INFORMATION INTERMEDIARY SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTERMEDIARY METHOD

An information intermediary system, in which a providing-side terminal device, an intermediary device, and a receiving-side terminal device are assigned with first to third public keys and first to third secret keys, the providing-side terminal device generates first encrypted data by encrypting provided data with third public key, and also generates a first electronic signature using the first secret key, and transmits the first encrypted data and the first electronic signature to the intermediary device; the intermediary device generates a second electronic signature using second secret key, and transmits the first encrypted data, the first electronic signature, and the second electronic signature to the receiving-side terminal device; and the receiving-side terminal device decrypts the first encrypted data with the third secret key to obtain the provided data, and also verifies the first electronic signature with the first public key and verifies the second electronic signature with the second public key.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present invention relates to an information intermediary system and an information intermediary method that intermediate transfer of data.

BACKGROUND ART

There is known a data transfer system that intermediates transfer of data (refer to Patent Document 1, for example). This data transfer system manages transfer based on a validity period of the data, by means of a data intermediary device, and is configured capable of encrypting/decrypting data transferred between a data transmitting device and a data receiving device.

PRIOR ART DOCUMENT

Patent Document

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Problem to be Solved by the Invention

Generally, when intermediating an interchange including a transfer of data between a data transmitting device and a data receiving device by means of a data intermediary device like in the above-described Patent Document 1, the data transmitting device and the data receiving device do not perform exchange of the data directly. Therefore, authenticity of the data transferred by the data intermediary device, integrity of there being no qualitative change in the data as a result of it having passed through the data intermediary device, and so on, cannot be completely assured simply by encrypting/decrypting the data, and will be important elements not only among parties concerned with interchange of the data, but also for a manager who intermediates information.

Furthermore, securing of authenticity and integrity of transmission information such as provided data, a data use authorization certificate, and so on, will also be an important element for creating a safe data transaction market too.

The present invention has an object of providing an information intermediary system and an information intermediary method that enable authenticity and integrity of intermediated information to be guaranteed and its safety to be secured.

Means for Solving the Problem

An information intermediary system according to the present invention is an information intermediary system comprising: a providing-side terminal device which transmits transmission information that includes provided data; a receiving-side terminal device that receives the transmission information; and an intermediary device that intermediates transfer of the transmission information between the providing-side terminal device and the receiving-side terminal device, wherein the providing-side terminal device is assigned with a first public key and a first secret key, the intermediary device is assigned with a second public key and a second secret key, and the receiving-side terminal device is assigned with a third public key and a third secret key. The providing-side terminal device generates first encrypted data by encrypting the provided data with the third public key, and also generates a first electronic signature using the first secret key, and transmits the first encrypted data and the first electronic signature to the intermediary device. The intermediary device generates a second electronic signature using the second secret key, and transmits the first encrypted data, the first electronic signature, and the second electronic signature to the receiving-side terminal device. The receiving-side terminal device decrypts the first encrypted data with the third secret key to obtain the provided data, and also verifies the first electronic signature with the first public key and verifies the second electronic signature with the second public key.

An information intermediary method according to the present invention is an information intermediary method in an information intermediary system, the information intermediary system comprising: a providing-side terminal device which transmits transmission information that includes provided data; a receiving-side terminal device that receives the transmission information; and an intermediary device that intermediates transfer of the transmission information between the providing-side terminal device and the receiving-side terminal device, the information intermediary method including: assigning a first public key and a first secret key to the providing-side terminal device; assigning a second public key and a second secret key to the intermediary device; assigning a third public key and a third secret key to the receiving-side terminal device; using the providing-side terminal device to generate first encrypted data by encrypting the provided data with the third public key, and also to generate a first electronic signature using the first secret key, and to transmit the first encrypted data and the first electronic signature to the intermediary device; using the intermediary device to generate a second electronic signature using the second secret key, and to transmit the first encrypted data, the first electronic signature, and the second electronic signature to the receiving-side terminal device; and using the receiving-side terminal device to decrypt the first encrypted data with the third secret key and thereby obtain the provided data, and also to verify the first electronic signature with the first public key and to verify the second electronic signature with the second public key.

Another information intermediary system according to the present invention is an information intermediary system formed within a data distribution market-forming system and comprising: a first terminal device that transmits transmission information; a second terminal device that receives the transmission information; and an intermediary device that intermediates transfer of the transmission information between the first terminal device and the second terminal device, wherein the first terminal device is assigned with a first public key and a first secret key, the intermediary device is assigned with a second public key and a second secret key, and the second terminal device is assigned with a third public key and a third secret key, and the first terminal device generates first encrypted data by encrypting the transmission information with the third public key, and also generates a first electronic signature using the first secret key, and transmits the first encrypted data and the first electronic signature to the intermediary device, the intermediary device generates a second electronic signature using the second secret key, and transmits the first encrypted data, the first electronic signature, and the second electronic signature to the second terminal device, and the second terminal device decrypts the first encrypted data with the third secret key to obtain the transmission information, and also verifies the first electronic signature with the first public key and verifies the second electronic signature with the second public key.

Effect of the Invention

The present invention enables authenticity and integrity of intermediated information to be guaranteed and its safety to be secured.

EMBODIMENTS FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION

Information intermediary systems and information intermediary methods according to embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, the embodiments below do not limit the inventions according to each of the claims, moreover, not all of the combinations of features described in the embodiments are necessarily essential to the means for solving the problem of the invention. Moreover, in the drawings, reduction scales or dimensions of each of the configuring elements will sometimes be shown exaggerated, and some of the configuring elements will sometimes be omitted.

First Embodiment

[Configurations of Information Intermediary System]

FIG.1is a block diagram showing configurations of an information intermediary system according to a first embodiment of the present invention.

As shown inFIG.1, an information intermediary system100according to the present embodiment comprises: a providing-side terminal device (A)1which transmits transmission information that includes provided data; a receiving-side terminal device (C)2that receives this transmission information; and an intermediary device (B)3that intermediates transfer of the transmission information between the providing-side terminal device (A)1and the receiving-side terminal device (C)2. In the information intermediary system100, these providing-side terminal device (A)1, receiving-side terminal device (C)2, and intermediary device (B)3are connected via a network5such as an internet, enabling them to mutually communicate. This network5is further connected with a public key certificate authority (CA)4which is an external third-party organization.

Note that although inFIG.1, two each are exemplified as each of the providing-side terminal device (A)1and the receiving-side terminal device (C)2, the present invention is not limited to this. Moreover, a connection mode of each of configuring elements such as the providing-side terminal device (A)1is not limited to the network5, and may be a cloud or the like. Moreover, the providing-side terminal device (A)1, receiving-side terminal device (C)2, and intermediary device (B)3may adopt a configuration of a publicly-known information processing device, arithmetic processing device, terminal device, and so on, such as a personal computer, a smartphone, a tablet terminal, a work station, a server device, and so on.

The information intermediary system100of the present embodiment presupposes that the providing-side terminal device (A)1, intermediary device (B)3, and receiving-side terminal device (C)2are assigned with public keys (Kp) and secret keys (Ks) based on an encryption system such as RSA that encrypts/decrypts the transmission information.

Specifically, the providing-side terminal device (A)1is assigned with a provider's public key (KpA) being a first public key, and a provider's secret key (KsA) being a first secret key. In the case of the provider's public key (KpA) being registered in the public key certificate authority (CA)4, the providing-side terminal device (A)1will have a provider's public key certificate (CKpA) being a first public key certificate, issued from the public key certificate authority (CA)4.

Moreover, the intermediary device (B)3is assigned with an intermediator's public key (KpB) being a second public key, and an intermediator's secret key (KsB) being a second secret key. In the case of the intermediator's public key (KpB) being registered in the public key certificate authority (CA)4, the intermediary device (B)3will have an intermediator's public key certificate (CKpB) being a second public key certificate, issued from the public key certificate authority (CA)4.

Furthermore, the receiving-side terminal device (C)2is assigned with a receiver's public key (KpC) being a third public key, and a receiver's secret key (KsC) being a third secret key. In the case of the receiver's public key (KpC) being registered in the public key certificate authority (CA)4, the receiving-side terminal device (C)2will have a receiver's public key certificate (CKpC) being a third public key certificate, issued from the public key certificate authority (CA)4. Since the first to third public key certificates (CKpA, CKpB, CKpC) are authenticated by the public key certificate authority (CA)4, they can be utilized in prevention of impersonation by sending them to other parties of the information transfer. [Flow of Information Intermediation of Information Intermediary System100]

FIGS.2and3are sequence diagrams showing an outline of sending/receiving of information in the information intermediary system100. Regarding handling of information herein, the respective public keys (KpA, KpB, KpC) and public key certificates (CKpA, CKpB, CKpC) are assumed to be priorly mutually exchanged between the providing-side terminal device (A)1, intermediary device (B)3, and receiving-side terminal device (C)2.

The transmission information that the providing-side terminal device (A)1being a first terminal device provides to the receiving-side terminal device (C)2being a second terminal device includes, for example: provided data (D) being first data, such as a data file, that is to be an object of transaction; and a transaction condition (T) being second data, that includes information such as range-of-use and price-of-provision of this provided data (D). Of these, the provided data (D) cannot be seen by the intermediary device (B)3. On the other hand, the transaction condition (T) needs to be confirmed by the intermediary device (B)3too.

As shown inFIG.2, first, the providing-side terminal device (A)1generates first encrypted data (D·KpC) by encrypting the provided data (D) with the receiver's public key (KpC) (step S1). In addition, the providing-side terminal device (A)1generates second encrypted data (T·KpB) by encrypting the transaction condition (T) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) (step S1). Furthermore, the providing-side terminal device (A)1generates third encrypted data (T·KpC) by encrypting the transaction condition (T) with the receiver's public key (KpC) (step S1). Note that in order that the transaction condition (T) be correlated with the provided data (D), there is included in the transaction condition (T) a hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) which is obtained by rendering the first encrypted data (D·KpC) as a one-way function such as a hash function (Hash), for example. Hereafter, when a “hash value” is referred to, it will be assumed to indicate a “hash value” that has been rendered by a hash function.

Moreover, the providing-side terminal device (A)1generates a provider's electronic signature (Ca=Hash(D·KpC)·KsA) being a first electronic signature, using the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) obtained from the first encrypted data (D·KpC), and using the provider's secret key (KsA). The providing-side terminal device (A)1transmits the thus-generated each item of encrypted data (D·KpC, T·KpB, T·KpC) and provider's electronic signature (Ca) to the intermediary device (B)3(step S1).

The intermediary device (B)3obtains the transaction condition (T) by decrypting the received second encrypted data (T·KpB) with the intermediator's secret key (KsB) (step S2). In addition, the intermediary device (B)3generates the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) from the received first encrypted data (D·KpC) (step S3). Furthermore, the intermediary device (B)3decrypts the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) from the provider's electronic signature (Ca) using the provider's public key (KpA) (step S4). Then, the intermediary device (B)3confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) included in the transaction condition (T), the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) generated from the first encrypted data (D·KpC), and the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) decrypted from the provider's electronic signature (Ca) all match. The intermediary device (B)3can verify by these all matching, that the transaction condition (T) that has been sent is information that relates to the provided data (D) and has been directed to the intermediary device (B)3, and that its originator is the providing-side terminal device (A)1(step S5).

Next, as shown inFIG.3, the intermediary device (B)3generates an intermediator's electronic signature (Cb=Hash(D·KpC)·KsB) being a second electronic signature, using the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) obtained from the received first encrypted data (D·KpC), and using the intermediator's secret key (KsB) (step S11). Then, the intermediary device (B)3transmits the received items of encrypted data (D·KpC, T·KpC) and provider's electronic signature (Ca), and the generated intermediator's electronic signature (Cb) to the receiving-side terminal device (C)2(step S11).

The receiving-side terminal device (C)2decrypts the received items of encrypted data (D·KpC, T·KpC) using the receiver's secret key (KsC), and obtains the provided data (D) and the transaction condition (T) (step S12). In addition, the receiving-side terminal device (C)2generates the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) as a computed result, from the obtained provided data (D) (step S13). Moreover, the receiving-side terminal device (C)2verifies (KpA (Ca)=Hash(D·KpC)) the provider's electronic signature (Ca) with the provider's public key (KpA) to obtain the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) as a decrypted result (step S14). In addition, the receiving-side terminal device (C)2verifies (KpB(Cb)=Hash(D·KpC)) the intermediator's electronic signature (Cb) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) to obtain the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) as a decrypted result (step S14).

Then, the receiving-side terminal device (C)2confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) included in the transaction condition (T), the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) generated from the provided data (D), the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) decrypted from the provider's electronic signature (Ca), and the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) decrypted from the intermediator's electronic signature (Cb) all match. The receiving-side terminal device (C)2can verify by these all matching, that the transaction condition (T) that has been sent is information that relates to the provided data (D) and has been directed to the receiving-side terminal device (C)2, and that its originator is the providing-side terminal device (A)1and its intermediator is the intermediary device (B)3(step S15).

Thus, due to the present embodiment, in the case where, as a result of verification, all of the obtained hash values (Hash(D·KpC)) are determined to be the same (True in step S15), it can be determined that the provided data (D) and transaction condition (T) are authentic, have been provided from the providing-side terminal device (A)1, and have been transmitted toward the receiving-side terminal device (C)2, via the intermediary device (B)3.

On the other hand, in the case where, as a result of verification, any one of the obtained hash values (Hash(D·KpC)) is determined to differ (False in step S15), it can be determined that the provided data (D) or transaction condition (T) is inauthentic, has not been provided from the provider, or has not been intermediated by the intermediator. In this case, the possibility of falsification or impersonation having occurred in the provided data (D) or transaction condition (T) is high, so the receiver may adopt a countermeasure such as notifying the provider. Note that by pinpointing a transmitter, communication route, and so on, of the information of that one of the above-described various results that indicates a differing result, it is possible to attempt an investigation of the falsification, and so on.

Note that a configuration may be adopted so that data communication from the intermediary device (B)3to the receiving-side terminal device (C)2in above-described step S11will be performed when payment information such as price to be paid to the providing-side terminal device (A)1in relation to the provided data (D) has been received from the receiving-side terminal device (C)2, by the intermediary device (B)3. By doing so, it can be prevented that the encrypted data (D·KpC), provider's electronic signature (Ca), and intermediator's electronic signature (Cb) end up being casually transmitted to the receiving-side terminal device (C)2in a state where confirmation of payment by the receiver to the provider, and so on, has not been obtained.

Moreover, in above-described step S11, the intermediator's electronic signature (Cb) transmitted from the intermediary device (B)3to the receiving-side terminal device (C)2may include the provider's electronic signature (Ca) in order to confirm that the intermediator's electronic signature (Cb) has been certainly received from the providing-side terminal device (A)1. For example, the intermediator's electronic signature (Cb) may be generated (Cb=Hash(D·KpC+Ca)·KsB) using a hash value (Hash(D·KpC+Ca)) that includes the provider's electronic signature (Ca), and using the intermediator's secret key (KsB).

Second Embodiment

[Configurations of Information Intermediary System]

FIG.4is a block diagram showing configurations of an information intermediary system according to a second embodiment of the present invention. Note that inFIG.4, a configuration similar to inFIG.1will be assigned with the same symbol as inFIG.1, and a duplicated description of the configuration will be omitted.

As shown inFIG.4, an information intermediary system200according to the present embodiment has a time stamping authority (TSA)6added to the information intermediary system100shown inFIG.1. The time stamping authority (TSA)6is connected to the providing-side terminal device (A)1, the receiving-side terminal device (C)2, the intermediary device (B)3, and the public key certificate authority (CA)4, via the network5. When the time stamping authority (TSA)6receives data (X) to be an object of time authentication, in a form of a hash value (Hash(X)), the time stamping authority (TSA)6returns a time-stamp (token) Ts having that hash value (Hash(X)) added to time information. Other configurations are similar to inFIG.1.

[Flow of Information Intermediation of Information Intermediary System200]

FIGS.5to7are sequence diagrams showing an outline of sending/receiving of information in the information intermediary system200. Regarding handling of information herein, too, the respective public keys (KpA, KpB, KpC) and public key certificates (CKpA, CKpB, CKpC) are priorly mutually exchanged between the providing-side terminal device (A)1, intermediary device (B)3, and receiving-side terminal device (C)2, similarly to in the previous embodiment.

As shown inFIG.5, first, the providing-side terminal device (A)1sends to the time stamping authority (TSA)6a hash value (Hash(T)) obtained by rendering the transaction condition (T) as a one-way function (step S21). The time stamping authority (TSA)6transmits to the providing-side terminal device (A)1a time-stamp (TsA) being a first time-stamp, that has time information (ta) added to the hash value (Hash(T)) (step S22). When the providing-side terminal device (A)1receives the time-stamp (TsA), the providing-side terminal device (A)1generates first time-authenticated data (Ta) by adding the time-stamp (TsA) to the transaction condition (T) (step S23).

Next, the providing-side terminal device (A)1generates the first encrypted data (D·KpC) by encrypting the provided data (D) with the receiver's public key (KpC) (step S24). In addition, the providing-side terminal device (A)1generates second encrypted data (Ta·KpB) by encrypting the first time-authenticated data (Ta) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) (step S24). Note that in order that the transaction condition (T) included in the first time-authenticated data (Ta) be correlated with the provided data (D), there is included in the transaction condition (T) the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) which is obtained by rendering the first encrypted data (D·KpC) as a one-way function such as a hash function (Hash), for example.

Moreover, the providing-side terminal device (A)1generates a provider's electronic signature (CaT=Hash(Ta·KpB)·KsA) using a hash value (Hash(Ta·KpB)) obtained from the second encrypted data (Ta·KpB), and using the provider's secret key (KsA) (step S24). The providing-side terminal device (A)1transmits the thus-generated items of encrypted data (D·KPC, Ta·KpB) and provider's electronic signature (Car) to the intermediary device (B)3(step S24).

The intermediary device (B)3obtains the first time-authenticated data (Ta) by decrypting the received second encrypted data (Ta·KpB) with the intermediator's secret key (KsB) (step S25). The intermediary device (B)3extracts from the decrypted first time-authenticated data (Ta) the hash value (Hash(T)) or time-stamp TsA, and transmits the extracted hash value (Hash(T)) or time-stamp TsA to the time stamping authority (TSA)6for verification (step S26). The time stamping authority (TSA)6returns to the intermediary device (B)3authentication-completed time information (ta) or a verified result, correspondingly to the received hash value (Hash(T)) or time-stamp TsA (step S27). The intermediary device (B)3receives the time information (ta) or verified result that has been transmitted from the time stamping authority (TSA)6, and verifies that the time information (ta) is authentic (step S28).

Next, as shown inFIG.6, the intermediary device (B)3generates the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) from the received first encrypted data (D·KpC) (step S31). In addition, the intermediary device (B)3generates the hash value (Hash(Ta·KpB)) from the decrypted first time-authenticated data (Ta) using the intermediator's public key (KpB) (step S32). Furthermore, the intermediary device (B)3verifies (KpA(CaT)=Hash(Ta·KpB)) the provider's electronic signature (CaT) with the provider's public key (KpA), and obtains the hash value (Hash(Ta·KpB)) (step S33). Then, by confirming that the transaction condition (T) included in the decrypted first time-authenticated data (Ta) includes the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)), the intermediary device (B)3can verify that the transaction condition (T) that has been sent relates to the provided data (D) (step S34). Moreover, depending on whether or not the hash values (Hash(Ta·KpB)) found from the decrypted first time-authenticated data (Ta) and from the received first electronic signature (Ca) are the same, it can be verified by the intermediary device (B)3that the information that has been sent is information that has been directed to the intermediary device (B)3, and that its originator is the providing-side terminal device (A)1(step S34).

Next, the intermediary device (B)3transmits the hash value (Hash(Ta)) of the decrypted first time-authenticated data (Ta) to the time stamping authority (TSA)6(step S35). The time stamping authority (TSA)6transmits to the intermediary device (B)3a time-stamp (TsB) being a second time-stamp, that has time information (tb) added to the hash value (Hash(Ta)) (step S36). When the intermediary device (B)3receives the time-stamp (TsB), the intermediary device (B)3generates second time-authenticated data (Tb) by adding the time-stamp (TsB) to the first time-authenticated data (Ta) (step S37). As a result, the second time-authenticated data (Tb) will include the transaction condition (T) and the two time-stamps (TsA, TsB).

The intermediary device (B)3transmits to the receiving-side terminal device (C)2the first encrypted data (D·KpC) that the intermediary device (B)3has received, and third encrypted data (Tb·KpC) that the intermediary device (B)3has obtained by encrypting the second time-authenticated data (Tb) with the receiver's public key (KpC) (step S38). In addition, the intermediary device (B)3transmits to the receiving-side terminal device (C)2the provider's first electronic signature (Ca) that the intermediary device (B)3has received, and an intermediator's second electronic signature (CbT=Hash(Tb·KpC)·KsB) generated by the intermediary device (B)3from a hash value Hash(Tb·KpC) of the third encrypted data (Tb·KpC) using the intermediator's secret key (KsB) (step S38).

As shown inFIG.7, the receiving-side terminal device (C)2decrypts the received items of encrypted data (D·KpC, Tb·KpC) using the receiver's secret key (KsC), and obtains the provided data (D) and the second time-authenticated data (Tb) (step S41). The receiving-side terminal device (C)2extracts from the decrypted second time-authenticated data (Tb) the hash values (Hash(T), Hash(Ta)) or time-stamps TsA, TsB, and transmits the extracted hash values (Hash(T), Hash(Ta)) or time-stamps TsA, TsB to the time stamping authority (TSA)6for verification (step S42). The time stamping authority (TSA)6returns to the receiving-side terminal device (C)2authentication-completed items of time information (ta, tb) or verified results, correspondingly to the received hash values (Hash(T), Hash(Ta)) or time-stamps TsA, TsB (step S43). The receiving-side terminal device (C)2receives the items of time information (ta, tb) or verified results that have been transmitted from the time stamping authority (TSA)6, and verifies whether or not the items of time information (ta, tb) are authentic (step S44).

Next, the receiving-side terminal device (C)2generates the hash values (Hash(D·KpC), Hash(Ta·KpB), Hash(Tb·KpC)) from the obtained provided data (D) and second time-authenticated data (Tb) (step S45). In addition, the receiving-side terminal device (C)2respectively verifies the first and second electronic signatures (CaT, CbT) with the provider's and intermediator's public keys (KpA, KpB) to obtain the hash values (Hash(Ta·KpB), Hash(Tb·KpC)) (step S46).

Then, the receiving-side terminal device (C)2confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) included in the transaction condition (T) within the second time-authenticated data (Tb), and the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) generated from the provided data (D) match. The receiving-side terminal device (C)2can thereby confirm that the transaction condition (T) relates to the provided data (D) (step S47). In addition, the receiving-side terminal device (C)2confirms whether or not the hash values (Hash(Ta·KpB), Hash(Tb·KpC)) generated from the decrypted provided data (D) and first and second time-authenticated data items (Ta, Tb), and the hash values (Hash(Ta·KpB), Hash(Tb·KpC)) obtained from the first and second electronic signatures (CaT, CbT) match. The receiving-side terminal device (C)2can verify by these matching, that the provided data (D) and transaction condition (T) that have been sent are items of information that have been directed to the receiving-side terminal device (C)2, that their originator is the providing-side terminal device (A)1and intermediator is the intermediary device (B)3, and that the items of time information (ta, tb) of when these have been created are authentic (step S47).

Thus, due to the present embodiment, it is possible, as a result of verification, to obtain respective verifications of the fact that the transmitted items of information have been provided from the providing-side terminal device (A)1to the receiving-side terminal device (C)2via the intermediary device (B)3, and of the times when these items of information have been created.

Third Embodiment

[Configurations of Information Intermediary System]

FIG.8is a block diagram showing configurations of an information intermediary system according to a third embodiment of the present invention. Note that in description from here onwards, includingFIG.8, a configuring element which is the same as in the first and second embodiments will be assigned with the same symbol as in the first and second embodiments, so a duplicated description thereof will be omitted below.

As shown inFIG.8, an information intermediary system300according to the third embodiment comprises: the providing-side terminal device (A)1which transmits the transmission information that includes the provided data; and a first receiving-side terminal device (C)2and second receiving-side terminal device (E)7that receive this transmission information. In addition, the information intermediary system300comprises the intermediary device (B)3that intermediates transfer of the transmission information between the providing-side terminal device (A)1and first and second receiving-side terminal devices (C)2, (E)7, or between the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2and second receiving-side terminal device (E)7. These providing-side terminal device (A)1, first and second receiving-side terminal devices (C)2, (E)7, and intermediary device (B)3are connected in a manner enabling them to mutually communicate via the network5which is connected with the public key certificate authority (CA)4being an external third-party organization.

The information intermediary system300of the third embodiment presupposes that the providing-side terminal device (A)1, intermediary device (B)3, and first and second receiving-side terminal devices (C)2, (E)7are assigned with public keys (Kp) and secret keys (Ks) based on an encryption system such as RSA that encrypts/decrypts the transmission information.

Specifically, with regard to the providing-side terminal device (A)1and intermediary device (B)3being assigned with each of public keys (KpA, KpB) and secret keys (KsA, KsB), and having each of public key certificates (CKpA, CKpB), this is similar to in the first embodiment, hence a description thereof will be omitted herein.

The first receiving-side terminal device (C)2is assigned with a first-receiver's public key (KpC) and a first-receiver's secret key (KsC). Moreover, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7is assigned with a second-receiver's public key (KpE) and a second-receiver's secret key (KsE). In the case of the first- and second-receivers' public keys (KpC, KpE) being registered in the public key certificate authority (CA)4, the first and second receiving-side terminal devices (C)2, (E)7will have first- and second-receivers' public key certificates (CKpC, CKpE) being public key certificates, issued from the public key certificate authority (CA)4. Since the public key certificates (CKpA, CKpB, CKpC, CKpE) are each authenticated by the public key certificate authority (CA)4, they can be utilized in prevention of impersonation by sending them to other parties of the information transfer.

[Flow of Information Intermediation of Information Intermediary System300]

FIGS.9and10are sequence diagrams showing an outline of sending/receiving of information in the information intermediary system300. Regarding handling of information herein, the respective public keys (KpA, KpB, KpC, KpE) and public key certificates (CKpA, CKpB, CKpC, CKpE) are assumed to be priorly mutually exchanged between the providing-side terminal device (A)1, intermediary device (B)3, first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, and second receiving-side terminal device (E)7.

Moreover, hereafter, there will be supposed the case where, for example, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2that has already obtained the provided data (D) such as the data file to be the object of transaction, and already obtained the transaction condition (T), after True in above-mentioned step S15, will be the provider. That is, there will be described the case where the transmission information is provided from the first-receiver of the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2to the second-receiver of the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7being likewise on the receiving side, that is, the case where the provided data (D) is distributed from device to device (transferred, and retransferred). Hence, in this embodiment, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2will be the first terminal device, and the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7will be the second terminal device. Moreover, the first-receiver's public key (KpC) and first-receiver's secret key (KsC) will respectively be the first public key and first secret key, and the second-receiver's public key (KpE) and second-receiver's secret key (KsE) will respectively be the third public key and third secret key.

The transmission information that the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2provides to the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7includes, for example: the above-described provided data (D); and a transaction condition (T1) that includes information such as range-of-use and price-of-provision of this provided data (D). Of these, the provided data (D) cannot be seen by the intermediary device (B)3. However, the transaction condition (T1) needs to be confirmed by the intermediary device (B)3too.

As shown inFIG.9, first, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2generates first encrypted data (D·KpE) by encrypting the provided data (D) with the second-receiver's public key (KpE) (step S51). In addition, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2generates second encrypted data (T1·KpB) by encrypting the transaction condition (T1) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) (step S51). Furthermore, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2generates third encrypted data (T1·KpE) by encrypting the transaction condition (T1) with the second-receiver's public key (KpE) (step S51). Note that in order that the transaction condition (T1) be correlated with the provided data (D), there are included in the transaction condition (T1) the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) and a hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) respectively found from the encrypted data (D·KpC) and from a value obtained by adding the electronic signatures (Ca, Cb) to the encrypted data (D·KpE).

Moreover, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2generates the hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) of the value obtained when the provider's electronic signature (Ca) and the intermediator's electronic signature (intermediator's first electronic signature) (Cb) are included in the encrypted data (D·KpE), and, using this hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) and the secret key (KsC) of the first-receiver being the provider in this case, generates a first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc=Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)·KsC) (step S51). The first receiving-side terminal device (C)2transmits the thus-generated each item of encrypted data (D·KpE, T1·KpB, T1·KpE), provider's electronic signature (Ca), intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), and first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc), to the intermediary device (B)3(step S51).

The intermediary device (B)3obtains the transaction condition (T1) by decrypting the received second encrypted data (T1·KpB) with the intermediator's secret key (KsB) (step S52). In addition, the intermediary device (B)3generates the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) and hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) from the decrypted transaction condition (T1) (step S53).

Moreover, the intermediary device (B)3decrypts the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) from the provider's electronic signature (Ca) using the provider's public key (KpA) (step S54). In addition, the intermediary device (B)3decrypts the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) from the intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb) using the intermediator's public key (KpB) (step S54). Furthermore, the intermediary device (B)3decrypts the hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) from the first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) that includes the provider's electronic signature (Ca) and intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), using the first-receiver's public key (KpC) (step S54).

Then, the intermediary device (B)3confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) included in the transaction condition (T1), the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) decrypted from the provider's electronic signature (Ca), and the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) decrypted from the intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb) all match (step S55).

Moreover, the intermediary device (B)3confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) generated from the first encrypted data (D·KpE), provider's electronic signature (Ca), and intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), the hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) included in the transaction condition (T1), and the hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) decrypted from the first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) all match (step S55). The intermediary device (B)3can verify on the basis of matchings of these hash values all having been confirmed, that the transaction condition (T1) that has been sent is information that relates to the provided data (D) and has been directed to the intermediary device (B)3after passing through the providing-side terminal device (A)1, intermediary device (B)3, and first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, and that its originator is the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2(step S55).

Next, as shown inFIG.10, the intermediary device (B)3generates a hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)) of a value obtained by adding the provider's electronic signature (Ca), the intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), and the first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) to the received first encrypted data (D·KpE), and, using this hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)) and the intermediator (B)'s secret key (KsB), generates the intermediator's electronic signature (intermediator's second electronic signature) (Cb2=Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)·KsB) as the second electronic signature (step S61). Then, the intermediary device (B)3transmits the received items of encrypted data (D·KpE, T1·KpE), provider's electronic signature (Ca), intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), and first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc), and the generated intermediator's second electronic signature (Cb2), to the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7(step S61).

The second receiving-side terminal device (E)7decrypts the received items of encrypted data (D·KpE, T1·KpE) using the second-receiver's secret key (KsE), and obtains the provided data (D) and the transaction condition (T1) (step S62). In addition, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7generates the hash values (Hash(D·KpC), Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb), and Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)) from the obtained provided data (D) (step S63). Moreover, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7generates the hash values (Hash(D·KpC) and Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) from the obtained transaction condition (T1) (step S63).

In addition, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7verifies (KpA (Ca)=Hash(D·KpC)) the provider's electronic signature (Ca) with the provider's public key (KpA) to obtain the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) (step S64). Moreover, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7verifies (KpB(Cb)=Hash(D·KpC)) the intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) to obtain the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) (step S64).

In addition, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7verifies (KpC (Cc)=Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) the first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) with the first-receiver's public key (KpC) to obtain the hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) (step S64). Furthermore, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7verifies (KpB(Cb2)=Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)) the intermediator's second electronic signature (Cb2) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) to obtain the hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)) (step S64).

Then, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) included in the transaction condition (T1), the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) generated from the provided data (D), the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) decrypted from the provider's electronic signature (Ca), and the hash value (Hash(D·KpC)) decrypted from the intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb) all match. In addition, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) included in the transaction condition (T1), the hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) found from the value obtained by adding the provider's electronic signature (Ca) and intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb) to the first encrypted data (D·KpE), and the hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb)) found from the first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) all match. Furthermore, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)) found from the value obtained by adding to the first encrypted data (D·KpE) the provider's electronic signature (Ca), intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), and first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc), and the hash value (Hash(D·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)) found from the intermediator's second electronic signature (Cb2) match.

The second receiving-side terminal device (E)7can verify on the basis of matchings of these values all having been confirmed, that the transaction condition (T1) that has been sent is information that relates to the provided data (D) and has been directed to the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7after passing through the providing-side terminal device (A)1, intermediary device (B)3, first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, and intermediary device (B)3, and that its originator is the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2and its intermediator the intermediary device (B)3(step S65).

Thus, due to the present embodiment, in the case where verified results have been determined to be authentic (True in step S65), it can be determined that the provided data (D) and transaction condition (T1) are authentic, have been provided by device-to-device distribution from the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, and have been transmitted toward the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7, via the intermediary device (B)3.

On the other hand, in the case where the verified results have been determined to be inauthentic (False in step S65), it can be determined that the provided data (D) or transaction condition (T1) is inauthentic, has not been provided from the provider, has not been intermediated by the intermediator, has not been provided from the first-receiver, or has not been re-intermediated by the intermediator. In this case too, the possibility of the above-mentioned kinds of falsification or impersonation having occurred in the provided data (D) or transaction condition (T1) is high, so the second-receiver can adopt the above-mentioned various kinds of countermeasures, or attempt an investigation of the falsification, and so on.

Fourth Embodiment

[Flow of Information Intermediation of Information Intermediary System300]

FIGS.11and12are sequence diagrams showing an outline of an information intermediary system according to a fourth embodiment of the present invention. Whereas in the above-mentioned first to third embodiments, there were described aspects where, in the information intermediary systems100to300, the transmission information including the provided data (D) and the transaction conditions (T, T1) was sent/received, in the fourth embodiment, there will be described an aspect where a data use authorization certificate (Dt) is handled as the transmission information. Note that system configuration of the information intermediary system of the fourth embodiment is configurable similarly to in the information intermediary system300of the third embodiment, hence illustration thereof will be omitted.

Now, the data use authorization certificate (Dt) refers to a document defining rights pertaining to data use, that clarifies rights pertaining to data use with respect to data (the provided data D) to be distributed in a data transaction market. In other words, the data use authorization certificate (Dt) is a document clearly stating, as a contract, rights and obligations of both a provider (A) and user (receivers C, E) with respect to the data (provided data D) that is to be an object of transaction. Items contracted are, for example, data being the object of transaction, period of its provision, range/purpose of its use, and so on. Note that it is important for the data use authorization certificate (Dt) to be linked as a pair with an image of the data (provided data D) being the object of transaction. What is paired with the data use authorization certificate (Dt) at this time is an image of the data (provided data D) to be distributed. It is therefore possible for multiple issues of this combination of the image of the provided data (D) and data use authorization certificate (Dt) to be issued.

Moreover, having this number-of-issues managed by an issuer (the provider (A)) leads to the data (provided data D) being assigned exclusivity so that its rarity is managed. Moreover, by the issuer (provider (A)) and intermediator (B) electronically signing the data use authorization certificate (Dt), its history will be clarified, and there will be enabled too an independently-performed device-to-device distribution of the data use authorization certificate (Dt) when a transfer by endorsement is performed by the receivers (C, E). That is, by introducing the data use authorization certificate (Dt) into a data distribution market, and creating a data use authorization transaction market, it becomes possible for promotion of data use to be achieved.

Moreover, by introduction of the data use authorization certificate (Dt), it will be certified by a third party (the intermediator (B)) that the provider (A) itself is a valid generator of the provided data (D). Therefore, when the data (provided data D) has its value evaluated subsequent to data distribution, the provider (A) may receive an evaluation as provider of the data's original.

Moreover, it will be certified by a third party (the intermediator (B)) that the receivers (C, E) are themselves valid users of the provided data (D). Furthermore, by the data use authorization certificate (Dt) being signed by the issuer (provider (A)) and intermediator (B), its history will be clarified (traceability), so it becomes possible for device-to-device distribution to be performed safely while guaranteeing authenticity and integrity of the data.

Note that regarding a data use authorization transaction in the information intermediary system300, what becomes important on top of there being realized the data use authorization certificate (Dt) based on the above-described kind of concept, is not just this data use authorization, but also detailed information of the data (provided data D) (information that cannot be expressed by the data itself, such as circumstances of its acquisition, or presence/absence of agreement, its measurement environment, and so on (hereafter, called “supplementary information”)).

Therefore, the data use authorization transaction market ultimately presupposes that this supplementary information, the data use authorization certificate (Dt), and the provided data (D) are distributed as a set. However, the provided data (D) paired with the data use authorization certificate (Dt) need only be appropriately provided at a timepoint when the right pertaining to data use indicated in that data use authorization certificate (Dt) is exercised. Therefore, the provided data (D) does not necessarily need to exist at a timepoint of issuing of the data use authorization certificate (Dt). That is, the data use authorization certificate (Dt) may be utilized as a document capable of being issued also with respect to provided data (D) to be provided in the future and not at a current timepoint.

[Flow of Issuing of Data Use Authorization Certificate (Dt)]

Regarding issuing of the data use authorization certificate (Dt), it is presupposed that the provider of the data will issue the intermediator with the data use authorization certificate (Dt), and inform them of its content, that the intermediator will invite purchase of that data use authorization certificate (Dt) from the receiver, and that the receiver will inform the intermediator of their wish to purchase that data use authorization certificate (Dt). Note that preconditions of the likes of the public keys and secret keys, and the public key certificates with regard to handling of information are similar to in the third embodiment. Here, issuing of the data use authorization certificate (Dt) from the providing-side terminal device (A)1to the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, will be described. The transmission information that the providing-side terminal device (A)1provides to the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2includes, for example, the data use authorization certificate (Dt) of provided data (D) that has been collected, and so on, into a providable state, or provided data (D) that is due to be provided in the future. The data use authorization certificate (Dt) cannot be seen by the intermediary device (B)3. Note that in the data use authorization certificate (Dt), various kinds of information such as the above-mentioned transaction conditions (T, T1) may be included as the supplementary information.

As shown inFIG.11, the providing-side terminal device (A)1generates first encrypted data (Dt·KpC) by encrypting the data use authorization certificate (Dt) with the first-receiver's public key (KpC) (step S71). In addition, the providing-side terminal device (A)1generates a provider's electronic signature (Ca=Hash(Dt·KpC). KsA) being a first electronic signature, using a hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) obtained from the encrypted data (Dt·KpC), and using the provider's secret key (KsA) (step S71). The providing-side terminal device (A)1transmits the thus-generated encrypted data (Dt·KpC) and provider's electronic signature (Ca) to the intermediary device (B)3(step S71).

The intermediary device (B)3generates the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) from the received encrypted data (Dt·KpC) (step $72). In addition, the intermediary device (B)3verifies (KpA (Ca)=Hash(Dt·KpC)) the provider's electronic signature (Ca) with the provider's public key (KpA) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) (step S73). Then, the intermediary device (B)3confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) generated from the encrypted data (Dt·KpC), and the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) decrypted from the provider's electronic signature (Ca) match. The intermediary device (B)3can verify by the hash values (Hash(Dt·KpC)) matching, that an originator of the sent encrypted data (Dt·KpC) is the providing-side terminal device (A)1(step S74).

Next, as shown inFIG.12, the intermediary device (B)3includes the provider's electronic signature (Ca) in the received encrypted data (Dt·KpC) to generate a hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)), and encrypts this hash value with the intermediator (B)'s secret key (KsB) to generate an intermediator's electronic signature (Cb=Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)·KsB) being a second electronic signature (step S81). Then, the intermediary device (B)3transmits the received encrypted data (Dt·KpC) and provider's electronic signature (Ca), and the generated intermediator's electronic signature (Cb) to the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2(step S81).

The first receiving-side terminal device (C)2decrypts the received encrypted data (Dt·KpC) using the first-receiver's secret key (KsC), and obtains the data use authorization certificate (Dt) (step S82). In addition, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2generates the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) and hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)) from the obtained data use authorization certificate (Dt) (step S83). Moreover, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2verifies (KpA (Ca)=Hash(Dt·KpC)) the provider's electronic signature (Ca) with the provider's public key (KpA) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) (step S84). In addition, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2verifies (KpB(Cb)=Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)) the intermediator's electronic signature (Cb) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)) (step S84).

Then, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) generated from the data use authorization certificate (Dt), and the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) decrypted from the provider's electronic signature (Ca) match. In addition, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)) generated from the data use authorization certificate (Dt), and the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)) decrypted from the intermediator's electronic signature (Cb) match. The first receiving-side terminal device (C)2can verify on the basis of matchings of these having been confirmed, that the data use authorization certificate (Dt) that has been sent is information that has been directed to the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, and that its originator is the providing-side terminal device (A)1and its intermediator the intermediary device (B)3(step S85). In addition, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2can verify there being a transaction relating to the data use authorization certificate (Dt), since the electronic signatures (Ca, Cb) that have been received by the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2include hash values generated from the data use authorization certificate (Dt).

Thus, due to the present embodiment, in the case where verified results have been determined to be authentic (True in step S85), it can be determined that the data use authorization certificate (Dt) is authentic, has been issued from the providing-side terminal device (A)1, and has been transmitted toward the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, via the intermediary device (B)3.

On the other hand, in the case where the verified results have been determined to be inauthentic (False in step S85), it can be determined that the data use authorization certificate (Dt) is inauthentic, has not been issued from the provider, or has not been intermediated by the intermediator, so the above-mentioned various kinds of countermeasures can be adopted, or an investigation of the falsification attempted.

Fifth Embodiment

[Flow of Purchase of Provided Data (D) by Data Use Authorization Certificate (Dt)]

FIGS.13and14are sequence diagrams showing an outline of an information intermediary system according to a fifth embodiment of the present invention.

Next, there will be described an aspect of the case where the provider (A)1of the data use authorization certificate (Dt) is enabled to provide the provided data (D) being an object of the data use authorization certificate (Dt), for example, and the first-receiver (C)2purchases the provided data (D).

As shown inFIG.13, first, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2generates encrypted data (Dt·KpA) that it generates by encrypting the data use authorization certificate (Dt) with the provider's public key (KpA) (step S91).2includes the provider's electronic signature (Ca) and intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb) in the generated encrypted data (Dt·KpA) to generate a hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)), and, using this hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)) and the first-receiver (C)2's secret key (KsC), generates a first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc=Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)·KsC) being a first electronic signature (step S91). The first receiving-side terminal device (C)2transmits the generated first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) along with the encrypted data (Dt·KpA), provider's electronic signature (Ca), and intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), to the intermediary device (B)3(step S91).

The intermediary device (B)3generates the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)) from the received encrypted data (Dt·KpA), provider's electronic signature (Ca), and intermediator's electronic signature (Cb) (step S92). In addition, the intermediary device (B)3obtains the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)) from the first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc), using the first-receiver's public key (KpC) (step S93).

Then, the intermediary device (B)3confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)) generated from the encrypted data (Dt·KpA), provider's electronic signature (Ca), and intermediator's electronic signature (Cb), and the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)) decrypted from the first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) match.

The intermediary device (B)3can verify by the hash values (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)) matching, that the sent encrypted data (Dt·KpA) has been originally sent from the providing-side terminal device (A)1(step S94).

Next, as shown inFIG.14, the intermediary device (B)3includes the provider's electronic signature (Ca), intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), and first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) in the received encrypted data (Dt·KpA) to generate a hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb+Cc)), and, using the obtained hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb+Cc)) and the intermediator's secret key (KsB), generates a intermediator's second electronic signature (Cb2=Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb+Cc)·KsB) being a second electronic signature (step S101). Then, the intermediary device (B)3transmits the generated intermediator's second electronic signature (Cb2) along with the received encrypted data (Dt·KpA), provider's electronic signature (Ca), intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), and first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc), to the providing-side terminal device (A)1(step S101).

The providing-side terminal device (A)1decrypts the received encrypted data (Dt·KpA) using the provider's secret key (KsA), and obtains the data use authorization certificate (Dt) (step S102). In addition, the providing-side terminal device (A)1generates the hash values (Hash(Dt·KpC), Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca), Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb), and Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb+Cc)) from the obtained data use authorization certificate (Dt) (step S103).

Moreover, the providing-side terminal device (A)1verifies (KpA (Ca)=Hash(Dt·KpC)) the provider's electronic signature (Ca) with the provider's public key (KpA) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) (step S104). In addition, the providing-side terminal device (A)1verifies (KpB(Cb)=Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)) the intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)) (step S104).

Moreover, the providing-side terminal device (A)1verifies (KpB(Cc)=Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)) the first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) with the first-receiver's public key (KpC) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)) (step S104). Furthermore, the providing-side terminal device (A)1verifies (KpB(Cb2)=Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb+Cc)) the intermediator's second electronic signature (Cb2) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb+Cc)) (step S104).

Then, the providing-side terminal device (A)1confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) generated from the data use authorization certificate (Dt) and hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) decrypted from the provider's electronic signature (Ca) match, whether or not the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)) generated from the data use authorization certificate (Dt) and provider's electronic signature (Ca), and hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)) decrypted from the intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb) match, whether or not the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)) generated from the data use authorization certificate (Dt), provider's electronic signature (Ca), and intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), and hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)) decrypted from the first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) match, and whether or not the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb+Cc)) generated from the data use authorization certificate (Dt), provider's electronic signature (Ca), intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), and first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc), and hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb+Cc)) decrypted from the intermediator's second electronic signature (Cb2) match.

The providing-side terminal device (A)1can verify on the basis of matchings of these values all having been confirmed, that the data use authorization certificate (Dt) that has been sent is information that has been directed to the providing-side terminal device (A)1after passing through the providing-side terminal device (A)1, intermediary device (B)3, first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, and intermediary device (B)3, and that its originator is the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2and its intermediator the intermediary device (B)3(step S105).

Thus, due to the present embodiment, in the case where verified results have been determined to be authentic (True in step S105), it can be determined that the data use authorization certificate (Dt) is authentic, has been provided from the providing-side terminal device (A)1, and has been re-transmitted toward the providing-side terminal device (A)1, via the intermediary device (B)3, first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, and intermediary device (B)3.

On the other hand, in the case where the verified results have been determined to be inauthentic (False in step S105), it can be determined that the data use authorization certificate (Dt) is inauthentic, has not been provided from the provider, has not been intermediated by the intermediator, or has not been originally sent from the first-receiver, so the above-mentioned various kinds of countermeasures can be adopted, or an investigation of the falsification attempted. Note that subsequent to the providing-side terminal device (A)1having received the authentic data use authorization certificate (Dt) from the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, the providing-side terminal device (A)1may transfer the provided data (D) to the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, in accordance with the flow described in the first embodiment. It thus becomes possible for the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2to purchase the provided data (D) from the providing-side terminal device (A)1.

Sixth Embodiment

[Flow of Distribution of Provided Data Set (Dset)]

FIGS.15and16are sequence diagrams showing an outline of an information intermediary system according to a sixth embodiment of the present invention.

There will herein be described an aspect of the case where subsequent to the provider (A)1of the data use authorization certificate (Dt) having received the authentic data use authorization certificate (Dt) from the first-receiver (C)2, the provider (A)1links the provided data (D) to the data use authorization certificate (Dt) to provide these to the first-receiver (C)2as a single provided data set (Dset=Dt+D), for example.

As shown inFIG.15, the providing-side terminal device (A)1generates encrypted data (Dset·KpC) that it generates by encrypting the provided data set (Dset) with the first-receiver's public key (KpC) (step S111). In addition, the providing-side terminal device (A)1generates a provider's second electronic signature (Ca2=Hash(Dset·KpC). KsA) being a first electronic signature, using a hash value (Hash(Dset·KpC)) obtained from the encrypted data (Dset·KpC), and using the provider's secret key (KsA) (step S111). The providing-side terminal device (A)1transmits the thus-generated encrypted data (Dset·KpC) and provider's second electronic signature (Ca2), along with the provider's electronic signature (provider's first electronic signature) (Ca), intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc), and intermediator's second electronic signature (Cb2), to the intermediary device (B)3(step S111).

The intermediary device (B)3generates the hash value (Hash(Dset·KpC)) from the received encrypted data (Dset·KpC) (step S112). In addition, the intermediary device (B)3obtains the hash value (Hash(Dset·KpC)) by verifying (KpA (Ca2)=Hash(Dset·KpC)) the provider's second electronic signature (Ca2) with the provider's public key (KpA) (step $113).

Then, the intermediary device (B)3confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(Dset·KpC)) generated from the encrypted data (Dset·KpC), and the hash value (Hash(Dset·KpC)) decrypted from the provider's second electronic signature (Ca2) match.

The intermediary device (B)3can verify by the hash values (Hash(Dset·KpC)) matching, that the originator of the sent encrypted data (Dset·KpC) is the providing-side terminal device (A)1(step S114).

Next, as shown inFIG.16, the intermediary device (B)3includes the provider's second electronic signature (Ca2) in the received encrypted data (Dset·KpC) to generate a hash value (Hash(Dset·KpC+Ca2)), and, using this hash value (Hash(Dset·KpC+Ca2)) and the intermediator's secret key (KsB), generates an intermediator's third electronic signature (Cb3=Hash(Dset·KpC+Ca2)·KsB) being a second electronic signature (step S121). Then, the intermediary device (B)3transmits the received encrypted data (Dset·KpC) and generated intermediator's third electronic signature (Cb3) along with the provider's first electronic signature (Ca), intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc), intermediator's second electronic signature (Cb2), and provider's second electronic signature (Ca2), to the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2(step S121).

The first receiving-side terminal device (C)2decrypts the received encrypted data (Dset·KpC) using the first-receiver's secret key (KsC), and obtains the provided data set (Dset) (step S122). In addition, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2generates the hash values (Hash(Dt·KpC), Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca), Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb), Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb+Cc), Hash(Dset·KpC), and Hash(Dset·KpC+Ca2)) from the obtained provided data set (Dset) (step S123).

Moreover, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2verifies (KpA (Ca)=Hash(Dt·KpC)) the provider's first electronic signature (Ca) with the provider's public key (KpA) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) (step S124). In addition, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2verifies (KpB(Cb)=Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)) the intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)) (step S124).

Moreover, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2verifies (KpC (Cc)=Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)) the first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) with the first-receiver's public key (KpC) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb)) (step $124).2verifies (KpB(Cb2)=Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb+Cc)) the intermediator's second electronic signature (Cb2) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb+Cc)) (step S124).

Moreover, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2verifies (KpA(Ca2)=Hash(Dset·KpC)) the provider's second electronic signature (Ca2) with the provider's public key (KpA) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dset·KpC)) (step S124). Furthermore, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2verifies (KpB(Cb3)=Hash(Dset·KpC+Ca2)) the intermediator's third electronic signature (Cb3) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dset·KpC+Ca2)) (step S124).

Then, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2confirms whether or not the hash values (Hash(Dt·KpC), Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca), Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb), Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb+Cc), Hash(Dset·KpC), and Hash(Dset·KpC+Ca2)) generated from the provided data set (Dset), and the hash values (Hash(Dt·KpC), Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca), Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb), Hash(Dt·KpA+Ca+Cb+Cc), Hash(Dset·KpC), and Hash(Dset·KpC+Ca2)) decrypted from the electronic signatures (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cb2, Ca2, and Cb3) respectively match.

The first receiving-side terminal device (C)2can verify on the basis of matchings of these values all having been confirmed, that the provided data set (Dset) that has been sent is information that has been directed to the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, and that its originator is the providing-side terminal device (A)1and its intermediator the intermediary device (B)3(step S125).

Thus, due to the present embodiment, in the case where verified results have been determined to be authentic (True in step S125), it can be determined that the provided data set (Dset) is authentic, has been provided from the providing-side terminal device (A)1, and has been transmitted toward the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, via the intermediary device (B)3, and that it has been transmitted toward the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2after passing through the providing-side terminal device (A)1, intermediary device (B)3, first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, intermediary device (B)3, providing-side terminal device (A)1, and intermediary device (B)3.

On the other hand, in the case where the verified results have been determined to be inauthentic (False in step S125), it can be determined that the provided data set (Dset) is inauthentic, has not been provided from the provider, has not been intermediated by the intermediator, or has not been originally sent from the provider and received by the first-receiver following the above-described kind of route, so the above-mentioned various kinds of countermeasures can be adopted, or an investigation of the falsification attempted.

Seventh Embodiment

[Flow of Transfer of Data Use Authorization Certificate (Dt)]

FIGS.17and18are sequence diagrams showing an outline of an information intermediary system according to a seventh embodiment of the present invention.

There will herein be described an aspect of the case where the data use authorization certificate (Dt) is independently transferred from the first-receiver (C)2to the second-receiver (E)7.

As shown inFIG.17, first, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2generates encrypted data (Dt·KpE) by encrypting the data use authorization certificate (Dt) with the second-receiver's public key (KpE) (step S131).

In addition, the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2finds a hash value (Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb)) of a value obtained upon the provider's first electronic signature (Ca) and intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb) having been included in the encrypted data (Dt·KpE), and, using this hash value (Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb)) and the secret key (KsC) of the first-receiver being the provider in this case, generates a first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc-Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb)·KsC) (step S131). The first receiving-side terminal device (C)2transmits the thus-generated encrypted data (Dt·KpE), provider's first electronic signature (Ca), intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), and first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc), to the intermediary device (B)3(step S131).

The intermediary device (B)3generates the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb)) from the received encrypted data (Dt·KpE), provider's first electronic signature (Ca), and intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb) (step S132). In addition, the intermediary device (B)3uses the first-receiver's public key (KpC) to decrypt the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb)) from the first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) that includes the provider's first electronic signature (Ca) and intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb) (step S133).

Then, the intermediary device (B)3confirms whether or not the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb)) generated from the encrypted data (Dt·KpE), and the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb)) decrypted from the first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) match.

The intermediary device (B)3can verify by the hash values (Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb)) matching, that the originator of the sent encrypted data (Dt·KpE) is the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2(step S134).

Next, as shown inFIG.18, the intermediary device (B)3includes the provider's first electronic signature (Ca), intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), and first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) in the received encrypted data (Dt·KpE) to generate a hash value (Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)), and, using this hash value (Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)) and the intermediator's secret key (KsB), generates a intermediator's second electronic signature (Cb2=Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)·KsB) (step S141).

Then, the intermediary device (B)3transmits the received encrypted data (Dt·KpE) and generated intermediator's second electronic signature (Cb2) along with the provider's first electronic signature (Ca), intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb), and first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc), to the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7(step S141).

The second receiving-side terminal device (E)7decrypts the received encrypted data (Dt·KpE) using the second-receiver's secret key (KsE), and obtains the data use authorization certificate (Dt) (step S142). In addition, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7generates the hash values (Hash(Dt·KpC), Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca), Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb), and Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Ch+Cc)) from the obtained data use authorization certificate (Dt) (step S143).

Moreover, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7verifies (KpA (Ca)=Hash(Dt·KpC)) the provider's first electronic signature (Ca) with the provider's public key (KpA) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC)) (step S144). In addition, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7verifies (KpB(Cb)=Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)) the intermediator's first electronic signature (Cb) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca)) (step S144).

Moreover, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7verifies (KpC (Cc)=Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb)) the first-receiver's electronic signature (Cc) with the first-receiver's public key (KpC) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb)) (step S144).

Furthermore, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7verifies (KpB(Cb2)=Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)) the intermediator's second electronic signature (Cb2) with the intermediator's public key (KpB) to obtain the hash value (Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)) (step S144).

Then, the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7confirms whether or not the hash values (Hash(Dt·KpC), Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca), Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb), and Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)) generated from the data use authorization certificate (Dt), and the hash values (Hash(Dt·KpC), Hash(Dt·KpC+Ca), Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb), and Hash(Dt·KpE+Ca+Cb+Cc)) decrypted from the electronic signatures (Ca, Cb, Cc, and Cb2) respectively match.

The second receiving-side terminal device (E)7can verify on the basis of matchings of these values all having been confirmed, that the data use authorization certificate (Dt) that has been sent is information that has been directed to the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7after passing through the providing-side terminal device (A)1, intermediary device (B)3, first receiving-side terminal device (C)2, and intermediary device (B)3, and that its originator is the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2and its intermediator the intermediary device (B)3(step S145).

Thus, due to the present embodiment, in the case where verified results have been determined to be authentic (True in step S145), it can be determined that the data use authorization certificate (Dt) is authentic, has been provided due to transfer (device-to-device distribution) from the first receiving-side terminal device (C)2after following the above-described route, and has been transmitted toward the second receiving-side terminal device (E)7, via the intermediary device (B)3.

On the other hand, in the case where the verified results have been determined to be inauthentic (False in step S145), it can be determined that the data use authorization certificate (Dt) is inauthentic, has not been provided from the provider, has not been intermediated by the intermediator, has not been provided from the first-receiver, or has not been re-intermediated by the intermediator, and so on. In this case too, the possibility of the above-mentioned kinds of falsification or impersonation having occurred in the data use authorization certificate (Dt) is high, so the second-receiver can adopt various kinds of countermeasures, or attempt an investigation of the falsification.

Note that in the third to seventh embodiments, a configuration may be adopted whereby the transmitted provided data (D), transaction condition (T1), data use authorization certificate (Dt), provided data set (Dset), and electronic signatures (Ca, Cb, Cc, Cb2, Ca2, and so on) include a time-stamp, as in the second embodiment.

DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE NUMERALS

1providing-side terminal device (A)2receiving-side terminal device (C)3intermediary device (B)4public key certificate authority (CA)5network6time stamping authority (TSA)7receiving-side terminal device (E)100,200,300information intermediary system