three errors of morality. He violently attacks Catholic doctrine and morality, which preach renunciation of pleasure in favor of suffering and condemn carnal love by threatening sinners with the flames of hell. But the most serious error, in Meslier's eyes, is the concept of forgiving one's enemies, as it justifies oppression. He believes that advocating love for one's enemies, doing good to those who harm you, and enduring insults without seeking revenge or showing anger only serves to overturn principles of justice, allowing the oppression of the good and weak while favoring the wicked. This, in his view, is the most destructive error of all. Meslier argues that it is a natural right to hate evil and those who unjustly harm us. He contends that people have the right to rebel against their oppressors and should not passively accept unjust treatment.

VI. Christianity allows and promotes oppression, inequality and injustice, which he sees as the root cause of the misery endured by the majority. Meslier denounces the abuses of the Catholic Church, its accumulation of wealth, the tyranny of the powerful elite it supports and legitimizes. The nobles, backed by the Church, possess all the wealth and are nothing but vermin that corrode the social fabric. Meslier proposes a new social regime based on communal ownership of goods. He advocates for a system where the land should belong to those who work it: everyone should have access to equal sustenance, to heated lodgings, and the clothing they need.

VII. God does not exist. If God were real, His existence would be evident and His will would be clearly communicated to humanity, rather than leaving people to dispute and debate over his nature and intentions. Meslier questions the need for humans to abandon their reason in order to believe in God, as he believes this opens the door to deception and manipulation. Furthermore, he finds it inconceivable that a perfect being would create such an imperfect and suffering-filled universe, full of evils, vices, and malevolence. The existence of suffering and the plight of most human beings in this world seem incompatible with the idea of an all-powerful and benevolent God.

VIII. The only necessary existence is that of matter. Why should we assume the existence of another invisible reality? The very idea of creation from nothing is absurd. The soul is not a spiritual substance but a modification of matter, and as such, mortal. Therefore, there is no afterlife to hope for, as there is no existence beyond the physical realm of matter.

In his conclusion, Meslier praises regicide and calls on the oppressed to unite against their oppressors. He encourages those of his readers who are the most enlightened and influential to support the oppressed in their struggle for liberation.

Le *Memoir* de Meslier contains the most violent indictment ever written against Christianity. He attacks religion not in itself due to its perceived absurdity but because he stands against the injustices of his time: the irrationality of religious beliefs reflect the irrationality of the social and political order. He strongly denounces the teachings that advocate enduring the actions of the wicked, loving one's enemies, and doing good to those who harm us: "it is obviously a natural right, natural reason, natural equality and justice to preserve our life and goods against those who want to take them from us unjustly. And as it is natural to hate evil, it is also natural to hate those who unjustly do evil" (p.267, Meslier, 2009). To endure insults not only without seeking revenge but also without becoming angry or complaining is to want to disrupt the order of things, to overturn principles of justice, to allow the good and the weak to be oppressed, and to favor the wicked. Meslier identifies the religious establishment, as it exists in his time, as the major obstacle to the emancipation of oppressed peoples. All religions are instruments of oppression, and to fight against tyranny is first and foremost to destroy religion. This union of religious and social critique constitutes the great originality of Meslier's *Memoir*.

On November 22, 1768, Diderot wrote to his mistress Sophie Volland: "It is raining bombs in the house of the Lord". These bombs are anti-Christian writings like the *Letters to Eugenia* (*Lettres à Eugénie*), *The Sacred Contagion* (*La Contagion sacrée*) or the *Examination of the Prophecies* (*Examen des prophéties*). He could have quoted *Christianity Unveiled* (*Le Christianisme dévoilé*), the first polemical work of his friend Baron d'Holbach, published two years earlier, and which also had the effect of a bomb. In the mid-century, simultaneously with the publication of the final volumes of the *Encyclopédie*, d'Holbach and his friends released a large number of anti-Christian works in quick succession, in which
three errors of morality. He violently attacks Catholic doctrine and morality, which preach renunciation of pleasure in favor of suffering and condemn carnal love by threatening sinners with the flames of hell. But the most serious error, in Meslier's eyes, is the concept of forgiving one's enemies, as it justifies oppression. He believes that advocating love for one's enemies, doing good to those who harm you, and enduring insults without seeking revenge or showing anger only serves to overturn principles of justice, allowing the oppression of the good and weak while favoring the wicked. This, in his view, is the most destructive error of all. Meslier argues that it is a natural right to hate evil and those who unjustly harm us. He contends that people have the right to rebel against their oppressors and should not passively accept unjust treatment.

VI. Christianity allows and promotes oppression, inequality and injustice, which he sees as the root cause of the misery endured by the majority. Meslier denounces the abuses of the Catholic Church, its accumulation of wealth, the tyranny of the powerful elite it supports and legitimizes. The nobles, backed by the Church, possess all the wealth and are nothing but vermin that corrode the social fabric. Meslier proposes a new social regime based on communal ownership of goods. He advocates for a system where the land should belong to those who work it: everyone should have access to equal sustenance, to heated lodgings, and the clothing they need.

VII. God does not exist. If God were real, His existence would be evident and His will would be clearly communicated to humanity, rather than leaving people to dispute and debate over his nature and intentions. Meslier questions the need for humans to abandon their reason in order to believe in God, as he believes this opens the door to deception and manipulation. Furthermore, he finds it inconceivable that a perfect being would create such an imperfect and suffering-filled universe, full of evils, vices, and malevolence. The existence of suffering and the plight of most human beings in this world seem incompatible with the idea of an all-powerful and benevolent God.

VIII. The only necessary existence is that of matter. Why should we assume the existence of another invisible reality? The very idea of creation from nothing is absurd. The soul is not a spiritual substance but a modification of matter, and as such, mortal. Therefore, there is no afterlife to hope for, as there is no existence beyond the physical realm of matter.

In his conclusion, Meslier praises regicide and calls on the oppressed to unite against their oppressors. He encourages those of his readers who are the most enlightened and influential to support the oppressed in their struggle for liberation.

Le *Memoir* de Meslier contains the most violent indictment ever written against Christianity. He attacks religion not in itself due to its perceived absurdity but because he stands against the injustices of his time: the irrationality of religious beliefs reflect the irrationality of the social and political order. He strongly denounces the teachings that advocate enduring the actions of the wicked, loving one's enemies, and doing good to those who harm us: "it is obviously a natural right, natural reason, natural equality and justice to preserve our life and goods against those who want to take them from us unjustly. And as it is natural to hate evil, it is also natural to hate those who unjustly do evil" (p.267, Meslier, 2009). To endure insults not only without seeking revenge but also without becoming angry or complaining is to want to disrupt the order of things, to overturn principles of justice, to allow the good and the weak to be oppressed, and to favor the wicked. Meslier identifies the religious establishment, as it exists in his time, as the major obstacle to the emancipation of oppressed peoples. All religions are instruments of oppression, and to fight against tyranny is first and foremost to destroy religion. This union of religious and social critique constitutes the great originality of Meslier's *Memoir*.

On November 22, 1768, Diderot wrote to his mistress Sophie Volland: "It is raining bombs in the house of the Lord". These bombs are anti-Christian writings like the *Letters to Eugenia* (*Lettres à Eugénie*), *The Sacred Contagion* (*La Contagion sacrée*) or the *Examination of the Prophecies* (*Examen des prophéties*). He could have quoted *Christianity Unveiled* (*Le Christianisme dévoilé*), the first polemical work of his friend Baron d'Holbach, published two years earlier, and which also had the effect of a bomb. In the mid-century, simultaneously with the publication of the final volumes of the *Encyclopédie*, d'Holbach and his friends released a large number of anti-Christian works in quick succession, in which
they vehemently criticized the moral and political influence of the Christian religion and its clergy. Their theses are easy to summarize. History and experience show that supernatural religions are morally useless, politically dangerous, contrary to the progress of reason, and flawed in their origins, doctrines, and representatives. Christian dogma is a fabric of legends, contradictions, impostures, and barbarous precepts. Prophecies and miracles defy common sense. The history of the councils, which gradually elaborated the dogma, is one of immoral bargaining, power struggles, so that theology in its entirety is a vast deception, intended to keep human reason under tutelage. Since human beings seek their own happiness and that of others, religion is not justified, as it makes life a valley of tears and limits itself to promises of happiness in the afterlife, combined with the threat of the worst punishments. *Christianity Unveiled* ends with these words:

> We have seen, above, that the Christian religion is not, on account of its fanatic virtues, blind zeal, and pretended perfections, the less injurious to sound morality, right reason, the happiness of individuals, and domestic harmony. It is easy to perceive that a Christian who proposes to himself as a model, a gloomy and suffering God, must take pains to afflict and render himself wretched. If this world be only a passage, if this life be only a pilgrimage, it must be ridiculous for man to attach himself to anything here below. If his God be offended with either the actions or opinions of his fellow creatures, he must do everything in his power, to punish them with severity, or be wanting in zeal and affection to his God. A good Christian must flee the world or become a torment to himself and others.

> These reflections are sufficient to answer those who pretend that the Christian religion is the foundation of true policy and morality, and that where it is not possessed there can be neither good men nor good citizens. The converse of this proposition in undoubtedly much truer; for, we may assert, that a perfect Christian, who conforms to all principles of his religion, who faithfully imitates the divine men proposed to him as a model, and practices their austerities in solitude, or carries their fanatic enthusiasm and bigotry into society, must be either useless to mankind, or a troublesome and dangerous citizen (p.141-142, d'Holbach, 1835).

To free oneself from religion is not to fall into immorality. On the contrary, properly developed natural laws of society will create useful and wise citizens, while religion has always engendered countless and monstrous crimes. Far from guiding and obliging man to virtue, religion provides him with the means to exempt himself from it. The practice of confession and penance, the hope that a final repentance will cancel the faults of a whole life, all these maneuvers maintain man in sin rather than removing him from it. Philosophers unanimously denounce the failure of religious morality and the reactionary role of the Church in society. Morality, they declare, must be independent of religion; it is not founded in the word of God but in the very nature of man. In the realm of sexuality in particular, desire is not morally reprehensible, but innocent and natural; what is forbidden by religion is recommended by nature.

## 5. For a secular morality

In 1683, Pierre Bayle's *Miscellaneous Reflections occasioned by the comet (Pensées diverses sur la comète)* made a splash by declaring that morality is independent of religion. Why? Because virtue is not a matter of belief. Common opinion suggests that men who fear God avoid sin as much as possible, while those who do not believe have no reason to refrain from indulging in all imaginable vices. A serious mistake, replies Bayle:

> When one compares the practice of a man pretending to religion, with the general idea conceived of such a man's manners, it is surprising not to find the least conformity between them. The general idea represents a man, who, believing a God, a heaven, and a hell, cleaves to what he
they vehemently criticized the moral and political influence of the Christian religion and its clergy. Their theses are easy to summarize. History and experience show that supernatural religions are morally useless, politically dangerous, contrary to the progress of reason, and flawed in their origins, doctrines, and representatives. Christian dogma is a fabric of legends, contradictions, impostures, and barbarous precepts. Prophecies and miracles defy common sense. The history of the councils, which gradually elaborated the dogma, is one of immoral bargaining, power struggles, so that theology in its entirety is a vast deception, intended to keep human reason under tutelage. Since human beings seek their own happiness and that of others, religion is not justified, as it makes life a valley of tears and limits itself to promises of happiness in the afterlife, combined with the threat of the worst punishments. *Christianity Unveiled* ends with these words:

> We have seen, above, that the Christian religion is not, on account of its fanatic virtues, blind zeal, and pretended perfections, the less injurious to sound morality, right reason, the happiness of individuals, and domestic harmony. It is easy to perceive that a Christian who proposes to himself as a model, a gloomy and suffering God, must take pains to afflict and render himself wretched. If this world be only a passage, if this life be only a pilgrimage, it must be ridiculous for man to attach himself to anything here below. If his God be offended with either the actions or opinions of his fellow creatures, he must do everything in his power, to punish them with severity, or be wanting in zeal and affection to his God. A good Christian must flee the world or become a torment to himself and others.

> These reflections are sufficient to answer those who pretend that the Christian religion is the foundation of true policy and morality, and that where it is not possessed there can be neither good men nor good citizens. The converse of this proposition in undoubtedly much truer; for, we may assert, that a perfect Christian, who conforms to all principles of his religion, who faithfully imitates the divine men proposed to him as a model, and practices their austerities in solitude, or carries their fanatic enthusiasm and bigotry into society, must be either useless to mankind, or a troublesome and dangerous citizen (p.141-142, d'Holbach, 1835).

To free oneself from religion is not to fall into immorality. On the contrary, properly developed natural laws of society will create useful and wise citizens, while religion has always engendered countless and monstrous crimes. Far from guiding and obliging man to virtue, religion provides him with the means to exempt himself from it. The practice of confession and penance, the hope that a final repentance will cancel the faults of a whole life, all these maneuvers maintain man in sin rather than removing him from it. Philosophers unanimously denounce the failure of religious morality and the reactionary role of the Church in society. Morality, they declare, must be independent of religion; it is not founded in the word of God but in the very nature of man. In the realm of sexuality in particular, desire is not morally reprehensible, but innocent and natural; what is forbidden by religion is recommended by nature.

## 5. For a secular morality

In 1683, Pierre Bayle's *Miscellaneous Reflections occasioned by the comet (Pensées diverses sur la comète)* made a splash by declaring that morality is independent of religion. Why? Because virtue is not a matter of belief. Common opinion suggests that men who fear God avoid sin as much as possible, while those who do not believe have no reason to refrain from indulging in all imaginable vices. A serious mistake, replies Bayle:

> When one compares the practice of a man pretending to religion, with the general idea conceived of such a man's manners, it is surprising not to find the least conformity between them. The general idea represents a man, who, believing a God, a heaven, and a hell, cleaves to what he
knows most pleasing to him, and shuns what he thinks displeasing. But the man's life shews, he
takes the quite contrary cause. [...] He almost always follows the reigning passion of his soul, the
biases of his constitution, the force of inveterate habits, and his taste and tenderness fore some
objects more than others (vol.I, p.272, Bayle, 1708).

As a consequence, a society that did without religious references would be just as moral, or at least no less immoral, than a society of Christians. Daily experience sufficiently proves that “man does not act his principles” (vol.I, p.274, Bayle, 1708). The reason is that man does not act according to his reason but according to his temperament. Religion, Bayle concludes, does not necessarily lead to the practice of virtue; from a social point of view, atheists can behave as well as Christians. In certain cases, atheism may even inspire more dedication and charity than the principles of the Gospel. A century later, d’Holbach will openly state: instead of inspiring love for one’s neighbor, the zeal which accompanies a sincere love for God “has been the source of the terrible persecutions of which Christians have so often been guilty”, has caused “members of the same state, and the same family, to detest and torment each other for opinions, and puerile ceremonies” and “kindled those religious wars so remarkable for their atrocity” (p.101, d’Holbach, 1835).

It is difficult to appreciate nowadays the scandal that the “Bayle paradox” once aroused. Atheism tends to undermine the foundations of society: no human community can survive without a religion that governs souls. Most of the Enlightenment philosophers were more or less of the same opinion, which Voltaire condensed in 1769 into this famous statement: “If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent Him” (vol.XV, p.22, Voltaire, 1901). At the same time, the Sorbonne vehemently denounced the “false maxims of atheism, deism, materialism, etc., which sever all the ties of society, destroy the restraint of conscience, obliterate the distinction between good and evil, and open the door to all sorts of crimes. Its power also extends to repress any other doctrine capable of shaking the foundations of Catholic doctrine, undermining the purity of its faith, and challenging the sanctity of its morals” (p.120-122, Censure, 1767).

Fifteen years after his paradox on atheism, Bayle caused a new scandal with his article *David* in the *Historical and Critical Dictionary (Dictionnaire historique et critique, 1697)*. In this article, Bayle emphasized the immorality of the second king of the Hebrews: his adultery with Bathsheba, his polygamy, the murder of Uriah, his deadly expeditions, his cruelty, and his illegal actions, etc. If one reads the Old Testament with the eyes of a non-believer, David is undoubtedly one of the greatest criminals in Jewish, if not ancient, history. But the question is precisely whether David can be judged like other men. According to the Bible, David is “the man after God’s own heart”. Since David is portrayed as a righteous and pious man, the moral criteria that apply to other men cannot be applied to him.

Bayle, on the other hand, does not at all appreciate good King David in this way. “To speak plainly”, he exclaims, his “conduct was very unjustifiable [...]. If a private man, how great soever by birth, should behave himself nowadays, as David did [...], he would, undoubtedly, be called by names of little honor” (vol.I, p.368-369, Bayle, 1826). Bayle argues that an individual does not have the right to commit such actions, and that David did indeed commit crimes. This Hebrew king is nothing more than a bloodthirsty condottiere, a traitor, a liar, and a villain of the worst kind. He cannot rightly be excused, for no one is above the law, and even saints must be “judged by the general notions of justice and order” (vol.I, p.370, Bayle, 1826). Two moral perspectives clash in the case of David: on one hand, the principles of a universal morality that applies to everyone, and on the other, a religious and particular morality that allows certain crimes to be excused. For Bayle, morality has a universal value and does not tolerate relativism. Clearly referencing the controversy sparked by Bayle’s article on *David*, Voltaire’s *Philosophical Dictionary* contrasts the principles of universal morality with various religious, partisan, and sectarian moralities. “It is to the interest of mankind that crime should in no case be sanctified”, he declares in the article *David*. It doesn’t matter what name a criminal like David is given, “who massacres the wives and children of his allies; who saws his unhappy captives in two, tears them into pieces with harrows, or burns them in brick-kilns? These actions we judge, and not the letters which compose the name of the criminal” (vol.IV-2, p.61, Voltaire, 1901). “There is but one morality”, says Voltaire in the article *Morality*, “as there is but one
knows most pleasing to him, and shuns what he thinks displeasing. But the man's life shews, he takes the quite contrary cause. [...] He almost always follows the reigning passion of his soul, the biases of his constitution, the force of inveterate habits, and his taste and tenderness fore some objects more than others (vol.I, p.272, Bayle, 1708).

As a consequence, a society that did without religious references would be just as moral, or at least no less immoral, than a society of Christians. Daily experience sufficiently proves that “man does not act his principles” (vol.I, p.274, Bayle, 1708). The reason is that man does not act according to his reason but according to his temperament. Religion, Bayle concludes, does not necessarily lead to the practice of virtue; from a social point of view, atheists can behave as well as Christians. In certain cases, atheism may even inspire more dedication and charity than the principles of the Gospel. A century later, d’Holbach will openly state: instead of inspiring love for one’s neighbor, the zeal which accompanies a sincere love for God “has been the source of the terrible persecutions of which Christians have so often been guilty”, has caused “members of the same state, and the same family, to detest and torment each other for opinions, and puerile ceremonies” and “kindled those religious wars so remarkable for their atrocity” (p.101, d’Holbach, 1835).

It is difficult to appreciate nowadays the scandal that the “Bayle paradox” once aroused. Atheism tends to undermine the foundations of society: no human community can survive without a religion that governs souls. Most of the Enlightenment philosophers were more or less of the same opinion, which Voltaire condensed in 1769 into this famous statement: “If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent Him” (vol.XV, p.22, Voltaire, 1901). At the same time, the Sorbonne vehemently denounced the “false maxims of atheism, deism, materialism, etc., which sever all the ties of society, destroy the restraint of conscience, obliterate the distinction between good and evil, and open the door to all sorts of crimes. Its power also extends to repress any other doctrine capable of shaking the foundations of Catholic doctrine, undermining the purity of its faith, and challenging the sanctity of its morals” (p.120-122, Censure, 1767).

Fifteen years after his paradox on atheism, Bayle caused a new scandal with his article *David* in the *Historical and Critical Dictionary (Dictionnaire historique et critique, 1697)*. In this article, Bayle emphasized the immorality of the second king of the Hebrews: his adultery with Bathsheba, his polygamy, the murder of Uriah, his deadly expeditions, his cruelty, and his illegal actions, etc. If one reads the Old Testament with the eyes of a non-believer, David is undoubtedly one of the greatest criminals in Jewish, if not ancient, history. But the question is precisely whether David can be judged like other men. According to the Bible, David is “the man after God’s own heart”. Since David is portrayed as a righteous and pious man, the moral criteria that apply to other men cannot be applied to him.

Bayle, on the other hand, does not at all appreciate good King David in this way. “To speak plainly”, he exclaims, his “conduct was very unjustifiable [...]. If a private man, how great soever by birth, should behave himself nowadays, as David did [...], he would, undoubtedly, be called by names of little honor” (vol.I, p.368-369, Bayle, 1826). Bayle argues that an individual does not have the right to commit such actions, and that David did indeed commit crimes. This Hebrew king is nothing more than a bloodthirsty condottiere, a traitor, a liar, and a villain of the worst kind. He cannot rightly be excused, for no one is above the law, and even saints must be “judged by the general notions of justice and order” (vol.I, p.370, Bayle, 1826). Two moral perspectives clash in the case of David: on one hand, the principles of a universal morality that applies to everyone, and on the other, a religious and particular morality that allows certain crimes to be excused. For Bayle, morality has a universal value and does not tolerate relativism. Clearly referencing the controversy sparked by Bayle’s article on *David*, Voltaire’s *Philosophical Dictionary* contrasts the principles of universal morality with various religious, partisan, and sectarian moralities. “It is to the interest of mankind that crime should in no case be sanctified”, he declares in the article *David*. It doesn’t matter what name a criminal like David is given, “who massacres the wives and children of his allies; who saws his unhappy captives in two, tears them into pieces with harrows, or burns them in brick-kilns? These actions we judge, and not the letters which compose the name of the criminal” (vol.IV-2, p.61, Voltaire, 1901). “There is but one morality”, says Voltaire in the article *Morality*, “as there is but one
geometry [...] morality is the same among all men who make use of their reason" (vol.VI-2, p.19, Voltaire, 1901). Voltaire denies that normally constituted men can find it morally acceptable to kill a poor man or gouge out his eyes instead of rescuing him: "It is evident to the whole world", he asserts in the article *Just and unjust*, "that a benefit is more honorable to the performer than an outrage, that gentleness is preferable to fury" (vol.VI-1, p.28, Voltaire, 1901). Like knowledge, morality is not a matter of convention, custom... or religion. A religious morality is a partisan morality that necessarily privileges obedience to God and the prophet over virtue-beneficence. "What is virtue?", asks Voltaire in the article devoted to this notion. The answer is as simple as it is obvious: "Beneficence towards your neighbor" (vol.VII-2, p.163, Voltaire, 1901). One is virtuous whenever one does good, provided it is for others. Virtue is only exercised within society; it resides entirely in the exchange of benevolence between individuals. Voltaire continually praises the great emperors of antiquity, such as Marcus Aurelius, Trajan, and others who ruled with justice and moderation. But at a time when Socrates, Virgil, or Seneca could at best claim a place in Limbo, at the gates of Hell<sup>8</sup>, the virtue of the pagans was not at all self-evident. An extremist position, dating back to Saint Augustine, even postulates that the good actions of pagans cannot be strictly qualified as virtuous. According to this rigorous doctrine, true virtue can only be found in someone who acts for the sake of God; when actions are carried out for personal interest or based on motives other than the love of God, "they were not performed by a good will, for an unbelieving and ungodly will is not a good will"; consequently, "the works of unbelievers [...] do not lead them to everlasting salvation and the kingdom" (p.198, 197, Augustine, 1957). Only the intention allows us to distinguish true virtues from those that onl appear to be virtuous: given over to greed, the pagans had virtues that were mostly superficial, closely resembling vices, and as such, useless for salvation. Even in the 18th century, many churchmen believed that it was out of the question to save the great men of antiquity who displayed moral perfection, or the coming of Christ was rendered pointless. The salvation of a Christian cannot be conceived without the three theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity, which are infused by God into the souls of the faithful to make them capable of deserving eternal life. Voltaire, on the other hand, performs a turns this accusation on its head by suggesting that Christian morality is sometimes incompatible with morality in general. To consider virtue as an action pleasing to God and not to men is to open the door to fanaticism. "What can be said in an answer to a man", he asks in the article *Fanaticism*, "who says he will rather obey God than men, and who consequently feels certain of meriting heaven by cutting your throat?" (vol.V-1, p.18, Voltaire, 1901). This unanswered question echoes Bayle's disillusioned observation, as he acknowledged in the *Response to a Provincial's Questions*, that the fanatic can believe, sincerely, that he has the right, even the duty, to commit horrors to the greater glory of God: "a man who convinces himself that by exterminating heresies, he advances the kingdom of God and earns a higher degree of glory in paradise [...]; such a man will trample upon all moral rules, and far from being restrained by remorse, he will feel impelled by his conscience to use all means to prevent blasphemy against the holy name of God and to establish orthodoxy on the ruins of heresy" (vol.IV, p.292, Bayle, 1704-07).

Great men are neither assassins in the name of their faith nor ascetics who, preoccupied with their own salvation, impose on themselves an austere life of mortification and abstinence. A hermit is not virtuous, says Voltaire in the article *Virtue* of the *Philosophical Dictionary*, because he leads a perfectly useless life. In Montesquieu's *The Persian Letters*, the Persian Usbek sends a letter to his brother, a Mohammedan monk ("santon") at the monastery of Casbin, whose hyperbolic oriental style brings out all the more the ironic criticism of monastic life:

> I humble and prostrate myself before you, holy santon; your footprints are to me as the pupils of my eyes. Your sanctity is so great that you seem to have the heart of our sacred Prophet; your austerities astonish heaven itself; the angels have watched you from the summit of glory and have

<footnote n="8"><sup>8</sup> We remember *The Divine Comedy* where Virgil explains to Dante that Limbo houses the souls of those who lived before the birth of Christ and therefore could not have the true faith, as well as those who lived after Christ and were not baptized (*Hell*, Canto IV, v. 24-42).</footnote>
geometry [...] morality is the same among all men who make use of their reason" (vol.VI-2, p.19, Voltaire, 1901). Voltaire denies that normally constituted men can find it morally acceptable to kill a poor man or gouge out his eyes instead of rescuing him: "It is evident to the whole world", he asserts in the article *Just and unjust*, "that a benefit is more honorable to the performer than an outrage, that gentleness is preferable to fury" (vol.VI-1, p.28, Voltaire, 1901). Like knowledge, morality is not a matter of convention, custom... or religion. A religious morality is a partisan morality that necessarily privileges obedience to God and the prophet over virtue-beneficence. "What is virtue?", asks Voltaire in the article devoted to this notion. The answer is as simple as it is obvious: "Beneficence towards your neighbor" (vol.VII-2, p.163, Voltaire, 1901). One is virtuous whenever one does good, provided it is for others. Virtue is only exercised within society; it resides entirely in the exchange of benevolence between individuals. Voltaire continually praises the great emperors of antiquity, such as Marcus Aurelius, Trajan, and others who ruled with justice and moderation. But at a time when Socrates, Virgil, or Seneca could at best claim a place in Limbo, at the gates of Hell<sup>8</sup>, the virtue of the pagans was not at all self-evident. An extremist position, dating back to Saint Augustine, even postulates that the good actions of pagans cannot be strictly qualified as virtuous. According to this rigorous doctrine, true virtue can only be found in someone who acts for the sake of God; when actions are carried out for personal interest or based on motives other than the love of God, "they were not performed by a good will, for an unbelieving and ungodly will is not a good will"; consequently, "the works of unbelievers [...] do not lead them to everlasting salvation and the kingdom" (p.198, 197, Augustine, 1957). Only the intention allows us to distinguish true virtues from those that onl appear to be virtuous: given over to greed, the pagans had virtues that were mostly superficial, closely resembling vices, and as such, useless for salvation. Even in the 18th century, many churchmen believed that it was out of the question to save the great men of antiquity who displayed moral perfection, or the coming of Christ was rendered pointless. The salvation of a Christian cannot be conceived without the three theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity, which are infused by God into the souls of the faithful to make them capable of deserving eternal life. Voltaire, on the other hand, performs a turns this accusation on its head by suggesting that Christian morality is sometimes incompatible with morality in general. To consider virtue as an action pleasing to God and not to men is to open the door to fanaticism. "What can be said in an answer to a man", he asks in the article *Fanaticism*, "who says he will rather obey God than men, and who consequently feels certain of meriting heaven by cutting your throat?" (vol.V-1, p.18, Voltaire, 1901). This unanswered question echoes Bayle's disillusioned observation, as he acknowledged in the *Response to a Provincial's Questions*, that the fanatic can believe, sincerely, that he has the right, even the duty, to commit horrors to the greater glory of God: "a man who convinces himself that by exterminating heresies, he advances the kingdom of God and earns a higher degree of glory in paradise [...]; such a man will trample upon all moral rules, and far from being restrained by remorse, he will feel impelled by his conscience to use all means to prevent blasphemy against the holy name of God and to establish orthodoxy on the ruins of heresy" (vol.IV, p.292, Bayle, 1704-07).

Great men are neither assassins in the name of their faith nor ascetics who, preoccupied with their own salvation, impose on themselves an austere life of mortification and abstinence. A hermit is not virtuous, says Voltaire in the article *Virtue* of the *Philosophical Dictionary*, because he leads a perfectly useless life. In Montesquieu's *The Persian Letters*, the Persian Usbek sends a letter to his brother, a Mohammedan monk ("santon") at the monastery of Casbin, whose hyperbolic oriental style brings out all the more the ironic criticism of monastic life:

> I humble and prostrate myself before you, holy santon; your footprints are to me as the pupils of my eyes. Your sanctity is so great that you seem to have the heart of our sacred Prophet; your austerities astonish heaven itself; the angels have watched you from the summit of glory and have

<footnote n="8"><sup>8</sup> We remember *The Divine Comedy* where Virgil explains to Dante that Limbo houses the souls of those who lived before the birth of Christ and therefore could not have the true faith, as well as those who lived after Christ and were not baptized (*Hell*, Canto IV, v. 24-42).</footnote>
said, "How is it that he is still on earth, since his soul is with us, flying about the throne borne up by the clouds?"

How should I not honor you, I who have learned from our doctors [...] that God has chosen from all regions of the earth some souls more pure than others, whom he has separated from the impious world, that their mortifications and fervent prayers might hold in suspense his anger, ready to fall upon the rebellious multitudes?

The Christians tell of the miracles of their early santons, thousands of whom sought refuge in the fearful Theban deserts under the leadership of Paul, Anthony, and Pachomius. If what is said of them is true, their lives were as full of prodigies as those of our most sacred imams. Ten entire years sometimes passed without their seeing a single man, but day and night they lived with demons and were ceaselessly tormented by malignant spirits who sought them out of bed and at table; no asylum from them was possible (p.154-155, Montesquieu, 1999).

The philosophers reject the religious fanaticism of those who deprive themselves of earthly pleasures for the love of God, all those saints whose (often legendary) lives are still read and recounted for the greater edification of the faithful. Christian morality is in itself impracticable and alienating; it is even corrupting and asocial: if everyone acted like Pachomius and the stylites, human society would cease to exist. In the name of universal morality, declares Diderot in *Philosophical Thoughts*, hermits and other denouncers of the flesh are not saints but enemies of society, and even of humanity: "It is the very height of madness to propose the ruin of the passions. A fine design, truly, in your devotee, to torment himself like a convict in order to desire nothing, love nothing, and feel nothing. He would end by becoming a monster, if he were to succeed" (p.28-29, Diderot, 2016). The demands of Christian morality are incompatible with human nature, adds d'Holbach; a good part of humanity's woes come from the fact that "the practices and duties alleged which superstition prescribes to men" have everywhere "taken the place of the true duties which Nature imposes on them" (vol.II, p.81, d'Holbach, 1768).

The Fifth Proof of Meslier's *Memoir* outlines the fundamental reasons why the atheistic priest believes that the natural rules of behavior oppose those that Christian morality seeks to impose on humanity. As mentioned in Chapter 40, three moral errors are denounced. The first is that it considers the pursuit of suffering as a perfection of virtue; the second is that it condemns sexuality, whether it be in "the natural pleasures of the body" or in desires and thoughts alone, as "lecherous inclinations and vices worthy of eternal punishment and reprobation" (p.265-66, Meslier, 2009). All of this is not only contrary to natural morality but also against common sense: it is ridiculous and absurd. Nature has created man to be happy, but Christian morality does everything to prevent it.

To understand the Church's attitude towards women and sexuality, one must go back to the first chapter of Genesis and the story of the creation of woman. Based on this passage and the account of the Fall, women were considered fundamentally different from men and afflicted with an original curse. Unlike Adam, woman was not created in the image of God but from man, as a tool for man, his housekeeper. "Man was not created for woman, but woman for man", explains Saint Paul (1 Corinthians 11:9). It follows that "the head of every man is Christ, and the head of the woman is man" (1 Corinthians 11:3). Hence the advice: "Wives, be subject to your husbands" (Ephesians 5:22-23). In Paul's writings, there is a deep hatred and contempt for the body, love, desire, and pleasure. He admits to the Corinthians: "I punish my body and bring it into subjection" (1 Corinthians 9:27). Although the Gospels themselves do not provide a systematic discussion on these topics, they do represent Jesus as teaching on "becoming a eunuch for the Kingdom of Heaven" (Matthew 19:12). Paul detests sexuality, celebrates chastity and abstinence, and praises celibacy; marriage is considered second best: "But if they cannot contain, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn" (1 Corinthians 7:9). The First Epistle to the Corinthians and the Epistle to the Ephesians form the basis of Catholic dogma that God conferred preeminence to men over women: "The established order of God is that the inferior is subject to the superior, the less perfect to the more perfect, and therefore woman to man. Man is nobler than woman, as taught by Saint Augustine, first because man is the principle of woman, the first woman having been formed from man; second because man is stronger, more
said, "How is it that he is still on earth, since his soul is with us, flying about the throne borne up by the clouds?"

How should I not honor you, I who have learned from our doctors [...] that God has chosen from all regions of the earth some souls more pure than others, whom he has separated from the impious world, that their mortifications and fervent prayers might hold in suspense his anger, ready to fall upon the rebellious multitudes?

The Christians tell of the miracles of their early santons, thousands of whom sought refuge in the fearful Theban deserts under the leadership of Paul, Anthony, and Pachomius. If what is said of them is true, their lives were as full of prodigies as those of our most sacred imams. Ten entire years sometimes passed without their seeing a single man, but day and night they lived with demons and were ceaselessly tormented by malignant spirits who sought them out of bed and at table; no asylum from them was possible (p.154-155, Montesquieu, 1999).

The philosophers reject the religious fanaticism of those who deprive themselves of earthly pleasures for the love of God, all those saints whose (often legendary) lives are still read and recounted for the greater edification of the faithful. Christian morality is in itself impracticable and alienating; it is even corrupting and asocial: if everyone acted like Pachomius and the stylites, human society would cease to exist. In the name of universal morality, declares Diderot in *Philosophical Thoughts*, hermits and other denouncers of the flesh are not saints but enemies of society, and even of humanity: "It is the very height of madness to propose the ruin of the passions. A fine design, truly, in your devotee, to torment himself like a convict in order to desire nothing, love nothing, and feel nothing. He would end by becoming a monster, if he were to succeed" (p.28-29, Diderot, 2016). The demands of Christian morality are incompatible with human nature, adds d'Holbach; a good part of humanity's woes come from the fact that "the practices and duties alleged which superstition prescribes to men" have everywhere "taken the place of the true duties which Nature imposes on them" (vol.II, p.81, d'Holbach, 1768).

The Fifth Proof of Meslier's *Memoir* outlines the fundamental reasons why the atheistic priest believes that the natural rules of behavior oppose those that Christian morality seeks to impose on humanity. As mentioned in Chapter 40, three moral errors are denounced. The first is that it considers the pursuit of suffering as a perfection of virtue; the second is that it condemns sexuality, whether it be in "the natural pleasures of the body" or in desires and thoughts alone, as "lecherous inclinations and vices worthy of eternal punishment and reprobation" (p.265-66, Meslier, 2009). All of this is not only contrary to natural morality but also against common sense: it is ridiculous and absurd. Nature has created man to be happy, but Christian morality does everything to prevent it.

To understand the Church's attitude towards women and sexuality, one must go back to the first chapter of Genesis and the story of the creation of woman. Based on this passage and the account of the Fall, women were considered fundamentally different from men and afflicted with an original curse. Unlike Adam, woman was not created in the image of God but from man, as a tool for man, his housekeeper. "Man was not created for woman, but woman for man", explains Saint Paul (1 Corinthians 11:9). It follows that "the head of every man is Christ, and the head of the woman is man" (1 Corinthians 11:3). Hence the advice: "Wives, be subject to your husbands" (Ephesians 5:22-23). In Paul's writings, there is a deep hatred and contempt for the body, love, desire, and pleasure. He admits to the Corinthians: "I punish my body and bring it into subjection" (1 Corinthians 9:27). Although the Gospels themselves do not provide a systematic discussion on these topics, they do represent Jesus as teaching on "becoming a eunuch for the Kingdom of Heaven" (Matthew 19:12). Paul detests sexuality, celebrates chastity and abstinence, and praises celibacy; marriage is considered second best: "But if they cannot contain, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn" (1 Corinthians 7:9). The First Epistle to the Corinthians and the Epistle to the Ephesians form the basis of Catholic dogma that God conferred preeminence to men over women: "The established order of God is that the inferior is subject to the superior, the less perfect to the more perfect, and therefore woman to man. Man is nobler than woman, as taught by Saint Augustine, first because man is the principle of woman, the first woman having been formed from man; second because man is stronger, more
industrious, and has more authority to preside" (p.289, Maillard, 1643). After the Epistles of Saint Paul, it
was the writings of Saint Augustine that had a lasting influence on the Church's position on women and
sexuality: "Saint Augustin says, she becomes the scholar of a serpent, the gate of sin, the fountain of error
and the rust of piety [...]. The first woman ungrateful towards God, a traitress to her husband, a murderess
of her race, made a bridge for Satan to pass into the world" (p.101, Caussin, 1664). According to Saint
Augustine, sexuality only has meaning when it aims at procreation. Outside of this purpose, when it is
exercised solely for pleasure, it falls under the condemnation of sin. Unlike in other civilizations, including
among the Jews, Christian marriage is not merely a human institution but possesses a spiritual dimension. It
is considered a "great sacrament", and as such, it is deemed indissoluble. The primary purpose of marriage
is procreation; sexual pleasure alone is not considered legitimate (Clark, 1996).

During the Classical Age, there were two kinds of libertinism, though the distinction between them is
somewhat artificial. The first kind consisted of libertines of the spirit or free-thinkers who displayed a
critical attitude towards the dominant influence of the Church and religion over all areas of knowledge and
daily life. The second kind practiced moral libertinism, which involved the denial of sin. In reality, the
terms "libertine" and "atheist" quickly became synonymous. According to defenders of religion, impiety
inevitably leads to immorality; therefore, an intellectually free person is also seen as morally libertine,
debauched, and depraved, as it is believed that the nonbeliever lacks a moral compass. It is true that free-
thinkers also engaged in behaviors, at least in their works, that were considered part of moral libertinism at
the time. Libertine wisdom revalued that which was repressed and denied by the Catholic Church and
conventional morality: namely, sex and women (Girerd, 2007). This is a real "erotic ethic" that includes a
moral critique of modesty, particularly female modesty, which the libertine opposes with openness and
emancipation. Many erotic novels of the Classical Age revolve around the initiation of a young girl into
libertinism, with this sexual initiation often depicted as liberation from any form of authority. Based on the
transgression of accepted norms, libertine literature fully participates in the Enlightenment project by
aiming to "reveal the truth" and combat authorities, prejudices, and obscurantism. Around 1658, we read in
*The Dialogues of Luisa Sigea* (Aloisiae Sigeae Toletanae satyra sotadica), a famous novel attributed to
Nicolas Chorier or Denis Salvaing de Boissieu: "The virile spear that opens our vulva also opens our
concealed therein" (p.69, Chorier, 1965). This means that women gain access to reason on the day they lose
their virginity. It is through sexual experience that young girls acquire enlightenment: positive knowledge
about sexuality enables them to break free from religious discourse and the guilt associated with the body.
The libertine who initiates a young woman into sexuality also opens her mind, liberating her from
obedience to parental or religious authorities. Religion denies the erotic body and directs Eros towards an
invisible and transcendent dimension, reserving love only for God. The libertine, on the other hand,
rehabilitates sexuality and pleasure, redirecting love away from transcendence and transforming it into
libidinous desire. Taking on the role of the priest, the libertine proclaims what is healthy, removing chastity
and continence from the catalog of virtues, and refusing to consider masturbation as a vice. Virginity is a
false honor with no rational justification, imposed on young girls as a divine obligation. In many cases,
libertine literature aims at emancipation, highlighting that both men and women should freely utilize all
their senses to achieve full intellectual development. Breaking free from subjugation and ignorance,
rejecting the guardianship of mother and future husband, and embracing independence, knowledge, erotic
awareness, and pleasure: this is the truly philosophical dimension of many texts depicting a woman's
sexual education.

In the 18th century, the most famousérotico-philosophical novel of the Enlightenment, *Thérèse the Philosopher (Thérèse philosophe)* published anonymously in 1748 and long attributed to the Marquis d'Argens, critiques the sexual morality of Judeo-Christianity by presenting the story of a progressive sexual and philosophical initiation, where the discovery of physical pleasures goes hand in hand with the broadening of intellectual horizons. It represents a counter-education, opposed to Christian education. At the age of seven, the precocious heroine starts experiencing pleasure through "fingering" activities, described by her mother using terms like "indecency" and "mortal sin". Between nine and ten years old, Thérèse engages in erotic games with other boys and girls of the same age in an attic. At eleven, she is sent
industrious, and has more authority to preside" (p.289, Maillard, 1643). After the Epistles of Saint Paul, it
was the writings of Saint Augustine that had a lasting influence on the Church's position on women and
sexuality: "Saint Augustin says, she becomes the scholar of a serpent, the gate of sin, the fountain of error
and the rust of piety [...]. The first woman ungrateful towards God, a traitress to her husband, a murderess
of her race, made a bridge for Satan to pass into the world" (p.101, Caussin, 1664). According to Saint
Augustine, sexuality only has meaning when it aims at procreation. Outside of this purpose, when it is
exercised solely for pleasure, it falls under the condemnation of sin. Unlike in other civilizations, including
among the Jews, Christian marriage is not merely a human institution but possesses a spiritual dimension. It
is considered a "great sacrament", and as such, it is deemed indissoluble. The primary purpose of marriage
is procreation; sexual pleasure alone is not considered legitimate (Clark, 1996).

During the Classical Age, there were two kinds of libertinism, though the distinction between them is
somewhat artificial. The first kind consisted of libertines of the spirit or free-thinkers who displayed a
critical attitude towards the dominant influence of the Church and religion over all areas of knowledge and
daily life. The second kind practiced moral libertinism, which involved the denial of sin. In reality, the
terms "libertine" and "atheist" quickly became synonymous. According to defenders of religion, impiety
inevitably leads to immorality; therefore, an intellectually free person is also seen as morally libertine,
debauched, and depraved, as it is believed that the nonbeliever lacks a moral compass. It is true that free-
thinkers also engaged in behaviors, at least in their works, that were considered part of moral libertinism at
the time. Libertine wisdom revalued that which was repressed and denied by the Catholic Church and
conventional morality: namely, sex and women (Girerd, 2007). This is a real "erotic ethic" that includes a
moral critique of modesty, particularly female modesty, which the libertine opposes with openness and
emancipation. Many erotic novels of the Classical Age revolve around the initiation of a young girl into
libertinism, with this sexual initiation often depicted as liberation from any form of authority. Based on the
transgression of accepted norms, libertine literature fully participates in the Enlightenment project by
aiming to "reveal the truth" and combat authorities, prejudices, and obscurantism. Around 1658, we read in
*The Dialogues of Luisa Sigea* (Aloisiae Sigeae Toletanae satyra sotadica), a famous novel attributed to
Nicolas Chorier or Denis Salvaing de Boissieu: "The virile spear that opens our vulva also opens our
concealed therein" (p.69, Chorier, 1965). This means that women gain access to reason on the day they lose
their virginity. It is through sexual experience that young girls acquire enlightenment: positive knowledge
about sexuality enables them to break free from religious discourse and the guilt associated with the body.
The libertine who initiates a young woman into sexuality also opens her mind, liberating her from
obedience to parental or religious authorities. Religion denies the erotic body and directs Eros towards an
invisible and transcendent dimension, reserving love only for God. The libertine, on the other hand,
rehabilitates sexuality and pleasure, redirecting love away from transcendence and transforming it into
libidinous desire. Taking on the role of the priest, the libertine proclaims what is healthy, removing chastity
and continence from the catalog of virtues, and refusing to consider masturbation as a vice. Virginity is a
false honor with no rational justification, imposed on young girls as a divine obligation. In many cases,
libertine literature aims at emancipation, highlighting that both men and women should freely utilize all
their senses to achieve full intellectual development. Breaking free from subjugation and ignorance,
rejecting the guardianship of mother and future husband, and embracing independence, knowledge, erotic
awareness, and pleasure: this is the truly philosophical dimension of many texts depicting a woman's
sexual education.

In the 18th century, the most famousérotico-philosophical novel of the Enlightenment, *Thérèse the Philosopher (Thérèse philosophe)* published anonymously in 1748 and long attributed to the Marquis d'Argens, critiques the sexual morality of Judeo-Christianity by presenting the story of a progressive sexual and philosophical initiation, where the discovery of physical pleasures goes hand in hand with the broadening of intellectual horizons. It represents a counter-education, opposed to Christian education. At the age of seven, the precocious heroine starts experiencing pleasure through "fingering" activities, described by her mother using terms like "indecency" and "mortal sin". Between nine and ten years old, Thérèse engages in erotic games with other boys and girls of the same age in an attic. At eleven, she is sent
to a convent where she confesses for the first time before an “old Father Guardian”, a Capuchin monk who also advises her mother’s conscience. Thérèse believes she has nothing to confess, but she is cruelly disillusioned. Her confessor is aware of the nightly activities she engages in, and he informs her that her mother had told him “of your lack of chastity, this foulest of all evils”. The condemnation of masturbation is delivered in the strongest terms, which terrifies Thérèse. Her reaction is in line with the shock of what she has just heard: “My cheeks were covered with a deep red blush and my eyes dropped to the floor. I remained mute and silent. For the first time I had an inkling that our harmless little games could have been sinful”.

To combat her passions, the confessor commands fasting, prayer, meditation, and a hair shirt, then ends with urgent counsel:

> “Never,” he told me, “never ever touch with your hand that filthy part of your body. Don’t even cast a glance upon it. It is the very apple which tempted Adam and which caused the fall of the race of man and the expulsion from Paradise. In it lives the devil who brought us to our doom. It is his home, his throne. Don’t allow yourself to be captured by this enemy of God and man. Soon, nature will cover this filthy part of your belly with ugly hairs, like those of the wild beasts in the forest. It is our punishment to remind you that you have to be ashamed of it, and from then on it will be hidden in darkness, and, God grant you, forgetfulness. But, my child, be even more careful with that piece of flesh the little boys have. You may have thought it fun up there in the attic, but, my daughter, that piece of flesh is the snake who tempted the mother of us all, Eve. Don’t allow yourself to become dishonored by touching this piece of meat, or even by looking upon it. It is intent upon biting you, poisoning you, and, if it can, gorging itself upon you.

From the outset, sexuality is explained through a reference to the story of the Fall, caused by the woman, which led to the expulsion of the first humans from paradise and the emergence of evil on earth. The confessor begins by using a morally connoted term, “filthy”, to devalue Thérèse’s genital organ; then, he resorts to two biblical metaphors, the apple and the serpent, to designate—and depreciate—sex itself. The woman’s sex is the “home” of the demon, the “enemy of God”, a medieval concept that linked Satanism, witchcraft, and female sexuality: a witch was not only someone who practiced malevolent magic but also a person who had made a pact with the devil, paying him homage in orgiastic encounters. The confessor insinuates that women should behave like nature, which covers their sex with “ugly hairs”: that is, hide and forget sexual desire, a pure animal instinct. Nature is seen here as obeying divine providence: pubic hair is not the natural result of puberty; interpreted as a blemish, it is meant to mark the shameful nature of sex and sexuality.

The man’s sex, on the other hand, is not burdened with guilt. While it is identified with the serpent that tempted Eve, it is not the embodiment of the devil, who, as just learned, only resides in the female sex. This “piece of flesh” is the “snake” that Eve did not mistrust enough in paradise. Thérèse is thus invited to do better than Eve in order not to become guilty in turn. It is the man who tempts the woman by darting the venom, but it is the woman who must avoid succumbing to temptation; otherwise, all the blame falls on her.

The entrance of Abbe T... in the novel marks the beginning of a new type of discourse, a materialistic, concrete, and non-symbolic discourse. We move away from fantasy to discover a simple and clear explanation of sexuality. According to Abbe T...., sexual desire is a natural instinct, just like hunger and thirst: one does not offend God by yielding to it. The moralizing discourse of the confessor, which blames and condemns, and has instilled a strong sense of guilt in Thérèse, gives way to an almost clinical or technical discourse, where masturbation is presented as a necessary action: since it is a “feeling which nature has implanted in us, [...] it is necessary to release the tensions which it creates at times. And mother nature also gave us a hand with fingers to satisfy the needs of our body”. Thus, the taboo that weighs on non-procreative sexuality is reversed: it becomes a duty to oneself. It is humanly impossible to live against
to a convent where she confesses for the first time before an “old Father Guardian”, a Capuchin monk who also advises her mother’s conscience. Thérèse believes she has nothing to confess, but she is cruelly disillusioned. Her confessor is aware of the nightly activities she engages in, and he informs her that her mother had told him “of your lack of chastity, this foulest of all evils”. The condemnation of masturbation is delivered in the strongest terms, which terrifies Thérèse. Her reaction is in line with the shock of what she has just heard: “My cheeks were covered with a deep red blush and my eyes dropped to the floor. I remained mute and silent. For the first time I had an inkling that our harmless little games could have been sinful”.

To combat her passions, the confessor commands fasting, prayer, meditation, and a hair shirt, then ends with urgent counsel:

> “Never,” he told me, “never ever touch with your hand that filthy part of your body. Don’t even cast a glance upon it. It is the very apple which tempted Adam and which caused the fall of the race of man and the expulsion from Paradise. In it lives the devil who brought us to our doom. It is his home, his throne. Don’t allow yourself to be captured by this enemy of God and man. Soon, nature will cover this filthy part of your belly with ugly hairs, like those of the wild beasts in the forest. It is our punishment to remind you that you have to be ashamed of it, and from then on it will be hidden in darkness, and, God grant you, forgetfulness. But, my child, be even more careful with that piece of flesh the little boys have. You may have thought it fun up there in the attic, but, my daughter, that piece of flesh is the snake who tempted the mother of us all, Eve. Don’t allow yourself to become dishonored by touching this piece of meat, or even by looking upon it. It is intent upon biting you, poisoning you, and, if it can, gorging itself upon you.

From the outset, sexuality is explained through a reference to the story of the Fall, caused by the woman, which led to the expulsion of the first humans from paradise and the emergence of evil on earth. The confessor begins by using a morally connoted term, “filthy”, to devalue Thérèse’s genital organ; then, he resorts to two biblical metaphors, the apple and the serpent, to designate—and depreciate—sex itself. The woman’s sex is the “home” of the demon, the “enemy of God”, a medieval concept that linked Satanism, witchcraft, and female sexuality: a witch was not only someone who practiced malevolent magic but also a person who had made a pact with the devil, paying him homage in orgiastic encounters. The confessor insinuates that women should behave like nature, which covers their sex with “ugly hairs”: that is, hide and forget sexual desire, a pure animal instinct. Nature is seen here as obeying divine providence: pubic hair is not the natural result of puberty; interpreted as a blemish, it is meant to mark the shameful nature of sex and sexuality.

The man’s sex, on the other hand, is not burdened with guilt. While it is identified with the serpent that tempted Eve, it is not the embodiment of the devil, who, as just learned, only resides in the female sex. This “piece of flesh” is the “snake” that Eve did not mistrust enough in paradise. Thérèse is thus invited to do better than Eve in order not to become guilty in turn. It is the man who tempts the woman by darting the venom, but it is the woman who must avoid succumbing to temptation; otherwise, all the blame falls on her.

The entrance of Abbe T... in the novel marks the beginning of a new type of discourse, a materialistic, concrete, and non-symbolic discourse. We move away from fantasy to discover a simple and clear explanation of sexuality. According to Abbe T...., sexual desire is a natural instinct, just like hunger and thirst: one does not offend God by yielding to it. The moralizing discourse of the confessor, which blames and condemns, and has instilled a strong sense of guilt in Thérèse, gives way to an almost clinical or technical discourse, where masturbation is presented as a necessary action: since it is a “feeling which nature has implanted in us, [...] it is necessary to release the tensions which it creates at times. And mother nature also gave us a hand with fingers to satisfy the needs of our body”. Thus, the taboo that weighs on non-procreative sexuality is reversed: it becomes a duty to oneself. It is humanly impossible to live against
nature; nature is not corrupt, and man should not struggle against it to sanctify himself. Man should not exchange earthly happiness, which is partly within his grasp, for a future bliss.

Usbek and Thérèse, in their own ways, are united in a common struggle. The wise Persian and the libertine philosopher both dare to think for themselves, both question traditions and authorities, and both encounter fierce resistance from a "mullah".

## 6. From tolerance to *laïcité*

If the Catholic religion is the only true religion, it follows that all others are false: the various Protestant denominations as well as the Jewish, Muslim, and other pagan beliefs. As Bossuet stated in the *Pastoral Instruction on the Church's Promises (Instruction pastorale sur les promesses de l'Église)*: "The heretic is someone who has an opinion; and that is what the word itself means. What does it mean, to have an opinion? It means following one's own thought and one's particular sentiment. But the catholic is catholic; that is to say, he is universal, and without having any particular feeling he follows unhesitatingly that of the Church" (vol.XVII, p.112, Bossuet, 1862-66). Truth cannot be the object of opinions; to have an opinion concerning the truth is to be a "heretic". The weakness of man in general and the insufficiency of his reason in particular do not plead for the tolerance of error but on the contrary for the unconditional submission to the truth that God has revealed to us and of which the Catholic Church is the depositary. Rousseau had understood well this incapacity of Catholics to tolerate heterodoxy, as they can only be intolerant: "It is impossible to live cordially in peace with those whom we firmly believe devoted to damnation: to love them would be to hate the Deity for punishing them; it is therefore absolutely necessary for us either to persecute or to convert them" (p.197, Rousseau, 1893).

The Catholic Church has a duty of intolerance towards those who are in error in order to bring them back to the right path, through persuasion or force. According to Abbé Malvaux, it is the essence of all truth not to tolerate the contradictory principle: "truth is essentially one, and therefore essentially intolerant" (p.x, Malvaux, 1762). The truth saves, and error damns: it is clear that this type of argumentation denies heretics any right to claim freedom of conscience. Tolerance automatically leads to impiety: to tolerate all religions, declares Abbé Yvon, is to have none at all (vol.I, p.86, Yvon, 1754). Tolerance is assimilated to indifference: to tolerate deviations and heresies is to be indifferent to the salvation of one's neighbor. The duty of a good Catholic, therefore, is to bring back those who deviate from the right path. The love of one's neighbor commands that we should not abandon them when we know that truth is one, and that eternal salvation depends on the knowledge of truth. When Bayle published his famous book on tolerance, *Philosophical Commentary (Commentaire philosophique)*, 1686), in favor of religious toleration as a matter of principle, the Edict of Nantes had been abolished one year before. Religious toleration in Europe had for all purposes ended for the time being: revocation of the Edict renewed persecution of Protestants. In many parts of France, a Protestant had no civil existence, the legal fiction being that everyone was a Roman Catholic. There was no such thing as a civil marriage, and Protestant marriages were not recognized, nor was the legitimacy of Protestant children. Children could be taken away from their parents' custody of in order to be raised by a Catholic relative. Boys could be placed in a Jesuit grammar school and girls in a convent; their conversion was declared valid as soon as they reached the age of seven. Public worship, of course, was out of the question. Many Protestants did not abjure their faith, and, having not sought refuge abroad, gathered in remote places (the "Desert") to celebrate an outlawed worship service, and organized an underground church risking death, prison, and the galley-ships. To a Protestant at this time religious peace and freedom must have seemed almost a lost cause.<fnref n="9" />

<footnote n="9">⁹ It must be remembered that in eighteenth-century Geneva, the nerve-center of Calvinism, there was no such thing as religious tolerance either. No Roman Catholic could be a citizen of Geneva, and conversion to Roman Catholicism involved the loss of civil rights.</footnote>
nature; nature is not corrupt, and man should not struggle against it to sanctify himself. Man should not exchange earthly happiness, which is partly within his grasp, for a future bliss.

Usbek and Thérèse, in their own ways, are united in a common struggle. The wise Persian and the libertine philosopher both dare to think for themselves, both question traditions and authorities, and both encounter fierce resistance from a “mullah”.

## 6. From tolerance to *laïcité*

If the Catholic religion is the only true religion, it follows that all others are false: the various Protestant denominations as well as the Jewish, Muslim, and other pagan beliefs. As Bossuet stated in the *Pastoral Instruction on the Church's Promises (Instruction pastorale sur les promesses de l'Église)*: "The heretic is someone who has an opinion; and that is what the word itself means. What does it mean, to have an opinion? It means following one's own thought and one's particular sentiment. But the catholic is catholic; that is to say, he is universal, and without having any particular feeling he follows unhesitatingly that of the Church" (vol.XVII, p.112, Bossuet, 1862-66). Truth cannot be the object of opinions; to have an opinion concerning the truth is to be a "heretic". The weakness of man in general and the insufficiency of his reason in particular do not plead for the tolerance of error but on the contrary for the unconditional submission to the truth that God has revealed to us and of which the Catholic Church is the depositary. Rousseau had understood well this incapacity of Catholics to tolerate heterodoxy, as they can only be intolerant: "It is impossible to live cordially in peace with those whom we firmly believe devoted to damnation: to love them would be to hate the Deity for punishing them; it is therefore absolutely necessary for us either to persecute or to convert them" (p.197, Rousseau, 1893).

The Catholic Church has a duty of intolerance towards those who are in error in order to bring them back to the right path, through persuasion or force. According to Abbé Malvaux, it is the essence of all truth not to tolerate the contradictory principle: "truth is essentially one, and therefore essentially intolerant" (p.x, Malvaux, 1762). The truth saves, and error damns: it is clear that this type of argumentation denies heretics any right to claim freedom of conscience. Tolerance automatically leads to impiety: to tolerate all religions, declares Abbé Yvon, is to have none at all (vol.I, p.86, Yvon, 1754). Tolerance is assimilated to indifference: to tolerate deviations and heresies is to be indifferent to the salvation of one's neighbor. The duty of a good Catholic, therefore, is to bring back those who deviate from the right path. The love of one's neighbor commands that we should not abandon them when we know that truth is one, and that eternal salvation depends on the knowledge of truth. When Bayle published his famous book on tolerance, *Philosophical Commentary (Commentaire philosophique)*, 1686), in favor of religious toleration as a matter of principle, the Edict of Nantes had been abolished one year before. Religious toleration in Europe had for all purposes ended for the time being: revocation of the Edict renewed persecution of Protestants. In many parts of France, a Protestant had no civil existence, the legal fiction being that everyone was a Roman Catholic. There was no such thing as a civil marriage, and Protestant marriages were not recognized, nor was the legitimacy of Protestant children. Children could be taken away from their parents' custody of in order to be raised by a Catholic relative. Boys could be placed in a Jesuit grammar school and girls in a convent; their conversion was declared valid as soon as they reached the age of seven. Public worship, of course, was out of the question. Many Protestants did not abjure their faith, and, having not sought refuge abroad, gathered in remote places (the "Desert") to celebrate an outlawed worship service, and organized an underground church risking death, prison, and the galley-ships. To a Protestant at this time religious peace and freedom must have seemed almost a lost cause.<fnref n="9" />

<footnote n="9">⁹ It must be remembered that in eighteenth-century Geneva, the nerve-center of Calvinism, there was no such thing as religious tolerance either. No Roman Catholic could be a citizen of Geneva, and conversion to Roman Catholicism involved the loss of civil rights.</footnote>
It is from the *Philosophical Commentary* principally that the ideas of the Enlightenment on the question of tolerance derive: what Bayle brings into the debate is an approach to tolerance conceived as a positive value. Bayle organizes his entire argument around the inviolable rights of conscience. The ultimate criterion of truth for man is not the authority of a Church, it is his conscience. There is no greater evil, declares Bayle, than denying one's conscience. Anything he does against what the voice of conscience commands him to do is sin. Bayle denies that God requires absolute knowledge of the truth from man. For salvation, he proclaims, “reputed truth” suffices, that is, the conviction, *true or false*, of being in the truth. In the field of belief, only the sincerity of the conviction—which can be the same in a Catholic or a Protestant—makes it possible to evaluate and validate the faith. Bayle's argument for toleration rests squarely on the assumption that there is no rational way to ascertain which is the true faith—or whether there is in fact a true faith. This argument provides the basis of Bayle's famous doctrine of the “erring conscience”: an act done against one's beliefs is a sin and there may be nothing blameworthy in the dogmatic errors of a heretic. From this it follows that the erring conscience constraint, even in the perceived interest of the errant individual, is never justified: the man who makes mistakes in good faith should benefit from the same rights as the one who is—or at least believes himself to be—in immediate possession of the truth. God “requires no more of us, than to examine and search after it diligently; and that when we have examined it to the best of our power, he will accept of our assent to the objects which to us appear true, and of our love for them as for a present from Heaven” (vol.I, p.331, Bayle, 1708). Bayle keeps insisting “we are obliged to have the same deference for a reputed as for a real truth” (vol.I, p.340, Bayle, 1708). Consequently, the only reasonable course is to grant freedom of conscience and religious practice to dissenting minorities, including those whom virtually everyone thinks utterly mistaken in their beliefs.

In France the strictly repressive policy in the 18th century, sometimes bloody and cruel as in the persecution of the Protestants, sometimes minutely vexatious as in the persecution of the philosophes, had the natural effect of provoking general exasperation with the church and its intolerance of Enlightenment and hatred of knowledge. The fury of intolerance, exclaims Helvétius, prompts not only devotees of different religions to “snatch the torch from each other’s hands to burn their brethren” (vol.I, p.347, Helvétius, 1777), but also those of the same religion, under the guise of charity and mercy, to slit each other’s throats for “frivolous objects” (vol.II, p.304, Helvétius, 1777). Voltaire’s slogan, “Crush the Infamous!”, sums up the hostility of the Enlightenment against the Church. Unlike Rousseau, who wanted to stabilize the State through religion, Voltaire demanded that religions be stabilized by the State. During his stay in England in 1726-1728, he had experienced the (relative) religious tolerance which was established there and guaranteed by the Act of Toleration passed in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution. In 1733, his *Letters concerning the English Nation* hold up English toleration of dissident protestant sects as a model for the French:

> Take a view of the Royal-Exchange in London, a place more venerable than many courts of justice, where the representatives of all nations meet for the benefit of mankind. There the Jew, the Mahometan, and the Christian transact together, as though they all professed the same religion, and give the name of infidel to none but bankrupts. There the Presbyterian confides in the Anabaptist, and the Churchman depends on the Quaker's word. At the breaking up of this pacific and free assembly, some withdraw to the synagogue, and others to take a glass. This man goes and is baptized in a great tub, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: that man has his son's foreskin cut off, whilst a set of Hebrew words (quite unintelligible to him) are mumbled over his child. Others retire to their churches, and there wait for the inspiration of heaven with their hats on, and all are satisfied.

> If one religion only were allowed in England, the government would very possibly become arbitrary; if there were but two, the people would cut one another's throats; but as there are such a multitude, they all live happy and in peace (p.30, Voltaire, 1994).
It is from the *Philosophical Commentary* principally that the ideas of the Enlightenment on the question of tolerance derive: what Bayle brings into the debate is an approach to tolerance conceived as a positive value. Bayle organizes his entire argument around the inviolable rights of conscience. The ultimate criterion of truth for man is not the authority of a Church, it is his conscience. There is no greater evil, declares Bayle, than denying one's conscience. Anything he does against what the voice of conscience commands him to do is sin. Bayle denies that God requires absolute knowledge of the truth from man. For salvation, he proclaims, “reputed truth” suffices, that is, the conviction, *true or false*, of being in the truth. In the field of belief, only the sincerity of the conviction—which can be the same in a Catholic or a Protestant—makes it possible to evaluate and validate the faith. Bayle's argument for toleration rests squarely on the assumption that there is no rational way to ascertain which is the true faith—or whether there is in fact a true faith. This argument provides the basis of Bayle's famous doctrine of the “erring conscience”: an act done against one's beliefs is a sin and there may be nothing blameworthy in the dogmatic errors of a heretic. From this it follows that the erring conscience constraint, even in the perceived interest of the errant individual, is never justified: the man who makes mistakes in good faith should benefit from the same rights as the one who is—or at least believes himself to be—in immediate possession of the truth. God “requires no more of us, than to examine and search after it diligently; and that when we have examined it to the best of our power, he will accept of our assent to the objects which to us appear true, and of our love for them as for a present from Heaven” (vol.I, p.331, Bayle, 1708). Bayle keeps insisting “we are obliged to have the same deference for a reputed as for a real truth” (vol.I, p.340, Bayle, 1708). Consequently, the only reasonable course is to grant freedom of conscience and religious practice to dissenting minorities, including those whom virtually everyone thinks utterly mistaken in their beliefs.

In France the strictly repressive policy in the 18th century, sometimes bloody and cruel as in the persecution of the Protestants, sometimes minutely vexatious as in the persecution of the philosophes, had the natural effect of provoking general exasperation with the church and its intolerance of Enlightenment and hatred of knowledge. The fury of intolerance, exclaims Helvétius, prompts not only devotees of different religions to “snatch the torch from each other’s hands to burn their brethren” (vol.I, p.347, Helvétius, 1777), but also those of the same religion, under the guise of charity and mercy, to slit each other’s throats for “frivolous objects” (vol.II, p.304, Helvétius, 1777). Voltaire’s slogan, “Crush the Infamous!”, sums up the hostility of the Enlightenment against the Church. Unlike Rousseau, who wanted to stabilize the State through religion, Voltaire demanded that religions be stabilized by the State. During his stay in England in 1726-1728, he had experienced the (relative) religious tolerance which was established there and guaranteed by the Act of Toleration passed in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution. In 1733, his *Letters concerning the English Nation* hold up English toleration of dissident protestant sects as a model for the French:

> Take a view of the Royal-Exchange in London, a place more venerable than many courts of justice, where the representatives of all nations meet for the benefit of mankind. There the Jew, the Mahometan, and the Christian transact together, as though they all professed the same religion, and give the name of infidel to none but bankrupts. There the Presbyterian confides in the Anabaptist, and the Churchman depends on the Quaker's word. At the breaking up of this pacific and free assembly, some withdraw to the synagogue, and others to take a glass. This man goes and is baptized in a great tub, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: that man has his son's foreskin cut off, whilst a set of Hebrew words (quite unintelligible to him) are mumbled over his child. Others retire to their churches, and there wait for the inspiration of heaven with their hats on, and all are satisfied.

> If one religion only were allowed in England, the government would very possibly become arbitrary; if there were but two, the people would cut one another's throats; but as there are such a multitude, they all live happy and in peace (p.30, Voltaire, 1994).
In England, the problem was how to organize peaceful coexistence between the Anglican church and all of the various religious sects; in France, it was how to prevent the Catholic church from persecuting its fellow-citizens. When philosophes were writing and working in behalf of toleration, they campaigned principally for the right not to believe, rather than the right to believe. And that of course puts a totally different complexion on the matter.

Abbé Nonnotte was one of the first to understand that in the mid-18th century, the repression against Protestants was no longer appropriate. He believed that the true enemies of Catholics were the modern philosophers and their “tolerantism”, which was nothing more than a poorly disguised impiety. According to him, “tolerantism is nothing more than a disdainful indifference towards all kinds of religion, a love of independence that leads one to refuse to be subjected to any law of conscience, an air of philosopher that one assumes, and by which one feels entitled to examine and judge all religions, even though one esteems and respects none” (vol.II, p.160-161, Nonnotte, 1762). It is therefore no longer towards heretics but towards philosophers that Nonnotte calls for state intervention, in other words, civil intolerance. “It is not surprising”, he wrote, “that they preach tolerance so zealously. There is no one who needs it more than they do, and who deserves less; Because there is no one who does more harm in religion. The punishment for their audacity is within the jurisdiction of the law” (vol.II, p.161, Nonnotte, 1762). From the perspective of Catholicism as the State religion, the civil magistrate has the duty to promote Catholicism as the only true religion at the expense of other religions. Nonnotte’s book attacking “the errors of Voltaire” was published the same year the Protestant pastor Rochette was hanged for the crime of exercising his functions in Languedoc and the Protestant merchant Jean Calas was broken on the wheel in Toulouse. Voltaire’s *Treatise on Religious Toleration (Traité sur la tolérance)*<fnref n="10" /> condemned Jean Calas’ execution as legal murder, assailed religious intolerance, called for greater French tolerance of Protestants in the manner of English tolerance toward Catholics, and declared that all civilizations ultimately worship the same god—a claim that logically implies Christianity is not the only true faith. For strategic reasons, however, Voltaire did not overtly repudiate the desirability of an established religion: to do so would be to adopt a posture that would have offended his readers.

A concise summary of Voltaire’s argument for tolerance can be found in the entry on *Toleration* in his *Philosophical dictionary*: “What is toleration? It is the appurtenance of humanity. We are all full of weakness and errors; let us mutually pardon each other our follies—it is the first law of nature.” (vol.VII-2, p.100, Voltaire, 1901). Voltaire’s claim is that toleration follows from human frailty and error. Since none of us has perfect knowledge, and since we are all weak, inconsistent, liable to fickleness and error, we should pardon one another for our failings. Building on Bayle’s epistemological argument that infallible knowledge is not available to human beings, Voltaire’s approach slips toward philosophical skepticism and religious relativism. If all truths are relative, he argues in the article *Sect*, we ought to relativize our own beliefs: “If you are a Mahometan, as there are many men who are not Mahometans, you may possibly be in error” (vol.VII-1, p.181, Voltaire, 1901). A true tolerance would be one which, out of prudence, thinks that after all, one is not sure of anything and that the truth of the other may be the real truth. Since there are men who disagree with me in any area, I could be the one who is wrong.

Voltaire then approaches tolerance from another angle: in the article *Toleration*, he wonders why intolerance still persists today, because nowadays everyone accepts the validity of tolerance: “There is nobody who does not assent to this truth”. If intolerance persists, it is because the powerful and the clergy, whose power is based on the dominant religion, are imposing it for their benefit:

> I possess dignity and power, which ignorance and credulity have founded. I trample on the heads of men prostrated at my feet; if they should rise and look me in the face, I am lost; they must, therefore, be kept bound down to the earth with chains of iron.

> Thus have men reasoned, whom ages of fanaticism have rendered powerful. They have other persons in power under them, and these latter again have underlings, who all enrich themselves with

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ The French word for “toleration” is *tolérance*. In English “tolerance” is never used in the title of books in English up to 1780; the word used is always “toleration”, which has no equivalent in French.</footnote>
In England, the problem was how to organize peaceful coexistence between the Anglican church and all of the various religious sects; in France, it was how to prevent the Catholic church from persecuting its fellow-citizens. When philosophes were writing and working in behalf of toleration, they campaigned principally for the right not to believe, rather than the right to believe. And that of course puts a totally different complexion on the matter.

Abbé Nonnotte was one of the first to understand that in the mid-18th century, the repression against Protestants was no longer appropriate. He believed that the true enemies of Catholics were the modern philosophers and their “tolerantism”, which was nothing more than a poorly disguised impiety. According to him, “tolerantism is nothing more than a disdainful indifference towards all kinds of religion, a love of independence that leads one to refuse to be subjected to any law of conscience, an air of philosopher that one assumes, and by which one feels entitled to examine and judge all religions, even though one esteems and respects none” (vol.II, p.160-161, Nonnotte, 1762). It is therefore no longer towards heretics but towards philosophers that Nonnotte calls for state intervention, in other words, civil intolerance. “It is not surprising”, he wrote, “that they preach tolerance so zealously. There is no one who needs it more than they do, and who deserves less; Because there is no one who does more harm in religion. The punishment for their audacity is within the jurisdiction of the law” (vol.II, p.161, Nonnotte, 1762). From the perspective of Catholicism as the State religion, the civil magistrate has the duty to promote Catholicism as the only true religion at the expense of other religions. Nonnotte’s book attacking “the errors of Voltaire” was published the same year the Protestant pastor Rochette was hanged for the crime of exercising his functions in Languedoc and the Protestant merchant Jean Calas was broken on the wheel in Toulouse. Voltaire’s *Treatise on Religious Toleration (Traité sur la tolérance)*<fnref n="10" /> condemned Jean Calas’ execution as legal murder, assailed religious intolerance, called for greater French tolerance of Protestants in the manner of English tolerance toward Catholics, and declared that all civilizations ultimately worship the same god—a claim that logically implies Christianity is not the only true faith. For strategic reasons, however, Voltaire did not overtly repudiate the desirability of an established religion: to do so would be to adopt a posture that would have offended his readers.

A concise summary of Voltaire’s argument for tolerance can be found in the entry on *Toleration* in his *Philosophical dictionary*: “What is toleration? It is the appurtenance of humanity. We are all full of weakness and errors; let us mutually pardon each other our follies—it is the first law of nature.” (vol.VII-2, p.100, Voltaire, 1901). Voltaire’s claim is that toleration follows from human frailty and error. Since none of us has perfect knowledge, and since we are all weak, inconsistent, liable to fickleness and error, we should pardon one another for our failings. Building on Bayle’s epistemological argument that infallible knowledge is not available to human beings, Voltaire’s approach slips toward philosophical skepticism and religious relativism. If all truths are relative, he argues in the article *Sect*, we ought to relativize our own beliefs: “If you are a Mahometan, as there are many men who are not Mahometans, you may possibly be in error” (vol.VII-1, p.181, Voltaire, 1901). A true tolerance would be one which, out of prudence, thinks that after all, one is not sure of anything and that the truth of the other may be the real truth. Since there are men who disagree with me in any area, I could be the one who is wrong.

Voltaire then approaches tolerance from another angle: in the article *Toleration*, he wonders why intolerance still persists today, because nowadays everyone accepts the validity of tolerance: “There is nobody who does not assent to this truth”. If intolerance persists, it is because the powerful and the clergy, whose power is based on the dominant religion, are imposing it for their benefit:

> I possess dignity and power, which ignorance and credulity have founded. I trample on the heads of men prostrated at my feet; if they should rise and look me in the face, I am lost; they must, therefore, be kept bound down to the earth with chains of iron.

> Thus have men reasoned, whom ages of fanaticism have rendered powerful. They have other persons in power under them, and these latter again have underlings, who all enrich themselves with

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ The French word for “toleration” is *tolérance*. In English “tolerance” is never used in the title of books in English up to 1780; the word used is always “toleration”, which has no equivalent in French.</footnote>
the spoils of the poor man, fatten themselves with his blood, and laugh at his imbecility. They detest all toleration, as contractors enriched at the expense of the public are afraid to render their accounts, and as tyrants dread the name of liberty. To crown all, in short, they encourage fanatics who cry aloud: Respect the absurdities of my master; tremble, pay, and be silent (vol.VII-2, p.106-107, Voltaire, 1901).

In 1785, La Fayette, who was back from the American War of Independence, protested in favor of the "emancipation" of the French Protestants. He got in touch with the new superintendent of the "Churches of the Desert", pastor Rabaut Saint-Étienne who, through La Fayette, met the government minister Malesherbes, the latter being well-known for his views in favor of a civil marriage for Protestants. Nine years after Voltaire's death, King Louis XVI promulgated an Edict of Tolerance which granted to non-Catholics the right to practice a profession or handicraft without molestation, permission to be legally married before magistrates, and to have births officially recorded (1787). Protestants were henceforth "tolerated" in Roman Catholic France according to the very definition of the word, which implies enduring, suffering, bearing, and forbearance. In granting tolerance to Protestants without freedom of worship, the King was in reality asking his Catholic subjects that they "put up with" this religion that they viewed as inferior. One century after the Act of Toleration, the French Protestants obtained approximately the same rights as the Catholics in England. But by this time, Bayle's concept of tolerance was supplanted by Voltaire's, which included liberty. On the 22nd of August 1789 Rabaut Saint-Étienne called for the recognition of full freedom for all:

> But Gentlemen, it is not even tolerance which I demand: it is liberty. Tolerance! Support! Pardon! Mercy! All ideas which are overwhelmingly unjust to all dissenters for as long as it is true that difference in religion or opinion is not a crime. Tolerance! I demand that the very word be banished; and it will be, this unfair word, which presents us only as citizens deserving of pity, as criminals to be pardoned [...]. Error, gentlemen, is not a crime: the person who has fallen into it takes it as the truth; it is the truth for him; he is obliged to believe in it, and no man or society has any right to prevent him (p.70-71, Warman, 2016).

A few days later, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen delineated a set of individual rights and of collective rights. It provided for freedom of speech and of the press, and a slightly weaker guarantee of freedom of religion: "No one may be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not trouble the public order established by the law" (Article 10). In fact, and with hindsight, this article founded religious freedom by proclaiming first that religion is only an opinion, having no special status, and secondly that any religion can be admitted from the moment when it does not affect public safety. As soon as a religion risks being a factor of disturbance with regard to public order or compromising the common good of the social group, it is for the State to enforce the law. Article 10 of the Declaration of Human Rights lays the foundation for the edifice of secularism in that it subordinates the practice of religion to the laws of the nation. A year later, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which obliges men of the Church to swear "to be faithful to the Nation, to the Law, to the King", submits the Church of France to the State. This is the first legacy of the French Enlightenment: religious beliefs are only "opinions", the truth of which is uncertain. Far from granting unlimited freedom to all faiths in the kingdom, the men of 1789 restrained the power of the Churches, at least when they claim to interfere in public affairs. Pope Pius VI was not mistaken and strongly rejected in his brief *Quod aliquantum* (1791) "this absolute freedom [...] which not only guarantees the right not to be disturbed because of one's religious opinions, but, beyond that, grants the freedom to think, say, write and even print as one wills everything and anything that may pass through the most unruly of imaginations" (p.352, Zamagni, 2011). For Pius VI, such religious liberty was a "monstrous right", a form of madness.

Although the Declaration was heavily influenced by the declarations of human rights contained in the U. S. Declaration of Independence (1776), there is a fundamental difference with the First Amendment of
the spoils of the poor man, fatten themselves with his blood, and laugh at his imbecility. They detest all toleration, as contractors enriched at the expense of the public are afraid to render their accounts, and as tyrants dread the name of liberty. To crown all, in short, they encourage fanatics who cry aloud: Respect the absurdities of my master; tremble, pay, and be silent (vol.VII-2, p.106-107, Voltaire, 1901).

In 1785, La Fayette, who was back from the American War of Independence, protested in favor of the “emancipation” of the French Protestants. He got in touch with the new superintendent of the “Churches of the Desert”, pastor Rabaut Saint-Étienne who, through La Fayette, met the government minister Malesherbes, the latter being well-known for his views in favor of a civil marriage for Protestants. Nine years after Voltaire’s death, King Louis XVI promulgated an Edict of Tolerance which granted to non-Catholics the right to practice a profession or handicraft without molestation, permission to be legally married before magistrates, and to have births officially recorded (1787). Protestants were henceforth “tolerated” in Roman Catholic France according to the very definition of the word, which implies enduring, suffering, bearing, and forbearance. In granting tolerance to Protestants without freedom of worship, the King was in reality asking his Catholic subjects that they “put up with” this religion that they viewed as inferior. One century after the Act of Toleration, the French Protestants obtained approximately the same rights as the Catholics in England. But by this time, Bayle’s concept of tolerance was supplanted by Voltaire’s, which included liberty. On the 22nd of August 1789 Rabaut Saint-Étienne called for the recognition of full freedom for all:

> But Gentlemen, it is not even tolerance which I demand: it is liberty. Tolerance! Support! Pardon! Mercy! All ideas which are overwhelmingly unjust to all dissenters for as long as it is true that difference in religion or opinion is not a crime. Tolerance! I demand that the very word be banished; and it will be, this unfair word, which presents us only as citizens deserving of pity, as criminals to be pardoned [...]. Error, gentlemen, is not a crime: the person who has fallen into it takes it as the truth; it is the truth for him; he is obliged to believe in it, and no man or society has any right to prevent him (p.70-71, Warman, 2016).

A few days later, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen delineated a set of individual rights and of collective rights. It provided for freedom of speech and of the press, and a slightly weaker guarantee of freedom of religion: “No one may be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not trouble the public order established by the law” (Article 10). In fact, and with hindsight, this article founded religious freedom by proclaiming first that religion is only an opinion, having no special status, and secondly that any religion can be admitted from the moment when it does not affect public safety. As soon as a religion risks being a factor of disturbance with regard to public order or compromising the common good of the social group, it is for the State to enforce the law. Article 10 of the Declaration of Human Rights lays the foundation for the edifice of secularism in that it subordinates the practice of religion to the laws of the nation. A year later, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which obliges men of the Church to swear “to be faithful to the Nation, to the Law, to the King”, submits the Church of France to the State. This is the first legacy of the French Enlightenment: religious beliefs are only “opinions”, the truth of which is uncertain. Far from granting unlimited freedom to all faiths in the kingdom, the men of 1789 restrained the power of the Churches, at least when they claim to interfere in public affairs. Pope Pius VI was not mistaken and strongly rejected in his brief *Quod aliquantum* (1791) “this absolute freedom [...] which not only guarantees the right not to be disturbed because of one’s religious opinions, but, beyond that, grants the freedom to think, say, write and even print as one wills everything and anything that may pass through the most unruly of imaginations” (p.352, Zamagni, 2011). For Pius VI, such religious liberty was a “monstrous right”, a form of madness.

Although the Declaration was heavily influenced by the declarations of human rights contained in the U. S. Declaration of Independence (1776), there is a fundamental difference with the First Amendment of
the Bill of Rights which states as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Whereas this Free Exercise Clause allows governmental authority and the authority of organized religion to peacefully coexist, the Declaration of 1789 founds the French conception of secularism (laïcité) by clearly subordinating religious practice to public order (the article 10 is the only one that mentions public order). When a religion begins to undermine human rights and is in danger of fomenting civil disorder or compromising the well-being of society, the state must see to it that law and order are maintained.

After the Revolution, the ideal of catholic political organization—a tightly interwoven structure of the Catholic Church and secular rulers, with the Catholic church having a favoured place in the political structure—was again defended during the Restoration. The reign of Louis XVIII gave way to a struggle between ultra-monarchists and those who saw the changes wrought by the Revolution as irreversible. King Charles X, pursuing the same catholic policy as his predecessor (he made sacrilege and irreligious writing criminal offences and re-established clerical control in education), handled the conflict between reactionaries and liberals with great ineptitude. During the whole century, France was split up between "Voltairians" and "anti-Voltairians", i. e. between anti-clerical republicans who wished to reduce religion to a purely private belief-system with no public profile or influence, and clerical conservatives who supported the power and influence of the clergy. At the start of the 1880s, Jules Ferry, Minister of Education, began to expel religious effigies from public schools. Then his government passed the "Jules Ferry laws", establishing free, mandatory and lay education (1882). On 9 December 1905, a law was passed in France separating church and state. This law was based on three principles: neutrality of the state, freedom of religious observance, and protection of the public power from the influences of religious institutions. This was not a friendly separation; it was a traumatic divorce after a "high-conflict" marriage. The law of 1905 providing separation of church and state made churches an unfortunate fact to be borne, not a good to be embraced and defended. Since religion was the primary cause of conflict and war, the argument went, peace could only be achieved through a lessening of people's passion for religion and commitment to specific doctrines. No wonder the Holy See urged Catholic priests to fight in the name of Catholicism. In 1906, Pope Pius X issued the *Vehementer Nos* encyclical denouncing the law as "a thesis absolutely false, a most pernicious error". Sixty years later, *Dignitatis humanae*, the Vatican II declaration on religious freedom (1965), taught likewise that religion is a human good to be promoted, not an evil to be tolerated. While government should not presume to command religious acts, it should "take account of the religious life of the citizenry and show it favour".

Many countries agree that religious practice forms part of the common good of society and should be encouraged rather than marginalized. There are three distinct church-state models applied in the United States and Western Europe. Briefly summarized, the United States employs a model that allows limited cooperation between religious organizations and government, but bars direct funding; celebrates a diverse and expressive public square, but bars state-sponsored religious expression; and treats all people equally, regardless of their religious beliefs. Western Europe, on the other hand, has two antithetical models. With the exception of France, Western European governments fund religious organizations, teach religion in public schools and have officially preferred, if not established, Churches. France's version of Church-State separation, or *laïcité*, makes it the most secular country in Europe.

The divorce French style called *laïcité*—in other words secularism—is based on equality of rights of all citizens, independently of their opinion (ideology, philosophy, belief, religion). It is not compatible with the existence of an official ideology or religion since this would necessarily create a discrepancy of rights between the citizens adopting this official ideology or religion, and the others. The nature of the problem remains unchanged if, instead of one official religion or ideology, a pluralist society gives recognition to different religions or ideologies: this would differentiate between citizens who adopt one of the official ideologies or religions, and those who hold a different opinion. *Laïcité* is a system or an arrangement that confines religion to the strictly private domain. It is an arrangement that ensures the absence of religious affairs from political matters... and from education.
the Bill of Rights which states as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Whereas this Free Exercise Clause allows governmental authority and the authority of organized religion to peacefully coexist, the Declaration of 1789 founds the French conception of secularism (laïcité) by clearly subordinating religious practice to public order (the article 10 is the only one that mentions public order). When a religion begins to undermine human rights and is in danger of fomenting civil disorder or compromising the well-being of society, the state must see to it that law and order are maintained.

After the Revolution, the ideal of catholic political organization—a tightly interwoven structure of the Catholic Church and secular rulers, with the Catholic church having a favoured place in the political structure—was again defended during the Restoration. The reign of Louis XVIII gave way to a struggle between ultra-monarchists and those who saw the changes wrought by the Revolution as irreversible. King Charles X, pursuing the same catholic policy as his predecessor (he made sacrilege and irreligious writing criminal offences and re-established clerical control in education), handled the conflict between reactionaries and liberals with great ineptitude. During the whole century, France was split up between "Voltairians" and "anti-Voltairians", i. e. between anti-clerical republicans who wished to reduce religion to a purely private belief-system with no public profile or influence, and clerical conservatives who supported the power and influence of the clergy. At the start of the 1880s, Jules Ferry, Minister of Education, began to expel religious effigies from public schools. Then his government passed the "Jules Ferry laws", establishing free, mandatory and lay education (1882). On 9 December 1905, a law was passed in France separating church and state. This law was based on three principles: neutrality of the state, freedom of religious observance, and protection of the public power from the influences of religious institutions. This was not a friendly separation; it was a traumatic divorce after a "high-conflict" marriage. The law of 1905 providing separation of church and state made churches an unfortunate fact to be borne, not a good to be embraced and defended. Since religion was the primary cause of conflict and war, the argument went, peace could only be achieved through a lessening of people's passion for religion and commitment to specific doctrines. No wonder the Holy See urged Catholic priests to fight in the name of Catholicism. In 1906, Pope Pius X issued the *Vehementer Nos* encyclical denouncing the law as "a thesis absolutely false, a most pernicious error". Sixty years later, *Dignitatis humanae*, the Vatican II declaration on religious freedom (1965), taught likewise that religion is a human good to be promoted, not an evil to be tolerated. While government should not presume to command religious acts, it should "take account of the religious life of the citizenry and show it favour".

Many countries agree that religious practice forms part of the common good of society and should be encouraged rather than marginalized. There are three distinct church-state models applied in the United States and Western Europe. Briefly summarized, the United States employs a model that allows limited cooperation between religious organizations and government, but bars direct funding; celebrates a diverse and expressive public square, but bars state-sponsored religious expression; and treats all people equally, regardless of their religious beliefs. Western Europe, on the other hand, has two antithetical models. With the exception of France, Western European governments fund religious organizations, teach religion in public schools and have officially preferred, if not established, Churches. France's version of Church-State separation, or *laïcité*, makes it the most secular country in Europe.

The divorce French style called *laïcité*—in other words secularism—is based on equality of rights of all citizens, independently of their opinion (ideology, philosophy, belief, religion). It is not compatible with the existence of an official ideology or religion since this would necessarily create a discrepancy of rights between the citizens adopting this official ideology or religion, and the others. The nature of the problem remains unchanged if, instead of one official religion or ideology, a pluralist society gives recognition to different religions or ideologies: this would differentiate between citizens who adopt one of the official ideologies or religions, and those who hold a different opinion. *Laïcité* is a system or an arrangement that confines religion to the strictly private domain. It is an arrangement that ensures the absence of religious affairs from political matters... and from education.
The first two principles on which the French system of education rests are freedom of education (free choice by the parents of public or private schools) and secularism. The French conception of secular education can be summarized by the distinction between education and instruction. It considers that the state would overreach its rights if it were giving "education" to children. Public school is the melting pot of the nation; its children are not yet citizens, they are future citizens. Schools should only instruct, teach facts and truths; in public school, children have to be protected from all proselytizing: public schools are proselytism-free zones, whether this proselytizing is political or religious.

Keeping religious signs out of public schools was a non-written rule for many years. It became a rule in writing (by ministerial decree) in 1937. It has never been controversial except very recently. Many comments have been made, including those of religious establishments. A declaration of Patrick Klugman, president of UEJF (French Jewish students union), at a meeting of May 6, 2003, will clearly illustrate this point of view:

> France is in danger because it is losing sight of its core principles, because in schools, I no longer see citizens but tribes. Increasingly, Jews see themselves only as Jews, Christians as Christians, Muslims as Muslims [...]. I clearly state, as a young, practicing Jewish person, that neither the hidjab nor the kippa have any place in public schools. Because they do not symbolize freedom when worn by children. Who can claim that a fourteen-year-old girl is sufficiently emancipated from the weight of tradition and the authority of her family first to know what she wants and then to do it? Because a girl wearing a hidjab will be considered a Muslim before being seen as a girl, a little boy wearing a kippa will always be seen as a Jew before being seen as a little boy. The Republic has no reason to accept this injustice in the name of a so-called tolerance that may be nothing more than weakness. In so doing, it would reduce individuals to symbols.

> While many states or nations permit freedom of religious *belief*, no country allows completely unrestricted freedom of religious *practice*. National laws, when they reflect important or fundamental governmental interests, may prohibit certain acts, which some citizens may claim represent the free exercise of their religious belief. In France, the understanding of *laïcité à la française* is shared by the enormous majority of French citizens and their representatives at the national parliament, whatever their religion or absence of religion; renouncing secularism would affect the nation as a whole.

## Conclusion

The 17th century was the century of rationalism, of the great metaphysical systems of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and their followers; the Enlightenment century is the century of reason, not systematic reason but critical reason. Dogmatism was succeeded by skeptical rationalism, and its first victim was religion. The invention of philology in the Renaissance, as well as the scientific revolution of the 17th century, have left their mark: it becomes increasingly difficult to believe in Revelation—at least as preached by the men of the Church—when it contradicts reason. It becomes increasingly difficult to bear the authority of the Catholic Church when it becomes clear that the history of the Christian religion is purely human and written in letters of blood. Philosophers rebel against its deemed absurd dogmas (the Trinity, original sin, etc.) and the image of a petty God who punishes men on a whim and condemns the majority to hell, starting with the Protestants who still did not have legal existence in the “all-Catholic France” (Bayle). The idea begins to take hold that man does not need religion to live in peace with other members of society, that morality is independent of religion, and that the precepts of the Christian religion, in particular, are often opposed to human nature. The Declaration of the Rights of Man, directly inspired by Enlightenment philosophy and the U.S. Declaration of Independence, provoked the wrath of the Pope and triggered a violent reaction from the Catholic Church against modernity, culminating in the law of 1905 codifying *laïcité*, a system or arrangement that confines religion to the strictly private domain.
The first two principles on which the French system of education rests are freedom of education (free choice by the parents of public or private schools) and secularism. The French conception of secular education can be summarized by the distinction between education and instruction. It considers that the state would overreach its rights if it were giving "education" to children. Public school is the melting pot of the nation; its children are not yet citizens, they are future citizens. Schools should only instruct, teach facts and truths; in public school, children have to be protected from all proselytizing: public schools are proselytism-free zones, whether this proselytizing is political or religious.

Keeping religious signs out of public schools was a non-written rule for many years. It became a rule in writing (by ministerial decree) in 1937. It has never been controversial except very recently. Many comments have been made, including those of religious establishments. A declaration of Patrick Klugman, president of UEJF (French Jewish students union), at a meeting of May 6, 2003, will clearly illustrate this point of view:

> France is in danger because it is losing sight of its core principles, because in schools, I no longer see citizens but tribes. Increasingly, Jews see themselves only as Jews, Christians as Christians, Muslims as Muslims [...]. I clearly state, as a young, practicing Jewish person, that neither the hidjab nor the kippa have any place in public schools. Because they do not symbolize freedom when worn by children. Who can claim that a fourteen-year-old girl is sufficiently emancipated from the weight of tradition and the authority of her family first to know what she wants and then to do it? Because a girl wearing a hidjab will be considered a Muslim before being seen as a girl, a little boy wearing a kippa will always be seen as a Jew before being seen as a little boy. The Republic has no reason to accept this injustice in the name of a so-called tolerance that may be nothing more than weakness. In so doing, it would reduce individuals to symbols.

> While many states or nations permit freedom of religious *belief*, no country allows completely unrestricted freedom of religious *practice*. National laws, when they reflect important or fundamental governmental interests, may prohibit certain acts, which some citizens may claim represent the free exercise of their religious belief. In France, the understanding of *laïcité à la française* is shared by the enormous majority of French citizens and their representatives at the national parliament, whatever their religion or absence of religion; renouncing secularism would affect the nation as a whole.

## Conclusion

The 17th century was the century of rationalism, of the great metaphysical systems of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and their followers; the Enlightenment century is the century of reason, not systematic reason but critical reason. Dogmatism was succeeded by skeptical rationalism, and its first victim was religion. The invention of philology in the Renaissance, as well as the scientific revolution of the 17th century, have left their mark: it becomes increasingly difficult to believe in Revelation—at least as preached by the men of the Church—when it contradicts reason. It becomes increasingly difficult to bear the authority of the Catholic Church when it becomes clear that the history of the Christian religion is purely human and written in letters of blood. Philosophers rebel against its deemed absurd dogmas (the Trinity, original sin, etc.) and the image of a petty God who punishes men on a whim and condemns the majority to hell, starting with the Protestants who still did not have legal existence in the “all-Catholic France” (Bayle). The idea begins to take hold that man does not need religion to live in peace with other members of society, that morality is independent of religion, and that the precepts of the Christian religion, in particular, are often opposed to human nature. The Declaration of the Rights of Man, directly inspired by Enlightenment philosophy and the U.S. Declaration of Independence, provoked the wrath of the Pope and triggered a violent reaction from the Catholic Church against modernity, culminating in the law of 1905 codifying *laïcité*, a system or arrangement that confines religion to the strictly private domain.
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