European Union.<fnref n="61" /> We must remember and emphasize that, from the beginning, these negotiations were guided by political ideologies that, during the same years, materialized in the formation of the International Christian Democracy and the reformulation of the International Social Democracy, that abandoned its historical Marxist Leninist inspiration, opening a door to a basic agreement between the two, in respect for the democratic system and the repudiation of totalitarian systems, creating the basic substrate that supported the projects of unity and continental cooperation.

Parallel to what happens in Europe, after the end of the Second World War, Chilean political experience in the context of the Cold War, shows us in 1957 the creation of the Christian Democratic Party, that organized a world-wide doctrinal congress held in Santiago in 1961, presided by Eduardo Frei Montalva, giving origin to the International that will bring together the communities of this inspiration in European and American countries.

The knowledge that leaves us the direct experience of what happened in Chile between the sixties and the beginning of the governments after 1989, reveals to us a society where real political experiments are concrete, like the government of the Christian Democracy and its "revolution in Freedom" and then the government of "Unidad Popular" and its project to build a socialist society, experiences that finally concluded with a ruined and fractured community after the institutional crisis of 1973, that resulted in a direct intervention of the armed forces that during 16 years ruled the country.

For European political sensitivity, the brutal overthrow of the "Unidad Popular" and Allende's death was exacerbated by the subsequent and persistent denunciation of the systematic violation of human rights by the military government.<fnref n="62" /> Virtually, from its origin, the European community and the totality of its political currents condemned the regime directed by the general Pinochet demanding the return to the democratic system, supporting in that sense to the opposing forces considered affines.

Paradoxically, during the dictatorship in Chile, a liberal economic experience was initiated, where private initiative was strongly stimulated. This was the basic pillar for the European capitalist economy since the Bretton Woods agreements by the end of the Second World War. If such experience creates perplexity, the concrete results of the Chilean economy are astounding at the successes achieved, allowing the country to emerge from the economic disaster of 1973 and become a sort of theoretical and practical example on how to overcome the endemic symptoms of underdevelopment, Latin America.<fnref n="63" />

Finally the Chilean evolution shows an extraordinary military dictatorship giving the political power, Pinochet returns to the position of commander in chief of the army, position he had on September the 10th of 1973, but in fact he is the leader of all the branches of the armed forces; in the lost plebiscite, he has counted with the considerable 43% of support of the citizenship and it delivers a country with a solid economic structure, ordered, functioning efficiently, where practically all the private economic agents have supported him and identify with his government.

The objective of the following analysis is to answer the question of how, in two decades, a country within the continent, showing an exemplary and internationally recognized institutional evolution, was able to destroy and then rebuild a new political, social and economic structure recognized and supported exceptionally by the European Union?

<footnote n="61">⁶¹ Ramiro Troitiño, D. (2017) "Jean Monnet before the first European Community: A historical perspective and critic." TRAMES: A Journal of the Humanities & Social Sciences 21, no. 3.</footnote>

<footnote n="62">⁶² Kerikmäe, T.; Hamulak, O.; Chochia, A. (2016). A Historical Study of Contemporary Human Rights: Deviation or Extinction? Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum, 4 (2), 98–115.</footnote>

<footnote n="63">⁶³ Fernandois, J. (2004) Mundo y fin de mundo. Chile en la política mundial 1900-2004, Santiago, Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile. p. 512.</footnote>
CHILE AND EUROPE IN THE GOVERNMENTS OF FREI AND ALLENDE

The presidency, that falls into Eduardo Frei, in the constitutive congress of the Christian Democratic International was not only an honorary fact but also represents the beginning of a process that strongly ties Chilean politics with an international organization, in this case the (IDC), whose main offices are in Europe having as territorial bases the cities of Bonn and Rome.

The aforementioned does not mean ignoring another strategic relationship that Frei managed to consolidate, we refer to the strong nexus built with the United States and in particular with the Democratic party and the so-called “Kennedy clan”. In this sense it is convenient to know the opinion expressed by a former American ambassador in Chile, who noted the following:

> In 1963 the FRAP (Frente de Acción Popular, alliance of the left side, whose presidential candidate was Salvador Allende) embodied the fears of Washington and Rome, who were not disconnected from each other. In contrast, Eduardo Frei and the PDC (Christian Democratic Party) seemed to be a very attractive bet, a team that could become the basis of a counterattack to face Havana and Moscow: a revolution in freedom that would provide an opposing pole of attraction... Chile would incarnate in the ideal political and social realms of its American patrons.<fnref n="64" />

Let us emphasize that among all these relationships, there is a common denominator that cannot be ignored, which is the influence of the Church's teaching on the European and North American leaders already mentioned, who are involved in a political project to face the challenge that globally represents the model of real socialism, an expression of Marxist totalitarianism which was explicitly condemned by the Holy Church since the 19th century.

We cannot ignore this list of events that formed, in the mid 20th century, the foundation of international architecture that was built post-war, and the creation before the political and economic bodies of European integration (with the exception of the Marshall Plan) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This arises as a structure destined to face the military threat represented by the USSR and its satellite countries and involved the United States, Canada and ten European states forming a block that finally ended logistically depending of the USA.<fnref n="65" />

At the beginning of the sixties, the threat of the communist ideology extends to the American continent through the Cuban revolution, which self-proclaiming socialist becomes an active part of the cold war that, until that moment, had been fought in Europe and Asia.

The construction of a socialist model that defies liberal democracy is the propitious occasion that allows Frei and Christian Democracy's rise in Chile, whose reputation to the eyes of the Western world, compares favorably with a regional political reality, where corrupt family dynasties proliferate or military dictatorships. That way, Frei is consolidated as the natural option and legitimate political alternative to counteract the epic image represented by Castro and his revolution.

After being elected president of Chile, Frei made a trip to Europe in 1965, as a special guest of Italy, France, England, Germany and the Vatican, which represents an unprecedented political and diplomatic event in the Latin American foreign relationships.<fnref n="66" />

<footnote n="64">⁶⁴ Korry, E. (1998) Los Estados Unidos en Chile y Chile en los Estados Unidos (1963-1975), Revista de Estudios Públicos, 72, pp.12-74, Primavera, Santiago. pp. 31-32.</footnote>

<footnote n="65">⁶⁵ Pereira, J. (2005) El nuevo orden de Yalta. La ONU y la Doctrina Truman; El Plan Marshall y la OTAN, pp.157-179. En Beneyto, J. et al. Eds. Europa y Estados Unidos. Una historia de la relación Atlántica en los últimos cien años, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva. p. 177.</footnote>

<footnote n="66">⁶⁶ Ramiro Troitino, D.; Chochia, A. (2015). Winston Churchill And The European Union. Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, 8 (1), 55-81.</footnote>
The following year, the European Community sets up a regional office in Santiago, which became known as the Liaison Office of the European Coal and Steel Community for Latin America, and the Chilean government is actively engaged in promoting the emerging integration organizations already in existence, which will be highlighted later, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Andean Pact.<fnref n="67" />

The rotations of government that take place in European countries between the 1960s and 1970s are natural expressions of the will of their citizens, but whether the Christian Democratic side or the Social-Democrat who is in power will invariably maintain democratic and free-trade principles as the essential axes on which integration initiatives and international relations operate.

Meanwhile the Christian Democratic government will end with the election of the socialist Salvador Allende in 1970. His image as a traditional politician with a long parliamentary career and extensive participation in the masonry shows him, to the European eyes, as a bourgeois social reformer, far removed from violent revolutionary tactics, a condition that arouses wide sympathies in a world shaken by the cruelty that reflects the Vietnam War.

In the words of E. Hobsbawm<fnref n="68" /> we can find the reason for this perception:

> When the Soviet leadership of the international communist movement that was threatened by China in 1960, not to mention various Marxist dissidents who did it in the name of the revolution, Moscow supporters in the third world maintained their political option of studied moderation. The enemy, in these countries, was not capitalism, if it even existed, but the pre-capitalist local interests and the (US) imperialism that supported them. The way to move forward was not the armed struggle, but the creation of a broad popular or national front in alliance with the national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie... This strategy, which infuriated those who preferred the armed route, seemed to succeed ... in Chile in 1970

In such a scenario, an idealized Allende image is constructed in Europe, which identifies him, as we have already mentioned, as a moderate politician with a government program that, while maintaining the liberties of the democratic system, looks for the modification of a wild capitalism, after the objective of improving socio-economic conditions of a historically exploited population which now, through transformations achieved by a peaceful way, can be incorporated to a dignified life system. In this respect Hobsbawm<fnref n="69" /> points out:

> The left tendency, including humanitarian liberals and moderate social democrats, needed more than just social security laws and wage improvement... How else can we explain the passion for helping third world countries?... This led, that the European liberals of the second half of the 20th century, to support the revolutionaries and the revolutions of the third world.

The construction of this utopia, lived with passion in important sectors of Europe, in fact destroyed progressively the social coexistence and installed in Chile the systematic violence as a conflict solution mechanism which was not perceived in the societies of the old world that supported the *Unidad Popular* experience, furthermore not considering that this alliance in real and concrete terms was inspired in the last instance by a socialist-Marxist ideology with clear presence of Leninist

<footnote n="67">⁶⁷ Martin, C. (2002) "Las relaciones América Latina-Unión Europea: Antecedentes de la importancia e institucionalización del diálogo político", Revista de Ciencia Política, XXIII, (2), pp.46-64, Santiago. p. 49.</footnote>

<footnote n="68">⁶⁸Hobsbawm, E. (1998) Historia del siglo XX, Buenos Aires, Grijalbo Mondadori. p. 435.</footnote>

<footnote n="69">⁶⁹ Ibid, pp. 435-436</footnote>
tactics.<fnref n="70" /> It is interesting, bearing in mind the distorted image in Europe of the "Social Democrat Allende" generating a true myth about its proximity to social democracy, to cite the opinion that Allende himself gave in an interview related to his ideological orientations: "Debray: Does that explain why the Chilean socialist party, for a while now, had nothing to do with European social democracy? Allende: Clearly. Nothing has to do with it, nor with some parties that claim to be socialists in Europe".<fnref n="71" />

In theory, both the form and the background of the allendista discourse coincide literally with the principles that the Social Democracy had impelled since its creation, and this will make that, considering the siege that the United States initiated against the Chilean regime, European governments and influential public figures publicly support what they consider an unprecedented political experience which they feel identified with.

The failure of the experiment and the violent end of the Allende's government and its death, will represent, for an important sector of the population and western political parties, a real Greek tragedy that turns to Allende into a martyr and into victims of a cruel repression to his followers, giving origin to an absolute condemnation of the military leaders who led the end of a utopia that was considered peaceful and disarmed.

## EUROPE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL PINOCHET

The internal reality of Chile on the September 11th 1973, when the Popular Unity government collapses, is dramatic; the economy is destroyed, political forces are immersed into a spiral of irrational actions to prepare their forces for a violent and decisive confrontation, education and public health, at all levels, collapse and live in constant paralyzes, foreign interventions that try to help the sectors in conflict are evident, and so on, the social fabric is broken and the climate of confrontation predicts a civil war.

A privileged witness of the administration of the Unidad Popular government, was former president Eduardo Frei, knowing the apocalyptic vision that is exhibited in Europe on the fall of the government in Chile, in a letter dated November 1973 addressed Mariano Rumor, President of the Christian Democratic International, points out the following background:

> The main problem is that this minority government, presenting itself as a legal and peaceful way to socialism (which was the slogan of its national and worldwide advertising) was determined to establish a totalitarian dictatorship in the country and was taking progressive steps to achieve this... To this political picture is added ... facts that have been determining in the Chilean process.

> Firstly, once the government was established, converged in Chile thousand representatives of the extreme revolutionary left of America... Men known on the continent for their guerrilla activities, were immediately occupied in Chile... (and) many of them spent their time to paramilitary training and to install guerrilla schools... What democracy can resist this situation?... Inflation in official government figures reached 323% in the last twelve months, however the University Institutes, considering that the country was practically living on the black market, estimated that it exceeded 600%... All productivity rates had fallen: Industries by more than 7%; agriculture about 23 % and mining about 30 %... Bankruptcy was total...".<fnref n="72" />

<footnote n="70">⁷⁰ Harmer, T. (2013) El gobierno de Allende y la guerra fría Interamericana, Chile, Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales. p. 303</footnote>

<footnote n="71">⁷¹ Debray, R. (1971) "Allende habla con Debray", Revista Punto Final, 126, pp. 3-62, marzo, Santiago. p. 21</footnote>

<footnote n="72">⁷² Frei, E. (1973) Carta de Eduardo Frei a Mariano Rumor.</footnote>
Despite the above, in Europe there was already an environment predisposed to reject the new Chilean political scenario and, accordingly, the 16-year period of the military regime shows a critical period of isolation in foreign relations which is felt as from day one, when the *Junta de Gobierno* declares itself anticommunist and breaks diplomatic relations with almost all the countries that conformed the communist side in the cold war.

Subsequently, and as the government increases repression against the Unidad Popular militants and to the extremist group, *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)*, which is trying to reorganize and fight against it, the critics from Western European countries and even from the American continent will grow transforming the country, along with South Africa and Israel, into true pariah nations with whom no state wants to appear related to.<fnref n="73" /> The siege will be completed when the United States, which initially supported the military government, ceases to support it since 1976 because of repeated allegations of human rights violations, compounded by an attack in Washington of which members of the Chilean intelligence are held responsible.

That same year 1976, the Chilean Christian Democracy, which initially encouraged and supported the military intervention, becomes an open opponent, realizing that the government's schedule does not contemplate the delivery of power and less the restoration of the existing model until 1973, circumstances to which will be added the exile of various leaders and a failed attempt on one of its historic leaders, Bernardo Leighton, in Rome for which the military government is blamed.

In this brief analysis of the historical development of the military government, we could not ignore other events of major importance that take place in the late 1970s and 1980s which provide views from other perspectives, helping to understand the behaviors that the European Community will concrete.

The Catholic Church, historically predominant in Chile, that had received with cautious and reservations the change of government, shows with the advance of the years, an attitude in the majority of the bishops of open critic towards the military and civilians in the power, assuming an actively protective role of opponents to the regime, considering that its mission was to defend the human rights frequently violated in the country.

Furthermore, we finally believe that it is relevant in this analysis of the period, to add international policy actions that have not been adequately taken into account and which we consider as key to the relationships that will be built at the end of the military regime, we are referring specifically to the election of Chilean politicians in positions of importance at an international level.

Since 1977, led by the Social-Democrat German Chancellor Willy Brandt, and as a United Nations initiative, is formed a commission of the highest level that will focus on the analysis of North-South relationships, with the commendable purpose of suggesting measures to deal with the pressing drama of inequality between developed and underdeveloped nations.<fnref n="74" />

The former Christian Democrat president, Eduardo Frei Montalva is invited to be part of this selected group, which will result in the achievement of, at least three political objectives: the alliance between the two major European countries, which were confronted after the fall of the Allende's government, is harmonized, the cleaning of the image of Frei, who was strongly criticized in Europe for being considered the civil responsible of the fall of the government of the Unidad Popular and for supporting the installation of the *Junta de Gobierno*, and in the third place, after the cleaning of Frei's image, the main internal political figure of Chile, a world rostrum to lead the opposition to the General Pinochet's government.

<footnote n="73">⁷³ Wilhelmy, M., Durán, R. (2003) Los principales rasgos de la política exterior chilena entre 1973 y el 2000, Revista de Ciencia Política, XXIII, (2), pp. 273-286, Santiago. pp. 274-275</footnote>

<footnote n="74">⁷⁴ Fernandois, J. (2001) Eduardo Frei Montalva: Esplendor y ocaso. Revista de Estudios Públicos, 83, pp. 297-314, Santiago. p. 310.</footnote>
Directly related to the above we can verify that Andrés Zaldívar, a prominent Chilean political figure, is elected president of the International Christian Democratic, a role he plays between 1981 and 1986. Another less well-known Chilean, Luis Ayala, joins external political institutions becoming, in 1986, general secretary by the International social-democratic. All that is shaping, in the old continent, a political scene that will have as resonance box the European Parliament.<fnref n="75" /> This institution of the community where the two partisan organizations mentioned have historically represented the mainstream, will be used permanently as a tribune to support the forces of opposition to the military government.

To complement this, let us finally mention that in 1992, just after the government of Patricio Aylwin began, the champion of the opposition, the Social Democrat Enrique Silva Cimma, chancellor of the new government, was appointed honorary president of the International Social-Democratic.

Having said that, with respect to the international political scenario that left few margins of movement, let us indicate that the cornered regime begins a true socio-economic revolution inspired by a model denominated neoliberal whose mentor is the school of economics of the University of Chicago, where the role of the state, in mostly all spheres of society, is minimized giving to the freedom to undertake and to the private initiative, a decisive role. That way, in Chile, an iron-fisted political control with broad economic freedom, that opens the frontiers of trade with the farthest latitudes, will be combined. The most prestigious Chilean historian of the 20th century, evaluating the transformations to the historical role of the state pointed out:

> *From then on (1974) a general restructure of the economy, of the society and of the state power: in a certain way a "revolution from above"... The cardinal idea of the Republican Chile is, historically considered, that the state is whom has been shaping and affirming Chilean nationality throughout the 19th and 20th centuries; and that the purpose of the state is the common good in all its dimensions... Now, instead, the trend towards privatization expands and the conviction that economic freedom is the basis of political freedom and finally of all freedom expressed by representatives of the economic team, without considering the similarity of this postulate with those of a primary Marxism.*

Over the years the country's economy, literally destroyed by the allendist experience that suffered in 1974, the negative effects of the petroleum crisis, it becomes a true laboratory of the so-called Neocapitalist theories and the results, especially in the field of macroeconomics, give rise to what was called "the Chilean miracle".<fnref n="76" />

Into the political scenario, a frustrated guerrilla attempts to prevent the achievement of the schedule designed to return to a democratic model, through electoral mechanisms, and which was incorporated in the new Constitution of the country on 1980, the moderate opposition openly supported by Western democracies, will face and defeat the regime in a plebiscite that marks the return of the country to the democratic system by reinserting it into the international community.<fnref n="77" />

<footnote n="75">⁷⁵ Ramiro Troitiño, D. (2014). The British Position towards European Integration: A Different Economic and Political Approach. Baltic Journal of European Studies, 4(1), 119-136. p. 343.</footnote>

<footnote n="76">⁷⁶ Chomsky, N.; Dieterich, H. (1995) La Sociedad Global. Educación, Mercado y Democracia, Chile, LOM ediciones. pp. 19-92.</footnote>

<footnote n="77">⁷⁷ Fermandois, J. (2004) Mundo y fin de mundo. Chile en la política mundial 1900-2004, Santiago, Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile. p. 489.</footnote>
CHILE AND ITS POLITICAL REINTEGRATION. GOVERNMENT OF AYLWIN AND THE
CONCERTACION

The full reincorporation of the country into the world's political system in the early 1990s, must be understood as a continuous flow where realities of different natures interact and combine, giving rise to events and conjunctures that finally, in the case we studied, allowed a peaceful political transition which gradually decompressed strong internal tensions that, at some point, seemed to threaten that evolution.

It is in this context, with a Chile incorporated again in the democratic system, that we observe
the signing of three successive agreements that deepened its relation with the European Union.<fnref n="78" />

These diplomatic events, gather in protocols, as from 1990, which will be perfected, in a
country of 14 million inhabitants at the end of the world, with an annual GDP of US$ 32.851 million
and a per capita income of US$ 2,328, with an alliance totaling about 470 million inhabitants, which
represented the cultural center of the Western world, with annual GDP of US$ 7.5 trillion and GDP
per capita of US$ 14,835.

Practically at the same time, the E.U signed agreements with Mexico (a population of 100 million and linked to the United States and Canada in NAFTA) and MERCOSUR, an alliance of which Brazil and Argentina are part of, (together they add a population of 230 million plus Uruguay and Paraguay) that is to say, we are talking about the three most populous and powerful nations in Latin America.

The figures indicated reveal a relationship of deep asymmetries, where the construction of an
alliance with Chile apparently does not show a logically quantitative and rational explanation. We
believe that the key to understand this process, is found in the political agreements made by the
moderate opposition to Pinochet with the international Christian Democrat and Social Democrat in
the 80's, to give governability and economic support to Chile at the time the military government
ends.

CONCLUSION

We believe that the strong reasons that led the European Community to define and concrete,
in the Chilean case, a privileged treatment, is built on the evident support that was given to the
opposing forces for 16 years and that was crowned with the electoral defeat of General Pinochet and
the victory of Patricio Aylwin.

As this was not enough however, for the military leader ceased to be a powerful player, the
new government's economic management should be exceptionally supported, opening the doors to
agreements that would consolidate, within a liberal capitalist democratic pathway, the political forces
of Chilean left center.

On the other hand, it is necessary to ask whether Pinochet's political defeat was considered, at
that time, sufficiently "demonstrative effect" by the international European policies to discourage the
emergence of new military governments in Latin America or, on the contrary, precisely in view of
the successful Chilean economic experience carried out by the military regime, it was necessary,
from a strategic political point of view, to strongly support Aylwin's government, which could be
considered by the ideological nature of the parties that were part of it, faithful representative of the
great European collectivities. This support action would aim to overcome and appropriate the
previous economic performance and, thus, associate the definitive leap to the developed world of the

<footnote n="78">78 Irigoin, J. (2000) Las relaciones de Chile y el MERCOSUR con la Unión Europea. Revista de Estudios Internacionales, 130, pp.3-12, Santiago. pp. 6-7.</footnote>
country with the operation of a democratic government, neutralizing any success that the military regime wanted to attribute itself.

The previous interpretation is obviously complemented by the political reality in the 1990s, when the European Union is consolidated as a global power,<fnref n="79" /> further favored by the Eastern sector collapse or by the real socialisms, which acts in the countries that integrate it as a strong incentive to expand its guiding principles: democracy and free market economy, which coincides fully with the birth and development of the new Chilean regime.

## References

Ballesteros, M.D.L.P.P.; Ramiro Troitiño, D. (2017) El modelo de integración europea de Churchill. Revista de Occidente, (433), pp. 57-71.

Chomsky, N. Dieterich H. (1995) La Sociedad Global. Educación, Mercado y Democracia, Chile, LOM ediciones.

Debray, R. (1971) "Allende habla con Debray", Revista Punto Final, 126, pp.3-62, marzo, Santiago.

Fermandois, J. (2001) "Eduardo Frei Montalva: Esplendor y ocaso", Revista de Estudios Públicos, 83, pp. 297-314, Santiago.

Fermandois, J. (2014) Mundo y fin de mundo. Chile en la política mundial 1900-2004, Santiago, Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile.

Ferrer, A. (1973) "Relaciones económicas entre la C.E.E y América Latina", Revista de Estudios Internacionales, 24, pp. 3-42, oct-dic, Santiago.

Frei, E. (1973) Carta de Eduardo Frei a Mariano Rumor.

Harmer, T. (2013) El gobierno de Allende y la guerra fría Interamericana, Chile, Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales.

Hobsbawm, E. (1998) Historia del siglo XX, Buenos Aires, Grijalbo Mondadori.

Irigoin, J. (2000) Las relaciones de Chile y el MERCOSUR con la Unión Europea. Revista de Estudios Internacionales, 130, pp. 3-12, Santiago.

Kerikmäe, T.; Hamulak, O.; Chochia, A. (2016). A Historical Study of Contemporary Human Rights: Deviation or Extinction? Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum, 4 (2), pp. 98–115.

Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing.

Korry, E. (1998) Los Estados Unidos en Chile y Chile en los Estados Unidos (1963-1975). Revista de Estudios Públicos, 72, pp. 12-74, Primavera, Santiago.

Martin, C. (2002) "Las relaciones América Latina-Unión Europea: Antecedentes de la importancia e institucionalización del diálogo político", Revista de Ciencia Política, XXIII, (2), pp. 46-64, Santiago.

Pereira, J. (2005) El nuevo orden de Yalta. La ONU y la Doctrina Truman; El Plan Marshall y la OTAN, pp.157-179. En Beneyto, J. et al. Eds. Europa y Estados Unidos. Una historia de la relación Atlántica en los últimos cien años, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva.

Ramiro Troitiño, D. (2013) European Integration: Building Europe (European Political, Economic, and Security Issues). Nova Science Publishers Incorporated.

Ramiro Troitiño, D. (2014). The British Position towards European Integration: A Different Economic and Political Approach. Baltic Journal of European Studies, 4(1), 119-136.

Ramiro Troitiño, D. (2017) "Jean Monnet before the first European Community: A historical perspective and critic." TRAMES: A Journal of the Humanities & Social Sciences 21, no. 3.

Ramiro Troitiño, D.; Chochia, A. (2015). Winston Churchill And The European Union. Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, 8 (1), 55–81.

Wilhelmy, M. y Durán, R. (2003)" Los principales rasgos de la política exterior chilena entre 1973 y el 2000", Revista de Ciencia Política, XXIII, (2), pp. 273-286, Santiago.

<footnote n="79">⁷⁹ Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing.</footnote>
# The Eastern Partnership policy and EU Neighborhood Policy in Georgia - Analyzing EU-Georgia relations

ANA KIKADZE

TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

EMAIL: A_KIKADZE@CU.EDU.GE

**Abstract:** Focusing on EU neighborhood policy and Eastern partnership policy, this paper aims to showcase the improvements, which was achieved between EU-Georgian relationships. The main ascent will be done on Georgia's perspective. The paper aims to examine how does the EU conducts relationship with Georgia and how will Georgia benefit from this relationship. Furthermore, the following questions will be answered: Why was the Eastern Partnership policy created? What are the main factors that led to its development? What are the main differences between EU Neighborhood policy and Eastern partnership policy?

**Keywords:** Eastern Partnership policy, Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, EU Neighborhood policy

## INTRODUCTION

The enlargement of the European Union has highlighted the need of reshaping the EU institutional framework and policies addressing the new neighborhood. In recent years the European Union is identified as security actor.<fnref n="1" /> Activities conducted by the Union showcases that EU is not only obsessed by its internal affairs but it also cares about the third countries too.<fnref n="2" /> The relationship between Georgia and EU become significant in 2003. In this year the European Union enclosed Georgia with the European Neighboring Policy. This step can be seen as the new aim of the union to contribute in the conflict of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.<fnref n="3" />

Despite the fact that in legal literature we cannot find what is the definition of ‘conflict resolution’ on part of the EU,<fnref n="4" /> it has to mean introducing concrete polices which will be implemented and formulated by the Union that will lead to a achieve mutually acceptable agreements. EU’s impact on conflict resolution in Georgia can be seen during the Georgian-Russian war in 2008.<fnref n="5" /> In this paper the EU’s involvement and relations with Georgia will be analyzed.

In 2010 European Parliament made a resolution where the importance of a new strategy for south Caucasus was highlighted. It was said that “geopolitical location of the South Caucasus and its increasing importance as an energy, transport and communications corridor connecting the Caspian region and Central Asia with Europe; considers it of the utmost importance therefore that EU cooperation with the South Caucasus be given high priority, not least in matters relating to

<footnote n="1">¹ Costea, S. (2012). The European Union's Eastern Partnership: the objective of regional cooperation. The Eastern Partnership and the Europe 2020 strategy: Visions of leading policymakers and academics, 51-60.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Chochia, A.; Popjanevski, J. (2016). Change of Power and Its Influence on Country's Europeanization Process. Case Study: Georgia. In: Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Ed.). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy (197-210). Springer International Publishing.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Troitiño, D. R. (2013). European Integration: Building Europe. Nova Publishers: New York.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Chochia, A. (2012). The European Union and its policy towards the neighbors from South Caucasus. L'Europe unie/United Europe, 6, 27-35.</footnote>
energy; emphasizes the role of the three countries as essential for the transit of energy resources, as well as for the diversification of the EU's energy supply and routes".<fnref n="6" />

"Georgia's relations with the EU has a long story, which as in the case with a majority of other post-Soviet countries started just after Georgia regained its sovereignty after the breakup of the Soviet Union.<fnref n="7" /> The EU was one of the first to assist Georgia in the difficult early years of transformation to a democratic country. The European Commission opened its Delegation in Georgia in Tbilisi in 1995, and the first main document on which Georgia and EU relationships are based on— the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement—came into force in 1999."<fnref n="8" />

In this paper two main policies of the European Union will be analyzed. Firstly, I will talk about the EU's Neighborhood Policy and conclude the main elements and achievements. Later I will answer the following questions. Why was the Eastern Partnership policy created? What are the main factors that led to its development? What are the main differences between EU Neighborhood policy and Eastern partnership policy?

## THE EU NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY IN GEORGIA

The European Neighborhood Policy of the European Union included ambitious objectives based on commitments to share values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms. Among other eastern European Countries, Georgia was also invited to enter into intensified political, security, economic and cultural relations with the EU, enhanced regional and cross-border co-operation and shared responsibility in conflict aspirations. The European Union took note of Georgia's expressed European aspirations. EU welcomed Georgia's readiness to enhance cooperation in all domains covered by the action Plan. The level of ambition of the relationship depended on the degree of Georgia's commitment to common values as well as its capacity to implement jointly agreed priorities in compliance with international and European norms and principles. The pace of the relationship fully acknowledged Georgia's efforts and concrete achievements in meeting those commitments. <fnref n="9" />

"In terms of the failure of the ENP, the deficiencies are well-documented with reference to governance, process and practice Contrary to the evolution of the southern dimension the EU's governance approach to the east has moved from bilateralism to multilateralism in the EaP, precisely because the EU wanted to inject a more political dimension into the process of transformation. However, the EU's overarching logic, and the underlying principles of differentiation and partnership found in the EU's approach, have been severely undermined by its practice through bilateral and multilateral processes on issues such as visa policy, democracy, energy and conflict resolution. This has meant that the governance and govern mentality of the east has more often than not been characterized by imbalance, and has thus been far from adequate in addressing the threats stemming from weak governance, political instability and the frozen

<footnote n="6">⁶ Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0193+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN [accessed 05 June 2017</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Kerikmäe, T; Nyman-Metcalf, K; Gabelaia, D; Chochia, A (2014). Cooperation of Post Soviets with the Aim of not being "Post" and "Soviets". In: N. Šišková (Ed.). From Eastern Partnership to the Association. The Legal and Political Analysis (144–159). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Gabelaia D., Georgia's right to 'European Dream', Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy, Tallinn Law School, p211</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ European Commission, ENP EU/Georgian action plan, p1 retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/georgia_enp_ap_final_en_0.pdf [accessed 05 June 2017]</footnote>
conflicts, not to mention the competition faced by Russia in its own attempts to reassert control over
what it constructs as its own sphere of influence”<fnref n="10" />

In 2004 the European Union launched its European Neighborhood Policy. The policy asserts that the EU wants to promote stability, security and well-being of all by the use of incentives in lieu of sections and to foster cooperation in areas of mutual consent and interest. This policy is remarkably balanced in its attention to interest and values, soft in respect of the absence of elements of coercion and rather generous I its offer of material assistance. At the end of 2006 there already were signs of a generalized European Neighborhood Policy among the neighboring countries and in June 2007 the Union acknowledged this by embracing the German EU presidency's plan to revive the policy. <fnref n="11" />

However, while talking about the good sides of the policy it is important to analyze why not this approach was as successful as the EU's Eastern Partnership policy. Georgia and EU agreed on specific reform steps and requirements in all ENP priority areas. Despite this fat, the policy was partly successful in Georgia. There are some reasons why it was so successful. The first reason was the positive conditionality. Secondly, the formulation of the policy was too vague and not credible enough. For instance the Union did not mentioned exactly what kind of reforms would Georgia get in case of any legislative reforms. Georgian authorities were disappointed that the security issues were not on a high condition. Finally, Georgia and eastern European countries were disappointed due to the fact that Policy was building too many distinct nations. The principle of differentiation was also lacking from the ENP.

The Next chapter will analyze the Eastern partnership Policy. Here I will make it clear why this Policy is better and how Georgia benefited from this approach.

THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

Poland and Sweden developed the need of an eastern partnership policy on 23 May 2008. Later the project proposal was sent to all EU member states. It was officially launched on May 7 2008 on Prague summit. The eastern partnership policy aims to cooperate with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus. EAP helps the six countries with harmonization of European standards. Principles of joint ownership, differentiation and conditionality are the main features of the policy. <fnref n="12" />

What are the main elements that EAP aims to envisage? We can divide the approach into three main elements. Firstly, the policy strengthens and intensifies the bilateral relations between the European Union and the partner countries. Secondly, it encourages flagship initiatives designed to increase EU visibility in the region. Finally, the EAP provides various financial sources and partnership instruments, cross border cooperation instruments and bilateral assistance. <fnref n="13" />

"In governance terms, the principles that underpin the EaP remain the same as those of the ENP: it is guided by differentiation, joint ownership, and conditionality the latter related to progress

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Christou G.(2011), Multilateralism, Conflict Prevention and the Eastern Partnership, European Foreign Affairs Review, 16:207-225, 2011 Kluwer law international BV.,p419</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ The EU as a modest 'force for good': the European Neighborhood Policy International Affairs 84: 1 (2008) 81–96
© 2008 The Author(s). Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs ESTHER BARBÈ AND ELISABETH JOHANSSON-NOGUÉS, p1</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Monacu O. (2009), The Eastern Partnership – A premise for an enhanced EU-Eastern Neighboring cooperation Relationship, Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 9, No.4, p48</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Monacu O. (2009), The Eastern Partnership – A premise for an enhanced EU-Eastern Neighboring cooperation Relationship, Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 9, No.4 51</footnote>
and reward conditional on agreement and implementation based on EU norms and values. In addition, the EaP references legal and regulatory approximation but not the wholesale adoption of the EU acquis. There is an aim to facilitate the movement to approximation through institutional and administrative capacity building at bilateral and multilateral levels of governance, and the commitments of partner countries will be reflected not in Action Plans but rather in Association Agreements (AAs; legally binding), which will offer added incentives in the thematically prioritized areas of the EaP. The macro-governance framework, therefore, resembles that of the ENP and points towards horizontal joint structures of governance."<fnref n="14" /> The Eap did not showed its visibility directly after it was officially launched. However, after one year the visibility of the policy was clear for the partner countries. The most significant achievement was that by 2010-2013 the budget was increased by a third billion euro. Some scholars see the policy as a new opportunity for the neighbors to sort and reset their relations with EU.<fnref n="15" />

How does the policy work? It has two tracks. The first one is bilateral and the second once multilateral. The bilateral dimension supports socio-economic and political reforms in the countries. Programmes contribute the objectives which are focused assistance in the priority areas identified in each country's multi-annual programing document and complementary support for the implementation of agreements with the EU that builds on the experience of the Comprehensive Institution Building programme. The multilateral dimension complements bilateral relations with thematic platforms to exchange best practices on issues of mutual interest and it also initiatives the flagship platforms. <fnref n="16" /> The key issue for the policy is to cooperate with Society. Civil Society Forum, Neighboring Civil Society Facility and dedicated funding at regional and country level are the good examples to prove this fact.

One crucially important fact is that the member states of the European Union have not officially given the six countries the status of an EU member candidate country. It is obvious that there is a little appetite among the majority of the member states to widen the group of would be member states for a lot of reasons. Eap countries can get advantages that were not offered to the EFTA countries in the context of EEA. During the period of 2014-2020, the European Neighboring Instrument (ENI) is the key EU financial instrument for cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries. Furthermore, in 2007-2013, the funding came from the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Nearly 2.5 billion euros was spent for the programs which cooperated with European partners in 2010-2013. This cooperation took account 350 million euros of additional funds when the Eastern Partnership was launched. <fnref n="17" /> "The Eastern Partnership, initiated by Poland and Sweden, has gradually become an important project for the Eastern part of EU's neighbors. Meant at first to counterbalance the Union for Mediterranean project, initiated for the Southern EU neighbors, the EaP has developed into a separate project, with specific and ambitious cooperation goals, both among EU and the Eastern partner countries. The free trade areas entailed, the visa-free travel perspective, the enhanced bilateral cooperation and the development of multilateral and, most of all, regional components of the initiative are only a few of the main goals the EaP intends to address. The EaP initiative envisages the relations of the EU27 with

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Christou G.(2011), Multilateralism, Conflict Prevention and the Eastern Partnership, European Foreign Affairs Review, 16:207-225, 2011 Kluwer law international BV.,p218</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Korosteleva, E. (2011), the Eastern Partnership Initiative: A New Opportunity for Neighbors? Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 27(1). pp. 1-21. ISSN 1352-3279 p3</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ European neighborhood policy and enlargement negotiations, Eastern Partnership, European Commission, retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/eastern-partnership_en [accessed 28 May 2017]</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ European neighborhood policy and enlargement negotiations, Eastern Partnership, European Commission, retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/eastern-partnership_en [accessed 28 May 2017]</footnote>
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus, all the six countries already under the ENP umbrella. The Eastern Partnership has a positive, constructive agenda, meant to support these six countries develop and harmonize with European standards."<fnref n="18" />

Furthermore, the policy makes the access to the European markets easier. Many neighbors compete but the new policy makes EU to give up some strict regulations. Researchers suggest that EU should press ahead with DCFTAs for its eastern and southern neighbors in a way which will bring them into parts of single market. It has to be mentioned that EaP makes traveling for the citizens of the partner countries way easier. For instance EU provides more than two million Schengen visas. The process of obtaining visa is shortened and this does not damage the reputation of the European Union. "Money is a powerful motivator". Including the overall budget and the part of it devoted to external relations, "there is a scope fir increasing the amount spent in regions where the EU has a strong interest in stability, prosperity and political reform, and especially in the neighborhood."<fnref n="19" />

EaP was welcomed in Georgia due to the fact that it was officially launched after the war of 2008. Georgian people saw this step from the European Union as an answer to Russian aggression. However, EU received more attention in 2013, when the Association Agreement (AA) between Georgia and the EU was initiated. Georgia's effort was finally appreciated by the EU. It can be said that AA made EaP to look more successful from Georgian perspective.<fnref n="20" /> The next chapter aims to analyze the Eastern partnership policy from the Georgian Perspective. I will conclude the most significant steps that has been made under this policy.

## EASTERN PARTNERSHIP POLICY: THE GEORGIAN PERSPECTIVE

The eastern partnership policy is not a product of EU's internal issues. Increase perception of insecurity, threat and risk resulting from events such as Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, the violence in the Moldovan elections in 2009 and the Ukraine-Russia gas crisis in 2009 led to the development of EaP. The policy added a multilateral dimension for ensuring security to the east, but firstly retained similar Marco-framework and method for engagement, and importantly the same tensions and trade-offs between the normative/duty and risk threat narratives. <fnref n="21" /> For Georgia the threat of military aggression from Russia is a main concern. None 'froze' conflicts have seen any movement towards a solution. Conversely, Russia enhanced military support to unilaterally recognized parts of Georgia. Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia sees the eastern partnership policy as added value, but feels that its security concerns are ignored. <fnref n="22" />

Georgia seems to be satisfied with the EaP's bilateral incentives and possibilities for multilateral cooperation. But as a Georgian expert emphasizes, "the region has significant security concerns, that may not be governed solely with the soft measures offered by the EaP. The EU's response to Russia's failure to fulfil the 2008 peace accord remains too soft and inconsistent". The

<footnote n="18">¹⁸Monacu O. (2009), The Eastern Partnership – A premise for an enhanced EU-Eastern Neighboring cooperation Relationship, Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 9, No.4,</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Grant CH., A new neighborhood policy for the EU, Center for European Policy reform brief, retrieved form http://cerlive.thomaspaterson.co.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/pb_grant_neighbourhood_11 march11-170.pdf [accessed 28 May 2017]</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰Sharashelidze T., The Eastern Partnership, the view from Georgia, retrieved from http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_georgia3025 [accessed 30 May 2017]</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Christou G.(2011), Multilateralism, Conflict Prevention and the Eastern Partnership, European Foreign Affairs Review, 16:207-225, 2011 Kluwer law international BV. P415</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²²Shapovalova N. (2010), the EU's Eastern Partnership: one year backwards, Fride, A European think Tank For global action, p1, p9</footnote>
policy has a great potential. Political leadership and society of Georgia see no alternative to integration into Western structures. EU integration is priority for society as we as for the government. It even has higher priority on Georgian policy addenda than NATO membership, which is postponed for the foreseeable future. 23 Before the EaP was launched, there were significant developments between EU and Georgian relationship. In 2010, Georgia and EU started to negotiate about the association agreement. Later, they signed visa facilitation agreement. Competition polices and food safety regulations started to harmonize with EU level. Nowadays EaP is still new for the country.

Most Georgian people consider themselves as a part of the European continent. In general, Georgian government officials and lawmakers are showing optimism towards the EaP contrasted with their dissatisfaction of the ENP. Georgian state Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration, Giorgi Baramidze, stated that the EaP would go “far beyond the current ENP framework. Public officials think that the principle of differentiation is valued more in this policy. Georgia criticized the approach of EU neighborhood policy when it did not differentiate between South Caucasian countries. The EaP in Georgia does not serve only social and economic goals but most likely it serves security issues. On one side, public officials reveal critics towards the policy and say that it misses security and conflict resolution dimensions. They feel that EU is a soft power. However, on the other hand government officials consider that the Eastern partnership policy with its incentives and principles is more credible compared to the European Neighborhood Policy and its shortcomings. 24

"Georgian academics agree with decision-makers that the inadequate security and conflict resolution dimension is the major flaw of the EaP. It is emphasized that expanding the security scope of the EaP will be "a decisive" determinant of the EaP's success in Georgia. This is underlined even by a political scientist from Abkhazia stating that an expanded EaP focus on this issue "is the only way to transform the context of the conflict and make it possible to alter public discourse in Abkhazia and Georgia toward new ideas for conflict resolution."<fnref n="25" />

To make it more clear, the Eastern Partnership policy offers to Georgia innovations which are not included in the European Neighborhood Policy. This innovations can be sorted in the following way:

1. Association Agreement, which with the aim of economic integration embraces the Agreement on Deep and Comprehensive Trade with Europe (DCFTA);

2. Pacts on Mobility and Security, which implies simplification of visa regime and cooperation with the EU in combat corruption, organized crime and illegal migration;

3. Comprehensive institution building (aiming to support good governance);

4. Promotion to Energetic security (either in member-state or in the territory of the EU) by financing infrastructure sphere and by other ways;

5. Intensive cooperation in the issues connected with protection of environment and climate;

6. Deepening contacts between people;

<footnote n="23">²³ Shapovalova N. (2010), the EU's Eastern Partnership: one year backwards, Fride, A European think Tank For global action gv10</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Rinnert D. ,Georgia and the Eastern Partnership: Perceptions and Viewpoint from Tbilisi retrieved from http://centruminicjatyw.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/YEaPPublication.pdf#page=65 , [accessed 30 May 2017], p76</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Rinnert D. ,Georgia and the Eastern Partnership: Perceptions and Viewpoint from Tbilisi retrieved from http://centruminicjatyw.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/YEaPPublication.pdf#page=65 , [accessed 30 May 2017], p78</footnote>
7. Promotion of cooperation between public civil organizations and the government in partner-states and increase of their inclusion in solution of the mentioned problems.<fnref n="26" />

I personally think that one of the most important changes which was brought by the Eastern partnership Policy to Georgia, was that the role and the recognition of non-governmental organizations is higher. The EaP has led to increased opportunities for NGOs in Georgia and it has given them new means and ways for empowerment. EU clearly has less direct impact on imposing or supporting democratic change within third countries. The impact of the EaP on NGO empowerment has been strongly influenced by how the other actors involved, in this case the EU and Georgian government, have recognized the role of the NGO. <fnref n="27" />

As Dali Gabelaia argues in her article, adoption of the law was one of the important and complex requirement. The Problem in this aspect was that Georgian authorities had the wrongful understanding of the essence of the law due to the law level of awareness. Georgian Legislation straggled a lot until it finally adopted the law on prohibition of all kind of discrimination. The issue of protection of minority rights was problematic for Georgian Society from the beginning. May 17, 2913 is a good argument to prove this fact. When the draft law was adopted, it was different from the original one and was criticized by nongovernmental and religious organizations. The mains reason of disagreement was between the Orthodox Church and authorities. In the end the law was adopted. While the nongovernmental organizations criticized the draft law for removal of the effective mechanism of enforcement introduced by initial draft. Despite serious turmoil, On May 2, 2014, the Georgian Parliament adopted the law at its third reading.<fnref n="28" />

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EAP IN GEORGIA

We can divide the implementation of the Eastern partnership policy in Georgia in five main
elements: Association agreement, Visa facilitation, Law governance, civil society forums and
Comprehensive Institution building program.

The Association Agreement (AA) between EU and Georgia officially began in Batumi,
Georgia on July 15, 2010. The ratification of AA replaced the outdated PCA as a legal bases of
bilateral relations. By launching AA, EU has expressed that the EaP incentives are credible and
achievable for partner countries even though it may take long until the Association agreement is
finalized. <fnref n="29" /> The AAs between EU and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are the most ambitious
among all EU association agreements with third countries. This agreements contain various
novelties. Scholars describe this agreements in three main words: comprehensives, complexity and
conditionality. Comprehensiveness means that the agreement are framework agreements which
embrace the whole spectrum of EU activities. In order to achieve complexity, they are equipped
with multiple specific provisions on legislative and regulatory approximation. And finally, in order
to achieve the conditionality the government of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are obliged to
provide reports to the EU in line with approximation deadlines specified in the Agreements. In

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Paresashvili N., Abashishvili A., Policy implementation of the eastern Partnership in Georgia, Faculty of Economics and Business, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University Street #2 doi:10.13165/VPA-13-12-4-09, p637</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ The Eastern Partnership: civil society in between the European and domestic level: the case of Georgia, East European Politics, Vol.30, issue 1, 2014, p67</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Gabelaia D., Georgia’s right to ‘European Dream’, Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy, Tallinn Law School, p214-2015</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Rinnert D., Georgia and the Eastern Partnership: Perceptions and Viewpoint from Tbilisi retrieved from http://centruminicjatyw.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/YEaPPublication.pdf#page=65, [accessed 30 May 2017] ,p11</footnote>
addition to the drafting of progress reports, which is a common practice within the EU's strategy, the monitoring procedure may include the participation of EU institutions, bodies and agencies, non-governmental bodies, supervisory authorities, independent experts and others depending on circumstances. <fnref n="30" />

The visa facilitation is another key aspect of the Eastern partnership policy. After the war of 2008, EU promised Georgia to grant it with the visa free regime. However, it did not happen until Georgia began negotiation with EaP. Finally, in 2010 Georgia and EU signed visa facilitation agreement which was signed and passed by the European Parliament in December 2010. This agreement contains a visa free reduction for Georgian citizens from 60 to 35 euros as well as some procedural simplifications and a reduction of required visa application document. <fnref n="31" />

"Eastern partners are first expected to sign visa facilitation and re-admission agreements with the EU. EU incentives offered under visa facilitation agreements include simplified procedures and shorter delays for obtaining EU visas, reduced visa fees for short-stay visas As well as simplified criteria for multiple-entry visas for certain categories of persons. While these measures represent tangible progress over the previous schemes, they are less significant for Georgia than for Moldova or Ukraine because of the country's remoteness from the EU. The costs incurred by Georgian citizens travelling to the EU minimize the importance of visa fee reduction." <fnref n="32" />

The year of 2017 is very important year for Georgia as the visa free regime is finalized and the citizens of the country have right to travel in the territory of MS without visas. From March 2008 Georgian citizens entered EU without visas. As part of the EU-Georgia Visa Liberalization Action plan Georgia was obliged to adopt a law on elimination various forms of discrimination. In April 2014, the Government has submitted the draft to the Parliament. The law was adopted on 2 May 2014. Following the signature of the president the law on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination has entered into force officially. <fnref n="33" />

Law governance process should be considered in a high level. Harmonization within the EU law is a necessary precondition for Georgian progress of EaP related programs such as Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. In recent years, some significant laws were passed in Georgia. In my point of view the most important one was the undiscriminating law. <fnref n="34" />

In 2009, civil society forum was launched. Until today, 62 civil society organizations have become as a part of Georgian Civil Society platform. Another key program within the Eastern Partnership policy is the development of ICB programme in early 2011. the budget of EaP is towered together to this program. <fnref n="35" />

While talking about the Eastern partnership program it is important to highlight the cost that has been done by the European Union to Georgia. Having outlined first results of the EaP's implementation in Georgia, the following parts of this study aim at revealing more general prospects

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Rinnert D. ,Georgia and the Eastern Partnership: Perceptions and Viewpoint from Tbilisi retrieved from http://centruuminicjatyw.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/YEaPPublication.pdf#page=65 , [accessed 30 May 2017] , p11</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³²Meandering Europeanization. EU policy instruments and policy convergence in Georgia under the Eastern Partnership, retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21599165.2013.807804?needAccess=true, [accessed 30 May 2017] p350</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/2339687 (last time checked 10.03.17)</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ Rinnert D. ,Georgia and the Eastern Partnership: Perceptions and Viewpoint from Tbilisi retrieved from http://centruuminicjatyw.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/YEaPPublication.pdf#page=65 , [accessed 30 May 2017] , p11</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ Rinnert D. ,Georgia and the Eastern Partnership: Perceptions and Viewpoint from Tbilisi retrieved from http://centruuminicjatyw.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/YEaPPublication.pdf#page=65 , [accessed 30 May 2017] , p11</footnote>
of the policy initiative in the South Caucasian republic. Budget for Georgia increases significantly under the EaP.

"While it received 120 million from 2007 – 2010 via the ENPI, this amount augments by 50% to 180 million from 2011-2013 if reforms will be carried out. All financial contributions to Georgia are delivered within four priority areas Together, the EU and Georgia develop specific bi- and multilateral projects related to these areas. With increasing direct contributions of the EU, the EaP seems to improve financial shortcomings of the ENP. Nevertheless, financial support of 180 million for three years remains a small sum considering Georgia's enormous domestic reform costs in areas such as the judicial system. Furthermore, the EaP National Indicative Program (NIP) budget appears to be less substantial in light of the EU post-conflict assistance package for Georgia from 2008-2010. At a donor conference following the August war, the EU pledged 483.5 million while the entire aid program amounts to 3.44 billion"<fnref n="36" />

Governance by conditionality has impacted the practices of policy convergence in Georgia. Imposing strict conditionality and establishing linkages between sectorial require, the Eastern partnership Policy has strengthened the EU's reach and generated more systematic convergence with Georgia. <fnref n="37" />

## CONCLUSION

To sum up, the ENP raised the expectation that this policy would enable harmonization of the east neighborhood countries of the EU to the Union. The Policy seemed at first glance well placed to allow the EU to temper interests and values with consideration for the well-being of its eastern partners. However, this result was not achieved. For a lot of years EU has gradually showcased it's willing to be a conflict manager and global security manager. Many efforts of the Union has been ad hoc. The accomplishments in 2008 during the Georgian-Russian war and the recent visa free regime which was granted to Georgian citizens prove that Union sees Georgian's desire for its Eutrophication.

On the other hand, EaP is more successful instrument. The paper showcased how important this policy is for Georgia. It can be said that Georgian authority's point of view about the Eastern Partnership policy is divided into parts. The first pars sees and appreciates the increased potential of the EaP compared to ENP while the other group criticizes the Policy.

Finally, I will answer the question which is asked in the first part of this paper. How the EaP does differs from ENP and how can Georgia benefit from the new policy? The missing security and conflict resolution is a major flow of the EaP. The EaP introduce an increased compliance with EU standards in Georgia. However, the conflict resolution issue remains still unclear.

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The EU as a modest ‘force for good’: the European Neighborhood Policy International Affairs 84: 1 (2008) 81–96© 2008 The Author(s). Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs ESTHER BARBÉ AND ELISABETH JOHANSSON-NOGUÉS,
# European Union Eastern Partnership Programme in Georgia

ELENE BERAIA

TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

E-MAIL: ELENEBERAIA1@GMAIL.COM

**Abstract:** The purpose of this research paper is to identify the relationship between Georgia and the EU. Also how effective is Eastern Partnership (EaP) and how Georgia can avoid the pressure from Russia. There are also discussed developments in Georgia, which are funded by the EU and how is democratic reforms helping country to become more democratic. In conclusion suggestions and opinions are given what the EU and Georgia should do from both sides to keep peace in the Caucasus region and how the EaP should be reformed, in order to face challenges properly, which Georgia has.

**Keywords:** Eastern Partnership, Georgia, Russia, polls, criticism, communication

## INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Georgia and the EU has never been as strong as it is today. Georgia became part of Eastern Partnership (EaP), which is focused on South Caucasian region and tries to conduct reforms, which will guarantee development of democracy and safety in the region. It can be seen as an economic and conflict resolution mechanism within the region.<fnref n="1" />

However some experts think that after the crisis in Ukraine, the EaP doesn't correspond to the demands of the partner countries and it fails as cooperation. The research question will be: Why is EaP cooperation beneficial tool for Georgia to become closer to the EU and conduct successful reform? The paper will focus on Georgia's relationship with the EU, what is EaP itself, its weaknesses and strong points, how Georgia citizens view new reforms, Russia as a threat will be discussed, what should be done from EU and Georgian government's side to have successful reforms and what achievements Georgia has reached so far. In the end research question will be answered and some suggestions will given. The different facts will be discussed and my opinions will be also included. There are used different materials: books, working papers, policy briefs, facts sheets and EU official documents.

## EU-GEORGIA

First of all I would like to discuss the relationship between Georgia and the EU in general, form where does it start and what does it cover. The relationship dates back from the time when Georgia got independence after the dismantle of the Soviet Union and started active cooperation with EU. The EU was the first to help Georgia to form Democratic society. The European Commission opened its delegation in Tbilisi in 1995 and the first document between Georgia and EU was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1999.<fnref n="2" />

<footnote n="1">¹ Costea, S. (2012). The European Union's Eastern Partnership: the objective of regional cooperation. The Eastern Partnership and the Europe 2020 strategy: Visions of leading policymakers and academics, 51-60.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Chochia, A.; Popjanevski, J. (2016). Change of Power and Its Influence on Country's Europeanization Process. Case Study: Georgia. In: Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Ed.). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership</footnote>
The most important event happened in June 2014, when the EU and Georgia signed an Association Agreement, which deepened political and economical ties between those two. Up till now EU plays a significant role in the development of Georgia.

So how exactly EU supports Georgia? First of all EU helps financially and technically. At the moment more than 100 projects are being conducted in Georgia. On 18 July 2014, Georgia signed a memorandum with EU from 2014 till 2017. This cooperation is focused on reforms in public administration and justice sectors, also on agriculture and countryside developments. The entire fund for this reforms are between €335 and €410 million.<fnref n="3" />

The second important support is for conflict resolutions. The EU continues to support Georgia's efforts to settle relationship with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It supports Georgia's territorial sovereignty. The EU conducts monitoring mission since September 2008, which helps in monitoring the situation in the conflict territorial borders of Georgia.

Georgia on the other hand is actively involved in the EU's crisis management operations. A Framework Agreement on participation of Georgia in CSDP(the common security and defense policy) operations entered into force in March 2014. The most recent news is visa liberalization, about which agreement started in March 2011. Today Georgia citizens can freely move within EU borders.<fnref n="4" />

As we see Georgia and EU have very tight connections with each other and that is caused by Georgia willingness to become member of the European union and be the part of the democratic society.

## THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME

In order to be closer with the EU, Georgia became member of EaP. “The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is a joint initiative of the EU and its Eastern European partners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. It was established in 2009 at the EU Prague Summit, in order to bring those countries closer to the EU. The Eastern Partnership supports and encourages reforms in the EaP member countries for the benefit of their citizens.”<fnref n="5" />

The partnership is based on the following principles:

* Supremacy of Law;

* Good management;

* Protection of human rights;

* Respect and protection of minorities;

* Market economy;

* Sustainable development.<fnref n="6" />

<footnote>Policy (197–210). Springer International Publishing; Chochia, A. (2012). The European Union and its policy towards the neighbors from South Caucasus. L'Europe unie/United Europe, 6, 27–35.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ European Union, External Action Service (2016). Facts sheet, EU-Georgia relations. Brussels, July 2016. Pp. 1-5.
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/factsheets/docs/eu-georgia_factsheet_en.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy.
Springer International Publishing</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Nino Paresashvili and Avtandil Abashishvili (2013). Policy implementation of the Eastern Partnership in Georgia.
Faculty of Economics and Business, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University. January 2013. P. 636.</footnote>
Members share their best practice and experience between each other to guarantee
development and safety in the region. According to the aims and values of the Eastern Partnership,
Cooperation Platforms have been created:

* Platform 1: democracy, efficient governance and stability;

* Platform 2: economic integration and convergence with the EU policy;

* Platform 3: protection of environment, change of the climate and energetic security;

* Platform 4: contacts between people.

Each platform has developed its own aims and working programs that guarantee effective implementation of the Eastern Partnership Program.<fnref n="7" />

So that means partner countries should focus on above-mentioned issues and try to conduct
reforms, which will be in compliance with the EU rules and which will guarantee further
developments in relationship between the EU and them.

EAP AND GEORGIA

One of the main factors, according to which Georgia became part of The Eastern Partnership (EaP) was the need of the safety. The cooperation was officially established after the 2008 Russia-Georgian war and was viewed as an EU answer to Russian aggression. So that Russia could see that Georgia wasn't alone and it wanted to become part of the EU. After the AA, the EaP was seen more realistic change in order to become more successful in Georgia's perspective. The AA itself is a significant achievement for Georgia, because after that many major developments have been achieved. For example, Georgia has restored its food security agency. Maybe there still are some issues still related to food security in Georgia, but the fact that this mechanism has started to work is quite big deal. <fnref n="8" />

In 2012 there were some cases of violence against minorities, which became an alarming topic for human rights activists. The law was adopted, but its up to Georgian citizens how will they benefit from it from now on. A Personal Data Protection Inspector's office was created in order to guarantee protection of the basic human rights. Moreover, Georgia also has a labour inspection office. This office is still quite weak, but it collects facts and cases of abuse. The real problem is still a lack of information in society, people don't know still how they can benefit from the relationship with the EU.

The most significant feature of EaP is The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which is at the same time an opportunity and a challenge for Georgia. Georgian export is focused on drinks and rural products, which are mainly meant for post Soviet countries. The main problem is the lack of the knowledge about the opportunities, which the European market can give to Georgian citizens. Also the standard and quality control of the Georgian products should become more regulated and stricter. It will still need some time to raise interest towards the EU market. In order to change situation, in 2013, under the guidance of the Euro-Atlantic Integration, the Information Centre of NATO was created. This agency helps to raise knowledge and opportunities, which EU offers to Georgia.<fnref n="9" />

<footnote n="7">⁷ Ibid. pp. 637-638.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Tornike Sharashenidze. Riga and beyond, what future for the Eastern Partnership? Food-for-thought paper:Georgia.
ECFR Riga Series. Views from EAP Countries. p. 16. http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Riga_Series_EAP_Countries.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Ibid. pp. 17-18.</footnote>
Even if such problems exist there are still some positive changes. Georgian export rose up to 12% in the first six months of the DCFTA. Also small and medium sized enterprises were created in order to support new investments in Georgia.<fnref n="10" />

Another important topic in EaP is energy security, which includes different activities within the framework of the Energy Community. Under the EU4Energy initiative, the effectiveness and clarity of energy markets are achieved by improving the availability and quality of data for consumers, investors, researchers and policy makers, better management and analyses of data.<fnref n="11" />

The document “South Corridor”, approved in the Prague summit, gives a specific plan for cooperation in energetic sphere, in which Georgia plays a significant role.<fnref n="12" /> Also partner countries take part in different EU agencies and programmes. For example: Erasmus +, Creative Europe, Cosme and Horizon 2020.<fnref n="13" />

The latest achievement is visa liberalization, which means that Georgia citizens can travel within EU easier, with biometric passports and without visas. As Georgia Prime-Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili tweeted on 28 March 2017 when the visa-free regime with the EU was officially launched: “Georgia is returning to the European family.” This achievement can be seen as an important tangible benefit towards Georgia’s European integration process.<fnref n="14" />

So as we can see the cooperation within the EaP is based on the principle “more for more”, which means more support from the European Union in exchange for more progress towards democratic reforms.<fnref n="15" />

After such significant steps made by Georgia many Georgian politicians, academics, and civil society activists are now observing what could be the next step in EU-Georgia relations. The EU acknowledges the importance of bilateralism in its relations with EaP countries. This is because the needs of countries are different and this is the factor to prevent the common approach. However, it may be unappealing to the EU, because Georgia’s political importance may be not so important. So the best case is to have both bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for cooperation with the EU.<fnref n="16" />

## RUSSIA

One of the main challenges, which EU and EaP countries have is to avoid Russian diplomatic and propaganda pressure. According to the European Council on Foreign Relations report, which was intended to analyze the differences between the EU member states about their general foreign policy towards Russia. According to the report, governments are torn between two approaches

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ European Union, External Action Service (2016). Facts sheet, EU-Georgia relations. Brussels, July 2016. Pp. 1-5. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/factsheets/docs/eu-georgia_factsheet_en.pdf pp. 1-2.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ European Commission. JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT. Eastern Partnership - Focusing on key priorities and deliverables.Brussels, 15.12.2016. p. 28. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/swd_2016_467_f1_joint staff working paper en_v3_p1_8733051.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Nino Paresashvili and Avtandil Abashishvili. Policy implementation of the Eastern Partnership in Georgia. Faculty of Economics and Business. Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University. 2013. P 642.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Facts sheet. Eastern Partnership. A policy that delivers. Brussels, 21 May, 2015. P. 2 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/factsheets/docs/factsheet_eastern_partnership_en.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Lebanese B. Policy brief. Georgia's European Integration: What Comes After The Eastern Partnership? Georgian Institute of Politics. April 2017/Issue #6. pp. 3-4. http://gip.ge/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Policy-Brief-6-Bidzina-Lebanidze-2.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF) and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. "Who is Who in Brussels on Georgia and the South Caucasus." European Initiative - Liberal Academy. Tbilisi, 2012. P 23. http://www.ei-lat.ge/images/doc/who%20is%20who_epf_ei-lat_eng.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Chochia, A. (2013). Models of European Integration: Georgia's Economic and Political Transition. (Tallinn University of Technology). TUT Press..</footnote>
towards Russia. One side sees Russia as a threat that needs to be controlled with “soft-containment,” the other side sees it as a potential partner that can be changed through “creeping integration” into the European system. However, at the current moment we see that Russia’s relations with the EU are filled with uncertainty and political conflicts. Russia at the same time builds strategic bilateral partnerships with certain countries.<fnref n="17" />

Russia has been against closer relationship between the members countries of EaP and the EU. Russian leaders could’t accept the “Western” choice of them and the proof was the case in 2008 when Russia intruded in Georgia and when in 2014 Moscow occupied Crimea and started military intervention in Donbas. The situation got worse when the signing of the AAs became a realistic scenario. Russian government thinks that EaP countries are part of it and somewhat it can be seen as a desire to revive the Soviet Union and old glory of Russian empire. In order to accomplish its desire, Moscow established its own integration project in 2015, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which includes two EaP countries, Armenia and Belarus. The authorities of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine stay firm on their opinion that they aren’t interested in joining the EEU. As we can see still Russian authorities, despite enormous efforts, haven’t been able to change the European choice of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in the following years. This shows that Russia isn’t all powerful, however it can bring destabilization in those countries.<fnref n="18" />

The lack of common long term strategy towards Russia, might be a benefit for Russia itself.<fnref n="19" /> Because of this EU should come up with a plan to stop the pressure from Russia, which will be effective and not just a text on the paper.

## PUBLIC OPINION

It is interesting to know what are Georgia citizens thoughts about the EU in General and how they see the future. It is necessary to see if Georgian citizens really are willing to become part of the European values and also this fact guarantees farther development of EaP in Georgia, since EU is founder of this cooperation.

In 2013 there was a survey, which asked: “if there was a referendum tomorrow, would you support Georgia’s accession to the EU?” 83 % of Georgian speaking respondents and 38% of non-Georgian speakers, minorities answered yes. However it should be noted that that people who answered yes, considered that Georgia wasn’t yet ready to become member of the EU. Only 13 % of Georgian speakers thought that the country was ready.<fnref n="20" />

According to the 2014 European Neighbourhood Barometer survey, 25% of Georgians don’t trust the EU and 26% would prefer to join the Eurasian Economic Union. Specialists who are against EU, say that they are afraid either of the political relations to worthen with Russia and losing opportunities to trade with it, or of the harmful influence of Western culture on the traditional Georgian way of life. Such views can be influenced by “Eurasian” NGOs and pro-Russia media sources. On the other hand the 68% of Georgians still support integration with the EU. What can

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Kristina Bocková and Marek Lenč. Eastern Partnership Reality Check. The case of Moldova and Georgia. East European Security Research Initiative. POLICY BRIEF. March 2015. P 2-3.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ The Stefan Batory Foundation and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Eastern Partnership Revisited. Warsaw 2015. P 14-15. http://www.fes-europe.eu/fileadmin/public/editorfiles/publications/575_12002_1_.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹Kristina Bocková and Marek Lenč. Slovakia. Eastern Partnership Reality Check, the case of Moldova and Georgia. Published at: LENČ, M. –BOCKOVÁ, K. 2014. ISSN 2257-3690 P. 165. http://www.academia.edu/11290053/Eastern_Partnership_Reality_Check._The_case_of_Moldova_and_Georgia</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Hug, A. (2015) Trouble in the Neighbourhood? The future of the EU's Eastern Partnership. The Foreign Policy Centre. European Commission. p. 47.</footnote>
be the reason for such results? The government conducted reforms, in agriculture, social policy, health care, the justice sector, public administration and local government, but of course results may not be satisfactory as citizens expected. The overall mood in society is negative regarding the economic policies of the government and living conditions. On the other hand we can see positive changes as well, for example healthcare reforms and the situation regarding human rights and the freedom of speech. 21

The 2014 polls show that jobs 63%, poverty 32% and territorial integrity 30% are the most critical issues for the Georgian population. Despite this, the country's population considers EU integration as an instrument in order to solve the above mentioned issues. 22

Yet another survey conducted by NDI in August 2014 aimed in finding out what was the attitude of the Georgian population towards the Association Agreement. According to the survey, 79% of the Georgian population knew that Georgia had signed the Association Agreement with the EU and 69% of those positively rated this step. 58% expected the economy to improve and 33% hoped that security would strengthen. More jobs 13% and the territorial integrity 10% were also expected as a result of European Integration.

The results of the above mentioned surveys show that support for European integration is high and the population expects that the biggest problems facing the country will be solved after joining the EU.<fnref n="23" /> The development is slow, but changes can be seen in everyday life.

## WHAT SHOULD BE DONE FROM GEORGIA'S SIDE?

So on behalf of Georgian government what should be done to conduct successful reforms concerning EaP and for integration in to the EU. The Georgia Government should focus on reforms that are top priority for the country. The serious problem is the government's tendency to influence institutional bodies and get decisions, which are satisfactory for them. The targets are justice sector and local government reforms. Another problem is political fight with the opposition. From the EU's point of view, the independence of Georgian judiciary system and prosecutor's office is the top priority in the country, which was mentioned by the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk in Brussels on 26 February 2015, when meeting with the Georgian prime minister, Irakli Gharibashvili.<fnref n="24" /> So that means that in order to conduct successful reforms it is important to have efficient governance and supremacy of law. Also, there should not be any selective justice.

Representatives of local government should come up with a strategy, so that the citizens will also be involved in policy planning. This will lead to the situation, where person can trust the local institutions more. Involvement of wider society in the improvement of the legislation, will guarantee more fair and democratic decisions. Corruption is still seen in the country and effective measures are needed to eliminate and prevent corruption among the members of the Georgian government.<fnref n="25" />

<footnote n="21">21 Teona Turashvili, Konrad Zasztowt. Georgia after the Riga Eastern Partnership Summit. The Polish institute of International affairs. Policy brief. No. 17 (119), May 2015. P 1-2.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 Hug, A. (2015) Trouble in the Neighbourhood? The future of the EU's Eastern Partnership. The Foreign Policy Centre. European Commission. p. 47.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">23 Ibid. p. 48.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">24 Teona Turashvili, Konrad Zasztowt. Georgia after the Riga Eastern Partnership Summit. The Polish institute of International affairs. Policy brief. No. 17 (119), May 2015. P 1-2.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">25 Ibid. p. 6</footnote>
## WHAT SHOULD BE DONE FROM THE EU'S SIDE?

The EU officials, together with representatives of local civil society, should monitor developments closely and push the EaP governments to conduct relevant measures to resolve the problems. The EU should support local government reforms in Georgia and have deeper relations. At the same time, the focus should be on raising awareness among the citizens of Georgia, about the main advantages of the reform, which EaP suggests. The EU should conduct special seminars and events not only in Tbilisi, but also in the regions.

There is always a danger from Russian financed NGOs and media, which are focused on to spread the false information about the EU. It is well-known that South Caucasus region is very chaotic region, because of its' location and Russia as a neighbour. Therefore the EU should define its long-term future goals.<fnref n="26" /> Also a practical approach should be found, how AA/DCFTA and the EEU can exist together in the region.<fnref n="27" />

So as we can see even though the reforms are continuing in Georgia, there are still challenges, which must be overcome. This could be achieved only by thorough planned and rational strategy, on which the EU, Georgian government and public sector should be working on.

## CRITICISM

The EaP is often criticized. Some say that it is unsuccessful, because it is less stable and less favourable for the EU and EaP members. However I think that it depends on how the EaP concept is understood. Obviously it can't be seen as a miraculous remedy for all the problems in the countries of Eastern Europe. The failure of the EaP can be seen in a situation, where, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Armenia are somewhat not really engaged in the processes.<fnref n="28" />

Another problem is the question: "how much of the EU policy towards the six EaP countries should be common and how much should be diverse?"

The EU politicians, diplomats and experts have different opinions, but recently they have agreed that the EaP countries should be divided into two groups and the EU should offer a different methods to the three countries, which have signed AAs and DCFTAs and a different approach to those, which haven't. This is because the EU should consider the European choice of the partner countries and their successful reforms in order to build a democratic society and a well-functioning economy, which could change the situation in the entire region.<fnref n="29" />

However, many EU diplomats and experts say that a specific policy towards the three association countries wouldn't mean that the other three EaP countries, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus will be ignored by the EU.<fnref n="30" />

At the current moment the EU faces many internal problems, concerning Eurozone crisis, Brexit and the surge of the refugees. Those asylum seekers are mostly from Asiatic and African countries and also from Syria, where is a war. Because of this many think that this may be the reason why the EU doesn't give enough attention to the Eastern European countries at the moment.<fnref n="31" />

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Neil Melvin and Giulia Prelz Oltramonti. Managing conflict and integration in the South Caucasus: A challenge for European Union. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.Policy Brief. November 2015. p. 7</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ The Stefan Batory Foundation and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Poland. Eastern Partnership Revisited. Associated Countries in Focus. Warsaw, 2015. p 12-13</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Troitiño, D. R. (2013). European Integration: Building Europe. Nova Publishers: New York.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Ibid. p. 14-15</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Ibid. p. 16</footnote>
I think in general EaP can be considered effective as an official package of EU proposals. The situation in Georgia is much better based on the following reforms. The EaP package includes three elements: firstly the AA and DCFTA with the EU, secondly visafree travel with the EU and the membership of the Energy Community created in 2006 for the Western Balkan countries.

The signing of the AAs and DCFTAs by Georgia must be considered as a big success because by giving visa liberalisation to Georgian citizens, but showed also other Eastern European countries, that their citizens are welcomed in Europe. We can say for sure that, ten years ago, nobody could have imagined that such incident would have been possible to happen. This opportunity allows a new, much more higher level of people-to-people contacts between the EU and partner countries.<fnref n="32" />

It should be understandable in Georgia's case that, while the EaP has the potential to become a more effective Neighborhood Policy, it isn't a suitable tool to be as an effective conflict policy. It wasn't designed as a policy to stop conflict issues in the first place.<fnref n="33" />

It could be said that Georgia has effectively used the chance given to it by the EaP.

## COMMUNICATION

The following state organs in Georgia help to set up communication between EU and Georgian government. The office of the State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration supervises how successfully Georgian government's conducts activities regarding the European integration. The Georgian Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development has an obligation in front of its citizens to explain the main idea and the process of implementation of the DCFTA. The ministry has launched a web-page, which informs public about the EaP. The Georgian government has also set up communications strategy regarding the EU integration for the period of 2014-2017. This document involves information about government aims, methods and other plans. This document together with annual action plans for different institutions provide a good basis for the communication with the EU. In order to inform the public about the future plans, the information center of NATO was created in 2005 under the supervision of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. The center is called "Information Center on NATO and EU". The center's main task is to inform the public about the EU benefits. The center cooperates closely with EU Member States and also with youth organisations, medical staff, farmers, public servants of local authorities and others in Georgia. The center also started to create new media projects and launched campaigning activities in order to promote EU integration. The EU Delegation in Georgia organises many initiatives to promote the EU and the AA/DCFTA within the country and is issuing relevant information materials, including factsheets. The delegation is actively using cultural events and youth initiatives for engaging with the younger generation.<fnref n="34" />

As we have discussed above, the public opinion polls and surveys showed that the majority of the population doesn't know information about the process of integration of Georgia to the European Union and result was wrong recognition and the development of stereotypes and myths.<fnref n="35" /> That's why it is important to talk on televisions, on social media and publicly about the benefits of the EU in general to broaden society's knowledge about it.

<footnote n="32">³² Ibid. p. 12.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ Fean, F. (2009) Making Good Use of the EU in Georgia: the “Eastern Partnership” and Conflict Policy. September. p. 19.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ The Eastern Partnership Review. EU-related communication in Eastern Partnership countries. Estonian Centre of Eastern Partnership. No. 22. May 2015.P 16</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ Ibid. p. 17.</footnote>
## CURRENT SITUATION

Within the period 2014-2017 Georgia is getting EUR 335 million and EUR 410 million partially from the ENI umbrella programme, which is considered as a reward mechanism given for the building deep and sustainable democracy within the country. It finances the following programmes focusing on the support of public institutions, the development of rural business and protection of the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups. Also to support the DCFTA, the small business and reforms in the justice sector.

The funding will help Georgian government and the business community to adapt to the new challenges and opportunities of trade after signing the AA/DCFTA. The funding will make stronger the policy framework and national legislation on small business, improve market observation, engage with business associations, make it easier to get access to banking and promote business-oriented cooperation among small farmers.

Social involvemnet is very important in this situation, since the DCFTA support programmes target is creating job job opportunities for vulnerable people, including internally displaced persons. There are still more than 250000 internally displaced persons in Georgia, form Abkhazia and South Ossetia, because of the unresolved conflicts. This people experience above average unemployment rates.

The programme focuses on justice system reforms as well, in order to launch a new and deeper key reforms in criminal and juvenile justice. The independence, professionalism, impartiality and efficiency of the judiciary are the main priorities. Also access to justice and a fair trial and the reform of private and administrative law.

The ENPARD ( the “European neighbourhood programme for agriculture and rural development”). It is a successful example of EU–Georgia cooperation to raise growth in rural economy, which brings together public institutions and small farmers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and associations, the business community, universities and schools.<fnref n="36" />

## CONCLUSION

To sum up, situation in Georgia is still quite tense, because Russia is crossing the borders every minute, therefore Georgia should work more and try to use all the opportunities it has given by the EU. I think that EaP cooperation as a package in general is an effective tool, in order to conduct different reforms and make Georgia more economically and politically democratic. It is one big step towards becoming the part of the European Family. However, regarding security and conflict resolution it needs more work. It should come up with the action plan, which will be effective against Russian aggression. The Caucasian Region is very difficult to handle, because the EU has to consider both EEU member countries and countries, which strive for their European future.

The internal problems also play vital role within the EU. The problem is that Russia for some EU member states seem a very helpful ally and important political player in suppressing was in Syria. It is also considered as a loyal and trustworthy gas supplier. Some may think that, because of refugee crisis and economic crisis EU can't solve the problems of Eastern countries well, I agree with this statement partly. This is because the fact that internal facts can't be the main reason. The other reason could be the flaws in the EaP system itself. It should be focused on each of partner

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Ibid. p. 15.</footnote>
countries separately, since those countries have different political, economical, social problems within the country, so common approach can't be used.

The multilateral platforms should be strengthened, because this will make possibilities for member states to exchange best practices and experience between each other. “More for more” principle should be the core of the EaP coopeartion, so that countries will, have more passion and motivation to conduct and strive for better situation in their countries and in the region as well.

As we see EU and EaP is funding a lot of programms, so maybe there is a need for much more increased funds, so that many more reforms will be conducted. As time goes the contribution from the EU side is increasing so that can be seen as positive step.

Georgia should focus on conducting reforms intentionally. The achievements, for example visa liberalization is the big step and country should continue in such a way. So in this process government and civil society should work together and also citizens' knowledge about the benefits of the EU and EaP should be raised. The EU should be more serious about its neighbourhood and try to become more strategic and ambitious. It is about the political will, the principles and understanding the needs of partners.

In conclusion relationship between EaP and Georgia can be considered positive. Both parties have carried out the cooperation on energy security, political and economic development and promoting security and peace.

## References

* Bocková, K.; Lenč, M. (2014). Slovakia. Eastern Partnership Reality Check, the case of Moldova and Georgia. Published at: LENČ, M. –BOCKOVÁ, K. 2014. ISSN 2257-3690.

* Bocková, K.; Lenč, M. (2015) Eastern Partnership Reality Check. The case of Moldova and Georgia. East European Security Research Initiative. POLICY BRIEF. March 2015.

* Chochia, A. (2012). The European Union and its policy towards the neighbors from South Caucasus. L'Europe unie/United Europe, 6, 27–35.

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TABLE DE MATIÈRES / SUMMARY

<table><tr><td>Maria de la Paz Pando BALLESTEROS, David Ramiro TROITIÑO: Female emigration from North Africa to Europe – Intercultural Functions</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Andréa SIMONNET: The European Union and the ASEAN's interregional relations</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>Ana MAGLAKELIDZE: Territorial conflicts in EaP countries and EU security and defense policy</td><td>26</td></tr><tr><td>Tuuli VARSA: Ukraine and the European Union</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Andrés Medina ARAVENA: Chile and the European Union: a Relationship with Privileges?</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>Ana KIKADZE: The Eastern Partnership policy and EU Neighborhood Policy in Georgia – Analyzing EU-Georgia relations</td><td>57</td></tr><tr><td>Elene BERAIA: European Union Eastern Partnership Programme in Georgia</td><td>67</td></tr></table>
**Directeur de la publication/Publication director: Dr. Michel LABORI** – Docteur d'Etat en sciences économiques et Agrégé d'histoire, ancien Professeur Jean Monnet, professeur honoraire – Université de Besançon (France)

**Editeur/Editor: Prodifmultimedia Paris**

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**Dr. Dragoş PĂUN** – assistant universitaire, Université « Babeş-Bolyai » Cluj-Napoca

**Dr. Eric OLSZAK** – enseignant-chercheur, Faculté Libre de Droit (FLD), Université Catholique de Lille, Membre de l'IDDR (Institut du développement durable et responsable)

**Dr. Bruno GUERMONPREZ** – enseignant-chercheur ISA Lille

**Dr. Boris GRÉSILLON** – maître de conférences à l'Université de Provence

**Dr. Emil DINGA** – professeur, ancien ministre de l'intégration européenne de Roumanie

**Dr. Dumitru BUDA** – enseignant, Université « Petru Maior » de Târgu-Mureş

**Dr. Flore POP** – professeur, Université « Babeş-Bolyai » Cluj-Napoca

**Dr. Lucia CATANĂ** – maître de conférences, Université « Dimitrie Cantemir » de Târgu-Mureş

**Florent VANREMORTERE** – ancien maître de conférences à l'I.E.P. de Lille

**Dr. Colin SWATRIDGE** – UK and University of Miskolc

**Anton CASIAN** – researcher Laboratory for Politics and International Relations, Romania

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**Dr. Placide MABAKA** – Professeur – Université Catholique de Lille (Faculté Libre de Droit C3RD)

**Dr. Nicolae PĂUN** – Professeur Jean Monnet, Doyen – Faculté d'études européennes, Université « Babeş-Bolyai » de Cluj-Napoca

**Dr. Didier BLANC** – Maître de conférences – Université de Perpignan « Via Domitia »

**Dr. Liviu MARIAN** – Doyen – Université « Petru Maior » de Târgu-Mureş

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**Dr. Erol KULAHCI** – Agence universitaire de la Francophonie (Bruxelles)

**Dr. Ioannis PANOUSSIS** – Professeur – Université Catholique de Lille (Faculté Libre de Droit C3RD)

**Dr. Tanel KERIKMÄE** – Professeur Jean Monnet – directeur de l'École de droit de Tallinn, Université de technologie de Tallinn

**Dr. Licínia SIMÃO** – Professeur assistant – University of Coimbra, Portugal

**Dr. Lina WILLIATE-PELLITTERI** – Professeur – Université Catholique de Lille (Faculté Libre de Droit C3RD)

**Dr. Hedi SAIDI** – Professeur – Université de Tunis

**Dr. Amelia HADFIELD** – Professeur Jean Monnet – Free University of Brussels VUB, Institute for European Studies (IES)

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