[Jumrah, 2021] and the South China Sea Conflict Zone also known as *the Spratly Islands disputes*<fnref n="13" />
[Moss, 2016] (**see Map 21**), (**see Map 29**).

<figure><img src="image_29.png" /><figcaption>Map 21.: China Sea Territory Disputes</figcaption></figure>

Source: Money Morning staff research, NPR, 2021

The country of *East Timor*, also known as Timor-Leste, which gained independence from Indonesia in 2002, only in 2018 has signed (with Australia) a historic treaty on a permanent maritime border in the Timor Sea – settling the dispute over Timor Gap. The deal ended a decade-long dispute between the neighbours over rights to the sea's rich oil and gas reserves.

The international border between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, which divides the *island of New Guinea* in half, represents another hot spot in the region [Cooke, 1984]. Tensions between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea grew, as the ongoing *West Papuan conflict*<fnref n="14" /> destabilised the border region, causing flows of refugees and cross-border incursions by Indonesia's military. Ongoing Papua conflict up to date preserves dangers and high level of violence in the region. Land dispute in which 21 people died (last update as for April 2021 [Fardah, 2021]) is the latest brutal conflict exacerbated by high-powered weapons, weak governance, and erosion of traditional mores.

The territorial and maritime *disputes in the South China Sea* are considered some of the most complex conflicts in the region if not worldwide [Sakomoto, 2021]. The disputed areas are abundant

<footnote>territorial waters generated by mainland Malaysia, Pedra Branca and Middle Rocks. As it is a maritime feature visible only at low tide, it belongs to the state in the territorial waters of which it is located. Malaysia and Singapore have established what they have named the Joint Technical Committee to delimit the maritime boundary in the area around Pedra Branca and Middle Rocks, and to determine the ownership of South Ledge.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ the South China Sea Conflict Zone: the situation today is as follows: The PRC controls eight or nine coral reefs and rocks in the Spratly archipelago, Vietnam controls from 21 to 29 islets, the Philippines – from 8 to 10, Malaysia-5, Brunei-2. The Republic of China (Taiwan) controls one, but the largest island in the Spratly group, Taipingdao, on which the runway is built. Each of the parties concerned states that they are trying to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in the South China Sea. The incredible interweaving of geopolitical, military-strategic, economic factors, as well as national-state interests and ambitions of the parties to the dispute turn the issue of the ownership of the islands of the South China Sea into one of the most dangerous conflict situations in Southeast Asia, characterized by a very high degree of military-political tension.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ The Papua conflict (1962 – ongoing) is an ongoing conflict in Western New Guinea between Indonesia and the Free Papua Movement.</footnote>
in natural resources such as gas and oil and carry strategic importance, as roughly half of the world's commercial shipping passes through them. These disputes played an important role not only in the relations among the claimants but also in the foreign policies of countries such as Japan and the United States. The disputes involve overlapping maritime, territorial, and fishing rights and claims by China, Taiwan, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia (see Map 21).

However, despite the fact, that territorial disputes in SEA are related to the vagueness of colonial titles and are usually of an acute political (geopolitical) nature, they affect the interests of third States, including superpowers (namely the USA, China, India); involve the analysis of not only territorial titles, but also claims to self-determination; provoke constant tension and are fraught with armed conflicts. Their judicial resolution is usually unlikely, and the use of conciliation mechanisms is preferable.

Despite this, there is little doubt [Avis, 2020] that the conflicts in the South China Sea will dominate the region's security agenda for years, if not decades, to come. In this case, the ASEAN claimant states have decidedly stuck to their unwritten agreement that some form of settlement needs to be reached with China before any attempt is made to resolve overlapping claims amongst themselves. Thus, the intra-ASEAN disputes in the South China Sea will most likely remain dormant for a considerable time to come [Tønnesson, 2002].

**South Asia** is Asia's largest sub-region. It comprises the sub-Himalayan SAARC countries, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (see Map 22). The area is often referred to geologically, as the Indian Subcontinent and appears to be the area with the highest conflict intensity index in the region (see Map 23), (see Map 29).

<figure><img src="image_30.png" /><figcaption>Map 22: Southern Asia</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_31.png" /></figure>

WorldAtlas

Source: WorldAtlas, 2019

The biggest country of the region – India – faces territorial issues with many of its neighbours. Over the past 70 years, it has succeeded to resolve its boundary issues only with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The undemarcated boundaries with Myanmar, Bhutan and lately with China, Pakistan and Nepal have often flared up into tensions [Kapoor, 2020] (see Map 24).
<figure><img src="image_32.png" /><figcaption>Map 23.: South Asia Conflict Map</figcaption></figure>

Source: Institute for Conflict Management, 2016

When analysing the stages of settlement of the minor conflicts of the region (namely *disputes over Bay of Bengal*<fnref n="15" />[Hague...,2014], *India – Myanmar dispute*<fnref n="16" />[Gilani,2020], *India – Bangladesh*<fnref n="17" />[Banerji,2021], *India – Bhutan border dispute*<fnref n="18" /> [Ramachandran,2021]), it is worth noting that two disputes concerning the delimitation of the Bay of Bengal were resolved by judicial means. These disputes were of exclusively economic importance. Three disputes from the second group were resolved based on international law; in two cases, the parties used judicial mechanisms, in one – conciliation.

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ The Bay of Bengal Dispute: The cause of the dispute is South Talpatti (as it was known internationally) or Sheikh Mujib Island (as it was called by supporters of the Bangladesh Awami League). India and Bangladesh participated in eight rounds of bilateral negotiations starting in 1974, but they remained inconclusive until 2009. In October 2009, Bangladesh notified India of the arbitration proceedings under UNCLOS.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Dispute between the land in Kabaw Valley near Hollenphai village, Moreh of Manipur state, India and Namphalong village, Tamu of Sagaing Region, Myanmar.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ India settled its land and maritime boundaries with Bangladesh, by resolving the issue of South Talpatti Island or Bangabandhu Island -- a small uninhabited offshore sandbar landform in the Bay of Bengal, off the coast of the Ganga-Brahmaputra Delta region. After decades of strenuous negotiations, both countries also exchanged enclaves five years ago, which were in adverse possession. Inside the main part of Bangladesh, there were 111 Indian enclaves (17,160 acres), while inside the main part of India, there were 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (7,110 acres).</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ The boundary has been detailed and refined in the 1973-1984 period through talks between Bhutan and India. Regions between Sarbhang and Geylegphug remain undefined. They border the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_33.png" /><figcaption>Map 24.: India's borders disputes with neighbours</figcaption></figure>

Source: Anadolu Agency Research, 2020

The most problematic disputes of the region are between India and China (namely *disputes over Aksai Chin*<fnref n="19" />[Ayres,2020], *Depsang Plains*<fnref n="20" />, *Demchok, Chumar*<fnref n="21" />[Long,2020], *Kaurik*

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Aksai Chin is in the northwestern part of the Tibetan Plateau, it is approximately 35,241 sq km in size, administered by China and part of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. India considers it a part of its union territory of Ladakh.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ The Depsang Plains are located on the border of the union territory of Ladakh and disputed zone of Aksai Chin. The Chinese Army controlled most of the plains during its 1962 war with India, while India controls the western portion of the plains</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Demchok, Chumar: Both in the Leh district of Ladakh, controlled by India</footnote>
Shipki La<fnref n="22" /> [Bhonsale, 2018], Barahoti<fnref n="23" />[PTI, 2017], Nelang, Pulam Sumda, Sang, Jadhang and Lapthal<fnref n="24" />[Modi, 2020], Trans – Karakoram Tract<fnref n="25" />, Arunachal Pradesh<fnref n="26" />[D'Ambrogio, 2018]), which have been worsening in recent years. The two world powers are facing off against each other along their disputed border in the Himalayan region. Thus, the most recent skirmish – on 20 January 2020 – left troops on both sides injured. It took place along the border in India's Sikkim state, which is sandwiched between Bhutan and Nepal. The June 2020 clash in the Galwan Valley – fought with sticks and clubs, not guns – was the first fatal confrontation between the two sides since 1975.

India – Pakistan borders disputes (namely *disputes over Jammu and Kashmir*<fnref n="27" />[Jilani, 2019], *Siachen Glacier*<fnref n="28" />, *Saltoro Ridge*<fnref n="29" />[Nair, 2009], *Sir Creek*<fnref n="30" />[Dabas, 2016]) are the second largest in the region. With continued violence in Kashmir and a heightened threat of terrorist activity by Pakistan-based militant groups, tensions, and concerns over a serious military confrontation between nuclear-armed neighbours India and Pakistan remain high. Thus, while analysing India – Pakistan relations, it can be concluded that, since 1947, Pakistan and India have been fighting and disagreeing, and are still set on claiming Kashmir (see Map 25). But until the political fate of Kashmir is fully developed, a war is always a constant threat between these two countries.

Third group of disputes, which is rising of the region's conflict potential, are India – Nepal border's disputes (namely *disputes over: Kalapani*<fnref n="31" />, *Susta*<fnref n="32" />[Drishti, 2019], *Limpiyadhura and Lipulekh of Uttarakhand* [IST, (2020)]). It is worth noting that the redrawing of the map covers a relatively small region high in the Himalayas, but it has stirred simmering tensions between two of the world's biggest powers, India, and China (see Map 26).

<footnote n="22">²² Kaurik, Shipki La: In the Kinnour district of Himachal Pradesh.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ Barahoti: In the Chamoli district of Uttarakhand whose grazing fields are disputed by China, which is also in the state of Uttarakhand and is controlled by India.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Nelang, Pulam Sumda, Sang, Jadhang and Lapthal: In the Uttarkashi district of Uttarakhand.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Trans-Karakoram Tract: An area of nearly 5,800 square kilometers (2,239 sq mi) along both sides of the Shaksgam River, is entirely administered by China as a part of Kargilik County in the Kashgar Prefecture of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. It was claimed by Pakistan until 1963, and still claimed by India as part of the Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan gave up its claim to the tract under a border agreement with China in 1963 with the proviso that the settlement was subject to the final solution of the Kashmir dispute.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Arunachal Pradesh: Arunachal Pradesh is a state of India created on Jan. 20, 1972, and located in the far northeast. Most of the territory is claimed by China as part of South Tibet.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Jammu and Kashmir: It is the center of the major dispute between Pakistan and India. Three wars have been fought between the two countries over Jammu and Kashmir.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Siachen Glacier: The Siachen Glacier is located in the eastern Karakorams in the Himalayas just east of the Actual Ground Position Line between India-Pakistan. India controls all of the Siachen Glacier itself, including all tributary glaciers. At 70 km (43 mi) long, it is the longest glacier in the Karakoram and second-longest in the world's non-polar areas.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Saltoro Ridge: The Saltoro Mountains is a subrange of the Karakoram Heights or of Saltoro Ridge. They are located in the heart of the Karakoram, on the southwest side of the Siachen Glacier. They are claimed as part of Ladakh union territory by India and as part of Gilgit-Baltistan by Pakistan. In 1984, India assumed military control of the main peaks and passes of the range, with Pakistani forces into the glacial valleys just to the west.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Sir Creek: The Sir Creek is a 96 km (60 mi) strip of water disputed between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch marshlands. Pakistan claims the line to follow the eastern shore of the estuary while India claims a center line.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Kalapani: Kalapani is an area under territorial dispute in Darchula District of Sudurpashchim Pradesh, Nepal and Pithoragarh District of Uttarakhand, India, area 400 square km. Although claimed by Nepal, Kalapani has been administered by India's Indo-Tibetan Border Police since the 1962 border war with China. This discrepancy in locating the source of the river led to boundary disputes between India and Nepal, with each country producing maps supporting their own claims. India has now released its new political map which includes all of Kalapani in India without any consent of Nepal. Nepal in turn has issued a new national map incorporating 300 square kilometers (115 square miles) of mountainous land incorporating Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura and Kalapani, currently with India.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² Susta: Susta is an area under territorial dispute currently in Tribenisusta, Lumbini Zone, Nepal and near Nichlaul, Uttar Pradesh, India. The area under dispute totals over 14,000 hectares (140 square km) and is controlled by Nepal.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_34.png" /><figcaption>Map 25.: Disputes on China – India borders</figcaption></figure>

Source: BBC, 2020

<figure><img src="image_35.png" /><figcaption>Map 26.: India – Nepal border disputes</figcaption></figure>

Source: BBC, 2020

Even during this period of social distancing and public lockdown, claims and counterclaims over territories in and around the Kalapani region (located at the trijunction between northern India, western Nepal, and southern China/Tibet) have resurfaced to become an issue that has embroiled
India and Nepal in a political debate; it is now gravitating towards a confrontational trend of popular politics.

Involving of the third party (China) into the conflicts of India – Pakistan and India – Nepal is
making the tension in the region even higher. China’s rising presence across the Himalayas,
particularly after the BRI, has forced India to readjust its policy toward Nepal and Pakistan. Delhi
has started to shift the focus away from geostrategic denial and isolation toward greater economic
delivery and connectivity. The situation acquires another obstacle against the backdrop of a
simmering border conflict between India and China along with their de facto frontier – the Line of
Actual Control (hereinafter LAC) – a frontier that remains unmarked. Besides, Nepal’s ruling
Communist Party administration and political circles of Pakistan have in recent years reached out to
China for investment and improved connectivity, which has worried India.

The problem of Afghanistan is also one of the most explosive in the region [Larson,2018]. The war has been going on here for the third decade, it has claimed millions of lives and has long ceased to be an internal affair of this state. Despite the change of power in the country after the events of 2001, it was not possible to overcome the severe economic crisis, and stabilization did not come. Till August 2021 the troops of 14 NATO countries were in Afghanistan fighting the “Taliban” [USIP,2021]. Moreover, several million Afghan refugees settled in Pakistan, Iran and other countries of Asia and Europe, in the United States.

The Western world has identified South Asia as an epicentre of terrorism and religious extremism and therefore has an interest in ensuring regional stability, preventing nuclear weapons proliferation, and minimizing the potential of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan [Rosand et al.,2009].

Based on the analysis of the conflict map of the region, the most significant territorial conflicts in the APR today include the situation on the Korean Peninsula, as well as such hotbeds of tension as the conflict over the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands, the conflict between China and Vietnam over several island territories in the South China Sea (the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands), between Japan and South Korea over the Liancourt Islands. Russia has territorial problems in relations with Japan over the Southern Kuril Islands, as well as with the United States (on the division of shelf zones in the Bering Sea). At the same time, it is characteristic that the United States traditionally supports Japan in its territorial disputes with Russia [McDevitt&Lea,2013].

It is also important to consider that the main trend in the region is the growth of military spending (see Map 27). For example, according to the calculations of experts from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies [Tian et al.,2020] from 2001 to 2013, nominal defence spending in Asian countries increased by 23%. According to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute [SIPRI, 2021], the APR has become the region of the world with the fastest growth in military spending-both in absolute terms and as a share of GDP. The second place after the United States is occupied by China, which accounts for 12.4% of spending in the Asia – Pacific region ($112.2 billion), and Japan closes the top three with 5.6% ($51 billion).

Given the growing number of military expenditures of the countries of the region and the presence of many hotbeds of tension, territorial disputes of the whole Asian region is turning into one of the most complex problems and potentially explosive challenges, indirectly affecting the interests of most of the states of the Eurasia (see Map 28).

Up to day countries of the region did not create a stable multilateral mechanism which can help them to work out a compromise solution on the issue of legal registration of state borders and territorial claims. This issue is one of the most important, since it can guarantee the territorial integrity of states and ensure non-interference in their internal affairs, as well as represent one of the barriers to external threats to their national security, such as smuggling, international crime, extremist and terrorist movements, illegal migration.
<figure><img src="image_36.png" /><figcaption>Map 27.: The Top-10 Military Spenders, 2019</figcaption></figure>

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2020

Today, the diversity of the Asia-Pacific region, the differences in the political and economic systems of the states, determine the specifics of the formation of integration structures in the region [Ayson, 2009].

<figure><img src="image_37.png" /><figcaption>Map 28.: New displacement by conflict and disasters in 2020</figcaption></figure>

The country and territory names and figures are shown only when the total new displacements value exceeds 20,000. Due to rounding, some totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures. The boundaries and the names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.

iDMC
internal displacement monitoring centre

Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2021

Thus, it is necessary to note a characteristic feature of integration structures in the APR – in most cases, they are created to jointly solve economic problems, achieve economic integration in the region or sub-regions, but not to solve security issues.
Despite this, it is important to mention that the steps aimed at creating a multipolar security structure in the APR were taken even before the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations. In the mid-1980s Mikhail Gorbachev offered the first proposal when he advanced the idea of organizing an “All – Asia security Forum” in May 1985 [Anwar, 1988]. This proposal was not a isolated diplomatic show, since he further elaborated on the idea in his Vladivostok address of July 1986 and his Krasnoyarsk speech of September 1988 [Ministry Of ..., 1989]. The security arrangement that he proposed was, in effect, a multilateral security system modelled on the CSCE in Europe. However, it failed to elicit positive responses from countries in the region. Most importantly, the West regarded Gorbachev’s offers chiefly as deliberate attempts to weaker its influence in Asia – Pacific security matters [Meyer, 1992].

In August 1987 the Australian government came up with a similar suggestion. Foreign Minister Bill Hayden emphasized that Asia – Pacific countries should begin dialogues both bilaterally and multilaterally on major regional security issues [ANU, 1987]. He especially stressed the urgent need to devise measures for improving military transparency and thereby to avert an arms race in the region. His successor, Gareth Evans [Evans, 1995], was more concrete in suggesting that an Asian version of the CSCE be formed, namely the CSCA (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia Pacific Region) [Evans & Dibb, 1994]. This multilateral forum was intended to complement the U.S.' bilateral security relations with its Asian allies. However, this proposal did not find a positive response, as it did not specify the range of potential participants and specific areas of possible cooperation.

The Canadian Prime Minister, Joe Clark, in the early 1990s, echoed [Majumdar, 2000] his support for such a proposal, indicating that it was time for Asia – Pacific countries to embark on creating a multilateral security institution for the region.

Nevertheless, the West continued to view negatively proposals made by allies [Kraft, 1993]. Basically, the Western superpower (US) saw no reason to revise the status-quo and security order in the APR, an order founded on bilateral security ties with regional allies. From its standpoint the collapse of the USSR removed the major security threat in the region, and thus only improved the security and stability of the APR. [Solomon & Drennan, 2001].

At the same time Asian countries itself were more eager to dynamize economic cooperation than to concentrate their efforts on solving certain strategic tasks.

That is why the well-known regional security structures of the APR – the Asia – Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC – established in 1989) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN – established in 1967) – set their priority task for economic cooperation aimed at trade and technological integration within the APR.

To understand the integration processes in Asia, it is necessary to consider in detail the existing integration organizations of the region:

### APEC

Being an organization with the largest Asian participation, the Asia – Pacific Economic Cooperation engulfing both sides of the Pacific. While created, this forum was planned to become a mechanism for developing global rules for economic and military-political interaction between countries of the APR, but eventually organization turned into a regional integration setting of the Asia – Pacific countries, mainly involved just in economically-related issues [APEC, 2021]. Even considering the shifts of the APEC towards resolving political issues (response to security threats), so far this is a forum for member economies not of sovereign nations, a sort of a prep-com for the World Trade Organization – WTO, which is not involved into the solving of security issues of the region.
SCO

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, created in 2001, was formed based on the previously existing political association of the “Shanghai Five”: Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan (See Map 30).

While it was mentioned that the main goals were strengthening trust between its participants in the military field, ensuring peace, security and stability in the region, criticism of the SCO [Weitz, 2014] largely concerns the failure of its activities, in the fight against terrorism and the protection of regional security. Some foreign analysts (i.e., Matthew Oresman of the American Centre for Strategic and International Studies) [Oresman, 2005] suggest that the SCO is nothing more than a discussion club, claiming something more. The same opinion is shared by the head of the Institute of Military History of the Russian Ministry of Defence A. A. Koltyukov, who claims that “the analysis of the results achieved by the SCO allows us to characterize it as a political club in which bilateral cooperation still prevails over the solution of regional and world problems. ... there is no real cooperation in these areas in countering the threats of terrorism, separatism and the fight against drug trafficking at the regional level” [Kol'tyukov, 2008].

SAARC

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, SAARC – economic and political organization of eight countries in South Asia is the Indian sub-continent's grouping, created in 1985 (See Map 30).

The main goal of the SAARC is to develop interaction between the participating countries in the economic, socio-cultural, and scientific-technical fields, however, with the accession of Afghanistan (in 2007), the Association began to discuss issues of combating terrorism [Rosand et al.,2009].

Being an organization, which helps the integrate the region and intensify mutual collaboration between countries-participants, the SAARC is practically a hostage of mega confrontation of its two largest members, both confirmed nuclear powers: India and Pakistan. Additionally, the SAARC although internally induced is an asymmetric organization, considering the size and position of India: centrality of that country makes SAARC practically impossible to operate in any field without the direct consent of India, which is not helping the organization to resolve important security-related issues of the region.

OIC and NAM

Another crosscutting integration settings of the region are the Organization of Islamic Cooperation – OIC and Non-Aligned Movement – NAM.

The development of NAM as a new trend in the system of international relations was laid by the Bandung Conference of 1955, which served as the beginning of the creation of an international organization uniting countries that proclaimed non-participation in military-political blocs and groupings as the basis of their foreign policy. The creation of the OIC in 1969 was facilitated by a series of events that shook the Islamic world, the main ones of which were the defeat in the Arab – Israeli war in 1967 and the burning of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem by Israeli extremists. Thus, initially the creation of these two settings had a security root.

However, as professor Anis H. Bajrektarevic elaborated in his work on “No Asian Century” [2015], they are inadequate forums as neither of the two is strictly mandated with security issues. Although both trans-continental entities do have large memberships being the 2nd and 3rd largest multilateral systems, right after the UN, neither covers the entire Asian political landscape – having important Asian countries outside the system or opposing it.

KEDO and the Iran-related Contact (P5 + 1, E3 + 3)

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which existed in 1995 – 2006, which main goal was to implement the 1994 Framework Agreement between the United States
and North Korea and freeze the development of a local nuclear power plant in North Korea, as well as Group 5 + 1 (P5 + 1, E3 + 3) – a forum of six great powers that have united their efforts to prevent the use of the Iranian nuclear program for military purposes, were both dealing with indeed security related issues in Asia. Nevertheless, both settings were created to deter and contain a single country by the larger front of peripheral states that are opposing a particular security policy, in this case, of North Korea and of Iran.

### BRICS and G-20

The formation of global governance institutions began with the creation of the G7 in 1975. In 2008, the first G20 summit took place, and in 2009 – BRIC (BRICS since 2011). These informal forums, focused primarily on economic cooperation, do not fully fulfil their obligations to counter protectionism, environmental growth, food security and fairness in the labour market.

These problems exist due to the inability of both institutions to create a full-fledged accountability mechanism to ensure transparency of the processes of implementation of the decisions of the summits.

Also, the BRICS and G-20 are not providing the Asian participating states either with the more leverage in the Bretton Woods institutions or helping to tackle the indigenous Asian security problems.

### ASEAN

Finally, there is an ASEAN – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – a sub-regional political and economic organization created in 1967, which includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei. The main goals of this organization are the development of economic, social, cultural, and other types of cooperation between the member countries of the Association, the establishment of peace and stability in Southeast Asia (See Map 30).

This organization played an important role in the social and economic development of the Southeast Asian countries, contributed to the growth of their political influence in the region, however, regional cooperation in the field of defence and security within the framework of ASEAN has not yet been activated. Today, it can be assumed that ASEAN can evolve into a “security community” in the sense that none of its members seriously consider using force against another member to resolve contentious issues [Friedrichs, 2012]. But it will not become a “defensive community” because there is no common cultural, ideological, and historical experience. More importantly, there is no threat common to all members. The successes achieved by ASEAN – relative peace, stability, and security – still do not form the basis for broader military cooperation, but rather allow each state to develop on its own way.

### Conclusions

Today Asian countries are more willing to consult and cooperate with each other on the integration and creating of the zone of co-prosperity issues, nevertheless in Asia, there is hardly a single state which has no territorial dispute within its neighbourhood. From the Middle East, Caspian and Central Asia, Indian sub-continent, mainland Indo – China or Archipelago SEA, Tibet, South China Sea and the Far East, many countries are suffering numerous green and blue border disputes [Mapbox, 2021], (See Map 29).

An equally important factor is the presence in Asia of strong global geopolitical players vying for spheres of influence in the region. Thus, China is fully involved in the integration processes in Asia [Cheng, 2014]. Every year, the Chinese Premier visits one of the ASEAN member-states to meet with the leaders of the ASEAN countries, proposing steps to strengthen Chinese cooperation with the member countries [Bisley, 2015]. As China's interest rate rises in the region, Beijing has launched its own initiatives, including the “Belt and Road” and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank [Smotrytska, 2021]. This helped to deepen China's interaction with its neighbours and, of course, increased its influence.
<figure><img src="image_38.png" /><figcaption>Map 29.: Green and Blue border disputes in Asia</figcaption></figure>

Source: IFIMES (MS), 2021

Source: Created by Author (IFIMES, ms), 2021.

But since the regional architecture of Southeast Asia is open, Chinese influence is not the only one. The United States remains [Goh, 2008] an important player in supporting regional security and stability while strengthening its economic engagement through proposals such as the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act [CRS, 2019] and the BUILD Act [Runde, 2018].

As noted by politicians in Asia (the PRC, Xi Jinping): “The Pacific Ocean is large enough to accommodate both the United States and China” [Ministry of ...2013]. However, this raises the question: Is the Pacific Ocean large enough for the United States and China to coexist peacefully with overlapping circles of friends and partners, or is it large enough to be divided into rival spheres of influence between the two powers?

Answering this question one should consider, that both countries cannot fully replace each other in the region: The US Seventh Fleet has maintained regional security in Southeast Asia since World War II, ensuring the security and openness of maritime communications that fuelled trade and spurred economic growth across the region. [Acharya et al., 2016]. Despite its growing military power, the PRC will not be able to assume the United States' security role. Unlike the Americans, Beijing has maritime and territorial disputes in the South China Sea with several countries in the region, which will always view China's naval presence as an attempt to enforce territorial claims.

Another obstacle that would prevent China from assuming a US security role is the fact that many Southeast Asian countries have Chinese minorities, whose relations with the non-Chinese majority are often delicate [Department of ...,2015]. These countries are extremely sensitive to any
hint that China is unduly influencing their ethnic Chinese populations, especially when one considers
the history of China's support for communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia up until the early 1980s.
And this circumstance will also restrain China's role here in the foreseeable future.

At the same time, it is very difficult, almost impossible for the United States to replace China as the world's main supplier – just as it is unthinkable to do without the Chinese market [Ramirez, 2020], which is the third largest importer of American goods after Canada and Mexico. But the PRC cannot oust the US economy in Asia either. The global financial system is heavily dependent on American financial institutions, and the yuan will not replace the dollar as the world's reserve currency anytime soon. Although other Asian countries export more to China than to the United States, US transnational corporations continue to be the most important source of foreign investment in many countries in the Asia – Pacific region. Major Chinese companies are already beginning to invest overseas, but it will take many years before they have the same scale and complexity as those based in America that will connect global value chains, connect Asia to the global economy, and create millions of jobs.

For the same reasons, the APR countries today do not want to choose between centres of power,
willing to develop good relations with all partners and at the same time ensure their security. In this
regard, the question of the creation of its own comprehensive pan-Asian multilateral mechanism,
with the help of which countries will be able to take an active part in the formation of a new world
order and take a worthy place in it, is becoming more and more urgent (See Map 30).

<figure><img src="image_39.png" /><figcaption>Map 30: International organization in Asia</figcaption></figure>

Source: Created by Author (IFIMES, ms), 2021.
The foundation on which Asia – Pacific countries now support regional cooperation initiatives, such as the various Indo – Pacific concepts proposed by Japan [Ministry of ..., 2021], the United States and others [Haruko, 2020], as well as China's “Belt and Road Initiative” [Smotrytska, 2021], is built on a policy of peaceful coexistence and containment of the emergence of one strongest leader in the region (many Asian countries believe that promoting the “Belt and Road” is a constructive way to control China's growing influence in the region [Smotrytska, 2020]). Thus, today the behaviour of the countries of the APR region shows that the development of new regional mechanisms does not mean abandoning the existing multilateral structures. These hard-won agreements and institutions continue to provide all countries, especially small ones, a framework to work together and advance collective interests.

Nevertheless, today even ASEAN Asians (as the most multilateralized Asians) have no suitable standing organization to tackle and solve their security issues. This makes one wonder whether it is possible that the Western century will be replaced by an Asian or Asia – Pacific century? The question also remains, will one of the Asian countries lead the new “Asian century”?

It should be noted that this is not the first time in history that we see emerging markets doing well for a good number of years before a crisis stops their development. Is this time different, or will their growth suddenly stop because of an economic crisis? More importantly, the growth model that takes an economy from low income to middle-income status is different from the one that is required to take it to the next level.

It is important to understand that early growth comes from basic economic reforms, as in China after Deng Xiaoping [Kobayashi et al, 1999]. But to go beyond that, to reach levels of development of the richest economies, a major institutional change is required. This change involves a substantial integration of the Asian region or a transformation of the political and societal institutions of its countries. This second step is harder, and we have seen economies in the past stagnating when they reach this level (i.e., the former Soviet Union, which managed to perform well until it reached a level of development that required that second step of institutional change).

Besides the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), there have been other emerging features of security cooperation in Asia that are not necessarily based on geographical groupings but on security concerns and capability [Pejsova, 2014]. These multidimensional developments indicate that security cooperation in Asia is far more complex today than a traditional bi-multi nexus model. The “double-track” approach is now entering into the new phase especially in the wake of various forms of multilateral security mechanisms that have been revealing in recent years in Asia – Pacific.

An analysis of the emerging alignment of forces within the international community allows us to conclude that the very formulation of the question of the Asian century suffers from unacceptable simplification and schematization that does not consider new world realities and the geopolitical structure of the region, that cannot be explained in traditional concepts and categories. And the reality is that the East has already become the supporting structure of the world community, equal in size to the West, and its role in the coming century will increase. Moreover, in the East itself, several centres are ripening (China, Japan, India, and a numerically growing group of smaller, but very dynamic new industrial countries), capable of competing on an equal footing both with each other and with the West, if not as a whole, then with its leading powers. But to consolidate the total power of Asian countries the largest continent must consider the creation of its own comprehensive pan-Asian multilateral mechanism. Economic and demographic parts of Asia must be accorded by the new pan-continental setting. On the very institution setup, Asia can closely revisit the well-envisioned SAARC and ambitiously empowered ASEAN fora. By examining these two regional bodies, Asia will be able to find and calibrate the appropriate balance between widening and deepening of the security mandate of such future multilateral organization.
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# Protection de l'enfance et enfants prives de famille en Algerie

ABLA ROUAG-DJENIDI

PROFESSEUR DE PSYCHOLOGIE
UNIVERSITE DE CONSTANTINE. ALGERIE

**Abstract:** The establishment of an efficace child protection system requires social policies to mobilize the resources of the populations to make them agents of change of their own situation. Social work is the most important part of all protection systems. It constitutes the responses provided in terms of services, programs and human resources that would help to attenuate risk situations, vulnerability factors and their negative impact on children and their families. The aim of this study, using documents devoted to the responses provided to childhood deprived of family in Algeria, is to summarize the mechanisms and child protection devices, the efficacy of these responses, the main difficulties encountered, and propositions concerning social work.

**Key words:** child protection, childhood deprived of family, social work, mechanisms, devices, Algeria.

**Résumé :** La mise en place d'un système efficace de protection de l'enfance nécessite des politiques sociales permettant de mobiliser les ressources des populations pour en faire les acteurs du changement de leur propre situation. Le travail social est l'élément le plus important de tous les systèmes de protection. Il constitue les réponses apportées en termes de services, programmes, ressources humaines et autres qui permettraient d'atténuer les situations à risque, les facteurs de vulnérabilité et leurs incidences négatives sur l'enfant et sur leurs familles. Il s'agit pour nous de faire ici, à partir de documents consacrés aux réponses apportées à l'enfance privée de famille, de faire une synthèse des mécanismes et dispositifs de protection, de l'efficacité de ces réponses, des principales difficultés rencontrées et des propositions en matière de travail social.

**Mots clé :** protection de l'enfance, enfance privée de famille, travail social, mécanismes, dispositifs, Algérie.

## INTRODUCTION

La protection de l'enfance comprise comme l'ensemble des mesures de prévention et de lutte contre la violence, l'exploitation et les mauvais traitements infligés aux enfants, y compris l'exploitation sexuelle, le travail et les pratiques préjudiciables, repose sur un ensemble de lois, de mécanismes, de financements et d'organismes constituant la réponse des gouvernements aux situations d'abus et de mauvais traitements envers les enfants.

Fondamentalement, la protection de l'enfance est garantie dans le monde par la Convention Relative aux Droits des Enfants, ainsi que par d'autres textes tels la Déclaration du millénaire (2000) qui souligne l'importance de protéger les groupes vulnérables, et surtout les enfants, à travers la ratification et la mise en œuvre intégrale de la Conventions relative aux droits de l'enfant. La Déclaration pour un monde digne des enfants<fnref n="1" /> à travers ses objectifs : (1) Donner la priorité aux enfants, (2) N'oublier aucun enfant, (3) Protéger les enfants contre les sévices et l'exploitation, (4) Protéger les enfants contre la guerre est également un instrument important.

La Convention Relative aux Droits des Enfants insiste en son article 7 sur le droit à l'enregistrement de la naissance, en son article 8 sur la préservation de l'identité, de la nationalité et des relations familiales, tandis que les articles 9, 10 et 20 garantissent le droit de ne pas être séparé des parents et à une protection spéciale pour l'enfant privé de milieu familial.

La mise en place d'un système efficace de protection de l'enfance nécessite des politiques sociales permettant de mobiliser les ressources des populations pour en faire les acteurs du changement de leur propre situation. Le travail social est l'élément le plus important de tous les systèmes de protection.

<footnote n="1">¹ La Déclaration pour un monde digne des enfants, 2002</footnote>
Un système de protection de l'enfance efficace constitue les réponses apportées en termes de services, programmes, ressources humaines et autres qui permettraient d'atténuer les situations à risque, les facteurs de vulnérabilité et leurs incidences négatives sur l'enfant et sur leurs familles. Les droits des personnes et la justice sociale en sont les principes fondamentaux.

En Algérie, de grands efforts ont été consentis par les pouvoirs publics pour mettre en adéquation sa législation avec la Convention Relative aux Droits des Enfants et s'est dotée d'un cadre juridique cohérent avec la CIDE en matière de droits de l'enfance, et qui accorde à l'enfant une place particulière. Ces efforts se sont traduits au plan législatif par la promulgation de plusieurs textes en faveur de l'enfant notamment en matière de nationalité, d'état civil, de droit de la famille et de la justice pour mineurs.

Ainsi, le Code de l'état civil, le Code de la nationalité, la Loi relative aux relations de travail protègent l'enfant, et le Code de procédure civile et administrative, le Code de la famille révisé préservent l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant en matière de droit de garde, de gestion des biens de l'enfant, de tutelle et de droit à l'émancipation<fnref n="2" />. Concernant les enfants victimes, le code pénal prévoit de 1 à 5 ans de prison pour toute personne qui exerce une maltraitance contre un enfant et des peines 2 fois plus lourdes lorsque les actes de violence sont perpétrés contre un enfant que contre un adulte, notamment les violences sexuelles et les viols.

En ce qui concerne les enfants privés de famille, chaque année, entre 3000 à 3200 enfants sont abandonnés par leurs parents, et généralement, immédiatement après leur naissance. L'État prend en charge ces enfants, soit en les plaçant en institution : pouponnières puis FEA (Foyers pour Enfants Assistés) après l'âge de 6 ans, soit en les plaçant en famille (dans le cadre de la kafala ou de la garde payante).

Malgré cet arsenal juridique important et tous les dispositifs mis en place par l'Algérie pour apporter la meilleure prise en charge possible à l'enfance privée de famille, les réponses apportées à cette catégorie d'enfants semblent relativement inefficaces, et les enfants privés de familles iront souvent grossir la population des enfants en situation de rue ou des enfants en conflit avec la loi.

Il s'agit pour nous dans la présente étude, à partir de documents divers (textes de loi, rapports...) consacrés aux réponses apportées à l'enfance privée de famille, de faire une synthèse des mécanismes et dispositifs de protection de l'enfance, mais surtout d'analyser l'efficacité de ces réponses basées sur le travail social, les principales difficultés et limites rencontrées dans la protection des enfants privés de famille.

# I - LA JURIDICTION :

Au plan juridique, la prise en charge des enfants privés de famille était régie par le code de la santé de 1976, abrogé en 1985. Ce code de la santé reste toutefois la source de référence réglementaire en matière d'enfance abandonnée à cause du vide juridique à ce sujet.

Le code de la famille, promulgué en 1984 ne traite pas de l'abandon, mais réglemente essentiellement le recueil légal ou Kafala (articles 116 à 123 du code de la famille)<fnref n="3" />. La « kafala » est le dispositif le plus important pour la protection de l'enfance, introduit en 1976 et révisé en 1984 puis en 1992, (Décret exécutif n° 92-24 du 13 janvier 1992) avec l'ordonnance portant changement de nom qui autorise la concordance entre le nom du « kafil »<fnref n="4" /> et celui du « mekfoul »<fnref n="5" />. La kafala est concrétisée par un contrat fait devant le juge ou le notaire. Les parents kafils doivent s'engager à élever et entretenir l'enfant (article 116 du code de la famille)<fnref n="6" />

<footnote n="2">² Code de la Famille, Code de la Nationalité, Code de l'État Civil, mise à jour 2005, Berti Edition, Alger, 2009/2010.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Le parent adoptif</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ L'enfant adopté</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Code de la Famille, Code de la Nationalité, Code de l'État Civil, mise à jour 2005, Berti Edition, Alger, 2009/2010.</footnote>
## II - LES DISPOSITIFS DE PROTECTION DE L'ENFANCE PRIVEE DE FAMILLE

Il existe 2 types de réponses à l'enfance privée de famille: le placement en institution et le placement en famille dans le cadre de la kafala

### 1 – Le placement en institution

Chaque année, environ 3000 à 3200 enfants sont abandonnés par leurs parents, et dans la plupart des cas, immédiatement après leur naissance. L'État a le devoir d'assurer leur prise en charge : la première réponse est le placement en institution, FEA ou Foyers pour Enfants Assistés. Le fonctionnement des FEA est prévu par le Décret 80-83 du 15 mars 1980 portant création, organisation et fonctionnement des F.E.A. Cependant ce décret ne définit pas de façon exhaustive la vocation des foyers pour enfance assistée.

#### 1.1. - Nombre et répartition des FEA:

Les documents étudiés signalent tous l'imprécision et le manque de fiabilité des chiffres en ce qui concerne les enfants privés de famille placés en institutions, la confusion étant souvent faite entre effectifs réels et capacités d'accueil théoriques des foyers, mais également la confusion entre enfants privés de familles et ensemble des pensionnaires des centres qui sont souvent des adultes (handicapés ou valides).

Il existe actuellement 35 foyers étatiques répartis dans les grandes villes de 26 wilayas auxquels s'ajoutent 2 pouponnières gérées par des associations (Hadjout et AEFAB à Palm Beach), et le village d'enfants SOS de Draria<fnref n="7" /> prenant en charge les enfants de 0 à 27 ans. Ces 3 derniers n'étant pas recensés au MSN, les enfants pris en charge ne seraient pas comptabilisés dans les statistiques. Il existe également 4 FAO (foyers d'accueil des orphelins).

Les 35 FEA étatiques regroupent 2748 places au total :

- les foyers pour enfants assistés âgés de 0 à 6 ans, dits Pouponnières (22 sur le territoire national),

- les foyers pour enfants assistés âgés de 7 à 19 ans, au nombre de 13 : 8 pour garçons, 4 pour filles et 1 mixte, regroupant 1200 places.

Les 35 FEA ont une grande capacité d'accueil mais avec un taux d'occupation de moins de 70%, seule une minorité d'enfants reste en institution (1792 enfants pris en charge pour un effectif théorique de près de 2 800 places). Cet état de fait montre que la kafala et le placement d'enfants en familles d'accueil sont des solutions privilégiées, qu'il faut encourager.

Les 35 FEA ont au total des personnels au nombre de 2260.

#### 1.2. - Processus d'admission et placement en pouponnière:

Les enfants sont placés en pouponnières dans les cas d'abandon ou de problèmes de garde parentale :

- Par voie administrative sur présentation du procès-verbal établi par le service social de la maternité (Ce sont les assistantes sociales des maternités des services hospitaliers qui réfèrent les cas aux juges, lesquels statuent sur le placement en institution).

- Par réquisition de la police pour les cas d'enfants trouvés ou présentés par des tiers.

- À la suite de la présentation de l'enfant par la mère au service de tutelle.

- Par ordonnance judiciaire.

L'enfant est placé en pouponnière de manière temporaire, en attendant son adoption en kafala ou son placement en famille d'accueil. Beaucoup d'enfants sont pris en adoption, et de manière générale, restent en pouponnière les enfants en garde judiciaire (enfants dont les parents sont déchus

<footnote n="7">⁷ Petite ville de la région d'Alger</footnote>
de la garde parentale, définitivement ou temporairement, ou enfants en danger moral) et les enfants
en situation de handicap.

1.3. - Les FEA de 7 à 19 ans :

Notons d'abord que toutes les études montrent que dans les FEA, les enfants provenant de pouponnières sont peu nombreux ; ce sont essentiellement les enfants handicapés ou en garde judiciaire, (qui n'ont pas été pris en kafala) qui arrivent après l'âge de 6 ans aux FEA.

En effet, 20 à 30% des pensionnaires des FEA sont des handicapés (1 sur 4 selon l'étude de Mimouni)<fnref n="8" />, auxquels les FEA ne peuvent pas apporter une aide spécifique.

Les 2/3 des résidents sont des enfants en garde judiciaire qui ne peuvent pas sortir de l'institution tant que le juge ne donne pas la main levée. Leur présence en FEA se justifie par les textes régissant la mission de ces institutions qui est « la prise en charge de tout enfant privé de famille définitivement ou temporairement ».

Les FEA abritent également un nombre important d'adultes (valides et handicapés) dont l'émancipation et l'intégration sociale n'ont pas abouti, ce qui représente 60% de l'effectif des pensionnaires, soit 3 pensionnaires sur 5. Ceci révèle la carence éducationnelle d'une prise en charge qui n'a pas amené les enfants à l'autonomie. Ces derniers demeurent dans le seul lieu qui les sécurise, car ils ont peur de se mêler à la société.<fnref n="9" />

2 – Reprise par la famille d'origine :

Les restitutions (reprises par la mère célibataire ou les parents) seraient de 16,3% de l'ensemble des admissions (enfants en dépôt temporaire et enfants abandonnés) durant la dernière décennie.

La reprise par la famille d'origine serait en progression par rapport aux décennies précédentes, mais rencontre de nombreux obstacles : difficultés financières des familles, résistance de l'environnement à la reprise des enfants par les mères célibataires, précarité de la situation des mères célibataires dont 46% se prostituerait régulièrement ou occasionnellement selon l'étude du CENEAP.<fnref n="10" />

Malgré ces difficultés, 38% des mères célibataires vivraient avec leur enfant en 2002 et 26% leur rendraient visite<fnref n="11" />. Selon la même étude, 3 femmes sur 5 seraient en mesure de garder leur enfant. Afin d'encourager la mère célibataire en difficulté qui émet le vœu de garder son enfant et pour faire face aux frais occasionnés par son entretien, une mesure d'élargissement de l'octroi de l'aide au secours à l'enfance aux mères célibataires a été adoptée depuis 2005. Grâce à une campagne de sensibilisation menée aux niveaux national et local, par le Ministère en charge de la solidarité et ses démembrements (Direction de l'Action Sociale de Wilaya) en vue de lutter contre l'abandon des enfants nés hors mariage par la mère biologique, le nombre des enfants récupérés par les jeunes mères célibataires ne cesse de connaître une augmentation progressive pour passer de 478 enfants en 2005 à 564 enfants en 2007¹².

3 – Placement en familles d'accueil: (garde payante)

C'est une garde payante, temporaire, en attendant le placement définitif pour enfants (privés de famille, temporairement ou définitivement)

C'est un dispositif qui a toujours existé mais qui a perdu de son importance depuis la
confirmation de la kafala par le code de la famille en 1984. Ce dispositif est peu décrit, l'étude du

<footnote n="8">⁸ MOUTASSEM MIMOUNI B, Naissances et abandons en Algérie, éd Khartala, 2008.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ CENEAP, *Les enfants abandonnés pour naissance hors mariage et mères célibataires*, Alger, 2002.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ CENEAP, Op cit.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ CENEAP, Op cit.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Rapport Comité des Droits de l'Enfance, 2009 ; République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire</footnote>
CNES<fnref n="13" /> nous le montre comme un dispositif peu utilisé et en situation d'échec. En effet, selon le CNES, pour un nombre d'enfants placés en famille et qui avoisine les 11.000, il est recensé, à fin 2000, plus de 50 % d'échecs :

- en raison du fait que le placement des enfants s'effectue souvent au sein de familles à faible revenu ;

- et du fait que la pension allouée, par mois et par enfant, aux nourrices pour l'entretien des enfants est insuffisante, (bien que revalorisée récemment à 1300 DA ou 1600 DA en cas d'enfant handicapé)

- et que de surcroît, elle est payée de manière irrégulière.

### 4 – Placement en kafala :

La kafala est l'un des moyens essentiels de désinstitutionalisation de la prise en charge des enfants privés de famille. Il convient de noter que la Kafala est l'objectif principal de la politique menée en direction de l'enfance privée de famille à titre définitif. Les Établissements d'accueil ou pouponnières ne sont considérés que comme une étape transitoire entre la maternité et la famille d'accueil. Le placement en milieu familial est encouragé par les autorités<fnref n="14" />.

<table><caption>Tableau 1- Statistiques sur les mesures de prises en charge des enfants privés de famille : Bilan 2005/2008</caption><thead><tr><th>Rubriques</th><th>2005</th><th>2006</th><th>2007</th><th>2008</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Nombre de kafala locale</td><td>1.608</td><td>1.972</td><td>1.739</td><td>1733</td></tr><tr><td>Nombre de kafala à l'étranger</td><td>289</td><td>144</td><td>192</td><td>137</td></tr><tr><td>Nombre d'enfants repris par la mère biologique</td><td>478</td><td>512</td><td>564</td><td>551</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source : RADP (2010) Rapport CDE<fnref n="15" />

Le placement en kafala est régi par les articles 116 à 123 du code de la famille.

Les familles candidates à la kafala se présentent au service social, auprès de l'assistante sociale et du psychologue pour la prise de contact et la formulation de la demande. Cette rencontre préliminaire permet de dresser un profil de la famille, qui est invitée à fournir un dossier. Puis, un entretien avec le psychologue permet de déterminer si :

- La famille manifeste un réel désir d'enfant.

- Le projet est mûr.

- Les deux conjoints adhèrent à ce projet ainsi que les autres membres de la famille.

Puis la demande de kafala est présentée à la commission de placements, pour avis.

Les parents sont déclarés aptes à prendre un enfant en kafala après une enquête sociale réalisée par les assistantes sociales de la Direction de l'Action Sociale.

La kafala est concrétisée par un contrat fait devant le juge ou le notaire, selon l'article 116 du code de la famille<fnref n="16" /> où les parents kafils s'engagent à élever et entretenir l'enfant. Ce dispositif pose toutefois la question de ses limites en cas de décès du kafil, (la garde du mekfoul n'étant pas assurée par la mère comme c'est le cas pour les enfants légitimes, mais aux héritiers du kafil), ou en cas de divorce où la garde est donné au kafil: une discrimination entre enfants légitimes et enfants

<footnote n="13">¹³ CNES Rapport national sur le développement humain, Algérie 2008. Conseil Économique et Social, en coopération avec PNUD (2009)</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ UNICEF, Analyse de la situation « Enfants et femmes en Algérie », version préliminaire, 2010</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ RADP (2010) 2ème Rapport national sur les Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement. Rapport établi par le gouvernement algérien</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Code de la Famille, Code de la Nationalité, Code de l'État Civil, mise à jour 2005, Berti Edition, Alger, 2009/2010.</footnote>
illégitimes apparaît au niveau de ces procédures juridiques qui ne reconnaissent pas aux deux
catégories d'enfants les mêmes droits.

Les documents consultés insistent sur l'aspect curatif des réponses apportées à l'enfance privée de famille, privilégié par rapport à l'aspect préventif (prévention des grossesses hors mariage, renforcement des capacités des familles d'origine, ...)

III – LES PRATIQUES EXISTANTES

1 – Les intervenants :

Le personnel impliqué dans la prise en charge de l'enfant en pouponnière est constitué par les éducateurs, les psychologues, les médecins, les infirmiers, les nourrices/berceuses, les veilleuses de nuit.

Les nourrices, berceuses, veilleuses de nuit constituant 1/3 du personnel n'ont pas de qualifications et ont un statut précaire au sein des pouponnières (vacataires, emploi jeunes, filet social, CDD...). Toutefois, malgré l'absence de qualification et de formation initiale, ces nourrices, formées sur le tas, auraient développé des compétences certaines de prise en charge des enfants.

Les psychologues interviennent directement auprès des enfants, ou auprès des nourrices et berceuses pour conseils et soutien.

Le rôle des médecins et infirmiers est le suivi de la santé des enfants.

Concernant la formation des intervenants, nous devons noter que :

- les universitaires (médecins, psychologues) et personnels diplômés (infirmiers, éducateurs (éducatrices)... ) n'ont pas de formation spécifique à la petite enfance.

- Les berceuses/nourrices n'ont pas de formation, ni de qualification.

- Tous les corps confondus ne bénéficient pas de formation continue.

2 – Les pratiques

- En milieu institutionnel, le modèle de prise en charge reste axé sur la satisfaction des besoins primaires et obéit aux principes de l'assistanat. L'appellation même des institutions en charge d'enfants privés de famille reste « Foyers pour Enfants Assistés ».

- Dans les pouponnières, le rôle du personnel est le maternage et la stimulation des enfants.

- La baisse spectaculaire du taux de mortalité dans les pouponnières (55% en 1976 à 4,5% en 2006) ne serait pas due seulement au changement de la prise en charge, mais serait beaucoup plus la conséquence du placement important et rapide des enfants en kafala.

- Dans les FEA, l'organisation de la vie quotidienne s'articule autour de l'hébergement en dortoirs collectifs, de l'absence d'espaces personnels, de la restauration dans des réfectoires collectifs, donc d'une absence de sphère privée et d'une organisation qui ne rappelle pas la sphère familiale. Les documents étudiés mettent également l'accent sur une carence en activités de loisirs qui stimulent le développement des enfants.

- La scolarisation des enfants qui sont encore dans le circuit scolaire ou dans la formation professionnelle est peu importante: les documents sur les FEA mentionnent très peu cette question de la scolarisation des enfants en âge d'être scolarisés, alors que le droit à l'éducation est fondamental, particulièrement dans le cas de populations vulnérables.

3 – Les difficultés et limites de la prise en charge :

Les différentes analyses des dispositifs de prise en charge de l'enfance privée de famille mettent l'accent sur leurs insuffisances et leur inadéquation aux besoins actuels de la société.
### 3.1. - La formation des acteurs impliqués :

- Les éducateurs ne sont pas formés de manière spécifique à la prise en charge des enfants privés de familles et ne semblent pas motivés par ce rôle, selon l'étude de Mimouni<fnref n="17" />.

- Les berceuses ou nourrices ne sont pas diplômées, ni qualifiées pour la plupart. Elles sont recrutées comme faisant fonction. Certaines auraient reçu des formations d'ONG ou d'associations, mais ces formations, qualifiantes mais non diplômantes ne sont pas reconnues par le MSN et ne leur permettent pas d'accéder à un statut stable, ce qui dévalorise ce métier.

- Les personnes faisant fonction ont souvent occupé des postes de travailleurs sociaux en FEA et leur manque de compétence a également contribué à la dévalorisation de ces métiers.

- Les personnels qualifiés et diplômés n'ont pas une formation spécialisée à la petite enfance.

- Il n'y a pas de formation continue des personnels des FEA

### 3.2. - L'encadrement :

- Nous constatons d'abord un faible niveau d'encadrement des structures, où la proportion des personnels spécialisés ne représente que 35% des effectifs employés.

- En pouponnière, les éducateurs (éducatrices) polyvalents ou spécialisés sont en nombre insuffisant et le taux d'encadrement est médiocre : 8 à 9 enfants par éducatrice.

- au sein des FEA (pour les enfants de plus de six ans) chaque éducatrice s'occupe de quinze à vingt-cinq pensionnaires.

- La rémunération du personnel qualifié est nettement insuffisante d'autant qu'une partie du personnel pédagogique et d'encadrement est payé sur le budget du filet social et de l'emploi des jeunes ;

### 3.3. - La préparation des enfants :

- La préparation des enfants des pouponnières à la séparation avec l'institution pour aller vers le placement en famille d'accueil n'est pas faite de façon appropriée.

- De même, il n'y a pas de préparation des enfants de FEA à l'insertion familiale et sociale, ni pour les enfants valides, ni pour les handicapés. D'où le nombre important d'adultes qui restent en institution. Les enfants n'ont pas de projet de vie susceptibles de permettre une insertion sociale réussie.

- Les foyers pour enfants privés de famille sont très peu ouverts sur l'environnement extérieur. Il n'y a pas de sorties organisées pour les enfants.

- Le lien familial n'est pas pris en compte dans les décisions du lieu d'affectation en pouponnière ou en FEA. Le contact avec les parents ou autres personnes de référence n'obéit pas à une organisation précise mais se fait au gré des parents visiteurs.

### 3.4. - La qualité de vie en structure d'accueil des enfants privés de famille :

- L'organisation dans les structures d'accueil ne permet pas une répartition adéquate des enfants selon l'âge (les enfants de 6 ans sont installés avec enfants de 18 ans), ni selon les besoins (enfants valides et enfants à besoins spécifiques...)

- La prise en charge spécifique d'adolescents pour la plupart en difficultés (toxicomanie, problèmes affectifs, maltraitance) est insuffisante.

- Les structures d'hébergement ne sont pas adaptées aux missions des foyers et ne permettent pas une prise en charge de qualité : l'enfant n'a pas un territoire propre à lui, les espaces de vie ne rappelant pas l'espace de la famille ...

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ MOUTASSEM MIMOUNI B, *Naissances et abandons en Algérie*, éd Khartala, 2008.</footnote>
- Il n'y a pas de suivi et de soutien à la scolarité des enfants qui sont encore dans le circuit scolaire, d'où un très faible taux de réussite scolaire.

### 3.5. - Les mécanismes de suivi

Les mécanismes de suivi et de contrôle sont quasi inexistants, concernant tous les dispositifs de prise en charge de l'enfance privée de famille.

**A – Concernant le placement en foyer d'accueil :**

- Il n'y a pas de mécanismes de contrôle du fonctionnement des foyers, ni de critères qualité à respecter.

- Aucune politique particulière n'est mise en place pour préparer la sortie de l'enfant des centres.

- Une partie de la population des enfants en situation de rue, est constituée par les enfants fuyant les foyers et les familles d'accueil (enquête du CENEAP sur le phénomène des enfants de la rue). Ceci montre l'absence de mécanismes de contrôle et de suivi des foyers mais aussi des familles kafilates.

**B – Concernant le placement dans les familles :**

- La garde temporaire en famille d'accueil pose le problème du suivi des enfants pour lequel aucun dispositif réglementaire n'est mis en place. En découlent des perturbations graves lors du placement définitif car l'enfant et la famille ne sont pas suffisamment accompagnés pendant le placement et pendant la transition.

- Aucun suivi ni contrôle spécifique par les services du Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale n'est assuré auprès des parents kafils, il n'y a pas de soutien ni d'accompagnement des familles. Certaines pouponnières assurent de façon informelle l'accueil et le conseil des parents, mais officiellement rien n'est prévu.

Des problèmes particuliers se posent par rapport à la kafala :

- Les rejets ou restitutions d'enfants sont assez fréquents en raison de la révocabilité de l'acte de kafala (prévue par l'article 125 du code de la famille)<fnref n="18" />.

- La procédure, révèle, dans les faits, des carences dans l'opération de sélection, de préparation et de suivi. L'acte juridique de Kafala serait facultatif et ne serait pas toujours fait.

Une grande problématique reste celle du placement à long terme des enfants handicapés.

## IV – EFFICACITÉ DE LA PRISE EN CHARGE ET DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL EN MATIÈRE D'ENFANCE PRIVÉE DE FAMILLE

Les pratiques en matière de prise en charge des enfants privés de famille s'appuient essentiellement sur l'assistanat et l'institutionnalisation qui ne préparent pas à l'autonomisation. En effet, l'intervention institutionnelle exprime une politique centrée sur la prise en charge totale des individus, et manifeste une position paternaliste qui ne favorise pas la mobilisation des ressources des individus en vue du changement de leur situation.

Or, comme le souligne Mimouni<fnref n="19" />, Il ne s'agit pas d'abriter mais d'éduquer, il ne s'agit pas non plus de garder l'enfant dans ces institutions, mais de le préparer à partir ailleurs dans une famille, l'institution n'est pas « sa maison », mais doit être considérée comme un 'internat temporaire' qui ne constitue en aucun cas un foyer ! L'entrée d'un enfant dans le FEA doit entraîner

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Code de la Famille, Code de la Nationalité, Code de l'État Civil, mise à jour 2005, Berti Edition, 2009/2010, Alger</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ MOUTASSEM MIMOUNI B. *Les foyers pour enfants assistés: État des lieux et perspectives*, in *Insaniyat*, n°41, pp 67-81, Oran, 2008.</footnote>
automatiquement l'élaboration d'un projet pour lui quelles que soient ses origines et quelle que soit
la durée de séjour prévue.

Il s'agit donc de passer de pratiques d'assistanat à un accompagnement social où la personne
et les groupes seraient acteurs de leur changement.

Il s'agit également de désinstitutionnaliser en favorisant le travail social de proximité : travail avec les familles, avec les enfants...

Le placement hors du foyer familial doit seulement être envisagé à titre transitoire et lorsque
ni la famille ni l'entourage familier de l'enfant ne sont en mesure de lui offrir une prise en charge
adéquate lui assurant un environnement marqué par la sécurité et des relations émotionnelles stables
et qui lui offrirait des perspectives d'avenir certaines.

Une nouvelle vision de la protection des enfants, le soutien aux familles, le placement d'enfants en famille d'accueil ou Kafala aura certainement comme conséquence de réduire le nombre d'enfants qui seront placés dans les institutions.

Actuellement, l'approche en matière de protection de l'enfance privée de famille est plutôt curative, la prévention occupant une place minime.

- Il faudrait donc favoriser la prévention primaire pour réduire les risques (grossesses hors mariage, abandons d'enfants...).

- Mais aussi développer la prévention secondaire en améliorant l'accès aux droits et aux services sociaux.

V-LES PROPOSITIONS

Parmi les recommandations faites dans les documents étudiés, certaines sont récurrentes et
nous paraissent essentielles. Il s'agit en particulier de :

1 – Mettre en place de nouvelles pratiques et renforcer des pratiques existantes

- Il s'agit ici de diversifier les réponses et de privilégier les réponses non institutionnelles. Des solutions alternatives au placement prolongé en institution doivent être instaurées : le placement en institution ne doit être envisagé que comme réponse temporaire et non pas définitive ou durable.

- Restructuration des foyers existants : la séparation des enfants de moins de 3 ans des enfants plus âgés est recommandée, ainsi que d'éviter les structures à grandes capacités, vecteur de dépersonnalisation ; l'adaptation des espaces aux besoins des enfants (espaces privés, intimes/espaces communautaires), et le fait de privilégier une organisation de vie par petits groupes dans des espaces rappelant les espaces familiaux (chaque espace regroupant un nombre limité d'enfants autour de chambres, d'un séjour et d'une cuisine) seraient des points positifs.

- Créer des structures spécialisées pour enfants privés de famille et handicapés qui représentent environ 0,5% des enfants abandonnés. (CENEAP)

- Ouvrir les institutions sur l'environnement (pour favoriser le développement de solutions d'intégration). Il faut favoriser l'insertion des enfants dans les écoles (en créant des classes spéciales pour ceux dont le niveau scolaire est très bas), partager des infrastructures avec la population de la région : jardin public, terrain de sport, piscine... Encourager l'éducation préscolaire dans les écoles publiques, mosquées...

- veiller à ce que la qualité de vie des enfants et leurs loisirs favorisent le développement et l'éducation des enfants : les enfants doivent pouvoir faire leurs devoirs scolaires, faire du sport, avoir accès à l'information....

- privilégier le travail social de proximité : pour assurer un suivi social et éducatif régulier des enfants placés en kafala, en famille d'accueil, ou repris par les familles d'origine et éviter ainsi les rejets, restitutions d'enfants et les fugues.
- Renforcer le placement en familles d'accueil (garde payante) et assurer le suivi des enfants en garde payante.

## 2 – Renforcement des capacités des professionnels :

Les services sociaux ont besoin de personnes qualifiées et engagées tant sur le plan professionnel que social et qui mettent leur expertise et leur humanité au service des enfants. Il est indispensable de disposer des ressources humaines nécessaires pour permettre aux enfants de grandir dans un environnement favorable à leur développement et pouvoir soutenir efficacement les familles. Renforcer les capacités des professionnels, c'est garantir la qualification des travailleurs sociaux. Le renforcement des capacités des professionnels passe par :

- La réhabilitation de la fonction des travailleurs sociaux et éducateurs par une revalorisation statutaire et salariale

- La construction de nouveaux métiers émergents, complémentaires aux métiers existants. Ces nouveaux métiers doivent émerger à partir des nouvelles pratiques à mettre en place. La proposition de Claudie DIDIER SEVET<fnref n="20" /> est la création du métier d'assistante maternelle (qui viendrait soutenir, sur un temps court, la fonction maternelle quand celle-ci est défaillante : mères célibataires, veuves, malades...) accueillant l'enfant à son propre domicile et constituant une alternative au placement en institution et attendant de trouver une solution durable. La seconde proposition de DIDIER SEVET est la création du métier d'auxiliaire de vie scolaire, affecté à un établissement scolaire et dont le rôle est l'accompagnement de la scolarisation et de la socialisation d'enfants dans le cadre de la réinsertion d'enfants en milieu ordinaire (enfants placés en kafala, en garde payante...) mais également d'enfants demeurant encore en institution et scolarisés. L'auxiliaire de vie scolaire assurera un travail de proximité au sein des écoles auprès des enfants en réinsertion sociale.

- Assurer la professionnalisation en offrant de nouvelles approches de travail, en renforçant et en développant de nouvelles compétences aux travailleurs sociaux traditionnels. Les assistants sociaux seront formés au travail avec les familles, pour assurer la guidance et l'accompagnement, chose qui n'existe pas actuellement.

- Formation obligatoire des personnels faisant fonction et/ou validation des acquis d'expérience pour ne pas continuer à dévaloriser l'image du travail social à travers ses agents.

- Assurer la formation continue des professionnels

## 3 – Renforcement des capacités des familles

- Renforcer les capacités de soutien aux familles pour assurer que l'enfant puisse grandir dans sa propre famille.

- Accompagnement des mères célibataires et renforcement de leurs capacités : aide financière, soutien psychologique, guidance... afin de leur permettre de s'occuper de leurs enfants.

- Mise en place de procédures de sélection et de suivi des familles kafilates et des familles d'accueil.

- Développer et professionnaliser les modes de placement en familles d'accueil.

## 4 – Mise en place d'un contrôle extérieur :

- Il est important que soient mis en place des indicateurs de suivi et d'évaluation pour les services de la protection des enfants privés de famille, tant au niveau des institutions que des

<footnote n="20">²⁰ DIDIER SEVET Claudie, « Professionnalisation des acteurs sociaux, renforcement des compétences, émergence de nouveaux métiers », Rapport pour l'UNICEF et le MSN, 2008.</footnote>
familles d'accueil et familles kafilates. C'est ce suivi et cette évaluation qui permettront de prévenir
les situations d'échec de la kafala et de la garde d'enfants.

5 – Renforcer les actions intersectorielles :

- Pour permettre une prise en charge intégrée, il serait utile de développer les partenariats institutionnels: Ministère de la solidarité, Santé, Justice, enseignement, formation professionnelle

POUR CONCLURE :

Malgré les efforts importants fournis en matière de prise en charge des enfants privés de
famille, et l'amélioration de leur situation, cette prise en charge demeure fondée sur les principes
de l'assistanat, de l'institutionnalisation et de l'approche curative. De nombreux problèmes
persistent, particulièrement le manque de préparation des enfants à l'autonomisation et l'intégration
sociale d'où découle l'échec de l'insertion familiale et sociale. La prise en charge des problèmes
liés à la protection des enfants privés de famille nécessite une refonte de la prise en charge de
l'enfance privée de famille, fondée sur les principes de l'accompagnement, de la
désinstitutionnalisation et de la prévention.

Les réponses en matière de protection de l'enfance, qui étaient pertinentes à un moment donné, doivent répondre à une nouvelle vision de la société et de l'individu, vision basée sur l'autonomisation, l'intégration sociale et familiale. Ces réponses, basées sur l'assistance aux personnes, consistant à répondre aux besoins par une aide financière et technique et sur l'institutionnalisation et le placement en structures d'accueil destinés à protéger les personnes vulnérables (en les sortant de la rue) ont montré leurs limites. Ce type d'aide fabrique en effet des générations de personnes assistées, dépendantes de ceux qui les aident et n'ayant pas les compétences pour trouver des solutions à leurs problèmes.

Cette vision de l'aide sociale est révolue et les modes d'intervention sont amenés à changer
à la lumière de nouveaux principes. Il s'agit maintenant, à la lumière de la transformation de la
notion d« aide », d'accompagner et non plus de donner des solutions extérieures qui ne sont pas
durables. Il s'agit de désinstitutionnaliser et de maintenir les individus dans leur contexte. Pour cela,
le travail social doit se transformer, les travailleurs sociaux doivent devenir de plus en plus des
animateurs des ressources des systèmes dans lesquels ils travaillent.

Les anciens métiers doivent s'adapter aux exigences des besoins actuels et de nouveaux métiers doivent apparaître, plus proches des populations en difficulté. C'est dans ce contexte que les métiers de la protection de l'enfance doivent évoluer vers l'accompagnement en milieu ouvert et de proximité. Cet accompagnement de proximité implique de développer de nouvelles compétences qui permettront des interventions participatives plus globales du travail social.

Bibliographie et Documents utilisés

CANTWEL Nigel, « Diagnostic du système de justice pour mineurs en Algérie » rapport pour l'UNICEF et le Ministère de la Justice, 2006.

CANTWEL Nigel, « La justice pour mineurs en Algérie : Propositions d'initiatives pour une meilleure application des normes internationales », 2007.

CENEAP, *Les enfants abandonnés pour naissance hors mariage et mères célibataires*, Alger, 2002.

CENEAP, *Le phénomène des enfants de la rue*, Rapport de recherche, non publié, 2003

CNES, « Résultats globaux du Rapport national sur le développement humain 2008. » Conseil National Économique et Social.2008.

CNES, *Rapport national sur le développement humain*, Algérie 2008. Conseil Économique et Social, en coopération avec PNUD.2009.

*Code de la Famille, Code de la Nationalité, Code de l'État Civil*, mise à jour 2005, Berti Edition, Alger 2009/2010,
DIDIER SEVET Claudie, « Professionnalisation des acteurs sociaux, renforcement des compétences, émergence de nouveaux métiers », Rapport pour l'UNICEF et le MSN. 2008.

DIDIER SEVET Claudie, « Définition des métiers à organiser et des métiers émergents en lien avec les nouvelles pratiques du travail social », Rapport pour l'UNICEF et le MSN. 2008.

MOUTASSEM MIMOUNI B, *Naissances et abandons en Algérie*, éd Khartala, 2008.

MOUTASSEM MIMOUNI B., *Les foyers pour enfants assistés: État des lieux et perspectives*. IN Insaniyat, n°41, pp 67-81, Oran, 2008.

ONU, *Déclaration pour un monde digne des enfants*, 2002

*Rapport Comité des Droits de l'Enfance*, République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2009.

*Rapport principal MICS3 Algérie, Enquête Nationale à indicateurs multiples*, 2008.

RADP, 2ème Rapport national sur les Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement. Rapport établi par le gouvernement algérien, 2010.

ROUAG et All, « Mapping des dispositifs de protection de l'enfance », étude commanditée par l'UNICEF Alger 2009.

UNICEF - Rapport annuel 2007

UNICEF - La situation des enfants dans le monde, 2008

UNICEF, *Analyse de la situation « Enfants et femmes en Algérie », version préliminaire*, 2010

WIDMER Rolf, Rapport du workshop sur la réforme de la prise en charge institutionnelle des enfants privés de famille en Algérie, Octobre 2008.

*Le travail social: dimension centrale du système de protection de l'enfant*, auteur inconnu
Book reviews

"Corruption and combating the phenomenon by means of criminal law and criminal procedure" by Dr. Aurelian Sabau Pop, Universul Juridic Publishing House, 2010.

ASSOC. PROF DR. MIHAELA DACIANA NATEA<fnref n="21" />

Corruption is an important negative phenomenon in Romania as international and national data show, and this is why it is relevant to underline the research published by Senior Lecturer Dr. Aurelian Sabău Pop and based on his PhD thesis. The research explores and identifies the way the corruption is defined and punished in the criminal code and criminal procedure code, and compare them to the practice of corruption thus identifying gaps in legislation.

The book is structured on six chapters which propose a methodological and conceptual approach over corruption. In the first chapter the author presents the political and social dimension of the concept of corruption, continuing with the international and national evolutions in legal mechanism. The chapter focuses on the legal norms starting from definitions and moving forward to penal and procedural norms in this matter, showing how the national legal system is connected to the European norms and recommendations.

The second chapter develops the corruption crimes, types and legal application. The third chapter develops on types of corruption crimes for companies, starting from international and European regulations and how they were implemented in the national legal system, thus pointing out the strong points but also the weakness of national system. Also, this chapter helps identifying the source of some European reports regarding the national legal system and corruption.

The fourth chapter approaches the aspect of corruption as a form of organized crime linking the European and international dimension of the phenomenon, with the national practices. The chapter identifies the way Romania fits into this system in positive and negative aspects, identifying favorable aspects which may increase the development of such practices.

The fifth chapter has a high scientific and policy making value as it proposes an extensive research concerning a comparative study concerning legal norms on corruption crimes, starting from the World Trade Organization, and continuing with the Finish, Swedish, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, Hungarian, Irish and German systems in combating corruption. Thus, the book adds an important contribution to the literature, highlighting similarities and practices specific to different European states.

The last chapter analyses the efficiency of legal norms in combating the phenomenon. Considering the globalization of the international economic system, the problem of sanctioning corruption and other linked crimes in international transactions has increased considerably. The books point that more attention needs to be given and stronger international norms and institutions need to be built in order to prevent and punish such crimes. As an international phenomenon,

<footnote n="21">²¹ Assoc. Prof Dr. Mihaela Daciana Natea - UMFST</footnote>
combating corruption should be seen as a European endeavor, aimed at unifying forces and methods in order to stop transnational crimes of corruption.

The book has the merit point towards the need of a European institutional system concerning this exact case, which, in fact was developed over the years. The book stresses the need for international cooperation between states, and national convergent norms as difference in legislation may represent the breach companies or private individuals need in order to escape punishment. Another conclusion of the book concerns the link between company and public entities corruption, and the need to identify legal means to stop these practices, which can be detrimental to the economy, to public service but also to country's image abroad, which can affect its international reputation and funding.
# Romania in European and International Context:
An Overview of a Century

DR. CRISTINA-MARIA DOGOT<fnref n="1" />

**Book review of:** Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021. ISBN 978-606-062-223-9

The book *Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence* [Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe], coordinated by Maria Costea<fnref n="2" />, proposes a new vision on the evolution of Europe, the European construction and the history of Romania itself, from the perspective of the complex interdependence, which characterizes the international relations in the contemporary and immediate history. This vision of complex interdependence is illustrated by the collection of fourteen papers organized in two chapters, one related to Romania's domestic and foreign policy issues since the first world war to the seventh decade of the XX-th century, and another on geopolitical issues related to some Eastern European states.

The first chapter gathers articles of some recognized Romanian scholars in the fields of history of Romania's international relations: Ion Calafeteanu, Nechita Runcan, Constantin Cheramidoglu, Maria Costea, Nicolae Răzvan Mitu, and Cezar Stanciu. The papers of the above-mentioned authors cover different topics related to the interwar period, as following: the Romanian national consciousness in the context of the First World War and Romania's unification of 1918; the religious freedom of Catholics Romanian citizens in the Constitution of 1923; a reflection in the French press of the time of the German politics at the mouth of the Danube; the role of Romania in European geopolitics according to the view of Belgian diplomats; the situation of Quadrilateral in the last years of belonging to Romania; Romanian reactions and perceptions to the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.

Some key ideas related to this historical period can be highlighted: the active negotiating role of Romanian liberal politician I.I.C. Brătianu in the decision-making process related to Romania's

<footnote n="1">¹ PhD, Lecturer at the University of Oradea, Department of International Relations and European Studies. E-mail: cdogot@uoradea.ro.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Among the other very valuable publications of the two coordinators, we can indicate: Costea, Simion, et Michel Labori, *Le Management des Politiques de l'Union Europeenne The Management of EU Policies*, PARIS, Prodifmultimedia, 2011. Costea, Simion, *Ideea europeană și interesele statelor/ European Issue and State Interests*, Cluj-Napoca, Napoca Star Publishing House, 2005. Costea, Simion, *România și Proiectul Briand de Uniune Europeană, /, Romania and the Briand Project of European Union*”, Tîrgu-Mureș, Petru Maior University Publishing House, 2004. Costea, Simion (coord.), *Culture, Elites and European Integration, Volume IV – International Relations and European Union Interdisciplinary Studies* (Preface de dr. Nicolae Paun), PARIS, Editions Prodifmultimedia, 2011. Costea, Simion and Maria Costea (coord.), *Integrarea României in UE: provocări și perspective/Romania's Accession to the EU: Challenges and Perspectives*, Iași, European Institute, 2007. Costea, Simion (coord.), “*For a Stronger and Wider European Union*”, Cluj-Napoca, Napoca Star Publishing House, 2005. Costea, Simion, *The Culture of the European Accession Negotiations*, in vol. *Globalization and intercultural dialogue: multidisciplinary perspectives* /ed.: Iulian Boldea - Tîrgu-Mureș: Arhipelag XXI, 2014 p.50-56. Costea, Maria and Costea Simion, *THE EU-TURKEY SUMMIT IN MARCH 2016*, p.45-56 in vol. *Globalization and National Identity. Studies on the Strategies of Intercultural Dialogue* /ed.: Iulian Boldea - Tîrgu-Mureș: Arhipelag XXI, 2016. Costea, Maria, Costea Simion, *HYBRID WAR, OLIGARCHIC DEMOCRACY AND EUROPEAN ASPIRATIONS*, p.44-53, in vol *The Proceedings of the International Conference Globalization, Intercultural Dialogue and National Identity, Volume no. 2, 2015*, ed.: Iulian Boldea - Tîrgu-Mureș: Arhipelag XXI, 2015.</footnote>
participation in the WWI and in 1919 Paris Peace Conference<fnref n="3" /> and, besides some other state and religious actors, in the new relations between Romania and Vatican Holy See<fnref n="4" />; the conflicting political and economic interests of Western states in the Danube and Black Sea areas, as they were reflected by the French newspapers of the time<fnref n="5" />; the detailed observations of the Belgian diplomats on Romania's position in its relations with Germany before the beginning of the Second World War and on the development of its relations with France, UK and Poland in this very special historical context<fnref n="6" />; on the sinuous relations between Romania and Bulgaria regarding the Quadrilateral, the geopolitical interests in the Black Sea area both of Germany and Soviet Union, and the difficulties that Romania faced in managing the Quadrilateral issues in its relations with Bulgaria, with its neighbours and its historical western collaborators, France and UK<fnref n="7" />; and, after a consistent time jump, on the particular character of Indo-Romanian relations in the fragile relational framework (despite of ideological affinities) of the Cold War<fnref n="8" />.

More eclectic than the first one, the second chapter focuses on some actual topics at international level: some approaches on diplomatic relations of China, the federal perspectives of the founder fathers of the EU and the current energy challenges of the EU and Ukraine, some geopolitical and security issues for the South-Eastern Europe and even an interesting article on Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In what concern the articles on China, there are two approaches: one related to the economic diplomacy of China in the actual global context and analyses the rise of China as economic power<fnref n="9" />, and another related to diplomatic relations between Serbia and China. It is noteworthy, in the second article, the analysis that the author, a career diplomat, makes on the economic attraction and influence that China exerts on Serbia, the balance of Serbia between the EU and China, and on the fundamentals of China's presence in Central and Eastern Europe<fnref n="10" />.

<footnote n="3">³ Ion Calafeteanu, “Logiu conștiinței naționale” [Praise to the national conscience], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomatie și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Nechita Runcan, “Concordatul Sfântului Scaun cu România în raport cu prevederile Constituției din 1923 și cu Legea cultelor din 1928”, [Concordat of the Holly See with Romania in relation to the provisions of the Constitution of 1923 and the Law of Cults of 1928], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomatie și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Constantin Cheramidoglu, “Cum vedeau aliații României politica Germaniei la gurile Dunării, în timpul Primului Război Mondial” [How Romania’s allies saw German politics at the mouth of the Danube, during the First World War], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomatie și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Maria Costea, “Noi considerații privind România în geopolitica europeană sub lupa diplomației Bruxelles-ului (1939)” [New considerations regarding Romania in European geopolitics under the magnifying glass of Brussels diplomacy], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomatie și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Nicolae Răzvan Mitu, “Noi mărturii în problema Cadrilaterului din ultima sa perioadă românească (1938-1940)” [New testimonies in the issue of the Quadrilateral from its last Romanian period], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomatie și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Cezar Stancu, “România și conflictul indo-pakistanez privind Bangladesh-ul, 1971” [Romania and the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Bangladesh, 1971], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomatie și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Nicoleta Vasilcovschi, “Diplomatie economică a Chinei – evoluție și adaptare în context global” [China’s diplomacy – evolution and adaptation in a global context], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomatie și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Mihaela Osorio, “Serbia și China: o prietenie de țel. Aniversarea a 70 de ani de relații diplomatice sino-sârbe la Belgrad” [Serbia and China: a friendship of steel. 70th anniversary of Sino-Serbian diplomatic relations in Belgrade], in Maria</footnote>
In the paper on energy security challenges of the EU and Ukraine, the author analyses the strategic effects of the gas pipelines Nord Stream 2 and Turkstream 2, highlighting the key influencing factors: the cleavages emerged between some of the Member States, based on their different interests, Russia's own strategies concerning both its former satellites and the EU (as a whole or some of EU member states). The author also highlights the US warnings about the possible consequences of EU energy strategies on both EU and Ukraine.<fnref n="11" />

As previously said, two papers of this chapter refer to some geopolitical and security issues for the South-Eastern Europe. The first one refers to the geopolitical and geostrategic situation of the Black Sea area after the end of Cold War, and the author considers that, despite its troubled history and of the new challenges surrounding it (the economic and some ethnic problems of riparian countries, materialised in some frozen conflicts, as the problems generated by corruption and organised crime), the concerned region will succeed, with the support of the EU and its different foreign policy tools (and the author presents the numerous programmes of cooperation in different fields of interest for riparian states) and of NATO, to overpass its unwieldy condition.<fnref n="12" /> In the same register can be considered the article of the Ambassador Paraschiva Bădescu, related to security challenges emerged in the South-Eastern Europe. From the author's perspective, the EU enlargement placed Romania (beside Poland and Baltic states) and Black Sea area in a challenging strategic position for the EU vis-à-vis Russia and some Asiatic states, in terms of security.<fnref n="13" />

As above-mentioned, two articles of the second chapter refer to Ukraine. One of it focuses on Ukrainian Orthodox church, and the author reveals both historical facts and details concerning the structure and the way to organise of Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the changes and challenges of the post-communist period<fnref n="14" />. In the other article Ambassador Bădescu, who refers to the situation of Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict from Donetsk and Lugansk, in April 2014, with a focus on the results of negotiations between Ukraine, Russia and some EU member states on the status of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict (the series of Minsk Agreements) and on the EU's and NATO's reactions to the conflict and the outcome of these negotiations.<fnref n="15" />

As can be seen, the volume provides an eclectic perspective on Eastern European geopolitics, through the collection of articles it proposes, leaving it to the reader to select those appropriate to his sphere of interest. From different perspectives, these articles illustrate the book's coherent vision on complex interdependence between the actors of international relations and their impact on

Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Aurel Lazăr, “Implicațiile strategice ale gazoductelor Nord Stream 2 și Turkstream 2 asupra securității energetice a Uniunii Europene și Ucrainei” [Strategic implications of Nord Stream 2 and Turkstream 2 gas pipelines on the energy security of the European Union and Ukraine], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Carmen Irène Atanasiu, “Situația geostrategică și geopolitică a spațiului pontic după încheierea Războiului Rece” [The geostrategic and geopolitical situation of the Pontic space after the end of the Cold War], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Paraschiva Bădescu, “Provocări și riscuri de securitate în Sud-stul Europei” [Security challenges and risks in South East Europe], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Adrian Ignat, “Biserica ortodoxă din Ukraina astăzi” [Ukrainian orthodox church today], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Paraschiva Bădescu, “Ukraine – între speranțe și noi provocări” [Ukraine – between hopes and new challenges], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.</footnote>
Romania, the European Union and its neighbors, the impact of international relations on the internal policies of states, and conversely, the impact of internal policies and events on international relations, conflicts, diplomacy and international cooperation. The volume represents an important source of information on the Eastern states, and can be useful for both researchers and students in the field of international relations and European studies or in the field of political science, as well as those passionate about the Eastern European reality.

**Bibliography:**

Atanasiu, Carmen Irène, “Situația geostrategică și geopolitică a spațiului pontic după încheierea Războiului Rece” [The geostrategic and geopolitical situation of the Pontic space after the end of the Cold War], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021, pp. 196-229.

Bădescu, Paraschiva, “Provocări și riscuri de securitate în Sud-stul Europei” [Security challenges and risks in South East Europe], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021, pp. 240-251.

Bădescu, Paraschiva, “Ukraina – între speranțe și noi provocări” [Ukraine – between hopes and new challenges], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021, 230-239.

Calafeteanu, Ion, “Elogiu conștiinței naționale” [Praise to the national conscience], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021, pp. 13-23.

Cheramidoglu, Constantin, “Cum vedeau aliații României politica Germaniei la gurile Dunării, în timpul Primului Război Mondial” [How Romania’s allies saw German politics at the mouth of the Danube, during the First World War], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021, pp. 51-64.

Costea, Maria, “Noi considerații privind România în geopolitica europeană sub lupa diplomației Bruxelles-ului (1939)” [New considerations regarding Romania in European geopolitics under the magnifying glass of Brussels diplomacy], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021, pp. 65-74.

Ignat, Adrian, “Biserica ortodoxă din Ukraina astăzi” [Ukrainian orthodox church today], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021, pp. 176-195.

Lazăr, Aurel, “Implicațiile strategice ale gazoductelor Nord Stream 2 și Turkstream 2 asupra securității energetice a Uniunii Europene și Ucrainei” [Strategic implications of Nord Stream 2 and Turkstream 2 gas pipelines on the energy security of the European Union and Ukraine], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021.

Mitu Nicolae Răzvan, “Noi mărturii în problema Cadrilaterului din ultima sa perioadă românească (1938-1940)” [New testimonies in the issue of the Quadrilateral from its last Romanian period], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021, pp. 75-89.

Osorio, Mihaela, “Serbia și China: o prietenie de oțel. Aniversarea a 70 de ani de relații diplomatice sino-sârbe la Belgrad” [Serbia and China: a friendship of steel. 70th anniversary of Sino-Serbian diplomatic relations in Belgrade], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca
*interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021, pp. 121-133.

Runcan, Nechita, “Concordatul Sfântului Scaun cu România în raport cu prevederile Constituției din 1923 și cu Legea cultelor din 1928” [Concoradt of the Holly See with Romania in relation to the provisions of the Constitution of 1923 and the Law of Cults of 1928], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021, pp. 24-50.

Stanciu, Cezar, “România și conflictul indo-pakistanez privind Bangladesh-ul, 1971” [Romania and the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Bangladesh, 1971], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021, pp. 90-112.

Vasilcovschi, Nicoleta, “Diplomația economică a Chinei – evoluție și adaptare în context global” [China’s economic diplomacy – evolution and adaptation in a global context], in Maria Costea, Simion Costea (eds.), *Diplomație și actori geopolitici în epoca interdependenței complexe* [Diplomacy and geopolitical actors in the age of complex interdependence], Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Napoca Star, 2021, pp. 115-120.
# SUMMARY

## EU Universities

Eric OLSZAK: L'analyse du macro et du meso-environnement des Universites au Sein de l'Union Europeenne.................................................................................................................. 1

Aurelian Olimpiu SABĂU-POP: Technology in higher education in European area before Covid 19.................................................................................................................. 10

Colin SWATRIDGE: Was Erasmus Altogether Too European?.................................................................................................................. 16

## EU legal framework, internal and external policies

Dioleen HUNDT: Finland and the European Union .................................................................................................................. 22

Manon CAPLIER: Assessment of the European legal framework of facial recognition technology .................................................................................................................. 29

Viktoria MAZUR: Law and Technology – Criminalization of Sex Robots................................................................. 41

Liisa Margit PAATS: EU Foreign and Security Policy: Overview and challenges .................................................... 49

Teele NÄSSI: EU external relations with Africa.................................................................................................................. 56

Katrin VIRGEBAU: External relations between EU and China.................................................................................................................. 64

## NATO, Turkey and Kremlin in international context

Aurel LAZĂR: Weakening transatlantic links? Re-assessing Turkey-NATO relations in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic .................................................................................................................. 71

Aurel LAZĂR: Turkey between NATO and Kremlin. The impact of Russian-Turkish cooperation on the relationship between Ankara and NATO .................................................................................................................. 92

## Global issues

Anis H. BAJREKTAREVIC, Carlos López-Veraza PÉREZ: Palermo Treaty System. Towards the Universal Criminal Justice. 20 Years After.................................................................................................................. 108

Maria SMOTRYTSKA: The Nonaligned Movement 60 years Later: Restless asia seeking its pan-continental integration .................................................................................................................. 139

Abla ROUAG-DJENIDI: Protection de l'enfance et enfants prives de famille en Algerie ........ 174

## Book reviews

Mihaela Daciana NATEA: "Corruption and combating the phenomenon by means of criminal law and criminal procedure" by Dr. Aurelian Sabau Pop, Universul Juridic Publishing House, 2010.................................................................................................................. 186

Cristina-Maria DOGOT: Romania in European and International Context: An Overview of a Century .................................................................................................................. 188
Faculté Libre de Droit Institut Catholique
de Toulouse

31 Rue de la Fonderie BP31068 Toulouse Cedex 7

Tél : 05 61 36 81 22 Fax : 05 61 36 81 37

E-mail: secr.univ2@ict-toulouse.asso.fr

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Mouvement Européen Nord

219 bis, bd de la Liberté, BP 1134, 59 012 Lille Cedex, France

Tél. : 03 20 52 72 89, Fax : 03 20 97 73 60, E-mail: mouveuropeen@wanadoo.fr

http://www.mouvement-europeen.org/section/

Association «Confrontations» (Paris, France)

4 Place de Valois 75001 Paris, Tel. 0033142605241,

E-mail: courriel@confrontations.fr

www.confrontations.fr

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Confrontations

Association d'Intellectuels Chrétiens

UMSF

UNIVERSITY OF
MEDICINE PHARMACY
SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY
OF TARGU MUREŞ

University of Medicine, Pharmacy, Sciences and Technology of Târgu-Mureş,
Gheorghe Marinescu Street no 38, Târgu Mureş, 540139, România

Tel.: +40 265 215.551, Fax: +40 265 210.407

E-mail: rectorat@umftgm.ro, www.umfst.ro/en/home.html

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Babeş-Bolyai University

Faculty of European Studies

1, Mihail Kogalniceanu Street

RO-400084 Cluj-Napoca 0264 40.53.00 0264 59.19.06

www.ubbcluj.ro

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Tallinn Law School at Tallinn University of Technology

Akadeemia tee 3, 12618 Tallinn, Estonia

Tel.: 003726202430 Fax: 003726202429

E-mail: tls@ttu.ee, www.ttu.ee/tallinn-law-school

<figure><img src="image_45.png" /></figure>

1918

TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF
TECHNOLOGY

<figure><img src="image_46.png" /></figure>

TALLINN LAW SCHOOL

<figure><img src="image_47.png" /></figure>

Université de Beira Interior (Portugal)

Convento de Sto. António, 6201-001 Covilha

Tel:+351(275)319700 Fax:+351(275)319057, www.ubi.pt

## EDITEURS:

1. Publishing Inc. European Readings & Prodifmultimedia, Paris

2. Association "JISR" ("Le Pont"), MDH -89,
chaussée de l'Hôtel de Ville, 59650 Villeneuve d'Ascq, FRANCE,
Courriel: hedisaidi@wanadoo.fr, Tél.: 03 20 91 45 31

3. University of Medicine, Pharmacy, Sciences and Technology of Târgu-Mureş

https://europeunie.com/
europeuniejournal@umfst.ro

<figure><img src="image_48.png" /></figure>

ISSN 0248-2851 (Édition imprimée)

ISSN 2743-4052 (Édition en ligne)

EAN: 99782749700519