by wireless to German agents in Spain and that the wireless set was secretly brought ashore on 9 April 1942 while the ship was in Reykjavik's harbor. (NARA 1)

**Apr 16, 1942:** Excerpt of a letter addressed by Prime Minister Hermann Jonasson to the American Chargé d'Affaires.

"It is deserving of notice that since the British troops landed here it cannot be proved or even made probable that one single act of sabotage has been done by the Icelanders." (NARA 1)

[This is a fairly strong statement, but it turns out that it cannot be considered trustworthy as shown by the following comments made by the US representative in Iceland. A copy of Jonasson's letter was sent to the State Department by Lincoln MacVeagh on 11 May 1942. In his comments, MacVeagh writes: "Two categorical statements made by the Prime Minister are definitely incorrect, according to information supplied to me by the Commanding General [General Charles Bonesteel] namely, that the Icelanders have committed no acts of sabotage and that the representatives of the Icelandic Government are not afforded the opportunity to be present at investigations conducted by the military. Telephone and telegraph communication in the island have certainly been interfered with by Icelanders from time to time." (NARA 1)]

In a memorandum to MacVeagh General Bonesteel gives evidence of cases of attack on Americans, theft, sabotage and spying. He writes: "The criminal files of the civilian police have many reports of offenses committed by Icelanders who have acted in a hostile manner to us ever since we came on the island; surely, the government is aware of anti-American and pro-Nazi talk, speeches, and activities indulged." Bonesteel observes that it is a prevalent custom to throw stones at US Army vehicles. More specifically he mentions the following incidents:

(i) On 13 January 1942, gasoline was set on fire by Icelanders on the aerodrome at Camp Tripoli.

(ii) In early March 1942, an Icelander attacked an American civilian in the lobby of the Borg Hotel.

(iii) On 4 March 1942, an Icelander was arrested after he drew a knife on a US soldier.

(iv) On 9 March 1942 a merchant seaman was found in the Hekla hotel with a knife in his stomach.

(v) In April 1942 an Icelander ran over an American soldier and injured him severely.

(vi) On 24 April 1942 the Military Police found that an Icelander had been shooting holes in army huts with a 0.22 caliber rifle.

(vii) The Erlendur case reveals at least one Icelander who stole a pistol, ammunition and was caught when trying to get another weapon from the American Army (the
memorandum does not say if he was tried, by whom and what was the sentence).
(viii) Finally, Gen. Bonesteels reveals two spying episodes: the investigation of a
fisherman boat and the arrest of an Icelandic national, Ib Arnason Riis, spying for
Germany. For a more detailed account see the dates of April 6 and 14, 1942.

What these episodes suggest is that the statements made at the time by Icelandic
officials about the behavior of their nationals with respect to Allied troops were not
really trustworthy. It can also be noted that both in Icelandic and American accounts
there is a tendency to belittle the significance of the incidents. Almost always Ice-
landers who attack Americans are said to be drunk and similarly for Americans who
assault Icelanders. When stones are thrown at Army vehicles or when military in-
stallations are damaged almost always it is specified that it was done by boys. This
may of course be true in a number of cases but is it not surprising that these boys are
never caught and their age never ascertained?

**Apr 16, 1942:** Prime Minister Hermann Jonasson presented the American Chargé d'Affaires with a list of 114 incidents ("attacks and bodily hurts") between American troops and the population which occurred from 26 July 1941 to 18 March 1942. This list was established by the Criminal Judge of Reyjavik; an important restriction is that this list mentions only incidents which occurred in Reykjavik. The covering letter mentions some serious incidents that occurred in the rest of Iceland but without giving a systematic count. In Reykjavik over this period of 7.5 months there were on average 18 incidents per month.

The letter of the Prime Minister points out that "many instances of attacks have not been reported to the authorities". As an example of an incident that was not included he mentioned an attack by American soldiers on two members of the Althing in a car. A memo about these complaints was transmitted by the American minister in Iceland, MacVeagh, to Secretary of State Hull. According to Hunt's thesis examples of violences mentioned in the report include the following.

* Throwing beer cans at Icelandic men and women.

* Assault with fists and even guns without apparent reason.

* Numerous brawls with Icelanders, with British and with other Americans.

* Much vandalism particularly to autos and windows of buildings.

While these incidents refer to the behavior of soldiers on leave, the Prime minister's letter also emphasized that American sentinels are "very quick to use their guns" and that Icelanders are "entirely unaccustomed to this kind of treatment".

The letter notes that when reports of incidents have been sent to the Military Au-
thorities for investigation, the Icelandic Authorities have in most cases been given
no information as to how the investigation was conducted and what sentences were
passed.
memorandum does not say if he was tried, by whom and what was the sentence). (viii) Finally, Gen. Bonesteels reveals two spying episodes: the investigation of a fisherman boat and the arrest of an Icelandic national, Ib Arnason Riis, spying for Germany. For a more detailed account see the dates of April 6 and 14, 1942.

What these episodes suggest is that the statements made at the time by Icelandic officials about the behavior of their nationals with respect to Allied troops were not really trustworthy. It can also be noted that both in Icelandic and American accounts there is a tendency to belittle the significance of the incidents. Almost always Icelanders who attack Americans are said to be drunk and similarly for Americans who assault Icelanders. When stones are thrown at Army vehicles or when military installations are damaged almost always it is specified that it was done by boys. This may of course be true in a number of cases but is it not surprising that these boys are never caught and their age never ascertained?

**Apr 16, 1942:** Prime Minister Hermann Jonasson presented the American Chargé d'Affaires with a list of 114 incidents ("attacks and bodily hurts") between American troops and the population which occurred from 26 July 1941 to 18 March 1942. This list was established by the Criminal Judge of Reyjavik; an important restriction is that this list mentions only incidents which occurred in Reykjavik. The covering letter mentions some serious incidents that occurred in the rest of Iceland but without giving a systematic count. In Reykjavik over this period of 7.5 months there were on average 18 incidents per month.

The letter of the Prime Minister points out that "many instances of attacks have not been reported to the authorities". As an example of an incident that was not included he mentioned an attack by American soldiers on two members of the Althing in a car. A memo about these complaints was transmitted by the American minister in Iceland, MacVeagh, to Secretary of State Hull. According to Hunt's thesis examples of violences mentioned in the report include the following.

* Throwing beer cans at Icelandic men and women.

* Assault with fists and even guns without apparent reason.

* Numerous brawls with Icelanders, with British and with other Americans.

* Much vandalism particularly to autos and windows of buildings.

While these incidents refer to the behavior of soldiers on leave, the Prime minister's letter also emphasized that American sentinels are "very quick to use their guns" and that Icelanders are "entirely unaccustomed to this kind of treatment".

The letter notes that when reports of incidents have been sent to the Military Authorities for investigation, the Icelandic Authorities have in most cases been given no information as to how the investigation was conducted and what sentences were passed.
General Bonesteel responded by pointing out that Icelanders were often intoxicated and that Icelandic children frequently threw stones at military vehicles. Anyway, the Americans were able to put off owing to a change of government. (Hunt 1966; State Department Papers 8559 A.20/187, May 11, 1942, National Archives of Iceland) [While Hermann Jonasson's covering letter was available at the NAI, the "enclosed" list of incidents established by the Criminal Judge was not.]

**Apr 18, 1942:** Deportation to Britain of 4 Icelandic fishermen who were allegedly corresponding with Germany (Bittner 1975, p. 555).

**Apr 21, 1942:** Cable from MacVeagh, the Minister in Iceland to the Secretary of State. [excerpt]

The British Commanding General departed this morning and the supreme military command in Iceland passed to [US] General Bonesteel. He has requested me to inform the Icelandic government secretly that in the event of an attack on this island of a nature sufficiently serious in his judgment to warrant such an action, he will instantly proclaim without further recourse to the civil authorities, the existence of a military government. He has furnished me with a copy of his proposed proclamation together with a formidable list of penal laws and penalties taken from the rules of land warfare. The General states that his proclamation has the full authority of the War Department. He also says that he had been definitely instructed [by the War Department] to proclaim military government and not simply martial law as was considered by the British. On account of our promise not to interfere with the Government of Iceland while our troops remain in the country, I believe I should take no action without specific instructions [from the Department of State]. (Foreign Relations p. 6)

[In this text, we emphasized *in his judgment* to stress that the procedure does not include any consultation with the Icelandic authorities. It is true that they were informed of the existence of this plan (yet perhaps not of its details, see below at the date of 3 July 1942) but this gave them no say in the way it would be carried out. It can be inferred that the plan for this military government was fairly similar to the one prepared in advance for Hawaii and eventually implemented after December 7, 1941.]

**Apr 24: 1942** The Military Police found that an Icelander had been shooting holes in army huts with a 0.22 caliber rifle. He was arrested and turned over to the civilian police. (NARA 1)

**May 1, 1942:** A negotiation is under way to give the US Command the right to establish two airfields. One point of paramount importance for the Icelandic government is the reversion of ownership of the land and all immovable installations to
General Bonesteel responded by pointing out that Icelanders were often intoxicated and that Icelandic children frequently threw stones at military vehicles. Anyway, the Americans were able to put off owing to a change of government. (Hunt 1966; State Department Papers 8559 A.20/187, May 11, 1942, National Archives of Iceland) [While Hermann Jonasson's covering letter was available at the NAI, the "enclosed" list of incidents established by the Criminal Judge was not.]

**Apr 18, 1942:** Deportation to Britain of 4 Icelandic fishermen who were allegedly corresponding with Germany (Bittner 1975, p. 555).

**Apr 21, 1942:** Cable from MacVeagh, the Minister in Iceland to the Secretary of State. [excerpt]

The British Commanding General departed this morning and the supreme military command in Iceland passed to [US] General Bonesteel. He has requested me to inform the Icelandic government secretly that in the event of an attack on this island of a nature sufficiently serious in his judgment to warrant such an action, he will instantly proclaim without further recourse to the civil authorities, the existence of a military government. He has furnished me with a copy of his proposed proclamation together with a formidable list of penal laws and penalties taken from the rules of land warfare. The General states that his proclamation has the full authority of the War Department. He also says that he had been definitely instructed [by the War Department] to proclaim military government and not simply martial law as was considered by the British. On account of our promise not to interfere with the Government of Iceland while our troops remain in the country, I believe I should take no action without specific instructions [from the Department of State]. (Foreign Relations p. 6)

[In this text, we emphasized *in his judgment* to stress that the procedure does not include any consultation with the Icelandic authorities. It is true that they were informed of the existence of this plan (yet perhaps not of its details, see below at the date of 3 July 1942) but this gave them no say in the way it would be carried out. It can be inferred that the plan for this military government was fairly similar to the one prepared in advance for Hawaii and eventually implemented after December 7, 1941.]

**Apr 24, 1942** The Military Police found that an Icelander had been shooting holes in army huts with a 0.22 caliber rifle. He was arrested and turned over to the civilian police. (NARA 1)

**May 1, 1942:** A negotiation is under way to give the US Command the right to establish two airfields. One point of paramount importance for the Icelandic government is the reversion of ownership of the land and all immovable installations to
Iceland at the end of the war. In return the Department of State is seeking compensations on two counts (i) most-favored nation's rights for the United States (ii) Post war commercial landing rights favoring US interests.

On 6 May the Icelandic government accepted the principle that “upon reversion US aviation interests will possess unconditional and unrestricted most-favored-nation rights with respect to the use of the [Keflavik] airdrome and also rights equal to those accorded to Icelandic aviation interests.” Some slight modification were made to the agreement on May 19. (Foreign Relations p. 6, 9)

**May 1, 1942:** Until May 1, 1942 the US forces employed a total of 3,000 Icelanders, but after this date the number decreased. In June 1942 it was 1,500, by December 1942 it was down to 480 and a year later it was 80 (Hunt 1966).

**May 7, 1942:** Cable of the Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland [excerpt:]
In lieu of the procedure suggested to you by General Bonesteel (see above 21 April) the President has authorized you to discuss with General Bonesteel and with the Icelandic Government the terms of a proclamation under which the Icelandic Government would itself proclaim martial law and delegate to the US military the full enforcement thereof. [The President fully measured that the proclamation of a Military Government would provoke discontent in Iceland and outweigh its military advantages.] (Foreign Relations p. 8)

**May 16, 1942:** Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and Icelandic Minister Thor Thors signed an exchange stabilization agreement under which 2 million dollars of the US stabilization fund will be used for stabilizing the US dollar-Icelandic krona rate of exchange (NYT p. 32).

**May 22, 1942:** ● (1,36,6) An American sentry shot and killed an 12-year old Icelandic boy. The new Prime Minister Olafur Thors asked Icelandic papers to tone down their protests (Hunt 1966, p. 105).

**May 22, 1942:** A law was passed in the Althing which instituted a Wage Arbitration Committee; this committee allowed very few increases in basic wages. Labor was of course considerably opposed to this law; it seems that it was not strictly enforced in the sense that Icelandic business and even some government agencies paid wages in excess of the legal limit. As a result, the military forces which were paying only the legal rates experienced difficulty securing labor. In August 1942 the Arbitration law was repealed; however this union victory was short-lived (see below Dec 19, 1942). (Chamberlin 1947, p. 120)

**May 29, 1942:** Three US soldiers were under arrest following the fatal shooting of a 12-year old Icelandic boy, Jan Hinrik Benediktsson, by a sentry at an American
Iceland at the end of the war. In return the Department of State is seeking compensations on two counts (i) most-favored nation's rights for the United States (ii) Post war commercial landing rights favoring US interests.

On 6 May the Icelandic government accepted the principle that “upon reversion US aviation interests will possess unconditional and unrestricted most-favored-nation rights with respect to the use of the [Keflavik] airdrome and also rights equal to those accorded to Icelandic aviation interests.” Some slight modification were made to the agreement on May 19. (Foreign Relations p. 6, 9)

**May 1, 1942:** Until May 1, 1942 the US forces employed a total of 3,000 Icelanders, but after this date the number decreased. In June 1942 it was 1,500, by December 1942 it was down to 480 and a year later it was 80 (Hunt 1966).

**May 7, 1942:** Cable of the Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland [excerpt:]

In lieu of the procedure suggested to you by General Bonesteel (see above 21 April) the President has authorized you to discuss with General Bonesteel and with the Icelandic Government the terms of a proclamation under which the Icelandic Government would itself proclaim martial law and delegate to the US military the full enforcement thereof. [The President fully measured that the proclamation of a Military Government would provoke discontent in Iceland and outweigh its military advantages.] (Foreign Relations p. 8)

**May 16, 1942:** Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and Icelandic Minister Thor Thors signed an exchange stabilization agreement under which 2 million dollars of the US stabilization fund will be used for stabilizing the US dollar-Icelandic krona rate of exchange (NYT p. 32).

**May 22, 1942:** ● (1,36,6) An American sentry shot and killed an 12-year old Icelandic boy. The new Prime Minister Olafur Thors asked Icelandic papers to tone down their protests (Hunt 1966, p. 105).

**May 22, 1942:** A law was passed in the Althing which instituted a Wage Arbitration Committee; this committee allowed very few increases in basic wages. Labor was of course considerably opposed to this law; it seems that it was not strictly enforced in the sense that Icelandic business and even some government agencies paid wages in excess of the legal limit. As a result, the military forces which were paying only the legal rates experienced difficulty securing labor. In August 1942 the Arbitration law was repealed; however this union victory was short-lived (see below Dec 19, 1942). (Chamberlin 1947, p. 120)

**May 29, 1942:** Three US soldiers were under arrest following the fatal shooting of a 12-year old Icelandic boy, Jan Hinrik Benediktsson, by a sentry at an American
Army camp. The Army is investigating (NYT p. 4).

**Jun 27, 1942:** The convoy PQ17 left Iceland bound for Murmansk on June 27. It comprised 35 merchant ships (including 22 American and 8 British ships) and transported some 600 tanks, 4,200 vehicles and 300 aircraft. According to an article published in the Sunday Times in 2003 and based on recently opened British archives, the convoy was used as a bait to lure out the German battleship Tirpitz from its anchorage in Norway. After his arrest, Ib Arnason Riis (see above at the date of 6 April 1942) accepted to work for the British. He was told to transmit the information about the departure of PQ17 which he did. However, the whole operation ended in disaster: 70% of the tonnage of PQ17 was sunk by German submarines and aircraft; the Tirpitz was not caught: after an initial move it went back to port without taking part in the attack of the convoy. Riis who was 88 years old in 2003 declared after the publication of the article: "The British cannot pin the blame on me. I had no idea what was in the message. Normally, I would code the telegram myself, but this time it was already coded and I had no idea what it was." Naturally, if the German had learned about Riis's arrest they would have guessed that his message was a trap. (Sunday Times, 25 May 2003)

**Jun 3, 1942:** A group of Icelandic fishermen were fired upon by an American sentry at Skerjafjördur (Hunt 1966, p. 108).

**Jul 3, 1942:** US Chargé in Iceland (Warner) to the US Secretary of State [excerpt:] Final Icelandic text of the proclamation to be issued by the Commanding General in case it becomes necessary for him to exercise full military control by reason of an imminent serious attack and final text of an appeal by the Prime Minister to the Icelandic people have both been printed secretly by the Icelandic Government. Some 150 copies of each were delivered this morning to General Bonesteel. (Foreign Relations p. 11)

[The expression "imminent serious attack" sounds mysterious. It can hardly refer to a big approaching fleet because Germany did not have such a fleet. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to imagine what kind of major threat Germany could have been able to exercise.]

**Jul 6, 1942:** A general election took place in July in which the Communist party doubled its number of votes (from 8.5% in 1937 to 16%) and its elected Parliament members (from 3 to 19 out of total of 49). Over the same period the support for the Social-democratic party share dropped slightly from 19% to 16%. (Thorarinsson et al 1943, p. 35)

**Jul 21, 1942:** The issue which let to the resignation of the government was a bill brought forward by the Independent Party proposing a rearrangement of the electoral
Army camp. The Army is investigating (NYT p. 4).

**Jun 27, 1942:** The convoy PQ17 left Iceland bound for Murmansk on June 27. It comprised 35 merchant ships (including 22 American and 8 British ships) and transported some 600 tanks, 4,200 vehicles and 300 aircraft. According to an article published in the Sunday Times in 2003 and based on recently opened British archives, the convoy was used as a bait to lure out the German battleship Tirpitz from its anchorage in Norway. After his arrest, Ib Arnason Riis (see above at the date of 6 April 1942) accepted to work for the British. He was told to transmit the information about the departure of PQ17 which he did. However, the whole operation ended in disaster: 70% of the tonnage of PQ17 was sunk by German submarines and aircraft; the Tirpitz was not caught: after an initial move it went back to port without taking part in the attack of the convoy. Riis who was 88 years old in 2003 declared after the publication of the article: "The British cannot pin the blame on me. I had no idea what was in the message. Normally, I would code the telegram myself, but this time it was already coded and I had no idea what it was." Naturally, if the German had learned about Riis's arrest they would have guessed that his message was a trap. (Sunday Times, 25 May 2003)

**Jun 3, 1942:** A group of Icelandic fishermen were fired upon by an American sentry at Skerjafjördur (Hunt 1966, p. 108).

**Jul 3, 1942:** US Chargé in Iceland (Warner) to the US Secretary of State [excerpt:] Final Icelandic text of the proclamation to be issued by the Commanding General in case it becomes necessary for him to exercise full military control by reason of an imminent serious attack and final text of an appeal by the Prime Minister to the Icelandic people have both been printed secretly by the Icelandic Government. Some 150 copies of each were delivered this morning to General Bonesteel. (Foreign Relations p. 11)

[The expression "imminent serious attack" sounds mysterious. It can hardly refer to a big approaching fleet because Germany did not have such a fleet. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to imagine what kind of major threat Germany could have been able to exercise.]

**Jul 6, 1942:** A general election took place in July in which the Communist party doubled its number of votes (from 8.5% in 1937 to 16%) and its elected Parliament members (from 3 to 19 out of total of 49). Over the same period the support for the Social-democratic party share dropped slightly from 19% to 16%. (Thorarinsson et al 1943, p. 35)

**Jul 21, 1942:** The issue which let to the resignation of the government was a bill brought forward by the Independent Party proposing a rearrangement of the electoral
constituencies (Times p. 3).

**Jul 22, 1942:** Cable of the US Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iceland (Warner) [excerpt].

[We] learned with regret that certain factions in Iceland seem to be agitating for a premature abrogation of the Act o Union between Denmark and Iceland. While we have no desire to interfere in purely internal Icelandic matters, we suggest that it would be in the best interests of both countries that any active move towards abrogation be quieted. (Foreign Relations p. 13)

**Aug, 1942:** In August the wage arbitration law was repealed (Chamberlin 1947 p. 120, the exact date is not given in the source)

**Aug 8, 1942:** In a memorandum handed to the US representative in Reykjavik the Althing announced its unanimous decision to abolish the union with Denmark; the memorandum stated that the process would be continued unless an opposite advice was issued by the US government before August 22. On 18 August the US State Department stressed that the maintenance of the status quo, at the moment, was in the interest of all. This advice was transmitted by the US legation in Reykjavik to the Icelandic government on August 20. As a result the Althing did not put the bill before the current session of the Althing as planned at first but the US request was not made public until October 1942. (Hardarson 1974) The cable of 18 August addressed by the US Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iceland reads: "The Government of the United States has no desire to interfere in the slightest degree with the freedom of action of the Icelandic people [but] repeats the suggestion that the abrogation question be postponed until a more favorable occasion." (Foreign Relations p. 18)

**Aug 30, 1942:** Two American soldiers broke into a private home between Reykjavik and Hafnarjördur, assaulted a woman and then raped her (Hunt 1966, p. 112).

**Aug 30, 1942:** Two US soldiers have been sentenced to 5 years of hard labor for the fatal shooting of an Icelander during a cafe brawl. A sentry who shot a 12-year old Icelandic boy has been confined to an insane asylum and another sentry who shot an Icelander in the line of duty was acquitted. All four men were tried by general courts martial. (NYT p. 27).

**Sep 21, 1942:** Memorandum of the acting chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Secretary of State, [excerpt].

The Minister of Iceland tells us informally that his brother, the Prime Minister Olafur Thors, has been under very heavy political attack as the result of his recent action in obtaining, in compliance with the suggestion of the US Government, passage by the Icelandic Parliament of a resolution shelving the independence question. He is
constituencies (Times p. 3).

**Jul 22, 1942:** Cable of the US Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iceland (Warner) [excerpt].

[We] learned with regret that certain factions in Iceland seem to be agitating for a premature abrogation of the Act o Union between Denmark and Iceland. While we have no desire to interfere in purely internal Icelandic matters, we suggest that it would be in the best interests of both countries that any active move towards abrogation be quieted. (Foreign Relations p. 13)

**Aug, 1942:** In August the wage arbitration law was repealed (Chamberlin 1947 p. 120, the exact date is not given in the source)

**Aug 8, 1942:** In a memorandum handed to the US representative in Reykjavik the Althing announced its unanimous decision to abolish the union with Denmark; the memorandum stated that the process would be continued unless an opposite advice was issued by the US government before August 22. On 18 August the US State Department stressed that the maintenance of the status quo, at the moment, was in the interest of all. This advice was transmitted by the US legation in Reykjavik to the Icelandic government on August 20. As a result the Althing did not put the bill before the current session of the Althing as planned at first but the US request was not made public until October 1942. (Hardarson 1974) The cable of 18 August addressed by the US Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iceland reads: "The Government of the United States has no desire to interfere in the slightest degree with the freedom of action of the Icelandic people [but] repeats the suggestion that the abrogation question be postponed until a more favorable occasion." (Foreign Relations p. 18)

**Aug 30, 1942:** Two American soldiers broke into a private home between Reykjavik and Hafnarjördur, assaulted a woman and then raped her (Hunt 1966, p. 112).

**Aug 30, 1942:** Two US soldiers have been sentenced to 5 years of hard labor for the fatal shooting of an Icelander during a cafe brawl. A sentry who shot a 12-year old Icelandic boy has been confined to an insane asylum and another sentry who shot an Icelander in the line of duty was acquitted. All four men were tried by general courts martial. (NYT p. 27).

**Sep 21, 1942:** Memorandum of the acting chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Secretary of State, [excerpt].

The Minister of Iceland tells us informally that his brother, the Prime Minister Olafur Thors, has been under very heavy political attack as the result of his recent action in obtaining, in compliance with the suggestion of the US Government, passage by the Icelandic Parliament of a resolution shelving the independence question. He is
faced with general elections in about three weeks and fears that his political opponents may be able to make some headway with the electorate. His position would be strengthened if the United States would approve that the new parliament pass a resolution declaring that Iceland will become a Republic in 1944. (Foreign Relations p. 21)

**Oct 31, 1942:** Elections in Iceland (NYT p. 2). The number of voters who supported the Communist Party increased from 16% in July 1942 to 19%. In the same time the support for the Social-Democratic party continued to erode: from 16% in July to 14%. The share of the other right-wing parties remained stable. (Thorarinsson et al. 1943, p. 35)

**Nov 20, 1942:** A lend-lease agreement was concluded through which the US would furnish to Britain dollars with which the latter would be able to pay its Icelandic fish imports. Iceland would in turn use these dollars to increase its imports from the United States. This agreement (in a sense similar to the Marshall plan which came into effect after the war) indeed boosted US exports to Iceland: US share in Icelandic imports increased from 1.2 percent in 1938 to 67 percent in 1944 while during the same time interval British imports from Iceland increased from 20 percent of all Icelandic exports to 90 percent. (Chamberlin 1947, p. 95; Iceland 1966 p. 208, 209).

**Dec 7, 1942:** Establishment of a Joint American-Icelandic Valuation Board. One of its purpose was to estimate the compensation to be paid to landowners on which military installations were built (NAI 1)

**Dec 16, 1942:** As the political leaders were unable to form a government the Regent formed an extra-parliamentary government which remained in power for two years until October 21, 1944 (Karlsson 2000). Headed by Prime minister Björn Thordarson, this cabinet was named the Coca-Cola rule because two of its ministers received the right to sell the products of major US companies: Björn Olafsson and Vilhjalmur Thor became head of the Coca-Cola and ESSO subsidiaries respectively (Wikipedia, article for Björn Thordarson).

**Dec 18, 1942:** The situation of fish delivery to Britain has been aggravated by the refusal of Icelandic and Faroe Island trawlers to deliver at the ports specified by the British Ministry. About 85 percent of the British supply of fish comes from the Icelandic trawlers and it has been seriously affected by the dispute with the Ministry (Times p. 2).

**Dec 19, 1942:** The Wage Arbitration Committee was reestablished. Since an extra-parliamentary Cabinet was in power, it is not clear whether or not this decision was approved by the Althing. In order to get a better understanding of this event one must
faced with general elections in about three weeks and fears that his political opponents may be able to make some headway with the electorate. His position would be strengthened if the United States would approve that the new parliament pass a resolution declaring that Iceland will become a Republic in 1944. (Foreign Relations p. 21)

**Oct 31, 1942:** Elections in Iceland (NYT p. 2). The number of voters who supported the Communist Party increased from 16% in July 1942 to 19%. In the same time the support for the Social-Democratic party continued to erode: from 16% in July to 14%. The share of the other right-wing parties remained stable. (Thorarinsson et al. 1943, p. 35)

**Nov 20, 1942:** A lend-lease agreement was concluded through which the US would furnish to Britain dollars with which the latter would be able to pay its Icelandic fish imports. Iceland would in turn use these dollars to increase its imports from the United States. This agreement (in a sense similar to the Marshall plan which came into effect after the war) indeed boosted US exports to Iceland: US share in Icelandic imports increased from 1.2 percent in 1938 to 67 percent in 1944 while during the same time interval British imports from Iceland increased from 20 percent of all Icelandic exports to 90 percent. (Chamberlin 1947, p. 95; Iceland 1966 p. 208, 209).

**Dec 7, 1942:** Establishment of a Joint American-Icelandic Valuation Board. One of its purpose was to estimate the compensation to be paid to landowners on which military installations were built (NAI 1)

**Dec 16, 1942:** As the political leaders were unable to form a government the Regent formed an extra-parliamentary government which remained in power for two years until October 21, 1944 (Karlsson 2000). Headed by Prime minister Björn Thordarson, this cabinet was named the Coca-Cola rule because two of its ministers received the right to sell the products of major US companies: Björn Olafsson and Vilhjalmur Thor became head of the Coca-Cola and ESSO subsidiaries respectively (Wikipedia, article for Björn Thordarson).

**Dec 18, 1942:** The situation of fish delivery to Britain has been aggravated by the refusal of Icelandic and Faroe Island trawlers to deliver at the ports specified by the British Ministry. About 85 percent of the British supply of fish comes from the Icelandic trawlers and it has been seriously affected by the dispute with the Ministry (Times p. 2).

**Dec 19, 1942:** The Wage Arbitration Committee was reestablished. Since an extra-parliamentary Cabinet was in power, it is not clear whether or not this decision was approved by the Althing. In order to get a better understanding of this event one must
take a look at the evolution of real wages during previous years. The figures given by Chamberlin (1947, p. 109) show that real hourly wage of day labor remained almost unchanged from 1939 to early 1942. Then, it began to rise strongly with an overall increase of about 50 percent in 1942. Naturally, this situation was not satisfactory for the occupation forces which employed a substantial number of Icelanders. The establishment, suppression and reestablishment of wage control that occurred in 1942 illustrate the competition between Icelandic workers and occupation forces with the latter eventually prevailing over the former. (Chamberlin 1947, p. 104, 108, 120)

**Dec 28, 1942:** Excerpt of a letter of the Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American Minister in Iceland. [The letter concerns the operation of the Joint Icelandic-American Claims Board which is composed of three persons: one Icelandic member, one American member and an arbitrator who is an Icelander.] "It has been brought to the attention of this Ministry that even in a case in which the American member had declared himself in agreement with the Icelandic members, the United States Military authorities have refused to follow the decision of the board. It would seem from the above that some definite rules need to be established as to the authority of the Joint Icelandic-American Claims Board." (NAI 1)

[The fact that an unanimous decision of the Board can be overruled by the Commanding General shows that its approval is not just a formality required by US Army rules, but that this right can be used to veto the Board's decisions.]

**Dec 31, 1942:** During 1939 and 1942 the price of many foodstuffs tripled approximately. For instance the price of cheese was multiplied by 3.7, the price of beef by 3.1 and the price of eggs by 3.3. (Thorarinsson et al. 1943, p. 58)

## 1943

**Jan 8, 1943:** The British Ministry of War Transport has reached an agreement with the Icelandic government regarding the ports of landing of Icelandic trawlers (Times p. 2).

**Jan 14, 1943** In a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the American Legation in Reykjavik makes clear that the Joint Icelandic-American Claims Board has no authority to deal with claims against the United States Navy. The Commandant of the US Naval Base in Iceland has established a claim commission consisting of Naval officers in compliance with public law No 393. (NAI 1)

[In contrast to the Icelandic-American Claims Board, the commission established by the US Navy does not seem to comprise representatives of the Icelandic government.]

**Apr 3, 1943:** Found guilty of fishing in Icelandic territorial water and of resisting
take a look at the evolution of real wages during previous years. The figures given by Chamberlin (1947, p. 109) show that real hourly wage of day labor remained almost unchanged from 1939 to early 1942. Then, it began to rise strongly with an overall increase of about 50 percent in 1942. Naturally, this situation was not satisfactory for the occupation forces which employed a substantial number of Icelanders. The establishment, suppression and reestablishment of wage control that occurred in 1942 illustrate the competition between Icelandic workers and occupation forces with the latter eventually prevailing over the former. (Chamberlin 1947, p. 104, 108, 120)

**Dec 28, 1942:** Excerpt of a letter of the Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American Minister in Iceland. [The letter concerns the operation of the Joint Icelandic-American Claims Board which is composed of three persons: one Icelandic member, one American member and an arbitrator who is an Icelander.] "It has been brought to the attention of this Ministry that even in a case in which the American member had declared himself in agreement with the Icelandic members, the United States Military authorities have refused to follow the decision of the board. It would seem from the above that some definite rules need to be established as to the authority of the Joint Icelandic-American Claims Board." (NAI 1)

[The fact that an unanimous decision of the Board can be overruled by the Commanding General shows that its approval is not just a formality required by US Army rules, but that this right can be used to veto the Board's decisions.]

**Dec 31, 1942:** During 1939 and 1942 the price of many foodstuffs tripled approximately. For instance the price of cheese was multiplied by 3.7, the price of beef by 3.1 and the price of eggs by 3.3. (Thorarinsson et al. 1943, p. 58)

## 1943

**Jan 8, 1943:** The British Ministry of War Transport has reached an agreement with the Icelandic government regarding the ports of landing of Icelandic trawlers (Times p. 2).

**Jan 14, 1943** In a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the American Legation in Reykjavik makes clear that the Joint Icelandic-American Claims Board has no authority to deal with claims against the United States Navy. The Commandant of the US Naval Base in Iceland has established a claim commission consisting of Naval officers in compliance with public law No 393. (NAI 1)

[In contrast to the Icelandic-American Claims Board, the commission established by the US Navy does not seem to comprise representatives of the Icelandic government.]

**Apr 3, 1943:** Found guilty of fishing in Icelandic territorial water and of resisting
arrest, the skipper of a British trawler was fined 1,500 pounds sterling and ordered to be held in custody for two months. His catch and fishing equipment were confiscated. (Times p. 3)

**May 3, 1943:** ● (15,36,6) A B-24 crashed near the Royal Air Force airdrome at Kaldadarnes in Iceland. Before that the pilot tried to land at Meeks Field. The pilot of the aircraft, Capt. Robert H. Shannon, the copilot Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews, four additional crewmen and eight passengers were fatally injured. One crewman, the tail gunner, escaped with only minor injuries. The crash occurred under difficult weather conditions: low clouds, rain and reduced visibility. (Website of the Official Museum of the United States Air Force)

**May 28, 1943:** An American aircraft crashed when stalled on takeoff at Reykjavik airport. (1942 USAAF Serial Numbers, website)

**Jun 6, 1943:** An American B-17 aircraft crashed near Meeks Field, Iceland. (May 1943 USAAF Overseas Accident Reports, website)

**Oct 9, 1943:** Weddings took place in New York between two Navy pilots and two Icelandic girls. The brides who are of Norwegian descent speak English fluently but with a slight accent (NYT p. 15).

**Dec 13, 1943:** Excerpts of a letter sent by Mr. Leland Morris, American Legation in Reykjavik, to Mr. Vilhjalmur Thor, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

I have the honor to refer to the law which was passed by the Althing on November 26, 1943 providing for the settlement of claims of nationals of Iceland against the armed forces of the United States by Icelandic courts. My government regrets that the Government of Iceland should have seen fit to enact legislation which in effect implies dissatisfaction with Claims Commission established by the US Army. I desire to point out that my government cannot recognize that judgments obtained under this law in any way obligate the United States. (NAI 1)

## 1944

**Jan 1944:** "For seventeen months, I was in Iceland assigned to working in the Radio Station which was a short distance from the camp known as H.M.S. BALDUR 2 just outside Reykjavik. The Icelandic people were very much anti-British. They would not sit next to you in the local cinema, and as you walked in Reykjavik you could expect empty bottles to be aimed at you from the top of buildings". (BBC: Archive List, World, Iceland: Second part of Alfred Longbottom's war time experiences in the Navy as a decoder, 1941 - 1945).
arrest, the skipper of a British trawler was fined 1,500 pounds sterling and ordered to be held in custody for two months. His catch and fishing equipment were confiscated. (Times p. 3)

**May 3, 1943:** ● (15,36,6) A B-24 crashed near the Royal Air Force airdrome at Kaldadarnes in Iceland. Before that the pilot tried to land at Meeks Field. The pilot of the aircraft, Capt. Robert H. Shannon, the copilot Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews, four additional crewmen and eight passengers were fatally injured. One crewman, the tail gunner, escaped with only minor injuries. The crash occurred under difficult weather conditions: low clouds, rain and reduced visibility. (Website of the Official Museum of the United States Air Force)

**May 28, 1943:** An American aircraft crashed when stalled on takeoff at Reykjavik airport. (1942 USAAF Serial Numbers, website)

**Jun 6, 1943:** An American B-17 aircraft crashed near Meeks Field, Iceland. (May 1943 USAAF Overseas Accident Reports, website)

**Oct 9, 1943:** Weddings took place in New York between two Navy pilots and two Icelandic girls. The brides who are of Norwegian descent speak English fluently but with a slight accent (NYT p. 15).

**Dec 13, 1943:** Excerpts of a letter sent by Mr. Leland Morris, American Legation in Reykjavik, to Mr. Vilhjalmur Thor, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
I have the honor to refer to the law which was passed by the Althing on November 26, 1943 providing for the settlement of claims of nationals of Iceland against the armed forces of the United States by Icelandic courts. My government regrets that the Government of Iceland should have seen fit to enact legislation which in effect implies dissatisfaction with Claims Commission established by the US Army. I desire to point out that my government cannot recognize that judgments obtained under this law in any way obligate the United States. (NAI 1)

## 1944

**Jan 1944:** "For seventeen months, I was in Iceland assigned to working in the Radio Station which was a short distance from the camp known as H.M.S. BALDUR 2 just outside Reykjavik. The Icelandic people were very much anti-British. They would not sit next to you in the local cinema, and as you walked in Reykjavik you could expect empty bottles to be aimed at you from the top of buildings". (BBC: Archive List, World, Iceland: Second part of Alfred Longbottom's war time experiences in the Navy as a decoder, 1941 - 1945).
[As the stay of Longbottom lasted from January 1944 to May 1945 we do not know more precisely the time period to which he refers.]

**Jan 1, 1944:** Activity of the American-Icelandic Claims Board in December 1943. 28 new claims were received. 46 cases were processed; of these 34 claims were accepted, 9 were discarded and 3 serious cases have been returned by the War Department [which means that the War Department in Washington did not accept the proposed settlement and required the Board to work out a new one.] (NAI 2, Letter addressed to Mr Leland Morris, American Minister in Reykjavik)

[The number of new claims in December 1943 is consistent with the average rate of 20 claims by month given in Chapter 1.]

**Feb 1944:** The Althing informed the civil servants in charge of the government in Denmark that it had resolved to establish a republic and abrogate the union with Denmark (Hardarson 1974).

**May 4, 1944:** King Christian X of Denmark sent a message to the Icelandic government in which he expressed the hope that the decision on complete severance of the ties between the two nations would be deferred until after the war. He said that in the present circumstances he could not recognize the changes that had been decided unilaterally by the Althing. (Hardarson 1974)

**Sep 18, 1944:** The Icelandic Cabinet has offered its resignation (Times p. 4).

**Oct 24, 1944:** HMCS 21 Skeena, a destroyer that served in the Royal Canadian Navy, was lost in a storm on the night of 24 October 1944. She was anchored off Reykjavik, Iceland and dragged her anchor and grounded in 15 meter waves off Videy Island with the loss of 15 crewmembers. (Wikipedia, English, article "Skeena")

**Dec 11, 1944:** An American aircraft was wrecked when a tire burst on takeoff at the RAF base of Kaldadarnes, Iceland (1942 USAAF Serial Numbers, website)

## 1945

**Mar 14, 1945** Iceland students fly to the United States. (NYT p. 6)

**Feb 24, 1945:** Meeting of the Joint American-Icelandic Claims Board [excerpts of the minutes]. Three members were present when the Board convened at 10:00 hours: (i) Mr. Ragnar Jonsson, chairman (ii) Theodor B. Lindal, Lawyer of the Supreme Court (iii) Major Edward Roberts. The chairman presented a letter from the Ministry of Finance dated 22 February 1945 requesting that the Board give the Ministry

<footnote>21Her Majesty Canadian Ship</footnote>
[As the stay of Longbottom lasted from January 1944 to May 1945 we do not know more precisely the time period to which he refers.]

**Jan 1, 1944:** Activity of the American-Icelandic Claims Board in December 1943. 28 new claims were received. 46 cases were processed; of these 34 claims were accepted, 9 were discarded and 3 serious cases have been returned by the War Department [which means that the War Department in Washington did not accept the proposed settlement and required the Board to work out a new one.] (NAI 2, Letter addressed to Mr Leland Morris, American Minister in Reykjavik)

[The number of new claims in December 1943 is consistent with the average rate of 20 claims by month given in Chapter 1.]

**Feb 1944:** The Althing informed the civil servants in charge of the government in Denmark that it had resolved to establish a republic and abrogate the union with Denmark (Hardarson 1974).

**May 4, 1944:** King Christian X of Denmark sent a message to the Icelandic government in which he expressed the hope that the decision on complete severance of the ties between the two nations would be deferred until after the war. He said that in the present circumstances he could not recognize the changes that had been decided unilaterally by the Althing. (Hardarson 1974)

**Sep 18, 1944:** The Icelandic Cabinet has offered its resignation (Times p. 4).

**Oct 24, 1944:** HMCS 21 Skeena, a destroyer that served in the Royal Canadian Navy, was lost in a storm on the night of 24 October 1944. She was anchored off Reykjavik, Iceland and dragged her anchor and grounded in 15 meter waves off Videy Island with the loss of 15 crewmembers. (Wikipedia, English, article "Skeena")

**Dec 11, 1944:** An American aircraft was wrecked when a tire burst on takeoff at the RAF base of Kaldadarnes, Iceland (1942 USAAF Serial Numbers, website)

## 1945

**Mar 14, 1945** Iceland students fly to the United States. (NYT p. 6)

**Feb 24, 1945:** Meeting of the Joint American-Icelandic Claims Board [excerpts of the minutes]. Three members were present when the Board convened at 10:00 hours: (i) Mr. Ragnar Jonsson, chairman (ii) Theodor B. Lindal, Lawyer of the Supreme Court (iii) Major Edward Roberts. The chairman presented a letter from the Ministry of Finance dated 22 February 1945 requesting that the Board give the Ministry

<footnote>21Her Majesty Canadian Ship</footnote>
an accurate report on the evidence in connection with the accident which were at the disposal of the Board and upon which its decision was founded [the document does not give more details about the accident; clearly it was a case examined in an earlier meeting of the Board]. Major Roberts informed the Board that the relevant information was passed to Board members in a confidential relationship. The Icelandic members admit that they have received such information as confidential matter and handled it accordingly; they consider themselves bound to do so in the future.

The Board unanimously held that the request of the Ministry could not be granted as the result of the ruling of the Military and the desire of the Commanding General. The Board adjourned at 11:00 hours to meet again at the call of the chairman. (NAI 2)

[It should be noted that this meeting occurred as the war against Germany was almost over. Nevertheless, the Board considered that it was impossible to inform the Ministry of Finance of Iceland on the precise circumstances of an accident.]

**Aug 27, 1945:** The Statue of Liberty gleamed out a welcome to 52 newcomers to America last night as 31 Icelandic war brides and 21 war babies sailed up the bay aboard the Navy transport "Tarazed". (NYT p. 21)

**Oct 1945:** Following the US request for bases, Jonas Jonsson devoted several pamphlets and speeches to promoting this cause. A well-known Icelandic writer and former leader of the Progressive Party, Jonsson was the only politician in early 1946 who stated that Iceland should accept US military bases (Nuechterlein 1961). In a cable that Barnes, the US Chargé in Iceland, addressed to the Secretary of State on 25 February 1942, he says that "Jonas Jonsson is the power behind the Prime Minister" and notes that he has frequent contacts with him. (Foreign Relations p. 2)

**Nov 1, 1945:** 1,260 claims had been investigated by the Joint Claims Commission between Americans and Icelanders and compensations had been paid for 900 (Hunt 1966). 1,260 claims in 51 months represent a rate of 24 cases per month. A rough calculation performed above (see July 11, 1941) for the period of the British occupation gave a rate of some 25 cases per month.

[It would be of great interest to read a description of the cases settled by the Commission; our attempts to get these files from the National Archives of Iceland have been unsuccessful so far.]

## 1946

**Apr 27, 1946:** Olafur Thors, Prime Minister of Iceland, said that the United States had approached the Icelandic Government last fall to discuss the possibilities of ac-
an accurate report on the evidence in connection with the accident which were at the disposal of the Board and upon which its decision was founded [the document does not give more details about the accident; clearly it was a case examined in an earlier meeting of the Board]. Major Roberts informed the Board that the relevant information was passed to Board members in a confidential relationship. The Icelandic members admit that they have received such information as confidential matter and handled it accordingly; they consider themselves bound to do so in the future.

The Board unanimously held that the request of the Ministry could not be granted as the result of the ruling of the Military and the desire of the Commanding General. The Board adjourned at 11:00 hours to meet again at the call of the chairman. (NAI 2)

[It should be noted that this meeting occurred as the war against Germany was almost over. Nevertheless, the Board considered that it was impossible to inform the Ministry of Finance of Iceland on the precise circumstances of an accident.]

**Aug 27, 1945:** The Statue of Liberty gleamed out a welcome to 52 newcomers to America last night as 31 Icelandic war brides and 21 war babies sailed up the bay aboard the Navy transport "Tarazed". (NYT p. 21)

**Oct 1945:** Following the US request for bases, Jonas Jonsson devoted several pamphlets and speeches to promoting this cause. A well-known Icelandic writer and former leader of the Progressive Party, Jonsson was the only politician in early 1946 who stated that Iceland should accept US military bases (Nuechterlein 1961). In a cable that Barnes, the US Chargé in Iceland, addressed to the Secretary of State on 25 February 1942, he says that "Jonas Jonsson is the power behind the Prime Minister" and notes that he has frequent contacts with him. (Foreign Relations p. 2)

**Nov 1, 1945:** 1,260 claims had been investigated by the Joint Claims Commission between Americans and Icelanders and compensations had been paid for 900 (Hunt 1966). 1,260 claims in 51 months represent a rate of 24 cases per month. A rough calculation performed above (see July 11, 1941) for the period of the British occupation gave a rate of some 25 cases per month.

[It would be of great interest to read a description of the cases settled by the Commission; our attempts to get these files from the National Archives of Iceland have been unsuccessful so far.]

## 1946

**Apr 27, 1946:** Olafur Thors, Prime Minister of Iceland, said that the United States had approached the Icelandic Government last fall to discuss the possibilities of ac-
quiring military bases in this country on long-term leases. The query is tied up with desired membership in the United Nations. (NYT p. 5)

**Apr 28, 1946:** Iceland rejected the US bid for bases. The decision was announced by the Prime Minister as the State Department confirmed the failure of earlier talks. (NYT p. 8)

**Aug 21, 1946:** Russia endorsed the applications of Iceland and Sweden for membership in the United Nations, thus assuring a favorable recommendation for those nations from the Security Council to the General Assembly. (NYT p. 12)

**Sep 21, 1946:** The State Department announced that American military and naval personnel would be withdrawn from Iceland in 180 days. (NYT p. 1)

**Sep 25, 1946:** Protesting the proposed Icelandic-United States agreement about air bases in Iceland, a crowd of Icelanders attacked the mayor of Reykjavik and the- atened Prime Minister Olafur Thors. On 23 September the Federation of Icelandic Trade Unions started a 24 hour general strike in protest against the accord. Mayor Bjarni Benediktsson was attacked as he left a hall in which members of the Icelandic Conservative Party had heard speeches favoring the agreement. The Icelandic Communists have worked in the Cabinet in collaboration with Con- servatives and Social Democrats for nearly 2 years but they said that they will leave the government if the agreement is ratified by the Althing. (NYT p. 6)

**Sep 26, 1946:** Iceland strike protesting US bases <sup>22</sup> gets little support (NYT p. 12).

**Oct 4, 1946:** A strong British note supporting the US request for bases in Iceland has been forwarded by the British Foreign Office to the Icelandic government. The note emphasized that rejection would create a bad impression in London. (North China Daily News, p. 6)

**Oct 7, 1946:** By a vote of 32 to 19 the Icelandic Parliament ratified an agreement with the US for the American use of the Keflavik airport. (North China Daily News, p. 1)

**Oct 8, 1946:** The Icelandic parliament passed a law giving the United States the right to use the Keflavik airbase. The law passed 32 against 19. Among the 19 who opposed it were 10 Communists and 9 social-democrats. In protest the Communist ministers left the government. (Humanité p. 3)

**Oct 24, 1946:** American troops are leaving Iceland. The airfield of Keflavik will be transferred to Iceland. The last troops left Iceland in April 1947. (NYT 24 October

<footnote n="22"><sup>22</sup>These bases should be manned by civilians.</footnote>
quiring military bases in this country on long-term leases. The query is tied up with desired membership in the United Nations. (NYT p. 5)

**Apr 28, 1946:** Iceland rejected the US bid for bases. The decision was announced by the Prime Minister as the State Department confirmed the failure of earlier talks. (NYT p. 8)

**Aug 21, 1946:** Russia endorsed the applications of Iceland and Sweden for membership in the United Nations, thus assuring a favorable recommendation for those nations from the Security Council to the General Assembly. (NYT p. 12)

**Sep 21, 1946:** The State Department announced that American military and naval personnel would be withdrawn from Iceland in 180 days. (NYT p. 1)

**Sep 25, 1946:** Protesting the proposed Icelandic-United States agreement about air bases in Iceland, a crowd of Icelanders attacked the mayor of Reykjavik and the- atened Prime Minister Olafur Thors. On 23 September the Federation of Icelandic Trade Unions started a 24 hour general strike in protest against the accord. Mayor Bjarni Benediktsson was attacked as he left a hall in which members of the Icelandic Conservative Party had heard speeches favoring the agreement. The Icelandic Communists have worked in the Cabinet in collaboration with Con- servatives and Social Democrats for nearly 2 years but they said that they will leave the government if the agreement is ratified by the Althing. (NYT p. 6)

**Sep 26, 1946:** Iceland strike protesting US bases <sup>22</sup> gets little support (NYT p. 12).

**Oct 4, 1946:** A strong British note supporting the US request for bases in Iceland has been forwarded by the British Foreign Office to the Icelandic government. The note emphasized that rejection would create a bad impression in London. (North China Daily News, p. 6)

**Oct 7, 1946:** By a vote of 32 to 19 the Icelandic Parliament ratified an agreement with the US for the American use of the Keflavik airport. (North China Daily News, p. 1)

**Oct 8, 1946:** The Icelandic parliament passed a law giving the United States the right to use the Keflavik airbase. The law passed 32 against 19. Among the 19 who opposed it were 10 Communists and 9 social-democrats. In protest the Communist ministers left the government. (Humanité p. 3)

**Oct 24, 1946:** American troops are leaving Iceland. The airfield of Keflavik will be transferred to Iceland. The last troops left Iceland in April 1947. (NYT 24 October

<footnote n="22"><sup>22</sup>These bases should be manned by civilians.</footnote>
1946 p. 7; NYT 26 October 1946 p. 7; NYT 3 April 1947 p. 12)

1947-2006

**Feb 5, 1947:** Ending the political crisis a Cabinet is formed in Iceland in which the Communists hold no portfolio. (NYT p. 2)

**Jul 18, 1948:** Iceland was the first nation to receive a loan from the Economic Cooperation Administration, under the Marshall Plan. (NYT p. E8)

**Mar 31, 1949:** Defying club-swinging police, demonstrators hurled stones into the chambers of the Icelandic Parliament while it was voting, 37 to 13, to join the North Atlantic treaty. (NYT p. 2)

**May 31, 1949:** Minutes of the Meeting of the American-Icelandic Claims Board, published 7 June 1949 [excerpts]. Present at the meeting were the two representatives of the Icelandic government Ragnar Jónsson, Theodor Líndal and the United States Army Representative Major Ragnar Stefánsson. No new claims had arisen since the last meeting. It was therefore the unanimous decision of the Board that the American-Icelandic Claims Board will cease to exist as of May 31, 1949. (NAI 2)

**Oct 26, 1949:** At the general election in Iceland the Communists lost their only seat. (NYT p. 2)

**May 1950:** The Icelandic government signed a base treaty with the United States in May 1950. The people of Iceland, however, insisted on a severe policy of separation. American servicemen were not allowed to date or marry Icelandic women. Moreover, commanders could issue only 100 weekend passes at any time to American soldiers visiting Reykjavik. (Baker 2004, p. 53)

**May 8, 1951:** Brig. Gen. Edward J. McGaw landed by air with the first contingent (200 memn) of United States Army, Navy and Air Forces to help defend Iceland. (NYT p. 13)

**Oct 24, 1951:** The US Navy will expand its Icelandic force. (NYT p. 7)

**Nov 2, 1951:** Iceland received a loan of $ 1 million. (NYT p. 73)

**Nov 1953:** The Defense Agreement obtained by Iceland in its negotiations with the United States contained two important points: (i) The American prime contractor against whom there had been displayed much public dissatisfaction because of violations of Icelandic labor regulations was to cease all construction operations in Iceland. In its place, Icelandic contractors would receive contracts from the Defense
1946 p. 7; NYT 26 October 1946 p. 7; NYT 3 April 1947 p. 12)

1947-2006

**Feb 5, 1947:** Ending the political crisis a Cabinet is formed in Iceland in which the Communists hold no portfolio. (NYT p. 2)

**Jul 18, 1948:** Iceland was the first nation to receive a loan from the Economic Co-operation Administration, under the Marshall Plan. (NYT p. E8)

**Mar 31, 1949:** Defying club-swinging police, demonstrators hurled stones into the chambers of the Icelandic Parliament while it was voting, 37 to 13, to join the North Atlantic treaty. (NYT p. 2)

**May 31, 1949:** Minutes of the Meeting of the American-Icelandic Claims Board, published 7 June 1949 [excerpts]. Present at the meeting were the two representatives of the Icelandic government Ragnar Jónsson, Theodor Líndal and the United States Army Representative Major Ragnar Stefánsson. No new claims had arisen since the last meeting. It was therefore the unanimous decision of the Board that the American-Icelandic Claims Board will cease to exist as of May 31, 1949. (NAI 2)

**Oct 26, 1949:** At the general election in Iceland the Communists lost their only seat. (NYT p. 2)

**May 1950:** The Icelandic government signed a base treaty with the United States in May 1950. The people of Iceland, however, insisted on a severe policy of separation. American servicemen were not allowed to date or marry Icelandic women. Moreover, commanders could issue only 100 weekend passes at any time to American soldiers visiting Reykjavik. (Baker 2004, p. 53)

**May 8, 1951:** Brig. Gen. Edward J. McGaw landed by air with the first contingent (200 memn) of United States Army, Navy and Air Forces to help defend Iceland. (NYT p. 13)

**Oct 24, 1951:** The US Navy will expand its Icelandic force. (NYT p. 7)

**Nov 2, 1951:** Iceland received a loan of $ 1 million. (NYT p. 73)

**Nov 1953:** The Defense Agreement obtained by Iceland in its negotiations with the United States contained two important points: (i) The American prime contractor against whom there had been displayed much public dissatisfaction because of violations of Icelandic labor regulations was to cease all construction operations in Iceland. In its place, Icelandic contractors would receive contracts from the Defense
Forces directly. (ii) A fence will be erected around the Keflavik base. The American press commented with displeasure that US forces were being fenced in. (Nuechterlein 1961)

**Dec 21, 1953:** A US Navy Neptune bomber crashed atop an Icelandic glacier. The 9 crewmen were killed. (NYT p. 8)

**Oct 11, 1955:** Three American firms were named in an inquiry conducted by the Icelandic police about the biggest currency fraud ever revealed there (NYT p. 77)

**Mar 28, 1956:** The Icelandic parliament adopted a motion calling for the withdrawal of US military forces from Iceland (Nuechterlein 1961, ch. 1).

**Mar 30, 1956:** The effect of Parliament's bid for withdrawal is still under State Department study. United States officials were hopeful today that continued American use of the Keflavik air base in Iceland could be arranged. (NYT p. 30)

**Apr 8, 1956:** Vigorous labor leadership has gained following even among non-Communists. The ruler and guiding spirit of Iceland's Communists is a hard-bitten, little old man. (NYT p. 35)

**May 17, 1956:** All work on an air base to be built for the United States in Iceland has been "temporarily held up." (NYT p. 1)

**Jun 20, 1956:** Four Icelandic parties urged an exit of US troops. The United States chances of retaining the big Keflavik air base appeared in grave doubt tonight near the end of Iceland's parliamentary election campaign. (NYT p. 1)

**Jun 26, 1956:** Anti-US parties won the Icelandic vote, but they fell short of a clear majority needed to take over the Government. Washington said it would remove troops if asked. (NYT p. 1)

**Aug 1, 1956:** Iceland's new Government issued a statement saying its main objective in defense policy was for United States armed forces to withdraw and for Iceland herself to safeguard and maintain the defense installations. (NYT p. 4)

**Oct 2, 1956:** As bilateral talks on the future of United States troops in Iceland began, Iceland remains firm on their withdrawal. (NYT p. 1)

**Oct 19, 1956:** The Lower House of the Althing, Iceland's Parliament, today elected Einar Olgiersson, founder of the Icelandic Communist party, as its speaker. Mr. Olgeirsson has just returned from an annual trip to Moscow. (NYT p. 3)

**Nov 20, 1956:** Members of the Government of Iceland appear to have changed their minds about sending home the United States troops now manning the big Keflavik
Forces directly. (ii) A fence will be erected around the Keflavik base. The American press commented with displeasure that US forces were being fenced in. (Nuechterlein 1961)

**Dec 21, 1953:** A US Navy Neptune bomber crashed atop an Icelandic glacier. The 9 crewmen were killed. (NYT p. 8)

**Oct 11, 1955:** Three American firms were named in an inquiry conducted by the Icelandic police about the biggest currency fraud ever revealed there (NYT p. 77)

**Mar 28, 1956:** The Icelandic parliament adopted a motion calling for the withdrawal of US military forces from Iceland (Nuechterlein 1961, ch. 1).

**Mar 30, 1956:** The effect of Parliament's bid for withdrawal is still under State Department study. United States officials were hopeful today that continued American use of the Keflavik air base in Iceland could be arranged. (NYT p. 30)

**Apr 8, 1956:** Vigorous labor leadership has gained following even among non-Communists. The ruler and guiding spirit of Iceland's Communists is a hard-bitten, little old man. (NYT p. 35)

**May 17, 1956:** All work on an air base to be built for the United States in Iceland has been "temporarily held up." (NYT p. 1)

**Jun 20, 1956:** Four Icelandic parties urged an exit of US troops. The United States chances of retaining the big Keflavik air base appeared in grave doubt tonight near the end of Iceland's parliamentary election campaign. (NYT p. 1)

**Jun 26, 1956:** Anti-US parties won the Icelandic vote, but they fell short of a clear majority needed to take over the Government. Washington said it would remove troops if asked. (NYT p. 1)

**Aug 1, 1956:** Iceland's new Government issued a statement saying its main objective in defense policy was for United States armed forces to withdraw and for Iceland herself to safeguard and maintain the defense installations. (NYT p. 4)

**Oct 2, 1956:** As bilateral talks on the future of United States troops in Iceland began, Iceland remains firm on their withdrawal. (NYT p. 1)

**Oct 19, 1956:** The Lower House of the Althing, Iceland's Parliament, today elected Einar Olgiersson, founder of the Icelandic Communist party, as its speaker. Mr. Olgeirsson has just returned from an annual trip to Moscow. (NYT p. 3)

**Nov 20, 1956:** Members of the Government of Iceland appear to have changed their minds about sending home the United States troops now manning the big Keflavik
airbase. (NYT p. 10)

[What brought about this change of mind with respect to the position held by the government less than 2 months earlier? Was it a promise about some economic compensation? ]

Dec 29, 1956: The United States granted Iceland a new credit. (NYT p. 10)

**Jan 7, 1958:** Iceland's foreign commerce in 1957 was characterized by the steady increase in trade with Eastern Europe, primarily with the Soviet Union, and the rapid decline in trade with the United States. (NYT p. 66)

**Jul 14, 1959:** US servicemen have been forbidden access to Thingvellir (Plains of Assembly) where the nation's parliament was established in 930. Thingvellir, 50 kilometer from Reykjavik, has long been a favorite sight-seeing spot for foreign tourists and Icelanders. Recently it became a place where American servicemen held week end parties with Icelandic girls. The area was reported to have been left littered. After a Lutheran minister had complained Foreign Minister Gudmundsson forbade further visits by American servicemen. (NYT p. 4)

**Dec 6, 1959:** The United States has decided to withdraw from Iceland a 1,300-man Army unit. Factor in withdrawal was said to be Lack of harmony in G.I.-citizenry relations.

The move will leave about 4,000 US soldiers mainly Air Force personnel manning an air base and radar installation. It is understood that there are two important factors in this decision (i) It will save money (ii) It was said that the relations between the US personnel and the Icelanders have not been harmonious. An incident on September 5 forced the withdrawal of the American Commander, Brigadier General Gilbert L. Pritchard at the request of the Icelandic government. The incident involved a US sentry who forced two Icelandic Civil Air Defense officials to lie face down on wet ground while he ascertained their right to enter the base. Yesterday, it became known that Negro troops have not been sent to Iceland in deference to objections raised by the Icelandic government. (NYT p. 1)

[Withdrawing some troops and revealing the opposition (made orally) with respect to Negro troops were probably responses to the demand made by the Icelandic government to remove the US Commander.]

**Feb 21, 1960:** An aid of $ 20 million from the O.E.E.C. will help Iceland implement its stabilization plan. The krona is pegged at 32 krona to a dollar. The Bank rate was put at 11%. (NYT 21 February 1960 p. 7, NYT 23 February 1960 p. 6)

**Oct 8, 1961:** The United States will aid Iceland schools. (NYT p. 8)

**Jun 1, 2003:** A fight broke out between Icelanders and Americans, which resulted in
airbase. (NYT p. 10)

[What brought about this change of mind with respect to the position held by the government less than 2 months earlier? Was it a promise about some economic compensation? ]

Dec 29, 1956: The United States granted Iceland a new credit. (NYT p. 10)

**Jan 7, 1958:** Iceland's foreign commerce in 1957 was characterized by the steady increase in trade with Eastern Europe, primarily with the Soviet Union, and the rapid decline in trade with the United States. (NYT p. 66)

**Jul 14, 1959:** US servicemen have been forbidden access to Thingvellir (Plains of Assembly) where the nation's parliament was established in 930. Thingvellir, 50 kilometer from Reykjavik, has long been a favorite sight-seeing spot for foreign tourists and Icelanders. Recently it became a place where American servicemen held week end parties with Icelandic girls. The area was reported to have been left littered. After a Lutheran minister had complained Foreign Minister Gudmundsson forbade further visits by American servicemen. (NYT p. 4)

**Dec 6, 1959:** The United States has decided to withdraw from Iceland a 1,300-man Army unit. Factor in withdrawal was said to be Lack of harmony in G.I.-citizenry relations.

The move will leave about 4,000 US soldiers mainly Air Force personnel manning an air base and radar installation. It is understood that there are two important factors in this decision (i) It will save money (ii) It was said that the relations between the US personnel and the Icelanders have not been harmonious. An incident on September 5 forced the withdrawal of the American Commander, Brigadier General Gilbert L. Pritchard at the request of the Icelandic government. The incident involved a US sentry who forced two Icelandic Civil Air Defense officials to lie face down on wet ground while he ascertained their right to enter the base. Yesterday, it became known that Negro troops have not been sent to Iceland in deference to objections raised by the Icelandic government. (NYT p. 1)

[Withdrawing some troops and revealing the opposition (made orally) with respect to Negro troops were probably responses to the demand made by the Icelandic government to remove the US Commander.]

**Feb 21, 1960:** An aid of $ 20 million from the O.E.E.C. will help Iceland implement its stabilization plan. The krona is pegged at 32 krona to a dollar. The Bank rate was put at 11%. (NYT 21 February 1960 p. 7, NYT 23 February 1960 p. 6)

**Oct 8, 1961:** The United States will aid Iceland schools. (NYT p. 8)

**Jun 1, 2003:** A fight broke out between Icelanders and Americans, which resulted in
one Icelander being stabbed. (The Reykjavik Grapevine: The United States military base in Iceland, June 13, 2003.)

**Mar 17, 2006:** The United States has told the Icelandic government that it had decided to withdraw most of its service members and all of its fighter jets and helicopters later this year. The US Naval Air Station in Keflavik has about 1,200 American service members. The Pentagon has long said that it wants to reduce the size of the base which costs about 2.5 billion dollar a year to operate. (NYT p. 15)

[The F-15 fighter squadron left Iceland in October 2006.]
one Icelander being stabbed. (The Reykjavik Grapevine: The United States military base in Iceland, June 13, 2003.)

**Mar 17, 2006:** The United States has told the Icelandic government that it had decided to withdraw most of its service members and all of its fighter jets and helicopters later this year. The US Naval Air Station in Keflavik has about 1,200 American service members. The Pentagon has long said that it wants to reduce the size of the base which costs about 2.5 billion dollar a year to operate. (NYT p. 15)

[The F-15 fighter squadron left Iceland in October 2006.]
## Chapter 6
### Quantitative evidence

As already mentioned, there were about 20 incidents each month, which represents a total of about 1,000 incidents over 1940-1944. The information provided by the diplomatic sources cited in the chronology covers about 10% of these cases. A most useful source would be the records of the sessions of the joint Claim Commissions<fnref n="23" />. So far, however, we were not able to locate these records in American or Icelandic archives.

The data given in Fig. 6.1 correspond to military personnel from Commonwealth countries (mainly Britain but also New Zealand and Canada) who died and were buried in Iceland. Unfortunately, this source does not provide the causes of the death.

As an illustration of the anti-submarine protection provided by aircraft based in Iceland to convoys on the North Atlantic route one can mention the following episode. A convoy of 64 ships left New York for the United Kingdom on 25 January 1943. Air cover from West Atlantic bases was provided for the first week of the voyage, which was uneventful. On the morning of 4 February the ships were sighted by a patrolling U-boat, a pack assembled, and during the next two days five vessels were lost. One U-boat was sunk in counter-attacks by the surface escorts. From the morning of the 6th, in spite of rough weather, which at one time caused the convoy to be spread over 50 square miles of ocean, the maximum possible air cover was provided from bases in Iceland and later from the United Kingdom. Ten U-boats were sighted and depth-charged from the air during the following 48 hours, one being sunk outright. The first aircraft to reach the convoy on the 6th was a Liberator from Iceland with Sergeant H. J. Bennett as pilot. Three U-boats were attacked during the escort patrol, the aircraft remaining with the ships for seven hours at a distance of more than 1000 kilometers from its base. After February 6th no further attacks were made on the ships, which reached port four days later. (NORTH ATLANTIC PATROLS, New Zealand Electronic Text Centre)

Anti-submarine patrols were flown out of Kaldadarnes in Iceland.

As an illustration of the difficult sea conditions encountered in Iceland one can men-

<footnote n="23">²³Let us recall that the US Army and US Navy had separate commissions.</footnote>
# Chapter 6
## Quantitative evidence

As already mentioned, there were about 20 incidents each month, which represents a total of about 1,000 incidents over 1940-1944. The information provided by the diplomatic sources cited in the chronology covers about 10% of these cases. A most useful source would be the records of the sessions of the joint Claim Commissions<sup>23</sup> . So far, however, we were not able to locate these records in American or Icelandic archives.

The data given in Fig. 6.1 correspond to military personnel from Commonwealth countries (mainly Britain but also New Zealand and Canada) who died and were buried in Iceland. Unfortunately, this source does not provide the causes of the death.

As an illustration of the anti-submarine protection provided by aircraft based in Iceland to convoys on the North Atlantic route one can mention the following episode. A convoy of 64 ships left New York for the United Kingdom on 25 January 1943. Air cover from West Atlantic bases was provided for the first week of the voyage, which was uneventful. On the morning of 4 February the ships were sighted by a patrolling U-boat, a pack assembled, and during the next two days five vessels were lost. One U-boat was sunk in counter-attacks by the surface escorts. From the morning of the 6th, in spite of rough weather, which at one time caused the convoy to be spread over 50 square miles of ocean, the maximum possible air cover was provided from bases in Iceland and later from the United Kingdom. Ten U-boats were sighted and depth-charged from the air during the following 48 hours, one being sunk outright. The first aircraft to reach the convoy on the 6th was a Liberator from Iceland with Sergeant H. J. Bennett as pilot. Three U-boats were attacked during the escort patrol, the aircraft remaining with the ships for seven hours at a distance of more than 1000 kilometers from its base. After February 6th no further attacks were made on the ships, which reached port four days later. (NORTH ATLANTIC PATROLS, New Zealand Electronic Text Centre)

Anti-submarine patrols were flown out of Kaldadarnes in Iceland.

As an illustration of the difficult sea conditions encountered in Iceland one can men-

<footnote n="23"><sup>23</sup>Let us recall that the US Army and US Navy had separate commissions.</footnote>
tion the following episode.

The ship proceeded to Reykjavik, Iceland, where she would encounter the most severe weather she would see in her career. One particular day, 15 January 1942, was memorable. She set her special sea, anchor and steaming watches and put out both anchors with 220 meters of chain on the starboard and 110 to port, with her main engines turning over and steam up on all boilers. (VP-52 History)

About 30% of the fatalities listed in Fig. 6.1 correspond to air force personnel. Why such a high proportion? As shown by the previous excerpts, a large number of aircraft were based in Iceland. A number of planes crashed at take off or in the

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 6.1** Annual number of deaths among Commonwealth troops stationed in Iceland. These numbers correspond to soldiers buried in Iceland; therefore they do not include the fliers or sailors who perished during missions at sea. Nor do they include those who died from illness or injury after having been repatriated to Britain. The substantial numbers of deaths in 1942, 1943, 1944 and even 1945 is puzzling on account of the fact that British forces were supposed to be relieved by American troops after 1941. The death rate, which is a more significant variable, cannot be calculated in 1942-1945 because we do not know the strength of the Commonwealth force stationed in Iceland over 1942-1945. In 1940 and 1941 the numbers of deaths are 21 and 69 respectively. For 1940, as we do not know precisely the timing of the troop arrival, we cannot estimate the average strength. The peak strength of Commonwealth troops was about 20,000 (Hunt 1966, appendix D). If we assume that for the most part their withdrawal occurred only in late 1941 or early 1942 we get in 1941 a monthly death rate of $90/(12 \times 2) = 3.7$ deaths per month and per 10,000 troops; this rate is comparable to the death rate of American troops in Iraq over 2003-2006. Source: *Commonwealth War Graves Commission*.</figcaption></figure>
tion the following episode.

The ship proceeded to Reykjavik, Iceland, where she would encounter the most severe weather she would see in her career. One particular day, 15 January 1942, was memorable. She set her special sea, anchor and steaming watches and put out both anchors with 220 meters of chain on the starboard and 110 to port, with her main engines turning over and steam up on all boilers. (VP-52 History)

About 30% of the fatalities listed in Fig. 6.1 correspond to air force personnel. Why such a high proportion? As shown by the previous excerpts, a large number of aircraft were based in Iceland. A number of planes crashed at take off or in the

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 6.1** Annual number of deaths among Commonwealth troops stationed in Iceland. These numbers correspond to soldiers buried in Iceland; therefore they do not include the fliers or sailors who perished during missions at sea. Nor do they include those who died from illness or injury after having been repatriated to Britain. The substantial numbers of deaths in 1942, 1943, 1944 and even 1945 is puzzling on account of the fact that British forces were supposed to be relieved by American troops after 1941. The death rate, which is a more significant variable, cannot be calculated in 1942-1945 because we do not know the strength of the Commonwealth force stationed in Iceland over 1942-1945. In 1940 and 1941 the numbers of deaths are 21 and 69 respectively. For 1940, as we do not know precisely the timing of the troop arrival, we cannot estimate the average strength. The peak strength of Commonwealth troops was about 20,000 (Hunt 1966, appendix D). If we assume that for the most part their withdrawal occurred only in late 1941 or early 1942 we get in 1941 a monthly death rate of $90/(12 \times 2) = 3.7$ deaths per month and per 10,000 troops; this rate is comparable to the death rate of American troops in Iraq over 2003-2006. Source: *Commonwealth War Graves Commission*.</figcaption></figure>
process of landing. A number of cases are mentioned in the chronology. One of
the most tragic crashes was the crash of Lieutenant-General Frank Andrews' plane
which cost the lives of 14 people. The list of fatalities also comprises many Navy
men. This may possibly be explained by the fact that survivors from sunken ships
who were rescued by other vessels in the same convoy may have died subsequently
after their arrival in Iceland. So far, however, we did not find direct evidence for that
kind of fatalities.
process of landing. A number of cases are mentioned in the chronology. One of
the most tragic crashes was the crash of Lieutenant-General Frank Andrews' plane
which cost the lives of 14 people. The list of fatalities also comprises many Navy
men. This may possibly be explained by the fact that survivors from sunken ships
who were rescued by other vessels in the same convoy may have died subsequently
after their arrival in Iceland. So far, however, we did not find direct evidence for that
kind of fatalities.
Chapter 7
Conclusion

Among the various episodes of military occupation that we considered in our studies, there are two which resemble the occupation of Iceland, namely Australia and Hawaii. In all three cases we have a country which is occupied by the army of an *allied* country with the agreement of the government of the occupied country<sup>24</sup>. The parallel between Iceland and Hawaii is particularly interesting because in both cases the residents of the occupied country have strong cultural ties with an enemy country, namely Germany and Japan respectively.

Among the many questions for which we were not able to get satisfactory answers,
one can mention the following.

* Based on several testimonies there is ample evidence of offenses committed by Icelanders against occupation troops either during disputes or in retaliation for former actions by servicemen. Once discovered, by whom were these people arrested and tried? If arrested by Military Police were they taken over to Icelandic authorities? If tried by Icelandic tribunals did occupation authorities have a right to appeal the judgment for instance if it was found too lenient?

* The only Icelandic newspapers which questioned the self-censorship policy accepted by others was the leftist paper Thjodviljinn. It would be very interesting to see what Thjodviljinn has to say about these events (at least until its interdiction).

* As already mentioned, one would like to read the minutes of the various Joint Claim Committees. There were (at least) four: two during the British occupation (one for traffic incidents and a second for all other incidents) and two during the American occupation, one for the US Army and one for the US Navy.

<footnote n="24"><sup>24</sup>It is true that the British occupation of Iceland was carried out *without* the agreement of the Icelandic or Danish government, but the American occupation received the approbation of the Icelandic government.</footnote>
Chapter 7

Conclusion

Among the various episodes of military occupation that we considered in our studies, there are two which resemble the occupation of Iceland, namely Australia and Hawaii. In all three cases we have a country which is occupied by the army of an *allied* country with the agreement of the government of the occupied country<sup>24</sup>. The parallel between Iceland and Hawaii is particularly interesting because in both cases the residents of the occupied country have strong cultural ties with an enemy country, namely Germany and Japan respectively.

Among the many questions for which we were not able to get satisfactory answers,
one can mention the following.

* Based on several testimonies there is ample evidence of offenses committed by Icelanders against occupation troops either during disputes or in retaliation for former actions by servicemen. Once discovered, by whom were these people arrested and tried? If arrested by Military Police were they taken over to Icelandic authorities? If tried by Icelandic tribunals did occupation authorities have a right to appeal the judgment for instance if it was found too lenient?

* The only Icelandic newspapers which questioned the self-censorship policy accepted by others was the leftist paper Thjodviljinn. It would be very interesting to see what Thjodviljinn has to say about these events (at least until its interdiction).

* As already mentioned, one would like to read the minutes of the various Joint Claim Committees. There were (at least) four: two during the British occupation (one for traffic incidents and a second for all other incidents) and two during the American occupation, one for the US Army and one for the US Navy.

<footnote n="24"><sup>24</sup>It is true that the British occupation of Iceland was carried out *without* the agreement of the Icelandic or Danish government, but the American occupation received the approbation of the Icelandic government.</footnote>
8

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to the many people who have provided help, advice and encouragements and in particular to Maureen Annetts (Commonwealth War Graves Commission);

Eggert Bernhardsson (University of Reykjavik);

Agnes Kermin and Gilbert Chambon (Interlibrary Loan Department of University of Paris 6);

Timothy Nenninger (NARA, Washington);

Linda Schweizer (Ralph J. Bunche Library, US Department of State, Washington);

The present draft is still provisional and in many respects unsatisfactory, but I am convinced that with the help and support of my friends and colleagues it will be possible to bring this project to a successful completion.
8

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to the many people who have provided help, advice and encouragements and in particular to Maureen Annetts (Commonwealth War Graves Commission);

Eggert Bernhardsson (University of Reykjavik);

Agnes Kermin and Gilbert Chambon (Interlibrary Loan Department of University of Paris 6);

Timothy Nenninger (NARA, Washington);

Linda Schweizer (Ralph J. Bunche Library, US Department of State, Washington);

The present draft is still provisional and in many respects unsatisfactory, but I am convinced that with the help and support of my friends and colleagues it will be possible to bring this project to a successful completion.
9
Abbreviations

Althing: It designates the Icelandic Parliament (not an abbreviation)

NAI: National Archives of Iceland

NARA: National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC)

NYT: New York Times
9
Abbreviations

Althing: It designates the Icelandic Parliament (not an abbreviation)

NAI: National Archives of Iceland

NARA: National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC)

NYT: New York Times
10
References

Archives

All the documents used in the "Occupation project" including those listed below
(plus a number of others which have not been used yet) are available in the so-called
"Fonds Roehner 434 W" belonging to the archive bureau of "University Pierre and
Marie Curie" (UPMC), Central Tower, office 810, 4 place Jussieu, 75005 Paris.
In addition to archive records there are also several books, for instance a book with
many pictures of the 1941-1946 period in Iceland and two big volumes about the
occupation of South Korea published by Hallym University.
Altogether there are 8 boxes numbered: 434 W 1-8.

• 434 W1-4: Japan

• 434 W5: Hawaii

• 434 W6: South Korea

• 434 W7: South Korea, China, Iceland.

• 434 W8: Germany

In a general way we experienced great difficulties in collecting information from
archives. As already mentioned elsewhere, the Icelandic archives either did not re-
ally respond (case of the Reykjavik municipal archives) or in the case of the National
Archives told us that the documents were unavailable <fnref n="25" />.

Our inquiries at the National American archives were more successful but only for
foreign affairs (i.e. received or issued by the State Department) documents.
As far as documents of military origin (so-called "Icelandic Base Command" files)
were concerned our quest was very unsuccessful. Either the text of the messages
was missing (case of NARA 6,7) or the content did not fit with the ARC description
(case of NARA 8,9).

NAI 1: National Archives of Iceland, Ministry of Justice, 2002-B345/1

<footnote n="25">²⁵Even for documents issued by the Icelandic government.</footnote>
10
References

Archives

All the documents used in the “Occupation project” including those listed below
(plus a number of others which have not been used yet) are available in the so-called
“Fonds Roehner 434 W” belonging to the archive bureau of “University Pierre and
Marie Curie” (UPMC), Central Tower, office 810, 4 place Jussieu, 75005 Paris.
In addition to archive records there are also several books, for instance a book with
many pictures of the 1941-1946 period in Iceland and two big volumes about the
occupation of South Korea published by Hallym University.
Altogether there are 8 boxes numbered: 434 W 1-8.

• 434 W1-4: Japan

• 434 W5: Hawaii

• 434 W6: South Korea

• 434 W7: South Korea, China, Iceland.

• 434 W8: Germany

In a general way we experienced great difficulties in collecting information from
archives. As already mentioned elsewhere, the Icelandic archives either did not re-
ally respond (case of the Reykjavik municipal archives) or in the case of the National
Archives told us that the documents were unavailable 25 .

Our inquiries at the National American archives were more successful but only for
foreign affairs (i.e. received or issued by the State Department) documents.
As far as documents of military origin (so-called “Icelandic Base Command” files)
were concerned our quest was very unsuccessful. Either the text of the messages
was missing (case of NARA 6,7) or the content did not fit with the ARC description
(case of NARA 8,9).

NAI 1: National Archives of Iceland, Ministry of Justice, 2002-B345/1

<footnote n="25"><sup>25</sup>Even for documents issued by the Icelandic government.</footnote>
NAI 2: National Archives of Iceland, Ministry of Justice, 2002-B346/2

NARA 1: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Record Group 59, State Department Central File 1940-1944, 859s 20/187, 11 May 1942, Box 5384 250/34/4/6 (Stack 250, Row 34, Compartment 4, Shelf 6)

[This despatch by the US representative in Iceland, Lincoln MacVeagh, contains five enclosures: (i) Copy of a note of the Icelandic Prime Minister Hermann Jonasson. (ii) Copy of a list of offenses by American troops (during 20 Sep - 31 Dec 1941) which was attached to the Prime Minister's letter. In the chronology it is called the fall list. (iii) Copy of a second list of offenses (during 1 Jan - 18 Mar 1942) which was also attached to the Prime Minister's letter. In the chronology it is called the winter list. (iv) Copy of MacVeagh's reply to the Prime Minister. (v) Memorandum containing General Bonesteel's comments. It can be noted that the National Archive of Iceland holds a copy of the letter of the Prime Minister but, surprisingly enough, it does not hold a copy of any of the attached lists of offenses (as explicitly stated in a letter dated 29 June 2007 from the director of the NAI, Olafur Asgeirsson to the present author).]

NARA 2: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Record Group 59, State Department Central File 1940-1944, (Stack area 250, Row 34, Compartment 4, Shelf 6, Box 5384).

[This despatch by the US representative in Iceland, Lincoln MacVeagh, contains three enclosures: (i) Memorandum of a conference on the subject of the relations between American Forces and local population held on September 23, 1941 between: Mr. H. Jonasson, Prime Minister of Iceland; Major General C.H. Bonesteel; Brigadier General J. Marston, US Marine Corps; Brigadier General J.L. Homer, US Army; Mr. B.E. Kuniholm, American Consul; Mr. H.B. Wells, American Vice Consul.

(ii) Memorandum of a conversation between Mr. A. Kofoed-Hansen, Chief of Police and Mr. B.E. Kuniholm, American Consul held on 3 October 1941

(iii) Copy of Marine order dated 30 September 1941.]

NARA 3: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), State Department Central File 1940-1944, [This document is a despatch (No 136) sent to the Secretary of State by the US Consul in Iceland, Bertel E. Kuniholm on 18 July 1941. It contains three enclosures: the first one is a memorandum of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, Stephan Stefanson, to the American Consul; the two others are short letters (acknowledgment of receipt).]

NARA 4: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Wash-
NAI 2: National Archives of Iceland, Ministry of Justice, 2002-B346/2

NARA 1: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Record Group 59, State Department Central File 1940-1944, 859s 20/187, 11 May 1942, Box 5384 250/34/4/6 (Stack 250, Row 34, Compartment 4, Shelf 6)

[This despatch by the US representative in Iceland, Lincoln MacVeagh, contains five enclosures: (i) Copy of a note of the Icelandic Prime Minister Hermann Jonasson. (ii) Copy of a list of offenses by American troops (during 20 Sep - 31 Dec 1941) which was attached to the Prime Minister's letter. In the chronology it is called the fall list. (iii) Copy of a second list of offenses (during 1 Jan - 18 Mar 1942) which was also attached to the Prime Minister's letter. In the chronology it is called the winter list. (iv) Copy of MacVeagh's reply to the Prime Minister. (v) Memorandum containing General Bonesteel's comments. It can be noted that the National Archive of Iceland holds a copy of the letter of the Prime Minister but, surprisingly enough, it does not hold a copy of any of the attached lists of offenses (as explicitly stated in a letter dated 29 June 2007 from the director of the NAI, Olafur Asgeirsson to the present author).]

NARA 2: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Record Group 59, State Department Central File 1940-1944, (Stack area 250, Row 34, Compartment 4, Shelf 6, Box 5384).

[This despatch by the US representative in Iceland, Lincoln MacVeagh, contains three enclosures: (i) Memorandum of a conference on the subject of the relations between American Forces and local population held on September 23, 1941 between: Mr. H. Jonasson, Prime Minister of Iceland; Major General C.H. Bonesteel; Brigadier General J. Marston, US Marine Corps; Brigadier General J.L. Homer, US Army; Mr. B.E. Kuniholm, American Consul; Mr. H.B. Wells, American Vice Consul.

(ii) Memorandum of a conversation between Mr. A. Kofoed-Hansen, Chief of Police and Mr. B.E. Kuniholm, American Consul held on 3 October 1941

(iii) Copy of Marine order dated 30 September 1941.]

NARA 3: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), State Department Central File 1940-1944, [This document is a despatch (No 136) sent to the Secretary of State by the US Consul in Iceland, Bertel E. Kuniholm on 18 July 1941. It contains three enclosures: the first one is a memorandum of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, Stephan Stefanson, to the American Consul; the two others are short letters (acknowledgment of receipt).]

NARA 4: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Wash-
ington DC), State Department Central File 1940-1944, [This document is a despatch (No 88) sent to the Secretary of State by the US Consul in Iceland, Bertel E. on 20 March 1941.]

### CWGC: Commonwealth War Graves Commission

[This source gives the names, ranks and dates of death of the Commonwealth troops (i.e. mainly British and Canadians) who are buried in Iceland. I'm very grateful to Ms. Maureen Annets of the inquiries section of the CWGC for sending me this file. We do not know how many coffins were shipped to Britain to be buried there; another point of interrogation concerns the percentage of the personnel shipped back to British hospitals for treatment who died shortly after and should therefore be included in Icelandic fatalities.]

### NARA 5: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command: 220.86 Death, enlisted men [2 folders]. Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 180.

[In spite of the indication [2 folders], the file that I received from NARA contained only 5 pages which recorded only one death. The number 220.86 refers to the "War Department Decimal File System" (available online at: http://www.archives.gov/research/war-dept/index.html). 210 means "Commissioned officers", 220 means "Enlisted men", 86 means "Death".]

### NARA 6: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command: 319.1 G-2 Reports. Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 183.

ARC Identifier 1140820.

[As the previous one, this file provides only "INDEX SHEET SYNOPSIS" which includes the date, origin, destination and Subject but not the text of the reports. In the "War Department Decimal File System" 319 means "Miscellaneous" and 319.1 means "Miscellaneous.Reports"]

### NARA 7: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command: 319.1 Military intelligence reports. Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 182.

ARC Identifier: 1140817.

[As the previous one this file provides only "INDEX SHEET SYNOPSIS" which includes the date, origin, destination and Subject but not the text of the reports. The file covers the period from November 1941 to February 1942. Most of the reports are about observations of the movements of German submarines.]

### NARA 8: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command: (383.4) Spies, espionnage [2 folders].

Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 189.
ington DC), State Department Central File 1940-1944, [This document is a despatch (No 88) sent to the Secretary of State by the US Consul in Iceland, Bertel E. on 20 March 1941.]

### CWGC: Commonwealth War Graves Commission

[This source gives the names, ranks and dates of death of the Commonwealth troops (i.e. mainly British and Canadians) who are buried in Iceland. I'm very grateful to Ms. Maureen Annets of the inquiries section of the CWGC for sending me this file. We do not know how many coffins were shipped to Britain to be buried there; another point of interrogation concerns the percentage of the personnel shipped back to British hospitals for treatment who died shortly after and should therefore be included in Icelandic fatalities.]

### NARA 5: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command: 220.86 Death, enlisted men [2 folders]. Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 180.

[In spite of the indication [2 folders], the file that I received from NARA contained only 5 pages which recorded only one death. The number 220.86 refers to the "War Department Decimal File System" (available online at: http://www.archives.gov/research/war-dept/index.html). 210 means "Commissioned officers", 220 means "Enlisted men", 86 means "Death".]

### NARA 6: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command: 319.1 G-2 Reports. Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 183.

ARC Identifier 1140820.

[As the previous one, this file provides only "INDEX SHEET SYNOPSIS" which includes the date, origin, destination and Subject but not the text of the reports. In the "War Department Decimal File System" 319 means "Miscellaneous" and 319.1 means "Miscellaneous.Reports"]

### NARA 7: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command: 319.1 Military intelligence reports. Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 182.

ARC Identifier: 1140817.

[As the previous one this file provides only "INDEX SHEET SYNOPSIS" which includes the date, origin, destination and Subject but not the text of the reports. The file covers the period from November 1941 to February 1942. Most of the reports are about observations of the movements of German submarines.]

### NARA 8: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command: (383.4) Spies, espionnage [2 folders].

Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 189.
ARC Identifier: 1140888.

[In spite of the indication “2 folders” the photocopies that we received consisted of only 12 pages, of which not more than 2 contained real information; moreover, this information had nothing to do with “spies or espionnage”; it was in fact a letter from the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson to President Roosevelt about a possible extension of Icelandic sea port facilities.]

NARA 9: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command: (015) Courts Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 176.

ARC Identifier: 1140726.

[This file has little to do with “courts”; it reports a financial audit of the Army Post Office (No 810) of the Iceland Base Command established at Camp Tadcaster.]

NARA 10: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command (167) Claims Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 178.

ARC Identifier: 1140754.

## Books and articles

Baker (A.P.) 2004: American soldiers overseas. Praeger, Westport (Connecticut).

Bernhardsson (E.) 2000: Undir Bárujárnsboga. Braggalíf í Reykjaví 1940-1970. [Under corrugated iron archways. Nissen huts in Reykjavik 1940-1970] JPV ÚTGÁFA, Reykjavik.

Bittner (D.F.) 1975: The British occupation of Iceland 1940-1942. PhD Dissertation. University of Missouri, Columbia (Missouri).

[The author mentions that at the time he wrote his thesis, British intelligence records were still completely closed. In Chart No 7 he lists 144 fatalities (from all causes including 15 airmen referred to as missing in action) that occurred during the British occupation; according to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission there are almost 300 members of the Commonwealth force who are buried in Iceland cemeteries, and this number does not include those missing in action.]

Bittner (D.F.) 1983: The Lion and the White Falcon. British and Iceland in World War II era. Anchor Books, Hamden (Connecticut).

[In 1983 the author was holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Marines as military historian at the Command and Staff College of the US Marine Corps,
ARC Identifier: 1140888.

[In spite of the indication “2 folders” the photocopies that we received consisted of only 12 pages, of which not more than 2 contained real information; moreover, this information had nothing to do with “spies or espionnage”; it was in fact a letter from the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson to President Roosevelt about a possible extension of Icelandic sea port facilities.]

NARA 9: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command: (015) Courts Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 176.

ARC Identifier: 1140726.

[This file has little to do with “courts”; it reports a financial audit of the Army Post Office (No 810) of the Iceland Base Command established at Camp Tadcaster.]

NARA 10: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command (167) Claims Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 178.

ARC Identifier: 1140754.

## Books and articles

Baker (A.P.) 2004: American soldiers overseas. Praeger, Westport (Connecticut).

Bernhardsson (E.) 2000: Undir Bárujárnsboga. Braggalíf í Reykjaví 1940-1970. [Under corrugated iron archways. Nissen huts in Reykjavik 1940-1970] JPV ÚTGÁFA, Reykjavik.

Bittner (D.F.) 1975: The British occupation of Iceland 1940-1942. PhD Dissertation. University of Missouri, Columbia (Missouri).

[The author mentions that at the time he wrote his thesis, British intelligence records were still completely closed. In Chart No 7 he lists 144 fatalities (from all causes including 15 airmen referred to as missing in action) that occurred during the British occupation; according to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission there are almost 300 members of the Commonwealth force who are buried in Iceland cemeteries, and this number does not include those missing in action.]

Bittner (D.F.) 1983: The Lion and the White Falcon. British and Iceland in World War II era. Anchor Books, Hamden (Connecticut).

[In 1983 the author was holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Marines as military historian at the Command and Staff College of the US Marine Corps,
Quantico, Virginia.]

Chamberlin (W. C.) 1947: Economic development of Iceland through World War II. Columbia University Press, New York.

Conn (S.), Engelman (R.C.), Fairchild (B.) 1964: Guarding the United States and its outposts. Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington. [Reedited in 2000 and available online]

Dumais (L.A.) 1968: Un Canadien français à Dieppe. Editions France-Empire. Paris.

Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic papers 1942, volume 3, Europe. [This publication contains a selection of diplomatic despatches exchanged between the Department of State and its representatives in Iceland.]

Hadarson (S.B.J.) 1974: The Republic of Iceland 1940-1944: Anglo-American attitudes and influences. Journal of Contemporary History 9,4,427-456.

Hunt (J.J.) 1966: The United States occupation of Iceland, 1941-1946. Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington DC.

Iceland 1966 handbook. Published by the Central Bank of Iceland, Reykjavik.

Karlsson (G.) 2000: The history of Iceland. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Knightley (P.) 1975, 2004: The first casualty. The war correspondent as hero and myth-marker from the Crimea to Iraq. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

Nueschterlein (D.E.) 1961: Iceland, reluctant ally. Cornell University Press, Ithaca (New York).

Roehner (B.M.) 2002: Pattern and repertoire in history. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts).

Thorarinsson (S.), Vilhjalmur (F.), Westergard-Nielsen (C.) 1943: Island under occupation. [in Norwegian] Nordiske Kroniker No 12, Stockholm.
Quantico, Virginia.]

Chamberlin (W. C.) 1947: Economic development of Iceland through World War II. Columbia University Press, New York.

Conn (S.), Engelman (R.C.), Fairchild (B.) 1964: Guarding the United States and its outposts. Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington. [Reedited in 2000 and available online]

Dumais (L.A.) 1968: Un Canadien français à Dieppe. Editions France-Empire. Paris.

Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic papers 1942, volume 3, Europe. [This publication contains a selection of diplomatic despatches exchanged between the Department of State and its representatives in Iceland.]

Hadarson (S.B.J.) 1974: The Republic of Iceland 1940-1944: Anglo-American attitudes and influences. Journal of Contemporary History 9,4,427-456.

Hunt (J.J.) 1966: The United States occupation of Iceland, 1941-1946. Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington DC.

Iceland 1966 handbook. Published by the Central Bank of Iceland, Reykjavik.

Karlsson (G.) 2000: The history of Iceland. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Knightley (P.) 1975, 2004: The first casualty. The war correspondent as hero and myth-marker from the Crimea to Iraq. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

Nueschterlein (D.E.) 1961: Iceland, reluctant ally. Cornell University Press, Ithaca (New York).

Roehner (B.M.) 2002: Pattern and repertoire in history. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts).

Thorarinsson (S.), Vilhjalmur (F.), Westergard-Nielsen (C.) 1943: Island under occupation. [in Norwegian] Nordiske Kroniker No 12, Stockholm.
# Appendix A: Expected number of incidents

After the signature of the Peace Treaty in early 1952 Japanese media were no longer subject to military censorship; of course the Cold War was not over and censorship of Communist or left-wing newspapers was still present. As leftist publications were also those which were the most vocal against occupation forces, one realizes that the censorship which had been in force during the occupation was not completely over. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the data about incidents that are provided by the English language Japanese newspaper “Nippon Times” provide at least lower bounds. These data solely concern offenses committed by occupation troops against Japanese people. Although individual accounts which can be found occasionally in the same newspaper show that there were also cases of offenses against US soldiers by Japanese the data released by Japanese police does not provide global estimates for such incidents.

During the 5 months from May to September 1952 there were 4 murders and 113 assaults of Japanese by US troops (Nippon Times Dec 5, 1952). At that time there were about 172,000 US troops in Japan; this figure does not include American civilians and dependents but it is probably safe to assume that those who were in Japan with their family were less prone to clashes. These data give the following rates:

* Murder: 0.55 per year and per 10,000 troops

* Assault: 15.6 per year and per 10,000 troops.

Under the assumption that the behavior of the occupation troops was similar in Iceland and in Japan, we can apply the same rates to Iceland. Between May 1940 and December 1941 (19 months that is 1.58 year) there were mostly British-Canadian troops numbering on average about 20,000; this gives:

Murder: $0.55 \times 2 \times 1.58 = 1.7$.

Assault: $15.6 \times 2 \times 1.58 = 50$

Between July 1941 and December 1943 (30 months that is 2.5 years) there were on average some 30,000 American troops (Hunt 1966, Appendix D) which gives:

Murder: $0.55 \times 3 \times 2.5 = 3.4$

Assault: $15.6 \times 3 \times 2.5 = 97$
# Appendix A: Expected number of incidents

After the signature of the Peace Treaty in early 1952 Japanese media were no longer subject to military censorship; of course the Cold War was not over and censorship of Communist or left-wing newspapers was still present. As leftist publications were also those which were the most vocal against occupation forces, one realizes that the censorship which had been in force during the occupation was not completely over. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the data about incidents that are provided by the English language Japanese newspaper “Nippon Times” provide at least lower bounds. These data solely concern offenses committed by occupation troops against Japanese people. Although individual accounts which can be found occasionally in the same newspaper show that there were also cases of offenses against US soldiers by Japanese the data released by Japanese police does not provide global estimates for such incidents.

During the 5 months from May to September 1952 there were 4 murders and 113 assaults of Japanese by US troops (Nippon Times Dec 5, 1952). At that time there were about 172,000 US troops in Japan; this figure does not include American civilians and dependents but it is probably safe to assume that those who were in Japan with their family were less prone to clashes. These data give the following rates:

* Murder: 0.55 per year and per 10,000 troops

* Assault: 15.6 per year and per 10,000 troops.

Under the assumption that the behavior of the occupation troops was similar in Iceland and in Japan, we can apply the same rates to Iceland. Between May 1940 and December 1941 (19 months that is 1.58 year) there were mostly British-Canadian troops numbering on average about 20,000; this gives:

Murder: $0.55 \times 2 \times 1.58 = 1.7$.

Assault: $15.6 \times 2 \times 1.58 = 50$

Between July 1941 and December 1943 (30 months that is 2.5 years) there were on average some 30,000 American troops (Hunt 1966, Appendix D) which gives:

Murder: $0.55 \times 3 \times 2.5 = 3.4$

Assault: $15.6 \times 3 \times 2.5 = 97$
In the previous calculation, it was assumed that the number of incidents depends only upon the number of soldiers. This assumption is acceptable when the soldiers represent a small proportion of the total population of the occupied country. This was of course the case in Japan where occupation troops never represented more than 0.3 percent of the Japanese population but it is no longer true in Iceland where the ratio was of the order of 30 percent. Thus, the previous calculation is likely to produce over-estimates (in the extreme situation where the population goes to zero the number of incidents of course goes to zero as well). However the estimate for homicides is in agreement with the number of Icelanders killed.
In the previous calculation, it was assumed that the number of incidents depends only upon the number of soldiers. This assumption is acceptable when the soldiers represent a small proportion of the total population of the occupied country. This was of course the case in Japan where occupation troops never represented more than 0.3 percent of the Japanese population but it is no longer true in Iceland where the ratio was of the order of 30 percent. Thus, the previous calculation is likely to produce over-estimates (in the extreme situation where the population goes to zero the number of incidents of course goes to zero as well). However the estimate for homicides is in agreement with the number of Icelanders killed.
**Occupation episodes and analytical history**

By education the present author is a physicist, so it may not be surprising that he tried to transform history into a testable science. How to do that was explained in a book he co-authored with Pr. Tony Syme and which was published by Harvard University Press in 2002.

The main step in transforming history into a testable science is to study not just one case but several similar cases. Indeed, a physicist does not just study the fall of one kind of bodies (e.g. apples), he wants to describe and understand the fall of all kinds of falling objects (e.g. iron balls, drops of water, hailstones, and so on).

Actually this requirement is not specific to physics, it is common to all testable sciences. Thus, in medicine one does not wish to describe solely the influenza of Mr. Martin; one wants to understand *all cases of influenza* whether they occur in China, Europe or the United States.

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>Bertrand Roehner (Oct. 2012)</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>Harvard University Press (2002)</figcaption></figure>

That is why the present study is part of a series of several books devoted to various occupation episodes.

**Studies of “occupation” episodes by the same author**

1. Relations between Allied forces and the population of Japan
**Occupation episodes and analytical history**

By education the present author is a physicist, so it may not be surprising that he tried to transform history into a testable science. How to do that was explained in a book he co-authored with Pr. Tony Syme and which was published by Harvard University Press in 2002.

The main step in transforming history into a testable science is to study not just one case but several similar cases. Indeed, a physicist does not just study the fall of one kind of bodies (e.g. apples), he wants to describe and understand the fall of all kinds of falling objects (e.g. iron balls, drops of water, hailstones, and so on).

Actually this requirement is not specific to physics, it is common to all testable sciences. Thus, in medicine one does not wish to describe solely the influenza of Mr. Martin; one wants to understand *all cases of influenza* whether they occur in China, Europe or the United States.

<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>Bertrand Roehner (Oct. 2012)</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>Harvard University Press (2002)</figcaption></figure>

That is why the present study is part of a series of several books devoted to various occupation episodes.

**Studies of “occupation” episodes by the same author**

1. Relations between Allied forces and the population of Japan
2 Relations between Allied forces and the populations of Germany and Austria.

3 Relations between Allied forces and the population of Iceland

4 Relations between US forces and the population of Hawaii

5 Relations between American forces and the population of China

6 Relations between American forces and the population of South Korea

7 Relations between American forces and the population of Australia

All these studies are available on the author's website at:
http://www.lpthe.jussieu.fr/roehner/occupation.html

## Modules and submodules

What we call modules of a major historical episode are simpler elements. Occupation episodes are modules of the Second World War, but these modules have themselves several aspects that can be called submodules. It turns out that many of these submodules are common to several occupation episodes.

As examples of such submodules one can mention:

* Military tribunals

* Clashes between soldiers and the population

* Looting of art items

* Purge of undesirable elements in education and the medias

* Control of political activity

* Introduction of a special currency

* Creation of new universities

* Establishment of exchange programs for teachers or officers in the police and armed forces

For each submodule the various occupation episodes will provide several realizations. These realizations parallel the repeated experiments conducted by a physicist who wants to study a specific phenomenon.

Of course, defining the submodules and collecting all information about them is only the first step. Once this has been done, the historian is in the same situation as a physicist who has finished a first round of experiments.

The next challenge is to make sense of the data. This means asking the right questions.
2 Relations between Allied forces and the populations of Germany and Austria.

3 Relations between Allied forces and the population of Iceland

4 Relations between US forces and the population of Hawaii

5 Relations between American forces and the population of China

6 Relations between American forces and the population of South Korea

7 Relations between American forces and the population of Australia

All these studies are available on the author's website at:
http://www.lpthe.jussieu.fr/roehner/occupation.html

## Modules and submodules

What we call modules of a major historical episode are simpler elements. Occupation episodes are modules of the Second World War, but these modules have themselves several aspects that can be called submodules. It turns out that many of these submodules are common to several occupation episodes.

As examples of such submodules one can mention:

* Military tribunals

* Clashes between soldiers and the population

* Looting of art items

* Purge of undesirable elements in education and the medias

* Control of political activity

* Introduction of a special currency

* Creation of new universities

* Establishment of exchange programs for teachers or officers in the police and armed forces

For each submodule the various occupation episodes will provide several realizations. These realizations parallel the repeated experiments conducted by a physicist who wants to study a specific phenomenon.

Of course, defining the submodules and collecting all information about them is only the first step. Once this has been done, the historian is in the same situation as a physicist who has finished a first round of experiments.

The next challenge is to make sense of the data. This means asking the right questions.
tions in order to find some hidden order behind them. Once a regularity has emerged,
a new set of observations can be planned which will permit to improve its accuracy.
tions in order to find some hidden order behind them. Once a regularity has emerged,
a new set of observations can be planned which will permit to improve its accuracy.