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Open licence - etalab
L'EUROPE UNIE
UNITED EUROPE

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>

No. 11 /
2017

Revue d'études européennes
PARIS
TABLE DE MATIÈRES / SUMMARY

<table><tr><td>Maria de la Paz Pando BALLESTEROS, David Ramiro TROITIÑO: Female emigration from North Africa to Europe – Intercultural Functions</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Andréa SIMONNET: The European Union and the ASEAN's interregional relations</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>Ana MAGLAKELIDZE: Territorial conflicts in EaP countries and EU security and defense policy</td><td>26</td></tr><tr><td>Tuuli VARSA: Ukraine and the European Union</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Andrés Medina ARAVENA: Chile and the European Union: a Relationship with Privileges?</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>Ana KIKADZE: The Eastern Partnership policy and EU Neighborhood Policy in Georgia – Analyzing EU-Georgia relations</td><td>57</td></tr><tr><td>Elene BERAIA: European Union Eastern Partnership Programme in Georgia</td><td>67</td></tr></table>
# Female emigration from North Africa to Europe – Intercultural Functions

MARIA DE LA PAZ PANDO BALLESTEROS<fnref n="1" />

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, PHD, SALAMANCA UNIVERSITY

DAVID RAMIRO TROITIÑO<fnref n="2" />

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, PHD, TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

**Abstract:** The current world is under a social phenomenon based on globalization. The revolution of communications, economic freedom, transportation and others are influencing an important movement of population from the poorer areas to those more developed all over the planet. The European Union is receiving immigrants from Africa and Asia that somehow are challenging the social cohesion of the European societies. This research is focused on the immigration from the Maghreb region, including Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, to Spain and the European Union, because the nationals of these three countries represent an important share of immigrants in European soil. The reference to Spain is due the difficulty to find reliable global European data about immigration, the geographical position of the country as a gate to Europe and its potential as a consistent sample for the rest of Europe. This research has focused on the female participation in this movement of population as a crucial fact to keep the migrants local identity avoiding their assimilation by the host societies or their influence as multicultural vectors in a two ways cultural communication.

**Keywords:** Immigration, Europe, Muslims, Female immigrants, integration, European Union.

## INTRODUCTION

The outstanding immigration south (Islamic)-north (European Union) in the Mediterranean have created important differentiated cultural communities in Europe. Spain as a southern border of the European Union (as a final destination or just transit area) has become a frontline of the European efforts to organize such a population movement.

Globalization is the most significant social process in the last decades as it is affecting enormously the whole planet from different perspectives, as economy, politics or social composition. However, we continue to identify it as an eminently economic process with no borders for the movement of companies, capital, technology, goods, goods, services.<fnref n="3" /> Nevertheless, globalization as planetary phenomenon implies multiple immediate consequences in all sectors. For this reason, the absence of the gender variable (the conceptual silence that Isabella Bakker calls<fnref n="4" />) in the studies and research on the subject<fnref n="5" />, makes invisible its impact on half of the population, women, especially when neoliberal economic policies have derived into significant changes in their living conditions, affecting them unequally in different parts of the planet but conditioning them in all of them.

<footnote n="1">¹ e-mail: mpaz@usal.es</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² e-mail: david.troitino@ttu.ee</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Hans-Peter, M., *La trampa de la Globalización: el ataque contra la democracia y el bienestar*. Taurus. Madrid. 1998. Doulfus, O., *La mundialización. Bellaterra. Barcelona*. 1999. Fariñas Dulce, M.J., *Globalización, ciudadanía y Derechos Humanos*. Dykinson. Madrid. 2000. Guiddens, A., *Un mundo desbocado: los efectos de la globalización en nuestras vidas*. Taurus. Madrid. 2000.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Bakker, I., “Dotar de género a la reforma de la política macroeconómica en la era de la reestructuración y el ajuste global”. Carrasco, C., *Mujeres y economía: nuevas perspectivas para viejos y nuevos problemas*. Icaria. Barcelona. 2003. pp. 245.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Agra, Mª. J., “Justicia y género: la agenda del feminismo global”. Ortega, C., Guerra, Mª. J., *Globalización y neoliberalismo: ¿Un futuro inevitable?*. Nobel. Oviedo. 2002. pp. 98.</footnote>
First, there has been a change in the labor market hardening labor conditions, a fact reflected in the practical disappearance of fixed labor and the easing of contracts, which means greater ease of dismissal of workers. In addition, workers have irregular schedules, in part-time and low-paid jobs rather than stability. Concurrently there is a strong gender segregation, where jobs that require some qualification and that are, therefore, highly paid, are performed by men who also have a training and preparation that allows them to be retrained within a changing labor market, while women and immigrants (especially if they are immigrant women) would form the group of generic workers, following the terminology of Manuel Castells<fnref n="6" />, who perform a very determined activity, which does not require any preparation and which in turn prevents them from being reconverted, thus causing the polarization of the labor market.<fnref n="7" />

Western women (but not women in Arab-Muslim countries) are increasingly accessing traditionally male jobs, to some extent reducing horizontal segregation in the "first world" where, however, there is still a strong vertical segregation, preventing women reaching positions of authority or responsibility. On the other hand, the employment is feminized increasing female employment, but at the same time it means lower wages, longer working hours, night shifts, poor training and scarce possibility of promotion for all the workers. A second negative point is added that characterizes the policies of structural adjustment of the neoliberal economy as the crisis of the welfare state cutting down the public expense that gravitates directly on the women. The reduction of investment in social policies<fnref n="8" /> implies the increase of the free work of women in care activities, as childcare, sick, elderly, etc., which reaches limits that lead to talk about a feminization of unpaid work<fnref n="9" />.

The conjunction of unemployment affecting the less retraining workers, united with the reduction of subsidies and financial aid in situations of unemployment, illness, maternity, etc. are affecting specially women. The poorest countries, main source of female migration to Europe are highly affected by this phenomenon as the economic precariousness is compounded by the absence of democratic regimes that guarantee the fulfillment of basic rights of citizens and prevent the modernization of archaic cultural traditions that discriminate women.<fnref n="10" /> It has led to a feminization of poverty<fnref n="11" />, a feminization of survival, resulting in emigration or prostitution to survive, or a feminization of social exclusion<fnref n="12" />. Globalization has perpetuated discrimination against women also at the international level, with most of their work being unpaid, unrecognized and not economically valued.<fnref n="13" />

<footnote n="6">⁶ Castells, M., “Conclusión: entender nuestro mundo”. *La era de la Información*. T. III. Alianza. Madrid. 1999.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Castaño Collado, C., “Trabajo para las mujeres en un mundo globalizado”. VVAA, *Globalización y mujer*. Pablo Iglesias. Madrid. 2002. pp. 40-41.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Navarro, V., “Globalización y mujer”. VVAA, *Globalización y mujer*. Op. Cit. pp. 153. Véase además, Cobo, R., Globalización y nuevas servidumbres de las mujeres”. Amorós, C., Miguel, A., de, *Teoría feminista: de la Ilustración a la globalización. De los debates sobre el género al multiculturalismo*. Minerva Ediciones. Madrid. 2005 pp. 265-300. Benería, L., “La globalización de la economía y el trabajo de las mujeres”. *Revista de economía y sociología del trabajo*. N°. 13-14. 1991. pp. 23-35.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Bakker, I., Op. Cit. pp. 263-64. Durán, Mª.A., *La contribución al trabajo no remunerado en la economía española*. Instituto de la Mujer. Madrid. 2000.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Kerikmäe, T.; Hamulak, O.; Chochia, A. (2016). *A Historical Study of Contemporary Human Rights: Deviation or Extinction? Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum, 4 (2), 98–115.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ < http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2002_es.pdf ></footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Sassen, S., *Contrageografías de la globalización. Género y ciudadanía en los circuitos transfronterizos*. Traficantes de sueños. Barcelona. 2003. pp. 51 ss. Berzosa, C., “La desigualdad Norte-Sur”. Villota, P., de, *Globalización y Género*. Síntesis. Madrid. 1999. pp. 99-108.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Ribero, I., “Globalización, desigualdad y mujer”. VVAA, *Globalización y mujer*. Op. Cit. pp. 16. Martínez Veiga, V., “Globalización y transformación del papel laboral de la mujer”. Maquieira, V., Vara, M.J., *Género, clase y etnia en*</footnote>
There are other negative aspects of globalization consequence of the abolishment of borders as the elimination of international obstacles to criminal activities easing the movement of large sums of money from arms trafficking or the trade of women and girls. In addition to this sexual violence, other abuses against women are also part of globalization, infanticide and abandonment of girls is increasing, the practice of genital mutilation is maintained even in girls residing in Europe, who are taken temporarily to their countries of origin to practice rituals such as the ablation of clitoris, etc. Also continues the policy of arranged marriages, which in case of not being accepted by the adolescents, many are killed by honor.

As a balance to the previously mentioned aspects, Globalization is imposing new patterns of behavior that weaken traditional roles and have a positive impact on the situation of women. The inclusion of women in the labor market, despite the poor working conditions, contributes to the rupture of the patriarchal system. In Morocco, for example, women's work is beginning to be seen as a value in itself and sometimes women earn higher wages than men working in more traditional sectors, thus reinforcing the power of female decision in the home facing the traditional male family providers. However, there are still many young women who must pay the male members of their families and many companies who, instead of paying the workers, give their salaries directly to the male relatives, thereby perpetuating gender inequalities.

On the other hand, the intensification of relations at the global level has contributed, despite the resistance, to the crisis of the traditional family model, favoring the rupture of marriage by legal divorce and separation. As a consequence new family models such as single parent families, matrilocal or de facto unions are emerging. In Morocco, for example, in the urban area, these new structures represent 21% of families<fnref n="14" />.

## NORTH AFRICAN MIGRANTS IN THE EU

Within the free circulation that allows Globalization, the mobilization of people is not the one what most interests the developed countries. Curiously, globalization increases the obstacles to the exchange of labor and to emigration in general, in countries that need it, hence the paradox.

Since the 1980s, Europe has been imposing a policy of restricting and controlling immigration to member countries of the European Union. Spain is the first European line of containment of the Maghreb immigration, and from those who transit through this area from central Africa. The geographical position of Spain, just 14 kilometers, locates the country in the priority area formed by Italy (receiving migrants from Tunis and Libya) and Greece (Asian migration) with an important impact on the whole European Union. The creation of the European Common Market including the free movement of workers and its later expansion with the Schengen agreement including the free movement of people, has practically abolished the border controls between the member states of the European Union, allowing a free movement of migrants from the Southern border countries as Spain, Italy or Greece to the rest of the members of the Union. Since the year 2000 till nowadays, Spain is the second country that has received the largest number of immigrants worldwide in absolute terms, after the US, and has the highest rate of emigration on the planet.<fnref n="15" />

At the beginning of the XXI century, it is estimated that Western Europe had about 65 million immigrants, of whom between 12 and 15 million were Muslims, although the economic crisis made that after the first decade of the century the immigrants' arrivals to the countries Of the European

<footnote>los nuevos procesos de globalización. Instituto Universitario de Estudios de la Mujer. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Madrid. Madrid. 1997.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Hernández Corrochano, E., “Mujeres inmigrantes en España. Análisis de la situación de las mujeres extranjeras no comunitarias”. Cuesta Bustillo, J., *Historia de las mujeres en España. El. S. XX*. Op. Cit., Pp. 216.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Ramiro Troitiño, D. 2013. European Integration: Building Europe. Nova Publishers: New York.</footnote>
Union began to remit, as of 1 January 2015, in the member countries of the European Union there were 34.3 million people born outside the EU<fnref n="16" />. However, these data seem to contrast with the intensification of flows of irregular immigrants. In 2015 the arrival of immigrants was around 1.8 million people but fell by more than 50,000 in 2016, according to figures from FRONTEX, the Community Agency for the control of external borders. The data indicated a reduction of 72%, very similar to that shown by the data offered by the UN. Spain is the country of the OECD where the arrival of immigrants during the crisis has reduced the most.

Nevertheless the presence of migrants imposes new challenges on the host European societies, which, after assuming political pluralism, must implement cultural pluralism. The difficulty of the subject is evidenced by the outbreaks of racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia, demonstrating the need for greater promotion and protection of the human rights of migrants in general and a greater express recognition of the specific rights of immigrant women in the European context<fnref n="17" />.

Neither the assimilationist model of French integration nor the communitarian insertion of the Anglo-Saxon countries presupposes a satisfactory result, as reflected by the continuous incidents between the local population and the new comers, collected and transmitted by the media. The French idea of integrating the individuals in the society as single units holding political rights has generated diverse problems, especially concerning those marginalized by the society living in ghettos or segregated areas. The high impact of terrorism in France is a reflection of this problem as local French terrorist from North African origins have been often involved in the attacks. On the other hand, the British approach of communitarian solutions<fnref n="18" /> has created artificial barriers to the integration of those who want to become part of the British society but are kept away being included in a group even against their will<fnref n="19" />.

In recent times, it seems that the EU tends to reinforce a secularized legislative framework where the religious and political spheres are dissociated. The system is based on the individual rights of Muslims as citizens but not as community. Hence the practice of their faith is respected in a personal level, thus preserving the values of the receiving society without demanding renunciation of the culture of origin<fnref n="20" />.

## FEMALE MUSLIM MIGRANTS

In Spain the presence of Muslim immigrants is more recent than in other European countries, such as France. Despite this, the country has a juridical framework for the integration of Muslim communities which is one of the most advanced and balanced in Europe<fnref n="21" />. The arrival flows have been increasing until the outbreak of the economic crisis, but the approach to the real numbers of immigrants must be cautioned, due to the difficulty in producing the statistics because the numerous

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrantPopulation_statistics/es</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Mariño Fernández, F., *La protección internacional de los derechos de la mujer tras la Conferencia de Pekín de 1995*. Ministerio de Justicia. Madrid. 1996. pp. 89-105.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Ramiro Troitiño, D.; Chochia, A. 2015 Winston Churchill And The European Union. Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, 8 (1), 55-81; Ramiro Troitiño, D. 2014. *The British Position towards European Integration: A Different Economic and Political Approach*. Baltic Journal of European Studies, Vol. 4, 119-136.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Garrido Rodríguez, P., *Inmigración y diversidad cultural en España. Su gestión desde la bonanza económica a la crisis*. Fundamentos. Madrid. 2014.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Ramiro Troitiño, D. 2014. The European Parliament: past, present, future. *Teisés apžvalga*, 2014, nr. 1 (11), p. 5-24.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Lathion, S., “Presencia del Islam en Europa: La mujer musulmana en España”. Elpais.com. 29/07/2007. Pérez Cantó, P., *También somos ciudadanas*. Instituto Universitario de Estudios de la Mujer. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Madrid. 2000. Martín Muñoz, G., “El Islam en España”. Martín Rojo, L., Gómez, C., eds. *Hablar y dejar hablar (sobre racismo y xenofobia)*. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Madrid. 1994. Pp. 219-231.</footnote>
illegal immigration. It is estimated that the number of Muslims living in Spain is around two million people, an increase of 1.6% compared to 2014, according to the Demographic Study of the Muslim population prepared by the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain, UCIDE, and the Observatory Andalusí, being Morocco the country of origin of the great majority of them<fnref n="22" />.

Similarly, there has been a significant increase in the number of immigrant women. The presence of women in migratory movements is not a new phenomenon, although researches have made their participation invisible, excluding them from their studies until the mid-1970s, based on the hypothesis that immigrants were mostly men and women were simply dependent on them<fnref n="23" />.

Female migration is a growing fact as an unwanted consequence of the neoliberal economy and the patriarchal system and despite the harsh conditions in the receiving country, where they are doubly discriminated, first as immigrants and then as women<fnref n="24" />. The following graph shows how has been increasing the Muslim immigration registered in Spain during the last twenty years. The sources used are the municipal registers of the National Institute of Statistics. Obviously it does not exclude that there are more immigrants who are not registered and therefore not counted. The representative sample includes the three countries of the Maghreb with the highest flow of emigrants, among whom Morocco, as we anticipated, stands out ahead of the rest.

EVOLUTION OF THE MAGREBIES FROM MOROCCO, ALGERIA AND TUNISIA IN SPAIN IN THE LAST TWENTY YEARS

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">COUNTRY<br>YEAR/<br>INMIGR</th><th colspan="3">MOROCCO</th><th colspan="3">ALGERIA</th><th colspan="3">TUNISIA<sup>25</sup></th></tr><tr><th>TOTAL</th><th>FE-<br>MALE</th><th>MALE</th><th>TOTAL</th><th>FE-<br>MALE</th><th>MALE</th><th>TOTAL</th><th>FE-<br>MALE</th><th>MALE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1996*</td><td>89.983</td><td>32.095</td><td>57.888</td><td>4.614</td><td>1.075</td><td>3.539</td><td>412</td><td>113</td><td>298</td></tr><tr><td>1998</td><td>103.225</td><td>36.356</td><td>66.869</td><td>8.429</td><td>2.645</td><td>5.784</td><td>560</td><td>176</td><td>385</td></tr><tr><td>1999</td><td>133.001</td><td>48.287</td><td>84.714</td><td>7.637</td><td>1.943</td><td>5.694</td><td>550</td><td>146</td><td>404</td></tr><tr><td>2000</td><td>173.158</td><td>63.964</td><td>109.794</td><td>10.759</td><td>2.837</td><td>7.922</td><td>666</td><td>173</td><td>493</td></tr><tr><td>2001</td><td>233.416</td><td>79.940</td><td>153.476</td><td>18.265</td><td>4.025</td><td>14.240</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2002</td><td>307.458</td><td>101.307</td><td>206.151</td><td>28.921</td><td>5.857</td><td>23.064</td><td></td><td>*</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2003</td><td>378.979</td><td>123.548</td><td>255.431</td><td>36.301</td><td>7.851</td><td>28.450</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2004</td><td>420.556</td><td>141.873</td><td>278.683</td><td>39.425</td><td>9.132</td><td>30.293</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2005</td><td>511.294</td><td>170.498</td><td>340.796</td><td>46.278</td><td>11.145</td><td>35.133</td><td>1.566</td><td>436</td><td>1.130</td></tr><tr><td>2006</td><td>563.012</td><td>191.071</td><td>371.941</td><td>47.079</td><td>11.759</td><td>35.320</td><td>1.642</td><td>437</td><td>1.205</td></tr><tr><td>2007</td><td>576.344</td><td>205.134</td><td>371.210</td><td>45.236</td><td>12.271</td><td>32.965</td><td>1.531</td><td>446</td><td>1.085</td></tr><tr><td>2008</td><td>652.695</td><td>239.464</td><td>413.231</td><td>51.922</td><td>14.876</td><td>37.046</td><td>1.741</td><td>536</td><td>1.205</td></tr><tr><td>2009</td><td>718.055</td><td>274.157</td><td>443.898</td><td>56.201</td><td>16.738</td><td>39.463</td><td>1.879</td><td>597</td><td>1.282</td></tr><tr><td>2010</td><td>754.080</td><td>299.328</td><td>454.752</td><td>58.743</td><td>18.439</td><td>40.304</td><td>1.977</td><td>652</td><td>1.325</td></tr><tr><td>2011</td><td>773.995</td><td>313.229</td><td>460.766</td><td>60.912</td><td>19.700</td><td>41.212</td><td>1.997</td><td>669</td><td>1.328</td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>788.563</td><td>325.068</td><td>463.495</td><td>62.912</td><td>21.118</td><td>41.794</td><td>2.061</td><td>682</td><td>1.379</td></tr><tr><td>2013</td><td>792.158</td><td>333.354</td><td>458.804</td><td>64.038</td><td>22.342</td><td>41.696</td><td>2.057</td><td>686</td><td>1.371</td></tr><tr><td>2014</td><td>774.383</td><td>331.071</td><td>443.312</td><td>63.525</td><td>22.933</td><td>40.592</td><td>1.978</td><td>674</td><td>1.304</td></tr><tr><td>2015</td><td>750.883</td><td>324.178</td><td>426.705</td><td>62.398</td><td>22.887</td><td>39.511</td><td>1.898</td><td>679</td><td>1.219</td></tr><tr><td>2016</td><td>755.459</td><td>328.656</td><td>426.803</td><td>62.173</td><td>23.087</td><td>39.086</td><td>1.942</td><td>684</td><td>1.258</td></tr></tbody></table>

SOURCE: data from the National Institute of Statistics, INE<fnref n="26" />.

<footnote n="22">²² http://observatorio.hispanomuslim.es/estademograf.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ Castaño Collado, C., pp. 44. Solé, C., “La feminización del proceso migratorio”. Solé, C., *La mujer inmigrante*. Instituto de la Mujer. Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. Madrid. 1994. pp. 157 ss.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Hernández Corrochano. E., Op. Cit. Morales Lezcano, V., *Inmigración africana en Madrid: marroquíes y guineano*. UNED. Madrid. 1993.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Blank boxes represent no data.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ <http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=/t20/e245/&file=inebase> [16 de febrero de 2017].</footnote>
• Reasons for female emigration

For some authors the emigration of men and women has different roots, while the male emigrated for economic reasons, female would be driven by social reasons<fnref n="27" />. One of these social causes for which the Maghreb women emigrate would be family reunification. This usually occurs when the man decides not to return to the place of origin and the harsh conditions in the host country force them to request the affective as well as economic support of the woman. On other occasions, some women have been recruited by their brothers, previously settled in Europe, to marry them with their co-workers, following the Muslim tradition of arranged marriages, a clear example of implementation in Europe of traditional practices discriminating women taking away their freedom. Family reunification would represent a typology of female migration that would characterize a first wave of arrivals of women in the 80's, mostly from rural areas and who would become, at least initially, housewives. Their situation was very precarious because they did not know the European society and often even the local language. Hence, these women had an absolute dependence of their husbands in the emotional, economic, cultural and even legal level, because it is the marriage bond that allowed their residence. A divorce would end with the residence permission and the woman in an illegal situation. This has occasionally been the subject of blackmail from the spouses to possible feminine complaints of ill-treatment, adding a new level of domination to the traditional female subjugation in the North African societies. All these circumstances have led some researchers to ensure that this type of migration is not a project of their own, but rather the subordination of women to the male movement.

A second wave in the arrival of immigrant women occurred around the 90s and presents different characteristics from the first wave as included young women, urban, single and with a level of training superior to its predecessors.

There are social motivations in their desire or need to emigrate as, for example, having been repudiated in Morocco, having suffered a marriage breakup, a premarital pregnancy or being widowed, with or without children in their charge who to carry out and have to re-depend on male of the family. These circumstances would make difficult to remain in the place of origin since they question their honor and put in question also the honor of their families that sometimes "invites" them to leave in order to avoid the public shame.

However, more and more women are leaving for economic reasons. Young Muslims choose to migrate to Europe due the low profit they obtain from their agricultural or craft economic activities. Even in the most probably case of double discrimination in terms of salary because of their condition of female and migrants, the wage in Europe will always be higher than they could imagine or obtain in their countries of origin. Obviously exploitation is therefore served on a tray unless strong legal protection is provided by the host state.

Annex I shows the evolution of the number of Muslim women and men in Spain with residence permission in the last century, using as a reference the countries already mentioned. It can be verified that the figures reflected here are slightly lower than those indicated by the National Institute of Statistics. Annex II shows the number of persons affiliated to Social Security System in Spain, coming from Morocco and Algeria. It is noteworthy the low numbers of women with Social Security System entitlement that appear, compared with those with a Residency card, which leads us to suppose that many of the women workers are not legally hired and insured or they just simply stay at home as housewife reproducing the social system of their countries without European influence, especially in the case of gender equality.

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Gregorio, C., “Los movimientos migratorios del Sur al Norte como procesos de género”. Villota, P., de, Op. Cit. pp. 264-266.</footnote>
• Female immigrants in Europe

These female immigrants are usually between 25 and 40 years old. They usually have cultural/professional level/capacity above the work they do<fnref n="28" />, in fact more and more women with higher education are emigrating to Europe from North Africa, although they work in sectors that European women do not want: About three quarters do it in domestic service, contributing in turn to the mobility of European female professionals<fnref n="29" />, and less than one tenth would be employed in factories and companies. This trend seems to have no prospect of change, as the aging of the population in the host countries increases the demand for labour for care jobs.

The arrival to Europe of these immigrants usually occurs through the intervention of a second person, usually another woman, who can be the one who hires them or relatives, or friends, who help them financially to pay the ticket of the trip and once in Europe help them to the process of adaptation to a new social reality. It does not necessarily imply that the journey takes place outside the family as usually the decision is consensual. The money needed is obtained with the help of the family and even their own mobility is based on the necessity to support the family by sending a significant part of their wages home<fnref n="30" />.

On other occasions the emigrations is produced directly by a desire of the family unit for social independence and begin to live in Europe according to the western canons. It must be remembered that, once in the host country in Europe, it completely disappears from the legislative power the normative Islamic model. In fact, this Islamic system has already begun to become more flexible in Northern Africa thanks to the influence of these migrants. The process is neither simple nor automatic, and there are still many women who, despite the absence of impositions in the recipient country, remain faithful to the traditions of the sending country<fnref n="31" />.

Europe faces a social reality in which the migrants are not only Islamic men but whole families or women single or with children<fnref n="32" />, who have abandoned the idea of returning to their societies of origin and aspire to integrate in the host countries. This settlement will generate changes in the European society. These migrant families need housing, request places of worship and burials according to their rites. In the case of Spain in 2006 there were 344 mosques and 11 Muslim cemeteries following the precepts of the Koran. In 2016, the Observatory of Religious Pluralism in Spain, under the Government, totaled 1,334 places of worship, which represents 21% of the total places of worship of all religions present in Spain.

• Female Muslims and dependents

Another of the great challenges that immigrant societies pose in Europe is related with the training of children and young people, whose proper integration will depend on providing them opportunities. About 200,000 adolescents and children form the second generation of Muslims born in Spain who claim contact with their roots and history. The teaching of Islam in schools is the main demand of Spanish Muslims; these schoolchildren have the right to receive Islamic instruction in public and private schools, provided that they constitute a group of more than 10 students. Of this group of adolescents and children, a large group is made up of girls, whose number has been

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Lutz, H., “Inmigración y racismo en la Unión Europea”. Villota, P., de, Op. Cit. pp. 236. Colectivo IOE, *Mujer, Inmigración y trabajo*. INSERSO. Madrid. 2001. Solé, C., “La mujer magrebí en el Servicio doméstico”. Solé, C., *La mujer inmigrante*. Op. Cit. CELEM, *La integración laboral de las mujeres inmigrantes: ¿una oportunidad para la igualdad?*. CELEM. Madrid. 2004.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Vernygora, V., 2007. The EU-NZ: time to move. *The National Business Review*, 5.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Ibídem. pp. 259-288.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Pando Ballesteros, Mª.P., “Musulmanas en España. Integración y derecho a la cultura”. Pando Ballesteros, Mª.P., (Ed.). *Musulmanas y derecho a la cultura. Tradición y modernidad*. La Xara Edicions. Valencia. 2011. Pp. 17-32.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² Kerikmäe, T. and Chochia, A. eds., 2016. *Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy*. Springer.</footnote>
increasing proportionately with the passage of the years; let us see as an example the evolution of Moroccan girls in Spain following the data of the National Institute of Statistics.

EVOLUTION OF MOROCCAN GIRLS AND ADOLESCENTS IN SPAIN

<table><thead><tr><td>YEAR</td><td>TOTAL FEMALE</td><td>0-19 YEARS OLD</td><td>%</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2000</td><td>63.364</td><td>21.436</td><td>33,83%</td></tr><tr><td>2001</td><td>79.940</td><td>26.450</td><td>33,09%</td></tr><tr><td>2002</td><td>101.307</td><td>33.250</td><td>32,82%</td></tr><tr><td>2003</td><td>123.548</td><td>39.955</td><td>32,34%</td></tr><tr><td>2004</td><td>141.873</td><td>47.003</td><td>33,13%</td></tr><tr><td>2005</td><td>170.498</td><td>56.902</td><td>33,37%</td></tr><tr><td>2006</td><td>191.071</td><td>64.315</td><td>33,66%</td></tr><tr><td>2007</td><td>205.134</td><td>69.821</td><td>34,04%</td></tr><tr><td>2008</td><td>239.464</td><td>82.259</td><td>34,3%</td></tr><tr><td>2009</td><td>274.157</td><td>94.829</td><td>34,5%</td></tr><tr><td>2010</td><td>299.328</td><td>104.678</td><td>34,9%</td></tr><tr><td>2011</td><td>313.229</td><td>110.535</td><td>35,2%</td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>325.068</td><td>114.794</td><td>35,3%</td></tr><tr><td>2013</td><td>333.354</td><td>118.109</td><td>35,4%</td></tr><tr><td>2014</td><td>331.071</td><td>115.524</td><td>34,8%</td></tr><tr><td>2015</td><td>324.178</td><td>108.826</td><td>33,5%</td></tr><tr><td>2016</td><td>328.656</td><td>107.295</td><td>32,6%</td></tr></tbody></table>

SOURCE: Data from the National Institute of Statistics, INE<fnref n="33" />.

As can be seen in the table that precedes these lines, according to the 2016 Register there would be more than 100,000 Moroccan girls in Spain. These young females face numerous problems of integration in Spain that can be extrapolated to the European level, among them the best known, undoubtedly, is the disputed issue of carrying veiling or not in the schools. But also the girls are debating between putting on long skirts or pants for gym class, eating pork on school menus in the absence of halal food, facing possible fainting in class for fasting during the Ramadan, etc.<fnref n="34" />

For some researchers, when the emigration becomes irreversible, it is when the woman becomes a protagonist, although not recognized, of the integration process. Well in order to ensure their no return, if they have already decided personally, or to ensure their full integration or that of their descendants. Its role will not be easy, women once installed in Spain should ensure that the family maintains the traditions of Islam, but will establish relations with local institutions so that they are recognized as Muslims and allowed to participate in the citizenship. Basically women take the role of keeping the origin identity of the family by adapting their traditions to the new social

<footnote n="33">³³ <http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=/t20/e245/&file=inebase> [16/02/2017].</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ Ramírez, Á., *La trampa del velo. El debate sobre el uso del pañuelo musulmán*. La Catarata. Madrid. 2011.</footnote>
realities their face. If by any mean women keep integrally their origin identity without European influences, they will transfer their social inadaptability to the minors of the family<fnref n="35" />.

Women are generally responsible for the education of children, representing the family in the school, and manage issues related to health. But it is understood that this situation occurs in women with some degree of independence regarding their husbands and independence from certain traditions prescribed by the Muslim system that according to Mudawana, comprehend that women do not have their own autonomy, depend on the will of their husbands and also do not have the tutelage of their children. Hence these women would control neither the education nor the aspects related to health of the family, and it should be noted that many Muslim marriages living in Europe have transferred this traditional social behavior from their countries maintaining alive that way of life in the host society<fnref n="36" />.

## CONCLUSIONS

Women therefore maintain the Muslim culture but must reconcile it with the European because inevitably they have to use its codes to survive in the European society, this in the long run will modify her own personality by not being able to renounce either. At this point women act as a bridge between the two cultures to articulate a communication between them, and it is at that moment that she becomes the central figure of intercultural dialogue. But attention will only be a factor of interculturality and integration for the new generation, their children, insofar as it is at the same time transmitter of their culture and enabler of the new. Hence it is necessary to have women who already have their own autonomy and initiative. Qualities that they do not lack, throughout different historical epochs, have shown and continue to do so (serves as a demonstration of their participation in the recent mobilizations of the "Arab Spring"), their ability to question their subalterity and generate strategies of resistance and negotiation, despite the fact that in the western collective imagination, especially in countries receiving immigration, the identification of Muslims with women dependent and without resources of struggle persists.

We can therefore conclude by affirming that the social changes that undermine the foundations of the patriarchal family, provoking changes in gender relations, redefining women's roles and stimulating their desire for emancipation are also influenced, not only by the diffusion of the Western model in the South, this, in turn, together with the economic variable favors the emigration of women and all this cannot be dissociated from the consequences of Globalization. Once in Europe, the Muslim women have the possibility of becoming, for all of the above, an instrument of intercultural dialogue and mediator between both cultures.

<footnote n="35">³⁵ Tarozzi, A., “Globalización, migraciones y redes sociales. Las mujeres como intermediarias culturales”. Villota, P., de, *Globalización y género*. Op. Cit. Pp. 257.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Op. Cit. Pp. 257.</footnote>
ANEX I<fnref n="37" />

RESIDENTS IN SPAIN WITH RESIDENCE PERMITION

<table><thead><tr><th>YEAR</th><th>ALGERIA</th><th>MOROCCO</th><th>TUNISIA</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2000</td><td>13.647</td><td>197.723</td><td>637</td></tr><tr><td>2001</td><td>15.057</td><td>533.422</td><td>728</td></tr><tr><td>2002</td><td>19.964</td><td>281.447</td><td>793</td></tr><tr><td>2003</td><td>23.704</td><td>386.596</td><td>908</td></tr><tr><td>2004</td><td>27.490</td><td>386.596</td><td>1.013</td></tr><tr><td>2005</td><td>33.428</td><td>492.961</td><td>1.192</td></tr><tr><td>2006</td><td>39.430</td><td>543.616</td><td>1.327</td></tr><tr><td>2007</td><td>45.825</td><td>648.735</td><td>1.561</td></tr><tr><td>2008</td><td>48.919</td><td>717.416</td><td>1.740</td></tr><tr><td>2009</td><td>52.845</td><td>767.784</td><td>1.795</td></tr><tr><td>2010</td><td>53.456</td><td>737.640</td><td>1.725</td></tr><tr><td>2011</td><td>56.194</td><td>770.112</td><td>1.791</td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>58.426</td><td>790.258</td><td>1.801</td></tr><tr><td>2013</td><td>58.329</td><td>785.180</td><td>1.783</td></tr><tr><td>2014</td><td>57.588</td><td>770.753</td><td>1.743</td></tr><tr><td>2015</td><td>56.775</td><td>766.622</td><td>1.766</td></tr><tr><td>2016</td><td>55.881</td><td>759.999</td><td>1.287</td></tr></tbody></table>

SOURCE: Data from the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security

RESIDENTS IN SPAIN WITH RESIDENCE PERMISSION ACCORDING TO NATIONALITY AND GENDER

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">YEAR</th><th colspan="4">ALGERIA</th><th colspan="4">MOROCCO</th><th colspan="4">TUNISIA</th></tr><tr><th colspan="2">FEMALE</th><th colspan="2">MALE</th><th colspan="2">FEMALE</th><th colspan="2">MALE</th><th colspan="2">FEMALE</th><th colspan="2">MALE</th></tr><tr><th>Amount</th><th>%</th><th>Amount</th><th>%</th><th>Amount</th><th>%</th><th>Amount</th><th>%</th><th>Amount</th><th>%</th><th>Amount</th><th>%</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2000</td><td>2523</td><td>18,48</td><td>11.124</td><td>81,5</td><td>65.250</td><td>33</td><td>132.473</td><td>66,9</td><td>164</td><td>25,7</td><td>473</td><td>74,2</td></tr><tr><td>2001</td><td>2.992</td><td>19,8</td><td>12.065</td><td>80,1</td><td>75.151</td><td>14</td><td>158.271</td><td>29,6</td><td>190</td><td>26,09</td><td>538</td><td>73,9</td></tr><tr><td>2002</td><td>3953</td><td>19,8</td><td>16.011</td><td>80,19</td><td>92167</td><td>32,7</td><td>189.280</td><td>67,2</td><td>213</td><td>25,7</td><td>580</td><td>73,1</td></tr><tr><td>2003</td><td>5.238</td><td>22,1</td><td>18.466</td><td>77,9</td><td>113.707</td><td>34,14</td><td>219.385</td><td>65,8</td><td>256</td><td>28,19</td><td>652</td><td>71,8</td></tr><tr><td>2004</td><td>6.925</td><td>25,1</td><td>20565</td><td>74,8</td><td>139.806</td><td>36,16</td><td>246.790</td><td>63,8</td><td>297</td><td>29,32</td><td>716</td><td>70,68</td></tr><tr><td>2005</td><td>6513</td><td>24,0</td><td>26915</td><td>75,9</td><td>170.516</td><td>34,5</td><td>322.445</td><td>65,4</td><td>341</td><td>28,6</td><td>851</td><td>71,39</td></tr><tr><td>2006</td><td>10.294</td><td>26,1</td><td>29.136</td><td>73,89</td><td>193.180</td><td>35,5</td><td>350.436</td><td>64,4</td><td>391</td><td>29,4</td><td>936</td><td>70,54</td></tr><tr><td>2007</td><td>13026</td><td>28,43</td><td>32797</td><td>71,5</td><td>239879</td><td>36,98</td><td>408.757</td><td>63</td><td>473</td><td>30,30</td><td>1.081</td><td>69,6</td></tr><tr><td>2008</td><td>14.699</td><td>30,04</td><td>34.033</td><td>69,5</td><td>273.006</td><td>38,05</td><td>443.924</td><td>61,8</td><td>546</td><td>31,3</td><td>1.191</td><td>68,4</td></tr><tr><td>2009</td><td>16.653</td><td>31,5</td><td>36.012</td><td>68,1</td><td>299.190</td><td>38,9</td><td>468.193</td><td>60,9</td><td>570</td><td>31,7</td><td>1.223</td><td>68,1</td></tr><tr><td>2010</td><td>17.407</td><td>32,5</td><td>36.049</td><td>67,4</td><td>292.929</td><td>39,7</td><td>444711</td><td>60,2</td><td>558</td><td>32,3</td><td>1.167</td><td>67,6</td></tr><tr><td>2011</td><td>18.462</td><td>32,8</td><td>37.732</td><td>67,1</td><td>308.519</td><td>40,06</td><td>461.593</td><td>59,9</td><td>581</td><td>32,4</td><td>1.210</td><td>67,5</td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>19.591</td><td>33,5</td><td>38.835</td><td>66,4</td><td>321.614</td><td>40,6</td><td>468.644</td><td>59,3</td><td>599</td><td>33,2</td><td>1.202</td><td>66,7</td></tr><tr><td>2013</td><td>20.107</td><td>34,4</td><td>38.222</td><td>65,5</td><td>324.646</td><td>41,3</td><td>460.534</td><td>58,6</td><td>596</td><td>33,4</td><td>1.187</td><td>66,5</td></tr><tr><td>2014</td><td>20.157</td><td>35</td><td>37.431</td><td>64,9</td><td>322.025</td><td>41,7</td><td>448.710</td><td>58,2</td><td>603</td><td>34,5</td><td>1.140</td><td>65,4</td></tr><tr><td>2015</td><td>19.955</td><td>35,1</td><td>36.820</td><td>64,8</td><td>323.236</td><td>42,1</td><td>443.386</td><td>57,8</td><td>604</td><td>34,2</td><td>1.162</td><td>65,7</td></tr><tr><td>2016³⁸</td><td>19.760</td><td>35,3</td><td>36.121</td><td>64,6</td><td>322.728</td><td>42,4</td><td>437.271</td><td>57,5</td><td>137</td><td>10,6</td><td>1.150</td><td>89,3</td></tr></tbody></table>

SOURCE: Data from the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security.

<footnote n="37">³⁷ < http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/Estadisticas/operaciones/con-certificado/> [10/02/2017]</footnote>

<footnote n="38">³⁸ Los datos publicados hasta el momento corresponden al mes de junio de 2016</footnote>
ANEX II

FOREIGN WORKERS REGISTERED IN SPAIN ACCORDING TO THEIR NATIONALITY AND GENDER<fnref n="39" />

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">YEAR</th><th colspan="5">ALGERIA</th><th colspan="5">MOROCCO</th></tr><tr><th>TOTAL</th><th>FE-MALE</th><th>%</th><th>MALE</th><th>%</th><th>TOTAL</th><th>FE-MALE</th><th>%</th><th>MALE</th><th>%</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2001</td><td>8.762</td><td>689</td><td>7,8</td><td>8.072</td><td>92,1</td><td>124.223</td><td>18.539</td><td>14,9</td><td>105.683</td><td>85,07</td></tr><tr><td>2002</td><td>11.026</td><td>891</td><td>8,08</td><td>10.135</td><td>91,9</td><td>148.051</td><td>23.000</td><td>15,5</td><td>125.050</td><td>84,4</td></tr><tr><td>2003</td><td>12.181</td><td>1.010</td><td>8,29</td><td>11.171</td><td>91,7</td><td>158.328</td><td>25.309</td><td>15,9</td><td>133.018</td><td>84</td></tr><tr><td>2004</td><td>13.177</td><td>1.126</td><td>8,5</td><td>12.051</td><td>91,4</td><td>172.664</td><td>28.728</td><td>16,6</td><td>143.936</td><td>83,3</td></tr><tr><td>2005</td><td>17.305</td><td>1.736</td><td>10,03</td><td>15.569</td><td>89,9</td><td>239.941</td><td>43.166</td><td>17,9</td><td>196.775</td><td>82</td></tr><tr><td>2006</td><td>18.331</td><td>1.798</td><td>9,8</td><td>16.533</td><td>90,1</td><td>250.693</td><td>47.336</td><td>18,8</td><td>203.357</td><td>81,1</td></tr><tr><td>2007</td><td>18.925</td><td>2.094</td><td>11,06</td><td>16.831</td><td>88,9</td><td>257.340</td><td>52.392</td><td>20,3</td><td>204.948</td><td>79,6</td></tr><tr><td>2008</td><td>16.266</td><td>1.956</td><td>12,02</td><td>14.310</td><td>87,97</td><td>238.048</td><td>54.924</td><td>23</td><td>183.122</td><td>76,9</td></tr><tr><td>2009</td><td>14.619</td><td>1.852</td><td>12,6</td><td>12.765</td><td>87,3</td><td>233.484</td><td>56.063</td><td>24,01</td><td>177.419</td><td>75,9</td></tr><tr><td>2010</td><td>13.421</td><td>1.844</td><td>13,7</td><td>11.577</td><td>86,2</td><td>220.822</td><td>54.298</td><td>24,5</td><td>166.524</td><td>75,4</td></tr><tr><td>2011</td><td>12.496</td><td>1.819</td><td>14,5</td><td>10.677</td><td>85,4</td><td>210.048</td><td>53.489</td><td>25,4</td><td>156.559</td><td>74,5</td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>11.484</td><td>1.838</td><td>16</td><td>9.646</td><td>83,9</td><td>199.261</td><td>53.303</td><td>26,7</td><td>145.958</td><td>73,2</td></tr><tr><td>2013</td><td>10.119</td><td>1.805</td><td>17,8</td><td>8.313</td><td>82,1</td><td>185.254</td><td>51.849</td><td>27,9</td><td>133.405</td><td>72,01</td></tr><tr><td>2014</td><td>9.771</td><td>1.762</td><td>18</td><td>8.008</td><td>81,9</td><td>184.942</td><td>51.191</td><td>27,6</td><td>133.751</td><td>72,3</td></tr><tr><td>2015</td><td>10.073</td><td>1.840</td><td>18,2</td><td>8.233</td><td>81,7</td><td>195.542</td><td>52.980</td><td>27,09</td><td>142.562</td><td>72,9</td></tr><tr><td>2016<sup>40</sup></td><td>11.717</td><td>2.061</td><td>17,5</td><td>9656</td><td>82,4</td><td>215.830</td><td>55.827</td><td>25,8</td><td>160.003</td><td>74,1</td></tr></tbody></table>

SOURCE: Data from the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security.

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<figure><img src="image_4.png" /></figure>
# The European Union and the ASEAN's interregional relations

ANDRÉA SIMONNET

UNIVERSITY OF NANTES

EMAIL: ANDREA.SIMONNET@ETU.UNIV-NANTES.FR

**Abstract:** This paper aims at giving an overview of the nature of the relations between the two specific regional entities that are the ASEAN and the European Union beyond their economic ties. Their relations tend to be less predominant on the international scene and are not as much depicted as others. The current situation, what they managed to create so far as well as the recent developments allow demonstrating how it is possible and necessary for them to evolve toward a more political and diplomatic sense according to an optimistic perspective. However the many challenges they are facing on their way to the deepening of their relations are also to be reminded here. Both entities are fundamentally different and many other actors are involved and tend to influence positively or not the development of such relations.

**Keywords:** European Union, Association of South-East Asian Nations, Asia Europe Meeting, EU External Relations

## INTRODUCTION

Over twenty years have passed since the first Asian-Europe meeting between the European Union and the Association of South-East Asian Nations happened, as March 2016 marked its twentieth birthday. In the official website of the European Union External Action Service, developing relations with the “diverse and dynamic region” that is Asia is indicated as one of the current challenges of Europe as its emergence is of “global significance”<fnref n="1" />. Having this is mind, it is right to wonder what exactly happened during these twenty years and how the European Union dealt with this challenge<fnref n="2" />.

When it comes to the field of the external relations of the European Union (EU), the Asian-European Union relationship, besides economic-related issues, is not the most obvious one. The focus would rather be on the European Neighbourhood policy<fnref n="3" />, the historical ties between the two giant powers that are United States and the European Union as well as the current help provided to Africa by the European countries.<fnref n="4" /> However, Asia also constitutes a relevant issue, especially when it comes to the Pacific Asia and even more South-East Asia. They are even further historically and culturally than the Central Asian countries as the Eastern European<fnref n="5" /> countries tend to have shared with them a common Soviet history.<fnref n="6" />

<footnote n="1">¹European Union External Action Service Official Website, EU in the World: Asia, Online, published the 15/06/2016, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/334/asia_en Accessed the 23/05/17</footnote>

<footnote n="2">²Troitiño, D. R. (2013). European Integration: Building Europe. Nova Publishers: New York.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³Costea, S. (2012). The European Union's Eastern Partnership: the objective of regional cooperation. The Eastern Partnership and the Europe 2020 strategy: Visions of leading policymakers and academics, 51-60.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵Chochia, A. (2012). The European Union and its policy towards the neighbors from South Caucasus. L'Europe unie/United Europe, 6, 27-35.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶Kerikmäe, T; Nyman-Metcalf, K; Gabelaia, D; Chochia, A (2014). Cooperation of Post Soviets with the Aim of not being "Post" and "Soviets". In: N. Šišková (Ed.). From Eastern Partnership to the Association. The Legal and Political Analysis (144-159). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.</footnote>
When focusing on this region, the relationship between the EU and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) raises quite many interesting issues. It might be appropriate to reflect upon the relations between these two regional organisations as they pursue different objectives as well as they possess two really different “institutional frameworks” meant to help fulfilling their purposes<fnref n="7" />. Whereas the European Union is quite an original construction halfway between an integrated entity and an intergovernmental organisation, which has been established in this current shape quite a long time ago if it were to be compared with the evolving ASEAN, the ASEAN is more of a classical regional organisation which dates back to 1967. It is important to remind what concretely the ASEAN is. The ASEAN was created by the Bangkok Declaration of the 8th of August during a delicate period of Cold War and conflicts in Asia. The five founding countries were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. All of them were, according to Badel, united by this anti-communist ideology<fnref n="8" />. It functions as a three-pillar based organisation:

- Political-Security community

- Economic community

- Socio-Cultural community

When studying the external relations of the European Union with these countries, it has to be borne in mind that there are still quite important bilateral relations between the Member States and the Asian States which remain of importance due to their common history. For example, historically in Laos there was the French protectorate which still has some influence in the current development of the country. But at the same time, it does not prevent the fact that an EU delegation is settled as well in the country and both lead common diplomatic actions. France and Great Britain greatly contributed to the establishment of these relations. The former colonial powers contributed to raise the European Community's awareness on the necessity to act jointly towards the ASEAN at the times of the Vietnamese then Cambodian conflicts respectively in the 1950's and 1980's<fnref n="9" />. Journoud reminds in his contribution that both countries despite having different motives have been mediating together the issues between People's Republic of China, the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam<fnref n="10" />. Moreover, during the Vietnamese issue with Cambodia, in 1979 they pushed the European Community cooperation with the ASEAN<fnref n="11" />. However, the nine Member States at this time could not find any common position on the political matters. When the United States finally left the region, during the 1980's as trade exchanges as well as discussion became more intense between the European Community and the ASEAN, both countries started to conduct a more politically-oriented discussion with South-East Asia<fnref n="12" />. After the conflicts in the region and the Cold War ended, it could have been expected to see a lot of interesting developments in the relations between the two regional powers.

Thus we will interrogate ourselves in order to determine what exactly the relations between the two entities are and what their current challenges are. The purpose of this study would be to have an overview on the perspective of developing relations in Eastern Asia with the ASEAN, within the framework of the ASEM. It would be relevant to adopt a vision going beyond the economic relations even though right now they are the main key point in their relations. It is crucial

<footnote n="7">⁷Oerstroem Meoller J., (2007), ASEAN's Relations with the European Union: Obstacles and Opportunities, in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No. 3 p466</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸Badel L., (2016) «Regards français sur la genèse d'un dialogue interrégional, l'ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) », in Relations internationales (n°168), p62</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹Hauser C., Journoud, P., (2016) «Introduction», Relations internationales (n°168), p4</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰Journoud P., (2016) « De la naissance de l'OTASE à l'accord de paix sur le Cambodge : la France, la Grande-Bretagne et la sécurité en Asie du Sud-Est pendant la Guerre froide », Op. Cit. p31</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹Ibidem. p42</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹²Ibidem. p43</footnote>
as well to mention Chinese issues as both the European Union and China are currently trying to expand their influence over the region.

# 1. INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS REMAINING MAINLY ECONOMIC

The relations between the two entities are mainly economic and trade related ones. The fact that the European culture and the Asian one are quite different might be preventing other types of relations from developing. The ASEAN presents an opportunity for the EU to be a significant market<fnref n="13" />.

The GDP growth in the area is quite considerable. They are mainly trading manufactured goods<fnref n="14" /> and the ASEAN is the second exporting market of the EU<fnref n="15" />. The project of establishing an EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement emerged in 2005 and would replace the current Cooperation Agreement of 1980¹⁶. In 2006, an argument was put forward as it would lead to “boost trade in goods and services and help attract new EU investments to ASEAN, as well as encouraging ASEAN's increasing investment in the EU”<fnref n="17" />. In this sentence no political motives are included. Both sides would benefit from it, as the ASEAN would have access to a new market<fnref n="18" />.

In terms of “interregional” cooperation, two instruments established in 2003 are currently regulating the promotion of economic and trade cooperation: the Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI) and the Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI)<fnref n="19" />. They benefit as well to the States individually such as illustrated in Quam Minh’s explanation on Vietnam current situation. He explains that Vietnam is enjoying preferential customs tariff as well as a free trade agreement since 2016.<fnref n="20" />

One thing which has to be mentioned is that Asian countries have been fearing for a long time the European construction’s nature and perceiving it negatively. Indeed, they were distrusting the European protectionism<fnref n="21" />, calling it the “Europe’s fortress”. Thus, as the EU became aware of it has tended to change its strategy towards the region. They are conscious that rebranding their image in Asia is essential so the focus switched to the communication with the region. The more Asia gets to know the EU in a good light, the more it would favourable to the development of European activities in Asia whether they are economic or not<fnref n="22" />.

Where political and economic matters are interacting is also within the framework of the Free Trade Agreement. Indeed, surrounding the negotiations of this agreement in order conduct it, there

<footnote n="13">¹³Robles, C. A., (2008) *The EU and ASEAN: Learning from the Failed EU-Mercosur FTA Negotiations*, in ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 25, No. 3, p335</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴Petiteville F., (2001) *La coopération économique de l'Union européenne entre globalisation et politisation*, in Revue française de science politique, Vol. 51, No. 3 p212</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵Alles D., (2010) *Union européenne et Asie du sud-est Entre inter-régionalisme asymétrique et bilatéralismes, les aléas d'une action extérieure en construction*, in Revue de l'Union européenne, Revue du Marché commun et de l'Union européenne, Dalloz p.116</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶Robles, C. A., (2008) *The EU and ASEAN: Learning from the Failed EU-Mercosur FTA Negotiations*, Op. Cit. p334</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷Oerstroem Meoller J., (2007), ASEAN's Relations with the European Union: Obstacles and Opportunities, Op. Cit. p469</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸Robles, C. A., (2008) *The EU and ASEAN: Learning from the Failed EU-Mercosur FTA Negotiations*, Op. Cit. p337</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹Pham Q. M., (2016) « *Les études européennes, un outil pour développer les relations entre le Vietnam et l'Union européenne* », in Relations internationales (n°168), p50</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰*Ibidem*. p50</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹Badel L., (2016) «Regards français sur la genèse d'un dialogue interrégional, l'ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) », Op. Cit., p64</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²²Badel L., (2016) «Regards français sur la genèse d'un dialogue interrégional, l'ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) », Op. Cit., p72</footnote>
have been mentions made to environment protection, labour rights and standards they have to agree on. The European Union is well aware that expanding its values over Asia is not an easy task. It is admitted that Human Rights are being defended in Europe as well as in Asia even though the way it is done quite differs. Thus the EU is willing to have open discussions on political matters with Asia<fnref n="23" />.

Oerstroem underlines that at the time of the Asian Financial Crisis, the EU Member States provided a "financial assistance through the International Monetary Fund", even a lot more than the US, but they did not succeed in obtaining political advantages from this in return<fnref n="24" />. Indeed, developing political ties between the two regions seems to be quite a challenge for the European Union. Stakes are not solely of economic nature, the Commission is also willing to promote peace and stability in the Asian region<fnref n="25" />. However the European strategy raises issues on the competences of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Petiteville underlines how the EU might be a bit too ambitious compared to its ability to act in terms of security and geopolitical influence<fnref n="26" />.

## 2. THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL RELATIONS

### 2.1. The historical and cultural impediments

The relations of political nature firstly emerged in 1972 as informal before becoming official ministerial consultations back in 1978²⁷. Later on, in 1980 the Cooperation Agreement was signed between the former European Community and the ASEAN<fnref n="28" />. As mentioned in the introduction, the ASEAN-EU relationship is delicate to consider when taking into account the context during which they developed. Historically, the ties tended to be more of a bilateral nature. As Hauser and Journoud rightly develop it, the idea surrounding the ASEAN was to strengthen the regional cohesion free from the intrusions of big powers and communism. Thus the countries of the ASEAN are willing to develop a pacific relationship between equals<fnref n="29" />.

Intercultural mutual understanding<fnref n="30" /> is required. As Oerstroem rightly highlights it, both entities possess two different cultures and histories which might prevent the mutual understanding between them. It is important to underlines that for quite a long time establishing political ties with countries other than the neighbours and the United States was not the priority of the European Union. There were no evolutions before the 1990's as there was no need from the European side to deepen the relations with the ASEAN region<fnref n="31" />. Even the development of relations with a key player in our globalized world such as China, is still an on-going process. However, progressively both ASEAN and the EU established a political dialogue<fnref n="32" />. They both need each other in our globalized

<footnote n="23">²³Kerikmäe, T.; Hamulak, O.; Chochia, A. (2016). A Historical Study of Contemporary Human Rights: Deviation or Extinction? *Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum, 4 (2), 98–115.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴Oerstroem Meoller J., (2007), *ASEAN's Relations with the European Union: Obstacles and Opportunities, Op. Cit.* p468</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵Petiteville F., (2001) *La coopération économique de l'Union européenne entre globalisation et politisation, Op. Cit.* p440</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶*Ibidem*. p449</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷Oerstroem Meoller J., (2007), *ASEAN's Relations with the European Union: Obstacles and Opportunities, Op. Cit.* p466</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸*Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹Hauser C., Journoud, P., (2016) «Introduction», Relations internationales (n°168), p7</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰*Ibidem*. p96</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹Oerstroem Meoller J., (2007), *ASEAN's Relations with the European Union: Obstacles and Opportunities, Op. Cit.* p467</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³²*Ibidem*. p466</footnote>
world in order to establish themselves as global key players. Both of them understand the requirement to play a role at the global level in terms of politics or economics.

About the different meetings they are having, both sides tend not to consider it the same way. Whereas the EU is thinking about how it can lead to promote the Occidental influence in Asia as well as concrete realisations, the ASEAN is still at the point where it is trying to understand the EU and punctually consulting its partner without excluding that in the future they might conduct actions together<fnref n="33" />. Oerstroem identifies the main issue preventing the reinforcing of the relations as the “reluctance on the EU's part to move to the EU-ASEAN relationship into the category of a strategic partnership.”³⁴Strengthening the relation with Asia for Europe is inevitable for economic reasons but as well as peace purposes. During the ASEM meetings even though the attempts remain measured, the EU is mentioning security issues<fnref n="35" />.

The initiative came from both Singapore and France to promote trade, multilateralism and dialogue in order for both civilisations to understand each other<fnref n="36" />. As previously mentioned, Great Britain and France are quite active in the development of the relations. The UK involved itself in convincing the EU to adopt a firm position on the conflict between People's Republic of China and other countries of the ASEAN related to the South China Sea<fnref n="37" />.

ASEAN and Singapore especially are willing to develop another type of relationship with the EU. The impulsion of Singapore is quite important<fnref n="38" />, as the country is acting in a way so that Europe could gain a more important visibility in Asia and have a political impact. The country reaffirmed the necessity to have meetings not only between ministries but high officials as well<fnref n="39" />.

Europe wants to spread its soft power. In July 1994, the Commission published a communication addressed to the Council defining the new Asian Strategy: there was a willingness to discuss political matters even though they are aware that it might be difficult to have the Human Rights recognized the same way as in the EU<fnref n="40" />. Moreover, the European Commission has gone through the growing pressure of the other institutions such as the European Parliament, the Council to take into account environmental, Human Rights, public health issues when developing relations with the ASEAN. However, as Forster interestingly mentions it, for the ASEAN it is comparable to opposing the “expensive European welfare and employment models against Asian competition.”<fnref n="41" />

The thing is that the EU's foreign policy is based on expanding the European values which are thought by the Europeans to be universal, and imposing rules on the international scene which might be reluctant for the ASEAN<fnref n="42" />. There is an Asian willingness to develop itself in opposition with Europe<fnref n="43" />. Palmujoki qualifies « neutralism » as a central «element of Southeast Asian

<footnote n="33">³³*Ibidem*. p470</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴*Ibidem*. p469</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵Hauser C., Journoud, P., (2016) «Introduction», Relations internationales (n°168), p7</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶Picciau S., (2016) « Le rôle de la coopération culturelle et éducative au sein de l'ASEM », Relations internationales (n° 168), p93</footnote>

<footnote n="37">³⁷Journoud P., (2016) « De la naissance de l'OTASE à l'accord de paix sur le Cambodge : la France, la Grande-Bretagne et la sécurité en Asie du Sud-Est pendant la Guerre froide », in Relations internationales, p45</footnote>

<footnote n="38">³⁸Badel L., (2016) «Regards français sur la genèse d'un dialogue interrégional, l'ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) », Op. Cit., p62</footnote>

<footnote n="39">³⁹*Ibidem*. p63</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰Badel L., Singaravélou P., (2016) « Le Dialogue Asie-Europe en perspective (xix e-xx e siècle) », Relations internationales 2016/3 (n°167), p6</footnote>

<footnote n="41">⁴¹Forster A., (1999) *The European Union in South-East Asia: Continuity and Change in Turbulent Times*, in *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 75, No.4, p751</footnote>

<footnote n="42">⁴²*Ibidem*. p98</footnote>

<footnote n="43">⁴³Badel L., (2016) «Regards français sur la genèse d'un dialogue interrégional, l'ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) », Op. Cit., p61</footnote>
regionalism »<fnref n="44" />. The ASEAN countries are strongly attached to their independence and sovereignty as the Charter of the ASEAN of 2008 states it. They make a point of condemning external interferences in their affairs<fnref n="45" />. Already in the 1990's when the Community and the ASEAN were dialoguing, Europe wanted to include “social clause and conditionality”, however, from the ASEAN side the response was firm and clear. They rejected their demands as Palmujiko explains it in his contribution on “environmental issues, human rights and democratic values” as they were not compliant with the current state of the ASEAN<fnref n="46" />.

The ASEAN has not been the priority in terms of external relations of the EU since the focus has been on the closest neighbouring countries from Eastern Europe which might integrate the EU<fnref n="47" />. From the ASEAN perspective, their respective economic interests remain the essential part of their relations<fnref n="48" />. The year 2003 marked the relaunch of the relations with the Commission's communication on the objectives of the EU in the region: fighting terrorism, promoting Human Rights, Stability, Peace, etc.<fnref n="49" /> The European External Action service constitutes one hope for the diplomacy: South-East Asia constitutes a challenge for the European common position as they have different individually objectives and practices in the region<fnref n="50" />.

## 2.2. The ASEM: a significant however limited improvement in terms of political relations

As Lechervy mentions it, the ASEM failed to impose itself as indispensable since dialogue also happens within other frameworks<fnref n="51" />. Its vague purpose and its format raise questions<fnref n="52" />, the main issues being the justification behind the existence of such an entity and the coordination of the actions.

In 1996, the Asian-Europe meeting (ASEM) was created<fnref n="53" />. Former French President Jacques Chirac declared at that time in Singapore just before the beginning of the summit that: « Europe needs Asia. Asia needs Europe», before inviting both sides to work together to make this big gathering a success<fnref n="54" />. The first summit gathered in Bangkok the fifteen Member States of the European Union at that time along with the President of the European Commission as well as the seven ASEAN Member States representative and their General Secretariat<fnref n="55" />. China, South Korea and Japan also joined the political dialogue<fnref n="56" />. However its action has been limited since it is not

<footnote n="44">⁴⁴Palmujoki, E., (1997) *EU-ASEAN Relations: Reconciling Two Different Agendas*, in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 19, No. 3, p271</footnote>

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵Alles D., (2010) *Union européenne et Asie du sud-est Entre inter-régionalisme asymétrique et bilatéralismes, les aléas d'une action extérieure en construction*, Op. Cit. p.116</footnote>

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶Palmujoki, E., (1997) *EU-ASEAN Relations: Reconciling Two Different Agendas*, Op. Cit., p277</footnote>

<footnote n="47">⁴⁷Forster A., (1999) *The European Union in South-East Asia: Continuity and Change in Turbulent Times*, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 75, No.4 p749</footnote>

<footnote n="48">⁴⁸ *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="49">⁴⁹Alles D., (2010) *Union européenne et Asie du sud-est Entre inter-régionalisme asymétrique et bilatéralismes, les aléas d'une action extérieure en construction*, Op. Cit. p.116</footnote>

<footnote n="50">⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="51">⁵¹Lechervy C., (2016) « L'ASEM : le début d'un (mini-)pivot européen vers l'Asie-Pacifique ?», *Relations internationales* (n°168), p119</footnote>

<footnote n="52">⁵²Hellendorff B., (2016) « Le dialogue Asie-Europe (ASEM) depuis les années 1990 : plus pertinent, moins intelligible », *Relations internationales* (n° 168), p 77</footnote>

<footnote n="53">⁵³Oerstroem Meoller J., (2007), ASEAN's Relations with the European Union: Obstacles and Opportunities, Op. Cit. p466</footnote>

<footnote n="54">⁵⁴Personal Translation ; Badel L., (2016) «Regards français sur la genèse d'un dialogue interrégional, l'ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) », Op. Cit., p60</footnote>

<footnote n="55">⁵⁵Blanchemaison C., (2016) «Vingt ans de dialogue entre l'Asie et l'Europe», Relations internationales (n°168), p132</footnote>

<footnote n="56">⁵⁶Badel L., (2016) «Regards français sur la genèse d'un dialogue interrégional, l'ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) », Op. Cit., p60</footnote>
that often that the projects discussed lead to concrete action with significant improvements<fnref n="57" />. It is the result from the political willingness to establish a political dialogue between the two entities. It leads both sides to take into consideration European and Asian stakes whether they might be economic or cultural<fnref n="58" />. Hauser and Journoud insist on the third cooperation pillar which is the sociocultural one in order to bring the light on other issues than economic ones and to go beyond economic agreements<fnref n="59" />. Its general purpose is the promotion of political dialogue between the two regional powers but also to discuss economic and cultural related issues<fnref n="60" />. The ASEM allows the decision-makers to meet and discuss within an interregional framework, which has to be highlighted as a positive improvement<fnref n="61" />.

However, the ASEM is only as its name indicate it a meeting. It is not constitutive of an international organisation nor is it a framework-structure for negotiation<fnref n="62" />. There is no official status for the structure, neither agreements nor treaties resulting from these meetings<fnref n="63" />. The only existing official document is the “Cooperation Framework Asia-Europe” of 2000. Badel also importantly mentions the fact that there is no administrative structure not a budget to ensure its right functioning<fnref n="64" />. This illustrates the lack of means at the disposal of these meetings and the difficulties to do any concrete action within its framework.

The cooperation is divided into three pillars: economic, politic and sociocultural/ intellectual<fnref n="65" />. At the beginning, the three of them did not have the same importance for the members of the meeting, with the priority being set on trade and investments<fnref n="66" />. In the 1990’s, the EU was settling its common market and was in the process of its regional integration and as Picciau explains it, thus was interested in the dynamism of the Asian area<fnref n="67" />. It was also the time after Maastricht Treaty when the EU started to take a deeper interest in spreading values like democracy, fundamental freedoms and Human Rights, etc<fnref n="68" />.

Tertrais qualifies the ASEM as “virtual” since it is neither a concrete organisation nor a regional association<fnref n="69" />. The ASEM organises meetings every two years that no one is talking about. Despite the criticism the ASEM remains the European linchpin toward Asia by connecting European and Asian decision-makers<fnref n="70" />. On the initiative of Singapore, providing the material structure for it, the first meeting resulted in the creation of the ASEF, the only organisation able to lead an action<fnref n="71" />. Hellendorff questions the functioning of the framework which is neither interregional neither multilateral, and asks whether the ASEM should maintain this format or evolve

<footnote n="57">⁵⁷ Hauser C., Journoud, P., (2016) «Introduction», Relations internationales (n°168), p3</footnote>

<footnote n="58">⁵⁸Ibidem. p5</footnote>

<footnote n="59">⁵⁹Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="60">⁶⁰Badel L., (2016) «Regards français sur la genèse d'un dialogue interrégional, l'ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) », Op. Cit., p60</footnote>

<footnote n="61">⁶¹Hauser C., Journoud, P., (2016) «Introduction», Relations internationales (n°168), p6</footnote>

<footnote n="62">⁶²Badel L., (2016) «Regards français sur la genèse d'un dialogue interrégional, l'ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) », Op. Cit., p60</footnote>

<footnote n="63">⁶³Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="64">⁶⁴Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="65">⁶⁵Picciau S., (2016) « Le rôle de la coopération culturelle et éducative au sein de l'ASEM », Op. Cit. p93</footnote>

<footnote n="66">⁶⁶Ibidem. p94</footnote>

<footnote n="67">⁶⁷Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="68">⁶⁸Ibidem. p95</footnote>

<footnote n="69">⁶⁹Tertrais H., (2016) « Réflexions conclusives : l'ASEM dans les relations entre l'Europe et l'Asie », Relations internationales (n° 168), p140</footnote>

<footnote n="70">⁷⁰Hauser C., Journoud, P., (2016) «Introduction», Relations internationales (n°168), p3</footnote>

<footnote n="71">⁷¹Blanchemaison C., (2016) «Vingt ans de dialogue entre l'Asie et l'Europe», Op. Cit. p132</footnote>
towards a supranational dimension<fnref n="72" />. There is criticism towards the fact that problems should not only be discussed in meetings but that there should be action to follow<fnref n="73" /> in order for the ASEM be useful.

Right now over fifty States have joined the ASEM whereas they started with only half of this number twenty years ago. However it is still not considered as an international actor<fnref n="74" />. Importance of the meetings: it concerns 60% of the worldwide population, 60% of the international trade<fnref n="75" />. The EU is using its soft power in order to bypass the obstacle based on the Asian values with the help of non-governmental actors<fnref n="76" />. An interesting dimension introduced by these meetings is that cultural aspects are put at the same level as economic and political cooperation<fnref n="77" />. Hellendorff identifies six main principles of the ASEM among them can found: equality in the partnership, mutual respect and interest, informality, etc<fnref n="78" />.

## 2.3. The ASEF and the promising developments

Even though the action of the ASEM remains quite limited and presents some inconvenient, during its first summit led to a concrete realisation by creating the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF)<fnref n="79" />. It is an interstate foundation aiming at promoting contacts between intellectuals, students, artists and in general civil societies of both Asia and Europe<fnref n="80" />. Despite criticism, according to Blanchemaison, a former French ambassador, it is the only permanent organisation which is providing a useful work by organizing seminars on common challenges of Asia and Europe<fnref n="81" />. It has been working actively now for over twenty years. For example, they promoted the exchanges of good practices during the COP21 by organising meetings between the people responsible. They also hold annual seminars on Human Rights<fnref n="82" />. The organisation has its headquarters in Singapore and about thirty people are working there. Besides, communication is also part of their job since they have online websites to document people, students and politics on their action and news related to the topics from political meetings. They are quite active and working in a coordinated way with Asian and European Think Tanks<fnref n="83" />.

There is a cultural dimension of the projects connecting Europeans and Asians: they target a “people to people” approach. The ASEF is contributing as well as financing some of these projects<fnref n="84" />. It is important to underlines the success of this foundation in terms of Eurasian cooperation. As Picciau mentions it, the foundation managed to lead over 600 projects related to education, sustainable growth, environmental issues, Human rights…<fnref n="85" /> The author adds in her contribution how it leads to promote the purposes of the ASEM while its capacity of action is depending from the subventions of the ASEM members<fnref n="86" />.

<footnote n="72">⁷²Hellendorff B., (2016) « *Le dialogue Asie-Europe (ASEM) depuis les années 1990 : plus pertinent, moins intelligible* », Op. Cit. p81</footnote>

<footnote n="73">⁷³*Ibidem*. p86</footnote>

<footnote n="74">⁷⁴Tertrais H., (2016) « *Réflexions conclusives : l’ASEM dans les relations entre l’Europe et l’Asie* », Op. Cit. p135</footnote>

<footnote n="75">⁷⁵Lechervy C., (2016) « L’ASEM : le début d’un (mini-)pivot européen vers l’Asie-Pacifique ?», Op. Cit. p128</footnote>

<footnote n="76">⁷⁶*Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="77">⁷⁷Picciau S., (2016) « *Le rôle de la coopération culturelle et éducative au sein de l’ASEM*», Op. Cit. p93</footnote>

<footnote n="78">⁷⁸Hellendorff B., (2016) « *Le dialogue Asie-Europe (ASEM) depuis les années 1990 : plus pertinent, moins intelligible* », Op. Cit. p82</footnote>

<footnote n="79">⁷⁹Hauser C., Journoud, P., (2016) « *Introduction*», Relations internationales (n°168), p3</footnote>

<footnote n="80">⁸⁰Personal translation ; Blanchemaison C., (2016) « *Vingt ans de dialogue entre l’Asie et l’Europe*», Op. Cit. p132</footnote>

<footnote n="81">⁸¹Personal translation ; Blanchemaison C., (2016) « *Vingt ans de dialogue entre l’Asie et l’Europe*», Op. Cit. p132</footnote>

<footnote n="82">⁸²*Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="83">⁸³*Ibidem*. p133</footnote>

<footnote n="84">⁸⁴Tertrais H., (2016) « *Réflexions conclusives : l’ASEM dans les relations entre l’Europe et l’Asie* », Op. Cit. p140</footnote>

<footnote n="85">⁸⁵Picciau S., (2016) « *Le rôle de la coopération culturelle et éducative au sein de l’ASEM*», Op. Cit. p99</footnote>

<footnote n="86">⁸⁶*Ibidem*. p100</footnote>
For the last twenty years, the number of members has been increasing due to the European Union's multiple enlargements but also other countries have been willing to join the organisation such as India, New Zealand or even Russia. However, as Blanchemaison underlines it, it has become quite difficult for the organisation to be efficient as the increasing number of members has brought limits to their ability to agree in a consensual way<fnref n="87" />.

On another note, when it comes to promising developments, the European Commission established the New Southeast Asia Strategy (2004), and it resulted from it that the EU is planning to cooperate in the long run with Vietnam, which is quite promising. This can be found in the Strategic document created between 2007 and 2013.<fnref n="88" /> The EU's support to the countries in this region is bringing some interesting improvements. For example, Vietnam managed to integrate the World Trade Organisation thanks to the EU in 2007⁸⁹.

After celebrating its twentieth birthday, there is hope for an improvement as the idea to support an increased connectivity and more targeted cooperation between Asia and Europe emerged. The idea is also to focus on the partnership between the people<fnref n="90" />. The devise of the ASEM in 2016 was indeed « 20 Years of ASEM: Partnership for the Future through Connectivity »<fnref n="91" />, even though the purpose remains quite unclear. Lechervy criticises the generic nature of the previous slogans which were « Responsible Partnership for Sustainable Growth and Security » or « Friends for Peace, Partners for Prosperity »<fnref n="92" />. Even though connectivity is not a clear idea, it can be guessed that it aims at multiplying the interactions between the two regions.

There were evolutions, already 10 years ago, the Helsinki summit announced some promising developments to which followed enlargements<fnref n="93" />. The recent summits have also led to the creation of workgroups working on themes like education<fnref n="94" />. The accent has been put on how to make the ASEM's action more efficient and visible. Besides, European's soft power is promoted through the European cultural and educational policies<fnref n="95" /> which tend to become more and more efficient.

### 3. THE CHINESE ISSUE

It is important when speaking about the relations between Asia and the EU to mention the inescapable main rising actor in this region and more generally in the global scene: China. From both sides, China's policy and actions have influenced their approach to this relation. From the European Union's perspective, it might be necessary to get closer to these countries in order to restrain somehow the Chinese's influence expansion. Whereas concerning the South-East Asian countries, the region has been seeking for independence from the big powers especially from China. They are looking for "stability" and to protect themselves from the intrusions of other countries such as the US and China<fnref n="96" />.

<footnote n="87">⁸⁷Blanchemaison C., (2016) «Vingt ans de dialogue entre l'Asie et l'Europe», Op. Cit. p133</footnote>

<footnote n="88">⁸⁸Pham Q. M., (2016) « Les études européennes, un outil pour développer les relations entre le Vietnam et l'Union européenne », Op. Cit. p50</footnote>

<footnote n="89">⁸⁹Ibidem. p50</footnote>

<footnote n="90">⁹⁰Lechervy C., (2016) « L'ASEM : le début d'un (mini-)pivot européen vers l'Asie-Pacifique ?», *Relations internationales* (n°168), p119</footnote>

<footnote n="91">⁹¹Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="92">⁹²Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="93">⁹³Hellendorff B., (2016) « Le dialogue Asie-Europe (ASEM) depuis les années 1990 : plus pertinent, moins intelligible », Op. Cit. p83</footnote>

<footnote n="94">⁹⁴Ibidem. p84</footnote>

<footnote n="95">⁹⁵Picciau S., (2016) « Le rôle de la coopération culturelle et éducative au sein de l'ASEM», Op. Cit. p98</footnote>

<footnote n="96">⁹⁶Oerstroem Meoller J., (2007), ASEAN's Relations with the European Union: Obstacles and Opportunities, Op. Cit. p471</footnote>
Nowadays, China is considered as the country having developed the closest ties with the ASEAN countries despite the fact that the organisation was founded on an anti-communist basis<fnref n="97" />. It is currently the biggest investor in the region. There is a free-trade area established between the ASEAN and China<fnref n="98" />. China is the most important trade partner of the ASEAN<fnref n="99" />. China is also part of the ASEAN + 3,<fnref n="100" /> an extended version of the ASEAN including Japan and South Korea. In 1978, when Deng Xiaoping was governing the country, his policy of openness contributed to decrease the ASEAN's distrust<fnref n="101" />. During the Asian financial crisis in 1997, China took advantage of the inability of the International Monetary Fund to act to intervene and impose itself as a useful partner.

Lechervy argues that China was one of the reasons the ASEM process occurred, as it was one an opportunity for Europe to get closer to China and indirectly discuss the issues of Human Rights<fnref n="102" />. China as well as the US, were motivations behind the development of the relationship between the EU and the ASEAN. They are cooperating in order to avoid the emergence of a world solely dominated by the US and China which would not be in accordance with the two regional organisations' interests<fnref n="103" />.

Understanding the Asian point of view is crucial. Bafoil highlights their hostility to colonialism; the region does not want to be perceived as China's backyard<fnref n="104" />. The two powers, the EU and China possess two different approaches when it comes to relations with third countries from these two powers: whereas the EU is always providing conditional help to other countries such as in Africa, where they have to comply with the values of the EU, China has adopted a less constraining position. Besides, as previously mentioned, the ASEAN rejected already once such conditional type of relations. This could explain why China right now seems in a better position than the EU.

The 2013 OBOR project is a pillar of the influential policy of China in Asia, which should raise a reaction from the European Union. China has managed to change its approach toward the ASEAN by developing multilateral cooperation and to integrate itself into the process of regional integration<fnref n="105" />.

## CONCLUSION

Both the European Union and the ASEAN are aware of the necessity to understand each other in order to improve their relations. From the economic point of view, they work quite well. When it comes to political, cultural areas things tend to be more challenging even though improvements have been noticed. They can count on a mutual willingness to enhance their connection. In this sense, the connectivity which has been mentioned aims at promoting mutual understanding,

<footnote n="97">⁹⁷Astarita C., Courret L., (2008) *Le rôle de la Chine dans l'évolution des organisations régionales d'Asie du Sud-Est, Perspectives Chinoises, No. 3 (104)*, p85</footnote>

<footnote n="98">⁹⁸Cheng Y. S. J., Jacquet R., (2013) *La stratégie régionale de la Chine en Asie orientale : ambitions et défis*, Perspectives Chinoises, No. 2 p63</footnote>

<footnote n="99">⁹⁹*Ibidem*. p64</footnote>

<footnote n="100">¹⁰⁰*Ibidem*. p61</footnote>

<footnote n="101">¹⁰¹Picciau S., (2016) « Le rôle de la coopération culturelle et éducative au sein de l'ASEM », Op. Cit. p86</footnote>

<footnote n="102">¹⁰²Lechervy C., (2016) « L'ASEM : le début d'un (mini-)pivot européen vers l'Asie-Pacifique ? », Op. Cit. p126</footnote>

<footnote n="103">¹⁰³Lechervy C., (2016) « L'ASEM : le début d'un (mini-)pivot européen vers l'Asie-Pacifique ? », Op. Cit. p128</footnote>

<footnote n="104">¹⁰⁴Bafoil, F., (2013) *Repenser les identités régionales par les élargissements: une comparaison UE/ASEAN*, Revue française de science politique, Vol. 63, No. 1</footnote>

<footnote n="105">¹⁰⁵Astarita C., Courret L., (2008) *Le rôle de la Chine dans l'évolution des organisations régionales d'Asie du Sud-Est*, Op. Cit. p85</footnote>
reflexing together<fnref n="106" />. Picciau enunciates the idea that improving the dialogue with Asia would benefit all of the European countries from the cultural point of view. There is a necessity to implement even more the European delegations in Asia as well as reinforcing their capacity of action<fnref n="107" />. The European policy's visibility seems to be lacking compared to the United States<fnref n="108" />.

It is essential, especially from the European side to keep their mind open and try not to duplicate their organisation on the ASEAN. Alles develops the idea that the ASEAN's regional development should not be compared to the EU<fnref n="109" />. The EU can count on partners of choice such as Singapore or Vietnam which whom they are in good terms to support the strengthening and the deepening of the he relationship with the ASEAN. Europe and Asia both have common challenges to face such as proliferation of weapons of massive destruction, migrations issues, environmental matters or even terrorism so they need to cooperate<fnref n="110" />. During the different meetings, within the framework of the ASEM, the ASEAN expressed its willingness not to concentrate on divergences<fnref n="111" /> which is quite promising as to future developments.

Beyond the ASEAN, China is a key player in this relationship that the EU cannot ignore. For example the OBOR (One Belt, One Road) project is a Chinese massive infrastructure project on all over Asia aiming at improving the regional integration of China. It concerns the neighbouring countries of China as well as Eastern European countries which are also part of the framework for the 16+1 initiative<fnref n="112" />. Cooperation and mutual understanding would be the key for all of these powers to benefit from either the relationships either the regional integration in process.

## References

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<footnote n="106">¹⁰⁶Hellendorff B., (2016) « Le dialogue Asie-Europe (ASEM) depuis les années 1990 : plus pertinent, moins intelligible », Op. Cit. p88</footnote>

<footnote n="107">¹⁰⁷Picciau S., (2016) « Le rôle de la coopération culturelle et éducative au sein de l'ASEM», Op. Cit. p103</footnote>

<footnote n="108">¹⁰⁸*Ibidem*. p103</footnote>

<footnote n="109">¹⁰⁹Alles D., (2010) *Union européenne et Asie du sud-est Entre inter-régionalisme asymétrique et bilatéralismes, les aléas d'une action extérieure en construction*, Op. Cit. p.116</footnote>

<footnote n="110">¹¹⁰Hellendorff B., (2016) « Le dialogue Asie-Europe (ASEM) depuis les années 1990 : plus pertinent, moins intelligible », Op. Cit. p89</footnote>

<footnote n="111">¹¹¹Palmujoki, E., (1997) *EU-ASEAN Relations: Reconciling Two Different Agendas*, Op. Cit., p281</footnote>

<footnote n="112">¹¹²Briefing of the European Parliament (July 2016) “One Belt, One Road (OBOR): China's regional integration initiative”</footnote>
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Hauser Claude, Journoud Pierre, «Introduction», in *Relations internationales* 2016/4(n°168), p. 3-8. DOI 10.3917/ri.168.0003

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## Official document of the European Union

Briefing of the European Parliament (July 2016) “One Belt, One Road (OBOR): China's regional integration initiative”

URL:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586608/EPRS_BRI%282016%29586608_EN.pdf, Accessed the 22/05/17

## Online Source

European Union External Action Service Official Website, EU in the World: Asia, Online, published the 15/06/2016, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/334/asia_en, Accessed the 23/05/17

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /></figure>
# Territorial conflicts in EaP countries and EU security and defense policy

ANA MAGLAKELIDZE

TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

EMAIL: A_MAGLAKELIDZE@CU.EDU.GE

**Abstract:** Georgia is one of the active and the most successful members of the European Union's Eastern Partnership programme. The country has declared integration into the European Union and NATO as its priority and political orientation. However, the process of its association with the EU has also been complicated with a difficult situation in the country, including frozen conflicts in its two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as war with Russia in 2008. This paper tries to analyse Georgia's EU ambitions by evaluating the political situation in the country, including above-mentioned conflicts.

**Keywords:** European Union, EU Eastern Partnership, Georgia, EU Security

## INTRODUCTION

European Union with its earliest forms such as coal and steel community and later European community has emerged exactly on time when devastated Europe from long-going World War II needed unity and path leading to economic prosperity.<fnref n="1" /> However by the time as the member states became more and more, their ambitions towards community became boosted as well. Thus EC and nowadays already EU developed major policies, which as well including defense and security policy that has become one of the priorities in EU action plans. After several waves of enlargement, “the EU had brought east and west together, consolidating the fragile democracies that had emerged from fall of the communism.”<fnref n="2" />

In 2012 European Union received Nobel peace prize as much as its work has caused advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe.<fnref n="3" /> European Union wants to be ready and able to deter, respond to and protect its member states from internal and external threats by means of mutual cooperation within the member counties as well as NATO. “An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders.” <fnref n="4" /> With hope to make such effects in other countries than member states, EU commission established European neighborhood policy which later became the base on which eastern partnership was established.<fnref n="5" /> “Faced by enlargement fatigue and growing absorption incapacity within the union, the ENP’s main objective was to promote a ring of friends neighboring the EU by pushing for security through European democratic norms and values that seemed to be guided by a Kantian vision. Although the ENP would not offer membership to the six post-communist partner states, the strategic partnership would nevertheless

<footnote n="1">¹ Troitiño, D. R. (2013). European Integration: Building Europe. Nova Publishers: New York.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Mueller, J-W., East Europe goes south, Foreign Affairs 93, International security forum, 2014,14-19, page 14</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Nilsson, M., Silander, D., Democracy and Security in the EU's Eastern Neighborhood? Assessing the ENP in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, Democracy and Security, Vol12, No1, 44-61, page 44</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ European union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy, 2016, 19-20</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Costea, S. (2012). The European Union's Eastern Partnership: the objective of regional cooperation. The Eastern Partnership and the Europe 2020 strategy: Visions of leading policymakers and academics, 51-60.</footnote>
offer integration and collaboration, thus safeguarding democracy and security in the region.”<fnref n="6" /> This was kind of an offer to east European countries to cooperate with EU with hope of getting integrated or at least getting technical help and financial aid from union to conduct state reformations. But as much as east European countries are territorially far from the heart of EU and actual continent of Europe and on the other hand close to Russia, thus having major political and territorial problems caused by northern neighbor, this offer which many east European countries eagerly accepted became much of a challenge for European security and defense. Despite the attitude of the EU which seems very optimistic tone, idea and plans of new enlargement waves might become problem for EU defense and security.

As general impression, EU representatives try to make appeal in their daily speeches that eastern partnership is one of the main priorities to the union. This seems to be partially true as much as those countries of EaP who has expressed any kind of will of cooperation have nowadays already signed DCFTAs, association agreements, even got visa free regime, but there is other side of story on which EU tries to keep delicacy. Several EaP countries besides some economic and social problems have major territorial issues. For example, 20% of Georgian land is occupied by Russian troops – Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Ukraine is into actual war with Russia for occupied Crimea, Moldova has problem of Transnistria. Here I am not naming Armenia and Azerbaijan and conflict of Karabakh as much as Armenia obviously is keeping pro-Russian path and Azerbaijan has enough resources to maneuver freely having economic relations with Russia but staying more neutral than others I have mentioned above. It is fact that these conflicts exist, it is also fact that these countries see solution to their territorial problems but what is not a fact is whether EU will integrate these countries in the union with such issues or not.<fnref n="7" />

For me it is obvious that existence of occupied territories and tense relations with Russia hider the process of Georgia's EU integration. Society in country has double approaches to this issue, some believe that EU integration will not happen unless Georgia manages to solve the territorial conflict which in reality is either impossible or perspective of a far future and others claim that for getting status of a member state, Georgia will have to refuse own rights on occupied territories. However governmental authorities and EU based organizations that although existence of conflict zones threaten country stability EU perceives Georgia in its international boundaries not less and not more. Above this, they are stating that EU-Georgian cooperation might help to solve the problem of lost territories.<fnref n="8" /> Despite such options, we all see how slow the process of integration goes. The only argument that politics usually state defending the idea that Georgian EU integration will happen is the example of Cyprus which managed to become a member state despite long-lasting conflict between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus itself.

European Union has worked out number of fresh initiatives, strategy and action plan and a new level of ambition for security and defense in 2016. “The EU therefore starts 2017 with a range of policy options to enhance defense cooperation: aligning these initiatives to produce coherent policy in the future is now a priority.”<fnref n="9" /> So it has been interesting for me when EU does such preparations to enhance security, will it shut the entrance to Georgia because it can bring new threats or exactly by this enhanced security policy EU will become a resolution to frozen conflict.

This short research will be focused on Georgia's EU integration. I will not discuss territorial problems of Ukraine and Moldova as such but I will refer to them in some cases. The main aim of

<footnote n="6">⁶ Supra note 2, page 45</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Chochia, A. (2012). The European Union and its policy towards the neighbors from South Caucasus. L'Europe unie/United Europe, 6, 27-35.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ http://infocenter.gov.ge/123-moutsevs-thu-ara-saqarthvelos-mthavrobas-evrokavshirshi-gatsevrianebis-survilis-shemthkhvevashi-okupirebuli-regionebis-dabrunebaze-uaris-thqma.html, last time visited 01.06.2017</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Fiott, D., European defence: the year ahead, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2014, page 1</footnote>
this article will be to identify whether the fact that Georgia's 20% is occupied by Russia can become reason on rejection to EU integration. Based on existing research papers, own knowledge and the example of Cyprus I will try analyze and suggest answer to abovementioned issue.

EU AND EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES – PLANS OF NEW ENLARGEMENT AND PROBLEM OF CONFLICTS

EU's idea to cooperate with eastern European countries started shaping in 2003-2004 by commission and finalized under the notion of eastern partnership in 2009 year. EaP was founded on a shared commitment to common values, including democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights<fnref n="10" /> and to the principles of international law, underlying responsibility of eastern partnership countries to guarantee the introduction and execution of reforms and satisfying some criterias established by EU. This was meant to be political partnership to make those countries more consistent to handle security challenges. <fnref n="11" /> "Priority should be given to joint efforts to restore the European security order under international law; underlines that such an order must be based on democratic principles, the rule of law, fundamental values, respect for human rights, the protection of minorities, sovereignty, independence and the inviolability of borders".<fnref n="12" /> Here the word integration is not named, however for EaP states partnership means that one day when the fulfill EU requirements they will become member states. EU is ready for new enlargement as soon as EaP countries will be ready for that, this is what I usually hear but what is meant under being ready? Georgia is eagerly trying to be a “good boy” and do everything that EU says and recommends. These steps did give visa-free regime, association agreement and DCFTA to country. Georgian government believes that every single step forward with relation to EU makes it more and more possible to return Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is believed that people residing on occupied territories will be attracted by the benefits which EU integration can bring. So they put effort to make integration closer and possible.<fnref n="13" /> However, such attitude did not seemed to be mutual. Georgia will never be able to solve Georgia-Russian problem alone. If EU sees this as a hindrance, then of course integration will hardly ever happen considering that this conflict has been existing from early nineties. It was only after war in august 2008 when EU started to intervene in this process at least somehow, sending monitoring groups on conflict lines. In that period, EU understood that EaP countries are so much counterlinked that conflict in one state means that whole region is under threat, especially when Russia is neighboring that region and has economic, trade, political, energy resource influence on those countries. So starting from that moment, EU started intensive cooperation with Georgia in economic, energy and trade fields, signed association agreement and helped with financial aid to conduct major reforms and became security actor in southern Caucasus." On the other hand, for the European Union, the August conflict made it evident that the EU's security begins outside its borders and that developments taking place in its neighborhood affect its wellbeing."<fnref n="14" />

Another thing worth to mention here is that it was Georgian and Ukrainian aspiration of EU integration that caused Russian aggression. "The military conflicts in Ukraine and Georgia and the

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Kerikmäe, T.; Hamulak, O.; Chochia, A. (2016). A Historical Study of Contemporary Human Rights: Deviation or Extinction? Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum, 4 (2), 98–115.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Resolution by the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly on Common positions and concerns of the EU Member States and Eastern European partner countries over foreign policies and external threats to their security (2016/C 193/01), Official Journal of the European Union</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Ibid</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Supra note 5</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Khidasheli, T., Georgia's European way, friedrich ebert schtiftung, 2010, page 10-11</footnote>
political tension in Moldova of the 1990s and 2000 are a consequence of the EU's push for
democracy in the region and Russia's reactions and striving for regional hegemonic influence." "It
should also be seen as a result of Russia's counter-hegemonic reactions to the EU's promotion of
democracy promotion in its neighboring regions."<fnref n="15" /> Russian federation openly expressed that was
for that cooperation. Sometimes even used economic, trade and energy resources as pressure on
these countries. It is as well believed as much as Russia has direct influence on occupied territories
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it can use that influence and those territories for annexing whole
country.

"When signing bilateral Association Agreements with the EU, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine committed, along with the EU, to promote, preserve and strengthen peace and stability in the regional and international dimensions, as one of the aims of political association; as highlighted in the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit on 21-22 May 2015, the acts of aggression by Russia against Ukraine and Georgia have shown that the fundamental principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, with internationally recognised borders, cannot be taken for granted in the 21st century."<fnref n="16" /> Fact that unresolved territorial conflicts of Georgia are related to EU security I believe are seen from abovementioned aspects. But despite the fact that security strategy of EU in 2003 was mentioning that EU would play huge role as a resolutor of the protracted conflicts, it appears that in reality no results were achieved.

Practice of Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia show that EU does not have any
concrete action plan to handle territorial conflicts in eastern partnership countries, nether individual
for each case, nor a unified plan.<fnref n="17" /> Despite working on that, it seems to me that EU is more oriented
on strengthening own security, as if foresees some eminent threats, which I guess EU relates to
Eastern Europe and Russia. Sometimes this issues makes me confused to the extent that maybe EU
will leave the idea of eastern enlargement at all when it is related to so many problems of territorial
conflicts which directly affect EU- Russian relation. Territorial conflicts per se mean other
problems, such as migration, economic destabilization and so on. But the other side of the coin
might be that EU strengthens itself so that more effectively gets involved in conflict resolution.

"Conflicts in the territories of Eastern European partner countries make them more vulnerable to political destabilisation and seriously endanger their economic and social situation; whereas, furthermore, these conflict-affected areas within and around the European continent pose a serious danger to the security of the EU and its partners."<fnref n="18" /> This is how EU refers to existing conflict and of course it is logical. However the consequences of such perception are hard to foresee. Worth of attention is that EU is never asking neither form Georgia nor from Ukraine and Moldova to make any specific commitment with regard to conflict territories other than keeping peace and not causing military cases.

In my opinion, the strategy which European Union has chosen with regard to Georgia is that
they will help country stabilize economy, evolve trade, help to find alternative sources of energy to
Russia, help with gaining military experiences and so on.<fnref n="19" /> They might not physically and directly
get involved into conflict resolution over Abkhazia and South Ossetia because in that case they will
have to deal with Russia. Indeed, European union representatives call Russia to be aggressor and
have occupied some territories, they as well claim Russia to protect terms of Minsk agreement and

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Supra note 2, page 45</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Supra note 7</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷Paul, A., The Eastern Partnership, the Russia-Ukraine War, and the Impact on the South Caucasus, IAI, 2015, page 12</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Supra note 7</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹Freire, M., Simão, L., The EU's security actorness: the case of EUMM in Georgia, European Security, 22:4, 2013 464-477, Page 466</footnote>
put some sanctions after they have seen Russian threat is already close to continent of Europe. Will
helping Georgia to develop they will give country chance to solve territorial problem peacefully as
residents of occupies territories will themselves prefer such Georgia to what they have now.<fnref n="20" /> But
the biggest problem which in my opinion is as well evident as Russian endless aggression towards
Georgia is that they will not give those residents opportunity to choose. Russia has started
passportization in those occupied areas, so Russia himself offers them some benefits. So it seems
50/50 for me that EU plan can help Georgia to recover lost territories. However with other plan than
this – in case of using force EU will obviously shut the door to Georgia to avoid direct conflict with
Russia and this happens with Ukraine as well. Georgian president Giorgi Margvelashvili is stating
that territorial conflicts over occupied lands will be solved according to EU strategy and violent
activities.<fnref n="21" /> Although in my opinion all conflicts (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova) are different from
each other, European Union's attitude to problem solution seems same to me. Someone will oppose
that in case of Ukraine, EU used sanctions against Russia but I would say that it was social and
political pressure on EU to do so, when Russia stayed unpunished after war with Georgia, and the
same scenario later happened in Ukraine, it would simply put EU's capabilities under question if
the union didn't react. Otherwise it is notable that EU does not want to risk own security to resolve
existing problems.

FROZEN CONFLICT IN GEORGIA AND IMPORTANCE OF EU INTEGRATION

Conflict in Georgia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia have started as soon as Georgia proclaimed independence in 1991. First uprising in Abkhazia happened in 1993 and that time Shevardnadze was the one who asked Russia too support with troops and send them in the region. Russian troops were staying in Abkhazia since then. South Ossetia declared independence one year priorly, in 1990. This caused conflict between Tskhinvali region and already independent Georgia which is still ongoing and is full of controversies. But this conflict was not to be internal conflict within the state of Georgia, as much as Russian Republic was politically and militarily involved, supporting de facto government of the region and practically controlling borders Only after Roses revolution, the new president started moving Towards European union and Nato. That was the period when Georgia started reformations and deserved some positive comments from European Union. But frozen conflict still stayed in same condition. The most crucial moment however appeared Georgia-Russian war in 2008. "Russia, on the other hand, had geopolitical aspirations in the Caucasian region, which were tested in the Chechen-Russian conflict, where Georgia was one of the few countries who recognized Chechnya's declaration of independence. Russia started to prevent any new eastern enlargements for NATO and the EU. In spring 2008, NATO promised Georgia that it would become a future member of the organization, which irritated Russia even more. At the same time, the EU launched its neighborhood policy and was about to launch the "Eastern Partnership," aiming to tie Georgia closer to the EU.<fnref n="22" /> The closer ties between the EU and Georgia intensified the latter's security challenges, leading to fresh military incidents between

<footnote n="20">²⁰ http://georgiatoday.ge/news/6416/Amanda-Paul%3A-EU-Enlargement-Capacity-at-All-Time-Low, last time visited 8.06.2017</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ http://newsday.ge/new/index.php/en/component/k2/item/31649-the-president-of-georgia-problems-of-occupied-territories-will-be-overcome-not-by-violent-means,-but-according-to-the-european-standards, last time visited 8.06.2017</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Kerikmäe, T; Nyman-Metcalf, K; Gabelaia, D; Chochia, A (2014). Cooperation of Post Soviets with the Aim of not being "Post" and "Soviets". In: N. Šišková (Ed.). From Eastern Partnership to the Association. The Legal and Political Analysis (144–159). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.</footnote>
South Ossetia and the Georgian military”<fnref n="23" />. Existing Russian influence on these territories makes this conflict more serious for Georgia and hence more serious threat to defense and security of EU.

Both regions, Abkhazia as well as South Ossetia is economically dependent on Russia. Their budget consists whole from the Russian monetary contribution. Russia has already started passportization in both regions, some even say that residents are threatened to obtain Russian passports. ²⁴This means that Russia will always justify it’s military interventions in this regions as protecting own citizens from whatever threat there is. So when EU considers that by strengthening Georgian capabilities in economic and other major fields will have major effect on occupied territories, they should always consider that Russia has already put those territories under own “jurisdiction”. “This leaves Georgia and the EU in a security dilemma that involves not only the breakaway regions but also Russia.”<fnref n="25" /> In 2011 European Union recognized these territories as occupied by Russia.

New parliamentary elections in 2012 have brought new force in government continuing with same route and action plan to move towards EU. Finally Georgia signed association agreement with EU and just recently acquired visa-free regime. This is the argument that EU and Georgia are moving forward together. Parallel to this events, Georgian government is continuing to act within The EU strategy which I discussed above. It is always proclaimed and appealed that European Union when signing any of agreements or providing any support and benefits to the country does that considering the internationally recognized borders. In my opinion in such conditions EU and Georgian relation show that Union is not trying to keep distance from those territories and avoid interceptions. “The EU has repeatedly ignored the requests from the Georgian government for internationalization of the conflict over South Ossetia and Abkhasia through deploying an EU observation mission on the borders. In a similar vein, the EU preferred to distance itself from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and relied for its limited activities on the OSCE Minsk Group”. <fnref n="26" /> With such ways European Union tries to deisolate occupied territories so that European values and decrease unilateral attachment to Russia as well as seed trust that European benefits are actually available for them too. This means that government is offering to occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia European future however it is obvious that occupied territories should not use this offer for communications with the Union.

When ex prime-minister of Georgia was in Brussels signing association agreement, in first row he noted that eurointegration is important for Georgia as much as it makes possible to reestablish territorial integrity of the state. Same was appealed by the president of the country that European path is the unique possibility for solving territorial conflicts. However interesting for the sense of this article is the response which was made by non-recognized government of the occupied regions. De facto president of Abkhazia stated that deepened relations between European union and Georgia will not have any direct and important effects on the “country” but considering that Europe in such way strengthens its positions in Caucasus, Abkhazia will have to make additional moves to enhance strategic partnership with Russian federation. Similar speeches were made by same governments with regard to Georgia – EU visa liberalization.

I would say that the fact that Moldova as well has received visa liberation with Georgia proves that European Union has similar approach to resolution of territorial conflicts. Because same like Georgia, Moldova has been granted visa-free with aim to make the country as well as its conflict

<footnote n="23">²³ Supra note 2, page 54-55</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Sinkkonen, T., A security dilemma on the boundary line: an EU perspective to Georgian-Russian confrontation after the 2008 war, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 11:3, 265-278, page 267</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Supra note 2, page 54-55</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Börzel, T., Albanidze, B., European Neighbourhood Policy at the Crossroads, Evaluating the Past to Shape the Future, 2015, page 27</footnote>
zone – Transistria close to Europe. Transistria as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia exists with financial aid that is provided by Russian federation. All of such territories can be easily used by Russia to make military or other types of actions to hinder EU integration of these counties and if European Union will not solve conflict before accession of these countries, than Russia will already be direct threat to European Union, literally meaning. But Moldova's EU integration is hindered as well by the fact that Russia has influence not only on Transnistria but basically on polit-economic issues in country.<fnref n="27" />

“EU believes that the ‘frozen conflicts’ in the European Neighborhood (Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh) need to be treated urgently in order to bring stability to the region; believes that there should be closer cooperation among the Eastern European partner countries in order to put in place a strong foundation to ensure regional integration”<fnref n="28" /> despite such notes from side of the European union practice in all of eastern partnership countries show that the policy and action plan which nowadays European union is offering to those states do not have urgent effects. If the union considers that these states will gain status of member states only when their territorial stability will occur, this means integration should not be expected in near future.

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine being in same type of problems, looking forward to solve existing conflicts with help of the European Union and thus awaiting for integration do have only hope in case if they will not manage territorial stability in their countries. Between existing 28 member states if the European Union, Cyprus was the one who similarly to EaP countries had territorial problems but still managed to integrate in EU. However after that fact European Union as it seems to me tries to avoid such actions. In cases of Bosnia and Kosovo for example, European commission is stating that there still exists “unstable political climate”.<fnref n="29" /> Well it seems to me that same is happening in Georgia and especially in Ukraine. Some scholars say that despite visa free and other bilateral agreements, there is still doubts within union member states whether over possibility of Georgia EU integration and as arguments they use the way and time union needs to go to the next level of negotiations.

## CAN GEORGIA BECOME A MEMBER STATE HAVING CYPRUS AS AN EXAMPLE?

As Cyprus is usually compared to case of Georgia and Cyprus managed to become member state, it will be interesting what was the way to integration and whether than can become an example for Georgia's EU integration.

Cyprus made and application for membership in 1990. Within the period of 1997-1999 European union asked from Cyprus to handle territorial conflict with northern Cyprus peacefully and was noted as a condition for integration. However this condition was taken away, leaving that conflict quite in same condition and in 2004 Cyprus became a member state with territorial problems. This happened during the new level of the biggest EU enlargement.<fnref n="30" /> By that time Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Poland, Czech Republic and Estonia became member states. For me here stands a question, maybe EU needed such enlargement for increasing own competence and covering new territories with new resources?

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Centre for European Policy Studies, European neighborhood watch, thinking ahead for Europe, issue 124, 2016, page 1-2</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Supra note 7</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11283616, last time checked 08.06.2017</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Chochia, A.; Popjanevski, J. (2016). Change of Power and Its Influence on Country's Europeanization Process. Case Study: Georgia. In: Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Ed.). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy (197–210). Springer International Publishing.</footnote>
Some scholars note that integration process was accelerated by the fact that residents wanted get benefits which membership was promising to bring. Others believed that the main factor was that countries who were in conflict, themselves wanted to achieve status of membership and thus were ready to leave their positions. For example, Turkey which was an occupant country of northern Cyprus – part where Turkish Cypriots were living by that time was in process of cooperation with European Union. However as much as I recall due to the issue over Cyprus, these processes of negotiations between Turkey and European Union were hindered and are almost unchanged even nowadays. So Turkey was forced by the circumstances to change own policy with regard to Cyprus.<fnref n="31" />

EU integration of Cyprus is believed to be consequential for the union "longstanding conflict which has continued over the last five decades became an internal EU problem with the membership of the RoC in 2004, and therefore an issue between the EU and Turkey, which is also a candidate for EU membership." ³²But although this issue tensed relation between turkey and the union, it is was stated that EU was using the same passive approach to Cyprus territorial conflict as it is used in cases of EaP. "The EU has always offered economic benefits to the "TRNC" in order to tempt it to conclude an easy solution of the conflict. The EU does not seem to understand the nature of the conflict. Forty-six years of economic blockade has been endured without creating enough pressure to force a reunification of the RoC, despite the much higher standards of living in southern Cyprus." The "TRNC" perceives the Cypriot EU membership to be a security threat, while its guarantor power, Turkey, is not a member State Turkish Cypriots claiming that integration of Greek Cyprus part cannot be affecting them." <fnref n="33" /> This seems the same scenario as I discussed about Abkhazia, however the difference I can see and which in my opinion is the most important element which differs case of Cyprus from case of Georgia is that Turkey as an occupant country was ready to compromise in relation with Cyprus due to own interest as a candidate of union integration and in case of Georgia, obviously, Russia is never going to such compromises. Conversely Russia make own influence on occupied territories stronger and threaten to Georgia as well as Ukraine and Moldova with every possible tool it can find. Russia as well openly expresses own attitude towards european aspirations of eastern partnership countries.

However with difference to Cyprus, European Union yet is only offering association to eastern partnership countries of Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus. This aspect makes me think that European Union either does not perceive cases of eastern partnership who has territorial problems as similar to Cyprus case or do not want to use same policy towards them. "It should be mentioned that unlike in the case of the Western Balkans, Georgia, as well as Moldova and Ukraine, was granted an "action plan" and not a "roadmap"; the reason for this was EU's desire to avoid setting the Western Balkans' experience as a precedent for the Eastern Partnership."<fnref n="34" /> Hence if such attitude is correct than Eastern partnership countries are far from integration procedures. If we also consider that these countries are so much counterlinked within the region, they have common values and common threats, it is understandable that if one country has problem of conflict, if somehow affects another one or who region, thus outcomes with European union for these countries will not be very different if not the same.

There is another important issue, as much as all conflicts are different I think it will be logical if we identify what kind of conflict existed in Cyprus. "Conflict in Cyprus dates back to the 1960s

<footnote n="31">³¹ YİIma, K., A Partitioned State that is in the European Union: The Case of Cyprus, 3 Ankara B. Rev., 2010, 125-140, page 130</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² Ibid</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ Ibid, page 131</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing.</footnote>
and is not ethnic in nature; when you look at the two communities in Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, they are very friendly to each other and there was never a great deal of hostility towards reunification. The main issue with the Cyprus conflict was the role of external parties – Turkey, Greece, the UK and to a certain extent, the US. They played a huge role in the conflict coming about in the first place. This is a scenario very different from the Georgian conflict. Also, the Greek half of the island was allowed to enter the EU; this was not a productive step, it was detrimental because it made finding the solution harder, as the Greek Cypriots got leverage in the EU in terms of the Cyprus problem. "<fnref n="35" /> In this sense I would say that conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were much rough as far as there were civilians fighting against each other, of course with Russian and other hired troops. One more issue I would like to mention is that occupant country in case of Cyprus could offer much more benefits that Russian can offer to Sokhumi and Tskhinvali and European benefits might be more interesting to residents of those occupied territories than for Cypriots, so maybe this could balance the difference between Cyprus and Georgian conflict cases.

Despite that there are some significant differences between abovementioned conflict cases, some of the researchers state that Georgia should be one of the priorities to European Union due to its location as much as it is the hub between Europe and Asia and EU should be considering how country makes reforms and not based on general regional problems as much as Russia is there major threat, it has been and it will be in future. “The EU has acknowledged Georgia's European choice, even if EaP countries do not have a clear membership perspective. Georgia needs to remain realistic in this respect. It must understand that a step-by-step approach of intensifying relations with the EU in as many different areas as possible will be the best way to advance its integration aspirations. However, one day the EU will ultimately have to decide whether or not EaP countries have a future as full members of the EU.” <fnref n="36" />

Unless European union makes steps towards eastern partnership countries, they will not have any chance at all to reestablish their territorial integrity. More, nothing will hold Russia from full annexation. And that means Russia becoming direct threat to EU. So one more aspect why European Union might be interested in strengthening own forces within the countries of south Caucasus and others in that region is sphere of the EU security interests.

## CONCLUSION

It is quite hard to foresee what will be the outcome either for EU- Georgian cooperation or generally eastern partnership countries. As it was discussed above, the region itself includes so many complex problems that it is possible to perceived as threat to the security of the European Union. But another part of the story tells, that unless EU continues to work with those countries who hope to accession, that situation might become worse.

Example of Cyprus does not say much about what will be in case of Georgia. There are similarities as well as differences, my opinion was set in such a way that European Union will not do the same scenario with Georgia, Moldova or Ukraine as it did with Cyprus, because it brings actual military threats to Europe. In case of Cyprus such problem did not exist, only insignificant economic problems could be caused just be unstable political situation on the island. With comparison to Georgian case Turkey as much as was itself interested in membership of EU was not constituting such a big threat as Russia can be.

<footnote n="35">³⁵ Supra note 16</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Paul, A., Shiriyev, Z., Georgia's future: between Euro-Atlantic aspirations and geopolitical realities, European policy center, 2012, page 1</footnote>
Despite such factors, some scholars believe that “The EU is and should be interested in Georgia, and South Caucasus as whole, not only for bringing peace and stability on its borders and therefore preventing direct problems to the Union but also due to its geographical and political position. The Black Sea area and the South Caucasus region are of different international players’ interests, also due to the region’s huge transit capacities, including the sea routes, as well as the pipelines, being an East–West corridor.”<fnref n="37" /> So I would say that EU definitely has reasons, why it should be oriented and willing to strengthen works towards conflict resolution in Georgia as well as in other EaP countries. But there is a long way to go for both sides. We should not be expecting any major changes neither with regard to Georgian occupied territories no country’s EU integration. But I would still say that this time makes situation stabilized in country so that its integration will no more be constituting any threat to EU. This will be supported by successful reforms in the state, strengthened national defense and other effects that EU might have on country. But with situation as it is today, in my opinion, Georgia will not get a status of a member state. This will not only be caused by it’s conflict with Russia but will general level of state development.

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Freire, M., Simão, L., The EU's security actorness: the case of EUMM in Georgia, European Security, 22:4, 2013, 464-477

Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing.

Kerikmäe, T.; Hamulak, O.; Chochia, A. (2016). A Historical Study of Contemporary Human Rights: Deviation or Extinction? Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum, 4 (2), 98–115.

Kerikmäe, T; Nyman-Metcalf, K; Gabelaia, D; Chochia, A (2014). Cooperation of Post Soviets with the
Aim of not being "Post" and "Soviets". In: N. Šišková (Ed.). From Eastern Partnership to the
Association. The Legal and Political Analysis (144–159). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Khidasheli, T., Georgia's European way, friedrich ebert schtiftung, 2010

Mueller, J-W., East Europe goes south, Foreign Affairs 93, International security forum, 2014,14-19

Nilsson, M., Silander, D., Democracy and Security in the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood? Assessing the ENP in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, Democracy and Security, Vol12, No1, 44-61

Paul, A., Shiriyev, Z., Georgia’s future: between Euro-Atlantic aspirations and geopolitical realities,
European policy center, 2012

Paul, A., The Eastern Partnership, the Russia-Ukraine War, and the Impact on the South Caucasus, IAI,
2015

<footnote n="37">³⁷ Supra note 29, page 199</footnote>
Resolution by the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly on Common positions and concerns of the EU
Member States and Eastern European partner countries over foreign policies and external threats to their
security (2016/C 193/01), Official Journal of the European Union

Sinkkonen, T., A security dilemma on the boundary line: an EU perspective to Georgian–Russian confrontation after the 2008 war, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 11:3, 265-278

Troitiño, D. R. (2013). European Integration: Building Europe. Nova Publishers: New York.

YIIma, K., A Partitioned State that is in the European Union: The Case of Cyprus, 3 Ankara B. Rev., 2010, 125-140
# Ukraine and the European Union

TUULI VARSA

TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

EMAIL: TUULI.VARSA@ICLOUD.COM

**Abstract:** This paper analyses the EU-Ukraine relations. It collects together the main historical events of the relations and tells us how the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement changed to the challenging Association Agreement while describing some details of the EU's Eastern Partnership program. The crisis in Ukraine is analyzed from the European Union perspective. Among others it brings up some problems of the relations, such as the Ukrainian decision to suspend of the Association Agreement because of the pressure from Russia. Russian relations with Ukraine as well as with the European Union are mentioned. Along with the colorful history brief of the relations between the EU and Ukraine, the possibility of Ukraine to join the EU is covered. In the end there is a summary of current situation and some analyses of the future.

**Keywords:** European Union, Ukraine, The Eastern Partnership program, Ukraine-Russia crisis, EU external relations

## INTRODUCTION

On March 2017 I came across with the term ‘Russian passportization’. Passportization is a Russian policy, where they are offering a Russian nationality or a dual nationality to the residences of the former Soviet Union countries<fnref n="1" />. I read several articles about how this was done in East Ukraine and the research made me more interested about the situation in Ukraine as a whole. Ukraine is one of the European Union’s (EU) neighbour country,<fnref n="2" /> I wanted to learn more about how the EU is dealing with one of the Europe’s worst crisis since World War II<fnref n="3" />, especially when the crisis is happening next to EU’s external boarders. On the week on the change between May and June, I visited some EU institutions in Brussels, there in several presentations was mentioned how Ukraine has a European path and how it is a pro-EU country. What does this actually mean?

## HISTORY

The EU and Ukraine had their first significant legal framework with their relations in 1994, when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signet. The agreement came into force in 1998 and had an initial period of ten years. After that, the agreement was meant to continue with extensions of one year per time, unless one of the parties represents its willingness to denunciation it before six months of the current expiry date. The agreement was founded out dated after internal developments of both sides of the agreement. It did not have specific legal consequences and for example Ukraine was supposed to ensure that it will make its legislation compatible with the EU law, but there was no mention of any timeline, methods of implementation

<footnote n="1">¹ Anne Peters, “Extraterritorial Naturalizations: Between the Human Right to Nationality, State Sovereignty and Fair Principles of Jurisdiction” in Thomas Giegerich, Alexander Proelss (coord.), German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 53, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2011, p.634.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Costea, S. (2012). The European Union's Eastern Partnership: the objective of regional cooperation. The Eastern Partnership and the Europe 2020 strategy: Visions of leading policymakers and academics, 51-60.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine between a Constrained EU and Assertive Russia” in Journal of Common Market Studies, Special Issue: Europe's Hybrid Foreign Policy : The Ukraine-Russia Crisis, volume 55, issue 1, January 2017, p.1.</footnote>
or any sanctions if this was not fulfilled.<fnref n="4" /> At that time Ukraine had a hybrid regime, which did not have enough democratic characters that it could work properly with the PCA<fnref n="5" />.

When Hungary, Poland and Slovakia joined to the EU in 2004, Ukraine became the border neighbour of the EU. On the same year EU launched The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the idea was to create “a framework that would be successfully containing the complicated set of relationships”.<fnref n="6" /> They wanted to strengthen the prosperity, stability and security between the EU and its neighbours.<fnref n="7" /> In 2005 ENP Action Plan was adopted with Ukraine and they started it’s long term objective, the negotiations of new bilateral agreement for replacing the PCA<fnref n="8" />.

EU presented its Global Europe Strategy<fnref n="9" /> in 2006, the main idea was to promote trade liberalisation and integration. Later, on the same year there was an announcement from the EU that they wanted to negotiate, with their neighbours, about the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA). During that time Ukraine was dealing with the Orange Revolution, whereof I will talk more about on the next part of this paper. In 2007 Ukraine was the first country to start the negotiations on a new Association Agreement (AA), but the negotiations were able to start only after the Ukraine would join to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This happened in 2008 and so did the DCFTA negotiations start officially.<fnref n="10" />

After suffering with various problems, with very different kinds of neighbours, EU decided to split ENP to the smaller groups<fnref n="11" />. The Easter Partnership (EaP) programme launched in 2009 within Ukraine and five other former Soviet countries, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus.<fnref n="12" /> The EaP offered integration politically, through the Association Agreement, economically, through DCFTA as well as the possibility for visa-free regime. Ukraine was the largest and geopolitically the most important of all of these six countries.<fnref n="13" />

Finally in 2011 the AA between the EU and Ukraine was concluded, it was initialled in 2012 and 2013 EU adopted the proposals for final conclusions and signatures. In the end, the agreement was not signed, because the EU still asked Ukraine to rectify its judiciary and law enforcement systems with European standards as well as the abandonment of the practice of selective justice. During all this time, the crisis between Ukraine and Russia was coming along and one day before

<footnote n="4">⁴ Guillaume Van der Loo, Peter Van Elsuwege, Roman Petrov, *The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument*, EUI Working Papers Law 2014/09, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), European University Institute, 2014, p.3-4.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Geoffrey Pridham, "EU/Ukraine Relations and the Crisis with Russia, 2013-14: A Turning Point" in The International Spectator, volume 49 issue 4, December 2014, p.54.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Troitiño, D. R. (2013). European Integration: Building Europe. Nova Publishers: New York.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Guillaume Van der Loo, Peter Van Elsuwege, Roman Petrov, *The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument*, EUI Working Papers Law 2014/09, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), European University Institute, 2014, p.4.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ European Commission, 'Global Europe: Competing in the World', COM (2006) 567 final, 4 October 2006.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Guillaume Van der Loo, Peter Van Elsuwege, Roman Petrov, *The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument*, EUI Working Papers Law 2014/09, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), European University Institute, 2014, p.4-5.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Chochia, A. (2012). The European Union and its policy towards the neighbors from South Caucasus. L'Europe unie/United Europe, 6, 27-35; Chochia, A.; Popjanevski, J. (2016). Change of Power and Its Influence on Country's Europeanization Process. Case Study: Georgia. In: Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Ed.). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy (197-210). Springer International Publishing.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine between a Constrained EU and Assertive Russia" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Special Issue: Europe's Hybrid Foreign Policy: The Ukraine-Russia Crisis, volume 55, issue 1, January 2017, p.3.</footnote>
the EaP summit in Vilnius Ukraine stated that it would suspend the AA.<fnref n="14" /> This was because Ukraine wanted to “ensure the national security of Ukraine and to recover trade and economic relations with the Russian Federation”<fnref n="15" />.

The decisions of suspend the AA got pro-EU Ukrainians attention. They started to riot and the disorder ended up for the Euromaiden revolution. The pro-Russia president Victor Yanukovych was dismissed and a new pro-EU government was established. Arseniy Yatsenyuk, a new leader of interim government stated that signing the AA was the priority of the new government. Signing the contract was still not an easy task, this time the Ukrainian government had some legal issues. According to Ukrainian Constitution<fnref n="16" />, the president is the one, who is responsible of signing international agreements. Olexander Turchynov, at the time current acting president, was appointed by the Parliament without elections because of the revolution. The situation did bring up some questions of legitimacy.<fnref n="17" />

At the same time, also the EU was dealing with competence issues of the AA. The agreement is a mixed agreement, which means that the competence is with both, the EU and it's member states. Because of the situation in Ukraine, there was a political pressure to act quickly. EU has 28 member states and mixed agreements take time until all the members are satisfied with the agreement. This was one of the reasons, why EU decided that all the political chapters of the AA will be sing first. Finally on 21 March 2014 the first part of the agreement was signed. And when Ukraine got its new elected president, Petro Poroshenko, he signed the entire agreement on 27 June 2014.<fnref n="18" />

## UKRAINE-RUSSIA CRISIS

Since 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed and Ukraine became an independent state<fnref n="19" />, Russia has had its direct and indirect presence in Ukraine<fnref n="20" />. There have been several disagreements between these two countries and for example in 2006 there were a gas war between Ukraine and Russia<fnref n="21" />.

Before the gas war Ukraine dealt with the, earlier in this paper mentioned, Orange revolution. Ukraine was divided in two different kinds of parts, the east and the west. The east side was mainly Russian speaking orthodoxies, which were strongly pro-Russians and the west was Ukrainian speakers Roman Catholics who were nationalistic and contra-Russians. In November 2004 Ukraine had a presidential elections. West voted for Viktor Yushchenko, who was a pro-EU and wanted to

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Guillaume Van der Loo, Peter Van Elsuwege, Roman Petrov, *The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument*, EUI Working Papers Law 2014/09, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), European University Institute, 2014, p.5.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine from 21st November 2013, N 905-p.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Art. 106 (3) of the Ukrainian Constitution.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Guillaume Van der Loo, Peter Van Elsuwege, Roman Petrov, *The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument*, EUI Working Papers Law 2014/09, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), European University Institute, 2014, p.5.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Guillaume Van der Loo, Peter Van Elsuwege, Roman Petrov, *The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument*, EUI Working Papers Law 2014/09, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), European University Institute, 2014, p.5-6.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ BBC, *Ukraine country profile*, 3 February 2017. URL www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18018002 Accessed: June 7th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Jonathan Stern, The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006, Oxford, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2006.</footnote>
have stronger ties with the Europe and the rest of the west, whereas the east voted for Russian supporter Viktor Yanukovich. The latter was officially declared for the winner of the elections.<fnref n="22" />

Soon after the official declaration of the elections winner, there was found a massive fraud by the election observes. They stated that there were over a million extra votes. The west started to riot and demanded that the result should be annulled. The name Orange revolution comes from the colours of the parties. Blue was the colour of the pro-Yanukovich government supporters and orange came from Yushchenko protesters.<fnref n="23" />

The EU and USA denounced that the runoff was fraudulent. USA even threatened Ukraine with their relation if it would not do anything for the situation. After that Russia, who unsurprisingly was the supporter of Yanukovich, warned the West to back of.<fnref n="24" /> On 26 December 2004 The Ukraine's Supreme Court ordered the result invalid and ruled new elections. The new elections were held on 23 January 2005 and this time the independent election observers found the re-run much fairer than earlier rounds. Viktor Yushchenko the winner of the elections, the new president of Ukraine, stated that "The people achieved honest elections, the transfer of power was legitimate. It is a great national victory".<fnref n="25" />

The orange revolution ended for the result of the fairer elections, but the disputes between the pro-Russians and pro-EU people did not disappear. Russia and the EU as well as the USA had already taken part for the crisis. Then the new presidential elections came in 2010 and this time Yanukovich was elected. During the following year it become clear that "he was set on power aggrandizement through reversing democratic reforms". Ukraine had failed to create a real democracy. <fnref n="26" /> The pro-Russian way of leading the country was perceived and for example and the Russians took Ukrainian military and Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) into control. They were training for training anti-Euromaidan vigilantes.<fnref n="27" /> The unhappiness for the government was visible and in 2013 the (Euro)Maidan protested started.

In November 2013 Ukraine decided to suspend from the AA with the EU because the pressure from the Russia. This started the disorders in Ukraine, pro-EU presenters were gathering to the streets and to the Maiden in Kyiv for protests with the EU flags. Slowly the protestors diminished and only some few hundred students and student-aged protestors stayed. Then at 4 AM on November 30 2013 the Berkut Special Police forcefully and even violently dispersed the group. This was the moment when Ukrainians become furious, they did not want to stay passive when their children were beaten. Later on the same day, there were already more than ten thousand people on the Maidan again, and people were still coming even from the distant parts of the Ukraine. It is estimated that by 1 December 2013 there had been about eight hundred thousand people at the Maidan. The protests were changing from the EU perspective to the anti-corruption, but the main demands of the protestors were all the time the withdrawal of president Yanukovych.<fnref n="28" />

<footnote n="22">²² The Atlantic, Shneider, W, *Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution',* 2004, URL www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/ukraines-orange-revolution/305157/ Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ The Atlantic, Shneider, W, *Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution',* 2004, URL www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/ukraines-orange-revolution/305157/ Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ The Atlantic, Shneider, W, *Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution',* 2004, URL www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/ukraines-orange-revolution/305157/ Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ BBC News, *Yushchenko takes reins in Ukraine*, 23 January 2005, URL news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4198957.stm Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Geoffrey Pridham, "EU/Ukraine Relations and the Crisis with Russia, 2013-14: A Turning Point" in The International Spectator, volume 49 issue 4, December 2014, p.54-55.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine between a Constrained EU and Assertive Russia" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Special Issue: Europe's Hybrid Foreign Policy : The Ukraine-Russia Crisis, volume 55, issue 1, January 2017, p.6.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Euromaidan Press, Borislaw Bilas, *Euromaidan Protests – The Revolution of Dignity*, 20 February 2016, URL euromaidanpress.com/2016/02/20/the-story-of-ukraine-starting-from-euromaidan/2/ Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>
There were speeches as well as music and other kinds of cultural performances during days and nights and they were even establishing a perimeter and Samo, a self-defence patrol, for keeping the Berkut Police away. At the beginning the government was trying to spread out the people, but the more they were trying, the more people came and pushed back. Bilash is writing on his article "The government paid street hooligans, called "Titushkas", to attack protesters, kidnap activists and journalists and create general chaos throughout Kyiv, while the corrupt police turned a blind eye to these hooligans." At the beginning of the next year the Ukrainian government adopted laws against protesting. As an example, if you were blocking the entrance of a government building during a protest, you might get six years of imprisonment.<fnref n="29" />

Three politicians, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Vitali Klitschko and Oleh Tyahnybok started negotiations, on behalf of the protesters, with the president Yanukovych. The negotiations did not have any resolution, mainly because Yanukovych did not agree to resign. The unsuccessful negotiations and new laws pushed a group of protestors to march from Maidan to the Parliament on 19 January 2014. But the march ended up to the riots with the police and first protesters were killed by shootings. The negotiations were still trying to find the resolution and in the end some of the anti-protest laws were rolled back. Yanykovych still refused to resign and the protests kept going. The Titushkas were continuing their job to kidnap and murder protesters and journalists. In the end of February there was a new march that ended up for the massacre. More than one hundred protesters died. There are some claims that Russia took part of these shootings. The representatives of the protesters, Yanukovych as well as some European diplomats had a meeting for to end this crisis. They created a draft agreement, where was a clause that the new presidential elections should be sooner as it was supposed to be. The protesters still were not happy for the agreement and required that the president would resign before the next morning. During the night Yanukovych fled from the country and as soon as it was discovered, the parliament officially removed him from the office and new presidential elections were held on 25 May 2014. <fnref n="30" />

One week after the president had fled, armed men without any identifiable insignias started to take the control of checkpoints and government buildings in Crimea. Crimea was an autonomous region of Ukraine, which had more than 60% of ethnic Russians. On the next day these unidentified green man ousted the Crimean prime minister and hoisted to top of Crimea's parliament building the Russian flag. The new prime minister, Sergey Aksyonov, called for referendum about options for Crimea joining to Russia or giving Crimea the sovereign status by returning the Crimean Constitution of 1992. On 16 March 2014 there was the vote. The voting it self was untrustworthy, for example there has been some evidence that the ballots were pre-filled and the vote had to be done without verified voters list, since the Ukrainian government refused to alienate it. The fact that the Russia was supervising the pole did not help the trustworthy of the vote either. The result was that 93% of the voters wanted to be part of Russia. The very next day Russia signed a decree recognizing Crimea as an independent state and the day after Aksyonov and Putin signed The Treaty on the Incorporation of Crimea into Russia. EU as well most of the countries does not recognise the annexation of Crimea.<fnref n="31" />

At the same time pro-Russia protest were happening in eastern and southern Ukraine. It is stated that the most of the protesters were citizens of Russia and that some of the Russian protesters were even paid to come to Ukraine and protest. In the Eastern Ukraine the situation got worse and

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Euromaidan Press, Borislaw Bilas, *Euromaidan Protests – The Revolution of Dignity*, 20 February 2016, URL euromaidanpress.com/2016/02/20/the-story-of-ukraine-starting-from-euromaidan/2/ Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Euromaidan Press, Borislaw Bilas, *Euromaidan Protests – The Revolution of Dignity*, 20 February 2016, URL euromaidanpress.com/2016/02/20/the-story-of-ukraine-starting-from-euromaidan/2/ Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Euromaidan Press, Borislaw Bilash, *The Annexation of Crimea*, 20 February 2016, URL euromaidanpress.com/2016/02/20/the-story-of-ukraine-starting-from-euromaidan/3/ Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>
in the provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk, armed militants managed to overtake and occupy government buildings as well as to take control of television and radio transmission towers. Once again there were two referendums after which there was a statement of two independent states: the Donetsk National Republic (DNR) and the Luhansk National Republic (LNR). Several battles were seen across Eastern Ukraine, but what finally got the attention of the world, was when a Malaysian Airlines plane carrying 298 civilians from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was shot down in the Ukrainian airspace. Later on the investigations showed that it was shot down with BUK missile system made by Russia. The systems requires specialized training and the support of ground based radar, whereas the nearest of them are on the Russian soil. In September, after the extensive diplomatic negotiations the Minsk Protocol, a ceasefire agreement was presented. But neither party was following the agreement and the battles kept going. When the Russians inventions to the crisis become more clear the EU as well as US and Canada imposed sanctions towards Russia. In February 2015 the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany signed the Minsk II Protocol.<fnref n="32" />

## EU'S PART IN THE CRISIS

Some people say that the EU is one to blame for the Ukrainian crisis. Cross and Karolewski claims on their article<fnref n="33" /> that since the EU is relatively new on its foreign policy, EU is not strong enough for the international relations at all. Bonnenberg has stated on his article<fnref n="34" /> that the EaP is the reason for all these happenings. He states that the idea of the EaP was to impart Western values to these six countries, but in reality “the effort has been a Western European attempt to strip these countries of their historical ties with Russia.” Of course Russia feels threatened when EU surrounds it and even more after the NATO enlarged to the Baltics and to the former European satellite states of the Soviet Union. The EaP has failed and it has only been harmful to the Europe, “a Europe that is more than just the EU”.

Whereas Solonenko states that the western populism weakens the democracy in Ukraine. She states that after the elections in 2014 “it was thanks to pro-European aspirations and the determination of millions of Ukrainians that the country received a chance to overhaul the old post-Soviet system of governance and make a breakthrough towards becoming a truly European country”.<fnref n="35" /> Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI)<fnref n="36" /> has shown that Ukraine has improved the quality of its democracy after the Euromaiden protests, but it is still descoped as a defective democracy country. In the West, the rise of the populism, the Brexit and the election of Donald Trump might all affect for Ukrainian democracy. One of these examples is a French Front Nationalist Marine Le Pen, who has insisted that the Russian sanctions should be lifted and that the annexation of Crimea was legitimate. Another example was when the Netherlands voted against AA on June 2016, which delayed the rustication of AA. The postpone of the granting of visa-free travel for Ukrainians is also a good example. “Ukrainians have paid a high price in lost lives and

<footnote n="32">³² Euromaidan Press, Borislaw Bilash, *The Hybrid War in Eastern Ukraine*, URL euromaidanpress.com/2016/02/20/the-story-of-ukraine-starting-from-euromaidan/4/ Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ Mai'a K. Davis Cross, Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, “What Type of Power has the EU Exercised in the Ukraine–Russia Crisis? A Framework of Analysis” in Journal of Common Market Studies, Special Issue: Europe's Hybrid Foreign Policy: The Ukraine-Russia Crisis, volume 55, issue 1, January 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ Atlantic-Community.org, Heinrich Bonnenberg, *EU's Eastern Partnership to Blame for Crisis over Ukraine*. 28 March 2014, URL www.atlantic-community.org/-/eu-s-eastern-partnership-to-blame-for-crisis-over-ukraine Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ Kerikmäe, T; Nyman-Metcalf, K; Gabelaia, D; Chochia, A (2014). Cooperation of Post Soviets with the Aim of not being "Post" and "Soviets". In: N. Šišková (Ed.). From Eastern Partnership to the Association. The Legal and Political Analysis (144–159). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶Stiftung’s Transformation Index 2016, URL www.bti-project.org/en/home/ Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>
displacements for a unique chance to become a truly democratic and prosperous European country – a chance which populist developments in Europe now undermine.”<fnref n="37" />

I think that the EU can create internationals relations, its members has done it far before the EU and its external relations policies, but both of the others authors are partly right. After all these happenings EU should help Ukraine even more, after all they do have the AA. But at the same time maybe the EU has already done too much. If one of the Ukrainian crisis is even called for Euromaiden, that definitely tells, that the EU is part of the disorders. Ukraine is a poor country between the huge Federal State and a large association of states, both offering the possibility “to join their respective (and mutually incompatible) trading blocs with different conditionalities”<fnref n="38" /> And at the same time both blaming each other and taking offence if Ukraine agrees something with the other. A good example here is when in 2016 January Russia cancelled its free trade agreement with Ukraine after the DCFTA came into the force<fnref n="39" />.

The problems with the 2004 EU enlargements of new member states, 2007 new enlargement with two not so easy countries as well as the Eurozone crisis made the EU become more careful with promising membership for new countries. That is why the consensus of Ukraine joining to the EU was not enough inside the EU. During the Euromaidan crisis USA and the protestors of the Maidan criticized the EU from its slowness and of the lack of boldness to respond for Yanukovych's refusal to sign the AA as well as all the others happening in Ukraine. Only after the killings of the protesters in February 2014 waked the EU for the actions. They started to consider the sanctions against Russia. But when Yanukovych fed from Ukraine, EU felt that the situation was good again and started to invest for other international organizations before the Ukraine.<fnref n="40" />

Then the EU extended the relations also for the economic aid. Such as, an agreement in March to embed EU officials in certain ministries in Kyiv in an advisory capacity and the cooperation with Ukraine and OLAF, the EU's anti-fraud agency. They also started to prevent embezzlement with the creation of a support group for Ukraine by the European Commission to mobilize expertise from member states and promote coordination with donors and international financial institutions. EU created a support package for Ukraine including technical assistance on constitutional, judicial and electoral matters and a plan for accelerating visa liberalization. Later they established a mission to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform embracing the police and the rule of law. When AA finally came into the force, it did bring along several other cooperation perspectives. Beside the economic side, it also had political and administrative reform and it promoted democratic values and human rights.<fnref n="41" />

In July 2013 Russian took actions against AA and stated some sanctions to Ukraine. In June the chief operating officer, David O'Sullivan, of the European External Action Service (EEAS) stated that that the AA would not be signed only on geopolitical considerations. But by August there was a change of minds when EU realized that it couldn't lose Ukraine. At the same time various

<footnote n="37">³⁷ EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, Iryna Solonenko, *How western populism weakens democracy in Ukraine*. 30 March 2017, URL eprints.lse.ac.uk/71816/1/blogs.lse.ac.uk-How%20western%20populism%20weakens%20democracy%20in%20Ukraine.pdf Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="38">³⁸ Tatjana Muravska, Alexandre Berlin, “Towards a New European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): What Benefits of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) for Shared Prosperity and Security?” in Tanel Kerkmäe, Archil Chochia (coord.), Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy, Cham, Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2016.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">³⁹ Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine between a Constrained EU and Assertive Russia” in Journal of Common Market Studies, Special Issue: Europe's Hybrid Foreign Policy: The Ukraine-Russia Crisis, volume 55, issue 1, January 2017, p.4.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ Geoffrey Pridham, “EU/Ukraine Relations and the Crisis with Russia, 2013-14: A Turning Point” in The International Spectator, volume 49 issue 4, December 2014, p.54-56.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">⁴¹ Geoffrey Pridham, “EU/Ukraine Relations and the Crisis with Russia, 2013-14: A Turning Point” in The International Spectator, volume 49 issue 4, December 2014, p.54-56.</footnote>
new member states from post-Communist Europe were pressing for signing the AA for geopolitical reasons. After the Crimea EU's conditionality demands had become irrelevant and the focus was now on actions towards Russia. There were several meeting and warnings towards Russia, but EU was still acting way friendlier than for example US or Japan<fnref n="42" />. Only after the Malaysian airlines airplane was shot down the EU sanctions were really adopted.<fnref n="43" />

The Member States of EU have different kinds of perspectives and interest towards the Russian-Ukraine crisis. But still, besides some individual cases, the EU has maintained its common response towards the sanctions. One reason for this was that “Member States accepted the political and economic costs of sanctioning Russia due to a sense of collective commitment to the principles of sovereignty and self-determination”.<fnref n="44" />

In my personal opinion, I think that if two parties have a dispute, a clever third party would not take a side, the best way is to be impartial and keep the relations between both of the parties. Only if both or other of the parties act against current agreements, ethics or for example human rights, then it is the time to show that you do not agree or accept with their actions. For example in the Ukrainian case, I think that the annexation of Crimea and the sill on-going wars on Eastern Ukraine went too far. That is why I think that the sanctions against Russia are admissible.

## CURRENT SITUATION

The armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine continues<fnref n="45" /> and Crimea, as a part of Russia now, suffers from the sanctions and the loss of the tourism<fnref n="46" />. EU still holds the Russian sanctions<fnref n="47" />, but what is the current situation of the EU and Ukraine relations?

After long negotiations and several delays, finally on 11 May 2017 the European Union approved visa-free travel for Ukrainian citizens<fnref n="48" />. The visa-free travel for Ukrainians with biometric passports will be available in summer 2017 to all EU countries, excluding the Great Britain and Ireland but including Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. Currently the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine is organizing information campaigns about the visa-free travels around Ukraine, covering all regions inside Ukraine and continuing until the end of 2018.<fnref n="49" />

A EU-Ukraine summit will be held in 12 July 2017. The trade measures have become more favourable to the Ukraine, when for example on 6 of June EU ambassadors reached agreement on

<footnote n="42">⁴² Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine between a Constrained EU and Assertive Russia” in Journal of Common Market Studies, Special Issue: Europe's Hybrid Foreign Policy: The Ukraine-Russia Crisis, volume 55, issue 1, January 2017, p.9.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">⁴³ Geoffrey Pridham, “EU/Ukraine Relations and the Crisis with Russia, 2013-14: A Turning Point” in The International Spectator, volume 49 issue 4, December 2014, p.58-59.</footnote>

<footnote n="44">⁴⁴ Helene Sjursen, Guri Rosén, “Arguing Sanctions. On the EU's Response to the Crisis in Ukraine”, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Special Issue: Europe's Hybrid Foreign Policy: The Ukraine-Russia Crisis, volume 55, issue 1, January 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵ Live UA Map, URL liveuamap.com/en/2017/9-june-45-attacks-on-ukrainian-positions-yesterday-1-soldier Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶ Bloomberg, Misha Friedman, *The High Price of Putin's Takeover of Crimea*, 31 March 2017 URL www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-03-31/crimea-pays-a-high-price-three-years-after-russian-takeover Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">⁴⁷ European Union Newsroom. *EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis*, 16 March 2017, URL europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">⁴⁸ Schengen visa info, *EU approves visa-free travel for Ukrainians*, 11 May 2017, URL www.schengenvisainfo.com/eu-approves-visa-free-travel-ukrainians/ Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="49">⁴⁹ Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine. *Information campaign on visa-free travel to the European countries was launched*, 11 May 2017, URL https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/25968/information-campaign-visa-free-travel-european-countries-launches-today_en Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>
the Council's stance on temporary autonomous trade measures. The agreement will be for three years and it consist “additional import quotas at zero tariff for certain agricultural products ('tariff rate quotas' at 0%) and the partial or full removal of import duties on several industrial products”. The principles under the AA and the safeguard will apply.<fnref n="50" />

The European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine works continually with the relations between the EU and Ukraine. It is “a non-executive mission of the European Union that formally began operations from its headquarters in Kyiv on 1 December 2014, following the Maidan revolution of 2013/14 and an invitation issued by the Ukrainian government... The goal is to achieve a civilian security sector that is efficient, accountable, and enjoys the trust of the public.”<fnref n="51" /> For example on 23 May the representatives of the EUAM and Tetiana Kovalchuk, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of the Interior had a meeting where they announced that the Ministry had set up a dedicated Human Rights Department.<fnref n="52" />

There is also EUACI, The EU Anti-Corruption Initiative, which objective is “to improve the implementation of anti-corruption policy in Ukraine, thereby ultimately contributing to a reduction in corruption”. The project is now calling for the proposals. “The goal of this call for proposals is to support national level civil society organizations (CSOs) within the field of anti-corruption aiming to engage with regional and local level CSOs and civic initiatives fighting corruption to deliver the state reforms, and to implement extensive advocacy and oversight.” The implementation of the proposed projects will most likely to start in July 2017 or at the latest in early 2018.<fnref n="53" />

## CONCLUSIONS

The relations between the EU and Ukraine had has more turning points, delays, suspends and crisis as ether of the parties were expecting. Both of the parties can be blamed of the negative issues, but as I see it, at the moment the relations are relatively good. The cooperation is working and as Pridham sated on his article<fnref n="54" /> now is the great change to create even more positive cooperation strategy. A Ukrainian government is firmly committed to joining the EU, a civil society is more motivated than before and driven in particular by a young generation hopeful of their country moving on from the Soviet past, and the fact that, besides some Eastern parts of Ukraine, the situation has increasingly alienated by Russia’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine.

I don't think that corruption is something what we can beat in the one night. We still have a lot of corruption inside the EU as well. But with cooperation it is definitely easier task. In the end, will Ukraine become part of the EU? In 2014 Petro Porošenko stated that Ukraine will apply for the EU membership in 2020⁵⁵, but for example in 2016 European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said that ‘Ukraine will definitely not be able to become a member of the EU in the next 20

<footnote n="50">⁵⁰ European Council, *Ukraine: Council agrees its stance on trade measures*, URL www.consilium.europa.eu/fi/press/press-releases/2017/06/06-ukraine-trade-measures/ Accessed: 9th June 2015.</footnote>

<footnote n="51">⁵¹ EUAM Ukraine, *Our Mission*, www.euam-ukraine.eu/our-mission/about-us/ Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="52">⁵² EUAM Ukraine, *Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine creates Human Rights Unit with EUAM support*, 26 May 2017, URL www.euam-ukraine.eu/news/latest-news/ministry-of-internal-affairs-of-ukraine-creates-human-rights-unit-with-euam-support/ Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="53">⁵³ Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine. *EU Anti-Corruption Initiative (EUACI) Call for Proposals – Ukrainian Registered CSOs*, 20 May 2017, URL https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/26633/eu-anti-corruption-initiative-euaci-call-proposals—ukrainian-registered-csos_en Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="54">⁵⁴ Geoffrey Pridham, “EU/Ukraine Relations and the Crisis with Russia, 2013-14: A Turning Point” in The International Spectator, volume 49 issue 4, December 2014, p.59.</footnote>

<footnote n="55">⁵⁵ HS, Suvi Turtiainen, *Ukraina aikoo hakea EU:n jäseneksi vuonna 2020*, 25 September 2014, URL www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000002764306.html Accessed: June 9th 2017.</footnote>
to 25 years, and not of NATO either'.<fnref n="56" /> Personally I do think, that in the end Ukraine will be a member of the European Union one-day.

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# Chile and the European Union: a Relationship with Privileges?

DR. ANDRÉS MEDINA ARAVENA

THE UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE LA SANTÍSIMA CONCEPCIÓN, CHILE

EMAIL: AMEDINA@UCSC.CL

**Abstract:** The article aims to provide historical background that allow us to explain the reasons for the European Union, an alliance of global relevance, to sign agreements not only with MERCOSUR (where Brazil and Argentina participate) and Mexico, the great Ibero-American countries, but also and at the same time with a small country located in the antipodes like Chile.

**Keywords:** Chile, European Union, EU External Relations, International Policies

## INTRODUCTION

The relationship of European countries with America has deep roots that go back to the discovery of the new world. However, in the 20th century since the enormous development of the United States, the Ibero-American nations were under the obvious dependence of the giant of the north and relations with Europe became weak.<fnref n="57" /> It will only be in the decade of the eighties when the European Community manifests its presence again, which will increase progressively by the end of the 20th century and the beginning of today's century, with the signing of agreements that will gradually refine and consolidate this approach.

In this framework of new relations construction is striking, even mysterious, the commitment that assumes, by means of a pact of last generation, a power of global characteristics such as the European Union with Chile a small country located on the periphery of the globe. Developing an hypothesis regarding the historical fact in question, leads us to state, in the first instance, the historical background that culminated in Europe with the Treaty of Maastrich in 1993,<fnref n="58" /> which is the birth certificate of the current continental alliance, and then analyze the path traveled by Chile to achieve, after the government of General Pinochet, the reincorporation to the Western political world, which has, as one of its relevant milestones, the aforementioned alliance.

The current European Union is the successor to the European Economic Community<fnref n="59" />, which, during the 1980s, joined together twelve old world countries in a process that involved political, economic, cultural and legal dimensions, among others.<fnref n="60" />

The first initiatives focused on economic aspects but then transcend to the political sphere, joining the principles of freedom and private initiative, which until today represent the essence of the

<footnote n="57">⁵⁷ Ferrer, A. (1973) "Relaciones económicas entre la C.E.E y América Latina", Revista de Estudios Internacionales, 24, pp. 3-42, oct-dic, Santiago, p.15.</footnote>

<footnote n="58">⁵⁸ Ramiro Troitiño, D. (2013) European Integration: Building Europe (European Political, Economic, and Security Issues). Nova Science Publishers Incorporated, pp. 322-324.</footnote>

<footnote n="59">⁵⁹ Ballesteros, M.D.L.P.P.; Ramiro Troitiño, D. (2017) El modelo de integración europea de Churchill. Revista de Occidente, (433), pp. 57-71.</footnote>

<footnote n="60">⁶⁰ Pereira, J. (2005) El nuevo orden de Yalta. La ONU y la Doctrina Truman; El Plan Marshall y la OTAN, pp.157-179. En Beneyto, J. et al. Eds. Europa y Estados Unidos. Una historia de la relación Atlántica en los últimos cien años, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva.</footnote>