• The American authorities asked the French Interior Ministry to forward the information about the executions to the préfets of the départements of Manche and Ille-et-Vilaine so that French newspapers can provide accounts. Usually, such crimes and executions are hardly made public. Why did the American authorities suddenly wish to make them known? On 3 November 1944 General Alphonse Juin (French Chief of Staff) had sent a message to General Eisenhower about the wave of rapes and other crimes that had been brought to his attention by General Legentilhomme, the commander of the Normandy area (Lamache 2010b p.731). Moreover, on 5 November 1944, the French Ministry in charge of the relations with the Allies also sent a letter to the commander of the SHAEF. In response, the American authorities wanted to show that they had already taken action. In short, this episode shows that French protests were not completely ignored. However, as shown by the list of cases given below, after a short-lived decline the crimes continued.

Prior to the wave of executions of 18-24 November 1944 there is only one execution mentioned in Lamache (2010b, p. 766).

1 On 14 August 1944 Private Clarence Whitfield was executed by hanging at the Canisy castle (center of the Manche département) The crime (rape and assault) was committed on 14 June and the trial took place on 20 June.

The executions following those of 18-24 November are listed below in chronological order (Lamache 2010b, p. 768-776).

2 On 10 February 1945 Private Waiters Yancy and Robert L. Skinner were executed by hanging at Briquebec (northern part of the Manche département). The crime (rape and murder) was committed on 1 August 1944 and the trial took place on 7 November 1944.

3 On 28 February 1945 a US soldier, William C. Downes, was executed by hanging at Etienville (in the northern part of the Manche département). The crimes (repeated rape) were committed on 12 July and 26 July and the trial took place on 23 November 1944.

4 On 29 March 1945 a US soldier, Tommie Davison, was executed by hanging at the village of Prise Guiment where the crime (rape) was committed. The trial took place on 9 December 1944.

5 Also on 29 March, a US soldier, Olin W. Williams, was executed by hanging at the village of Chérencé-le-Héron (in the south of the Manche département). The crime (rape and murder) was committed on 24 September 1944 and the trial took place on 15 December.

6 On 19 April 1945, three US soldiers were executed by hanging at La Pernelle (northern part of the Manche département). The crime (rape and murder) was committed on 11 October 1944 and the trial took place on 14 December.

6 On 21 May 1945 Private First Class Haze Heard was executed by hanging at
• The American authorities asked the French Interior Ministry to forward the information about the executions to the préfets of the départements of Manche and Ille-et-Vilaine so that French newspapers can provide accounts. Usually, such crimes and executions are hardly made public. Why did the American authorities suddenly wish to make them known? On 3 November 1944 General Alphonse Juin (French Chief of Staff) had sent a message to General Eisenhower about the wave of rapes and other crimes that had been brought to his attention by General Legentilhomme, the commander of the Normandy area (Lamache 2010b p.731). Moreover, on 5 November 1944, the French Ministry in charge of the relations with the Allies also sent a letter to the commander of the SHAEF. In response, the American authorities wanted to show that they had already taken action. In short, this episode shows that French protests were not completely ignored. However, as shown by the list of cases given below, after a short-lived decline the crimes continued.

Prior to the wave of executions of 18-24 November 1944 there is only one execution mentioned in Lamache (2010b, p. 766).

1 On 14 August 1944 Private Clarence Whitfield was executed by hanging at the Canisy castle (center of the Manche département) The crime (rape and assault) was committed on 14 June and the trial took place on 20 June.

The executions following those of 18-24 November are listed below in chronological order (Lamache 2010b, p. 768-776).

2 On 10 February 1945 Private Waiters Yancy and Robert L. Skinner were executed by hanging at Briquebec (northern part of the Manche département). The crime (rape and murder) was committed on 1 August 1944 and the trial took place on 7 November 1944.

3 On 28 February 1945 a US soldier, William C. Downes, was executed by hanging at Etienville (in the northern part of the Manche département). The crimes (repeated rape) were committed on 12 July and 26 July and the trial took place on 23 November 1944.

4 On 29 March 1945 a US soldier, Tommie Davison, was executed by hanging at the village of Prise Guiment where the crime (rape) was committed. The trial took place on 9 December 1944.

5 Also on 29 March, a US soldier, Olin W. Williams, was executed by hanging at the village of Chérencé-le-Héron (in the south of the Manche département). The crime (rape and murder) was committed on 24 September 1944 and the trial took place on 15 December.

6 On 19 April 1945, three US soldiers were executed by hanging at La Pernelle (northern part of the Manche département). The crime (rape and murder) was committed on 11 October 1944 and the trial took place on 14 December.

6 On 21 May 1945 Private First Class Haze Heard was executed by hanging at
Mesnil Clinchamps in the west of the Calvados département. The crime (rape and murder) was committed on 13 October 1944 and the trial took place on 25 January 1945.

Altogether, according to this list of cases, between August 1944 and May 1945, there were 14 executions for rape crimes. One may wonder if this list is really complete. Indeed, in the week from 18 to 24 November there were 5 executions whereas in the three months after the execution of 14 August there was not a single one until 18 November. This is a very non-uniform statistical distribution.]

**Sep 8, 1945:** On the front page of the "Presse Cherbourgeoise", the newspaper published in Cherbourg, there is an article entitled "Nous voulons nos écoles" [We want our schools back]. The article deplores that 16 months after the Normandy invasion and 4 months after the end of the war, many school buildings in the Cherbourg area are still occupied by US troops. (Lamache 2010b, p. 268)

**Oct 1946:** In French as well as in US accounts there is a temptation to minimize the authority of US military commanders in France in the aftermath of the war. One must rely on a number of "incidents" to form a clearer idea.

For instance in October 1945 a US Military Police sergeant fired on the car of Roger Wybot, the director of French counter intelligence (the so-called DST).

Probably he did not know who was in the car but at the same time one can observe that the incident would have remained unreported if the passenger had been an ordinary citizen.

(http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org)

**Feb 4, 1946:** Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (excerpt). The Department views on French credit needs have not been adversely affected by the change in the French government [de Gaulle left the government in January 1946]. On the contrary. (FRUS, 1946, France)

**May 3, 1946:** War Department to the Commanding General of US Forces in European theater (excerpt). Authority is granted to effect movement into France in case of serious disturbance in order to protect US lives and property if the constitution is rejected. (FRUS, 1946, France)

[This message suggests that after the departure of General de Gaulle France was reduced to the status of a country where, as in Haiti or the Dominican Republic, US troops would intervene to re-establish public order. Although the State Department voiced some objections the directive was uphold nonetheless.]

**Feb 6, 1948:** The Italian government signed a bilateral civil aviation agreement with the United States according to which US carriers are allowed to operate to and through Italy with little restrictions while the Italian carrier is severely limited as to
Mesnil Clinchamps in the west of the Calvados département. The crime (rape and murder) was committed on 13 October 1944 and the trial took place on 25 January 1945.

Altogether, according to this list of cases, between August 1944 and May 1945, there were 14 executions for rape crimes. One may wonder if this list is really complete. Indeed, in the week from 18 to 24 November there were 5 executions whereas in the three months after the execution of 14 August there was not a single one until 18 November. This is a very non-uniform statistical distribution.]

**Sep 8, 1945:** On the front page of the "Presse Cherbourgeoise", the newspaper published in Cherbourg, there is an article entitled "Nous voulons nos écoles" [We want our schools back]. The article deplores that 16 months after the Normandy invasion and 4 months after the end of the war, many school buildings in the Cherbourg area are still occupied by US troops. (Lamache 2010b, p. 268)

**Oct 1946:** In French as well as in US accounts there is a temptation to minimize the authority of US military commanders in France in the aftermath of the war. One must rely on a number of "incidents" to form a clearer idea.

For instance in October 1945 a US Military Police sergeant fired on the car of Roger Wybot, the director of French counter intelligence (the so-called DST).

Probably he did not know who was in the car but at the same time one can observe that the incident would have remained unreported if the passenger had been an ordinary citizen.

(http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org)

**Feb 4, 1946:** Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (excerpt). The Department views on French credit needs have not been adversely affected by the change in the French government [de Gaulle left the government in January 1946]. On the contrary. (FRUS, 1946, France)

**May 3, 1946:** War Department to the Commanding General of US Forces in European theater (excerpt). Authority is granted to effect movement into France in case of serious disturbance in order to protect US lives and property if the constitution is rejected. (FRUS, 1946, France)

[This message suggests that after the departure of General de Gaulle France was reduced to the status of a country where, as in Haiti or the Dominican Republic, US troops would intervene to re-establish public order. Although the State Department voiced some objections the directive was uphold nonetheless.]

**Feb 6, 1948:** The Italian government signed a bilateral civil aviation agreement with the United States according to which US carriers are allowed to operate to and through Italy with little restrictions while the Italian carrier is severely limited as to
traffic points in the United States. (US National Security Council of 22 May 1958, Report on Italy dated 30 April 1958)

[The report emphasizes that Italy has become very unsatisfied with this “unequal treaty” and has formally submitted proposals for amending it.

The same report contains complaints about initiatives taken by President Giovanni Gronchi (president from 11 mai 1955 to 11 mai 1962) such as inviting President Nasser to make a state visit in Italy or supporting Enrico Mattei, the president of ENI, in his conflict with US oil companies.]

**Nov 22, 1949:** Creation of the “Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls” (COCOM) under the influence of the United States. It was based in Paris in an annex of the US embassy. It had 18 members, basically all NATO countries plus Australia, Japan and South Korea. Its role was to prevent exports of sensitive items (e.g. machine tools or computers) to Communist countries. In 1994 it was replaced by the “Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls”. (Wikipedia article in French about COCOM)

[In May 1958 a report about Italy included in the minutes of the 366th meeting of the “National Security Council” observed: “US pressure on Italy to reduce mercury shipments to the Soviet bloc continues”. Although export of mercury to the Soviet bloc was not prohibited, it was subject to quotas.]

**Jun 2, 1958:** Epilogue: General de Gaulle back to power.

Just one day after the government, that General de Gaulle formed at the request of President René Coty, had been invested by the National Assembly, President Eisenhower sent a friendly message of felicitations to General de Gaulle. It said:

Dear Mr. President: I wish to extend to you my personal greetings and good wishes on this occasion of your assuming leadership of the French nation.

You may be confident that I retain vividly in mind the important and friendly association which we had during the critical days of the Second World War.

You know of my deep and lasting affection for France. You may be sure that you have my sympathetic understanding in the great tasks which you are about to undertake.

Please accept, Mr. President, my best wishes for the success of your mission.

Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower
(FRUS, 1958-1960, France. p. 22)

[Quite naturally, this epilogue raises the following question. Prior to May 1958 France was ruled by weak governments (for instance in January 1958, France was granted a loan of $650 million by the US). The State Department knew of course very well that under de Gaulle France would be less pliable. Why then were there no attempts to prevent him from assuming power? The answer is
traffic points in the United States. (US National Security Council of 22 May 1958, Report on Italy dated 30 April 1958)

[The report emphasizes that Italy has become very unsatisfied with this “unequal treaty” and has formally submitted proposals for amending it.

The same report contains complaints about initiatives taken by President Giovanni Gronchi (president from 11 mai 1955 to 11 mai 1962) such as inviting President Nasser to make a state visit in Italy or supporting Enrico Mattei, the president of ENI, in his conflict with US oil companies.]

**Nov 22, 1949:** Creation of the “Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls” (COCOM) under the influence of the United States. It was based in Paris in an annex of the US embassy. It had 18 members, basically all NATO countries plus Australia, Japan and South Korea. Its role was to prevent exports of sensitive items (e.g. machine tools or computers) to Communist countries. In 1994 it was replaced by the “Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls”. (Wikipedia article in French about COCOM)

[In May 1958 a report about Italy included in the minutes of the 366th meeting of the “National Security Council” observed: “US pressure on Italy to reduce mercury shipments to the Soviet bloc continues”. Although export of mercury to the Soviet bloc was not prohibited, it was subject to quotas.]

**Jun 2, 1958:** Epilogue: General de Gaulle back to power.

Just one day after the government, that General de Gaulle formed at the request of President René Coty, had been invested by the National Assembly, President Eisenhower sent a friendly message of felicitations to General de Gaulle. It said:

Dear Mr. President: I wish to extend to you my personal greetings and good wishes on this occasion of your assuming leadership of the French nation.

You may be confident that I retain vividly in mind the important and friendly association which we had during the critical days of the Second World War.

You know of my deep and lasting affection for France. You may be sure that you have my sympathetic understanding in the great tasks which you are about to undertake.

Please accept, Mr. President, my best wishes for the success of your mission.

Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower
(FRUS, 1958-1960, France. p. 22)

[Quite naturally, this epilogue raises the following question. Prior to May 1958 France was ruled by weak governments (for instance in January 1958, France was granted a loan of $650 million by the US). The State Department knew of course very well that under de Gaulle France would be less pliable. Why then were there no attempts to prevent him from assuming power? The answer is
fairly simple.

* In fact, until 23 May the US tried to prop up the government of Pierre Pflimlin. The headlines of the New York Times show this very clearly.

* Between 16 and 22 May there were indirect contacts between General de Gaulle and the US Embassy. For instance on 21 May Mr. Henri Tournet, an aide of General de Gaulle, accompanied by Colonel Sternberg, Executive Officer of MAAG in France, visited the US Embassy. He gave guarantees regarding de Gaulle's position on NATO that allowed the embassy to write to the State Department (on 1 June) "We have been assured from so many sources that De Gaulle will continue the policy of supporting NATO". Indeed, that is what he did. France left NATO only 7 years later during the second term of President de Gaulle.

* The last reason for supporting de Gaulle was expressed by President Eisenhower in the meeting of the "National Security Council" of 29 May: "The President indicated his fear of grave civil disorder if the Communists and Social-ists insisted on standing against the assumption of power of General de Gaulle". (FRUS, 1958-1960, France, p. 22)

Incidentally, it was already very clear at that time that de Gaulle's intention was to give a large autonomy to Algeria. Indeed, during his visit to the US Embassy Tournet called attention to the fact that de Gaulle never said "Algeria is France" and instead considered an association.]

Chronology of the liberation of Denmark

The case of Denmark has many similarities with the case of France.

* After the defeat the government and the king remained in Denmark.

* In April 1940 British troops occupied Iceland and the Faroe islands which were at that time dependencies of Denmark. In April 1941 US troops occupied Greenland. Such invasions parallel the occupation of North Africa, Madagascar and Clipperton Island in the sense that these territories were occupied for strategic reasons without the agreement of the respective governments

* After August 1943 the (more or less nominal<fnref n="37" />) autonomy of the Danish government ended.

* A movement called "Free Danes" or also "Fighting Denmark" appeared in London. It was in relation with a political council in Copenhagen. However, it was

<footnote n="37">³⁷For instance, newspaper articles "which might jeopardize German-Danish relations" were outlawed, in violation of the Danish constitutional prohibition against censorship. On 22 August 1941, the Danish parliament, in violation of the Danish constitution, passed a law outlawing the Communist party and Communist activities. 246 Communist leaders were imprisoned.</footnote>
fairly simple.

* In fact, until 23 May the US tried to prop up the government of Pierre Pflimlin. The headlines of the New York Times show this very clearly.

* Between 16 and 22 May there were indirect contacts between General de Gaulle and the US Embassy. For instance on 21 May Mr. Henri Tournet, an aide of General de Gaulle, accompanied by Colonel Sternberg, Executive Officer of MAAG in France, visited the US Embassy. He gave guarantees regarding de Gaulle's position on NATO that allowed the embassy to write to the State Department (on 1 June) "We have been assured from so many sources that De Gaulle will continue the policy of supporting NATO". Indeed, that is what he did. France left NATO only 7 years later during the second term of President de Gaulle.

* The last reason for supporting de Gaulle was expressed by President Eisenhower in the meeting of the "National Security Council" of 29 May: "The President indicated his fear of grave civil disorder if the Communists and Socialists insisted on standing against the assumption of power of General de Gaulle". (FRUS, 1958-1960, France, p. 22)

Incidentally, it was already very clear at that time that de Gaulle's intention was to give a large autonomy to Algeria. Indeed, during his visit to the US Embassy Tournet called attention to the fact that de Gaulle never said "Algeria is France" and instead considered an association.]

Chronology of the liberation of Denmark

The case of Denmark has many similarities with the case of France.

* After the defeat the government and the king remained in Denmark.

* In April 1940 British troops occupied Iceland and the Faroe islands which were at that time dependencies of Denmark. In April 1941 US troops occupied Greenland. Such invasions parallel the occupation of North Africa, Madagascar and Clipperton Island in the sense that these territories were occupied for strategic reasons without the agreement of the respective governments

* After August 1943 the (more or less nominal<fnref n="37" />) autonomy of the Danish government ended.

* A movement called "Free Danes" or also "Fighting Denmark" appeared in London. It was in relation with a political council in Copenhagen. However, it was

<footnote n="37">³⁷For instance, newspaper articles "which might jeopardize German-Danish relations" were outlawed, in violation of the Danish constitutional prohibition against censorship. On 22 August 1941, the Danish parliament, in violation of the Danish constitution, passed a law outlawing the Communist party and Communist activities. 246 Communist leaders were imprisoned.</footnote>
not recognized by the Allies until

* The navy managed to scuttle 32 of its larger ships, while Germany succeeded in seizing 14 of the larger and 50 of the smaller vessels.

<figure><img src="image_16.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. Allied currency introduced into Denmark in May 1945.** As the inscription in the upper part of the notes is hardly readable, it has been reprinted in red at the top of the figure. It says: "UDSTEDT AF DEN ALLIEREDE OVERKOMMANDO TIL BRUG I DANMARK". In contrast with Norway where the Allied currency was issued with the agreement of the king, there was no such agreement in the case of Denmark.</figcaption></figure>

**Apr 13, 1940-Sep 1944:** The Royal Navy cruiser HMS Suffolk arrived in the Faroe islands on 13 April 1940. 250 Royal Marines were disembarked. Emergency banknotes were issued, and specially-issued Faroese banknotes were later printed by Bradbury Wilkinson in England.

Approximately 170 marriages took place between British soldiers and Faroese women. The British Consul Frederick Mason also married a local woman. The last British soldiers left in September 1944. Home rule was introduced on 23 March 1948.

(Wikipedia article about the occupation of the Faroe islands)

[What proportion of Faroese marriageable women represented the 170 women who married British soldiers? In 1945 the population was about 30,000. If one assumes a similar age group distribution as in the United States, the female population between age 20 and 29 represented 8.4% of the total population, that is to say 2,519 women. Of these the 170 who married British soldiers represented 6.7%. In comparison with the fairly small numbers of soldiers this represents a substantial proportion. If the same proportion of marriages had taken place in Iceland where the number of troops was much larger it would have implied a huge loss of the marriageable part of the population.]
not recognized by the Allies until

* The navy managed to scuttle 32 of its larger ships, while Germany succeeded in seizing 14 of the larger and 50 of the smaller vessels.

<figure><img src="image_16.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. Allied currency introduced into Denmark in May 1945.** As the inscription in the upper part of the notes is hardly readable, it has been reprinted in red at the top of the figure. It says: "UDSTEDT AF DEN ALLIEREDE OVERKOMMANDO TIL BRUG I DANMARK". In contrast with Norway where the Allied currency was issued with the agreement of the king, there was no such agreement in the case of Denmark.</figcaption></figure>

**Apr 13, 1940-Sep 1944:** The Royal Navy cruiser HMS Suffolk arrived in the Faroe islands on 13 April 1940. 250 Royal Marines were disembarked. Emergency banknotes were issued, and specially-issued Faroese banknotes were later printed by Bradbury Wilkinson in England.

Approximately 170 marriages took place between British soldiers and Faroese women. The British Consul Frederick Mason also married a local woman. The last British soldiers left in September 1944. Home rule was introduced on 23 March 1948.

(Wikipedia article about the occupation of the Faroe islands)

[What proportion of Faroese marriageable women represented the 170 women who married British soldiers? In 1945 the population was about 30,000. If one assumes a similar age group distribution as in the United States, the female population between age 20 and 29 represented 8.4% of the total population, that is to say 2,519 women. Of these the 170 who married British soldiers represented 6.7%. In comparison with the fairly small numbers of soldiers this represents a substantial proportion. If the same proportion of marriages had taken place in Iceland where the number of troops was much larger it would have implied a huge loss of the marriageable part of the population.]
**Oct-Nov 1943:** Some 7,500 Jews were able to escape to Sweden. Only some 500 were deported, most of them to Theresienstadt. (Wikipedia article entitled "History of the Jews in Denmark")

**Nov 4, 1944:** Instructions for the SHAEF mission

Message from SHAEF to Maj Gen Richard H. Dewing (Br), Head of the SHAEF Mission to Denmark, excerpts.

* 3. You will endeavor to bring the Danish Government to comply with such Civil Affairs policies as the Supreme Commander may formulate or with such requests as he may address to the Danish Government through the Mission under your command.

* 5. Your Civil Affairs staff has been selected for its knowledge of the problems peculiar to Denmark.

* 11. Finance. You will maintain liaison with the Danish Government on all problems relating to currency, property control and general financial questions. You will be guided as to policy by the separate financial directive issued by the Supreme Commander relative to Denmark.

* 17. You will refer to Supreme Headquarters all questions requiring policy decision raised by the Danish Government outside routine Civil Affairs activities. (Coles 1964, chapter 29, p. 837) [This directive is not issued to Civil Affairs but to SHAEF of which Civil Affairs is a component (namely G-5). This is certainly the reason why it does not give any specific instructions.]

**1945:** After the war, 40,000 people were arrested on suspicion of collaboration. Of these, 13,500 were punished in some way. 78 received death sentences, of which 46 were carried out. (Wikipedia article on the German Occupation)

**May 4, 1945:** When collapse in Europe seemed imminent, the entire G-5 Division (i.e. Civil Affairs) was placed on 24 hours notice to move to the continent. On the announcement of the surrender of the Germans occupying Denmark, Maj. Gen. R. H. Dewing and certain officers of his staff were flown to Copenhagen, and arrived at Kastrup Airfield on the afternoon of 6 May 1945. Two days later a further group arrived at Copenhagen by air. The [Civil Affairs] Division was established on the 5th floor of Dagmarhus, Copenhagen and immediately commenced the tasks for which it had so long been planning. (Coles 1964, chapter 29, p. 838)

**May 23, 1945:** The motion [about Greenland] was brought before the Rigsdag<fnref n="38" /> at its first meeting on 16 May 1945 and both Chambers unanimously gave their consent to the Agreement [of 9 April 1941]. In virtue of the consent given by the Rigsdag, His Majesty the King of Denmark in a Council of State held on 23 May has formally

<footnote n="38">³⁸The Rigsdag was composed of an upper house and a lower house. In 1953 it was replaced by the unicameral Folketing.</footnote>
**Oct-Nov 1943:** Some 7,500 Jews were able to escape to Sweden. Only some 500 were deported, most of them to Theresienstadt. (Wikipedia article entitled "History of the Jews in Denmark")

**Nov 4, 1944:** Instructions for the SHAEF mission

Message from SHAEF to Maj Gen Richard H. Dewing (Br), Head of the SHAEF Mission to Denmark, excerpts.

* 3. You will endeavor to bring the Danish Government to comply with such Civil Affairs policies as the Supreme Commander may formulate or with such requests as he may address to the Danish Government through the Mission under your command.

* 5. Your Civil Affairs staff has been selected for its knowledge of the problems peculiar to Denmark.

* 11. Finance. You will maintain liaison with the Danish Government on all problems relating to currency, property control and general financial questions. You will be guided as to policy by the separate financial directive issued by the Supreme Commander relative to Denmark.

* 17. You will refer to Supreme Headquarters all questions requiring policy decision raised by the Danish Government outside routine Civil Affairs activities. (Coles 1964, chapter 29, p. 837) [This directive is not issued to Civil Affairs but to SHAEF of which Civil Affairs is a component (namely G-5). This is certainly the reason why it does not give any specific instructions.]

**1945:** After the war, 40,000 people were arrested on suspicion of collaboration. Of these, 13,500 were punished in some way. 78 received death sentences, of which 46 were carried out. (Wikipedia article on the German Occupation)

**May 4, 1945:** When collapse in Europe seemed imminent, the entire G-5 Division (i.e. Civil Affairs) was placed on 24 hours notice to move to the continent. On the announcement of the surrender of the Germans occupying Denmark, Maj. Gen. R. H. Dewing and certain officers of his staff were flown to Copenhagen, and arrived at Kastrup Airfield on the afternoon of 6 May 1945. Two days later a further group arrived at Copenhagen by air. The [Civil Affairs] Division was established on the 5th floor of Dagmarhus, Copenhagen and immediately commenced the tasks for which it had so long been planning. (Coles 1964, chapter 29, p. 838)

**May 23, 1945:** The motion [about Greenland] was brought before the Rigsdag<fnref n="38" /> at its first meeting on 16 May 1945 and both Chambers unanimously gave their consent to the Agreement [of 9 April 1941]. In virtue of the consent given by the Rigsdag, His Majesty the King of Denmark in a Council of State held on 23 May has formally

<footnote n="38">³⁸The Rigsdag was composed of an upper house and a lower house. In 1953 it was replaced by the unicameral Folketing.</footnote>
approved the Greenland Agreement of 9 April 1941. (Foreign Relations of the United States, Europe 1945)

[The Agreement of 9 April 1941 had been signed by the Danish Ambassador in Washington without any official authorization. He was dismissed thereafter. The meeting of the Rigsdag took place hastily only one week after the liberation of the country. Did this parliament really represent This Rigsdag had been elected in 1943 under German occupation. Did it truly represent the country? One can observe that in 1943 the Communist party was banned and could not take part in the election.]

**Jul 25, 1945:** Message from the Acting US Secretary of State to the Danish Minister. I have the honor to request that the areas in Greenland appearing on the attached list shall be considered as defense areas in accordance with the provisions of Article V of the Agreement of 9 April 1941. [The list which is attached consists of 15 enclaves each having a diameter of 6.5 km. (FRUS, Europe, 1945)]

[In 1941 the US government had proclaimed that it was occupying Greenland and Iceland to defend these islands against a possible invasion by Germany. Yet, the end of the war did not bring an end to these occupations.]

**Oct 11, 1945:** The Danish government did not wish to receive any renumeration due to Denmark for the use made of Greenland by the United States during the war. (FRUS, Europe, 1945)

[In contrast it can be mentioned that during the war Denmark had continued without any interruption the payment of the interest on the $ 125 million Danish bonds issued in the United States. Although dismissed by the Danish government, the Danish minister in Washington, Mr de Kaufmann, had allowed such payments by reducing the Danish gold reserve in the United States.]

**Oct 19, 1945:** The 40 Danish ships requisitioned by the US government were sent into danger zones from which American ships were excluded by the US Neutrality Act. They sailed without protection and 23 of them were sunk with heavy loss of lives.

In a reply to a Danish message, the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, said that if the owners of the ships are not satisfied with the compensation offered by the United States they can start an action in US courts. (FRUS, Europe, 1945)

[Would such an action in US courts have any chance to be successful? An action in Danish courts had perhaps a better chance of success but the US government would probably not comply with a judgment delivered by a Danish court. In any case it turned out to be a difficult negotiation which lasted 13 years. The final agreement occurred on 28 August 1958.]

**Oct 26, 1945:** The Danish Foreign Office has telegraphed that it was horrified at the
approved the Greenland Agreement of 9 April 1941. (Foreign Relations of the United States, Europe 1945)

[The Agreement of 9 April 1941 had been signed by the Danish Ambassador in Washington without any official authorization. He was dismissed thereafter. The meeting of the Rigsdag took place hastily only one week after the liberation of the country. Did this parliament really represent This Rigsdag had been elected in 1943 under German occupation. Did it truly represent the country? One can observe that in 1943 the Communist party was banned and could not take part in the election.]

**Jul 25, 1945:** Message from the Acting US Secretary of State to the Danish Minister. I have the honor to request that the areas in Greenland appearing on the attached list shall be considered as defense areas in accordance with the provisions of Article V of the Agreement of 9 April 1941. [The list which is attached consists of 15 enclaves each having a diameter of 6.5 km. (FRUS, Europe, 1945)]

[In 1941 the US government had proclaimed that it was occupying Greenland and Iceland to defend these islands against a possible invasion by Germany. Yet, the end of the war did not bring an end to these occupations.]

**Oct 11, 1945:** The Danish government did not wish to receive any renumeration due to Denmark for the use made of Greenland by the United States during the war. (FRUS, Europe, 1945)

[In contrast it can be mentioned that during the war Denmark had continued without any interruption the payment of the interest on the $ 125 million Danish bonds issued in the United States. Although dismissed by the Danish government, the Danish minister in Washington, Mr de Kaufmann, had allowed such payments by reducing the Danish gold reserve in the United States.]

**Oct 19, 1945:** The 40 Danish ships requisitioned by the US government were sent into danger zones from which American ships were excluded by the US Neutrality Act. They sailed without protection and 23 of them were sunk with heavy loss of lives.

In a reply to a Danish message, the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, said that if the owners of the ships are not satisfied with the compensation offered by the United States they can start an action in US courts. (FRUS, Europe, 1945)

[Would such an action in US courts have any chance to be successful? An action in Danish courts had perhaps a better chance of success but the US government would probably not comply with a judgment delivered by a Danish court. In any case it turned out to be a difficult negotiation which lasted 13 years. The final agreement occurred on 28 August 1958.]

**Oct 26, 1945:** The Danish Foreign Office has telegraphed that it was horrified at the
prospect of receiving a request from the United States for bases in Greenland. It feels
that any such request would be rejected except if supported by the Security Council.
(FRUS, Europe, 1945)

[The Danish government understood very well that any such decision of the Security Council would be vetoed by the Soviet Union. In other words, this was the first Danish refusal opposed to US requests.]

**Dec 21, 1945:** The Danes are angry at England over a pact on trade. (Chicago Daily Tribune, Dec 21, 1945, p. 6)

**Dec 22, 1945:** Troops of Britain and Denmark clashed. The Moscow radio, quoting a Tass dispatch from Copenhagen, said tonight had been a "number of clashes" involving British and Danish troops on the Danish-German frontier. No comment was available immediately from the British war office. Chicago Daily Tribune Dec 22, 1945, p. 7; Washington Post Dec 22, 1945 p. 4)

The liberation of Denmark was mainly a British affair but American "Technical Intelligence Teams" did operate in British controlled areas in 1945. One of these teams was the "Combined Advance Field Teams" (CAFT) who would evaluate targets judged to be of scientific intelligence value.

Chronology of the liberation of Norway

**May 9, 1945:** Lt. Col. E. A. J. Johnson, Chief of the Economics Branch, arrived in Oslo by plane as the first Civil Affairs Officer to enter the country since the surrender of the German forces. On 11 May he was joined by:

Lt. Col. John Enrietto, Chief of the Legal Branch,

Lt. Col. E. Ross Jenney, Head of the Public Health Section,

Lt. Col. R. F. E. Laidlaw, Chief of the Public Safety and Welfare Branch.

The Civil Affairs Division will work under British General Andrew M. Thorne, the Commander of Allied Land Forces in Norway.

(Coles 1964, chapter 29, p. 843)

**May 20-31, 1945:** The usual incidents of cutting of hair of women who consorted with the enemy have taken place but without great disturbances. It seems to be the Norwegian attitude that these women will be such social outcasts that they will find it necessary to go to Germany. (Coles 1964, chapter 29, p. 844)

**May 20-31, 1945:** A somewhat startling departure in the field of international law is the determination by SHAEF that members of the German armed forces in Norway who surrendered on 8 May 45 would not be declared prisoners of war but would be treated as disarmed military personnel. The effect was to create in international law
prospect of receiving a request from the United States for bases in Greenland. It feels
that any such request would be rejected except if supported by the Security Council.
(FRUS, Europe, 1945)

[The Danish government understood very well that any such decision of the Security Council would be vetoed by the Soviet Union. In other words, this was the first Danish refusal opposed to US requests.]

**Dec 21, 1945:** The Danes are angry at England over a pact on trade. (Chicago Daily Tribune, Dec 21, 1945, p. 6)

**Dec 22, 1945:** Troops of Britain and Denmark clashed. The Moscow radio, quoting a Tass dispatch from Copenhagen, said tonight had been a "number of clashes" involving British and Danish troops on the Danish-German frontier. No comment was available immediately from the British war office. Chicago Daily Tribune Dec 22, 1945, p. 7; Washington Post Dec 22, 1945 p. 4)

The liberation of Denmark was mainly a British affair but American "Technical Intelligence Teams" did operate in British controlled areas in 1945. One of these teams was the "Combined Advance Field Teams" (CAFT) who would evaluate targets judged to be of scientific intelligence value.

Chronology of the liberation of Norway

**May 9, 1945:** Lt. Col. E. A. J. Johnson, Chief of the Economics Branch, arrived in Oslo by plane as the first Civil Affairs Officer to enter the country since the surrender of the German forces. On 11 May he was joined by:

Lt. Col. John Enrietto, Chief of the Legal Branch,

Lt. Col. E. Ross Jenney, Head of the Public Health Section,

Lt. Col. R. F. E. Laidlaw, Chief of the Public Safety and Welfare Branch.

The Civil Affairs Division will work under British General Andrew M. Thorne, the Commander of Allied Land Forces in Norway.

(Coles 1964, chapter 29, p. 843)

**May 20-31, 1945:** The usual incidents of cutting of hair of women who consorted with the enemy have taken place but without great disturbances. It seems to be the Norwegian attitude that these women will be such social outcasts that they will find it necessary to go to Germany. (Coles 1964, chapter 29, p. 844)

**May 20-31, 1945:** A somewhat startling departure in the field of international law is the determination by SHAEF that members of the German armed forces in Norway who surrendered on 8 May 45 would not be declared prisoners of war but would be treated as disarmed military personnel. The effect was to create in international law
an entirely new class of persons, namely disarmed military personnel. (Coles 1964, chapter 29, p. 844)

[This is one case of re-categorization of prisoners following the German surrender. Such re-definitions greatly contributed to make Allied statistical data about German prisoners of war unreliable and open to discussion.]

**Jun 7, 1945:** About one hour before King Haakon VII set foot on Norwegian soil the Head of Civil Affairs in Norway, rode to the Royal Palace. He carried with him a letter from SHAEF terminating the Military Phase of the Norway operation. This letter announced to the Norwegian Government that the complete responsibility for civil administration in Norway was restored to His Majesty the King and to the Norwegian Government.

Though of historical value, this declaration has in no way affected the work of Civil Affairs, which, in any case, has always worked in close co-operation with both governmental and local authorities. Their work will continue until the Allied Forces are eventually withdrawn. (Coles 1964, chapter 29, p. 846)

[This excerpt mentions the “responsibility for civil administration”, but what about Norwegian armed forces?]

## Why did the US promote European unification?

### US role in European unification?

Between 1945 and 1949, the expression “European Union” appears in 567 articles of the New York Times and the expression “United States of Europe” 182 times.

The fact that the US State Department sponsored non-governmental organisations working in favor of European integration has been well documented for instance in the works of Rebattet (1962), Aldrich (1997), Grosbois (2006, 2009, 2010). It has been estimated that between 1949 and 1960 (at least) $4 million were distributed (Aldrich 1997, p. 211).

The Oxford thesis by François-Xavier Rebattet (1962) provided the first detailed description of US involvement in the promotion of European unification. However, for some reason, this thesis was closed to consultation from 1962 to 1971. The ban was lifted by the Oxford Faculty Board in 1971 (see Fig. xx). Then, on 26 June 1975 the “Washington Post” devoted a long article (see Fig. xxa) to the thesis<fnref n="39" />. This

<footnote n="39">³⁹As stated in the article itself, it was in fact preceded by an article in the English weekly magazine "Time out" in the issue of 23-29 May 1975 which was entitled "Uncle Sam goes to market". This article came out at a critical moment just a few days before the referendum of 6 June 1975 on whether to stay in or quit the Common Market. It should be noted that in the first years after being launched in 1968, "Time out" had a radical leaning (which however did not survive very long). For instance, in 1976 it published the names of 60 purported CIA agents stationed in England. In the time interval between the publications of the "Time Out" and "Washington Post" articles there was also an article</footnote>
an entirely new class of persons, namely disarmed military personnel. (Coles 1964, chapter 29, p. 844)

[This is one case of re-categorization of prisoners following the German surrender. Such re-definitions greatly contributed to make Allied statistical data about German prisoners of war unreliable and open to discussion.]

**Jun 7, 1945:** About one hour before King Haakon VII set foot on Norwegian soil the Head of Civil Affairs in Norway, rode to the Royal Palace. He carried with him a letter from SHAEF terminating the Military Phase of the Norway operation. This letter announced to the Norwegian Government that the complete responsibility for civil administration in Norway was restored to His Majesty the King and to the Norwegian Government.

Though of historical value, this declaration has in no way affected the work of Civil Affairs, which, in any case, has always worked in close co-operation with both governmental and local authorities. Their work will continue until the Allied Forces are eventually withdrawn. (Coles 1964, chapter 29, p. 846)

[This excerpt mentions the “responsibility for civil administration”, but what about Norwegian armed forces?]

## Why did the US promote European unification?

### US role in European unification?

Between 1945 and 1949, the expression “European Union” appears in 567 articles of the New York Times and the expression “United States of Europe” 182 times.

The fact that the US State Department sponsored non-governmental organisations working in favor of European integration has been well documented for instance in the works of Rebattet (1962), Aldrich (1997), Grosbois (2006, 2009, 2010). It has been estimated that between 1949 and 1960 (at least) $4 million were distributed (Aldrich 1997, p. 211).

The Oxford thesis by François-Xavier Rebattet (1962) provided the first detailed description of US involvement in the promotion of European unification. However, for some reason, this thesis was closed to consultation from 1962 to 1971. The ban was lifted by the Oxford Faculty Board in 1971 (see Fig. xx). Then, on 26 June 1975 the “Washington Post” devoted a long article (see Fig. xxa) to the thesis<fnref n="39" />. This

<footnote n="39">³⁹As stated in the article itself, it was in fact preceded by an article in the English weekly magazine “Time out” in the issue of 23-29 May 1975 which was entitled “Uncle Sam goes to market”. This article came out at a critical moment just a few days before the referendum of 6 June 1975 on whether to stay in or quit the Common Market. It should be noted that in the first years after being launched in 1968, “Time out” had a radical leaning (which however did not survive very long). For instance, in 1976 it published the names of 60 purported CIA agents stationed in England. In the time interval between the publications of the “Time Out” and “Washington Post” articles there was also an article</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_17.png" /></figure>

**Fig. xxa: Article of 26 June 1975 in the "Washington Post" about the Oxford thesis by François Xavier Rebattet.** Because for some reason the thesis had been closed to public consultation during the 1960s, this article provided the first insight into the role of the United States in subsidizing pro-European movements. The thesis was again closed to public consultation two months after the publication of this article. The article was written by Bernard Nossiter who had been a renowned newspaperman first at the "Washington Post" for almost 20 years and then at the "New York Times". The many references to the CIA were probably destined to attract the readers' attention. However, it is well known that the CIA (as well as other US intelligence agencies) carries out the policy and instructions given by the US government and particularly in the present case by the State Department. In other words, whereas the question is first and foremost a political issue, the article's emphasis on secret funding just distracts the reader's attention. In contrast, the political stances taken by the "European Movement" are hardly mentioned. In short, from the perspective of historical research this article had clearly a negative effect. It transformed an important political issue into a murky story about secret services. It is difficult to understand why Mr. Georges Rebattet accepted to give this interview.

article by the renowned journalist Bernard Nossiter provided what can be seen as the
# CIA Is Linked to Funding Of European Unity Groups

By Bernard D. Nossiter

Washington Post Foreign Service

LONDON, June 25-As far back as 23 years ago, the Central Intelligence Agency was secretly subsidizing private political organizations promoting European unity, according to a doctoral thesis written by the son of the secretary general of the European Movement, one of the groups said to have received funds.

According to the dissertation, the CIA, using a group of distinguished Americans and its own leaders as a cover, was pumping funds into the European Movement and its affiliates.

From 1947 until 1953, the European Movement and its offshoots are said to have spent an estimated $2.6 million. Of this, the thesis says about $1 million came from secret U.S. funds and another $170,000 from Americans' business firms. The Washington contribution was put at 38 per cent of the total.

It has been known for some years that the CIA secretly financed political and propaganda activities in Europe, such as Radio Free Europe, which broadcasts to Communist nations; youth and labor organizations, and even some publications, among them the British magazine Encounter. The European Movement, however, has not been mentioned among these.

A detailed account of the relationship is given in a 1962 doctoral thesis written at St. Antony's College, Oxford, by Francis Xavier Rebattet. He was a unique position to search the records and investigate those involved because his father, Georges, was deputy secretary general and later secretary general of the European Movement.

Rebattet's thesis, "The European Movement" 1945-1953: A Study in National and International Non-Governmental Organization Working for European Unity," was first brought to public attention by Time Out a lively London weekly.

Interviewed by telephone at his Paris apartment today, Georges Rebattet emphasized that the bulk of the CIA money went to finance the European Movement's youth arm and not his headquarters. He estimated the U.S. subsidy to his own secretariat at no more than $10,000 to $20,000 a year. "We know there were people of the CIA" on the American committee transmitting funds, he said, "but we were not so very interested."

Many of the European Movement leaders, he re-

called, had fought in the war time resistance and had met Allen Dulles, then in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and later CIA director Rebattet said it then seemed合理 to work with Dulles after the war.

Rebattet said that the Americans had not pressed any policy or program on the Europeans that the Europeans themselves rejected. "We were not under pressure from the American committees," he said. He recalled that, in private talks, the Americans had urged the formation of a European Defense Community (EDC), a project of overcome French fears of a reformed Western European army. But here the Americans acted with discretion. The project was ultimately defeated by the French Assembly.

The younger Rebattet's thesis underscores the heavy CIA influence in the American Committee on United Europe, the body that transmitted the funds around the Atlantic. Its chairman was William J. Donovan, the wartime boss of OSS. The CIA's predecessor, Allen Dulles was vice chairman; Thomas Brasen, a CIA official and now a columnist, was executive director, and Charles M. Spofford, a New York lawyer identified in the thesis as a CIA man, was a director.

Braden, reached for comment in Washington, said his tenure with the committee was before he became a CIA officer and, as far as he knew, the funds raised in the United States were genuinely private contributions, not money from the CIA.

I'm so far as I know, there was no CIA money in it," Brasen said.

"What happened after I left, I don't know." Another director was Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, head of the CIA from 1950 to 1953 when the U.S. funds began flowing in quantity to the private European groups.

Prominent members of the American committee included David Dubinsky of the Ladies Garment Workers Union; Arthur Goldberg, then general counsel of the CIA; Conrad Hilton, the hotel tycoon, and Lucius Clay, former commander of U.S. forces in Germany. It was an elite group, dominated by corporation executives and bankers, and limited to 600 members.

Rebattet describes the money channeled through the committee to Europe as "State Department secret funds."

Rebattet does not disclose which members of the European Movement knew the secret U.S. funds were helping finance their activities. His father thinks that the movement's first chairman, Duncan Sandys, was aware of Washington's aid. Sandy, the son-in-law of Winston Churchill, was to become a minister in a Conservative government. The thesis indicates that Paul-Henri Spaak, the second chairman, clearly knew. He insisted, however, that the U.S. funds pay only for special projects so that the movement would be protected from being labeled as an American tool.

Spock later became Belgium's prime minister.

Rebattet was unified politically. Donovan's position was said to be that Europe must be united and strengthened to resist communism.

Rebattet said this group was clearly supported because John J. McCloy, then the U.S. high commissioner in Germany, was impressed by a 1961 Communist youth rally that drew 2 million to East Berlin. McCloy wanted the west to match it, but the Europeans successfully resisted staging what was said to be a crude propaganda exercise.

Rebattet said this group was clearly supported because John J. McCloy, then the U.S. high commissioner in Germany, was impressed by a 1961 Communist youth rally that drew 2 million to East Berlin. McCloy wanted the west to match it, but the Europeans successfully resisted staging what was said to be a crude propaganda exercise.

They got their money anyway, and Rebattet gives this breakdown of activities that the funds financed in 1953: 1,880 study sessions or congresses; 90 film showings; 1,746,149 brochures in 19 languages; 21 exhibitions; and printing of 2,765,500 periodicals.

Rebattet says the American committee pushed its scheme for a European army through an action committee for the supranational European Community. He reports that it got all its money from the United States, by only par from government funds. In a six-month period ending on May 31, 1953, the action committee took in $77,000.

As for Rebattet, Francis Xavier is now 38 and a freelance interpreter. He received his doctorate for the thesis. His father, Georges, now 67, is a consultant to a private welfare agency among immigrant workers in France.

**Fig. xxa: Article of 26 June 1975 in the "Washington Post" about the Oxford thesis by François Xavier Rebattet.** Because for some reason the thesis had been closed to public consultation during the 1960s, this article provided the first insight into the role of the United States in subsidizing pro-European movements. The thesis was again closed to public consultation two months after the publication of this article. The article was written by Bernard Nossiter who had been a renowned newspaperman first at the "Washington Post" for almost 20 years and then at the "New York Times". The many references to the CIA were probably destined to attract the readers' attention. However, it is well known that the CIA (as well as other US intelligence agencies) carries out the policy and instructions given by the US government and particularly in the present case by the State Department. In other words, whereas the question is first and foremost a political issue, the article's emphasis on secret funding just distracts the reader's attention. In contrast, the political stances taken by the "European Movement" are hardly mentioned. In short, from the perspective of historical research this article had clearly a negative effect. It transformed an important political issue into a murky story about secret services. It is difficult to understand why Mr. Georges Rebattet accepted to give this interview.

article by the renowned journalist Bernard Nossiter provided what can be seen as the

on the same topic in the French newspaper "Le Monde" (18 June 1975).
<figure><img src="image_18.png" /></figure>

**Fig. xxb: Consultation rules for Dr. Rebattet's thesis at Oxford.** This is the reproduction of a page at the beginning of the thesis which gives librarians indications about whether or not readers should get access to it. To close a thesis in history to public consultation seems in opposition with the very role of historical research which is to put under the eyes of the public information and documents otherwise difficult to find because (for instance) they were buried in archives and not easily accessible. So, if it is harder to get access to the work of the historian than to the documents themselves it has no real usefulness. Source: Bodleian Library, Oxford.

first disclosure of the funding by the State Department (through the CIA, the Ford Foundation or other agencies) of pro-European movements.

Of course, ever since its creation in January 1949, the role of the “American Committee on United Europe” had been well known, but without the information provided by this article it could be argued that it was only involved in advising.

## Side effects of the “Washington Post” article

As shown in Fig xxc the article of 26 June is not mentioned in the list of the papers published by Bernard Nossiter, May be this was just due to a computer glitch? Moreover, two months after the article was published the thesis was closed to any public consultation by the Oxford Faculty Board. May be the timing was just a coincidence?

On the other hand it is quite understandable that the article may have infuriated the US government because some of its statements seem quite inappropriate.

* For instance toward the bottom of column two it says that: “Charles M. Spoford, a New York lawyer identified in the thesis as a CIA man was a director [of the American Committee on United Europe]”.

* Toward the bottom of column three it says “The thesis indicates that Paul-Henri
<figure><img src="image_17.png" /></figure>

**Fig. xxb: Consultation rules for Dr. Rebattet's thesis at Oxford.** This is the reproduction of a page at the beginning of the thesis which gives librarians indications about whether or not readers should get access to it. To close a thesis in history to public consultation seems in opposition with the very role of historical research which is to put under the eyes of the public information and documents otherwise difficult to find because (for instance) they were buried in archives and not easily accessible. So, if it is harder to get access to the work of the historian than to the documents themselves it has no real usefulness. Source: Bodleian Library, Oxford.

first disclosure of the funding by the State Department (through the CIA, the Ford Foundation or other agencies) of pro-European movements.

Of course, ever since its creation in January 1949, the role of the “American Committee on United Europe” had been well known, but without the information provided by this article it could be argued that it was only involved in advising.

## Side effects of the “Washington Post” article

As shown in Fig xxc the article of 26 June is not mentioned in the list of the papers published by Bernard Nossiter, May be this was just due to a computer glitch? Moreover, two months after the article was published the thesis was closed to any public consultation by the Oxford Faculty Board. May be the timing was just a coincidence?

On the other hand it is quite understandable that the article may have infuriated the US government because some of its statements seem quite inappropriate.

* For instance toward the bottom of column two it says that: “Charles M. Spoford, a New York lawyer identified in the thesis as a CIA man was a director [of the American Committee on United Europe]”.

* Toward the bottom of column three it says “The thesis indicates that Paul-Henri
<figure><img src="image_19.png" /></figure>

Fig. xxc: Articles written by Bernard Nossiter for the Washington Post during the first semester of 1975. The titles of the articles show that B. Nossiter was mainly in charge of British affairs. As shown by the beginning of its article of 26 June 1975 (which, incidentally, is not listed here), he was based in London, not in Washington. Source: *Search engine index of the Washington Post*.

Spaak, the second chairman [of the “European Movement”] clearly knew [that secret US funds were helping financing the activities of the Movement].

To reveal the identity of a CIA officer seems not only inappropriate but also questionable for there can hardly be any solid evidence for such a contention. The same comment applies to the statement regarding Paul-Henri Spaak. Unless, he acknowledged himself that he knew about the funding [which seems very unlikely] how can one prove that he “clearly knew”?

By making such statements one will perhaps attract more readers, but one will not provide a better understanding. Indeed, from his whole political career, it is clear that Paul-Henri Spaak was a spokesman of US political interests and objectives. Whether he did so through his own volition or thanks to the encouragements of the State Department is in fact of little interest. Similarly, whether or not Mr. Charles Spofford was a CIA officer does not add anything to our understanding.

Lastly, one may wonder why this article was written at all. One answer is that it was quite in tune with the *Zeitgeist* of the mid-1970s. This is illustrated by the following facts.

In the late 1960s in the wake of the debacle in South Vietnam, US intelligence agen-
<figure><img src="image_18.png" /></figure>

Fig. xxc: Articles written by Bernard Nossiter for the Washington Post during the first semester of 1975. The titles of the articles show that B. Nossiter was mainly in charge of British affairs. As shown by the beginning of its article of 26 June 1975 (which, incidentally, is not listed here), he was based in London, not in Washington. Source: *Search engine index of the Washington Post*.

Spaak, the second chairman [of the “European Movement”] clearly knew [that secret US funds were helping financing the activities of the Movement].

To reveal the identity of a CIA officer seems not only inappropriate but also questionable for there can hardly be any solid evidence for such a contention. The same comment applies to the statement regarding Paul-Henri Spaak. Unless, he acknowledged himself that he knew about the funding [which seems very unlikely] how can one prove that he “clearly knew”?

By making such statements one will perhaps attract more readers, but one will not provide a better understanding. Indeed, from his whole political career, it is clear that Paul-Henri Spaak was a spokesman of US political interests and objectives. Whether he did so through his own volition or thanks to the encouragements of the State Department is in fact of little interest. Similarly, whether or not Mr. Charles Spofford was a CIA officer does not add anything to our understanding.

Lastly, one may wonder why this article was written at all. One answer is that it was quite in tune with the *Zeitgeist* of the mid-1970s. This is illustrated by the following facts.

In the late 1960s in the wake of the debacle in South Vietnam, US intelligence agen-
cies had already come under the scrutiny of US newspapers. A few years later, in 1971 there was the publication of the “Pentagone Papers” by the “New York Times” and the “Washington Post”<fnref n="40" />. Then, in 1974 there was the Watergate scandal in which the “Washington Post” played a prominent role. On August 9, 1974 it led to the resignation of President Nixon. Moreover, with the hasty US withdrawal from Saigon, 1975 marked a low point in US foreign influence.

In short, although one can understand why such an article came to be published in 1975, one must realize that it was aimed at the wrong targets. The “European Movement” had been vocal in its support of the “European Defense Community” project. Yet, in spite of the fact that the EDC is discussed in the article (second column) this undisputable fact is not even mentioned. In other words, by examining the political record of the “European Movement” one would learn much more about the role of this pressure group than through dubious statements about undercover funding.

## Adverse side effects of an assertive unified Europe

The question in the title of this section is rarely raised. Yet, it is a very natural question. Why?

It is often said that the United States wanted a unified Europe to stand as a bullwark against the USSR and its East European satellites. That was of course the major motivation for the creation of NATO. However, as suggested by the expressions used in the New York Times the American project for Europe also included economic, monetary and political unification. Is that not odd?

As a rule, it is the “Divide and rule (Divide et impera)” strategy which guides the foreign policy of world powers. Why should a country wish to encourage competitors?

* An European Common Market with negligible internal tariffs but high external tariffs would certainly not be in the best interest of the US economy.

* A successful integrated European film industry would certainly reduce the market share of Hollywood movies.

* At the time of writing (2014) there are three major rating agencies (Standard and Poor's, Moody's, Fitch) and they are all American. On account of the political importance of such organisations, in particular regarding the rating of sovereign debt, would it not be in order for the European Union to create its own rating agencies? One can be sure that such an objective would certainly not be welcomed by the US Treasury; that is probably why it was never seriously considered by the European

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰In this respect it can be observed that whereas the charges against Daniel Elsberg (who gave the documents to the newspapers) were eventually dropped, Bradley Edward Manning (who gave US diplomatic documents to Wikileaks) was sentenced in August 2013 to 35 years in jail.</footnote>
cies had already come under the scrutiny of US newspapers. A few years later, in 1971 there was the publication of the “Pentagone Papers” by the “New York Times” and the “Washington Post”<fnref n="40" />. Then, in 1974 there was the Watergate scandal in which the “Washington Post” played a prominent role. On August 9, 1974 it led to the resignation of President Nixon. Moreover, with the hasty US withdrawal from Saigon, 1975 marked a low point in US foreign influence.

In short, although one can understand why such an article came to be published in 1975, one must realize that it was aimed at the wrong targets. The “European Movement” had been vocal in its support of the “European Defense Community” project. Yet, in spite of the fact that the EDC is discussed in the article (second column) this undisputable fact is not even mentioned. In other words, by examining the political record of the “European Movement” one would learn much more about the role of this pressure group than through dubious statements about undercover funding.

## Adverse side effects of an assertive unified Europe

The question in the title of this section is rarely raised. Yet, it is a very natural question. Why?

It is often said that the United States wanted a unified Europe to stand as a bullwark against the USSR and its East European satellites. That was of course the major motivation for the creation of NATO. However, as suggested by the expressions used in the New York Times the American project for Europe also included economic, monetary and political unification. Is that not odd?

As a rule, it is the “Divide and rule (Divide et impera)” strategy which guides the foreign policy of world powers. Why should a country wish to encourage competitors?

* An European Common Market with negligible internal tariffs but high external tariffs would certainly not be in the best interest of the US economy.

* A successful integrated European film industry would certainly reduce the market share of Hollywood movies.

* At the time of writing (2014) there are three major rating agencies (Standard and Poor's, Moody's, Fitch) and they are all American. On account of the political importance of such organisations, in particular regarding the rating of sovereign debt, would it not be in order for the European Union to create its own rating agencies? One can be sure that such an objective would certainly not be welcomed by the US Treasury; that is probably why it was never seriously considered by the European

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰In this respect it can be observed that whereas the charges against Daniel Elsberg (who gave the documents to the newspapers) were eventually dropped, Bradley Edward Manning (who gave US diplomatic documents to Wikileaks) was sentenced in August 2013 to 35 years in jail.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_20.png" /></figure>

**Fig. xx: Turnout at the elections for the European Parliament.** The trend is 3.2% less participation every 5 years. The dotted line gives a prediction based on the previous trend. For the elections of 2014 and 2019 it gives 39.7% and 36.5% respectively. Such figures are of the same order of magnitude as turnout for US mid-term Congress elections (41% in 2010) but much lower than for national parliamentary elections in most European countries which are usually over 60%. Examination of turnout figures by country shows that the turnout is lowest in former East European countries: 24% in Poland 27% in Romania, 20% in Slovakia. Source: *Data published by the European Parliament, cited in the Wikipedia article entitled "Elections du Parlement Européen"*

Commission.

* More generally, would a politically unified and assertive European Union not endanger US world leadership?

Nothing of this kind happened so far. No European film industry emerged, no European rating agencies were created. No European universities (except a minuscule one created in Bruges in 1948) were established. In a general way the foreign policy of the European Union remains weak and completely subordinated to the US agenda. As a historical parallel for the European Union one can think of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Both entities were and are ruled by a rigid state bureaucracy estranged from the hearts and wishes of the people. This is shown fairly clearly by the fact that the turn-over at European parliamentary elections has been dwindling decade after decade and is about 40% at the time of writing.

"Divide and rule"

Nevertheless there were a few cases in which European integration led to genuine autonomy. In all those cases, far from encouraging greater integration, the United States has resorted to the “Divide and rule” strategy. Here are a few illustrations.

* One of the earliest cases was brought about by European cooperation in the aviation industry which led to the construction of the Anglo-French supersonic Con-
<figure><img src="image_19.png" /></figure>

**Fig. xx: Turnout at the elections for the European Parliament.** The trend is 3.2% less participation every 5 years. The dotted line gives a prediction based on the previous trend. For the elections of 2014 and 2019 it gives 39.7% and 36.5% respectively. Such figures are of the same order of magnitude as turnout for US mid-term Congress elections (41% in 2010) but much lower than for national parliamentary elections in most European countries which are usually over 60%. Examination of turnout figures by country shows that the turnout is lowest in former East European countries: 24% in Poland 27% in Romania, 20% in Slovakia. Source: *Data published by the European Parliament, cited in the Wikipedia article entitled "Elections du Parlement Européen"*

Commission.

* More generally, would a politically unified and assertive European Union not endanger US world leadership?

Nothing of this kind happened so far. No European film industry emerged, no European rating agencies were created. No European universities (except a minuscule one created in Bruges in 1948) were established. In a general way the foreign policy of the European Union remains weak and completely subordinated to the US agenda. As a historical parallel for the European Union one can think of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Both entities were and are ruled by a rigid state bureaucracy estranged from the hearts and wishes of the people. This is shown fairly clearly by the fact that the turn-over at European parliamentary elections has been dwindling decade after decade and is about 40% at the time of writing.

"Divide and rule"

Nevertheless there were a few cases in which European integration led to genuine autonomy. In all those cases, far from encouraging greater integration, the United States has resorted to the “Divide and rule” strategy. Here are a few illustrations.

* One of the earliest cases was brought about by **European cooperation in the aviation industry** which led to the construction of the Anglo-French supersonic Con-
corde airliner. Numerous obstacles were raised by the American administration be-
fore it was allowed to land in New York. This strategy was quite successful. It dis-
couraged many (non-American) companies which therefore did not transform their
commitments⁴¹into actual purchases. Moreover, it stretched the delay between the
first flight in 1969 and the start of commercial operation in 1976. Instead of a stan-
dard time interval of one year and a half, in this case it was 7 years.

Some 20 years later the competition between Airbus and Boeing became a major
source of friction between the United States and Europe. Once again the “Divide
and rule” strategy was put to use. After being awarded profitable contracts with the
US Army, “BAE Systems” (formerly “British Aerospace”) sold all its Airbus shares
on 13 October 2006.

In the 1980s the success of the Airbus A320 relied largely on Middle Eastern and
Asian airlines. In the United States, apart from US Airways, no other airline ordered
it at that time. The same “Concorde syndrome” repeated itself for the A380. At the
time of writing (February 2014) this jumbo aircraft has been ordered by most major
airline companies with the distinct exception of US and Japanese airlines<fnref n="42" />.

* When the European Union announced its intention to build its own GPS (Global Positioning system) the United States tried its best to derail the project<fnref n="43" />. Whereas the US system had been established (mostly for military purposes) without any international concertation, the Europeans had to submit their own system to an US agreement.

* **Monetary unification** was one of the themes of the pro-integration campaigns sponsored by the United States. Yet, the creation of the “euro” was not welcomed by the United States. Once again the United Kingdom was the target of a “Divide and rule” strategy. The British pound entered the system of the “Snake in the tunnel” (through which fluctuations between European currencies were limited to ±2.4%) in May 1972 but left it one month later (Wikipedia article entitled “Serpent monétaire européen”). Later on the “Snake in the tunnel” mechanism was replaced by the “European Exchange Rate Mechanism” (ERM)

Some 20 years later, in October 1990, Britain became a member of the ERM but
speculative attacks on the pound led to its withdrawal two years later on 16 Septem-
ber 1992. After that episode Britain stayed away from subsequent negotiations about
the introduction of the euro. Ever since, quite understandingly, British leaders see

<footnote n="41">⁴¹Around 1972 apart from the orders from “Air France” and “British Airways” there were commitments for some 30 aircraft mainly from Middle Eastern companies.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">⁴²However, for some reason, the situation was slightly different for the A350 (planned to enter commercial service by the end of 2014); it has been ordered by US Airways, United Airlines, by US leasing companies and by Japan Airlines. Some of the companies (e.g. United Airlines, Japan Airlines, Ethiopian Airlines) which were among the first to get deliveries of Boeing 787 Dreamliners were also early buyers of the A350.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">⁴³For instance, it offered to provide a higher accuracy (which until then had been limited by purpose) so as to make the European system less attractive.</footnote>
corde airliner. Numerous obstacles were raised by the American administration be-
fore it was allowed to land in New York. This strategy was quite successful. It dis-
couraged many (non-American) companies which therefore did not transform their
commitments⁴¹into actual purchases. Moreover, it stretched the delay between the
first flight in 1969 and the start of commercial operation in 1976. Instead of a stan-
dard time interval of one year and a half, in this case it was 7 years.

Some 20 years later the competition between Airbus and Boeing became a major
source of friction between the United States and Europe. Once again the “Divide
and rule” strategy was put to use. After being awarded profitable contracts with the
US Army, “BAE Systems” (formerly “British Aerospace”) sold all its Airbus shares
on 13 October 2006.

In the 1980s the success of the Airbus A320 relied largely on Middle Eastern and
Asian airlines. In the United States, apart from US Airways, no other airline ordered
it at that time. The same “Concorde syndrome” repeated itself for the A380. At the
time of writing (February 2014) this jumbo aircraft has been ordered by most major
airline companies with the distinct exception of US and Japanese airlines<fnref n="42" />.

* When the European Union announced its intention to build its own GPS (Global Positioning system) the United States tried its best to derail the project<fnref n="43" />. Whereas the US system had been established (mostly for military purposes) without any international concertation, the Europeans had to submit their own system to an US agreement.

* **Monetary unification** was one of the themes of the pro-integration campaigns sponsored by the United States. Yet, the creation of the “euro” was not welcomed by the United States. Once again the United Kingdom was the target of a “Divide and rule” strategy. The British pound entered the system of the “Snake in the tunnel” (through which fluctuations between European currencies were limited to ±2.4%) in May 1972 but left it one month later (Wikipedia article entitled “Serpent monétaire européen”). Later on the “Snake in the tunnel” mechanism was replaced by the “European Exchange Rate Mechanism” (ERM)

Some 20 years later, in October 1990, Britain became a member of the ERM but
speculative attacks on the pound led to its withdrawal two years later on 16 Septem-
ber 1992. After that episode Britain stayed away from subsequent negotiations about
the introduction of the euro. Ever since, quite understandingly, British leaders see

<footnote n="41">⁴¹Around 1972 apart from the orders from “Air France” and “British Airways” there were commitments for some 30 aircraft mainly from Middle Eastern companies.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">⁴²However, for some reason, the situation was slightly different for the A350 (planned to enter commercial service by the end of 2014); it has been ordered by US Airways, United Airlines, by US leasing companies and by Japan Airlines. Some of the companies (e.g. United Airlines, Japan Airlines, Ethiopian Airlines) which were among the first to get deliveries of Boeing 787 Dreamliners were also early buyers of the A350.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">⁴³For instance, it offered to provide a higher accuracy (which until then had been limited by purpose) so as to make the European system less attractive.</footnote>
any problem with the euro as a justification of their policy.

Some 20 years later, Greece and Portugal became the target of speculative campaigns. This was the so-called Eurozone debt crisis. For English and US experts, the question was no longer whether or not the Eurozone would collapse but rather *when this would happen*^44.

## A unified Europe as a vassal state

What conclusion can one draw from the former discussion? What was the American conception of a unified Europe?

One can get a good idea about that by listening to Paul-Henri Spaak. He was the Secretary General of NATO from 1957 to 1961. Before that he had been the president of the “European Movement” from 1950 to 1955. In both positions he was certainly a faithful spokesperson of US conceptions. Here is what he says (p. 13) in a book published by the “European Movement” (1949) to celebrate the creation of the “European Council”, its main achievement.

> We, in the European Movement, have the right to be satisfied with the work we have done so far. The Hague Congress was a splendid and historic achievement. It was there that the idea of a United Europe passed from the world of dreams to the realm of reality. It was thanks to the Hague Congress and the subsequent campaign of the European Movement that the Council of Europe was established.

Even if one forgets for a moment that the “European Movement” was the mouthpiece of the United States, who would believe that the creation of the European Council marked the real beginning of the European unification. In previous sections we emphasized the weakness of the present European Union but if it had been erected upon the Council of Europe it would be even much weaker. If Spaak really believed what he says, he is a dreamer himself, if he did not he may be just an unreliable person.

It seems that when the United States was promoting European unification, its idea was unification *under its control*. This was the idea behind NATO and in this case it succeeded brilliantly. As explained below, there was the same idea behind the failed project of the “European Defense Community”. One should remember that in 1950 when it was proposed the countries of Continental Europe (Britain never considered becoming an EDC partner) had no defense industry. All European armies had to rely on US equipment. Perhaps even more importantly, none of them had any nuclear capability.

<footnote>^44Just as an illustration, here is a declaration made in an interview for Blomberg TV by Michael Platt, the founder of the $30 billion hedge fund “Blue Crest” (15 December 2011): “The probability that the market is putting on a Eurozone breakup, in my opinion from evidence I’m seeing from option pricing across the different markets, is steadily rising. We are going into 2012 and in our opinion, it’s only going to get worse”.</footnote>
any problem with the euro as a justification of their policy.

Some 20 years later, Greece and Portugal became the target of speculative campaigns. This was the so-called Eurozone debt crisis. For English and US experts, the question was no longer whether or not the Eurozone would collapse but rather *when this would happen*^44.

## A unified Europe as a vassal state

What conclusion can one draw from the former discussion? What was the American conception of a unified Europe?

One can get a good idea about that by listening to Paul-Henri Spaak. He was the Secretary General of NATO from 1957 to 1961. Before that he had been the president of the "European Movement" from 1950 to 1955. In both positions he was certainly a faithful spokesperson of US conceptions. Here is what he says (p. 13) in a book published by the "European Movement" (1949) to celebrate the creation of the "European Council", its main achievement.

We, in the European Movement, have the right to be satisfied with the work we have done so far. The Hague Congress was a splendid and historic achievement. It was there that the idea of a United Europe passed from the world of dreams to the realm of reality. It was thanks to the Hague Congress and the subsequent campaign of the European Movement that the Council of Europe was established.

Even if one forgets for a moment that the "European Movement" was the mouthpiece of the United States, who would believe that the creation of the European Council marked the real beginning of the European unification. In previous sections we emphasized the weakness of the present European Union but if it had been erected upon the Council of Europe it would be even much weaker. If Spaak really believed what he says, he is a dreamer himself, if he did not he may be just an unreliable person.

It seems that when the United States was promoting European unification, its idea was unification *under its control*. This was the idea behind NATO and in this case it succeeded brilliantly. As explained below, there was the same idea behind the failed project of the "European Defense Community". One should remember that in 1950 when it was proposed the countries of Continental Europe (Britain never considered becoming an EDC partner) had no defense industry. All European armies had to rely on US equipment. Perhaps even more importantly, none of them had any nuclear capability.

<footnote>^44Just as an illustration, here is a declaration made in an interview for Blomberg TV by Michael Platt, the founder of the $30 billion hedge fund "Blue Crest" (15 December 2011): "The probability that the market is putting on a Eurozone breakup, in my opinion from evidence I'm seeing from option pricing across the different markets, is steadily rising. We are going into 2012 and in our opinion, it's only going to get worse".</footnote>
## Achievements of sponsored entities

US intentions can be seen more clearly by examining the conditions put by the State Department on the funding of pro-unification organizations. In a meeting of the Executive Directors of the “American Committee on United Europe” that took place in May 1952 the criteria for a program to get subsidies were set as follows. (Aldrich p. 193 and 221):

* Strengthening the Council of Europe.

* Realization of the basic aims of the Marshall Plan, the Mutual Security Act and the North Atlantic Security Organization.

* Lastly, such programs must not be in opposition to the foreign policy of the United States.

While the last two criteria seem fairly natural, the first one requires some additional explanations.

The setting up of the “Council of Europe” in May 1949 was the first major achievement of the “European Movement”. One of the main purposes of the “Council of Europe” was to provide a tribune to “governments in exile” of East European countries by giving them associate membership (Aldrich 1997 p. 199). The strong emphasis the “Council of Europe” put on human rights was another step in the program destined to fight Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe<fnref n="45" />.

In short, the Council of Europe was a machinery directed against the Soviet Union and after 1990 against any country not in favor with the State Department<fnref n="46" />. Needless to say, the sheer number of its members prevented any real European integration. It started with 10 members, one year later it had already 14 and in 2014 it had 47.

## Chronology

**May 16, 1946:** Creation in Brussels of the “Ligue Indépendante de Coopération Economique Européenne” [Independent League for European Economic Cooperation] by Paul van Zeeland, former Belgian Prime Minister and Joseph H. Retinger<fnref n="47" />.

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵The fact that supporting dissidents in Eastern Europe was a major objective of US policy is shown fairly clearly by the attention given to this question by the “National Security Council”. For instance, in June 1953 a report summarized a number of “actions to exploit the unrest in the satellite states” (NSC no 158). One suggested action was to “encourage the elimination of key puppet officials”, another was to engage in “aggressive psychological warfare to heighten unrest behind the Iron Curtain”. In May 1958 another discussion took place about new recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As this was shortly after the failed uprising in Budapest Secretary of State Dulles deplored that “the elements that we most depended upon had been liquidated by the resort to violence” (NSC no 366).</footnote>

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶This statement may seem too categorical. Indeed, there have been a few investigations which did not follow this rule, e.g. the one about interrogation centers set up by US secret services in East European countries. However, the trend was set by the main members of the European Council which were all close allies of the United States. The situation would have been different if the Soviet Union and its satellites had become members from the very beginning in the same way as they were members of the United Nations.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">⁴⁷In 1954 Retinger was also at the origin of the foundation of the “Bilderberg Group” together with the head of Unilever, Paul van Zeeland and Walter Bedell Smith, then head of the CIA (according to the Wikipedia article entitled “Bilderberg</footnote>
## Achievements of sponsored entities

US intentions can be seen more clearly by examining the conditions put by the State Department on the funding of pro-unification organizations. In a meeting of the Executive Directors of the “American Committee on United Europe” that took place in May 1952 the criteria for a program to get subsidies were set as follows. (Aldrich p. 193 and 221):

* Strengthening the Council of Europe.

* Realization of the basic aims of the Marshall Plan, the Mutual Security Act and the North Atlantic Security Organization.

* Lastly, such programs must not be in opposition to the foreign policy of the United States.

While the last two criteria seem fairly natural, the first one requires some additional explanations.

The setting up of the “Council of Europe” in May 1949 was the first major achievement of the “European Movement”. One of the main purposes of the “Council of Europe” was to provide a tribune to “governments in exile” of East European countries by giving them associate membership (Aldrich 1997 p. 199). The strong emphasis the “Council of Europe” put on human rights was another step in the program destined to fight Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe<fnref n="45" />.

In short, the Council of Europe was a machinery directed against the Soviet Union and after 1990 against any country not in favor with the State Department<fnref n="46" />. Needless to say, the sheer number of its members prevented any real European integration. It started with 10 members, one year later it had already 14 and in 2014 it had 47.

## Chronology

**May 16, 1946:** Creation in Brussels of the “Ligue Indépendante de Coopération Economique Européenne” [Independent League for European Economic Cooperation] by Paul van Zeeland, former Belgian Prime Minister and Joseph H. Retinger<fnref n="47" />.

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵The fact that supporting dissidents in Eastern Europe was a major objective of US policy is shown fairly clearly by the attention given to this question by the “National Security Council”. For instance, in June 1953 a report summarized a number of “actions to exploit the unrest in the satellite states” (NSC no 158). One suggested action was to “encourage the elimination of key puppet officials”, another was to engage in “aggressive psychological warfare to heighten unrest behind the Iron Curtain”. In May 1958 another discussion took place about new recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As this was shortly after the failed uprising in Budapest Secretary of State Dulles deplored that “the elements that we most depended upon had been liquidated by the resort to violence” (NSC no 366).</footnote>

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶This statement may seem too categorical. Indeed, there have been a few investigations which did not follow this rule, e.g. the one about interrogation centers set up by US secret services in East European countries. However, the trend was set by the main members of the European Council which were all close allies of the United States. The situation would have been different if the Soviet Union and its satellites had become members from the very beginning in the same way as they were members of the United Nations.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">⁴⁷In 1954 Retinger was also at the origin of the foundation of the “Bilderberg Group” together with the head of Unilever, Paul van Zeeland and Walter Bedell Smith, then head of the CIA (according to the Wikipedia article entitled “Bilderberg</footnote>
In March 1947 the League was re-organized and Retinger became its Secretary General. (Wikipedia article in German entitled "Ligue Européenne de Coopération Economique")

[This was one of the first organizations set up (with British and US support) to promote European cooperation<fnref n="48" />. The English Wikipedia article entitled "European League for Economic Cooperation" (ELEC) says that this organization "acts in complete independence from national or private interests, public authorities or any pressure group". Well, in the present time marked by widespread lobbying this is a fairly strong statement. How to determine the real degree of independence of such organizations remains an interesting open question.]

**Dec 1946:** Creation of the "Union of European Federalists" (UEF), a non-governmental organisation campaigning for a Federal Europe. (Wikipedia article entitled "Union of European Federalists") [Later on the UEF campaigned for transforming the Advisory Assembly of the Council of Europe into the Constituent Assembly of the European Federation. It also campaigned for the ratification of the European Defense Community. Both objectives were completely in line with the policy of the US State Department which means that whether or not this organization received US subsidies its policy was the same as if it had. Henri Frenay (who was one of the chiefs of the French Resistance) was one of the chairmen of the UEF.]

**Jan 5, 1949:** Creation in New York at the Woodrow Wilson Foundation of the "American Committee on United Europe" (ACUE). Its chairman was William J. Donovan, former director of the OSS (Organization of Special Services), the predecessor of the CIA. Its vice-president was Allen W. Dulles who would later become the director of the CIA. Its executive director was Thomas W. Braden, former OSS officer who would later become deputy director of the CIA. The three European members of the committee were Winston Churchill, Joseph Retinger and Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi.

The ACUE provided financial support to many organizations promoting European integration (under American leadership).

(http://www.paperblog.fr/6946863/les-federalistes-europeens-etaient-bien-finances-par-la-cia, Wikipedia article in French entitled "Joseph Retinger", article by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard published on 19 September 2000 in the British newspaper "The Telegraph")

[According to the Telegraph article, declassified US sources showed that among the organizations sponsored by the ACUE there was the "European Movement" and its youth movement the "European Youth Campaign". The former got about 50% of its

<footnote>Group"). Retinger was appointed as Secretary of the Steering Committee. After 1957 the annual conference of the Group was funded by the Ford Foundation. The main objective of the Group is to "bolster a consensus around free market Western capitalism", i.e. the neoliberal version of capitalism.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">⁴⁸This organization is still active nowadays (January 2014).</footnote>
In March 1947 the League was re-organized and Retinger became its Secretary General. (Wikipedia article in German entitled "Ligue Européenne de Coopération Economique")

[This was one of the first organizations set up (with British and US support) to promote European cooperation<fnref n="48" />. The English Wikipedia article entitled "European League for Economic Cooperation" (ELEC) says that this organization "acts in complete independence from national or private interests, public authorities or any pressure group". Well, in the present time marked by widespread lobbying this is a fairly strong statement. How to determine the real degree of independence of such organizations remains an interesting open question.]

**Dec 1946:** Creation of the "Union of European Federalists" (UEF), a non-governmental organisation campaigning for a Federal Europe. (Wikipedia article entitled "Union of European Federalists") [Later on the UEF campaigned for transforming the Advisory Assembly of the Council of Europe into the Constituent Assembly of the European Federation. It also campaigned for the ratification of the European Defense Community. Both objectives were completely in line with the policy of the US State Department which means that whether or not this organization received US subsidies its policy was the same as if it had. Henri Frenay (who was one of the chiefs of the French Resistance) was one of the chairmen of the UEF.]

**Jan 5, 1949:** Creation in New York at the Woodrow Wilson Foundation of the "American Committee on United Europe" (ACUE). Its chairman was William J. Donovan, former director of the OSS (Organization of Special Services), the predecessor of the CIA. Its vice-president was Allen W. Dulles who would later become the director of the CIA. Its executive director was Thomas W. Braden, former OSS officer who would later become deputy director of the CIA. The three European members of the committee were Winston Churchill, Joseph Retinger and Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi.

The ACUE provided financial support to many organizations promoting European integration (under American leadership).

(http://www.paperblog.fr/6946863/les-federalistes-europeens-etaient-bien-finances-par-la-cia, Wikipedia article in French entitled "Joseph Retinger", article by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard published on 19 September 2000 in the British newspaper "The Telegraph")

[According to the Telegraph article, declassified US sources showed that among the organizations sponsored by the ACUE there was the "European Movement" and its youth movement the "European Youth Campaign". The former got about 50% of its

<footnote>Group"). Retinger was appointed as Secretary of the Steering Committee. After 1957 the annual conference of the Group was funded by the Ford Foundation. The main objective of the Group is to "bolster a consensus around free market Western capitalism", i.e. the neoliberal version of capitalism.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">⁴⁸This organization is still active nowadays (January 2014).</footnote>
funding from the ACUE while the later was 100% funded by Washington.

**Dec 19, 1949:** Paul Ramadier, French Socialist Deputy and a former Prime Minister, has been elected chairman of the International Parliamentary Group of the European Movement. (NYT 19 December 1949)

[This article shows that, as will be the case of Jean Monnet's "Action Committee for the United States of Europe", the "European Movement" had an "International Parliamentary Group". This gave it a joint lobbying capacity in several European countries.]

**Feb 18, 1950:** Dr. Retinger is now in the United States on behalf of the American Committee on United Europe. (NYT 18 February 1950)

**Feb 21, 1950:** In response to a letter sent to them by Major General William J. Donovan, Chairman of the "American Committee on United Europe", 14 European leaders have endorsed in varying degree his call for economic and political merger, as a vital step toward Western unity. (NYT 21 February 1950 p. 1)

**May 5, 1950:** General Donovan announced the results of a public opinion poll that showed that the majority of the people of France, Holland, Italy, Norway and Western Germany favored the creation of a European Union. (NYT 5 May 1950).

[Once it had been shown that both the political leaders and the public opinions were in favor of European integration, time was ripe for the next move. It came four days later in Paris with the announcement of the so-called "Schuman plan" for the "Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier" (CECA). Given the role played by the ACUE, one wonders if it should not rather be called the "Donovan Plan". It can be recalled that Jean Monnet who is often seen as the moving spirit behind the "Schuman plan" was in relation with General Donovan.

**Jun 1950:** **Crisis at the "European Movement".** The ACUE abruptly refused to continue funding the "European Movement". A few weeks before the Secretary General of the movement, Joseph Retinger, had already suggested to its president, Duncan Sandys, to resign. In a letter to him he wrote "Our American friends do not agree with your tactics" [it would be of interest to learn which "tactics" he had in mind]. Sandys resigned in July and Paul-Henri Spaak took over the leadership of the European Movement. (Aldrich 1997 p. 197)

[One may wonder what was the reason of this crisis? Richard Aldrich gives no clues which makes the whole story fairly opaque. Although one cannot know for sure, a likely reason was the following. Duncan Sandys was Churchill's son in law. After the creation of NATO the next step on the American agenda was the European Defense Community in which Britain did no wish to take part however. Therefore a clash between British and US interests was predictable. The "Schuman Plan" which was
funding from the ACUE while the later was 100% funded by Washington.

**Dec 19, 1949:** Paul Ramadier, French Socialist Deputy and a former Prime Minister, has been elected chairman of the International Parliamentary Group of the European Movement. (NYT 19 December 1949)

[This article shows that, as will be the case of Jean Monnet's "Action Committee for the United States of Europe", the "European Movement" had an "International Parliamentary Group". This gave it a joint lobbying capacity in several European countries.]

**Feb 18, 1950:** Dr. Retinger is now in the United States on behalf of the American Committee on United Europe. (NYT 18 February 1950)

**Feb 21, 1950:** In response to a letter sent to them by Major General William J. Donovan, Chairman of the "American Committee on United Europe", 14 European leaders have endorsed in varying degree his call for economic and political merger, as a vital step toward Western unity. (NYT 21 February 1950 p. 1)

**May 5, 1950:** General Donovan announced the results of a public opinion poll that showed that the majority of the people of France, Holland, Italy, Norway and Western Germany favored the creation of a European Union. (NYT 5 May 1950).

[Once it had been shown that both the political leaders and the public opinions were in favor of European integration, time was ripe for the next move. It came four days later in Paris with the announcement of the so-called "Schuman plan" for the "Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier" (CECA). Given the role played by the ACUE, one wonders if it should not rather be called the "Donovan Plan". It can be recalled that Jean Monnet who is often seen as the moving spirit behind the "Schuman plan" was in relation with General Donovan.

**Jun 1950:** **Crisis at the "European Movement".** The ACUE abruptly refused to continue funding the "European Movement". A few weeks before the Secretary General of the movement, Joseph Retinger, had already suggested to its president, Duncan Sandys, to resign. In a letter to him he wrote "Our American friends do not agree with your tactics" [it would be of interest to learn which "tactics" he had in mind]. Sandys resigned in July and Paul-Henri Spaak took over the leadership of the European Movement. (Aldrich 1997 p. 197)

[One may wonder what was the reason of this crisis? Richard Aldrich gives no clues which makes the whole story fairly opaque. Although one cannot know for sure, a likely reason was the following. Duncan Sandys was Churchill's son in law. After the creation of NATO the next step on the American agenda was the European Defense Community in which Britain did no wish to take part however. Therefore a clash between British and US interests was predictable. The "Schuman Plan" which was
planed without Britain's Secretary of State Ernest Bevin being consulted was another
point of contention.]

**Jun 20, 1950:** 118 American leaders support the "Schuman Plan". Industrialists, labor groups and Senators backed the Coal-Steel Pool and criticized British opposition. (NYT 20 June 1950)

[It can be guessed that had Europe appeared as a real competitor there would not have been such a strong support as illustrated years later by the bitter (commercial as well as political) dispute between Boeing and Airbus.]

**Nov 19, 1955:** Weakening of the European Movement. The European Community was seriously affected by the failure of the EDC, the death of De Gasperi, the fading of Robert Schuman, and the resignation of Jean Monnet from the Coal and Steel Community. (NYT 19 November 1955)

[The "Action Committee for the United States of Europe" was created by Jean Monnet on 13 October 1955. In the following years it would hold the role played previously by the "European Movement".

**Jun 26, 1975:** Publication of a long article in the "Washington Post" about the support given by the United States to pro-European movements between 1947 and 1953. The article is reproduced in Fig. xxa.

[The real significance of this article was discussed in one of the previous sections.]

## The EDC: a failed vassalization attempt (1950-1954)

### Origin of the EDC project

The plan to create an "European Defence Community" (EDC) is often called the "Pleven plan" after the name of French Prime Minister René Pleven who presented such a plan to the National Assembly on 24 October 1950. This is a misrepresentation however as can be seen through two facts.

* On 11 August 1950 the plan for an European army was presented by Winston Churchill to the Assembly of the Council of Europe. He proposed the following motion to the Assembly:

> L'Assemblée demande la création immédiate d'une armée européenne unifiée agissant en coopération avec les Etats-Unis et le Canada.

> [The Assembly proposes that a unified European Army be created shortly which would operate in conjunction with the United States and Canada.]

⁴⁹ That was two months before the presentation of the "Pleven plan".

<footnote n="49">⁴⁹The assembly of the Council of Europe was a consultative assembly with no decision power. Nevertheless the motion presented by Churchill was approved by a vote. In August 1950, Churchill was not Prime Minister but he would again become Prime Minister from October 1951 to April 1955. It is somewhat a paradox that after promoting this plan,</footnote>
planed without Britain's Secretary of State Ernest Bevin being consulted was another
point of contention.]

**Jun 20, 1950:** 118 American leaders support the "Schuman Plan". Industrialists, labor groups and Senators backed the Coal-Steel Pool and criticized British opposition. (NYT 20 June 1950)

[It can be guessed that had Europe appeared as a real competitor there would not have been such a strong support as illustrated years later by the bitter (commercial as well as political) dispute between Boeing and Airbus.]

**Nov 19, 1955:** Weakening of the European Movement. The European Community was seriously affected by the failure of the EDC, the death of De Gasperi, the fading of Robert Schuman, and the resignation of Jean Monnet from the Coal and Steel Community. (NYT 19 November 1955)

[The "Action Committee for the United States of Europe" was created by Jean Monnet on 13 October 1955. In the following years it would hold the role played previously by the "European Movement".

**Jun 26, 1975:** Publication of a long article in the "Washington Post" about the support given by the United States to pro-European movements between 1947 and 1953. The article is reproduced in Fig. xxa.

[The real significance of this article was discussed in one of the previous sections.]

## The EDC: a failed vassalization attempt (1950-1954)

### Origin of the EDC project

The plan to create an "European Defence Community" (EDC) is often called the "Pleven plan" after the name of French Prime Minister René Pleven who presented such a plan to the National Assembly on 24 October 1950. This is a misrepresentation however as can be seen through two facts.

* On 11 August 1950 the plan for an European army was presented by Winston Churchill to the Assembly of the Council of Europe. He proposed the following motion to the Assembly:

> L'Assemblée demande la création immédiate d'une armée européenne unifiée agissant en coopération avec les Etats-Unis et le Canada.

> [The Assembly proposes that a unified European Army be created shortly which would operate in conjunction with the United States and Canada.]

⁴⁹ That was two months before the presentation of the "Pleven plan".

<footnote n="49">⁴⁹The assembly of the Council of Europe was a consultative assembly with no decision power. Nevertheless the motion presented by Churchill was approved by a vote. In August 1950, Churchill was not Prime Minister but he would again become Prime Minister from October 1951 to April 1955. It is somewhat a paradox that after promoting this plan,</footnote>
● The plan presented by Mr. Pleven was described by the New York Times of 23 October 1950 (p. 8) by the following title: "German arms plan gaining in France".

The United States had two objectives. The first was to make the rearmament of West Germany acceptable by France. The second was to bring European armed forces under their control more fully than was already the case under NATO. To these ends the plan presented by Churchill contained two clever ideas.

1. Under NATO the armed forces of each country kept their autonomy. The unification was at the level of the Hearquarters. On the contrary, Churchill's European army would be integrated in the sense that a division would contain regiments (or even battalions) from different countries. Therefore, it was thought, Germany would not have really its own army<sup>50</sup>.

2. As the European army would operate in the framework of NATO it would *ipso facto* be under American command.

After the concept had been introduced by Churchill the plan was disclosed on 29 August 1950 by German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer through the publication of a memorandum which suggested the creation of an European army with German participation. One should recall that at that time Germany had not yet regained its full independence. Moreover, as there was no armament production in Germany the creation of a German army would rely entirely on the United States. In other words, the publication of the German memorandum required prior US acceptance. Such a project was certainly in relation with the beginning of the Korean war on 28 June 1950.

At first the idea of a German Army was not accepted by the French government. However, after pressure was applied by the US State Department the French Minister of Foreign affairs, Robert Schuman, gave his agreement on 16 September 1950 (French version of Wikipedia article about the CED). After this acceptance, the German army could have been set up in the NATO framework.

## The question of nuclear weapons

However, from an American perspective the project of an integrated European army had the great advantage that it would bar all involved European countries from testing and acquiring atomic weapons. There are two reasons for this.

● The first reason is that in the project (article 64, paragraph 2) the national parliaments would have to transfer their power to decide defense expenses to the European parliament. Therefore it would become impossible for any country and

<footnote>Churchill did not wish Britain to take part in it.</footnote>

<footnote n="50"><sup>50</sup>In the project, apart from the forces taking part in the European army, each nation could keep a fraction of its armed forces under national command. For France that fraction was about 50% but it would have been smaller in the case of Germany.</footnote>
● The plan presented by Mr. Pleven was described by the New York Times of 23 October 1950 (p. 8) by the following title: "German arms plan gaining in France".

The United States had two objectives. The first was to make the rearmament of West Germany acceptable by France. The second was to bring European armed forces under their control more fully than was already the case under NATO. To these ends the plan presented by Churchill contained two clever ideas.

1. Under NATO the armed forces of each country kept their autonomy. The unification was at the level of the Hearquarters. On the contrary, Churchill's European army would be integrated in the sense that a division would contain regiments (or even battalions) from different countries. Therefore, it was thought, Germany would not have really its own army<sup>50</sup>.

2. As the European army would operate in the framework of NATO it would *ipso facto* be under American command.

After the concept had been introduced by Churchill the plan was disclosed on 29 August 1950 by German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer through the publication of a memorandum which suggested the creation of an European army with German participation. One should recall that at that time Germany had not yet regained its full independence. Moreover, as there was no armament production in Germany the creation of a German army would rely entirely on the United States. In other words, the publication of the German memorandum required prior US acceptance. Such a project was certainly in relation with the beginning of the Korean war on 28 June 1950.

At first the idea of a German Army was not accepted by the French government. However, after pressure was applied by the US State Department the French Minister of Foreign affairs, Robert Schuman, gave his agreement on 16 September 1950 (French version of Wikipedia article about the CED). After this acceptance, the German army could have been set up in the NATO framework.

## The question of nuclear weapons

However, from an American perspective the project of an integrated European army had the great advantage that it would bar all involved European countries from testing and acquiring atomic weapons. There are two reasons for this.

● The first reason is that in the project (article 64, paragraph 2) the national parliaments would have to transfer their power to decide defense expenses to the European parliament. Therefore it would become impossible for any country and

<footnote>Churchill did not wish Britain to take part in it.</footnote>

<footnote n="50"><sup>50</sup>In the project, apart from the forces taking part in the European army, each nation could keep a fraction of its armed forces under national command. For France that fraction was about 50% but it would have been smaller in the case of Germany.</footnote>
particularly for France to set up a national nuclear dissuasion.

* Secondly any nuclear dissuasion was also impossible at the European level. Indeed, as Germany (like Japan) had to pledge not to develop nuclear weapons this pledge would automatically extend to the integrated European army.

France was the only European country which at that time had started a program for developing such weapons but its acceptance of the EDC would prevent it from going forward in this direction. In other words, Europe would have to rely entirely on the US atomic umbrella.

The question of nuclear weapons also explains why Britain did not wish to be part of the EDC. Later on, through the Kennedy-Macmillan Nassau agreement signed in December 1962, the United States accepted to sell submarine-launched Polaris missiles to the UK. At the time it was claimed that the Nassau pact was not a dual-key arrangement that would only allow launch if both parties agreed. Then, in 1980 the UK moved from the Polaris to US Trident missiles. Unlike what had happened for the Polaris system, the US would retain full responsibility for the maintenance of the Trident missiles (Wikipedia article entitled “Polaris”). Can one expect such a deterrence force to be really free of foreign interference?

## The broader question of weapons production

In the EDC project, nations would be asked to participate in the production of standard weapons. For instance, a large quantity of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition were required in Europe. Thus, France was supposed to produce 80,000 rounds of anti-tank ammunition between July 1951 and May 1952 (MAAG 2. Title: Request for material from government of France required for US stockpile “C” program).

However, the design and production of new sophisticated weapons was supposed to remain in US hands. This appears fairly clearly in the following excerpt from a meeting of the US National Security Council.

US National Security Council of 22 May 1958 (excerpt).

Annex A: Franco-Italian-German weapons production. The Defense Ministers of France, Italy and Germany recently formed a 3-power association (known as “FIG”) to coordinate the production of advanced weapons, aircraft and missiles. Implications of the association have come under close US study.

On April 17, 1958 the North Atlantic Council approved a Western European Union Defense Ministers' proposal that should formulate collective plans for cooperation in defense research. Such plans should be presented to NATO through the Secretariat General. Proper provision should be made to give any interested NATO country the opportunity to associate itself with any such plans.
particularly for France to set up a national nuclear dissuasion.

* Secondly any nuclear dissuasion was also impossible at the European level. Indeed, as Germany (like Japan) had to pledge not to develop nuclear weapons this pledge would automatically extend to the integrated European army.

France was the only European country which at that time had started a program for developing such weapons but its acceptance of the EDC would prevent it from going forward in this direction. In other words, Europe would have to rely entirely on the US atomic umbrella.

The question of nuclear weapons also explains why Britain did not wish to be part of the EDC. Later on, through the Kennedy-Macmillan Nassau agreement signed in December 1962, the United States accepted to sell submarine-launched Polaris missiles to the UK. At the time it was claimed that the Nassau pact was not a dual-key arrangement that would only allow launch if both parties agreed. Then, in 1980 the UK moved from the Polaris to US Trident missiles. Unlike what had happened for the Polaris system, the US would retain full responsibility for the maintenance of the Trident missiles (Wikipedia article entitled "Polaris"). Can one expect such a deterrence force to be really free of foreign interference?

## The broader question of weapons production

In the EDC project, nations would be asked to participate in the production of standard weapons. For instance, a large quantity of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition were required in Europe. Thus, France was supposed to produce 80,000 rounds of anti-tank ammunition between July 1951 and May 1952 (MAAG 2. Title: Request for material from government of France required for US stockpile "C" program).

However, the design and production of new sophisticated weapons was supposed to remain in US hands. This appears fairly clearly in the following excerpt from a meeting of the US National Security Council.

US National Security Council of 22 May 1958 (excerpt).

Annex A: Franco-Italian-German weapons production. The Defense Ministers of France, Italy and Germany recently formed a 3-power association (known as "FIG") to coordinate the production of advanced weapons, aircraft and missiles. Implications of the association have come under close US study.

On April 17, 1958 the North Atlantic Council approved a Western European Union Defense Ministers' proposal that should formulate collective plans for cooperation in defense research. Such plans should be presented to NATO through the Secretariat General. Proper provision should be made to give any interested NATO country the opportunity to associate itself with any such plans.
Before we comment on the previous statement, it must be recalled that weapons development and production is a crucial pre-condition for an independent defense. A country which must rely on a foreign supplier can never be sure that during a conflict spare parts will be made available in required quantity. In this respect one may remember the airlift set up by the Pentagon to supply Isreal during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973.

The previous excerpt outlines fairly well two principles of US policy with respect to Europe defense.

* US policy backs European cooperation if only for the sake of unifying the equipment inside NATO.

* The United States always emphasizes the need of *multilateral* agreements, possibly in the framework of NATO. Bilateral agreements especially those between France and Germany are *not* favored by the State Department.

## Chronology

**Apr 3, 1949: NATO.**

Tomorrow at 3 pm in Washington, D.C., the Foreign Ministers of 12 nations, United States, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and the United Kingdom, with an aggregate population of 332 million persons, will sign a historic document, the North Atlantic pact pledging the member nations to collective security. (NYT p. E1)

[It can be noticed that all non-enemy countries liberated and/or occupied (in the sense of accepting US bases on their territory) by US forces became founding members of NATO. The list comprises the following 10 countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the UK. All of them also accepted permanent US bases on their territory. In contrast, western European countries which were not occupied were not founding members and accepted less US bases. One can mention Ireland, Spain or Sweden.

At first sight it might seem that Portugal constitutes an exception in the sense that it was a founding member but was not really occupied by US forces. However, contrary to Spain which remained neutral, Portugal cooperated closely with Great Britain and the United States during the war. In late 1943 Portugal even allowed the Allies to establish air bases in the Portugese island of Azores to fight German U-boats.]

**May 9, 1950:** At a press conference French Foreign minister Robert Schuman announced the creation of an “European Coal and Steel Community.” (ECSC)

[This ECSC is usually considered as the first step in a process which later on led to
Before we comment on the previous statement, it must be recalled that weapons development and production is a crucial pre-condition for an independent defense. A country which must rely on a foreign supplier can never be sure that during a conflict spare parts will be made available in required quantity. In this respect one may remember the airlift set up by the Pentagon to supply Isreal during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973.

The previous excerpt outlines fairly well two principles of US policy with respect to Europe defense.

* US policy backs European cooperation if only for the sake of unifying the equipment inside NATO.

* The United States always emphasizes the need of *multilateral* agreements, possibly in the framework of NATO. Bilateral agreements especially those between France and Germany are *not* favored by the State Department.

## Chronology

**Apr 3, 1949: NATO.**

Tomorrow at 3 pm in Washington, D.C., the Foreign Ministers of 12 nations, United States, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and the United Kingdom, with an aggregate population of 332 million persons, will sign a historic document, the North Atlantic pact pledging the member nations to collective security. (NYT p. E1)

[It can be noticed that all non-enemy countries liberated and/or occupied (in the sense of accepting US bases on their territory) by US forces became founding members of NATO. The list comprises the following 10 countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the UK. All of them also accepted permanent US bases on their territory. In contrast, western European countries which were not occupied were not founding members and accepted less US bases. One can mention Ireland, Spain or Sweden.

At first sight it might seem that Portugal constitutes an exception in the sense that it was a founding member but was not really occupied by US forces. However, contrary to Spain which remained neutral, Portugal cooperated closely with Great Britain and the United States during the war. In late 1943 Portugal even allowed the Allies to establish air bases in the Portugese island of Azores to fight German U-boats.]

**May 9, 1950:** At a press conference French Foreign minister Robert Schuman announced the creation of an “European Coal and Steel Community.” (ECSC)

[This ECSC is usually considered as the first step in a process which later on led to
the “Common Market” and to the “European Union”. Why did it start with an agreement about coal and steel? There was a very specific reason for that. In the post-war years, as a form of war reparation, France was able to get the coal production of the Sarre region and also about 50% of the production of the Ruhr. However, as such reparation supplies could not last for ever, a permanent solution had to be found. Two points should be noted about the announcement of 9 May.

* Although Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had given his agreement on the principle at that time all the technical details had still to be worked out and discussed.

* From its very beginning this project was destined to be the seed for a broader agreement. This can be seen through the fact that it involved a Common Assembly composed of national parliamentarians, a Special Council composed of nation minister and a Court of Justice. Those institutions clearly show that the ECSC was intended to be more than just a free trade agreement for coal and steel.]

**Aug 11, 1950:** The plan for an European army was presented by Winston Churchill to the Assembly of the Council of Europe. He proposed the following motion to the Assembly [my translation]:

> The Assembly proposes that a unified European Army be created shortly which will operate in full cooperation with the United States and Canada.

http://www.cvce.eu/obj/discours_de_winston_churchill_devant_le_conseil_de_l_europe_strasbourg_11_aout_1950-fr-ed9e513b-af3b-47a0-b03c-8335a7aa237d.html

or: http://www.coe.int/t/dgal/dit/ilcd/archives/selection/churchill/default_en.asp [This motion already contained the two main ideas of the ECD namely (i) That, in contrast with NATO, it should be an integrated army (ii) That it should operate in the framework of NATO that is to say under US command. Although this second point is not made very clearly (and for good reason), it would anyway result from the fact that the United States was the only country which could equip such an army.]

**Oct 26, 1950:** The French Assembly passed Bonn Arms Plan. (NYT 26 October 1950 p. 18)

[This plan that the NYT calls “Bonn Arms Plan” is the “European Defense Community” project. Needless to say, to suggest that it was put forward by the German government was a misrepresentation because Germany regained its full sovereignty only on 5 May 1955, when the occupying powers (United States, Britain and France) issued a proclamation declaring an end to the military occupation of West Germany. In other words, by first calling it the “Bonn plan”, then by convincing René Pleven to present it to the French National Assembly, the objective was to make it appear as an European project. The strong pressures applied by the United States (see below the entries between April 1953 and September 1954) to coerce France and Italy into ratifying it, clearly points to the real initiator of the project.]
the “Common Market” and to the “European Union”. Why did it start with an agreement about coal and steel? There was a very specific reason for that. In the post-war years, as a form of war reparation, France was able to get the coal production of the Sarre region and also about 50% of the production of the Ruhr. However, as such reparation supplies could not last for ever, a permanent solution had to be found. Two points should be noted about the announcement of 9 May.

* Although Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had given his agreement on the principle at that time all the technical details had still to be worked out and discussed.

* From its very beginning this project was destined to be the seed for a broader agreement. This can be seen through the fact that it involved a Common Assembly composed of national parliamentarians, a Special Council composed of nation minister and a Court of Justice. Those institutions clearly show that the ECSC was intended to be more than just a free trade agreement for coal and steel.]

**Aug 11, 1950:** The plan for an European army was presented by Winston Churchill to the Assembly of the Council of Europe. He proposed the following motion to the Assembly [my translation]:

> The Assembly proposes that a unified European Army be created shortly which will operate in full cooperation with the United States and Canada.

http://www.cvce.eu/obj/discours_de_winston_churchill_devant_le_conseil_de_l_europe_strasbourg_11_aout_1950-fr-ed9e513b-af3b-47a0-b03c-8335a7aa237d.html

or: http://www.coe.int/t/dgal/dit/ilcd/archives/selection/churchill/default_en.asp [This motion already contained the two main ideas of the ECD namely (i) That, in contrast with NATO, it should be an integrated army (ii) That it should operate in the framework of NATO that is to say under US command. Although this second point is not made very clearly (and for good reason), it would anyway result from the fact that the United States was the only country which could equip such an army.]

**Oct 26, 1950:** The French Assembly passed Bonn Arms Plan. (NYT 26 October 1950 p. 18)

[This plan that the NYT calls “Bonn Arms Plan” is the “European Defense Community” project. Needless to say, to suggest that it was put forward by the German government was a misrepresentation because Germany regained its full sovereignty only on 5 May 1955, when the occupying powers (United States, Britain and France) issued a proclamation declaring an end to the military occupation of West Germany. In other words, by first calling it the “Bonn plan”, then by convincing René Pleven to present it to the French National Assembly, the objective was to make it appear as an European project. The strong pressures applied by the United States (see below the entries between April 1953 and September 1954) to coerce France and Italy into ratifying it, clearly points to the real initiator of the project.]
**May 28, 1952:** The Allies will allow Germany to make some arms such as artillery and tanks. However, planes and atomic weapons will be banned. (NYT p. 1)

**May 30, 1952:** Strasbourg. Calling for speed and audacity, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium drew applause from both opponents and adherents when he pleaded with the Council of Europe's Assembly to make a European federal union at once in order to save Germany from being drawn into the Soviet orbit. His plan was rejected on the following day. (NYT 30 May 1952 p. 3; NYT 31 May p. 9)

[Nowadays (2014) the Council of Europe has no longer any real function as far as European unification is concerned. The present entry shows that in 1952 it was still instrumental in this respect, particularly in a Cold War perspective.]

**Jan 31, 1953:** Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was en route to Western Europe today on his delicate assignment of persuading the Allies of the United States that their unification for defense might well determine the future of the American aid policy. He will visit Rome, Paris, Bonn, London, (NYT p. 1)

[In other words, Mr. Dulles did not only wish to praise the concept of a European defense community, but wanted to apply pressure by emphasizing that this was a necessary requirement.]

**Apr 30, 1953: US pressure (1)**

Secretary of State Dulles warned the Parliaments of Western Europe tonight that delay in their approval of the European Army was holding back the only “good solution”. (NYT p. 1)

**Dec 15, 1953: US pressure (2)**

Secretary of State Dulles warned the European Allies that if an European army was not established soon the United States would be forced into an “agonizing reappraisal of its own basic policies”. (NYT p. 1)

**Dec 17, 1953: US pressure (3)**

President Eisenhower emphasized today that he was bound by law to reduce drastically United States military aid to Europe if the European Defense Community did not materialize. (NYT p. 18)

**Apr 1, 1954:** Excerpt of a message about Indochina sent by the US Secretary of State to the US embassy in London.

"We will actively oppose any solution of any kind which directly or indirectly could lead to loss of Indochina to the Communists. (FRUS, Vol. 1 about Indochina, p. 1203)

[This was a strong language and helps to understand why the United States did not sign the Geneva Agreement when it was concluded in late July 1954. This excerpt
**May 28, 1952:** The Allies will allow Germany to make some arms such as artillery and tanks. However, planes and atomic weapons will be banned. (NYT p. 1)

**May 30, 1952:** Strasbourg. Calling for speed and audacity, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium drew applause from both opponents and adherents when he pleaded with the Council of Europe's Assembly to make a European federal union at once in order to save Germany from being drawn into the Soviet orbit. His plan was rejected on the following day. (NYT 30 May 1952 p. 3; NYT 31 May p. 9)

[Nowadays (2014) the Council of Europe has no longer any real function as far as European unification is concerned. The present entry shows that in 1952 it was still instrumental in this respect, particularly in a Cold War perspective.]

**Jan 31, 1953:** Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was en route to Western Europe today on his delicate assignment of persuading the Allies of the United States that their unification for defense might well determine the future of the American aid policy. He will visit Rome, Paris, Bonn, London, (NYT p. 1)

[In other words, Mr. Dulles did not only wish to praise the concept of a European defense community, but wanted to apply pressure by emphasizing that this was a necessary requirement.]

**Apr 30, 1953: US pressure (1)**

Secretary of State Dulles warned the Parliaments of Western Europe tonight that delay in their approval of the European Army was holding back the only “good solution”. (NYT p. 1)

**Dec 15, 1953: US pressure (2)**

Secretary of State Dulles warned the European Allies that if an European army was not established soon the United States would be forced into an “agonizing reappraisal of its own basic policies”. (NYT p. 1)

**Dec 17, 1953: US pressure (3)**

President Eisenhower emphasized today that he was bound by law to reduce drastically United States military aid to Europe if the European Defense Community did not materialize. (NYT p. 18)

**Apr 1, 1954:** Excerpt of a message about Indochina sent by the US Secretary of State to the US embassy in London.

"We will actively oppose any solution of any kind which directly or indirectly could lead to loss of Indochina to the Communists. (FRUS, Vol. 1 about Indochina, p. 1203)

[This was a strong language and helps to understand why the United States did not sign the Geneva Agreement when it was concluded in late July 1954. This excerpt
<figure><img src="image_21.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. xx: Debate in France on the ECD (in French CED).** Left-hand side: Uncle Sam shows some soldiers to his child (France) and says: "These are the soldiers you will get for Christmas. Don't expect any others". Right-hand side: Advertisement for the EDC. The two black birds symbolize the Soviet Union and nazism. The EDC shield protects Europe against them. Source: Internet.</figcaption></figure>

also shows that the circumstances leading to the end of the Indochina war created a tension between France and the United States which can explain that the EDC was rejected by the parliament almost without discussion.]

**Apr 10, 1954:** Congratulations are due to Luxembourg for becoming the fourth of the six nations involved to ratify the "European Defense Community". Its action completes ratification of the project by Benelux which also comprises Belgium and the Netherlands. (NYT 10 April 1954 p. 14)

[So, at this date, the EDC had been ratified by Germany and the three Benelux nations. The ratification by France and Italy was expected within a short time. However, it was rejected by France two months later.]

**May 7, 1954:** French defeat of Dien Bien Phu (Indochina).

[From that point on, there is good reason to think that the French decision about the EDC was conditioned by the events in Indochina and the attitude of the United States in this respect.]

**May 29, 1954:** France advanced call to 80,000 men to help Asia war. (NYT 29 May 1954)

[Clearly, the United States wanted France to continue the war against the Vietminh.]

**Jun 1954:** A document issued by MAAG France indicates the composition and strength of 14 planned French EDC divisions and 14 French national divisions. It can be seen that although the total strength is about the same (223,842 versus 282,116) there were almost three times more armored units in the EDC forces (32,956 versus 12,140). (MAAG 3)

[This detailed table shows that much planning had already been done in order to implement the EDC in French forces.]
<figure><img src="image_20.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. xx: Debate in France on the ECD (in French CED).** Left-hand side: Uncle Sam shows some soldiers to his child (France) and says: "These are the soldiers you will get for Christmas. Don't expect any others". Right-hand side: Advertisement for the EDC. The two black birds symbolize the Soviet Union and nazism. The EDC shield protects Europe against them. Source: Internet.</figcaption></figure>

also shows that the circumstances leading to the end of the Indochina war created a tension between France and the United States which can explain that the EDC was rejected by the parliament almost without discussion.]

**Apr 10, 1954:** Congratulations are due to Luxembourg for becoming the fourth of the six nations involved to ratify the "European Defense Community". Its action completes ratification of the project by Benelux which also comprises Belgium and the Netherlands. (NYT 10 April 1954 p. 14)

[So, at this date, the EDC had been ratified by Germany and the three Benelux nations. The ratification by France and Italy was expected within a short time. However, it was rejected by France two months later.]

**May 7, 1954:** French defeat of Dien Bien Phu (Indochina).

[From that point on, there is good reason to think that the French decision about the EDC was conditioned by the events in Indochina and the attitude of the United States in this respect.]

**May 29, 1954:** France advanced call to 80,000 men to help Asia war. (NYT 29 May 1954)

[Clearly, the United States wanted France to continue the war against the Vietminh.]

**Jun 1954:** A document issued by MAAG France indicates the composition and strength of 14 planned French EDC divisions and 14 French national divisions. It can be seen that although the total strength is about the same (223,842 versus 282,116) there were almost three times more armored units in the EDC forces (32,956 versus 12,140). (MAAG 3)

[This detailed table shows that much planning had already been done in order to implement the EDC in French forces.]
**Jun 3, 1954: American embassy in Paris to Secretary of State. Excerpts.**

MAAG Paris was approached yesterday by the French Minister of Defense [René Pleven] regarding the formation of 3 new divisions in Indochina, using cadres from existing French NATO divisions in Germany. The French said they would require equipment for these divisions which could be delivered to Indochina from our Far Eastern stocks. MAAG will forward detailed French request to Defense [i.e. US Department of Defense] in due course.

I would like to make the following purely political comments on this subject.

1. In order to maintain French will to resist in Indochina, I feel it is most important to tell French promptly that in principle we will do whatever is necessary to get them equipment for these divisions.

2. We should make no objection to the weakening of French NATO forces that will result from organization of these new divisions. This is particularly important in view of the coming debate on EDC as creation of these divisions will provide example of flexibility in European situation.

[signed] Dillon [US ambassador in Paris]
(MAAG 3)

[It was the wish of the US State Department that despite the Dien Bien Phu defeat (7 May 1954) France continues in its role as an anti-Communist bulwark in Indochina. The demand made by René Pleven shows that this was indeed the intention of the French government. However, the government of Joseph Laniel fell on 12 June 1954. Under the government of Pierre-Mendès France, all French forces were withdrawn from the northern part of Indochina even before an agreement was reached in the Geneva negotiations on 20 July 1954.

The previous excerpt also shows that the success of the EDC was a central-objective for the United States.

The following entry shows that the wise advice given by the US Ambassador in Paris was not followed.]

**Jun 11, 1954:** The United States has turned down a French request that it provide Globemaster planes and Air Force crews to fly about 3,000 additional troops from North Africa to Indochina. (NYT p. 1)

**Jun 12, 1954:** The French cabinet lead by Joseph Laniel comes to an end after a vote in Parliament. He was succeeded by Pierre Mendès France.

**Jun 16, 1954:** The Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly rejected the EDC treaty, 24 to 18 with 2 abstentions. Six Socialists, defying their party's directives, voted against the EDC. (NYT 10 June 1954 p. 10)

[It is often said that it is the opposition of the Gaullists and Communists which made
**Jun 3, 1954: American embassy in Paris to Secretary of State. Excerpts.**

MAAG Paris was approached yesterday by the French Minister of Defense [René Pleven] regarding the formation of 3 new divisions in Indochina, using cadres from existing French NATO divisions in Germany. The French said they would require equipment for these divisions which could be delivered to Indochina from our Far Eastern stocks. MAAG will forward detailed French request to Defense [i.e. US Department of Defense] in due course.

I would like to make the following purely political comments on this subject.

1. In order to maintain French will to resist in Indochina, I feel it is most important to tell French promptly that in principle we will do whatever is necessary to get them equipment for these divisions.

2. We should make no objection to the weakening of French NATO forces that will result from organization of these new divisions. This is particularly important in view of the coming debate on EDC as creation of these divisions will provide example of flexibility in European situation.

[signed] Dillon [US ambassador in Paris]
(MAAG 3)

[It was the wish of the US State Department that despite the Dien Bien Phu defeat (7 May 1954) France continues in its role as an anti-Communist bulwark in Indochina. The demand made by René Pleven shows that this was indeed the intention of the French government. However, the government of Joseph Laniel fell on 12 June 1954. Under the government of Pierre-Mendès France, all French forces were withdrawn from the northern part of Indochina even before an agreement was reached in the Geneva negotiations on 20 July 1954.

The previous excerpt also shows that the success of the EDC was a central-objective for the United States.

The following entry shows that the wise advice given by the US Ambassador in Paris was not followed.]

**Jun 11, 1954:** The United States has turned down a French request that it provide Globemaster planes and Air Force crews to fly about 3,000 additional troops from North Africa to Indochina. (NYT p. 1)

**Jun 12, 1954:** The French cabinet lead by Joseph Laniel comes to an end after a vote in Parliament. He was succeeded by Pierre Mendès France.

**Jun 16, 1954:** The Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly rejected the EDC treaty, 24 to 18 with 2 abstentions. Six Socialists, defying their party's directives, voted against the EDC. (NYT 10 June 1954 p. 10)

[It is often said that it is the opposition of the Gaullists and Communists which made
this project fail. The present entry shows that this is not completely true.

This rejection came two months after the French setback at Dien Bien Phu in Indochina. During the last phase of the battle, the French government had been seeking and expecting US air support, in vain however.]

**Jun 16, 1954: US pressure (4)**

Some military aid to Europe is already being cut off under the terms of the Richards amendment, Secretary of State Dulles disclosed today. (NYT p. 1)

**Jun 18, 1954: US pressure (5)**

US prods allies about the EDC. The House Foreign Affairs Committee, with Administration backing, moved again to put new pressure on France and Italy for ratification of the EDC treaty. (NYT 18 June 1954 p. 4)

**Jul 11, 1954: US pressure (6)**

The Senate acts to speed EDC ratification. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to halt military and other aid to France and Italy on December 31 unless by that time they had ratified the EDC treaty or an acceptable alternative. (NYT 11 11 July p. 1)

**Jul 15, 1954:** In the Geneva negotiation France, backed by the United States, is determined not to fix a date for holding elections in Vietnam, even if the Communists make this the price for agreeing to an armistice. (NYT p. 1)

[This suggests that from the very beginning the United States decided not to support the organization of elections in Vietnam.]

**Jul 20, 1954:** An agreement was reached in the Geneva peace negotiation. Then, on July 24, Premier Pierre Mendes-France won the approval of the French National Assembly for the truce in Indochina. The vote was 462 to 13. (NYT p. 1)

**Jul 25, 1954:** Title: The setback of the West in Geneva may be costly later. (NYT July 25, 1954)

**Aug 17, 1954: US pressure (7)**

The State Department expressed its official opposition to major revisions of the EDC treaty proposed by the French Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France. (NYT 17 August 1954 p. 1)

[The EDC was supposed to be a plan proposed by France for military cooperation in Europe. This was mere window-dressing, however. A further confirmation is provided here by the fact that the refusal of any revision in fact is spelt out by Washington.]

**Aug 31, 1954:** The EDC treaty was rejected by the French National Assembly by a
this project fail. The present entry shows that this is not completely true.

This rejection came two months after the French setback at Dien Bien Phu in Indochina. During the last phase of the battle, the French government had been seeking and expecting US air support, in vain however.]

**Jun 16, 1954: US pressure (4)**

Some military aid to Europe is already being cut off under the terms of the Richards amendment, Secretary of State Dulles disclosed today. (NYT p. 1)

**Jun 18, 1954: US pressure (5)**

US prods allies about the EDC. The House Foreign Affairs Committee, with Administration backing, moved again to put new pressure on France and Italy for ratification of the EDC treaty. (NYT 18 June 1954 p. 4)

**Jul 11, 1954: US pressure (6)**

The Senate acts to speed EDC ratification. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to halt military and other aid to France and Italy on December 31 unless by that time they had ratified the EDC treaty or an acceptable alternative. (NYT 11 11 July p. 1)

**Jul 15, 1954:** In the Geneva negotiation France, backed by the United States, is determined not to fix a date for holding elections in Vietnam, even if the Communists make this the price for agreeing to an armistice. (NYT p. 1)

[This suggests that from the very beginning the United States decided not to support the organization of elections in Vietnam.]

**Jul 20, 1954:** An agreement was reached in the Geneva peace negotiation. Then, on July 24, Premier Pierre Mendes-France won the approval of the French National Assembly for the truce in Indochina. The vote was 462 to 13. (NYT p. 1)

**Jul 25, 1954:** Title: The setback of the West in Geneva may be costly later. (NYT July 25, 1954)

**Aug 17, 1954: US pressure (7)**

The State Department expressed its official opposition to major revisions of the EDC treaty proposed by the French Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France. (NYT 17 August 1954 p. 1)

[The EDC was supposed to be a plan proposed by France for military cooperation in Europe. This was mere window-dressing, however. A further confirmation is provided here by the fact that the refusal of any revision in fact is spelt out by Washington.]

**Aug 31, 1954:** The EDC treaty was rejected by the French National Assembly by a
vote of 319 to 264. (NYT 31 August 1954 p. 1)

[This outcome was of course expected on account of the decision reached by the Foreign Affairs Committee on 16 June.

Here again, it can be observed that the 319 votes against the EDC extended beyond the opposition of the Gaullists and Communists. The detailed count was as follows (total party membership is given within parentheses):

Communists: 99 (103), Gaullists (RPF=Rassemblement du Peuple Français): 67 (73), Radicals: 44 (100), Socialists: 53 (105), non-affiliated members: 54⁵¹. In other words, opposition to the EDC came from all sides.]

**Sep 26, 1954: US pressure (8)**

Italy faces loss of US help soon. (NYT 26 September 1954 p. 15)

**Oct 23, 1954:** After the failure of the EDC, seven countries (the 6 of the ECD plus the UK) formed the Western European Union. (Wikipedia article entitled "Western European Union")

[This organization was supposed to be a link between NATO and the Economic Union (commonly called "Common Market"). However, its role remained unclear. It was definitely abolished in 2011.]

**Dec 8, 1957:** The French and West German Governments have established a joint armament research center. The joint research to stress rockets and missiles. (NYT p. 26)

[It is against this bilateral cooperation that the statement (given above) made in the US National Security Council of 22 May 1958 was directed. Later on, this bilateral agreement was, so to say, "diluted" through the joining of other countries: first Italy in late January 1958, then Britain at the end of March 1958. The wish of the State Department (as expressed in the excerpt given above) was that this cooperation should take place in the framework of NATO. Basically, this would give the United States *de facto* control.]

## A test-experiment: is the US in favor or against the euro?

### Looking beyond official statements

Are the State Department and the US Treasury in favor or against the euro? This is certainly an important question, however it is not easy to provide a clear answer. Why is this so? For many issues, the official position of the State Department is quite different from the actual policy that is being developed. In other words, there is often

<footnote n="51">⁵¹Sources: Wikipedia article entitled "Composition de l'Assemblée nationale française par législature"; "Une certaine idée de l'Europe by Laurent de Boissieu.</footnote>
vote of 319 to 264. (NYT 31 August 1954 p. 1)

[This outcome was of course expected on account of the decision reached by the Foreign Affairs Committee on 16 June.

Here again, it can be observed that the 319 votes against the EDC extended beyond the opposition of the Gaullists and Communists. The detailed count was as follows (total party membership is given within parentheses):

Communists: 99 (103), Gaullists (RPF=Rassemblement du Peuple Français): 67 (73), Radicals: 44 (100), Socialists: 53 (105), non-affiliated members: 54⁵¹. In other words, opposition to the EDC came from all sides.]

**Sep 26, 1954: US pressure (8)**

Italy faces loss of US help soon. (NYT 26 September 1954 p. 15)

**Oct 23, 1954:** After the failure of the EDC, seven countries (the 6 of the ECD plus the UK) formed the Western European Union. (Wikipedia article entitled "Western European Union")

[This organization was supposed to be a link between NATO and the Economic Union (commonly called "Common Market"). However, its role remained unclear. It was definitely abolished in 2011.]

**Dec 8, 1957:** The French and West German Governments have established a joint armament research center. The joint research to stress rockets and missiles. (NYT p. 26)

[It is against this bilateral cooperation that the statement (given above) made in the US National Security Council of 22 May 1958 was directed. Later on, this bilateral agreement was, so to say, "diluted" through the joining of other countries: first Italy in late January 1958, then Britain at the end of March 1958. The wish of the State Department (as expressed in the excerpt given above) was that this cooperation should take place in the framework of NATO. Basically, this would give the United States *de facto* control.]

## A test-experiment: is the US in favor or against the euro?

### Looking beyond official statements

Are the State Department and the US Treasury in favor or against the euro? This is certainly an important question, however it is not easy to provide a clear answer. Why is this so? For many issues, the official position of the State Department is quite different from the actual policy that is being developed. In other words, there is often

<footnote n="51">⁵¹Sources: Wikipedia article entitled "Composition de l'Assemblée nationale française par législature"; "Une certaine idée de l'Europe by Laurent de Boissieu.</footnote>
a wide gap between official and actual policy.

A fairly clear example is the US policy with respect to Taiwan. Officially, the US supports a “one China” policy. However, at the same time, Taiwan is treated by the US as an independent state. This manifests itself in several ways.

* Of course, there is no US embassy in Taiwan but the “American Institute in Taiwan” (AIT), a private nonprofit corporation, provides almost all services expected from an embassy. For instance, it is authorized to accept passport applications and issue visas. In short, except for its name, it is an embassy.

* Whereas members of the US government do not meet the president of Taiwan in Washington there are frequent meetings in other places. For instance, on 3 July 2014 President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan met with Secretary of State John Kerry in Panama<fnref n="52" />. Ma previously met with US Vice President Joe Biden in the Vatican in March 2013 at the inauguration of Pope Francis.

* The United States sells large amounts of weapons to Taiwan. To put such sales in comparative perspective one should think of weapons officially sold by a foreign government to a separatist movement in Puerto Rico.

Coming back to the euro how can one discriminate between official and actual US attitude?

* Some semi-official medias such as the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal may say more clearly what the State Department does not wish to say.

* Instead of paying too much attention to statements one should rather analyse the actions of the US government.

## US vision of a United Europe

In the years after World War II, the US policy consisted in encouraging the formation of a “United States of Europe”. What was the real intent? Here again one cannot rely on official statements. As already mentioned, the State Department encouraged and funded the creation of the “European Movement”. There can be little doubt that some of its members were sincerely in favor of a true European unification. However, the first (and so far main) achievement of the “European Movement” was the “Council of Europe”, an organization which can hardly be said to have opened the road of an effective European Union.

## The European Free Trade Association: a British watered-down version of the Common Market

The New York Times (29 January 2003) summarized the role of the UK in the European construction in the following terms: “It [UK] tried to sabotage the plan for a

<footnote n="52">⁵²Ma said that he and Kerry talked about a wide range of topics, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a US-led trade bloc that Taiwan hopes to enter (Taipei Times 3 July 2014). “One China” implies that Taiwan is a province of the PRC; however the scope of such discussions was far beyond province-level discussions.</footnote>
a wide gap between official and actual policy.

A fairly clear example is the US policy with respect to Taiwan. Officially, the US supports a “one China” policy. However, at the same time, Taiwan is treated by the US as an independent state. This manifests itself in several ways.

* Of course, there is no US embassy in Taiwan but the “American Institute in Taiwan” (AIT), a private nonprofit corporation, provides almost all services expected from an embassy. For instance, it is authorized to accept passport applications and issue visas. In short, except for its name, it is an embassy.

* Whereas members of the US government do not meet the president of Taiwan in Washington there are frequent meetings in other places. For instance, on 3 July 2014 President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan met with Secretary of State John Kerry in Panama<fnref n="52" />. Ma previously met with US Vice President Joe Biden in the Vatican in March 2013 at the inauguration of Pope Francis.

* The United States sells large amounts of weapons to Taiwan. To put such sales in comparative perspective one should think of weapons officially sold by a foreign government to a separatist movement in Puerto Rico.

Coming back to the euro how can one discriminate between official and actual US attitude?

* Some semi-official medias such as the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal may say more clearly what the State Department does not wish to say.

* Instead of paying too much attention to statements one should rather analyse the actions of the US government.

## US vision of a United Europe

In the years after World War II, the US policy consisted in encouraging the formation of a “United States of Europe”. What was the real intent? Here again one cannot rely on official statements. As already mentioned, the State Department encouraged and funded the creation of the “European Movement”. There can be little doubt that some of its members were sincerely in favor of a true European unification. However, the first (and so far main) achievement of the “European Movement” was the “Council of Europe”, an organization which can hardly be said to have opened the road of an effective European Union.

## The European Free Trade Association: a British watered-down version of the Common Market

The New York Times (29 January 2003) summarized the role of the UK in the European construction in the following terms: “It [UK] tried to sabotage the plan for a

<footnote n="52">⁵²Ma said that he and Kerry talked about a wide range of topics, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a US-led trade bloc that Taiwan hopes to enter (Taipei Times 3 July 2014). “One China” implies that Taiwan is a province of the PRC; however the scope of such discussions was far beyond province-level discussions.</footnote>
customs union by a proposal for a free trade area. When a single currency began to be discussed, it tried to derail this with a dotty plan for a 'hard ecu'. In 1991, when the Maastricht treaty was drafted, Britain insisted on removal of the word 'federal' from its aims. Britain has steadily given priority to the United States over Europe and Blair has pursued this line so sedulously that he is widely regarded in Europe as an American stooge".

What was this free trade area?

Called the "European Free Trade Association" (EFTA), it was established on 4 January 1960 by 7 European countries: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK<fnref n="53" />. It was a watered-down version of the Common Market (also called European Economic Community or EEC) for two main reasons:

1. The EFTA planned the progressive elimination of customs duties on industrial products, but not on agricultural products or maritime trade.

2. The crucial difference between the EEC and the EFTA was the absence of a common external customs tariff. Therefore each EFTA member was free to establish individual free trade agreements with non EFTA countries.

It seems that the US State Department welcomed the creation of the EFTA. In January 1960 the New York Times devoted some 20 articles to this event. In the US the EFTA was called the "Outer Seven". From the very beginning those articles emphasized the perspective of close ties between the US and the "Outer Seven". Here are two examples:

* "The US is optimistic on Europe trade; it expects to share any tariff cuts negotiated by the two blocs" (NYT 16 Jan 1960 p.8). In other words, the article suggests that if the individual members of the EFTA cut their tariff rates for US imports the EEC will have to follow suit.

* "American support and participation in efforts to maintain trade cooperation by West European nations was urged yesterday by representatives of the new Outer Seven free-trade alliance". (NYT 26 Jan 1960 p. 44)

In summary, the US plan was the following. Because the members of the EEC and EFTA were close neighbors, by necessity the two blocs had to find tariff agreements. Despite not being a close neighbor, the US expected to benefit from any lowering of custom duties between the EEC and the EFTA.

Negotiations between the two blocs quickly became contentious with Germany (probably backed by France) taking a fairly resolute position with respect to the EFTA:

<footnote n="53">⁵³This Free Trade Association should not be confused with the Benelux which was an association of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. So, at that time there were three different European free trade associations (in chronological order of their creation): the Benelux (1947), the European Economic Community also called Common Market (1957) and the EFTA (1960).</footnote>
customs union by a proposal for a free trade area. When a single currency began to be discussed, it tried to derail this with a dotty plan for a 'hard ecu'. In 1991, when the Maastricht treaty was drafted, Britain insisted on removal of the word 'federal' from its aims. Britain has steadily given priority to the United States over Europe and Blair has pursued this line so sedulously that he is widely regarded in Europe as an American stooge".

What was this free trade area?

Called the "European Free Trade Association" (EFTA), it was established on 4 January 1960 by 7 European countries: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK<fnref n="53" />. It was a watered-down version of the Common Market (also called European Economic Community or EEC) for two main reasons:

1. The EFTA planned the progressive elimination of customs duties on industrial products, but not on agricultural products or maritime trade.

2. The crucial difference between the EEC and the EFTA was the absence of a common external customs tariff. Therefore each EFTA member was free to establish individual free trade agreements with non EFTA countries.

It seems that the US State Department welcomed the creation of the EFTA. In January 1960 the New York Times devoted some 20 articles to this event. In the US the EFTA was called the "Outer Seven". From the very beginning those articles emphasized the perspective of close ties between the US and the "Outer Seven". Here are two examples:

* "The US is optimistic on Europe trade; it expects to share any tariff cuts negotiated by the two blocs" (NYT 16 Jan 1960 p.8). In other words, the article suggests that if the individual members of the EFTA cut their tariff rates for US imports the EEC will have to follow suit.

* "American support and participation in efforts to maintain trade cooperation by West European nations was urged yesterday by representatives of the new Outer Seven free-trade alliance". (NYT 26 Jan 1960 p. 44)

In summary, the US plan was the following. Because the members of the EEC and EFTA were close neighbors, by necessity the two blocs had to find tariff agreements. Despite not being a close neighbor, the US expected to benefit from any lowering of custom duties between the EEC and the EFTA.

Negotiations between the two blocs quickly became contentious with Germany (probably backed by France) taking a fairly resolute position with respect to the EFTA:

<footnote n="53">⁵³This Free Trade Association should not be confused with the Benelux which was an association of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. So, at that time there were three different European free trade associations (in chronological order of their creation): the Benelux (1947), the European Economic Community also called Common Market (1957) and the EFTA (1960).</footnote>
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer is determined to maintain West Germany's support of the controversial Common Market tariff proposal that threatens to split Western Europe into two warring factions. (NYT 3 April 1960 p. 22)

What was eventually the fate of the EFTA? Almost all its members left it and joined the European Union: the UK and Denmark in 1973, Portugal in 1986, Austria and Sweden in 1995.

**Amero or dollarization?**

What are US wishes in terms of monetary unification? This can best be seen by considering the case of the dollar. While dollarization is the ultimate objective, there are some intermediate stages which have been implemented in several countries.

1. The first stage consists in countries whose currency is pegged to the dollar through a fixed exchange rate. A well-known example is the Hong Kong dollar.

2. The second stage consists in countries where payment can be made in dollars as well as in the national currency. Thus, the US dollar is officially accepted alongside local currencies in Belize, Bermuda and Barbados, Cambodia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru<fnref n="54" />, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe (Wikipedia articles entitled “North American monetary union” and “Currency substitution”)

3. The third step is the establishment of what is called a “currency board”. This expression is in fact somewhat misleading because a country which adopts this system has no longer any real need of a central bank, except in name. In this system the national currency still exists but it is pegged to the dollar and all decisions in its regard are taken in Washington. The central bank has a completely passive role consisting in exchanging its notes for dollars and vive versa. Such a currency board cannot lend money to the domestic government. Compared with dollarization, the main difference is that the domestic “central bank” can collect so-called “seigniorage”, the profit gained by issuing coinage which is due to the fact that producing the currency costs less than the actual value of the currency (especially for paper currency).

In the decade 1991-2000 many countries (e.g. Argentina) adopted currency boards. In this decade the New York Times had about 10 articles a year containing the word “currency board” against 0.2 per year in the previous decade. Before it ended in disaster in 2001, the Argentinian currency board was at first successful in reducing inflation. It served as a model for the purpose of encouraging other countries to adopt the same system. After the crash in Argentina, the interest in currency board waned. In the period 2001-2009 the number of articles on this topic in the New York Times

<footnote n="54">⁵⁴For instance, in 1999 64% of the money supply in Peru was held in US dollars</footnote>
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer is determined to maintain West Germany's support of the controversial Common Market tariff proposal that threatens to split Western Europe into two warring factions. (NYT 3 April 1960 p. 22)

What was eventually the fate of the EFTA? Almost all its members left it and joined the European Union: the UK and Denmark in 1973, Portugal in 1986, Austria and Sweden in 1995.

**Amero or dollarization?**

What are US wishes in terms of monetary unification? This can best be seen by considering the case of the dollar. While dollarization is the ultimate objective, there are some intermediate stages which have been implemented in several countries.

1. The first stage consists in countries whose currency is pegged to the dollar through a fixed exchange rate. A well-known example is the Hong Kong dollar.

2. The second stage consists in countries where payment can be made in dollars as well as in the national currency. Thus, the US dollar is officially accepted alongside local currencies in Belize, Bermuda and Barbados, Cambodia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru<fnref n="54" />, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe (Wikipedia articles entitled “North American monetary union” and “Currency substitution”)

3. The third step is the establishment of what is called a “currency board”. This expression is in fact somewhat misleading because a country which adopts this system has no longer any real need of a central bank, except in name. In this system the national currency still exists but it is pegged to the dollar and all decisions in its regard are taken in Washington. The central bank has a completely passive role consisting in exchanging its notes for dollars and vive versa. Such a currency board cannot lend money to the domestic government. Compared with dollarization, the main difference is that the domestic “central bank” can collect so-called “seigniorage”, the profit gained by issuing coinage which is due to the fact that producing the currency costs less than the actual value of the currency (especially for paper currency).

In the decade 1991-2000 many countries (e.g. Argentina) adopted currency boards. In this decade the New York Times had about 10 articles a year containing the word “currency board” against 0.2 per year in the previous decade. Before it ended in disaster in 2001, the Argentinian currency board was at first successful in reducing inflation. It served as a model for the purpose of encouraging other countries to adopt the same system. After the crash in Argentina, the interest in currency board waned. In the period 2001-2009 the number of articles on this topic in the New York Times

<footnote n="54">⁵⁴For instance, in 1999 64% of the money supply in Peru was held in US dollars</footnote>
dropped to 1.7 per year.

4 The final step is full dollarization. When it was hit by the crisis, Argentina was on the way of full dollarization. Panama and Ecuador are two countries which are fully dollarized.

One may be surprised that after the NAFTA free-trade agreement came into effect in 1994 the North American countries did not try to go toward monetary unification. The explanation seems to be as follows. The United States is not interested in anything short of dollarization. Thus, the creation of a common currency called the “Amero” raised no interest whatsoever in Washington. On the other hand, Canada and Mexico do not seem eager to embrace full dollarization.

However, in March 1999 the influential “Mexican Businessmen’s Council” and the “Mexican Bankers Association” presented President Zedillo with a dollarization proposal. President Zedillo has staunchly opposed dollarization and, somewhat more surprisingly, Slim Helu, chairman of “Telefonos de Mexico” and one of the most important businessmen in Mexico, has joined Zedillo in his opposition.

The previous points suggest that when promoting monetary integration in Europe in the late 1940s, the United States had in mind a form of currency board. This would have paralleled in monetary affairs the steps planed in military affairs.

<table><caption>Table x: Planned European unification under US leadership: military versus monetary</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Military</th><th>Monetary</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Loose partnership</td><td>NATO</td><td>IMF</td></tr><tr><td>Integrated organization</td><td>EDC (not passed)</td><td>Currency board (not made public)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, IMF: International Monetary Fund, EDC: European Defence Community, Currency board: see text. The European Union is a fairly weak construction; however, it would be even weaker if built on the “Council of Europe” and the EDC.

## The “Hard Ecu”: a British watered-down version of the euro

In the same way as the “Council of Europe” was a weak and ineffective unification scheme, the “hard Ecu” was a proposal for a common currency that would have been even weaker than the euro.

It was put forward by the Chancellor of Exchequer (i.e. Ministry of finance) John Major on 20 June 1990. The announcement followed Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's comments that she did not believe a commitment to a single currency would be made in her lifetime.

What was the “hard Ecu” and why was it a watered-down version of the euro?
dropped to 1.7 per year.

4 The final step is full dollarization. When it was hit by the crisis, Argentina was on the way of full dollarization. Panama and Ecuador are two countries which are fully dollarized.

One may be surprised that after the NAFTA free-trade agreement came into effect in 1994 the North American countries did not try to go toward monetary unification. The explanation seems to be as follows. The United States is not interested in anything short of dollarization. Thus, the creation of a common currency called the “Amero” raised no interest whatsoever in Washington. On the other hand, Canada and Mexico do not seem eager to embrace full dollarization.

However, in March 1999 the influential “Mexican Businessmen’s Council” and the “Mexican Bankers Association” presented President Zedillo with a dollarization proposal. President Zedillo has staunchly opposed dollarization and, somewhat more surprisingly, Slim Helu, chairman of “Telefonos de Mexico” and one of the most important businessmen in Mexico, has joined Zedillo in his opposition.

The previous points suggest that when promoting monetary integration in Europe in the late 1940s, the United States had in mind a form of currency board. This would have paralleled in monetary affairs the steps planed in military affairs.

<table><caption>Table x: Planned European unification under US leadership: military versus monetary</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Military</th><th>Monetary</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Loose partnership</td><td>NATO</td><td>IMF</td></tr><tr><td>Integrated organization</td><td>EDC (not passed)</td><td>Currency board (not made public)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, IMF: International Monetary Fund, EDC: European Defence Community, Currency board: see text. The European Union is a fairly weak construction; however, it would be even weaker if built on the “Council of Europe” and the EDC.

## The “Hard Ecu”: a British watered-down version of the euro

In the same way as the “Council of Europe” was a weak and ineffective unification scheme, the “hard Ecu” was a proposal for a common currency that would have been even weaker than the euro.

It was put forward by the Chancellor of Exchequer (i.e. Ministry of finance) John Major on 20 June 1990. The announcement followed Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's comments that she did not believe a commitment to a single currency would be made in her lifetime.

What was the “hard Ecu” and why was it a watered-down version of the euro?
* Ecu is an acronym of “European currency unit”; it was the first name of the common currency before being replaced by the term “euro”. This currency would not have replaced the national currencies but would have circulated alongside with them.

* The “hard Ecu” would not been used by all people but only by those who had a special need for it, as for instance investors or tourists.

* It was planned that initially the “hard Ecu” would be equal in value to a bundle of European currencies, Subsequently it may not be devalued relative to any member currency.

* The hard ecu would not be managed by a central bank but by a fund.

It is of course impossible to say how such a system would have worked had it been implemented. However, it is clear that it would have generated little fervor, commitment or interest among citizens. The system would have been similar to those countries mentioned above in which the dollar is accepted together with the national currency.

Would a currency with such a low status have been attractive as a reserve currency for non-European central banks or as a currency used in international trade?

The proponents of the “hard Ecu” claim that there would have been a healthy competition between the new currency and the old national currencies. One may think as well that it would have been a source of division. After all, the fifty US states do not have their own currency. There is perhaps a good reason for that.

## US support to the “hard ecu” plan led to the “dropping” and eviction of Margaret Thatcher

As noted elsewhere the United States was not in favor of a common currency but did not state this position openly. The circumstances which led to the resignation of Margaret Thatcher provide a rare occasion in which the US position is brought to light.

Margaret Thatcher was Britain's Prime Minister from 4 May 1979 to 28 November 1990. Her time in office almost coincided with the two terms of President Reagan of whom she was a staunch supporter.

It is on 14 November 1990 (in the middle of the Koweit crisis which led to the First Gulf War) that her leadership of the Conservative Party was challenged by what was first a small minority. At this moment she indicated her intention "to fight and fight to win". Curiously however, on 19 and 21 November the "New York Times" ran articles entitled "Time to go" and "Twilight for Mrs. Thatcher". Then, on 23 November, she announced that she would resign as party leader and prime minister. As a result, Britain's stock market raised sharply.
* Ecu is an acronym of “European currency unit”; it was the first name of the common currency before being replaced by the term “euro”. This currency would not have replaced the national currencies but would have circulated alongside with them.

* The “hard Ecu” would not been used by all people but only by those who had a special need for it, as for instance investors or tourists.

* It was planned that initially the “hard Ecu” would be equal in value to a bundle of European currencies, Subsequently it may not be devalued relative to any member currency.

* The hard ecu would not be managed by a central bank but by a fund.

It is of course impossible to say how such a system would have worked had it been implemented. However, it is clear that it would have generated little fervor, commitment or interest among citizens. The system would have been similar to those countries mentioned above in which the dollar is accepted together with the national currency.

Would a currency with such a low status have been attractive as a reserve currency for non-European central banks or as a currency used in international trade?

The proponents of the “hard Ecu” claim that there would have been a healthy competition between the new currency and the old national currencies. One may think as well that it would have been a source of division. After all, the fifty US states do not have their own currency. There is perhaps a good reason for that.

## US support to the “hard ecu” plan led to the “dropping” and eviction of Margaret Thatcher

As noted elsewhere the United States was not in favor of a common currency but did not state this position openly. The circumstances which led to the resignation of Margaret Thatcher provide a rare occasion in which the US position is brought to light.

Margaret Thatcher was Britain's Prime Minister from 4 May 1979 to 28 November 1990. Her time in office almost coincided with the two terms of President Reagan of whom she was a staunch supporter.

It is on 14 November 1990 (in the middle of the Koweit crisis which led to the First Gulf War) that her leadership of the Conservative Party was challenged by what was first a small minority. At this moment she indicated her intention "to fight and fight to win". Curiously however, on 19 and 21 November the "New York Times" ran articles entitled "Time to go" and "Twilight for Mrs. Thatcher". Then, on 23 November, she announced that she would resign as party leader and prime minister. As a result, Britain's stock market raised sharply.
It is true that the domestic economic situation was not very good. Inflation was running at nearly 11%, three times the figure in Germany or France, the introduction of the “poll tax” was widely unpopular and her support as reflected in the latest polls had dropped markedly. Yet, domestic reasons do not explain why she was pushed to resignation precisely at that moment in the middle of an international crisis.

If we read the American newspapers it becomes clear that her euro-sceptic attitude was a triggering factor in her eviction at this moment. A meeting of European leaders would take place in Rome in the following month (December 1990) to begin mapping plans for speedy monetary union. Clearly, this was a time during which the integration of the European Union was progressing rapidly. The “New York Times” of 4 November 1990 observes that there were even “plans to develop an independent defense capability to which the Americans and Britons have reacted ambivalently”. Thus, for the State Department it became important to slow down this movement. Traditionally, applying brakes was the role of the UK, but because of Mrs. Thatcher rigid attitude, she had lost her credibility and was no longer able to fulfil this role. Thus, it became urgent to replace her by someone who could rally other pro-US European countries around an alternative plan.

This scenario is made fairly plain through the excerpts given in the box.

## Euro: a long history of delayed and failed attempts

The decision to establish a full monetary union within 10 years was taken at the Hague Summit in December 1969 at the initiative of France and Germany. Yet, at the European Council meeting at Luxembourg in April 1980 the heads of government abandoned the objective of setting up an organization with central banking power. In fact, this decision followed a February agreement between France and Germany to delay plans to set up a central bank (New York Times 19 February 1980, p. D2). It would be interesting to know more precisely what led to this decision.

### Britain's exit in 1992

Why did Britain not become an eurozone member? The standard story goes as follows (Wikipedia article entitled “Black Wednesday”). On 16 September 1992 the British Conservative government was forced to withdraw the pound sterling from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) after it was unable to keep the pound above its agreed lower limit. This is a fact. The story goes on by telling us that this was due to short-selling by speculator George Soros. This last point is more difficult to check. In his book entitled “The Vandals’ Crown” Gregory Millman explains that this view is wrong in several respects. He mentions mostly technical reasons, but in a broader perspective two facts appear clearly.

* In September 1992 it was not only the pound which came under attack but also
It is true that the domestic economic situation was not very good. Inflation was running at nearly 11%, three times the figure in Germany or France, the introduction of the “poll tax” was widely unpopular and her support as reflected in the latest polls had dropped markedly. Yet, domestic reasons do not explain why she was pushed to resignation precisely at that moment in the middle of an international crisis.

If we read the American newspapers it becomes clear that her euro-sceptic attitude was a triggering factor in her eviction at this moment. A meeting of European leaders would take place in Rome in the following month (December 1990) to begin mapping plans for speedy monetary union. Clearly, this was a time during which the integration of the European Union was progressing rapidly. The “New York Times” of 4 November 1990 observes that there were even “plans to develop an independent defense capability to which the Americans and Britons have reacted ambivalently”. Thus, for the State Department it became important to slow down this movement. Traditionally, applying brakes was the role of the UK, but because of Mrs. Thatcher rigid attitude, she had lost her credibility and was no longer able to fulfil this role. Thus, it became urgent to replace her by someone who could rally other pro-US European countries around an alternative plan.

This scenario is made fairly plain through the excerpts given in the box.

## Euro: a long history of delayed and failed attempts

The decision to establish a full monetary union within 10 years was taken at the Hague Summit in December 1969 at the initiative of France and Germany. Yet, at the European Council meeting at Luxembourg in April 1980 the heads of government abandoned the objective of setting up an organization with central banking power. In fact, this decision followed a February agreement between France and Germany to delay plans to set up a central bank (New York Times 19 February 1980, p. D2). It would be interesting to know more precisely what led to this decision.

**Britain's exit in 1992** Why did Britain not become an eurozone member? The standard story goes as follows (Wikipedia article entitled “Black Wednesday”). On 16 September 1992 the British Conservative government was forced to withdraw the pound sterling from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) after it was unable to keep the pound above its agreed lower limit. This is a fact. The story goes on by telling us that this was due to short-selling by speculator George Soros. This last point is more difficult to check. In his book entitled “The Vandals’ Crown” Gregory Millman explains that this view is wrong in several respects. He mentions mostly technical reasons, but in a broader perspective two facts appear clearly.

* In September 1992 it was not only the pound which came under attack but also
### Main reason for the eviction of Margaret Thatcher in November 1990.

He [Geoffrey Howe] accused her of undercutting her Cabinet ministers while they tried to promote a British alternative to the proposed creation of a single community currency and central bank: the creation of a 13th currency whose value would be made up of the 12 others (NYT 14 November 1990).

America can only welcome a turn away from Mrs. Thatcher's Little England nationalism. On the issues that affect America most, substantial continuity is assured under any of the Conservative contenders, Michael Heseltine, Douglas Hurd or John Major (NYT 23 November 1990).

Mrs. Thatcher's belligerence on the issue of a unified Europe often backfired, making it easy for her European peers to ignore her; that is what the 11 other leaders did at a meeting in Rome last month. With John Major as Prime Minister of Britain, the 11 other leaders of the 12-nation community may find it a lot more difficult to ignore Britain's opposition. John Major has made it clear that he does not like, any more than Margaret Thatcher, the idea of a single currency and central bank for the European Community. Mr. Major, with his calm demeanor, will be a more reasonable voice than Mrs. Thatcher. Some community members who are less enthusiastic than others about a single currency or an independent central bank may want to listen to him.

As Britain's Prime Minister, he will also be in a much stronger position to promote Britain's alternative proposal for a system that would push the adoption of a single currency and central bank to the distant horizon, if not beyond. (NYT 28 November 1990)

> Excerpts of the “New York Times” in the days preceding and following the eviction of Margaret Thatcher in November 1990. The last sentence shows fairly clearly that the US was not in favor of a common currency controled by an European Central Bank. Although the British plan was not adopted, its mere existence probably dissuaded a number of European countries from becoming eurozone members. Source: Website of the New York Times.

the currencies of Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain and Sweden. For instance, in the 4th quarter of 1992, the real effective exchange rate of the lira fell by 10% whereas for the British pound the fall was only about 3%. On 8 September 1992, Finland let its currency float. On 13 September Italy devalued the lira by 7%, on 16 September Spain devalued the peseta by 5%, on 19 November Sweden let its currency float (Temperton 1993, Fig. 6.1)

* The British move out of the ERM can certainly not explain why Britain did not become a eurozone member for indeed Italy also had to leave the ERM under the pressure of speculation but joined it again later on.

* In August 1993 speculative attacks targeted the French franc which led to a suspension of the ERM and its redefinition in a looser form. The previous 2.25% allowed fluctuation range (but for the pound it was 6%) was enlarged to 15%. This was a setback for the convergence scheme but at the same time it would have allowed re-entry of the pound into the ERM if there had been a political will.

* Finally, there is one intriguing question for which we have no answer yet: why did speculative attacks against European currencies cease after September 1993? The
### Main reason for the eviction of Margaret Thatcher in November 1990.

He [Geoffrey Howe] accused her of undercutting her Cabinet ministers while they tried to promote a British alternative to the proposed creation of a single community currency and central bank: the creation of a 13th currency whose value would be made up of the 12 others (NYT 14 November 1990).

America can only welcome a turn away from Mrs. Thatcher's Little England nationalism. On the issues that affect America most, substantial continuity is assured under any of the Conservative contenders, Michael Heseltine, Douglas Hurd or John Major (NYT 23 November 1990).

Mrs. Thatcher's belligerence on the issue of a unified Europe often backfired, making it easy for her European peers to ignore her; that is what the 11 other leaders did at a meeting in Rome last month. With John Major as Prime Minister of Britain, the 11 other leaders of the 12-nation community may find it a lot more difficult to ignore Britain's opposition. John Major has made it clear that he does not like, any more than Margaret Thatcher, the idea of a single currency and central bank for the European Community. Mr. Major, with his calm demeanor, will be a more reasonable voice than Mrs. Thatcher. Some community members who are less enthusiastic than others about a single currency or an independent central bank may want to listen to him.

As Britain's Prime Minister, he will also be in a much stronger position to promote Britain's alternative proposal for a system that would push the adoption of a single currency and central bank to the distant horizon, if not beyond. (NYT 28 November 1990)

> Excerpts of the “New York Times” in the days preceding and following the eviction of Margaret Thatcher in November 1990. The last sentence shows fairly clearly that the US was not in favor of a common currency controled by an European Central Bank. Although the British plan was not adopted, its mere existence probably dissuaded a number of European countries from becoming eurozone members. Source: Website of the New York Times.

the currencies of Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain and Sweden. For instance, in the 4th quarter of 1992, the real effective exchange rate of the lira fell by 10% whereas for the British pound the fall was only about 3%. On 8 September 1992, Finland let its currency float. On 13 September Italy devalued the lira by 7%, on 16 September Spain devalued the peseta by 5%, on 19 November Sweden let its currency float (Temperton 1993, Fig. 6.1)

* The British move out of the ERM can certainly not explain why Britain did not become a eurozone member for indeed Italy also had to leave the ERM under the pressure of speculation but joined it again later on.

* In August 1993 speculative attacks targeted the French franc which led to a suspension of the ERM and its redefinition in a looser form. The previous 2.25% allowed fluctuation range (but for the pound it was 6%) was enlarged to 15%. This was a setback for the convergence scheme but at the same time it would have allowed re-entry of the pound into the ERM if there had been a political will.

* Finally, there is one intriguing question for which we have no answer yet: why did speculative attacks against European currencies cease after September 1993? The
broadening of the fluctuation range should have made such attacks easier rather than
more difficult.

In short, the UK did not become an eurozone member because it did not welcome
the idea of an European Central Bank. As already noted, when John Major became
Prime Minister he made clear that he was not in favor of a common currency. His
only objective was to promote the alternative plan of the “hard ecu”.

## Crisis of 2005: Roberto Maroni

After the rejection of the European constitution in referendums held in France and the
Netherlands, Roberto Maroni, Italian welfare minister, started a campaign to collect
signatures for the organization of a referendum on whether to re-introduce the lira in
Italy. He suggested that the new lira should be pegged to the dollar (The Economist
11 June 2005). This single declaration received an enormous coverage in British and
American media.

In the same issue of “The Economist” there were 3 articles about the euro. Their
titles convey fairly well their main purpose.

1. “The euro is not in danger of breaking up, yet” (p. 12)

2. “That lovely lira” (p. 28)

3. “The euro and its troubles” (p. 67)

4. There were similar articles in US newspapers, e.g.: “Lira nostalgia. Kicking the euro when Europe is down” (New York Times 19 June 2005)

## Crisis of 2010-2013

During the so-called European debt crisis the question raised by British and US me-
dia was not whether the eurozone would break apart but rather when that would
occur. Here are a few examples.

* Title: “Europe’s piecemeal failure” (NYT 5 December 2010)

* “My current best guess, writes Gideon Rachman in the Financial Times, is that the single currency will indeed eventually break up and that the euro’s executioner will be Germany.” (NYT 7 December 2010)

* “Let me say that in English: the European Union is cracking up.” (Thomas Friedman in the NYT of 27 August 2011)

* Title: “This is the way the euro ends” (NYT 9 November 2011)

Among the articles published during this crisis we did not find a single one trying to
figure out how the United States could come to the help of the European countries.
Incidentally, the same attitude prevailed during the crisis of 1997-1998 in south-east
Asia.

## Metrics for measuring the role of a currency in the world economy
broadening of the fluctuation range should have made such attacks easier rather than
more difficult.

In short, the UK did not become an eurozone member because it did not welcome
the idea of an European Central Bank. As already noted, when John Major became
Prime Minister he made clear that he was not in favor of a common currency. His
only objective was to promote the alternative plan of the “hard ecu”.

## Crisis of 2005: Roberto Maroni

After the rejection of the European constitution in referendums held in France and the
Netherlands, Roberto Maroni, Italian welfare minister, started a campaign to collect
signatures for the organization of a referendum on whether to re-introduce the lira in
Italy. He suggested that the new lira should be pegged to the dollar (The Economist
11 June 2005). This single declaration received an enormous coverage in British and
American media.

In the same issue of “The Economist” there were 3 articles about the euro. Their
titles convey fairly well their main purpose.

1. “The euro is not in danger of breaking up, *yet*” (p. 12)

2. “That lovely lira” (p. 28)

3. “The euro and its troubles” (p. 67)

4. There were similar articles in US newspapers, e.g.: “Lira nostalgia. Kicking the euro when Europe is down” (New York Times 19 June 2005)

## Crisis of 2010-2013

During the so-called European debt crisis the question raised by British and US me-
dia was not whether the eurozone would break apart but rather when that would
occur. Here are a few examples.

* Title: “Europe’s piecemeal failure” (NYT 5 December 2010)

* “My current best guess, writes Gideon Rachman in the Financial Times, is that the single currency will indeed eventually break up and that the euro’s executioner will be Germany.” (NYT 7 December 2010)

* “Let me say that in English: the European Union is cracking up.” (Thomas Friedman in the NYT of 27 August 2011)

* Title: “This is the way the euro ends” (NYT 9 November 2011)

Among the articles published during this crisis we did not find a single one trying to
figure out how the United States could come to the help of the European countries.
Incidentally, the same attitude prevailed during the crisis of 1997-1998 in south-east
Asia.

## Metrics for measuring the role of a currency in the world economy