Apparatus and method for assigning cyber-security risk consequences in industrial process control environments

A method includes identifying multiple devices or groups of devices in an industrial process control and automation system. The method also includes, for each device or group of devices, (i) obtaining impact values identifying potential effects of a failure or compromise of the device or group of devices due to one or more cyber-security risks and (ii) identifying a consequence value using the impact values. Multiple impact values associated with different categories of potential effects are obtained, and the consequence value identifies an overall effect of the failure or compromise of the device or group of devices.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This disclosure relates generally to network security. More specifically, this disclosure relates to an apparatus and method for assigning cyber-security risk consequences in industrial process control environments.

BACKGROUND

Processing facilities are often managed using industrial process control and automation systems. Conventional control and automation systems routinely include a variety of networked devices, such as servers, workstations, switches, routers, firewalls, safety systems, proprietary real-time controllers, and industrial field devices. Often times, this equipment comes from a number of different vendors. In industrial environments, cyber-security is of increasing concern, and unaddressed security vulnerabilities in any of these components could be exploited by attackers to disrupt operations or cause unsafe conditions in an industrial facility.

SUMMARY

This disclosure provides an apparatus and method for assigning cyber-security risk consequences in industrial process control environments.

In a first embodiment, a method includes identifying multiple devices or groups of devices in an industrial process control and automation system. The method also includes, for each device or group of devices, (i) obtaining impact values identifying potential effects of a failure or compromise of the device or group of devices due to one or more cyber-security risks and (ii) identifying a consequence value using the impact values. Multiple impact values associated with different categories of potential effects are obtained, and the consequence value identifies an overall effect of the failure or compromise of the device or group of devices.

In a second embodiment, an apparatus includes at least one processing device configured to identify multiple devices or groups of devices in an industrial process control and automation system. The at least one processing device is also configured, for each device or group of devices, to (i) obtain impact values identifying potential effects of a failure or compromise of the device or group of devices due to one or more cyber-security risks and (ii) identify a consequence value using the impact values. Multiple impact values associated with different categories of potential effects are obtained, and the consequence value identifies an overall effect of the failure or compromise of the device or group of devices.

In a third embodiment, a non-transitory computer readable medium embodies computer readable program code that when executed causes at least one processing device to identify multiple devices or groups of devices in an industrial process control and automation system. The computer readable medium also embodies computer readable program code that when executed causes the at least one processing device, for each device or group of devices, to (i) obtain impact values identifying potential effects of a failure or compromise of the device or group of devices due to one or more cyber-security risks and (ii) identify a consequence value using the impact values. Multiple impact values associated with different categories of potential effects are obtained, and the consequence value identifies an overall effect of the failure or compromise of the device or group of devices.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

FIG. 1illustrates an example industrial process control and automation system100according to this disclosure. As shown inFIG. 1, the system100includes various components that facilitate production or processing of at least one product or other material. For instance, the system100is used here to facilitate control over components in one or multiple plants101a-101n. Each plant101a-101nrepresents one or more processing facilities (or one or more portions thereof), such as one or more manufacturing facilities for producing at least one product or other material. In general, each plant101a-101nmay implement one or more processes and can individually or collectively be referred to as a process system. A process system generally represents any system or portion thereof configured to process one or more products or other materials in some manner.

InFIG. 1, the system100is implemented using the Purdue model of process control. In the Purdue model, “Level 0” may include one or more sensors102aand one or more actuators102b. The sensors102aand actuators102brepresent components in a process system that may perform any of a wide variety of functions. For example, the sensors102acould measure a wide variety of characteristics in the process system, such as temperature, pressure, or flow rate. Also, the actuators102bcould alter a wide variety of characteristics in the process system. The sensors102aand actuators102bcould represent any other or additional components in any suitable process system. Each of the sensors102aincludes any suitable structure for measuring one or more characteristics in a process system. Each of the actuators102bincludes any suitable structure for operating on or affecting one or more conditions in a process system.

At least one network104is coupled to the sensors102aand actuators102b. The network104facilitates interaction with the sensors102aand actuators102b. For example, the network104could transport measurement data from the sensors102aand provide control signals to the actuators102b. The network104could represent any suitable network or combination of networks. As particular examples, the network104could represent an Ethernet network, an electrical signal network (such as a HART or FOUNDATION FIELDBUS network), a pneumatic control signal network, or any other or additional type(s) of network(s).

In the Purdue model, “Level 1” may include one or more controllers106, which are coupled to the network104. Among other things, each controller106may use the measurements from one or more sensors102ato control the operation of one or more actuators102b. For example, a controller106could receive measurement data from one or more sensors102aand use the measurement data to generate control signals for one or more actuators102b. Each controller106includes any suitable structure for interacting with one or more sensors102aand controlling one or more actuators102b. Each controller106could, for example, represent a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller or a multivariable controller, such as a Robust Multivariable Predictive Control Technology (RMPCT) controller or other type of controller implementing model predictive control (MPC) or other advanced predictive control (APC). As a particular example, each controller106could represent a computing device running a real-time operating system.

Two networks108are coupled to the controllers106. The networks108facilitate interaction with the controllers106, such as by transporting data to and from the controllers106. The networks108could represent any suitable networks or combination of networks. As a particular example, the networks108could represent a redundant pair of Ethernet networks, such as a FAULT TOLERANT ETHERNET (FTE) network from HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC.

At least one switch/firewall110couples the networks108to two networks112. The switch/firewall110may transport traffic from one network to another. The switch/firewall110may also block traffic on one network from reaching another network. The switch/firewall110includes any suitable structure for providing communication between networks, such as a HONEYWELL CONTROL FIREWALL (CF9) device. The networks112could represent any suitable networks, such as an FTE network.

In the Purdue model, “Level 2” may include one or more machine-level controllers114coupled to the networks112. The machine-level controllers114perform various functions to support the operation and control of the controllers106, sensors102a, and actuators102b, which could be associated with a particular piece of industrial equipment (such as a boiler or other machine). For example, the machine-level controllers114could log information collected or generated by the controllers106, such as measurement data from the sensors102aor control signals for the actuators102b. The machine-level controllers114could also execute applications that control the operation of the controllers106, thereby controlling the operation of the actuators102b. In addition, the machine-level controllers114could provide secure access to the controllers106. Each of the machine-level controllers114includes any suitable structure for providing access to, control of, or operations related to a machine or other individual piece of equipment. Each of the machine-level controllers114could, for example, represent a server or other computing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating system. Although not shown, different machine-level controllers114could be used to control different pieces of equipment in a process system (where each piece of equipment is associated with one or more controllers106, sensors102a, and actuators102b).

One or more operator stations116are coupled to the networks112. The operator stations116represent computing or communication devices providing user access to the machine-level controllers114, which could then provide user access to the controllers106(and possibly the sensors102aand actuators102b). As particular examples, the operator stations116could allow users to review the operational history of the sensors102aand actuators102busing information collected by the controllers106and/or the machine-level controllers114. The operator stations116could also allow the users to adjust the operation of the sensors102a, actuators102b, controllers106, or machine-level controllers114. In addition, the operator stations116could receive and display warnings, alerts, or other messages or displays generated by the controllers106or the machine-level controllers114. Each of the operator stations116includes any suitable structure for supporting user access and control of one or more components in the system100. Each of the operator stations116could, for example, represent a computing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating system.

At least one router/firewall118couples the networks112to two networks120. The router/firewall118includes any suitable structure for providing communication between networks, such as a secure router or combination router/firewall. The networks120could represent any suitable networks, such as an FTE network.

In the Purdue model, “Level 3” may include one or more unit-level controllers122coupled to the networks120. Each unit-level controller122is typically associated with a unit in a process system, which represents a collection of different machines operating together to implement at least part of a process. The unit-level controllers122perform various functions to support the operation and control of components in the lower levels. For example, the unit-level controllers122could log information collected or generated by the components in the lower levels, execute applications that control the components in the lower levels, and provide secure access to the components in the lower levels. Each of the unit-level controllers122includes any suitable structure for providing access to, control of, or operations related to one or more machines or other pieces of equipment in a process unit. Each of the unit-level controllers122could, for example, represent a server or other computing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating system. Although not shown, different unit-level controllers122could be used to control different units in a process system (where each unit is associated with one or more machine-level controllers114, controllers106, sensors102a, and actuators102b).

Access to the unit-level controllers122may be provided by one or more operator stations124. Each of the operator stations124includes any suitable structure for supporting user access and control of one or more components in the system100. Each of the operator stations124could, for example, represent a computing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating system.

At least one router/firewall126couples the networks120to two networks128. The router/firewall126includes any suitable structure for providing communication between networks, such as a secure router or combination router/firewall. The networks128could represent any suitable networks, such as an FTE network.

In the Purdue model, “Level 4” may include one or more plant-level controllers130coupled to the networks128. Each plant-level controller130is typically associated with one of the plants101a-101n, which may include one or more process units that implement the same, similar, or different processes. The plant-level controllers130perform various functions to support the operation and control of components in the lower levels. As particular examples, the plant-level controller130could execute one or more manufacturing execution system (MES) applications, scheduling applications, or other or additional plant or process control applications. Each of the plant-level controllers130includes any suitable structure for providing access to, control of, or operations related to one or more process units in a process plant. Each of the plant-level controllers130could, for example, represent a server or other computing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating system.

Access to the plant-level controllers130may be provided by one or more operator stations132. Each of the operator stations132includes any suitable structure for supporting user access and control of one or more components in the system100. Each of the operator stations132could, for example, represent a computing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating system.

At least one router/firewall134couples the networks128to one or more networks136. The router/firewall134includes any suitable structure for providing communication between networks, such as a secure router or combination router/firewall. The network136could represent any suitable network, such as an enterprise-wide Ethernet or other network or all or a portion of a larger network (such as the Internet).

In the Purdue model, “Level 5” may include one or more enterprise-level controllers138coupled to the network136. Each enterprise-level controller138is typically able to perform planning operations for multiple plants101a-101nand to control various aspects of the plants101a-101n. The enterprise-level controllers138can also perform various functions to support the operation and control of components in the plants101a-101n. As particular examples, the enterprise-level controller138could execute one or more order processing applications, enterprise resource planning (ERP) applications, advanced planning and scheduling (APS) applications, or any other or additional enterprise control applications. Each of the enterprise-level controllers138includes any suitable structure for providing access to, control of, or operations related to the control of one or more plants. Each of the enterprise-level controllers138could, for example, represent a server or other computing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating system. In this document, the term “enterprise” refers to an organization having one or more plants or other processing facilities to be managed. Note that if a single plant101ais to be managed, the functionality of the enterprise-level controller138could be incorporated into the plant-level controller130.

Access to the enterprise-level controllers138may be provided by one or more operator stations140. Each of the operator stations140includes any suitable structure for supporting user access and control of one or more components in the system100. Each of the operator stations140could, for example, represent a computing device running a MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating system.

Various levels of the Purdue model can include other components, such as one or more databases. The database(s) associated with each level could store any suitable information associated with that level or one or more other levels of the system100. For example, a historian141can be coupled to the network136. The historian141could represent a component that stores various information about the system100. The historian141could, for instance, store information used during production scheduling and optimization. The historian141represents any suitable structure for storing and facilitating retrieval of information. Although shown as a single centralized component coupled to the network136, the historian141could be located elsewhere in the system100, or multiple historians could be distributed in different locations in the system100.

In particular embodiments, the various controllers and operator stations inFIG. 1may represent computing devices. For example, each of the controllers106,114,122,130,138could include one or more processing devices142and one or more memories144for storing instructions and data used, generated, or collected by the processing device(s)142. Each of the controllers106,114,122,130,138could also include at least one network interface146, such as one or more Ethernet interfaces or wireless transceivers. Also, each of the operator stations116,124,132,140could include one or more processing devices148and one or more memories150for storing instructions and data used, generated, or collected by the processing device(s)148. Each of the operator stations116,124,132,140could also include at least one network interface152, such as one or more Ethernet interfaces or wireless transceivers.

As noted above, cyber-security is of increasing concern with respect to industrial process control and automation systems. A cyber-security risk refers to a risk to at least one computing device, including the potential of illicit access, illicit change, or illicit damage to the computing device(s). Unaddressed security vulnerabilities in any of the components in the system100could be exploited by attackers to disrupt operations or cause unsafe conditions in an industrial facility. However, in many instances, operators do not have a complete understanding or inventory of all equipment running at a particular industrial site. As a result, it is often difficult to quickly determine potential sources of risk to a control and automation system.

In an industrial control and automation system, a tool or methodology could be used to assign a “risk score” to each cyber-security risk, and those risk scores could be used in various ways (such as to identify or prioritize the cyber-security risks in order to allow personnel to then reduce or eliminate those risks). Risk scores could be calculated as a function of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. Threats identify various types of cyber-security attacks that could be launched against an organization or its equipment, such as the installation of malware or the illicit control of processing equipment. Vulnerabilities identify weaknesses or other potential issues with networked equipment that could be exploited, such as missing or outdated antivirus software, misconfigured security settings, or weak or misconfigured firewalls. Consequences identify the types of effects or results that could be created if at least one of the threats materializes and exploits at least one of the vulnerabilities, such as physical damage to plant equipment.

In many instances, both threats and vulnerabilities are well-defined and generally consistent across and between organizations. For example, many organizations include computing devices that are vulnerable to the installation of malware or that could lack adequate antivirus software. However, consequences are often highly subjective and likely to introduce inconsistencies across and between organizations if configured arbitrarily. For instance, the consequence of a cyber-security threat materializing with one computer in one organization can be completely different from the consequence of the same cyber-security threat materializing with another computer in the same organization or with another computer in a different organization.

The lack of consistency in consequences can prevent accurate risk quantification. For example, in some instances, risk scores are generated to numerically or otherwise represent the significance of various cyber-security risks. Unfortunately, the lack of consistency in consequences can prevent risk scores from being accurately compared within and between different sites or organizations.

This disclosure provides a mechanism for identifying at least one consequence value of a cyber-security risk or incident against a specific target device or group of devices. A consequence value denotes a value that summarizes the overall effect or impact that could potentially occur as a result of a failure or compromise of the specific target device or group of devices. As a result, the consequence value can be derived from various potential impact(s) of the failure or compromise of the specific target device or group of devices.

This is accomplished using a risk manager154. Among other things, the risk manager154supports a technique in which the risk manager154“interviews” an end user during a configuration process, such as via a user interface or a configuration wizard, to determine the potential impacts that the failure or compromise of one or more devices or groups of devices could have. As examples, the potential impact of the failure or compromise of a specific target device or group of devices could include no impact, minor impact, moderate impact, high impact, or critical impact. Moreover, the potential impacts could be broken down into different categories, such as (i) potential impact to health, safety, and the environment (HSE), (ii) potential impact to production of products or other materials, and (iii) potential impact to an organization. Using this information, the risk manager154could generate consequence values for different devices or groups of devices within the industrial control and automation system100. By understanding both the independent consequence value of a device as well as the inter-connections and inter-relations of that device to other devices or groups within the industrial process control and automation system (as shown inFIG. 1), the risk manager154is able to utilize the device consequence values to determine accurate system-level consequence values and therefore accurate system-level risk scores. This allows more consistent consequence values to be generated, which (among other things) can help more consistent or more useful risk scores to be calculated and used.

Additional details regarding the operation of the risk manager154are provided below. The risk manager154includes any suitable structure that supports assigning cyber-security risk consequences in industrial process control environments. The functionality of the risk manager154could be implemented using any suitable hardware or a combination of hardware and software/firmware instructions. In this example, the risk manager154includes one or more processing devices156; one or more memories158for storing instructions and data used, generated, or collected by the processing device(s)156; and at least one network interface160. Each processing device156could represent a microprocessor, microcontroller, digital signal process, field programmable gate array, application specific integrated circuit, or discrete logic. Each memory158could represent a volatile or non-volatile storage and retrieval device, such as a random access memory or Flash memory. Each network interface160could represent an Ethernet interface, wireless transceiver, or other device facilitating external communication.

AlthoughFIG. 1illustrates one example of an industrial process control and automation system100, various changes may be made toFIG. 1. For example, a control and automation system could include any number of sensors, actuators, controllers, servers, operator stations, networks, risk managers, and other components. Also, the makeup and arrangement of the system100inFIG. 1is for illustration only. Components could be added, omitted, combined, or placed in any other suitable configuration according to particular needs. Further, particular functions have been described as being performed by particular components of the system100. This is for illustration only. In general, control and automation systems are highly configurable and can be configured in any suitable manner according to particular needs. In addition,FIG. 1illustrates an example environment in which the functions of the risk manager154can be used. This functionality can be used in any other suitable device or system.

FIG. 2illustrates an example graphical user interface200for assigning cyber-security risk consequences according to this disclosure. The graphical user interface200could, for example, be used by the risk manager154to obtain information from one or more end users in order to identify consequence values associated with cyber-security risks. Note, however, that the graphical user interface200could be used by any other suitable device and in any other suitable system.

As shown inFIG. 2, the graphical user interface200includes a list202. In this example, the list202identifies networked devices within an industrial control and automation system. Note, however, that the list202could also identify groups of networked devices, such as different zones. A zone generally defines a collection of networked devices that can be monitored or controlled as a group, often where the networked devices are related in some way (such as by equipment type, geographic area, function, or other characteristics). The number of devices or groups contained in the list202inFIG. 2is for illustration only and can vary depending on a number of factors, such as the system being managed or the area of the system previously selected by a user for monitoring or configuration. As a specific example, the devices or groups in the list202could be identified after an end user has selected a specific machine, unit, plant, or other subsection of a larger process system.

For each device or group in the list202, the graphical user interface200presents various information about that device or group. In this example, the list202identifies for each device a name204of the device and a network address206(such as an Internet Protocol address) of the device. Each device is also associated with a checkbox208, which controls whether the risk manager154is monitoring that device for cyber-security risks. Each device is further associated with a drop-down list210that allows the end user to group the devices into zones.

For each device or group in the list202, the graphical user interface200also presents the end user with a set of consequence definition controls212. The controls212include three drop-down lists214-218for each device or group in the list202. The drop-down list214allows the end user to define the impact to health, safety, and the environment (HSE) if a specific device or group of devices failed or became compromised due to a cyber-security risk. The HSE consequences include a negative effect on the health or safety of individuals or on the surrounding environment. The drop-down list216allows the end user to define the impact to a production process if a specific device or group of devices failed or became compromised due to a cyber-security risk. The production consequences include a negative effect on any process performed by a system that involves producing or processing one or more materials in some manner. The drop-down list218allows the end user to define the impact to a business or other organization operating the system or the production process if a specific device or group of devices failed or became compromised due to a cyber-security risk. The organization consequences include a negative effect on the finances, independence, or other aspects of an organization.

In some embodiments, each drop-down list214-218could allow an end user to select one of the following options: no impact, minor impact, moderate impact, high impact, or critical impact. In the drop-down list214related to HSE impacts, these options could be defined as follows:No impact: no or substantially minimal impact to widespread health, safety, and the environment;Minor impact: minor injury or damage to the environment;Moderate impact: major injury or damage to the environment;High impact: loss of life or widespread environmental damage; andCritical impact: widespread health and safety with catastrophic potential.

In the drop-down list216related to production impacts, these options could be defined as follows:No impact: no or substantially minimal impact to production;Minor impact: minor loss of production quality or volume;Moderate impact: short-term loss of production quality or volume;High impact: long-term loss of production quality or volume; andCritical impact: unrecoverable failure or indefinite loss of production.

In the drop-down list218related to organizational impacts, these options could be defined as follows:No impact: no or substantially minimal impact on regulations or governance;Minor impact: minor non-compliance issues;Moderate impact: non-compliance requiring additional action;High impact: penalty associated with non-compliance; andCritical impact: major penalty or consequence.

Each device or group in the list202has an associated “submit” button220, which allows the end user to accept the settings for that specific device or group in the graphical user interface200. Additionally or alternatively, a “submit all” button222allows the end user to accept the settings for all devices or group listed in the graphical user interface200. Note that when settings are submitted for a group of devices (such as a zone), the settings defined in the graphical user interface200for that group can be applied to all devices in that group.

The impact values selected using the drop-down lists214-218could be used by the risk manager154(or other components of a control and automation system) in any suitable manner, and the understanding of the industrial process control and automation system can be used such that a given device consequence value can further weight the consequence value of other connected devices or groups of devices in any suitable manner. For example, the risk manager154could assign a numerical value to each impact value selected using the drop-down lists214-218. As a particular example, “no impact” selections could be assigned a value of 20, “minor impact” selections could be assigned a value of 40, “moderate impact” selections could be assigned a value of 60, “high impact” selections could be assigned a value of 80, and “critical impact” selections could be assigned a value of 100. One or more of these numerical values could then be used by the risk manager154to calculate the “risk score” associated with each cyber-security risk to a device or group. As a particular example, the largest numerical value associated with the entries selected using the drop-down lists214-218for a device or group could be used as the consequence value during the calculation of a risk score for that device or group (where risk scores are calculated using numerical values representing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences as noted above). Note that any suitable function can be used to calculate risk scores based on threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. Also note that consequence values need not be numeric; any value summarizing the overall impact that could potentially occur as a result of a failure or compromise of a device or group of devices because of a cyber-security risk could be used.

As another example, after generating the cyber-security risk scores, those risk scores could be presented on a graphical display to one or more end users, such as end users responsible for maintaining security within the system100. If a cyber-security risk is identified having a score above a threshold, that cyber-security risk can be flagged to the users, such as via a warning, alarm, or other notification. If a user chooses to view particular details of a notification, the impact(s) associated with that cyber-security risk could be included in the display.FIG. 3illustrates an example graphical user interface300for using assigned cyber-security risk consequences according to this disclosure. The graphical user interface300here identifies a particular cyber-security risk to a particular device or group identified by name302. The graphical user interface300also provides a description304of the cyber-security risk, one or more possible causes306of the cyber-security risk, one or more potential impacts308of the cyber-security risk, and one or more recommended actions310for resolving or reducing the cyber-security risk. The impact information provided using the drop-down lists214-218for a particular device or group can be included within or as part of the potential impacts308of the cyber-security risk. InFIG. 3, for instance, a particular cyber-security risk can have a critical impact on health, safety, or the environment. This type of information can be particularly useful to personnel responsible for maintaining or improving cyber-security within a site or across multiple sites, as it informs the personnel of the potential impact(s) if the cyber-security risk is not reduced or eliminated.

AlthoughFIG. 2illustrates one example of a graphical user interface200for assigning cyber-security risk consequences, various changes may be made toFIG. 2. For example, while certain input mechanisms (such as checkboxes and drop-down lists) are shown inFIG. 2, any other or additional input mechanisms could be used to obtain information from one or more users. Also, while three categories of impact values (HSE, production, and organization) are shown inFIG. 2, any other or additional categories of impact values could also be defined. AlthoughFIG. 3illustrates one example of a graphical user interface300for using assigned cyber-security risk consequences, various changes may be made toFIG. 3. For instance, the impact values obtained using the graphical user interface200ofFIG. 2could be used in any other suitable manner.

FIG. 4illustrates an example method400for assigning cyber-security risk consequences according to this disclosure. The method400could, for example, be used by the risk manager154to obtain information from one or more end users in order to identify consequence values associated with cyber-security risks. Note, however, that the method400could be used by any other suitable device and in any other suitable system.

As shown inFIG. 4, devices or groups of devices in an industrial control and automation system are identified at step402. This could include, for example, the risk manager154receiving user input identifying a particular machine, unit, plant, or other portion of a process system or all of a process system. Various techniques are known for identifying devices or groups of devices in an industrial system, such as the use of a hierarchical device/zone tree or a graphical representation of an industrial system.

A graphical user interface identifying the devices or groups of devices is presented at step404. This could include, for example, the risk manger154generating the graphical user interface200and presenting the graphical user interface200on a display. The graphical user interface200can include a listing202of the identified devices or groups of devices.

Different categories of impacts associated with cyber-security risks for the devices or groups are presented at step406. This could include, for example, the risk manger154including the set of consequence definition controls212in the graphical user interface200, where the consequence definition controls212identify different categories of impacts. Example categories of impacts can include HSE, production, and organizational impacts, although any other or additional impact categories could be identified. Also, the HSE, production, and organizational impacts could be subdivided into more specific categories, such as separate health, safety, and environment impact categories or different types of production or organizational impact categories.

Impact values identifying the potential impacts that may be experienced if at least one cyber-security threat materializes and exploits at least one cyber-security vulnerability of the devices or groups are received at step408. This could include, for example, the risk manger154receiving user selections via the drop-down lists214-218in the definition controls212of the graphical user interface200. An impact value can be received for each impact category for each device or group identified in the graphical user interface200. Note that default impact values, such as “no impact” values, could pre-populate the drop-down lists214-218so that the user only needs to make selections for devices or groups where cyber-security events would have some type of impact.

The impact values can be used in any suitable manner. For example, inFIG. 4, consequence values for cyber-security threats can be identified using the impact values at step410, and risk scores for the cyber-security threats can be identified using the consequence values at step412. This could include, for example, the risk manager154mapping each impact value to a numerical value, such as by mapping values of 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100 to “no impact,” “minor impact,” “moderate impact,” “high impact,” and “critical impact” values, respectively. This could also include the risk manager154identifying the largest numerical value assigned to any impact associated with each device or group, and that largest numerical value could be used as the consequence value for that device or group. The consequence value could then be used to calculate any risk scores for cyber-security threats associated with that device or group, and the risk scores could be used in any suitable manner, such as to generate another graphical user interface that identifies cyber-security risks associated with risk scores above one or more thresholds. As another example, the impact or consequence values can be presented to users, such as within other graphical user interfaces, at step414. A particular example of this is shown inFIG. 3, where the graphical user interface300uses an impact value as part of the information describing a specific cyber-security risk. Note, however, that the impact or consequence values could be used in any other or additional manner.

AlthoughFIG. 4illustrates one example of a method400for assigning cyber-security risk consequences, various changes may be made toFIG. 4. For example, while shown as a series of steps, various steps inFIG. 4could overlap, occur in parallel, occur in a different order, or occur any number of times.

Note that the risk manager154and/or the graphical user interface200could be used or operate in conjunction with any combination or all of various features described in the following previously-filed patent applications (all of which are hereby incorporated by reference):U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/482,888 entitled “DYNAMIC QUANTIFICATION OF CYBER-SECURITY RISKS IN A CONTROL SYSTEM”;U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/036,920 entitled “ANALYZING CYBER-SECURITY RISKS IN AN INDUSTRIAL CONTROL ENVIRONMENT”;U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/113,075 entitled “RULES ENGINE FOR CONVERTING SYSTEM-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS AND EVENTS INTO CYBER-SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT VALUES”;U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/113,221 entitled “NOTIFICATION SUBSYSTEM FOR GENERATING CONSOLIDATED, FILTERED, AND RELEVANT SECURITY RISK-BASED NOTIFICATIONS”;U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/113,100 entitled “TECHNIQUE FOR USING INFRASTRUCTURE MONITORING SOFTWARE TO COLLECT CYBER-SECURITY RISK DATA”;U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/113,186 entitled “INFRASTRUCTURE MONITORING TOOL FOR COLLECTING INDUSTRIAL PROCESS CONTROL AND AUTOMATION SYSTEM RISK DATA”;U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/113,165 entitled “PATCH MONITORING AND ANALYSIS”;U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/113,152 entitled “APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR AUTOMATIC HANDLING OF CYBER-SECURITY RISK EVENTS”;U.S. Provisional Patent Application 62/114,928 entitled “APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR DYNAMIC CUSTOMIZATION OF CYBER-SECURITY RISK ITEM RULES”;U.S. Provisional Patent Application 62/114,865 entitled “APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR PROVIDING POSSIBLE CAUSES, RECOMMENDED ACTIONS, AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS RELATED TO IDENTIFIED CYBER-SECURITY RISK ITEMS”; andU.S. Provisional Patent Application 62/114,937 entitled “APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR TYING CYBER-SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS TO COMMON RISK METHODOLOGIES AND RISK LEVELS”.