quantities of gas for domestic consumption and become a regional energy hub. These developments have automatically led to an intensification of Russian-Turkish economic relations. The state of affairs has drawn the attention of Western observers who look with suspicion at strengthening the Russian-Turkish relationship, especially in the context in which Turkey is a NATO member and the Russian Federation the main security threat to the Alliance<fnref n="23" />.

Although Turkish officials believe that TurkStream is in Turkey's national interest and that the project does not represent a distance from the West, the pipeline favors emergencies of a long-term mutual dependence between the Russian and Turkish states<fnref n="24" />. In the last years, Turkey has made sustained efforts to diversify energy sources, which has led to lower imports of hydrocarbons from the Russian Federation. Despite these evolutions, the Russian Federation continues to be the largest exporter of natural gas to Turkey, having strategic advantages over Ankara<fnref n="25" />.

## 3.2. Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant

Given the increase in energy consumption, the lack of domestic fossil fuel resources, and the high dependence on energy imports, nuclear energy is one of the available alternatives for Turkey. Thus, Turkish officials plan to produce domestically about 10,000 MW of electricity from nuclear sources by 2030. To achieve this goal, Turkey accepted the Russian state-owned company Rosatom's offer to build a Nuclear Power Plant in Akkuyu. The Turkish state also plans to build a second nuclear power plant in the Sinop region, in partnership with a Japanese-French consortium, and a third nuclear power plant in partnership with China<fnref n="26" />.

Akkuyu NPP is a representative project for the bilateral Russian-Turkish energy relationship. The project was launched in 2010, when Turkey signed an agreement with the Russian state-owned company Rosatom, the latter committing to build four nuclear reactors at Akkuyu with a total installed capacity of 4800 MW. Under the terms of the Agreement, on December 13, 2010, the Russian side established a project company in the territory of the Republic of Turkey – Akkuyu Nuclear Joint-Stock Company (Akkuyu Nükleer Anonim Şirketi). The Akkuyu NPP construction project in Turkey is the first-ever NPP project implemented according to the BOO model (Build - Own - Operate). Under the long-term contract, the Russian company provides the design, construction, maintenance, operation, and decommissioning of the NPP. The stake of Rosatom State Corporation in the project is 99.2% and the total project cost is estimated at 20 billion US dollars. According to the official website of Akkuyu NPP, the project is "the biggest one in the history of Russian-Turkish relations" and "it opens new vistas for cooperation between Russian and Turkey and provides opportunities for exchange of technologies and experience"<fnref n="27" />.

During the launching ceremony of the Akkuyu NPP project, the then Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yıldız underlined that "Economic development cannot take place in a country without nuclear energy". The minister also mentioned that "If the Akkuyu plant had been built a decade ago, Turkey would have saved $14 billion in natural gas purchases and nuclear power would today cover 28% of

<footnote n="23">²³ Hilal Köylü, *Turkey and Russia: TurkStream pipeline not a fix for bilateral woes*, July 01, 2020, accessed May 14, 2021, online available at: https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-and-russia-turkstream-pipeline-not-a-fix-for-bilateral-woes/a-51923019.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Galip Dalay, "After the S-400 Purchase: Where Are Turkish-Russian Relations Heading?", *German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, September 03, 2019, accessed May 15, 2021, online available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/after-the-s-400-purchase-where-are-turkish-russian-relations-heading.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Nuran Erkul Kaya, *Turkey's gas imports from Iran see sharp fall in 2020*, February 26, 2021, accessed May 15, 2021, online available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/energy-diplomacy/turkeys-gas-imports-from-iran-see-sharp-fall-in-2020/31999.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Huseyin Erdogan, *Turkey to build 3rd nuclear plant with China: Erdogan*, June 19, 2018, accessed May 16, 2021, online available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/nuclear/turkey-to-build-3rd-nuclear-plant-with-china-erdogan/20544.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Akkuyu Nuclear Rosatom, accessed May 15, 2021, online available at: http://www.akkunpp.com/index.php?lang=en.</footnote>
the electricity demand”<fnref n="28" />. According to calculations made by the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, if Akkuyu NPP were to start functioning, then it alone would provide electricity to a large city with a population of 15 million, such as Istanbul<fnref n="29" />.

The construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is a complex process, which facilitates the intensification of cooperation between the Russian Federation and Turkey. Russian and Turkish specialists from several fields cooperate and work together to complete the project<fnref n="30" />. As part of an agreement between the two governments, students from Turkish universities, mostly engineers, have been enrolling in training programs in Russia since 2011 to take jobs afterward at the Akkuyu Nuclear Plant, which is being constructed in the Mediterranean province of Mersin<fnref n="31" />. In March 2018, took place the first graduation of Turkish students trained in the nuclear energy field at the leading specialized university – National Research Nuclear University (MEPhI).

35 Turkish young professionals successfully completed a 6.5 long year training course with a degree in “Nuclear power plants: design, operation and engineering”. All of them received higher education diplomas in Russia and were hired by Akkuyu Nuclear Jsc to implement the project of the first nuclear power plant in Turkey. In 2019, another 53 young specialists from Turkey who received higher specialized education at MEPhI were hired by the company. In February 2020, 54 graduates of MEPhI received their diplomas, followed by job offers to join the Akkuyu project<fnref n="32" />.

Although the specific activities carried out to build the NPP facilitate the bilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and Turkey, the project is still challenging, especially for the Turkish state. Given that the Russian Federation builds, owns, and operates the Akkuyu NPP, Moscow has a dominant position compared to Turkey. At the same time, in addition to the economic advantages obtained by the Russian Federation following the implementation of the project, the Russian state also gains a series of strategic advantages, Akkuyu NPP being the only nuclear power plant built and controlled by the Russian Federation in a NATO state. Although the Akkuyu NPP is an energy project with economic implications for the Russian Federation and Turkey, it cans also have strategic and security implications. The Russian state is known for using energy diplomacy in an offensive manner, which is why Moscow will be able to use the Akkuyu energy project to exert pressure and influence the decisions of the political establishment in Ankara, especially during a crisis. Akkuyu NPP is the first nuclear power plant created according to the BOO model (Build - Own - Operate), which means maintaining long-term favorable relations in the Russian and Turkish states. The fact that the Russian Federation will own the Akkuyu nuclear power plant for about 60 years, with an extension period of 20 years, will have a considerable impact on Russian-Turkish relations. The situation favors the asymmetric nature of the interdependence between the Russian Federation and Turkey. Turkey will depend on the Russian Federation to ensure technology, nuclear fuel, skilled labor, know-how etc<fnref n="33" />.

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Ground broken for Turkey's first nuclear power plant, April 15, 2015, accessed May 16, 2021, online available at: https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Ground-broken-for-Turkeys-first-nuclear-power-plant-1541501.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Akkuyu Nuclear Rosatom, *Economic Effect, Expected project effect for the region*, accessed May 16, 2021, online available at: http://www.akkuyu.com/economic-effect.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Tuncay Babali, “The Role Of Energy In Turkey’s Relations With Russia And Iran”, *The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey*, Ankara, March 29, 2012, p. 4.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Mithat Yurdakul, *Turkish engineers trained in Russia take jobs at country's first nuclear plant*, April 13, 2021, accessed May 16, 2021, online available at: https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-engineers-trained-in-russia-take-jobs-at-countrys-first-nuclear-plant-163893.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² Akkuyu Nuclear Rosatom, *op. cit.*</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ Turkey, Russia lay foundation for third unit of Akkuyu NPP, Daily Sabah, Istanbul, March 10, 2021, accessed May 17, 2021, online available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/turkey-russia-lay-foundation-for-third-unit-of-akkuyu-npp.</footnote>
Despite the substantial economic benefits that the Akkuyu NPP will bring to Turkey, the Turkish officials' decision to cooperate with the Russian Federation represents a paradox. Even though Turkey resorted to several strategies designed to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, Ankara is deepening its cooperation with the Russian Federation in the nuclear field. In other words, Turkey's dependence on the Russian federation's energy resources is maintained. Moreover, the degree of complexity in energy relations between the two states will increase. The Akkuyu project has suffered criticism from the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, which in 2019 issued a written report and warned that electricity generated from Akkuyu "would increase Turkey's dependence" on foreign countries. The report also states that "the energy generated in Akkuyu will be sold by the Russian side to the Turkish state at 275 percent higher prices than general energy costs in Turkey. Income from this will be sent abroad in the form of foreign currency"<fnref n="34" />. It should be noted that for 15 years there is a purchasing guarantee for 70% of the electricity produced by the first two units and 30% from the third and fourth reactors at an average price of 12.35 cents / kWh. At the end of the 15 years, the prices will be settled by the market<fnref n="35" />.

Regarding the geopolitical dimension of the Akkuyu NPP, Jamelle Bal underlines that the project is part of the Russian Federation's strategy to finance nuclear energy programs in the Middle East. According to Ball, the outcome of Akkuyu NPP is not just economic. In his opinion, Russian Federation and Turkey intend to increase their regional influence in opposition to US interests<fnref n="36" />. It is important to note that in August 2016, after a meeting between President Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım designated Akkuyu as a strategic investment<fnref n="37" />. The Akkuyu project is essential for the Kremlin, especially for ensuring and increasing the credibility of its nuclear reactors under the conditions of the competitive reactor market<fnref n="38" />.

Akkuyu NPP favors the intensification of cooperation between the Russian Federation and Turkey in the nuclear energy field. Moreover, the complexity of the project favors the intensification of cooperation in other domains. Akkuyu NPP generates benefits for Moscow and Ankara, but it deepens Turkey's dependence on the Russian Federation. The Russian state will be the de-facto owner of the Akkuyu NPP, even though the project is being built on Turkish ground. Moreover, given that Turkey will depend on the expertise, nuclear material, and decommissioning provided by the Russian Federation, Moscow will have a new level of control over the political establishment in Ankara.

Moreover, the Akkuyu NPP is the only nuclear project built and owned by the Russian Federation in a NATO member state, and Moscow has the opportunity to jeopardize the relationship between Ankara and the Alliance by resorting to blackmailing operations. Through the Akkuyu NPP and TurkStream 2, the complexity of energy cooperation between the Russian Federation and Turkey has increased substantially, which reduces Ankara's room for maneuver in its relations with Moscow.

<footnote n="34">³⁴ Ilgin Karlidag and Ksenia Idrisova, *Analysis: Fears of nuclear disaster as Russia builds Turkey's first plant*, August 28, 2019, accessed May 17, 2021, onlie available at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c2011oyk.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ Soli Özel and Gökçe Uçar, "The Economics of Turkey-Russia relations", *Centre for Economics and Foreign policy Studies*, Foreign Policy and Security, NO.10, July 2019, p. 23.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Jamelee Bal, "Turkey's pursuit of nuclear energy. A case study of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant", *The Institute for Middle East Studies*, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, November 2015, p. 20-21.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">³⁷ Bariş Şimşek, *Akkuyu nuclear power plant turns into strategic investment*, August 11, 2016, accessed May 18, 2021, online available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2016/08/11/akkuyu-nuclear-power-plant-turns-into-strategic-investment.</footnote>

<footnote n="38">³⁸ Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney, "Where Does Turkey Stand in the Quest for Civilian Nuclear Energy in the Middle East?", *Perceptions, Journal Of International Affairs*, Center for Strategic Research, Summer-Autumn 2017 Volume XXII - Number 2-3, pp. 95-96.</footnote>
4. S-400 TRIUMPH MISSILE SYSTEM AFFAIR – MORE SECURITY FOR TURKEY NEW THREATS FOR NATO

The Turkish-owned air defense systems and those deployed by the Allies in Turkey cannot
defend the entire airspace of the Turkish state. Against this background, the political establishment
in Ankara has taken steps to purchase more advanced missile defense systems from third parties.
Ankara has negotiated with several NATO and non-NATO states for the delivery of such types of
military hardware. For example, the political leaders in Ankara focused on the acquisition of the
Patriot anti-missile system, but the US did not agree to build Patriot systems on Turkish territory and
transfer technology to the Turkish army. In this context, Turkish officials decided to buy the Russian-
made S-400 Triumph missile defense system. Ibrahim Kalin, the Turkish Presidential
Administration spokesman, stated on April 05, 2018 that “Turkey decided to buy the Russian system
to ensure its national security”. The Turkish official also mentioned that his country welcomes the
statement issued by Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, who declared that “the acquisition
of the system is Turkey’s sovereign decision”. In the context of the EU and US opposition to Turkey-
Russia deal, Ibrahim Kalin states that “S-400 Triumph are a system purchased to meet Turkey’s
defense needs, therefore it is already out of the question for them to pose a threat to any other
country”. At the same time, to contradict the rumors that the Russian Federation is an alternative to
the West, Ibrahim Kalin stressed that “Turkey will be willing in the future to acquire Patriot systems
in the conditions in which the American side will accept the conditions imposed by Ankara”<fnref n="39" />.

Given the lack of consensus with the US on the Patriot deal, in July of 2019, Turkey received the first components of the Russian-made S-400 Triumph system<fnref n="40" />. Moreover, by January 2020, Moscow had sent in Turkey all S-400 Triumph components<fnref n="41" />. Even though NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg declared in 2017 that “the S-400 issue is the sovereign decision of Turkey”, the US protested vehemently against the deal<fnref n="42" />. US officials have drawn attention to the fact that the Russian Federation, through the S-400 Triumph system delivered to Turkey, has the opportunity to collect information about NATO military installations deployed on and around Turkish territory. At the same time, the American side drew attention to the security risks that the S-400 Triumph system can generate. Due to the fact that Turkey has not given up the acquisition of the S-400 Triumph system, Washington has decided to exclude Ankara from the program designed to build the F-35 fighter jet, refusing to deliver this type of aircraft to the Turkish army<fnref n="43" />.

Moreover, the US government decided to impose economic sanctions against the Turkish
Presidency of Defense Industries and activated the CAATSA sanctions mechanism (Countering
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act). The sanctions are imposed on any person
determined to have knowingly engaged in a significant transaction with a person that is a part of, or

<footnote n="39">³⁹ Statement by Presidential Spokesperson Ambassador İbrahim Kalın, April 05, 2018, accessed May 31, 2021, online available at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/spokesperson/1696/92515/statement-by-presidential-spokesperson-ambassador-ibrahim-kalin.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ Burak Ege Bekdil, *Turkey makes deal to buy Russian-made S-400 air defense system*, Decembrie 29, 2017, Online: https://www.defensenews.com/land/2017/12/29/turkey-russia-reportedly-sign-loan-deal-for-s-400-air-defense-system/, Accessed: 23.09.2020.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">⁴¹ Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey’s Critical ‘S-400 Moment’ Has Arrived, The Jamestown Foundation”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor* Volume: 17 Issue: 61, 4 May 2020.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">⁴² Robin Emmott, *No angst over Turkey's air defense deal with Russia, says NATO chief*, October 10, 2017, accessed May 31, 2021, online available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-turkey-idUSKBN1CF1CF.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">⁴³ U.S. removing Turkey from F-35 program after its Russian missile defense purchase, July 17, 2019, accessed April 11, 2021, online available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-turkey-security-f35-idUSKCN1UC2GL.</footnote>
operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation<fnref n="44" />.

Although Turkey is one of the NATO member states that allowed the US to use its military bases, Washington contested Turkey's decision to acquire the S-400 Triumph system. The US attitude highlights the importance the US government attaches to the bilateral relationship with Turkey and the latter's actions. If until the S-400 deal the US reactions were moderate and there were critical statements against the Erdogan regime, after the delivery by the Russian Federation of the military anti-aircraft installation, a radical change of US rhetoric was observed. The exclusion of Turkey from the F-35 program and the initiation of the CAATSA sanctions mechanism is only part of the US strategy to punish Turkish officials. The Biden administration considered it appropriate for the US to increase the level of pressure on the political establishment in Ankara. On this basis, in April of 2021, Washington officially recognized the Armenian genocide, holding Turkey responsible for the events of 1915. Although the US decision has no economic implications for Turkey, it has important symbolic significance, generating dismay among Turkish political leaders<fnref n="45" />.

These developments show that there is a limited level of tolerance for others in terms of Russian-Turkish cooperation. Washington's actions to punish Turkey indicate that the US will no longer allow the Ankara settlement to exceed limits that could jeopardize the US and NATO security. In other words, the intensification of Russian-Turkish cooperation in the energy and military fields poses the potential to foster a cleavage between Turkey and NATO. Although there is no tangible evidence that the intensification of Russian-Turkish cooperation has led Ankara to act contrary to NATO's interests and policies, many of the recent Turkish state's policies raised questions about the Turkish state's intentions. It is worth mentioning that during 2019 Turkey was the only NATO state that blocked the Eagle Defender plan, a project aimed at defending Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania from possible military aggression orchestrated by the Russian Federation<fnref n="46" />.

Also, in the context of the tensions erupted between the West and Belarus, during May 2021, Ankara pushed NATO to tone down its condemnation of Minsk's grounding of a Ryanair plane and its decision to arrest a dissident journalist. In this context, NATO's 30 allies released a two-paragraph statement condemning the forcing down of a Ryanair flight to arrest journalist Roman Protasevich but did not include any punitive steps that Baltic States and Poland had pressed for. Ankara insisted that any mention of support for more Western sanctions on Belarus, and calls for the release of political prisoners there, would be left out of the statement. Turkey's insistence on a watered-down text upset several allies, particularly Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, which had pushed for tougher wording<fnref n="47" />.

<footnote n="44">⁴⁴ CAATSA Section 231 "Imposition of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries", U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Greece, Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesperson, December 14, 2020, accessed May 31, 2021, online available at https://gr.usembassy.gov/caatsa-section-231-imposition-of-sanctions-on-turkish-presidency-of-defense-industries/.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵ Biden's recognition of Armenian massacres as genocide is to honor victims - U.S. official, Apriul 24, 2021, accessed May 31, 2021, online available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/bidens-recognition-armenian-massacres-genocide-is-honor-victims-us-official-2021-04-24/.</footnote>

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶ NATO puts defense plan for Poland, Baltics into action, officials say, July 02, 2020, accessed May 29, 2021, online available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-baltics-turkey-idUSKBN24320B.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">⁴⁷ Humeyra Pamuk and Robin Emmott, *Turkey pushed NATO allies into softening outrage over Belarus plane, diplomats say*, May 28, 2021, accessed May 29, 2021, online available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/exclusive-turkey-pushed-nato-allies-into-softening-outrage-over-belarus-plane-2021-05-27/.</footnote>
CONCLUSIONS

The 2016 rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow marked the beginning of a new stage in Russian-Turkish bilateral relations. This process accelerated the construction of the TurkStream gas pipeline and the Akkuyu NPP. At the same time, Moscow has exploited the deteriorating relationship between Turkey and the West and facilitated the cooperation process with Ankara. Thus, Moscow and Ankara extended the cooperation process from the energy field to the military one. In other words, the economic relations between the two states created a favorable framework for expanding cooperation in the military field, which led to the deepening of Russian-Turkish ties and the increasing complexity of the bilateral relationship. These developments have favored the increase in the number of contact channels between the two states, which is why we can argue that the relationship between the Russian Federation and Turkey after 2016 is in line with the first feature of Complex Interdependence – multiple channels connect societies.

After 2000, cooperation between the Russian Federation and Turkey intensified, especially in the energy field. However, starting in 2016, the bilateral relationship agendas changed substantially, being added new layers of complexity. The main characteristic of it after 2016 is the lack of a pre-established hierarchy concerning the bilateral dossiers. Thus, the evolution of the Russian-Turkish bilateral relations after 2016 is in line with the second characteristic of Complex Interdependence which stipulates that interstate relations consist of multiple issues without a clear hierarchy.

Concerning the use of military power, the high level of economic cooperation between the two states has led their leaders to exercise caution when using military capabilities. Despite divergent interests in the war in Syria, the Russian Federation and Turkey were not involved in direct fights but only through proxies. The armed forces of the Russian Federation and Turkey killed Russian and Turkish soldiers, but just accidentally. However, the policymakers from Moscow and Ankara rapidly mitigated the political tensions generated by the incidents without causing a possible escalation.

Moreover, the intensification of military cooperation between Moscow and Ankara and the Turkish state's acquisition of the Russian S-400 Triumph air defense system has considerably diminished the possibility of the Russian Federation and Turkey attacking each other. In other words, by providing an air defense system to Turkey, the Russian Federation has helped strengthen Turkey's defense capabilities. In the light of these evolutions, we can conclude that Russia-Turkey energy and military cooperation created a propitious environment for the Complex Interdependence to manifest in the bilateral relationship between the Russian Federation and Turkey.

As for the capacity of the Russo-Turkish economic and strategic partnership to impact the relationship between Ankara and NATO, the situation is nuanced, and the answer is highly complex. The Russian Federation has always agreed with Turkey's reserved attitude towards expanding NATO's military presence in the Black Sea and has used its tools to reward this approach. Thus, during the Crimean Peninsula annexation, the Kremlin granted Turkey a 6% discount for the Russian gas imports. In the same context, the Russian Federation and Turkey signed the agreement to start work on the TurkStream gas pipeline. It also should be noted that Turkey had a reserved attitude towards the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian state and did not join the sanctions regime adopted against the Kremlin by the West. Moreover, Ankara used the crisis to increase the volume of exports of consumer goods to the Russian Federation.

As for the Akkuyu project, the Turkish officials awarded the construction of the nuclear power plant to a Russian state company even though the Turkish state's energy strategy aims to reduce its energy reliance on the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the Akkuyu NPP is the only nuclear power plant built by the Kremlin on the territory of a NATO state. Thus, Akkuyu NPP has the potential to deepen the Russia-Turkey bilateral relationship. It also facilitates the interdependence between the two states to manifest.
Similarly, Turkey's acquisition of the S-400 Triumph air defense system has increased the complexity of the Russian-Turkish bilateral relationship and thus the level of interdependence between the two states. Furthermore, the Russo-Turkish cooperation in the military field strained the Ankara-West ties, amid the security risks that the S-400 Triumph may pose to NATO's security infrastructure.

Even though the Russia-Turkey cooperation in the energy and military fields can generate security risks on NATO, the Ankara officials did not adopt a more cautious approach toward the Russian Federation. In conclusion, energy and military cooperation between Moscow and Ankara represents a factor that can lead to a change in the foreign policy priorities of the Turkish state. At the same time, the projects jointly developed by Moscow and Ankara have created the framework for the manifestation of the Complex Interdependence between the Russian Federation and Turkey, which will alter the dialogue between Ankara and the West.

**Acknowledgment:** "This article was elaborated within the Human Capital Operational Program 2014-2020, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project POCU/380/6/13/124708 no. 37141/23.05.2019, with the title "Researcher-Entrepreneur on Labour Market in the Fields of Intelligent Specialization (CERT-ANTREP)", coordinated by the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration.

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Global issues

Palermo Treaty System. Towards the Universal Criminal Justice. 20 Years After

PROF. ANIS H. BAJREKTAREVIC<fnref n="1" />

IFIMES VIENNA

CARLOS LOPEZ-VERAZA PÉREZ<fnref n="2" />

SPANISH PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

**Abstract:** 2020 marked the 20th anniversary of the Palermo Convention and its Protocols, the main instruments in the fight against transnational crime. Both authors, one as an active participant in the Palermo system treaty-making and the other as a prosecutor passionate about human rights, revisit, rethink and sum up the first 20-year period after the creation of these important international instruments on organized crime and corruption. The following lines are a brief assessment of the central institutions and instruments relevant to universal criminal justice. A due reference is made to corruption, trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling, and terrorism. The present text appeared in 1999 for the first time (in a considerably shorter form, as the working paper dealing only with the critical similarities and differences between 'smuggling of' and 'trafficking in') before the ICMPD Steering Board – Ministerial.<fnref n="3" />

**Keywords:** JHA, diplomacy, international regime, multilateral treaties, trafficking in human beings, terrorism, UNODC, universal criminal justice

JHA DIPLOMACY: FROM ISOLATED INSTRUMENTS TO THE SOLID INTERNATIONAL REGIME

<figure><img src="image_7.png" /></figure>

The last few decades are marking a significant breakthrough in the efforts towards the universal criminal justice. The sporadic international instruments (that accommodated expressed interests of member countries on a rather ad hoc basis) are showing – by its number and scope – a new quality: a more structured and interlinked set of rules and provisions of international law

<footnote n="1">¹ Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic - In the 1990s, serving as the Senior Legal Officer and Permanent Representative to the UN Office in Vienna, Anis H. Bajrektarevic has been actively taking part (or/and holding the statements) at the 10th UN Congress (On the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders – ODCCP, 10–17 April 2000); 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th annual Commission of CICP (UN Centre for International Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice); 41st, 42nd, 43rd and 44th annual (CND) Commission of UN DCP (Drugs Control Programme); at all 11 sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee on the elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three additional instruments (period 1998-2000), and at the High-level Political Signing UN Conference, Palermo 12–15 December 2000. For the past twenty years, the author has been research and teaching professor on international law. Prof. Bajrektarevic authored 8 books for the American and European publishers. On subject of international law itself, he has over 1,200 teaching hours. He still actively observes the work of the Vienna-based UN ODC (Office on Drugs and Crimes).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Carlos López-Veraza Pérez is Spanish public prosecutor since 2012 (specialised in HR, human trafficking, the protection of persons with disabilities, and gender-based violence). Served as a lawyer at the European Court of Human Rights (secondment 2020-21). He is the author of numerous legal publications and the author of the book "Criminal Law in the Eu and the Right to a Fair Trial." He has given several lectures on human trafficking and migrant smuggling issues, both at the international and national level. He has represented the Spanish Prosecutor's Office in activities before organisations such as the OSCE or the IOM. He is currently participating as an expert in the Euromed Justice Programme organised by Eurojust.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ *Remark:* Present text is a 10-year-after update to the original text: JHA Diplomacy – Ten Years After *authored by* professor Bajrektarevic for the Addleton Academic Publishers, NY, GHIR 3 (1) 2011</footnote>
(often pre-supposing the advanced development of both institutions and instruments). Therefore, we
can safely say that by now these instruments are creating a (new) practice of states, which theory
usually labels as The International Regime<fnref n="4" />. We are indeed witnessing a progressive development
of International Criminal Justice Regime.

Among the essential instruments, some of the fundamental ones are brokered at the Office on
Drugs and Crime (ODC) – a Vienna based part of the UN Secretariat that primarily deals with Crimes
and (Narcotic) Drugs, including corruption and a small branch department on terrorism prevention
(TPB). It operates in more than 80 countries, with 2400 UNDOC personnel globally.<fnref n="5" /> The UN ODC
is a guardian of the Narcotic Drugs Treaty System<fnref n="6" /> as well as the Organized Crime – Corruption
Treaty System.<fnref n="7" />

Since dealing with the problems of crime and narcotic drugs confronts us with clandestine,
illicit and nearly always the illegal trans-border criminal activity, we have – first of all – to make an
important distinction between two legal terms: (i) international crime and (ii) transnational crime:

(i) the former refers to offenses prescribed by international law, which can be prosecuted (previously by the international tribunals, including the Ad Hoc tribunals for the former YU as well as for Rwanda, and now) by the standing International Criminal Court, as the Rome Convention entered into force in July of 2002.

(ii) the later rather refers to more conventional (nationally proscribed) crimes which do involve
more than one national jurisdiction, and therefore require a transnational or/and cross- border
response.

When dealing with issues of transnational crime, the usual response is a treaty or
(multilateral/trilateral, bilateral) agreement between the state parties as to ensure that:

- the very conduct involved is a crime proscribed by domestic law;

- each state party has adequate jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute and punish offenses which occur only partly on their territory or which have other links, such as the involvement of citizens as either offenders or victims;

- state parties agree to provide necessary forms of cooperation to each other.

These are the basic functions of the multilateral legal instruments such as the Palermo
Convention and the UN Convention against Corruption.

As transnational organized crime grows, sophisticates and proliferates, there is an evident need
to create a larger body of international legislation of this kind. These requests are not without
controversies, as the experience with the International Criminal Court illustrates:

- it is still understood that international treaties cause certain erosion of national sovereignty
and that they do hinder domestic political priorities for crime-control;

- treaties are expensive to administer and moderately effective in the monitoring of
compliance mechanisms;

<footnote n="4">⁴ We can tentatively define the international regime as: Any set of norms of behaviour and of rules and policies, which extensively cover relevant international issue, and facilitate substantive or procedural arrangements among the States (and IOs) they address.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ UNDOC, *Untoc at 20*, Vienna, 2020, p.46</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ This “system” is composed of: The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) and the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), in force since 1990 with over 175 parties to the instrument. The UN (ODC) Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) also oversees the comprehensive list of precursors and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacturing of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances (which are by the letter of instrument kept under international control).</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ This “system” is composed of: The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (known as the Palermo Convention of 2000, in force since September 2003, with 159 parties by February 2011). Attached to this main are three additional instruments: (i) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish</footnote>
– finally, treaties are usually negotiated on consensus, which ensures wide agreement basis, but a “lowest common denominator” on substance – the provisions are what everyone could agree upon and often do not go as far as some state parties would like (or have domesticated in their own legislation).

However, the crime treaties will almost certainly be expanded as pressures to deal with global problems are gradually overcoming national reluctance. Consequently, it was expected that new instruments would be stipulated against varied sorts of transnational organized crime in the form of additional protocols to the Palermo Convention. Despite this, 20 years have passed, and it does not look like it will be extended for the time being. Although this does not prevent the UNTOC from adapting to new forms of organised crime. It is a flexible legal instrument, drafted in broad terms, so that it can adapt with the times, and it has established itself as a fundamental mechanism in international cooperation. Having dealt with Narcotic Drugs, Organized Crime, Terrorism Financing and Corruption related treaties, the international community is now turning its attention to forms of the private/corporate sector and of individual or non-organized crime. Let us now quickly elaborate on the current state of the International Criminal Regime (its universal and regional European bodies), with a brief overview on the peculiarities of each of its main constituting elements.

## IRREGULAR MIGRATION

Irregular migration is mainly carried out in the following ways:

A. By crossing the international border without the required travel documents (solely or by using the services of professional traffickers):

- either far away from regular border-points, via the green (land/woods), blue (river/lake/sea) or white (aboard of flying object) borders;

- or via the regular border-crossings, but hidden (in truck/car/ship/train/aircraft).

B. By crossing the international border de facto legal, although using:

- either falsified or stolen document;

- or regular document displaying a forged/falsified visa.

C. Each host-country usually issues several types of visas (entry/stay conditions) for different purposes and most of them have a time and activity limit. A person becomes illegal or undocumented by violating any of these limits:

- either by overstaying the permit-period granted to the entering individual;

- or otherwise violating the entry-conditions and visa-purpose (student visa for employment, pro form marriage, false family-reunion etc.).

## IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN FIGURES

The figures of irregular immigration and migrant smuggling can provide an idea of the magnitude of the phenomenon. It has been estimated that in 2017⁸ there were 10.5 million people in the US living in an irregular situation and 4.8 million in the European Union<fnref n="9" />. Furthermore, while not all migrants who enter other territories irregularly are victims of migrant smuggling, many are. It has been calculated that approximately 375,000 people per year are smuggled to Europe via the three main Mediterranean routes and 735,000 to 800,000 people to North America<fnref n="10" /> According to

<footnote n="8">⁸ IOM World Migration Report 2020 (p. 111)</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Philip Connor, Jeffrey S.Passe, *Europe's Unauthorized Immigrant Population Peaks in 2016, Then Levels Off*</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ UNODC, Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants, 2018, p. 22. On 2018, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime published its first Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants. Available at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/glosom.html (last visit on 22 February 2021)</footnote>
the first Global Study on Smuggling of migrants (2016), there is evidence that at least 2,5 million migrants were smuggled for an economic return of US 5.5 to 7 billion Euros.

Immigration- Building up the Policy

The European Union has moved in recent years towards a common policy in relation to immigration material. In 2011, it adopted the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). In May 2015, the European Commission published the European Agenda on Migration<fnref n="11" />, with the irregular immigration crisis experienced in recent years in the Mediterranean region. In 2020, the European Commission presented a new Pact on Migration and Asylum in order to establish a more European approach to managing migration and asylum.

Despite this advance in common politics, it remains a material heavily used for electoral purposes<fnref n="12" /> in the various countries of the European Union. Their main overseas counterparts: the US, Canada, and Australia) take their political action on immigration entirely on the national level.

ORGANIZED CRIME

1. ORGANIZED CRIME IN GENERAL

Although visibly evident on the old continent over decades, the issue of Organized Crime has attracted very little attention at higher politico-economic levels in Europe in the last decades of the 20th century. Simultaneously, the radical changes in CEE/SEE countries of the late 1980s implied growing possibilities for organized crime to carry out trans frontier operations throughout Europe. Consequently, the criminal markets became very mobile, more flexible, transnational and trans-continental, highly accumulative and increasingly aggressive. Hence, the problem has gained visibility in recent years, and international cooperation has been advanced as a way to fight new forms of organised crime.

2. MULTILATERAL EFFORTS IN FIGHTING ORGANIZED CRIME

Activities on a supranational and intergovernmental level to combat organized crime have actually existed since 1923 (Interpol). Present international/regional fora trying to combat transnational organized crime and to improve criminal justice are:

The European Union/Commission, EUROPOL, Council of Europe; as well as the global/universal ones: Interpol-ICPO and UN ODC, formerly ODCCP (CICP and DCP).<fnref n="13" />

<footnote n="11">¹¹European Commission, *New Pact on Migration and Asylum*, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/new-pact-migration-and-asylum_en (last visit on 28 April 2021)</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Faced with aging domestic populations and following the logics of corporate expansion, the Western markets need migrants, but the ordinary citizenry does not want them. What changed in the meantime is the capacity of the society (not always in compliance with economic conjuncture) to absorb those immigrants – and closely related to that – the psychological state of domestic populations. Therefore, many European political parties extended their agendas with more restrictive immigration policies, but ignoring the golden rule of migration: “Once you cut off legal means, would-be immigrants just turn to smugglers”</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Although ABA (American Bar Association) with its CEELI (Central and Eastern European Law Initiative) is not a multilateral body, its NGO-like role in technical legal assistance to almost each of the CEE/SEE countries deserves to be highlighted. By posting its Liaison officers and other expert-staff in many CEE/SEE countries, by organizing seminars and trainings, by providing domestic legislatures with a world-wide legal expertise and assessments – all that in continuity for over decade – ABA through its CEELI program, has made a paramount effort and considerable contribution to the CEE/SEE countries’ judiciary system and criminal justice.</footnote>
EUROPEAN UNION

Before the Maastricht Treaty there was no specific EU-framework for dealing with matters related to organized crime (only informal police co-operation between Member States, initiated in the mid-1970s, which was gradually expanded to deal with organized crime – among others in the context of the TREVI group).

The Maastricht Treaty and its Third Pillar made specific provisions in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), leading to the establishment of a formal co-operation structure for Customs and Police matters, as well as for criminal and judicial issues. Within the framework of this structure, working groups on police co-operation, drugs and organized crime, corruption, money-laundering, terrorism and judicial co-operation were established. Since the Maastricht Treaty, and especially since the provisions of the Amsterdam (and Nice) Treaty entered into force at a special JHA meeting of the European Council with the EU heads of states/governments in Tampere, Finland in October 1999 (also the Seville European Council of June 2002), the European Union has further strengthened its structures as well as its cross-EU and pan-European cooperation. Currently, there are sets of legal instruments related to the fight against organized crime, such as: The JHA Action Plan/s (the first such a plan with its 30 recommendations was prepared in April 1997.

Following the meeting held in Tampere in 1999, it was stipulated that a judicial body for judicial cooperation comprising judges, prosecutors, and police should be set up. Further incentives were brought about at the EU Council summit in Nice, France, on 09th of December 2000 as it agreed to establish the EUROJUST<fnref n="14" />. Since then, Eurojust has grown steadily until the Treaty of Lisbon, which specifically established its function of support and cooperation between national authorities of severe crimes affecting two or more Member States<fnref n="15" />. In December 2019, Eurojust became the EU Agency for Criminal Cooperation, and a new regulation entered into force.
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, security became a shared competence between the European Union and the Member States.

A Pre-accession Pact (resting upon the Copenhagen accession criteria of 1993) on organized crime between the EU Member States and the EU candidate countries<fnref n="16" /> was approved as early as 1998 (after the Amsterdam and shortly before the Nice Treaty). The main purpose of this Pact was to develop a joint annual strategy to identify the most significant measures against organized crime (including a two-way flow of information, the exchange of liaison officers, joint investigative activities and special operations carried out with Europol's support)<fnref n="17" />.

Furthermore, the European Union established in 2010 a four-year policy cycle to address the European Union's main threats (EMPACT). The European Council defines in each cycle what the priorities are, taking into account recommendations from other agencies, such as Frontex or Eurojust.

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Article 31 of the Treaty of Nice stated: "The Council shall promote co-operation through EUROJUST by promoting support for criminal investigations in cases of serious cross-border crime, particularly organized crime, taking account, in particular, of analyzes carried out by Europol;...</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, *History*, available at https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about-us/history (last visit on 15 February 2021)</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ The Commission and the Council of Europe are jointly running the OCTOPUS program against corruption that is entirely designed for CEE (candidate and non-candidate) countries. Additionally, for the new EU 10+2 CEE countries, the PHARE program, managed by the Commission's Enlargement Directorate-General, also has a section devoted to JHA projects.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ In this regard the frequent visits of Mr. Costa to Brussels should be understood, where he regularly met with the Prodi's JHA Commissioner Mr. Antonio Vitorino, and later with several of Barroso's Commissioners</footnote>
In the EMPACT programmes, particular emphasis is put on migrant smuggling, child abuse, environmental crimes, cybercrime, document fraud, money laundering, drug, and arms trafficking<fnref n="18" />

The recent proposal by the European Commission for a European strategy against organised crime stresses the need to promote international cooperation, break down the structures of international organisations and their methods of infiltrating economies, and combat the use of new technologies by criminals.<fnref n="19" />

In 2016, in an unprecedented development in criminal cooperation in the European Union, the member states of the European Union agreed on the creation of a European Public Prosecutor's Office, with power to investigate fraud, corruption, money laundering, and cross-border VAT Fraud and which is becoming operational in 2021²⁰.

## EUROPOL

The Maastricht Treaty and other EU regulations created the opportunity for wider police co-operation in the field of combating (transnational) organized crime – something that has been reaffirmed in the Reform/Lisbon Treaty of 2007.

EDU (European Drug Unit), a first step towards the establishment of Europol, has been staged up by the decision of the European Council in 1993. EDU was mandated to cover: (i) illicit drugs trafficking; (ii) immigration networking; (iii) theft-vehicle trafficking, and finally in 1996, EDU got an additional mandate to cover (iv) trafficking in persons. The Europol Convention entered into force on 01 October 1998, mandating this agency to follow illegal/ illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances; in persons, vehicles and drugs, as well as the money laundering related to it. Since January 1999, Europol is additionally charged to cover terrorism, cybercrime and child pornography (eventually through SIRENE system). Over the past 20 years, Europol has carried out thousands of investigations against criminal organizations with international activities. These have included remarkable international operations against drug trafficking, terrorism, cybercrime, counterfeiting, facilitation of illegal immigration, corruption, or child sexual exploitation<fnref n="21" /> Finally, Europol cooperates with countries outside the European Union and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, UN and other relevant fora.<fnref n="22" />

## COUNCIL OF EUROPE

The Council of Europe, as the single pan-European forum, has its own inter-governmental work program against crime that is channelled through the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC). It strengthened the co-operation between Member States in combating corruption, its links with organized crime and money laundering, and the trafficking in illicit drugs and smuggling of medical drugs (incl. all sorts of exploitation and child pornography).

Among the major outcomes of this “principal legislative machinery of Europe” (which since 1945 has brokered over 200 conventions and treaties), the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Cybercrime 2001 and the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cyber Crime in

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Katrien Luyten, Sofija Voronova, *Understanding the EU response to organised crime*, European Parliamentary Research Service, September 2020, p.5, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652043/EPRS_BRI(2020)652043_EN.pdf. (last visit on 26 February 2021)</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Communication from the commission on the EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025, Brussels, 14.4.2021</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office ('the EPPO')</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹Europol, *Europol's Most Noteworthy Operations*, available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/europol-20-years/europols-20-most-noteworthy-operations (last visit on 3 March 2021)</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Europol, Strategic Agreements, https://www.europol.europa.eu/partners-agreements/strategic-agreements (last visit on 8 March 2021)</footnote>
2002 (111th Session of the Committee of Ministers of the CoE),<fnref n="23" /> the Trafficking in Human Beings Convention in 2005 and the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism in 2006. For the past decade, the Council of Europe has continued its legislative line and adopted new conventions to prevent and combat international crimes: in 2011, the Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (it also addresses human trafficking and forced marriages affecting women) and the Convention on the counterfeiting of medical products and similar crimes involving threats to public health (the Medicrime Convention); in 2015, the Convention against Trafficking in Human Organs and in 2017 the Council of Europe Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property (in the framework of the terrorism and organised crime).

## INTERPOL – ICPO (INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION)

Interpol enjoys a membership of 194 countries and a world-wide telecommunication network which links each member's National Crime Bureau (NCB) by I-mail (intra-mail: closed telecom system),<fnref n="24" /> and gives automated access to a centralized data base (and the basic back- ground information) on international crime and criminal gangs. The NCBs are (as an exchange mechanism) a key element in the services Interpol provides to its member countries. The NCB serves as a link between law enforcement agencies of one country and the law enforcement agencies of other member countries. The growth and threat of criminal organizations has been elaborated in various resolutions and other deliberations adopted by the Interpol General Assembly (GA) sessions during the '70s and '80s. By the Interpol GA Resolution of 1987, a working group on Organized Crime was created in 1988. This resolution noted that "...organized crime does not limit itself to one form of criminal activity". As a result of this resolution Interpol later created the Organized Crime Branch at the General Secretariat in 1989. A subsequent Resolution adopted at the 1993 General Assembly further emphasized the need for international co-operation in combating organized crime, by recommending that "the ICPO-Interpol should continue to encourage police efforts and to intensify co-operation between countries and their police services, ...seeking to improve the exchange of information between countries, and analysis of that information, and to promote participation by all countries in the structure created within the ICPO-Interpol to deal with this subject." The long-term aim of the Organized Crime Branch was to create an extensive and comprehensive data base of organized criminal enterprises and persons who are engaged in continued, illegal activity in order to generate (illicit) profits.

The Organized Crime Branch realized that organized crime groups are increasingly active in alien smuggling and trafficking in of human beings. Therefore, in 1996, Project 'Marco Polo' was initiated to produce a study on the routes, modus operandi and organized crime groups involved in irregular migrations from any country to Western Europe.

The Marco Polo study, published in 1997, clearly showed that the largest number of non-European illegal immigrants coming to Western Europe between 1992 and 1997 had originated from either Iraq, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India, or one of the African countries (such as Nigeria, Rwanda or Somalia). Several routes utilized in the smuggling of Chinese nationals to Western Europe were also noted in the Marco Polo study, etc.

<footnote n="23">²³ The Convention particularly deals with offenses related to infringements of copyrights, computer-related fraud, child pornography and offenses connected with network security. It also covers series of procedural powers such as searches and interception of material on computer networks. Its main aim, as set out in the Preamble, is to pursue "a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against Cybercrime, by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation." On the other hand, the prime focus of the Convention's Protocol follows the criminalisation of acts of racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ It is rather the same sort of communication modus used for the Schengen related SIS and SIRENE systems within the European states, parties to the Schengen acqui.</footnote>
The Organized Crime Branch is currently collecting and analysing several other, but equally important cases of illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings. Upon evaluation, Interpol intends to send its specialized officers and analysts to assist local police units during the ongoing investigations (which are of relevance at the international level).

The current intention of Interpol is to provide its member countries with a better insight into the linkage between organized crime groups, on the one hand, and the illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings on the other hand (description of groups, their membership, ordinary routes, methods and means of transportation, location of safe houses, identity of escorts, suppliers of forged documents, as well as visa fraud methods). Special emphasis will be put on the collection and dissemination of information related to the post-smuggling/trafficking networking of organized crime groups (involving trafficked persons into activities such as: forced labour, organized begging, pick-pocketing, prostitution, pornography, terrorism, etc.).

As for refocusing attention on the Public and Private sector, the ICPCO organized several international meetings, bringing together experts, public and private organisations from all over the world on issues such as the fight against terrorism and human trafficking<fnref n="25" />. In recent years, Interpol has focused its work on the need to recover the proceeds of crime, fight corruption that diminishes trust in governments and institutions, cooperate actively with the private sector and break the business model of criminal organisations.<fnref n="26" />

UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations and its Vienna-based Office for Drugs and Crimes (ODC), formerly ODCCP; including the Drug Control Program – UNDCP, and the Centre for International Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice – CICP,<fnref n="27" /> play a significant global role in combating organized crime and in strengthening criminal justice. As a result of the recent restructuring of the work of the United Nations Office in Vienna, a new Director-General was appointed in February 2020²⁸.

The first important step, with regard to the relevant United Nations activities, was the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances which contains provisions requiring the development of international co-operation in the fields of extradition, asset forfeiture, mutual legal assistance, co-operation among the law enforcement agencies of Member States, control of precursors, essential chemicals and crop eradication.

In order to better address the problem of the internationalization and sophistication of criminal groups, UN Member States adopted the Naples Political Declaration and the Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime<fnref n="29" /> (at the World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime held in Naples in 1994). The Naples Action Plan lays emphasis on the member states' national combating capacities as well as on international co-operation against transnational organized crime and its effective prevention.

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Interpol, *5th Interpol Global Conference on Trafficking in Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants*, available at https://www.interpol.int/fr/Actualites-et-evenements/Evenements/2017/5th-INTERPOL-Global-Conference-on-Trafficking-in-Human-Beings-and-Smuggling-of-Migrants* (accessed 23 March 2021)</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Interpol, *Shaping a global response to corruption*, available at https://www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2019/Shaping-a-global-response-to-corruption* (last visit on 15 March 2021)</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ TPB- A special division “Terrorism Prevention Brach” is attached to the CICP/ODC UN Vienna Office</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Ghada Fathi Waly is the Director-General/Executive Director of the United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV)/United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) since 1 February 2020, following her appointment by Secretary-General António Guterres. She holds the rank of Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ About the same recommendations were adopted at the 9th UN Congress in Cairo in 1995 as well as at the 10th UN Congress held in Vienna, in April 2000 (including the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice as the biggest outcome of the Congress, chaired by South Africa's Justice Minister, Mr. P.M. Maduna).</footnote>
Moreover, the UN CICP was requested (by the resolution of the UN GA 53/111, December 1998) to further its tasks by preparing and conducting an open-end Intergovernmental Ad-Hoc Committee(s) on Elaboration of a comprehensive International Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and three additional instruments, to which Poland made a first draft in 1998. Between January 1999 and the end of October 2000, as many as 11 Ad Hoc meetings (minimum two-week duration each) were held in Vienna, with an average participation of 140 delegations of states and organizations.

Thus, a final text of the Convention was verified on the closing day of the 10th Session of the Ad Hoc Committee (its 177th meeting), on 28th of July 2000³⁰.

Additional instruments include: (i) Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish Trafficking in persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized crime (to which Argentina and the US took the initiative); (ii) Protocol against the Smuggling of migrants by Land, Air and Sea, supplementing the same Convention (to which Austria and Italy took the initiative); and finally (iii) Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components, and Ammunition supplementing the same Convention.

The High-level Political Signing conference was scheduled for December 11–15, 2000 (UN GA Res. 54/129), following September's Millennium Assembly Convention approval. So far, over 190 countries have signed the Convention, 178 the protocol to prevent, suppress and publish trafficking in persons, and 150 the Protocol against Smuggling of migrants. Consequently, the Convention and the two protocols entered into force between late 2003 and early 2004. The only exception was the “Firearms” protocol, entering into force as late as mid 2005 (with currently 119 parties).

To ensure compliance with the Convention and its protocols, up to 10 sessions have been held by UNTOC member states since 2020.<fnref n="31" /> In 2018, it was established a review mechanism for the implementation of the Convention (Resolution 9/1). Of particular interest was the session held in 2020, which adopted the self-assessment questionaries for a review of the implantation of the Convention and the Protocols (resolution 10/1), the guidelines for conducting the country reviews. It was also adopted a series of resolutions aimed at promoting international cooperation against arms trafficking (resolution 10/2), or implementation measures in the fight against trafficking in human beings. In this regard, it encourages the private sector to establish proper due diligences to end human trafficking in production chains (resolution 10/3). Finally, it also recommends that efforts be focused on other highly topical crimes, such as the misappropriation of medical products (resolution 10/5),

<footnote n="30">³⁰ The issues covered by the Palermo Convention (many covered globally for the first time) are as follows: (i) Statement of purpose; (ii) Use of terms; (iii) Scope of (the Convention's) application; (iv) Protection of sovereignty; (v) Criminalization of participation in an Organized Crime Group; (vi) Criminalization of the Laundering of proceeds of crime; (vii) Measures to combat Money-laundering; (viii) Criminalization of corruption; (ix) Measures against corruption; (x) Liability of Legal persons; (xi) Prosecution, adjudication and sanctions; (xii) Confiscation and Seizure; (xiii) Intl. co-operation for purpose of confiscation; (xiv) Disposal of confiscated proceeds of crime or property; (xv) Jurisdiction; (xvi) Extradition; (xvii) Transfer of sentenced person; (xviii) Mutual legal assistance; (xix) Joint investigation & special investigative techniques; (xx) Transfer of criminal proceedings; (xxi) Establishment of criminal record; (xxii) Criminalization of obstruction of justice; (xxiii) Protection of witnesses and victims; (xxiv) Measures to enhance co-operation with legal enforcement authorities; (xxv) Collection, exchange and information analysis on the nature of Organized Crime; (xxvi) Training and technical assistance; (xxvii) Other measures: economic development and technical assistance; (xxviii) Prevention; (xxix) Conference of the Parties to the Convention; (xxx) Implementation of Convention; (xxxi) Relation with Protocols; (xxxii) Final Provisions; and conclusively: Travaux Préparatoires (Interpretative Notes).</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ UNDOC, *Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/resolutions-and-decisions-conference-of-the-parties-to-the-united-nations-convention-against-transnational-organized-crime.html#COP5 (last visit on 23 March 2021)</footnote>
or those that affect the environment and are carried out by international criminal organisations (resolution 10/6).

## CORRUPTION IN THE FOCUS OF UN ODC – UNCAC

In its resolution 54/128, the General Assembly asked the Ad Hoc Committee (which was still negotiating the Palermo Convention at the time) to consider whether a further instrument elaborating solely corruption was desirable (prior to or parallel with the Expert group on Explosives) or not. Upon the extensive consultations, the Committee expressed that a separate instrument is needed because much of the corruption-related problems felt by member states were not covered by the forthcoming Palermo Convention. It was subsequently reported back to the General Assembly (A/AC/254/25), which resulted in the UN GA resolution 55/61 deciding to create a further instrument and to establish an expert group to consider terms of reference. The Expert group convened in 2002 in Vienna, and produced draft terms of reference, which were then transmitted to the GA, via the CICP (Crime Commission) and the ECOSOC. The General Assembly has adopted these terms of reference, clarifying the issues under negotiation, with its resolution UN GA 56/260. This text appeared before the Ad Hoc Committee at its second meeting.

As stipulated by the Resolution, the Ad Hoc Committee was about to resolve many critical issues in all together seven sessions producing the final text of the Convention by the end of 2003. Among the most tantalizing were the following two issues: (i) the very definition of corruption – determining the basic scope of application of the forthcoming instrument (whether to include private-sector corruption or not, etc.); and (ii) the political and legal implications of the “grand corruption” cases involving the high level officials (mostly from third world countries such as Nigeria, Philippines, etc.)

That time, a newly arrived Executive Director Mr. Costa and his ODC secretariat had managed to close the Corruption Convention with astonishing speed – it still remains one of the fastest concluded UN conventions ever. However and regrettably enough, the Corruption instrument did not include the private sector corruption at all, and therefore should be regarded as an instrument of rather partial success. Some of the most influential countries were not supportive of the idea to tackle both private and public sector corruption by a single instrument (?!?). Therefore, member states got an exception and the Secretariat gained a speed – compromise resulting in rather weak and incomplete instrument.

As the UNCAC does not provide for a definition of corruption at all (be it private or public sector, or both), and as there is no comprehensive (and at the same time simple) definition of corruption available, one of the Authors (prof. Bajrektarevic) operates for decades with his own definition: **tacit and simingly victimless exchange between influence and gain.** <fnref n="32" />

However, in conformity with Article 2 of the UN Charter, UNCAC provides in its Article 4 for the protection of national sovereignty of the States Parties.

In April 2002 the CICP (Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice) at its 11th annual session in Vienna, welcomed the offer made by the Government of Mexico to host a high-level Political Conference for the purpose of signing the UN Convention against Corruption. Endorsed by the GA, it was adopted in Merida, Mexico (31 X 2003) soon after. Talking about the

<footnote n="32">³² Interestingly enough, some critical terms used in the UNCAC are defined in conformity with the previous conventions and some appeared anew (e.g. 'public official', 'foreign public official', and 'official of a public international organization'). The very body of instrument is organized in the following way: (i) General Provisions (Chapter I, Articles 1-4); (ii) Preventive Measures (Chapter II, Articles 5-14); (iii) Criminalization and Law Enforcement (Chapter III, Articles 15-44); (iv) International Cooperation (Chapter IV, Articles 43-49); (v) Asset Recovery (Chapter V, Articles 51-59); (vi) Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (Chapter VI, Articles 60-62); (vii) Mechanisms for Implementation (Chapter VII, Articles 63-64), and (viii) Final Provisions (Chapter VIII, arts.65-71)</footnote>
main deliberations, the 11th CICP Commission additionally accepted the offer of Thailand to hold the 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Thailand in 2005 (with the theme: "Synergies and responses: strategic alliances in crime prevention and criminal justice"). Following the ODC recommendation, the UN General Assembly (res. 62/173 of 18 December 2007) accepted the offer of Brazil to host the 12th Congress in April 2010 (with the theme: "Comprehensive strategies for global challenges: crime prevention and criminal justice systems and their development in a changing world").

In 2009 (Doha, Qatar), a review mechanism of the UNCAC to assist states in its implementation (resolution 3/1)<fnref n="33" />, with UNODC as the secretariat was launched. In an innovative system, each state party must be reviewed once and must conduct a review of between 1 and 3 other states<fnref n="34" />. In this context, the first cycle between 2010 and 2015 addressed criminalisation and law enforcement as well as international cooperation. The cycle from 2015 to 2020 covered prevention and asset recovery measures<fnref n="35" />. It is remarkable that numerous states have taken action and made legislative changes as a result of the observations made during the review process

3. DEFINING ORGANIZED CRIME

The Palermo Convention does not define transnational organised crime, but it provides the characteristics that should portray every organised criminal group. According to Article 2 of the Convention, it must be formed by a group of three or more persons that was not randomly formed; existing for a period of time: acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable at least for years' incarceration; in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.

For their part, the European Commission and the Council of Europe's Expert Group on Organised Crime have been considering that a series of requirements must be met such as (i) collaboration of three or more persons; (ii) for a prolonged or indefinite period of time; (iii) suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal offenses; and finally (iv) with the objective of pursuing profit and/or power.

Among the optional criteria (eventually) are: (v) having a specific task or role for each participant; (vi) using a form of internal discipline and control; (vii) using violence or other means suitable for intimidation; (viii) exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, law enforcement, the administration of justice or the economy by corruption or using other means; (ix) using commercial or business-like structures; (x) engagement in money laundering; and (xi) operating on an international level.

Both the UN 1994 Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan specified the following six characteristics of organized crime (which might be transnational: point 5 and 6): (i) there has to be group organization to commit crime; (ii) hierarchical links or personal relations which enable leaders to control the group; (iii) the use of violence, intimidation and corruption to earn profits or control territories or markets; (iv) the laundering of illicit proceeds to further criminal activity and to infiltrate the legitimate economy; (v) a potential for expansion into any new activity beyond national borders; and finally (vi) co-operation with other Organized Transnational criminal groups.

<footnote n="33">³³ UNDOC, *Third session of the Conference of the State Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption*, available at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/COSP/session3-resolutions.html (last visit on 28 March 2021)</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴UNDOC, *Implementation Review Mechanism*, available at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/es/corruption/implementation-review-mechanism.html (last visit on 29 March 2021)</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ United Nations Information Service, *Real change generated by the Implementation Review Mechanism for the anti-corruption Convention*, available at https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2019/uniscp1089.html (last visit on 3 April 2021)</footnote>
However, there is still no global definition, although the requirements can give us an exact approximation of the concept.

## 4. TRAFFICKING IN/SMUGGLING OF PERSONS ON THE AGENDA OF ORGANIZED CRIME

Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling remains a serious worldwide threat. Criminal organisations continue to see both phenomena as significant business opportunities incorporating the 'Trafficking in' and 'Smuggling of' persons in their agendas, as it turns out to be:

(i) minimum investment undertaking, (ii) maximum profit gained, (iii) lenient punishment (e.g. compared to drug trafficking, the penalties for trafficking in and smuggling of persons are considerably lower or even non-existent in many countries).

## 5. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SMUGGLING OF AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

The two phenomena are often confused, and while it is true that they are interconnected, there are apparent differences between them. The main distinction is that while trafficking in human beings is a crime that affects the fundamental rights of individuals, migrant smuggling is in principle a crime against the immigration rules of states. However, the commonly accepted distinction is not always straightforward, requiring a more detailed analysis of both offences.

### Trafficking in Persons

The English legal term “trafficking” means trade or illicit trade. Thus, Trafficking in Persons is a form of trade in human beings which occurs illicitly.

Notion of Trafficking in Persons:

(i) an intermediary, a trafficker, who provides the necessary services facilitating migration;

(ii) the traffickers are paid under long-term arrangements;

(iii) in most of the cases crossing of border is either illegal or seemingly legal (well established legal structures within the host-countries, such as language summer schools or vocational institutes, that actually cover their real (illegal) intentions); although trafficking can occur within the same state, it is more common for victims of trafficking to be trafficked to another state.

(iv) upon their arrival in a host-country the migrants – with or without their consent – are introduced into illegal activities or criminal circles;

(v) the profit in trafficking business comes (not solely from a transportation fee but) from long-term exploitation;

(vi) in most cases trafficked persons actually make a seemingly free choice to enter or stay in a country illegally.

### Smuggling of persons

The English legal term “smuggling” means an illicit/illegal import or export. Consequently, Smuggling of Persons means illegal transportation of human beings from the source country (export) to the country of destination or the host-country (import).

Features of the Smuggling of Persons:

(i) an intermediary, a smuggler, who facilitates the border crossing, but the clients are not provided with further extensive services as in the trafficking business;

(ii) crossing of border is either illegal or seemingly legal;

(iii) smuggling does not include a component of extended exploitation (the escort-fee is always paid under short-term arrangements).
Four differentiating elements that separate Trafficking in from Smuggling of Persons are:

(i) an exploitation and usage of the trafficked person over a long period of time;

(ii) inter-dependency that forms a strong (brothers-in-arms like) linkage, between trafficked victim and organized crime groupings;

(iii) eligibility for further networking (recruitment for criminal purpose);

(iv) very often trafficking itself is not a voluntary movement, but in the case of smuggled persons it always occurs voluntarily.

## 6. LINKAGES AND INTERDEPENDENCIES

Organized crime groups are vertically (hierarchically) and horizontally structured in such a manner that different sub-groups (chambers) are specialized in specific activities. The level of diversification of tasks inside the criminal organization is sufficiently high. It aims to meet both demands: higher specialization and sophistication as well as better protection from the police ride or sting operations (a compartmentalized, ship-chamber like inner system).

In the business of Trafficking in Persons (long-lasting horizontal inter-dependency is very high), organized crime groups yield a profit from both (i) the trafficking escort service itself, and (ii) from the subsequent exploitation of the trafficked persons as manpower, that are upon the transfer, basically recruited for criminal purposes. This double use makes the business of Trafficking in Persons competitive to Drug Smuggling and other speedy and highly (lucrative) accumulative criminal activities. Finally, that explains why even the biggest and most structured organized crime groups (especially transnational) have incorporated Trafficking in Persons into their core activities.

Transnational expansion requires permanent networking of the organization. In order to set up a new or to improve the existing network additional recruitment has to be done repeatedly. Therefore, in most cases, not the trafficked person but the organized crime groups make the final decision about: (i) how many people to traffic, (ii) which ethnicity, gender, skills or profile to traffic, and finally (iii) to which destination(s) – one or several countries. It has been already noticed that after the need for recruitment of a certain profile or gender in one country is successfully met, the traffickers will not traffic in but rather smuggle more people (driven only by a one-off financial gain without further recruiting and networking).

Nowadays, the organized criminal groups actually regulate illegal flows to a great extent. As a strong horizontal interdependency remains between the trafficked persons and the group behind it, it is safe to say that illegal migration, further contributes to organized crime as well.

## 7. NATURE OF THE BUSINESS OF *TRAFFICKING IN* AND *SMUGGLING OF PERSONS*

Organized crime groups basically function as any legal economic entity.<fnref n="36" /> Consequently, the ultimate goal of organized crime is similar to that of an ordinary commercial enterprise: to gain profit. As any profit depends on the market, criminal groups are strengthening their productivity, efficiency, sophistication and organization, cutting costs and risks, widening their territory, and trying to set up an exclusive monopoly in certain fields and/or on certain territory in order to maintain and to

<footnote n="36">³⁶ In his speech to the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg (South Africa in September 2002), the Executive Director of UN ODC at that time, Mr. Costa, warned the delegates: "...We at ODC believe there cannot be sustainable development unless the concerns which are at the heart of our mandate – crime, corruption, narcotics, terrorism, trafficking in human beings – are also well addressed..."</footnote>
optimize their profits.<fnref n="37" /> In the process of profit-making and cost-cutting can put the lives of trafficked or smuggled persons at higher risk. Furthermore, in the face of growing demand, internal competition among organized criminal groups is rising and leading to increased violence which is exercised on both levels: internally (towards its own members) and externally (towards other gangs as well as towards the wider society).

Wishing to cover their illegal activities in trafficking and smuggling, as well as to launder generated assets afterwards, the organized crime groups often expand their activities into legitimate businesses (such as: newspapers/print house, travel agencies, language summer or seasonal schools, vocational institutes, shipping companies; non-governmental humanitarian and other illicit or converted charities, and other sorts of non-profit organizations). Therefore, it becomes very hard to distinguish overt from covert activities of those groups. By doing so, the organized crime groups are fulfilling several ultimate goals: (i) better protection from eventual raid and coverage for their illegal activity (risk spreading/burden-sharing); (ii) money laundering; (iii) gradual legalization and respectability; (iv) more prominent and powerful positioning within the given society.

Finally, the lasting achievement of any parallel structure (parallel society) which organized crime tends to be (when phases of accumulation, stabilization, expansion and monopolization are successfully met), is to legalize itself.

In order to do so, the organized crime group will use all means that are at its disposal (ranging from hard means such as: blackmailing, extortion, assassination, kidnapping, denunciation, intimidation and racketeering; to soft means, like: corruption, humanitarian contributions, sponsorship and voluntary donations for political and other societal campaigns, and the like).

## 8. NEW TENDENCIES

Facing increasing competition, the organized crime groups are forced to undergo certain specialization, or/and diversification as well as company-like fusions/synergies. Specialization, diversification and fusions are creating a higher vertical line (along with a wider horizontal line). Apart from enlarging their market and profit shares it allows the Organization for (i) better damage control possibilities, and (ii) to minimize risk of law enforcement.

Together with operational, organizational and management mobility, transferability, adaptability and flexibility are what make the organized crime groups so successful and (if ever penetrable) almost non-detectable in their full scope as a corporate mechanism.

## 9. STRUCTURES OF CRIME RINGS

These rings range from single individuals to smaller or larger networks composed of family members (or of persons from the same region, of shared language or religion), up to strictly organized, hierarchically structured and trans-continentally tied organized Crime Rings. The majority of the operating groups are of the same ethnic origin either in their core staff or entirely. Functionally, these groups are horizontally structured from several sub-units that are specialized in a particular part or sequence of the smuggling/trafficking operation. In many cases, victims are recruited and trafficked by their own compatriots and even by their relatives. On many occasions, it may also be the victims themselves who recruit the new victims.

<footnote n="37">³⁷ The Money Laundering component is of crucial importance here for the very outcome; or as the play-writer Bertolt Brecht effectively says in his The Threepenny Opera (staged in 1928) – “What is the bank robbery in comparison with the foundation of a new bank”.</footnote>
# 10. DIVERSIFICATION AND SOPHISTICATION

The tasks are diversified, the organization clustered of different units or elements, which then independently carry out their particular criminal sequences. Each unit or element consists of one or more persons that are highly specialized, independent and with little knowledge about other parts of their own organization (in most cases, vertically they know only their direct supervisor whereas their horizontal knowledge is practically non-existent).

A typical criminal organization involved in the business of Trafficking in and Smuggling of Persons is comprised of the following elements or units (cells):

**A. Recruitment unit** (common for both Traffickers and Smugglers)

Advertises the organization and recruits new clients by using informal exchange of information (locals, friends, relatives, countrymen), up to announcements in the press or on the internet, including various kinds of overt agencies (travel agencies, summer schools, etc.); In recent years, the processes of recruitment and deception through the internet and new technologies have intensified, in cases of human trafficking such as the lover boy cases.

**B. Escort unit** (common for both Traffickers and Smugglers)

Deals with transport by land, air or waterways and takes care of every particular stage of the transportation phase (from the sending country, throughout transiting country/ies and to the destination – a host country). Very often this unit has sub-units which further specialize in particular sub-tasks; territory or means of transportation;

**C. Corrupted Officials** (common for both Traffickers and Smugglers)

These officials, although not necessarily interconnected or known to each other, are basically acting as an integral (corrupted) unit together with members of the organized crime ring that are corrupting them. Co-operation of local officials plays a critically important role in setting up, maintaining and further permanent networking of the trafficking/smuggling structure. Hence, bribed officials in the sending-, transiting- or/and host-country are essential for the safe transfer of illegal migrants. As in other fields of organized criminal activity, corruption is an elementary part<fnref n="38" /> of the trafficking/smuggling business;

**D. Guiding/navigation unit** (common for both Traffickers and Smugglers)

Mostly comprised of local agents and informants who know very little about the organization and each other. This in turn minimizes the risk of law enforcement gaining access on the organization and its activities. The higher compartmentalization the better damage control possibility – a ship-chamber like inner structure is a preventive damage control measure against any deep and total raid or penetration);

**E. Supporting/Logistics unit** (common for both Traffickers and Smugglers)

The task of this unit is to provide all the supporting services (safe shelter, accommodation, food, etc.). This is to prevent the illegal migrants from having any contact to the ordinary society (keeping them totally at the mercy of their traffickers). By doing so, both of these aims will be fulfilled: (i) protection of the operation from any police interception and eventual information leakage; as well as (ii) creating interdependency at an early stage between those trafficked and the traffickers thus enabling further long-term exploitation;

**F. Debt collecting unit** (common for both Traffickers and Smugglers)

<footnote n="38">³⁸ Corruption as a societal phenomenon represents a deviant relationship within or between government, citizenry and businesses that seriously departs from generally accepted legal or/and moral social conduct. From the legal point of view corruption can be defined as a clandestine trade-off between the influence and (material or in- kind/intangible favour) gain that is seemingly victimless. (Both def. – A.B.)</footnote>
This unit is responsible for keeping illegal migrants in the safe houses and collecting the transportation fees. Unlike the Smuggling of Persons—business in which this unit collects a one-off escort service fee from smuggled persons, in the business of trafficking in persons the unit is permanently collecting revenue from all illegal (or overt) businesses that the trafficked persons are recruited for. Usually, the debt rate is purposely set high which then transforms into a debt-bondage that proves to be the most effective control mechanism (creating additionally strong dependency between the trafficked and the traffickers);

**G. Exploiting unit(s) (Traffickers only)**

The number of units or sub-units depends on the number of activities that any particular organization is involved in (such as: exploitation of prostitution, drugs and organ smuggling, shop-window restaurants/cafes/gambling houses for money laundering, pick-pocketing, car theft, forging, begging, etc.). Naturally, this unit operates entirely within the host-country/ies;

**H. Re-escort unit (Traffickers only)**

As mentioned before, most of the victims of trafficking are re-escorted to several countries, irrespective of their will. This is especially evident in cases of exploitation of prostitution, cybercrime, terrorism-related espionage and drug smuggling.

**I. Management/Supervising unit (common for both Traffickers and Smugglers)**

This is the single vertical unit in the explained structure, whereas all others (from A to H) are horizontal. This unit drafts, plans, finances, manages, chains and supervises the whole operation and maintains a criminal structure that is both operable and profitable in its covert and overt segments. This unit is rarely known to the horizontal units and is hardly visible to or penetrable from the outside world (very often camouflaged by the well-established legal business, or/and protected by the prominent public figures).

**Channels and Routes**

There are several channels and routes for Trafficking in and Smuggling of Persons in Europe<fnref n="39" />. The routing/re-routing is permanently changing or oscillating according to several factors such as: geographical position, distance between countries of departure and destination, political and economic situation, law enforcement efforts in different areas, and an achieved degree of corruption. Organized crime groups are flexible and adaptable to any change of circumstances (sometimes changing their routes from one day to another) – e.g. when the authorities in one country improve their fight against both crimes, or intensify their legal enforcement, the Groups move to another territory where they can act with greater impunity.

When expanding into new criminal areas, the new activities are often channelled through the old and already tested routes (e.g. routes used for drug trafficking are now further being used for Trafficking in and Smuggling of Persons or human organs, or lately by the terrorist cells).

By doing so, the Trafficking and Smuggling organizations are directly influencing both: (i) the direction as well as (ii) the intensity and patterns of general criminal flows.

As far as trafficking in human beings is concerned, there are multiple routes, although it is impossible to know all of them or to give an accurate picture due to the very secrecy and invisibility of the crime. However, given the places of origin of the victims of trafficking in human beings detected in recent years, it allows us to indicate the main routes used by traffickers. A first one, which goes from sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and the Middle East towards Europe via southern countries such as Spain, Italy, and Greece. 2015 saw an unprecedented increase in the number of migrants across the sea and overland towards the European Union, mainly fleeing armed conflicts

<footnote n="39">³⁹ UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018*, United Nations publication, Sales No.E.19.IV.2, p.42. available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2018/GLOTiP_2018 BOOK web_small.pdf. (last visit on 8 April 2021)</footnote>
in the Middle East. Subsequently, intensified controls and agreements between the EU and Turkey led many migrants and refugees to use smugglers to reach the EU, increasing the risk of human trafficking.<fnref n="40" /> Routes have also been detected from East Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific to both North America and Europe, either via Eastern Europe or via the Middle East. And finally, a route from South America to Central and North America.

For their part, migrant smuggling routes are numerous and carried out in a variety of ways<fnref n="41" />. The most common cases are between countries in the Mekong sub-region and other parts of Central Asia on land borders. Also, in Spain, at the borders of Morocco with the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla, migrants have to jump over metal fences. Another major land route is between Mexico and the US. Smugglers are also active between numerous African, Eastern European, and Central Asian borders. Particularly dangerous are borders that include jungles such as in Southeast Asia, the deserts of Africa, and the Americas. As for sea routes, the most relevant smuggling passages involving sea crossings are those across the Mediterranean Sea to southern Europe, from the Horn of Africa to the Arabian peninsula, and across the Andaman Sea to South-East Asia. Less relevant than in the recent past are sea smuggling routes to Australia from South-East Asia.

## 11. GOING TRANSCONTINENTAL

The political developments and the socio-economic conditions on the European continent in the last decades have led to the fact that, in addition to more traditional organized criminal rings (such as Italian and Asian syndicates or the Latin American Drugs cartels), there are several new transnational organized criminal structures that are present and operable in Europe (such as groups from the former Soviet Union, from the Central Eastern European /CEE/, South Eastern European /SEE/ countries and Africa).

There are clear traces that the criminal syndicates from Afghanistan, China (Triads), Iran, Kosovo, Thailand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Columbia, Turkey (mostly Kurdish rings), and Japan (Yakuza) have been involved in the following: the drugs and precursors, firearms and explosives, human organs, radiological and illicit bio-chemical materials, and stolen car trafficking as well as in Smuggling of Persons into Europe and overseas.

Moreover, non-European organized crime groups have already established their branches in Europe (or have made connections/synergies with the existing European groups in Italy, Greece, Ireland, CEE/SEE, Germany, France etc.), sometimes through networks of illicit or converted charities, 'investment' banks, offshore firms, and the like. That was a new impetus in dealing with illicit drugs and narcotics, firearms, vehicle theft, black labour, fraud, false documents and credit-card manufacturing, counterfeiting, money laundering (partially through legally established chains of gambling houses), and extortion. Some of these groups are connected to (or even formed by) the political radicals, and therefore also involved in terrorism, (politically motivated) blackmailing, kidnapping, assassinations, sabotages and diversions, etc.

Pre-empting the EU enlargement and subsequent accession in 2004 and in 2007, many of these non-European clan-cartels (particularly the bigger and more sophisticated ones) have established their 'legal' businesses by registering companies in CEE/SEE countries (as well as in Macao prior to its authority-transfer from Portugal to China), or/and laundering money by participating in the

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ The relationship between human trafficking and migratory movements has been analysed by the Greta Group in its fifth General Report as well as in the Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2016. Migrants and refugees are potential victims of human trafficking, and their vulnerability is exploited by traffickers. It is essential that the capacity to detect victims of human trafficking in the area of immigration and refugees is enhanced.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">⁴¹ Ibid., *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants*, 2018</footnote>
privatization and the foreign investment process in CEE/SEE countries and in the post-Soviet republics.

ANNEX I: List of the Core International Instruments

1904 International agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic

1910 International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic

1921 International Convention (Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children)

1926 Slavery Convention

1930 ILO Convention No. 29 concerning Forced Labor

1933 International Convention (Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age) 1945 United Nation Charter and Statute of the International Court of Justice

1947 Protocol to amend the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children and the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age (a/m conventions No. 3 and 6)

1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights

1949 Protocol amending the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic and the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Trade (a/m conventions No. 1 and No. 2)

1950 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others

1950 Final Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic of Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others

1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

1951 Protocol amending the Slavery Convention of 1926

1951 The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the Geneva Convention)

1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery

1957 European Convention on Extradition

1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

1966 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

1972 Protocol relating to the Status of refugees (NY Protocol to the Geneva Convention) 1972 European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters

1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts

1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism

1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages

1981 European Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data

1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child

1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families

1990 European Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crim

1990 European Convention on the Implementation of the Schengen Agreement (including the related provisions of the Maastricht treaty of 1993 and of Tampere Provisions of the Amsterdam treaty of 1999; of the Nice of 2000 and of the Seville of 2002) 1995 EUROPOL Convention

1995 Implementation of the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime, report of the UN Secretary-General

1997 EU Convention on the fight against Corruption

1999 UN General Assembly: Guidelines for Reporting by governments on the implementation of the Global program of Action 2003 – 2008, UNOV/CND

1999 Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
2000 Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice of the 10th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders

2000 UN (International Palermo) Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (and additional instruments/protocols)

2001 Council of Europe (Budapest) Convention on Cyber Crime (23 XI 2001)

2003 Council of Europe additional Protocol to the Convention on Cyber Crime

2003 Council of Europe Protocol amending the European Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism

2003 UN Anti-Corruption Convention

2005 UN International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

2005 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism

2005 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism

2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings

2010 United Nations Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons

2011 Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention)

2011 Council of Europe Convention on the counterfeiting of medical products and similar crimes involving threats to public health

2013 Declaration of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development

2015 Doha Declaration on Integrating Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

2015 Council of Europe Convention against Trafficking in Human Organs

2015 Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism

2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants

2017 Council of Europe Convention of Offences relating to Cultural Property

# TERRORISM

## 1. TERRORISM IN GENERAL

The English word terror literally means: extreme fear. Thus, according to the Oxford dictionary terrorism means: the use of violence for political aims or to force a government to act, especially because of the fear it causes among the ordinary people.

Consequently, it is easy to linguistically define terrorism, but the real problem starts when terrorism as a phenomenon (including its range and scope) has to be politically and legally determined and effectively defined.

Low or high scale atrocities, domestic violence or terrorism; international terrorism; state (sponsored) terrorism; special war, secession and self-determination; armed conflict; declaration of war; social unrest, proscribed organization and undermining the constitutional order; upheaval and revolutionary movement; – all these terms, as such, are somehow defined at the national level, incorporated in and treated by the national legislations. However, to define them more universally, by achieving a wide international consensus over the scope, wording and very definition turns out to be a delicate and complex problem.

## 2. TERRORISM – STRUGGLE FOR DEFINITION

As defining terrorism in any particular case implies a political component, this very category becomes quite extensive and subject to different readings and understandings. Having permanent – primarily political – disputes over the category and scale of ‘conflict’, contemporary international community repeatedly failed over decades to agree upon a single and comprehensive but universal
instrument determining, prescribing and combating terrorism. As a consequence of these, mostly political and less legal implications, today we are confronted with two dozen international (universal and regional) instruments, which are good, but far from being standardized and harmonized.

Thus, the tentative political definition of (international) terrorism could be as follows: Terrorism is the use of violence as political means of pressuring the government and/or society into accepting a radical socio-political or/and socio-economic change (ideological or/and territorial). The word terrorist is obviously self-incriminating (demonizing and alienating), and consequently most terrorists would not apply the label to themselves<fnref n="42" />

The targets of terrorist groups are traditionally the combat forces (army and police) and high officials of the state. Lately, the tactics are aiming at undermining domestic economic capacity, destroying civil moral and calling upon the widespread civil disobedience – by assassinating public figures and/or attacking randomly population at large in public space. Terrorist groups are (or claim to be) motivated by a number of different ideologies. Thus, nationalism is a frequent cause of terrorist activity (incl. anti-colonial struggles, separatism/self-determination, irredentism); a whole spectrum of ideologies from right-wing (anti-Semitic, neo-fascist) to left-wing (Maoists, Marxist-Leninists) etc.

Although most terrorist groups, especially in Europe and Latin America, have not in fact achieved their political ends, elsewhere the situation is different. Many groups, particularly in Africa and Asia that were formerly labelled as terrorist groups, and began as opponents of colonial regimes, have legitimized themselves by forming the post-colonial government. In recent years, it was observable how the Islamic State has managed to control vast sways of Iraq and Syria, with cities as large as Raqqa and Mosul.

### 3. TERRORISM – SOME LEGAL PROVISIONS

Terrorism – the use of violence for political ends, including the use of violence for putting the public in fear. Hence, the act of terrorism defines a terrorist as a person who is or has been concerned with committing or attempting to commit any act of terrorism (such as: sabotage by explosion or fire; killing or by endangering people and/or property either by misuse of nuclear, biological, chemical materials or by conventional means and devices; hijacking of aircraft, ship or other transportation means; kidnapping or taking hostages; serious cyber- attacks) or directing, organizing, recruiting or training people for the purpose of terrorism.

Additionally, the vast majority of national legislation considers it a serious criminal offense if a person fails to disclose information which may assist the authorities in the prevention of an act of terrorism. Other criminal offenses also prescribed by law are acts of collecting information or possession of information likely to be useful to (foreign or domestic) terrorists.

### 4. TERRORISM – LINKAGES TO POLITICAL PARTIES

Without any attempt to problematize here the ‘asymmetric threats’, ‘non-state actors’ and ‘winning the hearts and minds’ theories or pre-emptive doctrines<fnref n="43" /> that appeared after 9/11, let us quickly state the following: the difference between a political party and a terrorist group is in their means – these are always criminal, on the side of terrorist groups; and legitimate, constitutionally prescribed means on the side of ordinary political parties. However, the very goal is in most of the

<footnote n="42">⁴² Experts’ estimates claim that for every apprehended/detained terrorist another 9 remain at large (rating it to 10%). Therefore, many describe terrorism like a balloon: squeeze one end and it expands at the other.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">⁴³ Around that time, the grand wiz of American geopolitics, Henry Kissinger has coined his famous and thereafter frequently quoted term: “confrontational nostalgia”.</footnote>
cases identical: political influence. Political agenda is always national and aims at either ideological or territorial change on a specific, clearly defined territory and population. As there is no international political party, there is also no international terrorist group. There is a sporadic trans-national cooperation (logistics, exchange of operative information or tools), but the core ideas and members are always and only national. (Al Qaida is also a national – Moroccan and Yemeni Arab are still both Arabs. Throughout most of their history, Arabs lived within one state entity /Caliphates, the Ottomans/. Living in two-dozen states is rather a historical novelty for Arabs – a shock, which they are still absorbing. The Islamic State, although it calls itself a caliphate and claims religious authority over all Muslims, is, in fact, a terrorist organization focused on Iraq and Syria- ISIS- Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). Finally, terrorism is not an ideology per se. Eventually, it can be a method of political action – a radicalism of an (subjectively or objectively) excluded group which is justified by a projected political aim

5. TERRORISM – LINKAGES TO ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS

Establishing a line of critical similarities and differences between the legitimate political party and clandestine (prescribed by law) terrorist group, we can now endorse – following the same token – the link between the criminal group and corporate entity. Thus, the essential similarity between the (trans-national) organized crime group and the legitimate business enterprise is that both are profit driven – they operate to either gain, maintain or enlarge the market and profit shares. The critical difference is in the means used. On the side of organized crime grouping the means used are always (predominantly) criminal, whereas the legitimate enterprise will operate respecting the national legal framework.

However, the lasting, ultimate ambition of any parallel structure, as are organized crime (gray
economic sector) or terrorist grouping (gray political sector), will be a gradual, well- orchestrated
eventual legalization. It is not only the relative strength of a particular state: capability and capacity
of its judiciary and effectiveness of its legal enforcement that matters. The ability of a state to achieve
and maintain the social cohesion by including all segments of society to participate coherently will
also be essential.<fnref n="44" />

However, debates on the linkages between terrorism and organised crime are intensifying in last decades offering novel concepts and views (beyond elaboration in this text).

6. MULTILATERAL EFFORTS AND MEASURES TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Since the existing international conventions against terrorism did not adequately address the issue of State responsibility to prevent and refrain from acts of terrorism all along, during the 1990s, the UN Security Council adopted the resolutions imposing sanctions on certain states accused of sponsoring terrorism several times. At that point it became evident that a legal instrument adopted by the UN General Assembly would provide a universally legitimate basis for combating international terrorism and avoid political controversies arising from unilateral or selective actions. To this end, a draft of a comprehensive convention against international terrorism appeared during

<footnote n="44">⁴⁴ As the 10th UN Congress already recorded (and the 11th and 12th Congress confirmed), there are growing firm bonds and linkages between Terrorism and Organized Crime, as well as dangerous similarities between the two of them (such as: money-laundering through illicit or covered charities, covert and overt offshore banking; trafficking/smuggling of firearms, of human beings; kidnapping; various sorts of plundering of property, etc.) Tediously enough, unlike drugs money or any other laundering of proceeds of crime, the terrorist funds must be traced before, not after, the crime has been committed.</footnote>
the 53rd session of GA. Most of the parties concerned, contributed to strengthening the global consensus on combating international terrorism.

As a result of these efforts, the UN GA reaffirmed the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee (established by Res. 51/210) with its new resolution 53/108, to elaborate a draft international convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing to supplement existing international instruments on terrorism.

Finally, in December 1999, the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was approved. This Convention expands the legal framework for international co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in (financing) terrorism. Additionally, elaboration of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism has successfully been closed in 2005 in Vienna – further strengthening the body of universal legislations in matters related to terrorism.

There has been considerable progress recorded on the regional level too. Thus, two new instruments appeared in 1999 alone: OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combat Terrorism (and its protocol of 2004) and the OIC Convention on Combating International Terrorism, followed by the 2002 Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, the 2006 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, and finally the 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism.

In addition to the instruments adopted (or still under elaboration) on a global and regional level, there is a wide scope of measures that have been taken to suppress and eliminate international terrorism. The following is a brief overview of some of the ongoing activities.

Together with the WCO (World Customs Organization) and Interpol, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) conducts a detection and response training programs for custom and other officials (programs mostly emphasized on the prevention of nuclear smuggling).

Further on, IAEA assists CEE/SEE, Central-East Asian and Pacific countries in establishing their domestic legal frameworks to comply with the intl. standards, incl. the national laws governing the safe and peaceful usage of nuclear energy (nuclear legislation & regulations, including non-proliferation and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities).

ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) very successfully carries on the financial, technical and material assistance to states with regard to aviation security (aircraft and airports serving international civil aviation security strengthening measures).

IMO (International Maritime Organization) organizes specially designed training programs to combat crimes connected with international terrorism (safety of maritime navigation, safety of fixed platforms, open-seas piracy, etc.).

TPB of CICP/ODCCP (Terrorism Prevention Branch, special division, created in 1999) is a clearing-house for matters related to international terrorism. It is very active in research (e.g. the questionnaires regularly sent to each of the Institutes of UN criminal justice network). As regards the legal assistance, TPB has a well-established cooperation and permanent consultations with the UN 6th committee and UN Office of Legal Affairs in NY (particularly with a Codification Division of the LA Office, which gathers data on national laws and regulations regarding the prevention and suppression of intl. terrorism).

UN DCP, Europol, UNESCO, OAS, OIC, OAU, LAS, SAARC, EU/EC, Council of Europe and other affiliated or non-affiliated bodies, agencies and regional organizations are, also, taking their measures to prevent; detect; collect, disseminate and exchange information on; suppress; punish and eliminate international terrorism.

Example (of non-affiliated entity) includes the Naif Arab Academy for Security Studies in Riyadh, which annually offers dozens of comprehensive training courses on combating terrorism for the Arab JHA community.
Finally, in 2006, the United Nations adopted Resolution 60/288⁴⁵, establishing a plan of action against terrorism, according to which member states must unequivocally condemn any act or manifestation or form of terrorism. As concrete measures to combat terrorism, the plan set out, inter alia, the obligation to prevent territories in member states from being used for the formation of terrorist groups; full cooperation in accordance with international standards; the prosecution and extradition of perpetrators, in accordance with international standards; the intensification of cooperation and exchange of information aimed at the prevention of terrorism; coordinating and combating other crimes that are sometimes connected, such as drug or arms trafficking; checking that asylum seeker have not been involved in terrorist activities; creating regional counter-terrorism offices; the possibility of creating an international centre for the fight against terrorism; implementing recommendations against money laundering; establishing a database of biological crimes; as well as encouraging cooperation between states and between international organisations.

## 7. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AGAINST TERRORISM

There are several comprehensive global and regional international instruments directly or indirectly subjecting the issue of (international) terrorism:

**Global International Instruments:**

The **1963 Convention** on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (including the stipulations on Jurisdiction; Powers of the Aircraft Commander; Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; Powers and Duties of States)

- **Tokyo Convention** (September 14, 1963); applies to acts affecting in-flight safety

**Status of the Convention:**

Signature: 40 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 186 states (ratification instruments deposited with the International Civil Aviation Organization).

The **1970 Convention** for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft - **Hague Convention** (December 16, 1970): applies to hijackings

**Status of the Convention:**

Signature: 76 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 185 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Governments of USSR/Russia, UK and USA).

The **1971 Convention** for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation

- **Montreal Convention** (September 23, 1971): applies to acts of aviation sabotage such as bombings abroad aircraft in flight

**Status of the Convention:**

Signature: 59 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 188 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Governments of USSR/Russia, UK and USA).

The **1973 Convention** on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including diplomatic agents

- **UN Convention** (NY December 14, 1973): Protects senior governmental officials and diplomats

**Status of the Convention:**

Signature: 25 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 180 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General at the UN HQ in NY).

The **1979 International Convention** against the Taking of Hostages

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵ UNGA, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 2006.</footnote>
- **UN Convention (NY December 18, 1979):** applies erga omnes

Status of the Convention:

Signature: 39 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 176 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General at the UN HQ in NY).

The **1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material**

- **UN Convention (March 3, 1980):** Combats unlawful taking and use of nuclear material

Status of the Convention:

Signature: 45 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 155 states (ratification instruments deposited with the International Atomic Energy Agency, UNOV).

The **1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation**

- **Montreal Protocol (February 24, 1988):** Extends and supplements the Montreal 1971

Convention on air safety

Status of the Instrument:

Signature: 68 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 188 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Governments of USSR UK USA and with ICAO).

The **1988 UN Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation**

- **Rome Convention (March 10, 1988):** applies to terrorist activities on ships

Status of the Convention:

Signature: 41/17 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 166 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General at the UN HQ in NY).

The **1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf**

- **Rome Protocol (March 10, 1988):** refers to terrorist attacks on fixed offshore platforms

Status of the Instrument:

Signature: 39 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 156 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General at the UN HQ in NY).

The **1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (including the stipulations on Plastic and High Explosives; Detection agent; Manufacturing and Marking; Duly authorized military devices; Description of Explosives, etc.)**

- **Montreal Convention (March 1, 1991):** applies to chemical marking for international identification of plastic explosives, e.g. to combat aircraft sabotage

Status of the Convention:

Signature: 51 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 156 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Intl. Civil Aviation Org. at HQ in Montreal).

The **1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (including the stipulations on state or government facility; Infrastructure facility; Explosive or other lethal device; Cause of death, serious injury or substantial material damage; Impact of toxic chemicals, biological agents or toxins, radiation or radioactive material; Military forces of a state; Place of public use; Public transportation system; Mutual legal assistance, etc.)**

- **UN Convention (NY December 15, 1997):** expands legal framework for international co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons who engage in terrorist bombings

Status of the Convention:

Signature: 58 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 170 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General at the UN HQ in NY).
The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (including the stipulations on funds; State or governmental facility; Proceeds; Exchange of information; Extraditable offences; Mutual legal assistance, etc.)

- **UN Convention (NY December 9, 1999):** expands legal framework for international co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons who engage in financing terrorism

**Status of the Convention:**

Signature: 132 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 189 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General at the UN HQ in NY).

The Security Council Resolution 1373 on International Cooperation to combat threats to International Peace and Security caused by Terrorist attacks (2001).

- **The 2001 SC Resolution 1373**

**Status:** unanimously – SC members (5+10)

The 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (including the stipulations on definition of nuclear facilities and of nuclear materials; Crimes and Offenders; Proceedings and Extraditable offenses; Mutual legal assistance, etc.)

- **UN Convention (Vienna, 2005):** designated to criminalize acts of nuclear terrorism, expands legal framework for international co-operation in the prevention, investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in these acts

**Status of the Convention:**

Signature: 115 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 117 states (ratification instruments deposited with the IAEA, Vienna).

**Regional International Instruments:**

The 1971 OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish the Act of Terrorism taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance

- **Organization of American States Convention (Washington, February 2, 1971):** expands the scope of the OAS GA Resolution on Acts of Terrorism with special regards to the Kidnapping of Persons and Extortion in connection with that Crime

**Status of the Convention:**

Signature: 19 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 18 states (ratification instruments deposited with the OAS General Secretariat).

The 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (all EU Member States agreed to the application of this convention as of December 04, 1979)

- **Council of Europe Convention (Strasbourg, January 27, 1977):** as a wider basement for the 1992 EU Maastricht Treaty and its provisions on the Justice-Home Affairs (JHA) Co-operation

**Status of the Convention:**

Signature: 32 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 46 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe).

The 1987 SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism

- **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Convention (Kathmandu, November 4, 1987):** applies only to Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka but recalls the UN Resolution 2625 (XXV) as well as the Dhaka SAARC Summit of 1985

**Status of the Convention:**

Signature: -- states; Ratification, accession or succession: 7 states (full) (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of SAARC). Including: The 2004 Additional Protocol to the SAARC Convention
- **SAARC Additional Protocol (Islamabad, 2004):** framework for regional mechanisms of implementation and information exchange relevant to the acts of terrorism (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of SAARC).

The 1998 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism

- **League of Arab States Convention:** expands legal framework for int'l. co-op. in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in terrorist activities
Status of the Convention:

Signature: 22 states; Ratification, accession or succession: 17 states (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of LAS).

The 1999 OAU/AU<fnref n="46" /> Convention on the Prevention and Combat Terrorism (including the stipulations on Terrorist act definition; Areas of co-operation; State Jurisdiction; Extradition; Extra-territorial investigations and mutual legal assistance, Extraditable offenses, etc.)

- **Organization of African Unity Convention** (Addis Ababa, 1999): expands legal framework for prevention and combating of and international co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in terrorist activities

Status of the Convention:

Signature: no data; Ratification, accession or succession: no data available (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of AU/African Union).

Including:

The 2004 Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism

- **African Union Protocol** (Addis Ababa, 2004): legal framework for regional mechanisms of implementation, prevention and combating of acts of terrorism (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of AU).

The 1999 OIC Convention on Combating International Terrorism (including the provisions on Contracting state; Terrorism definition; Terrorist Crime; Measures to Prevent and Combat Terrorist crimes; Exchange of Information and Expertise; Investigation; Education and Information Field; Extradition and extradition procedures; Rogatory Commission; Judicial co-operation; Seized assets and proceeds of the crime; Exchange of Evidence; Implementation Mechanisms; Protection of Witnesses and Experts)

- **Organization of the Islamic Conference Convention** (Ouagadougou, July 1, 1999): expands legal framework for int'l. co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in terrorism within the OIC member states

Status of the Convention:

Signature: verified by the OIC Foreign Ministers at the 26th Session of Organization in Burkina Faso; Ratification, accession or succession: no data available (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of OIC).

The 2002 Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism
(including the stipulations on Terrorist act definition; Areas of co-operation; State Jurisdiction; Joint
Investigation, Extradition; Extra-territorial investigations and Mutual legal assistance, Extraditable
offenses, etc.)

- **Organization of American States Convention** (Bridgetown/Barbados, 2002): sets the legal framework for prevention and combating of and regional co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in terrorist activities

Status of the Convention:

Signature: 33 (of 34 active); Ratification, accession or succession: 24 (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of OAS).

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶ Organization of African Unity (OAU) has been renamed into African Union (AU).</footnote>
The 2005 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (including the stipulations on Terrorist act definition; Areas of co-operation; State Jurisdiction; Indictment and Investigation, and Exchange mechanisms; Mutual legal assistance; Extraditable offenses, etc.)

- **Council of Europe Convention** (Warsaw, 2005): expands legal framework for prevention and combating of and regional co-operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of persons engaged in terrorist activities

**Status of the Convention:**

Signature: 17; Ratification, accession or succession: 42 (opened in Warsaw, ratification instruments deposited with the CoE).

**The 2005 Council of Europe Convention** on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. (Warsaw, 2005): Is the first international treaty covering both the prevention and the control of money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

**Status of the Convention:**

Signature: 10; Ratification, accession or succession: 37

The 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (including the stipulations on Terrorist offences; Strong reference on non-interference principle; Areas of co-operation; Rehabilitative programs; Political Offenses Exceptions; State Jurisdiction; Mutual legal assistance, Extraditable offenses, etc.)

- **ASEAN Convention** (Cebu/Philippines, 2007): expands legal framework for prevention and combating of terrorism; Foresees designation of Central Authorities or Coordinating structures: clearing-house mechanism

**Status of the Convention:**

Signature: 10; Ratification, accession or succession: 10 (ratification instruments deposited with the Secretary-General of ASEAN).33

The 2017 Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism

- **Council of Europe Convention (Riga, 2015).** Criminalise the acts of taking part in an association or group for terrorism, receiving terrorist training, traveling abroad for terrorism, and financing or organizing travel for such purposes.

**Status of the Convention:**

Signature: 19; Ratification, accession or succession: 23

## CONCLUSION

Twenty years have passed since the adoption of the Palermo Convention and its protocols, and it still remains the actual international mechanism for fighting global organised crime. The UNTOC is one of the most widely ratified international treaties and has also served as a significant promoter of the fight against various criminal modalities such as human trafficking, and especially trafficking in human beings. The Palermo Convention and its protocol on preventing and combating trafficking have served as the basis for the criminalisation in many states of the so-called modern slavery. Despite this, it is sometimes under-utilized, and there is even a lack of implementation in some countries, which energetically invites all to join forces in the advancement of international justice.

As stated throughout the text, the lasting and ultimate ambition of any parallel societal structure is to legalize itself. After stages of accumulation/recruitment, stabilization, expansion, and monopolization are achieved, the parallel structure will make all necessary efforts to establish itself within the given society legitimately. This is where corruption, organized crime (including money laundering, cybercrime, and trafficking), and terrorism come to a dangerous interplay. There is no
successful transition through the phases for neither organized crime nor a terrorist group without support from a corrupted official. Corruption is used from neutralization (lowering the legal enforcement risk) to naturalization (legalization of the criminal group). Once successfully conducted, the corruption keeps presenting itself as an opportunity, almost automatically. That is the manner that corruption evolves from a sporadically attempted ad hoc condition into a systematically used, well-established, and powerful instrument, which in the long run seriously undermines, deeply penetrates, or even sometimes overtakes the state structure. In order to respond adequately to these challenges, the sub-national and national (states) level, as well as the supranational (international community) one, have to be effective and decisive, but also inclusive and cohesive.

Organised crime is becoming increasingly global, with international networks, and new types of crime appear like those targeting cultural property, the environment, or the counterfeiting of medical products. Therefore, international cooperation is essential, but also the implementation of new strategies to fight crime, such as the confiscation of the proceeds of crime or corporate liability. The fight against transnational crime must be holistic and multidisciplinary, taking into account that organised crime is nowadays a global phenomenon that affects us all. UNDOC is therefore making a major effort to adapt its policies and strategies to meet the new challenges, focusing for example on the need to recover the proceeds of crime, to include the private sector in the fight against crime, or to focus on the liability of legal persons.

In this context, the existence of an international forum is essential. Tentatively, we can describe multilateralism as a special sort of constant, refined diplomatic bargaining among states. Multilateralism is also about the fine-tuning, filtering, and clustering of interests of individual states (which are promulgating their respective national interests through the foreign policy formulation that rests upon the rational, political, and emotional element) and is about building up momentum. Finally, multilateralism is not a linear, directional, irreversible upward process of (agreed or imposed) compromise. It often suffers serious setbacks (sometimes, despite the existing solid institutional framework and its steady financial cover) but also moments of progress, and let us hope that the review mechanism for the implementation of the UNTOC and its protocols established in 2018 can serve as an impetus and a step forward in the fight against transnational crime.

The Justice and Home Affairs diplomacy keeps up its brave, silent, accorded, and sustained work towards establishing a viable, lasting, and comprehensive international regime on universal criminal justice. The human rights, freedom and liberties of individuals and groups are at stake, as well as the proper functioning of our societies. Since we borrowed from the future generations – bound by the cross-generational contract, we simply owe them.

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# The Nonaligned Movement 60 years Later:
Restless asia seeking its pan-continental integration

DR MARIA SMOTRYTSKA<fnref n="1" />

SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW AT IFIMES/DESSA

**Abstract:** The very creation of sub-regional international organizations is a proof that currently Asian countries are more willing to consult and cooperate with each other on the integration and creating of the zone of co-prosperity issues. Nevertheless, in Asia, there is hardly a single state which has no territorial dispute within its neighbourhood. From the Middle East, Caspian and Central Asia, Indian sub-continent, mainland Indo - China or Archipelago SEA, Tibet, South China Sea and the Far East, many countries are suffering numerous green and blue border disputes. The foundation on which Asia – Pacific countries now support regional cooperation initiatives, such as the various Indo – Pacific concepts proposed by Japan, the United States and others, as well as China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”, is built on a policy of peaceful coexistence and prevention of the emergence of a single prevailing power. This paper closer examines these trends and all-Asia future prospect.

**Keywords:** Asia, multilateralism, collective security, prof. Bajrektarevic, border disputes, confidence building

Marking the 60th anniversary of the inaugural, Belgrade conference of the Non-aligned Movement (NaM) (Aug-Sep 1961), the International Institute for Middle East and Balkans Studies (IFIMES) conducts series of research papers and reports. Hence, the first of them:

Following the famous argument of prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic ‘No Asian century without pan-Asian multilateral settings’ which was prolifically published as policy paper and thoroughly debated among practitioners and academia in over 40 countries on all continents for the past 15 years, hereby the author is revisiting and rethinking this very argument, its validity and gravity.

Today Eurasia is the axial continent of mankind, which is home to about 75% of the world's population (see Map 1), produces 60% of world GDP (see Map 2) and stores three quarters of the world's energy resources (see Map 3) [Shepard, 2016]. In these open spaces, two giant poles of modern geoeconomics are being formed: European and East Asian, which are tearing the canvas of the familiar geographical concept of “Eurasia” and at the same time providing opportunities for new synthesis through the construction and connection of transcontinental transport arteries.

In the XX century, a united Europe was able to consolidate the power of its members and create the largest bloc that challenged the world hegemon – the United States, and the rapidly growing Asian giants – India and China. However, today the issue of the fact that the world economy is beginning to rely more and more on the East Asian pole of high technologies is being discussed more actively (see Map 4) [Tobny, 2019]. World geopolitics talk about the transformation of the Pacific Ocean into the same centre of business activity as the Mediterranean Sea in ancient times.

<footnote n="1">¹ Dr Maria Smotrytska is senior research fellow at IFIMES/DeSSA, a research sinologist, specialized in the investment policy of China; Asian affairs; BRI-related initiatives; Sino – European ties, etc. She is distinguished member of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists and the PORA (Project Office for Arctic Development) Expert Council. She has PhD in International politics, Central China Normal University (Wuhan, Hubei province, PR China).</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_8.png" /><figcaption>Map 1.: World's population density (per square kilometer)</figcaption></figure>

Source: WHO, 2019

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>Map 2.: Global GDP Purchasing Power Parity</figcaption></figure>

Source: International Monetarny Fund World Economic Outlook, 2019
<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>Map 3.: World's natural resources map</figcaption></figure>

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2020

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>Map 4.: Global Trade, 2017</figcaption></figure>

Source: The World Bank, 2017
At the end of the XIX century John Hay – US Secretary of State, stated: “The Mediterranean is the ocean of the past, the Atlantic is the ocean of the present, the Pacific is the ocean of the future” [Lehmann&Engammare, 2014]. Statistics show [Akhtar, 2018] that today the Asia – Pacific region (hereinafter APR) has become a powerful world theatre. Ascending Asia encompasses a vast triangle stretching from the Russian Far East and Korea in the northeast to Australia in the south and Pakistan in the west (see Map 5). This triangle contains many of the leading industrialized countries of the modern world – Japan, China, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, which are characterized by the fastest rates of economic development [Reynolds, 2021]. In the water area of the region a new global reproduction complex is being formed, which today provides more than half of world production and world trade, almost half of the inflow of foreign direct investment (see Map 4).

In the XXI century, it was impossible not to notice the rapid economic growth of Asia, given that the growth rates of each of the national economies of the region exceed those of the Western countries. However, the assertion about the beginning of the Asian century is still vague.

Asia's economic resurgence and cumulative financial strengths over the last two decades have largely contributed to the global shift of power to Asia [Medcalf, 2018], nevertheless how politically and economically stable the “dominance” of Asia? To answer this question, one need to refer to history of the region and its current geopolitical status-quo.

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>Map 5.: Political map of Eurasia</figcaption></figure>

Source: Dept. Of Global Studies and Geography, Hofstra University, 2018

At the end of the last century and the beginning of this century, Asia flourished because the Pax Americana period after the end of World War II provided a favourable strategic context. But now the twists and turns of US – China relations are raising questions about the future of Asia and the structure of the emerging international order.
For a long time, Asian countries have taken the best of both worlds, building economic relations with China, and maintaining strong ties with the United States and other developed countries. Many Asian states for a long time have considered the United States and other developed countries as their main economic partners [Tran, 2019]. But now they are increasingly taking advantage of the opportunities created by China's rapid development [Harada, 2020].

Due to the new geopolitical situation, the countries of the East Asia region are concerned [Rsis, 2021] that, being at the intersection of the interests of major powers, they may find themselves between two fires and will be forced to make difficult choices. In this regard, countries understand that the status-quo in Asia must change. But whether the new configuration will further prosper or bring dangerous instability remains to be seen.

It is worth noting that Asian countries view the United States as a power present in the region and having vital interests there. At the same time, China and India are immediate and close reality. Asian countries don't want to choose between them. And if they face this challenge – Washington will try to contain the growth of China or Beijing will make efforts to create an exclusive sphere of influence in Asia – they will embark on the path of confrontation that will drag on for decades and jeopardize the highly-discussed Asian century.

An important element that can resolve the issue of the status-quo in the region is the fact, that the largest world's continent must consider creation of the comprehensive pan-Asian institution, as the other major theatres do have in place already for many decades [Kuo, 2018] (i.e., the Organization of American States – OAS (American continent), African Union – AU (Africa), Council of Europe and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE (Europe)) (see Map 6).

<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>Map 6: Atlas of international organizations</figcaption></figure>

Source: Dept. Of Global Studies and Geography, Hofstra University, 2020

The steps taken by the countries of the leading regions of the world to create a single market and a zone of co-prosperity in recent years have given rise to a desire for consolidation among the leaders of Asian countries [Frost, 2008]. Thus, today Asia is a place of concentration of the largest integration groupings, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), its countries are members of large organizations: the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian
Economic Community (EurAsEC), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), BRICS, G-20, G-8, E-7. These integration groupings are closely interconnected, widely diversified (Commonwealth of Nations) or specialized (OPEC) **(see Map 6)**. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in Asia there is still the absence of any pan-Asian security/ multilateral structure, which leaves many issues of cooperation between countries (especially in the field of security and interstate territorial disputes) unresolved [Kaisheng, 2015]. Thus, in Asia the presence of the multilateral regional settings is limited [Bajrektarevic, 2013] to a very few spots in the largest continent, and even then, they are rarely mandated with security issues in their declared scope of work **(see Map 6)**.

Underlining the importance of the creation on multilateral mechanism in Asia, one need to analyse in details the conflicts' map of the region. The world's map, which is showing the world's countries involved in land or border disputes, categorizes the conflicts according to their gravity, from dormant disputes to active conflicts (countries marked in grey have none) **(see Map 7)**, **(see Map 29)**. Thus, Central and Western Africa, Asia and the Middle East emerge as the areas of the world with most active territorial conflicts [Conant, 2014].

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>**Map 7.:** All world's ongoing territorial disputes (intensity index)</figcaption></figure>

Source: CIA World Factbook, 2020

The historical background of Asian region shows that Asia has witnessed more territorial disputes, and more armed conflicts over disputed territory, than any other region in the world **(see Map 8)** [Mancini, 2013]. In 2000, Asia also accounted for almost 40 % of all active territorial disputes worldwide [Fravel, 2014]. Thus, today territorial disputes in Asia remain a serious challenge to peace, stability, and prosperity of the countries. The geopolitical shifts, natural resources, and environmental degradation are a source of concern **(see Map 29)**. The East and South China Seas are flashpoints that could lead to devastating confrontations for the region and beyond.

Dividing the region to subregional level Asia as a region includes **Northern (Northeast) Asia**, **China & Far East (Eastern Asia)**, **South – Eastern Asia**, **Western Asia**, **South Asia**, and **Central Asia** **(see Map 9)**. Among them **Western Asia** and **Central Asia** has higher conflict potential, which influence the interstate cooperation.
<figure><img src="image_15.png" /><figcaption>Map 8.: Asia's Disputed Borders</figcaption></figure>

Source: Business Insider, 2020

<figure><img src="image_16.png" /><figcaption>Map 9.: Subregions of Asia</figcaption></figure>

Source: National Geography, 2018
The subregion of **Central Asia** is west of China, south of Russia, and north of Afghanistan.
The western border of this region runs along the Caspian Sea. It is politically divided into five
countries: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan (see **Map 10**).

Two post-Soviet Caspian Sea sub-regions – Central Asia and the South Caucasus – have experienced different conflict scenarios. The South Caucasus has been embroiled in protracted, large-scale armed conflicts, while Central Asians have managed to avert a serious armed conflict, remaining largely peaceful despite local, short-term, small-scale clashes, and the existence of factors that may have led – and still may potentially lead – to a serious military conflict (i.e., Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict (*The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict*<fnref n="2" /> [Visual Explainer, 2021]). Conflict map of Central Asia (see Map 11) mainly describes the issue of border settlement is the problem of *ethnic enclaves* [Indeo, 2020], which is a constant factor of tension in relations between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (see Map 29).

<figure><img src="image_17.png" /><figcaption>Map 10.: Central Asia Subregion</figcaption></figure>

Source: Cartarium/Shutterstock, 2019

<footnote n="2">²The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an ethnic and territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, inhabited mostly by ethnic Armenians, and seven surrounding districts, inhabited mostly by Azerbaijanis until their expulsion during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which are *de facto* controlled by the self-declared Republic of Artsakh, but are internationally recognized as *de jure* part of Azerbaijan. The conflict has its origins in the early 20th century, though the present conflict began in 1988, when the Karabakh Armenians demanded that Karabakh be transferred from Soviet Azerbaijan to Soviet Armenia. The conflict escalated into a full-scale war in the early 1990s which later transformed into a low-intensity conflict following the end of the war, later escalating into another full-scale war in 2020.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_18.png" /><figcaption>Map 11.: Conflicts of Central Asia region</figcaption></figure>

Source: Jacques Leclerc Research Centre, 2020

To date, of all the currently existing independent states in Central Asia, only Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have decided to delimit their land borders with neighbouring countries [Zhunisbek, 2021]. The largest number of territorial disputes leading to border armed conflicts arose between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, which share a common border in the Ferghana Valley, where there is a difficult socio-economic situation (high density and rapid population growth, lack of farmland, lack of water resources), as well as strong positions of supporters of Islamic radicalism.

The conflicts on the borders and border areas of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in recent years and months allow to characterize the current situation as unstable and tends to worsen (see Map 29).

Western Asia is in the area between Central Asia and Africa, south of Eastern Europe. Most of the region is often referred to as the Middle East, although it geographically excludes the mainland of Egypt (which is culturally considered a Middle Eastern country). West Asia is politically divided into 18 states: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Yemen. Iran can also be considered as border state of the subregion. It also includes the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt (see Map 12).

The situation in (South-) Western Asia, which covers most of the Near and Middle East, has remained very complex and explosive for half a century. This is largely due to the *Palestine – Israeli confrontation* in Palestine [BBC, 2021], which escalated in the early twentieth century after the proclamation of the doctrine of creating a “people's land” for the Jews. The *Arab – Israeli confrontation* [Boston, 2021], which began in 1948 (the state of Israel was proclaimed), remains unresolved to this day and is a hotbed of armed conflicts in the region (see Map 13).
<figure><img src="image_19.png" /><figcaption>Map 12: Western Asia Map</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_20.png" /></figure>

WorldAtlas

Source: WorldAtlas, 2019.

<figure><img src="image_21.png" /><figcaption>Map 13: Israel Palestine conflict: A map of the region</figcaption></figure>

Source: Express Politics, 2020
The second hotbed of instability in Southwest Asia for almost a quarter of a century is the forcibly divided Cyprus [Anno, 2015]. The main reasons for the dispute in the region are the instability of the state system based on the principle of ethnic dualism and ethnic confrontation (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots). Thus, the unresolved political and ethnic disputes not only maintain tensions between NATO members Greece and Turkey, but also complicates the implementation of Cyprus's initiative to join the European Union.

Unsettled border issues are the reason for the aggravation of the situation in the south of the Arabian Peninsula between Saudi Arabia and Yemen [Martin, 2021]. The border between these states was clearly established only in the southwestern sector (after the military conflict in 1943). In 1993, Saudi Arabia put forward claims for 12 of 20 oil fields located between 17 and 18 parallels, and the negotiations of the border commission have not yielded results so far.

The region's richness in oil and the lack of agreed borders are the cause of territorial disputes both on land and in the waters of the Persian Gulf: territorial disputes between Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman (see Map 14) [Henderson, 2008].

<figure><img src="image_22.png" /><figcaption>Map 14.: Natural resources map of Middle East</figcaption></figure>

Source: CIA Factbook
Simran Khosla/GlobalPost

Source: CIA Factbook, 2016

Islands Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs (Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz) - subject of dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates [Al-Mazrouei, 2015]. Due to the depth of sea, oil tankers and big ships must pass between Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser
Tunbs, which makes these islands some of the most strategic points in the Persian Gulf. The islands are now controlled by Iran, which took control of them in 1971. The conflict between Iran and the UAE periodically flares up and turns into a phase of exchange of harsh statements.

The already dangerous situation in the Persian Gulf region is fuelled by several other regional conflicts: important players in the regional political arena are concerned about the threat of Iranian expansion. The enmity between Iran and Saudi Arabia is based not only on interfaith conflict. Political leadership in the Middle East is at stake.

In addition to those listed above, the *Iraqi issue* remains a hot spot in the South – West Asia subregion [CRS, 2003]. The overthrown 2003 dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein and the creation of new government bodies did not save the country from acute internal political conflicts.

The instability of the *Caucasus* significantly exacerbated the conflict in the region at the beginning of the 21st century: in August 2008, the situation in the region worsened sharply, which was associated with an attempt by Georgia to regain South Ossetia by military means [Lehmkuhl, 2017]. Russia's intervention in this conflict led to the proclamation of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The conflict remains unresolved to this day.

Ethno-religious conflicts and the struggle of the *Kurds* for their statehood, which lasted throughout the entire twentieth century, are important centres of instability in the region [Khalifa&Bonsey, 2013]. The Kurds (according to estimates, at least 20 million people) are settled compactly in mountainous areas at the junction of state borders in the south-eastern part of Turkey (about 10 million people), north-western Iran (5.3 million), northern Iraq (3.0 million) and Syria (1.3 million), more than 0.5 million Kurds live in other countries, in Armenia (see Map 15).

<figure><img src="image_23.png" /><figcaption>Map 15.: Where are the Kurds.</figcaption></figure>

Source: The Kurdish Project, 2018

In 1992, the Kurds proclaimed their own state on part of the territory of Iraq, the government of which was not recognized by Iraq, which offered them the preservation of their autonomy status. The "temperature" of the centres of separatism of the Islamic regional type, the greatest contribution to the formation of which was made by ethno-confessional and geopolitical factors, as well as the factor of natural boundaries, today remains relatively high. One of the bloodiest separatist conflicts,
as noted above, is the Kurdish one. Since its inception, the number of its victims has exceeded 40 thousand people.

The conflict potential of the region is aggravated by the numerous emigrations of Kurds to Western Europe (Germany, France) and the United States, whose radical groups often resort to terrorist acts. Such approaches and fierce military operations complicate the overall political climate in such a volatile region (see Map 29).

**Northern and Eastern Asia** is one of the world's most dynamic areas in terms of economic growth and significance for global trade. While China attracts most attention, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are all strong economies. Add Russia and the US in the mix and the importance of Northeast Asia cannot be overstated.

**Northern Asia** includes the bulk of Siberia and the North – Eastern edges of the continent and comprises Siberia and Russian Far East, which is in the Asian part of Russia and Mongolia (see Map 16).

<figure><img src="image_24.png" /><figcaption>Map 16: East Asia</figcaption></figure>

Source: WorldAtlas, 2019

In the Far East and North Asia, destabilizing factors remain the Russian – Japanese territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands (Northern Territory) [Kaczynski, 2020], the Korean – Japanese territorial dispute over the Dokdo Islands (Takeshima) (Liancourt Rocks dispute) [Genova, 2018] and the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai) between Japan and China [SCMP, 2019].

Analysing Russia – Japanese territorial dispute over Kuril Islands [Gorenburg, 2012], it can be emphasized that the official position of Japan is that the Kuril Islands were never part of Russia and therefore these islands belong to Japan but are currently illegally occupied by Russia (see Map 17). A peace treaty has not yet been signed due to Japan's remaining claims to the islands of Kunashir and Iturup. Russia sees no guarantees of the end of the dispute, even after the “theoretically conceivable” transfer of the four disputed islands to the Japanese side.

Japan – South Korea territorial dispute over Liancourt Rocks remains unresolved [Jennings, 2017] (since 1965 – the parties concluded a Basic Agreement on Relations) and mainly stems from a controversial interpretation of the fact – whether Japan's renunciation of sovereignty
over its colonies also applies to the Liancourt Islands. Due to this fact Japan recalls its claims and makes attempts to exercise its jurisdiction in the area.

<figure><img src="image_25.png" /><figcaption>Map 17.: The Kuril Islands</figcaption></figure>

Source: Deutsche Welle analytics, 2016

**East Asia (China & Far East)**, one of the subregions of Asia, is including the continental part of the Russian Far East region of Siberia, the East Asian islands, Korea, and eastern and north-eastern China. It is located east of Central Asia, with its eastern border running along the East China Sea. East Asia is politically divided into eight countries and regions: China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau (see Map 16).

These two regions are characterised by “strategic diversity” where several unresolved territorial disputes threaten to undermine the very source of regional prosperity: maritime trade.

Of all the disputed territories in the APR, a striking example of the high potential of a formally latent territorial dispute in NEA is the *conflict over the Senkaku – Diaoyu Islands*<fnref n="3" /> [European Parliament, 2021], in which Japan and China, the two largest economies and two leading foreign policy players in Northern and East Asia (NEA), are parties to the conflict (see Map 18). This conflict illustrates the essence of modern territorial disputes in the region and the essential information component of such processes.

Currently, territorial disputes over the right to own the above-mentioned region are not resolved. Both China and Japan periodically engage in military provocations.

The further development of the situation around the Senkaku – Diaoyu Islands is likely to take the form of an ongoing foreign policy conflict of moderate intensity, including the alleged periodic escalation-de-escalation. Thus, the consideration of the situation around the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands makes it clear that this territorial conflict in modern conditions is supported mainly by information actions of its participants. A similar scenario development is typical for many other territorial contradictions in the APR today.

<footnote n="3">³ Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands: the archipelago is de facto controlled by Japan and owned by private individuals (however, these islands may soon be nationalized by Japan). The Senkaku ownership dispute is seen as a potential casus belli</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_26.png" /><figcaption>Map 18.: Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute</figcaption></figure>

Source: Chinese Defense Ministry, EIA, Yonhap, 2015

However, other, equally intractable, disputes cannot be neglected. Among these cases are disputes between Japan and Korea over Dokdo/Takeshima Island<fnref n="4" /> and the Kuril Islands<fnref n="5" /> that are held by Russia but claimed by Japan (See Map 17). Further regional conflicts involve Korean Peninsula<fnref n="6" /> disputes [Visual Explainer, 2013], disputed fishing areas that frequently witness clashes between fishing boats and respective law enforcement agencies. No less important conflict areas of the region are Korean Peninsula and Chinese territories [Krishnankutty, 2020] (namely China – Taiwan<fnref n="7" /> [Maizland, 2021], the issue of Inner Mongolia<fnref n="8" /> [Roney, 2013] the issue of Tibet (Tibet

<footnote n="4">⁴ Liancourt Rocks: in 1952, South Korea declared its sovereignty over Liancourt. In 1954 and 2012, Japan offered to refer the dispute to the UN, to which South Korea refused. In 1965, the parties concluded a Basic Agreement on Relations, in which they recognized the existence of a dispute over the islands. Currently, the conflict mainly stems from a controversial interpretation of the fact — whether Japan's renunciation of sovereignty over its colonies also applies to the Liancourt Islands. From time to time, Japan recalls its claims and makes attempts to exercise its jurisdiction in the area.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Kuril Islands: currently, the official position of Japan is that the South Kuril Islands were never part of Russia, the decisions of the Yalta Conference were not a treaty, and Japan was not a participant in this conference, and therefore these islands belong to Japan, but are currently illegally occupied by Russia. A peace treaty has not yet been signed due to Japan's remaining claims to the islands of Kunashir and Iturup. Russia sees no guarantees of the end of the dispute, even after the "theoretically conceivable " transfer of the four disputed islands to the Japanese side.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Dispute between South and North Koreas: earlier agreements were disavowed by Lee Myung-Bak in 2010 (after the incident with the sinking of the corvette "Cheonan"), and the April 2013 crisis led to the fact that the DPRK ceased to consider itself bound by the terms of not only the 1953 Agreement, but also the 1991 document. On March 8, 2013, the DPRK government annulled the peace treaty with South Korea on non-aggression. The dispute is not resolved.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ China – Taiwan: mainland China considers the island to be part of the People's Republic of China. However, the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China does not actually govern the island, Taiwan has its own government, parliament, and ruling party. Moreover, on the Chinese mainland, there is a special law that prescribes the armed seizure of Taiwan in certain cases, for example, when certain amendments to the Constitution of the island state are adopted. Therefore, the inhabitants of the island live in constant anticipation of possible military aggression from the mainland. The territory of Macclesfield Bank is located below sea level, so it cannot be a disputed territory under international law. Contested by the Republic of China.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ China – Inner Mongolia: Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia is now one of the largest national entities in China. Now the activity of the independence movement has decreased: there are only about 18 Mongols in Inner Mongolia %</footnote>
Autonomous Region)<fnref n="9" /> [Shetty, 2017] and *the issue of Xinjiang* Uygur Autonomous Region) [Fuller&Starr, 2003] (**see Map 19**).

None of the above-mentioned disputes are likely to be resolved in the foreseeable future. The worst-case scenario is that they continue to plague Japan's bilateral relations with China, South Korea, and Russia, isolating Japan in the region, and perhaps even resulting in militarized conflict. Though such conflict is unlikely in the disputes with Russia and South Korea, it remains a possibility in the dispute with China.

The recent flare-ups in all three disputes have served to harden domestic opinion on all sides, preventing the states from explicit compromises (**see Map 29**). But the Northern and Eastern Asia territorial disputes underline an important fact: as the disputes faded from view, public opinion softened slightly, and bilateral trade and other exchanges developed. If the states involved can recognise and pursue their long-term interests, the disputes could be shelved. Over time, if shelving agreements pertained and future flare-ups were avoided, an environment may even develop whereby both sides could reach a compromise agreement. This is perhaps the most optimistic scenario, and it requires a suppression of nationalism and revisionism that may well be impossible. Still, the alternative is a bleak future for not only the disputes, but also for Northeast Asia as a whole.

<caption>**Map 19.:** the PRC: Administrative Divisions & Territorial Disputes</caption>

People's Republic of China (PRC):
Administrative Divisions & Territorial Disputes

<figure><img src="image_27.png" /></figure>

Source: South China Morning Post, Infographics, 2019

<footnote n="9">⁹ China – Tibet: Currently, no State recognizes the independence of Tibet, considering it part of the PRC. Fleeing from the repression, many Tibetans, led by the Dalai Lama XIV, went into exile, mainly to India. Under the leadership of the Dalai Lama, a Tibetan government-in-exile was established, the legitimate successor to the Tibetan Government that had previously operated in Lhasa.</footnote>
**Southeast Asian** subregion is located north of Australia, south of East Asia, west of the Pacific Ocean, and east of the Bay of Bengal. It encompasses several island and archipelago nations that stretch between the northern and southern hemispheres, making it the only Asian region located on both sides of the equator. Southeast Asia is politically divided into 12 countries and territories: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam (see Map 20).

In Southeast Asia (hereinafter SEA), compared to other regions, the numbers of unresolved territorial disputes are still considered small [Jenne, 2017], and SEA is considered a relatively safe region with no violence going on due to the unresolved territorial disputes as compared to the Africa region (where the conflicts has involved 9 million people causing them to be refugees and internally displaced people (hereinafter IDP) where hundreds and thousands of people were slaughtered).

<figure><img src="image_28.png" /><figcaption>Map 20: Southeast Asia</figcaption></figure>

Source: WorldAtlas, 2019

The territorial disputes in SEA consist of the following disputes: *the Philippines' Sabah Claim (The North Borneo)*<fnref n="10" />, *the Ligitan and Sipidan dispute*<fnref n="11" /> [Victoria, 2019], *the Pedra Branca dispute*<fnref n="12" />

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ The North Borneo (Sabah) dispute: to date, Malaysia maintains that the Sabah claim is a non-issue and non-negotiable, thereby rejecting any calls from the Philippines to resolve the matter in ICJ. Sabah authorities stated in 2009 that they see the claim made by the Philippines' Moro leader Nur Misuari to take Sabah to International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a non-issue and that they dismiss the claim</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ the Ligitan and Sipidan dispute: none of Indonesia's actions are of a legislative or administrative nature; it did not follow from the fact of patrolling that Indonesia considered the islands as its own; the activities of fishermen cannot be considered as originating from the State. Malaysia's actions, on the contrary, can be regarded as suggesting a claim to sovereignty. The number of these actions is small, but they are diverse in content and cover a significant period of time. Neither Indonesia nor the Netherlands protested them during their implementation. Thus, the islands belong to Malaysia.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² The Pedra Branca dispute: on 23 May 2008, the ICJ ruled that Pedra Branca is under Singapore's sovereignty, while Middle Rocks belongs to Malaysia. As regards South Ledge, the Court noted that it falls within the apparently overlapping</footnote>