<figure><img src="image_1.png" /></figure>

HAL
open science

17/2021 L'EUROPE UNIE

Simion Costea

► To cite this version:

Simion Costea. 17/2021 L'EUROPE UNIE. 17/2021, 2021, 10.13140/RG.2.2.34028.48007. hal-05045150

HAL Id: hal-05045150

https://hal.science/hal-05045150v1

Submitted on 7 May 2025

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.

<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>

Open licence - etalab
L'EUROPE UNIE

UNITED EUROPE

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>

No. 17 /
2021

Revue d'études européennes
PARIS
## EDITORIAL BOARD:

**Professeur Dr. Hab. Hedi Saidi**

Président d'honneur de la revue académique « L'Europe unie », Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur, Chevalier des Palmes académiques – Université Catholique de Lille & Association "JISR" ("Le Pont"), Villeneuve d'Ascq, France

**Dr. d'État Michel LABORI**

JOURNAL DIRECTOR / DIRECTEUR DU JOURNAL
"Jean Monnet Professor" [founder], University of
Besançon (France). Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur
(France)

**Dr. hab. Simion COSTEA**

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF / RÉDACTEUR EN CHEF
Senior Lecturer "Jean Monnet Professor" of EU Studies
and Contemporary History, "G.E. Palade" University of
Medicine, Pharmacy, Science and Technology of Târgu-
Mureş (Romania), former advisor to the European
Parliament (Brussels)

**Dr. Mihaela Daciana NATEA**

MANAGING EDITOR
Senior Lecturer, "G.E. Palade" University of Medicine,
Pharmacy, Science and Technology of Târgu-Mureş
(Romania)

## EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBERS:

**Dr. Adrian-Gabriel CORPĂDEAN**

Editorial Board – Secretary
Senior Lecturer, Faculty of European Studies, "Babeş-
Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca (Romania)

**Dr. Archil CHOCHIA**

Editorial Board – Member
Researcher, Tallinn Law School, Tallinn University of
Technology (Estonia)

**Dr. Vasile CUCERESCU**

Editorial Board – Member
"Jean Monnet Professor", President of ECSA Moldova,
Chișinău (Republic of Moldova)

**Dr. Cristian LAKO**

Editorial Board – Member
Lecturer, "G.E. Palade" University of Medicine, Pharmacy,
Science and Technology of Târgu-Mureş (Romania)

**Dr. Dragoş PĂUN**

Editorial Board – Member
Senior Lecturer, Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca
(Romania)

**Dr. Silviu PIROŞ**

Editorial Board – Member
Researcher, Head of Department IES, VUB – Free
University of Brussels (Belgium)

**Dr. Andreea POP**

Editorial Board – Member
Lecturer, "G.E. Palade" University of Medicine, Pharmacy,
Science and Technology of Târgu-Mureş (Romania)

**Dr. Lucian SĂCĂLEAN**

Editorial Board – Member
Lecturer, "G.E. Palade" University of Medicine, Pharmacy,
Science and Technology of Târgu-Mureş (Romania)

**Dr. Daniel ŞTEFAN**

Editorial Board – Member
Senior Lecturer, "G.E. Palade" University of Medicine,
Pharmacy, Science and Technology of Târgu-Mureş
(Romania)

**Dr. Colin SWATRIDGE (UK)**

Editorial Board – Member
Visiting professor, Miskolc University (Hungary)

## SCIENTIFIC BOARD / CONSEIL SCIENTIFIQUE:

**Dr. Didier BLANC**

Scientific Board – Member
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toulouse
(France)

**Dr. Ioannis PANOUSSIS**

Scientific Board – Member
Professor, Dean of the Faculté Libre de Droit, Université
Catholique de Lille (France)

**Dr. Eric OLSZAK**

Scientific Board – Member
Professor, Faculté Libre de Droit (FLD), Université
Catholique de Lille. Member of the IDDR (Institut du
développement durable et responsable) (France)

**Dr. hab. Simion COSTEA**

Scientific Board – Member
"Jean Monnet Professor", Senior Lecturer, G.E. Palade
University of Medicine, Pharmacy, Science, and
Technology of Târgu-Mureş (Romania)

**Dr. hab. Boris GRÉSILLON**

Scientific Board – Member
Professor, Aix-Marseille University, Associated
Researcher Centre Marc Bloch (France)

**Dr. Amelia HADFIELD**

Scientific Board – Member
"Jean Monnet Professor", Professor, Head of Department
of Politics. Director of the Centre for Britain and Europe
(CBE), University of Surrey (UK)

**Dr. Tanel KERIKMÄE**

Scientific Board – Member
"Jean Monnet Professor", Professor, Head of the Tallinn
Law School, Tallinn University of Technology (Estonia)

**Dr. Placide MABAKA**

Scientific Board – Member
Professor, Université Catholique de Lille (France)

**Dr. Nicolae PĂUN**

Scientific Board – Member
"Jean Monnet Professor", Professor, Dean - Faculty of
European Studies, Babeş- Bolyai University of Cluj-
Napoca (Romania)

**Dr. hab. Hedi SAIDI**

Scientific Board – Member
Professor, Université Catholique de Lille (France).
Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur (2010) et Chevalier
des Palmes Académiques (2013)

**Dr. Cornel SIGMIREAN**

Scientific Board – Member
Professor, "G.E. Palade" University of Medicine,
Pharmacy, Science, and Technology of Târgu-Mureş
(Romania)

**Dr. Licínia SIMÃO**

Scientific Board – Member
Professor, University of Beira Interior, University of
Coimbra (Portugal)

**Dr. Béatrice BOISSARD**

Scientific Board – Member
Senior Lecturer, University of Versailles-Saint-Quentin
(France)

**Dr. Bruno GUERMONPREZ**

Scientific Board – Member
Lecturer, ISA Lille (France)
EU Universities

# L'analyse du macro et du meso-environnement des Universites au Sein de l'Union Europeenne

PROFESSEUR ERIC OLSZAK

UNIVERSITES CATHOLIQUES EN SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES<fnref n="1" />

**Abstract:** All European universities, whether public or private, are increasingly facing strong competition to develop strategies that can attract large numbers of students. One of the elements of this strategy is to better understand the influences of the macroenvironment that revolve around these universities; this is the purpose of the PESTEL model. At the same time, the universities are confronted daily with relationships with all a range of players who force them to adapt their strategy; this is the purpose of the Stakeholders model. The purpose of this article is to put these two tools into the light in order to better understand the macro and mesoeconomic constraints faced by universities.

**Keywords:** University, Competition, Macroenvironment, Stakeholders.

**Résumé:** L'ensemble des universités européennes qu'elles soient publiques ou privées sont de plus en plus confrontées à une forte concurrence qui les poussent à développer des stratégies susceptibles d'attirer un grand nombre d'étudiants. L'un des éléments de cette stratégie consiste à mieux connaître les influences du macroenvironnement qui gravitent autour de ces universités, tel est l'objet du modèle PESTEL. Dans le même temps, les universités sont confrontées quotidiennement à des relations avec toutes une série d'acteurs qui les obligent à adapter leurs stratégies, tel est l'objet du modèle des Parties Prenantes. L'objet de cet article consiste à mettre en lumière ces deux outils afin de mieux comprendre les contraintes macro et mésoéconomiques auxquelles sont confrontées les universités.

**Mots clés :** Universités, Concurrence, Macroenvironnement, Parties prenantes.

L'analyse des stratégies des universités a fait l'objet de nombreux ouvrages depuis le début des années 1980 mais un ouvrage en particulier retient toute notre attention celui de Kotler et Fox (1995)<fnref n="2" /> portant sur le marketing stratégique des universités. Ces deux auteurs en préambule de leur ouvrage font ressortir sept éléments caractéristiques selon eux du marché de l'université, respectivement :

- « certains pays comme les pays anglo-saxons mais pas uniquement peuvent se vanter de posséder un système universitaire très performant à l'instar de n'importe quels autres secteurs d'activités économiques » ;

- « le fait de posséder un secteur universitaire performant contribue à améliorer la situation de la Balance des paiements de certains pays. En effet, le fait de pouvoir attirer des étudiants du monde entier correspond en fait à une exportation de services pour le pays d'accueil » ;

- « les effectifs étudiants ont considérablement augmenté depuis un demi-siècle et l'évolution de la démographie d'une part mais surtout le fait que de plus en plus d'adolescents souhaitent désormais poursuivre des études supérieures accentuent encore cette tendance » ;

- « le risque de voir une université faire faillite n'est pas totalement exclu mais apparait pour l'occasion moins fréquent que dans nul autre secteur d'activité » ;

<footnote n="1">¹ Professeur des Universités Catholiques en sciences économiques Faculté Libre de Droit- C3RD Université Catholique de Lille, eric.olszak@univ-catholille.fr</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Philip Kotler, Karen Fox, *Strategic Marketing for Educational Institutions*, Hall, Englewood Cliffs, Nj, 2nd, ed, Prentice, 1995.</footnote>
- « seule une université est capable d'attirer autant de talents en son sein sur une période conséquente, c'est vrai du côté des étudiants mais c'est encore plus évident si l'on se place du côté des personnels enseignants et non enseignants d'un très haut niveau » ;

- « en s'inscrivant à l'université, les étudiants concluent un accord avec elle dans la mesure où cette dernière en échange des frais d'inscription ne leur offre pas uniquement un service d'éducation mais dans la plupart des cas : un logement ; de la nourriture ; un accès à la culture, aux équipements sportifs, aux bibliothèques, etc. L'ensemble de ces services qui sont joints au produit initial sont proposés à des prix avantageux » ;

- « le retour sur investissement d'un étudiant ayant choisi de poursuivre quatre ans d'études supérieures se traduit immanquablement par le fait d'occuper un poste plus important et généralement mieux payé qu'un individu ayant choisi d'arrêter après le lycée »<fnref n="3" />.

Ces sept caractéristiques peuvent s'appliquer à toutes une série d'établissements de l'enseignement supérieur en Europe mais également aux universités situées sur les autres continents. Ces considérations générales sont naturellement prises en compte par les Présidents et les Recteurs des universités mais afin d'optimiser leur prise de décision, ils se doivent de prendre en considération les influences du macro-environnement universitaire dans un premier temps, ce que nous verrons dans une section 1, de mettre en exergue ensuite les relations qu'elles entretiennent avec toute une série d'acteurs, ce que nous verrons dans la section 2.

## §1. L'ANALYSE PESTEL APPLIQUEE AUX UNIVERSITES

Le modèle PESTEL est un acronyme signifiant respectivement : Politique ; Economique ; Sociétal ; Technologique ; Environnemental et Légal. Chaque organisation que ce soient des entreprises, des associations et des universités subissent l'influence de chacune des dimensions, Brulhart, Favoreu, Gherra (2015)<fnref n="4" /> en font une description détaillée dans leur ouvrage consacré à la stratégie des entreprises. Dans cette section, nous examinerons les caractéristiques de ces six dimensions en les appliquant aux universités européennes. Le tableau 1 nous indique les différentes dimensions afférentes plus spécifiquement aux universités européennes quelles que soient leurs situations géographiques.

<table><caption>**Tableau 1 :** Les caractéristiques des 6 dimensions du modèle PESTEL appliquées aux Universités européennes.<fnref n="5" /></caption><thead><tr><td>Dimensions</td><td>Caractéristiques</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>P : Politique</td><td><ul><li>Attitude du pouvoir vis-à-vis de l'enseignement supérieur ;</li><li>Mise en place de programmes visant à développer les universités ;</li><li>Instabilité politique : absence de majorité politique stable ;</li><li>Existence de régime autoritaires.</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>E : Economique</td><td><ul><li>PIB par habitant faible ;</li><li>Grande pauvreté ;</li><li>Présence d'infrastructures ;</li><li>Développement des moyens de communication ;</li></ul></td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote n="3">³ Philip Kotler, Karen Fox, *Strategic Marketing for Educational Institutions*, Hall, Englewood Cliffs, Nj, 2nd, ed, Prentice, 1995.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Franck Brulhart, Christophe Favoreu, Sandrine Gherra, *Stratégie*, Collection Openbook, Dunod Editeur, 2015, pp.6-11.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Le tableau reprend les grandes dimensions du modèle PESTEL telles qu'elles apparaissent dans tous les ouvrages, la seconde colonne a été élaboré par l'auteur du présent article.</footnote>
<table><tr><td></td><td>- Financement partiel de l'activité des universités par les autorités publiques;<br/>- Intensité de la concurrence avec les autres universités ;<br/>- Liens étroits entre l'Université et les entreprises.</td></tr><tr><td>S : Sociologique et démographique</td><td>- Evolution du nombre de naissances ;<br/>- Proportion des jeunes en âge de rentrer dans les universités ;<br/>- Impact du COVID 19 et de la diffusion des épidémies.</td></tr><tr><td>T : Technologique</td><td>- Importance du digital et impact sur la vie universitaire ;<br/>- Développement des formations à distance ;<br/>- Développement du télétravail.</td></tr><tr><td>L : Légal</td><td>- Statuts juridiques des universités ;<br/>- Statut des personnels des universités catholiques.</td></tr><tr><td>E : Environnemental</td><td>- Prise de conscience des problèmes écologiques par la population ;<br/>- Développement de la RSE et intégration aux stratégies de l'université;<br/>- Application des principes du développement durable aux stratégies de l'université.</td></tr></table>

Le tableau numéro 1 appelle un certain nombre de commentaires, concernant tout d'abord la dimension « Politique » on peut la subdiviser en deux sous-ensembles : les facteurs spécifiquement politiques et les facteurs liés à la mise en œuvre des politiques publiques en direction des universités. Au niveau des facteurs politiques, la présence des universités dans chaque pays européen implique qu'elles soient confrontées à des situations politiques très différentes, ainsi la dérive constatée vers une forme d'autoritarisme de la part de certains pays comme la Pologne et la Hongrie laisserait craindre une tentative de prise de contrôle de la gestion des universités par ces autorités politiques même si cela ne s'est pas encore produit<fnref n="6" />. De la même manière, l'instabilité gouvernementale qui existe dans certains pays rend parfois plus difficile la mise en œuvre de politiques ambitieuses envers l'enseignement supérieur. Ce dernier élément nous conduit à mettre en évidence, la place qu'occupe le développement de l'enseignement supérieur dans les politiques publiques mises en œuvre dans les différents pays, certains d'entre eux peuvent considérer la formation comme une priorité nationale alors que d'autres choisiront de réinvestir dans d'autres secteurs d'activités. L'Union européenne peut également jouer un rôle dans le développement des universités, la mise en place du programme ERASMUS au début des années 1990 en favorisant les échanges d'étudiants entre les universités leur a permis également de renforcer leur coopération sur différents programmes.

Au niveau de la dimension « Economique », on peut également subdiviser en deux sous-catégories : la conjoncture économique et les conditions économiques d'une part ; les facteurs ayant un impact direct sur la gestion des universités. Au niveau de la conjoncture économique, on peut estimer que les pays ayant des économies solides avec des taux de croissance élevées sont de nature à développer le niveau de vie de la population constituant un facteur favorable aux inscriptions dans les universités notamment les universités privées. Dans cette optique, les pays les plus pauvres de l'Union Européenne ont une probabilité plus faible de voir se développer des universités privées au profit des universités publiques. Etroitement corrélées avec le développement économique, la multiplication des moyens de communication et le développement des infrastructures contribuent à faciliter le développement de l'implantation des universités sur un territoire. Au niveau des facteurs influençant la gestion des universités, plusieurs paramètres peuvent avoir une énorme influence sur

<footnote n="6">⁶ L'actualité quotidienne nous montre que l'Union Européenne s'inquiète régulièrement des dérives de ces deux pays en matière de libertés fondamentales, on peut estimer que l'Université n'échappera pas à ces dérives.</footnote>
leurs activités. De la même manière que les relations étroites avec les entreprises peuvent constituer une source complémentaire de ressources (contrats de recherche, mécénats) en même temps qu'elle peut assurer plus aisément les débouchés auprès des étudiants. Pour finir, l'intensité de la concurrence entre les universités constituent un autre point important influençant leurs stratégies, c'est le cas des pays anglo-saxons notamment.

Concernant la dimension « Sociologique et Démographique », une fois encore on peut subdiviser celle-ci en deux sous-catégories : l'évolution et les caractéristiques de la population d'une part ; les facteurs sanitaires d'autre part. L'évolution et les caractéristiques de la population peuvent avoir un impact significatif sur l'évolution des inscriptions au sein des universités. Dans un premier temps, si l'on effectue une analyse à court terme, le nombre de jeunes susceptibles d'intégrer l'année suivante l'enseignement supérieur constitue une bonne indication du marché potentiel d'un établissement par rapport aux nouvelles inscriptions. De la même manière, si l'on se place sur le long terme, le niveau des naissances au cours d'une année constitue un indicateur approché du nombre d'inscriptions potentielles 18 ans plus tard. A titre indicatif, le boom des naissances enregistrée en l'an 2000 dans certains pays a eu un impact significatif sur les inscriptions dans l'enseignement supérieur à partir de 2018. Un autre élément que l'on aurait pu classer dans la dimension économique peut avoir une influence sur les inscriptions est lié à l'importance des classes moyennes et aisées dans la structure de la population totale, plus celle-ci est élevée plus cela constitue un facteur favorable à l'inscription dans des formations payantes. La deuxième sous-catégorie apparaît plus ciblée en se focalisant sur le facteur sanitaire. En effet, l'irruption inattendue du COVID 19 au niveau mondial a eu un impact sur la gestion quotidienne des établissements d'enseignement supérieur (fermetures partielles ou totales, adaptation des enseignements) et les conditions sanitaires différentes d'un pays à l'autre ont modifié en conséquence les stratégies des entreprises.

Au niveau de la dimension « technologique », ce dernier apparaît à l'inverse des trois premiers comme relativement homogène dans la mesure où le dénominateur commun aux trois éléments précités se trouve être l'environnement « numérique ». En effet, le développement du numérique depuis le milieu des années 1990 a considérablement modifié la gestion quotidienne de l'ensemble des établissements d'enseignement supérieurs. Dans le même temps, le développement des techniques numériques permet aujourd'hui d'envisager le développement de l'offre de formations à distance qui dépasse largement les possibilités d'interaction que proposait initialement l'enseignement par correspondance qui existait jusqu'à présent. Pour terminer, la propagation du COVID 19 a bouleversé considérablement les méthodes d'enseignement en présentiel vers un basculement partiel ou total en distanciel, toutes les universités du globe ont été obligées de s'adapter relativement vite et la rapidité d'adaptation a pu constituer un élément de différenciation positive<fnref n="7" />.

La dimension « juridique » comporte plusieurs sous-dimensions, respectivement : le statut juridique des universités et le statut des personnels des établissements d'enseignement supérieur. Concernant le statut juridique, les multiples établissements de l'enseignement supérieur ont des statuts juridiques différents qui varient beaucoup en fonction de la législation des pays, on peut trouver des universités qui ont le statut d'association comme les universités catholiques françaises ou au contraire des universités privées. Les différences de statuts juridiques peuvent influer considérablement sur la mise en œuvre de la stratégie des universités. Le deuxième élément a pour cadre le statut des personnels de l'enseignement supérieur qui ont des statuts différents suivant qu'ils évoluent dans des établissements privées ou publiques, dans le premier cas, les salariés sont assimilés à des salariés du secteur privé comme n'importe salariés des entreprises, dans le deuxième cas, ils sont assimilés à des fonctionnaires.

<footnote n="7">⁷ L'auteur du présent article ayant été confronté directement à ce type de situation en étant dans l'obligation d'assurer tous ces cours à distance à partir d'Octobre 2020 peut témoigner de la satisfaction des étudiants face à la volonté de l'Université d'assurer la continuité pédagogique.</footnote>
La dernière dimension « environnementale » peut également se subdiviser en deux sous-parties: la prise en compte des problèmes écologiques par la population d'une part ; la prise en compte des principes du développement durable et de la RSE d'autre part.

La prise en compte par la population des problèmes écologiques se rencontrent aujourd'hui dans la plupart des pays du Globe et la sensibilisation aux problèmes de réchauffement climatique devient omniprésent. De par les nombreuses interactions, les universités européennes ne peuvent ignorer cette dimension. Dans la logique du rapport « Brundtland » paru en 1987⁸, la plupart des universités ont transposé dans leurs stratégies les principes du développement durable en axant principalement leurs efforts sur la minimisation des activités sur le développement durable. Dans le même temps, la dimension sociale mais aussi la dimension « gouvernance » se retrouve dans l'application par de nombreuses universités des principes de la responsabilité sociale et environnementale des entreprises.

Ayant procédé à l'analyse du macroenvironnement, il convient à présent de nous focaliser sur la prise en compte des relations qu'une université entretient quotidiennement avec un certain nombre d'acteurs, ce que l'on nomme la méso-environnement, tel est l'objet de la théorie des parties prenantes.

## § 2. LA THEORIE DES PARTIES PRENANTES

Le modèle des parties prenantes est un concept abondamment utilisé dans la littérature des sciences de gestion, de nombreux articles lui sont consacrés mais c'est l'ouvrage de Freeman (1984)<fnref n="9" /> qui en fait une synthèse assez complète. Ayadi (2003)<fnref n="10" /> pour sa part, nous indique que le concept de « parties prenantes » se réfère à la littérature anglo-saxonne qui distingue souvent les *shareholders* (actionnaires) et les autres *stakeholders* (les parties prenantes). On ne peut véritablement comprendre ce concept qu'en effectuant un retour en arrière en se plongeant dans l'histoire de la pensée en sciences de gestion plus précisément sur celle ayant pour cadre la place de la firme et ses relations avec l'environnement. Berle et Means (1932)<fnref n="11" /> mettent en évidence le développement d'une pression sociale qui s'exerce sur les dirigeants afin qu'ils reconnaissent leur responsabilité auprès de tous ceux dont les décisions de l'entreprise peuvent affecter leur bien-être. Quelques décennies plus tard, les travaux respectifs de Bowen (1953)<fnref n="12" /> et d'Ansoff (1968)<fnref n="13" /> viennent en quelques sortes compléter ceux précurseurs de Berle et Means. Bowen que l'on peut considérer comme l'un des pères fondateurs du concept de Responsabilité Sociale et Environnementale plus connu dans le langage courant sous l'acronyme RSE, estime que l'entreprise mais surtout ses dirigeants se doivent de prendre en considération à la fois d'un point de vue moral et social l'impact de leur décision sur des groupes externes. Ansoff reste le premier pour sa part à faire référence à la théorie des parties prenantes en arguant du fait qu'en matière d'organisation, une entreprise se doit d'orienter ses objectifs de façon à fournir à chaque parties prenantes une part équitable de satisfactions. Ansoff insiste également sur le fait que la prise en compte des parties prenantes affecte de façon plus ou

<footnote n="8">⁸ Gro Harlem Brundtland, *Notre avenir à tous*, Rapport de la Commission Mondiale sur l'environnement et le développement de l'ONU, Avril 1987, 349 p.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Robert Edouard Freeman, *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach*, Boston Pitman, 1984.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Salma Damak Ayadi, La théorie des parties prenantes, théorie empirique ou théorie normative ? in *identification et maîtrise des risques : enjeux pour l'audit, la comptabilité et le contrôle de gestion*, Bruxelles, 2003.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Adolf Berle, Gardiner Means, *The modern Corporation and The Private Property*, New York, Mac Millan, 1932.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Howard Bowen, *Social Responsabilities of the Businessman*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1953.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Igor Ansoff, *Stratégies du développement de l'entreprise*, Paris, Editions Hommes et Techniques, 1968.</footnote>
moins importante la stratégie d'une entreprise en renforçant de fait les contraintes dans sa gestion quotidienne<fnref n="14" />.

Dans cette optique, on peut considérer que dans le cas d'une université les parties prenantes représentent l'ensemble des individus et institutions qui entretiennent des contacts plus ou moins réguliers avec elle. Ainsi, on peut dresser une liste exhaustive de l'ensemble des parties prenantes d'une université en Europe dans le cas présent mais qui pourrait être transposée sans problème à d'autres universités dans le monde :

- les étudiants ;

- les parents ;

- les professeurs ;

- le personnel administratif ;

- les fournisseurs ;

- les entreprises ;

- les décideurs politiques locaux et nationaux ;

- les associations de riverains ;

- les autorités administratives (Rectorat d'Académie, Ministère de l'éducation nationale) ;

- les autres universités ;

- les anciens étudiants ;

- les donateurs ;

- les lycées publics et privés ;

- les étudiants des autres universités ;

- l'Union européenne ;

- les administrateurs de l'université ;

- les médias (journaux, radios et télévisions).

Le tableau 2 nous donne un aperçu des relations spécifiques que les universités européennes peuvent avoir avec chacune des parties prenantes.

<table><caption>**Tableau 2 : Les relations entre les universités européennes et leurs parties prenantes<fnref n="15" /> :**</caption><thead><tr><td>Les Parties prenantes</td><td>Relations envisagées et influence sur la stratégie</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Les étudiants</td><td>Les étudiants constituent le cœur même de la stratégie des universités à travers les politiques de marketing, les différents services qui leur sont rendus sont de nature à assurer à l'université sa pérennité à travers leur satisfaction.</td></tr><tr><td>Les parents</td><td>A l'instar des étudiants, ils représentent une cible importante au niveau de la stratégie marketing, ce sont eux qui financent le plus souvent les études de leurs enfants, ils vont être particulièrement sensibles au rapport qualité/prix. Ils voudront par ailleurs un retour sur investissement qui sera d'autant plus fort que les coûts d'inscription apparaîtront initialement élevés.</td></tr><tr><td>Les professeurs</td><td>Ils constituent l'un des éléments essentiels de la politique d'offre, dans la mesure où leurs compétences, leurs disponibilités auprès des</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Igor Ansoff, *Stratégies du développement de l'entreprise*, Paris, Editions Hommes et Techniques, 1968.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Le tableau numéro 2 résulte des observations de l'auteur enseignant depuis 20 ans au sein de l'Institut Catholique de Lille.</footnote>
<table><tr><td></td><td>étudiants renforcera d'autant plus la qualité du service offert à ces derniers.</td></tr><tr><td>Le personnel administratif</td><td>Bien qu'ayant une fonction liée plus généralement à ce que l'on qualifie de « Back Office », leur rôle est fondamental dans la qualité du service fourni dans la mesure où les étudiants vont les solliciter très souvent afin d'obtenir des réponses (changements de salle, date d'examen, fourniture d'un certificat, etc.).</td></tr><tr><td>Les fournisseurs</td><td>Ils peuvent influer sur la qualité du service notamment à travers les équipements mis à disposition des étudiants, à travers la nourriture offerte dans les restaurants universitaires.</td></tr><tr><td>Les entreprises</td><td>Les relations qui s'établissent entre les entreprises et l'université sont primordiales à plus d'un titre :<br/>- Les entreprises vont être sensibles à l'offre de formation et seront susceptibles d'accueillir les étudiants en stage qui pourront déboucher ensuite sur une embauche. Elles contribuent ainsi à faire la réputation d'une université en augmentant son taux de placement qui reste par ailleurs un indicateur fondamental dans le choix final d'une inscription ;<br/>- Les universités peuvent participer à l'élaboration de certains programmes en finançant des chaires, en participant à la taxe d'apprentissage ou en finançant des contrats d'études.</td></tr><tr><td>Les décideurs politiques locaux et nationaux</td><td>Le fait d'entretenir de bonnes relations avec les décideurs publics locaux et nationaux contribue également à améliorer la qualité du service et cela de plusieurs manières :<br/>- Au niveau des autorités locales (municipalités, assemblées locales), leur pouvoir d'autoriser de nouvelles constructions de bâtiments universitaires apparaît déterminant. Plus généralement, elles ont un pouvoir décisionnel en matière d'aménagements et de grosses rénovations. Pour finir, les autorités peuvent accorder des subventions par rapport à certains projets de recherche qui se traduisent par des flux financiers conséquents. Plus spécifiquement, les autorités locales de proximité comme les municipalités peuvent exercer un pouvoir de police en cas de débordements de la population estudiantine lors des soirées ;<br/>- Au niveau des décideurs politiques nationaux, de bonnes relations dans le cadre des pratiques de lobbying peuvent les amener à voter des lois favorables au fonctionnement des universités catholiques.</td></tr><tr><td>Les associations de riverains</td><td>Avoir de bonnes relations avec les associations de riverains témoigne d'une bonne insertion de l'université dans l'environnement local en même temps qu'elle peut favoriser l'existence d'un bouche à oreille positif susceptible d'augmenter potentiellement les futures inscriptions.</td></tr><tr><td>Les autorités administratives (Rectorat d'Académie, Ministère de l'éducation nationale)</td><td>Les systèmes éducatifs étant très différents d'un pays à l'autre, il n'en demeure pas moins que les relations avec les autorités administratives peuvent influer considérablement sur la stratégie d'une université. Ainsi le plus souvent, les autorités administratives de l'éducation nationale ont un pouvoir réglementaire important</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td></td><td>pouvant aller dans certains cas jusqu'à interdire l'ouverture de certaines formations conditionnant en partie la politique de produit.</td></tr><tr><td>Les autres universités</td><td>Les établissements de l'enseignement supérieur entretiennent des relations étroites avec d'autres établissements à la fois nationaux mais aussi internationaux. Ces échanges peuvent contribuer à donner une image encore plus dynamique de l'offre universitaire, par exemple à travers le programme ERASMUS.</td></tr><tr><td>Les anciens étudiants</td><td>Les anciens étudiants ont une triple mission au regard de leur ancienne université :<br/>- Ils peuvent relayer avec bienveillance auprès de leurs relations le fait d'avoir eu une formation de qualité ;<br/>- Ils peuvent favoriser l'accueil de stagiaires et constituer un réseau important de nature à favoriser le plus souvent des futures embauches ;<br/>- Ils peuvent devenir ultérieurement des donateurs.</td></tr><tr><td>Les donateurs</td><td>Entretenir de bonnes relations avec les donateurs constitue un élément essentiel de la réussite des universités lorsqu'elles relèvent du secteur privé. Ces derniers peuvent contribuer substantiellement au financement de l'activité de l'université et plus spécifiquement en participant à son plan de développement.</td></tr><tr><td>Les lycées publics et privés</td><td>Ces établissements constituent l'essence même du marché d'une université, les lycéens constituent de fait la première cible à atteindre.</td></tr><tr><td>Les étudiants des autres universités</td><td>Les étudiants des autres universités constituent également une cible de choix dans la mesure où ils peuvent choisir ensuite de s'inscrire dans les formations de second et de troisième cycle au sein de l'université.</td></tr><tr><td>L'Union Européenne</td><td>L'Union européenne de par ses multiples actions envers l'ensemble du secteur éducatif et plus particulièrement vis-à-vis de l'enseignement supérieur détient une place importante dans la stratégie des universités. La mise en place du processus de Bologne, les multiples programmes visant à promouvoir l'accès des étudiants à l'université les conduisent à avoir beaucoup de contacts avec les autorités communautaires.</td></tr><tr><td>Les administrateurs de l'université</td><td>A nouveau, la gouvernance des universités peut varier sensiblement d'un pays à l'autre mais d'une manière générale, les administrateurs ont un pouvoir très important dans l'élaboration et parfois dans l'infléchissement de certaines orientations stratégiques.</td></tr><tr><td>Les médias (journaux, radios et télévisions).</td><td>Les médias constituent un vecteur fondamental de transmission des messages dans le cadre de la politique de communication. Le plan de communication de l'université doit s'efforcer d'optimiser l'impact de la transmission des messages en direction des prospects potentiels.</td></tr></table>
## CONCLUSION

Les universités européennes quelles que soient leurs statuts, leurs tailles et leurs localisations sur le territoire européen sont de plus en plus confrontés à une forte concurrence qui les obligent à faire preuve d'innovations pour attirer toujours plus d'étudiants. Dans cette optique, à l'instar de ce que les entreprises font quotidiennement, les universités doivent élaborer des stratégies pour affronter cette concurrence. La réussite d'une stratégie passe au préalable par une prise de conscience de la part des Présidents et des Recteurs de l'environnement dans lequel évolue une université respectivement le macro-environnement matérialisé par l'utilisation du modèle PESTEL, à travers le méso-environnement ensuite à travers la prise en compte de la théorie des parties prenantes. Les multiples influences du macro-environnement mais surtout les multiples acteurs qui gravitent autour des universités qu'ils soient personnes physiques ou morales rendent extrêmement complexes la mise en place des stratégies par les universités européennes.

## Bibliographie :

- Igor Ansoff, *Stratégies du développement de l'entreprise* », Paris, Editions Hommes et Techniques, 1968.

- Salma Damak Ayadi, La théorie des parties prenantes, théorie empirique ou théorie normative ? *in identification et maîtrise des risques : enjeux pour l'audit, la comptabilité et le contrôle de gestion* », Bruxelles, 2003.

- Adolf Berle, Gardiner Means, *The modern Corporation and The Private Property*, New York, Mac Millan, 1932.

- Howard Bowen, *Social Responsabilities of the Businessman* », Harper and Brothers, New York, 1953.

- Franck Brulhart, Christophe Favoreu, Sandrine Gherra, *Stratégie, Collection Openbook*, Dunod Editeur, 2015, pp.6-11.

- Gro Harlem Brundtland, *Notre avenir à tous*, Rapport de la Commission Mondiale sur l'environnement et le développement de l'Onu, Avril 1987, 349 p.

- Robert Edouard Freeman, *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach*», Boston Pitman, 1984.

- Philip Kotler, Karen Fox, *Strategic Marketing for Educational Institutions*, Hall, Englewood Cliffs, Nj, 2nd, ed, Prentice, 1995.
# Technology in higher education in European area before Covid 19

SENIOR LECTURER DR. AURELIAN OLIMPIU SABĂU-POP

GEORGE EMIL PALADE UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE, PHARMACY, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY OF TĂRGU-MUREŞ

**Abstract:** Higher education, dominated in the past by an exchange between instructor and the students in a classroom, has expanded to a variety of delivery systems. Technology can be expected to deeply affect higher educational institutions. Distance education, as a pioneer in the uses of technology, not only should adjust to the possibilities of advanced technology, but also should modify existing structures so as to enhance e- learning in education either we consider pre-university education, higher education or life-long learning. Distance education systems are expanding in pace with the development of communication and information technology.

**Key words:** Higher education, European reforms, Strategy, Technology.

## 1. EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM VS. TECHNOLOGY

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /></figure>

The European higher education has passed through many changes in the last two decades, being included in the much broader Western and Eastern European reforms. Since the late 1990s, the rate of change has accelerated to unprecedented levels, largely on the shoulders of three key developments: the Sorbonne Declaration (1998), the Bologna Declaration (1999), and the Lisbon Strategy (2000). The Sorbonne Declaration of 1998 was the first signalled preference of major European countries (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) for a more compatible and comparable set of European higher education systems over the longstanding perspective that Europe's diversity was its strongest asset<fnref n="1" />.

The first two key development objectives was to make study programmes more compatible across the European systems. The Lisbon Strategy, including its 2005 restart New Lisbon partnership for growth and jobs, seeks to reform the continent's still fragmented systems into a more powerful and more integrated, technological - based social-economical environment. Subsequent communications from European policymakers have only strengthened the belief that higher education institutions will be crucial to Europe's future well-being and, in effect, the lynchpin that binds these major processes and strategies together.

### 1.1. Lisbon agenda

Lisbon agenda has become known through objectives that follow the transformation of the European economy as the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy capable of sustainable economic growth, offering better jobs with a higher social cohesion. To achieve, by 2010, this objective, the EU should coordinate its efforts to obtain not only a radical transformation of the economy, but also to adopt an ambitious program for the modernization of the social and educational system.<fnref n="2" />

Regarding the major role of entrepreneurial education in universities there are numerous papers<fnref n="3" /> published. The article *Entrepreneurial Intentions of Business Students: A Benchmarking*

<footnote n="1">¹ Vasile Puscaş, *Universitate, societate, modernizare*, Ed. Eikon, 2004</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Costea, Simion, "The Lisbon Strategy", p.200-206, in vol. *Public Policies of the European Union*, coordinators Asztalos Zsofia and Pakozdy Csaba, "Petru Maior" University Publishing House, Tîrgu-Mureş, 2008.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Franke, B. and Luthje, Ch., "Entrepreneurial Intentions of Business Students: A Benchmarking Study", 2004, International Journal of Innovation & Technology Management, 1, 269-288</footnote>
Study published in International Journal of Innovation & Technology Management indicates that "all over the world there are rapidly developing businesses based on new technologies within the small and medium sized companies, an area that needs technically specialized staff, with knowledge in the business domain, to manage the organizations and groups, so the formation education in the domain of entrepreneurship must be developed".

**1.2. Bologna declaration**

The main objective of the Bologna process is to create a European area of higher education based on international cooperation and academic exchanges, a European area attractive to both students and teachers in Europe, as well as around the world. The creation of this European higher education space facilitates the mobility of students, graduates and academic staff, prepares students for their future careers and lives as active citizens of democratic societies, and provides support for their personal development by providing access to quality higher education.

Regarding the theme of the present article the Declaration has two principal implications.

Firstly, the emphasis on the individual choice undermines the traditional assumption that learning best takes place within an institution, within a fixed period of time defined by academic staff<fnref n="4" />.

Secondly, the focus should be on competence and general skills more than on acknowledge and the skills of reproduction of the didactic material put on the reach of the student. The restructuring of the curriculum will impose the change of teaching from subject-based teaching to student - based teaching, where the teacher is a "facilitator rather than expert"<fnref n="5" />.

The Declaration has had a major impact in the academic plan; most of the institutions of higher education have adapted the University's curricula in consonance with the principles laid down above.

Furthermore, there have been created platform that allows an easier access of the students at the bibliographic resources, the possibility of informing them about the contents of the disciplines and, in general, better information of students with all the changes that occur during the academic year.

Moreover, Informatics laboratories have been established within all the faculties regardless of the specialization, in order to prepare students and teachers with the use of electronic resources that is intended to facilitate access to the career and the acquisition of complementary skills to the specialization that they have.

**1.3. European Recommendations**

The Recommendation of the European Parliament and Council of 18 December 2006 regards key competences for lifelong learning providing an European framework of reference which covers eight key competences, defined as "knowledge, skills and attitude." Our project aims at most of these competences, especially those related to creativity, innovation, learning process, spirit of initiative and entrepreneurship, cultural awareness and expression.

Innovative capacity is closely related to creativity as a personal trait that is based on values and cultural and interpersonal skills.

In March 2007, the European Council stressed again the role of education and training as a key factor in enhancing creativity, innovation, performance and competitiveness, giving the concept

<footnote n="4">⁴ Trowler, P., *Academics responding to change: new higher education frameworks and academic cultures*, 1998, Society for Research into Higher Educational & Open University Press, Buckingham.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Ensor, P., "Contesting discourses in higher education curriculum restructuring in South Africa", 2004, *Higher Education*, 48, 339-359</footnote>
of "knowledge triangle": education, research and innovation. (see Recommendation 2006/962/CE, JO L 394, 30.12.2006).

Moreover, for the period 2007-2013, the European Commission has integrated its initiatives in education and training under the umbrella of a single program of lifelong learning. This program enables European citizens, regardless of their age, to benefit from learning opportunities throughout Europe.

As the higher education system has developed, also the standards required by the society have grown. Today, higher education and research are associated with the notion of progress and innovation, both at individual and society level. In order to adapt higher education to these new orientations towards society needs, curriculum reform becomes one of the most important tools. Any effort at curriculum revision should be designed to prepare all students for effective citizenship and participation in an increasingly diverse multicultural and multiracial society. Major curriculum revisions and articulation agreements at colleges and universities should involve consultation with faculty members from other educational institutions affected by the changes.

## 2. IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY IN EDUCATION

Traditional campus-based education is no longer the only way higher education is developed nowadays. Due to the technological developments the last decades have witnessed a significant increase in different forms of education and new educational providers as an example university have a wider impact, some of them even global<fnref n="6" />, with strong international university brands<fnref n="7" />. They include a wider range of interactions, more than just face-to-face courses:

- distance educations programs that are delivered through computer, internet, correspondence or other technological means

- degrees gained through study in more than one country as a result of agreements between institutions from different countries in joint educational programs

- virtual universities

- study abroad semester as in Erasmus projects.

Technological resources put at the hand of students consist mainly in the use of computer, use of means of distance communication, projector, or electronic data storage.

### 2.1. What students are using technology in education

Technology has removed the limitations of time and space, and as a consequence the number of students who can attend a class has increased considerably<fnref n="8" />.

A lot of students who were eliminated from college institution due to their physically inability to be present in the classroom are now able to participate in higher education due to distance education. This is the reason why American National Center for Education Statistics (2008) defined distance education as a formal educational process in which the instructor and the student are not in the same location. Thus, instruction might be synchronous or asynchronous, and it may involve communication through the use of video, audio, or computer technology, or by correspondence (which may include both written correspondence and the use of technology such as CD-Rom) reducing the in-class seat time for students.

<footnote n="6">⁶ Stella, A. and Gnanam, A., "Quality assurance in distance education: The challenges to be addressed", 2004, *Higher Education*, 47, 143-160</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Mihaela Daciana, Bolos "Mărcile și indicațiile geografice în sistemul relațiilor internaționale", Ed. Universul Juridic, 2013</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Lawson, N., "Questions students ask about distance education", 2007, *Distance Learning*, 4, 61-65</footnote>
The students taking advantage of educational opportunities made available by new technology include<fnref n="9" />:

- students with physical disabilities

- parents with children who find it difficult to leave home

- students working full time with no flexible time schedule

- urban students for whom is easier to time-shift than space-shift

- students from rural areas

- military/diplomatic personnel serving in remote locations.

Students want the flexibility that distance delivery offers, allowing them to combine work and school demand.

Continuing education using a distance format is appealing to employers who can reduce training costs, increase productivity with less time spent away from the company office, and increase the professional knowledge for the employees<fnref n="10" />. Employers moving into new areas in their carrier can do so easier by obtaining professional certificates or a college degree online.

## 2.2. Organizational change in Universities

Since non-traditional students have different academic and social needs than traditional students, the universities have to adapt. There are important quality measures in learning that must be taken to ensure that e-learning courses are of the same quality as traditional courses<fnref n="11" />.

First step consists in the selection of appropriate faculty members for web-based delivery. The faculty members selected for this position have an advanced knowledge of technological instruments and the abilities to organize the proposed tasks.

Step two consists in providing faculty training and support for teachers. University staff and auxiliary staff should benefit from training programs in order to develop skills and competences they can use later on in the education process.

If institutions are to provide technological resources and stimulate the implementation of education technologies, it is vital to gather information about the difficulties their users may encounter<fnref n="12" />. Even if most faculty members are aware of the benefits in using technology to enhance students learning, many chose not to adopt and use available educational technologies<fnref n="13" />.

Step three consist in designing a learning environment with care. In order to ensure the quality as face-to-face courses, the new programs have to design the transition of the students to use web-based-technology. Considering these reasons, we recommend that the first course take place on site and to be trained on the web-based course management platform that will be used for the remaining part of the teaching program. Based upon the student's feedback and input the course might suffer some changes.

<footnote n="9">⁹ Renes, S. and Strange, A., "Using technology to enhance higher education", 2010, *Innovating Higher Education*, Springer, New York</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Appana, S., "A review of benefits and limitations of online learning in the context of the students, the instructor and the tenured faculty", 2008, *International Journal on E-learning*, 7, 5-22</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Husson, W. J. and Watterman, E. K., "Quality measures in distance learning", 2002, *Higher Education in Europe*, 27, 243-261</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Lane, C. A. and Lyle, H. F., "Obstacles and supports related to the use of educational technologies: the role of technological expertise, gender and age", 2010, *Innovating Higher Education*, Springer, New York</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Sax, L. "An overview of the 1998-99 faculty norms", 2000, *Graduate School of Education and Information Studies at UCLA*</footnote>
### 3. CONCLUSION

Technology provides us with a great opportunity to modify our approaches to teaching and learning in a positive way. Expanding the use of this knowledge could help a lot of students who were deprived by their right to education.

Many factors contribute to the reluctance in using technology needed to develop distance education. In the Romanian system of higher education, a series of negative examples can be identified in which universities have used on a wide scale distance learning and forms of examination via the internet. These universities have used modern communication systems only in order to have an education in mass making the rebate from all the higher education's quality rules. But despite all these examples of bad omen that can be identified, there is no need to buffer the development of the Romanian education on this plan.

The assessment of clear qualitative rules and of a governmental system of control is needed in order to build qualitative standards in higher education e-learning.

We can't ignore the benefits and advantages of technology:

- students and teachers do not have to be present in the same classroom

- deliverable of content can be adapted to the needs and schedules of the students

- competition among institutions of higher education is facilitated independent of the geographical area

- courses are available easier to students with special problems such as mothers, handicapped, soldiers

- students have more control in their learning style

- content can be delivered where is needed<fnref n="14" />.

The use of technology has a number of implications in the context of education, considered somehow traditional; teachers teach students the course using powerpoint presentations that are able to attract the increased attention of students. We achieved that, a few years ago, many of the teachers were reluctant in the use of powerpoint presentations in the Universities, but recently the most of the courses are held using this formula. All in the same sense, we see a better ability and wish of using such means only by younger generations of teachers, the reluctance of elderly academics towards this innovative aspect still persisting nowadays în some Romanian universities.

Also, an application of the innovative teaching methods consists in the distribution of the course support in electronic format, or saved on electronic devices or by electronic means of distance communication. This variant also ensures a decrease in the cost of schooling and even a positive impact on the environment.

### References:

1. Appana, S., "A review of benefits and limitations of online learning in the context of the students, the instructor and the tenured faculty", 2008, International Journal on E-learning, 7, 5-22.

2. Bolos, Mihaela Daciana, "Mărcile și indicațiile geografice în sistemul relațiilor internaționale", Ed. Universul Juridic, 2013

3. Costea, Simion coordinator, *Culture, Elites and European Integration, Volume IV – International Relations and European Union Interdisciplinary Studies*, PARIS, Editions Prodifmultimedia, 2011,

4. Costea, Simion, 'The Lisbon Strategy', p.200-206, in vol. *Public Policies of the European Union*, coordinators Asztalos Zsofia and Pakozdy Csaba, "Petru Maior" University Publishing House, Tîrgu-Mureş, 2008.

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Eamon, D. B. "Has Technology became a threat to the academy", 1999, *Behavior Research Methods*, Instruments and Computers, 31, 197-207</footnote>
5. Eamon, D. B, “*Has Technology became a threat to the academy*”, 1999, Behavior Research Methods, Instruments and Computers, 31, 197-207.

6. Ensor, P., “*Contesting discourses in higher education curriculum restructuring in South Africa*”, 2004, Higher Education, 48, 339-359.

7. Franke, B. and Luthje, Ch., “*Entrepreneurial Intentions of Business Students: A Benchmarking Study*”, 2004, International Journal of Innovation & Technology Management, 1, 269-288.

8. Husson, W. J. and Waterman, E. K., “*Quality measures in distance learning*”, 2002, Higher Education in Europe, 27, 243-261.

9. Lane, C. A. and Lyle, H. F., “*Obstacles and supports related to the use of educational technologies: the role of technological expertise, gender and age*”, 2010, Innovating Higher Education, Springer, New York.

10. Lawson, N., “*Questions students ask about distance education*”, 2007, Distance Learning, 4, 61-65.

11. Labori, Michel and Costea, Simion, *Le Management des Politiques de l'Union Europeenne* The Management of EU Policies, PARIS, Prodifmultimedia, 2010,

12. Natea Mihaela Daciana, “*Identity, Culture, and Intellectual Property – Past Present and Future Dilemmas*”, în Natea Mihaela Daciana, Lucian Săcălean (coord.), Security and reconstruction in Europe/ Securite et reconstruction en Europe, L'Harmattan, Paris France, 2020

13. Vasile Puscaş, Universitate, societate, modernizare, Ed. Eikon, 2004

14. Renes, S. and Strange, A., “*Using technology to enhance higher education*”, 2010, Innovating Higher Education, Springer, New York.

15. Sax, L. “*An overview of the 1998-99 faculty norms*”, 2000, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies at UCLA.

10. Stella, A. and Gnanam, A., “*Quality assurance in distance education: The challenges to be addressed*”, 2004, Higher Education, 47, 143-160.

11. Trowler, P., *Academics responding to change: new higher education frameworks and academic cultures*, 1998, Society for Research into Higher Educational & Open University Press, Buckingham.
# Was Erasmus Altogether Too European?

DR COLIN SWATRIDGE<fnref n="1" /> (UK)

UNIVERSITY OF MISKOLC, HUNGARY

**Abstract:** Britain's exit from the European Union need not have meant quitting the very successful Erasmus+ scheme for student and staff exchange; but such was the enthusiasm for complete severance from European institutions following the 2016 referendum, among jubilant 'eurosceptic' Conservatives, that this was one more link that had to be broken. The Erasmus+ scheme is being replaced by the so-called Turing scheme; but in a number of ways, it is an inferior scheme, not least in that it is not truly reciprocal. What is more, it is 'global', and therefore more expensive, and more exclusive, than the scheme that it is replacing.

**Keywords:** Erasmus+, Turing scheme, 'Brexit', student testimonies, reciprocity.

On the 15th of January 2020, a Scottish National Party MP addressed the British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, in the House of Commons: he regretted that the government had decided against participating in the Erasmus scheme. He was ‘heartbroken’, he said. Johnson’s reply was unequivocal:

> “The right honourable gentleman is speaking out of the back of his neck. There is no threat to the Erasmus scheme. We will continue to participate in Erasmus. UK students will continue to be able to enjoy the benefits of exchanges with our European friends and partners, just as they will continue to benefit from the scheme.”<fnref n="2" />

There was a resounding shout of “Hear! Hear!” from the Conservative benches, signalling hearty approval. Conservatism, by definition, is about leaving things that work as they are, so it was a bold Conservative, Margaret Thatcher, who attached her signature to the treaty that set up the single market with its guarantee of ‘free movement’. This led to the UK’s participation in Erasmus, in 1987.

It was said of the ‘Brexiter’ Johnson government that it was the Treasury that balked at the costs involved in our continued participation in Erasmus+. It was also said that ministers, and perhaps voters in general, were under the impression that Erasmus privileged middle-class university students – that the programme gave an expensive licence to young people to have fun at taxpayers’ expense. The government’s expressed aim was to ‘level up’ UK society, not to subsidize the life-chances of the elite. Of course, it was also said that withdrawing from Erasmus was just another way in which the UK could regain its ‘sovereignty’, and to demonstrate that we were now a global nation.

Johnson was right to say that UK students ‘enjoy the benefits’ of the exchanges that the Erasmus programme has made possible. I have taught many Erasmus students at the University of Miskolc, Hungary, over the years, and all have mentioned three benefits of the programme, in particular:

1. The experience increased their self-confidence: they proved to themselves that they were capable of leaving home, travelling to, and living in, a foreign country;

<footnote n="1">¹ Dr Colin Swatridge (UK) was an A Level Chief Examiner in the UK, tutor for the Open University for 15 years. He has taught at a number of universities in Hungary as a visiting professor (“Pazmany Peter” Catholic University, Budapest, “Karoli Gaspar” University, Budapest, University of Miskolc), as well as in Romania (“Petru Maior” University) and Poland (Krosno State College). The University of Miskolc, in Hungary has been his ‘home’ university for more than twenty years. He is a generalist whose fields are Central European Studies and the art of argument – and much are in between. He has taught critical thinking for some years to Erasmus students from all over Europe. He has written books about Hungary and Transylvania, published in Budapest. His most recent UK book is the *Oxford Guide to Effective Argument and Critical Thinking* (Oxford University Press, 2014).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² UK Parliament, 15/1/2020: https://www.parliament.uk/.../prime-ministers-questions-15-january-2020</footnote>
2. They made a circle of friends from very different cultures, with many of whom they have kept in touch,

3. It improved their spoken English; they discovered that the language that they had learnt at school had utility – it was the language that they had in common with their peers.

As their teacher, I was myself impressed by the way in which Turks and Spaniards, Germans and Poles – and, yes, even Hungarians, who are ordinarily rather shy about speaking in English, lest a teacher reprove them for a grammar mistake – were heard to be speaking in English to each other in the corridors, the cafés, and the canteen. The reinforcement of English as an effective lingua franca was, surely, an unintended consequence of those who drew up the Erasmus programme; for me, it was a happy consequence.

But it was the first two of the above effects that I sought to draw students out about. Orsolya, a Romanian said, simply: ‘It helped me to grow’. A French girl, Marine, wrote:

> My Erasmus experience was one of the best experiences of my life. It was the first time I left my home, my family and my country for such a long time. I discovered a new home where I had to manage to live by myself. I have now that curiosity and need to go deeper to understand things. At work I am not scared to make speeches in front of hundreds of people. It changed my personality, my way of seeing things, my life. I am much more open-minded than I was before.

Éva is a Hungarian who spent a semester in Finland. She was a country girl who embarked on an undergraduate course at Miskolc at the age of 28 – she was testing herself. In Finland, she said, ‘I was assured that I could cope at a foreign university, in a foreign country.’ Iwona, a Pole, was another self-confessed introvert: ‘I’ve become so much more self-confident’, she reported, ‘as an introvert I learned that stepping out of my comfort zone is not scary after all.’ She went on:

> Young people have little chance of work experience, so the fact that they were brave enough to study abroad, in a foreign language, can be proof that they can quickly adapt in a new work environment and are open to new challenges.

For many, the experience of living and studying abroad in one country was the first step on the path to living and working in another. For Sabina, like Orsolya, her time in Miskolc was the first time that she had been abroad alone. ‘It gave me a taste for living abroad – I’d always wanted to do that.’ It enabled her not only to improve her English, but (as a Romanian native speaker, unlike Orsolya) her Hungarian, too. She is now living in Germany, and learning German. Irodion, a Greek, admitted that the experience, ‘affected me on a deep level: it made me determined to pursue my career outside Greece.’ He lived for almost five years in Bratislava. ‘Being in Miskolc, he said, ‘was the key factor to my working in Slovakia.’ Asked whether, if she had the chance, she would return to Miskolc, Magda, a Pole, adapted the famous saying of Heraclitus: ‘We shouldn’t step into the same river twice. If I had the opportunity, I’d choose another country’. Magda has lived and worked in Barcelona for the past ten years or so.

The real bonus of the programme is the insight it gives into other cultures: Iratxe, a Spaniard in Miskolc (who later lived and worked in Italy and Argentina), spoke of the ‘fruit cocktail’ of nationalities by whom she was suddenly surrounded in provincial Hungary: she noted a difference in attitude between students from once ‘Iron Curtain’ countries and those from Western Europe:

> ‘We were bolder, noisier, and the Germans were even a little arrogant. This instilled a certain knowing caution in dealing with different peoples. Living in close proximity with a veiled Turkish girl was a revelation.’

Katarzyna, a Pole, also learned that ‘Turkish students behave differently, and you can talk about it.’ It was thanks, indirectly, to Erasmus, that at least two of my respondents met their husbands-to-be: Esra, a Turk, and the above-mentioned Spaniard, Iratxe. This happy chance must certainly rank as another unintended consequence of the scheme.
If the original Erasmus scheme had been about providing for the exchange of university students, across borders within the EU, the same could not be said of Erasmus+, launched in January 2014, which brought together seven existing programmes, including Comett and Lingua. According to the latest available programme report, published in December 2020³, between 2014 and 2020, four million people benefited from participation in the scheme. To be sure, half of these were ‘students’, but around 650,000 were explicitly vocational education and training students, and 500,000 were young people on youth exchange schemes; 125,000 schools, vocational education, and training institutions, were involved in so-called ‘strategic partnerships’.

A vocational college in Miskolc, specializing in catering and hospitality, regularly sends apprentices to partner institutions in Ireland and Germany. Marcell, an apprentice chef learned as much about Hungarians as he did about the Irish:

‘My Irish boss was peaceful and helpful – this type of boss is very rare in Hungary. The Irish have a very calm mentality. They like to live, not just living life, like us. I knocked accidentally into a drunk in a bar, and he said “Sorry”. That wouldn’t happen in Hungary.’

Péter, an apprentice pastry-cook, and Kamilla, an apprentice waitress, agreed: ‘The Irish people are very friendly and open-minded. They’re all so nice and welcoming to foreign people. It’s easy to make friends at work, in a shop, in the pub, even in the street.’ And Bianka, an apprentice pastry chef owned up to becoming ‘an open person; I can see the “new” in everything.’

Having spent a semester in Miskolc, María, a Spaniard, was placed in a small enterprise in Cork. She was disconcerted by the ‘terrible weather’, and the cost of living, and: ‘They left many decisions to me’; but, she added, ‘I realized this was the beginning of my adulthood – I was the owner of my decisions, establishing my own goals.’ Natalia, a Ukrainian, had a background in commerce, but was placed in a Polish nursery: the experience opened up for her the option of a completely new profession. The associated self-development seminars steeled her to approach a stranger to ask for change on her way to the airport – something, she says, that she would have been too shy to do before.

Özge, a Turk in Romania, observed that, since students are all on social media, they already have much in common. She continued:

‘Since I was raised in the Islamic culture, I was a little alien to the Christian culture. I met with Christian feasts, like Easter. To be honest, in these times, religious rituals are not important for young people. They only enjoy these ornaments and family dinners. This is much the same for a person raised in the Islamic, as in the Christian culture.

This cultural assimilation – if Özge is right – may be yet one more unintended consequence of the Erasmus+ programme. In any event, that Scottish National Party MP had reason to be ‘heartbroken’ at the thought that the UK might abandon it.

In a UK Government press release<fnref n="4" />, on (of all days) 26 December 2020, and less than a year after Johnson’s ringing declaration in the House of Commons, Gavin Williamson, the Education Secretary, announced the launch of the ‘Turing Scheme’ to replace Erasmus+. Williamson wrote:

We have designed a truly international scheme which is focused on our priorities, delivers real value for money, and forms an important part of our promise to level up the United Kingdom.

The initial budget for the scheme is just over £100 million, somewhat less than the sum of Erasmus grants to the UK of £130 million, in 2019⁵ It is envisaged that this will provide funding for 35,000 students in universities, colleges and schools. Bids for funding opened in March 2021, and the first recipients of grants embarked on their courses in September.

<footnote n="3">³ European Commission, Brussels, (undated) https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/about/-en</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ UK Government, London, 12/03/2021: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-turing-scheme-to-</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Waters, Johanna L., “Erasmus what the turning scheme must be?” *The Conversation*, London 5/1/2021: https://theconversation.com/erasmus-what-the-turing-scheme-must-do-to-ensure-uk-students-dont-miss...</footnote>
What are the ‘priorities’ to which Williamson referred? In a later bulletin<fnref n="6" />, the government announced ‘four main objectives’:

* **Global Britain** (to enhance existing partnerships and encourage the forging of new relationships across the world)

* **Levelling up** (to widen participation, support social mobility across the UK and give equal access to all regardless of background)

* **Developing Key Skills** (to give unique career-building opportunities in hard and soft skills looked for by employers)

* **Value for UK Taxpayers** (to optimise social value in terms of costs, benefits, and risks).

Professor Dame Janet Beer, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Liverpool observed that there were ‘shortcomings’ to the Erasmus scheme: ‘Unlike Erasmus,’ she said, ‘students will not be tied to an exchange lasting a full academic year or semester’. Instead, ‘we can offer short, flexible opportunities to students from a wider range of backgrounds and academic disciplines than was possible under Erasmus.’<fnref n="7" />

In line with the first of the above objectives, Michelle Donelan, the universities minister, said the scheme would ‘open up the globe to our young people’<fnref n="8" />. Of the countries to which students might go, there are five ‘priority countries’: India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Nigeria. These particular countries appear to be targeted with a view to increasing the number of fee-paying international students applying to study at UK universities. It is clear that it is not exactly an ‘exchange’ that is planned: in spite of the claim by a government spokesperson that ‘UK universities will build reciprocal relationships’<fnref n="9" /> with global partners, the costs of incoming students are to be covered by their own governments and institutions.

This is, perhaps, the single biggest criticism that has been levelled at the scheme: that it is unlikely to be ‘reciprocal’; there is no money in the budget to pay for international students coming to the UK. Will ‘global’ governments and institutions be minded to enter into partnerships that are one-sided? It must be asked, too, whether consideration has been given to the administrative burden that there will be, on UK universities, colleges, and schools (and perhaps especially schools), of setting up agreements with ‘global’ partners, at a time, in particular, when those institutions are only now getting back on their feet after more than a year of disruption caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Making arrangements with institutions in Vietnam and Indonesia is likely to be very different financially and otherwise from doing so with institutions in Toulouse and Vienna – to say nothing of the cost of flights (to the taxpayer and the climate) to the other side of the world.

Furthermore, as Johanna L. Walters, Professor of Human Geography at University College, London, points out<fnref n="10" />:

The Turing Scheme is intended to encourage mobility globally, but no mention has been made of how tuition fees – which vary considerably, internationally, will be covered. Under Erasmus, students paid no tuition fees to their overseas university, and received a grant for living expenses.

The UK government would seem to have excluded the costs of supporting incoming students purely to meet the above fourth of the ‘main priorities’: value for UK taxpayers. In doing so, it has ignored the fiscal benefits incoming students bring. Chatham House is a respected independent

<footnote n="6">⁶ UK Parliament (undated): https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9141/CBP-9141.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Hazell, Will, “Turning scheme. Erasmus students exchange placements”. *The i*, London, 06/02/2021: https://inews.co.uk/news/education/turing-scheme-erasmus-student-exchange-placements-860600</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Hazell, Will, London: The i, 6/02/2021: https://inews.co.uk/news/education/turing-scheme-erasmus-student...</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Water, Johanna L., *op. cit.*</footnote>
policy institute: Ben Horton and Max Fras point out<fnref n="11" /> that students coming to the UK are a lucrative customer base for higher education, for services of all kinds, including the hospitality sector. They report that ‘research by Universities UK suggests that UK made a net profit of £243 million per annum from participation in Erasmus.’ Whilst one might ask how such a figure can have been arrived at, there can be no question that, as a popular destination for European students (who do not come to the UK for its weather) the UK benefits greatly in terms of what the above authors call ‘cultural diplomacy and soft power’<fnref n="12" />. Moreover, to give the lie to the supposition that Erasmus is all about benefiting metropolitan, middle-class students, just one third of Erasmus+ funding is earmarked for higher education<fnref n="13" />; the rest covers vocational training opportunities, apprenticeships, adult education, volunteering and youth-work schemes – and there is protected funding for young people with special needs and disabilities<fnref n="14" />.

It is a sad fact that ‘Brexit’ has emphasized differences among the four nations of the UK. Independence is on the agenda of the ruling party in Scotland; and it is talked about even in Wales – more modestly, though, the further and higher education ministers of both nations, Richard Lochhead of Scotland, and Kirsty Williams of Wales, have explored ways in which the two nations might continue to participate in Erasmus+. Both nations, they claim, have been more active in the programme than England. They note that the £100+ million budget for Turing is only for one year in the first instance and that it is ‘puny in comparison’ with the seven-year Erasmus+ budget, at €26.2 billion<fnref n="15" />.

Hywel Ceri Jones was a Welsh pioneer of the Erasmus scheme. As EU Commission Director for Education, Training and Youth, in 1987, he is particularly exercised by the omission from the Turing Scheme of opportunities for initial and further vocational education and training abroad, including opportunities for the disabled. He points out, also, that withdrawal from Erasmus+ means the loss of interconnection between this programme and Horizon 2020, the EU's flagship programme for research and innovation<fnref n="16" />. In the Welsh Senedd, on 6th February, First Minister Mark Drakeford echoed Jones's complaint, calling the exclusion of Wales's young people from Erasmus+ 'shameful'.

Asked in a press conference how probable it is that Scotland and Wales might re-enter the Erasmus+ programme, Sonya Gospodinova for the European Commission answered: ‘in general, based on the Erasmus regulations, only countries can join the programme.’<fnref n="17" /> The irony for the ‘United’ Kingdom is that students at Northern Ireland universities can continue to participate in Erasmus+ under an arrangement with the Irish government, in order that the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic (and, therefore, the EU) be not a ‘hard border’<fnref n="18" />. German Green MEP Terry Reitke asked Ursula van der Leyen, in a letter co-signed by 150 colleagues, whether special consideration might be given to Scottish and Welsh participation. Van der Leyen’s response

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Horton, Ben & Fras, Max, “Turning scheme holds lessons for global Britain” *The Royal Institution of International Affairs*, London, 13/01/2021: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/01/turing-scheme-erasmus-holds-lessons-global-britain</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ German Academic Exchange Service, Brussels (undated): https://www.daad.brussels.eu/en/eu-higher-education-policy/erasmus/...</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ European Commission, Brussels (undated): https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/opportunities/individuals/students/students-and-staff-with-mental-or-health-rel...</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Scottish Government, Edinburgh, 26/01/2021 https://www.gov.scot/news/erasmus-exchange-programmes/</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Jones, Hywel Ceri, Nation Cymru, Wales, 27/01/2021: https://nation.cymru/opinion/five-reasons-why-the-uk-governments-opportunities-decision-to-exit-erasmus-was-a...</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Nation Cymru, Wales, 05/02/2021: https://nation.cymru/news/european-commission-appear-to-shoot-down-Welsh-and-scottish-hopes...</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ BBC, London, 26/12/2020: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-55455532/</footnote>
was uncompromising: 'The only possibility for the UK is to associate as a whole, or not at all.'<fnref n="19" /> In a briefing to members of the European Movement in the UK on 27 January 2021, former Attorney-General Dominic Grieve explained our withdrawal from Erasmus as based on 'a mixture of money and pique.' He urged the movement to make re-attachment to the scheme its very first campaign. Alan Turing was very much an Englishman (with an Irish connection on his mother's side); could it be that Erasmus, a Dutchman, was altogether too European? And is this nationalism what Grieve meant by the 'pique'?

If Erasmus+ has had unintended consequences that have been undeniably benign, the UK government's Turing Scheme would appear to have unintended consequences – even before it has been tested – of more significance than the 'bumps in the road' that ministers foresaw 'Brexit' would bring.

**Bibliography:**

(Selected journal articles)

Adams, Richard (2021) ‘Students apply to UK version of Erasmus foreign study scheme’. London: *The Guardian*, 04/08/2021

Böttcher, Lucas et al. (2016) ‘Gender gap in the ERASMUS mobility program’. San Francisco: Plos One, 22/02/2016

Bozoğlu, Oğuzhan (2016) ‘What motivates Turkish undergraduate students to attend International Student Mobility Programs and study abroad: insights from a university’. Gebze, Turkey: *International Journal of Sciences: basic and applied research*, Vol. 30 No.2, 2016

Cairns, David (2017) ‘The Erasmus undergraduate exchange programme: a highly qualified success story’. London: Taylor and Francis Group, 16/05/2017

Dangoor, Natasha (2021) ‘What do students need to know about the Turing scheme?’. London: *Times Higher Education*, 23/03/2021

De Benedictus, Luca and Silvia Leoni (2020) ‘Gender bias in the Erasmus network of universities’, *Appl.Netw.Sci.* 5, 15/09/2020

Gallardo, Cristina (2020) ‘UK pulls out of EU’s “extremely expensive” Erasmus scheme’, London: *Politico*, 24/12/2020

Higgins, James (2021) ‘Turing scheme: half of participants “disadvantaged students” government says’, Bristol: *University Business*, 04/08/2021

Lewis, Joe (2021) ‘The Turing scheme’, London: House of Commons Briefing Paper No. 9241, 18/02/2021

Local, The (2021) ‘First UK students on Turing scheme head to France’, Stockholm, Sweden: *The Local*, 08/09/2021

Mutlu, Sevda (2020) ‘Development of European consciousness in Erasmus students’, NY: *Journal of Education, Culture, and Society*, 2 (2), January 2020

Salcedo-López, Daniel and Mercedes Cuevas-López (2021) ‘Analysis and assessment of new permanent teacher training activities under the Erasmus+ program from the perspective of the participants of Spain in times of COVID-19’. Basel, Switz.: MDPI, 12/10/2021

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Morgan, Sam, Nation Cymru, Wales, 16/02/21: https://nation.cymru/news/eu/-commission-dashes-welsh-and-scottish-erasmus-hopes-for-now/ (see also: Banks, Martin & Johnson, Brian, London: The Parliament Magazine, 17/02/2021: https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/ursula-van-der-leyan)</footnote>
# EU legal framework, internal and external policies

## Finland and the European Union

DIOLEEN HUNDT<fnref n="1" />

TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, ESTONIA

**Abstract:** Finland joined the European Union in 1995 and is a member of the Eurozone. The country uses the Euro to trade as a member of the Economic and Monetary Union. This paper analysis Finland – EU relations, focusing on different fields and highlighting how the membership had influenced Finland, how the European integration process has worked and is working in case of this Nordic country.

**Keywords:** European Union, European integration, European politics, Finland.

## INTRODUCTION

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /></figure>

The actions of the European Union (EU) in the international scene are guided by principles embedded in the international law and the United Nations Charter. The major concerns of the EU in external relations include cooperation on health, energy, environmental and climate issues, and negotiation of trade agreements. In all its dealings, the EU is concerned about promoting human rights and democracy as its key goals. Finland joined the European Union in 1995 and is a member of the Eurozone. The country uses the Euro to trade as a member of the Economic and Monetary Union. It also enjoys free travel within the Schengen region as a party to the Schengen Agreement. Through external relations with other countries, organizations, or civil societies, the EU benefits the members states by promoting social and economic development as well as fair globalization for the economies. The EU has always had an interest in building strong partnerships with all its neighbors, and Finland is one such country.<fnref n="2" />

## FINLAND INTEGRATION INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION

Finland is among the latecomers to the European Union together with Austria and Sweden. Finland's EU membership has contributed significantly to its process of re-identification on the international stage.<fnref n="3" /> Prior to joining the EU, Finland's western identity was quite blurry, and joining the EU was not just a norm just like any other European country. Upon joining the EU, Finland had little time to adjust because of the tight schedules and the EU agenda that was considered very important at the time. It was also at a time when Finland was recovering from a period of economic recession hence there was an imposed strict budgetary discipline on the people. Despite the challenges posed by the EU membership, Finland has adapted well and fits in the EU fine.

Finland uses a pragmatic and constructive approach in its integration into the EU. Within a short period, the country has changed from a non-aligned country to a full EU member through

<footnote n="1">¹ TalTech Law School, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia, dioleen_talviste@hotmail.com</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Ramiro Troitino, D., “EU enlargement to Austria, Finland, and Sweden”. *MEST Journal*, 2018, 6 (1), 97–104.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Raunio, T., Tiilikainen, T., *Finland in the European Union*, 2003.</footnote>
the strategic approaches.<fnref n="4" /> Finland realized early enough that to secure its place among the western European countries was one of the ways of protecting its national economic and political interests.<fnref n="5" /> Thus, it has played an active role in committing to integration with the European Union. According to Hanf and Soetendorp, decision-making in the member states of the EU is fast becoming more Europeanized meaning national policy-making is highly influenced by happenings at the EU.<fnref n="6" /> The member states ensure that the outcomes from the EU level align with the national interest which may sometimes be intertwined with EU interests. Therefore, every country, in developing their policies put into consideration the stake of the EU to ensure both are aligned.

## EU COOPERATION ON HEALTH IN FINLAND

Although the European Union does not direct make health policies, other policies regarding its operations affect healthcare.<fnref n="7" /> While most countries within the EU like to maintain their independence in healthcare, the policy decisions made by the European Union often impact them more often in a negative manner. This has forced them to reconsider the role of the EU in healthcare of such countries. For a long time, Finland has had a Health in All Policies approach towards its healthcare systems before seeing a need to improve healthcare policies. The country developed intersectoral health policies on smoking, nutrition, accident prevention in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO). Upon joining the EU, Finland's national intersectoral work got complicated because of the delegation of some competencies to the EU.<fnref n="8" /> The EU is majorly concerned with the economic situations of constituent countries like Finland; however, it is constitutionally mandated to protect the healthcare systems as well, hence its involvement in healthcare.

The EU has little mandate on individual health policies of countries. Although the EU wants to be seen as actively involved in health matters of its member states, it has faced constant opposition from political leaders because of the high pedestal on which healthcare is placed in individual countries. Nonetheless, the EU still makes its impact felt indirectly in healthcare systems of its member states, something Finland considers a complication of it. The EU encourages cooperation between the member states and offers support for their actions related to healthcare. The EU can financially support the health actions of the member states like Finland but is not allowed to interfere with the health laws in place. However, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 strengthened the mandate of the EU in matters relating to healthcare in the member states since it was now tasked with ensuring a high level of protection of human health. To support the EU in its mandate, Finland has shifted focus to government intersectoral programs as well as others not in the administrative sector.

The European Union legitimized the Health in All Policies (HiAP) for its healthcare approach in 2006.<fnref n="9" /> After long deliberations and active efforts to streamline healthcare with other EU policies after the recognition of the fact that EU policies affect health systems. Nonetheless, implementation of the HiAP remains a challenge because the new procedures do not strengthen

<footnote n="4">⁴ Raunio, T., Wiberg, M., Parliamentarizing *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Finland in the European Union*, 2001.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Dutt, P.; Ferraro, S.; Chochia, A.; Muljar, R., "Using Patent Development, Education Policy and Research and Development Expenditure Policy to Understand Differences Between Countries – The Case of Estonia and Finland", *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, 8 (1), 2018, 123–153.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Hanf, K., Soetendorp, B., *Adapting to European Integration, Small States and the European Union*, 1997.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Duncan, B., *Health policy in the European Union: how it's made and how to influence it*, 2002.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Melkas, T., *Health in all policies as a priority in Finnish health policy: A case study on national health policy development*, 2013.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Koivusalo, M., *The state of Health in All policies (HiAP) in the European Union: potential and pitfalls*, 2010.</footnote>
the efforts of the EU to use health impact assessments for the benefit of the public and their health systems. HiAP is a broader approach to healthcare and the EU hoped narrowing down to health impact assessment (IA) would finally give them the much-needed breakthrough in health within the member states. Nonetheless, this increased push for the use of IA to push for policy decisions may undermine healthy public policy.<fnref n="10" /> Thus, the involvement of the EU in healthcare matters of its constituent states still remains a complicated issue.

## FINLAND AND EU TRADE AGREEMENTS

Trade Agreements between the EU and the member states facilitate markets for the countries. Although Finland has benefited from free trade Agreements with the EU, the impact on the Finnish economy remains way below par. Globalization has played a bigger role in expanding Finland's trade affairs than the EU.<fnref n="11" /> Nonetheless, there are key sectors in Finnish businesses that have greatly benefited from free trade agreements like the machinery and equipment manufacturing industry as well as the forest industry. Even greater is the indirect impact of free trade agreements on Finland through different value chains. Economic policies of the EU revolve around promoting open and predictable international trade.<fnref n="12" /> To achieve this objective, the EU has free trade agreements (FTA) among its member states. Finland is a major beneficiary of these FTAs with increased exports to other countries with the FTAs.

Finland does not have an independent trade policy owing to it being an EU member state. The country, however, enjoys a stable political climate that encourages trade with other countries. The government invests a lot in infrastructure that supports Finland's engagement in trade under the EU. By virtue of being a member state of the EU, Finland shares in the Trade Agreements applicable to the EU. The EU is responsible for negotiating Trade Agreements on behalf of Finland, and once these get signed, Finland comes in to trade. The Agreements the EU has entered into are both bilateral and multilateral FTAs and always passes the same to the member states for ratification before implementation. These trade negotiations happen over a period of time, often for years, with the aim of negotiating the best deals for the member states.<fnref n="13" /> Finland applies interim rules on a case-by-case basis during the trade negotiations because the terms of each negotiation differ. Finland has always held trade arrangements with foreign trading partners in high regards from way before joining the EU.<fnref n="14" /> The country has had its trade framework in place from 1948 and used this to integrate and align with the trade policies of the EU. The interim rules during trade negotiations ensures the country signs up for beneficial trade terms that will boost the economy. Currently, the EU and Finland are negotiating the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). This will involve trade in services just like they have been trading in goods across the various trade platforms. Finland and other countries negotiating the TiSA have a high level of ambition to rise above the current liberalization level of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and encourage greater flow of trade in services.

Finland has a regulatory framework that guides its provision of financial services. The EU passporting regime where companies and banks that offer financial services have a single-license

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Smith, K., *Is the increasing policy use of Impact Assessment in Europe likely to undermine efforts to achieve healthy public policy?* 2010.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Hakkala, N. K., *Study: Finland has benefitted from free trade agreements but less than EU on average*, 2019.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Hakkala, N. K., Kaitila, V., Kuusi, T., Lehmus, M. Wang, M., *The economic impact of EU free trade agreements on Finland and the EU*, 2019.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Dobrin, S.; Chochia, A. “The Concepts of Trademark Exhaustion and Parallel Imports: A Comparative Analysis between the EU and the USA”, *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, 6 (2), 2016, 28–57.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Mettälä, K., Stahlberg, K., *Free Trade Agreements between Finland and Central and Eastern European Countries*, 1994.</footnote>
principle promotes trade among EU authorized firms with minimal additional regulatory requirements. This means that as long as a firm has an EU license to trade, they can do so with any firms operating within the EU regions without requiring additional regulatory frameworks hence easing the trade process across the regions. For any entities to trade in financial services in Finland, they must have authorization from an appropriate body whether they are local or foreign entities. They can also provide the services if they are registered as service providers meaning they are subject to supervision by either the Finnish Supervisory Authority (FSA) or a foreign supervisory authority that compares to FSA. The EU has nine different passporting systems for those wishing to trade in Financial services within the member states and they are overseen by a specific directive or regulation of the EU.

Custom laws and regulations in Finland are enforced by the Finnish Customs authority. This authority is also a part of the EU customs system meaning that all the custom import and export operations in Finland form part of the larger EU customs operations. The customs are responsible for collecting custom duties, controlling imports and exports, investigating offences related to customs, and compiling statistics on foreign trade. If any legislation of Finland or the EU is violated during trade matters, then the Finnish customs is mandated to impose penalties and sanctions to that effect. Finland as a member of the EU benefits from free import and export of goods across its borders. However, for trade outside the EU membership, the EU has the European Community Common Custom Tariff applied. Although the tariff is common to all states, the EU sometimes regulates the tariffs depending on the economic sensitivity of the goods, the type, and their origin. The EU also imposes Value Added Tax (VAT) to the insurance, cost, and freight value of the goods imported. For Finland, the standard rate of VAT is 24% although medicines, books, and groceries attract lower VAT rates.

The EU legislation among its member states regulates non-tariff barriers to imports within these countries. The member states of the EU have a common foreign trade policy and this is what Finland borrows from when implementing import non-tariff barriers, although some restrictions are imposed by Finland at a national level. The EU has important requirements for imports, although these requirements have variations at national levels. For example, Finland has special requirements for public health and safety purposes on goods like alcohol, agricultural produce, nuclear and radioactive substances, waste, endangered species, and biocides and other chemicals. Sometimes traders may feel unfairly treated due to some regulations and customs decisions. There is an appeal procedure for such cases and is regulated by the Customs Act. The complainant is required to lodge a complaint to the customs office responsible for the decision in question. If not satisfied by the outcome, the decision can further be appealed at the Administrative Court of Helsinki or further to the Supreme Administrative Court.

The EU has a number of rules on trade remedies and these rules are set in the EU regulations and applicable to Finland. Both Finland and the EU are members of the WTO; and the EU has enacted several legislations to implement various Agreements with the WTO. For example, the EU has a regulation against dumping and subsidized imports from non-members of the EU. The EU has the Trade Commissioner who is responsible for conducting investigations and reviews on trade remedies. For those attempting to evade payment of conventional custom duties, the EU anti-fraud office is mandated to investigate and report to the national authorities. In this case, any traders suspected to conduct fraudulent trade activities, the European Union takes an initiative of investigating and upon confirmation, reports to the Finnish authorities to act on them. Non-compliance with export regulations set by the EU can lead to either criminal or administrative sanctions. Minor violations can pass of with warnings whereas major violations can result in custodial sentences.
EU ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND FINLAND

Prior to joining the EU, Finland had various environmental policies developed in various international forums. However, these international forums for development never achieved the central position as should be until when Finland joined the EU.<fnref n="15" /> The EU makes or collaborates with member countries in the making of their environmental policies. For this reason, therefore, many member states have had to adjust their policies to streamline with the requirements of the EU and at the same time project their preferred approaches on the European level. It is therefore a two-way for the policies where national policies become Europeanized and EU policies become domesticated. The policies for individual countries like Finland are so well harmonized with those of the EU that it is hard to refer to one without making a reference to the other.

Finland is a part of the EU's green bloc although it plays a passive role in environmental policy matters. Finland as a country enjoys a generally clean and great state of the environment because of clean technologies and low population density hence less pollution. However, the major challenge for the country is the cross-border pollution from the bordering member states. Finland has been a great player in the international scene on environmental matters. Finland has fairly strict environmental standards and this explains the roles allocated to it during EU negotiations. In Finland, environmental policy is managed in a similar manner to other policies. Finland has created a niche for itself in developing an Environmental policy for the European Union.

Finland has independent policies on climate with the Climate Change Act being its key pillar. This Act requires Finland to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases by at least 80% by the year 2050. To this effect, Finland has climate objectives and well-laid out strategies to meet them. The climate policy decisions of the EU are also binding to Finland meaning that no matter the independent policies the country has, it has to abide by those set by the EU. The same way Finland has a target of reducing emissions by 80% by 2050, the EU has a target of achieving a climate neutrality by 2050.<fnref n="16" /> The reduction in emissions is some of the ways through which climate neutrality can be achieved hence the two policies are aligned towards the same goal. The EU has a target of improving energy efficiency by 32.5% which it allocates as 0.8% a year to individual member states from 2021 to 2030.

Finland is highly dependent on energy from Russia, a move that is highly controversial. Some quarters argue that it is because of an impending energy threat whereas other claim it is a mutually beneficial trade relation.<fnref n="17" /> Russia is known for its supply of nuclear weapons and one fuel type that is natural gas. Therefore, any trade relations that involve energy transfer are likely to raise issues, and this has been one of the major challenges the EU has to deal with. The European Union has also set a target for energy consumption for Finland at less than 290 TWh. This means that the EU ropes Finland in on its energy plan with the aim of addressing climatic changes. The EU's strategy to ensure clean, secure, and affordable energy for the European citizens is called The Energy Union.<fnref n="18" /> The Union vice president in his speech congratulated Finland for making significant steps towards the achievement of energy efficiency as outlined by the EU. The EU has targets for renewable energy production, most of which have been surpassed by Finland in a bid to achieve the 2050 target. Finland imports less energy and invests in research and innovation on a wider scale as compared to the EU in general. Member states of the EU have strategies developed to help them meet the 2030

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Lindholm, A., *Finland in EU Environmental Policy*, 2002.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ European Commission, *Assessment of Climate Change Policies in the Context of the European Semester*, 2012-2014.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Jääskeläinen, J.J., Höysniemi, S., Syri, S., Tynkkynen, V-P., *Finland's Dependence on Russian Energy – Mutually Beneficial Trade Relations or an Energy Security Threat? 2018*.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ European Commission, *Focus on Finland: the Energy Union tour*, 2017.</footnote>
energy target.<fnref n="19" /> After targets are set, individual countries set out to prepare individual national plans for the European Commission and follow up on the planning processes set up by the commission. The EU has a minimum climate policy target for Finland. This means that although Finland can create individual energy policies, the EU ensures it regulates the bare minimum of the same.

## CONCLUSION

The European Union has a mandate to guide and create policies for its member states. At the same time, the EU is restricted by the UN and international law on the extent of its actions among member states and neighbouring regions. The major concerns of the EU in external relations include negotiating trade agreements, health, energy, climate, and environmental issues. While the EU plays an active role in legislation and policies regarding the environment, climate, energy, and trade issues, its powers are limited in matters relating to health. Health policies within the member states of the EU often have a political tag and are left to national legislators. Although the EU still influences health policies by extension, the major decisions are made by the governments of individual countries. There have been calls to streamline the same, but member states are hesitant about relinquishing their powers in health legislation, hence the policies remain enacted at national level. The major concern of EU for its member states is economic stability, hence its role in trade negotiations. The EU negotiates trade agreements for member states to increase their access to international markets and grow their economies. The EU aims to promote open and free trade, and this is why the member states enjoy Free Trade Agreements where they can move their goods and services freely across the member states. Although Finland has not reached its target for international trade, the FTAs signed by the EU give it the necessary boost to rise to the standards. Both Finland and the EU have a target to achieve neutral climate, reduce emissions, and increase energy efficiency by 2050. Both have strategies and policies in place to ensure they attain the set targets as part of the EU's responsibility towards the environment, energy, and climate agenda. While Finland may act independently in formulating some policies, the country highly relies on the input of the EU in aligning its policies. Being a member of the EU, the country would want to be in agreement with the other member states for a holistic approach towards integration. Finland may have joined the EU late, but it has quickly adjusted and is making strides towards achieving the agenda set forth by the EU. With proper support and leadership, the country will most likely propel the EU towards achieving its vision.

## References /Bibliography:

* Dobrin, S.; Chochia, A. (2016). The Concepts of Trademark Exhaustion and Parallel Imports: A Comparative Analysis between the EU and the USA. Baltic Journal of European Studies, 6 (2), 28–57.

* Duncan, B., Health policy in the European Union: how it's made and how to influence it, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.324.7344.1027 (13.05.2021)

* Dutt, P.; Ferraro, S.; Chochia, A.; Muljar, R. (2018). Using Patent Development, Education Policy and Research and Development Expenditure Policy to Understand Differences Between Countries – The Case of Estonia and Finland. Baltic Journal of European Studies, 8 (1), 123–153. DOI: 10.1515/bjes-2018-0008 (13.05.2021)

* European Commission, Assessment of Climate Change Policies in the Context of the European Semester, 2012-2014. https://www.ecologic.eu/node/9918/printable/pdf (17.05.2021)

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Toivanen, P., Lehtonen, P., Aalto, P., Björkqvist, T., Järventausta, P., Kilpeläinen, S., Kojo, M., Mylläri, F., *Finland's energy system for 2030 as envisaged by expert stakeholders*, 2017.</footnote>
European Commission, Focus on Finland: the Energy Union tour, 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/focus-finland-energy-union-tour-2017-oct-11_en (17.05.2021)

Hakkala, N. K., Kaitila, V., Kuusi, T., Lehmus, M. Wang, M., The economic impact of EU free trade agreements on Finland and the EU, 2019. https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/161952/TEAS_2019_70_Effects%20of%20EU%20FTAs%20VNK_final_proofread.pdf (17.05.2021)

Hakkala, N. K., Study: Finland has benefitted from free trade agreements but less than EU on average, 2019. https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/10616/tutkimus-vapaakauppasopimukset-ovat-hyodyttaneet-suomea-mutta-eu-keskiarvoa-vahemman (15.05.2021)

Hanf, K., Soetendorp, B., Adapting to European Integration, Small States and the European Union, 1997.

Jääskeläinen, J.J., Höysniemi, S., Syri, S., Tynkkynen, V-P., Finland's Dependence on Russian Energy – Mutually Beneficial Trade Relations or an Energy Security Threat? 2018. https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/10/3445 (17.05.2021)

Koivusalo, M., The state of Health in All policies (HiAP) in the European Union: potential and pitfalls, 2010. https://jech.bmj.com/content/64/6/500 (13.05.2021)

Lindholm, A., Finland in EU Environmental Policy, 2002. https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/40412/FE_551.pdf?sequence=1 (17.05.2021)

Melkas, T., Health in all policies as a priority in Finnish health policy: A case study on national health policy development, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1177/1403494812472296 (13.05.2021)

Mettälä, K., Stahlberg, K., Free Trade Agreements between Finland and Central and Eastern European Countries, 1994. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40707173?seq=1 (17.05.2021)

Ramiro Troitino, D. (2018). EU enlargement to Austria, Finland, and Sweden. MEST Journal, 6 (1), 97–104.

Raunio, T., Tiilikainen, T., Finland in the European Union, 2003.

Raunio, T., Wiberg, M., Parliamentarizing Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Finland in the European Union, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1177/00108360121962263 (13.05.2021)

Smith, K., Is the increasing policy use of Impact Assessment in Europe likely to undermine efforts to achieve healthy public policy? 2010 https://doi.org/10.1136/jech.2009.094300 (15.05.2021)

Toivanen, P., Lehtonen, P., Aalto, P., Björkqvist, T., Järventausta, P., Kilpeläinen, S., Kojo, M., Mylläri, F., Finland's energy system for 2030 as envisaged by expert stakeholders, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2017.09.007 (17.05.2021)
# Assessment of the European legal framework of facial recognition technology

MANON CAPLIER<fnref n="1" />

TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, ESTONIA

**Abstract:** In an era where half of our face is hidden by a mask, facial recognition technology keeps improving. Despite the opportunities it represents in many fields, this innovative technology is far from winning unanimous support among European citizens and right advocates. Between abuses of use, security drifts and privacy breaches; many risks have been pointed out. The European Union institutions are thus increasingly aware of the importance to provide facial recognition with its own legal framework, so that it is no longer governed solely by the broader framework of data protection legislation.

**Keywords:** artificial intelligence; biometric data; facial recognition technology; remote biometric identification; sensitive data.

## INTRODUCTION

Back in 1975, the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault already foresaw the electronic surveillance that is currently ongoing in our societies. In his book *Discipline and Punish*, he used the metaphor of the panopticon<fnref n="2" /> – a specifically designed prison that enables the guard to monitor all the prisoners without them being able to see if they are being observed or not – to describe a modern technique of observation used in schools, factories, hospitals, and military institutions.<fnref n="3" /> This is what led Gilles Deleuze to state, a few years later: “There is no need for science fiction to conceive of a control mechanism that gives the position of an element in an open environment, an animal in a reserve, a man in a company, at every moment”.<fnref n="4" /> And he got it right.

Indeed, the current state of artificial intelligence technology has made it belong to the “infra-ordinary”<fnref n="5" />; more specifically facial recognition technologies (FRT) and artificial intelligence (AI) software, which are now part of our daily lives. As one all knows, it is possible to use our face to unlock your phone, pay, enter a place or even prevent tiredness while driving. And the use of facial recognition goes much further: it allows the police to identify criminals, brands to adapt their advertising to consumers’ facial reactions, universities to track students during remote exams, etc.

Faces are distinctive, difficult to alter and, in most cases, publicly visible; which make them particularly useful for identification purposes.<fnref n="6" /> AI software is able to create templates of people out of the characteristics of their face (distance between the eyes, between the nose and the mouth...). Then this unique template is compared with what is available in the database of the software.

<footnote n="1">¹ TalTech Law School, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia, manon.caplier@gmail.com</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Idea theorised by the English philosopher and social theorist Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th century.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir*, Paris, Gallimard, 1975.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Maša Galič, Tjerk Timan and Bert-Jaap Koops, “Bentham, Deleuze and Beyond: An Overview of Surveillance Theories from the Panopticon to Participation” in *Philosophy & Technology*, vol. 30, no. 1, 2017, pp. 9-37.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Georges Perec, *L'infra-ordinaire*, Paris, Seuil, 1989. The infra-ordinary can be seen as a contrary of the 'extra-ordinary'. It the sphere of existence that lies beneath notice or comment, and within which “we sleep through our lives in a dreamless sleep”.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Yana Welinder, “A Face Tells More than a Thousand Posts: Developing Face Recognition Privacy in Social Networks” in *Harvard Journal of Law and Technology*, vol. 26, no. 1, Fall 2012, p. 167.</footnote>
Facial recognition technology is defined in the EU as the “automatic processing of digital images which contain the faces of individuals for identification, authentication/ verification or categorisation of those individuals”.<fnref n="7" /> The data processed are thus so-called ‘biometric data’.

It is essential not to confuse authentication with identification when it comes to the purpose of facial recognition use. On the one hand, authentication is referred to as one-to-one matching. It enables the comparison of two biometric templates, in order to determine if they belong to the same individual. On the other hand, identification means that the template of a person’s facial image is compared to many other templates stored in a database to find out if his/her image is stored there. This second application of FRT can be carried out remotely, usually via video cameras (CCTV), and is commonly called ‘live facial recognition technology’ or ‘remote biometric identification’.

The expansion of this omnipresent technology is reflected in the figures: the global facial recognition market size was valued at USD 3.4 billion in 2019 and is anticipated to expand at a CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) of 14.5% until 2027.<fnref n="8" />

Everything can seem to head towards a society based on the concept of “smart city”. i.e. a highly efficient system that incorporates disparate sources of data, from drones, cars, roads, tracks (etc.) into a complete and up to date network.<fnref n="9" /> This is a dream world for many private companies that promise a simpler, safer, and smoother environment; an ideal shared by some governments who see it as an opportunity to strengthen security.

This innovation, although impressive, and considered by some as a technological revolution, raises many concerns in many legal aspects.<fnref n="10" /> Among other issues like discrimination, ethics or accuracy, this paper will focus here on the controversies of FRT from a legal point of view. The question is not whether reasoned use of facial recognition is still possible or whether we are condemned to live in a world where anonymity has disappeared, but to understand how it is handled by the European Union in terms of legislation. The main problem being that this multifaceted technology seems to evolve faster than the rules that govern it.

This research paper seeks to assess the past, current and future legal framework of facial recognition technology in Europe. More precisely, in a first part will be discussed the evolution of this legal framework, to understand the legislation applied at present. The second part will deal with what makes FRT difficult to govern. The third and last part will attempt to provide ideas for improving the situation and overcoming the identified issues.

# 1. EVOLUTION OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY AND ITS GOVERNING RULES IN EUROPE

## 1.1 First attempts to regulate the processing of biometric data

At the dawn of the 21st century, as information and communication technologies were taking off, European institutions began to address the issue of how the personal data of European citizens were being handled. It is in this perspective that the Article 29 Working Party (WP) was launched in

<footnote n="7">⁷ Opinion 02/2012 on facial recognition in online and mobile services, Article 29 Working Party, 2012, p. 2.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Market Analysis Report entitled “Facial Recognition Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis Report By Technology, By Application, By End Use And Segment Forecasts, 2020 – 2028”. Summary retrieved from: https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/facial-recognition-market</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ G. B. Praveen and Dakala Jayachandra, “Face Recognition: Challenges and Issues in Smart City/Environments” in 12th International Conference on Communication Systems & Networks (COMSNETS), 2020, pp. 791-793.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ On contract-law matters raised by algorithm-based decision-making see Thomas Hoffmann, „The Impact of Digital Autonomous Tools on Private Autonomy”, *Baltic Yearbook of International Law Online*, vol 18, 2020, pp. 18–31; On legal and ethical concerns when applying AI solutions for people with disabilities, please see e.g. Joamets, K.; Chochia, A. (2021). Access to Artificial Intelligence for Persons with Disabilities: Legal and Ethical Questions Concerning the Application of Trustworthy AI. *Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum*, 9 (1), 51–66.</footnote>
1996, to deal with issues relating to the protection of privacy and personal data.<fnref n="11" /> At the same period, the Council of Europe was adopting its Convention No. 108¹² that was one of the first legally binding international instrument in the data protection field. In the course of the various opinions and reports published in the following years, it has been highlighted that biometric data should be considered as “sensitive” data that presents risks because it contains information about racial and ethnic origin or health.<fnref n="13" /> Special safeguards<fnref n="14" /> were therefore recommended to be applied in addition to the general data protection principles of the 95/46/EC Directive as well as to assess the sensitivity of data processed by biometric systems, taking into account the context of the processing.

Despite the risks identified, the general data protection framework and most national legislation did not contain specific binding provisions on the use and processing of biometric data, and guidelines remained limited while these technologies were expanding. Nevertheless, some national supervisory authorities have attempted to overcome this, for example by applying the principle of proportionality to determine whether the use of biometrics is proportionate to the legitimate objective sought.<fnref n="15" />

It was not until 2016 that a definition of the term was provided in a legally binding EU act. ‘Biometric data’ then means “personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data”.<fnref n="16" />

## 1.2 The slow emergence of specific regulations on FRT

Most of the legal texts on the protection of personal data mentioned above refer to artificial intelligence or FRT at some point. For instance, Article 29 Working Party provides a non-exhaustive list of biometric technologies that can be considered as mature technologies, which includes facial recognition (Opinion 3/2012, 4.2). However, very few acts – if not any – specific to facial recognition itself have emerged yet. One can only mention the focus paper issued by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2019 which rather deals with the fundamental rights implications of relying on live FRT rather than how to regulate it from a legal point of view.<fnref n="17" />

The White Paper on Artificial Intelligence published by the European Commission in February 2020 is more relevant as it makes some interesting comments on our topic.<fnref n="18" /> According to the commissioners, some AI applications have to be considered as “high-risk” as such (i.e. without any need of “risk-based” assessment<fnref n="19" />) and require the application of some specific requirements in addition to already existing legislation. Among these exceptional instances, one can find the AI applications for purposes of remote biometric identification. The facial recognition technology is

<footnote n="11">¹¹ The composition and purpose of Article 29 WP was set out in Art.29 of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. Since the entry into force of the GDPR in 2018, it was replaced by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB).</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (CETS No. 108), opened for signature on 28 January 1981. Even if the Council of Europe is distinct from the European Union, it is relevant to take its work into account as part of this research paper.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies, Article 29 WP, 27 April 2012, p. 3 and “Progress Report on the Application of the Principles of Convention 108 to the Collection and Processing of Biometric Data” commissioned by the Council of Europe, 2005, p.6.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Provided by article 8 of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Els Kindt, “A First Attempt at Regulating Biometric Data in the European Union”, chapter 4 of the compendium “Regulating Biometrics: Global Approaches and Urgent Questions” in *AI Now Institute*, 2020, p.63.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Article 4(14) of the General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR) and Article 3(13) of the Directive 2016/680.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ FRA Focus, “Facial recognition technology: fundamental rights considerations in the context of law enforcement”, 27 November 2019.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ White Paper on Artificial Intelligence, “A European approach to excellence and trust”, COM/2020/65.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ *Ibid*. p.17. A risk-based assessment should be carried out to differentiate between the different AI applications, in order to check whether they are ‘high-risk’ or not.</footnote>
therefore part of it, as it deals with the gathering of biometric identifiers (facial images) of multiple
persons at a distance, in a public space and in a continuous or ongoing manner and the check of these
features against data stored in a database.<fnref n="20" />

At the end of January 2021, the Council of Europe published guidelines on facial recognition addressed to governments, developers, manufacturers, service providers and "entities using FRT".<fnref n="21" /> The document is well-detailed and sheds light on the implementation of principles enshrined in European Union law. Although they are not binding, these guidelines help rekindle the debate on the multiple applications of facial recognition and underline the complexity of the subject.

1.3 Current legal framework applicable to the FRT

As facial recognition technology deals with the processing of personal data, it is governed by
the current EU data protection rules, namely the GDPR and its law enforcement Directive.<fnref n="22" /> The
Regulation officially entered into force on 25 May 2018 and the Member States had until 6 May
2018 to transpose the provisions of the directive into their national legislation.

According to the letter of the Regulation, “processing of biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person [...] shall be prohibited”.<fnref n="23" /> This general prohibition is subject to some ten exceptions, exhaustively listed in Article 9(2).

First, processing such a sensitive category of personal data can be lawful when the data subject has given its “explicit consent” to it “for a specific purpose”.<fnref n="24" /> The notion of consent is defined and clarified several times throughout the text, its main characteristics being that it must be freely given, informed and unambiguous.<fnref n="25" /> Recital 43 lays down a relevant exception: it states that consent will be presumed not to have been freely given “in a case where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller”. Even if the provision lacks precision, one can understand that the consent given by an ordinary citizen to a public authority therefore not provides a valid legal basis for the processing of the citizen’s data, given the manifest balance of power between the actors involved.

Another main legal ground is when processing is “necessary for reasons of substantial public interest”.<fnref n="26" /> In this case, it must take place on the basis of Community or national law and be subject to the requirements of proportionality, respect for the essence of the right to data protection and appropriate safeguards such as the possibility to collect those data only in connection with other data on the natural person concerned, the possibility to secure the data collected adequately, stricter rules on the access of staff of the competent authority to the data and the prohibition of transmission of those data.<fnref n="27" />

Finally, there are some further exceptions including the protection of “the vital interests of the data subject”<fnref n="28" /> or “where the where such processing relates to data which are manifestly made public

<footnote n="20">²⁰ *Ibid.* p.18. Definition of ‘remote biometric identification’ given by the White Paper. It should be distinguished from “biometric authentication” which is a security process that relies on the unique biological characteristics of an individual to verify that he/she is who he/she says he/she is.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ “Guidelines on facial recognition” from the Consultative committee of the Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data, 28 January 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² “Directive 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data”, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ GDPR Article 9(1).</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ GDPR Article 9(2) a).</footnote>

<footnote n="25">25 GDPR Recitals 32 & 43 ; Article 4 (11).</footnote>

<footnote n="26">26 GDPR Article 9(2) g).</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Directive 2016/680, Recital 37.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ GDPR Article 9(2) c) and Directive 2016/680 Article 10 b).</footnote>
by the data subject”<fnref n="29" />, for example social networks’ posts. The latter raises the issue of the origin of the images contained in the databases used to compare and identify facial images obtained through AI technologies. This issue, along with others, will be discussed in the second part of the paper.

All in all, one can argue that the legal framework for FRT seems quite clear so far, based on an initial prohibition coupled with limited exceptions. Any entity wishing to use this technology must therefore carefully justify the legal ground to rely from in order to process sensitive data lawfully. But we will see that these rules actually show shortcomings and that there is room for improvement, especially by creating a text specifically dedicated to facial recognition, or AI in general.

## 2. A TECHNOLOGY THAT EU LAW STRUGGLES TO HANDLE

### 2.1 The issue of facial recognition databases

It should be borne in mind that the GDPR was first and foremost created to deal with the constantly evolving state of technology, as well as its attendant risks. Many people believe that Snowden’s disclosures on global surveillance had a huge influence on the drafting and content of the text, as studies showed that some EU member states were also the scene of the large-scale surveillance practices.<fnref n="30" /> Since this scandal, and all the similar cases that are now part of our daily lives, it is not surprising that artificial intelligence systems, and especially facial recognition, frighten many people about their privacy.

One of the biggest concerns in the context of FRT being used for identification purposes is the origin of the images contained in the softwares databases. Not when public authorities refer to official national files but when private entities collect data from social networks in order to create their own facial recognition database. That is what the controversial company Clearview did: over the years, the firm has collected no less than 3 billion images of individuals, retrieved from Twitter, Facebook, Youtube, and other accounts, using the technique of data scraping<fnref n="31" />. The aim was to create an application that gives access to all the images and information related to a specific person, using a simple uploaded picture and a face analysis.

An article from the NY Times revealed in January 2020 that the tech company sold this tool to over 600 law enforcement agencies across the United States, which were using it to solve cases. Facing numerous lawsuits, the startup had to back down, promising to stop selling its technology to private companies and to cancel the subscriptions of non-law enforcement entities.

At the EU level, a question about the lawfulness of this data scraping was referred to the European Commission, which replied that the involvement of Member States authorities or the processing of EU citizens’ data has not been confirmed.<fnref n="32" /> The commissioner thus merely recalled the rules concerning data protection and privacy. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the latter are deeply incompatible with the facts of the case, which have led the company to shelve its plans for European expansion.

The only legal ground on which Clearview could have relied on in the event of a trial before a European court is that the personal data retrieved have been made publicly available by the data subject (Article 9(2) e) of the GDPR). However, this is not a sufficient justification for data scraping, which is in fact a practice manifestly prohibited by Facebook and other social media in their terms

<footnote n="29">²⁹ GDPR Article 9(2) e) and Directive 2016/680 Article 10 c).</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Didier Bigo et al., “Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its Compatibility with EU Law” in *Liberty and Security in Europe Papers*, No. 62, November 2013 ; referenced in: Hallie Coyne, “The Untold Story of Edward Snowden’s Impact on the GDPR” in *The Cyber Defense Review*, vol. 4, no.2, 2019, p.70.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Scraping: practice which consists of using a software program to extract a whole bunch of data from websites automatically, with the aim of recovering it and using it, often for profit.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission (17.07.2020) - question E-000507/20.</footnote>
of service.<fnref n="33" /> Especially since Clearview acted without obtaining any authorization or consent from the users. And more importantly, the company provided its customers with a large number of immediately available facial images of citizens who might never be in situations that could lead to criminal proceedings.<fnref n="34" /> Clearview's methods could therefore only have been condemned by the European Union.

If a tool, such as the one developed by Clearview, is able to recognise people, it is thanks to the work done by social media users who have been tagging themselves on pictures for years. All the mainstream social networks use this type of feature for years now, enabling people who post pictures to tag everyone who appears on it. That is how AI software can then put together several pictures of the same individual and come up with precise patterns, thereby increasing the accuracy of identification algorithms. This is similar to how the human brain recognises and remembers facial images.<fnref n="35" />

Facebook went one step further by introducing in December 2010 a new feature called “Photo Tag Suggest”, which uses face recognition technology. This tool is able to let users know when they appear in photos or videos without having been tagged and to suggest them to tag people in the new photos they add to their profile. In 2012, Facebook’s photo collection already contained around 220 billion images and was increasing by up to 300 million per day.<fnref n="36" />

## 2.2 The rise of mistrust due to abuses in the use of FRT

Nowadays, biometric identification is increasingly used in public space for surveillance and security purposes. Police forces, for instance, use facial recognition devices in crowded places like stadiums or concert halls to detect potential terrorists among spectators. At first glance, this situation seems to offer much benefits, both to citizens who feel safer and to law-enforcement organizations who see their work simplified. On second thought, it turns out that the risks of infringements on individual civil rights are huge. The fear that these security-oriented systems will reduce our freedom is growing, and legitimate.

In China, a programme called "Sharp Eye" was launched to strengthen the national security system in rural areas. With nearly 300 million cameras equipped with facial recognition software, the Chinese population is constantly being observed. This "Big Brother" can now be found at the entrance to places of worship and enables the population's religious beliefs to be monitored.<fnref n="37" /> That is how the Chinese government tracks the Uighurs and constantly watches where they come and go, contributing to their ongoing oppression.

The example of China is obviously extreme and cannot be compared with the situation in European countries, but it does show what kind of drift can happen when it comes to crossing the line between hyper-security and mass surveillance. Because even if installing this type of cameras does not, strictly speaking, reduce freedoms. As we have seen with the example of the panopticon, the feeling of being watched can lead to a form of self-censorship on the part of citizens, particularly

<footnote n="33">³³ See https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html</footnote>

<footnote>Accessed: 27.03.2021</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ Isadora Neroni Rezende, “Facial recognition in police hands: Assessing the ‘Clearview case’ from a European perspective” in *New Journal of European Criminal Law*, vol. 11, no. 3, 2020, p.389.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ Christopher S. Milligan, “Facial recognition technology, video surveillance, and privacy” in *Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal*, vol. 9, no. 1, winter 1999, p. 304.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Yana Welinder, *op. cit.*, p. 173.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">³⁷ See https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/01/07/feature/in-china-facial-recognition-is-sharp-end-of-a-drive-for-total-surveillance/ Accessed: 03.03.2021</footnote>
with regard to their participation in public life and, more broadly, the exercise of their fundamental freedoms.<fnref n="38" />

It is therefore not surprising that citizens' distrust is the FRT is reflected in the public consultation about artificial intelligence launched by the European Commission in February 2020.<fnref n="39" /> Respondents to the online survey published along with the White Paper voiced doubts on the public use of remote biometric identification systems: 28% were in favour of its general ban while another 29% required a specific EU guideline or legislation before such systems may be used in publicly accessible spaces.<fnref n="40" /> In the final report, it was noted that civil society is aware that biometric identification threatens fundamental rights, endangers privacy, enables mass surveillance and leads to imbalances in power. Citizens also argued that biometric surveillance can interfere with the freedom of movement, expression and assembly.

# 3. PROSPECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO SHAPE A BETTER REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO FRT

## 3.1 The pressing need to set up a specific framework for facial recognition

As we have seen in this article, facial recognition technology is definitely evolving faster than the legislation that regulates it. Moreover, it deals with such a specific category of data that it calls for the application of a much tighter regime. But above all, in the absence of a common European framework, Member States are developing their own legal systems on the matter, which is likely to cause fragmentation in the internal market.

The European institutions seem to have understood this need, as shown by their latest publications on the topic; notably the online consultation introduced by the European Commission, which was presented as being part of a broader stakeholder consultation process that will contribute to the preparation of various regulatory options. Following an in-depth analysis of the consultation results as well as a detailed impact assessment, a regulatory proposal on artificial intelligence should be presented. A spokesperson for the EU executive interviewed said that the Commission is considering introducing specific provisions on facial recognition.<fnref n="41" />

### 3.1.1 The content of such future system

The guidelines on facial recognition published by the Council of Europe at the end of January 2021 provide a good overview of the main measures to be implemented for a more appropriate framework for the use of FRT. It gives recommendations to decision-makers as well as developers and manufacturers.

Firstly, the Council recommends legislating by category of use. It specifies that any legal framework must include a detailed explanation of the intended use and purpose, the minimum reliability and accuracy of the algorithm used, the length of time the photos used are kept, the possibility of auditing these criteria, the traceability of the process and safeguards (p.4). The legislator should also indicate the different phases of the use of facial recognition technologies (including the creation of databases and deployment phases), the sectors in which these technologies are used and the intrusive nature of some of them, while providing clear guidance on lawfulness (p.5).

<footnote n="38">³⁸ Jameson Spivack and Clare Garvie “A Taxonomy of Legislative Approaches to Face Recognition”, Chapter 7 of the compendium “Regulating Biometrics: Global Approaches and Urgent Questions” in *AI Now Institute*, 2020, p.88.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">³⁹ Public consultation towards a European approach for excellence and trust Consultation on the White Paper on Artificial Intelligence, European Commission White Paper on Artificial Intelligence.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ Consultation's Final Report, November 2020, see https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/white-paper-artificial-intelligence-public-consultation-towards-european-approach-excellence Accessed 03.03.2021</footnote>

<footnote n="41">⁴¹ See https://www.euractiv.fr/section/economie/news/after-clearview-ai-scandal-commission-in-close-contact-with-eu-data-authorities/ Accessed: 06.03.2021</footnote>
The guidelines also stress the need to systematically consult the supervisory authorities before initiating any project (p.6) and encourage the use of certification mechanisms (p.7).

With respect to the different actors of the facial recognition industry, the document introduces some obligations. For developers, manufacturers and service providers, the emphasis is placed on the need to ensure the quality of data and algorithms, to guarantee the reliability of the tools used as well as data security, and to raise awareness among users. For "user entities", i.e. data controllers and processors (p. 10), it is recalled that they are subject to compliance with the basic data protection principles: legitimacy of processing, transparency, fairness, accuracy, minimisation, limited storage time, data security, impact assessment, etc. Finally, the rights of individuals must be guaranteed. For example, in case of false matches, they should be able to request rectification (p. 15-16).

The European Commission finally published on 21 April 2021 its “Proposal for a Regulation laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence”<fnref n="42" />, which it introduced as “the first ever legal framework on AI, which addresses the risks of AI and positions Europe to play a leading role globally”. The main challenge was to decide how to approach this technology and its heterogeneous applications. While this approach could have been sectoral (according to the industrial sector concerned) or legal (according to the branch of law concerned), the Commission favoured a third option already foreshadowed by its previous writings: a risk-based approach.<fnref n="43" /> The proposal, also known as the “Artificial Intelligence Act”, therefore distinguishes between unacceptable, high, limited and minimal risk.

The text refers to facial recognition already in its Title 2 on prohibited artificial intelligence practices. After carefully defining remote biometric identification system (Art. 3, 36), and distinguishing between ‘real-time’ analysis (Art. 3, 37) and ‘post’ remote biometric identification system (Art. 3, 38); Article 5 of the proposal introduces a prohibition principle on the use of real-time remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement. Exceptions remain open. These are the targeted search for for specific potential victims of crime, including missing children (i); the prevention of a specific, substantial and imminent threat to the life or physical safety of natural persons or of a terrorist attack; (ii); the detection, localisation, identification or prosecution of a perpetrator or suspect of a criminal offence punishable by a custodial sentence of at least three years (iii). These grounds must take account of defined assessment criteria (§ 2) and the use of such systems must be authorised by a judicial or administrative authority (§ 3), subject to prior legislation (§ 4).

On governance, the Commission proposes the creation of national competent authorities designated by each Member State to ensure enforcement of the Act. A new Artificial Intelligence Committee will be created to contribute to the effective cooperation of national supervisory authorities. Finally, the penalties are very high and can be up to €30 million or, if the offender is a company, up to 6% of its total worldwide annual turnover in the previous financial year (Articles 71 and 72).

It remains to be seen whether this model, observed all over the world, will make it through the EU legislative process.

### 3.1.2 The scenario of a complete ban

Given the many abuses and criticisms of the FRT, one might think that the most effective solution would be to simply ban it, or at least its most worrying use: remote biometric identification in public spaces. European citizens seem to hold this view<fnref n="44" />, as well as the Council of Europe which

<footnote n="42">⁴² COM/2021/206 final “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain union legislative acts”</footnote>

<footnote n="43">⁴³ Cécile Crichton, “Projet de règlement sur l'IA (II) : une approche fondée sur les risques” in *Dalloz actualité 4 mai 2021*, pp. 19.</footnote>

<footnote n="44">⁴⁴ Public Consultation's Final Report, *loc. cit*.</footnote>
advocates that private entities should not be allowed to use this technology in uncontrolled and freely accessible environments for marketing or private security purposes (guidelines p.7).

This idea, although radical, has tempted the European Commission, which let the rumour of a five-year ban on FRT in public areas spread while commissioners were drawing up the White Paper released in February 2020.<fnref n="45" /> This ban, which was eventually dropped, would have given them time to assess the impacts of this technology, develop potential risk management measures and determine how to prevent abuses. It would have acted more like a moratorium than a straight ban.

However, the arguments put forward by the European institutions do not seem to convince everyone, as proven by the movement "Reclaim Your Face" which describes itself as “a European movement that brings people’s voices into the discussion around biometric data used to monitor the population”.<fnref n="46" /> It gathers digital rights advocates of six European countries and calls for a Europe-wide ban on the use of “dangerous facial recognition”. On 17 February 2021, this coalition has joined forces with the EDRi organization (European Digital Rights) to launch a petition based on the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) mechanism<fnref n="47" />. The aim is to reach 1 million signatures during a period of 12 months, in the hope of establishing an “official” communication with the Commission in order to ask for a debate in the Parliament.

## 3.2 Temporary solutions pending the establishment of a future legal framework

### 3.2.1 Make facial recognition devices more GDPR compliant

While waiting for European lawmakers to adopt and bring into effect a specific bill on facial recognition, improvements to the current system can still be considered. The first step would be to work on making the existing FRT devices more compliant with the GDPR, ensuring that their use in the public space has an appropriate legal basis and additional safeguards adapted to the risks involved and the interests to be protected.

When the processing of biometric data from live FRT is based on consent, the challenge would be to ensure that the data subject has understood the full implications of such processing. As the lack of trust in the devices is compounded by the difficulty for a user to really grasp the consequences of the collection and uses that will be made of his personal data. The objective would be to present, technically, what facial recognition is and what it is used for, but also to highlight the risks associated with it.

It is with this awareness-raising perspective that Facebook updated its "Photo Tag Suggest" feature in 2019. This update implies that users receive a notice in their News Feed with information about the face recognition setting and options to learn more about how the social network uses it. It also includes a button to turn it on or keep it off.<fnref n="48" /> This is a good example of how to raise awareness among data subjects to ensure the most informed consent possible.

As regards surveillance cameras used for remote identification, time limits for the retention of recordings should also be set and transparently indicated.

### 3.2.2 Toward a common European facial recognition database?

In Mai 2019, in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 2019/817 establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of borders and visa, the European Commission has announced the creation of a common network of facial recognition

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵ Chee F. Y. (2020). EU mulls five-year ban on facial recognition tech in public areas. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL8N29L61I.</footnote>

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶ See https://reclaimyourface.eu/the-movement/ Accessed 06.03.2021</footnote>

<footnote n="47">⁴⁷ The European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) is a unique tool provided by the European Union mechanism to increase direct democracy by allowing citizens to participate directly in the development of EU policies. It was introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">⁴⁸ See https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/update-face-recognition/ Accessed: 13.03.2021</footnote>
databases for European law-enforcement forces. This new system, called shared biometric matching service (shared BMS), will replace the actual five different central systems with a common platform where the data is queried and compared simultaneously.<fnref n="49" /> The European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA) has been mandated to develop the shared BMS and ensure its technical management.

By 2022, the shared BMS will be one of the largest biometric systems in the world, integrating a database of over 400 million third-country nationals with their fingerprints and facial images. Based on European biometrics technology, this new system will generate substantial benefits in terms of security, cost, maintenance and operation. Moreover, the biometric template will remain stored in one location. It promises to become the cornerstone of the protection of European borders.

This tool should help the EU to avoid scandals such as the Clearview case, when it is known that the FBI's biometric database contained four times fewer images than the one created by the company.<fnref n="50" />

## 4. CONCLUSION

Facial recognition is an increasingly popular technology for both identification and identity verification solutions. It is now part of our daily environment, sometimes without even realising it. As it softly imposed itself in our societies, it is difficult to realize the major turning point this innovation represents for humanity. So much so that the legislators were unable to anticipate it and are now struggling to adapt to it.

The European Union has been particularly slow to grasp the challenges of this rapidly developing technology and to set the necessary steps to reduce its impact. FRT in Europe is today still governed by the broader legal framework of data protection, which appears to be not specific and clear enough to ensure an optimum control of its use. However, we know that an unsupervised use can be damaging and infringe people's rights and freedoms. Abuses of this kind have already occurred.

The most problematic area is that of remote biometric identification, as it can easily amount to a permanent identity check. Even if its use in European countries is far from being as widespread as in China for example; trials are multiplying, with the aim of gradually including it in our cities. And despite the strong reactions, nothing has yet been done to stop this progression. Neither should we claim a technological emergency, but there is indeed a real need to adopt binding laws on the matter.

One can then conclude by keeping in mind that facial recognition is both a fascinating and frightening technology that should not be underestimated. It is also clear that legislating in this area is especially hard, given all the elements at stake. The biggest challenge is thus to find the right balance between, innovation, security and privacy.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. COYNE, Hallie, "The Untold Story of Edward Snowden's Impact on the GDPR" in *The Cyber Defense Review*, volume 4, no.2, 2019, pp. 65-79.

2. CRICHTON, Cécile, "Projet de règlement sur l'IA (II) : une approche fondée sur les risques" in *Dalloz actualité* 4 mai 2021, pp. 19-23.

3. FOUCAULT, Michel, *Surveiller et punir*, Paris, Gallimard, 1975.

4. GALIČ, Maša et. al., "Bentham, Deleuze and Beyond: An Overview of Surveillance Theories from the Panopticon to Participation" in *Philosophy & Technology*, vol. 30, no. 1, 2017, pp. 9-37.

<footnote n="49">⁴⁹ Regulation 2019/817, Recital 17.</footnote>

<footnote n="50">⁵⁰ See https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/sciences/clearview-l-application-proscrite-par-la-france-pour-proteger-notre-vie-privee_2115879.html Accessed 13.03.2021</footnote>
5. HOFFMANN, Thomas, „The Impact of Digital Autonomous Tools on Private Autonomy”, in *Baltic Yearbook of International Law Online*, vol 18, 2020, pp. 18–31.

6. JOAMETS, K.; CHOCHIA, A. (2021). Access to Artificial Intelligence for Persons with Disabilities: Legal and Ethical Questions Concerning the Application of Trustworthy AI. *Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum*, 9 (1), 51–66.

7. KINDT, Els, "A First Attempt at Regulating Biometric Data in the European Union", chapter 4 of the compendium "Regulating Biometrics: Global Approaches and Urgent Questions" in *AI Now Institute*, September 2020, pp.62-68.

8. MILLIGAN, Christopher S., "Facial recognition technology, video surveillance, and privacy" in *Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal*, volume 9, no. 1, winter 1999, pp. 296-333.

9. PEREC, Georges, *L'infra-ordinaire*, Paris, Seuil, 1989.

10. PRAVEN, G. B. and DAKALA, Jayachandra, "Face Recognition: Challenges and Issues in Smart City/Environments" in 2020 12th International Conference on Communication Systems & Networks (COMSNETS), pp. 791-793.

11. REZENDE, Isadora Neroni, "Facial recognition in police hands: Assessing the 'Clearview case' from a European perspective" in *New Journal of European Criminal Law*, volume 11, no. 3, 2020, pp. 375-389.

12. SPIVACK, Jameson and GARVIE, Clare, "A Taxonomy of Legislative Approaches to Face Recognition", Chapter 7 of the compendium "Regulating Biometrics: Global Approaches and Urgent Questions" in *AI Now Institute*, 2020, pp. 86-94.

13. WELINDER, Yana, "A Face Tells More than a Thousand Posts: Developing Face Recognition Privacy in Social Networks" in *Harvard Journal of Law and Technology*, vol. 26, no. 1, Fall 2012, pp.166-237.

European legislation and associated materials:

14. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (CETS No. 108).

15. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995.

16. Directive 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016.

17. Final Report of the Public Consultation on the AI White Paper, November 2020. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/white-paper-artificial-intelligence-public-consultation-towards-european-approach-excellence.

18. Focus Paper, "Facial recognition technology: fundamental rights considerations in the context of law enforcement, EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 27.11.2019.

19. Guidelines on facial recognition, Consultative committee of the Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data, 28.01.2021.

20. Opinion 2/2012 on facial recognition in online and mobile services, Article 29 Working Party, 22.03.2012.

21. Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies, Article 29 Working Party, 27.04.2012.

22. Parliamentary question E-000507/20, answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission, 17.7.2020.

23. Progress Report on the Application of the Principles of Convention 108 to the Collection and Processing of Biometric Data, Council of Europe, 2005.

24. Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain union legislative acts, COM/2021/206 final, European Commission, Brussels, 19.4.2021.

25. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 2016 L 119/1.
26. Regulation 2019/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of borders and visa, OJ L 135, 22.5.2019.

27. White Paper on Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust, COM/2020/65, European Commission, Brussels, 19.2.2020.

Web materials:

28. Chee F. Y. (2020). EU mulls five-year ban on facial recognition tech in public areas. See https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL8N29L61I Accessed: 13.03.2021.

29. Fossat M. (2020). Vie privée : pourquoi l'application Clearview ne devrait pas arriver en France (trad: Privacy: why the Clearview application should not be available in France). See https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/sciences/clearview-l-application-proscrite-par-la-france-pour-proteger-notre-vie-privee_2115879.html Accessed: 06.03.2021.

30. Harwell D. & Dou E. (2020). Huawei tested AI software that could recognize Uighur minorities and alert police, report says. See https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/01/07/feature/in-china-facial-recognition-is-sharp-end-of-a-drive-for-total-surveillance/ Accessed 06.03.2021.

31. Hill K. (2020). *The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It*. See https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html Accessed 03.03.2021

32. Market Analysis Report (2020). *Facial Recognition Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis Report By Technology, By Application, By End Use And Segment Forecasts, 2020 – 2027*. Summary available at: https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/facial-recognition-market. Accessed: 03.03.2021.

33. Narayanan S. (2019) An Update About Face Recognition on Facebook. See https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/update-face-recognition/ Accessed: 17.03.2021.

34. Stolon S. (2020). Bruxelles se penche sur le scandale Clearview AI sur la reconnaissance faciale (trad: Brussels looks into AI facial recognition scandal). See https://www.euractiv.fr/section/economie/news/after-clearview-ai-scandal-commission-in-close-contact-with-eu-data-authorities/ Accessed: 06.03.2021.
# Law and Technology – Criminalization of Sex Robots

VIKTORIA MAZUR

VIMAZU@TALTECH.EE

TALTECH LAW SCHOOL, TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, ESTONIA

**Abstract:** Influence of technology on our everyday lives, and in on our societies in general, is enormous. It is difficult to imagine life without technology, as it offers so many solutions and eases various tasks we conduct, it makes lives better. However, certain developments of technology raise concerns, ethical and legal concerns. One of such fields where technology development has been rather controversial is sex robots. This article indents to research into this field and raise several problems related to the technology development in sex robots.

**Keywords:** Criminalization, ethics of technology, law and technology, sex robots.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Sex robots are becoming extremely popular<fnref n="1" />, especially during the Covid pandemic related lockdown. The first sex robot Roxxxxy was invented and presented in 2010 by TrueCompanion<fnref n="2" />. Since that time robots have started looking more real and advanced in mechanics and animatronics considerably<fnref n="3" />, as well as the significant developments of the AI systems have been improved; they act more real. Sex robots are meant and created for those that are deprived of sex, some experts claim that they have therapeutic effect<fnref n="4" /> of these dolls on men that suffer from unfulfilled sexual need and especially those that have unlawful (philosopher Marc Behrendt is the one that discusses therapeutic use of childbots for pedophiles) and violent sexual behavior. Nonetheless, having access to these outlets has not stopped men from raping, besides sexual violence remains at the same high level<fnref n="5" />. There is also a raise in use of childlike sex dolls, which are not yet a fully robotic or automatic machineries but rather an anatomically correct prepubescent mannequins or dolls. Although, the future may offer new technologic opportunities and childlike sex robots could be created as to the fact that there are no legal restrictions in this respect. It is a known fact that not all sexual offences against children are carried out into practice by pedophiles<fnref n="6" />, as well as not all pedophiles sexually offend children. It may be deducted that the effectiveness of childlike sex bots for pedophilic use for preventing child sexual abuse remains quite controversial<fnref n="7" />. The violent standards of conduct and behavior should be criminalized, and the reasons are discussed in further research. "If we are to criminalize a type of conduct, we must show that it falls within the public

<footnote n="1">¹ Bishop, K. (2020). "Sex Robots, Teledildonics, and the Rise of Technosexuals During Lockdown. Observer." https://observer.com/2020/10/sex-robots-teledildonics-growing-popularity-covid19/ (accessed 20.06.2020).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² TechCrunch, "True Companion Debuts Sex Robot Roxxxxy.", NSFW, 2010 https://techcrunch.com/2010/01/09/nsfw-true-companion-debuts-sex-robot-roxxxxy/?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAMgLtBs83sEStHIRHKmryh2W1SFwPUHZz0j_OI_W_5ZiY2K9PDcdqJe-YQMhqoRvtL-kqk7t92F-QyKQe_ERAw_Bth4NvKRh0iKKyAcsPHkQx0MTRvPg_BQFzhdrJ1wEp53jBJKFxvj1axQwTfnpgKTbA48DrgPba6GGJKaucxrN (accessed 20.06.2020).</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Realdoll official website: https://www.realdoll.com/realdoll-x/ (accessed 20.06.2020).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Levy, D., *Love and Sex with Robots*. 3rd ed. Springer, UK, 2017</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Mlambo-Ngcuka, P. (2020). "Violence against women and girls: the shadow pandemic" *UN Women*.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Jenkins, G.C., *Banished: A Comprehensive Look into the Mind and Soul of the Sex Offender with Sex Offender Case Studies and the Recidivism Challenge*. 1st ed. USA: BrownWalker Press, 2020</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Behrendt, M. (2017). "Reflections on Moral Challenges Posed by a Therapeutic Childlike Sexbot" *International beConference on Love and Sex with Robots*, 96–113.</footnote>
realms, the civic enterprise, and that it is therefore of proper interest to all citizens in virtue of their participation in that enterprise”<fnref n="8" />. To ensure the well-being of public a sound moral character should be built, moral harms may ruin well-being<fnref n="9" />.

## 2. ROBOTS AND RAPE

Childlike sex dolls have appeared several years ago in Asian countries, whereas regular sex dolls have existed for a long time all over the world. Initially sex dolls were just ordinary sex toys which did not show a significant resemblance with real people, the modern dolls (RealDoll) are not only extremely human-looking creatures that have a hyper-realistic anatomically correct bodies, but they also have an Artificial Intelligence (AI) platform built into a robotic head. Such a doll is nothing but a robotic AI. They are able to form expressions, detect the touch and its intensity<fnref n="10" />, move their head, and speak. Although their bodies are not equipped with animatronic parts yet. Moreover, they can learn what their owners like and offer an emotional connection afterwards. It could be assumed that a sexual experience with such a device may feel real. Moreover, any abuse, assault, or rape could also be “felt” like real for both the offender and the victim (robot). In the University of Osaka, a robot with tactile sensors can detect pain, the research aims at developing empathy. However, hypothetically the same setting may be installed into the sex robot. It raises important ethical questions of whether such robots, which are able to “feel” and have a selection of personal features<fnref n="11" />, should be considered as any kind of personalities and should the degrading treatment of such machines be a violation of human rights?

### 2.1. Representation of rape

It is fair to mention, that from philosophical point of view, a sexual connection is a relation with human being or animal, alive substance<fnref n="12" />. Today robot is not legally defined as electronic or legal personality. According to such philosophical idea, sex with a robot should be considered as masturbation as well as ordinary sex toys. Of course, robot is not alive, it does not have emotions, it is not identified with legal means and therefore it is not capable of giving consent. But even if the robot is not a real human, the representation of rape is real<fnref n="13" />. Some may say that films, video games, pornography also have scenes that represent rape, but the scenarios of violence are played by actors or avatars and they are completely fictional, yet causing moral harm as well, but not considered in this research. Though, in terms of sex robots the person involved is real (there is no or insufficient mental distance) and the function which may turn on scenario of rape which robot would play - at least morally problematic<fnref n="14" />. If a hyper-realistic woman-looking robot would deny the sexual intercourse, would cry and at the same time would “feel” the pain, then the violence will be directly associated with pleasure. In the future, if sex with robots will not require consent or will play a “raping scenario” it may become misleading and give the appearance of the fact that women should not give their consent and are always available for sex. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that some people might have different motivation to purchase a sex robot.

<footnote n="8">⁸ Duff, R. A., “Towards a Modest Legal Moralism”, *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, vol. 8, 2014, 217–235.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Wall, S. (2013). Enforcing Morality – *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, vol. 7, 455–471.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Rahman, A., Walia, S., Naznee, S., Taha, M., Nirantar, S., Rahman, F., Bhaskaran, M., Sriram, S., “Artificial Somatosensors: Feedback Receptors for Electronic Skins”, *Wiley-VCH GmbH*, vol. 2000094, 2020 1-10.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Video uploaded on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ff_NRSf4s20&t=619s</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Goldman, A. H., “Plain sex” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 6, no. 3, 1977, 267–287.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Sparrow, R., “Robots, Rape, and Representation”, *International Journal of Social Robotics*, vol. 9, 2017, 465–477.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Danaher, J., “Robotic Rape and Robotic Child Sexual Abuse: Should They be Criminalised?”, *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, vol. 11, 2017, 71–95.</footnote>
## 2.2. Replacing human relationship

The innovation of sex robot technology is one of the biggest trends in the industry which also affects the psychology of people. There is a new sexual preference called digisexuality<fnref n="15" />. In 2018, a Japanese man married a hologram, such a movement of “closer relationship with technology” is becoming very popular. However, “the deception involved in designing robots to encourage users to falsely attribute thoughts and emotions to them is morally problematic”<fnref n="16" />. Nowadays technologies and the level of robot’s development or, more precisely being able to keep the conversation, to express “emotions” and in some nearest future being able to empathize, and having the hyper-realistic appearance, may lead to replacing human relationships with sex robots<fnref n="17" />.

# 3. CHILDLIKE SEX “ROBOTS” AND ABUSE

In Japan, childlike sex dolls have been manufactured by company, created by Shin Takagi (a self-confessed pedophile<fnref n="18" />) directly for pedophiles<fnref n="19" /> and meant to simulate the experience of raping a child. It is believed that pedophilia is not a sexual orientation but rather a psychological disorder triggered by early childhood trauma, which cannot be cured; and the possession of such devices may help these people to lead a better life. Some experts say that childlike sex dolls help pedophiles channel and control their sexual urges and they can be used to keep pedophiles away from child molestation. There are childlike sex dolls on the market, and they have been sold through mainstream online retailers like Amazon, Ebay, Aliexpress and Wish *sub voce* as mannequin. In light of the fact, that adult sex robots already exist, it is just a matter of time when the AI system will be installed to childlike robots as well. But what if such an approach may encourage the demand, allow to fully enjoy, and develop the sexual and psychological bent, which will motivate pedophiles to go on abuse on child? However, in this paper psychological aspects of an issue are not the point of discussion, but rather a lack of legal framework for such dolls and consequently sex robots of any kind of appearance in the UK.

Sexual intercourse is legal starting from certain age (according to national Penal Codes) only if both sides gave their consent without using the force and threat, otherwise it is considered as rape. If it is a sexual intercourse with a robot, should the setting of “consent” be also installed? No robot can be raped unless it will be designed in a way that it can refuse the sexual connection, such a setting of different repertoires of sexual abuse may be installed into the AI’s system. In the mentioned company TrueCompanion there was a sex robot called “Frigid Farah”. In the article written by John Danaher it was mentioned that “if you touched her in a private area, more than likely, she will not be to[o] appreciative of your advance”<fnref n="20" />. Such a behavior represents a non-consent or rape scenario. Furthermore, if sex robots are deprived of consent they might be considered as sex slaves, which at the same time could perpetuate gender inequality and enhances misogyny, because sexual

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ McArthur, N., “The rise of digisexuality: therapeutic challenges and possibilities”, *Special Issue on sex and technology*, vol. 32, 2017, 1-12.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ De Graaf, M. M. A., “An Ethical Evaluation of Human-Robot Relationships” *International Journal of Social Robotics*, vol. 8, 2016, 589-598.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Sulins, J. P., “Robots, Love, and Sex: The Ethics of Building a Love Machine”, *IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AFFECTIVE COMPUTING*, vol. 3, no. 4, 2012, 398-409.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ McCrum, K., “Lifelike child sex dolls created to 'stop paedophiles committing crimes”, *Irish Mirror*, 2016 https://www.irishmirror.ie/news/world-news/lifelike-child-sex-dolls-created-7177869 (accessed 20.06.2020).</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Osborne, S., “Japanese company manufactures lifelike child sex dolls for paedophiles”, *Independent*, 2016 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/japanese-company-manufactures-lifelike-child-sex-dolls-paedophiles-a6811046.html (accessed 20.06.2020).</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Danaher, J., “Robotic Rape and Robotic Child Sexual Abuse: Should They be Criminalised?”, *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, vol. 11, 2017, 71-95.</footnote>
preferences of men would be placed before the rights of women and girls. Mostly such dolls and robots are of women or girls' appearances, consequently men are the owners of such toys. Throughout the centuries and today women have been fighting for equal rights, but woman-looking sex "slaves" will not defuse a conflict between feminists and sexists<fnref n="21" />. According to Joanna Bryson, "the appropriate metaphor for the relationship between humans and robots is that of master and slave"<fnref n="22" />. Leslie Green is raising the question of morality, she believes, that law should improve the morality in the context of sex and consent<fnref n="23" />. Current "sexual morality" is limiting women to the extent that "they feel obliged to avoid certain places, to be careful going out at certain times, to give thought to how their dress and manner will be received—in general, to remain unwillingly vigilant. Few men have experiences that are remotely similar." Also, a minimum age of the robot's appearance should be set, prepubescent bodies should not be used. Although, if experts would find enough evidence for the therapeutic approach then childlike sex robots should be made available to pedophiles under a range of conditions or at least under a medical diagnosis. Whereas in contrast, qualified majority of population should not get access to these robots, also a legal framework should be provided to cover this issue and provide for punishment in the event of illegal distributing and use. The limited access of these robots may be compared with license of marihuana for medical purposes.

In some countries the pornography, images etc. are considered as harmful to children (physically or/and psychologically), because the real children are supposed to feature on child-exploitation material. In Portugal, pornographic material with a realistic representation of underage individuals is a typified crime even though there are no children involved. For the purposes of creation of these dolls no children were harmed directly. On the other hand, the picture of a child could be used for the prototype of the doll's face, which is sure enough to be considered as harmful towards children. Moreover, childlike sex dolls harm children through legitimising and normalising their sexual use. There is an obvious and very common link between possessing a childlike sex doll and a child-abuse material. In the number of cases in UK and Australia, majority of offenders possessing sex dolls also had child pornography, or child-exploitation images. Nevertheless, the purpose of this paper is not to assess the therapeutic approach or to cover psychological or moral part of the issue, though it should be noted that robots are not human beings, even as childlike sex robots are not real children. Yet, without proper regulation these robots, created for good, may lead to real harm to children. Child pornography is a crime, but is it a crime if adult is performing sexual activity with childlike robot? If not controlled, Porn websites may be overflowed with porn where featuring childlike robots.

**3.1. Legal framework**

Development of technology has raised several legal and ethical concerns, promoting countries and organization to introduce new ethical regulations, as well as often legal solutions.<fnref n="24" /> law In 2018, the European Commission has released a European approach to boost investment and set ethical

<footnote n="21">21 Moeckli, D., Shah, S., Sivakumaran, S., *International Human Rights Law*. 2nd Ed. Ch. 16., 2017, Oxford University Press, UK</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 Frank, L., Nyholm, S., “Robot sex and consent: Is consent to sex between a robot and a human conceivable, possible, and desirable?” *Artificial Intelligence and Law*, vol. 25, 2017, 305–323.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">23 Green, L., “Should law improve morality?”, *University of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series*, vol. 73, 2013, 1–38.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">24 Kerikmäe, T.; Hoffmann, T.; Chochia, A. (2018), “Legal Technology for Law Firms: Determining Roadmaps for Innovation” *Croatian International Relations Review*, 24 (81), 2018, 91–112; Kerikmäe, T.; Müürsepp, P.; Särav, S.; Chochia, A., “Ethical Lawyer or Moral Computer – Historical and Contemporary Discourseon Incredulity between the Human and a Machine”, *Вісник Національної академії правових наук України*, 2 (89), 2017, 27–42.</footnote>
guidelines. It was then clear that development of AI could raise new ethical issues.<fnref n="25" /> Some steps have been done since then. In 2018, European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies presented Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and ‘Autonomous’ Systems, which discusses important moral and ethical questions. In 2019, High-Level Expert Group on AI presented Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence. Nowadays, there are nine main areas that shape the discussion of AI ethics. Yet, none of these legal issues are covered by a special AI legal framework (there is, though, an existing or forthcoming EU legislation), whereas legal personhood of AI is covered neither by EU secondary law relating specially to AI systems<fnref n="26" />. Should AI systems be deemed subjects of law? Today this question cannot be answered as the discussions about legal personality and electronic personality are still held. European civil law rules in robotics is today one of the fullest and exhaustive legal documents on robotics based on several research taken within years. According to these rules a robot will soon be provided with common definition.

Under Section 10 of Sexual Offences Act (SOA) 2003 of England, it is prohibited to cause a child to engage in sexual activity, while it does not relate to a robot that represents a child. Under Section 1 of The Protection of Children Act (POCA) 1978 of England, it is forbidden “to take, or permit to be taken [or to make], any indecent photograph [ or pseudophotograph] of a child [...]”, when a meaning of pseudophodograph is vague and its connection to sex robot is controversial as well, unless the picture of a real child would be used in the design of robot’s appearance. Under Section 1(2) of The Obscene Publications Act (OPA) 1959 of England, distribution, circulation, sale, hiring, giving, lending, offering for sale or for letting on hire of any obscene article (wide, not limited meaning) should be prohibited. However, the Act covers the sale and distribution of the dolls but “fails to address bare possession”27. Under Section 42 of Customs Consolidation Act of 1876 of England, the list of goods is prohibited or restricted to be imported into UK. The “list” of the following section was amended in 2008 with the Statute Law (Repeals) Act: "All articles bearing or having affixed to them any stamp, name, writing, or other device implying or tending to imply any sanction or guarantee by the Customs or by any other Department of the Government." At the moment, in UK there is no existing framework that would cover directly the possession of childlike sex robots. In 2017, in the United States of America, there was adopted an act named as Curbing Realistic Exploitative Electronic Pedophilic Robots (CREEPER) Act that aims to ban the importation and transportation of child sex dolls and does not address to possession as well. By “Child sex dolls” it is meant any child-looking, anatomically correct mannequin or robot that can be used for sexual purposes. Congress finds that “the dolls and robots not only lead to rape, but they make rape easier by teaching the rapist about how to overcome resistance and subdue the victim”.

Under Section 1 of Criminal Attempts Act 1981 of England and Wales even the attempt to commit a crime is considered as crime. Moreover, even if it is impossible to commit a crime, the person should be found guilty. It is considered that an intent or will to commit a crime should be punished. In *Regina v. Shivpuri*<fnref n="28" /> judgement, Lord Bridge of Harwich stated that “Putting the hand in the pocket is the guilty act, the intent to steal is the guilty mind, the offence is appropriately dealt with as an attempt, and the impossibility of committing the full offence for want of anything in the pocket to steal is declared by [subsection (2)] to be no obstacle to conviction”. In terms of sex robots,

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Joamets, K.; Chochia, A., “Access to Artificial Intelligence for Persons with Disabilities: Legal and Ethical Questions Concerning the Application of Trustworthy AI”, *Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum*, 9 (1), 2021, 51–66; Joamets, K.; Chochia, A., “Artificial Intelligence and its Impact on Labour Relations in Estonia”, *Slovak Journal of Political Sciences*, 20 (2), 2020, 255–277.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ SIENNA D “Analysis of the legal and human rights requirements for AI and robotics in and outside the EU.”, 4.2. (2019).</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Chatterjee, B. B., “Child sex dolls and robots: challenging the boundaries of the child protection framework” *International Review Of Law, Computers & Technology*, vol. 34, no. 1, 2020, 22–43.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ R v Shivpuri [1986] UKHL 2 (15 May 1986).</footnote>
it can also be approached following the logics this way: if there is an intent and belief that person
rapes a woman or sexually abuses a child, which are represented by robots then such person should
be guilty of intent and desire to commit a crime. However, currently the fact of having got robot
mixed up with a human seem doubtful and implausible.

3.2. Case study

The majority of cases, where childlike sex dolls have been used in sexual purposes accrue to Australia<fnref n="29" /> and United Kingdom<fnref n="30" />. The number of men in the UK who appear to show an active interest in the are connected to child sexual abuse is very high. Andrew Dobson<fnref n="31" /> was one of the first people jailed for child sexual abuse. He pleaded guilty importing an indecent object, possessing indecent images of children making indecent images of children<fnref n="32" />. David Turner<fnref n="33" /> have also admitted importing indecent object, possessing 34,000 obscene images, making indecent images, and possessing extreme pornographic images<fnref n="34" />. According to Section 50 of Customs and Excise Management Act of 1979 another man was jailed in 2018, Sean Doel<fnref n="35" /> was accused of importing prohibited goods<fnref n="36" />. He did not possess any indecent images of a child, though. The conclusion must be driven from the cases considered that importing childlike sex doll or robot is a criminal offence. No precedent was provided where sex doll was manufactured or 3D-printed in UK. But acknowledging the legislation it could be claimed that possession of childlike sex doll is not illegal.

CONCLUSION

The childlike sex dolls and sex robots have already been sold, possessed and used in several
countries in the world. In the UK the legislation is still not prepared for the issues arising from the
rape, assault or sexual abuse of robotic AI. Considering existing law in UK, none of Acts may fully
cover the childlike sex robots. Punishing measures may be applied only to those cases, where the
image of a child is used in manufacturing under POCA and SOA, criminalization is justified because
such use constitutes a secondary harm to a child. Whereas OPA might cover import and transfer of
such dolls and robots. Although the possession of such doll and consequently childlike sex robots is
not prohibited under existing law. The future harm can be validly interpreted to justify the
criminalisation of childlike sex robots and sex robots that are designed to play different “rape
scenarios”, because it promotes a damaging culture of the sexualisation of children and represents
women in sexist way.

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Molloy, S. (2020). “Australian Border Force seizes large number of lifelike child sex dolls” *NZHerald*. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/australian-border-force-seizes-large-number-of-lifelike-child-sex-dolls/4BJN34ARDIMLP4KF2JRJVFGDGA/ (accessed 20.06.2020).</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Dearden, L. (2019). “Hundreds of child sex dolls seized at UK borders, sparking legal crackdown”, *Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/child-sex-dolls-uk-paedophiles-seized-borders-jail-prosecutions-a8844406.html (accessed 20.06.2020).</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ R v Dobson (2017).</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² BBC, “Andrew Dobson jailed for ‘child-like’ sex doll import bid” 2017, *BBC*, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-stoke-staffordshire-40383627 (accessed 20.06.2020).</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ R v Turner (2017).</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ BBC (2017). Ex-school governor who imported child sex doll is jailed. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-41203239 (accessed 20.06.2020).</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ R v Doel (2018).</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Blair, A. (2018). Brit man, 45, in court for 'importing CHILD sex doll from China'. Daily Star. https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/ sean-doel-child-sex-doll-16851771 (accessed 20.06.2020).</footnote>
References /Bibliography:

BBC (2017). Andrew Dobson jailed for 'child-like' sex doll import bid. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-stoke-staffordshire-40383627 (accessed 20.06.2020).

BBC (2017). Ex-school governor who imported child sex doll is jailed. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-41203239 (accessed 20.06.2020).

Behrendt, M. (2017). Reflections on Moral Challenges Posed by a Therapeutic Childlike Sexbot – *International Conference on Love and Sex with Robots*, 96–113.

Bhaskaran, M., Naznee, S., Nirantar, S., Rahman, A., Rahman, F., Sriram, S., Taha, M., Walia, S. (2020). Artificial Somatosensors: Feedback Receptors for Electronic Skins – *Wiley-VCH GmbH*, vol. 2000094, 1-10.

Bishop, K. (2020). Sex Robots, Teledildonics, and the Rise of Technosexuals During Lockdown. Observer. https://observer.com/2020/10/sex-robots-teledildonics-growing-popularity-covid19/ (accessed 20.06.2020).

Blair, A. (2018). Brit man, 45, in court for 'importing CHILD sex doll from China'. Daily Star. https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/ sean-doel-child-sex-doll-16851771 (accessed 20.06.2020).

Chatterjee, B. B. (2020). Child sex dolls and robots: challenging the boundaries of the child protection framework – *INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW, COMPUTERS & TECHNOLOGY*, vol. 34, no. 1, 22–43.

Danaher, J. (2017). Robotic Rape and Robotic Child Sexual Abuse: Should They be Criminalised? – *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, vol. 11, 71–95.

De Graaf, M. M. A. (2016). An Ethical Evaluation of Human-Robot Relationships – *International Journal of Social Robotics*, vol. 8, 589–598.

Dearden, L. (2019). Hundreds of child sex dolls seized at UK borders, sparking legal crackdown. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/child-sex-dolls-uk-paedophiles-seized-borders-jail-prosecutions-a8844406.html (accessed 20.06.2020).

Duff, R. A. (2014). Towards a Modest Legal Moralism – *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, vol. 8, 217–235.

Frank, L., Nyholm, S. (2017). Robot sex and consent: Is consent to sex between a robot and a human conceivable, possible, and desirable? – *Artificial Intelligence and Law*, vol. 25, 305–323.

Goldman, A. H. (1977). Plain sex – *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 6, no. 3, 267–287.

Green, L. (2013). Should law improve morality? – *University of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series*, vol. 73, 1–38.

Jenkins, G.C. (2020). *Banished: A Comprehensive Look into the Mind and Soul of the Sex Offender with Sex Offender Case Studies and the Recidivism Challenge*. 1st ed. USA: BrownWalker Press.

Joamets, K.; Chochia, A. (2021). Access to Artificial Intelligence for Persons with Disabilities: Legal and Ethical Questions Concerning the Application of Trustworthy AI. Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum, 9 (1), 51–66.

Joamets, K.; Chochia, A. (2020). Artificial Intelligence and its Impact on Labour Relations in Estonia. Slovak Journal of Political Sciences, 20 (2), 255–277.

Kerikmäe, T.; Hoffmann, T.; Chochia, A. (2018). Legal Technology for Law Firms: Determining Roadmaps for Innovation. Croatian International Relations Review, 24 (81), 91–112.

Kerikmäe, T.; Müürsepp, P.; Särav, S.; Chochia, A. (2017). Ethical Lawyer or Moral Computer – Historical and Contemporary Discourseon Incredulity between the Human and a Machine. Вісник Національної академії правових наук України, 2 (89), 27–42.

Levy, D. (2017). *Love and Sex with Robots*. 3rd ed. UK: Springer.

McArthur, N. (2017). The rise of digisexuality: therapeutic challenges and possibilities – *Special Issue on sex and technology*, vol. 32, 1-12.

McCrum, K. (2016). Lifelike child sex dolls created to 'stop paedophiles committing crimes'. Irish Mirror. https://www.irishmirror.ie/news/world-news/lifelike-child-sex-dolls-created-7177869 (accessed 20.06.2020).

Mlambo-Ngcuka, P. (2020). Violence against women and girls: the shadow pandemic – *UN Women*.

Moeckli, D., Shah, S., Sivakumaran, S. (2017). *International Human Rights Law*. 2nd Ed. Ch. 16. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Molloy, S. (2020). Australian Border Force seizes large number of lifelike child sex dolls. NZHerald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/australian-border-force-seizes-large-number-of-lifelike-child-sex-dolls/4BJN34ARDIMLP4KF2JRJVFGDGA/ (accessed 20.06.2020).

Osborne, S. (2016). Japanese company manufactures lifelike child sex dolls for paedophiles. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/japanese-company-manufactures-lifelike-child-sex-dolls-paedophiles-a6811046.html (accessed 20.06.2020).

SIENNA D4.2. (2019). Analysis of the legal and human rights requirements for AI and robotics in and outside the EU.

Sparrow, R. (2017). Robots, Rape, and Representation – *International Journal of Social Robotics*, vol. 9, 465–477.

Sulins, J. P. (2012). Robots, Love, and Sex: The Ethics of Building a Love Machine – IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AFFECTIVE COMPUTING, vol. 3, no. 4, 398–409.

TechChrunch (2010). NSFW: True Companion Debuts Sex Robot Roxxxy. https://techcrunch.com/2010/01/09/nsfw-true-companion-debuts-sex-robot-roxxxy/?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xILmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAMgLtBs83sEStHlRHKmryh2W1SFwPUHZz0j_OI_W_5ZiY2K9PDcdqJe-YQMhqoRvtL-kqk7t92F-QyKQe_ERAw_Bth4NvKRh0iKKyAcsPHkQx0MTRvPg_BQFzJ1wEp53jBJKFxvj1axQwTfnpgKTBAA48DrgPba6GGJKaucxrN (accessed 20.06.2020).

Wall, S. (2013). Enforcing Morality – *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, vol. 7, 455–471.
# EU Foreign and Security Policy: Overview and challenges

LIISA MARGIT PAATS<fnref n="1" />

TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, ESTONIA

**Abstract:** This paper focuses on the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), its evolution, changes brought about the Treaty of Lisbon and the EU's capacity to act within this area. The report provides an overview of the CFSP and brings out the main internal and external challenges the Common Foreign and Security Policy faces today.

**Keywords:** Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European integration, the Treaty of Lisbon

## INTRODUCTION

Although the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the context known today was launched by adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 and was strengthened through the following treaties, the roots of coordination in the foreign policy areas between the Member States date back already to the 1970s of the European Political Cooperation<fnref n="2" />. What began only as information exchange, has evolved into much broader and closer cooperation between the EU Member States and institutions covering several policies of European Commission such as neighbourhood and development coordination policies, treaties concluded by the European Council and the Council, and foreign policies adopted by the Member States of the Union<fnref n="3" />. In despite of this, while most policy areas and the EU itself have experienced ever-closer integration and have taken up supranational policy characteristics, it has been claimed that the CFSP is not fully part of this as the EU's capacity to act within this area is rather limited and the necessity of consensus generation has led to a conclusion that the final decision-making power regarding foreign policy issues has remained to rest with the Member States<fnref n="4" />.

The aim of this paper is to give overview of the CFSP of the EU and introduce its relevant challenges. For doing this, the article focuses on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU by first providing the general overview of the emergence of this policy area through relevant treaties and introducing its aims and importance in the Union. After that, the changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon will be more closely examined through first examining the alterations in the general governance framework and then the institutional set-up. The final part of the article brings out the main internal and external challenges the Common Foreign and Security Policy faces today.

## COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF EU

While it is generally understood that the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy covers only the normative policies falling under the legal and institutional framework such as fundamental values and norms of the Union, there is also much broader view incorporating all cross-border

<footnote n="1">¹ TalTech Law School, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia, liisa.paats@taltech.ee</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228306</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Annegret Bendiek, "European Realism in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy" Edited by Dr Paul James Cardwell. *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era*, Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012, pp. 35-58.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Uwe Puetter, "The Latest Attempt at Institutional Engineering: The Treaty of Lisbon and Deliberative Intergovernmentalism in EU Foreign and Security Policy Coordination" Edited by Dr Paul James Cardwell. *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era*, Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012, pp. 17-34.</footnote>
communications of the EU institutions and the Member States between third countries<fnref n="5" />. In despite of the contesting perspectives, it can be agreed that the CFSP relates to Union's core values and aims to improve and promote international peace and security, democracy, rule of law, effective multilateralism, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms<fnref n="6" />. The entire external action of the EU however, covers a wider spectrum of areas including the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), trade and development policy issues, pre-accession treaties for candidate countries, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), crisis response and prevention, and peacebuilding missions<fnref n="7" />.

In determining the power limits of the European Union, it is clear that the Union can act only within the competences its Member States have conferred upon it as stipulated in the Article 5(2) of the Treaty on the European Union<fnref n="8" />. When it comes to the CFSP, this policy area cannot be distinguished neither as exclusive, nor shared or supportive competences as it falls under a special category with different rules and specific procedures<fnref n="9" />. Due to national security and sovereignty issues, the Member States have been reluctant in terms of giving the EU ultimate decision-making power in the foreign and security policy area. As a consequence of this, the EU lacks legislative competences in CFSP, in most cases there is the unanimity requirement (in very exceptional issues QMV is allowed), decisions are taken through loyalty clause, Member States cannot be sanctioned for non-compliance officially, the flexibility clause of Article 352 of TFEU does not apply, the Court of Justice of the EU does not have jurisdiction and the European Commission and European Parliament powers are very limited<fnref n="10" />. In this policy area the main two legislative bodies – the European Parliament and the Commission have been deprived the legislative powers and have some control only through the right to be informed, supportive role and budgetary issues<fnref n="11" />.

When identifying the greatest players of the EU in the CFSP, it has been claimed that the European Council due to having the power of determining the strategic direction, general guidelines and principles of the policy and ensuring its effective implementation in accordance with Article 22 TEU, is the key institution<fnref n="12" />. The logic behind this is that because of the sensitivity of the issues in this area and national interests, only the heads of state and government can agree on common policy and its future direction<fnref n="13" />. The main decision-making body in the EU in this area is the External Relations Council which is composed by the foreign ministers of the Member States chaired by the High Representative and makes its decision on the bases of the guidelines and direction suggestions made by the European Council<fnref n="14" />. Other players in the EU's CFSP that should be mentioned are the

<footnote n="5">⁵ Annegret Bendiek, „European Realism in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy“ Edited by Dr Paul James Cardwell. *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era*, Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012, pp. 35-58.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/158/foreign-policy-aims-instruments-and-achievements</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228304</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016ME%2FTXT, Accessed: 21.05.2021</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Marise Cremona, *Implementation of the Lisbon, Improving Functioning of the EU: Foreign Affairs, In-depth analysis for the AFCO committee*, Brussels, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015, 34 pages.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Uwe Puetter, „The Latest Attempt at Institutional Engineering: The Treaty of Lisbon and Deliberative Intergovernmentalism in EU Foreign and Security Policy Coordination“, Edited by Dr Paul James Cardwell, *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era*, Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012, pp. 17-34.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Marise Cremona, *Implementation of the Lisbon, Improving Functioning of the EU: Foreign Affairs, In-depth analysis for the AFCO committee*, Brussels, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015, 34 pages.; Kaniok, P. and Komínková, M., „Parliamentary Questions: Expressions of Opposition(s) within the European Parliament?“ *TalTech Journal of European Studies*, Vol.9 (Issue 1), 2019, pp. 33-56.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Marise Cremona, *Implementation of the Lisbon, Improving Functioning of the EU: Foreign Affairs, In-depth analysis for the AFCO committee*, Brussels, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015, 34 pages.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Ramiro Troitiño, D; Kerikmäe, T; De la Guardia, R. M; Perez, G. A. (2020). *The EU in the 21st Century. Challenges and Opportunities for the European Integration Process*. Springer.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/228308</footnote>