Secure cover with tamper resistant landing area

Various aspects of the disclosure generally relate to security for a credit card processing reader. Part of security for a reader is a secure cover having a trace mesh to discourage drilling through the cover. The mesh may be connected to one or more landing areas on the cover. The landing area has electrical pads with trace routing that provides tamper protection for the landing area.

BACKGROUND

Field of the Disclosure

The disclosure relates generally to credit card processing readers, and more specifically to security measures in the cover for a printed circuit board in a credit card processing reader.

Description of Related Art

Fundamental to the functioning of the economy is the exchange of payment for goods and services. Throughout modern commercial history, payment has typically been rendered with money in the form of currency or cash such as banknotes and coins. Cash continues to be used to purchase goods and services, but it is becoming increasingly less common. In the United States, a study by Tufts University concluded that the cost of using cash amounts to around $200billion per year. This is primarily the costs associated with collecting, sorting and transporting the physical currency, but also includes expenses like automated teller machine (ATM) fees. The study also found that the average American wastes five and a half hours per year withdrawing cash from ATMs, which is just one of the many inconvenient aspects of physical currency. Physical currency is often unhealthy too. Researchers in Ohio spot-checked cash used in a supermarket and found 87% contained harmful bacteria.

Conventional financial transactions are fundamentally based on the value of currency, but often involve the transfer of funds that do not require the physical exchange of cash.

In the United States, the Federal Reserve Bank's Automated Clearing House (ACH) Network is a processing and delivery system that provides for the distribution and settlement of electronic credits and debits among financial institutions, and functions as an electronic alternative to paper checks. Unlike a check, which is always a debit instrument, an ACH entry may be either a credit or a debit entry. The ACH Network is also widely used to settle consumer transactions made at ATMs and point-of-sale (POS) terminals.

Physical currency is already being replaced by cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. Bitcoin allows for direct transfers of funds between parties, without the need for a third party. A wide range of startups are now developing products based on the Bitcoin protocols, in the hope that it will compete with other global payment systems. Cash transactions worldwide rose just 1.75% between 2008 and 2012, to $11.6 trillion. Meanwhile, non-traditional payment methods rose almost 14% to total $6.4 trillion. This group includes online and mobile payment systems including PayPal, Google Wallet, Apple Passbook, and other cashless alternatives.

Thrive Analytics 2014 Digital Wallet Usage Study revealed that, despite nearly 80% of consumers being aware of digital wallets, including major players like PayPal, Google Wallet, and Apple Passbook, security concerns remain the main barrier to adoption, followed by lack of usability versus credit cards/cash (37%) and not being top of mind as a form of payment at the time of purchase (32%). Meanwhile, MasterCard and Visa face obstacles as they try to become players in the digital wallet game.

Other companies produce a point-of-sale credit card reader and app that provides transparent pricing, reliable technology and is available for major credit cards plus Google Pay and Apple Pay. Contrasting this with a traditional credit card terminal, which contains the hardware and software for generating an authorization request, these card readers work in conjunction with online systems to generate that request. Security and ensuring the secrecy of user credit card information is paramount in any credit card reader and strict standards apply to the construction and operation of these POS readers. While meeting security standards, the makers of these readers must design a product that is rugged, reliable and long-living.

In line with that need for and expectation of security and reliability, a credit card reader is expected to be resistant to tampering. Tampering, or hacking into, a credit card reader can make the reader vulnerable to being used as a skimmer (a device that steals credit card information for unauthorized use), which may or may not be known by a merchant using a hacked reader.

What's needed is a secure credit card reader that resists tampering.

SUMMARY

A cover with a non-conducting base and a plurality of landing areas coupled to the base. Each landing area includes a first and a second exposed electrical pads, each having a length of not more than 2 mm and a width of not more than 1.5 mm. A first trace is electrically coupled to the first electrical pad at a first connection point. A second trace is electrically coupled to the second electrical pad at a second connection point. The first connection point is directly between the first electrical pad and the second electrical pad. A conductive mesh is coupled to the base and directly between the plurality of landing areas, the mesh including a third trace and a fourth trace.

Following a first path along the first trace, starting at the first connection point and moving away from the first connection point, the first trace turning in the direction of the first electrical pad only after a distance along the first path at least greater than a length of the second electrical pad.

The second connection point may be directly between the first electrical pad and the second electrical pad.

Following a second path along the second trace starting at the second connection point and moving away from the second connection point, the second trace turning in the direction of the second electrical pad only after a distance along the second path at least greater than a length of the first electrical pad.

The length of the third trace and length of the fourth trace being more than double the distance between any of the plurality of landing pads.

The width of the third trace and the fourth trace being no more than 150 micrometers and the separation between the third trace and the fourth trace being no more than 250 micrometers.

The distance between the first and second trace is between 100 and 200 micrometers.

The mesh is entirely covering one side of the base not covered by the plurality of landing areas.

The second electrical pad being rectangular, the first trace being closer to three sides of the second electrical pad than the second trace, as measured perpendicular from each of the three sides of the second electrical pad.

The first electrical pad being rectangular, the second trace being closer to three sides of the first electrical pad than the first trace, as measured perpendicular from each of the three sides of the first electrical pad.

The plurality of landing areas being on and defined by a raised surface such that they form a plane separate from a plane formed by the base.

The plurality of landing areas further including a first landing area, a second landing area, a third landing area, a fourth landing area, the base having edges and each of the four landing areas near one of the edges, the mesh further including a fifth trace and a sixth trace.

The first trace of the first landing area is electrically connected to the third trace. The third trace is electrically connected to the first trace of the second landing area. The second trace of the first landing area is electrically connected to the fourth trace. The fourth trace is electrically connected to the second trace of the second landing area. The first trace of the third landing area is electrically connected to the fifth trace. The fifth trace is electrically connected to the first trace of the fourth landing area. The second trace of the third landing area is electrically connected to the sixth trace. The sixth trace is electrically connected to the second trace of the fourth landing area.

Each of the first and second electrical pads are spaced apart from one another by no more than 5 mm.

A point-of-sale credit card reader may include all of the aforementioned, including a printed circuit board (PCB) coupled to the cover.

A cover may include a non-conducting base, a plurality of landing areas coupled to the base, with each landing area including a first and a second exposed electrical pad, each having a length of not more than 2 mm and a width of not more than 1.5 mm. A first trace is electrically coupled to the first electrical pad at a first connection point. A second trace is electrically coupled to the second electrical pad at a second connection point. A second length is established by measuring from the second connection point along the second trace to a point at which the second trace is further from the second electrical pad than the first trace. A first length is established by measuring along the first trace from a point at which the first trace is closer to the second electrical pad than the second length to a point at which the first trace is further from the second electrical pad than the second length. The first length is greater than the second length. A mesh is coupled to the base and directly between the plurality of landing areas. The mesh includes a third trace and a fourth trace.

A third length is established by measuring from the first connection point along the first trace to a point at which the first trace is further from the first electrical pad than the second trace. A fourth length is established by measuring along the second trace from a point at which the second trace is closer to the first electrical pad than the first length to a point at which the second trace is further from the first electrical pad than the first length. The fourth length is greater than the third length.

The first and second connection points are between the first and second electrical pads.

A cover includes a non-conducting planar base. A plurality of landing areas are coupled to the base, each landing area including a first and a second electrical pad spaced apart from each other no more than 150 micrometers, each electrical pad having four sides and elevated from the base, the first and second electrical pads being electrically isolated from each other and surrounded by a first trace, the first trace being adjacent to and surrounding the first electrical pad on at least two sides, with no intervening conductive material between the first trace and the first electrical pad. The first trace is electrically isolated from the first electrical pad. A mesh is coupled to the base and is directly between the plurality of landing areas. The mesh includes a third trace and a fourth trace.

The cover further includes a second trace surrounding the first and second electrical pads. The second trace is nearest to and surrounding the second electrical pad on at least two sides, with no intervening conductive material between the second trace and the second electrical pad. The second trace is electrically isolated from the second electrical pad.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

A point-of-sale (POS) credit card reader may physically interact with payment instruments such as magnetic stripe payment cards, Europay, MasterCard and Visa (EMV) payment cards, and short-range communication (e.g., near field communication (NFC), radio frequency identification (RFID), Bluetooth, Bluetooth®. low energy (BLE), etc.) payment instruments. The reader may provide a rich user interface through the display, communicate with the payment reader, and communicate with a payment processing service server, which may communicate with payment processing service provider server(s). In this manner, the reader may collectively process transaction(s) between a merchant and customer(s).

POS readers may be mobile, such that POS readers may process transactions in disparate locations across the world. For various reasons, a payment processing service provider may contract with a payment processing service regarding where the payment processing service is permitted to collectively process card-present transactions between merchants that utilize POS readers serviced by the payment processing service and customers. As a non-limiting example, a payment processing service provider may contract with a payment processing service such that the payment processing service is permitted to process card-present transactions on behalf of a merchant via a POS reader serviced by the payment processing service in one or more particular regions but is not permitted to process transactions on behalf of the merchant in any region that is not one of the one or more particular regions. For instance, a payment processing service provider may contract with a payment processing service such that the payment processing service is permitted to process card-present transactions on behalf of the merchant in the United States, Canada, and Australia, but is not permitted to process card-present transactions on behalf of the merchant in any other country. That is, if the merchant tries to transact with a customer in China via a card-present transaction using a POS reader serviced by the payment processing service and the payment processing service processes the card-present transaction, the payment processing service may breach its contract with the payment processing service provider. Accordingly, the payment processing service may refrain from processing the card-present transaction (i.e., the payment processing service may not transmit the card-present transaction to the payment processing service provider) to avoid breaking its contract with the payment processing service provider.

For the purpose of this disclosure, a card-present transaction is a transaction where both a customer and their payment instrument are physically present at the time of the transaction. Card-present transactions may be processed by swipes, dips, and/or taps. A swipe is a card-present transaction where a customer slides a card having a magnetic strip through a payment reader that captures payment data contained in the magnetic strip. A dip is a card-present transaction where a customer inserts a card having an embedded microchip (i.e., chip) into a payment reader chip-side first. The card remains in the payment reader until the payment reader prompts the customer to remove the card. While the card is in the payment reader, the microchip creates a one-time code which is sent from the POS reader to a server associated with a payment processing service, a bank, and/or a card payment network (e.g., Mastercard, VISA, etc.) to be matched with an identical one-time code. A tap is a card-present transaction where a customer may tap or hover his or her electronic device such as a smart phone running a payment application over a payment reader to complete a transaction via short-range communication (e.g., NFC, RFID, Bluetooth™, BLE, etc.). Short-range communication enables the electronic device to exchange information with the payment reader. A tap may also be called a contactless payment. In some countries, a customer may engage in a tap using a TAP card instead of an electronic device.

The phrases “in some examples,” “according to various examples,” “in the examples shown,” “in one example,” “in other examples,” “various examples,” “some examples,” and the like generally mean the particular feature, structure, or characteristic following the phrase is included as at least one example, and may be included in more than one example without specifically being referred to as such. In addition, such phrases do not necessarily refer to the same examples or to different examples.

The preceding summary is provided for the purposes of summarizing some examples to provide a basic understanding of aspects of the subject matter described herein. Accordingly, the above-described features are merely examples and should not be construed as limiting in any way. Other features, aspects, and advantages of the subject matter described herein will become apparent from the following description of Figures and Claims.

FIG.1illustrates one example of credit card processing reader100such as a point-of-sale (POS) reader for on-premises credit card payments. Such readers typically meet industry requirements if used for processing Visa, Mastercard, American Express, JCB or Discover payments. The security standards are set by the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC), which also sets standards for personal identification number (PIN) transaction security (PTS). One of the security standards set is the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). Other security standards are set by a European subgroup of the Joint Interpretation Library (JIL) working group, called the JIL Terminal Evaluation Methodology Subgroup, or JTEMS. The standards serve to protect against fraud and provide for secure entry and transmission of PIN and account data. POS terminals and readers are used in the retail, restaurant, entertainment, healthcare, and service industries, to name a few.

Reader100may be a standalone device, or it may be mounted within or on to a cradle, bracket or other holder (not illustrated) and interface through port102. Port102may be any type of serial or parallel communication port, for example a universal serial bus (USB), or any other type of interface. In one example port102may be used to provide power to reader100. In one example port102may be used for communication and power to reader100. Other communication options for reader100are discussed below. On the side of reader100that is opposite port102is a slot (not visible inFIG.1) into which a credit card may be inserted and read by a payment reader (not illustrated inFIG.1). This describes a dip, but it should be understood that both a tap and a swipe are both included as potential transaction methods with an appropriately configured terminal, for example with near field communications (NFC). An NFC antenna (not shown inFIG.1) may be located behind, for example, a display and enable interaction with other NFC devices. Display104may be any type of emissive or reflective display, or a combination thereof, for example LED, LCD, OLED, MEMS, ELD, QLED, etc. Additionally display104may be touch sensitive such that a user may interact with images present on display104. Such interactions include viewing an amount to be charged to a card, transaction description, entry or selection of amounts for gratuity, signature input, transaction approval, and so on. Button106activates reader100and may be used to power down, power up, place reader100into a sleep/standby mode or awaken reader100from a sleep/standby mode.

FIG.2is an exploded parts diagram illustrating one example of credit card processing reader100. The illustrated parts are broadly grouped into three groups plus a structural component. The groups are communications assembly202, secure circuit assembly204and rear assembly206. Frame208is the structural component. The naming convention with respect to each group is in no way limiting to that group or any other group, for example communications assembly202may include more than just communication components, or secure circuit assembly204does not mean or imply that other groups are not secure, or that communications may be engaged by rear assembly206, to name a few examples.

The assembly of reader100may be completed by collapsing the parts illustrated inFIG.2, with communications assembly202attaching to the topmost section of frame208, then secure circuit assembly204inserting within frame208and underneath communications assembly202, with rear assembly inserting within frame208and under secure circuit assembly204. This top-down orientation is maintained inFIG.3, but reversed inFIGS.4and5.

FIG.3is a partial exploded parts diagram illustrating communications assembly202fromFIG.2in a top-down orientation, as well as frame208. Communications assembly202includes display104as previously described with respect toFIG.1. Also included in communications assembly202is shield300, reflector302and antennae304. Shield300attenuates electromagnetic impulses between display104and antenna304, as well as secure circuit assembly204.

Shield300may be useful in reducing losses that occur from metal parts that are on the other side of shield300from display104(e.g. the PCB, the battery—conductive material that is near shield300) reducing interference of communications and circuit processing by display104. Shield300may be made from ferrite or other suitable shielding material for short range attenuation, for example NiZn, MnZn, etc.

Reflector302reduces efficiency losses that otherwise would occur for the cellular antenna (seeFIG.5). Reflector302may be made of a metal, for example copper, aluminum or steel.

Antennae304in this example may be a near field communication (NFC) antenna. NFC is based on inductive coupling between two antennas present on NFC-enabled devices, for example a POS credit card processing reader and a credit card. An NFC system can be used for communicating in one or both directions, using a frequency of 13.56 MHz. One practice of providing a small form factor for a POS reader is by placing a communication coil used by the NFC system in close proximity to the readout display of the processing device. Because of the proximity of the coil and display, operating aspects of the display may cause distortion of the waveforms from the NFC system.

Frame208provides structural support and integrity to reader100and may be made from injection molded plastic or any other suitable material and manufacturing method. From the perspective shown inFIG.3, communications assembly202stack together near the top of frame208once pressed into place.

FIG.4is a partial exploded parts diagram illustrating secure circuit assembly204fromFIG.2in a bottom-down orientation, as well as frame208and communications assembly202.FIG.4is in the reverse orientation ofFIG.3, such that communications assembly202is pictured at the bottom of frame208. Secure circuit assembly204includes printed circuit board (PCB)400, battery402, card guide404, conductive tape406, seal tape card connector408, tamper switches410, foam display cables412, cover414and screws416.

In a POS credit-card processing terminal or reader, secure covers and anti-tamper rubber switches are commonly used to pass penetration tests that verify the resistance of the reader against physical attack methods. Secure covers may have grabbers (also referred to as ribs)(not illustrated inFIG.4) into which conductive rubber blocks are pressed to form a bridge between electrical pads. In one example, the conductive rubber blocks may be zebra connectors, or tamper switches410. Electrical pads (seeFIG.6) are respectively connected to electrical traces (not illustrated inFIG.4) and are located on PCB400. When cover414is tightened onto PCB400with screws416, the resistance of tamper switches410changes until it is within a determined range. Once reader100is in use, if a change in resistance is detected with respect to the circuit connected to tamper switches410, that is outside the determined range, then reader100registers that change as a tamper attempt and reader100may be blocked or disabled. Once activated, removing cover414dislodges one or more tamper switches410, causing a change in resistance across the electrical contacts and triggering a tamper attempt. Drilling into cover414and connecting a trace from one of the electrical pads, to a trace from another electrical pad (creating a short circuit), also causes a change in resistance and triggers a tamper attempt. This is one example of security for secure circuit assembly204.

Battery402provides backup power for data retention in volatile memory in case of power loss as well as providing continuous power to security sensors. Card guide404assists in guiding a credit card at a proper place and angle into reader100.

FIG.5is a partial exploded parts diagram illustrating rear assembly206fromFIG.2in a bottom-down orientation, as well as frame208and secure circuit assembly204.FIG.5is in the reverse orientation ofFIG.3, such that communications assembly202(not illustrated inFIG.5) is at the bottom of frame208, with secure circuit assembly204shown on top of communications assembly202and inside of frame208. Rear assembly206includes communications assembly500, button support assembly502, foam button support504, battery506, wireless charging pad508, adhesive510, rear support512, adhesive514, rear panel516.

Communications assembly500may connect to PCB400and provide additional communication capability, for example one or more of the following: cellular, Bluetooth, Bluetooth LE, Wi-Fi, Zigbee, infrared, near field (NFC), etc. Button support assembly502and foam button support504in conjunction serve as button106(seeFIG.1) for power and sleep operations. Button support assembly502may connect to PCB400. Battery506provides power to reader100and may be rechargeable or non-rechargeable. Examples of rechargeable battery types include lead-acid, nickel-cadmium (NiCd), nickel-metal hydride (NiMH), lithium-ion (Li-ion), lithium-ion polymer (LiPo), and rechargeable alkaline batteries. Wireless charging pad508may recharge battery506through wireless inductive charging. A magnetic loop antenna (copper coil) is used to create an oscillating magnetic field, which can create a current in one or more receiver antennas in wireless charging pad508. This current may be used to recharge battery506. Rear support512is bonded to wireless charging pad508with adhesive510. Rear panel516is bonded to rear support512with adhesive514. Rear panel516may be made from any suitable material, for example metal, glass, plastic, etc.

FIG.6is a bottom plan view illustrating one example of a secure cover for a credit card reader. A secure cover may be part of the security measures in place for a credit card reader. The secure cover may have a variety of active and/or passive security measures to prevent unauthorized access to the circuitry and electronics over which it sits. These security measures may be prescribed by standard, statute, or they may be optional. One aspect of that security is described below. In one example, the secure cover is cover414.FIG.6illustrates cover414from a perspective opposite that illustrated inFIGS.4and5—from the underside of cover414. Base600is a part of cover414and may include landing areas602a,602b,602cand602d(collectively referred to as landing areas602). Base600may be made from a non-conducting (insulating) material and formed by a variety of methods, for example molding (compression, injection, reaction injection, injection blow, extrusion blow, rotational, etc.), vacuum casting, thermoforming, etc. Base600may have embedded metal particles that are exposed during manufacturing by a laser. After laser engraving, a chemical bath bonds to the exposed metal in base600and forms traces. In one example, base600is plastic, though it can be made from other insulating material

In one aspect, landing areas602are electrically connected to each other. For example, landing area602amay be electrically connected to landing area602b, or602c, or602d. Landing area602bmay be electrically connected to landing area602c, or602d. Landing area602cmay be electrically connected to landing area602d. In one aspect, more than two landing areas may be electrically connected together, for example landing area602amay be connected to landing areas602band602c, or602cand602d. In one aspect, landing area602ais electrically connected to landing area602cwhile landing area602bis electrically connected to landing area602d. In one aspect, landing area602ais electrically connected to landing area602bwhile landing area602cis electrically connected to landing area602d. Among any of the two-landing area connection configurations, with two electrical pads there may be two possible connection configurations. In one aspect of landing areas602aand602bbeing connected, electrical pad604amay be electrically connected to604c, while electrical pad604bmay be electrically connected to604d. In one aspect of the same landing area connection configuration, electrical pad604amay be electrically connected to604d, while electrical pad604bmay be electrically connected to604c. The same type of configuration may be applied to any combination of landing areas602. Electrical pads604may electrically connect through traces that make up a mesh (seeFIG.7) on base600.

FIG.7is a bottom perspective view illustrating one example of a security mesh on a secure cover for a credit card reader. Cover414has depth in order to accommodate elements between base600and PCB400. Connecting landing areas602with one another, as described above, is mesh700. Mesh700may extend along the entirety of base600, including the sides. In one aspect, cover414is open on one side where a credit card, for example, may be inserted into reader100. Mesh700includes multiple traces that provide electrical connection between landing areas602. Mesh700is an electrical security screen, part of the security measures of a secure cover. One technique for hacking into a credit card reader includes drilling into cover414and accessing tamper switch410, circuitry from PCB400, or other components. Mesh700includes traces that are near one another and extend along the entire inside of cover414, such that in credit card processing reader100, a drill bit passing through base600and coming into contact with two adjacent traces creates a short circuit and therefore a change in resistance which is detected and processed as a tamper attempt. This may trigger security protocols for reader100. In one aspect, mesh700includes traces that have a width of 150 μm and are spaced apart from each other by 250 μm. The trace width and spacing may be as small as enabled by manufacturing tolerances, including narrower traces that are closer together.

The trace connecting one landing area602with another, for example connecting landing area602awith602b, or connecting landing area602awith602d, is necessarily greater than the distance between those landing areas because of mesh700. The length of the trace may be a multiple of the distance between landing areas, for example two times the distance, or three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, and so on. The multiple may be fractional, for example 2.83, 5.12, 3.74, etc.

FIG.8is a partial cross-sectional view taken across line A-A ofFIG.5of a landing area connected to a printed circuit board with a tamper switch, for example, a zebra connector. In one aspect, cover414includes landing area602d, with electrical pads604gand604h. PCB400has electrical contact800aand800b(collectively referred to as electrical contacts800). Electrical pad604hmay be in electrical communication with electrical contact800athrough tamper switch410. Electrical pad604gmay be in electrical communication with electrical contact800bthrough tamper switch410. Tamper switch410may be a conductive block made from rubber, for example, that provides electrical resistance depending on an amount of compressive force exerted on tamper switch410between cover414and PCB400. In one aspect, tamper switch410may isolate electrical pad604hfrom electrical contact800b. In one aspect, tamper switch410may isolate electrical pad604hfrom electrical contact800b.

FIG.9is a top plan view illustrating one example of trace routing around a landing area. Trace routing illustrated inFIG.9may apply to none, any one, more than one, or all of landing areas602on cover414. In one aspect, landing area602aincludes electrical pads604aand604b. Electrical pad604ais electrically connected to trace902aat connection point900a, which is positioned between electrical pads604aand604b. Electrical pad604bis electrically connected to trace902b(trace902aand902bcollectively referred to as traces902) at connection point900b, which is positioned between electrical pads604aand604b. Traces902follow a path away from their respective electrical pads. As illustrated inFIG.9, each trace extends along the opposite electrical pad such that each trace turns back in the direction of their respective pad after a distance greater than the opposite electrical pad. Trace902awraps back towards electrical pad604aafter crossing the length of electrical pad604band then crossing the width of electrical pad604b. Electrical pad604bis surrounded on three sides by trace902a, which is closer to electrical pad604bthan trace902b, on those three sides. Trace902bwraps back towards electrical pad604bafter crossing the length of electrical pad604aand then crossing the width of electrical pad604a. Electrical pad604ais surrounded on three sides by trace902b, which is closer to electrical pad604athan trace902a, on those three sides. Each of traces902connects to a trace (not illustrated inFIG.9) in mesh700. The proximity of each trace902to an electrical pad to which the trace is not connected increases security at landing pad602a. In an attempted hack of reader100, a drill attempt near one of the electrical pads has a greater likelihood of triggering a tamper event because the surrounding trace originates from the opposite electrical pad. If the drill bit contacts the electrical pad and surrounding trace then the tamper event is triggered and security measures may be enacted.

FIG.10is a top plan view illustrating one example of trace routing around a landing area. Trace routing illustrated inFIG.10may apply to none, any one, more than one, or all of landing areas602on cover414. In one aspect, landing area602bincludes electrical pads604cand604d. Electrical pad604cis electrically connected to trace1002aat connection point1000a, which is positioned between electrical pads604cand604d. Electrical pad604dis electrically connected to trace1002b(trace1002aand1002bcollectively referred to as traces1002) at connection point1000b, which is not positioned between electrical pads604cand604d. Traces1002follow a path away from their respective electrical pads. As illustrated inFIG.10, trace1002awraps back towards electrical pad604cafter crossing the length of electrical pad604cand then crossing the width of electrical pad604c. Electrical pad604dis surrounded on two sides by trace1002a, which is closer to electrical pad604dthan trace1002b, on those two sides. Trace1002bwraps back towards electrical pad604dafter extending away from electrical pad604d, and is parallel to parts of trace1002a. Electrical pad604cis surrounded on three sides by trace1002b, which is closer to electrical pad604cthan trace1002a, on those three sides. Each of traces1002connects to a trace (not illustrated inFIG.10) in mesh700. The proximity of each trace1002to an electrical pad to which the trace is not connected increases security at landing pad602b.

FIG.11is a top plan view illustrating one example of trace routing around a landing area. Trace routing illustrated inFIG.11may apply to none, any one, more than one, or all of landing areas602on cover414. In one aspect, landing area602cincludes electrical pads604eand604f. Electrical pad604eis electrically connected to trace1102aat connection point1100a, which is positioned between electrical pads604eand604f. Electrical pad604fis electrically connected to trace1102b(trace1102aand1102bcollectively referred to as traces1102) at connection point1100b, which is not positioned between electrical pads604eand604f. Traces1102follow a path away from their respective electrical pads. As illustrated inFIG.11, trace1102awraps back towards electrical pad604eafter crossing the length of electrical pad604eand then crossing the width of electrical pad604e. Electrical pad604fis surrounded on three sides by trace1102a, which is closer to electrical pad604fthan trace1102b, on those three sides. Trace1102bwraps back towards electrical pad604fafter traversing along and then extending away from electrical pad604f, and is parallel to parts of trace1102a. Electrical pad604eis surrounded on three sides by trace1102b, which is closer to electrical pad604ethan trace1102a, on those three sides. Each of traces1102connects to a trace (not illustrated inFIG.11) in mesh700. The proximity of each trace1102to an electrical pad to which the trace is not connected increases security at landing pad602c.

FIG.12is a schematic representation illustrating one example of a secure cover with a plurality of landing areas. The example illustrated byFIG.12includes reference numbers different from those previously applied to similar components because the example is one particular configuration. Many configurations are possible, that in order to illustrate would require additional and different reference numbers. The use of different reference numbers is for clarity and only as an example, not necessarily to distinguish or separate from that which was previously described.

Cover414includes non-conducting base600with landing areas1200a,1200b,1200cand1200d(collectively referred to as landing areas1200). Landing areas1200may be raised from base600by the manufacturing process. Landing areas1200have a similar configuration to landing area602aillustrated inFIG.9. Landing area1200amay include electrical pads1202aand1202b, along with trace1204aelectrically connected to electrical pad1202a, and trace1204belectrically connected to electrical pad1202b. Landing area1200bmay include electrical pads1202cand1202d, along with trace1204celectrically connected to electrical pad1202c, and trace1204delectrically connected to electrical pad1202d. Landing area1200cmay include electrical pads1202eand1202f, along with trace1204eelectrically connected to electrical pad1202e, and trace1204felectrically connected to electrical pad1202f. Landing area1200dmay include electrical pads1202gand1202h, along with trace1204gelectrically connected to electrical pad1202g, and trace1204helectrically connected to electrical pad1202h.

Landing area1200aconnects to landing area1200bthrough mesh700. Landing area1200cconnects to landing area1200dthrough mesh700. Mesh700is represented without illustrating the totality of trace connections, for clarity. Traces1204i,1204j,1204kand12041are exemplary and illustrate one partial path that may be taken. Each of traces1204i-lmay occupy some of the space covered by mesh700, most of the space covered by mesh700, or the entire space covered by mesh700, covering all of base600including the sides, and each having a total length greater than double (or more than 3×, or more than 4×, or more than 5×, or more than 6×, or more than 7×, or more than 8×, or more than 9×, or more than 10×, depending on the security needs, configuration size, dimensions of both cover and tolerances for making the mesh, and other factors) the distance between any of landing areas1200. Other trace lines not illustrated inFIG.12may be present. Trace1204amay connect to trace1204i, which may connect to trace1204c. This results in an electrical connection between electrical pads1202aand1202c. Trace1204bmay connect to trace1204j, which may connect to trace1204d. This results in an electrical connection between electrical pads1202band1202d. Trace1204emay connect to trace1204k, which may connect to trace1204g. This results in an electrical connection between electrical pads1202eand1202g. Trace1204fmay connect to trace1204l, which may connect to trace1204h. This results in an electrical connection between electrical pads1202fand1202h.

FIG.13is a schematic representation illustrating one example of a secure cover with landing areas. The example illustrated byFIG.13includes reference numbers different from those previously applied to similar components because the example is one particular configuration. Many configurations are possible, that in order to illustrate would require additional and different reference numbers. The use of different reference numbers is for clarity and only as an example, not necessarily to distinguish or separate from that which was previously described.

Cover414includes non-conducting base600with landing areas1300aand1300b(collectively referred to as landing areas1300). Landing areas1300may be raised from base600by the manufacturing process. Landing area1300ahas a similar configuration to landing area602billustrated inFIG.10. Landing area1300bhas a similar configuration to landing area602cillustrated inFIG.11. Landing area1300amay include electrical pads1302aand1302b, along with trace1304aelectrically connected to electrical pad1302a, and trace1304belectrically connected to electrical pad1302b. Landing area1300bmay include electrical pads1302cand1302d, along with trace1304celectrically connected to electrical pad1302c, and trace1304delectrically connected to electrical pad1302d.

Landing area1300aconnects to landing area1300bthrough mesh700. Mesh700is represented without illustrating the totality of trace connections, for clarity. Traces1304iand1304jare exemplary and illustrate one partial path that may be taken. Each of traces1304iand1304jmay occupy some of the space covered by mesh700, most of the space covered by mesh700, or the entire space covered by mesh700, covering all of base600including the sides, and each having a total length greater than double (or more than 3×, or more than 4×, or more than 5×, or more than 6×, or more than 7×, or more than 8×, or more than 9×, or more than 10×, depending on the security needs, configuration size, dimensions of both cover and tolerances for making the mesh, and other factors) the distance between any of landing areas1300. Other trace lines not illustrated inFIG.13may be present. Trace1304amay connect to trace1304i, which may connect to trace1304c. This results in an electrical connection between electrical pads1302aand1302c. Trace1304bmay connect to trace1304j, which may connect to trace1304d. This results in an electrical connection between electrical pads1302band1302d.

FIG.14is a schematic representation illustrating one example of a secure cover with landing areas. The example illustrated byFIG.14includes reference numbers different from those previously applied to similar components because the example is one particular configuration. Many configurations are possible, that in order to illustrate would require additional and different reference numbers. The use of different reference numbers is for clarity and only as an example, not necessarily to distinguish or separate from that which was previously described.

Cover414includes non-conducting base600with landing areas1400a,1400b, and1400c(collectively referred to as landing areas1400). Landing areas1400may be raised from base600by the manufacturing process. Landing area1400ahas a similar configuration to landing area602aillustrated inFIG.9. Landing area1400bhas a similar configuration to landing area602billustrated inFIG.10. Landing area1400chas a similar configuration to landing area602cillustrated inFIG.11. Landing area1400amay include electrical pads1402aand1402b, along with trace1404aelectrically connected to electrical pad1402a, and trace1404belectrically connected to electrical pad1402b. Landing area1400bmay include electrical pads1402cand1402d, along with trace1404celectrically connected to electrical pad1402c, and trace1404delectrically connected to electrical pad1402d. Landing area1400cmay include electrical pads1402eand1402f, along with trace1404eelectrically connected to electrical pad1402e, and trace1404felectrically connected to electrical pad1402f.

Landing area1400aconnects to landing areas1400band1400cthrough mesh700. Mesh700is represented without illustrating the totality of trace connections, for clarity. Traces1204g,1204h, and1204iare exemplary and illustrate one partial path that may be taken. Each of traces1204g-imay occupy the entire space covered by mesh700, covering all of base600including the sides, and each having a total length greater than double (or more than 3×, or more than 4×, or more than 5×, or more than 6×, or more than 7×, or more than 8×, or more than 9×, or more than 10×, depending on the security needs, configuration size, dimensions of both cover and tolerances for making the mesh, and other factors) the distance between any of landing areas1400. Trace1404amay connect to trace1204g, which may connect to trace1404c. This results in an electrical connection between electrical pads1402aand1402c. Trace1404bmay connect to trace1404g, which may connect to trace1404l. This results in an electrical connection between electrical pads1402band1402l. Trace1404dmay connect to trace1404h, which may connect to trace1404e. This results in an electrical connection between electrical pads1402dand1402e.

This disclosure refers to the term “reader” throughout, and while specifically directed towards a credit card reader, the disclosure applies equally well to a traditional credit card terminal. Nothing in the disclosure should be taken as limiting to a reader over a terminal. Moreover, many aspects of the disclosure apply equally well to any electronic device with similar physical security needs, as would be recognized by one skilled in the art.

The description and drawings merely illustrate the principles of the disclosure. Furthermore, all examples recited herein are principally intended expressly to be only for pedagogical purposes to aid the reader in understanding the principles of the disclosure and the concepts contributed by the inventor(s) to furthering the art. All statements herein reciting principles, aspects, and examples of the disclosure, as well as specific examples thereof, are intended to encompass equivalents thereof.