Taiwan” (AFNRT), which had a main station in Taipei. After the US Armed Forces withdrew all its troops stationed in Taiwan, the station was reorganized under the name of International Community Radio Taipei (ICRT) by the American business community and the ROC government. Today, ICRT is the only English-language radio service in Taiwan.

Before we discuss the question of whether occupation episodes can be instrumental in expanding political influence it will be useful to examine the case of Denmark.

# The liberation of Denmark

## Why Denmark?

This country is of special interest with respect to the question under investigation for at least two reasons.

* No battle had to be waged for the liberation of Denmark. Instead its liberation was a consequence of the capitulation of Germany on 8 May 1945 (in fact the Danish resistance movement took over a few days earlier that is to say in the time interval between the suicide of Adolf Hitler on 30 April 1945 and the capitulation of 8 May). In other words, there was no military need for an occupation of the country by Allied troops. The Danish resistance would have been able to disarm the German troops and to direct them toward Allied internment camps.

* No occupation agreement was signed with Denmark because after the German occupation the government had remained in Denmark and the Allies recognized neither the “Fighting Denmark” movement that emerged in London in 1943 nor the “Danish Freedom Council established secretly in Copenhagen.

## Civil affairs directives for Denmark

However, on the Internet one can read a document<fnref n="30" /> entitled “Details of Civil Affairs Directives for Denmark, 9 April 1945”. This document is much more interesting and revealing than the occupation agreements with countries such as Belgium or the Netherlands. The occupation agreements are fairly vague and leave aside many important points (e.g. the issue of the bank notes introduced by Allied Forces). On the contrary, because it was not destined to be published and read by Danish people, the “Civil Affairs Directives” provide many specific details as shown by the following excerpts.

1. Zone covered by Civil Affairs. You will be responsible for insuring that the execution of Civil Affairs policies is uniform throughout Denmark both in the Military and non-Military Zone.

<footnote n="30">³⁰It comes from the UK National Archives (FO 371/47222-0002) and corresponds to a publication of the company “Gale, Cengage Learning”. As of 20 September 2013 it was freely available on the Internet</footnote>
2 **Establishment of Military Courts.** During the initial period, the Commander-in-Chief is authorized to establish Military Courts to try offenses committed by civilians against the property or security of the Allied Forces including violation of the orders, if any, issued by the Commander-in-Chief.

Moreover Allied courts will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of the Al-
lied Forces. The Supreme Commander may, by directives and orders, extend such
immunity to civilians who are not subject to military law.

3 Procurement. Procurement of civilian labor, billets and the use of lands or buildings will be effected in accordance with the policy of the Supreme Commander.

4 US and British flags. The US and British flags will be displayed (together with the Danish flag) on all administrative buildings where US or British personnel are present.

5 **Censorship.** During the military period, such censorship and control of press, publications, cinema, mail telecommunications will be instituted as are considered necessary.

6 **Re-organization of Danish services.** Safeguarding the interests of the Allied Forces may require the enactment of legislation and the re-organization of Danish administrative and judicial services.

7 **Bank notes introduced by Allied Forces.** Allied Military Kronor notes and Danish Kronor notes now in circulation will be legal tender without restriction.

8 **Control of the banking sector.** Banks should be placed under such control as necessary in order that adequate facilities for military needs be provided. Banks should not be closed unless really necessary and then only long enough to introduce satisfactory control, *to remove objectionable personnel* and to issue instructions.

When satisfied that the "Denmark National Bank" is under adequate control it may be used for official business of the Allied forces.

9 Issuance of bank notes. Except as may be authorized by the Civil Affairs authority or by a recognized Danish government the issuance of bank notes or kronor currency will be prohibited.

10 Assets blocked. All assets (including gold and securities) held by absent owners, hostile political organizations, including the officials thereof will be impounded [i.e, seized and retained in custody] or blocked or used under authorizations issued by the Financial Division of Civil Affairs of Denmark.

11 Anti-inflation measures. The indigenous government should be directed to continue existing anti-inflation measures. What was the rationale of this directive? It was of course expected that the introduction of large quantities of bank notes at a moment when the economic activity was almost at a standstill would have inflationary effects. Thus, the recommendation about anti-inflationary measures was an
2 **Establishment of Military Courts.** During the initial period, the Commander-in-Chief is authorized to establish Military Courts to try offenses committed by civilians against the property or security of the Allied Forces including violation of the orders, if any, issued by the Commander-in-Chief.

Moreover Allied courts will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of the Al-
lied Forces. The Supreme Commander may, by directives and orders, extend such
immunity to civilians who are not subject to military law.

3 Procurement. Procurement of civilian labor, billets and the use of lands or buildings will be effected in accordance with the policy of the Supreme Commander.

4 US and British flags. The US and British flags will be displayed (together with the Danish flag) on all administrative buildings where US or British personnel are present.

5 **Censorship.** During the military period, such censorship and control of press, publications, cinema, mail telecommunications will be instituted as are considered necessary.

6 **Re-organization of Danish services.** Safeguarding the interests of the Allied Forces may require the enactment of legislation and the re-organization of Danish administrative and judicial services.

7 **Bank notes introduced by Allied Forces.** Allied Military Kronor notes and Danish Kronor notes now in circulation will be legal tender without restriction.

8 **Control of the banking sector.** Banks should be placed under such control as necessary in order that adequate facilities for military needs be provided. Banks should not be closed unless really necessary and then only long enough to introduce satisfactory control, *to remove objectionable personnel* and to issue instructions.

When satisfied that the "Denmark National Bank" is under adequate control it may be used for official business of the Allied forces.

9 Issuance of bank notes. Except as may be authorized by the Civil Affairs authority or by a recognized Danish government the issuance of bank notes or kronor currency will be prohibited.

10 Assets blocked. All assets (including gold and securities) held by absent owners, hostile political organizations, including the officials thereof will be impounded [i.e, seized and retained in custody] or blocked or used under authorizations issued by the Financial Division of Civil Affairs of Denmark.

11 Anti-inflation measures. The indigenous government should be directed to continue existing anti-inflation measures. What was the rationale of this directive? It was of course expected that the introduction of large quantities of bank notes at a moment when the economic activity was almost at a standstill would have inflationary effects. Thus, the recommendation about anti-inflationary measures was an
attempt to limit this impact. The best anti-inflationary measures would have been not to allow the introduction of US-made banknotes<fnref n="31" />

12 **Purge in education** If it is thought that Danish educational associations or activities are being used to conceal political activities which would interfere with the success of the mission, the Danish authorities will be requested to effect such suspension as it is desired. Failing such compliance, the Commander-in-Chief is authorized to take direct action.

13 **Relief** The Commander-in Chief will deliver supplies to Danish authorities in exchange for a receipt showing description of supplies delivered for purpose of ultimate billing and settlements between governments.

Relief will be confined to making available the minimum quantities of food, clothing or medical supplies necessary to maintain the working capacity of the population and to preserve public order.

When these “Civil Affairs Directives” were issued on 9 April 1945 it was probably fairly clear that the war would end soon. In other words, military necessity would soon disappear. Nevertheless, according to these orders, Civil Affairs personnel should take control of the country in many important sectors: public security through the creation of military courts, extensive censorship, supplies and relief, control of currency issuance and banking activities, elimination of “objectionable personnel” in banks and schools or universities.

Moreover, the directives were broad enough to justify almost anything. What should one understand by “safeguarding the interests of Allied Forces”? What are the meanings of expressions such as “hostile political organizations” or “objectionable personnel”? They are open to many interpretations. They may apply to former Nazis but may also include the Communists who, on the contrary, had taken an active role in resistance movements. One may remember that in Japan the occupation forces at first targeted the nationalists but fairly soon (starting in 1946) their aim shifted toward the Communists and in a more general way toward any elements opposed to the occupation and the ensuing reorganization of the Japanese society.

## Causes of friction with the United States

At the end of the war there were several contentious points in the relations between Denmark and the United States.

* In 1941 the United States had occupied key-positions in Greenland and had participated in the British occupation of Iceland. In both cases this was done without permission of the Danish government. In the case of Greenland an agreement had

<footnote n="31">³¹As seen above in the treaties of 1871 and 1918, it was a standard rule to ask the defeated country to cover the cost of the occupation. On the contrary, there was no similar rule for the occupation of liberated countries. Of course, this cost could have been covered by Germany, but it would take several years until Germany would be able to pay it. The introduction of US-made bank notes solved the problem *at once*.</footnote>
attempt to limit this impact. The best anti-inflationary measures would have been not to allow the introduction of US-made banknotes<fnref n="31" />

12 **Purge in education** If it is thought that Danish educational associations or activities are being used to conceal political activities which would interfere with the success of the mission, the Danish authorities will be requested to effect such suspension as it is desired. Failing such compliance, the Commander-in-Chief is authorized to take direct action.

13 **Relief** The Commander-in Chief will deliver supplies to Danish authorities in exchange for a receipt showing description of supplies delivered for purpose of ultimate billing and settlements between governments.

Relief will be confined to making available the minimum quantities of food, clothing or medical supplies necessary to maintain the working capacity of the population and to preserve public order.

When these “Civil Affairs Directives” were issued on 9 April 1945 it was probably fairly clear that the war would end soon. In other words, military necessity would soon disappear. Nevertheless, according to these orders, Civil Affairs personnel should take control of the country in many important sectors: public security through the creation of military courts, extensive censorship, supplies and relief, control of currency issuance and banking activities, elimination of “objectionable personnel” in banks and schools or universities.

Moreover, the directives were broad enough to justify almost anything. What should one understand by “safeguarding the interests of Allied Forces”? What are the meanings of expressions such as “hostile political organizations” or “objectionable personnel”? They are open to many interpretations. They may apply to former Nazis but may also include the Communists who, on the contrary, had taken an active role in resistance movements. One may remember that in Japan the occupation forces at first targeted the nationalists but fairly soon (starting in 1946) their aim shifted toward the Communists and in a more general way toward any elements opposed to the occupation and the ensuing reorganization of the Japanese society.

## Causes of friction with the United States

At the end of the war there were several contentious points in the relations between Denmark and the United States.

* In 1941 the United States had occupied key-positions in Greenland and had participated in the British occupation of Iceland. In both cases this was done without permission of the Danish government. In the case of Greenland an agreement had

<footnote n="31">³¹As seen above in the treaties of 1871 and 1918, it was a standard rule to ask the defeated country to cover the cost of the occupation. On the contrary, there was no similar rule for the occupation of liberated countries. Of course, this cost could have been covered by Germany, but it would take several years until Germany would be able to pay it. The introduction of US-made bank notes solved the problem *at once*.</footnote>
been signed on 9 April 1941 by the US Ambassador of Denmark in Washington who, of course, did not have the authority to do that.

* After the occupation of Denmark by Germany, some 40 Danish ships which were in American ports were taken over by the US government. Subsequently, several of them were sunk by German submarines. Denmark wanted a compensation.

* After the capitulation of Germany, Denmark was aiming at small rectifications of its border with Germany in Schleswig-Holstein. London and Washington opposed any rectification.

The chronology section provides information about how these problems were solved. Obviously, it was to the advantage of the United States to be able to negotiate these issues with a fairly weak government.

## Occupation episodes and NATO

In all, after World War II, some 25,000 Civil Affairs personnel have been at work. To say that this number corresponds approximately to two divisions does not give an appropriate perspective because most of these 25,000 personnel were officers. As in the US Army there are about 6 enlisted men for each officer, the Civil Affairs personnel would represent 12 divisions in terms of officers. In other words it was by no means a marginal activity.

Needless to say, the way a nation ensures its defense is closely connected with its status as an independent entity. For instance, as long as the European Union will rely on NATO for its defense it will remain a political dwarf on the international stage. At first sight one might think that the European continent has become more independent of the United States than it was in the years following World War II. In this section we will see that this opinion is not correct. As a matter of fact, it is quite the opposite.

## Founding members of NATO

During the Second World War, apart from the defeated enemy countries, several European countries were occupied by US forces (or accepted US bases on their territory) namely: Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom. One can also add Italy to this list for, although being an enemy country at the time of the Allied invasion of Sicily, it became an ally after Mussolini was overthrown.

In 1949 these 10 countries were all founding members of NATO. If one adds the United States and Canada NATO had initially a membership of 12.

## Command structure of NATO

It is the United States that have the military leadership in NATO because the “Supreme
been signed on 9 April 1941 by the US Ambassador of Denmark in Washington who, of course, did not have the authority to do that.

* After the occupation of Denmark by Germany, some 40 Danish ships which were in American ports were taken over by the US government. Subsequently, several of them were sunk by German submarines. Denmark wanted a compensation.

* After the capitulation of Germany, Denmark was aiming at small rectifications of its border with Germany in Schleswig-Holstein. London and Washington opposed any rectification.

The chronology section provides information about how these problems were solved. Obviously, it was to the advantage of the United States to be able to negotiate these issues with a fairly weak government.

## Occupation episodes and NATO

In all, after World War II, some 25,000 Civil Affairs personnel have been at work. To say that this number corresponds approximately to two divisions does not give an appropriate perspective because most of these 25,000 personnel were officers. As in the US Army there are about 6 enlisted men for each officer, the Civil Affairs personnel would represent 12 divisions in terms of officers. In other words it was by no means a marginal activity.

Needless to say, the way a nation ensures its defense is closely connected with its status as an independent entity. For instance, as long as the European Union will rely on NATO for its defense it will remain a political dwarf on the international stage. At first sight one might think that the European continent has become more independent of the United States than it was in the years following World War II. In this section we will see that this opinion is not correct. As a matter of fact, it is quite the opposite.

## Founding members of NATO

During the Second World War, apart from the defeated enemy countries, several European countries were occupied by US forces (or accepted US bases on their territory) namely: Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom. One can also add Italy to this list for, although being an enemy country at the time of the Allied invasion of Sicily, it became an ally after Mussolini was overthrown.

In 1949 these 10 countries were all founding members of NATO. If one adds the United States and Canada NATO had initially a membership of 12.

## Command structure of NATO

It is the United States that have the military leadership in NATO because the “Supreme
<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1c Military treaties between the United States and countries of the non-Communist world in 1963.**
The Rio Treaty included 20 Latin American countries; it was signed in August 1947, that is to say almost two years before the NATO Treaty was signed. The SEATO Treaty (which means Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) included the UK, France, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines. It was signed in September 1954. The CENTO Treaty (which means Central Treaty Organization) was an outgrowth of the former Bagdad Pact. It included Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Source: *New York Times* 14 January 1963, p. 11</figcaption></figure>

Allied Commander Europe” (SACEUR) is appointed by the President of the United States. Since 1950, some 17 four-star US generals have held the SACEUR position. The first one was General Eisenhower. The SACEUR is the commanding officer of Allied Command Operations. Whereas the Secretary General of NATO and the “Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe” are usually non Americans, the SACEUR is always an American general. In the media the name of the Secretary General appears very often whereas the name of the SACEUR is rarely mentioned. Whether intentional or not this gives the false impression that NATO is a multi-national organization among members who are equals.

## Expansion of NATO

What has been the evolution of NATO? By 2013 its membership has swollen from the 12 initial members to 28. In fact, the expansion was not limited to European countries. As shown by the attached world map the United States had also similar treaties in other parts of the world.

The same evolution can be seen in US-led wars.

* Some 17 nations took part in the Korean War, of which 8 were NATO countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK).

* Some 50 nations took part in the war in Afghanistan including all NATO mem-
<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1c Military treaties between the United States and countries of the non-Communist world in 1963.**
The Rio Treaty included 20 Latin American countries; it was signed in August 1947, that is to say almost two years before the NATO Treaty was signed. The SEATO Treaty (which means Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) included the UK, France, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines. It was signed in September 1954. The CENTO Treaty (which means Central Treaty Organization) was an outgrowth of the former Bagdad Pact. It included Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Source: *New York Times* 14 January 1963, p. 11</figcaption></figure>

Allied Commander Europe” (SACEUR) is appointed by the President of the United States. Since 1950, some 17 four-star US generals have held the SACEUR position. The first one was General Eisenhower. The SACEUR is the commanding officer of Allied Command Operations. Whereas the Secretary General of NATO and the “Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe” are usually non Americans, the SACEUR is always an American general. In the media the name of the Secretary General appears very often whereas the name of the SACEUR is rarely mentioned. Whether intentional or not this gives the false impression that NATO is a multi-national organization among members who are equals.

## Expansion of NATO

What has been the evolution of NATO? By 2013 its membership has swollen from the 12 initial members to 28. In fact, the expansion was not limited to European countries. As shown by the attached world map the United States had also similar treaties in other parts of the world.

The same evolution can be seen in US-led wars.

* Some 17 nations took part in the Korean War, of which 8 were NATO countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK).

* Some 50 nations took part in the war in Afghanistan including all NATO mem-
bers. By geographical division, the largest group were the European countries. In contrast, there were very few countries from Central and South America. Here we see a clear contrast. Whereas South America was a US turf until around 2000, the situation has changed with several Latin American countries becoming ruled by leftist governments who assumed more independent positions with respect to Washington. Whether or not this situation will last is an open question.

# AMGOT, AMG, Civil Affairs Division, G-5 and MAAG

## Terminology

* AMGOT means “Allied Military Government in Occupied Territories”
* AMG means “Allied Military Government”. AMG is basically identical to AMGOT but under a more tactful name.

The “Civil Affairs Division” (CAD) is a component of AMG and refers to the military personnel in charge of the administration of the countries occupied by Allied forces.

Later on, CAD was referred to as G-5 which made it even more discreet.

MAAG means “Military Assistance and Advisory Group”. It designates the US advisors who took part in the post-war reconstitution and reorganization of the European armies.

As we have already seen above, AMGOT was used in US newspapers only during a short time interval at the beginning of the invasion of Sicily. Subsequently, it may have been used in military documents but mostly in defeated countries. One exception was South Korea which was a liberated country just as the countries of western Europe, but where the expression “US Army Military Government in Korea” (USAMGIK) was commonly used. The fact that the term AMGOT is sometimes used as a substitute for ‘Civil Affairs” even in present day discussions (as for instance in the title of a study by Mr. Bruno Bourliaguet) is probably due to the fact that it is much clearer and transparent than “Civil Affairs”.

In US plans, military government referred to a throughout implementation of military directives whereas “Civil Affairs” referred to a partial implementation. This difference can be seen clearly in the following excerpt from the official history of Coles (1964)

> Since early in 1944 planning had gone ahead. Lest he [General de Gaulle] be alienated a plan for military government was dropped. Two civil affairs plans were prepared in accordance with the decision to invade southern France in support of the main invasion.
bers. By geographical division, the largest group were the European countries. In contrast, there were very few countries from Central and South America. Here we see a clear contrast. Whereas South America was a US turf until around 2000, the situation has changed with several Latin American countries becoming ruled by leftist governments who assumed more independent positions with respect to Washington. Whether or not this situation will last is an open question.

# AMGOT, AMG, Civil Affairs Division, G-5 and MAAG

## Terminology

* AMGOT means “Allied Military Government in Occupied Territories”
* AMG means “Allied Military Government”. AMG is basically identical to AMGOT but under a more tactful name.

The “Civil Affairs Division” (CAD) is a component of AMG and refers to the military personnel in charge of the administration of the countries occupied by Allied forces.

Later on, CAD was referred to as G-5 which made it even more discreet.

MAAG means “Military Assistance and Advisory Group”. It designates the US advisors who took part in the post-war reconstitution and reorganization of the European armies.

As we have already seen above, AMGOT was used in US newspapers only during a short time interval at the beginning of the invasion of Sicily. Subsequently, it may have been used in military documents but mostly in defeated countries. One exception was South Korea which was a liberated country just as the countries of western Europe, but where the expression “US Army Military Government in Korea” (USAMGIK) was commonly used. The fact that the term AMGOT is sometimes used as a substitute for ‘Civil Affairs” even in present day discussions (as for instance in the title of a study by Mr. Bruno Bourliaguet) is probably due to the fact that it is much clearer and transparent than “Civil Affairs”.

In US plans, military government referred to a throughout implementation of military directives whereas “Civil Affairs” referred to a partial implementation. This difference can be seen clearly in the following excerpt from the official history of Coles (1964)

> Since early in 1944 planning had gone ahead. Lest he [General de Gaulle] be alienated a plan for military government was dropped. Two civil affairs plans were prepared in accordance with the decision to invade southern France in support of the main invasion.
From this excerpt it is clear that Civil Affairs plans are a “milder form” of military government.

## Crucial issues in civil affairs plans

Needless to say, all governments of liberated countries (including the French provisional government of General de Gaulle) would be willing to cooperate with allied military authorities in giving priority to military requirements over civilian needs in the zone where fighting was under way. However, allied plans went much further in several important respects.

* In the fighting zone the Commander-in-Chief would have *Supreme* authority". This appears clearly in the first article of the agreement signed with the Norwegian government in exile (Coles 1964, chapter 22: Civil Affairs agreements and disagreements, section 1, excerpts):

1. In areas affected by military operations it is necessary to contemplate a military phase during which the Commander in Chief must exercise supreme authority.

Among other things, “Supreme authority” would mean that military tribunals could be set up to try Norwegian people or that banknotes printed in the United States could be introduced into the country and used by allied troops. This interpretation is indeed confirmed by subsequent articles.

* The end of the military phase is to be determined solely by the Commander-in-Chief which means that he would exercise supreme authority as long as he would wish to do so. This is said very clearly in the second article of the agreement with the Norwegian government.

2. As soon as in the opinion of the Commander in Chief the military situation permits the Norwegian Government will be notified in order that they may resume the exercise of responsibility for the civil administration.

* One may think that in the first phase the directives of the Commander in Chief would be limited to military requirements. However, articles 4 and 5 clearly state that he will also have a leading role in the reorganization of the Norwegian administration and in the appointments of civil servants.

4. During the first phase the Norwegian Government will assist the Commander in Chief by reorganizing the Norwegian administrative and judicial services.

5. If during the first phase conditions should necessitate appointments in the Norwegian administrative or judicial services, the Norwegian Government will, upon the request of the Commander in Chief, appoint the requisite officials.

* Article 7 explicitly gives the power to the Commander in Chief “to bring to
From this excerpt it is clear that Civil Affairs plans are a “milder form” of military government.

## Crucial issues in civil affairs plans

Needless to say, all governments of liberated countries (including the French provisional government of General de Gaulle) would be willing to cooperate with allied military authorities in giving priority to military requirements over civilian needs in the zone where fighting was under way. However, allied plans went much further in several important respects.

* In the fighting zone the Commander-in-Chief would have *Supreme* authority". This appears clearly in the first article of the agreement signed with the Norwegian government in exile (Coles 1964, chapter 22: Civil Affairs agreements and disagreements, section 1, excerpts):

1. In areas affected by military operations it is necessary to contemplate a military phase during which the Commander in Chief must exercise supreme authority.

Among other things, “Supreme authority” would mean that military tribunals could be set up to try Norwegian people or that banknotes printed in the United States could be introduced into the country and used by allied troops. This interpretation is indeed confirmed by subsequent articles.

* The end of the military phase is to be determined solely by the Commander-in-Chief which means that he would exercise supreme authority as long as he would wish to do so. This is said very clearly in the second article of the agreement with the Norwegian government.

2. As soon as in the opinion of the Commander in Chief the military situation permits the Norwegian Government will be notified in order that they may resume the exercise of responsibility for the civil administration.

* One may think that in the first phase the directives of the Commander in Chief would be limited to military requirements. However, articles 4 and 5 clearly state that he will also have a leading role in the reorganization of the Norwegian administration and in the appointments of civil servants.

4. During the first phase the Norwegian Government will assist the Commander in Chief by reorganizing the Norwegian administrative and judicial services.

5. If during the first phase conditions should necessitate appointments in the Norwegian administrative or judicial services, the Norwegian Government will, upon the request of the Commander in Chief, appoint the requisite officials.

* Article 7 explicitly gives the power to the Commander in Chief “to bring to
trial before a military court any person alleged to have committed an offense against the persons, property, or security of the Allied forces”.

* The last article leaves open for further discussions a number of other important issues, in particular the tricky questions of imported bank notes.

16. Questions relating to finance and currency and the attribution of the cost of maintaining the civil administration during the first phase shall be regarded as remaining open for further negotiation.

The Norwegian government in exile was recognized by the Allies as the legal government of Norway. In other words, the previous excerpts show that the civil affairs policy was basically the same in all liberated countries whether or not official recognition was given to the national government. Moreover it has often been said that the plans of civil affairs in France were the consequence of a misunderstanding between general de Gaulle and President Roosevelt. The fact that the plans for Norway were the same as for France shows that this kind of argument is besides the point. As a matter of fact, the directives given to civil affairs in Denmark were even more drastic than those for Norway.

In Coles (1964) there is a discussion about the respective roles of the British and US governments in setting up civil affairs plans. It is said that, in this matter as in many others, due to the fact that the United States furnished the lion's share of men and arms, Washington had the last word. Thus, the final form of the civil affairs agreements came from the "Civil Affairs Division" of the US War Department.

So far, we have only discussed civil affairs plans. What about their implementation? This is a much more difficult question because one needs to investigate the frictions and conflicts between the respective national governments and the allied military commanders. Moreover, one needs to do a separate investigation for each of the liberated countries. However, common sense would suggest that the extent to which the plans were implemented depended very much upon the resistance put forth by the respective governments.

In this respect one can mention three factors which enabled General de Gaulle to enforce his opposition to the implementation of civil affairs plans in France.

1. France was by far the largest of the countries to be liberated.

2. The landings would occur in France, first in Normandy and two months later in Provence. This gave to this area a special strategic importance.

3. After the landing in Provence there would be several French divisions fighting the Germans alongside with Allied troops.

## Outline of the activities of Civil Affairs Divisions
trial before a military court any person alleged to have committed an offense against the persons, property, or security of the Allied forces”.

* The last article leaves open for further discussions a number of other important issues, in particular the tricky questions of imported bank notes.

16. Questions relating to finance and currency and the attribution of the cost of maintaining the civil administration during the first phase shall be regarded as remaining open for further negotiation.

The Norwegian government in exile was recognized by the Allies as the legal government of Norway. In other words, the previous excerpts show that the civil affairs policy was basically the same in all liberated countries whether or not official recognition was given to the national government. Moreover it has often been said that the plans of civil affairs in France were the consequence of a misunderstanding between general de Gaulle and President Roosevelt. The fact that the plans for Norway were the same as for France shows that this kind of argument is besides the point. As a matter of fact, the directives given to civil affairs in Denmark were even more drastic than those for Norway.

In Coles (1964) there is a discussion about the respective roles of the British and US governments in setting up civil affairs plans. It is said that, in this matter as in many others, due to the fact that the United States furnished the lion's share of men and arms, Washington had the last word. Thus, the final form of the civil affairs agreements came from the "Civil Affairs Division" of the US War Department.

So far, we have only discussed civil affairs plans. What about their implementation? This is a much more difficult question because one needs to investigate the frictions and conflicts between the respective national governments and the allied military commanders. Moreover, one needs to do a separate investigation for each of the liberated countries. However, common sense would suggest that the extent to which the plans were implemented depended very much upon the resistance put forth by the respective governments.

In this respect one can mention three factors which enabled General de Gaulle to enforce his opposition to the implementation of civil affairs plans in France.

1. France was by far the largest of the countries to be liberated.

2. The landings would occur in France, first in Normandy and two months later in Provence. This gave to this area a special strategic importance.

3. After the landing in Provence there would be several French divisions fighting the Germans alongside with Allied troops.

## Outline of the activities of Civil Affairs Divisions
The Second World War was probably the first instance in history in which one of the belligerents, namely the United States, planned in great detail what should be done after the war to ensure a world wide hegemony in all countries occupied by its forces. Some 25,000 persons, mostly officers, were trained for that purpose. In terms of strength this represents two divisions but much more in terms of numbers of officers.

Previously wars were ended with a peace conference where the fate of the countries who lost the war was decided among diplomats. This was so in 1815 with the Vienna conference and in 1918 with the various conferences held near Paris (Versailles, Sèvres). In 1944-1945 for the first time the future of the countries which took part in the war, not only the vanquished countries but also the liberated countries, was decided de facto in the wake of their occupation by US forces.

In all occupied countries Civil Affairs Divisions would be set up which would take
into their hands all or part of the activities normally assumed by representatives of
national governments.

Example of France

Article 1 defining the implementation of “Civil Affairs” in France said: “All the powers will be in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces. He will act on the basis that France has no legal government. He will not engage into any negotiation with representatives of the Vichy government but will simply take their authority into his own hands.

Article 2 said: "French civil servants and judiciary personnel will be selected or confirmed in their position by the Commander-in-Chief or his authorized delegates.

In this respect see also the letter of 8 May 1943 from Roosevelt to Churchill in the chronology section.

It seems that some 1,500 civil affairs officers trained in US universities such as Yale
were ready to come to France to fill key-positions.

The ultimate directives to General Eisenhower were contained in a message sent to
him by President Roosevelt on 15 March 1944 (Coles 1964, chapter 22, section 5).
As shown by the following excerpt, these directives gave him broad powers including
for issues which had no military connection but rather concerned French domestic
political matters.

5. In entering into relations with the "French Committee of National Liberation" you should obtain from it [that] it will take no action designed to entrench itself in power pending the selection of a constitutional government.

6. In any area of liberated France you will retain the right at any time to make such changes which may seem necessary (a) for the effective prosecution of the
The Second World War was probably the first instance in history in which one of the belligerents, namely the United States, planned in great detail what should be done after the war to ensure a world wide hegemony in all countries occupied by its forces. Some 25,000 persons, mostly officers, were trained for that purpose. In terms of strength this represents two divisions but much more in terms of numbers of officers.

Previously wars were ended with a peace conference where the fate of the countries who lost the war was decided among diplomats. This was so in 1815 with the Vienna conference and in 1918 with the various conferences held near Paris (Versailles, Sèvres). In 1944-1945 for the first time the future of the countries which took part in the war, not only the vanquished countries but also the liberated countries, was decided de facto in the wake of their occupation by US forces.

In all occupied countries Civil Affairs Divisions would be set up which would take into their hands all or part of the activities normally assumed by representatives of national governments.

## Example of France

Article 1 defining the implementation of “Civil Affairs” in France said: “All the powers will be in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces. He will act on the basis that France has no legal government. He will not engage into any negotiation with representatives of the Vichy government but will simply take their authority into his own hands.

Article 2 said: “French civil servants and judiciary personnel will be selected or confirmed in their position by the Commander-in-Chief or his authorized delegates. In this respect see also the letter of 8 May 1943 from Roosevelt to Churchill in the chronology section.

It seems that some 1,500 civil affairs officers trained in US universities such as Yale were ready to come to France to fill key-positions.

The ultimate directives to General Eisenhower were contained in a message sent to him by President Roosevelt on 15 March 1944 (Coles 1964, chapter 22, section 5). As shown by the following excerpt, these directives gave him broad powers including for issues which had no military connection but rather concerned French domestic political matters.

5. In entering into relations with the “French Committee of National Liberation” you should obtain from it [that] it will take no action designed to entrench itself in power pending the selection of a constitutional government.

6. In any area of liberated France you will retain the right at any time to make such changes which may seem necessary (a) for the effective prosecution of the
war against Germany; (b) for the maintenance of law and order; and (c) for the maintenance of civil liberties.

## Multiple facets of the activity of Civil Affairs

The activity of military governments was by no means restricted to basic aspects connected with the continuation of the war (means of transportation supply of goods and so on) but extended to all aspects of the life of the country. For the purpose of illustration one can mention the following aspects.

* Emission of banknotes printed in the United States which would be accepted in the countries on par with their national currency.

* Military tribunals were set up to try persons for offenses and crimes against the occupation forces.

* Censorship of newspapers, mail, phone calls was established which went far beyond the strict necessities of military censorship. In fact, any criticism of occupation forces was prohibited.

* The fact that police forces were under the control of the military authorities was used to bring to leadership positions persons who were fluent in English. As a rule such persons were also pro-US. Moreover, new police forces were recruited and trained under US control.

* In almost all liberated countries the armed forces had to be reconstructed. Taking advantage of their overwhelming supremacy in military matters, US commanders were able to ensure that the new forces would be equipped with US weapons, organized and trained following US lines and standards. MAAG missions were sent to almost all occupied countries including China, France, Norway and many others.

* Agreements for the establishment of US military bases were secured from the weak national governments which arose in the wake of the military governments.

* Monitoring and control of political activity was established under the cover of maintaining peace and security. For instance political parties had to register with the military authorities and permission from military government authorities was required to hold political meetings.

* The first elections held in occupied countries were often organized with the "help" of US advisers. The fact that during the electoral campaigns police forces were still under the control of the military government gave it the possibility to influence the campaign and thus the outcome of the elections. For the purpose of illustration of such mechanisms one can mention the general elections of 1946 in Japan, 1947 in Italy and 1948 in South Korea.

Military governments were not established in completely uniform ways. At least to some extent they tried to adapt themselves to local contexts. At first sight one may think that there was a drastic difference between the plans that were established for
war against Germany; (b) for the maintenance of law and order; and (c) for the maintenance of civil liberties.

## Multiple facets of the activity of Civil Affairs

The activity of military governments was by no means restricted to basic aspects connected with the continuation of the war (means of transportation supply of goods and so on) but extended to all aspects of the life of the country. For the purpose of illustration one can mention the following aspects.

* Emission of banknotes printed in the United States which would be accepted in the countries on par with their national currency.

* Military tribunals were set up to try persons for offenses and crimes against the occupation forces.

* Censorship of newspapers, mail, phone calls was established which went far beyond the strict necessities of military censorship. In fact, any criticism of occupation forces was prohibited.

* The fact that police forces were under the control of the military authorities was used to bring to leadership positions persons who were fluent in English. As a rule such persons were also pro-US. Moreover, new police forces were recruited and trained under US control.

* In almost all liberated countries the armed forces had to be reconstructed. Taking advantage of their overwhelming supremacy in military matters, US commanders were able to ensure that the new forces would be equipped with US weapons, organized and trained following US lines and standards. MAAG missions were sent to almost all occupied countries including China, France, Norway and many others.

* Agreements for the establishment of US military bases were secured from the weak national governments which arose in the wake of the military governments.

* Monitoring and control of political activity was established under the cover of maintaining peace and security. For instance political parties had to register with the military authorities and permission from military government authorities was required to hold political meetings.

* The first elections held in occupied countries were often organized with the "help" of US advisers. The fact that during the electoral campaigns police forces were still under the control of the military government gave it the possibility to influence the campaign and thus the outcome of the elections. For the purpose of illustration of such mechanisms one can mention the general elections of 1946 in Japan, 1947 in Italy and 1948 in South Korea.

Military governments were not established in completely uniform ways. At least to some extent they tried to adapt themselves to local contexts. At first sight one may think that there was a drastic difference between the plans that were established for
vanquished countries such as Germany and Japan and those for liberated countries such as South Korea, France or Greece. There were indeed differences. For instance, in contrast to vanquished countries, liberated countries were not subject to paying reparations. However, in many other aspects, including those mentioned above, the organization and rules followed by military governments were very much the same in vanquished and liberated countries.

## Resistance to foreign influence

How can one understand that liberated countries with a long history as sovereign states accepted the establishment on their soil of military governments? The answer is that many of them were indeed reluctant to accept it.

### US opinion about sovereignty concerns

authorities were inclined to discard the sovereignty issue through the following argument (Treasury Dept Memo, 23 September 1943, cited in: Coles 1964, chapter 23, section 6: British and Americans argue over the kind of currency to be used).

> The argument that the use of currencies not under their control may infringe the sovereignty of the governments-in-exile appears to be premised upon a faulty perspective. These governments will owe their very existence to the efforts of the Allied military machine. Unless they object to the use of the Allied armies as an infringement of their sovereignty, there can be little basis for objecting on that ground to the use of one of the economic weapons which those armies deem effective to assure complete victory.

The very same argument that is made here with respect to the currency issue can of course be used as well for any other sovereignty request. In substance, the argument means: "The fact that we are helping you to liberate your country nullifies any of the requests that you may express regarding your sovereignty, period."

### Iceland

One example is provided by Iceland. It was neither a vanquished nor a liberated country. It had been occupied by US forces for the duration of the war in order to prevent Germany forces to take it over. The occupation had led to frictions between US servicemen and the Icelandic population. Therefore when after the end of the war a decision had to be taken regarding the establisment of a permanent US base there was at first a strong opposition against such a project both in the population and in the Icelandic parliament. Nevertheless, through pressure, promises and by raising fear of Soviet influence, the US State department was eventually able to secure a favorable vote in parliament.
vanquished countries such as Germany and Japan and those for liberated countries such as South Korea, France or Greece. There were indeed differences. For instance, in contrast to vanquished countries, liberated countries were not subject to paying reparations. However, in many other aspects, including those mentioned above, the organization and rules followed by military governments were very much the same in vanquished and liberated countries.

## Resistance to foreign influence

How can one understand that liberated countries with a long history as sovereign states accepted the establishment on their soil of military governments? The answer is that many of them were indeed reluctant to accept it.

### US opinion about sovereignty concerns

authorities were inclined to discard the sovereignty issue through the following argument (Treasury Dept Memo, 23 September 1943, cited in: Coles 1964, chapter 23, section 6: British and Americans argue over the kind of currency to be used).

> The argument that the use of currencies not under their control may infringe the sovereignty of the governments-in-exile appears to be premised upon a faulty perspective. These governments will owe their very existence to the efforts of the Allied military machine. Unless they object to the use of the Allied armies as an infringement of their sovereignty, there can be little basis for objecting on that ground to the use of one of the economic weapons which those armies deem effective to assure complete victory.

The very same argument that is made here with respect to the currency issue can of course be used as well for any other sovereignty request. In substance, the argument means: "The fact that we are helping you to liberate your country nullifies any of the requests that you may express regarding your sovereignty, period."

### Iceland

One example is provided by Iceland. It was neither a vanquished nor a liberated country. It had been occupied by US forces for the duration of the war in order to prevent Germany forces to take it over. The occupation had led to frictions between US servicemen and the Icelandic population. Therefore when after the end of the war a decision had to be taken regarding the establisment of a permanent US base there was at first a strong opposition against such a project both in the population and in the Icelandic parliament. Nevertheless, through pressure, promises and by raising fear of Soviet influence, the US State department was eventually able to secure a favorable vote in parliament.
## Italy

The case of Italy is quite interesting. Under Mussolini, Italy was allied to Germany. However, after Mussolini was overthrown in July 1943 an armistice with the Allies was signed on behalf of the king. The Wikipedia article entitled “Armistice of Casibibile” says that it was “signed on 3 September 1943, and made public on 8 September”. That is not true however. What was made public was only the fact that an armistice had been signed. The text of the armistice was *not* published. The reason is that it was basically an unconditional surrender of the same kind as those imposed to Germany and Japan. On 25 October 1945, there were still discussions under way between Italy and the Allies in order to decide when the text would eventually be published (FRUS, 1945, Italy).

In the words of Prime Minister Bonomi in a declaration made on 5 February 1945, “the armistice follows the formula of unconditional surrender and thus confers to the Allies full power over the internal, financial, economic and military life of the nation”. In other words, between 5 September 1943 and the signature of the Peace Treaty on 10 February 1947 (the treaty came into effect only on 15 September 1947) Italy had the odd status of a “co-belligerent and unconditionally surrendered enemy”. This means that for all really important decisions the successive Italian governments (Badoglio, Bonomi, Parri, De Gasperi) were merely a facade.

It is true that in the course of these four years some Allied controls were progressively relaxed. For instance, on 3 July 1945 it was decided that Italy no longer needed the approval of the “Allied Commission” prior to the execution of its external financial transactions (which included imports and exports). However, even after this date, Italy had to provide detailed information about its transactions (fortnightly and in triplicate form) to the Allied Commission (FRUS, 1945, Italy).

It would certainly be interesting to give a detailed account of the role played by the Allies between September 1943 and September 1947 but this would require a book-length study. Italy was the first country where AMGOT policies were tried. Subsequently, the AMGOT acronym was replaced by “Civil Affairs” but the objectives remained very much the same.

As an illustration it can be mentioned that on 19 January 1945, through the cover of the Allied Commission, the United States told the Italian government that under Mussolini American petroleum interests in Italy had been subject to unfair treatment and have suffered grave damages. “Your government must recognize that rights belonging to them were confiscated”, the statement said. (FRUS, 1945, Italy, p. 1305) It seems that the Italian government gave preferential treatment to the national companies AGIP (Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli) and ANIC (Azienda Nazionale Idrogenazione Combustibile). Needless to say, from China to the United States itself,
## Italy

The case of Italy is quite interesting. Under Mussolini, Italy was allied to Germany. However, after Mussolini was overthrown in July 1943 an armistice with the Allies was signed on behalf of the king. The Wikipedia article entitled “Armistice of Cas-sibile” says that it was “signed on 3 September 1943, and made public on 8 Septem-ber”. That is not true however. What was made public was only the fact that an armistice had been signed. The text of the armistice was *not* published. The reason is that it was basically an unconditional surrender of the same kind as those imposed to Germany and Japan. On 25 October 1945, there were still discussions under way between Italy and the Allies in order to decide when the text would eventually be published (FRUS, 1945, Italy).

In the words of Prime Minister Bonomi in a declaration made on 5 February 1945, “the armistice follows the formula of unconditional surrender and thus confers to the Allies full power over the internal, financial, economic and military life of the nation”. In other words, between 5 September 1943 and the signature of the Peace Treaty on 10 February 1947 (the treaty came into effect only on 15 September 1947) Italy had the odd status of a “co-belligerent and unconditionally surrendered enemy”. This means that for all really important decisions the successive Italian governments (Badoglio, Bonomi, Parri, De Gasperi) were merely a facade.

It is true that in the course of these four years some Allied controls were progressively relaxed. For instance, on 3 July 1945 it was decided that Italy no longer needed the approval of the “Allied Commission” prior to the execution of its external financial transactions (which included imports and exports). However, even after this date, Italy had to provide detailed information about its transactions (fortnightly and in triplicate form) to the Allied Commission (FRUS, 1945, Italy).

It would certainly be interesting to give a detailed account of the role played by the Allies between September 1943 and September 1947 but this would require a book-length study. Italy was the first country where AMGOT policies were tried. Subsequently, the AMGOT acronym was replaced by “Civil Affairs” but the objectives remained very much the same.

As an illustration it can be mentioned that on 19 January 1945, through the cover of the Allied Commission, the United States told the Italian government that under Mussolini American petroleum interests in Italy had been subject to unfair treatment and have suffered grave damages. “Your government must recognize that rights be-longing to them were confiscated”, the statement said. (FRUS, 1945, Italy, p. 1305) It seems that the Italian government gave preferential treatment to the national com-panies AGIP (Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli) and ANIC (Azienda Nazionale Idrogenazione Combustibile). Needless to say, from China to the United States itself,
many governments give preferential treatment to their national companies.

As a matter of fact, this conflict between the national business interests of the United
States and Italy rather worsened in the post-war years. In 1945 the National Libera-
tion Committee appointed Enrico Mattei (needless to say, this appointment was made
in agreement with the Allies) to the leadership of Agip and gave him the task of dis-
mantling the company. Instead Mattei enlarged and reorganized it into the ENI (Ente
Nazionale Idrocarburi= National Fuel Trust). Under his direction ENI negotiated
important oil concessions in the Middle East as well as a significant trade agreement
with the Soviet Union in 1959. This policy more or less broke the oligopoly of the
so-called "Seven Sisters" that had dominated the mid-20th century oil. He also in-
troduced the principle whereby the country from where the oil was extracted should
receive royalties amounting to 75% of the profits, i.e. far more than what the indus-
try was used to give. This policy strongly displeased the United States. A report on
Italy written by the US "Operation Coordination Board" for the 366th "National Se-
curity Council" says: "Progress toward the achievement of our objectives has been
hampered by the activities, inside and outside of Italy, of Enrico Mattei, head of the
Italian petroleum monopoly and by the continuing interference of President [Gio-
vanni] Gronchi". In May 1962 at the end of his 7-year term, President Gronchi tried
to win a reelection. The attempt failed however. Moreover, a few months later, Mat-
tei died in an air crash which, according to investigations conducted years later, was
caused by the explosion of a bomb<fnref n="32" /> (Wikipedia articles in English entitled "Enrico
Mattei" and "Dag Hammarskjöld")

Another important point was the introduction of regional decentralization. This ob-
jective was already mentioned in the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943. Over
British objections the United States accepted not to raise this issue officially but it
introduced it informally by telling the US Ambassador in Italy (31 July 1945) "You
are instructed to provide for transmission informally to officials of the Italian gov-
ernment of documents no 312 and 314 (enclosed for this purpose)". (FRUS, 1945,
Italy, p. 981)

Decentralization was also one of the central objectives of “Civil Affairs” in Germany
and Japan.

South Korea

A US military government was established in South Korea in September 1945 and it
lasted officially for 3 years. On 15 August 1948 a Korean government took officially
over but US troops remained in the country until the beginning of the Korean War.

<footnote n="32">³²With regard to the obstacles to an effective investigation immediately after the crash, a parallel can be drawn with the crash in which the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, died one year early. In both cases the accident occurred shortly before landing.</footnote>
many governments give preferential treatment to their national companies.

As a matter of fact, this conflict between the national business interests of the United
States and Italy rather worsened in the post-war years. In 1945 the National Libera-
tion Committee appointed Enrico Mattei (needless to say, this appointment was made
in agreement with the Allies) to the leadership of Agip and gave him the task of dis-
mantling the company. Instead Mattei enlarged and reorganized it into the ENI (Ente
Nazionale Idrocarburi= National Fuel Trust). Under his direction ENI negotiated
important oil concessions in the Middle East as well as a significant trade agreement
with the Soviet Union in 1959. This policy more or less broke the oligopoly of the
so-called "Seven Sisters" that had dominated the mid-20th century oil. He also in-
troduced the principle whereby the country from where the oil was extracted should
receive royalties amounting to 75% of the profits, i.e. far more than what the indus-
try was used to give. This policy strongly displeased the United States. A report on
Italy written by the US "Operation Coordination Board" for the 366th "National Se-
curity Council" says: "Progress toward the achievement of our objectives has been
hampered by the activities, inside and outside of Italy, of Enrico Mattei, head of the
Italian petroleum monopoly and by the continuing interference of President [Gio-
vanni] Gronchi". In May 1962 at the end of his 7-year term, President Gronchi tried
to win a reelection. The attempt failed however. Moreover, a few months later, Mat-
tei died in an air crash which, according to investigations conducted years later, was
caused by the explosion of a bomb<fnref n="32" /> (Wikipedia articles in English entitled "Enrico
Mattei" and "Dag Hammarskjöld")

Another important point was the introduction of regional decentralization. This ob-
jective was already mentioned in the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943. Over
British objections the United States accepted not to raise this issue officially but it
introduced it informally by telling the US Ambassador in Italy (31 July 1945) "You
are instructed to provide for transmission informally to officials of the Italian gov-
ernment of documents no 312 and 314 (enclosed for this purpose)". (FRUS, 1945,
Italy, p. 981)

Decentralization was also one of the central objectives of “Civil Affairs” in Germany
and Japan.

South Korea

A US military government was established in South Korea in September 1945 and it
lasted officially for 3 years. On 15 August 1948 a Korean government took officially
over but US troops remained in the country until the beginning of the Korean War.

<footnote n="32">³²With regard to the obstacles to an effective investigation immediately after the crash, a parallel can be drawn with the crash in which the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, died one year early. In both cases the accident occurred shortly before landing.</footnote>
In South Korea the resistance to the occupation was marked by a permanent state of unrest and by four major upheavals.

* From September to December 1945 when the local People's Committees established in many places were suppressed by US troops.

* In October and November 1946 when a leftist uprising was suppressed by US troops.

* In October and November 1948 when mutinies in several South Korea military units were suppressed partly by South Korean troops and partly by US troops.

* From April 1948 to May 1949 a leftist uprising in the Island of Jeju was suppressed by South Korean troops supported by US aircraft and ships.

## France

Another case in which a national government strongly opposed an AMGOT attempt was France. It is this case that we wish to describe here in some detail. It will be seen that the issue of AMGOT was at the heart of the conflicts between the French provisional government and the US administration from the very beginning of US involvement in the European war in November 1942 until the end of the war in May 1945. The attitudes and actions of major actors such as Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, Charles de Gaulle or Jean Monet can be understood fairly clearly when seen in this light.

In this respect, one should recall that the French provisional government of General de Gaulle was officially recognized by the United States as late as 23 October 1944, that is to say over three months after the Normandy landing and two months after the liberation of Paris.

Before telling this story in more detail, it may be useful to outline the main forces which were at work in early 1943.

For some reason Franklin Roosevelt and his private adviser Harry Hopkins strongly disliked Charles de Gaulle and tried to use another Frenchman, Jean Monnet, to get rid of him. The two following sub-sections provide a more detailed view about de Gaulle and Monnet.

### Charles de Gaulle

Charles de Gaulle is well known for having been the president of France from 1958 to 1969 but what was his position during World War II? After the invasion of France by Germany in May-June 1940 a cease-fire agreement was negotiated. As a result, France was divided into two parts: the north and west (including Paris) which was occupied by Germany and the South-East which was ruled by a French government established in the town of Vichy located in the center of France. As is understand-
In South Korea the resistance to the occupation was marked by a permanent state of unrest and by four major upheavals.

* From September to December 1945 when the local People's Committees established in many places were suppressed by US troops.

* In October and November 1946 when a leftist uprising was suppressed by US troops.

* In October and November 1948 when mutinies in several South Korea military units were suppressed partly by South Korean troops and partly by US troops.

* From April 1948 to May 1949 a leftist uprising in the Island of Jeju was suppressed by South Korean troops supported by US aircraft and ships.

## France

Another case in which a national government strongly opposed an AMGOT attempt was France. It is this case that we wish to describe here in some detail. It will be seen that the issue of AMGOT was at the heart of the conflicts between the French provisional government and the US administration from the very beginning of US involvement in the European war in November 1942 until the end of the war in May 1945. The attitudes and actions of major actors such as Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, Charles de Gaulle or Jean Monet can be understood fairly clearly when seen in this light.

In this respect, one should recall that the French provisional government of General de Gaulle was officially recognized by the United States as late as 23 October 1944, that is to say over three months after the Normandy landing and two months after the liberation of Paris.

Before telling this story in more detail, it may be useful to outline the main forces which were at work in early 1943.

For some reason Franklin Roosevelt and his private adviser Harry Hopkins strongly disliked Charles de Gaulle and tried to use another Frenchman, Jean Monnet, to get rid of him. The two following sub-sections provide a more detailed view about de Gaulle and Monnet.

### Charles de Gaulle

Charles de Gaulle is well known for having been the president of France from 1958 to 1969 but what was his position during World War II? After the invasion of France by Germany in May-June 1940 a cease-fire agreement was negotiated. As a result, France was divided into two parts: the north and west (including Paris) which was occupied by Germany and the South-East which was ruled by a French government established in the town of Vichy located in the center of France. As is understand-
<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 3a General Eisenhower is being decorated by General de Gaulle on 27 June 1944, that is to say 3 weeks after the Normandy landing.</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 3b General de Gaulle in 1946 at the marriage of his daughter Elisabeth (born in 1924).</figcaption></figure>

able, this government was subject to ever increasing German pressure for greater cooperation with Germany particularly for supplying various commodities to the German war economy. However, on 18 June 1940 that is to say at the very moment when the cease-fire was under discussion in France, an appeal broadcast by the BBC was made by Charles de Gaulle a two-star general who had been Secretary of War in the last French government in office before the cease-fire. With the agreement and support of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, he emphasized that the war had to be continued and asked all French people who had that wish to join him in London. He rejected the authority of the Vichy government and for that reason was tried in absentia later on by a French military court which sentenced him to death.

The alternative French government established in London by General de Gaulle took the name of "Free French Committee".

This "Free French Committee" eventually became a French Provisional Government
<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 3a General Eisenhower is being decorated by General de Gaulle on 27 June 1944, that is to say 3 weeks after the Normandy landing.</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 3b General de Gaulle in 1946 at the marriage of his daughter Elisabeth (born in 1924).</figcaption></figure>

able, this government was subject to ever increasing German pressure for greater cooperation with Germany particularly for supplying various commodities to the German war economy. However, on 18 June 1940 that is to say at the very moment when the cease-fire was under discussion in France, an appeal broadcast by the BBC was made by Charles de Gaulle a two-star general who had been Secretary of War in the last French government in office before the cease-fire. With the agreement and support of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, he emphasized that the war had to be continued and asked all French people who had that wish to join him in London. He rejected the authority of the Vichy government and for that reason was tried in absentia later on by a French military court which sentenced him to death.

The alternative French government established in London by General de Gaulle took the name of "Free French Committee".

This "Free French Committee" eventually became a French Provisional Government
<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4** Jean Monnet on TIME Magazine cover of 6 October 1961. One may wonder why the cover displays the British flag. Britain would not become a member of the Common Market until 1 January 1973.</figcaption></figure>

but this emergence was staunchly opposed by President Roosevelt. An excellent account of the struggle between the US administration and the “Free French” is given in a book by François Kersaudy (2004). It is the support of the British Foreign Office and the help of General Eisenhower which finally allowed the “Free French” to win the struggle.

**Jean Monnet**

Jean Monnet was a Frenchman who had many close connections in Washington, including in the financial world. Throughout his career he was to serve US interests even when those interests were in contradiction with French national interest. For that reason he was considered as an American agent by several French historians. It is interesting to notice that while this aspect of his role is well described in the French Wikipedia article about him, it is completely omitted in the English version. In his Memoirs (p. 276) Monnet says that during his stay in Algiers he was not on an mission set by the Americans and that his objective was not to comply with the wishes of President Roosevelt. However, this claim is contradicted by all US letters and documents concerning the purpose of his stay in Algiers.

For instance in a book by Frederic Fransen (2001), one reads: “Roosevelt and the Americans clearly expected Monnet to usher in Giraud as the champion of their French policy.” Indeed for over 3 months from 27 February 1943 until a few days after the arrival of de Gaulle in Algiers on 31 May 1943, Monnet faithfully fulfilled his mission of supporting Giraud and making him more palatable for US newspapers and public opinion. Yet, in mid-June 1943 it seems that in his wish to find a solution
<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4** Jean Monnet on TIME Magazine cover of 6 October 1961. One may wonder why the cover displays the British flag. Britain would not become a member of the Common Market until 1 January 1973.</figcaption></figure>

but this emergence was staunchly opposed by President Roosevelt. An excellent account of the struggle between the US administration and the “Free French” is given in a book by François Kersaudy (2004). It is the support of the British Foreign Office and the help of General Eisenhower which finally allowed the “Free French” to win the struggle.

**Jean Monnet**

Jean Monnet was a Frenchman who had many close connections in Washington, including in the financial world. Throughout his career he was to serve US interests even when those interests were in contradiction with French national interest. For that reason he was considered as an American agent by several French historians. It is interesting to notice that while this aspect of his role is well described in the French Wikipedia article about him, it is completely omitted in the English version. In his Memoirs (p. 276) Monnet says that during his stay in Algiers he was not on an mission set by the Americans and that his objective was not to comply with the wishes of President Roosevelt. However, this claim is contradicted by all US letters and documents concerning the purpose of his stay in Algiers.

For instance in a book by Frederic Fransen (2001), one reads: “Roosevelt and the Americans clearly expected Monnet to usher in Giraud as the champion of their French policy.” Indeed for over 3 months from 27 February 1943 until a few days after the arrival of de Gaulle in Algiers on 31 May 1943, Monnet faithfully fulfilled his mission of supporting Giraud and making him more palatable for US newspapers and public opinion. Yet, in mid-June 1943 it seems that in his wish to find a solution
to the locked situation, he made a step in the direction de Gaulle's objective of setting
up a provisional government. The fact that he was a member of that government may
have weakened his determination of being a staunch supporter of Roosevelt's policy.

As a result he was accused of disloyalty and even of being a traitor by his US em-
ployers (see below at the date of 17 June 1943).

According to Fransen (2001) “Monnet was a key player in achieving what seemed
to close observers like Murphy [Robert Murphy was Roosevelt’s personal represen-
tative] exactly the opposite [of his initial mission]”.

The key issue of national sovereignty

One may wonder why General de Gaulle put so much insistence on avoiding AM-GOT. At that time, in 1943, there was not a single historical AMGOT case through which one could study the implications and effects of AMGOT policies. So, what raised de Gaulle's suspicion?

The answer can probably be found in an observation that he made to General Eisen-
hower on 19 June 1943 at the US headquarters. This conversation took place shortly
before the landing of American and British troops in Sicily. Following directives of
the US and British governments, General Eisenhower asked de Gaulle to guaranty
that the "French Committee of National Liberation" (which had assumed the role of
being the provisional government of France in early June) would not try to control
or interfere in the cooperation between the Commander of the French Forces and the
US headquarters.

However, in any democracy, even in time of war, military commanders must follow
and obey the directives of their governments. In other words, Eisenhower was re-
questing the provisional French government to be content with a restricted form of
sovereignty. Britain and the United States were able to cooperate in the "Joint Chiefs
of Staff" (JCS) which gave directives to the military commander but France was not
represented in the JCS. That is why de Gaulle could not accept this request. He ex-
plained his position in the following terms: "As a military chief, do you really think
that the authority of a commander can survive for a long time if he is subordinated
to a foreign power?" This discussion shows that in de Gaulle's mind there was
a close connection between the sovereignty of a nation and the independence of its
defense capability. This is why he was adamantly opposed to the AMGOT scheme.
The subsequent course of history in countries which experienced AMGOT reveals
that he was indeed right.

Chronology of a Civil Affairs dispute: France, 1942-1946
to the locked situation, he made a step in the direction de Gaulle's objective of setting
up a provisional government. The fact that he was a member of that government may
have weakened his determination of being a staunch supporter of Roosevelt's policy.

As a result he was accused of disloyalty and even of being a traitor by his US em-
ployers (see below at the date of 17 June 1943).

According to Fransen (2001) “Monnet was a key player in achieving what seemed
to close observers like Murphy [Robert Murphy was Roosevelt’s personal represen-
tative] exactly the opposite [of his initial mission]”.

The key issue of national sovereignty

One may wonder why General de Gaulle put so much insistence on avoiding AM-GOT. At that time, in 1943, there was not a single historical AMGOT case through which one could study the implications and effects of AMGOT policies. So, what raised de Gaulle's suspicion?

The answer can probably be found in an observation that he made to General Eisen-
hower on 19 June 1943 at the US headquarters. This conversation took place shortly
before the landing of American and British troops in Sicily. Following directives of
the US and British governments, General Eisenhower asked de Gaulle to guaranty
that the "French Committee of National Liberation" (which had assumed the role of
being the provisional government of France in early June) would not try to control
or interfere in the cooperation between the Commander of the French Forces and the
US headquarters.

However, in any democracy, even in time of war, military commanders must follow
and obey the directives of their governments. In other words, Eisenhower was re-
questing the provisional French government to be content with a restricted form of
sovereignty. Britain and the United States were able to cooperate in the "Joint Chiefs
of Staff" (JCS) which gave directives to the military commander but France was not
represented in the JCS. That is why de Gaulle could not accept this request. He ex-
plained his position in the following terms: "As a military chief, do you really think
that the authority of a commander can survive for a long time if he is subordinated
to a foreign power?" This discussion shows that in de Gaulle's mind there was
a close connection between the sovereignty of a nation and the independence of its
defense capability. This is why he was adamantly opposed to the AMGOT scheme.
The subsequent course of history in countries which experienced AMGOT reveals
that he was indeed right.

Chronology of a Civil Affairs dispute: France, 1942-1946
**Jul 16, 1940:** Through a letter written by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and received by Monnet on 16 July, the later was sent to Washington as a public servant of the British government. He would serve there as deputy head of the commission in charge of organizing the US supply of goods for the British war economy. Monnet would arrive to Washington by ship in late August 1940. (Monnet 1976, p. 212, 215)

**Nov 8, 1942:** Landing of US and British troops in Morocco and Algeria which were at that time two French territories. Morocco was a protectorate and Algeria a French department. Called "Operation Torch" this invasion was the starting point of US operations on the western front against Italy.

**Jan 14, 1943:** A few days before the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting in Casablanca, President Roosevelt sent a telegram to Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, in which he wrote [excerpts].

> General Giraud [General Giraud who was at that moment the Commander of French forces in North Africa] will arrive tomorrow and together with Mr. Churchill we agreed to summon General de Gaulle for next Monday (18 January). As Giraud does not seem to have any real interest in political matters, it would be appropriate to bring a civilian into the [French] administration. Would you agree to send here Monnet? This instruction should remain secret. (Monnet 1976, p. 266)

**Jan 24, 1943:** Invited by Churchill to come to Casablanca, de Gaulle declined the invitation because he did not wish an agreement between himself and Giraud to be made under Anglo-American patronage. At that point there was the following discussion between Churchill and Roosevelt (that the later repeated to Secretary of War Stimson).

> De Gaulle held back from coming to the conference. After two successive invitations, Roosevelt asked whether de Gaulle got any salary and who paid it. Churchill replied that he, Churchill, paid it. Then Roosevelt suggested to him that salaries are paid for *devoted and obedient service* and if he does not come his salary would be cut off. De Gaulle came the next day [on 22 January].

(Stimson diary vol. 42, p. 20, 3 Feb 1943.)

[Nevertheless de Gaulle refused to sign the agreement (allegedly) between Giraud and himself that had been drafted by US and British negotiators, i.e. Murphy and Macmillan. (De Gaulle 1954a p. 102-103)]

**Feb 23, 1943** A memorandum was published by the Free French Committee in London which states in the clearest possible way that its objective was to form a provisional government which would be able to replace the Vichy government as soon
**Jul 16, 1940:** Through a letter written by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and received by Monnet on 16 July, the later was sent to Washington as a public servant of the British government. He would serve there as deputy head of the commission in charge of organizing the US supply of goods for the British war economy. Monnet would arrive to Washington by ship in late August 1940. (Monnet 1976, p. 212, 215)

**Nov 8, 1942:** Landing of US and British troops in Morocco and Algeria which were at that time two French territories. Morocco was a protectorate and Algeria a French department. Called "Operation Torch" this invasion was the starting point of US operations on the western front against Italy.

**Jan 14, 1943:** A few days before the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting in Casablanca, President Roosevelt sent a telegram to Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, in which he wrote [excerpts].

> General Giraud [General Giraud who was at that moment the Commander of French forces in North Africa] will arrive tomorrow and together with Mr. Churchill we agreed to summon General de Gaulle for next Monday (18 January). As Giraud does not seem to have any real interest in political matters, it would be appropriate to bring a civilian into the [French] administration. Would you agree to send here Monnet? This instruction should remain secret. (Monnet 1976, p. 266)

**Jan 24, 1943:** Invited by Churchill to come to Casablanca, de Gaulle declined the invitation because he did not wish an agreement between himself and Giraud to be made under Anglo-American patronage. At that point there was the following discussion between Churchill and Roosevelt (that the later repeated to Secretary of War Stimson).

> De Gaulle held back from coming to the conference. After two successive invitations, Roosevelt asked whether de Gaulle got any salary and who paid it. Churchill replied that he, Churchill, paid it. Then Roosevelt suggested to him that salaries are paid for *devoted and obedient service* and if he does not come his salary would be cut off. De Gaulle came the next day [on 22 January].

(Stimson diary vol. 42, p. 20, 3 Feb 1943.

[Nevertheless de Gaulle refused to sign the agreement (allegedly) between Giraud and himself that had been drafted by US and British negotiators, i.e. Murphy and Macmillan. (De Gaulle 1954a p. 102-103)]

**Feb 23, 1943** A memorandum was published by the Free French Committee in London which states in the clearest possible way that its objective was to form a provisional government which would be able to replace the Vichy government as soon
<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5** General Giraud (left) in 1943 at the Casablanca conference From left to right: General Giraud, President Roosevelt, General de Gaulle, Prime Minister Churchill at the Anfa conference on 24 January 1943 in Morocco some two months after the allied invasion of North Africa. Anfa was the name of the district of Casablanca where the conference took place from 14 January (Thursday) to 24 January (Sunday). On meeting Giraud in Anfa on 22 January de Gaulle's first words were: "Well, I proposed to meet you four times and now it is inside this American military camp surrounded by a barbed wire fence that we have been summoned. Don't you see that such a situation is quite unpleasant for the Frenchmen that we are?" That gave the tone of their relations during the following months.</figcaption></figure>

as some parts of France would be liberated. The memorandum was sent to General Giraud in Algiers on 26 February. A reply from Giraud was received on 10 April (see below). (De Gaulle 1954 p. 112).

**Feb 27, 1943** Monnet arrived in Algiers and his first action was to visit General Giraud. Through the Clark-Darlan deal the American government had promised to equip 8 French divisions, to provide 1,400 aircraft and 5,000 tanks. The fact that through his close connection with Hopkins Monnet had some authority over the supply of this equipment gave him an important leverage in his discussions with Giraud. Basically the later was ready to fulfill all wishes that Monnet might express with insistence. Thus, on 14 March 1943 Giraud accepted to make a speech which had largely been written by Monnet. In this speech he accepted to break the relations he had kept so far with the Vichy government. On the crucial point of whether he was ready to form a provisional government he stated the thesis of the US government (completely endorsed by Monnet) that a French government could only emerge after the liberation of France. (Monnet 1976 p. 259, 267)

**Apr 10, 1943** In his reply to the memorandum of 23 February General Giraud stated again his position, modeled on the wishes of the US government, that a French provisional government should be established only after the whole territory would be liberated and elections could be organized. In the interval France would be governed by a weak French council and for all important issues by the US military authorities. (De Gaulle 1954 p. 117)
<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5** General Giraud (left) in 1943 at the Casablanca conference From left to right: General Giraud, President Roosevelt, General de Gaulle, Prime Minister Churchill at the Anfa conference on 24 January 1943 in Morocco some two months after the allied invasion of North Africa. Anfa was the name of the district of Casablanca where the conference took place from 14 January (Thursday) to 24 January (Sunday). On meeting Giraud in Anfa on 22 January de Gaulle's first words were: "Well, I proposed to meet you four times and now it is inside this American military camp surrounded by a barbed wire fence that we have been summoned. Don't you see that such a situation is quite unpleasant for the Frenchmen that we are?" That gave the tone of their relations during the following months.</figcaption></figure>

as some parts of France would be liberated. The memorandum was sent to General Giraud in Algiers on 26 February. A reply from Giraud was received on 10 April (see below). (De Gaulle 1954 p. 112).

**Feb 27, 1943** Monnet arrived in Algiers and his first action was to visit General Giraud. Through the Clark-Darlan deal the American government had promised to equip 8 French divisions, to provide 1,400 aircraft and 5,000 tanks. The fact that through his close connection with Hopkins Monnet had some authority over the supply of this equipment gave him an important leverage in his discussions with Giraud. Basically the later was ready to fulfill all wishes that Monnet might express with insistence. Thus, on 14 March 1943 Giraud accepted to make a speech which had largely been written by Monnet. In this speech he accepted to break the relations he had kept so far with the Vichy government. On the crucial point of whether he was ready to form a provisional government he stated the thesis of the US government (completely endorsed by Monnet) that a French government could only emerge after the liberation of France. (Monnet 1976 p. 259, 267)

**Apr 10, 1943** In his reply to the memorandum of 23 February General Giraud stated again his position, modeled on the wishes of the US government, that a French provisional government should be established only after the whole territory would be liberated and elections could be organized. In the interval France would be governed by a weak French council and for all important issues by the US military authorities. (De Gaulle 1954 p. 117)
[Monnet's idea (which he transmitted to Giraud) was to rely on a procedure introduced in 1872 according to which, in case of emergency, the government could be chosen by the assembly of provincial representatives (the so-called "Conseil Généraux", Monnet 1976, p.274). As these representatives enjoyed very little prestige themselves, the provisional government they would set up would have only limited authority. Moreover, it was likely that in the départements occupied by US forces, quite a few of these local representatives would have been appointed by the Civil Affairs Division. This weak provisional government would also have been in charge of the crucial task of organizing the election of a new assembly.]

**May 4, 1943:** In a public speech made in London General de Gaulle announced that he will go to Algiers. (De Gaulle 1954 p. )

**May 5, 1943:** In a comment to this speech, Jean Monnet wrote the following day: "This is a speech and a method very much in the manner of Hitler. He [de Gaulle] is a danger for the French people and their freedom. Consequently, he must be destroyed (*il doit être détruit*) in the very interest of the French people, of the Allies and of peace."

(Source: http://www.observatoiredeleurope.com/De-Gaulle-Monnet-le-duel-du-siecle_a1434.html)

[This was written not in a letter addressed to someone but as a personal note. The original document is part of the archives of Madame Monnet-Nobécourt (8 Nov. 1941-28 Apr 2013), Jean Monnet's daughter. I'm grateful to Mr. Régis Clavé, the archivist of the "Fondation Jean Monnet", for giving me the precisions about the location of the document. See also Monnet's biography by Eric Roussel (p. 335-336).

The tone of these comments is rather surprising especially in the light of what we know about Monnet's subsequent actions one month later. As a matter of fact, to the great disappointment and surprise of Roosevelt and Hopkins, he sided with de Gaulle with the result that Giraud was made powerless.]

**May 5, 1943:** At a meeting with Monnet, and Giraud, Harold Macmillan (a member of the British Foreign Office) encouraged them to issue de Gaulle a statement of principles that he must accept before coming to Algiers among which was the renouncement to form a French government in the liberated parts of France. De Gaulle accepted and arrangements were made for him to arrive in Algiers on 30 May. (Fransen 2001)

[The statement made by this source is probably not correct because (i) All subsequent events show that taking the engagement not to form a French government was certainly the last thing that de Gaulle was willing to accept. (ii) On 6 May 1943, in response to a letter received from Giraud on 27 April, de Gaulle stated once again
[Monnet's idea (which he transmitted to Giraud) was to rely on a procedure introduced in 1872 according to which, in case of emergency, the government could be chosen by the assembly of provincial representatives (the so-called "Conseil Généraux", Monnet 1976, p.274). As these representatives enjoyed very little prestige themselves, the provisional government they would set up would have only limited authority. Moreover, it was likely that in the départements occupied by US forces, quite a few of these local representatives would have been appointed by the Civil Affairs Division. This weak provisional government would also have been in charge of the crucial task of organizing the election of a new assembly.]

**May 4, 1943:** In a public speech made in London General de Gaulle announced that he will go to Algiers. (De Gaulle 1954 p. )

**May 5, 1943:** In a comment to this speech, Jean Monnet wrote the following day: "This is a speech and a method very much in the manner of Hitler. He [de Gaulle] is a danger for the French people and their freedom. Consequently, he must be destroyed (*il doit être détruit*) in the very interest of the French people, of the Allies and of peace."

(Source: http://www.observatoiredeleurope.com/De-Gaulle-Monnet-le-duel-du-siecle_a1434.html)

[This was written not in a letter addressed to someone but as a personal note. The original document is part of the archives of Madame Monnet-Nobécourt (8 Nov. 1941-28 Apr 2013), Jean Monnet's daughter. I'm grateful to Mr. Régis Clavé, the archivist of the "Fondation Jean Monnet", for giving me the precisions about the location of the document. See also Monnet's biography by Eric Roussel (p. 335-336).

The tone of these comments is rather surprising especially in the light of what we know about Monnet's subsequent actions one month later. As a matter of fact, to the great disappointment and surprise of Roosevelt and Hopkins, he sided with de Gaulle with the result that Giraud was made powerless.]

**May 5, 1943:** At a meeting with Monnet, and Giraud, Harold Macmillan (a member of the British Foreign Office) encouraged them to issue de Gaulle a statement of principles that he must accept before coming to Algiers among which was the renouncement to form a French government in the liberated parts of France. De Gaulle accepted and arrangements were made for him to arrive in Algiers on 30 May. (Fransen 2001)

[The statement made by this source is probably not correct because (i) All subsequent events show that taking the engagement not to form a French government was certainly the last thing that de Gaulle was willing to accept. (ii) On 6 May 1943, in response to a letter received from Giraud on 27 April, de Gaulle stated once again
the position expressed in the memorandum of 23 February. This message clearly contradicts the previous statement that "de Gaulle accepted the arrangements". (De Gaulle 1954 p. 121)

**May 6, 1943:** In a long letter to Harry Hopkins, the personal adviser of President Roosevelt, Jean Monnet made the following comments about de Gaulle's address of 4 May. "It disregards all past negotiations. He [de Gaulle] does not even mention Giraud's propositions. He throws Catroux overboard with some polite words. He menaces or tempts the people in the administrations and the Army here [in Algeria]. He insists on the fact that he must come to Algiers to negotiate, and to no other place.

It reminds me of the speech Hitler made before the Czecho-Slovakian affair. The same technique, the same form, the same object, the same illusory promises. It is impossible to accept that de Gaulle, after his speech, should come to Algiers to negotiate. It would not be negotiations; it would be an attempt to coerce Giraud into submission.

The exact difference between de Gaulle and Giraud is this:

De Gaulle stands for the formation now of a *government*. This government would remain the government of France until the general election that would be held after the liberation.

Giraud stands for the formation now of a *council*, which would not have the status of a government. After the liberation of France this council would hand over its power to the Assembly of the Conseils Généraux [an assembly which in normal times is in charge of regional affairs only]. The Assembly would then immediately name the Provisional Government of France [one wonders how?]. The Assembly would fix the date at which the general elections would be held. De Gaulle stands for arbitrary action, with all the risks of Fascism. Giraud stands for the preservation of the democratic process. In one case it is Hitlerism or civil war; in the other the maintenance of the law."

Regarding General Giraud, Monnet says: "He goes along completely with all my suggestions".

(Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Harry Hopkins papers, Jean Monnet folder. I am grateful to Mr. William Baehr, archivist at the FDR Library, for sending me a copy of this letter.)

[Giraud's plan would have meant a weak council during the duration of the war, then an even weaker Assembly would designate a weak provisional government until the general elections. This process would have created a long vacuum of power during which AMGOT and the Civil Affairs Division would have been able to implement the policy desired by the State Department.]
the position expressed in the memorandum of 23 February. This message clearly contradicts the previous statement that "de Gaulle accepted the arrangements". (De Gaulle 1954 p. 121)

**May 6, 1943:** In a long letter to Harry Hopkins, the personal adviser of President Roosevelt, Jean Monnet made the following comments about de Gaulle's address of 4 May. "It disregards all past negotiations. He [de Gaulle] does not even mention Giraud's propositions. He throws Catroux overboard with some polite words. He menaces or tempts the people in the administrations and the Army here [in Algeria]. He insists on the fact that he must come to Algiers to negotiate, and to no other place.

It reminds me of the speech Hitler made before the Czecho-Slovakian affair. The same technique, the same form, the same object, the same illusory promises. It is impossible to accept that de Gaulle, after his speech, should come to Algiers to negotiate. It would not be negotiations; it would be an attempt to coerce Giraud into submission.

The exact difference between de Gaulle and Giraud is this:

De Gaulle stands for the formation now of a *government*. This government would remain the government of France until the general election that would be held after the liberation.

Giraud stands for the formation now of a *council*, which would not have the status of a government. After the liberation of France this council would hand over its power to the Assembly of the Conseils Généraux [an assembly which in normal times is in charge of regional affairs only]. The Assembly would then immediately name the Provisional Government of France [one wonders how?]. The Assembly would fix the date at which the general elections would be held. De Gaulle stands for arbitrary action, with all the risks of Fascism. Giraud stands for the preservation of the democratic process. In one case it is Hitlerism or civil war; in the other the maintenance of the law."

Regarding General Giraud, Monnet says: "He goes along completely with all my suggestions".

(Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Harry Hopkins papers, Jean Monnet folder. I am grateful to Mr. William Baehr, archivist at the FDR Library, for sending me a copy of this letter.)

[Giraud's plan would have meant a weak council during the duration of the war, then an even weaker Assembly would designate a weak provisional government until the general elections. This process would have created a long vacuum of power during which AMGOT and the Civil Affairs Division would have been able to implement the policy desired by the State Department.]
**May 8, 1943:** Letter of President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill (excerpt).

We might talk over the formation of an entirely new French Committee subject in its membership to the approval of you and me. I do not know what to do with de Gaulle. Possibly you would like to make him Governor of Madagascar. I am more and more of the opinion that we should consider France as a military-occupied nation and governed by British and American generals (...) We would keep 90% of the [Vichy] mayors. Important posts would remain the responsibility of the military commander. This will last between 6 months and a year.

(Robertson 2011 p. 83; “Dubious liberators” available at the following Internet access (retrieved on 30 August 2013): http://rall.com/searchablearchives/essays/dubious-liberators-allied-plans-to-occupy-france-1942-1944)

[Shortly before the Normandy landing, in the detailed instructions to General Eisenhower contained in the message of 15 March 1944, President Roosevelt repeated the same options. In particular, the nomination to important posts should be made by Allied Commanders through their Civil Affairs staff and not by the French provisional government.]

**May 30, 1943:** Arrival of de Gaulle at Algiers. Due to Allied censorship the news was not announced in advance in any newspaper in Algiers, probably to prevent public gatherings. (De Gaulle 1954, p. 125)

**Jun 1, 1943:** First meeting of the French National Committee which included 7 members: Catroux, de Gaulle, Massigli, Philip on the one side and George, Giraud, Monnet on the other side. The meeting ended without any agreement being reached. (De Gaulle 1954 p. 127-128, Monnet 1976 p. 284-288)

**Jun 2, 1943:** The Governor General of Algeria, Peyrouton, who had been given this position on the demand of President Roosevelt, sent his resignation to General de Gaulle (and also to General Giraud). The fact that it occurred two days after the arrival of de Gaulle in Algiers was clearly a setback for Roosevelt. (De Gaulle 1954 p. 128-129, Monnet 1976 p. 288)

**Jun 2, 1943:** De Gaulle gains control in Algiers as Peyrouton goes. Fighting French leader wins a major point. The startling shift in politics symbolized General de Gaulle's mastery of the political situation here. (New York Times p. 1)

**Jun 3, 1943:** Second meeting of the French National Committee. It was a turning point because de Gaulle's positions were endorsed by 5 votes against 2. Monnet voted on de Gaulle's side, something he was probably not supposed to do. Had he voted on Giraud's side, the majority would have been reduced to 4-3 but the end result would have been the same. The official communiqué stated very clearly that the Committee would take over the government of France in any part of France to be
**May 8, 1943:** *Letter of President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill (excerpt).*

We might talk over the formation of an entirely new French Committee subject in its membership to the approval of you and me. I do not know what to do with de Gaulle. Possibly you would like to make him Governor of Madagascar. I am more and more of the opinion that we should consider France as a military-occupied nation and governed by British and American generals (...) We would keep 90% of the [Vichy] mayors. Important posts would remain the responsibility of the military commander. This will last between 6 months and a year.

(Robertson 2011 p. 83; “Dubious liberators” available at the following Internet access (retrieved on 30 August 2013): http://rall.com/searchablearchives/essays/dubious-liberators-allied-plans-to-occupy-france-1942-1944)

[Shortly before the Normandy landing, in the detailed instructions to General Eisenhower contained in the message of 15 March 1944, President Roosevelt repeated the same options. In particular, the nomination to important posts should be made by Allied Commanders through their Civil Affairs staff and not by the French provisional government.]

**May 30, 1943:** *Arrival of de Gaulle at Algiers.* Due to Allied censorship the news was not announced in advance in any newspaper in Algiers, probably to prevent public gatherings. (De Gaulle 1954, p. 125)

**Jun 1, 1943:** First meeting of the French National Committee which included 7 members: Catroux, de Gaulle, Massigli, Philip on the one side and George, Giraud, Monnet on the other side. The meeting ended without any agreement being reached. (De Gaulle 1954 p. 127-128, Monnet 1976 p. 284-288)

**Jun 2, 1943:** The Governor General of Algeria, Peyrouton, who had been given this position on the demand of President Roosevelt, sent his resignation to General de Gaulle (and also to General Giraud). The fact that it occurred two days after the arrival of de Gaulle in Algiers was clearly a setback for Roosevelt. (De Gaulle 1954 p. 128-129, Monnet 1976 p. 288)

**Jun 2, 1943:** De Gaulle gains control in Algiers as Peyrouton goes. Fighting French leader wins a major point. The startling shift in politics symbolized General de Gaulle's mastery of the political situation here. (New York Times p. 1)

**Jun 3, 1943:** Second meeting of the French National Committee. It was a turning point because de Gaulle's positions were endorsed by 5 votes against 2. Monnet voted on de Gaulle's side, something he was probably not supposed to do. Had he voted on Giraud's side, the majority would have been reduced to 4-3 but the end result would have been the same. The official communiqué stated very clearly that the Committee would take over the government of France in any part of France to be
liberated in the future. (Monnet 1976 p. 288-289)

[Probably two factors played an role in Monnet's change of attitude.

* Harold Macmillan, the British representative, with whom he had a friendly relationship was pushing him in this direction.

* In Algiers overt American interference into French internal political discussions became more obvious because of the numerous meetings between Giraud and his “advisers”. Thus, it is fairly natural that when de Gaulle was denouncing such interventions this struck a chord with many French officials.

In other words, continuing to support Giraud would have put Monnet in a very awkward position.]

**Jun 5, 1943:** Third Meeting of the French National Committee. The Committee was extended to 14 members whose attributions covered all major facets of a central government. De Gaulle could count on a clear majority in this enlarged committee. Realizing this, Murphy, the representative of the US State Department in Algiers, hurriedly contacted Giraud to ask him why he had accepted to be marginalized. Together with Macmillan Murphy also visited Monnet and they both blamed him for having created this situation. (Monnet 1976 p. 293).

It can be observed that several of the members of the Committee were still in London where, not surprisingly, the British government was reluctant to let them go to Algiers. They would arrive there only on 15 June. (De Gaulle 1954 p. 136). Moreover the Committee was still chaired jointly by de Gaulle and Giraud who in addition was the commander of the French forces. For the Committee to become really effective and efficient that had to be changed.

**Jun 9, 1943:** The fourth meeting of the Committee was unable to solve the Giraud-de Gaulle joint chairmanship issue. (Monnet 1976 p. 294-295)

**Jun 10, 1943:** Uruguay recognized the "French Committee of National Liberation" in Algiers as the official government of France. (New York Times 10 June 1943)

**Jun 10, 1943:** Excerpt of the diary of US Secretary of War H.L. Stimson.

I had a massage and was sleeping peacefully after it when the telephone rang. Jack McCloy was on the telephone to say that a terrific hell to pay [i.e. a great trouble] had broken out in Africa. De Gaulle apparently is raising Cain [i.e. making a disturbance] and the President has been very much excited and irritated and has blown out [i.e. lost his temper] and has sent out telegrams to the PM [Churchill probably, who was at that time at Algiers] and to Eisenhower which were about as drastic as could be. I immediately called him up. He expressed himself as violently as he could against de Gaulle. Marshall was not present at this time and the president had consulted only one person namely Harry Hopkins. (Stimson Vol 43, p. 106)
liberated in the future. (Monnet 1976 p. 288-289)

[Probably two factors played an role in Monnet's change of attitude.

* Harold Macmillan, the British representative, with whom he had a friendly relationship was pushing him in this direction.

* In Algiers overt American interference into French internal political discussions became more obvious because of the numerous meetings between Giraud and his “advisers”. Thus, it is fairly natural that when de Gaulle was denouncing such interventions this struck a chord with many French officials.

In other words, continuing to support Giraud would have put Monnet in a very awkward position.]

**Jun 5, 1943:** Third Meeting of the French National Committee. The Committee was extended to 14 members whose attributions covered all major facets of a central government. De Gaulle could count on a clear majority in this enlarged committee. Realizing this, Murphy, the representative of the US State Department in Algiers, hurriedly contacted Giraud to ask him why he had accepted to be marginalized. Together with Macmillan Murphy also visited Monnet and they both blamed him for having created this situation. (Monnet 1976 p. 293).

It can be observed that several of the members of the Committee were still in London where, not surprisingly, the British government was reluctant to let them go to Algiers. They would arrive there only on 15 June. (De Gaulle 1954 p. 136). Moreover the Committee was still chaired jointly by de Gaulle and Giraud who in addition was the commander of the French forces. For the Committee to become really effective and efficient that had to be changed.

**Jun 9, 1943:** The fourth meeting of the Committee was unable to solve the Giraud-de Gaulle joint chairmanship issue. (Monnet 1976 p. 294-295)

**Jun 10, 1943:** Uruguay recognized the "French Committee of National Liberation" in Algiers as the official government of France. (New York Times 10 June 1943)

**Jun 10, 1943:** Excerpt of the diary of US Secretary of War H.L. Stimson.

I had a massage and was sleeping peacefully after it when the telephone rang. Jack McCloy was on the telephone to say that a terrific hell to pay [i.e. a great trouble] had broken out in Africa. De Gaulle apparently is raising Cain [i.e. making a disturbance] and the President has been very much excited and irritated and has blown out [i.e. lost his temper] and has sent out telegrams to the PM [Churchill probably, who was at that time at Algiers] and to Eisenhower which were about as drastic as could be. I immediately called him up. He expressed himself as violently as he could against de Gaulle. Marshall was not present at this time and the president had consulted only one person namely Harry Hopkins. (Stimson Vol 43, p. 106)
[Why did Roosevelt react in this way on 10 June? According to Eric Roussel (1996) it is on 12 June that Giraud co-signed a number of decrees which translated in official language the fact that he had lost the power struggle in the French Committee. As a matter of fact, to most observers this was already clear in early June. It seems that it was a message sent by Murphy which incensed the President.]

**Jun 12 - Aug 17, 1943** Invasion of Sicily by British and US forces.

**Jun 12, 1943:** The Italian island of Pantelleria, the last Axis stronghold in the Sicilian Strait, surrendered to overwhelming Allied air power this morning rather than endure another day of death and destruction under the most concentrated aerial attack in the history of warfare. (New York Times p. 1)

**Jun 13, 1943:** Waves of Allied bombers hammered the tiny Italian island of Lampe-dusa into submission and surrender today, just one day after Pantelleria had capitulated to the same Allied air mastery. (New York Times p. 1)

**Jun 17, 1943:** Excerpt of the diary of the US Secretary of War. Hull [Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State] told me that the lines were laid for de Gaulle to get the position that we had been afraid he would take. Hull told me that *Monnet had proved a traitor* which I'm not ready to believe. The President is strongly alarmed about the situation which would occur if de Gaulle got possession of the French troops. He says that must not happen and he has authorized Eisenhower to take full steps to prevent it. Also that he must not get Dakar. When the President brought it up at Cabinet meeting today I told him that de Gaulle is a man who is so unstable a character that he might actually get up a fight between his troops and ours. (Stimson Vol 43, p. 121)

[Fortunately, General Eisenhower had a more realistic view and (as shown below) it is through him that the opinion of the US cabinet about de Gaulle began to change. The only persons who did not change their minds were Roosevelt and Hopkins.]

**Jun 26, 1943:** The city of Cherbourg in the western part of the Normandy was occupied by US forces. However, most of the port equipment had been destroyed. (http://www.bayeuxmuseum.com/la_bataille_de_normandie.html)

**Jul 2, 1943:** General Giraud left Algiers for a visit to the United States, Canada and Britain. He would return to Algiers on 24 July. If this visit was aimed at bolstering his international status it was a failure not only in the countries that he visited but also among the members of the French Committee of National Liberation. For instance during a press conference attended by Giraud President Roosevelt declared that he was happy to welcome a great French Commander fighting alongside the Allies especially at the present time while France did no longer exist. General Giraud did not care to correct that statement even though the purpose of the Committee that
[Why did Roosevelt react in this way on 10 June? According to Eric Roussel (1996) it is on 12 June that Giraud co-signed a number of decrees which translated in official language the fact that he had lost the power struggle in the French Committee. As a matter of fact, to most observers this was already clear in early June. It seems that it was a message sent by Murphy which incensed the President.]

**Jun 12 - Aug 17, 1943** Invasion of Sicily by British and US forces.

**Jun 12, 1943:** The Italian island of Pantelleria, the last Axis stronghold in the Sicilian Strait, surrendered to overwhelming Allied air power this morning rather than endure another day of death and destruction under the most concentrated aerial attack in the history of warfare. (New York Times p. 1)

**Jun 13, 1943:** Waves of Allied bombers hammered the tiny Italian island of Lampe-dusa into submission and surrender today, just one day after Pantelleria had capitulated to the same Allied air mastery. (New York Times p. 1)

**Jun 17, 1943:** Excerpt of the diary of the US Secretary of War. Hull [Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State] told me that the lines were laid for de Gaulle to get the position that we had been afraid he would take. Hull told me that *Monnet had proved a traitor* which I'm not ready to believe. The President is strongly alarmed about the situation which would occur if de Gaulle got possession of the French troops. He says that must not happen and he has authorized Eisenhower to take full steps to prevent it. Also that he must not get Dakar. When the President brought it up at Cabinet meeting today I told him that de Gaulle is a man who is so unstable a character that he might actually get up a fight between his troops and ours. (Stimson Vol 43, p. 121)

[Fortunately, General Eisenhower had a more realistic view and (as shown below) it is through him that the opinion of the US cabinet about de Gaulle began to change. The only persons who did not change their minds were Roosevelt and Hopkins.]

**Jun 26, 1943:** The city of Cherbourg in the western part of the Normandy was occupied by US forces. However, most of the port equipment had been destroyed. (http://www.bayeuxmuseum.com/la_bataille_de_normandie.html)

**Jul 2, 1943:** General Giraud left Algiers for a visit to the United States, Canada and Britain. He would return to Algiers on 24 July. If this visit was aimed at bolstering his international status it was a failure not only in the countries that he visited but also among the members of the French Committee of National Liberation. For instance during a press conference attended by Giraud President Roosevelt declared that he was happy to welcome a great French Commander fighting alongside the Allies especially at the present time while France did no longer exist. General Giraud did not care to correct that statement even though the purpose of the Committee that
he chaired jointly with de Gaulle was precisely to be the provisional government of the Fighting France. (De Gaulle 1954, p. 145)

**Jul 10, 1943:** Excerpt of the New York Times. Commenting upon the accusation that the United States was interfering in French affairs, President Roosevelt at his press conference today said that 95 per cent of the French people were still under the German heel and that there was no France by now. (NYT p. 1)

**Aug 10, 1943:** Excerpt of the diary of the US Secretary of War. I went to the State Department for my weekly meeting with Hull. I talked over with him the question of the recognition of the French-North African Committee. He felt exactly the same doubts as to the wisdom of such recognition as I had. We both were afraid that the Committee might sometime fall into the hands of de Gaulle and, if it is recognized in any sense as the government of North Africa that would give de Gaulle a platform for making trouble. (Stimson Vol 44, p. 82)

[It seems that Hull and Stimson did not have a realistic view of the situation for on 10 August de Gaulle has already a clear leadership position in the French Committee of National Liberation. Moreover, at that time Giraud was absent from Algiers and on a long visit to the United States, Canada.]

**Sep 7, 1943:** The French Committee of National Liberation issued a memorandum about the liberation of France. This memorandum defined the principles and framework for the cooperation between the French government and the Allied forces. It was submitted to the American and British governments as the draft for a possible agreement. So, almost two years before the Normandy landing, the French provisional government was concerned about what would happen in France after the landing.

In his memoirs, de Gaulle explains this initiative in the following terms. "We were aware of the fact that in the wake of their advance our allies would wish to take over the government of France through the military government that they would establish. Needless to say, we were determined to bar such an attempt".

Not surprisingly in the light of its plans (see below at the date of 29 November 1943) the US government did not reply to this memorandum.

**Nov 15, 1943:** Jean Monnet left Algiers to return to Washington. During the 9 months that he had spent in Algiers his wife and daughter had remained in Washington. The French Committee had named him "Commissioner General for Supply and Reconstruction".

In his memoirs he says that in this position he did not have as easy an access to members of the Roosevelt administration as during the two years that he had spent in Washington before being sent to Algiers. Is that because in some sense his action
he chaired jointly with de Gaulle was precisely to be the provisional government of the Fighting France. (De Gaulle 1954, p. 145)

**Jul 10, 1943:** Excerpt of the New York Times. Commenting upon the accusation that the United States was interfering in French affairs, President Roosevelt at his press conference today said that 95 per cent of the French people were still under the German heel and that there was no France by now. (NYT p. 1)

**Aug 10, 1943:** Excerpt of the diary of the US Secretary of War. I went to the State Department for my weekly meeting with Hull. I talked over with him the question of the recognition of the French-North African Committee. He felt exactly the same doubts as to the wisdom of such recognition as I had. We both were afraid that the Committee might sometime fall into the hands of de Gaulle and, if it is recognized in any sense as the government of North Africa that would give de Gaulle a platform for making trouble. (Stimson Vol 44, p. 82)

[It seems that Hull and Stimson did not have a realistic view of the situation for on 10 August de Gaulle has already a clear leadership position in the French Committee of National Liberation. Moreover, at that time Giraud was absent from Algiers and on a long visit to the United States, Canada.]

**Sep 7, 1943:** The French Committee of National Liberation issued a memorandum about the liberation of France. This memorandum defined the principles and framework for the cooperation between the French government and the Allied forces. It was submitted to the American and British governments as the draft for a possible agreement. So, almost two years before the Normandy landing, the French provisional government was concerned about what would happen in France after the landing.

In his memoirs, de Gaulle explains this initiative in the following terms. "We were aware of the fact that in the wake of their advance our allies would wish to take over the government of France through the military government that they would establish. Needless to say, we were determined to bar such an attempt".

Not surprisingly in the light of its plans (see below at the date of 29 November 1943) the US government did not reply to this memorandum.

**Nov 15, 1943:** Jean Monnet left Algiers to return to Washington. During the 9 months that he had spent in Algiers his wife and daughter had remained in Washington. The French Committee had named him "Commissioner General for Supply and Reconstruction".

In his memoirs he says that in this position he did not have as easy an access to members of the Roosevelt administration as during the two years that he had spent in Washington before being sent to Algiers. Is that because in some sense his action
in Algiers had been a disappointment for Roosevelt and Hopkins? He does of course
not say so. In order to know one would need to read some messages about him ex-
changed within the US administration. However, it can be noted that during the 9
months of his stay in Algiers his name was mentioned in 25 articles of the New York
Times, whereas during the 9 months following his return to Washington his name
appeared in only two articles. (Monnet 1976 p. 304, 310)

**Nov 29, 1943:** Excerpt of the diary of the US Secretary of War. "Roosevelt wants that when we go into France the authority must be purely military". (Stimson Vol. 45, p. 70-71)

[In the United States (as in any other sovereign country) “purely military” is a meaningless and deceptive expression for at any time the military are under the authority of the government. The purpose of any military action is to implement a political project. This is even more obvious for the so-called “Civil Affairs” departments of the US Army which would be in charge of the administration of the liberated country. In their very essence the tasks fulfilled by civil affairs officers were political.
A special committee for Civil Affairs was established in Washington under the chairmanship of John McCloy, the Deputy Secretary of War. It was in charge of all problems that would arise with local populations. (Monnet 1976 p. 310)]

**Dec 17, 1943:** The currency issue. The British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax, called upon the Secretary of State and informed him unexpectedly that the British Government is now opposed to use of an Allied Military franc. The British now propose a French national currency issued by the French National Committee. (Coles 1964,chapter 23, p. 690-691)

[This information is rather puzzling for indeed the British government knew very
well that President Roosevelt was opposed to such a solution and that it had no
chance to be accepted therefore.]

**Dec 27-30, 1943:** Decision regarding the liberation of Paris. On 27 December there
was a meeting between de Gaulle and Giraud on the one hand and General Bedell
Smith, General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff on the other hand. Three days later it
was followed by a personal conversation between de Gaulle and Eisenhower.

What was under discussion was the participation of French army divisions in the
liberation of France and the question of whether Paris will be liberated by US troops
or by French troops. Because most of the French divisions were in the Italy theater
or in North Africa it was obviously simpler to make them take part in the landing
that would occur in August 1944 in the South of France.

However, for Paris to be liberated by French forces, at least one division had to land
in Normandy. At first, the Allies argued that there was not enough shipping available
in Algiers had been a disappointment for Roosevelt and Hopkins? He does of course
not say so. In order to know one would need to read some messages about him ex-
changed within the US administration. However, it can be noted that during the 9
months of his stay in Algiers his name was mentioned in 25 articles of the New York
Times, whereas during the 9 months following his return to Washington his name
appeared in only two articles. (Monnet 1976 p. 304, 310)

**Nov 29, 1943:** Excerpt of the diary of the US Secretary of War. "Roosevelt wants that when we go into France the authority must be purely military". (Stimson Vol. 45, p. 70-71)

[In the United States (as in any other sovereign country) “purely military” is a meaningless and deceptive expression for at any time the military are under the authority of the government. The purpose of any military action is to implement a political project. This is even more obvious for the so-called “Civil Affairs” departments of the US Army which would be in charge of the administration of the liberated country. In their very essence the tasks fulfilled by civil affairs officers were political.
A special committee for Civil Affairs was established in Washington under the chairmanship of John McCloy, the Deputy Secretary of War. It was in charge of all problems that would arise with local populations. (Monnet 1976 p. 310)]

**Dec 17, 1943:** The currency issue. The British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax, called upon the Secretary of State and informed him unexpectedly that the British Government is now opposed to use of an Allied Military franc. The British now propose a French national currency issued by the French National Committee. (Coles 1964,chapter 23, p. 690-691)

[This information is rather puzzling for indeed the British government knew very
well that President Roosevelt was opposed to such a solution and that it had no
chance to be accepted therefore.]

**Dec 27-30, 1943:** Decision regarding the liberation of Paris. On 27 December there
was a meeting between de Gaulle and Giraud on the one hand and General Bedell
Smith, General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff on the other hand. Three days later it
was followed by a personal conversation between de Gaulle and Eisenhower.

What was under discussion was the participation of French army divisions in the
liberation of France and the question of whether Paris will be liberated by US troops
or by French troops. Because most of the French divisions were in the Italy theater
or in North Africa it was obviously simpler to make them take part in the landing
that would occur in August 1944 in the South of France.

However, for Paris to be liberated by French forces, at least one division had to land
in Normandy. At first, the Allies argued that there was not enough shipping available
to transport a French armored division from North Africa to England. Eventually, the solution proposed by General Eisenhower was to ship the soldiers and the equipment separately. The main steps in this negotiation are described in the excerpts given below.

**Gen. B. Smith:** In order to make our plans we need to know how many French divisions will take part.

**Gen. de Gaulle:** If, in addition to the divisions that will land in the south, we get your pledge that at least one French armored division will be able to land in the north-east [i.e. in Normandy] then we will give our agreement. Failing that, there will be no agreement concerning the participation of French forces.

**Gen. Eisenhower:** Moving a French armored division from North Africa to England would be an almost impossible task. Yet, if enough equipment is made available in England, only the soldiers will have to be moved from North Africa to Britain. That would be much simpler. **Gen. de Gaulle:** I trust that once you are in England you will be able to see to it. Let me repeat that we do not wish Paris to be liberated without a participation of French forces. **Gen. Eisenhower:** Be assured that I do not contemplate to go into Paris without French troops.

For the war in France I will need the support of the French administration and public opinion. Although I do not yet know what will be the instructions that my government will give me, I wish to tell you that I will not recognize any other authority in France but the one of your government.

(Mémoires de guerre. Vol. 2. L'unité, p. 459-467, my translation)

[Through this dialogue the way Paris would be liberated was decided on some 8 months before the event actually took place. Of course, for this agreement to get implemented, General Eisenhower was still in need of President Roosevelt's approval. As it turned outr, that was not an easy matter.

Incidentally, the whole discussion between Eisenhower and de Gaulle reveals a deep agreement and sympathy between the two men. Therefore it is not surprising that, once back in Washington, Eisenhower would contribute to change the opinion about de Gaulle in the US administration. The next entry describes how the Secretary of War changed his mind.

Roosevelt, however and almost alone, would stick to his former opinion. It cannot be said that Roosevelt's attitude resulted from a misunderstanding for indeed in a long letter (dated from 26 October 1942) that was handed to him by André Philip, General de Gaulle opened his heart and explained his aims with much clarity and sincerity. Perhaps with too much sincerity for indeed his aims were not compatible with the objectives of the Roosevelt administration regarding liberated countries.]

**Jan 2, 1944:** Excerpt of the diary of the US Secretary of War. General Eisenhower
to transport a French armored division from North Africa to England. Eventually, the solution proposed by General Eisenhower was to ship the soldiers and the equipment separately. The main steps in this negotiation are described in the excerpts given below.

**Gen. B. Smith:** In order to make our plans we need to know how many French divisions will take part.

**Gen. de Gaulle:** If, in addition to the divisions that will land in the south, we get your pledge that at least one French armored division will be able to land in the north-east [i.e. in Normandy] then we will give our agreement. Failing that, there will be no agreement concerning the participation of French forces.

**Gen. Eisenhower:** Moving a French armored division from North Africa to England would be an almost impossible task. Yet, if enough equipment is made available in England, only the soldiers will have to be moved from North Africa to Britain. That would be much simpler. **Gen. de Gaulle:** I trust that once you are in England you will be able to see to it. Let me repeat that we do not wish Paris to be liberated without a participation of French forces. **Gen. Eisenhower:** Be assured that I do not contemplate to go into Paris without French troops.

For the war in France I will need the support of the French administration and public opinion. Although I do not yet know what will be the instructions that my government will give me, I wish to tell you that I will not recognize any other authority in France but the one of your government.

(Mémoires de guerre. Vol. 2. L'unité, p. 459-467, my translation)

[Through this dialogue the way Paris would be liberated was decided on some 8 months before the event actually took place. Of course, for this agreement to get implemented, General Eisenhower was still in need of President Roosevelt's approval. As it turned outr, that was not an easy matter.

Incidentally, the whole discussion between Eisenhower and de Gaulle reveals a deep agreement and sympathy between the two men. Therefore it is not surprising that, once back in Washington, Eisenhower would contribute to change the opinion about de Gaulle in the US administration. The next entry describes how the Secretary of War changed his mind.

Roosevelt, however and almost alone, would stick to his former opinion. It cannot be said that Roosevelt's attitude resulted from a misunderstanding for indeed in a long letter (dated from 26 October 1942) that was handed to him by André Philip, General de Gaulle opened his heart and explained his aims with much clarity and sincerity. Perhaps with too much sincerity for indeed his aims were not compatible with the objectives of the Roosevelt administration regarding liberated countries.]

**Jan 2, 1944:** Excerpt of the diary of the US Secretary of War. General Eisenhower
had suddenly landed here and wanted to see me. Mabel [Stimson's wife] gave us all tea and I had a good chat with him. When we talked about de Gaulle I was very glad to learn that he is becoming much more amenable. De Gaulle has accepted all our plans for the arming of the French. This fitted right in the work that McCloy and I are doing to try to get the President to be a little more amenable to the French Committee. (Stimson vol. 46, p. 3)

**Jan 13, 1944:** Excerpt of the diary of the US Secretary of War. "As Hull is clinging to his old aversion against de Gaulle, McCloy and I will try to see the President about establishing a connection with the French Committee." (Stimson vol. 46, p. 21)
[Neither Eisenhower, nor Stimson nor anybody else was able to convince Roosevelt. The reason behind Roosevelt's attitude was brought to light during de Gaulle's visit in Washington. His discussions with Roosevelt showed that there was no personal animosity between them but it also revealed Roosevelt's ambitions and plans for world wide hegemony (see below). In the words of General de Gaulle, he peace would be an American peace.]

**Mar 15, 1944:** Letter of President Roosevelt to Secretary of War Stimson and General Eisenhower (excerpts).

1. The three paramount aims which are to be the landmarks of your policy are the following.

[The aims A and B are in relation with the military aspects.]

C. The fostering of democratic methods under which a French government may ultimately be established according to the free choice of the French people.

[In other words the US Commander should provide advice for organizing democratic elections. Incidentally, such a course of action took place in Japan in the sense that the election of 10 April 1946 was supervised by the occupation authorities; for more details see "Relations between Allied forces and the population of Japan".]

2. You will have the ultimate determination as to where, when and how the Civil Administration in France shall be exercised by French citizens.

[This directive gives Eisenhower a leading role in setting up the French civil administration.]

4. Nothing that you do in connection with the French Committee of National Liberation shall constitute a recognition of said committee as the government of France even on a provisional basis.

[In other words, until elections could be held, France would be left without government. Needless to say, Allied directives would fill this vacuum. This was exactly the situation created by US forces in South Korea after the "People's Committees" had been suppressed.]
had suddenly landed here and wanted to see me. Mabel [Stimson's wife] gave us all tea and I had a good chat with him. When we talked about de Gaulle I was very glad to learn that he is becoming much more amenable. De Gaulle has accepted all our plans for the arming of the French. This fitted right in the work that McCloy and I are doing to try to get the President to be a little more amenable to the French Committee. (Stimson vol. 46, p. 3)

**Jan 13, 1944:** Excerpt of the diary of the US Secretary of War. "As Hull is clinging to his old aversion against de Gaulle, McCloy and I will try to see the President about establishing a connection with the French Committee." (Stimson vol. 46, p. 21)
[Neither Eisenhower, nor Stimson nor anybody else was able to convince Roosevelt. The reason behind Roosevelt's attitude was brought to light during de Gaulle's visit in Washington. His discussions with Roosevelt showed that there was no personal animosity between them but it also revealed Roosevelt's ambitions and plans for world wide hegemony (see below). In the words of General de Gaulle, he peace would be an American peace.]

**Mar 15, 1944:** Letter of President Roosevelt to Secretary of War Stimson and General Eisenhower (excerpts).

1. The three paramount aims which are to be the landmarks of your policy are the following.

[The aims A and B are in relation with the military aspects.]

C. The fostering of democratic methods under which a French government may ultimately be established according to the free choice of the French people.

[In other words the US Commander should provide advice for organizing democratic elections. Incidentally, such a course of action took place in Japan in the sense that the election of 10 April 1946 was supervised by the occupation authorities; for more details see "Relations between Allied forces and the population of Japan".]

2. You will have the ultimate determination as to where, when and how the Civil Administration in France shall be exercised by French citizens.

[This directive gives Eisenhower a leading role in setting up the French civil administration.]

4. Nothing that you do in connection with the French Committee of National Liberation shall constitute a recognition of said committee as the government of France even on a provisional basis.

[In other words, until elections could be held, France would be left without government. Needless to say, Allied directives would fill this vacuum. This was exactly the situation created by US forces in South Korea after the "People's Committees" had been suppressed.]
8 You may at your discretion incorporate in your Civil Affairs Section members of the French Military Mission and other French officials.

[This is also what was done in South Korea. After the Military Government had been set up it was given a Korean appearance by recruiting some obedient Koreans who very fluent in English.

10 Instructions on economic and fiscal matters will be furnished to you by the President or by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

[Were instructions on fiscal matters necessary to wage the war?]

**May 4, 1944: Currency question** SHAEF Admin Memo 11 (excerpts). A Civil Affairs Currency Section will be activated for each country in which operations are undertaken by the Allied Forces. Each such currency section, when activated, will have the following functions and powers:

(1) Receive, hold, and supply adequate currency for pay and procurement of Allied Army Forces for Civil Affairs operations.

(Coles 1964, chapter 23, p. 691)

**Jun 6, 1944: Allied landing in Normandy.** The troops who took part in the D-Day landing belonged to 4 nationalities: US, British, Canadian and Polish. No French soldiers took part in spite of the fact that there was a French Division in England (the 2nd Armored Division under General Leclerc) that would be shipped to France in the following days so as to be able to liberate Paris, a symbolical action for which General Eisenhower had given his agreement on the insistence of General de Gaulle.

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>**Fig.** American, British and Canadian sectors in the Normandy landing. On 7 June 1944 Bayeux was taken by the British forces which had landed on "Gold Beach". It was the first French city to be liberated. Bayeux has a military cemetery where 4,000 of the 4,600 graves are for British soldiers. Courseulles-sur-Mer where General de Gaulle landed on 14 June 1944 belonged to the Canadian sector of "Juno Beach". Wikipedia articles entitled "Bayeux" and "Courseulles-sur-Mer".</figcaption></figure>

**Jun 6, 1944: Excerpts of the message of General Eisenhower to the French people.** Millions of leaflets bearing this message were dropped on French territory shortly after the Normandy landing started. We are particularly interested in what Eisenhower said about the administration of liberated areas.

"As Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces there is imposed on
8 You may at your discretion incorporate in your Civil Affairs Section members of the French Military Mission and other French officials.

[This is also what was done in South Korea. After the Military Government had been set up it was given a Korean appearance by recruiting some obedient Koreans who very fluent in English.

10 Instructions on economic and fiscal matters will be furnished to you by the President or by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

[Were instructions on fiscal matters necessary to wage the war?]

**May 4, 1944: Currency question** SHAEF Admin Memo 11 (excerpts). A Civil Affairs Currency Section will be activated for each country in which operations are undertaken by the Allied Forces. Each such currency section, when activated, will have the following functions and powers:

(1) Receive, hold, and supply adequate currency for pay and procurement of Allied Army Forces for Civil Affairs operations.

(Coles 1964, chapter 23, p. 691)

**Jun 6, 1944: Allied landing in Normandy.** The troops who took part in the D-Day landing belonged to 4 nationalities: US, British, Canadian and Polish. No French soldiers took part in spite of the fact that there was a French Division in England (the 2nd Armored Division under General Leclerc) that would be shipped to France in the following days so as to be able to liberate Paris, a symbolical action for which General Eisenhower had given his agreement on the insistence of General de Gaulle.

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>**Fig.** American, British and Canadian sectors in the Normandy landing. On 7 June 1944 Bayeux was taken by the British forces which had landed on "Gold Beach". It was the first French city to be liberated. Bayeux has a military cemetery where 4,000 of the 4,600 graves are for British soldiers. Courseulles-sur-Mer where General de Gaulle landed on 14 June 1944 belonged to the Canadian sector of "Juno Beach". Wikipedia articles entitled "Bayeux" and "Courseulles-sur-Mer".</figcaption></figure>

**Jun 6, 1944: Excerpts of the message of General Eisenhower to the French people.** Millions of leaflets bearing this message were dropped on French territory shortly after the Normandy landing started. We are particularly interested in what Eisenhower said about the administration of liberated areas.

"As Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces there is imposed on
me the duty to take all measures for the prosecution of the war. Prompt and willing
obedience to the order that I shall issue is essential.

Effective civil administration of France must be provided by Frenchmen. All persons
must continue in their present duties unless otherwise instructed. Those who have
made common cause with the enemy and so betrayed their country will be removed.
When France is liberated from their oppressors, you yourselves will choose your
representatives and the government under which you wish to live."

http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/education/teacher_resources/spy kit/spy kit documents.html

[Although somewhat ambiguous, this message is compatible with the plan of estab-
lishing a military government. Why? One needs just to ask who will assume the
responsibility of removing French police officers and public servants who “made
common cause with the enemy”? As the French provisional government is not men-
tioned anywhere in the message, such removals will necessarily be decided by the
Allied military commander<fnref n="33" />. The example of South Korea showed that selecting
whom to keep and whom to remove is an essential attribute of the occupation forces.
Clearly, this is a very effective way for leading the country in one direction or an-
other. The Korean case also showed that the sentence “Effective civil administration
of France must be provided by Frenchmen” is compatible with an organization of
Civil Affairs in which the employees would be Frenchmen (or Koreans in the case
of Korea) under the authority of Civil Affairs officers. For instance, until 15 August
1948 the Korean director of the Korean police police was under the authority of an
American officer.]

In recent years the role of “US Civil Affairs” in France has been investigated by
several authors, e.g. Boivin (2003, 2004), Bourliaguet (2009), Lamache (2010 a,b),
Robertson (2011). This question can be examined at different levels: (i) US plan-
ning, (ii) Agreements between the Allies and the French provisional government;
this would include the monetary agreement of 18 July 1944 and the general agree-
ment of 25 August 1944. (iii) Actual implementation of the agreement. The most
relevant and significant level is of course the last one, but it is also the most difficult
to document. In many cases, French officials had no other choice than to approve
and rubber-stamp the wishes of Allied commanders.

This can be illustrated by the following case. In mid-July 1944 two Frenchmen ac-
cused of spying were tried by a military tribunal in Cherbourg. It is certainly not
enough to observe that the judges were French, one needs also to know by whom the
men were indicted and who conducted the investigation.

Regarding the issue of sovereignty in the non-combat zone one can ask four simple

<footnote n="33">³³The text of the leaflet is consistent with the instructions given by President Roosevelt to Eisenhower in April 1944 through which he gave him full authority in France and advised him to select himself the French authorities with whom he would wish to cooperate (De Gaulle 1954 p. 253)</footnote>
me the duty to take all measures for the prosecution of the war. Prompt and willing
obedience to the order that I shall issue is essential.

Effective civil administration of France must be provided by Frenchmen. All persons
must continue in their present duties unless otherwise instructed. Those who have
made common cause with the enemy and so betrayed their country will be removed.
When France is liberated from their oppressors, you yourselves will choose your
representatives and the government under which you wish to live."

http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/education/teacher_resources/spy kit/spy kit documents.html

[Although somewhat ambiguous, this message is compatible with the plan of estab-
lishing a military government. Why? One needs just to ask who will assume the
responsibility of removing French police officers and public servants who “made
common cause with the enemy”? As the French provisional government is not men-
tioned anywhere in the message, such removals will necessarily be decided by the
Allied military commander<fnref n="33" />. The example of South Korea showed that selecting
whom to keep and whom to remove is an essential attribute of the occupation forces.
Clearly, this is a very effective way for leading the country in one direction or an-
other. The Korean case also showed that the sentence “Effective civil administration
of France must be provided by Frenchmen” is compatible with an organization of
Civil Affairs in which the employees would be Frenchmen (or Koreans in the case
of Korea) under the authority of Civil Affairs officers. For instance, until 15 August
1948 the Korean director of the Korean police police was under the authority of an
American officer.]

In recent years the role of “US Civil Affairs” in France has been investigated by
several authors, e.g. Boivin (2003, 2004), Bourliaguet (2009), Lamache (2010 a,b),
Robertson (2011). This question can be examined at different levels: (i) US plan-
ning, (ii) Agreements between the Allies and the French provisional government;
this would include the monetary agreement of 18 July 1944 and the general agree-
ment of 25 August 1944. (iii) Actual implementation of the agreement. The most
relevant and significant level is of course the last one, but it is also the most difficult
to document. In many cases, French officials had no other choice than to approve
and rubber-stamp the wishes of Allied commanders.

This can be illustrated by the following case. In mid-July 1944 two Frenchmen ac-
cused of spying were tried by a military tribunal in Cherbourg. It is certainly not
enough to observe that the judges were French, one needs also to know by whom the
men were indicted and who conducted the investigation.

Regarding the issue of sovereignty in the non-combat zone one can ask four simple

<footnote n="33">³³The text of the leaflet is consistent with the instructions given by President Roosevelt to Eisenhower in April 1944 through which he gave him full authority in France and advised him to select himself the French authorities with whom he would wish to cooperate (De Gaulle 1954 p. 253)</footnote>
questions.

* Can Allied soldiers who committed crimes against French people be tried by French courts? Clearly the answer is “no”.

* Can Allied soldiers in the course of committing crimes be arrested by French police? In the cases listed below (entry of 18-24 November 1944) there is not a single one in which French police was able to protect the victims and arrest the criminals. In this respect one should remember that the soldiers had pistols and rifles.

* To what extent were the French regional media (e.g. newspapers and radio in the Normandy area) controlled and censured by the occupation authorities?

* Had the occupation forces to get French authorization before setting up their own radio broadcasting stations? To our best knowledge the answer is “no”.

In fact, if one wants to get a clear view of US objectives in occupied areas, it is not the case of France that one should study but rather the case of Italy. Because Italy was (apart from North Africa) the first country to be occupied by the Allies, the methods of Civil Affairs were tried for the first time with the result that US newspapers gave accounts which were much more candid than in subsequent cases. This can be seen in different ways.

* During the first two months of the occupation the Allied administration was called AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories). Then, after 26 August 1943, following a directive of the War Department, it was called AMG and subsequently the name was changed again to “G-5” or “Civil Affairs”. Altough admittedly less clear, these expressions are also less offensive.

* In late August 1943 a New York Times article candidly recognized that “in Sicily the judicial system is reorganized on lines approaching Anglo-American law. Our contribution is in the line of Anglo-Saxon democracy and liberalism” (NYT 22 August 1943 p. 7). Apart from Italy, the judicial system was reorganized on the model of the US system in several occupied countries but such a plain acknowledgment was never made again.

* On 11 February 1944 an agreement was reached according to which the Badoglio-Victor Emmanuel government was recognized by the Allies “on condition of sympathy”. More specifically, the agreement said that the Italian administration at both central and local level, should consist “of men of Allied sympathy”. (NYT 11 February 1944 p. 4) This may also have been the main objective in subsequent occupations but in those cases it was never stated so clearly. Instead, it was presented under the appearance of denazification or elimination of militarists.

How could the Allies determine the degree of sympathy of Italian citizens? The answer is simple. Questionaires were issued to officials, teachers and civilian employees which had to be filled out under oath and backed up by Italian government files or police records. (NYT 1 January 1944 p. 1) Incidentally, the same system
questions.

* Can Allied soldiers who committed crimes against French people be tried by French courts? Clearly the answer is “no”.

* Can Allied soldiers in the course of committing crimes be arrested by French police? In the cases listed below (entry of 18-24 November 1944) there is not a single one in which French police was able to protect the victims and arrest the criminals. In this respect one should remember that the soldiers had pistols and rifles.

* To what extent were the French regional media (e.g. newspapers and radio in the Normandy area) controlled and censured by the occupation authorities?

* Had the occupation forces to get French authorization before setting up their own radio broadcasting stations? To our best knowledge the answer is “no”.

In fact, if one wants to get a clear view of US objectives in occupied areas, it is not the case of France that one should study but rather the case of Italy. Because Italy was (apart from North Africa) the first country to be occupied by the Allies, the methods of Civil Affairs were tried for the first time with the result that US newspapers gave accounts which were much more candid than in subsequent cases. This can be seen in different ways.

* During the first two months of the occupation the Allied administration was called AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories). Then, after 26 August 1943, following a directive of the War Department, it was called AMG and subsequently the name was changed again to “G-5” or “Civil Affairs”. Altough admittedly less clear, these expressions are also less offensive.

* In late August 1943 a New York Times article candidly recognized that “in Sicily the judicial system is reorganized on lines approaching Anglo-American law. Our contribution is in the line of Anglo-Saxon democracy and liberalism” (NYT 22 August 1943 p. 7). Apart from Italy, the judicial system was reorganized on the model of the US system in several occupied countries but such a plain acknowledgment was never made again.

* On 11 February 1944 an agreement was reached according to which the Badoglio-Victor Emmanuel government was recognized by the Allies “on condition of sympathy”. More specifically, the agreement said that the Italian administration at both central and local level, should consist “of men of Allied sympathy”. (NYT 11 February 1944 p. 4) This may also have been the main objective in subsequent occupations but in those cases it was never stated so clearly. Instead, it was presented under the appearance of denazification or elimination of militarists.

How could the Allies determine the degree of sympathy of Italian citizens? The answer is simple. Questionaires were issued to officials, teachers and civilian employees which had to be filled out under oath and backed up by Italian government files or police records. (NYT 1 January 1944 p. 1) Incidentally, the same system
was also used in Hawaii (so-called loyalty investigations), in Germany (the so-called *Fragenbogen*), in Japan, and later on during the elimination of leftists in the United States.

**Jun 7, 1944:** Collevile-sur-Mer (in lower Normandy near Omaha Beach). Mr. Gustave Joret, a French farmer and the father of 7 children, was shot by a soldier of the 1st US Infantry Division while trying to reach a shelter. He died on 12 June 1944 at the Field Hospital of Saint-Laurent-sur-Mer. A picture (available on the Internet) taken a short while before that shows him trying to help a Civil Affairs Lieutenant. The record about Mr. Joret in the Memorial of the civilian fatalities in Normandy says "Died in a bombing strike". (Antonin Dehays, no 290 of "39-45 Magazine", a French journal about the Second World War).

[In this story, the most interesting point is that the cause of the death was not reported correctly. May be it was just a mistake? In order to find out one would wish to know the conditions under which this Memorial was established.]

**Jun 13, 1944:** One week after the landing General de Gaulle visited a (small) liberated zone in Normandy that was located in the British sector. He had to ask the Allies permission to do so and they were reluctant to grant it. In fact, it seems that neither Roosevelt nor Churchill allowed the visit but that the green light was eventually given by Antony Eden and the British Cabinet (De Gaulle 1954 p. 272-273).

**Jul 3, 1944:** Declaration made by Colonel Charles Poletti, Chief of Civil Affairs in Italy:

> "Italy's elections should take place pretty shortly after the war. In the meantime the Allies must remain as an educational guiding force to see that the election is carried out properly. (NYT p. 5)

[In this respect it must be recalled that on 19 December 1943 the Allied Military Government had banned a congress of political parties (NYT p. 38). The Italian Committee of National Liberation charged that by banning a scheduled Italian political congress, the AMG violated its pledge of free speech and assembly. In other words, the parties which were to run in any forthcoming election would be established under the control of the AMG.

Italy, of course, was a defeated country, but the same policy was openly implemented in South Korea in 1946-1948 (see "Relations between US Forces and the population of South Korea").

Roosevelt's insistence on not recognizing any French provisional government before elections could be held were in line with the policy followed in Italy and South Korea.]

**Jul 6, 1944:** De Gaulle visited President Roosevelt. General Charles de Gaulle
was also used in Hawaii (so-called loyalty investigations), in Germany (the so-called *Fragenbogen*), in Japan, and later on during the elimination of leftists in the United States.

**Jun 7, 1944:** Collevile-sur-Mer (in lower Normandy near Omaha Beach). Mr. Gustave Joret, a French farmer and the father of 7 children, was shot by a soldier of the 1st US Infantry Division while trying to reach a shelter. He died on 12 June 1944 at the Field Hospital of Saint-Laurent-sur-Mer. A picture (available on the Internet) taken a short while before that shows him trying to help a Civil Affairs Lieutenant. The record about Mr. Joret in the Memorial of the civilian fatalities in Normandy says "Died in a bombing strike". (Antonin Dehays, no 290 of "39-45 Magazine", a French journal about the Second World War).

[In this story, the most interesting point is that the cause of the death was not reported correctly. May be it was just a mistake? In order to find out one would wish to know the conditions under which this Memorial was established.]

**Jun 13, 1944:** One week after the landing General de Gaulle visited a (small) liberated zone in Normandy that was located in the British sector. He had to ask the Allies permission to do so and they were reluctant to grant it. In fact, it seems that neither Roosevelt nor Churchill allowed the visit but that the green light was eventually given by Antony Eden and the British Cabinet (De Gaulle 1954 p. 272-273).

**Jul 3, 1944:** Declaration made by Colonel Charles Poletti, Chief of Civil Affairs in Italy:

> "Italy's elections should take place pretty shortly after the war. In the meantime the Allies must remain as an educational guiding force to see that the election is carried out properly. (NYT p. 5)

[In this respect it must be recalled that on 19 December 1943 the Allied Military Government had banned a congress of political parties (NYT p. 38). The Italian Committee of National Liberation charged that by banning a scheduled Italian political congress, the AMG violated its pledge of free speech and assembly. In other words, the parties which were to run in any forthcoming election would be established under the control of the AMG.

Italy, of course, was a defeated country, but the same policy was openly implemented in South Korea in 1946-1948 (see "Relations between US Forces and the population of South Korea").

Roosevelt's insistence on not recognizing any French provisional government before elections could be held were in line with the policy followed in Italy and South Korea.]

**Jul 6, 1944:** De Gaulle visited President Roosevelt. General Charles de Gaulle
<figure><img src="image_15.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 6 General de Gaulle on 6 July 1944 shaking the hand of General Marshall at his arrival in Washington at the invitation of President Roosevelt</figcaption></figure>

stepped out of a big United States Army transport plane at the National Airport in Washington, made a little speech in English that he had carefully rehearsed in the plane and was received by President Roosevelt and his Cabinet at the White House. On 8 July General de Gaulle completed the official part of his visit to the United States with a talk with President Roosevelt lasting 75 mn. (NYT 7 July p. 1, 9 July p. 1)

The account given by General de Gaulle of his discussions with President Roosevelt is quite interesting for it reveals that assuming world leadership was already at that time the main goal of the US policy.

President Roosevelt wants to set up a system based on permanent intervention in world affairs. A four-member council composed of the United States, Soviet Russia, China and Great Britain would decide all problems while a parliament of the United Nations would give it a democratic touch. However, according to Roosevelt the implementation of such a policy requires a network of US bases all over the world and with some of them located in France. Among the four leading countries, China under Chiang Kai-shek will need US assistance; in order to protect and keep their dominions the British will have no other choice than to comply with US policy. Moreover, encouraged by the proclaimed principle of the right to auto-determination as well as by US political support many countries whether in Africa, Asia or in the Pacific will become independent states which will constitute as many client states of the US. In Roosevelt's speech, as is quite natural, the high ideals are the standard façade which mask the will for power. I was seriously worried by the fact that in his conception the future role of Europe will be fairly limited. At the end of my stay in Washington he offered me a picture of him with the inscription "To General de Gaulle who is
<figure><img src="image_15.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 6 General de Gaulle on 6 July 1944 shaking the hand of General Marshall at his arrival in Washington at the invitation of President Roosevelt</figcaption></figure>

stepped out of a big United States Army transport plane at the National Airport in Washington, made a little speech in English that he had carefully rehearsed in the plane and was received by President Roosevelt and his Cabinet at the White House. On 8 July General de Gaulle completed the official part of his visit to the United States with a talk with President Roosevelt lasting 75 mn. (NYT 7 July p. 1, 9 July p. 1)

The account given by General de Gaulle of his discussions with President Roosevelt is quite interesting for it reveals that assuming world leadership was already at that time the main goal of the US policy.

President Roosevelt wants to set up a system based on permanent intervention in world affairs. A four-member council composed of the United States, Soviet Russia, China and Great Britain would decide all problems while a parliament of the United Nations would give it a democratic touch. However, according to Roosevelt the implementation of such a policy requires a network of US bases all over the world and with some of them located in France. Among the four leading countries, China under Chiang Kai-shek will need US assistance; in order to protect and keep their dominions the British will have no other choice than to comply with US policy. Moreover, encouraged by the proclaimed principle of the right to auto-determination as well as by US political support many countries whether in Africa, Asia or in the Pacific will become independent states which will constitute as many client states of the US. In Roosevelt's speech, as is quite natural, the high ideals are the standard façade which mask the will for power. I was seriously worried by the fact that in his conception the future role of Europe will be fairly limited. At the end of my stay in Washington he offered me a picture of him with the inscription "To General de Gaulle who is
my friend”.

**Jul 15, 1944:** Two young Frenchmen accused of spying were sentenced to life imprisonment by a military tribunal. (Lamache 2010 b, p. 108)

[Although Stéphane Lamache does not say it explicitly, it seems that the judges were French officers. This belief is supported by the fact that many journalists were invited (by the Allied authorities) to attend the trial. In addition one would like to know by whom the defendants were arrested and indicted and who conducted the investigation. In other words, one would like to know whether the French judiciary had a real role in the organisation of this trial or whether the court comprised merely puppet judges.

Incidentally, S. Lamache writes that an article about this trial was published in the New York Times of 15 July 1944 under the title: “Traitors and action in Normandy”. Apart from this case, there were also other trials by military tribunals in Bayeux and Cherbourg. One would like to know how many.]

**Jul 18, 1944:** An agreement between the Allies and the French Provisional Government was concluded regarding the question of the currency introduced in France by the Allies. (Lamache 2010 b, p. 116)

[Needless to say, one would like to know the terms of this agreement and how they were implemented actually.]

**Jul 27, 1944:** Memo on Civil Affairs in Normandy, British Sector (excerpts). Due to the fact that the authority of the Civil Affairs Division was not clarified before entering the area [an agreement would be signed with the French provisional government only on 27 August] there was a tendency to avoid responsibility. This was true at every Civil Affairs level. Thus, Civil Affairs had mainly a liaison function. (Coles 1964, chapter 25)

[“Liaison function” means that Civil Affairs officers transmitted (and translated) messages between French officials and Allied commanders. This was not really the role for which they had been selected and trained. Interpreters could have rendered the same service.]

**Jul 27, 1944:** Excerpts of reports of Civil Affairs officers.

* Looting by soldiers was a constant complaint reaching Civil Affairs. Orders to detachments were to report, but not investigate, complaints. It was hoped that the severe punishments being meted out would lessen these complaints.

* French officials at all levels with whom Civil Affairs Detachments were required to deal, quickly resumed ordinary functions.

The Provisional government was accepted by all with enthusiasm as being the only possible solution; at any rate for the time being. Considerable enthusiasm always
my friend”.

**Jul 15, 1944:** Two young Frenchmen accused of spying were sentenced to life imprisonment by a military tribunal. (Lamache 2010 b, p. 108)

[Although Stéphane Lamache does not say it explicitly, it seems that the judges were French officers. This belief is supported by the fact that many journalists were invited (by the Allied authorities) to attend the trial. In addition one would like to know by whom the defendants were arrested and indicted and who conducted the investigation. In other words, one would like to know whether the French judiciary had a real role in the organisation of this trial or whether the court comprised merely puppet judges.

Incidentally, S. Lamache writes that an article about this trial was published in the New York Times of 15 July 1944 under the title: “Traitors and action in Normandy”. Apart from this case, there were also other trials by military tribunals in Bayeux and Cherbourg. One would like to know how many.]

**Jul 18, 1944:** An agreement between the Allies and the French Provisional Government was concluded regarding the question of the currency introduced in France by the Allies. (Lamache 2010 b, p. 116)

[Needless to say, one would like to know the terms of this agreement and how they were implemented actually.]

**Jul 27, 1944:** Memo on Civil Affairs in Normandy, British Sector (excerpts). Due to the fact that the authority of the Civil Affairs Division was not clarified before entering the area [an agreement would be signed with the French provisional government only on 27 August] there was a tendency to avoid responsibility. This was true at every Civil Affairs level. Thus, Civil Affairs had mainly a liaison function. (Coles 1964, chapter 25)

[“Liaison function” means that Civil Affairs officers transmitted (and translated) messages between French officials and Allied commanders. This was not really the role for which they had been selected and trained. Interpreters could have rendered the same service.]

**Jul 27, 1944:** Excerpts of reports of Civil Affairs officers.

* Looting by soldiers was a constant complaint reaching Civil Affairs. Orders to detachments were to report, but not investigate, complaints. It was hoped that the severe punishments being meted out would lessen these complaints.

* French officials at all levels with whom Civil Affairs Detachments were required to deal, quickly resumed ordinary functions.

The Provisional government was accepted by all with enthusiasm as being the only possible solution; at any rate for the time being. Considerable enthusiasm always
greeted any mention of the name of General de Gaulle.

* The delay in giving full recognition to the Provisional Govt. gave rise to many difficulties at the detachment level. As an example of this it may be mentioned the uncertainty at first of acceptance of the new currency. Another trouble was the question of postage stamps. A suggestion to overprint the "Petain" head by the "Lorraine Cross" was vetoed [by whom?] and eventually orders came to continue the use of the Petain stamp pending new issues<fnref n="34" />

* Large scale removals were carried out by units of the Allied Forces without requisition and it did cause considerable unfavorable comment from the French. At request of Civil Affairs, an order was issued by the military commander prohibiting the removal of any property without written authority.

* Many units occupied premises without reference to Civil Affairs or anyone, with the result that in many cases the houses of French families were wrongly taken over.

* In Cherbourg, Public Safety was fortunate in obtaining the services of a Gen-darme sergeant who spoke English fluently. He was thus able to act as liaison officer: his services were invaluable. All letters, reports, statements, etc., coming from the French were written in French only. Therefore, in order to pass copies to the vari-ous military departments concerned, chiefly the Provost Branch, it was necessary to have them translated: as the complaints were numerous, this proved a problem. The average French person who speaks English and is a good interpreter is not a good translator and difficulty was experienced in this direction.

* Plenty of black market operations were taking place in the city. At the foot of the Eiffel Tower, American troops were known to be selling American foods, gasoline, and other stuff to French civilians.

* Except for Supply, the Civil Affairs units in Paris were working themselves out of a job. This was entirely in accordance with our policy of letting the French do it. Some sections were doing little or no work except to report daily activities. Legal, Economics and Labor, Fiscal, Public Health, Utilities, Communication, and Transportation were marking time.

* The French authorities in North Africa have on several occasions ... pointed out that it was important, both on psychological and economic grounds, that the troops should not make full and indiscriminate use of the very high purchasing power which the conversion of their pay into francs gave them in a country where most goods were in short supply. The Allied Army will be confronted with the same problems in France, but on a much larger scale and in a more acute way.

<footnote n="34">³⁴ Yet, on websites destined to stamp collectors (e.g. http://1f50bersier.free.fr/libe.html) one can see Pétain stamps which are overprinted by a Lorraine cross. However, these Lorraine crosses are all different from one another (some are even upside down) which shows that the stamps were overprinted locally (probably in the post offices) before being sold to the public.</footnote>
greeted any mention of the name of General de Gaulle.

* The delay in giving full recognition to the Provisional Govt. gave rise to many difficulties at the detachment level. As an example of this it may be mentioned the uncertainty at first of acceptance of the new currency. Another trouble was the question of postage stamps. A suggestion to overprint the "Petain" head by the "Lorraine Cross" was vetoed [by whom?] and eventually orders came to continue the use of the Petain stamp pending new issues<fnref n="34" />

* Large scale removals were carried out by units of the Allied Forces without requisition and it did cause considerable unfavorable comment from the French. At request of Civil Affairs, an order was issued by the military commander prohibiting the removal of any property without written authority.

* Many units occupied premises without reference to Civil Affairs or anyone, with the result that in many cases the houses of French families were wrongly taken over.

* In Cherbourg, Public Safety was fortunate in obtaining the services of a Gen-darme sergeant who spoke English fluently. He was thus able to act as liaison officer: his services were invaluable. All letters, reports, statements, etc., coming from the French were written in French only. Therefore, in order to pass copies to the vari-ous military departments concerned, chiefly the Provost Branch, it was necessary to have them translated: as the complaints were numerous, this proved a problem. The average French person who speaks English and is a good interpreter is not a good translator and difficulty was experienced in this direction.

* Plenty of black market operations were taking place in the city. At the foot of the Eiffel Tower, American troops were known to be selling American foods, gasoline, and other stuff to French civilians.

* Except for Supply, the Civil Affairs units in Paris were working themselves out of a job. This was entirely in accordance with our policy of letting the French do it. Some sections were doing little or no work except to report daily activities. Legal, Economics and Labor, Fiscal, Public Health, Utilities, Communication, and Transportation were marking time.

* The French authorities in North Africa have on several occasions ... pointed out that it was important, both on psychological and economic grounds, that the troops should not make full and indiscriminate use of the very high purchasing power which the conversion of their pay into francs gave them in a country where most goods were in short supply. The Allied Army will be confronted with the same problems in France, but on a much larger scale and in a more acute way.

<footnote n="34">³⁴ Yet, on websites destined to stamp collectors (e.g. http://1f50bersier.free.fr/libe.html) one can see Pétain stamps which are overprinted by a Lorraine cross. However, these Lorraine crosses are all different from one another (some are even upside down) which shows that the stamps were overprinted locally (probably in the post offices) before being sold to the public.</footnote>
* The decision to use special supplemental French Currency, equal in value to the French Metropolitan currency, and to fix rates of exchange favorable to France, was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, after collaboration with the State Departments of the countries concerned. The exchange rate of 49.5 francs to the dollar. was favorable to France, and bore little relation to the actual relative values of the currencies (the same occurred in Japan, what motivated this policy is unclear).

(Coles and Weinberg 1964 p. 729,731,732,735,743)

[Comments](#)

* The act of vetoing the “Lorraine Cross” overprint was clearly an interference with a matter which had no military reason. It should have been decided by the French Provisional Government.

* The language barrier is always a serious problem in Civil Affairs activity. The same was seen during the occupation of South Korea and, more recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq.]

**Aug 25, 1944:** An long expected agreement was signed by General Eisenhower for the Allies and General Koenig for the provisional French government which organized the relations between the French administration and the Allied Headquarters. Often, however, the rules set in this agreement were just ignored by Allied military commanders especially at regional level. (de Gaulle 1954a p.359, http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/l-homme/dossiers-thematiques/1940-1944-la-seconde-guerre-mondiale/la-france-libre-et-les-allies/les-etats-unis/les-etats-unis-et-la-france-combattante.php)

**Aug 26, 1944:** General de Gaulle and other members of the French government were acclaimed by hundreds of thousand people as they marched down the Champs-Elysées. The 2nd Armored Division of General Leclerc protected the parade against possible German incursions from the northern suburbs. For that purpose, General de Gaulle had to override the orders given to Leclerc by the US Headquarters of General Gerow.

During the night Paris and its suburbs were bombed by German bombers with a toll of 108 killed.

(de Gaulle 1954a, p. 363-369)

[The bombing was fairly surprising because the Allies had clear air supremacy. What was the purpose of this raid? From which airfield did the bombers come?]

**Aug 29, 1944:** In a triomphal Champs-Elysées parade victorious American troops of the Fifth Corps rolled through Paris. (NYT 30 August 1944, p. 1)

[The New York Times devoted a big front page title to this parade. In contrast, in the edition of 27 August there was not a single title about the victory parade of 26
* The decision to use special supplemental French Currency, equal in value to the French Metropolitan currency, and to fix rates of exchange favorable to France, was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, after collaboration with the State Departments of the countries concerned. The exchange rate of 49.5 francs to the dollar. was favorable to France, and bore little relation to the actual relative values of the currencies (the same occurred in Japan, what motivated this policy is unclear).

(Coles and Weinberg 1964 p. 729,731,732,735,743)

[Comments](#)

* The act of vetoing the “Lorraine Cross” overprint was clearly an interference with a matter which had no military reason. It should have been decided by the French Provisional Government.

* The language barrier is always a serious problem in Civil Affairs activity. The same was seen during the occupation of South Korea and, more recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq.]

**Aug 25, 1944:** An long expected agreement was signed by General Eisenhower for the Allies and General Koenig for the provisional French government which organized the relations between the French administration and the Allied Headquarters. Often, however, the rules set in this agreement were just ignored by Allied military commanders especially at regional level. (de Gaulle 1954a p.359, http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/l-homme/dossiers-thematiques/1940-1944-la-seconde-guerre-mondiale/la-france-libre-et-les-allies/les-etats-unis/les-etats-unis-et-la-france-combattante.php)

**Aug 26, 1944:** General de Gaulle and other members of the French government were acclaimed by hundreds of thousand people as they marched down the Champs-Elysées. The 2nd Armored Division of General Leclerc protected the parade against possible German incursions from the northern suburbs. For that purpose, General de Gaulle had to override the orders given to Leclerc by the US Headquarters of General Gerow.

During the night Paris and its suburbs were bombed by German bombers with a toll of 108 killed.

(de Gaulle 1954a, p. 363-369)

[The bombing was fairly surprising because the Allies had clear air supremacy. What was the purpose of this raid? From which airfield did the bombers come?]

**Aug 29, 1944:** In a triomphal Champs-Elysées parade victorious American troops of the Fifth Corps rolled through Paris. (NYT 30 August 1944, p. 1)

[The New York Times devoted a big front page title to this parade. In contrast, in the edition of 27 August there was not a single title about the victory parade of 26
August (in spite of the fact that there were many articles about the liberation of Paris in this edition). Has the attitude of the New York Times any connection with the uncooperative attitude of General Gerow?)

**Sep 27, 1944:** The French administration officially resumed control of civil affairs in Normandy. A ceremony was held at Saint-Pierre-Eglise (département of "Manche") in which civil authority was restored to French mayors by an officer of the Allied Civil Affairs Bureau. The ceremony was attended by 20 mayors. M. Leviandier, Sub-Prefect of the Cherbourg District, was congratulated by Lieutenant-Colonel Franck H. Howley, chief of the Civil Affairs Bureau in the Cherbourg area. (Archive of the département of Manche, call number: 13 Num 1247³⁵)
[Several observations can be made.

* Saint-Pierre-Eglise is a few kilometers west of Sainte-Mère-Eglise; both cities belong to the département of "Manche" on the western side of the American sector. Incidentally, Normandy is the name of a province which refers to a much broader area comprising the départments of Calvados (706 communes), Eure (675), Manche (601), Orne (505), Seine-Infrieure (now Seine-Maritime, 746). Altogether Normandy has 3,233 communes and therefore as many mayors.

* The title given to the picture by the "Signal Corps", namely "French resume control of civil affairs in Normandy" does not seem correct because this ceremony concerned only the Cherbourg area (i.e. less than 10% of the total area of Normandy). The fact that no British officers took part suggests that the British sector of Normandy was not implied.

* As already noted there are 601 mayors in the département of the Manche and 3,233 in the province of Normandy. In other words, the 20 mayors who took part in this ceremony represented only a tiny fraction. As the French Provisional Government was opposed to the very idea that the civil administration should at any time be assumed by the Civil Affairs Division, it can be assumed that the mayors who took part were on the side of the US Civil Affairs. The préfet of the Manche département was Edouard Lebas and his absence at this ceremony is revealing.

The fact that in the US sector (contrary to the British sector) French mayors were (often) appointed by US Civil Affairs authorities<fnref n="36" /> is confirmed by the testimony

<footnote n="35">³⁵The call number refers to a picture showing the 20 mayors in front of the town hall. On the website of the archives of the Manche the date of the picture is given as 27 September 1944. However, for the same picture, Stéphane Lamache (2010b, p.145) gives the date of 9 August 1944. He also refers to an article about this event that was published in the newspaper "Presse Cherbourgeoise" on 11 August 1944. This suggests that the correct date may indeed be 9 August 1944. Moever, an article in the "Sydney Morning Herald" (16 September 1944) shows that on 15 September Lt-Col. Frank Howley was already in Paris. The date does not really matter anyway because the ceremony at Saint-Pierre-Eglise was largely symbolic. Those mayors will continue to approve and sign the rules edicted by the American authorities, whether or not civil affairs officers remain in the region.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶Anyway, the appointments of mayors of towns and villages was of little political importance. What mattered were the medias (radio, newspapers), the mayors of large cities or the chiefs of police forces.</footnote>
August (in spite of the fact that there were many articles about the liberation of Paris in this edition). Has the attitude of the New York Times any connection with the uncooperative attitude of General Gerow?)

**Sep 27, 1944:** The French administration officially resumed control of civil affairs in Normandy. A ceremony was held at Saint-Pierre-Eglise (département of "Manche") in which civil authority was restored to French mayors by an officer of the Allied Civil Affairs Bureau. The ceremony was attended by 20 mayors. M. Leviandier, Sub-Prefect of the Cherbourg District, was congratulated by Lieutenant-Colonel Franck H. Howley, chief of the Civil Affairs Bureau in the Cherbourg area. (Archive of the département of Manche, call number: 13 Num 1247³⁵)
[Several observations can be made.

* Saint-Pierre-Eglise is a few kilometers west of Sainte-Mère-Eglise; both cities belong to the département of "Manche" on the western side of the American sector. Incidentally, Normandy is the name of a province which refers to a much broader area comprising the départments of Calvados (706 communes), Eure (675), Manche (601), Orne (505), Seine-Infrieure (now Seine-Maritime, 746). Altogether Normandy has 3,233 communes and therefore as many mayors.

* The title given to the picture by the "Signal Corps", namely "French resume control of civil affairs in Normandy" does not seem correct because this ceremony concerned only the Cherbourg area (i.e. less than 10% of the total area of Normandy). The fact that no British officers took part suggests that the British sector of Normandy was not implied.

* As already noted there are 601 mayors in the département of the Manche and 3,233 in the province of Normandy. In other words, the 20 mayors who took part in this ceremony represented only a tiny fraction. As the French Provisional Government was opposed to the very idea that the civil administration should at any time be assumed by the Civil Affairs Division, it can be assumed that the mayors who took part were on the side of the US Civil Affairs. The préfet of the Manche département was Edouard Lebas and his absence at this ceremony is revealing.
The fact that in the US sector (contrary to the British sector) French mayors were (often) appointed by US Civil Affairs authorities<fnref n="36" /> is confirmed by the testimony

<footnote n="35">³⁵The call number refers to a picture showing the 20 mayors in front of the town hall. On the website of the archives of the Manche the date of the picture is given as 27 September 1944. However, for the same picture, Stéphane Lamache (2010b, p.145) gives the date of 9 August 1944. He also refers to an article about this event that was published in the newspaper "Presse Cherbourgeoise" on 11 August 1944. This suggests that the correct date may indeed be 9 August 1944. Moever, an article in the "Sydney Morning Herald" (16 September 1944) shows that on 15 September Lt-Col. Frank Howley was already in Paris. The date does not really matter anyway because the ceremony at Saint-Pierre-Eglise was largely symbolic. Those mayors will continue to approve and sign the rules edicted by the American authorities, whether or not civil affairs officers remain in the region.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶Anyway, the appointments of mayors of towns and villages was of little political importance. What mattered were the medias (radio, newspapers), the mayors of large cities or the chiefs of police forces.</footnote>
of François Coulet (1966). In this respect see also the study of Stéphane Lamache (2010) which is devoted to the American sector. In other words, in the discussion about Civil Affairs in Normandy one should make a clear distinction between the US and British sectors.

* Various spellings can be found on the Internet for the first names of Lieutenant-Colonel Howley: Franck H., Frank Leo (Wikipedia), Frank O. (Coles 1966), Frank J. They probably refer to the same person.]

### Nov 18-24, 1944: Crimes and executions.

(1) On 18 November near Cherbourg, Corporal Richard B. Scott of the 229th Quartermaster Company was executed by hanging for having raped a French women and injured two Frenchmen. The crime occurred on 20 July at Octeville (Manche département) and the trial by a General Court Martial took place on 7 September.

(2) The same day and at the same place, private William D. Pennyfeather of the 3868th Quartermaster Truck Company was executed by hanging for the rape of a French girl. The crime occurred on 1 August at Cherbourg and the trial took place on 2 September.

(3) Two days later on 20 November at Saint-Lô (Manche département) private Theron W. McGann of the 32nd Signal Battalion was executed by hanging for the rape of two French women. The crime occurred on 5 August at Quibou (a few kilometers south west of Saint-Lô), and the trial took place on 28 August.

(4) On 22 November (at least) one US soldier was executed by hanging at Montours (in the north-east of the département of Ille-et-Vilaine which is located on the southern side of the Manche département). The source does not give the name(s). The crime (rape) took place on 10 August near Montours.

(5) On 24 November Private James E. Hendricks was executed by hanging at Plumaudan in the east of the Côtes-du-Nord, (now Côtes d'Armor) département). The crime (rape and murder) was committed on 21 August. (Lamache 2010b, p. 775. The primary source is a report sent by Lieutenant-Colonel Brunschwig of the US Army to the French Interior Ministry and dated 27 November 1944.)

[Why do we mention these facts? These crimes are of some interest for our purpose for at least two reasons.

* It is well-known that even in more normal times only a small percentage of the rapes are reported to the authorities. Even more so of course in time of war. Thus the number of trials are one of the few reliable ways to describe this effect. The accounts of such events given in Lamache (2010b) reveals that the French police almost never confronted the armed American soldiers. People who tried to get help almost always went to the nearest American camp. This observation provides a partial answer to the question raised above about who was really in charge of public safety.
of François Coulet (1966). In this respect see also the study of Stéphane Lamache (2010) which is devoted to the American sector. In other words, in the discussion about Civil Affairs in Normandy one should make a clear distinction between the US and British sectors.

* Various spellings can be found on the Internet for the first names of Lieutenant-Colonel Howley: Franck H., Frank Leo (Wikipedia), Frank O. (Coles 1966), Frank J. They probably refer to the same person.]

### Nov 18-24, 1944: Crimes and executions.

(1) On 18 November near Cherbourg, Corporal Richard B. Scott of the 229th Quartermaster Company was executed by hanging for having raped a French women and injured two Frenchmen. The crime occurred on 20 July at Octeville (Manche département) and the trial by a General Court Martial took place on 7 September.

(2) The same day and at the same place, private William D. Pennyfeather of the 3868th Quartermaster Truck Company was executed by hanging for the rape of a French girl. The crime occurred on 1 August at Cherbourg and the trial took place on 2 September.

(3) Two days later on 20 November at Saint-Lô (Manche département) private Theron W. McGann of the 32nd Signal Battalion was executed by hanging for the rape of two French women. The crime occurred on 5 August at Quibou (a few kilometers south west of Saint-Lô), and the trial took place on 28 August.

(4) On 22 November (at least) one US soldier was executed by hanging at Montours (in the north-east of the département of Ille-et-Vilaine which is located on the southern side of the Manche département). The source does not give the name(s). The crime (rape) took place on 10 August near Montours.

(5) On 24 November Private James E. Hendricks was executed by hanging at Plumaudan in the east of the Côtes-du-Nord, (now Côtes d'Armor) département). The crime (rape and murder) was committed on 21 August. (Lamache 2010b, p. 775. The primary source is a report sent by Lieutenant-Colonel Brunschwig of the US Army to the French Interior Ministry and dated 27 November 1944.)

[Why do we mention these facts? These crimes are of some interest for our purpose for at least two reasons.

* It is well-known that even in more normal times only a small percentage of the rapes are reported to the authorities. Even more so of course in time of war. Thus the number of trials are one of the few reliable ways to describe this effect. The accounts of such events given in Lamache (2010b) reveals that the French police almost never confronted the armed American soldiers. People who tried to get help almost always went to the nearest American camp. This observation provides a partial answer to the question raised above about who was really in charge of public safety.