<figure><img src="image_1.png" /></figure>

HAL
open science

# Made in Europe. Local Content Policy for the European Automotive Industry

Tommaso Pardi, Marc Alochet, Bernard Jullien, Alexandra Kuyo

<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>

## To cite this version:

Tommaso Pardi, Marc Alochet, Bernard Jullien, Alexandra Kuyo. Made in Europe. Local Content Policy for the European Automotive Industry. Actes du GERPISA, 2025, 44. hal-05076860

HAL Id: hal-05076860

https://hal.science/hal-05076860v1

Submitted on 21 May 2025

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.

Public Domain
GERPISA

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>

MADE IN EUROPE
LOCAL CONTENT POLICY FOR
THE EUROPEAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY

Tommaso Pardi, CNRS - IDHES – ENS Paris-Saclay

Marc Alochet, Ecole Polytechnique

Bernard Jullien, Université de Bordeaux

Alexandra Kuyo, ENS Paris-Saclay
GERPISA International Network

Permanent Group for the Study of the Automobile Industry and its Employees

Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris-Saclay

4 Avenue des Sciences, 91190 Gif-sur-Yvette

https://gerpisa.org

# ACTES DU GERPISA

Director of publication: Tommaso PARDI

Editorial board: Marc Alochet, Lourdes Alvarez, Bruce Belzowski, Vallejo Bertha, Antjie Blocker, Holger Bungsche, Giuseppe Giulio Calabrese, Juan Sebastian Carbonell, Jorge Carrillo, Elsie Charron, Alex Covarrubias, Anthony d'Costa, Gery Deffontaines, Guillaume Delautre, Boleslaw Domanski, Kristin Dziczek, Patrick Fridenson, Vincent Frigant, Takahiro Fujimoto, Francesco Garibaldo, Stéphane Heim, Bruno Jetin, Bernard Jullien, Ulrich Jurgens, Samuel Klebaner, Thomas Klier, Martin Krzywdzinski, Jesus F. Lampon, Yveline Lecler, Adriana Marotti de Mello, Roberto Marx, Lorenza Monaco, Antonio Moniz, Tommaso Pardi, Yannick Perez, Heike Proff, Sigfrido Ramirez, Margherita Russo, Mario Salerno, Martin Schroeder, Hiromi Shioji, Michael Smitka, Hua Wang.
## Made in Europe

### Local content policy for
the European automotive industry

## Table of Contents

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** 6

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 6

HOW BIG IS THE CHINESE THREAT FOR THE EUROPEAN AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIERS? 7

LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES FOR THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR 8

RULES OF ORIGINS: THE RIGHT TEMPLATE? 9

THE PROPOSAL: A RULE OF ORIGIN FOR MADE IN EUROPE CARS AND AUTO-PARTS 9

**WHY THE EUROPEAN AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIER NETWORK NEEDS TO BE PROTECTED** 11

TOWARDS A LOCAL CONTENT POLICY FOR THE EUROPEAN AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR? 12

REGULATORY AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES 12

**1. HOW BIG IS THE CHINESE THREAT FOR THE EUROPEAN AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIERS?** 15

**1.1 EVIDENCES FROM THE "ILLEGAL SUBSIDIES" (2024) AND THE "TRADE DISTORTIONS" (2024) EU ENQUIRIES** 18

**1.2 IS FOREIGN TRADE IN AUTOMOTIVE PARTS AND COMPONENTS BECOMING DE-EUROPEANIZED?** 20

1.2.1 8708-29: MISCELLANEOUS PARTS AND ACCESSORIES 23

1.2.2 8708-40 GEARBOXES 25

1.2.3 8708-30 BRAKES 27

1.2.4 8708-50 DRIVE-AXLES 29

1.2.5 8708-80 SUSPENSION SYSTEMS 31

1.2.6 8708-94 STEERING WHEELS 33

1.2.7 8708-70 ROAD WHEELS 35

1.2.8 8708-92 SILENCERS "MUFFLERS" 37

1.2.9 8708-93 CLUTCHES 39

1.2.10 8708-91 RADIATORS 41

1.2.11 8708-10 BUMPERS 43

1.2.12 8708-95 SAFETY AIRBAGS 45

1.2.13 7318 SCREWS, BOLTS AND NUTS 47

1.2.14 8507-60 LITHIUM-ION ACCUMULATORS 49

1.2.15 8408-20 DIESEL ENGINES 52

1.2.16 8407-34 GASOLINE ENGINES >1.000 CM3 54

1.2.17 4011-10 NEW PNEUMATIC TYRES 56

1.2.18 8482 BALL OR ROLLER BEARINGS 58
1.2.19 CONCLUSION ON THE "DE-EUROPEANIZATION" OF THE AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLY CHAIN AND THE CHINESE THREAT 60

1.3 PRESSURE TO RELOCATE: WHAT FRENCH AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIERS SAY ABOUT FUTURE CONTRACTS 63

1.4 CONCLUSION: A COMPREHENSIVE LOCAL CONTENT POLICY FOR THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR IS NEEDED 70

2. LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON AND THE EUROPEAN EXCEPTION 71

2.1 BEFORE 1995: WHEN LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES WERE THE NORM 71

THE "JAPANESE CHALLENGE" AND THE "EUROPEAN FORTRESS" 72

2.2 FROM LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES TO RULES OF ORIGINS: THE GLOBALISATION OF THE 1990S AND EARLY 2000S 73

2.3 LOCAL VALUE ADDED POLICIES FOR EXPORTS: WHERE EUROPE LEADS THE WAY 75

2.3 LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES FOR DOMESTIC MARKETS: WHERE EUROPE IS ABSENT 77

2.4 FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS TO THE COVID 19 CRISIS: A FIRST PEAK AND A REGULAR GROWTH 78

BRAZIL'S INOVAR AUTO 2013-2017 79

THE NEW ENERGY VEHICLES' POLICIES IN CHINA 81

2.5 FROM THE COVID 19 CRISIS TO THE "CHINA CHALLENGE": A SECOND PEAK AND ACCELERATED GROWTH DRIVEN BY DE-RISKING AND RE-SHORING POLICIES 83

THE INFLATION REDUCTION ACT IN THE US 84

DE-RISKING LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES AND WTO COMPLIANCE 85

TURKEY'S LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES FOR THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR 86

2.6 CONCLUSION ON LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES 88

2.7 RULES OF ORIGIN: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHY THEY MATTER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 89

2.7.1 DEFINITION AND A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CREATION OF ROO 89

2.7.2 HOW TO DETERMINE THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF GOODS? 91

2.7.3 THE FRENCH ECO-BONUS AS A SMART LOCAL CONTENT POLICY 94

2.7.4 THE SITUATION OF EUROPE REGARDING TRADE OF GOODS 94

2.7.5 CONCLUSIONS ON RULES OF ORIGINS 98

3. RECOMMENDATIONS 99

3.1 PLEADING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND AMBITIOUS EU LOCAL CONTENT POLICY FOR THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR 99

3.2 A "RULE OF ORIGIN" FOR MADE IN EUROPE CARS AND AUTO-PARTS 101

REFERENCES 103

ANNEX 1. COMPARISON OF RULES OF ORIGIN REQUIREMENTS IN DIFFERENT FTAS FOR THE AUTOMOTIVE SECTOR 106

A.-THE EU-UK AGREEMENT CASE 106

B. - THE USMCA (UNITED STATES - MEXICO AND CANADA AGREEMENT) CASE 109

C. - THE EU-INDIA AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS 110

D. - THE CPTPP CASE 112

E. - EU-JAPAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 114

F. - EU-KOREA AGREEMENT 116

G. - PAN-EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONVENTION 117

H. - THE EU-MERCOSUR AGREEMENT 118

I. - EU-MEXICO AGREEMENT 120

L. - THE CETA AGREEMENT 121
List of Tables

<table><tr><td>TABLE 1. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN AUTOMOTIVE PARTS AND ACCESSOIRES (2014-2024) - CODE 8708</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 2. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 3. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN MISCELLANEOUS PARTS AND ACCESSORIES (2014-2024)</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 4 EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8708-29</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 5. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN GEARBOXES (2014-2024)</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 6. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8708-40</td><td>26</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 7. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN BRAKES (2014-2024)</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 8. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8708-30</td><td>28</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 9 EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN DRIVE-AXLES (2014-2024)</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 10 EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8708-50</td><td>30</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 11. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN SUSPENSION SYSTEMS (2014-2024)</td><td>31</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 12. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 870880</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 13 EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN STEERING WHEELS (2014-2024)</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 14 EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8708-94</td><td>34</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 15 EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN ROAD WHEELS (2014-2024)</td><td>35</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 16. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8708-70</td><td>36</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 17. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN SILENCERS (2014-2024)</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 18. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8708-92</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 19. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN CLUTCHES (2014-2024)</td><td>39</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 20. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8708-93</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 21 EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN RADIATORS (2014-2024)</td><td>41</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 22. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8708-91</td><td>42</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 23. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN BUMPERS (2014-2024)</td><td>43</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 24. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8708-10</td><td>44</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 25. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN SAFETY AIRBAGS (2014-2024)</td><td>45</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 26. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8708-95</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 27. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN SCREWS, BOLTS AND NUTS (2014-2024)</td><td>47</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 28. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 7318</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 29. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN LITHIUM-ION ACCUMULATORS (2014-2024)</td><td>49</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 30. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8507-60</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 31. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN DIESEL ENGINES (2014-2024)</td><td>52</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 32. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8408-20</td><td>53</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 33. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN GASOLINE ENGINES (2014-2024)</td><td>54</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 34. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8407-34</td><td>55</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 35. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN PNEUMATIC TYRES (2014-2024)</td><td>56</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 36. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 4011-10</td><td>57</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 37. EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES TRADE IN BALL OR ROLLER BEARINGS (2014-2024)</td><td>58</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 38. EVOLUTIONS 2014-2024 BASE 100 2014 - CODE 8482</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 39. LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES BY TYPE, NUMBER AND MAIN IMPLEMENTING COUNTRIES (2009-2024)</td><td>74</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 40. LOCAL VALUE ADDED POLICIES BY COUNTRY OF IMPLEMENTATION (2009-2024)</td><td>76</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 41. LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES IMPLEMENTED BY TYPE (2009-2024)</td><td>77</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 42. LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES IMPLEMENTED BY TOP 10 COUNTRIES (2009-2024)</td><td>78</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 43. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS</td><td>90</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 44. EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION OF CHANGE OF TARIFF CLASSIFICATION</td><td>92</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 45. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CRITERIA USED IN THE DETERMINATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL TRANSFORMATION</td><td>93</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 46. MAIN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND RELATED RULES OF ORIGIN</td><td>95</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 47. THE INITIAL TCA RULES OF ORIGIN FOR BATTERIES, BATTERY CELLS AND ELECTRIC AND ELECTRIFIED VEHICLES BEFORE THE EXTENSION OF THE FIRST-PHASE RULES IN DECEMBER 2023</td><td>107</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 48. THE TCA RULES OF ORIGIN FOR BATTERIES, BATTERY CELLS AND ELECTRIC AND ELECTRIFIED VEHICLES AFTER THE EXTENSION OF THE FIRST-PHASE RULES IN DECEMBER 2023</td><td>108</td></tr><tr><td>TABLE 49. VEHICLE IMPORT DUTY IN INDIA</td><td>111</td></tr></table>
The research presented in the 44th Acte du Gerpisa was supported by and carried out in cooperation with:

**CLIFA - Comité de liaison des industries fournisseurs de l'automobile**

which gathers:

* elanova - Syndicat national du caoutchouc - Centre d'excellence

* FFF - Fédération Forge Fonderie

* FIEV - Fédération des industries des équipements pour véhicules

* FIM - Fédération des Industries Mécaniques

* FFC - Fédération Française de Carrosserie Industrie et Services

* GPA - Groupement Plasturgie Automobile

the trade associations representing the French automotive suppliers' industries.
## Background and context

China has become the main global exporter of light vehicles, intermediate and semi-finished goods for Electric Vehicles, of tires, brakes and their respective parts, the second exporter of engine parts behind Germany and the third exporter of body panel parts behind Germany and Mexico. Without "strong defensive action from traditional auto hubs", supply chains for both ICE and EV parts will further concentrate in China <fnref n="1" />. Europe is currently the most exposed region to this risk <fnref n="2" />.

The tariffs for auto parts imported from China to Europe are set between 3% and 4,5% depending on the type of products, and at 1,3% for lithium-ion batteries by comparison with 18% to 45% for Battery Electric Vehicles. Imports of auto parts from China have been constantly rising during the last ten years and already represented in 2024 one auto part out of four imported to Europe. So far no action has been taken by the European Commission to address this risk <fnref n="3" />. Since 75-80% of the value of vehicles manufactured in Europe come from car-part suppliers <fnref n="4" />, this represents a major threat to the whole European automotive ecosystem.

> A letter addressed ahead of the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the European Automotive Industry by a consortium of French and Italian equipment manufacturers and their professional associations has demanded the introduction of local content requirements and incentives to fulfil this regulatory void and preserve the resilience of the European automotive supply chain against unfair Chinese competition.

The Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector announced on the 5th of March highlights the need to strengthen the "trade defence" toolbox and "to investigate unfair practices further up the supply chain, including in the batteries and parts segment when necessary" <fnref n="5" />. However, there are no references to local content requirements or incentives, at least for the auto parts' sector.

Against this background, the present reports focuses on two questions:

- Why is it necessary to implement now a comprehensive local content policy (LCP) for the automotive sector?

- What type of policy mix should Europe implement to introduce rapidly and efficiently local content requirements for automotive production?

<footnote n="1">¹ Kratz, Piper, and Bouchaud, 'China and the Future of Global Supply Chains'.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Goujon and Sebastian, 'Car Trouble: ICTS Rule Rewires Global Auto Supply Chains'.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Sebastian and François Chimits, ""Made in China" Electric Vehicles Could Turn Sino-EU Trade on Its Head | Merics''; Fix and Crebo-Rediker, 'China's Double Threat to Europe'.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ European Commission, 'GEAR 2030. High Level Group on the Competitiveness and Growth of the Automobile Industry in the European Union'.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ European Commission, 'Industrial Action Plan for the European Automotive Sector', 17.</footnote>
**To answer the first question, the report develops a detailed assessment of the risks that European automotive suppliers face if such a comprehensive LCP is not implemented at the EU level.**

The analysis is based on:

- The evidences presented in the two enquiries made by the DG Trade in 2024 on illegal subsidies and trade distortions from China;

- The customs' data extracted from Eurostat concerning 18 different categories of auto parts and their trade flows within Europe, outside Europe and in particular with China, between 2014 and 2024;

- An online questionnaire completed in February 2025 by 108 French based automotive suppliers which were asked to quantify the risks represented by the "Chinese threat" and more generally by the current pressure to relocate towards extra-EU low-cost countries for their French and European production over the next five years.

**The results confirm the need to implement a comprehensive LCP at the EU level to avoid rapid and massive disruption of the European supply chain.**

First, both EU enquiries carried in 2024 conclude that the Chinese Government is actively promoting "coordinated overseas expansion of Chinese brands which include both car manufacturing companies and car parts manufacturing companies" <fnref n="6" />"; that "The competitive dynamics seem to be distorted also in the industry of parts and components"; and that all the illegal tools used to support NEV manufacturers – "direct grants, taxation policy support, financial service support and venture capital support" – have been also used to develop the supplier industry <fnref n="7" />.

Second, the trade data shows that the European supplier industry has remained competitive (despite the current difficulties) against extra-EU imports during the last ten years, with the only exception of China, whose imports have increased in all 18 categories of auto-parts considered, with significant disruptive consequences for some of them, like tires, steering wheels, road wheels and lithium-ion accumulators.

> Overall the EU deficit on auto-parts with China in 2024 is of €1,6 billion (from a surplus of €7,7 billion in 2014). If we exclude Germany, the deficit for all the other EU countries in 2024 is of €7,6 billion (from a deficit of €0,5 billion 2014). Even for Germany, which benefits from important volumes of German cars exported to and manufactured in China, the trade surplus in auto parts with China has declined by €2,2 billion since 2014.
> 
> **If we include lithium-ion accumulators as auto-parts, the EU trade deficit with China climbs to €21 billion in 2024 (from a €7,3 billion surplus in 2014) and also Germany is concerned with a trade deficit of €2,2 billion.**

<footnote n="6">⁶ European Commission, 'On Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People's Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations', 680.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ European Commission, 'Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1866 of 3 July 2024 Imposing a Provisional Countervailing Duty on Imports of New Battery Electric Vehicles Designed for the Transport of Persons Originating in the People's Republic of China', 118.</footnote>
Third, the trends identified in the trade data suggesting an emerging de-Europeanization of the automotive supply chain driven by increasing Chinese imports, are confirmed by the survey of 108 French based suppliers. On average between 30 and 50% of the French production and between 15 and 30% of the European production of these suppliers is threatened by the increasing pressure exerted by OEMs to shift their sourcing towards low-cost extra EU countries and in particular to China.

**To avoid such a massive disruption of the European automotive supply chain a local content target of at least 75% is needed. An 80% threshold is suggested to preserve the current configuration from further disruption in a context already characterized by spreading factory closures and restructuring.**

Such a level would also make sure that new Chinese production sites in Europe for car or component manufacturing are on the same level playing field than EU factories and do not benefit from massive imports of cheap Chinese components and parts.

## Local content policies for the automotive sector

The second section of the report reviews the different types of LCP that have been implemented internationally since the 2008 financial crisis. We focus in particular on automotive related LCP to identify the types of policies implemented in other countries and to assess their record in promoting domestic production and reducing imports. We also analyse the implementation of "Rules of Origins" in Free Trade Agreements negotiated since 2016, including those negotiated by the EU, and their implications for automotive trade.

**We have found that between 2009 and 2024, 5330 different LCP have been implemented in 57 countries.** About 7% of these policies have been implemented in Europe but only by two countries, Germany and the UK, which have applied local value added requirements for state loans and incentives to support extra EU exports and FDI. **If we exclude this specific policy, Europe represents less than 1% of the LCP implemented.** The main countries by number of implemented LCP are Brazil, the US, India, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Russia and Canada. China is only 13th in this list, with about 4% of the LCP implemented, because its main policy tool to support and develop domestic industries consists in direct subsidies to Chinese controlled companies – China concentrates 75% of the direct subsidy policies implemented globally during this period. If we exclude local content incentives in Brazil (which represent alone 52% of the LCP implemented), **the annual number of LCP implemented has increased to 30 between 2009 and 2018, from less than 10 in the previous period between 2000 and 2008, and to 70 in the period 2019-2024. Automotive related LCP represented on average 14% of the LCP implemented.**

The report analyses in detail four automotive LCP: **the Inovar AUTO in Brazil (2013-2017), the NEV policies in China (2012-2024), the Inflation Reduction Act in the US (2022-2024), and the EV LCP in Turkey (2019-2024).**

We found that these policies contributed in reducing automotive imports and had a positive impact on new investments. We did not find evidences of price increases or reduced international competitiveness due to the long-term effects of these polices, also because their implementation was target-related (to address spikes in imports, support new emerging sectors, increase R&D investments, etc.) with limited time frames
(policies evolved regularly and local content requirements were removed once the
targets were achieved).

The evolution of these policies also highlights a more general change in the scope and
targets of LCP. In the post-2008 crisis context, the emphasis was still on the traditional
targets of such policies, i.e. reducing imports, fostering investments and upgrading
domestic supply chain in strategic industries. This was typically the case in the auto-
parts sector (i.e. the Inovar AUTO policy), even if many of these policies already
concerned in this period new technological sectors (solar panels, wind turbines, clean
energy, etc.). This was also why most of these policies were concentrated in emerging
countries, and in particular in the BRICs.

**In the post-2019 pandemic context the emphasis has shifted towards de-risking (reducing strategic economic dependencies) and re-shoring strategic production capacities.** The main sectors concerned are now the pharmaceutical sector and clean-tech sectors including the electric vehicle value chain as in the case of IRA in the US. The most-active countries include mature economies such as the US, Japan and Korea, besides major emerging economies such as China, India and Indonesia.

**The main exception in this new geo-political landscape characterised by widespread implementation of de-risking and/or re-shoring policies is Europe.** The lack of such policies in Europe represents a threat to its competitiveness and sovereignty in key strategic sectors, with the automotive industry being one **amongst many**. We conclude that given this evolving context it is now a matter of time before such policies are implemented, and it is reasonable to assume that the sooner this happens, the more effective these policies will be.

## Rules of Origins: the right template?

To explore how Europe could rapidly address the lack of LCP for the automotive sector we analyse the current application in the EU of Rules of Origins in Free Trade Agreements. ROO are local content requirements that only apply on imported and exported goods within a given FTA. We analyse ROO for the automotive sector in 10 different FTAs negotiated since 2016, 7 of which are currently implemented in the EU.

We have found that ROO provide a solid framework to implement local content
requirements by using three different criteria: change in tariff classification; value added
percentage; and localization of specific manufacturing or process operations. These
criteria are already applied in many FTAs and can be combined together to address the
risk of circumventing strategies from third countries' exporters.

## The proposal: a Rule of Origin for Made in Europe cars and auto-parts

**We propose to create a ROO (as a local content requirement) for the Single Market set at 20% MaxNOM (maximum value of Non-Originating Materials) for passenger cars and light vehicles which corresponds to a local content requirement of 80%**.

**We propose to set at 25% the MaxNOM for auto-parts.** A distinction between core-parts, principal parts and complementary parts as used in the USMCA FTA could be introduced to adjust the MaxNOM at different levels to reflect the reality of current international trade flows and avoid negative impacts on the competitiveness of OEMs. We propose to combine these MaxNOM with a manufacturing operation requirement for at least core-parts.
We propose to exclude batteries from the EU vehicles-auto-parts ROO and to have
a separate ROO for batteries that will be set according to the EU "Battery Booster
package" and the announced target of at least 50% value added along the battery value
chain made in Europe by 2030 <fnref n="8" />.

The new European ROO for passenger cars, light-vehicles and auto-parts will
define what is a "made in Europe" car or auto-part, and could be then used in
different key EU and national policies:

- In trade policies to exclude non "made in Europe" cars and auto-parts from the free-circulation of goods within the Single Market;

- In public procurement to effectively implement a 'buy European' procurement plan;

- In policies for boosting demand for zero-emission vehicles such as social leasing schemes, corporate fleet's decarbonising schemes;

- In incentive schemes for consumers' purchase;

- In the up-coming Clean Industrial State Aid framework to define the eligibility criteria for overseas players

- In the FDI screening regulation to regulate foreign automotive production in Europe.

Such a comprehensive LCP is fully coherent with the Mario Draghi's call for "protecting
jobs (in the automotive sector) from unfair competition"<fnref n="9" /> and Ursula von der Leyen's
will to "ensure that the future of cars remains firmly rooted in Europe" <fnref n="10" />. It will align
European trade and industrial policies and regulations with those of our main
competitors. It will boost the resilience and sustainability of the European automotive
sector and avoid the imminent massive disruption of its supply chain.

<footnote n="8">⁸ European Commission, 'Industrial Action Plan for the European Automotive Sector', 11.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Draghi, 'The Future of European Competitiveness', 41.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ European Commission, 'Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the European Automotive Industry to Start in January'.</footnote>
# Why the European Automotive Supplier network needs to be protected

The European Commission started in January 30th 2025 the **Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the European Automotive Industry (SDFEAI)**. Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen introduced the SDFEAI by stressing the need “to support this industry in the deep and disruptive transition ahead” and that the European Union “must ensure that the future of cars remains firmly rooted in Europe” <fnref n="11" />.

The SDFEAI follows up on Mario Draghi's report on "The Future of European Competitiveness" <fnref n="12" /> that already called for an EU industrial plan for the European automotive sector covering all stages of the value chain <fnref n="13" />. Mario Draghi put a particular emphasis on the need to protect "jobs (in the automotive sector) from unfair competition" and warned that a laissez-faire approach to Chinese imports of electric vehicles is "unlikely to succeed in Europe given the threat it could pose to employment, productivity and economic security" <fnref n="14" />.

The EU anti-subsidies enquiry on Chinese electric vehicles launched by the EC in 2023 and the ensuing tariffs established on Electric Vehicles' imports from China represented an important step in this direction ahead of the SDFEAI. However, as also stressed by the Policy Foresight Unit of the European Parliament <fnref n="15" />, these tariffs will not be enough to protect the European automotive industry from Chinese competition:

* First, the current tariffs appear to be still too low (between 18% and 45% by comparison with 100% in the United-States, between 40% and 70% in India, or 60% in Turkey) to shield the Single Market from further Chinese subsidised imports <fnref n="16" />.

* Second, they can be circumvented via the creation of screwdriver plants to assemble CKD or SKD imported from China and assembled within the Single Market as recently exemplified by the case of Leapmotors' SKD assembled by the Stellantis factory of Tychy in Poland.

* Third, they only cover the imports of assembled BEVs, while the threat of Chinese exports concern the whole value chain for both BEVs and Internal Combustion Engine Vehicles.

According to a recent report by the Rhodium Group <fnref n="17" />, not only China has become by far the main global exporter of intermediate and semi-finished goods (batteries) for EV, but it also dominates global exports of tires, brakes and their respective parts, and has become the second exporter of engine parts behind Germany and the third exporter of

<footnote n="11">¹¹ European Commission.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Draghi, 'The Future of European Competitiveness'.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Ragonnaud, 'The Crisis Facing the EU's Automotive Industry'.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Draghi, 'The Future of European Competitiveness', 41.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Van Wieringen, 'The Future of European Electric Vehicles'.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Sebastian, Barkin, and Kratz, 'Ain't No Duty High Enough'.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Kratz, Piper, and Bouchaud, 'China and the Future of Global Supply Chains'.</footnote>
body panel parts behind Germany and Mexico. The report expects that without "strong defensive action from traditional auto hubs", supply chains for both ICE and EV parts will further concentrate in China. As "strong defensive action" has already been taken in the US under the Biden administration via the Inflation Reduction Act, and it is expected to further increase under the Trump administration, Europe is currently the most exposed region to this risk <fnref n="18" />.

The tariffs for auto parts imported from China to Europe are currently set between 3% and 4,5% depending on the type of products, and at 1,3% for lithium-ion batteries by comparison with 18% to 45% for BEVs. Imports of auto parts from China have been constantly rising during the last ten years and already represented in 2024 one auto part out of four imported to Europe. So far no action has been taken by the European Commission to address this risk <fnref n="19" />. Since 75-80% of the value of vehicles manufactured in Europe come from car-part suppliers <fnref n="20" />, this represents a major threat to the whole European automotive ecosystem.

## Towards a local content policy for the European automotive sector?

A letter addressed ahead of the SDFEAI by a consortium of French and Italian equipment manufacturers and their professional associations has demanded the introduction of local content requirements and incentives to fulfil this regulatory void and preserve the resilience of the European automotive supply chain against unfair Chinese competition.

Local content requirements would be coherent with the industrial plan for the automotive sector proposed by Mario Draghi. They would notably fulfil both the short-term objective of avoiding "the radical displacement of production away from the EU's automotive sector" threatened by fast increasing imports from State-subsidised competitors, and the medium-term objective of maintaining "the European production base with current technological advantages" <fnref n="21" />.

Building on the conclusions of Draghi's report, the Policy Foresight Unit of the European Parliament has indeed called for some local content policies such as tying purchase subsidies for EVs to local manufacturing requirements or setting local content requirements for Chinese manufacturers in Europe <fnref n="22" />.

## Regulatory and political challenges

A consensus seems now to emerge around the need to protect the automotive supplier industry against unfair Chinese competition via for instance a "buy European and sustainable Act" for public procurement <fnref n="23" />. Yet, the possibility to move towards more ambitious and comprehensive local content requirements, with clear local content

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Goujon and Sebastian, 'Car Trouble: ICTS Rule Rewires Global Auto Supply Chains'.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Sebastian and François Chimits, ""Made in China" Electric Vehicles Could Turn Sino-EU Trade on Its Head | Merics''; Fix and Crebo-Rediker, 'China's Double Threat to Europe'.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ European Commission, 'GEAR 2030. High Level Group on the Competitiveness and Growth of the Automobile Industry in the European Union'.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ 'The Future of European Competitiveness', 152.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Van Wieringen, 'The Future of European Electric Vehicles', 26.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ Grudler, 'Against Unfair Competition, Time Has Come for a Buy European Act.'; Carbone 4, 'Buy European and Sustainable Act'.</footnote>
targets set at the EU level as demanded by the French-Italian consortium of equipment manufacturers, has still some way to go.

* First, European OEMs appear so far hesitant to accept the overall concept of local content, as it would restrict their capacity of sourcing globally and taking advantage of lower cost intermediate inputs, including those made in China, to preserve/enhance their competitiveness vis-à-vis Chinese and US competitors, in particular for EVs.

* Second, the European Commission could also be reluctant to implement such measures because they have been generally (but not systematically) considered as being in conflict with WTO obligations, particularly those concerning trade-related measures and subsidies 24.

* Finally, due to the almost complete absence of local content related policies within the European Union (see section 2), at least since the late 1990s, European regulators, policy makers and industry representatives do not have a clear template to define what local content should be, how it should be calculated, at which levels should be set, how should it be applied via different regulatory tools, and how could be integrated with other EU key policy targets, such as a decarbonisation, just transition and the promotion of skills and quality jobs.

The Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector announced on the 5th of March as the outcome of the SDFEAI confirms these difficulties. If the plan clearly highlights the need to strengthen the “trade defence” toolbox and “to investigate unfair practices further up the supply chain, including in the batteries and parts segment *when necessary*” 25, there are no references to local content requirements or incentives, at least for the auto parts’ sector. Concerning the batteries segment there is a reference to the introduction of “European content requirements on battery cells and components in EVs sold in the EU” that “will be set in upcoming legislation, including the Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act and the Circular Economy Act” (12). Yet, even for batteries there are no further details about the nature and level of these requirements, apart from the fact that will be based on “resilience and sustainability criteria”.

Clearly the alarm signal sent by the European automotive suppliers ahead of the SDFEAI has not been enough to overcome the reluctance of both stakeholders and regulators towards a more comprehensive trade defence policy for the automotive sector.

The purpose of this report is to address these reluctance as well as the challenges inherent to the introduction of local content requirements and incentives in the European regulations.

The first section develops a detailed assessment of the risks that European automotive suppliers face if a comprehensive local content policy is not implemented at the EU level. In assessing these risks we do not isolate the “Chinese threat”, represented by unfair competition and massive output overcapacities, but we consider it by also taking into account the overall difficult economic environment in which European automotive

<footnote n="24">24 Stone, Messent, and Flaig, ‘Emerging Policy Issues’; Deringer et al., ‘The Economic Impact of Local Content Requirements’.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">25 European Commission, ‘Industrial Action Plan for the European Automotive Sector’, 17.</footnote>
suppliers currently operate (electrification, overcapacities, pressure towards lower-cost sourcing) and which could exacerbate the consequences of the “Chinese threat”.

The second section reviews the widespread and increasing implementation of local content policies in almost all the main non-European countries and regions since the financial crisis of 2008. It shows that the European Union has become increasingly the exception in a new geopolitical order where all the major economic powers, including the US and China, make an increasingly systematic use of these regulatory tools to develop and support their automotive industries.

To illustrate how these local content policies are conceived and applied in different countries and context we will analyse both the main national local content policies implemented for the automotive sector between 2008 and 2024, and the rules of origins for motor vehicles, parts and batteries associated with the main free trade agreements negotiated since 2016.
# 1. How big is the Chinese threat for the European automotive suppliers?

In presenting the Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector, Stéphane Sejourné, the vice-president of the European Commission in charge of industry, warned that the European automotive industry is in mortal danger. This seems particularly true for automotive suppliers that are in a much more vulnerable position during the current crisis than OEMs for several complementary reasons.

* **First, the fast transition to electrification engaged by the European Union with the "fit for 55" amendment to the CAFE regulation in 2022 and the ban of non-zero emissions new car sales by 2035, has much more disruptive consequences for the suppliers than for OEMs.** OEMs can shift their production from ICE powertrains to electric powertrains and batteries (at least their assembly) and can also internalize previously outsourced production to compensate for the decline of employment in powertrain production. For automotive suppliers specialised in ICE related technologies and products there are no easy ways to convert their expertise, capacities and industrial tools for other types of production. According to a report made by Strategy& 26 for CLEPA, at least 600,000 jobs will be lost on the 2,4 million directly employed by the European automotive sector during the next 5-10 years due to this fast transition to electrification.

* **Second, in 2023 and 2024, despite a return to "normal" after the pandemic crisis and the chips' shortage, light vehicles production in Europe was still 20% below its pre-pandemic level.** This depressed production is, to a certain extent, due to the difficulties faced by OEMs in pushing EV sales, but its main cause has been the sharp increase in the price of new car sales during the last five years. This sharp increase in prices has been a key contributor to record profits for European OEMs. In 2023, European OEMs (VW, Daimler, BMW, Stellantis and Renault) have recorded €95 billion of profits (EBIT) with a record average operational margin of 11% 27. This however has not been the case for their suppliers. According to the CLEPA and McKinsey & Company automotive supply industry's health and sentiment bi-annual survey, 56% of the firms pulled in 2023 expected profitability levels below 5%, and this percentage has increased to 65% in 2024, with 25% of the firms pulled expecting to operate at marginal or negative profitability level28. In other terms, the suppliers are now absorbing the full impact of the reduced production volume without having enjoyed any of the benefits that OEMs have been able to accumulate during this period.

* **Third, the "enchanted parenthesis" of very high profitability for OEMs that lasted between 2021 and 2023, is now over.** The "enchanted parenthesis" was

<footnote n="26">26 'Electric Vehicle Transition Impact Assessment Report 2020 - 2040. A Quantitative Forecast of Employment Trends at Automotive Suppliers in Europe'.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">27 do Prado et al., 'The Road to a New European Automotive Strategy: Trade and Industrial Policy Options'.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">28 Source: https://www.clepa.eu/insights-updates/press-releases/european-automotive-suppliers-face-unprecedented-uncertainty-amid-shrinking-profit-margins/</footnote>
triggered by the Covid 19 pandemic and lasted until the end of the chips'
shortage. It was due to lower than demand supply of new cars that resulted in
lower competition and higher margins in new car sales while most of the cost of
idle capacity was absorbed by States' temporary unemployment measures. In
2024, the European OEMs profitability was back to their pre-pandemic level, but
due to the sudden drop from record levels in 2023, this return to "normal" has
been heavily sanctioned by the financial market. In 2024, the total capitalization
of EU OEMs has been reduced by almost half. As a short-term solution to this
mounting pressure from shareholders and financial analysts, several EU OEMs
have announced their intention of shifting an increasing amount of their sourcing
towards low-cost countries. Stellantis has notably announced a target of 80% of
its sourcing made in low-cost countries by 2028 <fnref n="29" />. As we will see later more in
detail, the results of the survey of 108 French based automotive suppliers carried
out for this report confirms that this is actually the case. According to these
results, between 30% and 50% of the French production and between 15% and
30% of the European production of these suppliers is expected to be relocated in
the next five years to low-cost extra-EU countries, and in particular to China.

* **Finally, exactly as the European OEMs that are confronted with the unfair competition of new Chinese OEMs, both in China and in Europe, European automotive suppliers are also confronted with the same threat.** The two EU enquiries made in 2024 on the illegal subsidies to the NEV industry and on the trade distortions in China have found that the same illegal subsidies that went to Chinese OEMs also went to Chinese auto-parts companies with the same ambition of creating global competitive players capable of exporting and expanding overseas. These findings have led the European Union to impose duties on the imports of Chinese EVs ranging from 18% to 45%. But as already stressed in the introduction, no duties have been imposed on imports of Chinese auto-parts and batteries.

Taking into account both the massive overcapacities generated by these policies
in China, and the specific context highlighted above, in particular the short-term
financial pressure exerted on European OEMs to shift their sourcing towards
lower cost locations, suggests that the European automotive suppliers are
confronted with a potential existential threat.

The purpose of this section is to provide a more precise and detailed assessment of this threat, and whether or not it does justify the implementation of a much more comprehensive local content policy and trade defense instruments than what has been proposed so far by the EU Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector.

First, we consider the evidences presented in the two 2024 EU enquiries on illegal subsidies and trade distortions as far as the auto-parts sector is concerned, and how these evidences should already legitimate (at least) some trade related measures, such as countervailing duties, to protect the European automotive suppliers from unfair competition.

Second, we carry an analysis of the EU customs' data for 18 different categories of auto parts and their trade flows within Europe, outside Europe and in particular with China,

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Fay, 'Carlos Tavares' Ruthless Cost-Cutting Strategy'.</footnote>
between 2014, 2019 and 2024 in order to better characterize the degree of penetration
of Chinese imports and the evolution of the EU trade balance with extra-EU countries
and with China in particular.

Third, we exploit an online questionnaire completed in February 2025 by 108 French
based automotive suppliers which were asked to quantify the risks represented by the
"Chinese threat" and more generally by the current relocation pressure to relocate
towards extra-EU low-cost countries for their French and European production over the
next five years.
1.1 Evidences from the “illegal subsidies” (2024) and the “trade distortions”
(2024) EU enquiries

These two enquiries, both carried out by the DG Trade in 2023-2024, were mainly concerned by the fast increasing import penetration of the Single Market by Chinese made electric vehicles and whether or not NEV producers benefited from illegal subsidies and government support. They do however provide some clear evidences that automotive parts suppliers were also heavily subsidized and supported by the Chinese government whose intervention "spread to the entire production and supply chain of the BEV industry, among others, by the provision of parts and components for less than adequate remuneration" <fnref n="30" />.

Both enquiries identify the will of the Chinese government of developing and supporting a complete automotive domestic value chain. For instance, in the 2015 industrial policy "Made in China 2025", the government expressed its continuous support to develop and improve "the engineering and industry of core technologies such as power batteries, drive motors, high-efficiency internal combustion engines, advanced transmissions, lightweight materials, and intelligent control capabilities, so as to form a complete industrial system and innovation system from key components to complete vehicles, and promote independent brands of energy-saving and new energy vehicles to be in line with international advanced levels" <fnref n="31" />.

Amongst the objectives of the 2017 Chinese Automobile Plan there was notably the creation of “several Chinese automobile parts companies having a turnover of RMB 100 billion (€13 billion) by 2020” and “able to become competitive in key technological fields” in order to establish themselves by 2025 “among the top ten automobile parts companies in the world in terms of production value” <fnref n="32" />. Currently there are 15 Chinese automotive suppliers amongst the top 100, and three amongst the top 20 (CATL (7), Weichai Group (8), and HASCO (16) in 2023). The 2017 Automobile Plan also “invited car companies to adopt a ‘strategic concept of international development’ and to outline an ‘international development strategy’. In particular, car manufacturing companies cooperating with car parts manufacturing companies would qualify for governmental support to identify ‘key development areas to build automobile industrial parks’ and for support related to establishing ‘overseas development alliances’” <fnref n="33" />.

The EU enquiry on “trade distortions” concluded: “In short, the Government actively promotes a “coordinated overseas expansion” of Chinese brands which include both car manufacturing companies and car parts manufacturing companies” <fnref n="34" />.

Evidences of this were also found at the level of provincial plans. For instance the Anhui 14th Automobile Provincial Plan had as a key priorities to “Support the e-commerce of

<footnote n="30">³⁰ European Commission, ‘Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1866 of 3 July 2024 Imposing a Provisional Countervailing Duty on Imports of New Battery Electric Vehicles Designed for the Transport of Persons Originating in the People’s Republic of China’, 12.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ European Commission, 113.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² European Commission, ‘On Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations’, 679.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ European Commission, 680.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ European Commission, 680.</footnote>
component supplying companies, build public overseas warehouses for export products, share channels to overseas markets and service support systems. Create tools such as import and export trade platforms, overseas industry parks as well as trade parks and guide the development of clusters of Chinese overseas investment enterprises.” <fnref n="35" />.

Similarly, the 14th Development Plan for the New Energy Automobile Industry in Guizhou Province sought to “Support the construction of key projects” and notably the “Wuchuan Automobile’s annual production of 1 million tons of automotive aluminium alloy die-casting projects”, the “Baike automobile brake molds production line project”, and “a number of key projects such as the Guizhou Aerospace Smart Manufacturing Industry Cluster Base Project in Guiyang Economic and Technological Development Zone” <fnref n="36" />.

Here again, the enquiry on “trade distortions” concluded that:

**"The competitive dynamics seem to be distorted also in the industry of parts and components."** Indeed, the Jiangsu 14th NEV Provincial Plan intends to "[e]ncourage key parts and components companies: to focus on increasing their market share, on mastering core technologies, on increasing quality and cost controllability etc.; and to proceed to mergers and reorganizations and speed up the fostering and emergence of automobile parts industry clusters with a systematic development, a modular manufacturing pattern and integrated supplies" (idem).

The enquiry on “illegal subsidies” similarly concluded that all the illegal tools used to support NEV manufacturers – direct grants, taxation policy support, financial service support and venture capital support – were also used to develop the supplier industry: **"Input suppliers are provided with the means to perform their public functions, namely, to develop the BEV industry, thanks to the support of the Government of China"** <fnref n="37" />.

Given these converging conclusions, it seems legitimate to ask why the European Commission has not introduced yet countervailing duties to protect the European automotive supplier industry from this unfair competition, and, if such measure were not possible in the scope of an inquiry on battery electric vehicles, why the Commission has not started yet an enquiry on auto-parts to address the “trade distortions” and “illegal subsidies” identified by the two aforementioned enquiries.

One possible reason for this lack of action, can be found in the recent EU Industrial Action Plan for the Automotive Sector where is stated that “the Commission is equally committed to make use of Trade Defence Instruments and the Foreign Subsidies Regulation to investigate unfair practices further up the supply chain, including in the batteries and parts segment **where necessary**.” <fnref n="38" />.

<footnote n="35">³⁵ European Commission, 693.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ European Commission, 694.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">³⁷ European Commission, 'Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1866 of 3 July 2024 Imposing a Provisional Countervailing Duty on Imports of New Battery Electric Vehicles Designed for the Transport of Persons Originating in the People's Republic of China', 118.</footnote>

<footnote n="38">³⁸ European Commission, 'Industrial Action Plan for the European Automotive Sector', 17.</footnote>
The first question that we need to address is therefore whether or not it is currently necessary to protect the European automotive supplier industry from these “unfair practices”.

## 1.2 Is foreign trade in automotive parts and components becoming de-Europeanized?

<table><caption>Table 1. EU and selected countries trade in Automotive parts and accessoires (2014-2024) - code 8708</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th><th>2014-2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">EU</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>15,5%</td><td>17,1%</td><td>17,1%</td><td>1,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>36,9%</td><td>32,1%</td><td>29,5%</td><td>-7,4%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance extra UE</td><td>30 127 938 278</td><td>26 546 957 072</td><td>25 322 656 541</td><td>-4 805 281 737</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,9%</td><td>2,7%</td><td>4,3%</td><td>2,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>7,6%</td><td>6,1%</td><td>5,2%</td><td>-2,4%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance China</td><td>7 566 499 361</td><td>5 791 416 580</td><td>2 221 974 282</td><td>-5 344 525 079</td></tr><tr><td>Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>17,2%</td><td>17,1%</td><td>16,7%</td><td>-0,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>53,6%</td><td>49,6%</td><td>47,8%</td><td>-5,8%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance extra UE</td><td>19 438 724 246</td><td>21 581 079 057</td><td>21 093 403 758</td><td>1 654 679 512</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>2,0%</td><td>3,1%</td><td>4,7%</td><td>2,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>17,4%</td><td>14,9%</td><td>14,0%</td><td>-3,4%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance with China</td><td>7 323 261 911</td><td>7 217 812 641</td><td>6 269 831 953</td><td>-1 053 429 958</td></tr><tr><td>Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>18,5%</td><td>21,7%</td><td>18,3%</td><td>-0,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>34,7%</td><td>28,0%</td><td>28,3%</td><td>-6,4%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance extra UE</td><td>2 554 073 020</td><td>236 749 686</td><td>731 167 073</td><td>-1 822 905 947</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,4%</td><td>3,7%</td><td>3,7%</td><td>2,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>4,9%</td><td>1,3%</td><td>0,8%</td><td>-4,0%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance China</td><td>477 633 493</td><td>-391 651 041</td><td>-482 275 424</td><td>-959 908 917</td></tr><tr><td>Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>8,8%</td><td>13,5%</td><td>15,9%</td><td>7,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>35,6%</td><td>33,5%</td><td>34,3%</td><td>-1,3%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance extra UE</td><td>1 593 001 352</td><td>1 165 195 496</td><td>1 496 808 258</td><td>-96 193 094</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,2%</td><td>1,7%</td><td>3,0%</td><td>1,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>3,0%</td><td>3,2%</td><td>3,1%</td><td>0,0%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance China</td><td>66 641 928</td><td>56 401 292</td><td>-86 168 263</td><td>-152 810 191</td></tr><tr><td>Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>24,8%</td><td>24,8%</td><td>21,5%</td><td>-3,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>36,5%</td><td>32,6%</td><td>31,5%</td><td>-5,0%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance extra UE</td><td>2 701 650 762</td><td>2 430 658 603</td><td>2 669 818 122</td><td>-31 832 640</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>5,7%</td><td>5,7%</td><td>7,1%</td><td>1,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1,4%</td><td>1,2%</td><td>1,0%</td><td>-0,4%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance China</td><td>-145 851 025</td><td>-256 011 967</td><td>-484 956 952</td><td>-339 105 927</td></tr><tr><td>Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>16,6%</td><td>15,0%</td><td>18,4%</td><td>1,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>14,9%</td><td>14,2%</td><td>12,8%</td><td>-2,1%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance extra UE</td><td>408 282 004</td><td>428 063 100</td><td>-272 171 642</td><td>-680 453 646</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,0%</td><td>1,8%</td><td>4,1%</td><td>3,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1,0%</td><td>1,8%</td><td>4,1%</td><td>3,0%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance China</td><td>52 539 176</td><td>-78 608 922</td><td>-423 261 176</td><td>-475 800 352</td></tr><tr><td>Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>13,7%</td><td>15,3%</td><td>14,6%</td><td>0,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>13,7%</td><td>15,3%</td><td>14,6%</td><td>0,9%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance extra UE</td><td>-392 327 956</td><td>-1 193 147 873</td><td>-1 388 270 808</td><td>-995 942 852</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Slovenia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,8%</td><td>1,4%</td><td>3,5%</td><td>2,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,6%</td><td>0,5%</td><td>0,8%</td><td>0,2%</td></tr><tr><td>Trade balance China</td><td>-28 388 206</td><td>-130 950 032</td><td>-427 851 753</td><td>-399 463 547</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat. Note: Non-EU partners and China in the foreign trade in parts and components of the EU and its main producing countries (Eurostat sources, 2024 figures estimated on the basis of the first 11 months).
The table above shows the general trend in foreign trade in parts and components within the EU. It does not reveal a clear "de-regionalization" of the production organization of the European automotive industry. Indeed, if this were the case, there would be a clear increase in "non-EU" imports, as assembly plants would source more clearly from China or India. The share of non-EU imports remains fairly stable at between 15% and 20%, and the increase observed between 2014 and 2019 is no longer perceptible over the following 5 years. For Germany, France and Italy over the decade, there has been a slight decline in non-EU imports. Italy stands out for its higher levels. Spain was hardly affected by these imports at the start of the period, and now seems to be coming into line.

On the export side, this share of non-European flows is greater, as European OEM sites largely supply assembly sites located outside the EU, sometimes to supply local markets far from the EU (China, India, Brazil, Russia, etc.), and sometimes to re-export their production to the EU (as in the case of Turkey, Morocco and now the UK). However, as these non-European sites grow and age, they attract investment from local or global equipment manufacturers, and become less importers and more exporters. In our table, this is reflected in non-EU exports, which are tending to decline in importance. For the EU as a whole, the "non-EU" share of total exports fell by 7.4 points over the decade.

In terms of external balances, this resulted in a significant drop in the EU surplus, from 30 to 25 billion euros. At country level, however, there were contrasting trends: Germany, Spain and Italy are consolidating their surpluses, while France's has fallen from 2.5 to 0.7 billion euros, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia are increasingly in deficit.

The situation with China stands out from this general picture. In fact, the 5 billion euro reduction in the surplus mentioned above is mainly explained by the evolution of foreign trade in parts and components with China. From 7.6 billion euros, the EU's surplus with China has fallen to 2.2. This means that, excluding China, the EU's foreign trade surplus has grown.

Clearly, Chinese factories have less and less need of European components and, despite the growth in Chinese production over the decade, exports to China are stagnating. Conversely, imports of components from China rose from 1.9 to 7.3 billion euros (a 3.7-fold increase).

<table><caption>Table 2. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Import UE</th><th>Import extra UE</th><th>Import China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>157</td><td>151</td><td>365</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>162</td><td>159</td><td>424</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>88</td><td>174</td><td>234</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>177</td><td>147</td><td>211</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>185</td><td>209</td><td>737</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>252</td><td>270</td><td>1 075</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat.

This trend is very clear in Germany and even more so in France. It is exacerbated in the Czech and Slovak cases, and much less marked in Spain and Italy.
As a result, Germany still manages to generate a surplus that has only fallen by 1 billion euros (from 7 to 6) over the decade. With the EU surplus now down to 2 billion, EU countries excluding Germany were in deficit by 4 billion in 2024. The same figure applies to France and Italy (-0.5), the Czech Republic and Slovakia (-0.4). The non-EU share and the Chinese share of Czech and Slovak imports are growing faster, and this probably reflects the fact that what little loyalty automakers may still have in the old automotive countries to their historical suppliers does not exist in these new EU member states. In other words, what they don't dare or hesitate to do at home is less of a problem in the new automotive countries.

These developments, which concern all automotive parts and components (classified as 8708), provide the basis for our subsequent examinations of the main components belonging or not belonging to this class.

We are therefore repeating our analysis for 12 items in this class:

- 29: miscellaneous parts and accessories

- 40: gearboxes

- 30: brakes

- 50: axles

- 80: suspensions

- 94: steering wheels

- 70: wheels

- 92: mufflers

- 93: clutches

- 91: radiators

- 10: bumpers

- 95: airbags.

We add:

- 840734: gasoline engines

- 840820: diesel engines

- 7318: fasteners

- 8482: bearings

- 401110: tires

- 850760: lithium batteries.

The question is whether certain fields are more or less sensitive to the dynamics we detect at a general level.

We therefore propose 18 sheets featuring our tables and the commentary they inspire, followed by a summary to help us understand why these statistics support the idea that local content requirements deserve to be structured by the EU:

* not only for EVs, but also for other types of vehicle;

* not only for the sourcing of new assembly sites (new factories established by Chinese OEMs and component manufacturers), but also for the sourcing of old ones.
### 1.2.1 8708-29: Miscellaneous parts and accessories

<table><caption>Table 3. EU and selected countries trade in miscellaneous parts and accessories (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>11,5%</td><td>13,0%</td><td>12,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>33,8%</td><td>28,8%</td><td>23,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>5 266 235 953</td><td>4 800 801 236</td><td>3 708 170 506</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,0%</td><td>2,0%</td><td>2,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>10,0%</td><td>7,0%</td><td>4,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>2 047 365 242</td><td>1 519 091 388</td><td>680 611 484</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>10,8%</td><td>10,6%</td><td>9,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>55,7%</td><td>50,1%</td><td>44,1%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>3 905 772 843</td><td>4 205 724 177</td><td>3 095 297 125</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,0%</td><td>1,6%</td><td>1,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>23,8%</td><td>18,2%</td><td>13,5%</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>1 928 976 417</td><td>1 718 114 331</td><td>1 053 698 914</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>16,0%</td><td>23,7%</td><td>24,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>37,2%</td><td>28,6%</td><td>30,8%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>340 161 907</td><td>-25 146 586</td><td>150 388 681</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,1%</td><td>8,7%</td><td>5,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>4,9%</td><td>0,6%</td><td>0,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>56 489 858</td><td>-172 064 234</td><td>-96 811 171</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>15,1%</td><td>14,1%</td><td>14,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>38,3%</td><td>27,0%</td><td>25,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>107 962 493</td><td>-5 962 645</td><td>-4 802 041</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>2,0%</td><td>2,4%</td><td>4,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>5,4%</td><td>0,5%</td><td>0,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>17 021 498</td><td>-37 689 379</td><td>-86 721 378</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>39,4%</td><td>33,4%</td><td>24,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>31,2%</td><td>38,2%</td><td>34,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>105 452 643</td><td>278 548 637</td><td>355 475 122</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,6%</td><td>2,1%</td><td>4,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,4%</td><td>0,8%</td><td>0,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-4 295 414</td><td>-3 963 799</td><td>-25 697 433</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>14,8%</td><td>15,5%</td><td>16,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>9,5%</td><td>7,7%</td><td>4,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>51 622 966</td><td>-14 906 762</td><td>-336 997 658</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,5%</td><td>1,2%</td><td>0,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,5%</td><td>1,2%</td><td>0,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>19 756 329</td><td>5 645 178</td><td>-17 509 337</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>4,3%</td><td>8,5%</td><td>8,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>4,3%</td><td>8,5%</td><td>8,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-44 130 362</td><td>-249 841 011</td><td>-296 771 228</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Slovenia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,4%</td><td>1,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,1%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-2 307 761</td><td>-16 944 537</td><td>-50 619 970</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

In terms of imports, this sub-category, which is rather difficult to grasp, weighs heavily in 2024, with total EU imports amounting to 33 billion euros.
A major characteristic of this item is that it is very much "European", and there is no clear trend towards de-Europeanization. In 2014, the share of "non-EU" imports was 4 points lower than for all automotive equipment, and at the end of the period the difference was 4.5 points: the greater resilience of these items is confirmed, probably because they travel less well.

Despite this, the overall dynamic is the same: the EU is finding it increasingly difficult to export outside the EU, and the share of exports outside the EU is down 10 points. The reverse is true for imports, with the result that the surplus is shrinking, losing 1.6 billion euros in 10 years, from 5.3 to 3.7 billion euros. This regression is essentially due to what is happening with China: the bilateral surplus was 2 billion in 2014 and will only be 0.7 billion in 2024.

<table><caption>Table 4 Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 – code 8708-29</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>133</td><td>120</td><td>251</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>136</td><td>234</td><td>762</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>147</td><td>139</td><td>306</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>204</td><td>104</td><td>492</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>208</td><td>241</td><td>422</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>198</td><td>385</td><td>2 130</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat.

By country, the picture is fairly consistent with that generally observed for equipment. Germany still has a surplus with non-EU countries, particularly China, but its surplus fell by almost 1 billion euros (25%) over the period, due to trends in imports from and exports to China. The other countries can be divided into two categories: the former automotive countries, such as France and Italy, are still exporters to non-EU countries, but have become net importers from China; the others, which have a large assembly activity, are net importers to all non-EU countries, and increasingly to China. However, the amounts involved remain fairly limited. The biggest bilateral deficit is with Spain, at around 100 million euros.

As a result, these parts and components are not the ones we should be most concerned about.
### 1.2.2 8708-40 Gearboxes

<table><caption>Table 5. EU and selected countries trade in gearboxes (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>22,1%</td><td>26,5%</td><td>20,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>53,6%</td><td>43,2%</td><td>41,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>7 346 048 566</td><td>5 602 678 437</td><td>7 243 798 588</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,1%</td><td>1,2%</td><td>4,2%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>18,0%</td><td>13,1%</td><td>13,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>3 188 496 648</td><td>3 132 032 386</td><td>2 937 616 673</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>67,6%</td><td>60,1%</td><td>60,1%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,5%</td><td>1,1%</td><td>4,0%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>27,3%</td><td>22,1%</td><td>24,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>2 879 778 323</td><td>3 123 589 590</td><td>3 580 669 202</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>441 008 592</td><td>-584 780 189</td><td>174 684 383</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>33,5%</td><td>17,2%</td><td>25,9%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>15,4%</td><td>30,9%</td><td>16,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>35,8%</td><td>39,8%</td><td>43,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>3 676 660</td><td>-356 798 704</td><td>64 073 506</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,4%</td><td>0,2%</td><td>0,2%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,4%</td><td>0,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-3 632 352</td><td>-2 285 547</td><td>-1 660 926</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>16,3%</td><td>29,4%</td><td>16,6%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>45,1%</td><td>32,1%</td><td>29,9%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>377 318 691</td><td>174 441 318</td><td>276 593 569</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>3,6%</td><td>3,2%</td><td>3,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>1,9%</td><td>0,7%</td><td>0,6%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>-2 211 782</td><td>-26 909 993</td><td>-32 807 996</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>34,8%</td><td>25,8%</td><td>34,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>25,9%</td><td>32,0%</td><td>24,5%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-75 728 187</td><td>-39 458 220</td><td>-288 629 804</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,1%</td><td>2,0%</td><td>11,9%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>1,1%</td><td>2,0%</td><td>11,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-1 653 604</td><td>-23 047 222</td><td>-161 486 215</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>27,6%</td><td>29,9%</td><td>27,8%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>-170 440 717</td><td>-451 253 657</td><td>-585 477 116</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,7%</td><td>2,0%</td><td>10,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,3%</td><td>2,3%</td><td>0,1%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-3 659 801</td><td>-21 634 295</td><td>-219 311 020</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Gearboxes travel easily, and the gearbox economy is more global and less European than other components. The EU imports 1/5th of the value of its total imports from the ROW and, more importantly, despite the regression in this share observed, 40% of the value
of total exports is represented by non-EU exports. China accounted for 18% of these exports in 2014 and now needs less, but China's share of total European gearboxes exports is 2.5 times higher for gearboxes than for all automotive equipment. The EU still has a surplus of over 7.3 billion euros vis-à-vis the ROW and 3 billion vis-à-vis China.

<table><caption>Table 6. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 – code 8708-40</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>272</td><td>110</td><td>596</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>164</td><td>82</td><td>182</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>216</td><td>239</td><td>117</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>211</td><td>216</td><td>191</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>185</td><td>179</td><td>2 044</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>341</td><td>346</td><td>4 853</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

This is because German industry has improved its position in this area over the period, with a surplus vis-à-vis non-European countries as a whole rising from 6.4 to 8.6 billion euros, and vis-à-vis China from 2.9 to 3.5 billion. As with many other items, the surplus is thus attributable solely to Germany. More precisely, France is quite close to balance. This is also the case for Italy and Spain. In all three cases, imports from China are growing, but at a slower rate than for components as a whole.

Slovakia and the Czech Republic are major importers of gearboxes from China, with sizeable deficits. In Germany and, above all, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Germany and its automakers show a propensity to seek out gearboxes in China, which appears to be quite strong. This seems to indicate that, as much as the foreign trade in parts of the major historical assembly countries, that of the new automotive countries must be observed to assess the “de-Europeanization” movement that needs to be countered.
<table><caption>Table 7. EU and selected countries trade in brakes (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>17,5%</td><td>18,9%</td><td>18,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>30,4%</td><td>28,1%</td><td>27,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>1 762 686 522</td><td>1 650 136 922</td><td>1 537 300 487</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>5,5%</td><td>7,3%</td><td>9,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>3,4%</td><td>2,7%</td><td>2,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>(142 239 678)</td><td>(466 295 428)</td><td>(1 046 015 004)</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>17,9%</td><td>19,6%</td><td>19,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>43,7%</td><td>39,9%</td><td>38,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>1 024 641 557</td><td>1 025 479 248</td><td>1 002 718 008</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>5,5%</td><td>8,6%</td><td>10,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>6,6%</td><td>5,5%</td><td>4,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>71 327 572</td><td>-39 505 353</td><td>-248 953 512</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>11,7%</td><td>15,7%</td><td>17,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>34,5%</td><td>29,2%</td><td>34,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>246 115 623</td><td>128 408 835</td><td>126 765 752</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>2,0%</td><td>2,9%</td><td>5,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>5,3%</td><td>2,2%</td><td>1,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>36 021 721</td><td>-11 689 740</td><td>-57 864 729</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>17,6%</td><td>21,2%</td><td>16,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>26,6%</td><td>30,0%</td><td>29,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>114 434 365</td><td>118 953 652</td><td>155 575 844</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>7,5%</td><td>9,5%</td><td>10,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1,5%</td><td>0,8%</td><td>0,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-27 026 670</td><td>-52 425 503</td><td>-78 579 530</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>29,2%</td><td>28,1%</td><td>30,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>27,1%</td><td>27,4%</td><td>27,1%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>239 532 561</td><td>276 523 918</td><td>326 534 229</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>18,3%</td><td>18,0%</td><td>24,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1,9%</td><td>2,0%</td><td>2,1%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-88 069 590</td><td>-119 425 227</td><td>-197 838 242</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>8,4%</td><td>12,2%</td><td>12,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>15,3%</td><td>14,9%</td><td>15,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>120 530 888</td><td>93 296 165</td><td>80 960 544</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,0%</td><td>1,5%</td><td>3,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1,0%</td><td>1,5%</td><td>3,8%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>10 441 727</td><td>12 037 853</td><td>-16 787 162</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>16,8%</td><td>14,2%</td><td>10,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>16,8%</td><td>14,2%</td><td>10,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-5 708 184</td><td>-25 733 837</td><td>2 273 927</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Slovenia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,4%</td><td>0,6%</td><td>0,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>2,6%</td><td>0,5%</td><td>2,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>8 690 958</td><td>-537 249</td><td>5 638 316</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

The pattern of change observed on the brakes is fairly typical: non-EU imports are between 15% and 20% and growing fairly little; in exports, non-EU, which in 2014 was associated with a share of over 30%, has been brought down to 27%. China's share of
imports has grown very significantly, rising from 5.5% to 9.7%. The opposite is true for exports, which fell from 3.4% to 2.2%.

Germany is in line with these trends, starting from higher levels for non-EU imports and exports, for which the trade balance remains in surplus by 1 billion euros over the period. With regard to China, the share of imports has doubled, reaching 11% by 2024. The value of brakes exported to China fell by 33%, from 6.6% to 4.4%. Bilateral trade, which was in surplus in 2014, is in deficit by a quarter of a billion in 2024.

<table><caption>Table 8. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 - code 8708-30</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>136</td><td>152</td><td>276</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>103</td><td>162</td><td>292</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>158</td><td>145</td><td>212</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>152</td><td>166</td><td>210</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>127</td><td>201</td><td>486</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>267</td><td>147</td><td>513</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Some other countries are importing a growing share of the value of their brake imports from outside the EU. This is particularly true of France and the Czech Republic. This is not the case for Spain, Italy and Slovakia.

For its foreign trade in brakes with China, France has narrowly fallen into deficit (56 million). Spain and Italy are even more so (79 and 198 million euros), whereas their deficits were much smaller in 2014.

The Czech Republic has a surplus with non-EU countries, but a deficit with China. Slovakia is a net exporter to non-EU countries, including China.
1.2.4 8708-50 Drive-axles

<table><caption>Table 9 EU and selected countries trade in drive-axles (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>17,6%</td><td>18,2%</td><td>19,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>35,2%</td><td>35,3%</td><td>32,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>1 655 616 787</td><td>2 123 768 333</td><td>2 206 771 940</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,5%</td><td>2,5%</td><td>4,4%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>1,5%</td><td>2,5%</td><td>4,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>5,2%</td><td>4,6%</td><td>3,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>307 102 963</td><td>263 991 822</td><td>(13 267 078)</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,9%</td><td>3,2%</td><td>7,1%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>1,9%</td><td>3,2%</td><td>7,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>9,8%</td><td>10,1%</td><td>7,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>307 876 611</td><td>351 908 529</td><td>208 679 893</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>7,3%</td><td>12,8%</td><td>24,1%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>7,3%</td><td>12,8%</td><td>24,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>31,3%</td><td>33,4%</td><td>24,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>133 359 898</td><td>134 105 677</td><td>-22 024 967</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,5%</td><td>5,1%</td><td>6,3%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,5%</td><td>5,1%</td><td>6,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>3,5%</td><td>1,0%</td><td>0,5%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>16 618 494</td><td>-26 986 293</td><td>-59 397 379</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,5%</td><td>5,1%</td><td>6,3%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>15,7%</td><td>17,5%</td><td>11,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>43,4%</td><td>50,0%</td><td>44,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>8 953 988</td><td>58 983 088</td><td>74 098 890</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,9%</td><td>0,9%</td><td>1,3%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,9%</td><td>0,9%</td><td>1,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>1,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-3 973 309</td><td>-4 938 758</td><td>-6 170 368</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>57,4%</td><td>50,0%</td><td>41,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>57,4%</td><td>50,0%</td><td>41,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>34,5%</td><td>35,2%</td><td>42,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>202 591 094</td><td>291 427 646</td><td>516 954 786</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>6,9%</td><td>8,5%</td><td>10,0%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>6,9%</td><td>8,5%</td><td>10,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>2,0%</td><td>1,5%</td><td>1,8%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>4 089 863</td><td>-4 621 424</td><td>-11 588 219</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>21,7%</td><td>20,7%</td><td>17,8%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>21,7%</td><td>20,7%</td><td>17,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>19,1%</td><td>25,5%</td><td>21,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-66 194 234</td><td>-66 003 794</td><td>-109 436 687</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,8%</td><td>2,8%</td><td>2,4%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,8%</td><td>2,8%</td><td>2,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,8%</td><td>2,8%</td><td>2,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-1 615 325</td><td>-19 403 798</td><td>-23 591 693</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>35,3%</td><td>33,2%</td><td>36,3%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>35,3%</td><td>33,2%</td><td>36,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>35,3%</td><td>33,2%</td><td>36,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-90 169 704</td><td>-159 761 980</td><td>-229 951 057</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>3,9%</td><td>4,0%</td><td>5,4%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>3,9%</td><td>4,0%</td><td>5,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-13 227 602</td><td>-22 497 125</td><td>-41 415 734</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

This item, which corresponds to foreign trade of 11 billion euros for the EU, is, as can be seen by comparing our two tables, very much in line with the general trend, with the exception of a slight increase in the surplus vis-à-vis non-EU countries, from 1.7 billion
euros to 2.2. However, their share of imports rose by two points, while their share of exports fell by 2.6 points. China's share of imports rose by 3 points, while its share of exports fell by 1.5 points. As a result, the surplus of 300 million observed in 2014 disappeared in 2024.

Germany is more active with non-EU countries in this foreign trade: they represent 21.3% of imports at the start of the period and 23.1% in 2024; on the export side, after having reached 48%, non-EU countries are back below 40%, but this is still significant. This is largely due to China, whose share of imports has risen by over 5 points, while its share of exports has fallen by 2.5 points. The result is a persistent surplus in both cases. The surplus with non-EU countries rose slightly (from 1.1 to 1.5 billion euros). With China, it fell by 1/3, from 300 to 200 million.

<table><caption>Table 10 Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 – code 8708-50</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>178</td><td>197</td><td>674</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>179</td><td>723</td><td>2 754</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>184</td><td>126</td><td>240</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>280</td><td>148</td><td>296</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>199</td><td>156</td><td>544</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>224</td><td>234</td><td>314</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

France saw its imports from non-European countries rise very rapidly (from 7% to 25% of total imports), while its exports to the same countries fell. This has led to a deficit on this item. The same applies to China, from which no imports were accounted in 2014 and which now accounts for 6% of imports. Spain has a growing surplus with non-EU countries (74 million in 2024). This is not the case with China. The same is true of Italy, which has a growing surplus of half a billion in 2024, but a deficit with China. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are net importers in both cases.
1.2.5 8708-80 Suspension systems

<table><caption>Table 11. EU and selected countries trade in suspension systems (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>22,5%</td><td>23,6%</td><td>24,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>37,7%</td><td>33,8%</td><td>31,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>1 045 669 932</td><td>1 144 306 149</td><td>1 226 075 359</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>4,8%</td><td>7,1%</td><td>8,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>5,8%</td><td>6,5%</td><td>4,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>111 313 941</td><td>75 252 274</td><td>(250 047 299)</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>26,3%</td><td>31,8%</td><td>29,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>55,1%</td><td>47,7%</td><td>45,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>854 170 363</td><td>979 676 768</td><td>977 325 455</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>5,0%</td><td>8,7%</td><td>9,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>12,1%</td><td>12,9%</td><td>10,1%</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>196 250 879</td><td>263 623 920</td><td>140 496 472</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>16,5%</td><td>17,4%</td><td>28,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>29,8%</td><td>29,5%</td><td>35,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>27 380 795</td><td>31 073 251</td><td>25 168 151</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,9%</td><td>4,2%</td><td>7,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1,0%</td><td>1,6%</td><td>0,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-269 304</td><td>-12 309 016</td><td>-37 730 641</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>19,7%</td><td>27,4%</td><td>26,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>23,6%</td><td>20,3%</td><td>19,8%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>88 723 802</td><td>47 694 035</td><td>70 331 233</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>8,4%</td><td>8,5%</td><td>9,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>2,5%</td><td>2,1%</td><td>1,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-9 139 694</td><td>-15 583 255</td><td>-27 390 951</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>25,8%</td><td>23,2%</td><td>31,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>40,3%</td><td>34,6%</td><td>34,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-1 673 520</td><td>-3 464 374</td><td>-30 274 117</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>7,0%</td><td>12,4%</td><td>12,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,3%</td><td>0,9%</td><td>0,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-14 156 690</td><td>-37 388 978</td><td>-55 505 043</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>12,1%</td><td>9,7%</td><td>11,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>25,6%</td><td>26,6%</td><td>16,8%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>62 402 872</td><td>106 595 382</td><td>70 328 797</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>2,0%</td><td>2,5%</td><td>2,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>2,0%</td><td>2,5%</td><td>2,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>4 882 122</td><td>-2 994 247</td><td>-11 323 253</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>15,4%</td><td>14,8%</td><td>14,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>15,4%</td><td>14,8%</td><td>14,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>36 515 998</td><td>-1 166 862</td><td>64 587 531</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,5%</td><td>1,1%</td><td>3,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,1%</td><td>1,0%</td><td>3,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-637 311</td><td>127 850</td><td>1 745 025</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat.

These are components that travel quite well, and foreign trade between the EU and the ROW is quite significant. It grew in importance to represent ¼ of imported flows in 2024, 7 points above the average. Suspensions are also widely exported to non-European
countries but, as is the case in general, these countries of destination have lost importance over the last ten years, dropping from 38% of flows to 31%. Despite this, the trade surplus has increased from 1 to 1.2 billion euros. This is not the case with China, with whom the 110 million surplus has turned into a 250 million deficit.

The 1.2 billion euro surplus is mainly due to Germany, which has a 1 billion euro surplus, but France also has a surplus (25 million), as do Spain (70), the Czech Republic and Slovakia (70 and 65 million respectively). Only Italy is in deficit (by 30 million).

<table><caption>Table 12. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 – code 870880</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>157</td><td>151</td><td>365</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>162</td><td>159</td><td>424</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>88</td><td>174</td><td>234</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>177</td><td>147</td><td>211</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>185</td><td>209</td><td>737</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>252</td><td>270</td><td>1 075</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

With China, import growth is high or very high. Germany imported 54 million euros worth of goods from China in 2014, and will import 250 million in 2024. France's import growth is frightening, but since we're starting from a very low base, this 13-fold increase brings the total to just 40 million euros. Spain, Italy, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, with imports of 42, 57, 13 and 29 million, are in fairly comparable situations, and their deficits are quite close, since their exports to China are close to 0.
1.2.6 8708-94 Steering wheels

<table><caption>Table 13 EU and selected countries trade in steering wheels (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>17,5%</td><td>17,7%</td><td>24,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>41,1%</td><td>32,9%</td><td>30,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>2 048 262 990</td><td>1 519 818 756</td><td>729 451 978</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="5">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,5%</td><td>3,2%</td><td>5,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>10,3%</td><td>7,1%</td><td>6,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>663 300 715</td><td>368 652 563</td><td>187 050 823</td></tr><tr><td>Share of the extra EU</td><td></td><td>15,0%</td><td>11,5%</td><td>14,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>65,6%</td><td>58,2%</td><td>54,0%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="5">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,3%</td><td>2,0%</td><td>3,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>25,6%</td><td>20,0%</td><td>21,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>644 765 008</td><td>529 055 048</td><td>509 382 435</td></tr><tr><td>Share of the extra EU</td><td></td><td>26,5%</td><td>22,0%</td><td>46,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>20,6%</td><td>16,7%</td><td>23,7%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="5">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,6%</td><td>2,0%</td><td>5,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>4,1%</td><td>0,5%</td><td>0,5%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>52 226 168</td><td>-18 139 191</td><td>-38 256 170</td></tr><tr><td>Share of the extra EU</td><td></td><td>12,7%</td><td>14,4%</td><td>29,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>22,8%</td><td>29,1%</td><td>24,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="5">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>-16 984 410</td><td>-34 915 055</td><td>-181 138 531</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1,9%</td><td>1,6%</td><td>1,1%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-5 596 414</td><td>-10 243 323</td><td>-8 387 618</td></tr><tr><td>Share of the extra EU</td><td></td><td>9,8%</td><td>24,4%</td><td>29,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>33,1%</td><td>25,6%</td><td>36,8%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="5">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>2,2%</td><td>1,2%</td><td>4,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,7%</td><td>0,8%</td><td>0,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-3 029 815</td><td>-2 300 191</td><td>-13 571 704</td></tr><tr><td>Share of the extra EU</td><td></td><td>18,3%</td><td>20,5%</td><td>20,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>33,0%</td><td>21,8%</td><td>17,6%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="5">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,8%</td><td>4,2%</td><td>2,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1,8%</td><td>4,2%</td><td>2,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-3 800 120</td><td>-21 700 310</td><td>-13 827 823</td></tr><tr><td>Share of the extra EU</td><td></td><td>34,6%</td><td>29,9%</td><td>17,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>34,6%</td><td>29,9%</td><td>17,1%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="5">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>-70 352 814</td><td>-107 504 473</td><td>-81 384 329</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>4,2%</td><td>4,0%</td><td>0,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-9 377 922</td><td>-14 939 250</td><td>-2 707 216</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Foreign trade in steering wheels is worth around 8 billion euros in total, and 2 billion euros in imports from non-EU countries. There was a surplus of 2 billion euros in 2014, and this surplus has been reduced by 2/3 over the last 10 years. The share of exports of
steering wheels outside the EU has fallen by more than 10 points (from 41% to 30.5%). For imports, the trend is the opposite: the increase is 7 points, 4 of which refer to the growing share of imports of Chinese shuttlecocks, which in 2014 represented 172 million euros and in 2024 accounted for 729 million. Foreign trade remains in surplus with China, but the surplus has been divided by 3.

<table><caption>Table 14 Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 – code 8708-94</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production (€)</th><th>Imports EU (€)</th><th>Imports extra EU (€)</th><th>Imports China (€)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>130</td><td>128</td><td>337</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>64</td><td>157</td><td>806</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>133</td><td>380</td><td>94</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>126</td><td>495</td><td>357</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>129</td><td>149</td><td>198</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>279</td><td>108</td><td>33</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Germany stands out for its surplus with non-EU countries, which has fallen only slightly from 1.4 billion to 1.1 billion, with bilateral trade with China still showing a surplus of half a billion in 2024. Conversely, most other countries are seeing their imports of steering wheels increase. France, Spain and Italy have seen the non-European share of their imports of steering wheels increase by 20 points. For France, for example, they represented 26% of total imports in 2014 and now account for 46%. This corresponds to an increase in imports from 236 to 370 million euros, a 1.6-fold increase compared to a 1.25-fold increase in production value. Imports from China, which were previously anecdotal, became increasingly important.

In most countries, we find a similar configuration, with a double deficit vis-à-vis non-EU countries in general, and China in particular. This is an area where there is a clear trend towards de-Europeanization.
1.2.7 8708-70 Road wheels

<table><caption>Table 15 EU and selected countries trade in road wheels (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>24,8%</td><td>25,3%</td><td>30,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>27,1%</td><td>24,0%</td><td>21,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>174 723 536</td><td>28 654 955</td><td>-664 417 097</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>2,9%</td><td>4,4%</td><td>3,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>2,1%</td><td>1,2%</td><td>0,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>(34 966 154)</td><td>(192 382 397)</td><td>(227 435 342)</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>25,4%</td><td>24,9%</td><td>33,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>39,2%</td><td>31,6%</td><td>31,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>209 365 220</td><td>241 120 983</td><td>-112 224 074</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>2,5%</td><td>3,6%</td><td>3,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>5,0%</td><td>3,1%</td><td>1,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>41 404 729</td><td>929 816</td><td>-48 778 163</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>15,2%</td><td>27,3%</td><td>28,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>26,0%</td><td>27,8%</td><td>34,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>69 108 859</td><td>-54 288 216</td><td>-12 611 548</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>2,2%</td><td>9,6%</td><td>3,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1,5%</td><td>1,7%</td><td>1,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-3 204 112</td><td>-57 248 035</td><td>-13 490 398</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>33,5%</td><td>51,2%</td><td>52,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>34,9%</td><td>30,5%</td><td>19,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-28 603 614</td><td>-96 050 005</td><td>-203 837 570</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>3,0%</td><td>2,0%</td><td>2,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>4,2%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-750 256</td><td>-6 882 444</td><td>-10 086 824</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>32,7%</td><td>44,4%</td><td>39,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>26,3%</td><td>22,0%</td><td>19,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>65 300 638</td><td>2 746 453</td><td>16 517 349</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>5,9%</td><td>5,7%</td><td>5,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,2%</td><td>0,2%</td><td>0,1%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-12 662 569</td><td>-16 763 633</td><td>-17 155 578</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>13,7%</td><td>17,6%</td><td>40,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>15,2%</td><td>16,0%</td><td>9,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>33 753 145</td><td>26 025 268</td><td>-101 583 009</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,7%</td><td>0,7%</td><td>0,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,7%</td><td>0,7%</td><td>0,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>1 213 996</td><td>-1 521 317</td><td>-2 355 780</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>27,3%</td><td>2,5%</td><td>11,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>27,3%</td><td>2,5%</td><td>11,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-34 262 806</td><td>-4 788 624</td><td>-49 595 215</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,0%</td><td>0,6%</td><td>0,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,0%</td><td>#VALUE!</td><td>0,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-1 856 381</td><td>#VALUE!</td><td>-1 711 572</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat
Here, de-Europeanization is relatively advanced, since ¼ of imports were already concerned, and now it's over 30%. Exports have fallen by 5.5 points. The small surplus has become a deficit of 664 million euros. China accounted for a small quarter of this deterioration in the EU's balance of 838 billion euros in 10 years.

<table><caption>Table 16. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 - code 8708-70</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>107</td><td>159</td><td>187</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>91</td><td>197</td><td>170</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>127</td><td>279</td><td>123</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>124</td><td>166</td><td>133</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>142</td><td>605</td><td>194</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>321</td><td>108</td><td>92</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Germany saw its trade balance deteriorate by more than 310 million euros, 90 of which with China alone. Imports from non-EU countries accounted for 25% of total imports in 2014, rising to 33.5%. France has a similar profile, with non-EU imports almost doubling in size from 15% to 28%. Foreign trade with these countries is no longer in surplus, but in deficit.

This is also the case for Spain, which used to import only a third of its road weels from non-EU countries, but now imports more than half. Its deficit has risen from 28 million to 204 million. China is not the main culprit here. Italy remains in surplus despite a slight deficit with China.

Here, then, we have a configuration in which the “non-EU” sector weighs more and more and exports more and more to the EU, while its imports from the EU are falling. Here, it is not China that is weighing down foreign trade, but countries such as Morocco and Turkey, with which the bilateral deficits of major partners such as France and Spain are widening.
1.2.8 8708-92 Silencers "mufflers"

<table><caption>Table 17. EU and selected countries trade in silencers (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>13,9%</td><td>14,7%</td><td>17,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>19,9%</td><td>18,3%</td><td>15,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>395 703 408</td><td>390 624 103</td><td>102 338 820</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>2,4%</td><td>3,2%</td><td>5,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>2,1%</td><td>1,3%</td><td>1,1%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>8 616 778</td><td>(78 242 771)</td><td>(191 902 591)</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>11,1%</td><td>13,9%</td><td>25,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>38,7%</td><td>28,7%</td><td>29,0%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td></td><td>301 946 634</td><td>288 002 686</td><td>154 057 776</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>1,4%</td><td>4,0%</td><td>4,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>7,0%</td><td>4,2%</td><td>3,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>60 260 565</td><td>24 266 528</td><td>15 669 145</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td></td><td>9,2%</td><td>6,9%</td><td>21,3%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>31,4%</td><td>24,9%</td><td>23,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>31 999 551</td><td>32 017 092</td><td>-21 907 191</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>0,8%</td><td>0,3%</td><td>3,8%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td></td><td>6,4%</td><td>1,1%</td><td>0,6%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>9 726 624</td><td>1 358 754</td><td>-14 257 747</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>10,4%</td><td>11,0%</td><td>4,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>17,4%</td><td>24,9%</td><td>45,7%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td></td><td>12 420 259</td><td>20 365 854</td><td>30 844 771</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>1,3%</td><td>3,9%</td><td>2,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,1%</td><td>1,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-3 226 585</td><td>-6 871 673</td><td>-5 269 237</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td></td><td>24,1%</td><td>14,6%</td><td>7,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>23,4%</td><td>19,9%</td><td>17,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>31 925 247</td><td>31 685 934</td><td>36 199 998</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>3,8%</td><td>3,3%</td><td>1,6%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td></td><td>0,8%</td><td>0,6%</td><td>0,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>-940 764</td><td>-2 215 907</td><td>-2 730 745</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>10,5%</td><td>10,5%</td><td>18,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>47 124 392</td><td>-37 837 775</td><td>-77 428 419</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td></td><td>0,9%</td><td>1,5%</td><td>10,1%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,9%</td><td>1,5%</td><td>10,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-1 483 673</td><td>-12 221 507</td><td>-68 276 702</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>4,6%</td><td>34,8%</td><td>12,0%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td></td><td>4,6%</td><td>34,8%</td><td>12,0%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>5 480 329</td><td>-87 662 920</td><td>-25 189 586</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>3,0%</td><td>10,8%</td><td>10,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>0,2%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,3%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td></td><td>-4 809 899</td><td>-29 834 579</td><td>-28 179 702</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

This item corresponds to total EU imports of around 5 billion euros, of which less than 1 comes from the ROW. Nevertheless, this share has risen sharply (by 4 points) over 10 years, while exports to non-EU countries, which were of little importance at the start of
the period, have lost considerable importance. Bilateral trade with China is minor, but its share of imports is rising by 3 points, so that the 2014 surplus will turn into a deficit by 2019, significantly reducing the EU's surplus from 400 million euros to 100, mainly due to Chinese imports, which have risen from 82 to 256 million euros in 10 years.

<table><caption>Table 18. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 – code 8708-92</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>91</td><td>252</td><td>327</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>120</td><td>323</td><td>667</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>140</td><td>61</td><td>200</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>437</td><td>111</td><td>153</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>151</td><td>283</td><td>1 891</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>153</td><td>438</td><td>584</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Germany's surplus with non-EU countries was 300 million euros in 2014, and is now just 150 million euros: the share of "non-EU" in its imports has risen from 11% to 26%, while its share of exports has fallen by 10 points. China played an important but not decisive role here, since the surplus of 60 million euros was reduced by three-quarters. However, this only explains a third of the reduction in the surplus.

For France, "non-EU" countries, which used to account for less than a tenth of imports, will account for a fifth of imports by 2024, and as the trend on the export side is the opposite, the surplus turns into a deficit. The balance with non-EU countries deteriorates by 50 million euros over the period, half of which is due to the silencer trade with China, which had a surplus of 10 million euros in 2014 and a deficit of 15 million in 2024. Spain and Italy are experiencing a highly atypical trend, with their surplus balances with "non-EU" countries improving from 12 to 30 million euros for Spain and from 32 to 36 million euros for Italy, despite slight deficits with China. The Czech Republic and Slovakia went from having a surplus with non-European countries to having large deficits, mainly due to a sharp rise in imports of Chinese mufflers.
<table><caption>Table 19. EU and selected countries trade in clutches (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>18,2%</td><td>17,6%</td><td>19,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>31,6%</td><td>30,7%</td><td>30,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>793 940 907</td><td>895 471 511</td><td>1 021 013 682</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,5%</td><td>3,0%</td><td>4,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>4,6%</td><td>4,1%</td><td>3,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>149 894 880</td><td>97 204 337</td><td>(4 311 884)</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>22,4%</td><td>23,7%</td><td>25,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>43,3%</td><td>43,1%</td><td>41,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>799 554 771</td><td>744 702 598</td><td>844 196 560</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,7%</td><td>4,1%</td><td>6,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>6,7%</td><td>7,9%</td><td>5,8%</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>139 255 377</td><td>137 605 328</td><td>75 924 835</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>22,7%</td><td>24,5%</td><td>24,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>46,5%</td><td>27,9%</td><td>29,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>29 662 414</td><td>19 218 709</td><td>32 441 923</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,7%</td><td>5,4%</td><td>5,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>4,3%</td><td>1,9%</td><td>1,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>7 832 853</td><td>-13 252 427</td><td>-13 167 496</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>18,6%</td><td>17,5%</td><td>16,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>14,5%</td><td>13,2%</td><td>10,5%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-12 184 466</td><td>-8 738 804</td><td>-23 344 270</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,7%</td><td>0,7%</td><td>1,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,2%</td><td>0,8%</td><td>0,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-827 583</td><td>90 482</td><td>-2 423 770</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>30,9%</td><td>16,3%</td><td>25,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>31,1%</td><td>32,9%</td><td>32,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-35 825 775</td><td>41 100 686</td><td>11 141 571</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>3,9%</td><td>4,1%</td><td>5,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>2,8%</td><td>2,0%</td><td>0,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-6 802 471</td><td>-10 674 725</td><td>-17 743 882</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>9,7%</td><td>11,1%</td><td>5,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>13,2%</td><td>9,2%</td><td>15,8%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>2 229 565</td><td>-7 737 874</td><td>4 310 138</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="6">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,6%</td><td>1,7%</td><td>1,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,6%</td><td>1,7%</td><td>1,5%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>3 290 586</td><td>-1 921 443</td><td>-3 178 845</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>11,6%</td><td>14,3%</td><td>14,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>11,6%</td><td>14,3%</td><td>14,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-985 655</td><td>-11 253 102</td><td>12 729 987</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,2%</td><td>0,2%</td><td>3,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,1%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>164 672</td><td>-42 888</td><td>-7 489 668</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Here, de-Europeanization appears limited: non-EU sales rose by 1.6 points, as is the case for parts and accessories in general, but as we were starting from higher levels, the increase is proportionally much smaller. In addition, exports to non-European countries
held up very well, declining only slightly in share, resulting in a surplus that rose from 800 million to 1 billion euros. The picture is less rosy when it comes to trade with China, where we find the usual three elements:

i. The share of Chinese clutches in total imports rose significantly from 1.5% to 4.4%;

ii. The share of clutches destined for China in EU exports falls from 4.6% to 3%;

iii. The surplus turns into a deficit.

<table><caption>Table 20. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 – code 8708-93</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>152</td><td>180</td><td>647</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>102</td><td>112</td><td>815</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>195</td><td>172</td><td>290</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>124</td><td>95</td><td>149</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>141</td><td>81</td><td>365</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>270</td><td>361</td><td>4 410</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

This general picture is fairly consistent with that for Germany and France, whose trade balances with non-EU countries are in surplus and improving. On the other hand, their balances with China are deteriorating. For Germany, the surplus of 139 million dropped to 76. For France, the surplus of 8 million became a deficit of 13.

Spain's deficit with non-EU countries doubled from 12 to 24 million euros, and this was not mainly due to the EC's trade with China. For Italy, the situation was in deficit and is now in surplus, despite the fact that the deficit with China has risen from 6.7 million euros to 18. This is also the situation for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which in 2024 have a surplus with non-EU countries, whereas their deficits with China are 3 and 7 million euros respectively, whereas they were in surplus in 2014.
<table><caption>Table 21 EU and selected countries trade in radiators (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>16,9%</td><td>20,7%</td><td>17,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>26,3%</td><td>25,1%</td><td>27,5%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>371 279 332</td><td>247 643 262</td><td>384 691 488</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>5,0%</td><td>6,5%</td><td>7,9%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>6,1%</td><td>3,8%</td><td>2,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>64 109 247</td><td>(52 177 814)</td><td>(190 065 892)</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>299 137 712</td><td>183 310 310</td><td>313 862 816</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>2,7%</td><td>3,8%</td><td>4,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>17,3%</td><td>12,1%</td><td>8,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>111 319 653</td><td>60 172 009</td><td>21 548 950</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>21,2%</td><td>32,9%</td><td>26,6%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>22,9%</td><td>22,0%</td><td>31,4%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>20 465 522</td><td>-8 204 482</td><td>6 075 595</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>20 465 522</td><td>-8 204 482</td><td>6 075 595</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>2,0%</td><td>13,2%</td><td>8,5%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,9%</td><td>0,9%</td><td>0,3%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>-1 038 848</td><td>-22 239 614</td><td>-20 524 005</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-1 038 848</td><td>-22 239 614</td><td>-20 524 005</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>12,8%</td><td>10,3%</td><td>15,5%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>13,6%</td><td>20,2%</td><td>18,6%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>3 833 628</td><td>22 746 215</td><td>14 389 311</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>3 833 628</td><td>22 746 215</td><td>14 389 311</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>3,0%</td><td>1,8%</td><td>6,5%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,8%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>-2 758 071</td><td>-4 233 981</td><td>-17 304 497</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-2 758 071</td><td>-4 233 981</td><td>-17 304 497</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>26,4%</td><td>21,1%</td><td>15,0%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>41,9%</td><td>26,6%</td><td>34,1%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>8 734 749</td><td>10 096 503</td><td>6 795 705</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>8 734 749</td><td>10 096 503</td><td>6 795 705</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>8,2%</td><td>6,7%</td><td>6,1%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>2,9%</td><td>4,4%</td><td>0,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>-5 304 885</td><td>-3 181 008</td><td>-13 564 845</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-5 304 885</td><td>-3 181 008</td><td>-13 564 845</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>18,8%</td><td>18,3%</td><td>25,5%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>11,3%</td><td>13,2%</td><td>10,3%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>15 096 550</td><td>23 766 858</td><td>-27 797 962</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>15 096 550</td><td>23 766 858</td><td>-27 797 962</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>10,5%</td><td>11,4%</td><td>10,1%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>10,5%</td><td>11,4%</td><td>10,1%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>3 058 022</td><td>-18 020 068</td><td>-20 411 876</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>3 058 022</td><td>-18 020 068</td><td>-20 411 876</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>18,8%</td><td>23,7%</td><td>27,7%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>18,8%</td><td>23,7%</td><td>27,7%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>19 496 590</td><td>20 503 351</td><td>-30 930 591</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>19 496 590</td><td>20 503 351</td><td>-30 930 591</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>3,2%</td><td>6,6%</td><td>11,8%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,1%</td><td>0,4%</td><td>0,1%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>6 535</td><td>-5 435 121</td><td>-22 605 965</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>6 535</td><td>-5 435 121</td><td>-22 605 965</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

For radiators, the landscape seems fairly stable: de-Europeanization is generally not very noticeable, even if France, Spain, the Czech Republic and Slovakia tend to contradict this diagnosis. Like the EU, most countries have a surplus with the rest of the world.
Only the Czech Republic and Slovakia will be in deficit in 2024. This is because the vigorous growth in radiator imports from countries outside the EU is not accompanied by growing difficulties in exporting to these same countries: their share of EU exports is not falling, and is even rising in the case of Germany, France and Spain.

With China, on the other hand, radiator imports and exports behave like all automotive equipment: imports are growing rapidly or very rapidly (in the case of France and Slovakia), while exports are marking time. As a result, the 2014 surplus becomes a slight deficit from 2019 onwards, and a substantial deficit in 2024: the bilateral balance thus deteriorates by 250 million euros over the ten-year period.

<table><caption>Table 22. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 – code 8708-91</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>187</td><td>223</td><td>318</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>154</td><td>206</td><td>694</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>205</td><td>257</td><td>468</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>291</td><td>143</td><td>187</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>268</td><td>397</td><td>282</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>374</td><td>620</td><td>1 525</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Germany remains in surplus, but its surplus is divided by 5 (from 111 million to 22). The other countries were often already in deficit in 2014 (France, Italy and Spain) and will be even more so in 2024. The Czech Republic and Slovakia were in surplus in 2014, and in 2024 will have larger deficits than France or Spain.

Chinese imports have tripled from 100 to 300 million euros in 10 years, while intra-EU flows have only multiplied by 1.8 and imports from non-EU countries by 2. This means that the additional 200 million euros in radiator imports accounted for the bulk of the 330 million euros in additional EU imports from non-EU countries. Even for this item, which is one of those where the situation seems the least alarming since the surplus is growing, Chinese imports pose a problem.
1.2.11 8708-10 Bumpers

<table><caption>Table 23. EU and selected countries trade in bumpers (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>21,3%</td><td>17,0%</td><td>19,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>35,8%</td><td>33,1%</td><td>30,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>467 168 135</td><td>661 091 385</td><td>593 275 989</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,9%</td><td>1,3%</td><td>4,3%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,9%</td><td>1,3%</td><td>4,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>7,2%</td><td>6,6%</td><td>5,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>155 972 298</td><td>196 883 192</td><td>92 194 936</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>32,7%</td><td>22,6%</td><td>22,7%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>56,7%</td><td>56,8%</td><td>54,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>454 915 804</td><td>645 831 621</td><td>617 345 597</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>454 915 804</td><td>645 831 621</td><td>617 345 597</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,7%</td><td>1,8%</td><td>7,9%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>15,6%</td><td>15,2%</td><td>14,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>157 639 808</td><td>200 567 422</td><td>146 975 692</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>157 639 808</td><td>200 567 422</td><td>146 975 692</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>12,9%</td><td>13,9%</td><td>26,9%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>36,1%</td><td>18,3%</td><td>31,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>45 483 518</td><td>7 523 715</td><td>23 860 108</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>45 483 518</td><td>7 523 715</td><td>23 860 108</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,7%</td><td>0,9%</td><td>2,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>1,3%</td><td>0,6%</td><td>2,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1 090 187</td><td>-1 267 436</td><td>-171 501</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>1 090 187</td><td>-1 267 436</td><td>-171 501</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>18,4%</td><td>8,8%</td><td>13,2%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>12,7%</td><td>11,8%</td><td>14,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>3 669 560</td><td>19 383 552</td><td>21 377 568</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>3 669 560</td><td>19 383 552</td><td>21 377 568</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>4,1%</td><td>1,5%</td><td>2,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>1,2%</td><td>0,2%</td><td>0,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-3 191 835</td><td>-3 267 208</td><td>-4 498 328</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-3 191 835</td><td>-3 267 208</td><td>-4 498 328</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>29,6%</td><td>24,9%</td><td>30,6%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>20,9%</td><td>28,5%</td><td>28,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-3 129 682</td><td>26 852 649</td><td>18 002 797</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-3 129 682</td><td>26 852 649</td><td>18 002 797</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,8%</td><td>2,1%</td><td>4,8%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,2%</td><td>1,0%</td><td>0,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-1 711 396</td><td>-1 165 462</td><td>-7 688 956</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-1 711 396</td><td>-1 165 462</td><td>-7 688 956</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>21,5%</td><td>8,0%</td><td>19,0%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>19,3%</td><td>11,9%</td><td>4,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>9 209 535</td><td>32 862 077</td><td>-14 533 559</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>9 209 535</td><td>32 862 077</td><td>-14 533 559</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,6%</td><td>6,6%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,6%</td><td>6,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>430 499</td><td>-499 188</td><td>-13 612 986</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>430 499</td><td>-499 188</td><td>-13 612 986</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>3,7%</td><td>7,6%</td><td>2,7%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>3,7%</td><td>7,6%</td><td>2,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-3 769 955</td><td>-14 570 279</td><td>9 385 637</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-3 769 955</td><td>-14 570 279</td><td>9 385 637</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,7%</td><td>0,1%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>1,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-123 581</td><td>-1 847 835</td><td>1 470 217</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-123 581</td><td>-1 847 835</td><td>1 470 217</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Here, the "non-EU" share of imports is higher than average, but declining, while exports to non-European countries fell by 5 points (from 35.8% to 30.4%). The result is a persistent and even growing surplus. Even with China, although the surplus is shrinking,
it persists despite very strong imports growth: exports are also growing. Here, international trade is growing much faster than production. For example, for France, the country whose production grew the least (+26% in current euros), imports from other EU countries grew by 53%, those from non-EU countries by 278%, and those from China are multiplied by a factor of 6. Exports, on the other hand, increased by only a factor of two, and were directed more towards other EU countries than beyond, resulting in a declining surplus vis-à-vis non-EU countries. The opposite is true for many countries, including Germany, whose surplus with non-EU countries rose by 160 million euros, Spain (+18 million), Italy (+15) and Slovakia (+12). The Czech Republic, which had a surplus of 9 billion euros, now has a deficit of 14.5 billion euros with non-EU countries.

<table><caption>Table 24. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 – code 8708-10</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Germany</th><td>137</td><td>335</td><td>202</td><td>3 286</td></tr><tr><th>France</th><td>126</td><td>153</td><td>378</td><td>598</td></tr><tr><th>Spain</th><td>133</td><td>187</td><td>126</td><td>105</td></tr><tr><th>Italy</th><td>146</td><td>170</td><td>178</td><td>449</td></tr><tr><th>Czechia</th><td>168</td><td>217</td><td>186</td><td>22 596</td></tr><tr><th>Slovakia</th><td>159</td><td>341</td><td>247</td><td>341</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

By contrast, the surplus with China is shrinking. However, with import flows remaining limited (4.3% in 2024), the impact is not very noticeable: most countries are virtually in balance. Only Italy and the Czech Republic have suffered significant assaults from imports of Chinese bumpers: Italy has lost 6 million euros in bilateral surplus and the Czech Republic 14.

The case is interesting and important because these parts are reputed to travel rather poorly and, in fact, total imports represent only 4 billion euros, of which less than 1 comes from countries outside the EU. Nevertheless, these figures for 2024 should be compared with those for 2014: total imports were then worth 1.8 billion euros, and bumper imports from non-EU countries accounted for just 380 million euros. Sourcing is becoming less local and more global.
<table><caption>Table 25. EU and selected countries trade in safety airbags (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>21,1%</td><td>16,2%</td><td>17,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>27,3%</td><td>26,4%</td><td>21,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>370 635 612</td><td>551 093 588</td><td>251 883 287</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,4%</td><td>3,0%</td><td>3,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>8,3%</td><td>4,6%</td><td>3,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>206 314 155</td><td>88 454 291</td><td>32 308 384</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>14,0%</td><td>16,9%</td><td>16,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>45,0%</td><td>48,2%</td><td>41,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>381 004 671</td><td>425 357 940</td><td>220 119 496</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,2%</td><td>3,2%</td><td>3,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>16,7%</td><td>12,6%</td><td>11,1%</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>171 348 376</td><td>121 513 234</td><td>68 157 235</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>31,6%</td><td>10,8%</td><td>19,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>30,7%</td><td>34,1%</td><td>27,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>27 061 892</td><td>55 263 018</td><td>30 259 317</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>9,2%</td><td>2,8%</td><td>3,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>7,3%</td><td>2,0%</td><td>0,8%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>4 750 465</td><td>-1 182 052</td><td>-4 023 357</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>6,6%</td><td>4,9%</td><td>7,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>45,0%</td><td>39,4%</td><td>63,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>19 704 320</td><td>58 044 354</td><td>76 745 247</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,8%</td><td>1,4%</td><td>0,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1,9%</td><td>0,7%</td><td>0,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-2 037 564</td><td>-2 861 735</td><td>-299 065</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>24,8%</td><td>37,5%</td><td>21,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>64,5%</td><td>48,7%</td><td>19,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>11 909 357</td><td>-9 033 955</td><td>-1 862 417</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>3,7%</td><td>5,3%</td><td>8,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>34,9%</td><td>4,9%</td><td>0,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>9 422 404</td><td>-1 710 614</td><td>-8 999 383</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>27,8%</td><td>15,0%</td><td>19,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>40,2%</td><td>37,1%</td><td>30,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-18 487 952</td><td>9 612 400</td><td>-478 587</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,8%</td><td>0,3%</td><td>4,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,8%</td><td>0,3%</td><td>4,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>-1 226 698</td><td>2 377 229</td><td>-10 136 682</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>42,1%</td><td>0,1%</td><td>16,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>42,1%</td><td>0,1%</td><td>16,1%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-27 272 743</td><td>181 513</td><td>-23 101 688</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>16,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>55,0%</td><td>0,1%</td><td>3,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>16 386</td><td>1 110</td><td>-23 277 340</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat
Foreign trade in airbags is limited in scope, with total annual imports in 2024 amounting to 3.5 billion euros, of which one-sixth was imported from non-EU countries. This represents a sharp rise from the 1.9 billion euros imported 10 years earlier, of which one-fifth (395 million euros) were airbags purchased outside the EU. As a result, we are not witnessing a "de-Europeanization" of import flows, since "non-EU" imports are even losing 3.3 points. The surplus grows between 2014 and 2019, then declines, but remains significant despite the sharp drop in the bilateral surplus with China, which stood at 206 million euros in 2014 and will be just 32 million in 2024.

<table><caption>Table 26. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 - code 8708-95</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>125</td><td>149</td><td>355</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>205</td><td>106</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>131</td><td>146</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>395</td><td>335</td><td>857</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>169</td><td>107</td><td>832</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>326</td><td>86</td><td>4 374 905</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

The trajectory of the German surplus is the same as that of the EU surplus. It's just that their imports are becoming somewhat "de-Europeanized", mainly due to the increase in imports from China, which have risen from 1.2% of the total to 3.3%. Exports of German airbags to both the ROW and China are declining in importance: these export flows are becoming "re-Europeanized". France, like Italy and the Czech Republic, imports 20% of the value of its airbag imports from countries outside the EU. However, this share is declining, as is the share of their airbag exports to non-EU countries, which has fallen sharply in some cases: Italy, which used to import 2/3 of its exports from non-EU countries, has seen this figure drop to 20%. Its exports to China, which accounted for a third of export flows, have disappeared. Spain is experiencing the opposite trend.

In general, trade in airbags with China carries little weight: even if imports are rising rapidly, they started from such low levels that the amounts imported remain modest. The Czech Republic and Slovakia partly contradict this picture, as both countries are net importers vis-à-vis non-EU countries in 2024, mainly due to Chinese imports that did not exist in 2014 and 2019.
1.2.13 7318 Screws, bolts and nuts

<table><caption>Table 27. EU and selected countries trade in screws, bolts and nuts (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>38,5%</td><td>39,2%</td><td>37,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>36,3%</td><td>35,8%</td><td>34,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>-299 044 343</td><td>-615 476 208</td><td>-421 073 178</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>4,9%</td><td>8,4%</td><td>9,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>7,0%</td><td>5,9%</td><td>4,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td>213 534 189</td><td>(378 211 025)</td><td>(732 052 804)</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>46,3%</td><td>46,9%</td><td>45,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>44,1%</td><td>42,5%</td><td>41,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>703 518 338</td><td>779 551 841</td><td>1 008 881 048</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>4,6%</td><td>8,2%</td><td>10,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>12,2%</td><td>10,9%</td><td>9,5%</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td>426 496 655</td><td>338 094 308</td><td>233 876 244</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>35,5%</td><td>35,9%</td><td>34,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>44,9%</td><td>44,9%</td><td>43,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>25 062 399</td><td>68 128 704</td><td>135 535 954</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>3,2%</td><td>4,5%</td><td>5,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>7,2%</td><td>2,9%</td><td>2,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td>37 075 263</td><td>-29 207 954</td><td>-54 370 602</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>34,4%</td><td>38,8%</td><td>35,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>29,0%</td><td>30,7%</td><td>27,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>-71 365 554</td><td>-101 081 627</td><td>-147 522 480</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>5,2%</td><td>13,8%</td><td>12,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>3,2%</td><td>1,3%</td><td>0,8%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td>-15 861 781</td><td>-86 915 050</td><td>-113 660 178</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>54,0%</td><td>51,3%</td><td>47,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>24,1%</td><td>24,6%</td><td>26,8%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>-3 624 080</td><td>-9 432 101</td><td>65 801 136</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>10,4%</td><td>17,3%</td><td>18,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1,0%</td><td>1,1%</td><td>1,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td>-53 912 252</td><td>-128 573 585</td><td>-190 255 847</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>22,1%</td><td>24,6%</td><td>22,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>17,8%</td><td>16,9%</td><td>18,5%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>-81 946 731</td><td>-127 513 140</td><td>-109 463 275</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>3,0%</td><td>4,9%</td><td>4,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>3,0%</td><td>4,9%</td><td>4,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td>-12 914 707</td><td>-34 132 817</td><td>-40 448 109</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>30,5%</td><td>28,9%</td><td>30,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>30,5%</td><td>28,9%</td><td>30,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>-67 375 743</td><td>-129 751 082</td><td>-154 705 790</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>2,0%</td><td>3,5%</td><td>4,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,6%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td>-5 369 137</td><td>-18 194 264</td><td>-27 712 106</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat
Even if fasteners are not exclusively automotive, they are linked to it, and this is a highly "globalized" item where the "Europe" share and the ROW share are 60/40 or 2/3-1/3. The EU has an ongoing deficit, which has risen from 300 million euros to 420 million. In relation to China, the surplus of 200 million euros in 2014 turns into a deficit of 732 million euros in 2024: the bilateral balance has deteriorated by 1 billion euros. China's share of imports almost doubles from 4.9% to 9.3%, while its share of exports falls from 7% to 4.9%.

<table><caption>Table 28. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 - code 7318</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>97</td><td>118</td><td>190</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>99</td><td>145</td><td>155</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>123</td><td>125</td><td>175</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>120</td><td>135</td><td>133</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>122</td><td>117</td><td>122</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>93</td><td>152</td><td>164</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Germany improved its surplus with non-EU countries, which accounted for 45% of imports and 41% of exports. China increased its share of German fastener imports from 4.6% to over 10%, while the opposite trend was observed for exports. The bilateral surplus has fallen by 200 million euros in 10 years.

France has a surplus of 135 million euros in 2024, corresponding to a positive balance that has doubled since 2014. This result can be seen at a time when the bilateral balance with China has deteriorated by more than 90 million.

Spain is increasingly in deficit, largely due to the improvement in China's share (+7.5 points).

Italy was in deficit with non-EU countries and is now in surplus, despite a bilateral deficit with China that almost quadruples from 53 million euros to 190.

The Czech Republic and Slovakia are major importers in relation to non-EU countries in general and China in particular.
<table><caption>Table 29. EU and selected countries trade in lithium-ion accumulators (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>70,4%</td><td>58,8%</td><td>53,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>26,6%</td><td>22,1%</td><td>25,5%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>-1 190 985 842</td><td>-4 186 234 137</td><td>-16 517 386 523</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>21,0%</td><td>28,1%</td><td>46,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1,8%</td><td>5,1%</td><td>2,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td>(414 153 146)</td><td>(2 361 872 241)</td><td>(19 406 164 117)</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>78,4%</td><td>67,9%</td><td>44,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>28,5%</td><td>50,4%</td><td>46,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>-470 422 910</td><td>-1 357 119 336</td><td>-6 126 455 292</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>18,9%</td><td>36,0%</td><td>41,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>3,0%</td><td>17,0%</td><td>13,7%</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td>-128 759 267</td><td>-892 211 878</td><td>-7 208 933 525</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>53,2%</td><td>36,0%</td><td>57,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>47,0%</td><td>43,6%</td><td>28,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>-140 750 697</td><td>-263 545 780</td><td>-1 684 770 758</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>11,5%</td><td>14,8%</td><td>46,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>3,9%</td><td>3,8%</td><td>0,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td>-34 132 361</td><td>-135 122 786</td><td>-1 465 155 050</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>65,9%</td><td>65,4%</td><td>63,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>52,4%</td><td>37,6%</td><td>22,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>-21 209 318</td><td>-123 732 539</td><td>-1 038 782 730</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>32,4%</td><td>34,4%</td><td>51,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,9%</td><td>0,4%</td><td>0,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td>-11 390 934</td><td>-72 799 367</td><td>-879 534 441</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>59,1%</td><td>54,6%</td><td>46,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>31,4%</td><td>28,3%</td><td>27,1%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>-35 747 263</td><td>-110 259 208</td><td>-804 405 017</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>39,9%</td><td>41,2%</td><td>39,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,2%</td><td>3,5%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td>-26 089 289</td><td>-95 036 586</td><td>-727 013 279</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>81,7%</td><td>55,3%</td><td>56,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>25,9%</td><td>32,3%</td><td>5,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>-46 618 247</td><td>-91 590 654</td><td>-1 764 769 626</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>55,9%</td><td>29,9%</td><td>52,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>55,9%</td><td>29,9%</td><td>52,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td>-37 232 718</td><td>-71 441 430</td><td>-1 781 246 033</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>6,8%</td><td>49,9%</td><td>31,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>6,8%</td><td>49,9%</td><td>31,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td>-2 219 245</td><td>-138 974 289</td><td>-219 407 770</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>4,1%</td><td>37,9%</td><td>24,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td>-2 177 417</td><td>-107 622 420</td><td>-189 415 703</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat
Batteries represent a very different dynamic from that of traditional parts and components, since imports from non-EU countries will be three times greater in proportion in 2024 than is the case for standard automotive equipment and components. Similarly, among imports from non-EU countries, the Chinese share is ultra-dominant (46% out of a total of 53%).

Dynamically, over the past 10 years, intra-EU trade in batteries has strengthened, but dependence on Asian supplies remains very high. As a result, the EU's foreign trade deficit has risen from 1 to 16 billion euros in 10 years. With regard to China, it has risen from 414 million to 19.4 billion. This means that, excluding China, the EU has a surplus of batteries vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

<table><caption>Table 30. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 – code 8507-60</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>6 634</td><td>1 474</td><td>5 643</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>930</td><td>1 084</td><td>4 045</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>5 123</td><td>4 648</td><td>7 707</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>3 773</td><td>2 251</td><td>2 818</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>12 206</td><td>3 502</td><td>4 787</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>1 043</td><td>6 455</td><td>8 635</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Insofar as BEV production is set to grow very strongly if we consider that the 15% of BEV registrations in 2024 will have to rise to 100% in 2035, we can fear that this will increase in the future. We can also assume that the European battery production capacities installed by European and non-European players will gradually help to consolidate the downward trend in the share of non-European batteries already perceptible, despite the very strong growth in production and imports.

Given the time taken to build the plants and the relatively long learning periods needed to use the tools to their full capacity, it can nevertheless be assumed that for some years the European plants assembling EVs cannot satisfy themselves with the productions of the European giga-factories alone and will still rely massively on the Chinese, Korean or Japanese productions.

The result is that in 2024, all the traditional components have a surplus which may well turn into a deficit before the end of the decade. Vis-à-vis China, the bilateral surplus of 2 billion is transformed into a deficit of 17 billion euros when we aggregate traditional automotive equipment and batteries. Reasoning with the components of batteries made in Europe would make the picture even more problematic. This is a strong argument to defend the support for investment in both giga-factories in Europe and in the upstream production of the battery value chain. It is also an argument for seeking to preserve the integralities of the production chains of European equipment and components.

From this point of view the German singularity is non-existent. Indeed, more than a third of the battery deficit vis-à-vis China (7 billion out of 19) is attributable to Germany which is certainly in surplus vis-à-vis other non-EU countries (such as the UK) of 1 billion but still has a deficit of 6 billion towards countries outside the EU, leaving it with
only 15 billion in surplus. This is 5 less than in 2019 and refers to a surplus vis-à-vis
China that was still 6.3 billion five years ago and turned into a deficit of 1 billion in 2024.

For the other countries that are already all in deficit vis-à-vis China at the level of
historical components, battery deficits are proportional to their EV production and
multiply by three or four times the bilateral deficit: for France, for the historical
components alone, it is half a billion and the battery has a deficit of 1.5 billion vis-à-vis
China, so the total bilateral deficit is 2 billion. The small surplus that France still had vis-
à-vis non-EU countries (+ 0.7) thus turns into a deficit of almost 1 billion when this item
is included.
<table><caption>Table 31. EU and selected countries trade in diesel engines (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>12,1%</td><td>12,3%</td><td>9,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>38,1%</td><td>34,7%</td><td>31,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>5 299 010 997</td><td>3 644 247 809</td><td>3 275 576 766</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,7%</td><td>0,6%</td><td>0,8%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,5%</td><td>0,5%</td><td>0,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>2 917 911</td><td>157 730</td><td>(40 628 170)</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>10,1%</td><td>11,1%</td><td>10,9%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>61,0%</td><td>47,4%</td><td>46,3%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>1 879 600 353</td><td>1 570 331 631</td><td>1 267 865 305</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>1,4%</td><td>0,8%</td><td>0,5%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>51 476 700</td><td>32 953 130</td><td>17 496 871</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>7,9%</td><td>12,9%</td><td>11,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>30,2%</td><td>26,2%</td><td>42,8%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>834 554 843</td><td>245 838 693</td><td>396 347 172</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>2,8%</td><td>2,2%</td><td>1,9%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,4%</td><td>0,4%</td><td>0,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-11 012 437</td><td>-13 084 055</td><td>-21 246 815</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>42,0%</td><td>36,0%</td><td>44,2%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>380 733 530</td><td>29 859 340</td><td>278 429 667</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>914 642</td><td>-351 100</td><td>-29 070</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>21,3%</td><td>40,3%</td><td>35,9%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>82,0%</td><td>72,4%</td><td>47,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1 032 732 058</td><td>753 917 216</td><td>484 012 589</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>6,0%</td><td>10,7%</td><td>16,4%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,3%</td><td>0,1%</td><td>1,0%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In export</td><td>-41 655 843</td><td>-48 028 984</td><td>-44 051 111</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>10,1%</td><td>1,2%</td><td>0,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>53,5%</td><td>90,8%</td><td>83,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>325 785</td><td>28 646 280</td><td>16 499 012</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,1%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>62 314</td><td>44 528</td><td>-552 078</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>0,3%</td><td>13,4%</td><td>37,8%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,3%</td><td>13,4%</td><td>37,8%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>29 052 133</td><td>-71 938 224</td><td>-115 194 332</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>-2 349</td><td>16 180</td><td>-6 187</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Measured by total exports, foreign trade in diesel engines is declining quite sharply, with total exports of 17 billion euros in 2014 and only 13 billion in 2024. The case of Germany, where the 37% growth in production is accompanied by imports from EU
countries and non-EU countries falling by 34% and 28%, gives an idea of this phenomenon of "de-dieselisation" which has come to limit the flows traded over the period.

This has not prevented the EU as a whole and the major producer countries from generating, in most cases, fairly large trade surpluses with non-EU countries. These surpluses are, however, quite logically in fairly sharp decline. Thus, the EU loses 2 billion of surplus by decreasing it from 5.3 billion euros to + 3.3. Germany loses 600 million but remains in 2024 surplus of 1.3 billion. France had a surplus of 830 million and has to settle for 400. Spain is losing only 100 million and has a surplus of 280 million in 2024. Italy, which exported 1 billion euros more to non-EU countries than it imported of diesel engines, is losing over half of this surplus. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are hardly affected by this trade.

<table><caption>Table 32. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 - code 8408-20</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>66</td><td>72</td><td>102</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>127</td><td>188</td><td>92</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>183</td><td>32</td><td>3 402 300</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>37</td><td>76</td><td>123</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>152</td><td>6</td><td>9 993</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>90</td><td>17 985</td><td>263</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

This development indicates that the switch from thermal to electric will mean for the EU losses of export opportunities associated with its dominance on these technologies and the importance of its industrial tool which will gradually lose importance as it was already the case over the past decade. To the extent that, for the moment, on the battery, the situation is reversed, electrification which is still in its infancy should, all things being equal, degrade the EU's external car trade quite significantly. In order to prevent this, it would first be necessary for the supply of the assembly plants for electric vehicles to be much more assured than is currently the case by a battery industry that is not European but at least located in Europe. It would still be necessary for equipment stricto sensu (items 8708 and others) to reverse the trend and to contain the erosion of the surplus.
<table><caption>Table 33. EU and selected countries trade in gasoline engines (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>19,7%</td><td>20,1%</td><td>13,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>49,0%</td><td>38,5%</td><td>29,4%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>4 122 236 132</td><td>3 352 544 434</td><td>2 941 064 522</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,1%</td><td>2,6%</td><td>2,2%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,1%</td><td>2,6%</td><td>1,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>5,1%</td><td>3,2%</td><td>(58 412 913)</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>588 929 017</td><td>187 760 233</td><td>13,6%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>26,6%</td><td>14,2%</td><td>40,9%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>64,8%</td><td>62,5%</td><td>40,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>1 798 344 567</td><td>2 093 155 139</td><td>1 495 550 828</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>249 953 150</td><td>327 780 863</td><td>-151 814 955</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,2%</td><td>4,1%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>6,3%</td><td>8,2%</td><td>0,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>54,2%</td><td>15,3%</td><td>21,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>89 217 260</td><td>70 463 124</td><td>60 823 032</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,0%</td><td>1,5%</td><td>2,2%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>3,3%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>15 673 094</td><td>-5 597 850</td><td>-9 338 469</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>83,6%</td><td>72,6%</td><td>61,4%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,6%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-210</td><td>342 967</td><td>-7 655 415</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>48 209 182</td><td>233 794 491</td><td>359 277 726</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>7,2%</td><td>1,3%</td><td>5,6%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-2 330 892</td><td>-6 033 806</td><td>-2 882 800</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>118 176 795</td><td>-76 304 164</td><td>-24 113 037</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,0%</td><td>8,1%</td><td>3,8%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,0%</td><td>8,1%</td><td>3,8%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-151 252</td><td>-86 600 001</td><td>-65 670 807</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>96 243 414</td><td>-241 729 985</td><td>-532 756 240</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>0,0%</td><td>12,1%</td><td>0,2%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td><td>0,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-137 706</td><td>-131 623 699</td><td>-2 736 923</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

In this case, with regard to those bodies which have gained importance over the period as registrations in Europe have become less and less diesel friendly, external trade has been rather «re-europeanized»: the share of imports from non-EU countries has fallen
by almost 6 points and, Exports fell by 20 points. Despite this, in 2024, with imports of €1.9 billion (for a total of 13.6) and exports of €4.8 billion (for a total of 16.4), the EU still has a fairly large surplus of €3 billion. Its trade with China is quite limited here: the growth of imports has been very strong but they still represent only 300 million in 2024. Germany concentrates a little more than half of the trade surplus despite the fact that its 250 million surplus vis-à-vis China has turned into a 150 million deficit. As is the case for all EU countries, its foreign trade in petrol engines is Europeanised on the import side (imports from non-EU countries decreasing from 26% to 13%) and on the export side (from 65% to 41%).

<table><caption>Table 34. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 - code 8407-34</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>178</td><td>77</td><td>8 594</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>678</td><td>37</td><td>17 452</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>158</td><td>190</td><td>6 232 104</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>577</td><td>57</td><td>185</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>220</td><td>138</td><td>42 404</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>266</td><td>673</td><td>1 864</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

France which imported its gasoline engines pure 69% of countries outside the EU now import 90% of EU countries: as the need for gasoline engines has become established, French factories have been massively fed into the French and European sites, and imports from countries outside the EU have fallen. China is an exception but the very strong growth applied to a very low base does not have much importance: the deficit is in the end only 7 million euros.

These findings are broadly valid for Spain and Italy, whose foreign trade in petrol engines with non-EU countries is quite marginal and falling sharply for Italy. They are in surplus. Trade with China is marginal. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are, on the other hand, net importers vis-à-vis non-EU countries. They imported a significant proportion of these engines from China in 2019, but these flows stopped in 2024.
1.2.17 4011-10 New pneumatic tyres

<table><caption>Table 35. EU and selected countries trade in pneumatic tyres (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>28,0%</td><td>26,7%</td><td>26,4%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>28,3%</td><td>27,7%</td><td>25,2%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>230 876 527</td><td>286 258 978</td><td>-174 151 773</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>6,8%</td><td>8,7%</td><td>12,0%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>1,3%</td><td>1,4%</td><td>0,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>(740 389 894)</td><td>(1 126 189 457)</td><td>(2 445 688 580)</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>19,6%</td><td>24,1%</td><td>24,6%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>41,3%</td><td>37,7%</td><td>28,0%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>2,2%</td><td>1,9%</td><td>1,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-74 898 210</td><td>-137 811 579</td><td>-440 013 474</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>4,2%</td><td>5,5%</td><td>10,3%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>34,3%</td><td>26,3%</td><td>30,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-8 518 785</td><td>3 284 808</td><td>-73 384 198</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>4,4%</td><td>8,0%</td><td>10,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>2,6%</td><td>1,9%</td><td>0,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-47 354 863</td><td>-131 805 607</td><td>-302 253 237</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>13,2%</td><td>16,1%</td><td>19,9%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,5%</td><td>0,2%</td><td>0,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-120 176 975</td><td>-154 823 801</td><td>-276 166 363</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>34,4%</td><td>33,3%</td><td>32,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>30,0%</td><td>28,4%</td><td>27,3%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-171 325 050</td><td>-177 201 446</td><td>-210 048 344</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>12,2%</td><td>12,0%</td><td>14,7%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,7%</td><td>2,9%</td><td>1,6%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-134 398 970</td><td>-135 460 132</td><td>-248 627 909</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>17,9%</td><td>13,3%</td><td>11,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>26,8%</td><td>31,1%</td><td>26,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>195 939 284</td><td>254 090 648</td><td>389 186 950</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,2%</td><td>4,1%</td><td>5,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>1,2%</td><td>4,1%</td><td>5,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>18 788 172</td><td>-421 190</td><td>-36 522 271</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>4,4%</td><td>9,3%</td><td>6,1%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>4,4%</td><td>9,3%</td><td>6,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>124 100 200</td><td>94 323 715</td><td>248 448 022</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>1,0%</td><td>0,9%</td><td>1,3%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,3%</td><td>0,1%</td><td>0,2%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-1 665 226</td><td>-4 139 343</td><td>-10 523 074</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

The situation of external trade in tyres is typical of a case where the non-EU does not progress (it even loses 1.5 points in total imports) but where China turns the situation upside down: the surplus becomes deficit due to the magnitude of the bilateral deficit.
Here the EU had a surplus of 230 million euros despite a deficit of 740 million compared to China in 2014. Ten years later, the deficit is 174 million because the large surplus with other non-European countries is no longer sufficient to cover the 2.5 billion euro bilateral deficit with China. Exports to China stagnated while imports tripled. The deficit also tripled.

Germany is, here, representative of the European situation: it was in surplus vis-à-vis the «outside EU» and is now in deficit because its deficit vis-à-vis China which was 75 million euros has risen to 440. France, in a similar way, sees its deficit with countries outside the EU grow because its imports from China were multiplied by 3.8 and led to the bilateral deficit of 47 million to 302 million euros.

<table><caption>Table 36. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 – code 4011-10</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>127</td><td>170</td><td>335</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>176</td><td>119</td><td>384</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>140</td><td>171</td><td>225</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>166</td><td>152</td><td>194</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>182</td><td>108</td><td>790</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>324</td><td>462</td><td>421</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Spain and Italy were in deficit vis-à-vis the «non-EU» countries in 2014, and these deficits are significantly increased in 2024 mainly because imports of Chinese tyres, which were already large in 2014, are doubling in value. Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia are net exporters to non-European countries in 2014 and 2024, and these surpluses are growing. However, the two countries are in deficit vis-à-vis China in 2024 at 36 million and 10 million respectively.

Here, inexorably, Chinese imports are spoliating market shares everywhere in Europe and transforming European export positions into import positions. The additional €1.5 billion in imports of Chinese tyres since 2014 should be quantified in terms of market share and employment, and a forecast of what will happen in 2034 if nothing is done to break this trend.
<table><caption>Table 37. EU and selected countries trade in ball or roller bearings (2014-2024)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>2014</th><th>2019</th><th>2024</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">UE</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>26,2%</td><td>27,9%</td><td>29,0%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>35,8%</td><td>35,6%</td><td>36,9%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>1 557 442 891</td><td>1 338 045 973</td><td>1 384 737 650</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>7,6%</td><td>9,4%</td><td>11,8%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Germany</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>7,3%</td><td>9,1%</td><td>6,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>91 861 367</td><td>79 290 265</td><td>(511 567 628)</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>1 117 648 991</td><td>1 494 104 044</td><td>1 166 869 040</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>6,3%</td><td>8,8%</td><td>11,7%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">France</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>12,6%</td><td>18,3%</td><td>12,1%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>282 241 250</td><td>541 827 923</td><td>126 166 184</td></tr><tr><td>TB with China</td><td></td><td>25,4%</td><td>31,0%</td><td>33,3%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>35,4%</td><td>35,8%</td><td>41,7%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Spain</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>216 882 775</td><td>121 997 223</td><td>160 248 417</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>24,3%</td><td>18,3%</td><td>24,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>32,7%</td><td>30,0%</td><td>35,1%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>7,7%</td><td>9,9%</td><td>10,8%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Italy</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>5,7%</td><td>4,8%</td><td>3,5%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-10 655 112</td><td>-71 130 633</td><td>-98 797 458</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>2 615 935</td><td>887 892</td><td>-19 583 417</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>9,2%</td><td>9,7%</td><td>13,0%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Czechia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>0,4%</td><td>2,3%</td><td>0,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-33 639 565</td><td>-36 577 704</td><td>-59 317 387</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>28,1%</td><td>31,8%</td><td>30,6%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>30,2%</td><td>28,3%</td><td>33,6%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>61 972 334</td><td>1 553 461</td><td>34 422 806</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>17,1%</td><td>18,7%</td><td>18,3%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>5,7%</td><td>5,1%</td><td>4,6%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>-104 715 657</td><td>-153 210 464</td><td>-167 657 642</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>15,5%</td><td>14,6%</td><td>14,9%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>20,6%</td><td>15,9%</td><td>15,6%</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>-12 794 775</td><td>-20 909 726</td><td>-22 201 305</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>6,7%</td><td>4,5%</td><td>6,7%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>6,7%</td><td>4,5%</td><td>6,7%</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>-13 728 895</td><td>-9 763 189</td><td>-13 148 838</td></tr><tr><td>TB extra UE</td><td></td><td>17,2%</td><td>16,5%</td><td>25,5%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>17,2%</td><td>16,5%</td><td>25,5%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Slovakia</td><td rowspan="2">Share of the extra EU</td><td>In import</td><td>-19 832 111</td><td>-14 515 704</td><td>20 691 490</td></tr><tr><td>In export</td><td>11,3%</td><td>13,1%</td><td>18,0%</td></tr><tr><td>TB China</td><td></td><td>0,4%</td><td>0,7%</td><td>4,3%</td></tr><tr><td>Share of China</td><td>In import</td><td>-30 517 901</td><td>-35 041 965</td><td>-28 015 972</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

The foreign trade of bearings is an important position. It represents an import total of 11.4 billion, of which 3.3 billion euros (29%) come from countries outside the EU. This share grew by 3 points over the decade and this refers to an increase of 4 points in
China's share (from 7.6% to 11.8%) combined with a decrease of 1 point in the share of other non-EU countries. Imports from China increased by some 600 million euros while exports stagnated. This results in a bilateral deficit of €1/2 billion in 2024. Since the balance vis-à-vis other countries outside the EU has improved slightly, the EU remains a net exporter of 1.4 billion and sees its balance deteriorate by less than 200 million.

<table><caption>Table 38. Evolutions 2014-2024 base 100 2014 - code 8482</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Production</th><th>Imports EU</th><th>Imports extra EU</th><th>Imports China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>137</td><td>97</td><td>118</td><td>190</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>126</td><td>99</td><td>145</td><td>155</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>133</td><td>123</td><td>125</td><td>175</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>146</td><td>120</td><td>135</td><td>133</td></tr><tr><td>Czechia</td><td>168</td><td>122</td><td>117</td><td>122</td></tr><tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>159</td><td>93</td><td>152</td><td>164</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Eurostat

Germany maintains a surplus of around €1.1 billion due to exports holding up well. However, the share of its imports from countries outside the EU is increasing (from 27.5% to 31.6%), mainly due to Chinese imports rising from 6.3% to 11.7%. Despite this, the bilateral surplus of Germany persists. It is however divided by more than two (from 282 to 126 million euros).

France "de-Europeanizes" its imports (+8 points for the share of «outside EU» in imports) but also its exports (+ 6 from 35.4% to 41.7%). Its surplus is eroding, mainly due to a growing bilateral deficit with China. Spain becomes deficit due to imports of Chinese bearings mainly. Italy maintains a surplus but it erodes by 30 million largely because the bilateral deficit with China is worsening by 60 million.

The Czech Republic and Slovakia have quite large deficits vis-à-vis China, but these deficits have changed little over the period. Compared to non-EU countries, the Czech Republic is continuously in deficit and this deficit has increased. Slovakia had a deficit of 20 million and is in 2024 surplus by the same amount.
### 1.2.19 Conclusion on the "de-Europeanization" of the automotive supply chain and the Chinese threat

Our work on foreign trade in parts and equipment over the past decade does not allow us to conclude that we are witnessing a clear "de-Europeanization" of sourcing for European assembly plants in France and Europe. Indeed, with a few exceptions, the share of imports from countries outside the EU remains limited, and if it does increase, it is usually by a few points. Insofar as the production organization of new vehicle manufacturing worldwide, and particularly in Europe, has for decades been much more regional than global, it's not enough to have tempting offers in India or China to call into question years of partnership with suppliers who have given satisfaction and complied with the very strict demands of automakers, sometimes involving relocation within the EU.

From this point of view, the fact that imports are generally growing faster than production clearly indicates that sourcing is becoming more international, and that German suppliers for German assembly sites and Italian suppliers for Italian factories are being replaced by suppliers located outside Germany or Italy. Most of the time (4 times out of 5 on average if we reason in terms of EU vs. non-EU, more if we define a "Europe zone" including UK, Morocco and Turkey), this choice is European, but in a growing minority of cases, the decision is taken to import components from countries located far from Europe.

**With the exception of the special cases of Morocco and Turkey, where EU countries' foreign trade in equipment remains in surplus, the only perceptible de-Europeanization movement over the period is, as expected, towards China.** This does not (or no longer) concern exports, as Chinese assembly plants are "de-Europeanizing" their sourcing. On the other hand, in almost all of our 18 cases, it clearly concerns imports.

Overall the EU deficit on auto-parts with China in 2024 is of €1,6 billion (from a surplus of €7,7 billion in 2014). If we exclude Germany, the deficit for all the other EU countries in 2024 is of €7,6 billion (from a deficit of €0,5 billion 2014). Even for Germany, which benefits from important volumes of German cars exported to and manufactured in China, the trade surplus in auto parts with China has declined by €2,2 billion since 2014. **If we include lithium-ion accumulators as auto-parts, the EU trade deficit with China climbs to €21 billion in 2024 (from a €7,3 billion surplus in 2014) and also Germany is concerned with a trade deficit of €2,2 billion.**

**The sharpness of this trend, and the growing importance of the amounts involved, indicate that, in a context marked by significant cyclical overcapacity that the consensus is seeing as being structural, there is a serious risk of seeing sites and skills disappear in many activities as a result of this movement.** To put it another way, short-term decisions taken by purchasing departments to reduce their wheel and flywheel procurement costs by a few euros could lead to the disappearance of sites or companies that supply these components close to factories. If - or when - these scenarios materialize, European factories may find themselves having to go to the other side of the world for components that will no longer be cheap because Chinese suppliers will no longer be competing with their European counterparts.
Several of the items studied in our data sheets show trends which indicate that this risk is not just a fantasy, but a very real one, either because the relative importance of imports of Chinese parts is beginning to threaten the survival of suppliers who are losing markets, or because the speed of the increase in these imports, which nothing seems to be stopping, suggests that we shouldn't wait until these levels are reached before reacting and protecting suppliers present in Europe.

If we examine the case of steering wheels, we can see that the globalization of sourcing, already stronger than for other components in 2014 (17.5% vs. 15.5%), is developing rapidly, with a quarter of imports coming from outside the EU by 2024. Of the 7.5 points lost by European suppliers, half went to Chinese suppliers, whose share of total imports rose from 1.5% to 5.3%. The EU surplus persists, but has been divided by 3, dropping from 2 billion to 0.7. In this loss of 1.3 billion euros, China weighs heavily, since the bilateral surplus has been reduced by half a billion. Here, the China effect is also accompanied by Moroccan and Turkish sourcing, which is progressing strongly, with surpluses in both cases reduced by 100 million euros.

Wheels are another area where the level of non-European imports has risen sharply (by 4 points) to 18% in 2024. Of this 4-point increase, 3 are attributable to imports of Chinese steering wheels, which accounted for 1.5% in 2014 and now represent 4.5%. Here too, the result is a surplus that persists for the time being, but is shrinking considerably, from 2 billion euros to 0.7. Half of this deterioration in the balance is attributable to foreign trade in steering wheels with China, which also remains in surplus, but has fallen from +0.7 to 0.2 billion. Similarly, the balance of trade in steering wheels with Morocco and Turkey fell by 120 million euros and 150 million euros respectively.

The foreign trade situation for tires is typical of a case where non-EU imports were already very high in 2014 and are not increasing (they are even losing 1.5 points in total imports). However, in this case, China turns the situation on its head: the surplus becomes a deficit due to the scale of the bilateral deficit caused by both the very sharp rise in imports and the growing difficulty of exporting outside the EU. Here, the EU had a surplus of 230 million euros despite a deficit of 740 million against China in 2014. Ten years on, the deficit is 174 million euros, because the large surplus with other non-European countries is no longer enough to make up for the 2.5 billion euro bilateral deficit with China. Exports to China stagnated, while imports tripled. The deficit has also tripled.

In all these cases, we could show that, beyond the statistics, companies have gone under and/or plants have closed in France and Germany in particular. Some have relocated to other EU countries, or to non-EU countries such as Morocco or Turkey, which belong to the European zone both in terms of industrial practices and customs duties. Another part has disappeared from the map forever, because Chinese overcapacity has created a situation where the prices offered to find outlets for the factories that have set up too many of them in China are de facto predatory: no European producer can match the prices offered to its European factories, and is forced either to throw in the towel or to source Chinese production for its European sites.

**The risk underlined by our statistics is that, little by little, value chains that are still largely European due to logistical constraints and the importance of legacy in the production cost structures of most parts, will be systematically managed**
**without regard to these two arguments.** The fact that in many programs currently under development, European companies are frequently no longer consulted indicates that the movement already detected by our statistics is still underestimated by the measurement of flows which refer to old programs. This is why we also needed to question the equipment manufacturers on cases where this de-Europeanization has in some way been already formalized by the manufacturers' purchasing departments.

The questionnaire sent by the six main French automotive suppliers associations to their adherents in February 2025 served this purpose and we now turn to analyze the answers given by 108 automotive suppliers based in France.
## 1.3 Pressure to relocate: what French automotive suppliers say about future contracts

In February 2025 a questionnaire was sent via the six main French automotive suppliers associations to their members: 108 questionnaires (filled online) have been returned.

More than one third of the companies in the sample belong to the FIEV, which represents automotive equipment manufacturers; one fifth to the FIM, which represents mechanical companies; 13%, 12% and 11% respectively to the GPA (plasturgists), the FFC (bodywork sector) and ELANOVA (rubber sector); and 7% to the CLIFA (forges and foundries).

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /></figure>

60% of the companies polled are first tier suppliers, 40% are second tier suppliers, and 6% of them are both tier 1 and tier 2.

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /></figure>
All 108 companies have at least a production site in Europe. The large majority of the companies have at least one production site in France (89%), 57% at least one production site in Eastern Europe, and 49% at least one production site in Western Europe (outside France).

<figure><img src="image_7.png" /></figure>

Most of the companies polled have at least a production site in China (53%), India (39%), Morocco (27%) and Turkey (26%). Of the 82 companies that have production sites in these countries, 31 have been asked to move their current sourcing in the EU to these production sites, 29 have not been asked, and 22 have not replied to this question.

If you have sites in these countries, have manufacturers asked you to move your sourcing to these production sites?

<figure><img src="image_8.png" /></figure>

To the open question "if yes to which countries" and "by which manufacturer or equipment suppliers" 41 companies have replied.
<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>■ If yes, by which manufacturers or equipment suppliers?</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /></figure>

They responses indicate clearly that most of the pressure to relocate sourcing outside the EU is currently towards China (40%) and India (30%) rather than Morocco (23%) and Turkey (6%). This represents a major break with the policy of regionalisation highlighted in the previous section. What is asked now to suppliers is to use their capacity already installed in China and India for these markets to supply the European market. About half of the replies given to this question come from members of the FIEV and indicate clearly that French and some other European OEMs are strongly pushing in this direction but that the impact of these pressures will only start to become visible towards the end of 2025.

Concerning who is exerting this pressure, not surprisingly French OEMs are here identified as the main source of pressure (Stellantis 45% and Renault 28%), other OEMs (BMW, Volkswagen, “all of them”) less so (10%) and for second tier suppliers the pressure comes obviously from first tier suppliers (18%) such as Valeo, Forvia, Bosch, Borgwarner, Vitesco Schaeffler and Inteva (mentioned in the replies).
If you don't have production sites in these countries, are you under pressure from manufacturers to set up production sites there?

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /></figure>

On the 108 companies polled, 21 (on the 59 companies that have replied to this question) have been asked to set up new production sites in low-cost countries where they did not have previously production sites.

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /></figure>

The countries mentioned as the destination of these new investments are differently hierarchized by comparison with the demands of relocations towards already existing production sites. Morocco clearly emerges as the main destination (50%), followed by India (19%) and Eastern Europe (9%). By contrast, China appears to be here marginal (6%). Some companies also mention the US (3%) and Mexico (3%).