# Relations between Allied Forces and the population of Iceland

Bertrand M. Roehner

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Bertrand M. Roehner. Relations between Allied Forces and the population of Iceland. Laboratoire de Physique Théorique et Hautes Énergies; Université Pierre et Marie Curie (Paris 6). 2009, 74 p. hal-04620113

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# Relations between Allied Forces and the population of Iceland

Bertrand M. Roehner

<figure><img src="image_1.png" /></figure>

To cite this version:

Bertrand M. Roehner. Relations between Allied Forces and the population of Iceland. Laboratoire de Physique Théorique et Hautes Énergies; Université Pierre et Marie Curie (Paris 6). 2009, 74 p. hal-04620113

HAL Id: hal-04620113

https://hal.science/hal-04620113v1

Submitted on 21 Jun 2024

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.

Public Domain
RELATIONS BETWEEN
ALLIED FORCES
AND THE
POPULATION OF ICELAND

Bertrand M. Roehner

Institute for Theoretical and High Energy Physics, University of Paris 6
Laboratoire de Physique Théorique et Hautes Énergies, UPMC
Working Report
RELATIONS BETWEEN
ALLIED FORCES
AND THE
POPULATION OF ICELAND

Bertrand M. Roehner

Institute for Theoretical and High Energy Physics, University of Paris 6
Laboratoire de Physique Théorique et Hautes Énergies, UPMC
Working Report
<figure><img src="image_1.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>
Alle Menschen werden Brüder wo dein sanfter Flügel weilt.
[All people become brothers under your tender wing.]

—Friedrich Schiller, *Lied an die Freude* [Ode to Joy] (1785)

"Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"

"Yes, to the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."

"The dog did nothing in the night-time."

"That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *Silver Blaze* (1892)

There is a strong family resemblance about the misdeeds, and if you have all the details
of a thousand at your finger ends, it is odd if you can't unravel the thousand and first.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *The Valley of Fear* (1915)
Alle Menschen werden Brüder wo dein sanfter Flügel weilt.
[All people become brothers under your tender wing.]

—Friedrich Schiller, *Lied an die Freude* [Ode to Joy] (1785)

"Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"

"Yes, to the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."

"The dog did nothing in the night-time."

"That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *Silver Blaze* (1892)

There is a strong family resemblance about the misdeeds, and if you have all the details
of a thousand at your finger ends, it is odd if you can't unravel the thousand and first.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *The Valley of Fear* (1915)
<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>
RELATIONS BETWEEN ALLIED FORCES
AND
THE POPULATION OF ICELAND
1940–2006

Bertrand M. Roehner, University of Paris 6, roehner@lpthe.jussieu.fr

Version of 14 April 2009. Comments are welcome.

We hope that these notes will enable us to get in touch with Icelandic scholars. Need-
less to say, this is an essential condition for the success of this project. Please, if you
happen to know people who have a working interest in this kind of historiography
do not hesitate to send them a copy of the present draft.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction

2 Incidents

3 British and American interference

4 Censorship

5 Chronology, 1940-2006

6 Quantitative evidence

7 Conclusion

8 Acknowledgments

9 Abbreviations

10 References

11 Appendix A: Expected number of incidents

12 Other occupation episodes and analytical history
RELATIONS BETWEEN ALLIED FORCES
AND
THE POPULATION OF ICELAND
1940–2006

Bertrand M. Roehner, University of Paris 6, roehner@lpthe.jussieu.fr

Version of 14 April 2009. Comments are welcome.

We hope that these notes will enable us to get in touch with Icelandic scholars. Need-
less to say, this is an essential condition for the success of this project. Please, if you
happen to know people who have a working interest in this kind of historiography
do not hesitate to send them a copy of the present draft.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction

2 Incidents

3 British and American interference

4 Censorship

5 Chronology, 1940-2006

6 Quantitative evidence

7 Conclusion

8 Acknowledgments

9 Abbreviations

10 References

11 Appendix A: Expected number of incidents

12 Other occupation episodes and analytical history
<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_4.png" /></figure>
# Chapter 1
## Introduction

In 1940 Iceland had a population of about 150,000. Although still linked to the kingdom of Denmark, it enjoyed a large autonomy. After the outbreak of World War II, Iceland (as well as Denmark) asserted its neutrality but because of its strategic importance in the North Atlantic, it was occupied by British forces in May 1940 and one year later by American forces. The last American troops left in April 1947. There would be no military American presence until May 1951. Thereafter, for more than 50 years, a part of Keflavik airport became a base of the US Air Force. After unsuccessful discussions on a new agreement the American military presence ended for a second time in October 2006.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the interactions of the British and American forces with the population of Iceland. First of all, we wish to explain what makes this point important.

## Contrasting accounts

When reading accounts of the occupation of Iceland, one is faced with a puzzling and somewhat frustrating situation. On the one hand, there are testimonies by journalists or servicemen which mention that soldiers had to walk in Reykjavik “in parties of three, well-armed and on their guards against stabbing and shooting” and to be watchful for “empty bottles aimed at them from the top of the buildings” (see below January 13, 1941 and January 1944). On the other hand, the reports made by military commanders do not mention any events of this kind. Most military reports emphasize the good relations between the troops and the Icelandic population<fnref n="1" />. Even more surprising are some declarations made by Icelandic people, but perhaps encouraged by military commanders (see the chronology chapter at the date of 31 July 1940), to the effect that the “behavior of the troops was irreproachable”.

If the contacts between the troops and the Icelandic population had been so satisfac-

<footnote n="1">¹Even when incidents are mentioned it is done in a very restrictive way. For instance, Brigadier L. F. Page, the Commander of the Canadian Z force described one incident at the very beginning of the occupation (see below the chronology chapter at the date of 23 June 1940) before adding “no further incident of this nature was reported throughout the remainder of the Canadians’ stay in Iceland”. It will be seen below that this statement is not true.</footnote>
# Chapter 1
## Introduction

In 1940 Iceland had a population of about 150,000. Although still linked to the kingdom of Denmark, it enjoyed a large autonomy. After the outbreak of World War II, Iceland (as well as Denmark) asserted its neutrality but because of its strategic importance in the North Atlantic, it was occupied by British forces in May 1940 and one year later by American forces. The last American troops left in April 1947. There would be no military American presence until May 1951. Thereafter, for more than 50 years, a part of Keflavik airport became a base of the US Air Force. After unsuccessful discussions on a new agreement the American military presence ended for a second time in October 2006.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the interactions of the British and American forces with the population of Iceland. First of all, we wish to explain what makes this point important.

## Contrasting accounts

When reading accounts of the occupation of Iceland, one is faced with a puzzling and somewhat frustrating situation. On the one hand, there are testimonies by journalists or servicemen which mention that soldiers had to walk in Reykjavik “in parties of three, well-armed and on their guards against stabbing and shooting” and to be watchful for “empty bottles aimed at them from the top of the buildings” (see below January 13, 1941 and January 1944). On the other hand, the reports made by military commanders do not mention any events of this kind. Most military reports emphasize the good relations between the troops and the Icelandic population<fnref n="1" />. Even more surprising are some declarations made by Icelandic people, but perhaps encouraged by military commanders (see the chronology chapter at the date of 31 July 1940), to the effect that the “behavior of the troops was irreproachable”.

If the contacts between the troops and the Icelandic population had been so satisfac-

<footnote n="1">¹Even when incidents are mentioned it is done in a very restrictive way. For instance, Brigadier L. F. Page, the Commander of the Canadian Z force described one incident at the very beginning of the occupation (see below the chronology chapter at the date of 23 June 1940) before adding “no further incident of this nature was reported throughout the remainder of the Canadians’ stay in Iceland”. It will be seen below that this statement is not true.</footnote>
tory it would be difficult to understand why toward the end of World War II there
was so much popular support for terminating the American presence. At that time
the United States was willing to keep a base in Iceland. As the Icelandic government
was a close ally, the only obstacle was the wish of a large fraction of the population
to end the American presence. In 1941 American troops were welcomed by the pop-
ulation<sup>2</sup>. What happened between 1941 and 1945 which made the population change
its mind<sup>3</sup>? If we don't have a clear knowledge of the friction and incidents between
troops and population we cannot understand the turn of mind of the Icelandic peo-
ple<sup>4</sup>.

Possible sources

One may suspect that the contrasting declarations mentioned above largely arose
from the fact that reports from Iceland were subject to military censorship during
both the British and American occupations. This left a vacuum that historians were
(to some extent) free to fill according to their own inclinations. Our objective in these
notes is to use the data and records which have become available in the past decades
to give a fairly reliable and unbiased account.

One way of finding out which one of the previous descriptions is correct is to resort to
quantitative evidence. The simplest and most obvious variable which may allow us
to judge the frequency and gravity of incidents between troops and population is the
number of deaths which occurred both in the population and among the occupation
force as a result of these incidents. In contrast to some other occupation episodes
(e.g. Australia or China) for which no fatality data are yet available, in the case of
Iceland the deceased soldiers of the Commonwealth force were buried on the island.
This has an important consequence because it means that we can get individual dates
of deaths (and also names and rank of the deceased, but unfortunately not the causes
of the deaths) from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. On the contrary,
because after the war all American dead were transferred to the United States there
are no similar fatality data for US forces.

The Commonwealth data are summarized in graphical form in the chapter on quan-
titative evidence. When analyzing these data, one is confronted to two questions.

* The total number of the deaths, namely 267, is much higher than expected. A clue is provided by the percentages of fatalities belonging to the Army, Air Force and Navy, namely:

<footnote n="2"><sup>2</sup>In contrast to British troops, the American occupation was carried out with the agreement of the Icelandic government.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³The feeling of the population against a continuing American presence was substantiated by resolutions passed in the Althing (the Icelandic parliament) urging for the withdrawal of American bases.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴Even less if one recalls that by and large the presence of American troops was a factor of economic prosperity.</footnote>
tory it would be difficult to understand why toward the end of World War II there
was so much popular support for terminating the American presence. At that time
the United States was willing to keep a base in Iceland. As the Icelandic government
was a close ally, the only obstacle was the wish of a large fraction of the population
to end the American presence. In 1941 American troops were welcomed by the pop-
ulation<sup>2</sup>. What happened between 1941 and 1945 which made the population change
its mind<sup>3</sup>? If we don't have a clear knowledge of the friction and incidents between
troops and population we cannot understand the turn of mind of the Icelandic peo-
ple<sup>4</sup>.

Possible sources

One may suspect that the contrasting declarations mentioned above largely arose
from the fact that reports from Iceland were subject to military censorship during
both the British and American occupations. This left a vacuum that historians were
(to some extent) free to fill according to their own inclinations. Our objective in these
notes is to use the data and records which have become available in the past decades
to give a fairly reliable and unbiased account.

One way of finding out which one of the previous descriptions is correct is to resort to
quantitative evidence. The simplest and most obvious variable which may allow us
to judge the frequency and gravity of incidents between troops and population is the
number of deaths which occurred both in the population and among the occupation
force as a result of these incidents. In contrast to some other occupation episodes
(e.g. Australia or China) for which no fatality data are yet available, in the case of
Iceland the deceased soldiers of the Commonwealth force were buried on the island.
This has an important consequence because it means that we can get individual dates
of deaths (and also names and rank of the deceased, but unfortunately not the causes
of the deaths) from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. On the contrary,
because after the war all American dead were transferred to the United States there
are no similar fatality data for US forces.

The Commonwealth data are summarized in graphical form in the chapter on quan-
titative evidence. When analyzing these data, one is confronted to two questions.

* The total number of the deaths, namely 267, is much higher than expected. A clue is provided by the percentages of fatalities belonging to the Army, Air Force and Navy, namely:

<footnote n="2"><sup>2</sup>In contrast to British troops, the American occupation was carried out with the agreement of the Icelandic government.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³The feeling of the population against a continuing American presence was substantiated by resolutions passed in the Althing (the Icelandic parliament) urging for the withdrawal of American bases.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴Even less if one recalls that by and large the presence of American troops was a factor of economic prosperity.</footnote>
Army: 33%, Air Force: 47%, Navy: 19%.

The Air Force fatalities total $f_1 = 114^5$.

* It is often said that the Commonwealth troops were progressively replaced by American troops. The first American troops arrived in July 1941, but the replacement process lasted from that date until mid-1942. Yet, the fatality data show that even after 1942 a substantial number of Commonwealth air force personnel (Australians, British, Canadians, New Zealanders) remained in Iceland.

So far, we have not been able to find adequate responses to these questions. In particular, it would be important to know how many were killed in aircraft crashes and how many died from other causes.

Incidentally, it is thanks to the Internet revolution that the data from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission have become easily available which is probably why previous researchers did not address these questions.

Censorship (including auto-censorship) of American news became more strict after Pearl Harbor. The following excerpt of an article on how Icelanders viewed the occupation of their country which was published in *Time Magazine* on 13 October 1941 shows that at this time auto-censorship was still limited:

> "Premier Hermann Jonasson of Iceland thought Icelandic conditions last week were approaching the outlandish. If 15,000,000 soldiers were dumped in London, said he, it would not be any worse off than Iceland is now. Further, the British-American occupation has upped living costs for Iceland's residents 70%, disrupted the island's foreign trade, upset many an Icelandic lass [girl]. Last week 4 US Marines got 10 to 20 years in Portsmouth (N.H.) prison for rape committed in Iceland."

The fact that no mention can be found in the *New York Times* either of Premier Jonasson's feelings or of the court-martial trial suggests differences in self-restraint behavior; a longer excerpt of this article is given in the chronology chapter at the date of 13 October 1941.

For historians or sociologists who would welcome a more detailed and trustworthy account, the most reliable sources would be the records of Allied military courts martial and sentences of trials held in Icelandic courts.

In the case of Iceland there is another valuable source of information namely the records of the Claims Committees. After their occupation the British set up an

<footnote n="5">⁵It is interesting to compare this figure to the data given in Bittner (1974, Chart No 7: Deaths: 1940-1946) namely $f_2 = 81$ fliers killed and $f_3 = 15$ missing. $f_1$ corresponds to fliers whose death could be established, but whose remains are not necessarily buried in Iceland; for instance the remains of the crews of aircraft lost overseas usually could not be retrieved. The number of 267 corresponds to personnel *buried* in Iceland which means that it does not include the crews of aircraft who disappeared during missions over the North Atlantic. However, the fliers who died in crashes which occurred during take off or landing were buried in Iceland.</footnote>
Army: 33%, Air Force: 47%, Navy: 19%.

The Air Force fatalities total $f_1 = 114^5$.

* It is often said that the Commonwealth troops were progressively replaced by American troops. The first American troops arrived in July 1941, but the replacement process lasted from that date until mid-1942. Yet, the fatality data show that even after 1942 a substantial number of Commonwealth air force personnel (Australians, British, Canadians, New Zealanders) remained in Iceland.

So far, we have not been able to find adequate responses to these questions. In particular, it would be important to know how many were killed in aircraft crashes and how many died from other causes.

Incidentally, it is thanks to the Internet revolution that the data from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission have become easily available which is probably why previous researchers did not address these questions.

Censorship (including auto-censorship) of American news became more strict after Pearl Harbor. The following excerpt of an article on how Icelanders viewed the occupation of their country which was published in *Time Magazine* on 13 October 1941 shows that at this time auto-censorship was still limited:

> "Premier Hermann Jonasson of Iceland thought Icelandic conditions last week were approaching the outlandish. If 15,000,000 soldiers were dumped in London, said he, it would not be any worse off than Iceland is now. Further, the British-American occupation has upped living costs for Iceland's residents 70%, disrupted the island's foreign trade, upset many an Icelandic lass [girl]. Last week 4 US Marines got 10 to 20 years in Portsmouth (N.H.) prison for rape committed in Iceland."

The fact that no mention can be found in the *New York Times* either of Premier Jonasson's feelings or of the court-martial trial suggests differences in self-restraint behavior; a longer excerpt of this article is given in the chronology chapter at the date of 13 October 1941.

For historians or sociologists who would welcome a more detailed and trustworthy account, the most reliable sources would be the records of Allied military courts martial and sentences of trials held in Icelandic courts.

In the case of Iceland there is another valuable source of information namely the records of the Claims Committees. After their occupation the British set up an

<footnote n="5">⁵It is interesting to compare this figure to the data given in Bittner (1974, Chart No 7: Deaths: 1940-1946) namely $f_2 = 81$ fliers killed and $f_3 = 15$ missing. $f_1$ corresponds to fliers whose death could be established, but whose remains are not necessarily buried in Iceland; for instance the remains of the crews of aircraft lost overseas usually could not be retrieved. The number of 267 corresponds to personnel *buried* in Iceland which means that it does not include the crews of aircraft who disappeared during missions over the North Atlantic. However, the fliers who died in crashes which occurred during take off or landing were buried in Iceland.</footnote>
“Anglo-Icelandic Claims Committee” and a “British-Icelandic Traffic Accident Committee”. Both committees had a 2- or 3-member representation from each side. The British members were empowered to settle for claims not exceeding 100 pounds on any one claim. A similar organization was adopted by American troops. The joint Claim Board established for the purpose of settling claims by Icelanders held its first meeting on December 12, 1941 (see below). On average some 20 incidents were submitted to these committees every month.

Until such records become available we will not know the whole story. Until then we have tried to make the best of whatever sources are presently available. We relied mainly on newspaper articles and accessible military archives. A list of incidents established by the Criminal Judge in Reykjavik shows that in Reykjavik alone there were on average 18 incidents per month in the first year of the American occupation (no similar count is available for the rest of Iceland). The chronology chapter which follows is the result of these researches. Let us point out that this chronology is still highly provisional and will be revised when new sources become available.

## Relations between Icelandic girls and soldiers

The main problem of the occupation was the number of the occupation force in comparison with the population. Yearly average figures are as follows (Hunt 1966):

1940 (after May): 20,000

1941: 25,000

1942: 30,000

1943: 30,000

1944: 15,000

1945: 7,000.

However, it is not to the total Icelandic population of 120,000 that the previous numbers should be compared; indeed the soldiers were mostly unmarried males and those numbers should therefore be compared with the same section of the Icelandic population. In Iceland the unmarried population over the age of 16 numbered some 20,000 males and about as many females (Iceland 1966). Because this number also includes aged widows, one can be sure that the number of marriageable females was somewhat under 20,000. Thus, as a rule of thumb, one can retain that in a population the number of marriageable females is of the order of one sixth of the total population. The comparison shows that the troops in fact outnumbered the group of Icelandic marriageable females. As pointed out by Hunt (1966) any substantial number of marriages between US men and Icelandic girls would have represented a serious loss to Iceland as these girls would probably have emigrated to America. One may recall in this respect that about 110,000 British girls got married to American
“Anglo-Icelandic Claims Committee” and a “British-Icelandic Traffic Accident Committee”. Both committees had a 2- or 3-member representation from each side. The British members were empowered to settle for claims not exceeding 100 pounds on any one claim. A similar organization was adopted by American troops. The joint Claim Board established for the purpose of settling claims by Icelanders held its first meeting on December 12, 1941 (see below). On average some 20 incidents were submitted to these committees every month.

Until such records become available we will not know the whole story. Until then we have tried to make the best of whatever sources are presently available. We relied mainly on newspaper articles and accessible military archives. A list of incidents established by the Criminal Judge in Reykjavik shows that in Reykjavik alone there were on average 18 incidents per month in the first year of the American occupation (no similar count is available for the rest of Iceland). The chronology chapter which follows is the result of these researches. Let us point out that this chronology is still highly provisional and will be revised when new sources become available.

## Relations between Icelandic girls and soldiers

The main problem of the occupation was the number of the occupation force in comparison with the population. Yearly average figures are as follows (Hunt 1966):

1940 (after May): 20,000

1941: 25,000

1942: 30,000

1943: 30,000

1944: 15,000

1945: 7,000.

However, it is not to the total Icelandic population of 120,000 that the previous numbers should be compared; indeed the soldiers were mostly unmarried males and those numbers should therefore be compared with the same section of the Icelandic population. In Iceland the unmarried population over the age of 16 numbered some 20,000 males and about as many females (Iceland 1966). Because this number also includes aged widows, one can be sure that the number of marriageable females was somewhat under 20,000. Thus, as a rule of thumb, one can retain that in a population the number of marriageable females is of the order of one sixth of the total population. The comparison shows that the troops in fact outnumbered the group of Icelandic marriageable females. As pointed out by Hunt (1966) any substantial number of marriages between US men and Icelandic girls would have represented a serious loss to Iceland as these girls would probably have emigrated to America. One may recall in this respect that about 110,000 British girls got married to American
soldiers and most of them left Britain after the war (Registrar General's Statistical Review, 1940-1945, Text, Volume 2) In the case of Iceland massive intermarriage would have been a threat to the very existence of Iceland as a nation.

The American Command soon became aware of this problem. Whereas marriages with Icelandic women had been allowed at the beginning of the occupation, when the number of American troops was still fairly small, they were prohibited on March 2, 1942 that is to say at a time when the strength of the American force reached about 15,000. This rule was not strictly enforced however at least as far as officers were concerned (see below October 9, 1943) nor could it prevent soldiers from getting married to Icelandic girls after being demobilized. Nevertheless, on the whole, the prohibition was remarkably effective; according to Hunt (1966, p. 86), by October 1945 only 60 Icelandic women had left Iceland for the United States. One may wonder if such a low estimate is really reliable.

The Wikipedia article entitled “Iceland in World War II” gives the following information (as of May 2016).

The interaction between young Icelandic women and soldiers became known as “Astandid” which means “the condition”. Many of the children born as a result bore the patronymic Hansson (hans means “his”), which was used because the father was unknown or had left the country. In addition a part of them have English surnames<fnref n="6" />.

The main question is of course what was the extent of the relations between Icelandic girls and occupation troops. A Wikipedia article in Icelandic which is entitled “Astandid” gives the following data.

In the fall of 1941 a 3-member committee was established by the Icelandic government to investigate the matter. In its report it is stated that the police had a list of 500 women who had very close contacts with the occupation forces and that 150 of them were under 17. At least 129 of the 500 women had become pregnant. Altogether there were over 255 children. The police chief thought that these data covered only a fraction of the cases and he estimated that for the whole city of Reykjavik the figures should be multiplied by 5.

The estimate of a fivefold multiplicative factor seems an exageration for such a high number of additional births would be clearly visible in Icelandic birth statistics. According to the Statistical Office of Iceland the birth numbers are as follows:

<footnote n="6">⁶On 3 May 2016 the author received the following email from the son of a US officer who took part in the occupation of Iceland. “My late father was an officer sent to Iceland with the first American Army troops. Based on family information shared after the war, we later came to believe he had impregnated the daughter of a high ranking official in Iceland’s government. He was sent home but not discharged from the service. He later returned to the war at Marseille and was near the Brenner pass when the war ended. He would never talk about it and all I ever got was bits and pieces. He died in 2001. Relatives say that his daughter from Iceland came to the US. We looked, but could never find her after his death.” [for confidentiality reasons, the name is omitted]</footnote>
soldiers and most of them left Britain after the war (Registrar General's Statistical Review, 1940-1945, Text, Volume 2) In the case of Iceland massive intermarriage would have been a threat to the very existence of Iceland as a nation.

The American Command soon became aware of this problem. Whereas marriages with Icelandic women had been allowed at the beginning of the occupation, when the number of American troops was still fairly small, they were prohibited on March 2, 1942 that is to say at a time when the strength of the American force reached about 15,000. This rule was not strictly enforced however at least as far as officers were concerned (see below October 9, 1943) nor could it prevent soldiers from getting married to Icelandic girls after being demobilized. Nevertheless, on the whole, the prohibition was remarkably effective; according to Hunt (1966, p. 86), by October 1945 only 60 Icelandic women had left Iceland for the United States. One may wonder if such a low estimate is really reliable.

The Wikipedia article entitled "Iceland in World War II" gives the following information (as of May 2016).

The interaction between young Icelandic women and soldiers became known as “Astandid” which means “the condition”. Many of the children born as a result bore the patronymic Hansson (hans means “his”), which was used because the father was unknown or had left the country. In addition a part of them have English surnames<fnref n="6" />.

The main question is of course what was the extent of the relations between Icelandic girls and occupation troops. A Wikipedia article in Icelandic which is entitled “Astandid” gives the following data.

In the fall of 1941 a 3-member committee was established by the Icelandic government to investigate the matter. In its report it is stated that the police had a list of 500 women who had very close contacts with the occupation forces and that 150 of them were under 17. At least 129 of the 500 women had become pregnant. Altogether there were over 255 children. The police chief thought that these data covered only a fraction of the cases and he estimated that for the whole city of Reykjavik the figures should be multiplied by 5.

The estimate of a fivefold multiplicative factor seems an exageration for such a high number of additional births would be clearly visible in Icelandic birth statistics. According to the Statistical Office of Iceland the birth numbers are as follows:

<footnote n="6">⁶On 3 May 2016 the author received the following email from the son of a US officer who took part in the occupation of Iceland. "My late father was an officer sent to Iceland with the first American Army troops. Based on family information shared after the war, we later came to believe he had impregnated the daughter of a high ranking official in Iceland's government. He was sent home but not discharged from the service. He later returned to the war at Marseille and was near the Brenner pass when the war ended. He would never talk about it and all I ever got was bits and pieces. He died in 2001. Relatives say that his daughter from Iceland came to the US. We looked, but could never find her after his death." [for confidentiality reasons, the name is omitted]</footnote>
1939: 2,363 1940: 2,480 1941: 2,634 1942: 3,005 1943: 3,173 1944: 3,213 1945: 3,434

However, the interpretation of these data is less straightforward than could seem at first sight, mainly for two reasons.

* Independently of the presence of troops there are also “natural” medium-term birth rate fluctuations; thus, even after 1945 the births numbers remained at their level of 1945 during several years.

* The birth data do not cover the case of Icelandic girls who left the country with their husband or companion before the birth of their child.

# Methodology of this study

This is not an isolated study. It belongs to a set of parallel investigations of various occupation episodes. In this part we wish to describe the methodological framework of this set of comparative studies.

In the first section we explain the rationale of the chronological method of exposition that we have chosen. The second section discusses the reasons for providing a comparative perspective. In the third section we emphasize that this study could not have been carried out, at least not in this form, before the advent of the Internet.

## Making historiography into a cumulative body of knowledge

The part devoted to the chronological listing of events represents some 70% of the content of this book. As this is a fairly uncommon feature for an historical account, a few words are in order to explain why, in our opinion, chronologies should be seen as a key element in historiography.

The chronology part and the chapter on quantitative evidence are the core of this report because they contain the information that comes from the sources and documents found in various archives and in primary sources such as newspapers. The other chapters contain comments on the events mentioned in the chronology. The main drawback of these comments is their subjective nature. They concern issues which at the time of writing were considered “important” but 30 years earlier or later historians would probably focus on different points. On the contrary, the chronology part can be seen as an objective list of events in the sense that it is largely (if not completely) independent of the personal interests of the historian. It becomes even more “objective” when it is a collective production of many historians (see below).

Why is the distinction between subjective and objective historical accounts essential?

One of the most basic features of a science is the fact that it is (and must be) a process of accumulation. From Bernard de Chartres to Descartes to Newton, this has been widely recognized:
1939: 2,363 1940: 2,480 1941: 2,634 1942: 3,005 1943: 3,173 1944: 3,213 1945: 3,434

However, the interpretation of these data is less straightforward than could seem at first sight, mainly for two reasons.

* Independently of the presence of troops there are also “natural” medium-term birth rate fluctuations; thus, even after 1945 the births numbers remained at their level of 1945 during several years.

* The birth data do not cover the case of Icelandic girls who left the country with their husband or companion before the birth of their child.

# Methodology of this study

This is not an isolated study. It belongs to a set of parallel investigations of various occupation episodes. In this part we wish to describe the methodological framework of this set of comparative studies.

In the first section we explain the rationale of the chronological method of exposition that we have chosen. The second section discusses the reasons for providing a comparative perspective. In the third section we emphasize that this study could not have been carried out, at least not in this form, before the advent of the Internet.

## Making historiography into a cumulative body of knowledge

The part devoted to the chronological listing of events represents some 70% of the content of this book. As this is a fairly uncommon feature for an historical account, a few words are in order to explain why, in our opinion, chronologies should be seen as a key element in historiography.

The chronology part and the chapter on quantitative evidence are the core of this report because they contain the information that comes from the sources and documents found in various archives and in primary sources such as newspapers. The other chapters contain comments on the events mentioned in the chronology. The main drawback of these comments is their subjective nature. They concern issues which at the time of writing were considered “important” but 30 years earlier or later historians would probably focus on different points. On the contrary, the chronology part can be seen as an objective list of events in the sense that it is largely (if not completely) independent of the personal interests of the historian. It becomes even more “objective” when it is a collective production of many historians (see below).

Why is the distinction between subjective and objective historical accounts essential?

One of the most basic features of a science is the fact that it is (and must be) a process of accumulation. From Bernard de Chartres to Descartes to Newton, this has been widely recognized:
“We are like dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants” said Bernard de Chartres in 1124. “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” wrote Newton in a famous letter to Robert Hooke (1676).

In Britain the phrase “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants” was even included on the edge of a 2 pound coin issued in 1997.

For subjective comments one can hardly speak of a cumulative process. One set of comments that is found quite interesting at a given moment will be found outdated thirty years later and replaced by another set which will of course experience the same fate a few decades later<fnref n="7" />.

On the contrary, chronologies present facts (not opinions) which will have a lasting interest for historians<fnref n="8" />.

Moreover, it is easy to add complementary information to such files. Suppose, for instance, that in 2020 an historian discovers a record (not found or not accessible earlier) that describes a series of events. Thanks to the chronology structure it will be easy to check whether these events are already known or whether they are really “new”. In the later case they will be incorporated at the appropriate dates. In this way, the chronology will grow year by year, always remaining the ultimate source of reference. In the future<fnref n="9" />, it may even be possible to make the *primary documents* available to readers. This will allow them to judge the degree of reliability of the events which are mentioned, a feature of crucial importance.

The methodology of such multi-layered chronologies has been proposed in Roehner (2002, p. 370-373) where the construction of very large chronicles (VLCs) was advocated. Such VLCs should be seen as huge computerized chronologies resulting from a process of *collective production* (somehow like the Wikipedia encyclopedia).

## Why it is crucial to adopt a comparative perspective

In medical research there are basically three successive phases.

1. First there is the need to describe and categorize the various illnesses. Clearly this phase is of crucial importance. If one cannot make a clear distinction between an attack of bronchitis and a lung cancer, any cure will be hazardous.

<footnote n="7">⁷This could appear as a fairly cavalier judgment. Unfortunately, it seems to apply even to the work of historians who adopted a comparative perspective. Consider for instance the work of the renowned British historian Arnold Toynbee. Under the title “A study of history” he published a 12-volume study of the rise and fall of civilizations. Naturally, we are not going to argue that forty years after its publication the work is no longer useful. For one thing, it shows how such a synthesis can be done and sets a model for similar attempts; in that respect it is certainly a stimulating answer to the specialising tendency of modern historical research. However, precisely because of its originality and specificity, it would be difficult to link up this work with subsequent studies. Thus, it does not seem to be a step in a cumulative process. Naturally, such monumental studies have also another potential usefulness. Once digitized and made searchable by key-words, they will become valuable pools of facts and references of primary sources.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸The same observation holds for evidence which takes the form of quantitative data.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹Thanks to the possibilities of the hypertext format and to the fact that more and more archive resources will be digitized and made available online.</footnote>
"We are like dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants" said Bernard de Chartres in 1124. "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants" wrote Newton in a famous letter to Robert Hooke (1676).

In Britain the phrase "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants" was even included on the edge of a 2 pound coin issued in 1997.

For subjective comments one can hardly speak of a cumulative process. One set of comments that is found quite interesting at a given moment will be found outdated thirty years later and replaced by another set which will of course experience the same fate a few decades later<sup>7</sup>.

On the contrary, chronologies present facts (not opinions) which will have a lasting interest for historians<sup>8</sup>.

Moreover, it is easy to add complementary information to such files. Suppose, for instance, that in 2020 an historian discovers a record (not found or not accessible earlier) that describes a series of events. Thanks to the chronology structure it will be easy to check whether these events are already known or whether they are really "new". In the later case they will be incorporated at the appropriate dates. In this way, the chronology will grow year by year, always remaining the ultimate source of reference. In the future<sup>9</sup>, it may even be possible to make the *primary documents* available to readers. This will allow them to judge the degree of reliability of the events which are mentioned, a feature of crucial importance.

The methodology of such multi-layered chronologies has been proposed in Roehner (2002, p. 370-373) where the construction of very large chronicles (VLCs) was advocated. Such VLCs should be seen as huge computerized chronologies resulting from a process of *collective production* (somehow like the Wikipedia encyclopedia).

## Why it is crucial to adopt a comparative perspective

In medical research there are basically three successive phases.

1. First there is the need to describe and categorize the various illnesses. Clearly this phase is of crucial importance. If one cannot make a clear distinction between an attack of bronchitis and a lung cancer, any cure will be hazardous.

<footnote n="7"><sup>7</sup>This could appear as a fairly cavalier judgment. Unfortunately, it seems to apply even to the work of historians who adopted a comparative perspective. Consider for instance the work of the renowned British historian Arnold Toynbee. Under the title "A study of history" he published a 12-volume study of the rise and fall of civilizations. Naturally, we are not going to argue that forty years after its publication the work is no longer useful. For one thing, it shows how such a synthesis can be done and sets a model for similar attempts; in that respect it is certainly a stimulating answer to the specialising tendency of modern historical research. However, precisely because of its originality and specificity, it would be difficult to link up this work with subsequent studies. Thus, it does not seem to be a step in a cumulative process. Naturally, such monumental studies have also another potential usefulness. Once digitized and made searchable by key-words, they will become valuable pools of facts and references of primary sources.</footnote>

<footnote n="8"><sup>8</sup>The same observation holds for evidence which takes the form of quantitative data.</footnote>

<footnote n="9"><sup>9</sup>Thanks to the possibilities of the hypertext format and to the fact that more and more archive resources will be digitized and made available online.</footnote>
2 Then one has to identify the mechanisms (bacteria, virus, mutation and so on) which are responsible for the disorder.

3 The last step is to find a cure.

One faces the same kind of challenges for social events. Suppose for instance that one has a detailed account of 10 different riots. The first question is to see if they follow a common pattern. If they do not, a closer examination may perhaps show that there are in fact two different patterns; this opens the way to a classification of riots. As in medicine the second step is to find the mechanisms which are at the root of the different types of riots. Once these mechanisms are well understood, it may become possible to assess the likelihood of riots, may be even to prevent them.

For an isolated event the only thing one can do is to describe it. In order for a phenomenon to be studied scientifically, one needs many observations. This has been well understood by many sociologists and historians. Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Marc Bloch, Ernest Labrousse, Fernand Braudel and many others developed various forms of comparative analysis. Basically, the broader the phenomenon<fnref n="10" /> the more cases one needs in order to study it in a meaningful way. For instance, economic growth depends upon a staggering number of parameters which explains why it is so difficult to come up with well-defined conclusions. On the contrary, for a sharply defined phenomenon, one can expect to draw clear-cut results even from a relatively small sample of less than 10 observations.

For all these reasons, the present study is not isolated but is part of a set of studies which centers around the phenomenon of military occupation. There have been various occupation episodes during and after World War II; several of them are examined in the various studies which compose this project. All these studies follow the same format and focus on the same variables.

They turned out to be more time consuming than was realized when this project was started because we had to pierce the smoke screen of military censorship. As a matter of fact, comparative analysis was instrumental in suggesting which accounts are most affected by censorship. For instance, if one sees a substantial number of incidents in cases A, B, C and none in a case D which is similar in other respects, then it can be suspected that censorship was stricter in this last case. Naturally, the obstacle of censorship can be overcome only if access to previously restricted sources has been made possible. Many important files still remain closed<fnref n="11" />.

We concentrated on post-World War II episodes for in this case archive sources are

<footnote n="10">¹⁰By which we mean that one needs more parameters to define it.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹Apart from keeping a file closed there are several other ways of making it inaccessible. If it is not included in the catalog (or if the title under which it is catalogued has no connection with actual content) nobody will be able to request it. Keeping apart a record and its inclosures is a way of making the inclosures inaccessible. Sometimes such problems may occur just by inadvertance but there are also cases in which one suspects that it was done by purpose.</footnote>
2 Then one has to identify the mechanisms (bacteria, virus, mutation and so on) which are responsible for the disorder.

3 The last step is to find a cure.

One faces the same kind of challenges for social events. Suppose for instance that one has a detailed account of 10 different riots. The first question is to see if they follow a common pattern. If they do not, a closer examination may perhaps show that there are in fact two different patterns; this opens the way to a classification of riots. As in medicine the second step is to find the mechanisms which are at the root of the different types of riots. Once these mechanisms are well understood, it may become possible to assess the likelihood of riots, may be even to prevent them.

For an isolated event the only thing one can do is to describe it. In order for a phenomenon to be studied scientifically, one needs many observations. This has been well understood by many sociologists and historians. Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Marc Bloch, Ernest Labrousse, Fernand Braudel and many others developed various forms of comparative analysis. Basically, the broader the phenomenon<fnref n="10" /> the more cases one needs in order to study it in a meaningful way. For instance, economic growth depends upon a staggering number of parameters which explains why it is so difficult to come up with well-defined conclusions. On the contrary, for a sharply defined phenomenon, one can expect to draw clear-cut results even from a relatively small sample of less than 10 observations.

For all these reasons, the present study is not isolated but is part of a set of studies which centers around the phenomenon of military occupation. There have been various occupation episodes during and after World War II; several of them are examined in the various studies which compose this project. All these studies follow the same format and focus on the same variables.

They turned out to be more time consuming than was realized when this project was started because we had to pierce the smoke screen of military censorship. As a matter of fact, comparative analysis was instrumental in suggesting which accounts are most affected by censorship. For instance, if one sees a substantial number of incidents in cases A, B, C and none in a case D which is similar in other respects, then it can be suspected that censorship was stricter in this last case. Naturally, the obstacle of censorship can be overcome only if access to previously restricted sources has been made possible. Many important files still remain closed<fnref n="11" />.

We concentrated on post-World War II episodes for in this case archive sources are

<footnote n="10">¹⁰By which we mean that one needs more parameters to define it.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹Apart from keeping a file closed there are several other ways of making it inaccessible. If it is not included in the catalog (or if the title under which it is catalogued has no connection with actual content) nobody will be able to request it. Keeping apart a record and its inclosures is a way of making the inclosures inaccessible. Sometimes such problems may occur just by inadvertance but there are also cases in which one suspects that it was done by purpose.</footnote>
much more numerous than for episodes that occurred in earlier times. In the United
States there does not seem to be a 50-year rule for the opening of archives. For in-
stance, most of the files of the “Military Advisory and Assistance Groups” (MAAG)
which worked in many countries in the wake of World War II are still closed and it
is likely that at least some parts of them will remain closed for ever.

The crucial role of the Internet Revolution

The Internet is not just one additional tool. For the social sciences it truly represents a Revolution. This word is justified by the fact that many investigations which were strictly impossible before the Internet have now become possible. The role of the Internet in the present study can be illustrated by three examples.

* All the studies in the present project are based on the analysis of *microsocial events*. Such events can only be found in databases of newspapers or news agencies. Selecting these events from a set of many thousands articles would have been a daunting and almost impossible task before these databases had been computerized and made searchable by keywords. For the present studies, the databases of the articles of the “New York Times” and of the “Times” have been searched extensively and this information has provided (at least sometimes) a first insight<fnref n="12" />.

* The advent of the Internet has completely changed the way we work in archives. Nowadays, the catalogs of many national archives have been computerized<fnref n="13" /> and it has become possible to search them by key-words as well as by other characteristics such as “record group” or “file creator”. Once the item in which one is interested has been located it is possible to get photocopies (or files of scanned images) from the archives. It is in this way that we have been able to work with archives located in various countries: Australia, Britain, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, United States without leaving Paris.

* Finally, many documents once available in only a few libraries are now directly accessible on the Internet. This observation also extends to personal testimonies which had never been available in libraries and can now be read on the websites set up by veterans or their descendants.

In the following pages we briefly examine some key points in order to provide a
general perspective for the events mentioned in the two chronology chapters.

<footnote n="12">¹²Of course, during wars major newspapers are also subject to censorship (pre-censorship, post-censorship or auto-censorship); in such cases one must find alternative sources of information.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³At the time of writing (2008) this process is still in progress. For the archives which are the most advanced in this respect, about 50% of the entries have been included in the electronic catalog.</footnote>
much more numerous than for episodes that occurred in earlier times. In the United
States there does not seem to be a 50-year rule for the opening of archives. For in-
stance, most of the files of the “Military Advisory and Assistance Groups” (MAAG)
which worked in many countries in the wake of World War II are still closed and it
is likely that at least some parts of them will remain closed for ever.

The crucial role of the Internet Revolution

The Internet is not just one additional tool. For the social sciences it truly represents a Revolution. This word is justified by the fact that many investigations which were strictly impossible before the Internet have now become possible. The role of the Internet in the present study can be illustrated by three examples.

* All the studies in the present project are based on the analysis of *microsocial events*. Such events can only be found in databases of newspapers or news agencies. Selecting these events from a set of many thousands articles would have been a daunting and almost impossible task before these databases had been computerized and made searchable by keywords. For the present studies, the databases of the articles of the “New York Times” and of the “Times” have been searched extensively and this information has provided (at least sometimes) a first insight<fnref n="12" />.

* The advent of the Internet has completely changed the way we work in archives. Nowadays, the catalogs of many national archives have been computerized<fnref n="13" /> and it has become possible to search them by key-words as well as by other characteristics such as “record group” or “file creator”. Once the item in which one is interested has been located it is possible to get photocopies (or files of scanned images) from the archives. It is in this way that we have been able to work with archives located in various countries: Australia, Britain, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, United States without leaving Paris.

* Finally, many documents once available in only a few libraries are now directly accessible on the Internet. This observation also extends to personal testimonies which had never been available in libraries and can now be read on the websites set up by veterans or their descendants.

In the following pages we briefly examine some key points in order to provide a
general perspective for the events mentioned in the two chronology chapters.

<footnote n="12">¹²Of course, during wars major newspapers are also subject to censorship (pre-censorship, post-censorship or auto-censorship); in such cases one must find alternative sources of information.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³At the time of writing (2008) this process is still in progress. For the archives which are the most advanced in this respect, about 50% of the entries have been included in the electronic catalog.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.1 Construction of a Nissen hut.** These pictures show different steps in the construction of Nissen huts of different models. Bernhardsson 2000, p. 19. Many thanks to Prof. Eggert Bernhardsson for sending me a copy of his book.</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.1 Construction of a Nissen hut.** These pictures show different steps in the construction of Nissen huts of different models. Bernhardsson 2000, p. 19. Many thanks to Prof. Eggert Bernhardsson for sending me a copy of his book.</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.2 Location of Nissen huts.** The drawing shows the disposition of a camp ("Thulekampur"). Bern-hardsson 2000, p. 214</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.2 Location of Nissen huts.** The drawing shows the disposition of a camp ("Thulekampur"). Bern-hardsson 2000, p. 214</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.3 Entrance of Camp Knox (US Navy).** Camp Knox is number 3 on the map of the next figure. One may wonder if the words "US Navy property" are really appropriate. In other words did the US Navy lease or purchase this land? *Source: Bernhardsson 2000, p. 67*</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.3 Entrance of Camp Knox (US Navy).** Camp Knox is number 3 on the map of the next figure. One may wonder if the words "US Navy property" are really appropriate. In other words did the US Navy lease or purchase this land? *Source: Bernhardsson 2000, p. 67*</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.4a Location of military camps around Reykjavik.** Altogether there were some 80 camps. The harbor is in the upper right corner, the airfield is in the lower right corner. *Bernhardsson 2000, p. 24*</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_8.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.4a Location of military camps around Reykjavik.** Altogether there were some 80 camps. The harbor is in the upper right corner, the airfield is in the lower right corner. *Bernhardsson 2000, p. 24*</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_8.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.4b Location of military camps.** This picture shows the locations of camps in the countryside around Reykjavik. Bernhardsson 2000, p. 25</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.4b Location of military camps.** This picture shows the locations of camps in the countryside around Reykjavik. Bernhardsson 2000, p. 25</figcaption></figure>
Í verstu húsakynnunum í Reykjavík býr fjöldi fólks, sem læknar hafa bannað að búa í vondum húsakynnum vegna heilsubrests

Mörg dæmi um það, að fólk, sem náð hefir bata í sjúkrahúsum og hælum, hefir veikzt aftur vegna vondra hlúsnæðisskilyrða

Í mörgum af verstu vistarverunum, sem fólk í Reykjavík verður að sætta sig við og að álti allra dömbærra manna eru heilsusplandið hverjum sem er, búa fjölmargir, sem læknar hafa sérstaklega lagt bann við, að mættu dvelja í vondum húsakynnum, heilsufars sín vegna. Margas konar heilsubrestir þjá þetta fólk — sumt er nýútskrifað frá Vifils stöðum og Reykjavlundi og þarf umfram allt að njóta góðra skilyrða, meðan það er að venjast eðlilegu starfslífi á nýjan leik.

Tlöndamaður frá Timan- um hefir aflið sé ýmsra upp- lysinga um þetta, meðal ann árs frá stjórн Leigjendafélags ins, sem safnað hefir skýrsl um um þetta, ásamt mörgu. er varðar jör leigjenda í bænum.

Það segir sig sjálftt, hversu heilsusamlegt muni að búa i bragghavferum Reykjavikur, þar sem öll sjálfsögðustu nú- timaþægindu þrestur, kuldi herjar og ekki er unnt að- stæðna vegna að skeyta um neinar heilbrigðisreglur — jafnvel skólpresi eru sams staðar ofan jarðar á milli bragganna, þar sem leið fólks liggur um og verður ekki við ráðið, að er leikvangur barnanna oft og tíðum.

Húsakynni af þessu tagi

(Framh. á 2. síðu.)

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /></figure>

Léleg fundarsókn hjá krötum, íhaldi og kommúnistum í gærkveldi

Íhaldi, kratar og komm- únistar héldu allir kjós- endafundi í gærkveldi, en litlar sigurvonir munu þessir fundir hafa gefið. í Stjörnubió héldu kratar fund og fengu ekki helm- ing þess, sem í húsið (Framhald á 2. síðu)

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /></figure>

Morgunblaðið birti í gær mikla frásögn um aukið heilbrigðiseftirlit og þrifnað og ráð- stafanir bæjarstjórnarinnar til bættra hollustuháta. Áltt er þetta gamlar lummur, — gömul loforð, sem íhaldi hefir vakið upp kosningar eftir kosningar. Hefir það náð þeirri tækni, sem sjá mátti í Morgunblaðinu í gær, að það er birt mynd af sorþbíl og sorpeyð- ingarstöð, sem alls ekki eru til, nema í huga í haldins fyrir kosningarnar. Timanum bykir rétt að birta í dag mynd af hollustu háttum bæjarstjórnarihaldins eins og þetta er í dag. Mýndin er úr einu stærsta bragga hverfinu, þar sem hundruð manna verða að hafast við. Skólpípan gapir við augum, og lækurinn rennur niður um hverfið, en börn- in leika sér á bókkunum. Annar leikvangur er þeim ekki ætlaður. Sørstöðin er í pönt- un, segir Morgunblaðið, og líklega er líka skópleiðslan þarna í pöntun, ef vel er að gáð. Efri myndin er af götulífi í öðru braggahverfi.

Byggingarmálum gamla fólksins skilar nokkuð áleiðis

Hinar stórmerku tillögur Gísla Sigur- björnssonar um ibúðabyggingar fyrir gamla fólkkið fá góðan hyr •

Gísl Sigurbjörnsson, forstjóri, sýndi fréttamönnum blaða og útvarps í gær likan af byggingu, sem þórir Bald- vinsson hefir teiknað fyrir elliheimilið, og gert er ráð fyrir að í verði íbúðir fyrir aldrað fólk, svo sem fyrir hefur verið sagt frá hér í blaðinu.

Teikning Þóris Baldvinsson ar er af húsi, sem á að vera 48 m. á lengd, 9,80 m. á breidd eða samtals að flatar- máli 470 fermetrar. Hæðin er 11,20 m. svo að rúmmál allir- ar byggingarinar verður rúm lega 5200 rúmmetrar. Húsið

verður þrjár hæðir auk kjall ara og rishæðar og verða þar 36 íbúðir, 15 tveggja her- bergja og 21 eins herbergis auk eldhúss og matstofu í kjálra, íbúða starfslóks og geymslu fyrir hverja íbúð, sem og þvottahúss.

Prir inngangar verða í hverju húsi og 12 íbúðir við hvern uppgang, fjórar á hæð.

Stærð íbúða verður þessi: (Innanmál) forstofa 1,25x 2,30 m. bað og W. C. 1,10x2,30 eldhúm 1,75x2,30, stofa 3,70x 4,50 og svefnherbergi 2,30x 4,30. Tveggja herbergja íbúð hefir þannig 37. ferm. gölf en eins herbergis íbúð rúm- lega 26 ferm. þessu fylgja svo rúmgóðar svalir og geymsluþlass í kjálara.

Stjórн elliheimilisins hefur sött um lóðir undir þrjár slík ar byggingar hinn 6. okt s. l. Hafa skipulagsmenn bæjar-

(Framhald á 7. síðu)

Dönsku katalina- bátarnir enn veð- urtepptir hér

Danski varðbáturinn sem hvart við Grænlandsstrendur fyrir atta dögum hefir ekki komið fram og engar menjar fundizt eftir hann. Hafa mörg skip leitað undan farna daga árangurslaust. Ætlunin var að tveir danskir katalinuflugbátar færu til Grænlands til leitarr, en þeir tófðust vegna illra flugskil- yrða og komu til Reykjavikur í fyrradag. Þaðan hafa þeir ekki getað haldið ferðinni á- fram enn og blíða hér lelćið.

Vinnið ötullega fyrir

B-listann

Þeir, sem vilja vinna sjálfbðavinnu fyrir B- listann einkum á kosninga daginn, eru beðinn að gefa sig fram í skrifstofu list- ans sem allra fyrst.

<caption>Fig. 1.5 The first page of the newspaper Timinn (18 January 1950). The two photographs show that 5 years after the end of the war the Nissen huts were not in good shape. Bernhardsson 2000, p. 190</caption>
Í verstu húsakynnunum í Reykjavík býr fjöldi fólks, sem læknar hafa bannað að búa í vondum húsakynnum vegna heilsubrests

Mörg dæmi um það, að fólk, sem náð hefir bata í sjúkrahúsum og hælum, hefir veikzt aftur vegna vondra hlúsnæðisskilyrða

Í mörgum af verstu vistarverunum, sem fólk í Reykjavík verður að sætta sig við og að álti allra dömbærra manna eru heilsusplandið hverjum sem er, búa fjölmargir, sem læknar hafa sérstaklega lagt bann við, að mættu dvelja í vondum húsakynnum, heilsufars síns vegna. Margas konar heilsubrestir þjá þetta fólk — sumt er nýútskrifað frá Vifils stöðum og Reykjavlundi og þarf umfram allt að njóta góðra skilyrða, meðan það er að venjast eðlilegu starfslífi á nýjan leik.

Tlöndamaður frá Tíman-um hefir aflið sé ýmsra upplýsinga um þetta, meðal ann árs frá stjórн Leigjendafélags ins, sem safnað hefir skýrslu um um þetta, ásamt mörgu. er varðar jör leigjenda í bænum.

Það segir sig sjálftt, hversu heilsusamlegt muni að búa i bragghavferum Reykjavikur, þar sem öll sjálfsögðustu nútimægindu þrestur, kuldi herjar og ekki er unnt aðstæðna vegna að skeyta um neinar heilbrigðisreglur — jafnvel skólpresi eru sumts staðar ofan jarðar á milli bragganna, þar sem leið fólks liggur um og verður ekki við ráðið, að er leikvangur barnanna oft og tíðum.

Húsakynni af þessu tagi

(Framh. á 2. síðu.)

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /></figure>

Léleg fundarsókn hjá krötum, íhaldi og kommúnistum í gærkveldi

Íhaldi, kratar og kommúnistar héldu allir kjós- endafundi í gærkveldi, en litlar sigurvonir munu þessir fundir hafa gefið. í Stjörnubió héldu kratar fund og fengu ekki heim- ing þess, sem í húsið (Framhald á 2. síðu)

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /></figure>

Morgunblaðið birti í gær mikla frásögn um aukið heilbrigðiseftirlit og þrifnað og ráðstafanir bæjarstjórnarinnar til bættra hollustuháta. Áltt er þetta gamlar lummur, — gömul loforð, sem íhaldi hefir vakið upp kosningar eftir kosningar. Hefir það náð þeirri tækni, sem sjá mátti í Morgunblaðinu í gær, að það er birt mynd af sorþbíl og sorpeyðingarstöð, sem alls ekki eru til, nema í huga íhaldsins fyrir kosningarnar. Tímanum bykir rétt að birta í dag mynd af hollustu háttum bæjarstjórnarihaldsins eins og þetta er í dag. Mýndin er úr einu stærsta bragga hverfinu, þar sem hundruð manna verða að hafast við. Skólpípan gapir við augum, og lækurinn rennur niður um hverfið, en börn- in leika sér á bókkunum. Annar leikvangur er þeim ekki ætlaður. Sørstöðin er í pönt- un, segir Morgunblaðið, og líklega er líka skópleiðslan þarna í pöntun, ef vel er að gáð. Efri myndin er af götulífi í öðru braggaherfi.

Byggingarmálum gamla fólksins skilar nokkuð áleiðis

Hinar stórmerku tillögur Gísla Sigur-björnssonar um ibúðabyggingar fyrir gamla fólkkið fá góðan hyr •

Gísl Sigurbjörnsson, forstjóri, sýndi fréttamönnum blaða og útvarps í gær likan af byggingu, sem þórir Baldvinsson hefir teiknað fyrir elliheimilið, og gert er ráð fyrir að í verði íbúðir fyrir aldrað fólk, svo sem fyrir hefir verið sagt frá hér í blaðinu.

Teikning Þóris Baldvinssonar er af húsi, sem á að vera 48 m. á lengd, 9,80 m. á breidd eða samtals að flatarmálit 470 fermetrar. Hæðin er 11,20 m. svo að rúmmál allir- ar byggingarinar verður rúm lega 5200 rúmmetrar. Húsið

verður þrjár hæðir auk kjallara og rishæðar og verða þar 36 íbúðir, 15 tveggja herbergja og 21 eins herbergis auk eldhúss og matstofu í kjálra, íbúða starfsfólks og geymslu fyrir hverja íbúð, sem og þvottahús.

Prir inngangar verða í hverju húsi og 12 íbúðir við hvern uppgang, fjórar á hæð.

Stærð íbúða verður þessi: (Innanmál) forstofa 1,25x 2,30 m. bað og W. C. 1,10x2,30 eldhúm 1,75x2,30, stofa 3,70x 4,50 og svefnherbergi 2,30x 4,30. Tveggja herbergja íbúð hefir þannig 37. ferm. gölf en eins herbergis íbúð rúm- lega 26 ferm. þessu fylgja svo rúmgóðar svalir og geymsluþlass í kjálara.

Stjórн elliheimilisins hefur sött um lóðir undir þrjár slík ar byggingar hinn 6. okt s. l. Hafa skipulagsmenn bæjar-

(Framhald á 7. síðu)

Dönsku katalina-bátarnir enn veðurtepptir hér

Danski varðbáturinn sem hvart við Grænlandsstrendur fyrir atta dögum hefir ekki komið fram og engar menjar fundizt eftir hann. Hafa mörg skip leitað undan farna daga árangurslaust. Ætlunin var að tveir danskir katalinuflugbátar færu til Grænlands til leitarr, en þeir tófðust vegna illra flugskil- yrða og komu til Reykjavikur í fyrradag. Þaðan hafa þeir ekki getað íhaldið ferðinni á- fram enn og bíða hér lelćið.

Vinnið ötullega fyrir

B-listann

Þeir, sem vilja vinna sjálfböðavinnu fyrir B-listann einkum á kosninga daginn, eru beðinn að gefa sig fram í skrifstofu list- ans sem allra fyrst.

<caption>Fig. 1.5 The first page of the newspaper Timinn (18 January 1950). The two photographs show that 5 years after the end of the war the Nissen huts were not in good shape. Bernhardsson 2000, p. 190</caption>
## Chapter 2
# Incidents

This chapter contains some general comments about various forms of incidents. For specific examples one should consult the chronology chapter.

Lists of complaints made by Icelanders about the behavior of servicemen are given in the chronology chapter at the dates of 3 October 1941 and 16 April 1942. However, it must be kept in mind that these enumerations represent only a small part of the incidents. As already mentioned it can be estimated that there were about 20 incidents per month. This figure which is based on partial data from the joint "Claim Committee" concerns only the grievances of Icelanders and does not include those expressed by the troops.

Can we try to predict how many serious incidents are to be expected on the basis of other occupation episodes? Appendix A presents a calculation which is based on data for the occupation of Japan in the second half of 1952 that is to say after the coming into effect of the Peace Treaty on 28 April 1952. Based on these data, one gets the following estimates.

* British-Canadian occupation (May 1940 - Dec 1941): 1.7 murder, 50 assaults

* American occupation (Jul 1941 - Dec 1943): 3.4 murders, 100 assaults<fnref n="14" />.

In these estimates, murder and assault means crimes on Icelandic people. There may also have been offenses of Icelanders against occupation troops, but there are no Japanese data for this kind of incidents.

Naturally, one may argue that the conditions of the occupation of Iceland and Japan were very different. While some circumstances were indeed different others were the same; it is precisely in order to decide which effect was dominant that we propose this comparison.

The black market was another disorder which was a direct consequence of the occupation.

The mechanism which brought about black-marketing by servicemen was basically the same in all areas which were occupied by American troops during or after World

<footnote n="14">¹⁴These figures cannot be directly compared with the average of 20 incidents per month because the latter also includes incidents of a less serious nature such as non-payment of taxi drivers or brawls between servicemen in hotels or cafés which resulted in damages to property.</footnote>
## Chapter 2
Incidents

This chapter contains some general comments about various forms of incidents. For specific examples one should consult the chronology chapter.

Lists of complaints made by Icelanders about the behavior of servicemen are given in the chronology chapter at the dates of 3 October 1941 and 16 April 1942. However, it must be kept in mind that these enumerations represent only a small part of the incidents. As already mentioned it can be estimated that there were about 20 incidents per month. This figure which is based on partial data from the joint "Claim Committee" concerns only the grievances of Icelanders and does not include those expressed by the troops.

Can we try to predict how many serious incidents are to be expected on the basis of other occupation episodes? Appendix A presents a calculation which is based on data for the occupation of Japan in the second half of 1952 that is to say after the coming into effect of the Peace Treaty on 28 April 1952. Based on these data, one gets the following estimates.

* British-Canadian occupation (May 1940 - Dec 1941): 1.7 murder, 50 assaults

* American occupation (Jul 1941 - Dec 1943): 3.4 murders, 100 assaults<fnref n="14" />.

In these estimates, murder and assault means crimes on Icelandic people. There may also have been offenses of Icelanders against occupation troops, but there are no Japanese data for this kind of incidents.

Naturally, one may argue that the conditions of the occupation of Iceland and Japan were very different. While some circumstances were indeed different others were the same; it is precisely in order to decide which effect was dominant that we propose this comparison.

The black market was another disorder which was a direct consequence of the occupation.

The mechanism which brought about black-marketing by servicemen was basically the same in all areas which were occupied by American troops during or after World

<footnote n="14">¹⁴These figures cannot be directly compared with the average of 20 incidents per month because the latter also includes incidents of a less serious nature such as non-payment of taxi drivers or brawls between servicemen in hotels or cafés which resulted in damages to property.</footnote>
War II.

* As the pay of servicemen was much higher than the salary of the working people, the presence of a substantial number of American troops in a city increased the demand to the point of locally creating a state of scarcity 15 which inflated non-official open-market prices (i.e. prices of goods available on the black-market) even though prices subject to official price-control may have remained unchanged. For instance, in the Chinese port of Tsingtao the arrival of about 25,000 American Marines in September 1945 provoked a huge (twenty-fold) rise in local prices.

* Once the price of black-market goods was higher than the price of canteen goods it made sense for servicemen to buy canteen goods in order to sell them with a profit to local traders.

* Naturally, such sales were even more profitable if military goods or equipment could be misappropriated by servicemen. In contrast to the sale of canteen goods for which one had to wait until local goods had become sufficiently expensive, black marketing in misappropriated goods could start almost immediately after a unit had taken up quarters in a city.

Through this process American servicemen could send home amounts of money in excess to their pay. It has been estimated that in the decade following 1940 the total sent home exceeded the total pay of the GIs by $ 530 million<fnref n="16" />.

<footnote n="15">15 Needless to say, this effect was stronger in countries such as China, Germany or Japan where industrial facilities had been partially destroyed during the war.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 This figure is given in Rundell (1961) but the author does not say on which primary source it is based. The article also emphasizes that even when servicemen were paid in local currency (as was for instance the case in Iceland after February 1942) they were entitled to exchange the local currency against dollars which they could send to the United States by money order at no cost.</footnote>
War II.

* As the pay of servicemen was much higher than the salary of the working people, the presence of a substantial number of American troops in a city increased the demand to the point of locally creating a state of scarcity 15 which inflated non-official open-market prices (i.e. prices of goods available on the black-market) even though prices subject to official price-control may have remained unchanged. For instance, in the Chinese port of Tsingtao the arrival of about 25,000 American Marines in September 1945 provoked a huge (twenty-fold) rise in local prices.

* Once the price of black-market goods was higher than the price of canteen goods it made sense for servicemen to buy canteen goods in order to sell them with a profit to local traders.

* Naturally, such sales were even more profitable if military goods or equipment could be misappropriated by servicemen. In contrast to the sale of canteen goods for which one had to wait until local goods had become sufficiently expensive, black marketing in misappropriated goods could start almost immediately after a unit had taken up quarters in a city.

Through this process American servicemen could send home amounts of money in excess to their pay. It has been estimated that in the decade following 1940 the total sent home exceeded the total pay of the GIs by $ 530 million<fnref n="16" />.

<footnote n="15">¹⁵Needless to say, this effect was stronger in countries such as China, Germany or Japan where industrial facilities had been partially destroyed during the war.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶This figure is given in Rundell (1961) but the author does not say on which primary source it is based. The article also emphasizes that even when servicemen were paid in local currency (as was for instance the case in Iceland after February 1942) they were entitled to exchange the local currency against dollars which they could send to the United States by money order at no cost.</footnote>
It is clear that no country can take major political decisions without caring about their possible implications for other nations. In this sense it can be said that all countries are in fact interdependent. However, as suggested by common sense and confirmed by observation, in the adjustment process between a small and a large country the wishes of the large country usually prevail.

Even before the British occupation the relation between the two countries was fairly unsymmetrical. Why?

The main reason was an economic one. In 1940, the United Kingdom annually exported to Iceland 170,000 tons of coal and 65,000 tons of coke, salt and fertilizers<fnref n="17" />. Apart from Germany there was no other possible source of supply within a distance which would keep transportation costs at a reasonable level<fnref n="18" />. It is true that Iceland in turn exported large quantities of fish to the UK. Although certainly important, these shipments were by no means as crucial for Britain as were the imports of coal, coke and oil for Iceland.

After the US occupation there was a considerable change, not so much in the trade of coal and fish, but rather in the way the transactions were carried out. Instead of being bought directly by Britain, Icelandic exports were first bought by the United States and then sold to the UK and charged on the British defense aid account<fnref n="19" />. This arrangement had two advantages (i) To Icelanders it provided the dollars they needed to import machinery and other industrial products from the United States (ii) It dispensed Britain from spending sterling on its imports from Iceland. During the whole war, Britain imported twice as much as it exported which explains why this

<footnote n="17">¹⁷The source is a despatch from the British Embassy to the Department of State, 29 July 1941, in "Foreign Relations of the United States", 1941, Vol. 2.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸New York is 2.5 times more distant from Iceland than Glasgow or Newcastle.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹This was permitted by the Lend-Lease Act passed by Congress on 11 March 1941, that is to say shortly before the American occupation of Iceland. The program totaled an amount of $ 50 billion (about $ 600 billion in dollars of 2000). In sharp contrast to the American loans to the Allies in World War I, the Lend-Lease Act made no provisions for postwar repayments. However, compensations were provided in different forms. For instance, Britain gave the United States permission to establish military bases in Newfoundland, Bermudas, the British West Indies, India, Sri Lanka. Like the Marshall plan after the war, the Lend-Lease Act was a way to massively subsidize American manufacturers, and at the same time to secure world wide political influence. In that sense, it was a watershed that marked for the United States the end of non-interventionism and the beginning of broad international involvement.</footnote>
It is clear that no country can take major political decisions without caring about their possible implications for other nations. In this sense it can be said that all countries are in fact interdependent. However, as suggested by common sense and confirmed by observation, in the adjustment process between a small and a large country the wishes of the large country usually prevail.

Even before the British occupation the relation between the two countries was fairly unsymmetrical. Why?

The main reason was an economic one. In 1940, the United Kingdom annually exported to Iceland 170,000 tons of coal and 65,000 tons of coke, salt and fertilizers<fnref n="17" />. Apart from Germany there was no other possible source of supply within a distance which would keep transportation costs at a reasonable level<fnref n="18" />. It is true that Iceland in turn exported large quantities of fish to the UK. Although certainly important, these shipments were by no means as crucial for Britain as were the imports of coal, coke and oil for Iceland.

After the US occupation there was a considerable change, not so much in the trade of coal and fish, but rather in the way the transactions were carried out. Instead of being bought directly by Britain, Icelandic exports were first bought by the United States and then sold to the UK and charged on the British defense aid account<fnref n="19" />. This arrangement had two advantages (i) To Icelanders it provided the dollars they needed to import machinery and other industrial products from the United States (ii) It dispensed Britain from spending sterling on its imports from Iceland. During the whole war, Britain imported twice as much as it exported which explains why this

<footnote n="17">¹⁷The source is a despatch from the British Embassy to the Department of State, 29 July 1941, in "Foreign Relations of the United States", 1941, Vol. 2.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸New York is 2.5 times more distant from Iceland than Glasgow or Newcastle.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹This was permitted by the Lend-Lease Act passed by Congress on 11 March 1941, that is to say shortly before the American occupation of Iceland. The program totaled an amount of $ 50 billion (about $ 600 billion in dollars of 2000). In sharp contrast to the American loans to the Allies in World War I, the Lend-Lease Act made no provisions for postwar repayments. However, compensations were provided in different forms. For instance, Britain gave the United States permission to establish military bases in Newfoundland, Bermudas, the British West Indies, India, Sri Lanka. Like the Marshall plan after the war, the Lend-Lease Act was a way to massively subsidize American manufacturers, and at the same time to secure world wide political influence. In that sense, it was a watershed that marked for the United States the end of non-interventionism and the beginning of broad international involvement.</footnote>
benefit was quite consequential at this time.

The occupation by British and American troops created new bonds between Iceland and these countries. Observation shows that on important questions Iceland had to follow their lead. Illustrations are provided by the following episodes.

* In two letters (20 March and 18 July 1941) to the US Secretary of State (see the chronology at these dates) the American Consul in Reykjavik observed that the trade representative of the British government has developed into "an omnipotent trade tsar with unlimited power over practically the whole of Icelandic trade. As a result, he is probably the most unpopular man in Iceland today".

* During the largest part of the wartime occupation, Iceland had an extra-parliamentary government (see the chronology chapter at the date of 16 December 1942) of administrators instead of a government representing the majority party in Parliament.

* In the question of independence from Denmark, in spite of the unanimous wish expressed in 1942 by the Icelandic Parliament, the government had to bow to the wish of the United States and postpone independence until 1944 (see the chronology at May 17, 1941 and August-September 1942). At one point, on 21 September 1942, the prime minister (indirectly) appeals to the US government for bolstering its political standing.
benefit was quite consequential at this time.

The occupation by British and American troops created new bonds between Iceland and these countries. Observation shows that on important questions Iceland had to follow their lead. Illustrations are provided by the following episodes.

* In two letters (20 March and 18 July 1941) to the US Secretary of State (see the chronology at these dates) the American Consul in Reykjavik observed that the trade representative of the British government has developed into "an omnipotent trade tsar with unlimited power over practically the whole of Icelandic trade. As a result, he is probably the most unpopular man in Iceland today".

* During the largest part of the wartime occupation, Iceland had an extra-parliamentary government (see the chronology chapter at the date of 16 December 1942) of administrators instead of a government representing the majority party in Parliament.

* In the question of independence from Denmark, in spite of the unanimous wish expressed in 1942 by the Icelandic Parliament, the government had to bow to the wish of the United States and postpone independence until 1944 (see the chronology at May 17, 1941 and August-September 1942). At one point, on 21 September 1942, the prime minister (indirectly) appeals to the US government for bolstering its political standing.
## Chapter 4
### Censorship

When the British occupied Iceland in 1940 they set up a system of mail censorship that, according to Hunt (1966), infuriated both the Icelanders and the US representatives in the island. Basically, all mail coming from or going to Iceland was redirected to Britain where it was examined by military censors. This included all US mail except the communications originating in or addressed to the Department of State. Letters from American and Icelandic importers and exporters were delayed sometimes for as many as 100 days. After the American occupation the Icelandic government accepted a mail censorship which was carried out by censors located on the island thereby reducing the delays. There was also a joint British-American control of telegrams and radio or cable communication.

As far as the present study is concerned the question which is of most significance is whether or not there was a censorship of the local press. With military reports being largely untrustworthy, the local press remains the most important daily source of information from which we can hope to learn what really happened. Unfortunately, it seems that there was at least self-censorship. Indeed, according to Bittner (1975, p. 628), Icelandic newspapers (with the only exception of the Communist paper Thjodviljinn) accepted a gentleman's agreement with the British Command according to which the papers would print no details concerning the garrison until the specifics were cleared by the Intelligence officer. Although with its circulation of only 1,500, Thjodviljinn had a very small impact on the Icelandic public, the British Command could not get used to this dissenting voice; on April 27, 1941 the paper was eventually banned and its editors deported to Britain. Thjodviljinn was not allowed to reappear before May 13, 1942. At this point it is not clear whether or not there was also a gentleman's agreement between the local press and the American command. Naturally, there must have been some form of military control in order to prevent important information to be leaked to Germans even inadvertently. For instance we know that, for obvious reasons, the military forbade all talk about weather on the radio (Karlsson 2000, p. 321).
## Chapter 4
### Censorship

When the British occupied Iceland in 1940 they set up a system of mail censorship that, according to Hunt (1966), infuriated both the Icelanders and the US representatives in the island. Basically, all mail coming from or going to Iceland was redirected to Britain where it was examined by military censors. This included all US mail except the communications originating in or addressed to the Department of State. Letters from American and Icelandic importers and exporters were delayed sometimes for as many as 100 days. After the American occupation the Icelandic government accepted a mail censorship which was carried out by censors located on the island thereby reducing the delays. There was also a joint British-American control of telegrams and radio or cable communication.

As far as the present study is concerned the question which is of most significance is whether or not there was a censorship of the local press. With military reports being largely untrustworthy, the local press remains the most important daily source of information from which we can hope to learn what really happened. Unfortunately, it seems that there was at least self-censorship. Indeed, according to Bittner (1975, p. 628), Icelandic newspapers (with the only exception of the Communist paper Thjodviljinn) accepted a gentleman's agreement with the British Command according to which the papers would print no details concerning the garrison until the specifics were cleared by the Intelligence officer. Although with its circulation of only 1,500, Thjodviljinn had a very small impact on the Icelandic public, the British Command could not get used to this dissenting voice; on April 27, 1941 the paper was eventually banned and its editors deported to Britain. Thjodviljinn was not allowed to reappear before May 13, 1942. At this point it is not clear whether or not there was also a gentleman's agreement between the local press and the American command. Naturally, there must have been some form of military control in order to prevent important information to be leaked to Germans even inadvertently. For instance we know that, for obvious reasons, the military forbade all talk about weather on the radio (Karlsson 2000, p. 321).
Chapter 5

Chronology, 1940-2006

Fatality numbers

Symbols such as ●(6,11,7) signal the incidents marked by fatalities. The three figures total the fatalities since the beginning of the occupation for 3 different categories:

(6: American troops, 11: Commonwealth troops, 7: Icelandic civilians)

Whereas for Allied troops all fatalities (whether by accidents or any other cause) are taken into account, for Icelandic civilians we count only the fatalities which came about as a direct consequence of the occupation, e.g. people killed in traffic accidents due to military vehicles, shot by sentries, killed in explosions brought about by Allied operations, and other similar causes.

1940

**Mar 1940:** Iceland was granted a one million dollar loan by the US government Export-Import Bank (Chamberlin 1947, p. 93).

**May 10, 1940:** British troops landed in Iceland (Times May 11, p. 5)

**May 10, 1940:** ●(0,1,0) A British soldier died from gunshot, allegedly by committing suicide (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Jun 1940:** Shortly after the landing of British troops an unpublished trade agreement was made between the British and Icelandic governments which gave the British the power of exercising a veto over all decisions taken by the Icelandic Import and Currency Exchange Board. All decisions of the Board (and in particular the delivery of import or export licenses) had to be reviewed by a two-man board composed of one Icelander and one Englishman. The Englishman was attached to the British Legation in Reykjavik and received its orders from the British Minister of Economic Warfare. In July 1941, in a dispatch to his government the US consul in Iceland, Kuniholm, stated that the British Legation had unlimited power over practically the whole of Icelandic trade. (Hunt 1966 p. 242-243; Chamberlin 1947, p. 94). It would be interesting to better understand why and how a country like Iceland which
# Chapter 5

## Chronology, 1940-2006

### Fatality numbers

Symbols such as ●(6,11,7) signal the incidents marked by fatalities. The three figures total the fatalities since the beginning of the occupation for 3 different categories:

(6: American troops, 11: Commonwealth troops, 7: Icelandic civilians)

Whereas for Allied troops all fatalities (whether by accidents or any other cause) are taken into account, for Icelandic civilians we count only the fatalities which came about as a direct consequence of the occupation, e.g. people killed in traffic accidents due to military vehicles, shot by sentries, killed in explosions brought about by Allied operations, and other similar causes.

### 1940

**Mar 1940:** Iceland was granted a one million dollar loan by the US government Export-Import Bank (Chamberlin 1947, p. 93).

**May 10, 1940:** British troops landed in Iceland (Times May 11, p. 5)

**May 10, 1940:** ●(0,1,0) A British soldier died from gunshot, allegedly by committing suicide (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Jun 1940:** Shortly after the landing of British troops an unpublished trade agreement was made between the British and Icelandic governments which gave the British the power of exercising a veto over all decisions taken by the Icelandic Import and Currency Exchange Board. All decisions of the Board (and in particular the delivery of import or export licenses) had to be reviewed by a two-man board composed of one Icelander and one Englishman. The Englishman was attached to the British Legation in Reykjavik and received its orders from the British Minister of Economic Warfare. In July 1941, in a dispatch to his government the US consul in Iceland, Kuniholm, stated that the British Legation had unlimited power over practically the whole of Icelandic trade. (Hunt 1966 p. 242-243; Chamberlin 1947, p. 94). It would be interesting to better understand why and how a country like Iceland which
was longing for complete independence from Denmark was induced to accept an
arrangement which limited so drastically the liberty of its trade; one of the factors
may have been the fact that since the beginning of the war (and the end of trade with
Germany) Iceland had become heavily dependent on Britain for its vital coal and oil
imports; oil was particularly essential for the Icelandic fishing fleet. The only other
possible source would have been the United States which was of course unwilling to
cause displeasure to its ally. Naturally, this is only an assumption; it is only through
the testimony of Icelandic officials that one would be able to confirm that this was
indeed the real reason.

**Jun 23, 1940:** Some Canadian troops of the "Z" force were talking to some girls near the football grounds when a civilian police motor patrol arrived. The girls ran away and in the ensuing excitement a stone broke a window of the car. Later a rumor circulated that a Canadian soldier had been put in the police cells. As a result a body of Canadian troops arrived at the police station intent on a delivery. This was prevented by a member of the Canadian police who was able to persuade the troops that no Canadian was in jail. The next morning the Commander of the Canadian force called the Chief of Police to express his regrets at the incidents and to offer to pay for the damage. He also advised him strongly against trying to handle Canadian troops with his own men. (Weekly Report of the "Z" Force, 24 June 1940, cited in Report No 33, Historical Section of Army Headquarters, 16 December 1949, p. 27)

**Jul 1940:** The Icelandic krona was again tied to the British pound at a rate of 27 krona for one pound. In order to understand the signification of this decision one must look back at the monetary events of 1939. On April 4, 1939 the krona was devalued by 22 percent to a rate of 27 krona for one pound. However, after September 1939, fearing that the pound would loose much of its value as a result of the war, the Icelandic government tied the krona to the US dollar at a rate of 6.51 krona for one dollar. As a result of the dollar peg and of a slide of the pound with respect to the dollar, in April 1940 the krona had almost regained its pre-devaluation level of 22 krona to one pound. This decision which was more or less imposed by the British reintroduced the rate of April 1939 as if the peg to the dollar and the slide of the pound had not occurred. (Chamberlin 1947, p. 86)

**Jul 4, 1940:** ● (0,2,0) A British soldier died from gunshot, allegedly by committing suicide (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Jul 7, 1940:** ● (0,3,0) A British soldier died from gunshot, allegedly by committing suicide (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

[This is the third case of this kind since the arrival of the British Force two months earlier; if we assume that there are 15,000 troops in Iceland at this date these three
was longing for complete independence from Denmark was induced to accept an
arrangement which limited so drastically the liberty of its trade; one of the factors
may have been the fact that since the beginning of the war (and the end of trade with
Germany) Iceland had become heavily dependent on Britain for its vital coal and oil
imports; oil was particularly essential for the Icelandic fishing fleet. The only other
possible source would have been the United States which was of course unwilling to
cause displeasure to its ally. Naturally, this is only an assumption; it is only through
the testimony of Icelandic officials that one would be able to confirm that this was
indeed the real reason.

**Jun 23, 1940:** Some Canadian troops of the "Z" force were talking to some girls near the football grounds when a civilian police motor patrol arrived. The girls ran away and in the ensuing excitement a stone broke a window of the car. Later a rumor circulated that a Canadian soldier had been put in the police cells. As a result a body of Canadian troops arrived at the police station intent on a delivery. This was prevented by a member of the Canadian police who was able to persuade the troops that no Canadian was in jail. The next morning the Commander of the Canadian force called the Chief of Police to express his regrets at the incidents and to offer to pay for the damage. He also advised him strongly against trying to handle Canadian troops with his own men. (Weekly Report of the "Z" Force, 24 June 1940, cited in Report No 33, Historical Section of Army Headquarters, 16 December 1949, p. 27)

**Jul 1940:** The Icelandic krona was again tied to the British pound at a rate of 27 krona for one pound. In order to understand the signification of this decision one must look back at the monetary events of 1939. On April 4, 1939 the krona was devalued by 22 percent to a rate of 27 krona for one pound. However, after September 1939, fearing that the pound would loose much of its value as a result of the war, the Icelandic government tied the krona to the US dollar at a rate of 6.51 krona for one dollar. As a result of the dollar peg and of a slide of the pound with respect to the dollar, in April 1940 the krona had almost regained its pre-devaluation level of 22 krona to one pound. This decision which was more or less imposed by the British reintroduced the rate of April 1939 as if the peg to the dollar and the slide of the pound had not occurred. (Chamberlin 1947, p. 86)

**Jul 4, 1940:** ● (0,2,0) A British soldier died from gunshot, allegedly by committing suicide (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Jul 7, 1940:** ● (0,3,0) A British soldier died from gunshot, allegedly by committing suicide (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

[This is the third case of this kind since the arrival of the British Force two months earlier; if we assume that there are 15,000 troops in Iceland at this date these three
suicides would correspond to an annual rate of 3/(0.15 × 0.16) = 125 per 100,000; for the purpose of comparison the rate in the British male population of age around 20 is about 10 per 100,000. No subsequent suicide is mentioned in Bittner's chart but this does not mean that there were none for he cautions the reader that his table is restricted to cases that he found mentioned in various unit diaries. No overall official casualty data seem to have been released by the army.]

**Jul 8, 1940:** ● (0,3,1) Comments made by a Canadian soldier shortly after his landing. "Confronted to a hostile population, we were instructed always to walk in Reykjavik in teams with loaded rifles and 50 rounds. Recently an Icelandic police-man was killed in a brawl with soldiers." (Dumais 1968)

**Jul 13, 1940:** The British minister <fnref n="20" /> in Iceland, Mr Smith, reported to London that General Curtis at his suggestion was preparing a martial law proclamation. Its first section read as follows: "It is hereby declared that all persons in Iceland are now subject to martial law under which they shall be liable to trial by military courts without the right of appeal to the civil courts." By July 31, 1941 the text of the mar-tial law had been passed to all units but was still being kept secret. Proclamations were printed and kept ready to be posted. (Bittner 1975, p. 648)

[The proclamation of martial law was aimed as a sword of Damocles over the Ice-landic authorities; whereas it was not proclaimed in all of Iceland, it is not clear if it was not implemented in some sectors over short time intervals.]

**Jul 25, 1940:** In a letter to the Commanding Officer of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal (belonging to the Canadian force), Major-General L.F. Page wrote:

> A complaint has been put forward by His Majesty's Britannic Minister to Ice-land that your troops are drinking "Black Death" [i.e. a strong alcohol] and un-der its influence are terrorizing the civilians in Hot Springs. Women are afraid to leave their homes and inhabitants are afraid of their homes being broken into. A subsection of British Military Police will be billeted with the Fusiliers Mont Royal to help you.

In his reply, the Commanding Officer of the Fusiliers claimed that the reports were inspired by Communists. As the best way to combat the "Black Death" drink was to prevent its production, some units sent troops into the hills to destroy the stills which produced the beverage. (Bittner 1975, p. 534)

[In the British report cited above (23 June 1940) one reads that after June "no further incident was reported throughout the remainder of the Canadians' stay in Iceland". Obviously, in the light of the present episode, this statement was not correct.]

<footnote n="20">²⁰As at this time Iceland is not yet an independent country, the term "minister" does not seem completely appropriate; nevertheless, it is commonly used by the sources.</footnote>
suicides would correspond to an annual rate of 3/(0.15 × 0.16) = 125 per 100,000; for the purpose of comparison the rate in the British male population of age around 20 is about 10 per 100,000. No subsequent suicide is mentioned in Bittner's chart but this does not mean that there were none for he cautions the reader that his table is restricted to cases that he found mentioned in various unit diaries. No overall official casualty data seem to have been released by the army.]

**Jul 8, 1940:** ● (0,3,1) Comments made by a Canadian soldier shortly after his landing. "Confronted to a hostile population, we were instructed always to walk in Reykjavik in teams with loaded rifles and 50 rounds. Recently an Icelandic police-man was killed in a brawl with soldiers." (Dumais 1968)

**Jul 13, 1940:** The British minister <fnref n="20" /> in Iceland, Mr Smith, reported to London that General Curtis at his suggestion was preparing a martial law proclamation. Its first section read as follows: "It is hereby declared that all persons in Iceland are now subject to martial law under which they shall be liable to trial by military courts without the right of appeal to the civil courts." By July 31, 1941 the text of the mar-tial law had been passed to all units but was still being kept secret. Proclamations were printed and kept ready to be posted. (Bittner 1975, p. 648)

[The proclamation of martial law was aimed as a sword of Damocles over the Ice-landic authorities; whereas it was not proclaimed in all of Iceland, it is not clear if it was not implemented in some sectors over short time intervals.]

**Jul 25, 1940:** In a letter to the Commanding Officer of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal (belonging to the Canadian force), Major-General L.F. Page wrote:

> A complaint has been put forward by His Majesty's Britannic Minister to Ice-land that your troops are drinking "Black Death" [i.e. a strong alcohol] and un-der its influence are terrorizing the civilians in Hot Springs. Women are afraid to leave their homes and inhabitants are afraid of their homes being broken into. A subsection of British Military Police will be billeted with the Fusiliers Mont Royal to help you.

In his reply, the Commanding Officer of the Fusiliers claimed that the reports were inspired by Communists. As the best way to combat the "Black Death" drink was to prevent its production, some units sent troops into the hills to destroy the stills which produced the beverage. (Bittner 1975, p. 534)

[In the British report cited above (23 June 1940) one reads that after June "no further incident was reported throughout the remainder of the Canadians' stay in Iceland". Obviously, in the light of the present episode, this statement was not correct.]

<footnote n="20">²⁰As at this time Iceland is not yet an independent country, the term "minister" does not seem completely appropriate; nevertheless, it is commonly used by the sources.</footnote>
**Jul 31, 1940:** The archives of the Department of National Defence of Canada hold the following English translations of two declarations by Icelandic people to the effect that the behavior of Canadian troops of the Fusiliers Mont Royal was good and that any complaints to the Icelandic Police were unfounded:

* As one of the Officers of the Canadian Army have asked me, I am happy to be able to say that the behavior of the Canadian Troops here in Hverargerdi is very good. Their behavior is irreprochable. [Signed:] Halldor Gunnlaugsson (oddviti i.e. sheriff.) Hverargerdi, 29 July 1940. Addressed to Lt.-Col Paul Grenier.

* We, the undersigned, apologize for sending the Reykjavik Police Station a letter complaining of the trouble caused by soldiers here in the country. We have found that this was not the truth and hereby state that we have no complaints against the Regiment. [Signed:] Eyjolfur Gislason, Saemundur Eyjolfsson. Hveragerdi 31 July 1940.

(Department of National Defence of Canada, 145.2F1009 (D3) Reports on conduct of FMR in Iceland. Many thanks to Yves Tremblay, National Defence historian, for bringing this document to my attention.)

[The Fusiliers Mont Royal stayed only four months in Iceland, from 1 July 1940 to 31 October when they were transferred to Britain; other Canadian troops stayed longer.]

**Aug 21, 1940:** Most of the children of Reykjavik either have been or are to be evacuated into the countryside. Accommodation is by no means easy to obtain as the majority of the country people are farmers who often have large families themselves and whose houses are usually small. In addition no one has leisure to care about small children. (Times p. 5)

**Aug 21, 1940:** Before the war the Nazi government tried to win the adherence of young men by supporting Icelandic flying clubs and by sending instructors in gliding; they also sent teachers in skiing and rock climbing. The increasing number of attacks on British soldiers in cafes and in the streets by young people show the extent to which German propaganda had won over a section of Icelandic youth. Anti-British feeling seems to be growing stronger in many quarters. (Times p. 5)

**Oct 11, 1940:** A conference on newspaper policy took place at the Headquarters of the British force at which newspaper editors were asked to attend. All Icelandic newspapers accepted the invitation except the editors of the Communist newspaper Thjodivljinn. In a post-conference article the latter wrote that it regarded the British troops as an invading force. (Bittner 1975, p. 630)

**Oct 16, 1940:** ● (0,4,1) A British soldier was drowned after his stolen motor vehicle was driven off pier (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).
**Jul 31, 1940:** The archives of the Department of National Defence of Canada hold the following English translations of two declarations by Icelandic people to the effect that the behavior of Canadian troops of the Fusiliers Mont Royal was good and that any complaints to the Icelandic Police were unfounded:

* As one of the Officers of the Canadian Army have asked me, I am happy to be able to say that the behavior of the Canadian Troops here in Hverargerdi is very good. Their behavior is irreprochable. [Signed:] Halldor Gunnlaugsson (oddviti i.e. sheriff.) Hverargerdi, 29 July 1940. Addressed to Lt.-Col Paul Grenier.

* We, the undersigned, apologize for sending the Reykjavik Police Station a letter complaining of the trouble caused by soldiers here in the country. We have found that this was not the truth and hereby state that we have no complaints against the Regiment. [Signed:] Eyjolfur Gislason, Saemundur Eyjolfsson. Hveragerdi 31 July 1940.

(Department of National Defence of Canada, 145.2F1009 (D3) Reports on conduct of FMR in Iceland. Many thanks to Yves Tremblay, National Defence historian, for bringing this document to my attention.)

[The Fusiliers Mont Royal stayed only four months in Iceland, from 1 July 1940 to 31 October when they were transferred to Britain; other Canadian troops stayed longer.]

**Aug 21, 1940:** Most of the children of Reykjavik either have been or are to be evacuated into the countryside. Accommodation is by no means easy to obtain as the majority of the country people are farmers who often have large families themselves and whose houses are usually small. In addition no one has leisure to care about small children. (Times p. 5)

**Aug 21, 1940:** Before the war the Nazi government tried to win the adherence of young men by supporting Icelandic flying clubs and by sending instructors in gliding; they also sent teachers in skiing and rock climbing. The increasing number of attacks on British soldiers in cafes and in the streets by young people show the extent to which German propaganda had won over a section of Icelandic youth. Anti-British feeling seems to be growing stronger in many quarters. (Times p. 5)

**Oct 11, 1940:** A conference on newspaper policy took place at the Headquarters of the British force at which newspaper editors were asked to attend. All Icelandic newspapers accepted the invitation except the editors of the Communist newspaper Thjodivljinn. In a post-conference article the latter wrote that it regarded the British troops as an invading force. (Bittner 1975, p. 630)

**Oct 16, 1940:** ● (0,4,1) A British soldier was drowned after his stolen motor vehicle was driven off pier (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).
**Oct 22, 1940:** ●(0,5,1) A British soldier fell off pier into the sea and drowned (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Nov 16, 1940:** A guard of the 70 Infantry Brigade fired on Icelanders (Bittner 1975, p. 597, the author does not say if there were casualties).

1941

**Jan 6, 1941:** In early January the editors of Thjodviljinn became involved in the organization of the strike of Icelandic labor working on British bases. There were at that time about 3,000 Icelanders employed in military construction projects, in particular the establishment of airfields. Leaflets in English were distributed exhorting troops to refuse to obey any orders to break strike picket lines or to do work normally done by the striking Icelanders. The leaflets ended with the words: "Don't be a scab. Don't take the job of an Icelandic working man." The basic issues included a cost of living bonus which would compensate the rise in the cost of living. The distributors of the pamphlets were arrested on January 6, 1941 and handed over to Icelandic authorities. It was make clear to them that a light sentence would not be accepted. Thus, the Consul General Shepherd wrote to the Foreign Office: "The outcome of the trials will be considered a test case. If sentences are incommensurate with the gravity of the offense, the Commanding Officer may wish to take further action such as deportation and he might insist on himself dealing with any offenses against military security". (Bittner p. 631, 643)

[Under these circumstances a strike of civilian workers can hardly be considered as a direct threat to military security; but this notion was given a broad acceptance in the sense that it included almost any issue regarding occupation forces.]

**Jan 13, 1941:** The reception of British and Canadian troops in Iceland was anything but warm. The Icelanders so resented them that soldiers had to go out in parties of three, well-armed and on their guard against stabbings and shootings. But the soldiers' greatest problem was the stubborn womankind of Iceland. About the only word of Icelandic they learned was the word for girl, stulka. They would lounge in the streets, calling "Hi, stulka" to every blonde. But they got no response. If a girl were indiscreet enough to accept an Englishman, she would have all her hair shaved off. (Time Magazine January 13, 1941)

**Jan 15, 1941:** ●(0,6,1) A British medical officer was killed by fractured skull suffered during a gale (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Feb 24, 1941:** The Icelandic representative in London, Mr Benediksson, was called to the Foreign Office and was given the warning that if the Icelandic government did
**Oct 22, 1940:** ●(0,5,1) A British soldier fell off pier into the sea and drowned (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Nov 16, 1940:** A guard of the 70 Infantry Brigade fired on Icelanders (Bittner 1975, p. 597, the author does not say if there were casualties).

1941

**Jan 6, 1941:** In early January the editors of Thjodviljinn became involved in the organization of the strike of Icelandic labor working on British bases. There were at that time about 3,000 Icelanders employed in military construction projects, in particular the establishment of airfields. Leaflets in English were distributed exhorting troops to refuse to obey any orders to break strike picket lines or to do work normally done by the striking Icelanders. The leaflets ended with the words: "Don't be a scab. Don't take the job of an Icelandic working man." The basic issues included a cost of living bonus which would compensate the rise in the cost of living. The distributors of the pamphlets were arrested on January 6, 1941 and handed over to Icelandic authorities. It was make clear to them that a light sentence would not be accepted. Thus, the Consul General Shepherd wrote to the Foreign Office: "The outcome of the trials will be considered a test case. If sentences are incommensurate with the gravity of the offense, the Commanding Officer may wish to take further action such as deportation and he might insist on himself dealing with any offenses against military security". (Bittner p. 631, 643)

[Under these circumstances a strike of civilian workers can hardly be considered as a direct threat to military security; but this notion was given a broad acceptance in the sense that it included almost any issue regarding occupation forces.]

**Jan 13, 1941:** The reception of British and Canadian troops in Iceland was anything but warm. The Icelanders so resented them that soldiers had to go out in parties of three, well-armed and on their guard against stabbings and shootings. But the soldiers' greatest problem was the stubborn womankind of Iceland. About the only word of Icelandic they learned was the word for girl, stulka. They would lounge in the streets, calling "Hi, stulka" to every blonde. But they got no response. If a girl were indiscreet enough to accept an Englishman, she would have all her hair shaved off. (Time Magazine January 13, 1941)

**Jan 15, 1941:** ●(0,6,1) A British medical officer was killed by fractured skull suffered during a gale (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Feb 24, 1941:** The Icelandic representative in London, Mr Benediksson, was called to the Foreign Office and was given the warning that if the Icelandic government did
not take action to prevent activities harmful to the security of the British forces, the
Army might take action which would be more severe than handing over offenders
to the Icelandic authorities. More specifically, the British government wanted the
activities of the Communist party curtailed and its newspaper suppressed. (Bittner
1975 p. 634)

**Feb 25, 1941:** After the trials of 8 persons in relation with the distribution of leaflets in January, the British minister in Iceland, Mr Smith, wrote to London: "The chief culprits have received heavy sentences and the law has been stretched to detain them in custody pending appeal". As a matter of fact, the composer and translator of the pamphlet were sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, the two distributors to 6 months imprisonment and loss of civil rights, and the two editors of Thjodviljinn to 3 months. Upon appeal in March, the Icelandic Supreme Court reduced the 18 month sentences to 15 months and annulled the loss of civil rights. The only problem was that one of the editors, Mr Einar Olgeirsson was a member of the Althing and as such enjoyed parliamentary immunity and would not serve his sentence until after the current session of the Althing had ended. (Bittner 1975, p. 634)

[It is not clear whether or not Mr Olgeirsson was nonetheless taken into custody for
it is said that he wrote letters and columns from his jail.]

**Mar 1, 1941:** ●(0,7,1) A British sentry was blown off a pier during a gale and drowned (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Mar 20, 1941:** Letter sent by the American Consul to the Secretary of State, [excerpt]

The Anglo-Icelandic Joint Standing Committee consists of 7 members, 2 British and 5 Icelanders. The two British members are the British Consul General (Mr. F.M. Shepherd) and the British Commercial Counselor at Reykjavik (Mr. C.R.S. Harris). Actually, the committee is nothing more than a kind of forum where Icelanders are supposed to be able to air their trade grievances to the British authorities. I have been informed by the Icelanders themselves that Mr. Harris dominates all meetings of the committee, and that his usual reply to requests for concessions of any kind is the monosyllable "no". The most recent meetings have been concerned principally with endeavors on the part of the Icelandic representatives to obtain from the British the release of dollar exchange for the purchase of goods from the United States. Mr. Harris now advises the Icelanders to let him place their orders in the United States. Such orders under the rigid import control now in operation are bound to be small. (NARA 4)

**Mar 21, 1941:** ●(0,8,1) A British sentry was blown into the sea and drowned (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).
not take action to prevent activities harmful to the security of the British forces, the
Army might take action which would be more severe than handing over offenders
to the Icelandic authorities. More specifically, the British government wanted the
activities of the Communist party curtailed and its newspaper suppressed. (Bittner
1975 p. 634)

**Feb 25, 1941:** After the trials of 8 persons in relation with the distribution of leaflets in January, the British minister in Iceland, Mr Smith, wrote to London: "The chief culprits have received heavy sentences and the law has been stretched to detain them in custody pending appeal". As a matter of fact, the composer and translator of the pamphlet were sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, the two distributors to 6 months imprisonment and loss of civil rights, and the two editors of Thjodviljinn to 3 months. Upon appeal in March, the Icelandic Supreme Court reduced the 18 month sentences to 15 months and annulled the loss of civil rights. The only problem was that one of the editors, Mr Einar Olgeirsson was a member of the Althing and as such enjoyed parliamentary immunity and would not serve his sentence until after the current session of the Althing had ended. (Bittner 1975, p. 634)

[It is not clear whether or not Mr Olgeirsson was nonetheless taken into custody for
it is said that he wrote letters and columns from his jail.]

**Mar 1, 1941:** ●(0,7,1) A British sentry was blown off a pier during a gale and drowned (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Mar 20, 1941:** Letter sent by the American Consul to the Secretary of State, [excerpt]

The Anglo-Icelandic Joint Standing Committee consists of 7 members, 2 British and 5 Icelanders. The two British members are the British Consul General (Mr. F.M. Shepherd) and the British Commercial Counselor at Reykjavik (Mr. C.R.S. Harris). Actually, the committee is nothing more than a kind of forum where Icelanders are supposed to be able to air their trade grievances to the British authorities. I have been informed by the Icelanders themselves that Mr. Harris dominates all meetings of the committee, and that his usual reply to requests for concessions of any kind is the monosyllable "no". The most recent meetings have been concerned principally with endeavors on the part of the Icelandic representatives to obtain from the British the release of dollar exchange for the purchase of goods from the United States. Mr. Harris now advises the Icelanders to let him place their orders in the United States. Such orders under the rigid import control now in operation are bound to be small. (NARA 4)

**Mar 21, 1941:** ●(0,8,1) A British sentry was blown into the sea and drowned (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).
**Apr 7, 1941:** Thjodviljinn published an article which charged the British with paying low wages to the Icelanders who worked for them and tolerating poor working and living conditions.

**Apr 11, 1941:** A US occupation force landed in Greenland after an agreement had been signed with the Danish minister in Washington Henrik de Kauffmann. Kauffmann, however, had acted without the consent of the Danish government and, as a result, Denmark declared the agreement void and dismissed Kauffmann from the Danish diplomatic corps. The United States nevertheless continued to recognize him as a duly authorized Danish minister. President Roosevelt announced that the United States has taken Greenland under its protection and will insure its remaining a Danish colony. (NYT p. 1, Hardarson 1974)

**Apr 17, 1941:** The control of the price of Icelandic cod which was to come into operation recently has been held up by seasonal difficulties (Times p. 2).

**Apr 27, 1941:** The Communist newspaper Thjodviljinn was suppressed and the three editors were deported to England. One of them, Einar Olgeirsson was a member of the Althing (Bittner 1975, p. 627).

**Apr 29, 1941:** In a protest sent to London the Prime minister wrote: "This step was taken contrary to the assurance given as to the non-interference with the sovereignty of the Icelandic people. On behalf of the Icelandic government I hereby protest against the suppression of the Icelandic newspaper Thjodviljinn and the deportation of three members of the editorial staff." On June 11, 1941 the British government rejected the protest of the Icelandic government. (Bittner 1975)

**May 1941:** August Lehrman, a German who was in hiding since the British landing was arrested. He had evaded capture for a year with the assistance of some Icelandic families. The 180 Germans who were in Iceland in May 1940 were arrested shortly after the British landing (Bittner 1975, p. 599).

**May 2, 1941:** The Icelandic Communist newspaper Thjodviljinn has been suppressed for incitement to sabotage and the editors have been deported to Britain; one the deported editors is a member of the Althing (Times p. 3).

[In this account the expression "incitement to sabotage" was obviously an overstatement.]

**May 17, 1941:** The Althing declared unanimously that it considered that Iceland had acquired the right to abrogate entirely the Union with Denmark. According to the Treaty it should not be abrogated before 1944, but the Icelandic government considers that due to the occupation, Denmark has become unable to fulfill its obligations which makes the treaty void. (Foreign Relations p. 15)
**Apr 7, 1941:** Thjodviljinn published an article which charged the British with paying low wages to the Icelanders who worked for them and tolerating poor working and living conditions.

**Apr 11, 1941:** A US occupation force landed in Greenland after an agreement had been signed with the Danish minister in Washington Henrik de Kauffmann. Kauffmann, however, had acted without the consent of the Danish government and, as a result, Denmark declared the agreement void and dismissed Kauffmann from the Danish diplomatic corps. The United States nevertheless continued to recognize him as a duly authorized Danish minister. President Roosevelt announced that the United States has taken Greenland under its protection and will insure its remaining a Danish colony. (NYT p. 1, Hardarson 1974)

**Apr 17, 1941:** The control of the price of Icelandic cod which was to come into operation recently has been held up by seasonal difficulties (Times p. 2).

**Apr 27, 1941:** The Communist newspaper Thjodviljinn was suppressed and the three editors were deported to England. One of them, Einar Olgeirsson was a member of the Althing (Bittner 1975, p. 627).

**Apr 29, 1941:** In a protest sent to London the Prime minister wrote: "This step was taken contrary to the assurance given as to the non-interference with the sovereignty of the Icelandic people. On behalf of the Icelandic government I hereby protest against the suppression of the Icelandic newspaper Thjodviljinn and the deportation of three members of the editorial staff." On June 11, 1941 the British government rejected the protest of the Icelandic government. (Bittner 1975)

**May 1941:** August Lehrman, a German who was in hiding since the British landing was arrested. He had evaded capture for a year with the assistance of some Icelandic families. The 180 Germans who were in Iceland in May 1940 were arrested shortly after the British landing (Bittner 1975, p. 599).

**May 2, 1941:** The Icelandic Communist newspaper Thjodviljinn has been suppressed for incitement to sabotage and the editors have been deported to Britain; one the deported editors is a member of the Althing (Times p. 3).

[In this account the expression "incitement to sabotage" was obviously an overstatement.]

**May 17, 1941:** The Althing declared unanimously that it considered that Iceland had acquired the right to abrogate entirely the Union with Denmark. According to the Treaty it should not be abrogated before 1944, but the Icelandic government considers that due to the occupation, Denmark has become unable to fulfill its obligations which makes the treaty void. (Foreign Relations p. 15)
**May 21, 1941:** Iceland has been granted a one million dollar loan by the American Treasury (Times p. 3).

**Jun 1941:** In Reykjavik a sentry bayoneted and killed the horse of a town clerk who apparently had attempted to run him down (Bittner p. 597; the author does not give the date nor does he say if the clerk was injured).

**Jul 1941:** Publication of the report of the Afstand Morality Committee.
[This report in which the Committee described the bad conduct of the British garrison received considerable publicity. However, it did not affect the judgment of British officers on the behavior of their troops. Thus, in his "History of the Duke of Welling-ton Regiment, 1919-1952", Brigadier C.N. Barclay observes: "The Icelanders who had regarded our arrival with little enthusiasm were even less enthusiastic about our departure. This is possibly the best tribute that could have been paid to the behaviour of the British troops".] (Bittner 1975)

**Jul 1941:** ●(0,8,2) A British Army truck accidentally killed an Icelandic woman who was walking in a street (Bittner 1975, p. 598; the author does not give the day on which this accident occurred).

**Jul 8, 1941:** US Navy forces landed in Iceland (NYT p. 1). This first echelon comprises 4,000 Marines.

**Jul 8, 1941:** In a letter to Prime Minister Jonasson, the British government confirmed a new [and more favorable] agreement that Iceland had been in no position to demand after the British landing 14 months earlier. (Nuechterlein 1961, p. 30)

**Jul 11, 1941:** The Iceland Parliament approved by a vote of 39 to 3 the government's agreement to permit United States armed forces to occupy Iceland in cooperation with the British forces already on the island. The three Communist members voted against the agreement notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet Union has been attacked by Germany on June 21, 1941 (NYT p. 6). According to this agreement, military tribunals will have exclusive jurisdiction over military personnel. Icelanders involved in offenses against the US forces should be tried by Icelandic courts and if laws were not available for this the government should enact them; consequently, there will be no provost court trials of Icelandic people by military courts (Hunt 1966, p. 71).

**Jul 11, 1941:** In a letter to the Commander of the Marine Corps, Brigadier General John Marston wrote: "The claims [settled by the Claims Commission] that the British forces have already paid have amounted to about 5,000 dollars per month. The British members of the Anglo-Icelandic Claim Committee were empowered to settle claims not exceeding 100 pounds (Bittner 1975). At the current exchange rate,
**May 21, 1941:** Iceland has been granted a one million dollar loan by the American Treasury (Times p. 3).

**Jun 1941:** In Reykjavik a sentry bayoneted and killed the horse of a town clerk who apparently had attempted to run him down (Bittner p. 597; the author does not give the date nor does he say if the clerk was injured).

**Jul 1941:** Publication of the report of the Afstand Morality Committee. [This report in which the Committee described the bad conduct of the British garrison received considerable publicity. However, it did not affect the judgment of British officers on the behavior of their troops. Thus, in his "History of the Duke of Welling-ton Regiment, 1919-1952", Brigadier C.N. Barclay observes: "The Icelanders who had regarded our arrival with little enthusiasm were even less enthusiastic about our departure. This is possibly the best tribute that could have been paid to the behaviour of the British troops".] (Bittner 1975)

**Jul 1941:** ●(0,8,2) A British Army truck accidentally killed an Icelandic woman who was walking in a street (Bittner 1975, p. 598; the author does not give the day on which this accident occurred).

**Jul 8, 1941:** US Navy forces landed in Iceland (NYT p. 1). This first echelon comprises 4,000 Marines.

**Jul 8, 1941:** In a letter to Prime Minister Jonasson, the British government confirmed a new [and more favorable] agreement that Iceland had been in no position to demand after the British landing 14 months earlier. (Nuechterlein 1961, p. 30)

**Jul 11, 1941:** The Iceland Parliament approved by a vote of 39 to 3 the government's agreement to permit United States armed forces to occupy Iceland in cooperation with the British forces already on the island. The three Communist members voted against the agreement notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet Union has been attacked by Germany on June 21, 1941 (NYT p. 6). According to this agreement, military tribunals will have exclusive jurisdiction over military personnel. Icelanders involved in offenses against the US forces should be tried by Icelandic courts and if laws were not available for this the government should enact them; consequently, there will be no provost court trials of Icelandic people by military courts (Hunt 1966, p. 71).

**Jul 11, 1941:** In a letter to the Commander of the Marine Corps, Brigadier General John Marston wrote: "The claims [settled by the Claims Commission] that the British forces have already paid have amounted to about 5,000 dollars per month. The British members of the Anglo-Icelandic Claim Committee were empowered to settle claims not exceeding 100 pounds (Bittner 1975). At the current exchange rate,
100 pounds was equivalent to 400 dollars; as a rough order of magnitude it can be assumed that the average claim was around 200 dollars; this would mean that there were some 25 incidents per months.

**Jul 18, 1941:** Excerpts of telegram No 136 sent by the American Consul, Bertel E. Kuniholm, to the Secretary of State. This memorandum deals with a broad range of questions related to the occupation: housing, warehouses, procedure for settling claims, organization of military construction projects, relations with the population. The excerpts below focus mainly (but not exclusively) on this last aspect.

* As a result of the British occupation, the British Ministry of Economic Warfare has maintained a staff of several people at Reykjavik under Mr. C.R. Harris who has been given the title of Counselor to the British Legation in Iceland. Mr. Harris has developed into an omnipotent trade tsar with unlimited power over practically the whole of Icelandic trade (see my confidential despatch No 88 of March 20, 1941. He is probably the most unpopular man in Iceland today.

* The British Army of occupation has refused steadfastly to agree to trial of British military personnel by Icelandic courts. In case of altercations, assault, et cetera the regular army court martial have dealt with British personnel.

* The British contribute to road upkeep in Iceland on the basis of gasoline consumed by automotive vehicles. The proportion of British vehicles on the roads at present is two for every three Icelandic vehicles.
(NARA 3)

**Aug 1941:** Negotiations were started in Washington on a trade agreement between the United States and Iceland. Although both parties declared to be in complete agreement on most points, the agreement was not signed by the Department of State until 27 August 1943. Hunt (1966) observes that the Instruction No 41 sent in March 1942 to the American Legation in Iceland became, word for word, the text of the trade agreement (Hunt 1966, p. 247).

**Aug 8, 1941:** President Roosevelt appointed the diplomat Lincoln MacVeagh as the first ambassador to Iceland. He presented his credentials on September 30, 1941 and remained in Reykjavik until 27 June 1942. (Wikipedia, English, article: Lincoln MacVeagh)

[It should be noted that at the time of this appointment Iceland was not an independent country; in fact, MacVeagh's official title was: "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary". The title of the US representative in Iceland was changed to "Ambassador Extraordinary" only after 1955. (Wikipedia, English, article: United States Ambassador to Iceland.)

**Aug 26, 1941:** The ban against the stationing of American reporters in Iceland has
100 pounds was equivalent to 400 dollars; as a rough order of magnitude it can be assumed that the average claim was around 200 dollars; this would mean that there were some 25 incidents per months.

**Jul 18, 1941:** Excerpts of telegram No 136 sent by the American Consul, Bertel E. Kuniholm, to the Secretary of State. This memorandum deals with a broad range of questions related to the occupation: housing, warehouses, procedure for settling claims, organization of military construction projects, relations with the population. The excerpts below focus mainly (but not exclusively) on this last aspect.

* As a result of the British occupation, the British Ministry of Economic Warfare has maintained a staff of several people at Reykjavik under Mr. C.R. Harris who has been given the title of Counselor to the British Legation in Iceland. Mr. Harris has developed into an omnipotent trade tsar with unlimited power over practically the whole of Icelandic trade (see my confidential despatch No 88 of March 20, 1941. He is probably the most unpopular man in Iceland today.

* The British Army of occupation has refused steadfastly to agree to trial of British military personnel by Icelandic courts. In case of altercations, assault, et cetera the regular army court martial have dealt with British personnel.

* The British contribute to road upkeep in Iceland on the basis of gasoline consumed by automotive vehicles. The proportion of British vehicles on the roads at present is two for every three Icelandic vehicles.
(NARA 3)

**Aug 1941:** Negotiations were started in Washington on a trade agreement between the United States and Iceland. Although both parties declared to be in complete agreement on most points, the agreement was not signed by the Department of State until 27 August 1943. Hunt (1966) observes that the Instruction No 41 sent in March 1942 to the American Legation in Iceland became, word for word, the text of the trade agreement (Hunt 1966, p. 247).

**Aug 8, 1941:** President Roosevelt appointed the diplomat Lincoln MacVeagh as the first ambassador to Iceland. He presented his credentials on September 30, 1941 and remained in Reykjavik until 27 June 1942. (Wikipedia, English, article: Lincoln MacVeagh)

[It should be noted that at the time of this appointment Iceland was not an independent country; in fact, MacVeagh's official title was: "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary". The title of the US representative in Iceland was changed to "Ambassador Extraordinary" only after 1955. (Wikipedia, English, article: United States Ambassador to Iceland.)

**Aug 26, 1941:** The ban against the stationing of American reporters in Iceland has
been removed. Such permission has been withheld so far pending an agreement with the British forces. Applications for permission to proceed to Iceland might now be filed with the Navy Department. (NYT p. 3)

**Aug 28, 1941:** ● (0,8,3) Death of a small child in an accident occasioned by British troops (Bittner 1975, p. 598)

[The author does not describe the circumstances of this accident].

**Sep 3, 1941:** President Roosevelt approved allotment for $ 25,000 settlement of claims [made by Icelandic people]. (NARA 10)

[Unfortunately the file gives no information about the nature of these claims.]

**Sep 15, 1941:** In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, General Marston, the Commander of the Marines, mentioned that tension between the troops and the population increased markedly after the rape of an Icelandic woman by 4 Marines (Hunt 1966, p. 88).

[The Marines were sentenced to 10-20 years in prison, see below the article of Time Magazine at the date of Oct 13, 1941.]

**Sep 20, 1941:** An Icelander was struck by a soldier on Austurvollur when he walked past a crowd of soldier. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Sep 23, 1941:** In a meeting with American military commanders, Prime Minister H. Jonasson expressed the hope that Americans “would not take over houses in Reykjavik the way the British had”. (NARA 2)

[What exactly had the Prime Minister in mind? It would be interesting to know.]

**Sep 28, 1941:** A plan for the establishment of a Claim committee was adopted. It combined two procedures. (i) A Primary Board consisting of one officer would attempt to reach an agreement with the claimant and settle the amount of compensation. (ii) If agreement turned out to be impossible the matter would go to the Joint Claims Board, a committee of three persons consisting of one American officer, one representative of the Icelandic government and a justice of the Icelandic Supreme Court as arbitrator. All decisions taken by the board had to be approved by the American Commander. The Board held its first meeting on 12 December 1941. (Conn et al. 1964, Chapter 19, p. 513)

**Sep 30, 1941:** American soldiers on the platform of a truck threw stones at an Icelander, Palmi Ingimundarson, when he walked past the truck. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Sep 30, 1941:** Excerpt of an order issued by the Headquarters of the First Marine Brigade, Icelandic Base Command. Subject: Resisting arrest.

An incident recently occurred in which a number of Marines resisted arrest when the
been removed. Such permission has been withheld so far pending an agreement with the British forces. Applications for permission to proceed to Iceland might now be filed with the Navy Department. (NYT p. 3)

**Aug 28, 1941:** ● (0,8,3) Death of a small child in an accident occasioned by British troops (Bittner 1975, p. 598)
[The author does not describe the circumstances of this accident].

**Sep 3, 1941:** President Roosevelt approved allotment for $ 25,000 settlement of claims [made by Icelandic people]. (NARA 10)
[Unfortunately the file gives no information about the nature of these claims.]

**Sep 15, 1941:** In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, General Marston, the Commander of the Marines, mentioned that tension between the troops and the population increased markedly after the rape of an Icelandic woman by 4 Marines (Hunt 1966, p. 88).
[The Marines were sentenced to 10-20 years in prison, see below the article of Time Magazine at the date of Oct 13, 1941.]

**Sep 20, 1941:** An Icelander was struck by a soldier on Austurvollur when he walked past a crowd of soldier. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Sep 23, 1941:** In a meeting with American military commanders, Prime Minister H. Jonasson expressed the hope that Americans "would not take over houses in Reykjavik the way the British had". (NARA 2)
[What exactly had the Prime Minister in mind? It would be interesting to know.]

**Sep 28, 1941:** A plan for the establishment of a Claim committee was adopted. It combined two procedures. (i) A Primary Board consisting of one officer would attempt to reach an agreement with the claimant and settle the amount of compensation. (ii) If agreement turned out to be impossible the matter would go to the Joint Claims Board, a committee of three persons consisting of one American officer, one representative of the Icelandic government and a justice of the Icelandic Supreme Court as arbitrator. All decisions taken by the board had to be approved by the American Commander. The Board held its first meeting on 12 December 1941. (Conn et al. 1964, Chapter 19, p. 513)

**Sep 30, 1941:** American soldiers on the platform of a truck threw stones at an Icelander, Palmi Ingimundarson, when he walked past the truck. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Sep 30, 1941:** Excerpt of an order issued by the Headquarters of the First Marine Brigade, Icelandic Base Command. Subject: Resisting arrest.
An incident recently occurred in which a number of Marines resisted arrest when the
city police at Reykjavik attempted to take them into custody. Officers and enlisted men should be informed that resistance to arrest constitutes disorderly conduct and will be punished as such. The American military police should be notified at once of their arrest. Every effort will be made by this headquarters to have them released at once to the custody of their organization commander. [Signed:] John Marston, Brigadier General, US Marine Corps. (NARA 2)

[In the covering letter with which this order was transmitted to the State Department, Lincoln MacVeagh notes that prior to the issuance of this order, which by the way was due to General Bonesteel's insistence, Brigadier Marston used to ask the American legation to protest against any Icelander laying hands upon his men. MacVeagh adds the following observation: "Incidentally, it may be added that the British also had the typical Marine attitude. It has not helped them in their relations with the local population and government."]

**Oct 3, 1941:** The Chief of Police, Agnar Kofoed Hansen, gave an oral account of recent incidents to the US consul Kuniholm in a conversation held on 3 October. They were summarized in enclosure 2 of a despatch sent to the State Department on 4 October. These incidents are presented in general terms; in contrast to a second list of incidents established in the spring of 1942 (see NARA 1) no precise dates are given here. This list of complaints included the following instances.

* American soldiers, particularly sailors and the regular army enlisted men, are belligerent with the Icelanders. Very often the soldiers trail Icelanders for several blocks endeavoring all the while to pick a fight. Attacks are usually without provocation and seemingly without motive. The men are quite sober and not under the influence of liquor.

* There have been several instances where taxis have been hired by soldiers for protracted periods of time. The men have not paid for the cab and have simply told the chauffeur that they had no money.

* There have been occasions where soldiers have taken private automobiles and driven off with them damaging them and then have left them beside the road.

* The British soldiers have a very profound disrespect for the Icelandic police and for Icelanders which has been fostered by their officers. American soldiers should not be encouraged to adopt an overbearing attitude toward Icelanders.

* There have been numerous cases of shooting by British soldiers in the city of Reykjavik since the occupation began and much damage has been done. The British seem not to have enough military police and are not really able to patrol the streets effectively.

* Soldiers, particularly the British, have done considerable damage to property while on liberty in the city. This has consisted in smashing furniture and crockery in
city police at Reykjavik attempted to take them into custody. Officers and enlisted men should be informed that resistance to arrest constitutes disorderly conduct and will be punished as such. The American military police should be notified at once of their arrest. Every effort will be made by this headquarters to have them released at once to the custody of their organization commander. [Signed:] John Marston, Brigadier General, US Marine Corps. (NARA 2)

[In the covering letter with which this order was transmitted to the State Department, Lincoln MacVeagh notes that prior to the issuance of this order, which by the way was due to General Bonesteel's insistence, Brigadier Marston used to ask the American legation to protest against any Icelander laying hands upon his men. MacVeagh adds the following observation: "Incidentally, it may be added that the British also had the typical Marine attitude. It has not helped them in their relations with the local population and government."]

**Oct 3, 1941:** The Chief of Police, Agnar Kofoed Hansen, gave an oral account of recent incidents to the US consul Kuniholm in a conversation held on 3 October. They were summarized in enclosure 2 of a despatch sent to the State Department on 4 October. These incidents are presented in general terms; in contrast to a second list of incidents established in the spring of 1942 (see NARA 1) no precise dates are given here. This list of complaints included the following instances.

* American soldiers, particularly sailors and the regular army enlisted men, are belligerent with the Icelanders. Very often the soldiers trail Icelanders for several blocks endeavoring all the while to pick a fight. Attacks are usually without provocation and seemingly without motive. The men are quite sober and not under the influence of liquor.

* There have been several instances where taxis have been hired by soldiers for protracted periods of time. The men have not paid for the cab and have simply told the chauffeur that they had no money.

* There have been occasions where soldiers have taken private automobiles and driven off with them damaging them and then have left them beside the road.

* The British soldiers have a very profound disrespect for the Icelandic police and for Icelanders which has been fostered by their officers. American soldiers should not be encouraged to adopt an overbearing attitude toward Icelanders.

* There have been numerous cases of shooting by British soldiers in the city of Reykjavik since the occupation began and much damage has been done. The British seem not to have enough military police and are not really able to patrol the streets effectively.

* Soldiers, particularly the British, have done considerable damage to property while on liberty in the city. This has consisted in smashing furniture and crockery in
cafes and restaurants and breaking windows.

* The worst evil in the city of Reykjavik consists in the isolated Nissen huts that one finds here and there on private property. This is one of the means whereby girls, particularly the younger ones, have been seduced, and there is a large file in the police office dealing with this problem. The Police Chief says that many Icelanders, including very distinguished members of the community, have been in his office time after time broken and sobbing when apprised of the comings and goings of daughters of the family. The Chief of Police feels that these Nissen huts should be removed from the city.

* One very sore point among Icelanders is the shouting and yelling by soldiers in the streets. There is universal anger against this on the part of Icelanders. There have been instances where Icelanders, particularly older men, have asked the soldiers to make less noise and have been attacked and knocked down. The number of such old men attacked is large enough to be regrettable.

* The Icelandic Government inquires if it is possible to have the Icelandic police authorized by the American army authorities to detain, but not arrest, any soldiers who are caught in the act of committing misdemeanors. If this were possible then soldiers could be held on the spot until the military police could arrive and take over. [This point suggests that so far the Icelandic police had hardly ever detained American servicemen.]

* Arrangements must be made to have strong police forces on the spots where trouble is liable to occur such as the Hotel Hekla, the Oddfellows Hall, and popular cafes. This is particularly true on payday and the two days immediately following them.

* Soldiers should be requested not to walk four abreast on sidewalks forcing Icelanders off the sidewalk.

* Icelandic buses which went to Reykjavik were stoned by American and British servicemen simply because they were too overcrowded to transport additional people.

* After several Icelanders had been knocked down the newspaper Thjodalfur, advised men in sports clubs to arm themselves with clubs and suggested that these vigilante groups should follow any soldier seen on the streets with an Icelandic girl. (NARA 2, Hunt 1966, p. 90-92)

**Oct 3, 1941:** American soldiers who were passengers in a bus asked the driver to transport them to Alafoss. He explained to them that he had no authority to do so. When they left the bus the soldiers threw stones at it and broke a window pane. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Oct 10, 1941:** A taxi driver transported two soldiers to the Mosfells district. The
cafes and restaurants and breaking windows.

* The worst evil in the city of Reykjavik consists in the isolated Nissen huts that one finds here and there on private property. This is one of the means whereby girls, particularly the younger ones, have been seduced, and there is a large file in the police office dealing with this problem. The Police Chief says that many Icelanders, including very distinguished members of the community, have been in his office time after time broken and sobbing when apprised of the comings and goings of daughters of the family. The Chief of Police feels that these Nissen huts should be removed from the city.

* One very sore point among Icelanders is the shouting and yelling by soldiers in the streets. There is universal anger against this on the part of Icelanders. There have been instances where Icelanders, particularly older men, have asked the soldiers to make less noise and have been attacked and knocked down. The number of such old men attacked is large enough to be regrettable.

* The Icelandic Government inquires if it is possible to have the Icelandic police authorized by the American army authorities to detain, but not arrest, any soldiers who are caught in the act of committing misdemeanors. If this were possible then soldiers could be held on the spot until the military police could arrive and take over. [This point suggests that so far the Icelandic police had hardly ever detained American servicemen.]

* Arrangements must be made to have strong police forces on the spots where trouble is liable to occur such as the Hotel Hekla, the Oddfellows Hall, and popular cafes. This is particularly true on payday and the two days immediately following them.

* Soldiers should be requested not to walk four abreast on sidewalks forcing Icelanders off the sidewalk.

* Icelandic buses which went to Reykjavik were stoned by American and British servicemen simply because they were too overcrowded to transport additional people.

* After several Icelanders had been knocked down the newspaper Thjodalfur, advised men in sports clubs to arm themselves with clubs and suggested that these vigilante groups should follow any soldier seen on the streets with an Icelandic girl. (NARA 2, Hunt 1966, p. 90-92)

**Oct 3, 1941:** American soldiers who were passengers in a bus asked the driver to transport them to Alafoss. He explained to them that he had no authority to do so. When they left the bus the soldiers threw stones at it and broke a window pane. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Oct 10, 1941:** A taxi driver transported two soldiers to the Mosfells district. The
soldiers struck the driver as they got out of the car, and ran away without making payment. An officer arrived at this moment and forced the soldiers to pay for the hire of the car. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Oct 11, 1941:** An Icelandic taxi driver drove two American soldiers to a camp in the Mosfells district. When the soldiers left the car one of them drew a gun, pointed it at the driver and ordered him to drive off. They then ran away without making payment. The taxi driver then reported this to the guards and appealed to them for assistance which they ignored. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Oct 11, 1941:** A soldier crept in through a kitchen window in Reykjavik (Tjarnagata 41), attacked the mistress of the house and placed over her mouth a rag that smelt strongly of chloroform. She managed to scream which brought some men in from an adjoining room upon which the soldier ran away. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Oct 13, 1941:** Iceland has decided to lay up her entire deep-sea trawler fleet because the owners say the new British price control and import tax render fishing unprofitable. The decision affects some 40 ships which normally carry their catches to Great Britain. Since the occupation, Great Britain has been Iceland's only market for fish, the country's staple export. (Times p. 3)

**Oct 13, 1941:** Excerpt of an article published in Time Magazine. Premier Hermann Jonasson of Iceland thought Icelandic conditions last week were approaching the outlandish. If 15,000,000 soldiers were dumped in London, said he, it would not be any worse off than Iceland is now. Further, the British-American occupation has upped living costs for Iceland's residents 70%, disrupted the island's foreign trade, upset many an Icelandic lass. Last week four U.S. Marines got 10 to 20 years in Portsmouth (N.H.) prison for rape committed in Iceland. Nevertheless Premier Jonasson was still anxious to cooperate.

It was revealed last week that on the heels of the original U.S. force of sailors and Marines a U.S. Army field force had arrived at Reykjavik in mid-September. As they disembarked, General Bonesteel's men got a rousing welcome from Brigadier General John Marston's tough Marines: they were barked at (ordinary soldiers are called "dogfaces" by the devil-dog Marines).

(Time 13 October 1941, available on the website of Time).

**Oct 15, 1941:** The maximum retail price of fresh salted cod from Iceland will be 9 pence a pound (i.e. 0.083 pound a kilogram) (Times p. 2).

**Oct 16, 1941:** An audit of the US Army Post Office in Iceland revealed that between 3 Oct 1941 and 16 Oct 1941 seven US (Treasury) checks (which were not indorsed) representing a total of $ 67,836 were sent from the US Army Post Office of the
soldiers struck the driver as they got out of the car, and ran away without making payment. An officer arrived at this moment and forced the soldiers to pay for the hire of the car. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Oct 11, 1941:** An Icelandic taxi driver drove two American soldiers to a camp in the Mosfells district. When the soldiers left the car one of them drew a gun, pointed it at the driver and ordered him to drive off. They then ran away without making payment. The taxi driver then reported this to the guards and appealed to them for assistance which they ignored. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Oct 11, 1941:** A soldier crept in through a kitchen window in Reykjavik (Tjarnagata 41), attacked the mistress of the house and placed over her mouth a rag that smelt strongly of chloroform. She managed to scream which brought some men in from an adjoining room upon which the soldier ran away. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Oct 13, 1941:** Iceland has decided to lay up her entire deep-sea trawler fleet because the owners say the new British price control and import tax render fishing unprofitable. The decision affects some 40 ships which normally carry their catches to Great Britain. Since the occupation, Great Britain has been Iceland's only market for fish, the country's staple export. (Times p. 3)

**Oct 13, 1941:** Excerpt of an article published in Time Magazine.
Premier Hermann Jonasson of Iceland thought Icelandic conditions last week were approaching the outlandish. If 15,000,000 soldiers were dumped in London, said he, it would not be any worse off than Iceland is now. Further, the British-American occupation has upped living costs for Iceland's residents 70%, disrupted the island's foreign trade, upset many an Icelandic lass. Last week four U.S. Marines got 10 to 20 years in Portsmouth (N.H.) prison for rape committed in Iceland. Nevertheless Premier Jonasson was still anxious to cooperate.

It was revealed last week that on the heels of the original U.S. force of sailors and Marines a U.S. Army field force had arrived at Reykjavik in mid-September. As they disembarked, General Bonesteel's men got a rousing welcome from Brigadier General John Marston's tough Marines: they were barked at (ordinary soldiers are called "dogfaces" by the devil-dog Marines).

(Time 13 October 1941, available on the website of Time).

**Oct 15, 1941:** The maximum retail price of fresh salted cod from Iceland will be 9 pence a pound (i.e. 0.083 pound a kilogram) (Times p. 2).

**Oct 16, 1941:** An audit of the US Army Post Office in Iceland revealed that between 3 Oct 1941 and 16 Oct 1941 seven US (Treasury) checks (which were not indorsed) representing a total of $ 67,836 were sent from the US Army Post Office of the
Iceland Base Command to the Postmaster of New York City. (NARA 9)

[The other documents in NARA 9 give no real clue which could help us to understand the significance of this incident.]

**Oct 23, 1941:** Iceland Cabinet hands in resignation. The resignation of Premier Jonasson's government was precipitated by sharp rises in living costs and "unsettled difficulties" in connection with the occupation of Iceland (NYT p. 3).

**Oct 26, 1941:** American soldiers forcibly entered the University of Iceland where a dance was being held. One of them got in a fight with a student. A little later a crowd of shouting soldiers approached the University, struck people that were leaving the dance and intended to force their way into the building, but were stopped by policemen who had arrived by then. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Oct 26, 1941:** A taxi driver transported soldiers to a camp at Hagi. When he demanded payment, an argument arose during which the soldiers threatened and struck him. A guard that was present pointed his gun at him and ordered him to leave. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Oct 31, 1941:** The Regent postponed acceptance of Premier Jonasson resignation. After nine days of useless negotiation, Prime minister Hermann Jonasson and his interim cabinet had to resume office when the Regent postponed acceptance of the resignation which occurred over problems caused by the presence of British and American armies of occupation. (NYT p. 3)

[Apart from mentioning the question of rising living cost the article does not give more precision about the problems which lead to the government's resignation.]

**Nov 3, 1941:** Soldiers threw stones at an automobile when the car passed them and refused to stop. The driver asked a guard who was stationed close by for assistance but he refused to interfere in the matter. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Nov 6, 1941:** The worst profiteering of the war was made by the carriers who brought fish from Iceland to Britain. (Times p. 2)

[Yet, if the purpose of the price control was only to curtail the profit of the carriers it is difficult to understand why Icelandic fishermen went on strike.]

**Nov 6, 1941:** Supplies of fish from Iceland should now slowly increase. If and when fish reappears in any considerable quantities, customers will not be asked the outrageous prices prevailing before the imposition of price control four months ago (Times p. 5).

**Nov 6, 1941:** Brawling among soldier and other customers at Hotel Hekla. A Norwegian skipper was struck. (NARA 1, fall list)
Iceland Base Command to the Postmaster of New York City. (NARA 9)

[The other documents in NARA 9 give no real clue which could help us to understand the significance of this incident.]

**Oct 23, 1941:** Iceland Cabinet hands in resignation. The resignation of Premier Jonasson's government was precipitated by sharp rises in living costs and "unsettled difficulties" in connection with the occupation of Iceland (NYT p. 3).

**Oct 26, 1941:** American soldiers forcibly entered the University of Iceland where a dance was being held. One of them got in a fight with a student. A little later a crowd of shouting soldiers approached the University, struck people that were leaving the dance and intended to force their way into the building, but were stopped by policemen who had arrived by then. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Oct 26, 1941:** A taxi driver transported soldiers to a camp at Hagi. When he demanded payment, an argument arose during which the soldiers threatened and struck him. A guard that was present pointed his gun at him and ordered him to leave. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Oct 31, 1941:** The Regent postponed acceptance of Premier Jonasson resignation. After nine days of useless negotiation, Prime minister Hermann Jonasson and his interim cabinet had to resume office when the Regent postponed acceptance of the resignation which occurred over problems caused by the presence of British and American armies of occupation. (NYT p. 3)

[Apart from mentioning the question of rising living cost the article does not give more precision about the problems which lead to the government's resignation.]

**Nov 3, 1941:** Soldiers threw stones at an automobile when the car passed them and refused to stop. The driver asked a guard who was stationed close by for assistance but he refused to interfere in the matter. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Nov 6, 1941:** The worst profiteering of the war was made by the carriers who brought fish from Iceland to Britain. (Times p. 2)

[Yet, if the purpose of the price control was only to curtail the profit of the carriers it is difficult to understand why Icelandic fishermen went on strike.]

**Nov 6, 1941:** Supplies of fish from Iceland should now slowly increase. If and when fish reappears in any considerable quantities, customers will not be asked the outrageous prices prevailing before the imposition of price control four months ago (Times p. 5).

**Nov 6, 1941:** Brawling among soldier and other customers at Hotel Hekla. A Norwegian skipper was struck. (NARA 1, fall list)
**Nov 9, 1941:** The Icelandic government headed by Prime Minister Hermann Jónsson's resigned for a second time in 16 days. A bill limiting living cost was defeated. The Regent accepted the resignation but as on October 22 he asked the Cabinet to remain in office until a new government is formed. (NYT p. 24)

[Incidentally, one may wonder why a bill limiting living cost, in itself a fairly desirable objective, was defeated]

**Nov 9, 1941:** Violent brawling among Icelanders and soldiers and sailors at Hotel Hekla. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Nov 14, 1941:** ● (0,8,4) Two American soldiers shot and killed an Icelander fisherman in a brawl outside a cafe Saturday night; he will be tried by a general court-martial. The soldiers were carrying guns in violation of instructions. Thordur Sigursson, 22, died with a bullet through the stomach. The shooting caused strong reactions among Icelanders and newspapers advised that natives avoid American soldiers as much as possible to avert further repetition of such incidents. (NYT p. 1)

**Nov 15, 1941:** War Department authorities delegated full authority to Army heads in Iceland to handle the affair in which two American enlisted men shot and killed a citizen in Iceland as the result of a brawl. They will be tried by general court martial after which the proceedings and the verdict will be reviewed by the Judge Advocate General in Washington. (NYT p. 6)

**Nov 21, 1941:** Soldiers attacked and struck an Icelander on the Mela Road (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 21, 1941:** Soldiers struck a women who was waitress at a cafe in Reykjavik (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 22, 1941:** Brawls between soldiers and Icelanders on Kirkjustraeti (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 23, 1941:** A soldier attacked an Icelander as he was entering a taxi that he had hired (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 24, 1941:** During October soldiers sent more than 100,000 dollars in money orders to their families; in the same month they sent about 60,000 letters home [which represents some 2 letters per serviceman] (NYT p. 7).

[100,000 dollars represents some $ 3 per serviceman. The article does not comment on the origin of the 100,000 dollars. What in this amount were the shares of the soldiers' pay on the one hand and of the profits earned from black market operations on the other hand. At that time the pay od a private was about $ 21 per month, but this was the gross-pay which was subject to various deductions (e.g. the so-called
**Nov 9, 1941:** The Icelandic government headed by Prime Minister Hermann Jonsson's resigned for a second time in 16 days. A bill limiting living cost was defeated. The Regent accepted the resignation but as on October 22 he asked the Cabinet to remain in office until a new government is formed. (NYT p. 24)

[Incidentally, one may wonder why a bill limiting living cost, in itself a fairly desirable objective, was defeated]

**Nov 9, 1941:** Violent brawling among Icelanders and soldiers and sailors at Hotel Hekla. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Nov 14, 1941:** ● (0,8,4) Two American soldiers shot and killed an Icelander fisherman in a brawl outside a cafe Saturday night; he will be tried by a general court-martial. The soldiers were carrying guns in violation of instructions. Thordur Sigursson, 22, died with a bullet through the stomach. The shooting caused strong reactions among Icelanders and newspapers advised that natives avoid American soldiers as much as possible to avert further repetition of such incidents. (NYT p. 1)

**Nov 15, 1941:** War Department authorities delegated full authority to Army heads in Iceland to handle the affair in which two American enlisted men shot and killed a citizen in Iceland as the result of a brawl. They will be tried by general court martial after which the proceedings and the verdict will be reviewed by the Judge Advocate General in Washington. (NYT p. 6)

**Nov 21, 1941:** Soldiers attacked and struck an Icelander on the Mela Road (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 21, 1941:** Soldiers struck a women who was waitress at a cafe in Reykjavik (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 22, 1941:** Brawls between soldiers and Icelanders on Kirkjustraeti (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 23, 1941:** A soldier attacked an Icelander as he was entering a taxi that he had hired (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 24, 1941:** During October soldiers sent more than 100,000 dollars in money orders to their families; in the same month they sent about 60,000 letters home [which represents some 2 letters per serviceman] (NYT p. 7).

[100,000 dollars represents some $ 3 per serviceman. The article does not comment on the origin of the 100,000 dollars. What in this amount were the shares of the soldiers' pay on the one hand and of the profits earned from black market operations on the other hand. At that time the pay od a private was about $ 21 per month, but this was the gross-pay which was subject to various deductions (e.g. the so-called
kitchen sink deduction or an optional life insurance).]

**Nov 25, 1941:** An Icelandic automobile was shot at on the road near Hagi. The driver heard no warning and saw no guard before the shot was fired. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Nov 27, 1941:** Soldiers attacked an Icelander at a cafe in Reykjavik on Adalstraeti (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 27, 1941:** American soldiers attacked British soldiers at the Froda cafe (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 30, 1941:** All British and American officers and men were forbidden to enter the city of Reykjavik except on official business on Iceland's Independence day. The custom was instituted by the British a year ago in deference to Icelanders' feelings. (NYT p. 51)

**Dec 2, 1941:** A taxi driver drove a soldier to Mosfellveit. An argument arose over the fare. Five guards approached the car, pointed their guns at the driver and forced him to leave without receiving payment. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 7, 1941:** A bus was damaged by soldiers who began fighting in it (NARA 1, fall list).

**Dec 9, 1941:** Soldiers attacked an Icelander in the corridor of Hotel Hekla when he was on the way to his room (NARA 1, fall list).

**Dec 11, 1941:** Soldiers fired at a loud speaker in a cafe in Reykjavik (NARA 1, fall list).

**Dec 12, 1941:** The joint Claim Board established for the purpose of settling claims by Icelanders held its first meeting. The procedure functioned as follows.

* Claims were first received by an American officer who attempted to reach an agreement with the claimant and settle the amount of compensation in accordance with Army regulations.

* In case no agreement could be reached the claim would go to the joint Claims Board which comprised three persons: an American officer, a representative of the Icelandic government and an Icelandic judge.

From an Icelandic perspective this procedure had two main drawbacks: first was the fact that any decision reached by the Board had to be approved by the commanding general and secondly there was the limitation that the Board could not handle claims for actions of soldiers outside their time of service. (Conn et al. 1964, chapter 19)

**Dec 14, 1941:** A taxi driver transported soldiers to Reykir where they left the car
kitchen sink deduction or an optional life insurance).]

**Nov 25, 1941:** An Icelandic automobile was shot at on the road near Hagi. The driver heard no warning and saw no guard before the shot was fired. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Nov 27, 1941:** Soldiers attacked an Icelander at a cafe in Reykjavik on Adalstraeti (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 27, 1941:** American soldiers attacked British soldiers at the Froda cafe (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 30, 1941:** All British and American officers and men were forbidden to enter the city of Reykjavik except on official business on Iceland's Independence day. The custom was instituted by the British a year ago in deference to Icelanders' feelings. (NYT p. 51)

**Dec 2, 1941:** A taxi driver drove a soldier to Mosfellveit. An argument arose over the fare. Five guards approached the car, pointed their guns at the driver and forced him to leave without receiving payment. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 7, 1941:** A bus was damaged by soldiers who began fighting in it (NARA 1, fall list).

**Dec 9, 1941:** Soldiers attacked an Icelander in the corridor of Hotel Hekla when he was on the way to his room (NARA 1, fall list).

**Dec 11, 1941:** Soldiers fired at a loud speaker in a cafe in Reykjavik (NARA 1, fall list).

**Dec 12, 1941:** The joint Claim Board established for the purpose of settling claims by Icelanders held its first meeting. The procedure functioned as follows.

* Claims were first received by an American officer who attempted to reach an agreement with the claimant and settle the amount of compensation in accordance with Army regulations.

* In case no agreement could be reached the claim would go to the joint Claims Board which comprised three persons: an American officer, a representative of the Icelandic government and an Icelandic judge.

From an Icelandic perspective this procedure had two main drawbacks: first was the fact that any decision reached by the Board had to be approved by the commanding general and secondly there was the limitation that the Board could not handle claims for actions of soldiers outside their time of service. (Conn et al. 1964, chapter 19)

**Dec 14, 1941:** A taxi driver transported soldiers to Reykir where they left the car
without making payment. The driver applied to a guard for assistance. He pointed
his gun at him and ordered him to leave. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 19, 1941:** An Icelander was beaten by soldiers while walking along Reynimel
(NARA 1, fall list).

**Dec 25, 1941:** Soldiers broke a window at the house of an Icelandic woman and thrashed her son. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 25, 1941:** A soldier accosted an Icelandic woman, Jakobina Grimsdottir, when she was walking along Karlagata street in Reykjavik. As he received no response, he attacked her, forced her to the ground but retreated when she was able to scream. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 28, 1941:** A taxi driver drove some soldiers to a camp in the Mosfells district. An argument arose over the fare and one of the soldiers stroke the driver. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 28, 1941:** A soldier attacked a 15-year old girl on Laugarnesvegur (NARA 1, fall list).

1942

**Jan 1942:** The Althing passed a law providing for the supervision of people under 21 and the sending of "immoral women" to a reformatory. This concerned especially the girls who were friendly with British troops. (Bittner 1975)

**Jan 1, 1942:** An Icelander was struck over the head with a bottle by a soldier
(NARA 1, winter list).

**Jan 11, 1942:** A soldier asked an Icelander for directions, but in the course of their conversation he became very angry and attacked the Icelander. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Jan 12, 1942:** ●(1,8,4) A US Navy 1st class Seaman named William Hon was shot and killed by a sentry at Balbos Beach. (NARA 5)

[This is one of the few mentions that we have found so far of the death of a member of the American Forces (the so-called Indigo Force). It is not clear if he was killed by an American or British sentry.]

**Jan 13, 1942:** Gasoline was set on fire by Icelanders on the aerodrome at Camp Tripoli. (NARA 1, winter list)

[This is one of the few cases of sabotage that are mentioned in the records.]

**Jan 13, 1942:** During the 20 days 26 Sep 1941 – 17 Oct 1941, about $100,000 were
without making payment. The driver applied to a guard for assistance. He pointed
his gun at him and ordered him to leave. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 19, 1941:** An Icelander was beaten by soldiers while walking along Reynimel
(NARA 1, fall list).

**Dec 25, 1941:** Soldiers broke a window at the house of an Icelandic woman and thrashed her son. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 25, 1941:** A soldier accosted an Icelandic woman, Jakobina Grimsdottir, when she was walking along Karlagata street in Reykjavik. As he received no response, he attacked her, forced her to the ground but retreated when she was able to scream. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 28, 1941:** A taxi driver drove some soldiers to a camp in the Mosfells district. An argument arose over the fare and one of the soldiers stroke the driver. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 28, 1941:** A soldier attacked a 15-year old girl on Laugarnesvegur (NARA 1, fall list).

1942

**Jan 1942:** The Althing passed a law providing for the supervision of people under 21 and the sending of "immoral women" to a reformatory. This concerned especially the girls who were friendly with British troops. (Bittner 1975)

**Jan 1, 1942:** An Icelander was struck over the head with a bottle by a soldier
(NARA 1, winter list).

**Jan 11, 1942:** A soldier asked an Icelander for directions, but in the course of their conversation he became very angry and attacked the Icelander. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Jan 12, 1942:** ●(1,8,4) A US Navy 1st class Seaman named William Hon was shot and killed by a sentry at Balbos Beach. (NARA 5)
[This is one of the few mentions that we have found so far of the death of a member of the American Forces (the so-called Indigo Force). It is not clear if he was killed by an American or British sentry.]

**Jan 13, 1942:** Gasoline was set on fire by Icelanders on the aerodrome at Camp Tripoli. (NARA 1, winter list)
[This is one of the few cases of sabotage that are mentioned in the records.]

**Jan 13, 1942:** During the 20 days 26 Sep 1941 – 17 Oct 1941, about $100,000 were
sent in money orders from Iceland to the United States. In the 2 months 13 Nov 1941 – 13 Jan 1942, an amount of about $ 400,000 was sent in money orders from Iceland to the United States. (NARA 9)

[If one assumes that US 20,000 troops were present on average during this period, the previous amounts represent about 10 dollar per month and per serviceman. A previously given figure (see 24 November 1941) was $ 3 per month and per soldier.]

**Jan 15, 1942:** File No 470-Indigo-(SECRET). Subject: Guns for John Olafson Company of Reyjavik. (NARA 6)

[Unfortunately this file gives only an Index Sheet with the date and the subject; so far we have not been able to find the text. A telegram dated 13 January 1942 explains that this order was sent to the Savage Arms Corporation in Manhattan. A subsequent file (see below) recommends that the order should not be shipped. Note that the name of the company has different spellings: Hoh Olafsson in the telegram of 13 January, John Olafson in the report of 15 January.]

**Jan 17, 1942:** File No 470-Indigo-(SECRET). Subject: Recommendation that Olafson order be not shipped and also arms to Iceland civilians. (NARA 6)

[The meaning of “arms to Iceland civilians” remains obscure.]

**Jan 17, 1942:** Two Icelanders were attacked by American soldiers on Melavegur after they had approached them and asked them for the time. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Jan 19, 1942:** As an Icelandic automobile was passed by an American military truck on Mosfellssveitar road the soldiers who stood on the platform threw rocks and snow on the car and broke the windshield. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Jan 25, 1942:** A porter at Hotel Borg was struck by an American employed by the Army after he refused him entrance because the hotel was crowded. The American was intoxicated. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Jan 27, 1942:** An Icelandic woman was struck by an American soldier at Hotel Hekla. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Jan 27, 1942:** As an American military truck passed an Icelandic car the soldiers standing on the platform of the truck threw coke at the car and the windshield. Another Icelandic car that was following behind him met with the same treatment.

(NARA 1, winter list)

**Jan 31, 1942:** American soldiers who were fighting with British soldiers at a cafe struck an Icelander who happened to come in. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Feb 1942:** Since their arrival in July 1941, American troops had been paid in dollars. Apparently this lead to a great deal of black marketing and in February 1942 the
sent in money orders from Iceland to the United States. In the 2 months 13 Nov 1941 – 13 Jan 1942, an amount of about $ 400,000 was sent in money orders from Iceland to the United States. (NARA 9)

[If one assumes that US 20,000 troops were present on average during this period, the previous amounts represent about 10 dollar per month and per serviceman. A previously given figure (see 24 November 1941) was $ 3 per month and per soldier.]

**Jan 15, 1942:** File No 470-Indigo-(SECRET). Subject: Guns for John Olafson Company of Reyjavik. (NARA 6)

[Unfortunately this file gives only an Index Sheet with the date and the subject; so far we have not been able to find the text. A telegram dated 13 January 1942 explains that this order was sent to the Savage Arms Corporation in Manhattan. A subsequent file (see below) recommends that the order should not be shipped. Note that the name of the company has different spellings: Hoh Olafsson in the telegram of 13 January, John Olafson in the report of 15 January.]

**Jan 17, 1942:** File No 470-Indigo-(SECRET). Subject: Recommendation that Olafson order be not shipped and also arms to Iceland civilians. (NARA 6)

[The meaning of “arms to Iceland civilians” remains obscure.]

**Jan 17, 1942:** Two Icelanders were attacked by American soldiers on Melavegur after they had approached them and asked them for the time. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Jan 19, 1942:** As an Icelandic automobile was passed by an American military truck on Mosfellssveitar road the soldiers who stood on the platform threw rocks and snow on the car and broke the windshield. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Jan 25, 1942:** A porter at Hotel Borg was struck by an American employed by the Army after he refused him entrance because the hotel was crowded. The American was intoxicated. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Jan 27, 1942:** An Icelandic woman was struck by an American soldier at Hotel Hekla. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Jan 27, 1942:** As an American military truck passed an Icelandic car the soldiers standing on the platform of the truck threw coke at the car and the windshield. Another Icelandic car that was following behind him met with the same treatment.

(NARA 1, winter list)

**Jan 31, 1942:** American soldiers who were fighting with British soldiers at a cafe struck an Icelander who happened to come in. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Feb 1942:** Since their arrival in July 1941, American troops had been paid in dollars. Apparently this lead to a great deal of black marketing and in February 1942 the
change to kronur payments was made. (Conn et al. 1964, Chapter 19, p. 510)

**Feb 1, 1942:** Three intoxicated American soldiers attacked Icelanders on Frikirkjuegur (NARA 1, winter list).

**Feb 13, 1942:** ●(1,26,4) 18 British servicemen were drowned after their two small boats capsized (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Feb 14, 1942:** An Icelander was attacked by an American soldier at hotel Hekla; on February 17 a Norwegian was also attacked by an American soldier (NARA 1, winter list).

**Feb 14, 1942:** An Icelandic woman was attacked by an American soldier who visited her (NARA 1, winter list).

**Feb 15, 1942:** Telegram sent by General Bonesteel to the Adjutant General Office at the GHQ of the US Army.

Neither I nor General Marston [Marine Commander] have authorized Frederick Leonard [probably mispelling for Leonard] Kayan any rights or privileges as an officer in the Marine Corps. Surveillance of Kayan was requested by radio 3 February.

[Signed Bonesteel] (NARA 7)

[In order to understand this telegram one would need some additional information.]

**Feb 16, 1942:** ●(1,34,4) 8 British soldiers died when caught in blizzard in Iceland during a march (Times p. 3). According to Bittner (1974, chart No 7). the accident occurred on January 20, 1942 but was announced in the Times only one month later.

**Feb 17, 1942:** Fishermen were attacked and threatened with bayonets by American sentries as they were beaching their boat in Gardar parish west of Hafnarfjördur. (This incident is mentioned in a letter of 16 April 1942 by Prime Minister Jonasson: NARA 1)

**Feb 22, 1942:** An Icelander and a Lithuanian seaman were attacked by American soldiers who took their garrison belts off to hit them. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Mar 1942:** In early 1942 (probably in March) an American sentry shot and seriously wounded an Icelander at the port of Hafnarfjördur. (Hunt 1966, NARA 1, the exact date is not given).

**Mar 2, 1942:** Two American soldiers left Leif's cafe without making payment; a 14-year old boy who tried to hinder their leaving was struck down (NARA 1: winter list).

**Mar 4, 1942:** An Icelander was arrested after he drew a knife on a US soldier. (NARA 1), winter list)
change to kronur payments was made. (Conn et al. 1964, Chapter 19, p. 510)

**Feb 1, 1942:** Three intoxicated American soldiers attacked Icelanders on Frikirkjuegur (NARA 1, winter list).

**Feb 13, 1942:** ●(1,26,4) 18 British servicemen were drowned after their two small boats capsized (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Feb 14, 1942:** An Icelander was attacked by an American soldier at hotel Hekla; on February 17 a Norwegian was also attacked by an American soldier (NARA 1, winter list).

**Feb 14, 1942:** An Icelandic woman was attacked by an American soldier who visited her (NARA 1, winter list).

**Feb 15, 1942:** Telegram sent by General Bonesteel to the Adjutant General Office at the GHQ of the US Army.

Neither I nor General Marston [Marine Commander] have authorized Frederick Leonard [probably mispelling for Leonard] Kayan any rights or privileges as an officer in the Marine Corps. Surveillance of Kayan was requested by radio 3 February.

[Signed Bonesteel] (NARA 7)

[In order to understand this telegram one would need some additional information.]

**Feb 16, 1942:** ●(1,34,4) 8 British soldiers died when caught in blizzard in Iceland during a march (Times p. 3). According to Bittner (1974, chart No 7). the accident occurred on January 20, 1942 but was announced in the Times only one month later.

**Feb 17, 1942:** Fishermen were attacked and threatened with bayonets by American sentries as they were beaching their boat in Gardar parish west of Hafnarfjördur. (This incident is mentioned in a letter of 16 April 1942 by Prime Minister Jonasson: NARA 1)

**Feb 22, 1942:** An Icelander and a Lithuanian seaman were attacked by American soldiers who took their garrison belts off to hit them. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Mar 1942:** In early 1942 (probably in March) an American sentry shot and seriously wounded an Icelander at the port of Hafnarfjördur. (Hunt 1966, NARA 1, the exact date is not given).

**Mar 2, 1942:** Two American soldiers left Leif's cafe without making payment; a 14-year old boy who tried to hinder their leaving was struck down (NARA 1: winter list).

**Mar 4, 1942:** An Icelander was arrested after he drew a knife on a US soldier. (NARA 1), winter list)
**Mar 9, 1942:** A merchant marine seaman form the steamship Kingman was found in the Hekla hotel with a knife in his stomach. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Mar 14, 1942:** ●(1,34,5) A group of Icelanders misunderstood the command of an American sentry whereupon the sentry shot and killed one of them, Gunnar Einars-son (Hunt 1966). The sentry was court-martialed and acquitted (NARA 1, winter list).

**Mar 18, 1942:** Fishermen were fired upon on Skerjafjordur (NARA 1, winter list).

**Mar 30, 1942:** ●(1,36,5) Two British servicemen died when caught in blizzard during a training march (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Apr 2, 1942:** An Icelandic taxi driver was fired upon by an American sentinel near Hagi (NARA 1, winter list).

**Apr 6, 1942:** Excerpt of a memorandum by General Bonesteel. "I refer to the case of the Icelandic national, I.B. Riis, [the exact name seems to be Ib Arnason Riis] a paid German agent, who departed by submarine from Heligoland, March 29, 1942, landing by rubber boat at Fagranes, North East Iceland, April 6, 1942. He buried short-wave radio and codes in that area as weather forced him to seek shelter. Upon seizure by British Coast Watching Station, he confessed that his plan had been to send information concerning weather, troops and shipping to enemy agents." (NARA 1)

[This memorandum was sent by General Bonesteel to L. MacVeigh, the American Minister in Iceland at a date which is not specified on the document but which is comprised between 16 April 1942 and 11 May 1942. MacVeigh forwarded a copy of the memorandum to the Department of State as an enclosure attached to his despatch dated 11 May 1942 (see below at 16 April 1942). In that letter he says that he also forwarded a copy of the memorandum to Prime Minister Jonasson. In his statement Gen. Bonesteel does not say that after his arrest Riis accepted to work for British counter intelligence. Probably he did not know, otherwise he would certainly not have revealed that Riis had been arrested. Anyway, for British intelligence it was certainly a risky proposition to use Riis because it may have been tricky to keep his arrest secret in a sparsely populated country like Iceland especially if Riis had some Icelandic contacts which was likely since himself was an Icelander. See below at the date of 27 June 1942 the continuation of this story.]

**Apr 14, 1942:** An American guard was placed aboard the Icelandic shooner "Artic" and an investigation was initiated of its voyage from Vigo, Spain to Reykjavik where it arrived on on 24 February 1942. According to the American Commander, General Bonesteel, the investigation revealed that reports of shipping movements were sent
**Mar 9, 1942:** A merchant marine seaman form the steamship Kingman was found in the Hekla hotel with a knife in his stomach. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Mar 14, 1942:** ●(1,34,5) A group of Icelanders misunderstood the command of an American sentry whereupon the sentry shot and killed one of them, Gunnar Einarson (Hunt 1966). The sentry was court-martialed and acquitted (NARA 1, winter list).

**Mar 18, 1942:** Fishermen were fired upon on Skerjafjordur (NARA 1, winter list).

**Mar 30, 1942:** ●(1,36,5) Two British servicemen died when caught in blizzard during a training march (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Apr 2, 1942:** An Icelandic taxi driver was fired upon by an American sentinel near Hagi (NARA 1, winter list).

**Apr 6, 1942:** Excerpt of a memorandum by General Bonesteel. "I refer to the case of the Icelandic national, I.B. Riis, [the exact name seems to be Ib Arnason Riis] a paid German agent, who departed by submarine from Heligoland, March 29, 1942, landing by rubber boat at Fagranes, North East Iceland, April 6, 1942. He buried short-wave radio and codes in that area as weather forced him to seek shelter. Upon seizure by British Coast Watching Station, he confessed that his plan had been to send information concerning weather, troops and shipping to enemy agents." (NARA 1)

[This memorandum was sent by General Bonesteel to L. MacVeigh, the American Minister in Iceland at a date which is not specified on the document but which is comprised between 16 April 1942 and 11 May 1942. MacVeigh forwarded a copy of the memorandum to the Department of State as an enclosure attached to his despatch dated 11 May 1942 (see below at 16 April 1942). In that letter he says that he also forwarded a copy of the memorandum to Prime Minister Jonasson. In his statement Gen. Bonesteel does not say that after his arrest Riis accepted to work for British counter intelligence. Probably he did not know, otherwise he would certainly not have revealed that Riis had been arrested. Anyway, for British intelligence it was certainly a risky proposition to use Riis because it may have been tricky to keep his arrest secret in a sparsely populated country like Iceland especially if Riis had some Icelandic contacts which was likely since himself was an Icelander. See below at the date of 27 June 1942 the continuation of this story.]

**Apr 14, 1942:** An American guard was placed aboard the Icelandic shooner "Artic" and an investigation was initiated of its voyage from Vigo, Spain to Reykjavik where it arrived on on 24 February 1942. According to the American Commander, General Bonesteel, the investigation revealed that reports of shipping movements were sent
by wireless to German agents in Spain and that the wireless set was secretly brought ashore on 9 April 1942 while the ship was in Reykjavik's harbor. (NARA 1)

**Apr 16, 1942:** Excerpt of a letter addressed by Prime Minister Hermann Jonasson to the American Chargé d'Affaires.

"It is deserving of notice that since the British troops landed here it cannot be proved or even made probable that one single act of sabotage has been done by the Icelanders." (NARA 1)

[This is a fairly strong statement, but it turns out that it cannot be considered trustworthy as shown by the following comments made by the US representative in Iceland. A copy of Jonasson's letter was sent to the State Department by Lincoln MacVeagh on 11 May 1942. In his comments, MacVeagh writes: "Two categorical statements made by the Prime Minister are definitely incorrect, according to information supplied to me by the Commanding General [General Charles Bonesteel] namely, that the Icelanders have committed no acts of sabotage and that the representatives of the Icelandic Government are not afforded the opportunity to be present at investigations conducted by the military. Telephone and telegraph communication in the island have certainly been interfered with by Icelanders from time to time." (NARA 1)]

In a memorandum to MacVeagh General Bonesteel gives evidence of cases of attack on Americans, theft, sabotage and spying. He writes: "The criminal files of the civilian police have many reports of offenses committed by Icelanders who have acted in a hostile manner to us ever since we came on the island; surely, the government is aware of anti-American and pro-Nazi talk, speeches, and activities indulged." Bonesteel observes that it is a prevalent custom to throw stones at US Army vehicles. More specifically he mentions the following incidents:

(i) On 13 January 1942, gasoline was set on fire by Icelanders on the aerodrome at Camp Tripoli.

(ii) In early March 1942, an Icelander attacked an American civilian in the lobby of the Borg Hotel.

(iii) On 4 March 1942, an Icelander was arrested after he drew a knife on a US soldier.

(iv) On 9 March 1942 a merchant seaman was found in the Hekla hotel with a knife in his stomach.

(v) In April 1942 an Icelander ran over an American soldier and injured him severely.

(vi) On 24 April 1942 the Military Police found that an Icelander had been shooting holes in army huts with a 0.22 caliber rifle.

(vii) The Erlendur case reveals at least one Icelander who stole a pistol, ammunition and was caught when trying to get another weapon from the American Army (the