# Are Young Candidates “Sacrificial Lambs”? Evidence from the 2012, 2017, and 2022 French Legislative Elections

Camille Gélix, Philippe Chassé

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Camille Gélix, Philippe Chassé. Are Young Candidates “Sacrificial Lambs”? Evidence from the 2012, 2017, and 2022 French Legislative Elections. Electoral Studies, 2024, 90, pp.102829. 10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102829. hal-04702821

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# Are young candidates “sacrificial lambs”? Evidence from the 2012, 2017, and 2022 French legislative elections

Camille Gélix<sup>a</sup>, Philippe Chassé<sup>b,a,*</sup>

## ARTICLE INFO

**Keywords:**

Youth

Candidates

Elections

Underrepresentation

Sacrificial lambs

France

## ABSTRACT

The underrepresentation of young adults is widespread in the parliaments of Western democracies. Yet evidence suggests that voters do not have a negative bias towards young candidates. In this article, we focus on another factor that may contribute to youth underrepresentation: the level of competitiveness in districts where political parties nominate young people. Using data on all candidates who ran for a major political party/coalition in the 2012, 2017, and 2022 French legislative elections, we attempt to determine whether young adults tend to be nominated in districts where they have little or no chance of winning. To do so, we use three different measures of district competitiveness. Our results show that young people – and especially young women – are more likely than others to be “sacrificial lambs”. Our analyses nevertheless indicate that men aged between 31 and 35 have become almost as competitive as older people in 2022.

## 1. Introduction

In recent years, many studies (Stockemer and Sundström, 2018, 2021, 2022; Stockemer et al., 2023) have highlighted the underrepresentation of youth in the parliaments of Western democracies. Although young adults constitute a large share of the population, few of them win seats in their country's legislative elections. An analysis of 120 different legislatures shows that less than ten percent of parliamentarians are 35 and under, a percentage three times lower than the demographic weight of this group of citizens (Stockemer and Sundström, 2022). In spite of this underrepresentation, voters do not appear to have a negative bias towards young candidates. Evidence from experimental research demonstrates that voters are equally likely to support young adults and older people, even in countries known for their “gerontocratic” institutions like Japan (Eshima and Smith, 2022; McClean and Ono, 2024; Roberts and Wolak, 2022).

In this article, we focus on another factor that may contribute to youth underrepresentation: the level of competitiveness in districts where political parties nominate young people. Using data on all candidates who ran for a major political party in the 2012, 2017, and 2022 French legislative elections, we attempt to determine whether young adults tend to be nominated in districts where they have little or no chance of winning similar to other traditionally marginalized groups such as women (Gatto and Wylie, 2022; Lee, 2019; Thomas and Bodet, 2013; Wylie et al., 2019), visible minorities (Kulich et al., 2014), and openly LGBTQ2+ people (Baisley and Albaugh, 2021; Everitt and

Tremblay, 2023; Lapointe et al., 2024). To do so, we use three different measures of district competitiveness: the first is “dynamic” (level of competitiveness in the district over time), while the other two are “static” (electoral results of a given legislative election and relative performance of the presidential candidate of the candidate’s party at the district level). We also use an alternative measure in the appendix to ensure the robustness of our findings (relative performance in the first round of the legislative election).

As it is often the case in the literature on youth representation, we consider adults 35 and under to be “young” candidates (Norris and Franklin, 1997; Stockemer and Sundström, 2022). Yet it should be noted that youth is a fluid concept, and that its definition varies according to the context (Muxel, 2018). While the United Nations defines youth as people between the ages of 15 and 24, what scholars consider “young” in politics sometimes extends into the late thirties – for instance to have a sufficient population when studying elected representatives (Lardeux and Lacroix, 2020). To verify whether all young adults are equally likely to be “sacrificial lambs”, we also use two other benchmarks (30 and under/25 and under). These allow us to see whether individuals in their twenties or in their early adulthood are more likely to be sacrificed than others.

Our results show that individuals 35 and under are more likely than older people to be “sacrificial lambs”, and that despite the fact that the situation for young candidates has improved since 2017, only one

<footnote><sup>a</sup> Centre de recherches politiques (CEVIPOF), CNRS, Sciences Po, France</footnote>

<footnote><sup>b</sup> Département de science politique, Université de Montréal, Canada</footnote>

<footnote>* Correspondence to: 1 Place Saint-Thomas d'Aquin, 75007 Paris, France.
E-mail addresses: camille.gelix@sciencespo.fr (C. Gélix), philippe.chasse@sciencespo.fr (P. Chassé).</footnote>
subgroup is close to becoming as competitive as older people: men aged between 31 and 35. We find that even after the 2017 legislative election, young women and people 30 and under were considerably more likely than others to be “sacrificed”. Additional analyses allow us to determine that one of the main reasons why young adults tend to run in districts where they have little or no chance of winning is that incumbents, who are generally in their forties and fifties, compete in the safest districts for their party.

## 2. Why does youth representation matter?

Until recently, young people were considered unfit to govern in many societies. Indeed, for a long time, age has been positively associated with wisdom, a quality often deemed necessary to make enlightened decisions and to exert power reasonably (see Stockemer et al., 2023). The idea that older people form better political leaders has permeated the constitutions of a large number of Western democracies. For instance, there is still a significant gap between the age at which citizens can vote and the age at which they can seek the office of president in Italy (50 years old), Germany (40 years old), and the United States of America (35 years old).

However, over the course of the last few decades scholars have argued that political and social elites often belittle the voices of young adults and, further, that the inclusion of youth in the political institutions of democracies matters (Stockemer and Sundström, 2018, 2021). Age is a somewhat singular criterion for defining a group, since unlike other socio-demographic characteristics, a person's age is constantly changing. As a result, people only belong to an age group for a limited period of time. This means that individuals first elected in their twenties or early thirties will not represent young people indefinitely, and that constant renewal is necessary to maintain youth representation in political institutions. Yet, age is also a meaningful criterion, since it is strongly tied to the types of experiences and challenges one encounters (see Muxel, 2011). When elected, young people can put forward issues that currently affect individuals their own age and influence policymaking accordingly. There is evidence that the policies that elected officials implement differ significantly when there are young people in office. For example, McClean (2021) finds that young mayors typically increase spending on child welfare, whereas older mayors tend to increase short-term spending for the elderly. Results obtained by Jung (2023) indicate that mayors under the age of 50 are more likely than older mayors to increase spending on economic and cultural affairs, and to decrease spending on social protection.

People who come of age at the same time form a cohort, and their membership in this cohort is permanent (Tiberj, 2017). Stockemer and Sundström (2022) note that each cohort has different goals, values, and political preferences. Younger cohorts tend to have postmaterialist values (see Inglehart, 1990): they are generally more concerned about the environmental crisis and more favorable to same-sex marriage than older cohorts. They also have different public spending priorities (Stockemer et al., 2023). Since older cohorts are overrepresented in political institutions, the decisions made by parliaments tend to correspond to what baby boomers and Generation X believe is important.<fnref n="1" /> These decisions will necessarily have a long-term effect on the living conditions of the generations to come. It is therefore imperative that young cohorts join decision-making bodies now (Mansbridge, 1999; Stockemer and Sundström, 2022).

Of course, there are multiple ways for young people to influence policymaking, and being elected is only one of them. As Stockemer

and Sundström (2022) note, young adults can also get involved in student unions, youth organizations, or the youth wings of political parties. However, none of these institutions has arguably enough power to influence the political system in a sustainable way.

## 3. Explaining the underrepresentation of young adults

There are several reasons that could explain the lack of youth representation in the political institutions of Western democracies. Some are supply-based, and others demand-based. First, a certain number of authors highlight that young adults generally have little interest in active politics (Lawless and Fox, 2015; Shames, 2017). When asked why they do not perceive running for office as a desirable career path, young people often bring up political scandals, increasing polarization, the incapacity of parties to renew themselves, and the feeling that politicians are powerless to deal with new issues such as climate change (Lawless and Fox, 2015).

Second, many studies point out that personal circumstances related to the life cycle might hinder young people's participation in active politics. Individuals 35 and under typically lack the financial resources to run for office (Shames, 2017). They also face a period of instability (Franklin, 2004; Muxel, 2011). Indeed, it is not uncommon for people to stay in school well into their twenties. Some also become parents for the first time, a stage in life that is generally associated with a lower propensity to be politically engaged among women (Grechyna, 2023). Additionally, it should be noted that the first years of adulthood are also the moment individuals begin to establish their social networks (Plutzer, 2002). As Muxel (1991) shows, political participation tends to increase as soon as people are better integrated professionally and socially. It is usually at this moment that interest in running for office begins to develop.

Third, some researchers note that when young people get involved in active politics, they do not necessarily start by running for office (Muxel, 2007, 2011). Often, they begin their involvement with student unions or the youth wings of political parties (Bargel, 2009, 2011, 2014; Muxel, 2001). Whether of their own free will or because of the internal workings of political parties, many pursue their commitment within a trajectory that never leads them to occupy an elected position during their youth. Few studies examine the factors that lead young political activists to run for office. Focusing on mayoral candidates in France, Lacroix and Lardeux (2022) note that there are strict prerequisites for youth to be considered “eligible”. Parties tend to nominate young adults who convey an image of a “local youth”, have held representative positions at school or sit as a municipal councilor, and have a higher level of education than older candidates.

Finally, several studies focus on the difference between the number of young candidates and the number of young people who are elected. It is usual for the former to be considerably higher than the latter. In France, for instance, Sineau and Tiberj (2007) find that in the 2002 legislative election, individuals aged between 50 and 59 represented one third of candidates, but half of the people elected. On the other hand, the proportion of people under 40 who were elected was three times lower than the proportion of candidates in that age group. For now, two main hypotheses have been tested. The first is that voters have a negative bias towards young candidates. This, however, does not seem to hold. In fact, there is mounting evidence that the high average age of elected officials neither stems from a lack of willingness to support younger candidates nor from older voters supporting candidates from their generation (Webster and Pierce, 2019). In Western democracies (Roberts and Wolak, 2022) as in Japan (Eshima and Smith, 2022; McClean and Ono, 2024), voters are equally likely to support younger and older candidates. Roberts and Wolak (2022) conclude that the over-representation of older individuals in the United States of America likely reflects structural factors.

<footnote n="1">¹ It should be noted that individuals 35 and under do not constitute the only age group that is underrepresented in the political institutions of Western democracies: the proportion of elected officials who are in their 70s and 80s is also smaller than the demographic weight of this age group.</footnote>
The second hypothesis is that young candidates tend to run for parties that are less competitive. Studying how candidate's age and gender have conditioned candidate selection during the 2019 Irish local elections, Belschner (2023) finds that young candidates tend to run for smaller and newer parties that win fewer seats. The author notes that mainstream parties tend to prefer candidates with high political status (which correlated with being male and middle-aged). Stockemer and Sundström (2022) reach similar conclusions using a sample of 270 party delegations around the world. The two scholars show that, in general, newly formed political parties tend to nominate a greater number of young candidates.

A hypothesis that has received much less attention is that political parties nominate young candidates in districts where they are certain of losing. We explore this possibility in this article.

## 4. The “sacrificial lamb” hypothesis

In politics, “sacrificial lambs” are candidates who have been nominated to contest elections they have little or no chance of winning, for instance because they are running in the stronghold of another party (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Trimble and Arscott, 2003). They may agree to run in order to gain political experience and develop their network, or to do their party a favor (Wylie et al., 2019). By competing in “unwinnable” districts, they allow citizens from all constituencies to cast their ballot for their party, even if their vote is unlikely to have an impact on the distribution of seats in parliament. The literal translation of “sacrificial lamb” in French is “brebis sacrifiée”, but this expression is rarely used by French-speaking scholars and political analysts. Indeed, there does not seem to be a specific term to refer to candidates who have little or no chance of winning in France.<fnref n="2" />

A burgeoning literature shows that candidates from historically marginalized groups are more likely than others to run in districts where they have little or no chance of winning. This would partly explain why these groups still tend to be underrepresented in parliaments today. Using data from the four Canadian federal elections held between 2004 and 2011, Thomas and Bodet (2013) demonstrate that women are more likely than men to be “sacrificial lambs”. They find a clear relationship between district competitiveness and candidates’ gender. Their results also indicate that women incumbents are more likely to run in districts in which their party’s support is unstable over time. Lapointe et al. (2024) reach similar conclusions in their study focusing on the 2015, 2019 and 2021 Canadian federal elections.

The practice of nominating female candidates in districts they are unlikely to win is also frequent in other countries as well. In Brazil, the popular expression “laranja”, which designates a docile person who acts as an intermediary for fraudulent or suspicious practices, is frequently used to describe female candidates (Gatto and Wylie, 2022; Wylie et al., 2019). Indeed, in this country where there is an open-list system, many women are nominated to meet the gender quota, but have little to no chance of securing a seat in one of the 27 multimember districts. In South Korea, where there is a mixed-member electoral system at the national level, Lee (2019) finds that parties tend to nominate women in proportional representation (PR) seats, and men in single-member district (SMD) seats. Not only are PR seats perceived as less prestigious than SMD seats by South Korean political parties, but PR members also have limited access to party leadership positions. According to Lee (2019), this would contribute to the interruption and termination of the political careers of many experienced women. Of particular interest to our study, Murray (2008, 2010) shows that in the early 2000s, French political parties generally reserved their safest seats

for men and allocated constituencies where the outcome was uncertain to women.

While the literature on “sacrificial lambs” focuses mainly on the electoral performance of female candidates, women are not the only group of citizens who tend to be nominated in districts where they have little or no chance of winning. Kulich et al. (2014) find that, in the United Kingdom, the lower winnability of the districts in which Conservative Party candidates who are visible minorities run for office explains their lack of electoral success. The authors do not find disparities related to the winnability of districts among white and visible minorities in the Labour Party, but note that at the time of writing, much work remained to be done, with only six percent of the Labour MPs being visible minorities. Finally, three studies conducted recently (Baisley and Albaugh, 2021; Everitt and Tremblay, 2023; Lapointe et al., 2024) also highlight that, in Canada, LGBTQ2+ candidates – especially those who are women, trans/non-binary, and 2-Spirit – are likely to be “sacrificed”.

## 5. Why should we expect young candidates to be “sacrificial lambs”?

The selection of candidates by political parties is a key moment in the democratic process. This important responsibility makes parties essential actors in politics. Indeed, in most democratic countries, parties have a lot of freedom to organize candidate nominations (Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Vandeleene, 2018). Having a good network and influence within a party can therefore be a guarantee for a winning position. While official expectations of parties tend to become more homogenized with the introduction of formal selection mechanisms (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988), parties continue to be influenced by their own political culture. When it comes to nominations, Squarcioni (2017) mentions that it is important to distinguish normative rules (the ideal of selection that the party wants to show) from pragmatic rules (the arrangements, or “what is done” typically). Although it is possible to run for one of the 577 French constituencies without being affiliated to a party (Assemblée nationale, 2019), most candidates run under the label of a party in order to gain visibility.<fnref n="3" />

In France, the candidate selection process varies slightly from one party to another, but an overall trend has emerged. In most cases, parties set up a national committee responsible for evaluating and validating the candidacies put forward by their departmental or local branches (see Appendix B). Generally, candidates are recruited from within the parties themselves, although external candidates are sometimes invited to apply. An exceptional case is that of La République en Marche ! which, prior to the 2017 legislative election, encouraged all those who were interested in representing the party to send in their application. Although aspiring candidates may have a preference for one district rather than another, winning a nomination often requires having a strong base within a constituency, with so-called parachute candidates being particularly frowned upon. In all cases, the final say rests with the party executive or the local committee (Murray, 2010).

It should be emphasized that the results of legislative elections represent a major financial stake for French political parties, as (a) the number of seats they win and (b) the number of votes they receive determine the public funding they will receive during the following five years. To be eligible for public funding, parties must ensure that their candidates obtain at least one per cent of the vote in more than half of the constituencies located in European France. These rules influence the behavior of political parties in at least two ways. First, they further incentivize parties to nominate candidates they consider likely to secure a seat (or to perform well). Since it is rather difficult to determine

<footnote n="2">² In Québec (and Canada more generally), the media use the expression “candidats poteaux”, which refers to the fact that these candidates often do not campaign actively, and that their only visibility is on election posters. However, this practice does not seem to have crossed the Atlantic yet.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ To run, candidates must be at least 18, have the right to vote, and be eligible (no criminal record). They cannot hold a mayor's office at the same time (Assemblée nationale, 2019).</footnote>
precisely whether one candidate is more “electable” than another, parties tend to rely on the little information they already have. This often leads them to prefer familiar faces – or incumbents – to political newcomers (Murray, 2008; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). Second, it encourages parties to nominate candidates in as many constituencies as possible. Even if a candidate performs poorly, the few votes they obtain will bring additional funding to the party.

One of the potential reasons why political parties could be more likely to nominate young candidates in districts where they have little or no chance of winning is that incumbents already run in the party's safest constituencies. Indeed, evidence shows that incumbents, who are generally older people, do not face much competition when they seek to be nominated again by their party. For example, Laure Squarcioni (2017)'s interviews with candidates who ran for the Parti socialiste and the Union pour un mouvement populaire in the 2007 and 2012 French legislative elections reveal that incumbents generally perceive their nomination as an administrative formality. One incumbent mentioned that he was convinced that he could be nominated by his party as long as he wanted, provided that he did not fail in his duties or cause a scandal. He added that other potential candidates were generally not being considered seriously (Squarcioni, 2017). The tendency of French parties to consider incumbents as more “electable” candidates probably contributes to maintaining this dynamic. This suggests that parties’ internal rules and procedures regarding nominations apply uniquely to vacant seats.

Another potential reason why candidates who are 35 and under could be more likely to be “sacrificial lambs” is that parties might have prejudices against young adults and not consider them to be competitive candidates. Evidence shows that in politics as in the corporate world, recruiters tend to favor experience for positions of responsibility (Kirkland and Coppock, 2018; Teele et al., 2018). Furthermore, some stereotypes about younger individuals are hard to overcome; young adults are often described as “apathetic, disengaged, narcissistic, selfish, shallow, lazy, impulsive, confused, lost, impatient, and pampered” (Holbein and Hillygus, 2020, p.7). It is thus possible that party executives and voting members prefer to reserve safe and tightly contested constituencies for older people. Besides, Lacroix and Lardeux (2022) report that opposing parties often attack young mayoral candidates for their age, and that the latter need to campaign door-to-door to gain legitimacy.

There are still some advantages for parties in nominating a certain number of young candidates, even if they only do so in “unwinnable” districts. It allows them to brand themselves as parties that listen to young people, and that attach importance to the same issues as them. It also allows them to send out a signal that they can renew themselves and reach new voters (see Gélix, 2020). As mentioned above, political parties have a financial interest in nominating candidates in all constituencies. Not being able to field candidates in most districts could, furthermore, give the impression that they are unable to attract the interest of citizens (unless they form alliances with other parties). Younger people are potentially easier to recruit on short notice to fill the remaining, less secure constituencies, in particular because they are often at an earlier stage in their professional careers and do not have to put aside a long-standing job to stand as a candidate. Some of them may also consider running for office as an opportunity to gain recognition within their party, perhaps with the prospect of obtaining responsibilities in the future.

## 6. Hypotheses

In light of the current literature, it seems plausible that political parties allocate their safest constituencies to older and more experienced individuals, and that like women, visible minorities, and members of the LGBTQ2+ community, people under the age of 35 tend to be nominated in districts where they are likely to lose. We therefore hypothesize that:

**Hypothesis 1.** Young adults are more likely than older people to be nominated in districts where they have little or no chance of winning.

However, we do not expect all young candidates to be equally likely to be “sacrificial lambs”. The vast literature on women’s electoral performance and representation suggests that one’s gender may influence their likelihood of being “sacrificed”, and that our analyses need to be intersectional. Since in many countries including France, women – regardless of their age – are more likely to run in constituencies that they are likely to lose, we expect that:

**Hypothesis 2.** Young women are more likely than young men to be nominated in districts where they have little or no chance of winning.

We cannot ignore the possibility that the emergence of a challenger party – La République en Marche ! – has had an impact on the propensity of young adults to be “sacrificial lambs”. Challenger parties are political parties “without government experience” (De Vries and Hobolt, 2020, p.17). They generally have few incumbents, and their candidates tend to have less political experience and to be younger than those of mainstream parties (see Briquet, 2022; Nez, 2017). The victory of Emmanuel Macron’s party in the 2017 legislative election indeed marks a turning point in French politics. That year, the French National Assembly experienced an unprecedented transformation: of the 345 deputies who ran for re-election, only 140 were re-elected and 75 percent of the seats changed occupant. Four hundred and twenty-four of the 577 individuals who were elected had never held office before (Brouard, 2017). Given that such a context is particularly conducive to the election of younger individuals, as demonstrated, for example, by the fact that the average age of the members of the French National Assembly has considerably dropped in the wake of the 2017 legislative election, we contend that:

**Hypothesis 3.** Since the emergence of a challenger party, young adults are less likely than before to be “sacrificial lambs”.

Given that (a) the appointment of incumbents in the district where they were previously elected is most often a formality (Squarcioni, 2017), and (b) incumbents tend to be over 35, we hypothesize that:

**Hypothesis 4.** One of the reasons why young candidates are more likely to be nominated in districts where they have little or no chance of winning is that incumbents – who are typically older than 35 – tend to run in the safest districts of their party.

Finally, it is possible that some parties are more inclined than others to nominate a greater proportion of young candidates than older candidates in districts where they have little or no chance of winning. We do not have clear expectations about the relationship between the parties’ candidate selection processes and their propensity to “sacrifice” young candidates. On the one hand, it could be argued that parties with a centralized candidate selection process can more easily nominate young candidates in “winnable” districts if they are committed to youth representation. On the other hand, one could point out that a centralized selection process might hinder the nomination of young candidates in “winnable” districts when parties are not committed to youth representation, and that decentralization allows members to overcome their party’s reluctance to nominate young adults. However, we expect to find some differences between mainstream and challenger parties. Since mainstream parties typically have more incumbents than challenger parties, we hypothesize that:

**Hypothesis 5.** Mainstream parties are more likely than challenger parties to nominate young candidates in districts where they have little or no chance of winning.
## 7. Data and methods

Our analyses focus on the last three French legislative elections, which were held in 2012, 2017, and 2022. This methodological choice not only enables us to account for recent changes in the level of competitiveness of the constituencies in which young candidates typically run, but also to determine whether the emergence of La République en Marche! – a challenger party – in 2017 is associated with a change in young adults' propensity to be “sacrificed”. France has a two-round system with single-member constituencies. Candidates who win more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round or the plurality vote in the second round are elected. Research shows that youth representation is typically higher in countries that have a proportional electoral system, and lower in countries that have a majoritarian system, such as France (Joshi, 2013; Kurz and Ettensperger, 2023; Stockemer and Sundström, 2018).

A significant advantage of investigating the “sacrificial lamb” hypothesis in the context of France is that the French Ministry of the Interior publishes the date of birth of all official candidates on its online repository. In most other Western countries, such data is not available. Researchers therefore have to rely on multiple sources, such as the parties’ websites, to determine which candidates were 35 and under at the time of the election. This method rarely allows them to confirm the age of all people running for office, and the vast majority of studies that have been published so far rely on incomplete samples.

As will be discussed below, the French electoral calendar – under which legislative elections are generally held two months after presidential elections – also provides an ideal setting in which to study the “sacrificial lamb” hypothesis. It enables us to use the performance of the presidential candidate of the candidate’s party to obtain a measure of competitiveness that (a) accounts for the most recent information that parties have about their likelihood of securing each district when nominating their candidates, and (b) cannot be influenced by the effects that candidates’ personal characteristics may have on voter behavior.

The French case is also relevant for studying the “sacrificial lamb” hypothesis, as it allows us to test the hypothesis that the emergence of a challenger party is positively associated with the overall level of competitiveness of the constituencies in which young candidates run for office. Our results therefore provide a glimpse of the potential impact of the rise in popularity of new political parties on the representation of young people elsewhere in the world. La République en Marche! shared several traits with other Western European challenger parties when it was first elected in 2017. Notably, it nominated a significant number of individuals with little or no experience in politics and relied on younger candidates than mainstream parties. Whereas results from the 2012 election give an idea of the role generally attributed to young people when two mainstream parties share power for many years, results from the 2017 and 2022 elections are suggestive of how this role evolves with and after the election of a challenger party.

Lastly, focusing on France gives us an opportunity to learn more about how gender quotas work in practice. While we know that gender quotas improved the representation of women in the French National Assembly (Murray, 2010), it is still unclear whether all women benefited equally from this policy. In particular, our results allow us to determine whether young women are more inclined to run in districts where they have little or no chance of winning when compared to older women and men.

As mentioned in the introduction, we consider people 35 and under to be “young” candidates. We also use other benchmarks (30 and under/25 and under) to verify whether individuals in their twenties are more likely than individuals in their early thirties to be “sacrificial lambs”. These benchmarks do not separate clearly defined periods of life, but give us an idea of the type of districts in which candidates run according to the stage of adulthood in which they are. Given that these thresholds are necessarily arbitrary, we reproduce our main analyses using all ages between 25 and 40 as thresholds in Appendix F.

We limit our analyses to “major” parties/coalitions, as we consider that apart from a few exceptions, candidates running for “small” parties/coalitions have little or no chance of winning elections. By “major” parties/coalitions, we refer to parties/coalitions that received at least five percent of the national vote in the first round of a given legislative election. In 2012, our definition encompasses the Front de gauche (FG), the Parti socialiste (PS), the Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP), and the Front national (FN). The FG was a coalition between the Parti communiste (PC), the Parti de gauche (PG), and some smaller left-wing parties. The coalition’s 2012 presidential candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, founded the France insoumise (FI) in 2016, simultaneously ending the alliance between the different parties.

In 2017, our definition comprises the FI, the PS, La République en marche (LREM), the Union des démocrates et indépendants (UDI), Les Républicains (LR), and the FN. Since the Mouvement démocrate, or MoDem (MDM), ended up concluding an alliance with LREM a few days before the election, we consider candidates of this party as LREM candidates. The UMP changed its name to “Les Républicains” in 2015. “UMP” and “LR” thus refer to the same party. Although the UDI and LR concluded an alliance before the election, UDI candidates faced LR candidates in some constituencies. We therefore study the two parties separately.

Finally, in 2022, our definition of “major” parties and coalitions includes the Nouvelle Union populaire écologique et sociale (NUPES), Ensemble ! (ENS), LR, and the FN, which was renamed the “Rassemblement national” (RN) in 2018. The NUPES was a coalition between the PC, the FI, the PS, Europe Écologie Les Verts (EELV), and many other small left-wing parties that aimed at improving the competitiveness of the left during the 2022 legislative election. ENS, on the other hand, was a coalition among parties that supported the recently re-elected French president, Emmanuel Macron. It included LREM (renamed Rénaissance, or RE) and the MDM, among others. Appendix A shows the candidate selection methods used by “major” French political parties and coalitions between 2012 and 2022. The parties that qualify as mainstream parties are the PS and the UMP/LR in 2012 and 2017, and LR and ENS in 2022 (see De Vries and Hobolt, 2020).

We use three different measures to determine whether young adults are more likely than older people to be “sacrificial lambs”. The first is “dynamic”, meaning that it takes into consideration the level of competitiveness of the districts in the long run. It follows a similar logic to the “dynamic” measure used in Thomas and Bodet (2013), but its coding differs in order to take account of the French context. Relying in part on the work of Christophe De Nantois (2010), we classify all 577 French electoral districts into three categories: strongholds, potential strongholds, and battlegrounds.<fnref n="4" /> To be categorized as a stronghold, a district must have been held by a party representing the same political ideology for 25 years or more at the time of the election. Districts that have been held by a party representing the same political ideology for more than 15 years (but less than 25 years) at the time of the election are considered as potential strongholds, and all other districts as battlegrounds. We account for the ideology of the parties rather than the parties themselves because the French party system typically changes slightly from one election to another, and electoral coalitions are frequent in France (see Appendix B for the coding of the political ideology of the parties). Table 1 shows the number of strongholds and potential strongholds per political ideology and election year. It also displays the number of battlegrounds per election year.

<footnote n="4">⁴ It should be noted that the French electoral districts were redrawn in 2010, partly in order to create districts for French citizens living abroad. According to our classification, only the constituencies that existed before the redrawing can be strongholds or potential strongholds. The new constituencies are considered battlegrounds. Despite the changes to the French electoral map, we found almost the same number of strongholds in 2012 as De Nantois (2010) before the redrawing (176 vs. 178 for the right, and 58 vs. 59 for the left).</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 1**
Classification of districts per election year.</caption><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>Left strongholds</th><th>Left P. Strongholds</th><th>Right strongholds</th><th>Right P. Strongholds</th><th>Battlegrounds</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2012</td><td>58 (10%)</td><td>81 (14%)</td><td>176 (31%)</td><td>42 (7%)</td><td>220 (38%)</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>57 (10%)</td><td>86 (15%)</td><td>154 (27%)</td><td>52 (9%)</td><td>228 (40%)</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>42 (7%)</td><td>18 (3%)</td><td>68 (12%)</td><td>27 (5%)</td><td>422 (73%)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Number of districts (percentage of all districts). P. Strongholds = potential strongholds.

Like De Nantois (2010), we find that the right historically had more strongholds than the left. However, it is worth noting that the left could count on more potential strongholds in 2012 and 2017. Neither the center nor the far right has strongholds or potential strongholds, as the parties representing these political ideologies were only sporadically successful in electing candidates before the 2010s. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the number of battlegrounds increased drastically between the two last legislative elections. While they represented about 40 percent of districts in 2017, they constituted over 70 percent of them in 2022. This is due to the fact that both the left and the right lost many strongholds and potential strongholds to LREM, a party that claims to be neither on the left nor the right, in 2017.

Using our classification of the 577 French electoral districts, we create an index in which a value of 1 indicates that a district is more difficult to win, and a value of 5 that the district is easier to win. We assign each candidate one of the following types of districts: stronghold of another party's ideology (value of 1), potential stronghold of another party's ideology (value of 2), battleground (value of 3), potential stronghold of own party's ideology (value of 4), and stronghold of own party's ideology (value of 5). We then compute the mean value of the index per age group. We do so in order to facilitate the readability of our results. Yet, it should be noted that we also present the distributions of the types of districts per age group in Appendix E. Results indicating that the mean index value of candidates 35 and under is substantially lower than the mean index value of candidates over 35 would lend support to the “sacrificial lamb” hypothesis. While our “dynamic” measure enables us to have an insight into the level of competitiveness of the constituencies, it might not reflect the most up-to-date information that parties have about their likelihood of winning a constituency when nominating candidates. Furthermore, this measure does not necessarily allow to determine whether centrist and extreme-right parties/coalitions nominate youth in their most promising districts, since they do not have strongholds. This is why we also rely on another measure to determine whether young candidates tend to be nominated in districts where they have little or no chance of winning.

Our second measure is “static”, meaning that it examines the ability of candidates to win a given election only. Using candidates’ electoral results, we create a second index. Relying on candidates’ electoral performance is a fairly common practice in the literature on the competitiveness of candidates. For example, Stockemer et al. (2023) use this approach to determine whether the two main US political parties tend to nominate young adults in winnable and safe constituencies. We classify all candidates into five categories. The first group includes candidates who won less than 10 percent of the votes in the first round (value of 1); the second group, candidates who won more than 10 percent of the votes in the first round, but did not qualify for the second round (value of 2); the third group, candidates who qualified for the second round but were not in a close race (less than 45 percent of the votes, value of 3); the fourth group, candidates who qualified for the second round and were in a close race (more than 45 percent of the vote, value of 4), and the fifth group, candidates who were elected (value of 5). Again, results indicating that the mean index value of candidates 35 and under is substantially lower than the mean index value of candidates over 35 would lend support to the “sacrificial lamb” hypothesis. Distributions per age group are presented in Appendix E.

The main limitation of this measure is that it does not allow us to determine whether candidates 35 and under performed poorly solely because they were “sacrificial lambs”. Indeed, it could be argued that other factors, such as a candidate’s ability to run a successful campaign or voters’ biases, can also influence election outcomes. This is why we also use a second “static” measure.

Our third measure takes advantage of the fact that in France, the presidential election is held approximately two months before the legislative election, and that all main French political parties typically nominate a presidential candidate (PC). Since both elections are held close together, their outcomes tend to be similar (see for instance Dupoirier and Sauger, 2010). Consequently, a PC’s performance in each district in the first round of the presidential election (a time when all PCs are still on the ballot) can give a good idea of the constituencies where a party is likely to perform well in the legislative election. For example, if in a given district, support for a party’s PC is higher than in 95 percent of other districts, this party can likely expect to be competitive in that constituency in the legislative election. We classify all candidates into five categories according to the performance of their party’s PC in their district during the first round of the presidential election. To account for the fact that the NUPES was created between the 2022 presidential and legislative elections, we aggregate the votes cast for the PCs of the parties that joined the NUPES before the legislative election.

Candidates who ran in a district where support for their party’s PC in the first round of the presidential election is lower than two standard deviations below the national average are assigned the value of 1; candidates who ran in a district where support for their party’s PC is between two and one standard deviations below the national average the value of 2; candidates who ran in a district where support for their party’s PC is between one standard deviation below and one standard deviation above the national average the value of 3; candidates who ran in a district where support for their party’s PC is between one and two standard deviations above the national average the value of 4; and candidates who ran in a district where support for their party’s PC is higher than two standard deviations above the national average the value of 5. As for the other two measures, substantially lower mean index values for candidates 35 and under would lend support to the “sacrificial lamb” hypothesis (see Appendix E for distributions per age group). The second “static” measure is particularly useful, as it gives us the opportunity to account for the recent information available to parties when selecting candidates, but cannot be influenced by the effects that candidates’ personal qualities have on voters’ behavior. However, we have to exclude UDI candidates from our analyses based on this measure, as this party did not field any candidates in the 2017 presidential election.<fnref n="5" />

While they each have some limitations, we consider that, together, our three different measures provide strong evidence to determine whether young people tend to run in districts where they have little

<footnote n="5">⁵ It should be noted that the UDI, after some hesitation, supported the candidacy of François Fillon (LR) in the 2017 presidential election. However, given that the two parties are independent and that some UDI candidates ran against LR candidates in the legislative election, we regard Fillon’s support primarily as an indicator of LR candidates chances of winning.</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 2**
The proportion of young candidates per election year.</caption><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>N</th><th>35 and –</th><th>31 to 35</th><th>26 to 30</th><th>18 to 25</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2012</td><td>2103</td><td>220 (10.5%)</td><td>120 (5.7%)</td><td>61 (2.9%)</td><td>39 (1.9%)</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>2706</td><td>445 (16.4%)</td><td>204 (7.5%)</td><td>164 (6.1%)</td><td>77 (2.8%)</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>2106</td><td>404 (19.2%)</td><td>196 (9.3%)</td><td>136 (6.5%)</td><td>72 (3.4%)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Number of candidates (percentage of all candidates).

or no chance of winning in France. To ensure the robustness of our results, we also use an alternative measure of the electoral performance of candidates in Appendix C. This enables us to ensure that the results obtained using our first “static” measure are not conditional on the coding we retained.

Like other researchers who have studied the “sacrificial lamb” hypothesis before us (Everitt and Tremblay, 2023; Thomas and Bodet, 2013), we only present descriptive tests. Such a methodological choice makes sense because we have data on all candidates who ran for a “major” French political party in the 2012, 2017, and 2022 legislative elections. Yet, we still perform Welch’s t-tests to verify whether the differences between the mean average values we present are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) since one might consider that there is a superpopulation of candidates, or a theoretical population including all those who might have run as candidates. We also run statistical models which take into account the fixed effects per district in Appendix G.

# 8. Results

## 8.1. The proportion of young candidates

Before examining the level of competitiveness of the districts in which candidates 35 and under tend to run for office, we evaluate the extent to which major French political parties/coalitions rely on young candidates in legislative elections, and how many young individuals they nominate. Table 2 displays the proportion of young candidates by age group and election year. It shows that the overall proportion of candidates 35 and under has almost doubled over the course of the last ten years, becoming closer to the demographic weight of this age group (21 percent of the French population in 2022).<fnref n="6" /> While people aged between 18 and 35 represented only 10.5 percent of candidates in 2012, they represented 19.2 percent of them in 2022.

Table 2 nonetheless reveals that not all age groups are equally well represented. Although there were more candidates aged 25 and under in 2022 than in 2012, the proportion of candidates aged between 18 and 25 remained well below the demographic weight of this age group (9.5 percent of the French population in 2022) in each election. Conversely, people aged between 26 and 30, and people aged between 31 and 35 were overrepresented in the 2017 and 2022 legislative elections. In 2022, the demographic weights of these age groups were respectively 5.5 percent and 6 percent of the French population.

Table 3 shows that despite the fact that most major French political parties/coalitions increasingly rely on young candidates, some nominate a much larger proportion of people aged between 18 and 35. In each election, the party that nominates the highest proportion of young individuals is the FN/RN. This comes as no surprise, since according to Sylvain Bréchon, this is one of the key elements of the “de-demonization” strategy initiated by Marine Le Pen after she took over the leadership of the party in 2011. Indeed, young people “[cannot be] linked to the darkest hours of the FN, nor to the controversial statements made by Jean-Marie Le Pen”, the former leader of the party (see Kujawski, 2013). Choosing individuals who are just starting

<table><caption>**Table 3**
The proportion of young candidates (35 and under) per party and election year.</caption><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>FG</th><th>FI</th><th>NUPES</th><th>PS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2012</td><td>69/558 (12.4%)</td><td></td><td></td><td>28/471 (5.9%)</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td></td><td>124/557 (22.3%)</td><td></td><td>43/414 (10.4%)</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td></td><td></td><td>127/543 (23.4%)</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>LREM/ENS</th><th>UDI</th><th>UMP/LR</th><th>FN/RN</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2012</td><td></td><td></td><td>35/503 (7%)</td><td>88/571 (15.4%)</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>82/537 (15.3%)</td><td>10/146 (6.8%)</td><td>58/481 (12.1%)</td><td>128/571 (22.4%)</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>70/555 (12.6%)</td><td></td><td>72/443 (16.3%)</td><td>135/565 (23.9%)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Number of candidates (percentage of all candidates).

to get involved in politics and did not previously hold political office over people who have more experience is also consistent with the FN/RN’s criticism of the elites.

The challenger left-wing coalition (FG) and party (FI), as well as the NUPES, also nominate a significant proportion of young candidates. This is potentially due to the fact that young adults are at the very core of the left’s electoral strategy (see for instance Gélix, 2020), and that they form a non-negligible part of its supporters (Bristielle and Chazel, 2022). The parties/coalitions that nominate the smallest proportion of young candidates are mainstream parties (i.e., the PS before being part of the NUPES and the UMP/LR), or parties that held a significant number of seats in the previous legislature (i.e., ENS). These parties often have a large number of incumbents, and as discussed above, the nomination of these individuals is most frequently a formality (Squarcioni, 2017). The case of ENS in 2022 is particularly interesting. Although the LREM’s electoral breakthrough in 2017 rejuvenated the French National Assembly, the coalition supporting Emmanuel Macron is the political organization that nominated the smallest proportion of candidates aged between 18 and 35 in 2022. This suggests that maintaining a significant number of young candidates poses a challenge when all of a party’s officeholders only served a single term, and that those who were 35 and under when elected are now in their late thirties.

## 8.2. Results from the “dynamic” measure

We now turn to the types of districts in which major French political parties/coalitions nominate young candidates. We first present the results from our “dynamic” measure, which, as a reminder, takes into account the level of competitiveness of districts in the long run. As Table 4 shows, in all three elections, candidates 35 and under were more likely than candidates over 35 to be nominated in a district they had little or no chance of winning. The 2012 election saw the starkest disparity between young and older candidates. In that election, the difference between the mean index value of candidates 35 and under and the mean index value of candidates over 35 is 0.47 points. When we look at the dynamics within each party separately, we find that the difference between young and older candidates is substantially greater in the UMP (0.90*) and the PS (0.69*) than in the FG (0.13) and the FN (0.03) (Appendix D). This lends support to the hypothesis that mainstream parties are more likely than challenger parties to nominate young people in the districts where they have little or no chance of winning (Hypothesis 5).

The situation slightly improved in the 2017 election. Indeed, even though young candidates were still less likely than older candidates to compete in “winnable” constituencies, the difference between the mean index value of candidates 35 and under and the mean index value of candidates over 35 shrank to 0.30 points. Interestingly, the results presented in Appendix D reveal that despite the fact that LREM did not have strongholds in 2017, this party chose to nominate young candidates in more competitive districts than older candidates. Again, the difference between the mean index values of young and older candidates is greater in the PS (0.57*) and LR (0.52*), two mainstream

<footnote n="6">⁶ The demographic weights of the different age groups were computed using the estimates from the Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (Insee, 2022).</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 4**
Mean index values per age group (dynamic measure).</caption><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>+35</th><th>35 and –</th><th>30 and –</th><th>25 and –</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2012</td><td>2.72</td><td>2.25*</td><td>2.21*</td><td>1.95*</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>2.62</td><td>2.32*</td><td>2.23*</td><td>2.10*</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>2.79</td><td>2.64*</td><td>2.56*</td><td>2.65</td></tr></tbody></table>

A lower mean index value indicates that the candidates in the subgroup are less competitive on average. A star indicates that the difference between the value of the subgroup is statistically different (p < 0.05) from that of the reference group (+35).

parties that still held many strongholds and potential strongholds at that time.

The 2022 election stands out from the previous two. In this election, a vast majority of candidates campaigned in a battleground, as a significant number of strongholds of the left/right were won by LREM in 2017 (see Table 1 and Appendix E). There is still a difference between the mean index value of candidates 35 and under and the mean index value of candidates over 35, but it is far smaller (0.15*). As shown in Appendix D, this time, ENS – the electoral coalition succeeding to LREM – did not nominate young adults in more competitive districts than older candidates. The difference between the mean index value of young and older ENS candidates (0.13) is identical to the difference between the mean index value of young and older LR candidates (0.13).

## 8.3. Results from the two “static” measures

So far, the results obtained using our “dynamic” measure support the hypothesis that young adults are more likely than older people to be nominated in districts where they have little or no chance of winning (Hypothesis 1). As mentioned above, however, parties arguably have more precise information about their likelihood of winning a district than their previous electoral performance when they nominate candidates. In this section, we verify whether our findings hold when we use our two “static” measures of competitiveness: candidates’ electoral results and the electoral performance of the presidential candidate of candidates’ party at the district level. Table 5 confirms that youth were particularly likely to be “sacrificial lambs” in the 2012 election. For both the first and the second “static” measures, the differences between the mean index values of candidates 35 and under and the mean index values of candidates over 35 are particularly great in this election (0.68* and 0.10*). Appendix D shows that the FN stands out from the other political parties. Even if, overall, it did not do as well as the mainstream parties in 2012, it was more inclined to nominate young people than older people in the districts in which it performs better.

Table 5 also confirms that younger candidates have become more likely to run in “winnable” constituencies since 2017. These results suggest that the 2017 legislative election mark a turning point for youth in French politics; since then, not only have there been a greater number of young candidates, but people 35 and under have become more likely to be serious contenders. This gives credence to Hypothesis 3. Comparing the electoral results of young candidates across parties, we find that young adults (whether 35 and under, 30 and under or 25 and under) who ran for LREM in 2017 were particularly successful (see Appendix D). LREM candidates who were 35 and under were also more likely to be nominated in constituencies where Emmanuel Macron performed well in the first round of the 2017 presidential election. In fact, the mean index values of young LREM candidates are greater than the means of LREM candidates over 35 who did so for both “static” measures. We again find the starkest differences between young and older candidates in the two mainstream parties, the PS and LR.

In 2022, the electoral performance of young candidates is even more similar to that of their older counterparts. As shown in Table 5, however, not all young adults are equally likely to win a seat in the French National Assembly, and if we focus on the electoral performance of candidates 30 and under (and 25 and under), we find that young candidates were still considerably more likely than their older counterparts to be “sacrificial lambs” in 2017 and 2022. We can draw a similar

<table><caption>**Table 5**
Mean index values per age group (static measures).</caption><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>+35</th><th>35 and –</th><th>30 and –</th><th>25 and –</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>Static 1:</strong></td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>2.75</td><td>2.07*</td><td>1.77*</td><td>1.79*</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>2.60</td><td>2.42*</td><td>2.24*</td><td>1.92*</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>3.01</td><td>2.86*</td><td>2.58*</td><td>2.17*</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>Static 2:</strong></td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>3.07</td><td>2.97*</td><td>2.93*</td><td>3.03</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>3.07</td><td>3.00</td><td>2.94*</td><td>2.83*</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>3.05</td><td>3.05</td><td>2.94*</td><td>2.74*</td></tr></tbody></table>

A lower mean index value indicates that the candidates in the subgroup are less competitive on average. A star indicates that the difference between the value of the subgroup is statistically different (p < 0.05) from that of the reference group (+35).

conclusion from the results obtained using the second “static” measure. Therefore, it seems that only young adults aged between 31 and 35 have become almost as equally competitive as older people. Those 30 and under, on the other hand, still tend to be nominated in districts where they have little or no chance of winning, even though it should be noted their electoral performance has improved since 2012. This could be the case because people who are in their twenties are generally starting to get involved in politics, have less experience than people in their thirties, and often cannot count on a well-developed network like their older counterparts. Unfortunately, our methodological approach does not allow us to determine whether it is the case.

## 8.4. Are young women more likely to be “sacrificial lambs”?

Examining the types of districts in which male and female candidates tend to be nominated and the mean index values for our two “static” measures, we find that young women are particularly inclined to be “sacrificial lambs”. Our results thus provide support for Hypothesis 2. Table 6 shows that in all three elections, the mean index values of our three measures are considerably lower for women 35 and under than for men 35 and under.<fnref n="7" /> Gender inequality therefore seems to persist over time.

The results presented in Table 6 are also interesting, in that they show that women – regardless of age – are still more likely than men to be “sacrificial lambs” in France. Indeed, in all three elections, female candidates were more likely than male candidates to be nominated in districts that where had little or no chance of winning. Women were also less likely than men to perform well in the elections, even in 2017 and 2022. It would therefore appear that the practices identified by Murray (2008, 2010) have not changed over time.

## 8.5. Is the incumbency effect to blame?

As discussed above, there are two main reasons that could explain why young candidates are more likely than others to run in districts where they have little or no chance of winning. Our data only allows us to study one of these possibilities; that, most of the time, parties allocate their safest constituencies to their incumbents (who are generally older than 35).<fnref n="8" /> Table 7 shows that the gap between young and older candidates is much less important when we look solely at the types of districts and electoral results of candidates who were not previously elected. However, the mean index value of our “dynamic” measure remains lower for non-incumbents 35 and under than for candidates

<footnote n="7">⁷ Interestingly, the results of the models presented in Appendix G suggest that for the dynamic and first static measures, there is no additional combined effect of being a young woman on the probability of being “sacrificed” beyond the individual negative effects of being young and a woman.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ The percentage of candidates aged 35 and under is much lower among incumbents than among all candidates running for office: 0.25 percent (vs. 10.5 percent) in 2012, 0.98 percent (vs. 16.4 percent) in 2017, and 5.97 percent (vs. 19.2 percent) in 2022.</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 6**
Differences across genders.</caption><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>+35(M)</th><th>35 and – (M)</th><th>+35(F)</th><th>35 and – (F)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="5"><em>Dynamic:</em></td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>2.91</td><td>2.29*</td><td>2.46*</td><td>2.22*</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>2.75</td><td>2.46*</td><td>2.47*</td><td>2.13*</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>2.88</td><td>2.68*</td><td>2.69*</td><td>2.58*</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><em>Static 1:</em></td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>2.99</td><td>2.25*</td><td>2.40*</td><td>1.89*</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>2.74</td><td>2.46*</td><td>2.44*</td><td>2.36*</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>3.11</td><td>2.97</td><td>2.92*</td><td>2.69*</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><em>Static 2:</em></td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>3.14</td><td>3.05</td><td>2.97*</td><td>2.88*</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>3.10</td><td>3.10</td><td>3.02*</td><td>2.86*</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>3.09</td><td>3.13</td><td>3.01*</td><td>2.92*</td></tr></tbody></table>

A lower mean index value indicates that the candidates in the subgroup are less competitive on average. A star indicates that the difference between the value of the subgroup is statistically different (p < 0.05) from that of the reference group (Men +35).

<table><caption>**Table 7**
Non-incumbents only.</caption><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>+35</th><th>35 and –</th><th>30 and –</th><th>25 and –</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="5"><em>Dynamic:</em></td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>2.39</td><td>2.25</td><td>2.21</td><td>1.95*</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>2.44</td><td>2.31*</td><td>2.23*</td><td>2.10*</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>2.65</td><td>2.59</td><td>2.55</td><td>2.65</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><em>Static 1:</em></td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>2.24</td><td>2.05*</td><td>1.77*</td><td>1.79*</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>2.45</td><td>2.41</td><td>2.24*</td><td>1.92*</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>2.67</td><td>2.75</td><td>2.56</td><td>2.17*</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><em>Static 2:</em></td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>3.01</td><td>2.97</td><td>2.93</td><td>3.03</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>3.03</td><td>3.00</td><td>2.94*</td><td>2.83*</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>3.01</td><td>3.03</td><td>2.95</td><td>2.74*</td></tr></tbody></table>

A lower mean index value indicates that the candidates in the subgroup are less competitive on average. A star indicates that the difference between the value of the subgroup is statistically different (p < 0.05) from that of the reference group (+35).

over 35 in all three elections, and the mean index value of our two “static” measures in 2012 and 2017. 2022 was indeed the only election in which non-incumbents 35 and under outperformed non-incumbents 35 and over when it comes to these two measures.

Examining the results of non-incumbents 30 and under (and 25 and under) more closely, we find that there is still a non-negligible difference between the mean index values of young candidates and those of older candidates (except for candidates aged 25 and under in 2012 according to the second “static” measure). This suggests that the incumbency effect only partly explains why people in their twenties and early thirties are more likely than others to run in districts where they have little or no chance of winning, and that there are other factors at play.

## 9. Conclusion

In this article, we have examined a seldom-studied factor that may contribute to the underrepresentation of young adults in the parliaments of Western democracies: the level of competitiveness of the districts in which political parties nominate young candidates. Using data on all individuals who ran for a major political party in the 2012, 2017, and 2022 French legislative elections, we show that people 35 and under are more likely than older people to be “sacrificial lambs”. Although the situation for younger candidates has improved since 2017, only one subgroup is close to becoming equally competitive as older people: men aged between 31 and 35. In the last two legislative elections, people 30 and under and young women remained significantly more likely than others to run in “unwinnable”

districts. Furthermore, our results reveal that, regardless of their age, women are more likely than men to run in constituencies that they are likely to lose. As it is the case in Brazil, Canada, and South Korea, female candidates seem to be especially at risk of being “sacrificed”. Interestingly, we find that the parties that are the most prone to nominate young adults in the districts in which they perform well are challenger parties.

The additional analyses we have conducted indicate that one of the main reasons why young candidates tend to be “sacrificial lambs” is that incumbents – who are on average older – compete in the safest districts for their party. Such results imply that if political parties are keen to increase youth representation in political institutions, they should consider promoting young candidates in “winnable” constituencies when incumbents are not standing for re-election. They could also hold open nominations at every election. The fact that, even in 2022, non-incumbents who are 30 are under were more likely than other non-incumbents to run in districts where they have little or no chance of winning nevertheless suggest that other factors explain why French political parties nominate young people in “unwinnable” constituencies. Perhaps major political parties cultivate some prejudices against young people, and do not necessarily see them as competitive candidates. Unfortunately, our methodological approach does not allow us to verify whether this is the case. Future work using a more qualitative approach could deepen our understanding of the “sacrificial lamb” hypothesis in France and elsewhere by looking more closely at the factors that drive political parties to nominate people aged 30 and under and young women in more difficult-to-win constituencies. It could also make it possible to determine whether young adults are less reluctant than older people to run in districts where they are almost certain of losing.

## Funding information

Both authors are supported by funding from Sciences Po. Philippe Chassé is also supported by funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Canada).

## Credit authorship contribution statement

Camille Gélix: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Conceptualization. Philippe Chassé: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Methodology, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization.

## Declaration of competing interest

None.

## Data availability

Data will be made available on request.

## Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Richard Nadeau, Martial Foucault, Ruth Dassonneville, and Daniel Stockemer for their guidance. They are also grateful to Olivier Bergeron-Boutin, Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau, Kira Kurz, Juliette Leblanc, Prarthana Puthran, Matthew Taylor, Can Zengin, and the two anonymous reviewers for their comments on the article. Earlier versions of this paper were presented during a seminar organized by the Canada Research Chair in Electoral Democracy, at the European Political Science Association Annual Conference, and at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. The authors thank the participants of these conferences for their useful remarks.
## Appendix A. French political parties' candidate selection methods

<table><thead><tr><th>Party</th><th>Year</th><th>Method</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>FG</td><td>2012</td><td>PC: Commission including at least one representative of each federation and a secret ballot during the national congress.<br>PG: Same as for the PC.</td></tr><tr><td>FI</td><td>2017</td><td>Constituency assembly and vote by the executive.</td></tr><tr><td>NUPES</td><td>2022</td><td>PC: Same as in 2012.<br>FI: Same as in 2017.<br>PS: Same as in 2012.<br>EELV: Commission at the national level, and vote from members in the constituency.</td></tr><tr><td>PS</td><td>2012</td><td>Discussion within the local sections or federations, commission at the national level, vote from members in the constituency, and validation by the commission.</td></tr><tr><td>PS</td><td>2017</td><td>Same as in 2012.</td></tr><tr><td>LREM</td><td>2017</td><td>LREM: Commission at the national level, and consultation of party members (optional).<br>MDM: Consultation of the departmental associations, and national commission.</td></tr><tr><td>ENS</td><td>2022</td><td>RE: Same as in 2017.<br>MDM: Same as in 2017.</td></tr><tr><td>UDI</td><td>2017</td><td>Commission at the national level.</td></tr><tr><td>UMP</td><td>2012</td><td>Commission at the national level, and consultation of party members (optional).</td></tr><tr><td>LR</td><td>2017</td><td>Same as in 2012.</td></tr><tr><td>LR</td><td>2017</td><td>Same as in 2012.</td></tr><tr><td>FN</td><td>2012</td><td>Departmental delegates and commission at the national level.</td></tr><tr><td>FN</td><td>2017</td><td>Same as in 2012.</td></tr><tr><td>RN</td><td>2022</td><td>Same as in 2012.</td></tr></tbody></table>

## Appendix B. Political ideology of major French political parties/coalitions

<table><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>Ideology</th><th>Parties</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1988</td><td>Left</td><td>Majorité présidentielle (MAJ), Parti communiste (PC), Parti radical de gauche (PRG), Parti socialiste (PS)</td></tr><tr><td>1988</td><td>Right</td><td>Divers droite (DVD), Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), Union pour la démocratie française (UDF)</td></tr><tr><td>1988</td><td>Extreme-right</td><td>Front national (FN)</td></tr><tr><td>1993</td><td>Left</td><td>MAJ, PC, PRG, PS</td></tr><tr><td>1993</td><td>Right</td><td>DVD, RPR, UDF</td></tr><tr><td>1997</td><td>Left</td><td>Divers gauche (DVG), Les Verts (LV), PC, PRG, PS</td></tr><tr><td>1997</td><td>Right</td><td>DVD, RPR, UDF</td></tr><tr><td>1997</td><td>Extreme-right</td><td>FN</td></tr><tr><td>2002</td><td>Left</td><td>DVG, LV, PC, PRG, PS</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td>2002</td><td>Right</td><td>DVD, UDF, Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP)</td></tr><tr><td>2007</td><td>Left</td><td>DVG, LV, PC, PRG, PS</td></tr><tr><td>2007</td><td>Center</td><td>Mouvement démocrate (MDM)</td></tr><tr><td>2007</td><td>Right</td><td>DVD, Nouveau Centre (NC), UMP</td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>Left</td><td>DVG, Europe Écologie Les Verts (EELV), Front de Gauche (FG), PRG, PS</td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>Center</td><td>MDM</td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>Right</td><td>DVD, NC, Parti radical valoisien (PRV), UMP</td></tr><tr><td>2012</td><td>Extreme-right</td><td>FN, Ligue du Sud (LS)</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>Left</td><td>DVG, France insoumise (FI), EELV, PC, PRG, PS</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>Center</td><td>MDM, La République en Marche (LREM)</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>Right</td><td>DVD, LR, Union des démocrates et indépendants (UDI)</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>Extreme-right</td><td>FN, LS</td></tr></table>

## Appendix C. Alternative measure

### C.1. Coding

<table><thead><tr><td>Value</td><td>Description</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>Candidates who obtained a percentage of the vote lower than two standard deviations below the national average of their party in the first round of the legislative election.</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>Candidates who obtained a percentage between two and one standard deviations below the national average of their party in the first round of the legislative election.</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>Candidates who obtained a percentage between one standard deviation below the national average of their party and one standard deviation above the national average of their party in the first round of the legislative election.</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>Candidates who obtained a percentage between one and two standard deviations above the national average of their party in the first round of the legislative election.</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>Candidates who obtained a percentage higher than two standard deviations above the national average of their party in the first round of the legislative election.</td></tr></tbody></table>

### C.2. Mean index values per age group

<table><thead><tr><td>Year</td><td>+35</td><td>35 and –</td><td>30 and –</td><td>25 and –</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2012</td><td>2.98</td><td>2.88*</td><td>2.86</td><td>2.90</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>3.04</td><td>2.96*</td><td>2.92*</td><td>2.87*</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>3.06</td><td>3.02</td><td>2.92*</td><td>2.69*</td></tr></tbody></table>

### C.3. Differences across genders

<table><thead><tr><td>Year</td><td>+35 (M)</td><td>35 and – (M)</td><td>+35 (F)</td><td>35 and – (F)</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2012</td><td>3.06</td><td>2.94</td><td>2.87*</td><td>2.82*</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>3.11</td><td>3.06</td><td>2.96*</td><td>2.82*</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>3.13</td><td>3.12</td><td>2.98*</td><td>2.88*</td></tr></tbody></table>
### C.4. Non-incumbents only

<table><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>+35</th><th>35 and –</th><th>30 and –</th><th>25 and –</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2012</td><td>2.86</td><td>2.88</td><td>2.86</td><td>2.90</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>2.96</td><td>2.95</td><td>2.92</td><td>2.87</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>2.95</td><td>2.98</td><td>2.91</td><td>2.69*</td></tr></tbody></table>

## Appendix D. Analyses per party

As a reminder, the mean index values presented in the tables below were obtained using data on all candidates who ran in the French legislative elections of 2012, 2017, and 2022. Although some differences are substantively important, they are not always statistically significant if we consider that there is a superpopulation of candidates. This is partly due to the fact that some parties have nominated very few young candidates, and variability with regard to their performance is sometimes high.

### D.1. Dynamic measure

<table><thead><tr><th>Party</th><th>+35</th><th>35 and –</th><th>30 and –</th><th>25 and –</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>2012:</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>FG</td><td>2.67</td><td>2.54</td><td>2.59</td><td>2.55</td></tr><tr><td>PS</td><td>2.80</td><td>2.11*</td><td>2.33</td><td>1.00*</td></tr><tr><td>UMP</td><td>3.47</td><td>2.57*</td><td>2.29*</td><td>3.00</td></tr><tr><td>FN</td><td>1.98</td><td>1.95</td><td>1.92</td><td>1.72</td></tr><tr><td><strong>2017:</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>FI</td><td>2.76</td><td>2.52</td><td>2.40*</td><td>2.28*</td></tr><tr><td>PS</td><td>2.92</td><td>2.35*</td><td>2.21*</td><td>1.00*</td></tr><tr><td>LREM</td><td>2.02</td><td>2.09</td><td>2.03</td><td>2.33</td></tr><tr><td>UDI</td><td>2.88</td><td>2.80</td><td>2.33</td><td>NA</td></tr><tr><td>LR</td><td>3.40</td><td>2.88*</td><td>2.65*</td><td>1.67*</td></tr><tr><td>FN</td><td>2.05</td><td>1.98</td><td>2.04</td><td>2.08</td></tr><tr><td><strong>2022:</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>NUPES</td><td>2.92</td><td>2.71*</td><td>2.57*</td><td>2.54*</td></tr><tr><td>ENS</td><td>2.56</td><td>2.43</td><td>2.21*</td><td>3.00</td></tr><tr><td>LR</td><td>3.21</td><td>3.08</td><td>3.09</td><td>3.14</td></tr><tr><td>RN</td><td>2.56</td><td>2.46</td><td>2.46</td><td>2.64</td></tr></tbody></table>

### D.2. First static measure

<table><thead><tr><th>Party</th><th>+35</th><th>35 and –</th><th>30 and –</th><th>25 and –</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>2012:</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>FG</td><td>1.24</td><td>1.07*</td><td>1.09*</td><td>1.00*</td></tr><tr><td>PS</td><td>4.28</td><td>3.89</td><td>2.33</td><td>2.50</td></tr><tr><td>UMP</td><td>3.87</td><td>3.06*</td><td>2.86*</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>FN</td><td>1.79</td><td>1.88</td><td>1.90</td><td>2.12</td></tr><tr><td><strong>2017:</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>FI</td><td>1.87</td><td>1.85</td><td>1.78</td><td>1.78</td></tr><tr><td>PS</td><td>1.84</td><td>1.19*</td><td>1.26*</td><td>1.00*</td></tr><tr><td>LREM</td><td>4.40</td><td>4.51</td><td>4.61</td><td>5.00*</td></tr><tr><td>UDI</td><td>2.07</td><td>1.40*</td><td>1.17*</td><td>NA</td></tr><tr><td>LR</td><td>3.01</td><td>2.67</td><td>2.56</td><td>1.33*</td></tr><tr><td>FN</td><td>1.85</td><td>2.02</td><td>1.99</td><td>1.94</td></tr><tr><td><strong>2022:</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>NUPES</td><td>3.41</td><td>3.21</td><td>3.03*</td><td>2.75*</td></tr><tr><td>ENS</td><td>3.81</td><td>3.54</td><td>3.07*</td><td>3.00</td></tr><tr><td>LR</td><td>2.04</td><td>1.83</td><td>1.56*</td><td>1.29*</td></tr><tr><td>RN</td><td>2.57</td><td>2.73</td><td>2.48</td><td>1.86*</td></tr></tbody></table>
## D.3. Second static measure

<table><thead><tr><th>Party</th><th>+35</th><th>35 and –</th><th>30 and –</th><th>25 and –</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>2012:</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>FG</td><td>3.10</td><td>2.96*</td><td>2.85*</td><td>2.82</td></tr><tr><td>PS</td><td>3.11</td><td>3.00</td><td>3.00</td><td>2.50</td></tr><tr><td>UMP</td><td>3.08</td><td>2.74*</td><td>2.64*</td><td>3.00</td></tr><tr><td>FN</td><td>3.00</td><td>3.06</td><td>3.06</td><td>3.16</td></tr><tr><td><strong>2017:</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>FI</td><td>3.05</td><td>2.98</td><td>2.91</td><td>2.81</td></tr><tr><td>PS</td><td>3.16</td><td>2.95*</td><td>2.95</td><td>2.50</td></tr><tr><td>LREM</td><td>3.04</td><td>3.16</td><td>3.06</td><td>3.00</td></tr><tr><td>UDI</td><td>NA</td><td>NA</td><td>NA</td><td>NA</td></tr><tr><td>LR</td><td>3.10</td><td>2.86*</td><td>2.78*</td><td>2.67</td></tr><tr><td>FN</td><td>3.00</td><td>2.99</td><td>2.95</td><td>2.89</td></tr><tr><td><strong>2022:</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>NUPES</td><td>3.09</td><td>3.08</td><td>2.94*</td><td>2.79*</td></tr><tr><td>ENS</td><td>3.00</td><td>3.07</td><td>2.97</td><td>3.00</td></tr><tr><td>LR</td><td>3.10</td><td>3.01</td><td>2.94*</td><td>2.86</td></tr><tr><td>RN</td><td>2.96</td><td>3.06</td><td>2.94</td><td>2.67*</td></tr></tbody></table>

## D.4. Alternative measure

<table><thead><tr><th>Party</th><th>+35</th><th>35 and –</th><th>30 and –</th><th>25 and –</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>2012:</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>FG</td><td>3.12</td><td>3.00*</td><td>2.97*</td><td>2.91*</td></tr><tr><td>PS</td><td>3.02</td><td>2.89*</td><td>2.33*</td><td>2.00*</td></tr><tr><td>UMP</td><td>3.02</td><td>2.63*</td><td>2.50*</td><td>2.00</td></tr><tr><td>FN</td><td>2.76</td><td>2.88</td><td>2.92</td><td>3.04</td></tr><tr><td><strong>2017:</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>FI</td><td>3.00</td><td>2.94</td><td>2.90</td><td>2.84</td></tr><tr><td>PS</td><td>3.09</td><td>2.77*</td><td>2.63*</td><td>2.25*</td></tr><tr><td>LREM</td><td>3.00</td><td>3.01</td><td>3.06</td><td>3.00</td></tr><tr><td>UDI</td><td>3.08</td><td>2.60*</td><td>2.33*</td><td>NA</td></tr><tr><td>LR</td><td>3.07</td><td>2.81*</td><td>2.65*</td><td>2.00*</td></tr><tr><td>FN</td><td>3.02</td><td>3.11</td><td>3.07</td><td>3.03</td></tr><tr><td><strong>2022:</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>NUPES</td><td>3.11</td><td>2.99</td><td>2.86*</td><td>2.75*</td></tr><tr><td>ENS</td><td>3.00</td><td>2.99</td><td>2.86</td><td>3.00</td></tr><tr><td>LR</td><td>3.13</td><td>3.01</td><td>3.00</td><td>2.57*</td></tr><tr><td>RN</td><td>3.00</td><td>3.08</td><td>2.95</td><td>2.67*</td></tr></tbody></table>

# Appendix E. Distributions

## E.1. Dynamic measure

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>
## E.2. First static measure

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /></figure>

## E.3. Second static measure

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /></figure>

## E.4. Alternative measure

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /></figure>
## E.5. Differences across genders

### E.5.1. Dynamic measure

<figure><img src="image_7.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_8.png" /><figcaption>E.5.2. First static measure</figcaption></figure>
E.5.3. Second static measure

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /></figure>
### E.5.4. Alternative measure

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /></figure>

### E.6. Non-incumbents only

#### E.6.1. Dynamic measure

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /></figure>
### E.6.2. First static measure

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /></figure>

### E.6.3. Second static measure

<figure><img src="image_13.png" /></figure>

### E.6.4. Alternative measure

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /></figure>
# Appendix F. Age thresholds

## F.1. Dynamic measure

<figure><img src="image_15.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_16.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_17.png" /></figure>
## F.2. First static measure

<figure><img src="image_18.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_19.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_20.png" /></figure>
F.3. Second static measure

<figure><img src="image_21.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_22.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_23.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_24.png" /><figcaption>F.4. Alternative measure</figcaption></figure>
## Appendix G. Statistical models

See Tables G.1–G.4.

<caption>**Table G.1**</caption>

Dynamic measure (2012–2022)

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Model 1</th><th>Model 2</th><th>Model 3</th><th>Model 4</th><th>Model 5</th><th>Model 6</th><th>Model 7</th><th>Model 8</th><th>Model 9</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>35-</td><td>-0.216*<br>(0.039)</td><td>-0.252*<br>(0.051)</td><td>-0.086<br>(0.049)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>30-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.273*<br>(0.051)</td><td>-0.324*<br>(0.067)</td><td>-0.155*<br>(0.063)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>25-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.299*<br>(0.085)</td><td>-0.263*<br>(0.116)</td><td>-0.071<br>(0.110)</td></tr><tr><td>Women</td><td></td><td>-0.273*<br>(0.031)</td><td>-0.181*<br>(0.030)</td><td></td><td>-0.271*<br>(0.030)</td><td>-0.186*<br>(0.028)</td><td></td><td>-0.256*<br>(0.029)</td><td>-0.176*<br>(0.027)</td></tr><tr><td>Women: 35-</td><td></td><td>0.053<br>(0.078)</td><td>-0.021<br>(0.073)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Women: 30-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.082<br>(0.103)</td><td>0.016<br>(0.097)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Women: 25-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.067<br>(0.170)</td><td>-0.164<br>(0.160)</td></tr><tr><td>Incumbent</td><td></td><td></td><td>1.127*<br>(0.042)</td><td></td><td></td><td>1.127*<br>(0.042)</td><td></td><td></td><td>1.136*<br>(0.042)</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>-0.259*<br>(0.033)</td><td>-0.243*<br>(0.033)</td><td>-0.039<br>(0.032)</td><td>-0.261*<br>(0.033)</td><td>-0.245*<br>(0.033)</td><td>-0.038<br>(0.032)</td><td>-0.272*<br>(0.033)</td><td>-0.258*<br>(0.033)</td><td>-0.042<br>(0.032)</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>0.117*<br>(0.034)</td><td>0.131*<br>(0.034)</td><td>0.127*<br>(0.032)</td><td>0.113*<br>(0.034)</td><td>0.126*<br>(0.034)</td><td>0.127*<br>(0.032)</td><td>0.104*<br>(0.034)</td><td>0.115*<br>(0.034)</td><td>0.122*<br>(0.032)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.028</td><td>0.042</td><td>0.144</td><td>0.028</td><td>0.041</td><td>0.145</td><td>0.025</td><td>0.038</td><td>0.144</td></tr><tr><td>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></td><td>-0.070</td><td>-0.055</td><td>0.058</td><td>-0.070</td><td>-0.055</td><td>0.058</td><td>-0.073</td><td>-0.059</td><td>0.058</td></tr><tr><td>FE: District</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr></tbody></table>

<caption>**Table G.2**</caption>

First static measure (2012–2022)

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Model 1</th><th>Model 2</th><th>Model 3</th><th>Model 4</th><th>Model 5</th><th>Model 6</th><th>Model 7</th><th>Model 8</th><th>Model 9</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>35-</td><td>-0.270*<br>(0.053)</td><td>-0.335*<br>(0.070)</td><td>-0.039<br>(0.064)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>30-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.519*<br>(0.071)</td><td>-0.563*<br>(0.092)</td><td>-0.264*<br>(0.083)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>25-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.810*<br>(0.117)</td><td>-0.939*<br>(0.160)</td><td>-0.600*<br>(0.145)</td></tr><tr><td>Women</td><td></td><td>-0.339*<br>(0.043)</td><td>-0.175*<br>(0.039)</td><td></td><td>-0.328*<br>(0.041)</td><td>-0.178*<br>(0.037)</td><td></td><td>-0.320*<br>(0.040)</td><td>-0.179*<br>(0.036)</td></tr><tr><td>Women: 35-</td><td></td><td>0.118<br>(0.107)</td><td>-0.015<br>(0.097)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Women: 30-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.057<br>(0.142)</td><td>-0.060<br>(0.129)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Women: 25-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.286<br>(0.233)</td><td>0.115<br>(0.211)</td></tr><tr><td>Incumbent</td><td></td><td></td><td>2.017*<br>(0.056)</td><td></td><td></td><td>1.997*<br>(0.055)</td><td></td><td></td><td>2.004*<br>(0.055)</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>-0.203*<br>(0.046)</td><td>-0.182*<br>(0.046)</td><td>0.184*<br>(0.043)</td><td>-0.196*<br>(0.046)</td><td>-0.176*<br>(0.046)</td><td>0.192*<br>(0.043)</td><td>-0.212*<br>(0.046)</td><td>-0.195*<br>(0.046)</td><td>0.186*<br>(0.043)</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>0.326*<br>(0.047)</td><td>0.343*<br>(0.047)</td><td>0.337*<br>(0.043)</td><td>0.330*<br>(0.047)</td><td>0.345*<br>(0.047)</td><td>0.348*<br>(0.043)</td><td>0.317*<br>(0.047)</td><td>0.330*<br>(0.047)</td><td>0.343*<br>(0.042)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.026</td><td>0.037</td><td>0.211</td><td>0.031</td><td>0.042</td><td>0.213</td><td>0.030</td><td>0.040</td><td>0.214</td></tr><tr><td>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></td><td>-0.072</td><td>-0.060</td><td>0.131</td><td>-0.067</td><td>-0.055</td><td>0.134</td><td>-0.068</td><td>-0.057</td><td>0.135</td></tr><tr><td>FE: District</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote>*p < 0.05.</footnote>

<footnote>*p < 0.05.</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table G.3**
Second static measure (2012–2022)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Model 1</th><th>Model 2</th><th>Model 3</th><th>Model 4</th><th>Model 5</th><th>Model 6</th><th>Model 7</th><th>Model 8</th><th>Model 9</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>35-</td><td>-0.047*<br>(0.022)</td><td>-0.002<br>(0.030)</td><td>0.029<br>(0.030)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>30-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.121*<br>(0.030)</td><td>-0.083*<br>(0.038)</td><td>-0.053<br>(0.038)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>25-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.206*<br>(0.049)</td><td>-0.134*<br>(0.067)</td><td>-0.099<br>(0.066)</td></tr><tr><td>Women</td><td></td><td>-0.122*<br>(0.018)</td><td>-0.105*<br>(0.018)</td><td></td><td>-0.134*<br>(0.017)</td><td>-0.118*<br>(0.017)</td><td></td><td>-0.136*<br>(0.017)</td><td>-0.121*<br>(0.017)</td></tr><tr><td>Women: 35-</td><td></td><td>-0.119*<br>(0.045)</td><td>-0.133*<br>(0.045)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Women: 30-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.114<br>(0.060)</td><td>-0.126*<br>(0.059)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Women: 25-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.149<br>(0.098)</td><td>-0.167<br>(0.097)</td></tr><tr><td>Incumbent</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.210*<br>(0.025)</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.203*<br>(0.025)</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.206*<br>(0.025)</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>-0.030<br>(0.019)</td><td>-0.024<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.014<br>(0.020)</td><td>-0.027<br>(0.019)</td><td>-0.020<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.017<br>(0.020)</td><td>-0.031<br>(0.019)</td><td>-0.023<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.016<br>(0.020)</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>-0.007<br>(0.020)</td><td>-0.004<br>(0.020)</td><td>-0.004<br>(0.020)</td><td>-0.005<br>(0.020)</td><td>0.0004<br>(0.020)</td><td>0.001<br>(0.020)</td><td>-0.008<br>(0.020)</td><td>-0.002<br>(0.020)</td><td>-0.001<br>(0.019)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>6481</td><td>6481</td><td>6481</td><td>6481</td><td>6481</td><td>6481</td><td>6481</td><td>6481</td><td>6481</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.001</td><td>0.015</td><td>0.026</td><td>0.003</td><td>0.017</td><td>0.027</td><td>0.004</td><td>0.016</td><td>0.027</td></tr><tr><td>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></td><td>-0.101</td><td>-0.087</td><td>-0.074</td><td>-0.099</td><td>-0.085</td><td>-0.073</td><td>-0.099</td><td>-0.085</td><td>-0.073</td></tr><tr><td>FE: District</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>**Table G.4**
Alternative measure (2012–2022)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Model 1</th><th>Model 2</th><th>Model 3</th><th>Model 4</th><th>Model 5</th><th>Model 6</th><th>Model 7</th><th>Model 8</th><th>Model 9</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>35-</td><td>-0.057*<br>(0.022)</td><td>-0.044<br>(0.029)</td><td>0.033<br>(0.028)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>30-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.117*<br>(0.029)</td><td>-0.088*<br>(0.038)</td><td>-0.011<br>(0.037)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>25-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.213*<br>(0.049)</td><td>-0.181*<br>(0.066)</td><td>-0.094<br>(0.064)</td></tr><tr><td>Women</td><td></td><td>-0.156*<br>(0.018)</td><td>-0.113*<br>(0.017)</td><td></td><td>-0.157*<br>(0.017)</td><td>-0.118*<br>(0.016)</td><td></td><td>-0.160*<br>(0.016)</td><td>-0.124*<br>(0.016)</td></tr><tr><td>Women: 35-</td><td></td><td>-0.048<br>(0.044)</td><td>-0.083<br>(0.043)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Women: 30-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.095<br>(0.059)</td><td>-0.125*<br>(0.057)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Women: 25-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.062<br>(0.097)</td><td>-0.105<br>(0.093)</td></tr><tr><td>Incumbent</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.520*<br>(0.025)</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.514*<br>(0.024)</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.514*<br>(0.024)</td></tr><tr><td>2017</td><td>-0.007<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.002<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.096*<br>(0.019)</td><td>-0.005<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.003<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.098*<br>(0.019)</td><td>-0.008<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.001<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.098*<br>(0.019)</td></tr><tr><td>2022</td><td>0.068*<br>(0.020)</td><td>0.075*<br>(0.020)</td><td>0.073*<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.069*<br>(0.020)</td><td>0.076*<br>(0.020)</td><td>0.077*<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.067*<br>(0.020)</td><td>0.074*<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.077*<br>(0.019)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td><td>6608</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.004</td><td>0.021</td><td>0.089</td><td>0.006</td><td>0.023</td><td>0.090</td><td>0.006</td><td>0.022</td><td>0.090</td></tr><tr><td>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></td><td>-0.096</td><td>-0.078</td><td>-0.003</td><td>-0.094</td><td>-0.076</td><td>-0.002</td><td>-0.094</td><td>-0.076</td><td>-0.002</td></tr><tr><td>FE: District</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote>*p < 0.05.</footnote>

<footnote>*p < 0.05.</footnote>
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