Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak

The American University of Paris

**Abstract:** Since incorporating Latin America into its foreign assistance portfolio in the early 1960s, the Ford Foundation typically privileged working with academic institutions and private think tanks over direct collaborations with government agencies. In 1966, however, the Foundation departed from this policy to extend a grant to the recently inaugurated Center for Training and Research in Economic Development (CENDEC), an advanced training unit for economists operated by the Brazilian Ministry of Planning and Economic Coordination. Ostensibly designed to provide applied training in the tools of economic planning to government technicians, CENDEC was directed by Og Francisco Leme, the first Brazilian economist to obtain a graduate degree in Economics from the University of Chicago. Under Leme's leadership, the Center quickly became a Chicago enclave within the Brazilian economics community, responsible for recruiting a regular flow of local economists who went to Chicago to pursue their graduate studies. The paper will explore the motivations behind the creation of CENDEC, the reasons why the Ford Foundation was interested in this initiative, and the tensions created by Leme's reliance on Chicago as a privileged partner institution. We will use this episode to shed further light on the ambivalent relationship between the Ford Foundation and the Brazilian military regime, and to highlight the diverse array of forces shaping the early development of Brazilian economics.
# 1. Introduction

The words ‘Chicago’ and ‘economics’, when uttered in the same sentence, have the power of conjuring a set of clear and forceful notions in the minds of Latin Americans ever since the last quarter of the 20th century. First among these are the comprehensive free market reforms implemented by the so-called ‘Chicago Boys’ during the authoritarian regime of Augusto Pinochet in Chile, a social experiment that both augured and prepared the ground for the surging neoliberal tide of the 1980s and 1990s. To academic economists, it will likely call to mind prolonged disputes between ‘orthodox’ economic theory – produced in elite academic institutions of the United States and thence imported into Latin America – and the ‘heterodox’ variants designed to address the specific problems plaguing the underdeveloped and peripheral economies of the region, chiefly represented by the structuralist approach championed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL). Critical social analysts of various stripes might also mention cultural imperialism and the efforts of US foreign policy during the Cold War era to channel Latin American intellectual currents into Western-friendly streams, be it through overt or covert means.

While the case of Chile unquestionably provides the most powerful symbol of the penetration of Chicago economics in Latin America, the school's influence in the region was at once broader and more diffuse. The outreach initiatives designed to extend the training model pioneered by Chicago at the Universidad Católica de Chile to the Universidad Nacional de Cuyo (Argentina) and the Universidad de Valle (Colombia) are well documented (Valdés 1995, pp. 181-200; Sjastaad 2011; Guiot-Isaac 2024). Less visible in the scholarship, but at least as important, was the widespread presence of Chicago as an institutional actor in the process of ‘Americanization’ of the economics profession in Latin America (Coats 1996; Montecinos & Markoff 2009), which coincided with the growing prestige of the school during the 1960s. In Brazil, there was no cooperation agreement to streamline the outflow of economists to Hyde Park and their subsequent reabsorption into the local economics community. Still, in a survey of Brazilian economists who taught in graduate programs during the early 1990s, Loureiro and Lima (1996, pp. 282-4) estimated that Chicago was the second most frequent source of PhD degrees – closely trailing Vanderbilt, which did enjoy the benefits of a cooperation agreement (Suprinyak & Fernández 2021), and ahead of other powerhouses like Harvard, Berkeley, and Yale. Between 1967 and 1977 only, at least 25 Brazilian economists visited the Chicago economics department, either as graduate students or postdoctoral researchers (Castro 2022, p. 17).
How can we explain the robust presence of the Chicago school in Latin America, even in the absence of favorable institutional arrangements? This paper will show how, at least in the Brazilian case, the channels that permitted the dissemination of Chicago economics were quite different from the well-known story of the Chicago Boys in Chile and elsewhere. Rather than being consciously introduced as a pro-market alternative to the left-leaning influence of CEPAL structuralism, the Chicago connection emerged within a seemingly inhospitable environment: a training unit for government technicians in charge of economic planning. Both in its orientation toward the public sector and its emphasis on planning techniques, the Center for Training and Research in Economic Development (CENDEC) might appear to represent the opposite of everything Chicago stood for. Yet, through a careful recruitment process put in place by its director, Og Leme, with the dedicated assistance of Arnold Harberger, CENDEC became the source of a regular stream of economists who made their way to the shores of Lake Michigan to be instructed in the principles of ‘good economics’ (Harberger 1996). By exploring this overlooked episode, the paper will highlight how actors who happen to occupy key institutional positions can use their leeway to produce results with lasting long-term implications. It will also show, conversely, how the language of economic planning had become virtually inescapable by the 1960s, forcing even its fiercest opponents to capture and bend it to their own purposes.

## 2. The “Brookings Institution of Brazil”

The origins of CENDEC are closely tied to the comprehensive reforms in the apparatus of government bureaucracy introduced by the military regime that came to power in Brazil after the 1964 coup. One of the key figures in this process was Roberto de Oliveira Campos, a career diplomat and economist who would become a prominent public officer during the early years of the new military government. By the early 1960s, Campos’s credentials as an economic advisor and policymaker were already well established. As a young diplomat stationed in Washington, he was appointed member of the Brazilian delegation to the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. Later, during the left-leaning government of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-61), Campos participated in the elaboration of the famous *Plano de Metas*, an ambitious development plan inspired by the import substitution industrialization agenda advocated by CEPAL. He also served as President of the Brazilian National Economic Development Bank (BNDE) between 1958 and 1959, before returning to the United States as Brazilian ambassador in 1961.<fnref n="1" /> By this time, Campos had publicly distanced himself from the developmental ideas associated with CEPAL, becoming the most

<footnote n="1">¹ Campos had been closely involved with BNDE since its creation in 1962 (Klüger 2014).</footnote>
visible spokesperson for the ‘monetarist’ position in the controversy between monetarists and structuralists that raged in Latin America during the early 1960s (Boianovsky 2012; Fajardo 2022, Ch. 3; Suprinyak and Carvalho 2022).

Campos’s embrace of a more openly orthodox position in economic policy moved in tandem with his growing political detachment from the leftwing government of João Goulart (1961-64). Having been involved in negotiations between the Brazilian and US governments and the IMF to secure a consolidation loan to help stabilize Brazil’s foreign debt, Campos decided to resign from his ambassadorship in August 1963, after the failure of the stabilization plan led by Goulart’s Minister of Planning, Celso Furtado, caused the agreement to collapse. Around the same time, Campos began to articulate a group of elite businessmen from the state of São Paulo to raise funds for a new think tank that could offer an independent diagnosis of the policies pursued by the government. Motivated by the belief that “the private sector must find its own coordinates of economic policy, through which to assess governmental measures with better justice and preciseness,” the National Association for Economic and Social Programming (ANPES) described itself as committed to “the difficult task of applying, with intelligence, modern economic theory to the concrete reality of an underdeveloped country like Brazil.”<fnref n="2" /> One of the Ford Foundation’s officers at the time described the project more bluntly: ANPES had been organized in the months preceding the military coup “to encourage a number of economic studies which might serve to ‘set the record straight’ with respect to the confused economic statements and policies of the Goulart regime.”<fnref n="3" />

The officer in question was Reynold Carlson, an economist from Vanderbilt University who had long been involved with Brazil, both as a scholar and as a participant in different diplomatic missions (Suprinyak & Fernández 2021). One of his earliest and most important assignments to the country came in 1951, as a member of the US delegation to the Joint Brazil-US Commission for Economic Development (CMBEU), a technical cooperation mission organized under the auspices of Harry Truman’s Point Four Program. When the Ford Foundation decided to expand its international portfolio toward Latin America in the late 1950s, Carlson was made head representative of its newly inaugurated office in Rio de Janeiro. From this privileged position, he witnessed first-hand the events leading to the 1964 coup, all the while trying to leverage his local networks to get the Ford Foundation’s ambitious program for ‘modernizing’ Brazilian

<footnote n="2">² Letter from Sérgio Pinheiro Mallão to Stacey Widdicombe, October 28, 1965, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, Ford Foundation Records, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY (hereafter FFR).</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Letter from Reynold Carlson to Joseph Grunwald, November 12, 1965, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>
economics off the ground. Roberto Campos was among the select group of Brazilian economists with whom Carlson had worked closely during his two years with the Joint Commission, which might help explain his familiarity with the design now animating the ANPES project. It also made him a potentially useful patron for the ANPES group when trying to boost institutional support for their cause.

At first, Campos himself was expected to exercise administrative and intellectual leadership on behalf of ANPES. Shortly after the military takeover, however, he was appointed to the brand-new position of Extraordinary Minister for Planning and Economic Coordination, which ruled out any direct participation in the routine activities of the new think tank. It thus fell on another veteran from the Joint Commission – civil engineer and self-educated economist Ary Torres – to approach Carlson and the Ford Foundation for help. In October 1965, Torres met with representatives from the Ford and Rockefeller foundations and the Council of Foreign Relations in New York, trying to secure funds that might help him “attract a few first-class US people to his institution on a visitor basis” to boost the profile of ANPES before the Brazilian public. “Apparently,” the Ford officer who attended this meeting summarized, “Mr Torres views his organization as ultimately becoming the Brookings Institution of Brazil.”<fnref n="4" /> He reported having “some ten or a dozen young economists presently on their staff,” who had just completed “a thoroughgoing study of inflation.”<fnref n="5" /> But this staff could not be paid competitive salaries from the limited endowment raised so far from donations, even if Torres believed “private enterprise would respond to the presence of European and North American scholars of repute.”

As it happened, a senior fellow from the Brookings Institution, Austrian-American economist Joseph Grunwald, was scheduled to visit São Paulo in late 1965.<fnref n="6" /> Carlson explained to Grunwald how he and Torres were “old friends from the days of the Joint Commission” and asked him to pay a visit to the ANPES leadership while in São Paulo, to “tell them of the things that Brookings does (and does not do) and give them your best advice on what they should do.”<fnref n="7" /> He also provided Grunwald with some useful background into the initiative:

<footnote n="4">⁴ Letter from L.S. Hardin to Reynold Carlson and Stacey Widdicombe, 'Session with Mr. Ary Torres of ANPES', October 25, 1965, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Published as *Alguns aspectos da inflação brasileira* (1965), this study was headed by Antônio Delfim Netto, another prominent Brazilian economist who had replaced Campos as secretary-general of ANPES. Delfim Netto would leave ANPES himself in 1967 to become Minister of Finance for the military government.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Grunwald had joined the economics faculty at Columbia after fleeing Austria during the Nazi occupation. He then relocated to Chile in 1954, where he served as director of the University of Chile's Institute of Economics until 1961. During this period, Grunwald also became involved in the controversy between monetarists and structuralists on the causes of inflation in Latin America (Suprinyak and Carvalho 2022).</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Letter from Reynold Carlson to Joseph Grunwald, November 12, 1965, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>
At the outset Roberto Campos and Mario Simonsen were to head ANPES and AID was to be approached for a grant to supplement the sums raised from the business community. After the revolution Campos planned to use ANPES as a base for the various research studies that would be relevant to the new regime. In short, AID was to make a grant to ANPES which funds would be used to hire a number of economists and general staff to undertake the studies. It was hoped to avoid the appearance of an AID grant directly to the Brazilian government.<fnref n="8" />

After leaving for the Ministry of Planning, however, “Campos and his associates found the ANPES business group difficult to handle.” This led to a change of strategy. Rather than working with an outside think tank to produce the economic expertise required for his new duties, Campos decided to put in place “a kind of ‘assessoria’ called EPEA”. Created in September 1964, the Office of Applied Economic Research (EPEA) was born as a technical research division inside the Ministry of Planning, headed by Yale-trained economist João Paulo dos Reis Velloso.<fnref n="9" /> The USAID grant initially envisioned for ANPES was thus channeled to EPEA instead, in the form of a contract with the University of California, Berkeley that brought a team of economists headed by Howard Ellis to serve as technical consultants for Velloso and the new office. “In short,” Carlson summarized, “the original plan was carried through, but ANPES was dumped in favor of the new association in Rio, which is officed on the eighth floor of the Fazenda”.<fnref n="10" />

USAID’s decision to support EPEA despite its concerns about direct involvement with the Brazilian government owed much to the trust deposited in the two key figures behind the new initiative, Campos and Velloso. While increasingly distant from the Brookings model, EPEA was nevertheless styled as an island of rationality within the volatile world of Brazilian politics. This was in line with some of the beliefs expressed by Campos at the time, who associated underdevelopment with the low level of rationality prevailing among the Brazilian public, which spilled over to poor economic decision-making by political elites (Silva 2021). Later in his life, Campos would recall his confidence in a “rational development project” for Brazil – a project anchored on an “enlightened technocracy” instead of a “work of popular persuasion” (Nassif 30 Oct. 1994). Before it could spread out and take root in society, this new rationality – based on technical knowledge and ideological neutrality (Covre 1983; Aranha 2016) – should be cultivated within the State. Conceived as a “technical department with the principal responsibility to perform long-term economic studies,” EPEA was one of the privileged sites for advancing this task.<fnref n="11" />

<footnote n="8">⁸ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Later renamed Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), it remains to this day the most prominent Brazilian government bureau dedicated to economic research.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ *Fazenda* is the Portuguese term used to designate the Ministry of Finance.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ ‘Present and Future Institutional Basis of EPEA’, undated (c. 1966), Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>
Crucially, Campos' understanding of State-level rationality was closely linked to his commitment to expanding and improving the machinery of economic planning in Brazil. While generally sympathetic to private enterprise and the market system, Campos (1963, p. 16) believed the "special circumstances" of underdeveloped countries made "economic planning and state intervention more urgent and important than in more developed countries." He defined economic planning as the "guiding of economic activities by a communal body, through a scheme describing, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, the productive processes that should be undertaken during a predetermined future period" (p. 10). EPEA was meant to be a central piece in ongoing efforts to enhance the Brazilian government's capacity to pursue this task. After contributing to prepare the new stabilization plan to be implemented shortly after the military takeover, the office was promptly redirected by Campos and Velloso to the elaboration of a 10-year development plan for the Brazilian economy, with technical assistance from the recently-arrived Berkeley team.<fnref n="12" /> This new emphasis was in line with their stated ambition of establishing, through EPEA, a "permanent mechanism for medium- and long-term planning" in Brazil.<fnref n="13" />

A background document prepared by the Ford Foundation staff in Rio de Janeiro went to great lengths to establish the continuity between the activities of EPEA and the previous history of economic planning in Brazil, starting with the mission led by Sir Otto Niemeyer in the 1930s and extending all the way to the abortive stabilization plan prepared by Celso Furtado shortly before the military coup.<fnref n="14" /> The work of the Joint Brazil-US Commission received special praise, both for "presenting concrete results in terms of specific projects" and for "bringing planning 'down to earth' again in terms of projects based on a careful analysis of Brazilian reality."<fnref n="15" />

<footnote n="12">¹² In an interview much later in his life, Velloso recalled the exchange with Campos that kickstarted EPEA's work on this 10-year plan. After being prompted by the minister about the need to prepare a "strategic plan" for the government, Velloso would have asked: "Isn't this something that brings to mind the Soviet Union?" To which Campos replied: "No, not really. The Soviet Union has a 25-year plan. We'll have a 10-year plan." (D'Araújo et al 2004, p. 28).</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Memorandum from João Paulo dos Reis Velloso to Roberto de Oliveira Campos, September 16, 1965, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR. A good example of the type of economic planning concretely envisaged by Campos and Velloso can be found in a paper prepared by Mario Henrique Simonsen – another prominent Brazilian economist and Campos' close associate at the time – to lay the groundwork for the 10-year plan. The paper advanced a model of an underdeveloped economy with exogenously fixed growth targets for GDP, real consumption, and exports. It then used linear programming techniques to solve the model for sectoral production and imports with the goal of minimizing the current account deficit in the balance of payments. Working through his assumptions, Simonsen derived recommendations of development policy that suggested introducing import substitution in growing order of capital/output ratio (i.e., from consumption goods to capital goods). 'Notas sobre un modelo tri-setorial de desenvolvimento econômico', Mario Henrique Simonsen, undated (c. 1965), Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ This historical review was largely based on Baer (1965). Werner Baer, who would later play a critical role among the fledgling Brazilian economics community, had recently become the Ford Foundation's program officer for economics in Brazil (Suprinyak & Fernández 2021).</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Memorandum from Stacey Widdicombe to Harry Wilhelm, 'Background Paper on Federal Ministry of Planning Request for Foundation Assistance in Establishing a Center for Training and Research on Economic Development', April 29, 1966, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>
Conversely, the economic plan prepared by a group of CEPAL and BNDE experts in the mid-1950s was more ambiguously described as “an exercise of projections and construction of economic models,” in which “little or nothing was suggested in the way of instruments and methods for implementation of the plan, especially in regard to its financing.” While some economists believed this had been “a useful exercise,” others saw “no consequences except the ‘academic’ experience of constructing a ‘new’ methodology for elaboration of economic development plans.” The creation of EPEA signaled that ‘down to earth’ was once again the order of business – only now with a stronger commitment to putting in place the necessary institutional structure to transform plans into action.

“After the April 1964 Revolution,” the document continued, “a new stage began in the field of economic and social planning in Brazil.”<fnref n="16" /> The creation of a new Ministry of Planning was an important statement, both symbolically and politically. But success would ultimately require extensive technical and institutional groundwork: “If, on one hand, an economic plan requires the preparation of basic studies and availability of reliable statistical information, its implementation, on the other hand, presupposes an adequate administrative structure.” And while administrative reform was undoubtedly an important element in this process, effective planning likewise required “the availability of the human element, that is, professionals with the necessary ability to work as planners and executors (administrators) of the plan, at various levels.” Herein lied another stumbling block, for “there are very few economists and other professionals duly qualified to do such planning work in Brazil today.” Among public servants, these technical deficiencies were even more glaring. There was widespread “lack of understanding on the part of the functionaries of public administration as to what planning is and how it works,” which seriously hindered the task of “carrying out the new economic policies and the new development plan.” To bear fruit, therefore, this “new stage” inaugurated by the military government would require the systematic training of a new class of planning technicians.

### 3. Planning the planners

Toward the end of 1965, Velloso approached the Ford Foundation to ask for its financial support to a new “training and research center in the field of economic planning.” The center should contribute to establishing “the minimum necessary conditions for the training of

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ This statement aligns with Velloso’s own perception a few years later, who believed it was “only after the 1964 Revolution that it made sense to speak of economic planning in Brazil,” since before then “there were no institutionalized mechanisms to produce and execute a plan.” Rather than the elaboration of specific economic plans, Velloso claimed to be interested in “planning as a process, a permanent activity” (Aranha 2016, p. 44).</footnote>
professionals specialized in economic planning,” who were “urgently demanded not only by the Ministry of Planning, but also by other ministries, state and regional planning bodies,” besides different federal- and state-level development banks.17 Given their complementary nature, the center should function in “close collaboration” with EPEA. In fact, the proposal was pitched building on a set of courses that had already been launched by the office, on a pilot basis, earlier in the year. One of them was a 9-month full-time course on economic programming, framed as a graduate-level program for students who already possessed a solid background in economic theory. The others were shorter programs (3 to 4 months) on narrower topics – one of them on the theory and practice of statistical sampling, the other on program-budgets – designed to cater to the specific needs of different government bodies involved in economic policy.

The economic programming course was clearly the centerpiece of the proposal. Besides refresher courses on mathematics and statistics, it contained dedicated modules on a rather extensive list of subjects: the theory of economic development; mathematical models in economics; activity analysis and linear programming; principles of economic planning; project analysis; techniques of sectoral planning; and finally, a seminar on economic development policy. This curriculum sought to achieve “the necessary equilibrium between the indispensable theoretical foundations, programming techniques and the practical experience of planning.”18 Students were selected based on interviews plus a written examination covering mathematics, statistics, and economic theory (micro and macroeconomics). “Economic planning,” the proposal explained, “is an exercise in applied economics,” which required both theoretical skills and an adequate knowledge of Brazilian economic reality. Accordingly, the course offered a mix of theoretical, applied, and practical instruction, featuring seminars dedicated to the “concrete problems of the Brazilian economy” and workshops on economic planning, where students would “perform specific tasks under the guidance of instructors and other EPEA professionals.” Since economics education in Brazil failed to prepare adequately for research work, the course should likewise provide training in “modern research methods and techniques, especially on hypotheses testing.” Indeed, it was hoped that research pursued by students enrolled in the course would generate “a flow of factual information that might be useful for the current work of EPEA and other national bodies responsible for elaborating economic policy.”19

<footnote n="17">17 ‘Minuta de um projeto para a criação de um centro de ensino e pesquisas no campo do planejamento econômico’, undated (c. Jan 1966), Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 ‘Curso de programação econômica’, Escritório de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (EPEA) do Ministério do Planejamento, undated (c. 1965), Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 ‘Minuta de um projeto’, FFR.</footnote>
The Ford staff in Brazil were quickly sold on the proposal. One trusted local advisor strongly endorsed the strategy of getting students involved in "working assignments right in the Planning Ministry," arguing that "you learn to plan by planning and not just attending lectures."<fnref n="20" /> Another advisor looked favorably upon the prospect that "more government officials have a chance to learn what real planning is all about and then to have the chance to work at it."<fnref n="21" /> Despite initial reservations about the new training program "overshadowing the very essential operating aspect" of EPEA, USAID staff were finally "convinced that the training aspect would reinforce and improve the operating aspects since the students in the training center would be assigned as working apprentices in the operating division."<fnref n="22" /> Howard Ellis, the chief of the Berkeley mission at EPEA, was pleased to see a "serious attempt to professionalize the economic planning staff of the Ministry," adding that his team "would be delighted to have training associates" for "practical apprenticeship work."<fnref n="23" /> Ford personnel echoed these assessments, arguing that the training offered by the new center would "not be academic and isolated from the planning mechanisms," involving instead "actual work in the various divisions of the medium-range and long-range planning unit." Moreover, since the Ministry of Planning occupied "a position of real power in the government," other ministries had strong incentives "for sending their senior division heads and planning staff members to these courses."

The Center for Training and Research on Economic Development (CENDEC) was officially inaugurated in January 1966, obtaining a grant from the Ford Foundation the following October. The bulk of the funds were allocated to cover the salaries and expenses of visiting professors who would help lay the foundations for a high-quality training and research program, with a smaller amount earmarked for graduate fellowships for Brazilian students abroad. Whereas the Rio staff recognized that "the proposal contains more political risks than has been normal in the Foundation's grants in Brazil," they believed it presented "an unusual opportunity for the Foundation to assist the Brazilian Government in a significant and timely way in its development planning and executive efforts" – while still remaining "within the Foundation's traditional focus on training and research" and thus a comfortable few steps behind the "operational firing line of development planning and execution."<fnref n="24" /> But the New York office proved more concerned about

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Memorandum from Stacey Widdicombe, 'Planning Ministry Proposal for a Training and Research Center', January 19, 1966, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Memorandum from Stacey Widdicombe, 'Planning Ministry Proposal for a Training and Research Center', January 10, 1966, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Memorandum from Stacey Widdicombe, 'Planning Ministry Training Center Project', February 15, 1966, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ Widdicombe, 'Background Paper', FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Ibid.</footnote>
the political exposure inherent in the project, causing the five-year commitment initially suggested to be reduced to two years subject to renewal, which allowed the Foundation the opportunity to "decide to withdraw or change directions if political circumstances dictate."<fnref n="25" /> Ford staff were especially wary of Campos being replaced by another minister, an increasingly likely scenario given the unpopularity of his ongoing stabilization plan.<fnref n="26" /> Depending on the profile of an eventual new appointee, the status of the Ministry of Planning – and the stability of both EPEA and CENDEC – might be in jeopardy.

The Foundation's enthusiasm for this atypical grant sprang from two main reasons. First, the perception that an advanced training program in applied economics, with a strong practical bent, would both cater to the present and future needs of the Brazilian government in the field of economic planning, and nicely complement the other graduate programs being nurtured by Ford in Brazil at the time, which focused on a more conventional academic curriculum (Fernández & Suprinyak 2018). On this point, an internal memorandum circulated shortly after the grant was approved referred to Ford's Executive Vice President David Bell and his "continuing fondness for economic planning."<fnref n="27" /> Second, but hardly less important, was the high esteem in which Ford personnel at all levels held the main characters behind the project. Minister Campos – "so well-known that little needs to be added" – was described as "the most powerful civilian in the Castello Branco government so far as ideas and action are concerned."<fnref n="28" /> Velloso likewise received high praise. The "energetic, young head of EPEA" had recently returned to Brazil with a master's degree in economics from Yale, "where he was considered one of the brightest students in years." But despite his academic potential, Velloso "rejected all pleas to continue on for his Ph.D. because he wanted to come back to work in Brazil." Local advisors confirmed they had "great respect" for Velloso and "thought very highly" of his skills as an economist.<fnref n="29" />

But whereas Campos and Velloso were clearly the guarantors of the proposal, the direction of the new center was put in the hands of another Brazilian economist: Og Francisco Leme. Freshly returned after "many years of practical experience in economic planning" at the CEPAL headquarters in Santiago, Leme seemed to have the required background and experience to put CENDEC on a solid footing. Through its partnership with BNDE, after all, CEPAL had been offering its trademark Training Course on Problems of Economic Development all over Brazil.

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Memorandum from Harry Wilhelm to Stacey Widdicombe, 'Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Center for Training and Research in Economic Development', June 2, 1966, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Campos indeed stepped down from his position as Minister of Planning in March 1967.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Memorandum from Harry Wilhelm to Stacey Widdicombe, 'Center for Training and Research in Economic Development, Brazil', October 21, 1966, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Widdicombe, 'Background Paper', FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Widdicombe, 'Planning Ministry Proposal', Jan 10, 1966; 'Planning Ministry Proposal', Jan 19, 1966, FFR.</footnote>
since 1956 – a program that similarly prioritized civil servants directly involved in economic planning and development policy (Klüger et al, 2022). As they had with Velloso, the Foundation’s local advisors did not hesitate to vouch for Leme’s professional credentials. Crucially, he possessed one conspicuous mark of academic distinction: Leme was the first – and then still the only – Brazilian to obtain a graduate degree in economics from the University of Chicago.<fnref n="30" />

The potential implications of this Chicago connection were not lost on all observers. Brazilian economist Isaac Kerstenetsky, director of research at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation and one of Ford's most trusted advisors in Brazil, explained that “while he did not always agree with some of the policy recommendations of Sr. Leme, he would rather deal with a good economist with whom he sometimes disagreed than with a poor economist who always agreed with him.”<fnref n="31" /> But most of the commentary focused squarely on the positive. Howard Ellis thought Leme was “very competent and serious about his work.” A senior USAID staff member in Brazil, responsible for supervising the work of the Berkeley group at EPEA, said he considered him to be “an able, balanced economist.” Finally, the Ford staff in Rio described the director of CENDEC as “a well-trained and experienced economist with a solid middle-of-the-economic-road stance.”<fnref n="32" />

The only problem? He was not.

## 4. Leme's stealthy plan

The terms of the grant which the Ford Foundation offered to CENDEC foresaw the consulting services of “an experienced development economist” who would help ensure “continuity of effort by visiting professors, quality of training for Brazilian fellows, and evaluation of progress of the Center.”<fnref n="33" /> The New York office saw this consultant as someone “who is sensitive to the need to preserve initiative in Brazilian hands and who at the same time can be a facilitator and friend to Og Leme.”<fnref n="34" /> Responding to the grant letter, Stacey Widdicombe, the head of Ford’s Rio de Janeiro office, mentioned the interest of both “Prof. Fishlow of the University of California (Berkeley)” and of “the University of Chicago group” in this position. Widdicombe likewise expressed his opinion that “Prof. Fishlow would be ideal for this purpose if both he and

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Leme obtained a master's degree in economics from Chicago in 1956, shortly before relocating to Santiago.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Widdicombe, 'Planning Ministry Proposal', Jan 19, 1966, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² Widdicombe, 'Background Paper', FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ Request for Grant Action, Support to the Center for Training and Research in Economic Development of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Coordination, October 10, 1966, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA73211, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ Wilhelm, 'Center for Training and Research in Economic Development', Oct 21, 1966, FFR.</footnote>
Dr. Leme would agree to such a relationship,” and promised to “initiate appropriate conversations” with both parties without much delay.<fnref n="35" />

Only a few months later, however, Leme was already in advanced talks with Arnold Harberger about what both referred to as their “recruiting problem”. Undoubtedly a member of the “University of Chicago group” to which Widdicombe alluded, Harberger was a central figure in the decade-old cooperation agreement between Chicago and the Universidad Católica de Chile, which had only recently received a sizeable new injection of resources from Ford (Valdés 1995, pp. 181-200; Edwards 2023, pp. 27-36). While not an obvious pick for the position of ‘experienced development economist’, Harberger was indeed on very friendly terms with Leme, as the tone of their letters illustrates. In May 1967, Harberger avowed he had been “working hard, but without complete success” on the task of finding suitable visiting professors who might be open to coming down to Rio de Janeiro for an extended stay at CENDEC.<fnref n="36" /> Qualified US economists being in short supply, he inquired whether Leme would be open to a solution involving trusted Canadian economists coming to spend their annual summer breaks at the Center.<fnref n="37" /> While Widdicombe seemed to look favorably upon this proposal, Leme was less than enthusiastic, arguing that travel expenses would weigh heavily on the budget. When pondering their options, he hinted at an alternative that had clearly been discussed with Harberger before: “Am I right in assuming that Ernesto and Ricardo French-Davis [sic] are out of consideration?”<fnref n="38" />

The ‘Ernesto’ in question was Ernesto Fontaine, part of the first cohort of Chileans who were sent to Chicago to study for a graduate degree in economics, and who later became the first Latin American to obtain a PhD degree in economics from the university. Fontaine had only

<footnote n="35">³⁵ Memorandum from Stacey Widdicombe to Harry Wilhelm, 'Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Center for Training and Research on Economic Development', October 17, 1966, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Letter from Arnold Harberger to Og Leme, May 9, 1967, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">³⁷ Harberger's role as the designated recruiter for this grant was acknowledged by Ford's New York office during an episode involving the new Brazilian Minister of Finance, Antonio Delfim Netto. When Arthur da Costa e Silva became the new president in March 1967, he implemented a cabinet reshuffle that saw Roberto Campos resign from the Ministry of Planning, being replaced by Helio Beltrão. Former ANPES secretary-general Delfim Netto was named the new Minister of Finance, quickly establishing himself as the dominant force in Brazilian economic policymaking, much like Campos before him. Shortly after acceding to his new post, Delfim Netto paid a visit to Ford's office in Rio de Janeiro, ostensibly to discuss “the Foundation’s tax situation” in Brazil. During this interview, he asked whether Ford would change its previous stance and agree to provide support for ANPES. Widdicombe told the minister he would be glad to discuss this prospect with both himself and the ANPES leadership, later telling his bosses in New York he had been “anxious not to complicate our tax exemption process with this personal project of the Minister.” A couple of months later, during a visit to the New York office, Delfim Netto was told that “his friend Al Harberger” was now helping CENDEC recruit its visiting professors and could perhaps look for someone with the appropriate profile to work for ANPES as well. Memorandum from Harry Wilhelm to Stacey Widdicombe, ‘Brazilian National Association for Economic and Social Programming (ANPES)’, May 15, 1967; Memorandum from Stacey Widdicombe to Harry Wilhelm, ‘Brazilian National Association for Economic and Social Programming (ANPES)’, May 24, 1967, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="38">³⁸ Letter from Og Leme to Arnold Harberger, May 23, 1967, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>
recently returned to his professorship at the Universidad Católica de Chile, after an extended
period as a visiting professor at the Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, in Argentina, as part of the
cooperation agreement signed by the latter with both Chicago and Católica (Sjaastad 2011).<fnref n="39" />
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, another of the early Chileans to arrive in Chicago, was a professor at the
Universidad de Chile and also held an appointment, since 1964, at the Chilean Central Bank.<fnref n="40" />
While Leme and Harberger continued to pursue Fontaine as a possible recruit for a visiting
professorship at CENDEC, the name of Ffrench-Davis quickly disappeared from view, being
replaced instead by Luis Arturo Fuenzalida. Yet another Chilean with a graduate degree in
economics from Chicago, Fuenzalida was attached at the time to the Universidad del Valle, in
Colombia, as part of the rescue operation put together by the Rockefeller Foundation with the
help of Harberger and his disciples at the Católica (Valdés 1995, pp. 183-4; Offner 2019, pp. 138-
43). To Leme, Fontaine and Fuenzalida would make “an excellent team” at CENDEC: the former
teaching price theory, project analysis and economic development, the latter covering economic
planning and monetary theory.<fnref n="41" />

Fuenzalida seemed eager to leave his position in Colombia to accept an appointment at CENDEC, but reports received from the Foundation's office in Bogotá cast some doubt on the wisdom of this decision. As it transpired, Fuenzalida had recently taken part in an insurrection of faculty against the dean of the School of Economics at Universidad del Valle, Reinaldo Scarpetta. While Fuenzalida had gradually positioned himself as a mediator as the conflict evolved, he remained “a voice of moderation among mutineers nonetheless.” Perhaps more damaging, during his recent tenure as associate dean, he was accused by other faculty of “exercising poor judgment in recommending people” and “administering too many curriculum changes too often.” As far as his professional competence was concerned, other visiting professors stationed at the university had been “extremely negative”. The Rockefeller Foundation had been pushing Fuenzalida to “complete his thesis for a Ph.D., but with little success” thus far. Finally, there were worrying signs he had been less than above board when dealing with his employers. While officially on Rockefeller's payroll, Fuenzalida had for over two years been receiving a salary supplement paid out of a Ford grant, about which the Rockefeller Foundation remained “in complete ignorance”. News of a possible appointment in Brazil had arrived at Ford's Bogotá office at the same time as

<footnote n="39">³⁹ While working for the Cuyo Project in Argentina, Fontaine even held the status of University of Chicago staff (Valdés 1995, p. 182).</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ While Ffrench-Davis was technically a ‘Chicago Boy’, having received his graduate training through the Chicago-Católica cooperation agreement, he distinguished himself from the group from an early date due to his critical stance toward free market policies and reforms. Ffrench-Davis would later become closely associated with the neo-structuralist approach in Latin America, which sought to update and qualify some of the original insights of CEPAL.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">⁴¹ Letter from Og Leme to Robert Mayer, July 21, 1967, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>
Dean Scarpetta requested additional funds to extend Fuenzalida's contract. In other words, neither the Ford or Rockefeller offices in Colombia, nor the university administration itself had "any advice whatsoever from Fuenzalida that he was negotiating a job change."<fnref n="42" />

Despite these admonitions, Fuenzalida was offered a contract and finally moved into his visiting position at CENDEC in early 1968. Fontaine had been held up in Chile due to other professional commitments but was expected in Rio de Janeiro later in the year. Meanwhile, Leme and Harberger had been active on another front. In May 1967, the former had already requested and received the application forms to the Chicago PhD program in economics.<fnref n="43" /> These were meant for Carlos Geraldo Langoni, who Leme described as “the best student” to have gone through CENDEC’s economic planning course the year before. After asking whether Langoni might obtain a Chicago scholarship, he explained to Harberger how this information was important to determine “the number of students I will be able to send to Chicago for two years with funds from the Ford Foundation.”<fnref n="44" /> Widdicombe was happy with this first choice, telling Harberger that Langoni seemed to be “a very serious and dedicated young man,” and that the CENDEC director was “very sure of his academic qualifications.”<fnref n="45" /> One month later, Leme reported that a second student had now been selected to study for a PhD in Chicago with a Ford scholarship. This was Arthur Carlos Chagas Diniz, an engineer by training, whose application had been promptly accepted after he was “personally interviewed by Professor Arnold Harberger.”<fnref n="46" /> Langoni departed for the US shortly thereafter, in July, while Diniz was expected to arrive in Chicago early the following year.

But it was not long before this burgeoning CENDEC-Chicago partnership began to raise some eyebrows among Ford personnel. In November 1967, the Center received a visit from Werner Baer, the Foundation's recently appointed program advisor for economics in Brazil.<fnref n="47" /> Baer noticed, first, the contrast between the ambitious design of the CENDEC training program and its deficient execution. Many big names in the Brazilian economics community were listed as CENDEC professors but hardly ever appeared to teach a class, which were left mostly in the hands

<footnote n="42">⁴² Memorandum from Robert Ready to Harry Wilhelm and Stacey Widdicombe, 'Appointment of Luis Arturo Fuenzalida', July 17, 1967, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">⁴³ When responding to Leme's request, Harberger mentioned that "letters of recommendation from people like Delfin [sic], Simonsen, and Kerstenetsky would be particularly useful to us." Letter from Harberger to Leme, May 9, 1967, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="44">⁴⁴ Letter from Leme to Harberger, May 23, 1967, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵ Letter from Stacey Widdicombe to Arnold Harberger, May 24, 1967, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶ Letter from Og Leme to Stacey Widdicombe, June 22, 1967, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">⁴⁷ Baer was also one of the leading forces behind the ongoing cooperation agreement between Vanderbilt University and the University of São Paulo, sponsored by Ford and USAID (Suprinyak & Fernández 2021).</footnote>
of a narrow group of low-profile instructors. Moreover, there seemed to be a critical
misconception about the nature of the training on offer. While the program promised “a practical
training in Economics to promising young public servants from various government ministries,”
without requiring any previous background in economics, Baer found out that “most of the time
[...] has been spent on math, statistics and economic theory,” the theoretical content appearing
“rather refined and of little relevance to what these public servants will be doing.” This curriculum
might be appropriate to one of the new graduate programs recently inaugurated at the Getúlio
Vargas Foundation and the University of São Paulo – but certainly not to “a practical course in
Economics for planners.”<fnref n="48" />

Baer further remarked how the two students selected thus far to receive a scholarship had
both been directed to the University of Chicago. “If the program is training public servants to
know some practical Economics,” he wondered, “why send people to a PhD program in the U.S.
instead of a special Economic Development program like that of Williams College?” After pointing
out that the visiting professors expected to arrive the following year were both Chilean economists
with Chicago PhDs, he confessed to feeling “somewhat uneasy with Leme’s overreliance on
Chicago.” Baer thought it was “unhealthy to rely only on one U.S. institution” – even if it was by
then common knowledge that “Chicago always has had a tendency to monopolize institutions with
which it has become associated.” But the problem ran deeper, prompting concerns over the
“exclusive intellectual influence a place like Chicago has.” On this respect, Baer spoke frankly: “I
greatly respect Chicago’s department and I believe that some students should study there, but I
am also afraid of a situation developing where its ideological position would reign supreme.” He
concluded the report reaffirming that “all is not well with CENDEC.” His verdict was that “the
main fault lies with its director,” who could not be considered “a good economist or a decent
administrator.” The best the Foundation could do was to proceed cautiously until the grant came
up for renewal, in the hopes that a new director would be appointed in the meantime.<fnref n="49" />

Baer followed up with Leme shortly thereafter, expressing his concern that, as the
CENDEC program now stood, “perhaps a little too much weight is put on the more esoteric
aspects of economic theory.” He wondered whether the emphasis should not be instead “on those
aspects of theory which have more direct bearing on planning problems.” Baer also took this
opportunity to revive an issue that had been considered during the early stages of the grant, asking

<footnote n="48">⁴⁸ Confidential memorandum from Werner Baer to Peter Bell, 'Report on Visit to CENDEC', November 30, 1967, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA73211, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="49">⁴⁹ Baer mentioned a discussion with Velloso in which the latter suggested Edmar Bacha, who was about to return to Brazil with a PhD from Yale, as a possible replacement for Leme at the head of CENDEC.</footnote>
Leme “if CENDEC could not make more use of the Berkeley people attached to IPEA.” Finally, without questioning the choice of Chicago itself, he raised the problem of choosing an appropriate destination for CENDEC alumni abroad: “Since all of them are public servants, wouldn’t an M.A. program like that of Williams College or the special program at Harvard for public servants be worth looking into?”<fnref n="50" /> Leme’s reply was polite but unyielding. To make the CENDEC course more aligned with the practical needs of economic planners, he suggested expanding the treatment of capital theory. According to his own account, he had tried “insistently” to secure the Berkeley group’s collaboration, but so far without success. And on the matter of where to place graduate students, Leme reinforced his conviction they should be sent to regular economics programs, since they were expected to become themselves instructors at CENDEC upon their return.<fnref n="51" />

When Fuenzalida finally arrived in Rio, a few months later, Baer was quick to meet him and share his first impressions with the Ford office in New York. Despite describing him as a “capable enough individual”, Baer discovered he had “not even begun on his doctoral dissertation for the University of Chicago and is still looking around for topics.” Since Leme had not yet introduced Fuenzalida to the Berkeley group, Baer urged him “to get to know them and to possibly see whether they could be used in the courses of instruction.” Upon hearing the recent arrival confirm ongoing plans for another Chilean visiting professor at CENDEC, he confided: “I frankly do not see the necessity for this, if visiting professors will consist of people not more advanced than many Brazilians available for the same tasks at much lesser expense.”<fnref n="52" /> Baer visited the Center again a month later, when he had a chance to interview a small group of students selected as possible candidates for scholarships abroad. His report contained an “interesting anecdote” pertaining to this interview:

> I tried to see how much they have really thought about the things they learned at CENDEC. They told me that among other things they had studied the theory of markets. I asked them what they thought was the most desirable market structure. They answered perfect competition. I asked why. After a while I got them to tell me that it was good not to have concentration of economic power and that the perfectly competitive firm always was forced to produce at the minimum point of the average cost curve, whereas the monopolist was not as efficient. I then asked whether this theoretical conclusion would lead them to recommend the breaking up of Brazil’s automobile industry into tiny competing firms. Immediately they admitted that technological considerations made this impossible. I then asked them how they could thus reconcile theory

<footnote n="50">⁵⁰ Letter from Werner Baer to Og Leme, December 6, 1967, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="51">⁵¹ Letter from Og Leme to Werner Baer, December 11, 1967, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="52">⁵² Confidential memorandum from Werner Baer to Peter Bell, ‘Interview with Luiz A. Fuenzalida on February 5, 1968’, February 5, 1968, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>
with fact. Og broke in, however, and said that they should be aware that I represented the Harvard ideology
and thus was setting up a trap!<fnref n="53" />

Baer built on this episode to insist on the futility of sending CENDEC graduates to study
for a PhD in the US, and to question Leme's argument about using the scholarships to train the
Center's future teaching staff: "I do not see why he cannot get graduates of [the University of São
Paulo's] IPE and the Vargas Graduate school who are returning from studies abroad to fill his
staff. Why does he have to build up his own 'panelinha'?" The notion that Leme was using the
CENDEC grant to build a Chicago 'panelinha' – a pejorative word in Portuguese to describe a
narrow, tight-knit group of likeminded individuals – reinforced Baer's perception that the money
might be better spent otherwise, sending the students for internships "to the U.S. Council of
Economic Advisors, or the Federal Reserve Bank, or the Treasury, or to some state governments,
to get some practical experience in a different system." But even if this practical orientation proved
unworkable, the problem of fostering intellectual plurality remained: "Let me state again my
concern of the Chicago relationship. We should keep pressing Og to send his graduates to various
different universities, if to a university they should go!"

The report submitted by Leme, on behalf of CENDEC, when the two-year grant came up
for renewal painted a predictably flattering picture. Though "experimental and prospective" in
nature, the Center's activities sought to raise "the professional level of the Brazilian technicians
engaged in the task of planning, preparation, and analysis of projects and, generally, in economic
policy formulation." More broadly, they aimed to contribute "toward the improvement of the
degree of rationality of the Brazilian people in dealing with economic problems." With respect to
the objections recently raised by the Ford staff, the report promised "the predominant theoretic
character" of its planning course would be "counter-balanced in the future, by a gradual expansion
to practical exercises, principally in the planning and project sector." Leme recognized the
challenges encountered when hiring visiting professors but argued the Center was "very well
pleased with Prof. Fuenzalida's cooperation," for which he asked the Foundation to consider an
extension of his contract. The director further reported that a third CENDEC alum had now been
selected to receive a fellowship for graduate studies abroad – this time at the University of
California at Los Angeles, rather than Chicago.<fnref n="54" />

<footnote n="53">⁵³ Memorandum from Werner Baer to Peter Bell, 'Visit to CENDEC, March 14, 1968', March 21, 1968, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="54">⁵⁴ Og Leme, 'Report on the Activities of CENDEC During Period January 1967 to August 1968, Including Accounting of Expenditures Made with Ford Foundation Grant Funds', September 12, 1968, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>
To Ford, however, these amendments seem to have been too little, too late. In a private interview with Velloso, Baer discussed "the problems we had with the annual report of CENDEC," in response to which the Director of IPEA confirmed "his decision to get rid of Og Leme."<fnref n="55" /> Internally, Baer was even more adamant than before. "By sending one student to UCLA to give the impression that CENDEC is on the road to diversification does not impress me," he explained, "since UCLA's economics department is basically a Chicago-oriented school." While the individuals selected thus far were unobjectionable in themselves, he was skeptical of "the objectivity of Og's selection procedures," citing the cases of brilliant students who had been turned down due to their refusal to change dissertation topics. Baer thought it futile to elaborate on "the lack of wisdom in selecting Fuenzalida" for a visiting professorship and vehemently opposed the extension of his contract. Finally, he called into question the effectiveness of the training programs offered by the Center: "I suspect that in many cases CENDEC acts mainly as a clearing house, with requests for special courses which come from all over the country and where suitable professionals who wish to do some travel and to earn some money are found."<fnref n="56" /> Based on this feedback, the Foundation decided against renewing the CENDEC grant past 1968.

Despite Velloso's reservations, Leme remained as director for another year, finally being replaced in 1970 when the bulk of IPEA's operation was transferred to the new capital, Brasília. Leme was thus ahead of CENDEC for only about four years, but during this time he managed to leverage the financial and institutional resources at his disposal to establish an effective channel for the dissemination of Chicago economics in Brazil. Between students and research assistants, a total of eleven people were sent to Chicago through the CENDEC route between 1967 and 1970, eight of which returned with PhDs in economics (Castro 2022, pp. 117-9). Many of them would come to play an important role within the Brazilian community of economists, the case of Langoni being the most emblematic. Upon returning from Chicago, he substituted Mario Henrique Simonsen as director of the graduate school of economics at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, which soon became the institution of choice for other returning Chicago PhDs. One of Langoni's first acts as director was to remove the Vargas program from the fledgling Brazilian National Association of Graduate Programs in Economics (ANPEC), to protest the admission of another program with strong Marxian and structuralist elements – an act of defiance to the emerging pluralist consensus in Brazilian economics that has played a symbolic role ever since (Fernández & Suprinyak 2019). Two years later, Langoni joined the entourage of Milton Friedman's infamous

<footnote n="55">⁵⁵ Memorandum from Werner Baer to William Carmichael, 'Ministry of Planning, CENDEC', August 26, 1968, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>

<footnote n="56">⁵⁶ Memorandum from Werner Baer to William Carmichael, 'Comments on CENDEC's Annual Report', September 6, 1968, Reel 3807, Grant File 670-93, FA7321I, FFR.</footnote>
visit to Pinochet's Chile, lecturing on the recent Brazilian experience with macroeconomic stabilization policies (Edwards & Montes 2020). Around that same time, he was involved in a high-profile public debate in which he used Chicago human capital theory to explain away the adverse distributional effects of the economic policies implemented by the Brazilian military government (Andrada & Boianovsky 2020) – a debate in which his main antagonist was none other than the former chief of the Berkeley mission at EPEA, Albert Fishlow.

**5. Concluding remarks**

The case of CENDEC illustrates both the power of established scientific languages to shape discourse, and the capacity of key actors to play with these languages to further their own agendas. The notion of economic planning had become so ubiquitous by the 1960s that even those who found it most abhorrent were forced to incorporate it into their repertoire if they wished to be heard. The language itself, of course, was flexible enough to allow such incorporation. Under ordinary circumstances, this flexibility might be rightly perceived as just another symptom of intellectual hegemony. But when well-positioned actors managed to bend the language enough to suit extraneous purposes, its inherent fragilities also lay exposed. It was thus that Og Leme and Arnold Harberger managed to put together their ‘panelinha’, turning a training center for economic planners into a bridgehead for the inroads of Chicago economics in Brazil.

The episode offers additional evidence likewise of the ambiguous relationship between the Ford Foundation and the Brazilian military government. While Ford staff would soon come to ponder the moral implications of its involvement with an increasingly repressive and authoritarian regime (Suprinyak & Fernández 2022), by the mid-1960s the Foundation was still eager to collaborate more closely with the government, hoping to increase the effectiveness of its own initiatives. More broadly, the story throws some light on the standards and motivations that animated Ford's sponsorship of the social sciences in Latin America. The concern with fostering a pluralistic intellectual environment seems to have been a constant across different national experiences (Valdés 1995, pp. 181-200; Parmar 2012, pp. 180-220), and is visible here once again in the prompt reaction against the perceived risk of an excessive Chicago bias. But the results obtained in each case depended crucially on the actors engaged on all sides, and the room for maneuvering they enjoyed.
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