# Cavell's perfectionism and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

Paolo Babbiotti, Luca Torrente

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Paolo Babbiotti, Luca Torrente. Cavell's perfectionism and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Philosophical Inquiries, 2025, 13 (1), pp.65-82. 10.4454/philinq.v13i1.595. hal-05224701

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Cavell's perfectionism and Aristotle's
*Nicomachean Ethics*

Paolo Babbiotti, Luca Torrente

*Abstract*: This article offers a rereading of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in light of the moral perfectionism outlined by Stanley Cavell in *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome* (1990) and *Cities of Words* (2004). In the first part, after clarifying possible misunderstandings related to the idea of “perfectionism” and presenting Cavell’s perfectionist or “Emersonian” vision, we analyze his original interpretation of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* in Cities of Words. Specifically, we focus on Cavell’s commentary on Aristotle’s doctrines of happiness and friendship, which highlights the role of the philosophical style Aristotle employs throughout the work. In the second part of the article, we turn more closely to the *Nicomachean Ethics* itself, examining the nature of this Aristotelian treatise not only in comparison with modern works of ethics but also, and above all, in relation to Aristotle’s other treatises. In doing so, we emphasize two main aspects of the *Nicomachean Ethics*: the audience for whom the work is intended and its style. We conclude by examining the practical aim of this text and testing Cavell’s reading hypothesis in *Cities of Words* concerning the final books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (8, 9, and 10).

*Keywords*: Cavell, Aristotle, Perfectionism, Style

"Our intellectual and active powers increase with our affection. The scholar sits down to write, and all his years of meditation do not furnish him with one good thought or happy expression; but it is necessary to write a letter to a friend, — and, forthwith, troops of gentle thoughts invest themselves, on every hand, with chosen words" (Emerson 1903: 191-192).

*Introduction*

In 1990, Stanley Cavell published the text of the lectures he had delivered
two years earlier in the context of the *Carus Lectures* (founded in 1925, whose
inaugural lecture was John Dewey’s *Experience and Nature*). Cavell’s lectures were titled “Emersonian Strains” and were these three: “*The American Scholar* and Heidegger on Thinking,” “*Experience* and Wittgenstein’s Skepticism,” and “*Self-Reliance* and American Cinema.”<fnref n="1" /> Thus, three of Emerson’s essays (*The American Scholar*, *Experience*, and *Self-Reliance*) are paired respectively with Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and American cinema. These lectures were extensively reworked and published in 1990 in the book *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome. The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism*.

For about a decade, from the late 1980s until his retirement in 1997, Cavell taught “a number of times” (Cavell 2004: ix) a course in Harvard University’s core curriculum called “Moral Perfectionism.” On Tuesdays, he examined a classic of philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Kant, Rawls...) or literature (Henrik Ibsen, George Bernard Shaw, Henry James...) or what professional philosophers are not inclined to consider philosophy (Emerson, Freud...). Then, on Thursdays, he discussed a film from classical Hollywood, from the genre he famously termed the “comedy of remarriage” (Cavell 1981).<fnref n="2" />

These lectures were later revised for publication and appeared in the 2004 volume *Cities of Words. Pedagogical Lectures on a Register of the Moral Life*. In the introduction to that book, and in his 2010 autobiography, *Little Did I Know. Excerpts from Memory*, Cavell retraces the steps of the biographical constitution of this register of the moral life, which he sometimes calls “Emersonian Perfectionism” and sometimes, following the course title, simply “Moral Perfectionism.”

Summarizing what Cavell means by perfectionism is very difficult and, depending on the occasion, one can focus on different aspects. Indeed, both *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome* and *Cities of Words* can be read as works that, as Umberto Eco would say, are “disjointable” (Eco 1994: 128). In *Six Walks in the Fictional Woods*, Eco uses the term “disjointable” (“sgangherabile”, in Italian) to refer to some compositions so rich that allow one to extract single elements at the expense of others, without compromising their overall meaning.

Eco also reflects on the fact that it is not a requisite of a “disjointable” work to be “disjointed.” However, it can happen: in the case of Cavell’s books on perfectionism, given the eccentricity of his juxtapositions, it can be said they are both “disjointable” and “disjointed.” Even though, perhaps, the disjointedness (*sgangheratezza*) is sometimes the price to pay when one wants to write,

<footnote n="1">¹ See *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 61, No. 3, 1988: 616, 618, 621.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² And also from the genre he famously termed “melodrama of unknown woman” (Cavell 1996).</footnote>
as Cavell declares in the Introduction to *Cities of Words*, a kind of philosophy that has the ambition to be “both interested and interesting” (Cavell 2004: x). This aspiration carries with it the risk that one’s own interests may, on close inspection, appear rather strange or eccentric; but that, for this very reason, they may prove interesting if, given their peculiarity, they manage to inspire readers to cultivate their own strangeness or eccentricity – or, in other words, their own interests.

It goes without saying that it is also rather strange and eccentric to match Cavell's moral or Emersonian perfectionism with Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. But, in the course of our article, we would like to show how a rereading of Aristotle's work, in light of observations on Cavell's moral perfectionism, can be enlightening and inspire new directions of historical-philosophical research on the Aristotelian corpus. Moreover, at the same time, a closer look at the *Nicomachean Ethics* will allow us to show concretely one of many possible variations of Cavell's moral perfectionism.

In the course of our article, we will first devote ourselves, in Section 1, to a focused inquiry into what Cavell means by Emersonian perfectionism. We will begin by dwelling on the possible misunderstandings which this proposal, starting with the very title “perfectionism”, may give rise to. We will then examine Cavell’s specific reading of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* in *Cities of Words*: in particular, we will focus on Cavell’s comments on the Aristotelian doctrines of happiness and friendship, giving space also to his reflections on the importance of the philosophical style adopted by Aristotle to advance these doctrines.

Subsequently, in Section 2, we will concentrate on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, investigating various aspects of this work. We will first take into account the particular nature of this writing, not only with respect to any book of moral philosophy in modernity, but also and above all in respect to the other treatises of Aristotle that have come down to us. This analysis will allow us to highlight two aspects that are important for perfectionism: the audience to which the work is addressed and its style. In a second moment, we will deal with the nature of this treatise insofar as it presents a practical purpose, i.e., in that it presents itself as a highly useful tool for those who wish to seek the highest good – happiness – and wish to act according to reason. Finally, we will focus on the reading hypothesis of the last books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (8-9 and 10) that Cavell proposes in *Cities of Words*.

# I

It is always useful to begin with what Cavell does not mean by moral or Emersonian perfectionism, namely, with the various forms of what he calls,
starting from 1990 in *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome*, “false or de-
based perfectionism” (Cavell 1990: 13). It is a perfectionist conception of life
understood as an aspiration to achieve a final, ultimate stage, dictated by an
external model (which could be self-help literature, the military, advertising,
stock-market trading – all examples Cavell gives first in *Conditions* and later
in *Cities of Words*). Here the motto *you can be anything you want* turns into
*you must become everything I want you to be*. For this reason, in *Conditions*,
Cavell establishes an equivalence between a “false perfectionism” and a “false
autonomy” (Cavell 1990: 121).

In any case, this form of perfectionism, that is of no interest to Cavell, can be
confused with moral or Emersonian perfectionism in that the starting point of
both perspectives is very similar: both views, indeed, invite one to be ashamed
and to perceive the shortcomings of one’s present state, to aspire to change, to
move from a state of confusion to one of greater clarity, from a state of priva-
tion to one of greater freedom. At the end of the preface to the Italian edition
of *The Claim of Reason*, Cavell also uses psychoanalytic language to refer to
this transformation: it is a shift from a condition of “fixation and obscurity” to
a condition of “motion and lucidity” (Cavell 2022: 222).

Is there a way to distinguish the efforts, the “strains,” found for instance
in Emerson’s *Essays*, from the slogans of best-sellers like *Love Yourself* that,
Cavell wrote in 1990, “seem to be everywhere these days?” (Cavell 1990: 16).
There is more than one way, but we will highlight just two. A first way is related
to the different perfectionist conception that is encouraged in texts such as *The
American Scholar*, *Experience* and *Self-reliance*, or in other minor essays such as
(among many others) *Considerations by the Way*. These writings emphasize an
ongoing transformation of the self that has no fixed or definite end point, and
above all does not imply “false autonomy.” Key figures in this quest are those
of the friend and of the community. In Cavell’s characterization of Emersonian
perfectionism, we read the following:

Perfectionism, as I think of it, is not a competing theory of the moral life, but some-
thing like a dimension or tradition of the moral life that spans the course of Western
thought and concerns what used to be called the state of one’s soul, a dimension that
places tremendous burdens on personal relationships and on the possibility or neces-
sity of the transforming of oneself and of one’s society (Cavell 1990: 2).

It is a dimension that, in addition to placing “tremendous burdens on per-
sonal relationships,” places great importance on philosophical writing. Indeed,
the way in which Emerson aspires to achieve this change in himself and in
others is linked to the presentation of his writings. A fundamental part is lin-
ked to what might be called “Emersonian Perfectionist Writing” (Babbiotti
2024: 31-54), in which attention to style aims to awaken the reader's autonomy. As Cavell writes, in Emerson's work “the attentiveness to or attractive reliance on every word ... is the mark of perfectionist authorship, its drawing of its reader to another way” (Cavell 1990: 109).

We can add a further observation: what is the reason that leads Cavell to emphasize that “perfectionism, as he thinks of it, is not a competing theory of the moral life”? The negation is, in a certain sense, significant: one would in fact be led to think that, to put forward a proposal such as the perfectionist one, is to put forward a new moral theory in competition with others already present in Anglo-American philosophy, such as utilitarianism or Kantianism. One would be led to think so, but this is not the case. For one fundamental reason: it is not really a theory. Cavell speaks of “a dimension or tradition of moral life” and when he writes this he has in mind a series of texts that can present perfectionist aspects. Typically, these texts will focus on the development of the character of the moral subject (an aspect neglected by various utilitarian theories) and on the contingent circumstances – or the steps, or Emersonian “stairs” (Emerson 1957: 254) – in which this same subject finds himself living (an aspect neglected by Kantian theories).

What is more, being both theories, neither mobilizes the rhetorical and stylistic resources necessary to bring about change and transformation. This does not mean, however, that one cannot find elements or even excerpts of perfectionist texts in authors such as John Stuart Mill or Kant, who in fact occupy a place in Cavell's lectures, and to whom a chapter each is dedicated in *Cities of Words*. It just means that achieving a perfectionist life or writing will not be their main goal.<fnref n="3" />

But there is one last reason why Cavell tries to rehabilitate and resignify the concept of perfectionism. “Perfectionism” is a term that Cavell encounters in the debate of contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy. It had been used by John Rawls in *A Theory of Justice* to define a moral perspective that he criticized and rejected, which he had identified in Aristotle and, in a more extreme form, in Nietzsche (Rawls 1999: 22). In general, Rawls rejects “per-

<footnote n="3">³ In the course of this article, we won't take into account Cavell's discussion of perfectionism as a "genre," introduced in order to distinguish generic features from features of particular members of this genre. We overlook this discussion for a specific reason: we are more interested in the particular features of "Emersonian Perfectionism" (and of what we call "Emersonian Perfectionist Writing"), than in the features of perfectionism taken as a whole. Our choice has the advantage of restricting the scope of our article, but it has the major disadvantage of emphasizing some aspects of an Emersonian perfectionist vision (like the avoidance of any final or ultimate stage of perfection) that may be unhelpful when commenting on authors like Aristotle, for whom a final or ultimate stage of perfection is achievable. We are aware of such a discrepancy between Emerson and Aristotle and we will comment on it further in the text. See footnote 13.</footnote>
fectionism” as a teleological doctrine and, more specifically, because, at least in the extreme form that Rawls extracts from *Schopenhauer as an educator* of Nietzsche, it theorizes a State that unduly promotes forms of human excellence – in philosophy, the arts and sciences – that are assumed to be the ultimate goal (Rawls 1999: 286).

This brings us to Aristotle: as Rawls’s mention in *A Theory of Justice* shows, for Aristotle the label of *perfectionism* tout court is relevant, beyond the label of Emersonian perfectionism. This is because his ethics can be read as an attempt to actualize the potential of the human being, an ethics that contemplates a principle of perfection (Rawls 1999: 286). Indeed, many commentators have interpreted Aristotelian ethics – in sometimes very different ways – as a form of moral perfectionism.<fnref n="4" /> In Aristotle we find the idea of a *nature* of character that is given to us at birth, with certain characteristics such as an inclination towards temperance, an aptitude for courage and so on, but in all cases this “nature” is presented as a raw material that can and must be worked and molded by education and teaching to realize one’s nature and reach a virtuous state in the true sense of the word. What is essential for the moral development of the individual is his socio-cultural environment, his family and the community in which he grows up and is educated, because it is from here that the individual can perfect himself and achieve a virtuous state in the proper sense.<fnref n="5" /> This is why Aristotle’s ethics is ultimately connected to politics, because while ethics establishes the final cause of human action – happiness – politics looks for ways to educate the citizens to live a happy life together (Pol. X 10, 1180a32-35).

Now, Cavell doesn’t focus directly on the Aristotelian texts that deal with character and its education, but he is interested in talking about two other perfectionist aspects of the *Nicomachean Ethics*: the doctrine of happiness and friendship.

What is interesting, for our purposes, is that Cavell is attentive to the textual order in which both doctrines are presented. He takes the time to recapitulate the order of presentation of the themes of the various books (Cavell 2004: 360): “happiness” (*eudaimonia*) is presented as the aim of the investigation and as what must be defined right from the start (Book I); then there is a series of books dedicated to virtue – Aristotle first examines its general traits (Book II, and part of III, insofar as it discusses the voluntary and the involuntary) and then analyzes each particular virtue (Book IV, followed by Book V dedicated to

<footnote n="4">⁴ See for example Nussbaum 1988; Charles 1988; Horn 2019; Frede 2019.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Aristotle in fact distinguishes between natural virtues (which are given from birth and which are shared with animals) and virtues in the proper sense, that is, ethical and dianoetic virtues, which require wisdom and education of one’s natural character (NE VI 13). Cf. Morel 2021: 125-145.</footnote>
justice); Book VI deals with wisdom, which is a condition for virtue, and Book
VII deals with the problem of weakness of will and pleasure; then there are two
books on friendship (VIII, IX), followed by Book X, which largely stands on
its own, and which deals in the first part (chapters 1-5) again with pleasure and
then (chapters 6-10) with *theoretical life*<fnref n="6" /> as a higher form of life, in which the
human being realizes himself to the maximum.

Firstly, Cavell notes a difference in the treatment reserved for friendship
compared to the virtues (such as generosity, truthfulness, wit, shame or in-
telligence), in that Aristotle writes that "no one would choose to live without
friends even if he possessed all other goods" (NE VIII 1, 1155a5). Therefore,
comments Cavell, "it seems as though [Aristotle] is assigning to friendship
the importance of happiness itself" (Cavell 2004: 364). From this different
treatment reserved for friendship, two different problems arise (which have
occupied Aristotelian critics and studies): 1. "Can only those advanced human
beings capable of the friendship of character be said to have genuine frien-
dships, or do ordinary people, stuck in friendships of advantage or of use or of
the enforced provision of pleasure, have friendships worth the name?" (Cavell
2004: 364), and 2. "If the best life is one of self-sufficiency<fnref n="7" /> (basing itself on
virtue, as a shield against the turns of fortune) why does it require friends?"
(Cavell 2004: 364).

For Cavell's purposes, it is the second of the two questions that is the most
important. Before putting forward his proposed interpretation, however, Ca-
vell announces that he will try to answer this question "in conjunction with the
puzzle about Aristotle's new evaluation of happiness at the end of the *Nicoma-
chean Ethics* – namely his apparently sudden claim of 'theoretical study' as the
supreme element of happiness" (Cavell 2004: 365).

In studies on Aristotle, Cavell reminds us, at least three main approaches have
been taken to try to solve this problem. The first argues that Aristotle, in Book
X, "is simply emphasizing, as presumably most moral philosophers will, reason
or rationality as essential to the good life." The second, on the other hand, claims
that "the intrusion of theorein as the highest life is a straight reversion to Plato's
view, a view explicitly mentioned (without endorsement) ... at the opening of the
*Nicomachean Ethics*." Finally, the third, refusing to accept this last solution, goes
so far as to argue that "the passages on theoretical study in Book X were not by
Aristotle himself but by an editor of his notes" (Cavell 2004: 365).

<footnote n="6">⁶ As Cavell also notes, it is difficult to adequately express in modern languages the meaning of the Greek term *theorein*.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Of course, Aristotle's philosophy posits that only the Unmoved Mover is truly self-sufficient. The optimal existence for humans is thus not a solitary one, as self-sufficiency is actually impossible, and a human who did not live in a community would be either a god or a beast.</footnote>
Let us now move on to Cavell’s original proposal. Let us read a substantial excerpt from *Cities of Words*:

Grant, then, that there is no doubt about the desirability, or rather the necessity of the friend in Aristotle’s conception of the best life. My suggestion is this. It is taken for granted by the scholars I have read that the “study” (*theorein*) Aristotle takes to represent the occupation of the highest friendship is the same – that is, it is a study of the same things – as defined in other works of Aristotle, for example, the study of mathematics or physics. But suppose the “study” in question is a study of what this book – the *Nicomachean Ethics* – is about, namely, friendship and its role in the best life in human affairs. Could there be such a study? I mean, Aristotle famously warns, early in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, against searching in philosophizing about human affairs for the same degree of exactness that, so to say, nature and numbers yield (1094b). Now suppose what is different about Book X of this text is that it somewhat contests or modifies this methodological claim, so as to emphasize the relation of the idea of *theorein* (or theory) with ideas of perceiving and gazing. (The English word “speculation” gives both registers, intellectual and sensuous.) It is a register of the concept always commented upon, if in footnotes. This would still not mean that we can reason more exactly about human affairs than ordinary practical wisdom allows. But the reasoning might have its own conditions of origin and goal, its own completeness or accuracy or depth. My suggestion is that, in particular, the origin and goal of the study that constitutes the highest activity of friendship is precisely the study that takes friendship, this friendship in particular [between virtuous people], as its object. It is to achieve a new perception of your life, new speculation about it, but one whose condition is the friendship itself (Cavell 2004: 366-367).

In this long passage, a paradoxical situation is highlighted (as Cavell will not fail to observe immediately afterwards, explicitly speaking of a “paradox”): this type of study, the study of friendship – which Cavell says can be traced in Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in continuation of the investigations of Books VIII and IX – must be conducted on the terrain of friendship itself. Friendship is at once both the condition and the object of the investigation. Cavell continues:

> Only in the state of friendship is it possible to “study” it, to perceive it – there is nothing of the kind otherwise to perceive. Of course there is something of a paradox here: the condition of friendship, the study that makes it possible, is not possible until the friendship has already been achieved. But is this a greater, or lesser, paradox than Aristotle’s formulations which recognize the friend as another myself, and announce that in order to perceive myself I must perceive my friend’s being together with mine? Then Aristotle’s observation that we achieve such perceptions in living together and
in sharing conversations and thoughts should constitute the solution of the paradox. Following Aristotle's mode in suggesting that, since he finds that happiness expresses virtue, examining virtue will be a way of studying happiness further, I am suggesting that examining what constitutes conversation, or sharing thoughts, will be a way of studying friendship further (Cavell 2004: 367).

In a nutshell, therefore, for Cavell, Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics* could be read as a further reflection on friendship, made possible only by that very practice of friendship that Aristotle described in the previous books (VIII and IX). If this is really the case, then theoretical life does not refer (only) to the natural sciences or mathematics, but to a way of “speculating” and looking at one’s own human condition through conversation and sharing with a friend. A perfectionist way, but of that Emersonian perfectionism that makes friendship an integral part of the process of discovery and self-realization.

Now, Cavell himself, adopting the voice of the skeptic, admits: “This may seem a little too good to be true, I mean too convenient from my point of view... to be credible...” (Cavell 2004: 367). And it is good to keep in mind this possible skeptical voice, which reminds us of the need to put this suggestion to the test. However, in the chapter dedicated to Aristotle in *Cities of Words*, Cavell doesn’t limit himself to first proposing, and then weakening or dampening the proposed thesis. He also gives us suggestions on how to try to corroborate it, to test it in the light of Aristotle’s writing. For example, in this passage: “And suppose we take it that, although Aristotle does not give examples of what these conversations will sound like, they will not be so different from the weight and the topics of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. That text, even given its form as notes, is pervaded by ‘what is said’ by the wise and the many, so that it gives the impression of a writer in conversation with countless representatives of a culture” (Cavell 2004: 367).<fnref n="8" />

Now, once we have finished this part of the reconstruction of Cavell's so-
mewhat idiosyncratic reading (especially in his proposal to read Book X as a
further reflection on friendship), but in many other ways closely in dialogue
with Aristotle's text – with its order of exposition, or the emphasis placed on
the concepts of happiness and friendship, and on the fabric of examples and
representative voices – we are left with the simple question: is it really so? Or,
to put it in Cavell's skeptical terms: isn't it too good to be true? Is the *Nicom-
chean Ethics* in fact a book of philosophy that aims to achieve a certain type of
conversation in its writing? So not only in Book X as a commentary on what
has been written previously, but also through certain rhetorical devices used by
Aristotle in the previous books (for example: entering into conversation with

<footnote n="8">⁸ See also MacIntyre 2007 (1981): 147-148.</footnote>
exponents, representatives of the culture contemporary to him)? Or, again, to
pick up the thread of what Cavell called “perfectionist authorship”: do stylistic
issues relating to the relationship between author and audience (in which the
audience, or the reader, must develop a certain autonomy) have such a signifi-
cant centrality in the *Nicomachean Ethics*?

For the purposes of this article, we just need to take a closer look, using the
tools of the history of ancient philosophy, to see if the Aristotelian texts and
studies confirm, contradict or further complicate this reading given by Cavell
in *Cities of Words*.

II

In the subsequent section, we shall direct our attention to the *Nicomache-
*an Ethics*, exploring its distinct aspects. Initially, we will consider the unique
character of this text, not only in relation to modern moral philosophies but
also, and most notably, in comparison to Aristotle's other extant treatises. This
analysis will highlight two aspects that are critical for perfectionism: the inten-
ded audience and the style. In a subsequent step, we will address the nature of
the treatise insofar as it presents as, not just a work of moral theory, but a tool
for those who wish to seek the highest good – happiness – and to act according
to reason. Finally, we will take a look at the hypothesis of reading the last books
of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (8-9 and 10) that Cavell proposes in *Cities of Words*.

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the philosophical
style of Aristotle, particularly with regard to the investigation of his varied wri-
ting modes.<fnref n="9" /> This study focuses on a detailed examination of the *Nicomachean
Ethics* and its distinctive characteristics. As is widely acknowledged, this work
presents certain problems not only in its relation to the other ethics (the *Eude-
mian*), but also in its internal unity, particularly with regard to the articulation
of the different books and the homogeneity, or rather, the non-homogeneity,
in style of the ten books that constitute the *Nicomachean Ethics*. It is not our
intention to imply that the order of presentation is entirely haphazard; rather,
we posit that the *Nicomachean Ethics* should not be regarded as the completed
and then revised work to which Aristotle would have given the imprimatur. It
is evident, however, that certain sections exhibit a discernible attention to style
and lucid exposition of arguments that is absent in the other ethical works and
in treatises on physics, metaphysics, and biology. In particular, we can affirm,
as Carlo Natali does (2017), that the first four books (and, notably, the first

<footnote n="9">⁹ An ERC project is currently underway called Aristoteles Pezographos – https://aristotlepe-zographos.org/.</footnote>
book in particular) in conjunction with the second part of X (chapters 6-10) were composed with meticulous attention and exhibit the following distinctive characteristics:

* There is an absence of any mention of particular Aristotelian doctrines or the specialized terminology employed in works on physics or metaphysics, a notable contrast to the *Eudemian Ethics*. For instance, there is no indication of the doctrine of hylomorphism or the conception of the soul presented in the *De anima*.

* Aristotle employs a method of argumentation that integrates the techniques of dialectic and those outlined in the *Analytics*, with the objective of persuading his audience. It is noteworthy that certain sections, such as the prologue of the first book, exhibit a substantial rhetorical dimension. The exposition of arguments is lucid and methodical, employing metaphors to facilitate comprehension and guiding the reader through the discourse with clarity. A notable distinction emerges when the *Nicomachean Ethics* is juxtaposed with Aristotle's other school writings, which often exhibit an elliptical and unpolished style, often regarded as mere research notes and observations.

* An emphasis is placed on the necessity to augment universal and abstract theories with investigations of specific types of events and characters. Consequently, it can be inferred that the audience transcends the confines of the Lyceum's students and researchers, who are presumed to be experts in philosophy. The previously mentioned books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* are thus rather well finished and edited, aimed at an audience also accustomed to a certain elegance of style in expression (Natali 2017: 16).

This trait can be examined in conjunction with another aspect of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, namely the practical purpose of the work. Interpreters do not hold unanimous views on this point.<fnref n="10" /> However, there is a consensus among many scholars that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is not merely a treatise in which ethical conduct is *explained* by providing a theory that is sufficiently universal to be valid in all cases. Instead, it is also a kind of ethical handbook for all those who are disposed in a certain way toward their ethical action. The following excerpt, taken from the opening chapter of the first book (NE I 1, 1095a1-10), offers a concise representation of this viewpoint:

> Each person judges well what he knows, and is a good judge of these things (so the person who is educated in a given thing is a good judge of that, and the person who is educated in everything is a good judge without qualification). This is why the young

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ A useful discussion can be found in Anagnostopoulos 1994.</footnote>
are not an appropriate audience for the political expert; for they are inexperienced in the actions that constitute life, and what is said will start from these and will be about these. What is more, because they have a tendency to be led by the emotions, it will be without point or use for them to listen, since the end is not knowing things but doing them. Nor does it make any difference whether a person is young in years or immature in character, for the deficiency is not a matter of time, but the result of living by emotion and going after things in that way. For having knowledge turns out to be without benefit to such people, as it is to those who lack self-control; whereas for those who arrange their desires, and act, in accordance with reason, it will be of great use to know about these things (Transl. Rowe)

As previously stated, the *Nicomachean Ethics* is not intended for everyone; rather, it is directed towards a select group of individuals. This select group is not exclusively comprised of people who are or want to be philosophers. So who are those who form their own desires and act according to reason? These are not inexperienced people in terms of character, which means that age doesn't matter or only partly matters. The philosopher's discourse is directed towards those who are already oriented towards virtue and aspire to shape and structure their ethical lives. To achieve this objective, it is imperative to possess a fundamental understanding of the ethical concepts of the good, happiness, virtue, pleasure, and friendship, among others. In this regard, the *Nicomachean Ethics* emerges as a valuable resource for its practical purpose, as articulated by Aristotle. Indeed, if the *Nicomachean Ethics* were merely a theoretical exposition of ethical conduct, it would be intended for an audience of philosophers only. However, as it is a kind of ethical handbook, its intended audience is broader. Additionally, the practical nature of the work is intertwined with the notion that ethical action has the potential to transform individuals and communities. It is a recognized aspect of Aristotle's philosophy that ethics is inextricably linked to politics. This relationship is evident in several aspects of Aristotle's philosophy. Firstly, the conclusion of the *Nicomachean Ethics* encourages readers to engage with political treatises. Secondly, the discourse on the supreme human good in the initial book is inherently political. Thirdly, the sphere of education, which is crucial for character development, must be examined within the political framework of the community. The *Nicomachean Ethics* is thus a work that attaches considerable importance to character and the possibility of its transformation. This comes – necessarily – through one's relationship with others, in the wider sphere of the political community in which one lives, but also in the narrower sphere of friends.

Let us now quote another passage from the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (this is a continuation of the previous quotation):
Let this stand as our preamble: about audience, about how the present inquiry is to be received, and about what we are proposing. Let us then resume the argument: since every sort of knowledge, and every undertaking, seeks after some good, let us say what it is that we say political expertise seeks, and what the topmost of all achievable goods is. Pretty well most people are agreed about what to call it: both ordinary people and people of quality say 'happiness', and suppose that living well and doing well are the same thing as being happy. But they are in dispute about what happiness actually is, and ordinary people do not give the same answer as intellectuals. The first group identifies it with one of the obvious things that anyone would recognize, like pleasure or wealth or honour, while some pick some other thing and others another (often, too, the same person picks a different thing: when he falls ill, it's health, and if he is poor, it's wealth); but out of consciousness of their own ignorance they are in awe of those who say something impressive and over their heads. Some people used to think that besides these many goods there is another one, existing by itself, which is cause for all of these too of their being good. Now it is presumably rather otiose to examine all these opinions, and enough to examine those that are most widely held, or seem to have some justification (NE I 2, 1095a11-30. Transl. Rowe).

In this excerpt, we find several key elements for Cavell's perfectionism. First, the fact that he enters into conversation with exponents, representatives of the culture that was contemporary with him. In the immediate continuation of the discourse, not only Plato is invoked, but also Hesiod and the Pythagoreans. The other aspect is the role of skepticism as a motor for moral improvement. People, that is, the many (οἱ πολλοὶ), when they realize their ignorance as to what is the highest good to be sought in their lives, set out in search of answers. And then they go to the lectures of the philosophers – what we would call mainstream today – which use speeches that are both grandiose and incomprehensible to their audience. Aristotle is certainly being ironic about a certain way of understanding ethics as derived from metaphysics – think of the idea of the good in Platonic philosophy. But Aristotle also wants to be critical of the many to the extent that it is believed that it is enough to go and listen to the speeches of philosophers in order to achieve happiness. This position is explicitly criticized in the second book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE II 3, 1105b 12-18):

> But most people fail to do these things, and by taking refuge in talk they think that they are philosophizing, and that they will become excellent this way, so behaving rather like sick people, when they listen carefully to their doctors but then fail to do anything of what is prescribed for them. Well, just as the latter, for their part, won't be in good bodily condition if they look after themselves like that, neither will the former have their souls in good condition if they philosophize like that (Transl. Rowe).
The point is that ethical teachings must be put into practice. Here again we find the insistence on the practical purpose of the work. Admittedly, the *Nicomachean Ethics* is a *discourse* on ethical action, but this discourse affirms the necessity of acting and transforming one's character and habits in order to become a virtuous person and thus be happy: "Since, then, the present undertaking is not for the sake of theory, as our others are (for we are not inquiring into what excellence is for the sake of knowing it, but for the sake of becoming good, since otherwise there would be no benefit in it at all), we need to inquire into the subjects relating to actions" (NE II 2, 1103b26-30, Transl. Rowe, cf. also X 10, 1179a35-b4).

At this point, one might wonder whether these two aspects (the style suitable for an educated but broad audience and the practical purpose of the work) are not somehow related. We think that they are, and that this characteristic — to be added to those listed by Cavell himself — makes the *Nicomachean Ethics* a perfectionist work that fits in well with the others listed in the “canon” or, rather, in the list of perfectionist texts. Aristotle wrote the *Nicomachean Ethics* not only to provide a theory of human ethical action, but also, and above all, to provide his readers with a tool for moral perfectionism. In order to do this, the ethical discourse must be directed toward its audience, it must make itself as understandable and accessible as possible to non-philosophers. In other words, it should be devoid of technicalities derived from other philosophical domains, such as metaphysical or physical domains.

Let us now turn to the theme of friendship, which is central to Cavell's proposed reconstruction of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and in particular of Book X. Let us begin by saying that Cavell is certainly right to emphasize the central role of the friend in Aristotle's ethics, just think of the space (two whole books) that this theme occupies in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Admittedly, more than one scholar has suggested that the treatise on friendship was originally a separate treatise. However, the origin of Books VIII and IX of the *Nicomachean Ethics* does not affect the importance of friendship in Aristotle, for at least two reasons. First, it can be said that, according to Aristotle, one cannot be happy without friends, and this means that friendship must be part of the subject matter of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as a work of ethical discourse (the purpose of ethics is precisely happiness, as we have seen). Second, it can be argued that friendship is not only a condition for happiness, but that happiness is primarily found in the communal life of friends. These points need to be specified, and we will see below what additions need to be made to the claim about the importance of friendship.

Cavell argues that *theorein*, that is, theoretical activity in the broad sense, which Aristotle describes as the best way of life in Book X, is not so much or
only the study of the mathematical sciences or the philosophy of nature, but
rather the study of friendship among virtuous men. The object of this "study"
(*theorein*) would then be the object of the *Nicomachean Ethics* itself. Here,
however, a clarification is needed. Of course one can say that friendship is ne-
cessarily part of ethical philosophy for Aristotle, but Cavell leans toward over-
statement when he writes that friendship is the object of study of the *Nicom-
achean Ethics* ("a study of what this book – the *Nicomachean Ethics* – is about,
namely, friendship and its role in the best life in human affairs"), because this
is actually happiness. It can certainly be said that friendship is a fundamental
part of Aristotle's ethical discourse, but the book *Nicomachean Ethics* is not
presented by Aristotle as a work on friendship.<fnref n="11" />

If we continue to listen to the voice of the skeptical, we might also say that the claim about the change in methodology in Book X is not entirely convincing. Cavell argues that reasoning about human affairs “might have its own conditions of origin and goal, its own completeness or accuracy or depth,” if it is understood as a *theorein* whose object is friendship itself. In fact, there is no need to see this as a paradigm shift from what Aristotle argues in Book I of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, for Aristotle never emphasizes that ethics cannot be as exact as the mathematical sciences (and is therefore less authoritative or accurate), but that it is about the object of study itself. As in biology, in Aristotle’s ethics the objects of study are sublunary entities or events, subject to the corruption and to the degree of randomness of the material accidents. This means that the discourse that studies such objects can only be accurate up to a certain point – the Aristotelian “most of the time” – because its objects are not necessary.

But is Cavell's idiosyncratic reading of Book X really too good to be true? It
may be, insofar as it puts *all* the emphasis on friendship. But Cavell's proposal
has the merit of placing the friendship between virtuous men at the center of
ethical discourse. This accentuates the perfectionist aspect of life, and especially of common perception and contemplation (*theorein*). Indeed, living with
others must be modeled not on the animal but on the human being. This is
why, for Aristotle, human life in community is not — only — configured as the
fact of eating together or acting for survival. The goal of human beings is not to

<footnote n="11">¹¹ The aim of the book is to make people happy through ethical conduct, not through friendship itself. Friendship is just one of the things you need to be happy. Of course, Cavell's proposal can be tempered by interpreting the word 'about' in the quoted sentence in a softer, more charitable way. It can be argued that Cavell is simply saying that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is a book that deals with — among other things — friendship, without this being its overarching topic. However, we find that the overall context of Cavell's utterance, together with the continuation of his discussion of friendship, risks overstating the importance and centrality of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. (It is, of course, an intentional and explorative overstatement and — as we shall see — with fruitful consequences).</footnote>
live, but to live happily (EE VII 12 and Pol. I 2, 1252b28-34). Therefore, what we share with friends is speech and thought.<fnref n="12" /> Thus we see that exchange and dialogue between individuals is as important as their living community, which also implies a common perception of friends living together. The philosophical communities of Plato's Academy or of the Lyceum, but also the Pythagorean communities and other groups of thinkers, are rather obvious examples of this way of life. Communities come together to carry out the activity that constitutes the reason for living or the purpose of the individuals who comprise them. This is why some gather to drink together, others to play dice, still others to exercise, hunt, or philosophize together (συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν) (NE IX 9, 1172a1-5). The virtuous person should therefore seek to live with virtuous and honest friends in order to be happy (NE IX 9, 1170b14-19). On the other hand, vicious people who live together will only get worse because they will constantly be doing vile things together. It is clear that the community of friends plays a crucial role in the process of moral improvement, for it is through the mutual exchange of words and actions that friends can improve each other. Each individual, therefore, must go through relationships with others, and especially with friends, in order to achieve his or her excellence – virtue – and happiness.<fnref n="13" /> This is the aspect that Cavell captured in his proposal to read Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as the fulfillment of the two books on friendship that precede it. Moreover, the search for a plurality of voices is fully justified here: the friend with whom one converses is not only a prerequisite for a polyphonic style, but also a condition for mutual moral refinement. Rereading the *Nicomachean Ethics* in the light of Cavell's remarks thus allows us to grasp some aspects that might remain in the background in the absence of the interpretive framework of moral or Emersonian perfectionism. Moreover, the various aspects we have evoked in the course of this article (the perfectionist style of the work, its audience, its practical purpose, friendship, and a certain kind of conversation with others) not only exemplify, in Aristotle's case, what Cavell means by moral or Emersonian perfectionism, but also reveal that there is a kind of interconnection between each of the elements mentioned. This, in turn, helps to show that Cavell's perfectionism is not a theory, but a dimension of moral life in which the importance of the concreteness of *certain* moments or aspects of life is emphasized, which is what really counts in perfectionism, as opposed to the abstract theories that may be proposed by philosophers.

<footnote n="12">¹² It must be noted, however, that this does not imply an absence of other shared experiences. The nature of the friendship under discussion is not purely intellectual and does not necessarily pass through language, but this is undoubtedly the aspect that interests Cavell most.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ It is clear that Aristotle believed there was a final stage of human action – happiness – but this does not exclude the possibility of an affinity with Emerson's proposal, insofar as happiness is not achieved once and for all by human beings.</footnote>
## Acknowledgements

This work was supported by a postdoctoral research project at the University of Turin, PRIN 2022 (Unione Europea - Next Generation EU, MIUR - Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca), with the title "Towards the History of a Heterodox Tradition in Analytic Philosophy: Transformative, Humanistic, Conversational" (Prot. 2022XS25NZ).

Section 1 was written by Paolo Babbiotti (University of Turin) and Section 2 was written by Luca Torrente (Université Aix-Marseille). The Introduction to the article was written by both authors.

Paolo Babbiotti
Università di Torino
paolo.babbiotti@unito.it

Luca Torrente
Affiliation
Email

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