from the budget, it is easy to define a budgetary trans-
fer, which is the difference between the two. Such
transfers are positive when the region gains more than
it contributes and negative when it contributes more
than it gains.

5.3.5 Flow Approach and Benefit Approach

The procedure just described is, in fact, refined and
enriched in the case of expenditures (or, to take the
viewpoint of regions, in the case of gains from the
budget) by a distinction between a "flow approach"
and a "benefit approach". When the regional allocation
of a given item of expenditure is considered, there are
two basically different ways of looking at the regional
gains. First, the question can be posed: where does
the money go? Where is the expenditure actually
made? This the flow approach. Second, where are the
actual beneficiaries of this item of expenditure? Whose
welfare is actually increased by it? This is the benefit
approach.

The flow and benefit concepts can perhaps be made
clearer by a few examples. Take the case of expen-
ditures on agricultural research mentioned above: in
a flow approach the amount will be allocated to the
region(s) where research centres are located; in a
benefit approach the amount will be allocated to the
regions where agricultural goods are produced and/or
in the regions where agricultural goods are con-
sumed. Take the case of military expenditures: in a
flow approach; this item will be allocated to the re-
gions where arms are being made, or soldiers sta-
tioned; in a benefit approach, it will be assumed that
all citizens are equally protected all over the country,
and the expenditure will be allocated pro rata in line
with population. Take expenditures in central govern-
ment ministries: in a flow approach, they will be allo-
cated to the city where wages are paid; in a benefit
approach, they will be allocated all over the country,
with the help of criteria reflecting the benefit that
each region draws from the services performed by
the particular ministry.

The flow approach and the benefit approach will
therefore usually imply the use of different criteria for
the allocation of most items of expenditure. Rather
than utilising all the possible criteria for a given item,
it was found useful to perform two distinct alloca-
tions, one for each approach. The work described
above is thus done twice for expenditures. Distinct
criteria are used, different summations are made, dif-
ferent sets of 101 distributions are randomly select-
ed, different distributions of estimates are produced
and analysed, different median values of the gains of
each region from the national budget are retained.

For a given region, two estimates of the budgetary
"gain" are produced: the "gain (flow)" and the "gain
(benefit)". The comparison with the contribution to
the budget will yield two estimates of budget-induced
transfers: "transfers (flow)" and "transfers (benefits)",
that is transfers in the flow approach and in the ben-
efit approach.

Which is best? The question is futile. They are equally
interesting but they tell different stories. They look at
the complex phenomenon of budget-induced interre-
gional transfers from different angles. The two ap-
proaches incorporate two conceptual approaches that
are so different that it would not be reasonable to try
and mix them. A corollary of this is that the dispersion
of the 101 figures obtained for "gains" in both ap-
proaches will be narrower than would be the case if
this distinction were not made.

Why is there not a similar distinction introduced for rev-
ence items? For revenues items, use is made basical-
ly of a benefit approach. A flow approach would allo-
cate revenues at the place where they are collected.
For institutional reasons, this would not have much
meaning, because the location of tax collection (or tax
payment), at least for certain taxes, has little econom-
ic significance. In Portugal, due to the lack of existing
regional data, the regional allocation of the budget and
Social Security was implemented for the "flow" ap-
proach and not for the "benefit" one (which requires
more data).

5.3.6 Treatment of Debt-Related Items

Borrowing (on the revenue side), debt reimbursements
and interest on the debt (on the expenditure side) -
which might be called debt-related items - present a
special problem, all the more important because of the
magnitude of such amounts in many countries. Lend-
ing money to the government is not the same thing as
paying taxes to it. Receiving interest on such loans is
not the same thing as benefiting from government ex-
penditures.

Debt repayment on the expenditure side is allocated
differently between the flow and the benefit calcula-
tions. For the benefit approach, regional proxies re-
flecting the incidence of debt financing are used. Debt
financing increases the level of expenditure from which
the population can benefit. Accordingly, debt pay-
ments have been allocated in proportion to the re-
gional distribution of expenditures. These figures are
based on a "first round" of calculations of the region-
alisation of taxes and spending. This process assumes
implicitly that (i) the regional distribution of marginal
taxes or expenditures is the same as the mean of re-
gional taxes and expenditures; and (ii) that the region-
al allocations of the expenditure benefits of previous
years are not different from those of 1993. For the flow
approach, debt financing is allocated according to the
regional distribution of savers or shareholders. The
deficit, on the revenue side, is allocated according to
the tax contributions of the regions.

5.4 Main Findings

Many millions of calculations have been computed to
produce regional budgetary balances in the seven
countries. The general results, for each country, are
presented in Annex IIB, in absolute terms (national cur-
rency, ECU and PPS) and in relative terms (relative to
regional GDP and to total budget expenditures). Annex
IIC displays a cartography of the results (see also Fiq-
ures 5.5 to 5.12 at the end of this chapter). It is im-
portant, before presenting and discussing these re-
sults, to remember that they are not regional "ac-
counts", but the outcome of economic analysis. The
figures presented are mean results of various concep-
tual or statistical choices of allocation.

A number of observations and cautionary remarks
should be made concerning the use of these results.

i. the type of government spending analysed dif-
fers between countries. In Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom, social securi-
ty revenues and expenditures are included; in
France and Germany they are essentially distinct.
Attempts to compare the distributions between
countries must take account of the different
types of expenditure assessed in different coun-
tries and of the relative weight of the budget in
the national GDP.

ii. similarly, the intensities of the interregional
transfers are a function of the territorial break-
downs used in the different countries. This is
always a concern in undertaking regional analy-
ses of any kind; however, it is important to un-
derline the significance of this issue. For statis-
tical reasons, the breakdowns used vary con-
siderably: 18 regions in Spain; 22 in France; 17
in Germany, 5 in Portugal, 20 in Italy; 11 in the
United Kingdom; and 8 in Sweden. The inten-
sity of the transfers measured is directly related
to the territorial units employed; as such, com-
paring the intensity of the transfers is broadly
equivalent to comparing regional breakdowns.
For example, if the two neighbouring regions of
Stockholm (which is a net contributor) and
east-mid Sweden (which is a net beneficiary)

were considered as a single region, the total
value of the transfer from this "new" region to
the rest of Sweden would be affected signifi-
cantly. This means that it is not conceptually
very meaningful to compare the general amount
of transfers between countries.

iii. although the basic methodology adopted for
the regional distribution of the budgets of the
seven countries is the same, certain differences
in the implementation of the methodology
should be noted (as mentioned in the previous
section). They result from differences in the
quality and availability of the statistical informa-
tion, especially at the regional level. For exam-
ple, in the Spanish case, the regional criteria
used for civil servants' wages is the number of
employees in non-market employment. Annex
IID displays the allocation choices made for the
main expenditures and contributions of each
country. It is easy to verify, on the basis of da-
ta for those countries where the regional statis-
tical coverage is better, that there is, at the re-
gional level, a very large convergence of the re-
gional values for various analogue indicators.
For example in France, the difference between
the percentage of civil servants in Ile de France
and the percentage of civil servants' wages is
only one percentage point.

In spite of this somewhat lengthy list of caveats, the re-
sults presented provide, for the most part, a robust
measure of the interregional transfers of the countries
under study.

5.4.1 The Concentration of the Results

In the course of this study 101 regional allocations of
expenditures on the "flow" and "benefit" approaches
and 101 allocations of regional contributions have
been calculated. It is appropriate to use the mean re-
sults as long as there is a concentration of these re-
sults. Such concentration was found in practice. An-
nex IIE gives, for each region, the variation coefficient
(standard error/average: σ/M) and the Min/Max of the
three sets of calculations. Table 5.5 gives an example
of these tables for the UK case. Table 5.6 presents the
national average and standard error of these regional
coefficients.

All the values of the concentration coefficients indicate
a good convergence of the results. The most concen-
trated results are for contributions, then for "flow" ex-
penditures and "benefit" expenditures. Spain is the
country where the results are the least concentrated,
but even in this country, the regional contributions vary,
<table><caption>Table 5.5: Concentration of Results of 101 Regional Allocations of Budget Expenditures ("Benefit" and "Flow" Approaches) and Contributions: the Case of the UK</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Exp(benefit)<br>s/M</th><th>Exp(benefit)<br>Min/Max</th><th>Exp(flow)<br>s/M</th><th>Exp(flow)<br>Min/Max</th><th>Contributions<br>s/M</th><th>Contributions<br>Min/Max</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>North</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.91</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.97</td><td>-0.01</td><td>0.97</td></tr><tr><td>Y&H</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.95</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.98</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.98</td></tr><tr><td>E. Mids</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.94</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.98</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.98</td></tr><tr><td>E. Anglia</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.90</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.97</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.98</td></tr><tr><td>South East</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.96</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.98</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.98</td></tr><tr><td>South West</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.90</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.98</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.98</td></tr><tr><td>W. Mids</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.95</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.99</td><td>-0.01</td><td>0.96</td></tr><tr><td>North West</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.93</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.98</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.98</td></tr><tr><td>Wales</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.95</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.95</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.99</td></tr><tr><td>Scotland</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.96</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.97</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.99</td></tr><tr><td>N. Ireland</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.94</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.98</td><td>-0.01</td><td>0.97</td></tr><tr><td>Mean</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.94</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.98</td><td>-0.01</td><td>0.98</td></tr><tr><td>Standard error</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.01</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 5.6: Concentration of Results of 101 Regional Allocations of Budget Expenditures ("Benefit" and "Flow" Approaches) and Contributions: National Coefficients of Concentration</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th>Exp(benefit)<br>s/M</th><th>Exp(benefit)<br>Min/Max</th><th>Exp(flow)<br>s/M</th><th>Exp(flow)<br>Min/Max</th><th>Contributions<br>s/M</th><th>Contributions<br>Min/Max</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="2">France</td><td>Average</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.91</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.97</td><td>-0.01</td><td>0.98</td></tr><tr><td>Std. Err.</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.04</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.01</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Germany</td><td>Average</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.93</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.91</td><td>-0.02</td><td>0.92</td></tr><tr><td>Std. Err.</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.04</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.06</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.05</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Italy</td><td>Average</td><td>0.10</td><td>0.80</td><td>0.04</td><td>0.86</td><td>-0.01</td><td>0.98</td></tr><tr><td>Std. Err.</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.08</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.05</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.01</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Portugal</td><td>Average</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.88</td><td>-0.01</td><td>0.97</td></tr><tr><td>Std. Err.</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.01</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Spain</td><td>Average</td><td>0.04</td><td>0.82</td><td>0.05</td><td>0.82</td><td>-0.06</td><td>0.86</td></tr><tr><td>Std. Err.</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.06</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.09</td><td>0.05</td><td>0.10</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Sweden</td><td>Average</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.88</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.92</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>Std. Err.</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.07</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.06</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.00</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">U.K.</td><td>Average</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.94</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.98</td><td>-0.01</td><td>0.98</td></tr><tr><td>Std. Err.</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.01</td></tr></tbody></table>

on average, from -7 percent to +7 percent around the mean contribution and from -9 percent to +9 percent around the average for regional expenditures ("flow" and "benefit"). The results of regional allocations of expenditures in Italy show the same levels of deviation.

For the other countries, the level of difference of the re-

sults is very small. The statistical convergence of the social and economic characteristics of regions makes the results generally insensitive to conceptual differences of allocation. For example, in all countries, the three synthetic proxies used to allocate corporate taxes (three different combinations of regional proxies on capital, wages and consumption) give almost the same result.
### 5.4.2 Budget-Induced Interregional Transfers are Large

Irrespective of whether the "flow" or the "benefit" concept is used, it appears that the richer regions of the countries studied transfer significant sums to the poorer or problem regions, through public funds. The implicit transfers involved are in line with regional policies implemented at national and European levels. This confirms the conclusion of the MacDougall report which highlighted the regional redistributive effects of the budget in the 1970s. There is a lack of technical vocabulary to define this mechanism, because the concepts of "progressivity" or "regressivity" apply only to tax matters. It is possible to enlarge this vocabulary

to expenditures and even to interregional transfer systems. On this basis, a transfer system can be said to be interregionally progressive if and when richer regions subsidise poorer regions. This is the case for the Member States studied.

Detailed results of the regional allocations of national budgets are provided in Annex IIB (expenditures, revenues and balances, in terms of local currencies, ECU, PPS and relative to regional GDP and budget expenditures). Table 5.7 summarises the results of selected richer and poorer regions. Table 5.9 presents the balances of all the regions in terms of percentage of regional GDP and in ECU.

<table><caption>Table 5.7: Budget-Induced Interregional Transfers in MECU, as a Percent of Regional GDP and in k. ECU per capita: Selected Regions</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>transf (benef) MECU</th><th>transf (flow) MECU</th><th>transf (benef) %GDPreg.</th><th>transf (flow) %GDPreg.</th><th>transf (benef) k ECU/cap</th><th>transf (flow) k ECU/cap</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Andalucia</td><td>9,178</td><td>7,435</td><td>17%</td><td>14%</td><td>1.30</td><td>1.10</td></tr><tr><td>Galicia</td><td>3,185</td><td>2,078</td><td>14%</td><td>9%</td><td>1.20</td><td>0.80</td></tr><tr><td>Madrid</td><td>-8,455</td><td>-6,041</td><td>-13%</td><td>-9%</td><td>-1.70</td><td>-1.20</td></tr><tr><td>Cataluña</td><td>-4,302</td><td>-4,113</td><td>-6%</td><td>-5%</td><td>-0.70</td><td>-0.70</td></tr><tr><td>Midi Pyrenees</td><td>2,158</td><td>2,137</td><td>6%</td><td>6%</td><td>0.90</td><td>0.90</td></tr><tr><td>Languedoc R</td><td>2,649</td><td>2,760</td><td>8%</td><td>9%</td><td>1.20</td><td>1.30</td></tr><tr><td>Ile de France</td><td>-17,806</td><td>-8,848</td><td>-6%</td><td>-3%</td><td>-1.60</td><td>-0.80</td></tr><tr><td>Rhône-Alpes</td><td>-673</td><td>-1,655</td><td>-1%</td><td>-2%</td><td>-0.10</td><td>-0.30</td></tr><tr><td>Thüringen</td><td>6,883</td><td>5,111</td><td>28%</td><td>21%</td><td>2.71</td><td>2.01</td></tr><tr><td>Mecklen-Vor.</td><td>5,225</td><td>3,970</td><td>29%</td><td>22%</td><td>2.82</td><td>2.14</td></tr><tr><td>Baden-Württ.</td><td>-11,071</td><td>-10,128</td><td>-5%</td><td>-4%</td><td>-1.09</td><td>-0.99</td></tr><tr><td>Hessen</td><td>-6,778</td><td>-6,112</td><td>-4%</td><td>-4%</td><td>-1.14</td><td>-1.03</td></tr><tr><td>Sicilia</td><td>12,151</td><td>8,955</td><td>24%</td><td>17%</td><td>2.40</td><td>1.80</td></tr><tr><td>Campania</td><td>11,891</td><td>10,117</td><td>21%</td><td>18%</td><td>2.10</td><td>1.80</td></tr><tr><td>Lombardia</td><td>-23,436</td><td>-20,051</td><td>-14%</td><td>-12%</td><td>-2.60</td><td>-2.20</td></tr><tr><td>Piemonte</td><td>-6,778</td><td>-6,945</td><td>-9%</td><td>-10%</td><td>-1.50</td><td>-1.60</td></tr><tr><td>Alentejo</td><td>-</td><td>629</td><td>-</td><td>26%</td><td>-</td><td>1.18</td></tr><tr><td>Algarve</td><td>-</td><td>209</td><td>-</td><td>10%</td><td>-</td><td>0.61</td></tr><tr><td>Norte</td><td>-</td><td>-547</td><td>-</td><td>-2%</td><td>-</td><td>-0.16</td></tr><tr><td>Lisboa e V.T.</td><td>-</td><td>-657</td><td>-</td><td>-2%</td><td>-</td><td>-0.20</td></tr><tr><td>North Norrland</td><td>1,210</td><td>1,257</td><td>13%</td><td>14%</td><td>2.30</td><td>2.40</td></tr><tr><td>N.Mid Sweden</td><td>1,585</td><td>1,625</td><td>11%</td><td>11%</td><td>1.80</td><td>1.90</td></tr><tr><td>Stockholm</td><td>-3,493</td><td>-2,058</td><td>-10%</td><td>-6%</td><td>-2.10</td><td>-1.20</td></tr><tr><td>West Sweden</td><td>-76</td><td>-670</td><td>0%</td><td>-2%</td><td>0.00</td><td>-0.40</td></tr><tr><td>North West</td><td>4,368</td><td>3,530</td><td>6%</td><td>4%</td><td>0.70</td><td>0.60</td></tr><tr><td>Wales</td><td>3,603</td><td>2,704</td><td>11%</td><td>8%</td><td>1.20</td><td>0.90</td></tr><tr><td>South East</td><td>-21,524</td><td>-15,176</td><td>-8%</td><td>-5%</td><td>-1.20</td><td>-0.90</td></tr><tr><td>East Anglia</td><td>-426</td><td>-748</td><td>-1%</td><td>-3%</td><td>-0.20</td><td>-0.40</td></tr></tbody></table>
Before analysing and comparing the results, particularly between different countries, it must be recalled, as explained in Section 5.2, that the level of interregional transfers depends on the weight of the government budget in national income. In this research, due to lack of statistics on the regional allocation of social security in France and Germany, there is a great disparity of these weights (see Table 5.8). Before comparing, for example, the relative subsidy of Stockholm or Lom-

bardia to the Île de France it is necessary to bear in mind the relative amounts of public finance included. In fact, previous studies (Davezies, 1993) showed that the transfer induced by French social security from Île de France to other regions is even bigger than budget-induced transfers. It is possible to take this different weighting of the budget effect into account, and to calculate "virtual" transfers by point of GDP financing the budget studied (see Table 5.8).

<table><caption>Table 5.8: The Weight in National GDP of Public Funds Analysed by Country and the Value of the Transfers per point of GDP of the National Budget 1993</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Budget analysed<br>in % of GDP</th><th></th><th>ECU/cap. of "flow"<br>transfers/point<br>of GDP in budget</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>France</td><td>25%</td><td>Île de France</td><td>-33</td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>14%</td><td>Hessen</td><td>-73</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>48%</td><td>Lombardia</td><td>-46</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>46%</td><td>Lisboa e V.T.</td><td>-4</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>32%</td><td>Madrid</td><td>-37</td></tr><tr><td>Sweden</td><td>53%</td><td>Stockholm</td><td>-23</td></tr><tr><td>United Kingdom</td><td>40%</td><td>South East</td><td>-23</td></tr></tbody></table>

Considering the results in Table 5.9 in detail, there are 16 out of the 100 studied regions where the "flow" and "benefit" results display different signs (for the five Portuguese regions, out these 100, the "benefit" has not been calculated). This situation occurs in intermediate income or very small regions. The number of regions in this position is low, given the big conceptual differences between the "flow" and "benefit" approaches. In the countries studied, there are 10 instances where regions were net beneficiaries in benefit terms and net contributors in flow terms. This means that in these regions, there are less flows of public money - relative to their contributions to the budget - than the amount of benefits obtained from government policies. Six of the regions in this case are in France where the social security funds are not regionally allocated; if this had been done, there would probably be a better convergence of the "flow" and "benefit" approaches. The reverse situation, in which "flow" transfers exceed "benefit" ones, arises in only six instances. There is, then, a considerable coherence in the results, in spite of the fact that the two types of regional allocation are based on quite distinct hypotheses.

Not surprisingly, the transfers accruing to net beneficiary regions are consistently higher in "benefit" terms than in "flow" terms. However, the net contributor regions generally receive a greater proportion of the flows of public money than of the benefits. For example,

in the United Kingdom, almost half of civil service salaries are accounted for by the South-East.

The "central" regions appear to be the main contributors: Madrid and Cataluña in Spain; Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna and Piemonte in Italy; Stockholm in Sweden; Île de France in France; the South-East in the United Kingdom. On the basis of the "flow" concept, the net contribution varies between 2 percent (Lisbon & VT) and 12 percent (Lombardia) of the value of the regional GDP (the transfer financed by Île de France is three percent of its GDP, but probably more than double this figure if social security were included). In Germany, where social security funds are not included, the net contributors regions are less concentrated: four Länder share the same level of effort: Baden-Württemberg (4 percent of the regional GDP), Hessen (4 percent), Bayern (3 percent), Rheinland Pfalz (3 percent). In Portugal, because of the geographical breakdown of the regions, where the two main economic regions contain more than 70 percent of the population and comprise a mixture of rich and poor areas, the calculated interregional transfers are of course very small.

A secondary point is that a small number of other regions also appear as net "flow" contributors in the countries studied. This is true of four French regions (with two others near zero), four Italian, seven Spanish, one Swedish and three British regions.
Although caution is required in aggregating these results, it is interesting to have an order of magnitude of the redistributive mechanism by calculating the following overall results: for the "flow" approach, which minimises the transfers, the seven richest regions (Île de France, Hamburg, Lisbon & VT, Lombardia, Madrid, Stockholm and the South East), which represent 16 percent of the overall population of the seven countries and 19 percent of their GDP, financed (in 1993) 54 billion ECU of budget induced interregional transfers. This is equal to six percent of their regional GDP and 1.1 percent of the total GDP of the five countries. The 29 net contributing regions, with 55 percent of the population of the seven countries and 64 percent of their total GDP, financed 128 billion ECU. This represents four percent of their regional GDP and three percent of the total GDP of the five countries.

These figures confirm that national public funds play a very significant role in cohesion processes, transferring huge amounts of money from richer to poorer regions, more than twice the amount of the national contributions of these countries to the budget of the EC. If the other Member States produce the same level of budget-induced transfers, one could estimate that these transfers are something like more 20 times the European budget of the Structural Funds!

Of course, the flows are symmetrical in the sense that the poorer regions tend to be the largest net beneficiaries: Languedoc-Roussillon, Midi Pyrénées and Limousin in France; the eastern Länder in Germany, the Italian Mezzogiorno regions, Alentejo, Algarve and Centro regions in Portugal, Andalucía and Extremadura in Spain; the north of Sweden; northern regions and Wales in the United Kingdom.

<table><caption>Table 5.9: Budget-Induced Interregional Transfers: France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom 1993</caption><thead><tr><th>France</th><th>transf(benefit)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(flow)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(benefit)<br>k ECU/cap</th><th>transf(flow)<br>k ECU/cap</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Alsace</td><td>-1%</td><td>0%</td><td>-0.2</td><td>0.0</td></tr><tr><td>Aquitaine</td><td>3%</td><td>2%</td><td>0.4</td><td>0.3</td></tr><tr><td>Auvergne</td><td>2%</td><td>1%</td><td>0.3</td><td>0.2</td></tr><tr><td>Bourgogne</td><td>3%</td><td>0%</td><td>0.4</td><td>-0.1</td></tr><tr><td>Bretagne</td><td>3%</td><td>3%</td><td>0.5</td><td>0.4</td></tr><tr><td>Centre</td><td>0%</td><td>1%</td><td>0.0</td><td>0.1</td></tr><tr><td>Champagne-A</td><td>1%</td><td>0%</td><td>0.2</td><td>0.0</td></tr><tr><td>Corse</td><td>15%</td><td>10%</td><td>1.9</td><td>1.4</td></tr><tr><td>F.-Comte</td><td>2%</td><td>-2%</td><td>0.3</td><td>-0.4</td></tr><tr><td>Île de France</td><td>-6%</td><td>-3%</td><td>-1.6</td><td>-0.8</td></tr><tr><td>Languedoc-R.</td><td>8%</td><td>9%</td><td>1.2</td><td>1.3</td></tr><tr><td>Limousin</td><td>6%</td><td>6%</td><td>0.9</td><td>0.9</td></tr><tr><td>Lorraine</td><td>3%</td><td>2%</td><td>0.5</td><td>0.4</td></tr><tr><td>Midi-P.</td><td>6%</td><td>5%</td><td>0.9</td><td>0.9</td></tr><tr><td>Nord-P.C.</td><td>5%</td><td>1%</td><td>0.8</td><td>0.2</td></tr><tr><td>B.-Normandie</td><td>4%</td><td>3%</td><td>0.7</td><td>0.5</td></tr><tr><td>H.-Normandie</td><td>2%</td><td>-1%</td><td>0.3</td><td>-0.2</td></tr><tr><td>P.-de-la-Loire</td><td>2%</td><td>0%</td><td>0.3</td><td>-0.1</td></tr><tr><td>Picardie</td><td>2%</td><td>-3%</td><td>0.3</td><td>-0.4</td></tr><tr><td>Poitou-C.</td><td>3%</td><td>1%</td><td>0.4</td><td>0.1</td></tr><tr><td>Prov.-A.C.A.</td><td>1%</td><td>2%</td><td>0.2</td><td>0.3</td></tr><tr><td>Rhône-A.</td><td>-1%</td><td>-2%</td><td>-0.1</td><td>-0.3</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Germany</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>transf(benef)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(flow)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(benef)<br>k ECU/cap</th><th>transf(flow)<br>k ECU/cap</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Baden-Württ.</td><td>-5%</td><td>-4%</td><td>-1.09</td><td>-0.99</td></tr><tr><td>Bayern</td><td>-4%</td><td>-3%</td><td>-0.93</td><td>-0.72</td></tr><tr><td>Berlin</td><td>9%</td><td>12%</td><td>1.73</td><td>2.16</td></tr><tr><td>Brandenburg</td><td>22%</td><td>17%</td><td>2.39</td><td>1.79</td></tr><tr><td>Bremen</td><td>-1%</td><td>1%</td><td>-0.37</td><td>0.16</td></tr><tr><td>Hamburg</td><td>-5%</td><td>-1%</td><td>-1.77</td><td>-0.43</td></tr><tr><td>Hessen</td><td>-4%</td><td>-4%</td><td>-1.14</td><td>-1.03</td></tr><tr><td>Mecklen.-Vor.</td><td>29%</td><td>22%</td><td>2.82</td><td>2.14</td></tr><tr><td>Niedersachsen</td><td>-1%</td><td>-1%</td><td>-0.28</td><td>-0.15</td></tr><tr><td>Nordrh.-West.</td><td>-2%</td><td>-2%</td><td>-0.32</td><td>-0.33</td></tr><tr><td>Rhein.-Pfalz</td><td>-3%</td><td>-3%</td><td>-0.55</td><td>-0.54</td></tr><tr><td>Saarland</td><td>6%</td><td>4%</td><td>1.10</td><td>0.85</td></tr><tr><td>Sachsen</td><td>24%</td><td>17%</td><td>2.34</td><td>1.67</td></tr><tr><td>Sach.-Anhalt</td><td>26%</td><td>19%</td><td>2.57</td><td>1.95</td></tr><tr><td>Schles.Holst.</td><td>-3%</td><td>-1%</td><td>-0.50</td><td>-0.25</td></tr><tr><td>Thüringen</td><td>28%</td><td>21%</td><td>2.71</td><td>2.01</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Italy</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>transf(benef)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(flow)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(benef)<br>k ECU/cap</th><th>transf(flow)<br>k ECU/cap</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Abruzzo</td><td>18%</td><td>10%</td><td>2.3</td><td>1.2</td></tr><tr><td>Basilicata</td><td>49%</td><td>27%</td><td>4.6</td><td>2.5</td></tr><tr><td>Calabria</td><td>37%</td><td>20%</td><td>3.2</td><td>1.7</td></tr><tr><td>Campania</td><td>21%</td><td>18%</td><td>2.1</td><td>1.8</td></tr><tr><td>Emilia R.</td><td>-10%</td><td>-10%</td><td>-1.8</td><td>-1.7</td></tr><tr><td>Friuli V.G.</td><td>-2%</td><td>0%</td><td>-0.3</td><td>0.1</td></tr><tr><td>Lazio</td><td>-2%</td><td>10%</td><td>-0.3</td><td>1.7</td></tr><tr><td>Liguria</td><td>-4%</td><td>-4%</td><td>-0.7</td><td>-0.6</td></tr><tr><td>Lombardia</td><td>-14%</td><td>-12%</td><td>-2.6</td><td>-2.2</td></tr><tr><td>Marche</td><td>1%</td><td>-2%</td><td>0.1</td><td>-0.2</td></tr><tr><td>Molise</td><td>41%</td><td>17%</td><td>4.5</td><td>1.9</td></tr><tr><td>Piemonte</td><td>-9%</td><td>-10%</td><td>-1.5</td><td>-1.6</td></tr><tr><td>Puglia</td><td>18%</td><td>9%</td><td>1.8</td><td>1.0</td></tr><tr><td>Sardegna</td><td>23%</td><td>19%</td><td>2.5</td><td>2.1</td></tr><tr><td>Sicilia</td><td>23%</td><td>17%</td><td>2.4</td><td>1.8</td></tr><tr><td>Toscana</td><td>-7%</td><td>-7%</td><td>-1.1</td><td>-1.0</td></tr><tr><td>Trentino A.A.</td><td>-2%</td><td>10%</td><td>-0.3</td><td>1.8</td></tr><tr><td>Umbria</td><td>2%</td><td>0%</td><td>0.2</td><td>0.1</td></tr><tr><td>Valle d'Aosta</td><td>-3%</td><td>12%</td><td>-0.5</td><td>2.2</td></tr><tr><td>Veneto</td><td>-8%</td><td>-9%</td><td>-1.3</td><td>-1.4</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Portugal</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>transf(benef)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(flow)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(benef)<br>k ECU/cap</th><th>transf(flow)<br>k ECU/cap</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Alentejo</td><td>-</td><td>26%</td><td>-</td><td>1.18</td></tr><tr><td>Algarve</td><td>-</td><td>10%</td><td>-</td><td>0.61</td></tr><tr><td>Centro</td><td>-</td><td>4%</td><td>-</td><td>0.22</td></tr><tr><td>Lisboa e V.T.</td><td>-</td><td>-2%</td><td>-</td><td>-0.20</td></tr><tr><td>Norte</td><td>-</td><td>-2%</td><td>-</td><td>-0.16</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Spain</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>transf(benefit)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(flow)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(benefit)<br>k ECU/cap</th><th>transf(flow)<br>k ECU/cap</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Andalucia</td><td>17%</td><td>14%</td><td>1.3</td><td>1.1</td></tr><tr><td>Aragon</td><td>-7%</td><td>-3%</td><td>-0.8</td><td>-0.4</td></tr><tr><td>Asturias</td><td>1%</td><td>1%</td><td>0.1</td><td>0.1</td></tr><tr><td>Baleares</td><td>-8%</td><td>-7%</td><td>-1.0</td><td>-1.0</td></tr><tr><td>Canarias</td><td>13%</td><td>11%</td><td>1.3</td><td>1.2</td></tr><tr><td>Cantabria</td><td>0%</td><td>-1%</td><td>0.0</td><td>-0.1</td></tr><tr><td>Castilla L.Ma.</td><td>5%</td><td>3%</td><td>0.4</td><td>0.3</td></tr><tr><td>Castilla Leon</td><td>1%</td><td>2%</td><td>0.1</td><td>0.2</td></tr><tr><td>Cataluña</td><td>-6%</td><td>-5%</td><td>-0.7</td><td>-0.7</td></tr><tr><td>Ceuta Y Melil.</td><td>3%</td><td>14%</td><td>0.2</td><td>1.3</td></tr><tr><td>Extremadura</td><td>18%</td><td>15%</td><td>1.3</td><td>1.1</td></tr><tr><td>Galicia</td><td>14%</td><td>9%</td><td>1.2</td><td>0.8</td></tr><tr><td>La Rioja</td><td>-6%</td><td>-3%</td><td>-0.7</td><td>-0.3</td></tr><tr><td>Madrid</td><td>-13%</td><td>-9%</td><td>-1.7</td><td>-1.2</td></tr><tr><td>Murcia</td><td>3%</td><td>2%</td><td>0.2</td><td>0.2</td></tr><tr><td>Navarra</td><td>-6%</td><td>-6%</td><td>-0.8</td><td>-0.8</td></tr><tr><td>Pais Vasco</td><td>-9%</td><td>-9%</td><td>-1.1</td><td>-1.1</td></tr><tr><td>Valencia</td><td>0%</td><td>0%</td><td>0.0</td><td>0.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Sweden</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>transf(benefit)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(flow)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(benefit)<br>k ECU/cap</th><th>transf(flow)<br>k ECU/cap</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Stockholm</td><td>-9%</td><td>-6%</td><td>-2.1</td><td>-1.2</td></tr><tr><td>E.Mid Sweden</td><td>4%</td><td>3%</td><td>0.6</td><td>0.5</td></tr><tr><td>Smal/Islands</td><td>2%</td><td>0%</td><td>0.4</td><td>-0.1</td></tr><tr><td>South Sweden</td><td>1%</td><td>0%</td><td>0.2</td><td>0.0</td></tr><tr><td>West Sweden</td><td>0%</td><td>-2%</td><td>0.0</td><td>-0.4</td></tr><tr><td>N.Mid Sweden</td><td>11%</td><td>11%</td><td>1.8</td><td>1.9</td></tr><tr><td>Midden</td><td>9%</td><td>8%</td><td>1.6</td><td>1.4</td></tr><tr><td>Norrland</td><td>13%</td><td>14%</td><td>2.3</td><td>2.4</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>United Kingdom</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>transf(benefit)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(flow)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(benefit)<br>k ECU/cap</th><th>transf(flow)<br>k ECU/cap</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>North</td><td>9%</td><td>9%</td><td>1.1</td><td>1.2</td></tr><tr><td>Y. & H.</td><td>1%</td><td>-1%</td><td>0.2</td><td>-0.1</td></tr><tr><td>E. Midlands</td><td>1%</td><td>-2%</td><td>0.1</td><td>-0.2</td></tr><tr><td>East Anglia</td><td>-1%</td><td>-3%</td><td>-0.2</td><td>-0.4</td></tr><tr><td>South East</td><td>-7%</td><td>-5%</td><td>-1.2</td><td>-0.9</td></tr><tr><td>South West</td><td>0%</td><td>1%</td><td>-0.1</td><td>0.1</td></tr><tr><td>W. Midlands</td><td>3%</td><td>1%</td><td>0.3</td><td>0.1</td></tr><tr><td>North West</td><td>5%</td><td>4%</td><td>0.7</td><td>0.6</td></tr><tr><td>Wales</td><td>11%</td><td>8%</td><td>1.2</td><td>0.9</td></tr><tr><td>Scotland</td><td>6%</td><td>5%</td><td>0.9</td><td>0.6</td></tr><tr><td>N. Ireland</td><td>18%</td><td>17%</td><td>2.0</td><td>1.9</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: OEIL Calculations
These transfers produce a large reduction of interregional disparities within countries. The best way to analyse this reduction would be to use regional data on the disposable income of households, because these transfers are generally oriented more towards regional income or standard of living than towards regional production. However, due to unavailable regional income data on the five countries, it has proven necessary to use a comparison of regional GDP per capita "before" and "after" budget transfers. This way of proceeding is

conceptually questionable because GDP already includes public funds (taxes on production, public value added,...), and because the income oriented transfers weigh less in GDP than in income (national income is around two-thirds of national GDP), but it is nevertheless convenient to use this "mix" of data to produce a general indicator of regional disparity reduction. The term "budgetary adjusted GDP" (BAGDP) consists of the regional GDP plus transfers. Table 5.10 shows the result of an analysis in term of Gini coefficients:

<table><caption>Table 5.10: The Impact of Budget-Induced Interregional Transfers on Regional Economic Disparities in France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 1993. (GDP and Budget Adjusted GDP per capita)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Gini GDP</th><th>Gini BAGDP benefit</th><th>Gini BAGDP flow</th><th>% of reduction benefit</th><th>% of reduction flow</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>France (a)</td><td>0.121</td><td>0.098</td><td>0.109</td><td>-18.4%</td><td>-9.9%</td></tr><tr><td>Germany (a)</td><td>0.147</td><td>0.116</td><td>0.123</td><td>-21.0%</td><td>-16.2%</td></tr><tr><td>Italy (a)</td><td>0.132</td><td>0.068</td><td>0.095</td><td>-48.5%</td><td>-28.0%</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal (a)</td><td>0.149</td><td>-</td><td>0.133</td><td>-</td><td>-10.8%</td></tr><tr><td>Spain (a)</td><td>0.110</td><td>0.060</td><td>0.069</td><td>-45.4%</td><td>-37.4%</td></tr><tr><td>Sweden (a)</td><td>0.051</td><td>0.034</td><td>0.043</td><td>-33.8%</td><td>-14.4%</td></tr><tr><td>United Kingdom (a)</td><td>0.065</td><td>0.035</td><td>0.044</td><td>-46.9%</td><td>-32.7%</td></tr><tr><td>Weighted by pop mean reduction on seven countries (b)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-34.3%</td><td>-22.8%</td></tr><tr><td>7 countries (ECU)</td><td>0.187</td><td></td><td>0.169</td><td></td><td>-9.5%</td></tr><tr><td>6 countries (ECU) (b)</td><td>0.178</td><td>0.152</td><td></td><td>-14.8%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>7 countries (PPS)</td><td>0.143</td><td></td><td>0.120</td><td></td><td>-16.5%</td></tr><tr><td>6 countries (PPS) (b)</td><td>0.140</td><td>0.105</td><td></td><td>-25.2%</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

(a) Gini in ECU or in PPS are the same

(b) Benefit calculated on 6 countries (without Portugal)

Note: French and German social security are not taken into account.

Source: OEIL Calculations

The reduction of interregional disparities appears very important, and of the same order of magnitude as the figures of the MacDougall report (Table 5.1), taking into account the fact that the MacDougall report measured the reduction of interregional disparities of income, which are less important before the budget than GDP disparities, and because the transfers have a larger impact on regional income than on regional GDP. Before comparing the intensity of the national budget redistributions, it must be recalled again that a part of the differences are due to differences in the degree of regional breakdown (in the UK for example, the breakdown is into eight regions whereas it is in 22 in France).

Table 5.10 shows the mean national reduction of disparities weighted by population. This is a good indicator of the mean national ability to reduce interregional disparities via the national budget. It is possible to compare this reduction with the reduction of Gini coefficients calculated on the GDP and BAGDP of the 101 regions. It appears clearly that the cohesion machine is more a national machine than an European one. A large part of the cohesion effect remains at the national level and does not play a role with respect to European cohesion. When a richer region of a poorer country subsidises an even poorer region, this mechanism has most impact on national rather than European cohesion.
### 5.4.3 Budget-Induced Interregional Transfers are Related to GDP

The transfers induced by government budgets are clearly related to the GDP per capita of regions. The richer is a region, relative to the national situation, the more its net contribution to the budget is negative. In similar vein, the poorer is a region, the more it receives in transfers from the budget.

There is a quite homogeneous transfer mechanism

among the seven countries. It is possible to show, referring to the simple model set out in Figure 5.1 that this mechanism reflects a steady combination of the regional incidence of the tax system and expenditure allocations: richer regions contribute more to the budget than poorer regions, and in a larger proportion than they gain from the budget. Table 5.11 gives the slopes and coefficients of determination (R2) of the linear regressions linking respectively budget contributions and gains of the regions at their GDP per capita.

<table><caption>Table 5.11: Statistics of Linear Regressions Between Budget Contribution per capita and Gains(flow) per capita v GDP per capita in the Regions of France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom (1993)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>x=GDP/cap</th><th>y=contribution/cap</th><th>y=gain(flow)/cap</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="2">France</td><td>Slope</td><td>0.18</td><td>0.06</td></tr><tr><td>[R2]</td><td>[0.92]</td><td>[0.10]</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Germany</td><td>Slope</td><td>0.12</td><td>0.00</td></tr><tr><td>[R2]</td><td>[0.98]</td><td>[0.0001]</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Italy</td><td>Slope</td><td>0.53</td><td>0.25</td></tr><tr><td>[R2]</td><td>[0.96]</td><td>[0.40]</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Portugal</td><td>Slope</td><td>0.32</td><td>0.01</td></tr><tr><td>[R2]</td><td>[0.97]</td><td>[0.30]</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Spain</td><td>Slope</td><td>0.36</td><td>-0.02</td></tr><tr><td>[R2]</td><td>[0.88]</td><td>[0.02]</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Sweden</td><td>Slope</td><td>0.60</td><td>0.24</td></tr><tr><td>[R2]</td><td>[0.96]</td><td>[0.15]</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">United Kingdom</td><td>Slope</td><td>0.46</td><td>-0.01</td></tr><tr><td>[R2]</td><td>[0.96]</td><td>[0.001]</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: OEIL Calculations

The linear regression is very good for contributions (R2 near 1) and the slopes are steeper than the slopes for gains, even in Italy and Sweden where gains are increasing with GDP per capita. The role of contributions in the redistributive mechanism seems more important also in Sweden and Italy. These statistics show that while contributions are a function of income, expenditures do not follow the same rule (the R2 is near 0) and are distributed quite differently, without any regular pattern. There are at least four combined trends regarding regional gains from the budget in the flow approach: (i) some richer regions in Italy and Sweden receive relatively more per capita than the average, (ii) the same can be said of regions with political problems such as Corsica and Northern Ireland, and to a certain extent Trentino; (iii) and of regions with natural handi-

caps such as Canarias, Ceuta and Melilla, Val d'Aos-ta, or the three northern region of Sweden; (iv) for the other regions, it seems that the gains are related more to population than to any other indicator.

### 5.4.4 Equal Regions are not Treated Equally

One of the most important findings of this evaluation of budget-induced interregional transfers is the fact that national cohesion machines are unequal at the European level. As observed above in the context of the analysis of the difference of the mean Gini coefficient reduction in the seven countries compared with the Gini calculated on the 101 regions, the transfers produce more national cohesion than European cohesion. This means that transfers from regions are limited by na-
tional borders. It is a well-known finding of tax analysts: the more a tax system is decentralised, the less the system redistributes between populations and areas. The European Union, at the public finance level, functions as a very decentralised space. There is, on this point, a great difference with the United States of America where the Federal budget induces huge transfers between States: it can be seen from Table 5.1 (MacDougall report, 1977) that the US budget induced a reduction of the interregional income dispari-

ties index of 28 percent (variation coefficient) to 23 percent (Gini coefficient).

The fact that the main cohesion systems within Europe are implemented at the national level produces paradoxical mechanisms at the European level: some equal regions, in terms of GDP per capita, are not treated equally by their respective national budgets. Table 5.12 gives some examples with respect to selected regions.

<table><caption>Table 5.12: Equal Regions Regarding GDP per capita Are Treated Unequally by National Budgets: Selected Regions</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>transf(flow)<br>% reg. GDP</th><th>transf(flow)<br>ECU/cap</th><th>GDP<br>ECU/cap</th><th>BAGDP (flow)<br>ECU/cap</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Lisbon &VT</td><td>-2%</td><td>-187</td><td>10,270</td><td>10,019</td></tr><tr><td>Brandenburg</td><td>17%</td><td>1,807</td><td>10,637</td><td>12,444</td></tr><tr><td>Wales</td><td>8%</td><td>932</td><td>11,734</td><td>12,666</td></tr><tr><td>Aragon</td><td>-3%</td><td>-379</td><td>11,776</td><td>11,398</td></tr><tr><td>Pais Vasco</td><td>-9%</td><td>-1,079</td><td>12,347</td><td>11,268</td></tr><tr><td>North</td><td>9%</td><td>1,176</td><td>12,433</td><td>13,609</td></tr><tr><td>NW</td><td>4%</td><td>552</td><td>12,507</td><td>13,058</td></tr><tr><td>Cataluña</td><td>-5%</td><td>-675</td><td>12,658</td><td>11,983</td></tr><tr><td>WMids</td><td>1%</td><td>75</td><td>12,722</td><td>12,797</td></tr><tr><td>EAng</td><td>-3%</td><td>-358</td><td>14,140</td><td>13,782</td></tr><tr><td>Languedoc-R.</td><td>9%</td><td>1,272</td><td>14,500</td><td>15,771</td></tr><tr><td>Toscana</td><td>-7%</td><td>-1,025</td><td>15,450</td><td>14,425</td></tr><tr><td>Bretagne</td><td>3%</td><td>395</td><td>15,621</td><td>16,016</td></tr><tr><td>Midi-P.</td><td>5%</td><td>869</td><td>15,842</td><td>16,711</td></tr></tbody></table>

Relatively rich regions at the national level can be relatively poor regions at the European level. Similarly, poor regions at the national level can be rich regions at the European level. For example, the richer regions in Spain (as in Portugal, and probably Ireland or Greece), such as Cataluña, are financing (-5 percent of its GDP) poorer Spanish regions despite the fact that they have the same level of GDP per capita as Midi Pyrénées (on ECU basis) or Lorraine (on PPS basis), which are both financed by the French budget (respectively +5 percent and +2 percent of their GDP).

This is the major reason for the weak result in terms of European cohesion induced by the interregional redistribution of national budgets.

Figure 5.3 gives a general view of this unequal - at the European level - ability of national budgets to contribute to European cohesion. Annex IIF provides an exhaustive list of GDP per capita and net transfers (flow) per capita for all the regions within the case study countries.

A feature of Figure 5.3 is that it shows clearly that regions which have the same levels of GDP per capita can be treated very differently in terms of budget-induced interregional transfers. In considering this point, it is useful to distinguish between two sets of country: Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom on the one hand and Italy, Sweden, France and Germany on the other.

The first three countries have regions which are relatively poor from a European perspective (on the basis of GDP per capita figures) but which are net contributors in terms of interregional transfers. In Spain, Cantabria, La Rioja, Aragón, Pais Vasco and Cataluña finance other Spanish regions despite the fact that they have on average, a GDP/capita of 78 percent of the European (12 countries) GDP per capita, 92 percent in terms of PPS. In the United Kingdom, Yorkshire & Humberside, East Midlands and East Anglia, are in the same situation, albeit at a lesser degree, as net contributors to the budget with a mean GDP per capita of 83 percent of the European average (94 percent
<figure><img src="image_36.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5.3: Budget-Induced Interregional Transfers Related to GDP per capita in France (18 840 ECU), Germany (20 070), Italy (14 586), Portugal (7 466), Spain (10 434), Sweden (18 134) and United Kingdom (13 858)</figcaption></figure>
in PPS). In Portugal, Lisbon and Norte are net contributors with a very low GDP/capita (64 and 47 percent in ECU, 70 and 96 percent in PPS). It is certain that the same kind of figures would be found in other countries such as Ireland or Greece.

In contrast, the other four countries have regions with a relatively high level of GDP per capita and a net gain from their national budgets. This is true of regions with a GDP/capita higher than the European average of 15,830 ECU: in Sweden, Mid Norrland, North Norrland and North Mid Sweden gain between 8 and 10 percent of their GDP; in Italy, the regions in this situation are mainly "special" regions like Val d'Aosta, for natural reasons, Trentino, for political reasons and Lazio for institutional reasons; in Germany, there are two net beneficiary Länder, Bremen and Saarland, which both have GDP per capita above the European average (352 and 244 percent in ECU, 155 and 107 percent in PPS). Berlin and the new Lander are all net beneficiaries, with a GDP per capita higher than the European average in term of ECU (226 percent in Berlin, around 120 percent in the new Länder), but lower in terms of PPS (99 percent in Berlin, around 50 percent in the new Lander); in

France, there are five regions which are both above the European average of GDP per capita and net beneficiaries from the budget, without any particular "special" reason: Basse-Normandie, Centre, Aquitaine, Provence-Alpes - Côte d'Azur and Midi-Pyrénées. It is probable that the same kind of situation occurs in the regions of other richer European countries like the Netherlands or Austria. The case of Belgium is probably very different because the country is no longer unitary since the 1988 reform, which means that the Flanders to Wallonia transfers have probably been significantly reduced.

### 5.4.5 Additional Confirmation in the Cases of France and the UK

This research is a first attempt to measure, using a common methodology, the transfers induced by public funds in European countries. The main conclusion is that GDP/capita disparities are lessened by the mechanisms of budget. This implies that regional disparities in household incomes are less significant than GDP interregional disparities. It is possible to verify this point with respect to the cases of France and UK where these data are available (see Table 5.13).

<table><caption>Table 5.13: Interregional Disparities of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Personal Disposable Income (PDI) in France and UK (1993 for UK, 1992 GDP and 1991 PDI for France): Regions Ranked by Growing GDP per capita.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>% share of UK GDP</th><th>% share of UK PDI</th><th></th><th>% share of Fr GDP</th><th>% share of Fr PDI</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>North Ireland</td><td>2.24</td><td>2.62</td><td>Corse</td><td>0.30</td><td>0.39</td></tr><tr><td>Wales</td><td>4.23</td><td>4.52</td><td>Picardie</td><td>2.67</td><td>2.81</td></tr><tr><td>North</td><td>4.78</td><td>4.86</td><td>Nord Pas de Calais</td><td>5.53</td><td>6.17</td></tr><tr><td>North West</td><td>9.94</td><td>10.34</td><td>Pays de la Loire</td><td>4.60</td><td>4.88</td></tr><tr><td>West Midlands</td><td>8.35</td><td>8.72</td><td>Franche Comte</td><td>1.74</td><td>1.75</td></tr><tr><td>York & Humb.</td><td>7.92</td><td>8.07</td><td>Languedoc Rouss.</td><td>2.90</td><td>3.40</td></tr><tr><td>East Midlands</td><td>6.58</td><td>6.60</td><td>Poitou Charentes</td><td>2.21</td><td>2.58</td></tr><tr><td>South West</td><td>7.80</td><td>8.22</td><td>Bretagne</td><td>3.94</td><td>4.58</td></tr><tr><td>Scotland</td><td>8.65</td><td>8.93</td><td>Basse Normandie</td><td>2.08</td><td>2.28</td></tr><tr><td>East Anglia</td><td>3.67</td><td>3.65</td><td>Auvergne</td><td>1.83</td><td>2.20</td></tr><tr><td>South East</td><td>35.85</td><td>33.46</td><td>Haute Normandie</td><td>3.07</td><td>2.93</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Limousin</td><td>0.97</td><td>1.23</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Bourgogne</td><td>2.47</td><td>2.74</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Midi Pyrenées</td><td>3.63</td><td>4.15</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Lorraine</td><td>3.40</td><td>3.94</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Rhône Alpes</td><td>9.39</td><td>9.16</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Centre</td><td>3.82</td><td>4.09</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Provence Aca</td><td>6.91</td><td>7.39</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Aquitaine</td><td>4.33</td><td>4.88</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Champagne Ard.</td><td>2.29</td><td>2.36</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Alsace</td><td>2.87</td><td>2.98</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Ile de France</td><td>29.03</td><td>23.12</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: On France INSEE/Statistiques et Indicateurs des Régions Française; on the UK: Regional Trends (1995)
There is no direct linkage from GDP to Personal Dis-
posable Income (PDI). This is because not only do
budget transfers play a role, but also private interre-
gional and international transfers. Even so, the figures
are very clear: income disparities are much smaller
than GDP disparities. In both countries and without ex-
ception, the poorer a region in terms of GDP/capita,
the more it augments its share of income. In similar
vein the richer is a region, the more its income is re-
duced. In the UK, the GDP/capita of Northern Ireland,
the poorest region, is 68 percent of the South East fig-
ure while disposable income is 85 percent. In France,
Languedoc-Roussillon, the poorest region (after atypi-
cal Corsica) moves from 55 percent of the GDP/capi-
ta of Île de France to 71 percent of the income/capita.
The literature too often ignores the difference between
GDP and income, perhaps because of old macroeco-

nomic habits (at the national level, GDP and GNP are
close, because there are no interregional transfers).
The other reason is that too few Member States pro-
duce regional income/capita data. This is a pity, be-
cause this kind of figure offers direct evidence of the
reality of progressive transfers between regions. Fur-
ther, it is possible to show, in the case of France, that
the evolution of interregional disparities is moving in
opposite directions for GDP and DPI per capita (Figure
5.4). During the 1980s, interregional disparities in
GDP/capita were growing whereas, at the same time,
income disparities were decreasing. It is difficult to
measure the factors of this double mechanism without
knowing anything about the evaluation of annual pub-
lic and private transfers, but this finding confirms that
these transfers play a major role, in a static or dynam-
ic approach, in the cohesion process between regions.

<figure><img src="image_37.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5.4: Coefficient of Variation, Weighted by Population, of Gross Domestic Product per capita (1975-1990) and Disposable Personal Income per capita (1962-1990) Within French Regions.</figcaption></figure>

Source: Davezies L (1995). Calculated from INSEE data.

5.5 Concluding Points - Implications
of the Findings

There are a lot of discussions which have still to be de-
veloped regarding the mechanism of interregional pro-
gressivity of budget-induced transfers. The first one, of

course, is about the importance of an improvement in,
and a periodic production of, such calculations. This
study is a first attempt to measure these transfers,
done thanks to the cooperation of seven academic
teams, in a very short time period. The role played by
such transfers in the cohesion process between Euro-
pean regions requires that they be taken into account
by European policymakers on a regular basis.
Out of these first results, it is already possible to suggest three broad implications, regarding European regional policies.

### 5.5.1 A New Ranking of the Regional Economic Situations in Europe

As has been shown, taking into account budget-induced transfers produces a new representation of the relative economic situations of the European regions. It is important for European regional policy to keep in mind this new ranking (see Annex IIG). In the current methodology of designating problem region maps, the use of GDP (either in ECU or in PPS) gives the same status to regions which are equal in terms of GDP but which are unequal once transfers are taken into account. It could be argued that this introduces unfairness into the system; moreover, this could be corrected by a better measure of the real economic situation of the regions, one which included measures of both production and income. Budget-induced transfers, implicitly but politically conducted, play only a partial role in the formation of income. International and interregional private transfers, which are impossible to measure at the regional level, also play an important role in the state of development of a region. European regional policymakers may need to consider reviewing their method of defining the economic situation of European regions; and in particular, they may need to introduce into the definition of problem regions (i) the amount of public funds that implicitly benefit the regions and (ii) in the longer term, once it becomes available, the personal income of households (which take into account both private and public interregional transfers).

### 5.5.2 An Alternative Regional Development Strategy in the Poorest Regions

Another important discussion suggested by the findings presented in this chapter concerns the most efficient way of speeding up the development of the peripheral regions of Europe - in particular, the poorest regions of the less developed Member States. The measurement of budget-induced transfers shows that some of the richest regions of these countries, though relatively poor at the European level, transfer large amounts of money to the rest of their countries (see Figure 5.3). This implicit phenomenon suggests at least two conclusions:

(i) If the main obstacle to regional cohesion in Europe is international economic disparities, and if the main economic growth in the poorest countries is due to their most developed and productive regions - which both improve European economic

cohesion and their own national interregional cohesion through national budgets - it is possible to conceive at the theoretical level, a policy alternative: (a) either to go on transferring direct European regional support to the poorest regions which have a low rate of return, in value-added terms, due to their low productivity and which have a small impact on European cohesion at both national and interregional levels, or (b) to reorientate European regional support towards the most productive regions of these countries. This second policy option can both maximise national growth - which is good for European cohesion - and maximise the income surplus a large part of which is redistributed (through production as well as social expenditures) to less developed regions - which is good for both national and European cohesion. To go further in this analysis, and to have a solid basis for making a choice between these two strategies, it would be necessary to build a dynamic model explaining what is the best strategy, and in what countries, according to interregional differences in marginal productivity and the marginal propensity of the budget to redistribute money between regions.

(ii) A second argument of relevance to the current focus of European regional policy, in relation to budget-induced transfers, lies in the fact that the richest regions of various countries are in very unequal situations. Both fiscal theory and common sense converge to explain that, if redistribution is operated at a decentralised level, some agents in net contributor regions located in poorer parts of the EU will migrate to richer areas where they can be net beneficiaries. The European public finance system is, by construction, decentralised. Assuming all the mobility obstacles were abolished at the European level (language, size of markets...), a firm located in Madrid or Barcelona (but also in a city like Lisbon or Thessalonika), could easily understand that it is better to operate and pay taxes in a place where it receives more money back through public expenditures, like Toulouse, Glasgow or Lille. The unfair competition between equally productive regions induced by budget transfers is a bias which may fuel a particular process of economic concentration, slowing down the growth of the most productive regions in poorer countries, and benefiting regions in the wealthiest countries. Such a development would run counter to cohesion. It may be that, rather than focus on the poorest regions, a long-term European cohesion policy could aim to compensate richer, more productive regions in poor Member States for the burden of the transfers they make to underdeveloped regions.
### 5.5.3 The Impact of Non-Regional Policy Changes on Interregional Cohesion

Regional policy must take into account the fact that changes in institutional or fiscal policies could have direct implications for the level of the flows of budget-induced transfers. For example, fiscal decentralisation, which is in process in many countries, has a direct implication for the volume of public funds managed at the national level and, related, for the intensity of the interregional redistribution of income. In another field, the EU convergence criteria which aim to reduce the public deficit (ie. public expenditures) have a direct im-

pact on the scale of interregional transfers. Any harmonisation of national tax systems in European countries could also produce changes in the structure of government revenues, and thus change the spatial progressivity of the fiscal system. For example, in France, Ile de France contributes 25 percent of VAT, 36 percent of personal income tax and 65 percent of the tax on wealth. Any change in the structure of tax revenue has an immediate regional impact. As a result, those in charge of regional policies must develop a better understanding of budgetary cohesion mechanisms and become more involved in many, indeed most, non-regional policy changes.

<figure><img src="image_38.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5.5: Interregional Transfers in France</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_39.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5.7: Interregional Transfers in Italy</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_40.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_41.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5.9: Interregional Transfers in Spain</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_42.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_43.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5.11: Interregional Transfers in the United Kingdom</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_44.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_45.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5.12: Interregional Transfers in Selected EU Countries (Flow Analysis)</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_46.png" /></figure>

Note: Social Security is not included for France and Germany.
<figure><img src="image_47.png" /></figure>
# 6. Conclusions

## 6.1 Main Findings

This report has focused on two principal categories of government spending that impact on economic and social cohesion in the EU Member States: the automatic transfers induced by government taxation and expenditures; and the spending policies pursued proactively by governments, whether or not with cohesion in mind. The substantive conclusions for each of the areas considered are set out at the end of each of the preceding chapters. The purpose of this concluding section is to draw together some of the more general issues that arise from the study.

A key point to bear in mind in considering the overall results of the work concerns the scale of the transfers and spending concerned; budget induced interregional transfers are massive compared with spending on proactive government policies. This is best illustrated by example: the value of the transfer flows to Lorraine is about 40 times the spend on regional incentive policy in the region. Moreover, this is a modest example; Lorraine is not even one of the principal beneficiaries of transfers in France (transfer flows to Midi-Pyrénées and Limousin amounted to 5 and 6 percent of regional GDP, respectively compared to just 2 percent for Lorraine), but Lorraine does receive more regional aid as a proportion of regional GDP than any other French region. The same calculation for Limousin shows that transfers are worth 600 times more than regional incentive spending in the region.

The same holds true for expenditure on horizontal policies. In Chapter 4, it was noted that the contribution of EU governments to private sector spending on R&D was of the same broad order of magnitude as their spending on regional incentive policy. In all the countries discussed, this spending is very heavily skewed in

favour of the more prosperous regions, even in relation to regional GDP. Taking France as an example again, government funding of private sector R&D in Île de France amounts to around one-fifth of the value of the transfer flows out of the region. Again, this is a very conservative example. Of the countries considered in Chapter 4, government funding of private sector R&D accounts for a higher proportion of regional GDP (0.57 percent) in the Paris region than anywhere else; the comparable proportions for Madrid and Piemonte are 0.26 percent and 0.13 percent of their regional GDP figures respectively. Moreover, the value of the transfer flows away from these regions are significantly higher than those away from Paris; 10 percent of regional GDP in the case of Piemonte and 9 percent in the case of Madrid. This means that the value of the transfer flows away from Madrid is some 70 times the value of government R&D policy in the region.

In the wider context of cohesion at the European level, these figures are clearly of considerable significance. Not only does Île de France receive substantially more in government funded R&D as a proportion of regional GDP than does Madrid, but the transfer flows away from Madrid are substantially larger than those away from Paris. All this must be set in the context of the fact that the GDP of Madrid is 97 percent of the EU average while that of Île de France is 166 percent of the EU average.

Not only do the expenditures considered in this report differ substantially in scale, they also differ in nature. Automatic transfers are the inevitable outcome of differences between the amount of taxation collected in a given region, which is closely related to the prosperity of that region, and the value of government expenditures in a region, which is more closely related to the population of that region. The pattern of much of this expenditure reflects the needs arising from the demands made on welfare and public services provision,
including health, education and unemployment benefits. In consequence, in regional terms, transfers flow, in a neutral way, to those regions where the need arises. In so doing, they remove much of the impact on regional incomes of external economic shocks. Also key, transfer mechanisms are long-term, providing a kind of mutual insurance policy between the regions of a nation. In France, for example, the status of regions as contributors or beneficiaries from the central government has changed over time as the competitive advantage of regions has changed; in the 1960s, the Nord Pas de Calais region was a contributor to the budget - it is now a beneficiary. It is unclear how common this change of status is; however, it is clear that if regions that are beneficiaries are to have any chance of becoming contributors, then government funding must continue to provide for the basic needs of the region, irrespective of how much it currently contributes to the central budget.

Proactive policies contrast sharply with automatic transfers. By their nature, they are explicit and directed at specific developmental objectives; they tend to be implemented on short to medium-term timescales. Far from being neutral and automatic, they frequently involve considerable policymaker discretion and require expert input into policy design, delivery and implementation. Nevertheless, the impact of proactive policies is unclear. The difficulties involved in policy evaluation mean that an understanding of the real effects of the range of government policies (on cohesion or more generally) "remains elusive".

Notwithstanding the differences in the nature and the volume of the expenditures studied, and the difficulties involved in policy evaluation, it can be said that, overall, national expenditures tend to flow from the more prosperous towards the less prosperous regions within a country. Not surprisingly, regional policy spending tends to flow in the direction of the worst-off regions within countries although, as has been shown, the patterns of spend are somewhat uneven. Regional policy spending is buttressed by automatic transfers; the results from this part of the study are unambiguous - the direction of the flows supports economic and social cohesion within the national context. Member States' other spatial policies also support cohesion, although it is notable that, as far as these policies are concerned, the overriding objectives are political and social, rather than economic. The pattern for horizontal policies is less clear cut. Member States' employment policies tend, by their nature, to support social, and perhaps economic, cohesion. However, the pattern of expenditures on policies aimed at improving the competitiveness of national economies by promoting RTD is virtually a mirror image of patterns of regional dis-

parity; the wealthier a region is, the more government tends to spend on promoting R&D within that region. Conversely, the poorer a region is, the smaller the spend on R&D as a proportion of regional GDP.

This study has examined the situation of regions primarily within their national contexts. However, it is important to stress that, taking an EU perspective, there is no direct relationship between the prosperity of a region and its status as a contributor to the national budget or a beneficiary from it; similarly, it does not follow that regions of equivalent prosperity in a European context will be equal beneficiaries of Member States' regional or horizontal policies. The Midi-Pyrénées and Cataluña regions, which have the same level of prosperity in relation to the EU average illustrate this point. Midi-Pyrénées is designated for French regional policy purposes and receives a net flow transfer from the government budget equal to 5 percent of regional GDP; in contrast, Cataluña is not designated for national regional policy purposes and makes a net flow contribution to the government budget of 5 percent of its GDP. More than this, not only does Cataluña receive nothing from the national regional policy budget, but it also receives less than Midi-Pyrénées in R&D policy spend; the R&D spend in Midi-Pyrénées is worth 0.44 percent of regional GDP; in Cataluña it is worth just 0.06 percent.

## 6.2 Outstanding Issues

The analysis presented in this report is very far from having exhausted the topic of the relationships between regional policies and cohesion mechanisms. Three sets of issues deserving further work appear particularly important.

The first set is related to time. The analyses undertaken are basically static. They relate to a given year and do not take into account the time dimension, which is of course essential to the cohesion process. In particular, they take no account of the benefits that can accrue from past accumulated infrastructure investments. It can be hypothesised that the poorer regions, even if they now receive as much as, or more than, the richer regions in terms of specific or general expenditures, remain at a disadvantage because they received less in the past, and do not benefit from similar infrastructure endowments. If appropriate cohesion policies are to be developed more research is required in order to understand the impact of history on cohesion mechanisms.

Second, "non-spending" policies have not been considered. Non-spending policies are regulatory policies
that have a differential impact upon different regions. Examples of such policies would be environmental policies (they are more costly in congested or ecologically fragile regions), social policies (a national minimum wage policy is more constraining in low wage regions), or deregulation policies (the relaxation of universal service provision requirements which they often imply brings benefits for richer regions). In the same category, are fiscal expenditures, that is tax breaks or exemptions for specific purposes, such as housing construction or environmental improvements: their regional impacts are very unlikely to be identical for the various regions of a country. The regional implications of all these "non spending" policies are one of the "blind spots" of regional development analysis - and policies. They are difficult to evaluate, but they are certainly important.

Thirdly, the analysis (especially that of budget-induced transfers) has ignored the true long term impacts of public expenditures. They have, in essence, implicitly assumed that one ecu spent in a given region is equal to one ecu spent in another region, and that one ecu spent in a given fashion is equal to one ecu spent in another fashion. This simplifying assumption is of course not very realistic. From a cohesion viewpoint, the impacts of all these ecus are likely to be very different. What is required but is not available is a typology of the long-term impacts of various types of expenditures in various types of regions. It could be, for instance, that the "cohesion benefit" of an ecu is larger for welfare assistance than for infrastructure investments in a very poor region but that the reverse is true for a medium income region. In the absence of such information, adding ecus is a rather crude way of estimating the magnitude of what is being done for regions.

## 6.3 Policy Implications

This report was not recommendations-oriented. Nevertheless, the analyses - imperfect as they are - have some policy implications. A number of them have already been evoked or discussed in the various chapters of the report. Four, rather general, but important, implications will be mentioned briefly here.

The first is that policy decisions which impact on economic and social cohesion emanate from all parts of the Commission, not just the Regional Policy Directorate (DG XVI). Decisions taken in all Directorates have regional and cohesion consequences. Some of these consequences can be as important, or more important, for cohesion objectives, than the decisions

and the expenditures controlled by DG XVI. What is done in the fields of environment, transportation, research, taxation, agriculture, education, consumer and competition policies, etc. matters. This has been recognised for quite some time at the national level, where regional policies increasingly strive to achieve harmonisation with sectoral policies. The same thing is of course a goal at the European level, but, as documented by this report, must probably be pursued and undertaken even more systematically.

The second implication is that the sum of Member States commitments to national cohesion does not add up to EU cohesion. It is in many cases the other way around. As a result of national cohesion policies, the richer regions of the poorer countries (Cataluña) have to pay for the poorer regions of their countries, whereas the poorer regions of the richer countries (the Midi-Pyrénées) are subsidised by the richer regions of their own country. Equals (Cataluña and Midi-Pyrénées) are not treated equally. National cohesion policies frequently run counter to European cohesion policies. This basic contradiction must be analysed, appreciated and addressed. It is a major challenge for regional policy at the EU level.

Thirdly, the analysis suggests that the role presently played by regional GDP per capita in the design of EU regional policies should perhaps be reconsidered. GDP per capita is an indicator of the wealth of a region before national redistributive policies. What matters, or what matters also, is probably the wealth of each region after national redistributive policies. Regional income per capita - which is not even available for all countries - is likely to be an indicator as important for EU policies as GDP per capita.

Finally, our analysis suggests that more attention should be given to the longer term impacts of assistance policies. Because of the magnitude of national redistributive policies, the poorer regions of the poor countries (the Alentejos) benefit from the wealth of the richer regions of these countries (the Lisbons). Giving money to Lisbon is thus a way to give money to Alentejo. This is true in the short term. But it is probably truer in the long term. If, as is likely, the money spent in Lisbon induces more growth than the money spent in Alentejo, then an ecu spent now in Lisbon will mean an increased flow of benefits for Alentejo over the years. There might be a time when it is better for Alentejo itself that the assistance money be spent in Lisbon, not to mention the fact that it would be better for Portugal. This is at this stage hardly more than an hypothesis, that should be further researched, but it is an hypothesis that has serious policy implications for the European Union.
<figure><img src="image_48.png" /></figure>
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<figure><img src="image_49.png" /></figure>
# ANNEXES

ANNEX I: Regional Incentive Expenditure by Nation and Region in the EU Member States: Tables and Charts, 1989-93 119

ANNEX II: Interregional Transfers from Central Government Budgets: Research Results 179
<figure><img src="image_50.png" /></figure>
ANNEX I:
Regional Incentive Expenditure
by Nation and Region in the EU Member States:
Tables and Charts, 1989-93

Table of contents

<table><tr><td>1. Introduction</td><td>121</td></tr><tr><td>2. National Level Data</td><td>125</td></tr><tr><td>National Level Data: Tables and Charts</td><td>128</td></tr><tr><td>3. Regional Level Data</td><td>133</td></tr><tr><td>• Portugal</td><td>135</td></tr><tr><td>• Spain</td><td>138</td></tr><tr><td>• Italy</td><td>143</td></tr><tr><td>• Germany</td><td>148</td></tr><tr><td>• Belgium</td><td>153</td></tr><tr><td>• France</td><td>157</td></tr><tr><td>• Netherlands</td><td>162</td></tr><tr><td>• Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td><td>167</td></tr><tr><td>Overview Charts: Regional-Level Expenditure Data v. Regional GDP</td><td>173</td></tr></table>
<figure><img src="image_51.png" /></figure>
# 1. Introduction

The tables and charts in this annex provide information at the national and then the regional level on the trends, scale and intensity of regional incentive expenditure in the EU Member States (EU 12) over the 1989-93 period. The annex divides into two main sections.

First, in Section 2, overview tables and charts are provided at the *national* level for EU 12. The tables contain the following information for the years 1989 to 1993 (in as far as data is available):

* expenditure trends (national currencies): Table 1a

* expenditure trends (ECU, 1993 prices); Table 1b

* expenditure as a percentage of national GDP: Table 2

* expenditure per capita (national population): Table 3

* expenditure per capita (recipient assisted areas): Table 4

The four charts which follow relate in turn to Tables 1b, 2, 3 and 4.

The adjustments made to the data in moving from Table 1a through to Table 4 are straightforward:

* the original data was drawn from country-specific sources and contacts; its coverage is discussed further in Section 2

* to allow *trends* to be identified (in Table 1a) the original data was translated to 1993 prices by utilising the Eurostat "price index" (GDP change in prices 1989-93)

* to bring the Table 1a data on to a common currency, ECU exchange rates for 1993 were applied (Table 1b)

* two measures of the *scale* of policy were derived:

- one involved relating the original expenditure data to national GDP (see Table 2)

- the other involved adjusting the Table 1b data to a *per capita* basis utilising Eurostat national population figures for 1989-93 (Table 3)

* in estimating the *intensity* of policy, national-level expenditure was related to the national population located in
designated assisted areas; information on the population coverage of such areas was drawn from country sources and DGIV.

Second, in Section 3, tables and charts are provided at the regional level for those countries where regional expenditure data is available: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Of the other four countries:

* there has been no regional incentive on offer in Denmark since January 1991

* there is no national-level data for Greece, and hence no regional breakdown

* in both Ireland and Luxembourg the NUTS breakdown means that, again, no regional breakdown is available.

In presenting regional-level data, the countries concerned are grouped as follows to reflect the discussion in Section 3.3 of the report:

* the Cohesion countries (Portugal and Spain)

* Italy and Germany

* the 'northern European' countries (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom)

The tables provided at the regional level broadly mirror those in Section 2 of this annex. They show for each region covered:

* expenditure trends (ECU, 1993 prices): Table 1

* expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP: Table 2

* expenditure per capita (regional population): Table 3

* expenditure per capita (recipient regional assisted areas): Table 4

The three charts which follow relate, in turn, to Tables 2, 3 and 4. Finally, a further chart is provided which gives an indication of the overall "mosaic" of the regional intensity of policy, setting *per capita* expenditure in the assisted areas of each recipient region against regional GDP.

The adjustments involved in moving from Table 1 to Table 4 at the regional level are very similar to those adopted nationally:

* the original data was drawn from country-specific sources and contacts; its coverage is discussed further in Section 3

* *trends* have been identified by utilising the Eurostat "price index" (GDP change in prices 1989-93)

* to bring the data on to a common currency ECU exchange rates for 1993 were applied (Table 1)

* two measures of *scale* were derived:

* one involved relating the original expenditure data to regional GDP (see Table 2)

* the other involved adjusting the Table 1 data on to a *per capita* basis utilising Eurostat regional population figures for 1989-93 (Table 3)

* in estimating the regional *intensity* of policy, regional-level expenditure was related to the regional population lo-
cated in designated assisted areas; information on the population coverage of such areas at the regional level has been obtained from DGIV.

One final point to note is that some of the expenditure on national regional incentives may be co-financed by the Structural Funds, particularly in Objective 1 regions. Unfortunately, information on this is not readily available. Statistics have, however, been produced on the degree of Structural Fund support for the productive environment (industry and services) over the 1989-93 period as part of the CSFs agreed for Objective 1 regions. These show the percentage contribution of the Structural Funds to have been as follows:

<table><thead><tr><th>Country Grouping</th><th>Objective 1 CSF</th><th>Percent</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">Cohesion countries</td><td>Greece</td><td>62.2</td></tr><tr><td>Ireland</td><td>61.7</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>65.8</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>50.0</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Italy/Germany</td><td>Italy</td><td>42.5</td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>50.0</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Other Member States</td><td>Northern Ireland</td><td>54.8</td></tr><tr><td>Corsica</td><td>45.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Directorate-General for Regional Policy.

While these percentages give some indication of the potential for Structural Fund support for the main regional incentives on offer in those regions which qualify for Objective 1 support, no information is available on the actual levels of co-financing which have taken place.
<figure><img src="image_52.png" /></figure>
## 2. National-Level Data

This section provides a series of tables and related charts which highlight trends in regional incentive expenditure at the national level, together with indicators of the scale and intensity of the national regional policy spend. The data in the tables and charts generally relate to expenditure committed under the main regional capital grant(s) of the countries concerned (EU 12). The focus is on capital grants for two main reasons: first, such grants are far and away the most significant regional incentive measure in nearly all of the countries covered; and second, it is only in respect of regional capital grants that information is available at the regional level on the spatial distribution of expenditure (see Section 3).

Before reviewing, country by country, the coverage of the data in the tables and charts which follow, it is useful to be aware of the broad relationship between regional capital grant expenditure and regional incentive spending more generally. Such information is provided in the recent Commission Survey on State Aids(1). This shows, over the 1990-92 period, between 97 percent and 100 percent of regional State aid spending took the form of grant support in five countries: Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. In a further two countries (Belgium and Great Britain), around 90 percent of expenditure was grant-based, while in another four countries (Ireland, west Germany, Northern Ireland and Greece) around three-quarters of the regional State aid spend was attributable to grants. Only in parts of three countries - Germany (in the east and along the now-defunct Zonal Border Area), France and Italy - have grants played a lesser role in expenditure terms. In general, grants very much represent the mainstay of regional incentive spending across the EU Member States.

Turning to a more detailed, country-by-country review of data coverage, in Belgium the data relates to the capital grant/interest subsidy in Flanders and Wallonia. These are, by some way, the main regional incentives in Belgium, though support is also available in the form of a State guarantee, an accelerated depreciation allowance and exemptions from capital registration duties and real estate income tax. Over the 1990-92 period, the Fourth Commission Survey on State Aids estimates that some 92 percent of regional State aid spending took the form of grants, with most of the remainder being accounted for by the State guarantee. A substantial revision of the Wallonian regional incentives in 1993 has created a discontinuity in the Wallonian statistics. From 1993 the Wallonian investment grant was limited to firms with more than 250 employees or turnover exceeding ECU 20 million. Projects from smaller firms are processed under separate small firm legislation (available nationally).

In Denmark the regional incentive package (which, by that time, consisted solely of the investment grant scheme) was abolished as from 1 January 1991, though an assisted area location may still be used to justify awarding grants to industry on an ad hoc basis. However, this facility has not so far been used. Over the 1990-92 period the State Aids Survey identified all Danish regional incentive expenditure as being in the form of grant support.

In France the main regional incentive is the regional policy grant, PAT (prime d'amenagement du territoire). In ad-

<footnote>(1) Fourth Survey from the Commission on State Aid in the European Union in the Manufacturing and Certain Other Sectors (COM (95), 365 final, Brussels, 26.07.1995).</footnote>
dition, regional incentive support is available in the form of the local business tax concession (exoneration de la taxe professionnelle), aid to decentralisation (aide a la decentralisation) and the reduction in property transfer/land tax (reduction du droit de mutation ou de la taxe de publicite foncier). Further, a wide range of more general support to regional development is provided as part of the concept of amenagement du territoire (for more details, see Section 3.3.1.3 in the main report). According to the State Aids Survey, all regional incentive support in France over the 1990-92 period took the form either of grants (ie. mainly the PAT) or tax concessions. In metropolitan France just over 56 percent of regional State aid support was accounted for by the PAT; in contrast, in the overseas territories (which qualify for aid under Article 92 3(a)) all but 2 percent of support was in the form of tax concessions. One final point to note in the French context is that, although the local business tax concession is not insignificant in terms of tax revenue foregone, its impact on investment and location decisions is less clear. The fact is that richer localities can often offer more attractive prospects for business development - including lower general rates of local business tax - than can poorer localities via time-limited local business tax concessions.

In Germany, regional policy has been the joint responsibility of the Federal and Land levels since 1969. The key regional incentive under the Joint Task for the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur) is the investment grant (Investitionszuschuss). However, it should be noted that, until 1989, there was also an important investment allowance available (Investitionszulage). Moreover, until 1994 it was possible to receive a special depreciation allowance in the now-abolished Zonal Border Area. Further, small locally-oriented firms (those which do not exhibit the 'primary effect') are eligible for support under the ERP regional soft loan. Also of note is the fact that, prior to unification, separate support measures were available in Berlin. Such assistance is currently being phased out. Finally, the obvious point must be made that investment grant assistance is only part of the support package directed towards the new Länder. Broader policies for the new Länder are discussed more fully in Section 3.4.1.4 of the main report. According to the State Aids Survey, some three-quarters of regional State aid in west Germany over the 1990-92 period took the form of a grant, with most of the remainder being a tax concession. In the new Länder, in contrast, just 63 percent of regional State aid was accounted for by grant support, with the activities of the Treuhandanstalt representing a large proportion of the remaining expenditure. Finally, support for Berlin and for the now-defunct Zonal Border Area, mainly in the form of tax concessions, was a very important component of regional State aid spending in Germany over the 1990-92 period (representing over two-fifths of the total according to the State Aids Survey). However, as noted above, such support is currently being phased out.

In Greece, two incentive packages are available: a fiscal package comprising a tax allowance combined with an increased depreciation allowance; and an (alternative) financial package comprising an investment grant and interest rate subsidy, again combined with the increased depreciation allowance. No award statistics are available for the fiscal elements of the package. For the financial incentives, no data is available after 1988. The Greek figure in the tables is 1988 expenditure committed under the investment grant scheme for manufacturing projects only. The figure would be more than doubled were all sectors taken into account. Moreover, adding interest rate subsidy expenditure would further increase the outcome by more than 13 percent. The combined investment grant/interest rate subsidy figure for all sectors in 1988 was Drs 82,599 million; this compares with investment grant spending on manufacturing of Drs 32,387 million. While regional State aid figures for Greece over the 1990-92 period are included in the State Aids Survey (showing that three-quarters of such expenditure is accounted for by grant support), the Survey makes the point that "since the figures are still essentially estimates, the results for Greece should still be treated with caution"(2).

In Ireland, IDA-Ireland operates incentive programmes for new industry, major expansions and international services while Forbairt focuses on schemes for small industries, product and process development and enterprise development. The data in the table covers grants approved under the IDA new industry and internationally-traded services programmes. No data is available for 1993. According to the State Aids Survey, over the 1990-92 period grants represented almost 78 percent of the regional State aid spend in Ireland; a further 15 percent was in the form of tax concessions with some 7 percent as equity support.

In Italy, the data in the tables relates to Law 64/86. This has effectively been suspended since the summer of 1992, leaving a large number of applications and payments unprocessed. Subsequently, a new legal basis for policy was passed (Law 488/92) but it has not yet been fully implemented. The data provided covers the capital grant and in-

<footnote>(2) Ibid p. 4.</footnote>
terest subsidy available under Law 64/86. In addition, major social security concessions operated in favour of Mez-
zogiorno firms. Finally, tax concessions were also available in respect of the IRPEG and ILOR taxes. No expendi-
ture information is available in respect of these tax concessions. In the State Aids Survey, grants accounted for 25
percent of regional State aid expenditure over the 1990-92 period. Almost all of the remaining spend took the form
of social security concessions. These have subsequently been revised both in the context of the Italian regional
policy package and with a view to phasing them out completely by the end of the decade.

In Luxembourg, regional assistance is mainly in the form of grants, but interest rate subsidies, loan guarantees and tax concessions are also provided for under the Framework Law. The statistics in the tables relate to the capital grant. Over the 1990-92 period, the State Aids Survey records all regional State aid spending in Luxembourg as being in the form of grant support.

In the Netherlands, there is just one key regional incentive, the investment premium, IPR (Investering-
spremieregelung). The data in the tables relate to this scheme. The State Aids Survey shows 100 percent of re-
gional State aid expenditure in the Netherlands to have taken the form of grant assistance over the 1990-92 peri-
od.

In Portugal, the SIR replaced the SIBR in 1994. The figures in the tables are in respect of the SIBR (Sistema de Incentivos de Base Regional), the regional incentives system. The SIBR is essentially a grant-based system; this is confirmed by the State Aids Survey which identifies 97 percent of regional State aid expenditure over the 1990-92 period as being grants based.

In Spain, there is a single regional incentive on offer, the regional investment grant (subvención a la inversión). The figures in the tables relate to this scheme. Unsurprisingly, 100 percent of regional State aid expenditure over the 1990-92 period is recorded as being in the form of grants in the State Aids Survey.

Finally, in the United Kingdom, a distinction must be drawn between the British and Northern Irish regional incentive packages. In Britain, the main element of the package is Regional Selective Assistance (RSA). The figures in the tables are in respect of RSA. In addition, minor support (less than £20 million per annum in terms of expenditure committed) is available for small firms in the assisted areas under the Regional Enterprise Grant scheme. In Northern Ireland, regional incentive support is provided via the Selective Financial Assistance scheme. In considering recent trends in regional incentive expenditure in the UK, it should be noted that previously-important components of the regional incentive package were withdrawn in 1988 - the Regional Development Grant in Britain and the Capital Grant in Northern Ireland. In both Britain and Northern Ireland, the regional incentives currently on offer are very much grants-oriented. Although RSA in Britain has historically involved a relatively wide range of incentives, in recent years it has become increasingly (indeed, almost exclusively) grants-based. The State Aids Survey records almost 90 percent of British regional State aid spending between 1990 and 1992 as being in the form of grants. In Northern Ireland, the grants component is almost three-quarters of total expenditure over the 1990-92 period, most of the remainder taking the form of tax concessions.
<table><caption>Table 1a: Expenditure trends for main regional incentives (1993 prices, national currencies)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">COUNTRY</th><th rowspan="2">INCENTIVE</th><th colspan="6">EXPENDITURE COMMITTED<br>(national currency, millions, 1993 prices)<sup>(1)</sup></th></tr><tr><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Belgium</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>10133,9</td><td>7490,4</td><td>5936,9</td><td>5599,7</td><td>4583,0</td><td>6748,8</td></tr><tr><td>Denmark</td><td>Regional Development Grant</td><td>73,1</td><td>64,2</td><td>0,0</td><td>0,0</td><td>0,0</td><td>27,5</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>PAT (Regional Policy Grant)</td><td>752,5</td><td>901,2</td><td>703,8</td><td>575,2</td><td>251,6</td><td>636,9</td></tr><tr><td>Germany (West)</td><td>Investment Grant - west</td><td>819,9</td><td>1089,0</td><td>827,8</td><td>671,2</td><td>489,5</td><td>779,5</td></tr><tr><td>Germany (East)</td><td>Investment Grant - east</td><td>0,0</td><td>146,0</td><td>7650,3</td><td>5715,1</td><td>5775,5</td><td>6428,9</td></tr><tr><td>Greece</td><td>Investment Grant</td><td>60074,4</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>60074,4</td></tr><tr><td>Ireland</td><td>IDA (Industrial Development Authority)</td><td>236,5</td><td>172,8</td><td>112,7</td><td>125,4</td><td>n.a.</td><td>161,9</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>3290,9</td><td>7556,8</td><td>1880,3</td><td>350,8</td><td>0,0</td><td>2615,8</td></tr><tr><td>Luxembourg</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>1219,0</td><td>1342,1</td><td>1911,0</td><td>2211,0</td><td>1412,0</td><td>1619,0</td></tr><tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>IPR (Investment Premium)</td><td>160,0</td><td>262,4</td><td>218,0</td><td>181,9</td><td>52,0</td><td>174,9</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>SIBR (Regional Incentive System)</td><td>46313,2</td><td>32671,9</td><td>28285,6</td><td>25947,2</td><td>44845,8</td><td>35612,8</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>RIG (Regional Investment Grant)</td><td>265818,8</td><td>110636,3</td><td>39205,7</td><td>32569,4</td><td>29192,7</td><td>95484,6</td></tr><tr><td>Great Britain</td><td>Regional Selective Assistance</td><td>324,0</td><td>393,4</td><td>226,9</td><td>231,1</td><td>341,7</td><td>303,4</td></tr><tr><td>N Ireland</td><td>Selective Financial Assistance</td><td>94,8</td><td>81,3</td><td>88,9</td><td>48,7</td><td>53,7</td><td>73,5</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 1b: Expenditure trends for main regional incentives, 1989-93 (1993 prices, ECU, millions)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">COUNTRY</th><th rowspan="2">INCENTIVE</th><th colspan="6">EXPENDITURE COMMITTED - MECU<br>(1993 prices)</th></tr><tr><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Belgium</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>250,4</td><td>185,1</td><td>146,7</td><td>138,4</td><td>113,2</td><td>166,8</td></tr><tr><td>Denmark</td><td>Regional Development Grant</td><td>9,6</td><td>8,5</td><td>0,0</td><td>0,0</td><td>0,0</td><td>3,6</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>PAT (Regional Policy Grant)</td><td>113,4</td><td>135,9</td><td>106,1</td><td>86,7</td><td>37,9</td><td>96,0</td></tr><tr><td>Germany (West)</td><td>Investment Grant - west</td><td>423,4</td><td>562,4</td><td>427,5</td><td>346,6</td><td>252,8</td><td>402,5</td></tr><tr><td>Germany (East)</td><td>Investment Grant - east</td><td>0,0</td><td>75,4</td><td>3950,8</td><td>2951,4</td><td>2982,6</td><td>3320,1</td></tr><tr><td>Greece</td><td>Investment Grant</td><td>223,7</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>223,7</td></tr><tr><td>Ireland</td><td>IDA (Industrial Development Authority)</td><td>295,6</td><td>216,1</td><td>140,9</td><td>156,8</td><td>n.a.</td><td>202,3</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>1787,4</td><td>4104,2</td><td>1021,2</td><td>190,5</td><td>0,0</td><td>1420,7</td></tr><tr><td>Luxembourg</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>30,1</td><td>33,2</td><td>47,2</td><td>54,6</td><td>34,9</td><td>40,0</td></tr><tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>IPR (Investment Premium)</td><td>73,6</td><td>120,6</td><td>100,2</td><td>83,6</td><td>23,9</td><td>80,4</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>SIBR (Regional Incentive System)</td><td>245,9</td><td>173,4</td><td>150,2</td><td>137,7</td><td>238,1</td><td>189,1</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>RIG (Regional Investment Grant)</td><td>1782,5</td><td>741,9</td><td>262,9</td><td>218,4</td><td>195,8</td><td>640,3</td></tr><tr><td>Great Britain</td><td>Regional Selective Assistance</td><td>415,3</td><td>504,4</td><td>290,9</td><td>296,3</td><td>438,1</td><td>389,0</td></tr><tr><td>N Ireland</td><td>Selective Financial Assistance</td><td>121,6</td><td>104,2</td><td>114,0</td><td>62,4</td><td>68,8</td><td>94,2</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote>(1) Italian commitments in billions of lira</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 2: Expenditure on main regional incentives, 1989-93, as a percentage of national GDP</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">COUNTRY</th><th rowspan="2">INCENTIVE</th><th colspan="6">EXPENDITURE COMMITTED<br>as a % of national GDP</th></tr><tr><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Belgium</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>0,147%</td><td>0,105%</td><td>0,082%</td><td>0,076%</td><td>0,064%</td><td>0,095%</td></tr><tr><td>Denmark</td><td>Regional Development Grant</td><td>0,009%</td><td>0,008%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,003%</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>PAT (Regional Policy Grant)</td><td>0,011%</td><td>0,013%</td><td>0,010%</td><td>0,008%</td><td>0,004%</td><td>0,009%</td></tr><tr><td>Germany (West)</td><td>Investment Grant - west</td><td>0,032%</td><td>0,040%</td><td>0,029%</td><td>0,023%</td><td>0,017%</td><td>0,028%</td></tr><tr><td>Germany (East)</td><td>Investment Grant - east</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,004%</td><td>0,224%</td><td>0,186%</td><td>0,204%</td><td>0,206%</td></tr><tr><td>Greece</td><td>Investment Grant</td><td>0,367%</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,367%</td></tr><tr><td>Ireland</td><td>IDA (Industrial Development Authority)</td><td>0,902%</td><td>0,604%</td><td>0,385%</td><td>0,409%</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,575%</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>0,218%</td><td>0,491%</td><td>0,121%</td><td>0,022%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,170%</td></tr><tr><td>Luxembourg</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>0,388%</td><td>0,414%</td><td>0,572%</td><td>0,649%</td><td>0,405%</td><td>0,486%</td></tr><tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>IPR (Investment Premium)</td><td>0,030%</td><td>0,047%</td><td>0,039%</td><td>0,032%</td><td>0,009%</td><td>0,031%</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>SIBR (Regional Incentive System)</td><td>0,420%</td><td>0,280%</td><td>0,238%</td><td>0,216%</td><td>0,370%</td><td>0,305%</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>RIG (Regional Investment Grant)</td><td>0,461%</td><td>0,185%</td><td>0,064%</td><td>0,053%</td><td>0,048%</td><td>0,162%</td></tr><tr><td>Great Britain</td><td>Regional Selective Assistance</td><td>0,052%</td><td>0,062%</td><td>0,037%</td><td>0,038%</td><td>0,055%</td><td>0,049%</td></tr><tr><td>N Ireland</td><td>Selective Financial Assistance</td><td>0,015%</td><td>0,013%</td><td>0,014%</td><td>0,008%</td><td>0,009%</td><td>0,012%</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 3: Expenditure per capita on main regional incentives, 1989-93 (1993 prices, ECU, national population)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">COUNTRY</th><th rowspan="2">INCENTIVE</th><th colspan="6">EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA (NATIONAL POPULATION<br>(ECU))</th></tr><tr><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Belgium</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>25,22</td><td>18,60</td><td>14,69</td><td>13,81</td><td>11,25</td><td>16,71</td></tr><tr><td>Denmark</td><td>Regional Development Grant</td><td>1,88</td><td>1,65</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,70</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>PAT (Regional Policy Grant)</td><td>2,02</td><td>2,40</td><td>1,86</td><td>1,52</td><td>0,66</td><td>1,69</td></tr><tr><td>Germany (All)</td><td>Investment Grant - all</td><td>6,86</td><td>10,18</td><td>54,90</td><td>41,08</td><td>39,95</td><td>30,59</td></tr><tr><td>Germany (West)</td><td>Investment Grant - west</td><td>6,86</td><td>8,97</td><td>5,36</td><td>4,32</td><td>3,12</td><td>5,73</td></tr><tr><td>Germany (East)</td><td>Investment Grant - east</td><td>0,00</td><td>1,20</td><td>49,54</td><td>36,77</td><td>36,83</td><td>41,45</td></tr><tr><td>Greece</td><td>Investment Grant</td><td>22,24</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>22,24</td></tr><tr><td>Ireland</td><td>IDA (Industrial Development Authority)</td><td>84,09</td><td>61,61</td><td>40,02</td><td>44,25</td><td>n.a.</td><td>57,49</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>31,55</td><td>72,39</td><td>18,00</td><td>3,36</td><td>0,00</td><td>25,06</td></tr><tr><td>Luxembourg</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>80,34</td><td>87,43</td><td>122,84</td><td>140,15</td><td>88,28</td><td>103,81</td></tr><tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>IPR (Investment Premium)</td><td>4,97</td><td>8,10</td><td>6,68</td><td>5,53</td><td>1,57</td><td>5,37</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>SIBR (Regional Incentive System)</td><td>24,70</td><td>17,48</td><td>15,21</td><td>13,97</td><td>24,13</td><td>19,10</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>RIG (Regional Investment Grant)</td><td>45,88</td><td>19,06</td><td>6,74</td><td>5,59</td><td>5,00</td><td>16,46</td></tr><tr><td>United Kingdom</td><td>RSA and SFA</td><td>9,39</td><td>10,62</td><td>7,02</td><td>6,20</td><td>8,73</td><td>8,39</td></tr><tr><td>Great Britain</td><td>Regional Selective Assistance</td><td>7,27</td><td>8,80</td><td>5,04</td><td>5,12</td><td>7,54</td><td>6,75</td></tr><tr><td>N Ireland</td><td>Selective Financial Assistance</td><td>2,13</td><td>1,82</td><td>1,98</td><td>1,08</td><td>1,19</td><td>1,64</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Table 4: Expenditure on main regional incentives - per capita of recipient assisted areas (1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">COUNTRY</th><th rowspan="2">INCENTIVE</th><th colspan="6">EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA IN ELIGIBLE AREAS<br>(ECU per capita of eligible population, 1993 prices)</th></tr><tr><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Belgium</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>76,20</td><td>56,21</td><td>44,38</td><td>41,71</td><td>33,98</td><td>50,49</td></tr><tr><td>Denmark</td><td>Regional Development Grant</td><td>8,37</td><td>7,95</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>3,27</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>PAT (Regional Policy Grant)</td><td>5,17</td><td>5,73</td><td>4,45</td><td>3,62</td><td>1,57</td><td>4,11</td></tr><tr><td>Germany (West)</td><td>Investment Grant - west</td><td>23,67</td><td>30,97</td><td>25,72</td><td>20,60</td><td>14,83</td><td>23,16</td></tr><tr><td>Germany (East)</td><td>Investment Grant - east</td><td>0,00</td><td>4,41</td><td>217,25</td><td>164,38</td><td>167,03</td><td>184,35</td></tr><tr><td>Greece</td><td>Investment Grant</td><td>38,34</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>38,34</td></tr><tr><td>Ireland</td><td>IDA (Industrial Development Authority)</td><td>84,09</td><td>61,61</td><td>40,02</td><td>44,25</td><td>n.a.</td><td>57,49</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>88,62</td><td>203,34</td><td>50,55</td><td>9,43</td><td>0,00</td><td>70,39</td></tr><tr><td>Luxembourg</td><td>Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy</td><td>80,34</td><td>87,43</td><td>122,84</td><td>140,15</td><td>110,63</td><td>108,28</td></tr><tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>IPR (Investment Premium)</td><td>24,97</td><td>40,70</td><td>33,55</td><td>27,78</td><td>9,45</td><td>27,29</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>SIBR (Regional Incentive System)</td><td>24,70</td><td>17,48</td><td>15,21</td><td>13,97</td><td>49,25</td><td>24,12</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>RIG (Regional Investment Grant)</td><td>78,29</td><td>32,53</td><td>11,51</td><td>9,54</td><td>8,54</td><td>28,08</td></tr><tr><td>Great Britain</td><td>Regional Selective Assistance</td><td>21,35</td><td>25,86</td><td>14,82</td><td>15,04</td><td>22,82</td><td>19,98</td></tr><tr><td>N Ireland</td><td>Selective Financial Assistance</td><td>76,90</td><td>65,70</td><td>71,63</td><td>38,95</td><td>42,36</td><td>59,11</td></tr></tbody></table>

<figure><img src="image_53.png" /><figcaption>Main regional incentive expenditure trends in the Member States, 1989-1993 (1993 prices, ECU, millions)
See Member State Table 1b</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_54.png" /><figcaption>Main regional incentive expenditure in the Member States, per capita of the national population, 1989-1993
(ECU, 1993 prices)
See Member States Table 3</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_55.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_56.png" /><figcaption>Main regional incentives: Expenditure per capita in the recipient assisted areas only, 1989-93 (ECU, 1993 prices)
See Member States Table 4</figcaption></figure>
## 3. Regional-Level Data

This section consists of a series of tables and related charts which highlight trends in regional incentive expenditure at the regional level. In addition, indicators of the scale and intensity of regional incentive spending at the regional level are provided. As in Section 2, the focus is on grant expenditure; this is the only information which was available on the spatial distribution of regional incentive expenditure amongst the regions. The relationship of grant-based expenditure to more general regional incentive spending has already been discussed in Section 2.

As noted earlier (in Section 1), regional breakdowns are available for only eight of the EU 12 countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. The regional breakdowns are as follows:

<table><tr><td>Belgium</td><td>2 regions</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>22 regions</td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>16 Länder</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>20 regions</td></tr><tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>12 provinces</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>5 CCR plus 2 autonomous regions</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>17 autonomous communities plus Ceuta and Melilla</td></tr><tr><td>United Kingdom:</td><td>10 standard regions (plus Northern Ireland)<sup>(3)</sup></td></tr></table>

For each country four tables are provided for the main regional capital grant on offer:

* expenditure trends (ECU, 1993 prices): Table 1

* expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP: Table 2

* expenditure per capita (regional population): Table 3

* expenditure per capita (recipient regional assisted areas): Table 4

In addition, charts have been produced for Tables 2-4 for each country. Finally, a chart is provided for each country which relates the intensity of policy at the regional level to regional GDP.

<footnote>(3) A problem in the UK is that the available regional data sets relate to two different categories of region: the regional expenditure data is for DTI regions while other data is for so-called UK standard regions. The main differences of relevance to the current study are in the North and North West of the country, and, more specifically, in the treatment of Cumbria. Steps are currently being taken to minimise the impact of these regional discontinuities which exaggerate expenditure slightly in the North West and understate it for the North.</footnote>
The country groupings which follow reflect the discussion in Section 3.3 of the main report. Accordingly, the charts and tables are in the country order set out below:

<table><tr><td>Cohesion countries</td><td>Portugal</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Spain</td></tr><tr><td>Italy/Germany</td><td>Italy</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Germany</td></tr><tr><td>Other Member States</td><td>Belgium</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>France</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>the Netherlands</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Great Britain</td></tr></table>

Finally, there is an overview set of three charts which relate regional-level policy intensity to regional GDP for the:

* Cohesion countries

* Italy/Germany

* Other Member States

In these overview charts all of EU 12 are included, with national data being utilised where regional-level data is not available.
<table><caption>Table 1. Portugal: Regional Incentive System (SIBR)
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>pt11</td><td>Norte</td><td>36,92</td><td>45,45</td><td>23,35</td><td>30,62</td><td>44,04</td><td>36,07</td></tr><tr><td>pt12</td><td>Centro (P)</td><td>47,45</td><td>48,98</td><td>21,01</td><td>35,37</td><td>27,96</td><td>36,15</td></tr><tr><td>pt13</td><td>Lisboa e Vale do Tejo</td><td>144,87</td><td>53,00</td><td>41,09</td><td>27,62</td><td>60,58</td><td>65,43</td></tr><tr><td>pt14</td><td>Alentejo</td><td>4,42</td><td>13,19</td><td>21,06</td><td>8,63</td><td>17,53</td><td>12,96</td></tr><tr><td>pt15</td><td>Algarve</td><td>2,43</td><td>1,42</td><td>0,43</td><td>0,32</td><td>0,21</td><td>0,96</td></tr><tr><td>pt2</td><td>Acores</td><td>5,79</td><td>8,29</td><td>32,32</td><td>20,21</td><td>13,85</td><td>16,09</td></tr><tr><td>pt3</td><td>Madeira</td><td>3,95</td><td>3,21</td><td>10,95</td><td>15,05</td><td>73,91</td><td>21,41</td></tr><tr><td>pt</td><td>Portugal</td><td>245,83</td><td>173,55</td><td>150,19</td><td>137,8</td><td>238,07</td><td>189,09</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 2. Portugal: Regional Incentive System (SIBR)
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP, 1989-93</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>pt11</td><td>Norte</td><td>0,168%</td><td>0,197%</td><td>0,103%</td><td>0,133%</td><td>0,193%</td><td>0,16%</td></tr><tr><td>pt12</td><td>Centro (P)</td><td>0,542%</td><td>0,539%</td><td>0,234%</td><td>0,390%</td><td>0,311%</td><td>0,40%</td></tr><tr><td>pt13</td><td>Lisboa e Vale do Tejo</td><td>0,458%</td><td>0,156%</td><td>0,123%</td><td>0,082%</td><td>0,180%</td><td>0,20%</td></tr><tr><td>pt14</td><td>Alentejo</td><td>0,180%</td><td>0,544%</td><td>0,880%</td><td>0,357%</td><td>0,729%</td><td>0,54%</td></tr><tr><td>pt15</td><td>Algarve</td><td>0,121%</td><td>0,065%</td><td>0,020%</td><td>0,014%</td><td>0,010%</td><td>0,05%</td></tr><tr><td>pt2</td><td>Acores</td><td>0,495%</td><td>0,714%</td><td>3,041%</td><td>1,881%</td><td>1,298%</td><td>1,49%</td></tr><tr><td>pt3</td><td>Madeira</td><td>0,297%</td><td>0,243%</td><td>0,906%</td><td>1,231%</td><td>6,090%</td><td>1,75%</td></tr><tr><td>pt</td><td>Portugal</td><td>0,368%</td><td>0,245%</td><td>0,209%</td><td>0,189%</td><td>0,329%</td><td>0,27%</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 3. Portugal: Regional Incentive System (SIBR)
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>pt11</td><td>Norte</td><td>10,18</td><td>13,08</td><td>6,72</td><td>8,81</td><td>12,63</td><td>10,28</td></tr><tr><td>pt12</td><td>Centro (P)</td><td>26,61</td><td>28,27</td><td>12,19</td><td>20,59</td><td>16,32</td><td>20,80</td></tr><tr><td>pt13</td><td>Lisboa e Vale do Tejo</td><td>41,91</td><td>16,08</td><td>12,48</td><td>8,39</td><td>18,39</td><td>19,45</td></tr><tr><td>pt14</td><td>Alentejo</td><td>7,80</td><td>23,98</td><td>38,64</td><td>15,96</td><td>32,61</td><td>23,80</td></tr><tr><td>pt15</td><td>Algarve</td><td>7,10</td><td>4,19</td><td>1,25</td><td>0,92</td><td>0,60</td><td>2,81</td></tr><tr><td>pt2</td><td>Acores</td><td>22,83</td><td>34,66</td><td>135,72</td><td>85,08</td><td>58,22</td><td>67,30</td></tr><tr><td>pt3</td><td>Madeira</td><td>14,44</td><td>12,65</td><td>43,17</td><td>59,38</td><td>291,22</td><td>84,17</td></tr><tr><td>pt</td><td>Portugal</td><td>23,86</td><td>17,55</td><td>15,22</td><td>13,98</td><td>24,13</td><td>18,95</td></tr></tbody></table>

<caption>Table 4. Portugal: Regional Incentive System (SIBR)
Expenditure per capita of eligible population</caption>

See Table 3: 100% of the population is eligible.
Portugal: Regional Incentive System (SIBR)

Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP, 1989-93

<figure><img src="image_57.png" /><figcaption>See Portugal Table 2</figcaption></figure>

Portugal: Regional Incentive System (SIBR)

Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU)

<figure><img src="image_58.png" /><figcaption>See Portugal Table 3</figcaption></figure>
Portugal: Mean annual Regional Incentive System (SIBR)
Expenditure per capita of eligible regional population 1989-93 v. regional GDP per capita 1992 (both in ECU)

<figure><img src="image_59.png" /></figure>
<table><caption>Table 1. Spain: Regional Investment Grant (RIG)
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 1989-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>es11</td><td>Galicia</td><td>95,92</td><td>43,86</td><td>24,46</td><td>20,16</td><td>15,42</td><td>39,96</td></tr><tr><td>es12</td><td>Asturias</td><td>24,44</td><td>264,81</td><td>39,90</td><td>9,27</td><td>5,57</td><td>68,80</td></tr><tr><td>es13</td><td>Cantabria</td><td>12,54</td><td>3,77</td><td>2,32</td><td>5,31</td><td>1,12</td><td>5,01</td></tr><tr><td>es21</td><td>Pais Vasco</td><td>32,77</td><td>13,31</td><td>0,92</td><td>17,58</td><td>0,20</td><td>12,96</td></tr><tr><td>es22</td><td>Navarra</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es23</td><td>Rioja</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es24</td><td>Aragon</td><td>23,82</td><td>17,52</td><td>6,97</td><td>9,41</td><td>7,05</td><td>12,96</td></tr><tr><td>es3</td><td>Madrid</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es41</td><td>Castilla-Leon</td><td>133,62</td><td>56,10</td><td>31,66</td><td>47,70</td><td>35,70</td><td>60,96</td></tr><tr><td>es42</td><td>Castilla-La Mancha</td><td>101,15</td><td>38,65</td><td>24,38</td><td>17,60</td><td>17,54</td><td>39,87</td></tr><tr><td>es43</td><td>Extremadura</td><td>90,84</td><td>90,92</td><td>39,21</td><td>17,28</td><td>10,91</td><td>49,83</td></tr><tr><td>es51</td><td>Cataluna</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es52</td><td>Valencia</td><td>22,19</td><td>28,97</td><td>5,83</td><td>7,78</td><td>3,99</td><td>13,75</td></tr><tr><td>es53</td><td>Baleares</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es61</td><td>Andalucia</td><td>277,68</td><td>141,38</td><td>62,47</td><td>49,70</td><td>88,60</td><td>123,97</td></tr><tr><td>es62</td><td>Murcia</td><td>907,67</td><td>15,51</td><td>11,54</td><td>10,17</td><td>4,06</td><td>189,79</td></tr><tr><td>es63</td><td>Ceuta y Melilla</td><td>0,78</td><td>2,95</td><td>-</td><td>0,14</td><td>0,18</td><td>0,81</td></tr><tr><td>es7</td><td>Canarias</td><td>59,12</td><td>24,15</td><td>13,23</td><td>6,29</td><td>5,42</td><td>21,64</td></tr><tr><td>es</td><td>Spain</td><td>1.782,54</td><td>741,91</td><td>262,91</td><td>218,41</td><td>195,76</td><td>640,30</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 2. Spain: Regional Investment Grant (RIG)
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 1989-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>es11</td><td>Galicia</td><td>0,441%</td><td>0,199%</td><td>0,110%</td><td>0,090%</td><td>0,070%</td><td>0,182%</td></tr><tr><td>es12</td><td>Asturias</td><td>0,228%</td><td>2,493%</td><td>0,368%</td><td>0,085%</td><td>0,051%</td><td>0,645%</td></tr><tr><td>es13</td><td>Cantabria</td><td>0,236%</td><td>0,072%</td><td>0,044%</td><td>0,099%</td><td>0,021%</td><td>0,094%</td></tr><tr><td>es21</td><td>Pais Vasco</td><td>0,128%</td><td>0,051%</td><td>0,004%</td><td>0,067%</td><td>0,001%</td><td>0,050%</td></tr><tr><td>es22</td><td>Navarra</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>es23</td><td>Rioja</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>es24</td><td>Aragon</td><td>0,175%</td><td>0,127%</td><td>0,049%</td><td>0,068%</td><td>0,050%</td><td>0,094%</td></tr><tr><td>es3</td><td>Madrid</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>es41</td><td>Castilla-Leon</td><td>0,568%</td><td>0,236%</td><td>0,132%</td><td>0,201%</td><td>0,144%</td><td>0,256%</td></tr><tr><td>es42</td><td>Castilla-La Mancha</td><td>0,709%</td><td>0,261%</td><td>0,162%</td><td>0,115%</td><td>0,117%</td><td>0,273%</td></tr><tr><td>es43</td><td>Extremadura</td><td>1,242%</td><td>1,202%</td><td>0,502%</td><td>0,219%</td><td>0,139%</td><td>0,661%</td></tr><tr><td>es51</td><td>Cataluna</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>es52</td><td>Valencia</td><td>0,059%</td><td>0,074%</td><td>0,014%</td><td>0,019%</td><td>0,010%</td><td>0,035%</td></tr><tr><td>es53</td><td>Baleares</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>es61</td><td>Andalucia</td><td>0,546%</td><td>0,259%</td><td>0,111%</td><td>0,088%</td><td>0,161%</td><td>0,233%</td></tr><tr><td>es62</td><td>Murcia</td><td>9,718%</td><td>0,154%</td><td>0,114%</td><td>0,103%</td><td>0,041%</td><td>2,026%</td></tr><tr><td>es63</td><td>Ceuta y Melilla</td><td>0,073%</td><td>0,268%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,013%</td><td>0,016%</td><td>0,074%</td></tr><tr><td>es7</td><td>Canarias</td><td>0,410%</td><td>0,164%</td><td>0,088%</td><td>0,041%</td><td>0,035%</td><td>0,148%</td></tr><tr><td>es</td><td>Spain</td><td>0,461%</td><td>0,185%</td><td>0,064%</td><td>0,053%</td><td>0,048%</td><td>0,162%</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Table 3. Spain: Regional Investment Grant (RIG)
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>es11</td><td>Galicia</td><td>34,13</td><td>15,63</td><td>8,73</td><td>7,21</td><td>5,53</td><td>14,24</td></tr><tr><td>es12</td><td>Asturias</td><td>21,61</td><td>234,86</td><td>35,48</td><td>8,27</td><td>4,99</td><td>61,05</td></tr><tr><td>es13</td><td>Cantabria</td><td>23,80</td><td>7,16</td><td>4,41</td><td>10,08</td><td>2,12</td><td>9,51</td></tr><tr><td>es21</td><td>Pais Vasco</td><td>15,41</td><td>6,25</td><td>0,43</td><td>8,25</td><td>0,10</td><td>6,09</td></tr><tr><td>es22</td><td>Navarra</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es23</td><td>Rioja</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es24</td><td>Aragon</td><td>19,58</td><td>14,43</td><td>5,76</td><td>7,79</td><td>5,85</td><td>10,68</td></tr><tr><td>es3</td><td>Madrid</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es41</td><td>Castilla-Leon</td><td>50,78</td><td>21,35</td><td>12,07</td><td>18,21</td><td>13,64</td><td>23,21</td></tr><tr><td>es42</td><td>Castilla-La Mancha</td><td>59,09</td><td>22,56</td><td>14,23</td><td>10,26</td><td>10,21</td><td>23,27</td></tr><tr><td>es43</td><td>Extremadura</td><td>80,71</td><td>80,66</td><td>34,74</td><td>15,29</td><td>9,64</td><td>44,21</td></tr><tr><td>es51</td><td>Cataluna</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es52</td><td>Valencia</td><td>5,88</td><td>7,66</td><td>1,54</td><td>2,05</td><td>1,05</td><td>3,63</td></tr><tr><td>es53</td><td>Baleares</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es61</td><td>Andalucia</td><td>40,42</td><td>20,48</td><td>9,01</td><td>7,13</td><td>12,66</td><td>17,94</td></tr><tr><td>es62</td><td>Murcia</td><td>891,36</td><td>15,15</td><td>11,21</td><td>9,82</td><td>3,90</td><td>186,29</td></tr><tr><td>es63</td><td>Ceuta y Melilla</td><td>6,26</td><td>23,64</td><td>-</td><td>1,13</td><td>1,38</td><td>6,48</td></tr><tr><td>es7</td><td>Canarias</td><td>40,17</td><td>16,32</td><td>8,88</td><td>4,20</td><td>3,60</td><td>14,63</td></tr><tr><td>es</td><td>Spain</td><td>45,88</td><td>19,06</td><td>6,74</td><td>5,59</td><td>5,00</td><td>16,46</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 4. Spain: Regional Investment Grant (RIG)
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted population
(1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>es11</td><td>Galicia</td><td>34,13</td><td>15,63</td><td>8,73</td><td>7,21</td><td>5,53</td><td>14,24</td></tr><tr><td>es12</td><td>Asturias</td><td>21,61</td><td>234,86</td><td>35,48</td><td>8,27</td><td>4,99</td><td>61,05</td></tr><tr><td>es13</td><td>Cantabria</td><td>23,80</td><td>7,16</td><td>4,41</td><td>10,08</td><td>2,12</td><td>9,51</td></tr><tr><td>es21</td><td>Pais Vasco</td><td>54,63</td><td>22,17</td><td>1,53</td><td>29,26</td><td>0,34</td><td>21,59</td></tr><tr><td>es22</td><td>Navarra</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es23</td><td>Rioja</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es24</td><td>Aragon</td><td>59,15</td><td>43,60</td><td>17,40</td><td>23,53</td><td>17,67</td><td>32,27</td></tr><tr><td>es3</td><td>Madrid</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es41</td><td>Castilla-Leon</td><td>50,78</td><td>21,35</td><td>12,07</td><td>18,21</td><td>13,64</td><td>23,21</td></tr><tr><td>es42</td><td>Castilla-La Mancha</td><td>59,09</td><td>22,56</td><td>14,23</td><td>10,26</td><td>10,21</td><td>23,27</td></tr><tr><td>es43</td><td>Extremadura</td><td>80,71</td><td>80,66</td><td>34,74</td><td>15,29</td><td>9,64</td><td>44,21</td></tr><tr><td>es51</td><td>Cataluna</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es52</td><td>Valencia</td><td>19,59</td><td>25,53</td><td>5,12</td><td>6,83</td><td>3,50</td><td>12,11</td></tr><tr><td>es53</td><td>Baleares</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>es61</td><td>Andalucia</td><td>40,42</td><td>20,48</td><td>9,01</td><td>7,13</td><td>12,66</td><td>17,94</td></tr><tr><td>es62</td><td>Murcia</td><td>891,36</td><td>15,15</td><td>11,21</td><td>9,82</td><td>3,90</td><td>186,29</td></tr><tr><td>es63</td><td>Ceuta y Melilla</td><td>6,26</td><td>23,64</td><td>-</td><td>1,13</td><td>1,38</td><td>6,48</td></tr><tr><td>es7</td><td>Canarias</td><td>40,17</td><td>16,32</td><td>8,88</td><td>4,20</td><td>3,60</td><td>14,63</td></tr><tr><td>es</td><td>Spain</td><td>78,29</td><td>32,53</td><td>11,51</td><td>9,54</td><td>8,54</td><td>28,08</td></tr></tbody></table>
<figure><img src="image_60.png" /><figcaption>Spain: Regional Investment Grant)
Expenditure per capita of regional population, 1989-93 (1993 prices, ECU)
See Spain Table 3</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_61.png" /></figure>
Spain: Regional Investment Grant)

Expenditure per capita of recipient regional assisted area population,
1989-93 (1993 prices, ECU)

See Spain Table 4

<figure><img src="image_62.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_63.png" /><figcaption>Spain: Mean annual Regional Investment Grant (RIG) expenditure per capita of eligible regional population, 1989-93, v. regional GDP per capita 1992 (both in ECU)</figcaption></figure>
<table><caption>Table 1. Italy: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU)</caption><thead><tr><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>it11 Piemonte</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it12 Valle d'Aosta</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it13 Liguria</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it2 Lombardia</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it31 Trentino-Alto Adige</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it32 Veneto</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it33 Friuli-Venezia Giulia</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it4 Emilia Romagna</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it51 Toscana</td><td>-</td><td>1,27</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>0,25</td></tr><tr><td>it52 Umbria</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it53 Marche</td><td>59,69</td><td>287,47</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>69,43</td></tr><tr><td>it6 Lazio</td><td>383,55</td><td>2.051,79</td><td>52,72</td><td>1,70</td><td>-</td><td>497,95</td></tr><tr><td>it8 Campania</td><td>321,11</td><td>544,98</td><td>283,74</td><td>79,95</td><td>-</td><td>245,96</td></tr><tr><td>it71 Abruzzo</td><td>377,37</td><td>396,46</td><td>172,38</td><td>43,09</td><td>-</td><td>197,86</td></tr><tr><td>it72 Molise</td><td>43,23</td><td>17,85</td><td>42,06</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>20,63</td></tr><tr><td>it91 Puglia</td><td>59,69</td><td>86,69</td><td>37,91</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>36,86</td></tr><tr><td>it92 Basilicata</td><td>198,29</td><td>251,77</td><td>220,36</td><td>61,24</td><td>-</td><td>146,33</td></tr><tr><td>it93 Calabria</td><td>62,44</td><td>79,68</td><td>40,87</td><td>4,54</td><td>-</td><td>37,50</td></tr><tr><td>ita Sicilia</td><td>146,15</td><td>158,08</td><td>139,20</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>88,68</td></tr><tr><td>itb Sardegna</td><td>135,85</td><td>228,19</td><td>31,99</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>79,21</td></tr><tr><td>it Italy</td><td>1.787,36</td><td>4.104,22</td><td>1.021,22</td><td>190,52</td><td>-</td><td>1.420,67</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 2. Italy: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP</caption><thead><tr><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>it11 Piemonte</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>it12 Valle d'Aosta</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>it13 Liguria</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>it2 Lombardia</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>it31 Trentino-Alto Adige</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>it32 Veneto</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>it33 Friuli-Venezia Giulia</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>it4 Emilia Romagna</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>it51 Toscana</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,002%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>it52 Umbria</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>it53 Marche</td><td>0,288%</td><td>1,357%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,329%</td></tr><tr><td>it6 Lazio</td><td>0,466%</td><td>2,385%</td><td>0,060%</td><td>0,002%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,583%</td></tr><tr><td>it8 Campania</td><td>0,574%</td><td>0,940%</td><td>0,488%</td><td>0,136%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,427%</td></tr><tr><td>it71 Abruzzo</td><td>2,405%</td><td>2,443%</td><td>1,038%</td><td>0,257%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>1,229%</td></tr><tr><td>it72 Molise</td><td>1,178%</td><td>0,478%</td><td>1,098%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,551%</td></tr><tr><td>it91 Puglia</td><td>0,142%</td><td>0,204%</td><td>0,086%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,086%</td></tr><tr><td>it92 Basilicata</td><td>3,572%</td><td>4,421%</td><td>3,823%</td><td>1,051%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>2,573%</td></tr><tr><td>it93 Calabria</td><td>0,345%</td><td>0,462%</td><td>0,222%</td><td>0,024%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,211%</td></tr><tr><td>ita Sicilia</td><td>0,307%</td><td>0,318%</td><td>0,272%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,179%</td></tr><tr><td>itb Sardegna</td><td>0,803%</td><td>1,308%</td><td>0,173%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,457%</td></tr><tr><td>it Italy</td><td>0,218%</td><td>0,491%</td><td>0,121%</td><td>0,022%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,170%</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Table 3. Italy: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>it11 Piemonte</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it12 Valle d'Aosta</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it13 Liguria</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it2 Lombardia</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it31 Trentino-Alto Adige</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it32 Veneto</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it33 Friuli-Venezia Giulia</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it4 Emilia Romagna</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it51 Toscana</td><td>-</td><td>0,36</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>0,07</td></tr><tr><td>it52 Umbria</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it53 Marche</td><td>42,02</td><td>202,03</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>48,81</td></tr><tr><td>it6 Lazio</td><td>75,23</td><td>401,10</td><td>10,28</td><td>0,33</td><td>-</td><td>97,39</td></tr><tr><td>it8 Campania</td><td>57,42</td><td>97,22</td><td>50,49</td><td>14,20</td><td>-</td><td>43,87</td></tr><tr><td>it71 Abruzzo</td><td>304,38</td><td>318,88</td><td>138,33</td><td>34,50</td><td>-</td><td>159,22</td></tr><tr><td>it72 Molise</td><td>130,83</td><td>54,00</td><td>127,22</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>62,41</td></tr><tr><td>it91 Puglia</td><td>14,91</td><td>21,59</td><td>9,42</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>9,18</td></tr><tr><td>it92 Basilicata</td><td>324,54</td><td>412,00</td><td>360,65</td><td>100,39</td><td>-</td><td>239,52</td></tr><tr><td>it93 Calabria</td><td>29,98</td><td>38,33</td><td>19,70</td><td>2,19</td><td>-</td><td>18,04</td></tr><tr><td>ita Sicilia</td><td>29,44</td><td>31,82</td><td>28,01</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>17,85</td></tr><tr><td>itb Sardegna</td><td>83,09</td><td>139,29</td><td>19,45</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>48,37</td></tr><tr><td>it Italy</td><td>31,55</td><td>72,39</td><td>18,00</td><td>3,36</td><td>-</td><td>25,06</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 4 Italy: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted population (ECU, 1993 prices)</caption><thead><tr><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>it11 Piemonte</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it12 Valle d'Aosta</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it13 Liguria</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it2 Lombardia</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it31 Trentino-Alto Adige</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it32 Veneto</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it33 Friuli-Venezia Giulia</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it4 Emilia Romagna</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it51 Toscana</td><td>-</td><td>18,04</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>3,61</td></tr><tr><td>it52 Umbria</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it53 Marche</td><td>165,55</td><td>797,25</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>it6 Lazio</td><td>800,35</td><td>4,267,03</td><td>109,31</td><td>3,52</td><td>-</td><td>1.036,04</td></tr><tr><td>it8 Campania</td><td>57,42</td><td>97,22</td><td>50,49</td><td>14,20</td><td>-</td><td>43,87</td></tr><tr><td>it71 Abruzzo</td><td>304,38</td><td>318,88</td><td>138,33</td><td>34,50</td><td>-</td><td>159,22</td></tr><tr><td>it72 Molise</td><td>130,83</td><td>54,00</td><td>127,22</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>62,41</td></tr><tr><td>it91 Puglia</td><td>14,91</td><td>21,59</td><td>9,42</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>9,18</td></tr><tr><td>it92 Basilicata</td><td>324,54</td><td>412,00</td><td>360,65</td><td>100,39</td><td>-</td><td>239,52</td></tr><tr><td>it93 Calabria</td><td>29,98</td><td>38,33</td><td>19,70</td><td>2,19</td><td>-</td><td>18,04</td></tr><tr><td>ita Sicilia</td><td>29,44</td><td>31,82</td><td>28,01</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>17,85</td></tr><tr><td>itb Sardegna</td><td>83,09</td><td>139,29</td><td>19,45</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>48,37</td></tr><tr><td>it Italy</td><td>83,65</td><td>191,76</td><td>48,46</td><td>9,04</td><td>-</td><td>66,58</td></tr></tbody></table>
<figure><img src="image_64.png" /><figcaption>Italy: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy
Expenditure per capita of regional population, 1989-92, (1993, prices, ECU)
See Italy Table 3</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_65.png" /></figure>
Italy: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy

Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted area population, 1989-92, (1993, prices, ECU)

<figure><img src="image_66.png" /><figcaption>See Italy Table 4</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_67.png" /><figcaption>Italy: Mean annual Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy (CG/IS) expenditure per capita of eligible regional population, 1989-93, v. regional GDP per capita 1992 (both in ECU)</figcaption></figure>
<table><caption>Table 1. Germany: Investment Grant (IG)
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="8"><strong>West Germany</strong></td></tr><tr><td>de1</td><td>Baden Wurttenburg</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,02</td><td>0,32</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,07</td></tr><tr><td>de2</td><td>Bayern</td><td>33,07</td><td>65,70</td><td>49,57</td><td>32,71</td><td>17,69</td><td>39,75</td></tr><tr><td>de5</td><td>Bremen</td><td>1,29</td><td>1,52</td><td>1,97</td><td>6,82</td><td>5,16</td><td>3,35</td></tr><tr><td>de6</td><td>Hamburg</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td></tr><tr><td>de7</td><td>Hessen</td><td>16,38</td><td>39,15</td><td>9,72</td><td>5,38</td><td>4,68</td><td>15,06</td></tr><tr><td>de9</td><td>Niedersachsen</td><td>76,93</td><td>213,27</td><td>100,39</td><td>87,84</td><td>61,92</td><td>108,07</td></tr><tr><td>dea</td><td>Nordrhein-Westfalen</td><td>178,54</td><td>116,05</td><td>158,99</td><td>88,70</td><td>87,73</td><td>126,00</td></tr><tr><td>deb</td><td>Rheinland-Pfalz</td><td>27,01</td><td>45,88</td><td>52,23</td><td>36,75</td><td>24,85</td><td>37,34</td></tr><tr><td>dec</td><td>Saarland</td><td>57,61</td><td>28,20</td><td>37,63</td><td>83,53</td><td>43,52</td><td>50,10</td></tr><tr><td>def</td><td>Schleswig Holstein</td><td>32,64</td><td>52,47</td><td>16,52</td><td>4,96</td><td>7,22</td><td>22,7</td></tr><tr><td></td><td><strong>West Germany (exc. Berlin)</strong></td><td><strong>423,47</strong></td><td><strong>562,26</strong></td><td><strong>427,34</strong></td><td><strong>346,68</strong></td><td><strong>252,77</strong></td><td><strong>402,5</strong></td></tr><tr><td colspan="8"><strong>East Germany</strong></td></tr><tr><td>de3</td><td>Berlin</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,04</td><td>252,41</td><td>100,05</td><td>181,83</td><td>178,11</td></tr><tr><td>de4</td><td>Brandenburg</td><td>0,00</td><td>11,39</td><td>1015,87</td><td>322,64</td><td>660,63</td><td>670,17</td></tr><tr><td>de8</td><td>Macklenburg-Vorpommern</td><td>0,00</td><td>30,85</td><td>312,57</td><td>328,64</td><td>290,37</td><td>320,81</td></tr><tr><td>ded</td><td>Sachsen</td><td>0,00</td><td>7,50</td><td>619,43</td><td>827,69</td><td>552,50</td><td>669,04</td></tr><tr><td>dee</td><td>Sachsen-Anhalt</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,11</td><td>1016,36</td><td>859,89</td><td>610,19</td><td>828,85</td></tr><tr><td>deg</td><td>Thuringen</td><td>0,00</td><td>25,54</td><td>733,84</td><td>511,89</td><td>687,08</td><td>652,78</td></tr><tr><td></td><td><strong>East Germany (inc. all Berlin)</strong></td><td><strong>0,00</strong></td><td><strong>75,43</strong></td><td><strong>3950,47</strong></td><td><strong>2950,78</strong></td><td><strong>2982,61</strong></td><td><strong>3319,76</strong></td></tr><tr><td>de</td><td>Germany (all)</td><td>423,47</td><td>637,70</td><td>4377,81</td><td>3297,46</td><td>3235,37</td><td>3722,27</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 2. Germany: Investment Grant (IG)
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="8"><strong>West Germany</strong></td></tr><tr><td>de1</td><td>Baden Wurttenburg</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>de2</td><td>Bayern</td><td>0,014%</td><td>0,026%</td><td>0,018%</td><td>0,012%</td><td>0,006%</td><td>0,015%</td></tr><tr><td>de5</td><td>Bremen</td><td>0,007%</td><td>0,008%</td><td>0,010%</td><td>0,034%</td><td>0,026%</td><td>0,017%</td></tr><tr><td>de6</td><td>Hamburg</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>de7</td><td>Hessen</td><td>0,012%</td><td>0,026%</td><td>0,006%</td><td>0,003%</td><td>0,003%</td><td>0,010%</td></tr><tr><td>de9</td><td>Niedersachsen</td><td>0,059%</td><td>0,155%</td><td>0,069%</td><td>0,059%</td><td>0,042%</td><td>0,077%</td></tr><tr><td>dea</td><td>Nordrhein-Westfalen</td><td>0,052%</td><td>0,032%</td><td>0,043%</td><td>0,024%</td><td>0,024%</td><td>0,035%</td></tr><tr><td>deb</td><td>Rheinland-Pfalz</td><td>0,040%</td><td>0,064%</td><td>0,071%</td><td>0,050%</td><td>0,034%</td><td>0,052%</td></tr><tr><td>dec</td><td>Saarland</td><td>0,284%</td><td>0,132%</td><td>0,172%</td><td>0,380%</td><td>0,201%</td><td>0,234%</td></tr><tr><td>def</td><td>Schleswig Holstein</td><td>0,071%</td><td>0,107%</td><td>0,032%</td><td>0,010%</td><td>0,014%</td><td>0,047%</td></tr><tr><td colspan="8"><strong>East Germany</strong></td></tr><tr><td>de3</td><td>Berlin</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,354%</td><td>0,153%</td><td>0,284%</td><td>0,264%</td></tr><tr><td>de4</td><td>Brandenburg</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,050%</td><td>4,757%</td><td>1,457%</td><td>2,443%</td><td>2,903%</td></tr><tr><td>de8</td><td>Macklenburg-Vorpommern</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,212%</td><td>2,271%</td><td>2,151%</td><td>1,626%</td><td>2,087%</td></tr><tr><td>ded</td><td>Sachsen</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,020%</td><td>1,736%</td><td>2,130%</td><td>1,204%</td><td>1,697%</td></tr><tr><td>dee</td><td>Sachsen-Anhalt</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>4,628%</td><td>3,552%</td><td>2,183%</td><td>3,454%</td></tr><tr><td>deg</td><td>Thuringen</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,142%</td><td>4,329%</td><td>2,667%</td><td>2,786%</td><td>3,309%</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Table 3. Germany: Investment Grant (IG)
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="8"><strong>West Germany</strong></td></tr><tr><td>de1</td><td>Baden Wurttenburg</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,03</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,01</td></tr><tr><td>de2</td><td>Bayern</td><td>2,99</td><td>5,86</td><td>4,33</td><td>2,82</td><td>1,50</td><td>3,50</td></tr><tr><td>de5</td><td>Bremen</td><td>1,95</td><td>2,26</td><td>2,89</td><td>9,97</td><td>7,53</td><td>4,92</td></tr><tr><td>de6</td><td>Hamburg</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td></tr><tr><td>de7</td><td>Hessen</td><td>2,94</td><td>6,92</td><td>1,69</td><td>0,92</td><td>0,79</td><td>2,65</td></tr><tr><td>de9</td><td>Niedersachsen</td><td>10,71</td><td>29,28</td><td>13,59</td><td>11,75</td><td>8,17</td><td>14,70</td></tr><tr><td>dea</td><td>Nordrhein-Westfalen</td><td>10,58</td><td>6,79</td><td>9,16</td><td>5,07</td><td>4,96</td><td>7,31</td></tr><tr><td>deb</td><td>Rheinland-Pfalz</td><td>7,39</td><td>12,39</td><td>13,88</td><td>9,62</td><td>6,40</td><td>9,94</td></tr><tr><td>dec</td><td>Saarland</td><td>54,65</td><td>26,48</td><td>35,07</td><td>77,57</td><td>40,15</td><td>46,78</td></tr><tr><td>def</td><td>Schleswig Holstein</td><td>12,73</td><td>20,22</td><td>6,29</td><td>1,87</td><td>2,69</td><td>8,76</td></tr><tr><td colspan="8"><strong>East Germany</strong></td></tr><tr><td>de3</td><td>Berlin</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,02</td><td>73,51</td><td>29,03</td><td>52,47</td><td>51,68</td></tr><tr><td>de4</td><td>Brandenburg</td><td>0,00</td><td>4,42</td><td>394,01</td><td>126,89</td><td>259,81</td><td>261,71</td></tr><tr><td>de8</td><td>Macklenburg-Vorpommern</td><td>0,00</td><td>16,04</td><td>162,46</td><td>173,73</td><td>155,70</td><td>169,31</td></tr><tr><td>ded</td><td>Sachsen</td><td>0,00</td><td>1,53</td><td>130,02</td><td>176,90</td><td>119,05</td><td>142,50</td></tr><tr><td>dee</td><td>Sachsen-Anhalt</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,04</td><td>353,64</td><td>304,57</td><td>218,16</td><td>292,13</td></tr><tr><td>deg</td><td>Thuringen</td><td>0,00</td><td>9,78</td><td>281,03</td><td>199,02</td><td>269,89</td><td>253,24</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 4. Germany: Investment Grant (IG)
Expenditure committed per head of recipient region assisted population
(ECU, 1993 prices)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="8"><strong>West Germany</strong></td></tr><tr><td>de1</td><td>Baden Wurttenburg</td><td>0,00</td><td>3,60</td><td>65,65</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>13,85</td></tr><tr><td>de2</td><td>Bayern</td><td>17,71</td><td>34,65</td><td>25,62</td><td>16,69</td><td>8,89</td><td>20,71</td></tr><tr><td>de5</td><td>Bremen</td><td>1,95</td><td>2,26</td><td>2,89</td><td>9,97</td><td>7,53</td><td>4,92</td></tr><tr><td>de6</td><td>Hamburg</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td></tr><tr><td>de7</td><td>Hessen</td><td>45,96</td><td>108,08</td><td>26,36</td><td>14,41</td><td>12,34</td><td>41,43</td></tr><tr><td>de9</td><td>Niedersachsen</td><td>18,37</td><td>50,22</td><td>23,31</td><td>20,15</td><td>14,02</td><td>25,21</td></tr><tr><td>dea</td><td>Nordrhein-Westfalen</td><td>28,07</td><td>18,00</td><td>24,31</td><td>13,44</td><td>13,16</td><td>19,39</td></tr><tr><td>deb</td><td>Rheinland-Pfalz</td><td>25,41</td><td>42,59</td><td>47,69</td><td>33,05</td><td>22,00</td><td>34,15</td></tr><tr><td>dec</td><td>Saarland</td><td>61,61</td><td>29,86</td><td>39,54</td><td>87,45</td><td>45,27</td><td>52,74</td></tr><tr><td>def</td><td>Schleswig Holstein</td><td>17,51</td><td>27,82</td><td>8,65</td><td>2,57</td><td>3,71</td><td>12,05</td></tr><tr><td colspan="8"><strong>East Germany</strong></td></tr><tr><td>de3</td><td>Berlin</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,02</td><td>73,51</td><td>29,03</td><td>52,47</td><td>51,68</td></tr><tr><td>de4</td><td>Brandenburg</td><td>0,00</td><td>4,42</td><td>394,01</td><td>126,89</td><td>259,81</td><td>261,71</td></tr><tr><td>de8</td><td>Macklenburg-Vorpommern</td><td>0,00</td><td>16,04</td><td>162,46</td><td>173,73</td><td>155,70</td><td>169,31</td></tr><tr><td>ded</td><td>Sachsen</td><td>0,00</td><td>1,53</td><td>130,02</td><td>176,90</td><td>119,05</td><td>142,50</td></tr><tr><td>dee</td><td>Sachsen-Anhalt</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,04</td><td>353,64</td><td>304,57</td><td>218,16</td><td>292,13</td></tr><tr><td>deg</td><td>Thuringen</td><td>0,00</td><td>9,78</td><td>281,03</td><td>199,02</td><td>269,89</td><td>253,24</td></tr></tbody></table>
<figure><img src="image_68.png" /><figcaption>**Germany:** Investment Grant
Expenditure per capita of regional population, 1989-93 (1993 prices, ECU)
See Germany Table 3</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_69.png" /></figure>
Germany: Investment Grant

Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted area population, 1989-93

(1993 prices, ECU)

<figure><img src="image_70.png" /><figcaption>See Germany Table 4</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_71.png" /><figcaption>Germany: Mean annual Investment Grant (IG) expenditure per capita of eligible population, 1989-93, v. regional GDP per capita 1992 (both in ECU)</figcaption></figure>
<table><caption>Table 1. Belgium: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean,<br>89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>be1</td><td>Brussels</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><td>be2</td><td>Vlaams Gewest</td><td>92,09</td><td>100,92</td><td>71,83</td><td>56,69</td><td>81,86</td><td>80,68</td></tr><tr><td>be3</td><td>Region Wallonne</td><td>158,18</td><td>84,09</td><td>74,79</td><td>81,71</td><td>31,38</td><td>86,03</td></tr><tr><td>be</td><td>Belgium</td><td>250,28</td><td>185,00</td><td>146,63</td><td>138,40</td><td>113,24</td><td>166,71</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 2. Belgium: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean,<br>89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>be1</td><td>Brussels</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>be2</td><td>Vlaams Gewest</td><td>0,093%</td><td>0,098%</td><td>0,069%</td><td>0,053%</td><td>0,078%</td><td>0,078%</td></tr><tr><td>be3</td><td>Region Wallonne</td><td>0,354%</td><td>0,182%</td><td>0,159%</td><td>0,171%</td><td>0,066%</td><td>0,187%</td></tr><tr><td>be</td><td>Belgium</td><td>0,147%</td><td>0,105%</td><td>0,082%</td><td>0,076%</td><td>0,063%</td><td>0,095%</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 3. Belgium: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean,<br>89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>be1</td><td>Brussels</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td></tr><tr><td>be2</td><td>Vlaams Gewest</td><td>16,09</td><td>17,58</td><td>12,45</td><td>9,78</td><td>14,05</td><td>13,99</td></tr><tr><td>be3</td><td>Region Wallonne</td><td>48,90</td><td>25,92</td><td>22,95</td><td>24,94</td><td>9,53</td><td>26,45</td></tr><tr><td>be</td><td>Belgium</td><td>25,21</td><td>18,60</td><td>14,68</td><td>13,81</td><td>11,25</td><td>16,71</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 4. Belgium: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted population (1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean,<br>89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>be1</td><td>Brussels</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td></tr><tr><td>be2</td><td>Vlaams Gewest</td><td>71,36</td><td>78,03</td><td>55,33</td><td>43,51</td><td>62,54</td><td>62,16</td></tr><tr><td>be3</td><td>Region Wallonne</td><td>79,23</td><td>42,03</td><td>37,24</td><td>40,54</td><td>15,50</td><td>42,91</td></tr><tr><td>be</td><td>Belgium</td><td>76,14</td><td>56,17</td><td>44,34</td><td>41,71</td><td>33,97</td><td>50,47</td></tr></tbody></table>
<figure><img src="image_72.png" /><figcaption>**Belgium:** Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy
Expenditure per capita of regional population, 1989-93, (1993 prices, ECU)
See Belgium Table 3</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_73.png" /></figure>
Belgium: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy

Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted area population, 1989-93,
(1993 prices, ECU)

See Belgium Table 4

<figure><img src="image_74.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_75.png" /><figcaption>Belgium: Mean annual expenditure on Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy per capita of eligible regional population 1989-93 v. regional GDP per capita 1992 (both in ECU)</figcaption></figure>
<table><caption>Table 1. France: Regional Development Grant (PAT)
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>fr1</td><td>Ile de France</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td></tr><tr><td>fr21</td><td>Champagne-Ardenne</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,43</td><td>6,47</td><td>0,39</td><td>0,87</td><td>2,04</td></tr><tr><td>fr22</td><td>Picardie</td><td>n.a.</td><td>2,29</td><td>1,89</td><td>0,76</td><td>0,53</td><td>1,37</td></tr><tr><td>fr23</td><td>Haute-Normandie</td><td>n.a.</td><td>2,47</td><td>2,68</td><td>1,03</td><td>0,18</td><td>1,59</td></tr><tr><td>fr24</td><td>Centre</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,59</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>2,25</td><td>0,71</td></tr><tr><td>fr25</td><td>Basse-Normandie</td><td>n.a.</td><td>3,99</td><td>2,05</td><td>5,55</td><td>2,25</td><td>3,46</td></tr><tr><td>fr26</td><td>Bourgogone</td><td>n.a.</td><td>1,76</td><td>2,84</td><td>7,09</td><td>1,63</td><td>3,33</td></tr><tr><td>fr3</td><td>Nord Pas de Calais</td><td>n.a.</td><td>15,89</td><td>21,92</td><td>10,21</td><td>5,89</td><td>13,48</td></tr><tr><td>fr41</td><td>Lorraine</td><td>n.a.</td><td>19,59</td><td>24,13</td><td>33,00</td><td>3,47</td><td>20,05</td></tr><tr><td>fr42</td><td>Alsace</td><td>n.a.</td><td>3,56</td><td>2,52</td><td>0,74</td><td>0,21</td><td>1,76</td></tr><tr><td>fr43</td><td>Franche Comte</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,93</td><td>0,14</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,15</td><td>0,31</td></tr><tr><td>fr51</td><td>Pays de la Loire</td><td>n.a.</td><td>28,82</td><td>2,84</td><td>2,62</td><td>5,32</td><td>9,90</td></tr><tr><td>fr52</td><td>Bretagne</td><td>n.a.</td><td>8,24</td><td>9,46</td><td>6,32</td><td>4,51</td><td>7,13</td></tr><tr><td>fr53</td><td>Poitou Charentes</td><td>n.a.</td><td>2,82</td><td>1,89</td><td>2,33</td><td>0,00</td><td>1,76</td></tr><tr><td>fr61</td><td>Aquitaine</td><td>n.a.</td><td>13,95</td><td>5,68</td><td>1,00</td><td>2,07</td><td>5,67</td></tr><tr><td>fr62</td><td>Midi-Pyrenees</td><td>n.a.</td><td>11,02</td><td>4,10</td><td>3,59</td><td>3,17</td><td>5,47</td></tr><tr><td>fr63</td><td>Limousin</td><td>n.a.</td><td>2,42</td><td>0,33</td><td>0,22</td><td>1,22</td><td>1,05</td></tr><tr><td>fr71</td><td>Rhone Alpes</td><td>n.a.</td><td>2,96</td><td>4,73</td><td>2,70</td><td>1,91</td><td>3,08</td></tr><tr><td>fr72</td><td>Auvergne</td><td>n.a.</td><td>7,35</td><td>3,00</td><td>2,93</td><td>0,98</td><td>3,56</td></tr><tr><td>fr81</td><td>Languedoc Roussillon</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,95</td><td>7,41</td><td>4,13</td><td>1,03</td><td>3,38</td></tr><tr><td>fr82</td><td>PACA</td><td>n.a.</td><td>5,84</td><td>1,47</td><td>2,02</td><td>0,30</td><td>2,41</td></tr><tr><td>fr83</td><td>Corse</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,37</td><td>0,05</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,15</td></tr><tr><td>fr</td><td>France</td><td>n.a.</td><td>135,86</td><td>106,09</td><td>86,71</td><td>37,93</td><td>91,65</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 2. France: Regional Development Grant (PAT)
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>fr1</td><td>Ile de France</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>fr21</td><td>Champagne-Ardenne</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,002%</td><td>0,025%</td><td>0,001%</td><td>0,004%</td><td>0,008%</td></tr><tr><td>fr22</td><td>Picardie</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,008%</td><td>0,007%</td><td>0,003%</td><td>0,002%</td><td>0,005%</td></tr><tr><td>fr23</td><td>Haute-Normandie</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,008%</td><td>0,009%</td><td>0,003%</td><td>0,001%</td><td>0,005%</td></tr><tr><td>fr24</td><td>Centre</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,001%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,006%</td><td>0,002%</td></tr><tr><td>fr25</td><td>Basse-Normandie</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,018%</td><td>0,009%</td><td>0,024%</td><td>0,009%</td><td>0,015%</td></tr><tr><td>fr26</td><td>Bourgogone</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,007%</td><td>0,011%</td><td>0,026%</td><td>0,006%</td><td>0,012%</td></tr><tr><td>fr3</td><td>Nord Pas de Calais</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,027%</td><td>0,037%</td><td>0,017%</td><td>0,010%</td><td>0,023%</td></tr><tr><td>fr41</td><td>Lorraine</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,053%</td><td>0,065%</td><td>0,089%</td><td>0,009%</td><td>0,054%</td></tr><tr><td>fr42</td><td>Alsace</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,012%</td><td>0,008%</td><td>0,002%</td><td>0,001%</td><td>0,006%</td></tr><tr><td>fr43</td><td>Franche Comte</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,005%</td><td>0,001%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,001%</td><td>0,002%</td></tr><tr><td>fr51</td><td>Pays de la Loire</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,059%</td><td>0,006%</td><td>0,005%</td><td>0,011%</td><td>0,020%</td></tr><tr><td>fr52</td><td>Bretagne</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,019%</td><td>0,022%</td><td>0,014%</td><td>0,010%</td><td>0,017%</td></tr><tr><td>fr53</td><td>Poitou Charentes</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,012%</td><td>0,008%</td><td>0,010%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,007%</td></tr><tr><td>fr61</td><td>Aquitaine</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,030%</td><td>0,012%</td><td>0,002%</td><td>0,004%</td><td>0,012%</td></tr><tr><td>fr62</td><td>Midi-Pyrenees</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,028%</td><td>0,010%</td><td>0,009%</td><td>0,008%</td><td>0,014%</td></tr><tr><td>fr63</td><td>Limousin</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,023%</td><td>0,003%</td><td>0,002%</td><td>0,011%</td><td>0,010%</td></tr><tr><td>fr71</td><td>Rhone Alpes</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,003%</td><td>0,005%</td><td>0,003%</td><td>0,002%</td><td>0,003%</td></tr><tr><td>fr72</td><td>Auvergne</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,037%</td><td>0,015%</td><td>0,015%</td><td>0,005%</td><td>0,018%</td></tr><tr><td>fr81</td><td>Languedoc Roussillon</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,003%</td><td>0,024%</td><td>0,013%</td><td>0,003%</td><td>0,011%</td></tr><tr><td>fr82</td><td>PACA</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,008%</td><td>0,002%</td><td>0,003%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,003%</td></tr><tr><td>fr83</td><td>Corse</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,016%</td><td>0,002%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,005%</td></tr><tr><td>fr</td><td>France</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,013%</td><td>0,010%</td><td>0,008%</td><td>0,004%</td><td>0,009%</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Table 3. France: Regional Development Grant (PAT)
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>fr1 Ile de France</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td></tr><tr><td>fr21 Champagne-Ardenne</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,32</td><td>4,80</td><td>0,29</td><td>0,65</td><td>1,51</td></tr><tr><td>fr22 Picardie</td><td>n.a.</td><td>1,26</td><td>1,04</td><td>0,41</td><td>0,29</td><td>0,75</td></tr><tr><td>fr23 Haute-Normandie</td><td>n.a.</td><td>1,42</td><td>1,54</td><td>0,59</td><td>0,10</td><td>0,91</td></tr><tr><td>fr24 Centre</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,25</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,93</td><td>0,30</td></tr><tr><td>fr25 Basse-Normandie</td><td>n.a.</td><td>2,87</td><td>1,47</td><td>3,97</td><td>1,60</td><td>2,48</td></tr><tr><td>fr26 Bourgogone</td><td>n.a.</td><td>1,09</td><td>1,76</td><td>4,40</td><td>1,00</td><td>2,06</td></tr><tr><td>fr3 Nord Pas de Calais</td><td>n.a.</td><td>4,01</td><td>5,53</td><td>2,57</td><td>1,48</td><td>3,39</td></tr><tr><td>fr41 Lorraine</td><td>n.a.</td><td>8,49</td><td>10,49</td><td>14,36</td><td>1,51</td><td>8,71</td></tr><tr><td>fr42 Alsace</td><td>n.a.</td><td>2,19</td><td>1,55</td><td>0,45</td><td>0,13</td><td>1,08</td></tr><tr><td>fr43 Franche Comte</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,85</td><td>0,13</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,14</td><td>0,28</td></tr><tr><td>fr51 Pays de la Loire</td><td>n.a.</td><td>9,42</td><td>0,92</td><td>0,85</td><td>1,71</td><td>3,23</td></tr><tr><td>fr52 Bretagne</td><td>n.a.</td><td>2,95</td><td>3,37</td><td>2,25</td><td>1,59</td><td>2,54</td></tr><tr><td>fr53 Poitou Charentes</td><td>n.a.</td><td>1,77</td><td>1,18</td><td>1,45</td><td>0,00</td><td>1,10</td></tr><tr><td>fr61 Aquitaine</td><td>n.a.</td><td>4,99</td><td>2,02</td><td>0,35</td><td>0,73</td><td>2,02</td></tr><tr><td>fr62 Midi-Pyrenees</td><td>n.a.</td><td>4,54</td><td>1,68</td><td>1,46</td><td>1,28</td><td>2,24</td></tr><tr><td>fr63 Limousin</td><td>n.a.</td><td>3,34</td><td>0,46</td><td>0,30</td><td>1,70</td><td>1,45</td></tr><tr><td>fr71 Rhone Alpes</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,55</td><td>0,88</td><td>0,50</td><td>0,35</td><td>0,57</td></tr><tr><td>fr72 Auvergne</td><td>n.a.</td><td>5,55</td><td>2,27</td><td>2,22</td><td>0,74</td><td>2,70</td></tr><tr><td>fr81 Languedoc Roussillon</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,45</td><td>3,47</td><td>1,91</td><td>0,47</td><td>1,57</td></tr><tr><td>fr82 PACA</td><td>n.a.</td><td>1,37</td><td>0,34</td><td>0,47</td><td>0,07</td><td>0,56</td></tr><tr><td>fr83 Corse</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,00</td><td>1,48</td><td>0,21</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,42</td></tr><tr><td>fr France</td><td>n.a.</td><td>2,40</td><td>1,86</td><td>1,52</td><td>0,66</td><td>1,61</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 4. France: Regional Development Grant (PAT)
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted population
(1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>fr1 Ile de France</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td></tr><tr><td>fr21 Champagne-Ardenne</td><td>n.a.</td><td>1,22</td><td>18,26</td><td>1,09</td><td>2,46</td><td>5,75</td></tr><tr><td>fr22 Picardie</td><td>n.a.</td><td>4,01</td><td>3,31</td><td>1,31</td><td>0,91</td><td>2,38</td></tr><tr><td>fr23 Haute-Normandie</td><td>n.a.</td><td>3,95</td><td>4,27</td><td>1,63</td><td>0,29</td><td>2,54</td></tr><tr><td>fr24 Centre</td><td>n.a.</td><td>2,75</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,00</td><td>10,26</td><td>3,25</td></tr><tr><td>fr25 Basse-Normandie</td><td>n.a.</td><td>3,41</td><td>1,75</td><td>4,72</td><td>1,90</td><td>2,95</td></tr><tr><td>fr26 Bourgogone</td><td>n.a.</td><td>5,38</td><td>8,68</td><td>21,66</td><td>4,95</td><td>10,17</td></tr><tr><td>fr3 Nord Pas de Calais</td><td>n.a.</td><td>5,06</td><td>6,98</td><td>3,24</td><td>1,87</td><td>4,29</td></tr><tr><td>fr41 Lorraine</td><td>n.a.</td><td>12,49</td><td>15,42</td><td>21,11</td><td>2,22</td><td>12,81</td></tr><tr><td>fr42 Alsace</td><td>n.a.</td><td>2,52</td><td>1,78</td><td>0,52</td><td>0,15</td><td>1,24</td></tr><tr><td>fr43 Franche Comte</td><td>n.a.</td><td>3,98</td><td>0,60</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,63</td><td>1,30</td></tr><tr><td>fr51 Pays de la Loire</td><td>n.a.</td><td>14,08</td><td>1,38</td><td>1,27</td><td>2,55</td><td>4,82</td></tr><tr><td>fr52 Bretagne</td><td>n.a.</td><td>3,23</td><td>3,70</td><td>2,46</td><td>1,74</td><td>2,78</td></tr><tr><td>fr53 Poitou Charentes</td><td>n.a.</td><td>1,77</td><td>1,18</td><td>1,45</td><td>0,00</td><td>1,10</td></tr><tr><td>fr61 Aquitaine</td><td>n.a.</td><td>6,53</td><td>2,64</td><td>0,46</td><td>0,95</td><td>2,65</td></tr><tr><td>fr62 Midi-Pyrenees</td><td>n.a.</td><td>5,85</td><td>2,16</td><td>1,88</td><td>1,65</td><td>2,89</td></tr><tr><td>fr63 Limousin</td><td>n.a.</td><td>3,34</td><td>0,46</td><td>0,30</td><td>1,70</td><td>1,45</td></tr><tr><td>fr71 Rhone Alpes</td><td>n.a.</td><td>3,03</td><td>4,79</td><td>2,71</td><td>1,91</td><td>3,11</td></tr><tr><td>fr72 Auvergne</td><td>n.a.</td><td>6,47</td><td>2,65</td><td>2,59</td><td>0,87</td><td>3,14</td></tr><tr><td>fr81 Languedoc Roussillon</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,53</td><td>4,11</td><td>2,27</td><td>0,56</td><td>1,87</td></tr><tr><td>fr82 PACA</td><td>n.a.</td><td>7,22</td><td>1,79</td><td>2,45</td><td>0,36</td><td>2,96</td></tr><tr><td>fr83 Corse</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0,00</td><td>1,48</td><td>0,21</td><td>0,00</td><td>0,42</td></tr><tr><td>fr France</td><td>n.a.</td><td>5,324</td><td>4,144</td><td>3,371</td><td>1,468</td><td>3,58</td></tr></tbody></table>
<figure><img src="image_76.png" /><figcaption>France: Regional Development Grant (PAT)
Expenditure per capita of regional population, 1990-93 (1993 prices, ECU)
See France Table 3</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_77.png" /></figure>
France: Regional Development Grant (PAT)

Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted area population, 1990-93

(1993 prices, ECU)

See France Table 4

<figure><img src="image_78.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_79.png" /><figcaption>France: Mean annual Regional Policy Grant (PAT)
Expenditure per capita of eligible regional population, 1989-93, v. regional GDP per capita 1992 (both in ECU)</figcaption></figure>
<table><caption>Table 1. Netherlands: Investment Premium (IPR)
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>nl11</td><td>Groningen</td><td>4,08</td><td>7,53</td><td>10,93</td><td>27,05</td><td>10,67</td><td>12,05</td></tr><tr><td>nl12</td><td>Friesland</td><td>3,83</td><td>7,24</td><td>8,20</td><td>11,77</td><td>3,59</td><td>6,92</td></tr><tr><td>nl13</td><td>Drenthe</td><td>1,36</td><td>1,43</td><td>2,49</td><td>4,34</td><td>3,17</td><td>2,56</td></tr><tr><td>nl21</td><td>Overijssel</td><td>8,42</td><td>19,89</td><td>47,27</td><td>5,42</td><td>-</td><td>16,20</td></tr><tr><td>nl22</td><td>Gelderland</td><td>12,85</td><td>16,69</td><td>8,96</td><td>1,26</td><td>-</td><td>7,95</td></tr><tr><td>nl23</td><td>Flevoland</td><td>0,40</td><td>2,85</td><td>2,68</td><td>2,85</td><td>1,79</td><td>2,12</td></tr><tr><td>nl31</td><td>Utrecht</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>nl32</td><td>Noord-Holland</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>nl33</td><td>Zuid-Holland</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>nl34</td><td>Zeeland</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>nl41</td><td>Noord-Brabant</td><td>20,57</td><td>7,48</td><td>3,55</td><td>6,63</td><td>-</td><td>7,65</td></tr><tr><td>nl42</td><td>Limburg</td><td>32,77</td><td>57,44</td><td>16,87</td><td>24,34</td><td>4,55</td><td>27,19</td></tr><tr><td>nl</td><td>Netherlands</td><td>84,28</td><td>120,54</td><td>100,96</td><td>83,68</td><td>23,77</td><td>82,65</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 2. Netherlands: Investment Premium (IPR)
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>nl11</td><td>Groningen</td><td>0,037%</td><td>0,065%</td><td>0,085%</td><td>0,213%</td><td>0,086%</td><td>0,097%</td></tr><tr><td>nl12</td><td>Friesland</td><td>0,045%</td><td>0,083%</td><td>0,093%</td><td>0,130%</td><td>0,041%</td><td>0,079%</td></tr><tr><td>nl13</td><td>Drenthe</td><td>0,021%</td><td>0,021%</td><td>0,037%</td><td>0,063%</td><td>0,049%</td><td>0,038%</td></tr><tr><td>nl21</td><td>Overijssel</td><td>0,056%</td><td>0,129%</td><td>0,303%</td><td>0,034%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,104%</td></tr><tr><td>nl22</td><td>Gelderland</td><td>0,049%</td><td>0,061%</td><td>0,032%</td><td>0,004%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,029%</td></tr><tr><td>nl23</td><td>Flevoland</td><td>0,015%</td><td>0,101%</td><td>0,091%</td><td>0,096%</td><td>0,058%</td><td>0,072%</td></tr><tr><td>nl31</td><td>Utrecht</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>nl32</td><td>Noord-Holland</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>nl33</td><td>Zuid-Holland</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>nl34</td><td>Zeeland</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>nl41</td><td>Noord-Brabant</td><td>0,058%</td><td>0,020%</td><td>0,009%</td><td>0,017%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,021%</td></tr><tr><td>nl42</td><td>Limburg</td><td>0,192%</td><td>0,334%</td><td>0,098%</td><td>0,138%</td><td>0,027%</td><td>0,158%</td></tr><tr><td>nl</td><td>Netherlands</td><td>0,034%</td><td>0,047%</td><td>0,039%</td><td>0,031%</td><td>0,009%</td><td>0,032%</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Table 3. Netherlands: Investment Premium (IPR)
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>nl11</td><td>Groningen</td><td>7,35</td><td>13,60</td><td>19,71</td><td>48,72</td><td>19,20</td><td>21,72</td></tr><tr><td>nl12</td><td>Friesland</td><td>6,39</td><td>12,08</td><td>13,66</td><td>19,56</td><td>5,94</td><td>11,53</td></tr><tr><td>nl13</td><td>Drenthe</td><td>3,10</td><td>3,24</td><td>5,62</td><td>9,75</td><td>7,08</td><td>5,76</td></tr><tr><td>nl21</td><td>Overijssel</td><td>8,29</td><td>19,49</td><td>46,06</td><td>5,25</td><td>-</td><td>15,82</td></tr><tr><td>nl22</td><td>Gelderland</td><td>7,16</td><td>9,25</td><td>4,93</td><td>0,69</td><td>-</td><td>4,41</td></tr><tr><td>nl23</td><td>Flevoland</td><td>1,99</td><td>13,50</td><td>12,12</td><td>12,24</td><td>7,37</td><td>9,44</td></tr><tr><td>nl31</td><td>Utrecht</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>nl32</td><td>Noord-Holland</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>nl33</td><td>Zuid-Holland</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>nl34</td><td>Zeeland</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>nl41</td><td>Noord-Brabant</td><td>9,47</td><td>3,42</td><td>1,61</td><td>2,98</td><td>-</td><td>3,49</td></tr><tr><td>nl42</td><td>Limburg</td><td>29,80</td><td>52,03</td><td>15,20</td><td>21,82</td><td>4,06</td><td>24,58</td></tr><tr><td>nl</td><td>Netherlands</td><td>5,69</td><td>8,10</td><td>6,73</td><td>5,53</td><td>1,56</td><td>5,52</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 4. Netherlands: Investment Premium (IPR)
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted population
(1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>nl11</td><td>Groningen</td><td>8,55</td><td>15,81</td><td>22,92</td><td>56,65</td><td>22,33</td><td>25,25</td></tr><tr><td>nl12</td><td>Friesland</td><td>6,39</td><td>12,08</td><td>13,66</td><td>19,56</td><td>5,94</td><td>11,53</td></tr><tr><td>nl13</td><td>Drenthe</td><td>8,56</td><td>8,94</td><td>15,53</td><td>26,94</td><td>19,55</td><td>15,90</td></tr><tr><td>nl21</td><td>Overijssel</td><td>14,73</td><td>34,61</td><td>81,80</td><td>9,32</td><td>-</td><td>28,10</td></tr><tr><td>nl22</td><td>Gelderland</td><td>57,44</td><td>74,57</td><td>40,06</td><td>5,64</td><td>-</td><td>35,54</td></tr><tr><td>nl23</td><td>Flevoland</td><td>6,93</td><td>47,03</td><td>42,23</td><td>42,65</td><td>25,67</td><td>32,90</td></tr><tr><td>nl31</td><td>Utrecht</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>nl32</td><td>Noord-Holland</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>nl33</td><td>Zuid-Holland</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>nl34</td><td>Zeeland</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>nl41</td><td>Noord-Brabant</td><td>91,91</td><td>33,43</td><td>15,85</td><td>29,65</td><td>-</td><td>34,17</td></tr><tr><td>nl42</td><td>Limburg</td><td>51,73</td><td>90,33</td><td>26,40</td><td>37,88</td><td>7,05</td><td>42,68</td></tr><tr><td>nl</td><td>Netherlands</td><td>28,61</td><td>40,67</td><td>33,80</td><td>27,79</td><td>9,39</td><td>28,05</td></tr></tbody></table>
Netherlands: Investment Premium

Expenditure by region, as a percentage of regional GDP, 1989-93

See Netherlands Table 2

<figure><img src="image_80.png" /></figure>

Netherlands: Investment Premium

Expenditure per capita of regional population, 1989-93 (1993 prices, ECU)

See Netherlands Table 3

<figure><img src="image_81.png" /></figure>
Netherlands: Investment Premium

Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted area population, 1989-93
(1993 prices, ECU)

See Netherlands Table 4

<figure><img src="image_82.png" /></figure>
Netherlands: Mean annual Investment Premium (IPR)
expenditure per capita of eligible regional population1989-93 v. regional GDP per
capita 1992 (both in ECU)

<figure><img src="image_83.png" /></figure>
<table><caption>Table 1. Great Britain: Regional Selective Assistance (RSA)
Northern Ireland: Selective Financial Assistance (SFA)
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean,<br>89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>UK1</td><td>North</td><td>103,76</td><td>27,74</td><td>23,41</td><td>33,62</td><td>44,86</td><td>46,67</td></tr><tr><td>UK2</td><td>Yorkshire & Humberside</td><td>21,10</td><td>31,73</td><td>24,90</td><td>14,46</td><td>22,05</td><td>22,85</td></tr><tr><td>UK3</td><td>East Midlands</td><td>1,32</td><td>0,49</td><td>2,15</td><td>1,06</td><td>3,13</td><td>1,63</td></tr><tr><td>UK4</td><td>East Anglia</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>0,31</td><td>0,06</td></tr><tr><td>UK5</td><td>South East</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>0,51</td><td>0,10</td></tr><tr><td>UK6</td><td>South West</td><td>17,86</td><td>7,98</td><td>6,78</td><td>8,45</td><td>10,88</td><td>10,39</td></tr><tr><td>UK7</td><td>West Midlands</td><td>27,27</td><td>21,17</td><td>16,86</td><td>9,51</td><td>27,90</td><td>20,54</td></tr><tr><td>UK8</td><td>North West</td><td>28,04</td><td>38,85</td><td>36,51</td><td>34,51</td><td>37,51</td><td>35,08</td></tr><tr><td>UK9</td><td>Wales</td><td>96,69</td><td>117,19</td><td>107,48</td><td>96,74</td><td>122,09</td><td>108,04</td></tr><tr><td>UKA</td><td>Scotland</td><td>119,30</td><td>259,24</td><td>72,86</td><td>97,97</td><td>168,86</td><td>143,64</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Great Britain</td><td>415,33</td><td>504,39</td><td>290,94</td><td>296,32</td><td>438,08</td><td>389,01</td></tr><tr><td>UKB</td><td>Northern Ireland</td><td>121,55</td><td>104,21</td><td>114,04</td><td>62,42</td><td>68,85</td><td>94,21</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 2. Great Britain: Regional Selective Assistance (RSA)
Northern Ireland: Selective Financial Assistance (SFA)
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean,<br>89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>UK1</td><td>North</td><td>0,115%</td><td>0,032%</td><td>0,029%</td><td>0,040%</td><td>0,055%</td><td>0,054%</td></tr><tr><td>UK2</td><td>Yorkshire & Humberside</td><td>0,014%</td><td>0,022%</td><td>0,018%</td><td>0,010%</td><td>0,016%</td><td>0,016%</td></tr><tr><td>UK3</td><td>East Midlands</td><td>0,001%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,002%</td><td>0,001%</td><td>0,003%</td><td>0,001%</td></tr><tr><td>UK4</td><td>East Anglia</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>UK5</td><td>South East</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td><td>0,000%</td></tr><tr><td>UK6</td><td>South West</td><td>0,012%</td><td>0,006%</td><td>0,005%</td><td>0,006%</td><td>0,008%</td><td>0,007%</td></tr><tr><td>UK7</td><td>West Midlands</td><td>0,017%</td><td>0,014%</td><td>0,012%</td><td>0,006%</td><td>0,020%</td><td>0,014%</td></tr><tr><td>UK8</td><td>North West</td><td>0,014%</td><td>0,021%</td><td>0,021%</td><td>0,020%</td><td>0,022%</td><td>0,020%</td></tr><tr><td>UK9</td><td>Wales</td><td>0,121%</td><td>0,151%</td><td>0,149%</td><td>0,130%</td><td>0,170%</td><td>0,144%</td></tr><tr><td>UKA</td><td>Scotland</td><td>0,076%</td><td>0,167%</td><td>0,050%</td><td>0,064%</td><td>0,115%</td><td>0,094%</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Great Britain</td><td>0,022%</td><td>0,028%</td><td>0,017%</td><td>0,017%</td><td>0,026%</td><td>0,022%</td></tr><tr><td>UKB</td><td>Northern Ireland</td><td>0,306%</td><td>0,268%</td><td>0,300%</td><td>0,158%</td><td>0,181%</td><td>0,243%</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Table 3. Great Britain: Regional Selective Assistance (RSA)
Northern Ireland: Selective Financial Assistance (SFA)
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>UK1</td><td>North</td><td>33,77</td><td>9,02</td><td>7,58</td><td>10,86</td><td>14,47</td><td>15,14</td></tr><tr><td>UK2</td><td>Yorkshire & Humberside</td><td>4,28</td><td>6,42</td><td>5,01</td><td>2,90</td><td>4,40</td><td>4,60</td></tr><tr><td>UK3</td><td>East Midlands</td><td>0,33</td><td>0,12</td><td>0,53</td><td>0,26</td><td>0,77</td><td>0,40</td></tr><tr><td>UK4</td><td>East Anglia</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>0,15</td><td>0,03</td></tr><tr><td>UK5</td><td>South East</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>0,03</td><td>0,01</td></tr><tr><td>UK6</td><td>South West</td><td>3,85</td><td>1,71</td><td>1,44</td><td>1,79</td><td>2,29</td><td>2,21</td></tr><tr><td>UK7</td><td>West Midlands</td><td>5,23</td><td>4,06</td><td>3,21</td><td>1,80</td><td>5,28</td><td>3,92</td></tr><tr><td>UK8</td><td>North West</td><td>4,40</td><td>6,09</td><td>5,72</td><td>5,39</td><td>5,85</td><td>5,49</td></tr><tr><td>UK9</td><td>Wales</td><td>33,75</td><td>40,73</td><td>37,26</td><td>33,42</td><td>42,06</td><td>37,44</td></tr><tr><td>UKA</td><td>Scotland</td><td>23,43</td><td>50,87</td><td>14,27</td><td>19,17</td><td>33,01</td><td>28,15</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Great Britain</td><td>7,47</td><td>9,05</td><td>5,19</td><td>5,26</td><td>7,76</td><td>6,95</td></tr><tr><td>UKB</td><td>Northern Ireland</td><td>76,90</td><td>65,70</td><td>71,63</td><td>38,95</td><td>42,36</td><td>59,11</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 4. Great Britain: Regional Selective Assistance (RSA)
Northern Ireland: Selective Financial Assistance (SFA)
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted population
(1993 prices, ECU)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Region</th><th>1989</th><th>1990</th><th>1991</th><th>1992</th><th>1993</th><th>Mean, 89-93</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>UK1</td><td>North</td><td>39,92</td><td>10,67</td><td>8,95</td><td>12,84</td><td>17,10</td><td>17,90</td></tr><tr><td>UK2</td><td>Yorkshire & Humberside</td><td>9,15</td><td>13,71</td><td>10,70</td><td>6,19</td><td>9,41</td><td>9,83</td></tr><tr><td>UK3</td><td>East Midlands</td><td>1,92</td><td>0,72</td><td>3,10</td><td>1,53</td><td>4,46</td><td>2,35</td></tr><tr><td>UK4</td><td>East Anglia</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>2,10</td><td>0,42</td></tr><tr><td>UK5</td><td>South East</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>0,47</td><td>0,09</td></tr><tr><td>UK6</td><td>South West</td><td>18,05</td><td>8,04</td><td>6,77</td><td>8,38</td><td>10,74</td><td>10,40</td></tr><tr><td>UK7</td><td>West Midlands</td><td>8,32</td><td>6,45</td><td>5,10</td><td>2,87</td><td>8,39</td><td>6,23</td></tr><tr><td>UK8</td><td>North West</td><td>9,23</td><td>12,76</td><td>11,99</td><td>11,31</td><td>12,27</td><td>11,51</td></tr><tr><td>UK9</td><td>Wales</td><td>47,80</td><td>57,69</td><td>52,78</td><td>47,33</td><td>59,58</td><td>53,04</td></tr><tr><td>UKA</td><td>Scotland</td><td>38,40</td><td>83,39</td><td>23,40</td><td>31,43</td><td>54,11</td><td>46,15</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Great Britain</td><td>21,58</td><td>26,15</td><td>15,02</td><td>15,25</td><td>22,49</td><td>20,10</td></tr><tr><td>UKB</td><td>Northern Ireland</td><td>76,90</td><td>65,70</td><td>71,63</td><td>38,95</td><td>42,36</td><td>59,11</td></tr></tbody></table>
Great Britain: Regional Selective Assistance

Expenditure by region, as a percentage of regional GDP, 1989-93

See Great Britain Table 2

(Also includes Northern Irish Selective Financial Assistance)

<figure><img src="image_84.png" /></figure>

Great Britain: Regional Selective Assistance

Expenditure per capita of regional population, 1989-93 (1993 prices, ECU)

See Great Britain Table 3

(Also includes Northern Irish Selective Financial Assistance)

<figure><img src="image_85.png" /></figure>
Great Britain: Regional Selective Assistance

Expenditure committed per capita of recipient region asststed area population,
1989-93 (1993 prices, ECU)

See Great Britain Table 4

(Also includes Northern Irish Selective Financial Assistance)

<figure><img src="image_86.png" /></figure>
Great Britain: Mean annual Regional Selective Assistance (RSA)

<figure><img src="image_87.png" /><figcaption>Expenditure per capita of eligible population, 1989-93, v. regional GDP per capita
1992 (both in ECU)</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_88.png" /></figure>
Overview Charts: Regional-Level Expenditure Data
v. Regional GDP
<figure><img src="image_89.png" /><figcaption>Cohesion Countries: Mean expenditure/capita of eligible population on main regional incentive by region, 1989-93, in ECU v. regional GDP/capita, 1992, in ECU</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_90.png" /><figcaption>Italy Germany: Mean expenditure/capita of eligible population on main regional incentive by region, 1989-93, in ECU v. regional GDP/capita, 1992, in ECU</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_91.png" /><figcaption>Other States: Mean expenditure/capita of eligible population on main regional incentive by region, 1989-93, in ECU v. regional GDP/capita, 1992, in ECU</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_92.png" /><figcaption>Mean expenditure/capita of eligible population on main regional incentive by
region, 1989-93, in ECU v. regional GDP/capita, 1992, in ECU</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_93.png" /></figure>
ANNEX II: Interregional Transfers from
Central Government Budgets:
Research Results

A. Budgetary Breakdowns and Regional Allocations.................................................................................. 181

B. Final Results by Country........................................................................................................................................ 183

• France.................................................................................................................................................................................. 184

• Italy .................................................................................................................................................................................. 187

• Spain.................................................................................................................................................................................. 190

• Sweden............................................................................................................................................................................ 193

• United Kingdom.................................................................................................................................................... 195

• Germany........................................................................................................................................................................ 197

• Portugal........................................................................................................................................................................ 200

C. Regional Maps of the Results........................................................................................................................................ 203

D. Main Expenditures and Revenues by Country................................................................................................ 209

E. Concentration of Results........................................................................................................................................ 225

F. GDP and Transfers Ranked by Country and by GDP.................................................................................. 229

1. Transfers and GDP of the Regions, Ranked by Country........................................................................ 230

2. Transfers and GDP of the Regions, Ranked by Growing GDP/capita................................................................ 233

G. GDP Per Capita and BAGDP Per Capita........................................................................................................ 235
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# A. Budgetary Breakdowns and Regional Allocations

The methodology utilised in the study is described in detail in Section 5.3 of the report. Basically, the methodology involves three steps:

* first, detailed national budgets are established. These have to be (i) consolidated (ii) balanced (iii) recent (iv) executed and (v) broken down into as many items of revenue and expenditure as possible.

* second, to allow the regional allocation of these budgetary items, allocation criteria or "keys" are sought for each item. Regional allocation keys are chosen on the basis of their economic sense: the research methodology is guided by economic reasoning and by the theory of incidence in the selection of criteria

* third, for each region, the amounts estimated for each item of revenue and of expenditure are summed with a view to indicating how much each region has contributed (in revenues) to the budget and how much it has gained (in expenditures) from the budget.

Detailed budgetary breakdowns as specified in step one were produced for each of the case study countries. The extent of breakdown by country is shown in the Table A.1:

<table><caption>Table A.1: Decomposition of National Budgets</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Expenditure items</th><th>Revenue items</th><th>Total number of items</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>France</td><td>312</td><td>62</td><td>370</td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>106</td><td>37</td><td>150</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>140</td><td>24</td><td>186</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>82</td><td>198</td><td>137</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>478</td><td>66</td><td>540</td></tr><tr><td>Sweden</td><td>80</td><td>49</td><td>130</td></tr><tr><td>United Kingdom</td><td>850</td><td>56</td><td>887</td></tr></tbody></table>
As mentioned, regional allocation keys were sought for each item in step two of the methodology. The number of regional allocation criteria used by country is set out in Table A.2:

<table><caption>Table A.2: Number of Criteria Used by Country</caption><tr><td>France</td><td>135</td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>111</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>200</td></tr><tr><td>Portugal</td><td>45</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>180</td></tr><tr><td>Sweden</td><td>110</td></tr><tr><td>United Kingdom</td><td>316</td></tr></table>

The final results of the exercise are presented in Annex II B.
## B. Final Results