# Religious criticism in 18th-century France

Gerhardt Stenger

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Gerhardt Stenger. Religious criticism in 18th-century France. Marc Mays. A Comprehensive History of Post-Communism, Colonialism, Totalitarianism and Secularism, Nova, pp.1-64, 2024, 9798891134799. hal-04553868

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# Religious criticism in 18th-century France

Gerhardt Stenger

► To cite this version:

Gerhardt Stenger. Religious criticism in 18th-century France. Marc Mays. A Comprehensive History of Post-Communism, Colonialism, Totalitarianism and Secularism, Nova, pp.1-64, 2024, 9798891134799. hal-04553868

HAL Id: hal-04553868

https://hal.science/hal-04553868v1

Submitted on 21 Apr 2024

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.

<figure><img src="image_1.png" /></figure>
### Gerhardt Stenger<fnref n="1" />

#### Abstract

The first defining feature of Enlightenment thinking is the emphasis on what we choose and decide for ourselves, to the detriment of what is imposed on us by an external authority. Religion became an object of examination, subject to the jurisdiction of reason, as in biblical exegesis, which took on considerable importance over the course of the century. From the 1680s onwards, the “truths” of the Christian religion deeply offended the philosophers and scientists of the Enlightenment, whose most striking works contained a vision of the world and a conception of life that broke almost completely with Christianity. The proponents of the new philosophy attack Christian theology as absurd, Christian morality, especially in the field of love and sexuality, which prevents men from being happy, and the dominant position of the Catholic Church in society and its claim to govern all areas of knowledge. Following cases as resounding as they were tragic, philosophers like Voltaire fought the religious intolerance imposed by the Catholic clergy leading to the Declaration of Human Rights and, at the beginning of the 20th century, to a particular form of secularization, *laïcité*.

**Keywords:** Enlightenment, *laïcité*, tolerance, Bible, Christianity, Morality, Bayle, Buffon, Diderot, d'Holbach, de Maillet, Meslier, Voltaire, theology, Trinity, original sin

#### Introduction

Écraser l'infâme (“Crush the Infamous”). The criticism of religion in the Age of Enlightenment is sometimes reduced to Voltaire's devastating war cry. But the Infamous in question is not *religion* itself, or even the Christian religion, but an ecclesiastical institution—the Catholic Church—insofar as it imposes an inviolable truth in all domains of knowledge and persecutes all those who challenge it, starting with Jansenists and Protestants. The philosophers, for their part, went the furthest in criticizing the Catholic Church and its dominant position, because the truth it defended come hell or highwater clashed head-on with the philosophical and scientific rationalism of the classical age. The philosophers of the Enlightenment fought against the “fundamentals” of Christianity, which were imposed by the Catholic Church and can be summarized as follows:

1. The Catholic religion is the only true religion; all others are in error.

2. The truths of Christianity were revealed by God in the Bible, and are superior to all other truths, philosophical or scientific.

3. Only Christians can claim salvation; all others are damned through no fault of their own.

The founding principle of Enlightenment thought (one cannot speak without abusive simplification of *the* philosophy of the Enlightenment, given the abundance of divergent philosophical positions during that period) is to prefer what one chooses and decides oneself, over what is imposed on us by an external authority. In order to shake off the yoke under which men still lived in the 18th century, philosophers claimed complete freedom to examine, question, criticize, and doubt: no dogma or institution was sacred.

<footnote n="1">¹Département de Lettres modernes, Nantes Université, France*</footnote>

<footnote>* Corresponding Author's Email: gerhardt.stenger@univ-nantes.fr.</footnote>
### Gerhardt Stenger<fnref n="1" />

#### Abstract

The first defining feature of Enlightenment thinking is the emphasis on what we choose and decide for ourselves, to the detriment of what is imposed on us by an external authority. Religion became an object of examination, subject to the jurisdiction of reason, as in biblical exegesis, which took on considerable importance over the course of the century. From the 1680s onwards, the “truths” of the Christian religion deeply offended the philosophers and scientists of the Enlightenment, whose most striking works contained a vision of the world and a conception of life that broke almost completely with Christianity. The proponents of the new philosophy attack Christian theology as absurd, Christian morality, especially in the field of love and sexuality, which prevents men from being happy, and the dominant position of the Catholic Church in society and its claim to govern all areas of knowledge. Following cases as resounding as they were tragic, philosophers like Voltaire fought the religious intolerance imposed by the Catholic clergy leading to the Declaration of Human Rights and, at the beginning of the 20th century, to a particular form of secularization, *laïcité*.

**Keywords:** Enlightenment, *laïcité*, tolerance, Bible, Christianity, Morality, Bayle, Buffon, Diderot, d'Holbach, de Maillet, Meslier, Voltaire, theology, Trinity, original sin

#### Introduction

Écraser l'infâme (“Crush the Infamous”). The criticism of religion in the Age of Enlightenment is sometimes reduced to Voltaire's devastating war cry. But the Infamous in question is not *religion* itself, or even the Christian religion, but an ecclesiastical institution—the Catholic Church—insofar as it imposes an inviolable truth in all domains of knowledge and persecutes all those who challenge it, starting with Jansenists and Protestants. The philosophers, for their part, went the furthest in criticizing the Catholic Church and its dominant position, because the truth it defended come hell or highwater clashed head-on with the philosophical and scientific rationalism of the classical age. The philosophers of the Enlightenment fought against the “fundamentals” of Christianity, which were imposed by the Catholic Church and can be summarized as follows:

1. The Catholic religion is the only true religion; all others are in error.

2. The truths of Christianity were revealed by God in the Bible, and are superior to all other truths, philosophical or scientific.

3. Only Christians can claim salvation; all others are damned through no fault of their own.

The founding principle of Enlightenment thought (one cannot speak without abusive simplification of *the* philosophy of the Enlightenment, given the abundance of divergent philosophical positions during that period) is to prefer what one chooses and decides oneself, over what is imposed on us by an external authority. In order to shake off the yoke under which men still lived in the 18th century, philosophers claimed complete freedom to examine, question, criticize, and doubt: no dogma or institution was sacred.

<footnote n="1">¹Département de Lettres modernes, Nantes Université, France*</footnote>

<footnote>* Corresponding Author's Email: gerhardt.stenger@univ-nantes.fr.</footnote>
In this context, reason becomes a powerful undermining tool: while acknowledging its own limits, it is employed by philosophers to combat prejudice, challenge authority and question even the most sacred traditions. Broadly speaking, their criticisms of religion will focus on the following points:

1. The history of the foundation of Christianity, that is, the question of its origins and its propagation by fire and blood.

2. Its doctrinal content, certain dogmas that have become unacceptable to reason, such as original sin or the doctrine of the Trinity.

3. The extravagance of superstitious beliefs and practices that seem to defy rationality: religious rituals, in their apparent gratuitousness, are perceived as delusional forms, remarkable illustrations of human folly.

4. The moral role of the Church: the abuses of hierarchy, monastic scandals, corruption within the clergy, popular devotion, and the crimes of fanatics.

5. The political and social function of the Church: privileged and abusive ally of tyrannical power, it serves that power in order to serve itself and thus dominate the world. The Church, as an oppressive force, has always crushed the weak and kept them in ignorance and servility.

The critique of religion refers to the refusal to submit to the sacredness of a discourse involving moral, social or political conduct. It is expressed in various ways, ranging from courteous moderation to passionate diatribes. However, these ideological differences also correspond to literary ones. In terms of style and tone, there is a world of difference between the scholarly, peaceful, somewhat weighty discourse found in Lévesque de Burigny's *Critical Examination of Christian Religious Apologists*, and the aggressiveness, fiery denunciation and passionate rhetoric of Meslier's *Memoir*, d'Holbach's *Christianity Unveiled* and the irony, satire, sarcasm, and even buffoonery with which Voltaire overwhelmed his opponents. Defining the Enlightenment solely on the basis of its rejection of revealed religions risks oversimplifying a very complex issue. The 18th century was also the century of Pietists, Methodists, Hamann and Young, Klopstock and Blake. Rousseau's work, in particular, represents a different vision of the Enlightenment. By reclaiming the impulses of the heart and the value of sensitivity, the author of *The Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar* contributed powerfully to revive a religion whose ardor and vitality seemed to decline under the blows of critical thinking. The uncompromising criticism of religions in general, and the Catholic religion in particular, is a phenomenon specifically linked to the French Enlightenment. Neither in England nor in Germany did it develop to such an extent. In Catholic countries such as Spain, Austria and to a lesser extent in Italy, the Enlightenment did not take firm root. In Protestant countries faith and reason are considered complementary rather than antagonistic. Kant's division in *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason* (1793) between the domain of reason, with its precise limits, and the domain of faith, is an illustration of this. A century earlier, the French philosopher Pierre Bayle asserted in his *Clarification on the Pyrrhonians* (Éclaircissement sur les pyrrhoniens, 1702) that any compromise between philosophy and faith is doomed to failure: "One must necessarily choose between philosophy and the Gospel: if you wish to believe nothing but that which is obvious and in line with common notions, embrace philosophy and forsake Christianity: if you want to believe in the incomprehensible mysteries of religion, choose Christianity and leave behind philosophy; for possessing both evidence and incomprehensibility together is what cannot be done [...]. One must necessarily choose" (vol.IV, p.3004, Bayle, 1720). The radicality of the French Enlightenment is expressed first of all in the rejection of faith, as defined by Voltaire, echoing the Church Father Tertullian<fnref n="1" />, in the article *Faith* of his *Philosophical Dictionary*: "Faith consists in believing not what seems true, but what seems false to our understanding" (vol.IV-2, p.326, Voltaire, 1901).

## 1. Reason versus faith

<footnote n="1">¹ We know Voltaire's famous *Credo quia absurdum est* (or more precisely: *credibile est quia ineptum est*), which he translated in the article *Faith* of his *Philosophical Dictionary* as: faith "consists in believing things because they are impossible" (vol.IV-2, p.332, Voltaire, 1901). All quotations have been modernized.</footnote>
In this context, reason becomes a powerful undermining tool: while acknowledging its own limits, it is employed by philosophers to combat prejudice, challenge authority and question even the most sacred traditions. Broadly speaking, their criticisms of religion will focus on the following points:

1. The history of the foundation of Christianity, that is, the question of its origins and its propagation by fire and blood.

2. Its doctrinal content, certain dogmas that have become unacceptable to reason, such as original sin or the doctrine of the Trinity.

3. The extravagance of superstitious beliefs and practices that seem to defy rationality: religious rituals, in their apparent gratuitousness, are perceived as delusional forms, remarkable illustrations of human folly.

4. The moral role of the Church: the abuses of hierarchy, monastic scandals, corruption within the clergy, popular devotion, and the crimes of fanatics.

5. The political and social function of the Church: privileged and abusive ally of tyrannical power, it serves that power in order to serve itself and thus dominate the world. The Church, as an oppressive force, has always crushed the weak and kept them in ignorance and servility.

The critique of religion refers to the refusal to submit to the sacredness of a discourse involving moral, social or political conduct. It is expressed in various ways, ranging from courteous moderation to passionate diatribes. However, these ideological differences also correspond to literary ones. In terms of style and tone, there is a world of difference between the scholarly, peaceful, somewhat weighty discourse found in Lévesque de Burigny's *Critical Examination of Christian Religious Apologists*, and the aggressiveness, fiery denunciation and passionate rhetoric of Meslier's *Memoir*, d'Holbach's *Christianity Unveiled* and the irony, satire, sarcasm, and even buffoonery with which Voltaire overwhelmed his opponents. Defining the Enlightenment solely on the basis of its rejection of revealed religions risks oversimplifying a very complex issue. The 18th century was also the century of Pietists, Methodists, Hamann and Young, Klopstock and Blake. Rousseau's work, in particular, represents a different vision of the Enlightenment. By reclaiming the impulses of the heart and the value of sensitivity, the author of *The Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar* contributed powerfully to revive a religion whose ardor and vitality seemed to decline under the blows of critical thinking. The uncompromising criticism of religions in general, and the Catholic religion in particular, is a phenomenon specifically linked to the French Enlightenment. Neither in England nor in Germany did it develop to such an extent. In Catholic countries such as Spain, Austria and to a lesser extent in Italy, the Enlightenment did not take firm root. In Protestant countries faith and reason are considered complementary rather than antagonistic. Kant's division in *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason* (1793) between the domain of reason, with its precise limits, and the domain of faith, is an illustration of this. A century earlier, the French philosopher Pierre Bayle asserted in his *Clarification on the Pyrrhonians* (Éclaircissement sur les pyrrhoniens, 1702) that any compromise between philosophy and faith is doomed to failure: "One must necessarily choose between philosophy and the Gospel: if you wish to believe nothing but that which is obvious and in line with common notions, embrace philosophy and forsake Christianity: if you want to believe in the incomprehensible mysteries of religion, choose Christianity and leave behind philosophy; for possessing both evidence and incomprehensibility together is what cannot be done [...]. One must necessarily choose" (vol.IV, p.3004, Bayle, 1720). The radicality of the French Enlightenment is expressed first of all in the rejection of faith, as defined by Voltaire, echoing the Church Father Tertullian<fnref n="1" />, in the article *Faith* of his *Philosophical Dictionary*: "Faith consists in believing not what seems true, but what seems false to our understanding" (vol.IV-2, p.326, Voltaire, 1901).

# 1. Reason versus faith

<footnote n="1">¹ We know Voltaire’s famous *Credo quia absurdum est* (or more precisely: *credibile est quia ineptum est*), which he translated in the article *Faith* of his *Philosophical Dictionary* as: faith “consists in believing things because they are impossible” (vol.IV-2, p.332, Voltaire, 1901). All quotations have been modernized.</footnote>
In the late 17th century, the development of reason and belief in the immutability of the laws of nature led to the decline of the witch hunts, which had culminated at the very moment when Galileo, Kepler and Descartes were laying the foundations of modern philosophy and science (Easlea, 1980). (It is hardly believable that the 1630s saw more witches burned alive throughout Europe than all previous periods combined). The new worldview that eventually prevailed considered the earth as a mere cog in a vast machine, and eliminated the effective role of spirits and demons in the universe. In 1691, the Protestant pastor and Cartesian philosopher Balthasar Bekker stated that “the common opinion of the devil, of his knowledge, power, and operations, and of people which are accused of having commerce with him, [begins] by little and little to become very suspicious by the help of natural light” (n.p., Bekker, 1695). In the wake of Spinoza’s *Theological-Political Treatise* (1670), which advocated freedom of philosophizing intended to liberate man from theological dogmas and prejudices, philosophical rationality engaged in a critical examination of religions, mainly revealed monotheistic faiths, such as Christianity, and to a lesser extent of ancient polytheisms or Eastern religions deploying another conceptions of divinity. In 1721, Montesquieu published the first major work of Enlightenment philosophical literature, *The Persian Letters*, in which he fiercely criticized society, institutions, and religion under the Ancien Régime. In *Letters XVI* and *XVII*, one of the Persian travelers, Usbek, begins by lavishly praising the mullah Mohammed Ali with hyperbolic flattery: “Your knowledge is an abyss deeper than the ocean, your mind sharper than Zufagar, Hali’s two-pointed sword. [...] You read the Koran on the breast of our divine Prophet, and when you find a passage obscure, an angel, at his order, unfolds his rapid wings and descends from the throne to reveal the secret to you”. After attempting to appease him in this manner, Usbek expresses his doubts regarding certain Muslim rituals. He apologizes in advance for his audacity, aiming to prevent any potential reproach: “I have doubts that must be resolved; I feel my reason wandering; lead it back to the right road. O source of light, come to enlighten me. Destroy with your divine pen the difficulties I am about to propose you. Make me blush, in shame and self-pity, at the questions I am about to ask”. After this preliminary demonstration of submission, Usbek finally gets to the questions: “Why is it that our Lawgiver forbids us to eat the flesh of swine and all meats that he calls unclean? Why does he forbid us to touch a corpse? And why, to purify our soul, does he require that we incessantly wash our bodies? It seems to me that things are neither pure nor impure in themselves, for I cannot conceive of any inherent quality that can make them that way” (p.31-33, Montesquieu, 1999).

In this passage, Usbek reasons as an 18th century philosopher who questions the rituals and practices prevailing in various religions. There is no inherent reason to abstain from eating pork or touching a corpse, nothing that *a priori* elevates such practices to the status of religious precept. Usbek suggests that all of this is perfectly arbitrary: why beef and not pork? There is no real difference between the two meats that would justify this prohibition: “things are neither pure nor impure in themselves”. It just so happens that “objects of sense do not affect all men in the same way. What gives an agreeable sensation to some produces disgust in others”. Hence it follows logically “that everyone can decide as his fancy dictates, and distinguish by himself those things that are pure from those that are not” (p.33, Montesquieu, 1999), which would, of course, overturn the rules established by the holy Prophet.

Mullah Mohammed Ali’s response (*Letter XVIII*) is an excellent example of this genre. Unlike his correspondent’s display of humility, the tone of his response is immediately haughty and aggressive: “You are always asking us questions that have already been asked of our holy Prophet a thousand times. Why do you not read the traditional opinions of the learned? Why not go to that pure source of all intelligence? There you would find your doubts resolved”. There is no point in asking questions, because all imaginable questions have already been asked and have found their answers. To the reasoning and examining mind, the mullah opposes unconditional respect for tradition, which he sees as “that pure source of all intelligence”. The true believer imposes silence on his intellect, because true enlightenment does not come from the earthly realm but from Heaven:

> Unhappy man! Always encumbered by worldly things, and never having an eye fixed on
> heavenly things, you revere the mollah’s condition but dare not embrace and follow it.
In the late 17th century, the development of reason and belief in the immutability of the laws of nature led to the decline of the witch hunts, which had culminated at the very moment when Galileo, Kepler and Descartes were laying the foundations of modern philosophy and science (Easlea, 1980). (It is hardly believable that the 1630s saw more witches burned alive throughout Europe than all previous periods combined). The new worldview that eventually prevailed considered the earth as a mere cog in a vast machine, and eliminated the effective role of spirits and demons in the universe. In 1691, the Protestant pastor and Cartesian philosopher Balthasar Bekker stated that “the common opinion of the devil, of his knowledge, power, and operations, and of people which are accused of having commerce with him, [begins] by little and little to become very suspicious by the help of natural light” (n.p., Bekker, 1695). In the wake of Spinoza’s *Theological-Political Treatise* (1670), which advocated freedom of philosophizing intended to liberate man from theological dogmas and prejudices, philosophical rationality engaged in a critical examination of religions, mainly revealed monotheistic faiths, such as Christianity, and to a lesser extent of ancient polytheisms or Eastern religions deploying another conceptions of divinity. In 1721, Montesquieu published the first major work of Enlightenment philosophical literature, *The Persian Letters*, in which he fiercely criticized society, institutions, and religion under the Ancien Régime. In *Letters XVI* and *XVII*, one of the Persian travelers, Usbek, begins by lavishly praising the mullah Mohammed Ali with hyperbolic flattery: “Your knowledge is an abyss deeper than the ocean, your mind sharper than Zufagar, Hali’s two-pointed sword. [...] You read the Koran on the breast of our divine Prophet, and when you find a passage obscure, an angel, at his order, unfolds his rapid wings and descends from the throne to reveal the secret to you”. After attempting to appease him in this manner, Usbek expresses his doubts regarding certain Muslim rituals. He apologizes in advance for his audacity, aiming to prevent any potential reproach: “I have doubts that must be resolved; I feel my reason wandering; lead it back to the right road. O source of light, come to enlighten me. Destroy with your divine pen the difficulties I am about to propose you. Make me blush, in shame and self-pity, at the questions I am about to ask”. After this preliminary demonstration of submission, Usbek finally gets to the questions: “Why is it that our Lawgiver forbids us to eat the flesh of swine and all meats that he calls unclean? Why does he forbid us to touch a corpse? And why, to purify our soul, does he require that we incessantly wash our bodies? It seems to me that things are neither pure nor impure in themselves, for I cannot conceive of any inherent quality that can make them that way” (p.31-33, Montesquieu, 1999).

In this passage, Usbek reasons as an 18th century philosopher who questions the rituals and practices prevailing in various religions. There is no inherent reason to abstain from eating pork or touching a corpse, nothing that *a priori* elevates such practices to the status of religious precept. Usbek suggests that all of this is perfectly arbitrary: why beef and not pork? There is no real difference between the two meats that would justify this prohibition: “things are neither pure nor impure in themselves”. It just so happens that “objects of sense do not affect all men in the same way. What gives an agreeable sensation to some produces disgust in others”. Hence it follows logically “that everyone can decide as his fancy dictates, and distinguish by himself those things that are pure from those that are not” (p.33, Montesquieu, 1999), which would, of course, overturn the rules established by the holy Prophet.

Mullah Mohammed Ali’s response (*Letter XVIII*) is an excellent example of this genre. Unlike his correspondent’s display of humility, the tone of his response is immediately haughty and aggressive: “You are always asking us questions that have already been asked of our holy Prophet a thousand times. Why do you not read the traditional opinions of the learned? Why not go to that pure source of all intelligence? There you would find your doubts resolved”. There is no point in asking questions, because all imaginable questions have already been asked and have found their answers. To the reasoning and examining mind, the mullah opposes unconditional respect for tradition, which he sees as “that pure source of all intelligence”. The true believer imposes silence on his intellect, because true enlightenment does not come from the earthly realm but from Heaven:

> Unhappy man! Always encumbered by worldly things, and never having an eye fixed on
> heavenly things, you revere the mollah’s condition but dare not embrace and follow it.
O profane ones, who never enter into the secrets of the Eternal! Your light is but abysmal shadow, and the reasonings of your mind are like the dust raised by your feet at noonday in the torrid month of Chahban.

Your mind, at its zenith, is lower than the nadir reached by the least of the imans. Your vain philosophy is the lightening, warning of storm and darkness. You are in the midst of the tempest, wandering at the will of the wind (p.34, Montesquieu, 1999).

To fully grasp the significance of the mullah's scathing response, one must read between the lines. Taking shelter in the Eastern fable, Montesquieu presents the main divide between the Enlightenment philosophers and their Catholic adversaries. On one side, there is the realm of Heaven and the secrets of the Eternal, known only to mullahs and imans. On the other side, there are critical minds that seek to subject traditions and beliefs to the scrutiny of reason. Mohammed Ali reproaches Usbek for displaying superficial respect towards the clerics of his religion—he has perfectly understood that Usbek's previous letter was heavily tainted with hypocrisy—while attempting to break free from their authority. Hence, his open expression of anger towards a “skeptical” correspondent and in general those who employ critical reason.

Mullah Mohammed Ali targets all those who believe that humans possess the faculty to discover facts by themselves. Towards the end of the 18th century, Kant defined the Enlightenment movement as “man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity” (p.263, Kant, 1986), breaking free of submission to the authority and tutelage of others. The light that philosophers look towards is no longer that of Heaven but the light of reason, which questions the reality or probability of “facts” and stories and their interpretations. The critical mind, according to Diderot, begins with doubt: “skepticism is [...] the first step towards truth” (p.45, Diderot, 2016). This proclamation of intellectual autonomy, of the freedom to exercise one’s own reason, is vehemently denounced by the mullah. If men start thinking for themselves, they no longer need those who think on their behalf: the mullahs and imans.

The Age of Enlightenment is primarily the age of *criticism*. Even if the word itself is not explicitly mentioned, the idea of criticism is pervasive. To criticize, in the etymological sense of the word, does not mean to disapprove so much as to discern: to distinguish between the true and the false, the just and the unjust, the plausible and the doubtful, and so on. The great philosophers of the 17th century, constructed coherent philosophical systems based on principles and facts that were taken to be self-evident and indisputable. However, in the 18th century, to know is first and foremost to liberate oneself from that which prevents understanding, that is from prejudice and traditional certainties. The Enlightenment marks the definitive abandonment of reliance on dogma and, more generally, on arguments from authority. The critical spirit that characterizes the Enlightenment is not intimidated in the face of Revealed doctrine or the rights of princes. Enlightenment thinkers demand intellectual autonomy, the—natural—right to think for oneself, to criticize freely, that is, to seek truth through reason rather than surrendering to blind faith or following an authority unquestioningly. In the 18th century, to criticize means to question and analyze tradition, to doubt the most sacred truths. The philosophers dismiss alleged “facts” put forward by Christians, such as miracles and the stories of martyrs, as these testimonies have often been distorted by historians’ biases or the credulity of the people. The ancient philosophers, as stated in the article *Certitude* in the *Encyclopédie*, were too intelligent to believe in the absurdities of pagan religion (vol.II, p.846, *Encyclopédie*, 1751-72). In *Philosophical Thoughts (Pensées philosophiques, 1746)* Diderot goes so far as to challenge the testimony of an entire city when it comes to believing in the authenticity of a supernatural event: “The less probability a fact has the more does the testimony of history lose its weight. I should make no difficulty in believing a single honest man who should tell me that His Majesty had just won a complete victory over the allies; but if all Paris were to assure me that a dead man had come to life again at Passy, I should not believe a word of it” (p.54, Diderot, 2016). It is essential to learn to not to trust supposedly truthful testimonies, miracles, and anything that contradicts reason. Faith, “the first of the Christian virtues [...], consists in an impossible conviction of the revealed doctrines and absurd fables which the Christian religion commands its disciples to believe”. Hence, “this virtue exacts a total renunciation of reason, and impracticable assent to improbable facts, and a blind submission to the authority of priests” (p.96,
O profane ones, who never enter into the secrets of the Eternal! Your light is but abysmal shadow, and the reasonings of your mind are like the dust raised by your feet at noonday in the torrid month of Chahban.

Your mind, at its zenith, is lower than the nadir reached by the least of the imans. Your vain philosophy is the lightening, warning of storm and darkness. You are in the midst of the tempest, wandering at the will of the wind (p.34, Montesquieu, 1999).

To fully grasp the significance of the mullah's scathing response, one must read between the lines. Taking shelter in the Eastern fable, Montesquieu presents the main divide between the Enlightenment philosophers and their Catholic adversaries. On one side, there is the realm of Heaven and the secrets of the Eternal, known only to mullahs and imans. On the other side, there are critical minds that seek to subject traditions and beliefs to the scrutiny of reason. Mohammed Ali reproaches Usbek for displaying superficial respect towards the clerics of his religion—he has perfectly understood that Usbek's previous letter was heavily tainted with hypocrisy—while attempting to break free from their authority. Hence, his open expression of anger towards a “skeptical” correspondent and in general those who employ critical reason.

Mullah Mohammed Ali targets all those who believe that humans possess the faculty to discover facts by themselves. Towards the end of the 18th century, Kant defined the Enlightenment movement as “man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity” (p.263, Kant, 1986), breaking free of submission to the authority and tutelage of others. The light that philosophers look towards is no longer that of Heaven but the light of reason, which questions the reality or probability of “facts” and stories and their interpretations. The critical mind, according to Diderot, begins with doubt: “skepticism is [...] the first step towards truth” (p.45, Diderot, 2016). This proclamation of intellectual autonomy, of the freedom to exercise one’s own reason, is vehemently denounced by the mullah. If men start thinking for themselves, they no longer need those who think on their behalf: the mullahs and imans.

The Age of Enlightenment is primarily the age of *criticism*. Even if the word itself is not explicitly mentioned, the idea of criticism is pervasive. To criticize, in the etymological sense of the word, does not mean to disapprove so much as to discern: to distinguish between the true and the false, the just and the unjust, the plausible and the doubtful, and so on. The great philosophers of the 17th century, constructed coherent philosophical systems based on principles and facts that were taken to be self-evident and indisputable. However, in the 18th century, to know is first and foremost to liberate oneself from that which prevents understanding, that is from prejudice and traditional certainties. The Enlightenment marks the definitive abandonment of reliance on dogma and, more generally, on arguments from authority. The critical spirit that characterizes the Enlightenment is not intimidated in the face of Revealed doctrine or the rights of princes. Enlightenment thinkers demand intellectual autonomy, the—natural—right to think for oneself, to criticize freely, that is, to seek truth through reason rather than surrendering to blind faith or following an authority unquestioningly. In the 18th century, to criticize means to question and analyze tradition, to doubt the most sacred truths. The philosophers dismiss alleged “facts” put forward by Christians, such as miracles and the stories of martyrs, as these testimonies have often been distorted by historians’ biases or the credulity of the people. The ancient philosophers, as stated in the article *Certitude* in the *Encyclopédie*, were too intelligent to believe in the absurdities of pagan religion (vol.II, p.846, *Encyclopédie*, 1751-72). In *Philosophical Thoughts (Pensées philosophiques*, 1746) Diderot goes so far as to challenge the testimony of an entire city when it comes to believing in the authenticity of a supernatural event: “The less probability a fact has the more does the testimony of history lose its weight. I should make no difficulty in believing a single honest man who should tell me that His Majesty had just won a complete victory over the allies; but if all Paris were to assure me that a dead man had come to life again at Passy, I should not believe a word of it” (p.54, Diderot, 2016). It is essential to learn to not to trust supposedly truthful testimonies, miracles, and anything that contradicts reason. Faith, “the first of the Christian virtues [...], consists in an impossible conviction of the revealed doctrines and absurd fables which the Christian religion commands its disciples to believe”. Hence, “this virtue exacts a total renunciation of reason, and impracticable assent to improbable facts, and a blind submission to the authority of priests” (p.96,
d'Holbach, 1835). Faith, proclaims d'Holbach, "forbids all doubt and enquiry; and deprives man of the
liberty of exercising his reason and reflection" (p.96-97, d'Holbach, 1835). As d'Holbach remarks, it can
sometimes lead to a blind acceptance of beliefs without critical examination. The concept of "fake news" in
modern times highlights the importance of cultivating a healthy skepticism. This was Diderot's aim in his
*Philosophical Thoughts*: the goal is to learn to reason without being guided solely by tradition, authority, or
unreliable testimonies. *Dare to think for yourself*.

At the turn of the 18th century, religion can be criticized only indirectly or by taking underground,
clandestine routes. Between 1700 and 1750, thousands of anonymous manuscripts, ranging from small
pamphlets of a few pages to large materialist treatises, circulate throughout Europe (Benítez, 1996). Some
authors ask the need for Revelation if human reason is a reliable guide. If human reason is reliable, then
divine Reason must conform to it. The history of religions is seen as a political imposture: religion becomes
a tool in the hands of the sovereign, allowing control of the ignorant masses. Other manuscripts undertake
systematic critiques of the biblical text, subjecting it to analysis with the same instruments that are used for
secular texts: philology, chronology, numismatics, paleography. An eminent scholar, Jean Lévesque de
Burigny, composed in the 1730s a *Critical Examination of Christian Religious Apologists* which was
published in 1766 under the name of another scholar, Nicolas Fréret. Burigny bases his approach on
rigorous historical criticism. He challenges the authenticity of the Gospels and questions the arbitrary
selection of the canon: early Christians read apocryphal texts which are now rejected, while there is no
evidence that the texts that have been retained are any more truthful. Christianity, from its inception, was
the religion of an ignorant, unhappy and gullible people. Its success was the result of the Roman Emperor
Constantine's political calculations, and its development the fruit of violence. Arguments based on the
supposed moral excellence of Christians do not withstand scrutiny: as one can observe every day, the
Christian religion has not changed men, who are neither better nor more enlightened than the wise men of
Greece, whose morality was comparable to that of modern preachers. Burigny goes even further: not only
did Christianity fail to improve men, it made them persecutors, because of its claim to absolute truth.

Internal criticism is no less damning. The Old Testament is a fabric of absurdities, and many passages
are morally outrageous. Burigny notes with irony that the Church prohibits its reading:

> Christians indeed claim that their fundamental books were inspired by the Holy Spirit, but how
can they reconcile this belief with the imperfections they attribute to them? In all of Italy and in all
countries where the authority of the Pope is boundless, Scripture is regarded as dangerous for the
majority of the faithful, who are very easily deceived. As a result of this belief, the Bible translated
into the vernacular language is only allowed to be sold to those who have permission to read it.
This is expressed in the fifth rule of the Index, which is translated as follows: "It being evident,
from experience, that if the Bible translated into the vernacular language were permitted
indiscriminately to everyone, the temerity of men would cause more harm to arise from it than
good; we desire that the judgment of the bishop or inquisitor be consulted in this matter, so that
with the advice of the parish priest or the confessor, they may grant permission to read the Bible
translated by Catholic authors into the vernacular language to those to whom they judge that this
reading will bring no harm; and this permission they must have in writing. But if anyone shall have
the presumption to read or possess the Bible without such written permission, they shall not
receive absolution." (p.240-241, Fréret, 1766).

Burigny does not position himself as a materialist or an atheist, and never addresses the question of
the existence of God. His criticism is historical and erudite, focused on the texts, but his analyses will
provide Voltaire with numerous arguments for his future battle against the "Infamous". In response to
rising skepticism and unbelief, defenders of Christianity attempt a massive but clumsy defense. They want
to prove the truth of Christianity, its "reasonableness". For example, in *The Unbeliever Brought to Reason
by Faith* (1710), the Benedictine François Lamy asserts that God is the origin of both reason and faith: the
two support each other, even if some mysteries are beyond the capacity of human reason. In 1717, Jean
d'Holbach, 1835). Faith, proclaims d'Holbach, "forbids all doubt and enquiry; and deprives man of the
liberty of exercising his reason and reflection" (p.96-97, d'Holbach, 1835). As d'Holbach remarks, it can
sometimes lead to a blind acceptance of beliefs without critical examination. The concept of "fake news" in
modern times highlights the importance of cultivating a healthy skepticism. This was Diderot's aim in his
*Philosophical Thoughts*: the goal is to learn to reason without being guided solely by tradition, authority, or
unreliable testimonies. *Dare to think for yourself*.

At the turn of the 18th century, religion can be criticized only indirectly or by taking underground,
clandestine routes. Between 1700 and 1750, thousands of anonymous manuscripts, ranging from small
pamphlets of a few pages to large materialist treatises, circulate throughout Europe (Benítez, 1996). Some
authors ask the need for Revelation if human reason is a reliable guide. If human reason is reliable, then
divine Reason must conform to it. The history of religions is seen as a political imposture: religion becomes
a tool in the hands of the sovereign, allowing control of the ignorant masses. Other manuscripts undertake
systematic critiques of the biblical text, subjecting it to analysis with the same instruments that are used for
secular texts: philology, chronology, numismatics, paleography. An eminent scholar, Jean Lévesque de
Burigny, composed in the 1730s a *Critical Examination of Christian Religious Apologists* which was
published in 1766 under the name of another scholar, Nicolas Fréret. Burigny bases his approach on
rigorous historical criticism. He challenges the authenticity of the Gospels and questions the arbitrary
selection of the canon: early Christians read apocryphal texts which are now rejected, while there is no
evidence that the texts that have been retained are any more truthful. Christianity, from its inception, was
the religion of an ignorant, unhappy and gullible people. Its success was the result of the Roman Emperor
Constantine's political calculations, and its development the fruit of violence. Arguments based on the
supposed moral excellence of Christians do not withstand scrutiny: as one can observe every day, the
Christian religion has not changed men, who are neither better nor more enlightened than the wise men of
Greece, whose morality was comparable to that of modern preachers. Burigny goes even further: not only
did Christianity fail to improve men, it made them persecutors, because of its claim to absolute truth.

Internal criticism is no less damning. The Old Testament is a fabric of absurdities, and many passages
are morally outrageous. Burigny notes with irony that the Church prohibits its reading:

> Christians indeed claim that their fundamental books were inspired by the Holy Spirit, but how
can they reconcile this belief with the imperfections they attribute to them? In all of Italy and in all
countries where the authority of the Pope is boundless, Scripture is regarded as dangerous for the
majority of the faithful, who are very easily deceived. As a result of this belief, the Bible translated
into the vernacular language is only allowed to be sold to those who have permission to read it.
This is expressed in the fifth rule of the Index, which is translated as follows: "It being evident,
from experience, that if the Bible translated into the vernacular language were permitted
indiscriminately to everyone, the temerity of men would cause more harm to arise from it than
good; we desire that the judgment of the bishop or inquisitor be consulted in this matter, so that
with the advice of the parish priest or the confessor, they may grant permission to read the Bible
translated by Catholic authors into the vernacular language to those to whom they judge that this
reading will bring no harm; and this permission they must have in writing. But if anyone shall have
the presumption to read or possess the Bible without such written permission, they shall not
receive absolution." (p.240-241, Fréret, 1766).

Burigny does not position himself as a materialist or an atheist, and never addresses the question of
the existence of God. His criticism is historical and erudite, focused on the texts, but his analyses will
provide Voltaire with numerous arguments for his future battle against the "Infamous". In response to
rising skepticism and unbelief, defenders of Christianity attempt a massive but clumsy defense. They want
to prove the truth of Christianity, its "reasonableness". For example, in *The Unbeliever Brought to Reason
by Faith* (1710), the Benedictine François Lamy asserts that God is the origin of both reason and faith: the
two support each other, even if some mysteries are beyond the capacity of human reason. In 1717, Jean
Denyse publishes *The Truth of the Christian Religion Demonstrated by Geometrical Order*, in which he attempts to prove the greatest mysteries of the Christian religion through demonstrations as certain as those of geometry. However, this method quickly proved to be dangerous: using reason to defend faith against rationalist attacks could lead to insurmountable contradictions. With regard to the reading and interpretation of the Bible, Christian apologists continue to affirm the position of Bossuet in his *Discourse on Universal History* (1681): all the books of the Bible are authentic and the entire Pentateuch was written by Moses. Above all, they insisted on adhering to the *exact letter* or literal sense of the Bible, as they believed it was the only way to understand what God intended to communicate to men. Studying the sacred text using profane methods and striving to uncover its meaning by taking into account not just the grammatical words, but also the syntactical aspects, the cultural and historical background, and the literary genre, is to commit sacrilege, to profane it. Scripture is considered inviolable, containing truth in its purest form. However, when defenders of the Bible engaged in scholarly studies to explain the most implausible details of the Old Testament, they unwittingly provided ammunition to their adversaries. If there are atheists, Voltaire quips, it is also the fault... of theologians:

> Men who have fattened on our substance, cry out to us: "Be persuaded that an ass spoke; believe that a fish swallowed a man, and threw him up three days after, safe and sound, on the shore; doubt not that the God of the universe ordered one Jewish prophet to eat excrement, and another to buy two prostitutes, and have bastards by them" [...] Believe a hundred things either visibly abominable or mathematically impossible: otherwise the God of Mercy will burn you in hell-fire, not only for millions of millions of ages, but for all eternity<fnref n="2" />.

A century later, in 1893, Pope Leo XIII promulgated the encyclical letter *Providentissimus Deus* (“On the Study of Holy Scripture”) which gave the first formal authorization for the use of critical methods in biblical scholarship. Leo acknowledged the possibility of errors introduced by scribes and argued that the scientist should not view the biblical writers as explaining the visible world, as that was not their intent. Leo then quotes Augustine: “And if in these Books I meet anything which seems contrary to truth, I shall not hesitate to conclude either that the text is faulty, or that the translator has not expressed the meaning of the passage, or that I myself do not understand” (p.56, *The Scripture Documents*, 2002).

## 2. Priestly imposture and the birth of Christianity

At the beginning of his philosophical inquiry, Descartes had wiped the slate clean of all prior knowledge to arrive, through logical deduction, at certain truths. By the end of the 17th century, another method of philosophical investigation emerged—the genealogical method. According to this method, one attempts to trace the origin of a given phenomenon, questioning the origin and foundation of society, power, ideas, religions, etc. This method enables one, for example, to challenge the validity of royal absolutism, the concept of innate ideas, or the divine origin of Christianity. In his *Philosophical Letters* or *Letters concerning the English Nation* (*Lettres philosophiques* or *Lettres sur les Anglais*, 1734), Voltaire described, for example, the birth of the Quaker sect in the mid-17th century, drawing a disturbing parallel between the life of the sect's main founder, George Fox, and the history of Jesus Christ (p.17-20, Voltaire, 1994). Voltaire thus insinuates that the establishment of a religion occurs through natural processes and that Christianity, in particular, has its origin in a... media figure, as we would say today, exploiting the gullibility of the people, and in some other circumstances found in most other religions. By employing the genealogical method to account for the origin of a phenomenon, it often becomes possible to demystify it. One of the first philosophers to use this method was Fontenelle.

<footnote n="2">² Article *Atheism* of the *Philosophical Dictionary* (vol.III-2, p.127, Voltaire, 1901). Voltaire refers to Numbers 22:28-30; Jonah 2:1-11; Ezekiel 4:15; Hosea 1:2-3.</footnote>
Denyse publishes *The Truth of the Christian Religion Demonstrated by Geometrical Order*, in which he attempts to prove the greatest mysteries of the Christian religion through demonstrations as certain as those of geometry. However, this method quickly proved to be dangerous: using reason to defend faith against rationalist attacks could lead to insurmountable contradictions. With regard to the reading and interpretation of the Bible, Christian apologists continue to affirm the position of Bossuet in his *Discourse on Universal History* (1681): all the books of the Bible are authentic and the entire Pentateuch was written by Moses. Above all, they insisted on adhering to the *exact letter* or literal sense of the Bible, as they believed it was the only way to understand what God intended to communicate to men. Studying the sacred text using profane methods and striving to uncover its meaning by taking into account not just the grammatical words, but also the syntactical aspects, the cultural and historical background, and the literary genre, is to commit sacrilege, to profane it. Scripture is considered inviolable, containing truth in its purest form. However, when defenders of the Bible engaged in scholarly studies to explain the most implausible details of the Old Testament, they unwittingly provided ammunition to their adversaries. If there are atheists, Voltaire quips, it is also the fault... of theologians:

> Men who have fattened on our substance, cry out to us: "Be persuaded that an ass spoke; believe that a fish swallowed a man, and threw him up three days after, safe and sound, on the shore; doubt not that the God of the universe ordered one Jewish prophet to eat excrement, and another to buy two prostitutes, and have bastards by them" [...] Believe a hundred things either visibly abominable or mathematically impossible: otherwise the God of Mercy will burn you in hell-fire, not only for millions of millions of ages, but for all eternity<fnref n="2" />.

A century later, in 1893, Pope Leo XIII promulgated the encyclical letter *Providentissimus Deus* (“On the Study of Holy Scripture”) which gave the first formal authorization for the use of critical methods in biblical scholarship. Leo acknowledged the possibility of errors introduced by scribes and argued that the scientist should not view the biblical writers as explaining the visible world, as that was not their intent. Leo then quotes Augustine: “And if in these Books I meet anything which seems contrary to truth, I shall not hesitate to conclude either that the text is faulty, or that the translator has not expressed the meaning of the passage, or that I myself do not understand” (p.56, *The Scripture Documents*, 2002).

## 2. Priestly imposture and the birth of Christianity

At the beginning of his philosophical inquiry, Descartes had wiped the slate clean of all prior knowledge to arrive, through logical deduction, at certain truths. By the end of the 17th century, another method of philosophical investigation emerged—the genealogical method. According to this method, one attempts to trace the origin of a given phenomenon, questioning the origin and foundation of society, power, ideas, religions, etc. This method enables one, for example, to challenge the validity of royal absolutism, the concept of innate ideas, or the divine origin of Christianity. In his *Philosophical Letters* or *Letters concerning the English Nation* (*Lettres philosophiques* or *Lettres sur les Anglais*, 1734), Voltaire described, for example, the birth of the Quaker sect in the mid-17th century, drawing a disturbing parallel between the life of the sect's main founder, George Fox, and the history of Jesus Christ (p.17-20, Voltaire, 1994). Voltaire thus insinuates that the establishment of a religion occurs through natural processes and that Christianity, in particular, has its origin in a... media figure, as we would say today, exploiting the gullibility of the people, and in some other circumstances found in most other religions. By employing the genealogical method to account for the origin of a phenomenon, it often becomes possible to demystify it. One of the first philosophers to use this method was Fontenelle.

<footnote n="2">² Article *Atheism* of the *Philosophical Dictionary* (vol.III-2, p.127, Voltaire, 1901). Voltaire refers to Numbers 22:28-30; Jonah 2:1-11; Ezekiel 4:15; Hosea 1:2-3.</footnote>
Published in 1724 but written some thirty years earlier, *Of the Origin of Fables* applies the genealogical method to religion, attributing supernatural events to the ignorance of early humans, who were obliged to resort to superior deities to explain facts whose cause they did not know. To understand the originality of Fontenelle's work, it is necessary to situate his thought in relation to the opinions of his contemporaries. At that time, a number of different explanations for the formation of ancient religions were in contention. The allegorical interpretation saw ancient gods and heroes as symbols of physical or moral truths. The historical interpretation argued that gods were ancient heroes, conquerors, or benefactors elevated to the status of divinities, and that myths were based on real events that were embellished, corrupted, or distorted. The political interpretation, on the other hand, viewed religions as deliberate inventions of impostors and tricksters whose goal was to control the minds of the people. In the 1680s, the discussion of myths took a particular turn, focusing on the similarities between various ancient religions and Jewish and Christian beliefs. To link pagan religions to the "true faith", Christian scholars adopted the theory of plagiarism: ancient mythology and theology were said to derive from biblical traditions, with Phoenicians serving as intermediaries between the Hebrews and the Greeks. In 1679, the Bishop of Avranches, Pierre-Daniel Huet, published an *Evangelical demonstration (Demonstratio evangelica)* in which he argued that all pagan theology derived from the acts or writings of Moses. According to Huet, the gods of the Phoenicians, Egyptians, Persians, Germans, Gauls, Bretons, Romans, etc., all came from Moses and were nothing but transpositions of what was presented in Genesis (p.38-39, Huet, 1679).

Fontenelle's essay *Of the Origin of Fables* analyzes the formation and transmission of beliefs and myths in general (p.10-18, Fontenelle, 1972). He seeks to understand why certain myths were accepted claiming that they gained such strong influence due to human cognitive weaknesses and errors in reasoning. Fontenelle observes a surprising disconnect between the absurdity of certain fables and their continued transmission from generation to generation, between the implausibility of the stories and the disconcerting ease with which they are believed and between the crudeness of the deceptions and the subtlety of the speculations that these myths gave rise to. Based on analogies of savages and children, Fontenelle constructs a typical savage mind: weak, credulous, imaginative, given to self-magnification, and in love with marvels. At the starting point lies ignorance: "The more ignorant one is and the less experience one has, the more miracles one will see. The first men saw plenty of them, and naturally, as the fathers told their children what they had seen and what they had done, there were nothing but prodigies in the tales of those times". The frequency of such anecdotes and the prevalence of myths throughout human history demonstrate that human credulity is a common and natural phenomenon. In some cases, myths came about as answers to the questions about the world posed by primitive thinkers. The human mind naturally seeks to understand and explain the world around it. These "just-so stories" were, of course, silly and wrong; but Fontenelle quickly goes on to say that the method involved in this early "philosophy", as he calls it, is exactly the same method as that of modern thinkers in that both try to explain "the unknown things in nature in terms of those we have before our eyes". This is the nature of human imagination: the less it grasps, the more it is open to the extraordinary. Thus, wind, lightning, and storms are "explained" as the actions of super-human beings: gods, goddesses. Early religions are anthropomorphic: the gods take human form because humans project onto their deities that which they have observed in themselves; but that which is insufficient in becomes perfect in the gods. We are, therefore, witnessing a kind of natural divinization of man by himself.

According to Fontenelle, the invention of religions is part of a historical process: men began by projecting onto their gods the ideas they had about force, and as men changed, as the human mind evolved, the gods also changed:

> The first men were indeed brutal, and they yielded everything to force; the gods became nearly as brutal, and only a bit more powerful, and thus one gets the gods of the time of Homer. Men began to have ideas of wisdom and justice; the gods picked them up: they began to be wise and just, and became more and more so in proportion to the extent to which these ideas developed among men;
Published in 1724 but written some thirty years earlier, *Of the Origin of Fables* applies the genealogical method to religion, attributing supernatural events to the ignorance of early humans, who were obliged to resort to superior deities to explain facts whose cause they did not know. To understand the originality of Fontenelle's work, it is necessary to situate his thought in relation to the opinions of his contemporaries. At that time, a number of different explanations for the formation of ancient religions were in contention. The allegorical interpretation saw ancient gods and heroes as symbols of physical or moral truths. The historical interpretation argued that gods were ancient heroes, conquerors, or benefactors elevated to the status of divinities, and that myths were based on real events that were embellished, corrupted, or distorted. The political interpretation, on the other hand, viewed religions as deliberate inventions of impostors and tricksters whose goal was to control the minds of the people. In the 1680s, the discussion of myths took a particular turn, focusing on the similarities between various ancient religions and Jewish and Christian beliefs. To link pagan religions to the "true faith", Christian scholars adopted the theory of plagiarism: ancient mythology and theology were said to derive from biblical traditions, with Phoenicians serving as intermediaries between the Hebrews and the Greeks. In 1679, the Bishop of Avranches, Pierre-Daniel Huet, published an *Evangelical demonstration (Demonstratio evangelica)* in which he argued that all pagan theology derived from the acts or writings of Moses. According to Huet, the gods of the Phoenicians, Egyptians, Persians, Germans, Gauls, Bretons, Romans, etc., all came from Moses and were nothing but transpositions of what was presented in Genesis (p.38-39, Huet, 1679).

Fontenelle's essay *Of the Origin of Fables* analyzes the formation and transmission of beliefs and myths in general (p.10-18, Fontenelle, 1972). He seeks to understand why certain myths were accepted claiming that they gained such strong influence due to human cognitive weaknesses and errors in reasoning. Fontenelle observes a surprising disconnect between the absurdity of certain fables and their continued transmission from generation to generation, between the implausibility of the stories and the disconcerting ease with which they are believed and between the crudeness of the deceptions and the subtlety of the speculations that these myths gave rise to. Based on analogies of savages and children, Fontenelle constructs a typical savage mind: weak, credulous, imaginative, given to self-magnification, and in love with marvels. At the starting point lies ignorance: "The more ignorant one is and the less experience one has, the more miracles one will see. The first men saw plenty of them, and naturally, as the fathers told their children what they had seen and what they had done, there were nothing but prodigies in the tales of those times". The frequency of such anecdotes and the prevalence of myths throughout human history demonstrate that human credulity is a common and natural phenomenon. In some cases, myths came about as answers to the questions about the world posed by primitive thinkers. The human mind naturally seeks to understand and explain the world around it. These "just-so stories" were, of course, silly and wrong; but Fontenelle quickly goes on to say that the method involved in this early "philosophy", as he calls it, is exactly the same method as that of modern thinkers in that both try to explain "the unknown things in nature in terms of those we have before our eyes". This is the nature of human imagination: the less it grasps, the more it is open to the extraordinary. Thus, wind, lightning, and storms are "explained" as the actions of super-human beings: gods, goddesses. Early religions are anthropomorphic: the gods take human form because humans project onto their deities that which they have observed in themselves; but that which is insufficient in becomes perfect in the gods. We are, therefore, witnessing a kind of natural divinization of man by himself.

According to Fontenelle, the invention of religions is part of a historical process: men began by projecting onto their gods the ideas they had about force, and as men changed, as the human mind evolved, the gods also changed:

> The first men were indeed brutal, and they yielded everything to force; the gods became nearly as brutal, and only a bit more powerful, and thus one gets the gods of the time of Homer. Men began to have ideas of wisdom and justice; the gods picked them up: they began to be wise and just, and became more and more so in proportion to the extent to which these ideas developed among men;
and thus one gets the gods of the time of Cicero, and they are preferable to those of Homer's time because better philosophers had had a hand in the business.

The history of religion is, therefore, an evolutionary history, like that of the human mind. As humans became more perfect, the gods also became all the more perfect. Strength transforms into wisdom, and the gods of Homer become the gods of Cicero. The successive stages of fables reflect in a way the successive stages of the human mind in its long and hesitant search for causes. Fontenelle stresses the natural aspect of all this: "So far, the first men had given birth to fables more or less innocently". We must not ridicule those who have invented fables and myths; it is the natural propensity of the human mind to seek to understand and to find causes for what it does not understand. The origin of fables and myths should not be seen solely as negative; it is a manifestation of intellectual curiosity in the human mind. We want to understand, and when we cannot find a reasonable explanation, we resort to fabulous explanations. Departing from the tradition of plagiarism, Fontenelle asserts that each people followed the same path in inventing gods. Reading between the lines, one can see that the development Hebrews' and Christians' beliefs followed the same course as the pagans. Christianity represents only a moment, only a stage in the history of reason.

Fontenelle's reflections are taken up and radicalized by Baron d'Holbach in *The Sacred Contagion* (*La Contagion sacrée*, 1768). Falsely attributed to the English freethinker John Trenchard, the book argues that religious influence is always harmful to morality, society, and government. Religion has always had its critics, writes d'Holbach, "but few have dared to attack it at the source" (vol.I, p.177, d'Holbach, 1768). Religion, which he systematically calls superstition, can be the object of scientific examination, and must be subjected to the same processes of analysis, to the same criteria of truth as any other phenomenon of nature. The invention of the gods, then that of a God, with the rituals they require, is part of a historical process that begins at the dawn of time and is explained by the ignorance and powerlessness of men in the face of a nature that surpasses and terrorizes them. Threatened by the evils that overwhelmed them, powerless to satisfy their needs, they invented deities and all kinds of occult forces: "Man is superstitious only because he is fearful; he fears only because he is ignorant. [...] calamities everywhere have made us think of divinities and imagine ways to appease them" (vol.I, p.1, 7-8, d'Holbach, 1768). Exploiting men's taste for the marvelous, priests soon became the interpreters of the gods: "they proclaimed their oracles, they foretold the future and, having become participants in their omnipotence, they worked wonders that astonished and confounded the common mind. The prostrate nations received their decrees with trembling; they submitted without a murmur, they adopted without examination the ways prescribed to them to make Heaven propitious; works which were believed to be supernatural because the manner in which they were performed was unknown completed the conviction of the legitimacy of the orders announced, and passed for the sanction of divinity" (vol.I, p.57-58, d'Holbach, 1768). Thus, religion was imposed on people through a sort of monumental and deliberate imposture. The priestly function is an usurpation from the very beginning, which only degenerates over time to maintain its position:

> In the midst of nations dismayed, suffering and devoid of experience, there found ambitious, enthusiastic or deceitful men who, taking advantage of the alarmed ignorance of their fellow citizens, turned their calamities, their fears and their stupidity to their own profit, won their confidence, succeeded in subjugating them and made them adopt their gods, their opinions and their cults. [...] Thus impostors identified with divinity exercised the most absolute power; they became despots and reigned by terror; the gods served to justify the excesses and crimes of their tyranny (vol.I, p.9, 12, d'Holbach, 1768).

D'Holbach mercilessly denounces the complicity that religions have always forged with tyranny: "The weakness, ignorance, vices and wickedness of the princes almost always made it impossible for them to do without the help of the priesthood; they needed it to tyrannize safely and contain subjects whose whims and follies made them moan incessantly" (vol.I, p.111, d'Holbach, 1768). In d'Holbach there is a sincere horror for the misdeeds of religion in general and Christianity in particular, an intellectual horror outraged by the
and thus one gets the gods of the time of Cicero, and they are preferable to those of Homer's time because better philosophers had had a hand in the business.

The history of religion is, therefore, an evolutionary history, like that of the human mind. As humans became more perfect, the gods also became all the more perfect. Strength transforms into wisdom, and the gods of Homer become the gods of Cicero. The successive stages of fables reflect in a way the successive stages of the human mind in its long and hesitant search for causes. Fontenelle stresses the natural aspect of all this: "So far, the first men had given birth to fables more or less innocently". We must not ridicule those who have invented fables and myths; it is the natural propensity of the human mind to seek to understand and to find causes for what it does not understand. The origin of fables and myths should not be seen solely as negative; it is a manifestation of intellectual curiosity in the human mind. We want to understand, and when we cannot find a reasonable explanation, we resort to fabulous explanations. Departing from the tradition of plagiarism, Fontenelle asserts that each people followed the same path in inventing gods. Reading between the lines, one can see that the development Hebrews' and Christians' beliefs followed the same course as the pagans. Christianity represents only a moment, only a stage in the history of reason.

Fontenelle's reflections are taken up and radicalized by Baron d'Holbach in *The Sacred Contagion* (*La Contagion sacrée*, 1768). Falsely attributed to the English freethinker John Trenchard, the book argues that religious influence is always harmful to morality, society, and government. Religion has always had its critics, writes d'Holbach, "but few have dared to attack it at the source" (vol.I, p.177, d'Holbach, 1768). Religion, which he systematically calls superstition, can be the object of scientific examination, and must be subjected to the same processes of analysis, to the same criteria of truth as any other phenomenon of nature. The invention of the gods, then that of a God, with the rituals they require, is part of a historical process that begins at the dawn of time and is explained by the ignorance and powerlessness of men in the face of a nature that surpasses and terrorizes them. Threatened by the evils that overwhelmed them, powerless to satisfy their needs, they invented deities and all kinds of occult forces: "Man is superstitious only because he is fearful; he fears only because he is ignorant. [...] calamities everywhere have made us think of divinities and imagine ways to appease them" (vol.I, p.1, 7-8, d'Holbach, 1768). Exploiting men's taste for the marvelous, priests soon became the interpreters of the gods: "they proclaimed their oracles, they foretold the future and, having become participants in their omnipotence, they worked wonders that astonished and confounded the common mind. The prostrate nations received their decrees with trembling; they submitted without a murmur, they adopted without examination the ways prescribed to them to make Heaven propitious; works which were believed to be supernatural because the manner in which they were performed was unknown completed the conviction of the legitimacy of the orders announced, and passed for the sanction of divinity" (vol.I, p.57-58, d'Holbach, 1768). Thus, religion was imposed on people through a sort of monumental and deliberate imposture. The priestly function is an usurpation from the very beginning, which only degenerates over time to maintain its position:

> In the midst of nations dismayed, suffering and devoid of experience, there found ambitious, enthusiastic or deceitful men who, taking advantage of the alarmed ignorance of their fellow citizens, turned their calamities, their fears and their stupidity to their own profit, won their confidence, succeeded in subjugating them and made them adopt their gods, their opinions and their cults. [...] Thus impostors identified with divinity exercised the most absolute power; they became despots and reigned by terror; the gods served to justify the excesses and crimes of their tyranny (vol.I, p.9, 12, d'Holbach, 1768).

D'Holbach mercilessly denounces the complicity that religions have always forged with tyranny: "The weakness, ignorance, vices and wickedness of the princes almost always made it impossible for them to do without the help of the priesthood; they needed it to tyrannize safely and contain subjects whose whims and follies made them moan incessantly" (vol.I, p.111, d'Holbach, 1768). In d'Holbach there is a sincere horror for the misdeeds of religion in general and Christianity in particular, an intellectual horror outraged by the
absurdities of the Bible and the childishness of superstition, and above all a moral horror that rejects excuses and forgiveness. *The Sacred Contagion* clearly establishes a cause-and-effect relationship between monotheism and religious violence: "those who admired only one god drew from his very unity a very dangerous consequence: they wanted him to reign alone. They fought to extend his empire and, convinced that their god was the only legitimate king, they regarded the other gods as usurpers, and treated their worshippers as rebels to be exterminated" (vol.I, p.53, d'Holbach, 1768). The very principles of monotheism inherently breed intolerance and violence, because "the dogma of the unity of God made this being a shady sovereign, the natural enemy of all those who wanted to share his throne with him" (vol.I, p.53-54, d'Holbach, 1768). As an institution called to defend the interests of an all-powerful God, the Church can only seek to impose Him on the people; His power can only be tyrannical. On the political level, this translates into the formation of a state within a state. Religious power, as it follows an absolutist logic, inevitably comes into conflict with political power, and "by priestly inventions, the unity of political societies [is] broken, peoples [are] subject to two legislations impossible to reconcile" (vol.I, p.106, d'Holbach, 1768). The two powers are even more incompatible as they oppose each other in their essence. While politics is meant to maintain unity and harmony among citizens, religion always provokes divisions among people due to the divergent interpretations that its followers propose based on sacred texts characterized by their ambiguity. Religion as such, declares Helvétius, is internally inclined toward intolerance and fanaticism. Fanatics are incapable of relativizing their views and affected by a paranoid obsession with otherness. They see in unbelievers or worshippers of different cults "diabolical seducers", "presumptuous lovers of false wisdom", "hypocritical zealots" and "firebrands of sedition" but are unable to recognize that they are the first to correspond to this caricature (vol.II, p.193, Helvétius, 1777). Drawing from the history of religion, especially of the Catholic Church, the philosopher highlights the abyss that has always separated the hypocritical outpourings of the priests from their bloody actions: "What does the history of religions teach us? That they have everywhere lighted up the torch of intolerance, strewed the plains with carcasses, imbrued the fields with blood, burned cities, and laid waste empires; but that they have never made men better" (vol.II, p.146, Helvétius, 1777). If the inhumanity of religions is proof of their human origin, persecution appears as a characteristic trait of Christianity: "When we consider the conduct of Catholic Christians, they at first, when feeble, appear to be lambs; but when strong, they are tigers" (vol.I, p.351, Helvétius, 1777). The philosophers particularly denounce the Inquisition, a well-oiled machine that exterminates heretics and troublemakers through denunciation and torture. In 1762, Abbé Morellet published a French translation of excerpts from *The Inquisitors' Manual* (*Le Manuel des inquisiteurs*), a veritable war machine that revealed the perversion of the holy court. He explains in the afterword:

> There may be honest people and sensitive souls who will blame us for presenting such horrifying pictures before their eyes; they will wonder what advantage or pleasure can be found in fixing one's gaze on such revolting objects.

> To counter these reproaches, it will suffice to point out that it is precisely because these works are revolting that it is necessary to show them in order to inspire horror; that, after all, these cruelties were applauded for several centuries by nations which we consider civilized and claiming to have morals; that in several countries of Europe, these horrible maxims are still regarded as sacred; and that in others, it is only recently and scarcely allowed to laugh and be indignant about them (p.196-198, Morellet, 1762).

All previous attempts to reform religion having simply pruned the tree, giving it new vitality, radical philosophers like d'Holbach, Helvétius and Diderot call for an abrupt turn from the supernatural to the natural. This return to natural morality, hand in hand with the secularization of government, is the only thing that can bring real happiness to individuals, nations, and humanity in general.

In the struggle against ignorance and credulity, erudition, as we have seen, proves to be an invaluable aid in undermining the authority of the sacred texts. By publishing in 1770 *A Critical Inquiry into the*
absurdities of the Bible and the childishness of superstition, and above all a moral horror that rejects excuses and forgiveness. *The Sacred Contagion* clearly establishes a cause-and-effect relationship between monotheism and religious violence: "those who admired only one god drew from his very unity a very dangerous consequence: they wanted him to reign alone. They fought to extend his empire and, convinced that their god was the only legitimate king, they regarded the other gods as usurpers, and treated their worshippers as rebels to be exterminated" (vol.I, p.53, d'Holbach, 1768). The very principles of monotheism inherently breed intolerance and violence, because "the dogma of the unity of God made this being a shady sovereign, the natural enemy of all those who wanted to share his throne with him" (vol.I, p.53-54, d'Holbach, 1768). As an institution called to defend the interests of an all-powerful God, the Church can only seek to impose Him on the people; His power can only be tyrannical. On the political level, this translates into the formation of a state within a state. Religious power, as it follows an absolutist logic, inevitably comes into conflict with political power, and "by priestly inventions, the unity of political societies [is] broken, peoples [are] subject to two legislations impossible to reconcile" (vol.I, p.106, d'Holbach, 1768). The two powers are even more incompatible as they oppose each other in their essence. While politics is meant to maintain unity and harmony among citizens, religion always provokes divisions among people due to the divergent interpretations that its followers propose based on sacred texts characterized by their ambiguity. Religion as such, declares Helvétius, is internally inclined toward intolerance and fanaticism. Fanatics are incapable of relativizing their views and affected by a paranoid obsession with otherness. They see in unbelievers or worshippers of different cults "diabolical seducers", "presumptuous lovers of false wisdom", "hypocritical zealots" and "firebrands of sedition" but are unable to recognize that they are the first to correspond to this caricature (vol.II, p.193, Helvétius, 1777). Drawing from the history of religion, especially of the Catholic Church, the philosopher highlights the abyss that has always separated the hypocritical outpourings of the priests from their bloody actions: "What does the history of religions teach us? That they have everywhere lighted up the torch of intolerance, strewed the plains with carcasses, imbrued the fields with blood, burned cities, and laid waste empires; but that they have never made men better" (vol.II, p.146, Helvétius, 1777). If the inhumanity of religions is proof of their human origin, persecution appears as a characteristic trait of Christianity: "When we consider the conduct of Catholic Christians, they at first, when feeble, appear to be lambs; but when strong, they are tigers" (vol.I, p.351, Helvétius, 1777). The philosophers particularly denounce the Inquisition, a well-oiled machine that exterminates heretics and troublemakers through denunciation and torture. In 1762, Abbé Morellet published a French translation of excerpts from *The Inquisitors' Manual* (*Le Manuel des inquisiteurs*), a veritable war machine that revealed the perversion of the holy court. He explains in the afterword:

> There may be honest people and sensitive souls who will blame us for presenting such horrifying pictures before their eyes; they will wonder what advantage or pleasure can be found in fixing one's gaze on such revolting objects.

> To counter these reproaches, it will suffice to point out that it is precisely because these works are revolting that it is necessary to show them in order to inspire horror; that, after all, these cruelties were applauded for several centuries by nations which we consider civilized and claiming to have morals; that in several countries of Europe, these horrible maxims are still regarded as sacred; and that in others, it is only recently and scarcely allowed to laugh and be indignant about them (p.196-198, Morellet, 1762).

All previous attempts to reform religion having simply pruned the tree, giving it new vitality, radical philosophers like d'Holbach, Helvétius and Diderot call for an abrupt turn from the supernatural to the natural. This return to natural morality, hand in hand with the secularization of government, is the only thing that can bring real happiness to individuals, nations, and humanity in general.

In the struggle against ignorance and credulity, erudition, as we have seen, proves to be an invaluable aid in undermining the authority of the sacred texts. By publishing in 1770 *A Critical Inquiry into the*
*History of Jesus Christ, being a Rational Analysis of the Gospels* (*Histoire critique de Jésus-Christ, ou Analyse raisonnée des Évangiles*), d'Holbach claims to subject the sacred history of the origins of Christianity to the same criteria that are valid in other sciences: authenticity of documents, consistency of facts, accuracy of dates, and so on, which are precisely lacking in the Gospels. This evocatively titled work seeks to determine what, from a rationalist or "scientific" perspective, is worthy of belief in the life of Jesus. D'Holbach aims to shake the foundations of Christianity, as the Christian faith and the authority of the Church are based on the sacred texts of the New Testament. But the Gospels are unclear and ambiguous, and their value is disputable. When subjected to objective criticism, the story they tell falls apart:

> There is every reason to believe, that if the Holy Ghost had foreseen the transcendent fortune which the religion of Jesus was one day to attain; if he had foreseen that this religion would in the course of time be received by kings, civilized nations, scholars, and persons in the higher circles of life; if he had suspected that this religion could be examined, analyzed, discussed and criticized by logicians; there is, I say, reason to believe that the Holy Ghost would have left us, on the life and doctrine of its founder, memoirs less shapeless, facts more circumstantial, proofs more authentic, and, in short, materials better digested than those we possess. He would have chosen writers, better qualified than those he has inspired, to transmit to nations the speeches and actions of the Savior of the world; he would have made him on the most trifling point, to act and speak in a manner more worthy of a God; he would have put in his mouth a language more noble, more perspicuous and more persuasive; and he would have employed means more certain to convince rebellious reason, and abash incredulity.

> None of all this has occurred; the gospel is merely an eastern romance, disgusting to every man of common sense, and apparently addressed only to the ignorant, the stupid, and the vulgar, the only persons whom it can mislead.—Criticism finds there no connection of facts, no agreement of circumstances, no train of principles, and no uniformity of relation. Four men, unpolished and devoid of letters, pass for the faithful authors of memoirs containing the life of Jesus Christ; and it is on their testimony, that Christians believe themselves bound to receive the religion they profess, and adopt without examination the most contradictory facts, the most incredible actions, the most amazing prodigies, the most unconnected system, the most unintelligible doctrine, and the most revolting mysteries! (p.7-8, d'Holbach, 1799)

D'Holbach's narrative aims to strip the life of Christ of all supernatural elements. The Church teaches of Mary a virgin who gives birth thanks to the Holy Spirit, without the assistance of a human father, despite her husband Joseph. D'Holbach adopts a highly immanent reading of this fiction and asserts that in the absence of her husband, the visitation, not by an angel, but by a young man, perhaps a passing soldier, was likely the cause of her maternity: "Nothing is more easy than to disengage the relation of St Luke from the marvelous. The event of Mary's pregnancy follows in the order of nature, and if we substitute a young man in the place of the angel, the passage of the Evangelist will have nothing incredible in it" (p.40, d'Holbach, 1799). D'Holbach contends that the life of Jesus is nothing but a tissue of absurdities. He describes Jesus as an "unskillful juggler", a liar and a deceiver, who manipulates people, presents himself as a magician, and bases his actions on the predictions of the Old Testament to give the illusion that he is the awaited Messiah. D'Holbach accuses Jesus of making false prophecies none of which came true. His miracles, if genuine, would undoubtedly have led to the conversion of the Jews. He may have had some healing abilities, but in that era, where supernatural beliefs were prevalent, a holy man who did not perform miracles would not have been taken seriously. Jesus' behavior appears to resemble that of an ambitious and enthusiastic adventurer who managed to gain the favor of the common people, and whose life was later transformed into legend. "In fine, we shall behold an artisan, a melancholy enthusiast [...] miscarrying in all his projects, himself punished as a public incendiary, dying on a cross, and yet after his death becoming the legislator and the God of many nations, and an object of adoration to beings who pretend to common
*History of Jesus Christ, being a Rational Analysis of the Gospels* (*Histoire critique de Jésus-Christ, ou Analyse raisonnée des Évangiles*), d'Holbach claims to subject the sacred history of the origins of Christianity to the same criteria that are valid in other sciences: authenticity of documents, consistency of facts, accuracy of dates, and so on, which are precisely lacking in the Gospels. This evocatively titled work seeks to determine what, from a rationalist or "scientific" perspective, is worthy of belief in the life of Jesus. D'Holbach aims to shake the foundations of Christianity, as the Christian faith and the authority of the Church are based on the sacred texts of the New Testament. But the Gospels are unclear and ambiguous, and their value is disputable. When subjected to objective criticism, the story they tell falls apart:

> There is every reason to believe, that if the Holy Ghost had foreseen the transcendent fortune which the religion of Jesus was one day to attain; if he had foreseen that this religion would in the course of time be received by kings, civilized nations, scholars, and persons in the higher circles of life; if he had suspected that this religion could be examined, analyzed, discussed and criticized by logicians; there is, I say, reason to believe that the Holy Ghost would have left us, on the life and doctrine of its founder, memoirs less shapeless, facts more circumstantial, proofs more authentic, and, in short, materials better digested than those we possess. He would have chosen writers, better qualified than those he has inspired, to transmit to nations the speeches and actions of the Savior of the world; he would have made him on the most trifling point, to act and speak in a manner more worthy of a God; he would have put in his mouth a language more noble, more perspicuous and more persuasive; and he would have employed means more certain to convince rebellious reason, and abash incredulity.

> None of all this has occurred; the gospel is merely an eastern romance, disgusting to every man of common sense, and apparently addressed only to the ignorant, the stupid, and the vulgar, the only persons whom it can mislead.—Criticism finds there no connection of facts, no agreement of circumstances, no train of principles, and no uniformity of relation. Four men, unpolished and devoid of letters, pass for the faithful authors of memoirs containing the life of Jesus Christ; and it is on their testimony, that Christians believe themselves bound to receive the religion they profess, and adopt without examination the most contradictory facts, the most incredible actions, the most amazing prodigies, the most unconnected system, the most unintelligible doctrine, and the most revolting mysteries! (p.7-8, d'Holbach, 1799)

D'Holbach's narrative aims to strip the life of Christ of all supernatural elements. The Church teaches of Mary a virgin who gives birth thanks to the Holy Spirit, without the assistance of a human father, despite her husband Joseph. D'Holbach adopts a highly immanent reading of this fiction and asserts that in the absence of her husband, the visitation, not by an angel, but by a young man, perhaps a passing soldier, was likely the cause of her maternity: "Nothing is more easy than to disengage the relation of St Luke from the marvelous. The event of Mary's pregnancy follows in the order of nature, and if we substitute a young man in the place of the angel, the passage of the Evangelist will have nothing incredible in it" (p.40, d'Holbach, 1799). D'Holbach contends that the life of Jesus is nothing but a tissue of absurdities. He describes Jesus as an "unskillful juggler", a liar and a deceiver, who manipulates people, presents himself as a magician, and bases his actions on the predictions of the Old Testament to give the illusion that he is the awaited Messiah. D'Holbach accuses Jesus of making false prophecies none of which came true. His miracles, if genuine, would undoubtedly have led to the conversion of the Jews. He may have had some healing abilities, but in that era, where supernatural beliefs were prevalent, a holy man who did not perform miracles would not have been taken seriously. Jesus' behavior appears to resemble that of an ambitious and enthusiastic adventurer who managed to gain the favor of the common people, and whose life was later transformed into legend. "In fine, we shall behold an artisan, a melancholy enthusiast [...] miscarrying in all his projects, himself punished as a public incendiary, dying on a cross, and yet after his death becoming the legislator and the God of many nations, and an object of adoration to beings who pretend to common
sense” (p.7, d’Holbach, 1799). According to d’Holbach, Christianity was from the very beginning the religion of an ignorant, unhappy, and gullible people. Its success was a result of the political calculation of the Roman Emperor Constantine, and its spread was achieved through violence.

The *Critical Inquiry into the History of Jesus Christ* ends with a panorama of the evolution of Christianity up to the contemporary era, a history written in letters of blood. Under the pretext of preaching the Gospel, the Church sowed discord, launched anathemas, ignited wars and seditions, persecutions and crusades, preached slavery and unlimited submission to sovereigns, but also rebellion and regicide against rulers who refused to bend under its yoke. It massacred a part of the world in the name of a god of peace. The final paragraph ends with this question: "If it is demanded of us, what can be substituted for a religion, which at all times has produced only effects pernicious to the happiness of the human race; we will bid men cultivate their reason, which, much better than absurd and deceptive systems, will advance their welfare, and make them sensible of the value of virtue" (p.292, d’Holbach, 1799).

### 3. Science against Genesis

In the 18th century, the Bible is still unanimously considered the first book of humanity. The Scriptures, the source of religious truth, are also seen as the foundation for indisputable truths in science, history, and politics. It is a time when the creation of the world, as described in the first chapter of Genesis is still taken literally. Charles Darwin’s companion, Thomas Huxley, reported towards the end of his life that the sciences of man and earth remained captive to the literal reading of the Bible until at least the mid-19th century:

> At the present time, it is difficult to persuade serious scientific inquirers to occupy themselves, in any way, with the Noachian Deluge. They look at you with a smile and a shrug, and say they have more important matters to attend to than mere antiquarianism. But it was not so in my youth. At that time, geologists and biologists could hardly follow to the end any path of inquiry without finding the way blocked by Noah and his ark, or by the first chapter of Genesis; and it was a serious matter, in this country at any rate, for a man to be suspected of doubting the literal truth of the Diluvial or any other Pentateuchal history (p.401, Huxley, 1892).

According to the sacred chronology still in force during the 18th century and beyond, the creation of the world occurred as follows in the year 4004 BC:

- Creation of heaven and earth, along with light, on Sunday, October 23, the first day of the world.

- Creation of the firmament, which separated the waters below from the waters above, on the second day of the world, Monday, October 24.

- The waters of the sea recede, leaving the land uncovered.

- Creation of plants and the Garden of Eden: third day of the world.

- Creation of the sun, moon and stars: fourth day.

- Fifth day, creation of birds, and fish, etc.

- Sixth day, creation of land animals; of man. Adam gives names to the animals. God creates a woman from one of his ribs.

- Seventh day, Saturday, October 29. God ceases His work of creation, blesses the seventh day, and sanctifies it.

- Sin of the first woman, she persuaded Adam to sin as well: Adam names her Eve, God expels them from paradise. It was apparently the same day they entered it, which is the tenth after creation, corresponding to November 1st (vol.I, p.86, Calmet, 1707-16).
sense” (p.7, d’Holbach, 1799). According to d’Holbach, Christianity was from the very beginning the religion of an ignorant, unhappy, and gullible people. Its success was a result of the political calculation of the Roman Emperor Constantine, and its spread was achieved through violence.

The *Critical Inquiry into the History of Jesus Christ* ends with a panorama of the evolution of Christianity up to the contemporary era, a history written in letters of blood. Under the pretext of preaching the Gospel, the Church sowed discord, launched anathemas, ignited wars and seditions, persecutions and crusades, preached slavery and unlimited submission to sovereigns, but also rebellion and regicide against rulers who refused to bend under its yoke. It massacred a part of the world in the name of a god of peace. The final paragraph ends with this question: "If it is demanded of us, what can be substituted for a religion, which at all times has produced only effects pernicious to the happiness of the human race; we will bid men cultivate their reason, which, much better than absurd and deceptive systems, will advance their welfare, and make them sensible of the value of virtue" (p.292, d’Holbach, 1799).

### 3. Science against Genesis

In the 18th century, the Bible is still unanimously considered the first book of humanity. The Scriptures, the source of religious truth, are also seen as the foundation for indisputable truths in science, history, and politics. It is a time when the creation of the world, as described in the first chapter of Genesis is still taken literally. Charles Darwin’s companion, Thomas Huxley, reported towards the end of his life that the sciences of man and earth remained captive to the literal reading of the Bible until at least the mid-19th century:

> At the present time, it is difficult to persuade serious scientific inquirers to occupy themselves, in any way, with the Noachian Deluge. They look at you with a smile and a shrug, and say they have more important matters to attend to than mere antiquarianism. But it was not so in my youth. At that time, geologists and biologists could hardly follow to the end any path of inquiry without finding the way blocked by Noah and his ark, or by the first chapter of Genesis; and it was a serious matter, in this country at any rate, for a man to be suspected of doubting the literal truth of the Diluvial or any other Pentateuchal history (p.401, Huxley, 1892).

According to the sacred chronology still in force during the 18th century and beyond, the creation of the world occurred as follows in the year 4004 BC:

- Creation of heaven and earth, along with light, on Sunday, October 23, the first day of the world.

- Creation of the firmament, which separated the waters below from the waters above, on the second day of the world, Monday, October 24.

- The waters of the sea recede, leaving the land uncovered.

- Creation of plants and the Garden of Eden: third day of the world.

- Creation of the sun, moon and stars: fourth day.

- Fifth day, creation of birds, and fish, etc.

- Sixth day, creation of land animals; of man. Adam gives names to the animals. God creates a woman from one of his ribs.

- Seventh day, Saturday, October 29. God ceases His work of creation, blesses the seventh day, and sanctifies it.

- Sin of the first woman, she persuaded Adam to sin as well: Adam names her Eve, God expels them from paradise. It was apparently the same day they entered it, which is the tenth after creation, corresponding to November 1st (vol.I, p.86, Calmet, 1707-16).
This interpretation of Genesis subordinates the history of the world to the biblical narrative as it is read in the Pentateuch and still practiced by some “creationists” today. From this interpretation, the following postulates arise:

1. About 6,000 years ago, God created the universe in six days, in the order described in Genesis (thus, light was created four days before the sun!).

2. The world was created as we see it today, and there was no evolution.

3. The world was created according to a rational design; it was ordered by God for mankind.

According to the official historiography of the Church, exactly 4,004 years elapsed between the creation of the world and the advent of Jesus Christ. In the year 129 (or 3875 BC), the earth began to fill, and crimes increased. In the year 1656 (or 2348 BC) the Flood episode occurred; in 1757 (or 2247 BC), the sons of Noah attempted to build the Tower of Babel, and so on (vol.I, p.1-4, Bossuet, 1728-29). Voltaire's *Letters concerning the English Nation* report how Newton, a scientific genius but deeply religious, sought to build by means of extremely precise calculations a chronological framework that irrefutably establishes the precedence of the history of the Hebrews over the history of the Egyptians, Assyrians and Greeks (p.82-86, Voltaire, 1994). By shortening the history of the world by 500 years, Newton reversed the positions of civilizations in relation to each other and preserved the postulate of the Hebrews' precedence over other peoples. However, in the 18th century, more critical scholars will counter this view by pointing to Chinese annals, which date back 4,000 years, as opposed to the biblical history. Consequently, the existence of Chinese civilization during the time of the Flood challenged the official chronology.

In the mid-18th century, the naturalist Buffon argues in the first volume of his work *Natural History* (*Histoire naturelle*, 1749-1767) that it was not the Flood that caused the presence of marine fossils inland and even in mountains, but rather a long and gradual transformation—"the common course of nature" (vol.I, p.40, Buffon, 1797). This audacious thesis immediately drew the wrath of the Sorbonne, the powerful Faculty of Theology in Paris. To escape censorship, Buffon made a declaration that fully satisfied the members of the Faculty:

I declare:

First: That I have never had any intention of contradicting the text of Scripture; that I believe quite firmly all that is related there concerning creation, be it concerning the order of times or the circumstances of events; and I abandon that, which in my book, concerns the formation of the earth, and, in general, all that which may be contrary to the narration of Moses, having only presented my hypothesis on the formation of planets as a pure philosophical conjecture (p.289, Lyon, 1981).

This declaration, which its author described as "foolish and absurd" thirty years later, allowed Buffon to continue his work. In 1778, Buffon reoffended in *The Epochs of Nature* (*Des Époques de la nature*), published as a supplementary volume of the *Natural History*. The introduction opens with a celebration of the biblical narrative of origins as "the most ancient, the most sacred of all traditions". Then, almost without transition, Buffon continues: "Everything in the story of Moses is placed within the limits of intelligence of the people. Everything there is represented relative to the common man, to whom it would not do to demonstrate the true system of the Earth, but it was sufficient to instruct about that which he owed to the Creator, in showing him the effects of His omnipotence as so many good deeds" (p.19-20, Buffon, 2018). Buffon then attempts to reconstruct the complete history of the earth, starting from the moment it was torn away from the Sun. By evaluating the duration of its cooling, he proposes the figure of seventy-five thousand years (p.40, Buffon, 2018) (he was still far from the actual age, as the Earth's age is currently estimated to be 4.56 billion years). The Sorbonne is again stirred into action. The charge is that Buffon tends to "destroy the authority of the Scriptures". He makes the earth's age far too old and his epochs contradict the true order of creation: plants were created on the third day and fish on the fifth; Buffon makes both appear in the same epoch. He describes "the first men" as living in a state of terror, while Genesis tells of a single first man, Adam, living in Paradise and already dominating the beasts.
This interpretation of Genesis subordinates the history of the world to the biblical narrative as it is read in the Pentateuch and still practiced by some “creationists” today. From this interpretation, the following postulates arise:

1. About 6,000 years ago, God created the universe in six days, in the order described in Genesis (thus, light was created four days before the sun!).

2. The world was created as we see it today, and there was no evolution.

3. The world was created according to a rational design; it was ordered by God for mankind.

According to the official historiography of the Church, exactly 4,004 years elapsed between the creation of the world and the advent of Jesus Christ. In the year 129 (or 3875 BC), the earth began to fill, and crimes increased. In the year 1656 (or 2348 BC) the Flood episode occurred; in 1757 (or 2247 BC), the sons of Noah attempted to build the Tower of Babel, and so on (vol.I, p.1-4, Bossuet, 1728-29). Voltaire's *Letters concerning the English Nation* report how Newton, a scientific genius but deeply religious, sought to build by means of extremely precise calculations a chronological framework that irrefutably establishes the precedence of the history of the Hebrews over the history of the Egyptians, Assyrians and Greeks (p.82-86, Voltaire, 1994). By shortening the history of the world by 500 years, Newton reversed the positions of civilizations in relation to each other and preserved the postulate of the Hebrews' precedence over other peoples. However, in the 18th century, more critical scholars will counter this view by pointing to Chinese annals, which date back 4,000 years, as opposed to the biblical history. Consequently, the existence of Chinese civilization during the time of the Flood challenged the official chronology.

In the mid-18th century, the naturalist Buffon argues in the first volume of his work *Natural History* (*Histoire naturelle*, 1749-1767) that it was not the Flood that caused the presence of marine fossils inland and even in mountains, but rather a long and gradual transformation—"the common course of nature" (vol.I, p.40, Buffon, 1797). This audacious thesis immediately drew the wrath of the Sorbonne, the powerful Faculty of Theology in Paris. To escape censorship, Buffon made a declaration that fully satisfied the members of the Faculty:

I declare:

First: That I have never had any intention of contradicting the text of Scripture; that I believe quite firmly all that is related there concerning creation, be it concerning the order of times or the circumstances of events; and I abandon that, which in my book, concerns the formation of the earth, and, in general, all that which may be contrary to the narration of Moses, having only presented my hypothesis on the formation of planets as a pure philosophical conjecture (p.289, Lyon, 1981).

This declaration, which its author described as "foolish and absurd" thirty years later, allowed Buffon to continue his work. In 1778, Buffon reoffended in *The Epochs of Nature* (*Des Époques de la nature*), published as a supplementary volume of the *Natural History*. The introduction opens with a celebration of the biblical narrative of origins as "the most ancient, the most sacred of all traditions". Then, almost without transition, Buffon continues: "Everything in the story of Moses is placed within the limits of intelligence of the people. Everything there is represented relative to the common man, to whom it would not do to demonstrate the true system of the Earth, but it was sufficient to instruct about that which he owed to the Creator, in showing him the effects of His omnipotence as so many good deeds" (p.19-20, Buffon, 2018). Buffon then attempts to reconstruct the complete history of the earth, starting from the moment it was torn away from the Sun. By evaluating the duration of its cooling, he proposes the figure of seventy-five thousand years (p.40, Buffon, 2018) (he was still far from the actual age, as the Earth's age is currently estimated to be 4.56 billion years). The Sorbonne is again stirred into action. The charge is that Buffon tends to "destroy the authority of the Scriptures". He makes the earth's age far too old and his epochs contradict the true order of creation: plants were created on the third day and fish on the fifth; Buffon makes both appear in the same epoch. He describes "the first men" as living in a state of terror, while Genesis tells of a single first man, Adam, living in Paradise and already dominating the beasts.
Buffon's theory of the end of the earth by freezing contradicts St. Peter's prediction of a final conflagration. To avoid censorship once, Buffon had to issue another retraction. In 1780, he signed a new formal declaration stating: "I declare that I still hold the same sentiments of respect for their decisions [the theologians'], and in renewing the declaration I made in 1751, I admit that I presented again my system of the formation of the Earth and the planets only in the belief that I could reconcile it with the account of the sacred historian" (p.18-19, *Acta*, 1780).<fnref n="3" /> The page is turned. Fifty years later, the Scottish geologist Charles Lyell became "the spiritual saviour of geology, freeing the science from the old dispensation of Moses" (p.91, Porter, 1976). Lyell favoured an indefinitely long age for the earth. His major work, the *Principles of Geology* (1830-33), presented the idea that the earth was shaped entirely by slow-moving forces still in operation today, acting over a very long period of time.

At the same time as Buffon, the treatise *Telliamed* by the writer and diplomat Benoît de Maillet shows a profound originality. The book is structured as a series of three speculative conversations between a French missionary and an Indian philosopher, Telliamed (the author's name spelled backwards), who proposes Maillet's heretical ideas. These ideas were so radical that the work was not published until 1748, a decade after de Maillet's death. Written in the early 1720, when Maillet was serving as the king of France's general consul in Egypt, *Telliamed* began circulating in various manuscript versions after the author's return to France in 1720. Maillet retained his original draft of the work (now lost), but made numerous additions and changes to it over the years to incorporate new information, some of which appears only in certain manuscript versions. Between 1732 and his death in 1738 Maillet worked with the Abbé Jean-Baptiste Le Mascrier to prepare *Telliamed* for publication. Recognizing the unorthodox and dangerous nature of Maillet's system of geology, Le Mascrier reworked *Telliamed* extensively in an attempt—ultimately unsuccessful—to soften its heterodoxy and reconcile it with Christian dogma. After Maillet's death, fearing possible repercussions, the Abbé waited ten years to publish what was a bowdlerized version of *Telliamed*; the first printed edition appeared in 1748, followed by a second in 1749 and a third in 1755. The published version provoked outrage from the clergy and other orthodox thinkers, but despite (or because of) this, it became something of a best-seller. Maillet was eager to convince his audience that an understanding of nature should be based on observations and questioning rather than religious authority. His thesis about the history of our planet and its inhabitants was extremely unorthodox for its time: he believed, based on his researches, that the earth was once entirely covered by a universal ocean, and he attributed all of the planet's geological features to the gradual diminution of this ocean, applying present-day marine mechanisms to a geologic past stretching back at least two billion years—a direct contradiction of the Biblical account of creation. His spokesperson Telliamed argues in favor of the aquatic origin of all life including man: as seas receded and terrestrial environments emerged, marine animals adapted (became transformed) to land. Correspondence of sea and land organisms and the presence of life on remote islands are strong evidence that modern terrestrial life began in the sea:

> In a word do not herbs, plants, roots, grains, and all of this kind, that the earth produces and nourishes, come from the sea? Is it not at least natural to think so, since we are certain that all our habitable lands came originally from the sea? [...] As for the origin of terrestrial animals, I observe that there are none of them, whether walking, flying, or creeping, the similar species of which are not contained in the sea; and the passage of which from one to these elements to another, is not only possible and probable, but even supported by a prodigious number of examples (p.218, Maillet, 1750).

The Indian sage Telliamed refutes the concept of a personified God as a ruler and creator of everything and assumes an eternal universe, undergoing natural changes under the effects of chance. Maillet was thus a forerunner of 19th-century uniformitarian geologists, and he also anticipated Lamarck in

<footnote n="3">³ The "sacred historian" is Moses, the alleged author of the Pentateuch.</footnote>
Buffon’s theory of the end of the earth by freezing contradicts St. Peter’s prediction of a final conflagration. To avoid censorship once, Buffon had to issue another retraction. In 1780, he signed a new formal declaration stating: “I declare that I still hold the same sentiments of respect for their decisions [the theologians’], and in renewing the declaration I made in 1751, I admit that I presented again my system of the formation of the Earth and the planets only in the belief that I could reconcile it with the account of the sacred historian” (p.18-19, *Acta*, 1780).<fnref n="3" /> The page is turned. Fifty years later, the Scottish geologist Charles Lyell became “the spiritual saviour of geology, freeing the science from the old dispensation of Moses” (p.91, Porter, 1976). Lyell favoured an indefinitely long age for the earth. His major work, the *Principles of Geology* (1830-33), presented the idea that the earth was shaped entirely by slow-moving forces still in operation today, acting over a very long period of time.

At the same time as Buffon, the treatise *Telliamed* by the writer and diplomat Benoît de Maillet shows a profound originality. The book is structured as a series of three speculative conversations between a French missionary and an Indian philosopher, Telliamed (the author’s name spelled backwards), who proposes Maillet’s heretical ideas. These ideas were so radical that the work was not published until 1748, a decade after de Maillet’s death. Written in the early 1720, when Maillet was serving as the king of France’s general consul in Egypt, *Telliamed* began circulating in various manuscript versions after the author’s return to France in 1720. Maillet retained his original draft of the work (now lost), but made numerous additions and changes to it over the years to incorporate new information, some of which appears only in certain manuscript versions. Between 1732 and his death in 1738 Maillet worked with the Abbé Jean-Baptiste Le Mascrier to prepare *Telliamed* for publication. Recognizing the unorthodox and dangerous nature of Maillet’s system of geology, Le Mascrier reworked *Telliamed* extensively in an attempt—ultimately unsuccessful—to soften its heterodoxy and reconcile it with Christian dogma. After Maillet’s death, fearing possible repercussions, the Abbé waited ten years to publish what was a bowdlerized version of *Telliamed*; the first printed edition appeared in 1748, followed by a second in 1749 and a third in 1755. The published version provoked outrage from the clergy and other orthodox thinkers, but despite (or because of) this, it became something of a best-seller. Maillet was eager to convince his audience that an understanding of nature should be based on observations and questioning rather than religious authority. His thesis about the history of our planet and its inhabitants was extremely unorthodox for its time: he believed, based on his researches, that the earth was once entirely covered by a universal ocean, and he attributed all of the planet’s geological features to the gradual diminution of this ocean, applying present-day marine mechanisms to a geologic past stretching back at least two billion years—a direct contradiction of the Biblical account of creation. His spokesperson Telliamed argues in favor of the aquatic origin of all life including man: as seas receded and terrestrial environments emerged, marine animals adapted (became transformed) to land. Correspondence of sea and land organisms and the presence of life on remote islands are strong evidence that modern terrestrial life began in the sea:

> In a word do not herbs, plants, roots, grains, and all of this kind, that the earth produces and nourishes, come from the sea? Is it not at least natural to think so, since we are certain that all our habitable lands came originally from the sea? [...] As for the origin of terrestrial animals, I observe that there are none of them, whether walking, flying, or creeping, the similar species of which are not contained in the sea; and the passage of which from one to these elements to another, is not only possible and probable, but even supported by a prodigious number of examples (p.218, Maillet, 1750).

The Indian sage Telliamed refutes the concept of a personified God as a ruler and creator of everything and assumes an eternal universe, undergoing natural changes under the effects of chance. Maillet was thus a forerunner of 19th-century uniformitarian geologists, and he also anticipated Lamarck in

<footnote n="3">³ The “sacred historian” is Moses, the alleged author of the Pentateuch.</footnote>
claiming that present-day terrestrial life forms had adapted themselves from ancient marine flora and fauna
through a process of transformation.

*Telliamed's* basic thesis, which suggests that our planet was once entirely covered with water, bears resemblance to the biblical account of the Great Flood—the second origin of humanity, which is generally believed to have occurred in the year 1656 after creation (or 2348 BC). Dom Calmet recounted this central episode in the history of humanity:

> This year 1656 is that of the flood.

Noah enters the ark with his children and all the animals on the 27th day of the second month, which corresponds to Sunday, December 7. The rains falls continuously for 40 days and 40 nights, and the waters remain on the earth for 150 days without receding. Afterward, the waters begin to subside, and the ark comes to rest on Mount Ararat on Wednesday, May 6. [...] Noah opens the top of the ark on Friday, October 23; he leaves the ark on Friday, December 18, and offers thanksgiving sacrifices to God (vol.I, p.87, Calmet, 1707-16)<fnref n="4" />.

In the 18th century, the sciences of humanity and the earth are still bound by the narrative of the Great Flood, which dates the rebirth of humanity to a little over 4,000 years ago, with its origin being traced back to the three families of Noah (his sons Shem, Ham and Japheth, and their wives). One wonders how three couples and their descendants were able to repopulate the whole world in record time. But advocates of literal reading of the Bible have answers to everything. At the turn of the 17th century, Temporarius (or Du Temps) imagined that no sooner had the Flood waters receded than Noah's three sons began producing twins annually—a male and a female—and they, in turn, began procreating at the same rate upon reaching their twentieth year (p.129, Temporarius, 1596). In 1703, the fellow Jesuit Denis Petau (ou Petavius) suggested that the progeny of two of Noah's sons consisted solely of males, while the third son furnished an ample number of females for them. He further postulated that women began procreating at seventeen, and in the subsequent eight years gave birth annually to one child. Under such conditions, Noah's posterity numbered no less than 623,612,358,728 males within 285 years of the Deluge (vol.II, p.35, Petavius, 1627). To enlightened minds, notably Voltaire's, calculations of this sort seemed preposterous, and he often targeted Petau's estimates for ridicule. In *The Philosophy of History* (*La Philosophie de l'histoire*, 1765), he objected that in the 18th century, "of a thousand children, born in one year, there, hardly ever, remain, six hundred, at the end of twenty years" according to the registers of the largest cities (p.139, Voltaire, 1829).

The criticism of the story of Noah's ark was a common topic in philosophical literature during the classical age. Many aspects of the story posed problems. For instance, how could so many animal species have been accommodated on the ark with enough food to sustain them for an entire year? Moreover, how many animals were there in total? If the Flood was universal, the ark would have had to contain representatives of all animal species, both present and extinct. As new species were discovered, especially with the exploration of the New World, it became increasingly difficult to imagine that there was enough space for all of them on the ark. Additionally, some species are found only in specific regions, like in America or distant islands. If the ark indeed made landfall on Mount Ararat in Armenia, why do we find kangaroos only in Australia, for example? It required an explanation of how these animals made the journey and why they are not found in the regions between the starting point and the arrival point. Another objection was how the sloth made its way to South America. Even if it had a direct overland route, it moves so slowly that the journey would have taken twenty thousand years—a particularly strong objection given that the biblical timeline of creation is very short.

The story of the universal flood is the event that most shocked Voltaire: "Was there ever a time when the globe was entirely inundated?", he asks in the article *Inundation of the Philosophical Dictionary*. "It is physically impossible" (vol.V-2, p.251, Voltaire, 1901). It is difficult to see, in fact, huge masses of water

<footnote n="4">⁴ Remember that at that time, the Egyptians had already constructed the pyramids.</footnote>
claiming that present-day terrestrial life forms had adapted themselves from ancient marine flora and fauna
through a process of transformation.

Telliamed's basic thesis, which suggests that our planet was once entirely covered with water, bears resemblance to the biblical account of the Great Flood—the second origin of humanity, which is generally believed to have occurred in the year 1656 after creation (or 2348 BC). Dom Calmet recounted this central episode in the history of humanity:

> This year 1656 is that of the flood.

Noah enters the ark with his children and all the animals on the 27th day of the second month, which corresponds to Sunday, December 7. The rains falls continuously for 40 days and 40 nights, and the waters remain on the earth for 150 days without receding. Afterward, the waters begin to subside, and the ark comes to rest on Mount Ararat on Wednesday, May 6. [...] Noah opens the top of the ark on Friday, October 23; he leaves the ark on Friday, December 18, and offers thanksgiving sacrifices to God (vol.I, p.87, Calmet, 1707-16)<fnref n="4" />.

In the 18th century, the sciences of humanity and the earth are still bound by the narrative of the Great Flood, which dates the rebirth of humanity to a little over 4,000 years ago, with its origin being traced back to the three families of Noah (his sons Shem, Ham and Japheth, and their wives). One wonders how three couples and their descendants were able to repopulate the whole world in record time. But advocates of literal reading of the Bible have answers to everything. At the turn of the 17th century, Temporarius (or Du Temps) imagined that no sooner had the Flood waters receded than Noah's three sons began producing twins annually—a male and a female—and they, in turn, began procreating at the same rate upon reaching their twentieth year (p.129, Temporarius, 1596). In 1703, the fellow Jesuit Denis Petau (ou Petavius) suggested that the progeny of two of Noah's sons consisted solely of males, while the third son furnished an ample number of females for them. He further postulated that women began procreating at seventeen, and in the subsequent eight years gave birth annually to one child. Under such conditions, Noah's posterity numbered no less than 623,612,358,728 males within 285 years of the Deluge (vol.II, p.35, Petavius, 1627). To enlightened minds, notably Voltaire's, calculations of this sort seemed preposterous, and he often targeted Petau's estimates for ridicule. In *The Philosophy of History* (*La Philosophie de l'histoire*, 1765), he objected that in the 18th century, "of a thousand children, born in one year, there, hardly ever, remain, six hundred, at the end of twenty years" according to the registers of the largest cities (p.139, Voltaire, 1829).

The criticism of the story of Noah's ark was a common topic in philosophical literature during the classical age. Many aspects of the story posed problems. For instance, how could so many animal species have been accommodated on the ark with enough food to sustain them for an entire year? Moreover, how many animals were there in total? If the Flood was universal, the ark would have had to contain representatives of all animal species, both present and extinct. As new species were discovered, especially with the exploration of the New World, it became increasingly difficult to imagine that there was enough space for all of them on the ark. Additionally, some species are found only in specific regions, like in America or distant islands. If the ark indeed made landfall on Mount Ararat in Armenia, why do we find kangaroos only in Australia, for example? It required an explanation of how these animals made the journey and why they are not found in the regions between the starting point and the arrival point. Another objection was how the sloth made its way to South America. Even if it had a direct overland route, it moves so slowly that the journey would have taken twenty thousand years—a particularly strong objection given that the biblical timeline of creation is very short.

The story of the universal flood is the event that most shocked Voltaire: "Was there ever a time when the globe was entirely inundated?", he asks in the article *Inundation of the Philosophical Dictionary*. "It is physically impossible" (vol.V-2, p.251, Voltaire, 1901). It is difficult to see, in fact, huge masses of water

<footnote n="4">⁴ Remember that at that time, the Egyptians had already constructed the pyramids.</footnote>
covering the entire globe by exceeding the highest mountain peaks by a few cubits without violating the laws of gravity and fluid balance. In fact, the story of the Great Flood in the book of Genesis, when interpreted literally, is crammed with more miracles than any comparable piece of literature anywhere on earth. The history of the Deluge related in the Pentateuch is "the most miraculous event of which the world ever heard [...] : it is one of the mysteries which are believed by faith; and faith consists in believing that which reason does not believe—which is only another miracle" (vol.V-2, p.252-53, Voltaire, 1901). All is miracle in the history of the Flood:

> A miracle, that forty days of rain should have inundated the four quarters of the world, and have raised the water to the height of fifteen cubits above the tops of the loftiest mountains; a miracle, that there should have been cataracts, floodgates, and openings in heaven; a miracle, that all sorts of animals should have been collected in the ark from all parts of the world; a miracle, that Noah found the means of feeding them for a period of ten months; a miracle, that all the animals with all their provisions could have been included and retained in the ark; a miracle, that the greater part of them did not die; a miracle, that after quitting the ark, they found food enough to maintain them (vol.V-2, p.252, Voltaire, 1901).

In the last sentence, Voltaire is mocking the work of a certain Jean Le Pelletier entitled Essays on *Noah's Ark* (Dissertations sur l'arche de Noé, 1700), in which the author attempted to demonstrate how all the animals could have fit and been nourished in the ark. He engaged in scholarly calculations to assess the capacity of the ark, leading him to conclude that the animals had enough space. He then evaluated their water and food requirements. He claimed that the capacity of the freshwater reservoir he placed in the hull was four times greater than necessary, and the capacity of the granary, located on the first floor, was one and a half times larger than needed. Like many other apologists before and after him, Le Pelletier desperately wanted to show that the Bible's claims were consistent with plausibility, nature, and reason. Ad hoc hypotheses were cooked up to suit the occasion, reminding one of historian W. E. H. Lecky's remark about the tendency "to invent, without a shadow of foundation, the most elaborate theories of explanation rather than recognize the smallest force in an objection" (vol.I, p.367, Lecky, 1869). At the end of the century, the Abbé Bergier will still label as ridiculous the stubbornness of unbelievers in challenging the reality of the Flood (vol.I, p.506, Bergier, 1788-90), and Chateaubriand will consider the narrative of the Flood as the true starting point of history. It would take another fifty years before, as reported by Huxley, it became permissible to doubt the literal truth of "Noah and his ark".

According to the dominant conception during the Classical Age, God imposed His order on nature as part of a rational plan. Since humans were believed to be created in the image of God, they could, at least in part, comprehend the Creator's grand cosmic design and glimpse the divine "plan" that guided creation. The reasons behind natural phenomena are rooted in the purposes set by God; thus, the mission of science is to search for the causes of natural effects based on the Creator's intended purposes for producing those effects. Consequently, scientists and philosophers should limit themselves to observing and describing "the spectacle of Nature"; they cannot provide explanations, as the true explanation lies in the wisdom of God, which is beyond human reach. Reflecting on efficient causes is futile; at most, one can try to infer the final causes, the intentions that God might have had in creating living beings. As an example, Daniel Le Clerc proclaims that all insects were created for the benefit of humans: bees for their honey, silkworms for silk, cochineal insects for dyeing purple, and locusts... to feed Saint John the Baptist in the desert (p.367-368, Le Clerc, 1715). In 1784, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre attempted to prove that nature behaves like an irreproachable mother whose sole concern is the particular well-being of humans. He asserted that "animals of prey are by no means an object of terror to man. [...] Even those who attack the human body are furnished with remarkable indications. They either smell strongly, as the bug; or present oppositions of color to the places on which they fix, as white insects on the hair; or the blackness of the flea contrasted to the whiteness of the skin" (vol.I, p.306-307, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, 1809). Another example is better known: "There is no less marvellousness of adaptation in the forms and sizes of fruits. Many of them are
covering the entire globe by exceeding the highest mountain peaks by a few cubits without violating the laws of gravity and fluid balance. In fact, the story of the Great Flood in the book of Genesis, when interpreted literally, is crammed with more miracles than any comparable piece of literature anywhere on earth. The history of the Deluge related in the Pentateuch is "the most miraculous event of which the world ever heard [...]": it is one of the mysteries which are believed by faith; and faith consists in believing that which reason does not believe—which is only another miracle" (vol.V-2, p.252-53, Voltaire, 1901). All is miracle in the history of the Flood:

> A miracle, that forty days of rain should have inundated the four quarters of the world, and have raised the water to the height of fifteen cubits above the tops of the loftiest mountains; a miracle, that there should have been cataracts, floodgates, and openings in heaven; a miracle, that all sorts of animals should have been collected in the ark from all parts of the world; a miracle, that Noah found the means of feeding them for a period of ten months; a miracle, that all the animals with all their provisions could have been included and retained in the ark; a miracle, that the greater part of them did not die; a miracle, that after quitting the ark, they found food enough to maintain them (vol.V-2, p.252, Voltaire, 1901).

In the last sentence, Voltaire is mocking the work of a certain Jean Le Pelletier entitled Essays on *Noah's Ark* (Dissertations sur l'arche de Noé, 1700), in which the author attempted to demonstrate how all the animals could have fit and been nourished in the ark. He engaged in scholarly calculations to assess the capacity of the ark, leading him to conclude that the animals had enough space. He then evaluated their water and food requirements. He claimed that the capacity of the freshwater reservoir he placed in the hull was four times greater than necessary, and the capacity of the granary, located on the first floor, was one and a half times larger than needed. Like many other apologists before and after him, Le Pelletier desperately wanted to show that the Bible's claims were consistent with plausibility, nature, and reason. Ad hoc hypotheses were cooked up to suit the occasion, reminding one of historian W. E. H. Lecky's remark about the tendency "to invent, without a shadow of foundation, the most elaborate theories of explanation rather than recognize the smallest force in an objection" (vol.I, p.367, Lecky, 1869). At the end of the century, the Abbé Bergier will still label as ridiculous the stubbornness of unbelievers in challenging the reality of the Flood (vol.I, p.506, Bergier, 1788-90), and Chateaubriand will consider the narrative of the Flood as the true starting point of history. It would take another fifty years before, as reported by Huxley, it became permissible to doubt the literal truth of "Noah and his ark".

According to the dominant conception during the Classical Age, God imposed His order on nature as part of a rational plan. Since humans were believed to be created in the image of God, they could, at least in part, comprehend the Creator's grand cosmic design and glimpse the divine "plan" that guided creation. The reasons behind natural phenomena are rooted in the purposes set by God; thus, the mission of science is to search for the causes of natural effects based on the Creator's intended purposes for producing those effects. Consequently, scientists and philosophers should limit themselves to observing and describing "the spectacle of Nature"; they cannot provide explanations, as the true explanation lies in the wisdom of God, which is beyond human reach. Reflecting on efficient causes is futile; at most, one can try to infer the final causes, the intentions that God might have had in creating living beings. As an example, Daniel Le Clerc proclaims that all insects were created for the benefit of humans: bees for their honey, silkworms for silk, cochineal insects for dyeing purple, and locusts... to feed Saint John the Baptist in the desert (p.367-368, Le Clerc, 1715). In 1784, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre attempted to prove that nature behaves like an irreproachable mother whose sole concern is the particular well-being of humans. He asserted that "animals of prey are by no means an object of terror to man. [...] Even those who attack the human body are furnished with remarkable indications. They either smell strongly, as the bug; or present oppositions of color to the places on which they fix, as white insects on the hair; or the blackness of the flea contrasted to the whiteness of the skin" (vol.I, p.306-307, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, 1809). Another example is better known: "There is no less marvellousness of adaptation in the forms and sizes of fruits. Many of them are
molded for the mouth of man, such as cherries and plumbs; others for his hand, such as pears and apples; others much larger, such as melons, have the sub-divisions marked, and seem destined to be a social family repast" (vol.II, p.450-51, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, 1809).

To liberate science from the yoke of theology, a new generation of philosophers and scientists demanded that science be independent of God. According to the postulate of objectivity formulated as early as 1644 by Descartes, there is no intention in the universe. The essence of science lies in its refusal to ask "Why?" and "For what purpose?" and, consequently, in its opposition to the method of searching for final causes. A century later, Diderot outlined a history of the universe that not only dispensed with God but also questioned the very idea of the order of nature. In 1749, he published *Letter on the Blind (Lettre sur les aveugles)* in which he imagined a dialogue between a dying blind man, the English mathematician Saunderson, and the Anglican pastor Holmes (p.109-114, Diderot, 2016). The conversation between Saunderson and Holmes starts with a quip from the blind man: "If you want to make me believe in God you must make me touch Him". The argument is a bit thin and the good pastor has no trouble refuting it: "'Sir', returned the clergyman, very appositely, 'touch yourself, and you will recognize the Deity in the admirable mechanism of your organs.'" False, Saunderson retorts: resorting to God to explain a difficulty is not good philosophy. It is better to admit one's ignorance: "If nature offers us a knotty problem, let us leave it for what it is, without calling in to cut it the hand of a being who immediately becomes a fresh knot and harder to untie than the first". Diderot asserts that replacing one difficulty with another serves no purpose. He continues then by dismantling the famous physico-theological argument or argument from design, which holds that complex functionality in the natural world which looks designed is evidence of an intelligent creator<fnref n="5" />. The mechanism of the universe as a clock, asserts Diderot, does not necessarily require a supreme clockmaker. The greatest mistake of proponents of the clockmaker theory is precisely assuming an admirable mechanism where there is none. The wonders of nature? Undoubtedly a beautiful spectacle, but who says it emerged fully formed from the hands of a God? For a few moments, consent to close your eyes, become blind to the wonders that impress you, forget them. Now try to go back to the early moments of the universe, before which you are as blind as a true blind person, for your eyes, which only see the present and fixed image, are of no use to you. Let's dream a little. Can we not imagine that, "if we went back to the origin of things and scenes and perceived matter in motion and the evolution from chaos, we should meet with a number of shapeless creatures, instead of a few creatures highly organized"? Inspired closely by the famous philosophical poem, *De natura rerum*, Saunderson-Diderot endeavors to imagine how, in its original abundance, nature randomly produced unstable combinations, animals without the necessary organs for survival. After much trial and error, "all the defective combinations of matter disappeared, and [...] those only survived whose mechanism was not defective in any important particular and who were able to support and perpetuate themselves".

By rewinding the evolution's film, Saunderson demonstrates how our seemingly ordered world slowly emerged from the primitive chaos of molecules animated by eternal motion. Organic matter arises from inorganic matter, step by step, but the conditions for this development are fortuitous circumstances, not a preconceived design by any Supreme Being. Among the monsters arising from the irregular agitations of moving matter, man appeared, and his survival owes itself to the fortunate conformation of his organs and a favorable environment. For if "the first man had his larynx closed, or had lacked suitable food, or had been defective in the organs of generation, or had failed to find a mate, or had propagated in another species, what then, Mr Holmes, would have been the fate of the human race?" Man, the supposed center of the universe created in the image of God, "would have been still merged in the general depuration of the universe, [...] dissolved and dispersed among the molecules of matter"! Indeed, the assertion is stark: the human species is the result of fortuitous circumstances, not a providential purpose that would designate it as the end and culmination of creation.

<footnote n="5">⁵ "When you see a sundial or a water-clock", stated Cicero, "you see that it tells the time by design and not by chance. How then can you imagine that the universe as a whole is devoid of purpose and intelligence, when it embraces everything, including these artifacts themselves and their artificers?" (*The Nature of the Gods*, II.34, transl. by Horace McGregor).</footnote>
molded for the mouth of man, such as cherries and plumbs; others for his hand, such as pears and apples; others much larger, such as melons, have the sub-divisions marked, and seem destined to be a social family repast" (vol.II, p.450-51, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, 1809).

To liberate science from the yoke of theology, a new generation of philosophers and scientists demanded that science be independent of God. According to the postulate of objectivity formulated as early as 1644 by Descartes, there is no intention in the universe. The essence of science lies in its refusal to ask "Why?" and "For what purpose?" and, consequently, in its opposition to the method of searching for final causes. A century later, Diderot outlined a history of the universe that not only dispensed with God but also questioned the very idea of the order of nature. In 1749, he published *Letter on the Blind (Lettre sur les aveugles)* in which he imagined a dialogue between a dying blind man, the English mathematician Saunderson, and the Anglican pastor Holmes (p.109-114, Diderot, 2016). The conversation between Saunderson and Holmes starts with a quip from the blind man: "If you want to make me believe in God you must make me touch Him". The argument is a bit thin and the good pastor has no trouble refuting it: "'Sir', returned the clergyman, very appositely, 'touch yourself, and you will recognize the Deity in the admirable mechanism of your organs.'" False, Saunderson retorts: resorting to God to explain a difficulty is not good philosophy. It is better to admit one's ignorance: "If nature offers us a knotty problem, let us leave it for what it is, without calling in to cut it the hand of a being who immediately becomes a fresh knot and harder to untie than the first". Diderot asserts that replacing one difficulty with another serves no purpose. He continues then by dismantling the famous physico-theological argument or argument from design, which holds that complex functionality in the natural world which looks designed is evidence of an intelligent creator<fnref n="5" />. The mechanism of the universe as a clock, asserts Diderot, does not necessarily require a supreme clockmaker. The greatest mistake of proponents of the clockmaker theory is precisely assuming an admirable mechanism where there is none. The wonders of nature? Undoubtedly a beautiful spectacle, but who says it emerged fully formed from the hands of a God? For a few moments, consent to close your eyes, become blind to the wonders that impress you, forget them. Now try to go back to the early moments of the universe, before which you are as blind as a true blind person, for your eyes, which only see the present and fixed image, are of no use to you. Let's dream a little. Can we not imagine that, "if we went back to the origin of things and scenes and perceived matter in motion and the evolution from chaos, we should meet with a number of shapeless creatures, instead of a few creatures highly organized"? Inspired closely by the famous philosophical poem, *De natura rerum*, Saunderson-Diderot endeavors to imagine how, in its original abundance, nature randomly produced unstable combinations, animals without the necessary organs for survival. After much trial and error, "all the defective combinations of matter disappeared, and [...] those only survived whose mechanism was not defective in any important particular and who were able to support and perpetuate themselves".

By rewinding the evolution's film, Saunderson demonstrates how our seemingly ordered world slowly emerged from the primitive chaos of molecules animated by eternal motion. Organic matter arises from inorganic matter, step by step, but the conditions for this development are fortuitous circumstances, not a preconceived design by any Supreme Being. Among the monsters arising from the irregular agitations of moving matter, man appeared, and his survival owes itself to the fortunate conformation of his organs and a favorable environment. For if "the first man had his larynx closed, or had lacked suitable food, or had been defective in the organs of generation, or had failed to find a mate, or had propagated in another species, what then, Mr Holmes, would have been the fate of the human race?" Man, the supposed center of the universe created in the image of God, "would have been still merged in the general depuration of the universe, [...] dissolved and dispersed among the molecules of matter"! Indeed, the assertion is stark: the human species is the result of fortuitous circumstances, not a providential purpose that would designate it as the end and culmination of creation.

<footnote n="5">⁵ "When you see a sundial or a water-clock", stated Cicero, "you see that it tells the time by design and not by chance. How then can you imagine that the universe as a whole is devoid of purpose and intelligence, when it embraces everything, including these artifacts themselves and their artificers?" (*The Nature of the Gods*, II.34, transl. by Horace McGregor).</footnote>
In a few words, Saunderson has demolished the physico-theological argument of the spectacle of nature. Rejecting the old static conception of the universe inspired by the first chapter of Genesis, which posited that animals and humans were created in their present form, Diderot outlines biochemical evolution from primitive matter to complex organisms endowed with temporary stability—a bold vision that modern biology would confirm two centuries later. The proof of evolutionary trial and error, continues Saunderson, is the existence, here on Earth, of “monsters” like himself: “the order is not even now so perfect as to exclude the occasional appearance of monstrosities”. Then, in a visionary impulse, this man, blind from birth, invites his interlocutor to close his eyes before the order that dazzles him, and gaze into the distance:

> I conjecture, then, that in the beginning, when matter in a state of ferment brought this world into being, creatures like myself were of very common occurrence. But might not worlds too be in the same case? How many faulty and incomplete worlds have been dispersed and perhaps form again, and are dispersed at every instant in remote regions of space which I cannot touch nor you behold, but where motion continues and will continue to combine masses of matter, until they have found some arrangement in which they may finally persevere? O philosophers, travel with me to the confines of this universe, beyond the point where I feel and you behold organized beings; cast your eyes over this new ocean, and search in its aimless and lawless agitations for vestiges of that intelligent Being whose wisdom fills you with such wonder and admiration here!

It is then that the conclusion falls like the blade of a guillotine: "But what is the use of taking you out of your element? What is this world, Mr Holmes, but a complex, subject to cycles of change, all of which show a continual tendency to destruction; a rapid succession of beings that appear one by one, flourish and disappear; a merely transitory symmetry and momentary appearance of order?"

*A momentary order:* these are the key words of Saunderson's discourse and, at the same time, one of the most fundamental theses of Diderot's thought. The blind mathematician is happy to admit the existence of an order, even an admirable order, in a part of the universe, but on one important condition: "I take your word for the present state of the universe, and in return keep the liberty of thinking as I please on its ancient and primitive state, with relation to which you are as blind as myself". The world in which we live is indeed governed by a certain order, which science aims to describe in mathematical language. However, this order is neither perfect, universal, nor eternal. Assuming that the world around us is orderly and concluding that the entire universe is orderly is not good philosophy. In reality, the order of the world is a mental construct, a mere facade, and the monstrous productions of nature, though rare, are evidence of this. Indeed, if a monster is defined by its inability to survive and/or reproduce, it is evident that we rarely encounter monsters today. Evolution generates order from an initial chaos: by eliminating beings unfit for life, the "general depuration of the universe" leaves only those that can give the illusion of having been directly created by a higher power. Thus, disorder produces order without concretizing any preexisting intention at the origin of its manifestation. But to see this, one must first become a little blind....

Until the mid-19th century, most scientists "naturally" defended a fixist and providentialist view of the universe, in which God created our world as it appears today. Nature had no history: species were fixed, each type of plant, animal, or human was individually created, and pre-adapted to the climate where it was to live. A century before Darwin, Diderot was about to dismantle this beautiful order of the universe created by God with perfect wisdom. Order is not a property of reality but a projection of our mind. The regularity of nature can only be provisional, and it cannot serve as the basis for definitive knowledge. The "spectacle of nature" that sings the glory of God is merely a convenient mathematical reduction intended to build a *provisional* science.

Until the 18th century, it was God who assigned meaning and purpose to science. Science was meant to serve the science of God, and it was seen as the most rigorous exegesis of the book of nature written by God. Today, science has definitively triumphed over the literal reading of the Bible: people no longer believe that a Flood submerged the entire surface of the earth, that a couple of each animal species was saved in Noah's ark, that Joshua stopped the Sun above the city of Gibeon (Joshua 10:12-13), that there
In a few words, Saunderson has demolished the physico-theological argument of the spectacle of nature. Rejecting the old static conception of the universe inspired by the first chapter of Genesis, which posited that animals and humans were created in their present form, Diderot outlines biochemical evolution from primitive matter to complex organisms endowed with temporary stability—a bold vision that modern biology would confirm two centuries later. The proof of evolutionary trial and error, continues Saunderson, is the existence, here on Earth, of “monsters” like himself: “the order is not even now so perfect as to exclude the occasional appearance of monstrosities”. Then, in a visionary impulse, this man, blind from birth, invites his interlocutor to close his eyes before the order that dazzles him, and gaze into the distance:

> I conjecture, then, that in the beginning, when matter in a state of ferment brought this world into being, creatures like myself were of very common occurrence. But might not worlds too be in the same case? How many faulty and incomplete worlds have been dispersed and perhaps form again, and are dispersed at every instant in remote regions of space which I cannot touch nor you behold, but where motion continues and will continue to combine masses of matter, until they have found some arrangement in which they may finally persevere? O philosophers, travel with me to the confines of this universe, beyond the point where I feel and you behold organized beings; cast your eyes over this new ocean, and search in its aimless and lawless agitations for vestiges of that intelligent Being whose wisdom fills you with such wonder and admiration here!

It is then that the conclusion falls like the blade of a guillotine: "But what is the use of taking you out of your element? What is this world, Mr Holmes, but a complex, subject to cycles of change, all of which show a continual tendency to destruction; a rapid succession of beings that appear one by one, flourish and disappear; a merely transitory symmetry and momentary appearance of order?"

*A momentary order*: these are the key words of Saunderson's discourse and, at the same time, one of the most fundamental theses of Diderot's thought. The blind mathematician is happy to admit the existence of an order, even an admirable order, in a part of the universe, but on one important condition: "I take your word for the present state of the universe, and in return keep the liberty of thinking as I please on its ancient and primitive state, with relation to which you are as blind as myself". The world in which we live is indeed governed by a certain order, which science aims to describe in mathematical language. However, this order is neither perfect, universal, nor eternal. Assuming that the world around us is orderly and concluding that the entire universe is orderly is not good philosophy. In reality, the order of the world is a mental construct, a mere facade, and the monstrous productions of nature, though rare, are evidence of this. Indeed, if a monster is defined by its inability to survive and/or reproduce, it is evident that we rarely encounter monsters today. Evolution generates order from an initial chaos: by eliminating beings unfit for life, the "general depuration of the universe" leaves only those that can give the illusion of having been directly created by a higher power. Thus, disorder produces order without concretizing any preexisting intention at the origin of its manifestation. But to see this, one must first become a little blind....

Until the mid-19th century, most scientists "naturally" defended a fixist and providentialist view of the universe, in which God created our world as it appears today. Nature had no history: species were fixed, each type of plant, animal, or human was individually created, and pre-adapted to the climate where it was to live. A century before Darwin, Diderot was about to dismantle this beautiful order of the universe created by God with perfect wisdom. Order is not a property of reality but a projection of our mind. The regularity of nature can only be provisional, and it cannot serve as the basis for definitive knowledge. The "spectacle of nature" that sings the glory of God is merely a convenient mathematical reduction intended to build a *provisional* science.

Until the 18th century, it was God who assigned meaning and purpose to science. Science was meant to serve the science of God, and it was seen as the most rigorous exegesis of the book of nature written by God. Today, science has definitively triumphed over the literal reading of the Bible: people no longer believe that a Flood submerged the entire surface of the earth, that a couple of each animal species was saved in Noah's ark, that Joshua stopped the Sun above the city of Gibeon (Joshua 10:12-13), that there
were only 42 generations between Adam and Jesus (Matthew 1:17), and so on. As Thomas Huxley said at the end of the 19th century, men of science “have more important matters to attend to than mere antiquarianism.” Today, God does not depend on science, and science does not depend on God, and everyone is content.

### 4. The critique of the Christian God and the absurdity of religious dogmas

The Book of Genesis also contains the story of the Fall and the expulsion of man from Paradise (Genesis 3:1-24). However, the dogma of original sin was formulated by Saint Augustine in the 4th century AD. It became a cornerstone of Christian theology, even though it does not play a significant role in the Old Testament, and the Gospels do not explicitly mention it. The concept of original sin can be found in embryonic form in Saint Paul's epistles. According to Paul, sin and, as a consequence, death are the result of Adam's disobedience, which divided mankind from the Creator. As a result of the Fall, the entire human race is destined for eternal damnation: “That criminal nature draws upon itself the most righteous punishment”, declares Saint Augustine (p.24, Augustine, 1992). This is therefore no more than justice, considering the terrible sin committed by the first humans. If God had considered only His justice, He could have abandoned all of humanity to Hell. But in His infinite mercy, God sent Christ to save a portion of humanity, while excluding three-quarters and a half of the human race from this blessing. *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, no salvation outside the Church<fnref n="6" />: are doomed to hellfire not only the ungodly and the heretics, but also all those who have never heard of Christ, virtuous infidels, well-intentioned heretics, and children who died without baptism (p.28, Augustine, 1992). Abbé Nonnotte reproaches Voltaire for supporting the idea that pagans, infidels, and heretics will be saved. A serious mistake! The New Testament says exactly the opposite: “Jesus Christ tells us that those who have not received a second spiritual birth through baptism cannot enter the kingdom of Heaven. [...] Scripture teaches us that without faith, it is impossible to please God; those who do not have faith will be condemned, and those who do not listen to the Church should be treated as pagans” (vol.II, p.265, Nonnotte, 1762). Following an evolution leading towards increasing rigorism, the official theology has come to favor texts that seem to justify this attitude. Salvation requires faith in God but also necessitates unconditional submission to His representative, the Church. Otherwise, there is no immortal and blissful life, but rather the assurance of equally eternal infernal punishments.

Regarding original sin, Rousseau believes that Scripture is less harsh than Saint Augustine and the theologians of his time: it is not possible, he believes, “that God creates so many innocent and pure souls purposely to join them to guilty bodies., to make them contract moral corruption thereby, and to condemn them all to hell, for no other crime than this union that is his work” (p.29, Rousseau, 2001). In Voltaire's view, the dogma of original sin is the true scandal of Christianity. Throughout the second part of his life, he dedicated himself to combating the Church and ridiculing its doctrines. However, even in his early works, he fiercely criticized the very foundations of the Christian faith, as seen in the *Epistle to Urania* (Épître à Uranie, 1722), his first monument of his freedom of thinking (vol.I B, p.463-502, Voltaire, 1968-2022). Voltaire contends that the priests expect him to venerate and love a cruel and wicked God whom he should rather despise, a God who debases humans created in His image and appears to take pleasure in the suffering of His creatures. The God of Judeo-Christianity is a detestable God, and Voltaire openly declares that he is not Christian:

> People say you are a tyrant; but in you I seek a Father;
> I am not Christian, but it is in order to love you better.

<footnote n="6">⁶ Saint Cyprian of Carthage, Epistle LXXII. The doctrine is based largely on Mark 16:15-16: “He said to them, “Go into the whole world and proclaim the gospel to every creature. Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved; whoever does not believe will be condemned”.</footnote>
were only 42 generations between Adam and Jesus (Matthew 1:17), and so on. As Thomas Huxley said at the end of the 19th century, men of science “have more important matters to attend to than mere antiquarianism.” Today, God does not depend on science, and science does not depend on God, and everyone is content.

### 4. The critique of the Christian God and the absurdity of religious dogmas

The Book of Genesis also contains the story of the Fall and the expulsion of man from Paradise (Genesis 3:1-24). However, the dogma of original sin was formulated by Saint Augustine in the 4th century AD. It became a cornerstone of Christian theology, even though it does not play a significant role in the Old Testament, and the Gospels do not explicitly mention it. The concept of original sin can be found in embryonic form in Saint Paul's epistles. According to Paul, sin and, as a consequence, death are the result of Adam's disobedience, which divided mankind from the Creator. As a result of the Fall, the entire human race is destined for eternal damnation: “That criminal nature draws upon itself the most righteous punishment”, declares Saint Augustine (p.24, Augustine, 1992). This is therefore no more than justice, considering the terrible sin committed by the first humans. If God had considered only His justice, He could have abandoned all of humanity to Hell. But in His infinite mercy, God sent Christ to save a portion of humanity, while excluding three-quarters and a half of the human race from this blessing. *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, no salvation outside the Church<fnref n="6" />: are doomed to hellfire not only the ungodly and the heretics, but also all those who have never heard of Christ, virtuous infidels, well-intentioned heretics, and children who died without baptism (p.28, Augustine, 1992). Abbé Nonnotte reproaches Voltaire for supporting the idea that pagans, infidels, and heretics will be saved. A serious mistake! The New Testament says exactly the opposite: “Jesus Christ tells us that those who have not received a second spiritual birth through baptism cannot enter the kingdom of Heaven. [...] Scripture teaches us that without faith, it is impossible to please God; those who do not have faith will be condemned, and those who do not listen to the Church should be treated as pagans” (vol.II, p.265, Nonnotte, 1762). Following an evolution leading towards increasing rigorism, the official theology has come to favor texts that seem to justify this attitude. Salvation requires faith in God but also necessitates unconditional submission to His representative, the Church. Otherwise, there is no immortal and blissful life, but rather the assurance of equally eternal infernal punishments.

Regarding original sin, Rousseau believes that Scripture is less harsh than Saint Augustine and the theologians of his time: it is not possible, he believes, “that God creates so many innocent and pure souls purposely to join them to guilty bodies., to make them contract moral corruption thereby, and to condemn them all to hell, for no other crime than this union that is his work” (p.29, Rousseau, 2001). In Voltaire's view, the dogma of original sin is the true scandal of Christianity. Throughout the second part of his life, he dedicated himself to combating the Church and ridiculing its doctrines. However, even in his early works, he fiercely criticized the very foundations of the Christian faith, as seen in the *Epistle to Urania* (Épître à Uranie, 1722), his first monument of his freedom of thinking (vol.I B, p.463-502, Voltaire, 1968-2022). Voltaire contends that the priests expect him to venerate and love a cruel and wicked God whom he should rather despise, a God who debases humans created in His image and appears to take pleasure in the suffering of His creatures. The God of Judeo-Christianity is a detestable God, and Voltaire openly declares that he is not Christian:

> People say you are a tyrant; but in you I seek a Father;
> I am not Christian, but it is in order to love you better.

<footnote n="6">⁶ Saint Cyprian of Carthage, Epistle LXXII. The doctrine is based largely on Mark 16:15-16: “He said to them, “Go into the whole world and proclaim the gospel to every creature. Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved; whoever does not believe will be condemned”.</footnote>
Guided by the flame of reason, Voltaire rejects the Christian God of wrath, the God who made his creatures sinful so that He could punish them, who made them in His image only then to wish He hadn't, who sent a Great Flood to destroy mankind only then to send His son to die for it instead, and who now continues to punish men for things they have never done. Finally, only Christians can claim salvation; all others are damned—and that encompasses a considerable number—without it being their fault. Such a God, whom the Church still proposes as a model to men, cannot serve as the foundation for an altruistic morality. Instead of encouraging men to love and unite, as d'Holbach emphasizes, the God of the Bible divides them, inciting them to quarrel, despise, hate, persecute, and slaughter one another: “a religion founded on a sanguinary deity must be a religion of blood” (p.8, d'Holbach, 1835).

The absurdity of the Judeo-Christian God who damns all men for a fault committed by Adam and Eve is also lambasted by Diderot in the *Addition to the Philosophical Thoughts (Addition aux Pensées philosophiques, 1762)*: “The Christian God is a father who makes much of his apples and very little of his children” (p.9, *Faith in Faithlessness*, 2008). Our heavenly Father is not a good father but a tyrant, to whom “no good father would want to resemble” (p.12, *Faith in Faithlessness*, 2008). The rest is more cruel, although not without relevance:

> A Catholic who is father of a family, convinced that the maxims of the Gospels must be practiced under penalty of what is called hell, and given the extreme difficulty in reaching this degree of perfection, which human weakness prevents, I see nothing else to be done than for him to take his child by the foot and smash him against the ground, or to suffocate it at birth. By this act he saves it from the peril of damnation and assures him eternal happiness. And I maintain that this act, far from being criminal, should be considered infinitely praiseworthy, since it is founded upon paternal love, which demands that all good fathers do all the good possible for their children (p.13, *Faith in Faithlessness*, 2008).

It is quite understandable, concedes Abbé Bergier with irony, that the dogma of original sin could not fail to displease unbelievers. They cannot conceive that God would entrust the eternal fate of their posterity to our first parents, especially knowing that both would violate the imposed law and make the entire human race miserable; even less understandable to them is how God could punish a sin that is neither free nor voluntary for us. To respond to the unbelievers shocked by Augustine's interpretation of the Fall, Bergier resorts to a comparison from the political realm: just as no one is scandalized when a king degrades one of his ennobled subjects and his posterity for being disloyal, one can conceive without indignation that God punishes the children for the sin of their father. But what of the severity of the punishment inflicted on Adam and Eve in relation to the offense committed? And of the damnation of innocent children who died without baptism? Abbé Bergier justifies them with this fine declaration worth its weight in gold: "When unbelievers weary us with objections, we can limit ourselves to answering them with Saint Augustine: although I cannot refute all their arguments, I see nonetheless that we must adhere to what Scripture clearly teaches us: namely, that no man can attain eternal life and salvation without being associated with Jesus Christ, and that God cannot unjustly condemn anyone or unjustly deprive them of life and salvation" (vol.III, p.57, Bergier, 1788-90).

Like original sin, the dogma of the Trinity is not founded in the Bible, the early Christians were completely unaware of it.<fnref n="7" /> In many places, the Bible presents Jesus as being subordinate to God the Father: "Jesus gave them this answer: 'Very truly I tell you, the Son can do nothing by himself; he can do only

<footnote n="7">⁷ In *An Historical Account of Two Notable Corruptions of Scripture* on the history of the manifest falsification of two verses of Scripture, first published in 1754, Newton demonstrated that the words "in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one" (1 John 5:7), supposedly supporting the doctrine of the Trinity, did not exist in the original Greek text of the Scriptures. He revealed how this forgery had found its way into the Latin versions, first as a marginal note, and then into the actual text. Newton proved that it was only incorporated into the Greek in 1515. It wasn't until the 19th century that translators of the Bible began correcting these verses...</footnote>
Guided by the flame of reason, Voltaire rejects the Christian God of wrath, the God who made his creatures sinful so that He could punish them, who made them in His image only then to wish He hadn't, who sent a Great Flood to destroy mankind only then to send His son to die for it instead, and who now continues to punish men for things they have never done. Finally, only Christians can claim salvation; all others are damned—and that encompasses a considerable number—without it being their fault. Such a God, whom the Church still proposes as a model to men, cannot serve as the foundation for an altruistic morality. Instead of encouraging men to love and unite, as d'Holbach emphasizes, the God of the Bible divides them, inciting them to quarrel, despise, hate, persecute, and slaughter one another: “a religion founded on a sanguinary deity must be a religion of blood” (p.8, d'Holbach, 1835).

The absurdity of the Judeo-Christian God who damns all men for a fault committed by Adam and Eve is also lambasted by Diderot in the *Addition to the Philosophical Thoughts (Addition aux Pensées philosophiques, 1762)*: “The Christian God is a father who makes much of his apples and very little of his children” (p.9, *Faith in Faithlessness*, 2008). Our heavenly Father is not a good father but a tyrant, to whom “no good father would want to resemble” (p.12, *Faith in Faithlessness*, 2008). The rest is more cruel, although not without relevance:

> A Catholic who is father of a family, convinced that the maxims of the Gospels must be practiced under penalty of what is called hell, and given the extreme difficulty in reaching this degree of perfection, which human weakness prevents, I see nothing else to be done than for him to take his child by the foot and smash him against the ground, or to suffocate it at birth. By this act he saves it from the peril of damnation and assures him eternal happiness. And I maintain that this act, far from being criminal, should be considered infinitely praiseworthy, since it is founded upon paternal love, which demands that all good fathers do all the good possible for their children (p.13, *Faith in Faithlessness*, 2008).

It is quite understandable, concedes Abbé Bergier with irony, that the dogma of original sin could not fail to displease unbelievers. They cannot conceive that God would entrust the eternal fate of their posterity to our first parents, especially knowing that both would violate the imposed law and make the entire human race miserable; even less understandable to them is how God could punish a sin that is neither free nor voluntary for us. To respond to the unbelievers shocked by Augustine's interpretation of the Fall, Bergier resorts to a comparison from the political realm: just as no one is scandalized when a king degrades one of his ennobled subjects and his posterity for being disloyal, one can conceive without indignation that God punishes the children for the sin of their father. But what of the severity of the punishment inflicted on Adam and Eve in relation to the offense committed? And of the damnation of innocent children who died without baptism? Abbé Bergier justifies them with this fine declaration worth its weight in gold: "When unbelievers weary us with objections, we can limit ourselves to answering them with Saint Augustine: although I cannot refute all their arguments, I see nonetheless that we must adhere to what Scripture clearly teaches us: namely, that no man can attain eternal life and salvation without being associated with Jesus Christ, and that God cannot unjustly condemn anyone or unjustly deprive them of life and salvation" (vol.III, p.57, Bergier, 1788-90).

Like original sin, the dogma of the Trinity is not founded in the Bible, the early Christians were completely unaware of it.<fnref n="7" /> In many places, the Bible presents Jesus as being subordinate to God the Father: "Jesus gave them this answer: 'Very truly I tell you, the Son can do nothing by himself; he can do only

<footnote n="7">⁷ In *An Historical Account of Two Notable Corruptions of Scripture* on the history of the manifest falsification of two verses of Scripture, first published in 1754, Newton demonstrated that the words "in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one" (1 John 5:7), supposedly supporting the doctrine of the Trinity, did not exist in the original Greek text of the Scriptures. He revealed how this forgery had found its way into the Latin versions, first as a marginal note, and then into the actual text. Newton proved that it was only incorporated into the Greek in 1515. It wasn't until the 19th century that translators of the Bible began correcting these verses...</footnote>
what he sees his Father doing, because whatever the Father does the Son also does"" (John 5:19); "The Father is greater than I" (John 14:28). From the 1st century AD, passionate there were debates about the nature of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and the relationships between them. In the mid-2nd century, many Christians were drawn to Platonic philosophy, and used it to mold Christian truths into a Platonic framework. In the early 18th century, Jacques Souverain declared in *Platonism Unveiled (Le Platonisme dévoilé)* that the dogma of the Trinity has a philosophical origin: it is an invention of Plato and his followers, blindly adopted by the Church Fathers, and has no basis in the Scriptures.

In the eyes of the philosophers of the Enlightenment, the dogma of the Trinity testifies, more than any other, to the fundamental absurdity of Christian theology. Voltaire's *A Philosophical Dictionary (Dictionnaire philosophique, 1764-1769)* extensively denounces the other side of reason, which is unreason, the mania for providing rational foundations for absurdities. The article on *Arianism* presents a strange paradox: great havoc was caused "for more than sixteen hundred years" by "an incomprehensible question": "Is Jesus the Word? If He be the Word, did He emanate from God in time or before time? If He emanated from God, is He co-eternal and consubstantial with Him, or is He of a similar substance? Is He distinct from Him, or is He not? Is He made or begotten?" (vol.III-2, p.20, Voltaire, 1901). What theological issue is at stake here? The main question at that time was whether Jesus was "only" *the Son of God* or the *Word made flesh, God Himself*. However, a God made man is unthinkable for Voltaire; it is a "monstrous" idea because "the distance from God to man is infinite; and it is impossible for a perishable body to be infinite, immense, or eternal" (vol.IV-2, p.144, Voltaire, 1901). Voltaire recounts that the dogma of the Trinity, the most fundamental dogma of Christianity, was not established and imposed until late, after a long and bloody conflict between the followers of Arius and those of Athanasius, both members of the church in Alexandria, in the 4th century. The Arians regarded Jesus Christ as *created* and not *begotten* by God: the Son is subordinate to the Father, he is of a substance similar to his own (*homoiousios*); whereas for the Trinitarians, the Son is consubstantial, meaning of the same substance as God (*homoousios*), and He proceeds from the Father as the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

Thus, the dogma of the Trinity, states Voltaire in the *Examen important de Milord Bolingbroke*, is a "chimerical metaphysics, which has been nothing but a source of discord and was absolutely irrelevant to morality [...]; for as soon as the early Christians started having dogmas, they hurled insults at each other, foreshadowing from afar the civil wars that would devastate the world over such arguments (vol.LXII, p.282-283, Voltaire, 1968-2022). Voltaire considers that theological unreason "has produced more horrors than the ambition of princes, which ambition has occasioned very many": the worst tyrants of antiquity have done less harm than the Christian quibblers, whose sophisms are responsible for the worst crimes: "The Christians sophisticated, caviled, hated, and excommunicated one another, for some of these dogmas inaccessible to human intellect". In other words, the more incomprehensible a thing is, the more fanatics are willing to butcher each other: the dogma of the Trinity "has furnished exercise for curiosity, for sophistic subtlety, for animosity, for the spirit of cabal, for the fury of domination, for the rage of persecution, for blind and sanguinary fanaticism, for barbarous credulity" (vol.III-2, p.20, Voltaire, 1901).

Abandoning the God of the Bible to irrational faith, the Enlightenment advocates not so much atheism as a philosophical religion, also known as natural religion or deism, based on the critical examination of revealed religion, its dogmas, and its ritual practices. Deism, one of the major figures of Enlightenment religion, seeks to reconcile faith and reason. According to deism, the divinity or Supreme Being (distinct from the personal God of revealed religions) having completed the creation no longer intervenes in nature, history, or the lives of humans. Similar to Newton's modern physics, deism views the world as a machine operating without the intervention of its creator. In stark contrast to revealed religions, Enlightenment deism reconciles the existence of a divinity with the rational demands of modern physical science and criticizes the dogmas, articles of faith, miracles, and mysteries of Christianity.

One of the most formidable opponents of the Christian religion knew it from within: he was the priest Jean Meslier, a quiet, modest priest in the tiny Ardennes parish of Étrépigny, who lived at the turn of the 18th century (Deruette, 2008). From his childhood, Meslier had the opportunity to witness the misery of the peasants, burdened with taxes and forced into complete submission. He confessed that he agreed to choose
what he sees his Father doing, because whatever the Father does the Son also does"" (John 5:19); "The Father is greater than I" (John 14:28). From the 1st century AD, passionate there were debates about the nature of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and the relationships between them. In the mid-2nd century, many Christians were drawn to Platonic philosophy, and used it to mold Christian truths into a Platonic framework. In the early 18th century, Jacques Souverain declared in *Platonism Unveiled (Le Platonisme dévoilé)* that the dogma of the Trinity has a philosophical origin: it is an invention of Plato and his followers, blindly adopted by the Church Fathers, and has no basis in the Scriptures.

In the eyes of the philosophers of the Enlightenment, the dogma of the Trinity testifies, more than any other, to the fundamental absurdity of Christian theology. Voltaire's *A Philosophical Dictionary (Dictionnaire philosophique, 1764-1769)* extensively denounces the other side of reason, which is unreason, the mania for providing rational foundations for absurdities. The article on *Arianism* presents a strange paradox: great havoc was caused "for more than sixteen hundred years" by "an incomprehensible question": "Is Jesus the Word? If He be the Word, did He emanate from God in time or before time? If He emanated from God, is He co-eternal and consubstantial with Him, or is He of a similar substance? Is He distinct from Him, or is He not? Is He made or begotten?" (vol.III-2, p.20, Voltaire, 1901). What theological issue is at stake here? The main question at that time was whether Jesus was "only" *the Son of God* or the *Word made flesh, God Himself*. However, a God made man is unthinkable for Voltaire; it is a "monstrous" idea because "the distance from God to man is infinite; and it is impossible for a perishable body to be infinite, immense, or eternal" (vol.IV-2, p.144, Voltaire, 1901). Voltaire recounts that the dogma of the Trinity, the most fundamental dogma of Christianity, was not established and imposed until late, after a long and bloody conflict between the followers of Arius and those of Athanasius, both members of the church in Alexandria, in the 4th century. The Arians regarded Jesus Christ as *created* and not *begotten* by God: the Son is subordinate to the Father, he is of a substance similar to his own (*homoiousios*); whereas for the Trinitarians, the Son is consubstantial, meaning of the same substance as God (*homoousios*), and He proceeds from the Father as the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

Thus, the dogma of the Trinity, states Voltaire in the *Examen important de Milord Bolingbroke*, is a "chimerical metaphysics, which has been nothing but a source of discord and was absolutely irrelevant to morality [...]; for as soon as the early Christians started having dogmas, they hurled insults at each other, foreshadowing from afar the civil wars that would devastate the world over such arguments (vol.LXII, p.282-283, Voltaire, 1968-2022). Voltaire considers that theological unreason "has produced more horrors than the ambition of princes, which ambition has occasioned very many": the worst tyrants of antiquity have done less harm than the Christian quibblers, whose sophisms are responsible for the worst crimes: "The Christians sophisticated, caviled, hated, and excommunicated one another, for some of these dogmas inaccessible to human intellect". In other words, the more incomprehensible a thing is, the more fanatics are willing to butcher each other: the dogma of the Trinity "has furnished exercise for curiosity, for sophistic subtlety, for animosity, for the spirit of cabal, for the fury of domination, for the rage of persecution, for blind and sanguinary fanaticism, for barbarous credulity" (vol.III-2, p.20, Voltaire, 1901).

Abandoning the God of the Bible to irrational faith, the Enlightenment advocates not so much atheism as a philosophical religion, also known as natural religion or deism, based on the critical examination of revealed religion, its dogmas, and its ritual practices. Deism, one of the major figures of Enlightenment religion, seeks to reconcile faith and reason. According to deism, the divinity or Supreme Being (distinct from the personal God of revealed religions) having completed the creation no longer intervenes in nature, history, or the lives of humans. Similar to Newton's modern physics, deism views the world as a machine operating without the intervention of its creator. In stark contrast to revealed religions, Enlightenment deism reconciles the existence of a divinity with the rational demands of modern physical science and criticizes the dogmas, articles of faith, miracles, and mysteries of Christianity.

One of the most formidable opponents of the Christian religion knew it from within: he was the priest Jean Meslier, a quiet, modest priest in the tiny Ardennes parish of Étrépigny, who lived at the turn of the 18th century (Deruette, 2008). From his childhood, Meslier had the opportunity to witness the misery of the peasants, burdened with taxes and forced into complete submission. He confessed that he agreed to choose
the priesthood to please his parents even though he never had faith himself. In early 1689, Meslier was appointed as the priest of Étrépigny and Balaives in the Ardennes. When de died in 1729, he left behind a copious manuscript as a legacy for his parishioners, le *Memoir of the Thoughts and Sentiments of Jean Meslier (Mémoire des pensées et des sentiments de Jean Meslier)*. It's a kind of testament in which the priest tells his former parishioners that he never believed in God. The subtitle of the work sets it out clearly: *Clear and Evident Demonstrations of the Vanity and Falsity of All the Divinities and of All the Religions of the World (Démonstrations claires et évidentes de la vanité et de la fausseté de toutes les divinités et de toutes les religions du monde)*. Meslier presents a methodical deconstruction of Christianity and the governments that support it, along with a thoughtful defense of the fundamental human rights of liberty, equality, and the pursuit of happiness. He reveals himself not only as a materialist and unbeliever but also as a man of revolutionary sentiments who firmly opposes the governments of his day, which he maintains keep the common people in ignorance, fear, and poverty through religion. For Meslier the books of the Bible were flawed, even fraudulent, works, "stories of fairies" (p.93, Meslier, 2009), while Jesus was "a vile and despicable man who had no mind, talent or knowledge, [...] a fool, a madman, a wretched fanatic, and a miserable scoundrel" (p.214-215, Meslier, 2009). This madman with his extravagant parables also had a perverse side: he glorified suffering, declared on one hand that he came to save all men, and on the other that he came to blind them, and that most would be damned. Meslier had another grievance against religion, which was particularly close to his heart: he reproached it for supporting tyranny and social injustice. A host of parasites lived off the labor of the poor: the clergy, the legal professions, the police, the soldiers. And the Church, rather than fighting injustice, blessed this exploitation of man by man. In his most famous quote, Meslier refers to a man who wished "that all the rulers of the earth and all the nobles be hanged and strangled with the guts of the priests" (p.37, Meslier, 2009). Meslier's manuscript, expanded over several hundred hand written pages, entered the lively world of illicit reproductions after his death in 1729. Various edited abstracts of the *Testament* were printed and circulated, condensing the original manuscript. One of them reached Voltaire, who published a heavily expurgated edition of it in 1762, a grossly distorted "Extract" that portrayed Meslier as a fellow-deist and suppressed Meslier's anti-monarchist and revolutionary opinions.

The 97 chapters of the *Testament* present a collection of eight reasons for rejecting all religious beliefs and practices:

I. Religions are human inventions. Throughout history, people have always endeavored to create idols, deities, rituals, and religions. Gradually, the most cunning among them claimed to possess the ability to speak or act on behalf of supposed powers from above, then allied themselves with rulers to exploit and oppress the people.

II. Faith, which serves as the foundation of religions, is based only on uncertainties, contradictions, and absurdities. Faith is a "blind belief", a principle of errors, illusions, and deceptions. As a result, people who live in blindness, who adhere to religious beliefs without any reasoning, are prone to disputes, disturbances, and persecutions to maintain and defend their religion, which they believe to be the only true one. It is because no religion can be demonstrated that people slaughter each other. Meslier criticizes the supposed miracles meant to prove the truth of the Christian religion. Miracles exist in all religions, and if Christians claim that these are false miracles perpetrated by impostors, there is no evidence that Christian miracle-makers are any more credible.

III. The so-called visions and promises of the Old Testament are vain and false. Meslier aims to dismantle the absurdity of the alleged covenant between God and the Jewish people, to whom he is said to have made absurd promises which have never been fulfilled (such as becoming the most holy, happiest, and triumphant people on earth). According to Meslier, these prophecies were merely concocted by Hebrew leaders to assert their authority over the people through this attribution of divine election.

IV. The prophecies of the Bible are false because they have been contradicted by history. None of the promises made by Christ in particular have been fulfilled.

V. Christian doctrine and morality offend common sense, are absurd and dangerous. In particular, Meslier targets five errors of doctrine (the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Eucharist, the creation of man and sin) and
the priesthood to please his parents even though he never had faith himself. In early 1689, Meslier was appointed as the priest of Étrépigny and Balaives in the Ardennes. When de died in 1729, he left behind a copious manuscript as a legacy for his parishioners, le *Memoir of the Thoughts and Sentiments of Jean Meslier (Mémoire des pensées et des sentiments de Jean Meslier)*. It's a kind of testament in which the priest tells his former parishioners that he never believed in God. The subtitle of the work sets it out clearly: *Clear and Evident Demonstrations of the Vanity and Falsity of All the Divinities and of All the Religions of the World (Démonstrations claires et évidentes de la vanité et de la fausseté de toutes les divinités et de toutes les religions du monde)*. Meslier presents a methodical deconstruction of Christianity and the governments that support it, along with a thoughtful defense of the fundamental human rights of liberty, equality, and the pursuit of happiness. He reveals himself not only as a materialist and unbeliever but also as a man of revolutionary sentiments who firmly opposes the governments of his day, which he maintains keep the common people in ignorance, fear, and poverty through religion. For Meslier the books of the Bible were flawed, even fraudulent, works, "stories of fairies" (p.93, Meslier, 2009), while Jesus was "a vile and despicable man who had no mind, talent or knowledge, [...] a fool, a madman, a wretched fanatic, and a miserable scoundrel" (p.214-215, Meslier, 2009). This madman with his extravagant parables also had a perverse side: he glorified suffering, declared on one hand that he came to save all men, and on the other that he came to blind them, and that most would be damned. Meslier had another grievance against religion, which was particularly close to his heart: he reproached it for supporting tyranny and social injustice. A host of parasites lived off the labor of the poor: the clergy, the legal professions, the police, the soldiers. And the Church, rather than fighting injustice, blessed this exploitation of man by man. In his most famous quote, Meslier refers to a man who wished "that all the rulers of the earth and all the nobles be hanged and strangled with the guts of the priests" (p.37, Meslier, 2009). Meslier's manuscript, expanded over several hundred hand written pages, entered the lively world of illicit reproductions after his death in 1729. Various edited abstracts of the *Testament* were printed and circulated, condensing the original manuscript. One of them reached Voltaire, who published a heavily expurgated edition of it in 1762, a grossly distorted "Extract" that portrayed Meslier as a fellow-deist and suppressed Meslier's anti-monarchist and revolutionary opinions.

The 97 chapters of the *Testament* present a collection of eight reasons for rejecting all religious beliefs and practices:

I. Religions are human inventions. Throughout history, people have always endeavored to create idols, deities, rituals, and religions. Gradually, the most cunning among them claimed to possess the ability to speak or act on behalf of supposed powers from above, then allied themselves with rulers to exploit and oppress the people.

II. Faith, which serves as the foundation of religions, is based only on uncertainties, contradictions, and absurdities. Faith is a "blind belief", a principle of errors, illusions, and deceptions. As a result, people who live in blindness, who adhere to religious beliefs without any reasoning, are prone to disputes, disturbances, and persecutions to maintain and defend their religion, which they believe to be the only true one. It is because no religion can be demonstrated that people slaughter each other. Meslier criticizes the supposed miracles meant to prove the truth of the Christian religion. Miracles exist in all religions, and if Christians claim that these are false miracles perpetrated by impostors, there is no evidence that Christian miracle-makers are any more credible.

III. The so-called visions and promises of the Old Testament are vain and false. Meslier aims to dismantle the absurdity of the alleged covenant between God and the Jewish people, to whom he is said to have made absurd promises which have never been fulfilled (such as becoming the most holy, happiest, and triumphant people on earth). According to Meslier, these prophecies were merely concocted by Hebrew leaders to assert their authority over the people through this attribution of divine election.

IV. The prophecies of the Bible are false because they have been contradicted by history. None of the promises made by Christ in particular have been fulfilled.

V. Christian doctrine and morality offend common sense, are absurd and dangerous. In particular, Meslier targets five errors of doctrine (the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Eucharist, the creation of man and sin) and