Foldable chip card with improved security

A chip card such as a credit card or a debit card that incorporates a protective layer that precludes unauthorized access to the chip in the chip card. The protective layer is a highly conductive layer that shields the chip and prevents electromagnetic waves that may be emitted by an illicit device from accessing the chip. This protective layer thus prevents any unauthorized persons from obtaining confidential information from the chip card that may then be used to consummate fraudulent transactions or conduct other illicit activities.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This disclosure relates generally to systems and methods for preventing access to chip cards such as credit cards, debit cards and identity cards by unauthorized persons.

BACKGROUND

Chip cards such as credit cards and debit cards, for example, are designed to be read by chip readers in payment terminals at, for example, retailers, banks and other institutions. Also, identity cards containing chips may be read by devices at entry points to limited-access facilities to allow access to those facilities only to authorized persons. When a chip card is inserted into a payment terminal, the chip provides instructions to the payment terminal, which then combines information stored in the chip with information in the payment terminal to create a unique encrypted code. This encrypted code is then used to authorize the transaction, either online over the Internet or within the payment terminal itself.

These chip cards provide better protection against some forms of credit card or debit card fraud than, for example, the cards with a magnetic strip that had been used prior to the introduction of the chip cards. However, since chip cards are designed to be read by chip readers in payment terminals, there is a potential for exposure to illicit devices that might emulate a chip reader to obtain information and/or instructions stored on the chip cards. For these reasons, there is a need for protecting chip cards from being accessed by illicit devices.

SUMMARY

In one aspect, embodiments include a chip card comprising a first portion of the chip card and a second portion of the chip card. The chip card also has a flexible portion that joins the first portion of the chip card to the second portion of the chip card, such that the first portion of the card can be folded over the second portion of the card. The first portion of the chip card, the second portion of the chip card and the flexible portion of the chip card each has an exterior surface. A chip embedded in the second portion of the card is configured to be read by a chip reader. The chip card also has a highly conductive protective layer adjoining the exterior surfaces of the first portion of the chip card, and adjoining the second portion of the chip card, and also adjoining the flexible portion of the chip card.

In another aspect, embodiments include a chip card that has a first portion with a first portion of a protective conductive layer on its exterior surface, a second portion of with a second portion of the protective conductive layer on its exterior surface and a flexible portion joining the first portion of the chip card to the second portion of the chip card. The flexible portion has a flexible portion of the protective conductive layer on its exterior surface. There is a chip embedded in the second portion of the chip card that is configured to be read by a chip reader. When the first portion of the chip card is folded over the second portion of the chip card, the protective conductive layer extends from a first end of the chip card over the first portion of the chip card, over the flexible portion of the chip card and over the second portion of the chip card to a second end of the chip card.

In yet another aspect, embodiments include a chip card configured to provide enhanced protection from unauthorized access to the chip card. The chip card has an embedded chip, which is configured to be read by a chip reader. The chip card has three portions: a first portion covered by a first highly conductive protective layer on its exterior surface, a second portion covered by a second highly conductive protective layer on its exterior surface, and a third flexible portion joining the first portion to the second portion. The chip is embedded in the second portion of the chip card such that when the first portion of the chip card is folded over the second portion of the chip card, the chip is protected from access by electromagnetic waves by at least one of the first highly conductive protective layer and the second highly conductive protective layer.

DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS

The embodiments disclosed herein provide systems and methods for protecting users of chip cards by preventing unauthorized access to the chip in their chip cards by persons using illicit devices to obtain information from the chip cards. Typically, chip cards are designed to communicate with chip readers in payment terminals using Near-Field Communication (NFC) technology. Unauthorized persons may use a device that emulates chip readers (such as those used in payment terminals or at entry points to limited-access facilities, for example) to interrogate chips in chip cards. Using these illicit devices, these persons may then be able to obtain sufficient information to then successfully consummate fraudulent transactions. Such fraudulent transactions may victimize the owner of the chip card, the institution that issued the chip card, or third parties. Moreover, in some cases the unauthorized person may be attempting to steal confidential information not necessarily to consummate a fraudulent transaction but for other illegal purposes such as to gain access to a limited-entry facility, for example.

As used herein, credit cards, debit cards, identity cards and other kinds of cards that incorporate chips that may be read by a chip reader or similar device will be referred to herein as “chip cards.” For convenience, the information, instructions or other data stored on the chip card will be referred to herein as “confidential data.” Also, for convenience, persons attempting to obtain confidential data by accessing another person's chip card using illicit devices will be referred to herein as “unauthorized persons.” Also, although for convenience the embodiments described herein are described as using NFC electromagnetic waves, the embodiments are not restricted to NFC technology or NFC electromagnetic waves, but are representative of devices that may use any applicable electromagnetic waves operating at any effective frequency to access chips in chip cards. Finally, the term “highly conductive layer” shall mean a layer that is sufficiently conductive that it will reflect electromagnetic waves directed at the layer, and will not allow a sufficient or effective intensity or amplitude of such waves to reach a chip embedded in a chip card protected by such a highly conductive layer with sufficient intensity to activate any of the circuits embedded in the chip card.

Briefly, the embodiments disclosed herein provide a highly conductive layer at the exterior surface of the chip card that functions as a shield that protects the chip from unauthorized access by illicit devices emitting electromagnetic waves, whether at the NFC frequency of 13.56 MHz or at other frequencies. The exterior surface of the chip card is a surface that is opposite to the surface that displays the chip. The highly conductive layer prevents penetration of the electromagnetic waves into the chip card, such that they cannot reach the chip itself, and therefore cannot extract any information or instructions from the chip. Essentially, the electromagnetic waves are reflected and/or scattered by the shield instead of being transmitted into the chip or towards the chip.

FIG. 1A,FIG. 1B,FIG. 2AandFIG. 2Billustrate two typical scenarios showing how an unauthorized person may obtain information, instructions or other confidential data from a chip card using an illicit device that emulates a conventional chip reader. In the illustration100shown inFIG. 1A, and the blow-up inFIG. 1B, an unauthorized person102holding an illicit device112is standing to the right of a customer106standing in line at a grocery store, waiting his turn as a person in front of him is loading groceries onto the conveyor belt at the cash register. Illicit device112contains an emulator that emulates the functions and characteristics of a chip reader in a payment terminal or entry point device, for example. For example, illicit device112may be using the NFC frequency of 13.56 MHz if that is the frequency used by chip readers in the region. The customer106is holding his chip card108at his side. The unauthorized person102is holding his illicit device112in close proximity to chip card108such that electromagnetic waves110are close enough to chip104in chip card108to energize and interrogate chip104.

In this scenario illustrated inFIG. 1AandFIG. 1B, illicit device112has a clear unobstructed path to chip104in chip card108. However, in many instances illicit device112may not need such a clear unobstructed path, because typical clothing, wallets or purses most often do not present a significant obstacle to electromagnetic waves. Also, illicit device112may emit its electromagnetic waves at a higher amplitude and intensity than do typical commercial chip readers, such that these more powerful electromagnetic waves can more readily penetrate through non-conductive obstacles such as vinyl, cloth or leather.

FIG. 2AandFIG. 2Billustrate an example of an unauthorized person202using an illicit device212obtaining confidential data from a chip card208held in a wallet in the back pocket of a pedestrian206. As shown in scenario200inFIG. 2A, pedestrian206is waiting at a curb so that he can cross the street, for example. The outline of his wallet214in his back pocket is visible. Unauthorized person202is standing behind pedestrian206, holding his illicit device212in his right hand, in fairly close proximity to wallet214. NFC (for example) electromagnetic waves210emitted by illicit device212are directed at chip204in chip card208. In that case, even though the electromagnetic waves must penetrate through the cloth covering the pedestrian's back pocket and through the leather of his wallet, electromagnetic waves210may nevertheless penetrate through these obstacles to read confidential data stored in chip204in chip card208. Thus storing one's chip cards in wallets, purses, clothing, briefcases or other personal items may not provide sufficient protection against the theft of confidential data.

FIG. 3A,FIG. 3BandFIG. 3Care a schematic diagrams300of an embodiment of a chip card302.FIG. 3Ashows a folded view of chip card302.FIG. 3Bshows a view of chip card302as it is being unfolded.FIG. 3Cshows a fully unfolded view of chip card302. As shown in all three renditions of chip card302inFIG. 3A,FIG. 3BandFIG. 3C, chip card302has a first portion306and a second portion312. First portion306is joined to second portion312by a flexible portion308. Chip card302has a chip304in its second portion312. Protective conductive layer310covers all exterior surfaces of chip card302, including the exterior surface346of first portion306, the exterior surface348of flexible portion308and the exterior surface342of second portion312. As best shown inFIG. 3C, protective conductive layer310extends from the longitudinal outside edge336of first portion306to the longitudinal outside edge332of second portion312. Flexible portion308allows chip card302to be folded over such that the entire exposed surfaces of chip card302are covered by protective conductive layer310when the chip card is folded over, as shown inFIG. 3A.

Credit and debit cards used in the United States and in some other countries typically have dimensions of 8.5 cm×5.4 cm, for example. In yet some other countries, the dimensions might be different. Identity cards may also have different dimensions. When chip card302is folded over as inFIG. 3A, its length L1, which is designated by the numeral320, may be roughly half the length of a typical chip card, for example L1may be about 4.25 cm or so, while its thickness t1, which is designated by the numeral322may be slightly greater than the twice the thickness of a typical chip card. When chip card302is fully unfolded as inFIG. 3C, its length L2, which is designated by the numeral324, may be roughly the same as the 8.5 cm length of a typical chip card and the thickness dimension t2inFIG. 3Cwould be slightly greater than the thickness of a typical credit or debit card.

Protective outer layer310is fabricated from a highly conductive material. For example, it could be fabricated from two polymer layers that are laminated with an aluminum, silver, copper or gold layer in between the polymer layers. It could alternatively be fabricated from a single layer of a polymer, rubber, fabric or other material that incorporates highly conductive particles, such as particles of aluminum, silver, copper or gold. It could also be fabricated from a conductive polymer, for example. Embodiments that comprise highly conductive particles may scatter as well as reflect electromagnetic waves, rather than only reflect electromagnetic waves, which could have additional benefits because scattering would further reduce the intensity of electromagnetic waves that might reach the chip or that might return to be read by an illicit device.

FIG. 4is a schematic diagram400illustrating the effect of a highly conductive outer layer410. Because outer layer410on the exterior of chip card402is a highly conductive layer, it reflects electromagnetic waves408emitted by illicit device406, such that the waves are reflected and/or scattered by highly conductive outer layer410, in various directions, for example as shown by reflected and/or scattered electromagnetic waves416and reflected and/or scattered electromagnetic waves418. Thus electromagnetic waves408emitted by illicit device406do not reach chip404. Furthermore, any electromagnetic waves that might somehow be emitted by chip404would not transmit back through outer layer410as long as the chip card is folded over as shown inFIG. 3A, and therefore could not be read by any illicit device.

FIG. 5,FIG. 6,FIG. 7andFIG. 8are schematic diagrams of other embodiments of chip cards that may be protected by a highly conductive outer layer from being accessed by illicit devices. These embodiments are generally similar to the embodiment shown inFIG. 3A,FIG. 3BandFIG. 3C, but each has its own characteristics. Thus the embodiment of a chip card502illustrated in the schematic diagram500ofFIG. 5has a first portion506that can be folded over a second portion512because the portion508joining the first portion506to the second portion is flexible. The exterior surface546of first portion506, the exterior surface548of flexible portion508and the exterior surface542of second portion512are covered by a highly conductive outer layer510. Thus chip504in the second portion512of chip card502is protected from electromagnetic penetration by highly conductive outer layer510as long as the chip card is folded over. When chip card502is fully unfolded, its length L4, which is designated by the numeral524, would be roughly twice the length of a typical credit card. However, when chip card502is fully folded over, its length L3, which is designated by the numeral520would be roughly the same as the length of a typical credit card, such that it could fit readily into a person's wallet (in which case it would use roughly the same amount of space as two adjacent chip cards). Its unfolded thickness t3, which is designated by the numeral526, would be roughly the same as or possibly somewhat greater than the thickness of a typical chip card. The longer dimensions of this embodiment might have the additional benefit of encouraging owners of chip cards to fold them over when putting them away. When it is folded over, the thickness of the folded chip card502would be roughly twice the thickness of a typical chip card, or possibly somewhat thicker.

The embodiment shown in the schematic diagram600ofFIG. 6offers an extra layer of protection against unauthorized access. That embodiment has an extra protective layer630of highly conductive material in addition to highly conductive protective layer610that extends on the exterior surface642of second portion612of chip card602, the exterior surface648of flexible portion608of chip card602, and the exterior surface646of first portion606. That extra layer of highly conductive material630is disposed on the interior surface644of first portion606of chip card602. Thus, when chip card602is in its folded over configuration, electromagnetic waves directed towards exterior surface646of first portion606may need to penetrate through two highly conductive layers, layer630and layer610, in order to reach chip604. In this embodiment, the overall length L4of the unfolded chip card designated by the numeral624may be either roughly the length of a typical chip card as in the embodiment ofFIG. 3C, or it may be roughly twice the length of a typical chip card as in the embodiment ofFIG. 5. The overall thickness t3(which is designated by the numeral622) of the second portion of the chip card would be roughly the same as or possibly somewhat greater than the thickness of a typical chip card. The thickness t4(which is designated by the numeral620) of the first portion of the chip may be somewhat greater than the thickness of a typical chip card or it may be roughly the same.

The embodiment shown in the schematic diagram ofFIG. 7has a gap708between first portion706of chip card702and second portion712of chip card702. Chip704is embedded in second portion712of chip card702. This embodiment has a highly conductive protective layer710which extends from the outer edge714of second portion712to the outer edge716of first portion706. In this embodiment, highly conductive protective layer710provides the mechanical structure that joins first portion706of chip card702to second portion712of chip card702. Gap708allows first portion706to be folded over second portion712. Because in this embodiment protective layer710may be thicker than in the embodiments ofFIG. 3C,FIG. 5or FIG.6, the thickness t5, designated by numeral722, may be somewhat greater than the thickness t3of theFIG. 6embodiment, and the thickness t6, designated by numeral720, may be somewhat greater than the thickness t4of theFIG. 6embodiment. Also, additional protective layer730, shown on top of first portion706, is optional in this embodiment.

Another embodiment, which is shown in the schematic diagram800ofFIG. 8, has a chip card802which is entirely made of a flexible material, except for stiffening structure(s)850. In this embodiment, stiffening structure(s)850are located in the second portion812of the chip card802that has a chip804, while the first portion806of chip card802may optionally incorporate a stiffening structure852. Thus in one embodiment, stiffening structure(s)850are used in the second portion of chip card802, but no stiffening structures are used in the first portion806of chip card802. In an optional alternative embodiment, chip card802may have stiffening structure(s)850in the second portion of chip card802and additional stiffening structures852in the first portion of chip card802. In the latter embodiment, there would be a gap808between the stiffening structures, so that the chip card may be folded over. Stiffening structure(s)850and stiffening structure(s)852may be a single structure, such as a thin, stiff rectangular structure, or may be multiple structures, such as two or more elongated structures that provide sufficient stiffness to chip card802so that it may be readily inserted into a chip reader.

FIG. 9AandFIG. 9Bare schematic illustrations showing how an attempt at accessing a chip904in a chip card902may be thwarted. In the example shown inFIG. 9AandFIG. 9B, chip card902may be any of the chip cards described above with reference toFIG. 3A,FIG. 3B,FIG. 3C,FIG. 5,FIG. 6,FIG. 7orFIG. 8. Chip card owner920has a chip card902in his wallet914, which is visible in his back pocket. A person922is holding an illicit device906, which is directing electromagnetic waves908at the chip card902in the chip card owner's back pocket. The electromagnetic waves908directed from illicit device906towards chip904in chip card902are reflected by the highly conductive protective layer (not shown) on chip card902.FIG. 9shows electromagnetic waves916and electromagnetic waves918that have been reflected by the highly conductive protective layer on chip card902. The electromagnetic waves908are prevented from reaching or accessing chip904, so that illicit device906is prevented from obtaining any information from chip904. Although in this example chip card owner920likely has no idea that an attempt has been made to obtain his confidential information, he has been protected from this attempt by the protective layer on the exterior surfaces of his chip card902.

In the various embodiments described above, the highly conductive protective layers may be coated onto the chip cards, may be laminated with the chip cards, may be printed on the chip cards, may be attached to the chip cards using adhesives or may be applied to the chip cards using other methods or technologies. In any event, all possible methods of attaching, affixing or incorporating a protective layer can be used to fabricate the various embodiments described above.