participated in Monday Demonstrations.<fnref n="9" /> To explain the phenomenon of convergence of foreign policy preferences of the extreme left and the extreme right in 2014, the German press returned to the forgotten concept of Querfront literally meaning "front askew"—a concept that denoted the idea (and practice) of an alliance between the extreme left and the extreme right during the Weimar Republic. Understanding the new contours of convergence between the extreme left and extreme right in modern Germany has been the subject of numerous publications, and few German experts will be surprised by the similarity in interpretations of the poisoning of Alexey Navalny between Die Linke and AfD representatives (which sometimes go as far as to imply that the US may be behind the incident).<fnref n="10" />

Affinity with authoritarian regimes (not only the Russian one) among the far left, which only intensified after 2014, again reveals the anti-democratic tendencies characteristic of the radical left; this affinity is largely based on the resentment generated by historic trauma due to the collapse of communist regimes.<fnref n="11" /> While pro-Russian sentiment has long existed in the left-wing circles, these attitudes became mainstream among the German far right only recently, with the "Ukrainian crisis" becoming one of the biggest catalysts. In its attempts to destabilize the European Union, the Kremlin mainly relies on the far right. There are reasonable suspicions that the Kremlin may be involved in the financing of AfD.<fnref n="12" /> The Russia-funded German-language TV channel RT-Deutsch has repeatedly participated in information campaigns promoting the AfD agenda.<fnref n="13" /> Moreover, of all the German parties, the AfD delegations receive the warmest reception in Moscow.<fnref n="14" />

However, it would be erroneous to limit the scope of positive sentiment for Russia exclusively to the far left and far right camps, or to explain them away solely through adherence to their respective ideologies. Pro-Russian sentiments can also be encountered among representatives of other German parties, though to a much lesser extent. In modern Germany, pro-Russian sentiments are scattered across the political spectrum from the far left to the far right, peaking at those seeming opposites. Understanding the specific German manifestations of Russophilia requires not so much an appeal to ideological preferences as cultural and historical contextualization.

How "normal" are pro-Russian positions in the context of political debates in modern Germany? We have already mentioned the statement by Dietmar Bartsch, the co-chair of the Die Linke parliamentary faction, in which he alleges the existence of a "Goebbels party school" in Ukraine. This message was repeated, in a slightly different form, by another leading Die Linke politician, Gregor Gysi, and was also mentioned in a request of the parliamentary faction to the German government.<fnref n="15" /> Dietmar Bartsch made his statement during a popular talk show on a taxpayer-funded channel. Yet his remark was not subject to criticism: no one conducted fact-checking, and with the exception of a critical comment in the personal English-language blog of Andreas Umland, the German media did not respond to it in any way.<fnref n="16" /> This situation

<footnote n="9">9 Martin Niewendick, "Verschwörungstheoretiker, Linke und Neonazis gegen Gauck [Conspiracy Theorists, the Left and the Neo-Nazi Against Gauck]," Der Tagesspiegel, 13.12.2014, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/demo-friedenswinter-in-berlin-verschwoerungstheoretiker-linke-und-neonazis-gegen-gauck/11116944.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10 "Fall Alexej Nawalny: Die fragwürdigen Thesen von Linken und Rechten [The Case of Alexey Navalny: Questionable Statements of the Left and the Right]," T-Online, 05.09.2020, https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/deutschland/innenpolitik/id_88522402/fall-alexej-nawalny-die-fragwuerdigen-thesen-von-linken-und-rechten.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11 Kyrylo Tkachenko, Pravi dveri zliva: Nimets'ka radykal'na livytsya I revolyutsiya ta viyna v Ukraini, 2013-2018 roky [Right Door on the Left: the German Radical Left and the Revolution and War in Ukraine, 2013-2018] (Київ: Критика, 2019), 44-48.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 Michael Laczynsky, "Russland-Connection: Auch AfD soll profitiert haben [Ties with Russia: AfD, Too, Probably Received Financial Support]," Die Presse, 26.11.2014, https://www.diepresse.com/4605451/russland-connection-auch-afd-soll-profitiert-haben.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">13 Laurelle, Rivera, Collusion, 12-14. For a detailed analysis of the support of the Western extreme right by media close to the Kremlin, see Shekhovtsov, Russia, 132-154.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 "Die AfD zu Besuch im Kreml [AfD Received in the Kremlin]," Deutsche Welle, 08.12.2020, https://www.dw.com/de/die-afd-zu-besuch-im-kreml/a-55874686.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">15 Gysi's version is about the "Goebbels research center," and the parliamentarian request claimed the existence of a "Goebbels party school" (https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/ehre-von-parteichef-verletzt-swoboda-nationalisten-zeigen-gysi-an/10049208.html; http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/029/1802960.pdf/). The real story is about only the Livejournal page of the user nachtigal88. The username refers to the battalion of Ukrainian collaborators during World War II and uses the neo-Nazi code "88" (which stands for Heil Hitler). The account belongs to a former MP from the far-right all-Ukraine Union "Svoboda," Yurii Mykhalchyshyn. According to Tadeusz Olszanski, this account was first created in 2005 as the "Joseph Goebbels Center for Political Studies," and was later renamed into "Ernst Junger Center for Political Studies." See https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-07-05/svoboda-party-new-phenomenon-ukrainian-right-wing-scene. Since 2011, this account is almost inactive. On his LI page, Yurii Mykhalchyshyn did publish translations of works by Joseph Goebbels and other national socialists. For some time, he was deputy head of the Lviv regional party organization for political education. However, despite the eye-catching name, the activity of this account between 2005 and 2011 cannot constitute sufficient grounds to claim that there was a "Goebbels party school" in Ukraine in 2014.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 Andreas Umland, "Bartsch Alleges on German TV Existence of Ukrainian Joseph Goebbels' Government Party School," Andreas Umland's blog, 13.12.2015, http://umland.livejournal.com/197212.html.</footnote>
can hardly be called normal. It is hard to imagine a similar statement remaining without response if it were about France, Poland, or Russia. A politician daring to make such a claim would face grave criticism and accusations of misunderstanding of the very idea of historic responsibility to other countries. Most likely, such a politician would have to apologize for spreading information that is not only false, but also harmful to Germany's friendly relations with other European states.

Indeed, we are talking not only about statements made by the far left and the far right that are similar to the Kremlin interpretations, but also about the specific German context in which such claims are "permissible." For instance, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, an ostensibly conservative newspaper, published an article supporting the legitimacy of Crimea's annexation "from the standpoint of international law."<fnref n="17" /> In another article, Kerstin Holmes, a regular reporter of this newspaper, called Sevastopol "the supporting pillar of Russian statehood" and blamed the West for Crimea's annexation.<fnref n="18" /> The left liberal newspaper Die Zeit published an author who considered the existence of the Ukrainian state nothing more than "a misunderstanding of the former USSR's national policy" and wondered "why should we forever shun the possibility of separation of eastern and western Ukraine?"<fnref n="19" /> The author failed to explain where the border would be located in this case, or to mention that there is a huge central region between western and eastern Ukraine. What is more, the author did not even wonder whether the residents of eastern Ukraine themselves would be in favor of this development (even though surveys have been conducted, and the findings are easily available).<fnref n="20" /> The same newspaper published

an interview with former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in which he argued that Ukraine is not a nation-state. Making this claim, he referred to history: "There is no consensus among historians about whether the Ukrainian nation exists at all."<fnref n="21" /> (The former chancellor failed to mention what historians he was referring to.) Another influential German newspaper, far removed both from the extreme left and the extreme right camps, Süddeutsche Zeitung, sometimes publishes articles calling Ukraine "the heart of Russia" and claiming that "notorious anti-Semites" could be found in the Ukrainian transitional government.<fnref n="22" /> What would seem to be one of the most unacceptable articles on the topic of the "Ukrainian crisis" has been published in the reputable magazine Spiegel. In the article, the standard musings about the West provoking Russia are "deepened" by a look into the history of the Crimean Peninsula with non-critical reproduction of the accusations used to justify the deportation of Crimean Tatars back in 1944. The article is illustrated with a picture of modern Crimean Tatars photographed so as to make them appear to be doing the "Roman salute."<fnref n="23" />

A full list of statements in tune with Kremlin propaganda published in German "quality media" would take up way more space. This being said, it would be unfair to accuse the entire German press of bias. Most of the articles referenced above received critical responses (often published in the same outlets as the criticized articles and written by competent historians specializing in Eastern Europe). It should also be noted that compared to 2014, the situation has changed for the better. It is also a good sign that the issue described can mostly be observed in popular media, as opposed to professional academic papers dedicated to the history, politics, and society of Eastern Europe (the evolution in the popular press is likely attributable to the influence of publications in academic

<footnote n="17">17 Reinhard Merkel, "Kühle Ironie der Geschichte [The Cold Irony of History]", Frankfurter Allgemeine, 08.04.2014, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/die-krim-und-das-voelkerrecht-kuehle-ironie-der-geschichte-12884464.html?fref=gc.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 Kerstin Holms, "Lesen Sie Putins Stellenbeschreibung [Read Putin's Job Description]", Frankfurter Allgemeine, 12.09.2014, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/ukraine-krise-lesen-sie-putinsstellenbeschreibung-13148481.html?printPagedArticle=true#pagelindex_2.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 Jörg Baberowski, "Zwischen den Imperien [Between Empires]", Zeit Online, 13.03.2014, http://www.zeit.de/2014/12/westenrusslandkonflikt-geschichte-ukraine/komplettansicht.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">20 To read more about pro-autonomy sentiment in Donbas before 2014, see Andriy Zotkin, "Stavlennya do instytutu regional'nykh avtonomiya ta perspektyvy detsentralizatsii derzhavnoi vlady v Ukraini [Attitude to the Institution of Regional Autonomies and the Prospects of Decentralization of Government in Ukraine]," Monitoring sotsial'nykh zmin 1/15 (2014), 219-227. One of the most recent detailed studies of the foreign policy preferences of Ukrainian residents (which recorded regional differences) was held by the School of Political Analysis at NaUKMA, https://sapiens.com.ua/publications/socpol-research/121/pres_05.05_Donbas_Crimea_fin.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">21 Matthias Naß, "Putins Vorgehen ist verständlich [Putin's Behavior is Understandable]", Zeit Online, 27.03.2014, https://www.zeit.de/2014/14/helmut-schmidt-russland/komplettansicht.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 Erhard Eppler, "Putin, Mann fürs Bose [Putin, Playing the Bad Guy]", Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11.03.2014, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/russlands-praesident-wladimir-putin-mann-fuers-boese-1.1909116-0#seite-2.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">23 Uwe Klußmann, "Nationalisten stiften Tataren zu Anschlägen an [Nationalists Incite Crimean Tatars to Engage in Acts of Terrorism]", Spiegel Online, 28.02.2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/krim-krise-nationalisten-stiften-tataren-zu-anschlaegen-an-a-956033.html. The picture that was used by Spiegel for illustration has been replaced with a different one. A copy of the original publication is available at https://archive.is/AJfyz.</footnote>
journals).<fnref n="24" />

The real trouble in the German media landscape is not the existence of isolated pro-Russian comments. As noted by Andrii Portnov, what is problematic about the German debate on the nature of the "Ukrainian crisis" is the very framework in which it takes place—a set of not-always-interpreted-yet-quickly-established ideas about what positions are acceptable and what can be deemed "normal."<fnref n="25" /> This framework is based on a particular interpretation of the standard of "balance," which posits that the Kremlin version of the events in Ukraine are worthy of being represented alongside the "opposing point of view." As a result, supporters of Russian intervention in Ukraine are offered the opportunity to publish their articles and give interviews for major German outlets that cannot be accused of affiliation with the far left or far right. Thus, in 2014, the framework of the discussion was set as if two equally legitimate narratives represented two alternative versions of what was happening in Ukraine. The same idea of "balance" and "neutrality" is reflected in established notions, in the way the semantic framework of perception of the "Ukrainian crisis" is set. The aggressor and the victim are called "parties to the conflict," and the term "Russian-Ukrainian war" is rarely used, with a clear preference for more "objective" and "neutral" notions, such as "the conflict in Eastern Ukraine" or "civil war." Even when it became obvious who the "little green men" occupying Crimea really were, the German press behaved as if the Kremlin needed to issue an official confirmation before they could start calling a spade a spade. Even writing about battles that the Ukrainian army lost to Russian regular troops (Izvaryne, Ilovaisk, Debaltseve), the German press still referred to "separatists" and "rebels." The same logic of "balance" evidently also applies to Flight MH17 of Malaysia Airlines. According to reports in the German press, the plane was shot down by "separatists" or "rebels." For example, the lead of the article in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* about the start of the trial in The Hague was "Four Pro-Russian Rebels Accused of

Shooting Down Flight MH-17" (though the article itself makes it clear that three out of the four accused are Russian citizens).<fnref n="26" /> The same "balance" can be seen in German talk shows. When Ukraine became an important news item in 2014, representatives of the nominal Kremlin point of view became mandatory guests of TV studios. It is important to note that the discussions about the "Ukrainian crisis" started without Ukrainian representatives at all—the idea that they also had to be invited to talk shows did not emerge right away.<fnref n="27" />

It must be noted that this "balance" towards Ukraine is exceptional in the German press. It would hardly occur to any German journalist to call the Spanish conquest of Mexico "a civil war." And this despite the fact that the troops led by Hernan Cortés were overwhelmingly composed of indigenous people, and his military expedition took place against the will of the Spanish governor (not to mention the fact that in 1519, the peoples under the rule of the Aztecs had better reasons for dissatisfaction than the inhabitants of the Donbas in 2014). It would never occur to anyone to justify the annexation of Tibet by saying that China managed to accomplish it (almost) without bloodshed. German Minister of Economy Sigmar Gabriel, who equated Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine with ethnic Russians in an interview, would hardly make the same mistake about the German-speaking population of Switzerland (and if he did, we can only imagine the denunciation in the German press, let alone the consequences for his continued political career).<fnref n="28" /> And, save for some completely marginal neo-Nazis, no one would try to justify Germany's right to interfere in Austria's internal affairs based on the fact that the majority of its population speaks German (about three times the percentage of Ukrainian citizens who mostly speak Russian).<fnref n="29" /> It is also hardly possible to imagine a discussion of events in Kuwait in 1990 or in Syria in 2014 with Saddam Hus-

<footnote n="24">24 Kateryna Zarembo, Marianna Fsakhurdinova, "Ukraina yak obstavyna: dyskursyvny analiz nazyvannya ta obramlennya rosiys'ko-ukrains'koho konfliktu v nimets'kykh naukovo-analitychnykh kolakh [Ukraine as a Circumstance: the Discursive Analysis of the Naming and Framing of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict in German Academic and Analytical circles]," Volodymyr Kulyk (ed.), Interpretatsii rosiys'ko-ukrains'koho konfliktu v zakhidnykh naukovykh i ekspertno-analitychnykh pratsyakh (Kyiv: Instytut politychnykh i etnonatsional'nykh doslidzhen', 2020), 99-127.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">25 Andriy Portnov, "Neither admiration, nor fear: Stereotypes about Ukraine in Germany", Volodymyr Yermolenko (ed.), Ukraine in Histories and Stories: Essays by Ukrainian Intellectuals (Kyiv: Internews Ukraine, 2019), 276, 284.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">26 "Vier prorussische Rebellen werden für Abschuss des Fluges MH17 angeklagt, [Four Pro-Russian Rebels Accused of Shooting Down Flight MH17]" *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 19.06.2019, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/mh17-russland-flugzeug-ukraine-1.4492122.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">27 Andriy Portnov, "Informatsiya viyna proty Ukrainy: Pohlyad z Berlinu [Information War against Ukraine. A View from Berlin]," *Historians*, 23.10.2014, http://www.historians.in.ua/index.php/en/avtorska-kolonka/1352-andrii-portnov-informatsiina-viina-proty-ukrainy-pohliad-z-berlina-povna-versiia.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">28 "Gabriel plädiert für Föderalisierung der Ukraine" [Gabriel Advocates Federalization of Ukraine], Welt, 23.08.2014, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article131513129/Gabriel-plaediert-fuer-Foederalisierung-der-Ukraine.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">29 Larysa Masenko, "Movna sytuatsiya Ukrainy v sotsiolingvistychnykh vymirakh [Language Situation in Ukraine in Sociolinguistic Terms]," *Padio Sвобода*, 01.05.2020, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30586236.html.</footnote>
sein's or ISIS' representatives invited to the studio to pres-
ent their "alternative" point of view. It is obvious that the
notion of "balance" in the German press is not something
universally applied, but rather depends on which points
of view are deemed acceptable in each specific case.

How is it that ways of argumentation that are inadmis-
sible in other contexts can be easily applied to Ukraine?
The set of problems that lead to Ukrainian events being
interpreted in accordance with Kremlin propaganda can
be grouped around a few root issues, described below.

First, we are talking about German society's long-
established mental map of Eastern Europe. Changes
to this mental map occur very slowly, and it is still full
of blind spots, Ukraine being one of the largest. This
problem is further compounded by the Russian imperial
legacy, which still significantly affects the perception of
Ukraine in Germany.

Second, the version of historical memory that domi-
nates in German society has a significant impact, name-
ly, how it remembers the military aggression of the Third
Reich in the East. In the historical memory of German so-
ciety, a huge undifferentiated "Russia," which begins im-
mediately east of Poland, was both the main object of the
Nazi invasion and the country that made the greatest sac-
rifice (in terms of numbers of casualties) and the greatest
contribution to the victory over the Nazis. Unfortunately,
at the same time, one can trace the tendency to identify
Ukrainians as Nazi collaborators. It cannot be said with
certainty that this second trend is dominant, but it is pres-
ent, and its presence significantly influences the debate
around the "Ukrainian crisis." Comparing the perception
of the role of Russia and the Ukrainians in World War II,
we can speak about a complex compromise in German
national education that allows, on the one hand, an ac-
ceptance of responsibility for the terrible times, but, on
the other hand, latently allows the shift of some of the
most severe elements of responsibility onto others. And
the absence of Ukraine on the traditional mental map of
Eastern Europe makes it an ideal target for such historical
projections.

The first of the sources we have identified for the
view of Ukraine as twisted and distorted by the Russian
imperial legacy manifests itself in a variety of ways and
can be quantified in some cases. To this day, even in the
most respectable German publications, the terms Russia
and Soviet Union are often used interchangeably. Such a
simplification is by no means neutral, and in the debates
around the "Ukrainian crisis," there are tangible negative
consequences (for the Ukrainian side). However, within
the German public discourse, this dehumanization is still

not perceived as problematic—the debate on its legitima-
cy seems to be confined to historians dealing with Eastern
Europe.

Another symptomatic manifestation of German so-
ciety's habitual mental map of Eastern Europe is the still-
widespread designation of Russia as a "neighbor" or
"neighbor country."<fnref n="30" /> The border between Germany and
Russia has not existed for over a hundred years. The bor-
der between Prussia and the Russian Empire was formed
after the partitions of Poland in the late 18th century
(with the participation of the Habsburg monarchy) and
remained until World War I. The short-term joint occu-
pation of the interwar Polish Republic by the Third Reich
and the Soviet Union in 1939-41 can be considered a
kind of historical replica of the partitions of Poland (in
any case, some Polish commentators are inclined to this
interpretation). Of course, the use of the popular image
of Russia as a "neighbor" is most likely motivated not so
much by a desire to whiten the dark pages of history,
but, on the contrary, by a sense of responsibility before
history and a desire to preserve peace on the European
continent. However, the problematic nature of this geo-
graphic metaphor becomes apparent when viewed side-
by-side with other countries. For example, Slovakia and
Romania also share no common border with Germany.
Yet, despite the fact that they are located closer than Rus-
sia, it is not customary to call them "neighbors" in Ger-
many. Pronouncing Belarus or Ukraine "neighbors" will
sound even harsher to the German ear. And although
Minsk and Kyiv are about half the distance from Berlin as
Moscow, we see that in this case, factual geographic pa-
rameters do not affect the perception that these countries
are not "neighbors."

In this context, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is not
used to "identify" the Putin regime with the Stalin regime
or the sentiments present in German society today with
the sentiments of the Germans during the Third Reich. It is

<footnote n="30">30 Some examples of this use: Angela Merkel, "Russland ist unser Nachbar [Russia is our Neighbor]", Bayerischer Rundfunk, 25.12.2017, https://www.br.de/mediathek/video/angela-merkel-russland-istunser-nachbar-v:5a3c62ffc9656300184257ec; Gerhard Schröder, "Verglichen mit Trump können wir froh sein, einen Putin zu haben [If We Compare the Situation with Trump, We Should be Happy to Have Putin]", ZEIT Online, 15.11.2017, https://www.zeit.de/2017/47/gerhard-schroeder-spd-bundestagswahlwladimir-putin-donald-trump/komplettansicht; Katja Gloger, "Russland: Der schwierige Nachbar [Russia: a Complicated Neighbor]", Handelsblatt, 06.10.2017, https://www handelsblatt.com/politik/international/deutschland-und-der-russland-komplex-der-schwierige-nachbar/20406708.html?ticket=ST-2249836-14zt0BMeuVqvxgSnGhV-ap1; Michael Stürmer, "Putin bleibt unser aller unheimlicher Nachbar [Putin Remains Our Most Difficult Neighbor]", Welt, 16.04.2015, https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article139668414/Putin-bleibt-unser-aller-unheimlicher-Nachbar.html.</footnote>
purely a matter of historical contextualization. Ignoring the interests of "small" peoples can both be an element of brutal predatory plans (as during World War I) and can also acquire milder forms generated by a specific understanding of politics aimed at establishing long-term peace (as in the post-war period). Examples of the latter include the refusal to support Polish Solidarity in the 1980s, a refusal motivated primarily by the desire not to provoke the Soviet Union and to continue to adhere to the policy of "détente" initiated by the FRG government (in essence, recognizing Poland as a legitimate zone of influence of the USSR). Germany's further support for the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline after the events of 2014 (and against the will of many Eastern European states) also applies to the second case. To this day, the German government has been ignoring its eastern neighbors' arguments that before the Nord Stream gas pipeline was built (bypassing Ukraine), Russia could not afford large-scale military action against Ukraine for economic reasons and that the construction of Nord Stream 2 finally freed Russia from the risk that new aggression on its part would obstruct gas supplies through Ukraine.

In another symptomatic metaphor often used by German politicians and journalists, Ukraine is described as “a bridge between Russia and Europe.”<fnref n="31" /> Of course, this comparison, albeit somewhat naïve, is undoubtedly based on entirely peaceful intentions. The bridge metaphor, however, implies a whole set of negative stereotypes. First, contrary to geographic evidence, the image implies that Ukraine is not part of Europe. Further, the position from which this comparison is made is objectifying and instrumental. There are full-fledged actors on the world scene, and then, on the other end of the spectrum, there is a dumb subject designed to provide convenience. Bridges do not talk, do not move, they cannot have feelings or desires—they exist solely to be used by others. What’s more, the doom of being a bridge in no way relieves the country from the threats of war and occupation. The bridge can be used by military people without insignia, tanks, and air defense systems capable of shooting down passenger aircraft at an altitude of ten

thousand meters.

We provided just a few examples of how Russia and Ukraine are reflected in the collective mind of modern German society. The extent to which these linguistic trends have taken root in the German public discourse demonstrates the problematic and archaic nature of the traditional mental map of Eastern Europe. And although Ukraine was weakly present on this map until recently, strong, ingrained prejudices are associated with it.

Every Ukrainian who finds himself in Germany will sooner or later face the question of whether the Ukrainian language is an independent language or a dialect of Russian. If you briefly explain the situation and, in turn, ask the interlocutor why he or she came up with such a question, invariably he or she is unable to recall the source of the statement of the "dialectal nature" of the Ukrainian language. This is not just a matter of similarity—of course, Russian and Ukrainian are related languages (and naming a particular language a "dialect" is not so much a scientific definition as a political statement). All Slavic languages are more or less close to each other, and among them, Slovak and Belarusian are closer to Ukrainian than to Russian. But in Germany, no one will ask you if the Ukrainian language is a dialect of Belarusian, or Slovak a dialect of Ukrainian. The determining factor for such questions is not linguistic affinity, but the perception of the history of the Eastern European region, which is still largely viewed through the lens of the Russian imperial heritage. And the same German who asks you this question has sufficient linguistic and historical knowledge (not to mention cultural sensitivity) to know not to ask a Dutchman or a Dane whether their languages are just dialects of German.

Most German journalists who have written about Ukraine have, at best, been to Moscow, and know Ukraine only from short visits. The situation has improved somewhat since 2014, but the problem remains today. To be sure, the mainstream media in Germany, as well as throughout the world, is going through hard times. However, while the opening of new offices abroad and the development of the correspondent network can still be justified by financial constraints, the same does not apply to language learning. For a German who has already learned Russian, it will not be difficult to learn Ukrainian as well. However, few German journalists appear to have been able to do this. The realization that command of the Ukrainian language will be an effective barrier to the unwitting dissemination of false reports about Ukraine does not seem to have come yet (and misinformation was re-

<footnote n="31">31 Some examples of this use: "Die Ukraine muss doch eine Brücke sein [Ukraine Should Be a Bridge]", Die Tageszeitung, 22.03.2014, http://www.taz.de/1375672/; Theo Sommer, "Die Ukraine kann nur als Brücke zwischen Ost und West überleben [Ukraine Can Only Survive as a Bridge Between East and West]", ZEIT Online, 11.03.2014, http://www.zeit.de/2014-03/krim-ukraine-russland; Karl Walter, "Ukraine kann zur Brücke werden [Ukraine Can Become a Bridge]", Merkur, 21.03.2014, https://www.merkur.de/lokales/dachau/landkreis/ukraine-ort29611/ukraine-kannbruecke-werden-3429294.html.</footnote>
produced by such serious publications as *Der Spiegel*).<fnref n="32" />

Toponymy is another striking example of how the Russian imperial legacy sways the German view of Ukraine. While the German language is quickly adapting to the post-colonial order, changing traditional colonial place names to indigenous ones, in the case of Ukraine, seemingly insurmountable obstacles arise. In German, many Ukrainian toponyms are still transcribed in their Russian form, for example, "Dnjepr," "Kiew," "Odessa." And although a few years ago the reputable dictionary of the German language *Duden* recorded the Ukrainian-oriented version "Kyjiw" alongside the more traditional one, it is still not used in the German press, and there is no discussion about the need to change the Ukrainian geographical names borrowed from the Russian language.

This status quo in German contrasts sharply with developments in English, where "Kyiv" already appears to prevail over the former "Kiev." It seems to us that this sensitivity in the English-speaking environment is not least due to the longer and deeper work with Ukrainian themes in the English-speaking world. The Harvard Institute for Ukrainian Studies has been in existence for over forty years. Seven Canadian universities host various centers, institutes, and archives dedicated exclusively to Ukrainian studies. And even distant Australia, with a population about a quarter that of Germany, has two separate institutes dedicated to Ukrainian studies.

By contrast, in Germany, until recently, there was only a "half-department" of Ukrainian studies (the department of Polish and Ukrainian studies at the University of Greifswald). Only recently has a full-fledged department, completely devoted to the study of the history of Ukraine, appeared in Germany (at the Viadrina University in Frankfurt (Oder)). This sad state of Ukrainian studies in Germany is both the cause and the manifestation of a narrowed view of Ukraine.

How do the issues we have identified affect the political agenda in Germany? The most obvious influence of stereotypes associated with Russia and Ukraine is evident in the activities of the extreme left and extreme right forces. However, the total electoral support of these forces in

the last elections to the Bundestag (2017) did not exceed 22 percent and is unlikely to be higher in the next elections (2021). These forces are not represented in the German government and have little influence on its decisions. As mentioned, however, these stereotypes are not limited to the extreme ends of the political spectrum. Politicians who "understand Russia" can be found in the ranks of practically all German parties represented in the Bundestag. This is especially true of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Although its electoral support has declined significantly in recent years, it came in second in the last Bundestag elections and is part of the ruling coalition. Former Minister of Economy (2013-2017) and of Foreign Affairs (2017-2018) Sigmar Gabriel is a member of the SPD and his statements in the spirit of "understanding Russia" were not limited to the identification of Russian-speaking and ethnic Russians that we mentioned.<fnref n="33" /> And while the former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had no significant influence on his party at the time of the interview cited above, the same cannot be said for another former chancellor from the SPD, Gerhard Schröder. Lobbying the interests of the Russian Federation in Germany, Schröder repeatedly operated with stereotypes that are the subject of our article, including those based on a complete disregard of historical facts (for example, when the ex-chancellor argued that Crimea was an "ancient Russian land").<fnref n="34" /> A certain influence of these stereotypes can be traced even in the statements of Angela Merkel, who, for example, used the metaphor of Russia as "our neighbor."<fnref n="35" /> The influence of the Russian narrative on German politicians is also confirmed by Ukrainian diplomats. For example, Yehor Cherniev, head of the Verkhovna Rada delegation to the NATO parliamentary assembly, characterizes communication with German colleagues as difficult. According to him, in the case of Nord Stream 2, the German position is influenced not only by considerations of a purely economic nature, but further, "communication with our German partners shows their rather deep relationship with the Russian Federation. They are pragmatic

<footnote n="32">32 One of the articles in Der Spiegel claimed that Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk referred to the inhabitants of Donbas as "Untermenschen." Yatsenyuk himself did not claim this, and apparently, German journalists, in this case, used Yatsenyuk's "free translation" in Russian sources (Benjamin Bidder, Moritz Gathmann, "Die Pöbler von Kiew," Spiegel Online, 17.06.2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/kiews-aussenminister-beschimpft-putin-a-975536.html). In private correspondence with the author of this article, one of the authors of the article in Der Spiegel argued that the lack of knowledge of the Ukrainian language was not an obstacle for competent journalism regarding Ukraine.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">33 Claudia von Salzen, "Beziehung zu Russland: Gabriel ist als Außenminister kaum noch tragbar [Relations with Russia: Gabriel is Failing as a Foreign Minister]," Der Tagesspiegel, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/beziehungen-zu-russland-gabriel-ist-als-aussenminister-kaum-noch-tragbar/20984494.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">34 "Altkanzler Schröder verteidigt russische Annexion der Krim [Ex-Chancellor Schröder Defends the Russian Annexation of Crimea]," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 14.06.2019, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ex-bundeskanzler-schroeder-verteidigt-russische-annexion-der-krim-16236234.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">35 Angela Merkel, "Russland ist unser Nachbar," Bayerischer Rundfunk, 25.12.2017, https://www.br.de/mediathek/video/angela-merkel-russland-istunser-nachbar-av:5a3c62ffc9656300184257ec.</footnote>
and not easily influenced by our position. [...] In addition, deeper relationships are revealed. For example, the German partners read between the lines: we bear the blame for World War II before the Russian Federation.<fnref n="36" /> At the same time, the Ukrainian parliamentarian confirms that with regard to Ukraine, the same logic of historical responsibility does not work among the German diplomats. Ukrainian ambassadors to Germany and Austria Andrii Melnyk and Oleksandr Shcherba have made similar observations.<fnref n="37" /> In other words, the aforementioned stereotypes have a clear influence on politics and thus represent a problem that needs to be addressed.

How could the negative stereotypes associated with Ukraine be broken? In the case of Germany, the answer seems clear. With regard to the necessary profound changes in social attitudes, we are talking primarily about greater attention to the history of Eastern European "small peoples" in school curricula, the development of Ukrainian studies, and the expansion of the correspondent network of German media in Ukraine (or, at least, the study of the Ukrainian language by journalists who write about Ukraine). On the political front, an important step would be to abandon the completion of Nord Stream 2 and support Ukraine in its aspirations to join NATO and the EU. Even if such a prospect is not likely in the near future and would require Ukraine to fulfill serious obligations, the very clear promise of principled openness by NATO and the EU could play an important role in Ukraine's democratic transformation.

This being said, as paradoxical as it may sound, in our opinion, the responsibility for smoothing out negative stereotypes in Germany lies primarily with Ukraine. Nothing can promote a positive perception of Ukraine as effectively as the successful establishment of stable democratic institutions, a radical reduction in the level of corruption, and economic success. Also, a significant part of Ukrainian society still does not realize the scope

of the negative contribution of its "memory policy" to the perception of Ukraine in Germany, as it is enshrined in the 2015 law "On the Legal Status and Commemoration of Fighters for the Independence of Ukraine in the 20th Century." This law includes radical nationalist organizations that collaborated with the Nazis and took part in ethnic cleansing during World War II in the list of fighters for the independence of Ukraine. The law provides for criminal liability<fnref n="38" /> towards those who "publicly display a disdainful attitude" towards the representatives of these organizations. Although no one has been prosecuted to date, the codification of such elements of the remembrance policy does nothing to lessen negative stereotypes. No RT Deutsch, Sputnik, or left or right marginals in Germany itself are capable of doing more damage to Ukraine's image than torchlight processions in honor of the leader of a Ukrainian nationalist organization aimed at building a mono-ethnic state with a one-party dictatorship. The same applies to marches in honor of the SS Galicia division, or the tolerant attitude of Ukrainian society and government towards modern extreme right-wing organizations in Ukraine. Ukrainians should realize that in the eyes of Germans, such practices are very poorly combined with assurances of adherence to liberal values and "European choice."

## CONCLUSIONS

Taking into account the complexity of the problem, we decided to elaborate on only one aspect of the problem in this article, namely, how the legacy of imperial Russia and the Soviet Union affects the perception of Ukraine in Germany (and even within this framework, we had to exclude detailed consideration of tendencies to interpret the role of Ukrainians in World War II as collaborators, referring to media publications, feature films, or such a symptomatic event as the trial of former Nazi death camp warden Ivan Demianuk).<fnref n="39" /> A more detailed study should include an analysis of Russian-German contacts starting from the 18th century (when the German aristocracy became an important source for replenishing the Russian administrative and military elites),<fnref n="40" /> the surge of interest in Russian culture in Germany at the end of

<footnote n="36">36 "They tried to put pressure on Zelensky before the elections: join the coalition, we will reformat the government in the interests of Kolomoisky' - 'servant of the people' Cherniev," Censor.Net, 26.11.2020, https://censor.net/ru/resonance/3233436/na_zelenskogo_pered_vyborami_pytalis_nadavit_zahodite_v_koalitsiyu_budem_pereformirovyvat_pravitelstvo.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">37 Claudia von Salzen, "Ukrainischer Botschafter weist Einladung von Michael Müller zurück [Ukrainian Ambassador Declines Michael Müller's Invitation]," Der Tagesspiegel, 01.05.2020, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/gedenken-in-berlin-loest-eklat-aus-ukrainischer-botschafter-weist-einladung-von-michael-mueller-zurueck/25793888.html; Olexander Scherba, "Mut und Anstand: Moskau glaubt in einer Welt ohne Regeln zu leben [Courage and Honesty: Moscow Believes It Lives in a World without Rules]," Der Standard, 10.07.2020, https://www.derstandard.de/story/2000118647239/mut-und-anstand.</footnote>

<footnote n="38">38 Kyrylo Tkachenko, "Laws of the truth: 2558, 2538," Politkrytyka, 14.04.2015, https://politkrytyka.org/2015/04/12/zakonyistyny-2558-2538/.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">39 Kyrylo Tkachenko, "Bolyova tochka: sprava Ivana Dem'yanyuka [Pressure Point: The case of Ivan Demianuk]," Krytyka, July 2019, https://krytyka.com/ua/articles/bolova-tochka-sprava-ivana-demyanyuka.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">40 Andreas Kappeler, Russland als Vielvölkerreich (München: Beck, 1992), 68-70, 108-120.</footnote>
the 19th century, and, especially, interest in tsarist and
then Bolshevik Russia as an "alternative" to Western de-
mocracies and a "natural ally" of Germany in the period
between the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888-1918) and
the coming of the National Socialists to power. And it
should be emphasized that such convictions could well
coexist with fear of Russia and disdain for the Russians
themselves. Such an attitude towards Russia was formu-
lated by Bismarck, who believed that "with this sponta-
neous force that we are not in a position to destroy" an
alliance should be concluded precisely to restrain Rus-
sia and use it in his interests.<fnref n="41" /> And even though Russia
found itself in the opposite camp during the First World
War, projects of a future German-Russian union among
the German intelligentsia gained even more popularity
precisely in the context of opposing the "special Ger-
man path" to the then Western democracies (supposedly
"spiritless", inclined to "haggling" and "formalism"). To
use Ged Koenen's expression, the complex set of motives
"between fear and admiration" still makes Russia attrac-
tive to German society. In this context, it should also be
noted that although the political transformations in West
Germany are some of the most impressive examples of a
transition from dictatorship to democracy, the fall of the
Nazi dictatorship was not the work of the Germans them-
selves; rather it was primarily due to military intervention
and occupation of West Germany by the armed forces
of the United States, Great Britain, and France (millions
of Germans, on the contrary, put up desperate armed
resistance until the surrender in May 1945). That is, the
interpretations popular among the German extreme right
(and even some of the extreme left), according to which
the modern form of government is imposed on Germa-
ny from the outside, are in fact not so far from the truth.
Anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism, and—more broadly—
anti-liberal resentment are still quite tangible, albeit not
dominant, tendencies that have a very real impact on
political life in modern Germany (and largely explain the
electoral support of such parties as Die Linke and AfD).
The view of Russia as a something of an ideal screen for
projections of one's authoritarian fantasies should be un-
derstood in the light of precisely this latent tendency in
the political life of modern German society. Figuratively
speaking, for many Germans, modern Russia gives the
opportunity (not subject to external and internal censor-
ship) to love something one cannot—openly—wish for
one's own country.

<footnote n="41">41 Gerd Koenen, Der Russland-Komplex: Die Deutschen und der Osten, 1900-1945 (München: Beck, 2005), 9.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_26.png" /></figure>

RUSSIAN MALIGN
INFLUENCE IN THE
CZECH REPUBLIC

Ivan Preobrazhensky

<figure><img src="image_27.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_28.png" /></figure>

## ABOUT AUTHOR

Ivan Preobrazhensky

Political analyst, PhD in Political Science, country expert for Central and Eastern Europe, Founder of the "Moscow Political Club, author at Deutsche Welle

The Czech Republic (population about 10.5 million) is not a large or influential country of the European Union (EU). Today, it is less influential than neighboring Poland, which entered the EU concurrently with the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic occupies a special place on the list of targets for Russian influence, including malign influence.

Unlike many other countries, such as Germany, which are the ultimate targets of Russian malign influence, the Czech Republic functions as a "hub" that Russian actors use to organize influence operations or subversive activities in other EU countries. At the same time, it cannot be claimed that the Czech Republic itself does not experience Russian malign influence. Thus, this small European country has a dual role. The first is as the target of Russian propaganda, "soft power," and direct subversive actions. The second is as a "hub," a base within the EU for exerting this influence on other countries and for legitimizing the key tenets of Russian foreign policy.

## EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO

Currently the Czech Republic is not a formal ally of Russia, nor is it its strategic partner. This is evident in its membership in supranational associations and international organizations, a key parameter.

The Czech Republic has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 2003. It applied for EU membership back in 1996 and joined the Union together with the other Visegrád Four countries (Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). Despite a relatively high level of Euro-skepticism and the presence of parties seeking to hold a referendum to leave the EU, the majority of the Czech

population still opposes this idea. According to a survey conducted in April 2019 by the Czech agency Median, 63 percent of Czechs assess their country's accession to the European Union as "positive" or "rather positive."<fnref n="1" /> According to a February 2019 poll by the Public Opinion Research Center at the Sociological Section of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (CVVM), 55 percent of Czechs opposed the referendum on the country's exit from the European Union, 17 percent were undecided and only 28 percent were in favor.<fnref n="2" /> Of these 28 percent, there may be a significant number who agree with Czech President Miloš Zeman: he supports holding the referendum, yet categorically declares that, if a referendum is called, he will vote for the preservation of the Czech Republic's membership in the European Union.

A still more important alignment is the Czech Republic's membership in NATO. According to a poll conducted by CVVM in February 2020, 58 percent of respondents in the Czech Republic say they are satisfied with membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and only 24 percent are "uneasy" about the fact that their country is a NATO member. Further, in 2020, according to Czech sociologists, for the first time the number of Czechs who believe that NATO membership is a guarantee of the security and independence of the Czech Republic exceeded the number who believe that this membership means submissiveness.

<footnote n="1">1 Zdeňka Trachtová. "Exclusive poll: about 60% of Czechs perceive Czech accession to the EU positively after 15 years." iRozhlas, cz, 23.04.2019, https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/evropska-unie-ceska-republika-pruzkum-median-vyroci-vstupu-do-eu_1904230605_nkr.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 "The attitude of the Czech society towards Brexit." The Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM), 02.2019, https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a4854/f9/pm190301.pdf.</footnote>
sion to the interests of other influential forces (48 percent against 44 percent. Finally, 69 percent of Czechs believe that NATO, as a military-political alliance, is currently necessary (25 percent—"definitely necessary," and 44 percent—"rather necessary").<fnref n="3" />

This support notwithstanding, current Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš took the liberty of criticizing NATO during the "migration crisis" in Europe.<fnref n="4" /> In 2019, he also advocated for reform of the Alliance.<fnref n="5" />

In addition, there are areas in which the Czech Republic separates itself from most EU countries—areas in which Russian agents of influence can also operate. In particular, the Czech Republic is not a member of the Euro area and, according to the CVVM poll conducted in May 2019, a quarter of Czechs would rather not see the introduction of a single European currency in their country, and 50 percent are categorically against it.<fnref n="6" />

## RUSSIAN-CZECH RELATIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Czechoslovakia, and hence the territory of the modern Czech Republic, was under strong Soviet influence for most of the 20th century. In 1945, the Soviet Red Army liberated most of Czechoslovakia from Nazi occupation. It is true that the western part of the country was liberated by the Americans; however, following the Yalta Conference and with the consent of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile headed by President Edvard Beneš, the country moved completely into the zone of Soviet influence.

After the so-called "revolution" of 1948, power in the country was completely usurped by the local Communist Party, which was under the strict control of the

USSR. This was demonstrated by the repressions within the party itself from 1949 to 1953, in which Soviet special services were actively involved in the repression of more than 200,000 people, according to official data. And this happened even though there were no Soviet troops on Czechoslovakian territory at the time, having left after the liberation of the country.

The Soviet military returned as an occupation force in 1968 along with the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries. During the period of "normalization" after the occupation, 327,000 people were expelled from the Communist Party, and another 350,000 citizens of Czechoslovakia lost their jobs. The last soldiers of the Soviet occupation army were withdrawn from Czechoslovakia as late as 1991, two years after the so-called "Velvet Revolution," when the dismantling of the communist, pro-Soviet political regime began.

According to CVVM sociologists, the events of 1968 are cited as the most tragic event of the 20th century for 57 percent of Czechs (another 19 percent call it a rather negative event), as opposed to the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany in 1938 (54 percent) and the Munich Agreement (50 percent).<fnref n="7" /> Thus, the qualified majority (76 percent) call the invasion by the Warsaw Pact countries the most tragic event, and it is this that still shapes the historical and political memory of the Czechs. It is, perhaps, the most reliable historical mental defense against Russian malign influence. This fact means that agents of Russian influence, and in particular ex-President Vaclav Klaus and his son Vaclav Klaus Jr., need to constantly remind Czechs of the non-equivalence of the USSR and Russia, to point out the fact that the modern Russian Federation is not, so they claim, the legal successor of the Soviet Union in terms of its crimes, including the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

This, however, is starkly contradicted by the actions of Russian authorities, who, for example, in December 2019, through statements by the Russian Foreign Ministry, condemned the decision of the Czech authorities to introduce a commemorative date in honor of those deceased during the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the troops

<footnote n="3">3 "Citizens on the membership of the Czech Republic in NATO." The Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM), 02.2020, https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a5165/f9/pm200312a.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4 Josef Kopecký, "Babiš called on the head of NATO to sink the smugglers' ships. The latter pointed to the EU." IDNES.cz, 9.9.2015, https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/babis-vyzval-sefa-nato-k-potapeni-lodi-paseraku-ten-ale-ukazal-na-eu.A150909_152804.domaci_kop.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">5 Ondřej Houska, "Babiš wants to change NATO because of Turkey. According to him, European states should sign an agreement on a new union within the framework of the alliance." Hošpodarské noviny, 17.10.2019, https://zahranicni.ihned.cz/c1-66661290-babis-chce-kvulturecku-zmenit-nato-evropske-staty-by-podle-nej-mely-v-ramci-aliance-podepsat-smlouvu-o-novem-spojenectvi.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6 "Citizens on the adoption of the euro and the results of the Czech Republic's membership in the EU." The Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM), 04.2019, https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a4932/f9/pm190531.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">7 "Citizens on the specifics, periods and events of Czech-Slovak history from the emergence of the Czech Republic to the present" The Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM), 03.2018, https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a4607/f9/pd180509.pdf.</footnote>
of the Warsaw Pact countries in 1968.<fnref n="8" /> The attempts of the Russian State Duma MPs to equate the veterans of the 1968 occupation campaign to the veterans of hostilities under Russian law, which have been going on since 2016, also serve to expose pro-Kremlin propaganda in the Czech Republic.<fnref n="9" />

On the other hand, traditional cultural ties between the Czech Republic and Russia play a significant role in strengthening Russian influence, primarily along the line of Pan-Slavism, which was especially popular on the territory of the modern Czech Republic in the 19th century, when the country was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In the current situation, these cultural ties are reflected in the Czech Eurosceptics' orientation towards Russia as a potential counterbalance to German and Anglo-Saxon influence. Politics is not just about marginal political actors or representatives of populist, anti-migrant parties and groups. It is also about the Communist Party of the Czech Republic and Moravia and the Freedom and Direct Democracy party of the national populist Tomio Okamura both having their factions in the lower house of the Czech parliament. In its program, the Freedom and Direct Democracy party consolidates the requirement to hold a referendum in the Czech Republic on the country's withdrawal from the EU.

This also applies to the country's two presidents: former Czech President Vaclav Klaus (the last President elected by parliament) and current President Miloš Zeman (the first President elected in general elections). This interest of Czech politicians in Russia is not accidental and is associated not only with history or geopolitics, but also with the overall current situation in the Czech Republic, which, by some parameters, has been approaching Russia rather than its Western European partners in the EU and NATO in recent years.

This is discernable, in particular, in the growth of corruption in the country. The Czech chapter of Transparency International was among the main personal opponents of the current head of the Czech government, An-

drej Babiš.<fnref n="10" /> The prime minister was personally involved in several corruption scandals related to the misuse of European subsidies—in particular subsidies for small businesses which Andrej Babiš received for his company, owned at the time by his children as a small business facility (the “Stork’s Nest” case).<fnref n="11" /> In this case, European auditors confirmed that Andrej Babiš had a conflict of interest, and the Czech police opened and tried to investigate a criminal case on corruption.<fnref n="12" /> The conflict of interest was also confirmed by an audit conducted by the staff of the European Commission (EC).<fnref n="13" />

In general, the 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index shows that the perception of corruption has been steadily growing in the Czech Republic in recent years. The country scores 56 points out of a possible 100 and is ranked 44th out of possible 180.<fnref n="14" /> This is one of the poorest results in the EU. Czech businesses believe that the country is also one of the most bureaucratic in the EU; Czech legislation is inconsistent; many more bureaucratic barriers exist, and more permits and licenses are required, than in Western Europe.

The Czech economy is not dependent on Russia. In the first nine months of 2019, mutual trade amounted to slightly more than USD 6 billion, while at the end of 2018 it exceeded USD 8 billion. Russia mainly supplies raw materials to the Czech Republic, and the Czech Republic remains an important source of technological equipment and technologies in general for Russian industry, insofar as the current sanctions allow.<fnref n="15" />

<footnote n="8">8 Commentary by the Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry in connection with the adoption in the Czech Republic of the law recognizing August 21 as the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Invasion and Subsequent Occupation (of Czechoslovakia) by the Warsaw Pact troops in 1968, 18.12.2019, https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3961546.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9 "The deputies proposed to recognize the participants in the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia as veterans of hostilities," Meduza.io, 16.06.2016, https://meduza.io/news/2016/06/06/deputaty-predlozhihi-priznat-uchastnikov-vvoda-voysk-v-chehoslovakiyu-veteranami-boevyh-deystviy</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10 "Babiš insists that Transparency International is corrupt. The trial will continue in February." Irozhlas.cz 7.1.2020, https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/soud-babis-transparency-international-spor-kritika-zkorumpovana_2001071403_aur.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11 "There are 28 more examples similar to the Stork's Nest, counted the Pirate Party," iDnes.cz, 10.12.2020, https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/jakub-michalek-pirati-agrofert-dotace-andrej-babis.A201210_101025_lesa.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 "Details of the Stork's Nest case. How Prime Minister Babiš came to the attention of the police," Seznam Zprávy, 4.12.2019, https://www.seznamzpravy.cz/clanek/den-rozhodnuti-o-capim-hnizde-jak-se-premier-dostal-do-hledacku-policie-78132.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">13 "Babis has a conflict of interest, confirmed the latest version of the audit by the European Commission," iDnes.cz, 30.10.2020, https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/babis-stret-zajmu-evropska-komise-capihnizdo-audit-verze.A201130_171416illeb_kzem.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 Corruption Perceptions Index 2019, Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">15 "Foreign trade of Russia with the Czech Republic for 9 months of 2019", Russian-trade.com, https://russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2019-11/vneshnyaya-torgovlya-rossii-s-chehiey-za-9-mesyatsev-2019-g/.</footnote>
ELECTIONS AND RUSSIAN
INFLUENCE

One should note the relatively successful perfor-
mance of pro-Russian politicians and parties in the Czech
elections. They are relatively successful because, in the
total number of parties registered in the last parliamen-
tary elections, non-systemic parties that include in their
program the exit from the EU or NATO, a strict anti-immi-
grant agenda, and the ideas of abolishing parliamentary
democracy in the Czech Republic accounted for about
half of the electoral list—more than 40 out of about 90
parties admitted to participate in elections. At the same
time, none of these radical organizations except for the
Communist Party and Okamura's party entered parlia-
ment.

The last election campaign, which took place in the
Czech Republic in 2017-2018, was protracted. It was a
double campaign, first for parliamentary elections, and
consequently for the president. As of 2013, the Czech
president is not elected by parliament, which is the ex-
pected process for a parliamentary republic, but by di-
rect universal suffrage. This has seriously upset the consti-
tutional balance in the country.

In 2013, the election was won by Miloš Zeman, a
former Czech prime minister who led the country during
the period of preparations for joining the EU and NATO.
However, he was marginalized within the ruling class,
which led to his significant geopolitical reorientation to-
wards Russia and China. His adviser Martin Nejedlý (for-
mer co-founder of the Czech limited liability company Lu-
koil Aviation Czech, s.r.o. co-owned by LUKOIL Aviation
BV, the Dutch subsidiary of a Russian company)<fnref n="16" /> played
an essential role in the organization and financing of his
campaigns both in 2013 and 2018.

During the 2018 elections, Martin Nejedlý was also
a member of the "Friends of Miloš Zeman" club, which,
in financing his election campaign, bypassed the current
legislation, since the president himself had said that he
would not campaign. Some of the sponsors later could
not be found,<fnref n="17" /> and some turned out to have Russian

roots and foreign origins,<fnref n="18" /> for example, the Slovenian
businessman Alexei Belyaev, who recognizes the facts
of friendship and business relations with the Czech Prime
Minister Andrej Babiš, and friendship with the former
head of Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin, as well as
long-term cooperation with Russian Railways.<fnref n="19" /> A scheme
for financing the election campaign while bypassing
state control over the spending of the electoral fund (in
fact, without the formation of this fund) was proposed
by political consultants, possibly including Russian ones,
based on the results of an analysis of the Czech electoral
legislation on the controversial issues and legal gaps.

Russian political strategists associated with the
Czech Republic may indeed have acted as consultants.
For instance, Igor Mintusov, who became a citizen of the
Czech Republic after the victory of Miloš Zeman in the
first popular presidential elections and on the eve of his
re-election. Or Timofey Shevyakov, who in 2020 acted
as one of the leaders of the Direct Democracy Party in
Russia, a party funded by the creators of the popular
game World of Tanks,<fnref n="20" /> who themselves are also indi-
rectly associated with the "Russian" political party in Cy-
prus.<fnref n="21" /> Shevyakov, in addition to having Russian citizen-
ship, may also be a resident of San Marino.<fnref n="22" />

The party with almost the same Russian name of
"Freedom and Direct Democracy" is the most popular
national-populist party in the Czech Republic. Its leader,
Tomio Okamura, is a Czech citizen of Japanese-Czech
origin. In the 2017 parliamentary elections, its electoral
strategy, Okamura's door-to-door campaign—that is,
direct communication with voters in the provinces and
through social networks—was the precursor to the elec-
toral campaign of Miloš Zeman. Miloš Zeman actively
and publicly supported this party and attended its con-
gress. The ideologies of the Okamura party and later, in
2018, of Miloš Zeman in the presidential elections signifi-

<footnote n="16">16 Vojtěch Srnka, "Lukoil paid the million fine for Nejedlý, the latter didn't give a single crown," iDnes.cz, 4.10.2016, https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/prazsky-hrad-lukoil-martin-nejedly.A161103_202521 domaci_fer.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17 Kristýna Guryčová, "Search for donors from the society of "Friends of Miloš Zeman": telephones are not available, contact with Janoušek, neighbors do not know them," iRozhlas.cz, 30.1.2018, https://www.irozhlas.cz/volby/milos-zeman-spolek-pratele-milose-zemana-prezidentske-volby-2018-sponzorovani_1801300600_hm.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 Andrea Procházková, "How Friends of Milos Zeman Hold Tens of Millions Non-Campaigns," Respekt, 10.1.2018, https://www.respekt.cz/politika/jak-delaji-pratele-milose-zemana-nekampan.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 Jiří Sezemski, "Alexei Belyaev: Friend of Putin and Fico, Russian Ties in Central Europe," Týždeň, 22.7.2017, https://www.tyzden.sk/spolocnost/41176/alexej-beljajev-andrejuv-pritel-z-petrimexu-ruskaspojka-ve-stredni-evrope/.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">20 Viktoria Polyakova, "Vladislav Skobelev, World of Tanks Developer announced the verification of "golden" passports by Cyprus", RBC, 17.11.2020, https://www.rbc.ru/business/17/11/2020/5fb4137c9a7947ae467601a4.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">21 Elena Gabrielyan, Pierre Setroy, "Leader of the Russian Party of Cyprus: "I decided to be European," Radio France International, 4.10.2018, https://www.rfi.fr/ru/rossiya/20181002-lider-russkoi-partikipra-ya-reshil-byt-evropeitsem.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 Angelina Galanina, "Itank-party", "Kommersant" No. 2 dated 10.01.2020, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4215517.</footnote>
cantly overlapped.

After the end of the second round of the presidential elections in the Czech Republic, Tomio Okamura's party transferred all the money from the party's account (thereby violating the law, which resulted in this payment becoming public) for the provision of consulting services.<fnref n="23" /> These firms turned out to be associated with a system of sites that, according to Czech analysts, are associated with the so-called Aeronet swarm—a group of disinformation propaganda media promoting, among other things, Russian interests in the Czech Republic.<fnref n="24" />

## THE SYSTEM OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

At the end of 2020, Martin Nejedlý traveled to Moscow where he met with President Putin's foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov, whose is considered to have a higher leadership status than Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. According to the official version, which Nejedlý voiced to the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Tomáš Petříček, who is also the only staunch supporter of European integration in the current Czech government, the conversation with Ushakov was about a meeting between the two presidents which was supposed take place in 2020. However, just at this time, the completion of the Dukovany nuclear power plant was being discussed in the Czech Republic, and the Czech liberal opposition opposed the admission of the Chinese or the Russian Rosatom to the competition.

Nejedlý is one of the Kremlin's most obvious counterparts in the Czech Republic. However, Russian influence in recent years has also spread through less obvious channels than the Miloš Zeman administration—for example, golf clubs and mixed martial arts associations that have begun to work actively in the Czech Republic and are infiltrated by Chechen businesses associated with Ramzan Kadyrov and his inner circle.

In general, it can be stated that all available tools of influence are being used, constituting interference in the

internal politics of the Czech Republic by helping individual political players, encouraging them into alliances, and interfering in elections.

Energy policy is being used most actively (in the area of natural gas trade and nuclear energy). On Czech territory, as previously conducted investigations show, offshore companies registered by Russian businessmen, including some who are under sanctions, are opening their branches in the Czech Republic. This was revealed, for example, in the case of Yevgeny Prigozhin's planes.<fnref n="25" />

There is no single hierarchical system; this activity is carried out according to the “swarm” principle whereby the Kremlin sets only the general direction of activity for various groups of influence and Russian organizations. For example, the Kremlin uses Russian-speaking immigrants from the former USSR to the Czech Republic, who form a single Russian-speaking diaspora, as lobbyists for its interests. In addition, the appearance of alleged Czech products in the Russian-linked Belarusian regime of Alexander Lukashenko indirectly confirms rumors about possible criminal cooperation in the illegal-arms trade.

There are no Russian think tanks in the Czech Republic, but the curator of Russian foreign policy propaganda, and the first deputy head of the presidential administration, Alexei Gromov, also acts as an informal curator of the Czech direction. Gromov worked for a long time in Russian diplomatic missions in the Czech Republic, and then in neighboring Slovakia.<fnref n="26" />

In addition, paramilitary formations associated with Russia operate on Czech Republic territory. In particular, these are clubs of self-defense, mixed martial arts, and ultimate fighters, led by Russian instructors. But there are also paramilitary organizations that are directly connected not only with the Russian authorities but also with the administrations of the territories occupied by Russian troops and pro-Russian militants in the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts of Ukraine.

First, we are talking about the organization “National House Defense” (Národní Domobrana), which in 2016 had about 90 branches in the Czech Republic. Its members are Czechs who possess firearms on a le-

<footnote n="23">23 Robert Břešfan, “Where Did The 7.4 Million from SPD Account Go? According to Úsvit, the money was spent for analysis and media marketing,” 31.1.2018, https://hlidacipes.org/kam-odeslo-74-milionuctu-spd-podle-vzoru-usvit-analyzy-medialni-marketing/.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">24 Jan Cemper, “Review of disinformation sites, projects and people spreading disinformation about the current pandemic—Monitoring,” Manipulatori.cz, 16.10.2020, https://manipulatori.cz/prehled-dezinformacnich-webu-projektu-a-lidi-siricich-dezinformace-o-aktualnipandemii/.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">25 Alesya Marokhovskaya, Irina Dolinina, Denis Korotkov, “Fly with Concorde planes,” Novaya Gazeta No. 111, 4.10.2019, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/10/03/82216-letayte-samoletamikonkorda.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">26 Mikhail Rubin, Maria Zholobova, Roman Badanin, “The Puppet Master. Portrait of Alexei Gromov, Head of Russian State Propaganda,” Proekt.media, 23.1.2019, https://www.proekt.media/portrait/alexeygromov/.</footnote>
gal basis.<fnref n="27" /> Many members of this organization went to training in the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, and one of the members of the Council of this organization, Nela Liskova, organized a "people's consultate of the DPR" in the Czech Republic. The authorities were forced to close it through the courts and with the help of police intervention.<fnref n="28" />

"National House Defense" also opposes Czech membership in NATO and the European Union and defends the need to preserve the memory of communist-era Czechoslovak military traditions. The activities of the National House Defense, which includes many former members of the radical right-wing National Democratic Party, allow the Czech extreme right to align with the Czech communists,<fnref n="29" /> who constitute another flank promoting Russian interests within the Czech party and parliamentary system.

It was the leader of the Czech communists, Vojtěch Filip, who introduced the incumbent President of the Czech Republic Miloš Zeman to Vladimir Yakunin and invited Zeman to go to the Dialogue of Civilizations Forum in Rhodes for the first time. This forum was organized and sponsored by Vladimir Yakunin, the former head of Russian Railways and a former KGB employee.<fnref n="30" /> Regarding the field of security, former employee of the communist "people's militia" Zdeněk Ondráček is an influential member of the parliamentary faction of the Communist Party. He is a member of all key committees and subcommittees on security, police oversight, etc. He was even appointed head of the commission of the lower house of the Czech parliament to control the activities of the Czech security agencies, but under the pressure of mass protests, he was forced to leave this post.<fnref n="31" />

As for intelligence activities and cybercrime, they are

carried out by Russian special services more from Czech territory than on its territory. Thus, accusations against the Russian special services of possible cyber-attacks on the Czech authorities have been heard more than once, but Czech intelligence has not publicly confirmed them. Indeed, the Czech special services stated that they had managed to suppress Russian intelligence activities in the Czech Republic, which were being carried out under the guise of commercial IT firms,<fnref n="32" /> but these activities were oriented outside the Czech Republic.

Historical revisionism from 2018 to 2020 was another lever of Russian pressure on Czech politics. The revisionism centered around the occupation of 1968 and everything connected with it and was directly connected to the controversy surrounding the transfer and then the demolition of the monument to Soviet Marshal Konev in Prague, as well as the installation of a monument to the soldiers of the Russian Liberation Army (the so-called "Vlasovites") in the Prague Řeporyje district who supported the Prague anti-Nazi uprising in the last days of the war.<fnref n="33" />

## RELIGION

The Czech Republic is the least religious country in the EU; in 2018, only 25 percent of Czechs identified as "religious" while 31 percent firmly claimed that they were atheists.<fnref n="34" /> Therefore, Russian influence, which, despite everything, is present in this area, remains not very significant in general on the scale of the Czech Republic. In recent years, as migration from the post-Soviet space, primarily from Ukraine, has grown, so has the number of parishioners of the Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia, the autocephaly of which was recognized by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in 1951, and by the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1998. According to the data for 2011, official statistics found only 20,500 parishioners of this church (for comparison, the Roman Catholic Church has 1,082,000, and Jehovah's

<footnote n="27">27 "Lookout wall, three veterans, and a fat pig. The Czech domobrana is armed ", Lidovky.cz, 9.7.2016, https://www.lidovky.cz/domov/cesk-domobrana-se-ozbrojuje.A160709_081240_In_domov_ELE.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">28 Martin Fendrych, "Czech Home Guard: Against the Government, Against NATO, Against the EU, Against Muslims. Putin's Fifth Column," Aktualne.cz, 13.7.2016, https://nazory.aktualne.cz/komentare/cesk-domobrana-proti-vlade-proti-nato-proti-eu-proti-muslim/r~96019578481611e682380025900fea04/.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">29 Šárka Kabátová, "Abbreviations will not protect us, will we create a home guard?—asks the deputy from KSČM ", Lidovky.cz, 2.5.2016, https://www.lidovky.cz/domov/bukvice-nas-neochrani-zalozime-domobrany-napsal-poslanec-za-kscm-strana-to-neresi.A160501_162132_In_domov_sk.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">30 Katerina Aizpurvit, Wagon Prague—Rhodes, Radio Prague International, 30 September 2016, https://ruski.radi.cz/vagon-pragarodos-8212778.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">31 Josef Kopecký, "Communist Ondráček resigned from the Commission for the Control of Law Enforcement Bodies (GIBS)," iDnes.cz, 6.3.2018, https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/ domaci/spor-o-ondracka-snemovngib-s-komunista-ods-ano.A180306_111232_kop.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">32 Lucia Hrdlickova, Martin Zita, "Russian spies in the Czech Republic operated under the guise of IT firms. Some of them had Czech citizenship ", Seznam Zprávy, 19 March 2019, https://www.seznamzpravy.cz/clanek/rusti-spioni-v-cesku-operovali-pod-krytim-it-firem-nekteri-meli-ceske-obcanstvi-68621.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">33 Kristina Zakurdaeva, "Prague, Marshal Konev and the" Russian agent ": how the "ricin business" developed in the Czech Republic, " Currently, 12.5.2020, https://ru.krymr.com/a/kak-razvivalos-ricinovoye-delo-v-chehii/30607076.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">34 "Czechs' Attitude to Faith", Charter of Empirical Research—STEM, 18.12.2018, https://www.stem.cz/postoj-cechu-k-nabozenstvi/.</footnote>
Witnesses, about 13,000) in the Czech Republic,<fnref n="35" /> how-
ever, it is generally believed that the real picture differs
considerably due to labor migrants, including those per-
manently residing in the Czech Republic. The hierarchs
themselves estimated the number of parishioners at more
than 100,000. There are also parishes of the Russian Or-
thodox Church in the Czech Republic, and its influence
on the Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slova-
kia is such that after its last leadership election it is still in a
state of half-split caused by Moscow's attempts to force-
fully push through the election of a loyal ROC primate.

As for the most numerous religion in the Czech Re-
public, the Roman Catholic Church, its leadership in
recent years has shown a close connection with Czech
President Miloš Zeman and his entourage on most issues.
This is especially true of the head of the Czech Roman
Catholic Church, Cardinal Dominik Duka, known for his
conservative, EU-skeptical statements. While there is no
direct Russian influence in this instance, in general, includ-
ing through the contacts of Cardinal Duka with Zeman, as
well as with the hierarchs of the Orthodox Church in the
Czech lands and Slovakia, Russian influence is present,
although it does not have a significant effect on the situa-
tion in the predominantly atheistic Czech Republic.

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

The Czech Republic has a strong and stable mu-
nicipal government that actively interacts with the state
government and often opposes it. The independence of
the municipal government is based on several param-
eters. First, it is a fairly deep implementation of the Euro-
pean Charter on Local Self-Government, which ensures
the real independence of municipal authorities from the
state, including—of fundamental importance—financial
independence.

Of course, this does not mean that Czech munici-
palities are completely financially independent. Most of
them are financially dependent on external support. This
can be funding from the region, the largest unit of formal
territorial division of the Czech Republic, funding from the
government of the Czech Republic, or support from the
EU. The second and third types of financial assistance
can theoretically cause a conflict of interest and make
municipalities dependent on the ruling party and/or co-

alition since European subventions are also distributed
through government agencies. But financial support from
the regions is most often not associated with the central
government and does not depend on it.

This is due to the specifics of the organization of
the party system and the system of representation in the
Czech Republic. Firstly, the deputies of the municipal
councils may have other mandates, most often the man-
dates of the deputies of the regional parliaments. Since
the "basic" for further re-election is most often communal,
that is, the municipal mandate, such deputies become ac-
tive lobbyists for the interests of their municipalities at the
regional level. The second reason is the electoral system
in the Czech Republic, which always allows participa-
tion in municipal elections not only for lists of nationally
registered political parties but also for associations of citi-
zens, which turns municipalities into sources of alternative
legitimization of power, i.e., not based on membership in
major nationwide parties.

Nonetheless, it is the partisanship of the heads of the
executive power of municipalities that prevents the es-
tablishment of control of the central state power over the
municipalities. Mayors of municipalities are not directly
elected and may be recalled or lose office in the event
of the collapse of the ruling coalition in the commune
(community). This often interferes with the corruption of
mayors, among other reasons because it does not allow
the central government to expeditiously resolve issues of
joint jurisdiction with them directly, bypassing public dis-
cussion in the municipal council. Prime Minister Andrej
Babiš, after the victory of his "Yes" (ANO) party in the
2017 parliamentary elections, immediately tried to raise
two issues: (1) the dissolution of the upper house of the
Czech parliament, that is, the Senate, which has a con-
trol function; and (2) the introduction of direct elections of
heads of the executive branch of municipalities modeled
on presidential elections. The upper house of parliament
was particularly active in supporting the investigation of
conflicts of interest for the prime minister. The majority in
the party belong to his political opponents, and among
the mayors of large cities, the majority also represent op-
position parties.

If implemented, these ideas would be an even stronger blow to the Czech constitutional system than direct presidential elections and would lead to an even more severe imbalance, and hence to a decrease in the quality of democracy.

The stability of the party system is a main factor in the
high stability of parliamentary democracy in the Czech
Republic, in comparison with its closest neighbors such

<footnote n="35">35 "Religion of the citizens according to the results of the 2011 population census," Czech Statistical Office, 27.2.2014, https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/nabozenska-vira-obyvatel-podle-vysledku-scitani-lidu-2011-61wegp46fl.</footnote>
as Slovakia or Poland. The Czech Republic's system is in the fullest sense a parliamentary democracy with political parties rather than individual politicians playing a significant role. Even the authoritarian changes of recent years, which began with the introduction of popular presidential elections, won by the authoritarian politician Miloš Zeman in 2013, have not yet been able to break this system. The parliamentary party system is also withstanding pressure from the new government, which began after the minority government came to power with the help of Zeman, led by Andrej Babiš, a Slovak-born billionaire and former informant of the Czech Secret Service STB (communist period). In the Czech Republic, not only are parties created after the Velvet Revolution of 1989 still operating and relatively influential, but the same goes for parties that formally retained the right to operate under the communist regime and before it, such as the Christian Democrats or the Social Democrats.

## MEDIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The independent media in the Czech Republic are in crisis. Public television and radio are under pressure from the authorities, to which they are in soft opposition. In the early 2010s, German owners, who owned all the largest print media and publishing houses, began to get rid of Czech assets, which were acquired by Czech big business. Currently, the PPF Foundation of the richest man in the Czech Republic, Petr Kellner, who earned his first millions from Russian privatization and keeps his business in Russia, owns the Prima TV channel group. The largest private media holding is owned by Prime Minister Andrej Babiš. Despite several attempts, the opposition failed to pass a law that would prohibit such a concentration of media in the hands of a single person, especially that of a politician. Such a law was passed in Italy, where the left and centrists managed to reduce the influence of the politician and media magnate Silvio Berlusconi, who served several terms as prime minister. Still, Andrej Babiš, unlike Petr Kellner, at least according to official data does not have a business in Russia or significant business ties with Russia. Andrej Babiš's media holdings include the Nova family of television channels and the Marfa publishing house, which publishes the popular sociopolitical newspapers "Lidove noviny" and "MF Dnes."

Barrandov, another media holding, formally belongs to its CEO and "star" of the Barrandov TV channel Jaromir Soukup. In the past, he also owned one of the largest Czech media advertisers, Medea; the Chinese financial group CITIC became his partner and then the

majority owner of the company.<fnref n="36" /> For a long time, Soukup hosted a regular TV show on the Barrandov TV channel in the format of an interview with the President of the Czech Republic. This show was regularly criticized, much like other Barrandov media products, by the Council on Radio and Television Broadcasting, among others, for complimenting the president and his entourage.<fnref n="37" /> Jaromir Soukup is also married to the cousin of the president's advisor, Martin Nejedlý.<fnref n="38" />

Another Czech billionaire, Zdeněk Bakala, owns a less powerful but still relatively influential media holding, whose key publication is the newspaper "Hospodarske noviny." He is also a sponsor of the liberal party TOP-09 and is in opposition to the current government.

The very popular Czech tabloid "Blesk" and with it the large publishing house Czech News Center were acquired from the German Axel Springer by Daniel Křetínský, a former junior partner in the business of Petr Kellner (owns 50 percent of the shares) and Patrik Tkáč (40 percent of the shares).<fnref n="39" />

The key media control body is the Radio and Television Broadcasting Council of the Czech Republic. During the tenure of Andrej Babiš, and with the help of a situational majority, it is gradually replacing, as the term of office expires, the members of this council, elected earlier, with people who have an openly negative attitude towards the liberal media. This is happening in alliance with the Czech Communist Party, which is represented in the national parliament, and with the Okamura Party.

It is also worth mentioning the poor situation with regard to the protection of human rights in the Czech Republic. The human rights infrastructure is seriously weakened. Prime Minister Andrej Babiš is in direct conflict with the Czech chapter of Transparency International. Key state and public institutions in the field of human rights protection have been handed over to the opponents of the very idea of protecting rights other than social ones.

<footnote n="36">36 "The Chinese got the majority in the Medea agency, Nejedlý acted as an intermediary in the sale," Aktualne.cz 18.4.2020, https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/ekonomika/cinane-ovladli-vetsinu-v-soukupove-agenture-medea-prodej-zpr/r~701ce31e814a11ea95caac1f6b220ee8/.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">37 "Tip: Soukup favored Zeman in pre-election debates, possibly violated the law," iDnes.cz, 8.2.2018, https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/tv-barrandov-jaromir-soukup-volby-milos-zeman.A180208_173259lhomaci_amu.</footnote>

<footnote n="38">38 Jiří Pšenička, Tomáš Pergler, "The End of Zeman on Barrandov can be a severe wound for Soukup," Seznam Zprávy, 13.1.2020, https://www.seznamzpravy.cz/lanek/konec-zemana-na-barrandove-muze-byt-pro-soukupa-tvrda-rana-86256.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">39 Rene Wolfik, "Křetínský and Tkach bought Ringier," Czech Television, 20.12.2013, https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/ekonomika/1057656-kretinsky-a-tkac-koupili-ringier.</footnote>
In particular, the new Commissioner for Human Rights in the Czech Republic, Stanislav Křeček, is focused on protecting only the labor rights of citizens. The new Commissioner for the Protection of Rights under the Czech government, Helena Válková, joined the Czech Communist Party after the occupation of 1968, during the period of so-called "normalization" and actively collaborated with the communist regime.<fnref n="40" />

## EFFICACY EVALUATION

Thus, the activities of the Kremlin in the Czech Republic can be considered relatively successful both tactically and strategically. The membership of this country in NATO and the EU has been called into question in recent years, although it continues to be implemented. The growth of supporters of the approach to NATO as a guarantor of security is compensated by the presence of an active minority, which, for the first time since the country's accession to NATO, managed to question the necessity of the Czech Republic's membership in this military-political bloc.

Part of the Czech political establishment is in favor of a partnership with the Kremlin. For many, this is not so much a strategic direction as a compensation for the sharp increase in Germany's influence on the Czech Republic, both after 1989 and especially after joining the EU. For some of the Czech ruling elites, diplomatic flirting with Russia is a way to protect Czech interests within the EU.

The Kremlin has established long-term cooperation with individual institutions of power (most notably the institution of the president). This does not mean that through cooperation with Miloš Zeman, Moscow receives a universal instrument for influencing Czech politics. First, in a parliamentary republic, even a popularly elected president with a very high level of legitimacy, such as Miloš Zeman, has very limited powers. Secondly, Zeman is not a Russian puppet but remains an independent politician.

Nevertheless, the Kremlin is getting the support it needs from the Czech president to legalize its foreign policy in the EU. First, note Zeman's repeated statements on recognizing Russian sovereignty over Crimea, annexed in 2014. In addition, Zeman provides support to Russia on many specific issues of domestic Czech politics

and administrative decisions. In particular, Zeman and his entourage in 2018-2019 put pressure on the Czech justice authorities when the issue of extradition to the United States of the hacker Yevgeny Nikulin, detained on Czech territory, was being decided.

Zeman is also in a long-term confrontation with the Czech counterintelligence BIS, questioning its reports regarding the activities of Chinese and Russian special services and agents on Czech territory. At the end of November 2020, it became known that the President of the Czech Republic directly requested BIS management inform him in detail about the Russian agents operating in the Czech Republic (spies, networks of influence), and therefore to disclose data on activities of the Czech special services against them.<fnref n="41" /> According to the opposition, he had no legal right to do so. Naturally, the opposition suggested that this information could eventually get to people close to Miloš Zeman who did not pass the security checks of the Czech special services, including Martin Nejedlý or the presidential chancellor Vratislav Mynář.<fnref n="42" /> This was not the first time that Zeman and his entourage had been accused of lobbying Russian interests and posing a threat to state security. Czech politicians made the same comments when the presidential office and Miloš Zeman himself tried to extradite Russian hacker Yevgeny Nikulin to Russia.<fnref n="43" /> At that time, persons associated with the Russian diplomatic mission in the Czech Republic acted in the interests of Nikulin.<fnref n="44" /> The decision of the Minister of Justice Robert Pelikán to extradite Nikulin to the United States was followed by the resignation of the minister.<fnref n="45" />

In addition, the comparative success of Russian pol-

<footnote n="41">41 Markéta Chaloupská, "President Zeman asks the head of the Secret Service about the names of Russian spies and details of the actual operations. "It is a trap" experts warn," iRozhlas.cz, 30.11.2020, https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/prezident-zeman-rusko-spioni-biskoudelka_2011300600_ace.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">42 Dominika Jeřábková, "Zeman is lobbying Russia's interests in BIS again, the opposition is outraged," Novinky.cz, 30.11.2020, https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/clanek/zeman-ukolem-pro-bis-opet-lobbuje-za-ruske-zajmy-bouri-se-opozice-40343715.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">43 Lukáš Prchal, Ondřej Kundra, "Zeman and the Chancellor lobbied the extradition of the hacker to Russia. Mynář: This is none of your business!", Aktualne.cz, 23.2.2018, https://zpravyaktualne.cz/domaci/hrad-nametlaci-kvuli-hackerovi-rekl-pelikan-babisovi-za-vy/r~12479304188f11e894960cc47ab5f122/.</footnote>

<footnote n="44">44 Janek Kroupa, "The Mystery Game for Nikulin: Money from Russia Should Have Organized Pelikan's Lobbying," iRozhlas.cz, 5.5.2018, https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/jevgenij-nikulin-robert-pelikan-stanislav-mecl-vydani-hacker-usa-rusko-spionazni_1804051518_haf.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">45 Marek Pokorný, "Pelikan Leaves Politics Also Because He Did Not Want to Give in to Zeman," Právní rádce, 10.4.2018, https://pravniradce.inhed.cz/c1-66105080-pelikan-v-politice-skoncil-i-proto-ze-nechteldavat-zaminky-zemanovi-na-jednani-jezdival-na-kole-do-zahranici-letalvlastnim-letadlem.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">40 Anna Kottová, "Valkova is accused of bullying dissidents: someone wants to cause me political harm, I am considering a lawsuit," iRozhlas.cz 9.1.2020, https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/helena-valkova-ksc-komunismus-josef-urvalek-ministryne-spravedlnosti-lidska_2001091538_akoo.</footnote>
icy towards the Czech Republic lies in the fact that the Czech Republic remains Russia's technological window to the EU. This shows the mutual trade turnover.

At the same time, in recent years, the Czech Republic has become more and more open to unofficial external influence, not only Russian but also, for example, Chinese. This is a consequence, not a cause, of the growing level of corruption in the country, the weakening of human rights protection, and the violation of the constitutional system due to the imbalance between the president and parliament.

The system of municipal government remains the most stable and independent of Russian influence. But it can be predicted that if the coalition headed by Prime Minister and leader of the "Yes" party Andrej Babiš remains in power, the central authorities of the Czech Republic will resume their attack on the independence of municipalities, by seeking to limit their budget revenues and change the system of electing heads of executive power of municipalities.

The relatively successful counteraction of the Czech special services to Russian agent influence may also be seriously affected if BIS nevertheless transfers all available information about the activities of the Russian special services in the Czech Republic to Zeman.

The level of Russia's influence in the Czech Republic in the medium term depends to a significant degree on the outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2021. In the case of a coalition of the Pirate Party and the political movement "Mayors and Independents," about which negotiations began in November 2020, the "Mayors," who express exactly the interests of Czech local self-government, together with the most popular opposition Pirate Party, will most likely prevent further erosion of the Czech constitutional system, prevent the dissolution of the Senate and direct elections of heads of municipalities, and also stop the transformation of the system of state control over public media. It is difficult to predict whether even noticeable internal political changes will lead to rapid positive changes in protecting the national interests of the Czech Republic. However, the above complex of factors could contribute, at least, to the inhibition of the current negative processes. With the weakening of Czech statehood, the imbalance of the constitutional system would be checked, which would automatically weaken external influences on the Czech Republic, to include the Russian influence.
<figure><img src="image_29.png" /></figure>

THE KREMLIN'S IN-
FLUENCE IN SLOVAKIA:
ROOTS AND ACTORS

Grigorij Mesežnikov

<figure><img src="image_30.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_31.png" /></figure>

## ABOUT AUTHOR

### Grigorij Mesežnikov

Grigorij Mesežnikov is a political scientist, president of the Institute for Public Affairs (Slovakia). He has published expert studies on party systems' development and political aspects of transformation in post-communist societies, illiberal and authoritarian tendencies, populism, radicalism and nationalism in various monographs, collections and scholarly journals in Slovakia and other countries. He has edited and authored dozens of books, including the Global Reports on Slovakia (1995–2011).

## INTRODUCTION

In August 2020, the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it had demanded three members of diplomatic staff of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Bratislava to leave Slovakia for activities incompatible with their diplomatic status. The decision came after the Slovak foreign service completed an internal investigation in connection with information that Slovakia's consul-general in St. Petersburg issued the Schengen entry visa to a Russian citizen who used it to visit Germany, where, as German police discovered, he assisted in the assassination of Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, a Georgian citizen of Chechen origin, in Berlin in August 2019. The killer caught by German police was Vadim Krasikov, who had a passport of the Russian Federation in the name of Vadim Sokolov. The assassination of Khangoshvili was an operation of the Russian GRU.

The Slovak general consulate in St. Petersburg issued an entry visa to "Roman Davydov," a person with a false identity (his real name was Roman Demyanchenko, according to Bellingcat's investigation<fnref n="1" />). In its statement, the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed directly to the connection between the decision to expel Russian diplomats and the assassination in Berlin: "In addition, the visa issued at the Slovak Consulate General in St. Petersburg was misused and in this connection a serious crime was committed on the territory of another NATO

and EU member state."<fnref n="2" /> The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by expelling three Slovak diplomats and made a harsh statement saying that it considered Slovakia's decision "an unfriendly step contradicting the traditional spirit of constructive development of relations between our countries."<fnref n="3" />

The expulsion of Russian diplomats resonated loudly in Slovakia not only in the media, in the foreign policy and security expert community, but also on the political scene, mainly because it became an indicator of the change that had occurred in the government elite in its relations with Russia. After the parliamentary elections in February 2020, which brought spectacular victory to the center-right parties and a heavy defeat to party Smer-SD (Direction – Social Democracy) of Robert Fico and to its allies from the nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS), Russian pro-government media claimed that Russia was losing a friendly country in Central Europe. Some even labeled the new Prime Minister Igor Matovič an "Ukrainophile";<fnref n="4" /> surprisingly for anyone who closely follows Slovak domestic political developments and is

<footnote n="1">1 "Bellingcat: установлена личность соучастника убийства Хангошвили," [Bellingcat: an accomplice in Khangoshvili's murder has been identified], Radio Liberty (website), August 29, 2020, https://www.svoboda.org/a/30810671.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 Mirek Tóda, "Slovensko vyhostilo troch ruských diplomatov, je to odveta za zneužitie našich víz pri vražde v Berlíne," [Slovakia has expelled three Russian diplomats in retaliation for the misuse of our visas in the Berlin murder], Denník N, August 10, 2020, https://dennikn.sk/1999069/slovensko-vyhostilo-troch-ruskych-diplomatov-je-to-odveta-za-zneuzie-nasich-viz-pri-vrazde-v-berline/?ref=in.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3 "О вызове в МИД России Посла Словакии в Москве," [On Summoning the Ambassador of Slovakia in Moscow to the Russian Foreign Ministry], "August 31, 2020. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (website), https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4306297.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4 Grigorij Mesežnikov, "A Friend Lost? The Slovak Elections Seen by the Russian Pro-Government Media," Visegrad Insight, March 31, 2020, https://visegradinsight.eu/a-friend-lost-slovakia-elections-russia/.</footnote>
aware about Igor Matovič's political profile—there were no signs of "Ukrainophilia" in his previous activities.

The fact, however, is that the new Slovak government emphasized, in its program manifesto and in the statements of its individual representatives, the objective to strengthen the country's pro-Western foreign policy, external security, and defense orientation. Formally, it did not contrast very much with the stance of the previous government led by Robert Fico (2016–2018) and Peter Pellegrini (2018–2020), which also officially subscribed to the pro-Western course. But such declarations often conflicted with the implementation of foreign policy. Both Fico and Pellegrini called for lifting the sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia for its aggression in Ukraine. Parliamentary Speaker Andrej Danko (SNS), who often visited Russia and met with the Russian politicians placed on the EU's sanctions list, behaved as a de facto supporter of the pro-Russian line in Slovakia's foreign policy. The government formed by Smer-SD was not able to push through a new version of the state's defense and security strategy in parliament during the entire 2016–2020 cycle due to strong resistance from pro-Russian SNS. In 2018 Slovakia did not join NATO and EU allies and did not expel a single Russian diplomat in response to Russia's GRU attempt to kill Russian defector Sergey Skripal in the United Kingdom.

The question arises: Are there reasons to believe that Slovakia is in a specific position in its relations with Russia compared to its neighbors from the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) and other EU and NATO member states?

The general answer can be "No." Slovakia is a part of the collective West, it is a country whose population made this strategic choice and the country's dominant political elite complies with such a decision. However, there are enclaves of pro-Russian attitudes and sentiments in some sectors of Slovak society (including politics), inherited from the past and based on sociocultural orientations of certain parts of the population or formed as a result of external influence. The current political regime in Moscow, therefore, is trying to use this situation to strengthen pro-Russian sentiments, seeking allies on the political scene, in media, academic, and cultural circles. The ultimate goal of Russia's efforts in this direction is, however, purely political—and it is to disconnect Slovakia from the West.

Let's try to take a closer look at the societal factors that encourage the current Russian regime to assert its influence in Slovakia, to the main lines of Russia's activities in this country, to the nature of Slovak-Russian bilateral

relations, and to domestic Slovak actors influenced by Russia.

## HISTORIC ROOTS OF RUSSIA'S INFLUENCE

Several events in the 20th century that significantly affected the fate of Slovakia and the life of its citizens were linked with Russia (or the Soviet Union as the historic continuation of pre-Communist Russia): the First World War (1914–1918), the Communist Revolution (1917), the Second World War (1939–1945), the Slovak National Uprising (1944), the Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia (1948), the invasion of armies of the USSR and Warsaw Treaty states to Czechoslovakia (1968), and the subsequent Soviet occupation (1968–1991). As a result, the relatively high-level presence of "Russian factor" that exists in Slovakia's political and cultural discourse creates a platform for Russia to employ its tools of influence.

As a country with a prevailing Slavic population, national political and intellectual circles emphasized, in the past, the necessity to build special relations with Russia on the basis of close linguistic and cultural ties between Slovaks and Russians. These circles were drawing an image of Russia as a genuine defender of small Slavic nations in Central East and South East Europe. Historic personalities who represented this opinion in the 19th century are considered part of a national cultural pantheon with unambiguously positive connotations. Their literary heritage is a subject of study as a part of school curricula. Thus, after three decades since the collapse of the Communist regime in Slovakia, the education system continues to contribute to the survival of Russophilia based on utopian or even delusional Pan-Slavic concepts.

One of the historic figures who represented the Russophile Pan-Slavic concept in Slovakia was Ľudovít Štúr, thinker and the codifier of modern Slovak language. Štúr was a cult figure, considered to be formative in terms of the linguistic and cultural identity of the Slovak nation. In his work *The Slavdom and the World of the Future*, published in 1867 in Russia, he dealt with the ultimate sense of history of Slavs and Slovaks.<fnref n="5" /> He came to conclusion that the optimal and only meaningful option for all Slavs, including Slovaks, who in the 19th century did not have their own independent statehood, would be unification

<footnote n="5">5 Ľudovít Štúr, *Slovanstvo a svet budúcnosti*, [The Slavdom and the World of the Future] (Bratislava: Slovenský inštitút medzinárodných štúdií, 1993), https://docplayer.cz/37569458-Ludovit-stur-slovanstvo-a-svet-buducnosti.html.</footnote>
with Russia and through this their de facto dissolution within the Russian nation (with use of Russian as official language), as well as conversion of all Slavs to Orthodox Christianity. (Štúr himself was Evangelical Protestant, Slovaks are overwhelmingly Catholic and in smaller part Protestant.) It is a paradox that a person who during his life and more than century and a half after his death was (and still is) considered the personalized epitome of Slovaks' efforts to sustain their independent national existence, eventually proposed for his nation such a solution for its historic destiny, which, if implemented, would mean its gradual disappearance as a separate ethnic entity with a specific language, culture, and historically inherited confessional characteristics. The state of affairs nowadays is absolutely different—Slovakia is an independent democratic state, a free society, part of the West, and actively participates in the Western integration projects (EU, NATO)—all this as a result of decisions and efforts of the dominant pro-Western national political and cultural elite.

There were some elements of Štúr's creed that were later used by other Slovak proponents of the idea of convergence with Russia (distancing from the liberal West, highlighting the special values of the Russian nation and state, etc.). In the first half of the 20th century the Russian philology was revived by the intellectual left-oriented (de facto pro-Communist) literary group DAV, whose members propagated Slovakia's inclination to Soviet Russia. This school of thought found a political umbrella for its activities in the Slovak Communist movement in the period before WWII. In its most radical form it expressed itself at the end of the WWII by flirting with the idea of "Sovietization of Slovakia," the affiliation of Slovakia to the USSR as the next union republic instead of the renewal of the common Czechoslovak state, broken as a result of Nazi aggression.

Attitudes towards Russia were also affected by the social experience of Slovakia's population after WWII. On the one hand, in February 1948 Communists who enjoyed the direct support of Moscow took power in Czechoslovakia and established an undemocratic, repressive regime. On the other hand, the Communist regime functioned in Slovakia under circumstances of delayed modernization. The gradual easing of differences that existed between Czech and Slovak parts within the Czechoslovak state in the socioeconomic area, such as the process of Slovakia's industrialization and urbanization, country's technological achievements in agriculture, building of the developed state education and health system—all these and some other elements of modern-

ization under Communist rule created preconditions for a less critical perception about the undemocratic nature of the regime implanted and supported from the outside.

In August 1968, the Soviet Union militarily suppressed the reform process in Czechoslovakia in what has been called the "Prague Spring." However, the process of "normalization" (i.e. cadre purge and removal of the Prague Spring reformist legacy) after the Soviet invasion chronologically coincided with the process of federalization of the Czechoslovak state that gave the Slovak population a feeling that national aspirations of Slovaks met their authentic forms. That also influenced the population's perception of sociopolitical developments and led to the softening of opposition against the Communist regime, and therefore the Soviet occupation, and created a less critical or even positive perception of the Soviet Union (later Russia).

Representative opinion polls conducted over a long showed a difference between Slovakia and other Visegrad states in terms of attitudes toward Russia. Slovaks are less critical of Russia and less pro-American than Hungarians, Czechs, and Poles. In the survey conducted by GLOBSEC Policy Institute in three Visegrad countries in 2016, 12 percent of respondents in Slovakia would prefer a pro-Russian orientation (in Hungary 6 percent, in the Czech Republic 4 percent).<fnref n="6" /> In the poll conducted by GLOBSEC in 2019, only 26 percent of Slovak respondents thought that Russia represented danger (significant threat) to their country (in Poland it was 77 percent, in the Czech Republic 52 percent, and in Hungary 31 percent). For comparison—in the same poll 41 percent of Slovaks thought that US represented a threat to their country (while in Poland it was 12 percent, in Hungary 16 percent, and in the Czech Republic 20 percent).<fnref n="7" /> Actors of Russian influence certainly help to solidify these trends in public opinion and public discourse and contribute to persistent geopolitical illusions about Slovakia as a bridge between East and West.

Since Russia is a country that is stagnating in multiple areas with severe social problems (corruption, ailing population, alcoholism, bad health care, heavy diseases, ethnic tensions) and technological backwardness, it

<footnote n="6">6 GLOBSEC Policy Institute, GLOBSEC Trends. Central Europe under the Fire of Propaganda: Public Opinion Poll Analysis in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia (Bratislava: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2016), https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/glb_trends_en.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">7 Daniel Milo, Katarina Klingová, Dominika Hajdu, GLOBSEC Trends 2019. Central & Eastern Europe 30 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain (Bratislava: GLOBSEC, 2019), https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/GLOBSEC-Trends2019.pdf.</footnote>
is difficult in such conditions to build a positive image of
Russia based on constructive alternatives. The main direc-
tion of activities aimed at strengthening Russia's influence
has become not the presentation of positive Russia-relat-
ed alternatives, but rather criticism of liberal democracy
as a system, inducing resistance against it, provoking ha-
tred towards the West, questioning the path of reforms
in Central European countries which led to the establish-
ment of the foundations of liberal democracy, reducing
public support for membership in the EU and NATO, and
opposing the policies of these groups. Russia's influence
focuses on discovering and demonstrating the real or
imagined shortcomings and problems in the functioning
of the democratic system in local conditions, feeding the
distrust in democratic mechanisms and institutions, and
attributing the existent social problems to the essence of
democratic order.

The narratives employed by actors of the Kremlin's
influence in Slovakia are adjusted to the peculiarities of
the political landscape in Slovakia. They include "theo-
ries" on the inappropriateness of liberal democracy as
a system; the higher importance of Slavic solidarity and
brotherhood over the importance of a political alliance
with the West; that Russia is a natural defender of all
Slavic nations; that Russia is a promoter of traditional and
conservative social values and norms, and a protector
from immoral liberal influence coming from the West; and
that Russia is a liberator of Europe and the only sincere
and genuine fighter against fascism and Nazism—during
WWII and today.

SLOVAK-RUSSIAN BILATERAL
RELATIONS

Being an EU and NATO member state, Slovakia is
generally engaged in relations with Russia on a multilat-
eral level that shapes the basic framework of coopera-
tion in particular areas. Slovak-Russian bilateral relations
have been evolving since 1993 in certain cycles; their
dynamic depended on the approach of the dominant
political forces in both countries to the wider context of
the international relations in Europe. The factor of depen-
dence of the Slovak Republic on the Russian Federation
in the area of energy also played its role.

Political parties that promoted Slovakia's clear pro-
Western orientation—accession to NATO and member-
ship in the EU (mostly programmatic liberal democratic
center-right parties), tried to build Slovak-Russian rela-
tions so that they would not in any way complicate or

negatively affect implementation of the basic pro-West-
ern course. These parties tried to separate cooperation
the in economic sphere (mainly trade with energy ma-
terials) from the main priorities of the political agenda in
order to minimize Russia's influence on domestic political
development.

Parties which were not the main advocates of the
country's pro-Western line (national populist formations
with different declared creeds—"national," "social,"
"left," "right," etc.) handled the bilateral relations with
Russia as not contravening to the overall pro-Western
course. In foreign policy areas they promoted the con-
cept of a sort of symbiosis of participation in the Euro-
Atlantic integration and close relations and friendship
with the Russian Federation. This attitude was represented
in the last two decades mostly by party Smer-SD, and
earlier by Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)
of Vladimír Mečiar. Although this approach was called
by representatives of these parties "pragmatic," in reality
it was rather inconsistent and unrealistic. This approach
underestimated the fact that Russia always retaliated
against deeper integration of former Communist coun-
tries, including Slovakia, into the structures of the collec-
tive West.

Important developments which affected the Slovak-
Russian relationship in the last six years were Russia's
annexation of Crimea, the war in eastern Ukraine and
consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict for the
system of international relations. As an EU member state,
Slovakia joined and abided the common policy of sanc-
tions imposed by the EU on Russia due to its aggression.
However, Smer-SD's leader Robert Fico, who served as
prime minister in 2012–2018, many times expressed his
objections against the sanctions and persistently spoke
about the need to lift them. In August 2016, Robert Fico
visited Moscow and during his meeting with Vladimir
Putin he said he did not see any reasons for decreasing
mutual trade between Russia and Slovakia. Prime Min-
ister Peter Pellegrini, also from Smer-SD (who served in
2018–2020), continued this line. He characterized the
sanctions as ineffective, useless, and even harmful for Slo-
vakia's economy. Speaker of Parliament Andrej Danko
from the SNS (who served in 2016–2020), known for
his close personal relations with the Russian State Duma
speaker Viacheslav Volodin, frequently visited Moscow
and presented views contradictory to the common EU
policies toward Russia. He de facto behaved as an ad-
vocate of Russia's interests.

However, with all this Slovakia did not initiate any
steps which would change the EU's policy of sanctions
against Russia. On the other hand, the fact that prominent Slovak politicians (Danko, Pellegrini, Fico) publicly expressed—and even directly in Russia—views dissenting from the common EU's positions, assisted the spread of pro-Russian narratives in Slovak society (including the idea about the high importance and irreplaceability of Slovak-Russian economic ties<fnref n="8" />). It led to the formation of an inadequate, misleading image of Russia and Russian policies toward Slovakia and its allies among considerable part of Slovakia's population.

Symptomatic in this context were findings about Russia's activities inside Slovakia disclosed by the Slovak special services. According to the 2018 annual report of the Slovak intelligence service (SIS), "the activities of Russian intelligence services were directed against the protected interests of the Slovak Republic as a member of the EU and NATO. Members of the Russian intelligence services operating in the Slovak Republic, mostly under diplomatic cover, sought to recruit employees in the central bodies of state administration, security forces and in the field of energy and defense."<fnref n="9" /> SIS notes that Russia "continued to regard the Euro-Atlantic community as its main geopolitical rival and a threat to its security and stability."<fnref n="10" /> In the section on hybrid threats the SIS report informs that in Slovakia, the "Russian Federation has been developing activities that were primarily aimed at keeping the Slovak public sympathetic to Russia, its culture and politics, and at weakening forces openly skeptical or critical of Russia. The Russian side also sought to create an impression among its own domestic as well as foreign audiences that the Slovak Republic is a close ally

of Russia, which, as a member of NATO and the EU, respects and understands Russian interests."<fnref n="11" />

At the end of September 2020, the Slovak Information Service (SIS) published a report on its activities in 2019. According to the SIS, "members of the Russian intelligence services, operating on the territory of the Slovak Republic mainly under diplomatic cover, sought to infiltrate the central state administration and security forces and to acquire collaborators in the energy and military fields. They regularly participated in professional events focused on energy and military issues, where they tried to contact the interested persons with access to sensitive classified information from the EU and NATO environment, as well as persons close to the highest state officials."<fnref n="12" />

The document continued with a chapter on hybrid threats, in which the SIS pointed out that "Slovakia, as an EU and NATO member state, faced influence campaigns mainly from foreign powers aimed at weakening the political cohesion of both international organizations in order to disrupt their unity, [and their] ability to act and defend themselves. Foreign actors have focused on influencing elites, the professional community, and the population with the aim to produce mistrust in these international organizations and questioning the Allies' willingness to fulfil their solidarity obligations the membership in these organizations assumes." SIS stated that "the primary sources of campaigns aimed at discrediting the EU and NATO were Russian sources (official media, state institutions, think tanks, experts), which formed the strategic direction of this communication. Their messages were subsequently adopted by similarly oriented media and organizations in European countries. The main disseminators of pro-Russian narratives in the Slovak Republic were pro-Russian non-governmental organizations and groups on social networks, Russian news media, including their foreign branches, and the so-called alternative media. As in the previous period, Russian propaganda, to a high degree, used pro-Russian sympathizers, who out of their own convictions uncritically adapted and further spread these messages."<fnref n="13" />

Compared to the SIS report for the previous year, in this year's report information on influence operations was more detailed and specific, especially with regard to

<footnote n="8">8 However, according to official statistics, the parameters of Slovakia's trade with Russia are today less significant than before 2014. In August 2020, Slovakia's export to Russia represented 1.6 % of the country's total exports; import from Russia represented 5.5 % of total Slovakia's imports. For comparison, Slovakia's export to EU member-states constituted 79.9 % of the total country's exports and import from the EU-member-states constituted 65.1 % of the total Slovakia's imports – see: "Celkový dovoz a celkový vývoz podľa kontinentov a ekonomických zoskupení krajín," [Total imports and total exports by continents and economic groupings of countries], Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (website), 2020, http://statdat.statistics.sk/cognosext/cgi-bin/cognos.cgi?b_action=cognosViewer&ui.action=run&uiobject=storeID(%22i10B2CB52FFF44B319DA31F65A3FFE155%22)&ui.name=Celkov%c3%bd%20dovoz%20a%20celkov%c3%bd%20v%c3%bdvoz%20pod%c4%bea%20kontinentov%20a%20ekonomick%c3%bdch%20zoskupen%c3%ad%20kraj%c3%adn%20v%20roku%202014%20%5bzo0002ms%5d&run outputFormat=&run=prompt=true&cv header=false&ui.backURL=%2fcognosext%2fcps4%2fportlets%2fcommon%2fclose.html&run.outputLocale=sk.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9 Slovak Information Service, Správa o činnosti SIS za rok 2018. Bratislava, jún 2019, [Report on activities of the Slovak Information Service in 2018. Bratislava, June 2019], http://www.sis.gov.sk/pre-vas/sprava-o-cinnosti.html#uvod.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10 Slovak Information Service, Správa o činnosti SIS za rok 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11 Slovak Information Service, Správa o činnosti SIS za rok 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 Slovak Information Service, Správa o činnosti SIS za rok 2019. Bratislava, september 2020, [Report on activities of the Slovak Information Service in 2019. Bratislava, September 2020], https://www.sis.gov.sk/pre-vas/sprava-o-cinnosti-2019.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">13 Slovak Information Service, Správa o činnosti SIS za rok 2019.</footnote>
domestic, Slovak disseminators of Russian influence. Unambiguous formulations of Slovak intelligence analysts painted a picture of a branched ecosystem of activities aimed at damaging the country's internal democratic organization and its foreign policy ties.

The clear-cut pro-Western line in the country's foreign policy in recent years is represented by President Andrej Kiska (2004–2019) and his successor Zuzana Čaputová (inaugurated in June 2019). Both heads of the state supported the sanctions against Russia and emphasized the need to strengthen Slovakia's ties and cooperation with the EU and NATO. The stances of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were basically in accordance with the positions of presidents.

Three parties of the current ruling coalition formed in March 2020—the center-right, prevailingly conservative movement Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OL'ANO), the libertarian party Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), and the liberal-conservative party Za ľudí (For People)—can be characterized as clearly pro-Western, pro-EU, and pro-NATO, both on the level of program and stances of their individual representatives. The fourth member of the coalition—the socially conservative populist movement Sme rodina (We Are Family)—is a partner of Marine Le Pen's National Rally and Matteo Salvini's Lega. Although its representatives do not present openly pro-Russian views, the movement's positions on foreign policy are marked by certain unclearness. The movement, however, promised that as a ruling party it would be strictly pursuing the overall pro-EU and pro-NATO line in the country's foreign policy and external security. It is worth noting that in previous years, despite We Are Family's partnership with Le Pen and Salvini, it did not act as an actor of Russian influence.

## PRO-KREMLIN'S LOBBIES

A conglomerate of local actors exists in Slovakia that openly features in favor of closer cooperation with Russia, and it varies from the extreme left to the extreme right.

## POLITICS

The political segment of this conglomerate includes the marginal Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), which did not run in the recent parliamentary elections in February 2020; the radical nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS), which dropped out from the parliament in February 2020 after the elections with 3.16 percent of votes; and the nationalist local “alt-right” party Vlasť (“Motherland”), founded by former Minister of Justice Štefan Harabin, which failed to enter the parliament in February 2020 with 2.93 percent of votes.

The most relevant openly pro-Russian political force in Slovakia is the neo-fascist party People's Party Our Slovakia (LSNS), elected in parliament in 2016 and re-elected in 2020 with similar results (7.97 percent). This party expresses clearly pro-Russian stances in foreign policy combining them with fierce anti-EU and anti-NATO views. It demands Slovakia's withdrawal from both organizations. There are two Members of the European Parliament elected in 2019 on the LSNS list who present in the European Parliament consistent pro-Kremlin views, advocating Russia's foreign policy. Moreover, one of them, Milan Uhrík, praises the Kremlin's domestic politics and recommends using Russia's experience pro domo in Slovakia. In one of his blog posts titled "Inspiration for Slovak politics—more national pride and less humiliation" he wrote: "The Russians approved in a popular vote major changes in the Russian constitution—a clear anchoring of traditional values, ensuring the defense of their own sovereignty, and also the enactment of raising pension and social standards. Some criticize the vote for allowing Putin to run for president again, but this is not surprising given his high popularity. In any case, many of the changes adopted are good and could be an inspiration for Slovak politics as well—for more national pride and less humiliation. For good cooperation with Russia."<fnref n="14" />

The previous ruling party Smer-SD, the self-declared “social democrats,” is an opportunistic mixture of politicians who—with few exceptions—avoid presenting their views on foreign policy and relations with other states. None of them can be considered as a sincere, commit-

<footnote n="14">14 Milan Uhrík, https://hlas-parlamentu.sk/politik/milan-uhrik.</footnote>
ted, and active supporter of the country's pro-Western orientation. The most spectacular and vocal exception however, on the opposite, pro-Russian, side is Smer-SD's MP, party's vice-chairman, Ľuboš Blaha, who calls himself "Marxist and leftist." Blaha is an open supporter of Russia's foreign policy, approving the annexation of Crimea, the concept of "Novorossiya," the Russian occupation of part of Ukraine's Donbas, and Russia's confrontation with the West. He is a fervent opponent of the "liberal" West, the US, NATO and the EU, a critic of Israel and a sympathizer of "left-leaning" authoritarian regimes (China, Venezuela, Cuba, Syria) as well as Iran. Blaha's typical optic in his perception of the global situation in the world and Slovakia's position in the context of relations between the West and Russia can be seen in the following statement made on July 1, 2020: "Today is a black day for Slovakia. We have officially become a colony of the USA. ... Do you know what happened today? Matovič's government recognized Guaidó as a president of Venezuela. ... The American Embassy gave the order and Minister [of Foreign Affairs] Korčok ran with his tongue out and fulfilled without grumbling what his masters commanded. ... Korčok sold us again. And it will continue. Soon there will be here the American bases, American weapons of mass destruction, American 'advisers,' American soldiers ... And they will drive us to war with Russia. That's what it's all about."<fnref n="15" />

During his three tenures as prime minister (2006–2010, 2012–2016 and 2016–2018), Smer-SD's leader Robert Fico had to demonstrate his basic compliance with the country's official pro-Western foreign policy; however as a party leader and a private person even then he repeatedly expressed his sympathies to Russia and other states with authoritarian regimes. After his resignation in 2018 he became an open opponent of the Western approach to Russia and a supporter of the world's autocrats (in August 2010 he criticized the EU for its critical stance to developments in Belarus and sanctions imposed on Lukashenka's regime).

## ACADEMIA AND CULTURE

Russian state-sponsored organizations and their local partners conduct common activities in Slovakia in the areas of culture and academia, especially in the humanities and social sciences. The possible reasons for involving local actors into pro-Russian activities include political and ideological considerations, personal value preferences, and last but not least, material interests. Seemingly, the most appealing thing that Russia can offer to pro-Russian local actors in Slovakia is an opportunity to be identified with the narratives which are closed to the value orientations of these actors (nationalism, pan-Slavism, nostalgia for the Communist or even pre-Communist authoritarian past, illiberal political views, anti-Western, anti-EU and NATO attitudes, criticism of liberal democracy). For some people, the attraction can also be an opportunity to visit Russia (for example, for participation in "prestigious" meetings such Valdai Club sessions), to lecture in Russian academic institutions (universities), to publish articles in Russian scholarly periodicals, and to enjoy "professional recognition" in Russia, and other things.

Russian institutions organize events in Slovakia aimed at promoting Russia's views about the world's development, historical events, the situation in Europe, and current international relations. The key player in these attempts is the Embassy of the Russian Federation, whose representatives, including the ambassador and senior diplomats, participate directly in the events and provide organizational support. In the sphere of social sciences and humanities the Russian organizations, in cooperation with local partners, organize conferences and other events for experts with specially selected speakers (Russian, Slovak or international) on the topics directly related to current developments in international affairs, Russia's foreign policy, journalism, Slovak-Russian relations. Part of the picture is individual activities of Russian scholars invited to Slovakia by the Russian Embassy or Russian Center for Science and Culture (lectures, participation in public events). The list of Russian lecturers and guests includes some known names—Stalinist propagandist Nikolay Starikov, historian Sviatoslav Rybas, political scientist Andranik Migranian, political analyst Vladimir Kozin, film director Nikita Mikhalkov, and others.

The efforts of Russian state institutions to infiltrate the space of independent social and policy analysis, however, has their limits due to the fact that the community of Slovak independent scholars working in analytical centers (think tanks) is strongly pro-Western and pro-Atlanticist. Therefore, Russian institutions (embassy, state agencies, academia, etc.) rather opt for cooperation with Slovak

<footnote n="15">15 Ľuboš Blaha, "Čierny deň pre Slovensko – budú nás hnaf do vojny s Ruskom," [Black day for Slovakia – they will drive us to war with Russia], Nové slovo, July 7, 2020, https://www.noveslovo.sk/prispevok-v-blogu/Cierny_den_pre_Slovensko_budu_nas_hnat_do_vojny_s_Ruskom.</footnote>
public (state-sponsored) academic institutions—universities and institutes of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. The reasons for closer cooperation between these institutions and Russian partners are often personal, including individual scholars' critical attitude to globalization considered as the "US-lead process," to the role of the West ("domination of the USA," "aggressive policies") that allegedly tries to diminish the role of other states, including Russia, and general distrust of liberal democracy. Some of such scholars have a track record of working in the official structures of the former Communist regime.

In the sphere of culture and art, the main Russian actor in Slovakia is the Russian Center of Science and Culture that separately or in cooperation with other institutions (local agencies, associations of Russian expats, representatives of some local self-governments, business groups, etc.) organizes cultural events combining art production (musical, visual, literary) with deliverance of sociopolitical messages and dissemination of Russian "patriotic" narratives (exhibitions dedicated to anniversaries of the liberation of Slovakia and Bratislava from Nazi Germany or Victory Day in WWII, photo exhibitions about events in "Novorossiya," concerts of the Alexandrov Ensemble (the official army choir of the Russian armed forces) with local pop-singers, visits of "Night Wolves" motorbike gang, festivals of Russian culture, performances of Russian dramatic actors and musicians, memorial events "Immortal regiment," celebrations of anniversaries of Yuri Gagarin's flight to space, the international festival "Day of Slavs," movies projection, exhibitions of Soviet posters, etc.). Some of these events attract a relatively limited audience, others, however, are attended by a large number of participants. The Center also directly influences the activities of Russian expats, organizing and supervising the social contacts and networks between Slovak alumni of Russian and Soviet universities and high schools.

## MEDIA

Attempts to strengthen Russia's influence in Slovakia would be unimaginable without actions on the media scene. There are, however, certain specifics here. The possibilities of Russian state media to directly influence the Slovak population are limited. Unlike in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, there are no national language versions of Russian media outlets in Slovakia.

Although selected Russian TV channels can be viewed in Slovakia on some TV cable networks (nationwide and local), the national monitoring of TV broadcast-

ing so far did not indicate any Russian channel among those which are mostly watched. The share of viewers of Russian channels is statistically insignificant. Taking into consideration the limited possibilities of Russian media to directly penetrate Slovak public space, it is logical that the main media channels of the Kremlin's ideological infiltration are domestic outlets. However, these are not mainstream media, since among Slovak mainstream ("serious") outlets there is a prevalent tone criticizing Russia and its foreign policy, but rather fringe, conspiratorial and disinformation outlets. These outlets constitute an openly pro-Russian camp on Slovakia's media scene. It needs to be said that after the inception of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, dozens of online resources in Slovak and Czech languages were activated and disseminated pro-Russian content and propagandist narratives.<fnref n="16" />

Web portal HlavneSpravy.sk (Main News), located in Košice, is an outlet spreading pro-Russian narratives in a sophisticated manner, mixing news from mainstream media (press and online outlets and agencies) with its own comments. It also translates and publishes contributions taken from various Russian media. Pro-Russian instances are accompanied by open criticism of policies of the Western states. HlavneSpravy.sk is considered the main disseminator of pro-Russian content on the media scene in Slovakia.

The monthly Zem a Vek (Earth and Age) is a periodical of conspiratorial type that publicizes material about the domination of the US and Zionism (Jews) over the world, a typical anti-Semitic media outlet. Articles published in this magazine are characterized by systemic resistance to values of liberal democracy and criticism of the West, the EU and NATO, as well as by positive attitudes towards the current political regime in Russia. In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict the magazine took a stance similar to Russian propaganda. It openly supported the separatist rebellion on Donbas.

The online radio station Slobodný vysielač (Free Broadcaster) is a fringe outlet established in 2013. It combines anti-corruption rhetoric with calls for direct or "true" democracy, along with a broad range of esoteric and conspiracy topics. It offers broadcasting space inter alia to persons whose views are marked by open sympathies to Russia's foreign policy, harsh criticism of liberal

<footnote n="16">16 Ivana Smoleňová, *The Pro-Russian Disinformation Campaign in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: Types of Media Spreading pro-Russian Propaganda, Their Characteristics and Frequently Used Narratives* (Prague: Prague Security Studies Institute, 2015), http://www.hom-bre.cz/images/253_is-pro-russian-campaign.pdf.</footnote>
democracy and the West, and anti-Semitic rhetoric.

The “left” side of the pro-Russian camp on Slovakia’s media scene consists of several platforms close to former ruling party Smer-SD. Clear pro-Russian attitudes and an extremely critical tone towards the West—EU, USA, NATO (and Ukraine since 2014) are typical for articles publicized in the biweekly *Slovenský rozhľad* (Slovak Outlook). Authors supported Robert Fico in his opposition against some EU policies and approved all his activities aimed at strengthening cooperation with Russia. “Leftist” web portal Slovo (Word), is an outlet publishing contributions with pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian, anti-American, and anti-Western content. The similarly themed articles, but formulated in a more nationalist and conspiratorial spirit, are publicized by biweekly periodical *Literárny týždenník* (Literary Weekly) and monthly *Extra Plus*. The content of the contributions in these outlets corresponds to the overall orientation of these periodicals, which is marked by criticism of the pro-Western line in Slovakia’s foreign policy, opposition to liberal socioeconomic reforms, state interventionism, disagreement with NATO activities, criticism of various aspects of European integration and EU policies, anti-Americanism, nationalism, and evident inclinations to the policy of Russia’s leadership. *Bojovník* (the Warrior), a biweekly periodical of the Slovak Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters, publishes materials taken directly from Russian sources that spreads Russian narratives, including those on the struggle against “Ukrainian fascism,” and it openly supported separatist rebels in Donbas.

## CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of Russia's efforts to strengthen its influence in Central Europe, including Slovakia, show that the ultimate goal of Russia's policy is to weaken the countries' ties with the EU and NATO to the lowest possible level, and, if the situation would allow, to achieve their withdrawal from these Western groupings. Efforts in this direction embrace a variety of steps: support for local political forces and personalities which hold anti-EU and anti-NATO stances to create favorable conditions for anti-Western foreign policy, and influence public discourse according to propaganda templates to provoke resistance against European integration and a transatlantic partnership. In this context Slovakia's case can serve as a part of the broader picture and as an indication of trends leading to disunity inside the EU and NATO, and to growing internal disputes and conflicts in the Western community. The weaker the ties with the EU and NATO, the stronger

the relations between Slovakia and Russia—this can be taken as an axiom of the Kremlin's attitude.

The experience of the last two decades shows that the nature of Slovak-Russian relations and the conditions for Russia's efforts to strengthen its influence in Slovakia depend to a large extent on domestic factors, mainly the balance of power between proponents and opponents of the country's pro-Western choice. The stronger the position of liberal democracy actors on the political scene and in the system of power institutions, the weaker the Kremlin's chances of penetrating the vital sectors of Slovak society. From this point of view, the results of the Slovak parliamentary elections in February 2020 should not increase the Kremlin's chances.
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