# Neoliberalism in the Anglophone World

Marc Lenormand, Simon Dawes

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Marc Lenormand, Simon Dawes. Neoliberalism in the Anglophone World. Angles: French Perspectives on the Anglophone World, 8, 2019, 10.4000/angles.544. hal-04354175

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LONG LIVE THE INVINCIBLE NEO-LIBERAL
REVOLUTION AND DAVID CAMERON THOUGHT!

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@BARCLAYS M amazon.com

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TESCO

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Coca-Cola
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Simon Dawes and Marc Lenormand (dir.), *Angles*, 8 | 2019, "Neoliberalism in the Anglophone World" [Online], Online since 01 April 2019, connection on 22 May 2025. URL: https://journals.openedition.org/angles/544; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/angles.544

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## Video introduction to issue 8

Simon Dawes and Marc Lenormand

## Changes in Official Poverty and Inequality Rates in the Anglophone World in the Age of Neoliberalism

Nicholas Sowels

## Robots and Immigrants: Employment, Precarisation and the Art of Neoliberal Governance

Kostas Maronitis

## The Zombie Economy and the Aesthetic of Austerity

Ruth Cain and Johnna Montgomerie

## The Neoliberalization of Public Spaces and the Infringement of Civil Liberties

The Case of the Safer Cities Initiative in Los Angeles

Marine Dassé

## Graphic Interlude: Neoliberalism in the Anglophone World

Eduardo Bardi

## How To “Talk Left and Walk Right” in South Africa: Access to Medicines in the Neoliberal Era

An insight into the public market of antiretroviral treatments in South Africa

Charlotte Pelletan

## Neoliberal Metaphors in Presidential Discourse from Ronald Reagan to Donald Trump

Jérôme Viala-Gaudefroy

## Post-2008 Films: The Financial Crisis in Fictions and Documentaries

Juliette Feyel and Clémence Fourton

## Reclaiming Our Universities: A Manifesto to Dismantle the UK HE Sector Neoliberal Agenda

Marian Mayer and Sue Eccles

## Varia

### “To mutiny against this servitude”: The Sophisticated Democracy of As You Like It

Ifig Cocoual

### Commemorating the Irish Diaspora in the USA: The Role of 19th-century Paintings

Amelie Dochy
Video introduction to issue 8

Simon Dawes and Marc Lenormand

This media file cannot be displayed. Please refer to the online document http://journals.openedition.org/angles/555

**Transcript:**

1 I'm Marc Lenormand, senior lecturer in British Studies at Université Paul-Valéry Montpellier 3. I'm primarily a scholar of trade in history and industrial relations. In my research, I've looked at the evolution of trade unions and their responses to neoliberal policies and austerity policies from the 1970s.

2 I'm Simon Dawes, lecturer in British Studies and cultural industries at the university of Versailles Saint-Quentin. I'm particularly interested in the neoliberalization of media policy in the UK, as well as theories of neoliberalism and liberal theories of press freedom.

3 Particularly outside of academia at the moment since the financial crash, the word 'neoliberalism' has been used more and more, by more and more people without necessarily understanding what the term means or agreeing on what the term means. I'm something that people are talking about quite a lot. Inside academia, there are some disciplines in which they have had a methodological debate about what neoliberalism is, whether it exists or not, how best to analyse it... and other disciplines that have been lacking behind somewhat. I think it was important for us to look at the fact that the word 'neoliberalism' is used a lot when we talk about different aspects of the Anglophone world to assess the extent to which it is, or isn't, a useful word to use, and to highlight the different perspectives that are drawn on different academic perspectives, different disciplines, different theoretical and methodological approaches, not necessarily to argue that one is better than others, but just to present the diversity of different approaches to studying various aspects of the neoliberal Anglophone world.

4 There's also this sense that the use of the term has become so inflated that no one knows what it means anymore. There are now some academic journals, for example, that refuse to accept any article that uses the word 'neoliberalism' without making it
explicit which theoretical position you are adopting, which theorists of neoliberalism
you're using. So it's important for us to question whether the word is useful. If we do
use it, we can't just use it and assume that everyone understands what we mean. We
have to actually engage with the literature on the subject.

5 These debates in the field of literature specializing in neoliberalism are generally structured around Marxist or Marx-inspired approaches versus, or combined with, Foucault and Foucauldian approaches. They are broadly two different camps. There are those who argue that neoliberalism is an ideology, that we can talk about neoliberal hegemony, and these people tend to adopt a broadly Marxist approach, often using Gramsci. They would cite David Harvey and/or Stuart Hall on neoliberalism. And then we have the different camp which would be Foucauldian or post-Foucauldian, who would cite Foucault's lectures from 1979, his book on the birth of biopolitics. There's also lots of literature that has been written by others since then, using Foucault's ideas, who talk more about neoliberalism as a form of governmentality rather than ideology. And then there are also those who draw on both approaches to argue that we can make bridges between these approaches. And there are those who argue that you cannot, that they are two fundamentally different approaches.

6 What's important for us with this issue was just showing the diversity. As long as the authors were engaging with the literatures and situating their own perspective within these debates, that was the main thing.

7 This special issue of *Angles* is a follow-up to a conference that we organized in Montpellier in 2017 on neoliberalism in the Anglophone world. It was very important for us to show this diversity of topics and approaches, by getting contributions from all the various sub-disciplines of English Studies in France. We have British and American civilization essays, essays on American literature, essays from linguists, as well as from people from all sorts of different disciplines from the Anglophone world.

8 We've got analysis of public policy in certain specific areas, and we've got discussions of economic policy, employment policy, and also the effects of neoliberal economic policies on a society and on bodies. And you've also got articles dealing more with representations: representing neoliberalism and the crisis, either in terms of visual studies analysis, or more in terms of linguistic analysis, or at least the analysis of rhetoric in discourse. The issue ends with a paper on resistance.

9 This conference happened just after the Brexit vote in the UK and the election of Trump in the US, so those issues were on the minds of everyone at the conference and it's issues like this, events like this, which many people would argue are consequences of neoliberalism, of austerity policies that have been pursued around the world after the financial crash.

10 As you'll see, in all of the articles in the issue, these issues are mentioned at least briefly. We're filming this video introduction in the middle of the yellow vest protests in France, protests against the French iteration of the neoliberal agenda. And there's also relevance to our immediate context in academia. Academia has been one of the testing grounds for neoliberal policies in the UK and France, among others.

11 If you look around you, and consider the increasing workload, top-down management, project funding, all the talk of excellence... well, think 'neoliberalism'.

12 We hope you enjoy the issue!
ABSTRACTS

This video introduces the thematic contributions on ‘Neoliberalism in the Anglophone world’.

La vidéo présente les contributions thématiques sur « Le néolibéralisme dans le monde ».

INDEX

**Keywords:** neoliberalism, United States, United Kingdom, South Africa, economics, politics, governmentality

**Mots-clés:** néolibéralisme, États-Unis, Royaume-Uni, Afrique du Sud, économie, politique, gouvernementalité

AUTHORS

SIMON DAWES

Guest editor of Issue 8. Senior Lecturer at Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines and member of the research team, Centre d'histoire culturelle des sociétés contemporaines. He is the founding editor of the open access journal, Media Theory, and the author of British Broadcasting and the Public-Private Dichotomy: Neoliberalism, Citizenship and the Public Sphere (2017, Palgrave Macmillan). His research revolves around issues of media theory, history and regulation, particularly the history and regulation of British and French media. Contact: simondawes0[at]gmail.com

MARC LENORMAND

Guest editor of Issue 8. Senior Lecturer at the Université Paul Valéry Montpellier 3. His research focuses on the industrial, political and intellectual history of the UK trade union movement and of the broader UK left in the second half of the 20th century. He has written on industrial action in the 1970s, the evolution of trade unions, their relationship with the Labour Party, women in trade unions and left organisations, and the recent history of collective movements. A former member of the Editorial Board and editor of Tracés, he has edited journal issues on education, minorities, political violence and animal rights. Contact: Marc.Lenormand[at]univ-montp3.fr.
# Changes in Official Poverty and Inequality Rates in the Anglophone World in the Age of Neoliberalism

Nicholas Sowels

1. This article presents an overview of official poverty and inequality rates in the Anglophone world, which are key issues related to the emergence of neoliberal capitalism since the late 1970s. They have had an important role to play in the rise of populist political movements leading to protectionist and nationalist politics, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom (Gamble 2017). In both countries, neoliberalism and globalization have left significant sections of society behind, fuelling popular anger against the *status quo* and so-called metropolitan elites, especially since the financial crisis and Great Recession. The Brexit referendum in June 2016 and the election of Donald Trump in November 2016 are clear manifestations of such anger in the face of public policies that have largely pursued a back-to-business agenda since the crisis.

2. The rise of inequality has been especially strong in the United States, where the “top 1%” of rich households has demonstrably pulled away from the rest of society in terms of income growth and wealth accumulation. Meanwhile, “middle America” has been largely left out of the growth that has accompanied neoliberal economic policies that go back to the 1970s, as a way of tackling stagflation at the time. Broadly speaking, these policies have included significant reductions in direct government intervention in economies and the strengthening of market forces to make product, financial and labour markets more flexible. Specifically, policies have been based on: the abandonment of fiscal policy as a tool for managing demand and supporting employment in favour of monetary policy aimed primarily at achieving low inflation, steep tax cuts for top income earners, the deregulation of markets, the privatization and contracting out of public service provision, the deliberate weakening of trade union power, the pursuit of international trade liberalization, and the financialization of the world economy which has been in the forefront of globalization. Such policies have varied from country to country, as has their impact on inequality and poverty
levels in the industrialized world. But among the developed countries, these policies have been especially pronounced in the Anglophone world, and they contrast strongly with the more interventionist policies of government that shaped capitalism in the post-war era.

3. To examine the broader impact of neoliberalism on poverty and inequality, this article will begin by providing a brief overview of the definitions of both phenomena which are linked but distinct. Section 2 will then present the key basic data on inequality and poverty trends, using standardized data provided by the OECD. It will also provide summary statistics concerning the income share of the “top 1%” provided by the World Inequality Database, constructed by the team of researchers working with Thomas Piketty.¹ The final section will review and analyze the specificity of the Anglophone world’s experience with neoliberalism.

## Key definitions of poverty and inequality

4. Poverty and inequality are linked but separate phenomena and affect the lives of millions of people on a daily basis in the Anglophone world (and beyond). Before turning to the dry statistics, it is important to recall — I believe — that the daily hardship of poverty is lost in the data and is generally absent in the media, and even in art. We may be exposed to war and terror on TV, while the audio-visual and plastic arts can shock. Abject poverty is also easily visible on the streets of major cities, where homeless people and refugees huddle under shelters, in cardboard boxes or simple tents. But most of the time, the daily grind of, say, the 40 million US citizens living below the poverty line takes place out of sight. Only occasionally it is captured on film, in TV documentaries, or in written fiction.

### Measuring poverty

5. There are two traditional definitions of poverty which split the Anglophone world. The first definition is more politically conservative and is based on assigning an absolute monetary value to poverty. This approach is used in the United States, where a poverty threshold is calculated on the basis of a “dollar amount for the sum of three broad categories of basic goods and services — food, clothing, and shelter (including utilities)” (Citro and Michael 1995). The poverty threshold is then adjusted to take into account household composition, with successive adults and children being weighted less in terms of the resources they need. Thus, in 2017, the poverty threshold for persons living in mainland America (i.e. not Alaska nor Hawaii) was a yearly income of $12,750 for a single adult under the age of 65, and $24,858 for a household with two adults under 65, and two children under 18 (see Table 1) (US Census Bureau 2018).

6. The other principle definition of poverty is a relative definition. Used in the European Union and by international organizations such as the OECD, this definition sets the poverty threshold at 60 (or 50) percent of the median household disposable income, equivalised to take into account household composition. This means that all state benefits/transfers are first added to households’ initial earned income and taxes are subsequently deducted. Again, adults in a household have diminishing weights, as do children.²
7 Poverty — or “low income” — is usually measured like this in the United Kingdom. Government statistics however also use an absolute definition of poverty/low income. This is calculated by adjusting the 60 percent median income threshold in a base year (currently 2010/11) for inflation, to provide a more absolute measure of poverty (McGuinness 2018). Relative measures of poverty by definition follow the evolution of median wages. By contrast, this calculation of absolute poverty in real money terms increases more slowly, as it does not reflect real growth in the economy, only price increases. In an expanding economy, this leads to more visible falls in poverty. An important issue in the UK statistics (and in other Anglophone countries) is also the inclusion or not of housing costs. Given the slow growth of housing units in recent decades in the UK, housing is an increasingly pressing expense on household budgets. As a result, the percentage of people living on low income “after housing costs” (AHC) is about 5 percentage points higher than the share on low income “before housing costs” (BHC).

8 In Ireland, the official measure of poverty relates to “consistent poverty”, which draws on two overlapping indicators: i) the at-risk-of-poverty indicator of individuals living in households below 60 percent of the median income, and ii) the basic deprivation indicator which captures individuals lacking 2 or more of 11 basic necessities, which include two pairs of shoes, a warm waterproof overcoat, new (not second-hand) clothes, the ability to eat a meal with meat, chicken or fish (or the vegetarian equivalent) every second day, and have a roast joint or equivalent once a week, the ability to keep adequately warm, etc. (Dept. of Employment Affairs and Social Protection 2016).

<table><caption>Table 1: Monetary Values of Poverty Thresholds (and equivalent in euros*)³</caption><thead><tr><td></td><td>Indicator</td><td>Year</td><td>Income per year, 1 person</td><td>Income per year, 2 adults & 2 children</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>United States</td><td>Poverty line (absolute value: basket of goods and services)</td><td>2017</td><td>$12,750 (€9,960)</td><td>$24,858 (€20,209)</td></tr><tr><td>United Kingdom</td><td>60% median income BHC</td><td>2016/17</td><td>£17,200 (€19,770)</td><td>£36,000 (€40,900)</td></tr><tr><td>Ireland</td><td>60% median income</td><td></td><td>€12,358</td><td>€25,823</td></tr><tr><td>Canada</td><td>LIM (Low income measure)</td><td>2015</td><td>C$22,133 (€14,097)</td><td>C$44,266 (€28,194)</td></tr><tr><td>Australia</td><td>60% median income BHC</td><td>2013-14</td><td>A$26,600 (€16,729)</td><td>A$55,862 (€35,133)</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td>New Zealand</td><td>60% median income BHC</td><td>2016</td><td>NZ$22,620<br/>(€13,464)</td><td>NZ$49,400<br/>(€29,404)</td></tr></table>

Sources: (full references are given at the end of the article): US: Census Bureau, "Poverty Thresholds", 2018; UK: DWP, "Households Below Average Income: An analysis of the UK income distribution: 1994/95-2016/17"; Ireland: European Anti Poverty Network Ireland, "Relative Poverty Rates"; Canada: Statistics Canada, "Census in Brief: Children living in low-income households"; Australia: Australian Council of Social Service [ACOSS] and Social Policy Research Centre [SPRC], "Poverty in Australia 2016"; New Zealand: Ministry of Social Development, "Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2016".

9. Canada has no official poverty line. A number of low income lines are nevertheless used by government agencies to inform public debate. Thus, Statistics Canada formulated the Low Income cut-offs (LICO) in the 1960s. These are thresholds below which families that spend more than 20 percentage points than the average family on certain necessities are defined as having a low income. The necessities include food, shelter and clothing. This is a low, but relative definition of poverty. The Market basket measure (MBM) in contrast defines a family as having a low income if it does not have enough money to buy "a specific set of goods and services that represent a basic standard of living". The MBM is therefore an absolute measure of poverty, similar to the US poverty line. Lastly, Canada also uses a Low income measure (LIM) which identifies families with income below the 50% median household income. This is similar to the EU definition — but lower. In 2014, it was estimated that 8.8% of the population (3.0 million people) were living below the LICO; 11.3% (or 3.9 million) below the MBM rate, and 13.0% (4.5 million) below the LIM (Government of Canada 2016). The relative definition using the 50% of median income threshold therefore seems to be the broadest, most inclusive definition.

10. Australia has no official definition of a poverty threshold either. Instead, poverty is principally measured by two independent, non-governmental organizations, albeit using public data. The Melbourne Institute tracks an absolute measure of poverty. This is done by updating a benchmark of weekly disposable income for a family of two adults and two children, as originally calculated in December 1973 (at A$62.70). Other thresholds for different types of families are calculated using equivalence scales: there seems to be no calculation for isolated individuals. These poverty lines are updated using an index of per capita household disposable income. Thus, in September 2017, the poverty line for this two-adult, two-child household was A$961.21 per week, including housing costs, and A$744.07 other than housing (Melbourne Institute 2018). For its part, the Australian Council of Social Service and the Social Policy Research Centre regularly report on relative poverty lines at the 50% and 60% of median disposable household income, before and after housing costs. For a couple with two children, the poverty line in 2013-14 at the 60% threshold was A$1,074.27 BHC and A$864.26 AHC (ACOSS and SPRC 2016).

11. Lastly, New Zealand also uses a mix of absolute and relative measures. Thus, two relative thresholds are calculated at "50 and 60 percent of the current year's household disposable income median net-of-housing-costs". An absolute measure is also calculated, based on 50% of the 2007 median household income (net-of-housing-costs), which has been subsequently updated to ensure its real value (Ministry of Social Development 2017).
Defining inequality

12 Measures of inequality typically relate mainly to income. The two most common measures are the Gini coefficient which is derived from the Lorenz Curve and the ratio of the top 10% (or 20%) of incomes to the bottom 10% (or 20%) of incomes. The Gini coefficient provides a scale indicator of inequality running from 0 (or 0%) indicating total equality, to 1 (or 100%) indicating total inequality (in which the top 1% takes all). It is usually used for income inequality, where statistics tend to be more reliable as they are usually based on households' tax declarations.

13 Some qualifying comments need to be made about this, however. There are limits to the upper-most value of the Gini coefficient concerning the distribution of income, simply because all members of a society need to receive some income to ensure subsistence, otherwise a society (or community) will collapse. Also, as societies get richer, the quantity of basic necessities needed to function in society — and the economy — rises. As a result, Gini coefficients have historically never exceeded 0.6 in today's major industrialized nations (including in the 19th century) (Milanovic 2016). In the post-World War II period and even with the rise of neoliberalism, Gini coefficients for disposable household income (after benefits and taxes) tend to cluster in a relatively narrow range from 0.25-0.3 for fairly equal societies (as in Scandinavia), to 0.35-0.4 for unequal societies (as in the United States today). It is only in extremely unequal societies, where national income is sufficiently higher than total, national subsistence income, that higher Gini values of 0.45 and more may be found (typically in Latin America).

14 The Gini coefficient may also be used to indicate wealth inequality. This however is less common because estimating wealth inequality is hard: declarations are less frequent (for example inheritance tax declarations) and wealth may often be held more in families than by individuals. Moreover, holders of wealth frequently avoid declaring assets fully, which is also the case for incomes. As a result, Gini coefficients are generally likely to understate inequalities.

An Overview of Current Poverty Rates and Inequality
Trends in the Anglophone Countries

15 Table 2 is taken from the OECD Income Distribution and Database (IDD). It provides two indicators of poverty: a relative measure at the 50% threshold of median disposable income; and a more absolute measure: the “anchored” 50% threshold of median disposable income in 2005 uses the same procedure to adjust for inflation as described for the UK and New Zealand above. The Table ranks poverty rates for 2015 in ascending order.

16 Not surprisingly, the United States comes nearly bottom of the list, just behind Turkey, with 17.2 percent of its population living in poverty, based on this measure — compared to 13.5% of the population living below the official poverty line in 2015 (Semega et al. 2017: 43). Canada too has a poverty level that was above the OECD average: respectively 14.2 percent and 11.6 percent in 2015. In diminishing order, Australia (12.8 percent), New Zealand (10.9 percent) and the United Kingdom (also at 10.9%) are clustered around the OECD average. Only Ireland, with a poverty rate of 9.2
percent, has a significantly lower rate, more akin to the rates found in continental and northern Europe. A quick glance at the table does indeed provide some impression of loose country groupings. Thus, the emerging countries (Turkey, Mexico and Chile) have significantly higher poverty rates than the OECD average. By contrast, poverty rates in the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) are all lower — sometimes much lower — than the OECD average. Northern European countries (the Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Belgium) along with France are also all situated around the OECD average. On the other hand, the Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) all had above-average poverty rates in 2015. Finally, the Central European countries have relatively low poverty rates, which is not the case for the Baltic States of Estonia and Latvia — Lithuania is not a member of the OECD but with 16.5 percent, it has a similar poverty rate to its Baltic neighbors.

17

This broad breakdown corresponds in general terms to the image one has of the different welfare states and “varieties of capitalism” in the developed world (see below). Poverty rates are lower on average in the more equal societies in Scandinavia, followed by countries with traditionally strong welfare states in northern Europe. In contrast, countries with more limited welfare states in the Mediterranean also have higher rates of poverty on the whole. As for the Anglophone countries, they stand out collectively as having liberal welfare states, with minimal state income support for pensions and unemployment pay, which are backed up by private welfare schemes. The US stands out strongly as having a very high poverty rate by OECD standards.

<table><caption>Table 2: Poverty Rates in the OECD Countries</caption><caption>15 December 2017<br>Updated countries and values are shaded</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="8">Poverty rate (relative threshold: 50% median disposable income)</th><th colspan="3">Poverty rate (threshold "anchored" in 2005)</th></tr><tr><th>2007</th><th>2014</th><th>2015 or</th><th>Children</th><th>Youth</th><th>Adult</th><th>Elderly</th><th>Working</th><th>2007</th><th>2014</th><th>2015 or</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Denmark</td><td>5.9 e</td><td>5.4</td><td>5.5</td><td>2.9</td><td>21.6</td><td>4.0</td><td>3.2</td><td>4.0</td><td>4.7 e</td><td>4.7</td><td>4.6</td></tr><tr><td>Finland</td><td>7.8</td><td>6.8</td><td>6.3</td><td>3.7</td><td>18.1</td><td>5.5</td><td>5.2</td><td>4.0</td><td>6.4</td><td>4.6</td><td>4.3</td></tr><tr><td>Czech Republic</td><td>5.5</td><td>5.9</td><td>6.4</td><td>10.5</td><td>6.6</td><td>5.7</td><td>4.2</td><td>3.9</td><td>3.4</td><td>3.6</td><td>3.2</td></tr><tr><td>Iceland</td><td>6.6</td><td>4.5</td><td>6.5</td><td>7.2</td><td>8.5</td><td>6.1</td><td>5.4</td><td>6.0</td><td>3.7</td><td>4.5</td><td>6.9</td></tr><tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>6.5 e</td><td>7.7</td><td>7.9</td><td>10.2</td><td>19.7</td><td>6.2</td><td>3.7</td><td>6.1</td><td>5.6 e</td><td>6.1</td><td>6.2</td></tr><tr><td>Luxembourg</td><td>7.1</td><td>8.3</td><td>8.1</td><td>11.3</td><td>9.9</td><td>7.5</td><td>3.9</td><td>7.6</td><td>7.0</td><td>8.9</td><td>8.4</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>7.5 e</td><td>8.1</td><td>8.1</td><td>11.3</td><td>13.9</td><td>7.4</td><td>3.1</td><td>7.1</td><td></td><td>7.3</td><td>7.1</td></tr><tr><td>Norway</td><td>7.8</td><td>8.1</td><td>8.1</td><td>7.3</td><td>24.1</td><td>6.3</td><td>4.4</td><td>6.4</td><td></td><td>4.4</td><td>4.4</td></tr><tr><td>Slovak Republic</td><td>6.8</td><td>8.7</td><td>8.4</td><td>14.8</td><td>8.2</td><td>7.5</td><td>3.4</td><td>5.9</td><td>3.4</td><td>3.3</td><td>2.9</td></tr><tr><td>Austria</td><td>9.7</td><td>9.0</td><td>8.7</td><td>9.6</td><td>11.4</td><td>8.2</td><td>7.8</td><td>6.6</td><td>9.7</td><td>8.4</td><td>8.2</td></tr><tr><td>Slovenia</td><td>7.9</td><td>9.4</td><td>9.2</td><td>7.0</td><td>7.9</td><td>8.8</td><td>13.5</td><td>5.9</td><td>6.1</td><td>8.5</td><td>8.3</td></tr><tr><td>Sweden</td><td>8.4 e</td><td>9.0</td><td>9.2</td><td>9.1</td><td>12.1</td><td>7.7</td><td>11.4</td><td>5.2</td><td></td><td>3.2</td><td>2.8</td></tr><tr><td>Ireland</td><td>9.6</td><td>8.8</td><td>9.2</td><td>9.2</td><td>14.7</td><td>8.8</td><td>6.8</td><td>3.5</td><td>7.2</td><td>14.2</td><td>11.4</td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>9.0</td><td>9.1</td><td>9.5</td><td>9.5</td><td>14.7</td><td>8.8</td><td>9.4</td><td>3.7</td><td>8.8</td><td>8.6</td><td>8.6</td></tr><tr><td>Belgium</td><td>9.2</td><td>9.1</td><td>9.8</td><td>11.0</td><td>10.3</td><td>9.4</td><td>9.5</td><td>4.5</td><td>8.3</td><td>7.1</td><td>6.8</td></tr><tr><td>Switzerland</td><td>9.7 e</td><td>8.6</td><td>9.9</td><td>9.9</td><td>9.3</td><td>7.2</td><td>19.4</td><td>7.1</td><td></td><td>6.9</td><td>7.5</td></tr><tr><td>Hungary</td><td>6.4 e</td><td>10.3</td><td>10.1</td><td>11.8</td><td>11.9</td><td>9.6</td><td>8.6</td><td>7.2</td><td></td><td>13.0</td><td>9.1</td></tr><tr><td>United Kingdom</td><td>12.8</td><td>10.5</td><td>10.9</td><td>11.2</td><td>10.6</td><td>9.9</td><td>13.8</td><td>5.9</td><td>11.8</td><td>9.5</td><td>9.0</td></tr><tr><td>New Zealand</td><td>11.0 e</td><td>9.9</td><td>10.9</td><td>14.1</td><td>9.6</td><td>9.8</td><td>10.5</td><td>6.6</td><td>5.5 e</td><td>5.7</td><td>5.6</td></tr><tr><td>Poland</td><td>9.6</td><td>10.4</td><td>11.1</td><td>13.4</td><td>12.1</td><td>10.8</td><td>8.5</td><td>8.4</td><td>5.2</td><td>3.6</td><td>3.2</td></tr><tr><td>OECD</td><td>11.5 e</td><td>11.7</td><td>11.6</td><td>13.1</td><td>13.7</td><td>10.1</td><td>12.9</td><td>8.0</td><td>8.5 e</td><td>9.7</td><td>9.4</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>12.8</td><td>13.5</td><td>12.6</td><td>15.5</td><td>14.1</td><td>12.0</td><td>10.8</td><td>9.0</td><td>10.8</td><td>13.8</td><td>11.8</td></tr><tr><td>Australia</td><td>14.9 e</td><td>14.0</td><td>12.8</td><td>13.0</td><td>8.0</td><td>10.6</td><td>25.7</td><td>4.8</td><td></td><td>8.2</td><td>7.1</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>11.9</td><td>13.3</td><td>13.7</td><td>19.3</td><td>15.5</td><td>13.4</td><td>9.3</td><td>12.4</td><td>10.6</td><td>15.6</td><td>16.3</td></tr><tr><td>Korea</td><td>14.8 e</td><td>14.4</td><td>13.8</td><td>7.1</td><td>7.9</td><td>8.6</td><td>45.7</td><td>5.6</td><td>14.4 e</td><td>11.4</td><td>10.9</td></tr><tr><td>Canada</td><td>12.9</td><td>12.6</td><td>14.2</td><td>17.1</td><td>17.3</td><td>13.5</td><td>10.7</td><td>11.0</td><td>11.3</td><td>9.0</td><td>9.6</td></tr><tr><td>Greece</td><td>13.2</td><td>14.8</td><td>14.9</td><td>18.9</td><td>18.8</td><td>15.6</td><td>7.7</td><td>13.1</td><td>11.3</td><td>33.6</td><td>33.2</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>14.2</td><td>15.3</td><td>15.3</td><td>22.1</td><td>21.0</td><td>15.3</td><td>5.9</td><td>14.8</td><td>14.2</td><td>22.5</td><td>21.9</td></tr><tr><td>Estonia</td><td>13.8</td><td>15.5</td><td>16.1</td><td>12.1</td><td>13.1</td><td>12.8</td><td>31.9</td><td>8.8</td><td>4.3</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Chile</td><td>17.8</td><td>16.8</td><td>16.1</td><td>21.1</td><td>15.1</td><td>13.9</td><td>16.3</td><td>13.8</td><td>14.0</td><td>7.8</td><td>6.4</td></tr><tr><td>Japan</td><td>15.7 e</td><td>16.0</td><td>16.1</td><td>16.3</td><td>19.7</td><td>13.8</td><td>19.0</td><td>13.3</td><td></td><td>19.6</td><td>17.2</td></tr><tr><td>Latvia</td><td>18.6</td><td>16.2</td><td>16.2</td><td>12.2</td><td>9.9</td><td>13.5</td><td>30.9</td><td>8.5</td><td>5.2</td><td>4.9</td><td>4.3</td></tr><tr><td>Mexico</td><td>18.4 e</td><td>18.9</td><td>16.7</td><td>19.7</td><td>12.0</td><td>14.4</td><td>25.6</td><td>15.3</td><td>13.3 e</td><td>16.0</td><td>14.7</td></tr><tr><td>United States</td><td>17.4 e</td><td>17.5</td><td>16.8</td><td>19.9</td><td>18.4</td><td>14.1</td><td>20.9</td><td>11.0</td><td></td><td>19.3</td><td>17.6</td></tr><tr><td>Turkey</td><td>17.0 e</td><td>17.3</td><td>17.2</td><td>25.3</td><td>15.5</td><td>13.0</td><td>17.0</td><td>15.5</td><td></td><td>6.8</td><td>5.2</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD). Gini, poverty, income, Methods and Concepts. http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm
18 Table 2 also shows that with relative poverty at the 50% threshold, the impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession has been largely absorbed in the Anglophone world. The figures for 2015 indicate that relative poverty rates are now lower than in 2007, with the notable exception of Canada, where this measure of the poverty rate rose from 12.9 percent in 2007 to 14.2 percent in 2015. Canada's figures are comparatively high in terms of the OECD average, and their increase has been substantial.

19 At the same time, Canada and the UK have seen quite clear falls in the percentage of persons living at or under the “anchored” threshold (in the UK, this percentage fell from 11.8 percent in 2007 to 9.4 percent in 2015). Other things being equal, fewer people are therefore living in poverty in real terms, indicating that the effects of the financial crisis have been mitigated to some degree. In Canada, this likely stems from the fact that the financial crisis had far less impact on its banking system, and so on growth. In the UK, government measures to protect pensions mean that incomes of older people were safeguarded after the crisis. This probably explains much of the reduction in “anchored” poverty, though it should be noted that young people have been particularly badly affected by the crisis. The measure of “anchored” poverty is also particularly telling for Ireland. While Ireland too has seen a fall in the percentage of persons living under the 50% threshold, the share of persons living at or under the “anchored” rate actually increased from 7.2 percent in 2007 to 11.4 percent in 2015, reflecting the huge economic shock experienced by Ireland due to the financial crisis (Whelan 2013).

<table><caption>Table 3: Inequality Indicators for the OECD countries (Gini coefficient and ratio of top 20 percent to bottom 20 percent)⁴</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Updated countries and values are shaded</th><th colspan="3">Gini coefficient</th><th colspan="3">S80/S20 income share ratio</th></tr><tr><th>1980*</th><th>1985</th><th>1995</th><th>2007</th><th>2014</th><th>2015 or latest available year</th><th>Increase 1980 to 2015</th><th>2007</th><th>2014</th><th>2015 or latest available year</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Iceland</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.286</td><td>0.241</td><td>0.246</td><td></td><td>4.1</td><td>3.4</td><td>3.6</td></tr><tr><td>Slovenia</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.239</td><td>0.251</td><td>0.250</td><td></td><td>3.5</td><td>3.7</td><td>3.7</td></tr><tr><td>Slovak Republic</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.245</td><td>0.247</td><td>0.251</td><td></td><td>3.5</td><td>3.7</td><td>3.7</td></tr><tr><td>Denmark</td><td>0.255</td><td>0.221</td><td>0.215</td><td>0.244 e</td><td>0.254</td><td>0.256</td><td>0.001</td><td>3.4 e</td><td>3.6</td><td>3.6</td></tr><tr><td>Czech Republic</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.256</td><td>0.257</td><td>0.258</td><td></td><td>3.6</td><td>3.7</td><td>3.7</td></tr><tr><td>Finland</td><td>0.217</td><td>0.209(86)</td><td>0.22</td><td>0.269</td><td>0.257</td><td>0.260</td><td>0.043</td><td>3.9</td><td>3.7</td><td>3.7</td></tr><tr><td>Belgium</td><td>0.226</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.277</td><td>0.266</td><td>0.268</td><td>0.042</td><td>4.1</td><td>3.9</td><td>4.0</td></tr><tr><td>Norway</td><td>0.235</td><td>0.222(86)</td><td>0.243</td><td>0.250</td><td>0.257</td><td>0.272</td><td>0.037</td><td>3.7</td><td>3.9</td><td>4.1</td></tr><tr><td>Austria</td><td>0.266(83)</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.284</td><td>0.274</td><td>0.276</td><td>0.010</td><td>4.4</td><td>4.1</td><td>4.2</td></tr><tr><td>Sweden</td><td>0.2</td><td>0.198(83)</td><td>0.211</td><td>0.259 e</td><td>0.274</td><td>0.278</td><td>0.078</td><td>3.9 e</td><td>4.1</td><td>4.2</td></tr><tr><td>Luxembourg</td><td>0.247(86)</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.277</td><td>0.280</td><td>0.284</td><td></td><td>4.0</td><td>4.2</td><td>4.2</td></tr><tr><td>Hungary</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.271 e</td><td>0.289</td><td>0.288</td><td></td><td>3.9 e</td><td>4.5</td><td>4.5</td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>0.251</td><td>0.251</td><td>0.266</td><td>0.285</td><td>0.292</td><td>0.289</td><td>0.038</td><td>4.3</td><td>4.4</td><td>4.4</td></tr><tr><td>Poland</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.316</td><td>0.298</td><td>0.292</td><td></td><td>5.0</td><td>4.7</td><td>4.6</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>0.291</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.292 e</td><td>0.293</td><td>0.295</td><td>0.004</td><td>4.3 e</td><td>4.4</td><td>4.4</td></tr><tr><td>Korea</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.312 e</td><td>0.302</td><td>0.295</td><td></td><td>5.6 e</td><td>5.4</td><td>5.1</td></tr><tr><td>Switzerland</td><td>0.303</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.298 e</td><td>0.295</td><td>0.297</td><td>-0.006</td><td>4.6 e</td><td>4.4</td><td>4.6</td></tr><tr><td>Ireland</td><td>0.311</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.304</td><td>0.308</td><td>0.298</td><td>-0.013</td><td>4.6</td><td>4.8</td><td>4.6</td></tr><tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>0.248</td><td>0.272</td><td>0.297</td><td>0.308 e</td><td>0.305</td><td>0.303</td><td>0.055</td><td>4.6 e</td><td>4.6</td><td>4.6</td></tr><tr><td>OECD</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.318 e</td><td>0.316</td><td>0.317</td><td></td><td>5.5 e</td><td>5.5</td><td>5.5</td></tr><tr><td>Canada</td><td>0.282</td><td>0.293</td><td>0.289</td><td>0.317</td><td>0.313</td><td>0.318</td><td>0.036</td><td>5.3</td><td>5.2</td><td>5.5</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>0.291</td><td>0.291(84)</td><td>0.327</td><td>0.313</td><td>0.325</td><td>0.326</td><td>0.035</td><td>5.2</td><td>5.8</td><td>5.9</td></tr><tr><td>Japan</td><td>0.244</td><td>0.304</td><td>0.323</td><td>0.329 e</td><td>0.336</td><td>0.330</td><td>0.086</td><td>6.0 e</td><td>6.2</td><td>6.1</td></tr><tr><td>Estonia</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.313</td><td>0.346</td><td>0.330</td><td></td><td>5.2</td><td>6.2</td><td>5.8</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>0.224</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.361</td><td>0.338</td><td>0.336</td><td>0.112</td><td>6.3</td><td>5.9</td><td>5.8</td></tr><tr><td>Australia</td><td>0.269</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.338 e</td><td>0.326</td><td>0.337</td><td>0.068</td><td>5.8 e</td><td>5.5</td><td>5.7</td></tr><tr><td>Greece</td><td>0.33(81)</td><td>0.352*</td><td></td><td>0.329</td><td>0.339</td><td>0.340</td><td>0.010</td><td>5.6</td><td>6.4</td><td>6.4</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>0.318</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.324</td><td>0.344</td><td>0.345</td><td>0.027</td><td>5.2</td><td>6.6</td><td>6.5</td></tr><tr><td>Latvia</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.374</td><td>0.350</td><td>0.346</td><td></td><td>7.3</td><td>6.4</td><td>6.3</td></tr><tr><td>Israel</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.365 e</td><td>0.360</td><td>0.346</td><td></td><td>7.5 e</td><td>7.1</td><td>6.5</td></tr><tr><td>New Zealand</td><td>0.281</td><td>0.272</td><td>0.335</td><td>0.330 e</td><td>0.333</td><td>0.349</td><td>0.068</td><td>5.3 e</td><td>5.3</td><td>5.8</td></tr><tr><td>United Kingdom</td><td>0.267</td><td>0.309</td><td>0.337(94)</td><td>0.373</td><td>0.356</td><td>0.360</td><td>0.093</td><td>6.6</td><td>6.0</td><td>6.1</td></tr><tr><td>United States</td><td>0.304</td><td></td><td>0.361</td><td>0.374 e</td><td>0.394</td><td>0.390</td><td>0.086</td><td>7.9 e</td><td>8.7</td><td>8.3</td></tr><tr><td>Turkey</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.409 e</td><td>0.398</td><td>0.404</td><td></td><td>7.8 e</td><td>7.7</td><td>7.8</td></tr><tr><td>Chile</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.480</td><td>0.465</td><td>0.454</td><td></td><td>11.8</td><td>10.6</td><td>10.0</td></tr><tr><td>Mexico</td><td>0.452(84)</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.450 e</td><td>0.457</td><td>0.459</td><td></td><td>10.8 e</td><td>11.5</td><td>10.4</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD). Gini, poverty, income, Methods and Concepts. http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm
20 In terms of child poverty, at the relative 50% measure, Ireland had a comparatively low rate of child poverty at 9.2 percent in 2014. The UK too was somewhat below the OECD average (respectively 11.2 percent and 13.1 percent). Relative child poverty rates were however markedly higher in Canada (17.1 percent) and the United States (19.9 percent). The United States and Australia also had particularly high relative poverty rates among the elderly: respectively 20.9 and 25.7 percent, compared to the OECD average of 12.9 percent.

21 Turning to inequality, the Gini coefficient for equivalised disposable household income indicates that Ireland had a slightly more equal income distribution on this measure in 2015 than the OECD average (respectively 0.298 and 0.317). This distinguishes Ireland from the other Anglophone countries. Canada at 0.318 was only a little more unequal, followed by Australia at 0.337. For New Zealand, the Gini coefficient was 0.349, while the UK was at 0.360 and the US at 0.390. The high Gini coefficients of these last four countries — Australia, New Zealand, the UK the US — are strong manifestations of the rise in inequality associated with neoliberalism in the Anglophone world. In all cases, the Gini coefficient rose substantially from 1980 (roughly the beginning of neoliberal tax cutting policies) to 2015: up by 0.068 in both Australia and New Zealand, by fully 0.093 in the United Kingdom and by 0.086 in the United States. It should be noted however that these increases were not uniform. In particular, reviewing global inequality trends in 2017, François Bourguignon distinguishes countries like the United States (as well as France, Denmark and Sweden, Israel and Japan) which have experienced a rising inequality trend, from those which have been characterized by a “one-step” rise. The latter include the United Kingdom and New Zealand (where inequality rose strongly in the second half of the 1980s, and then remained largely unchanged before actually falling somewhat after the financial crisis), and Canada and Australia (both experiencing their one-step increase in the second half of the 1990s, and again small drops in the immediate years after the crisis) (Bourguignon 2017).

22 An alternative way of perceiving the rise in inequality in the Anglophone countries (and elsewhere) is based on looking at the share of income going to the top 1% of households. Data from the World Inequality Database show very clearly how the pre-tax national income share of the Top 1% has risen since 1980, when neoliberal policies began taking effect (see Table 4). This follows the long “great compression” of inequality in the middle of the 20th century (discussed in the next section). The income share going to the top 1% of households has increased strongly in the Anglophone countries, especially in the UK (up from 6.67 percent of all income in 1981 to 13.88 percent in 2014) and in the United States (up from 10.67 percent in 1980 to 20.2 percent in 2014).

<table><caption>Table 4: Pre-Tax National Income Share of Top 1%</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>1920</th><th>1950</th><th>1980</th><th>2014</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Australia</td><td>11.63 (1921)</td><td>14.13</td><td>4.57</td><td>9.1</td></tr><tr><td>Canada</td><td>14.40</td><td>10.88</td><td>8.88</td><td>13.6(2010)</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>20.07</td><td>10.34</td><td>8.17</td><td>10.80</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td>Ireland</td><td>16.93(1938)</td><td>12.92(1943)</td><td>6.65</td><td>10.50(2009)</td></tr><tr><td>New Zealand</td><td>11.34(1921)</td><td>9.43</td><td>5.65</td><td>8.09</td></tr><tr><td>UK</td><td></td><td>10.89(1951)</td><td>6.67(1981)</td><td>13.88</td></tr><tr><td>US</td><td>18.40</td><td>15.88</td><td>10.67</td><td>20.2</td></tr></table>

Source: World Inequality Database. http://wid.world/.

# The Impact of Neoliberalism on Inequality in the Anglophone Countries

23 The precise impact of neoliberalism on inequality in the Anglophone countries is hard to measure, given the variety of factors which have affected changes in income and wealth in these countries, and elsewhere in the world. That said, inequality has risen more strongly in these countries than in other industrialized nations, and the evidence provided by the “varieties of capitalism” literature indicates that these English-speaking countries have implemented neoliberalism more strongly than other developed nations, consolidating their nature as “liberal market economies”. This section briefly reviews the concept of neoliberalism, how the strengthening of market forces and transactions-based economic relationships have contributed to the specific form of capitalism prevalent in these countries today, and what forces have driven greater inequality.

## The concept of neoliberalism

24 Neoliberalism is a concept that is broad and widely-used to describe the trend in public policies which emerged from the 1970s onwards, and that have accompanied the process of globalization. These policies have narrowed the scope of government intervention in developed and developing economies, while weakening the power of organized labor in pursuing wage claims and protecting workers’ rights. The policies include specifically: the deregulation of markets; the shift away from fiscal policy as a tool for managing demand and supporting employment in favor of monetary policy aimed primarily at achieving price stability; the privatization and contacting out of public services; steep tax cuts for top income earners and the shift to regressive taxation (like VAT and sales taxes); ongoing cuts in corporation tax and the financing of public deficits through the sale of bonds to private and institutional investors; the pursuit of international trade liberalization; domestic and international capital market liberalization, and more generally the financialization of economic activity (i.e. the expansion of financial services and the transformation of assets into securities and financial instruments); as well as the deliberate weakening of trade union power, through anti-union legislation and cuts in numbers of tenured public sector workers.

25 To be sure, these processes have not been uniform across countries. As Jamie Peck notes, neoliberalism has taken a “zigzagging course”: its path has been strewn with “policy failures, oppositional pushbacks, and stuttering forms of malregulation”. He also rightly points out that in many countries total government spending has not much
declined as a share of GDP, the State's powers have been extended in certain areas, and more generally that markets have always needed the State to enforce the protection of private property and contracts. Yet Peck also describes how neoliberalism as the dominant economic ideology and practice reasserted itself fairly quickly after the financial crisis (Peck 2013). Similarly, David Harvey has argued that neoliberalism has benefitted from the "uneven geographical developments" of nations, noting that "competition between territories (states, regions, or cities) as to who had the best model for economic development or the best business climate... heightened in the more fluid and open systems of trading relations established after 1970" (Harvey 2005: 87). Harvey too is skeptical about "extract(ing) some composite picture of a typical neoliberal state", yet he notes there are two arenas in particular in which neoliberalism restores class power. The first concerns the way labor and the environment are treated as mere commodities, to be subordinated to business interests. The second stems from how neoliberal states favor the financial system over the well-being of their populations and environments (ibid: 70-1): an observation he made in the mid-2000, shortly before the financial crisis and which has turned out to be highly prescient. Moreover, Harvey points to the privatization of assets as key component of neoliberal agenda, and the imperative of States to use their power to impose or invent market mechanisms (ibid: 65). Significantly, he observes that the main "substantive achievement of neoliberalization" has been to redistribute, rather than generate wealth and income (ibid: 159). This rapacious nature of neoliberalism is laid bare in even starker terms by Naomi Klein. In *The Shock Doctrine*, she argues that "disaster capitalism" emerged in the 1970s as a comprehensive policy approach to restructuring societies in states of disaster and shock, following: violent political takeover (Chile under Pinochet in the 1970s), internal collapse (the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s), invasion (Iraq in 2003) or natural disasters (hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, in 2005). Preying on profound societal disorientation associated with such upheavals, private interests restructured economies and societies for their own profit. This was (and is) achieved by drawing not only on neoliberal theory and policy-prescriptions, but also on techniques of psychiatry (including electro-shocks) experimented in the 1950s to remodel troubled personalities. Such policies were pursued very visibly in the aptly named, pro-market "shock therapies" applied to the transition economies of Eastern Europe during the early 1990s (Klein 2008).

26

Returning to the Anglophone countries, a considerable heterodox economic literature developed during the 1990s and through to the mid-2000s, examining their political and economic trajectories, in contrast to developments in other industrialized countries. In 1990, the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen published his landmark study on *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, in which he identifies so-called "liberal welfare states". These are found in the English-speaking countries, and are characterized by minimal public social insurance (unemployment support, pensions, etc.), and incentives for households to subscribe to private health, pension and even unemployment schemes. A year later and very much in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Michel Albert (a senior civil servant turned insurance financier) contrasted what he called "neo-American capitalism" and "Rhineland capitalism", in *Capitalisme contre capitalism* (1991). Albert specifically pointed to the deepening of stock market finance for firms and the rise of shareholder capitalism in the 1980s, allied to tax cuts, deregulation and high military spending as characteristics of the new economic regime
established by the Republican Presidency of Ronald Reagan (January 1981 to January 1989). In contrast, Rhineland capitalism — exemplified most clearly by (West) Germany — was based on stable relationships between companies and their “house banks”, as well as more stable relationships between firms, their suppliers, their customers and their employees. Indeed, a notable feature of Rhineland capitalism has been the involvement of companies in training apprentices and the negotiation of collective branch agreements between employer organizations and unions. This dichotomy of models of capitalism was extended in the collective research project and publication coordinated by Peter Hall and David Soskice: *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (2001). By investigating the functioning of companies in a series of economic sectors, the study argues that a basic distinction can be made between “liberal market economies” (LMEs) and “coordinated market economies” (CMEs) in terms of five relational spheres: industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and employees. Although nuances exist, the Anglophone economies are all identified as LMEs, characterized by much clearer transaction and market-based relationships than CMEs. Two distinguishing characteristics of these countries involve the way the financial rewards of higher education grew during the 1980s and 1990s, while their educational systems produced quite large minorities of workers with relatively limited skills, even if overall educational levels were comparatively high.

27

In fact, the evolution of wages for low-skilled workers has been widely noted as a cause for inequality in the economic literature. In a recent, summary article of global inequality trends, François Bourguignon notes that “almost by definition, globalization and technological progress are the most obvious common factors of income distribution across countries”, and that “[i]n the developed countries, globalization and skill-based technological progress are certainly responsible for a rise in the share of total income going to capital and for the slow growth of wages and employment of unskilled labor” (Bourguignon 2017). For much of the 1980s and 1990s, technological progress was strongly identified as the main source of rising inequality in the United States especially, due to skills differentials. Yet with the rise of Chinese exports, trade competition has played a more important role too. This follows almost mechanically — as indicated by the theory of international economics — from the way greater international trade favors the returns on capital as a production factor in rich countries, either directly or through the geographical relocation of manufacturing via foreign direct investment or outsourcing to low-wage countries. The financialization accompanying globalization has further enhanced rewards to capital, including investment income received by high-income households (specifically of top executives and leading employees/managers in finance). More specifically, Bourguignon quotes an OECD study published in 2011 which estimated that — on average — globalization and technological change explained 40 percent of the increase in the Gini coefficient since the early 1980s. A further 22 percent of the average increase was due to assortative mating and changing household composition. Furthermore, among the country-specific factors aggravating inequality, changes in tax and welfare systems have had the most direct impact on inequality (Bourguignon 2017).
Policy shifts

28 Indeed, tax policy changes have been of fundamental importance in inequality trends in the Anglophone countries. It is now often forgotten that both the UK and the US were high-tax countries in the decades after World War II, compared for example to France and Germany. The top income tax rate in Britain in the 1970s was 83 percent, and in the US it was 70 percent. Substantial tax cuts by the Thatcher and Reagan governments then brought the top income tax rates down to 40 percent in the UK and to 28 percent in the US by 1988, whereas the rates in Germany (56 percent) and France (57 percent) remained much higher at the time.⁵ At the beginning of 2018, the top personal income tax rates were 37 percent in the US,⁶ 45 percent in the UK,⁷ 53 percent in France,⁸ and 42 percent in Germany.⁹ These figures indicate both a spread of neoliberalism's anti-tax policies, yet also continued divergence among countries.

29 The tax-cutting agenda in the UK and US has been largely described as a tax revolt by the middle classes. It began with the successful referendum in the state of California on Proposition 13 to cut property taxes in 1978. In the United States, such tax cutting subsequently became part of the “supply-side” agenda to break with the economic policies of the past, and which was frequently referred to as “Reaganomics” after Reagan’s election in 1980. This agenda involved market deregulation, but also the clear belief that tax cuts would stimulate economic activity and ultimately lead to higher overall tax revenues, a relationship promoted publicly and visually by Arthur Laffer and his “Laffer-curve” (Laffer 2004). Allied to the idea that tax cuts would lead to faster growth and higher tax revenues was the belief that greater wealth (of the rich) would “trickle down” to the rest of society. Everyone would finally be better off. While the economics of Thatcherism were not couched in exactly the same terms, the policies of successive British governments (first Conservative, then New Labour) were based on similar beliefs: for the Conservatives, cutting taxes would encourage people to work more and build businesses; for New Labour, strong growth — including the success of financial services — would provide the tax revenues to fight child poverty and pay tax credits for low-income families. The same is broadly true wherever neoliberal reforms have been implemented, especially in the Anglophone world. Thus, the mid-1980s saw fundamental shifts to neoliberal economic policies in Australia and New Zealand pushed through by Labor governments elected in both countries in 1984. In Australia, reforms began by liberalizing international trade through lower tariffs, the removal of exchange controls and the floating of the exchange. The neoliberal agenda was then pursued incrementally, throughout the following two decades, affecting all aspects of the economy (De Brouwer 2003). In New Zealand, reform was led especially by Finance Minister Roger Douglas who implemented a draconian, rapid neoliberal program of market deregulation and tax reform, dubbed “Rogernomics”. Subsidies to agriculture (and industry) were scrapped, as were tariffs, while the top tax rate was gradually brought down from 66% to 33%. A second sharp wave of reforms to deregulate markets was subsequently driven through by Ruth Richardson, Finance minister in the National government of 1990 to 1993, whose policies became known as “Ruthanasia” (Evans 1996). In Canada, reform came later and was pushed mainly to rein in public deficits and public debt by cutting taxes and decentralizing spending to Canada’s provinces. As a result of massive fiscal restructuring, the overall government deficit was cut from 6% of GDP in 1995, to a balanced position by 1997, with surpluses thereafter, leading to significant downsizing of government and strong pay restraint (Thiessen 2001).
30

By contrast, the policy shift in Ireland was more complex and intriguing. While pursuing a tax-cutting agenda in the late 1980s, tripartite coordination with management and unions also allowed the authorities to tackle inflation by using an incomes policy as part of a national development plan. This, together with Ireland's increasing integration into the European Union and the inflow of EU monies, paved the way for Ireland to become the Celtic Tiger in the 1990s. At the same time, the rock-bottom corporate tax rate of only 12.5% helped lure substantial US high-tech investment to the country (Whelan 2013).

## Forces driving inequality

31

While the dislocations of neoliberal reforms in the Anglophone world during the 1980s did not bring immediate clear improvements in their economic performance, the situation changed quite notably from the early 1990s onwards, through to the financial crisis of 2007-2008. This was a period of long, sustained growth on the whole. Even the stock market crash of high-tech companies in 2000, followed by conventional falls in stocks in the wake of 9/11 and a shallow recession in the US in 2001 did not upset this broadly buoyant picture. These were the heyday years of the Anglo-Saxon economic model, with even an American “liberal” (i.e. progressive) economist like Paul Krugman celebrating the “certain *je ne sais quoi* of *les Anglophones*” (Krugman 1999). What was less apparent at the time, however, was the way prosperity in these countries, and especially the United States, was dependent on household borrowing and rising property prices. Put simply, financial deregulation had allowed middle-income households in the United States, in particular, to “eat credit” in order to maintain their living standards, while their real wages stagnated (Rajan). When the crash came, the reality of neoliberalism for “middle America” was brutally revealed.

32

More fundamentally, the historical reality of capitalism was subsequently revealed to the US economics profession with the publishing of Thomas Piketty's seminal work in English in 2014, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. While this mammoth investigation into the long-term dynamics of capitalism had received some media attention in France, the release of the book in English in spring 2014 turned it into an international bestseller, with sales topping 1.5 million. Apart from its dazzling assembly of data, the central thesis of the book is that when operating normally, capitalism inevitably leads to greater inequality, especially of wealth. This proposition was supported by rigorous reasoning and long-term trend analyses conducted by Piketty (and his team) which led to the spectacularly simple conclusion that the real rate of return on capital (r) generally exceeds the growth rate (g): or in a formula which anyone can understand $r > g$. Other things being equal, capital in the hands of the few — including non-working rentiers — will therefore accumulate at a faster rate than growth and so lead to ever greater inequality. Moreover, Piketty argues that in periods of high capital values relative to labor income, the tendency for capital to concentrate is especially strong. This was the case in the 19th century, as it is again true today, with high real-estate values in much of the developed world, and high stock market values: Graph 1 shows the rising share of total wealth held by the top 1%, especially in the United States, and the typical U-shaped evolution of inequality measures during the 20th century. As the world was still reeling from the financial crisis, Piketty's analysis clearly hit its mark.
<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>Graph 1: The Share Net Personal Wealth Held by the Top 1% (in percent)</figcaption></figure>

Source: World Inequality Database. http://wid.world/.

33

Piketty's book therefore explicitly overturned the previously held belief that while
capitalism and industrialization had indeed led to a massive rise of inequality in the
19th century, the 20th century had experienced falling inequality, especially in the
industrialized nations, but also elsewhere. This apparent behavior of capitalism was
first identified by the economic historian Simon Kuznets, and became known as the
“Kuznets curve”, a bell-shaped curve in which inequality first rises over time, before
subsequently falling. Piketty points out that Kuznets himself was aware that this
optimistic outcome of capitalism was partly empirical and largely speculative. In fact,
Piketty argues that the substantial reduction in inequality for much of the 20th century
had nothing to do with the internal workings of capitalism. Instead, it resulted from
the political shocks of the World Wars and the economic consequences of the Great
Depression. These unusual events led to massive falls in the value of accumulated
capital relative to the output of labor, and hence to falls in the returns on capital
relative to wages. Since the end of the 1970s, however, the slow post-1945 build-up of
capital, along with the liberalization of markets and especially financial markets, have
allowed the historical tendencies of capitalism to reassert themselves. As a result,
inequality is once again rising. The explosion of pay for top managers, which today
combines salaried income with earnings related to stock price movements, is a notable
driver of the present surge in inequality (Piketty 2014: 30-61). This phenomenon has
been especially marked in the Anglophone world, notably the United States and the
United Kingdom. In both these countries, top managers' overall compensation has
exploded from being twenty or thirty times average workers' pay in the 1960s and
1970s, to anything up to 200 or 300 times workers' pay today (Davis and Mishel 2014).

Conclusion

34

Neoliberalism has been a global phenomenon. It emerged first, most clearly in the United States and the United Kingdom in the late 1970s, coincidentally at a time when Deng Xiaoping began initiating market-oriented reforms in China. As time went on, and
especially following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of Soviet central planning as an alternative economic system, neoliberal policies have been adopted in many parts of the world. In the developed world, neoliberal reforms have generally been strongly pursued in the Anglophone nations, and these countries have all been clearly identified as “liberal market economies” in the varieties of capitalism literature.

35

One consequence of their stronger pursuit of neoliberalism has been the rise in inequality observed since 1980 (although Ireland is a notable exception, as its history of tripartism has likely fostered greater social cohesion, so that its level of disposable income inequality has remained unchanged). The United States on the other hand stands out as its levels of income and wealth inequality have soared since the late 1970s. Given that the US makes up 70% of the population of the Anglophone world studied in this paper, its experience largely dominates this country group. But it is important not to lose sight of the fact that, while all these countries today have higher levels of inequality than the OECD average (on the basis of Gini coefficients of their disposable household incomes), their experiences are varied.

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## NOTES

1. Both Thomas Piketty in his book (2013) and the WID (http://wid.world/) credit a large team for creating this database, including the WID Executive Committee of Facundo Alvaredo, Lucas Chancel, Piketty himself, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, and the late Anthony Atkinson.

2. For the OECD, the standard household of two adults is given a weight of 1 (0.67 for the first adult and 0.33 for the second adult). Children are then each weighted 0.2, so that a household with two adults and two children has a weighting, or equivalence value, of 1.4.

3. *The conversion into euros has been done using exchange rates prevailing in early April 2018. These rates differ from those prevailing in the years indicated. Nor do they reflect purchasing power parity. The calculations just serve to give a rough indication of the euro equivalent of the values in the other currencies.

4. The Gini coefficients for 1980 are taken from Walter Scheidel (2017: 406-8). The figures in brackets indicate other years of available data (e.g., (84) = 1984).

5. The figures here are taken from Thomas Piketty, ibid, Chapter 14. They can all be downloaded from his webpages at the Paris School of Economics. http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/capital21c.

6. Trading Economics. "United States Personal Income Tax Rate." https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/personal-income-tax-rate.

7. GOV.UK. "Income Tax rates and Personal Allowances." https://www.gov.uk/income-tax-rates.

8. 45 percent top income tax rate plus the 8 percent CSG. Wikipedia. "Barème de l'impôt sur le revenu en France." https://fr.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bar%C3%A8mes_de_l%27imp%C3%B4t_sur_le_revenu_en_France.

9. Steuerklassen.com. "Spitzensteuersatz," https://www.steuerklassen.com/steuern/spitzensteuersatz/.
ABSTRACTS

This article reviews the evolution of inequality and poverty in the Anglophone countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland) since the shift to neoliberal economic policies in the late 1970s. It provides brief summaries of the key definitions of inequality and poverty, which are separate but related phenomena. The article confirms the general impression that inequality has risen more quickly in this country group than in other developed countries. This is especially so for the United States, although Ireland is a notable exception with unchanged inequality levels. The article goes on to identify key policy characteristics of neoliberalism which have favoured capital over labour, and how they have contributed to consolidating the economic structure of these countries as “liberal market economies”. This in turn has impacted inequality, especially through strong cuts in top income tax rates.

Cet article examine l'évolution de l'inégalité et de la pauvreté dans les pays anglophones (États-Unis, Royaume-Uni, Canada, Australie, Nouvelle-Zélande et Irlande) depuis la mise en place des politiques économiques néolibérales à partir de la fin des années 1970. Il donne un bref résumé des définitions clés de l'inégalité et de la pauvreté, qui sont des phénomènes distincts mais liés. L'article confirme l'impression générale selon laquelle les inégalités ont augmenté plus rapidement dans ce groupe de pays que dans d'autres pays développés. C'est particulièrement le cas pour les États-Unis. L'Irlande constitue à l'inverse une exception notable, avec des niveaux d'inégalité inchangés. L'article poursuit en identifiant les principales caractéristiques politiques du néolibéralisme qui ont favorisé le capital au détriment du travail et comment elles ont contribué à consolider la structure économique de ces pays en tant qu'"économies de marché libérales". Ceci a eu un impact sur les inégalités, particulièrement par le biais de fortes réductions d'impôts pour les tranches supérieures.

INDEX

Keywords: neoliberalism, globalization, taxation, inequality, poverty

Mots-clés: mondialisation, néolibéralisme, fiscalité, inégalité, pauvreté

AUTHOR

NICHOLAS SOWELS

Nicholas Sowels is Associate Professor in English for economics at the Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University since 2003. His research in recent years has focused on the causes and consequences of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the financial implications of Brexit, as well as other issues related to the British economy and public policy. Contact: nicholas.sowels[at]univ-paris1.fr
# Robots and Immigrants: Employment, Precarisation and the Art of Neoliberal Governance

Kostas Maronitis

1. Employment is one of the defining topics of contemporary economies and societies. Prosperity, education, equality, well-being and overall social and political progress are largely imagined through the prism of employment. Qualitative differences in employment regarding income and location constitute a powerful metric system for evaluating education, cultural capital and social mobility. Most importantly, employment has become synonymous with existential anxieties concerning social hierarchy, identity and self-worth. However, employment has never been more precarious and employees have never felt more insecure. Fixed and zero-hours contracts, low incomes and continuous corporate restructurings are permanent features of the present political and economic landscape. These features can either be justified as a means to overcome low productivity in capitalist societies or can be explained as a manifestation of dysfunctional economies.

2. Arguments about low productivity, inefficient labour force, and lack of appropriate skills in the UK labour market have generated strong socio-political responses: from enthusiasm about the implementation and economic benefits of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and automation to sectors of the economy previously immune to such technological changes, to wider scepticism about massive loss of jobs and lack of a transition period for workers to acquire new skills for a new technological capitalist environment. At the same time, Britain's insecure position within the world economy due to the result of the referendum on membership of the European Union (EU) and to the subsequent negotiations with EU officials have given rise to business demands for sustaining the current rates of immigrant labour force in the British economy. More specifically, these demands focus on the need for cheap and/or low-skilled immigrant labour in the service and agriculture sectors for a competitive and growing economy. The competitiveness of the economy and national living standards appear to be
interdependent with an uninterrupted flow of immigrants from the EU and elsewhere, usually defined by low salaries, elastic working hours, and limited rights.

Whilst there is a growing body of research which convincingly examines the intellectual history of automation via the work of Marx (2004) and the Italian *operaismo* movement (Virno 2004; Berardi 2017) as well as the working conditions and rights of immigrant workers, there is very little on the ideological and political infrastructure that brings those two seemingly disparate discourses together. In this article, I argue that automation and demands for low-skilled immigrant labour are not only part of a political and economic agenda dealing exclusively with economic growth and productivity but also of a conscious attempt to produce a subject best suited to fulfil this agenda. Considering those two discourses, the article raises the following question: is there a connection between contemporary economic imaginaries of employment and productivity and specific modes of political governance?

The empirical material of this article derives, on the one hand, from economic and business reports dealing with the advent of AI and automation and its impact on productivity and employment and, on the other hand, from reports putting forward the argument that the flow of immigrant labour is integral to economic growth and prosperity. More specifically, the article will engage with relevant details from the Autumn Budget presented by the UK Government to the House of Commons in 2017; reports from PricewaterhouseCoopers (Berriman 2017); the World Economic Forum (Gray 2016); the International Transport Forum (2017); the Future of Work Commission (2017); the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (Rolfe 2016; Rolfe and Hudson-Sharpe 2016); the Royal Association of British Dairy Farmers (2017); and the National Farmers Union (2017).

For the purpose of avoiding a reductionist and economics-centred understanding of the discourses of technological displacement and low-skilled immigrant labour respectively, the article has to confront the socio-political devices which contribute to the detachment of the economy from politics and society and to the reification of terms and concepts such as productivity, training and competition. The analysis of the empirical material is not limited to questions over the dominant reading of reports, policies and public statements but extends to the way these discourses contribute to an all-encompassing art of neoliberal governance. This article provides an analysis of the narratives of the aforementioned reports in order to discover common themes and salient socio-political constructs. In particular, this article describes the dominant terms and themes featuring in the reports, policies and statements and then identifies the ways in which they are culturally and historically specific, and how they relate to each other; it reveals the commonalities that exist between the data, and then aims to produce generalised knowledge of neoliberalism and governance based on the selected data.

The article is organised as follows: the first section will focus on the meaning(s) of neoliberalism as an economic system and political logic and will establish its relationship with the state. The second and third sections will focus on the content and ideological implications of the reports and policies regarding automation of labour and low-skilled immigrant labour. The fourth section will bring the discourses of automation and low-skilled immigrant labour together under the concept of *homo œconomicus* and will examine their points of convergence and divergence by considering qualitative differences of precarity as an art of neoliberal governance.
The State of/in Neoliberalism

7 Any discussion about neoliberalism as a system of political and economic organisation needs to consider the ambiguous relationship between the state and the economy. Despite its dominance as a political and economic order, neoliberalism is hard to define. As Jessop (2012) notes, neoliberalism is more often used by critics of contemporary capitalist systems than by its proponents. In fact, Jessop refers to the impossibility of talking about neoliberalism as a singular and coherent term and the need to acknowledge multiple forms and manifestations of neoliberalism. However, there exist two permanent features in neoliberalism in all its manifestations. First, it aspires to expand the mechanisms of competitive markets to all aspects of social and political life. Second, it has a problematic and occasionally hostile relationship with the state. If the state prohibits the expansion of the market and, by association, individual freedom, then its powers need to be either minimised or adjusted to new economic and political realities.

8 Initially, the state was seen as counterproductive or even threatening to capital accumulation and economic growth. Theoretical economist Ludwig von Mises (1998) notably equated state intervention in economic affairs with socialism and effectively with the loss of individual freedom. For Mises, the formulation of a middle way between consumer democracies and state intervention is socially and politically hazardous, mainly due to the detrimental effects state control has on the choice and actions of the consumer citizen. State intervention, according to Mises, creates dependent beings lacking imagination and, most importantly, entrepreneurial skills. Individuals are perfectly capable of pursuing their interests without the help of the state and all economic science and activity can be stripped down to basic human action — a “praxeology” in Mises’ lexicon.

9 As soon as we start considering contemporary forms of neoliberalism and neoliberal practices, political theorisations permeated by state phobia appear naïve and parochial. Mises’ theorisation prevents us from understanding how the state coexists with the autonomy of the market and the individual pursuit of interest and freedom. In the final analysis, the issue at stake is not how to minimise the operation of the state but rather how to deploy and legitimise specific governmental actions and policies for supporting and reproducing the pivotal role of the market in all socio-political relations. Contrary to the *laissez-faire* economics and prevalent state phobia, Friedrich A. Hayek (2011:331) argued for a “permanent legal framework which enables the individual to plan with a degree of confidence and which reduces human uncertainty as much as possible”. Hayek’s references to law and human uncertainty indicate that neoliberalism should not necessarily be seen as a destructive force threatening established institutions while imposing the rule of the market. Most importantly, Hayek’s argument points out to the “denaturalisation” of both markets and competition (Gertenbach 2017; Foucault, 2004). Competing in global and national markets cannot and should not be perceived as some form of a primordial act that has been tamed and distorted by state regulation but rather as a political artifice whose function is to create a specific code of conduct and then evaluate this conduct according to specific benchmarks such as economic growth and profit maximisation.
10 Following the theoretical elaborations of Foucault (2004), Brown (2005) and Dardot and Laval (2013), neoliberalism should also be seen as productive in terms of establishing new social relations and new ways of living. Neoliberalism delineates competition between workers, the unemployed, policymakers and technological forces as a normal socio-political condition in which all social inequalities are legitimised on condition that the market dictates the rules of the competition. Part of neoliberalism's productive character is the transformation of the state into an ally and an enabler of market competition by designing and implementing policies aspiring to create the ideal political and economic conditions for profit maximisation. The main criticism directed towards the state is its general lack of efficiency and entrepreneurial spirit. In turn the state needs to respond to these criticisms by directing its focus from welfare to enterprise and to appear as an equal partner in the implementation of the agenda of competitiveness and economic growth. This new "disenchanted' conception of public action" (Dardot and Laval 2013: 217) is legitimised by the state's commitment to the common good. The latter mirrors the values and aspirations of neoliberalism, of course, and it is usually understood as a series of abstract economic indices such as high productivity, low unemployment, trained and efficient labour and, ultimately, a growing economy.

11 If and when the doctrine of the competitive market fails to deliver economic growth, higher productivity and a more efficient labour force, it is because the state has not been supportive enough of corporations and is not in tune with the free-market doctrine. The discourses of technological displacement and low-skilled immigrant labour have been developed as part of a solution to the problem of low productivity and competitiveness of the UK economy. As the two case studies will demonstrate, the state is regarded as a political actor tasked with reforming and managing society and its members in order to create the optimal conditions of corporations to thrive and, by association, to contribute to the growth of the economy.

Automation and Productivity: The Categorisation and Training of the Labour Force

12 Political and economic tensions between labour and technology have been a permanent feature of capitalism. Karl Marx (2004) argued in *Capital* that such tensions are the direct outcome of the continuous development of the forces of production. The technological advancements of industrialisation and automation expose the contradictions between productivity and the constant fear of being excluded from the production process and between unequal distribution of wealth and belief in the legitimacy of capitalism as a particular socio-political order. A logical step into this inquiry would be to identify the workers and, more specifically, the social classes mostly affected by technological advancements. Human labour has always been under threat by industrialisation, automation and, more recently, with robotics and AI. Even though processes of technological advancement have been at the forefront of arguments about efficiency, productivity and economic growth, they have now been incorporated into debates about the future of capitalism itself. According to Streeck (2016), capitalism's existential crisis can be explained by two distinctive, yet interrelated, phenomena: first, the processes of replacing human labour are steadfast and largely unopposed; second, the target of automation has now shifted from the
manual working class to the middle class to the defenders of an economic system based on private property, market economy and entrepreneurial activity. Robots and automation might render a significant percentage of jobs obsolete, but their sole purpose is to minimise taxation and maximise profits.

13 Does capitalism demarcate new battle lines between workers and robots? Is it possible for contemporary capitalism to survive without the support of wage earners? The driverless car is one of the most indicative examples for communicating both anxieties about labour displacement and a sense of optimism about a productive, growing economy. If cars can drive themselves, what will happen to professional drivers? Will they be permanently displaced by technological advancements? The UK government's 2017 Autumn Budget illustrates the need for more automation and autonomous technology in order to combat chronic low productivity. Relying on figures from the OECD, the budget states that productivity growth amongst developed economies has been at least 1 percentage point slower since 2008 than in the preceding decade. However, in the UK, the Autumn Budget points out that the slow-down has been more severe and productivity growth averages 0.1% since 2008 compared to 2.1% in the preceding decade (HM Treasury 2017: 11). One of the main arguments of the Autumn Budget (2017) is that "an economy driven by innovation will place the UK as a world leader in new technologies such as Artificial intelligence (AI), immersive technology, driverless cars, life sciences and FinTech" (HM Treasury 2017: 43). A significant part of this new technology and innovation agenda deals with what the government calls "connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVS)". The government wants to see autonomous, self-driving cars on UK roads by 2021. This ambition will come to fruition through changes in the regulatory framework for testing autonomous vehicles without human operators, and through the adjustment of present and future road networks to support these vehicles. In a subsequent interview, Philip Hammond, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, predicted that a million British workers would have to retrain and acquire a new set of professional skills to be employed in new jobs created in this new economy. "It is going to revolutionise our lives, it is going to revolutionise the way we work. And for some people this will be very challenging".¹

14 The ambition to populate roads with driverless cars extends to the transportation of goods. While corporations such as Google and Toyota have been active in the development of cars which will revolutionise work and everyday life, lorry manufacturers are developing similar technologies aiming at minimising costs in transporting goods. "Labour accounts for up to 45 per cent of total road freight cost" (International Transport Forum 2017: 9) and driverless lorries will redefine profit margins and ultimately redefine the rules of competition. As a result, up to 4.4 million of the 6.4 million professional trucker jobs in the US and Europe could be eliminated by autonomous technology (ibid.: 7). Even though the report asserts the resilience and adaptability of the work force under consideration, it concludes that their relatively low education level would be almost prohibitive for acquiring new and diverse training skills and knowledge.

15 The links between automation, education and labour displacement are further explored in a report published by PricewaterhouseCoopers (Berriman 2017). The report emphasises the potential loss of jobs due to accelerated automation and predicts that 30% of jobs in the UK could potentially be at high risk by the early 2030s, compared with 38% in the US, 35% in Germany and 21% in Japan (Berriman 2017). According to
the report, employment sectors such as “transport and storage”, “manufacturing” and “wholesale and retail” are more exposed to the risks of automation and subsequent loss of jobs, whereas “health and social care” appears to be immune to automation and robotics. The figures presented by the report largely depend on the educational level of workers. Workers with undergraduate or higher degrees will be better equipped to adapt to a new economy and labour market, while for workers with GCSEs or no formal qualifications automation presents a clear threat to their employment prospects. The report argues that labour displacement can be managed by the proliferation of new jobs created by new technologies and by (re)training initiatives for workers in order to acquire the right skills for a challenging new labour market.

16

Governmental intervention in the domains of education and vocational training are at the forefront of the report of the Future of Work Commission (2017). Falling real wages and increasing inequality are considered by the report to be some of the most significant by-products of automation. On the whole, the report welcomes the new technological shift towards automation, robotics and AI due to its potential to decrease working hours, increase productivity and contribute to higher standards of living. Such potential can only be realised with policy intervention in the areas of “good work”; “skills for the future”; “innovation”; “corporate governance”; “labour rights”; and “ethics”. The report advocates a stronger and more active role for the state in the new economy in order to assess the quality of the work that workers are engaged with, and the equal distribution of wealth. Lifelong learning and the establishment of education trusts in conjunction with new tax rates for incentivising business to invest more in their workforce will position the state as an active actor in the management of the new economy.

17

Skills, training and education, innovation and investment appear to be constant themes in the analysis of technological displacement. The “Future of Jobs” report published by the World Economic Forum does not necessarily diverge from these themes, yet introduces the issue of diversity as another defence strategy for avoiding skills shortage in an economy dominated by automation. In what the report refers to as the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”, human resources departments will have to be able to analyse skills gaps and determine how to align their workforce to meet present and future challenges (Gray 2016). The report states that diversity in the workplace will increase in significance as corporations and smaller businesses will have to recruit workers from across the world to fill gaps in skills specific to technological innovation and automation.

18

Overall, the above-mentioned reports shift the focus from the integration of workers as a collective into a new economic and social order, to a “project of self-realisation” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 217) by establishing links between performance, knowledge and the ability to remain employable in the new, and more demanding, corporate environment. As a result, the flexibility that all reports implicitly or explicitly demand through retraining and acquiring new skills transfers the uncertainty of insecure employment from the corporation to the actual workforce. Lack of access to retraining programmes or the unwillingness of corporations to provide such programmes will inevitably lead to the casualisation of a big proportion of the current labour force. The new technological displacement is presented by these reports as an unstoppable force whose missions are primarily to address low productivity and, secondly, to categorise the current and future labour force according
to the binary oppositions of competent and incompetent, trained and untrained, educated and uneducated, flexible and inflexible. The overwhelming emphasis on training and future investment also indicates the selection process of corporations and other businesses regarding their labour force. Access to training will be offered to those "whose disposition is deemed sufficiently promising to justify the investment" (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 237). Once retrained, workers need to fulfil the promise of a productive, automated and growing economy, and will be indebted to the corporation for maintaining their employment status. The anxiety over employment and skills is designed to prevent workers from challenging the structures of the new economy either as individuals or as part of a union.

19

As the alliance between state and corporation for the sustainability of the competitive labour market depends on the marginalisation of workers both as productive force and as active agents capable of challenging economic norms and structures, new contested sites emerge around the issues of workers' unionisation, working hours, income and taxation. Despite the fact that trade union membership is at an all-time low (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2018), precarious work and social insecurity have generated action by smaller unions such as the Independent Workers Union (IWGB) and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and in collaboration with the Trades Union Congress (TUC) have enabled precarious workers at the intersections of automation and self-employment to share their experiences and take part in legal battles over employment status and bargaining powers (Trades Union Congress 2017; Chakelian 2018). By acknowledging the automation of work as an irreversible process, unions demand the spreading of the benefits of new technologies. Secure employment, a reduced number of working hours and the introduction of Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a basic wage paid to every citizen constitute a new set of demands for a new type of society. Even though the description and implementation of UBI are subject to theoretical and policy debates (Srnicek and Williams 2016) unions and supportive policy-makers hope to set in motion a radical reconsideration of policy over the categorisation of citizens into employed and unemployed, skilled or unskilled. Due to the shrinking workforce, the implementation of UBI will not necessarily rely on income tax but on the actual taxation of the agents of automation, namely corporations and their technological infrastructures.

## The Use of Immigrant Labour

20

Arguments about productivity and economic growth are not limited to the discourse of automation and technological displacement. Rather, they extend to the mobility of labour and immigrant labour in particular. Immigration has either been articulated by media and political discourses as labour mobility that needs to be assessed according to a cost-benefit analysis, or as a socio-cultural process capable of re-defining the limits of national identity, belonging, and of dominant cultural patterns. More specifically, in order for immigration to be considered positive, the input of immigrant workers needs to surpass their impact on public services such as housing, health and education. However, for the Leave campaign and its affiliated media, the impact of immigration on the dominant definitions of national culture and social cohesion became a powerful persuasive tool for the lead-up to the UK's decision to disentangle itself from the structures, laws and policies of the EU (Pencheva and Maronitis 2018). In anticipation of
the communication of a concise post-Brexit immigration policy, the Migration Advisory Committee (2018) published a report outlining a socio-economic structure that supports economic growth while recognising the predominantly Eurosceptic electorate's anxieties over the control of national borders, access to housing, employment and welfare. The report argues for the need to offer visas to immigrants in a tiered system based on skills and income in proportion to their contribution to the UK economy (Financial Times 2018). However, such suggestions have been rebuked by business who demand access to a larger pool of unskilled and low-skilled workers to fill in vacancies in the construction, hospitality and haulage sectors of the economy. In principle, as David Goodhart (2018) suggests in the Public Policy Exchange report on post-Brexit immigration policy, employers could attract workers from the local and national labour market if they were willing to increase salaries and improve working conditions. This would result in higher prices for products and services. Eventually, the economy's competitiveness would be compromised. Present and future immigration policies will have to reflect public anxieties generated by media discourses and political rhetoric about the impact of immigration on cohesion, identity and public services and at the same time to address the needs of the economy in terms of skills, salaries, and overall number of the working population (Maronitis 2016).

21

The prospect of a new immigration policy framework that would enable the government to refuse EU immigrants the right to work in the UK, as well as forcing employers to recruit British citizens to perform jobs previously considered as unattractive, has led a number of thinktanks, political and business figures to defend current levels of immigrant labour solely for maintaining economic growth and existing standards of living. The National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) differentiates between “middle range” and “hard” Brexit and provides an assessment with respect to immigration and economic growth (Rolfe and Hudson-Sharp 2016). In the “middle range” scenario where immigration falls by as much as 91,000 a year, the GDP per head will be 3.4% lower than it would have been by 2030. In the “hard” Brexit scenario, the institute estimates that if immigration were cut by 150,000 a year then the annual GDP would be lower 5.4%. According to the NIESR, both moderate and sharp cuts in immigration would not necessarily have a positive impact on the wages of British workers employed in the most immigration-dependent sectors of the UK economy, namely construction, hospitality, retail and food processing. In particular, the “middle range” scenario would only contribute to a 0.5% rise in wages whereas the “hard” Brexit scenario would increase wages by 0.82% (Rolfe and Hudson-Sharp 2016).

22

The NIESR continues its investigation into the impact of Brexit on immigration and employment by illustrating the employers' concerns over possible free movement restrictions. The report indicates that most employers believe that Brexit and restrictions of free movement of labour would exacerbate their chronic recruitment difficulties and labour shortages. According to the report, these concerns are not only about the quantity of workers but also about the quality of work they perform.

> Everywhere you go in the leisure sector you will see lots of people from Eastern Europe. And it is not because they are any cheaper because we have the minimum wage and we have the national living wage. But they deliver a far better experience (Rolfe 2016: 8).
23 The report concludes by stating that the inflexibility of British workers and their expectations for higher wages constitute their recruitment as almost prohibitive for the future of businesses in a post-Brexit economy.

24 Farmers expressed similar concerns over immigration restrictions. In 2017, fruit and vegetable farms in the UK were in need of thousands of immigrant workers and as a result produce were left to rot in the fields. According to survey data from the National Farmers Union, more than 4,300 vacancies were left unfilled, which approximately covers 50% of the horticultural labour market. The survey points out that 99% of the seasonal workers employed in the sector are from Eastern Europe and 0.6% from the UK. Farmers in the UK claim that the vote to leave the EU has created the perception among foreign workers that the country is xenophobic and unwelcoming. The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and a prominent political figure in the campaign to leave the EU, addressed the concerns of farmers by insisting workers from the EU would still be able to work in UK farms, but they would have to get registered and sign temporary contracts in order to “augment” the horticultural labour force post-Brexit (Ferguson 2017). For the Secretary of State, one way to reconcile popular demands for control of immigration with economic growth would be to import seasonal workers according to specific demands in the labour market and effectively reinstate the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS). He explains that the current limited mobility of immigrant workers is not due to the negative perceptions of the UK as racist, but due to the growing economies of their countries of origin. “It’s already the case that the supply of labour from EU27 countries is diminishing as their economies recover and grow. So, in the future, we will need to look further afield” (Hughes and Daneshkhu 2018).

25 Yet, a survey conducted by the Royal Association of British Dairy Farmers (2017) has revealed that EU migrant workers are neither employed on a temporary basis nor are they perceived as transient workers. They are usually employed and perceived by their employers as permanent and integral members of the workforce. As in the leisure and hospitality sectors, employers in the farming and horticultural sectors are reluctant to employ and invest in the training of workers from the local and national labour markets. Preference for immigrant over domestic workers is usually explained by the willingness of the former to work more hours, positively respond to flexible working schedules, and live in the accommodation spaces provided by farms.

26 Reports on the state of the economy during and after the Brexit negotiations and demands from professional bodies for sustaining the current levels of immigrant labour in the UK illustrate the importance of immigration and of immigrant workers. Following Abdelmalek Sayad’s remarks on the social implications of immigration, it can be argued that immigrant workers are only accepted as long as they are defined by the work they perform. For Sayad, “the immigrant is only a body” (2007: 213) that is required to perform certain tasks and subsequently present her/himself as labour power. Outside the environments in which immigrants work and live, they are considered “minors” who need to be taught the local customs and the demands of the host economy and society. Sayad substantiates his argument on the singular perception of the immigrant as a working body by distinguishing between body and head, between working and thinking. Here, the implicit references to Aristotle’s “use of the body” for defining the nature of the slave are too strong to ignore. Aristotle defines the slave “as the human being whose work consists only in the use of the body” (Agamben 2016: 5).
Agamben argues that Aristotle does not necessarily deny the slave's human nature but insists that the work performed by the slave is not human work. The simultaneous exclusion and inclusion from humanity provides the slave with a special status that can be explained as an act of legislation and of necessity. Agamben points out that even though the slave is excluded from political life, his actual presence is an integral part of it. "The slave in fact represents a not properly human life that renders possible for others the *bios politicos*, that is to say, the truly human life" (Agamben, 2016: 20).

27 Agamben's reading of Aristotle enables us to perceive the socio-political exclusion of certain workers as a necessary condition for flourishing economies beyond the chronological confines of antiquity. From Hegel to Keynes and Beveridge, the presence of disposable, unskilled labour with no rights and access to welfare, also known as the "rabble", is not an historical anomaly that has been or will be rectified by civil society, but rather a product of civil society's unresolved contradiction between freedom and deprivation (Mann 2017). For Beveridge, this contradiction would dissolve with the introduction of the welfare state and the subsequent re-understanding of civil society's purpose: "Whatever the bearing of full employment upon industrial discipline one thing is clear. A civilised community must find alternatives to starvation for preservation of industrial discipline and efficiency" (Beveridge 1944: 300).

28 While it would be extreme and controversial to draw parallels between the slave of the Ancient Greek city-states and the low-skilled immigrant of the UK, it is worth noting that the marginalisation of workers and, in particular, the permanent otherness of immigrants, have been historically beneficial to national economies for growth and productivity. Low-skilled immigrant workers embody a cultural, ethnic and economic otherness that determines their position in economy and society. They come from poorer countries, underdeveloped economies and are part of different historical processes, which are sometimes incompatible with the host country's social and political order. Up to a certain extent, the otherness and incompatibility that immigrants embody are desirable qualities for the regulation of their mobility and control of their rights. They find themselves at the bottom of the social and political order, due to their perception by employers and policymakers as convenient and advantageous work accessories. The attempt of the UK's Conservative government to tame anti-immigration sentiments with plans to prioritise the inflow of high-skilled over low-skilled immigrants has been refuted by businesses in agriculture, farming, hospitality and leisure businesses. Minimum wages, the willingness to do jobs British citizens are unwilling to do and objective difficulties to form or be part of workers' unions constitute low-skilled immigrant workers as vital components for the country's economic growth and productivity.

29 The route to economic growth and productivity via the exploitation of low-skilled immigrant workers has been contested by the formation and subsequent action of new trade unions such as United Voices of the World and Independent Workers Union of Great Britain (2018). These unions address the pervasive precarious working conditions in hospitality, care and domestic services and campaign for minimum and living wages, dignified and safe conditions, and access to legal representation for all low-skilled immigrant workers. According to these unions, such actions aim at the integration of low-paid immigrant workers in a labour market in which standard rules, regulations and rights should be applied to all workers irrespectively of their ethnicity, qualifications and type of work.
Homo Œconomicus: Constructing and Governing the
Subject of Neoliberalism

30

The discourses of technological displacement and cheap, low-skilled immigrant labour normalise uncertainty and insecurity for the working population. On the one hand, there are people in work who have to be flexible, responsive and always willing to be retrained in order to be employable. On the other hand, there are people who are willing to work in jobs which are considered to be undesirable, low-paid and less secure. The uncertainty and fear communicated by the reports, policies and statements are by no means an indication of a political and economic system in disarray. In fact, fear and uncertainty are part of the motivational strategy ingrained in the “new spirit of capitalism” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007).

31

Fear and uncertainty as well as the categorisation of labour in relation to training programmes, exposure to technological advancements and immigration flows indicate that neoliberalism is much more than an economic system. Foucault argued that neoliberalism is an all-encompassing political system in which new subjectivities emerge (2004). The ways these subjectivities conduct themselves in competitive environments, and at the same time are being evaluated by the rules and standards of competition, reveal the political character and aspirations of neoliberalism. For Foucault, neoliberalism is a political rationality that aspires to produce a permanent consensus amongst all those who operate within its confines. Industrialists, manual workers, employees, business executives, politicians, policymakers, and law and order enforcement need to operate and conduct themselves according to the principles of competition and of the free market. This consensus requires and at the same time manifests itself with the existence of a collective subject that transcends class and status, capable of navigating under insecure and challenging political and economic conditions. This subject is predominantly defined by the dominance of the market and has been known historically as *homo œconomicus*. From Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson to Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, *homo œconomicus* has been the defining subject of both liberalism and neoliberalism. However, for Foucault, there is a noticeable change in the understanding and actions of *homo œconomicus*. In liberalism, *homo œconomicus* was understood as “the partner of exchange and the theory of utility based on a problematic of needs” (Foucault 2004: 225). According to this conception, the market serves as a social space where participants offer what they have, in exchange for what they need. In neoliberalism, the market as a place of exchange is transformed into a place of competition where the participants are not necessarily interested in exchange, but instead in “investing” in themselves as both producers and consumers (Foucault 2004: 226).

32

At this point, it has to be noted that the neoliberal *homo œconomicus* is not a subject constructed and understood within the limitations of structuralism. Following the theoretical elaborations of Michel Wieviorka (2012) and Alain Touraine (2000, 2010), it can be argued that *homo œconomicus* is an achievement and a product of constant struggle against institutions which seek to regulate the market and personal interest. However, *homo œconomicus* needs to be reconsidered across the multiple manifestations of neoliberalism and the relationship the latter establishes with other social and political spheres such as technology and immigration. Wendy Brown suggests that
Foucault's conceptualisation of the neoliberal subject needs to be updated in order to
capture new power dynamics between the individual, employment and the market.

Put it differently, rather than each individual pursuing his or her own interest unwittingly generating collective benefit, today, it is the project of macro-economic growth and credit enhancement to which neoliberal individuals are tethered and with which their existence as human capital must align if they are to thrive (Brown 2015: 84).

33 Neoliberalism demands from economic actors to trade off their rights and liberties for access to, and participation in, the market. At the same time, the state's input is not limited to the design and implementation of a legal framework that allows the expansion of the market in all spheres of social and political life but rather extends to the minimisation and, if possible, the elimination of all opposing forces to such expansion (Streeck 2014). In addition to the transition from liberalism to neoliberalism identified by Foucault, Brown highlights a new transition in the history of neoliberal subjectivity. *Homo œconomicus* is transformed from a subject attached to power, to a subject existing in precarity: job insecurity and labour flexibility; private and national debt; austerity and fiscal consolidation. For Brown, the *raison d'être* of the contemporary *homo œconomicus* is not necessarily self-interest but survival and sacrifice in a political and economic order that disregards notions of social security and employment stability.

34 The present employment conditions, in conjunction with anxieties about technological displacement, low productivity and the need for a flexible labour force with minimal rights constitute *homo œconomicus* as the defining collective subject of neoliberalism's strength and fragility. The indiscriminate exposure to precarious living conditions functions as a disciplinary mechanism for all those partaking in the competitive market economy delineated by neoliberalism. The way the competitive labour market affects the existing and aspiring labour force creates the perception of permanent employment as a privilege that needs to be preserved, regardless of the cost.

35 Is it possible to speak of a social class based on the common experience of competition and precarious working conditions? Is it possible to speak of a social class created in the ruins of the state as the central organising principle of both the economy and society (Hardt and Negri 2001; Virno 2004)? At this stage, it is important to underscore the critical role inequality plays in the neoliberal order. The competitive labour market does not aspire to the creation of a level playing field of insecurity and exploitation. As Hayek notes, "people in general do not regard mechanical equality of this kind as desirable" (2003: 65), because it restrains the individual's willingness to perform. With this in mind, the experience of precarious working conditions and social insecurity needs to vary in order to discourage the formation of a social class challenging the neoliberal order and also to encourage individuals to increase their performance in order to remain in employment. Compliance with the political system no longer depends on a strong state capable of protecting its subjects from lawlessness, insecurity and external threats. Instead, the new art of governance involves the precarisation of individuals and their subsequent hierarchy and relations. In the absence of social protection, precarisation needs to be regulated in order to remain politically legitimate and, more importantly, its "extent must not pass a certain threshold such that it seriously endangers the existing order: in particular, it must not lead up to insurrection. Managing this threshold is what makes up the art of governing today" (Lorey 2015: 2).
36

Precarisation, then, becomes not only the main governmental device of neoliberalism but also an effective medium for understanding social order and hierarchies between precarious workers. The normalisation of precarisation indicates that British society is quintessentially governed through insecurity. The art of neoliberal governance consists in maintaining a balance between the maximum precarisation of working conditions with the minimum safeguarding provided by the state, such as (re)training schemes and controlled flows of immigrant labour. Whereas precarisation refers to governance, precarity refers to a specific order that groups individuals according to their exposure to insecurity, and at the same time determines their rightful compensation. This is the moment of the fragmentation of the neoliberal subject *homo œconomicus* — a fragmentation that occurs along the dividing lines of national and foreigner, domestic and immigrant. Even though higher productivity and economic growth targets remain elusive, yet of paramount importance, the state still retains the obligation to discriminate between domestic and foreign workers. The dynamic relationship between employment and unemployment, security and insecurity becomes an integral part of the art of neoliberal governance. Governmental precarisation aspires to create substandard working environments for immigrant workers with minimal rights and lower salaries in order to maintain a sense of security and certainty for domestic workers and ultimately manage the acceptable threshold of precarisation in society.

## Conclusion

37

The discourses of technological displacement and low-skilled immigrant labour construct a narrative in which competition, precarious employment and insecurity are normalised. This narrative is produced, disseminated and controlled by businesses and the government, and occasionally contested by trade unions and individual workers. Despite differences and conflicting interests, the government and corporations are able to defend and promote the values and ethos of neoliberalism, as manifested in the competitive labour market, by pointing out to the necessity of economic growth, ever-higher productivity, and the country's ability to compete in the global economy. This article demonstrates that the construction of this narrative is based on two developments. Firstly, those two discourses aim at the de-politicisation of the economy and of the labour market, in particular. Economic growth, productivity and competitiveness appear as objectives that need to be achieved regardless of political and ideological inclinations. To that effect, technological displacement and workers with minimal rights appear as a necessary trade-off. Secondly, the two discourses under consideration formulate a new collective subjectivity within the theoretical and empirical frameworks of neoliberalism. Individual workers are deprived of their collective defences, and their sole aim is to survive in the competitive labour market by re-training and accepting lower wages, flexible working hours and substandard working conditions.

38

In order to politicise the labour market, the article juxtaposes the discourses of technological displacement and labour mobility with union responses, and establishes a theoretical and empirical connection between precarisation and neoliberal governance. By situating *homo œconomicus* as the defining subject of the competitive labour market, the article argues that technological automation and immigration are not inherently progressive, instead, their character depends on the political organisational framework
of the economy. Neoliberal governance asserts its dominance through the fragmentation and further categorisation of *homo œconomicus* according to nationality, ethnicity, levels of precarisation and state compensation. The contemporary labour market as an empirical manifestation of neoliberalism becomes an art of governance by simultaneously uniting and fragmenting its collective subject through the process of precarisation.

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## NOTES

1. "Today Programme". BBC Radio 4, 23 November 2017.

## ABSTRACTS

This article identifies the points of divergence and convergence between the discourses of technological displacement and low-skilled immigrant labour and argues for the understanding of a new model of neoliberal governance. New technologies, new managerial and organisational strategies, and new models of exploitation emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis in the UK. What are the main features of this crisis? The article points to two different yet interconnected processes. First, due to demands for higher productivity and economic growth the advent of automation, robotics and AI is presented as an irreversible process capable of
producing a new corporate environment in which low labour costs and efficiency co-exist with massive job losses, waning of workers' collective defences and re-training programmes. Second, for all the increasing popularity of protectionist politics and of demands for tight immigration controls the need for low paid and low-skilled immigrant labour across several sectors of the UK economy remains unchanged. Demands for economic growth render the presence of low-skilled immigrants necessary as long as they are subjected to the minimum political, economic and social provisions such as wages, political participation and mobility. As a result, low-skilled immigrants must exist within a political and economic environment in which they are perceived as useful and at times essential accessories for sustaining economic growth and public services. The concepts of precarisation and precarity provide a useful insight into the underlying logic that connects and differentiates those two discourses. In particular, precarisation becomes at once the dominant mode of governing the population and the most effective means for capital accumulation. In contradistinction to old understandings of government that demanded political compliance in exchange for the promise of social protection, the neoliberal process of precarisation increases instability and provides the minimum of insurance. Precarisation is not limited to employment but more generally to the formulation of *homo œconomicus* as a collective neoliberal subject living in fear and uncertainty. Precarity, on the other hand, designates a sense of hierarchy amongst insecure workforce and the compensations they receive. The article concludes by arguing that the dividing lines between national and foreigner, domestic and immigrant, become integral notions of neoliberal governance for differentiating between precarious groups and maintaining order in contemporary capitalism.

Cet article identifie les points de divergence et de convergence entre les discours portant respectivement sur l'automatisation et sur la main d'œuvre immigrée peu qualifiée, pour défendre une compréhension nouvelle du modèle de gouvernance néolibéral. De nouvelles technologies, de nouvelles stratégies managériales et organisationnelles et de nouveaux modèles d'exploitation ont émergé à la suite de la crise financière de 2008 au Royaume-Uni. Quels sont les aspects principaux de cette crise ? L'article met en exergue deux processus, distincts mais reliés. Tout d'abord, en raison des exigences croissantes en termes de productivité et de croissance économique, l'avènement de l'automatisation, de la robotique et de l'intelligence artificielle est présenté comme une processus irréversible susceptible de produire un nouvel environnement professionnel, dans lequel la réduction du coût du travail et les gains en efficacité sont concomitants de suppressions massives d'emplois, d'un affaiblissement des protections collectives dont bénéficient les travailleurs et de programmes de requalification professionnelle. Deuxièmement, en dépit de la popularité croissante des politiques protectionnistes et des appels à un contrôle plus strict de l'immigration, les besoins de plusieurs secteurs de l'économie britannique en matière de main d'œuvre immigrée peu qualifiée demeurent inchangés. Les exigences en termes de croissance économique rendent la présence de ces immigrants peu qualifiés nécessaire, pour autant qu'ils bénéficient de droits politiques, économiques et sociaux minimaux — salaires, participation politique et mobilité. Il en résulte que les immigrants peu qualifiés doivent exister dans un environnement politique et économique dans lequel ils sont perçus comme des rouages utiles - parfois essentiels — de la croissance économique et des services publics. Les concepts de précarisation et de précarité fournissent un éclairage précieux sur la logique sous-jacente qui relie ces deux discours tout en les différenciant. La précarisation est devenue le mode dominant de gouvernement de la population et le moyen le plus efficace de permettre l'accumulation du capital. À rebours des conceptions anciennes du gouvernement, dans lesquelles l'obéissance politique était échangée contre la promesse d'une protection sociale, le processus néolibéral de précarisation accroît l'instabilité et ne fournit qu'un minimum de protection. La précarisation n'est pas limitée à l'emploi, mais s'inscrit dans la formulation plus large de l'homo œconomicus comme sujet collectif néolibéral vivant dans la peur et d'incertitude.
La précarité, quant à elle, désigne la hiérarchie établie au sein des travailleurs vivant dans l'insécurité, et les formes de compensation qu'ils en retirent. L'article conclut en affirmant que les lignes de partage entre le national et l'étranger, le natif et l'immigrant, font partie intégrante d'une gouvernance néolibérale qui opère des distinctions entre groupes précaires pour maintenir l'ordre au sein du capitalisme contemporain.

## INDEX

**Mots-clés:** automatisation, immigration, néolibéralisme, précarisation, homo œconomicus, gouvernance

**Keywords:** technological displacement, immigration, neoliberalism, precarisation, homo œconomicus, governance

## AUTHOR

### KOSTAS MARONITIS

Kostas Maronitis is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Leeds Trinity University. His research on immigration, human rights, political activism and citizenship has been published by *European Politics and Society*, *Cultural Politics*, and the *New Statesman*. Kostas Maronitis is the author of the book *Postnationalism and the Challenges to European Integration in Greece: The Transformative Power of Immigration* (2017) published by Palgrave Macmillan. Contact: k.maronitis[at]leedstrinity.ac.uk
# The Zombie Economy and the Aesthetic of Austerity

Ruth Cain and Johnna Montgomerie

## Introduction

<footnote n="1">1 A decade after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) began, Anglo-American economies are still in the grips of protracted austerity. As many countries in the Global South have already experienced, the afterlife of neoliberal crisis is the prolonged period of ‘structural adjustment’ required by the entire economy to pay the costs of financial market boom and bust. The immediate demands of financial bailouts are to prevent cataclysm, quickly followed by calls for fiscal consolidation, and then protracted economic stagnation sets in, which leads to marked declines in living standards. What began in Mexico in the 1980s, and matured across multiple iterations of financial crisis, like chickens coming home to roost, austerity is the economic reality of the financialised heartland of Anglo-America and across much of Europe. Most political economy analysis focuses on debating the scale and scope of the different crises of neoliberal financialised capitalism (Lapavitsas 2009; Gamble 2014). Amidst the ongoing economic stagnation, new upheavals puncture austerity’s unfolding with political polarizations. It seems neoliberalism faces a global crisis on a scale that may be hard to grasp using the well-worn analytical tools that mainstream economics and politics provide (Sassen 2014; Earle et al. 2017), not least because the mainstream methodologies were useless at analysing or understanding the eruption of political fissures that have manifested in the vote for Brexit in the UK and Donald Trump’s election in the US. Indeed, the very connection between austerity and the rise of the far-right in Anglo-America is contested.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 This article seeks another explanatory path for articulating the severity of austerity. We will focus on the theme of protracted crisis as ‘undead.’ We connect the peculiar ‘non-death’ of neoliberalism (Crouch 2011) with forms of personal undeath, particularly through the decline experienced at the scale of the body. Whether mental or physical, the absolute decline of human health as a result of austerity is well</footnote>
documented in academic literature (Stuckler and Basu 2013; Bambra 2016; Schrecker and Bambra 2015; Mattheys et al. 2017). The extent to which austerity perpetuates a type of unacknowledged harm compliments the cultural analyses of the depredations of late neoliberalism on increasingly unsupported individuals, expected to look after themselves economically, physically and mentally, amid dwindling resources and opportunities (Fisher 2014). However, in the main, the violence and harm perpetuated by austerity is insufficiently addressed in political and cultural economy analyses of contemporary capitalism.

3

Drawing together both political economy and cultural studies, we advance the explanatory power of the monster as metaphor. Yet, this brings its own problems of coherence and justification. Why take the zombie and not the vampire, for example, as the undead monster with the most explanatory potential? After all, the literary vampire is part of the gothic revival under neoliberalism (Wilson 2016). The vampire is an undead monster that embodies the image of an elite aristocrat with wealth and power capable of violence without fear of repercussions.¹ Marx identified capital as ‘dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour’ (Marx 1976: 342). Marx’s 19th-century solitary vampire conveys the emergent power of capital as an abstract form of domination by a remorseless monster that is not easy to identify or act against. Vampires are plausible monsters of our financialised age because of the historical association with the blood-sucking parasitic characteristics of high finance (Crosthwaite et al. 2014). Today, the vampire is the liminal figure of the psychopath, a hollow, yet driven man, who is calculating and operates in the dark shadows of society (Seltzer 1998; Taplin 2017). Vampires need not be people, but capital made person in the corporation itself, a psychopathic legal entity gobbling up human (and natural) resources in an endless drive for ‘growth’ (Bakan 2012; Boddy 2011). Indeed, the anonymity of the asset-stripping ‘1%’ suggests vampires with coffins stuffed with offshore assets; capital kept out of living economic circulation. The story of the vampire elite (1%) sucking the value out of global assets to leave the rest of society anaemic because they can no longer share in the wealth created by global markets is plausible, but not the undead monster story being told in this article.

4

Instead, the undead monster metaphor of the zombie is used in this paper to communicate the specificity of the contemporary aesthetic of austerity. In other words, the zombie and vampire are not rivals competing for pole position as best cultural political-economy metaphor for the current epoch (McNally 2012). Rather, the vampire tells one story about the nature of elite rule under financialisation, and the zombie tells another story that highlights the grotesque embodied violence of austerity.

5

Here, we detail how finance-driven growth has become the zombie economy of austerity. In doing so, this article explores how the zombie as undead monster captures the multi-scalar manifestations of crisis under conditions of austerity in unique ways. Firstly, the zombie demonstrates how protracted crisis manifests as harm and violence to the demos, as it is manifest at the scale of the body. The vision of the undead monster with its open wounds, dishevelled clothing, decaying skin, lifeless eyes, dead brain, missing limbs, stumbling gait is collectivised into a marching horde that is disorganised but relentlessly moving forward as a cacophony of groans. It is the gruesome characteristics of the zombie that connect us to the inhumane outcomes of austerity: the numbers of humans that succumb to hunger and illness, the growing levels of squalor and homelessness, the gaps in social security that leave the sick without
treatment and the disabled without assistance, or the armies of workers living in
poverty because wages cannot sustain life. Thus, the zombie is the embodiment of
austerity because it connects the corporeal manifestations of crisis to the macro- and
global economy as the source of harm to the body.

6 This paper uses the zombie as a political economic metaphor to open up another way of communicating across disciplines the monstrous harm inflicted in Anglo-American society in the name of austerity. The zombie problematises the boundary between life and death, which in a corporeal form is an absolute binary, but in political-economic terms is currently in flux. The zombie allows us to read through the political economy of crisis to better imagine the embodiment of harm caused by austerity: the zombie as undead, unthinking, reanimated corpse relentlessly searching for another life to devour, marching in hordes whose voracious appetite cannot be satiated. The cultural capital of the zombie allows us to articulate in a new way the aesthetic of austerity. It is precisely the in-between existence of the zombie, the Dead Alive², that allows us to think through what is dead, and what still lives, in neoliberal financialisation, a decade after the onset of the GFC (Orpana 2016).

7 Bringing together the political economy understanding of austerity with the cultural studies readings of the zombie, we explore the afterlife of the GFC as it is embodied as a monstrous violence perpetuated on society. Austerity is not just a public policy platform that can be assessed in terms of policy successes and failures, costs and benefits. Austerity is a (necro-)political force transforming the role of the state in markets and society. The harm and violence inflicted by austerity is embodied in the zombie, the undead monster seeking to devour the *demos*. The first section explains how TINA ('There Is No Alternative') acts as zombie overlord, providing the battle plans for the march of austerity; yet, TINA remains ever vulnerable to alternative political-economic imaginaries that want neoliberalism to end. In the second section, the zombie is the mass violence of undeath; the visceral way austerity inflicts harm is understood in terms of the experiential and emotive. The mythical zombie monster evokes the tone and substance of the transformations induced by austerity, the harm caused by cuts to social security, and the everyday subtle violence of declining living standards. Finally, the paper concludes by making the connection between the aesthetic of austerity as the zombie and the rise of right-wing proto-fascism in Anglo-America.

TINA — the Neoliberal Zombie Overlord

8 The continuity between neoliberalism and austerity is most obvious in the ‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA) ethos, which is used for every manner of justification, but in this case is used to demand that austerity must follow a financial crisis. Austerity articulates the current phase of economic fatalism; with financial crisis comes bailouts for some, and austerity for the rest (Montgomerie 2016). The permeation of popular and academic culture with zombie metaphors is a product of a volatile and intensifying hyper-neoliberal economic climate (Randell-Moon et al. 2013: 55). According to various zombie mythologies, zombies may be summoned into existence by a zombie-master: a witch doctor or other person or entity with demonic power. Thus, zombies evoke the ‘necropolitics’ of increasingly authoritarian Western states which deal out routine violence both to citizens of foreign countries in acts of war, and to their own domestic
‘underclass’ (Mbembe 2003). Necromancy, or the magical control over the dead, offers a different way of understanding the sociology of power under conditions of austerity.

9 Capital has long been theorised as a fundamentally ‘undead’ force, as the worker is alienated from the products of his labour and increasingly from an over-commodified culture itself: the most Gothic description of capital is also the most accurate. Capital is an abstract parasite, an insatiable vampire and zombie-maker; but the living flesh it converts into dead labour is ours, and the zombies it makes are us (Fisher 2009: 15). Literary historian E.J. Clery (1995) writes of the haunted Gothic fiction of late 18th-century England, a troubled land where industrialisation was restructuring the nature of work at a ferocious pace, consuming human flesh to solidify its advance. Reminiscent of the accelerated neoliberal techno-capitalism of the early 21st century, in these horrific industrial tales “the living dead join a host of other spectral figures — vampires and other monsters [...] who have been vectors of an affective engagement with the visceral implications of the factory, the plantation, the market, the mine” (Clery 1995: 9). Zombies are the stuff of ‘estranged recognition’ (Clery 1995: 114).

10 The zombie offers a deeply troubling recognition of the “invisible predations that seem to congeal beneath the banal surfaces of new forms of wealth” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2002: 795). Zombies tell us of the colonial legacy of capitalism as they roamed the plantations as slaves summoned into being by acquisitive witchcraft.³ In contemporary times, zombies populate the blasted landscapes of dystopian literature, film and television (Romero 1978). Their living death is the death of state-backed systems of social reproduction, and of the individual forced to emulate an empty entrepreneurial ethic of constant expansion and consumption. “In their iconography of forced migration and wandering exile [...] the living dead comment on the disruption of an economy in which productive energies were once visibly invested in the reproduction of a situated order of domestic and communal relations” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2002: 796). On a broader metaphorical level, the zombie is our future in a post-apocalyptic nightmare where global warming and/or accelerating political instability have created a world fit only for the already-dead.

11 From a cultural perspective, zombies represent the abject aspect of a broader and previously utopian cultural move to ‘post-humanity’ (Lauro and Embry 2008); they are what is left when humanity has completely or almost wiped itself out. They embody the blind neoliberal drive to keep consuming, to reproduce and grow exponentially regardless of environmental, social and personal destruction. Thus, we often see the cinematic or televisual zombie staggering on as bits of its body fall off or are amputated, until perhaps a still-crawling torso or disembodied head continues to grope for, or gnash at, its prey. Since the zombie consumes all living matter in its path, and creates only endless copies of itself, it can only usher in a post-apocalyptic state. Necromancy also predicts the inevitable future caused by raising the dead. Thus, an effective metaphor “not only for how capitalism transforms its subjects but also for its relentless and devastating virologic march across the globe” (Canavan 2010: 432) has only one reasonable outcome — extinction. The zombie thus represents the endless inhuman ‘drive’ of capitalism, which has a sinister resonance with the malfunctioning machinery of financial capitalism itself (Dean 2013).

12 For the zombie to emerge in times of crises suggests the fear generated by shifts in the unfolding of capitalism. Thus, the zombie articulates the alienation felt by those whose increase in labour is accompanied by a decrease in control and autonomy over their
own lives (Randell-Moon et al. 2013: 59). This same theme of undeath is echoed by the post-GFC analysis of Ben Fine that notes neoliberal financial capitalism “is alive but it is not well because it is also dead” (Fine 2008: 2), his description of the creation of ‘zombieconomics’ is worth quoting at length:

> There are two reasons why the mainstream economics in the current phase of neo-liberalism is zombie-like. First, it is both dead and alive at the same time, undead as popular culture would have it. That it prevails within its own disciplinary boundaries with little or no contest and with scant respect for alternatives is more or less uncontroversial [...]. [Zombie economists] are totally insensitive to the considerations of the living but merely respond to an inner inescapable logic and, occasionally, perpetrate mysterious jerking movements of their own. (Fine 2008: 1)

13 In the immediate moment of crisis, speaking in 2008, Fine evokes the unthinking and unfeeling monster that the discipline of Economics has unleashed on humanity. In this account, the zombie is not so much brainless as without mercy or reflexivity. Fine is not alone; the GFC immediately provoked many metaphors of living death. “When our computers are compromised by hackers or viruses, they become zombie computers, and when our financial institutions fail, it is because they are zombie banks” (Canavan 2010: 432). Indeed, it was the Japanese financial crisis in the 1990s that gave rise to the popular term ‘zombie banks’ as a way of explaining how financial institutions can operate when ‘functionally insolvent’ (or, with more liabilities than assets or cash) because state-funded bailouts and central bank administered Quantitative Easing (QE) reanimates a failed bank, without making it solvent again. Following the GFC, multiple scholarly analyses described a global ‘zombie economy’, and gothic and zombie metaphors for the post-GFC world began to proliferate in left-wing political, economic and cultural analyses (Peck 2010; Fisher 2013; Giroux 2010; Wilson 2016; McNally 2012; Kuhling 2017).

14 Indeed, Colin Crouch’s (2011) analysis of the ‘strange non-death of neoliberalism’ juxtaposes the comparatively rapid historical death of liberal England in the early 19th century — as argued by Dangerfield (2017) — with the contemporary resilience of neoliberalism to emerge from financial collapse “more politically powerful than ever” (Crouch 2011: x). In the same time period, descriptions and confessions of personal feelings of ‘living death’ (by which we mean to indicate depression and other uncategorisable forms of mental suffering and mental health decline) among relatively affluent inhabitants of Anglo-America have increased across all age-categories (Knapp 2012). Austerity is materially affecting people’s brains, as the mental and emotional strain of protracted economic stagnation and political polarisation creates states of depression in both people and the political economy. It is ‘The zombie named TINA’ (Casey 2011) acting as the personification of Thatcher’s famous dictate that ‘there is no alternative’ that forecloses any way out of depression, stagnation and economic fatalism. It was TINA that brought the death of post-war Keynesianism; this threat now looms large in the everyday life of austerity. For Casey, TINA is a zombie overlord, the principle of economic undeath personified; for us, TINA the zombie overlord captures the aesthetic of austerity in a very meaningful way because it connects the death of economic ideas with the living death of the economy itself.

15 Zombie as the living death of economic ideas is articulated in John Quiggin’s *Zombie Economics* (2012) which details how long-dead economic ideas about the existence of ‘efficient markets’ or ‘dynamic stochastic’ models of general equilibrium (DSGE) continue to be used within academic economics, economic policy and governance,
despite the widely-acknowledged reality that economic ideas (concepts, models and theories) do not work well as tools for analysing empirical reality. In the GFC and the calls for (yet more) bailouts of the financial sector, we can see the same dead economic ideas “clawing their way up through the soft earth” (Quiggin 2012: 8) to once more dominate policy-making. The zombie epitomises a relentless desire implicit in the systems and logic of neoliberal financial capitalism, to remain undead rather than accept the finality of ‘real’ death.

16 Thus, the aesthetic of austerity is expressed in the agenda of economics enacted by political elites seeking to sustain the system that continues to benefit them. TINA acts as zombie overlord in which the neoliberal political economy ‘wins’ by doing wrong and causing harm, by being ‘too big to fail.’ As Jamie Peck (2010) articulates, neoliberal capitalism has “become mired in the unending challenge of managing its own contradictions, together with the social and economic fallout from previous deregulations and harmful interventions. It fails, but it tends to fail forwards” (Peck, 2018: 106). The pattern of sustained economic crisis does not discredit neoliberalism; on the contrary, crisis emboldens neoliberalism to advance with ever more deregulation and wrong-headed economic and political interventions. The zombie is ‘Dead but dominant’:

> [T]he brain has apparently long since ceased functioning, but the limbs are still moving, and many of the defensive reflexes seem to be working too. The living dead of the free-market revolution continue to walk the earth, though with each resurrection their decidedly uncoordinated gait becomes even more erratic. (Peck 2010: 109)

17 Thus, dead ideas continue to rule the global economy as austerity in the Anglosphere demonstrates. Fact and truth do not diminish the intellectual credibility of austerity as an economic agenda because of the political force that sustains it.

## Austerity and the Violence of Undead

18 In zombies we recognise human form without the vulnerability of the corporeal or agency bestowed by life. The zombie is thus a resonant ‘crisis metaphor’ for the increasingly dystopian aesthetic of austerity. What is rendered dead by austerity is the political credibility of the post-war welfare state; what we see today is a reanimated monster no longer able to provide collective provision of social security. What stays alive in the zombie economy is the boom-and-bust cycle, debt-led economic growth, and globalised financialization. As such, the zombie can also help us to understand how crisis at the scale of the body in terms of death and death-like states connects to the macroeconomy and global economy. Austerity produces forms of undeath; a violence or harm that is not absolute or obvious, contingent and subtle at the individual level, but obviously visible on the aggregate.

19 The power of austerity is first meted out by way of the economic ideas that justify it, the political project that sustains austerity and the harm austerity perpetuates on people's lives, which is embodied in the gruesomeness in the unthinking, remorseless zombie seeking to feast on anything it its path. Thus, the necromancing power of neoliberalism becomes evident in the persistence of discredited neoliberal ideas of Friedrich A. Hayek, Milton Friedman and Ayn Rand as they are wielded by the political elite. This resembles necromancy inasmuch as dead economists and political
philosophers are reanimat ed and deployed to destroy alternative futures. It does not
matter that the economic and political ideas of the first generation of neoliberals have
spectacularly backfired, indeed imploded; they cannot die as long as political choice
continues to reanimate them. Necromancy explains what problematising the practices
of scientific knowledge cannot, namely the almost mythical power of political elites to
use dead ideas. If something is disproven, inasmuch as it does not exist in evidence, it is
not real and, therefore, should not be used to inform political economic analysis or
public policy. This is exemplified by the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) controversy, in
which rigorous economic analysis of the connection between cutting government debt
and increasing economic growth was proved to be methodologically and statistically
dubious (Coy 2013), yet persists as the dominant policy paradigm in Anglo-America and
Europe. For academics, especially those committed to both enlightenment principles
and the scientific method, the continued existence of the discredited idea of austerity is
'dangerous' (Blyth 2013) because it contradicts dominant belief systems around what
political economy is and how it is used. For instance, austerity continues to live on in
political, economic and public policy circles despite overwhelming evidence that it will
not foster a 'recovery' from crisis and perpetuates harm to people who did not cause
the crisis in the first place.

20

Taking zombie form problematises the boundary between life and death itself, which in a corporeal form is (supposedly) an absolute binary, but in political and economic terms is fluid, and is in particularly obvious flux in these ‘end times’ of neoliberalism (Peck 2013). The zombie metaphor provides a means of reflecting on the political tumult and personal harm caused by present-day austerity as it connects what is normally threatened as three separate spheres of the economy, politics, and the body.

21

Economic and political living death manifests in the body as the many forms of physical and mental illness, decline and necrosis that accompany rising inequality and savage cuts to social security in the name of austerity (Schrecker and Bambra 2015). The sense of hopelessness arising from the apparent final triumph of neoliberalism over its alternatives links individual mental depression to global economic depression. Thus, rising unemployment and underemployment, combined with welfare conditionality, acts to limit the opportunities for meaningful collective community and sustaining of life.

22

Understanding austerity as the latest articulation of neoliberalism makes room for understanding how political and economic aesthetics change, sometimes very rapidly. Both economic and non-economic analyses of austerity apply a reductionism that endows zombie economics with life but with little content, both in terms of analytical elements and understanding of the necessities of human life. Zombie economics is dead in that it is based upon an unquestioned methodological individualism and technical apparatus of the narrowest type; it is ignorant of its own history, of its methodology and of alternatives (Cooper 2012).

23

Exploring the monstrous characteristics of austerity in the Anglosphere seeks to examine the inner workings of living death at the scale of the body and macroeconomy. Living death can be seen in mental ill-health. It should be noted, however, that large-scale studies of the effects of relative deprivation and inequality (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010) demonstrate that mental and physical suffering, as well as other pathologies such as addiction and decreasing trust in others, are *connected* responses to late-neoliberal social and economic policies. Encroaching death or restricted life is another, and thus
24

we look to the explanatory potential of the undeath metaphor to understand the contemporary political-economic and physical/mental pathologies of Anglo-America.

In the period immediately following the financial crisis, individual bankers were temporarily portrayed as pathological ‘gamblers’, and the ‘boom-and-bust’ capitalist system as a mass-manifestation of pathological mania (Dean 2013). From the bipolar symptomatology of market ‘boom-and-bust’, to the manias and panics of market crashes, to Great Depression, economic malaise or financial melancholia, the psychological dynamics of economics tend to only be articulated as explanations for the onset of the crisis, not the lived reality of austerity (Davies et al. 2015). Notably, market movements and their makers were pathologised by most commentators only *after* the GFC; when the market continued to boom, it was simply behaving gratifyingly, rewarding appropriate investment.

25

At the same time, the ‘zombie bankers’ who marched and danced during the Occupy London and Wall Street protests (Nyong’o 2012: figs 1-3) expressed the appetite of austerity with signs ordering onlookers to ‘feed me your hospitals, feed me your schools.’ Like the zombie, the banker often preys in herd formation. The sub-prime borrower, conjured as a person of colour who wanted to buy a home he/she could not afford, is an image that lasts in the collective memory far longer than the gambling ‘banksters’ (Giroux 2012). Thus, the harm experienced by sub-prime borrowers, credit-defaulters and everyday debtors in Anglo-America was deserved because they ‘lived beyond their means’ for far too long (Montgomerie 2010; Walker 2012). The power of guilt and collective moral responsibility for austerity was critically underrated by post-crash commentators who believed that the GFC would be followed by a complete reformation of neoliberal financial and political structures (Konings 2016). Instead, as Stanley (2014) also notes, collective values of thrift, personal responsibility and resilience were emphasised, and quickly gained traction in Anglo-America.

## The Monstrous Embodiment of Austerity

26

Traditional political-economy understandings of crisis are usefully refracted through the lens of affect when we use the zombie metaphor to examine the connection between psycho-social and socio-economic harm and the everyday life of austerity. The ‘living dead’ subject appears in more complex guises than ever, at a time of widespread and documented depression and other mental health issues (Knapp 2012; Pokonorwski 2016). Living death thus becomes an existence and culture without affect or future, a non-life endured particularly by the young, for whom previously-normal economic aspirations such as a family home have become remote. Mark Fisher sums up the eerie disappearance of a better or different future in the coherent epoch: “this place is nowhere, and it’s forever” (2014: 2). Austerity brings a new theoretical focus on depression and states of living death in the lives of the harassed citizens of late neoliberalism (Cain 2018). In its dissociation, numbness, persistence and lack of feeling, the zombie very effectively encodes the complexities and contours of a very contemporary epidemic of economic and affective living-deadness (Fisher 2009). Mental illness, particularly depression and anxiety, is increasingly prevalent and articulates a specific aesthetic of contemporary Anglo-American variant of austerity. Here, the falsehood of ‘free choice’ demotivates and depoliticises, forcing individuals
endlessly back upon diminishing resources of energy and capital. Thus, depression, anxiety and narcissism are manifest in the ethos of austerity.

27

Scholars are increasingly making thematic and material connections between the social and economic causes of the measurable decline in physical and mental health in post-austerity states such as the UK. Connecting austerity, health-service cutbacks and the resulting biological disenfranchisement, Matthew Sparke claims that “in relation to austerity across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis [...], the embodied experience of austerity repeatedly leads from market discipline to widespread morbidity and mortality” (2017: 288). The relentless march of spiralling inequality, withdrawal of basic state support, unemployment and precarious work is making people physically and mentally sick. Sparke elaborates: “efforts to restore business confidence and promote pro-market growth by cutting the costs of public services tend also to make poorer populations vulnerable to disease, disability and premature death” (Sparke 2017: 289). Adapting the acronym for structural adjustment programs (SAPs), this involves what Steve Gloyd (2004: 289) calls “SAPping the poor”, a process through which already-overburdened health systems for poor populations are sapped of all resources. The zombie is an avatar of the horrors of austerity capitalism, where *homo economicus* is transformed from a rational-acting profit-maximiser who collectively benefits through the market mechanism, to a monster immune to the pain and suffering of others, relentlessly searching for fresh brains to devour.

28

Zombies, in their expendable de-individuated horde of groans (Shaviro 2002), are most feared because they destroy the future, the promise of life not yet lived. Here the aesthetic connection between austerity and the precarious millennial generation is most chilling. Today's young people might be figured as the ultimate contemporary victim avatar of undeath, depleted youth without vitality because they are denied the promise of a better future. These disappointed youth are trapped by student debt or trapped by the empty 'depressive hedonia' of consumer capitalism, which is all there is to offer the heavily-leveraged young (Fisher 2009: 21-22). As David McNally (2012) suggests, the undead represent the agents as well as the victims of rapacious capitalism. Zombies represent the despair of living death in a physically- and emotionally-deadening era. Resistance is more likely to be a process of convalescence than a dramatic act of refusal (Cain 2018). Giving up is reasonable when faced with a system too complex to understand, capitulation or abdication of political responsibility is appealing to those seeking to protect themselves from the violence of austerity. As TINA pushes on, more debt feeds the indebted to make them ripe for securitisation, just as depleted debtors are easy prey for zombie banks.

29

Yet, there are always alternatives to the economics of living death; we are simply discouraged from contemplating them, until such a time that austerity is accepted as eternal and deserved. No solutions are being offered to the living-deadness of social and economic life other than to simply pull up one's socks, take responsibility and get on with it. As the zombie devours the human body, making a copy of itself, it destroys identity and the collective future of humanity. Instead, the zombie creates a proliferative living death as the horde invades everything around it.
Conclusion: Fight the Dead, Fear the Living

30

This article sought to bring together the cultural political-economy reading of austerity with the cultural-studies readings of the zombie, to explore the afterlife of the GFC as it is embodied as the undead monster perpetuating violence on society. We conclude by considering how the zombie economy as the aesthetic of austerity creates new ways of understanding the emergence of far-right, potentially proto-fascist, politics festering within Anglo-America.

31

The term ‘fight the dead, fear the living’ refers to Robert Kirkman’s (2010) *The Walking Dead* graphic novel series, in which the reader encounters the tensions and ambiguities of living in a post-apocalyptic world destroyed by zombies. We use it here to evoke the tensions of political resistance that must simultaneously fight the undead economic ideas of neoliberalism that continue to dominate the political agenda despite the obvious social and economic decay it fosters, and fight the ideas of far-right populism that continue to gain traction. As the necromancy of neoliberalism’s non-death enslaves the future by foreclosing alternatives, as austerity inflicts harm on ever-growing segments of the population, a violence is building up in the Anglosphere. At times the anger is directed at elites, the 1%; at other times, anger and rage are focused on the identities and bodies of women, migrants, Muslims or just dark-skinned people. At the same time, austerity imposes cuts on social security and services to the elderly, the sick, the disabled, children and anyone on a low income. The zombie metaphor allows us to consider how the aesthetic of austerity shapes and influences the rise of far-right politics and proto-fascism in Anglo-America.

32

The zombie metaphor forces us to consider the degree to which the aesthetic of austerity is embodied as various states of decline and necrosis, which is manifest as the deep structural crisis indicative of the terminal decline of financialised capitalism. Neoliberalism is in a state of permeant crisis; this political economic condition is best described by Antonio Gramsci as the ‘interregnum’: “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old are dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (Gramsci 1971: 77). It is these ‘morbid symptoms’ that are manifest in the zombie economy, as austerity produces different bodily states of decline and necrosis. The toxicity of economic and embodied/subjective living death should be seen not only as a property of the victims and sufferers of austerity; the elites contribute — as the zombie overlords — to the values and aesthetic of austerity by continuing to profit from relentless consumption, debt culture and the degradation of living conditions rampant across Anglo-America. The undead zombie horde is relentlessly marching ever forward, with no capacity to improve their condition. We see the rage of this condition expressed in the case of the Brexit ‘majority’ who want to ‘take back control’ or the Trump-voting ‘masses’ that want to ‘make America great again’, each expressing an ethos of re-animating a long-dead past.

33

The connection between austerity and far-right populism is articulated as the harm perpetuated on the marginalised communities ‘left behind’ by the zombie economy. The angry white working-class communities, whether in the American Rust Belt or post-industrial Northern Britain, exist as states of political economic undeath. They exist without economic vitality, sustained by state-funded life-support, without a future. Goodwin and Heath (2016) and Inglehart and Norris (2016) identify Brexit and Trump voters with the ‘left behind’ or ‘have-nots’ of globalisation, resentful of their
loss of opportunity and privilege. These forgotten places and the people that inhabit them have no capacity to change their condition, these communities direct and mobilise their anger at 'immigrants' or 'foreigners' or the immoral Welfare Queens and Skivers (Hall et al. 2017). "Older, working-class, white voters, citizens with few qualifications, who live on low incomes and lack the skills that are required to adapt and prosper amid the modern, post-industrial economy" (Goodwin and Heath 2016: 404). The strangely numb acceptance of austerity and inequality among these 'left-behind' populations of voters, who include many people who are themselves relying on social security, is indicative of the power of TINA to annihilate alternatives (Forkert 2014).

34

Another connection with the zombie economy aesthetic of austerity is the relative states of undeath represented in the ageing population supporting the far-right in both the Republican Party and the Brexit campaign. The theme of near-death is expressed in the decrepitude and myopia of the over-60 voters who delivered both Trump and Brexit narrow victories (Hitchings-Hales 2016). Mapping the various states of bodily decline with the political-economic necrosis of the US and the UK reveals the very specific populations that swung support behind the far-right (Monnat and Brown 2017; Bor 2017). In the UK, health geographers have recently warned that 'life expectancy in England and Wales [since 1945] has now slowed markedly, and at older ages may even be reversing' (Hiam et al 2018). Post-industrial areas of Britain, especially the North East of the UK and South Wales, have seen the parallel outcomes of restricted lifespan because of austerity and voting Brexit, particularly among white voters (Dorling 2016). Suicide rates and acts of intentional death are also on the rise in these left-behind communities; in the UK, these rates are especially elevated for middle-aged men (ONS 2017a). Among young people who have a weaker generational attachment to ideas of nationalism and racial identity, as Fisher notes (2014), the awareness of 'no future' appears to lead to the 'depressive hedonic' state of apathy brought on by continual attempts to relieve anxiety. Addiction, suicide and earlier death among younger people is also rising in the areas where overall health outcomes and age of death are in the most precipitous decline (ONS 2017b, 2017c).

35

When we consider the ways in which the harm and violence inflicted by austerity is expressed as bodily decay and undeath, and how the violence of undeath connects in a visceral, experiential and emotive way to how austerity inflicts harm, the connection between austerity and far-right populism and proto-fascism is that they share an aesthetic (Rawnsley 2018). The mythical zombie monster evokes the tone and substance of the transformations induced by austerity, the harm caused by cuts to social security and globalisation, and the subtle but persistent violence of declining living standards amplified through the anger and distrust of voters supporting the far-right, seeking to resist the undeath of financialised capitalism by fighting the living people they consider the enemy of national capitalist interests.
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## NOTES

1. The short novel by John William Polidori (1819), *The Vampyre: A tale*, was inspired by the poet Lord Byron to whom Polidori acted as personal physician; in turn, Polidori's book influenced Bram Stoker's novel *Dracula* (1897).

2. *Dead Alive* is the US title of the cult zombie horror comedy *Braindead* (1992) directed by Peter Jackson.

3. Jean and John Comaroff (2002) describe the zombie as a personification of labourers' fears of abduction into slavery and reduction to 'ghost labor' in late 19th and early 20th century South Africa. Such motifs, they argue, were coincident with new structures of colonial labour and social organisation.
ABSTRACTS

This article explores the present-day zombie economy as the embodiment of the aesthetic of austerity in Anglo-America. It uses the zombie monster metaphor to capture the multi-scalar manifestations of crisis under conditions of enduring austerity in unique ways. The theme of undeath, or living death, connects ‘dead’ economic ideas that are reanimated through the zombie economy to the logic of ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA). Moreover, the zombie monster permits a visceral connection between the harm inflicted on people’s physical and mental health and the underlying set of values perpetuated by austerity. It is the crisis at the scale of the body that manifests as the zombie macroeconomy of austerity. The contribution of this paper is that it articulates the aesthetic of austerity as the troubled boundary between what is alive and what is dead, which in a corporeal form is an absolute binary, but in political-economic terms is currently in flux.

Cet article s'attache à étudier l'économie zombie contemporaine, en tant qu'incarnation de l'esthétique de l'austérité dans le monde anglo-américain. Il recourt à la métaphore du monstre zombie pour saisir de manière originale les manifestations multi-scalaires de la crise dans un contexte d'austérité continue. Le thème du mort-vivant relie les idées économiques « mortes » qui sont réanimées par l'économie zombie à la logique de l'absence d'alternative (« There Is No Alternative », ou TINA). Par ailleurs, le monstre zombie permet de connecter, de manière viscérale, les atteintes portées à la santé physique et mentale des personnes, et les valeurs sous-jacentes perpétuées par l'austérité. C'est la crise à l'échelle du corps qui se manifeste sous la forme de la macro-économie zombie de l'austérité. Cet article propose de penser l'esthétique de l'austérité comme la frontière problématique entre ce qui est vivant et ce qui est mort — une distinction binaire en termes corporels mais fluctuante en termes politiques et économiques.

INDEX

Keywords: zombie economy, austerity, aesthetic, neoliberalism, health, mental illness

Mots-clés: économie zombie, austérité, esthétique, néolibéralisme, santé, maladie mentale

AUTHORS

RUTH CAIN

Dr. Ruth Cain is Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Kent. She has published on the law and politics of mental health, family law and literature among other subjects. Her most recent publications are “Shared Care after Separation in the United Kingdom: Limited Data, Limited Practice?” with Tina Haux and Stephen McKay in *Family Court Review* 55 (4) 2017 and “Responsibilising Recovery: Lone and Low-paid Parents, Universal Credit and the Gendered Contradictions of UK Welfare Reform” in *British Politics* 11 (4) 2016. She is currently working on a book project about the politics of measurement and tracking techniques for mental health and illness to appear in the Bristol University Press series *Quantified Societies and Selves*. Contact: r.c.m.cain[at]kent.ac.uk
JOHNNA MONTGOMERIE

Dr. Johnna Montgomerie is a Reader in International Political Economy at King's College London. Her research expertise is in political economy, global finance, the household, debt-led growth and austerity. She is convenor of the International Political Economy Group (IPEG) and Council Member of the Progressive Economy Forum (PEF). She has a forthcoming monograph with Polity, *Should We Abolish Household Debt?*, an edited volume with Routledge, *Critical Methods in Political and Cultural Economy*, and her most recent article with Daniela Tepe-Belfrage, "Cultures of Debt Resistance," was published in *Geoforum* (May 2018). Contact: johnna.montgomerie[at]kcl.ac.uk
# The Neoliberalization of Public Spaces and the Infringement of Civil Liberties

## The Case of the Safer Cities Initiative in Los Angeles

### Marine Dassé

1. "We have the largest number of millionaires, the largest number of mansions, but also the most acute poverty in the country" (L'Obs 2014). With this statement, Gary Blasi, a Law Professor at UCLA, highlights urban segregation as a particularly striking contradiction that lies at the heart of the city of Los Angeles. Wealthy neighborhoods, such as Beverly Hills, are famed for their luxurious villas and expensive hotels, yet they stand only a few miles away from one of the poorest and most dangerous areas of the nation: Skid Row, which concentrates the highest number of homeless people in the country in a very confined area of the city. For homeless people, enjoying daily access to public space to perform life-sustaining activities is a necessary condition for their survival. However, several anti-homeless laws have been passed in Los Angeles in recent decades. In 2006, the municipality implemented a program called the Safer Cities Initiative (SCI) to secure the streets. Its primary goal was to eradicate misdemeanors such as sleeping or urinating in public.

2. The publicness of an urban space — the state of a place being public — is open to interpretation. Indeed, the concept of public space is both a spatial and temporal construct, dependent on what one studies. In several papers, cultural geographer Don Mitchell has shown how rights over public spaces are not universal, they have been acquired through social struggle (Mitchell 2003). Public spaces are shaped by complex norms, and their emergence or decline is in constant evolution depending on their spatial and temporal setting. In other words, if some people can walk in some areas and not others, it is not a natural occurrence, but rather a result from specific, normative policies.

3. In this paper, the term "public space" will be understood as an urban, public area that can be accessed by anybody regardless of their social class, race, age or gender.
However, these components affect the way individuals use public spaces. Class, race, gender and age play a tremendous role in the frequency and motives for using a public space. For instance, research has shown that young girls are discouraged from exploring their environment from a very early age (Franck and Paxson 1989: 127). If the presence of homeless people in public spaces is of tremendous importance, it is because being visible to the non-homeless population prompts the following questions: to whom should public spaces belong? What actions should be allowed in public spaces? Most importantly, is it legitimate for cities and courts to make decisions regarding the use of public spaces?

4

Local authorities have argued that safety was the primary concern for initiating the Safer Cities Initiative. However, one may question the underlying reasons behind a policy excluding homeless people from an area they have massively occupied for decades. To what extent does a program such as the Safer Cities Initiative represent new incentives to put neoliberal policies into practice in public spaces and underpin the development of neoliberal ideals? This desire to “clean up the street” results from an evolution that started in the 1980s (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Jamie Peck 2002). In recent years, anti-homeless laws have multiplied. Several questions arise from recent anti-homeless initiatives such as SCI. How can neoliberalism, as a political and economic concept, be applied to public spaces? To what extent have they become “neoliberalized”? Perhaps most importantly, to what extent does it normalize the criminalization of poverty?

5

Although the SCI has been largely covered in the local press, especially in the *Los Angeles Times*, it has rarely been linked with public spaces or neoliberalism. For instance, the book *Down, Out and Under Arrest: Policing and Everyday Life in Skid Row* by sociologist Forrest Stuart deals with Skid Row, but rarely mentions the term “public space” and practically never analyzes its link with neoliberal policies (May and Cloke 2014: 896). Similarly, in an article entitled “Spillover of the Private City: BIDs as a Pivot of Social Control in Downtown Los Angeles”, German geographers Nadine Marquardt and Henning Füller offer a fascinating analysis of the close relations between public-private partnerships and the municipality in their attempts to control the homeless population (Marquardt and Füller 2012), but they do not explore how this type of social control originated in neoliberal principles. This article seeks to fill this gap, providing new insights in the SCI’s social consequences. More particularly, it aims at shedding light on the relationship between securing the street and the criminalization of poverty, as well as demonstrating the intrinsic link with neoliberal doctrine (Peck and Tickell 2002: 391).

6

This paper shall proceed in three parts: I will firstly provide a theoretical framework to explain the extent to which securing the street can be connected to neoliberal urbanism. I will then analyze the Safer Cities Initiative in terms of socio-spatial exclusion. Finally, I will explore its impacts on civil liberties and human rights.

7

This empirically-informed paper rests on the use of several methods, primarily observant participation. From September 2013 to June 2014, I conducted ground-level research on privatization and neoliberalization in Los Angeles, focusing mainly on newspaper archives, specialized websites, and interviews. While based in California, I went to Skid Row once a month for 10 months with a group of volunteers to distribute hygiene kits and to best understand and report on the residents’ daily lives and struggles. In addition, I conducted a series of interviews with local urban actors who