Hub-based token generation and endpoint selection for secure channel establishment

Systems and processes are described for establishing and using a secure channel. A shared secret may be used for authentication of session initiation messages as well as for generation of a private/public key pair for the session. A number of ways of agreeing on the shared secret are described and include pre-sharing the keys, reliance on a key management system, or via a token mechanism that uses a third entity such as a hub to manage authentication, for example. In some instances, the third party may also perform endpoint selection (e.g., load balancing) by providing a particular endpoint along with the token.

BACKGROUND

Secure communication channels are desirable for transmitting data between entities. For example, Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), both of which are sometimes referred to as “SSL”, are cryptographic protocols designed to provide communications security over a computer network. The primary goal of the TLS protocol is to provide privacy and data integrity between two communicating computer applications. TLS is general, and thus complicated.

Some such protocols may include extra features that weigh down use of the protocol (e.g., sub-streams, interleaving of messages, compression). Additionally, these protocols may be more useful for message-based transport as compared to streaming (the demands of streaming can impose severe penalties when transport layer security (TLS) is enabled).

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Various embodiments of methods and systems provide authentication of session establishment messages and generation of a key pair, based on pre-shared-secret. A protocol may be implemented for establishing sessions for sending and/or receiving data (e.g., sending/receiving messages or sending/receiving streams between applications that are internal or external to a service provider). The protocol may include authentication of the messages used to establish the secure session (e.g., each initiation message may be individually authenticated in a separate step from authentication of other initiation messages for the same session). For instance, a responder may receive an initiation message from an initiator and authenticate that initiation message using a shared secret. That same shared secret may also be used to generate a public/private key pair used to send data via the established connection, in embodiments. The protocol may be adapted to support either handshake or full negotiation styles of establishing the session.

A session may begin with a negotiation that concludes with the participants of the negotiation agreeing on a suite of cryptographic algorithms (e.g., protocol algorithms for network transport security) as well as a secure array of secret bits (e.g., a key block) that is only known to the participants of the negotiation. The key block includes the keys used to initialize the algorithms specified in the suite of cryptographic algorithms.

In an example handshake negotiation, one message is sent in each direction. The initiator starts by sending a HELLO message. The receiver responds with a SET message, indicating the receiver is now set to start receiving data. After negotiation, there are two independent streams, one in each direction, over which DATA messages can be sent. The two control messages (e.g., HELLO, SET) may be secured using a control message key block (may be a function of a stream key, in embodiments). The application DATA messages may be secured using an application message key block (may be a function of both the stream key and a negotiated public/private key. Use of the negotiated key may provide forward secrecy (e.g., saved DATA cannot be decrypted, even if the stream key is compromised). In some embodiments, the system is configured such that a stream key is never reused. A stream key may be derived from a client key and salt, in embodiments.

Another example, full negotiation adds a key confirmation step to the handshake. Before the sender sends application DATA, the sender verifies that the receiver knows the application message key block. For instance, after sending the HELLO message, the receiver may encrypt a well-known string (known to both parties) and send the resulting message authentication code (mac) to the sender as a key confirmation block (in a REPLY message). Once the sender verifies the key confirmation block, the sender knows the receiver has computed the correct key block, and application DATA may be sent.

In some embodiments, the process disclosed herein may provide integrity to guard against bit flips by network interface controllers.

In some embodiments, the steps described herein may be used to establish channels or streams that send data (e.g., application data) without encrypting or decrypting the data. For instance, data sent across data channels or streams entirely within a trusted, protected or otherwise known network (e.g., wherein confidentiality may not be as important) may not need to be encrypted/decrypted, but the source of the data may need to be authenticated.

Secret Key

Derivation of the key block may be based on a secret key (e.g., a shared secret key). A secret key may be agreed upon (e.g., disseminated or obtained) a number of different ways. A non-exhaustive list of examples include a pre-shared key scheme, using a key management system (e.g., shifting the root of trust to the identity and access management role allowed by a key management system account), and a token mechanism that may use a third entity (e.g., a hub) to manage authentication.

For instance, a key management system may generate, store and/or distribute the shared secret key (e.g., distribute an encrypted shared secret key). In embodiments, one or both of the initiator and the responder may be configured to decrypt the encrypted shared secret key.

In embodiments, forward secrecy or perfect forward secrecy may be implemented, as described herein. For example, embodiments include a Diffie-Hellman ephemeral key that is unique for each session.

After negotiation, a work phase of transporting the data may begin. Either unidirectional or bi-directional transport (e.g., UDP or TCP) may be implemented. For instance, for bidirectional transport, the two streams may be kept independent. Messages within a stream may be kept independent of one another, supporting out of order or concurrent processing, in embodiments. A stream may be terminated at any time by closing the underlying transport, in embodiments.

Generally, the processes described herein (e.g., illustrated inFIGS.1A-C,2A-E,4A-B,5A-B,6A-6B,7, and8) may be implemented by one or more of the components of the systems described herein (e.g., illustrated inFIGS.3and9). The components may be implemented via program instructions (e.g., one or more software modules) that are executable by one or more hardware processors to perform the process.

FIG.3illustrates a service provider that implements at least some of the processes described herein, and remote clients of customers of the service provider, according to at least some embodiments. For example,FIG.3illustrates a service provider110of one or more services (e.g., service120, and/or other services113such as a compute service and/or a storage service) that provides services to various customer systems that may include clients that are internal (e.g.,152A-N) and/or external (e.g.,154A-N) to the service provider.

Service provider110is depicted with provider network118that connects a key management system119and hub130to a fleet of nodes (e.g., nodes122A-122N may be nodes of a larger fleet, where the nodes provide a service). The one or more of the nodes of the fleet of nodes may be configured to provide the one or more services of the service provider. In some embodiments, applications or processes executing on the fleet of nodes on behalf of a customer may establish a connection with other applications or processes that are also executing on the fleet of nodes (on behalf of the customer or not). In some embodiments, one or more application or processes executing on one or more of the nodes (e.g., nodes122A-N or nodes of the other service(s)113) may operate as either of the initiator102or responder104, as described herein. The processes described herein may be applied to the establishment of a secure connection between two such applications or processes, in embodiments.

Generally, it is contemplated that the depicted components may be arranged differently from the particular illustrated embodiments, that other components (not necessarily illustrated herein) may perform one or more of the steps described herein, and that at least some of the steps may be performed in a different order or not at all, without departing from the scope of the invention. Although some embodiments include processes and components within a service provider network that provides one or more services (e.g., a storage service, or a compute service) to numerous distinct customers, each customer including a distinct network of one or more clients, processes and components described herein may also be configured within an enterprise network to service messages from clients within the enterprise network, in some embodiments.

FIGS.1A-1Cdepict state diagrams for an initiator and responder during establishment of a secure communication channel via handshake style negotiation, according to at least some embodiments.FIG.3illustrates a service provider that implements establishment of the secure communication channel, and remote clients of customers of the service provider, according to at least some embodiments. The roles of initiator and responder may be different in different embodiments.

FIGS.4A-5Billustrate various steps of a process of performing, by a computing device: authenticating a secure channel establishment message based on a shared secret key shared between the computing device and another computing device that sent the secure channel establishment message; and generating, based on contents of the secure channel establishment message and the shared secret key, a data communication key block for performing cryptographic operations on data sent over the secure channel between the computing device and the other computing device; wherein the shared secret key used for authenticating the secure channel establishment message is the same shared secret key used in generating the data communication key block. In some embodiments, cryptographic operations may include one or more of encryption, decryption, authentication, or one or more of various steps associated with calculating and/or applying a message authentication code.

For example,FIGS.4A-4Billustrate a flow diagram of a process for establishing a secure communication channel from the point of view of the party that sends the initiation message (e.g., a client142B inFIG.3or a process operating among some of the nodes120of the fleet of nodes inFIG.3sending an initiation message to another process operating among some of the nodes120in the fleet of nodes), according to at least some embodiments. In some embodiments, initiation messages may be sent between nodes of the other service(s)113and the service120or only among the nodes of the other service to set up a corresponding secure channel. At least some of the processes described herein include various steps of a process that ultimately leads to the generation of key blocks.FIG.8illustrates various key derivation processes, according to at least some embodiments

FIGS.5A-Billustrate the process from the point of view of the responder, in embodiments. Either of a client (e.g., client142A) or a node (e.g., node122A) may play the role of the responder, in embodiments.

FIG.1Aillustrates the state of initiator102and responder104, early in the process. Initiator102is depicted with a secret key (sk) that the initiator uses in generation of a message authentication code (e.g., “mac”). The secret key may be shared with the intended responder. “MAC” is sometimes used herein to refer to the process of generation of the code (the “mac”). In some embodiments, the initiator may also generate or store a host identifier (hidr).

In some embodiments, the initiator may select a cipher suite to use. As explained below, a cipher suite may include a particular cipher suite of protocols and/or algorithms to be used in the process (e.g., for negotiation, encryption, authentication, etc.). For example, a particular cipher suite may include one or more of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, an encryption algorithm E, a key derivation function KDF, a message authentication scheme MAC, and a hash function H, for example.

As illustrated inFIG.4Aat block402, an initiator may generate an initiator private-public key pair (e.g.,FIG.8, item818). For example, initiator102has generated a public/private key pair (di, Qi) inFIG.1A, where diis the private key and Qiis the public key. In some embodiments, a random stream identifier (rsii) may be generated. As illustrated inFIG.4Aat block404, an initiation message body may be generated for initiating a secure channel.FIG.1Aillustrates that the body of the message may include a public key (e.g., Qi) and a shared secret key identifier (e.g., skid). In some embodiments, the message body may include one or more of the responder host identifier, the random stream identifier, the public key, the cipher suite, the secure key or secure key id and other information (e.g., hidr, rsii, Qi, cipher suite, skid, otherinfo1.).

In some embodiments, a key conformation code may be generated by applying a key derivation function to the secret key, a random stream identifier and/or other information. For example, KDF (sk; rsii; otherInfo0). The random stream identifier may be a unique identifier for a stream, in embodiments. Both the initiator and the responder may generate distinct stream identifiers (e.g., such that the block encryption keys that are ultimately generated are different in each direction) in embodiments.

The process may also include generation of an initiation message authentication code (e.g., mac826) based on the shared secret key and the initiation message body (FIG.4, block406). For example MAC (key confirmation codei, hidr, Qi, skid, cipher suite, otherinfo1).

FIG.1Aillustrates that a message body (e.g., the public key of the initiator, and the identifier of the secret key) and the initiation message authentication code (e.g., mac) may be packaged into a secure channel initiation message and transmitted by the initiator102to the responder104. E.g.,FIG.4A, block408. In some embodiments, the initiation or HELLO message may include one or more of hidr, rsii, Qi, skid, cipher suite, otherinfo2, tagi.

As illustrated at block410, the initiator may wait for a response from the responder after sending the initiation message to the responder. If no response is received, the initiator may continue or wait, or time out after some time threshold (e.g., and generate an error message) in embodiments.

FIG.1Billustrates the state of the initiator and responder after the responder responds to the initiation message (e.g., after the responder has responded as illustrated in 410, yes). At this point, the initiator102has the same information as in1A, but the responder receives the secure channel initiation message (e.g., a “HELLO” message) from the initiator (FIG.5A, block512). In embodiments, the responder104may verify that a cipher suite indicated in the initiation message is acceptable (failure here may stop the process) and/or obtain the secret key (e.g., based on the secret key id in the received message) (block514). The responder may use one or more mechanisms to obtain the secret key from the secret key identifier (e.g., pre-shared, key management system, token mechanism, etc.).

A confirmation key may be generated (e.g., KDF (sk, rsii, other info0.)). As illustrated in block516ofFIG.5A, the secure channel initiation message is authenticated using the shared secret and mac (e.g., verify received mac=MAC (confirmation keyr, hidr, rsir, Q, cipher suite, skid, other info1). In embodiments, the responder may verify that the mac determined from the message body and delivered with the message is the same as a mac determined by initiator performing the same MAC calculation that was performed by the initiator. Any of various error messages413may be generated if any of the verification or authentication fail.

As illustrated at block518, another private-public key pair (dr, Qr) (e.g., a “responder private-public key pair,”) (e.g.,FIG.8, item820) is generated. A random stream identifier for the responder may also be generated or obtained, in embodiments. A key confirmation code may be calculated based on applying a key derivation function to one or more of the secret key, the random stream identifier of the initiator and/or other information (e.g., key confirmation coder=KDF (sk, rsir, otherinfo3)), in embodiments.

As illustrated at block520, a key block may be generated based on the private key, shared secret key, and the initiator's public key (e.g., kb=KDF (Z, rsii, rsir, sk, other info.).

In embodiments, a response message body that includes the public key of the responder private-public key pair (block522) is generated (e.g., a message body may include hidi, rsii, rsir, Qr, skid, otherinfo4). In some embodiments, the response message may or may not also include the responder key confirmation code (e.g., KDF (sk, rsir, otherinfo3). In some embodiments, the key confirmation code may be sent in a separate message.

As illustrated at block524, a message authentication code may be generated for the response message using the shared secret key and the message body (e.g., MAC (key confirmation coder, hidi, rsii, rsir, Qr, otherinfo4). The mac may be used for authentication of the message by the initiator, in embodiments. The mac may be based on the shared secret key and some well-known string, such as the response message body, in embodiments.FIG.1Billustrates that the response message (including the public key of the responder104, and the mac) may transmitted to the initiator102as a secure channel response message (block526). In some embodiments the reply message may include rsir, Qr, otherinfo5, tagr). The response message may sometimes be referred to as a “SET” message, in embodiments. In some embodiments, a similar message that also includes a key confirmation code is referred to as a “REPLY” message. The key confirmation code may be sent in a separate message, in embodiments.

The order of the steps (and/or details of each step) may be changed, in embodiments. For example, the steps520,522, and524may be performed in a different order, or with slight changes to the details of each step without departing from the scope of the invention. For instance, a message authentication code for the response message including the public key (and/or the key confirmation code) may be generated. A key confirmation code for the response message using the shared secret key and the message body may be generated. A key block based on the private key, shared secret key, and the initiator's public key may be generated; and a key confirmation code may be generated.

In another example variation, instead of sending the responder key confirmation code in the response message body of the secure channel response message to the initiator computing device, the responder key confirmation code may be sent in a message distinct from the secure channel response message.

In some embodiments, a key confirmation process may be implemented at this point. The key confirmation may include aspects that are implemented by and affect both the initiator and responder, in embodiments. For instance, in some embodiments, steps of an additional key confirmation process illustrated in blocks528-534and performed by the responder may be related to corresponding steps of the additional key confirmation process illustrated in blocks418and/or420. In some embodiments, steps530-536may be absent from the process (block528, not applicable). In embodiments where the confirmation process is implemented, the responder may wait to receive a key confirmation message from the initiator (528, no).

As depicted inFIG.4Aat block412, the initiator may receive the secure channel response message from the responder (e.g., including the responder's public key, a key confirmation code, and mac for the message). In some embodiments, the confirmation code may be sent in a message distinct from the secure channel response message. Block414illustrates that the initiator may use the shared secret key and the mac from the response message to authenticate the secure channel response message. If authentication fails, an error message413may be generated. Otherwise the process may continue to416, described below.

The Diffie-Hellman key exchange may be completed (e.g., Z=DH (dr, Qi).FIG.8, items,818-836.FIG.1Cillustrates that sometime during this process a key block based on the private key, the secret key and the initiator's public key is generated (block520). For instance, the initiator generates an initiator key block based on the shared key, the public key of the responder key pair, and the private key of the initiator's key pair. Similarly, the responder104generates a responder key block based on the shared secret, the public key of the initiator key pair, and the private key of the responder's key pair.

For example, an application key block (e.g., a key block for sending application data) may be generated (e.g.,FIG.8, block836) by applying a key derivation function834to one or more of Z828(the Diffie-Hellman secret), random stream identifiers, the secret key832and/or other information (e.g., kb=KDF (Z, rsii, rsir, sk, otherinfo6). Either or both entities may calculate the key block and use the keys from their respective key blocks to send and/or receive data over a secure channel (block536) at this point, in embodiments.

A key block (e.g., kb) can be broken up into communication keys, in embodiments. For instance, once a key block is established, both parties can parse the key block into encryption and authentication keys for sending and receiving. E.g., kb={authsend, ciphersend, authread, cipherread}.

WhereasFIGS.1A-1Cillustrate a handshake negotiation that includes the exchange of two messages (implicit key confirmation),FIGS.2A-2Cdepict state diagrams for an initiator and responder during establishment of a secure communication channel via full negotiation (w/explicit key confirmation), according to at least some embodiments.FIGS.1A and2Adepict the initiator and the responder in the same initial state.FIG.2Billustrates that the responder may generate a key confirmation code that may be sent with the responder's public key and the mac for the message (thus generating and transmitting a “REPLY” message, instead of a “SET” message, in embodiments. As illustrated at block416, a key block based on the private key, shared secret key, and the responder's public key may be generated (e.g., by the initiator). Block418illustrates that the key confirmation code may be verified (if present), by the initiator102for example. In some instances, the receiving entity may calculate their own version of the code to verify a match with the received code. For example, the initiator may generate another instance of the key confirmation code and compare it to the received key confirmation code to verify it. Failure may result in an error message413. However, success (418, pass) leads to the initiator sending (block420) an initiator key confirmation message (e.g., the message including key confirmation and message mac depicted inFIG.2Cto the responder104), and using the key block to send and/or receive data over a secure channel with the responder (block422), in embodiments.

If a confirmation process is implemented (block528, yes), the responder104may be configured to receive a key confirmation message from the initiator102. As depicted inFIGS.5B and2C, the responder may receive the key confirmation message from the initiator (block530) after sending the reply message, and authenticate the key confirmation message using the secret key (block532). If authentication fails, an error message413may be generated. Otherwise, the responder may verify the confirmation code (block534). Again, if authentication fails, an error message413may be generated. However, success leads to the responder using (block420) the key block to send and/or receive data over a secure channel with the initiator102, in embodiments.

FIGS.2D-2Edepict state diagrams for an initiator and responder prior and subsequent to termination of a secure communication channel, according to at least some embodiments.FIG.2Dis similar to the state of the initiator102and the responder104inFIGS.1C and2C.FIG.2Eillustrates termination of the secure channel (e.g., by termination of the underlying transport, in embodiments).FIG.2Eillustrates that at this point in the process, one or more of the respective key blocks may be deleted (e.g., removed from memory or written over memory). In some embodiments, the secret key and/or the respective private-public keys may be deleted.

Cipher Suite

In some embodiments, the initiator may select a particular cipher suite of protocols and/or algorithms to be used in the process (e.g., for negotiation, encryption, authentication, etc.). In some embodiments, a particular selectable cipher suite may include a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, an encryption algorithm E, a key derivation function KDF, a message authentication scheme MAC, and a hash function H. The system may be configured such that the cipher suite is selected from an extensible set of protocols and algorithms.

FIGS.6A,6Billustrate an endpoint determination and token generation process, in at least some embodiments.FIG.6Aillustrates the process from the point of view of the requesting client (e.g., client124A), andFIG.6Billustrates the process from the point of view of the hub130. In some embodiments, the token process described herein may be used to provide the shared secret to the initiator and/or the responder inFIGS.1A, and2A. Note that in some embodiments, the shared secret may be generated from a random number. For example, instead of generating the shared secret based on credentials, the shared secret may be generated on the fly (e.g., randomly or otherwise) and sent back to the initiator102.FIG.7illustrates a token-based stream request process, according to at least some embodiments. The illustrated process depicts the various data and/or information that is passed between an initiator102(e.g., a stream client), hub service130, key management service119, and a responder104(e.g., a stream provider at an endpoint, such as node122A).

A hub may be configured to perform more or less functionality. As illustrated inFIG.3, the hub130is configured with an authentication system132, authorization system134and endpoint selection component136. Generally, the authentication system132authenticates the credentials that are received with requests (e.g.,FIG.6, block610). The endpoint selection component136may apply a selection mechanism (e.g., a load balancing mechanism, a selection mechanism based on quality of service or proximity of an endpoint, etc.) to select an endpoint for the requested service (e.g., block612). In some embodiments, the hub may be configured with an authorization system312, that may determine whether the requesting client is authorized to access the requested service, for example.

Tokens

In embodiments, a token is a data structure that encodes information needed to initialize a secure connection (e.g., a secure stream). It may grant the bearer (e.g., a client) permission to establish a secure session or stream with a server (e.g., node122A). It may be used in a client/hub/server architecture to pass information from the hub to the server via the client, in embodiments. The token may be signed, to establish provenance. The token may be encrypted so that only actors with access to the appropriate secret can read the contents of the token. Various cryptographic algorithms and keys may be used to sign, encrypt, and/or authenticate the token, in embodiments.

In some instances, the token may include data required for the server to set up communication with the client. For instance, the token may include a stream key816which can be a secret that is used to set up the secure byte stream. In embodiments, the client must already know the stream key (it may be derived from a shared secret between the client and the hub). The token can also include application specific data that the hub can use to determine what the established stream should do. For instance, if the client makes a request for a stream of updates from a storage container, the hub can put into the token the name of the storage container.

Tokens may be encrypted so that only hubs can create them, and only servers (or hubs) can decrypt them. The client generally cannot decrypt the token, in embodiments. Generally, the lifecycle of a token includes i. minting of the token by the hub in response to a client request. The hub may sign the token with a signing key, encrypt it with a token key, and send it to the client. Then, ii. the client connects to the server, and passes the token to the server. Then, iii. the server decrypts814the token, verifies it was signed with a valid signing key, and uses the information in the token to initialize the stream.

As illustrated in block602ofFIG.6A(and block7A ofFIG.7), a client (e.g., client142A and/or initiator102) may send a request with security credentials804and/or salt806to a hub service (e.g., hub130). The salt may be a stream identifier, in embodiments. As illustrated in block7B ofFIG.7, the client may receive an encrypted token and service endpoint from the hub service (block604). The token may be opaque to the client, in embodiments. For example, the token may act as a mechanism to hide the value of the token from the client. For instance, the contents of the token or the token itself may be encrypted, in embodiments. As illustrated at7C inFIG.7, the client may perform a secure channel establishment exchange with a service endpoint104using the encrypted token and the shared secret key (block606).

FIG.6Billustrates a corresponding process that may be performed opposite the client, by a hub, for example. As illustrated at7A ofFIG.7, the hub (e.g.,130) may receive a request from a client (e.g., client142N). The request may include one or more of security credentials804and salt806, in embodiments (block608). For instance, the security credentials804may be the credentials of the client making the request. The hub may use the security credentials to authenticate the client (block610). If the authentication fails, (610, fail) an error message may be generated. If the credentials pass authentication (610, pass), the process may continue and the hub130may apply a selection mechanism to select an endpoint for the requested service (block612).

The host102may generate (e.g.,FIG.8, item810) the shared secret key based on one or more of the client security credentials and the salt (block614), and generate and cryptographically sign the encrypted token including information for the shared secret key (block616). For instance, the shared secret key may be encrypted (e.g.,FIG.8, item812) and placed into the token808, or a shared secret key identifier may be placed into the token808, such that the endpoint can determine the shared secret key from the shared secret key identifier. In some embodiments, the shared secret key may include one or more of a credential804or stream key816. As illustrated at7B ofFIG.7, at block618, the hub sends the encrypted token808and the selected service endpoint to the client102. As illustrated at7C inFIG.7, a secure channel initiation message (e.g., with the token) may be sent to the endpoint (e.g., responder104) and data stream(s) between the initiator102and responder104established such that data is sent via the data stream(s) (FIG.7,7E). In some embodiments (e.g., illustrated by the arrows between key management service119, hub service130and responder104ofFIG.7) the corresponding decryption key may be shared with the endpoint via various mechanisms, such as a key management system (e.g.,119).

In some embodiments, the disclosed protocol does not impose schema on its' messages; the protocol acts as a transport protocol, interpreting the messages may be left up to the application, for example.

In some embodiments, the protocol's shared secret-based authentication is insufficient for non-repudiation because the secret is ephemeral and not disclosed to third parties. Non-repudiation may be provided by incorporating digital signatures into the payloads, in embodiments.

Illustrative System

FIG.9is a block diagram illustrating an example computer system that may be used in some embodiments. In at least some embodiments, one or more servers that implement a portion or all of the authenticating session establishment messages and generating a key pair, based on pre-shared-secret methods as described herein may include a general-purpose computer system that includes or is configured to access one or more computer-accessible media, such as node122A, or hub130, or client152A or key management system119illustrated inFIG.3. In the illustrated embodiment, computer system900includes one or more processors910coupled to a system memory920via an input/output (I/O) interface930. Computer system900further includes a network interface940coupled to I/O interface930.

In various embodiments, computer system900may be a uniprocessor system including one processor910, or a multiprocessor system including several processors910(e.g., two, four, eight, or another suitable number). Processors910may be any suitable processors capable of executing instructions. For example, in various embodiments, processors910may be general-purpose or embedded processors implementing any of a variety of instruction set architectures (ISAs), such as the x86, PowerPC, SPARC, or MIPS ISAs, or any other suitable ISA. In multiprocessor systems, each of processors910may commonly, but not necessarily, implement the same ISA.

System memory920may be configured to store instructions and data accessible by processor(s)910. In various embodiments, system memory920may be implemented using any suitable memory technology, such as static random access memory (SRAM), synchronous dynamic RAM (SDRAM), nonvolatile/Flash-type memory, or any other type of memory. In the illustrated embodiment, program instructions and data implementing one or more desired functions, such as those methods, techniques, and data described above for authenticating session establishment messages and generating key pair, based on pre-shared-secret methods, are shown stored within system memory920as code924and data926.

Network interface940may be configured to allow data to be exchanged between computer system900and other devices960attached to a network or networks950, such as other computer systems or devices as illustrated inFIGS.1through8, for example. In various embodiments, network interface940may support communication via any suitable wired or wireless general data networks, such as types of Ethernet network, for example. Additionally, network interface940may support communication via telecommunications/telephony networks such as analog voice networks or digital fiber communications networks, via storage area networks such as Fibre Channel SANs, or via any other suitable type of network and/or protocol.

Conclusion

The various methods as illustrated in the figures and described herein represent exemplary embodiments of methods. The methods may be implemented in software (e.g., computer-readable program instructions), hardware, or a combination thereof. The order of method may be changed, and various elements may be added, reordered, combined, omitted, modified, etc.