Universal emergency power-off switch security device

A security device for a universal emergency power-off (UEPO) switch of a computer system enclosure involves a plate body having a first and second portion, the first portion has a length and width sufficient to allow it to be rigidly constrained, the second portion has: a surface including multiple openings to allow for ventilation while substantially impeding access to the UEPO switch, a port through which system identification information can be viewed, and a hand grip near an end of the second portion including surface texturing sufficient to capture and retain epithelial cells from a person who grips the hand grip. The plate body also has a deformation region such that, when the first portion is rigidly constrained, application of a force, directed within a range from 0° to about 45° from a right angle to the surface, will cause plastic deformation of the plate body within the deformation region.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

This disclosure relates generally to computer system hardware and, more particularly, computer security hardware.

BACKGROUND

Recent IT industry trends has seen a greater use of co-location datacenters to supplant/augment client IT computer infrastructure. This has resulted in an increase in the types of people who need access to areas containing such computers in order to provide on-site service support (i.e., a variety of suppliers, contractors, etc.). Consequently, the increased access has concurrently created a heightened need for system hardware security to minimizing potential tampering events. Some computer systems employ a locked door approach, whereby the emergency power off switch is maintained behind the locked door. However, this creates a problem because, in an emergency, such computer systems cannot be shut off using the switch unless/until, an appropriate person unlocks the door.

To avoid the foregoing problem, some computer systems leave the emergency power off switch and a tag or label containing certain system identification information exposed and accessible, irrespective of whether there is a door that can be locked to prevent access to the remainder of the computer equipment. However, computer systems with a universal emergency power off (UEPO) that is exposed when their enclosure is closed and locked are susceptible to the UEPO switch being switched when the system is running, either inadvertently, or intentionally.

To prevent inadvertent switching of the UEPO switch, many computer systems include a door or cover over the switch that must be slid or flipped out of the way in order to be able to move the UEPO switch. However, such an approach does noting to prevent intentional tampering with the switch.

Intentional tampering with an exposed UEPO switch (i.e., switching it off while the system is running) creates a significant problem because it would effectively interrupt system operation in the equivalent of an “unscheduled incident repair action” (UIRA). A UIRA is a hardware event that causes a system to be rebooted in full or degraded mode. It is typically caused by a non-recoverable failure in a critical hardware function which results in the need to bring a customer's system down for repair at an unscheduled time and is perhaps the single most important Reliability, Availability and Serviceability (RAS) characteristic.

Moreover, since that type of intentional tampering with the UEPO switch would be “transparent” in that it would normally appear to be a legitimate UIRA, it would likely be treated as such, resulting in a time consuming, wasteful, and fruitless search for the cause of the failure.

Thus, there is a continuing problem with maintaining the security of an exposed UEPO switch of a computer system against tampering while allowing for legitimate access in an emergency.

SUMMARY

One aspect of this disclosure involves a security device for a universal emergency power-off (UEPO) switch of a computer system enclosure having a door that can be locked and unlocked and provide access to computer equipment within the computer system enclosure. The door has an access opening therein, the access opening provides access to both the universal emergency power-off switch and system identification information when the door is in a closed position.

The security device includes a plate body having a first portion and a second portion opposite the first portion. The first portion has a length and width sufficient to allow it to be rigidly constrained on an interior side of the door adjacent the opening. The second portion has a length and a width defining a surface, the surface including multiple openings therethrough, dimensioned to allow for ventilation through the multiple openings while substantially filling the access opening and impeding access to the UEPO switch. The second portion also has a port through which the system identification information can be viewed when the door is in a closed position and the first portion is rigidly constrained on the interior side of the door adjacent the opening. The second portion further has a hand grip near an end of the second portion opposite the first portion. The hand grip includes surface texturing sufficient to capture and retain epithelial cells from a person who grips the hand grip.

The width of part of the second portion is less than a corresponding width of the access opening.

The plate body has a deformation region, of a thickness and material, such that, when the first portion is rigidly constrained on the interior side of the door adjacent the access opening, application of a force of less than about 45 Newtons to the hand grip, directed within a range from 0° to about 45° from a right angle to the surface in a direction of the first portion, will cause plastic deformation of the plate body within the deformation region.

Advantageously, the foregoing restricts access to the UEPO switch under normal circumstances, but allows for normal access to system identification information that is typically located near the UEPO switch, as well as direct access to the UEPO switch in an emergency when the door of the computer system enclosure is closed and locked. However, when such access occurs, either illicitly or in an emergency, the plate body will be plastically deformed and thereby evidence the occurrence. In addition, epithelial cells of the person who did so will be captured by the handle, facilitating identification of the person who accessed the switch through “contact trace DNA” (also referred to as “touch DNA” or “low-level DNA”) analysis.

The foregoing and following outlines rather generally the features and technical advantages of one or more embodiments of this disclosure in order that the following detailed description may be better understood. Additional features and advantages of this disclosure will be described hereinafter, which may form the subject of the claims of this application.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

This disclosure provides a technical solution to address the aforementioned problems inherent with exposed UEPO switches of computer systems.

Our technical solution improves upon current locked door approaches because it does not limit access by placing the UEPO behind the locked door.

Our technical solution also improves upon the non-secure “cover” approach used with exposed UEPO switches because it provides security and a way to identify that the switch has been accessed.

Our technical solution further optionally improves upon the non-secure “cover” approach used with exposed UEPO switches because it facilitates identification of the person who accessed the switch, through capture of epithelial cells from that person so that DNA analysis can be performed.

FIG. 1Aillustrates, in simplified form, a perspective view of an example prior art UEPO switch unit100, typically used on computer systems that have a door that can be locked and unlocked and provide access to computer equipment within the computer system enclosure and also include an access opening that provides access to both the universal emergency power-off switch and system identification information when the door is in a closed position (i.e., the UEPO and system identification information are exposed even if the door to the computer enclosure is closed and locked). As noted above, to prevent inadvertent switching (a.k.a. “throwing”) of the switch, a cover102is provided as part of the UEPO switch unit100that must be moved, for example, by sliding or swinging, out of the way via, for example as shown, a tab104. As shown inFIG. 1A, the cover102is closed, impeding access to the actual UEPO switch (not shown).

The UEPO switch unit100also includes a location106where system identification information, for example, a system serial number, is visibly present, for example, via a label, tag or plate.

FIG. 1Billustrates, in simplified form, a front view of the example UEPO switch unit100ofFIG. 1A.

FIG. 1Cillustrates, in simplified form, a perspective view of the example prior art UEPO switch unit100ofFIG. 1A, with the cover102opened, with this example, by sliding the tab104up to provide access to the actual UEPO switch108.

FIG. 1Dillustrates, in simplified form, a front view of the example UEPO switch unit100ofFIG. 1C.

FIG. 2illustrates, in simplified form, one example of a security device200for use with a UEPO switch according to the teachings herein.

The security device200includes a plate body202made up of a first portion204and a second portion206. The first portion204has a length (L1) and a width (W1) that are each of a size to allow the first portion204to be rigidly constrained on an interior side of a door of a computer enclosure, as will be shown and described in greater detail below.

The second portion206also has a length (L2) and a width (W2) that collectively define a surface208with multiple openings210through it. The openings210are present for ventilation purposes but are sized so that an object cannot easily be passed through to manipulate the cover102out of the way to access the UEPO switch108with the security device200in place. Although shown as round holes arranged in a rectangular array in this example implementation, the openings210can be square, rectangular, hexagonal, serpentine slot(s), or even part of a screen, and can be arranged in any configuration, the important aspect being their having a size and shape that allows for ventilation while inhibiting manipulation of the cover102when in place, not their particular size, shape or arrangement.

In addition, as will shown in greater detail below, the width W2is such that most of the second portion206will substantially, but not entirely, fill the opening in the door that can be used to access the UEPO switch and thus impedes access to the UEPO switch when present.

The second portion206also has a port212through which the location106for the system identification information can be viewed when the security device200is constrained in place on the interior of a computer system enclosure's door.

Additionally, the second portion206includes a hand grip214located at or near the end218of the second portion206. As shown, the hand grip214is formed from, and at, the end of the second portion206, but in other implementations, it could be a separate piece that is affixed to the second portion206in a horizontal, vertical or other orientation.

The plate body202also has a deformation region216such that, if the security device200is constrained in place on the interior of a computer system enclosure's door and the door is closed, and the hand grip214is moved away from the door in order by an amount sufficient to obtain access to the UEPO switch, the plate body will at least be plastically deformed (and may fracture) within the deformation region216, thereby providing a clear indication of an attempted access.

In this regard, with many implementations, the plate body202will have a uniform thickness and be made of a uniform material such that it will plastically deform (possibly to the extent of being frangible) when a force of less than about 45 Newtons (approx. 10 pounds) but greater than about 11 Newtons (approx. 2.5 lbs) is applied somewhere within an angle range of between 0 degrees and about 45 degrees (+/−a few degrees) off of a perpendicular to the surface208(i.e., some one or more angle(s), but not necessarily all angles, within that range should work). As to the approximate force values, it should be understood that they may vary, for example, by 5-10% and are based upon use of aluminum as the material for the plate body. The use of other materials or a non-uniform thickness may result in some variance in those force amounts. For purposes of understanding the potential variance, the important aspect is that the material and thickness will be selected such that, if an average person, grips the hand grip214and moves the second portion206of the security device200enough to obtain access to, and switch, the UEPO switch, it will be readily identifiable through an exceeding of the plastic deformation limit of the plate body202within the deformation region216.

FIG. 3illustrates, in simplified form, a sectional perspective view of the hand grip214portion of the security device200ofFIG. 2, viewed from the second portion206of the plate body202.

As shown by the cross-hatching inFIG. 3, the interior surface302(and optionally the edge304) of part of the hand grip214is textured, for example, by knurling, etching, scoring, grinding, or other mechanical or chemical roughening means, to a degree sufficient to capture and retain epithelial cells from a person who grips the hand grip214during the act of gaining access to the UEPO switch behind the second portion206of the security device200. Specifically, the texturing should be sufficient to capture enough epithelial cells to allow for “contact trace DNA” (also referred to as “touch DNA” or “low-level DNA”) testing/analysis to be performed, for purposes of assisting with identification of the person who gripped the hand grip214, and may enhance the person's ability to grip and pull on the hand grip214while also not being so rough that it will cause injury to the person (e.g., by cutting through, tearing or excessively abrading the skin).

FIGS. 4A-4Brespectively illustrate, in simplified form, a front and rear exploded perspective view of part of a computer system enclosure402(shown in ghost lines) having a door404with a lock406, that can be locked and unlocked, and, when open, will provide access to computer equipment within the computer system enclosure402. As can be seen, the door404has an access opening408that provides access to a UEPO switch unit100and the system identifying information noted above when the door404is closed.

As will be understood fromFIGS. 4A-4B, first portion204of the security device200is rigidly constrained behind the door404and ahead of the UEPO switch unit100. Specifically, as shown inFIGS. 4A-4B, the first portion204of the security device200is sandwiched between the door404and a retaining plate410that gets bolted to the door404ahead of the mounting plate/bezel412for the UEPO switch unit100. In this manner, the first portion204of the security device200will be immobilized by the door404, while the second portion206will not be.

FIG. 5illustrates, in simplified form, part of the door404ofFIGS. 4A-4Bafter the security device has been installed such that its first portion204is rigidly constrained behind the door404and the second portion206is visible within the access opening408. As can now be seen, the access opening408has a width (WA) such that the width (W2) of at least part of the second portion206is less than the width (WA) of the corresponding part of the access opening408. As a result, there will be a gap502between the access opening408and the part of the second portion206to the hand grip214side of the deformation region216(FIG. 2) to allow for the hand grip214to be grasped and moved, as described above, to gain access to the UEPO switch behind the second portion206in an emergency.

FIG. 6illustrates, in simplified form, a perspective view of the part of the door404shown inFIG. 5.