in coopetition formation is the need for simultaneous integration at two different but inextricably linked levels: the internal and the external organizational level (Fig. 4, Table 6). Simultaneous integration is necessary to avoid these mutually reinforcing and exacerbate each other (Raza-Ullah, 2020).

CFT managers have developed cognitive abilities to synthesize and integrate collaboration and competition internally and externally (Fig. 4). Internally, they work with analytical acumen (Raza-Ullah, Bengtsson, & Vanyushyn, 2018) to take a broad and strategic long-term view to evaluate the risks and benefits of new coopetition opportunities. Executional skills allow them to develop organizational routines and processes (Gnyawali et al., 2016; Rai et al., 2022) while emotional competencies enable them to understand and regulate conflicting emotions among their teams to facilitate the formation process (Raza-Ullah et al., 2018). Externally, CFT members additionally operate with strong relational skills to continuously build familiarity and trust with their peers (Lascaux, 2020; Raza-Ullah & Kostis, 2019). CFT managers understand the advantages of coopetition and help others see the strengths and opportunities it can provide. They actively build and reinforce a coopetitive mindset across all levels and functions of their firms (Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Pattinson et al., 2018).

As boundary-spanners, CFTs oscillate between internal and external levels to seamlessly integrate tensions on both sides. However, unlike studies suggesting that integration alone or a combination of separation and integration can resolve tensions (Fernandez et al., 2014; Fernandez & Chiambaretto, 2016; Seran et al., 2016), our data indicate that complete integration is not always possible. As CFT managers operate through influence and persuasion rather than hierarchical power, difficult conflicts may remain unresolved. Therefore, separation and integration may not suffice, and a third principle is necessary to complete the formation of MNE coopetition.

### 5.3.3. The conciliation principle

As certain conflicts cannot be managed by integration and separation alone, CFTs additionally rely on conciliation by top management as a critical third principle (Fig. 4, Table 6). Different from CFTs that are deeply entrenched in paradoxical tensions, our data suggest that top management has a more detached perspective and can thus sense resolutions that may be more difficult for CFTs to see (Pradies, Tunarosa, Lewis, & Courtois, 2021; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Internally, based on their hierarchical position, top management can reprioritize previously

defined individual objectives and realign these with the goals of coopetition. Externally, top management can relate among equals to the strategic value of coopetition for both firms, uncover shared goals, and perceive true priorities on each side, enabling them to remove disagreement and reach common ground (Fig. 4). Given their distant stance to tensions, top management is able to see conflicts from a more neutral and unbiased perspective compared to CFT managers. This allows them to approach conflicts and disagreements from unexpected and unusual angles and thereby provide creative and unconventional resolutions in situations when paradoxical tensions persist.

Top management have previously been identified as prime actors in the implementation of coopetition (Bengtsson et al., 2020; Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2024). Our data, however, provide a more nuanced perspective on their role in the formation of coopetition. Although top management in our study initiated the formation of coopetition, mid-level CFT managers steered and drove the formation efforts, relying on top management as supporting actors to resolve critical conflicts throughout the formation process (Pradies et al., 2021). This indicates that mid-level managers actively operate at the forefront of coopetition, establishing routines, facilitating exchanges, and managing the daily challenges of initiating coopetition within and between the engaging MNEs (Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016a; Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock, 2016b). By contrast, top management becomes involved to resolve persistent conflicts that threaten formation success.

Conciliation differs from the arbitration principle previously identified by Pellegrin-Boucher et al. (2018). The arbitration principle suggests that top management decides whether to collaborate or compete with a competitor for a specific project. Arbitration forces a choice – picking one option (cooperation) means rejecting the other (competition). It creates a win-lose outcome which can lead to frustrations and new tensions (Pellegrin-Boucher et al., 2018). Conciliation, by contrast, is a consideration of reconciling diverging views to deliver positive win-win responses, aimed at finding sustainable and creative resolutions to persistent conflicts (Pradies et al., 2021; Smith & Lewis, 2011). As our data suggest, top management can reframe tensions internally by reprioritizing goals and overcome conflicts externally by foregrounding shared interests on both sides. Nonetheless, conciliation must be deployed at the right time to be effective and avoid new tensions. If top management intervenes too early or too late, it can call into question the credibility and authority of CFT managers and compromise formation success (Table 6).

## 5.4. CFTs for the formation and CPTs for the implementation of coopetition

The organizational design of CFTs for coopetition formation is complementary to the organizational design of the CPT used for coopetition implementation (Fernandez & Le Roy, 2018; Le Roy et al., 2021). MNEs can form CFTs for the formation and CPTs for the implementation of coopetition. A CPT is a static ad-hoc project team created for a limited time to implement a complex coopetition project. After the project is completed, CPT members move on to another project. By contrast, CFTs are permanent teams moving across firm levels to continuously initiate new coopetition projects. They are not removed
<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 5. Integrated framework for coopetition formation between MNEs.</figcaption></figure>

after a project is established but remain in their roles for many years. Unlike CPTs that manage conflicts at the project level, CFTs address more complex tensions at the internal and external firm level. CPTs manage tensions by adopting the co-management principle (Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015). In coopetition formation, however, co-management cannot be effective as there is no joint management structure. Instead, top management from both firms intervenes to conciliate persistent conflicts. We compare and summarize the main characteristics of both organizational designs in Table 7.

## 5.5. Theoretical contributions

As the first study specifically dedicated to coopetition formation, this research makes several contributions to the coopetition literature. First, we contribute to research on tensions by offering a more nuanced understanding of four types of paradoxical tensions that emerge in the formation phase of coopetition (Fernandez et al., 2014; Lundgren-Henriksson & Tidström, 2021). Thus far, tensions have been a major area of investigation in the implementation of coopetition, and we show for the first time which specific tensions manifest in the formation of coopetition (Tidström, 2014; Tidström & Rajala, 2016).

Second, we contribute to the limited knowledge on organizational designs for coopetition (Fernandez et al., 2018; Le Roy et al., 2021). During coopetition formation, tensions manifest internally and externally and therefore, their management requires a dynamic organizational structure. We identify CFTs as boundary-spanners simultaneously moving within and between MNEs to manage tensions on internal and external levels. This design is a fundamentally new approach to the multi-level management of tensions in coopetition (Dorn & Albers, 2018; Raza-Ullah et al., 2014) and is a complement to the organizational structure previously identified in the implementation phase of MNE coopetition (Fernandez et al., 2018; Le Roy et al., 2021; Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015).

Third, we contribute to the ongoing debate about the principles of coopetition management (Le Roy et al., 2021; Le Roy & Fernandez, 2015). We confirm prior results on the relevance of separation and integration and add conciliation as a new principle to the literature, emphasizing the need for intervention by top managers as supporting actors to conciliate persistent conflicts threatening formation success (Pradies et al., 2021). Our findings thus provide a more nuanced view on the role and impact of top management in the formation of coopetition between MNEs (Bengtsson et al., 2020; Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2024).

Fourth, we consolidate our findings and propose an integrated framework for the formation of coopetition between MNEs, illustrating the organizational design, the four paradoxical tension types – performing, belonging, organizing, and learning tensions – along with the three associated principles to manage them (Fig. 5). Based on these insights, our study lays the foundation for further examinations of tensions and management approaches in the formation of coopetition. It contributes to a global research project investigating the management of coopetition across its entire lifecycle (Pellegrin-Boucher et al., 2018).

## 5.6. Managerial implications

This study enables MNE decision makers to better understand and manage tensions in the formation phase of coopetition. First, managers must be aware of specific tensions unfolding within and between firms when initiating coopetition. Second, managing these tensions calls for a dedicated organizational design in the shape of CFTs, acting as intermediaries dynamically managing tensions on both sides. CFTs must remain separate and develop specific capabilities that differ from classical managerial skills. MNE managers may need to incorporate the development of such skills into hiring, training, and promotion processes. Third, while mid-level CFT managers play an important role in
steering and driving coopetition formation, top management must be prepared to intervene and conciliate persistent tensions to support formation success.

## 5.7. Limitations and directions for future research

The findings of our study should be considered in light of the following limitations. First, our findings are based on an exploratory case study of three large MNEs in a highly innovation-driven, competitive, and consolidated industry in which fierce competitors are increasingly forced to collaborate. Although this setting is appealing to answer our research question, it limits the generalizability of our results. MNEs in less competitive and innovative sectors may adopt different organizational designs and/or management principles. Future multi-case research could analyze how diverse settings and contextual factors influence tensions, organizational designs, and associated management principles.

Second, we explored coopetition formation between competing MNEs of similar sizes and structures. The results might be different for small firms. When smaller firms seek to coopete with competitors of equal or different sizes, CFTs may not be the universally preferred or feasible organizational design. For instance, small business owners often initiate coopetition on their own (Galloway, Kuhn, & Collins-Williams, 2019; Granata, Lasch, Le Roy, & Dana, 2018). CFTs are complex and expensive structures that may be unprofitable for smaller and less resourceful firms. Therefore, our study suggests new opportunities for research on coopetition formation between firms of different sizes (Bengtsson & Johansson, 2014). Existing studies also highlight the importance of analyzing how tensions are linked across multiple organizational levels. Future research on the formation of coopetition could analyze how paradoxical tensions emerge at the micro-, meso-, and macro- levels and how they dynamically build and connect to each other (Sandvik, Sjödin, Brekke, & Parida, 2022).

Third, we did not explore the efforts to establish CFTs. As cross-functional teams, their interplay with internal departments must be explained and constantly reinforced (Dahl, 2014; Dahl et al., 2016). Future research should investigate how CFT managers gain organizational support and how they are trained, developed, and managed. Given their role as intermediaries between their own and the competitor firms, more research is also needed to better understand the personal identity of CFT managers and how their individual capabilities impact on their effectiveness and performance (Näsholm & Bengtsson, 2014; Raza-Ullah et al., 2023). Overall, we believe that the formation of coopetition is an exciting area for future research, and we encourage scholars to further explore and investigate the management of this important phase in greater detail.

## Conclusion

This study provides new and unique insights into how MNEs design their organizational structure to manage paradoxical tensions in the formation phase of coopetition. We draw several important conclusions from our results. First, the formation of coopetition is challenging and creates strong tensions within and between the engaging MNEs. These tensions are primarily attributed to misaligned goals, conflicting values and beliefs, dysfunctional processes, and conflicts between prior and new knowledge. Second, the complexity of these tensions demands a particular organizational design for their management. We find that such structure is composed of dedicated teams with unique capabilities to dynamically bridge and manage conflicts across internal and external organizational levels. Third, we uncover that top management members from each MNE play a crucial role as supporting actors in the formation of coopetition. Top management must interfere to conciliate conflicts which cannot be completely resolved by their teams. These results provide a much-needed starting point for a deeper exploration of coopetition formation. Whereas past research on coopetition between MNEs largely overlooked the formation phase, our study is the first to uncover the presence of specific tensions and the subsequent need to implement a specific organizational structure and principles to manage them. These new insights shed light on the relevance and complexity of the formation of coopetition. We encourage scholars to build upon and expand our results, for instance by further studying specific managerial practices, organizational processes, and individual capabilities to manage this important phase in coopetition.

## CRediT authorship contribution statement

Oliver Gernsheimer: Writing – original draft, Project administration, Methodology, Investigation, Data curation. Dominik K. Kanbach: Writing – review & editing, Supervision. Johanna Gast: Writing – review & editing, Supervision. Frédéric Le Roy: Writing – review & editing, Supervision.

## Data availability

The data that has been used is confidential.

## Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and valuable suggestions which significantly contributed to improving the quality of our paper. Johanna Gast and Frédéric Le Roy are members of LabEx Entrepreneurship, funded by the French government (LabEx Entreprendre, ANR-10-Labex-11-01).

# Appendix

## Appendix 1

### Interview guide.

**Introduction**

**Background**

**Management of intra-firm and inter-firm conflicts**

**Conclusion**

* Presentation of the scope and objective of the research project

* Presentation of the interview partner (current role, years of coopetition experience, number of coopetition projects actively involved, role in coopetition projects)

* Why does your firm collaborate with competitors?

* Who in your firm initiates collaborations with a competitor?

* Have you experienced internal (external) difficulties or conflicts when your firm initiated a collaboration with a competitor?

* How did these conflicts emerge and how did your firm handle them?

* Were there specific individuals involved in handling them?

* How would you describe their skills and capabilities?

* How would you describe the attitude and opinions in the organization during the initiation of collaborations with competitors?

* How would you describe the attitude and opinions of your competitor during the formation of such collaborations?

* Is there anything you would like to add?

* Could you recommend others who would be interested in participating in this study?

* Acknowledgment and greetings
## Appendix 2

Data supporting our findings.

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="3">Paradoxical intra-firm tensions (Expected pattern 1a)</th></tr><tr><th>Coding categories</th><th>Description and literature sources</th><th>Selective evidence on descriptive codes</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Performing tensions</td><td>Tensions associated with competing goals, expectations, and outcomes ( Smith & Lewis, 2011).</td><td><strong>Seizing and dismissing collaboration opportunities</strong><br>"A lot of people have their eyes are on what's going on today, not what's going on five or six or seven years in the future. They have a hard time dreaming about how competitor technologies could fit in our portfolio, especially technologies that haven't even been launched ... So, you have to get over the 'not built here syndrome' ... And that takes so much effort to accomplish that a lot of things, I think, died right there because you just can't get the organization oriented around it" (I32).<br><br><strong>Weighing immediate risks against future benefits</strong><br>"To reach across a competitor is a big deal and you don't do it lightly. Everybody has accountability, and how can you defend it? You got to show how it fits and benefits your long-term strategy. You need to convince internally about the goals and benefits, otherwise you risk going down a path and then having to back away from a commitment with a competitor midway in the process" (I12).<br><br><strong>Protecting private and pursuing collective goals</strong><br>"There are opportunities that are completely complementary. Our commercial teams just don't have the experience to imagine what is going to happen in the marketplace and therefore we struggle to build a business case to support such collaborations. So, its maybe not ignorance, but maybe inexperience as compared to ignorance as a reason for why we just can't do it or struggle to do it" (I29).</td></tr><tr><td>Belonging tensions</td><td>Tensions associated with diverging values, identities, and beliefs ( Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Smith & Lewis, 2011).</td><td><strong>Defending old and embracing new ways of working</strong><br>"The R&D team in our company is very proud of innovation. They always were very suspicious and never trusted any technology from the outside. They rather thought competitors want to unload their foul eggs on us and therefore they consequently blocked collaborations" (I26).<br><br><strong>Being self-sufficient and open to depending on others</strong><br>"Form an R&D perspective, if you are trying to access a technology from a competitor that you are also working on, it's very hard. Because it's an emotional thing. Basically your leadership and management is telling you they don't have any confidence in your capabilities to develop this on our own, so we have to bring it in from the outside" (I34).<br><br><strong>Acknowledging own strengths and those of others</strong><br>"There's I think a bit of an ego component around that as well. You know, some pride associated with whether we need that competitor or not. Can we do this on our own or do we really need that partner? Can we still deliver that without them? So I think there's a lot of backbone and posturing happening in our company ... We believe we are so much stronger than what we really are ... And that's why we tend to get in our own rut... a giant hole we dig for ourselves with both hands cut out" (I22).</td></tr><tr><td>Organizing tensions</td><td>Tensions associated with processes, structures, and routines (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Smith & Lewis, 2011).</td><td><strong>Compromising current benefits for future gains</strong><br>"A core area of tension is to agree to compromise a short-term benefit for a long-term gain. And that we haven't proven the long-term gain is worth taking a short-term hit. It's almost like an NPV. Earning 10 dollars in 10 years versus earning 10 dollars now is no comparison. That's kind of the problem we face when we look at long-term collaborations with competitors" (I4).<br><br><strong>Achieving short-term financial and long-term strategic goals</strong><br>"A key challenge in our company is the short-termism ... The further you go down in the organization, the more competitive it becomes, and the minds becomes narrow. Operational people tend to be a blockage for collaborations with a competitor if it means they have to give up their product or their budget or whatever ... We create behaviors by the incentive structures that we put in place with people. That's part of the tension within our company. We haven't adjusted our incentive structure to really support collaborations with competitors" (I16).<br><br><strong>Navigating organizational rigidity and flexibility</strong><br>"Our internal structure with legal is very difficult. Our lawyers are very guarded, very protective, and that prevents openness and candor to talk about where we can find joint opportunity and benefit ... We always have to be careful how we phrase things and, frankly, it's very difficult for us to get the legal people to be able to see that these collaborations with our competitors are a business imperative for us" (I11).</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="3">Paradoxical inter-firm tensions (Expected pattern 1b)</th></tr><tr><th>Coding categories</th><th>Description and literature sources</th><th>Selective evidence on descriptive codes</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Performing tensions</td><td>Tensions associated with competing goals, expectations, and outcomes ( Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Smith & Lewis, 2011).</td><td><strong>Capturing benefits today and in the future</strong><br>"Both sides need to build in the commercial hard end point at the very beginning. The meat of the collaboration has to be very clear upfront, on who gets what and what the profitable end point is ... And who contributes which costs and which assets. We have to be extremely clear about that in the beginning. The whole machine, how the balances work out. It has to be built with a structure and balance to it. We both have to believe that the journey to the north star is essential to our both success" (I5).<br><br><strong>Transforming differing into congruent goals</strong><br>"The biggest challenge though is assumptions around values. What the value of that technology we develop together has today and what it could be in five, ten, fifteen years down the road ... The way different organizations see the world is really different ... And often we fail to understand each other's perspective of value and at the end, we force the other party to break apart and do their own thing" (I17).</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued on next page)
Appendix 2 (continued)

Paradoxical inter-firm tensions (Expected pattern 1b)

<table><thead><tr><th>Coding categories</th><th>Description and literature sources</th><th>Selective evidence on descriptive codes</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">Learning tensions</td><td rowspan="4">Tensions associated with adjustments, moving between old and new, innovation, and change (Smith & Lewis, 2011).</td><td><strong>Seizing individual and compromising for mutual benefits</strong><br>"We start by thinking 'how can I leverage this for the benefit of my company? How can I get the advantage over the other guys? Screw the other guy! We are all trained to shoot at our competitor and to try to take them out, not try to work with them ... And to me, this is sometimes a difficult mindset to deal with, and it can lead to very long and painful discussions that don't end very well" (I30).</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Sharing and protecting knowledge</strong><br>"The first approach is always curiosity. We R&D people are curious people by nature. Open the door, open the box, seeing what other people are doing - we are science based, we always want to learn more. Second comes the 'not invented here'. Then we are getting a bit more suspicious. Protective of what we discovered, what we have found. So, if there is a lot of sharing and camaraderie in the science, that usually can continue. But if there are too many inquisitive questions, we are getting protective and that can spoil the relationship" (I20).</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Defending prior and accessing new knowledge</strong><br>"You also have to be really conscious about antitrust things. So, you know, if we co-develop something with another big player like [competitor name] or [competitor name] ... I'd rather have a lawyer sitting next to me in all of these discussions ... Because there is no way to develop a new product together without also looking into their existing research approach. And you would need to know what these guys are doing and la-la-la. And there are times where you may quickly be coming into kind of shallow waters there with regard to antitrust" (I2).</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Trusting and distrusting in shared knowledge</strong><br>"They [competitor name] told us they have this fantastic product in development and were looking for funding, when in reality it had a lot of hiccups and issues ... they really tried to deceive us by putting a lot of lipstick on their pig" (I9).</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Organizing tensions</td><td rowspan="4">Tensions associated with processes, structures, and routines (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Smith & Lewis, 2011).</td><td><strong>Maintaining flexibility and imposing control</strong><br>"In the beginning we need to agree how to resolve conflicts. Because usually in all of these joint development contracts, we have a conflict resolution part in there ... But you realize it is difficult because there is no real resolution of all these potential conflicts because there will always be some kind of sour feelings. You maybe have a steering committee or whatever. Now the problem is that even these guys, because they have to rely on what their people are telling them, don't agree either. There is no resolution. And then, you know, there's also finger pointing because it takes longer. So it's a very uncomfortable situation you're in already in the beginning" (I26).</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Creating stability and embracing change</strong><br>"Sometimes when we develop the structure of the collaboration, our competitors bring in experienced negotiators. All they do is negotiating the collaboration agreement. Having that person be a typical negotiator on behalf of the other company doesn't necessarily give me comfort, in fact it makes me more worried upfront. Because I feel they are there not because of their knowledge and the true need and benefit that we can both get by working together. They are there to strictly account for their own company. That doesn't help me believe that anything they say is truly advancing the ball and they look at the collaboration from the standpoint of finding a mutual benefit" (I19).</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Establishing and destroying organizational ties</strong><br>"If you fail in the relationship, how you how you deal with the assets? If you come to a critical situation, what kind of mechanisms you have in this partnership to tackle them? You have to think about these critical aspects when you are still in your honeymoon phase. That is sometimes very difficult for enthusiastic managers to think about all these critical aspects and it creates a lot of tension and discomfort. But if you don't do it and you will run into critical situations in any relationship, you will fail in your relationship" (I24).</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Organizational design for coopetition formation (Expected pattern 2)</strong></td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><thead><tr><th>Coding categories</th><th>Selective evidence on descriptive codes</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td><strong>Dedicated teams of coopetition experts</strong><br>– “The number one benefit of that team is to have someone who is hundred percent dedicated. To manage that as a hobby is not a good idea, and you are at a disadvantage. Because your competitors are very professional. Dedicated expertise, a focused approach; that is key. You need someone who can do that seriously” (I6).<br>– We [third-party teams] are like key account managers for the competitors. Being the interface between our company and the competitor company. Very similar to a key account manager ... we develop the strategy of what we want to accomplish with each of our competitors and define in which areas we want to collaborate and in which ones not” (I11).<br>– “They [third-party teams] provide insights in terms of what our competitors are doing and what they are focusing on from a competitive intelligence standpoint, identify opportunities to maximize the value of our products together with competitors, whether that is creating a new product where we combine technologies, maximizing the lifecycle of our products, and sourcing opportunities ... Its horse-trading of products back-and-forth, maximizing our innovation pipeline” (I21).<br>– The [third-party team] is a very valuable group. They sit in global strategy, they have a long-term purview, they deal directly with the product managers, they are typically coordinating collaborations. Funneling all of the communication through the organization to the competitor. This team has a mandate to maximize the long-term viability of our products, and shop them to competitors, use them as bargaining chips to get access and swap technologies ... They fulfill a very strategic role” (I27).</td></tr></tbody></table>

Oscillating within and between competing firms

(continued on next page)
Appendix 2 (continued)

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="3">Organizational design for coopetition formation (Expected pattern 2)</th></tr><tr><th>Coding categories</th><th>Selective evidence on descriptive codes</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td><ul><li>“They [third-party teams] are the point persons. And they would mediate the discussion, kind of like brokers or middlemen” (I16).</li><li>“People in those roles need keep us focused on what are we trying to get to. Because, yes, there are moments that are tense, and or seen to be very one-sided, unilateral, and I do think they [third party teams] are pretty good in trying to bringing it back to ‘what are we trying to achieve’, ‘let’s not ask for everything from our competitors, let’s ask for the right things’. Many times I feel the [third-party team] was critical in trying to keep that conversation on the right focus area” (I25).</li><li>“Our [third-party teams] purpose is to channel all the discussions we have with competitors so that we keep one face to them. And the others [other third-party teams] do the same. The idea is to maximize the footprint of our own portfolio by entering into collaborations with competitors, that is the out-licensing aspect. And also finding products from our competitors that we can in-license into our portfolio. In the end it is supporting our business segments in finding additional outlets for our products and also making sure there is a mutual benefit for both parties. That entails to have an understanding of what our competitors have to offer, both in terms of their portfolio but also an understanding about their organizational set-up, way of working, hierarchical set-up, decision making processes, all these different elements” (I12).</li></ul></td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="3"><strong>Building relationships, confidence, and trust</strong></td></tr><tr><td></td><td><ul><li>“I [third-party manager] am in good business contact with my peers at all the global key competitors. Personal relationships definitely help also in the later management of the collaboration, not only in establishing the collaboration. If there are problems in the implementation ... You can solve many problems because you have the relationship” (I15).</li><li>“Without them [third party teams], we would be missing out a lot of opportunities. In terms of additional business we can extract from competitors. Typically, what we have done in the past, is not talking to competitors already when we launch a new product. That is something we have missed out in the past. We always thought about giving our products to competitors when they were at the end of their lifecycle. But there are opportunities to collaborate with competitors even at the early stages even before the product is commercialized for the first time. Co-development opportunities, for example, that’s something other industries have been doing longer and more successful than we have. We typically look at collaborations only when the patent is about to expire. That’s changing now because of the [third party teams]. So, if we didn’t have the [third party teams], we would be missing out on these opportunities, and leverage, and intensify and get more penetration of our products in the market” (I23).</li><li>“A certain exposure and trust within the company is a basic requirement, which is supported by regular mail exchanges ... Every year we send out an email to remind the organization how much value these collaborations are creating ... a key to the success of what we have been doing” (I19).</li></ul></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="3">Management principles for coopetition formation (Expected pattern 3)</th></tr><tr><th>Coding categories</th><th>Description and literature sources</th><th>Selective evidence on descriptive codes</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Separation principle</td><td>Functional, temporal, or spatial division of collaboration and competition (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000).</td><td><p><strong>Removed from competing activities</strong></p><p>“They can separate both the short-term and the long-term. If you are coming to a head of a business and say ‘hey, would you like to give up your best technology to your competitor?’, their first response is ‘Hell no!’. Because they are not thinking about the long-term. But if you have someone in your organization who is able to only be concerned about long-term partnerships for win/win, the discussion is much easier, more objective, and more effective at the end of the day” (I7).</p><p><strong>Separated and specialized role</strong></p><p>“Being able to be strategic, being able to see the big picture, being able to navigate those company boundaries, and help to get to a conclusion, all these factors are critical ... It’s a very special role in our company” (I25).</p><p><strong>Fully focused on collaboration</strong></p><p>“You need to have these people [third-party teams] that are available and professional and capable to be managing relationships and access to information and technology with competitors. Because if you don’t, if you are just left with the local business manager that someday wakes up and realizes our own technology is not working anymore, and you have to start from that spot, you are going to be slow, inefficient and probably not going to be competitive as a partner for a collaboration” (I17).</p></td></tr><tr><td>Integration principle</td><td>Cognitive ability to move between competitive and collaborative thinking and contextually prioritise one force without ignoring the other (Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Stadtler & van Wassenhove, 2016).</td><td><p><strong>Recognizing the risks and benefits of coopetition</strong></p><p>“If you have a dedicated and professional group like [third-party teams] that are keeping up the relationships and know the competitor landscape, then you can quickly and easily have a phone call, they are going to bring you faster in a discussion and coming with the right concept. So speed and dynamic aspect of engaging with competitors is a key benefit” (I14).</p><p>The [third-party teams] is a little bit of a special set-up. It’s not a job that anybody can do. They are pretty experienced people who have been in the business for a while, and knowing how things work on the granular level will be critical to structure a realistic collaboration. You are not going to have bunch of junior and entry level people there. You need to have a long track-record with all these competitors to know exactly what the real opportunities are” (I20).</p><p><strong>Bridging and aligning cooperative and competitive interests</strong></p><p>“First of all, the people who are in these teams are very much focused on business with competitors, so they know the other players. They know the tools and they have the skills to do such collaborations, like drafting term sheets, doing contracts, knowing where the pain points are, which experts to involve, who to consult. And so these processes in a bigger organization take a long time. You need to have an established team who can immediately start acting if there’s an opportunity ... It’s very helpful to deal with</p></td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued on next page)
Appendix 2 (continued)

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="3">Management principles for coopetition formation (Expected pattern 3)</th></tr><tr><th>Coding categories</th><th>Description and literature sources</th><th>Selective evidence on descriptive codes</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td></td><td>people who have the relationship with competitors, who can balance benefits on each side, and also, another point, avoid any compliance issues because they [third-party teams] are well trained and they are the single point of contact. So for me it's helpful that there is not any doubt that I'm exchanging confidential or critical information with the competitor" (I26).<br/><br/><em>Establishing a coopetitive mindset within and between the firms</em><br/><br/>- "Key is my [third-party manager] internal relationship to the business segment leaders. If they have an idea for a project with a competitor, then they come to me to fight it through with our competitor of choice. To develop this trust, of course, takes some time. So you need to show to your own organization what you bring to the table, why it's good to have you in the room and why they should listen to you ... I have to build up internal trust with my colleagues and external trust with the competitor" (I10).<br/>- "Internally, I fight for the competitor, I am the advocate of the competitor. And externally, I fight for my company" (I12).<br/>- "Sometimes it's so ridiculous - our internal colleagues ask me to fight for something that I know no competitor would ever accept. They way out of this is to bring all the internal people together in one meeting and I play devil's advocate. I show them how unreasonable their demands are ... Our internal people are blocking so much ... To give a competitor the benefit of the doubt is an impossible thing for some of our colleagues ... It's really time consuming and I am having a lot of 1:1 meetings to explain. It's easy to put things in paper but to sit in front of a competitor and defend a ridiculous position is a totally different thing. So, I try to make my own colleagues feel how it is, so they understand" (I15).<br/><br/><em>Reaching persistent tensions and conflicts</em><br/><br/>- "We [third-party manager] get a lot of blame. It's not easy for our internal teams to sometimes swallow the bitter pill and give up a product to a competitor ... They don't say very nice words to us ... We have to find the balance, but it is not easy ... They want to have everything but not give anything back ... It doesn't work like this with competitors. It's always give and take" (I15).<br/>- "It's an uphill battle. Once we have convinced your own people, we have to go back to the competitor. And they come back with a totally different view, and we have to go back to our people. It's a never ending cycle" (I10).<br/>- "Right now, I am working with the R&D organizations of [competitor name] for anything that can be done jointly. We spend 10, they spend 10, we are both trying to develop the same thing. Can we do it together and spend 15 and accomplish the same thing? Oh, by the way, that may mean either we or [competitor name] need to shut down one piece of their research organization, and the labs, and whatever there is. Because none of us can sustain it with only half the spending. So here you are talking about a long-term decision that creates a lot of tension between us and [competitor name]. Who is going to shut down their research, [competitor name] or us? And then, if we do that, our research is in the hands of our direct competitor. It's a possibility. But guess what? I got to have the expertise of our own people who are doing that R&D work involved in these negotiations. In fact, they may be negotiating an exit of their function. And that creates a lot of internal anxiety and discomfort among our R&D team too" (I12).<br/><br/><em>Conciliation by top management</em><br/><br/>- "Senior management's role is very critical from the internal space. You've got the conflict between you and the other party, but you also have a lot of conflict internally. We underestimate the challenge of that piece, the conflict within the organization" (I30).<br/>- "I think leaders can play super important roles in these sort of setting expectations and create the space for collaborations to happen because it's sort of a mandate that they can give to go ahead and make these things happen" (I14).<br/>- "In terms of the highest level of management and progression, you need to find a resolution. Eventually top management needs to step in and resolve disagreements and remove roadblocks that prevent you from closing the deal" (I7).<br/>- "I do think it is essential for senior leadership to step in and interfere if conflicts are escalating. I really do think that all the way to the top, no matter the size of the deal, that person needs to take action" (I12).<br/>- "Senior leaders play a really important role in setting the tone and they can become quite involved in the process of alignment. So, it's almost like picking somebody you're going to choose to work with. These decisions are generally done based upon a mutual need and a mutual sort of alignment around expectations. And a certain amount of accountability ... Really good CEOs make sure they stay far enough away, but they're close enough to facilitate or conciliate maybe is a better word to use" (I27).<br/><br/><em>Reprioritizing internal goals to align with the goals of coopetition</em><br/><br/>- "In the end you need senior management to step in and clear the path. They have to say they really want this to happen, at the highest management level. It's very critical. They don't need to be involved in every little step, but they must empower and give that guidance and then push along the way to make it happen" (I13).<br/>- "Top management called me and said 'for each of you to have your jobs, give to ten years from now, this collaboration with [competitor name] was necessary. Had we not done it, this was what was going to happen. And when you woke up and lose a third of your profits, we have to lose a third of our sales people. We don't want to do that. We care about our people. We care about the company. And we did this [collaborating with a competitor], so you're going to get bruised up a little bit from your distributors and your retailers, but just know that you're doing this to protect your families, to protect the company" (I33).

(continued on next page)
Appendix 2 (continued)

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="2">Management principles for coopetition formation (Expected pattern 3)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Coding categories</td><td>Description and literature sources</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Selective evidence on descriptive codes</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Reframing external conflicts by foregrounding shared interests</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>—<br/>—'They [top management] are trying to not look at maximizing value but trying to find common ground. And a common enemy. So they are looking more at the commonalities. Making the deals valuable to both parties, see where they can create strategic dependencies so they can really make decisions on cutting resources to become more efficient'<br/>(19).<br/>—'For top management it's important to set a deal to where we all want to win ... Particularly if it's not a one and done, if it's a multi-year collaboration where you're having joint meetings once a year and where we are putting in money, the competitor is adding money. It's important to set up a deal where it's a fair deal for both parties ... treating them with respect, not using a sledgehammer when you can use a little screwdriver. Top management is typically very good at that' (128).</td></tr></tbody></table>

References

Akpinar, M., & Vincze, Z. (2016). The dynamics of coopetition: A stakeholder view of the German automotive industry. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 57, 53–63.

Ansari, S., Garud, R., & Kumaraswamy, A. (2016). The disruptor's dilemma: TiVo and the U.S. television ecosystem. *Strategic Management Journal*, 37(9), 1829–1853.

Bengtsson, M., Eriksson, J., & Wincent, J. (2010). Co-opetition dynamics – An outline for further inquiry. *Competitiveness Review*, 20(2), 194–214.

Bengtsson, M., & Johansson, M. (2014). Managing coopetition to create opportunities for small firms. *International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship*, 32(4), 401–427 (Retrieved Tuesday, January 24, 2023).

Bengtsson, M., & Kock, S. (2000). “Coopetition” in business networks—To cooperate and compete simultaneously. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 29(5), 411–426.

Bengtsson, M., & Raza-Ullah, T. (2024). Paradoxical tensions at multiple levels and top paradoxical tensions at multiple levels and top management team cross-level bridging in coopetition: A conceptual model. *Strategic Management Review*, 6(1). Forthcoming.

Bengtsson, M., Raza-Ullah, T., & Srivastava, M. K. (2020). Looking different vs thinking differently: Impact of TMT diversity on coopetition capability. *Long Range Planning*, 53(1).

Bengtsson, M., Raza-Ullah, T., & Vanyushyn, V. (2016). The coopetition paradox and tension: The moderating role of coopetition capability. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 53, 19–30.

Blanka, C., & Traunmüller, V. (2020). Blind date? Intermediaries as matchmakers on the way to start-up—Industry coopetition. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 90, 1–13.

Bonel, E., & Rocco, E. (2007). Coopeting to survive; surviving coopetition. *International Studies of Management and Organization*, 37(2), 70–96.

Bouncken, R. B., Clauß, T., & Fredrich, V. (2016). Product innovation through coopetition in alliances: Singular or plural governance? *Industrial Marketing Management*, 53, 77–90.

Bouncken, R. B., & Fredrich, V. (2012). Coopetition: Performance implications and management antecedents. *International Journal of Innovation Management*, 16(05), 1250028 (Retrieved July 28, 2021).

Bouncken, R. B., & Fredrich, V. (2016). Learning in coopetition: Alliance orientation, network size, and firm types. *Journal of Business Research*, 69(5), 1753–1758.

Bouncken, R. B., Fredrich, V., Kraus, S., & Ritala, P. (2020). Innovation alliances: Balancing value creation dynamics, competitive intensity and market overlap. *Journal of Business Research*, 112, 240–247.

Bouncken, R. B., Fredrich, V., Ritala, P., & Kraus, S. (2020). Value-creation-capture-equilibrium in new product development alliances: A matter of coopetition, expert power, and alliance importance. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 90, 648–662.

Bouncken, R. B., Gast, J., Kraus, S., & Bogers, M. (2015). Coopetition: A systematic review, synthesis, and future research directions. *Review of Managerial Science*, 9(3), 577–601.

Bouncken, R. B., & Kraus, S. (2013). Innovation in knowledge-intensive industries: The double-edged sword of coopetition. *Journal of Business Research*, 66(10), 2060–2070.

Bouncken, R. B., Qiu, Y., & García, F. J. S. (2021). Flexible pattern matching approach: Suggestions for augmenting theory evolvement. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 167, Article 120685.

Bouncken, R. B., Qiu, Y., Sinkovics, N., & Kürsten, W. (2021). Qualitative research: Extending the range with flexible pattern matching. *Review of Managerial Science*, 15 (2), 251–273.

Burström, T., Kock, S., & Wincent, J. (2022). Coopetition – Strategy and interorganizational transformation: Platform, innovation barriers, and coopetitive dynamics. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 104, 101–115. Retrieved Thursday, August 25, 2022.

Chen, M., Tang, T., Wu, S., & Wang, F. (2021). The double-edged sword of coopetition: Differential effects of cross-functional coopetition on product and service innovations. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing*, 36(2), 191–202. https://doi.org/10.1108/JBIM-06-2019-0313

Chen, M.-J. (1996). Competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry: Toward a theoretical integration. *Academy of Management Review*, 21(1), 100.

Chen, M.-J. (2008). Reconceptualizing the competition— Cooperation relationship. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 17(4), 288–304.

Chiambaretto, P., Bengtsson, M., Fernandez, A.-S., & Näsholm, M. H. (2020). Small and large firms’ trade-off between benefits and risks when choosing a coopetitor for innovation. *Long Range Planning*, 53(1).

Chiambaretto, P., & Dumez, H. (2016). Toward a typology of coopetition: A multilevel approach. *International Studies of Management and Organization*, 46(2-3), 110–129 (Retrieved July 03, 2021).

Chiambaretto, P., & Fernandez, A.-S. (2016). The evolution of coopetitive and collaborative alliances in an alliance portfolio: The air France case. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 57, 75–85.

Chin, K.-S., Chan, B. L., & Lam, P.-K. (2008). Identifying and prioritizing critical success factors for coopetition strategy. *Industrial Management and Data Systems*, 108(4), 437–454.
Chou, H.-H., & Zolkiewski, J. (2018). Coopetition and value creation and appropriation: The role of interdependencies, tensions and harmony. *Industrial Marketing Management* **70**, 25-33.

Cloutier, C., & Ravasi, D. (2021). Using tables to enhance trustworthiness in qualitative research. *Strategic Organization*, **19**(1), 113-133.

Creswell, J. W., & Miller, D. L. (2000). Determining validity in qualitative inquiry. *Theory Into Practice*, **39**(3), 124-130.

Crick, J. M. (2019). The dark side of coopetition: When collaborating with competitors is harmful for company performance. *The Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing*, **35**(2), 318-337.

Crick, J. M., & Crick, D. (2020). Coopetition and COVID-19: Collaborative business-to-business marketing strategies in a pandemic crisis. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **88**, 206-213.

Crick, J. M., & Crick, D. (2021a). Coopetition and family-owned wine producers. *Journal of Business Research*, **135**, 319-336.

Crick, J. M., & Crick, D. (2021b). Coopetition and sales performance: Evidence from non-mainstream sporting clubs. *International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research*, **27**(1), 123-147.

Crick, J. M., Crick, D., & Chaudhry, S. (2023). Staying alive: Coopetition and competitor oriented behaviour from a pre- to post COVID-19 pandemic era. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **113**, 58-73.

Czakon, W., & Czernek-Marszalek, K. (2018). Trust in tourism dyadic and network coopetition. In A.-S. Fernandez, P. Chiambaretto, & F. Le Roy (Eds.), *Routledge companions in business, management & accounting. The Routledge companion to co-opetition strategies* (pp. 83-92). New York: Routledge.

Czakon, W., & Czernek-Marszalek, K. (2021). Competitor perceptions in tourism coopetition. *Journal of Travel Research*, **60**(2), 312-335 (Retrieved July 26, 2021).

Czakon, W., Klimas, P., & Mariani, M. (2020). Behavioral antecedents of coopetition: A synthesis and measurement scale. *Long Range Planning*, **53**(1).

Dahl, J. (2014). Conceptualizing coopetition as a process: An outline of change in cooperative and competitive interactions. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **43**(2), 272-279.

Dahl, J., Kock, S., & Lundgren-Henriksson, E.-L. (2016). Conceptualizing coopetition strategy as practice: A multilevel interpretative framework. *International Studies of Management and Organization*, **46**(2-3), 94-109.

d'Armagnac, S., Geraudel, M., & Salvetat, D. (2019). Knowledge sharing in a coopetition project team: An institutional logics perspective. *Strategic Change*, **28**(3), 217-227.

Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (2000). Instabilities of strategic alliances: An internal tensions perspective. *Organization Science*, **11**(1), 77-101 (Retrieved July 28, 2021).

Depeyre, C., Rigaud, E., & Seraidarian, F. (2018). Coopetition in the French luxury industry: Five cases of brand-building by suppliers of luxury brands. *Journal of Brand Management*, **25**(5), 463-473.

Devetag, M. G. (2009). Coordination and trust as prerequisites of coopetition. Experimental evidence. In G. B. Dagnino, & E. Rocco (Eds.), *Coopetition strategy* (pp. 274-289). Routledge.

Dorn, S., & Albers, S. (2018). A multi-level perspective on managing coopetition. In A.-S. Fernandez, P. Chiambaretto, & F. Le Roy (Eds.), *Routledge companions in business, management & accounting. The Routledge companion to co-opetition strategies* (pp. 205-212). New York: Routledge.

Dorn, S., Schweiger, B., & Albers, S. (2016). Levels, phases and themes of coopetition: A systematic literature review and research agenda. *European Management Journal*, **34** (5), 484-500.

Dowling, M. J., Roering, W. D., Carlin, B. A., & Wisnieski, J. (1996). Multifaceted relationships under coopetition. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, **5**(2), 155-167.

Dussauge, P., Garrette, B., & Mitchell, W. (2000). Learning from competing partners: Outcomes and durations of scale and link alliances in Europe, North America and Asia. *Strategic Management Journal*, **21**(2), 99-126.

Efrat, K., Souchon, A. L., Wald, A., Hughes, P., & Cai, J. (2022). Mitigating coopetition tensions: The forgotten formation stage. *European Management Review*, **19**(4), 527-548. https://doi.org/10.1111/emre.12498

Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. *Academy of Management Review*, **14**(4), 532-550.

Fernandez, A.-S., & Chiambaretto, P. (2016). Managing tensions related to information in coopetition. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **53**, 66-76.

Fernandez, A.-S., Chiambaretto, P., Chauvet, M., & Engsig, J. (2021). Why do MNEs both make and coopete for innovation? *Technovation*, **106**, Article 102313.

Fernandez, A.-S., & Le Roy, F. (2018). The rise of the coopetitive project team. In A.-S. Fernandez, P. Chiambaretto, & F. Le Roy (Eds.), *Routledge companions in business, management & accounting. The Routledge companion to co-opetition strategies* (pp. 188-196). New York: Routledge.

Fernandez, A.-S., Le Roy, F., & Chiambaretto, P. (2018). Implementing the right project structure to achieve coopetitive innovation projects. *Long Range Planning*, **51**(2), 384-405.

Fernandez, A.-S., Le Roy, F., & Gnyawali, D. R. (2014). Sources and management of tension in co-opetition case evidence from telecommunications satellites manufacturing in Europe. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **43**(2), 222-235.

Fredrich, V., Bouncken, R. B., & Kraus, S. (2019). The race is on: Configurations of absorptive capacity, interdependence and slack resources for interorganizational learning in coopetition alliances. *Journal of Business Research*, **101**, 862-868.

Kalkina, T., & Lundgren-Henriksson, E.-L. (2017). Coopetition as an entrepreneurial process: Interplay of causation and effectuation. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **67**, 158-173.

Galloway, T. L., Kuhn, K. M., & Collins-Williams, M. (2019). Competitors as advisors: Peer assistance among small business entrepreneurs. *Long Range Planning*, **101929**.

Gast, J., Gundolf, K., Harms, R., & Matos Collado, E. (2019). Knowledge management and coopetition: How do cooperating competitors balance the needs to share and protect their knowledge? *Industrial Marketing Management*, **77**, 65-74.

Gernsheimer, O., Kanbach, D. K., & Gast, J. (2021). Coopetition research - a systematic literature review on recent accomplishments and trajectories. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **96**, 113-134.

Gibbert, M., Ruigrok, W., & Wicki, B. (2008). What passes as a rigorous case study? *Strategic Management Journal*, **29**(13), 1465-1474.

Gnyawali, D. R., Madhavan, R., He, J., & Bengtsson, M. (2016). The competition-cooperation paradox in inter-firm relationships: A conceptual framework. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **53**, 7-18.

Gnyawali, D. R., & Park, B.-J. (2009). Co-opetition and technological innovation in small and medium-sized enterprises: A multilevel conceptual model. *Journal of Small Business Management*, **47**(3), 308-330.

Gnyawali, D. R., & Park, B.-J. (2011). Co-opetition between giants: Collaboration with competitors for technological innovation. *Research Policy*, **40**(5), 650-663.

Gnyawali, D. R., & Ryan Charleton, T. (2018). Nuances in the interplay of competition and cooperation: Towards a theory of coopetition. *Journal of Management*, **44**(7), 2511.

Gnyawali, D. R., & Song, Y. (2016). Pursuit of rigor in research: Illustration from coopetition literature. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **57**, 12-22.

Granata, J., Lasch, F., Le Roy, F., & Dana, L.-P. (2018). How do micro-firms manage coopetition? A study of the wine sector in France. *International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship*, **36**(3), 331-355.

Guo, R., Yin, H., & Liu, X. (2023). Coopetition, organizational agility, and innovation performance in digital new ventures. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **111**, 143-157.

Hani, M., & Dagnino, G.-B. (2021). Global network coopetition, firm innovation and value creation. *The Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing*, **36**(11), 1962-1974. Retrieved Thursday, August 04, 2022.

Hartnell, G. (1996). The innovation of agrochemicals: Regulation and patent protection. *Research Policy*, **25**(3), 379-395.

Hoffmann, W., Lavie, D., Reuer, J. J., & Shipilov, A. (2018). The interplay of competition and cooperation. *Strategic Management Journal*, **39**(12), 3033-3052.

Jakobsen, S. (2020). Managing tension in coopetition through mutual dependence and asymmetries: A longitudinal study of a Norwegian R&D alliance. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **84**, 251-260.

Jarzabkowski, P., Le, J. K., & van de Ven, A. H. (2013). Responding to competing strategic demands: How organizing, belonging, and performing paradoxes coevolve. *Strategic Organization*, **11**(3), 245-280 (Retrieved August 04, 2021).

Klammer, A., Hora, W., & Kailer, N. (2023). Opposites attract: How incumbents learn and unlearn in coopetitive relationships with start-ups. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **112**, 85-97.

Kraus, S., Meier, F., Niemand, T., Bouncken, R. B., & Ritala, P. (2018). In search for the ideal coopetition partner: An experimental study. *Review of Managerial Science*, **4**, 1025.

Lascaux, A. (2020). Coopetition and trust: What we know, where to go next. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **84**, 2-18.

Le Roy, F., Bez, S. M., & Gast, J. (2021). Unpacking the management of oligo-coopetition strategies in the absence of a moderating third party. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **98**, 125-137.

Le Roy, F., & Czakon, W. (2016). Managing coopetition: The missing link between strategy and performance. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **53**, 3-6.

Le Roy, F., & Fernandez, A.-S. (2015). Managing Coopetitive tensions at the working-group level: The rise of the Coopetitive project team. *British Journal of Management*, **26**(4), 671.

Lechner, C., Soppe, B., & Dowling, M. (2016). Vertical coopetition and the sales growth of young and small firms. *Journal of Small Business Management*, **54**(1), 67-84.

Lee, Y., Fong, E. A., & Kim, H. (2023). Coopetition and technology licensing partner selection. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **112**, 60-70.

Lewis, M. W. (2000). Exploring paradox: Toward a more comprehensive guide. *The Academy of Management Review*, **25**(4), 760.

Lundgren-Henriksson, E.-L., & Kock, S. (2016a). A sensemaking perspective on coopetition. *Industrial Marketing Management*, **57**, 97-108.
Lundgren-Henriksson, E.-L., & Kock, S. (2016b). Coopetition in a headwind – The interplay of sensemaking, sensegiving, and middle managerial emotional response in cooperative strategic change development. *Industrial Marketing Management, 58*, 20–34.

Lundgren-Henriksson, E.-L., & Tidström, A. (2021). Temporal distancing and integrating: Exploring coopetition tensions through managerial sensemaking dynamics. *Scandinavian Journal of Business, 37*(3), Article 101168.

Luo, Y. (2004). *Coopetition in international business* (1st ed.). Denmark: Copenhagen Business School Press.

Manzhynski, S., & Biedenbach, G. (2023). The knotted paradox of coopetition for sustainability: Investigating the interplay between core paradox properties. *Industrial Marketing Management, 110*, 31–45.

Manzhynski, S., & Figge, F. (2020). Coopetition for sustainability: Between organizational benefit and societal good. *Business Strategy & the Environment (John Wiley & Sons, Inc)*, 29(3), 827–837.

Mariani, M. M. (2007). Coopetition as an emergent strategy: Empirical evidence from an Italian consortium of opera houses. *International Studies of Management and Organization, 37*(2), 97–126 (Retrieved July 20, 2021).

Mariani, M. M. (2016). Coordination in inter-network co-opetition: Evidence from the tourism sector. *Industrial Marketing Management, 53*, 103–123.

Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook, 2nd ed.* Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc.

Näsholm, M. H., & Bengtsson, M. (2014). A conceptual model of individual identification in the context of coopetition. *International Journal of Business Enviroment, 6*(1), 11–27 (Retrieved June 30, 2021).

Navío-Marco, J., Bujidos-Casado, M., & Rodrigo-Moya, B. (2019). Coopetition as an innovation strategy in the European Union: Analysis of the German case. *Industrial Marketing Management, 82*, 9–14.

Navío-Marco, J., Ibar-Alonso, R., & Bujidos-Casado, M. (2021). Interlinkages between coopetition and organisational innovation in Europe. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 36*(9), 1665–1677.

Nemeh, A. (2018). Building a first-mover advantage from coopetition. In A.-S. Fernandez, P. Chiambaretto, & F. Le Roy (Eds.), *Routledge companions in business, management & accounting. The Routledge companion to co-opetition strategies* (pp. 298–306). New York: Routledge.

Niesten, E., & Stefan, I. (2019). Embracing the paradox of Interorganizational value co-creation-value capture: A literature review towards paradox resolution. *International Journal of Management Reviews, 21*(2), 231–255.

Nishimoto, R. (2019). Global trends in the crop protection industry. *Journal of Pesticide Science, 44*(3), 141–147.

Obul, A., Yang, J., & Hiyit, M. (2021). Effect of joint learning on product innovativeness: The moderating role of goodwill trust and destructive conflict in coopetition. *Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 33*(2), 229–241.

Oliver, A. L. (2004). On the duality of competition and collaboration: Network-based knowledge relations in the biotechnology industry. *Scandinavian Journal of Management, 20*(1–2), 151–171.

Oshri, I., & Weeber, C. (2006). Cooperation and competition standards-setting activities in the digitization era: The case of wireless information devices. *Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 18*(2), 265–283.

Pattinson, S., Nicholson, J., & Lindgreen, A. (2018). Emergent coopetition from a sensemaking perspective: A multi-level analysis. *Industrial Marketing Management, 68*, 25–35.

Pekovic, S., Grolleau, G., & Mzoughi, N. (2020). Coopetition in innovation activities and firms’ economic performance: An empirical analysis. *Creativity and Innovation Management, 29*(1), 85–98.

Pellegrin-Boucher, E., Le Roy, F., & Gurau', C. (2018). Managing selling coopetition: A case study of the ERP industry. *European Management Review, 15*(1), 37–56.

Phillips, M. W. A. (2020). Agrochemical industry development, trends in R&D and the impact of regulation. *Pest Management Science, 76*(10), 3348–3356.

Pitelis, C. N., & Teece, D. J. (2018). The new MNE: 'Orchestration' theory as envelope of 'internalisation' theory. *Management International Review (MIR), 58*(4), 523–539.

Pradies, C., Tunarosa, A., Lewis, M. W., & Courtois, J. (2021). From vicious to virtuous paradox dynamics: The social-symbolic work of supporting actors. *Organization Studies, 42*(8), 1241–1263.

Putnam, L. L., Fairhurst, G. T., & Banghart, S. (2016). Contradictions, dialectics, and paradoxes in organizations: A constitutive approach. *Academy of Management Annals, 10*(1), 65–171. https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520.2016.1162421

Quintana-García, C., & Benavides-Velasco, C. A. (2004). Cooperation, competition, and innovative capability: A panel data of European dedicated biotechnology firms. *Technovation, 24*(12), 927–938.

Rai, R., Gnyawali, D. R., & Bhatt, H. (2022). Walking the tightrope: Coopetition capability construct and its role in value creation. *Journal of Management, 1*–33. https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063221107873

Rajala, A., & Tidström, A. (2017). A multilevel perspective on organizational buying behavior in coopetition—an exploratory case study. *Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 23*(3), 202–210.

Raza-Ullah, T. (2020). Experiencing the paradox of coopetition: A moderated mediation framework explaining the paradoxical tension-performance relationship. *Long Range Planning, 53*(1).

Raza-Ullah, T. (2021). When does (not) a coopetition relationship matter to performance? An empirical investigation of the role of multidimensional trust and distrust. *Industrial Marketing Management, 96*, 86–99. Retrieved Saturday, August 27, 2022.

Raza-Ullah, T., Bengtsson, M., & Gnyawali, D. R. (2020). The nature, consequences, and management of emotions in interfirm paradoxical relationships—A conceptual framework. *Scandinavian Journal of Management, 36*(4), Article 101127.

Raza-Ullah, T., Bengtsson, M., & Kock, S. (2014). The coopetition paradox and tension in coopetition at multiple levels. *Industrial Marketing Management, 43*(2), 189–198.

Raza-Ullah, T., Bengtsson, M., & Vanyushyn, V. (2018). Coopetition capability - what is it? In A.-S. Fernandez, P. Chiambaretto, & F. Le Roy (Eds.), *Routledge companions in business, management & accounting. The Routledge companion to co-opetition strategies* (pp. 197–204). New York: Routledge.

Raza-Ullah, T., & Kostis, A. (2019). Do trust and distrust in coopetition matter to performance? *European Management Journal, 38*, 367–376.

Raza-Ullah, T., Stadtler, L., & Fernandez, A.-S. (2023). The individual manager in the spotlight: Protecting sensitive knowledge in inter-firm coopetition relationships. *Industrial Marketing Management, 110*, 85–95. Retrieved Tuesday, March 07, 2023.

Ritala, P., & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, P. (2018). Dynamics of coopetive value creation and appropriation. In A.-S. Fernandez, P. Chiambaretto, & F. Le Roy (Eds.), *Routledge companions in business, management & accounting. The Routledge companion to co-opetition strategies* (pp. 58–67). New York: Routledge.

Rouyre, A., & Fernandez, A.-S. (2019). Managing knowledge sharing-protecting tensions in coupled innovation projects among several competitors. *California Management Review, 62*(1), 95–120 (Retrieved June 30, 2021).

Sandvik, H. O., Sjödin, D., Brekke, T., & Parida, V. (2022). Inherent paradoxes in the shift to autonomous solutions provision: A multilevel investigation of the shipping industry. *Service Business, 16*(2), 227–255.

Scandelius, C., & Cohen, G. (2016). Sustainability program brands: Platforms for collaboration and co-creation. *Industrial Marketing Management, 57*, 166–176.

Seran, T., Pellegrin-Boucher, E., & Gurau, C. (2016). The management of coopetitive tensions within multi-unit organizations. *Industrial Marketing Management, 53*, 31–41.

Sinkovics, N. (2018). Pattern matching in qualitative analysis. In C. Cassel, A. Cunlliffe, & G. Grandy (Eds.), *The sage handbook of qualitative business and management research methods* (pp. 468–485). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Smiljic, S., Aas, T. H., & Mention, A.-L. (2022). Coopetitive tensions across project phases: A paradox perspective. *Industrial Marketing Management, 105*, 388–403. Retrieved Thursday, July 28, 2022.

Smith, W. K., & Lewis, M. W. (2011). Toward a theory of paradox: A dynamic equilibrium model of organizing. *Academy of Management Review, 36*(2), 381–403.

Sparks, T. C., & Bryant, R. J. (2021). Crop protection compounds - trends and perspective. *Pest Management Science, 77*(8), 3608–3616.

Sparks, T. C., & Lorsbach, B. A. (2017). Perspectives on the agrochemical industry and agrochemical discovery. *Pest Management Science, 73*(4), 672–677.

Stadtler, L., & van Wassenhove, L. N. (2016). Coopetition as a paradox: Integrative approaches in a multi-company, cross-sector partnership. *Organization Studies, 37*(5), 655–685.

Taylor, J., & Blake, J. (2015). Key informant interviews and focus groups. In M. de Chesnay (Ed.), *Qualitative designs and methods in nursing. Nursing research using data analysis*. New York: Springer Publishing Company.

Tidström, A. (2014). Managing tensions in coopetition. *Industrial Marketing Management, 43*(2), 261–271.

Tidström, A. (2018). Coopetitive tensions. In A.-S. Fernandez, P. Chiambaretto, & F. Le Roy (Eds.), *Routledge companions in business, management & accounting. The Routledge companion to co-opetition strategies* (pp. 149–157). New York: Routledge.

Tidström, A., & Rajala, A. (2016). Coopetition strategy as interrelated praxis and practices on multiple levels. *Industrial Marketing Management, 58*, 35–44.

Tidström, A., Ritala, P., & Lainema, K. (2018). Interactional and procedural practices in managing coopetitive tensions. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 33*(7), 945–957.

Volschenk, J., Ungerer, M., & Smit, E. (2016). Creation and appropriation of socio-environmental value in coopetition. *Industrial Marketing Management, 57*, 109–118.
Woolley, J. L. (2023). Getting along with frenemies: Enhancing multi-competitor coopetition governance through artificial intelligence and blockchain. *Industry and Innovation, 1–34.

Yang, X. (2020). Coopetition for innovation in R&D consortia: Moderating roles of size disparity and formal interaction. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 2020*.

Yin, R. K. (2018). *Case study research and applications* (6th ed.). Thousand Oaks, SA: Sage.