L'EUROPE UNIE

UNITED EUROPE

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No. 5 / 2011

Revue d'études européennes
PARIS
TABLE DES MATIÈRES / SUMMARY

<table><tr><td>EDITORIAL</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Michel LABORI</td><td></td></tr></table>

The EU Foreign Affairs and the European values/
Les affaires étrangers de l'UE et les valeurs européennes

<table><tr><td>EU-Russia relations and the European security in perspective</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Licínia SIMÃO</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>L'UE, la Roumanie et la coopération régionale</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Michel LABORI</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Considérations sur la politique européenne de voisinage en 2011: les évolutions, les défis et les perspectives</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>Vira RATSBORYNSKA, Dr. Simion COSTEA</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>European experience of social partnership and possibilities of its implementation in Ukraine</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Nina DIDENKO</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Les droits des enfants en Albanie-une nouvelle ère pour le rapprochement de la législation dans le contexte de l'intégration européenne</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>Anila NEPRAVISHTA</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>EU standards and deliberative democracy: Case of Kyrgyzstan</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Tanel KERIKMÄE, Dr. Katrin NYMAN-METCALF</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>La Diplomatie commerciale de l'Union européenne dans l'Organisation mondiale du commerce</td><td>52</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Nicoleta VASILCOVSCHI</td><td></td></tr></table>

The Political, Economical and Social Construction of the EU /
La Construction Politique, Economique et Sociale de l'Union Européenne

<table><tr><td>Les Europes d'Europe – avant et après la seconde guerre mondiale</td><td>55</td></tr><tr><td>Adrian-Gabriel CORPĂDEAN</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>The Romanian intellectual's profile and the recreation of the European interwar myth</td><td>62</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Dorin DOBRA</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Shaping the New Europe. The Actuality of the German Ordoliberalism</td><td>68</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Ciprian PĂUN</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>La réalisation de l'Espace Economique Européen</td><td>77</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Flore POP</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Limits of the Financial and Banking Integration</td><td>83</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Dragos PĂUN</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Le développement de l'Economie sociale et solidaire, un enjeu européen pour la future programmation 2014-2020?</td><td>93</td></tr><tr><td>Ugo van HULSEN</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>The theoretical and practical implications of Criminal Convention regarding the corruption concluded in Strasbourg 1999 upon Romanian legislation</td><td>99</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Olimpiu Aurelian SABĂU-POP</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>The EU Roma Strategy and the Involvement of Regional and Local Authorities of Romania in 2010. A Case Study</td><td>105</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Simion COSTEA</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Interrelationships Between Globalization and Environmental Protection</td><td>113</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Lucretia DOGARU, Andrea KAJCSA</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>LES AUTEURS/THE AUTHORS</td><td>120</td></tr></table>
EDITORIAL

DR. MICHEL LABORI

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L'Europe Unie fête sa cinquième année d'existence. Le numéro cinq montre sa pérennité dans le contexte universitaire européen et marque un tournant important. En effet de nouvelles universités ont dcidé de la parrainer et des universitaires de pays extérieurs à l'Union européenne y ont collaboré.

L'Université de BEIRA Interieur (Portugal), l'Université BABES-BOLYAI de Cluj-Napoca (Roumanie) et l'Université de TALLINN (Estonia) donne leur caution. Elles sont renommées sur le continent européen et je tiens à remercier leurs Recteurs.

De nouveaux universitaires ont apporté leur contribution et renforcent le caractère européen de la revue: Dr Licinia Simao, Professeur à l'Université de Beira intérieur (Portugal), Dr Nina Didenko, Professeur à l'Université d'état de management de Donetsk (Ukraine), Dr Anila Nepravishta, commissaire du Médiateur de l'Albanie, Dr. Tanel Kerikmae et Dr. Katrin Nyman-Metcalf, Professeurs à l'Université de Talinn (Estonie), Dr. Dorin Dobra (Cluj-Napoca), Dr. Olimpiu Sabău-Pop (Targu-Mures), Hugo van Hulsen (Marseille), Nicoleta Vasilcovschi (Iasi), Vira Ratsiborynska (Strasbourg), Andrea Kajcsa (Targu-Mures).

Ce cinquième numéro est centré sur trois thèmes:

• l'Union européenne dans les relations internationales.

• le modèle européen pour l'Albanie, l'Ukraine et Kirghizstan.

• la construction politique, économique et sociale de l'Union européenne.

L'Europe Unie veut avant tout approfondir la réflexion sur des problèmes européens généraux ou spécifiques aux Etats membres ou voisins de l'Union européenne.

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# The EU Foreign Affairs and the European values/
Les affaires étrangers de l'UE et les valeurs européennes

## EU-Russia relations and the European security in
perspective<fnref n="1" />

DR. LICÍNIA SIMÃO

Assistant Professor, University of Beira Interior, Portugal
Post-Doctoral Fellow, Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Portugal

**Abstract:** This article addresses the nature and purpose of current relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia, building on the notion of political community development. It deals with the consolidation of new post-Cold War identities both in Western Europe and Russia and the mutually shaping processes undergone by both actors, in order to explain the complex nature of current relations. The paper advances some conceptual and analytical considerations on political communities and identity-shaping, adopting a constructivist view, followed by a case study section which addresses the 2004 EU enlargement, the orange revolution in Ukraine and the war in Georgia, in 2008.

**Keywords:** EU, Russia, regional security, perceptions, neighbourhood.

## INTRODUCTION

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This article addresses the nature and purpose of current relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia, building on the notion of political community development. It deals with the consolidation of new post-Cold War identities both in Western Europe and Russia and the mutually shaping processes undergone by both actors, in order to explain the complex nature of current relations. In this section, the paper advances some conceptual and analytical considerations on political communities and identity-shaping, adopting a constructivist view, followed by a case study section which addresses the 2004 EU enlargement, the orange revolution in Ukraine and the war in Georgia, in 2008.

The issue of political community formation in international affairs has been consistently shaped by what can be called the *nationalisation* of the modern political communities<fnref n="2" />, i.e. the establishment of the modern nation-state as the measure against which all other forms of political community are assessed. This has reinforced the socio-cultural homogeneity and territorial boundedness of the modern political communities, as opposed to a focus on the values and norms guiding political communities. This view, however, has not been without challenges. First and foremost, the EU has stood as a hard case for theorists of political communities, due to the hybrid nature of its sovereignty and due to its normative nature. Despite the hardships of the European integration process, the EU remains an “active identity builder” in Europe through its polity and its interaction with the states and the people of

<footnote n="1">¹ This article builds on the paper presented at the Conference on “The EU: an active player in a globalised world” organised by the Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Romania, on the 22nd October, 2010.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Baker, Gideon and Bartelson, Jens (eds.) (2009) *The future of political community*. New York: Routledge, p.3.</footnote>
Europe<fnref n="1" />. It defines standards for its members, for new ones to access it, but also in its relations with the outside world, between those inside and outside its borders.

An area of particular importance for the definition of a shared European political community, and for the EU's relations with Russia, is their shared neighbourhood in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The EU's Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is an example of this active construction of Europe's social identities, defining the features of the members of the community, but also its boundaries. Beyond the rhetoric of common values and shared principles, the limitations of the ENP became visible when the construction of the neighbours' identity as European was being actively linked to accession demands. It can be argued that in the framework of the ENP, the redefinition of identities in Europe and the setting of the boundaries of the European political community were being controlled by the EU, in a display of realist political behaviour, based on power asymmetries, more than a normative approach to regional relations. The post-Cold War period was a defining moment for the establishment of a EU identity and the consolidation of a polity based on a post-modern system of government. The EU also sought to be a different type of international actor, guided by norms and values, and promoting a principled approach to international relations. These two trends and the perception that European states and the EU could and should play a bigger role in European security led to the development of an active role of the EU in security missions, namely in the Balkans, but also to the establishment of a structural approach to security, rooted in institutional transformation of the European area.

Identity construction in Russia has also been significantly shaped by the idea of Europe<fnref n="2" />. Russians regard themselves as Europeans, *but also*, Eurasian, *also* unique. Among Russian elites, the nature of post-Soviet Russia has been hard to define. For the liberals supporting closer ties to Europe, Russia is a part of European history and identity and it should strive for closer relations with the EU and the European states. For those advocating the unique nature of Russian identity, Eurasianism has been an appealing notion portraying Russia as the bridge between Europe and Asia. This unsettled identity is the result of historical, geographic and political contexts, which have placed great pressure in Russia to rediscover its identity and purpose in the post-Cold War context, both in global and regional terms.

Overall, both Russia and the EU have developed into two very different actors and their relations have reflected this disparate nature. Considering this reflection on how political communities come to define their identities and how that process is mutually shaped and shapes other communities' identities, the question then arises as to the role of this interaction in European and Russian identities. The development of relations with the EU is therefore inconsistent and dependent on the interpretations advanced at a particular time. Either privileging a pragmatic approach, based on coinciding strategic interests, or promoting an alternative international order, Moscow and Brussels have failed to root their partnership on a clear understanding of what their discourses mean. The EU has also contributed to this confusion, seeking to be recognised as a different kind of actor in the international system. Its governance is complex and hard to understand by its closest partners, including Russia; and its ambitions to set itself as the yard-stick against which political relations should be assessed in Europe has also been contested. The EU's regional normative hegemony, although increasingly consolidated through enlargement and the neighbourhood policy, has also faced increasing challenges, by those standing outside of these processes, or those prevented from having an active voice in them.

<footnote n="1">¹ Risse, Thomas (2009) "Social constructivism and European Integration" in Antje Weiner and Thomas Diez (eds) *European Integration Theory*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press: 154.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Neumann, Iver B. (1996) *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A study in identity and international politics*. London: Routledge; Morozov, Viatcheslav (2007) "Russia and the West: Dividing Europe, Constructing Each Other", Paper presented at the ISA Annual Convention, Chicago, February 28 – March 3; Allison, Roy; Light, Margot; White, Stephen (2006) *Putin's Russia and the Enlarged Europe*. London: Chatham House/Blackwell Publishing.</footnote>
approach to relations with the EU. According to one commentator, “the enlargement of the EU, initially perceived as an objective process in the development of post-bipolar Europe, is today more and more often seen by many in Russia as a source of new challenges [linked with] rivalry in the post-Soviet space”<fnref n="1" />.

The disputes over influence in the so-called “shared neighbourhood” have added tension in EU-Russia relations. As Fernandes and Simão have argued

“Russia views the overall ENP as interference in its ‘near abroad’. This is less problematic than the engagement of NATO or the U.S. (e.g., the missile defence project) in Central and Eastern Europe, but it nevertheless provokes a will to reassert Russian power and sovereignty. Globally, EU post-enlargement ambitions in the common neighbourhood are those of a post-modern actor,<fnref n="2" /> in contrast with traditional Russian sovereign prerogatives. Instead of becoming an idealised European partner, Russia is becoming, in the EU perspective, a challenging foreign policy actor”<fnref n="3" />.

Whereas the EU was presenting the 2004 enlargement as an opportunity to reunite the continent, the creation of the ENP denotes recognition by the EU that integration processes do create new borders in Europe, between those in and those outside of the EU. Russia's demand to be treated as a strategic partner by the EU outside of the framework of the ENP was a clear statement that Moscow would challenge this revisionist EU notion of a wider Europe, and would fight for its influence in the CIS.

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### Colour Revolutions: Ukraine

The contestation of the election results, in Kiev, in late 2004 has been perceived through different lenses. For some it was the wilful action of the Ukrainian people to denounce corruption and fraud as unacceptable for the country's political future, and a committed choice of its leadership to follow a

<footnote n="1">¹ Arbatova, cited in Averre, 2009: 1691, *op cit*.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² We use here some elements of Krastev's definition of European post-modernity: a system of mutual interference in domestic affairs, security based on openness and transparency and the rejection of the use of force to solve conflicts (Krástev, 2007).</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Fernandes, Sandra and Licínia Simão (2010) “Competing for Eurasia: Russian and European Union Perspectives” in Maria R. Freire and Roger Kanet (eds.) *Key Players in Eurasia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 113-114</footnote>
Western model of development<fnref n="1" />. The reaction by the EU leaders, namely the Council, to the events in Ukraine was positive and of support, but also careful not to make commitments to the orange revolution leadership claims of future accession to the EU. Emerson<fnref n="2" /> underlines the subtle change in EU rhetoric, whilst initially making “explicitly negative remarks about the new neighbours having no membership perspectives, now the discourse seems to be cutting out the negatives, saying that while accession is not on the agenda, no doors are closed for the future”.

The events in Ukraine set Russia in a new course of action in the CIS. The lessons learned were extremely important for Moscow's more assertive and pro-active approach to Eurasia. First and foremost, an important speech, partly reproducing the views of the official elite, began to develop among Russian media, whereas the orange revolution in Ukraine was the result of a deliberate strategy by the west to “rob” Russia of Ukraine<fnref n="3" />. This was closely linked to the fears in Moscow that by pursuing a path of integration into the EU, Ukraine would abandon Russia-led formats of cooperation, namely the CIS, strategically curtailing Russia's power<fnref n="4" />. This discourse poised the West's approach as a zero-sum game, which neglected Russia's concerns in its neighbourhood, and ultimately posed a grave danger to the Russian model of centralised governance. Therefore, we can say that Russia's reaction to the colour revolutions aimed at two reinforcing goals: prevent the establishment of anti-Russian leaderships in Ukraine and Georgia and the spread of the colour revolutions to Russia<fnref n="5" />.

The EU's visible support to the leaders of the orange revolution in Ukraine and its support to the new Georgian President's pro-western rhetoric sparked a fierce debate in Moscow on how Russia could counter these events and potentially develop into an alternative centre of attraction to the CIS countries. Some of these views recycled the concept of Eurasianism to underline Russia's innovative offers<fnref n="6" />, others sustained that a more purposeful policy towards the near abroad would be necessary to foster pro-Russian forces among civil society and opposition forces<fnref n="7" />. Ultimately, Russia began a policy of contention with its neighbours. It enforced trade embargos on Moldova and Georgia; it raised energy prices to market levels, initiating a series of “gas wars” with Ukraine which had significant impact in Europe and Ukraine proper. The political use of energy has been documented as one of the most significant changes in Russia's policies towards the near abroad, as was the decision to resort to war in Georgia.

Under President Putin, Russia was very actively seeking to anchor Ukraine in the multilateral institutions of the Post-Soviet space, as well as to become a central economic player in Ukraine's strategic sectors, namely its pipeline infrastructures<fnref n="8" />. As the Russian-backed candidate, Yanukovich was elected as President in 2009, Russia also sought to assure another fundamental aspect of its relations with Ukraine, which was the presence of the Black Sea fleet in Crimea. Overall, Russia's presence in Ukraine is considerable, although the orange revolution did present Ukrainian leaders with alternatives to Russian dominance. This heritage was visible in the efforts by the new Ukrainian President to get the

<footnote n="1">¹ Kuzio, Taras (2007) “Comparative Perspectives on the fourth wave of democracy” in Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demes (eds) *Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in central and Eastern Europe*. Washington D.C.: German Marshall Fund of the United States: 217-234.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Emerson, Michael (2004) “Vade Mecum for the Next Enlargements of the European Union” *CEPS Policy Briefs*, 61, December, 3.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Grätz, Jonas (2010) “Who doesn’t love stability? Containing the Russian public after the Orange revolution”, *Russian analytical digest*, 75, 16 March: 14-16.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ March, Luke (2006) “Security strategy and the ‘Russia problem’” in Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson (eds) *Security strategy and transatlantic relations*. New York: Routledge: 98.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Makarychev, Andrey (2008) “Rebranding Russia: Norms, Politics and Power” *CEPS Working Document*, 283, February: 14.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Allison; Light, White, *op cit*. 162.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Makarychev, *op cit*.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Samokhvalov, Vasevolod (2007) “Relations in the Russia-Ukraine-EU triangle: ‘Zero-sum game’ or not?”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional paper 68, September: 11.</footnote>
EU and Russia to jointly manage the Ukrainian pipeline systems, in an effort to boost energy security in Europe<fnref n="1" />. The debacle of the orange revolution in the Presidential elections of 2009 and the election of the Moscow-backed candidate has been regarded in Moscow as a positive step and an important victory in terms of the maintenance of its influence in the post-Soviet space. As far as the EU is concerned, there has been an attempt to underline the process instead of the outcome, as proof of the positive development for Ukraine's democracy. The lawful conduct of elections is seen by some as the most important outcome for the country's political stability and ultimately the most important fruit of the orange revolution<fnref n="2" />.

## War in Georgia

Georgia has become another point of contention between the EU and Russia. Since the rose revolution in 2003 brought to power the pro-western President Mikhail Saakashvili, relations with Russia gradually worsened becoming apparent that Georgia's positions were irreconcilable with Russian interests in the Caucasus region. President Saakashvili's main goals for Georgia included, on the one hand the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory, including from the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and on the other, a steady path towards full Euro-Atlantic integration. These were two irreconcilable goals with Moscow's own ambitions to remain a relevant and hegemonic power in the CIS.

The EU cautiously welcomed the events of the rose revolution. Brussels was not keen on hampering its relations with Moscow due to a distant and unstable country like Georgia. Eventually the EU's Security Strategy called on the EU to take a more active role in the South Caucasus and the region was included in the ENP, in 2004. As events in Ukraine unfolded and western leaders began to speak of a fourth wave of liberation in Europe, which should be rewarded with Euro-Atlantic integration, Russia's muscle started to flex. Russia imposed what is widely seen as politically-motivated economic sanctions on Georgia, closed its borders and imposed stricter visa-regimes. It also developed an aggressive policy of passport distribution among Abkhaz and South Ossetians, further infringing on Georgia's claimed sovereignty over these territories.

Close cooperation with NATO became another point of contention between Russia and its neighbours, and tension rose even further in the NATO Budapest summit, where both Georgia and Ukraine were hoping to be given membership action plans (MAPs). Ultimately the MAPs were not agreed upon, but Russia was set on demonstrating how far it was willing to go to reassert its power in Eurasia. The hostilities in South Ossetia and Georgia proper were brief, from August 7 to August 12, when a cease-fire agreement was negotiated by the French President, holding the EU rotating presidency. Early EU reactions to the crisis included a repudiation of violence and a careful denouncing of Russia's actions by older EU member states, as opposed to loud statements by some of the younger member states. Although the EU presented a united front in the Council statements, President Saakashvili was being increasingly regarded as unpredictable and taking an authoritarian turn, which was poorly perceived in Brussels. It was therefore no surprise that the official EU position was rather limited to acting as an honest broker between Russia and Georgia.

For Russia, the point was even made that Russia was acting to stop a genocidal campaign ongoing in South Ossetia<fnref n="3" />, seeking to take the higher moral ground. Some analysts also predicted that Russia was aiming to undoubtedly prove its hegemonic position in its sphere of influence. The outcome

<footnote n="1">¹ RFE/RL (2010) “Yanukovych Says Ukraine Ready For Russian Fleet, Gas Deals”, 13 February. http://www.rferl.org/content/Yanukovych_Says_Ukraine_Ready_For_Russian_Fleet_Gas_Deals__/1957076.html</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Fischer, Sabine (2010) “Has the EU lost Ukraine?” *European Union Institute for Security Studies, Analysis*, February.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Schröder, Hans-Henning (2008) “’A short, victorious war’? Russian perspectives on the Caucasus Crisis” in Hans-Henning Schröder (ed.) *The Caucasus Crisis: International Perceptions and Policy Implications for Germany and Europe*, Berlin: SWP Research Paper 9, November: 8.</footnote>
might have been more limited than initially thought by Moscow. Instead of warm support, Russia received a cold-shoulder reaction from its CIS partners, concerned that this might symbolise the beginning of a militant and interventionist Russian policy in the CIS.

The intervention in Georgia is “Illustrative of Russia’s resistance to the applicability of EU principles ‘as the cornerstones of a wider international order’”<fnref n="1" />. President Medvedev’s proposal to establish a new comprehensive security treaty in Europe further reinforces this revisionist policy of the Russian Federation. A fundamental aspect of this proposal, as articulated by Foreign Minister Lavrov, in New York, is the rending operational of the concept of indivisibility of security in Europe, seen as “the inadmissibility of strengthening one’s own security by infringing upon the security of others”. According to Emerson<fnref n="2" /> “This can be read as diplomatic language for what writers about geo-politics call ‘sphere of influence’; which is not worthy of a ‘Helsinki-2’, but more reminiscent of some infamous 20th century pacts”.

In fact, the war has been regarded by one prominent Russian analyst as being “caused by the inability of the existing European security institutions to prevent both internal and intra-state conflicts which escalated after the bipolar confrontation was over”<fnref n="3" />. The same report clearly states that it was the Western countries’ “geopolitical expansion plans” which caused the war in Georgia and that Russia initiated a “radical modernization and revision of the political, legal and institutional frameworks of the system of international and collective security in Europe” right before the war.

## CONCLUSIONS:

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As these case studies sought to illustrate, the establishment of different and competing perceptions of the regional security environment in Europe has hampered the development of EU-Russia relations and has undermined the existing security regime. Not only the superiority of the European norms has been disputed by Russia, its exclusivist approach to the neighbourhood has been translated into new division lines, which the under-conceptualised Neighbourhood Policy has been unable to address. The ENP potentially escalated competition in the shared neighbourhood with Russia, by building on ambiguity. Moreover, EU official speech portrayed EU governance expansions as apolitical and inclusive, providing benefits for all. This understanding was contested in Moscow, which regarded EU rules as favouring the EU and not-necessarily Russia, or even the countries in the shared neighbourhood. Russia saw regime stability as preferable to so-called democratic revolutions, which created deep political instability in Ukraine, for instance. Moscow also saw EU commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration in the CIS space as a fundamental challenge to the EU's stated desire to build a strategic partnership with Moscow, and to its commitment to shared security in Europe.

After the war in Georgia and with the financial and economic impact of the global financial crisis, both the EU and Russia are looking at each other's potential. The partnership for modernisation has been advanced as the new moto for bilateral relations, although what will be fundamentally different in this approach is still to be seen. Fundamental differences subside. “Russia is more a norm-exploiter than a norm-producer. It stays far-removed from multiple norm-producing initiatives on a trans-national scale, including – but not limited to –norms that regulate transparency, accountability, sustainable development, good governance, and so on. If Russia remains aloof in these debates, communicative problems with its major Western partners are inevitable.”<fnref n="4" />

<figure><img src="image_8.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1">¹ Haukkala, Hiski (2009), “Lost in Translation? Why the EU has Failed to Influence Russia’s Development” *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61 (10), December: 1757.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Emerson, Michael (2008) “The August War and Beyond” *CEPS Neighbourhood Watch*, 41, September.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Valdai Club (2010) Report: *Towards a new Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture* (June 2010) http://www.globalaffairs.ru/docs/Karaganov_eng.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Mararychev, Andrey (2009) “Russia and its ‘New Security Architecture’ in Europe: A Critical Examination of the Concept”, CEPS Working Documents, 310, February: 7.</footnote>
# L'UE, la Roumanie et la coopération régionale

DR. MICHEL LABORI

Professeur Honoraire de l'Université de Franche-Comté

**Abstract:** Romania has a very important geographical position in the South-East of Europe. The country is neighbouring of the Balkans, the Black Sea and of the countries of Eastern Europe. Romania cooperates: 1) with the Balkans in the context of the "Process of cooperation in South-East Europe". 2) with the countries of the Black Sea in the "Organisation of Economic Cooperation of the Black Sea" and the "the Black Sea Synergy". 3) with the countries of Eastern Europe in the Eastern Partnership, especially Moldova.

**Keywords:** EU, Romania, Moldova, Black Sea Synergy, Balkans

## INTRODUCTION

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Le premier janvier 2007 est une date importante pour la construction européenne avec le sixième élargissement qui concerne la Bulgarie et la Roumanie. L'adhésion de ces deux pays modifie les situations géopolitiques et géostratégiques de l'UE qui a désormais un accès à la Mer Noire.

L'UE se trouve implique dans des nouvelles relations avec les pays proches de la Mer Noire et les pays frontaliers des deux nouveaux Etats membres.

La Roumanie est une puissance régionale majeure. Elle a une politique balkanique, elle est très engagée dans la coopération avec les pays de la région de la Mer Noire et elle est concernée directement par le Partenariat Oriental. Elle a l'ambition d'être un leader régional comme l'a déclaré le président Traian Băsescu lors du débat organisé par l'Association George S.Marshall et l'Administration présidentielle en 2007 « la Roumanie européenne, la Roumanie euro-atlantique, la Roumanie dans la sphère des relations internationales. »

## 1. LA ROUMANIE ET LES BALKANS

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /></figure>

La Roumanie fait partie du Processus de coopération en Europe du sud-est (SEECP). Le SEECP est une organisation régionale fondée en 1996. Elle comprend la Turquie, l'Albanie, la Bosnie Herzégovine, la Bulgarie, la Croatie, la Grèce, la Macédoine, la Moldavie, le Monténégro, la Roumanie, la Serbie et la Slovénie. Elle a pour but le renforcement de la coopération politique et économique dans la région, le maintien des relations de bon voisinage et la lutte commune contre le crime organisé. Les sommets sont annuels.

La Roumanie a manifesté son indépendance lors du sommet d'Istanbul des 23 – 25 juin 2010 en refusant la condamnation d'Israël suite à l'attaque de la flottille se rendant à Gaza. Elle soutient le Processus d'intégration des Balkans dans l'UE.

La Roumanie a refusé de reconnaitre l'indépendance du Kosovo (17.02.2008) au nom du principe de l'intégrité territoriale et de l'inviolabilité des frontières. La classe politique roumaine a été unanime à l'exception de l'UDMR qui représente la minorité hongroise. La Roumanie ne veut pas encourager la minorité hongroise à aller plus loin dans ses revendications pour ne pas remettre en cause l'unité nationale.

La Roumanie soutient la Serbie qui a déclaré illégale la proclamation d'indépendance unilatérale du Kosovo et a introduit un recours au près de la Cour Internationale de Justice de La Haye.L'avis de la Cour internationale de justice du 22 septembre 2010 déclare que l'indépendance du Kosovo n'est pas incompatible avec le droit international. En septembre 2010 le projet de résolution serbe faisant appel au dialogue pour résoudre la question du Kosovo a été voté à l'unanimité par l'A.G.de l'O.N.U.
## 2. LA ROUMANIE ET LA MER NOIRE

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /></figure>

La région de la Mer Noire a connu d'importants bouleversements géopolitiques à la fin du XXème siècle et au début du XXIème siècle avec les effondrements de l'URSS (1989) et l'élargissement de l'UE à la Roumanie et à la Bulgarie (2007).

La disparition de l'URSS a augmenté le nombre de pays riverains (Ukraine, Russie et Géorgie). Plusieurs initiatives régionales ont été prises pour renforcer la coopération entre les pays riverains.

L'organisation de la Coopération Economique de la Mer Noire est la plus importante (OECMN). Elle a été créée à Istanbul le 25 juin 1992 par 11 pays (Albanie, Arménie, Azerbaïdjan, Bulgarie, Croatie, Grèce, Macédoine, Moldavie, Roumanie, Russie, Turquie et Ukraine). Elle n'a fonctionné qu'en 1999 après sa ratification par les Etats membres. Elle a été rejointe par la Serbie. Son but est la coopération multilatérale politique et économique de manière à mettre en place une dynamique interactionnelle et un réseau de confiance entre les participants.

Elle repose sur plusieurs institutions:

**La Banque de commerce et de développement** de la Mer Noire, une assemblée parlementaire et un conseil d'affaires.

**La Banque de commerce et de développement** de la Mer Noire a été créée en 1997, elle soutient depuis 1999 des projets d'investissement, d'infrastructures de transport et de télécommunications pour renforcer les liens régionaux. Ses investissements s'inscrivent dans le cadre du développement durable. Une douzaine de groupes de travail thématiques fonctionnent (coopération statistique, protection de l'environnement, etc.).

L'Assemblée parlementaire date de 1993. Son siège est en Turquie, elle est composée de 76 représentants des Parlements nationaux.

Un Conseil d'affaires, composé d'experts internationaux, précise les opportunités d'investissements dans la région.

**L'OECMN** est un cadre de coopération qui dépasse les limites de la Mer Noire (Albanie, Serbie). Elle est la seule structure de dialogue qui existe. Elle peut jouer un rôle de médiateur en cas de crise. On lui reproche son manque d'efficacité lors de crises graves comme la guerre russo-géorgienne de 2008 ou pour apaiser les tensions entre la Turquie et l'Arménie ou l'Arménie et l'Azerbaïdjan.

La région est une zone géostratégique majeure avec les richesses pétrolières de la Caspienne et leur transit. L'OECMN est avant tout un forum de dialogue entre les pays membres.

La Roumanie a une situation géostratégique importante, elle constitue un pont entre les Balkans (Serbie, Albanie) et les pays riverains.

**La Communauté de choix démocratique** a été fondée en 2005 à l'initiative des présidents ukrainien Viktor Iouchtenko et géorgien Mikheil Saakashvili. Elle a pour objectif la réunion de « tous les Etats démocratiques de région de la Baltique, de la mer Noire et de la Mer Caspienne ». Elle comprend avec les pays fondateurs les trois pays baltes et aussi la Roumanie, La Slovénie, la Macédoine et la Moldavie. Elle ne regroupe qu'un nombre restreint de pays par rapport à ses ambitions initiales. Elle n'a donné lieu à aucune concrétisation jusqu'à maintenant. La Russie était hostile à sa création en considérant qu'elle était dirigée contre elle.

### La Synergie de la Mer Noire.

L'UE est un acteur majeur dans le basin de la Mer Noire depuis 2007. Elle est la seule entité capable de donner un nouveau souffle à la coopération régionale.

Les enjeux principaux sont l'énergie, l'environnement et la sécurité. La Mer Noire est une zone de transit des hydrocarbures russes et de la mer Caspienne dont le rôle va s'accentuer. La situation
environnementale de la Mer Noire est catastrophique et nécessite une réponse commune. La sécurité est un problème préoccupant avec les « conflits gelés » (Transnistrie, Russie – Géorgie), l' immigration illégale et la criminalité organisée).

L'UE a voulu remédier à cette situation en lançant la « Synergie de la Mer Noire », le 15 mars 2007. Elle concerne la Roumanie, la Bulgarie, la Grèce, la Turquie, la Russie,

l'Ukraine, la Géorgie, l'Arménie, l'Azerbaïdjan et la Moldavie. Elle est centrée sur les secteurs de coopération où l'UE est déjà partie prenante comme l'énergie, le transport et

l'environnement. Elle agira aussi en tant qu'appui à la société civile et dans la solution des « conflits gelés ».

La Synergie de la Mer Noire sera cofinancée en utilisant les mécanismes financiers existants: le FEDER pour les trois pays membres (Grèce, Roumanie, Bulgarie), l'aide de préadhésion (Turquie) et l' instrument de la politique européenne de voisinage pour les autres pays.

La Commission compte travailler avec les organisations régionales comme la **coopération économique de la Mer Noire**.

La Roumanie voit dans la Synergie de la Mer Noire la possibilité de réduire la dépendance en hydrocarbures de l'UE, des Balkans Occidentaux et de la République de Moldavie vis-à-vis de la Russie, grâce à la proximité des gisements de l' Azerbaïdjan et du Kazakhstan.

Elle s'y est profondément impliquée, c'est ce qui explique ses réticences lors du lancement du Partenariat Oriental.

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /></figure>

## 3. LE PARTENARIAT ORIENTAL

Le Partenariat a été lancé en mai 2009 durant la présidence tchèque à Prague. Il résulte d'une initiative polono-suédoise. Il était une réponse des PECO à l'Union pour la Méditerranée finalisée lors du sommet du Paris du 13 juillet 2008. Il renforce la dimension orientale de la politique européenne de voisinage et comprend le Belarus, l'Ukraine, la République de Moldavie, l'Arménie, l'Azerbaïdjan et la Géorgie et s'inscrit dans la cadre de la PEV.

Il prévoit des accords d'association comportant des accords de libre échange renforcés et globaux, l'intégration progressive dans l'économie européenne, la création entre les 6 pays d'une communauté économique de voisinage, l'amélioration de la sécurité énergétique pour l'UE et ses voisins, une meilleure gestion des frontières, l'ouverture d'une marché du travail de l'UE à la main-d'œuvre des pays partenaires, etc.

La Roumanie a manifesté de fortes réticences au Partenariat Oriental pour plusieurs raisons:

* Le projet a été proposé sans consultation de la Roumanie et sans qu'elle ait donné son avis sur le contenu du projet ;

* Il peut être un frein à la Synergie de la Mer Noire ;

* Il n'offre pas de perspectives clairement définies pour l'adhésion de la Moldavie à l'UE. Elle est placée sur le même plan que les autres pays.

La Roumanie s'est finalement ralliée au Partenariat Oriental à partir du moment où la Commission a affirmé sa complémentarité avec la Synergie de la Mer Noire.

La République de Moldavie est le pays du Partenariat Oriental dans lequel la Roumanie s'implique le plus. Les deux pays sont liés par des liens historiques étroits. La Moldavie a fait partie de la Roumanie jusqu'en 1940 quand elle a été annexée par l' URSS.
Elle est devenue indépendante en 1991 après l'éclatement de l'URSS. Les deux tiers de moldaves sont roumanophones. La Roumanie accorde la nationalité roumaine (Loi de la citoyenneté no 21) aux moldaves qui l'avaient en 1940 et à leurs descendants des premier et deuxième degrés. 800 000 demandes d'obtention de la citoyenneté roumaine ont été déposées pour favoriser la circulation des moldaves dans l'UE.

Les relations roumano - moldaves se sont tendues durant les gouvernements communistes (2001-2009). La victoire des parties libéraux favorables à l'UE aux législatives de juillet 2009 a rapproché les deux pays. Le président Traian Băsescu a consacré sa première visite à l'étranger après sa réélection à la Moldavie, qui a reçu 100 millions de la Roumanie pour ses projets d'infrastructures et d'éducation. Le premier ministre Vlad Filat a eu un geste symbolique significatif en enlevant les 360 km de barbèles sur les berges du Prut qui sépare les deux pays (février 2010).

La Moldavie a un grave problème intérieur avec la région de Transnistrie dont elle est séparée depuis qu'elle a proclamé son indépendance en décembre 1991. Elle est occupée par des troupes russes.

La Roumanie peut jouer un rôle de médiateur pour la solution de ce problème. Le Partenariat Oriental est un cadre adapté à la négociation d'un accord d'association, prélude à une candidature d'adhésion. La Roumanie soutient la candidature de la Moldavie à l'UE. Elle fait pression pour qu'elle bénéficie du même statut que les Balkans Occidentaux qui ont signé des accords de stabilisation et d'association avec l'UE.

## CONCLUSION

La Roumanie est partie prenante à toutes les formes de coopération régionale. Sa diplomatie pourrait être plus active pour qu'elle contribue à la stabilisation de la région. C'est cette vision de la géopolitique roumaine qui est ressentie ailleurs. Une rationalisation des formes de coopération s'impose pour qu'elles soient plus efficaces. Sa collaboration avec les pays voisins peut avoir un impact majeur non seulement pour la résolution des problèmes de la région, mais aussi pour la stabilité de l'Union européenne.

## Références

Beckouche, P. et Richardy, Y., *Atlas d'une nouvelle Europe. L'Europe occidentale et ses voisins, vers une région mondiale ?* Paris, Autrement, 2008.

Commission des communautés européennes, *Communication from the Commission and the Council on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2007 (COM 2008 164)*, Bruxelles, 3 avril 2008.

Mariani, Th., *Le développement de la politique européenne d e voisinage et la question des frontières de l'Union élargie. Rapport No 3132 de la Délégation générale pour l'U.E. de l'assemblée nationale*, 7 juin 2006.

SCHÄFFER, Sebastian and Dominik Tolksdorf, "The Eastern Partnership - "ENP plus" for Europe's Eastern neighbours", *C·A·Perspectives*, Nr 4, May 2009, 4 p.

TSANTOULIS, Yannis, "Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership: Different Centres of Gravity, Complementarity or Confusing Signals?", *International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBS)*, Athens, Policy Brief Nr 12, February 2009.

<figure><img src="image_13.png" /></figure>
# Considérations sur la politique européenne de voisinage en 2011: les évolutions, les défis et les perspectives

VIRA RATSIBORYNSKA

Doctorante, IEP Strasbourg et

DR. SIMION COSTEA

Université « Petru Maior » de Targu-Mures

**Abstract:** The article focuses on the challenges and developments in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Established in 2004, the ENP has opened some opportunities for beneficiary countries of this policy. The implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) vis-à-vis the Southern and Eastern partners, has been the subject of scrutiny in the international arena. Recent events in North Africa are forcing a redefinition of priorities in this region and show the new challenges of the ENP. The High Representative's communication from 25.05.2011 opens new perspectives, and more effectiveness of the ENP is necessary.

**Keywords:** ENP, Eastern Partnership, Ukraine, Moldova.

## 1. LA POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE DE VOISINAGE: SON EVOLUTION

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /></figure>

En 2004 la politique européenne de voisinage apparaît comme une politique étrangère très ambitieuse, qui vise à créer une zone de stabilité paneuropéenne assise sur le partage de valeurs communes (démocratie, droits de l'homme et économie de marché) que doit soutenir un environnement économique de prospérité partagée<fnref n="1" />. Cependant, huit ans après le lancement de cette politique les bénéfices politiques et économiques que l'on peut attendre de la PEV sont nuancés. Les expériences de la pré-adhésion et de l'élargissement, en partie reproduite par la politique européenne de voisinage, montrent que les bénéfices politiques et économiques devraient surtout se trouver du côté des Etats voisins, le bénéfice des Etats membres de l'Union européenne n'étant que relatif. De fait, l'intérêt pour l'Union européenne, quelle que soit «l'offre» destinée aux futurs pays frontaliers de l'Union, était et reste avant tout politique et sécuritaire<fnref n="2" />. Le risque pour la sécurité de l'UE comprend l'escalade régionale des conflits, des flux migratoires ingérables, la mise en suspens de routes commerciales et de l'approvisionnement énergétique et la création d'un terreau d'activités terroristes et criminelles. Dans ce contexte, le développement économique et politique du fait de la PEV doit servir de base à une stratégie préventive d'atténuation de ces risques. Il s'agit d'éléments du « soft power » européen, qui inclut également l'aide humanitaire ou les opérations de police en contraste avec l'approche américaine des dernières années<fnref n="3" />.

En 2011 la conjoncture politique et les évolutions récentes de la PEV démontraient l'inefficacité de la stratégie communautaire à l'égard de l'Est et du Sud, et la nécessité de revoir les instruments de sa politique étrangère<fnref n="4" />.

L'hétérogénéité du voisinage et la variété des situations des Etats voisins au Sud et à l'Est ont rendu nécessaire le développement de la PEV au cas par cas, par Etat voisin, selon ses spécificités. D'où l'importance de tels principes clés de la PEV comme la différentiation des partenariats et des

<footnote n="1">¹ Commission européenne, *L'Europe élargie – Voisinage : un nouveau cadre de relations avec nos voisins de l'Est et du Sud, COM(2003) 104 final*, Bruxelles, 11 mars 2003, p.4, disponible en ligne : http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/euromed_conf3/doc/com_2003_0262_en.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ NYE Joseph, “Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power”, Hardcover, Paris, 2008.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/documents/news/20110527_6_fr.pdf</footnote>
allocations entre les pays fondés sur les avancées des Etats partenaires dans le sens des principes de la PEV et la mise en oeuvre des réformes<fnref n="1" />.

La PEV pourrait exercer un pouvoir d'attraction effectif sur les pays voisins, et laisser espérer une stabilisation et une diffusion de la prospérité dans cet ensemble panéuropéen, si les réformes substantielles qui entrent dans le contenu de la PEV démontrent leur efficacité. La PEV mise au point le 25 mai 2011 va mettre en équilibre Est et Sud ce qui accroîtrait la transparence et les chances de succès de la PEV dans la satisfaction des besoins des partenaires<fnref n="2" />. La PEV, révisitée en 2011, par la Commission européenne et le Parlement Européen doit certainement s'avérer une fenêtre d'opportunité afin de rééquilibrer son mode de fonctionnement, assurant que les institutions démocratiques, les droits de l'Homme et la préservation de l'environnement ne soient pas délaissés au profit de la libéralisation économique<fnref n="3" />.

Mais pour que cette politique adaptée aux réalités actuelles soit efficace, les leçons des dernières années doivent être tirées et les défis relevés.

## 2. LES DEFIS DE LA PEV

Plusieurs défis et enjeux de taille subsistent dans le cadre de la PEV. En 2011, la Commission Européenne considère que "la coopération avec nos voisins est la seule manière de relever les défis et de s'attaquer aux menaces qui font fi des frontières, telles que le terrorisme, l'immigration clandestine ou la pollution des mers et des rivières qui nous sont communes. Elle nous permet de nous attaquer aux sources d'instabilité et de conflit dans la région"<fnref n="4" />.

Mais voilà des autres défis. Premièrement, peu de pays concernés par cette politique s'en satisfont pleinement. Certains d'entre eux souhaitent une promesse claire d'adhésion future à l'UE et désirent un traitement individualisé. La plupart demandent davantage d'aides financières, récusent plus ou moins la lecture communautaire de la démocratie ou des droits de l'homme.

A l'Est, la récente reprise économique en Russie et l'émergence d'un régime de plus en plus autoritaire à Moscou a renouvelé la confiance des dirigeants pour la défense d'intérêts dans les « pays étrangers proches »<fnref n="5" />. La Russie exerce son influence sur six pays concernés par la PEV et s'avère militairement présente dans chacun d'entre eux<fnref n="6" />. Sur le plan économique, il s'agit d'un fournisseur essentiel d'énergie et d'un exportateur important, son marché du travail étant en plus la source de flux financiers énormes. Une histoire commune, la prépondérance de la langue russe et la facilité du déplacement dans l'espace post-soviétique renforce la position de la Russie dans la région. Dans la pratique, ceci a gêné les progrès de la démocratie et favorisé la reprise de conflits ouverts ou larvés (Transnistrie, Abkhazie, Ossétie du Sud)<fnref n="7" />.

<footnote n="1">¹ http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/11-02-17_Non papier SIL Action de l'Union européenne en direction du voisinage Sud.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Commission Européenne, La Haute Représentante de l'UE pour les Affaires Etrangères et la Politique de Sécurité, COMMUNICATION CONJOINTE AU PARLEMENT EUROPEEN, AU CONSEIL, AU COMITÉ ÉCONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL EUROPÉEN ET AU COMITÉ DES RÉGIONS. Une stratégie nouvelle à l'égard d'un voisinage en mutation, Bruxelles, 25.05. 2011, en http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/documents/news/20110527_6_fr.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Svante CORNELL, "The New Eastern Europe: challenges and opportunities for the EU", Centre for European studies, Brussels, 2009.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Laure Delcours, Politique de voisinage et relations russo-européennes: partenariat stratégique ou lutte d'influence ?, Paris, juin 2005, disponible sur le site du CEES : http://www.cee-europe.fr/fr/etudes/revue9/r9a7.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ http://www.russiegeopolitique.org/Les_separatistes_pro-russes.html</footnote>
Certains États tels que la Géorgie et la Moldavie ont appelé l'UE à intervenir sur les questions de conflits territoriaux conformément aux plans d'actions identifiés par la PEV<fnref n="1" />. Le problème se ressent surtout par rapport aux États-membres jaloux de leurs prérogatives nationales et par rapport à la volonté de préserver des relations stables avec la Russie. Dans cette situation pour l'Union Européenne il s'avère difficile et contradictoire de concilier la promotion des valeurs de l'UE et la défense d'intérêts par rapport aux exportateurs d'énergie autocratiques.

Les partenaires orientaux comme l'Ukraine et la Moldavie, n'apprécient pas de recevoir le même traitement que les pays méditerranéens et de se voir inclure dans un cadre qui retarderait leur adhésion. Ces pays insistent aussi sur la différenciation de l'approche dans le cadre de la formation d'une stratégie communautaire concernant les États indépendants anciennement membres de l'URSS. Tout manquement à cette nécessité est interprété par les gouvernements de ces pays comme un possible menace envers leurs intégrités.

En ce qui concerne l'Ukraine, la PEV démontre pour l'heure l'absence d'une stratégie d'intégration de ce pays. En tant que tel, la PEV et le partenariat oriental n'offrent rien de plus qu'un partenariat identique à celui proposé à la Russie et aux pays méditerranéens.

Pourtant la perspective d'adhésion joue un rôle fondamental dans la transformation de l'Ukraine. Étant donné le caractère sensible de la question d'une intégration ukrainienne, l'UE réfléchit à des solutions alternatives telles qu'une zone de libre échange entre l'UE et l'Ukraine ou la levée des interdictions de visas<fnref n="2" />. Ceci aurait un impact considérable sur ceux qui se préoccupent de la démocratie en Ukraine et qui souhaitent unir son élite politique avec la société, pour ce qui est des réformes.

Au Sud, l'UE doit faire face à un dilemme du fait de la montée de l'islamisme. La coopération avec les régimes laïques mais autoritaires risque de diminuer leurs adversaires musulmans modérés. Ni les uns, ni les autres n'acceptent entièrement un modèle de société à l'européenne basé sur des droits fondamentaux et des libertés individuelles. Les partenaires du Sud se sentent quelque peu lésés par le processus de Barcelone et voient d'un mauvais œil les conditions

imposées par l'UE pour la conduite de réformes et la participation à ce projet politique. L'UE doit soutenir plus activement « le printemps arabe » de 2011.

En gros, les pays concernés par la PEV sont très hétérogènes et la réponse doit être différenciée en fonction de la situation politique de chaque partenaire et de son niveau de développement socio-économique. La différenciation est alors sans doute le plus important principe de la PEV et tombe en adéquation avec la volonté des pays partenaires.

Il existe un autre aspect qui pose une certaine ambiguïté au sein de la PEV. Le lien entre politique de voisinage et politique d'élargissement a été un thème récurrent depuis la création de la PEV. Les incitations créées par la perspective d'adhésion sont fortes et l'UE a cherché à développer à travers la PEV une politique extérieure complémentaire pour l'élargissement et la promotion des réformes.

Dès lors l'objectif de la politique de voisinage est de dresser un cadre pour une relation qui, à moyen terme, n'inclut pas l'adhésion à l'UE ou un rôle au sein des institutions communautaires<fnref n="3" />. Ces dernières doivent être considérées à part. La PEV a pour but de se dresser au delà de la simple

<figure><img src="image_15.png" /></figure>

European Neighbourhood Policy

<footnote n="1">¹ http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc11/FDOC12521.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² http://www.biz-affaire.com/communique-752072.html</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Commission Européenne, Communication de la Commission au Conseil et au Parlement Européen, Construire notre avenir commun, Défis politiques et moyens budgétaires de l'Union élargie-2007-2013, Com (2004)101 final, Bruxelles, février 2004</footnote>
coopération et d'accéder à un certain niveau d'intégration économique de même que d'approfondir le
dialogue pour que les pays partenaires participent progressivement à des programmes-clés de l'UE<fnref n="1" />.

Cependant cette distinction n'est pas facile à mettre en pratique. L'article 49 du Traité UE stipule que tout pays européen peut soumettre sa candidature dans l'optique de devenir membre<fnref n="2" />. Dès lors plusieurs États concernés par la PEV ont des raisons légitimes de nourrir de telles aspirations et perçoivent même la participation à la PEV comme l'exclusion du processus d'élargissement.

De même, un meilleur engagement des partenaires est rendu difficile par la réticence de l'UE à mettre en place des incitations suffisantes dans des domaines qui recouvrent des enjeux vitaux (mobilité, accès au marché). L'UE se révèle très réticente à ouvrir son marché à des produits où des pays partenaires disposent d'un avantage compétitif non négligeable. Les négociations laborieuses des accords commerciaux et les questions de la mobilité des personnes directement en lien avec la sécurité de l'UE et l'immigration clandestine font douter certaines partenaires de la bonne foi de l'Union. A cet égard la PEV a seulement la prétention de vouloir lever certains obstacles techniques à une coopération en vue d'une candidature éventuelle sans aucune certitude.

3. LES PERSPECTIVES DE LA PEV

La PEV est à présent implantée de manière solide et s'avère un élément principal de la politique extérieure de l'UE avec des structures et des instruments bien définis. L'article 7 du Traité de Lisbonne stipule clairement que la poursuite de certains objectifs doit être effective<fnref n="3" />. Néanmoins cette politique souffre toujours de certaines faiblesses liées à la crédibilité de l'UE en tant qu'acteur sur la scène internationale et à la mobilisation des États-membres concernant un agenda très ambitieux et des enjeux de taille à venir.

La PEV a été toujours pensée comme un moyen de promouvoir les « valeurs communes » de l'Europe, notamment dans les domaines de l'état de droit; de la bonne gouvernance; du respect des droits de l'Homme, y compris ceux des minorités nationales; de la poursuite de relations cordiales de voisinage et du développement durable en même temps que l'économie de marché<fnref n="4" />. Une fois de plus, la démocratisation et les droits civiques sont, théoriquement, placés au même niveau que la libéralisation économique. La politique ne fonctionne cependant pas de cette manière en pratique.

Depuis huit ans, à compter de sa création, la PEV donne toujours la priorité à la libéralisation économique par rapport à la démocratie et aux avancées sociales qu'elle s'était engagée à promouvoir<fnref n="5" />. Dans la majorité des pays de l'Est concernés par cette politique, les plans d'action nationaux ne déploient pas de moyens suffisants pour l'agriculture, l'éradication de la pauvreté, les systèmes de protection sociale et les infrastructures de santé publique.

Les évolutions récentes de la PEV ont montré que les choses évoluent rapidement et que la PEV n'a pas porté tous ses fruits<fnref n="6" />. Une importante avancée en la matière est l'élaboration de la

<footnote n="1">¹ *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Article 49 du Traité sur l'Union européenne, Version consolidée du Traité sur l'Union européenne, en http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/europe_828/avenir-union-europeenne_14204/colonne-droite_14807/textes-reference_17509/article-49-du-traite-sur-union-europeenne_44445.html</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ http://www.traite-de-lisbonne.fr/Traite_de_Lisbonne.php?Traite=2</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Commission européenne, L'Europe élargie – Voisinage, op.cit., note 1.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Commission européenne, la communication: Politique européenne de voisinage, document d'orientation, Com (2004) 373 final, Bruxelles, 12 mai 2004.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Commission Européenne, La Haute Représentante de l'UE pour les Affaires Etrangères et la Politique de Sécurité, COMMUNICATION CONJOINTE AU PARLEMENT EUROPEEN, AU CONSEIL, AU COMITÉ ÉCONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL EUROPÉEN ET AU COMITÉ DES RÉGIONS. Une stratégie nouvelle à l'égard d'un voisinage en mutation, Bruxelles, 25.05. 2011, en http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/documents/news/20110527_6_fr.pdf</footnote>
communication de la Commission Européenne sur la stratégie nouvelle de la PEV à l'égard d'un
voisinage en mutation<fnref n="1" />. L'application de cette stratégie va montrer son efficacité ou pas dans l'avenir.
Le cheminement reste malgré tout difficile; les enjeux politiques, les divergences dans la région et les
positions hétérogènes de l'UE vis-à-vis des questions sensibles au niveau local et international jouent
un rôle et influent dans le processus.

C'est important de reconnaître que les relations de l'UE avec les voisins au niveau
gouvernemental ne sont pas suffisantes. Il faut coopérer à plusieurs niveaux. « Conformément à
l'objectif de la PEV renouvelée de se focaliser sur les liens entre les sociétés, l'UE encouragera une
coopération plus intensive avec les différentes parties prenantes, notamment avec les parlements, dans
le cadre du réseau EURONEST créé par le Parlement européen, les acteurs régionaux, en
coopération avec le Comité des régions, les chefs d'entreprise, dans le cadre d'un Forum des
entreprises du partenariat oriental, ainsi qu'avec la société civile et les partenaires sociaux, en
s'appuyant sur le Forum de la société civile du partenariat oriental et ses plateformes nationales»<fnref n="2" />.
Mais, à notre avis, le budget alloué par l'UE pour cette coopération à plusieurs niveaux nécessite des
efforts et des financements supplémentaire, visibles pour le citoyen. Il faut faire des efforts communs
pour dépasser la crise économique mondiale. L'extension de la participation à des programmes tells
qu'Erasmus Mundus, Tempus, Jean Monnet, Jeunesse en action et e-Twinning, ouverture de futures
programmes supplémentaires, tel le programme pour l'éducation et la formation tout au long de la
vie, aux pays du partenariat oriental<fnref n="3" />, sont des objectifs très importantes a réaliser, avec des effets
multiplicatifs.

Nous considérons que l'UE doit être plus active et persévérante en soutenir les « révolutions »
arabes de 2011 et le processus de démocratisation, mais aussi de renforcer la perspective d'adhésion à
l'UE de certains pays européennes du « Partenariat Oriental ». Cette perspective européenne est
essentielle pour les évolutions politiques et économiques internes de ces pays, spécialement pour la
République de la Moldavie et l'Ukraine.

Bibliographie:

BEURDELEY, Laurent, Brosse Renaud, Maron Fabienne., *L'Union Européenne et ses espaces de proximité entre stratégie inclusive et partenariat renovés: quel avenir pour le nouveau voisinage de l'Union*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007, 372p.

BALZACQ, Thierry., *Construire le voisin. Pratiques européennes*, l'Harmattan, Paris, 2007, 191p.

CORNELL, Svante, *The New Eastern Europe: challenges and opportunities for the EU*, Centre for European Studies, Brussels, 2009.

DELCOURS, Laure, *Politique de voisinage et relations russo-européennes: partenariat stratégique ou lutte d'influence?*, Paris, juin 2005.

HILLION, Christophe., EU enlargement: a legal approach, Oxford and Portland Oregon, London, 2004.

LEPESANT, Gilles., L'Ukraine dans la nouvelle Europe », CNRS édition, Paris, 2005, 195p.

LEWIS, Ann., *The EU and Ukraine: neighbours, friends and partners?*, Federal trust for education and research, London, 2002, 318p.

NYE, Joseph., *Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power*, Hardcover, Paris, 2008.

PUSCAS, Vasile, *The New Approach of the ENP*, in « *Geostrategic Pulse*», 101/2011, p.16.

ROMER, Jean Christophe., *Géopolitique de la Russie*, Economica, 1999, Paris, 112p.

RUPNIK, Jacques., *Les banlieus de l'Europe: les politiques de voisinage de l'Union européenne*, Sciences Po les presses, Paris, 2007, 206p.

TINGUY, Ann., L'Ukraine, *nouvel acteur du jeu international*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2000, 322p.

<figure><img src="image_16.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1">¹ *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ *Ibidem*.</footnote>
# European experience of social partnership and possibilities of its implementation in Ukraine

DR. NINA DIDENKO

Doctor of Science on Public Administration,
Professor, Dean, Donetsk State University of Management, UKRAINE

**Abstract:** The article is devoted to the possibilities of implementing European experience of social partnership in Ukraine and actualization of these problems for public administration bodies. The article presents the factors that make a social partnership a necessary one in the social and economic development of the Ukraine. The article shows the key problems of social partnership in the system of tripartism, mechanism of state management in this system. The article also analyses the problems of European experience for accounting in forming the Ukrainian model of social partnership.

**Keywords:** social partnership, public administration, social responsibility of business, models of interaction between trade unions and state, European experience of social partnership.

<figure><img src="image_17.png" /></figure>

Urgency of implementing the European experience of social partnership in Ukraine is determined by the fact, that during the XX-XXI centuries the social partnership is an effective mechanism of social interaction, which allows solving the issues of economic, political, social and cultural character, enables to relieve social tension, to offset the negative social consequences of market reforms.

Availability of different models of social partnership does not contradict the possibility to highlight general principles, methods and forms of partnership that can be applied in Ukraine in developing a national model, in particular, the history of partnership demonstrates that the effectiveness and strength of each of the models were tested repeatedly in the conditions of inflation, high unemployment, social and legal chaos. This allowed recognizing the social partnership as an effective mechanism of social interaction, which guarantees peaceful reforms, coordination of socio-economic interests of subjects of a partnership with significant social objectives.

Existing models of social partnership in Europe differ from one another by institutional mechanism, norms and rules of regulating social and labor relations, the degree of centralization and decentralization, procedures of participation in social dialogue, the effectiveness of the negotiation process and the influence of social partnership on social and economic development, but have common principles of partnership as an alternative to confrontation, the dictatorship of any class or person, means of overcoming risks and contradictions.

The main factors of social partnership in Western Europe after the Second World War was the desire of the European population to rebuild the economy, restore social order, to ensure their own welfare and to ensure the future of their children through cooperation, joint efforts, adherence to high social discipline. The coincidence of economic, political and social interests, supported by the features of Western mentality with its tolerance, the ability to find compromises, the need for social consensus, already in 50-60-ies of XX century provided an opportunity for transformation of social partnership to an important direction of national policy, which was legally enshrined in the form of tripartism in such countries as Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, France, England, Luxembourg, Ireland, Germany, Scandinavian countries.

Each country has formed its own, specific model of social partnership, which reproducing the overall mechanism, has adapted it to the specific circumstances of its country, taking into account the interests of their citizens. This fact is important for the development of social partnership in Ukraine, which also must meet, first of all, the interests of their citizens and take into account historical, political and social experience of the country.
As the European experience shows, partnerships in a transitional society have covered a wide range of subjects and gradually moved beyond the social and labor relations, affecting society development in various fields, bringing together citizens' efforts in solving urgent problems of economic, political, social, cultural character. In particular, in the agreement of establishing the European Economic Community in 1957 a social partnership was considered as a mechanism, which at the formation of the European market enables to remove some social tension, to offset the negative social trends associated with the formation of a market system.

It should be noted that the development of social partnership and welfare of citizens of Western countries after World War II did not occur automatically, along with GDP growth. To establish acceptable social standards the state, citizens, unions, businesses passed the very difficult way of reconciling the interests, mutual claims on acceptable standards of social and labor relations, social security, raising the living standards of different groups. Differences of partnership models also lied in the legal conditions of cooperation between public authorities and unions of workers, trade union relations with employers' associations, participation of workers in production management, level of civil society development and possibilities of political participation of citizens in governing the country.

For Ukraine, which plans to join the EU, it is important to realize that European integration provides the conditions for social partnership, which are significantly better than existing in Ukraine. First of all it concerns the need to harmonize national legislation with EU norms that most meet the objectives of partnership and consolidate the new forms of partnership; recognizing the key role of social partnership in preventing discrimination in employment, vocational training and education in general; ensuring the free movement of workers, functioning a common labor market; cooperation with the International Labour Organization and other bodies dealing with social partnership.

In Ukraine, the formation of its own model of social partnership is carried out in quite difficult conditions of social transformation and is determined by a set of economic, social, political and ideological factors associated with the development of market economy, democratization of society, the transition to new forms of civilization (postindustrial, information,” knowledge society “) that influence the formation of partnerships.

The economic factors that determine the introduction of social partnership in Ukraine, in our opinion, include:

1) the need of overcoming the acute social and economic crises that accompany market reforms, which results in falling production and lowering living standards of citizens;

2) urgency of establishing non-confrontational relationships between representatives of different social groups, which prevent further deepening of society crisis, reduce social risks, prevent social conflicts;

3) the need for negotiating the terms of privatization, which takes place in Ukraine in violation of the rights of citizens, as major owners of many state properties have been a small number of individuals who had access to resources and power and could create “by themselves” reasonable conditions of privatization which caused the polarization of income and uncontrolled social differentiation;

4) the need for democratization of the economy, when the partnership between government, business and citizens will provide an opportunity to involve citizens to participate actively in managing the business in which they operate, expand the powers of representative bodies of employees to improve the public administration as a participant and a facilitator of economic relations;

5) the increase of the liability of employers for the conclusion of collective agreements in enterprises of all forms of ownership;

6) the need for revitalization of public administration to resolve labor disputes in enterprises that are privately owned;
7) the struggle for the exclusion of lobby forms of public decision-making for the benefit of certain groups, against the merging of business and government entities and the imposition of “rules” in the socio-economic relations by the shadow economy subjects;

8) the need of combating corruption and “shadow economy”, whose existence leads to violation of labor and social rights of citizens.

No less significant are the social factors of social partnership:

1) the need to overcome significant polarization in terms of life when fantastic income of clan-oligarchic groups contrast deeply with the material conditions of workers' life, especially in the countryside or in the so-called “depressed” cities;

2) the need for social programs, which provide joint investment of state funds, business and citizens in developing education, science, training employees, maintaining their health, etc.;

3) the need to expand the network of social services to compensate low income (state paternalism in this case is justified and necessary).

If Ukraine does not continue to solve more effectively such problems as poverty reduction, reduction of inflation to the European level, reduction of social polarization, the resolution of employment problems, social protest and confrontation mood can increase in society. This is confirmed by data on the integral index of social well-being of Ukrainian citizens, which for years 1992-2010 remained below conditional zero, which shows a negative level of satisfaction of social needs. Economic and social problems that exist in Ukraine, are combined with political instability and form a stable negative public view of the state as unable to perform effectively its functions, that causes the need of increasing the responsibility of all social sectors for political stability, the quality of political institutions, democracy.

This involves the circumstances that the development of tripartism in Ukraine demonstrates a lack of organization of not only government but also other subjects of partnership – employers, employees. Thus, the trade union movement in Ukraine, represented by the Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine (FPU) and network of independent unions, does not cover all workers and gradually loses its credibility, especially for workers of private enterprises, where unions are not created practically. If you take in consideration that private property in Ukraine is already over 80% of firms, the degree of decline in the popularity and effectiveness of trade unions is high. But at the level of other subject of partnership – employers – we also observe a weak organization, as the Federation of Employers of Ukraine does not cover all entrepreneurs and employers and is not an active participant in negotiations and initiator of cooperation with other public sectors.

In the society the active ideology of social partnership hasn't been formed, which offers a peaceful coexistence of different social groups with specific and often conflicting interests and civilized form of overcoming differences and reaching consensus, manifested in the dissemination of legal nihilism, lack of value-normative consensus, insufficient development of human and social capital. Thus, totality of the above factors causes the existence and improvement in Ukraine the system of social partnership as a natural stage of reformation of socio-economic relations and the condition of coordination of interests and motivations of partnership subjects for the welfare of citizens, a socially oriented economy creation.

First of all, it concerns the improvement of the legal framework of social partnership, because due to lack of forethought of legislative actions, frequent and chaotic change of economic legislation takes place that dramatically changes the conditions for entrepreneurs and enterprises of all forms of ownership. Another problem of legislation is that, despite the considerable amount of violations of labor rights and guarantees of workers, number of visits to court, arbitration is very small and there is a widespread opinion among citizens about their legal insecurity. This involves a negative practice of bribery of the judiciary, which “makes” decisions based on motives of profit. This enhances mistrust between business partnerships because demonstrates that even decisions of defense of either side may be disrupted or unfulfilled.
One should also note that, unlike Western European model of social partnership, where the legal modalities were created with the participation of all partnership entities as a result of class struggle, mass movements of workers, in Ukraine the legal framework of partnership, basically, was determined by the state. Although formally it corresponds to the basic principles of partnership, but not always protect the other partners, as it is done in European countries. The legal collisions appear, which show that the existence of laws on settlement of labor disputes, collective agreements and negotiations, tripartite bodies at various levels, the existence of employers organizations and trade unions do not provide real social interaction in society.

In particular, public authorities do not pay particular attention to the fact that among the employers a representative federation has not been really formed, which the real deals could be signed with and the social responsibility of business could be determined by. This allows many employers to use unlimited and uncontrolled power in their enterprises, to act only according to their own interests, not to take social responsibility for workers, to neglect the collective agreements or not to sign them with their employees.

<figure><img src="image_18.png" /></figure>

Thus, the normative-legal base of social partnership requires substantial changes in Ukraine and creation of such legal field, most questions, important for all subjects of partnership, can decide within the framework of that, including:

- creation of necessary terms for modernization of economy with the adequate social programs;
- adjusting of social labor relations, that go beyond the scopes of three-way agreements, for example, in the process of privatizing of enterprises or in transition from one proprietor to other;

- overcoming contradiction and insufficient formation of labor-market;

- strengthening of responsibility of employers for a compensation for ill-timed payment of salary and social payments;

- taking of living wage and minimum wage to the international and European social standards;
- social defense of the real incomes of population at economic hardships.

The real practice of partnership requires distribution and systematization of partner relations on all levels – from state to the separate enterprise. We consider that for the further functioning of national model of social partnership the organs of state administration should decide next tasks:
- to strengthen the activity of public authorities in the system of social partnership, to perfect the mechanism of co-operation between the subjects of partnership;

- to define the basic terms of concordance and observance of socio-economic interests of partners, to involve all subjects of social partnership in the process of reformation of economy;
– to introduce ideology and motivation of social partnership, that assists a social collaboration, improvement of quality of life, solidarity of citizens;

– to provide development of social labor partnership on all enterprises regardless of patterns of ownership;

– to make alterations to the normative acts about social partnership in accordance with international norms;

– to ratify in full the European Social Charter and the European Code of Social Security.

It requires the complex of the special measures of economic and social policy, which will stimulate the going out of interactive in these sphere subjects – government, officials, proprietors, leaders of small and large enterprises, and also different groups of the hired workers – from “shadow” space to the sphere of legal, transparent relations that are controlled by the state. Upon it is basic responsibility for forming of transparent and just labor relations, where laws can not be constantly changed, be accepted regulations that are not brought to the wide circle of workers, departmental instructions contradict each other and the legislation. Strengthening of regulative role of the state in social labor relations becomes the urgent condition of further development of social labor sphere.

But a question about the limits of such state interference causes certain discussions. In opinion of M. Rotbard, the state interference increases the load of charges not for businessmen and capitalists, but for workers and landowners, who have to come to terms with the decline of the profits. This gives grounds to M. Rotbard to estimate critically the state interference, acknowledging its advantages only for public administrators. Thus M. Rotbard offers abandonment from any forms of state interference as means of getting maximum social benefit of market. State interference on the side of trade unions in the questions of payment of labor is also exposed to criticism. In particular, analyzing practice of state payments from unemployment, M. Rotbard names them the channels of subsidized unemployment, because they remove mass of potential competitors of trade unions from a labor-market, which opens the unlimited possibilities for continuation of trade-union policy. Moreover, M. Rotbard considers, the removal of workers from a labour-market is paid by those, who pays taxes, *id est* by all citizens [1, 53, 61-62, 87].

Assuming certain objectivity of such analysis, we will notice that the estimations of M. Rotbard are more acceptable to the countries with the developed relations of partnership, where a considerable gap between a minimum and maximum salary has possible limits and abandonment from some elements of government control can really assist the activation of economic life, that, essentially, takes place in developed countries. For countries that did not pass such way and keep considerable polarization of profits, did not attain acceptable social standards (as seen in Ukraine), abandonment from state interference can show up in extremely negative social tendencies, both in the field of social labor relations and in intersectoral co-operation. Thus, the active practice of social partnership and strengthening of state influence on development of social labor relations remain for Ukraine the actual tasks of public administration.

Let's pay attention, that in the conditions of postindustrial development, according to Z.Bauman, we pass to the individualized society, whose features are “flexibility” becomes the slogan of day at the market of labor, *id est* passing to the new short-term contracts or without them, to work without certain guarantees, to the “duty report”, resulting in a worker's loss of position of solidarity and formation of vital strategy, different from that led to the creation of organizations that protected rights of a working class. In such situation, considers Z.Bauman, a capital becomes exterritorial, that gives an opportunity to blackmail the political institutes tied to certain locality with threats to move a production to other territories. It means that a government must go to all concessions for a capital – low taxes, freedom of entrepreneurship, flexible labor-market, – *id est* retentive influence on a capital, which labor force had that at hiring, the determined amount of workplaces, grows short considerably [2, 30-38].
This negative trend in the labor market, we believe, can be overcome at the terms of creation of new forms of partnership and corresponding strengthening of state influence. In a table 1 the basic questions that are important for sides of tripartite (state organs of management – trade unions – organizations of employers) are systematized (public authorities – unions – employers’ organizations).

<table><caption>**Table 1:** Key issues of the social partnership in the system of tripartism</caption><thead><tr><td>Subjects of partnership</td><td>Key issues</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Organs of state administration</td><td>social peace; consolidation of nation around socially meaningful aims; increase of welfare of all citizens, their the social protection; increase of profits of the state budget, compliance with its just distribution; ecological safety; competitiveness of national economy</td></tr><tr><td>Employees (trade unions)</td><td>growth of real incomes of employees; guarantees of social protection (against unemployment, sickness, pension provision, safe working conditions, etc.), ensuring decent living conditions and employment; participation of workers in production management</td></tr><tr><td>Employers (Entrepreneurs unions)</td><td>effective use of capital; increase of profits through productivity growth; improving product quality; continuity of production; improving the competitiveness of the economy</td></tr></tbody></table>

Solutions of key issues in the system of collective contracting practice in social and labor relations on the part of government are listed in Table 2.

<table><caption>**Table 2:** Mechanisms of public administration in the system of collective contracting practice in social and labor relations</caption><thead><tr><td>№</td><td>Fields of activity</td><td>Functions of public administration</td><td>Forms of Public Administration participation</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1.</td><td>Carrying out collective consultations and negotiations</td><td>Compliance with the law, protection of social and labor rights</td><td>Discussions, debates, providing necessary information</td></tr><tr><td>2.</td><td>Conclusion of collective agreements<br>Recognition of authority party, compliance with legislation, protection of social and labor rights, expert evaluation<br>Participation in joint working committees, allocation of budget funding, information, consultative, methodical assistance</td><td>Recognition of authority party, compliance with legislation, protection of social and labor rights, expert evaluation</td><td>Participation in joint working committees, allocation of budget funding, information, consultative, methodical assistance</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>Monitoring and evaluating the stability of social and labor relations</td><td>Control of compliance to legislation, social and labor rights, state social guarantees</td><td>Creation of specific bodies for monitoring, funding, information about the monitoring results of other partners, managing collective contractual relations</td></tr></tbody></table>
But the collective-contractual form of social labor relations does not embrace fully the sphere of partnership and can be complemented by the different forms of participation of workers in management of enterprises and companies. In recent year with the development of market economy a collective -contractual form is complemented by such forms as participation, self-government and participating in incomes. The example of participation is experience of Germany, where as early as 1952 a corresponding law was adopted, according to which participation ("mitbeshtimmung") is realized through production councils. Self-government, as a representation of workers in supervisory boards, economic committees, participating in setting directors from labor is used most actively in Sweden and Italy. The system of participation in incomes in different forms is widespread, for example, in Sweden and Italy. The system of participation in incomes in different forms is widespread, for example, in Netherlands.

The processes of globalization, the development of postindustrial, informative society and integration of Ukraine in a world market actualize a question about a selection of new level in partnership: the state – the hired workers – multinational corporations. Practice of such collaboration exists in Europe, that is why and in Ukraine it is needed to work out the corresponding normative - legal base of such partnership, to create (analogical to European) two – or trilateral councils for realization of collective negotiations and consultations, to work out the mechanism of co-operation between the representative organs of the hired workers of countries on territory of which multinational corporations work.

Important direction of optimization of social labor relations and development of social partnership is an increase of social responsibility of business, relation to which in Ukrainian society is ambiguous. It is considered that business does not execute social obligations and works only for own interests. Such moods can changed only on condition that business in Ukraine really will demonstrate its participation in public affairs, but will not use society as means of achievement of private interests.

Analyzing the social responsibility of modern corporations D.Bell comes to the following conclusions:

- the main lesson having been digested during the last three decades is that the corporations producing things consist of people and people can not be treated as things. The corporation for many employees changed to the business of their life, so it must be an acceptable style of life for their members;

- the corporation is a special world with the social duties to their members which has to determine the balance of its duties in such affairs as corporation members' satisfaction with work; the correlation of motivation with productivity of work; the level of responsibility of corporation for employment of representatives of national minorities; estimation of a worker cost; grounds of the salary gap of workers and managers in ratio of 1:25and more; the responsibility of corporation to local community for environmental protection and so on. To this list belong also the moral problems, so far as to remain value neutral is getting more and more difficult for corporation [3, 166-177].

The social practice of business circles of leading countries affirm the active integration of business into the social life, which gives the possibility to stimulate the economic growth, to settle the social conflicts, to create favourable environment for innovative development. The examples of such cooperation are the creation of social funds, analytic and research centers, support of social projects and so on. For leading countries a stable tendency for merging industrial and local associations of entrepreneurs and creation of nationwide unions, which take the functions of social partners in the scale of the country and now more frequently on a regional and a global scale is observed. The representatives of interests of business circles with the aim of increase of their public prestige come forward Confederation of British industry in Great Britain, National council of businessmen in France et al.

The sociological research "Social responsibility of business of Ukraine" [4] conducted in Ukraine, which was carried out on the base of 811 enterprises, showed that 51% enterprises have the
practice of introduction of social projects, including large enterprises – 64%, middle – 46%, small – 43%.

The actual question of development of social partnership in Ukraine is activity of trade unions. In the relations between trade unions and state it is possible to distinguish two models: cooperation and confrontation. In the first model trade unions are orientated to the achievement of macroeconomic indexes, including of corresponding points in the agreements of different level; activity is in such legal field that foresees the achievement of compromises; realization of policy of integration and co-operation with other partners. In this model trade unions, defending interests of the hired workers, go to the considerable concessions, when it touches modernization of production, understanding winning in the future, which will compensate existent difficulties. In addition, at institutional and legal level they lean against the clearly executed format of relationships with employers, which, as a rule, is not violated. In such model of partnership the role of the state is taken to development of corresponding labor and social legislation, creation of legal infrastructure of defense of labor rights of citizens, provision with legal infrastructure of defense of labor rights of citizens, providing of legal framework of mutual relations between the hired workers and employers and their representative organs. During realization of collective negotiations the organs of state administration provide other parties with complete information about the actions and decisions, study suggestions, take into account opinion of partners, aim to make agreement over the widest circle of questions.

In case of labor disputes and conflicts between the hired workers and employers the task of the state is softening of social contradictions and possibility of their warning. Interference of the state to the relations of social partners takes place only at violation by them current legislation, inability of both parties to produce compromise decisions.

Characteristic signs of model of confrontation is creation of trade unions on productive principle, politically independent, with a hard hierarchical structure; opposition character of actions of trade unions in relation to a government or other partners; defending of interests of the most unprotected layers or concrete group of workers; activity of trade unions in such legal field that relates to the social conflicts. In such model the actions of trade unions are concentrated both in the direction of collective negotiation processes and organization of strikes. The state in such model performs the duty of initiator of reconciliation, using the different branches of power, and active social reforms.

Determination of prevailing character of relationships with trade unions directs corresponding efforts of organs of state administration in desirable direction. The legal status of trade unions in Ukraine, envisaged by Law "On trade unions, their rights and guarantees of activity" [5], provides, that the state does not only ensure the realization of rights for citizens on association in trade unions and observance of rights and interests of trade unions, admits them the competent representatives of workers and defenders of their labor, socio-economic rights and interests, but also cooperates with trade unions, assists the establishment of business partner mutual relations with employers and their associations, provides the increase of level of knowledge of trade unions in relation to legal, economic and social defense of workers (art.13).

It should be noted that development of trade-union motion has the contradictions that reduce efficiency of actions for the defense of rights for workers. Among them we will distinguish:

- Total participation of all workers in the trade unions, including administration that levels structuring of relations an employer – the hired worker, reduces the efficiency of decision of problems of social labor relations in collectives, results in cap-in-hand policy of trade unions with employers;

- New, independent trade unions did not conquer sufficient popularity in society to become influential social and political power;
– Interaction with state unions can not be recognized quite effective, as in Ukraine remains unfulfilled the existing minimum of basic labor standards, fixed by the documents of the International Labor Organization, the European Social Charter and the European Code of Social Security;

– Financing of trade unions, which combines both the remains of the old system and attempts to move to independent financing through membership fees, does not meet the basic trade union functions;

– Agreements between unions, employers and the state often causes dissatisfaction of ordinary members of trade unions, because they outline the items that hardly can be completed in full, or they are not too meaningful for improving significantly working conditions and salary increase. On the other hand, in the arrangements not all unions are involved, but those which are most numerous.

Thus, trade unions of Ukraine should significantly increase their activity in protecting employees and act with joint position as, for example, trade unions in OECD countries exercise it, acting in partnership as a whole. Such an association may use the experience of Germany, France, where unions are partly involved in the social partnership and specially elected representatives of employees express the interests of workers and control the arrangements on their behalf.

In European countries, the activity of trade unions is always directed not only to meet the challenges of the labor market, but also has a broader context as defenders of all citizens. This actualizes the issue that trade unions should act as a group of lobbying for all workers: trade union as a lobby in Parliament, pressure on the media and others.

But implementation of such tasks is facing problems of a growing distrust of the public role of unions in protecting labor rights by reducing the number of union members, formal attitude toward membership. Significant social problems that remain in the country do not convince citizens in the activity of trade unions as defenders of their interests, which reduces their value as full partners. Often in the practice of tripartism most citizens trust the state more than their own unions. So, for the increase of trust from the side of citizens to the trade unions it is imperative to articulate clearly their demands and determine the procedure of actions on such topical issues as: creation of new workplaces; “legitimizing” of wage; prohibition of artificial underestimation of the labor cost; implementation of citizens’ constitutional right to an adequate standard of living; diminishing of level and scales of poverty of population and eradication it among employees that meets the obligations of state taken on the summit in Copenhagen (1995) and the Millennium Goals (2000); strengthening the legal work motivation and returning the workers from abroad; reducing the population differentiation by income and reducing social tension and conflicts; providing the state social guarantees – a minimum hourly wage. This position will contribute to overcoming internal conflicts of the trade union movement, will make impossible the compromise with employers, especially when the employer uses paternalistic forms of relationships with employees, requires loyalty to the administration and at any disagreement with the administration dismisses the employee.

This view coincides with the spread of idea about the transformation of trade unions to social movements with broad horizontal and associative connections, without a hard individual membership, with developed democratic procedures. It is important trade unions to be able to define their role as an active subject of social partnership and to act in a way that interaction with state government should give the additional resources and capabilities to protect labor rights of employees.

Studying the experience of Western European models of social partnership, we believe it necessary to draw attention to certain issues that accompany the development of social partnership in Europe.

First of all, it concerns the fact that a significant reduction of the public sector in Western countries has led to the loss of state's influence on economic policy. Often in public sector enterprises of transport, energy, communications mostly remain, where the solution of social issues is particularly complex. However, as a result of the privatization of banking and capital market liberalization the part of incomes of enterprises is increasing and the share of wages is reducing. The state practically does
not control the dramatic revenue growth of 10-20% rich people, leading to increase of break in profits with poor in hundred one times. The new social phenomenon as a "new poverty" has appeared, which means the inability to have normal social standards of the citizens who work, but have such a salary, which is considerably less than the living wage. This gives reason to say that the state can not and often does not wish to interfere in the decision of these questions.

Common causes of a crisis triparty structures can be considered, for example, that the state tried to take to the partners a role of consultants that did not allow them to influence more seriously on an acceptance of legislative decisions. On the other hand, in conditions of uneven development of different industries of economy, regions the opportunity to make such decisions that would be acceptable to all subjects of the partnership declined.

As the experience of UK, Germany showed, such forms of social partnership as a "social contract", "joint action" can not be fully realized in a market economy with its recession, elevations, crises and risks, so we observe a replacement of social security system, which made the redistribution of wealth from top to bottom and provided solidarity between social classes and generations, to targeted assistance to certain categories of citizens and policy of "equal chances".

Problematic within the framework of social partnership became the possibilities of the executive power to influence partnership process without the support of organized associations of citizens and employers. But the criterion for association is unlikely to be both changes in social structure, caused by the growing number of so-called "hired shareholders", and an increasing number of chronically unemployed and marginalized. Social impact of such changes is also distributing "ghettoisation" and "enclavisation".

There is the need to revise the functions of partnership in the development of postindustrial society and a change of the vertical and pyramidal structure of work organization to a horizontal networking one. Under the new conditions the labor market becomes natural, flexible and unstable, the guarantee of jobs and stable employee groups are lost. This structure is more self-managed than management requires, i.e. it goes beyond tripartism.

Thus, the prospects of social partnership in Western European countries have recently caused an active discussion. In recent years, in EU countries, for example, the social partnership is passing to the new level:

- the scope industry, collective agreements of the European format are concluded; - boards of the European enterprises are established as advisory bodies in each company that has business in two or more EU countries with 1 thousand or more workers in general or at least 150 in each country. In such boards, the management of companies discusses regularly with representatives of workers social and economic issues relating to workers of this company, signs collective agreements (the facts show that penetration of Western multinational companies to the Ukrainian market should be combined with the inclusion to such boards the representatives of Ukrainian Trade Unions and relevant improvement of trade union law).

So, we observe the development of a new kind of social partnership that brings together such entities as the EU institutions, national governments, multinational corporations, labor unions and employers associations. It is reasonable to remain priorities recorded in various position papers of the EU as the base of partners activity (the Stability and Economic Growth Pact, Program, 2000: For strengthening and expansion of Union, etc.) that include the following objectives:

- Stable economic growth and creation of economic conditions that guarantee population employment and reducing unemployment;

- The development of European projects in various fields;

- Leveling of regional imbalances of economic development, maintenance of relatively high standards of living and social guarantees for the population;
– The subordination of economic development to individual interests and providing complete bloom of personality on the basis of scientific and technical capabilities of society, putting them at the service of man.

The experience of the European social partnership shows that this process can not be short-term, one-sided and unsystematic, so it is important to avoid reiteration of mistakes and negative processes that led to the rejection of certain achievements of partnership in European countries, and to provide the formation of their own effective model of partnership in Ukraine.

## CONCLUSIONS

<figure><img src="image_19.png" /></figure>

European experience of social partnership allows to do some practical conclusions for Ukraine:

– The formation of social partnership is effective if it is carried out systematically at all levels (national, regional, local level of individual organizations), and assists achieving the public consensus;

– Social partnership is effective, if economically and organizationally combined with equitable distribution of income (the ratio of wages and labor productivity, participation in income, indexing, etc.), participation of workers in the ownership of enterprises, including possession of a controlling interest, participation in company management (membership in supervisory boards, various committees, etc.);

– Social partnership is built on citizens' understanding the need of social and economic representation of their interests at different levels of state government;

– State regulation should not mean monopoly and attempts to solve social problems by establishing a direct state control over the market, market prices (not excluding such control through market mechanisms – differentiated taxes, dues, subsidies, etc.);

– The state must exercise control over the social and labor relations state, labor rights and guarantees of citizens protection, determined by the Constitution and laws, in conflict situations – take the necessary sanctions for partners to stabilize the situation;

– In the development of post-industrial, information society new forms of social partnership are required, which are adequate to the changes taking place in social and economic relations.

Taking into account European experience, while forming the Ukrainian model of social partnership the terms should be created necessarily when socially oriented market economy maintains high economic growth and a reasonable level of social protection and social consensus. Achieving such a balance can be made only through a dialogue, stable relations between citizens, employers and the state, the coordination of basic principles of partnership on the legislative, organizational levels.

## Bibliography

1. Ротбард М. Власть и рынок: Государство и экономика / Мюррей Ротбард: Пер. с англ. Б.С.Пинскера под ред. Гр.Сапова – Челябинск: Социум, 2003.-415 с.

2. Бауман 3. Индивидуализированное общество / Зигмунт Бауман. / Пер. с англ. под ред. В.Л.Иноземцева; Центр исслед. постиндустр. о-ва, журн. «Своб. мысль» – М:Логос, 2002.- Л XIII, 324, [2] с.: порт.; 22 см.- Доп. тит. л. англ.- Библиограф. в прим.

3. Белл Д. Субординация корпорации: противоречие между экономизацией и социологизацией / Дениел Белл // Социально-трудовые отношения в современном российском обществе: Социология власти: Вестник Социологического центра РАГС.- 2005.- № 2.- С.145-177.

4. Соціальна відповідальність бізнесу в Україні / Відп. ред.: Ю.Саєнко. – К.: «Батискаф», 2002.-72 с.

5. Закон України «Про професійні спілки, їх права та гарантії діяльності» від 15.09.1999 № 1045 – XIV – [Електронний ресурс] – Доступно на: http: zakon 1 rada.gov.ua.

<figure><img src="image_20.png" /></figure>
# Les droits des enfants en Albanie-une nouvelle ère pour le rapprochement de la législation dans le contexte de l'intégration européenne

ANILA NEPRAVISHTA

Doctorante, Commissaire du Médiateur de l'Albanie

**Abstract:** The Children's Rights in Albania, a New Stage for the Approximation of Legislation in the context of European Integration. Children's rights are human rights. Speaking of human rights in general, without identifying the specific rights of children turn them into "invisible" and vulnerable. The United Nations Convention marked the final step of recognition of children's rights as human rights. Corpus of law in Albania so far is a product of the commitment of Albanian lawyers and assistance and expertise, mainly from European member countries of the Union. On November 4, 2010, the Albanian Parliament approved the Law "On Protection of Rights of the Child", which establishes the institutional framework for the establishment of appropriate safeguards to ensure the rights of all Albanian children by the individual, family, state and / or other third parties. Protection of children's rights in Albania is a constitutional obligation. Experience has shown that lack of coordination of institutions and structures between them, and lack of institutional and administrative capacity, made children's rights not verifiables by concrete mechanisms. Law "On Protection of Rights of the Child" is the first act in which are collected all children's rights, and the functioning structures that guarantee these rights. The Office of the Ombudsman in Albania has established a good reputation for integrity, political impartiality and courageous advocacy for issues raised by citizens. But in Albania doesn't existe a special ombudsman for children's rights. The final goal is to create a special institution and durable to protect the rights of children in Albania and for the realization of rights and improved services for children, and to influence government policies and practices. Albania wants to join the EU. So the European approximation of national legislation remains a major challenges. When it comes to protecting the rights of children Today, we speak of European citizens of tomorrow.

**Keywords:** Children's rights, mechanismes, special institution, ombudsman for children's rights, institutional framework.

## INTRODUCTION

Les droits de l'homme comprennent tous les êtres humains, et malgré cela on parle de plus en plus pour les droits des enfants. On explique simplement l'intérêt de la connaissance et de la protection des droits des enfants, par le fait que:

* Les normés internationales existantes ont clairement indiqué que les enfants devraient avoir la totalité de leurs droits.

* Les enfants constituent une catégorie particulière de personnes qui ont des besoins spécifiques et ne sont pas capables de se défendre. Souvent, les droits des personnes adultes sont différents de ceux des enfants. Parlant des droits de l'homme en général, sans identifier les droits spécifiques des enfants, on les transforme en "»nvisibles et vulnérables».

Bien qu'en principe, il soit apparu que les enfants jouissent de tout le spectre des droits civils, on peut dire que souvent ils ne sont pas pleinement respectés par de nombreux États. Une telle chose est justifiée par l'idée que le mineur n'a pas les compétences de procédure pour le règlement des intérêts. Une telle attitude a commencé à changer avec la rédaction de la Convention des Nations Unies sur les Droits de l'Enfant de 1989, qui a dépassé la différence entre la théorie et les pratiques existantes concernant les droits de l'enfant. "Il est intéressant de souligner à quel point les États ont ressenti le besoin de passer d'un énoncé de principes, qui avait néanmoins aucune valeur juridique et ne lie pas les Etats, a toujours constitué un engagement moral à une liaison Convention internationale pour eux séparément, et qui a un contenu spécifique pour la protection effective des enfants jusqu'à 18 ans".<fnref n="1" /> Ce n'est que par la ratification que les principes et les dispositions de la Convention

<footnote n="1">¹ L'Intérêt Supérieur de l'Enfant De l'Analyse Littérale à la Portée Philosophique Jean Zermatten Working report 3-2003</footnote>
devient partie intégrante du droit interne, et sont applicables dans les différents pays (l'Albanie a ratifié la Convention en Février 1992 et elle est entrée en vigueur en Mars 1992).

La Convention des Nations Unies a marqué la dernière étape de la reconnaissance des droits des enfants en tant que droits de l'homme. Cela prouve que cette voie est suivie dans le sens opposé à ce qui s'est fait pour les droits de l'homme, d'abord sont présentés et reconnus les droits sociaux et économiques, et puis les droits culturels, civils et politiques. Donc nous pouvons parler d'un changement radical, parce qu'enfin l'enfant est devenu sujet de droits; il a un statut spécial, autonome et bien définie. De même on peut dire que jusqu'à ce que la présente Convention existe l'enfant a été seulement l'objet d'une protection et non pas le sujet. Une bonne connaissance de certains droits de l'enfant encourage les différents niveaux de responsabilités: ,en premier lieu les parents et la famille, l'État et enfin la communauté internationale, à travers un mécanisme de protection et de contrôle.

En Janvier 2005, à Genève, a eu lieu la réunion du Comité des Droits de l'Enfant et il a examiné le rapport initial<fnref n="1" /> présenté par le Gouvernement Albanais pour mettre en œuvre la Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant. Le Comité a adressé des observations finales et recommandations<fnref n="2" /> qui ont émergé de cette réunion. Il a également déclaré que l'une des étapes les plus importantes entreprises dans le pays était la création d'une sous-section pour les droits de l'enfant dans la Bureau du Médiateur, qui doit être équipé de plus de pouvoirs et de ressources<fnref n="3" />.

Sur cette base il est le temps de créer la base juridique nécessaire pour institutionnaliser la protection des droits de l'enfant dans notre pays. Le but finale est de créer une institution spéciale et durable afin de protéger les droits des enfants en Albanie, et pour la réalisation des droits et des services améliorés pour les enfants, et d'influencer aux politiques et pratiques gouvernementales.

# I. UN PAS AVANT POUR L'APPROCHE DE LA LEGISLATION DANS LE CONTEXTE DE L'INTEGRATION DANS L'UE-UNE LOI SPECIALE POUR LES DROITS DES ENFANTS.

En 2006, la Communication de la Commission européenne «Vers une stratégie européenne sur les droits de l'enfant», établit une stratégie globale de l'UE pour promouvoir et protéger les droits de l'enfant dans les politiques internes et externes de l'Union européenne et à soutenir les efforts des États membres dans ce domaine. L'UE et l'Albanie ont conclu un accord de stabilisation et d'association (ASA), vu la première étape vers l'adhésion en Juin 2006. L'Albanie a demandé à adhérer à l'UE le 28 Avril 2009.

Lisant les chapitres 2 et 3 de l'article 3 CDE<fnref n="4" /> on peut évaluer le progrès de l'Albanie en adoptant une loi spécifique sur les droits des enfants:

ch.2: *Les Etats doivent prendre toutes les mesures législatives et administratives propres à assurer protection et soins nécessaires au bien-être de l'enfant, dans le respect de la famille.*

ch.3: *Les Etats doivent veiller au bon fonctionnement des services et institutions qui reçoivent ou prennent en charge des enfants.*

Le 04 Novembre 2010, le Parlement Albanais a approuvé la Loi "Sur la protection des droits de l'enfant", qui fixe le cadre institutionnel pour la mise en place des mécanismes de protection appropriés, afin de garantir le respect des droits de tous les enfants albanais par l'individu, la famille, l'état et / ou d'autres entités tierces.

<footnote n="1">¹ www.mfa.gov.al/dokumenta/crc_report.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/7d5e3444b12ac33dc1257018004dd14c/$FILE/G0540844.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ CRC/C/15/Add. 249 31 March 2005</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm</footnote>
La Loi "Sur la protection des droits de l'enfant"<fnref n="1" /> est le premier acte dans lequel se trouvent tous les droits des enfants, prévoyant la création et le fonctionnement des structures qui garantissent ces droits. Protéger les droits des enfants est une obligation constitutionnelle<fnref n="2" />. Garantir et promouvoir ces droits constitue une priorité dans les programmes entrepris et achevés à ce jour par les institutions albanaises élaborant des politiques. Le nouvelle Loi "Sur les droits de l'enfant" dans son contenu a été harmonisée en vertu de l'article 4 de la Convention des Nations Unies "Sur les droits de l'enfant", du Rapport de l'Union Européenne (pour 2009) pour le progrès de l'Albanie, des Recommandations du Comité de Genève sur les droits de l'enfant, dans laquelle l'obligation de l'Albanie était d'assurer une coordination efficace entre les ministères, les autorités locales, les représentants d'ONG et autres acteurs impliqués dans la mise en œuvre de la Convention.

Le législateur à l'élaboration de cette loi a pris en compte la Recommandation nr.1934 de 2010 de l'Assemblée Parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe "Pour la protection des enfants dans les établissements et à assurer leur protection complète", pour sanctionner et pour interdire les châtiments corporels des enfants. La Stratégie nationale pour l'enfance et son Plan d'action prévoient également l'élaboration d'une loi sur les droits des enfants. Pour la première fois dans un acte juridique sont résumés tous les droits des enfants et des mécanismes institutionnels qui garantissent leur accomplissement.

La Loi est conçue en deux parties. La première sur les droits et les garanties pour les enfants, et la deuxième sur les mécanismes institutionnels, qui seront chargé d'élaborer et de coordonner la politique et la législation pour les enfants et leur mise en œuvre.

Les dispositions légales concernant les droits des enfants se trouvent l'ajustement à des lois spéciales dans le domaine de la justice pour mineurs, en matière d'éducation, de la santé, de la culture, de la protection sociale etc. Ce cadre juridique permet la définition d'un droit protégé, tandis que la loi spécifique dans les domaines mentionnés réglemente en particulier la procédure d'obtention du droit et des institutions responsables qui assureront ce droit.

L'expérience a montré que le manque de coordination des institutions et des structures entre elles, et le manque de capacité institutionnelle et administrative, a fait des droits de l'enfant quelque chose de nonvérifiable par des mécanismes concrets. La Loi reprend la mise en place de ces mécanismes institutionnels et leur coordination afin de mieux répondre à l'intérêt supérieur des enfants et garantir leurs droits. La loi ne vise pas seulement à définir les droits, mais aussi à assurer leur mise en œuvre, en fournissant des dispositions spécifiques sur les mécanismes institutionnels au niveau central et local, qui permettront de déterminer et de consulter les politiques, lois et mesures pour les droits des enfants, assurera la coordination avec la protection d'un enfant à risque (abus, les enfants des rues, etc) et ainsi seront punis les contrevenants. La loi stipule qu'un enfant est considéré un enfant à risque dans les cas suivants : les enfants victimes de la violence dans la famille, dans les établissements scolaires, et ceux qui sont utilisés pour la mendicité des parents / leurs représentants légaux (les enfants des rues). S'il est établi qu'un enfant a subi les formes de violence ou d'abus cités ci-dessus, chacun a le droit de renvoyer l'affaire à l'Unité de la protection de l'enfance, qui travaillera dans les Unités du gouvernement local. Les représentants de la police et de la justice (dans les unités locales) seront partie du mécanisme, qui coordonne le travail entre les autorités chargées de diriger les enfants au cas de risque au niveau local. En plus des corps de police les citoyens peuvent agir en invoquant la loi sur la violence domestique et ont le droit de demander directement au tribunal de rendre une ordonnance de protection immédiate pour l'enfant. La Cour rend une décision dans les 24 heures pour des cas de maltraitance dans une famille d'accueil ou un établissement de soins sociaux. En outre, la police peut commencer des poursuites contre les parents ou le représentant légal de

<footnote n="1">¹ Loi nr.10347 date 4.11.2010 "Pour la protection des droits de l'enfant"</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² http://www.parlament.al/, Article 54 te la Constitution Albanaise prévoit que: "1.Les enfants, les jeunes, les donnes enceinte et les nouvelles mères ont le droit d'une protection spéciale de l'Etat"</footnote>
l'enfant, basées sur l'article 124 du Code Pénal "la violence physique et l'exploitation des enfants" et du Code de la Famille, la recherche jusqu'à la suppression du droit exerçant la responsabilité parentale, de contraindre le parent ou l'utilisateur. Donc, ces éléments font que la loi ne soit pas simplement une loi déclarative des droits des enfants, mais aussi le garant de leur mise en œuvre. Un mécanisme national pour protéger l'enfant sera établi, ainsi que des unités de protection des enfants dans les municipalités et communes qui seront obligés de suivre et de résoudre les cas d'enfants qui mendient ou vivant dans la rue. Un nouvel organisme sera créé subordonnée au Ministère du Travail et des Affaires sociales pour protéger les droits des enfants. La loi prévoit l'établissement et le fonctionnement d'une institution centrale, qui est l'Agence nationale pour la protection des droits de l'enfant. Cette institution sera subordonnée au Ministère du Travail et des Affaires Sociales.

L'adoption de la loi contribuera à :

* Harmonisation de toutes les lois et les politiques pertinentes à la Convention en donnant la priorité aux enfants défavorisés dans les plans nationaux économiques et sociaux avec l'allocation budgétaire appropriée.

* Mise en place et renforcement d'un suivi, d'évaluation adéquats et d'un système de rapports avec des indicateurs bien définis pour surveiller la pauvreté et l'exclusion sociale.

* Alignement des politiques et des normes de droits de l'enfant à la Stratégie nationale de développement et d'intégration ainsi qu'à mi-parcours du cadre budgétaire.

Donc: “L'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant vient éclairer le politique! N'est-ce pas là aussi une révolution?”<fnref n="1" />

C'est la Convention des Droits de l'Enfant que lui donne la parole, et toute la société est obligée de l'écouter.

## II. LE RÔLE DES INSTITUTIONS INDÉPENDANTES POUR LA PROTECTION DES DROITS DES ENFANTS

Le Médiateur en Albanie<fnref n="2" /> est une institution juridiquement indépendante des organes de l'administration publique de la magistrature et financée par le budget de l'Etat. Il protège les droits, les libertés et les intérêts légitimes non seulement des citoyens albanais, mais aussi pour les étrangers qui sont (ou non) des résidents permanents en Albanie, par les actes ou omissions illégaux ou irréguliers des organes de l'administration publique, en donnant des recommandations, ouen faisant des propositions pour remédier à la violation de la loi. Cette tâche fondamentale est réalisée dans la pratique, même si officiellement l'Avocat du Peuple (Médiateur en Albanie) n'est pas un organe de décision et ses recommandations n'ont pas de pouvoirs exécutifs. Comme on le sait, le système de contrôle et d'équilibre aujourd'hui est un principe fondamental d'un gouvernement moderne partout dans le monde, y compris l'Albanie. Sans aucun temps réservé pour les plaintes quotidiennes des citoyens, cette institution essaie d'influencer positivement à la bonne gouvernance dans le pays.

Grâce à des recommandations systématiques qui affectent l'administration, en peut préciser son rôle dans le système démocratique. Grâce à ses recommandations, le Médiateur a pour but d'améliorer les normes et la qualité des services aux citoyens, et de promouvoir et de respecter les valeurs morales des employés de l'administration publique. Telle qu'elle est conçue par la Constitution albanaise et comme elle fonctionne dans la pratique, l'institution de l'ombudsman (médiateur) ne remplace pas les tribunaux. Il fait partie de la machinerie des droits de l'homme, qui doivent être fournis à tous les Etats démocratiques, travaillant pour une culture de bonne gouvernance et de la protection et du développement de droits de l'homme. D'année en année le nombre de plaintes et des

<footnote n="1">¹ L'Intérêt Supérieur de l'Enfant De l'Analyse Littérale à la Portée Philosophique Jean Zermatten Working report 3-2003</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Crée par la Loi nr.8454 dt.4.02.1999 "Pour le Médiateur en Albanie", www.avokatipopullit.gov.al</footnote>
demandes aux Médiateur sont été augmentés, ce qui indique la confiance publique albanaise au Médiateur. Du service du Médiateur, ont bénéficié des milliers de personnes qui non seulement sont aidées par des conseils juridiques, mais elles ont reçu souvent les documents requis, les pensions, l'aide sociale. Le but du Médiateur est avec le précédent créé de punir ceux qui maltraitent les enfants et que soient aidés indirectement des centaines d'autres enfants qui ne devrons jamais frapper à la porte du Médiateur. La Constitution Albanaise de 1998 et plus particulièrement son article 60, a servi de base juridique pour la création de l'institution du Médiateur. La Loi sur le Médiateur a été conçue en tenant compte de la législation d'autres pays européens, qui ont déjà créé une telle institution. À ce titre, la protection et la promotion des droits des enfants sont des éléments importants du travail du Médiateur. Les citoyens de 0-18 ans sont considérés comme des mineurs en Albanie. Il est évident que les enfants sont les plus vulnérables. Le Médiateur a apporté une contribution particulière pour

protéger les droits des enfants, à la fois
par des plaintes individuelles et de son
enquête de propre initiative des cas
rendus publics, mais aussi par la révision
de la législation et les recommandations
de modifications ou améliorations
nécessaires. Les caractéristiques de base
de l'institution du Médiateur sont
l'indépendance de toute l'influence
politique, la facilité de contact, la vitesse,
la flexibilité, l'efficacité et la solidité des
recommandations. L'institution du
Médiateur depuis les débuts de son
travail a été très sensible à respecter les
droits des enfants. Les résultats des
réformes législatives ont entraîné
l'amélioration de la situation des enfants
dans le pays.

La Recommandation 13 du
Comité des droits de l'enfant du
Genève prévoit que “Le Comité s'est félicité des informations relatives à l'établissement de l'institution du Médiateur en 2000 et enfin la création du Département des droits des enfants, au sein de l'institution du Médiateur. Le Comité note qu'il existe des plans pour l'expansion et la reconnaissance de la nouvelle section. Toutefois, le Comité s'inquête parce que le niveau de sensibilisation du Bureau des services aux enfants de l'ombudsman peut être faible. Le Comité recommande à l'État partie pour permettre avec plus des ressources financières et humaines, pour assurer son plein fonctionnement, notamment par des campagnes de sensibilisation et de permettre pour obtenir les plaintes des enfants et des rapports pour la mise en œuvre des droits de l'enfant”<fnref n="1" />. Dans l'avenir, il sera nécessaire de modifier la loi sur le Médiateur ou mieux créer une institution indépendante. Le but de créer une institution spéciale et durable afin de protéger les droits des enfants en Albanie est de parvenir à améliorer les droits et les services destinés aux enfants, d'influencer les politiques et pratiques gouvernementales. Le Médiateur n'est pas créé comme un établissement axé sur les enfants. Le Département sur les droits de l'enfant a été créé en avril 2004 par un accord de la coopération entre Save the Children en Albanie et le Bureau du Médiateur de la République d'Albanie. Le mandat du Département était de “servir comme un avocat, un catalyseur et un organe de contrôle pour les droits des enfants, selon la Convention sur les droits de l'enfant (CDE) en Albanie”.

<figure><img src="image_21.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1">¹ CRC/C/15/Add.249 31 March 2005</footnote>
Les taches principales de la section étaient –Le traitement des plaintes concernant des violations des droits de l'enfant. – L'amélioration de la législation existante pour les droits de l'enfant. – La promotion des droits de l'enfant et les actions qui déterminent la façon dont ils ont exercé ces droits, et la sensibilisation de la société dans son ensemble.

*Un bref résumé des travaux de la section pour les droits des enfants du Médiateur:*

En 2005 on a traité 39 cas de plaintes ou de requêtes pour la violation des droits de l'enfant, dont 10 ont reçu une solution positive et 3 recommandations ont reçu une réponse positive des organes de l'administration publique.

En 2006 sont été examinés 46 cas de plaintes concernant des violations des droits de l'enfant, dont 8 ont reçu une solution positive et 3 recommandations sont été acceptées par l'administration publique.

En 2007 le nombre de plaintes a considérablement augmenté en comparaison avec 2006, au niveau de 280% de plus. 136 plaintes ont été traitées dont 43 positiveme

Les efforts de l'Office du Médiateur et du Section pour les droits des enfants sont concentrés non seulement sur les poursuites, le procès et le châtiment des coupables et des agresseurs des droits des enfants, mais aussi dans la reconnaissance et la sensibilisation du public sur les droits des enfants. Les efforts visant à lutter contre les violations des droits des enfants, souvent sont confrontés à des défis difficiles. Les droits plus souvent violés sont: pour la séparation des enfants et des adultes en détention ou dans des lieux de détention, en termes d'âge de la responsabilité pénale, le droit à la présence des parents, le droit de vivre avec le parent qui s'est engagé à la croissance et de l'éducation dans les cas du séparation légale des parents, etc. Afin de stimuler la réflexion à la protection des enfants, le Médiateur a eu en priorité les cas d'abus, de mauvais traitements et de la violation des droits de l'enfant, au début de l'exercice de son activité dans le domaine de la protection des droits de l'homme. Ici, il convient de mentionner le cas de la maltraitance d'un enfant orphelin par les forces de police, rendu public en 2000. Le succès du traitement et l'impartialité dans cette affaire a donné lieu à des mesures disciplinaires prises contre les employés de la police, et a affecté la sensibilisation du public sur la reconnaissance et le respect des droits des enfants.

L'amélioration de la loi organique “Pour le Médiateur”<fnref n="1" />, a donné la respiration et de plus grandes possibilités pour mieux protéger les droits des enfants, permettant l'examen et l'enquête des cas de violations des droits les enfants à l'initiative et sans restriction de l'obtention du consentement de la personne lésée. Durant ces années, le Médiateur a travaillé principalement sur le renforcement des capacités du personnel pour travailler avec les enfants. De même on peut ajouter les recommandations faites par le Bureau du Médiateur pour l'amélioration de la législation relative aux droits de l'enfant:

– Recommandation pour les changements de la Loi “Sur l'état civil” adressée au Parlement albanois. L'inscription de la naissance d'un enfant doit être faire en tout temps par un acte administrative, et non par une décision de la justice. La Recommandation a eu une réponse positive, et le législateur albanois a fait les changements de la Loi “Sur l'état civile”<fnref n="2" /> en faveur de l'interet supérieur des enfants.

– Recommandation au Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'ouverture des fonds financiers aux autorités de police locales pour le paiement des travailleurs sociaux et des avocats pour les mineurs.

<footnote n="1">¹ Loi nr.9398, du 12.05.2005 "Pour des amendements de la Loi nr.8454 du 4.02.1999 "Pour le Médiateur", article 13 et l'article 19/1. L'article 19 / 1 mentionne les institutions de l'administration publique où le Médiateur ou les personnes autorisées de lui ont le droit d'entrer à tout le temps, sans restriction et sans autorisation préalable, mais en informant le chef de l'institution: les prisons, les salles de détention, les hôpitaux psychiatriques, les asiles, les foyers pour les enfants.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Loi nr.9929 du 9.06.2008 "Pour des modifications de la Loi nr.8950 du 10.10.2002 "Sur l'Etat Civile".</footnote>
Donc le Médiateur a recommandé que le travailleur social doit toujours être présent lors de la question des mineurs par la police. Cette recommandation est acceptée par le Ministère de l'Intérieur et la Police d'État, qui a établi une commission rogatoire à tous les postes de police qui fait respecter le droit d'avoir un avocat au moment de l'association de l'enfant. Comme liée à la présence d'un psychologue, il est clair que ce sera fourni par la société civile prévue dans l'accord de coopération établi par le ministère de l'Intérieur.

On peut dire que le Département des Droits des Enfants dans le Bureau du Médiateur est reconnu et apprécié comme un acteur majeur dans le lobbying pour les questions relatives aux droits des enfants en Albanie. Il a établi une coopération avec les ONG au niveau national. Il ya eu une augmentation significative des plaintes.

Le Bureau du Médiateur a établi une bonne réputation d'intégrité, d'impartialité politique et de plaidoyer courageux pour les problèmes soulevés par les citoyens. "L'humanité doit donner aux enfants ce qui est le plus bon". C'est une proclamation de la Déclaration des droits de l'enfant, publiée par l'Assemblée de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en 1959. Mais en Albanie manqué un médiateur spécial pour les droits de l'enfant-ce qui est le plus bon pour leurs droits.

Le Comité des droits de l'enfant, l'organisme chargé par l'ONU du suivre la mise en œuvre de la CDE, a toujours souligné le rôle essentiel des médiateurs pour enfants pour la promotion et la protection des droits de l'enfant. Il a encouragé les États parties à la CDE à développer des institutions indépendants pour la défense des droits des enfants au lequel devrait être donné un large mandat dans la loi, des fonctions spécifiques, des pouvoirs et des fonctions relatives aux enfants et leurs droits conformément à la CDE<fnref n="1" />.

Plus précisément, l'article 4 de la CDE prévoit que:

1. *Les gouvernements doivent prendre toutes les mesures législatives, administratives et autres pour la mise en œuvre des droits reconnus dans la Convention*

2. *Les enfants sont un groupe particulièrement vulnérable: ils sont vulnérables aux violations des droits humains et sont dépendants des adultes. Les enfants n'ont aucun pouvoir politique: ils ne votent pas et n'ont pas accès à des lobbies qui influencent les programmes du gouvernement. Les enfants ont un accès limité aux mécanismes de plainte, les systèmes juridiques et les tribunaux*<fnref n="2" />.

### III. QUE PEUT FAIRE UN MEDIATEUR POUR LES DROITS DE L'ENFANT?

Il peut influencer à mieux prendre en compte les droits des enfants, donner une voix aux enfants et il est un modèle de communication entre les enfants et le gouvernement. Il peut veiller à ce que les enfants disposent de moyens efficaces de recours lorsque leurs droits sont violés et contrôler la conformité du gouvernement avec la CDE<fnref n="3" />.

Il fait le sensibilisation des droits de l'enfant parmi les enfants et les adultes en produisant et diffusant des informations sur les droits des enfants et de la CDE, la formation des professionnels qui travaillent avec les enfants, il peut travailler avec les médias pour accroître la sensibilisation, etc.

La Charte des droits de l'homme de l'Union Européenne, adoptée lors du Sommet de Nice en Décembre 2000 est le premier document officiel du monde dans le domaine des droits de l'homme qui a reconnu le droit à une bonne administration, en tant que droit humain fondamental. En fait la définition de cette Charte, le droit de bonne administration, le droit d'accès aux documents officiels et l'institution du médiateur, ont eu un développement nouveau et positif pour

<footnote n="1">¹ Observation générale n ° 2 sur le rôle des institutions nationales indépendantes de droits de l'homme dans la promotion et la protection des droits de l'enfant, http://www.crin.org/resources/infoDetail.asp?ID=8042&flag=report</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² www.crin.org/enoc/</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Article 4 de la CDE</footnote>
la promotion des droits de l'homme non seulement au sein des pays de la Communauté Européenne, mais aussi dans d'autres pays européens et au-delà.

Maintenir un contact régulier avec de nombreux Albanais et des ONG internationales travaillant dans différents fronts, surtout pour la protection des droits des enfants a été et demeure l'un des objectifs du travail du Médiateur. Cela parce qu'encore il n'est pas créé un Office du Médiateur pour les Enfants, comme il se trouve en plupart des pays de l'Europe. L'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant, la non-discrimination, le droit à la survie et le développement, la participation des enfants aux décisions concernant leur vie, sont des guides d'orienter les activités du Médiateur. Tous sont conscients que les droits des enfants, comme les droits humains fondamentaux ont leur fonctionnalité propre, ce qui nécessite des politiques intégrées et un engagement non seulement de l'État, mais aussi de toute la société entière.

L'article 3 ch.1 CDE fonde le principe de l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant:

"Dans toutes les décisions qui concernent les enfants, qu'elles soient le fait des institutions publiques ou privées de protection sociale, des tribunaux, des autorités administratives ou des organes législatifs, l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant doit être une considération primordiale."

Ce membre de phrase fonde donc une obligation<fnref n="1" /> pour les Etats d'examiner, dans toutes les décisions relative à un enfant, si son intérêt supérieur est garanti.

## IV. LES DEFIS DE L'ALBANIE-UNE NOUVELLE ERE POUR LE RAPPROCHEMENT DE LA LEGISLATION DANS LE CONTEXTE DE L'INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE

Depuis la ratification de la Convention des Nations Unies, le 28 Février 1992, de nombreux défis ont engagé le Parlement, le gouvernement, d'autres institutions albanaises et la société civile, parce que les enfants ont des besoins particuliers en tant qu'individus et en conséquence, ils ont leur statut. Par conséquent toutes les institutions publiques, de la protection sociale, des tribunaux et les autorités administratives dans leurs décisions doivent toujours garder l'esprit que l'intérêt de l'enfant soit le supérieur.

– Les enfants ne sont pas le produit de l'État et ils ne sont pas seulement en possession de leurs parents. Pour cette raison, tous les adultes de la société doivent avoir le devoir de connaître les exigences et leurs droits, droits en tant qu'individus. Certes, on peut dire que la situation des enfants, l'éducation et leur santé est un baromètre mesurant l'évolution précise socio-économique de l'État.

– Corpus de droit en Albanie jusqu'à présent est un produit de l'engagement des juristes albanais et de l'assistance et l'expertise proviennent principalement de pays européens membres de l'Union. L'approbation de la Loi "Sur la protection des droits de l'enfant" marque un succès important pour la protection des droits de tous les enfants albanais dans un cadre juridique complet et institutionnel en conformité avec la Constitution albanaise et la Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant (CDE). La loi ouvre la voie à la mise en place des mécanismes institutionnels appropriés permettant de garantir et d'assurer le respect des droits des enfants par l'individu, la famille, l'État ou d'autres entités tierces. Avec l'élaboration et l'adoption du cette loi l'Albanie a fait l'approche et l'harmonisation de la législation dans le contexte de l'intégration dans l'UE. Ainsi les institutions assumeront les responsabilités particulières pour la protection réelle des droits de l'enfant.

– La nécessité d'une coopération étroite et solide entre les différents acteurs multidisciplinaires en vue d'assurer la protection effective des enfants grâce à l'utilisation du modèle de CPU (Unités de la Protection des Enfants). Il est nécessaire qu'an niveau régional les représentants de l'administration des Municipalités souscrivent leur engagement et leur soutien aux

<footnote n="1">¹ FLAMMER August., Wer weiss dann, wann das Kind (ganzheitlich) wohl ist?, in Le Bien de l'enfant, pg. 45.</footnote>
Unités pour les droits des enfants grâce à l'allocation appropriée des fonds dans leurs budgets pour assurer la viabilité future des droits des enfants en Albanie.

– La nature et les défis à surmonter pour réaliser les droits des enfants, souvent ont besoin de la création d'un processus de renforcement des capacités. Le Médiateur doit avoir la capacité de traiter des violations des droits de l'enfant et de donner une solution à ce problème. Les capacités devraient être développées dans trois domaines fondamentaux: l'infrastructure, les compétences et la coordination. Les efforts visant à établir et renforcer une structure spéciale pour les droits de l'enfant au sein de l'institution du Médiateur en Albanie, ou de créer une institution particulière à l'exemple de leurs homologues dans les bureaux d'ombudsman pour les enfants dans de nombreux pays de l'Europe, doivent recevoir des interventions appropriées pour améliorer la protection des droits des enfants en Albanie, avec l'augmentation de la capacité des conseillers juridiques et autres employés de la première ligne dans l'identification, l'orientation et la réponse aux cas qui violent les droits de l'enfant, le renforcement et l'amélioration des structures législatives, de la police et la mise en œuvre institutionnelle des droits de l'enfant et de la communauté, afin de s'assurer que tous les enfants et les jeunes jouissent les droits sanctionnées dans la Convention des Nations Unies sur les Droits de l'Enfant.

–Renforcement des capacités du gouvernement au niveau national et local pour être en mesure de répondre aux exigences de l'adhésion de l'UE et d'accroître l'efficacité de la mise en œuvre des politiques de droits de l'enfant dans une perspective revêt une importance particulière.

–L’Albanie souhaite d’adhérer à l’UE. En ce process il y a deux défis à relever: d’une part pour assurer le rapprochement de la législation avec la législation communautaire, et d’autre part e l”appliquer efficacement. L’Albanie a été inclus dans TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office) un programme de la Commission européenne qui vise à fournir une assistance technique en matière d’adoption et la mise en œuvre de la législation.

– C'est vrai quand on pense que dans tous les pays du monde, les enfants sont représentés par la famille mais souvent, la famille est l'endroit où se produisent la plupart des violations des droits des enfants.

Mais on doit efforcer de réaliser en pratique ce que la loi prévoit et lutter contre l'idée que les droits des enfants ne seront plus des droits-enfant.

Bibliographie

1. Jean Zermatten, *L'Intérêt Supérieur de l'Enfant De l'Analyse Littérale à la Portée Philosophique*, Working report 3, 2003

2. www.mfa.gov.al/dokumenta/crc_report.pdf

3. www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/7d5e3444b12ac33dc1257018004dd14c/$FILE/G0540844.pdf

4. CRC/C/15/Add. 249 31 March 2005

5. Loi nr.10347 du 4.11.2010 *Pour la protection des droits de l'enfant*, http://www.parlament.al/

6. Loi nr.8454 du.4.02.1999 *Pour le Médiateur en Albanie*, www.avokatipopullit.gov.al

7. Observation générale n ° 2 *Sur le rôle des institutions nationales indépendantes de droits de l'homme dans la promotion et la protection des droits de l'enfant*, http://www.crin.org/resources/infoDetail.asp?ID=8042&flag=report

8. Convention relative de l'ONU "Sur les droits de l'enfant"

9. Flammer August, *Wer weiss dann, wann das Kind (ganzheitlich) wohl ist?*, Le Bien de l'enfant, pg. 45

10. Commission Européenne "Enlargement Strategies and Main Challenges 2009-2010", Brussels, 14.10.2009, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key-documents/2009/al-rapport-2009-en.pdf

<figure><img src="image_22.png" /></figure>
EU standards and deliberative democracy:
Case of Kyrgyzstan

DR. TANEL KERIKMÄE AND DR. KATRIN NYMAN-METCALF

Tallinn University of Technology (Estonia).

***Abstract:*** The article discusses, against the example of recent events in Kyrgyzstan, different forms of democracy including the use of alternative, traditional forms (mainly the kurultai) instead of “European style” parliamentary democracy. It analyses what is seen as a successful transition to democracy and rule of law in the eyes of the international community that in various ways supports democratic transition in Kyrgyzstan among many countries.

***Keywords:*** EU, Kyrgyzstan, constitution, consultative democracy, third countries, post-communist regimes, Central Asia and EU, transition, coup d'état, kurultai.

# I. INTRODUCTION

1. The year 2010 made Kyrgyzstan world-famous. Shocking and horrifying news about killed civilians, refugees, destruction of property and a political coup were noticed by the international community. Kyrgyzstan was propelled to the forefront of international attention. Even before this, there were various projects of international assistance to the country, for example for building up a constitutional democracy. After the coup, some projects continued and some were added, hoping that the new government would be even more receptive to international support to establish a rule of law democracy.

2. Kyrgyzstan presents an example of a country with quite peculiar constitutional and legal traditions that do not easily fit into the model of European-style parliamentary democracy and that has never in practice had such a system. At the same time, governments have claimed to strive toward this<fnref n="1" />, even if reality has been quite different. Especially European Union (EU) assistance aims to link the country to a democratic value system. Kyrgyzstan serves as an interesting and topical example of whether international assistance for democratic state structures, using existing models from very different countries, can work.

3. In creating a new governing structure for Kyrgyzstan after the dramatic events of 2010, what both in the opinion of the former President and the opposition is the weakest link in the chain of power – the Parliament – is given a strong role. This leads to the question why to attempt to use the parliamentary system when it has never proved to work in the country and if the Parliament is the only possible way to strengthening democracy in Kyrgyzstan. Both sides in the power struggle have advocated the use of alternative forms of democracy, the traditional *kurultai*. This is something not known in the European model of democracy. The article discusses if this is a reason why such alternative models are not properly examined and if it may mean that striving for a unified model of a democratic state may even hinder a proper democratic transition in Kyrgyzstan.

4. The current article will not try to screen theories on who (how and why) were behind the curtains when the revolution or *coup d'état* of 4th of April 2010 (still called officially “political events”) took place. The authors would rather analyse the legal society of Kyrgyzstan and especially its constitutional justice in the light of “political events” that suddenly left the country in chaos. The ethnic clashes in June of 2010 are not analysed to a greater extent than that which ties in with the

<footnote n="1">¹ At one point, in the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan was even called the Switzerland of Central Asia. See among others, Alkan, H. (2009) 'Post-Soviet politics in Kyrgyzstan: between centralism and localism?' Contemporary Politics 15: 3, 355 – 375 at p 355. During the last decades, the influence of China (economic) and Russia (political) have shadowed the pro-European policy.</footnote>
topic of this article, namely the governing system of Kyrgyzstan and more specifically, if and how
traditional structures can serve the aim of democracy and rule of law. Nor does this article attempt to
engage with the debate on the theories of democracy. We understand by the term democracy not just
the holding of free elections but also existence of a parliamentary system, a constitutional justice
system, respect for human rights and the landscape enabling free elections, including the media
landscape. Democracy also includes a link to development and social justice. It is this general
understanding of democracy that we use to denote what it is that international organisations and
especially the EU wish to promote and what the constitution and laws of the country include. The
relationship between freedom and democracy on the one hand and a capitalistic and free economy on
the other hand is widely debated in the world and this debate lies outside of the main topic for this
article.

II. THE 2010 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN KYRGYZSTAN: RE-INSTATING KURULTAI

5. The coup d'état derived from several political events that have not been internationally discussed to any great extent.<fnref n="1" /> What is relevant for our topic is how President Bakiev in March 2010 declared suddenly in media that the old Kyrgyz tradition of having councils of people's representatives "Kurultai of Consent" would be introduced. This was certainly an attempt to secure solid political say even if it was not clear enough why, in the case of a relatively weak Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh), it was needed.<fnref n="2" /> This kind of "consultative democracy" (words of Bakiev from his TV appeal) was officially needed because of the energy deficit and the new tariffs, worsening socio-economic situation and probably also unreliable relations with Russia (after the non-obedience of Bakiev that lead to the prolongation of a US military base). At this time the apparatus of the President controlled everything in the country. Legislative acts were formulated and legislative procedure was coordinated by the ministry of justice. However, de facto, the office of the President was always consulted. The initiative to have "real peoples representation" Kurultai was a surprise including to high officials after the speech of the President at national TV. The Parliament members were clearly insulted and expressed their disapproval. The ukas of the President was even taken to the Constitutional Court. However, as the role of the kurultai was as a consultative institution, the Constitutional Court did not find a problem. The Court was later disbanded by the new government after the withdrawal of Bakiev. The new Constitution directs the competences of the Constitutional Court to the Supreme Court.

6. Supposedly, the *kurultai* had to be established to secure that in the case of constitutional crisis (maybe caused by foreign political power, or the opposition), the President would be able to use his loyal friends and demonstrate the ultimate link of his own decisions with *vox populi* to increase legitimacy. Marat Kazakpayev, professor of political science and conflict resolution at Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, said the *kurultai* "raised questions that arouse popular interest and that the government can solve".<fnref n="3" />

7. *Kurultai* Presidium Chairman Sadykbek Ablesov said the presidium would meet at least once a quarter owing to the large number of complaints and requests from the people. "There are 17 of us

<footnote n="1">¹ The concentration of more and more power in the hands of the president Bakiyev and his family, the geographical and clan-based anger this gave rise to and all this at a time of worsening economical conditions are mentioned as explanations for the unrest. Cheterian, V. (2010) "Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island of Instability" Survival 52: 5, 21 – 27 at p 21.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² It is regarded as accepted knowledge that the Parliament in Kyrgyzstan has been weak for some time and often has been sidetracked, with the President and certain ministries holding the power. This is the case foreign policy for example according to Omelicheva. Omelicheva, M. Y.(2009) "Convergence of Counterterrorism Policies: A Case Study of Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia" in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32: 10, 893–908 at p 897.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Karabayev, A. (2010) “Opposition wary of Kyrgyz kurultai results” Central Asia Online 2010-03-25
http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en_GB/features/caii/features/politics/2010/03/25/feature-02</footnote>
in the presidium”, he said. “We’ll figure out a general working plan in a week. We’ll convey the essential issues not to the president but to concrete ministries and agencies, straight to the bureaucrats who are responsible for handling this or that problem”.<fnref n="1" />

8. Naumova explains that “Kurultai is a political and military council of ancient Mongol and Turkic chiefs and khans. The root of the word “Kural” or “Khural” means political “meeting” or “assembly” in the Mongolian language and having also these meanings in the Turkish languages. Various modern Mongolian and Turkic peoples use it in the political or administrative sense, as a synonym for parliament, congress, conference, council, assembly, convention, gathering”. <fnref n="2" /> Kyrgyzstan has retained many traditional elements parallel to the modern governing structures throughout its independence as well as even to some extent during Soviet times. This has included dispute resolution mechanism, law as well as governing bodies.<fnref n="3" />

9. The institute of the kurultai was also used in the context of the 2005 so called Tulip Revolution as a way to unite the very fractured opposition to the then president Akaev.<fnref n="4" /> A form of this body or an assembly of the people was used by Akaev and retained by Bakiev as a way to involve people in democracy but in practice more to support official policy. As for the Parliament, its role as well as structure (uni- or bicameral) has changed several times since the independence of Kyrgyzstan.<fnref n="5" /> The role of Parliament has often been questioned and some MPs even soon after independence made proposals that Parliament should abolish itself. Even if this did not happen, political parties have ever since independence been weak in Kyrgyzstan and Parliament thus also has not contained strong political forces or been regarded as representative of the popular will. Neither has it been structured as a subunit of and in reality if not formally dependent on the executive as in other Central Asian states.<fnref n="6" /> After the Tulip Revolution the pre-revolution Parliament was retained as a way to have stability rather than a democratic change.<fnref n="7" /> Mainly the Parliament has been seen as rather irrelevant. Constitutional changes in 2007 somewhat increased its role e.g. in forming a government and for some appointments of high officials, at the expense of the role of the President, but the situation still did not lead to real parliamentarism, nor the perception of it.<fnref n="8" /> The authority of Parliament was boosted after changes to the constitution were overwhelmingly approved in a nationwide referendum in June 2010. That model sets the country apart from the other former Soviet republics in Central Asia, where power is usually held in the hands of authoritarian leaders.<fnref n="9" /> Whether this new role for Parliament will mean anything in practice mainly remains to be seen.

10. It is significant that after the President's announcement in March 2010 the opposition started to compose their own kurultais thus ignoring the Parliament as a tool for political change while

<footnote n="1">¹ Karabayev (2010)</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Naumova, V. (2010) “Small Kurultai of ethnic Kazakhs of CA, Iran and Afghanistan opens in Tajik capital today”Asia-Plus. http://www.asiaplus.tj/en/news/50/50134.html. 20.04.2009 11:48</footnote>

<footnote>See also example of kurultai like forum for specific purposes “Astana hosts the International Kurultai of the Turkic-speaking Countries on Architecture and Urban Planning, as well as the IX Urban Forum Kazakhstan – 2010” at http://engnews.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=308070</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Juraev, S. (2008) “Kyrgyz democracy? The Tulip Revolution and beyond” Central Asian Survey, 27: 3, 253 – 264 at p 260.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Heathershaw, J. (2009) “Rethinking the International Diffusion of Coloured Revolutions: The Power of Representation in Kyrgyzstan” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 25: 2, 297 – 323 at pp 306-307.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Murzakulova, A. and Schoeberlein, J. (2009) “The Invention of Legitimacy: Struggles in Kyrgyzstan to Craft an Effective Nation-State Ideology” Europe-Asia Studies, 61: 7, 1229 – 1248 at p 1239-1243.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Alkan, H. (2009) pp 361-363. Also Juraev, S. (2008) especially pp 258-259.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Ó Beacháin, D. (2009) “Roses and Tulips: Dynamics of Regime Change in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 25: 2, 199-226 at p 219.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Alkan, H. (2009) pp 369-371.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Leonard, P and Karmanau, Y (2010) “Kyrgyz Democratic Experiment Begins Uncertainly, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament vote yields uncertain result, with nationalist party leading the pack”, October 11, 2010, abc News International, available in internet: http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=11847965 (access 15 February 2011)</footnote>
supporting the core idea of consultative democracy. The idea as such of having kurultai as an
instrument to secure democracy was however not discussed by the opposition. Rather, the
accusations directed to President Bakiev were related to corruption and isolation of the kurultai from
the general public. At the same time, the fact that the opposition composed their own kurultai is
significant as it demonstrates the support to this kind of mechanism.

11. The address of President Bakiev to the *Kurultai* of Concord of the Kyrgyz people (also called Grand National Assembly, *Kurultai* of Harmony or *Supreme Kurultai* to differentiate it from the other *kurultai* type of assemblies organized by the opposition)<fnref n="1" /> included the following aspects that help to identify the elements of the Kyrgyz kind of consultative democracy:

1. the country requires a continuous dialogue

2. decisions must be made quickly and accurately, and then effectively implemented

3. nobody has a monopoly on truth (Bakiev calls it “deliberative democracy”)

4. a reasonable balance of age-old traditions and innovations should be ensured

5. there should be a forum outside of State public offices

12. At the same time, Bakiev tried to use *kurultai* to distance Kyrgyzstan from a transparent democratic system and revitalize the idea of national identity in the light of *vox populi*, which would in the Kyrgyz tribal system mean to follow the leader. As he put it: Can we save the family and tribal values and at the same time to develop a Government based on the idea of equality before the law, even in spite of the relationships? And maybe, instead of forcibly imposing on all people a universal way of life, it is better to offer them an opportunity to choose themselves how to live?<fnref n="2" />

13. That the opposition kurultai concentrated on the most critical problems of the state (rather than analyzing the idea of kurultai as such) is reflected in the kurultai's resolution that stated among other things the following: The National Kurultai decides to recognize the social-economic and political situation as an extremely hard one. Increasing costs for food products, fuel and lubricants, public utilities, and transportation costs are worsening the nation's living conditions. Therefore, for their improvement we are calling on the government and the president to take urgent measures.<fnref n="3" /> The National (opposition) kurultai also decided to recognize work of the Kyrgyz Republic Government as unsatisfactory. What is also interesting, the opposition, using the kurultai as a forum, acted against competence of public offices including the Parliament: Thus, they “recognize results of early Parliamentary Elections of the 16th of December 2007 as illegitimate due to the self-willed behavior of local self-government bodies, the fabrication of election protocols and the absence of an open announcement of the election results as the State Legislation requires, and, accordingly, to recognize all laws adopted by this Jogorku Kenesh session as invalid”.<fnref n="4" />

14. The political situation can best be described as “weird”: the President wanted to secure his power and opposed himself to the constitutional institutions (Parliament, government). At the same time these institutions were first attacked by “revolutionists” as pro-Bakiev institutions. Kyrgyzstan has already earlier, both before and after the Tulip Revolution, shown evidence of political confusion, with a continued Soviet tone, strive toward the West and national traditions all competing for attention.<fnref n="5" /> The Parliament was left alone by both sides. The question is whether the newly elected (at the end of 2010) Parliament will not become the same kind of powerless and mistrusted institution.

<footnote n="1">¹ Available in internet: http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Address+of+President+Kurmanbek+Bakiev+to+Kurultai+of+Concord+of...-a0221874138</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² *Ibid.*</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Safin, R IPP media ‘Will the April revival lead to a dialogue between the opposition and the government?’” 29.04.2008http://www.ipp.kg/en/analysis/629/</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ *Ibid.*</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Alkan, H. (2009) p 355.</footnote>
### III. A UNIFORM EUROPEAN MODEL FOR POST-COMMUNIST STATES, INCLUDING KYRGYZSTAN?

15. All the former communist States that belong to the EU have attempted to follow a Western-European track in adapting the State to principles of democracy (the democratic nature of the EU itself is a separate issue and not touched upon in this article). Although some commentators stated that “democratization quickly came to mean westernization that was often chaotic, arbitrary and divorced from the country's psychological and cultural roots”<fnref n="1" /> the countries of East and Central Europe that are now in the EU all share the cultural background of the older EU Member States. Similarly further expansion of the European model to new territory, with Georgia, Ukraine, the Balkans and Turkey can be imagined relatively easily.<fnref n="2" /> It is when going further afield in the sense of cultural and psychological characteristics that the question of using a uniform European model becomes more complicated.

16. Many transformational states (including the most politically and economically 'successful' and 'advanced') continue to struggle with the problems of corruption and other forms of abuse of public power for private gain. Even within the group of relatively new East and Central European EU Member States it seems that EU institutional control has not been enough to remedy the problem. It is doubtful if the existence of a stick in the sense of strict EU institutional control in the new Member States compensates for the lack of a carrot when membership has already been obtained. For states that do not purport to become EU members, interest in closer cooperation and trade provides a certain carrot and stick to the EU to allow it to influence rule of law and human rights in states it is having relations with. But seeing that even membership is not a guarantee that EU values can be effectively upheld, further afield the obstacles are even greater. To what extent has international assistance and conditionality linked to this assistance aiming at achieving a rule of law and democratic state been successful? These questions are examined in this article in relation to Kyrgyzstan. Many features of the state and society in Kyrgyzstan are similar to that of other former Soviet Central Asian countries, as they come from the same recent historical situation, also in earlier times were similar in different ways and have population groups that are not restricted to one country. At the same time, it is not correct to assume that the Central Asian states are very similar in all respects – indeed, the road they have taken since independence from the Soviet Union has varied quite a lot. Kyrgyzstan is generally regarded as the country with the most open debate and relatively free and fair elections as well as a certain amount of media freedom<fnref n="3" /> – positive but only in the context of the weak democratic structures in the region.

17. Post-communist regimes in Central-Asia are known by their totalitarian nature, however, streaming to the Western welfare and values. Export of European democracy to Kyrgyzstan has been disputable. It is, of course, early to predict the political concept of the new Kyrgyz government. However, already a few weeks after the political events that forced President Bakiev and his supporters to step down, the idea of a parliamentarian republic (instead of presidential) was replaced with the idea of mixed form of parliamentarian and presidential republic. The former President clearly did not favour the Western model of democracy (emphasizing elections). His vision included “dialogue with social groups rather than a foundation of elections and individual human rights ...since elections have become an arena for “competing moneyed interests”.<fnref n="4" /> The elite under Bakiev (as well as that under Akaev, the leader before the Tulip Revolution) belonged to a large extent to the

<footnote n="1">¹ Baczynski, J. (2007) “The Flaws in Europe’s Democracy” Europe’s World, Autumn 2007/7, p. 105.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Baczynski, J. (2007) p 106.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Murzakulova and Schoeberlein for example point out that the debate on ideology in Kyrgyzstan has had different participants as opposed to the generally centralised discourses in Central Asia. Murzakulova, A. and Schoeberlein, J. (2009) p 1233.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Rogers, S. (2010) “Bakiyev favours ‘consultative democracy’ over Western model”, Central Asia online 2010-03-23</footnote>
former Soviet elite. They were familiar with as well as often supportive of Soviet-style thinking as well as generally pro-Russian.<fnref n="1" /> Various studies have shown that countries with a clear break with the past (not least in the post-Soviet context) have lower incidence of corruption<fnref n="2" />, which is one factor affecting the failure of a country like Kyrgyzstan to successfully integrate into what may be called a European or Western value system. As Cokgezen writes, a democratic system is essential to be able to combat corruption, together with transparency and legal certainty.<fnref n="3" />

<figure><img src="image_23.png" /></figure>

## IV. WHAT IS SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY?

18. Transition to democracy and when it is successful must be measured with international measures as well as by the measures of the society in question. Studies of transitional societies shows the role of international and regional bodies (international organisations, trade bodies, international NGOs) in encouraging, monitoring or even enforcing plans and decisions made within the transitional countries. The general trend of globalization, here meaning a global convergence tendency in many fields, looks like it could support the idea that legal and institutional harmonization through legal transplants is a rapid way of reform.<fnref n="4" /> There are various international (global or regional)

<footnote n="1">¹ Omelicheva, M. Y. (2009) p 900.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Cokgezen, M. (2004) "Corruption in Kyrgyzstan: the facts, causes and consequences" *Central Asian Survey*, 23: 1, 79–94 at p 83.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Cokgezen, M. (2004) p 90.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Merryman talks about pride in one's own culture and traditions, commitment to specific doctrines and distrust of foreign ideas as obstacles for legal convergence. Merryman, J. H. (1999) The Loneliness of the Comparative Lawyer, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston at p 35. Legal transplants have generally been seen to be successful when they</footnote>
measurement tools and benchmarks for determining success and failure e.g. through the growing body of international laws and norms on political, judicial and administrative performance. However, at the same time as it is possible to find such tools and benchmarks, experience also shows that transposition of laws or institutions from one type of society to another is not easy. There are many authors from the past decades within the spheres of legal history and legal sociology who show how the assumption of transferring laws and institutions as a rapid way to development needs to be reformulated or even refuted.<fnref n="1" /> Some call this non-transferability of law<fnref n="2" /> while others point to a risk of legal failure – the transplanted law will not lead to anything near the intended results.<fnref n="3" /> There has been much research on conditions for success in transplanting, like how similar the original and the transplant country have to be for a successful transplant to be possible. Fogelklou stresses that it is not strictly a matter of aligning transplants with the existing legal culture in the narrow sense, but rather ensuring that transplants resonate well with the broader political and moral environment,<fnref n="4" /> or 'deep structure' of law.<fnref n="5" />

19. What this means for the practical reform work is that strategies for the transplantation of laws or institutions need to be carefully formulated for the society in question. They should take into account means for influencing current popular notions of what is fair or efficient<fnref n="6" /> in addition to having long time-frames. The question of making effective and long-term strategies is however in practice often not really an option as states in transition want to 'catch up' quickly. There is also a certain pressure from the rest of the world, for different reasons – be they possible EU accession or other closer ties with various international organisations – to develop rapidly. This may lead to a temptation to think there are ideal models of social organisation, ready to be imported and put into work. The temptation of transplants as a quick road to development is there both for international organisations and other donors and for domestic forces looking for reforms. The copying of events or institutions elsewhere can be more or less conscious and planned as well as more or less successful, both factors dependent on a variety of parameters such as similarity of the different societies concerned, the time element, contacts between the parties involved and much else.<fnref n="7" />

20. In some countries it is often claimed – both on behalf of authorities and on behalf of the people – that certain reforms or progress is not possible because the country and the mentality of people are “different”. Such views can be exploited by authorities as an excuse to avoid reform and indeed the actual idea that the country is “different” is in authoritarian or post-authoritarian societies

concern instrumental matters like commercial practices rather than matters more linked with specific cultural ideas or principles. Cotterrell, R. (1992) The Sociology of Law: An Introduction, Butterworths, London p 24.

<footnote n="1">¹ For example Cotterell, R. (1992); Harding A. (2001) “Comparative Law and Legal Transplantation in South East Asia: Making Sense of the “Nomic Din” in Nelken, D. and Feest, J.(eds.) Adapting Legal Cultures, Onati International Series in Law and Society, Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland; Tamanaha, B. Z. (1995) “The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies” (Review article), The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 2, 1995 pp. 470–486; Waelde, T. W. And Gunderson, J. L. (1994) “Legislative Reform in Transition Economies: Western Transplants – A Short-cut to Social Market Economy Status?” in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1994 pp. 347–378.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Seidman, A. and Seidman, R. B. (1994) State and Law in the Development Process: Problem-Solving and Institutional Change in the Third World, St. Martin's Press, New York.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Galligan, D. J. (2003)”Legal Failure: Law and Social Norms in Post-Communist Europe”, in Galligan, D. and Kurkchiyan, M. (eds.) Law and Informal Practices: The Post-Communist Experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1-24.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Fogelklou, A. (2003) “Constitutionalism and the Presidency in the Russian Federation” in International Sociology, vol. 18, no. 1, 2003 pp. 181-98.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Tuori, K. (2002) Critical Legal Positivism, Aldershot, Ashgate.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Cotterell uses the failure of alcohol prohibition in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s as an example of a failed attempt to change behaviour through law alone. Cotterrell, R. (1992) p 55.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ The limited size of this paper does not allow going into detail on this question of how and why some developments may or may not be copied between countries. On the question or transferability of the coloured revolutions, e.g. in Kyrgyzstan (based on political science theory), see Heathershaw, J. (2009) and sources quoted there.</footnote>
usually instilled from above. It must be said that this is a poor excuse: even if reforms will have to look different and may work in different ways because of traditions and cultural norms, there is no excuse for not having a good legislation guaranteeing human rights and the rule of law with the corresponding institutions and mechanisms to ensure this.<fnref n="1" /> In the content of this article, this means that although the way in which Kyrgyzstan should reach higher levels of democratic governance may have to differ from the traditional European model of parliamentary democracy, there is no reason to doubt that this country like any other one could have democracy.

21. Nor is the fact that democracy itself is not immune to crisis a reason not to vigorously support it as the best available mean of governance. Some commentators may even say that democracy has always been in crisis. It seems to be reasonable to look back and find parallels with previous historical periods, like for example when the Estonian researcher Peeter Tarvel wrote already in 1928 that development of democracy goes together with problems of parliamentarism, corruption, battles between different social groups, armed conflicts.<fnref n="2" /> At that time, in Estonia as in many parts of the world, these problems lead to a return to autocratic political systems – explained as in many places as necessary because of the problems of democracy.

22. Peters and Schwenke warn that culture-based moral relativism may pay a high price as it can easily be made a handmaiden of dictators.<fnref n="3" /> Even if leaders of transition countries may be more wary than autocratic leaders in how they present the relativism of rights, when this goes to the essence of the rights and their protection rather than to details of their implementation, it must be recognised for what it is: limitation of the internationally recognised and most often also nationally explicitly protected human rights. Just because it is not easy to introduce democracy and respect for human rights – as there is no ready-made model applicable everywhere – the aim should not be abandoned.

23. However, although the statements that any one people is different and do not want democracy should not be used as an excuse to stop change, it is a fact that there is less popular pressure for reform in certain countries than in others and the objective reasons for this are not always clear. How and when media comes in to shape the pressure is a key factor as well as the question of when if ever (in living memory or not) the state in question has experienced democracy. Large Diasporas in democratic states may also have an influence. If the bureaucracy resists reform, the will to reform is not there at the top and there is not much pressure from below, the climate for reform is clearly poor. The effect of these factors on expectations of the population in the post-Soviet period can be observed when comparing different previous Soviet states. In Central Asian Soviet Republics it means that even if the Soviet system was never democratic, the reasons for the lack of strong opposition to it may partly be found in the system that preceded it. Also more subjective factors may be factored in like traditional fear or dislike of any disorder and an obsession with security, loyalty to persons rather than institutions and reluctance to engage in individual political and similar activities. As always with mentality, it is controversial to state what depends more on what: mentality on developments or developments on mentality. In Kyrgyzstan there have been some conscious and state-sponsored events to promote the creation of a state ideology, for example building on ancient historical facts or events to create an image of the country. As well as the state ideology, other factors such as Islam, nationalism, internationalism and other competing or complementary ideas for an ideology have been discussed, promoted and sometimes rejected.<fnref n="4" /> It is not evident which value family

<footnote n="1">¹ Nodia points out that the problems with introducing liberal democracy are likely to lead to one of two attitudes: that democracy is not suitable for a certain society so attempts to achieve it are pointless or that even if there are impediments, it is still the ultimate goal (even if people have no experience of it). Nodia, G. (2002) "The Democratic Path" in Journal of Democracy Vol. 13, No. 3, July 2002:13-19 at pp 17-18.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Tarvel, P. (2002) Demokraatia tulevik, Karjahärm, T. and Runnel, H. (eds.) Ilmamaa, Tartu at p. 50.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Peters, A. and Schwenke, H. (2000) "Comparative Law beyond Post-Modernism" in International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 49 October 2000:800-834 at p. 819.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Murzakulova, A. and Schoeberlein, J. (2009) p 1236.</footnote>
the country belongs to, but it contains elements of many and may not yet have found its place in a
specific such setting.

24. Another factor influencing the interest in, and conditions for, transplanting and otherwise receiving institutional concepts from the outside is various forms of external assistance and aid aiming at facilitating democratisation, rule harmonisation, human rights, rule of law, etc.<fnref n="1" /> There is a debate in the academic community, among aid agencies, and in international and regional organisations, about the effectiveness and impact of such assistance. There are several examples of failed attempts by international organisations, states and NGOs in designing and implementing such assistance strategies. Inexperienced personnel, applying models from totally different societies without knowledge of local conditions, not recognizing that perfect solutions cannot always be expected, lack of receptiveness to local criticism that among other things may lead to structures being set up that do not have any real attachment to local society, lack of budgets that provide for sustainability – these are just examples of what not infrequently leads to failure of external assistance projects.<fnref n="2" /> This does not mean that external assistance is always irrelevant or doomed to fail, but rather that the success of a transition or transplantation strategy is not automatically correlated to the external assistance provided for its implementation.

25. The issue of external assistance to transition states and even the question of the notion of transition states has been actively debated in academic literature not least following the article "The end of the transition paradigm" by Carothers in early 2002.<fnref n="3" /> The article was commented on by several authors<fnref n="4" />, most of them finding that the naïve view on what transition is and how other states can help that Carothers criticised was in fact not a view that really coloured assistance efforts. It is important to take a wider view on transition than the limited and mechanical one criticised by Carothers. All in all, it is easy to be critical to many assistance efforts for their failure to properly link into the societies they are operating in or the tendency of donors to look more at their own procedures and expectations than those of the receiving states, but at the same time it would be unfair to deny any positive effects of assistance efforts.

<footnote n="1">¹ Regarding the importance of EU aid and assistance strategies for facilitating rule harmonization in Eastern Europe, see Nyman-Metcalf (2003) "Influence through Assistance" in European Public Law, Vol. 9, Issue 3, September 2003 pp. 425-442. On rule harmonization generally, Peters, A. and Schwenke H. (2000) especially at p 810.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Diamond, L. (1997) "Introduction: In search of consolidation" in Diamond, L., Plattner, M. F., Yun-han Chu, Hung-mao Tien (eds.) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Regional Challenges, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore/London 1997 p. xiii; Mendelson, S. E. (2001) "Unfinished Business: Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Eastern Europe and Eurasia" in Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 48, No. 3 May-June 2001 pp. 19-27; McMahon, P. C. (2001) "Building Civil Societies in East-Central Europe: The effect of American non-governmental organisations on women's groups" in Democratization, Vol. 8, No. 2 Summer 2001 pp. 45-68.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Carothers, T. (2002) "The end of the transition paradigm" in Journal of Democracy Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2002, pp. 5-21.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Hyman, G. (2002) "Tilting at straw men" in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, July 2002 pp. 26-32; Nodia, G. (2002) "The Democratic Path" in Journal of Democracy Vol. 13, No. 3, July 2002 at pp. 13-19; O'Donnell, G. (2002) "In partial defence of the transition paradigm" in Journal of Democracy Vol. 13, No. 3, July 2002 pp. 6-12; Wollack, K. (2002) "Retaining the Human Dimension" in Journal of Democracy Vol. 13, No. 3, July 2002 pp. 20-25.</footnote>
V. INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATIONS ON THE NEW REGIME IN KYRGYZSTAN

26. For Kyrgyzstan the formation of a new government after the coup was a turning point for a country that has been aggravated by political violence at various times since its independence in 1991.<fnref n="1" /> The country has also been politically divided based on geography, between the north and south, although the reasons as well as the real extent of this division are debated and it may have been more pronounced earlier on in the history of independent Kyrgyzstan, especially at the time of the Tulip Revolution.<fnref n="2" /> The division is one of the reasons why some commentators called the Tulip Revolution more of an inter-regional confrontation than an institutional overhaul<fnref n="3" />, which may be one reason for its failure to lead to sustainable state building. The division between north and south can also be seen as an expression of the division of the country into different tribes, with geographical concentration of certain tribes in particular areas as well as traditional relations with other tribes based on this.<fnref n="4" />

27. Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia in general has long been seen as a region at a cross-road of many different cultures, including legal and governance cultures. Ancient traditions such as oral custom having an important role as a source of law remained relevant for longer than in for example Europe. Kyrgyzstan is an example of a part of Central Asia were ancient oral traditions have traditionally had greater weight than Islam and legal rules derived from it, such as Sharia. Kyrgyzstan like all of the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia became established as states of the Soviet Union in 1924. Before that the state structures in the region had been based on various traditional territories incorporated into Russia in different more or less strict ways.<fnref n="5" /> A state identity like what most European countries have is thus less evident for the Central Asian countries.

28. Kyrgyzstan did not have any tradition of democracy and had never had any democratic institutions when it was incorporated in the Soviet Union. After the fall of the Soviet Union there were no civil or social movements. The media has been relatively free by regional standards but state controlled media has still managed to dominate.<fnref n="6" /> Breaking with the region's political tradition of rigged elections, Kyrgyzstan at the end of 2010 held free, democratic and open elections. This assessment made by the new leaders of the country was largely shared by an election monitoring group from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). "Fundamental freedoms, including the right of assembly, association, and expression, were generally respected," Norwegian parliamentarian, Martin Hoglund, who led the OSCE monitoring group, said. "I have observed a number of elections in Central Asia over the past years. I must say, this is the only election in Central Asia that I have been to, where I could not predict the outcome. And I believe this election reflected the will of the people of the Kyrgyz Republic."<fnref n="7" /> In a regional comparison, Kyrgyzstan even before these elections had a relatively good adherence to international democratic standards of elections – even if this did not mean totally free and fair elections and is positive only when compared against the low standard of the region.<fnref n="8" />

<footnote n="1">¹ Kyrgyzstan Forms New Coalition Government, VOA News 30 November 2010</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² See Ryabkov, M. (2008) “The north-south cleavage and political support in Kyrgyzstan” in Central Asian Survey 27:3 pp 301-316 who questions if the cleavage is the same when looking at the general population as opposed to the elites, see p 301. He however agrees that a certain division does exist.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Ryabkov, M. (2008) p 306.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Alkan, H. (2009) p 356.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Tkatov, R. (2010) “Central Asian States and International Law: Between Post-Soviet Culture and Eurasian Civilization” in 9 Chinese Journal of International Law (2010) pp 205-220 at pp 208-209</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Cokgezen, M. (2004) p 90.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Brooke, J (2010:1) “Kyrgyzstan Parties Start Coalition Talks for Parliamentary Democracy”, Global Security.org, 11 October 2010, available in internet: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2010/10/mil-101011-voa05.htm (access 15 February 2011)</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Heathershaw, J. (2009) p 305</footnote>
29. There are important differences in the accepted political doctrine between the political parties, also as concerns the fundamental issues of what kind of political system the country should have. Several parties that did well in the 2010 elections campaigned for taking the nation back to a presidential system.<fnref n="1" /> It furthermore appears that the ethnic issues are escalated by the new parliament, which is based on multi party system.

30. At the same time, many Kyrgyz citizens are still worried. Some opinions may be given as illustrations. The Kyrgyz, lawyer Aynura Sultanbaeva, 22, says people are worried that political instability will only continue as parties jockey for positions in a ruling coalition. "The problem with Kyrgyzstan is that there is no leader", she said. "And even if he is a bad leader, it is easier to bargain with him and for international investments to come into the country. But when there are lots of leaders, you have to bargain with everybody."<fnref n="2" /> As Hillary Clinton hails the development, Dmitry Medvedev, predicts that Kyrgyzstan's experiment with parliamentary democracy will be a "catastrophe." "The events in Kyrgyzstan are not just a political crisis, they are a tragic example of what happens to a society unable to create a strong state," a deputy head of the Russian presidential administration, Vladislav Surkov, said.<fnref n="3" /> Some of the fears expressed in Kyrgyzstan about instability are very similar to those expressed after the tulip revolution.<fnref n="4" /> Many people, especially but not only those not belonging to the elite, fear a lack of stability much more than a lack of democracy as they have experience of chaos versus stability but too little experience of democracy in order to properly compare it with its opposites.

31. In accordance with the opinion of experts working under guidance of EU funded project <fnref n="5" /> serious issues on validity of the new constitution can be foreseen. Just before the political events, the experts found that there was a problem with the principle of the coordinated functioning and interoperability of branches of authority. The report stated that interpretation of the Constitution is carried to the competence of the Constitutional court; official interpretation of laws – the competence of Parliament. In practice interpretation is applied very seldom, which does not support the efficiency of the legal system. The parties to a proceeding quite frequently face a situation when interpretation of laws is necessary during litigation. Official interpretation of legal acts is not publicly available because of the complexity of parliamentary procedures. This does not assist efficiency of litigations, which can last for years, especially in economic matters. Interpretation of laws is necessary for a dynamically developing economy.

32. The balance of power between constitutional institutions and the principle of subsidiarity are underestimated. If the court does not cope with the task of effective justice, the parliament passes the law; if laws contradict each other – the court assesses the legislation. Subsidiary responsibility is not a call for intervention in actions of another branch of authority, but the tool of constitutional institutions with the objective of improvement of quality of services to citizens.

<footnote n="1">¹ Brooke, J (2010:1)</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Brooke, J (2010:2) "Kyrgyzstan Votes for New Parliament", Bishkek 10 October 2010, Global Security.org, available in internet: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2010/10/mil-101010-voa04.htm (accessed 15 February 2011)</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Lack of democracy Kyrgyzstan's main problem – Kremlin Vladislav Surkov 18:19 16/04/2010 RIA Novosti. Aleksei Drujinin</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Heathershaw, J. (2009) pp 316-317.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ The following section is a short overview of the section of the “Report of Representation in Kyrgyzstan’ Expert Groups analyzing the accordance of the legislation with the Kyrgyz Constitution”. One of the authors of this article, Tanel Kerikmäe has been the head of the component at the EU-GTZ project “Support of the Judicial Reform of Kyrgyz Republic” under which the research was conducted. The coordinator of the working group on constitutional issues was Mr. Nurlan Sydökov. The report is published in Russian language by EU and GTZ in 2010, Bishkek.</footnote>
VI. EUROPEAN STANDARDS ON “ORIGINAL DEMOCRACY”

33. The EU system is construed around the fact that Member States trust one-another.<fnref n="1" /> Thus, the export of “European democracy” is complex phenomenon as it has to take account the loyalty principle to the European Union and it means something different in the EU context (and thus for candidate countries) than as a general principle. The Haider case from 1999 is an interesting example: The Austrian coalition government was composed of several parties one of which was regarded to be undemocratic and as some other European leaders said, acting against the very principles of human rights. Although the government was composed according to the Austrian constitution and through participatory democracy process, the EU put pressure on Austria to recompose it and even instituted some forms of sanctions even if there was no clear legal basis for this. After evaluation by a committee set up by the EU, the sanctions were withdrawn quite quickly, as the committee judged that Austria had not violated the founding values of the EU. Partly as a result of this situation, the EU through the Treaty of Nice (signed 26 February 2001, in force 1 February 2003) included in the treaties (now Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty, in force since December 2009) an explicit possibility of sanctions against Member States that violate the values of the EU. There have been several instances of parties or politicians with e.g. overtly racist ideology or in other ways not in line with “European standards” gaining certain power in various European countries since the Haider affair. This has not lead to any new instances of sanctions, even if there now as opposed to at the time of the Austrian crisis actually is a legal basis. It may be so that the European model is better than its actual content.

34. Exporting European democracy can be seen, therefore, as a multi-level process where external political will (other Member States and developing common values of the EU) must be considered. Exporting democracy faces many problems e.g. cultural relativism. However, there must be something that is not disputable. It seems that the main keyword that secures the democratization is “institutions”. As put by Sadurski: “It is remarkable how the choice of this or that institution – whether it is a form of a presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary system of government, or a type of electoral system, or a role of a constitutional court – makes an important change in the way that otherwise similar societies can develop at a point of major transformation”.<fnref n="2" /> According to Annus, “there are several reasons why the transfer of policies and ideas makes good sense for the less developed countries. There is a severe need of introducing new policies and creating them from scratch is costly and time consuming”.<fnref n="3" /> There can be several reasons why this kind of transition fails. It would be assumed that the main donor and first political supporter of the new government, Russia would be the example. However, the path that was chosen by new power differs from the system of main political partner. Political history of EU Member States is rather different from Kyrgyz political culture. This leads to the idea that Kyrgyzstan can become successful with reforms only if the local traditions will be taken into account.

35. Paasi points out how foreign-funded NGOs in Kyrgyzstan have deviated somewhat from the role the donors presume (toward a more political role) as they understand better what would

<footnote n="1">¹ Nyman-Metcalf, K. (2006) “Common Values as a Basis for Integration: Is there an End to Europe? The Baltic States as a Bridge Between Europe and Beyond” in Promoting Democratic Values in the Enlarging Europe: The Changing Role of the Baltic States from Importers to Exporters. Kasekamp, A. and Pääbo, H. (eds.) Tartu University Press, at p 110.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Sadurski, W. (2001) “Conclusions: On the Relevance of Institutions and the Centrality of Constitutions in Post-Communist Transitions” in Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol 1. Institutional Engineering. Zielonka, J. (ed) Oxford University Press, at p. 455.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Annus, T. (2004) Governance and Law in Transition States. Dissertationes Rerum Publicarum Universitatis Tartuensis. Tartu University Press at p. 16</footnote>