Secure hardware access in a heterogeneous computing platform

Systems and methods include an Information Handling System (IHS) that is adapted to protect access to configurable settings of the IHS. Upon the IHS being powered, a UEFI boot sequence is initiated. During the boot sequence, a boot sequence notification is detected that indicates conditions required for booting an operating system of the IHS have been met. Further access to the NVRAM that stores UEFI variables is locked such that upon receiving a request for access to a UEFI variable stored in the NVRAM, the request for access to a UEFI variable is granted based on a listing of authorized applications.

FIELD

This disclosure relates generally to Information Handling Systems (IHSs), and more specifically, to systems and methods for securing access to hardware resources of IHSs.

BACKGROUND

As the value and use of information continues to increase, individuals and businesses seek additional ways to process and store it. One option available to users is an Information Handling System (IHS). An IHS generally processes, compiles, stores, and/or communicates information or data for business, personal, or other purposes thereby allowing users to take advantage of the value of the information. Because technology and information handling needs and requirements vary between different users or applications, IHSs may also vary regarding what information is handled, how the information is handled, how much information is processed, stored, or communicated, and how quickly and efficiently the information may be processed, stored, or communicated.

Variations in IHSs allow for IHSs to be general or configured for a specific user or specific use, such as financial transaction processing, airline reservations, enterprise data storage, or global communications. In addition, IHSs may include a variety of hardware and software components that may be configured to process, store, and communicate information and may include one or more computer systems, data storage systems, and networking systems.

SUMMARY

In various embodiments, Information Handling Systems (IHSs) may include: an NVRAM (Non-Volatile Random-Access Memory) storage device storing a plurality of UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) variables; and one or more processors coupled to the NVRAM, wherein the NVRAM comprises program instructions that, upon execution by the processors, cause the IHS to: initiate a UEFI boot sequence; detect a boot sequence notification indicating conditions for booting an operating system of the IHS have been met; lock further access to the NVRAM storing UEFI variables; receive a request for access to a UEFI variable stored in the NVRAM; and grant the request for access to a UEFI variable based on a listing of authorized applications.

In some embodiments, the boot sequence notification comprises a POST (Power-on Self-Test) notification. In some embodiments, execution of the instructions by the processors further causes the IHS to generate a challenge to an application issuing the request for access to the UEFI variable stored in the NVRAM. In some embodiments, the challenge is generated based on a cryptographic key associated with the requesting application in the listing of authorized applications. In some embodiments, execution of the instructions by the processors further causes the IHS to evaluate a response from the application issuing the request for access to the UEFI variable stored in the NVRAM. In some embodiments, the response establishes the application issuing the request has possession of a private key associated with the cryptographic key associated with the requesting application in the listing of authorized applications. In some embodiments, the requested UEFI variable access comprises a requested access to a UEFI variable used to configure firmware operations of a hardware component of the IHS. In some embodiments, the requested access to a UEFI variable used to configure firmware operations of a hardware component of the IHS is granted based on the application being authorized to access UEFI runtime variables in the listing of authorized applications. In some embodiments, the requested access to a UEFI variable used to configure firmware operations of a hardware component of the IHS is granted based on the application being authorized to access UEFI variables for configuring the hardware component of the IHS. In some embodiments, the requested UEFI variable access comprises a request to access to a UEFI boot variable. In some embodiments, the requested access to the UEFI boot variable is granted based on the application being authorized to access all UEFI variables in the listing of authorized applications. In some embodiments, the application comprises a host operating system of the IHS. In some embodiments, the application comprises a service operating system of the IHS and wherein the requested access to the UEFI boot variable is denied based on the application not being authorized to access UEFI boot variables in the listing of authorized applications. In some embodiments, the service operating system is run by an SoC (System-on-Chip) of the IHS.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

For purposes of this disclosure, an Information Handling System (IHS) may include any instrumentality or aggregate of instrumentalities operable to compute, calculate, determine, classify, process, transmit, receive, retrieve, originate, switch, store, display, communicate, manifest, detect, record, reproduce, handle, or utilize any form of information, intelligence, or data for business, scientific, control, or other purposes. For example, an IHS may be a personal computer (e.g., desktop or laptop), tablet computer, mobile device (e.g., Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) or smart phone), server (e.g., blade server or rack server), a network storage device, or any other suitable device and may vary in size, shape, performance, functionality, and price.

An IHS may include Random Access Memory (RAM), one or more processing resources such as a Central Processing Unit (CPU) or hardware or software control logic, Read-Only Memory (ROM), and/or other types of nonvolatile memory. Additional components of an IHS may include one or more disk drives, one or more network ports for communicating with external devices as well as various I/O devices, such as a keyboard, a mouse, touchscreen, and/or a video display. An IHS may also include one or more buses operable to transmit communications between the various hardware components.

The terms “heterogenous computing platform,” “heterogenous processor,” or “heterogenous platform,” as used herein, refer to an Integrated Circuit (IC) or chip (e.g., a System-On-Chip or “SoC,” a Field-Programmable Gate Array or “FPGA,” an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit or “ASIC,” etc.) containing a plurality of discrete processing circuits or semiconductor Intellectual Property (IP) cores (collectively referred to as “SoC devices” or simply “devices”) in a single electronic or semiconductor package, where each device has different processing capabilities suitable for handling a specific type of computational task. Examples of heterogenous processors include, but are not limited to: QUALCOMM's SNAPDRAGON, SAMSUNG's EXYNOS, APPLE's “A” SERIES, etc., which typically include ARM core(s).

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of components of an IHS (Information Handling System) 100 that, in some embodiments, may include a heterogenous computing platform, as described in additional detail below, and that is configured to secure access to hardware resources of the IHS, in particular to support secured access to UEFI memory that is used to access and configure certain hardware resources of an IHS. As depicted, IHS 100 includes host processor(s) 101. In various embodiments, IHS 100 may be a single-processor system, or a multi-processor system including two or more processors. Host processor(s) 101 may include any processor capable of executing program instructions, such as an INTEL/AMD x86 processor, or any general-purpose or embedded processor implementing any of a variety of Instruction Set Architectures (ISAs), such as a Complex Instruction Set Computer (CISC) ISA, a Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) ISA (e.g., one or more ARM core(s), or the like).

IHS 100 includes chipset 102 coupled to host processor(s) 101. Chipset 102 may provide host processor(s) 101 with access to several resources. In some cases, chipset 102 may utilize a QuickPath Interconnect (QPI) bus to communicate with host processor(s) 101. Chipset 102 may also be coupled to communication interface(s) 105 to enable communications between IHS 100 and various wired and/or wireless networks, such as ETHERNET, WIFI, BLUETOOTH (BT), cellular or mobile networks (e.g., Code-Division Multiple Access or “CDMA,” Time-Division Multiple Access or “TDMA,” Long-Term Evolution or “LTE,” etc.), satellite networks, or the like.

Communication interface(s) 105 may be used to communicate with peripherals devices (e.g., BT speakers, headsets, etc.). Moreover, communication interface(s) 105 may be coupled to chipset 102 via a Peripheral Component Interconnect Express (PCIe) bus, or the like. Chipset 102 may be coupled to display and/or touchscreen controller(s) 104, which may include one or more or Graphics Processor Units (GPUs) on a graphics bus, such as an Accelerated Graphics Port (AGP) or PCIe bus. As shown, display controller(s) 104 provide video or display signals to one or more display device(s) 111.

Display device(s) 111 may include Liquid Crystal Display (LCD), Light Emitting Diode (LED), organic LED (OLED), or other thin film display technologies. Display device(s) 111 may include a plurality of pixels arranged in a matrix, configured to display visual information, such as text, two-dimensional images, video, three-dimensional images, etc. In some cases, display device(s) 111 may be operate as a single continuous display, rather than two discrete displays.

Chipset 102 may provide host processor(s) 101 and/or display controller(s) 104 with access to system memory 103. In various embodiments, system memory 103 may be implemented using any suitable memory technology, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM) or magnetic disks, or any nonvolatile/Flash-type memory, such as a Solid-State Drive (SSD), Non-Volatile Memory Express (NVMe), or the like.

In certain embodiments, chipset 102 may also provide host processor(s) 101 with access to one or more USB ports 108, to which one or more peripheral devices may be coupled (e.g., integrated or external webcams, microphones, speakers, etc.). Chipset 102 may further provide host processor(s) 101 with access to one or more hard disk drives, solid-state drives, optical drives, or other removable-media drives 113.

Chipset 102 may also provide access to one or more user input devices 106, for example, using a super I/O controller or the like. Examples of user input devices 106 include, but are not limited to, microphone(s) 114A, camera(s) 114B, and keyboard/mouse 114N. Other user input devices 106 may include a touchpad, stylus or active pen, totem, etc. Each of user input devices 106 may include a respective controller (e.g., a touchpad may have its own touchpad controller) that interfaces with chipset 102 through a wired or wireless connection (e.g., via communication interfaces(s) 105). In some cases, chipset 102 may also provide access to one or more user output devices (e.g., video projectors, paper printers, 3D printers, loudspeakers, audio headsets, Virtual/Augmented Reality (VR/AR) devices, etc.).

In certain embodiments, chipset 102 may further provide an interface for communications with one or more hardware sensors 110. Sensor(s) 110 may be disposed on or within the chassis of IHS 100, or otherwise coupled to IHS 100, and may include, but are not limited to: electric, magnetic, radio, optical (e.g., camera, webcam, etc.), infrared, thermal, force, pressure, acoustic (e.g., microphone), ultrasonic, proximity, position, deformation, bending, direction, movement, velocity, rotation, gyroscope, Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), accelerometer, etc.

Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) 107 is coupled to chipset 102. Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) was designed as a successor to BIOS, and many modern IHSs utilize UEFI in addition to or instead of a BIOS. Accordingly, as used herein, the term “BIOS” is intended to also encompass UEFI. In operation, UEFI 107 provides an abstraction layer that allows the OS to interface with certain hardware components of the IHS 100. Upon booting of IHS 100, host processor(s) 101 may utilize program instructions of UEFI 107 to initialize and test hardware components that are coupled to IHS 100, and to load host OS 312 for use by IHS 100. Via the hardware abstraction layer provided by UEFI, software applications executed by host processor(s) 101 and/or SoCs 200 can interface with certain I/O devices that are coupled to IHS 100.

Operations by UEFI 107, and hardware devices that are accessed via UEFI, may be configured and operated through configuration of UEFI variables. These UEFI variables are stored in a secured NVRAM (Non-Volatile Random-Access Memory) or NVM (Non-Volatile Memory) of the IHS 100. In existing systems, access to these UEFI variables may be allowed for any process that has access to UEFI. In an IHS 100 that includes a heterogenous computing platform 200, various applications may access UEFI. In addition to access by a host OS 312 of the IHS 100, one or more service OSs 316 may be operated by the heterogenous computing platform 200, or by other computing capabilities of the IHS. Alternatively or additionally, one or more virtual machines may be operated by an IHS 100.

In some instances, each of these OSs and virtual machines may seek to access, and in some instances to configure, UEFI variables. Existing system are deficient in securing access to UEFI variables, and in particular to securing access to the NVRAM where these UEFI variables are stored. As described in additional detail below, in embodiments, UEFI may restrict access to the NVRAM UEFI variable space, where the restrictions may allow particularized variable access to specific processes that are operating on the IHS 100, thus controlling the applications that can access and/or modify these UEFI variables, while still supporting use of the UEFI variables.

Embedded Controller (EC) 109 (sometimes referred to as a Baseboard Management Controller or “BMC”) includes a microcontroller unit or processing core dedicated to handling selected IHS operations not ordinarily handled by host processor(s) 101. Examples of such operations may include, but are not limited to: power sequencing, power management, receiving and processing signals from a keyboard or touchpad, as well as operating chassis buttons and/or switches (e.g., power button, laptop lid switch, etc.), receiving and processing thermal measurements (e.g., performing cooling fan control, CPU and GPU throttling, and emergency shutdown), controlling indicator Light-Emitting Diodes or “LEDs” (e.g., caps lock, scroll lock, num lock, battery, ac, power, wireless LAN, sleep, etc.), managing a battery charger and a battery, enabling remote management, diagnostics, and remediation over an OOB or sideband network, etc. Moreover, in various implementations, EC 109 may be configured to manage boot operations in order to secure access to the memory space used to store UEFI 107 variable, as described in more detail below.

Unlike other devices in IHS 100, EC 109 may be operational from IHS being powered, in particular before other devices are fully running or even powered. As such, EC 109 firmware may be responsible for interfacing with a power adapter to manage the various power states that may be supported by IHS 100. Power operations of the EC 109 may also provide other components of the IHS 100 with power status information for the IHS, such as whether IHS 100 is operating from battery power or is plugged into an AC power source. Firmware instructions utilized by EC 109 may be used to manage other core operations of IHS 100 (e.g., turbo modes, maximum operating clock frequencies of certain components, etc.).

From the perspective of users, IHS 100 may appear to be either “on” or “off,” without any other detectable power states. In some embodiments, however, an IHS 100 may support multiple power states that may correspond to the states defined in the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) specification, such as: S0, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, and G3. For example, when an IHS 100 is operating in S0 working mode, the IHS is operational, but some hardware components that are not in use may still be individually configured in low power states. In an S0 low-power, idle mode (“Sleep” or “Modern Standby”), an IHS 100 remains partially running with various capabilities of the IHS (e.g., displays, network controllers) may be powered down and other capabilities (e.g., EC, processors) may be in low-power standby modes, thus supporting the ability of the IHS to quickly transition from to a full-power, working S0 mode in response to various events. In the past, S3 was commonly used as a default “Sleep state.” However, many IHSs 100 utilize the described Modern Standby, which may be designated as a hybrid “S0ix” mode, where some or all of the internal hardware of IHS 100 may be placed into their lowest power state, while still supporting code execution that allows fast response and transition of the IHS to a working S0 mode.

An IHS 100 may additionally or alternatively support other low-power modes, such as S1-S3 (that may also be referred to as “Sleep” modes), where the IHS may appear to users to be in an off state. Some IHSs may support only one or two of these states, where the number of distinct states may be a reflection of power saving features of the IHS that have been selected for use. For instance, the amount of power consumed in states S1-S3 is less than S0 and more than S4. An S3 mode consumes less power than S2, and S2 consumes less power than S1. In states S1-S3, volatile memory may be periodically refreshed in order to maintain the operating state of the IHS, with some components remaining powered so that the IHS may wake based on inputs from a keyboard, Local Area Network (LAN), or a Universal Serial Bus (USB) device.

In the S4 state (“Hibernate”), power consumption is reduced to its lowest level. The IHS saves the contents of volatile memory to a hibernation file and some components remain powered, allowing the IHS to wake based on detected input from the keyboard, LAN, or a USB device. “Hybrid sleep” may implemented by some IHSs may use a hibernation file that is used to save the IHS's operating state, and also used to resume the IHSs operations upon reverting to a working S0 mode. “Fast startup” may refer to a power state where the user is logged off before the hibernation file is created, which allows for a smaller hibernation file in IHSs with reduced storage capabilities.

When in the S5 state (“Soft off” or “Full Shutdown”), an IHS 100 is fully shut down without a hibernation file. It occurs when a restart is requested or when an application invokes a shutdown command of the OS, EC 109, etc. During a full shutdown and re-boot, the user session is methodically de-constructed and restarted on the next boot. In some instances, a boot/startup from an S5 state takes significantly longer than resuming from S1-S4 states. At the hardware level, the main difference between S4 and S5 may be that S4 sets a flag on the storage device used to store the hibernation file and configures the bootloader to boot from the flagged hibernation file instead of booting the OS from scratch.

In a G3 (“Mechanical off”) power mode, the IHS 100 may be completely turned off and consumes absolutely no power from its Power Supply Unit (PSU) or main battery (e.g., a lithium-ion battery), with the exception of any Real-Time Clock (RTC) batteries (e.g., Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor or “CMOS” batteries, Basic Input/Output System or “BIOS” batteries, coin cell batteries, etc.), which are used to provide power for the IHS's internal clock/calendar and for maintaining certain configuration settings. In some instances, G3 represents the lowest possible power configuration of an IHS from which the IHS can be initialized. From a G3 mode, an IHS may transition to an S5 mode in response to AC power source coupling (i.e., transitioning between battery mode to AC mode). Additionally, or alternatively, an IHS may transition from G3 to S0 based upon the detection of a power button event.

EC 109 firmware may also implement operations for detecting certain changes to the physical configuration or posture of IHS 100 (such as a laptop computer), and may also manage operations of other IHS devices based on the current physical configuration of IHS 100. For instance, when IHS 100 as a 2-in-1 laptop/tablet form factor, EC 109 may receive inputs from a lid position or hinge angle sensor 110, and may use those inputs to determine: whether the two sides of IHS 100 have been latched together to a closed position or a tablet position, the magnitude of a hinge or lid angle, etc. In response to these changes, the EC 109 may enable or disable certain features of IHS 100 (e.g., front or rear facing camera, etc.).

In this manner, EC 109 may identify any number of IHS physical postures, including, but not limited to: laptop, stand, tablet, or book. For example, when an integrated display 111 of IHS 100 is open with respect to a horizontal, face-up position of an integrated keyboard, EC 109 may determine IHS 100 to be in a laptop posture. When an integrated display 111 of IHS 100 is open with respect to a horizontal keyboard portion, but the keyboard is facing down (e.g., its keys are against the top surface of a table), EC 109 may determine IHS 100 to be in a kickstand posture. When the back of an integrated display 111 is closed against the back of the keyboard portion of an IHS, EC 109 may determine IHS 100 to be folded in a tablet posture. When IHS 100 has two integrated displays 111 that are open side-by-side (e.g., in a hybrid laptop with displays in both panels), EC 109 may determine an IHS 100 to be in a book posture. When an IHS 100 is determined to be in a book posture, EC 109 may also determine if the display(s) 111 of IHS 100 are arranged in a landscape or portrait orientation, relative to the user.

In some implementations, EC 109 may be installed as a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) component to the motherboard of IHS 100. Accordingly, as a component with the root of trusted hardware of IHS 100, EC 109 may be further configured to calculate hashes or signatures that uniquely identify individual components of IHS 100. In such scenarios, EC 109 may calculate a hash value based on the configuration of a hardware and/or software component coupled to IHS 100. For instance, EC 109 may calculate a hash value based on all firmware and other code or settings stored in an onboard memory of a hardware component.

Hash values may be calculated as part of a trusted process of manufacturing IHS 100 and may be maintained in secure storage as a reference signature. EC 109 may later recalculate a hash value based on instructions and settings loaded for use by a hardware component of IHS 100 and may compare the calculated value against the reference hash value to determine if any modifications have been made to the component, thus indicating that the component has been compromised. As such, EC 109 may validate the integrity of hardware and software components installed in IHS 100.

In some embodiments, EC 109 may provide an OOB (Out-Of-Band) or sideband channel that allows an ITDM or Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) to manage various settings and configurations of an IHS 100. OOB is used in contradistinction with “in-band” communication channels that operate only after networking 105 other interfaces of the IHS have been initialized, and the OS of the IHS has been successfully booted.

In various embodiments, IHS 100 may be coupled to an external power source through an AC adapter, power brick, or the like. The AC adapter may be removably coupled to a battery charge controller to provide IHS 100 with a source of DC power provided by battery cells of a battery system in the form of a battery pack (e.g., a lithium ion or “Li-ion” battery pack, or a nickel metal hydride or “NiMH” battery pack including one or more rechargeable batteries). Battery Management Unit (BMU) 112 may be coupled to EC 109 and it may include, for example, an Analog Front End (AFE), storage (e.g., non-volatile memory), and a microcontroller. In some cases, BMU 112 may be configured to collect and store information, and to provide that information to other IHS components, such as, for EC 109 and/or other devices within heterogeneous computing platform 200 (FIG. 2).

Examples of information collectible by BMU 112 may include, but are not limited to: operating conditions (e.g., battery operating conditions including battery state information such as battery current amplitude and/or current direction, battery voltage, battery charge cycles, battery state of charge, battery state of health, battery temperature, battery usage data such as charging and discharging data; and/or IHS operating conditions such as processor operating speed data, system power management and cooling system settings, state of “system present” pin signal), environmental or contextual information (e.g., such as ambient temperature, relative humidity, system geolocation measured by GPS or triangulation, time and date, etc.), etc.

In some embodiments, IHS 100 may not include all the components shown in FIG. 1. In other embodiments, IHS 100 may include other components in addition to those that are shown in FIG. 1. Furthermore, some components that are represented as separate components in FIG. 1 may instead be integrated with other components, such that all or a portion of the operations executed by the illustrated components may instead be executed by the integrated component.

Historically, IHSs with desktop and laptop form factors have had conventional host OSs executed on INTEL or AMD's “x86”-type processors. Other types of processors, such as ARM processors, have been used in smartphones and tablet devices, which typically run thinner, simpler, and/or mobile OSs (e.g., ANDROID, IOS, WINDOWS MOBILE, etc.). More recently, however, IHS manufacturers have started producing fully-fledged desktop and laptop IHSs equipped with ARM-based, heterogeneous computing platforms. Accordingly, host OSs (e.g., WINDOWS on ARM) have been developed to provide users with a familiar OS experience on those platforms.

FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of heterogenous computing platform 200. In various embodiments, heterogenous computing platform 200 may be implemented in one or more SoCs, FPGAs, ASICs, or the like. Heterogenous computing platform 200 may include one or more discrete and/or segregated devices or components, each having a different set of processing capabilities suitable for handling a particular type of computational task. When each device in platform 200 is tasked with executing only the types of computational tasks that it is specifically designed to execute, the overall power consumption of heterogenous computing platform 200 is minimized.

In various implementations, some of the devices in heterogenous computing platform 200 may include their own microcontroller(s) or core(s) (e.g., ARM core(s)) and corresponding firmware. In some cases, a device in platform 200 may also include its own hardware-embedded accelerator (e.g., a secondary or co-processing core coupled to a main core). Each device in heterogenous computing platform 200 may be accessible through a respective Application Programming Interface (API). Additionally, or alternatively, some devices in heterogenous computing platform 200 may execute their own OS. Additionally, or alternatively, one or more of the devices of heterogenous computing platform 200 may be virtual devices and may thus operate virtual machines.

Each of the OSs and/or virtual machines supported by heterogenous computing platform 200 may interface with configurable firmware capabilities of certain hardware, such as user I/O hardware, of an IHS 100 through UEFI variables, such as described with regard to UEFI 107 of the IHS 100 of FIG. 1. Although it may be desirable for some or all of these processes to access UEFI variables, allowing all processes with access to UEFI to access all available UEFI variables presents a significant security risk. These security risks are further increased when all processes with access to UEFI may modify core UEFI boot variables, such as modifying boot loading instructions and modifying encryption keys or other cryptographic secrets to be used by an IHS. As described in additional detail below, embodiments restrict access to the NVRAM variable space utilized by UEFI, where access may be cryptographically secured and limited to specific applications operating on the IHS, such as to specific OSs, OS applications and/or to specific virtual machines.

In the embodiment illustrated in FIG. 2, heterogenous computing platform 200 includes CPU clusters 201A-N that may correspond to system processor(s) 101, and that are intended to perform general-purpose computing operations. Each of CPU clusters 201A-N may include one or more processing cores and cache memories. In operation, CPU clusters 201A-N are available and accessible to the IHS's host OS 300 (e.g., WINDOWS on ARM) and other applications executed by IHS 100.

CPU clusters 201A-N may be coupled to memory controller 202 via internal interconnect fabric 203. Memory controller 202 may be responsible for managing system memory access for all of devices connected to internal interconnect fabric 203, which may include any communication bus suitable for inter-device communications within an SoC (e.g., Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture or “AMBA,” QuickPath Interconnect or “QPI,” HyperTransport or “HT,” etc.). All devices coupled to internal interconnect fabric 203 may communicate with each other and with a host OS executed by CPU clusters 201A-N. In some cases, devices 209-211 may be coupled to internal interconnect fabric 203 via a secondary interconnect fabric (not shown). A secondary interconnect fabric may include any bus suitable for inter-device and/or inter-bus communications within an SoC.

A GPU 204 of the heterogenous computing platform 200 produces graphical or visual content and communicates that content to a monitor or display of the IHS 100 for rendering. In some embodiments, display engine 209 may be designed to perform additional video enhancement operations. In operation, display engine 209 may implement procedures for provide the output of GPU 204 as a video signal to one or more external displays coupled to IHS 100 (e.g., display device(s) 111). PCIe interfaces 205 provide an entry point into any additional devices external to heterogenous computing platform 200 that have a respective PCIe interface (e.g., graphics cards, USB controllers, etc.).

Audio Digital Signal Processor (aDSP) 206 is a device designed to perform audio and speech operations and to perform in-line enhancements for audio input(s) and output(s). Examples of audio and speech operations include, but are not limited to: noise reduction, echo cancellation, directional audio detection, wake word detection, muting and volume controls, filters and effects, etc. In operation, input and/or output audio streams may pass through and be processed by aDSP 206, which can send the processed audio to other devices on internal interconnect fabric 203 (e.g., CPU clusters 201A-N). In some embodiments, aDSP 206 may be configured to process one or more of heterogenous computing platform 200's sensor signals (e.g., gyroscope, accelerometer, pressure, temperature, etc.), low-power vision or camera streams (e.g., for user presence detection, onlooker detection, etc.), or battery data (e.g., to calculate a charge or discharge rate, current charge level, etc.).

Camera device 210 includes an Image Signal Processor (ISP) configured to receive and process video frames captured by a camera coupled to heterogenous computing platform 200 (e.g., in the visible and/or infrared spectrum). Video Processing Unit (VPU) 211 is a device designed to perform hardware video encoding and decoding operations, thus accelerating the operation of camera 210 and display/graphics device 209. VPU 211 may be configured to provide optimized communications with camera device 210 for performance improvements.

Sensor hub 207 may include AI capabilities designed to consolidate information received from other devices in heterogenous computing platform 200, process context and/or telemetry data streams, and provide that information to: (i) a host OS, (ii) other applications, and/or (iii) other devices in platform 200. In collecting data, sensor hub 207 may include General-Purpose Input/Output (GPIOs) that provide Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C), Improved I2C (I3C), Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI), Enhanced SPI (eSPI), and/or serial interfaces to receive data from sensors (e.g., sensors 110, camera 210, peripherals 214, etc.). Sensor hub 207 may include a low-power core configured to execute small neural networks and specific applications, such as contextual awareness and other enhancements.

High-performance AI device 208 is a significantly more powerful processing device than sensor hub 207, and it may be designed to execute multiple complex AI algorithms and models concurrently (e.g., Natural Language Processing, speech recognition, speech-to-text transcription, video processing, gesture recognition, user engagement determinations, etc.). For example, high-performance AI device 208 may include a Neural Processing Unit (NPU), Tensor Processing Unit (TPU), Neural Network Processor (NNP), or Intelligence Processing Unit (IPU), and it may be designed specifically for AI and Machine Learning (ML), which speeds up the processing of AI/ML tasks while also freeing processor(s) 101 to perform other tasks. Using such capabilities, one or more devices of heterogeneous computing platform 200 (e.g., GPU 204, aDSP 206, sensor hub 207, high-performance AI device 208, VPU 211, etc.) may be configured to execute one or more AI model(s), simulation(s), and/or inference(s).

Security device 212 may include one or more specialized security components, such as a dedicated security processor, a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a TRUSTZONE device, a PLUTON processor, or the like. In various implementations, security device 212 may be used to perform cryptography operations (e.g., generation of key pairs, validation of digital certificates, etc.) and/or it may serve as a hardware root-of-trust (RoT) for heterogenous computing platform 200 and/or IHS 100.

Modem/wireless controller 213 may be designed to enable wired and wireless communications in any suitable frequency band (e.g., BLUETOOTH or “BT,” WiFi, CDMA, 5G, satellite, etc.), subject to AI-powered optimizations/customizations for improved speeds, reliability, and/or coverage. Peripherals 214 may include any device coupled to heterogenous computing platform 200 (e.g., sensors 110) through mechanisms other than PCIe interfaces 205. In some cases, peripherals 214 may include interfaces to integrated devices (e.g., built-in microphones, speakers, and/or cameras), wired devices (e.g., external microphones, speakers, and/or cameras, Head-Mounted Devices/Displays or “HMDs,” printers, displays, etc.), and/or wireless devices (e.g., wireless audio headsets, etc.) coupled to IHS 100, where configuration of such hardware may be via modifications to UEFI variables corresponding to a respective hardware component.

In some implementations, EC 109 may be integrated into heterogenous computing platform 200 of IHS 100. In other implementations EC 109 may be external to the heterogenous computing platform 200 (i.e., the EC 109 residing in its own semiconductor package) but coupled to integrated bridge 216 via an interface (e.g., enhanced SPI or “eSPI”), thus supporting the EC's ability to access the SoC's internal interconnect fabric 203, including sensor hub 207 and sensor(s) 110. Through this connectivity supported by the interconnect fabric 203, EC 109 may directly access and/or operate most or all of devices 201-216, 110 of the heterogenous computing platform 200.

FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an example of architecture 300 for securing access to hardware resources an IHS 100 that operates a heterogenous computing platform 200, in particular to securing access to the memory space used to store UEFI 107 variables that are used to configure certain hardware 350 of the IHS. As illustrated, architecture 300 includes IHS 301 (e.g., implementing aspects of IHS 100 and/or platform 200) coupled to storage device 302 (e.g., NVMe, SSD, etc.), secondary or companion IHS 303 (e.g., a smart phone, a laptop, etc.), and cloud or remote services 304. Cloud 304 may include backend or remote services 305, policy services 306, and web applications 307. In some cases, components of cloud 304 may be accessible to IHS 301 and/or secondary IHS 303, and configurable via ITDM management console 308. IHS architecture 301 may include hardware/EC/firmware layer 309, UEFI layer 107, and OS layer 311.

OS layer 311 includes a host OS (Operating System) 312 that is executed by host processor(s) 101. A variety of software applications may operate within the OS 312, where these applications may include user applications 313 and system applications 314, one or more telemetry applications 350. OS layer 311 may also include various drivers and other core OS operations, such as the operation of a kernel. As described, various components of a heterogenous computing platform 200 may independently run their own operating systems, such as an OS run by an SoC. Within IHS architecture 301, some of these discrete operating systems operating on individual components of the heterogenous computing platform 200 may be considered service OSs 316, where each service OS may each include its own applications 317 and services 318.

Both host OS 312 and service OS 316 may interface with hardware of the IHS 100. Some or all of the configurable firmware capabilities of hardware that is accessed by host OS 312 and service OS 316 may be configured through UEFI layer 107. In particular, host OS 312 and service OS 316 may configure the firmware operations of certain aspects of user I/O hardware 350 via UEFI variables that are stored in a NVRAM 320, where portions of this NVRAM may also be utilized to store core UEFI instructions and variables used to configure critical boot and security settings. As described, providing access to these UEFI variables presents a security risk that is increased in a heterogenous computing platform 200 that may include multiple OSs running concurrently and accessing UEFI variables. As described in additional detail below, embodiments provide secured access the UEFI NVRAM 320 variable space in a manner that provides granular control of the applications that are allowed to access this variable space and to limit access to certain variables within this UEFI NVRAM 320.

UEFI layer 107 may include UEFI core services 319, UEFI NVRAM 320, and UEFI network stack 321. UEFI core services 319 may include operations for identifying and validating the detected hardware components of an IHS. The UEFI network stack 321 may be utilized during initialization of the IHS in support of validation procedures, such as in retrieving reference signatures corresponding to authentic firmware instructions for hardware components of an IHS 100. UEFI core service 319 may also include operations for interfacing with certain hardware of an IHS, in particular user I/O hardware devices 350. As described in additional detail below, UEFI core services 319 may also include instructions for booting IHS 100, in particular for booting the host OS 312 of the IHS. In some embodiments, the UEFI core services 319 may also include instructions for securing access to UEFI variables in UEFI NVRAM 320.

As illustrated, IHS architecture 301 also includes a hardware/EC/firmware layer 309 that includes EC 109 and sensor hub 207. As described above, EC 109 may implement a variety of procedures for management of individual hardware of an IHS 100 and of the IHS itself, including management of the various power states that are supported by the IHS. EC 109 is configured to execute one or more sensor services 323 that interface with sensor hub 207 in implementing various features of an IHS 100, such response to user-presence determination by the sensor hub 207 that is acted upon by the EC 109 in initiation heightened security protocols. As described, EC 109 may interface with some or all of the individual hardware components/systems of an IHS via sideband management channels that are separate from inline communication channels used by the host processor 101 and SoCs.

As described above, sensor hub 207 may receive inputs from some or all of the sensors 110A-N of an IHS 100. Sensor hub 207 may implement a variety of sensor service(s) 322 for communicating with and collecting data from sensors 110A-N. In some embodiments, sensor hub 207 may implement shock detection procedures that may incorporate inputs from inertial and other sensors 110A-N of an IHS. Such shock detection procedures may detect shocks experienced by an IHS 110 and may characterize and assess detected shocks in evaluating possible damage to the IHS.

FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of a method, according to some embodiments, for securing access to hardware resources of an IHS, and in particular for securing access to the memory space used to store UEFI 107 variables. Embodiments may thus begin, at 405, with the initialization of an IHS 100 that includes a heterogenous computing platform 200. Upon being powered, at 410, secured boot instructions are accessed in order to initialize a host processor 101 and to locate instructions, in some embodiments stored in UEFI NVRAM 320, for initiating an UEFI boot sequence. The UEFI boot sequence may be described as a series of phases, where successful completion of one phase is generally required for the operation of subsequent phases of the boot sequence. These boot instructions of the initial phase may be used to validate the authenticity of host processor(s) 101, chipset 102, and the motherboard on which the processor is mounted.

In the next phase of the UEFI boot sequence, at 415, the execution of UEFI 107 firmware 136, that may be retrieved from UEFI NVRAM 320, enters the PEI (Pre-EFI Initialization) phase. During this phase, initialization of authenticated host processor(s) 101, chipset 102 and the motherboard is completed, along with the initialization of system memory 103. At 420, execution of UEFI 107 firmware enters the Driver Execution (DXE) phase, where images of bus and core hardware device drivers are retrieved. With core hardware and bus drivers loaded and operating, at 425, the BDS (Boot Device Selection) phase is initiated and the location of the OS boot code is identified. In some instances, memory and disk space may be allocated for booting of the OS corresponding to the identified boot code.

Once the BDS phase of the UEFI boot sequence has been completed, the IHS is ready to boot the host OS 312. In some instances, the UEFI boot sequence may include generation of a Ready-to-Boot notification as part of the POST (Power-on Self-Test) notifications that are generated by various components that participate in the boot sequence. In some embodiments, at 430, the Ready-to-Boot notification is detected, thus initiating operations to secure any further access to the UEFI NVRAM 320, and in particular initiating operations for maintaining secured access to the memory space within the UEFI NVRAM that is used to store UEFI 107 variables.

Upon detection of the Ready-to-Boot notification, at 435, further access to the UEFI variable space is locked. In some embodiments, all access to UEFI NVRAM 320 may be locked. In some embodiments, only access to a portion of the memory space within UEFI NVRAM 320 that is used to store UEFI variables is locked. For instances, in embodiments utilizing a UEFI file system, all files used to store and maintain UEFI variables may be locked. In existing systems, access to UEFI provides access to APIs operated by UEFI that provide access to UEFI variables, such as through get/set requests for each individual UEFI variable that is stored in UEFI NVRAM, where such requests may be implemented through operations supported by a UEFI filesystem of UEFI core service.

In some embodiments, such get/set requests supported by the UEFI 107 API may be modified to require the requesting process to be authenticated as authorized to perform the requested action with respect to the specific UEFI variable of the request. In such embodiments, access to the UEFI variables stored in UEFI NVRAM 320 may be locked or otherwise restricted by limiting access to get/set methods supported by UEFI core services 319 only to authenticated processes. In some embodiments, UEFI 107 may implement a filesystem for organizing and managing UEFI variables stored in UEFI NVRAM 320. In such embodiments, access to UEFI variables stored in UEFI NVRAM 320 may be locked through UEFI 107 filesystem operations that restrict access to all or some of the files used to store UEFI variables within the UEFI NVRAM 320.

In embodiments, specific applications may be authorized to access, and in some instances to modify, specific UEFI variables stored in UEFI NVRAM 320. In some embodiments, privileges for accessing UEFI variables may be separately granted for UEFI runtime variables, that include variables corresponding to hardware settings that are configurable via UEFI 107, and for UEFI boot variables that may be used to configure the UEFI boot sequence. Though embodiments, host OS 312 may be granted full privileges to access and modify all UEFI variables, or may instead be granted full privileges only for runtime variables and may be limited to reading privileges for boot variables. In other scenarios, host OS 312 be authorized through embodiments with privileges for reading all of the boot variables that are maintained by UEFI 107, but privileges for modifying only specific boot variables, such as safe mode boot settings.

As described, one or more services OSs 316 may operate concurrently on IHS 100 in addition to host OS 312, such as on an SoC used to implement a heterogenous computing platform 200. Through embodiments, these service OSs 316 may be separately authorized to access specific portions of the UEFI variables. For instance, a specific service OS 316 may be granted access to runtime UEFI variables, or access to specific UEFI variables, such as variables used for configuration of a specific hardware component. Through embodiments, a specific service OS 316 may be granted with reading access to runtime UEFI variables, with write access limited to specific UEFI variables for configuration of a specific hardware component.

In some embodiments, other applications may be similarly granted access to some or all of the UEFI variables. For instance, through embodiments, a virtual machine the is operated within the heterogenous computing platform 200 may be granted access to specific UEFI variables, where the virtual machine may be limited to read access to these UEFI variables and may be restricted from any modifications to any variables. Through embodiments, an SoC may be similarly granted read access to UEFI variables, with write access limited variables for configuration specific hardware components.

In some embodiments, at 440, each of the applications that is allowed with access to UEFI variables may be loaded for use by UEFI core services 319 in providing secured access to the UEFI variables stored in UEFI NVRAM 320. In some embodiments, each application that is allowed access to UEFI variables may be specified within UEFI boot code that is stored in UEFI NVRAM 320. In some embodiments, a listing of applications that is allowed access to UEFI variables may be loaded by UEFI from a remote location specified in the UEFI boot code. In identifying the applications that are allowed access to UEFI variables, limits on the privileges for an application may also be specified, such as limiting an application to accessing UEFI variables of a specific hardware component, or limiting an application to reading UEFI runtime variables.

In the listing of allowed application, each allowed application may be identified via one or more unique identifiers. In addition to specifying identifiers for each allowed application, the listing may specify a cryptographic key or token that may be used in authenticating an application that is requesting access to UEFI variables. For instance, the host OS 312 may be specified in the listing of applications allowed access to UEFI variables and may be associated with a cryptographic public key. As described in additional detail below, this cryptographic key may be used to challenge and thus authenticate an application purporting to be the host OS 312 that is requesting access to the UEFI variables.

Once access to the UEFI variables stored in UEFI NVRAM 320 has been locked or otherwise restricted, at 445, the UEFI boot sequence may be resumed. In some instances, remaining POST operations may be completed. In some instances, the remaining operations may include validation of loaded firmware as authentic, such as based on reference signatures generated based on trusted firmware instructions. With the UEFI boot sequence completed, at 450, the host OS 312 of the IHS is initialized based on the boot code identified in the BDS phase of the boot sequence. In some embodiments, the host processor 101 may operate a host OS 312, where this host OS 312 may be operated by a user of the IHS 100 through various user inputs. In some embodiments, multiple other operating systems, such as one or more service OSs 316, may be operated by other processors or by SoCs of the heterogenous computing platform 200.

An IHS 100 may operate for any amount of time configured in this manner, until, at 455, a request for access to the UEFI variable space is detected. In some embodiments, the detected requests for access to UEFI variables may be initiated via APIs or other interfaces supported by host OS 312 and/or service OSs 316. In some embodiments, the requests for access to UEFI variables stored in UEFI NVRAM 320 may be detected through direct invocation of the API supported by the UEFI 107 filesystem, such as requests initiated by automated tools operating on the IHS 100, whether within one of the OSs or operating elsewhere within the IHS or heterogenous computing platform 200.

Upon embodiments detecting a request to access the UEFI variables stored in UEFI NVRAM 320, at 460, a challenge may be issued to the requesting process. As described, as part of locking access to the UEFI variables, embodiments may load a list of applications that have been authorized to access the UEFI variables. In such embodiments, the applications that have been authorized are authenticated according to a cryptographic public key or token, where such mappings of authorized processes to cryptographic identifiers and the specific privileges for each process may be maintained as UEFI variables that are accessible only to the UEFI core service 319. In some embodiments, a public key may used to generate a challenge that is transmitted to the requesting application to prove proof of possession of the private key corresponding to the public key.

Accordingly, at 465, the requesting application is authenticated based on the response to the issued challenge, such as by establishing ownership of a private key. Once the requesting application has been authenticated, at 470, access is granted according to the limitations on the privileges of the requesting application, as set forth in the listing of allowed applications loaded when locking the UEFI NVRAM 320 variable space. For instance, an application that is authenticated as the host OS 312 may be granted with access to all runtime variables, and in some instances to all boot variables as well. As described, service OSs 316 may be granted more particularized access such that requests to access runtime variables may be granted, but all access to boot variables denied, and no privileges to modify any of the UEFI variables. In the same manner, virtual machines, SoCs or other components of an IHS 100 may be granted limited access to UEFI variables in a secured manner.

To implement various operations described herein, computer program code (i.e., program instructions for carrying out these operations) may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including an object-oriented programming language such as Java, Smalltalk, Python, C++, or the like, conventional procedural programming languages, such as the “C” programming language or similar programming languages, or any of machine learning software. These program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable storage medium that can direct a computer system, other programmable data processing apparatus, controller, or other device to operate in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer readable medium produce an article of manufacture including instructions which implement the operations specified in the block diagram block or blocks.

Program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, controller, or other device to cause a series of operations to be performed on the computer, or other programmable apparatus or devices, to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions upon execution provide processes for implementing the operations specified in the block diagram block or blocks.

Modules implemented in software for execution by various types of processors may, for instance, include one or more physical or logical blocks of computer instructions, which may, for instance, be organized as an object or procedure. Nevertheless, the executables of an identified module need not be physically located together but may include disparate instructions stored in different locations which, when joined logically together, include the module and achieve the stated purpose for the module. Indeed, a module of executable code may be a single instruction, or many instructions, and may even be distributed over several different code segments, among different programs, and across several memory devices.

Similarly, operational data may be identified and illustrated herein within modules and may be embodied in any suitable form and organized within any suitable type of data structure. Operational data may be collected as a single data set or may be distributed over different locations including over different storage devices.

Reference is made herein to “configuring” a device or a device “configured to” perform some operation(s). It should be understood that this may include selecting predefined logic blocks and logically associating them. It may also include programming computer software-based logic of a retrofit control device, wiring discrete hardware components, or a combination of thereof. Such configured devices are physically designed to perform the specified operation(s).

Unless stated otherwise, terms such as “first” and “second” are used to arbitrarily distinguish between the elements such terms describe. Thus, these terms are not necessarily intended to indicate temporal or other prioritization of such elements. The terms “coupled” or “operably coupled” are defined as connected, although not necessarily directly, and not necessarily mechanically. The terms “a” and “an” are defined as one or more unless stated otherwise. The terms “comprise” (and any form of comprise, such as “comprises” and “comprising”), “have” (and any form of have, such as “has” and “having”), “include” (and any form of include, such as “includes” and “including”) and “contain” (and any form of contain, such as “contains” and “containing”) are open-ended linking verbs.

As a result, a system, device, or apparatus that “comprises,” “has,” “includes” or “contains” one or more elements possesses those one or more elements but is not limited to possessing only those one or more elements. Similarly, a method or process that “comprises,” “has,” “includes” or “contains” one or more operations possesses those one or more operations but is not limited to possessing only those one or more operations.