work in the Kyrgyz society and achieve the goals the donors support but in a different way than that which may be imagined by foreign donors.<fnref n="1" />

VII. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

36. Kyrgyzstan has appeared uncertain of where its natural position lies and has been looking both toward Europe and toward Asia when determining its new place in the world after the fall of the Soviet Union. It is a Member of the OSCE but also of the Islamic Conference and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Like most parts of the former Soviet Union (and indeed Russia itself) Central Asia was immediately after the fall of the Soviet empire caught up in a general mood of creation of a common value system and world view based on what can be called Western or European ideals.<fnref n="2" /> Tkatova finds the end of the Millennium as the time when Central Asian states began to cool about the “Westernization” euphoria.<fnref n="3" /> This started a period of several regional initiatives on the international law stage. Tkatova further sees the development of “Eurasianism” with more and more emphasis on traditional values of the region rather than striving toward similarity with other regions.<fnref n="4" />

37. The *kurultai* was used by former Kyrgyz President as tool to secure his power and he gave orders how to compose it. Alternatively, the opposition's *kurultais* were used to proclaim that the former President's policy was not feasible in Kyrgyzstan. In both cases, the actors can be accused that they were using non-constitutional means and institutions. Of course, “the development of effective institutions is a process that takes time and is strongly affected by a variety of factors related to the resource and the individuals involved.”<fnref n="5" /> However, the President was deviating from constitutional order which means mistrust between him and the Parliament. At the same time, the opposition was not using the Parliament to achieve its goals, which is a sign that either:

a) Parliament was an useless instrument

b) Parliament was not representing the interests of neither the new or old power

38. It seems that the challenges involved with parliamentary democracy are not easy to overcome taking into account the non-existing experience of such a system and the political vehicles used by the new government. Kyrgyzstan has experienced very many changes to the Constitution so there has been no time for people or the leaders of the country to get used to systems of government before there are new changes.<fnref n="6" /> There have been power struggles between the President and the Parliament throughout the independence of the country.<fnref n="7" />

39. As Wilkinson claims “it is clear that Kyrgyzstan recovery is still far from assured. Aspirations to create a parliamentary democracy are no doubt laudable in the opinion of the international community, but are no substitute for addressing the immediate concerns of the population regarding their safety and security”.<fnref n="8" /> The idea of having participatory parliamentary system

<footnote n="1">¹ Paasiaro, M. (2009) “Home-grown strategies for greater agency: reassessing the outcome of civil society strengthening in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan” Central Asian Survey, 28: 1, 59 – 77 at p 68.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Tkatova (2010) pp 211-212</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Tkatova (2010) p 213.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Tkatova (2010) p 217</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Ostrom, E. (2001) “Decentralization and development: the new Panacea” in Challenges to Democracy. Ideas, Involvement and Institutions. The PSA Yearbook 2000. Dowding, K., Hughes, J. and Margetts, H. (eds), Palgrave at p 253.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Between 1994 and 2007 there were eight constitutional amendments, all but one decided by referendum based on a proposal by the president (rather than by Parliament). Most of the amendments included provisions strengthening the president at the expense of parliament. Alkan, H. (2009) p 363.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Alkan, H. (2009) pp 367-368.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Wilkinson, C. (2010) “Kyrgyzstan: one referendum does not make a government. The Birmingham Brief, intelligent thought on policy issues. 2010, http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/news/thebirminghambrief/index.aspx</footnote>
in an Asian country might be endangered by fact that the political culture has traditionally been very much influenced by tribal thinking. The rulers of the regions have to agree between themselves when electing the ones who are in power. As the active electorate is from the capital city, many of the interest groups may not have the chance to be represented and the antagonism with the new political culture can be fatal. In case the designers of new system will ignore the previous traditions, there will be a phenomena which can be called in the words of Christopher Hood as “a case of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark”<fnref n="1" />, a political chaos as the new parliament will be ignored (as it has been evident before the political events in 2010 by both sides, opposition and the former President). On the other hand, if the new power will try to combine the local interests with the homogenous Parliament, the result can be corruption.

40. As the Parliament has not been used as a tool for revolution and as it as an institution is associated with reform *fatigue*, the *kurultais* could still play a significant role as the members of different interest groups can be there as ex officio members, not just representing the local dukes but also different social groups.<fnref n="2" /> Then, the local *kurultais* can be a basis for electing a Parliament and the participatory democracy and parliamentary democracy will be combined to reduce social and political tension. By Bevir, “if we were to promote a participatory democracy that emphasized deliberation and ethical conduct, we might seek to devolve aspects of governance to various associations within civil society”.<fnref n="3" />

41. The *kurultai* as a traditional format and, furthermore, a potentially relevant instrument successful in fighting against the old and corrupted mentality, could therefore remain as a link between Europeanized capital city inhabitants and the regions. It would also help to overcome or soften the problem of transitional society i.a. dealing with the past as the *kurultais* are based on social agreement and “network democracy”.

42. By Anar Musabaeva "*Kurultay* (sic) is another occasion to reflect on whether democracy is possible in Kyrgyzstan. There are different views on this matter. Proponents of liberal democracy have long been disappointed, and their answer is “impossible”, at least, in the near future. Supporters of the ideas of sovereign democracies and democracies with national specific features, may say “yes, possible”. In general, democracy turned out to be a diverse phenomenon. And now we may be on the verge of creating our own special Kyrgyz model of democracy”.<fnref n="4" /> Taking account the peculiarities of Kyrgyz society, legal culture and failures to build up western standard based democracy, the search for innovative ideas to bridge *kurultai* and parliamentary democracy are only welcomed.

43. Cheterian<fnref n="5" /> says that Kyrgyzstan more and more resembles a failed state. If reliance on traditional models of governance can help the country to avoid this fate, it would appear worth trying. Juraev discusses the different suggestions for how to use or incorporate traditional, informal structures in democratization of the country. The informal may be formalised by having quotas based on tribes or similar for parliament, rotation between parts of the country for the presidency or similar. Others again fear this cements differences between regions and groups and feel that the country would be best served by a proper parliament with a proportional election system.<fnref n="6" />

<figure><img src="image_24.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1">¹ Hood, C. (2008) The Art of The State. Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management. Clarendon Press. Oxford, at p 24.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Kyrgyzstan has quite successfully formally included traditional councils of elders, *aksakal*, as dispute solving bodies. Merrell, D. E.(2010) "State engagement with non-state justice: how the experience in Kyrgyzstan can reinforce the need for legitimacy in Afghanistan" Central Asian Survey, 29: 2, 205 – 217 at p 205.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Bevir, M. (2007) “Democratic Governance: Systems and Radical Perspectives” in Public Governance, Bevir, M. (ed), vol 4. Sage Publications. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, at p 393.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Anar Musabaeva: "Deliberative Democracy in the Kyrgyz Manner", Institute for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.kg/en/analysis/802/</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Cheterian, V. (2010) p 22.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Juraev, S. (2008) pp 262-263.</footnote>
# La Diplomatie commerciale de l'Union européenne dans l'Organisation mondiale du commerce

DR. NICOLETA VASILCOVSCHI

„Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University, Doctoral School of Economics, Iași

**Abstract:** Commercial diplomacy of the European Union in the WTO. Globalization and its global implications, transform international economic relations and require adaption to the current economic changes. The must important actors in international trade diplomacy are the European Union, United States of America and Japon. The purpose of this article is to present the actors of international commercial diplomacy and to note the role of European Union trade diplomacy. In the first part of the paper, we give a general presentation of the key actors in international commercial diplomacy and the organization of European Union Common Commercial Policy. In the second part of the paper, we present European Union commercial activities in World Trade Organisation and the results of UE commercial diplomacy in WTO.

**Keywords:** European Union commercial diplomacy, WTO, actors of commercial diplomacy, common commercial policy, Doha Development Programme.

<figure><img src="image_25.png" /></figure>

La mondialisation et ses implications au niveau mondial, transforment les relations économiques internationales et imposent l'adaptation aux changements économiques actuels. Dans un monde global, il est important que de" nouvelles formes de consultation et de réglementations soient mises en pratique".<fnref n="1" />

Dans ce contexte, Giplin argue qu'une économie mutuelle entre les Etats-Unis, l'Union Européenne et le Japon peut établir les bases d'une stable économie globale.<fnref n="2" />

## 1. LES ACTEURS DE LA DIPLOMATIE COMMERCIALE

<figure><img src="image_26.png" /></figure>

Les plus importants acteurs de la diplomatie commerciale au niveau international restent les Etats-Unis, l'Union Européenne et le Japon. Dominique Roy considère que les Etats-Unis sont un associé pour l'Union Européenne.<fnref n="3" /> La politique commerciale commune doit être une politique commerciale libérale qui defend les interêts des Etats membes de l'Union européenne dans l'Organisation mondiale du commerce et dans le cadre des négociations multilatérales. L'élargissement de l'Union Européenne apporte l'analyse des différents problèmes que l'Union peut avoir du point du vue commercial. Certains analystes estiment que les Etats-Unis maintiennent leur influence sur les activités du Fonds monétaire international, de la Banque mondiale et de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce.<fnref n="4" />

## 2. LES ACTIVITÉS DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE DANS L'ORGANISATION MONDIALE DU COMMERCE

<figure><img src="image_27.png" /></figure>

Dans le cadre de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce, l'Union européenne est obligée d'agir selon les principes de l'Uruguay Round. Ainsi les thèmes principaux des négociations sur l'agriculture, les services, la propriété intellectuelle, ont été établis par les Américains. Le 21 mai 1992,

<footnote n="1">¹ Serge Cordeiller, *Le dictionnaire historique et géopolitique du 20e siècle*, Ed. La Découverte, Paris, 2000, p. 202.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Robert Gilpin, The challenge of global capitalism, The world economy in the 21st century, Ed. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2002, p. 352.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Dominic Roy, *Histoire du siècle, perspectives internationales*, Ed. Modulo, Quebec, 2003, p. 274.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ C. Fred Bergsten and the Institute for International Economics, *The United States and The world Economy, Foreign Economic policy for the next decade*, Ed. Institute for International Economics, Washington, 2005, p. 55.</footnote>
l'Union européenne a accepté la réforme de la Politique Agricole Commune. En 1984, la Communauté européenne a créé le Nouvel Instrument de la Politique Commerciale. Cet Instrument a été conçu pour lutter contre la concurrence déloyale des autres Etats.

Le nouvel instrument de la Politique commerciale a été remplacé en 1994 par les Règlements des Obstacles au Commerce. La Commission européenne a reçu l'accord de représenter l'Union européenne dans la lutte contre les barrières commerciales provenant d'autres pays. Dominique Pantz présente l'importance de ces réglementations sur les obstacles au commerce: elles permettent d'imposer des mesures unilatérales au commerce en accord avec les procédures multilatérales du l'Organisation mondiale du commerce. <fnref n="1" /> Ces réglementations exercent leur influence sur le déroulement du commerce de l'Union européenne, en permettant la protection des produits européens au niveau mondial.

L'Union européenne doit encore faire des efforts dans le cadre de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce pour les réglementations commerciales internationales. Les negociations du Cycle de Doha n'ont été pas avantageuses pour l'Union européenne. Les ambitions d'élargissement du development ont été lancées en 2001, elles étaient sans applicabilité au domaine agricole. Le Programme de Doha pour le développement, lancé en 2001, est soutenu par l'Union européenne. Il est basé sur un cycle de négociations lancé au niveau mondial pour intégrer et développer les pays pauvres. La Conférence ministérielle de Cancun (2003) fut un échec à cause des divergences entre l'Union européenne et les Etats-Unis et les Pays du G 20 et du G 90.

Les pays africains et les pays en développement du G 90, qui sont choisis comme partenaires commerciaux de l'Union européenne, ont refusé de s' engager dans l'élaboration des nouvelles responsabilités proposées par l'Union européenne. A la fin des négociations, pour être en conformité avec les règles de l' OMC, l'Union européenne a révisé le régime d'importations en commençant son application dès le 1er avril 2001.<fnref n="2" /> Le 26 Juin 2003 était adoptée la réforme Fischler, qui a modifié les modalités de financement de l'agriculture européenne. En 2004 sont relancés les débats pour le Programme Doha de Developpement.

Après la Conference ministérielle de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce de Hong Kong (decembre 2005), l'Union européenne était obligée de réeévaluer sa position pour la politique agricole au niveau interiieur et pour la diplomatie commerciale, au niveau extérieur. Les pays les plus pauvres pouvaient éxporter la plus grande partie de leur produits aux pays developés, sans respecter les quotas et sans payer les taxes.

Les résultats intérieurs de la politique commerciale de l'Union européenne sont dans quatre programmes d'initiative communautaire 7:

1. INTERREG, qui est pour la coopération à l'extérieur des frontalières nationales ou inter-régionales

2. EQUAL, qui représente un programme de coopération pour lutter contre la discrimination et les inégalités sur la marché du travail;

3. LEADER; qui est axé sur le développement rural;

4. URBAN; qui est un programme d'aide pour les régions en developpement.

Au niveau mondial, l'Union européenne maintient depuis 1968 la taxe pour les produits importés qui entrent sur le marché européen à Marseille, Hamburg, Amsterdam etc. En même temps, elle essaie de promouvoir sa vision commerciale à l' Organisation mondiale du commerce. L'Union européenne participe à l' Espace Economique Européen en partenariat avec l'Islande, le Lichtenstein et la Norvège.

Pour connaître l' importance des théories proposées pour analyser la diplomatie économique, nous proposons une analyse sur l'évolution de la connaissance scientifique du processus de détermination à l'expérince pratique.

<footnote n="1">¹ Dominique Pantz, *Institutions et politiques commerciales internationales: du GATT à l'OMC*, Ed, Armand Colin, Paris, 1998, p. 59.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Gérard Marie Henry, Annie Reithmann, *100 Questions sur la mondialisation*, Ed. Studyrama, La Flèche, 2003, p. 20.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_28.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3:** Le Système d'opération de la théorie à la pratique en diplomatie économique, Source: Adaptation d'après Gérard Durozoi, André Roussel, *Dictionnaire de philosophie*, Ed. Nathan, Paris, 1990, p. 331.</figcaption></figure>

L'Union européenne a des accords européens d'association avec les pays de l'Europe orientale ou avec les pays du bassin méditeranéen. En 1960 l'Union européenne a signé plusieurs accords commerciaux avec des pays d'Afrique-Caraibes-Pacifique et des accords commerciaux et d'association avec le Mexique et le Chili. L'Union européenne a des accord avec les pays du Mercosur, d'Afrique du Nord et l'Accord du Golfe. En 2001, l'Union européenne était la premier pouvoir commercial qui ait ouvert ses ports pour les 49 pays les plus pauvres du monde et pour réglementer les obstacles au commerce.<fnref n="1" />

## 4. CONCLUSIONS

L'article propose des analyses de la diplomatie commerciale de l'Union européenne dans l'Organisation mondiale du commerce. Dans la première partie de la recheche nous avons essayé de présenter les relations commerciales entre l'Union européenne et les autres puissances commerciales, ainsi que sa position dans le cadre de l'OMC. Dans la deuxième partie ont été présentées les principales conférences auxquelles a participé l'Union européenne et aussi leurs résultats.

## Bibliographie:

1. Bergsten, C. Fred and the Institute for International Economics, *The United States and The world Economy, Foreign Economic policy for the next decade*, Ed. Institute for International Economics, Washington, 2005; 2. Cordeiller, Serge; *Le dictionnaire historique et géopolitique du 20e siècle*, Ed. La Découverte, Paris, 2000; 3. Favret, Jean-Marc *L'essentiel de l'Union européenne et du Droit communautaire, 9 e édition*, Ed. Gualino lextemo éditions Paris, 2009; 4. Gilpin, Robert; The challenge of global capitalism, The world economy in the 21st century, Ed. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2002; 5. Henry, Gérard Marie, Reithmann, Annie, *100 Questions sur la mondialisation*, Ed. Studyrama, La Flèche, 2003; 6. Pantz, Dominique *Institutions et politiques commerciales internationales: du GATT à l'OMC*, Ed, Armand Colin, Paris, 1998; 7. Roy, Dominic, *Histoire du siècle, perspectives internationales*, Ed. Modulo, Quebec, 2003, p. 274; 8. La politique commerciale commune, http://www.touteleurope.fr/fr/actions/economie/commerce-exterieur.html, consulté le 4 Mars 2010.

<figure><img src="image_29.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1">¹ La politique commerciale commune, http://www.touteleurope.fr/fr/actions/economie/commerce-exterieur.html, consulté le 4 Mars 2010.</footnote>
# The Political, Economical and Social Construction of
the EU / La Construction Politique, Economique et
Sociale de l'Union Européenne

## Les Europes d'Europe – avant et après la seconde
guerre mondiale

ADRIAN-GABRIEL CORPĂDEAN<fnref n="1" />

Doctorant - Faculté d'études européennes

Université „Babeş-Bolyai“ Cluj-Napoca

*Abstract: The Europes of Europe -before and after the World War II.* This paper aims to perform an analysis of the complex course of events that surrounded the division of Europe after World War Two and, more particularly, the adoption of the Marshall Plan, with special emphasis on the positions of East-European governments, such as the one of Romania. This topic may now be subjected to a more comprehensive investigation, thanks to the newly-published literature, based on more open archives and a more objective view of this thorny subject. Hence, this article reviews part of the recent historiography related to the Marshall Plan and further traces its roots by moving backwards to the interwar period and that of the Second World War.

**Keywords:** Marshall Plan, WW2, division, communism.

## LE PLAN MARSHALL – VERS LA RECONSTRUCTION OU LA DIVISION DE L'EUROPE?

### Action politique

<figure><img src="image_30.png" /></figure>

La fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale a marqué l'achèvement d'une époque, avec la victoire des Alliés contre la machine de guerre nazie, une victoire qui est venue avec des coûts inimaginables, en matière de vies, destructions et horreurs. Les traumatismes sans précédent, tels l'holocauste et l'emploi de la bombe nucléaire sur les villes japonaises d'Hiroshima et Nagasaki en août 1945, ont laissé des cicatrices sur le visage du monde entier qui ne guériraient jamais. À part ces désastres, les tentacules de la dévastation se sont étendus jusqu'aux secteurs de l'économie des pays combattants, qui ont vu leurs branches industrielles converties en fournisseurs pour le front collapse devant le choc du retour à leur usage initial. Le Royaume-Uni, qui avait mené la bataille la plus dure contre le Wehrmacht pendant les premières années de la guerre, s'est vu dans la situation d'abandonner son héros de guerre, le premier ministre Winston Churchill, qui a perdu les élections, en faveur du laboriste Clement Attlee.<fnref n="2" />

En ce qui concerne l'Union soviétique, les pertes humaines ont été extrêmement sévères, d'environ 40 millions d'habitants, aussi bien sur le front que pendant les sièges de longue durée,

<footnote n="1">¹ *Investing in people!* Ph.D. scholarship, Project co-financed by the SECTORAL OPERATIONAL PROGRAM FOR HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 2007 – 2013</footnote>

<footnote>**Priority Axis 1.** "Education and training in support for growth and development of a knowledge based society"</footnote>

<footnote>**Key area of intervention 1.5:** Doctoral and post-doctoral programs in support of research.</footnote>

<footnote>Contract nr.: POSDRU/88/1.5/S/60185 – “INNOVATIVE DOCTORAL STUDIES IN A KNOWLEDGE BASED SOCIETY” Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Chris Wrigley, *Winston Churchill. A Biographical Companion*, Éd. ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, 2002, p.34.</footnote>
comme celui de Leningrad, ou dans les camps de concentration des Nazis. Si la population avait été brusquement réduite, l'économie a été également secouée, de sorte que le gouvernement soviétique a dû faire appel à ses pays-satellites pour les ressources nécessaires à la reconstruction, à côté des réparations de guerre de la part de l'Allemagne et de ses anciens alliés. Sous la main de fer de Josèphe Staline, c'est l'industrie lourde qui connaîtrait le plus grand essor, tandis que la production agricole et les biens de consommation ne reviendraient que très tard au niveau de développement d'avant la deuxième guerre mondiale. En outre, Staline a refusé d'accepter l'application du plan de reconstruction économique soutenu par le gouvernement américain dans les pays contrôlés par les Soviétiques, appelé le Plan Marshall.<fnref n="1" />

Nommé aussi le *Programme de rétablissement européen*, le Plan du général George Marshall, le Secrétaire d'État des États-Unis sous le Président Harry Truman, visait une intégration des États européens au sein de l'Organisation européenne de coopération économique. Mettant fin à une politique traditionnelle d'isolement économique, le Plan a fonctionné entre 1947 et 1952 et s'est adressé à un nombre de 17 pays européens, leur octroyant une aide totale de treize milliards de dollars (une somme comparable à un montant neuf fois plus grand à présent).<fnref n="2" />

Quant à la Roumanie, l'invitation de prendre part au Plan Marshall est venue de la part des gouvernements de la France et du Royaume-Uni le 4 juillet 1947, comme l'on apprend de la lettre adressée par le président du Parti national libéral, Constantin I.C. Brătianu, au Premier ministre de la Roumanie, Petru Groza.<fnref n="3" /> Dans cette lettre, Brătianu fait une plaidoirie impressionnante en faveur du besoin national de la Roumanie de continuer sa tradition d'être ouverte vers le commerce international, tout en soulignant le caractère vital de ce plan de reconstruction pour une Roumanie dévastée. Dans les trois points de son argumentation, le président du Parti national libéral fait preuve de lucidité, en analysant la situation économique et sociale du pays de manière univoque et en engageant la responsabilité de ce parti historique et pro-européen, pour une réponse affirmative de la part du gouvernement roumain à l'invitation des Alliés. En plus, Brătianu soulignait les dangers qui apparaîtraient suite à une décision d'isolement du pays à l'égard de l'Occident, puisqu'une réponse affirmative ne serait pas du tout équivalente au renoncement à la souveraineté de la Roumanie sur la scène des relations internationales. En fait, il a accentué le cours historique des liens de la Roumanie avec ces deux pouvoirs occidentaux, qui était fondé sur la coopération solide, c'est pourquoi dans sa vision, la seule réponse acceptable serait celle d'approuver la participation de ce pays au Plan Marshall.<fnref n="4" />

En revanche, la réponse officielle du gouvernement Groza est venue par l'intermédiaire de la lettre rédigée par le ministre des affaires étrangères, Gheorghe Tătărăscu, un ancien libéral dont le collaborationnisme avec le gouvernement communiste a été totalement incompatible avec ses visions politiques antérieures. S'appuyant sur une structure argumentative rigide et incohérente, typiquement rédigée sous les auspices d'un régime communiste, la lettre fait appel à l'argument des intérêts particuliers de la Roumanie et de l'éventuelle perte d'indépendance suite à la construction des structures qu'impliquerait le plan de reconstruction.<fnref n="5" /> Finalement, la dernière partie du document fait les louanges d'une Union soviétique qui est censée représenter le premier pilier de rétablissement

<footnote n="1">¹ Robert Service, *Stalin: a Biography*, Éd. Macmillan, Londres, 2004, pp.513-514.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Gérard Bossuat, *L'Europe occidentale à l'heure américaine 1945-1952*, Editions Complexe, Paris, 1992, p.140.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Lettre du président du Parti national libéral de Roumanie, C.I.C. Brătianu, au président du Conseil des ministres, Dr. Petru Groza, le 5 juillet 1947. Archive de Cicerone Ionițoiu, http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/maniu2/default.asp.htm.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Pour en savoir plus: Dinu Giurescu (éditeur), *Cade Cortina de Fier. România 1947. Documente diplomatiche*, Éd. Cartea Veche Publishing, Bucarest, 2002, p.256.; Florin Dobrinescu, *România la Conferințele de pace (Paris: 1919-1920; 1946-1947)*, Focșani, 1996.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Nicolae Păun, *Planul Marshall – veritabilă instituție a construcției europene*, dans *Studii istorice. Omațiu Profesorului Mureșanu*, Éd. PUF, 1988, pp.507-513.</footnote>
économique du continent, grâce à la « discipline travailleuse des peuples qui la forment », à sa productivité et à l'abondance de ses ressources naturelles. Qualifiant le plan d'inefficient sur le plan économique et dangereux du point de vue politique<fnref n="1" />, Tătărăscu a utilisé un langage qui deviendrait exponentiel pour l'approche de la communication avec l'Occident des gouvernements communistes de Roumanie – une structure argumentative dénuée de toute consistance, la perpétuation des clichés d'orientation soviétique et le manque de vision dans la projection du cours d'action politique et économique.<fnref n="2" />

Comme une preuve étonnante d'ironie, c'est le même Tătărăscu qui, le 9 juillet 1947, seulement un jour après la lettre de rejet du Plan Marshall, adresse une lettre au Secrétariat Général des Nations-Unies, afin d'obtenir la qualité de membre pour la Roumanie, « au milieu des autres peuples libres du monde ».<fnref n="3" /> Pour que sa hardiesse soit encore plus aveugle, le ministre affirme alors que la Roumanie a entrepris une série décisive de réformes démocratiques et a réussi à réorganiser la vie entière de l'État – une série de mensonges qui n'ont pas convaincu la société occidentale, persuadée de la corruption du gouvernement roumain et de son assujettissement à la voix soviétique. Il faut donner raison à l'ambassadeur britannique de cette époque-là, Archibald Clark Kerr, qui avait déjà caractérisé non seulement Gheorghe Tătărăscu, mais aussi Petru Groza, comme des traîtres et des trompeurs rusés, des marionnettes contrôlées par le Commissaire soviétique des affaires étrangères, Andrei Vîşinski.<fnref n="4" />

En réalité, au moment où ces lettres ont été envoyées au-delà du *rideau de fer* déjà bien visible en Europe, la Roumanie avait déjà connu la persécution de l'opposition par les communistes, les fraudes immenses lors du processus électoral et les emprisonnements illégaux des opposants politiques du

nouveau régime « démocratique ». En fait, le premier ministre roumain avait répondu aux lettres reçues des gouvernements britannique et américain les 24-25 juin 1947 et qui avaient accusé l'administration de Bucarest de violation des droits de l'homme et du Traité de paix, sous le même ton hostile. Ainsi, Groza y avait récité la même poésie omniprésente au sein du discours communiste à l'égard de l'Occident, en affirmant franchement que l'attitude des deux gouvernements occidentaux constituait une immixtion inacceptable dans la politique intérieure de l'État roumain.

Il devient plus visible maintenant la contradiction flagrante entre l'attitude des pouvoir occidentaux et celle du blocus

communiste à l'égard de l'aide financière offerte par l'administration Truman à la reconstruction européenne. Tandis que les États occidentaux ont bénéficié d'un modèle taillé conformément à l'expérience capitaliste américaine, les pays communistes ont, dans quelques cas, été obligés par Staline à ne pas l'accepter. Par exemple, il y a des signes clairs que la Tchécoslovaquie et la Pologne

<figure><img src="image_31.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1">¹ Marcel Ştirban, Nicolae Păun, *Continuitate şi schimbare în structurile instituţionale din România în anii 1940-1947*, Studia historia, 1991, 36, no.1-2, pp.111-119.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Lettre du Ministre des affaires étrangères de Roumanie, Gheorghe Tătărăscu, adressée aux représentants de la Conférence de paix de Paris, le 9 juillet 1947. Archive de Cicerone Ioniţoiu.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Lettre de Gheorghe Tătărăscu adressée au Secrétariat général de l'ONU, le 10 juillet 1947. Archive de Cicerone Ioniţoiu.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ *Idem*, http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/maniu2/default.asp.htm.</footnote>
étaient prêtes à accepter l'accord avec les dirigeants du Plan Marshall, mais il faut comprendre que cette voie, qui mènerait de manière inévitable vers une forme d'unification économique de l'Europe, était tout-à-fait incompatible avec la vision soviétique de l'économie dirigée.<fnref n="1" /> En fait, la rencontre programmée pour le 12 juillet 1947 à Paris comptait sur la participation, déjà confirmée, des représentants polonais et tchécoslovaques, qui ont pourtant été persuadés par Staline de ne pas rejoindre cette démarche. En revanche, Staline a fait à la Pologne une contre-offre, sous la forme d'un accord sur cinq ans, consistant en crédits, équipement industriel et céréales – et le premier ministre de Varsovie, Josef Cyrankiewicz a accepté la proposition soviétique.<fnref n="2" />

Les autres États de l'Europe orientale ont suivi l'exemple des Polonais, en rejetant le Plan Marshall et en s'inscrivant sur la route alternative du Plan Molotov, concrétisé sous la forme du Comecon, le Conseil d'aide économique mutuelle.

## Approche historiographique

L'historiographie du problème du Plan Marshall est abondante, mais il est important de souligner le ton qui a été adopté par les historiens à l'égard de ce sujet, des deux parties du rideau de fer. L'un des ouvrages écrits le plus proche du moment de l'adoption du Plan appartient à Sidney Stuart Alexander, qui a fait partie de l'Administration pour la coopération économique des États-Unis, appelée également l'Agence du Plan Marshall, étant l'un des souteneurs de cette initiative. Entre 1949 et 1952, Alexander a travaillé pour le Fond monétaire international à Washington DC et il a publié 31 études au cours de sa vie, surtout sur des thèmes liés à l'économie internationale. Dans son ouvrage intitulé « The Marshall Plan », il présente une vision de l'intérieur des structures qui ont été responsables de la conception du Plan, en analysant de manière détaillée les objectifs et la nature de cette initiative.<fnref n="3" /> En plus, l'auteur s'arrête sur l'implication américaine au sein du Plan Marshall, tout en présentant les enjeux pour le pays initiateur du Plan, mais d'une manière qui trahit l'appartenance d'Alexander au système (car le tout est exposé avec une certaine dose d'idéalisme sous la couverture d'une objectivité souhaitable).<fnref n="4" />

Si cette attitude a été normale du côté américain à l'époque, il est à noter que le thème du Plan Marshall est resté une préoccupation des historiens occidentaux même une décennie après la chute du rideau de fer. L'historiographie de cette période inclut une collection abondante de titres, dont l'un des plus compréhensifs est signé par Martin A. Schain, professeur de sciences politiques et directeur du Centre des études européennes de l'Université de New York<fnref n="5" />, qui a regroupé dans le volume « The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After » une collection de textes valeureux sur ce thème. Parmi ceux-ci, il est à souligner, dans la première partie de l'ouvrage (intitulé de manière suggestive « The Marshall Plan and European Construction »), la contribution de Michelle Cini<fnref n="6" />, dont l'article « From the Marshall Plan to EEC: Direct and Indirect Influences » surprend la contribution du Plan à la reconstruction de l'Europe occidentale après la guerre et, en particulier, les mécanismes par lesquels l'initiative américaine a poussé les États européens démocratiques vers l'unification économique.<fnref n="7" /> Dans la deuxième section du livre (qui s'appelle « The Others: From the Outside Looking in »), la

<footnote n="1">¹ Gerhard Wetting, *Stalin and the Cold War in Europe*, Éd. Rowman & Littlefield, 2008, p.138.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² *Poland: Carnations*, Time Magazine, 9 février 1948, Time Archives : http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,855998,00.html, consulté le 15 février 2011.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Sidney Stuart Alexander, *The Marshall Plan*, National Planning Association, Washington DC, 1948, p. 4-6.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 7-10.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ http://us.macmillan.com/author/martinschain. (consulté le 15 janvier 2010).</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Michelle Cini est Professeur d'études européennes à l'Université de Bristol, Grande Bretagne.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Michelle Cini, *From the Marshall Plan to EEC: Direct and Indirect Influences*, dans Martin A. Schain, *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, Palgrave, New York, 2001, p. 13-39.</footnote>
contribution de Bradley F. Adams<fnref n="1" />, intitulée « The Marshall Plan and Czechoslovak Democracy: Elements of Interdependency », surprend les pressions soviétiques qui ont obligé le gouvernement de ce pays, par le ministre des affaires étrangères, Jan Masaryk, de ne pas prendre part à la Conférence de Paris en juillet 1947.<fnref n="2" />

Finalement, une autre étude extrêmement utile pour comprendre l'attitude de l'occident à l'égard du plan Marshall à l'époque où il a été conçu a été rédigée par Allen Dulles, ancien directeur de l'Agence Centrale d'Informations des États-Unis, en 1947/48. À ce moment-là, les débats dans l'opinion publique américaine et dans les cercles gouvernementaux à l'égard du cours que le Plan Marshall devait prendre étaient plus vifs que jamais. Parmi d'autres, Dulles souligne les connexions du Plan avec la ligne politique prise par l'administration Truman dans la direction de la lutte anticomuniste, tout en précisant les principaux courants d'opinion de la société américaine envers ce problème.<fnref n="3" />

## L'ENTRE-DEUX-GUERRES: UN LABORATOIRE DE LA RECONSTRUCTION EUROPÉENNE?

Si la rupture entre les Deux Europes s'est faite aussi d'une perspective économique, dont le témoin a été sans doute le Plan Marshall, les racines de cette faille peuvent être tracées dans la période entre les deux guerres. Ainsi, la création de l'Union soviétique en 1922 a déstabilisé un système déjà remis en danger par les attitudes révisionnistes après la signature des traités de paix appartenant au système de Versailles.L'héritage de la première guerre mondiale rend plus facile la démarche pour comprendre comment

s'est faite la rupture entre le modèle occidental d'intégration (témoigné par un nombre impressionnant de projets, comme l'initiative de Pan-Europa, du comte Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, ou bien le Mémorandum du ministre des affaires étrangères de France, Aristide Briand) et le nouveau modèle oriental, créé autour des structures communistes et déjà en roulage au sein de l'Union soviétique.

L'une des répercussions les plus dangereuses de la première guerre mondiale, qui avait complètement renversé la nature de l'économie européenne, a été la Grande dépression qui s'est déroulée surtout entre 1929 et 1933, mais qui n'a cessé d'affecter certains pays jusqu'à l'aube de la seconde guerre mondiale. Les effets désastreux de cette crise qui a affecté le système capitaliste au sens plus profond a engendré une nouvelle approche du libéralisme, qui a trouvé sa plus fameuse expression dans la nouvelle ligne économique adoptée aux États-Unis sous le président Franklin Delano Roosevelt, appelée New Deal. Cette nouvelle orientation, impliquant un rôle plus proéminent de l'État dans l'économie, a rendu possible la réalisation du Plan Marshall après la fin de la guerre.<fnref n="4" />

Mais, en même temps, la situation économique créée par la crise a représenté une bonne occasion pour les mouvements politiques extrémistes d'acquérir de plus en plus de popularité en Europe. Réunifié sous des formules politiques, le Parti national-socialiste allemand est arrivé au pouvoir avec l'ascension d'Adolphe Hitler au poste de chancelier allemand, en 30 janvier 1933, un événement qui allait changer la configuration géopolitique de l'Europe au long d'une période de douze ans.

Dans le contexte d'un intérêt réduit de la part des États-Unis pour les actions de ses alliés après la première guerre mondiale et dans la période entre les deux guerres, la scène internationale a été préparée pour une reconfiguration périlleuse. Si pour les États-Unis, c'était l'axe du Pacifique qui a accaparé l'attention de la classe politique plutôt que les liens avec le vieux continent, l'Union

<footnote n="1">¹ Bradley F. Adams est Professeur d'histoire du communisme à l'Université Columbia de New York.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Bradley F. Adams, *The Marshall Plan and Czechoslovak Democracy: Elements of Interdependency*, dans op.cit, p. 93-119.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Allen Welsh Dulles (Éditeur : Michael Wala), *The Marshall Plan*, Éd. Berg, 1993, p. 14-15.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Ronald Edsforth, *The New Deal: America's Response to the Great Depression*, Éd. Wiley-Blackwell, Hoboken, 2000, p.25.</footnote>
soviétique était en train de concevoir ses plans pour étendre son influence idéologique à travers le continent européen, afin d'aboutir à la domination politique. Quant aux alliés, à part le Pacte de Locarno de 1925 entre la France et l'Allemagne, qui ne garantissait que les frontières occidentales de cette dernière, et le Pacte Briand-Kellogg de 1929, qui condamnait l'action de recourir à la guerre sans y imposer de réelles contraintes, les démarches institutionnelles ont été limitées afin de prévenir l'expansion du radicalisme sur le vieux continent<fnref n="1" />; c'est également l'effet d'une Société des nations inefficente et dont les instruments fonctionnels ne permettaient pas une action cohérente, coercitive et prompte de la part des États européens contre un agresseur.

En revanche, l'attitude des franco-britanniques dans cette période de temps a été caractérisée dans l'historiographie comme conciliatoire, puisque les alliés, visiblement affectés par la mémoire de la Grande guerre, ne voulaient pas arriver à des confrontations militaires avec les régimes autoritaires d'Allemagne ou bien d'Italie. Cette politique, regardée parfois dans l'historiographie comme une preuve de lâcheté, a été premièrement l'apanage du premier ministre britannique Neville Chamberlain et du premier ministre français Édouard Daladier, dont les actions à l'égard d'Hitler ont suivi la même logique que l'impuissance de la Société des nations. La Conférence de Munich de septembre 1938, pendant laquelle ces leaders politiques ont consenti à l'occupation par Hitler de la région Sudète, contrairement aux traités de paix, n'est qu'une preuve de l'échec de cette politique de conciliation qui n'a fait que d'amplifier les échos du revanchisme allemand pendant l'entre-deux-guerres.<fnref n="2" />

## ET LA GUERRE? UNE RUPTURE CULTURELLE OU GÉOPOLITIQUE DE L'ESPACE EUROPÉEN

Ainsi, c'est le moment du 1er septembre 1939 qui est intervenu de manière inévitable, avec l'invasion de la Pologne par un Hitler qui se considérait déjà apparemment invincible, face à des Alliés incohérents et faibles.<fnref n="3" /> L'axis du Pacifique est rentré dans les coordonnées des franco-britanniques après l'événement tragique du 7 décembre 1941, constitué par l'attaque de Pearl Harbour par les Japonais, suite auquel les États-Unis sont entrées dans la guerre, abandonnant une fois de plus la doctrine de l'isolement à l'égard des problèmes du vieux continent.<fnref n="4" />

Dans le cadre de l'alliance entre la Grande Bretagne, les États-Unis et les Français trouvés en exil, auxquels s'ajoute l'Union soviétique, il a été inévitable d'arriver à un compromis pour l'avenir de l'Europe et du monde entier, qui satisfasse les intérêts des deux pôles qui s'étaient déjà formés, du point de vue idéologique: les Soviétiques ou communistes, d'une part, et les capitalistes de l'autre. Pourtant, il est très important de noter que cette fois, à la différence de la première guerre mondiale, le conflit qui a duré jusqu'en 1945 n'a pas été achevé à l'aide des traités de paix. Si les vainqueurs ont appris bien des choses suite à l'échec du système de Versailles et de la Société des nations, ce manque n'a guère résolu la situation géopolitique du continent européen à la fin du conflit, un *status quo* dont nous sommes particulièrement intéressés afin de tracer le contexte dans lequel il a été possible de témoigner de la tombée du *rideau de fer*.

En revanche, les outils dont les leaders des alliés se sont servis afin de rendre officielles leurs ententes ont bien été les conférences. Celle de Téhéran, entre les « trois grands », qui a eu lieu à la fin de l'an 1943, a accueilli la première rencontre des trois personnalités politiques qui ont été responsables pour la reconfiguration de l'Europe après la capitulation des Nazis: Winston Churchill, le premier ministre britannique, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, le président américain et Joseph Staline,

<footnote n="1">¹ Ladislau Gyémánt, *Prehistory of the European Construction*, Éd. EFES, Cluj-Napoca, 1999, p.321.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Peter Neville, *Hitler and Appeasement: the British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War*, Continuum International Publishing Group, Londres, 2006, p.59.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ *Ibidem*, p.192.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Sir John Thomas Pratt, *Before Pearl Harbour: a Study of the Historical Background to the War in the Pacific*, Éd. Caxton, University of Michigan, 1944, p.59.</footnote>
le leader incontestable de l'Union Soviétique. Si cette première conférence, suivant immédiatement après le sommet du Caire, n'a fait que d'établir des principes militaires dans la lutte contre les ennemis, elle a ouvert la voie vers des pourparlers supplémentaires sous la même configuration.<fnref n="1" />

En conclusion, c'est la rencontre de Yalta qui est de première importance pour cette démarche de recherche, puisque les leaders alliés y ont mis en question l'idée de réorganiser l'Europe après la victoire face aux ennemis. À part les points clés qui se réfèrent à la capitulation sans conditions de l'Allemagne, une victoire significative de Roosevelt a été celle d'obtenir la promesse de Staline conformément à laquelle celui-ci joindrait l'organisation qui hériterait des idéaux de la Ligue des nations, c'est-à-dire l'Organisation des Nations Unies.<fnref n="2" />

**Bibliographie**

**a. Archives:**

1. Archive de Cicerone Ionițoiu:

a. Lettre du président du Parti national libéral de Roumanie, C.I.C. Brătianu, adressée au président du Conseil des ministres, Dr. Petru Groza, le 5 juillet 1947. (http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/maniu2/default.asp.htm.)

b. Lettre du Ministre des affaires étrangères de Roumanie, Gheorghe Tătărăscu, adressée aux représentants de la Conférence de paix de Paris, le 9 juillet 1947.

c. Lettre de Gheorghe Tătărăscu adressée au Secrétariat général de l'ONU, le 10 juillet 1947.

2. Time Magazine Archives:

a. *Poland: Carnations*, 9 février 1948, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,855998,00.html.

**b. Livres:**

1. Adams, Bradley F., *The Marshall Plan and Czechoslovak Democracy: Elements of Interdependency*, dans Martin A. Schain, *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, Palgrave, New York, 2001.

2. Bossuat, Gérard, *L'Europe occidentale à l'heure américaine 1945-1952*, Éditions Complexe, Paris, 1992.

3. Cini, Michelle, *From the Marshall Plan to EEC: Direct and Indirect Influences*, dans Martin A. Schain, *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, Palgrave, New York, 2001.

4. Dulles, Allen Welsh (Éditeur: Michael Wala), *The Marshall Plan*, Éd. Berg, 1993.

5. Edsforth, Ronald, *The New Deal: America's Response to the Great Depression*, Éd. Wiley-Blackwell, Hoboken, 2000.

6. Giurescu, Dinu (éditeur), *Cade Cortina de Fier. România 1947. Documente diplomatices*, Éd. Cartea Veche Publishing, Bucarest, 2002.

7. Gyémánt, Ladislau, *Prehistory of the European Construction*, Éd. EFES, Cluj-Napoca, 1999.

8. Neville, Peter, *Hitler and Appeasement: the British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War*, Continuum International Publishing Group, Londres, 2006.

9. Păun, Nicolae, *Planul Marshall – veritabilă instituție a construcției europene*, dans *Studii istorice. Omagiu Profesorului Mureșanu*, Éd. PUF, 1988.

10. Pratt, Sir John Thomas, *Before Pearl Harbour: a Study of the Historical Background to the War in the Pacific*, Éd. Caxton, University of Michigan, 1944.

11. Service, Robert, *Stalin: a Biography*, Éd. Macmillan, Londres, 2004.

12. Ştirban, Marcel; Păun, Nicolae, *Continuitate și schimbare în structurile instituționale din România în anii 1940-1947*, Studia historia, 1991, 36, no.1-2.

13. Stuart Alexander, Sidney, *The Marshall Plan*, National Planning Association, Washington DC, 1948.

14. Wetting, Gerhard, *Stalin and the Cold War in Europe*, Éd. Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.

15. Wrigley, Chris, *Winston Churchill. A Biographical Companion*, Éd. ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, 2002.

**c. Sources virtuelles:**

1. http://us.macmillan.com/author/martinschain.

<figure><img src="image_32.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1">¹ Chris Wrigley, op. cit., p.321-322.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Robert Service, op. cit., p.503.</footnote>
# The Romanian intellectual's profile and the recreation of the European interwar myth<fnref n="1" />

DR. DORIN DOBRA

„Babeş-Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca

**Abstract.** Along with the XIXth century, the Romanian lands entered a truly European route. Whether we refer to the cultural circuits or the economic ones, the European influence is strongly perceived in this area and imposes culture and civilization patterns. We can therefore speak of a comeback to the native cradle of the Romanian people, namely, to the European cultural lodes that occurred and were consequently maintained together with the Latin origin of the Romanian people. It is upon this foundation that the European formation routes of the Romanian intelligentsia sit, the institutional and cultural premises taken from within the country, even the political-administrative and cultural dialogue that was kept alive during the interwar period. From this point of view, one can always speak of the role of the Romanian intelligentsia in the reaffirmation of the plenary actualized European myth in the studied historic period.

**Keywords:** the Romanian intellectual, European creation routes, political elites, interwar European projects.

<figure><img src="image_33.png" /></figure>

After a European century of building the „nation states” and after a war with tragical consequences, all announced through the so-called ideology of the „European decline” in Oswald Sppengler’s work, the European intellectual elite enters a febrile phase that was concerned with the common European destiny. More plans, societies and continental and regional unification projects, which grants the new century a new panEuropean preoccupation, following a XIXth century of national accomplishments. In various formulas, almost all the national states, especially the newly configured ones, enter this concert, and Romania, in its turn, even manages to play founding roles in these constructions. Through its intellectual elite, our country manifests intensely on a European plan, being recognised especially due to its great public names that represented its name. And this was not a random thing, as long as the great majority of the RomnRaian intellectuals, asored by the political class, came via European formation routes and had accessed, therefore, the same schools with the European intellectual elites.

Therefore, the interwar debate referring to the European unification had, in its times, a serious partner in this side of the continent, reference made to Romania and its representatives in intercontinental relations. If one were to sequentially remember the main European unification projects in this period, promoted by Kalergi, Briand or Tardieu, one could name Romanian personalities such as V. Madgearu, G.G. Mironescu, N. Titulescu or Iuliu Maniu, who promptly positioned our country on the routes of these projects. It suffices to remember that in the Briand plan, Romania acted, through its representatives, a part of founding country in a conjuncture in which the president of the Nations Society Association was N. Titulescu, a Romanian whose name relates to the history itself of the entire organisation. „The president of the Association, read the resolution project that the French government lodged, on behalf of 45 delegates (September 17th 1930), by which the governments of the European states were invited to follow the inquiry initiated through Briand memorandum, finishing the proposals of the Nations Society Association.”<fnref n="2" />

From the point of view of the lights caused by the suggested title it is obvious that the Romanian intelligentsia, in general, and especially its elite, which turned into a normative and technical one, through all its representatives who took part, one way or another, in the decision-making and

<footnote n="1">¹ *This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU 89/1.5/S/60189 with the title „Postdoctoral Programs for Sustainable Development in a Knowledge Based Society”.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² George Ciorăncu, *Românii și ideea federalistă*, Ed. Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 1996, p. 115;</footnote>
legislative national process, becomes responsible for this entire development and modernisation step of Romania. But the connection between the proposed European model and the private destiny of each personality that adhered to this stands precisely in their process of intellectual growth. The ways of intelectually developping that the Romanian public figures of the times had followed were meant to tie them to the myth and destiny of Occidental Europe. From here to the settlement of unified Romania on an exclusive and uniquely European path was only a step. The entire intellectual debate of the epoch was, as we will here show, one of European descent; the development patterns being themselves organically European, and as a confirmation and crowning of these patterns,the political elite contributed in the fourth decade of the XXth century to the shaping and projection of some federative projects. And the mere mentioning of the fact that Romania, already engaged in the „ Little Entente”, played a significant role along its partners in the receiving of the „Briand Project” would suffice to underline the role that our country was playing in the epoch. „ The Foreign affaires Ministers agreed to promote under the institutional aspect a „staged accomplishment” of the European Union, which would initially have only an annual conference without the permanent comittee that Briand proposed.”<fnref n="1" />

By the reporting to the „Latin cultural fund” of the Romanian country, the recreation of the European myth becomes easier explained. The observed adhaccession to the European pattern, in the interwar epoch, which imposed the modernisation and rationalisation of the entire state system, represented, from this point of view, a comeback to the original root, the „latin gens”. The prevailing of the accession to this pattern, and its touched depths, built out of paradoxes, became realities of the Romanian interwar period.

And the Romanian intellectuals, as promotoers and representatives of the the Latinity of the national fund, acted in accordance to the „spirit of the epoch” in which they were living.

**Contact routes with the European West.** Undoubtedly placed in a dynamic geographical area, at the junction of empires and especially at the borders of cultures hereby influenced, the Romanian lands of the XIXth century find themselves in a crucial moment of liberation from the Ottoman power and of reoreintation or new contacts with new cultures. As a matter of fact, the culture and lifestyle of this people have been deeply influenced by the Sublime Porte's interests in the area. „The geographical settlement of the Romanians largely decided the historical route of these lands.”<fnref n="2" /> Starting from this premise, of the influence analysis in the Romanian regions by the cultures with the highest interests in the area, we shall use the reality of the Ottoman influence over the area until around the end of the XVIIIth century, when the Russian-Turk wars change the balance of the powers and, at the same time, of the cultural influences. Along with the occurrence of the first Russian troops in the territory of nowadays Romania, the citizens enefit from the first contacts with the European culture. „During the war, (1768-1774n.n.) the boyars came into contact with the Russian officers, many of them being of Frencg, German or Greek origin, with a cosmopolitan education.”<fnref n="3" /> The influence is powerful, especially when the upper classes take over European social habits, starting with clothing, dances, furniture etc. It is actually for the first time in a few centuries when the locals change their preferences and behaviours after a period when influences were primarily Oriental and then regional.

In an overall view, there are three periods of maximum cultural ebullience of the Romanian lands. The first, begun in 1774, was of exit from the exclusive influence of the Porte and of entrance into contact with the Western customs throughout the Russian officers. Under the auspices of the

<footnote n="1">¹ Simion Costea, *România și proiectul Briand de Uniune Europeană*, University Publishing House „Petru Maior”, Târgu-Mureș, 2004, p. 130;</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² A.D. Xenopol, *Războaiele dintre români și turci*, Albatros Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997, p. 7;</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Keith Hitchins, *Românii – 1774-1886*, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996, p. 83;</footnote>
„Kuciuk-Kainargi Treaty”, the period represents the taking notice of the Western economies through the relative lieration from the Ottoman hegemony. The second, marked by the Adrianopole Treaty, represents the entrance into contact with the Enlightenment Anglo-French ideology, especially throughout commerce with the two countries. Begun in 1830, the period is favored by the opening foresight of free commerce at the Danube gates. It is the period in which the 1848 Revolution takes place, the Union of the Romanian lands and the imposing of the first Constitution, all under the print of the French Revolution and its basic concept „the nation”. „The new system was obviously mimicked from Belgium, but if the Belgian system was preferred to the French one, the true cause was the animosity that Cuza had provoked in our political parties, left and right, representing at those times the same interests in which the bold agrarian reform hit.”<fnref n="1" /> Eventually, the third period, from 1875 until the first World War, came as a balancing of the German revolutionarism taken from the universities in Wien and erlin and sustained by the economic relations with these countries.

Therefore, throughout a century, Romania has already changed its cultural orientation by exiting the exclusive authority of the Porte and by imposing radical reforms in parallel with the sequencial building of the great Nation State. All these phenomena, of deep cultural assimilation, will coem to full amturity within the inter-war debate, in a tight corelation with the European debate. Actually, stemming from the initial premise, already proven, the messages of the inter-war personalities has as foundation this entire European trace acquired in the XIXth century and was, with its configurations, a deeply Western one-especially at the level of the great „modernism-aboriginal” debate or „progress-return to the archaic”. This return to native values, strongly represented in the background of inter-war ideology, unveils another essential theme for the understanding of the inter-war equation: „the latinity of the Romanian people and culture.”

**The Europeanness of the Romanian culture-the common Latin fund.** In the larger context, the mentioning of the historical-cultural luggage of the Romanian people was becoming a respectable stake, as long as it represented, or, on the contrary, it couldn't offer a basis for the modern existence of the XXth century society. Particularly, a significant part of the debate moved around the issue of the national specificity and the need to modify it, in the case of revolutionaries or the keeping and encouraging of an organic evolution, in the case of the conservatives. Criticized or not, as we shall show, the European fund of the Romanian culture, Latin in its roots, became a common theme, consistently debated throughout the epoch, with a respectable ideological stake. According to this, the opponents were in favor of the need to keep it, or, at the opposite pole, in favor of reconfiguration as insufficient means of keeping new socio-institutional forms. Regardless of the positioning, the supporters of the two ideologies stemmed from the same premise: the cultural historical fund of the people was a latin one, worthy of being called „European”.

A sort of return seems to be the answer that imposes in this issue: by the adhesion to the European culture, to the French revolutionary movement, the Romanian intelligentsia sets the culture of its country in the proper place: along with the modern, rationalist Enlightened European culture. Nevertheless, this maximum importance and value phenomenon seems to have a single explanation or, at least, it would require more complex explaining answers. „Why didn't the idea of the superior model action before the beginning of the XIXth century, when it appeared in the form of the Czar empire, and even beforehand, of the Habsburg empire, in full offensive? Why, if we, Romanians, were characterized through such plasticity and will to „mimic”, didn't we choose the Turkish model, that is, that of a country invincible for half a milenium? (...) Why didn't we later crossed to Catolicism? Why did we adopt the French revolutionry model, combining it with an Italian variant, carbonar and mazziniste? Lovinescu suggests that „through our pro-Western adherence, we found ourselves, on

<footnote n="1">¹ I.C.Filitti, *Originea şi rolul constituţional ale Consiliului Legislativ Român*, Revised edition, Graphic Arts Institute, Bucharest, 1936, p. 11;</footnote>
the axis of Latinity and the true vocation of our race, ignorant of the foreign forms of Slavo-phanariot civilisation, but today such an explanation is no longer considered valid.”<fnref n="1" />

To further emphasize the phenomenon, other two essential aspects ask to be brought into focus: the precedence of the connection of the Romanian lands to the European culture and the rapidity with which the phenomenon was achieved. The Romanian people set in 1848 a benchmark from which its history seems to be rushing in a new direction, but with which it shared numerous connections: „Both the older protagonists and the younger ones of the culturalisation epoch are guided by the same ideal, of going out of the dark and abjection, the ideal of recovering the disparity towards Europe, of the development of the Romanian creative potential, force to hibernate for such a long time.”<fnref n="2" /> But if we were to establish exactly the origin of the phenomenon of closeness-synchronization with the European culture, it seems to have begun even from the end of the XVIIIth century, when Enlightenment started to pierce Romania through Phanariots and young students in Paris. „It must be mentioned that we claimed and entered „Enlightened Europe” even from the Enlightenment, therefore the end of 18th century. “<fnref n="3" /> The phenomenon was already emphasized, through its first dedicated book.”We only want to ascertain a characteristic trait of the French influence in Romania it is an influence exerted by far and almost unconsciously by a people over another.”<fnref n="4" /> From this perspective, the 1848 moment is a formalization of all these aspects, an eruption in the light of what until then assiduously manifested itself in the social strata, especially in cultural awareness.

“The fourth decade also provides a much deeper infiltration of the ideas, morals, French cultural property assets than in the past, causing active mimicry phenomena among the ruling class and downwards, through the characteristic of the snobbery of the rapid transition ages, in the rows of the Bourgeois nobility and the regular bureaucracy.”⁵This is why 1848 is more a formalization of these events than only a beginning of modernization of the country. “The date 1840, where we stopped, is not a border-we said that beforehand – but a point of inflection. After 1840, everything we have seen bursting through the surface complex due to the inextricable determination of the circumstances will continue to subsist and procreate. (...) Looking from the point of view of history, the point we reached is just the need of the beginning.”<fnref n="6" /> “Thus placing the beginning of this process Adrian Marino, we have more than two centuries of cultural “claiming” from the Enlightened Europe, but, more importantly, the settlement of Romania in the front place of the process.

**The message of the Romanian public figures.** From the point of view of the suggested theory, the pattern of the European intellectual, the thesis of their implication in the political-administrative life of the country, remains to be demonstrated. Following the same pattern, the intellectual elite of the country interferes with the political one and therefore becomes an authority in the field, with implications in debating the development path that the country needed to follow. Specifically, we support here the thesis according to which between the intellectual elite of the country and the political elite there were strong recruitment phenomena. The mere enumeration of some epoch ministerials confirms the theory: N. Iorga, V. Madgearu, D. Gusti, ..., etc. There is, then the only logical step to achieve, that of accomplishing the connection between the modernisation effort and the implication of these personalities in the managing of these efforts. Even if unified Romania

<footnote n="1">¹ Alexandru George, *Reveniri, restituiri, revizuri*, Cartea Românească Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999, pp. 74-75;</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Paul Cornea, *Originile romantismului românese*, Minerva Publishing House, Bucharest, 1972, p. 432;</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Adrian Marino, *Modern, modernism, modernitate*, Universal Literature Publishing House, Bucharest, 1969, p. 75;</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Pompiliu Eliade, *Influența franceză asupra spiritului public în România – Originile*, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, pp. 9-10;</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Paul Cornea, op.cit., p. 513;</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 605;</footnote>
engaged itself, later in the XIXth century, in this modernisation process, the steps taken, although strongly criticized, represented minimal stages in the tendency to draw closer with the Western Europe. „The inter-war modernisation obviously ears the marks of the lack of means and purposes, but above everything the lack of a modernisation programme, of a suitable consensus”<fnref n="1" />

By and large, we assume the thesis according to which the message of the Romanian inter-war public figures was one of pro-European essence. We have shown, at a proper time, that the return towards autochtonism tendency itself was one of European cultural nature. From this point until the assumption of the consequent pro-Europeanism of the inter-war Romanian debate, there is a short distance. With public figures shaped in the European cultural space, with behaviours adequate to the European intelligentsia, all in a Latin cultural fund, common to most European cultures, the Romanian message suited the general borders of the European cultural debate.

In conclusion, we can ascertain, along with other histories of the epoch, that the inter-war period in Romania was one of continuing the modernisation effort initiated in the XIXth century. And the imposed landmark, especially of a country that had to report to such a model (as long as the peripheric geographic positioning towards the cultural emission centre gave birth to time gap) was permanently the European one, of the developed country in the Western part of the continent.

Starting from the premise ascertained in the first part of the paper, according to which the XXth century was the century of federalist projects, this happening after the XIXth century being one of national movements, we can only observe the affiliation of the Romanian elite to this natural flow. And if we were to mention simply the „Little Entente” and the „Balkan Pact”, the position taken by Romania in the Briand Project or the play N. Titulescu acted at the Nations’ Society, it would be sufficient to confirm our thesis. At ideational level, the only aspect to be emphasized remains that

the Romanian intellectual elites, such as Iuliu Maniu, Take Ionescu or Virgil Madgearu projected themselves European unification hypostases, with which they actually adhered to the preoccupations of the European elites of the time.

Starting either from regional interests of coalition for the peace keeping, or from continental preoccupations and of representation for the country at an European level, the Romanian initiatives to coagulate some inter or super statal, which will constitute a future study, were inscripted therefore in the general European interwar base lines of intellectual debate. Through the patterns of the regional „agreements” in which our country was an active element, the Romanian intellectuals represented an European behaviour landmark for their foreign brothers. „The Balkan Pact constituted, throughout

<figure><img src="image_34.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1">¹ Marius Jucan, in the study „Intelectualii Europei interbelice și mitul fondator al unității europene” in volume *Actualitatea mesajului fondatorilor Uniunii Europene*, coord. Nicolae Păun, Ed. FSE, Cluj-Napoca, 2006, p. 32;</footnote>
all the years of the passive activity of the four allied states, an extremely vivacious example, showing
the role and the contribution, not deprived of meaning, brought by these small and middle states in
the battle for the defense of security, for the protection of peace;(...) it revealed the ol dfriendship
traditions and the common battle of the people in the region, by showing the values and their
unshakable connections, values and connections that asserted and will always assert in this European
space with benign permanence.”<fnref n="1" /> Then, through the opening proven towards the panEuropean plans,
the intellectual elite in Romania constituted itself in a coagulant element of the general debate,
through the open way of touching these initiatives. „In an interview granted to the „Neue Freie
Presse” newspaper in 1930, when one intensely discussed A. Briand’s plan of the European
federation, Maniu proves to e a partisan of a regional federation, as a first step towards the
accomplishment of a general European federation, and the proposal of a central-European nucleus,
which would include Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yogoslavia, Hunagry, Bulgaria, Greece and
Romania.”<fnref n="2" />

Having, therefore the historical and cultural premises readily shaped, one only has to observe
and confirm the acculturation phenomenon to which our country was submitted. After more than a
century of intensified contact with the European West, both by intellectual elite and the historic-
economic mixtures, in which all the institutional and national models were of European nature( the
revolution of Pasoptism, the first Romanian Constitution, the national-statal building through he two
Unions), Romania was actually a state deeply connected to the realities and the European phenomena.
By the initiatives that concerned the European future, the intellectual elite of the country confirms it,
its continuous effort to modernise the country being the valid proof in this respect. And all these
aspects, fundamental to the country's evolution in these hsitorical moments, provide sufficient
arguments to support the rebirth of the European myth, through the models offered by Western
Europe in our country. The active participation of the coutnry, through its intellectual elites, to the
debate refering to the common European future shows that Romania has turned, from spectator into
actor and author in the great central European dialogue. The assimilation-adaptation phenomenon, as
Lovinescu has seen it, of the European culture was nearly accomplished, and the configuration one
has already become a granted historical accomplishment.

**Bibliography:**

1. Campus, Eliza – *Înțelegerea Balcanică*, Acad. RSR Publishing House, Bucharest, 1972;

2. Ciorăncescu, George – *Românii și ideea federalistă*, Ed. Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 1996;

3. Cornea, Paul – *Originile romantismului românesc*, Ed. Minerva, Bucharest, 1972;

4. Costea, Simion – *România și proiectul Briand de Uniune Europeană*, University Publishing House „Petru Maior”, Târgu-Mureș, 2004;

5. Eliade, Pompiliu – *Influența franceză asupra spiritului public în România – Originile*, Ed. Humanitas, Bucharest, 2000;

6. Filitti, I.C. – *Originea și rolulconstituțional ale Consiliului Legislativ Român*, Revised edition, Graphic Arts Institute, Bucharest, 1936;

7. George, Alexandru – *Reveniri, restituiri, revizuri*, Cartea Românească Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999;

8. Hitchins, Keith – *Românii – 1774-1886*, Ed. Humanitas, Bucharest, 1996;

9. Jucan, Marius – in the study „Intelectualii Europei interbelice și mitul fondator al unității europene” în vol. *Actualitatea mesajului fondatorilor Uniunii Europene*, coord. Nicolae Păun, Ed. FSE, Cluj-Napoca, 2006;

10. Marino, Adrian – *Modern, modernism, modernitate*, Universal Literature Publishing House, Bucharest, 1969;

11. Xenopol, A.D. – *Războaiele dintre români și turci...*, Albatros Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997;

<figure><img src="image_35.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1">¹ Eliza Campus, *Înțelegerea Balcanică*, Acad. RSR Publishing House, Bucharest, 1972, XXIV;</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² George Ciorăncescu, op.cit., p. 124;</footnote>
# Shaping the New Europe.

## The Actuality of the German Ordoliberalism

DR. CIPRIAN PĂUN

„Babes-Bolyai” University

<figure><img src="image_36.png" /></figure>

Today's international economic crisis is seen by many as the end of the *laissez-faire* liberalism. On the other side, liberal economists argue that we are only dealing with a crisis in the economic-financial sector, due to the insufficient quality of the *judicial framework* and its implementation in a very complex and technical domain such as financial services<fnref n="1" />. In addition, a great part of the responsibility in triggering the crisis can be attributed to the US intervention (the government and the federal reserve banks), whose policies supported exaggerated real estate investments<fnref n="2" />. As we shall see<fnref n="3" />, this is exactly the type of policy that liberal thinkers after the Second World War criticise.

Without entering this debate, it is obvious that liberal democratic principles continue to prevail in the political and economic organisations of European and EU member states. After a period of state intervention in the economy through bank nationalisations, state-supported investments and strengthening regulations, economic development will resume its course based on market economy principles.

However, the road so far has been long and the rebound periods numerous. From the first liberal economic ideas in the 18th and 19th centuries, a great part of the European continent had fallen prey both to Nazi and communist ideologies in the 20th century. Faced with two world wars and a profound economic crisis, liberal thinkers remained either in the shadows, could not express themselves, left in exile or were simply “unfashionable.” Even in free societies, the trend was the “Keynesian revolution,” resulted after the Great Depression, which promoted a greater state intervention in economic processes. In his autobiography, Alan Greenspan mentions that by the 1970s, John Maynard Keynes’ ideas had replaced those of Adam Smith<fnref n="4" />. Despite his great contribution to the understanding of macroeconomic processes and despite the fact that he considered himself to be “liberal,” a large part of Keynes’ works oppose classic liberalism: “I expect to see the State, which is in a position to calculate the marginal efficiency of capital-goods on long views and on the basis of general social advantage, taking an even greater responsibility for directly organising investment.”<fnref n="5" /> In this context, however, in Western Europe, Germany, Austria, but also in Italy and France, new thinkers emerged, who, on the basis of liberal principles, managed to greatly influence the economic policy in the democratic European states and the European Economic Community.

This study aims to present the German school of liberal thought after the Second World War and its contribution to the contemporary economic liberalism, as well its role in implementing the economic policies in European countries, given the context of the economic crisis.

<footnote n="1">¹ Melnik, Stefan. *The Current Financial Crisis: Propositions from a Liberal Perspective*, 9.4.2010. <http://www.stmelnik.com/></footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Taylor, John. "How Government Created the Financial Crisis." *Wall Street Journal*, 9.2.2009.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ see p.11.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Greenspan, Alan. *The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World*. New York: Penguin Press, 2007, p.15.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Keynes, John Maynard. *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. The Collected Writings*, vol. 7. London: Macmillan, Cambridge University Press, p.164.</footnote>
THE ORDOLIBERALISM AND THE GERMAN ECONOMIC MIRACLE

The German miracle (Wirtschaftswunder) was due largely to reforms undertaken after the Second World War and to introducing a “social market economy.” The engine behind these reforms and behind the German economic is the School of Freiburg, which promoted ordoliberalism.

The sources of German liberalism go back as far as the 16th and 17th centuries, to Samuel Pufendorf's theories of natural rights or to Johaness Althusius' decentralisation/federalisation. Liberal ideas can later be found in the works of Kant (1724-1804) and Fichte (1762-1814), who discussed the rights of man, the freedom of thought and expression. However, if we were to identify a work or a central author who expresses the liberal ideas in Germany, he would have to be Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835). His treaty *On the Limits of State Action*<fnref n="1" /> represents a solid and objective political analysis. Although written in 1792, the work was only partially published in various magazines of the time due to censorship. It was fully published in 1851, after the author's death. The treaty influenced the work of John Stuart Mill, especially *On Liberty*, published in 1859. Mill said that the only author worth talking about is Humboldt<fnref n="2" />. The latter criticised the paternalist state, which gives excessive attention to the well-being of its citizens, and suggested that the state intervention beyond its main duties – ensuring internal and external peace and internal order – leads to uniform behaviour in society which suffocates the natural variety of individuals. Although he held important diplomatic and governmental positions in Prussia, Humboldt did not apply his ideas into politics because of the political circumstances of the time.

The merit for reviving liberalism in Germany, both from an academic and a political point of view, goes to the Freiburg School and to those influenced by it. To be more precise, we are talking about the Faculty of Law and State Sciences (Fakultät für Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften) of the University of Freiburg. Its founders are economist Walter Eucken (1891-1950) and lawyers Franz Böhm (1895-1977) and Hans Grossman-Doerth (1894-1944), but also Leonhard Miksch (1901-1950).

The ordliberals considered that Adam Smith's theory of the "invisible hand" was not sufficient to ensure a harmonious economic development. The economy was supposed to be managed according to an "economic constitution," established, applied and guaranteed by the state. In 1940, Walter Eucken said that the problem of the economy would not resolve itself, allowing the economic system to develop spontaneously. The economic system had to be designed and deliberately enforced. Matters related to economic and commercial policies, protection against monopoly, fiscal policy and bankruptcy represent various aspects of a single fundamental issue – the way of establishing rules of the functioning of economy as a whole, on a national and international level<fnref n="3" />. Without these, private interests turn into monopolies or oligopolies, replacing competition through performance (*Leistungswettbewerb*) with competition through blocking the competitors (*Behinderungswettbewerb*), and thus damaging equality before the law and the legal state (*Rechtsstaat*).

According to the ordliberals, in a social market economy the state has to be powerful to be able to fight against practices that damage the social functioning of the market, such as monopolies or rent-seekers. Eucken said that the state has to act on the forms of economy, but not to manage the entire economic process. It is essential to make a distinction between form and process and to act accordingly<fnref n="4" />.

<footnote n="1">¹ German: *Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen*</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Miniter, Richard. "Wilhelm von Humboldt: German Classical Liberal." *The Freeman*, vol. 41, no. 2, February 1991.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Eucken, Walter. *The Foundations of Economics – History and Theory in the Analysis of Economic Reality*. Berlin, New York: Springer, 1992, p.314.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Eucken, Walter. *This Unsuccessful Age, or, The Pains of Economic Progress*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952, p.95.</footnote>
In order to be able to examine, elaborate its principles and apply such an order, a synthesis in the fields of law and economy was necessary. A *Wirtschaftsverfassungspolitik*<fnref n="1" /> is a political order that intends to improve the results of economic systems by means of establishing “rules of the game” and not directly, through specific economic interventions.

The principles of this order have to be: ensuring the correct functioning of the price system, the freedom of commerce, guaranteeing private property and freedom of contract, full responsibility, coherence and the establishment of economic policies. The purpose of such an order was to create the conditions that would allow economic actors to act together in the common interest of society, by following their own interests<fnref n="2" />.

In other words, they considered that the objective of the *Wirtschaftsverfassungspolitik* was to create the necessary conditions for the effective functioning of Smith's "invisible hand."

In what concerns the judicial aspect, Böhm concentrates upon the aspects of judicial order, elaborating a theory of the “private law firm” (*Privatrechtsgesellschaft*) based on private law, in order to protect individuals from the intervention of other individuals, groups or the state. This is how the state’s power on citizens is limited. Too great a role of the state leads to sacrificing the general interest in favour of personal or group interests.

The social market economy protagonists were after social justice through economic means. They were not using the term *social* only because it was in fashion in the politics of the time. They were thinking about how to reply to accusations of being mere partisans of the *laissez-faire* under a *social* disguise. The answer was that they could demonstrate that, in long term, the policies would lead to a favourable result from a human point of view<fnref n="3" />.

*The implementation of the social market economy*

At the level of the German government after the Second World War, the social market economy was put into practice thanks to the Minister for Economy (and, for a short while, Chancellor) Ludwig Erhard (1897-1977) and to Alfred Müller-Armack (1901-1978), economy professor and secretary of state within the Ministry for Economy.

Erhard's purpose was to create a *social* market economy. Erhard's preoccupation with the social problematic comes from of Oppenheimer's influence, among others. According to Oppenheimer, there has to be a way – a third way – that is a more effective synthesis, or a solution<fnref n="4" />. Oppenheimer's “liberal socialism” turned into Erhard's “social liberalism,” whose purpose was creating a social economy by means of a market economy. Erhard's vision of economic policy takes three points into account: preventing political power from becoming a source of disorder, eliminating monopolistic structures, promoting freedom and competition.

Moreover, in Erhard's programme, free market competition is not a purpose in itself, but a means. He considered that as long as competition functions properly, the socialisation of progress and profit is better achieved<fnref n="5" />.

Erhard fully recognises the merits of the Freiburg School. He declared that the merits of the school are not only economic, but also of political nature. By applying the Eucken doctrine, many

<footnote n="1">¹ Eucken, Walter. *The Foundations of Economics – History and Theory in the Analysis of Economic Reality*. Berlin, New York: Springer, 1992, p.316.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Eucken, Walter. *Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik*, p.336.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Wiseman, Jack. "Social Policy and the Social Market Economy" in Peacock, A., op. cit., p.161.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Erhard, Ludwig. "Franz Oppenheimer, dem Lehrer und Freund" (1964) in Erhard, Ludwig. *Gedanken aus fünf Jahrzehnten*, Düsseldorf-Vienna-New York: Econ, 1957.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Erhard, Ludwig. *Prosperity through Competition*. London: Thames-Hudson, 1958, p.1.</footnote>
countries sought to implement an economic order in conformity with clear intellectual principles, instead of pragmatism without an intellectual basis<fnref n="1" />.

The influence of the Freiburg School on Erhard's work is indisputable. For example, Leonhard Miksch, and important representative of the School, became a close collaborator of Erhard. He was one of the first to support a policy of regulation and liberalisation of prices coupled with a monetary reform. Against the instructions of the Allies<fnref n="2" />, Erhard used this policy to launch the liberalisation of prices at the same time with the monetary reform, an action that would later be known for marking the "birth of the market economy."<fnref n="3" />

Both Erhard and Eucken were born and raised in the same historical period of Germany. Born at the end of the 19th century, they had experienced the false market economy during the Weimar Republic, an economy dominated by personal interests that took advantage of the state's weaknesses. Erhard described that period as years of degeneration of the market economy. He said that they had two options: re-establishing an effective market, a truly liberal one, or declaring complete obedience towards the state a general economic principle<fnref n="4" />. Erhard said that his policy has the purpose of creating an order dominated by game rules<fnref n="5" />. This metaphor brings Erhard closer to the ordoliberals, since this is a basic principle of ordoliberalism: the state institutes and guarantees an economic order, but does not control the economic processes, thus allowing free and correct competition.

According to this ordoliberal perspective, the state has a specific function to perform: adopting and ensuring the respect of a constitution that is able to dominate the rent-seekers and those with personal interests.

Unlike the Austrian School, German ordoliberals gave great importance to resolving the social matter: “Everything has a social importance.”<fnref n="6" /> The success came also from the combination of the political and social expectations of the population and the academic economic thought. Like Joachim Zweynert said, the main concern of Müller-Armack was to make a traditionally socialist and romantic country accept capitalism. At the same time, the social market economy presented itself as a programme of liberally open reforms, corresponding to the demands of the Western Allies, especially the USA, who wanted to establish a liberal and capitalistic society in Western Germany<fnref n="7" />.

Müller-Armack differs from the other German liberals. He considers that it is possible to intervene in the market economy in order to produce a sufficient amount of richness that can be redistributed in the name of social justice. He promotes this idea in the context of the subsidiarity principle, taking into consideration that social responsibility belongs to smaller communities. If, however, this proves insufficient, the state has to intervene in a decentralised manner. The upper levels have to intervene only when the lower levels and the communities cannot fulfil the necessary functions. A central bureaucracy that uniformly and impersonally administers the state should be avoided. Armack goes even further to point out that there is a necessity for state subventions for small companies and vocational training, codetermination in the workplace and social right of

<footnote n="1">¹ Erhard, Ludwig. *Demokratie heißt Freiheit, Recht und Ordnung* in Erhard, Ludwig. Brüß, Kurt. Hagemeyer, Bernhard (ed.). *Grentzen der Demokratie? Problem und Konsequenzen der Democratisierung von Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Düsseldorf, Vienna: Econ, 1973, p.39.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Broyer, Sylvian. "Retour à l'économie de marché : les débats du Conseil scientifique attaché à l'administration économique de la Bizone," in Commun, Patricia (ed.). *L'ordoliberalisme allemand. Aux sources de l'économie sociale de marché*. Cergy-Pontoise: CIRAC, 2003, p.201-219.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Kloten, Norbert. "Role of the Public Sector in Social Market Economy." In Peacock, A., op. cit., p.74.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Erhard, Ludwig. "Kartelle im Blickpunkt der Wirtschaftspolitik" (1949) in Erhard, Ludwig. *Gedanken..., p.221*.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Erhard, Ludwig. *Prosperity..., op. cit., p. 102*.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Eucken, Walter. *Grundsätze..., op. cit.*, p.313.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Zweynert, Joachim. "Shared mental models, catch-up development and economic policy-making: The cases of Germany after World War II and contemporary Russia" in *Eastern Economic Journal (Eastern Economic Association)*, vol. 32 (3), 2006, p.457-478.</footnote>
participation in the organisation of work, as well as anti-cyclic macroeconomic instruments to ensure full employment<fnref n="1" />.

WILHELM RÖPKE

A presentation of the German liberalism after World War II cannot leave out Wilhelm Röpke (1899-1966), who, together with Alexander Rüstow (1885-1963), played an important role in elaborating the concept of social market economy and influenced the reforms of Ludwig Erhard.

After Röpke's death, Ludwig von Mises wrote that a great part of what is reasonable and positive in Germany's monetary and commercial politics can be attributed to Röpke's influence. Along with Walter Eucken, he is considered one of the intellectual authors of the German economic revival<fnref n="2" />.

Although an economist by profession, Röpke could be called a Renaissance man: he had a very broad academic education, ranging from sociology and politics to literature and art. After having taught at the universities of Jena and Graz and having worked in the Ministry for Economics in Germany, Röpke was forced to leave Nazi Germany, arriving together with Rüstow at the University of Istanbul in 1937, and afterwards, in Geneva. During the war he published several important works, such as *Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart* (The Society Crisis at Present), *Civitas Humana* and *Internationale Ordnung* (International Order), as well as *Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage* (Beyond Demand and Supply). After the war, Röpke was one of the founders of the Mont Pelerin Society.

Both Röpke and Rüstow strongly criticised socialism and the welfare state, as well as too utilitarian an approach of economic liberalism. The market and freedom cannot function by themselves; there is a need for values and basic structures beyond demand and supply. In this way, the two criticise the *laissez-faire* policy, because it does not take into account certain prerequisites related to a moral, ethical, political, judicial and economic law. On the other hand, few were those who brought such strong criticism to the welfare state – a centralised mechanism of social uniformity created by egalitarian democracy. The collective welfare ensured by the state is nothing else but the prosthesis of a collectivist society paralysed by proletarianism, a crutch that protects the economic and moral incapacity of the social classes, caused by the demolition of the old social order. In the “asylum of the welfare state” people turn into “obeying animals from the great state farm,” every one of them receiving “a good part of fodder.” In reality, it is not the masses that benefit from this evolution, but the state and government, which become the factors of decision in what concerns creating and using capital<fnref n="3" />. Röpke also criticised Keynesianism, which he considered to be a symptom of this centralised way of thinking – manipulation at a macroeconomic level cannot take into account all the microeconomic aspects subjected to continuous modification.

As an alternative, Röpke considers that decentralisation is necessary, as well as the involvement of the citizen in his environment – the family, small communities, clubs, associations –, and a greater autonomy of local and regional authorities. In the economic field, we are talking about small and medium enterprises which, according to Röpke, are disadvantaged by the legislation, created to suit the interest of larger companies.

The German School managed to create an economic, judicial and political synthesis in a coherent organisation of the *framework*, not the economic *act*. Without this framework, the state and

<footnote n="1">¹ Müller-Armack, Alfred. "The Second Phase of the Social Market Economy: An Additional Concept of a Humane Economy" in *Standard Texts on the Social Market Economy. Two Centuries of Discussion*. Stuttgart, New York: Ludwig-Erhard-Stiftung, 1982, p.53-61.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Mises, Ludwig von. *Wilhelm Röpke, RIP* in *National Review*, no. 8, 1966, p.200, quoted by Ebeling, Richard. "Wilhelm Röpke: A Centenary Appreciation" in *The Freeman*, October 1999, p.20.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Röpke, Wilhelm. *Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage*. Stuttgart, p. 247.</footnote>
the society could become dominated by strong private economic interests, like it happened during the Weimar Republic. The ideas of Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm and the others were transposed in the economic policy of Germany after the Second World War by Ludwig Erhard and Alfred Müller-Armack. Through the *social market economy* syntagm they obtained the political support to implement the principles of ordoliberalism – establishing an “economic constitution,” “rules of the game” of a powerful state that would ensure the economic liberty by protecting fair competition, the best means of creating a market economy that would guarantee justice and social welfare.

LIBERALISM IN EUROPE. AN ENDLESS DEBATE IN FINDING OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS

Reviewing the school of liberal thought in Germany after the Second World War might leave the impression of a divergence in opinions and approaches – from Mises<fnref n="1" /> “intransigence” in what concerns the state intervention in economy to “social liberalism” shared by some ordoliberals<fnref n="2" /> or French<fnref n="3" /> and Italian<fnref n="4" /> liberals.

An analysis would show that the basic principles are the same; there are however differences in nuance, in the degree of the state's involvement or in the angle of approach. These differences are explainable through the different professions of the members of various schools, as well as through the historical experience and the political and social context of different countries.

The emphasis on the free action of the individual, as a starting point in every analysis of economic functioning, is one of the main common principles of European schools. The free action of each individual is precisely the essence of Mises' economic theory<fnref n="5" />, as opposed to the statistical, quantitative economic approach, which would allow the economy to be governed. In order to explain how the invisible hand works, Hayek, too, starts from the individual, the only one able to observe, calculate, decide and act freely<fnref n="6" />.

Despite the Allies' reluctance, Ludwig Erhard liberalised prices in Germany ever since 1948, this being one of the essential factors that led to the German economic miracle<fnref n="7" />. Free prices, along with an appropriate judicial framework, make possible the functioning of the invisible hand and allow the interaction of a large number of economic agents without the need of direct contact. When the state (or private agents, through cartels or monopolies) intervenes in the process of forming prices, the information contained in the price is no longer correct, and the mechanism is disrupted<fnref n="8" />. Hayek considers that there is a necessity for structures, institutions, and a judicial framework that can prevent the appearance of such cartels and monopolies. The appropriate judicial order, those “rules of the game” which Erhard talked about constitute the other essential pillar of the free market economy. This order has to respect the principles defended by Hayek and the other liberal schools: free and correct functioning of the price system, fair competition, freedom of commerce, private property, freedom of contract. In this context, competition is a means, not a purpose in itself, of ensuring the functioning of a social market economy, which provides the best conditions to as many citizens as possible<fnref n="9" />.

Unlike Hayek, Eucken and the ordoliberals had a different vision in what concerns the role of the state in establishing and implementing this judicial order. Ordoliberals cannot agree to the idea

<footnote n="1">¹ see p.10.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² see p.5.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ see p.25.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ see p.20.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ see p.10.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ see p.13.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ see p.6.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ see p.14.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ see p.5.</footnote>
that free market competition rules can appear and be maintained spontaneously, without being enforced and controlled. Thus, it is not sufficient to apply some main principles and then to allow free development<fnref n="1" />. In his 1948 paper *Individualism and Economic Order*, Hayek proposed the deliberate adoption of principles of competition, market and prices as guidelines and using the judicial framework established by the state to allow a competition as effective as possible, intervening only when the framework proves to be ineffective<fnref n="2" />. We can therefore observe a difference, which is not irreconcilable however. Both Hayek and the ordoliberals support a market model through which the actions of economic operators are spontaneously coordinated within the framework of established rules. The state intervention in the delicate mechanisms of establishing prices is not welcome. In what concerns institutional organisation, ordoliberals make a distinction between the daily functioning of the market and a certain planning, an “economic constitution” that cannot be left to chance. The rules of the “game” have to be clearly established, known and applied by a powerful state. A *laissez-faire* in what regards the rules would paralyse the state in front of personal interests, which would compromise the coherence and neutrality of the rules. This approach can be explained through the historical and political context in Germany after the Second World War. The radical change of society called for the elaboration of a new judicial order in all fields, and liberal ideas were not dominant within the political parties. At the same time, the development of German economy after the First World War led exactly to what Eucken had predicted: seizing of the power of groups of private interests. The political context was however influenced by the American supervision in the reconstruction of Germany, as well as by the role played by Erhard in the government of Germany after the Second World War. Hayek himself considered that Erhard could not have accomplished what he had, had he been subjected to bureaucratic or democratic constraints. It was lucky to have the right person in the right place to do what he considered necessary<fnref n="3" />. Even if he did not specifically say it, Hayek would not have been opposed to the efforts of the ordoliberals to create an economic constitution and an institutional reconstruction in the period after the Second World War.

Between more different liberal schools the problem is the state intervention in the economy, with the purpose of developing “the social matter.” We are dealing with a continuum from Mises and Hayek at an extreme – to which “social justice” has no meaning in the context of free market economy –, to the representatives of the German and Italian Schools.

For ordoliberals, a powerful state and an institutional structure are necessary to maintain a functional competition, the best way to ensure “social justice.” Ordoliberals explained that classic liberals (*laissez-faire*) ignored the probability that, in an environment that allows monopoly, there can be certain individuals who have disproportionate power over others or, in a corporatist society, individuals who can control the public power of the state<fnref n="4" />. Eucken said that the social matter and social justice were the great dilemmas of the time<fnref n="5" />. The fact that the level of income depends on market conditions may lead to serious injustice<fnref n="6" />. Hayek has a different analysis. In his works of social philosophy, he came to the conclusion that the “social matter” cannot be formulated rationally, since there is no one who can give an answer, and the term “social justice” is devoid of content<fnref n="7" />. To Hayek, justice consists in equality before the law, but this does not mean that certain aspects of what “social justice” means are not important. We are however talking about a procedural justice, not a material

<footnote n="1">¹ Eucken, Walter. *Grundsätze...,* op. cit., p. 373.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Hayek, Friedrich von. *Individualism...,* op. cit., p.110.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Hayek, Friedrich von. *The Rediscovery of Freedom: Personal Recollections*, in *The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 4: The Fortunes of Liberalism, Essays on Austrian Economics and the Ideal of Freedom*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992, p.193.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Eucken, Walter. *Grundsätze...,* op. cit., p. 358.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Eucken, Walter. *This Unsuccessful Age...,* op. cit., p.56.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Eucken, Walter. *This Unsuccessful Age...,* op. cit., p.63.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Hayek, Friedrich. *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, vol. 2, op. cit., chapters 9-11.</footnote>
one. The inequality of incomes is the unpredictable and temporary result of individual abilities and opportunities. These results cannot be considered just or unjust according to universally acknowledged principles. We can only assess the rules of the economic system as being just or unjust, but not even this assessment can be considered “universal.”<fnref n="1" /> Still, Hayek does not exclude the possibility of ensuring a minimum wage for those who, within the free market, could not earn their living. Einaudi sustains the same principle of equality of chances and ensuring a necessary minimum<fnref n="2" />. However, just like Rueff, he proposes more interventionist methods to realise this – progressive taxation, inheritance tax, financial aid for certain activities that are desirable for society (such as building houses)<fnref n="3" />. Ordliberals add other versions of “income policies,”<fnref n="4" /> meant to correct the “spontaneous” distribution of income and to satisfy “urgent needs” of the population, all within the concept of “social market economy.” Müller-Armack also supports codetermination in the workplace, using anti-cyclic macroeconomic instruments or subventions for small enterprises<fnref n="5" />.

## THE MONT PELERIN SOCIETY AND THE LIBERAL REVIVAL OF EUROPE

A proof of predominant common principles in the manifestation of the contemporary liberalism is the initiative launched by Friedrich von Hayek in April 1947 in Mont Pelerin (Switzerland) – a debate forum meant to allow reflections on common principles and differences between points of view. This forum – the Mont Pelerin Society – would discuss liberalism and its decline, as well as the possibility of a liberal revival and the desire to form an association of individuals with common beliefs on the nature of a free society<fnref n="6" />. In the society's statement, the 39 members mentioned that the group does not wish to create propaganda. It does not wish to establish a meticulous and limited orthodoxy. It is not allied with any political party. Its objective is simply to contribute to the maintenance and perfecting of the free society by facilitating opinion exchange between the minds animated by common ideals and conceptions<fnref n="7" />. These opinion exchanges were meant to clarify and study problems such as the moral and economic causes of the crisis, redefining the state's functions, methods of re-establishing the lawful state and equality between citizens, the fight against the abusive use of history to promote un-liberal policies and creating an international order that would ensure peace and liberty.

Many of those mentioned in this paper were members or took part in the Society's debates: Friedrich von Hayek (president, 1947-1961), Wilhelm Röpke (president, 1961-1962), Bruno Leoni (president 1967-1968), Walter Eucken, Luigi Einaudi, Karl Popper, Ludwig Erhard, Jacques Rueff, Ludwig von Mises, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Alfred Müller-Armack, Friedrich Böhm, Alexander Rüstow, Salvador de Madariaga. Other members were Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Maurice Allais and James Buchanan, all prominent economists.

Thanks to the lengthy and prestigious academic and public activity, but also thanks to the success of implementing liberal policies in Germany, the representatives of the European liberal schools managed to achieve the objective set by the Mont Pelerin Society, that of promoting “liberal revival.” Even if it took several decades, principles such as promoting fair competition and limiting the state intervention in the economy have become universal principles not only in Europe, but in the entire world. As a proof, these principles can be found among the EU accession criteria, a fact that says a lot about the degree of penetration of liberal ideas launched more than 50 years ago.

<footnote n="1">¹ Hayek, Friedrich. *Law..., op. cit., p.27.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² see p.20.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ see p. 25.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Eucken, Walter. *Grundsätze..., op. cit., p. 300.*</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ see p.7.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Hartwell, R. M. *A History of the Mont Pelerin Society*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995, p.26.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Mont Pelerin Society – “Statement of Aims,” 9.4.2010. <https://www.montpelerin.org/montpelerin/mpsGoals.html></footnote>
The Article was drafted with the support of the European Union in the framework of European Program POSDRU - Proiect cofinanțat din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operațional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007 – 2013 Axa prioritară 1 „Educația și formarea profesională în sprijinul creșterii economice și dezvoltării societății bazate pe cunoaștere”Domeniul major de intervenție 1.5 „Programe doctorale și postdoctorale în sprijinul cercetării”.Titlul proiectului: „Științele socio-umaniste în contextul evoluției globalizate – dezvoltarea și implementarea programului de studii și cercetare postdoctorală” – ID 61104 Contract: POSDRU 89/1.5/S/61104

Bibliography

1. Broyer, Sylvian. "Retour à l'économie de marché: les débats du Conseil scientifique attaché à l'administration économique de la Bizone," in Commun, Patricia (ed.). *L'ordoliberalisme allemand. Aux sources de l'économie sociale de marché*. Cergy-Pontoise: CIRAC, 2003.

2. Erhard, Ludwig. "Franz Oppenheimer, dem Lehrer und Freund" (1964) in Erhard, Ludwig. *Gedanken aus fünf Jahrzehnten*, Düsseldorf-Vienna-New York: Econ, 1957.

3. Erhard, Ludwig. "Kartelle im Blickpunkt der Wirtschaftspolitik" (1949) in Erhard, Ludwig. *Gedanken aus fünf Jahrzehnten*, Düsseldorf-Vienna-New York: Econ, 1957.

4. Erhard, Ludwig. "Demokratie heißt Freiheit, Recht und Ordnung" in Erhard, Ludwig. Brüß, Kurt. Hagemeyer, Bernhard (ed.). *Grentzen der Demokratie? Problem und Konsequenzen der Democratisierung von Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Düsseldorf, Vienna: Econ, 1973.

5. Erhard, Ludwig. *Prosperity through Competition*. London: Thames-Hudson, 1958.

6. Eucken, Walter. *Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik*.

7. Eucken, Walter. *The Foundations of Economics – History and Theory in the Analysis of Economic Reality*. Berlin, New York: Springer, 1992.

8. Eucken, Walter. *This Unsuccessful Age, or, The Pains of Economic Progress*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952.

9. Greenspan, Alan. *The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World*. New York: Penguin Press, 2007.

10. Hartwell, R. M. *A History of the Mont Pelerin Society*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995.

11. Hayek, Friedrich von. *Individualism and Economic Order*, 1948.

12. Hayek, Friedrich. *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, vol. 2, 1976.

13. Hayek, Friedrich von. *The Rediscovery of Freedom: Personal Recollections*, in *The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 4: The Fortunes of Liberalism, Essays on Austrian Economics and the Ideal of Freedom*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.

14. Keynes, John Maynard. *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. The Collected Writings*, vol. 7. London: Macmillan, Cambridge University Press.

15. Kloten, Norbert. *Role of the Public Sector in Social Market Economy*.

16. Melnik, Stefan. *The Current Financial Crisis: Propositions from a Liberal Perspective*, 9.4.2010. <http://www.stmelnik.com/>

17. Miniter, Richard. "Wilhelm von Humboldt: German Classical Liberal." *The Freeman*, vol. 41, no. 2, February 1991.

18. Mises, Ludwig von. "Wilhelm Röpke, RIP" in *National Review*, no. 8, 1966, p.200, quoted by Ebeling, Richard. "Wilhelm Röpke: A Centenary Appreciation" in *The Freeman*, October 1999.

19. Müller-Armack, Alfred. "The Second Phase of the Social Market Economy: An Additional Concept of a Humane Economy" in *Standard Texts on the Social Market Economy. Two Centuries of Discussion*. Stuttgart, New York: Ludwig-Erhard-Stiftung, 1982.

20. Röpke, Wilhelm. *Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage*. Stuttgart.

21. Taylor, John. "How Government Created the Financial Crisis." *Wall Street Journal*, 9.2.2009.

22. Wiseman, Jack. *Social Policy and the Social Market Economy*.

23. Zweynert, Joachim. "Shared mental models, catch-up development and economic policy-making: The cases of Germany after World War II and contemporary Russia" in *Eastern Economic Journal (Eastern Economic Association)*, vol. 32 (3), 2006.

<figure><img src="image_37.png" /></figure>
# La réalisation de l'Espace Economique Européen

DR. FLORE POP

Professor, Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca

**Abstract:** *The Creation of the European Economic Area (EEA).* The long-term cooperation between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Community (EEC) – that has meanwhile become the European Union (EU) – led to the creation of a complex economic setting, the biggest in the world when the agreement was signed at Porto in May 2002. This short article summarizes the evolution of these two European organizations from the perspective of their common project: the European Economic Area (EEA).

**Keywords:** EU, European Economic Area, EFTA.

## A. L'ASSOCIATION EUROPÉENNE DE LIBRE ECHANGE

<figure><img src="image_38.png" /></figure>

Le 25 mars 1957, par la signature des Traités de Rome, l'Allemagne, la Belgique, la France, l'Italie, le Luxembourg et les Pays-Bas ont créé la Communauté Economique Européenne<fnref n="1" /> et la Communauté Européenne pour l'Energie Atomique (C.E.E.A. ou Euratom). Les Six se proposent à ce moment-là, selon le Traité C.E.E., de « promouvoir un développement harmonieux des activités économiques dans l'ensemble de la Communauté, une expansion continue et équilibrée, une stabilité accrue, un relèvement accéléré du niveau de vie et des relations plus étroites entre les Etats qu'elle réunit ». En réaction à la mise sur pied de cette organisation économique une initiative concurrente vois le jour en 1960².

### 1. Chronologie et objectifs initiaux

L'Association Européenne de Libre Echange a été créée le 3 janvier 1960 par l'Autriche, le Danemark, la Norvège, le Portugal, le Royaume-Uni, la Suède et la Suisse, à l'initiative du Royaume-Uni, par la signature – le 3 janvier 1960 – de la Convention de Stockholm<fnref n="3" />, entrée en vigueur quatre mois plus tard, au 3 mai 1960. Le Liechtenstein s'y est rallié ultérieurement, l'Islande en 1970, et la Finlande a été membre associé depuis 1961 jusqu'à son adhésion à l'Union Européenne. Entre 1967 et 1972 ont quitté l'organisation le Danemark, le Royaume-Uni et la Norvège, suite au début des négociations d'adhésion à la C.E.E., le Portugal s'est retiré en 1985, en fin – en 1995 ont quitté l'A.E.L.E. l'Autriche, la Finlande et la Suède, pour le même motif.

Le siège de la toute nouvelle organisation a été fixé à Genève, où a été installé également son *Secrétariat international*. A Bruxelles a son siège *l'Autorité de surveillance* de l'A.E.L.E., compétente dans le domaine de la concurrence. La vocation initiale de l'A.E.L.E. était de mettre sur pied une zone de commerce libre, sans établir un tarif douanier commun, donc sans l'ambition d'évoluer vers une union douanière. Cette organisation fonctionne jusqu'à aujourd'hui comme une simple zone de libre-échange, sans une politique économique commune, à l'exception du fait que les droits de douane et autres taxes pour les importations entre les Etats membres ont été supprimés au 1er janvier 1967.

### 2. Structure et organes

L'A.E.L.E. est administrée par un *Conseil*, qui est d'ailleurs son seul organe exécutif. L'organisation s'est dotée d'un *Secrétariat*, ayant à sa tête un *secrétaire général*. Le Conseil est composé des

<footnote n="1">¹ Sur la création de la C.E.E., voir, entre autres, Jean BOULOUIS, *Droit institutionnel des Communautés européennes*, Montchrestien, Paris, 1991, pp. 25-30.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Cette organisation a été créée, selon certains analystes, plus par un esprit de réaction, inspiré aux pays membres par l'initiative d'intégration des six pays fondateurs de la C.E.E.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Sur la création de l'A.E.L.E., voir *L'A.E.L.E.*, Secrétariat de l'A.E.L.E., Genève, 1987, 235 p.</footnote>
représentants des Etats membres, les décisions étant prises par consensus. Le Conseil se réunit habituellement deux fois par an au niveau des ministres. Cet organe exécutif est assisté par des *comités permanents* et des *groupes d'experts* dans les domaines considérés importants, comme l'agriculture, la pêche, etc. Le Conseil joue entre autres le rôle d'arbitre dans le cas des différends entre les Etats membres. Il peut négocier un accord avec un Etat membre ou avec un Etat tiers (par exemple, l'accord du 27 mars 1961 avec la Finlande), ou avec les autres organisations internationales à vocation régionale ou universelle (par exemple, l'accord avec la Communauté.).

Les accords réalisés avec d'autres Etats ou avec d'autres organisations internationales sont soumises aux ratifications des Etats membres.

Le Conseil adopte des décisions obligatoires pour les Etats membres, ainsi que des recommandations. Par l'intermédiaire du mécanisme du règlement des différends cet organe solutionne les cas de non respect de ses actes ou de la Constitution fondatrice de 1960.

L'organisation s'est dotée, suite à l'accord avec la Communauté européenne – pour la réalisation d'un espace économique européen intégré, d'autres structures comme le *Comité permanent*, chargé d'assurer la coordination avec l'Espace Economique Européen (E.E.E.), et la Cour A.E.L.E., siégeant à Genève, chargée du règlement des différends entre les pays membres.

La philosophie de cette organisation est bien différente de celle d'une union douanière, en lui opposant la formule d'une zone de libre-échange<fnref n="1" />, par laquelle les Etats membres abaissent leurs barrières douanières internes, mais conservent leurs tarifs douaniers nationaux envers les pays tiers, éliminent les restrictions quantitatives, ainsi que les obstacles non-tarifaires au niveau européen.

L'A.E.L.E. a réussi une bonne période de temps de faire pression sur la C.E.E., en démontrant ainsi la viabilité de l'idée de libre-échange, dont l'intérêt majeur était de suivre le plus possible les rythmes de libéralisation des échanges économiques imposés par les Communautés, mais sans s'encombrer de la bureaucratie supranationale des dites Communautés.

La logique d'une intégration très profonde adoptée par la C.E.E. a fini, pourtant, par donner à cette dernière gain de cause, car de façon indirecte et à travers des méthodes spécifiques elle a réussi à amoindrir le rôle de l'A.E.L.E., en réduisant son effectif à trois membres, tous les autres étant intégrés dans les structures de l'actuelle Union Européenne, où les standards législatifs et institutionnels sont beaucoup plus élevés. En dehors des accords « individuels » de libre-échange réalisés par ses pays membres, l'A.E.L.E. a signé plusieurs accords bilatéraux avec d'autres organisations – c'est le cas, notamment – comme nous l'avons vu, de celui qui la lie à la Communauté (ou à des pays européens, dont la Roumanie<fnref n="2" />).

## B. LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ET L'EVOLUTION DE LA NOUVELLE ENTITE CREE PAR L'ACCORD DE PORTO

Le plus important des accords internationaux signés par l'A.E.L.E. est celui instituant un Espace Economique Européen, signé à Porto, le 2 mai 1992 (entrée en vigueur le 1er janvier 1994), avec la Communauté européenne, suite à un premier accord, du 22 octobre 1991, qui a suscité les critiques de la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes (C.J.C.E.), relatives à la création d'une juridiction indépendante qui aurait eu compétence en matière de règlement des différends, qui s'est soldé ainsi par un échec<fnref n="3" />. L'accord signé à Porto a permis, suite à des négociations ultérieures, un premier élargissement de l'E.E.E.

<footnote n="1">¹ Dominique CARREAU, Thiébaud FLORY, Patrick JUILLARD, *Droit international économique*, Dalloz, 3ème édition, Paris, 1990, pp. 123-124.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² La Roumanie a signé un accord avec l'A.E.L.E. le 10 décembre 1992, à Genève, accord ratifié par la Loi n° 19/1993, publiée dans le *Moniteur Officiel*, Première partie, n° 75, du 16 avril 1993.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Cf. EUROPE, Bruxelles, 16 et 17 décembre 1991, n° 5631, p. 7.</footnote>
Au départ – radicalement antagonistes, les deux grandes organisations européennes ont fini par subir des évolutions spectaculaires.

## 1. La Communauté européenne et la coopération initiale avec l'A.E.L.E.

Le but des pères fondateurs des Communautés européennes était celui de mettre sur pied une union totale: économique, douanière, ensuite monétaire, politique et militaire, avec un degré d'intégration très profond, pour promouvoir un développement harmonieux dans l'ensemble des pays membres. Cela a provoqué, nous l'avons vu, des inquiétudes à certains pays non membres, qui par souci de préserver leurs intérêts ont préféré promouvoir une initiative parallèle, menant à la création d'une zone de libre-échange. Malgré l'antagonisme initial entre les deux grandes aires de coopération et les différences de structure (les Communautés étant nées d'un traité comportant une gamme complète d'institutions et d'organes qui collaborent à l'exercice du pouvoir: exécutif, législatif et judiciaire), une amorce de collaboration a été possible dès la décennie suivante à leur fondation, menant finalement à un projet d'envergure.

La coopération entre la Communauté européenne et l'A.E.L.E. pour la création de l'Espace Economique Européen, matérialisée finalement par la signature de l'accord de Porto (Portugal) du 2 mai 1992, était une modalité d'impliquer dans la coopération pan-européenne des pays qui ne pouvaient ou ne voulaient pas adhérer à l'Union Européenne, comme l'Islande, la Norvège, etc. Cette réalisation notable était précédée, comme nous l'avons signalé, par de nombreux accords bilatéraux, qui ont été signés durant les dernières deux décennies d'avant l'accord de Porto, à commencer par les accords de commerce, spécialement après 1973, surtout concernant les produits agricoles. D'autres accords – relatifs aux sciences et technologies, à la protection de l'environnement ou à d'autres domaines d'intérêt mutuel – ont été mis sur pied dans cette période. D'ailleurs, en 1972 les pays de l'A.E.L.E. ont signé individuellement des accords de libre-échange avec la Communauté, dans le but déclaré d'éliminer les taxes douanières à l'importation des produits industriels, action achevée en 1977.

Au-delà de ce cadre, la Communauté européenne elle-même a évolué de manière significative durant ces dernières décennies (dans les années quatre-vingts la Commission Européenne avait lancé le projet d'envergure d'un marché interne complètement intégré, projet retenu par l'Acte Unique Européen – A.U.E. – signé en 1986 et entré en vigueur en 1987), ses relations avec l'A.E.L.E. étant généralement cordiales. On apprécie que la Communauté a été le principal partenaire commercial de l'A.E.L.E. Encore en 1984 les Etats membres de l'A.E.L.E. et la Communauté européenne ont adopté une Déclaration commune relative à la mise sur pied d'un Espace Economique Européen intégré, qui prévoyait les principales voies de leur future collaboration, tout spécialement dans le cadre du commerce des marchandises. Ainsi, entre 1984 et 1989 ont été éliminées les barrières commerciales, au cas par cas, mais il y avait encore des entraves au commerce – vu que certains domaines étaient retenus pour la coopération et d'autres non.

En tenant compte de ces circonstances, à la fin de cette période – dès 1989, le Président de la Commission Européenne – Jacques Delors, avait proposé aux membres d'alors de l'A.E.L.E. (l'Autriche, la Finlande, l'Islande, le Liechtenstein, la Norvège, la Suède et la Suisse) une nouvelle forme de partenariat, beaucoup mieux structurée, qui allait devenir plus tard l'Accord sur l'E.E.E.

## 2. L'Accord instituant un Espace Economique Européen

Les négociations effectives entre la C.E.E. et l'A.E.L.E., pour la création de l'Espace Economique Européen, ont commencé en juin 1990 et ont mené à un premier accord en 1991, mais qui n'est jamais entré en vigueur, miné par l'intervention de la Cour de Justice de Luxembourg, l'accord définitif étant signé à peine le 2 mai 1992, au bout d'une nouvelle étape de négociations.

### a) L'importance de l'accord réalisé

i) *L'échec de 1991.* A l'occasion des travaux préliminaires et par l'accord de 1991 – la Communauté et l'A.E.L.E. avaient essayé de créer une juridiction indépendante, compétente en
matière de règlement des différends éventuels entre les pays membres de cet espace intégré. La nouvelle Cour devait avoir huit juges – cinq de la part de la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes et trois de la part des pays membres de l'A.E.L.E.

Mais la C.J.C.E. a apprécié, par avis du 16 décembre 1991, que la mise sur pied d'une telle juridiction porterait atteinte à l'autonomie du système juridictionnel communautaire<fnref n="1" />. L'institution d'un nouveau système indépendant dans le cadre du nouvel accord sur l'E.E.E. était ainsi jugée incompatible avec le Traité C.E.E. La C.J.C.E. y voit également une atteinte à son indépendance et se voit obligée de critiquer la possibilité que pourrait avoir une Cour de l'E.E.E. de définir les compétences des institutions communautaires, ainsi que celles des Etats membres de la Communauté. En plus, selon la C.J.C.E., une Cour de l'E.E.E. ferait sans doute double emploi et serait de toute façon contraire à l'article 219 du Traité C.E.E., qui prévoit l'obligation des Etats membres de soumettre leurs différends à la C.J.C.E. Pour ne pas parler de l'inconvénient créé par le fait que les cinq juges de la C.J.C.E. devront siéger tantôt à la Cour de l'E.E.E., tantôt à la C.J.C.E. – sur des questions commerciales – et dès lors ils n'auront plus leur indépendance d'esprit lorsqu'ils reviendraient siéger à la C.J.C.E. sur des questions identiques à celles dont ils viendraient de trancher à la Cour de l'E.E.E.

Comme la C.J.C.E. ne rend que des décisions obligatoires, la Cour de Luxembourg s'opposait à ce que les Etats membres de l'A.E.L.E. puissent lui demander des avis non contraignants. En outre, aucune des dispositions du Traité C.E.E. n'autorise ses Etats membres à créer une nouvelle institution juridictionnelle.

L'accord instituant un Espace Economique Européen a été considéré comme important de part et d'autre. Cette entente instaura à la date de sa signature une zone de commerce libre de grandes dimensions, un marché interne gouverné par les mêmes règles de base. Suite aux crises successives des années '70, qui ont mené à une poussée de protectionnismes dans le commerce mondial, de manière que les statistiques des organisations économiques internationales montraient que seulement 20 % des échanges mondiaux s'effectuaient en régime de commerce libre (promu alors par le GATT, devenu entre temps l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce), on a constaté qu'une certaine intensification des « guerres économiques », ainsi que l'interdépendance croissante des économies mènent à une évolution accélérée vers la libéralisation des échanges économiques. Au point de vue régional, on a observé une libéralisation des échanges par l'intermédiaire des unions douanières ou des zones de commerce libre.

L'Espace Economique Européen, en tant que zone de libre-échange (même si les Etats encore membres de l'A.E.L.E. n'ont transféré aucune compétence législative vers les institutions nouvellement créées par cet accord), ainsi que les autres zones de commerce libre apparues dans le monde ces dernières années, suggèrent l'idée que l'internationalisation croissante des grandes provocations actuelles (les questions liées à la protection de l'environnement, au chômage, le contrôle de l'immigration, les nouvelles politiques industrielles et régionales, etc.) porte atteinte au concept de « souveraineté nationale », tel qu'il a été compris jusqu'il y a peu.

b) *Principes généraux et objectifs préliminaires de l'Accord*

i) Les principes d'intérêt majeur et le premier élargissement de l'E.E.E. Les « quatre libertés » ou principes d'intérêt majeur pour l'intégration et la coopération économique promus par la Communauté européenne sont applicables à partir du 1er janvier 1994 (la date d'entrée en vigueur du traité de Porto) également aux pays de l'A.E.L.E. L'E.E.E. comprend actuellement 30 Etats – les 27 pays membres de l'Union Européenne et les trois membres actuels de l'A.E.L.E. – et 505 millions d'habitants. La Suisse a décidé par référendum, en décembre 1992, de ne pas participer à l'E.E.E., en reniant ainsi son statut de membre, tout en développant ses relations avec la Communauté européenne par le biais des

<footnote n="1">¹ Ibid.</footnote>
accords bilatéraux. Le Liechtenstein est devenu membre à part entière de la nouvelle organisation au 1er mai 1995. Un premier élargissement de l'E.E.E. a eu lieu au 1er mai 2004¹, lorsque dix des douze pays candidats à l'adhésion (la République Tchèque, l'Estonie, le Chypre, la Lettonie, la Lituanie, la Hongrie, Malte, la Pologne, la Slovénie et la Slovaquie) ont intégré l'U.E. Les négociations en vue de cet élargissement, débutées en janvier 2003 et finalisées en juillet, ont eu comme objet les arrangements financiers et les contributions des Etats pour éliminer les disparités de développement, les différences économiques et sociales dans le cadre de l'E.E.E., ainsi que les modalités d'accès sur le marché des produits de la pêche, l'accord étant signé au mois de novembre 2003.

ii) *L'acceptation de l'acquis communautaire. Les exceptions.* L'accord sur l'E.E.E. implique pour les pays signataires (membres de l'A.E.L.E.) l'assimilation de toutes les directives communautaires relatives à la libre circulation des personnes, biens, services et capitaux, des règles dites « horizontales » (la politique sociale, la protection des consommateurs, la protection de l'environnement, la statistique et le droit des sociétés), ainsi que des politiques d'accompagnement ou la coopération en dehors des susdites « quatre libertés » ou les domaines de « flanc » (recherche fondamentale, développement technologique, éducation, formation continue, protection civile, etc.). Ont été exclus du traité constitutif des domaines importants comme les politiques communes concernant l'agriculture et la pêche (mais l'accord prévoit divers aspects concernant le commerce des produits agricoles et piscicoles). L'accord ne comprend pas non plus l'union douanière, la politique commerciale commune, la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune, la justice et les affaires intérieures (même si la Norvège et l'Islande sont des signataires de l'accord de Schengen), l'union économique et monétaire.

### c) Législation, procédures, institutions politiques et de contrôle de l'E.E.E.

i) *La dynamique législative de l'accord.* L'Accord signé à Porto en 1992 est réalisé sur la base des traités fondateurs (le droit primaire ou originaire), du droit dérivé (directives, règlements, décisions, etc.) et de certains instruments non-obligatoires de l'E.E.E., adoptés au fil du temps par les institutions communautaires.

L'accord lui-même est constitué de 129 articles, 22 annexes et 49 protocoles.

En respectant une certaine dynamique, les règles usuelles de l'accord sont actualisées continuellement par l'ajout de la nouvelle législation et des nouvelles normes. Chaque mois un nombre croissant de normes et d'actes législatifs relevant de l'E.E.E. sont incorporés dans l'Accord par la décision du Comité Commun de l'E.E.E.

ii) *Le processus décisionnel et les organes de décision de l'E.E.E.* La prise effective d'une décision a posé aux négociateurs des deux parties un problème épineux du point de vue institutionnel et politique. Ainsi, devait être prévue une modalité de prise de décision qui pourrait permettre aux deux ensembles de pays de s'exprimer de façon équitable, mais sans faire appel à un système de pondération de voix, qui aurait procuré de toute façon une majorité confortable aux membres de l'U.E. On a évité également l'hypothèse des négociations bilatérales entre un représentant de l'A.E.L.E. et un représentant de la Communauté. On a opté finalement pour un *Conseil de l'E.E.E.*, formé par les représentants des pays de l'A.E.L.E. et des ceux des Communautés, conseil qui devait se réunir deux fois par an au niveau des ministres. La présidence du Conseil doit revenir, par alternance, au représentant de chacune des deux entités.

Les organes de l'E.E.E. sont les suivants: le *Conseil de l'E.E.E.*, le *Comité mixte de l'E.E.E.* (chargé d'évaluer la jurisprudence des deux Cours de Justice et d'éviter les divergences), le *Comité parlementaire commun de l'E.E.E.* et le *Comité consultatif de l'E.E.E.* Ces organes sont habilités de maintenir la liaison entre les deux grandes organisations économiques continentales.

<footnote n="1">¹ Les négociations pour l'élargissement de l'E.E.E. ont eu lieu entre janvier et juillet 2003, la signature de l'accord final étant différée pour le mois de novembre de la même année.</footnote>
iii) *La procédure de règlement des différends*. Suite à maints débats on a accepté finalement que la C.J.C.E. sera seule compétente dans le domaine de la concurrence (autorisations de fusion, aides d'Etat). Néanmoins, l'A.E.L.E. pourra se prononcer à elle seule sur une telle question si au moins 33 % du chiffre d'affaires de l'entreprise fusionnée sont réalisés dans ses pays membres. En même temps, l'U.E. pourra demander que la C.J.C.E. se prononce elle-même dans ce même dossier si la dite fusion aura des conséquences importantes pour son marché.

Une *procédure d'arbitrage* est prévue pour les litiges concernant les autres domaines. Cette procédure sera valable pour tous les litiges que surviendront dans le cadre de l'E.E.E., dans tous les domaines, sauf la concurrence.

En guise de conclusion – on doit rappeler l’importance des implications juridiques et économiques, très complexes, de cet accord, signé une première fois le 22 octobre 1991, mais qui a été renégocié et parafé le 14 avril 1992, signé dans sa forme finale le 2 mai 1992 et entré en vigueur le 1er janvier 1994. Tout d’abord, les pays membres de l’A.E.L.E. devaient intégrer dans leur droit national l’*acquis communautaire* et harmoniser leurs législations dans les domaines les plus importants avec les normes de l’U.E., ce qui même pour eux présentaient des difficultés inhérentes. Mais ces pays n’ont pas été ne seront pas obligés de participer aux politiques communautaires en matière de défense, diplomatie, monnaie unique ou autres domaines communs, par contre ils seront associés dans les affaires commerciales de l’U.E. Ainsi, dans le moment actuel de la globalisation et de l’interdépendance des économies, de la multiplications des échanges régionaux et interrégionaux, l’E.E.E. sera appelé à avoir un puissant impact sur le commerce mondial, dans une époque qui se dessine comme celle des antagonismes entre les grands blocs commerciaux<fnref n="1" />.

**Bibliographie**

1. ACCORD réalisé sur la création de l'Espace Economique Européen.

2. J. BOULOUIS, *Droit institutionnel des Communautés européennes*, Montchrestien, Paris, 1999.

3. CONSTANTINESCO (et al.), *Traité sur l'Union Européenne, Commentaire article par article*, Economica, Paris, 1995.

4. J. BOULOUIS, M. DARMON, *Contentieux communautaire*, Précis Dalloz, 2ème édition, Paris, 2000.

5. J.-Cl. GAUTRON, sous la direction de, *Les relations Communauté européenne Europe de l'Est*, Paris, Economica, 1991.

6. *Droit communautaire*, Précis Dalloz, 9ème édition, Paris, 2000.

7. *Droit européen*, Dalloz, 9ème édition, Paris, 1999.

8. G. ISAAC, *Droit communautaire général*, Paris, Armand Colin, 8ème édition, 2002.

9. CARREAU, T. FLORY, P. JUILLARD, *Droit international économique*, Dalloz, 3ème édition, Paris, 1990.

10. F. ALDECOA LUZARAGA, « Una Europa ». *Su proceso constituyente*, Madrid, Ed. Biblioteca Nueva, 2003, 341 p.

11. MOLINA DEL POZO, *Manual de Derecho de la Comunidad Europea*, 3a edición, Editorial Trivium S.A., Madrid, 1997.

12. MANGAS MARTIN, D., B. J. LINÁN NOGUERAS, *Instituciones y derecho de la Unión Europea*, 2a edición, McGRAW-HILL/INTERAMERICANA DE ESPANA, S.A.U., Madrid, 1999.

13. J. RIDEAU, *Droit institutionnel de l'Union et des Communautés Européennes*, 4ème édition, L.G.D.J., Paris, 2001.

14. SECRÉTARIAT DE L'A.E.L.E., *L'A.E.L.E.*, Genève, 1987, 235 p.

15. TAMAMES, M. LÓPEZ, *La Unión Europea*, 5a edición, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 2002.

16. N. STOFFEL VALLOTTON, « El Espacio Económico Europeo: un ejemplo de integración diferenciada en las relaciones exteriores de la Unión Europea. La aplicación del acervo comunitario a terceros Estados », *Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo*, n° 15, mai/août 2003, pp. 573-625.

<figure><img src="image_39.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1">¹ Voir en ce sens les développements récents sur les autres continents, les autres essais de coopération régionale dans le domaine économique.</footnote>
# Limits of the Financial and Banking Integration

DR. DRAGOŞ PĂUN

"Babeş-Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca

**Abstract:** The following article makes an overview of the limits of the financial and banking integration inside the Euro Area. The article presents the situation of the Central and Eastern European Countries that have recently joined the European Union and are on the verge of adopting the Euro. The article also presents some of the features of the Single Market and raises questions about the possibility of having a financial integration. The article presents some of the key aspects that are now to be handled by Romania on the road of adopting the Euro.

**Keywords:** banking, European Union, integration, Euro.

<figure><img src="image_40.png" /></figure>

High price transparency and the elimination of exchange rate fluctuation uncertainty accelerate the integration process of EU product markets and financial services.

Integrated product markets contribute to the intensification of international trade, competition growth and support foreign investments. The most integrated financial service markets provide high liquidity markets, distribution possibilities (the diversification of risk) and low capital acquisition costs. Through its role in the international financial system, the single European currency has started to ensure income and to strengthen Europe's resistance to external economic shocks. These positive effects stimulate the high competitiveness of the eurozone economy, which leads to rapid economic growth and higher living standards.

However, the eurozone productivity does not fully correspond to these optimistic expectations. It is much too early to talk about the advantages of adopting the euro. Various empirical analyses evaluating the effects of the single European currency shape a mixed image, not always clear. If we take a look at the expected final effect of the European unification, we have to admit that there are some deficiencies in what concerns the demand of the largest eurozone economy (especially on the labour market). These deficiencies can be explained through the disagreement that persists in national policies implemented between the '70s and the '80s. The euro was introduced in insufficiently reformed national economies and, although it brought advantages in certain fields (increase of international trade, reduction of capital acquisition costs for large companies), its effects could not be reflected in the increase of overall productivity in the eurozone. The euro did not exert a direct influence on the elimination of structural deficiencies (we have mentioned the insufficient flexibility of labour markets, unsustainable social systems in a long-term perspective, inefficient service markets, etc., belonging to several countries that joined the eurozone in the late '90s).

The impact of the euro in the progress of reforms had motivational effects only before the adoption of the currency in 1999, when the euro preparations stimulated a fiscal consolidation and a reduction in inflation. However, the structural reform has remained poor, and after the euro adoption, the process has become slower.

The consequence of insufficient reform initiatives, especially in the area of labour markets, is that some eurozone countries are negatively exposed to the effects of the globalisation, EU market integration and to the EU enlargement to the East. These countries will have to increase the competitiveness of their own employees and renew the trust of investors and consumers; to put it simply, they will have to adapt to the new international environment through essential and structural reforms.

In many eurozone countries, the direct pressure of financial markets on budgetary policies disappeared after the adoption of the euro. The market pressure was replaced by the administrative pressure of the European Commission, less effective and relatively slow in decision-making.
ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS. RISKS FOR THE EURO SYSTEM

The single internal market has brought advantages to the business environment and consumers of the EU. However, some barriers persist in areas where common standards have not been accepted and national laws still apply. For example, barriers against the free circulation of goods, services, capital and workers on the internal market diminish the implementation of the single market and of the euro advantage.

In what concerns trade (circulation of goods), we can observe various technical barriers imposed by national governments or unregulated barriers created by consumer groups, trade associations or governmental recommendations that are not compulsory for consumers. Such barriers meant for health protection, environment protection and consumer safety serve national or regional interests and impose additional import costs, which are not covered by producers. Exceptionally, the rules of free goods and services circulation are broken by the member states.

Services are part of the total EU 27 GDP value, with 60 to 70%. Although the service trade between member states is growing (unlike the goods trade), its worth is of only 20% of the mutual goods exchange. Despite the Maastricht Treaty assurances<fnref n="1" />, the common market is more likely a distant dream rather than a reality (McCreevy, 2005: 14). Opening a service market by eliminating numerous legislative and administrative barriers is also found in the ambitious project for services *Service Directive on the Internal Market* elaborated by the European Commission in January 2004. Although the estimated economic effects of the adoption of the Directive are favourable, so far the development shows that there are numerous difficulties. Moreover, the Directive is, politically speaking, situated in a very sensitive area.

The financial services and the financial integration represent a significant matter on the EU internal market agenda. The essence of these problems is the creation – still insufficient –, of a regulating legislation for the sector of financial services, seen in an integration vision of European financial markets<fnref n="2" />.

The euro has significantly contributed to the integration of monetary markets, bond markets and stock exchange and has brought advantages by lowering the cost of capital acquisition. The retail banking market is still segmented by national borders (Kaltenthaler, 2006: 125). This fact is reflected in the limited amount of foreign loans. Positive effects for the population and small companies are missing. Although supportive measures<fnref n="3" /> have been implemented in the legislation, the existence of national regulations in the field of consumer protection prevents the development of the common market. At the EU level there are discussions about the directives necessary for the consumer, meant to harmonise the laws, regulations and administrative measures in the field of loans.

Beyond legislative barriers, the integration is prevented by national languages and cultural barriers, but also by other factors (preference for local service providers, problems in estimating the level of risk for a client of a different EU state, difficulties in evaluating accounts of clients of other

<footnote n="1">¹ The freedom of services is established through Art.43 of the Maastricht Treaty, according to which a person has the right to develop stable economic activities in one or several member states. The freedom to provide services across borders is emphasized in Art.49 of the Maastricht Treaty, according to which a person providing services in one member state has the right to temporarily provide the same service in a different member state, without the obligation of establishing an organizational structure in that state. These two articles and the freedoms they promote are crucial for the functioning of the internal market of the EU.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² This objective is part of the *Financial Services Action Plan* and the *Green Paper on Financial Services Policy 2005-2010*, published in May 2005 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0177en01.pdf)</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ See the second bank directive of the EC, crucial for the elimination of legislative barriers for bank services abroad (http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/frdint12&div=18&id=&page=).</footnote>
EU states)<fnref n="1" />. Problems that slow down the integration of the common financial market include the relatively slow implementation of European laws within national laws, inconsistent implementation of European standards at a national level and the disagreement caused by the lack of supervision of the cross-border cooperation mechanism of European financial supervisors.

The free movement of capital through direct investments is prevented by national laws, through which some member states violate Art.56 of the Maastricht Treaty, guaranteeing the free movement of capital. The norms which limit the acquisition of equity shares or which restrict opportunities for participation in the administration or control of the company discourage foreign investors and restrict the access to the single market.

After the EU enlargement, most of the old member states limited the free movement of workers for a period of even 7 years. Today, in 2010, many eurozone countries still have closed labour markets for the new member states, especially for Romania and Bulgaria. Of course, there are economic reasons for such restrictions. However, they represent extra barriers for the greater economic growth of Europe and contribute to the conservation of the non-flexible economic environment in some western states. According to the *theory of the optimal currency area* (Mundell, 1961: 18-40), the profitability of a monetary union is conditioned by the mobility of the labour force and the capital of the states that make up that monetary union. The theory is correct because if the real economies of the countries that make up monetary unions are affected by an asymmetric shock, the absorption instrument in the form of nominal exchange rate is no longer available. In this regard, Mundell's model relies on the non-flexibility of wages and on the reduction of prices in a short time and, therefore, a response to asymmetric shocks involves only replacing a part of the workforce. If labour mobility is restricted, asymmetric shocks will increase the unemployment rate in the respective countries.

Hochreiter's references (Hochreiter 2002: 160) point out that, while the labour mobility in Europe is low and the stability of the common market has not changed, the flexibility of real wages has risen. This way, according to the renowned economist, labour mobility is not an inevitable condition for the proper functioning of the eurozone. In Hochreiter's opinion, the flexibility of real wages and the flexibility of prices on goods and service markets are the key factors for adapting to asymmetrical shocks.

Tavlas (Tavlas 2002: 172-215) does not agree to the conclusions of the above mentioned economists, showing that the low mobility of labour in the eurozone is alarming. He suggests that although labour mobility is not crucial for creating a monetary union, it is an inevitable condition for its implementation with full rights and benefits for the single European currency.

We consider that the lack of labour mobility in the EU, the administrative obstacles for the free movement of workers coming from the newer member states and, at the same time, the incomplete elements of the common market in the service sector, constitute a major drawback in the faster adoption of the euro by all new member states of the European Communities.

## THE COMMON MONETARY POLICY INVOLVES A DECENTRALISED FISCAL POLICY

One of the concerns and possible risks of entering the eurozone is represented by the scepticism regarding the monetary union project. In fact, this is a coherence problem of the common monetary policy based on national competences in fiscal policy matters. The aforementioned aspects have previously been resolved by the *Stability and Growth Pact*. The fiscal pact was conceived in such a way that the decentralised fiscal policy is consistent with the discussions about the common monetary

<footnote n="1">¹ The integration of credit registries and the retail payment system could contribute to resolving these situations. At present, the payment in euro is ready for retail payments, but we cannot wait for its practical use in the next period.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² See http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/economicandmonetaryaffairs/stabilityandgrowthpact/indexen.htm/</footnote>
policies. Recent discussions regarding the SGP and its results have led to an amendment of the norms and have shown that the “optimal” proposal of tax norms has not yet been reached, a key to successful implementation of the common monetary policy with the decentralised fiscal policy being the national governments’ formal approval and adoption of the laws<fnref n="1" />.

The main reason specialists and decision makers in European matters complain about the promotion of certain fiscal regulations is the perpetuation of the deficit, which manifests itself through the implementation of the fiscal policy by almost all states and governments. The uneven political process of the eurozone, the tendency of spending more and indebted future taxpayers – these represent the constant governmental practice of EU countries. The main negative consequences of this practice are the government debt accumulation and the visible pressure on the increase of interest rates, with a negative long-term impact on economic growth.

The uneven fiscal policy generates other negative aspects as well, such as excessive growth of government spending and prices, while also fuelling the pressure of the inflation in the economy. In this case, the monetary policy, oriented towards profitability (or towards exchange rate stability), loses credibility.

Although the European central bank system does not allow financing by central banks without additional norms, responsible fiscal policies cannot be guaranteed (in this context, clear norms are needed, both fiscal norms and contractual obligations).

Within the eurozone, the exchange risk does not function as an instrument that would regulate government lending by immediately increasing their debt costs. Financial markets cannot directly sanction a poor fiscal policy, even if the costs go to other eurozone members (governments, households, businesses). This situation facilitates loans (there is a “free riding” risk – wrong implementation of the fiscal policy without suffering all its consequences).

Another reason supporting fiscal regulations is the stabilising function of fiscal policies in the economic cycle. In certain circumstances, when there is a sufficient margin, the fiscal policy can act as an automatic stabiliser (it can reduce cyclic fluctuations in the economy). A preliminary condition is that the fiscal deficit created within the economic cycle must not be so great that reducing it would impose discretionary interventions. The discretionary fiscal policy is, in general, less effective, since, in the EU, it is difficult to both establish the measures and estimate the effects, which are usually pro-cyclic. In order to stimulate fiscal stabilisers, the level of the fiscal deficit has to be, on average, low enough or close to zero during the cycle, so that the fiscal deficit could be maintained within acceptable limits, including during the recession.

Fiscal laws have to meet certain conditions to become effective. These have to be adequate, not represent an inadequate burden or a restriction for the economy. The laws have to be sufficiently consistent to support trust in the fiscal policy, but also sufficiently flexible to allow the adoption of measures in emergency situations, since otherwise there is a risk of governments not respecting them.

The laws should be simple to enable their supervision, but not so simple as to avoid applying those laws, taking into account the complexity of the economic reality.

The SGP involves 27 EU countries. This policy should respect the differences between the 27 economies and, at the same time, guarantee equal treatment in applying the laws. The SGP cannot be in conflict with the sovereignty of each country.

The SGP was conceived as a two-pillar pact:

- the preventive component consists in establishing adequate fiscal objectives and adopting the convergence programme, namely the stability programme, which ensures that these fiscal objectives are met. The fiscal objectives should make sure that a balanced budget is maintained.

<footnote n="1">¹ European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, Special Issue, 20-29 September 2010.</footnote>
- the corrective component resolves the situation when the fiscal policy deviates from the established objective and requires a correction. The discipline of this component comes from the maximum deficit level of 3% or from the application procedure of excessive deficit.

The Economic and Monetary Union is built on uneven foundations. The monetary policy of the eurozone is correlated with the explicit responsibility of the European Central Bank. The fiscal policy is decentralised, but the coordination problems are only partly covered by the Stability and Growth Pact. In addition, the European Commission has certain options of implementing fiscal transfers through the Structural Funds to help those regions affected by negative shocks. The economic policies are almost exclusively the responsibility of the state.

From a long-term perspective, the stability of the Monetary Union can be difficult to achieve, with the exception of reaching a political union. A common position of EU countries is currently

realised through a complicated long-term process. In the eventuality of a major economic and financial crisis, like the one we are experiencing at present (2009-2010), a strong asymmetric shock may affect the eurozone, a problem that would need an appropriate response<fnref n="1" />.

At present, the EU is capable of acting quickly and efficiently, given the actual crisis, even if we are witnessing a relative failure of the subsequent reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. Besides, the issue of a closer political integration is not an urgent matter of the eurozone. The EU can function in its actual

form for a long-term stability of the EMU. There is a necessity to create a mechanism for taking decisions quickly in crisis situations and correcting asymmetric shocks efficiently through fiscal transfer meant to strengthen the coordination of fiscal policies.

When the periodic assessment of the preparation stage of new member states for joining the EU (based on the Copenhagen criteria) started, fears concerning the next integration step appeared – certainly, the fulfilment of the nominal convergence criteria might lead to a decrease in inflation and to a consolidation of public finances, but could in short-term jeopardise the economic growth in these states. It has been shown that in the support of the nominal convergence process short-term economic costs can appear, but on a medium and long term, the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria supports the real convergence process.

An important element in taking decisions on inflation involves the promptitude of the disinflation strategy. The permanent decrease of the inflation rate may be accompanied by a temporary decrease of production. Too rapid a decrease in inflation may expose the structural defects of the real economy. The dilemma of low inflation or economic growth represents a challenge for researchers, most of them accrediting the idea that a rise in inflation over a certain threshold is detrimental to economic growth and that, in addition to high costs due to the level of inflation, the economy must also support costs generated by uncertain decisions of the economic agents. On the one hand, efforts meant to reduce the inflation below a certain threshold are harmful for economic

<figure><img src="image_41.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1">¹ The Commission proposes a comprehensive package of legislative proposals and measures for a *European Economic Pact*. The ECOFIN has approved the agreement that allows supervision authorities of the financial and banking system of the EU to become operational from January 1, 2011 (www.euractiv.ro, September 8, 2010). It is a matter of complementing an already strong monetary union with an authentic and real economic union. It is already time to achieve these – Oli Rehn, European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs (European Economy News, Issue 19, October 2010).</footnote>
growth. Therefore, analysts consider that the optimal inflation rate in developed countries may vary between 1-3% (Bruno & Easterly, 1998: 14-18). On the other hand, the monetary disinflation strategy depends on the transmission mechanism existent at the level of the monetary policy. The Central Bank has to take into account the benefits and costs of a comprehensive strategy between inflation volatility, on the one hand, and the volatility of another variable – product, output gap (loss of economic performance to the potential or rate of interest) and commercial deficit –, on the other hand.

For example, the study regarding these problems for the Czech Republic shows that fast disinflation leads to better results in what concerns the output gap, but to a greater commercial deficit, while slow disinflation leads to a greater output gap with a lower commercial deficit (Mahadeva & Šmídková, 2001).

## THE REGIONAL IMPACT OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN CURRENCY AND THE SYNCHRONISATION OF ECONOMIC CYCLES

During the last years, empirical studies have discovered a growing synchronisation of economic cycles between the new EU member states and the eurozone countries. The structure of these countries' economies has become closer to that of the eurozone, thus reducing the risk of asymmetric shocks (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir, 2009: 69-70).

The rising role of the euro in the region can be assessed according to the exchange rate arrangements (single currency status agreement), the currency composition of national reserves and the public debt, the use of the euro in bank loans and deposits, in invoicing foreign trade and in domestic contracts.

In what concerns the status agreement for exchange rates, more and more countries have anchored their national currencies to the euro. Four of the new EU member states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) have anchored their national currencies with fluctuations between different margins. Apart from Lithuania, the countries come under the regulation of the Monetary Council (Szapary, 2009: 122). Croatia and Macedonia, not part of the EU, have anchored their currencies de facto, through a controlled fluctuation. Bosnia and Herzegovina has anchored the currency according to the Monetary Council recommendation, while Montenegro and Kosovo have unilaterally adopted the euro as a national currency.

Therefore, all South-Eastern European countries except for Albania and Serbia have either adopted the euro or anchored their currencies to it. This goes to prove the role of the euro as the reference nominal currency of countries that are not yet members of the EU, but could be candidates. At the same time, the reference currency role of the euro is evident in the case of free floating currencies both in the EU (Poland, Romania and Hungary) and outside the EU (Serbia, Albania). The Russian rubble varied de facto around the US dollar until 2005, but since then the variation takes place around the dollar and the euro, the latter's role being more and more visible. In the nearby countries, only the Ukrainian hrvynia is anchored to the dollar, however, during the current financial crisis, the currency has depreciated by over 90% (Szapary, 2009: 124).

The presentation of exchange rate arrangements clearly reflects the rising role of the euro, not only within the EU member states, but in other countries of the region as well. The authorities' deliberate decisions of coordinating their monetary policies according to the euro show their recognition of close commercial links between these countries and the eurozone and the wish to use the euro as a stable nominal anchor. In the case of free floating currencies, their growing stability towards the euro shows a high degree of commercial and financial integration in relation with the euro area. The reaction of the monetary authorities of these countries, reflected in the evolution of exchange rates, is influenced and tends to be guided by the steps taken by the ECB, a natural approach that shows the close financial integration.
<table><caption>**Table 1:** The Maastricht Criteria (Indicators of Nominal Convergence)</caption><thead><tr><th>Indicators of nominal convergence</th><th>Maastricht Criteria</th><th>Romania</th><th>Bulgaria</th><th>Czech Republic</th><th>Hungary</th><th>Poland</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Inflation rate (IAPC) (percentages, annual average)</td><td>&lt;1,5 pp over the average of the three best performing EU member states (1.6%*)</td><td>5.6</td><td>2.5</td><td>0.6</td><td>4.0</td><td>4.0</td></tr><tr><td>Long-term interest rates (percentages per year)</td><td>&lt;2 pp over the average in the three lowest inflation member states (5.3%*)</td><td>9.7</td><td>7.2</td><td>4.8</td><td>9.1</td><td>6.1</td></tr><tr><td>Euro exchange rate (maximum percentage appreciation(+)/depreciation (-)**)</td><td>±15 percentages</td><td>-15.1</td><td>0.0</td><td>-6.0</td><td>-11.5</td><td>-23.2</td></tr><tr><td>Annual government deficit*** (GDP percentages)</td><td>under 3 %</td><td>8.3</td><td>3.9</td><td>5.9</td><td>4.0</td><td>7.1</td></tr><tr><td>Government debt*** (GDP percentages)</td><td>under 60 %</td><td>23.7</td><td>14.8</td><td>35.4</td><td>78.3</td><td>51.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

*) reference level

**) calculated as maximum deviation of the euro exchange rate in 2009 compared to the 2008 average, based on daily data

***) according to the ESA95 methodology

Source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

The euro is also the most important reserve currency of national banks in Europe and outside (Morocco, Tunisia).

Most central banks consider national reserve data to be confidential, so public data is approximate. In the official reserves of non-eurozone EU countries, in Bulgaria and Lithuania, the euro reserves go over 90%, in Romania 70% and in Croatia 86% (Szapary, 2009: 127).

These high percentages are explained by the euro's role of accord, but also by the high level of financial integration of the respective states with the eurozone.

The countries, in the decision to create and administrate currency reserves, take into account the currency composition of the public debt. Thus, the currency in which most of the country's debt is expressed usually predominates in the national reserves. In Romania, for example, only 68% of the public debt is in euro, which would explain the 70% euro proportion in the national reserves. 99% of Lithuania's public debt is expressed in euros, and the euro national reserve is close to 100%<fnref n="1" />.

Lithuania's currency is anchored to the euro through a Monetary Council agreement, which constitutes a plausible reason for the quasi-total euro reserves. This is also the case of Bulgaria, where 90% of the reserve is in euros, while the public debt in euros was of 67% in 2007.

<footnote n="1">¹ See www.bnro.ro.</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 2:** Currency composition of the public debt in Central and South-Eastern Europe</caption><thead><tr><th>Country</th><th>2004</th><th>2005</th><th>2006</th><th>2007</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Bosnia</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>euro</td><td>21.4</td><td>22.5</td><td>25.5</td><td>28.2</td></tr><tr><td>US dollars</td><td>18.8</td><td>19.6</td><td>18.3</td><td>16.7</td></tr><tr><td>SDR</td><td>33.6</td><td>33.7</td><td>33.3</td><td>32.6</td></tr><tr><td>other</td><td>26.2</td><td>24.2</td><td>22.9</td><td>22.5</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Bulgaria</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>euro</td><td>44.4</td><td>55.7</td><td>63.1</td><td>67.3</td></tr><tr><td>US dollars</td><td>39.4</td><td>29.5</td><td>25.7</td><td>25.7</td></tr><tr><td>other</td><td>16.3</td><td>14.8</td><td>11.2</td><td>7.0</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Estonia</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>euro</td><td>100.0,0</td><td>100.0</td><td>100.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Lithuania</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>euro</td><td>88.2</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>99.4</td></tr><tr><td>US dollars</td><td>6.7</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0.0</td></tr><tr><td>other</td><td>5.1</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0.6</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Romania</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>euro</td><td>54.4</td><td>54.8</td><td>61.7</td><td>68.4</td></tr><tr><td>US dollars</td><td>35.7</td><td>34.8</td><td>28.6</td><td>23.0</td></tr><tr><td>SDR</td><td>3.2</td><td>2.0</td><td>0.8</td><td>0.0</td></tr><tr><td>Other</td><td>6.7</td><td>8.4</td><td>9.0</td><td>8.6</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Slovenia</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>euro</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>99.6</td></tr><tr><td>US dollars</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>0.4</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/paper/szapary1008ppt.pdf

Another characteristic of the countries neighbouring the eurozone is the large share of euro loans and, to a lesser extent, deposits in other foreign currencies. Loans and deposits in euro are dominant, with the exception of Hungary, where the Swiss franc predominates, and Ukraine, where loans in US dollars prevail.

In 2007 foreign currency loans represented 50% or more from the total loans on average and reached 80% in countries that operated with Monetary Councils and where the exchange risk was still present – Estonia<fnref n="1" /> and Lithuania. In countries with floating currencies, euro loans were greater – 72% in Albania, 59% in Hungary and 55% in Romania (Szapary, 2009: 129). Loans in foreign currency were facilitated by the dominant role of foreign capital banks in the bank structure of Central and Eastern Europe countries.

Another way of evaluating the euro influence in the region is related to its share in settling or invoicing foreign trade. This has risen during the last years and it is greater than the percentage of exports and imports from the eurozone, which demonstrates the importance of commercial transactions denominated in euro with third party countries (Szapary, 2009: 132).

Approximately 60% of the Czech Republic's exports are headed towards the eurozone, while almost 70% of its exports are denominated in euro. The difference is greater in the Baltic

<footnote n="1">¹ Estonia will join the eurozone on January 1, 2011.</footnote>
States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), who export between 25 and 31% towards the eurozone, while almost 55% of the total exports are denominated in euro. In Romania, over 50% of exports are headed towards the eurozone, and 69% of the exports are denominated in euro.

<table><caption>**Table 3:** The Degree of Openness of the Romanian Economy</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>2000</th><th>2001</th><th>2002</th><th>2003</th><th>2004</th><th>2005</th><th>2006</th><th>2007</th><th>2008</th><th>2009</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Degree of openness*</th><td>70.7</td><td>74.5</td><td>76.1</td><td>77</td><td>80.6</td><td>76.3</td><td>76.3</td><td>72.4</td><td>75.6</td><td>67.4</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/paper/szapary1008ppt.pdf

<figure><img src="image_42.png" /><figcaption>**Table 4:** Romania. External Imbalance. Import/Export. Current Account Deficit (% of GDP)</figcaption></figure>

Source: Idem; BNR statistics processed by the author

60% of the total Czech imports come from the eurozone and 68% are invoiced in the single currency. The Latvians have almost 61% of imports denominated in euro, while 46% of these come from the eurozone.

Romania imports 48% of the total from the eurozone, while imports denominated in euro reach almost 72%<fnref n="1" />.

Romania's problem is the high current account deficit. In 2009 and 2010, the deficit decreased not because of the corrections in the economic structure, but because of the crisis.

A final way of establishing the impact of the euro on the region's economy could be the presence of the single European currency in the denomination of contracts and the cash movement in the respective countries. Although there is insufficient statistic data regarding this type of usage, the euro is often used in real estate leases for premises (e.g. offices), especially when the tenants are foreign companies or individuals.

<footnote>* (export+import) of goods and services/GDP</footnote>

<footnote n="1">¹ See http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/paper/szapary1008ppt.pdf.</footnote>
In July 2009, the European Central Bank estimated that in 2008, in Eastern Europe, 43% of the euro bills outside the eurozone were bought, and 45% were sold. A research of the National Bank of Austria<fnref n="1" /> confirms the phenomenon analysed by the ECB and points out that the possession of euro bills varies considerably from country to country and tends to be greater in South-Eastern Europe countries than in Central and Eastern Europe countries. This situation can be explained as a reaction to a high inflation rate, especially in former Yugoslavia countries and Albania.

The relatively high rate of cash possession in countries near the eurozone is also due to the fact that the eurozone countries are the main business, shopping or holiday destination for many citizens. There are a few assumptions according to which a number of euro bills are used in these countries in the underground economy.

The European environment is a transparent one. In order to take advantage of that, these countries have to take certain steps, including the acceleration of economic and structural reforms and the liberalisation of trade and capital movements. The euro represents an opportunity of redefining the exchange rate policy, the European currency being a factor of stability.

***

The authors wish to thank for the financial support provided from the program co-financed by The Sectoral Operational Program for Human Resources Development, Contract POSDRU 6/1.5/S/3 – “Doctoral studies, a major factor in the development of socio-economic and humanistic studies”.

References

1. Kaltenthaler, K. (2006), *The Politics of Policy-making in the European Central Bank*, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, Boulder

2. Mundell, R. (1961), *A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas*, American Economic Review 51.

3. Sapir, A., Pisani-Ferry, J., (2006), *Last exit to Lisbon*, ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8106, ULB

4. Szapary, G. (2000), *Maastricht and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Transition during the Run-Up to EMU*, National Bank of Hungary Working Paper 2007

5. Hochreiter E., Schmidt-Hebbel K., Winckler G., (2002) *Monetary Union: European Lessons, Latin American Prospects*, The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, vol. 13, issue 3, pages 297-321

<figure><img src="image_43.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1">¹ See http://www.oenb.at/en/img/oenb_eurosurvey_feei_2009_2_final_tcm16-111733.pdf.</footnote>
# Le développement de l'Economie sociale et solidaire, un enjeu européen pour la future programmation 2014-2020?

UGO VAN HULSEN

l'Université de Provence Aix-Marseille I

**Abstract:** *The development of social economy and solidarity, a European issue for the future 2014-2020 programming?*.
The social economy is also an economy of solidarity. Its finality is not the profit. The european Commission supports this economy with the structural funds. The social economy is important in France. Few regions practice the development of the social innovation in France. "Provence-Alpes-côte d'Azur" (PACA) is an exception. The Belgian Presidency (2010) stresses the importance of social economy.*

**Keywords:** social innovation, development, EU.

ée d'influences diverses, l'Economie sociale et solidaire réunit sous un même vocable une diversité d'organisations qui mobilisent au quotidien des hommes et des femmes ainsi que des moyens économiques pour atteindre des finalités autres que la réalisation d'un profit financier.

L'idée d'une économie dont le but n'est pas stricto sensu le profit financier est un concept on ne peut plus paradoxal, et trouver ce paradoxe exprimé et défendu au sein même de la politique économique européenne est un fait qu'il convient de souligner.

Il est à mettre au crédit de la Commission européenne de défendre cette option, de la faire exister, de la nommer et de la soutenir financièrement. Dans le foisonnement des objectifs de Lisbonne et de Göteborg, il s'agit bien d'intégrer un modèle économique qui concerne déjà une large part du salariat français.

L'économie sociale et solidaire est au centre des notions d'innovation socio-économique, de développement durable et plus globalement de société de la connaissance. Toutes notions qui sont balisées et conceptualisées et qui portent en elles leur propre modèle de développement.

Au modèle global de type libéral, vient se surajouter un autre modèle, tout aussi transversal, mais dont on n'a pas encore pris la mesure. Il ne semble y avoir, à aucun niveau que ce soit, un rejet de la notion, mais plutôt une incompréhension pratique qui amène souvent à l'incapacité de se saisir de cette réalité économique.

Pour être effectives, les politiques engagées se doivent, à tous les niveaux (européen, national ou régional), d'engager un véritable travail de conceptualisation de la notion et de compréhension de ses fonctionnements. Faute de quoi, chaque étape de transmission financière ou politique risque de constituer une source de blocage supplémentaire plutôt qu'un rouage efficace, capable d'insuffler une dynamique propre.

Les enjeux de l'économie sociale et solidaire sont d'abord didactiques, où l'effort de formulation et d'explicitation au niveau national et local en est à ses débuts. Dans la mesure où la donnée sociale et solidaire est de plus en plus reconnue, il s'agit de lui donner force d'objectif et de veiller qu'elle ait assez de poids idéologique pour ne pas constituer qu'un simple alibi dans l'ensemble de la politique économique européenne.
## UN SECTEUR DYNAMIQUE EN FRANCE:

9,9 % de l'emploi français

2,3 millions de personnes salariées

53,1 milliards d'euros de rémunérations brutes

215 000 Etablissements employeurs

Plus de 100 000 emplois créés chaque année<fnref n="1" />

## 1/ ÉTATS DES LIEUX: LES FONDS EUROPEENS REGIONAUX FSE ET FEDER

Les fonds européens régionaux de l'Objectif Compétitivité régionale et Emploi (Objectif 2) représentent pour la période 2007-2013 un levier programmatique et financier de près de 26,45 milliards d'euros pour le développement des territoires. Ils sont gérés essentiellement au niveau régional par les Préfectures et les Conseils régionaux.

Les autorités françaises (la DATAR pour le FEDER et la DGEFP pour le FSE) ont établi un Cadre de référence stratégique national (CRSN) pour articuler l'intervention des fonds structurels (FEDER et FSE) aux politiques nationales. Ce cadre définit les orientations stratégiques pour contribuer à la politique de cohésion économique et sociale et constituer un instrument de référence pour la préparation, le pilotage et la révision de la programmation des Fonds.

Maquette financière de l'Objectif Compétitivité régionale et emploi
pour la France pour la période 2007-2013 en milliards d'euros

<table><thead><tr><th>Fonds</th><th>UE</th><th>Public</th><th>Privé</th><th>Total</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>FEDER</th><td>5,59</td><td>8,16</td><td>3,72</td><td>17,46</td></tr><tr><th>FSE</th><td>4,49</td><td>3,34</td><td>1,16</td><td>8,99</td></tr><tr><th>Total</th><td>10,09</td><td>11,49</td><td>4,87</td><td>26,45</td></tr></tbody></table>

NB: Les co-financements publics et privés ne sont pas systématiquement acquis. Il est du ressort du porteur de projet de mobiliser ces co-financements.

État d'avancement au 30/05/2010 Objectif Compétitivité régionale et emploi
pour la France *Donnée Infocentre Présage*

<table><thead><tr><th>Fonds</th><th>UE</th><th>%</th><th>Public</th><th>%</th><th>Privé</th><th>%</th><th>Total</th><th>%</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>FEDER</th><td>1,88</td><td>33,6%</td><td>3,17</td><td>38,9%</td><td>2,20</td><td>59,3%</td><td>7,26</td><td>41,5%</td></tr><tr><th>FSE</th><td>1,74</td><td>38,8%</td><td>2,02</td><td>60,5%</td><td>0,39</td><td>33,5%</td><td>4,15</td><td>46,2%</td></tr><tr><th>Total</th><td>3,62</td><td>35,9%</td><td>5,19</td><td>45,2%</td><td>2,59</td><td>53,2%</td><td>11,40</td><td>43,1%</td></tr></tbody></table>

Prévision du dégagement d'office au 30/05/2010
Objectif Compétitivité régionale et emploi pour la France
*Donnée Infocentre Présage*

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Fonds</th><th>Dépenses nouvelles à réaliser</th><th rowspan="2">Montant des contributions de l'UE<br>calculées pour le dégagement d'office</th></tr><tr><th>au 31/12/2010 pour échapper<br>au dégagement d'office</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>FEDER</th><td>1 360 845 441 €</td><td>421 083 434 €</td></tr><tr><th>FSE</th><td>735 165 049 €</td><td>367 470 345 €</td></tr><tr><th>Total</th><td>2 096 010 490 €</td><td>788 553 779 €</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote n="1">¹ Source: Panorama 2010 – l'Economie sociale et solidaire en France et dans les Régions. Observatoire national de l'économie sociale et solidaire – CNCRES – Décembre 2010. www.cncres.org</footnote>
## Nature des Bénéficiaires du Fonds Européen de Développement Économique Régional (FEDER)
2007-2013 FRANCE

Données infocentre presage au 01/11/2009

<figure><img src="image_44.png" /></figure>

## Nature des Bénéficiaires du Fonds Social Européen (FSE) 2007-2013 FRANCE

Données Infocentre Presage au 01/11/2009

<figure><img src="image_45.png" /></figure>

## 2/ ECONOMIE SOCIALE ET SOLIDAIRE ET INNOVATION

Il est assuré de la stratégie de Lisbonne-Göteborg révisée en 2005, les principaux axes d'intervention de la Politique régionale européenne 2007-2013 sont l'Innovation, le Développement durable et l'Emploi.
## a) L'Innovation

### Contexte

L'innovation technologique est une notion fortement cadrée par les référentiels communautaires et nationaux. Elle se traduit par une homogénéité d'affichage (tous les programmes proposent les mêmes objectifs centrés sur la recherche, le transfert de technologie, les projets collaboratif, le financement de l'innovation, les pôles de compétitivité, ...).

On note deux grands types de stratégie d'intervention (et beaucoup de situations mixtes):

* Les régions qui privilégient des **stratégies de construction ou structuration de l'offre d'innovation** technologique. Il s'agit le plus souvent de région qui ont peu anticipé la montée en puissance de l'innovation dans les économies régionales, au sein desquelles l'appétence pour ce sujet est faible, où la recherche et les filières ne sont pas ou peu structurées. Ces régions financent beaucoup les équipements de la recherche ou la mise en place de filières (infras-universitaires et de recherche, plateformes de recherche, incubateurs, pépinières, équipements de laboratoires) mais ont plus de mal à faire émerger des projets ;

* Les régions qui privilégient des **stratégies d'accélération ou d'optimisation des réseaux et outils** déjà en place. Il s'agit des régions qui avaient déjà largement anticipé le mouvement dans la génération de programmes précédents, dotées d'un tissu d'entreprises dense et déjà sensibilisées, où la recherche et les filières sont plus structurées. Ces régions mettent davantage l'accent sur les outils de financement de l'innovation ou sur les questions d'organisation, de formation, de management de l'innovation. Elles sont en avance sur le développement de projets collaboratifs et sont plus sensibles à la nécessité de déployer des actions au plus près de l'entreprenariat. On note dans ces régions une dynamique de programmation plus forte.

### Les Stratégies Régionales d'Innovation (SRI) et la prise en compte de l'innovation sociale

Dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des Programmes opérationnels FEDER 2007-2013, les régions ont élaboré une Stratégie Régionale d'Innovation (stratégies arrêtées fin 2009).

Ces stratégies, préparées dans une démarche partenariale entre les services déconcentrés de l'Etat (SGAR, DRIRE, DRRT) et les Conseils régionaux, ont été élaborées en deux phases: une phase de diagnostic, qui permettait aux régions de faire le point sur leurs faiblesses et leurs atouts, et une phase stratégiques où État et Région devaient définir des priorités stratégiques communes.

### La forme des diagnostics

Elle varie très sensiblement selon les régions. Alors que certaines régions ont rédigé un document complet avec une synthèse, d'autres ont simplement déjà défini des éléments de stratégie sans établir formellement un diagnostic.

### Modalités de validation

La validation de l'étape de diagnostic s'est effectuée selon des modalités elles-mêmes très diversifiées. Soit:

- d'une simple approbation dans le cadre d'un comité de pilotage du programme opérationnel. Cette option a été retenue par 4 régions (Aquitaine, Auvergne, Pays de la Loire, Rhône-Alpes);

- d'une validation des orientations stratégiques dans le cadre d'une réunion de concertation ou d'une manifestation régionale ad hoc ;

- d'une approbation formelle du document par le préfet de région et le président du Conseil Régional (ex. Bretagne, PACA).
<figure><img src="image_46.png" /><figcaption>L'exemple de la région Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur:</figcaption></figure>

## Le contenu de ces stratégies

Certaines régions ont exclusivement défini quelques point clefs et des axes stratégiques alors que d'autres ont élaboré un manifeste de politique économique accompagné d'un plan d'actions. D'autres encore ont rédigé un document permettant de modifier directement le Programme opérationnel FEDER.

## La prise en compte de l'innovation sociale

Peu de Régions font clairement référence à la nécessité de la prise en compte de l'innovation sociale. Néanmoins, la Région PACA a mis en place des Pôles Régionaux d'Innovation et de Développement Economique Solidaire – PRIDES – faisant clairement référence à l'ESS.

La plupart des régions françaises se limitent cependant à la prise en compte de l'innovation via une approche en terme de recherche et développement et d'innovation technologique.

L'innovation sociale est parfois mentionnée à travers les services qui constituent clairement un potentiel important de croissance et d'innovation. Il existe par exemple dans les services à la personne, une logique d'innovation qui répond à des besoins importants.

L'Observatoire régional de l'Economie sociale et solidaire PACA (ORESS PACA) a, pour sa part, entrepris une réflexion collective avec les acteurs de l'ESS sur la caractérisation de l'innovation sociale.
b) Le Développement durable

Le développement durable ne constitue pas un chapeau introductif ni un modèle d'organisation du diagnostic territorial. De même, les orientations communautaires et nationales étant davantage centrées sur l'environnement que sur le développement durable, cette empreinte initiale se retrouve clairement dans la structure des programmes qui ont tous identifié un axe dédié à l'environnement.

L'analyse permet de dégager un modèle type de prise en compte du développement durable dans les programmes qui correspond à une fusée à 3 étages:

- un axe dédié à l'environnement,

- la mise en place de critères transversaux (plus ou moins contraignants),

- dans certaines régions, la mise en place d'outils d'accompagnement à une meilleure prise en compte de l'environnement voire du développement durable (grille développement durable d'analyse des projets, mission d'appui dédiée, formations des services à la prise en compte de critères qualitatifs).

L'axe dédié à l'environnement a élargi son champ d'intervention par rapport à 2000-2006: changement climatique et maîtrise de l'énergie complètent les mesures traditionnelles axées sur la biodiversité, la ressource en eau, les risques.

On observe dans beaucoup de programmes l'existence de liens, c'est-à-dire des mesures, voire des actions qui articulent, intègrent les composantes économiques et environnementales (innovations, technologies vertes, recherche sur la biodiversité, tourisme durable par exemple).

Les liens économie et social ou social et environnement sont beaucoup plus rares (TIC au service du social ou de l'environnement; innovation sociale sur les appels à projet urbain par exemple).

3/ PERSPECTIVES

Les institutions européennes commencent néanmoins à intégrer l'Economie sociale et solidaire dans leurs prises de position. Ainsi, on peut noter les Conclusions de la Présidence belge du Conseil de l'Union européenne des 27 et 28 octobre 2010 intitulé « L'économie sociale et la Stratégie Europe 2020, La plus-value locale et l'ancrage territorial » Bruxelles:

« La Présidence est convaincue que l'économie sociale peut apporter des réponses positives et durables aux défis de la société européenne.

A l'heure où les propositions législatives pour la future politique de cohésion sont en cours d'élaboration par la DG REGIO de la Commission européenne, nous pouvons nous demander quelle place sera faite à l'Economie sociale et solidaire et si cette hypothétique intégration prendra en compte un de principes directeurs de cette économie alternative à savoir la gouvernance démocratique citoyenne.

<figure><img src="image_47.png" /></figure>
# The theoretical and practical implications of Criminal Convention regarding the corruption concluded in Strasbourg 1999 upon Romanian legislation

DR. OLIMPIU AURELIAN SABĂU-POP

"Petru Maior" University of Tg.Mureș

**Abstract:** Considering Resolution (58)7 regarding the authorisation of creating of an enlarged partial Agreement, which establishes the Group of States against corruption – GRECO, the Penal Convention regarding Corruption was also issued in January 27, 1999 at Strasbourg (STEN 173), convention which had a decisive impact upon changing the vision of the Romanian legislator regarding aspects concerning the notion of 'corruption', both of incriminatory as well as of procedural order.

**Keywords:** criminal law, corruption, conventions, European law

## 1. INTRODUCTION

<figure><img src="image_48.png" /></figure>

The member states of the European Council and other states[1], considering that the aim of the European Council is to build a tighter unity among its members, being convinced by the necessity of promoting in a priority way of a legal common policy with the purpose of protecting the society from the corruption phenomenon, which constitutes a threat to the supremacy of law, democracy, human rights by undermining the principle of a proper administration, equity, encroaching of the economic development, are agreeing for the establishment of an adequate legislation and proper procedural measures concretized in The Criminal Convention regarding the Corruption, concluded in Strasbourg in January 27, 1999.

Out of the recent development of some measures at international level against corruption, we mention the measures taken by the United Nations Organization, the World Bank, the International

Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the American States Organization. Some of the results are: *The Action Program Against Corruption*, adopted by the European Council Ministers Committee in November 1996; we also mention the Resolution 1 adopted by the European Ministers of Justice within the XXI Conference (Prague 1997) which resorts to urgent application of the previously presented program and recommends the issuing of a criminal

convention regarding the corruption; we also wish to mention the *second Summit which took place at Strasbourg in October 10-11, 1997* and the *Resolution from November 6, 1997*, which refers to the 24 fundamental principles concern the fight against the corruption phenomenon authorizing the Ministers Committee to finish within the proper time the papers issuing the international legal instruments. Considering Resolution (58)7 regarding the authorization of creating of an enlarged partial Agreement, which establishes the Group of States against corruption (GRECO)[2], the *Penal convention regarding corruption* was also issued in January 27, 1999 at Strasbourg (STEN 173). The latter convention, as we are about to see as it follows, had a decisive impact upon changing the vision of the Romanian legislator regarding aspects concerning the notion of 'corruption', both of incriminatory as well as of procedural order.

You can stop
CORRUPTION
## 2. THE LINK BETWEEN THE CONVENTION PROVISIONS AND THE 5TH ARTICLE FROM CORPUS JURIS (2000)

Between these two, there is a series of similarities regarding their content. It can be observed that the deal of corruption offence is made on the both sides of the subject, which is the active and passive corruption, a conception taken from the French doctrine and criminal legislation.

We can find this opinion, to a certain extent, also in the Romanian [3] doctrine. Both two forms of corruption contain, also in the Convention and Corpus Juris, same elements of the *actus reus*.

Corpus Juris refers only to the member states of the European Union and the common institutions, while the Convention refers to every state-party [4]. But among the member states of the European Union, those who have ratified the Convention, we consider that the qualified subjects of these legal international norms are overlapping due to lato-sensu interpretation which is received by the notion of civil servant in the European law. The only statute foreseen by the Convention, upon it could fall the suspicion that it's not incorporated by the expression “civil servant” from the European law, is the “agent or judge of an international Court” one.

To find an answer on this problem we must start from the interpretation of the 5th Article from E.C.H.R. concern the activity of “justice”. The justice is represented by every organ with competence in solving litigations, and by consequence implicitly defines the term “agent or judge”. In supporting this conclusion we’ll refer to a series of decisions of the European Court: Van Marle/Holland, Van Leuven and Meyere/Belgium, H/Belgium.

Thus, by the time of entry into force of Corpus Juris for the member states of the European Union, the two mentioned international norms will overlap perfectly upon the provisions of corruption offences.

## 3. THE COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION AND THE ROMANIAN LAW

Neither the Criminal Code nor the special domestic law have offered a definition to the concept of corruption and this fact led to a tendency of extrapolation, situation ended by the article 5 of Law 78/2000[5], modified by Law 161/2003[6]. It considers that crimes are: the ones stipulated by article 254-257 from the Criminal Code[7] (Accepting Bribe, Offering Bribe, Accepting Undeserved Goods, Traffic of Influence); the crimes stipulated by the articles 6¹ (influential buyer), article 8; crimes assimilated to those of corruption stipulated by the articles 10, 11, 12, 13 of Law 78/2000; crimes directly[8] linked with corruption(article 17-18 of Law 78/2000), assimilated [9]to those of corruption (articles 10-16 of Law 78/2000) and those against the financial interests of the European Union[10]

The Article 2 has correspondent in the article 255 of Criminal Code, with the note of the formulation "any un-owed advantage" that corresponds in the Criminal Code with "money or other benefits". The notion of money or other benefits, in the way formulated by the Romanian legislator, can be explained due to the insufficiently formulation in the criminal field only on the basis of Romanian Civil Code provisions, and implies an interaction between the patrimony of the briber (or a tertiary) and the bribed, more exactly at least the possibility of increasing the patrimony of the civil servant co-related with the decreasing patrimony of the briber, according to the element of the objective side from the article 255, which is made by the doer.

To demonstrate the meaning of "other benefits" understood by the legislator, we'll refer to the provisions regarding the special confiscation that require a patrimony feature to this notion [11].

In this way, the promise made by a civil servant but without a patrimonial feature(for example, passing the exam for somebody) can not be framed at the article 255 of the Criminal Code, but
eventually at the article 257 of the Criminal Code if are fulfilled the conditions of the latter offence.
Also, the donations [12] without economic value are not associated with the bribe offence.

The drafter of Convention preferred the formulation "un-owned advantage" that regards the valuable and non-valuable element. As a result, we have two choices: first, in a wider way, the interpretation of bribe could be extended, making abstraction of the "money" and this notion is associated with the notion "other benefits"; secondly, the national drafters cold take the formulation from the Convention. The former is considering better.

The article 3 from the Convention corresponds, regarding the objective side, the offence of bribing also to the national public agent, the provisions of article 1(a-d) of the Law 78/2000.

The objective side of the offence (stated by the article 3 of Convention) contains only actions, and the correspondent provision from the domestic law contains in addition an inaction, that is "non-rejecting the promise". As a consequence, it can be observed that it is imposed an active behaviour to the Romanian civil servant, that is to refuse of the briber.

Due to in-advertences that persist between the Convention ratified by Romania and the provisions of the article 254, as well as between the Convention and the Draft of the Criminal Code (article 303) we are suggesting to straighten them.

Another interesting aspect is that in the paragraph 3 of the article 303 of the project, are included also the categories of subjects from the article 8 from the Law 78/2000. Qualified subjects are to be seen also in the provisions of articles 5, 6, 7,8,9,10,11 from the Convention. From this statement we conclude that the purpose of legislator is to include the provisions from the special laws (that is Law 78/2000 and 16/2003, implicitly those from the Convention) in the Chapter I of the Title VI "offences and corruption offences".

<figure><img src="image_49.png" /></figure>

The Article 4 of the Convention refers to the *actus reus* of the offences stated by the articles 2 and 3, committed by a member of the Parliament. This quality of the active subject, therefore also this offence is to be re-find in to a smaller extent in the Law 78/2000, more concrete in the article 1(f) - "the persons that hold a leading role in a party or in a political entity".

A member of parliament in his law making activity acts in his official capacity, representing a collective organ, thus, taking into consideration the require of the criminal responsibility to have an individual [13] character, it considers that he can't commit the offence stated by the Article 4 of the Convention; rather is being possible to engage another form of responsibility in the practice, that is the political responsibility. This approach is based upon the legality of the activity of lobby and existence of interest groups. However, making abstraction of the professional activity of the members