Permanent Representatives Committee, the Political and Security Committee, the working groups of the Council, the High Representative, and the European External Actions Service (EEAS).

The EU is equipped with several tools and instruments for in the area of foreign and security policy area. One of the most important instruments is decision of the Council which before the Treaty of Lisbon used to be separated into the Joint Action and the Common Position. The European Council decisions require always unanimity and are sent out at this level only in case serious issues and when the message has to be strong. Besides that, there are also restrictive measures – the sanctions, which also adopted unanimously and have to fall under the general objectives of the policy area. Other instruments in the Common Foreign and Security Policy are statements, demarches, political dialogues (between the EU and third countries), and proposals made by special representatives<fnref n="15" />.

## EMERGENCE OF THE EU'S CFSP

The necessity for acting together at the EU level in the foreign and security policy issues was broUGHT by ever-changing and globalising world and notion that the security problems had became too great, cross-border, and complex for the member states to solve them on their own<fnref n="16" />. Besides that, it was understood that only facing collectively the new international challenges and developing common policies can enable the member states to respond to these issues in a stronger and more coherent manner and have a greater say over this area internationally<fnref n="17" />.

In the foreign and security policy issues, the cooperation between the EU Members States started in 1970 in the framework of the European Political Cooperation which was mainly about the information exchange and was incorporated into the treaties by the Single European Act I 1986¹⁸. The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy in the more current form was established through the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and added into the second pillar. The Treaty of Amsterdam (entered into force in 1997) introduced the new role of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and established the possibility for deal with crisis management and humanitarian aid the Western European Union<fnref n="19" />. The Treaty of Nice in 2003 brought further changes by establishing the European Security and Defence Policy as an independent policy area and creating Political and Security Committee for better management of civil and military crisis<fnref n="20" />. The Treaty of Lisbon amongst of other important adjustments outlined the legal basis for the policy area which is covered by Articles 21-46 of TEU and Articles 205-222 of the TFEU and created the External Actions Service.

## CHANGES BROUGHT BY THE TREATY OF LISBON

The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009, led to many rational structure, governance and institutional framework and decision-making process changes, abolished the three-pillar system, codified the case-law of the EU Court of Justice, and gave the EU legal personality and under the Articles 3(5) ad 21(1) TEU external mandate for entering into treaties. In terms of the CFSP, the Lisbon Treaty has some very ambitious targets such as giving the EU single

<footnote n="15">15 https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228310</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 Javier Solana, "European Foreign Policy and Its Challenges in the Current Context", in *The Search for Europe. Contrasting Approaches (BBVA)*, Madrid, 2015, pp. 422-439.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17 https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228304</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228306</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228306</footnote>

<footnote n="20">20 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/158/foreign-policy-aims-instruments-and-achievements</footnote>
voice regarding foreign policy, equipping it with necessary tools for implementing more coherent and effective actions, and making it the contact person for the whole Union in this area – some of these achieved today only partially<fnref n="21" />. However, taking into account all the aims the Lisbon Treaty had in general, it is not surprising that not all have been fully achieved<fnref n="22" />.

## CHANGES BROUGHT BY THE TREATY OF LISBON: CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE AND DECISION-MAKING

It has been claimed that in terms of governance and decision-making framework, the Lisbon Treaty brought about fairly little or in partially no changes since the governance architecture and policy processes remained largely the same<fnref n="23" />. The Treaty of Lisbon did not change the decentralised decision-making process, requirement of unanimity, also it did not extend the powers of the Commission nor the Parliament and refrained from giving the Court jurisdiction in this area. The CFSP remained the major exception in the EU treaty-making as the Commission has no right to initiative in this area and the European Parliament does not have co-legislative nor consent requirement powers<fnref n="24" />. In despite of this, it has been stated that the treaty had a positive impact on the negotiation setting improving the consensus seeking and dialogue between the Member States and the EU institutions and made the formation of the external strategy obligatory<fnref n="25" />. Besides that, according to the Article 24 of TEU, the Member States are bound to support the EU's foreign policies and required not to conclude actions going against its interests<fnref n="26" />.

## CHANGES BROUGHT BY THE TREATY OF LISBON: CHANGES IN INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP

In the level of institutional set-up, the adoption of Treaty of Lisbon increased the importance of the mandate of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy (created by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999) and established the European External Action Service (EEAS) with a task of representing the Union abroad<fnref n="27" />. Previously, the main task of the High Representative had been supporting the Council and its rotational presidency. The Treaty terminated the rotational presidency of the Council in the CFSP area and under the Articles 24(1) and 26(2) of TEU gave the High Representative central role and responsibility together with the Council and the Member States of carrying out CFSP, ensuring compliance in regards of fundamental principles, and securing the effectiveness, coherence and continuity of Union's actions in these issues<fnref n="28" />. Besides that, the High Representative was granted dual Vice-President role in the Commission, has the right to conduct political dialogue with third partners, make policy proposals to the Council, call extraordinary meetings, and is considered in general the representative of the European Union in the Common

<footnote n="21">²¹ Annegret Bendiek, „European Realism in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy“ Edited by Dr Paul James Cardwell. *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era*, Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012, pp. 35-58.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Marise Cremona, *Implementation of the Lisbon, Improving Functioning of the EU: Foreign Affairs, In-depth analysis for the AFCO committee*, Brussels, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015, 34 pages.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ Uwe Puetter, „The Latest Attempt at Institutional Engineering: The Treaty of Lisbon and Deliberative Intergovernmentalism in EU Foreign and Security Policy Coordination“ Edited by Dr Paul James Cardwell. *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era*, Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012, pp. 17-34.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Marise Cremona, *Implementation of the Lisbon, Improving Functioning of the EU: Foreign Affairs, In-depth analysis for the AFCO committee*, Brussels, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015, 34 pages.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Uwe Puetter, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-34.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228304</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Javier Solana, "European Foreign Policy and Its Challenges in the Current Context", in *The Search for Europe. Contrasting Approaches (BBVA)*, Madrid, 2015, pp. 422-439.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Uwe Puetter, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-34.</footnote>
Foreign and Security area<fnref n="29" />. However, there have been claims that the power of the High Representative is still rather week as he/she can make suggestions and act on the basis of the policies which have been previously accepted between and by the Member States<fnref n="30" />.

The Lisbon Treaty also created a new separate European Institution – the External Action Service under the position of High Representative set-up with the Commission and Council's General Secretariat officials and diplomats from the Member States. The tasks of this institution include supporting the High Representative, the Commission and the President of European Council in the issues connected with EU external relations, and cooperating with the Member States' diplomatic services and administrating the EU delegations abroad<fnref n="31" />.

## THE MAIN CHALLENGES: INTERNAL CHALLENGES

In terms of internal challenges for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the decentralised decision-making process requiring in most cases generation of consensus, and veto power of the Member States can be claimed to pose the greatest obstacle for effective policy implementation in this area<fnref n="32" />. The problem here is that due to different historical, linguistic and cultural backgrounds, geographical location, memberships in international organisations, independent views on possible security threats, and national foreign and security concerns make it very complicated to reach to a common interest and consensus necessary for adoption of EU foreign policy agenda<fnref n="33" />. One example of might be the debate between the so-called western and eastern member States as one side sees the biggest threat in the possible actions and policies of Russia and the other the conflicts in the Middle-East and massive influx of refugees in the Mediterranean<fnref n="34" />. The consensus-based decision making process also complicates adopting the decisions which are inconvenient for some of the Member States (for instance sanctions) or go against their national strategies, and gives the Union very limited tools for achieving its interests abroad<fnref n="35" />.

## THE MAIN CHALLENGES: EXTERNAL CHALLENGES

The external challenges mainly originate from the multi-polar ever-changing globalised world in which many of the threats to the security and sovereignty have transnational nature, and as a result of that, require closer cooperation and cannot be efficiently dealt anymore individually at nation state level<fnref n="36" />. Javier Solana, the former High Representative for CFSP has divided the external threats into

<footnote n="29">²⁹ https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228308</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Annegret Bendiek, „European Realism in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy“ Edited by Dr Paul James Cardwell. *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era*, Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012, pp. 35-58.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228308</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² Uwe Puetter, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-34.; Jakubowski, J., “Euroscepticism in a Pro-European State on the Basis of Media Content Analysis” *TalTech Journal of European Studies*, Vol.9 (Issue 4), 2019, pp. 218-236.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ Javier Solana, "European Foreign Policy and Its Challenges in the Current Context", in *The Search for Europe. Contrasting Approaches (BBVA)*, Madrid, 2015, pp. 422-439.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ Javier Solana, "European Foreign Policy and Its Challenges in the Current Context", in *The Search for Europe. Contrasting Approaches (BBVA)*, Madrid, 2015, pp. 422-439.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ Annegret Bendiek, „European Realism in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy“ Edited by Dr Paul James Cardwell. *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era*, Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012, pp. 35-58.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ See e.g Siljak, D. and Nagy, S., „Do Transition Countries Converge towards the European Union?“ *TalTech Journal of European Studies*, Vol.9 (Issue 1) 2019, pp. 115-139.; Ramiro Troitiño, D; Kerikmäe, T; Chochia, A, „Foreign Affairs of the European Union: How to Become an Independent and Dominant Power in the International Arena“ In: Ramiro Troitiño, D; Kerikmäe, T; de la Guardia, R.M; Pérez Sánchez, G.A (Ed.), *The EU in the 21st Century Challenges and Opportunities for the European Integration* (209–230), Springer, 2020.</footnote>
challenges related to foreign policy (such as Russian actions in Georgia<fnref n="37" /> and Ukraine<fnref n="38" /> leading to tense EU-Russia relations<fnref n="39" />, situation in Belarus, and conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa resulting in increased number of asylum seekers and fundamentalist terrorist reaching to Europe), global challenges (mostly linked with climate change, terrorism and cyber threats), and new shift of power from western countries to Asia and possible conflicts around South China Sea<fnref n="40" />.

## CONCLUSION

This report focused on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, tried to provide general overview of this policy area and introduce the internal and external challenges it faces today. In the first part the concept and powers of the Union in this area was studied. Then the creation of necessity of Member States acting together in foreign policy issues and consequently the emergence of the CFSP was examined. After that the paper brought out the most important changes introduced in the area by the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and looked into the challenges the EU has in these issues today.

While it was established that the CFSP is an integral part of the EU, it differs from other policy areas due to its non-communitarised nature and decentralised decision-making and governance methods. The Treaty of Lisbon which introduced many rational structure, governance and institutional framework and decision-making process changes, expanded the importance of the role of High Representative and created External Action Service, did not brought about significant adjustments in terms of policy making in the area of CFSP which still falls much under the realm of the Member States. Currently, there are many challenges for the Union's CFSP. When it comes to internal affairs, the main restriction for effective and coherent decision making and policy implementation is the requirement of consensus of the Member States which can be rather difficult to achieve due to different backgrounds, security concerns and national policies. The external challenges are mainly caused by the globalised ever-changing world, threatening behaviour of other countries, crisis situations and shift of power.

## References/Bibliography:

* BENDIEK, Annegret, *European Realism in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy*. Edited by Dr Paul James Cardwell. EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era, Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012.

* CHOCHIA A. AND KERIKMÄE T. (2020) Georgia on its path to Europeanisation: Academic Cooperation. TalTech Journal of European Studies, Vol.10 (Issue 2), pp. 3-6.

* CREMONA, Marise, *Implementation of the Lisbon, Improving Functioning of the EU: Foreign Affairs*, In-depth analysis for the AFCO committee, Brussels, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015, 34 pages.

<footnote n="37">³⁷ For more on Georgia, please see Chochia A. and Kerikmäe T., "Georgia on its path to Europeanisation: Academic Cooperation", *TalTech Journal of European Studies*, Vol.10 (Issue 2), 2020, pp. 3-6.; And on EaP please see Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.), *Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy*, Springer International Publishing, 2016</footnote>

<footnote n="38">³⁸ For more on Ukraine please see Kerikmäe, T. and Chochia, A., "Ukraine's Endeavour: Drawing Near(er) to the European Union" *TalTech Journal of European Studies*, Vol.8 (Issue 1), 2018, pp. 1-2.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">³⁹ Please see Hoffmann, T.; Chochia, A., "The Institution of Citizenship and Practices of Passportization in Russia's European Neighborhood Policies" In: A. Makarychev, T. Hoffmann (Ed.). *Russia and the EU Spaces of Interaction* (223-237). Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group., 2018</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ Javier Solana, "European Foreign Policy and Its Challenges in the Current Context", in *The Search for Europe*. *Contrasting Approaches (BBVA)*, Madrid, 2015, pp. 422-439.</footnote>
Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016ME%2FTXT, Accessed: 21.05.2021

HOFFMANN, T.; CHOCHIA, A. (2018). The Institution of Citizenship and Practices of Passportization in Russia's European Neighborhood Policies. In: A. Makarychev, T. Hoffmann (Ed.). Russia and the EU Spaces of Interaction (223–237). Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group.

JAKUBOWSKI, J. (2019) Euroscepticism in a Pro-European State on the Basis of Media Content Analysis. TalTech Journal of European Studies, Vol.9 (Issue 4), pp. 218-236.

KANIOK, P. AND KOMÍNKOVÁ, M. (2019) Parliamentary Questions: Expressions of Opposition(s) within the European Parliament?. TalTech Journal of European Studies, Vol.9 (Issue 1), pp. 33-56.

KERIKMÄE, T. AND CHOCHIA, A. (2018) Ukraine's Endeavour: Drawing Near(er) to the European Union. TalTech Journal of European Studies, Vol.8 (Issue 1), pp. 1-2.

KERIKMÄE, T.; CHOCHIA, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing.

PUETTER, Uwe, *The Latest Attempt at Institutional Engineering: The Treaty of Lisbon and Deliberative Intergovernmentalism in EU Foreign and Security Policy Coordination*. Edited by Dr Paul James Cardwell. EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era, Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012.

RAMIRO TROITIÑO, D; KERIKMÄE, T; DE LA GUARDIA, R. M; PEREZ, G. A. (2020). The EU in the 21st Century. Challenges and Opportunities for the European Integration Process. Springer.

RAMIRO TROITIÑO, D; KERIKMÄE, T; CHOCHIA, A (2020). Foreign Affairs of the European Union: How to Become an Independent and Dominant Power in the International Arena. In: Ramiro Troitiño, D; Kerikmäe, T; de la Guardia, R.M; Pérez Sánchez, G.A (Ed.). The EU in the 21st Century Challenges and Opportunities for the European Integration (209–230). Springer.

See https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228310 Accessed: 21.05.2021

See https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228308 Accessed: 21.05.2021

See https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228304 Accessed: 21.05.2021

See https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228306 Accessed: 21.05.2021

See https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/158/foreign-policy-aims-instruments-and-achievements Accessed: 21.05.2021

SILJAK, D. AND NAGY, S. (2019) Do Transition Countries Converge towards the European Union? *TalTech Journal of European Studies* Vol.9 (Issue 1), pp. 115-139.

SOLANA, Javier, "European Foreign Policy and Its Challenges in the Current Context", in *The Search for Europe*. Contrasting Approaches (BBVA), Madrid, 2015, pp. 422-439.
# EU external relations with Africa

TEELE NÄSSI<fnref n="1" />

TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, ESTONIA

**Abstract:** Europe and Africa have historically strong relations, covering peace and security, democracy, human rights, development, sustainable economic growth and trade. The two parties have made several agreements and the two main agreements that governs the European Union and Africa relations are Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Both of those include political, economic and development dimensions. Although agreements about equality have been made, there is still some indications that European Union reserves the donor part of the relationships and African Union is left behind as a recipient. This paper seeks to understand the reasons behind their relationships and wishes to find out, are the EU and AU now considered equal partners.

**Keywords:** Cotonou Agreement, JAES, Sub-Saharan Africa, EU External relations.

## INTRODUCTION

On the European Union (EU) side, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)<fnref n="2" /> Article 220 provides that the Union shall maintain „relations as are appropriate with other international organisations“. Article 220 (2) elaborates, that “the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission shall implement this Article”. On the African Union (AU) side, Executive Council decision 195(VII) of July 2005 lays out the criteria for granting observer status and accreditation of NGOs, non-African states, international organizations and regional integration organizations (such as the EU).<fnref n="3" />

According to the European Parliament<fnref n="4" /> the EU is working actively to promote peace and security in Africa and engages with the AU in various policy dialogues, including on democracy and human rights, following the plan to become more active on international arena.<fnref n="5" /> Migration has emerged as a core element of Africa-EU relations.<fnref n="6" />

The two main agreement that governs the EU and Africa relations are the 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement<fnref n="7" /> (also referred as Cotonou agreement) and the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy<fnref n="8" /> (JAES), both of which include political, economic and development dimensions.

In the following paper, the author will be focusing on EU relations with sub-Saharan Africa, while relations with other regions of Africa is only mentioned in a few points. The purpose of this paper is to understand, whether the Africa-EU relations are truly a partnership of equals.

<footnote n="1">¹ TalTech Law School, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia teele1985@gmail.com teenas@taltech.ee</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012/C 326/01.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Anna-Luise Chane, Magnus Killander “EU cooperation with regional organizations in Africa.” in *Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper* No. 197, 2018, p. 10.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ European Parliament factsheets – Africa, webpage.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Ramiro Troitiño, D; Kerikmäe, T; Chochia, A, “Foreign Affairs of the European Union: How to Become an Independent and Dominant Power in the International Arena” In: Ramiro Troitiño, D; Kerikmäe, T; de la Guardia, R.M; Pérez Sánchez, G.A (Ed.). *The EU in the 21st Century Challenges and Opportunities for the European Integration* (209–230), Springer, 2020</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Ramiro Troitiño, D; Kerikmäe, T; De la Guardia, R. M; Perez, G. A., *The EU in the 21st Century. Challenges and Opportunities for the European Integration Process*. Springer, 2020</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Partnership agreement, (EC) 2000/483.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ European Commission COM(2007) 357.</footnote>
This paper is divided in three main paragraph and provides an overview of the relations and a short presentation of the two main agreements. In the paper the author will collect and compare the different scholars' opinions and draw conclusions by giving my own opinion on the subject.

OVERVIEW OF EU-AFRICA EXTERNAL RELATIONS

The EU is considered to be a largest trading partner of sub-Saharan Africa.<fnref n="9" /> As African states gained independence, the EU developed a number of different frameworks for its trade, aid, and later political cooperation with African partners, resulting in the fragmentation of EU-Africa relations.<fnref n="10" />

As Jan Orbie has stated: “the EU has long been a pivotal actor in the shaping of Africa’s trade regimes with the rest of the world”<fnref n="11" /> and so the outcome of negotiations between the EU and African states has strongly influenced other external economic relations.<fnref n="12" />

In their working paper A.-L. Chane and M. Killander argue, that: “Over the past century, the relationships between Europe and Africa have gradually shifted from those between colonizers and colonized, to donor-recipient relations and more recently to an increasingly multilateral ‘partnership of equals’.”<fnref n="13" />

The formation of the AU has in part relied on the sharing and using of universal norms and the organisational templates from the EU.<fnref n="14" /> The AU does not constitute a model of the EU in the sense understood by EU integration scholars. Indeed, the local dynamics within Africa, with its many challenges and the previous regional integration trajectory, prevent the adoption of the EU model.<fnref n="15" /> Suh I has indicated: “The EU–Africa relationship is governed by regimes that represent strategic and binding expectations defined in partnership agreements.”<fnref n="16" /> Some of those agreements include peace and security, democracy, good governance and human rights, human development, sustainable and inclusive development growth and continental integration, global and emerging issues. According to European Commission<fnref n="17" /> the EU is a major trading partner for ACP countries, representing more than 21% of their trade with the world. The EU is Sub-Saharan Africa’s second-biggest trading partner after China. The EU is also the main destination for agricultural and transformed goods from ACP partners (more than €33 billion in 2019).

HISTORY OF EU-AFRICA RELATIONS

History has taught that for some 500 years, beginning from the 15th century with the practice of transatlantic slave trade to the mid-20th century with the end of colonialism, Africa has always been in European domination.<fnref n="18" /> According to Chane and Killander: “From the beginning, Africa has

<footnote n="9">⁹ John Kotsopoulos, Frank Mattheis, “A Contextualisation of EU–Africa Relations: Trends and Drivers from a Reciprocal Perspective.” in *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 25 (4), 2018, p. 448.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Anna-Luise Chane, Magnus Killander (2018), *supra nota* 2, p. 19.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Jan Orbie, “The European Union & the Commodity Debate: From Trade to Aid.” in *Review of African Political Economy*, 34(112), 2007, p. 299.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Duncan Money, Hans Otto Frøland, Tshepo Gwatiwa, “Africa–EU relations and natural resource governance: understanding African agency in historical and contemporary perspective.” in *Review of African Political Economy*, 47 (166), 2020, p. 586.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Anna-Luise Chane, Magnus Killander (2018), *supra nota* 2, p. 4.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Toni Haastrup, “EU as Mentor? Promoting Regionalism as External Relations Practice in EU–Africa Relations.” in *Journal of European Integration*, 35 (7), 2013, p. 797.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ *Ibid*.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Fru Norbert Suh I, “International Regime Complexity in EU–Africa.” in *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies*, 7 (2), 2020, p. 32.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ European Commission, Economic Partnerships, webpage.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Fru Norbert Suh I, (2020), *supra nota* 13, p. 37.</footnote>
held a special place in EU foreign relations. Instead of pursuing a comprehensive intercontinental approach, however, EU Africa policy quickly fragmented into parallel frameworks – for sub-Saharan and Northern Africa respectively – which co-exist until today.”<fnref n="19" />

Initially, relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and overseas colonial countries and territories (most of which were African) were governed by the Rome Treaty<fnref n="20" />, which provided for the association of these territories with the EEC in order to promote economic and social development and establish closer economic ties. Treaty of Rome also established a free trade area, rights of establishment for citizens and firms, and creating the European Development Fund.

EEC and the 18 sub-Saharan African states have signed the Yaoundé Convention<fnref n="21" /> in 1963 and the Yaoundé II-Convention<fnref n="22" /> and the Arusha Convention in 1969²³. The Conventions focused on trade and financial and technical coordination and still largely retained the hierarchical relationship of the past.<fnref n="24" /> In 1975 this first generation of treaties was replaced by the Lomé Convention<fnref n="25" />, with the newly formed African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)<fnref n="26" />.

An early EU position in relation to Africa was taken when Gaston Thom, the President of the Council of Ministers, made a statement condemning the policy of apartheid in South Africa on 23 February 1976.<fnref n="27" /> This resulted in the implementation of a foreign policy initiative by the EU.<fnref n="28" />

After an initially exclusive focus on trade and development, EU-ACP relations have included a political dimension since Lomé IV (1990)<fnref n="29" /> with the launch of a political dialogue and a stronger focus on the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

In 2000, the Lomé Agreement was replaced with the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which based on the fundamental principle of “equality of the partners and ownership of the development strategies”.<fnref n="30" /> And since 2002, the EU also negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with regional groupings of ACP states, which were to ultimately replace the trade regime under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.<fnref n="31" />

Until the year 2000, the EU-Africa relations were largely divided along geographical lines, between sub-Saharan Africa (the ACP group) and North Africa (the Mediterranean region). However in the first EU–Africa Summit in Cairo in 2000 all the Heads of State of the EU and the

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Anna-Luise Chane, Magnus Killander (2018), *supra nota* 2, p. 4.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, art 131-136.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and Associated African States, with related Agreements.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the African States and Madagascar associated with the Community.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Uganda and the Republic of Kenya.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Annemarie Peen Rodt, Jide Martyns Okeke, “AU-EU "Strategic Partnership": Strengthening Policy Convergence and Regime Efficacy in the African Peace and Security Complex?” in *African security* 6 (3-4), 2013, p. 215.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ EEC-ACP Convention of Lomé.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ The ACP Group includes 79 states (48 African, 16 Caribbean and 15 Pacific) who were all signatories of the Cotonou Agreement, except for Cuba. Since 5 April 2020, the name of this group was officially changed to the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS).</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Martin Holland, *The European Community and South Africa: European Political Co-operation under Strain*. London: Pinter, 1988, p. 31.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Stephen R. Hurt, *The European Union's external relations with Africa after the Cold War. Aspects of continuity and change*, 2004, p. 168.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Lomé IV Convention</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Cotonou Agreement, article 2.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Anna-Luise Chane, Magnus Killander (2018), *supra nota* 2, p. 5.</footnote>
African were included.<fnref n="32" /> According to the Cairo Declaration parties proclaimed there, that the EU relations with Africa will be revived “in a spirit of equality, respect, alliance and co-operation.”<fnref n="33" /> But in 2005, when European Commission adopted an EU Strategy for Africa<fnref n="34" />, there were practically no participation from African actors, which again raised a lot of doubts regarding the actual partnership discourse that was agreed earlier.<fnref n="35" />

## THE COTONOU AGREEMENT

The Cotonou Agreement was signed on 23 June 2000 and entered into force on 1 April 2003. It governs EU relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, most of whom are former colonies of one or other of the EU member states<fnref n="36" /> and it recognizes the AU as an actor of cooperation, as a partner for political dialogue, and emphasizes its role for peace building and conflict prevention in the region.<fnref n="37" />

Scholars elaborate that: “The implications of the Cotonou agreement can be grouped into three main categories: trade and the related issues regarding regionalization within the ACP group, aid, and the future role of non-state actors and local government”<fnref n="38" /> and: “The Cotonou Agreement promises that finances will be made available to ensure ACP countries’ fair entry into globalized markets.”<fnref n="39" /> Brkan argues: “One of the goals of the agreement was to reduce trafficking and the accumulation of small arms and light weapons.”<fnref n="40" /> Hurt continues: “It marks a substantial shift in the development policy of the EU with its increasing adoption of neoliberal values.”<fnref n="41" />

Cotonou Agreement is considered to be a close partnership agreement and it includes, among other, a comprehensive political dialogue on national, regional and global issues, promoting human rights and democratic principles, developing peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution and addressing migration issues and security issues which include the fight against terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Cotonou agreement offers EU and ACP countries the opportunity to negotiate development-oriented free trade arrangements – EPAs.<fnref n="42" />

According to Hurt: “Trade in goods between the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa has become relatively less significant for the latter since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement”.<fnref n="43" /> This indicates that African countries are more focused in evolving in other subjects rather than trade.

Since Cotonou Agreement expired in 2020, formal negotiations towards a new partnership agreement between the EU and ACP states began in September 2018. The signing of the post-Cotonou agreement will hopefully take place by the end of 2021. European Commission, in its

<footnote n="32">³² Karen Del Biondo, “Moving beyond a donor-recipient relationship? Assessing the principle of partnership in the joint Africa–EU strategy.” in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 38 (2), 2020, p. 316.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ European Commission Conseil/00/901.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ European Commission SEC(2005)1255.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ Karen Del Biondo, (2020), *supra nota* 29, p. 317.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Maria O'Neill, *Eu-North Africa Relations in Cross-Border Law Enforcement: New Legal Challenges for the EU in the Post-Lisbon and Post-Stockholm Era*, 2012, p. 243.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">³⁷ Cotonou Partnership Agreement as amended in 2010, articles 6, 8, 11.</footnote>

<footnote n="38">³⁸ Stephen R. Hurt, (2004) *supra nota* 25, p. 164.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">³⁹ Mark Langan, Sophia Price, “Imperialisms Past and Present in EU Economic Relations with North Africa.” in *Interventions*, 22 (6), 2020, p. 710.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ Maja Brkan, “The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Field of Common Foreign and Security Policy After the Treaty of Lisbon: New Challenges for the Future”, 2012, p. 102.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">⁴¹ Stephen R. Hurt, (2004) *supra nota* 25, p. 164.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">⁴² European Commission, *supra nota* 14.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">⁴³ Stephen R. Hurt, “African Agency and EU-ACP relations beyond the Cotonou Agreement.” in *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 16 (2), 2020, p. 150.</footnote>
proposals to the Council and the European Parliament, noted that the post-Cotonou negotiations are
“an opportunity to make the partnership fit for purpose in light of today’s challenges in a changed
world”.<fnref n="44" />

Although the Cotonou Agreement was meant to be the cornerstone of the equal relations
between European Union and Africa, it is still argued by many scholars, that the equality of the
relationship and the use of the term “partnership” are only rhetorical.<fnref n="45" /> Hopefully the post-Cotonou
Agreement will engage both parties equally and provides cooperation in a higher level.

JOINT AFRICA- EU STRATEGY

During the lifetime of the Cotonou Agreement there has been a development of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), which is reflective of an ongoing shift towards the EU working more directly with the AU.<fnref n="46" /> The Strategy recognizes the AU as a “natural interlocutor for the EU on continental issues and as the most important institutional partner for the EU”.<fnref n="47" />

The JAES was set to improve the Africa-AU political partnership by promoting peace, security, democratic governance and human rights; basic freedoms, gender equality; sustainable economic development, including industrialisation; regional and continental integration and ensuring that all the Millennium Development Goals are met in all African countries by 2015.<fnref n="48" />

Del Biondo acknowledges that JAES aimed to break with the traditional donor-recipient relationship between the EU and Africa to develop a true partnership.<fnref n="49" /> Many other scholars agree and demonstrate in their research, that this is in fact the case.

JAES was adopted in Lisbon in 2007 and according to Chane and Killander: "For the first time in EU-Africa relations, both sides agreed on a common strategy to tackle common challenges. Based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and local ownership, it marked a 'watershed moment' in the history of both regions and a final step away from the hierarchical donor-recipient relationships of the past towards a partnership of equals."<fnref n="50" /> They continue: "it also has laid the foundation for a strategic partnership between both continents, complementing and adding value to the existing frameworks."<fnref n="51" />

Fru Norbert Suh I also states, that „The discourse on partnership in the JAES reflects a broader trend in EU and AU foreign policy. Partnership is determined by shared values, equality and trust”.<fnref n="52" /> He also elaborates: “Human rights are one of the cardinal principles enshrined in the JAES agreement, but it is not exclusive to it. The notion of EU–Africa solidarity around the principle of human rights is porous, because human rights is an opportunistic notion that is only applied circumstantially. Africans have invoked other institutions to undermine human rights. Diplomacy of solidarity has been used to support regimes that are not committed to human rights.<fnref n="53" />

<footnote n="44">⁴⁴. European Commission JOIN(2016) 52 final.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵ Stephen Hurt “Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention.” in *Third World Quarterly*, 24 (1), 2003, p. 165; Kunibert Raffer, “Cotonou: Slowly Undoing Lomé’s Concept of Partnership.” in *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik*, 18 (2), 2001, p. 181; Nicolas Van de Walle, “Aid’s Crisis of Legitimacy: Current Proposals and Future Prospects.” in *African Affairs*, 98, 1999, p. 348; Anna-Luise Chane, Magnus Killander (2018), *supra nota* 2, p. 4.</footnote>

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶ Stephen, R. Hurt, (2020), *supra nota* 40, pp. 146-147.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">⁴⁷ JAES, paragraph 98.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">⁴⁸ European Union External Action Service, webpage.</footnote>

<footnote n="49">⁴⁹ Karen Del Biondo, (2020), *supra nota* 29, p. 310.</footnote>

<footnote n="50">⁵⁰ Anna-Luise Chane, Magnus Killander. (2018), *supra nota* 2, p. 8.</footnote>

<footnote n="51">⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.</footnote>

<footnote n="52">⁵² Fru Norbert Suh I, (2020), *supra nota* 13, p. 35.</footnote>

<footnote n="53">⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 40.</footnote>
According to Hurt: “the official portrayal of the JAES is that it provides an opportunity for a more balanced, less-dependent, relationship between Europe and Africa. It also signals an acknowledgement by the EU of the heightened status of the AU as an institution.”<fnref n="54" />

European Union External Action service explains that since 2007, the Africa-EU partnership has extended the parties political dialogue and cooperation. The result of this was the establishment of the EU Delegation to the African Union.<fnref n="55" />

## EU REPRESENTATION IN AFRICA

Since January 2008 EU has a Delegation in the African Union, based in Addis Abab. It represents the EU vis-a-vis the AU bodies and coordinates with the EU Member States.<fnref n="56" /> The EU also has Delegations accredited to the different Regional Economic Communities (RECs). For example, the EU Delegation to Nigeria is accredited to Economic Community of West African States.<fnref n="57" />

Delegations overall purpose is to contribute to enhancing the unique Partnership that exists between the two Unions. The EU Delegation operates in an environment which includes 55 AU Member States, regional and pan-African organizations and institutions, such as the AU Commission, and international partners. The Delegation deals with a wide range of topics, including both dialogue on political issues of mutual concern as they arise, as well as longer-term cooperation and institution building.<fnref n="58" />

## CONCLUSION

As indicated in the chapters above, Europa and Africa have historically strong relations, covering peace and security, democracy, human rights, development, sustainable economic growth and trade.

Like many researched scholars have indicated, the EU-African relations have been of European domination.<fnref n="59" /> They have criticised the possibility of a partnership between donors and recipients given the completely different history, culture, traditions, and interests.

Although the two parties have had many serious negotiations and agreed in many forms the equality of the two, it seems that the EU still somewhat has the donor part in this relationship. Africa largely relays on Europe's aid and guidance, although they have wished for a long time that they are an equal partner not a recipient.

And although Rutazimba explains that “Compared to previous documents on EU-Africa relations, words like ‘partnership’, ‘common’, ‘shared’, ‘unity’ and ‘joint’ figured more prominently in the documents of the JAES”<fnref n="60" />, there still are areas where Africa is following European lead.

The parties have both stated in their agreements and agendas, that their priorities have been set jointly, but as it showed in Del Biondo's research<fnref n="61" />, in some cases, it was the opposite, the African interviewees complained about not having an equal say and it was also noted that the African partners

<footnote n="54">⁵⁴ Stephen R. Hurt, (2020), *supra nota* 40, p. 147.</footnote>

<footnote n="55">⁵⁵ European Union External Action Service, webpage.</footnote>

<footnote n="56">⁵⁶ Anna-Luise Chane, Magnus Killander (2018), *supra nota* 2, p. 11.</footnote>

<footnote n="57">⁵⁷ *Ibid*.</footnote>

<footnote n="58">⁵⁸ Delegation of the European Union to the African Union, webpage.</footnote>

<footnote n="59">⁵⁹ See for example Suh I and Del Biondo.</footnote>

<footnote n="60">⁶⁰ Olivia U. Rutazibwa, “The Problematics of the EU’s Ethical (Self)Image in Africa: The EU as an ‘Ethical Intervener’ and the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy.” in *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 18 (2), 2010, p. 216.</footnote>

<footnote n="61">⁶¹ Karen Del Biondo, (2020), *supra nota* 29.</footnote>
interpreted ownership quite literally by hardly involving the EU altogether. This indicates that even if EU and AU are as equals, they still need more work to be done to clearly state their priorities and goals in their cooperation.

In her research Del Biondo concluded that AU had many donors keen on supporting it, so the EU was not the only one and although "EU is willing to take ownership seriously"<fnref n="62" /> it was clear that EU did not force its own ideas in the agenda, on the contrary, it was AU, that put the sensitive issues on the table. Although the EU and AU have so different history and "their divergences are rooted in religious and cultural differences"<fnref n="63" />, the parties must work together in order to keep their relations strong. By cooperating as equals they can prove that their intentions are good and the decisions they do, are done in the best interest of the two States.

**List of references:**

**Books**

CARDWELL; Paul James, *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era*. The Hague, The Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012.

HOLLAND, Martin, *The European Community and South Africa: European Political Co-operation under Strain*. London: Pinter, 1988.

TAYLOR, Ian, WILLIAMS, Paul, *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent*. Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, 2004.

**Academic publications:**

BRKAN, Maja, "The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Field of Common Foreign and Security Policy After the Treaty of Lisbon: New Challenges for the Future." in Cardwell, P.J. (Ed.) *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era* (pp. 241-263). The Hague, The Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012.

CHANE, Anna-Luise, KILLANDE, Magnus, "EU cooperation with regional organizations in Africa" in *Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper*, No. 197, 2018.

DEL BIONDO, Karen "Moving beyond a donor-recipient relationship? Assessing the principle of partnership in the joint Africa-EU strategy." in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 38 (2), 2020, pp. 310-329.

HAASTRUP, Toni, "EU as Mentor? Promoting Regionalism as External Relations Practice in EU-Africa Relations." in *Journal of European Integration*, 35 (7), 2013, pp. 785-800.

HURT, Stephen R, "The European Union's external relations with Africa after the Cold War. Aspects of continuity and change." in Taylor, I., Williams, P. *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent* (pp. 155-173). Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, 2004.

HURT, Stephen R., "African Agency and EU-ACP relations beyond the Cotonou Agreement." in *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 16 (2), 2020, pp. 139-162.

HURT, Stephen R., "Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention." in *Third World Quarterly*, 24 (1), 2003, pp. 161-176.

KOTSOPOULUS, John, MATTHEIS, Frank, "A Contextualisation of EU-Africa Relations: Trends and Drivers from a Reciprocal Perspective" in *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 25 (4), 2018, pp. 445-460

LANGAN, Mark, PRICE, Sophia, "Imperialisms Past and Present in EU Economic Relations with North Africa." in *Interventions*, 22 (6), 2020, pp. 703-721.

MONEY, Duncan, FRØLAND, Hans Otto, GWATIWA, Tshepo, "Africa-EU relations and natural resource governance: understanding African agency in historical and contemporary perspective." in *Review of African Political Economy*, 47 (166), 2020, pp. 585-603.

O'NEILL, Maria, "Eu-North Africa Relations in Cross-Border Law Enforcement: New Legal Challenges for the EU in the Post-Lisbon and Post-Stockholm Era." in Cardwell, P.J. (Ed.) *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era* (pp. 241-263). The Hague, The Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012.

<footnote n="62">⁶² Karen Del Biondo, (2020), *supra nota* 29, p. 324.</footnote>

<footnote n="63">⁶³ Karen Del Biondo, (2020), *supra nota* 29, p. 324.</footnote>
ORBIE, Jan, “The European Union & the Commodity Debate: From Trade to Aid” in *Review of African Political Economy*, 34 (112), 2007, pp. 297–311.

RAFFER, Kunibert, “Cotonou: Slowly Undoing Lomé’s Concept of Partnership.” in *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik*, 18 (2), 2001, pp. 171-184.

RAMIRO TROITIÑO, D; KERIKMÄE, T; DE LA GUARDIA, R. M; PEREZ, G. A. (2020). The EU in the 21st Century. Challenges and Opportunities for the European Integration Process. Springer.

RAMIRO TROITIÑO, D; KERIKMÄE, T; CHOCHIA, A (2020). Foreign Affairs of the European Union: How to Become an Independent and Dominant Power in the International Arena. In: Ramiro Troitiño, D; Kerikmäe, T; de la Guardia, R.M; Pérez Sánchez, G.A (Ed.). The EU in the 21st Century Challenges and Opportunities for the European Integration (209–230). Springer.

RODT, Annemarie Peen, OKEKE, Jide Martyns, “AU-EU "Strategic Partnership": Strengthening Policy Convergence and Regime Efficacy in the African Peace and Security Complex?” in *African security*, 6 (3-4), 2013, pp. 211-233.

RUTAZIMBA, Olivia U., “The Problematics of the EU’s Ethical (Self)Image in Africa: The EU as an ‘Ethical Intervener’ and the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy.” in *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 18 (2), 2010, pp. 209–228.

SUH I, Fru Norbert, “International Regime Complexity in EU–Africa.” in *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies*, 7 (2), 2020, pp. 27–48.

VAN DE WALLE, Nicolas, “Aid’s Crisis of Legitimacy: Current Proposals and Future Prospects.” in *African Affairs*, 98, 1999, pp. 337–352.

**Online sources**

See European Parliament, European Parliament factsheets – Africa. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/180/africa. Accessed: 18.05.2021.

See European Commission, Economic Partnerships https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/economic-partnerships/index_en.htm. Accessed: 25.05.2021.

See European Union External Action Service (2016) Africa and the EU. https://eeas.europa.eu/regions/africa/328/africa-and-eu_en. Accessed: 24.05.2021.

See Delegation of the European Union to the African Union (2016) About us. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/african-union-au/865/about-eu-delegation-african-union_en. Accessed: 23.05.2021.

**Law**

Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012/C 326/01.

Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part. (EC) 2000/483. Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000.

European Commission COM(2007) 357 final of 27.06.2007. The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership.

Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Official Journal C 224, 31/08/1992.

Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and Associated African States, with related Agreements (adopted 20 July 1963, entry into force 1 June 1964).

Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the African States and Madagascar associated with the Community (adopted 29 July 1969, entry into force 1 January 1971).

Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Uganda and the Republic of Kenya (adopted 24 September 1969, entry into force 1 January 1971).

EEC-ACP Convention of Lomé (adopted 28 February 1975, entry into force 1 April 1976).

Fourth ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989. Official Journal L 229, 17/08/1991.

European Commission Conseil/00/901 of 3-4 April 2000. Cairo Declaration. Africa-Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU.

European Commission SEC(2005)1255 of 12.10.2005. EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa’s Development.

European Commission JOIN(2016) 52 final of 22.11.2016. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: A Renewed partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.
# External relations between EU and China

KATRIN VIRGEBAU

KVIRGEBAU88@GMAIL

TALTECH LAW SCHOOL, TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, ESTONIA

**Abstract:** Paper attempts to give an understanding about EU's external relations and in particular part that includes EU and China's relationship. With comparing the two giants and their functioning it might help to uncover the mystery of a dysfunctional relationship of two strong powers in an international arena, whose common history dates back hundreds of years. It can also be a learning material for other countries to have an example of transferring world view, core values, political views, etc. from one country to another. And what are the benefits, obstacles and consequences of this kind of transfer. Paper concludes with a result that the EU has failed to persuade China to integrate a liberal order and China continues to prefer autocracy.

**Key words:** Autocracy, China, EU, External relations, Liberalism

## INTRODUCTION

In recent times, the regulatory framework and decision-making processes of the EU's external relations have been the subject of heated debate in the Member States, the European institutions and in the public generally. There seem to be differences in politicizing and challenging individual areas of the EU's external relations. Using a theoretical approach, we can explore the link between EU external policy and policy in third countries and how it affects EU foreign policy.<fnref n="64" /> what are the benefits and obstacles in an attempt to transfer visions and worldview from one country to another<fnref n="65" />. And what could be the consequences of such actions. Political dialogues between different governments or intergovernmental organizations such as the EU, are neither new nor special. In some cases, the motive for governments to do so is to find new ideas, and in some cases the motive is to share their values in order to expand strategic relations with other countries<fnref n="66" />. Because, in general, for stronger and better cooperation, countries prefer other countries with the same core values, visions and worldviews. This pattern of behavior has also been used by the EU in imposing conditions on acceding countries, for example on human rights and the rule of law.<fnref n="67" />

Although the transfer of political elements and universal values from one country to another may also be driven by basic national needs, such a process may not be successful in the long run. Despite the fact that opposites attract, it is not easy or maybe not even possible to change fundamental values that one side or another have long acted. The ups and downs of relations between China and the EU over the years are a good example to illustrate the transfer of political views, core values, etc., and the pros and cons of the whole process<fnref n="68" />. Relations between these two parties is a very good example precisely because the two parties could not be more different with their views, actions and

<footnote n="64">⁶⁴ Padgett, S., “Between synthesis and emulation: EU policy transfer in the power sector” *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10(2), 2003, 227-245.</footnote>

<footnote n="65">⁶⁵Dąbrowski, M., Musiałkowska, I., & Polverari, L., “EU-China and EU-Brazil policy transfer in regional policy” *Regional Studies*, 52(9), 2018, p. 1169-1180.</footnote>

<footnote n="66">⁶⁶Dąbrowski, M., Musiałkowska, I., & Polverari, L., “EU-China and EU-Brazil policy transfer in regional policy” *Regional Studies*, 52(9), 2018, pp. 1169-1180.</footnote>

<footnote n="67">⁶⁷ Ramiro Troitiño, D; Kerikmäe, T; Chochia, A, “Foreign Affairs of the European Union: How to Become an Independent and Dominant Power in the International Arena” In: Ramiro Troitiño, D; Kerikmäe, T; de la Guardia, R.M; Pérez Sánchez, G.A (Ed.). *The EU in the 21st Century Challenges and Opportunities for the European Integration* (209–230). Springer, 2020.</footnote>

<footnote n="68">⁶⁸ Maher, R., The elusive EU–China strategic partnership. *International Affairs*, 92(4), 2016, pp. 959-976.</footnote>
principles<fnref n="69" />. While the EU has enshrined it's values and principles in the Treaties and has remained true to them for a long time, China on the other hand, honors authoritarian rule and despises all the values that are important to the West. The parties seem to be on the opposite opinion in almost every important issue.

## PREHISTORY

Already in the 17th century long before the existence of the European Community there were states located in Europe who had relations with dynasty located in China. Historically China has rather preferred relations with giant powerful countries, but the mutual interest started to grow as European Union was established and mutual understanding about cooperation benefits increased. At some point European countries were not just some tiny individuals but a set of countries that functioned as a single whole in almost everything.

For more than a decade now, discussions have taken place among various EU professionals and officials in an attempt to define the content of EU and China relations, emphasizing the mutual benefits as well as the overall international benefits. Cooperation and political dialogues between the two countries has also been highlighted as the key cooperation on issues such as climate change and non-proliferation. Coordinated strategic cooperation between major powers is getting more essential as the global challenges become more and more complex.

Opposites attract but usually relations between two contrary sides will not last long and tend to end with catastrophe if unlucky enough. Non-functioning relations between China and the EU over the years are a good example, where two very opposing parties can go along with the game for a long time but ultimately stick to their principles. Unfortunately, contrary to all expectations and stable relations, the last decade has shown that the priorities and interests of the EU and China differ on a number of important issues. According to the EU's vision, views on important issues should converge over time, but in reality, the differences between the EU and China have just been well masked and hidden because of beneficial motives.

Exploring the different values and views of both parties on important issues such as ideology, geopolitical priorities and political values, etc. we might become to realize the reasons and disagreements that have prevented the EU and China from achieving better relations over the last decade. And also, why relations between these two huge powers have been dysfunctional since the very beginning.

## CONTROVERSIAL VIEWS

From the very beginning, both countries have had very different views on the world organization, governance and other values. While the EU has enshrined it's values and principles in the Treaties and has remained true to them for a long time, China on the other hand, honors authoritarian rule and despises all the values that are important to the West. China is repressing all initiatives that do not coincide with the vision of the political elite and the leaders of the country<fnref n="70" />. It is not difficult to understand why the EU and other countries have been highly motivated to improve relations with China. China's development into an economic giant has been a very important geopolitical development and also a very impressive development, if taking into account from where China started it's development. China's influence and role in the context of world politics is

<footnote n="69">⁶⁹Holslag, J., The Elusive Axis: Assessing the EU-China Strategic Partnership. *Jcms-Journal Of Common Market Studies*, 49(2), 2011, pp.293-313.</footnote>

<footnote n="70">⁷⁰ Blanchard, J., “The People’s Republic of China Leadership Transition and its External Relations: Still Searching for Definitive Answers” *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 20(1), 2015,1-16.</footnote>
becoming increasingly important and is likely to grow as it sets an example for other countries.<fnref n="71" /> But not always as a good example if we are looking into human rights and democracy issues relevant in China.

Cooperation between the EU and China intensified greatly following the signing of the Diplomatic Agreement in 1985⁷². The parties have had summits since 1998 and have established more than 50 dialogues on relations between the parties in key areas such as the environment, trade, civil society, etc. In addition, the Parties also launched higher-level forums to expand cooperation, one focusing on the economy and trade and the other on climate change and non-proliferation. Geopolitical interests were part of an attempt to take EU's and China's relationship to the next level. China was interested in balancing power globally, and the EU was interested in making China more similar to EU with democratic and transparency through closer cooperation. As both had the same vision and understanding of the United States, the future of cooperation seemed successful. Among other interests, the EU wanted to work with China to prove its credibility to the world and to advance its global interests.

Since the announcement of the EU and China Strategic Partnership in 2003, much of the motivation to strengthen relations has disappeared as world politics have changed dramatically since 2003. China has become much more powerful, and the EU has had to focus more on domestic problems. Lack of common understanding between Member States in relations with Beijing and differing EU and Chinese interests in global politics continue to hamper relations and old unresolved differences are compounded by new ones, such as China's cyber-attacks on EU computer systems. As can be seen, EU and China relations are a complex combination of cooperation and conflict.

## DEVELOPMENTS

Differences in political values and ideologies have hindered and will continue to hinder the expansion of relations between China and the EU. While the EU declares it's values to be an independent media, the rule of law and Western constitutional democracy, China rejects these values, silencing pro-democracy activists and imprisoning dissidents. The EU and China's relationship has been like a test of the EU's identity, which is centered on human rights and democracy. The EU's efforts to pass the test positively for itself have been a long-standing dilemma and a subject of debate for European policymakers.<fnref n="73" />

Despite developments in China's political system in recent decades, it has not encountered more democratic and open system and China remains committed to the practices of an authoritarian state and is not interested in liberalizing the country. Although China's economy has become more dependent on the world, expectations of liberalization of China's political system have not materialized, and China continues to see Western values as a threat to itself. China is also one of the few countries to have a political system in which appointments are made in a top-down party structure and elections are strictly controlled by officials. Among other things, China's and other Western countries' perceptions of human rights and state power have always differed greatly. Authorities use a variety of tools to suppress dissent and intimidate dissidents and encourage police to arbitrarily punish anyone who could jeopardize the authority of power. Instead of developing an independent judiciary to protect the human rights of its citizens, the state has stepped up its efforts to

<footnote n="71">⁷¹ See e.g. Charaia, V.; Chochia, A.; Lashkhi, M., “Caucasus 3 plus Baltic 3 and Economic Cooperation with China”, *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, 8 (2), 2018, pp. 44–64.</footnote>

<footnote n="72">⁷²Voituriez, T., & Wang, X., “Real challenges behind the EU-China PV trade dispute settlement”, *Climate Policy*, 15(5), 2015, pp. 670-677.</footnote>

<footnote n="73">⁷³ Ramiro Troitiño, D.; Kerikmäe, T.; De la Guardia, R. M.; Perez, G. A., *The EU in the 21st Century. Challenges and Opportunities for the European Integration Process*, Springer, 2020</footnote>
quell disagreements. In addition, the authorities have used large amounts of resources for
propaganda, censorship and the police to maintain control and retention among the other things.

China has been for a long time undoubtedly the biggest dilemma in EU foreign policy. Being, on the one hand, a key player in the Beijing<fnref n="74" /> issue and, on the other, an ever-increasing power on a global scale. But on the other hand, by representing a totalitarian regime and insulting the principles and ideals respected by Europeans<fnref n="75" />. China's attitude towards human rights and democracy hinders the development of the China and EU partnership in a number of ways. The EU considers human rights to be part of its identity and treats them as universal values<fnref n="76" />, while China violates all these values by violating its human rights at the national level. In addition, Europe has been perhaps one of the few parts of the world where the rule of law, democracy, security and human rights have been respected until now. Adherence to these values are also a precondition for EU membership to countries wishing to join the Union.

The arms embargo imposed on China by the EU in 1989 is more symbolic today but was also the result of one of China's many human rights violations. Regardless of its original purpose, the embargo has not hindered trade in military technology between the EU and China, and China has become one of the largest arms producers and suppliers. This contradictory behavior on the part of the EU has damaged the EU's credibility. Credibility has also been undermined by the general increase in trade between Member States and China, at a time when Beijing was experiencing the biggest repression of dissidents in decades. For some, such EU behavior is a sign of double standards and hypocrisy, where economic benefits take precedence over human rights. The EU's loud criticism of China's human rights has only resulted in a Chinese ban on the EU interfering in China's internal affairs. Criticism from the EU could also undermine cooperation on other important issues where the EU and China have a common understanding. Differences in values and principles between the EU and China prevent China from becoming a strategic partner of the EU and build mutual trust.

From a geopolitical point of view, the EU's and China's priorities on strategic and security issues are increasingly divergent. China has focused on expanding power in the Pacific, and the EU's main concerns have been the migration crisis and Russia's aggression. It seems that neither China nor the EU is willing to help each other with their concerns, and that the EU's and China's approach and preferences on important issues have diverged. In some cases, China's intentions remain unclear, but as power increases, it is quite likely that China's intention in the long run is to expand control and influence in its region.

At least in the past China has also been worried that North Korea would collapse, flooding China with refugees, straining China's resources and jeopardizing China's political stability, as the United States and South Korea could take advantage of the situation. At the same time, the EU is seeking to strengthen trade relations with Taiwan, as China is interested in taking control of South China's main shipping lane. Strengthening EU and Taiwan relations could also be useful in helping to prevent Taiwan's hostile integration with China. EU's geopolitical concerns include the situation in Ukraine and the aggression of Russia.<fnref n="77" /> And here, too, the principles and values of the EU and China tend to diverge. While the EU is trying to punish Russia, China has strengthened its relations with Russia and has refrained from criticizing Russia's actions. China's reluctance to help the EU

<footnote n="74">⁷⁴ Oriol Costa, “After Kyoto, Beijing: The EU and the new climate negotiations” *Revista CIDOB D'afers Internacionals*, (108), 2014, pp. 23-41.</footnote>

<footnote n="75">⁷⁵ Isar, Y., “‘Culture in EU external relations’: An idea whose time has come?” *International Journal Of Cultural Policy*, 21(4), 2015, pp. 494-508.</footnote>

<footnote n="76">⁷⁶ Dabrell, P. J., “Mapping out democracy promotion in the EU's external relations”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 16(1), 2011, pp. 21-40.</footnote>

<footnote n="77">⁷⁷ See e.g. HOFFMANN, T.; CHOCHIA, A., “The Institution of Citizenship and Practices of Passportization in Russia’s European Neighborhood Policies” in: A. Makarychev, T. Hoffmann (Ed.). *Russia and the EU Spaces of Interaction* (223–237). Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group, 2018</footnote>
with its migration crisis and other concerns was highlighted at the 2015 EU and China Summit, when China avoided any discussion of a migration crisis at all costs. From all this, it turns out that both the EU and China intentionally or unintentionally are not extremely helpful to each other's concerns.

The informal friendship between Russia and China has more than once created a situation in which China provides Russia with diplomatic cover by blocking Western proposals, for example on the Syrian issue<sup>78</sup>. With regard to China's behavior on the Syrian side, it was realized that a common understanding had emerged between China and Russia to counter EU aspirations. The EU's and China's differing visions of the international order, national sovereignty and human rights collide on all key issues. Over the next decade, it may become clear whether or not China is trying to change or replace today's international order and policy, and whether it will accept the order in the world, which is very different from China's own organizational system. China is very confident in its principles not to interfere in the internal affairs and sovereignty of other countries, while the EU considers it mandatory in some cases when, for example, human rights are at stake. The EU also considers it right to provide humanitarian aid to countries in need, but China sees this as a threat to its domestic system. China's adherence to its principles stems, on the one hand, from historical reasons when Western countries occupied China, and, on the other hand, neutrality deprives other countries of the opportunity to interfere in China's own internal affairs. China in this case has more materialistic motives as China needs access to gas, oil and other raw materials, it is more likely to work with countries with different political regimes from the West to secure export markets.

There are also important differences between EU and China's conclusion of agreements. While the EU incorporates its values and principles into trade agreements, China has maintained its position that politics and business do not interfere<sup>79</sup>. This tactic from the EU has so far been one of the most effective tools in policy, as the EU market has been very profitable and attractive to other countries. China's growing strength was accompanied by China becoming a major economic donor. While the EU imposed conditions on aid and agreements<sup>80</sup>, China overcame the EU in favor of countries, and as a result has offered very much competition to the EU in both the distribution of economic aid and the conclusion of trade agreements. China's expanding economic interests could pose a serious threat to its neutrality if, at some point, China has to make decisions that will inevitably interfere with other countries' internal affairs, such as Afghanistan<sup>81</sup>. Despite the fact that the EU's and China's approach to things began to resemble each other at some point, it does not necessarily mean that friendships have strengthened. If two giants with such different lines of government have already shown that they do not agree on important issues, then these differences will probably arise in the future as well. On the one hand, Europe has been a promoter of the liberal order, but on the other, Europe has also been the biggest beneficiary of all this. In the institutions shaped by the EU, through which economic and political agreements are managed, European countries have the necessary power to influence.

Although China has expressed its desire to be part of these institutions and has proposed a fairer redistribution of power, it would be very difficult to integrate a country as large and with such a different worldview as China into the liberal world order. Although China has experienced rapid economic growth and development in recent decades, its role in the world's leading lending

<footnote n="78">78 Fung, C., “Global South solidarity? China, regional organisations and intervention in the Libyan and Syrian civil wars”, *Third World Quarterly*, 37(1), 2016, pp. 33-50.</footnote>

<footnote n="79">79 O’Dolan, C., & Rye, T., “An insight into policy transfer processes within an EU project and implications for future project design”, *Transport Policy*, 24, 2012, pp. 273-283.</footnote>

<footnote n="80">80 Hackenesch, C., Bergmann, J., & Orbie, J., “Development Policy under Fire? The Politicization of European External Relations*” *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 59(1), 2021, 3-19.</footnote>

<footnote n="81">81 Spernbauer, M., “EU peacebuilding in Kosovo and Afghanistan: Legality and accountability” *Studies in EU External Relations*, 7, 2014, pp. 1-452.</footnote>
institutions remains disproportionate. Since the inception of the World Bank, both the United States and Japan have had greater voting rights, and Western European countries have taken the lead in the institutions. The G20 summit in 2010 tried to carry out a reform in this area, but it failed. Liberal methods among western countries already began to triumph after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but China's economic success with the opposite order has set an example for many countries to find opportunities and alternatives to a liberal society.

## CONCLUSION

Political dialogues between governments and intergovernmental organizations have been going on for a long time. When governments face difficulties, it has become a common practice to look for ideas in the success stories of other countries. But one can also look for motives for promoting and sharing countries' own visions. And sometimes political dialogues take place between countries because of the national need of cooperation. Whether it is related to economical issues, environment or just to eradicate poverty and learn from successful countries.

EU and China relations exist today and are likely to continue to do so in the future, but their relations will remain limited rather than as the EU originally hoped. The differences in values, interests and the controversial view of the world order between the EU and China over the years are too different and contradictory to facilitate a warmer relationship. Whereas initially China's motivation to cooperate with the EU was quite high, today China no longer considers the EU to be serious enough. In the years following the creation of the EU, the EU's influence was considerable in the world, but today it is only a remnant of its full potential, and China is taking advantage of the EU's weakening by splitting Europe's political divide with its attitude. In addition, China has helped uncover the EU's weaknesses. For example, different standpoint inside EU over Beijing and the desire to conclude trade agreements contrary to EU values and principles. Although China has made great strides in recent decades in favor of expanding EU and China relations in terms of economic interdependence, the EU has failed to persuade China to integrate a liberal order. Despite the EU's efforts to make China more respectful of human rights, free media and democracy, China continues to be more respectful of autocracy and uses all means to remove dissidents who threaten its power. The people of China must continue to be careful if their views do not coincide with those of the ruling authorities and the country continues to violate most human rights. Silencing, imprisonment and suppressing dissidents continues to be part of China's governance.

## References/Bibliography:

1. BLANCHARD, J. (2015). The People's Republic of China Leadership Transition and its External Relations: Still Searching for Definitive Answers. *Journal of Chinese Political Science, 20*(1), 1-16.

2. CARDWELL, P. J. (2011). Mapping out democracy promotion in the EU's external relations. *European Foreign Affairs Review, 16*(1), 21-40.

3. CHARAIA, V.; CHOCHIA, A.; LASHKHI, M. (2018). Caucasus 3 plus Baltic 3 and Economic Cooperation with China. Baltic Journal of European Studies, 8 (2), 44-64.

4. DĄBROWSKI, M., MUSIAŁKOWSKA, I., & POLVERARI, L. (2018). EU-China and EU-Brazil policy transfer in regional policy. *Regional Studies, 52*(9), 1169-1180.

5. https://europa.eu/

6. FUNG, C. (2016). Global South solidarity? China, regional organisations and intervention in the Libyan and Syrian civil wars. *Third World Quarterly, 37*(1), 33-50.

7. HACKENESCH, C., BERGMANN, J., & ORBIE, J. (2021). Development Policy under Fire? The Politicization of European External Relations*. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 59*(1), 3-19.
8. HOFFMANN, T.; CHOCHIA, A. (2018). The Institution of Citizenship and Practices of Passportization in Russia's European Neighborhood Policies. In: A. Makarychev, T. Hoffmann (Ed.). Russia and the EU Spaces of Interaction (223–237). Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group.

9. HOLSLAG, J. (2011). The Elusive Axis: Assessing the EU-China Strategic Partnership. *Jcms-Journal Of Common Market Studies, 49*(2), 293-313.

10. ISAR, Y. (2015). 'Culture in EU external relations': An idea whose time has come? *International Journal Of Cultural Policy*, 21(4), 494-508.

11. MAHER, R. (2016). The elusive EU-China strategic partnership. *International Affairs*, 92(4), 959-976.

12. O'DOLAN, C., & RYE, T. (2012). An insight into policy transfer processes within an EU project and implications for future project design. *Transport Policy*, 24, 273-283.

13. ORIOL COSTA. (2014). After Kyoto, Beijing: The EU and the new climate negotiations. *Revista CIDOB D'afers Internacionals*, (108), 23-41.

14. PADGETT, S. (2003). Between synthesis and emulation: EU policy transfer in the power sector. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10(2), 227-245.

15. RAMIRO TROITIÑO, D; KERIKMÄE, T; DE LA GUARDIA, R. M; PEREZ, G. A. (2020). The EU in the 21st Century. Challenges and Opportunities for the European Integration Process. Springer.

16. RAMIRO TROITIÑO, D; KERIKMÄE, T; CHOCHIA, A (2020). Foreign Affairs of the European Union: How to Become an Independent and Dominant Power in the International Arena. In: Ramiro Troitiño, D; Kerikmäe, T; de la Guardia, R.M; Pérez Sánchez, G.A (Ed.). The EU in the 21st Century Challenges and Opportunities for the European Integration (209–230). Springer.

17. SPERNBAUER, M. (2014). EU peacebuilding in Kosovo and Afghanistan: Legality and accountability. *Studies in EU External Relations, 7*, 1-452.

18. VOITURIEZ, T., & WANG, X. (2015). Real challenges behind the EU-China PV trade dispute settlement. *Climate Policy*, 15(5), 670-677.
# NATO, Turkey and Kremlin in international context

## Weakening transatlantic links? Re-assessing Turkey-NATO relations in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic

DR. AUREL LAZĂR<fnref n="1" />

SNSPA - NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL STUDIES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

**Abstract:** The aim of this paper is an in-depth contextualization, focusing on the main events that marked the relationship between Turkey and NATO after the Cold War, prior to investigating the new coordinates of the relationship between Ankara and NATO that followed the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis is focused on the very recent developments that took place between March 2020 and March 2021, with the intention to identify the new objectives of the Turkish foreign policy and their impact on the ties with NATO. In the theoretical section I present the implications of the implementation by the political establishment in Ankara of the so-called 'Neo-Ottoman' ideology. This section will highlight the implications that this ideology has on the Ankara-NATO relationship. The study relies mainly on qualitative data including document analysis and official statements issued by the Turkish Government and NATO member states officials during analysed period.

**Keywords:** Turkey, NATO, COVID-19, foreign policy, tensions, crisis.

## INTRODUCTION

Turkey's accession to NATO in 1952 has been mainly driven by an increasing Soviet threat to the Turkish state that required containment. The security umbrella provided by NATO to Turkey prompted the Kremlin to moderate its aggressive rhetoric against Ankara, an approach that favored a stable regional security climate. The context favored a steady improvement in the Ankara-Moscow bilateral relations, both in the 1952-1991 period and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These developments, corroborated with the new post-Cold War world order, have led to a deterioration of the relationship between NATO and Turkey and to the emergence of tensions between the two sides on a series of regional geopolitical dossiers.

After the end of the cold War, the Russian Federation, the successor of the USSR, a former strategic enemy of Turkey, no longer posed a threat to the security of the Turkish state. Moreover, with few exceptions, the new global order and the regional security climate gave Turkey the opportunity to get involved in collaborative projects with the Russian Federation, the successor to the USSR. Still under NATO's security umbrella, after the end of the Cold War, the economic power of the Turkish state increased considerably. Following the takeover of political power by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), in 2002, Turkey's interest in increasing influence in the former regions controlled by the Ottoman Empire has grown considerably. Under such conditions, the actions and policies of the political establishment in Ankara often contradicted those of NATO, which led to escalating tensions between Ankara and its allies.

The research concentrates on the process that alienated Turkey and determined the country's leadership to challenge some NATO policies and interests in recent decades. The main assumption

<footnote n="1">¹ Dr. Aurel LAZĂR has made his PhD thesis at the SNSPA - National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: lazar.a.aurel@gmail.com.</footnote>
of our argument is that the tensions between NATO and Turkey have been mainly generated by the neo-Ottoman policies promoted by the political establishment in Ankara and as a result of the intensification of cooperation in strategic areas with the Russian Federation. The research highlights the main elements that led to the deterioration of the relationship between Turkey and NATO after the end of the Cold War. However, the focus of the study is on the changes in relations between Ankara and the Alliance in the context of the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, between March 2020 and March 2021.

The first section of the article will deal with a short literature review regarding the so-called 'Neo-Ottoman' ideology and how Turkey's foreign policy was discussed in scholarly debates. In this section I will present the evolution of the concept throughout history and the way it impacted the transatlantic links.

The second section aims at developing the main arguments and bringing evidence to test the theoretical model. It is divided into two parts – firstly, it presents in a chronological approach the main political actions that generated tensions between NATO and Turkey, secondly, it analyses the main foreign policy decisions of the Turkish state in the context of the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and how they affected the relationship between Ankara and NATO. The goal is thus to show whether there are elements of continuity between previous tendencies of conflict among Turkey and its NATO allies, to there are new challenges brought by the pandemic and its political outcomes in particular. The goal is thus to show whether there are elements of continuity between previous tendencies of conflict among Turkey and its NATO allies, to there are new challenges brought by the pandemic and its political outcomes in particular.

The final section of the article will refer to the evidence discussed, with the main focus on formulating a set of policy recommendations on overcoming the challenges that have the potential to alter the ties between Turkey and NATO.

# 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

In this section, I intend to highlight the implications of neo-Ottomanism in Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. I will present the consequences of the support provided by the Turkish elites and people for this ideology. I will pay particular attention to how these developments have impacted the foreign policy of the Turkish state, highlighting the processes that have led to the departure of Ankara's political establishment from NATO policies and interests. In order to understand the extent and implications that Neo-Ottomanism currently has in Turkey's foreign policy, I will briefly present the underlying principles of the ideology, the elements that represented the foundation of it and how it has evolved over time.

Especially in the last decade, neo-Ottomanism was the main concept used to explain developments in the foreign policy of the Turkish state. After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took over power in Turkey in 2002, an increasing number of international relations specialist considered Turkish state domestic politics as one with neo-Ottoman attributes. In the last decade, the conceptual of neo-Ottomanism has been studied both by academia and specialists from other fields. A relatively small number of analysts stressed out that the concept was born long before the AKP took power. However, most specialists associated the neo-Ottoman foreign policy of the Turkish state with the decisions taken by the Erdogan-Davutoglu tandem.

Ömer Taspınar believes that in some respects Turkish foreign policy is neo-Ottoman. However, the author argues Ankara uses very different instruments and practices compared to those used by the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Taspınar points out that neo-Ottomanism is only a means by which Turkey seeks to strengthen its political, hegemonic and
cultural hegemon status in the region<fnref n="2" />. Rasim Özgür Dönmez believes that neo-Ottomanism in Turkish foreign policy is aimed at promoting Islamic solidarity and creating an alternative to the global order of Western origin. Dönmez also emphasizes Islam and the Islamic world are key elements that favor consolidation of the idea that Turkey plays a civilizational role in global politics<fnref n="3" />. Soner Cagaptay also argues that a thorough analysis of the foreign policy of Ankara's political establishment reveals its Islamist guidelines. Meanwhile, Cagaptay imagines the Ottoman Empire as a liberal rather than an Islamist-oriented entity. At the same time, the author believes the AKP's foreign policy is not neo-Ottoman and only Islamist<fnref n="4" />.

According to Edward Wastnidge, in the weak version Neo-Ottomanism as Islamism is seen as an antidote to excesses of Kemalism, with its militant secularism, nationalism, and Westernization. Neo-Ottomanism thus is seen as a corrective to these excesses, emphasizing and positively valuing Turkey's position between East and West. Thus, Turkey's foreign policy re-orientation away from Europe and toward the Middle East and North Africa is portrayed not as a 'turning away' from the 'West,' but as an appropriate re-balancing of its historical responsibilities and contemporary regional interests<fnref n="5" />.

Neo-Ottomanism is a concept born from the official ideologies and practices of the Ottoman Empire<fnref n="6" />. According to M. Hakan Yavuz, Neo-Ottomanism resorts to a wide, profound complex of stylistic connotations conducive to the project of memory and nostalgia. It is a term that is designed to comprise a set of ideas and norms about the self of Turkey and its world view. Thus neo-Ottomanism does not simply regulate Turkey's foreign and domestic politics as a set of ideals, values, ethics, and norms; more importantly, the holistic set constitutes the essential definition of how Turkey defines itself. Neo-Ottomanism is about constructing a new 'national' identity and translating it into foreign policy by using historical, cultural, and religious ties to former Ottoman territories. The purpose of neo-Ottomanism in foreign policy is to eliminate economic borders between the Balkan states, the Caucasus and the Middle East, in order to facilitate the exchange of goods, ideas and intensify the movement of people<fnref n="7" />.

Neo-Ottomanism gained supporters immediately after World War II, a period in which secular nationalist ideology promoted by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk began to have fewer and fewer adherents. On the other hand, there has been observed a revival of Islam and the beginning of the re-Islamization of Turkey and Turkish society. However, Neo-Ottomanism emerged as an ideology and political practice during the 1980s, one of the Turkish political leaders who contributed to the assertion of ideology being Turgut Özal, former prime minister and president of the Turkish state. During Turgut

<footnote n="2">² Ömer Taspinar, “Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism, Turkey’s Middle East Policies”, *Carnegie Papers*, September 2008, pp. 1-3, accessed March 26, 2021, online available at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cmc10_taspinar_final.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Rasim Özgür Dönmez, “Nationalism in Turkey under Justice and Development Party Rule: The Logic of Masculinist Protection”, *Turkish Studies*, 2015, pp. 554–571.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Soner Cagaptay, “The AKP’s Foreign Policy: The Misnomer of "Neo-Ottomanism"”, *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, accessed March 26, 2021, online available at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/akps-foreign-policy-misnomer-neo-ottomanism.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Edward Wastnidge, “Imperial Grandeur and Selective Memory: Re-assessing Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign and Domestic Politics”, *Middle East Critique*, Open University, UK, 28(1) pp. 7–28.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Ivaylo Hristov, “Neo-Ottomanism – Emergence, Ideology and Political Doctrine”, *Social Evolution & History*, Vol. 18 No. 1, ‘Uchitel’ Publishing House accessed, March 2019, accessed March 26, 2021, online available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333342321_Neo-Ottomanism_-_Emergence_Ideology_and_Political_Doctrine, pp. 140-148.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ M. Hakan Yavuz, “Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism: Searching for a Post-National Vision”, *Die Welt des Islams*, November 2016, pp. 442-454, accessed March 26, 2021, online available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311927268_Social_and_Intellectual_Origins_of_Neo-Ottomanism_Searching_for_a Post-National_Vision.</footnote>
Özal's term as president, the Turkish intelligentsia launched a debate on the need for Ankara to increase its involvement in resolving issues of Muslim minorities in the former territories controlled by the Ottoman Empire. simultaneously with this approach, Turgut Özal promoted the Westward orientation of Turkey's domestic and foreign policy<fnref n="8" />.

Necmettin Erbakan, a former Prime Minister of Turkey also played a significant role in promoting Neo-Ottomanism. Erbakan founded in 1983 the Welfare Party, which was one of the main ideological platforms for promoting Islam in Turkey. It should be mentioned that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began his political career as a member of the Welfare Party and having a political approach similar to that of Erbakan. The 1995 municipal elections represented a turning point in the Islamisation of society and the state. The pro-Islamic WP's successes (Erdoğan was then elected as the mayor of Istanbul), and the eventual forming of a coalition government, redirected the country from the path of the Kemalist system to the work-in-progress project of the New Turkey. As a result of his radical Islamist attitudes and his incitement to religious hatred, in 1999 Erdoğan was imprisoned for a period of 10 months. Despite this fact, in 2001, the current president of Turkey founded the Justice and Development Party, a moderately conservative political party, whose leadership later supported him to become president<fnref n="9" />.ª

During 2001, Ahmet Davutoğlu, one of Erdoğan's main confidants, published the book ‘Stratejik Derinlik’ (Strategic Depth), a work that unofficially became ‘the Bible’ of neo-Ottomanism.<fnref n="10" /> In the book earlier mentioned (having the subheading ‘Turkey’s place in international relations’), Ahmet Davutoğlu summarized the essence of the large-scale geopolitical strategy of the Turkish state. As Erdoğan’s long-term foreign policy advisor, Ahmet Davutoğlu advocated diversifying Turkey’s geopolitical options by creating Turkish zones of influence in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. On the day of his appointment Davutoglu asserted that Turkey’s influence in “its region” will continue to grow: Turkey had an “order-instituting role” in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus, he declared, quite apart from its links with the West<fnref n="11" />. In his book, Davutoğlu asserted that Turkey has become a key country, emerging from its position of serving as a forward base for NATO during the Cold War. By using its geopolitical and geostrategic position, Turkey can become a regional as well as a global actor. As part of this vision, the government has pursued a policy of ending its long-term hostilities with its neighbors, mainly in the Middle East, which the Ottoman Turks had once ruled<fnref n="12" />. According to Ivaylo Hristov, even though Turkey has so far adhered to the global policy of the United States and NATO, the country has set its own strategic goals alongside the promotion of its Euro-Atlantic interests. The emergence of Neo-Ottomanism in Turkey after the Cold War was due to the fact that Turkey's real economic and military power was disproportionate to the country's negligible rights to decision-making in the event of international conflicts. It was before Ahmet Davutoglu wrote ‘Strategic Depth’ that the Turkish political elite showed signs it would no longer submit to its subordinate role<fnref n="13" />.

*For Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s road to progress lies in its past.” As the Turkish foreign minister, he spoke openly about the reorientation of his country’s foreign policy in a November 2009*

<footnote n="8">⁸ Ivaylo Hristov, op. cit., pp. 140-148.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ M. Hakan Yavu op. cit.z, op. cit., pp. 457.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Ivaylo Hristov, op. cit., pp. 145-149.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Srdja Trifkovic, “Turkey as a Regional Power: Neo-Ottomanism in action”, p. 83, *Politea*, January 2011, pp. 83, accessed March 31, 2021, online available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315649301_Turkey_as_a_regional_power_Neo-Ottomanism_in_action.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Lale Sariibrahimoglu, “Davutoglu Promoting “Strategic Depth” in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor* Volume: 6 Issue: 89, May 08, 2009, accessed March 31, 2021, online available at https://jamestown.org/program/davutoglu-promoting-strategic-depth-in-turkish-foreign-policy/.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Ivaylo Hristov, op.cit. pp. 145-146.</footnote>
speech to AKP members: The Ottoman Empire left a legacy. They call us ‘neo-Ottomans’. Yes, we are ‘new Ottomans’. We are forced to deal with neighboring countries. And we even go to Africa. The great powers are dismayed by that. His name became synonymous with neo-Ottomanism<fnref n="14" />.

The shift from the USA and its European allies, interpreted as ‘Neo-Ottomanist policy’ by the West, has been more visible especially after the Arab Spring. Moreover, starting from 2014 Turkey’s foreign policy started to resemble a policy of ‘splendid isolation’ in reaction to mounting regional problems. AKP foreign policy is more pro-Islamic and pro-Arab, signaling a shift from its traditional western orientation<fnref n="15" />. Since the AKP came to power the Army has been neutered, confirming the old warning of the Turkish top bras that ‘democratization’ would mean Islamization. To the dismay of its Westernized secular elite, Turkey has reasserted its Ottoman and Muslim legacy with a vengeance<fnref n="16" />.

President Erdoğan contends that Turkey should become a key player in the international arena for its geostrategic location and also for its historical significance as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. He seeks to apply cultural and religious affinities and the past common history of the Ottoman Empire to the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East in order to promote Turkey’s influence. Despite the fact that its critics labeled the new vision of Turkey’s foreign policy as the ‘Neo-Ottomanism’, Erdoğan and his party in a reply to his critics always said that his policy is not to restore the past but to consolidate the current position for the purpose for a new collective goal and which is ‘New Turkey’ and not ‘Neo-Ottomanism’. In June 2020, President Erdoğan stated that Turkey has the right to protect its national interests and the current circumstances (such as the Libya Crisis, border disputes with Syria and Iraq, Kurdish insurgencies, presence of foreign forces in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, volatility in the Arabian Peninsula and deterioration of relations with Israel on Palestine and Syrian issues and future of 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Southern Turkey), all have forced Turkey to be assertive as a regional power.<fnref n="17" />

Key reasons that favored the emergence of the Neo-Ottomanism in Turkey are: the ideological transformation in the Turkish society; the gradual collapse of the bi-polar political system; the revival of the Cyprus crisis and aggression from Greece; the refusal of Turkey’s membership application in the EU; European indifference shown to the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims and Kurdish rise in South-East Turkey. For the last four years, Turkey has consolidated its position to successfully face relatively current volatile international circumstances and its internal developments such as growing economy; large population; military strength; strong state tradition; active diplomacy and national identity<fnref n="18" />. According to Srdja Trifkovic, Today’s Turkey is a regional power of considerable importance which bases its strategy on the concept of neo-Ottomanism, while denying its existence. Neo-Ottoman Turkey’s interests and aspirations no longer coincide with those of the US or Europe,

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ M. Hakan Yavuz, “Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism: Searching for a Post-National Vision”, *Die Welt des Islams*, November 2016, pp. 451, accessed March 26, 2021, online available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311927268_Social_and_Intellectual_Origins_of_Neo-Ottomanism_Searching_for_a_Post-National_Vision.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 459.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Srdja Trifkovic, “Turkey as a Regional Power: Neo-Ottomanism in action”, *Politea*, January 2011, pp. 83, accessed March 31, 2021, online available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315649301_Turkey_as_a_regional_power_Neo-Ottomanism_in_action.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Mohammad Iqbal, *The Emergence of Turkey as a Regional Power and the Neo-Ottomanism*, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia, August 25, 2020, pp. 15-17, accessed March 27, 2021, online available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3680333.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Mohammad Iqbal, *The Emergence of Turkey as a Regional Power and the Neo-Ottomanism*, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia, August 25, 2020, pp. 13-16, accessed March 27, 2021, online available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3680333.</footnote>
and they are diametrically opposed to the interests of the traditionally Orthodox Christian nations in the Balkans<fnref n="19" />.

In terms of methodology, taking into consideration that we perform a chronological analysis, the data used are mainly qualitative and include official documents and statements analysis. This research aims to analyze the main foreign policy decisions of the Turkish state after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which I placed them in antithesis with the foreign policy decisions taken by the political establishment in Ankara after the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.

## 2. THE DYNAMICS OF TURKEY-NATO DURING AKP REGIME

After the end of the Cold War, which led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin posed a much lower threat to Turkey's national security. These developments, coupled with Turkey's growing regional aspirations and desire for strategic autonomy, have led Ankara's political establishment to gradually distance itself from the West. The most pressing issue for Turkey's national security is the Kurdish issue, a subject that is often causing tension between Ankara and Washington, as a result of US the support for the Kurdish Movement.

The first notable differences between Turkey and the West in terms of foreign policy were visible in 2003, in the context of the Iraq War, when the Turkish Parliament refused to allow the US Armed Forces to use Turkish bases and transit Turkish territory with about 60,000 troops<fnref n="20" />. Similarly, during the 2008 Russian-Georgian War, Turkey banned two US hospital ships, the USNS Comfort and the Mercy, from entering the Black Sea basin through the Bosphorus Strait. Ankara officials say they have resorted to such a decision in order not to favor the escalation of tensions between NATO and the Russian Federation. Another subsidiary reason for making this decision was the Turkish political establishment's desire to increase Turkey's regional influence by acting as a mediator in the Russian-Georgian conflict<fnref n="21" />. The NATO-Turkey relationship has been tested again after the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU, following the fact that Ankara, as a NATO member, refused to exchange strategic information with the EU. Moreover, Ankara blocked the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU missions which involved the use of NATO's military infrastructure. The combative attitude of the Turkish political establishment led to further complications, as the Republic of Cyprus blocked the EU - Turkey Security Agreement on the exchange of classified material as well as Turkey's accession to the European Defense Agency. As a result of these developments, the EU-NATO cooperation has been slowed down, especially in matters related to the defense field<fnref n="22" />.

Through its NATO membership, Turkey constitutes a veto player in the inter-institutional relations between the EU and NATO and engages in boundary-testing strategy using active diplomacy, entangling diplomacy, and issue-linkage bargaining. Turkey engages in boundary challenging through strategic non-cooperation and inter-institutional balancing against the EU. The veto gives Turkey a voice against the EU and helps Turkey pursue long-term interests, such as

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Srdja Trifkovic, op. cit., p. 95.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰*Turkey rejects U.S. troop proposal*, March 2, 2003, accessed April 05, 2021, online available at https://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/01/sprj.irq.main/.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ *Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea and the South Caucasus*, International Crisis Group, Europe Report N°250, June 28, 2018, pp. 14, accessed April 05, 2021, online available at https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/250-russia-and-turkey-black-sea-and-south-caucasus.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Turkey blocked EU-NATO partnership programs, Nordic Monitor, January 07, 2020, accessed April 05, 2021, online available at https://nordicmonitor.com/2020/01/turkey-blocked-eu-nato-partnership-programs/.</footnote>
increasing its leverage against the EU in its accession negotiations, resolving the Cyprus problem to its advantage<fnref n="23" />.

Since 2009, the tensions between Turkey and the West have intensified, especially as a result of the different ways of perceiving regional threats. The relationship between the West and Turkey deteriorated amid differences of opinion on subjects like the Arab Spring and the Syrian conflict. The AKP leadership has repeatedly denounced the destabilizing nature of US operations in the vicinity of Turkish territory, especially the Obama administration's support for the YPG/PYD in Syria. Moreover, the insecurity of the AKP regime has been augmented by the anti-governmental large-scale protests organised on the Turkish territory and by the failed coup attempt of July 2016. All these developments, both internal and external, led to a 'radical reset' in Turkish foreign policy. Davutoğlu's 'win-win' approach has been replaced by a security-oriented vision<fnref n="24" />. Despite the fact that over time NATO policies and strategies have been the backbone of the Turkish state's foreign policy, in recent years a considerable part of the Turkish society and elites manifests attitudes opposable to the NATO policies and interests. In the context of differences in the approach of the regional threats in the case of Turkey and other NATO countries, the support expressed by the Turkish population for NATO has decreased considerably. The attitude of Turkish elites and citizens was influenced by the dissonant attitudes shown by the Ankara political establishment towards NATO. Although the Turkish officials have shown their devotion to NATO, they have often resorted to prioritizing national interests in the region, to the detriment of transatlantic interests. Simultaneously, the Turkish political establishment made efforts to increase Turkey's influence in NATO and to determine the strategic agenda of the Alliance.<fnref n="25" />

*The "Turkish Foreign Policy Public Perceptions" survey conducted by Istanbul's Kadir Has University in April 2020 found that 70 percent of the Turkish respondents see the US as a threat to Turkey's security. Meanwhile, just 55% of the respondents see the Russian Federation as a threat to Turkey's security<fnref n="26" />.*

A factor that contributed in a substantial way to the deterioration of the relations between Ankara and between Ankara and the Euro-Atlantic partners was the positioning of the American establishment in the context of the failed coup attempt of July 2016. The AKP leadership has accused the Euro-Atlantic partners for not showing their support for the Erdoğan regime and for reacting reacted late to the events that took place in Turkey. The AKP leadership also accused the Obama administration of backing the US-based cleric Fethullah Gülen who was denounced by Turkey as the mastermind of the July 2016 coup attempt<fnref n="27" />. In opposition to the West, the Kremlin has expressed support for the Erdoğan regime and the Russian publications, including The Moscow Times, have published articles stating that the Russian state has provided Turkish armed forces with information

<footnote n="23">²³ Oya Dursun-Özkanca, “The Turkish Veto over the EU–NATO Security Exchange”, in *Turkey–West Relations: The Politics of Intra-alliance Opposition*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, pp. 63-82.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Didem Buhari Gulmez, “The resilience of the US–Turkey alliance: divergent threat perceptions and worldviews”, *Contemporary Politics*, June 09, 2020, pp. 481, accessed April 05, 2020, online available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2020.1777038?scroll=true&needAccess=true.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Saban Kardas, “Turkey on NATO’s Role in the MENA: Perspectives from a “Central Country””, *Carnegie Europe*, 2012, pp. 2, accessed April 05, 2021, online available at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Kardas_Brief.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Turkish Foreign Policy Public Perceptions Survey 2020 Results Announced, June 17, 2020, accessed April 05, 2021, online available at https://www.khas.edu.tr/en/node/6098.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ William Hale, “The Turkish Military in Politics, and the Attempted Coup of 15-16 July 2016”, *Contemporary Research in Economics and Social Sciences* Vol.: 2 Issue: 1, Year: 2018, pp. 07-41, accessed April 09, 2021, online available at https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/515869.</footnote>
about the ongoing coup<fnref n="28" />. The Kremlin's support for the Erdoğan regime has contributed considerably to the rapprochement between the Russian Federation and Turkey and to the intensification of the bilateral ties, which reached an all-time low following the military downing of a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 fighter jet in November 2015. The resumption of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and Turkey has contributed to a considerable extent to the intensification of negotiations in the military field, which led to Turkey's decision to purchase the S-400 Triumph air defense system produced by the Russian Federation<fnref n="29" />. Turkey's decision was motivated by the fact that the US did not agree to provide the Turkish army with the Patriot defense system, as the conditions imposed by Ankara, including technology transfer, were not feasible<fnref n="30" />.

The tensions that characterized the relationship between Turkey and NATO after the July 2016 coup attempt and intensifying Russian-Turkish bilateral cooperation determined the Turkish political establishment to resort to decisions in opposition to NATO policies and interests. Specifically, Ankara has expressed opposition to Allied efforts to block the Russian Federation's actions in Ukraine and to strengthen the security of the Eastern Flank of NATO. The rapprochement between Turkey and the Russian Federation since the end of June 2016 made the creation of the Black Sea Flotilla difficult, because Ankara did not agree with the US proposal. The lack of interest manifested by the Turkish leaders on this matter is one of the reasons why the declaration of the NATO Summit in Warsaw (2016) did not refer to the creation of the Black Sea Flotilla. The text of the declaration was limited to emphasizing the strategic importance of the Black Sea and the need to strengthen NATO's presence in the Black Sea<fnref n="31" />.

During 2017, tensions between Turkey and NATO erupted again, amid the decision of Germany and the Netherlands not to allow the participation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in electoral rallies on their national. The purpose of the meetings to be carried out by the Turkish President on European territory was to persuade the Turkish communities in Germany and the Netherlands to take part in a referendum designed to confer more prerogatives to the President of Turkey <fnref n="32" />. Amid diplomatic disputes with Germany and the Netherlands, the Turkish officials have resorted to blocking military exercises and other types of activities that NATO supposed to carry out with Austria<fnref n="33" />.

It is worth mentioning that Turkey also blocked other NATO initiatives. For example, Turkey was the only NATO member state to block the Eagle Defender plan during the NATO Summit in London (2019). Turkey's move was of major gravity, as the Eagle Defender plan was designed to defend Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in the event of military aggression planned by the

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Russia Warned, “Turkish Government About Imminent Coup – Reports”, *The Moscow Times*, July 21, 2016, accessed April 05, 2021, online available at https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/07/21/russia-warned-turkey-about-imminent-coup-a54674.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Tuvan Gumrukcua and Ece Toksabay, *Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles*, December 29, 2017, accessed April 22, 2021, online available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-turkey-missiles-idUSKBN1EN0T5.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Selcan Hacaoglu and Firat Kozok, *Turkey Rejects Latest U.S. Offer to Sell Patriot Missiles*, March 01, 2019, accessed April 22, 2021, online available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-01/turkey-said-to-reject-latest-u-s-offer-to-sell-patriot-missiles.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Samir Puri, *Romania: Black Sea Security and NATO's South-Eastern Frontline*, King's College London, Department of War Studies, pp. 9, accessed 06 April 2021, online available at https://www.spf.org/projects/upload/Romania%2C%20Black%20Sea%20Security%20and%20NATO%E2%80%99s%20South-Eastern%20Frontline%20%28Puri%29.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² Turkey rallies row: Germany and Netherlands harden stance, March 12, 2017, accessed April 05, 2021, online available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39251216.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ Tom Körkemeier and Shadia Nasralla, *Turkey blocks some cooperation with NATO partners as EU row escalates*, March 15, 2017, accessed April 09, 2021, online available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-referendum-nato-idUSKBN16M2OR.</footnote>
Russian Federation. Ankara has expressed its readiness to vote the Eagle Defender plan only if NATO would have recognized YPG as a terrorist organization. Despite the fact that the Eagle Defender plan had no implications for Ankara's strategies in Syria, but for the security of NATO borders, Turkish officials agreed to vote on the implementation of the plan only during 2020, after difficult and lengthy discussions with representatives of the NATO Member States<fnref n="34" />.

Since 2019, the tensions between NATO and Turkey have intensified, following Turkey's reception of the S-400 Triumph air defense system. NATO member states, led by the United States, have expressed their concerns about the risks that the Russian-made system could pose to the military installations of the Alliance. Washington has vehemently protested against the Turkish state's decision, drawing attention to the fact that through the S-400 Triumph system the Russian Federation could be able to collect information about NATO military installations and generate security risks. In this context, the US excluded Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program and refused to deliver this type of aircraft to the Turkish air forces<fnref n="35" />.

The examples presented in this section highlight a gradual increase in tensions between NATO and Turkey after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This tendency has been favored in particular by the diminishing danger posed by the Russian state, the successor to the Soviet Union, and by the growing interests of the Ankara establishment in strengthening its regional and global influence. Under the auspices of the NATO security umbrella and as a member state of the Alliance, Turkey has exploited the veto power held within the organization to influence strategic decisions. By blocking certain NATO initiatives, many of them with no implications for the security of the Turkish state, the Turkish politicians tried to promote their own agenda, aiming to persuade member states to support other projects of interest to Ankara.

It is important to note that the tensions between NATO and Turkey have intensified especially after the AKP took power in Turkey, a political party aimed at strengthening Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's power. The controversial policies of the AKP and the difficult cooperation of the party leadership with the US and the EU have contributed to a substantial extent to the strained relations between Ankara and NATO.

Based on the chronological analysis of the dynamics of relations between Turkey and NATO, in the following sections of this article, I will investigate the main domestic and foreign policy decisions of the Turkish state taken in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. The analysis will focus on investigating how the political establishment in Ankara built its domestic and foreign policy strategy and to which extent it caused tensions in the relationship between Ankara and NATO.

### 3. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IS EXPLOITING THE CRISIS GENERATED BY THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC TO STRENGTHEN ITS INFLUENCE INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY

The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic favored a plethora of challenges for a large number of states around the globe. The impact of the crisis and its repercussions vary from country to country, depending to a substantial extent on how the authorities react<fnref n="36" />. Ranked 8th in the world<fnref n="37" />, Turkey

<footnote n="34">³⁴ NATO puts defense plan for Poland, Baltics into action, officials say, July 02, 2020, accessed January 11, 2021, online available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-baltics-turkey-idUSKBN24320B.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ U.S. removing Turkey from F-35 program after its Russian missile defense purchase, July 17, 2019, accessed April 11, 2021, online available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-turkey-security-f35-idUSKCN1UC2GL.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Mihaela Daciana Natea, Mihai Daniel Aniței, “Reshaping European and national security in a post COVID-19 context”, *Acta Marisiensis, Seria Oeconomica*, 2019, vol II, pp. 49-64</footnote>

<footnote n="37">³⁷Coronavirus Cases, Worldometer, accessed April 10, 2021, online available at https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/.</footnote>
is among the states most affected by the pandemic, totaling about 3.7 million infections and 33,500 deaths since the beginning of the crisis. In this context, Turkish public opinion has criticized the AKP government for its handling of the crisis. Amid declining popularity of political party led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the AKP leadership has sought to exploit the pandemic crisis to increase its popularity among the electorate and to promote its regional expansion and hegemonic agendas. In order to materialize these objectives, the political establishment in Ankara resorted to a plethora of tools and strategies. For example, Ankara resorted to the so-called 'aid diplomacy', which consisted in providing medical equipment to some states affected by the pandemic. However, at the same time Turkey took some disruptive actions, which had the character of damaging the relationship with the Euro-Atlantic partners: (1) the Turkish Government deliberately favored a new migrant crisis in order to force Euro-Atlantic partners to provide military support to Turkish armed forces deployed in Syria; (2) Ankara launched military operations against the Kurds located in the northern part of Syria; (3) Turkey signed a controversial energy deal with Libya under which it has (4) resorted to maritime exploration in the territorial waters of Greece and Cyprus<fnref n="38" />.

Concerning the ‘aid diplomacy’, in the early days of the pandemic, the Turkish government sent medical equipment to several states affected by the medical crisis. The humanitarian action targeted two categories of states and was launched under the slogan ‘Humanity first’. The first category includes states in which Turkey intends to consolidate its influence (Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, South Africa, Afghanistan etc.). The second category includes states with which Turkey intended to improve its bilateral relationship (Israel, US, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Bulgaria etc.). The humanitarian action launched by Turkey was aimed at promoting the hegemonic agenda and improving the relationship with the West. Nevertheless, it was also an initiative that came at a time when Ankara’s world-wide reputation is quite low. It was part of the narrative which targeted the domestic audience by reinforcing the claim that Turkey handled the crisis better than many advanced countries. Simultaneously, it was intending to enhance the country’s public image and prestige globally, thus reconstructing the ‘soft power’<fnref n="39" />. During the humanitarian action, Turkey has sent humanitarian aid to more than 150 states<fnref n="40" />.

Despite humanitarian action aimed at improving relations with Euro-Atlantic partners during the Covid-19 pandemic, disruptive actions to which Ankara resorted near its borders has deteriorated the relations with NATO member states. A first example is an inappropriate way in which Turkey has approached the conflict in Syria. At the beginning of 2020, tensions between the Turkish and Russian armed forces deployed in northwestern Syria escalated and the Russian attacks resulted in the killing of 33 Turkish soldiers<fnref n="41" />. In this context, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that ‘Ankara expects concrete support from all its allies in the fight that Turkey has been carrying out alone’. Moreover, the Turkish President asked NATO to provide support to Turkey on the battlefield, sending a list of 10 requests, among them greater air support on the Turkish-Syrian border, more reconnaissance aircraft, surveillance drones, more ships in the eastern Mediterranean etc.<fnref n="42" />

<footnote n="38">³⁸ Noora Al-Habsi, “The Covid-19 impact on Turkey’s domestic & foreign policies”, *TRENDS Research & Advisory*, June 09, 2020, accessed April 10, 2021, online available at https://trendsresearch.org/insight/3206/.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">³⁹ E. Gülseven, “Nationalism and the Response of Turkey to COVID-19 Pandemic”, *Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev.* 6, 2021, pp. 40–62, accessed April 22, 2021, online available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-020-00166-x#citeas.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ Eralp Yarar, “Turkey's medical aid campaign during pandemic embodies humanitarian foreign policy”, *News Analysis*, Istanbul, December 31, 2020, accessed April 12, 2021, online available at https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/news-analysis/turkeys-medical-aid-campaign-during-pandemic-embodies-humanitarian-foreign-policy.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">⁴¹ Jonathan Marcus, *Syria war: Alarm after 33 Turkish soldiers killed in attack in Idlib*, February 28, 2020, accessed April 04, 2021, online available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51667717.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">⁴² Erdogan demands ‘concrete support’ from EU, NATO over Syria, Al Jazeera, News Agencies, March 09, 2020, accessed April 14, 2021, online available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/3/9/erdogan-demands-concrete-support-from-eu-nato-over-syria.</footnote>
Moreover, in order to persuade the Allies to provide military support to the Turkish state in Syria, the Turkish authorities facilitated the movement of several thousand Syrian refugees to the borders with Greece, ignoring the risk posed by the possibility of Covid-19 spreading. In this context, several news agencies in Turkey exaggerated the exodus of Syrian refugees to the Greek border. The purpose of the media operation was to create an augmented image of the phenomenon and to create the impression that the new migrant crisis is comparable to that of 2015.<fnref n="43" />

Another relevant topic in the economics of the relationship between Turkey and NATO is how the two sides handle the Kurdish question. Although it has been launched shortly before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Turkish military offensive against the Kurds in northwestern Syria has strained relations between Ankara and NATO. In this context, Washington, the main partner and provider of logistical support to the Kurds, has vehemently protested the Turkish offensive and threatened to impose economic sanctions on Turkey. As retaliation, during NATO 2019 London Summit, Turkey was the only NATO member state that blocked the Eagle Defender plan, designed to defend Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the event of a Russian attack. Ankara instructed its NATO envoy not to sign off on the plan, demanding the alliance recognize the YPG as a terrorist organization. The plan for the Baltic States and Poland, drawn up at their request after Russian Federation annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, had no direct bearing on Turkey's strategy in Syria. Turkey approved the Eagle Defender plan in July 2020, but it has not allowed NATO military chiefs to put it into action.<fnref n="44" />

Simultaneously with the ongoing operations in Syria, during 2020 Turkey resorted to disruptive actions aimed at capturing energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, which led to strained relations with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, but also with NATO states such as France or regional actors like Egypt.

The genesis of the Greco-Turkish maritime disputes dates as far back as the founding periods of the two states and has traditionally taken the form of a frozen conflict, with occasional flare-ups. Maritime disputes between the two states are mainly generated by three topics: the disagreement over the territorial waters of Greece and the ownership of some Aegean islands and islets; the boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Turkey and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean; the unresolved nature of the Cyprus crisis. The conflict between Turkey and Greece has re-ignited in the context of the signing by the Ankara Government of a memorandum of understanding in the energy field with Libya's U.N.-recognized Government of National Agreement (GNA). The above-mentioned agreement, named the Delimitation of Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean Sea and signed in November 2019, was aimed to demarcate the maritime borders between Turkey and Libya. By the above-mentioned agreement, the two states established the EZZ perimeter between them, a process in which Greece's sovereignty was blatantly violated. The Turkish-Libyan agreement did not consider several Greek territories, including the Crete and Rhodes islands, whose EEZ overlaps with the EEZ established by Turkey and Libya. In retaliation, in August 2020 Greece signed an agreement with Egypt to delimit the EEZ between their countries<fnref n="45" />.

In addition to these actions, in 2020 Ankara sent maritime research vessels into the EEZ of Greece and Cyprus, which further strained relations between Ankara and Athens<fnref n="46" />. Turkey's

<footnote n="43">⁴³ Matina Stevis-Gridneff and Patrick Kingsley, *Turkey, Pressing E.U. for Help in Syria, Threatens to Open Borders to Refugees*, February 28, 2020, accessed April 14, 2021, online available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/28/world/europe/turkey-refugees-Greece-erdogan.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="44">⁴⁴ Robin Emmott and John Irish, *Turkey still blocking defence plan for Poland, Baltics, NATO envoys say*, June 17, 2020, accessed 14 April, 2020, online available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-france-turkey-plans-idUSKBN23O1TN.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵ Hacer Baser, “Egypt, Greece sign maritime demarcation deal”, *Anadolu Agency*, August 06, 2020, accessed April 16, 2021, online available at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/egypt-greece-sign-maritime-demarcation-deal/1933927.</footnote>

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶ It was formed in the context of the 1974 Turkish invasion of the island of Cyprus.</footnote>
assertive actions in Eastern Mediterranean have taken the form of a geopolitical confrontation that has drawn into conflict states such as Egypt, France and the United Arab Emirates. By redefining maritime boundaries through a deal with Libya's Government of National Accord and by conducting gas drilling operations in contested areas off Cyprus and Greece, Turkey is challenging the Eastern Mediterranean order. Moreover, Ankara is seeking to negotiate new rules in the region on the basis of one fait accompli after another. In this context, the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavusoglu stated in May 2020: "Turkey is here. You have to work with Turkey."<fnref n="47" />

As a form of protest against Turkey's decision to send exploration ships in the Eastern Mediterranean, in August 2020 Greece and the United Arab Emirates conducted military drills on the island of Crete<fnref n="48" />. Moreover, Turkey's actions in the eastern Mediterranean and the conflict between Ankara and Athens have prompted other NATO and EU member states to intervene in the conflict. Thus, in the context of escalating tensions between Greece and Turkey and the possibility of Ankara resorting to military action, France has increased its military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean<fnref n="49" />. Moreover, French President Emmanuel Macron called on Turkey to halt oil and gas exploration in the disputed waters in that area. France has become the most vocal European power supporting the Greek-Cypriot position, the attitude is also caused by the tensions between Ankara and Paris in Libya, where the two states support different sides and have divergent interests<fnref n="50" />. It is also worth mentioning that the aggressive attitude of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean has caused concern among other states in the region. Thus, during November and December 2020, the United Arab Emirates, Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, Egypt and France participated for the first time in history to the MEDUSA military drills, organized mainly to persuade Turkey to abandon its aggressive attitudes<fnref n="51" />.

Another controversial decision taken by the Turkish government in 2020 is to transform the Hagia Sophia mosque from the museum into a Muslim place of worship. The Hagia Sophia was built as a cathedral during the Christian Byzantine Empire and converted into a mosque after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453. In 1934, modern Turkey's founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk ordered it be turned into a museum. However, during June 2020 Turkey's highest administrative court, the Council of State, cancelled Ataturk's decision, arguing that the building had been registered as a mosque in its property deeds. Experts see Erdogan's move to turn Hagia Sophia back into a mosque as an attempt to galvanize his conservative and nationalist base amid economic uncertainty exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic<fnref n="52" />. On July 24, 2020, Muslim prayers have been held in the iconic Hagia Sophia for the first time in 86 years. It should be noted that president

<footnote n="47">47 Marc Pierini, "Emerging From the Pandemic, Turkey Rolls Out a More Assertive Foreign Policy", June 03, 2020, *Carnegie Europe*, accessed April 16, 2021, online available at https://carnegie europe.eu/2020/06/03/emerging-from-pandemic-turkey-rolls-out-more-assertive-foreign-policy-pub-81963.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">48 "UAE to send F-16s to Crete for training with Greek military amid tensions with Turkey", *Al-Monitor*, August 21, 2020, accessed April 16, 2021, online available at https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/08/uae-f16-crete-greece-turkey-eastern-mediterranean.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="49">49 "Turkey threatens Greece over disputed Mediterranean territorial claims", *Deutsche Welle*, September 05, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, online available at https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-threatens-greece-over-disputed-mediterranean-territorial-claims/a-54828554.</footnote>

<footnote n="50">50 France sends jets and ships to tense east Mediterranean, August 13, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, online available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53767792.</footnote>

<footnote n="51">51 "Egypt, Greece, Cyprus launch Medusa 10 training exercise in Mediterranean", *Egypt State Information Service*, December 02, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, online available at https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/153226/Egypt%2C-Greece%2C-Cyprus-launch-Medusa-10-training-exercise-in-Mediterranean?lang=en-us.</footnote>

<footnote n="52">52 Burcin Gercek and Gokan Gunes, *As Erdogan joins Hagia Sophia Muslim prayers, '2nd conquest of Istanbul' hailed*, July 26, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, online available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-erdogan-joins-hagia-sophia-muslim-prayers-2nd-conquest-of-istanbul-hailed/.</footnote>
Erdogan, accompanied by cabinet minister and other top officials, attended to the religious ceremony<fnref n="53" />.

In Karabekir Akkoyunlu's<fnref n="54" /> understanding, the Turkish government's decision to turn Hagia Sophia into a Muslim place of worship and President Erdogan's participation in the first religious ceremony is tantamount to a second symbolic conquest of Constantinople. The date chosen for the religious ceremony is not a coincidental one, because it represents the 97th anniversary of the Treaty of Laussane, an agreement that according to in Erdogan's understanding should be amended. In addition to the territorial losses suffered by Turkey since the 1923 Treaty of Laussane was signed, the agreement was the document that allowed the Ataturk regime to turn Hagia Sophia into a museum. It should also be noted that the day of the religious ceremony coincided with the anniversary of the Ottoman Constitutional Revolution of 1908, which marked the short-lived victory of Ottomanism against the absolutist rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II, the tragic hero of Turkey's Islamists<fnref n="55" />.

In the aftermath of Erdogan regime's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia into a Muslim place of worship, the Geneva-based World Council of Churches, representing more than 500 million Christians, urged Turkey's President reverse his move<fnref n="56" />. The leader of Russia's Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, also reacted and declared that calls to convert Istanbul's Hagia Sophia into a mosque posed a threat to Christianity<fnref n="57" />. Moreover, the United States and Greece and Christian church leaders urged Turkey to maintain Hagia Sophia's status as a museum. For its part, Pope Francis declared he was hurt by Turkey's decision to make Istanbul's Hagia Sophia museum a mosque, the head of the Catholic Church being the latest religious leader to condemn the move<fnref n="58" />. According to UNESCO, countries must notify the United Nation's cultural body of any changes in the status of a site, triggering a review by its World Heritage Committee if need be. Given that Turkey did not act accordingly, UNESCO stated its World Heritage Committee would review Hagia Sophia's status after Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan declared the ancient monument in Istanbul a mosque again. UNESCO said that decision raised questions about the impact on its universal value as a site of importance transcending borders and generations, which is necessary to be included on its coveted list of World Heritage sites<fnref n="59" />.

The European Union also reacted in the context of Ankara's decision to alter the status of Hagia Sophia. According to Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union, the 27 EU foreign ministers declared that they “condemned the decision to convert such an emblematic monument as the Hagia Sophia”. The EU's foreign affairs chief also stated that “Turkey's decision will inevitably fuel the mistrust, promote renewed division between religious communities and undermine our efforts at dialogue and cooperation”<fnref n="60" />. Erdogan rejects global criticism over Hagia

<footnote n="53">⁵³ Muslim prayers in Hagia Sophia for first time in 86 years, July 24, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, online available at https://www.aljAZEERA.com/news/2020/7/24/muslim-prayers-in-hagia-sophia-for-first-time-in-86-years.</footnote>

<footnote n="54">⁵⁴ Karabekir Akkoyunlu is a visiting scholar at the International Relations Institute, University of São Paulo, and a research associate of the Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz.</footnote>

<footnote n="55">⁵⁵ Karabekir Akkoyunlu, *The defeat of the 'real' neo-Ottomanists*, Open Democracy, August 05, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, online available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/defeat-real-neo-ottomanists/.</footnote>

<footnote n="56">⁵⁶ Hagia Sophia: World Council of Churches appeals to Turkey on mosque decision, July 11, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, online available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53375739.</footnote>

<footnote n="57">⁵⁷ Russian church leader says calls to turn Hagia Sophia into mosque threaten Christianity, July 06, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, online available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-museum-russia-idUSKBN2471C7.</footnote>

<footnote n="58">⁵⁸ Pope 'very pained' by decision to turn Istanbul's Hagia Sophia museum into mosque, July 12, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, online available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-museum-verdict-pope-idUSKCN24D0CG.</footnote>

<footnote n="59">⁵⁹ UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia, Istanbul, July 10, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, online available at https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-statement-hagia-sophia-istanbul.</footnote>

<footnote n="60">⁶⁰ EU ministers chide Turkey over Hagia Sophia, July 13, 2020, accessed April 19, 2020, online available at https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-haghia-sofia-european-union/a-54165074.</footnote>
Sophia decision, saying it represented his country's will to use its "sovereign rights". The president went ahead with the plan despite appeals from NATO ally the United States and from Russia, with which Ankara has forged close relations in recent years. Amid the loss of political capital in the context of the mismanagement of the Covid-19 pandemic, the decision on Hagia Sofia has helped increase popular support for the Erdogan regime. As Ozgur Unluhisarcikli (Ankara director of the German Marshall Fund) emphasized, the move would win hearts and minds at home as most Turks favor such a decision for religious or nationalist sentiments<fnref n="61" />.

4. TURKEY IS BUYING ANTI-COVID 19 VACCINES FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND CHINA, NATO'S STRATEGIC ENEMIES

The Covid-19 pandemic has created a series of challenges for all countries of the world, the way the authorities are applying the measures to combat and limit the spread of the virus is vital for the protection of society. Despite the major health crisis, there is no common strategy for vaccination policy worldwide. In this context, the Russian Federation and China are working to strengthen global influence by selling or donating vaccines to several categories of states. In general, states that accept vaccines produced in the Russian Federation and China have a close relationship with the political establishment in Moscow and Beijing. Given the global coverage of Russian and Chinese vaccine exports, the vaccine diplomacy strategy performed by the two countries is meant to undermine the West's influence and provide an alternative to it<fnref n="62" />. The majority of the political leaders have chosen vaccine providers based on the strategic interests of their states. At the same time, given that Western vaccine suppliers did not honor orders in a timely manner, several states shifted to Russian and Chinese suppliers.

As for the case of Turkey, as I mentioned earlier, this state is among the most affected countries in the world by the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite the fact that Turkey is a NATO member state and EU candidate state, Ankara has concluded several agreements with China and the Russian Federation for the acquisition and domestic production of vaccines against Covid-19. Meanwhile, the number of vaccines ordered from Western suppliers is in negligible amount. Turkey has ordered 50 million doses of CoronaVac from China, a vaccine against Covid-19 produced by the Chinese company Sinovac<fnref n="63" />.

Turkey also cooperates in the health field with the Russian Federation. Turkish company VisCoran İlac Sanayii AS Turkey signed an agreement with the Russian side in August 2020 to start the transfer procedures for the production of Sputnik V vaccine on Turkish territory.<fnref n="64" /> While the Ankara political establishment has signed substantial contracts with China and the Russian Federation, the numbers of vaccines ordered from Western companies are relatively modest, with Ankara ordering 4.5 million doses of Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine.<fnref n="65" /> It should be noted that Turkey is not the only NATO member state that has purchased vaccines against Covid-19 from China and the

<footnote n="61">⁶¹ Erdogan rejects global criticism over Hagia Sophia decision, July 11, 2020, accessed April 20, 2021, online available at https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/7/11/erdogan-rejects-global-criticism-over-hagia-sophia-decision.</footnote>

<footnote n="62">⁶² Alexander Smith, *Russia and China are beating the U.S. at vaccine diplomacy, experts say*, April 02, 2021, accessed April 19, 2021, online available at https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-china-are-beating-u-s-vaccine-diplomacy-experts-say-n1262742.</footnote>

<footnote n="63">⁶³ Turkey says it aims to produce Russia's Sputnik V vaccine at home, December 29, 2020, accessed April 20, 2021, online available at https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-turkey-russia-int-idUSKBN2930YU.</footnote>

<footnote n="64">⁶⁴ Murat Birinci, *Firm signs deal to produce Sputnik V vaccine in Turkey*, January 26, 2021, accessed April 20, 2021, online available at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/firm-signs-deal-to-produce-sputnik-v-vaccine-in-turkey/2122770.</footnote>

<footnote n="65">⁶⁵ Gözde Bayar, *Turkey to receive 4.5M doses of Pfizer vaccine this month*, March 18, 2021, accessed April 20, 2021, online available at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/latest-on-coronavirus-outbreak/turkey-to-receive-45m-doses-of-pfizer-vaccine-this-month/2179702.</footnote>
Russian Federation. Due to the inability of Western companies to deliver the promised vaccine quantities on time, NATO countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have opted for vaccines produced in China and the Russian Federation<fnref n="66" />, despite the fact that these types of vaccine have not been approved by the European Medicines Agency.

The diplomacy of the vaccine used by the Russian Federation and China is a considerable challenge for NATO unity, given that the Allies do not resort to unitary policies in times of crisis. Although vaccine diplomacy is not considered a major threat to NATO security, it is worth mentioning that this is just one of a plethora of strategies used by China and the Russian Federation to generate cleavages among NATO Member States. Moscow and Beijing are exploiting all situations that have the potential to cause ruptures within the Alliance, these not being limited only to the medical field. The strategies also aimed at initiating projects and offering alternatives to the Western initiatives in the military and energy fields. As for the case of Turkey, is eloquent the interest of the Russian Federation to offer the Turkish state alternatives to NATO, especially in the military field.

The topic of increased co-operation of Turkey with the Russian Federation and China, is being discussed by a large number of international relations specialists. However, this issue risks taking up public attention, as it does not pay attention to topics such as the Turkish adventurism in the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's increasingly reckless foreign policy is on full display - from weaponizing refugees to extort the European Union to exporting mercenary Jihadist fighters to Libya. These are hardly the actions of a responsible regional power, much less a key member of the NATO alliance<fnref n="67" />.

## 5. THE DECISION MADE BY THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO BUY THE RUSSIAN-MADE S-400 TRIUMPH MISSILES DEFENSE SYSTEM AND THE CONTROVERSIES REGARDING THE ACTIVATION OF THE SYSTEM

Turkey's decision to purchase a Russian-made S-400 Triumph air defense system and the delivery of the first two batteries in 2019 has strained relations between Ankara and NATO. The Allies expressed their concern about the security risks posed by the S-400 Triumph to the NATO military installations, in particular the fact that Moscow could use the system to collect intelligence about NATO equipment and activities.<fnref n="68" /> At the same time, the NATO Member States emphasized that there is no possibility to integrate the S-400 Triumph system into NATO's military infrastructure. From all the NATO member states, the US was the most disturbed by Russian-Turkish military cooperation. Turkey's decision to acquire the S-400 triumph system led the US government to exclude in July 2019 Turkey from the F-35 Lightning II jet program and to impose economic sanctions<fnref n="69" />.

Although Turkey was supposed to activate the S-400 Triumph in April 2020, the political establishment in Ankara has delayed the decision, claiming that this is not possible due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite the fact that Ankara postponed the activation of the S-400 Triumph system,

<footnote n="66">⁶⁶ Tim Gosling, "Russia and China Are Exploiting Europe's Vaccine Shortfalls", *Foreign Policy*, March 31, 2021, accessed April 20, 2021, online available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/russia-china-vaccine-diplomacy-slovakia-europe-eu-slow-rollout/.</footnote>

<footnote n="67">⁶⁷ Marwa Maziad and Jake Sotiriadis, *Turkey's Dangerous New Exports: Pan-Islamist, Neo-Ottoman Visions and Regional Instability*, April 21, 2020, accessed April 20, 2021, online available at https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkeys-dangerous-new-exports-pan-islamist-neo-ottoman-visions-and-regional.</footnote>

<footnote n="68">⁶⁸ Amanda Macias, *U.S. sanctions Turkey over purchase of Russian S-400 missile system*, December 14, 2020, accessed April 20, 2020, online available at https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/14/us-sanctions-turkey-over-russian-s400.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="69">⁶⁹ Keşvelioğlu Abdullah et. al., *Turkey's Procurement of the S-400 System: An Explainer*, Trt World Research Centre, London, August 2019.</footnote>
the US government triggered in December 2020 the 231 section of the CAATSA sanctions mechanism (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act), imposing sanctions on the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries<fnref n="70" />. The sanctions are imposed on any person determined to have knowingly engaged in a significant transaction with a person that is a part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation. The US decision to sanction Turkey has a precedent, with Washington imposing similar sanctions against China in 2018, following Beijing's acquisition of the Russian S-400 Triumph system and another military equipment of Russian origin.

It should be noted that following the US activation of the 231 section of the CAATSA mechanism, there has been a change of rhetoric among the Turkish establishment. Turkish officials have agreed not to permanently activate the Russian-origin system, in order to avoid jeopardizing relations with Washington. In this regard, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar stated that Turkey is not planning to integrate S-400s into the NATO military infrastructure. At the same time, the Turkish official stressed that his country is willing to activate the S-400 Triumph system only in the event that the Turkish territory is in danger. Hulusi Akar made an analogy with the situation in Greece, which has the Russian air defense system S-300, but which is activated only in case of imminent danger<fnref n="71" />. However, the decision of the Turkish political establishment to postpone the activation of the system and the desire to resume talks with the US is based on the following reasons: (1) the air defense provided by the Russian S-400 Triumph system is limited, because it does not cover the entire Turkish territory; (2) a possible US decision to impose additional economic sanctions would destabilize Turkey's economy, given that it is already severely affected by the Covid-19 pandemic; (3) the activation by the US of the 231 section of the CAATSA sanctions mechanism affects the Turkish armaments industry, because the US no longer supplies spare parts for military equipment of American origin. This affects Turkey's combat capability in the conflict in Syria; (4) the concern that Washington will provide additional support for the YPG in Syria.

It is important to note that Turkish officials were the ones who took the initiative to contact Washington to resolve the crisis generated by Turkey's acquisition of the Russian S-400 Triumph system. However, the Biden administration ignored Ankara's demands. Despite Ankara's openness to dialogue and determination to resolve the S-400 affair, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar said this is only possible if the US refuses to support YPG. The fact that the Biden administration intends to put even more pressure on Turkey is evidenced by the controversy over the US political establishment's recourse to formal recognition of the Armenian Genocide<fnref n="72" />.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As historical events show, the foreign policy of the Turkish state and its relationship with NATO has been profoundly influenced by the global order and regional security climate. Despite the fact that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father of the Republic of Turkey, promoted secularism and a pro-Western attitude, the neo-Ottoman ideology began to have more and more

<footnote n="70">⁷⁰ CAATSA Section 231 “Imposition of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries”, U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Greece, Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesperson, December 14, 2020, accessed April 20, 2021, online available at https://gr.usembassy.gov/caatsa-section-231-imposition-of-sanctions-on-turkish-presidency-of-defense-industries/.</footnote>

<footnote n="71">⁷¹ Umut Uras, *Analysis: Turkey's new S-400 proposal offers olive branch to US*, February 10, 2021, accessed April 21, 2021, online available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/10/turkey-proposes-model-to-resolve-s-400-dispute-with-us.</footnote>

<footnote n="72">⁷² Humeyra Pamuk, Trevor Hunnicutt and Arshad Mohammed, *Biden expected to recognize massacre of Armenians as genocide*, April 22, 2021, accessed April 23, 2021, online available at https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/biden-expected-recognize-massacre-armenians-genocide-wsj-2021-04-22/.</footnote>
sympathizers, especially after World War II. However, the political establishment in Ankara tried to keep neo-Ottoman ideas off the spectrum of foreign policy, but after the coming to power of AKP this rhetoric changed substantially. In the AKP regime Turkey's foreign policy has undergone substantial changes, which has led to a gradual strain on relations between Ankara and NATO. Regarding the nature of the relationship between Turkey and NATO in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the general conclusion that emerges from the events analyzed is that Turkey has exploited the context to promote its hegemonic and expansionist agenda. Turkey's attitude has led to strained relations with the several NATO Member States, which have resorted to reprisals against the Turkish state: imposing economic sanctions, organizing military exercises in the vicinity of Turkish territory, concluding agreements against Turkish interests some of the Mediterranean riparian countries etc. In order to stabilize relations between Turkey and NATO, I assume that the following decisions must be taken:

(1) Turkey's abandonment of exploration and drilling activities in the continental shelf of the Mediterranean Sea

Given that the Turkish economy is in dire need of hydrocarbon resources for domestic and industrial consumption, it is unlikely that Turkey will give up its disruptive actions in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, if the dialogue between Ankara and Athens will be maintained at acceptable levels, the adjudication before the International Court of Justice would be the optimal decision for the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict. As evidenced by the existing casuistry, the international law of the sea could be as flexible as necessary to reach agreements.

(2) The US acceptance of Ankara's proposals to discuss the S-400 affair

Turkey's decision to postpone the activation of the S-400 Triumph system and its openness to dialogue with Washington may help ease tensions between Ankara and NATO over the S-400 affair. However, there is a possibility that Turkey may open its dialogue to be relatively tardy, as the Biden administration has initiated several mechanisms to put pressure on the Ankara government. However, the crisis between Turkey and NATO can be resolved if the NATO Member States accept that Turkey will only temporarily activate the system, just in the event of imminent threats to the security of the Turkish state. Such a solution is not unprecedented, being applied to the S-300 air defense system owned by Greece. At the same time, the identification of a compromise solution and the supplementation by NATO of the airspace defense systems of Turkey could lead in the long run to the decrease of Ankara's interest in the military installations of the Russian Federation.

(3) Finding a common solution by the US and Turkey to manage the conflict in Syria

The Kurdish issue is a matter of terrorist importance to Turkey, both in terms of territorial integrity and the danger posed by the terrorist threat. Thus, it is very unlikely that Turkey will abandon its actions against the YPG in Syria. The US mediation of negotiations between Ankara and the representatives of the Kurds, culminating in the establishment of red lines could lead to a escalation of the situation.

As for the tensions between Turkey and the Russian Federation, a possible involvement of Washington in supporting Turkey would lead to an increased NATO influence in the region and to avoidance of a new exodus of war refugees to Europe's borders.

**Acknowledgment:** "This article was elaborated within the Human Capital Operational Program 2014-2020, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project POCU/380/6/13/124708 no. 37141/23.05.2019, with the title "Researcher-Entrepreneur on Labour Market in the Fields of Intelligent Specialization (CERT-ANTREP)", coordinated by the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration.
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# Turkey between NATO and Kremlin. The impact of Russian-Turkish cooperation on the relationship between Ankara and NATO

DR AUREL LAZĂR*

SNSPA

**Abstract:** In this article, we investigate the evolutions that marked the bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and Turkey after 2016. The main question to be tackled is: Did military and energy cooperation between the Russian Federation and Turkey favor the manifestation of Complex Interdependence and the distancing of Ankara from NATO? The study will tackle the following topics: TurkStream and Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) role in shaping Russo-Turkish strategic cooperation, S-400 Triumph missile system affair—more security for Turkey new threats for NATO. The bilateral relationship between the Russian Federation and Turkey will be assessed using the neoliberal analysis framework proposed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. The study relies mainly on qualitative data including document analysis and official statements issued by the Turkish Government and NATO member states officials. The main conclusion is Russia-Turkey cooperation affects the strategic foreign policy decisions of the Turkish state.

**Keywords:** NATO, Russian Federation, S-400 Triumph, Turkey, TurkStream.

## INTRODUCTION

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /></figure>

Turkey joined NATO in 1952 to defend its national security threatened by the Soviet Union. Under the auspices of the security umbrella provided by the Alliance, the Turkish state had the opportunity to consolidate its economy and ensure its prosperity. Moreover, as a member of NATO, Turkey signed multiple contracts in the economy field with Moscow, without fearing that the Russian side could resort to actions aimed at undermining the national security of the Turkish state or the territorial integrity of Turkey. Due to the fact that the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the disappearance of the most representative security threat for the Turkish state, the new regional and global context fostered the bilateral cooperation between Ankara and Moscow. Although the new world order that emerged after the post-Cold War facilitated strategic cooperation between the Russian Federation and Turkey, meanwhile the relationship between Ankara and the West deteriorated substantially. Ankara's intentions and perseverance to strengthen its influence in the Middle East and its efforts to reduce its strategic dependence on NATO have contributed in particular to the deterioration of relations between Ankara and NATO. The above mentioned radical changes in the conduct of the Turkish state's foreign policy intensified especially after 2002 when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took power in Turkey.

In the last period, Turkey and the US/NATO have defined the “threat” notion in a different manner, having a contrasting approach towards the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) actions. Moreover, the Turkish state's political and economic ambitions in the Middle East contributed to the increased tensions between Ankara and the West. Turkish officials display a considerable lack of confidence in the NATO security guarantees, while more and more NATO member states are questioning the real intentions of the Turkish state and its future strategic aspirations. Among the main NATO member states concern are: the hegemonic ambitions of the Turkish state and the revival of ideologies like neo-Ottomanism; Ankara's policy towards the Kurdish minority in Turkey

<footnote>* Dr. Aurel LAZĂR finalized his PhD thesis at SNSPA – the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: lazar.a.aurel@gmail.com.</footnote>
and the Middle East; Russian Federation-Turkey intensified cooperation and their development of strategic projects in the military and energy fields<fnref n="1" />.

The peak of the tensions between Ankara and the West has been reached during the failed coup attempt of July 2016, when Turkish officials accused NATO and the EU of not showing support for the Ankara government during the hostilities. In return, the Russian Federation supported the views of Turkish officials and condemned those involved in orchestrating the failed coup. Against this background, the cooperation between Turkey and the Russian Federation has seen a reversal that has favored the acceleration of negotiations on the strategic energy projects (TurkStream pipeline and Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant) and military cooperation (S-400 affair).

The aim of this article is to highlight the most important evolutions that marked the bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and Turkey after 2016. The study attempts to answer two research questions: 1. Did military and energy cooperation between the Russian Federation and Turkey favor the manifestation of Complex Interdependence and the distancing of Ankara from NATO? 2. Did the cooperation between Moscow and Ankara influence the cooperation between the Turkish state and NATO?

In terms of methodology, we used in our study mainly qualitative data on the basis of which we performed a qualitative and historical analysis. In this regard, we have started with the descriptive approach, so we presented the main events which marked the Russian-Turkish relationship in the long run. In this study, we analyzed official documents and communiqués, scientific papers, articles, publications that have an impact on the chosen field of study and that have been published by reputable scholars and experts. However, we do not assume the merit of advancing a geopolitical explanation for the identified transformations.

# 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The analytical construct of the Complex Interdependence Theory has been proposed for the first time in 1977 by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. The two authors formulated a critique against the precepts promoted by the political realism. Keohane and Nye challenge the realist arguments that claim the following: the states are the main actors of the international system; force is a usable and effective political tool; international policy themes follow a precise hierarchy. According to Keohane and Nye, the Complex Interdependence is placed in opposition with the realism precepts, and it's based on three main assumptions: multiple channels of contact among society, lack of clear hierarchies of issues, and irrelevance of military force<fnref n="2" />.

1. Multiple channels connect societies, including informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among nongovernmental elites (face-to-face and through telecommunications); and transnational organizations (such as multinational banks or corporations),

2. The agenda of interstate relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy,

3. Military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails<fnref n="3" />.

Keohane and Nye point out that the interdependence between actors does not imply the existence of a perfect balance of power, which leads to unequal dependence. Under these conditions,

<footnote n="1">¹ Nilsu Goren, “Nuclear Energy Developments, Climate Change and Security in Turkey”, *Council on Strategic Risks*, No. 7, April 27, 2020, accessed May 01, 2021, online available at: https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Nuclear-Energy-Climate-Change-and-Security-in-Turkey_BRIEFER-7_2020_4_27-1.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Robert O. Keohane, *Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence*, Longman, Boston, 2012, pp. 19-25.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ *Ibidem*.</footnote>
the less dependent and more influential actor has the ability to use the interdependence relationship as a source of power and as a tool of influence in negotiations with the less dependent actor<fnref n="4" />. At the same time, the two authors consider that in conditions of Complex Interdependence between actors, the conflict is not absent. Moreover, Keohane and Nye believe that the conflict can coexist with cooperation<fnref n="5" />.

In 1996, Marc Genest defined Complex Interdependence as “a trans-nationalist concept arguing that the states are not the only major players in the international relations scene and that the well-being of society occupies the same central place on the global agenda as security issues”. At the same time, Genest argues that cooperation has a place as important at the level of international politics as the one occupied by the theme of the conflict. According to Genest, in conditions of interdependence, states cooperate because interests are common and produce benefits on both sides<fnref n="6" />.

Concerning the faults of the theory, Keohane and Nye do not argue that Complex Interdependence faithfully reflects world political reality. Quite the contrary, the two authors highlight both it and the realist portrait are ideal types. They also emphasize that most situations will fall somewhere between these two extremes. Sometimes, realist assumptions will be accurate, or largely accurate, but frequently complex interdependence will provide a better portrayal of reality. Before one decides what explanatory model to apply to a situation or problem, one will need to understand the degree to which realist or Complex Interdependence assumptions correspond to a certain situation<fnref n="7" />.

Regarding the criticisms formulated by the realism adepts, Robert Powell considers that Complex Interdependence is applicable in conditions where there is a relatively safe climate between states<fnref n="8" />. Subsequently, Powell's idea was taken over and refined by John Mersheimer, who stressed that the relevance of Complex Interdependence decreases if there is conflict, and mutual gains diminish considerably. Based on Mearsheimer's assumptions, Mohammed Nuruzzaman argued in 2006 that Complex Interdependence lends itself much better to explain developments in the fields of political economy and the environment<fnref n="9" />.

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Despite the existence of several conflicting dossiers that have affected the Russian-Turkish bilateral relationship, several authors have studied the relations between Moscow and Ankara to determine whether the existing cooperation favors the manifestation of Complex Interdependence. Şaban Kardaş argues that between the Russian Federation and Turkey there is an incipient form of Complex Interdependence, generated mainly by cooperation in areas such as construction, tourism and energy. The author emphasizes that Turkish interest groups and

<footnote n="4">⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 10-11.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Robert Keohane şi Joseph Nye, „Power and Interdependence Revisited”, *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 4, 1987, The Mit Press, pp. 730, accessed April 28, 2021, online available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706764?origin=JSTOR-pdf&seq=1.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Marc A. Genest, *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations*, Thomson & Wadsworth, Belmont, 1996, pp. 133-140.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, Longman, Boston, 2012, pp. 20.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 85, No. 4, American Political Science Association, December 1991, pp. 1303-1320, accessed April 28, 2021, online available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1963947?origin=JSTOR-pdf&seq=1.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Mohammed Nuruzzaman, *Liberal Institutionalism and Cooperation in the Post-9/11 World*, 2006, accessed April 28, 2021, online available at: https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Nuruzzaman.pdf.</footnote>
companies with pro-Russian sympathies influence to a considerable extent the foreign policy of the Turkish state<fnref n="10" />.

On the other hand, Seçkin Köstem claims that economic relations between Moscow and Ankara are characterized by asymmetric interdependence, with the Russian Federation having an ascendancy over Turkey. The author also stresses that Turkey's sensitivity and vulnerability to the Russian Federation's actions are greater than vice versa, with Ankara having less room for maneuver in the bilateral relationship<fnref n="11" />. Nargiz Hajiyeva emphasizes that the energy projects jointly developed by the Russian Federation and Turkey intensify the interdependence between the two states, including from a strategic point of view. Nargiz Hajiyeva believes that the Turkish political establishment's appetite for Eurasianims will impact Turkey's foreign policy and will determine Turkish officials to join projects in strategic areas formulated by the Russian Federation<fnref n="12" />.

According to the above mentioned authors, the bilateral relationship between the Russian Federation and Turkey is unbalanced, especially in the economic field, with the Kremlin's gains surpassing those of Ankara. For this reason, the interdependence between the two states is rather asymmetrical. However, more and more authors believe that the intensification of cooperation in the energy field has the potential to create a framework for Complex Interdependence. At the same time, cooperation in the economic field favors cooperation in other fields as well. For example, the intensification of the Russian-Turkish bilateral relations since 2016 has also led to the intensification of cooperation in the military field, the S-400 Triumph affair being the result of this process. Despite the mutual benefits resulted from Russian-Turkish cooperation, projects like the S-400 Triumph affair, have the potential to alter the bilateral relationship between Ankara and NATO.

Mehmet Yegin also highlights the changes occured in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy following the acquisition of the Russian S-400 Triumph system. The author points out that Ankara used the subject to persuade the West to deliver sophisticated weapons to Turkey, the main stake being the Patriot missile defense system. Mehmet Yegin also emphasizes that the acquisition and operationalization by the Turkish army of sophisticated weapons systems of Russian origin have the potential to put at risk the national security of the Turkish state and NATO countries and to favor the increase of Ankara's dependence on Moscow<fnref n="13" />.

Furthermore, Timur Akhmetov argues that cooperation between Turkey and the Russian Federation gives the Kremlin strategic advantages in its competition with NATO. Against this background, the political elites of the Russian Federation intend to generate as sharp cleavages as possible between Turkey and the West<fnref n="14" />.

<footnote n="10">10 Şaban Kardaş, *Turkey's S400 vs. F35 Conundrum and its Deepening Strategic Partnership with Russia*, German Marshall Fund of the United States (on Turkey), May 28, 2019, pp. 1-11, accessed April 29, 2021, online available at: https://www.gmfus.org/publications/turkeys-s400-vs-f35-conundrum-and-its-deepening-strategic-partnership-russia.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11 Seçkin Köstem, *The Political Economy of Turkish-Russian Relations: Dynamics of Asymmetric Interdependence*, în Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey Report nr. 41/2019, Moscow, 2019, pp. 11-13.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 Hajiyeva Nargiz, *Russia-Turkey: The Interdependent Relationship Shaped by Energy or a Deeper Friendship?*, April 04, 2018, accessed April 29, 2021, online available at: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/04/04/russia-turkey-the-interdependent-relationship-shaped-by-energy-or-a-deeper-friendship/.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">13 Mehmet Yegin, “Turkey’s S-400 Purchase and Implications for Turkish Relations with NATO”, în *Turkey between NATO and Russia: The Failed Balance*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs nr. 30, June 2019, pp. 1-4.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 Timur Akhmetov, “It Is Time to Revise Russia-Turkey Relations for a More Stable Future, Russian”, *International Affairs Council*, October 02, 2020, accessed April 30, 2021, online available at: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/it-is-time-to-revise-russia-turkey-relations-for-a-more-stable-future/?sphrase_id=72816862.</footnote>
### 3. COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC ENERGY PROJECTS

#### 3.1. TurkStream project

Given the acute need for energy resources for industrial and domestic consumption, Ankara has concluded several energy partnerships in recent years with suppliers situated in the vicinity of Turkey, among them the Russian Federation. The turkis state opted for Russian gas because of the advantageous price charged by the Russian side and due to the fact Moscow is a reliable supplier. Turkey also intends to become a regional energy hub, and having as many suppliers as possible is gainful. To increase the amount of natural gas imported from the Russian Federation, in 2017 Turkey signed with Gazprom the TurkStream pipeline contract. The two parallel lines of TurkStream are crossing the Turkish territory and supply natural gas to Turkey and to states situated in southern and southeastern Europe. TurkStream is one of the most significant energy projects Turkey has undertaken in recent years. It is also a catalyst that is fostering the improvement and intensification of the relationship with Moscow. Despite criticism from the EU and NATO, Turkish officials have not suspended the project, omitting that Turkey is a NATO member and EU candidate<fnref n="15" />.

For example, the European Commission raised some objections against TurkStream 2 (the second line of TurkStream) and made it clear that the project would be carefully checked, to verify that it adheres to Internal Energy Market rules<fnref n="16" />. Brussels has also stated that the project would be approved if Bulgaria can secure gas supplies from three different sources<fnref n="17" />. The United States has also criticized the TurkStream 2 project. In December of 2019, President Trump signed the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and included sanctions against companies involved in building the Russian-sponsored natural gas pipelines to Europe, namely TurkStream and Nord Stream 2¹⁸. Later on, in July of 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced US administration is ending grandfather clauses that had spared firms previously involved in the pipelines' construction from sanctions authorized by the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

The law is aimed at punishing Russia for interference in U.S. elections and other matters. The move opens the door for U.S. economic and financial penalties to be imposed on any European or other foreign company over the Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream projects, including those that had been working on the pipelines before the passage of CAATSA and had been previously exempted from the penalties. Mike Pompeo also took aim at the pipeline projects (TurkStream 2 and Nord Stream 2), calling them “the Kremlin’s key tools to exploit and expand European dependence on Russian energy supplies” that “ultimately undermine transatlantic security”<fnref n="19" />. In these circumstances, in September of 2020, the world's largest shippers' insurance group, International

<footnote n="15">15 Dimitar Bechev, *Russia's Pipe Dreams Are Europe's Nightmare*, March 12, 2019, accessed May 01, 2021, online available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/12/russia-turkstream-oil-pipeline/.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 Martin Jirušek, *TurkStream is South Stream 2.0—has the EU done its homework this time?*, February 19, 2020, accessed May 01, 2021, online available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/turkstream-is-south-stream-2-0-has-the-eu-done-its-homework-this-time/.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17 Margarita Assenova, *TurkStream: Triumph or Failure for Russia?*, January 16, 2020, accessed May 02, 2021, online available at: https://jamestown.org/program/turkstream-triumph-or-failure-for-russia/.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 Gloria Shkurti Özdemir, Turkstream, “The U.S. Opposition And The Reasons Behind It”, *SETA Analysis*, Istanbul, August 2020, NO.68, accessed May 12, 2021, online available at: https://www.setav.org/en/russia-turkey-us-energy-triangle-success-of-turkstream/.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 Matthew Lee, *US warns firms about sanctions for work on Russian pipelines*, July 15, 2020, accessed May 05, 2021, online available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-toughens-stance-against-2-russian-gas-pipelines-to-europe/2020/07/15/e932ebcc-c6aa-11ea-a825-8722004e4150_story.html.</footnote>
Group of P&I Clubs, announced that it would not insure vessels involved in the Russian-led Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream gas pipeline projects because of the existing threat of U.S. sanctions<fnref n="20" />.

Given the above-mentioned legal statements and actions, it is clear that Washington's reaction to the TurkStream 2 project is much more vocal than that of the EU. The US claims that TurkStream 2 is a geopolitical project that will increase the EU's dependence on Russian gas and Moscow's influence in the region. One of the main fears of the US government is that once the TurkStream 2 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines are finalized, Moscow will suspend the gas exports to Ukraine, as it did in 2006 and 2009, putting the Ukrainian state in difficulty. At the same time, the operationalization of TurkStream 2 and Nord Stream 2 allows the Russian Federation to intensify subversive actions in eastern Ukraine because protecting the gas transmission network will not be a priority. Moscow's finding of alternative routes for exporting natural gas will not only deprive the Ukrainian state of gas of Russian origin but will also lead to a decrease in the amounts obtained from the transit taxes of the gas that the Russian state pays.

The US opposition to the TurkStream 2 gas pipeline has both economic and geopolitical implications. On the one hand, the Russian-Turkish project is a competitor for the USA, whose strategies aim to increase the quantities of liquefied natural gas exported to European countries. In other words, TurkStream 2 offers considerable advantages to the Kremlin in its fight with the US to control the European gas market. On the other hand, the Washington administration is concerned that the TurkStream 2 project will provide the Russian Federation with strategic advantages through which it will strengthen its levers of influence in Europe to the detriment of American interests. Despite Washington's opposition to TurkStream 2 and allegations of alienating the Western path of the Turkish state, the Ankara political establishment did not cancel the project, saying it was in line with Turkey's national interest. According to Ankara officials, the TurkStream project will increase the country's energy security and will improve the bilateral relationship with the Russian Federation. They also claim that TurkStream pipeline will contribute to the process of transforming Turkey into an energy hub<fnref n="21" />.

Speaking at the ceremony for the completion of the offshore section of the TurkStream Project, President Erdoğan underscored: "The TurkStream is a project of historic proportions for our bilateral relations and for the energy geopolitics in our region, on which we have exerted great efforts with our Russian friends." President Erdoğan continued his speech as follows: "The TurkStream Project, which will transport 31.5 billion-cubic-meter natural gas annually, has many advantages not only for our country and nation but also for our neighbors and the environment. We plan to transfer at least half of the natural gas, transported through here, to Europe". In the context of the West's criticism towards the TurkStream project and the intensification of relations with the Russian Federation, President Erdogan stated: "We have never defined the framework of our bilateral relations with Russia according to other countries' demands or impositions"<fnref n="22" />. All these statements make it very clear that TurkStream is more than an economic project for Turkey.

Through TurkStream, both Turkey and the Russian Federation have achieved their strategic and economic interests. On the one hand, the Russian Federation managed to increase the volumes of natural gas sold on the European market. On the other hand, Turkey managed to secure substantial

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Anton Kolodyazhnyy, *Citing U.S. Sanctions, Insurers Won't Cover Ships For Russia, Turkey Pipelines Projects*, September 23, 2020, accessed May 05, 2020, online available at: https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2020/09/23/583772.htm.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Gloria Shkurti Özdemir, "Russia-Turkey-US energy triangle: Success of TurkStream", *SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research*, January 13, 2021, accessed May 14, 2021, online available at: https://www.setav.org/en/russia-turkey-us-energy-triangle-success-of-turkstream/.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, "*The TurkStream is a project of historic proportions for the energy geopolitics in our region*" November 19, 2021, accessed May 14, 2021, online available at: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/99695/-the-turkstream-is-a-project-of-historic-proportions-for-the-energy-geopolitics-in-our-region-.</footnote>