CLOUD-BASED SECURITY FOR IDENTITY IMPOSTER

A computer-implemented method that secures cloud services from imposters automatically activating an imposter security service (ISS) responsive to receiving an imposter identifier (IID) of an imposter from an identity access and management system (IAMS). The ISS comprises a manipulation mapping table (MMT) that stores configurable factors to assist in control of execution of a cloud service security element (CSSE) in a respective cloud service of the cloud services. The ISS also comprises a decision engine (DE) that interacts with the MMT. The method exchanges imposter security information between the ISS and the CSSE and between the MMT and the DE, and directs the imposter security information to be sent to security information and event management (SIEM).

BACKGROUND

Disclosed herein is a system and related method for a cloud-based security system for handling an identity imposter. Identity and access management (IAM) is an important part of any enterprise security plan, as it is inextricably linked to the security and productivity of organizations in today's digitally enabled economy. Knowing the importance of identity and IAM protection mechanisms, digital hackers and other improper actors are adopting many ways like phishing, malware attack, social engineering and other low-tech tactics to steal the identities. These stolen identities are normally sold on the dark web to identity hackers who uses these identities to commit illegal activities mostly for financial gains.

SUMMARY

According to one aspect disclosed herein, a computer-implemented method to secure cloud services from imposters is provided comprising, automatically activating an imposter security service (ISS) responsive to receiving an imposter identifier (IID) of an imposter from an identity access and management system (IAMS). The ISS comprises a manipulation mapping table (MMT) that stores configurable factors to assist in control of execution of a cloud service security element (CSSE) in a respective cloud service of the cloud services. The ISS also comprises a decision engine (DE) that interacts with the MMT. The method exchanges imposter security information between the ISS and the CSSE and between the MMT and the DE, and directs the imposter security information to be sent to security information and event management (SIEM).

Embodiments disclosed herein further comprise an apparatus that is configured to implement the method described above.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The following general acronyms may be used below:

TABLE 1General AcronymsAPIapplication program interfaceARMadvanced RISC machineCD-ROMcompact disc ROMCMScontent management systemCoDcapacity on demandCPUcentral processing unitCUoDcapacity upgrade on demandDPSdata processing systemDVDdigital versatile diskEVCexpiring virtual currency (a virtual currency having anexpiration date, or subject to other virtual currencyusage rules; local virtual currencies with expiration dates)EVCUexpiring virtual currency (units)EPROMerasable programmable read-only memoryFPGAfield-programmable gate arraysHAhigh availabilityIaaSinfrastructure as a serviceI/Oinput/outputIPLinitial program loadISPInternet service providerISAinstruction-set-architectureLANlocal-area networkLPARlogical partitionPaaSplatform as a servicePDApersonal digital assistantPLAprogrammable logic arraysRAMrandom access memoryRISCreduced instruction set computerROMread-only memorySaaSsoftware as a serviceSLAservice level agreementSRAMstatic random-access memoryVCURvirtual currency usage rulesWANwide-area network

Data Processing System in General

FIG.1Ais a block diagram of an example DPS according to one or more embodiments. In this illustrative example, the DPS10may include communications bus12, which may provide communications between a processor unit14, a memory16, persistent storage18, a communications unit20, an I/O unit22, and a display24.

The processor unit14serves to execute instructions for software that may be loaded into the memory16. The processor unit14may be a number of processors, a multi-core processor, or some other type of processor, depending on the particular implementation. A number, as used herein with reference to an item, means one or more items. Further, the processor unit14may be implemented using a number of heterogeneous processor systems in which a main processor is present with secondary processors on a single chip. As another illustrative example, the processor unit14may be a symmetric multi-processor system containing multiple processors of the same type.

The memory16and persistent storage18are examples of storage devices26. A storage device may be any piece of hardware that is capable of storing information, such as, for example without limitation, data, program code in functional form, and/or other suitable information either on a temporary basis and/or a permanent basis. The memory16, in these examples, may be, for example, a random access memory or any other suitable volatile or non-volatile storage device. The persistent storage18may take various forms depending on the particular implementation.

For example, the persistent storage18may contain one or more components or devices. For example, the persistent storage18may be a hard drive, a flash memory, a rewritable optical disk, a rewritable magnetic tape, or some combination of the above. The media used by the persistent storage18also may be removable. For example, a removable hard drive may be used for the persistent storage18.

The communications unit20in these examples may provide for communications with other DPSs or devices. In these examples, the communications unit20is a network interface card. The communications unit20may provide communications through the use of either or both physical and wireless communications links.

The input/output unit22may allow for input and output of data with other devices that may be connected to the DPS10. For example, the input/output unit22may provide a connection for user input through a keyboard, a mouse, and/or some other suitable input device. Further, the input/output unit22may send output to a printer. The display24may provide a mechanism to display information to a user.

Instructions for the operating system, applications and/or programs may be located in the storage devices26, which are in communication with the processor unit14through the communications bus12. In these illustrative examples, the instructions are in a functional form on the persistent storage18. These instructions may be loaded into the memory16for execution by the processor unit14. The processes of the different embodiments may be performed by the processor unit14using computer implemented instructions, which may be located in a memory, such as the memory16. These instructions are referred to as program code38(described below) computer usable program code, or computer readable program code that may be read and executed by a processor in the processor unit14. The program code in the different embodiments may be embodied on different physical or tangible computer readable media, such as the memory16or the persistent storage18.

The DPS10may further comprise an interface for a network29. The interface may include hardware, drivers, software, and the like to allow communications over wired and wireless networks29and may implement any number of communication protocols, including those, for example, at various levels of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) seven layer model.

FIG.1Afurther illustrates a computer program product30that may contain the program code38. The program code38may be located in a functional form on the computer readable media32that is selectively removable and may be loaded onto or transferred to the DPS10for execution by the processor unit14. The program code38and computer readable media32may form a computer program product30in these examples. In one example, the computer readable media32may be computer readable storage media34or computer readable signal media36. Computer readable storage media34may include, for example, an optical or magnetic disk that is inserted or placed into a drive or other device that is part of the persistent storage18for transfer onto a storage device, such as a hard drive, that is part of the persistent storage18. The computer readable storage media34also may take the form of a persistent storage, such as a hard drive, a thumb drive, or a flash memory, that is connected to the DPS10. In some instances, the computer readable storage media34may not be removable from the DPS10.

Alternatively, the program code38may be transferred to the DPS10using the computer readable signal media36. The computer readable signal media36may be, for example, a propagated data signal containing the program code38. For example, the computer readable signal media36may be an electromagnetic signal, an optical signal, and/or any other suitable type of signal. These signals may be transmitted over communications links, such as wireless communications links, optical fiber cable, coaxial cable, a wire, and/or any other suitable type of communications link. In other words, the communications link and/or the connection may be physical or wireless in the illustrative examples.

In some illustrative embodiments, the program code38may be downloaded over a network to the persistent storage18from another device or DPS through the computer readable signal media36for use within the DPS10. For instance, program code stored in a computer readable storage medium in a server DPS may be downloaded over a network from the server to the DPS10. The DPS providing the program code38may be a server computer, a client computer, or some other device capable of storing and transmitting the program code38.

The different components illustrated for the DPS10are not meant to provide architectural limitations to the manner in which different embodiments may be implemented. The different illustrative embodiments may be implemented in a DPS including components in addition to or in place of those illustrated for the DPS10.

Cloud Computing in General

Characteristics are as Follows

Service Models are as Follows

Deployment Models are as Follows

Referring now toFIG.1B, illustrative cloud computing environment52is depicted. As shown, cloud computing environment52includes one or more cloud computing nodes50with which local computing devices used by cloud consumers, such as, for example, personal digital assistant (PDA) or cellular telephone54A, desktop computer54B, laptop computer54C, and/or automobile computer system54N may communicate. Nodes50may communicate with one another. They may be grouped (not shown) physically or virtually, in one or more networks, such as Private, Community, Public, or Hybrid clouds as described hereinabove, or a combination thereof. This allows cloud computing environment52to offer infrastructure, platforms and/or software as services for which a cloud consumer does not need to maintain resources on a local computing device. It is understood that the types of computing devices54A-N shown inFIG.1Bare intended to be illustrative only and that computing nodes50and cloud computing environment52can communicate with any type of computerized device over any type of network and/or network addressable connection (e.g., using a web browser).

Referring now toFIG.1C, a set of functional abstraction layers provided by cloud computing environment52(FIG.1B) is shown. It should be understood in advance that the components, layers, and functions shown inFIG.1Care intended to be illustrative only and embodiments of the invention are not limited thereto. As depicted, the following layers and corresponding functions are provided:

Any of the nodes50in the computing environment52as well as the computing devices54A-N may be a DPS10.

Computer Readable Media

The present invention may be a system, a method, and/or a computer readable media at any possible technical detail level of integration. The computer program product may include a computer readable storage medium (or media) having computer readable program instructions thereon for causing a processor to carry out aspects of the present invention.

Cloud-Based Security for Identity Imposter

The following application-specific acronyms may be used below:

An identity imposter is one who assumes a false identity or title for the purpose of deception. In the computer world, such an imposter is one who improperly uses the identity of another in order to gain improper access to resources on a computer or within a computer network. It is desirable to quickly detect and neutralize an imposter in order to safeguard computer systems and networks.

It is possible to detect imposters in a number of ways, such as through their behavior, access location, or devices being used. Although immediately terminating an improper access may be, in some instances, desirable, this is not always the best course of action. In some instances, it may be desirable to not reject certain accesses by an imposter, but rather to allow the imposter to access various integrated systems in order to learn their plans secretly and gather the concrete evidence required to prosecute the imposter, particularly when insiders are involved. An identity access and management system (IAMS) may be used to detect and deal with hackers and imposters.

FIG.2is a block diagram that illustrates an environment200in which the IAMS212is implemented within a cloud environment210. The cloud environment210may be, for example, a cloud computing environment52. The computers and devices that operate within the cloud computing environment52may be, e.g., DPSs10. The cloud210may contain a number of elements or services, including, by way of example, an application(s)214, a mail server216, a database(s)218, security orchestration (SOAR)220, and security information and event management (SIEM)222.

In normal operation, a normal, proper service requester, or proper client202A may access the cloud210in order to use one of the cloud's integrated elements or services. The IAMS212may monitor the access and, upon determining that there appear to be no security issues, allow normal access. Even under such normal circumstances, the IAMS212may keep a log of relevant activity, which may be helpful for a variety of reasons, but including the possibility that undetected improper activity has taken place.

However, various embodiments disclosed herein use the IAMS212to detect and identify a hacker or an imposter202B. When such an imposter202B is detected, the IAMS212may, as one of its functions, alert the integrated elements or services of the detection and take further action. Further action may involve simply terminating the imposter202B once detected. However, the immediate termination may not necessarily be the best action that can be taken. In many instances, it may be advantageous to allow the imposter202B to attempt various activities while at the same time tracking and logging those activities so that, for example, strong evidence may be collected in the event it is desired to prosecute the imposter202B. However, rather than allow the imposter202B access to actual data and/or functionality of the cloud services, which would likely still be detrimental even if the activities could be tracked, it may further prove beneficial if the imposter202B were given access to fake data and/or functionality of the cloud services. Such actions may be particularly valuable if insiders to a business are involved.

Various embodiments disclosed herein may also use an intermediary subscription-based service for identifying what set of cloud services/processes may be exposed/allowed. The intermediary subscription-based service may also identify the ways through which cloud assets may be protected while allowing these activities covertly and identifying and reporting the malicious intent of the identity imposter202B. It may achieve this by understanding/monitoring/recording his/her after-intrusion activities with the IAMS212integrated cloud services. The IAMS212may, upon detecting the identity breach, create an imposter identifier (imposter ID (or IID)) instead of a normal user authentication ID and share the imposter ID with the integrated systems of the cloud210.

FIG.3is a block diagram that illustrates a basic system300for an entity who has subscribed to an imposter security service (ISS)330(which may be a variant or a part of the IAMS212). As illustrated, the proper client202A attempts to log into the cloud210in order to properly access a particular cloud service340A,340B (collectively or representatively referred to by340). The proper client202A may attempt to access the cloud service340using an embedded connecting layer (CL) (342A and342B for cloud service340A and340B, respectively) via the IAMS212, which may include, e.g., a single sign-on (SSO) mechanism. The IAMS212may determine that the proper client202A is, in fact, a proper client and grant normal access to the various cloud services340that the proper client202A has proper access to.

Also as illustrated, when an imposter202B attempts to log into the cloud210in order to improperly access a particular cloud service340, the IAMS212may create an imposter ID, which may then be sent to the ISS330. The ISS330(which may be a subscription-based service) may be automatically triggered upon receiving the imposter's ID from the IAMS212.

The ISS330may, in some embodiments, and using ISS-resident service components332A,332B, coupled respectively with the CLs342A,342B, implement: a) a manipulation mapping table (MMT)334, Table 3, which stores configurable factors to dictate and control the working of the CL342operations in the respective cloud services340, and b) a decision engine (DE)336that detects a threat severity based on the imposter's202B past activities, determines the next best action, and updates necessary MMT factors to influence the CL's342operations accordingly. The example MMT334in Table 3 below illustrates different functions that may be handled differently, based on the determined nature of the imposter.

While the imposter202B is not aware of covert background activities taken by the ISS330and CL342, the ISS330secures the cloud services340from the imposter202B to provide tighter control and a customized response to the imposter's202B activities by using the CL342with exposed ISS330functionalities to various service components or constructs. The ISS330may utilize the decision engine336to find various security patterns and decide a next best action.

The ways through which cloud assets (assets of the cloud services340) may be protected while allowing these activities covertly and identifying and reporting the malicious intent of the identity imposter202B may be achieved by understanding/monitoring/recording the imposter's202B after-intrusion activities with the IAM integrated cloud services340,342. This approach may negate the need for use of both an emulated and a production network/system, and thus eliminate the need for an emulated network to be scanned or for a mimicking of an environment. This, in turn may reduce needed resources over such approaches.

In more detail, the system may use the IAMS212to detect an incoming user as an identity imposter202B, and may use an intermediary subscription-based service for identifying what set of cloud services/processes CS1, CS2(340) may be exposed/allowed and the ways through which cloud assets/services340can be protected while allowing these activities covertly and identifying and reporting the malicious intent of the identity imposter202B by understanding/monitoring/recording his/her after-intrusion activities with the IAM integrated cloud services. This may be achieved by utilizing the CLs342that are embedded and enabled in the various cloud services340to be secured. The ISS330may be triggered by the imposter202B user ID sent to it by the IAMS212. The ISS-resident service components332may then interact with the CLs342to provide the imposter202B with an artificial experience in interacting with the particular cloud service342in a way that does not actually compromise security.

The subscription-based ISS330is triggered upon receiving the imposter's202B ID from the IAMS212, and the IAMS212may further share, as a part of the imposter's202B ID, the user ID of the proper user202A who has been hacked, if known, and possible a risk score, such as, e.g., high, medium, and low, or possibly a numerical value representing risk.

The MMT334may store configurable factors to dictate and control the working of the CL342operations in the respective cloud services340. The decision engine336, which detects a threat severity based on the imposter's202B (or similar imposters) past activities, may determine a next best action, and may update various MMT334factors to influence the CLs342operations accordingly. The ISS330may check the MMT334for configurations and mappings related to various cloud services340that the imposter202B can access so that the ISS330may start protecting the cloud services340without informing the imposter202B of detection while recording imposter's202B activities. In some embodiments, the IAM system may mediate, manipulate, and log the imposter's request/response/UI behavior for any cloud service340using the CL342operations. The CL's342operation may be, in some embodiments, dictated and controlled by configurable factors stored in the MMT334at the ISS330level. In some embodiments, the ISS330dynamically determines the next best action to be taken by the CL340for a current imposter's202B request using the DE336at the ISS330level, which can determine threat severity from the imposter's202B stored past activities stored in the imposter activity log338. The ISS330may further influence the CL's342activity indirectly by updating various MMT334factors. When the imposter's202B sessions close, the DE336may share the activities of the imposter202B, the CL342response, threat findings, and recommendations with the IAM for offense investigation. The MMT334, the DE336, and the activity log338are illustrated as being within the ISS330, but outside of the cloud service components332of the ISS330. However, the location of the MMT334, the DE336, and activity log338may be provided within the CS332blocks, or at a different location within the cloud320.

In sum, to deal with imposters202B, as soon as an IAMS212detects an identity breach, it may begin imposter security activity (ISA). The ISA may include, as described above, creating an imposter ID instead of normal user authentication ID and sharing the imposter ID with all integrated systems that may be impacted by the breach. An imposter ID may comprise, for example: 1) the user id that is hacked; 2) a suspected insider id (if a confidence score is high); and 3) a risk score (e.g., high, medium, low) based on detected and calculated risk factors.

The role of having integrated systems in a cloud environment may be of value. On receiving the imposter ID from the IAMS212, the integrated system may adopt a protection mechanism secretly based on a risk score, and at the same time allow the imposter202B to access the system without letting the imposter202B know about their discovery. The system may engage in ISA, such as recording the activity of the imposter, and then, once the session is closed, share relevant activity logs with the IAMS212and temporarily disable the user id used for this session. Based on the activity logs received from the integrated systems, the IAM212may share the information collected. According to some embodiments, an SS with ISS integrated with an IAM may identify the allowed activities based on imposter ID details, identify what set of cloud services/processes may be exposed and/or allowed, and the ways through which cloud assets may be protected while allowing these activities covertly. The ISS330may identify and report the malicious intent of the identity imposter by understanding/monitoring/recording of the identity imposter's after-intrusion activities with the IAMS212integrated cloud services, as well as prepare and respond to the threats.

Thus, according various embodiments, an imposter202B using a stolen user id enters through the IAMS212, which detects the incoming user as an imposter and allows the imposter202B to access the imposter-intended service340through the ISS330, instead of giving direct access to the service340. The ISS330is designed to provide security to cloud services from such imposters. The ISS keeps default/customized mappings and configurable factors with the MMT334at its end to work with a CL342embedded close to a UI layer at each service340. The CL342at every service340may be responsible to record, mediate, and manipulate the imposter's request/response/UI behavior with the help of the ISS330in order to secure the service340and makes the service340seem operationally normal to imposter202B. Upon receiving an imposter request, details from the CL342, using the MMT334, returns manipulation commands/script which are performed at the request and response level. While this interaction goes on, the DE336and the other components at the ISS330level, may work to detect/predict the threat severity/pattern from imposter's past activities across the various cloud services. The DE336may also dynamically update various MMT334factors related to a risk score or next best action to be taken to further strengthening security at all service levels. Until the imposter sessions are closed, this sequence of operations between the ISS330and CL342may continue. Finally, the ISS330may share the summary of overall imposter activity logs and security measures taken with the IAM212for a next action.

This implementation of using the CL342is not the only way to protect a cloud service. In some embodiments, the MMT334and the DE336components at the ISS330may also be accessed from low level in-service components through APIs. This alternative implementation method gives the flexibility and tighter control on cloud service operations. There can be services that implement both the MMT334and the DE336, and use them appropriately as needed. The CL342and the APIs present on the cloud services340may be referred to generically herein as cloud service security elements (CSSEs). In some cloud architectures, various embodiments may include both the CL342and APIs. In these embodiments, some further variations may have a particular cloud service340using only one of the CL342and an API, whereas in other variations, a particular cloud service340may use both.

FIGS.4A and4Bare block diagrams illustrating different cloud service architectures for implementing various embodiments of the cloud-based security described herein.FIG.4Ashows the combined ISS330and cloud service410(340inFIG.3) according to embodiments described above that require a minimal architectural change in the cloud service410, namely, by the inclusion of the CL411(342inFIG.3).FIG.4B, discussed below, requires a major architectural change in the cloud service410and does not include the CL411requires the use of API calls to achieve the functionality that the CL410provides inFIG.4A.

InFIG.4A, the CL411receives the imposter202B user request420A via the browser or other UI402service. The CL411records UI402activities and requests, and manipulates the content going to the UI402. The CL411passes on the manipulated request420B to controller application logic412. The controller application logic gathers data and/or updates422from the model business logic416. The model business logic works with424integrated servers that may include a DBS418and other system419.

The controller application logic412renders obtained information in a way that may be presented to the UI402and passes the rendered information426to the view presentation logic414. The view presentation logic414passes on the original response428A to the CL411. The CL411then manipulates the response and sends the manipulated response428B to the UI402.

FIG.4Bis a figure similar toFIG.4A, and like elements are not described again. The primary difference is that there is no CL411, and thus, implementation of the functionality provided by the CL411inFIG.4Bis performed by APIs that are present in the controller application logic412, the view presentation logic414, the model business logic416, the DBS418, and the other systems419. However, modifying these elements to incorporate the APIs may require extensive effort. The controller application logic412directly receives the user request420from the UI402and the manipulations may be performed using the API calls. Similarly, the view presentation logic414directly manipulates the response and sends the manipulated response428to the UI402.

Use Case

FIG.5illustrates a process500according to some embodiments, of using cloud-based security for an identity imposter202B. With regard to the process500, an illustrative use case is provided as follows. John and Peter work as application support executives at Bank-X's backend office; both are good friends. However, Peter is upset with John because John has recently been given a privileged account to: 1) tackle mission critical defects by directly accessing a production DB; and 2) do external mail communication directly with customers. Both John and Peter have a common friend, Frank, who is working as a loan agent in Bank-Y, a competitor of Bank-X.

To achieve his yearly targets, Frank approaches John and Peter to get some reference customers for marketing Bank-Y's new mortgage loan offering. Frank promises them a good percentage of commissions from his share in case referral customers onboard. John, serving as the proper client202A in this use case, acts properly and ignores Frank's proposal. Peter, acting as the imposter202B in this use case, makes up his mind to pursue the opportunity seriously. As expected, this permits Frank to close extra business, resulting in Peter getting additional money from Frank.

The ability to make extra money in this way makes Peter desire to expand his efforts. He plans and agrees with Frank to break into John's set of customer data from the Bank-X production DB, which serves in this use case as a cloud service340. With the help of malware, Peter successfully steals John's credential and both Peter and Frank plan to explore the cloud-based production DB, without being aware that Bank-X has subscribed to the ISS330to protect its cloud services340. The following illustrates how Bank-X's ISS330subscription not only identifies the intentions of Peter and Frank, but also collects enough evidence to make clear the wrongdoing.

On Saturday night, Peter tries logging in as John from his office-provided laptop into the production DB. In operation505, the IAMS212detects a suspected insider threat as an imposter's202B entry when Imposter Peter logs in as John from his laptop during the weekend. The IAMS212may determine this activity is suspicious, using, e.g., historical information about user activity patterns, since John has never logged in using his laptop on weekend days. The IAMS212may utilize any type of information, such as devices used to login, times and dates, information about a current location of the user (that the user has granted Bank-X access permission to), or other information, to determine if activity is suspicious or not.

In this particular use case, in order to establish the improper conduct with more certainty, the IAMS212contacts John on his mobile app and asks John if he needs access to the production DB today, which John declines. Based on John's response (or, potentially, a lack of a response), the IAMS212may determine with near certainty that the attempted login is from one acting as an imposter202B. Other forms of confirmation may be utilized (secondary passwords or secondary authentication procedures, etc.).

Having received an indication that John does not need access to the production DB today, the IAMS212may conclude that this person attempting to login as John (Imposter Peter) is an imposter. The determination of an imposter or not may be based on a probability threshold. In other words, while it may not be absolutely certain that the person seeking access is an imposter, the IAMS212may still treat the person as an imposter if indications suggest a certain predetermined probability threshold has been crossed. In most situations, it will be better to have a false positive for an imposter than a false negative, since no harm will be done if the IAMS212mistakenly presumes someone to be an imposter who is not.

In response, the IAMS212creates an imposter ID (user: John; imposter: Peter; risk score: low), and approves the cloud access, but routed through the ISS330. In some embodiments, the identity of Imposter Peter may be determined by a number of factors. By way of example, the identity of Imposter Peter may be determined by keyboard and/or mouse user patterns, access location, and/or devices being used. Based on one or more factors (which may be weighted factors), a probability of an assigned imposter identity may be determined. In this case, the risk score may be low, due to the fact that the company knows more about Peter than an outsider and has more control over Peter than it would of outsiders.

In operation510, the ISS330checks the MMT334for configurations and mappings of how to handle the imposter202B for this particular service340, as well as other various cloud services which Imposter Peter can access. With this information, the ISS330can start protecting the cloud services without Imposter Peter knowing that these activities are taking place, and the ISS330and/or CL342may start recording the activities, responses, etc.

In operation515, a determination may be made by the ISS330as to whether the cloud service340has a CL342embedded. If not (515:NO), then in some embodiments, in operation525, the service340internal components may receive notice that the request is being made by the imposter (Imposter Peter)202B and handle the operation itself using, for example, APIs. In some embodiments, the ISS330may terminate the imposter's202B access if the service240does not have handlers for an imposter202B—or, in this situation, may take other steps to deal with the imposter, such as attempting to engage the imposter202B to provide additional information.

If the cloud service240has a CL342embedded (515:YES), then, in operation520, the CL342may receive the imposter's202B request through, e.g., a user interface to the cloud service240and handle various aspects of it. Based on the MMT334values for the requested operation, the CL342may decide how to manipulate responses to the request.

Regardless of whether the CL342or the cloud service340internal components receive and handle the imposter's202B request, in operation530, the request is analyzed in order to determine how to handle the request. The DE336at the ISS330may analyze the imposter's202B requests and responses received from various cloud services340A,340B, to dynamically detect and determine the threat severity. The imposter's202B activities may be determined as being attributed to an overarching intent (e.g., steal data, steal money, damage or disrupt the computer systems of the business entity, etc.) This overarching intent can further be used to update the imposter's202B risk score or other MMT330values.

Table 4, depicted below, illustrates an example MMT334for the initial imposter202B login and data access by Imposter Peter. The ISS330activates the CL342A of, e.g., the production DB services cloud service340, and shares information about received imposter202B ID with the CL342A. The CL342A allows Imposter Peter202B to login and (from his perspective) appear to be accessing the production DB. The MMT334contains entries for the production DB service. As shown in Table 4, the login and write functions for the production DB are handled in the same way, regardless of whether the imposter202B is a known user or not. No request or response control is necessary, since the response to a login of an imposter202B is handled in the same way. In response to a write request, the CL342A does nothing to the production database, but gives the imposter202B a fake confirmation that the data was written to the production DB.

In operation535, if the session created by the imposter is still active (535:YES), then the process may return to operation510and continue monitoring the activities of Imposter Peter. If the session created by the imposter is ended (535:NO), then the ISS330may perform session termination operations that may include activities such as creating and summarizing imposter activity logs for the IAMS212as well as security measures that have been taken. The IAMS212may then format and report this information to a designated SIEM and/or other stakeholders for investigation.

In the use case, however, Imposter Peter is not done with his session and now desires to see and copy the data from the CUSTOMER table in the production DB as planned, so he issues a SELECT * request on the CUSTOMER table. The CL342A receives this request and shares it with the ISS330. Since Imposter Peter is a known user and the request is a read request, Table 4 indicates that the request is to be allowed to run against the production DB table. Since the response is controlled with a “randomize output”, the CL342A randomizes all of the numbers with same data type and replaces client names with a false data set. Imposter Peter then copies this randomized data into a file and logs out from the production DB.

Imposter Peter now needs to send this file to Frank, so Imposter Peter compiles an e-mail from John's id, attaches the file, and, using an e-mail service340B, sends it to Frank. According to Table 5, the response control to this activity is to show the e-mail as being sent (even though the e-mail service340B has not actually sent it), and to update Imposter Peter's view of his e-mail as having successfully sent the e-mail. Upon receiving the fake confirmation of the “e-mail sent” message, Imposter Peter deletes the mail from sent folder. The CL342B works as per the MMT334configuration entry for the e-mail service340B in the ISS330for the e-mail service340B.

Imposter Peter considers his efforts using John's ID as successful. The DE336at the ISS330analyses the sequence of Imposter Peter's activities done with the DB service340A and the e-mail service340B, and identifies a security threat case as a serious “data exfiltration to out-of-company entity” case. The DE336at the ISS330may update the MMT334entries to close the existing sessions for services340A and340B, and this may be done immediately. The DE336may further not allow the imposter to login to any further cloud service unless this ID is unblocked (e.g., automatically or manually) by a security analyst.

In yet another round, Imposter Peter further decides to check the HR application (a further service340) to find out John's salary. However, since the ISS330has now implemented a lockout on Imposter Peter's account, Imposter Peter is now unable to access the salary information due to the technical maintenance cycle kicking-in with regard to the closing of this login ID. In other embodiments, however, the ISS330can repeat as before and provide fake information while recording all of the activities that are occurring without implementing the lockout on Imposter Peter's account.

Imposter Peter, having considered the operation a success, calls Frank to share the news and abandons further efforts to use this login ID. In the background, the ISS330shares Imposter Peter's activity report (which may, e.g., comprise Peter's executed activities, screen snapshots, and all other IOCs) to the IAMS212. The IAMS212may then automatically take measures, such as raising the case investigation ticket with the IR tool while blocking John's access from Imposter Peter's machine. The organization may now have the evidence it needs to bring legal action against Imposter Peter and Frank.

When the same process is tried by someone who is an outsider and is using some unknown device from outside of the network, the risk score may be high and, accordingly, the activity reach may also be limited by the MMT334and the DE336. In all, the activities performed by both the insider and the outsider may be logged along with any additional information that may be related to their intentions.

Technical Application

The one or more embodiments disclosed herein accordingly provide an improvement to computer technology. For example, various embodiments described herein represent an improvement to cloud-based security for an identity imposter allows for a more secure and effective network and cloud resource computing environment.