Method and apparatus for tamper detection

An apparatus secured to a device includes a fastener, an adhesive secured to the fastener, an electric circuit configured to measure a property, a memory configured to store the property, and at least one Key to access the stored property, wherein the apparatus is configured to detect an unauthorized opening of the device.

FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY

This disclosure relates generally to the field of tamper detection, and more particularly to a method and apparatus for remote and electronic tamper detection.

BACKGROUND

Telecommunications operators typically deploy thousands of Access Points, Micro Base Stations, or other network equipment across a large geographic area. Such network equipment is generally installed in close proximity to subscribers, and is typically located on such unprotected areas as walls or light poles, for example.

As a result of their relatively easy access, these types of network equipment provide relatively easy physical access to potential attackers, and accordingly are susceptible to tampering by unauthorized persons. Such tampering could lead to physical damage of the equipment or unauthorized changes being made to the equipment. Currently, it is not possible to detect if such an unauthorized tampering of the network equipment were to occur without physical monitoring or inspection of the equipment, which is impractical in most situations and may be impossible in situations where the equipment is spread out over a large geographic area.

SUMMARY

An apparatus secured to a device includes a fastener, an adhesive secured to the fastener, an electric circuit configured to measure a property, a memory configured to store the property, and at least one Key to access the stored property, wherein the apparatus is configured to detect an unauthorized opening of the device.

A method includes measuring a reference property value of a circuit, storing the reference property value of the circuit in a device, measuring a current property value of the circuit, comparing the reference property value of the circuit to the current property value of the circuit, and initiating an alarm at the device if the current property value does not match the reference property value.

A system for tamper detection includes a device in a telecommunications network, and an apparatus secured to the device, the apparatus including: a fastener; an adhesive secured to the fastener; an electric circuit configured to measure a property; and at least one Key configured to access the property value, wherein the property value is stored on the device, wherein the apparatus is configured to: measure a reference property value of the circuit; store the reference property value of the circuit in the device; measure a current property value of the circuit; compare the reference property value of the circuit to the current property value of the circuit; and initiate an alarm at the device if the current property value does not match the reference property value.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In accordance with the present disclosure, and as shown inFIG. 1, an apparatus100is provided for detecting tampering or unauthorized opening of a device, such as an access point, a micro-base station, a base station, or a network equipment device. The apparatus100is secured to the device102, and includes a fastener104, and an adhesive106secured to the fastener. In the present disclosure, the fastener104is a threaded screw, but it is contemplated that the fastener could also be, for example, a bolt, a rod, a hook, or any other known fastening device. The adhesive106is configured for being secured around the screw/fastener104. Further, and as will be described in further detail below, the adhesive106is configured such that upon curing, it becomes brittle.

The adhesive106could be of the type that includes a wide range of specific measurable physical properties (i.e., variant electrically conductive adhesives intended to cure to different narrow ranges of resistance), such that even if an unauthorized user attempted to reseal the device102with the same general brand of adhesive, it is unlikely that they would be aware of the exact variant being used on the device. Alternatively, the adhesive106could be a conductive ink, for example. Although not limited to this configuration, in the present disclosure, the fastener104can be made of a non-conductive material, and the adhesive106can be made of a conductive material. However, it is appreciated that other configurations may also be possible (such as conductive fastener with conductive adhesive; and conductive fastener with non-conductive adhesive).

As a result of the conductive/non-conductive relationship between the fastener104and the adhesive106secured thereto, a circuit is formed. Accordingly, the apparatus100also includes an electric circuit108configured to measure a property of the circuit formed by the adhesive material106being secured over the fastener104. For example, the electric circuit108can be configured to measure a resistance value formed by the adhesive106being secured to the fastener104. However, it is to be understood that other physical properties could also be measured by the electric circuit108, such as, for example, capacitance of the circuit. The measured physical property exhibits a change upon unauthorized tampering/opening of the device102, and can be remotely detected, as will be described in further detail below. It is further contemplated that the physical property is configured to retain its value (within a narrow range of variation) regardless of changes in environmental conditions, or time duration, for example.

The apparatus100also includes a memory110configured to store the property, and at least one Key configured to access the stored property. In the present disclosure, the at least one Key includes a pair of Keys, and more specifically, includes a Public Key112and a Private Key (not shown). The Public Key112can be placed and stored on the apparatus100or the device102; however, the Private Key is not stored on the apparatus100or the device102. In addition, it is understood that the Private Key can only be accessed by authorized users/operators.

The electric circuit108in accordance with the present disclosure is illustrated inFIG. 2. As seen inFIG. 2, the electric circuit108includes the fastener104, adhesive106, a power source114, and a measuring device116configured to measure the physical property of the circuit (for example, the Resistance Value, as described above).

As stated above, it is impractical and sometimes impossible to determine whether or not a device/network equipment has been unlawfully accessed or tampered without physical inspection of each device. As the telecommunications networks continue to grow, such physical inspection becomes more and more costly and inefficient. However, with the present disclosure, it is possible to electronically and remotely detect and report tampering of network equipment/devices, even if such tampering occurs when the device is powered “off”. As will be described in further detail below, the present disclosure provides an apparatus and method such that even if a device is tampered with when it is powered “off”, detection and reporting can still occur when the device is powered back “on”.

In accordance with the present disclosure and the apparatus100, a method300for tamper detection is shown inFIG. 3and includes, at S302, measuring a reference property value of a circuit, and storing the reference property value of the circuit in a device (S304). As stated above, the reference property value can be, for example, the resistance value created as a result of the conductive adhesive being secured over the non-conductive fastener. As stated above, alternative physical property values may also be possible. For example, when the apparatus100and device102are officially sealed (i.e., at a factory, or by an authorized field technician), the reference property value can be stored in a protected Log_File, which is then encrypted with the Private Key. The corresponding Public Key can be placed and stored on the apparatus100or device102, while the Private Key is not stored on the apparatus100or the device102. At S306, it is determined if the Log_File exists; in other words, it is determined whether or not the reference property value was measured and stored. If not, at S308, an alarm can be sent to the operator indicating that the Log_File is missing, and the method300ends.

If, at S306, it is determined that the Log_File does exist, then the apparatus100will use the Public Key to decrypt and read the reference property value from the Log_File (S310). At S312, if the reference property value is set to a “special NULL value”, then the method waits a predetermined time (i.e., one hour, for example) and starts again at S306. If the reference property value is not set to a special NULL value, then a current property value of the circuit is measured (S314). At S316, the reference property value of the circuit is compared to the current property value of the circuit. If, at S316, the current property value and the reference property value are the same (within a narrow range of variation), the method waits a predetermined time and starts again at S306.

If, however, the current property value and the reference property value are not the same, it is determined that an unauthorized tampering/opening of the device102has occurred, and an alarm is initiated at the device, alerting the operator (S318). For example, if an unauthorized user has attempted to access/open the device102, the cured adhesive106, which has become brittle upon curing around the fastener104, will break off from the fastener, causing a physical property change that is detected during the comparing at S316. In addition, if an unauthorized user successfully opened the device102and then attempted to apply new adhesive106around the fastener104after re-sealing the device, the measured property value of such a change would still be different than the reference property value stored in the Log_File. Accordingly, whether the device102is illegally opened while powered “ON”, or whether it is illegally opened after powering “OFF” and then closed and powered back “ON”, the present apparatus100and method300would still detect a change in the measured property value. Such a difference between the measured property value and the reference property value would indicate an unauthorized opening/tampering of the device102.

In addition to the alarm being initiated, a report, such as a Tamper Detection Report, for example, can also be sent to the operator, indicating the time, location, and other data related to the tampering.

A general use case is now illustrated in accordance with the flow chart depicted inFIG. 4. When an authorized operator/user needs to make a legitimate change to the device102, a method400in accordance with the present disclosure can be completed. At S402, the operator uses the Private Key, which is available to the operator via an application, for example, to create an encrypted Log_File that contains a special NULL value. For example, the application could reside on a remote server or on the authorized user's laptop/mobile device. The special NULL value, when read, signals the application to temporarily disable the tamper detection apparatus, allowing the operator to lawfully access the device102without generating false alarms. The operator can then, at S404, power OFF the device and remove the fastener104, which would break off the brittle conductive adhesive106. At S406, the operator can make any necessary changes/fixes to the device102. Once the changes are made, the operator can re-seal the device by inserting the fastener104and applying new adhesive material106around the fastener (S408), thereby completing the electric circuit108. The operator can then power ON the device102(S410) and wait for the adhesive106to cure (S412). After the adhesive106has cured, the operator can trigger the apparatus100to measure a new reference value property (S414). The operator can then use the Private Key to re-create an encrypted Log_File containing the new reference property value, securely overwriting the existing Log_File with the newly created encrypted Log_File (S416). The apparatus100can then continue monitoring tampering as described above and shown inFIG. 3.

Referring next toFIG. 5, a system500for tamper detection includes a device502in a telecommunications network, and an apparatus504secured to the device. The apparatus504includes a fastener, an adhesive secured to the fastener, an electric circuit (not shown) configured to measure a property; a memory506configured to store the measured property, and at least one Key (not shown) configured to access the property value, wherein the property value is stored on the device. As stated above with reference toFIGS. 1-3, the apparatus504is configured to measure a reference property value of the circuit, store the reference property value of the circuit in the device, measure a current property value of the circuit, compare the reference property value of the circuit to the current property value of the circuit, and initiate an alarm at the device if the current property value does not match the reference property value.

The apparatus504is configured such that when the device is opened, the adhesive is broken from the fastener, such that the current property value does not match the reference property value.

The present disclosure provides an apparatus, method, and system that can electronically and remotely detect any tampering or unauthorized opening of network equipment. In other words, there is no need to physically inspect or monitor network equipment to detect that tampering has occurred. It is also possible, utilizing the present disclosure, to detect tampering that could have occurred during device102being powered “OFF”. Specifically, because the brittle adhesive106breaks during opening, it changes the physical property value of the circuit108, and the property value change is measurable and detectable once the device100is later powered back “ON”.

The present disclosure also provides an efficient and cost effective system, method, and apparatus for tamper detection, because it does not require actual physical inspection or monitoring by operators. Because the property value is periodically measured, and such measurement occurs automatically, it is possible to remotely and electronically detect when an unauthorized tampering has occurred.

Embodiments of the present invention may be implemented in software (executed by one or more processors), hardware (e.g., an application specific integrated circuit), or a combination of software and hardware. In an example embodiment, the software (e.g., application logic, an instruction set) is maintained on any one of various conventional non-transitory computer-readable media. In the context of this document, a “non-transitory computer-readable medium” may be any media or means that can contain, store, communicate, propagate or transport the instructions for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device, such as a computer. A non-transitory computer-readable medium may comprise a computer-readable storage medium (e.g., memory or other device) that may be any media or means that can contain or store the instructions for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device, such as a computer. As such, the present invention includes a computer program product comprising a computer-readable storage medium bearing computer program code embodied therein for use with a computer, the computer program code comprising code for performing any of the methods and variations thereof as previously described. Further, the present invention also includes an apparatus which comprises one or more processors, and one or more memories including computer program code, wherein the one or more memories and the computer program code are configured, with the one or more processors, to cause the apparatus to perform any of the methods and variations thereof as previously described.