Static security scanner for applications in a remote network management platform

An example embodiment may involve a remote network management platform including a computational instance hosting a particular application. The particular application may be based on a unit of program code, use one or more database tables, and define one or more user roles with respect to accessing the program code and the database tables. A scanner application may be configured to: receive, from a client device, a request to scan the particular application; retrieve the particular application; conduct a static security scan by applying a set of rules that define security vulnerabilities, where the rules take into account (i) relationships between the user roles and the unit of program code, and (ii) relationships between the user roles and the database table; and transmit, to the client device, a representation of a web page that contains observed security vulnerabilities of the particular application.

BACKGROUND

Remote network management platforms allow computer networks to be managed by way of cloud-based devices and services. Advantageously, these architectures simplify the provisioning and administration of managed networks, and may provide mechanisms with which operational workflows can be defined and used. In some cases, a remote network management platform may allow users to write, develop, and deploy their own custom applications that leverage the platform's existing middleware, database, and user interface components.

There is a possibility that custom applications may access (or attempt to access) sensitive information, such as bank account numbers, credit card numbers, social security numbers, personal identification numbers, and so on. Thus, it is desirable for these custom applications to audited for potential security issues prior to deployment. But when operating on a particular remote network management platform, custom applications may use the platform's particular libraries and database tables, and may adhere to particular coding conventions. This makes any such audit more challenging and potentially requiring an intimate knowledge of the platform in order to be effective.

SUMMARY

The embodiments herein include a static security scanner for auditing custom applications developed for use with a remote network management platform. The scanner is a program that allows an administrator of the remote network management platform to retrieve a copy of the custom application, the database tables that the custom application can access, and the roles of users that may have access to the database tables. Then, the scanner applies a series of rules to determine whether there are known security vulnerabilities in the custom application. For example, the scanner may attempt to identify public web pages, open redirections, client-side script includes, server-side includes injection, improper access control lists (ACLs), and so on. The results of the scan may be displayed to the administrator on one or more web pages arranged in an intuitive fashion. For instance, potential problems may be clearly identified by category. From the web page, the administrator may be able to view code of the custom application or database tables accessed thereby to further evaluate the significance of the potential problems.

Accordingly, a first example embodiment may involve a remote network management platform including a computational instance associated with a managed network. The computational instance may host a particular application. The particular application may be based on a unit of program code, use one or more database tables, and define one or more user roles with respect to accessing the program code and the database tables. The remote network management platform may include a scanner application executable on the remote network management system, where the scanner application may be configured to: receive, from a client device, a request to scan the particular application; possibly in response to receiving the request to scan the particular application, retrieve the unit of program code, the database tables, and the user roles from the computational instance; conduct a static security scan of the unit of program code, the database tables, and the user roles by applying a set of rules that define security vulnerabilities that can be found in hosted applications on the remote network management system, where the rules take into account (i) relationships between the user roles and the unit of program code, and (ii) relationships between the user roles and the database table; and transmit, to the client device, a representation of a web page that contains a categorized list of observed security vulnerabilities of the particular application that were found by the static security scan.

A second example embodiment may include receiving, by a scanner application and from a client device, a request to scan a particular application. A computational instance of a remote network management platform may host the particular application. The particular application may be based on a unit of program code, use one or more database tables, and define one or more user roles with respect to accessing the program code and the database tables. Possibly in response to receiving the request to scan the particular application, the second example embodiment may involve retrieving, by the scanner application, the unit of program code, the database tables, and the user roles from the computational instance. The second example embodiment may involve conducting, by the scanner application, a static security scan of the unit of program code, the database tables, and the user roles by applying a set of rules that define security vulnerabilities that can be found in hosted applications on the remote network management system. The rules may take into account (i) relationships between the user roles and the unit of program code, and (ii) relationships between the user roles and the database table. The second example embodiment may involve transmitting, by the scanner application and to the client device, a representation of a web page that contains a categorized list of observed security vulnerabilities of the particular application that were found by the static security scan.

In a fifth example embodiment, a system may include various means for carrying out each of the operations of the first and/or second example embodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In order to achieve this goal, the concept of Application Platform as a Service (aPaaS) is introduced, to intelligently automate workflows throughout the enterprise. An aPaaS system is hosted remotely from the enterprise, but may access data, applications, and services within the enterprise by way of secure connections. Such an aPaaS system may have a number of advantageous capabilities and characteristics. These advantages and characteristics may be able to improve the enterprise's operations and workflow for IT, HR, CRM, customer service, application development, and security.

The aPaaS system may support development and execution of model-view-controller (MVC) applications. MVC applications divide their functionality into three interconnected parts (model, view, and controller) in order to isolate representations of information from the manner in which the information is presented to the user, thereby allowing for efficient code reuse and parallel development. These applications may be web-based, and offer create, read, update, delete (CRUD) capabilities. This allows new applications to be built on a common application infrastructure.

The aPaaS system may support clearly-defined interfaces between applications, so that software developers can avoid unwanted inter-application dependencies. Thus, the aPaaS system may implement a service layer in which persistent state information and other data is stored.

The following embodiments describe architectural and functional aspects of example aPaaS systems, as well as the features and advantages thereof.

FIG. 2depicts a cloud-based server cluster200in accordance with example embodiments. InFIG. 2, operations of a computing device (e.g., computing device100) may be distributed between server devices202, data storage204, and routers206, all of which may be connected by local cluster network208. The number of server devices202, data storages204, and routers206in server cluster200may depend on the computing task(s) and/or applications assigned to server cluster200.

III. EXAMPLE REMOTE NETWORK MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE

FIG. 3depicts a remote network management architecture, in accordance with example embodiments. This architecture includes three main components, managed network300, remote network management platform320, and third-party networks340, all connected by way of Internet350.

Managed network300may also include one or more proxy servers312. An embodiment of proxy servers312may be a server device that facilitates communication and movement of data between managed network300, remote network management platform320, and third-party networks340. In particular, proxy servers312may be able to establish and maintain secure communication sessions with one or more customer instances of remote network management platform320. By way of such a session, remote network management platform320may be able to discover and manage aspects of the architecture and configuration of managed network300and its components. Possibly with the assistance of proxy servers312, remote network management platform320may also be able to discover and manage aspects of third-party networks340that are used by managed network300.

In some cases, managed network300may consist of a few devices and a small number of networks. In other deployments, managed network300may span multiple physical locations and include hundreds of networks and hundreds of thousands of devices. Thus, the architecture depicted inFIG. 3is capable of scaling up or down by orders of magnitude.

Remote network management platform320is a hosted environment that provides aPaaS services to users, particularly to the operators of managed network300. These services may take the form of web-based portals, for instance. Thus, a user can securely access remote network management platform320from, for instance, client devices302, or potentially from a client device outside of managed network300. By way of the web-based portals, users may design, test, and deploy applications, generate reports, view analytics, and perform other tasks.

As shown inFIG. 3, remote network management platform320includes four customer instances322,324,326, and328. Each of these instances may represent a set of web portals, services, and applications (e.g., a wholly-functioning aPaaS system) available to a particular customer. In some cases, a single customer may use multiple customer instances. For example, managed network300may be an enterprise customer of remote network management platform320, and may use customer instances322,324, and326. The reason for providing multiple instances to one customer is that the customer may wish to independently develop, test, and deploy its applications and services. Thus, customer instance322may be dedicated to application development related to managed network300, customer instance324may be dedicated to testing these applications, and customer instance326may be dedicated to the live operation of tested applications and services. A customer instance may also be referred to as a hosted instance, a remote instance, a computational instance, or by some other designation.

The multi-instance architecture of remote network management platform320is in contrast to conventional multi-tenant architectures, over which multi-instance architectures have several advantages. In multi-tenant architectures, data from different customers (e.g., enterprises) are comingled in a single database. While these customers' data are separate from one another, the separation is enforced by the software that operates the single database. As a consequence, a security breach in this system may impact all customers' data, creating additional risk, especially for entities subject to governmental, healthcare, and/or financial regulation. Furthermore, any database operations that impact one customer will likely impact all customers sharing that database. Thus, if there is an outage due to hardware or software errors, this outage affects all such customers. Likewise, if the database is to be upgraded to meet the needs of one customer, it will be unavailable to all customers during the upgrade process. Often, such maintenance windows will be long, due to the size of the shared database.

In order to support multiple customer instances in an efficient fashion, remote network management platform320may implement a plurality of these instances on a single hardware platform. For example, when the aPaaS system is implemented on a server cluster such as server cluster200, it may operate a virtual machine that dedicates varying amounts of computational, storage, and communication resources to instances. But full virtualization of server cluster200might not be necessary, and other mechanisms may be used to separate instances. In some examples, each instance may have a dedicated account and one or more dedicated databases on server cluster200. Alternatively, customer instance322may span multiple physical devices.

Third-party networks340may be remote server devices (e.g., a plurality of server clusters such as server cluster200) that can be used for outsourced computational, data storage, communication, and service hosting operations. These servers may be virtualized (i.e., the servers may be virtual machines). Examples of third-party networks340may include AMAZON WEB SERVICES® and MICROSOFT® Azure. Like remote network management platform320, multiple server clusters supporting third-party networks340may be deployed at geographically diverse locations for purposes of load balancing, redundancy, and/or high availability.

Managed network300may use one or more of third-party networks340to deploy applications and services to its clients and customers. For instance, if managed network300provides online music streaming services, third-party networks340may store the music files and provide web interface and streaming capabilities. In this way, the enterprise of managed network300does not have to build and maintain its own servers for these operations.

Remote network management platform320may include modules that integrate with third-party networks340to expose virtual machines and managed services therein to managed network300. The modules may allow users to request virtual resources and provide flexible reporting for third-party networks340. In order to establish this functionality, a user from managed network300might first establish an account with third-party networks340, and request a set of associated resources. Then, the user may enter the account information into the appropriate modules of remote network management platform320. These modules may then automatically discover the manageable resources in the account, and also provide reports related to usage, performance, and billing.

FIG. 4further illustrates the communication environment between managed network300and customer instance322, and introduces additional features and alternative embodiments. InFIG. 4, customer instance322is replicated across data centers400A and400B. These data centers may be geographically distant from one another, perhaps in different cities or different countries. Each data center includes support equipment that facilitates communication with managed network300, as well as remote users.

In data center400A, network traffic to and from external devices flows either through VPN gateway402A or firewall404A. VPN gateway402A may be peered with VPN gateway412of managed network300by way of a security protocol such as Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC). Firewall404A may be configured to allow access from authorized users, such as user414and remote user416, and to deny access to unauthorized users. By way of firewall404A, these users may access customer instance322, and possibly other customer instances. Load balancer406A may be used to distribute traffic amongst one or more physical or virtual server devices that host customer instance322. Load balancer406A may simplify user access by hiding the internal configuration of data center400A, (e.g., customer instance322) from client devices. For instance, if customer instance322includes multiple physical or virtual computing devices that share access to multiple databases, load balancer406A may distribute network traffic and processing tasks across these computing devices and databases so that no one computing device or database is significantly busier than the others. In some embodiments, customer instance322may include VPN gateway402A, firewall404A, and load balancer406A.

Data center400B may include its own versions of the components in data center400A. Thus, VPN gateway402B, firewall404B, and load balancer406B may perform the same or similar operations as VPN gateway402A, firewall404A, and load balancer406A, respectively. Further, by way of real-time or near-real-time database replication and/or other operations, customer instance322may exist simultaneously in data centers400A and400B.

Data centers400A and400B as shown inFIG. 4may facilitate redundancy and high availability. In the configuration ofFIG. 4, data center400A is active and data center400B is passive. Thus, data center400A is serving all traffic to and from managed network300, while the version of customer instance322in data center400B is being updated in near-real-time. Other configurations, such as one in which both data centers are active, may be supported.

Should data center400A fail in some fashion or otherwise become unavailable to users, data center400B can take over as the active data center. For example, domain name system (DNS) servers that associate a domain name of customer instance322with one or more Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of data center400A may re-associate the domain name with one or more IP addresses of data center400B. After this re-association completes (which may take less than one second or several seconds), users may access customer instance322by way of data center400B.

FIG. 4also illustrates a possible configuration of managed network300. As noted above, proxy servers312and user414may access customer instance322through firewall310. Proxy servers312may also access configuration items410. InFIG. 4, configuration items410may refer to any or all of client devices302, server devices304, routers306, and virtual machines308, any applications or services executing thereon, as well as relationships between devices, applications, and services. Thus, the term “configuration items” may be shorthand for any physical or virtual device, or any application or service remotely discoverable or managed by customer instance322, or relationships between discovered devices, applications, and services. Configuration items may be represented in a configuration management database (CMDB) of customer instance322.

As noted above, VPN gateway412may provide a dedicated VPN to VPN gateway402A. Such a VPN may be helpful when there is a significant amount of traffic between managed network300and customer instance322, or security policies otherwise suggest or require use of a VPN between these sites. In some embodiments, any device in managed network300and/or customer instance322that directly communicates via the VPN is assigned a public IP address. Other devices in managed network300and/or customer instance322may be assigned private IP addresses (e.g., IP addresses selected from the 10.0.0.0-10.255.255.255 or 192.168.0.0-192.168.255.255 ranges, represented in shorthand as subnets 10.0.0.0/8 and 192.168.0.0/16, respectively).

IV. EXAMPLE DEVICE, APPLICATION, AND SERVICE DISCOVERY

In order for remote network management platform320to administer the devices, applications, and services of managed network300, remote network management platform320may first determine what devices are present in managed network300, the configurations and operational statuses of these devices, and the applications and services provided by the devices, and well as the relationships between discovered devices, applications, and services. As noted above, each device, application, service, and relationship may be referred to as a configuration item. The process of defining configuration items within managed network300is referred to as discovery, and may be facilitated at least in part by proxy servers312.

FIG. 5Aprovides a logical depiction of how configuration items can be discovered, as well as how information related to discovered configuration items can be stored. For sake of simplicity, remote network management platform320, third-party networks340, and Internet350are not shown.

InFIG. 5A, CMDB500and task list502are stored within customer instance322. Customer instance322may transmit discovery commands to proxy servers312. In response, proxy servers312may transmit probes to various devices, applications, and services in managed network300. These devices, applications, and services may transmit responses to proxy servers312, and proxy servers312may then provide information regarding discovered configuration items to CMDB500for storage therein. Configuration items stored in CMDB500represent the environment of managed network300.

Task list502represents a list of activities that proxy servers312are to perform on behalf of customer instance322. As discovery takes place, task list502is populated. Proxy servers312repeatedly query task list502, obtain the next task therein, and perform this task until task list502is empty or another stopping condition has been reached.

To facilitate discovery, proxy servers312may be configured with information regarding one or more subnets in managed network300that are reachable by way of proxy servers312. For instance, proxy servers312may be given the IP address range 192.168.0/24 as a subnet. Then, customer instance322may store this information in CMDB500and place tasks in task list502for discovery of devices at each of these addresses.

FIG. 5Aalso depicts devices, applications, and services in managed network300as configuration items504,506,508,510, and512. As noted above, these configuration items represent a set of physical and/or virtual devices (e.g., client devices, server devices, routers, or virtual machines), applications executing thereon (e.g., web servers, email servers, databases, or storage arrays), relationships therebetween, as well as services that involve multiple individual configuration items.

Placing the tasks in task list502may trigger or otherwise cause proxy servers312to begin discovery. Alternatively or additionally, discovery may be manually triggered or automatically triggered based on triggering events (e.g., discovery may automatically begin once per day at a particular time).

In general, discovery may proceed in four logical phases: scanning, classification, identification, and exploration. Each phase of discovery involves various types of probe messages being transmitted by proxy servers312to one or more devices in managed network300. The responses to these probes may be received and processed by proxy servers312, and representations thereof may be transmitted to CMDB500. Thus, each phase can result in more configuration items being discovered and stored in CMDB500.

In the scanning phase, proxy servers312may probe each IP address in the specified range of IP addresses for open Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and/or User Datagram Protocol (UDP) ports to determine the general type of device. The presence of such open ports at an IP address may indicate that a particular application is operating on the device that is assigned the IP address, which in turn may identify the operating system used by the device. For example, if TCP port135is open, then the device is likely executing a WINDOWS® operating system. Similarly, if TCP port22is open, then the device is likely executing a UNIX® operating system, such as LINUX®. If UDP port161is open, then the device may be able to be further identified through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). Other possibilities exist. Once the presence of a device at a particular IP address and its open ports have been discovered, these configuration items are saved in CMDB500.

In the identification phase, proxy servers312may determine specific details about a classified device. The probes used during this phase may be based on information gathered about the particular devices during the classification phase. For example, if a device was classified as LINUX®, a set of LINUX®-specific probes may be used. Likewise if a device was classified as WINDOWS® 2012, as a set of WINDOWS®-2012-specific probes may be used. As was the case for the classification phase, an appropriate set of tasks may be placed in task list502for proxy servers312to carry out. These tasks may result in proxy servers312reading information from the particular device, such as basic input/output system (BIOS) information, serial numbers, network interface information, media access control address(es) assigned to these network interface(s), IP address(es) used by the particular device and so on. This identification information may be stored as one or more configuration items in CMDB500.

Running discovery on a network device, such as a router, may utilize SNMP. Instead of or in addition to determining a list of running processes or other application-related information, discovery may determine additional subnets known to the router and the operational state of the router's network interfaces (e.g., active, inactive, queue length, number of packets dropped, etc.). The IP addresses of the additional subnets may be candidates for further discovery procedures. Thus, discovery may progress iteratively or recursively.

Once discovery completes, a snapshot representation of each discovered device, application, and service is available in CMDB500. For example, after discovery, operating system version, hardware configuration and network configuration details for client devices, server devices, and routers in managed network300, as well as applications executing thereon, may be stored. This collected information may be presented to a user in various ways to allow the user to view the hardware composition and operational status of devices, as well as the characteristics of services that span multiple devices and applications.

Furthermore, CMDB500may include entries regarding dependencies and relationships between configuration items. More specifically, an application that is executing on a particular server device, as well as the services that rely on this application, may be represented as such in CMDB500. For instance, suppose that a database application is executing on a server device, and that this database application is used by a new employee onboarding service as well as a payroll service. Thus, if the server device is taken out of operation for maintenance, it is clear that the employee onboarding service and payroll service will be impacted. Likewise, the dependencies and relationships between configuration items may be able to represent the services impacted when a particular router fails.

In general, dependencies and relationships between configuration items be displayed on a web-based interface and represented in a hierarchical fashion. Thus, adding, changing, or removing such dependencies and relationships may be accomplished by way of this interface.

Furthermore, users from managed network300may develop workflows that allow certain coordinated activities to take place across multiple discovered devices. For instance, an IT workflow might allow the user to change the common administrator password to all discovered LINUX® devices in single operation.

The discovery process is depicted as a flow chart inFIG. 5B. At block520, the task list in the customer instance is populated, for instance, with a range of IP addresses. At block522, the scanning phase takes place. Thus, the proxy servers probe the IP addresses for devices using these IP addresses, and attempt to determine the operating systems that are executing on these devices. At block524, the classification phase takes place. The proxy servers attempt to determine the operating system version of the discovered devices. At block526, the identification phase takes place. The proxy servers attempt to determine the hardware and/or software configuration of the discovered devices. At block528, the exploration phase takes place. The proxy servers attempt to determine the operational state and applications executing on the discovered devices. At block530, further editing of the configuration items representing the discovered devices and applications may take place. This editing may be automated and/or manual in nature.

The blocks represented inFIG. 5Bare for purpose of example. Discovery may be a highly configurable procedure that can have more or fewer phases, and the operations of each phase may vary. In some cases, one or more phases may be customized, or may otherwise deviate from the exemplary descriptions above.

V. EXAMPLE APPLICATION ARCHITECTURE AND VULNERABILITIES THEREOF

As various entities make use of remote network management platform320, these entities may develop and use their own custom software applications on top of middleware provided within a customer instance. As noted above, remote network management platform320may include various application programming interfaces (APIs) and libraries so that these custom applications can be rapidly developed. For instance, the middleware may include GUI libraries so that custom applications can make use of pre-defined GUI functionality (e.g., widgets, menus, text boxes, etc.).

Custom applications may be developed in various types of programming languages, both compiled and interpreted. For example, JavaScript, an interpreted language, may be used. Alternatively, a proprietary scripting language that can be converted to JavaScript may be used. Other possibilities exist.

These custom applications may have various purposes or goals. Some may define workflows for HR, supply chain, IT, or finance operations within an enterprise. Thus, it would not be uncommon for custom applications to have access to sensitive information, such as social security numbers, personal identification numbers, credit card numbers, bank account data, and so on. Given the likely presence of such sensitive information, it is desirable for custom applications to be written in such a way that sensitive information is only available to users with proper authorization. For example, a manager of an enterprise's HR division should be able to access any sensitive employee data by way of a custom HR application, but rank-and-file employees should only be able to access their own employee data when they use the application.

Furthermore, the multi-instance architecture of remote network management platform320facilitates the deployment of custom applications to multiple enterprises. For example, remote network management platform320may support an “application store” where software developers can house custom applications that they have developed. Applications in such a store may be accessible or installable on any customer instance. In some cases, the enterprise associated with the customer instance may be required to pay a one-time or monthly fee for use of such applications, in other cases, the applications may be free.

To that point,FIG. 6depicts an application store600hosting several custom applications602A,602B,602C,602D, and602E. Customer instances322,324, and326may be able to access, download, and/or locally install at least some of custom applications602A,602B,602C,602D, and602E. Application store600and customer instances322,324, and326are assumed to be within remote network management platform320. As shown inFIG. 6, customer instance322has installed copies of custom applications602A and602C, customer instance324has installed a copy of custom application602D, and customer instance326has installed copies of custom applications602C and602E. Custom application602B is not installed on any customer instances.

The possible widespread deployment of custom applications across multiple customer instances of remote network management platform320further illustrates the benefits of performing scans for security vulnerability on these applications. In a particularly severe scenario, a custom application with unintentional defects (i.e., software bugs) that becomes popular by way of application store600could be installed in thousands of customer instances, thus exposing a similar number of enterprises to security concerns. Also, it may even be possible for individuals with bad intent (i.e., hackers) to attempt to distribute malware by way of application store600. Therefore, the ability to scan these applications for such defects, in a semi-automated or fully-automated fashion, is valuable.

In some embodiments, a developer of a custom application may submit this application for inclusion in application store600. Prior to being approved and placed in application store600, remote network management platform320may perform a scan of the custom application. For instance, the developer may provide an identifier of a customer instance (e.g., the developer's own instance used for testing) on which the application is installed, as well as an identifier of the custom application. With this information, remote network management platform320and/or an administrator thereof may initiate the scan.

The source code and/or other human-readable program code of a custom application may be stored in a customer instance during development and possibly even after deployment. The availability of this code facilitates the static security scanner application described herein. Particularly, the scanner application may obtain copies of the custom application's source code, database tables that the custom application accesses, and any user roles defined by the custom application. With this information, the scanner application may seek to identify security vulnerabilities within the custom application. There are numerous potential vulnerabilities that the scanner application may be able to identify.

The security scans herein may be referred to as “static,” in that they involve analyzing the code, data, and access permissions associated with a custom application without necessarily executing the custom application. This makes the scans faster, more predictable, and capable of finding a variety of security vulnerabilities or potential security vulnerabilities in the custom application. Nonetheless, conducting these static security scans does not preclude executing the custom application or taking actions consistent with application execution to detect other vulnerabilities.

FIG. 7depicts an example software architecture of a custom application hosted within a customer instance of a remote network management platform. Particularly, custom application700includes functions702, uses data704, and defines user roles706. Custom application700may include one or more units of program code (or source code) of which functions702may be a part. This program code may manipulate data706(e.g., create, read, write, delete) to carry out operations. Data706may be retrieved from database tables716, used or modified by custom application700, then potentially stored once again in database tables716.

User roles706may define one or more types of user and permissions associated therewith. These user roles may control access to features and capabilities in applications. Once access rules have been defined for a user role, all of the users or groups of users assigned to the user role are granted the access. In some cases, user roles may be derived from other user roles, and any access granted to one of these other user roles is granted to any user role derived therefrom.

Access rules for a user role may take the form of an access control list (ACL). An ACL may provide a list of per-user-role permissions associated with an object, such as one of functions702or one or database tables716. For example, an “administrator” role may have create, read, write, and delete permissions for all of database tables716. On the other hand, a “basic user” role may have read and write access permissions for one of database tables716and only read access permission for another of database tables716.

In general, the “administrator” role may be useable by a small number of individuals who have unlimited (e.g., superuser) access permissions. Thus, the “administrator” role might be granted to IT professionals who are responsible for maintenance of the custom application. The “basic user” role, on the other hand, may be assigned to individual users and may have restricted access permissions.

Middleware708may include libraries defined by remote network management platform320for use by custom applications. The logical and/or architectural difference between customer instance322and middleware708is demarked by the horizontal dotted line inFIG. 7.

Some of the libraries may include communication library710containing functions that facilitate transmission and reception of data over a network, user interface (UI) library712containing functions that facilitate displaying graphical or text-based user interfaces and receiving input therefrom, and database library714containing functions that facilitate reading from and writing to database tables716. Thus, data704may be read from database tables716by way of functions702using an API to access database library714. This indirect access is represented inFIG. 7by the dashed line between data704and database tables716. Other possibilities exist.

As noted previously, security vulnerabilities may arise with respect to how user roles706define access permissions to functions702and data704for various users. But an automated scan of the program code of custom application700may also reveal additional vulnerabilities, such as open redirections and server-side include injections. Each of these vulnerabilities, as well as how they can be detected, is discussed in more detail below.

VI. EXAMPLE SCANNER APPLICATION

FIG. 8depicts a message flow involving a scanner application802. The message flow illustrates the high-level operations of the scanner application and its working environment.

Scanner application802may be deployed on remote network management platform320that includes computational instance804(here, the terminology “computational instance” is used to signify that this instance may or may not be assigned to a specific enterprise customer of remote network management platform320). Computational instance804includes custom application806and database tables808. As noted earlier, but not represented inFIG. 8, custom application806may include program code that contains functions, uses data in accordance with database tables808, and defines user roles.

At step (1) ofFIG. 8, client device800transmits a request, to scanner application802, for a scan of custom application806on computational instance804. In the request, custom application806and computational instance804may be specified by respective unique identifiers. Client device800may be operated by a user and may therefore provide a graphical user interface with controls that facilitate the sending of the request. Alternatively, client device800could remotely trigger, in an automated fashion, the sending of the request. Without loss of generality, the following discussion assumes that client device800is user-controlled.

At step (2), possibly in response to receiving the request, scanner application802may transmit, to computational instance804, a request for the program code and user roles associated with custom application806, as well as for database tables808. This request may also include the respective unique identifiers for computational instance804and custom application806.

At step (3), reception of the request at computational instance804may trigger computational instance804to transmit, to scanner application802, the program code and user roles associated with custom application806, as well as database tables808.

At step (4), scanner application802may perform the requested scan. This scan may involve a number of phases and/or steps, and may be based on a particular set of rules that define security vulnerabilities that can be found in hosted applications on the remote network management system.

At step (5), scanner application802may transmit, to client device800, a representation of a web page with the results of the scan. As a consequence of receiving this representation, client device800may display the web page on its graphical user interface.

With regard to the web page,FIG. 9Adepicts an example web-based graphical user interface900that may be displayed to the user prior to step (1). Graphical user interface900may include an input pane902and an output pane904. As shown, input pane902may allow a user to enter the unique identifier of computational instance804(“INSTANCE TEST”), an administrative password for the computational instance804(which, as shown, may be obscured for purpose of security), and the unique identifier of custom application806(“F77E8D474FF8AA00693F46”). Using the “INSTANCE LOGIN” button, the user may then trigger the sending of a request in accordance with step (1). At this point, output pane904may be empty, since no output has yet been generated.

As noted above, the scan may be triggered at step (4). For instance, the user may activate the “BEGIN SCAN” button to do so. In some embodiments, the user may be shown one or more interstitial panes or web pages while the scan takes place.

Also as noted above, at step (5) scanner application802may transmit a representation of the web page ofFIG. 9Bto client device802for display. While input pane902inFIG. 9Bis the same as it was inFIG. 9A, output pane904contains a summary of the results of the scan.

For example, inFIG. 9B, output pane904includes an interactive list of observed security vulnerabilities associated with custom application806, as well as other relevant information that may be helpful to a user attempting to evaluate the severity of these vulnerabilities. Each entry in the list may be expanded by clicking on, or otherwise activating the entry. For instance, if the user clicks on the entry “3 Custom User Roles”, additional information for this entry may be displayed. In general, any entry with a right-pointing arrow (such as any of the entries in output pane904) may be expanded in this fashion. Once expanded, an entry may be contracted back to a single line if the user clicks on or otherwise activates the entry again.

The following sections provide more detailed descriptions of some of the vulnerabilities displayed in output pane904, as well as the rules that scanner application802could use to identify these vulnerabilities. These descriptions are not comprehensive, and are merely for purpose of example. Therefore, more or fewer vulnerabilities may be identified, and such identification may take place in the fashion discussed herein or in other ways.

A. Custom User Roles

FIG. 9Cdepicts output pane904of user interface900with the “3 Custom User Roles” entry expanded. Particularly, the three user roles defined for scanner application802are “administrator”, “basic user”, and “integration”. Each of these user roles may define different sets of access permissions with respect to custom application806. Further, some user roles may derive these access permissions from other user roles.

As shown inFIG. 9C, the “administrator” user role derives its access permissions from the “basic user” user role, while the “basic user” user role does not derive its access permissions from any other user role. The “integration” user role, on the other hand, derives its access permissions from both the “administrator” and “basic user” user roles. These user role relationships may be displayed in a table as shown, or in some other fashion.

Notably, these relationships may indicate the presence (or lack thereof) of possible vulnerabilities. For instance, the “administrator” role deriving access permissions from the “basic user” user role might not be considered a vulnerability, as administrators are expected to have virtually unlimited access permissions. On the other hand, the “integration” user role deriving its access permissions from the “administrator” user role is a potential vulnerability, because it effectively gives a second account the administrator's access permissions. While only custom roles are shown inFIG. 9C, some of these custom roles may derive their access permissions from additional default system roles.

Also, an analysis of the names of the user roles may indicate that an “integration” user role (usually involved in application development and testing) is unlikely to need administrative privileges. Therefore, scanner application802may have rules that identify certain types of relationships between user roles, where these relationships could be problematic. For instance, any user role that derives its permissions from an administrative user role (i.e., the administrative user role is shown in “derived from” column) could be flagged as a vulnerability.

To that point, scanner application802may display the information as shown inFIG. 9C, or may highlight or otherwise emphasize an observed vulnerability. For instance, the third row of the user roles table may be displayed in a different font or color from the other rows.

Furthermore, since user interface900may take the form of a web page, each of the user roles displayed inFIG. 9Cmay include an embedded hyperlink to another web page with that user role's respective definition on computational instance804. If a user clicks on or otherwise activates this hyperlink, his or her web browser may open the web page with the user role's respective definition.

FIG. 9Ddepicts output pane904of user interface900with the “3 Tables” entry expanded. This expanded entry displays access permissions in the form of ACLs for three of database tables808that are used by custom application806. These tables are named “app.config”, “app.transactions”, and “app.alert”.

For the “app.config” table, the “basic user” user role has been granted create, read, write, and delete access permissions. As discussed above, the “administrator” has all access permissions of the “basic user” user role. Thus, both the “basic user” and “administrator” user roles can create, read, write, and delete entries from the “app.config” table.

For the “app.transactions” table, the “basic user” user role has been granted create and read access permissions, while write and delete access permissions are only available to the “administrator” user role.

For the “app.alert” table, the “basic user” user role and the null user role have been granted read access permissions.

Notably, these access permissions may indicate the presence (or lack thereof) of possible vulnerabilities. For instance, the “basic user” user role having write access permissions to a database table, where the database table controls an application's configuration, may be a vulnerability in general. A low-privileged user probably should not be able to change an application's configuration. This vulnerability may arise when a software developer grants a user role write access to a table during development or testing, but fails to delete this access permission.

Additionally, the “basic user” user role having read access to a database table may also be a vulnerability. Particularly, if that access is not limited to entries in the database table associated with a particular user, this user may be able to view other users' data. The “<LINK>” parenthetical after the user role for having read access permission to the app.transactions table may be a hyperlink that, when activated, retrieves a web page in which the user of scanner application802can view the ACL for this table in more detail. This more detailed view may display whether the user roles are limited to reading certain entries in the app.transactions table. If an access permission for a particular table does not have a more specific ACL, the “<LINK>” parenthetical might not be shown. This vulnerability may arise when a software developer defines a general ACL for a table, but fails to define a more specific user-level ACL for reading sensitive data in the table.

Moreover, use of the null user role may be a vulnerability, as it grants all user roles access to a table. InFIG. 9D, for example, the “app.alert” table grants all users read access through use of a null user role. This vulnerability may arise when a software developer grants a null user role access to a table during development or testing, but forgets to delete this access permission.

Scanner application802may display the information as shown inFIG. 9D, or may highlight or otherwise emphasize an observed vulnerability. For instance, the entries for “app.config” write and delete access permissions, “app.transactions” read access permissions, and “app.alert” read access permissions for the null user may be displayed in a different font or color from the other rows.

Furthermore, since user interface900may take the form of a web page, each of the database tables and access permissions displayed inFIG. 9Dmay include an embedded hyperlink to another web page with that table's or permission's respective definition on computational instance804. If a user clicks on or otherwise activates this hyperlink, their web browser may open the web page to display the respective definition. As an example, if a user of scanner application802is uncertain whether a particular user role should have a particular access permission to a table, the user can use the hyperlink to view the entries of the table in order to make this determination.

If any of these entries contain sensitive information (e.g., passwords, social security numbers, credit card numbers, bank account numbers, etc.), the user may determine that access to this information should be limited to particular user roles. Alternatively or additionally, scanner application802may look for entries in database tables808with sizes and/or formats that could hold sensitive information (e.g., a nine-digit entry that could hold social security numbers, a 16-digit entry that could hold credit card numbers) and flag non-administrator user roles with access to database tables808as vulnerabilities.

C. Client Callable Script Includes

FIG. 9Edepicts output pane904of user interface900with the “1 Client Callable Script Include” entry expanded. This expanded entry displays functions that are defined by custom application806and parameters used by these functions. For example, the function process( ) of the class transferMoney uses three parameters: from_acct, to_acct, and amount. Calling this function will transmit “amount” from the account indicated by “from_acct” to the account indicated by “to_acct”. The “basic user” role can call this function, which means that this user may be able to transfer money between any two accounts. Such a capability is an example of a vulnerability. Further, since the type of the function is AJAX (Asynchronous JavaScript And XML), this function may be callable by executing JavaScript via a web browser console, sending a customized hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) request to the URL, or in some other fashion. Regardless, such a capability is another potential vulnerability.

Thus, scanner application802may display the information as shown inFIG. 9E, or may highlight or otherwise emphasize an observed vulnerability. For instance, the entries for the process( ) function may be displayed in a different font or color from other parts of the page.

Scanner application802may have rules to detect these vulnerabilities. For instance, scanner application802may look for functions that are callable by a non-administrative user.

A processor is a request handler that contains server-side code. This code may be executed when a processor is accessed by way of a URL. Such a processor can contain a sensitive script that can cause security issues (e.g., the script may access sensitive information). A processor can be protected by associating it with appropriate ACLs. But if there are no ACLs associated with the processor, it can be accessed by all logged-in users.

Scanner application802may identify and report potential vulnerabilities with processors. In doing so, scanner application802may display details of any ACLs that are configured. Scanner application802may also display user-controllable parameters of processors, similar to those of client callable script includes.

E. UI Pages

User interface (UI) pages may be custom web pages associated with an application or service. They can also contain server side code that is executed when they are accessed by way of a URL. Such a UI page can contain a sensitive script that can cause security issues (e.g., the script may access sensitive information). A UI page can be protected by associating it with appropriate ACLs. But if there are no ACLs associated with the UI page, it can be accessed by all logged-in users.

Scanner application802may identify and report potential vulnerabilities with UI pages. In doing so, scanner application802may display details of any ACLs that are configured. Scanner application802may also display user-controllable parameters of UI pages, similar to those of client callable script includes.

Scripted representational state transfer (REST) APIs are resource-based custom web service APIs that use JSON for representation of information. They may also contain server-side code that is executed when a REST API is accessed by way of a URL. A scripted REST API can contain multiple end points and methods. These methods may have individual security rules associated with ACLs, or a default ACL rule. Any such method can contain a sensitive script that can cause security issues (e.g., the script may access sensitive information).

Scanner application802may identify and report potential vulnerabilities with a scripted REST API and its methods. In doing so, scanner application802may display details of any ACLs that are configured. Scanner application802may also display user-controllable parameters of scripted REST APIs, similar to those of client callable script includes.

UI actions are buttons (or other types of widgets or icons) that, when clicked on or otherwise activated, can execute a script on the web server device providing the UI action. Such a script can also utilize user-controllable data in parameters. The script execution can be triggered by any user if it is not protected by an ACL. Scanner application802may display a security configuration of each UI action, such as any conditions or roles required to execute the script.

Server-side includes (SSIs) may be directives in web applications used to provide a web page with dynamic content. SSIs can be used to execute actions before a web page is loaded or while the web page is being viewed by the user. In order to do so, the web server may read and process the SSI before supplying the web page to the user.

An SSI injection forces a web application to execute arbitrary program code. Particularly, an attacker could provide input that, if inserted by the web application (or maybe directly by the server) into a dynamically generated web page, would be parsed as one or more SSI commands.

For instance, suppose that a proprietary scripting language that can be converted to JavaScript supports the command <evaluate>var user=${sysparam_user}</evaluate>. The <evaluate> method may execute any script embedded therein. Similarly, the JavaScript eval( ) method may execute any script embedded therein. If the code being evaluated is derived from user input or from data received over a network, an attacker can potentially cause arbitrary code to be executed.

Thus, scanner application802may check custom application806for any program code that allows an SSI injection. In some cases, scanner application802may identify any potential opening for an SSI injection as a vulnerability, and may highlight or otherwise emphasize these vulnerabilities in output pane904. For instance, any string beginning with “${sysparam” inside of an <evaluate> tag may be considered a potential SSI injection.

Users accessing a web page with an open redirection can be automatically redirected to an untrusted and/or malicious target web page instead of the intended web page. This target web page may mimic the intended web page, and thus may be part of a phishing attack that seeks to have users provide personal or private information by way of the target web page.

An example of redirection is as follows. A user makes a request to http://example.com/profile. The example.com web site determines that the user has not yet logged in, and is therefore unauthenticated. Accordingly, the example.com web site redirects the user to the login page, and stores the original URL by adding a parameter to the URL of the login page http://example.com/login?toURL=http://example.com/myprofile. After the user logs in, he or she will be redirected to the stored http://example.com/myprofile. In the ideal case, the web application at http://example.com/login will check to ensure that all redirections in the URL are valid—for instance, the web application might only allow redirections to example.com.

In an open redirection scenario, however, the web application allows redirections with limited or no restrictions. For instance, a user may be provided (e.g., by way of an email message) with the URL http://example.com/login?toURL=http://badexample.com/myprofile. The user may believe that they are visiting example.com when they access the web site at this URL, because example.com is the first domain name in the URL.

If the web application at http://example.com/login allows open redirections, the user will be automatically redirected to http://badexample.com/myprofile. This latter URL may refer to a web site that mimics the appearance of example.com and may prompt the user to enter a userid and password for example.com. In this manner, a phishing attack can take place.

Another type of open redirection can occur in JavaScript or other languages that allow redirection of a user to another site. For instance, the JavaScript document.location( ) or document.location.href( ) functions may allow such redirection. As an example, the JavaScript code <script>document.location.href=“http://badexample.com”;</script> redirects the user to http://badexample.com.

Thus, scanner application802may check custom application806for any program code that allows such an open redirection. In some cases, scanner application802may identify any redirection as a vulnerability, and may highlight or otherwise emphasize these vulnerabilities in output pane904. For instance, scanner application802may check for JavaScript code that passes user-controllable data to location objects, such as window.location. An example of this would be the code <script>document.location=“${sysparm_next_url}”;</script>, as “${sysparm_next_url} is user-controllable.

J. Public Pages

Most web applications require that a user log in to the application before being able to substantively use the application. For instance, a user would typically log in to a financial application before being able to use this application to transfer money between accounts. However, due to coding errors or misconfigurations, some such web applications may have one or more public pages—web pages that can be accessed without first logging in. Each of these public pages may be identified as a security vulnerability.

Thus, scanner application802may check custom application806for all web pages therein. Scanner application802may attempt to access each of these web pages without logging in to custom application806. If scanner application can do so, these pages may be classified as security vulnerabilities, and scanner application802may highlight or otherwise emphasize these vulnerabilities in output pane904.

K. Sensitive Scripts

FIG. 9Fdepicts output pane904of user interface900with the “Sensitive Scripts” entry expanded. This expanded entry displays keywords that are used in scripts of custom application806. These keywords typically refer to sensitive information that may be, for example, readable from the program code of custom application806. Examples of such sensitive keywords include “password”, “pw”, “pwd”, “username”, “token”, “API”, “API key”, and “APIKEY”. Other possibilities exist.

Output pane904may display a list of sensitive keywords in one column, hyperlinks to locations of where these keywords were found in another column, and how the keywords are used in yet another column. For example, the hyperlink in the “Location” column for the “password” keyword may direct the user to a web page in the computational instance containing custom application806. This web page may display the program code where the keyword was found. The line or lines of program code that contain the keyword may be displayed in the “Usage” column.

Scanner application802may display the information as shown inFIG. 9F, or may highlight or otherwise emphasize an observed vulnerability. For instance, the entries for the “password” and “username” keywords may be displayed in a different font or color from other parts of the page.

Scanner application802may have rules to detect these vulnerabilities. For instance, scanner application802may parse source code and/or scripts of custom application806in an attempt to find these keywords.

VII. EXAMPLE OPERATIONS

FIG. 10is a flow chart illustrating an example embodiment. The process illustrated byFIG. 10may be carried out by a computing device, such as computing device100, and/or a cluster of computing devices, such as server cluster200. However, the process can be carried out by other types of devices or device subsystems. For example, the process could be carried out by a portable computer, such as a laptop or a tablet device.

Block1000may involve receiving, by a scanner application and from a client device, a request to scan a particular application. A computational instance of a remote network management platform may host the particular application. The particular application may be based on a unit of program code, use one or more database tables, and define one or more user roles with respect to accessing the program code and the database tables. In some embodiments, the remote network management platform may also host the scanner application.

Block1002may involve, possibly in response to receiving the request to scan the particular application, the scanner application retrieving the unit of program code, the database tables, and the user roles from the computational instance.

Block1004may involve conducting, by the scanner application, a static security scan of the unit of program code, the database tables, and the user roles by applying a set of rules that define security vulnerabilities that can be found in hosted applications on the remote network management system. The rules may take into account (i) relationships between the user roles and the unit of program code, and (ii) relationships between the user roles and the database table.

Block1006may involve transmitting, by the scanner application and to the client device, a representation of a web page that contains a categorized list of observed security vulnerabilities of the particular application that were found by the static security scan.

In some embodiments, the user roles include at least two user roles with different sets of access permissions. The rules may also take into account relationships between the user roles. Conducting the static security scan may involve identifying, as a security vulnerability, a relationship between the user roles in which a first user role of the at least two user roles derives its access permissions from a second user role of the at least two user roles.

In some embodiments, the user roles include administrative user roles, non-administrative user roles, and null user roles. Conducting the static security may involve identifying, as a security vulnerability, that at least one of the database tables has an access control list that either: grants write or delete permission to a non-administrative user role, grants unlimited read access to the non-administrative user role, or grants any permission to a null user role.

In some embodiments, the user roles include administrative user roles and non-administrative user roles. The unit of program code may define a function. Conducting the static security scan may involve identifying, as a security vulnerability, that a non-administrative user role can call the function.

In some embodiments, conducting the static security scan involves identifying, as a security vulnerability, that the unit of program code contains a server-side include that allows the execution of commands.

In some embodiments, conducting the static security scan involves identifying, as a security vulnerability, that the unit of program code contains a command that allows a user of the application to be redirected to a different web page.

In some embodiments, conducting the static security scan involves identifying, as a security vulnerability, that the unit of program code contains a publicly accessible web page.

In some embodiments, the scanner application defines one or more sensitive keywords. Conducting the static security scan may involve identifying, as a security vulnerability, that the unit of program code contains at least one of the sensitive keywords.

In some embodiments, the static security scan takes into account possible security vulnerabilities related to use, by the unit of program code, of one or more APIs specific to the remote network management system.

In some embodiments, the static security scan takes into account possible security vulnerabilities related to use, by the unit of program code, of one or more program coding conventions for developing custom applications for the remote network management system.

In some embodiments, an entry in the categorized list includes a hyperlink. Activating the hyperlink may cause the scanner application to display details regarding observed security vulnerabilities related to the entry.

In some embodiments, an entry in the categorized list includes a hyperlink. Activating the hyperlink may cause retrieval of a second web page from the computational instance. The second web page may contain an observed security vulnerability corresponding to the entry.