# CPN-M'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AFTER SEIZING POWER: THE END OF AN ERA?

## Benoît Cailmail

The Maoist movement in Nepal did not take place independently, isolated from its peers abroad. From the beginning, it tried to remain in keeping with the history of the international revolutionary movement, with the insurgents of the Paris Commune of 1871 whom they saw as their ancestors (Singh 2057 v.s.). The history of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) in general and the Maoist movement in particular reflects the endless exchanges it has maintained with its counterparts abroad. The many links between the CPN—at first, then the CPN-M (Maoist)—and the Communist Party of India (CPI) are the first evidence of these exchanges. The early CPN ideologues were trained mostly at Indian universities or within the CPI, and relied on the example set by their comrades to lay the foundations for their new political party.

Moreover, the numerous quarrels that divided the Communist movement in Nepal often ran parallel to the debates that at the same time were tearing apart the entire revolutionary community worldwide, reflecting the influence the International Communist context had on the case of Nepal. For example, as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, the Nepali Communist movement split between supporters of Moscow and of Beijing, and this led to the split of the CPN into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese Communists at the Party's Third Congress in 1962.

The Nepali Maoist movement was therefore heavily influenced by regional and international communism. From the mid-1980s onwards, however, it ceased to be a mere passive spectator and became a fully fledged participant in the Revolutionary International. The founding congress of the Revolutionary International Movement (RIM), held in France in 1984 with the participation of the Revolutionary Communist Party-United States and the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path (to name just a few), gathered together the revolutionaries of the world who opposed the ideological line drawn by Deng Xiaoping (Cailmail 2011). By taking part in this conference, Mohan Bikram Singh—the founder of the main Communist Party of Nepal which adopted the doctrine of “Mao Thought”—contributed to bringing a new dimension to Maoism in Nepal: from then on, it contributed fully to the international debate and to shaping the world's new revolutionary path.
However, Nepali revolutionaries did not occupy center stage. The 1980s were indeed marked by the revolution led by Shining Path in Peru, which epitomized the future of the international revolution. Yet, the arrest of Shining Path leader (Abimael Guzmán) in 1992 deprived the RIM of its main flagship. It was thus with genuine relief that the RIM greeted the launching of the People's War by the CPN-M on 13 February, 1996.

This May First, the revolutionary masses have a new reason to celebrate as the sparks of People's War kindled on February 13th leap across the Himalayas of Nepal and begin to catch fire amongst the workers and peasants. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [...] has dared to initiate a war which will no doubt be protracted and bitterly fought but that has already begun to transform Nepal from a backward and oppressed country to an advanced outpost of the world proletarian revolution. [...] The revolutionary thunder in the Himalayas come as a welcome reinforcement to the struggling people of Peru [...] who has been carrying the struggle forward valiantly despite fierce attack [...] from the reactionary Fujimori regime (RIM 1996: 25).

The CPN-M—whose doctrine satisfied Marxist-Leninist-Maoist precepts while adapting to the case of Nepal via “Prachanda Path” (the name of the Party’s General Secretary)—gradually became the new torch of the revolution (FO 2005: 76). All Maoist parties around the world, whether American (RCP-USA 1997: 32), Peruvian (PCP-SL 2005: 25), Greek (CPG-ML et al. 2002), Turkish (MKP 2002: 60–61) or Iranian (Sarbedaran 1999: 42) [the list goes on], welcomed the revolution initiated by their counterparts in Nepal and invited its troops to follow the example of their comrades who were preparing to hoist the red flag onto the roof of the world.<fnref n="1" /> Nepali revolutionaries were fully aware of the role they had to play in the future of the international communist movement, arguing that “the continuous development of the Nepalese People’s War has not only started exposing Nepalese revisionism but also world revisionism.” They also felt that they had become an inspiration for revolutionaries around the world, placing “international responsibility on the shoulders of the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist)” (Prachanda 2004: 162).

The ambitions of the CPN-M were not merely confined to the domestic political scene: in addition to the worldwide revolution that any

Communist party advocates, it aimed at establishing a proper South-Asian Soviet Union and for this purpose set up the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organization of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) in June 2001, alongside the revolutionary parties of India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka (CCOMPOSA 2001).

However, the alliance signed in November 2005 between the CPN-M and seven main political parties of Nepal (which was the subject of a heated debate within the party, opposing Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) and Baburam Bhattarai) to cope with King Gyanendra's autocratic rule upset relations between the Nepali Maoists and their peers abroad. By choosing to end the conflict after ten years of civil war—endorsed by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on 21 November, 2006—and to join the democratic process by taking part in the elections of 11 April, 2008, Pushpa Kamal Dahal took the risk of alienating some of the international revolutionary, who had based their hopes on their comrades in Nepal.

## First Criticisms are Voiced

The abandon by the CPN-M of the protracted People's War that had formed the backbone of its political line from the early 1990s called for some justification. Pushpa Kamal Dahal had never ceased to demonstrate the revolutionary character of their new approach since the first signs of alliance between the Maoists and mainstream political parties (Seven Party Alliance [SPA]). His emphasis on the tactical but not strategic character of the SPA reveals his will to display the fact that they had not abandoned the path advocated by Mao Zedong. The central committee of the CPN-M went even further, saying that the Chunbang rally held in September-October 2005 was the fourth stage in the “Prachanda Path” [after the meeting in February 1995, the second National Conference of 2001, and the Central Committee meeting in May-June 2003 which adopted the “Resolution on the development of democracy in the twenty-first century” (Bhattarai 2066 v.s.: 68)]. More than six months after signing the peace agreement whereby he had to submit his armed forces to United Nations monitoring, Pushpa Kamal Dahal held the same speech, mindful of the questions that his policy had possibly raised among Maoist activists: “I feel that sometimes you too might have been startled by the way we signed the agreements, [...] how flexible we have been” (Prachanda 2007a).

Yet despite the explanation by the Secretary General of CPN-M about the party being in line with twentieth century Marxism-Leninism-Maoism

<footnote n="1">¹ The main purpose of this article is to focus on the ideological relations between the CPN-M and the other Maoist parties around the world. Hence, we will not dwell here on the concrete support given by the Maoist international to their Nepali counterparts.</footnote>
(MLM) as applied to the twenty-first century (Vadarajan 2006), the path taken by the revolutionaries in Nepal raised many questions among Maoists in the world.

Bob Avakian was among the first to voice the issues that the CPN-M's new policy had raised among RCP-USA militants. In a letter to the Central Committee of the CPN-M written in October 2005, the RCP-USA Secretary General explained that he had followed the People's War in Nepal closely and had so far fully shared the theories of his fellow Nepali. The latest statements by the Maoist party of Nepal had nevertheless taken a new direction, which he considered wrong (RCP-USA 2009: 65). Therefore, for the sole purpose of advancing the revolutionary cause, he deemed it necessary to communicate to members of the CPN-M the errors they had committed (RCP-USA 2009: 86).

It is interesting to note that these criticisms show indirectly that the United States revolutionaries criticized the CPN-M Central Committee for finally returning to the line advocated by Baburam Bhattarai since 2004. Indeed, the latter had written in February 2004 an article entitled "The Question of Building a New Kind of State" in which he argued that the establishment of a socialist state in the twenty-first century could not follow the exact path proposed by Lenin or Mao in the twentieth century. Moreover, because of a different international context, the domestic situation in Nepal was not comparable to that of Russia or China and the CPN-M could not create socialism in the country without taking into account these differences. This led Baburam Bhattarai to conclude:

> In this background, we should dare develop the model of a new type of proletarian state with the ideological guidance of MLM and Prachanda Path and keeping in mind the experiences of revolutions from the Paris Commune through the Russian Soviet and the Chinese GPCR to our present revolution (Bhattarai 2004).

All the criticisms by the RCP-USA in its first letter are based on this article (RCP-USA 2009: 66). The American Revolutionary Party considered that Baburam Bhattarai was misinterpreting the writings of Lenin or Mao Zedong (RCP-USA 2009: 66, 67 or 73), and opening the door to revisionist strategies including a so-called obligatory bourgeois republic stage (RCP-USA 2009: 72).

The CPN-M did not disregard the "good intentions" behind the comments of the RCP-USA, believing in the importance of debates between Maoists in order to advance the revolution. Nevertheless the CPN-M estimated that the charges of which it was the target were unfounded and proved the ideological differences between them (RCP-

USA 2009: 87). In a reply sent to its American comrades on 1 July, 2006, the CPN-M Central Committee reminded them that their party had taken up the torch of the revolution at a time when the international communist movement was suffering serious setbacks. They had to lead their People's War in a particularly hostile context where, on the one hand, imperialism was more globalized and no longer weakened by internal strife and, on the other hand, where "the hoxhaïte dogma" of Mohan Bikram Singh was poisoning Maoist thought throughout the country. Therefore, they had the huge responsibility of finding new strategies for creating a new Democracy. They argued: "we came to realize that the traditional way of thinking and applying MLM is not sufficient to face new challenges created by the new situation" (RCP-USA 2009: 87-88).

In other words, Pushpa Kamal Dahal and his supporters pointed out to Bob Avakian that they had gone beyond the theoretical stage and that, unlike their fellow Americans who continued to be armchair revolutionaries, they had the difficult task of waging a People's War which dictated its own laws according to the national and international context. The CPN-M also stressed that the RPC-USA had never ceased to be critical of its Nepali brothers since the early 1990s, but that each of its accusations had been belied by the reality on the ground (RCP-USA 2009: 89).

The RCP-USA was not the only party to criticize the Maoists in Nepal. While in May 2005 the French Communist Party Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (PCMLM) was still claiming that "a Communist meeting without talking about Nepal just does not exist! [...] The miserable gurgling of Marxism-Leninism does not stifle the echo of the People's War in Nepal, an integral part of People's war for world Communism" (PCMLM 2005a), it published a pamphlet on its website in September 2005, aimed at denouncing the contradictions that existed within the CPN-M since the latter had announced its willingness to join the democratic parties of the country. According to French Maoists, an alliance with the urban petty bourgeoisie and with the national leftist bourgeoisie was possible, but not without the risk of these "hesitant classes" taking control of the revolution and causing it to abort before it reached its end. Quoting Mao Zedong, they warned the Nepali Maoists of the "sugar-coated bullets" which could threaten the revolution (PCMLM 2005b).

Moreover, for PCMLM ideologists, it is impossible to transform a democratic revolution into a socialist revolution if it bends to the middle classes by replacing communism with republicanism. They claimed:
The negotiations led by the CPN-M make no sense and contradict the principles of the democratic revolution. [...] The people's war is guided by the Communist Party, the revolutionary process is guided by the Communist Party. Those who defend the position of "negotiations" are at odds with the ideology of the proletariat. Elections, negotiations, no! People's War, yes! (PCMLM 2005b).

The denunciation by the PCMLM of the new ideology advocated by the CPN-M continued in the months that followed. In a second paper published in October 2005, French Maoists again expressed their concern at the situation in Nepal. While according to them, the People's war in Nepal was previously a flagship for all Maoists of the world, the will of the CPN-M to join other political parties (even going as far as granting an unacceptable cease-fire according to PCMLM) left them fearing the worst. Believing that Pushpa Kamal Dahal's tactics were comparable to those adopted by the Popular Front in 1930, the French Maoists felt that the CPN-M "[could] only lead to the victory of revisionism and to the defeat of the People's War because without the army the people are nothing" (PCMLM 2005c). The term "revisionist" was soon routinely linked to Prachanda's name by French Maoists who thereafter saw in each of his interventions further evidence of the error of his ways. Thus, to cite just one example, the interview Pushpa Kamal Dahal gave to *The Hindu* in February 2006 showed, so they believed, that his philosophy was not only a "complete break with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism," but that it was "neither more nor less full revisionism and complete submission to bourgeois propaganda" (PCMLM 2006a).

Finally, it is interesting to note that though the CPN-M was forever incurring the wrath of the PCMLM from September 2005 onwards, the latter nevertheless considered that the Nepali Maoists were not alone in paving the way for modern revisionism. Therefore, although the preceding paragraphs have shown that the RCP-USA made serious criticisms of Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the French Maoists accused Bob Avakian of defending "more and more openly revisionist and 'democratic' ideas" and of being the centre of world revisionism. Nepali revolutionaries were therefore, in the eyes of the PCMLM, merely taking the road already laid out by the RCP-USA (PCMLM 2006a).

The reactions of American and French Maoist parties in the wake of tactical change by CPN-M ideologues show that the support they had so far received in the international revolutionary movement was beginning to collapse. Their return to official Nepali politics, signing peace agreements

and their accession to power contributed to further stir up trouble among some of their allies.

### The CPN-M at the Centre of the Maoist International Controversy

In the previous section we showed that while the CPN-M had established links with the international Maoist community at large, it had specifically sought to strengthen its relations with revolutionaries in South Asia by becoming one of the main actors in the founding of CCOMPOSA. During the People's War, Indian Naxalites and their Nepali counterparts maintained multiple exchanges, both ideologically and materially, the purpose of which was none other than to establish a Soviet Republic in Southeast Asia. Despite this common perspective, the two parties often had their differences, which, though not affecting their long-term relationship, showed cracks in their union. The tenth anniversary of the launching of the People's War was an opportunity for the CPI-M to renew its support to revolutionaries in Nepal, praising the importance of their struggle "for the great cause of establishment of Socialism-Communism in the entire human society" (CPI-M 2006a). Yet, the new direction taken by Pushpa Kamal Dahal had begun to cast doubt on the influence he wielded on the regional scene.

One month later, in May 2006, the General Secretary of CPI-M praised the Nepali Maoist party for having shown remarkable adaptability over the ten years of the People's war, stressing that "our Party appreciates the boldness and the creativity of your Party leadership in such a flexible use of the weapons of tactics" (Ganapathy 2006: 47), the CPI-M spokesman issued reservations about the tactical line adopted by Pushpa Kamal Dahal. He felt that their idea of a peaceful transition by a Constituent Assembly to a New Democracy Republic was an error:

> one may bring some reforms from above and satisfy certain deprived sections of the people but it will never solve the basic problems of the people as you cannot smash feudalism and throw out imperialism from the soil of Nepal utilizing the old state whatever embellishments one might do to give it a refurbished image (Azad 2006: 26).

Similarly, Comrade Azad judged CPN-M's new policy of alliance with the SPA even worse given that the CPN-M had been perfectly able to analyze the true nature of the parliamentary parties in Nepal in the document entitled "Present Situation and Our Historical Task" (adopted in June 2003) [Azad 2006: 28]. The CPI-M spokesperson listed a series of points illustrating in his opinion the minefield towards which the CPN-M was heading, and ranging from the question of the dissolution of local
people's governments to the merging of the PLA and RNA (Azad 2006: 26-27), as well as the importance given to the bourgeois democracy compared to the New Democracy (Azad 2006: 30), or advice given to Indian Maoists (Azad 2006: 32).

The signing of the peace agreement in November 2006 further tarnished the image of the CPN-M in the eyes of the Naxalites. A few days after rebels in Nepal had officially laid down their arms the spokesman for the Maoist party of India issued a press release in which he recalled the basic principles of MLM that the CPN-M seemed, he said, to have forgotten. First, the CPI-M strongly condemned Pushpa Kamal Dahal and his followers for agreeing to surrender. He stressed that "entire experiences of the world revolution had demonstrated time and again that without the people's army it is impossible for the people to exercise their power." He concluded from this edict that the decision taken by the CPN-M was "harmful to the interests of the revolution" (CPI-M 2006b: 1). He then criticized their confidence in the UN, which he described as "an instrument in the hands of the imperialists, particularly US imperialists, to dominate, bully, and interfere in the affairs of the Third World countries for the benefit of the imperialists" (CPI-M 2006b: 2). Finally, the CPN-M's conception of Indian expansionism was the object of Comrade Azad's third criticism: "Comrade Prachanda's repeated praise for India's role in bringing about the agreement between Maoists and the SPA in Nepal creates illusions among the masses about India rather than preparing them for fighting the Indian expansionists who are keen on Skirmishing Nepal in future" (CPI-M 2006b: 2).

Finally, he once again castigated Pushpa Kamal Dahal for his advice to his fellow Indians to follow an example that the CPI-M considered to be contrary to the fundamental principles of MLM (CPI-M 2006b: 2).

However, the result of the elections in April 2008 with the landslide victory of the CPN-M was largely welcomed by the CPI-M, which saw in it the proof of,

> the overwhelming anger of the masses against the outdated feudal monarchic rule in Nepal, against the Indian expansionist's bullying and domination of Nepal, against US domination and oppression, and are a reflection of the growing aspirations of the Nepali masses for democracy, land, livelihood and genuine freedom from imperialist and feudal exploitation (Azad 2008: 1).

Yet, the CPI-M continued to believe that a genuine communist party should concentrate on organizing and mobilizing the masses so they rebel against all types of injustice and exploitation perpetrated by the state and

its bureaucracy (CPI-M 2008: 3), and it once again reminded its comrades in Nepal that "it is sheer illusion to think that a new Nepal can be built without smashing the existing state" (CPI-M 2008: 5).

The Naxalites thus proved particularly critical of the new policy adopted by the CPN-M and publicly announced the disagreements that opposed it to its Nepali comrades.

The RCP-USA which, we have seen, was one of the first to cast doubt on the ideological line followed by the CPN-M, was strengthened in its convictions when the Nepali Maoists engaged on the path of peace. Far from allowing itself to be disarmed by the counter-attack the CPN-M had reserved for it in July 2006, the RCP-USA fuelled the controversy by sending the CPN-M a new letter on 19 March, 2008. In getting the RIM to bear witness by sending a copy to each of its members, the RCP-USA maintained its belief that,

> unless the CPN-M makes a radical rupture with its present course [...], the tremendous accomplishments of the People's War in Nepal will be squandered, and the great hopes that the revolution in Nepal has lit among the masses of that country and many others worldwide will be dashed once again (RCP-USA 2009: 26).

Of course, Bob Avakian acknowledged the fact that in the context of a revolutionary uprising, it was normal to use a flexible tactic that helped take advantage of the internal dissension among the enemy forces, but he did judge however that such tactics could in no way serve as a basis and a general direction for CPN-M's policy (RCP-USA 2009: 29). On 4 November, 2008, a few months after Pushpa Kamal Dahal had secured the post of Prime Minister, the Central Committee of the RCP-USA reiterated its criticism of the Maoist party of Nepal summoning "all communists who hold the revolution in Nepal dear [...] to repudiate and fight against the wrong line in the CPN-M" (RCP-USA 2009: 6).

Similarly, the PCMLM proved more virulent than ever towards the General Secretary of the CPN-M, saying that he tended to embody a new Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales and Luiz Lula, ideologues and lackeys of the petty bourgeoisie of imperialist countries, and of the middle and national bourgeoisie of oppressed countries (PCMLM 2006b). They also mocked him by saying, "Prachanda wanted to play at being Lenin or at least Kerensky – he will be none of them, because history has no time for his fantasies" (PCMLM 2006c). For them, Prachanda had used MLM as a simple "toolbox," to pick out "revolutionary" ideas (PCMLM 2007) and approaches in order to then lapse into the worse form of revisionism and "cast Maoism overboard" (PCMLM 2008: 5).
In addition, many other Maoist parties around the world that had remained silent until 2006 saw in the peace agreements and Pushpa Kamal Dahal's accession to power a matter of concern for the future of the revolution in Nepal.

Though the PCP-SL still hailed the progress made by the CPN-M in May 2005 (PCP-SL 2005: 25), its support started to wane the more the latter took on the status of an official political party. Based on statements by Pushpa Kamal Dahal published in the official organ of the CPN-M to mark the tenth anniversary of the People's War, Peruvian Maoists deduced that the Secretary-General no longer considered the right to rebel as one of the pillars of Marxism, reducing the people's war to a mere guerrilla one (PCP-SL 2007: 13).

Like the PCP-SL, other Maoist organizations in Latin America proved critical of their comrades in Nepal. The Union of Revolutionary Communists-Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (URC-MLM)—the forerunner of the Revolutionary Communist Party of Chile (Chile-PCR)—for example, stated that “November 21, 2006 will be remembered as a fateful day in the history of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the people of Nepal, as a day of betrayal of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist principles” (URC-Chile 2007). They added that it was their duty “to expose these new revisionists and all those who deceptively raise the red banner of Maoism, but in reality fight against it” (URC-Chile 2008). And to mark the importance of such a struggle for them, a picture of Prachanda, whose legend left no room for doubt (“The Revisionist Betrayal in Nepal”), now adorned the home page of their website in Arica (URC-Chile nd).

Colombian revolutionaries of the Unión Obrera Comunista Marxista-Leninista Maoista (Colombia) (UOC-MLM) judged for their part that for several months the CPN-M leadership had been pursuing,

a policy contrary to the principles of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism; this policy is not the result of the good or bad will of a few individuals, but has its roots in the lack of confidence in the forces of revolution and in the overestimation of the reactionary forces which was wrongly analysed and interpreted by comrades of the Party Central Committee regarding the current situation of imperialist capitalism and its relationship with the labour movement and the masses [UOCMLM(Colombia) 2006a].

Like their fellow Chileans, Colombians experienced the signing of the peace agreement by the Maoists as an act of betraying not only MLM, but the proletarian masses of the world and the spirit of the 1984 RIM

Declaration (UOCMLM 2007a: 9).<fnref n="2" /> They thus decided to end all relations with the CPN-M (UOCMLM 2006b: 3). Since then, they have been constantly combating “renegade Prachanda” philosophy (UOCMLM 2008b: 7), asserting that “to confront Prachanda [was] a necessary condition for the construction of the [communist] international to progress” (UOCMLM 2007b: 1).

The Communist Party of Iran-Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (CPI-MLM) sent a letter to the CPN-M's Central Committee the day after the ratification of the peace agreements in order to highlight its errors. Among these aberrations the CPI-MLM Central Committee explained that the new path taken by the Nepali Maoists, contrary to what they claimed, was not a matter of tactics, but an “objectively strategic” plan, which gave “new vigor to the comprador-feudal ruling class of Nepal” (CPI-MLM 2006). And far from celebrating the CPN-M's victory in the April 2008 elections, the CPI-MLM expressed its fears for the future of the Nepali revolution, recalling “no class in history has seized political power peacefully” (CPI-MLM 2008).

In Asia, a revolutionary party in the Philippines also condemned Pushpa Kamal Dahal, caricaturing him as a dog licking the boots of American imperialism. Finally, revolutionaries who believed that the future of Maoism was inseparable from the Third World and who had set up a forum called “It’s Right to Rebel” to defend “real Maoism,” judged after the signing of the peace agreement that all the ideas promoted by the CPN-M Central Committee went against the basic principles of MLM, making them traitors in the pay of American imperialism and Indian expansionism (IRTR 2006).

The CPN-M therefore came under fire from critics of revolutionary organizations throughout the world (bar Africa). However, except for a few, their links were not severed and Central Committee members still aspired to play a leading role within the world revolutionary movement.

## South Asia, the only Way Forwards for the Revolution

Apart from the PCMLM, the PCP-SL, the UOC-MLM and organizations belonging to “Third World Maoism” which were fiercely opposed to the RIM [accused of not being sufficiently opposed to Prachanda’s revisionism, which, for the moment, was “the greatest threat to the unity of the International Communist Movement” (UOCMLM 2008a: 5)], the parties condemning the CPN-M’s tactical change did not intend to cease

<footnote n="2">² On the foundation of RIM, see RIM (2009).</footnote>
all contact with them. Thus, the CPI-MLM felt the need to launch a constructive debate with the CPN-M's Central Committee, considering that "the revolution in 21st century will be marked by whether you safeguard this revolution or not" (CPI-MLM 2008).

Similarly, the CPI-M, which was among those most critical of the ideological line taken by the CPN-M since 2006, continued to support them in their fight against Indian expansionism and U.S. imperialism (CPI-M 2009: 52).

For their part, Pushpa Kamal Dahal and his supporters were convinced of the role they had to play in the future of the world communist revolution. By September 1995, the Committee stated that,

> the Nepalese revolution is an integral part of the world proletarian revolution and this will serve the world revolution. In this context our Party takes it as a serious responsibility to contribute towards the further development of Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) [...] and to create a New International (CPN-M 2004: 25).

A decade later, their convictions had not changed: "we are trying to interpret [...] Marxism according to the needs of 21st century [...]. This is important not just for South Asia, but for the masses throughout the planet" (Gilioli 2006).

Hence, anxious to maintain a dialogue and to convince their counterparts of their sound tactical approach to the world revolution, a few months before signing the peace agreements, the CPN-M organized the fourth CCOMPOSA conference, many members of which belonged to the RIM and were able to put their case to the rest of the international organization.

The conference, held in Nepal in August 2006, brought together several South Asian revolutionary organizations (particularly the CPI-M) (CCOMPOSA 2006b: 8). It began with a tribute to the martyrs of the revolution in Nepal and India, and led to a political resolution approved by all the supporters who showed that despite their differences, the revolutionary front in South Asia remained united. Thus, the situation in Nepal was promised a bright future under the leadership of the CPN-M (CCOMPOSA 2006b: 10), and the joint press release that the CPN-M and CPI-M broadcast after the conference (CPN-M and CPI-M 2006: 7) highlighted the fact that if they do not always share the same vision of MLM, their discussions do not have any effect on their relationship.

In addition, CCOMPOSA members reaffirmed that U.S. imperialism was continuing to destroy and oppress people throughout the world, with India as its right arm (CCOMPOSA 2006b: 9). Conference attendees

noted that though South Asia was threatened by imperialism, it had a great capacity to resist the People's enemies. Indeed, with the two major Maoist movements in India joining forces, the Nepali People's War continuing to progress to new heights, the birth of a Maoist party in Bhutan and regional armed nationalist movements, the situation in South Asia had become explosive and had made the region "a burning cauldron of the Revolutionary, and more particularly Maoist Movements" (CCOMPOSA 2006b: 9-10). Therefore, CCOMPOSA's mission was to fight reactionary governments and Indian expansionism, and to drive the U.S. imperialists out of South Asia. Above all, they pledged to continue the revolution towards a new democracy across the subcontinent in order to contribute to the world socialist revolution (CCOMPOSA 2006b: 10).

The main points to emerge from this fourth conference show that CCOMPOSA had a high opinion of the role it could play at an international revolutionary level. And Pushpa Kamal Dahal, more than anyone else, claimed to have such an influence. Indeed, he pointed out in February 2006 that if the Nepali revolution succeeded it "will have direct impact on the one billion people of India, and it will also spill over into China. When it affects two or two and a half billion people, It means it will have impact all over the world" (Prachanda nd: 43). Yet, in spite of the advanced stage in the Nepali People's War, the CPN-M could not hope to become the pillar of the South Asian—and, by extension, global—revolution without the support of other revolutionary parties (especially the CPI-M).

However, the RIM, which represented the main platform from which the Nepali Maoist party could be sure to be heard beyond its regional borders, was largely dominated by the RCP-USA. Bob Avakian and the CPN-M had had their differences, and the latter wanted to free itself of the tutelage of the American party, considering that the direction of the world revolution was to be entrusted to a revolutionary party from the third world, a new crucible of the People's War. It was only natural for Prachanda to be its mentor (ICG 2007: 16). Thus, the CPN-M's Central Committee advocated the creation of a new International in 1995 (CPN-M 2004: 25). As reports of the International Crisis Group show, it was for this purpose that in December 2006 the CPN-M invited all the Maoist parties to an international seminar entitled "Imperialism and Proletarian Revolution in the Twenty-first Century," in the hope that it would be the first step in this direction (CPN-M 2007a).
Much more important than the CCOMPOSA conference<fnref n="3" /> (which only gathered nine organizations), the international seminar organized by the CPN-M was attended not only by CCOMPOSA members such as the CP of Bhutan (MLM), the CPI-M, the CPI-ML Naxalbari, the CPI (MLM) or CPN-M, but also by the PC of Afghanistan (Maoist), the RCP-USA, the Communist revolutionaries of Germany, the proletarian parties of Eastern Bengal (CC) and (RG), the PKP, the Italian Maoist Party, the Toiler Party of Iran and two independent observers (CPN-M 2007b). The papers presented by the CPN-M and CPI-M at the seminar provided an opportunity for participants to move the discussion forward regarding the situation of the contemporary communist movement (Prachanda 2007b) and indirectly allowed some participants to clarify their position with regard to the CPN-M's policy. Thus, the CPI-M Central Committee recalled the need for the Maoist movement to combat international revisionism, making allusions to recent developments in Nepal (CPI-M 2007). Conversely, representatives of the CPN-M counter attacked by pointing out the dangers posed by a dogmatic approach to MLM (CPN-M 2007a).

The seminar was nevertheless considered a success by the CPN-M, whose Secretary-General was convinced that it had sent out "a powerful message to the people of the world about the unity of the Maoist forces and a warning to imperialism and all reaction" (The Worker 2007).

**"Nepal Shows that a New, Radically Better World is Possible"<fnref n="4" />**

The launching of the People's War in Nepal by the CPN-M had propelled the party to the forefront of the international communist scene. All Maoist organizations gradually turned their attention to the ongoing revolution, showing their unconditional support for their fellow comrades. As summarized in *A World to Win*, "revolutionary communists in every country consider the Nepali revolution their own and are determined to render every possible assistance to the revolution in Nepal and to oppose the foul plans of the imperialists and reactionaries to derail and/or defeat the revolution" (RIM 2006: 9).

Yet if some of these parties reconsidered the opinion they had of the CPN-M following the tactical changes it had made, others on the contrary reaffirmed their support.

Indeed, thanks to the fall of King Gyanendra, the electoral victory and the proclamation of a Republic, the CPN-M also received many messages of congratulations from around the world.

Among the European revolutionaries, activists of the Communist Organization of Greece (KOE) went to Nepal to meet their counterparts. They praised the Nepali Maoists for their success in winning elections, guaranteeing future victories against the imperialists and reactionaries, stating that "the Nepali Revolution has not only given hope to Nepali people but to all the peoples of the world" (Sapkota 2008). At the same time, the Communist Party of Norway (Marxist-Leninist) also sent a letter of encouragement for the future of the revolution (KPML 2008). The Maoist Communist Party of France (PCMF – not to be mistaken for the PCMLM mentioned earlier) also remained confident in the Nepali revolutionaries, but stressed that if "the Nepalese revolution is neither dead nor buried, or sold [...], there is still a long way to go for Nepal to build the revolutionary foundations of socialism in this country" (PCMF 2009a: 4).<fnref n="5" /> Finally, the (New) Italian Communist Party held that the election results in Nepal in April 2008 were none other than the first major victory of the communist movement in the twenty-first century, delivering a message of hope for the proletariat in Italy and a death signal to the bourgeoisie [(n)PCI 2008: 3 and 7].

The CPN-M also received expressions of sympathy from other continents. Eugenio Gastiasoro, member of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Communist Party of Argentina, came to Nepal at the end of 2008 to forge bonds with his fellow Nepali comrades, whose fight was a source of inspiration for the people of Argentina (Gastiasoro 2008). The Communist League of Indonesia greeted the twelve-year war against world imperialist domination. In Sri Lanka, the Ceylon Communist Party-Maoist congratulated Pushpa Kamal Dahal for successfully leading his party so far along the path of the revolution, but alerted him to the danger of transforming his tactical maneuver into a strategic principle (CCP-M 2008).

Most of the messages sent by Maoist organizations show that the reputation of the CPN-M had remained intact throughout the world and

<footnote n="3">³ For the press release, see CCOMPOSA (2006a).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Quoted from Ely (2008).</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ It is interesting to note that a few months later the PCMF withdrew its support for PCN(M), arguing in particular that "the government with a Maoist majority was faced with contradictions that it could not resolve [... and that] support for a process must not be unconditional support" (PCMF 2009b: 36–37).</footnote>
that it continued to inspire many revolutionaries whatever their background. However, these parties only welcome the progress of their comrades in Nepal without actually taking part in the debate between Pushpa Kamal Dahal and part of the Maoist world. However, some displayed much stronger support, applauding not only their success, but also defending the ideological orientations taken by the General Secretary of CPN-M.

Mike Ely, co-founder and member of the RCP-USA, was among those to admire the main path proposed by Pushpa Kamal Dahal, listing four main reasons to justify that the world should embrace the Nepali model: the abandon of rigid thought without actually having set aside its radicalism, the influence that its movement may have on India and on its billion or so people, the example it gives the world by managing to free itself of all the shackles imprisoning Nepali society, and finally, the courage to have shown how to launch a People's war (Ely 2008).

The Maoist Party of Russia also took the defense of Prachanda's philosophy. After having carefully read the writings of Baburam Bhattarai and the Secretary General of the Party, the Russian Maoists came to the conclusion that,

> the electoral victory by the CPN-M and the abolition of the feudal
> monarchy is by no means the end, but only the beginning of a long and
> arduous struggle for the genuine democratization of Nepal [and that] the
> sterile attacks against the line and policy of the CPN-M by some so-called
> 'Leftists' and even people calling themselves 'Maoists' around the world
> do not serve the interests of the proletariat and the oppressed; such people
> have forfeited the right to call themselves Maoist or revolutionary (RMP
> 2008).

Conclusion

The ideological transformation that the CPN-M underwent met with various reactions among the international revolutionary community. While some condemned the new philosophy advocated by Prachanda and went on to sever relations with his party, others applauded the foresight of the Nepali leader and reasserted their support. Whether positive or negative, these reactions go to show that the course taken by the People's War in Nepal left no international party claiming to be MLM indifferent. Having recognized the role their uprising had gradually come to play on the international revolutionary scene, members of CPN-M strove to maintain their influence. Nevertheless, even though the seminars they organized in 2006 allowed them to pave the way for a hypothetical new

International, the union of the Maoist parties of South Asia, which is essential for the future, still remains fragile.

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