# When a forest is masked by trees: How French subsurface industries involved in decarbonisation and transition policies are instrumentalising poor social acceptance

Xavier Arnauld de Sartre, Sébastien Chailleux

► To cite this version:

Xavier Arnauld de Sartre, Sébastien Chailleux. When a forest is masked by trees: How French subsurface industries involved in decarbonisation and transition policies are instrumentalising poor social acceptance. Energy Research & Social Science, 2026, 132, 10.1016/j.erss.2025.104517. halshs-05485920

HAL Id: halshs-05485920

https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05485920v1

Submitted on 30 Jan 2026

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.

<figure><img src="image_1.png" /></figure>

Distributed under a Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 - Attribution - International License
Original research article

# When a forest is masked by trees: How French subsurface industries involved in decarbonisation and transition policies are instrumentalising poor social acceptance☆

Xavier Arnauld de Sartre<sup>a,*</sup>, Sébastien Chailleux<sup>b</sup>

<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>

## ARTICLE INFO

**Keywords:**

Social acceptance

Subsurface

Carbon capture and storage

Shale gas

Mining

Energy transition

## ABSTRACT

Many policy-makers and industrialists consider that, over and above technology, social acceptance is the main obstacle to any decarbonised industrial use of the subsurface. Our aim in this paper is to challenge – and criticise – this point of view, by showing that even if a lack of social acceptance can explain the non-deployment of some subsurface technologies, generalising this explanation to every industrial failure hides – sometimes intentionally – the different reasons explaining why various promises from subsurface industries have failed to materialise in France. Through an analysis of three subsurface industries over a period of 15 years (underground carbon storage, shale gas development and mining prospects), this article shows how a coalition of subsurface industries and policymakers have built up a narrative emphasising the lack of social acceptability. We first show why the narratives about the lack of social acceptance fail to describe the various conflicts and project failures, and then categorise three different ways the lack of social acceptance is used to describe opponents, hide other reasons for failure and obtain policy reforms. We discuss the limitations of these frames to promote energy transition projects and the use of the very notion of social acceptance.

## 1. Introduction

While decarbonisation and transition policies are slowly driving investments towards more sustainable modes of production, subsurface industries have been pursuing diversification and transition strategies that have succeeded in becoming part of the portfolio of solutions to tackle climate change. The mining industry today is central to decarbonisation policies that encompass the development of wind and solar energy, but also to efficiency policies based on digitisation, which also all rely on material resources [1–5]. Other industries have followed suit: oil and gas companies are now leading the push for underground carbon storage [6–8], while continuing to promote natural gas as a ‘bridging’ fuel, especially in association with shale gas development [9–13]. Along with other infrastructure and renewable energy projects, these decarbonisation and transition policies and projects often generate protest, and their promoters tend to frame opposition as a matter of social acceptance, i.e. an opposition based on either a lack of understanding of the project, or a lack of trust in its promoters. Although this explanation

has shortcomings that prevent a full understanding of opposition to decarbonisation projects, the framing of such opposition as essentially a matter of social acceptance endures. Now, considering social acceptability solely through the lens of sporadic opposition – rather than as a broader process of building the legitimacy of a policy, sector, or project [14,15] – does not account for the diversity of mechanisms at play in social acceptance. Our aim here is to understand why these narratives of lacking social acceptability persist and what purpose they serve.

In this article, we analyse not only how this explanation overemphasises the role of social acceptance, but also how it allows many actors to mask their own failures. We shed light on the social construction of a public problem – that of social acceptance – by a heterogeneous coalition of actors from subsurface industries, government administration and public and semi-public research centres and agencies. Analysing how these actors have constructed the problem of social acceptance of subsurface projects, we show how the issue of social acceptance may be instrumental in masking other aspects that explain industrial and political failures. We conclude with the risks of delay in

<footnote><sup>a</sup> CNRS, Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, UMR TREE, Pau, France</footnote>

<footnote><sup>b</sup> Sciences Po Bordeaux, Université de Bordeaux, CNRS, Centre Emile Durkheim, Pessac, France</footnote>

<footnote>* This work was supported by the French national research agency, as a France 2030 program (grant reference ANR-22-PESP-0011).</footnote>

<footnote>* Corresponding author at: Institut des Sciences de la Terre (ISTerre), CNRS, Université Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, France.
E-mail addresses: xavier.arnauld@cnrs.fr (X. Arnauld de Sartre), s.chailleux@sciencespobordeaux.fr (S. Chailleux).</footnote>
meeting carbon neutrality targets that arise from specious debates about social acceptance.

## 2. Social acceptance of subsurface industries as a constructed public concern

Considering the social world in terms of its willingness to accept an infrastructure or technology project has a major performative effect on policymakers and industrial actors [16]. This is not surprising given the history of this notion that came from management science. Batel's review of the literature about social acceptance of transition projects suggests three waves or approaches [17]. The first, developed in the 1990s, was normative and one-sided, favouring the proponents of a transition project (e.g. development of renewables): it aimed to explain projects and lessen any social protest, which was framed as a NIMBY problem ('Not In My Back Yard'), where the only opponents are neighbours protecting their own interests and/or misunderstanding the project (which is never criticised). The 'criticism approach' developed in the 2000s criticises the NIMBY explanation and sets out to examine the socio-psychological and community factors underlying opposition. However, most studies were still implicitly framing social opposition as a form of deviant behaviour to be overcome. The latest type of approach is critical, takes the wider socio-political and economic system into account and openly discusses the nature of transition projects, which can be unfair, undemocratic and a means of perpetuating the neoliberal capitalist system [18]. In this case, social acceptability is not just a matter of contesting projects at a given moment, but a process of working with social and political actors to build legitimacy and fair conditions for the development of a sector in general and projects in particular.

However, despite advances in the literature about social acceptability, the analytical perspective over social acceptance does not transfer towards projects' promoters who still use the narrative of the lack of social acceptance to characterise the opposition to their projects. The reason is simple: by targeting the capitalist mode of accumulation as the main reason for opposition, the critical approaches expose, in many instances, the unfair characteristics of transition projects and thus justify opposition to them de facto [19,20]. Of the many solutions suggested to overcome public resistance, most are undemocratic ways of imposing ecological modernisation as the only means to achieve carbon neutrality [21]. In other words, interpreting social protest as a matter of a lack of social acceptance generally leads to the implementation of policy tools able to keep criticism in check [22]. Therefore, framing opposition as a matter of social acceptability can have powerful public and policy impacts that need to be questioned.

Our contribution addresses a different interpretation of the issue 'the lack of social acceptance' in relation to subsurface industries. Based on the third (critical) approach to social acceptability, we put forward the process of social construction of risk to underline how those players circulating the 'issue of social acceptance' are at the same time hiding other weaknesses of their projects. In doing so, they construct a new social problem, 'the lack of social acceptance', which will sometimes justify 'anticipatory regulation' [23]. Interpretative and constructivist policy analysis [24-27] stresses the role of narratives and coalitions in pushing forward policy change [24,28,29], by identifying causal relations, victims, culprits and potential solutions [30-32] to explain a failure. By analysing the social construction of the lack of social acceptance issue, we aim to underline how the actors who are framing this issue also tend to mask other explanations for their failures, while at the same time paving the way for policies they would wish to see. It is now well known that overemphasising a risk is a way of building strategic ignorance [33,34] in order to highlight an issue - in this case, that of social acceptability - that will mask other issues. But it can also serve other agendas: overemphasising a risk can, for instance, lead to building a solution around that risk. In this case, it can help to promote administrative simplification in order, for instance, to lessen the pressure

social movements are able to put upon industrial projects. But this point is hard to demonstrate, since most of the meetings occur behind closed doors in what Culpepper calls 'quiet politics' [35], which can be harder for researchers to access. Even if we cannot demonstrate which agendas are served by strategic ignorance, we can bring out the questions it raises.

## 3. Materials and method: grid analysis of the social construction of a public problem

### 3.1. Framework of the study

In the following analyses, we aim to analyse how supporters of subsurface industries have framed opposition to their policies and projects. We will differentiate between (1) analyses of attempts to deploy three underground systems and (2) the discourse surrounding the difficulties of deployment, which are mainly focus on the lack of social acceptance. To achieve this, we will examine the various competing strategies [30] and redefinitions of framing [24,28,29] in both public and closed arenas.

We distinguished three types of arenas according to their openness to participation and the level of conflict. We differentiated between public forums such as the media or debates in Parliament, which are open and highly conflictual; political arenas such as inter-ministerial committees, which are closed but still very conflictual; and confidential circles such as government departments, which are closed and homogeneous. Policy decisions occur across all these arenas, but problems and solutions are forged in one or another, which contributes to placing the emphasis on particular aspects and to legitimate identities.

We built two analytical grids of the debates in these arenas (Tables 1 and 2).

Our first analytical grid aims to analyse how the three subsurface industries were framed prior to their failures. To achieve this, we characterise, for each industry, who the main coalitions of actors are competing with, what are the main problems constructed, what are the main solutions proposed and what are the main battlegrounds. These four dimensions are studied together because our contention is that they influence each other, given that the actors' statements are made in specific settings or arenas that determine the legitimacy of both the actors and their statements [36,37]. For each of our cases, we built a matrix to compare the main coalitions of actors who are competing to become the owners of a public problem [38], how they frame both problems and solutions and where they defend their stances. Our analysis distinguishes how supporters of subsurface industries initially defined an issue and suggested how their industry would be a solution, how opponents framed that industry as an issue, how the supporters responded to that and, finally, what was the government's decision.

We then compared how the problem of social acceptability was constructed in each case. To do so, we distinguished three kinds of discourses of the lack of social acceptance, according to the arena in which they are produced (closed circles, public forum or political arena) and the time frame they serve (during, after, and long after the conflict). These three types of discourse focus on different narratives and fulfil different functions: explaining the lack of trust or scientific culture of opponents, hiding the other reasons of the failure, or obtaining policy reforms [16]. We develop further these functions in the discussion section.

### 3.2. Cases and materials

We analysed three cases in France. Our analysis of the first grid is

<table><caption>Table 1</caption><thead><tr><td>Coalitions</td><td>Definition of problem (s)</td><td>Proposed solutions</td><td>Main debating arena</td></tr></thead></table>
<table><caption>**Table 2**</caption><thead><tr><th>Type of space of debate</th><th>Closed circles</th><th>Public forum</th><th>Political arena</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Timeframe</td><td>During or just after the conflicts</td><td>Analysing the conflict</td><td>Narratives about of the conflict long after</td></tr><tr><td>Use of the argument of social acceptance</td><td>Defining opponents</td><td>Hiding other reasons for failure</td><td>Gaining political support and obtaining policy reforms</td></tr></tbody></table>

based on previous publications (we provide a synthesis for each case), while our analysis of the second grid is based on original data. France exemplifies an overall revival of subsurface industries associated with climate concerns. Indeed, industrialists proposed new projects in the 2000s in the name of decarbonisation, after decades of decline. This article summarises three distinct research projects, each focusing on a particular industry. One, a PhD in political science (2011–2015), studied shale gas, while two post docs investigated CCUS (2017–2018) and mining relocation (2019–2020). Except for the PhD on shale gas, the research was conducted under two academic chairs investigating how industrial projects relating to the energy transition and the subsurface were developed in France.

All three research projects draw on similar data sources: semi-constructed interviews, press and document analysis and participatory observations. The interviews used in this article were conducted with representatives from the relevant industry, local and central government, local and national officials, and experts. 28 interviews were conducted for shale gas (2012–2014), 15 for carbon storage (2017–2018) and 12 for mining (2019–2020). The interviews were used to draw up a timeline of key events with the help of a press analysis. We sought to understand the role of the actors we met, how they interacted with each other, how they defined different situations and what action they engaged in. Interviews were not coded, they were used as testimonies from key players in the policy process. The participatory observations covered various scientific events concerning subsurface industries. These interviews and observations were key to analyse the discourse about social acceptance. The press analysis drew on a corpus of French press articles from the Europresse database, which included 599 articles on shale gas between 2008 and 2012, 579 articles on CCS between 2002 and 2017 and 699 articles on mining between 2010 and 2017. Qualitative analysis of these articles gave us a timeline for the main narratives in the media and identified the actors cited in the main national and local press. Articles were coded manually given the bottom-up construction of the main arguments and categories of actors. While press analysis plays a secondary role in this article, it helps us gather public discourse from proponents of subsurface industries about their opponents.

### 3.3. The overestimated role of ‘lack of social acceptance’ in three subsurface industries failures

#### 3.3.1. The meteoric career of shale gas

The trajectory of shale gas in France coincided with a time of waning economic and political interest in the subsurface in France (Table 3). During the 1990s, while major companies left the oil and gas resources that remained for conventional extraction to smaller companies, industrial and political interest for subsurface progressively decreased [39]. When in the mid-2000s applications for exploration licences targeting unconventional resources (coalbed methane, shale oil and gas, tight gas – 64 licences were under assessment in 2011) arose, civil servants welcomed the renewal of their activities. They saw neither novelty nor risk in the use of hydraulic fracturing. Oil companies were fragmented in their approach to shale oil and gas – most existing players in the conventional oil sector had little interest, instead seeing the arrival of new and speculative companies as a risk to their sector's reputation.

<table><caption>**Table 3**
Shale gas trajectory.</caption><tbody><tr><td>2007–2010</td><td>Licences delivered for shale oil (12) and shale gas (3) (64 under assessment)</td></tr><tr><td>December 2010</td><td>First public meeting against shale gas</td></tr><tr><td>January 2011</td><td>First government response: business-as-usual</td></tr><tr><td>February 2011</td><td>Second government response: moratorium and expert commission + the Ministry of the Environment envisions a reform of the Mining Code</td></tr><tr><td>March 2011</td><td>Third government response: ban on hydraulic fracturing</td></tr><tr><td>June 2011</td><td>The ban comes into law (Loi Jacob 2011–835)</td></tr><tr><td>October 2011</td><td>The most contested licences are cancelled</td></tr><tr><td>Summer 2012</td><td>Attempt to reverse the ban: shale gas would bring economic growth</td></tr><tr><td>Autumn 2013</td><td>Attempt to reverse the ban: exploration = science and progress</td></tr></tbody></table>

As in the USA, the first companies involved were junior companies looking for economic opportunity. While each company had its own rationale for requesting a licence, the main narrative was about ‘exploring’ to see what lies beneath the surface.

Unconventional oil and gas became a hot social and political topic in France almost overnight as a result of flash mobilisation [40,41]. Protests spread rapidly, first against shale gas licences in south-eastern France, then spreading to shale oil licences in the Paris Basin. As well as denouncing the lack of participatory governance in granting licences, the protests succeeded in ascribing a new public definition to hydraulic fracturing as a threat to the environment and to public health and also in winning over most of French officialdom to that definition [42]. The emergence of this new public problem led to a ban on hydraulic fracturing within just six months, which is a very short time for political processes in France. The Minister for the Environment was preparing a reform of the French mining regulation in order to address one of the criticisms about the lack of public participation (reform drafted in confidential arenas), but she was outflanked by MPs who submitted a proposal for a ban that gradually gathered political and governmental support (ban discussed in public forums). For the government, shale gas became a political problem: despite its modest size, the social movement destabilised the government as MPs seized the momentum to criticise the Prime Minister. Ultimately, the government sided with the ban in a move to assert its authority over the growing problem (Table 4).

No support for shale gas was voiced during this period, although some timid reminders of the American experience were expressed to journalists (balance of trade, royalties, jobs, energy independence). Companies were in disarray over the issue and disagreed over the value

<table><caption>**Table 4**
Main coalitions and narratives about shale gas.</caption><thead><tr><th>Coalitions</th><th>Problem(s)</th><th>Proposed solutions</th><th>Main debating arena</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Local collectives against shale gas supported by local officials, then by national MPs</td><td>Environmental impacts and risks; degradation of landscapes and way of life; undemocratic decision-making process</td><td>Cancellation of licences, then ban on hydraulic fracturing</td><td>Public forum</td></tr><tr><td>Junior oil and gas companies supported by the government department granting licences</td><td>Redeveloping the oil potential of the French subsurface; reducing balance of trade deficit; participating in the shale gas boom</td><td>Developing shale gas exploration, then supporting innovation and reforming mining regulations</td><td>Confidential circle</td></tr><tr><td>French government</td><td>Social unrest, lack of social acceptance</td><td>Reforming mining regulations, then suspension of the licences, then ban on hydraulic fracturing</td><td>Political arena and public forum</td></tr></tbody></table>
of unconventional oil and gas. Supporters only reacted after the ban passed into law in 2011. Two main attempts to reopen exploration in 2012 and 2013 were organised but they failed. In the end, the whole oil and gas industry were progressively targeted in 2017 with a law forbidding new exploration licences and forecasting the end of exploitation by 2040.

### 3.4. The slow and highly incomplete process of deconfinement of geological CO₂ storage

CCS was imagined in the 1970s to remove the CO₂ emitted by industrial activities from the atmosphere by storing it in underground geological formations (Table 5). European research programmes have supported CCS development as a means of minimising climate change since 1993, with the aim of demonstrating the feasibility of fulfilling its technological promise [43]. France was among the main supporters despite low national interest in implementing the technique [44]: French political support is mostly aimed at establishing national expertise to be exported worldwide. Linking CCS to the climate agenda was central to its development and funding [45]. An EU directive in 2009 required all member states to update their mining regulations to include underground carbon storage, so that demonstrators could be supported. The latter were costly, so the Commission set up a funding scheme in 2008 to provide €300 million in credits from the EU ETS to fund 12 demonstrator units by 2020. CCS projects were developed in the UK, the Netherlands and Germany targeting coal-fired units but also cement and steel production and oil refining. Only two CCS projects had emerged in France by 2020 (capture projects were developed but mostly without a storage solution): the failed ULCOS (Ultra Low Carbon Steel) project in Florange and Total's successful Chapelle-de-Rousse project (South West). In this case, the opposition was relatively minor and did not stop the project. However, opponents raised questions about the safety of the technique, potential leaks, seismicity and impacts on surface activities such as growing and selling wine. Consultative tools were implemented to channel opposition.

CCS failed to take off in Europe as planned, mostly for economic and political reasons in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008. The financial crisis slowed both economic growth and GHG emissions, making it less relevant to implement CCS and contributing to devalue the EU ETS. The IEA notes that USD$30bn in funding was announced between 2007 and 2010, but less than USD$3bn was actually spent [46]. In 2012, the negative economic narrative prevailed over the narrative about CCS being a strategic investment and remained strong afterwards [47], reflecting the cycle of hype and disillusionment that appeared in the UK [48]. In the EU, CCS became more marginal among ways of tackling GHG emissions in the energy sector and projects were redirected towards heavy industry. Power companies backed away from the supporting platforms. None of the twelve European demonstrators had been developed, except for the Total demonstrator funded by private-sector investment, the development schedule was clearly outdated, and no major onshore storage sites had been identified. In France, CCS development was also hampered by a lack of political support. Managed by the Ministry of the Environment, it was seen as a marginal solution

<table><caption>**Table 5**
The carbon capture and storage trajectory.</caption><tr><td>1993</td><td>First research project at EU level</td></tr><tr><td>2008</td><td>Creation of the NER300 funding scheme for CCUS</td></tr><tr><td>2009</td><td>European Directive about CCUS</td></tr><tr><td>2010–2013</td><td>Total develops its industrial pilot in Lacq</td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>Failed Arcelor-Mittal CCS project in Florange</td></tr><tr><td>2014</td><td>IPCC gives credit to CCUS</td></tr><tr><td>2015</td><td>COP21 acknowledges the legitimacy of negative emission technologies</td></tr><tr><td>2018</td><td>France targets carbon neutrality</td></tr><tr><td>2023</td><td>New political support to CCUS</td></tr><tr><td>2024</td><td>The French regulatory commission for energy proposes a framework to develop onshore underground storage in France</td></tr></table>

but also as a solution promoted by oil companies. One civil servant explained that it was difficult for a Minister of the Environment to be seen shaking hands with oil companies and promoting what would have been seen as 'greenwashing' (Table 6).

Unlike hydraulic fracturing, however, CCS has remained in the European and French political portfolio because it has adapted to criticism, especially by developing narratives around carbon neutrality. A new EU-level funding scheme emerged in the early 2020s and all climate policy roadmaps include CCS to tackle emissions not related to power generation. Since 2023, CCS has gained traction in the French government with the transfer of the dedicated department to the Ministry for Industry. A roadmap was published in 2023 with targets for capture and storage. While most of the storage should be offshore, a small share remains onshore, reopening the possibility to develop new projects such as the Pycasso project in South-western France, which was again criticised and failed. CCS remains marginal because the business model is weak but it is still powerful because, in the long term, the scenario on decarbonisation relied on it to be coherent.

#### 3.4.1. A missed opportunity for mining revival

Mining activities are now residual in mainland France since a massive decline since the 1980s for economic and environmental reasons, but also as a result of disinvestment by the French state. In the 2000s, French mining policy and industry were directed towards international markets and investments in mining projects abroad [49]. But this strategy has been undermined since the end of the 2000s, when questions of security of supply resurfaced [50,51], in connection with the European Commission's Raw Materials Initiative of 2008. In France, it was not so much French mining players that were involved in putting this supply problem on the agenda as certain ministerial departments (Table 7).

Parts of the policy for supply security reflect a push for renewed explorations of the subsurface in mainland France, but reinvestment by the State has remained symbolic and unstable. A dozen exploration permits were issued between 2011 and 2015 to junior exploration companies, a first in France after 30 years of decline. The size of potentially interesting deposits in France did not arouse much interest among the major mining companies [52]. Starting in 2012, this revival found a leading political proponent in the Minister for Industry, Arnaud

<table><caption>**Table 6**
Main coalitions and narratives about CCS.</caption><thead><tr><th>Coalitions</th><th>Problem(s)</th><th>Proposed solutions</th><th>Main debating arena</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Local collectives against CCS in Chapelle-de-Rousse</td><td>Environmental impacts and risks; undemocratic decision-making process</td><td>Better social and environmental assessment; for some: cancelling the project</td><td>Public forum</td></tr><tr><td>National experts and industrialists</td><td>Climate change and carbon taxes, public and political pressure</td><td>Supporting innovation, decarbonisation, avoiding carbon leakage</td><td>Confidential circle</td></tr><tr><td>National experts and industrialists</td><td>Local opposition; lack of understanding among the local population; ideological opposition; lack of social acceptance</td><td>Pedagogy, local public debate</td><td>Public forum</td></tr><tr><td>French government</td><td>Little interest in French climate goals, low availability of domestic storage sites</td><td>Exporting expertise, waiting for industrial support</td><td>Confidential circle</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>**Table 7**
Mining revival trajectory.</caption><tr><td>2008</td><td>European Raw Materials Initiative</td></tr><tr><td>2011</td><td>Creation of the National Committee for Strategic Minerals</td></tr><tr><td>2011–2015</td><td>About a dozen new exploration permits</td></tr><tr><td>2012–2014</td><td>Ministry of Industry supports ‘Mining Revival’</td></tr><tr><td>2015</td><td>Responsible Mining Initiative</td></tr><tr><td>2015–2016</td><td>Virulent protests in Brittany</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>Brittany permits abandoned</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>Reform of the Mining Code</td></tr><tr><td>2023</td><td>New permits for lithium and materials needed for the energy transition</td></tr></table>

Montebourg, who incorporated in 2013 it into his grand narrative on deglobalisation and his policy for economic patriotism and reinvestment in industry by the state [53]. However, his support went no further than a declaration of intent and does not commit any new instruments for public action or any new budgetary resources.

This economic opportunity was supported by private actors but their projects were soon faced with ecological criticisms. Opponents of mining projects, mainly located in Brittany [54], criticised the environmental damage that was likely to ensue from the wide range of risks the projects entailed, including air, surface and groundwater pollution. Opponents also criticised the regulatory framework, the inadequacy of public debate and the ‘denial of democracy’ shown in regional and local areas [52]. Explorations also stalled because of the activists’ actions: landowners refused to admit prospecting teams on foot, mayors refused to authorise aerial mapping of prospecting zones, etc. In the wake of the presidential election in which E. Macron became President, local MPs helped by N. Hulot, who as Minister for the Environment had banned fossil fuel extraction in France, announced an end to mining projects in Brittany in June 2017. In the years that followed, all the remaining projects were also revoked or cancelled.

Social mobilisation contributed to the cancellation of the permits, but other factors also weakened the initial proposal. While Montebourg's narratives were based on resource nationalism and reindustrialisation, explorations were conducted by junior companies in accordance with a neoliberal model based on speculation and global value chains. Their funding model relied on assembling a portfolio of licences and developing the potential of the resources they discovered in order to boost the value of their shares on the market [55]. Variscan's ambivalent discourse was denounced by most opponents who claimed that the company's economic promises were spurious because there was every chance that they would sell on the exploitation of any resources discovered. More worryingly, many licences concerned previously mined areas in which the quality of the resources had declined, but as prices went higher, old sites were reopened. The problem with renewed explorations was that it reopened the issue of post-mining management, whose importance has been underestimated in many cases.

After this first wave of failed projects, a second one developed in the early 2020s, accompanied with a reform of the mining regulation in 2022. The reform includes a better environmental and social assessments (see Table 8). The new exploration projects looked like the previous ones but one project was put in the fore front to exemplify the will to develop new value chain for energy transition: the extraction and processing of lithium in central France. Led by the major company Imerys, the project was presented as the state of the art for consultative procedure and integrative shape from extraction to the production of EV batteries.

### 3.5. Narratives of lack of social acceptance by sector

While the causes of project failures are multifactorial, it is striking to note that a discourse of lack of social acceptability has been constructed to explain the failures of these three sectors.

<table><caption>**Table 8**
Main coalitions and narratives about mining.</caption><thead><tr><th>Coalitions</th><th>Problem(s)</th><th>Proposed solutions</th><th>Main debating arena</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Local collectives against mining projects in Brittany supported by local officials</td><td>Environmental impacts and risks; degradation of landscapes and way of life; undemocratic decision-making process</td><td>Cancelling the projects</td><td>Public forum</td></tr><tr><td>Administrative departments and Ministers for Industry</td><td>Dependence on China for minerals; need for energy transition; threat to French industries</td><td>National sovereignty, economic opportunity, need for explorations,</td><td>Confidential circle</td></tr><tr><td>Junior mining companies and some government agencies</td><td>Opposition, lack of understanding from local population; ideological opposition; lack of social acceptance</td><td>Economic opportunity, pedagogy</td><td>Public forum</td></tr><tr><td>French government</td><td>Social unrest; lack of social acceptance</td><td>Public debate, supporting good practices, reforming mining regulations, then abandoning the projects</td><td>Political arena</td></tr></tbody></table>

#### 3.5.1. ‘The lack of’ – discrete narratives during of just after the conflicts

The first discourse on opponents is a fairly conventional one which is consubstantial with the notion of a lack of social acceptability. It is a discourse that characterises opponents in negative terms: their position is explained by a lack. This discourse aims ultimately to complain about a negative politicisation of the subsurface relying on ignorance.

The discourse describing this lack of social acceptability highlights four different types of shortcoming: technical ignorance; procedural ignorance, whereby opponents fail to distinguish between exploration and exploitation; weaknesses in existing information systems, which prevent discussion with the public; and inappropriate deviant behaviour. While we find these shortcomings in all cases, the case of shale gas is the most illustrative. After shale gas was banned in 2011, shale gas promoters tried to reopen the possibility of exploration. This episode in 2012 and 2013 shows how they framed the lack of social acceptance. The crusade was led not by companies or politicians but rather by research centres and experts with the help of a few MPs who denounced supporters of the ban as obscurantist and against the very idea of progress. They focused on the fact that the ban did provide for the possibility of exploration and experimentation, which promoters had demanded. They argued in favour of some kind of technocratic management and the idea that ‘science speaks truth to power’: ‘it’s scandalous, nowadays anyone can give their opinion. People from anti shale gas collectives talk nonsense. I’m a scientist, I’ve got 40 years of experience as a geologist, I’ve given my expertise in big books where I was right’ (interview with senior civil servant in 2012). The Parliamentary Office for Scientific and technological Assessment was the most vocal, its members (mostly conservative MPs with none of the necessary scientific background) explaining that ‘refusing research is incomprehensible. We have to accept experimentation. I defend research against obscurantism. There is no progress without research’ (L’Usine Nouvelle, 16/12/2012). They responded to the main arguments invoking expert knowledge: shale gas and hydraulic fracturing are not an issue as they have been managed for decades. They suggested technical innovations to answer criticisms about water consumption and pollution and also promoted shale gas as a way of supporting economic growth. They also insisted on the exploration phase which was differentiated from the production phase and labelled uncertain and for some promoters associated with a ‘scientific
endeavour', a quest for knowledge. This exploration should be accom-
panied by a reform of mining regulations to improve the consultation
process.

The shortcomings can be generalised not only to information, but to
attitude in general. In the case of mines, Variscan's CEO rejected oppo-
nents as a group of people who were 'against everything' and 'anti-
progress'. Proponents of the mining revival, on the other hand, placed
their emphasis on mineral explorations as a 'scientific' phase with low
risks. However, some promoters acknowledged communication issues
but they associated them to marginal attitude from specific actors. In the
case of Variscan's CEO, most actors recognised he was not fit to
communicate with the local population. Thus, when problems are
acknowledged, they came from specific personae and are not structural.
On the other hand, these promoters criticised bad behaviours from op-
ponents they linked to violence (and again to anti-science) such as in the
case of Variscan when the company headquarters was the target of a
homemade explosive device. While in the case of mining, consultative
committees have been implemented, they did not serve their attended
purpose: they were put in place only in the areas with the most conflicts
and they mostly contributed to increase the tensions.

Ultimately, what project leaders regretted is the political expression of these shortcomings, which transformed what they described as the normal and technical management of projects towards a politically biased decision to restrict or stop the project based on emotion, falsehood and electoral design. What they lamented is decision-makers sitting with opponents in a move which is described as 'political'. The term 'political' is used to describe an undesirable stage where things cannot be managed within confidential circles anymore.

'After that, it's political. It's no longer the same logic, our logic. We're outside the law, outside the technical realm, it's political. That's something I'm starting to understand. I spent twenty years in that department. We issued permits, things went well, we had a great time, (...) everything was going very well. We were completely outside the political sphere, whether we had a minister from the left or the right, we had no problems. We were spared from politics. And then, overnight, we were directly impacted. For us, this is new. Our reasoning is distorted'

(Interview with a member of the BEPH, 2014)

The expression ‘lack of social acceptance’ is ultimately perceived here as ignorance that translates into illegitimate political positioning. This first discourse therefore depicts opponents through their lack of expertise and encompasses the fear that this uninformed or ill-informed understanding of an activity translates into the position of policymakers.

3.5.2. Analysing the conflict with lack of social acceptance lens to hide other reasons

Framing social opposition as one of the main brakes for projects tends to become an excuse for failed projects when this discourse is used as the analytical frame for explaining failures. This second use of the lack of social acceptance is usually mobilised after the conflicts in an attempt to explain not only the failure of projects but of a whole industry. In that instance, the lack of social acceptance does not aim to characterise opponents, it rather serves as an excuse: local opposition is postulated rather than observed in a motto than can be summarised as follow 'there is nothing more we can do, my dear'. Opponents are deemed to be all powerful, backed by local officials and fully funded by obscure channels.<fnref n="1" /> The case of CCS is exemplary. Lack of social acceptance is the first obstacle mentioned by CCS supporters when asked why CCS projects have not been successful [56]. While it is true that all onshore projects in Europe have encountered some local opposition, this did not stop the development of Total's Chapelle de Rousse project in France. More

broadly, oppositions cannot be considered essential to the failures. In the
case of ULCOS in Florange, the issue of acceptability is used to explain
the project's difficulties while the reason for its dismiss seems elsewhere.

'More than economic obstacles, I would highlight social obstacles. We realised that it was not only difficult to find storage sites, but that we were also facing local opposition to CO2 storage because of the potential risks and threats, and also because some people claimed that this technology gave polluters the right to continue polluting'

(interview with a public agency).

However, stakeholders themselves play down this opposition,
saying:

'ULCOS, we didn't go through with it, but it was still one of the ar-
guments put forward by ArcelorMittal, saying that work should have
been done because, potentially, at the most suitable and interesting
storage site, they could have had a problem with the local popula-
tion. In the end, they never went there, so we'll never know.'

(Interview with a project manager at Ademe, 2018).

While the closure of Florange is a response to international steel market challenges (Florange is landlocked, while the remaining activities in Europe are located in port areas), potential opposition from the population to geological carbon storage continues to be used as a justification for the failure. In a CCS sector where profitability remains a major problem, the argument of lack of acceptability acts as a scare tactic. It adds an extra level of uncertainty and complexity to an already fragile CCS chain. But above all, for CCS promoters, it is a way of obscuring the sector's other difficulties, including its profitability and uncertainties in risk management. This explanation can be applied to the other two sectors: in the case of mining revival and shale gas, opposition has played a role, but mainly in revealing the intrinsic weaknesses of the projects. Attributing the failures to this opposition is tantamount to turning the consequence – opposition to projects with relevant weaknesses – into the cause of the projects' failure. We observe the same discourse in the case of mining, though to a lesser extent. While the social mobilisation did play a role in the dismiss of some projects, blaming only the opponents hides the other reasons for the failed mining renewal: weak political support, contradictory narratives, outdated regulation, etc. Therefore, this discourse about social acceptance after the conflicts acts as a smokescreen hiding probably the main reasons for the dismiss of projects.

3.5.3. Long after the conflict, narratives are used to promote regulatory reforms and consultation tools

The last narrative about the lack of social acceptable highlights the
construction of a public problem and the promotion of solutions in the
shape of policy reforms. This narrative has developed across different
industries and culminated in the reform of mining regulations in 2022,
as well as in consultative tools aimed at defusing mobilisation before
projects are halted.

The need to reform the mining regulation in order to update it with the Charter of the Environment dated back to 2005. Adding the Charter to the Constitution modified the hierarchy of norms and the regulation had to be adapted such as to integrate the prevention principle, for example. Indeed, the mining regulation is a rather centralised and technocratic process which gave little leeway to local officials and population and favour the ‘general interest’ defined by the government. But, as almost no new projects developed in the early 2000s, the pressure was not high to start the reform. After the failure of shale gas in 2011, its former promoters continued their efforts towards adapting the existing regulatory framework to forms of opposition they were not used to dealing with. Both sides agreed on the need for reform. But while operators criticised the duration of the licencing procedure (about two years), environmentalists were demanding greater consistency between the Environment Charter and the mining regulation – which had been

<footnote n="1">¹ In the case of shale gas, promoters accused Russia to fund local collectives.</footnote>
described by the senior government official in charge of its reform in 2013 as an outdated 'productivist' framework dating back to the 1950s. A senior government official in charge of its reform in 2013 recommended, in a report a new independent authority, better environmental assessment and systematic public information and consultation (Tuot report). Emphasising the oppositions helps justify a reform of the regulation. It took more than a decade to materialise (failing attempts in 2013, 2015, 2017), but in 2022, the new version of the regulation integrated a better environmental and social assessment and better public information. It integrated the point about a problem of social acceptability which had to be addressed through socio-environmental assessment and better information. The growing need for critical minerals and the local opposition to mines was among the trigger to act the reform.

Outside the mining regulation *stricto sensu* and before the reform came into act, successive governments and administrative agencies have long promoted consultation as a tool to overcome the lack of social acceptance. In 2023, in the case of CCS, the French government asked the Energy Regulatory Commission to present a forward-looking report on CO₂ capture, transport, use and storage. This report highlights the main challenges that could prevent the implementation of onshore carbon storage in mainland France and lays the foundations for a CCS policy requested by the French President. This roadmap focuses on five key issues for the emergence of CCS in France, the first of which is social acceptance of CCS projects, and the other four relating to public policy and financial support. Promoters of CCUS are still pushing for consultations at the project scale but they are still uninterested by a larger debate about the legitimacy of CCUS in the French energy transition. Their objective is not so much to achieve social acceptance of CCS as to push for a debate that could encourage political actors to support CCS, thus paving the way for the other four recommendations. Public debates are thus less a tool to convince opponents than a way to enroll supporters and to demonstrate that this industry is developing and not stalling.

The case of mining revival is also an interesting one to understand. To counter opposition to the mining revival, E. Macron (who was Minister of the Economy at the time) launched the 'Initiative for Responsible Mining' in 2015, which aimed to establish a common charter between mining operators, state agencies and environmental organisations. E. Macron attempted to develop an environmental and transparency framework to promote the simplification of administrative discussions and, consequently, standards relating to mining activities [55,57]. In this sense, the 'Responsible Mining' approach crystallised a policy of encouraging good practices while developing a framework for environmental dialogue. However, there was no consensus on the possibility that 'clean' mining could characterise a responsible mining industry for the 21st century, and several environmental associations left the negotiating table. Although the idea of 'responsible mining' has not succeeded in becoming institutionalised, it has nevertheless spread to various professional fields seeking to use sociological tools to make the 'social acceptability' of projects operational [57].

## 4. Strategic use of 'lack of social acceptance'

Table 9 is provided for comparison as part of the analysis of these trajectories.

These three cases illustrate the trajectory of the issue of social acceptance of industrial projects involving the subsurface in France. In all cases, promoters framed the problem of failure in terms of a lack of social acceptance, whereas the industries' difficulties were much larger. Our analysis produces four findings about social acceptance of the use of subsurface for the energy transition in France.

The first finding relates to heterogeneous use of the very concept of 'the lack of social acceptance', which is called upon in widely differing situations as summarised in Table 9. In all three cases, there was opposition, in particular from local communities, to the projects. But the nature of the opposition was very different: in the case of shale gas, local

<table><caption>**Table 9**
Social acceptance issues in the three subsurface industries.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Use of the argument of social acceptance</th><th>During or just after the conflicts</th><th>Analysing the conflict</th><th>Narratives about of the conflict long after</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Shale gas</td><td>Opposition led to rejection of the policy</td><td>Locals are afraid and allow emotional decision-making</td><td>The ban was a political response to emotion</td><td>Promote a reform of the mining regulation</td></tr><tr><td>CCS</td><td>Opposition hinders the deployment of projects</td><td>Public is not aware of CCS and is afraid by risks</td><td>We don't know what the public would have said; CCS is not developing because of local opposition</td><td>Promote debate around CCS to pave the way for a political support of CCS</td></tr><tr><td>Mining</td><td>Opposition hinders the deployment of projects</td><td>NIMBY</td><td>Locals are against everything</td><td>Push for a responsible mining</td></tr></tbody></table>

opponents joined forces with national players and used international arguments that shale gas is a polluting industry that raises risks locally and contributes to climate change. The case of the mining revival is somewhat similar, with local opponents in different locations joining forces. The difference, however, is that their arguments focus more on the gap between the promise and the reality of mining. These are fairly typical cases of increasingly widespread opposition, echoing analyses of social acceptance found in the literature (see Fortin and Fournis, or Battel's third wave). The case of CCS is more specific, because this sector did not give rise to national or local debate: until recently, the subject has remained relatively confined within confidential circles, and its failures are only marginally due to a lack of social acceptance. As in other countries, this way to frame CCS appears to be a way to 'burying problems' with a dominant imaginary based on ecological modernisation which frames out alternative approaches to lowering emissions [58,59]. An alternative way of qualifying the lack of social acceptance would be to understand it as a failure to establish the legitimacy of a sector. However, this is not how it is usually framed.

Defining opposition as a lack of social acceptance reduces the analysis to local factors, which, as we have shown, are not necessarily the main determinant as shown in Table 9. However, this way of framing opposition may be a deliberate choice. The ways in which the issue of social acceptance has been used across the three cases studied show several instances of its instrumentalisation to hide other weaknesses. It is no doubt much simpler to blame the failure of a project on its lack of acceptance than on internal weaknesses. Beyond this general aim, the uses made of this argument also display similarities with the strategic use of ignorance and uncertainty [34,60]. This is obvious in the case of CCS: the delays in this sector are accounted for by both economic problems (no carbon pricing policy) and infrastructural problems (need to set up very large infrastructure with no clarity on investment). The origins of these problems are global (carbon market), European (policy not followed or coordinated at EU level) and national (France is not prepared to invest in CCS when it considers that its economy is already well decarbonised due to nuclear energy). The same pattern can be seen in the other two sectors: in the case of the mining revival, projects can be scuppered by opposition to them because the policy that supports them is not consistent over time, has objectives that are at odds with its own practices (e.g. sovereignty versus environmental objectives) and has not succeeded in developing institutions capable of giving focus to the policy. The reindustrialisation policy clearly has real shortcomings, and the same can be seen in political support for shale gas: basically, we cannot see the emergence of any positive counter-discourse to the anti-shale gas arguments.
There is a third lesson to be learned from these examples of opposition: project sponsors appear to be ill-prepared for debates. They tend to promote an apolitical definition of projects. This finding can be tied to a dominant techno-economic narrative about these projects that becomes a main limit to the enactment of actual action towards these projects: they are framed as economic opportunity and a way to move forward with energy transition. Narratives from promoters are rooted into post-politics which give no credit to a space of disagreement, negotiation and political subjectivation [61,62]. Their projects are mostly de-politicized but that becomes a main weakness when debating with opponents. Industrialists and government officials overwhelmingly hold the view, based on their own expertise, that they have the right technology, which leaves local residents as mere recipients of that technology. However, these narratives are not heard in public forums. The arguments focused on in the press are systematically and overwhelmingly those of project opponents. Arguments about environmental impacts, risks and environmental degradation, on the one hand, and governance on the other, are largely dominant in the cases of shale gas and mining, outweighing the economic arguments and giving rise to social debates. For CCS, which is less advanced, the more technical and economic arguments are dominant, taking the form of controversies over the feasibility of putting technologies together. The fact that the arguments put forward by promoters are not much heard can be explained by the lack of political support. This concurs with the results of analyses carried out on the notion of social acceptance, and shows the danger for industrialists of a limited understanding of this notion, as it prevents them from grasping the importance of well-informed dialogue. This relative absence of well-informed dialogue from all sides in our cases also limits the necessary just transition because most projects reflect only the interests of shareholders but ignore the needs from larger stakeholders [63,64].

However, it must not be forgotten that in all three cases, the issue of social acceptance helped to promote regulatory reform. The interpretation of opposition as due to lack of knowledge, the broadcasting of false information, ideological positions, etc. show that the rejection of opponents' positions by most promoters was not a rational response. Arguing that social acceptance is a problem was also a means to create new ways of regulating public debates, by advocating a reform of the mining regulation or a coherent policy for CCS and mining. If we compare the actions recommended in response to the rejection of policies, it is clear that they were not in fact aimed at the public, but at the State. This can be interpreted as a failure on the part of the French state, which does not have a clear strategy for energy. Indeed, the reform of the mining regulation did not only integrated downstream information and participation but also swifter response to demands and simpler administrative process. The lessons learned from these failures are intended to give rise to national debates and procedures that would make it politically easier to implement these reforms. The lack of social acceptance basically reveals the weaknesses of political support for these reforms, and it is these weaknesses that industrial and government players seek to act on.

## 5. Conclusion

We investigated how supporters of three French subsurface projects framed their failures almost exclusively in terms of lack of social acceptance. Although the idea is widely held that a lack of social acceptance explains many of the failures of energy transition policies, in the case of the subsurface in France we propose that the reasons for the failure of three particular technologies lie elsewhere than in the conflicts that accompanied their deployment. The lack of coherence on the part of the industrial operators, the lack of political support and the fact that local populations were kept out of the project design process explain the failures far more than public opposition.

This leads us to draw a few lessons about lack of social acceptance, a notion that needs to be handled with the utmost caution. Not only does it

mask the very different forms of opposition, not only does it fail to take account of the many difficulties facing projects, but it can also be used strategically by different stakeholders: the insistence on social acceptance as a problem is used by both industry and the State to mask the weaknesses of their own policies. But the argument deceives no-one, since it is in fact these same stakeholders who are calling for better policy formulation.

Ultimately, this article could call for a better formulation of the part played by the public in the opposition to renewable technologies but this probably won't be useful for government administrations and industrialists: admittedly, there is a tendency in these two groups, which could be described as cultural, to keep people away from innovations that they consider a priori to be excellent, but these stakeholders are not fooled by their own rhetoric. They often deliberately use the lack of social acceptance to mask other reasons for the failure of their projects. To follow through on our analysis, the claim is more likely to be a disguise for the fact that they are faced with political inconsistencies that translate into a lack of support for their businesses and the achievement of their objectives. As a conclusion to this article, we could call for the avoidance of this kind of rhetoric, but this would require a language of truth that it is probably not always possible to use. Our inference is that even if no one is fooled by the rhetoric claiming that all these failures are due to poorly educated populations, it is still in the interests of much of the world to keep saying so to avoid facing the inconsistencies of relying on technological innovation to bring about an energy transition. This is a dangerous trail for decarbonisation strategies: facing an uphill battle against conservative forces, energy transition policies are on the verge to be declared void because 'people do not want them'. Justifying consistently the failure of projects because the lack of social acceptance is a useful strategy to deflect the real reason of failure including the weak integration of social and environmental justice, typical of techno-market solutions. Our findings should be put into perspective of other European contexts as the central role of the State and the relative weak position of subsurface industries may differ in other countries and generate other frames regarding the lack of social acceptance and the ways to respond to it.

### CRediT authorship contribution statement

Xavier Arnauld de Sartre: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Supervision, Project administration, Methodology, Investigation, Funding acquisition, Conceptualization. Sébastien Chailleux: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Supervision, Methodology, Investigation, Conceptualization.

### Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as potential competing interests: Arnauld de Sartre, Xavier reports financial support was provided by French National Research Agency. Arnauld de Sartre, Xavier reports a relationship with TotalEnergies SE that includes: funding grants. If there are other authors, they declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

### Data availability

No data was used for the research described in the article.

### References

[1] D.L.P. Arrobas, K.L. Hund, M.S. McCormick, J. Ningthoujam, J.R. Drexhage, The Growing Role of Minerals and Metals for a Low Carbon Future, The World Bank, 2017.

[2] M.D. Bazilian, The mineral foundation of the energy transition, Extr. Ind. Soc. 5 (1) (2018) 93–97, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.12.002.
[3] J. Canelas, A. Carvalho, The dark side of the energy transition: extractivist violence, energy (in)justice and lithium mining in Portugal, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 100 (2023) 103096, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103096.

[4] S. Carr-Wilson, S.K. Pattanayak, E. Weinthal, Critical mineral mining in the energy transition: a systematic review of environmental, social, and governance risks and opportunities, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 116 (2024) 103672, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2024.103672.

[5] A. Dunlap, M. Riquito, Social warfare for lithium extraction? Open-pit lithium mining, counterinsurgency tactics and enforcing green extractivism in northern Portugal, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 95 (2023) 102912, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102912.

[6] M. El Farsaooui, J.M. Uratani, M.A. Zahra, S. Griffiths, Establishing leadership in bringing carbon capture, utilisation and storage to scale, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 121 (2025) 103960, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2025.103960.

[7] J. Gregory, F.W. Geels, Unfolding low-carbon reorientation in a declining industry: a contextual analysis of changing company strategies in UK oil refining (1990–2023), Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 107 (2024) 103345, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103345.

[8] N. Markusson, S. Shackley, B. Evar (Eds.), The Social Dynamics of Carbon Capture and Storage: Understanding CCS Representations, Governance and Innovation, Routledge, 2012, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203118726.

[9] A.-A.B. Bugaje, M.O. Dioha, M.C. Abraham-Dukuma, M. Wakil, Rethinking the position of natural gas in a low-carbon energy transition, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 90 (2022) 102604, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102604.

[10] R. Cantoni, M.S. Klaes, S.I. Lackerbauer, C. Foltyn, R. Keller, Shale tales: politics of knowledge and promises in Europe's shale gas discourses, Extr. Ind. Soc. 5 (4) (2018) 535–546, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2018.09.004.

[11] D. Evensen, Yet more 'fracking' social science: an overview of unconventional hydrocarbon development globally, Extr. Ind. Soc. 5 (4) (2018) 417–421, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2018.10.100.

[12] Y. Si, D. Desai, D. Bozhilova, S. Puffer, J.C. Stephens, Fossil fuel companies' climate communication strategies: industry messaging on renewables and natural gas, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 98 (2023) 103028, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103028.

[13] C. Weible, T. Heikkila, M. Fischer, K. Ingold, Policy Debates on Hydraulic Fracturing (Palgrave), 2016.

[14] S. Batel, Research on the social acceptance of renewable energy technologies: past, present and future, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 68 (2020) 101544, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exrs.2020.101544.

[15] P. Devine-Wright, Rethinking NIMBYism: the role of place attachment and place identity in explaining place-protective action, J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol. 19 (6) (2009) 426–441, https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.1904.

[16] P. Batellier, Acceptabilité sociale des grands projets à fort impact socio-environnemental au Québec: Définitions et postulats, VertigO - La Revue Électronique En Sciences de l'environnement [En Ligne] 16 (1) (2016) mis en ligne le 09 mai 2016, consulté le 20 février 2017. URL : http://vertigo.reves. org/16920.

[17] S. Batel, A critical discussion of research on the social acceptance of renewable energy generation and associated infrastructures and an agenda for the future, J. Environ. Policy Plan. 20 (3) (2018) 356–369, https://doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2017.1417120.

[18] Y. Fournis, M.-J. Fortin, From social 'acceptance' to social 'acceptability' of wind energy projects: towards a territorial perspective, J. Environ. Plan. Manag. 60 (1) (2017) 1–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2015.1133406.

[19] A. Dumarcher, Y. Fournis, Canadian resource governance against territories: resource regimes and local conflicts in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence provinces, Policy. Sci. 51 (1) (2018) 97–115, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-017-9294-0.

[20] Y. Fournis, M.-J. Fortin, Une définition territoriale de l'acceptabilité sociale: Pièges et défis conceptual, VertigO - La Revue Électronique En Sciences de l'environnement [En Ligne]. (2015), https://doi.org/10.4000/vertigo.16682.

[21] B. Auvet, X. Arnauld deSartre, L. Desvallées, S. Le Visage, S. Chailleux, La modernisation écologique en action: Les promesses à l'aune de leurs contradictions internes. *Développement durable et territoires, Économie, géographie, politique, droit, sociologie 15* (3) (2024), https://doi.org/10.4000/13cqj. Vol. 15, n°3, Article.

[22] L. Mermet, D. Salles, Environnement: La concertation apprivoisée, contestée, dépassée ? De Boeck, 2015.

[23] M. Aczel, R. Heap, M. Workman, S. Hall, H. Armstrong, K. Makuch, Anticipatory regulation: lessons from fracking and insights for greenhouse gas removal innovation and governance, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 90 (2022) 102683, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102683.

[24] J. Dodge, T. Metze, Hydraulic fracturing as an interpretive policy problem: lessons on energy controversies in Europe and the U.S.A, J. Environ. Policy Plan. 19 (1) (2017) 1–13, https://doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2016.1277947.

[25] F. Fischer, D. Torgerson, A. Durnová, M. Orsini, (Eds.), Handbook of Critical Policy Studies (Paperback Edition), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017.

[26] M. Hajer, Discourse coalition and institutionalization of practice: the case of acid rain in Britain, in: In J. Forester, F. Fischer (Eds.), The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, Duke University Press, 1993.

[27] P. Zittoun, La fabrique politique des politiques publiques: Une approche pragmatique de l'action publique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2013.

[28] F. Fischer, J. Forester, The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, Duke University Press, 1993.

[29] H. Wagenaar, Meaning in Action: Interpretation and Dialogue in Policy Analysis. M. E. Sharpe, 2011.

[30] M. Jones, M. McBeth, E. Shanahan, A brief introduction to the narrative policy framework, in: In M. Jones, M. McBeth, E. Shanahan (Eds.), Narratives and the Policy Process: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework, 1st ed, Montana State University, 2021, p. 1, https://doi.org/10.15788/npf1.

[31] C.M. Radaelli, Logiques de pouvoir et récits dans les politiques publiques de l'Union européenne, Rev. Fr. Sci. Polit. 50 (2) (2000) 255–275, https://doi.org/10.3406/rfsf.2000.395467.

[32] D.A. Stone, Causal stories and the formation of policy agendas, Polit. Sci. Q. 104 (2) (1989) 281, https://doi.org/10.2307/2151585.

[33] E. Henry, Ignorance scientifique et inaction publique, Presses de Science-Po, Les politiques de santé au travail, 2017.

[34] L. McGoey, The logic of strategic ignorance: the logic of strategic ignorance, Br. J. Sociol. 63 (3) (2012) 533–576, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2012.01424.x.

[35] P.D. Culpepper, Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan, Cambridge University Press, 2010, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511760716.

[36] P. Zittoun, The domestication of a 'wild' problem: Taming policy agenda setting. Handbook of Public Policy Agenda Setting (Elgar). Nikolaos Zahariadis, 2016.

[37] P. Zittoun, F. Fischer, N. Zahariadis (Eds.), The Political Formulation of Policy Solutions: Arguments, Arenas and Coalitions, Bristol University Press, 2021.

[38] J.R. Gusfield, The culture of public problems: drinking-driving and the symbolic order, in: Morality and Health, Routledge, 1997.

[39] S. Chailleux, Making the subsurface political. How enhanced oil recovery techniques reshaped the energy transition, Environ. Plann. C 38 (4) (2019), https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654419884077.

[40] F. Chateauraynaud, J. Debaz, Aux bords de l'irréversible, Sociologie pragmatique des transformations, Editions Pétra, 2017.

[41] P.-M. Terral, La fronde contre le gaz de schiste: Essai d'histoire immédiate d'une mobilisation éclair (2010–2011), Écol. Polit. 45 (2) (2012) 185–194, https://doi.org/10.3917/ecopo.045.0185.

[42] S. Chailleux, Strategic ignorance and politic of time; How expert knowledge framed shale gaz policies, Critical political studies 14 (2) (2019), https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2018.1563556.

[43] R. Neri O'Neil, A. Nadaï, Risque et démonstration, la politique de capture et de stockage du dioxyde de carbone (CCS) dans l'Union européenne, VertigO 12 (1) (2009) 1.

[44] R. Briday, S. Chailleux, X. Arnauld de Sartre, The complex challenges and opportunities of the industrial and energy sector (IES) in the time of climate politics: carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) in France as a case study, Review of agricultural, food and environmental study 105 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1007/s41130-024-00208-x.

[45] International panel on climate change, in: B. Metz, O. Davidson, H. Coninck, M. Loos, L. Meyer (Eds.), Carbon Dioxode Capture and Storage, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

[46] International energy agency, World energy outlook 2016 – analysis. IEA. http://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2016.

[47] S. Chailleux, X. Arnauld de Sartre, R. Briday, Ecological modernisation wanderings: ambivalent framings and unstable coalitions in the development of carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) in France, Journal of environmental policy and planing 25 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2022.2162765.

[48] B. Nerlich, R. Jaspal, UK media representations of carbon capture and storage: actors, frames and metaphors, Metaphor Soc. World 3 (1) (2013) 35–53, https://doi.org/10.1075/msw.3.1.02ner.

[49] C. Mercier, S. Chailleux, X. Arnauld de Sartre, Evolution de la perception et de la gestion du sous-sol dans l'administration centrale française: vue de l'intérieur, Nat. Sci. Soc. 29 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1051/nss/2021049.

[50] R. Galin, J.-F. Gaillaud, La politique française des matières premières minérales non énergétiques, Ann. Min. Responsabilité Environ. 99 (3) (2020) 84–88, https://doi.org/10.3917/rei.099.0084.

[51] G. Pitron, La guerre des métaux rares. Les liens qui libèrent, 2018.

[52] S. Chailleux, S. Le Berre, Y. Gunzburger (Eds.), Ressources minérales et transitions. Trajectoires politiques du sous-sol français au 21e siècle. Peter Lang, coll. "Ecopolis", 2022.

[53] A. Rodriguez, L'alternative Arnaud Montebourg, Cherche Midi, 2016.

[54] D. Schrijen, La Bretagne face aux industries extractives. Processus de cadrage et construction de coalitions contre la prospection minière et l'extraction de sable dans les Côtes d'Armor, Gov. Rev. 18 (2) (2021) 86–109. Érudit, https://doi.org/10.7202/1082503ar.

[55] B. Laurent, J. Merlin, L'ingénierie de la promesse: Le renouveau minier français et la « mine responsable », Nat. Sci. Sociétés 29 (2021) S55–S68, https://doi.org/10.1051/nss/2021046.

[56] S. Chailleux, X. Arnauld de Sartre, L'acceptabilité au prisme du stockage géologique de CO2. Retour sur un débat non émergé, Nat. Sci. Soc. 29 (2021) https://doi.org/10.1051/nss/2021043.

[57] P. Massé, Des instruments (insuffisants) pour gouverner les critiques adressées au « renouveau minier » en France métropolitaine. Une articulation autour des référentiels de l'environnement et du territoire, Gov. Rev. 18 (2) (2021) 110–135, https://doi.org/10.7202/1082504ar.

[58] A. Hansson, J. Anshelm, M. Fridahl, S. Haikola, The underworld of tomorrow? How subsurface carbon dioxide storage leaked out of the public debate, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 90 (2022) 102606, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102606.

[59] L. Lefstad, J. Allesson, H. Busch, W. Carton, Burying problems? Imaginaries of carbon capture and storage in Scandinavia, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 113 (2024) 103564, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2024.103564.
[60] D.J. Hess, *Undone Science: Social Movements, Mobilized Publics, and Industrial Transitions*, MIT Press, 2016.

[61] S.D. Stephenson, J.M. Allwood, *The gap between discourse and action in the United Kingdom: exploring the weakness of climate action in the post-COVID political space*, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 125 (2025) 104093, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2025.104093.

[62] E. Swyngedouw, *Apocalypse forever? Theory Cult. Soc. 27 (2-3) (2010) 213-232*, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276409358728.

[63] C. Dowling, G. Otero, *Mirages or miracles? Lithium extraction and the just energy transition*, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 119 (2025) 103862, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2024.103862.

[64] C. Ó. Maonaigh, L.M. Fitzgerald, L. Reilly, *Revisiting the social licence to operate in the energy transition: an intersectional agenda for research and practice*, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 126 (2025) 104139, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2025.104139.