# Russian Influence on the Parliamentary Elections 2020 in Georgia

Alexandra Yatsyk

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Alexandra Yatsyk. Russian Influence on the Parliamentary Elections 2020 in Georgia. The Kremlin's Influence quarterly, The Kremlin's Influence quarterly, 3, pp.18-25, 2021. hal-04243112

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POLITICS

BELARUS

MEDIA

HISTORY AND CULTURE

THE KREMLIN'S
INFLUENCE
QUARTERLY

#3

FRANCE

ROMANIA

GERMANY

CHEZH REPUBLIC SLOVAKIA
THE KREMLIN'S
INFLUENCE
QUARTERLY #3

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>
**Free Russia Foundation**

**Editor-in-Chief**

Anton Shekhovtsov

**Project Manager**

Grigory Frolov

**Proofreading**

Courtney Dobson, Bluebeareediting

**Authors**

Anton Shekhovtsov

Alexandra Yatsyk

Georgy Chizhov

Răzvan-Ovidiu Ceuca

Kyrylo Tkachenko

Ivan Preobrazhensky

Grigorij Mesežnikov

**Layout**

Free Russia Designs
# CONTENTS

Summary

5

## POLITICS

Anton Shekhovtsov. Putin's "Foot Soldier" in the Kremlin's Political War against France

8

Alexandra Yatsyk. Russian Influence on the Parliamentary Elections 2020 in Georgia

18

Georgy Chizhov. The Kremlin and elections in Belarus. Winning without an Ace Up Your Sleeve

26

## MEDIA

Răzvan-Ovidiu Ceuca. The Kremlin's Malign Influence through Strategic Narratives: Sputnik's Discourse on the Relation between Romania and NATO

36

## HISTORY AND CULTURE

Kyrylo Tkachenko. "Our Great Neighbor Russia": Cultural and Historical Background of Russophilia in Germany in the Context of the "Ukrainian Crisis"

46

## OVERVIEW

Ivan Preobrazhensky. Russian Malign Influence in the Czech Republic

58

Grigorij Mesežnikov. The Kremlin's Influence in Slovakia: Roots and Actors

69
SUMMARY

The third issue of *The Kremlin's Influence Quarterly* focuses on malign influence of Putin's regime in the areas of politics, media, as well as history and culture.

Anton Shekhovtsov's opening essay examines reasons and agendas behind the attacks of the head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov on France and President Emmanuel Macron. The author argues that Kadyrov's anti-French rhetoric, which included an element of apology towards Islamist terrorism in France, was shaped by political, personal, and tactical concerns. The Kremlin benefitted from Kadyrov's attacks. By empowering Islamists in France, Kadyrov contributed to religious polarization in France. Moreover, Kadyrov helped Moscow covertly fight another political war, with Istanbul, consolidating its positions in the region and competing with Moscow in different areas.

Alexandra Yatsyk looks at how Russia tried to influence parliamentary elections that took place in Georgia in October 2020. The author observes that, with Russian structures participating in election campaigns of particular Georgian parties, the Kremlin's overall task was to bring discord into the ranks of Georgian patriots and nationalists and derail the country from its "Western track" of European democracy. However, Yatsyk believes that Georgia has already reached a national consensus with regard to its general direction of development, while the Kremlin's and its agents' efforts to generate anti-NATO sentiment in Georgia have predominantly been fruitless.

In his chapter on Belarus, Georgy Chizhov provides an overview of Russian malign influence in Belarus before and after the 2020 presidential election that resulted in the largest anti-government protests in the country's history. Chizhov shows that, despite the affinity of the two authoritarian regimes, Russia was until recently limited in its ability to influence Belarus, but now it can actively impact the situation in the country. According to the author, the Kremlin pursues two main objectives in Belarus. The first objective is to prevent Belarus from reorienting towards Europe and democratic values. The second objective is to gain control over the Belarusian economy, or at least its key enterprises.

Răzvan-Ovidiu Ceuca analyses various instruments that Putin's Russia uses to exert malign influence in Romania. He argues that Russia employs sharp power, mimetic power and dark power in Romania. Relating to sharp power, the Kremlin aims to penetrate the Romanian political, social, and information environment by undermining NATO's role in Romania, seeding fractures between NATO and the EU, and instrumentalizing the "links" between local organized crime and the presence of NATO bases in Romania. Through mimetic power, Putin's Russia tries to brand itself as a better alternative for Romania, while also blaming NATO's expansion in Eastern Europe. Last but not least, when exerting its dark power techniques, Putin's Russia promotes rhetoric meant to demonize NATO.

Kyrylo Tkachenko's essay discusses peculiar perceptions of Ukraine in Germany, which make the latter vulnerable to influence of Putin's Russia. Tkachenko asserts that one of the reasons for the West's ambivalent response to the events in Ukraine is the persistence of cultural and historic stereotypes connected with a lack of understanding of Ukraine's history and of the nature of relations between Ukraine and Russia. In his essay, the author shows how Ukraine's insufficient presence on the mental map of modern German society affected the perception of "the Ukrainian crisis" in Germany and led to the (relative) success of the Kremlin narrative.
Ivan Preobrazhensky gives an overview of Russian malign influence in the Czech Republic that occupies a special place on the list of targets for Russian political warfare. Preobrazhensky writes that, unlike many other countries, which are the ultimate targets of malign Russian influence, the Czech Republic functions as a "hub" that Russian actors use to organize influence operations or subversive activities in other EU countries. Still, however, the Czech Republic itself experiences malign influence of Putin's Russia. Thus, this small European country has a dual role. The first is as the target of Russian propaganda, "soft power," and direct subversive actions. The second is as a "hub," a base within the EU for exerting this influence on other countries and for legitimizing the key tenets of Russian foreign policy.

The concluding chapter by Grigorij Mesežnikov maps the sociocultural and political factors of Russia's influence in Slovakia, disclosing the ecosystem of local actors that constitute the pro-Kremlin's lobby, describing their background and motivation. As Mesežnikov argues, Putin's Russia does not possess attractive social alternatives it could offer to people in Central Europe, hence it focuses on weakening the population's adherence to values of a liberal democratic regime, lowering the level of trust in the EU and NATO, strengthening positions of illiberal Eurosceptic, nationalist and populist political forces, and attempts to improve its own image damaged by geopolitical excesses.
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# PUTIN'S "FOOT SOLDIER" IN THE KREMLIN'S POLITICAL WAR AGAINST FRANCE

Anton Shekhovtsov

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POLITICS
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## ABOUT AUTHOR

### Anton Shekhovtsov

Anton Shekhovtsov is a Senior Fellow at the Free Russia Foundation (USA), Director of the Centre for Democratic Integrity (Austria), and expert at the European Platform for Democratic Elections (Germany).

## INTRODUCTION

"He's a hero for the entire Islamic world. In France and Europe, they consider faggots as heroes, but that's not the case here."<fnref n="1" /> The "he" in question is Abdoullakh Anzorov, an 18-year-old Russian refugee of Chechen origin who murdered and then decapitated French schoolteacher Samuel Paty in a suburb of Paris on the 16th of October 2020. And the person who called Anzorov "a hero for the entire Islamic world" is Salman Magamadov, a head of the Shalazhi village in the Chechen Republic where Anzorov was buried after the French police shot him following his deadly terrorist attack. Around 200 male relatives and friends of the Anzorov family attended his funeral ceremony in Shalazhi shouting "Allahu akbar" ("God is the greatest") during the procession of his cofin.<fnref n="2" />

Samuel Paty was a French history teacher, and his only "crime"—in the eyes of the Islamists like Anzorov— was that he showed satirical cartoons, including some depicting Muhammad, the founder of Islam, to his class during a lesson about freedom of speech, as part of a moral and civic education course. Following the lesson, Paty was attacked on social media by Islamists, including a religious militant Abdelhakim Sefrioui and a parent of

one of his pupils.<fnref n="3" />

Anzorov had no direct connection either to Paty or the school where he taught;<fnref n="4" /> most likely, he became aware of Paty's "crime" as a result of the online hate campaign against the schoolteacher orchestrated by the Islamists. Anzorov tracked Paty down on the October 16, more than a week after the freedom-of-speech lesson, and murdered him with a knife. According to witnesses, Anzorov was shouting "Allahu akbar" during the attack.<fnref n="5" /> The killer also photographed Paty's severed head and posted the picture on Twitter, addressing French President Emmanuel Macron: "To Macron, the leader of the infidels, I executed one of your hellhounds who dared to belittle Muhammad, calm his fellow human beings before a harsh punishment is inflicted on you."<fnref n="6" /> French police confronted Anzorov shortly after Paty's murder and, as he was offering armed resistance to the arrest, shot him dead.

President Macron called the murder an "Islamist ter-

<footnote n="1">1 "'Kakie pochesti? V Shalazhi on pervy raz pokoynikom okazalsya.' Glava sela, gde pokhoronili terrorista Abdulakha Anzorova, otritsaet, chto tseremoniya proshla v torzhestvennoy obstanovke," Pod'yom, December 7, 2020, https://pdmnews.ru/18328/.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 "Chechen Who Beheaded French Teacher Buried on Home Soil – Reports," The Moscow Times, December 7, 2020, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/12/07/chechen-who-beheaded-french-teacher-buried-on-home-soil-reports-a72252.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3 "France Teacher Attack: Seven Charged over Samuel Paty's Killing," BBC, October 22, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-54632353.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4 "France Teacher Attack: Suspect 'Asked Pupils to Point Samuel Paty out'," BBC, October 17, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-54581827.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">5 "France Terror Attack: Teacher Decapitated in Paris Suburb Named as Samuel Paty," Sky News, October 18, 2020, https://news.sky.com/story/france-terror-attack-47-year-old-decapitated-in-paris-suburb-named-as-teacher-samuel-paty-12105885.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6 Cécile Chambraud, Elise Vincent, Nicolas Chapuis, "Attentat de Conflans: ce que l'on sait de l'enquête après le meurtre brutal de Samuel Paty," Le Monde, October 17, 2020, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2020/10/17/attentat-de-conflans-un-hommage-national-sera-rendu-a-l-enseignant-assassine-vendredi-annonce-l-elysee_6056408_3224.html.</footnote>
rorist attack," adding that Paty had been murdered because he taught "freedom of expression, the freedom to believe or not believe."<fnref n="7" /> Macron also said that the killer sought to "attack the republic and its values" and called the battle against Islamist terrorism "existential."<fnref n="8" />

After yet another Islamist attack in Nice on the 29th of October, European leaders issued a joint statement saying that they were "shocked and saddened by the terrorist attacks in France" and condemning "in the strongest possible terms these attacks which represent attacks on our shared values."<fnref n="9" /> The statement continued: "We stand united and firm in our solidarity with France, with the French people and the Government of France – in our common and continued fight against terrorism and violent extremism."<fnref n="10" />

In France itself, the overwhelming majority of Muslim communities condemned the murder of Samuel Paty. The French Council of the Muslim Faith said that the "the horrible assassination of our fellow citizen" was a reminder "of the scourges which sadly mark our reality: that of the outbreaks, in our country, of radicalism, violence and terrorism."<fnref n="11" /> The Strasbourg-based Assembly of Chechens in Europe and Paris-based Chechen Association Bart-Marsho sent an open letter to President Macron saying that they condemned the crime and "all forms of religious extremism and all acts of violence." The signatories of the letter stated that members of their organisations were grateful to the French state for allowing thousands of Chechen refugees who had fled war and persecution to stay on French territory and that they condemned extremism, calling on their compatriots "to respect the law and respect all members of the societies" in which they lived.<fnref n="12" />

What, then, can explain the contrasting, somewhat

apologetic reactions to Paty's murder among particular circles in the Chechen Republic—reactions that went beyond praising the murderer as “a hero for the entire Islamic world” on the part of the local authorities of Shalazhi and seemed to be shared even by the political and religious leadership of Chechnya? And why did those reactions differ from the Kremlin's official unambivalent condemnation of “the barbaric murder of a French teacher” by the Islamist?<fnref n="13" />

## MACRON: FROM RUSSIA-SCEPTICISM TO REALPOLITIK

In order to answer these questions, we first need to review, if briefly, the relations between Putin's Russia and Macron's France.

The background of these relations was problematic: Macron was not Moscow's preferred candidate in the 2017 French presidential elections. In late autumn to early winter 2016, when the election campaign was in full swing, the Kremlin felt optimistic about the would-be president of France. National public opinion polls predicted that, while no candidate would be able to secure a victory in the first round, the final stand-off would be between François Fillon, the candidate of the center-right Republicans party, and Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far-right National Front.

Both candidates were seen as friendly towards Putin's Russia. The likeliest winner, Fillon, a former Prime Minister of France (2007-2012) under President Nicolas Sarkozy, was "advocating a dramatic change of tack with Moscow, favouring lifting economic sanctions imposed by the EU after Russia's annexation of Crimea," and was "also pushing for a military alliance with Mr. Putin and the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad to combat ISIS."<fnref n="14" /> During the Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine, Fillon "argued that it was mostly Russian-speaking and more or less belonged to Moscow."<fnref n="15" /> In his turn, Putin called Fillon "a professional to the highest degree and an

<footnote n="7">7 Elaine Ganley, "French Leader Decries Terrorist Beheading of Teacher," AP, October 16, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/france-teacher-decapitated-eragny-f1ecd575344d171ff8fc8c33c5320f0c.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">8 Kim Willsher, "Macron Speaks of 'Existential' Fight against Terrorism after Teacher Killed in France," Guardian, October 17, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/16/french-police-shoot-man-dead-after-knife-attack-near-paris-school.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9 "Joint Statement by the Members of European Council," Council of the European Union (website), October 29, 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/10/29/joint-statement-by-the-members-of-european-council/.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10 "Joint Statement by the Members of European Council."</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11 "Attentat à Conflans: Le CFCM propose un prêche aux imams de France," 20 minutes, October 22, 2020, https://www.20minutes.fr/societe/2891475-20201022-attentat-conflans-cfcm-propose-preche-imams-france.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 "Lettre ouverte au Président de la République Française et au Ministre de l'Interieur," Bret Marsho, October 18, 2020, https://bartmarsho.com/открытое-письмо-президенту-французс/.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">13 "Telephone Conversation with President of France Emmanuel Macron," President of Russia (website), October 20, 2020, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64249.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Jack Farchy, "François Fillon's Rapprochement Plans Meet with Putin Approval," Financial Times, November 23, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/554b82ea-b18a-11e6-a37c-f4a01f1b0fa1.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">15 Nicholas Vinocur, "François Fillon, Thatcherite with a Thing for Russia," Politico, November 21, 2016, https://www.politico.eu/article/francois-fillon-thatcherite-with-a-thing-for-russia-juppe-france/.</footnote>
honest person.”<fnref n="16" /> And the Russian state-controlled media hailed the candidacy of Fillon, describing him as “the most pragmatic candidate in international politics” and suggesting that he “lived up to the expectations of the French people.”<fnref n="17" />

Le Pen was even friendlier towards Moscow. Already in 2011, she said she believed that “France should stop ‘bowing to America’s decisions’ and strengthen its ties with Russia instead,”<fnref n="18" /> and that if she came to power, she would make Russia “a privileged partner” of France.<fnref n="19" /> Le Pen justified the annexation of Crimea;<fnref n="20" /> her advisor on international relations at that time, Aymeric Chauprade, even “observed” the so-called “referendum” on Crimea joining Russia in March 2014—and blamed the EU for the Russia-backed separatist activities in Eastern Ukraine.<fnref n="21" /> In 2014, her party obtained a €9.4 million loan from the First Czech-Russian Bank, a now defunct bank that at that time was owned by the structures of Gennadiy Timchenko, a major Russian businessman from Putin’s inner circle.<fnref n="22" /> Since 2014, Le Pen had consistently criticized the EU’s sanctions on Russia for the annexation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine.<fnref n="23" />

In the beginning of 2017, the “win-win” situation with the French presidential elections ended for Moscow: because of a corruption scandal, public support for Fillon dramatically decreased, and Emmanuel Macron replaced him as the presumptive winner of the presidential race. Macron, when still the Minister of Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs (2014-2016), did support the idea

of lifting the EU's sanctions on Russia, but he insisted on the conditionality of the removal of the sanctions: "The objective we all share is to provide the lifting of sanctions by the summer, as far as the peace process in southern Ukraine is respected," Macron said in January 2016 during his trip to Moscow.<fnref n="24" /> In Macron, the Kremlin seemed to anticipate the continuation of President François Hollande's policies towards Putin's Russia: maintaining a polite conversation with Moscow while remaining firm on the need for Russia to stop its aggression against Ukraine.

Before Macron's rise, the Kremlin preferred not to interfere in the presidential elections in France, but when its preferred candidate's popularity fell, Putin's regime decided to attack Macron through media and cyber operations. Russian state-controlled RT and Sputnik propagated and amplified conspiracy theories about Macron,<fnref n="25" /> while his team complained that their website and databases were subject to cyber-attacks originating from Russia.<fnref n="26" /> Moreover, in March 2017, just one month before the first round of the presidential elections, the Kremlin invited Macron's closest opponent, Marine Le Pen, to visit Moscow and meet with Putin. The political message was clear: the Kremlin had resigned itself to the failure of Fillon and presented Le Pen as its candidate in the French presidential elections. "We all know who Le Pen's allies are: the regimes of Orban, Kaczynski, Putin. These aren't regimes with an open and free democracy. Every day they break many democratic freedoms," Macron said just days before his victory in the final stand-off between him and Le Pen.<fnref n="27" />

Already, at the end of the presidential campaign, Macron's team had denied press access to RT and Sputnik, "accusing them of spreading 'propaganda' and

<footnote n="16">16 “Russia Ready to Work with French Leadership to Restore Relations – Putin,” Sputnik, November 23, 2016, https://sputniknews.com/politics/201611231047755531-putin-work-france-president/.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17 “Russia Hails Francois Fillon (as a Worried Germany Looks on),” The Local, November 28, 2016, https://www.thelocal.fr/20161128/russian-media-hail-fillon-as-a-worried-germany-looks-on.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 “I Want to Free France from EU Straitjacket – Far-Right Party Leader,” RT, April 27, 2011, https://www.rt.com/news/france-eu-immigrants-pen/.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 “Marine Le Pen veut aller en Russie,” Le Figaro, May 2, 2011, https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2011/05/02/97001-20110502FILWWW00503-marine-le-pen-veut-aller-en-russie.php.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">20 Tom Batchelor, “Marine Le Pen Insists Russian Annexation of Crimea Is Totally Legitimate,” Independent, January 3, 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/marine-le-pen-crimea-russia-putin-ukraine-illegal-annexation-france-front-national-fn-a7507361.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">21 Anton Dolgunov, “Marin Le Pen: Evropa neset otvetstvennost’ za proiskhodyashchee na Ukraine,” ITAR-TASS, June 1, 2014, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1230269.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 Marine Turchi, “Le Front national décroche les millions russes,”</footnote>

<footnote>Mediapart, November 22, 2014, www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/221114/le-front-national-decroche-les-millionsrusses; Anton Shekhovtsov, *Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 197-198.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">23 “France’s Marine Le Pen Urges End to Russia Sanctions,” BBC, March 24, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39375969.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">24 “Macron in Moscow: France Wants Russia Sanctions Lifted by Mid-Year,” RFI, January 25, 2016, https://www.rfi.fr/en/economy/20160125-macron-moscow-france-wants-russia-sanctions-lifted-mid-year.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">25 “Dupont-Aignan soupçonne Macron de conflits d’intérêts et veut qu’il clarifie ‘ses financements’,” RT, February 11, 2017, https://francais.rt.com/france/33829-dupontaignan-soupconne-macron-conflitinterets-clarifie-financements; “Ex-French Economy Minister Macron Could Be ‘US Agent’ Lobbying Banks’ Interests,” Sputnik, February 4, 2017, https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201702041050340451-macron-us-agent-dhuicq/.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">26 “France Condemns Alleged Russian Cyber Attacks Targeting Presidential Candidate Macron,” France24, February 19, 2017, https://www.france24.com/en/20170219-francecondemns-cyberattacks-targeting-presidential-candidate-macron-points-russia.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">27 Lidia Kelly, “Poland Outraged after Macron Comments on Le Pen and Putin,” Reuters, May 2, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-poland-russia/poland-outraged-after-macron-comments-on-le-pen-and-putin-idUSKBN17Y1IE.</footnote>
'misleading information.'"<fnref n="28" /> Furthermore, at a press conference with Putin, who had arrived in Paris to meet with the newly elected president of France at the end of May 2017, Macron held his ground and reiterated that RT and Sputnik had behaved during the campaign not "as media organisations and journalists" but as "agencies of influence" and "lying propaganda."<fnref n="29" />

At that time, the Russian attacks on Macron made him out to be "a Russia hawk."<fnref n="30" /> In June 2018, the French edition of RT "received its first reprimand from the French regulator CSA (Conseil de Surveillance Audiovisuel) [...] for its biased coverage of the chemical attack in [Syrian] Douma in April 2018."<fnref n="31" /> At the end of the same year, France adopted a law on the "fight against the manipulation of information" that enabled "the transmission of foreign state controlled radio and television services that broadcast disinformation to be curtailed, or temporarily suspended, prior to key elections," and established "a new civil procedure by which a judicial order [could] be obtained requiring online communication providers to block further transmission of false information in the run-up to elections and referenda."<fnref n="32" />

The Kremlin continued its political warfare against Macron and started building contacts with representatives of the radically anti-Macron Yellow Vest movement. The Kremlin engaged with them with the help of Leonid Slutsky, the chair of the Committee on International Affairs and president of the Russian Peace Foundation (RPF). In 2014, Slutsky had helped organize an illegitimate referendum in Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which was followed by its annexation by Russia, and for this he was sanctioned by Western countries. Since then, Slutsky had become one of the key operators of Russian political warfare in Europe. For example, it was Slutsky who officially invited Marine Le Pen to meet with Putin in

2017, and, in 2020, he was actively engaged in Russian malign influence operations in Italy and Serbia.<fnref n="33" /> As revealed by *The Insider*, Slutsky's RPF issued special invitations for several French Yellow Vest members so they could visit Russia, allegedly to discuss RPF's "humanitarian and charitable programmes and projects."<fnref n="34" /> Given the subversive nature of Slutsky's activities in Europe, it is viable to suggest that the Kremlin wanted to exert influence on the Yellow Vest movement with the aim of strengthening it and/or pushing particular narratives through its activists.

However, despite Russia's flirtations with the anti-Macron Yellow Vests and while remaining sceptical about Russian propaganda and disinformation, Macron increasingly adopted a Realpolitik approach towards Russia. Former Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine (1997-2002) and former Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (2005-2007) played a crucial role in Macron's transformation from a Russia-sceptic to a politician who called for deeper cooperation with Russia despite the latter's non-compliance with international norms. In the summer of 2019, Macron declared: "Pushing Russia away from Europe is a profound strategic error, because we will push Russia either into an isolation that increases tensions or into alliances with other great powers such as China."<fnref n="35" /> He did not suggest "to forget all our disagreements and to embrace each other again," but he still held that "the European continent [would] never be stable, [would] never be in security, if we [didn't] pacify and clarify our relations with Russia."<fnref n="36" />

The Kremlin enthusiastically received Macron's Realpolitik turn towards Moscow, and, in August 2019, Putin visited Macron at the latter's summer retreat at the Brégançon Fort to discuss Ukraine and Syria. And yet, Moscow officially maintained its contacts with anti-Macron forces in France. On the 11th of November 2019, while in Paris, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maria Zakharova

<footnote n="28">28 "French Presidential Hopeful Macron Bans Russian-State Media from Campaign Trail," France 24, April 29, 2017, https://www.france24.com/en/20170429-macron-campaign-drops-accreditation-kremlin-backed-media.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">29 "Video: Macron Slams RT, Sputnik News as 'Lying Propaganda' at Putin Press Conference," France 24, May 30, 2017, https://www.france24.com/en/20170530-macron-rt-sputnik-lying-propaganda-putin-versailles-russia-france-election.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">30 Ben Judah, "Emmanuel Macron's Foreign Policy Doctrine(s)," Politico, May 8, 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macrons-foreign-policy-doctrines/.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">31 Anastasia Kirilenko, "RT France and Sputnik's Attempts to Enhance French Society's Divisions," *The Kremlin's Influence Quarterly*, no. 2 (2020): 34-45 (39), https://www.4freerussia.org/the-kremlin-s-influence-quarterly-2/.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">32 Rachael Kraufurd Smith, "Fake News, French Law and Democratic Legitimacy: Lessons for the United Kingdom?," *Journal of Media Law*, vol. 11, no. 1 (2019): 52-81 (52).</footnote>

<footnote n="33">33 Anton Shekhovtsov, "Russian Malign Influence Operation in Coronavirus-hit Italy," *The Kremlin's Influence Quarterly*, no. 1 (2020): 8-16; Anton Shekhovtsov, "How to Fail a Malign Influence Operation: The Case of Russian Aid to Serbia," *The Kremlin's Influence Quarterly*, no. 2 (2020), 8-15.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">34 "Khotim kak v Parizhe. Dokumenty podtverdili kontakty rossiyskhikh vlastey s 'zheltymi zhiletami' i nemetskimi natsionalistami," *The Insider*, November 18, 2019, https://theins.ru/politika/188244.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">35 Victor Mallet, James Shotter, Michael Peel, "Emmanuel Macron's Pivot to Russia Sparks EU Unease," *Financial Times*, September 11, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/00ac54f4-d30f-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">36 "Keeping Russia out of Western Fold a 'Strategic Error', Macron Says in Key Speech," France 24, August 27, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20190827-france-macron-ambassadors-speech-new-economic-order-diplomacy-foreign-policy.</footnote>
held a meeting "with members of the French civil society," as Zakharova described them.<fnref n="37" /> Among them one could identify, among others, Martial Bild, a co-founder of the far-right Party of France who was also involved in launching the far-right, pro-Kremlin TV Libertés;<fnref n="38" /> Olivier Berruyer, a blogger and regular commentator for RT;<fnref n="39" /> Bertrand Pillet, who runs the ThinkerView YouTube channel that regularly hosts far-right and far-left activists, as well as conspiracy theorists and Eurosceptics; and Dimitri de Kochko, a co-founder of the Union of Russophones of France and a regular commentator for the French edition of the Russian state-controlled Sputnik website.

There is naturally nothing new in the Kremlin's double game of striving to have a high-profile dialogue with the leaders of European countries and yet keeping communication lines open with anti-system actors aiming to undermine that very leadership. And this double game is exactly the background that provides insight into the Kremlin's behaviour towards Paris in the wake of Samuel Paty's brutal murder by a Russian Islamist.

## THE KREMLIN'S DOUBLE GAME

For most of 2020, which was dramatically affected by the coronavirus pandemic, relations between Moscow and Paris remained positively neutral. However, the Kremlin disrupted the balance with the poisoning of major opposition figure Alexei Navalny on the August 20, 2020. Two days later, Navalny was evacuated to Germany, where specialists established that Navalny had been poisoned by a Novichok nerve agent. Navalny survived, but the West was shocked by the attempt on his life: not only was it an outrageous act aimed at silencing the leading Russian critic of Putin's regime, but the use of the nerve agent against a political opponent was also a clear violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention signed and ratified by the overwhelming majority of the world's countries, including Russia. Because of these considerations, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas called on Russia to "urgently clarify" in full the facts and responsibilities behind this assassination attempt on a member of the Russian political opposition using a military-grade nerve agent that belongs to a group of agents developed by Russia."<fnref n="40" />

As could have been expected, the Kremlin denied any responsibility for the poisoning of Navalny. On October 6, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons confirmed the conclusions of the German experts who said that the Russian opposition activist had been poisoned by a Novichok nerve agent.<fnref n="41" /> The next day, Le Drian and Maas issued yet another joint statement saying that there was "no other plausible explanation for Mr. Navalny's poisoning than a Russian involvement and responsibility," adding that France and Germany would "share with European partners proposals for additional sanctions" targeting "individuals deemed responsible for this crime and breach of international norms."<fnref n="42" /> Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova responded to the statement accusing France and Germany of "heading the anti-Russian coalition" allegedly taking shape in the EU "contrary to the earlier statements by Paris and Berlin on their commitment to partnership with Russia."<fnref n="43" /> Zakharova finished her response to the statement of Le Drian and Maas by saying that Russia did not "consider it possible to conduct 'business as usual' with Berlin and Paris."<fnref n="44" />

The EU and the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on top Russian officials and a number of Russian entities on the 15th of October 2020. The EU determined that Navalny had been poisoned with a Novichok nerve agent, and, since that toxic agent was "accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation," it was "reasonable

<footnote n="40">40 "Joint Communiqué by the Foreign Ministers of France and Germany (4 Sept. 2020)," Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères (website), September 4, 2020, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/russia/news/article/alexei-navalny-joint-communique-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-france-and-germany.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">41 "OPCW Issues Report on Technical Assistance Requested by Germany," Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (website), October 6, 2020, https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2020/10/opcw-issues-report-technical-assistance-requested-germany.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">42 "Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France and Germany – Alexei Navalny (7 October 2020)," Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères (website), September 7, 2020, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/russia/news/article/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-france-and-germany-alexei-navalny.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">43 "Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on the Joint Statement by the French and German Foreign Ministers on the Situation with Alexey Navalny," The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (website), October 7, 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4372528.</footnote>

<footnote n="44">44 "Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova."</footnote>

<footnote n="37">37 "In Paris, FM Sergey #Lavrov Met with Members of the French Civil Society," Facebook (social media), November 11, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/MIDRussia/posts/2090333797732717.</footnote>

<footnote n="38">38 Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far Right, 146-147.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">39 Anastasia Kirilenko, "Advokaty d'yavola. Kak Kreml' zadeystvoval svoyu set' vo Frantsii, dokazyvaya v sude, chto kremlyovskoy seti vo Frantsii net," The Insider, March 15, 2019, https://theins.ru/antifake/147120.</footnote>
to conclude that the poisoning of Alexei Navalny was
only possible with the consent of the [Russian] Presiden-
tial Executive Office."<fnref n="45" />

The following day, Samuel Paty was murdered in an
Islamist terror attack in a suburb of Paris. It would be a
paranoid fantasy to suggest that there was any connec-
tion between the EU's sanctions and Paty's murder. How-
ever, the introduction of the new sanctions against Putin's
regime may help explain the nature of the double game
that the Kremlin started in relation to Macron.

The official Russian reaction was unambiguous. Pu-
tin called Macron on October 20; he "expressed his
condolences in connection with the terrorist act – the
barbaric murder of a French teacher," and both report-
edly reaffirmed "mutual interest in stepping up coop-
eration to combat terrorism and the spread of extremist
ideology."<fnref n="46" /> A few days earlier, the head of the Chechen
Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, who calls himself Putin's "foot
soldier,"<fnref n="47" /> had condemned the terrorist attack in France
and offered condolences to the relatives of the murdered
teacher.<fnref n="48" /> Kadyrov also called on the French authorities
"not to provoke the faithful, [and] not to hurt their religious
feelings."<fnref n="49" /> And, importantly, Kadyrov essentially dis-
owned Abdoullakh Anzorov as a Chechen, saying that
the latter had lived almost his entire life in France, spoke
French, and had visited Chechnya only once, at the age
of two.<fnref n="50" /> For a person who—since at least 2010—had in-
sisted that he was the national leader of all Chechens no
matter whether they lived, in Chechnya or anywhere else
in the world,<fnref n="51" /> the disownment of Anzorov as a co-ethnic
implied an even deeper denunciation than Kadyrov's of-
ficial condemnation of the terrorist attack.

But already, in some Chechen circles, some were
condoning Anzorov's terror attack. In his Instagram post,
Chechen MMA fighter Zelim Imadaev called Anzorov "a

hero of Islam" and asked Allah to approve of his jihad.<fnref n="52" />
Yet another Chechen MMA fighter, Albert Duraev, noted
in his Instagram account that "freedom of speech lost its
origin in France," adding a laughing emoji to his post.<fnref n="53" />

By the end of October, Chechen leadership had
changed its positions with regard to the terrorist attack in
France. Using the Instagram account of the Spiritual Ad-
ministration of the Muslims of Chechnya, Salakh-Khadzhi
Mezhiev, a mufti and advisor to Kadyrov, started spread-
ing disinformation about Macron, claiming that the
French president was having Muhammad cartoons post-
ed on all government buildings in France.<fnref n="54" /> Reacting to
this made-up story, Mezhiev called Macron "the number
one terrorist in the world," "the most degraded creature,"
"the enemy of the humankind," and "the enemy of all
Muslims."<fnref n="55" /> There was an ideological angle to Mezhiev's
hateful attack on Macron too, as the mufti also talked
about "genuine terrorism and extremism cultivated on the
Western pseudo-values of multi-liberalism [sic] and all-
permissiveness."<fnref n="56" /> And by making the "insane professor"
a national hero, France, Mezhiev claimed, "deliberately
incited Muslims to provocative actions."<fnref n="57" />

Mezhiev's words were almost immediately echoed
by Kadyrov. He wrote that the murdered teacher was
himself responsible for what happened, because he
"provoked pupils."<fnref n="58" /> If Anzorov was a terrorist, Kadyrov
argued, then Macron was much worse: "the leader and
encourager of terrorism."<fnref n="59" />

The new approach to the terrorist attack offered by
Mezhiev and Kadyrov became the main narrative of the
entire story in Chechnya: Paty had it coming, his murder
was not a terrorist attack but a result of provocation, Ma-
cron is a terrorist himself.

Moreover, a similar narrative was being pushed by
Dmitry Kiselyov, a major Russian propagandist and the

<footnote n="45">45 Official Journal of the European Union, vol. 63, October 15, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2020:341:FULL&from=EN.</footnote>

<footnote n="46">46 "Telephone Conversation with President of France Emmanuel Macron," President of Russia (website), October 20, 2020, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64249.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">47 Andrew Osborn, Dmitry Solovyov, "Chechen Leader, amid Reshuffles, Says Ready to Die for Putin," Reuters, November 27, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-chechnya-idUSKBN1DR03I.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">48 "Dorogie druz'yal," Telegram (social media), October 17, 2020, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1008.</footnote>

<footnote n="49">49 "Dorogie druz'yal."</footnote>

<footnote n="50">50 "Dorogie druz'yal."</footnote>

<footnote n="51">51 Elena Milashina, "Khozyain chechentsev," Novaya gazeta, July 28, 2019, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/07/28/81403-hozyain-chechentsev.</footnote>

<footnote n="52">52 Karim Zidan, "Former UFC Fighter Praises Chechen Teen who Beheaded French Teacher," Bloody Elbow, October 19, 2020, https://www.bloodyelbow.com/2020/10/19/21523149/ufc-fighter-praises-chechen-teen-beheaded-french-teacher-decapitation-prophet-mma-news.</footnote>

<footnote n="53">53 Zidan, "Former UFC Fighter Praises Chechen Teen."</footnote>

<footnote n="54">54 "Sovetnik Glavy ChR, Muftiy Chechenskoy Respubliki Salakh-Khadzhi Mezhiev vystupil s zayavleniem," Instagram (social media), October 26, 2020, https://www.instagram.com/p/CG0I-pPF4vO/.</footnote>

<footnote n="55">55 "Sovetnik Glavy ChR, Muftiy Chechenskoy Respubliki Salakh-Khadzhi Mezhiev."</footnote>

<footnote n="56">56 "Sovetnik Glavy ChR, Muftiy Chechenskoy Respubliki Salakh-Khadzhi Mezhiev."</footnote>

<footnote n="57">57 "Sovetnik Glavy ChR, Muftiy Chechenskoy Respubliki Salakh-Khadzhi Mezhiev."</footnote>

<footnote n="58">58 "Frantsuzskie vlasti podderzhivayut publikatsii karikatur na Proroka Mukhammada," Telegram (social media), October 27, 2020, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1010.</footnote>

<footnote n="59">59 "Frantsuzskie vlasti podderzhivayut publikatsii."</footnote>
head the Russian government-owned international news
agency "Rossiya Segodnya." Kiseloyov had been sanc-
tioned by the EU in 2014 for his participation in the infor-
mation warfare against Ukraine. During a TV program
that he anchored (after the Islamist attack in Nice on Oc-
tober 29), Kiselyov claimed that France was "descend-
ing into a religious war," and that the state itself was
"pitting the majority of its citizens and law enforcement
against Muslims."<fnref n="60" /> And while he talked about "the soul-
chilling brutality and massacre of the innocent," he still
referred to them as "desperate resistance of the Muslims"
to the allegedly repressive state actions that he himself
fabricated.<fnref n="61" /> Kiselyov's message was clear: the West in
general hated traditional values, was on the brink of col-
lapse, and could not serve as an ideological inspiration
for Russia.

Furthermore, Kadyrov made a U-turn on disownment
of Anzorov as a Chechen: he allowed the body of the
terrorist to be transported from France to Chechnya and
buried in the Shalazhi village where his relatives lived.
The clear message was that Kadyrov claimed Anzorov
as one of his own: he was no longer a person who had
lived his entire life in France; he was, first and foremost,
a Chechen. At the same time, the re-owning of Anzorov
as a Chechen through his burial in Chechnya was a vio-
lation of the Russians' own tradition with regard to the
terrorists: in Russia (including Chechnya), bodies of killed
terrorists are never given to their relatives.

Dozens of police officers secured Shalazhi; only
residents were allowed to enter the village during the
funeral and reception, and only around 200 hundred
people were allowed to take part in the ceremony.<fnref n="62" /> Af-
ter the funeral, which some media described as a funeral
"with honors,"<fnref n="63" /> the Chechen State Television and Radio
Company "Grozny" aired a report that reiterated Kady-
rov's narrative of the terrorist attack. The report, referenc-
ing his relatives, called Anzorov "a god-fearing young
man who was not known for any aggressiveness" and
claimed that the "incident" (i.e. the murder of Paty) would
not have taken place if not for the "overt Islamophobic

provocation and pressure on religious feelings."<fnref n="64" />

It was after the funeral that the head of the Shala-
zhi village called Anzorov "a hero for the entire Islam-
ic world."<fnref n="65" /> And on the 18th of December, around 50
horseback riders performed a ziyarat (a pilgrimage to
holy sites in Islam) to Anzorov's grave. As they reached
it, they said a prayer asking Allah to accept Anzorov's
ghazwa, i.e. a military jihad against infidels.<fnref n="66" />

KADYROV AS AN INSTRUMENT
OF THE KREMLIN'S
POLITICAL WAR

There is little doubt that following Kadyrov's U-turn
on Anzorov and the latter's burial in Chechnya, the
"Grozny" report on the funeral and the glorification of
his actions was not simply tolerated but directly sanc-
tioned by Kadyrov or his inner circle.<fnref n="67" /> The leadership
in Chechnya—described as "a black hole in the Council
of Europe's human rights protection system"<fnref n="68" />—is even
more authoritarian than Putin's regime, and no significant
development in Chechnya (apart from sporadic terrorist
activities) can happen without approval from Kadyrov's
circles.

Kadyrov's departure from a more moderate posi-
tion on Anzorov's terrorist attack, which was generally
compliant with the Kremlin's official position, can be ex-
plained by a combination of several factors.

First, the praise of Anzorov was a continuation of
Kadyrov's fight against Western secularism. For example,
shortly after the Islamist terror attack on the office of the
French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, which left 12
people dead, Kadyrov organized a demonstration of
hundreds of thousands of people against the newspa-
per in Chechnya's capital Grozny—a demonstration that

<footnote n="60">60 Yuriy Bershidskiy, "Feyk Dmitriya Kisenyova: Zapad provotsiruet religioznuyu voynu protiv musul'man," *The Insider*, November 3, 2020, https://theinsrs.org/antifake/236555.</footnote>

<footnote n="61">61 Bershidskiy, "Feyk Dmitriya Kisenyova."</footnote>

<footnote n="62">62 Benoît Vitkine, "Le terroriste qui a assassiné Samuel Paty enterré en Tchétchénie," Le Monde, December 8, 2020, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2020/12/08/attentat-de-conflans-sainte-honorine-l-assassin-de-samuel-paty-enterre-en-tchetchenie_6062554_3224.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="63">63 "Chechen Who Beheaded French Teacher Buried on Home Soil - Reports," *The Moscow Times*, December 7, 2020, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/12/07/chechen-who-beheaded-french-teacher-buried-on-home-soil-reports-a72252.</footnote>

<footnote n="64">64 Aleksandr Baklanov, "Telekanal 'Grozny' vypustil syuzhet o pokhoronakh 18-letnego chechentsa, obezglavivshego uchitelya pod Parizhem. I nazval ubiytsu zhertvoy provokatsii," Meduza, December 8, 2020, https://meduza.io/feature/2020/12/08/telekanal-groznyy-vypustil-syuzhet-o-pohoronah-18-letnego-chechentsa-obezglavivshego-uchitelya-pod-parizhem-i-nazval-ubiytsu-zhertvoy-provokatsii.</footnote>

<footnote n="65">65 "'Kakie pochesti?'"</footnote>

<footnote n="66">66 "Pol'zovateli sotsseti odobrili konny pokhod k mogile Anzorova v Chechnye," Kavkazskiy Uzel, December 21, 2020, https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/357839/.</footnote>

<footnote n="67">67 Amina Zakaeva, Semen Charny, "Opravdanie Anzorova v syuzhete ChGTRK 'Grozny' pokazalo neposledovatel'nost' Kadyrova," Kavkazskiy Uzel, December 9, 2020, https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/357382/.</footnote>

<footnote n="68">68 "No Justice in Sight for Grave Crimes in Chechnya," European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (website), https://www.ecchr.eu/en/case/no-justice-in-sight-for-grave-crimes-in-chechnya/.</footnote>
pushed pro-Muslim and anti-Western narratives.<fnref n="69" />

Second, Kadyrov aspires to be recognized as a major defender of Islam, and as the leaders of important Muslim countries such as Turkey and Iran harshly attacked Macron for his intentions to combat radical Islam,<fnref n="70" /> Kadyrov's radicalized move was about joining the front of other major self-proclaimed defenders of Islam.

Third, by sanctioning Islamist actions normalizing or even glorifying Anzorov and his terror attack, Kadyrov allows Chechen Islamists “to let off steam”<fnref n="71" /> and express their radical sentiments in a controlled environment created by the Chechen leadership to contain Islamism.

Fourth, Kadyrov positions himself as the leader of all Chechens wherever they live, and the re-owning of Anzorov as a Chechen sent a double message to the Chechen diaspora in Europe and elsewhere: on the one hand, whatever you do, whatever crime you commit, we will always support you (unless your crime was against Russian leadership or Kadyrov); on the other hand, we own you, so you should behave and never try to undermine Kadyrov's authority.<fnref n="72" />

The Kremlin never strayed from its official unambiguous condemnation of the terror attack. Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov even publicly distanced himself twice from Kadyrov's statements. In one instance, Peskov, commenting on Kadyrov's anti-Macron attack, said that Russian regional leaders cannot engage in or shape foreign policy, and that one should keep the line formulated by the president.<fnref n="73" /> In another instance, Peskov, when asked about the above-mentioned report on Anzorov's funeral on the Chechen "Grozny" TV channel, said that the report did not correlate with the Kremlin's position, while defending the alleged pluralism of the Russian state-controlled media.<fnref n="74" />

Nevertheless, the Kremlin, if it did not directly authorize, then, at the very least, permitted Kadyrov and his circles, as well as propagandist Dmitry Kiselyov, to voice a radically different position on the same case on Samuel Paty's murder. This can also be explained by two major considerations.

First, the Kremlin, which was initially pleased with Macron's Realpolitik turn, was deeply disaffected when France took a leading role in the introduction of the EU sanctions in response to the poisoning of Navalny by the Russian security services. Kadyrov thus became an element of Moscow's double game in relation to Macron. As argued above, this game consists of maintaining a dialogue with Western leaders while simultaneously keeping open communication lines with anti-system and anti-establishment actors. In the case of Anzorov's Islamist terror attack, Putin's regime supported Macron and yet empowered, through Kadyrov and others, the Islamist opposition to Macron as part of the Kremlin's political warfare against France.

Second, as Ivan Preobrazhensky insightfully noted, against the background of the rise of anti-Macron sentiments in many Muslim countries, with Turkish President Recep Erdoğan effectively becoming the leader of the anti-French front, Putin's regime could not afford further consolidation of Erdoğan's regional authority.<fnref n="75" /> Kadyrov's entry into this front erodes Erdoğan's claims to political leadership of the Islamic world. (The Kremlin naturally does not allow Kadyrov to criticize China for the genocide of Uyghur Muslims—and Kadyrov knows perfectly well his limits as a self-proclaimed defender of Islam—but the rhetoric aimed at radicalizing Muslims and inciting them against Macron and French liberal democracy does fit into Moscow's subversive agenda in Europe.)

<footnote n="69">69 "Up to 800,000 Chechens Protest over Cartoons of Prophet Muhammad," Guardian, January 19, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/19/chechens-protest-cartoons-prophet-muhammad-charlie-hebdo.</footnote>

<footnote n="70">70 Michael Safi, Redwan Ahmed, Akhtar Mohammad Makoii, Shah Meer Baloch, "Anger towards Emmanuel Macron Grows in Muslim World," Guardian, October 28, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/28/anger-towards-emmanuel-macron-grows-in-muslim-world.</footnote>

<footnote n="71">71 Interview with Pavel Luzin, an expert on Russian politics conducted via Skype on the 10th of December 2020.</footnote>

<footnote n="72">72 Interview with Pavel Luzin.</footnote>

<footnote n="73">73 "Peskov predlozhil sledit' vo vneshney politike za slovami Putina, a ne Kadyrova," Interfax, October 28, 2020, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/734545.</footnote>

<footnote n="74">74 "Peskov ne soglasilsya s TV Chechni v otsenke deystviy ubitsy uchitelya Pati," Interfax, December 8, 2020, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/740383.</footnote>

<footnote n="75">75 Kommentariy: Kadyrov – golos iz RF v islamskom internatsionale protiv Makrona,” Deutsche Welle, October 28, 2020, https://p.dw.com/p/3kXI5.</footnote>
## CONCLUSION

At the moment, it seems impossible to establish whether Kadyrov's attack on Macron was authorized or simply permitted by the Kremlin. Staying on the safe side and assuming the latter is true, Kadyrov's anti-French rhetoric and apologetic stance towards the perpetrator of the terror attack seems to be shaped by political, personal, and tactical concerns. Kadyrov is illiberal and attacked French liberalism; he lays claim for leadership in the Islamic world and joined other leaders in attacking "Islamophobic" Macron; he diverts radical Islamist sentiments in Chechnya to a foreign power; and he strengthens his authority among the Chechens worldwide by defending the terrorist just because of his Chechen origin.

Regardless of which concerns are more important to Kadyrov, the Kremlin benefits from his attacks against Macron and France. On the one hand, by empowering Islamists in France, Kadyrov contributes to religious polarization and undermines social cohesion in France, which, despite Macron's discovered Realpolitik approach to Putin's Russia, still takes principled stands with regard to the Kremlin and its violations of international agreements such as the Chemical Weapons Convention. On the other hand, Kadyrov helps Moscow covertly fight another political war, with Istanbul, consolidating its positions in the region and competing with Moscow in different areas.

Focusing on the Kremlin's use of Kadyrov as an instrument of its political warfare against France, it must be said that while not all Chechens living in Europe in general and France in particular are supportive of Kadyrov (and, as demonstrated earlier, official Chechen organizations in Europe unambiguously condemned the terror attack), Chechen youth in Europe is susceptible to his illiberal propaganda.<fnref n="76" /> And as his attacks on Macron and French secularism continue, they pose a clear security threat to French society.

<footnote n="76">76 Anastasia Kirilenko, "Propaganda Kadyrova povliyala na radikalizatsiyu chechenskoy molodezhi v Evrope," Kavkazskiy Uzel, October 21, 2020, https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/355564/.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_7.png" /></figure>

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON
THE PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS 2020
IN GEORGIA

Alexandra Yatsyk

POLITICS

<figure><img src="image_8.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_10.png" /></figure>

## ABOUT AUTHOR

Alexandra Yatsyk

Alexandra Yatsyk is a fellow of the Free Russia Foundation.

# "DREAM" WINS AGAIN BUT REMAINS "UNDER SUSPICION"

Regular parliamentary elections were held in Georgia on October 31, 2020. As expected,<fnref n="1" /> Bidzina Ivanishvili's Georgian Dream retained its leading position with 48.22 percent of the vote. The United National Movement (UNM), Mikheil Saakashvili's party, came out of the race with 27.18 percent. Eight more opposition parties did not manage to garner even 4 percent of voters' support. These are "European Georgia" (3.79 percent), "Lelo for Georgia" (3.15 percent), "Agmashenebeli's Strategy" (3.15 percent), "Alliance of Patriots of Georgia" (APG) (3.14 percent), Girchi (2.89 percent), Aleko Elisashvili — Citizens (1.33 percent), Labor Party (1 percent)<fnref n="2" /> and United Georgia — Democratic Movement (0.85 percent).<fnref n="3" /> Although almost all of these parties were eligible for parliamentary mandates (the electoral threshold was set at 1 percent), they refused to recognize the election results and declared a boycott of the new parliament of the 10th convocation, demanding the dissolution of the current composition of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and an early re-election.<fnref n="4" /> Mass pro-

tests took place outside the parliament and CEC buildings in Tbilisi, marked by clashes with the police.

By November 10, 2020, the participants of the electoral campaign and observer organizations had filed a total of 1,272 complaints with the CEC, resulting in a recount at 39 polling stations. In the majority of cases, however, the information was only "refined," with the overall results unchanged, according to the Georgian CEC. Neither the President of Georgia, Salome Zurabishvili, nor the representatives of the ruling party recognized the elections as rigged. The USA agreed with this position as well, based on international organizations' reports.<fnref n="5" /> Parliament Speaker of the 9th convocation Archil Talakvadze considers the consolidated boycott of the second round of elections by the opposition (it took place in 17 out of 30 single-mandate districts, and the majority of MPs, 120 individuals, were elected under the one-man, one-vote rule) nothing more than a game "in Russia's interests."<fnref n="6" />

Mutual accusations of pro-Russian actions by both the ruling party and its opponents are a common theme in Georgian political discourse. An overview of the Georgian-language social media held between June and August 2020 by the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) found that accusations of cooperation with the Kremlin were put forward against both the ruling party and opposition

<footnote n="1">1 Kseniya Sigaeva, "'Gruzinskaya mechta' okazalas' real'nee ozhidaniy" [Georgian Dream had turned out to be more real than it was expected], RBC, October 30, 2020, https://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2020/11/02/5f9bfdc79a79477898618671</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 "CEC Summarizes Proportional, Majoritarian MP Election Results", Civil.ge, November 14, 2020, https://civil.ge/archives/382334</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3 "100% Counted: GD - 48.15%, UNM - 27.14%, EG - 3.78%", Civil.ge, November 1, 2020, https://civil.ge/archives/379692</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4 "All Opposition Parties Refuse to Enter Next Parliament," Civil.ge, November 2, 2020, https://civil.ge/archives/380014</footnote>

<footnote n="5">5 "U.S. Embassy Statement on Georgia's Parliamentary Elections," U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi, November 1, 2020, https://ge.usembassy.gov/u-s-embassy-statement-on-georgias-parliamentary-elections/</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6 "Georgia Election Live Blog: Nika Melia's Campaign Office Attacked," Civil.ge, November 16, 2020, https://civil.ge/archives/363949</footnote>
ones, including political forces with vast ideological
differences, such as Mikheil Saakashvili's UNM and the
APG.<fnref n="7" /> ISFED concluded that Georgian-language social
media are increasingly used for political defamation and
misinformation, involving Russian organizations among
other actors. For example, in April 2020, Facebook
deleted accounts operated by the Russian organizations
News Front and Sputnik as inciting internal conflicts in
Georgian society.<fnref n="8" />

The ISFED report shows that the Georgian Dream and the government were targets of the majority of the defamatory posts published between June and August 2020 (5,593 posts).<fnref n="9" /> The main targets of criticism were party leader Bidzina Ivanishvili, Tbilisi Mayor and Chief Secretary of the Georgian Dream Kakha Kaladze, Executive Secretary Irakli Kobakhidze, Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, Defense Minister Irakli Garibashvili and Justice Minister Tea Tsulukani.

Ivanishvili was often portrayed in such posts as a pro-Russian politician interested in «Georgia without Georgians» and one who encourages emigration from the country.<fnref n="10" /> Nor did opposition representatives shy away from accusing Ivanishvili of acting in Russian interests while ostensibly declaring a pro-Western and democratic vector. According to Khatia Dekanoidze, a member of the United National Movement, Ivanishvili is responsible for the increasing Russian influence in Georgia, with the effect of aggravating poverty.<fnref n="11" />

Recall as well the sensational interview with former president of Cartu Group and Ivanishvili's chief of security Eldar Gogoladze, which came out on Mtavari Channel six days before the election.<fnref n="12" /> In the interview, which went on for an hour and a half, Gogoladze, who had worked with Ivanishvili for five years before quitting in 2004, mentioned the Russian origin of Ivanishvili's

wealth, which had already been covered by the media—
e.g. his direct participation in the development of major
Russian companies, such as Roscredit Bank,<fnref n="13" /> Rosmetal-
linvest, and Gazprom.<fnref n="14" /> One of most scandalous stories
allegedly involving Ivanishvili, according to Gogoladze,
was the illegal arms trade during the civil war in Ango-
la.<fnref n="15" />

According to Gogoladze, Ivanishvili had experience in Russian political campaigns—he had worked on the promotion of general Alexander Lebed during the 1996 presidential election. In fact, Boris Ivanishvili (probably a Russified version of the Georgian name Bidzina) was then awarded the gratitude of President Boris Yeltsin «for active participation in organizing and conducting the election campaign.»<fnref n="16" /> The connection between Lebed and Ivanishvili, which Gogoladze emphasized, evokes a very specific sentiment in the Georgian context: Alexander Lebed—at the time, the commander of the 106th airborne division of the Soviet troops—participated in the brutal dispersal of a peaceful protest (the so-called Tbilisi massacre) on April 9, 1989, in Tbilisi, where people were killed.<fnref n="17" />

Gogoladze also claimed that another notorious figure in Russian politics, Vladislav Surkov, was directly related to Ivanishvili's involvement in politics: Surkov allegedly persuaded him to run for president of Georgia shortly after the 2003 Revolution of Roses.<fnref n="18" />

Surkov's name first emerged in the Georgian political context in 2013, when he was appointed assistant to President Vladimir Putin on relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.<fnref n="19" /> This period overlaps with Ivanishvili's leadership of Georgia as prime minister (from October 2012 to November 2013).

Specifics about the “relationship” between Surkov’s
department and Abkhazia/South Ossetia surfaced in
the global information space in 2016 thanks to Ukrai-

<footnote n="7">7 "Social Media Monitoring: 2020 Parliamentary Elections. First Interim Report," International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, October 2020, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tsqaLCMp6yMlwJhabEy49Es2cDhCDIt8/view</footnote>

<footnote n="8">8 "Social Media Monitoring", p.1, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t
sqaLCMp6yMlwJhabEy49Es2cDhCDIt8/view</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9 "Social Media Monitoring", p.4, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t
sqaLCMp6yMlwJhabEy49Es2cDhCDIt8/view</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10 "Social Media Monitoring", p.33, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tsqaLCMp6yMlwJhabEy49Es2cDhCDIt8/view</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11 Sophiko Megrelidze, "Georgia's ruling party claims victory in parliamentary vote," Apnews.com, October 31, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-ukraine-georgia-tbilisi-elections-df12d18874fcbcb05ce1e0e025d98fca7</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 "Rossiyskie svyazi, moshennichestvo, Angolageyt-put' Ivanishvili k milliarderstvu" [Russian capital, fraud, Angola gate: Ivanishvili's way to billions], Grusia Online, October 26, 2020, https://www.apsny.ge/2020/pol/1603759449.php</footnote>

<footnote n="13">13 "Rossiyskie svyazi, moshennichestvo, Angolageyt-put' Ivanishvili k milliarderstvu."</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 "Ruling party head's former security chief in tell-all TV interview," JamNews, October 26, 2020, https://jam-news.net/interview-with-nika-gvaramia-former-head-of-the-security-service-bidzina-ivanishvili/</footnote>

<footnote n="15">15 "Rossiyskie svyazi, moshennichestvo, Angolageyt-put' Ivanishvili k milliarderstvu," 2020</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 "Rasporyazhenie Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 25.07.1996 g. № 396-rp" [Russian Federation President Decree as of 25.07.1996 № 396-rp], President of Russia, July 25, 1996, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/9795</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17 Georgij Dvali, "Nachalo gruzinskoy ery" [The Beginning of Georgian Era], Kommersant, April 6, 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3933415#id1176623</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 "Former Cartu Group Official Talks Ivanishvili's Past," Civil.ge, October 28, 2020, https://civil.ge/archives/377682</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 "Vladislav Surkov: a Profile," Polit.ru, September 21, 2020, https://polit.ru/news/2020/09/21/surkov/</footnote>
nian hackers from “Cyberjunta,” who hacked the work email of the Surkov team. Dated 2013-2014, the e-mails contained a description of investment projects that the Kremlin planned to carry out in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the fields of oil production, power generation, construction, and other strategic industries with the involvement of the largest Russian companies: Rosneft, Inter RAO, Rosatom, and others. In addition to projects on the economic «development» of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the files of Surkov's department included dosiers on key persons in Abkhazia, including avenues for individual approaches and personal motives conducive to «cooperation.»<fnref n="20" />

The implementation of these plans manifested itself through the significant Russian investments into Abkhazia, which reached about RUR 3.24 billion in 2018-2019, and RUR 2.9 billion in 2015-2016.<fnref n="21" /> In July 2019, Surkov came to Abkhazia to discuss investment programs for 2020-2022 with the then-president of the unrecognized republic, Raul Khajimba. In August of the same year, Khajimba met with Vladimir Putin in Sochi. Presidential elections in Abkhazia were scheduled for September 8, 2019, and Moscow supported Khajimba.<fnref n="22" />

Meanwhile, director of the Alania Inform agency Yuri Beteyev believes that Surkov's department in Abkhazia was not really successful. According to him, Moscow did not control the events in the unrecognized republic,<fnref n="23" /> as evidenced by the early resignation of Khajimba in January 2020 under pressure from the opposition.<fnref n="24" />

Surkov himself also resigned in January 2020. While some analysts believe that Moscow took a neutral stance towards Abkhazia's political choice (when opposition leader Aslan Bzhania won at the preterm presidential elections in March 2020),²⁵ Surkov's resignation immediately after the mass unrest may be evidence of the failure of the “Caucasus scenario.”<fnref n="26" /> It should be noted that Georgia does not consider the elections in Abkhazia legitimate.<fnref n="27" />

Even though Gogoladze gave some remarkable examples of Bidzina Ivanishvili's relations with the political and economic establishment of Moscow in his interview, allies of the Georgian Dream leader consider this interview to be nothing more than a hostile provocation organized by pro-Russian opposition—the “former high-profile KGB officer Gogoladze”<fnref n="28" />—and the TV company supporting the now-disgraced Mikheil Saakashvili.

Gogoladze, who used to be a bodyguard of Georgian president Eduard Shevarnadze, is mentioned in the still-unsolved 1993 murder of high-ranking CIA officer Freddie Russell Woodruff.<fnref n="29" /> However, no evidence of current cooperation between Gogoladze and the Kremlin has yet been published.

<footnote n="20">20 "Abhaziya v delovoy perepiske Surkova" [Abkhazia in Surkov's correspondence], SOVA, October 28, 2016, https://sova.news/2016/10/28/abhaziya-v-delovoj-perepiske-surkova/</footnote>

<footnote n="21">21 "Kreml' pereklyuchilsya na dialog s abkhazskoy oppozitsiey na fone otstavki Hadzhimby" [Kremlin has switched over to the dialogue with the opposition in the context with Khadzhimba's resignation], Kavkazsky Uzel, January 13, 2020, https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/344608/</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 "Kreml' pereklyuchilsya," 2020</footnote>

<footnote n="23">23 "Sozdatel' psevdoreal'nostey: chem zanimalsya Surkov v Abhazii i Yuzhnoy Osetii" [A creator of quasi-realities: what Surkov has done in Abkhazia and South Ossetia], EurAsia Daily, January 25, 2020, https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2020/01/25/sozdatel-psevdorealnostey-chem-zanimalsya-surkov-v-abhazii-i-yuzhnoy-osetii</footnote>

<footnote n="24">24 Based on the results of the presidential election in the unrecognized republic of Abkhazia on September 8, 2019, the incumbent leader Raul Khajimba won. His rival in the second round, Alkhas Kvitsinia, filed a lawsuit, which the court granted amid the seizure of the presidential administration building by protesters. On March 22, 2020, pre-term presidential elections were held in Abkhazia. Former head of the State Security Service and opposition leader Aslan Bzhania won. The elections were held without Russian observers (whose absence was justified by the safety measures in the situation of the coronavirus epidemic), however, polling stations were organized in two Russian cities, Moscow and Cherkessk. "Glavnoe o dosrochnykh vyborakh prezidenta Abkhazii-2020" [Key facts about the pre-term Presidential Election in Abkhazia], Kavkazsky Uzel, March 25, 2020, https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/347342/25 "Prezident Abkhazii Raul' Hadzhimba ushel v otstavku pod davleniem oppozitsii" [Abkhaz President has resigned because of the opposition], BBC news, January 12, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-51085615</footnote>

<footnote n="26">26 "Sozdatel' psevdoreal'nostey," 2020</footnote>

<footnote n="27">27 "Repeat Polls' in Occupied Abkhazia Slated for March 22," Civil.ge, January 12, 2020, https://civil.ge/ru/archives/334314</footnote>

<footnote n="28">28 "Ruling party head's former security chief in tell-all TV interview," 2020</footnote>

<footnote n="29">29 "'Fatal shot came from within car': Georgian security chief suspended", Independent, August 12, 1992, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/fatal-shot-came-from-within-car-georgian-security-chief-suspended-1460582.html; "Delo ob ubiystve v Gruzii sotrudnika CRU mozhet byt' peresmotreno" [The case of CIA officer murder in Georgia could be revised], Pravo, April 24, 2004, https://pravo.ua/delo-ob-ubijstve-v-gruzii-sotrudnika-c/</footnote>
KREMLIN TECHNOLOGIES IN
THE PATRIOTS' CAMPAIGN

On August 24 and 31, 2020, the Dossier Center("Dossier), a non-commercial project of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, published several reports on the partici- pation of Russian structures in the election campaign of the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia (APG) party. According to Dossier, the campaign was overseen by well-known Kremlin political strategist Sergei Mikheev (persona non grata in the EU from 2014 to 2017) representing the Mos- cow PR company POLITSECRETS. Mikheev himself was controlled by retired FSB Colonel Valery Maksimov and officer of the Russian Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Valery Chernyshov—both sub- ordinates Vladimir Chernov, the Russian General of the Foreign Intelligence Service and Head of the Presidential Directorate for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries Vladimir.

The documents presented by Dossier include a de- tailed plan of the APG's election campaign: items to be discussed in speeches, topics of rallies, the content of election videos, an action plan, correspondence with the head of POLITSECRETS Vera Blashenkova, as well as a cost sheet for the entire "project." According to the lat- ter, the costs amounted to USD 8,430,625; another USD 700,000 was used to pay political strategists.<fnref n="30" />

There is little information openly available about political consultant Vera Blashenkova and the POLIT- SECRETS company: one can find brief mentions of her successful work in "turnkey election campaigns" in Ka- zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine, her experience as a branding "coach" and consultant, and her authorship of books on management psychology.<fnref n="31" /> Before the publica- tion of Dossier's files, Blashenkova's name never emerged in conversations about Kremlin political projects, and her work with the APG largely looks like a standard PR proj- ect with run-of-the-mill strategies for opponent defama- tion, engagement of the potential constituency, generat- ing media publicity, etc.

As shown in project “manuals” published by Dossier, the Kremlin mentors suggested building the AGP’s rhetorical content on societal fears of losing traditional

Georgian values and of Turkish economic and religious expansion, as well as on hopes of restoring Georgian territorial integrity.

These hopes and fears are shared by a significant portion of Georgian society and can indeed be used for political manipulation.<fnref n="32" /> For several years now, the APG has consistently promoted such narratives, including dur- ing the 2020 parliamentary campaign.<fnref n="33" />

In some cases, APG members obediently followed recommendations from the Kremlin manuals. This was the case with Irma Inashvili and Georgy Lomiya's trip to Ab- khazia in August 2020 with the "humanitarian" purpose of handing over an icon to the Ilori Cathedral,<fnref n="34" /> a visit organized, as admitted by both the APG and Abkhazian authorities, with the support of Russian "friends."<fnref n="35" /> The trip led to an uproar both in Tbilisi and Sukhumi, and the assistant of Abkhazia "president" Lasha Sakania, who had organized the visit, had to resign.<fnref n="36" /> The so-called Abkhazian Church gave the icon back, saying it could not communicate with Georgians who did not recognize its autonomy and wanted to speak with Abkhazia in re- vanche terms.<fnref n="37" />

According to Georgian analysts, the APG leaders' trip to Abkhazia was a Kremlin sabotage aimed at pre- venting direct negotiations between Tbilisi and Sukhu- mi.<fnref n="38" /> The new leader of the unrecognized republic, Aslan Bzhania, was not a Moscow protégé and was inclined to

<footnote n="30">30 "Kak Kreml' vmeshivaetsya vo vnutrennyuyu politiku sosednikh stran. Vybory v Gruzii: prodolzhenie" [How the Kremlin interferes in the domestic policy of other countries. Georgian elections: continuation], Dossie, August, 2020, https://dossier.center/georgia2/</footnote>

<footnote n="31">31 "Vera Blashenkova," Dobraya Kniga, http://www.dkniga.ru/writer.php?ELEMENT_ID=1085</footnote>

<footnote n="32">32 Tamar Kintsurashvili, Sopho Gelava, "Anti-Western Propaganda 2019," Media Development Foundation (MDF), 2020, http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/library/173/file/eng/AntiWest-Booklet-ENG.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="33">33 Kintsurashvili, Gelava, "Anti-Western Propaganda 2019."</footnote>

<footnote n="34">34 "Irma Inashvili podtverdila svoy vizit v okkupirovannuyu Abkhaziju" [Irma Inashvili has confirmed her visit to occupied Abkhazia], SOVA, August 24, 2020, https://sova.news/2020/08/24/irma-inashvili-podtverdila-svoj-vizit-v-okkupirovannuyu-abhaziyu/</footnote>

<footnote n="35">35 "Pomotechnik de-fakto prezidenta Abkhazii vse zhe provel 'bogougodnuyu' vstrechu s chlenami 'Al'yansa patriotov Gruzii" [Assistant of Abkhazia's de-facto President has convened a godly meeting with members of the "Alliance of Patriots"], SOVA, August 24, 2020, https:// sova.news/2020/08/24/pomoshhnik-de-fakto-prezidenta-abkhazii-vse- zhe-provel-bogougodnuyu-vstrechu-s-chlenami-alyansa-patriotov-gruzii/; "Upravlyaemye 'patrioty': vmeshatel'stvo Rossii v gruzinskie vybory" [Mastered "patriots": Russia's interference Georgian elections], SOVA, September 7, 2020, https://sova.news/2020/09/07/upravlyaemye-</footnote>

<footnote n="36">36 "Pomotechnik de-fakto lidera Abkhazii, vstretivshy chlenov 'Al'yansa patriotov', podal v otstavku" [Assistant of Abkhazia's de-facto leader who has met the members of the "Alliance of Patriots," resigned], SOVA, August 26, 2020, https://sova.news/2020/08/26/pomoshhnik-de-fakto- lidera-abhazii-vstretivshij-chlenov-alyansa-patriotov-podal-v-otstavku/</footnote>

<footnote n="37">37 Elena Zavodskaja, "Ileyer Vissarion: 'Peredali ili ne peredali, eto vy sprashivayte u nikh'" [Priest Vissarion: "if they have delivered it or not, ask them"], Ekho Kavkaza, September 2, 2020, https://www.ekhokavkaza. com/a/30817434.html</footnote>

<footnote n="38">38 "Upravlyaemye 'patrioty','" 2020</footnote>
establish contact with Georgia.<fnref n="39" /> The APG, while declaring its goal of rapprochement with Abkhazia, is promoting the idea of Georgia's neutrality<fnref n="40" /> and dialogue with Russia, which is beneficial to the Kremlin.

The idea of “military non-alignment” is key and is promoted by the Kremlin through the APG in conjunction with the idea of patriotism. “You need to protect your interests from other countries, including Russia” is what the Kremlin “manual” instructs the APG to do. But this is not about military defense, but rather about a close dialogue with Russia. According to the APG, unjustified spending on the «military complex, defense and NATO» should instead go towards helping families and private entrepreneurs.<fnref n="41" /> The anti-NATO and anti-American rhetoric of the APG election campaign in 2020 also included distrust of American democratic institutions operating in Georgia (such as the NDI and IRI),<fnref n="42" /> exaggerated suspicions of political reasons behind the failed construction of the Anaklia seaport, criticism of the deployment of a US military base in Georgia as a factor irritating Russia, etc.<fnref n="43" />

The Kremlin strategy of opponent defamation also manifested itself in the 2020 APG campaign in the form of fueling anti-Turkish sentiments especially with regard to the potential threat of losing the Georgian national identity, neighboring Turkey's religious expansion, and the occupation of Adjara. On an APG election banner placed on the Batumi-Sarpi highway, Adjara was painted over in red, similarly to the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and was accompanied by the inscription: “Protect Adjara! Protect your piece of Georgia!»<fnref n="44" /> Representatives of the APG denied the authenticity of the banner and claimed it was a provocation

by the UNM and European Georgia.<fnref n="45" /> According to ISFED, during the 2020 election campaign, the APG actively circulated paid commercials on social media inciting anti-Turkish sentiment and religious and ethnic hatred.<fnref n="46" /> The Tbilisi City Court fined the APG 2,000 Laris for violating the rules of electoral behavior.<fnref n="47" />

The documents presented by Dossier, which also include the correspondence between the APG representatives and their Moscow mentors, do not, however, demonstrate the coherence of their actions. On the contrary, it is clear from the correspondence that the APG missed deadlines, did not fulfill the project plan, and did not provide the information necessary for «ideological production» on time.<fnref n="48" />

However, the APG still provided some lists of interest to the Kremlin: the names of public figures supporting the party as well as information about Georgian voters, including their addresses, and the number of entrances and floors in their apartment buildings.<fnref n="49" />

The 2020 report of the Media Development Foundation found that the Alliance of Patriots and Kremlin jointly produced 75 percent of all disinformation publications in Georgia (the APG accounted for 59 percent, and the Russian government for 16.7 percent).<fnref n="50" /> Among the media, the APG «Objectivi» TV channel ranks second in terms of misleading publications.<fnref n="51" /> Compared to previous years, the total number of anti-Western media messages has doubled (in 2016 it was 1,258 messages, in 2019, the number reached 2,769).<fnref n="52" />

However, the votes in favor of the Alliance in the 2020 elections effectively show that the party has failed: it only got 3.14 percent of all votes, which is much less than at the 2016 elections, when it obtained 5.01 percent.

In other words, the Kremlin assignment for the APG's 2020 campaign to “divert votes from other parties”

<footnote n="39">39 "Aslan Bzhaniya ob'yasnil, pochemu vystupaet za dialog s Tbilisi" [Aslan Bzania has explained why he supports a dialogue with Tbilisi], SOVA, January 29, 2020, https://sova.news/2020/01/29/aslan-bzhaniya-obyasnil-pochemu-vystupaet-za-dialog-s-tbilisi/; Mzija Paresishvili, "Zachem Moskve 'Patrioty' Gruzii" [Why Moscow needs Georgian patriots], August 25, 2020, https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/30802303.html</footnote>

<footnote n="40">40 "Kak Kreml' vmeshivaetsya vo vnutrennyuyu politiku sosednikh stran. Vybory v Gruzii: chast' pervaya" [How the Kremlin interferes in the domestic policy of other countries. Georgian elections: part 1], Dossier, August, 2020, https://dossier.center/georgia/</footnote>

<footnote n="41">41 Marta Ardasheliya, "Pochemu neytralitet ne vykhod, a tupik" [Why neutrality is not a solution but a deadlock], SOVA, May 6, 2019, https://sova.news/2019/05/06/pochemu-nejtralitet-ne-vyhod-a-tupik/</footnote>

<footnote n="42">42 "Alliance of Patriots Rallies, Wants NDI, IRI Banned in Georgia," Civil.ge, January 27, 2020, https://civil.ge/ru/archives/336218</footnote>

<footnote n="43">43 "Social Media Monitoring: 2020 Parliamentary Elections. First Interim Report", p. 8</footnote>

<footnote n="44">44 Vladimir Unanyants, "Osobennosti 'patriotichnogo' piara" [Peculiarities of the "patriotic" PR], Ekho Kavkaza, August 31, 2020, https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/30813496.html</footnote>

<footnote n="45">45 Vladimir Unanjanc, "Osobennosti 'patriotichnogo' piara," 2020</footnote>

<footnote n="46">46 "CEC says opposition Alliance of Patriots' anti-Turkish ads violate election code," Agenda.ge, September 11, 2020, https://agenda.ge/en/news/2020/2796</footnote>

<footnote n="47">47 "Court fines Opposition Alliance of Patriots for anti-Turkish political ads," Agenda.ge, September 19, 2020, https://agenda.ge/en/news/2020/2893</footnote>

<footnote n="48">48 "Kak Kreml' vmeshivaetsya vo vnutrennyuyu politiku sosednikh stran. Vybory v Gruzii: prodolzhenie," 2020</footnote>

<footnote n="49">49 "Kak Kreml' vmeshivaetsya vo vnutrennyuyu politiku sosednikh stran. Vybory v Gruzii: prodolzhenie," 2020</footnote>

<footnote n="50">50 "Social Media Monitoring: 2020 Parliamentary Elections. First Interim Report," c. 22</footnote>

<footnote n="51">51 "Social Media Monitoring: 2020 Parliamentary Elections. First Interim Report," c. 21</footnote>

<footnote n="52">52 "Social Media Monitoring: 2020 Parliamentary Elections. First Interim Report," c. 12</footnote>
through "inciting fear [...] that other parties will win" and to "strengthen Russia's influence in the region" was only partially fulfilled.<fnref n="53" />

Georgian NGOs pay a lot of attention to misinformation campaigns<fnref n="54" /> and the APG activity alike: at the request of ISFED, Facebook deleted dozens of profiles and groups with thousands of followers which belonged to the APG and the pro-Russian media Alt-info, which published fake news about the current events in Georgia, the EU, and Russia and about the parliamentary elections in Georgia; Alt-info also used hate speech while criticizing liberal parties, ethnic and sexual minorities, and migrants.<fnref n="55" />

It remains unclear why such an unpopular, almost marginal party draws such scrutiny; some pundits see it as nothing more than the financial interest of Russian political consultants.<fnref n="56" />

## ALLIANCES WITH THE «ALLIANCE»

Candidates and parties in Georgia are prohibited from receiving financial assistance and donations from foreign legal entities and individuals.<fnref n="57" /> According to Transparency International Georgia, if the materials on the APG campaign published by Dossier are authentic, they may constitute corpus delicti under two articles of the Criminal Code of Georgia: Art. 194 (money laundering) and Art. 319 (assistance in hostile activity to a foreign state, a foreign organization or an organization subject to foreign control).<fnref n="58" />

The amount of almost USD 8.5 million in the POLIT-SECRETS cost sheet is enormous by Georgian standards, especially considering that the money officially declared as received by the APG in 2019 constituted 1,676,618

Laris (about USD 543,000), where donations from private individuals accounted for only 2 percent.<fnref n="59" />

However, a request to the prosecutor's office filed on August 25 by Elene Khoshtaria, a member of the European Georgia party, to investigate the possible financing of the APG by Russia and to withdraw the party from the October elections remained largely unheeded. The Prosecutor's Office of Georgia did not find grounds for initiating investigative actions and forwarded the matter to the State Audit Service.<fnref n="60" />

The Alliance itself denies direct Moscow support,<fnref n="61" /> and party leader Irma Inashvili «swore before God, the nation and TV viewers»<fnref n="62" /> that she had not taken Russian money. APG representatives claim that Dossier investigation includes “fakes” forged by the UNM and European Georgia.<fnref n="63" />

Likewise, representatives of the ruling Georgian Dream did not consider it necessary to proceed with the case and remove the APG from the elections because of "one article."<fnref n="64" />

Elene Khoshtaria believes that this behavior of the ruling party representatives is yet another piece of evidence that the APG is a satellite of the Georgian Dream; more clear proof of their cooperation may lie in the fact that the APG supported Salome Zurabishvili, the Georgian Dream 2018 presidential candidate, at the elections.<fnref n="65" />

<footnote n="53">53 "Kak Kreml' vmeshivaetsya vo vnutrennyuyu politiku sosednikh stran. Vybory v Gruzii: prodolzhenie," 2020</footnote>

<footnote n="54">54 Vladimir Unanyants, "Gruzinskiy Facebook poprosili pokazat'sya v otkryty profil", [Georgian Facebook was asked to show its profile], Ekho Kavkaza, June 29, 2020, https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/30697073.html</footnote>

<footnote n="55">55 October 2020 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report, Facebook, https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/October-2020-CIB-Report.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="56">56 "Kak Kreml' vmeshivaetsya vo vnutrennyuyu politiku sosednikh stran. Vybory v Gruzii: chast pervaya," 2020</footnote>

<footnote n="57">57 "Izbiratel'ny kodeks Gruzii" [Georgian Electoral Code], https://matsne.gov.ge/ru/document/download/1557168/18/ru/pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="58">58 "Kak [ne] reagiruyut vlasti Gruzii na deyatел'nost' prorosiyskoy partii", [Georgian authorities' (non)reaction to the Georgian pro-Russian party], Gruzia online, September 1, 2020, https://www.apsny.ge/2020/pol/1598982904.php</footnote>

<footnote n="59">59 Vladimir Unanyants, "'Gruzinskoy mechte' poschitali finansy" [Georgian Dream's budget was counted], Ekho Kavkaza, July 9, 2020, https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/30716833.html</footnote>

<footnote n="60">60 Nino Chuchia, "NPO: materialy 'Dos'ye' po APG neobkhodimo rassledovat' do vyborov" [NGO: Dossie's materials should be investigated before elections], NetGazeti, October, 2020, https://ru.netgazeti.ge/4700/</footnote>

<footnote n="61">61 Mziya Paresishvili, "Zachem Moskve 'Patrioty' Gruzii," 2020, https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/30802303.html</footnote>

<footnote n="62">62 "Upravlyaemye 'patrioty'," 2020, https://sova.news/2020/09/07/upravlyaemye-patrioty-vmeshatelstvo-rossii-v-gruzinskie-vybory/</footnote>

<footnote n="63">63 "Upravlyaemye 'patrioty'," 2020, https://sova.news/2020/09/07/upravlyaemye-patrioty-vmeshatelstvo-rossii-v-gruzinskie-vybory/</footnote>

<footnote n="64">64 "Deputaty ot partii Ivanishvili ne sobirauutsya reagirovat' 'iz-za odnogo dos'e'" [Deputies of Ivanishvili Party are not going to react due to one dossier], NetGazeti, September 1, 2020, https://ru.netgazeti.ge/2573/</footnote>

<footnote n="65">65 Mziya Paresishvili, "Zachem Moskve 'Patrioty' Gruzii," 2020</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_11.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_13.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_15.png" /></figure>

ფინანსება
პუტინისგან

Ekvtime Bidzinashvili
Financed from Putin

Stop Oligarchy
Are they the ones who want

Source: Social Media Monitoring, 2020, p. 38

The image on the left depicts APG leaders Irma Inashvili and David Tarkhan-Mouravi; the image on the right shows Bidzina Ivanishvili, Irma Inashvili and Vladimir Putin<fnref n="66" />

Many representatives of the Georgian political establishment agree, including the founder of the «Center for Strategic Analysis,» security expert Nodar Kharshiladze, who claims that the idea of «Georgia's neutrality» promoted by the Kremlin through the APG cannot develop without the assistance of Georgian Dream, and that "at the end of his reign, Bidzina Ivanishvili [...] is trying to fulfill the commitments to Moscow."<fnref n="67" />

According to Batu Kutelia, vice president of the NGO Atlantic Council of Georgia, the APG's promotion to parliament can indeed be part of the ruling party's strategy to create a common political agenda—so that “Georgia is not a problem between Russia and the West” and “so that Georgia would not take steps in relation to Russia that would be perceived with hostility from the Russian side.”<fnref n="68" /> Kutelia believes that the Kremlin's strategy at the recent parliamentary elections was to disperse the objects of influence while playing a game with right

and far-right parties (such as the Georgian March). The Kremlin's overall task is to bring discord into the ranks of Georgian patriots and nationalists and to generate doubt around issues where a national consensus has already been established, which should eventually derail the country from its "Western track" of European democracy.<fnref n="69" />

Yet, NDI polls show that support of Georgia's Euro-Atlantic vector among the population remains high: June 2020 research found that 69 percent of Georgians support the country joining NATO, 59 percent believe that Georgia would get more benefits from joining the EU and NATO than from an alliance with Russia (with only 11 percent holding the opposite opinion, and even this number is gradually decreasing). The regular analysis of public opinion on this matter carried out by NDI since 2012 demonstrates the stability of such attitudes: in 2012, 62 percent of the population supported Georgia joining NATO, and 58 percent of the population opted for the European and Atlantic integration of the country, with only 19 percent supporting stronger ties to Russia.<fnref n="70" />

Thus, we can say that Georgia has reached a national consensus concerning the general direction of the country's development, while the efforts made by the Kremlin and its agents to generate anti-NATO sentiment have mostly been fruitless.

<footnote n="66">66 "Social Media Monitoring: 2020 Parliamentary Elections. First Interim Report," p. 38</footnote>

<footnote n="67">67 Marta Ardasheliya, "Pochemu neytralitet ne vykhod, a tupik," 2019</footnote>

<footnote n="68">68 Vladimir Unanyants, “Moskva igraet po-malen’komu” [Moscow plays for low stakes], Ekho Kavkaza, October 28, 2020, https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/30917748.html</footnote>

<footnote n="69">69 Unanyants, "Moskva igraet po-malen'komu."</footnote>

<footnote n="70">70 "Public Attitudes in Georgia," NDI, June 2020, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Georgia%20Poll%20Results_June_2020_Final%20Version_ENG.pdf</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_16.png" /></figure>

THE KREMLIN AND
ELECTIONS IN BELARUS
WINNING WITHOUT AN ACE
UP YOUR SLEEVE

Georgy Chizhov

<figure><img src="image_17.png" /></figure>

POLITICS

<figure><img src="image_18.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_19.png" /></figure>

## ABOUT AUTHOR

Georgy Chizhov

Georgy Chizhov is a member of the Expert Group "European Dialogue" and its coordinator in Ukraine, as well as the program director at the Reform support center (Ukraine).

## "RESERVATION OF SOCIALISM," OR SLUGGISH "PROSPERITY" IN RUSSIA'S SHADOW

Belarus is unique among European countries in that its leader has been in office longer even than Vladimir Putin. Throughout almost its entire period of independence, Belarus has been headed by President Alexander Lukashenko, elected in the 1994 competitive election. Almost immediately after, Belarus started resembling a typical personalist dictatorship, where the role of elections (as well as other democratic institutes) was purely ornamental. None of Lukashenko's "re-elections" (in 2001, 2006, 2011, 2015, and 2020) were recognized to be free and democratic by the international community, including the OSCE, the EU, and others.

Meanwhile, the permanent president managed to retain the support of a significant part of Belarusian society for many years, appealing to nostalgia for socialist stability and manipulating paternalistic expectations. The country saw low privatization rates, the government retained a dominant role in the economy, and particular approaches to social protection and employment stemming from Soviet practices remained. Over two and a half decades, these politics often (though not always) provided Belarusians with a higher standard of living than that of the average Ukrainian, and sometimes even the average Russian.

However, the economic policy espoused by Belarusian leadership was certainly not effective. To ensure the "unique state model," the country needed constant

support from external sources. "Disregarding national principles, Lukashenko rushed to Russia, primarily to get support for himself, as well as bread, gasoline, gas, which were necessary not only for 'revival,' but even for mere survival of the winter until the spring," commented famous Soviet and Belarusian writer Vasil Bykov.<fnref n="1" /> Minsk did get support from the Russian Federation, which supplied raw materials at low prices, provided preferential and interest-free loans, and cancelled debts, among other actions.

At first, when Russia still seemed intent on building a democratic state, such an exotic ally, rapidly destroying civil liberties and any checks and balances, compromised Moscow in a way before the international community. Yet, Russian officials avoided publicly criticizing Lukashenko himself and the system he had built. There were several reasons for this.

In the mid-1990s, Gazprom supplied gas from Russia to European countries via the only existing route—through Ukraine. Gazprom negotiated the construction of the cross-country pipeline Yamal-Europe through Belarus. By that time, Ukraine owed Gazprom USD 900 million, negotiations to settle the deal were faltering, and diversification of supply routes seemed to make sense. The construction of the pipeline actually started in February 1996, which was also when Gazprom waived Belarus' gas debt in the amount of USD 700 million,<fnref n="2" /> a similar sum to that owed by Ukraine. Ironically, Russia basically signed its own dependence on an authoritarian, whimsical

<footnote n="1">1. Bykaŭ Vasil'. "BNF. Paz'nyak // Doŭgaya daroga dadomu". Мінск: КіHIRA, 2004.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2. V.Panyushkin, M.Zygar'. "Gazprom. Novoe russkoe oruzhie" [Gazprom. New Russian weapon], Moscow: Zakharov, 2008.</footnote>
cal ally.

Another reason for Russian leadership's loyalty to Lukashenko in the 1990s was purely political. "Boris Yeltsin felt very guilty for the collapse of the Soviet Union, and he always tried to make up for it somehow," said Anatoly Chubais.<fnref n="3" /> In January 1995, Yeltsin and Lukashenko signed an agreement on the creation of a payment and customs union between Belarus and Russia. This was followed by the creation of the Commonwealth of the two countries (1996), the Union of Belarus and Russia (1997), and finally, the Union State (1999).

At the time, Lukashenko was likely striving for further integration, intending to take the higher position in the newly created Union. Legends about the happy life of the Belarusian people, who had kept all the benefits of the socialist system, spread across the Russian territories not yet covered by the World Wide Web. These rumors were fueled by Russian elites themselves.

The Belarusian leader became a factor in internal politics in Russia. Every governor aspiring to get re-elected tried to demonstrate his friendship with the neighboring leader to his constituency, with Boris Yeltsin himself making use of this trick in the 1996 presidential campaign. Russian politicians were afraid of criticizing Lukashenko, let alone quarreling with him, since this could result in significant electoral losses. They either spoke well of the leader of the fraternal state, or not at all—which, in turn, kept increasing his rating among Russians.

## BELARUS BETWEEN THE WEST AND MOSCOW

Alexander Lukashenko had a very real chance of eventually becoming the Russian leader, until that coveted role was taken by Vladimir Putin. When the new master of the Kremlin got rid of internal competition, the gist of the dialogue with the Belarusian side changed dramatically. Suddenly, it turned out that the fraternal country, which was economically dependent on Russia, had somehow not transferred any of its significant assets under the control of its Eastern neighbor, had not created real preferences for Russian businesses, and had basically made no specific promises in terms of future integration. Minsk seemed to have agreed to the introduction of a single currency, but only on the condition that the new currency have issuing centers in both Union capitals. In practice, this would mean that the Belarusian government

would be able to feed its economy with "empty" money, while the inflationary effect would be spread across the entire Union State.

The first signals from the Kremlin regarding the unsatisfactory cooperation received an asymmetrical response from Alexander Lukashenko: he proclaimed the need for Belarus to develop in the European vector. He launched a subtle yet clearly anti-Russian media campaign to ensure that Moscow would not be able to appeal to the Belarusian society by bypassing the president. Communications between the fraternal countries narrowed down to a simple three-step scheme: Russia attacks, Belarus takes a demonstrative step towards the West, and Russia steps back, with Lukashenko assuring the media of the unbreakable Slavic unity. Even the full-fledged "gas war," not to mention petty differences, went according to this scheme. In the course of each escalation, foreign political analysts started speculating publicly about whether Lukashenko would be overthrown by the opposition with the support of the West, or whether he would lead his country to the West in exchange for guarantees of personal integrity.

At first, this tactic left Moscow at a loss every single time, forcing it to make more and more concessions. This continued in the late 2000s, and into the 2010s, but then Russia gradually learned to demand something in return. Lukashenko started taking steps to meet Russia in the proverbial middle, although with evident reluctance, trying to make the same concessions two or three times: a prime example of this is the transfer of control over the Belarusian gas transportation system to Russia, when Gazprom was gradually acquiring ownership from mid-2000s and until 2011. But with each conflict, with each new round, Belarus and Russia were drifting further apart, both politically and psychologically.

In 2010, Russia tried to weaken Lukashenko in the context of the upcoming presidential elections, demanding he turn over shares of strategic enterprises and pledge loyalty. As one example, the Russian TV channel NTV showed a five-part documentary *The Godfather*,<fnref n="4" /> in which Lukashenko was accused of the gravest crimes, from embezzlement of public funds to the assassination of political opponents. RT showed a story entitled *Hard Luka*, which straightforwardly called the Belarusian leader "the last European dictator." According to Minsk po-

<footnote n="3">3 Ibid</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4 "Kryostnyy otec": RF nanesla informacionnyy udar po prezidentu «druzhestvennoy» Belarusi. Video" [The Godfather: Russia delivers an information blow to president of 'friendly' Belarus. Video], Newsru.ua, 5.07.2010, https://web.archive.org/web/20100713234413/http://rus.newsru.ua/world/05jul2010/udar_bel.html</footnote>
litical analyst Arseny Sivitsky, "at that time, Moscow was negotiating with at least two high-ranking Belarusian officials regarding their readiness to stand as candidates against the incumbent President and, in fact, initiate an establishment coup."<fnref n="5" />

It cannot be ruled out that the criminal prosecution of seven alternative presidential candidates after the vote, the lengthy arrest of four of them and the subsequent imprisonment of two were nothing more than a "blood oath" of continued loyalty to Moscow. Repressions against the recent rivals did not provide Lukashenko with any objective benefits (while producing a plethora of negative effects); to the contrary, they fully undermined Lukashenko's legitimacy in the West and seemed to have made the "pro-Kremlin" vector of Belarusian politics the only option. Before long, the above-mentioned gas transportation system was fully transferred to Gazprom, with a number of critical Belarusian enterprises also ending up under Russian control.

## COLLAPSE OF “DEEP INTEGRATION”

For several years, relations between the leaders of the two countries looked untainted, but in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea and the start of hostilities in Eastern Ukraine, Lukashenko saw an opportunity for a foreign policy maneuver. A balanced position on Crimea, a willingness to mediate a settlement in the Donbas, and a certain liberalization in internal policies (former presidential candidates had already been released by this time) once again made the Belarusian leader a somewhat acceptable negotiating partner for Western politicians. This predictably led to tensions with Russia. Belarus did not support Russian sanctions on food supplies from Western countries and expanded economic and political co-operation with Ukraine and the EU. In addition, Russian economic entities had not yet received all the enterprises that Moscow wanted to control.

Although the customs union did function, the customs border between the two countries was partly restored, with cargo getting delayed and certain types of goods being the object of an import ban. Russia was extremely dissatisfied when citizens of the EU, the United States, and a number of other countries were allowed to enter the territory of Belarus for a short time without a visa

(there was no border control at the Belarusian-Russian border at that time).

Still, the situation did not reach open confrontation. On the eve of 2019, there was a dispute about the price of oil for Minsk. It was sparked by Russia's tax maneuver in the oil industry: the tax on oil production started growing, while export duties began to decrease until their full cancellation after a five-year period. Since Belarus bought Russian oil duty-free, replacing the duty with a tax meant a price increase of almost 25 percent within five years.

Against this backdrop, Moscow began to exhibit increased interest in the "deep integration" of the two countries within the Union State Treaty of 1999. At that time, the conversation had not broached the creation of supranational authorities, as called for in the agreement. Instead, officials and experts from both sides developed the so-called roadmaps of economic integration, the full content of which was never disclosed. According to public statements, the roadmaps revolved around the single tax code and civil code, joint public regulation of economy, joint customs policies, the creation of a single energy regulator, etc. Yet, there were rumors about the 31st roadmap, which was allegedly about a single currency and supranational authorities.

The Belarusian opposition was concerned that Russia may have been preparing for a full takeover of their country. Some politicians and journalists assumed that Russia needed this integration to extend Putin's presidential powers beyond 2024 (since his presidential term could theoretically be considered the first one in the hypothetical newly created unified state). Lukashenko, for his part, said, "If our fundamental issues (on the supply of hydrocarbons, proper opening of markets for our goods, removing barriers, etc.) are not resolved, no roadmaps can be signed." He added, "I will not approve and sign any document if it contradicts the Constitution and fundamental principles of our society's life. And our main principles are the sovereignty and independence of our country."<fnref n="6" />

As a result, the Action Program to implement the Union State Treaty, which was meant to be signed in December 2019, was postponed, and the leaders of the two countries started exchanging public quips once again.

Ahead of the 2020 presidential election, Alexander

<footnote n="5">5 Aleksandr Starikevich. "Arseny Sivicky: glavnye soperniki lukashenko na vyborah – KKK" [Arseny Sivitsky: Lukashenko's main competitors at the elections are the three K's], Salidarnasc', 18.06.2020, https://gazetaby.com/post/arsenij-siviczkij-glavnye-soperniki-lukashenko-na-/164704/</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6 "Lukashenko nazval prichiny, po kotorym on mozhet ne podpisat' dokumenty ob uglublennoy integracii" [Lukashenko named the reasons why he might not sign the papers on deeper integration], Naviny.by. Beloruskie novosti, 17.11.2019, https://naviny.by/new/20191117/1573984992-lukashenko-nazval-prichiny-po-kotorym-mozhet-ne-podpisat-dokumenty-ot</footnote>
Lukashenko started speaking out in favor of his country's
sovereignty in more and more explicit terms, making
abundantly clear who the threat to this sovereignty was.
The typical terms "fraternal nation," "deep integration,"
and "union state" were not abandoned, but the perma-
nent president kept claiming to his people that he was
ready to defend national interests against "brothers" and
"allies." This position ahead of elections was rather un-
usual.

MOSCOW WITHOUT
LEVERAGE

What could Moscow do against the rebellious Be-
larusian leader? Ironically, it proved to be much harder
to influence the "semi-integrated" Belarus than many Eu-
ropean countries, with far fewer tools available. While
democratic institutions were weak and independent me-
dia hardly existed (save for a few online resources), the
total control of the government prevented Moscow from
making any real impact. Security and law enforcement
agencies were cleared of pro-Russian officers back at
the previous rounds of Moscow-Minsk tensions. Corrup-
tion and even organized crime were effectively "nation-
alized." Belarus remained economically dependent on
Russia, but when Moscow refused to reduce prices for
hydrocarbons, it forced Minsk to look for ways to diver-
sify the supply. In addition, with the global demand for oil
and oil prices dropping in March 2020, disagreements
over the prices became economically insignificant, and
the "oil leverage" lost its impact at least for a while.

The partial closure of the border between Russia and Belarus by Moscow (under the pretext of COVID-19) led to an emotional response from Lukashenko: "Russia is aflame from the coronavirus... who needs to be closing the border, then?"<fnref n="7" /> However, it made no real impact either on the economy, or on public attitudes in Belarus.

The last resort was election pressure, which had
done the trick in 2010. This time, no new TV shows about
the permanent president were filmed—instead, modern
tools were put to use: Russian Telegram channels, which
many political analysts believe to have come under the
Putin administration's control in the recent years.

The Kremlin did not work with the Belarusian opposition in years prior. Not only did the opposition leaders hold pro-Western beliefs, but they also did not enjoy sig-

nificant popular support. And Lukashenko's regime did
everything to stop the emergence of any pro-Russian op-
position, since it was perceived as a potential threat.

The year 2020 shed an unexpected light on new
opposition leaders, still marginal at the beginning of the
year. With the mutual rhetoric of Minsk and Moscow be-
coming more tense, many people outside Belarus hast-
ily concluded that Viktor Babaryka, Sergei Tikhanovsky,
and Valery Tsepkalo, who intended to run in the elec-
tions, were supported by the Kremlin. Why was this the
common assumption?

The reasons were mostly formal. For example,
Babaryka worked as the chair of Belgazprombank for al-
most 20 years—a bank where over 99 percent of shares
belong to Russia's Gazprom and Gazprombank.<fnref n="8" /> Yet,
there are no other signs of the alleged pro-Kremlin na-
ture of the unsuccessful presidential candidate. The pub-
lic took notice of Babaryka's social activity in the early
2010s, and his priorities—returning the original Bible by
one of the first book printers Francysk Skaryna, paintings
of Marc Chagall, Chaïm Soutine, and Leon Bakst to Be-
larus, publishing a five-volume edition of works by Nobel
Prize winner Svetlana Alexievich for Belarusian libraries,
and the creation of the OK16 art space—demonstrated
that the future politician belonged to the nationally orient-
ed intellectual circles, which were traditionally wary of
Moscow. What the Kremlin probably found completely
inexcusable were his statements about the blurring "since
the formation of the strong Moscow Principality at the
end of the 17th century ... of the Litvin gene of the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania, which we carried in ourselves"<fnref n="9" /> and
that Belarus should be neutral and leave the Collective
Security Treaty Organization.<fnref n="10" />

Sergei Tikhanovsky, after Crimea was annexed in
2014, visited the area and spoke positively about Vladi-
mir Putin on several occasions. However, since the end
of 2019, he actively participated in actions against in-
tegration with Russia, which led to him serving a total
of 30 days of administrative arrests. "The president has
turned the entire economy eastward, which is his biggest
mistake. If we purchased energy from different countries,
Russia could not dictate us what to do with integration
and other issues," "the Union State project no longer

<footnote n="7">7 "Lukashenko prokommentiroval razvitie situacii s koronavirusom" [Lukashenko commented on the development of the coronavirus situation], BELTA, 16.03.2020, https://www.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-prokommentiroval-razvitie-situatsii-s-koronavirusom-383447-2020/</footnote>

<footnote n="8">8 Belgazprombank, https://belgazprombank.by/about/o_bank/akcioneri/</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Tatyana Guseva, Aleksandr Strikevich. "Viktor Babariko: 'My popali v klassicheskuyu lovushku lyubogo parazita'" [Viktor Babariko: "We got caught in the classic trap of any parasite"], Salidarnasts', 6.05.2020, https://gazetaby.com/post/viktor-babariko-my-popali-v-klassicheskuyu-lovushk/163176/</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10 Vladimir Solovyov. "Ekonomika nahoditsya v predsmertnom sostoyanii" [The economy is near death], Kommersant, № 96, 2.06.2020</footnote>
makes sense,”<fnref n="11" /> said Tikhanovsky in the spring of 2020.

As for Valery Tsepkalo, his political views are less clear. A long-time associate of Alexander Lukashenko (at least since 1994), he held a number of high-profile positions in Belarus, including the country's Foreign Ministry. Tsepkalo can boast of strong contacts in the Russian administration—back in 1994, which turned out victorious for Lukashenko, he organized the young candidate's visit to Moscow to speak before the Duma.<fnref n="12" /> The media of a few post-Soviet countries alleged he had ties with the oligarch Alisher Usmanov (of note, the media controlled by Usmanov actively covered Tsepkalo's run for president) and other influential Russians.

Tsepkalo was much more cautious with his criticism of Lukashenko compared to other opposition candidates. He also supported integration with Russia as part of the Union State but proposed to reconsider the terms of the agreement.<fnref n="13" /> The potential candidate also guaranteed that Russian would remain the official language if he were to win.<fnref n="14" /> While it can be assumed that the Kremlin favors this politician, Tsepkalo was the least prominent of the three opposition candidates and had no chance of succeeding, even hypothetically, unless the Central Election Commission registered only him out of the three.

Most likely, Moscow did not count on any opposition candidate. Moderate information pressure, which included skeptical coverage by Russian TV channels available in Belarus and the aforementioned Telegram attacks, combined with the changed public attitudes was meant to make Lukashenko nervous and more susceptible to the Kremlin's proposals. Moscow could hardly have wished for more: a real destabilization of the situation in Belarus with difficult-to-predict consequences.

## CONFRONTATION AHEAD OF ELECTIONS

However, Lukashenko himself raised the stakes in the conflict with the Kremlin, largely building his presidential campaign on opposing the eastern neighbor. The challenge to Moscow was evident even as Lukashenko organized the military parade on May 9th in honor of the 75th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, while Moscow had to postpone a mass celebration due to the COVID-19 epidemic. "Even if this year's military parade in Minsk is the only one on the post-Soviet space, it will take place in honor of all Soviet soldiers who liberated the world from nationalism," said Lukashenko.<fnref n="15" /> He had to know he was hitting a sore spot, as Vladimir Putin largely based his legitimacy in Russia and worldwide on ostentatious ceremonies honoring the soldiers who fought against the Nazis, depicting himself as their successor. That is why, in recent years, Moscow has been claiming the exclusive right to define the main events and formats to celebrate the "Great Victory."

It would be hard to judge whether the "victory over Moscow" yielded any electoral results to Alexander Lukashenko. However, many Belarusian analysts believe that the president's dismissive remarks about the danger of the coronavirus epidemic<fnref n="16" /> were perceived by the public as the national leadership's indifference to the lives of regular people. In reality, the healthcare system had started preparing for a potential outbreak back in January. In early March, before any other neighboring countries had taken protective measures, Minsk International Airport was already implementing quarantine measures: passengers' temperatures were taken, staff wore masks, etc. However, the president's blasé attitude in public made it appear the government had no intention of protecting the population from this new threat.

Meanwhile, as the election was getting closer, the tensions in the relations between Russia and Belarus ran higher than ever. On July 29, the Belarusian KGB and Minsk riot police apprehended a group of 32 men in a sanatorium near Minsk; they were called "militants of the Wagner foreign private military company" by the state news agency BelTA. The agency also reported that "an-

<footnote n="11">11 Aleksandra Boguslavskaya. "Blogger Tikhanovsky o strahah Lukashenko, protestah i integracii s Rossiey" [Blogger Tikhanovsky on Lukashenko's fears, protests, and integration with Russia], DW, 21.05.2020, https://www.dw.com/ru/блогер-тихановский-о-страхалукашенко-протестах-и-интерврации-с-россией/а-53522792</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 Aleksandr Feduta. "Kak poznakomilis' Valeriy Vil'yamovich i Aleksandr Grigor'evich: svidetel'stvo souchastnika" [How Valery Viliamovich and Alexander Grigorievich met: testimony of an accomplice], Belorusskiy partizan, 4.06.2020, https://belaruspartisan.by/blogs/feduta/kak-poznakomilis-valeriy-vilyamovich-i-aleksandr-grigorevich-svidetels/</footnote>

<footnote n="13">13 Vladimir Solov'yov. "Moskvu obvinyayut, chto ona vinovata v nashih bedah, a my zolotye i prekrasnye" [Moscow is blamed for our problems, while we are golden and wonderful], Kommersant, 7.06.2020, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4372654</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 "Tsepkalo: 'osobybe otnosheniya s Rossiey' i 'russkiy yazyk — nashe dostoyanie'" [Tsepkalo: "a special relationship with Russia" and "Russian language are our treasure"], Euroradio, 21.05.2020, https://euroradio.fm/ru/cepkalo-osobybe-otnosheniya-s-rossiey-i-russkiy-yazyk-nashe-dostoyanie</footnote>

<footnote n="15">15 "Parad Pobedy v Minske stal edinstvennym na postsovetskom prostranstve – Lukashenko" [Victory Parade in Minsk became the only one on the post-Soviet space], Interfax-Ukraine, 9.05.2020, https://interfax.com.ua/news/political/661155.html</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 E.g., Yuri Tsarik. "Vmeshatel'stvo Shryodingera" [Schroedinger's Interference], Riddle, 16.06.2020, https://www.ridl.io/ru/vmeshatelstvo-shredingera/</footnote>
other person was detected and apprehended in the country's south," citing law enforcement officers, who "told BelTA that information had been received that over 200 militants had arrived in Belarus in order to destabilize the situation during the period of the election campaign."<fnref n="17" /> All the detainees save one turned out to be Russian citizens, though a few also had Ukrainian passports.

Commenting on Russia's response, Lukashenko took an exceptionally harsh tone: "They are already making excuses, almost saying that we may have brought them here by ourselves. Clearly, you need to justify your dirty intentions somehow."<fnref n="18" /> In response, Deputy Chair of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev warned that "Belarusian authorities' attempts to paint Russia as the enemy to a political end will lead to negative consequences."<fnref n="19" /> Konstantin Zatulin, who accounts for CIS affairs, Eurasian integration, and compatriot relations in the Russian Duma, spoke in even harsher terms. He called Lukashenko "a freeloader and almost a parasite on Russian-Belarusian relations" and commented that the latter "risked the relations with Russia for personal gain, to impose himself as the president again when the country started a protest movement."<fnref n="20" />

It is safe to say that Russian leadership had a multitude of issues with its long-time ally ahead of the elections in Belarus. In a matter of weeks, when a wave of street protests against election fraud rose in Belarus, Moscow's rhetoric towards Lukashenko would radically change, with the "Wagner militants" released and returned to Russia, and Vladimir Putin calling their detention near Minsk a "joint operation of Ukrainian and American special services."<fnref n="21" />

## CAPITULATION AS THE PRICE OF SUPPORT

Although the Kremlin did not have a practical opportunity to influence the outcome of the Belarusian elections, the situation appears optimal for Moscow. In the first days of mass protests and their brutal suppression, Western diplomats did their best to avoid harsh rhetoric—probably so as not to "burn bridges" with Lukashenko and to avoid encouraging a renewed closeness with Russia. However, the explicit brutality of law enforcement and the complete unwillingness of the president, who was losing his legitimacy, to engage in dialogue with the opposition soon compelled the West to refuse to acknowledge his victory and to start discussing sanctions against Minsk. Fearing the palpable public outrage, Lukashenko painted himself into a corner, with the only way out being exactly what Moscow had been attempting to persuade him to do during the past few years. He could only "surrender" to the Kremlin, losing all leverage.

As early as August 10, the day after the election, Vladimir Putin congratulated Alexander Lukashenko on his victory. "I expect that your politics will contribute to the further development of mutually beneficial Russian-Belarusian relations in all sectors, to the deepening of cooperation as part of the Union State, to the development of integration processes as part of the Eurasian Economic Union and CIS, as well as of military and political ties in the Collective Security Treaty Organization," said the congratulatory telegram.<fnref n="22" /> On August 14, the apprehended "Wagner militants" were released and returned to Russia. On August 15, Lukashenko and Putin spoke on the phone for the first time since the election. The Kremlin press service reported that the two leaders discussed the situation in Belarus and expressed confidence that all problems would soon be resolved, the most important item being to stop destructive forces aiming to harm the cooperation between the two countries as part of the Union State from taking advantage of the situation.<fnref n="23" />

On the same day, at a meeting of the Belarusian

<footnote n="17">17 "Pod Minskom zaderzhany 32 boevika inostrannoy chastnoy voennoy kompanii" [32 militants of a private foreign military company detained near Minsk], BELTA, 29.07.2020, https://www.belta.by/incident/view/pod-minskom-zaderzhany-32-boevika-inostrannoy-chastnoy-voennoy-kompanii-400470-2020/</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 Viktoriya Polyakova. "Lukashenko obvinil Rossiyu v 'gryaznyh namereniyah posle poimki 'boevikov''' [Lukashenko accused Russia of "dirty intentions after detaining 'militants'"], RBC, 29.07.2020, https://www.rbc.ru/politics/29/07/2020/5f218ff69a79476159ef37e8</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 "Medvedev predupredil Belorussiyu o pechal'nyh posledstviyah" [Medvedev warned Belarus of negative consequences], Lenta.ru, 5.08.2020, https://lenta.ru/news/2020/08/05/medv/</footnote>

<footnote n="20">20 "V Gosdume nazvali Lukashenko nahlebnikom i parazitom v otnosheniyah s Rossiey" [Lukashenko was called a freeloader and a parasite in the relations with Russia in the Russian Duma], Lenta.ru, 2.08.2020, https://lenta.ru/news/2020/08/02/parazit/</footnote>

<footnote n="21">21 "Putin: zaderzhanie 'vagnerovtsev' v Belarusi – sovmestnaya operatsiya spetsluzhb SSHA i Ukrainy, 'eto ochevidno" [Putin: detaining 'Wagner militants' in Belarus is a joint operation of US and Ukrainian special services, "it is obvious"], Nastoyashchee vremya, 27.08.2020, https://www.currenttime.tv/a/putin-wagner-belarus-operation-usa-ukraine/30805618.html</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 "Pozdravlenie Aleksandru Lukashenko s pobedoy na vyborah Prezidenta Belorussii" [Congratulations to Alexander Lukashenko on his victory in the Belarusian presidential election], President of Russia, 10.08.2020, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/63872?fbclid=IwAR2xl5ZdpAKOKuXKyhzngEBF_kW44KIpDpkLuCSmrb20_uSZFcAGKNrMBSs</footnote>

<footnote n="23">23 Cit. ex "Kak razvivalis' otnosheniya Rossii i Belorussii posle vyborov v respublike v 2020 godu" [How the relations between Russia and Belarus developed following the 2020 election in the republic", TASS, 14.09.2020, https://tass.ru/info/9447955</footnote>
Ministry of Defense, Lukashenko said he and Putin had agreed that, in the event of an external military threat, Russia would “provide comprehensive assistance to ensure Belarus’ security” at the first request from Minsk.<fnref n="24" /> Vladimir Putin himself said this in his interview for Rossiya-24 TV channel: “Alexander Grigoryevich asked me to form a certain reserve of law enforcement officers. And I did it.” According to the Russian president, the reserve was not meant to be used until the situation got out of control, “until extremist forces under political slogans cross a certain line, start engaging in simple banditry, setting cars, houses, banks on fire, try to seize administrative buildings, and so on.”<fnref n="25" />

Earlier still, on August 18, in a phone conversation with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Putin stressed that it was inadmissible to interfere in Belarusian internal affairs. The next day, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov admitted that the elections were not “perfect” but advised that the Belarusian leadership should avoid following the lead of those who want Belarus solely for the development of the geopolitical space and those who promote the “destructive logic” that “you are either with Russia or with Europe.”<fnref n="26" />

What did Minsk have to give up in exchange for Russian support in the most difficult moment in Lukashenko's entire presidency? So far, there have mostly been hints. During his visit to Minsk on September 3, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin made assurances that the development of the Union State would be “based on the completely independent position” of Moscow and Minsk, but “with the previously agreed upon economic measures.”<fnref n="27" /> In response, Lukashenko said that Russia “did not turn away” from its ally and helped to stabilize the situation “at least in the field of economy.”<fnref n="28" />

At Mishustin's negotiations with Belarusian Prime Minister Roman Golovchenko, the parties agreed to work out how Belarus would repay its debt for energy carriers, the terms of their supply in 2021 and later, as well as redirection of Belarusian oil product flow. The Russian side is interested in selling oil products produced in Belarus from Russian raw material, which are currently sold through the seaports of Lithuania and Latvia, through the Baltic ports of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region instead. It was also announced that a special group would be created to work out the interaction of the two countries' energy systems in the context of the launch of the Belarusian nuclear power plant.

On September 14, Alexander Lukashenko himself went to Sochi for a face-to-face meeting with Putin. "I think we have made considerable progress in just the past few days, maybe a couple of weeks, to resolve the problems and tasks that have accumulated between Belarus and Russia. I would like this dynamic to be maintained," he said before the negotiations.<fnref n="29" /> After the meeting, he remained optimistic. According to Lukashenko, Russia had acted "in a very decent, human way" towards Belarus. "A friend in need is a friend indeed," he emphasized.<fnref n="30" />

In practice, it meant an agreement that Russia would provide a loan of USD 1.5 billion to Belarus, and a promise that Moscow would supply Belarus with the coronavirus vaccine that was under development as a matter of priority. In addition, Putin added that Russia and Belarus had to continue their cooperation in the defense sector, in particular in the work of defense enterprises, and in the military sector.<fnref n="31" />

This statement may somewhat clear up the mystery around another set of behind-the-scenes agreements between Moscow and Minsk. Belarus has a number of military industrial enterprises which manufacture competitive (at least, in some markets) products. Some of these companies are mainly focused on cooperation with Russian partners (supply of components for military equipment), while others have independent positions in foreign mar-

<footnote n="24">24 Ibid</footnote>

<footnote n="25">25 "Putin gotov napravit' silovikov v Belorussiyu, esli 'situatsiya vyydet iz-pod kontrolya'''" [Putin is ready to send security forces to Belarus if "the situation gets out of control"], Kommersant, 27.08.2020, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4468124</footnote>

<footnote n="26">26 "Lavrov ne schitaet prezidentskie vybory v Belorussii ideal'nymi" [Lavrov does not consider the presidential election in Belarus perfect], Vedomosti, 19.08.2020, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2020/08/19/837109-lavrov-neidealnimi-vibori-belorussii</footnote>

<footnote n="27">27 Pavel Myl'nikov. Mishustin zaveril Lukashenko v podderzhke Moskvoy 'nezavisimosti Belarusi'" [Mishustin assured Lukashenko of Moscow supporting "Belarus' independence"], DW, 3.09.2020, https://www.dw.com/ru/mishustin-zaveril-lukashenko-v-podderzhke-moskvoj-nezavisimosti-belarusi/a-54802848</footnote>

<footnote n="28">28 Cit. ex "Kak razvivalis' otnosheniya Rossii i Belorussii posle vyborov v respublike v 2020 godu" [How the relations between Russia and Belarus developed following the 2020 election in the republic", TASS, 14.09.2020, https://tass.ru/info/9447955</footnote>

<footnote n="29">29 "Lukashenko: Belarus' i Rossiya znachitel'no prodvinulis' v reshenii nakopivshisya problem i zadach" [Lukashenko: Belarus and Russia made significant progress in resolving the accumulated problems and tasks], BELTA, 10.09.2020, https://www.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-belarus-i-rossija-znachitelno-prodvinulis-v-reshenii-nakopivshisja-problem-i-zadach-406221-2020/</footnote>

<footnote n="30">30 "Lukashenko poblagodaril Rossiyu za podderzhku posle vyborov" [Lukashenko thanked Russia for support after the elections], Lenta.ru, 14.09.2020, https://lenta.ru/news/2020/09/14/blagodarochka/</footnote>

<footnote n="31">31 Irina Balachuk. "Putin dast Lukashenko kredit na $1,5 mlrd." [Putin will give Lukashenko a loan of USD 1.5 billion], Ukrainska pravda, 14.09.2020, https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2020/09/14/7266347/</footnote>
kets.

From 2015 to 2019, Belarus was the 20th on the list of arms exporting nations, between Australia and the Czech Republic. The country accounted for 0.3 percent of the global arms exports. In 2019, Minsk's revenue from arms and military equipment exports amounted to USD 1.4 billion. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Belarusian weapons were purchased by countries of North and Central Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Latin America.<fnref n="32" />

For many years, Moscow expressed interest in gaining full or partial control over the Belarusian military industrial complex, but Lukashenko remained steadfast. Russian, Polish, and other media reported multiple times that the arms trade was directly controlled by the president's family, in particular by his eldest son Viktor Lukashenko, Assistant to the President of the Republic of Belarus on National Security and a member of the country's Security Council.

Shortly before the presidential election, the propagandist outlet Ukraina.ru, part of the state media holding Rossiya Segodnya, published dirt on Viktor Lukashenko.<fnref n="33" /> The article, citing the Belarusian opposition Telegram channel NEXTA, claimed that as of March 24, 2012, the president's son's personal accounts in the Credit Suisse bank alone contained amounts equivalent to USD 840,466,689—equivalent to about 1.5 percent of Belarus' entire annual GDP. Then Russian propagandists used the data gathered by journalists from different countries to explain the origin of such wealth through numerous arms export operations.

It would make sense that Belarus' military industrial complex, previously inaccessible to Russia, has now become part of the price which Alexander Lukashenko will have to pay for the "ally support."

## WHAT DOES THE KREMLIN WANT?

Ostensibly, relations between Minsk and Moscow today are picture perfect. The presidents talk on the phone and discuss fully opening the border between the two countries. In early November, the first power unit of the nuclear power plant, built by a Russian contractor, was launched. This is a cause of major concern for neighboring Lithuania due to violations of safety and environmental standards. In a November 4, 2020 phone conversation between the presidents, "the president of Belarus asked his Russian colleague about a possible purchase of an oil field on the territory of Russia."<fnref n="34" /> According to Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov, the Russian president supported this idea, but "nothing specific has been decided yet."<fnref n="35" /> It is likely that nothing specific will be known to the public until the subject of integration is fully back on the agenda.

As limited as Russia was until recently in its ability to influence Belarus, it can now actively impact the situation in the country. There are only two objectives to this influence.

The first is to prevent Belarus from reorienting towards Europe and democratic values. To achieve this, Russia needs to stop the organization of civil society, which is spontaneously forming among the protesters, and to block the revival of democratic institutes—in particular, to prevent early elections until Moscow can choose a convenient moment and its own terms. In this context, Russia simply supports Alexander Lukashenko, in spirit and in action: by recognizing the legitimacy of the presidential election, by ignoring and defaming the opposition, by its readiness to send police forces to Belarus, by assigning journalists from Russia to Belarusian TV channels<fnref n="36" />, etc. The Belarusian president himself guarantees a conflict

<footnote n="32">32 Nataliya Ishchenko. "Smachna bilorus'ka... zbroya. Yak lukashenko psuvaz zhittya rosiys'kim eksporteram" [Delicious Belarusian... weapons. How Lukashenko spoiled the lives of Russian exporters], Dilova stolytsia, 19.08.2020, https://www dsnews ua/ukr/world/ vkusnoe-belarusskoe-oruzhie-kak-lukashenko-portil-zhizn-rossiyskim- eksporteram-18082020-395922</footnote>

<footnote n="33">33 Vladislav Mal'tsev. "Pochti milliard. Otkuda na schetah u syna Lukashenko mogut byt' sotni millionov dollarov?" [Almost a billion. Where did Lukashenko's son get hundreds of millions of dollars on his bank accounts?], Ukraina.ru, 23.06.2020, https://ukraina.ru/ exclusive/20200623/1028059219.html</footnote>

<footnote n="34">34 "Lukashenko i Putin obsudili situatsiyu v mire, epidemiyu COVID-19, perevalku tovarov, neftegazovuyu tematiku" [Lukashenko and Putin discussed the situation in the world, the COVID-19 epidemic, the transfer of goods, oil and gas-related subjects," BELTA, 4.11.2020, https://www. belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-i-putin-obsudili-situatsiju-v-mire- epidemiju-covid-19-perevalku-tovarov-neftegazovuju-414126-2020/</footnote>

<footnote n="35">35 "V Kremle otreagirovali na predlozhenie Lukashenko prodat' emu mestorozhdenie nefti" [The Kremlin responded to Lukashenko's offer to sell him an oil field], Lenta.ua, 5.11.2020, https://lenta.ua/v-kremle- otreagirovali-na-predlozhenie-lukashenko-prodat-emu-mestorozhdenie- nefti-75242/</footnote>

<footnote n="36">36 Aleksandr Atasuntsev, Natal'ya Galimova. "Kak stalo rabotat' belorusskoe televidenie posle zabastovki sotrudnikov" [How the Belarusian television started functioning after the workers' strike], RBC, 31.08.2020, https://www rbc.ru/politics/31/08/2020/5f44ce2e9a794742baeada 1b?from=from_main_2</footnote>
with the West and the harsh suppression of the protests.

The second focus area is gaining control over the Belarusian economy, or at least its key enterprises. We may recall how, in December 2012, during another "honey-moon" of the two countries, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev suggested that the Belarusian side come up with five integration projects involving privatization of Belarusian enterprises in favor of Russian partners. The eventual plan was to create the holding Rosbelavto based on MAZ (Belarus) and KamAZ (Russia), and to integrate the Belarusian Integral and Minsk wheeled tractor plant with structures of the Russian state corporation Ros-tech, Peleng with Roskosmos, Grodno Azot with the Russian Eurokhim or Gazprom. Naturally, Lukashenko was aware that if those projects were implemented, he would effectively have signed away some of his country's most valuable assets. As soon as April 2013, in his address to the nation and the Parliament, he spoke sincerely about the merger of MAZ and KamAZ: "My dear friends, I am the president of Belarus, and I will not engage in this bandit event. You want to try; let's not touch the property."<fnref n="37" /> The same fate befell the other "integration projects": none were implemented.

Today, Moscow may well return to seemingly forgotten projects and even add new ones. For instance, it can move into oil refining (for now, it only has a share in the Mozyr refinery), acquire some assets of Belaruskali, of the Belarusian railway, etc. Redirecting the flows of Belarusian oil products, almost agreed upon by Mikhail Mishustin and Roman Golovchenko, would also mean that Belarus would lose the opportunity to diversify its oil supply—something that had been Belarus' big achievement in the recent years, as it had been buying alternative raw materials from Norway and the US through Klaipeda in Lithuania after the "oil war" with Russia started. The negotiations with Poland on the launch of the Druzhba oil pipeline in the reverse mode towards Belarus are as good as finished.

Meanwhile, there is no certainty that the Kremlin intends to support the politically bankrupt regime of Alexander Lukashenko's personal power infinitely. That is only highlighted by the negative attitude of the Russian leaders to him, which had been demonstrated on multiple occasions until August of this year. Rumor has it

among independent Belarusian political analysts<fnref n="38" /> that Moscow and some Western capitals secretly coordinate their actions on the Belarusian crisis, since their ultimate goal is the same: a change of the regime and the removal of President Lukashenko from office.

Getting economic concessions from Lukashenko and leaving Minsk with no wiggle room regardless of the ideological preferences of the country's future leadership, Moscow can gently remove the fully dependent president from office and try to place a moderate yet acceptable person at the helm of Belarus instead (through early elections). This person will not necessarily be any of the registered opposition candidates or any of the current protest leaders.

<footnote n="37">37 "Lukashenko o sliyanii MAZa i KaMAZa: ya na etu aktsiyu banditskuyu ne poydu" [Lukashenko about the merger of MAZ and KaMAZ: I will not engage in this bandit event], Naviny.by, Beloruskie novosti, 19.04.2013, https://naviny.by/node/254663/href</footnote>

<footnote n="38">38 E.g., "Sivitskiy: Tseli Rossii i Zapada teper' sovpadayut – otstranenie Lukashenko ot vlasti" [The goals of Russia and the West now coincide: to remove Lukashenko from power], Beloruskiy partizan, 1.10.2020, https://belaruspartisan.by/interview/513890/</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_20.png" /></figure>

THE KREMLIN'S MALIGN
INFLUENCE THROUGH
STRATEGIC NARRATIVES:
SPUTNIK'S DISCOURSE ON
THE RELATION BETWEEN
ROMANIA AND NATO

Răzvan-Ovidiu Ceuca

<figure><img src="image_21.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_22.png" /></figure>

## ABOUT AUTHOR

### Răzvan-Ovidiu Ceuca

Răzvan-Ovidiu Ceuca, PhD Candidate in International Relations at the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History of the "Babeș-Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania; an expert specializing in analyzing and countering hybrid threats for Intel4Patriam; a collaborator of Informational Warfare and Strategic Communication Laboratory (LARICS).

## INTRODUCTION

Since the 2014 events, marked by the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in eastern Ukraine, Putin's foreign policy toolkit has mostly prioritized the use of nonmilitary means. Taking into account the fact that the use of military means has not brought the expected results in Ukraine, the Kremlin opted for a nonmilitary approach, especially towards the West and its allies. Thus, when it comes to Romania, Putin's Russia exerts what is conceptually labeled as "malign influence." Defined as "a specific type of influence that directly or indirectly subverts and undermines European values and democratic institutions,"<fnref n="1" /> Russia's malicious influence is wielded through three main forms of power: sharp power,metic power, and dark power. Consequently, although the concept implies European values and democratic institutions, my research will extend its application to a less studied case in the literature: the role of NATO in Romania and the benefits offered to the latter by its membership. In this sense, Russia's malign influence covers all the three forms of power by using five main narrative approaches, through the Romanian-Moldovan branch of one of its media platforms: Sputnik.

## ROMANIA BETWEEN THE PROTECTIVE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE US AND RUSSIA'S OFFENSIVE AMBITIONS

Romania's Strategic Partnership with the US and its NATO membership are today challenged by Russia's malign influence in the Black Sea Region, and the country and its partners have embarked on efforts to counteract this interference.

Romania's Strategic Partnership with the US, signed in 1997, was the stepping-stone for Romania's NATO accession, offering benefits to both parties involved, as long as certain criteria are observed. According to the Romanian analyst Iulian Chifu, three criteria had to be fulfilled: a durable relationship over time, a comprehensive cover of all fields of cooperation, and incorporation of security-related aspects.<fnref n="2" /> Drawing on the Partnership, Romania managed to secure itself in relation to external threats—such as a resurgent and more ambitious Russia, cross-border crime or transnational terrorism, and structural weaknesses such as corruption. For the US, the Partnership provides a way of expanding its influence by offering benefits to Romania, in order to protect its military capabilities located there against the emerging

<footnote n="1">1 Anton Shekhovtsov, Conceptualizing Malign Influence of Putin's Russia in Europe (Washington D.C.: Free Russia Foundation, 2020): 5, https://www.4freerussia.org/conceptualizing-malign-influence-of-putin-s-russia-in-europe/.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 Iulian Chifu, "Parteneriat Strategic. Sistemul de parteneriate strategice al României" [Strategic Partnership. Romania's Strategic Partnerships System], Occasional Papers, 5 (Bucharest, 2012): 2, www.cpc-ew.ro.</footnote>
threat posed by actors who proliferate ballistic missiles.<fnref n="3" /> Thus, the Partnership was a response to needs on both sides, which led to a promising relationship between Romania and the US (followed by the former's accession to NATO in 2004); even though initially the partnership was viewed as a "consolation prize," offered by the Clinton administration for having not been accepted into NATO in the first round in 1999.<fnref n="4" />

However, Russia's current malign influence in the Black Sea Region, implemented by sharp power, mhemetic power and dark power tools, challenges the performance of Romania's partnership with the US and that of its membership in NATO. Using a panoply of tools, Moscow's foreign policy aims to undermine Romania's relationship with the US by influencing Romanian public perceptions related to the importance of this partnership and the country's NATO membership. David Schlaefer, a political officer with the US Embassy in Romania, was the first American official to speak publicly, in 2018, about the dangers posed by Kremlin's interference in Roma-nia. He stated that "the Strategic Partnership is based on common values" and that the Kremlin used "all types of means and press to disseminate disinformation, namely traditional media, television, radio, but social media as well" to promote the narrative that "Romania does not share Western values, that it is not a part of the West-ern world, that the US and the EU have a different set of values and that Romania has more in common with Russia than with the Western world."<fnref n="5" /> Consequently, the objective of disputing Romania's benefits both as a strategic partner for the US and a NATO member state is explained through Putin's belligerent and asymmetric approach towards the West and its allies, and meant to regain Russia's superpower status, by any means.

While no Romanian official spoke publicly about
Russia's malign influence in the country, the National
Defense Strategy covering the period 2020–2024 did,
labeling Moscow's strategy of hybrid warfare as a na-
tional security concern, both relating to its military and

nonmilitary components. Russia is depicted as a threat
to Romania's national security. On the one hand, Rus-
sian deployment of military forces and the strengthening
of its capabilities, through which offensive and defensive
operations can be carried out, pose a major challenge
both to Romania's national interests in the Black Sea re-
gion and to NATO and EU borders. On the other hand,
using nonmilitary means, the Kremlin aims to undermine
stability, predictability and security within the Alliance,
by perpetuating divergencies between allied states. Con-
sequently, the solution identified in the National Defense
Strategy stipulates that Romania needs to boost its pres-
ence in the Black Sea zone, in order to keep and increase
the control of the US, NATO and EU in the area.<fnref n="6" />

CONCEPTUALIZING
THE KREMLIN'S MALIGN
INFLUENCE IN ROMANIA

In the literature focused on Russia's malign influence, three main concepts have constituted significant contribu-tions, which explain the main dimensions of external ac-tion exerted by the Kremlin. The concepts in question are sharp power, mimetic power and dark power. Therefore, not only are these terms used to explain how Moscow interferes with NATO and the EU as a whole, but also to explain how Russian malign influence is adapted to Romania's domestic features.

One of Russia's forms of malign influence in Roma-
nia is directed though what is conceptualized in the litera-
ture as sharp power. According to Christopher Walker
and Jessica Ludwig, sharp power best describes the tech-
niques used by authoritarian regimes, as some of them
are not hard "in the openly coercive sense," but neither
soft. In this sense, sharp power tools imply penetrations
of political, social and information environments of tar-
geted states, in order to manipulate the public opinion,
by distorting the information.<fnref n="7" /> In Romania, the Kremlin's
malign influence in the form of sharp power—specifically
the component that targets NATO—promotes a series of
narratives using the following approaches in relation to
public opinion: undermining NATO's role in Romania,

<footnote n="3">3 Cristian Nită, “Analiza Parteneriatului Strategic România-SUA din perspectivă multidimensională” [The Analysis of the Romania-US Strategic Partnership from a Multidimensional Perspective], Policy Briefs Collection (Bucharest, 2017): 12–14, http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Final_Policy-Brief-4_Relatia-Transatlantica_web.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4 John F. Harris and Michael Dobbs, "Clinton Discovers All Is Forgiven in Romania," Washington Post, July 12, 1997, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/07/12/clinton-discovers-all-is-forgiven-in-romania/ece7ce3c-b63a-4d53-854d-53da65dc629d/.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">5 "David Schlaefer, consilier politic la Ambasada SUA, despre razboiul hibrid" [David Schlaefer, political advisor for the US Embassy, about hybrid warfare], YouTube video, posted by Europa FM, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iz1NrbWRL8Q.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6 "Strategia Națională de Apărare a Jării Pentru Perioada 2020-2024" [National Defense Strategy 2020-2024], (Bucharest, 2020), https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente/Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_2020_2024.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">7 Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, "The Meaning of Sharp Power," Foreign Affairs, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-16/meaning-sharp-power.</footnote>
seeding fractures between NATO and the EU as well as
shaping Romanian attitudes using "links" between local
organized crime and the presence of NATO bases in Ro-
mania. Therefore, the aim of Russian sharp power in Ro-
mania consists in eroding the public's trust in the benefits
of membership in the Alliance.

Another relevant concept for explaining the Krem-
lin's malign influence in Romania is mimetic power. Ac-
cording to Anton Shekhovtsov, mimetic power implies
"the ability to influence Western nations by creating the
impression that Russia is a normal member of the interna-
tional community and emulating what pro-Kremlin actors
perceive as Western soft power techniques." Recourse to
the toolkit of mimetic power is due because while Rus-
sia tries to reiterate the triumph of Russian high culture
through references to literature, arts, classical music, and
ballet within organized international sports competitions,
it also acted in ways that turned attraction into repulsion,
due to its aggressive interventions in Georgia, Crimea,
and eastern Ukraine. Thus, instead of changing its politi-
cal values or domestic policies to cultivate effective soft
power, the Putin regime and Russian pro-Kremlin actors
morphed soft power into mimetic power. Consequently,
this emulation of what is perceived as soft power in the
West has two main objectives: on the one hand, to create
an image of Russia as a legitimate member of the inter-
national community, which adapts to Western normalcy
and, on the other, to undermine the Western response
to Moscow's malign influence.<fnref n="8" /> However, regarding Ro-
mania, mimetic power is used to promote the narrative
of advancing the Kremlin's belligerent perspective about
NATO, as well as Moscow's "friendly intentions" in rela-
tion to Bucharest.

The last power-related concept that describes an-
other form of Russian malign influence both generally
exerted against other state actors and Romania in par-
ticular is dark power. In 2018, Mark Galeotti argued that
dark power represents "the shadowy counterpart to 'soft
power,'" because "if soft power is the ability of a state to
get its way by attraction and positive example, then dark
power is the capacity to bully." In this sense, dark power
implies a form of deterrence exerted by Moscow in order
to force their Western counterparts to pacify Russia "with
deals and exemptions," instead of addressing challeng-
es to a "fearsome and formidable" bully, uncapable of

making "any real friends" at all.<fnref n="9" /> Drawing on this discus-
sion, Anton Shekhovtsov defines dark power as "the abil-
ity to influence preferences and behavior of other nations
through projecting an image of a state inherently antago-
nistic to their political values."<fnref n="10" /> In Romania, Putin's use
of dark power is implemented by bullying the Alliance
with anti-NATO narratives, and uses policymakers and
cultural actors, whose rhetoric is firmly turned against
diplomats like Adrian Zuckerman, the US ambassador in
Bucharest, and Mircea Geoană, the current Deputy Sec-
retary General of NATO (see below).

UNDERMINING NATO'S ROLE
IN ROMANIA

One of the main channels through which the Kremlin exerts its malign influence in Romania is Sputnik Romania-Moldova. Sputnik began its activity back in 2014, under the patronage of the news agency Rossiya Segodnya and, according to the description on its website, it "presents a multipolar world, in which each country has its national interests, culture, history and traditions."<fnref n="11" /> The Romanian language platform was launched in February 2016 in the Republic of Moldova, but little attention was given to it until 2017. Throughout Sputnik Romania-Moldova, articles bear the signatures of five authors: Ionuț Țene, a writer and owner of a local nationalist-extremist press website; Ilie Catrinoiu, a commentator on a few conservative, nationalist and anti-Western blogs and websites; Octavian Racu, a Moldovan sociologist and promoter of Alexander Dugin's Eurasianism in the Republic of Moldova; Bogdan-Alexandru Duca, a conservative political scientist and theologian; and Dragoș Dumitriu, an ex-MP and ex-member of the Romanian far right Greater Romania Party.<fnref n="12" /> Drawing on these aspects, we have selected a series of articles written by the above-mentioned authors and conducted a content analysis to examine the main narrative approaches, related to the main forms of

<footnote n="8">8 Anton Shekhovtsov, "Mimetic Power: How Russia Pretends to Be a Normal Member of the International Community," openDemocracy, October 31, 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/mimetic-power-russia-international-community/.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9 Mark Galeotti, "Russia Pursues 'Dark Power' and the West Has No Answer," Raam op Rusland, March 15, 2018, https://raamoprusland.nl/dossiers/kremlin/894-russia-pursues-dark-power-and-the-west-has-no-answer.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10 Shekhovtsov, Conceptualizing Malign Influence of Putin's Russia in Europe, 4.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11 Sputnik România-Moldova, "Despre Proiect" [About the Project], accessed November 11, 2020, https://ro.sputnik.md/docs/about/index.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 Costin Ionescu, "Cine semneaza propaganda rusa in presa din Romania" [Who Signs the Russian Propaganda in the Press from Romania], HotNews.ro, October 23, 2017, https://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-media_publicitate-22068365-analiza-cine-semneaza-propaganda-rusapresa-din-romania.htm.</footnote>
Russian malign influence exerted upon Romania. Consequently, we have traced five main narrative approaches that the Kremlin uses through Sputnik Romania-Moldova: (1) undermining NATO's role in Romania, (2) bullying the Alliance through anti-NATO narratives, policymakers and cultural actors, (3) seeding fractures between NATO and the EU, (4) reproducing the Kremlin's "alternative" perception on NATO, and (5) shaping Romanian attitudes using "links" between local organized crime and the presence of NATO bases in Romania.

Despite the fact that NATO's presence has given Romania a pivotal role on the Eastern flank, the Kremlin's malign influence in the form of sharp power has undermined this contribution brought by the Alliance.

Russian propaganda portrays the Alliance as a malicious entity by labeling it a relic of the past. Radu Toma, a self-titled geopolitician, states in a Sputnik article that the Alliance has become nothing more than a "relic of the past," and this is due to the fact that it has become a "non-profit business," because "NATO entered in Romania and not Romania in NATO," as "Bucharest did not support the organization either militarily or financially."<fnref n="13" /> In similar rhetoric, it is stated that NATO "has come to be a huge lie and a danger to the whole world." This statement is based on a series of ideas promoted by Sputnik, such as: Romanian soldiers who lost their lives "in theaters of war unrelated to us or with any real motivation," joining the Alliance involved "major privatizations," "the sale of land and the surrender of natural resources," facts that "would have transformed Romania into a colony and the Romanians into a threatened nation." Last but not least, NATO is categorized as a "budgetary institution" whose existence is justified by "inventing threats, but also by maintaining a militaristic climate."<fnref n="14" />

On the other hand, the narrative that undermines NATO's role in Romania also influences public perceptions about the consequences of the Alliance's presence in the country. In this sense, one article states that "not only has the Pentagon failed to win in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan or against the Islamic State," but "the Romanian people are used as guinea pigs in America's attempt to annihilate the 'strong army' of the Russian Federation."

For this reason, Romania is "used in the efforts to contain Russia without being threatened by it," so Romania is blamed for allowing NATO and the US to contain Russia, and the Romanian people for falling into the trap of "American war propaganda," by installing the antimissile shield at Deveselu.<fnref n="15" /> Such rhetoric also stipulates that the US (along with NATO) is "no longer a gendarme of the planet," which is why Romania "has become a rather geopolitically isolated country, although it is a NATO member state," because "strategically it has broken all ties with other nations to please Brussels and the United States." Therefore, against the background of the weakening of NATO, this idea is based on the superiority of military capabilities of Russia in terms of hypersonic systems, and the presence of the antimissile shield from Deveselu, which would turn Romania into a "certain target of the Russian military complex ready to face a blow from the Alliance."<fnref n="16" />

Conspiracy theories are also part of the narratives against NATO in Romania. For instance, another article presents the idea that Romania "is a CIA branch in the Balkans and refuses to strengthen its position in the vicinity of the Black Sea, due to the fact that Romanian society is closely controlled by Soros and Embassies."<fnref n="17" /> In this context, Russia and Turkey are intensifying their bilateral relations and redefining their interests in the Black Sea region. Also, such rhetoric promotes the idea that "the US aims to sacrifice democracy and prosperity in Romania through the so-called parallel state, whose tools consist in various media institutions, the three opposition parties (National-Liberal Party, Union "Save Romania" and Romania 100), as well as the #resist protest movement, a radicalized minority." Correlating this narrative with messages related to corruption and influence peddling, it is stated that Romania was "forced to give" USD 3.9 billion for a series of American missiles, and "blackmailed" with the threat posed by Russia in the region.<fnref n="18" />

<footnote n="13">13 Ilie Catrinoiu, "Geopolitician român: NATO este o relicvă a trecutului" [Romanian Geopolitician: NATO is a Relic of the Past], Sputnik, January 28, 2017, https://ro.sputnik.md/radio/20170128/10993728/geopolitician-nato-relicva-trecut.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 Dragoș Dumitriu, "NATO – o uriașă minciună și un pericol pentru lumea întreagă!" [NATO - A Huge Lie and a Danger for the Whole World!], Sputnik, April 2, 2019, https://ro.sputnik.md/International/20190402/25368877/NATO--o-uriasa-minciuna-si-un-pericol-pentru-lumea-ntreaga.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">15 Ionuț Țene, "Ionuț Țene: poporul român, un cobai al SUA în caz de conflict cu Putin" [Ionuț Țene: the Romanian people, a lab rat of the US in case of conflict with Putin], Sputnik, May 30, 2016, https://ro.sputnik.md/Moldova_Romania/20160530/8492445.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 Ionuț Țene, "Adio, Deveselu?" [Goodbye, Deveselu?], Sputnik, January 3, 2019, https://ro.sputnik.md/columnists/20190103/23943783/Adio-Deveselu.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17 Bogdan Duca, "România, sucursala CIA din Balcani, iese prost în urma pactului ruso-turc" [Romania, the CIA Branch in the Balkans, Goes Wrong in the Russian-Turkish Agreement], Sputnik, August 10, 2016, https://ro.sputnik.md/analytics/20160810/8524466.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 Bogdan Duca, "Bogdan Duca: Obiectivele SUA în România necesită sacrificarea democrației" [Bogdan Duca: US Objectives in Romania need the sacrificing of democracy], Sputnik, December 11, 2017, https://ro.sputnik.md/analytics/20171211/16080791/bogdan-duca-sua-romania.html.</footnote>
BULLYING THE ALLIANCE
THROUGH ANTI-NATO
NARRATIVES, POLICYMAKERS
AND CULTURAL ACTORS

Throughout this approach, the dark power compo-
nent of the Kremlin's malign influence is instrumentalized
through rhetoric aimed at demonizing NATO. The pattern
of diabolizing the Alliance follows two distinct paths. On
the one hand, Sputnik bullies local pro-NATO policy-
makers, hence promoting narratives against well-known
names like Mircea Geoană, the current Deputy Secre-
tary General of NATO, or the current US ambassador to
Romania, Adrian Zuckerman. On the other hand, Sput-
nik offers a platform to anti-NATO Romanian politicians
and cultural personalities, like ex-Prime Minister Adrian
Năstase and actor Dan Puric, whose discourses criticize
the expansion of the Alliance in Eastern Europe, as well
as Romania's accession to it.

In this sense, Mircea Geoană and Adrian Zucker-
man are blamed either for "destroying" the Social-Dem-
ocratic Party or for the losses caused by the NATO mem-
ber status of Romania, as well as for "false" statements
related to Ceaușescu's communist regime. Consequently,
Geoană is presented by Sputnik Romania-Moldova as a
"weak man" and this "quality" helped him to be appoint-
ed Deputy Secretary General of NATO. For this reason,
Mircea Geoană is labeled a "fool of NATO," also ac-
cused of "destroying" the Social-Democratic Party, "the
only party able to have a word in the face of Western
orders."<fnref n="23" /> Representatives of the US, such as Zuckerman,
are also criticized on the same platform. His statement
to Romanians at the beginning of this year aroused criti-
cism from one of the editorialists who stated that the suc-
cesses of Romanians in the strategic partnership signed
with the US consisted only "in payments to it, the deaths
of Romanian soldiers, external adversities and the loss of
seats in the UN Security Council."<fnref n="24" /> Also, Adrian Zucker-
man was blamed for an article published in Agerpres, in
which a series of statements about Nicolae Ceaușescu's

In the same manner, the argument is made that that
the US plan consists, in fact, of transforming Romania into
a "Cuba of Europe," as "the lack of vision and desire
to promote the national interest in the Balkans, Europe
and the Black Sea area risk turning the country into an
American 'black sheep' and a Cuba isolated from the
rest of the world." For this reason, it is stated that "only
the Social-Democratic Party-ruled governments<fnref n="19" /> con-
tributed to the consolidation of the 'Craiova Group' (fol-
lowing the model of the Visegrad Group), to intensify
cooperation between the Balkan states," while the for-
mer technocratic government of Dacian Ciolos and the
current National Liberal Party government "does nothing
but maintain a speech in which NATO is presented as
a security umbrella, which would affect Romania's inter-
ests, but would strengthen those of the USA." Therefore,
it is stipulated that "NATO is gradually transforming itself
from a military alliance into a trade alliance, in which the
goal is not so much to ensure the security of its members,
but to ensure the market for large arms manufacturers,
thus making Romania a Cuba of Europe."<fnref n="20" /> Similarly, it
is argued in another article that "East European states,
especially Poland and Romania, should be concerned,
because the US would like a return to the spheres of in-
fluence," as was portrayed to have occurred under the
Monroe Doctrine.<fnref n="21" /> For this reason, Romania is blamed
for trying to increase its importance in Eastern Europe,
through an aggressive anti-Russian discourse, evoking
the "eternal Russian threat," in a context in which Russia
and China wait to declare their own spheres of influence,
following "the example of American politics."<fnref n="22" />

<footnote n="23">23 Dragoș Dumitriu, "Recompensă pentru omul slab care a făcut praf PSD – devine "prostăNATO" [Reward for the Weak Man that Destroyed the Social-Democratic Party - He Becomes a Fool of NATO], Sputnik, July 17, 2019, https://ro.sputnik.md/columnists/20190717/26896385/Recompensa--omul-slab-PSD-ProstNATO.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">24 Dragoș Dumitriu, "Ambasadorul SUA se face de râs la început de an, cel mai stupid mesaj pentru românil" [The US Ambassador Is Embarrassing Himself at the Start of the New Year, the Most Stupid Message for the Romanians!], Sputnik, January 1, 2020, https://ro.sputnik.md/analytics/20200101/28735343/Ambasadorul-SUA-se-face-de-rs-la-început-de-an-cel-mai-stupid-mesaj-pentru-romni.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 The Social-Democratic Party (PSD) governed for a few mandates since the fall of communism in 1989 in Romania. Evolving as a rupture from the National Salvation Front (FSN), the political organization that constituted the governing body in the first weeks after the Romanian Revolution, PSD governed intermittently: 2000–2004, 2008–2009 (along with the Democratic-Liberal Party), 2011–2013 (along with the Conservative Party and the National-Liberal Party), and 2017–2019. During its last mandate, Romania has faced intense corruption, crony-capitalism, protests, attempts to politicize Judicial power, as well as an increase of anti-Western discourse along with pro-Russian statements from certain PSD members. For this reason, Sputnik Romania-Moldova intensively promotes PSD as a "fighter" against "the parallel state" and the West's interests in Romania and the Black Sea region.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">20 Octavian Racu, “De ce SUA vor să transforme România înro-Cubă a Europei” [Why Does the US Want to Transform Romania into a Cuba of Europe], Sputnik, December 2, 2019, https://ro.sputnik.md/columnists/20191202/28407509/De-ce-SUA-vor-sa-transforme-Romania-inro-o-Cub-a-Europei.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">21 Octavian Racu, “SUA readuc ‘sferele de influență.’ Efectele ‘Doctrinei Monroe’” [The US Are Bringing Back the ‘Spheres of Influence.’ The Effects of ‘Monroe Doctrine’], Sputnik, May 8, 2019, https://ro.sputnik.md/analytics/20190508/25826541/SUA-readuc-sferele-de-influenta-Efectele-doctrinei-Monroe.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 Racu, “SUA readuc ‘sferele de influență.’”</footnote>
communist regime were presented. In this sense, the main accusations are that "the number of victims of the

Ceaușescu's regime is exaggerated by American propaganda" and that "Romania's current level of development has occurred because of what was built during the communist period and not because of the benefits offered by the US."<fnref n="25" />

On the other hand, political actors like Adrian Năstase and cultural ones like Dan Puric are instrumental in the process of demonizing the Alliance. For instance, Năstase is praised as "the diplomat and political leader with the most important role in history after 1990," because by integrating Romania into Euro-Atlantic structures, he tried to offer an international position favorable to it.<fnref n="26" /> The reason why he deserves praise is that he had the courage to accuse NATO of "violating its commitments not to expand towards the East," through "imperialist expansion" in the post-communist space.<fnref n="27" /> In addition, another name discussed in articles promoting the anti-Western strategic narrative is that of Dan Puric.<fnref n="28" /> Appealing to the accusations brought against Tudor Gheorghe,<fnref n="29" /> Puric considers that "there is a tendency to annihilate everything that is Romanian," but also that "Romania's accession to NATO and the EU would have been made without us negotiating, therefore, implicitly, to have something to gain," which turned us into "servants."<fnref n="30" />

## SEEDING FRACTURES BETWEEN NATO AND THE EU

Another objective of the Kremlin's malign influence in the form of sharp power, apart from undermining the role of NATO in Romania, consists of cultivating a series of fractures between the Alliance and its European ally, the EU.

Sputnik reports that the initiative to set up an EU army is a "clear expression of Brussels' desire for independence from the United States" and "a first step towards the disintegration of NATO." In this context, it is stipulated that the establishment of an EU army is a "German maneuver to militarily control the continent, after subjugating it economically and financially," which is why French President Emmanuel Macron is labeled as Chancellor Merkel's "geostrategic poodle."<fnref n="31" /> However, distorting the US perspective on the EU, Sputnik states that "the provocative gestures of the US ambassadors in Chișinău and Bucharest would aim to encourage a nationalist, Euroskeptic and easily controllable discourse, useful to American interests," a policy that would, among other things, "have a role in sharpening nationalist and Euroskeptic sentiments in Romania."<fnref n="32" /> Also in the same anti-Western narrative, Donald Trump is associated with the former leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, and accused of triggering a perestroika in Europe, by which "the current liberal-democratic elites will be eliminated like the communists in 1989."<fnref n="33" /> Moreover, Trump is credited with "a political tendency to support political leaders who agree with his views," such as Viktor Orbán and Jarosław Kaczyński to "take command over the EU's Franco-German engine."<fnref n="34" />

<footnote n="25">25 Dragoș Dumitriu, "Ambasadorul Zuckerman - șir de aberații și manipulare! Îl vom regreta pe Hans Klemm?!" [Ambassador Zuckerman - Series of Aberrations and Manipulation! Will We Regret Hans Klemm?], Sputnik, December 25, 2019, https://ro.sputnik.md/politics/20191225/28665129/Ambasadorul-Zuckerman-sir-de-aberatiisi-manipulare-il-vom-regreta-pe-Hans-Klemm.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">26 Dragoș Dumitriu, "Adrian Năstase: demonstrația minciunii uriașe a Occidentului și NATO!" [Adrian Năstase: The Demonstration of the West and NATO's Huge Lie!], Sputnik, June 9, 2020, https://ro.sputnik.md/analytics/20200609/30513888/Adrian-Nstase-demers-fulminant-demonstraia-minciunii-uriaie-a-Occidentului-i-NATO.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">27 Dumitriu, "Adrian Năstase."</footnote>

<footnote n="28">28 Dan Puric is a Romanian actor, known for his nationalist and Euroskeptic discourse promoted on certain TV Shows.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">29 Tudor Gheorghe is a Romanian artist who, in December 2019, as a commemoration of three decades since the fall of communism in Romania, attended a show called "Degeaba 30" [In Vain 30] that was broadcasted on the Romanian Television (TVR). The title itself represents the quintessence of a general popular assumption among Romanians that "nothing has been done in the last 30 years of democracy." However, apart from nationalist statements Tudor Gheorghe also roughly criticized the EU, stipulating that Romania "groans and waits for a decree from Brussels and Strasbourg." See "Tot Degeaba [Still in Vain]," YouTube video, posted by "Tudor Gheorghe," December 22, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGDc78XTr1s.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">30 Dragoș Dumitriu, "Dan Puric: Ne-am dus ca niște slugi în NATO și UE, tot ce e românesc trebuie să dispară!" [Dan Puric: We Went Like Servants in NATO and EU, Everything That Is Romanian Has to Disappear!], Sputnik, February 3, 2020, https://ro.sputnik.md/analytics/20200203/29065737/Dan-Puric-Ne-am-dus-ca-nite-slugi-n-NATO-i-UE-tot-ce-e-romnesc-trebuie-s-dispar.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">31 Ionuț Țene, "Armata UE: Un prim pas spre dezmembrarea NATO?" [The EU's Army: A First Step Towards NATO's Disruption?], Sputnik, January 28, 2019, https://ro.sputnik.md/columnists/20190128/24374402/Armata-UE-un-prim-pas-spre-dezmembrarea-NATO.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">32 Bogdan Duca, "De ce SUA și-ar dori resuscitatea naționalismului românesc?" [Why Does the US Wish the Romanian Nationalism's Resuscitation], Sputnik, September 14, 2016, https://ro.sputnik.md/analytics/20160914/9008979/nationalism-sua-romania.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">33 Octavian Racu, "Trump a dat start unei 'perestroika' în UE: sfârșitul liberalismului european" [Trump Has Started a 'perestroika' in the EU. The End of European Liberalism], Sputnik, June 15, 2018, https://ro.sputnik.md/columnists/20180615/19875524/trump-perestroika-liberalism.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">34 Racu, "Trump a dat start unei 'perestroika' în UE."</footnote>
## REPRODUCING THE KREMLIN’S “ALTERNATIVE” PERCEPTION OF NATO

When it comes to exerting its malign influence in the form of mimetic power in Romania, Putin’s Russia opts for a rhetoric meant to promote the “alternative vision” of the Kremlin, both by disseminating a series anti-US and anti-NATO discourses and by branding itself as a legitimate member of the international community.

Sputnik quotes a statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry that blamed the "cynicism" with which the US is involved in the domestic policy of the Republic of Moldova.<fnref n="35" /> The statement is related to a letter signed by the US ambassador in Chișinău, who made a series of recommendations to Moldovan deputies on the new parliamentary majority and the future government. Similarly, referring to the situation in Ukraine, Washington is accused of "pushing Chișinău into blackmail" for the "only correct option," ignoring the "views of a large majority of Moldovan voters."<fnref n="36" /> NATO is also labeled as "an outdated structure, a remnant of the Cold War," due to the fact that "it would maintain a tense state typical of that period to fulfill its role of imperialist-militarist organization," which "benefits only for certain power circles that consume huge budgets."<fnref n="37" /> On the other hand, a delegation of deputies from the Russian State Duma stated that Russia has "friendly intentions," but also that "it has never started a war, but rather has responded to various aggressions."<fnref n="38" /> In addition, there is evidence that a deputy who represents the Russian-Lipovan minority in the Parliament has tried to strengthen Russian-Romanian relations "at a level worthy of historical traditions."<fnref n="39" />

Regarding NATO's presence on Romanian territory, the narrative directed against it also targeted the antimissile shield from Deveselu. Therefore, the Alliance ends up being accused of "propaganda" by which "it tries to convince the Romanian public opinion that an antimissile

shield is needed just because it says so."<fnref n="40" /> Moreover, the Kremlin accuses NATO of "not keeping its promises following the withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), saying that the systems located at Deveselu also have the ability to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles," hence threatening Russia.<fnref n="41" />

## SHAPING ROMANIAN ATTITUDES USING “LINKS” BETWEEN LOCAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE PRESENCE OF NATO BASES IN ROMANIA

The third approach related to the sharp power dimension of the Kremlin's malign influence in Romania focuses on exploiting the so-called links between local organized crime and the presence of NATO bases in Romania. The main narrative put forward emphasizes that human trafficking is employed to satisfy the sexual needs of NATO soldiers deployed in Romania, hence underlining the negative impact of the Alliance's bases within Romanian borders. The main example referred to by the Russian propaganda is the Caracal case.

The case in question involves the murder of a 15-year-old girl named Alexandra Măceșanu, who went missing in the town of Caracal on July 24, 2019. The girl disappeared while hitchhiking from her village Dobrosloveni to Caracal, having been kidnapped by a 65-year-old mechanic named Gheorghe Dincă, who raped, beat, and eventually killed her. The event sparked a huge emotional backlash in the country which, correlated with the late response from local law enforcement authorities (19 hours between the emergency call and the intervention), triggered widespread protests and caught the attention of international media. As a consequence, the case itself represented another incident the Kremlin could exploit, using its sharp power toolkit.

The crime scene—Caracal—is located five miles away from Deveselu, a commune located in Olt Country that became well-known after NATO built one of its missile defense systems in Europe in 2015. In May 2016, the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Complex became opera-

<footnote n="35">35 Octavian Racu, "Moscova: SUA se implică direct și cinic în politica internă a Moldovei" [Moscow: The US Are Directly and Cynically Involved in the Republic of Moldova's Domestic Policy], Sputnik, March 28, 2019, https://ro.sputnik.md/moldova/20190328/25316034/Moscova-SUA-se-implica-direct-cinic-politica-interna-Moldovei.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">36 Racu, "Moscova."</footnote>

<footnote n="37">37 Racu, "Moscova."</footnote>

<footnote n="38">38 Dragoș Dumitriu, "Adevăr și curaj: Omul lui Jirinovski a făcut praf NATO ... chiar la București!" [Truth and courage: Zhirinovski's man destroyed NATO ... right at Bucharest], Sputnik, December 13, 2019, https://ro.sputnik.md/Rusia/20191213/28542645/Adevar-si-curaj- Omul-lui-Jirinovski-a-facut-praf-NATO-chiar-la-Bucuresti.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">39 Dumitriu, "Adevăr și curaj."</footnote>

<footnote n="40">40 Dragoș Dumitriu, "Nici Moscova, nici isteriile pro-NATO nu pot ascunde cifrele reale de la Deveselu" [Neither Moscow, Nor pro-NATO Hysteria Cannot Hide the Real Numbers from Deveselu], Sputnik, February 8, 2019, https://ro.sputnik.md/International/20190208/24596258/ Nici-Moscova-nici-isteriile-pro-NATO-nu-pot-ascunde-cifrele-reale-de-la-Deveselu.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">41 Dumitriu, "Nici Moscova, nici isteriile pro-NATO."</footnote>
tional and a target of Russian propaganda in Romania. An article in Sputnik suggests a possible link between the tragedy in Caracal and the NATO military base in Deveselu, stipulating that "it is another sex scandal in which the US military troops are involved."42 To substantiate this information, a report issued by the US Department of Defense is cited that gives "alarming figures" on "the involvement of American soldiers in sex scandals with minors." This report is also connected with the extraction of 95 soldiers from Deveselu.43 Such rhetoric also states that "Romania is on the first place not only in the delivery of girls for the human trafficking networks in the EU, but also in the trafficking of women for the NATO military troops."44 To support this claim, the article in question quotes a former translator from the American base, who reported that she received death threats from American soldiers in Deveselu once she began to inquire about the events that had taken place, declaring, at the same time, that "there would be a real brothel."45

However, Sputnik also tries to combat those who claim that the platform contributes to the dissemination of these narratives considered to be false. As such, "propagandists and manipulators by profession" are blamed for "reinterpreting the information linking the Caracal case to the US base in Deveselu" just to "attribute this to Putin regime's propaganda."46

## CONCLUSION

To sum up, we notice that Putin's Russia exerts malign influence in Romania in all its three forms: sharp power, mimetic power, and dark power. Relating to the sharp power component, the Kremlin primarily aims to penetrate the Romanian political, social, and information environment by undermining NATO's role in Romania, seeding fractures between NATO and the EU, and instrumentalizing the "links" between local organized crime and the presence of NATO bases in Romania. Consequently, between 2016 and 2020, Sputnik Romania-Moldova promoted a series of narratives such as the loss of the "gendarme of the planet" status by the US, the fall of Romania in the trap of "American war propaganda," as well as attributed labels to the country like "CIA branch in the Balkans" or "Cuba of Europe." Other narratives, like a potential "perestroika" launched by Donald Trump in the EU, a possible "resurrection of nationalism and Euroskepticism" by the US, and the "manifestation of independence" from NATO's umbrella have also been instrumental in the process of manipulating Romanian public perceptions, by cultivating the idea that acute fractures indeed exist between the two poles of the Western world: NATO and the EU. Last but not least, the Kremlin exploited the emotional backlash triggered by the tragedy in Caracal to criticize the presence of NATO bases in Romania by making connections between local organized crime (which is involved in human trafficking) and "the needs" of NATO soldiers deployed in Romanian territory.

On the other hand, through mimetic power, Putin's Russia tries to brand itself as a better alternative for Romania, while also blaming NATO's expansion in Eastern Europe. Therefore, NATO is accused of "political interference" in Romania and expansion in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, is also considered a "structure outdated by the new international realities" positioned in Russia's sphere of influence. At the same time, under the narrative of "responding to other aggressions," Moscow promotes itself as a better "alternative" for Bucharest, taking into account that all its intentions are "friendly." Thus, it is obvious that the Kremlin aims to enhance its relations with Bucharest using what it perceives as soft power techniques, even though this is not how the concept of soft power is generally defined.

When exerting its dark power techniques, Putin's Russia promotes rhetoric meant to demonize NATO. As evidenced before, and related to Romania, the Kremlin

<footnote n="42">42 Dragoș Dumitriu, "Armata SUA, lovită oficial: agresiuni sexuale. 'Un mic trafic de influență la București'" [The US Army officially hit: Sexual Aggression. 'A Little Traffic of Influence to Bucharest'], Sputnik, August 2, 2019, https://ro.sputnik.md/analytics/20190802/27107462/Armata-SUA-lovit-oficial-agresiuni-sexuale-Un-mic-trafic-de-influenta-la-Bucuresti.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">43 Dumitriu, "Armata SUA, lovită oficial: agresiuni sexuale."</footnote>

<footnote n="44">44 Dragoș Dumitriu, "Dosar FULMINANT - Bordel în baza SUA de la Kogălniceanu - legătură cu Caracal" [Fulminant Dossier - Brothel in the US Base from Kogălniceanu - ties with Caracal], Sputnik, January 23, 2020, https://ro.sputnik.md/analytics/20200123/28950967/Dosar-Bordel-in-baza-SUA-de-la-Kogălniceanu-legatura-cu-Caracal.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">45 Dumitriu, "Dosar FULMINANT."</footnote>

<footnote n="46">46 Dragoș Dumitriu, "O minciună grosolană se promovează în cazul Deveselu - un fost ministru e implicat" [A Huge Lie is Promoted in Deveselu Case - an ex-Minister is involved], Sputnik, August 14, 2019, https://ro.sputnik.md/politics/20190814/27233208/O-minciuna-grosolana-se-promoveaza-in-cazul-Deveselu-un-fost-ministru-e-implicat.html.</footnote>
bullies both local pro-NATO policymakers who promote the common values and norms of the Alliance in Romania, and advocate for anti-Western critics who come from political or cultural spheres. In this sense, while the Deputy Secretary General of NATO Mircea Geoană is called a "fool" and a "weak man," the US ambassador in Bucharest Adrian Zuckerman is blamed for sharing "fake" information regarding the benefits of Romania's Strategic Partnership with the US, as well as for presenting "false" truths about the communist regime that ruled before 1989. By contrast, the statements of Adrian Năstase and Dan Puric are instrumental for the Kremlin's capacity to diabolize the West, as both actors argued either that NATO "violated" its commitments to stop its "imperialist expansion" towards Eastern Europe or that everything "that is Romanian" must be "annihilated."
<figure><img src="image_23.png" /></figure>

# “OUR GREAT NEIGHBOR RUSSIA”
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RUSSOPHILIA IN GERMANY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE “UKRAINIAN CRISIS”

Kyrylo Tkachenko

HISTORY
CULTURE

<figure><img src="image_24.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_25.png" /></figure>

## ABOUT AUTHOR

### Kyrylo Tkachenko

Historian and sociologist, studied philosophy in Kyiv and Munich. At the present he is doing research on the miners' movement in the Donbas, 1989–1993. Tkachenko authored two books, *The Case of Abu-Jamal* (in German, 2012) and *How Right is the Left?* (in Ukrainian, 2019).

## THE “UKRAINIAN CRISIS” IN THE LIGHT OF AUTHORITARIAN REACTION AND RETREAT OF THE WEST

In 1992, American philosopher Francis Fukuyama published the book *The End of History and the Last Man*. According to Fukuyama, the Soviet Union's defeat in the Cold War would lead to the gradual establishment of Western-oriented democratic regimes around the world. Global history had peaked and humanity's further progress would take place within what Fukuyama believed to be the best form of society's organization. While the American philosopher's statements faced considerable criticism, the phrase "the end of history" almost immediately took off. Indeed, the idea of "the end of history" can be perceived as a too-optimistic and somewhat naïve forecast, which many would want to take as fact. Moreover, it can be criticized as an ideological expression of the euphoria of those who emerged victorious from the Cold War. However, it should be kept in mind that the idea of "the end of history" was based on fundamental changes in global politics. It was not only in Eastern Europe that authoritarian regimes faced their end; throughout the 1990s, they fell in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia.<fnref n="1" /> Meanwhile, the dominant position of the US seemed undeniable.

Following Fukuyama's phrasing, the changes in global politics after 2014 can be called "the end of 'the

end of history.'" With China increasing its economic and military power, the United States' dominance no longer seems indisputable, and authoritarian regimes such as Putin's in the Russian Federation or Erdoğan's in Turkey have learned to oppose the West effectively. This new challenge of authoritarian regimes to the West is not limited to diplomatic tensions or propaganda directed at Western societies. It includes Russia's interference in electoral processes in the US and the UK, and military interventions to expand state borders (in Ukraine) or support other "anti-Western" authoritarian regimes (in Syria). In both of these cases, Russia's military intervention succeeded—in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, and its intervention in 2015 saved Bashar al-Assad's authoritarian regime from defeat in a brutal civil war. Both cases mark two important precedents. The annexation of Crimea was the first annexation on the European continent since World War II. Of course, state borders changed multiple times between 1945 and 2014 in Europe, and attempts at annexations took place in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, the first successful annexation in Europe following World War II certainly poses a greater threat to global security than, for example, the annexation of Tibet by China. In the case of Crimea's annexation, the crisis of the international security system is further aggravated by the fact that Ukraine had previously voluntarily given up an enormous arsenal of nuclear weapons inherited from the USSR in exchange for security guarantees (although these were not supported by specific commitments), including Russia's assurances that it would "respect the independence,

<footnote n="1">1 Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World* (New York: Times Book, 2008).</footnote>
sovereignty and existing borders" of Ukraine.<fnref n="2" />

The authoritarian reaction is accompanied by two distinctly linked phenomena that we could designate as the simultaneous *retreat* and *contraction* of the West. The Russian intervention in Syria did indeed set a new precedent. Retention of power by dictators despite large-scale protests in their country against the backdrop of diplomatic isolation by Western countries can hardly be called an exception; this happened several times during the period from 1991 to 2014. A new feature in Syria's case was the retreat of the West following the intervention of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah (joined a bit later by Turkey, which occupied parts of northern Syria). In the case of Syria, the West's retreat was literal—the reduction of the American military presence was provoked first by Russian and then Turkish interventions. The reduction of the military presence and the cessation of support for opposition to the Assad regime forces were accompanied by a retreat on the diplomatic front: after the Russian intervention in 2015, the number of diplomatic expressions of "concern" in connection with what was happening in Syria sharply decreased, and the proposed Obama administration plan to limit the activities of Assad's aviation by establishing a flight-free zone in Syria was never discussed again.

Although the West's response to Russia's intervention in Ukraine cannot be called a retreat, it appears to ambivalent in nature. On the one hand, no Western state has recognized the legitimacy of the annexation of Crimea; on the other hand, the policy of deterring Russia can be justifiably called a compromise. The sanctions imposed by the West are rather symbolic, and the implementation of joint projects such as Nord Stream 2 undermines their already limited economic efficiency.

The *retreat* of the West—its readiness to concede in the face of Russia's aggressive actions—is accompanied by processes in the Western countries themselves that we refer to as the *contraction* of the West. This concept entails both the growth of nationalist, authoritarian, and conservative trends in Western countries themselves and the contradictions between them generated by this growth. These processes have led to the UK leaving the European Union and significant erosion of democratic institutions in EU member states such as Hungary and Poland. At the transatlantic level, Donald Trump's rhetoric has called into question the United States' readiness to meet its obli-

gations within NATO.

Naturally, democratic institutions in many Western countries may prove stronger and more resilient than some skeptics would like to believe (as demonstrated by the 2020 presidential election in the US). Furthermore, authoritarian regimes, including the ones in Russia and China, may turn out to have "feet of clay," surprising bystanders with an unexpected, crushing fall following mass protests. In any case, it does make sense to highlight the existence and interlinkage of such trends as authoritarian responses and the West's retreat/contraction. It is in this context that we should view the events known in the Western public discourse as "the Ukrainian crisis." The 2014 anti-authoritarian revolution in Ukraine and Russia's subsequent military intervention are part of a broader standoff. Opposing an authoritarian response requires coordinated simultaneous effort on many fronts, and Ukraine is undoubtedly among the most important ones. One of the reasons for the West's ambivalent response to the events in Ukraine is the persistence of cultural and historic stereotypes connected with a lack of understanding of Ukraine's history and of the nature of relations between Ukraine and Russia. In this article, we aim to show how Ukraine's insufficient presence on the mental map of modern German society affected the perception of "the Ukrainian crisis" in Germany and led to the (relative) success of the Kremlin narrative. Since Eastern Europe remains one of the main areas of confrontation between the West and Russia, cultural work aimed at filling such "blank spots" as Ukraine and Belarus not only has obvious intrinsic value but is also essential to preparing comprehensive measures aimed at curbing the Kremlin's revanchist actions effectively and for the long term.

## SYMPTOMATIC ASPECTS OF THE RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS IN UKRAINE

In 2014, the most pro-Kremlin positions concerning the Ukrainian crisis on the Germain political landscape were occupied by the far left and the far right. Political heavyweights both in the ranks (represented in the Bundestag) of the far-left Die Linke (The Left) party and the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) party accused the West of supporting "regime change" in Ukraine, "provoking" the annexation of Crimea, and generally pursuing an irresponsible, aggressive policy towards Russia. At the same time, left-wing politicians in the Bundestag did not hesitate to spread messages that

<footnote n="2">2 Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_1994_1399.pdf.</footnote>
Euromaidan was funded by USD 5 billion, that there is a "Joseph Goebbels party school" in Ukraine, and even that the trident on Ukraine's national coat of arms is a Nazi symbol.<fnref n="3" /> Meanwhile, statements by leading AfD politicians demonstrated a high level of loyalty to Russian leadership, as well as anti-Americanism and Euroscepticism.

The convergence of rhetoric between the German far right and far left reached the point where the leading politician of Die Linke, Gregor Gysi, called for the division of spheres of influence between the US and Russia (evidently supporting Ukraine ending up in the Russian sphere of influence). Further, the leader of the far-right National Democratic Party, Udo Voigt, in his criticism of NATO and the US (which, according to him, provoked the annexation of Crimea), used rhetoric that was indistinguishable from the statements made by "anti-imperialists" and "pacifists" on the left.<fnref n="4" /> The same is true for popular left and right publications—after 2014, passages concerning Ukraine and Russia could be safely swapped without readers even noticing that they came from newspapers or magazines belonging to the opposite political camp. The same trend can be traced in the program documents for both parties, in the votes of Die Linke and AfD in the Bundestag and the European Parliament, and in symbolic actions, such as visits of representatives of both

parties to the occupied Crimea and Donbas.<fnref n="5" /> It should be noted that the pro-Russian stance is generally consistent with the attitudes dominant among the supporters of Die Linke and AfD. According to one opinion poll conducted in 2016, the supporters of both parties place higher levels of trust in Vladimir Putin more than in Angela Merkel (supporters in other parties in the Bundestag do not share these high levels of trust in Putin).<fnref n="6" />

In 2014-2015, the convergence of interpretations of "the Ukrainian crisis" among the far left and the far right became especially noticeable for German society in connection with the so-called Monday Demonstrations (Montagdemos). The organizers and the participants claimed to be rallying "for peace"; however, the general attitudes of the Monday Demonstrations were pro-Russian and anti-Western. The main initiators of the "new peace movement" were two adherents of conspiracy theories and one far-right publicist. However, the Monday Demonstrations attracted more than just right-wing supporters. An opinion poll showed that the largest faction among the participants was actually the voters of Die Linke.<fnref n="7" /> Despite the notoriety of the movement initiators (one of them was known for overt antisemitism<fnref n="8" />), Die Linke representatives up to and including Bundestag members

<footnote n="3">3 Speech by co-chair of the Die Linke faction Sahra Wagenknecht in Bundestag, 07.07.2016; speech by co-chair of the Die Linke faction Dietmar Bartsch in the talk show Maybrit Illner, 23.10.2014; press releave by a Die Linke member Wolfgang Gehrke (Sahra Wagenknecht, Die agilsten Gegner Europas sitzen heute in Brussel, http://www.sahra-wagenknecht.de/de/article/2391.die-agilsten-gegner-europas-sitzen-inbr%C3%Bcssel.html; Dietmar Bartsch, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2gXkpu4TiBA; Wolfgang Gehrke, Pressemitteilung vom 15.09.2014, http://linksfraktion.de/pressemitteilungen/nato-manoever-nazi-symbolen-sofort-beenden; http://archive.fo/JegGH).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4 This includes, among other things, numerous presentations by Udo Voigt in the European Parliament, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GU8dPHI8M04, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLNxKV3fPrs, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wnvr2sWN9Y.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">5 To find out more about the visits of AfG representatives to Crimea and Donbass, see Marlene Laurelle, Ellen Rivera, Collusion or Homegrown Collaboration? Connections between German Far Right and Russia (Political Capital, 2019), 16-19, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344221694_Collusion_or_Homegrown_Collaboration_C Connections Between German Far Right and Russia_Political Capital_Budapest/link/5f5d6ef34585154dbbce103f/download. To find out more about the visits of Die Linke representatives to Crimea and Donbass, see Anton Shekhovtsov, "German Die Linke delegation visits right-wing terrorists in Eastern Ukraine," Anton Shekhovtsov's Blog, February 19, 2015, http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2015/02/german-die-linke-delegation-visits.html. For a detailed analysis of the role of the far right as "election observers," see Anton Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 101-131.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6 "Viele Anhänger von AfD und Die Linke vertrauen Putin mehr als Merkel [Many AfD and Die Linke Supporters Trust Putin More than Merkel]," Die Zeit, August 31, 2016, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-08/wladimir-putin-deutschland-afd-anhaengervertrauen.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">7 Priska Daphi et al., Occupy Frieden: Eine Befragung der Teilnehmer/innen der "Mahwachen für Frieden" [Occupy Peace: A Survey of Participants of "Demonstrations for Peace"] (Berlin: Technische Universität, 2014), 21, https://depositonce.tu-berlin.de/bitstream/11303/5260/3/occupy-frieden.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">8 Ken Jebsen, "Die Terrorlüge wird 10 Jahre alt [The Fiction about the Terrorist Attack Turns Ten]", https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hTG5F5vHna8&t=215s; Ken Jebsen, "Zionistischer Rassismus [Zionist Racism]", https://archive.org/details/KenfmZionistischerRassismusOpferGuenter-Grass; Ken Jebsen, "Kai-ROH", http://archive.is/ek0Pz.</footnote>