Systems and methods for using attribute data for system protection and security awareness training

The present disclosure describes a system for saving metadata on files and using attribute data files inside a computing system to enhance the ability to provide user interfaces based on actions associated with non-executable attachments like text and document files from untrusted emails, to block execution of potentially harmful executable object downloads and files based on geographic location, and to a create a prompt for users to decide whether to continue execution of potentially harmful executable object downloads and files. The system also records user behavior on reactions to suspicious applications and documents by transmitting a set of attribute data in an attribute data file corresponding to suspicious applications or documents to a server. The system interrupts execution of actions related to untrusted phishing emails in order to give users a choice on whether to proceed with actions.

FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE

This disclosure generally relates to systems and methods for saving metadata on files and using attribute data files inside a computing system to enhance the ability to provide user interfaces based on actions associated with non-executable attachments like text and document files from untrusted emails, to block execution of potentially harmful executable object downloads and files, and to a create a prompt for users to decide whether to continue execution of potentially harmful executable object downloads and files. In particular, the disclosure is directed to systems and methods for using specific attribute data that was created and stored for a file which was received as an attachment to an untrusted email and stored on a computer system, the attribute data associated with the file is used to recognize the file as suspicious or as containing a security threat.

This disclosure also describes systems and methods for providing a user interface to confirm whether to review or take an action associated with an application or file attachment associated with an untrusted email based on geographic location. In particular, the disclosure is directed to systems and methods for providing a user interface to confirm whether to review or take an action associated with an application or file attachment that was created in a different location than it is being accessed at.

This disclosure also describes systems and methods for recording user behavior on reactions to suspicious applications or documents. In particular, the disclosure is directed to systems and methods for transmitting a set of attribute data in an attribute data file corresponding to suspicious applications or documents to a server.

BACKGROUND OF THE DISCLOSURE

A phishing attack involves an attempt to acquire sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, credit card details, etc., often for malicious reasons, possibly by masquerading as a trustworthy entity. For example, an email may be sent to a target, the email having an attachment that performs malicious actions when executed or a link to a webpage that either performs malicious actions when accessed or prompts the user to execute a malicious program. Malicious actions may be malicious data collection or actions harmful to the normal functioning of a device on which the email was activated, or any other malicious actions capable of being performed by a program or a set of programs. Malicious attacks may be contained in executable files like scripts and macros, but they may also be contained in non-executable files, for example document files, spreadsheets, PowerPoint presentations, and text files.

In general, there are a variety of anti-ransomware technologies that attempt to protect computers before they get infected by cybersecurity attacks such as phishing attacks. These anti-ransomware technologies can prevent ransomware, malware, and spyware attacks that result from phishing attacks or other attacks. For example, one anti-ransomware product leverages an artificial intelligence engine to detect and eliminate ransomware, malware, and zero-day threats before they can infect a computer or encrypt the computer's data. Phishing attacks are typically delivered via email or another type of message. When these phishing emails contain an executable attachment, anti-ransomware technologies can easily recognize this and remove the attachment.

When malicious attacks are embedded in non-executable files that are attached to messages, and in particular when these files are downloaded and saved on the computing system and opened later or moved between computing systems before being opened, anti-ransomware technologies and security awareness training technologies may not be able to keep track of the movement of the file or that fact that it may contain a security risk because it was downloaded from a message.

It is useful to track user behavior with respect to suspicious applications or documents, in order to learn information about the type of attacks that users are most likely to be susceptible to. This information may be used to provide improved security awareness training.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE

While anti-ransomware technologies may be used to prevent phishing attacks, these technologies do not provide any training on how to approach or act with respect to suspect phishing attacks. The anti-ransomware technologies are entirely in control in removing threats (e.g., removing phishing emails) without giving a user a chance to make decisions with respect to a suspect or untrusted phishing email. It has been discovered that there is a need by companies for their employees to be well-trained in spotting phishing emails and how to act with respect to phishing emails.

The present solution addresses the problem of non-executable attachments, and executable attachments that contain executable objects that contain security threats, are downloaded from messages, originated at a different geographical location than they are being accessed at, are saved on a computing system, and opened at a later time. If the system does not know critical information about the history and creation of the attached file, then neither anti-ransomware nor security awareness training technologies will be able to inform the user about the risks in the attached file if the attached file is saved on the computer and then opened at a later time. The present solution provides systems and methods that enable the system to create and use metadata and file attribute data to enhance the anti-phishing capability of the system, allowing the system to enable the provision of training and education by allowing users to make decisions with respect to attachments to untrusted phishing emails, and saved attachments from untrusted phishing emails, and by collecting and analyzing the information that the user decisions yield. The file metadata and attribute data can also be used to augment or enhance anti-ransomware technologies, enabling them to block actions or remove files that contain threats.

The present solution addresses the problem of recording user behavior on reactions to suspicious applications or documents by using a set of attribute data in an attribute data file corresponding to suspicious applications or files. The set of attribute data comprises one or more of the following: suspicious application/process name, application name that was filtered, name of document that was blocked, encrypted copy of the file's attribute data, software certificate, hash of the suspicious application, user response to the alert, warning or alert details, machine IP address, currently logged in user name, and machine unique ID.

The present solution further provides a system that notifies users when users perform specific actions with respect to attachments from untrusted phishing emails. The system pauses execution of these actions and prompts the user to confirm whether to take the actions or to revert back to review the actions. The user behavior with respect to the actions and the prompts may be recorded and sent to a server for analysis. In contrast from anti-ransomware technologies which are entirely in control, the present solution gives the user autonomy in deciding actions relating to untrusted phishing emails. The present solution interrupts execution of actions related to attachments to untrusted phishing emails in order to give users a choice on whether to proceed with actions. The choice that the user makes may be recorded and later analyzed to determine, for example, what additional simulated phishing attack training may be useful in teaching the user to recognize similar attacks.

Individuals who perform an attack using an attachment to a phishing email will often embed a link or executable object inside the attachment to the phishing email. In one example, when the user opens the attachment, the user may interact with the link in the attachment. In some cases, the user needs to click on the link in the attachment in order to enable the security threat. In other cases, the user only needs to hover over the link with their mouse in order to activate and enable the security threat. In all cases, the user behavior with the email, the attachment, the application, links within attached documents, and other user interactions with the phishing email can be recorded and later analysis by the system.

Users are taught to associate security threats with emails through security awareness training, and so users are likely to be more careful when they are viewing an attachment to an email at the time when they receive the email, as these types of threats are likely to be more prevalent at that time. However often users may save files that are attachments to emails to review later. The user may not look at this file for days or even months after it was received, and the user may lose track of the fact that this file was received as an attachment to an email. Further, the user may move the file from their computer system to the computer system of another user, who would have no idea that the file was received as an attachment to an email.

In another example, a user may receive a file onto their system through another method, for example as an ftp transfer or via a portable memory drive. The file may contain an executable object or link which, if interacted with, would install harmful malware or other security threats onto the user's computer. The user may save this file somewhere on the storage of their computer system and not open the file until a later time or day, at which point the user may not remember that the file was not created by them on their computer.

Accordingly, the present solution provides systems and methods by which to track the origin and heritage of files that may contain executable objects or links which may represent security threats to the user, such that no matter when the file is opened and/or a user engages with the executable object or link in the file, the security awareness system will be able to recognize that this may represent a security threat to the users system and will be able to raise a notification prompt to the user in order to give users a choice on whether to proceed with actions, or in some embodiments the security awareness system will prevent any interaction with the executable object or link in the file or prevent access to the file itself. The security awareness system may also record the user's actions and behaviors in order to improve security awareness training.

Methods, systems and apparatus are provided in which a system reads attribute data for a file of an application. In some embodiments, a file driver reads the attribute data, determines that the file contains an attachment, and pauses execution of any processes created when a user interacts with the file. In some embodiments, a rerouting library that is injected inside the application that is handling the file that was an attachment reads the file attribute data and determines that the file contains an attachment, and then enables the anti-phishing mechanism of pausing execution of any processes created when a user interacts with the file.

In some embodiments, a file driver reads the attribute data, identifies an originating geographical location of the file and determines that the originating geographical location does not correspond to a geographical location permitted by the client device. In some embodiments, the system pauses execution of any processes created when a user interacts with the file. In some embodiments, a rerouting library that is injected inside the application that is handling the file that was an email attachment reads the file attribute data and determines and identifies an originating geographical location of the file, and determines that the originating geographical location does not correspond to a geographical location permitted by the client device, and then enables the anti-phishing mechanism of pausing execution of any processes created when a user interacts with the file. In some embodiments, an external application, for example an application of a security awareness system, detects the launching of the application handling the file that was an email attachment, reads the file attribute data and enables the anti-phishing mechanism of pausing execution of any processes created when a user interacts with a file. In some embodiments, the anti-phishing mechanism may delete the file from the user's system.

A client service executing on a device registers a driver into an operating system of the device to monitor processes, wherein the driver is configured to receive notifications from the operating system of processes started or terminated on the device. An attribute data writer is executed on the devices, wherein the attribute data writer is in communication with the driver to receive notifications from the driver of processes started on the device. The attribute data writer receives a process ID from the driver for a process of an application detected by the driver as starting on the device, and the attribute data writer launches an injector program and injects an attribute data writer library into the process of the application corresponding to the process ID. The attribute data writer library classifies the application into a plurality of classes and causes the application to create attribute data corresponding to the class responsive to a file being one of created or opened by the application.

Methods, systems, and apparatus are provided in which a system provides a user interface to confirm whether to review or take an action associated with an attachment of an untrusted email. A driver on a device monitors the startup of any processes. Responsive to monitoring, the driver detects an application process that was created that indicates than an application was launched and notifies a user console about the creation of the application process. The user console determines if the application process is of significance, if so, it injects a monitor library into the process. Once injected into the process, the monitor library detects if the application process receives an action of a user to access, within a document or file, a domain that is not identified as trusted. The monitor library notifies the user console of the user's URL-access request. The monitor library then pauses the URL request waiting for the user console instruction. Once informed of a URL-access request, the user console then resolves the URL (Punycode, tinyurl or any other) to its true form and then queries if the URL is trusted or not. Based on the results of the query the user console dynamically crafts a dialog alerting the user about the potential dangers of their actions. The user console then listens for a response from the user to confirm whether or not to open the URL or revert back to review the action. Once the user has decided to either revert or continue the URL request, the user response may be recorded to a remote server. The user response is also passed on to the monitor library which either resumes the URL request or disregards it.

The methods, systems, and apparatus further comprise executing, by the service, the attribute data writer responsive to a user being logged in. The methods, systems and apparatus are further configured to receive, by the attribute data writer, a second process ID corresponding to a parent process. The methods, systems and apparatus further comprise the attribute data writer resolving the process ID into one of a path or name of file corresponding to the application and determining if one of the path or name of the file is in a list of applications to be monitored by the application data writer. The methods, systems and apparatus further comprise the attribute data writer determining, responsive to the file being in the list of applications to be monitored, a type of architecture of the application, and the attribute data writer launching a version of the injector program corresponding to the type of architecture, and the injector program injecting a version of the attribute data writer library corresponding to the type of architecture. The methods, systems and apparatus are further configured to obtain, by the attribute data writer library, information on the injected application and classifying, based on the information, the application into the class of the plurality of classes comprising an email client, a word processor, a web browser, a portable document format reader or writer, and a presentation processor. The methods, systems and apparatus further comprise causing the application to create non-class specific attribute data comprising one or more of the following: author application, original file name, logged in name, domain name, source tag, location data, machine ID, local internet protocol address, host name and a first non-system initiator application.

In one embodiment, the data created is stored in one of a master file table or an alternate data stream.

Methods, systems, and apparatus are defined for identifying a suspicious file using an attribute data file of a file, comprising identifying, by an attribute data library injected into an application, an attribute data file of a file being one of opened, created, or received by the application, identifying from one or more attribute data values in the attribute data file a non-system initiator application of the application, determining that the file is suspicious based on the one or more attribute data values, and displaying a prompt that the file is suspicious.

The methods, systems and apparatus are further configured to using an attribute data file that comprises one of a master file table or an alternate data stream. The method, systems and apparatus further comprise identifying from one or more attribute data values in the attribute data file an executable file extension of an original file name.

Methods, systems, and apparatus are defined for intercepting a call of an application to open a file, comprising identifying an attribute data file of the file. The methods, systems and apparatus further comprise accessing a set of attribute data and corresponding values from the attribute data file, identifying one or more rules to be applied to the set of attribute data to determine whether or not to open the file, applying the one or more rules to values of the set of attribute data and responsive to the application of the one or more rules, determining not to open the file and displaying a prompt to the user identifying one or more reasons for not opening the file.

The methods, systems and apparatus are further configured to prevent the opening of the file. The methods, systems and apparatus further comprises identifying from the set of attribute data a domain of where the file was created and applying one or more rules to determine that the domain of the client device is different than the domain identified in the set of attribute data.

Methods, systems, and apparatus are defined for alerting of a launch of a suspicious application, the method comprising resolving a name of an executable file of the application based on a process id of a launched application, identifying an attribute data file of the application, accessing a set of attribute data and corresponding values from the attribute data file, identifying one or more rules to be applied to the set of attribute data to determine whether or not the launched application is suspicious, determining responsive to the application of the one or more rules that the launched application is suspicious, and responsive to the determination displaying a prompt identifying that the launched application is suspicious.

The methods, systems and apparatus further comprise identifying from the one or more attribute data values in the attribute data file whether the application is an email attachment. The methods, systems and apparatus further comprise identifying from one or more attribute data values in the attribute data file a location from which the file was one or created, stored, or received. The methods, systems and apparatus further comprise identifying from one or more attribute data values in the attribute data file a uniform resource location from which the file was downloaded.

The methods, systems and apparatus further comprise preventing the launched application from continuing to execute. The methods, systems and apparatus are further configured to display with the prompt a user interface element for a user to select whether to terminate or continue to execute the launched application, and responsive to the selection terminating or continuing to allow the launched application to execute. The methods, systems and apparatus are further configured to identify, from the attribute data file of the application, one or more of the following attribute data: domain name, user name, subnet, machine unique id, time zone and a source tag marking if copied from an external storage.

The methods, systems, and apparatus further comprise determining access to an application is not permitted based on geographical location. A service executing on a client device or a library injected into an application executing on the client device may determine that a user has taken action to open a document or launch an application that is suspicious. The service executing on a client device or a library injected into an application executing on the client device is further configured to identify an attribute data file corresponding to the application or the file and identify an attribute data value identifying the originating geographical location of the file or the launched application. The service executing on a client device or a library injected into an application executing on the client device is further configured to determine that the originating geographical location does not correspond to a geographical location permitted by the client device, and to display a prompt identifying that the action is not permitted.

The methods, systems and apparatus further comprise identifying that the original geographical location of the application or the file was a USB drive.

The methods, systems and apparatus further comprise transmitting, by the client service or library injected into an application on the client device, at least the values of the set of attribute data to a server for recording behavior of the user and information on the suspicious filed or launched application.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Section B describes embodiments of systems and methods for providing user interfaces based on actions associated with untrusted emails.

A. Computing and Network Environment

Prior to discussing specific embodiments of the present solution, it may be helpful to describe aspects of the operating environment as well as associated system components (e.g., hardware elements) in connection with the methods and systems described herein. Referring toFIG. 1A, an embodiment of a network environment is depicted. In brief overview, the network environment includes one or more clients102a-102n(also generally referred to as local machine(s)102, client(s)102, client node(s)102, client machine(s)102, client computer(s)102, client device(s)102, endpoint(s)102, or endpoint node(s)102) in communication with one or more servers106a-106n(also generally referred to as server(s)106, node106, or remote machine(s)106) via one or more networks104. In some embodiments, a client102has the capacity to function as both a client node seeking access to resources provided by a server and as a server providing access to hosted resources for other clients102a-102n.

AlthoughFIG. 1Ashows a network104between the clients102and the servers106, the clients102and the servers106may be on the same network104. In some embodiments, there are multiple networks104between the clients102and the servers106. In one of these embodiments, a network104′ (not shown) may be a private network and a network104may be a public network. In another of these embodiments, a network104may be a private network and a network104′ a public network. In still another of these embodiments, networks104and104′ may both be private networks.

The network104may be connected via wired or wireless links. Wired links may include Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), coaxial cable lines, or optical fiber lines. The wireless links may include BLUETOOTH, Wi-Fi, Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX), an infrared channel or satellite band. The wireless links may also include any cellular network standards used to communicate among mobile devices, including standards that qualify as 1G, 2G, 3G, or 4G. The network standards may qualify as one or more generation of mobile telecommunication standards by fulfilling a specification or standards such as the specifications maintained by International Telecommunication Union. The 3G standards, for example, may correspond to the International Mobile Telecommunications-2000 (IMT-2000) specification, and the 4G standards may correspond to the International Mobile Telecommunications Advanced (IMT-Advanced) specification. Examples of cellular network standards include AMPS, GSM, GPRS, UMTS, LTE, LTE Advanced, Mobile WiMAX, and WiMAX-Advanced. Cellular network standards may use various channel access methods e.g. FDMA, TDMA, CDMA, or SDMA. In some embodiments, different types of data may be transmitted via different links and standards. In other embodiments, the same types of data may be transmitted via different links and standards.

The network104may be any type and/or form of network. The geographical scope of the network104may vary widely and the network104can be a body area network (BAN), a personal area network (PAN), a local-area network (LAN), e.g. Intranet, a metropolitan area network (MAN), a wide area network (WAN), or the Internet. The topology of the network104may be of any form and may include, e.g., any of the following: point-to-point, bus, star, ring, mesh, or tree. The network104may be an overlay network which is virtual and sits on top of one or more layers of other networks104′. The network104may be of any such network topology as known to those ordinarily skilled in the art capable of supporting the operations described herein. The network104may utilize different techniques and layers or stacks of protocols, including, e.g., the Ethernet protocol, the internet protocol suite (TCP/IP), the ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) technique, the SONET (Synchronous Optical Networking) protocol, or the SDH (Synchronous Digital Hierarchy) protocol. The TCP/IP internet protocol suite may include application layer, transport layer, internet layer (including, e.g., IPv6), or the link layer. The network104may be a type of a broadcast network, a telecommunications network, a data communication network, or a computer network.

In some embodiments, the system may include multiple, logically-grouped servers106. In one of these embodiments, the logical group of servers106may be referred to as a server farm (not shown) or a machine farm. In another of these embodiments, the servers106may be geographically dispersed. In other embodiments, a machine farm may be administered as a single entity. In still other embodiments, the machine farm includes a plurality of machine farms. The servers106within each machine farm can be heterogeneous—one or more of the servers106or machines106can operate according to one type of operating system platform (e.g., WINDOWS NT, manufactured by Microsoft Corp. of Redmond, Wash.), while one or more of the other servers106can operate on according to another type of operating system platform (e.g., Unix, Linux, or Mac OS X).

In one embodiment, servers106in the machine farm may be stored in high-density rack systems, along with associated storage systems, and located in an enterprise data center. In this embodiment, consolidating the servers106in this way may improve system manageability, data security, the physical security of the system, and system performance by locating servers106and high-performance storage systems on localized high-performance networks. Centralizing the servers106and storage systems and coupling them with advanced system management tools allows more efficient use of server resources.

The servers106of each machine farm do not need to be physically proximate to another server106in the same machine farm. Thus, the group of servers106logically grouped as a machine farm may be interconnected using a wide-area network (WAN) connection or a metropolitan-area network (MAN) connection. For example, a machine farm may include servers106physically located in different continents or different regions of a continent, country, state, city, campus, or room. Data transmission speeds between servers106in the machine farm can be increased if the servers106are connected using a local-area network (LAN) connection or some form of direct connection. Additionally, a heterogeneous machine farm may include one or more servers106operating according to a type of operating system, while one or more other servers106execute one or more types of hypervisors rather than operating systems. In these embodiments, hypervisors may be used to emulate virtual hardware, partition physical hardware, virtualize physical hardware, and execute virtual machines that provide access to computing environments, allowing multiple operating systems to run concurrently on a host computer. Native hypervisors may run directly on the host computer. Hypervisors may include VMware ESX/ESXi, manufactured by VMWare, Inc., of Palo Alto, Calif.; the Xen hypervisor, an open source product whose development is overseen by Citrix Systems, Inc.; the HYPER-V hypervisors provided by Microsoft or others. Hosted hypervisors may run within an operating system on a second software level. Examples of hosted hypervisors may include VMware Workstation and VIRTUALBOX.

Management of the machine farm may be de-centralized. For example, one or more servers106may comprise components, subsystems and modules to support one or more management services for the machine farm. In one of these embodiments, one or more servers106provide functionality for management of dynamic data, including techniques for handling failover, data replication, and increasing the robustness of the machine farm. Each server106may communicate with a persistent store and, in some embodiments, with a dynamic store.

Server106may be a file server, application server, web server, proxy server, appliance, network appliance, gateway, gateway server, virtualization server, deployment server, SSL VPN server, or firewall. In one embodiment, the server106may be referred to as a remote machine or a node. In another embodiment, a plurality of nodes may be in the path between any two communicating servers.

Referring toFIG. 1B, a cloud computing environment is depicted. A cloud computing environment may provide client102with one or more resources provided by a network environment. The cloud computing environment may include one or more clients102a-102n, in communication with a cloud108over one or more networks104. Clients102may include, e.g., thick clients, thin clients, and zero clients. A thick client may provide at least some functionality even when disconnected from the cloud108or servers106. A thin client or a zero client may depend on the connection to the cloud108or server106to provide functionality. A zero client may depend on the cloud108or other networks104or servers106to retrieve operating system data for the client device102. The cloud108may include back end platforms, e.g., servers106, storage, server farms or data centers.

The cloud108may be public, private, or hybrid. Public clouds may include public servers106that are maintained by third parties to the clients102or the owners of the clients102. The servers106may be located off-site in remote geographical locations as disclosed above or otherwise. Public clouds may be connected to the servers106over a public network. Private clouds may include private servers106that are physically maintained by clients102or owners of clients102. Private clouds may be connected to the servers106over a private network104. Hybrid clouds108may include both the private and public networks104and servers106.

Clients102may access IaaS resources with one or more IaaS standards, including, e.g., Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), Open Cloud Computing Interface (OCCI), Cloud Infrastructure Management Interface (CIMI), or OpenStack standards. Some IaaS standards may allow clients access to resources over HTTP, and may use Representational State Transfer (REST) protocol or Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP). Clients102may access PaaS resources with different PaaS interfaces. Some PaaS interfaces use HTTP packages, standard Java APIs, JavaMail API, Java Data Objects (JDO), Java Persistence API (JPA), Python APIs, web integration APIs for different programming languages including, e.g., Rack for Ruby, WSGI for Python, or PSGI for Perl, or other APIs that may be built on REST, HTTP, XML, or other protocols. Clients102may access SaaS resources through the use of web-based user interfaces, provided by a web browser (e.g. GOOGLE CHROME, Microsoft INTERNET EXPLORER, or Mozilla Firefox provided by Mozilla Foundation of Mountain View, Calif.). Clients102may also access SaaS resources through smartphone or tablet applications, including, e.g., Salesforce Sales Cloud, or Google Drive app. Clients102may also access SaaS resources through the client operating system, including, e.g., Windows file system for DROPBOX.

In some embodiments, access to IaaS, PaaS, or SaaS resources may be authenticated. For example, a server106or authentication server may authenticate a user via security certificates, HTTPS, or API keys. API keys may include various encryption standards such as, e.g., Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Data resources may be sent over Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).

The client102and server106may be deployed as and/or executed on any type and form of computing device, e.g. a computer, network device or appliance capable of communicating on any type and form of network and performing the operations described herein.FIGS. 1C and 1Ddepict block diagrams of a computing device100useful for practicing an embodiment of the client102or a server106. As shown inFIGS. 1C and 1D, each computing device100includes a central processing unit (CPU)121, and a main memory unit122. As shown inFIG. 1C, a computing device100may include a storage device128, an installation device116, a network interface118, an I/O controller123, display devices124a-124n, a keyboard126, and a pointing device127, e.g. a mouse. The storage device128may include, without limitation, an operating system129, a software131, and a software of a simulated phishing attack system120. As shown inFIG. 1D, each computing device100may also include additional optional elements, e.g. a memory port103, a bridge170, one or more input/output devices130a-130n(generally referred to using reference numeral130), I/O ports142a-142b, and a cache memory140in communication with the central processing unit121.

The central processing unit121is any logic circuitry that responds to and processes instructions fetched from the main memory unit122. In many embodiments, the central processing unit121is provided by a microprocessor unit, e.g.: those manufactured by Intel Corporation of Mountain View, Calif.; those manufactured by Motorola Corporation of Schaumburg, Ill.; the ARM processor and TEGRA system on a chip (SoC) manufactured by Nvidia of Santa Clara, Calif.; the POWER7 processor, those manufactured by International Business Machines of White Plains, N.Y.; or those manufactured by Advanced Micro Devices of Sunnyvale, Calif. The computing device100may be based on any of these processors, or any other processor capable of operating as described herein. The central processing unit121may utilize instruction level parallelism, thread level parallelism, different levels of cache, and multi-core processors. A multi-core processor may include two or more processing units on a single computing component. Examples of a multi-core processors include the AMD PHENOM IIX2, INTEL CORE i5 and INTEL CORE i7.

Main memory unit122may include one or more memory chips capable of storing data and allowing any storage location to be directly accessed by the central processing unit121(e.g., microprocessor). Main memory unit122may be volatile and faster than storage device128memory. Main memory units122may be Dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) or any variants, including static random-access memory (SRAM), Burst SRAM or SynchBurst SRAM (BSRAM), Fast Page Mode DRAM (FPM DRAM), Enhanced DRAM (EDRAM), Extended Data Output RAM (EDO RAM), Extended Data Output DRAM (EDO DRAM), Burst Extended Data Output DRAM (BEDO DRAM), Single Data Rate Synchronous DRAM (SDR SDRAM), Double Data Rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM), Direct Rambus DRAM (DRDRAM), or Extreme Data Rate DRAM (XDR DRAM). In some embodiments, the main memory122or the storage device128may be non-volatile; e.g., non-volatile read access memory (NVRAM), flash memory non-volatile static RAM (nvSRAM), Ferroelectric RAM (Fear), Magnetoresistive RAM (MRAM), Phase-change memory (PRAM), conductive-bridging RAM (CBRAM), Silicon-Oxide-Nitride-Oxide-Silicon (SONOS), Resistive RAM (RRAM), Racetrack, Nano-RAM (NRAM), or Millipede memory. The main memory122may be based on any of the above described memory chips, or any other available memory chips capable of operating as described herein. In the embodiment shown inFIG. 1C, the processor121communicates with main memory122via a system bus150(described in more detail below).FIG. 1Ddepicts an embodiment of a computing device100in which the processor communicates directly with main memory122via a memory port103. For example, inFIG. 1Dthe main memory122may be DRDRAM.

FIG. 1Ddepicts an embodiment in which the central processing unit121(e.g., a main processor) communicates directly with cache memory140via a secondary bus, sometimes referred to as a backside bus. In other embodiments, the main processor121communicates with cache memory140using the system bus150. Cache memory140typically has a faster response time than main memory122and is typically provided by SRAM, BSRAM, or EDRAM. In the embodiment shown inFIG. 1D, the main processor121communicates with various I/O devices130via a local system bus150. Various buses may be used to connect the main processor121to any of the I/O devices130via I/O ports142a-142b, including a PCI bus, a PCI-X bus, or a PCI-Express bus, or a NuBus. For embodiments in which the I/O device is a video display device124, the main processor121may use an Advanced Graphics Port (AGP) to communicate with the display device124or the I/O controller123for the display device124.FIG. 1Ddepicts an embodiment of a computing device100in which the main processor121communicates directly with I/O device130bor other processors121′ (not shown) via HYPERTRANSPORT, RAPIDIO, or INFINIBAND communications technology (via I/O port142b).FIG. 1Dalso depicts an embodiment in which local busses and direct communication are mixed: the main processor121communicates with I/O device130ausing a local interconnect bus while communicating with I/O device130bdirectly (via I/O port142a).

I/O devices130a-130nmay include a combination of multiple input or output devices, including, e.g., Microsoft KINECT, Nintendo Wiimote for the WII, Nintendo WII U GAMEPAD, or Apple IPHONE. Some I/O devices130a-130nallow gesture recognition inputs through combining some of the inputs and outputs. Some I/O devices130a-130nprovides for facial recognition which may be utilized as an input for different purposes including authentication and other commands. Some I/O devices130a-130nprovides for voice recognition and inputs, including, e.g., Microsoft KINECT, SIRI for IPHONE by Apple, Google Now or Google Voice Search.

Additional I/O devices130a-130nhave both input and output capabilities, including, e.g., haptic feedback devices, touchscreen displays, or multi-touch displays. Touchscreen, multi-touch displays, touchpads, touch mice, or other touch sensing devices may use different technologies to sense touch, including, e.g., capacitive, surface capacitive, projected capacitive touch (PCT), in-cell capacitive, resistive, infrared, waveguide, dispersive signal touch (DST), in-cell optical, surface acoustic wave (SAW), bending wave touch (BWT), or force-based sensing technologies. Some multi-touch devices may allow two or more contact points with the surface, allowing advanced functionality including, e.g., pinch, spread, rotate, scroll, or other gestures. Some touchscreen devices, including, e.g., Microsoft PIXELSENSE or Multi-Touch Collaboration Wall, may have larger surfaces, such as on a table-top or on a wall, and may also interact with other electronic devices. Some I/O devices130a-130n, display devices124a-124nor group of devices may be augment reality devices. The I/O devices130a-130nmay be controlled by an I/O controller123as shown inFIG. 1C. The I/O controller123may control one or more I/O devices130a-130n, such as, e.g., a keyboard126and a pointing device127, e.g., a mouse or optical pen. Furthermore, an I/O device may also provide storage and/or an installation medium116for the computing device100. In still other embodiments, the computing device100may provide USB connections (not shown) to receive handheld USB storage devices. In further embodiments, an I/O device130may be a bridge between the system bus150and an external communication bus, e.g. a USB bus, a SCSI bus, a FireWire bus, an Ethernet bus, a Gigabit Ethernet bus, a Fiber Channel bus, or a Thunderbolt bus.

In some embodiments, display devices124a-124nmay be connected to I/O controller123. Display devices124a-124nmay include, e.g., liquid crystal displays (LCD), thin film transistor LCD (TFT-LCD), blue phase LCD, electronic papers (e-ink) displays, flexile displays, light emitting diode displays (LED), digital light processing (DLP) displays, liquid crystal on silicon (LCOS) displays, organic light-emitting diode (OLED) displays, active-matrix organic light-emitting diode (AMOLED) displays, liquid crystal laser displays, time-multiplexed optical shutter (TMOS) displays, or 3D displays. Examples of 3D displays may use, e.g. stereoscopy, polarization filters, active shutters, or autostereoscopic. Display devices124a-124nmay also be a head-mounted display (HMD). In some embodiments, display devices124a-124nor the corresponding I/O controllers123may be controlled through or have hardware support for OPENGL or DIRECTX API or other graphics libraries.

In some embodiments, the computing device100may include or connect to multiple display devices124a-124n, which each may be of the same or different type and/or form. As such, any of the I/O devices130a-130nand/or the I/O controller123may include any type and/or form of suitable hardware, software, or combination of hardware and software to support, enable or provide for the connection and use of multiple display devices124a-124nby the computing device100. For example, the computing device100may include any type and/or form of video adapter, video card, driver, and/or library to interface, communicate, connect or otherwise use the display devices124a-124n. In one embodiment, a video adapter may include multiple connectors to interface to multiple display devices124a-124n. In other embodiments, the computing device100may include multiple video adapters, with each video adapter connected to one or more of the display devices124a-124n. In some embodiments, any portion of the operating system of the computing device100may be configured for using multiple displays124a-124n. In other embodiments, one or more of the display devices124a-124nmay be provided by one or more other computing devices100aor100b(not shown) connected to the computing device100, via the network104. In some embodiments, software may be designed and constructed to use another computer's display device as a second display device124afor the computing device100. For example, in one embodiment, an Apple iPad may connect to a computing device100and use the display of the computing device100as an additional display screen that may be used as an extended desktop. One ordinarily skilled in the art will recognize and appreciate the various ways and embodiments that a computing device100may be configured to have multiple display devices124a-124n.

Referring again toFIG. 1C, the computing device100may comprise a storage device128(e.g. one or more hard disk drives or redundant arrays of independent disks) for storing an operating system129or other related software, and for storing application software programs such as any program related to the simulated phishing attack system software120. Examples of storage device128include, e.g., hard disk drive (HDD); optical drive including CD drive, DVD drive, or BLU-RAY drive; solid-state drive (SSD); USB flash drive; or any other device suitable for storing data. Some storage devices128may include multiple volatile and non-volatile memories, including, e.g., solid state hybrid drives that combine hard disks with solid state cache. Some storage device128may be non-volatile, mutable, or read-only. Some storage devices128may be internal and connect to the computing device100via a system bus150. Some storage devices128may be external and connect to the computing device100via an I/O device130that provides an external bus. Some storage devices128may connect to the computing device100via the network interface118over a network104, including, e.g., the Remote Disk for MACBOOK AIR by Apple. Some computing devices100(e.g., client devices102) may not require a non-volatile storage device128and may be thin clients102or zero clients102. Some storage devices128may also be used as an installation device116, and may be suitable for installing software and programs. Additionally, the operating system129and the software131can be run from a bootable medium, for example, a bootable CD, e.g. KNOPPIX, a bootable CD for GNU/Linux that is available as a GNU/Linux distribution from knoppix.net.

Computing device100(e.g., client device102) may also install software or application from an application distribution platform. Examples of application distribution platforms include the App Store for iOS provided by Apple, Inc., the Mac App Store provided by Apple, Inc., GOOGLE PLAY for Android OS provided by Google Inc., Chrome Webstore for CHROME OS provided by Google Inc., and Amazon Appstore for Android OS and KINDLE FIRE provided by Amazon.com, Inc. An application distribution platform may facilitate installation of software on a client device102. An application distribution platform may include a repository of applications on a server106or a cloud108, which the clients102a-102nmay access over a network104. An application distribution platform may include application developed and provided by various developers. A user of a client device102may select, purchase and/or download an application via the application distribution platform.

The computing device100(i.e., computer system) can be any workstation, telephone, desktop computer, laptop or notebook computer, netbook, ULTRABOOK, tablet, server, handheld computer, mobile telephone, smartphone or other portable telecommunications device, media playing device, a gaming system, mobile computing device, or any other type and/or form of computing, telecommunications or media device that is capable of communication. The computing device100has sufficient processor power and memory capacity to perform the operations described herein. In some embodiments, the computing device100may have different processors, operating systems, and input devices consistent with the device. The Samsung GALAXY smartphones, e.g., operate under the control of Android operating system developed by Google, Inc. GALAXY smartphones receive input via a touch interface.

In some embodiments, the computing device100is a gaming system. For example, the computing device100may comprise a PLAYSTATION 3, or PERSONAL PLAYSTATION PORTABLE (PSP), or a PLAYSTATION VITA device manufactured by the Sony Corporation of Tokyo, Japan, a NINTENDO DS, NINTENDO 3DS, NINTENDO WII, or a NINTENDO WII U device manufactured by Nintendo Co., Ltd., of Kyoto, Japan, an XBOX 360 device manufactured by the Microsoft Corporation of Redmond, Wash.

In some embodiments, the computing device100is a tablet e.g. the IPAD line of devices by Apple; GALAXY TAB family of devices by Samsung; or KINDLE FIRE, by Amazon.com, Inc. of Seattle, Wash. In other embodiments, the computing device100is an eBook reader, e.g. the KINDLE family of devices by Amazon.com, or NOOK family of devices by Barnes & Noble, Inc. of New York City, N.Y.

In some embodiments, the communications device102(i.e., client device) includes a combination of devices, e.g. a smartphone combined with a digital audio player or portable media player. For example, one of these embodiments is a smartphone, e.g. the IPHONE family of smartphones manufactured by Apple, Inc.; a Samsung GALAXY family of smartphones manufactured by Samsung, Inc; or a Motorola DROID family of smartphones. In yet another embodiment, the communications device102is a laptop or desktop computer equipped with a web browser and a microphone and speaker system, e.g. a telephony headset. In these embodiments, the communications devices102are web-enabled and can receive and initiate phone calls. In some embodiments, a laptop or desktop computer is also equipped with a webcam or other video capture device that enables video chat and video call.

B. Systems and Methods of Providing User Interfaces Based on Actions Associated with Untrusted Emails.

This disclosure generally relates to systems and methods for saving metadata and using attribute data on files inside a computing system, to enhance the ability to provide user interfaces based on actions associated with non-executable and executable attachments from untrusted emails.

This disclosure also describes systems and methods for recording user behavior on reactions to suspicious applications or files using attribute data on files inside a computing system, to enhance the ability to provide enhanced security awareness training based on analysis of behaviors and actions associated with attachments from untrusted emails.

In one embodiment, a method provides a user interface to confirm whether to review or take an action associated with an untrusted email. For example, a driver on a device monitors the startup of any processes. Responsive to monitoring, the driver detects an application process that was created that indicates that an application was launched, and notifies a user console about the creation of the application process. The user console determines if the application process is of significance, and if so it spawns an injector process to inject a monitor library into the application process. Once injected into the application process, the monitor library detects if the application process receives an action of a user with respect to an email to access a domain that is not identified as trusted. The monitor library notifies the user console of the user's URL-access request. The monitor library then pauses the URL request waiting for the user console instruction. Once informed of a URL-access request, the user console then resolves the URL (Punycode, tinyurl, or any other) to its true form and then makes queries to determine if the URL is trusted, untrusted, or unknown. Responsive to the results of the query, the user console displays a user interface to receive input from the user to confirm whether to take the action or to revert back to review the action. Responsive to the user input, the user console may record the user input on a remote server. The user console passes the user input to the monitor library which either unpauses the URL request or discards it. For this embodiment, the action can include a user accessing a domain associated with the untrusted email, a user responding to the untrusted email, or a user opening an attached file associated with the untrusted email.

In another embodiment, a method provides a user interface to confirm whether to review or take actions associated with an untrusted domain. For example, a driver on a device monitors the startup of any processes. Responsive to monitoring, the driver detects an application process that was created that indicates that an application was launched, and notifies a user console about the creation of the application process. The user console determines if the application process is of significance, and if so it spawns an injector process to inject a monitor library into the application process. Once injected into the application process, the monitor library detects if the application process receives an action of a user to access a domain that is not identified as trusted. The monitor library notifies the user console of the user's URL-access request. The monitor library then pauses the URL request waiting for the user console instruction. Once informed or a URL-access request, the user console then resolves the URL (Punycode, tinyurl, or any other) to its true form and then makes queries to determine if the URL is trusted, untrusted, or unknown. Responsive to the results of the query, the user console displays a user interface to receive input from the user to confirm whether to take the action or to revert back to review the action. Responsive to the user input, the user console may record the user input on a remote server. The user console passes the user input to the monitor library which either unpauses the URL request or discards it.

In some aspects, unpausing execution of the application further includes receiving input via the user interface from the user confirming to take the intercepted action and responsive to the input, allowing the application to continue to process the intercepted action. In other aspects, unpausing execution of the application further includes receiving input from the user to revert back to review the action and responsive to the input providing access to the application for the user to review a point in the application at which the user took the action.

In some aspects, monitoring process execution of the application further includes identifying, by the driver, one or more processes initiated from the application. The methods or systems can further include associating the one or more processes with at least one of the application, the action taken by the user, or the domain. In other aspects, monitoring process execution of the application further includes tracking, by the monitor library, actions of the user taken to open a file obtained from a phishing email.

In some aspects, detecting that the application received the action of the user to access the domain further includes detecting, by the monitor library, the action of the user to access the domain comprising a click by the user on a uniform resource locator provided via one of the application or a process associated with the application.

In some aspects, the application is one of paused or unpaused by one of the driver or the monitor library.

In some aspects, the methods or systems further include receiving, by the user console, from a server a predetermined list of domains identified as one of untrusted domains or trusted domains. In other aspects, the methods or systems further include obtaining, by the user console, from storage of the device a predetermined list of domains identified by an administrator of the device as one of untrusted domains or trusted domains.

A simulated phishing attack may test the readiness of a security system or users of a system to handle phishing attacks such that malicious actions are prevented. A simulated phishing attack or actual phishing attack may, for example, target a large number of users, such as employees of an organization. Such attacks may be performed by a party friendly or neutral to the targets of the attacks. In one type of phishing attack, an attempt is made to extract sensitive information using phishing methods. For the simulated phishing attack, any extracted information is used not for malicious purposes, but as part of a process of detecting weaknesses in security. Performing the simulated phishing attack can help expose a lack of vigilance and/or know-how in a user or set of users of a device. This information can be used to provide targeted training or remedial actions in order to minimize risk associated with such attacks. For example, user know-how can be improved by providing targeted, real-time training to the user at the time of failing a test provided by the simulated phishing attack.

Phishing attacks occur frequently by way of phishing emails. Phishing emails are typically masqueraded as emails from parties known to the users, such as an executive of a company that employs the users. The phishing emails may be designed to appear interesting to the users, and may offer or promise, for example, access to an interesting tidbit of news, access to useful computer software, access to knowledge of how to perform a money-making scheme, or any other thing that may be of interest. In some embodiments, the phishing emails may request that the user perform a certain action, such as clicking on a link, providing sensitive information by replying to the email, or transferring money to an account owned by the attacker and then sending a reply email to confirm that the money has been transferred. A common attack vector used by phishing emails is to get users to click on links in an email or to click on links delivered in documents attached to phishing emails or to interact with executable attachments to phishing emails or to interact with executable code inside a file attachment to an email.

The present solution offers several benefits to client companies and end users of companies with respect to cybersecurity training. The present solution can provide enhanced training with respect to simulated phishing attacks as well as real world phishing attacks through recording user behavior when the user encounters a real or suspected phishing attack. Specifically, the present solution records user behavior in order to offer enhanced training when users click on links in, or delivered via, attachments to untrusted emails that are saved on the computer system and opened later. This enables real-world training by way of experience whenever a user interacts with an executable attachment received via an untrusted email. The present solution offers the ability to turn back time and provides users with a second chance after performing an action (e.g., interacting with an executable objects embedded in a document that was originally received as an attachment to a phishing email). This gives users the opportunity to try again and revert back to review their action before making a decision. The system pauses the actions that would have taken place when the user mistakenly clicks on a link in an attachment to a suspected phishing email.

The present solution functions by using file attribute data to further protect email users from advanced phishing attempts that use non-executable attachments like text and document files and executable attachments embedded in text and document files or attached to phishing emails. An email with an executable or non-executable attachment may be received by a user. The user may download and save the email attachment to the computer system. Once a save request is detected by the security awareness system, one or more of the following actions happens: a. a file driver is triggered to write file attribute data (e.g. metadata information) on the file, b. a rerouting library residing inside the email client saves the file attribute data information, and c. an external application detects the save request and in turn saves the file attribute data information about the file that has been downloaded and saved.

The file attribute data may be saved using one or more of the following methods or mechanisms:a. Keeping a database of all files created/downloaded by applications such as email clients and/or web browser using drivers. It is composed primarily of the following:i. A database that records metadata for each file createdii. A file watcher software application that updates the database entries whenever files are copied, renamed or deletediii. A file driver that monitors the OS file operations and then notifies the file watcher of executed file operationsb. Keeping a database of all files created/downloaded by applications such as email clients and/or web browser using an API rerouting library. It is composed primarily of the following:i. A database that records metadata for each file createdii. A rerouting-DLL that re-routes file-IO calls, allowing code to update the database before the actual IO operationiii. An optional software injector that injects the rerouting-DLL into all or pre-selected processesc. With file drivers, write metadata in plain form or in shortened binary data into safe and or “unused” portions of the file. It is composed primarily of the following:i. A file driver, activated on file creation/writing, that judges the file type, by file name or content, and modifies certain parts of the file to save metadata dataii. Another file driver that gets activated whenever a file is opened, which raises an event or notifies one or more processes, if any metadata data is foundd. With an API rerouting library, write metadata in plain form or in shortened binary data into safe and or “unused” portions of the file. It is composed primarily of the following:i. A Rerouting-DLL that re-routes file-IO calls, that:1. Writes metadata content on the file before the file is closed2. Detects if the file has metadata data before a process opens a file3. May or may not remove the metadata data in the file before it is openedii. An optional software injector that injects the rerouting-dll into all or pre-selected processes.e. With file drivers, modify existing file attributes (i.e. version, last modified date or time) or add new attribute-values to the file. It is composed mainly of the following:i. A file driver that adds or modifies the attributes of a file upon its creation. In windows, Attributes are stored in a Master File Table (MFT)ii. A file driver that detects and notifies other processes if metadata data was found in the file's attributesf. With an API rerouting library, modify existing file attributes (i.e. version, last modified date or time) or add new attribute-values to the file. It is composed primarily of the following:i. A Rerouting-DLL that re-routes file-IO calls, that: (In windows, Attributes are stored in a Master File Table (MFT).)1. modifies or adds more metadata data into the attributes of a file whenever a file is created or modified2. detects if the file has metadata data before a process opens a file3. may or may not remove the metadata data in the file before it is openedii. An optional software injector that injects the Rerouting-dll into all or pre-selected processes.g. With file drivers, add or modify alternate data streams to a file to save metadata data. It is composed primarily of the following:i. A file driver that writes an alternate data stream into a newly created or modified fileii. A file driver that reads the alternate data stream and then detects and notifies other processes if metadata data was found.h. With an API rerouting library, add or modify alternate data streams to a file to save metadata data. It is composed primarily of the following:i. A Rerouting-DLL that re-routes file-IO calls, that:1. modifies or adds alternate data streams into a file to save metadata data file whenever a file is created or modified2. detects if the file has metadata data before a process opens a file3. may or may not remove the metadata data in the file before it is openedii. An optional software injector that injects the Rerouting-dll into all or pre-selected processes.

The file attribute data may include one or more of the following:a. Author Application—the application that created the file;b. URL—the URL where the file was copied from or downloaded from;c. Optional markers—to mark a file as safe, trusted or otherwise;d. Original file name—the original name of the file even before it was renamed or copied;e. Email address of sender—if the file is an email attachment;f. Email address of receiver—email receiver's name;g. Time email was received;h. Logged in name—name of currently logged in user;i. Source tag—can mark as either from the internet or from a USB drive or from local networks;j. Geolocation data—the physical location where the file was created;k. Subnet;l. Machine unique ID;m. Time Zone; andn. Hashes and keys—that can be used to secure documents.

After the file is downloaded and saved, the email application may be closed and all processes associated with the email application will be terminated by the computer system. A user, which may or may not be the user than downloaded and saved the file attachment, may subsequently open the file. In some embodiments, the user may open the file in a different location than the location where it was originally saved. In some embodiments, the user may open the file on a different computer system than the computer system where the file was originally downloaded and saved. The system uses the saved file attribute data to identify the file as potentially containing a security threat.

File attribute data can be used to filter applications, executable modules, downloadable runnable objects and documents in order to create a prompt for users or to remove the module, object or document. Examples of harmful runnable downloads include i) executable binary files, ii) script files like python, javascript, vbscript, iii) executable compressed files; and iv) dynamic libraries like dlls.

In some embodiments, an executable file may be created by any of the following scenarios, or derivatives of the following scenarios:a. a user downloads and saves a runnable object email attachmentb. a macro capable document writes or downloads a runnable object from a remote source.c. a script executed that writes or downloads a runnable object from a remote source.d. a media player that creates or downloads a runnable object from a remote source.

In some embodiments, as the file is opened, any or one of the following may happen:a. a file driver reads the attribute data, determines the file as an email attachment, and enables the anti-phishing engineb. a rerouting library injected inside the application handling the attachment, reads the attribute data and determines the file as an email attachment, and then enables the anti-phishing mechanism of the Second Chance Engine.c. an external application detects the launching of the application handling the attachment, reads the attribute data and enables the anti-phishing mechanism of the Second Chance Engine.

In some embodiments, when the file is written, created or received, one or more of the following transpires:a. a file driver is triggered to write file attribute data information on the file being written. Such file attribute data will be saved using any of the methods and mechanisms previously discussed;b. a rerouting library residing inside the application that writes the file, creates the file attribute data information for the file it creates. Such file attribute data will be saved using any of the methods and mechanisms previously discussed;c. an external application detects the save request and in turn saves the file attribute data information about the file downloaded. Such file attribute data will be saved using any of the methods and mechanisms previously discussed.

Each time the operating system launches a runnable object, the application filter will check for file attribute data on the object to be executed. Using the file attribute data, the application filter can prompt the end user or block the object from running entirely. In some embodiments, the application filter will prompt or block the object from running if the runnable object was created by a word processor or editor. In some embodiments, the application filter will prompt or block the object from running if the runnable object was created by a script or script runner. In some embodiments, the application filter will prompt or block the object from running if the runnable object was created by an email client application. In some embodiments, the application filter will prompt or block the object from running if the runnable object was created by a media player.

The present solution has several possible applications. For example, the present solution can provide real time training enhancements, such that the system is configured to raise a prompt whenever a user takes a potentially dangerous action with the downloaded and saved file. For example, the system may remind the user of specific aspects of their training by highlighting in the email the potential threats that the user has been exposed to in security training (e.g., “Did you verify the 7 red flags before clicking?”) In this way, the present solution serves to enhance end users' security awareness to make them intelligently avoid document files (DOC, XLR, RFT, TXT, PDF, PPT and others) and other applications with the capability to execute malicious code via a threat embedded in the file. In some aspects, the present solution uses the prompt to generally remind the user that they should be more diligent (e.g., “Do you want to turn back time and review the email more closely?”) The present solution can provide pre-training protection such that new hires are placed into a group where the users are limited in what action they can take until they have passed security training. In some aspects, the security training assigned to the user may be based on how the user responds to the present solution system (e.g., Did the user click on links? Did the user still proceed to open or interact with the file after being prompted?) A company administrator can customize alert actions sent to users when they take a potentially dangerous action, such as Ignore (let the action proceed and do nothing), Report (let the action proceed and report and/or track the action), Prompt (ask the user to rethink and review the action that they took and give them a second chance to perform an action), or Prevent (do not let the action proceed, may be combined with reporting). In some aspects, therefore, the present solution provides network administrators the choice to either continue or stop the user from opening the file or the macro within the file. In another example, the present solution can be used as part of a training reinforcement tool that sends daily notifications to an administrator or to users showing users' number of potentially harmful clicks or interactions with dangerous files made the day before. These notifications when sent to users are intended to remind users to think before they interact with potential security threats. The present solution records the instances of risky user behavior, in terms of accessing URLs from different sites that are unknown or that are known to be untrusted, where the URLs may be embedded in non-executable files. The invention may further analyze and use this information to customize training for a user, to enforce training for a user, and/or to improve the security of the overall system. The invention further enables the system to pinpoint the users who need to be educated more, and in what specific ways. The invention further provides network administrators and cybersecurity educators a means to monitor and record the behavior of their end users and measure education effectiveness. The present solution also provides network administrators and cybersecurity educators better insight into typical end user behavior through behavior data collection and analysis so they can better tailor their products to fit their customer's needs.

The present solution provides several benefits. As the present solution is not security software, there are no definitions or scans. The present solution may be provided as a software as a service (SAAS) product, thus no server software needs to be installed. For example, for the SAAS, users only need to sign-up to use the service. SAAS uses limited client resources compared to other security systems. The present solution provides the benefit of clients being able to customize the system—e.g., how users are configured to interact with the system, actions taken by users, and prompt text may be customizable. The present solution can be provided such that it is active immediately after installation, thus no initial scans are needed.

In one embodiment, a system and methods perform a website link and domain analysis with respect to phishing attacks. The system determines if a website link is associated with a possible phishing site (i.e., untrusted list) or with a non-phishing site (i.e., trusted list) based on pre-determined domain lists. The system and method protects the end user from making these types of bad security decisions (e.g., clicking on a link from an untrusted source) while also giving the end user autonomy in making a final decision.

In one embodiment, systems and methods determine if the file or launched application attached to a suspected phishing email has an originating geographical location that is different than a geographical location of one of a user or a client device, and determines whether or not the file or launched application is suspicious based at least on the comparison of the geographical locations

Referring toFIG. 2Ain a general overview,FIG. 2Adepicts some of the architecture of an implementation of a system200capable of providing a user interface to confirm whether to review or take an action associated with any of the following: (1) receiving untrusted email (2) connections to untrusted domain from the email and any of its attachments (3) execution of “script”, “library”, “binary”, or “executable” email attachments (4) opening macro enabled attachments (5) opening of dangerous compressed files and their contents.

System200includes a server106. The server106includes a second chance manager246and a simulated phishing campaign manager250, which is responsible for executing simulated phishing campaigns. The server106includes several storage modules. Trusted domains are stored in storage230A, untrusted domains are stored in storage232A, and simulated phishing emails are stored in storage244.

Each of the server106, second chance manager246, simulated phishing campaign manager250, user interface manager252, and simulated phishing email generator254may comprise a program, service, task, script, library, application or any type and form of executable instructions or code executable on one or more processors. Any of the server106, second chance manager246, simulated phishing campaign manager250, user interface manager252, and/or simulated phishing email generator254may be combined into one or more modules, applications, programs, services, tasks, scripts, libraries, applications, or executable code.

Each of the client102, watch dog service210, communications module264, user interface266, display268, messaging application270, executing application212, client service214, and user console216may comprise a program, service, task, script, library, application or any type and form of executable instructions or code executable on one or more processors. Any of the client102, watch dog service210, communications module264, user interface266, display268, messaging application270, executing application212, client service214, and user console216may be combined into one or more modules, applications, programs, services, tasks, scripts, libraries, applications, or executable code.

The simulated phishing campaign manager250includes a simulated phishing email generator254, which may be implemented as or contain a virtual machine256. The simulated campaign manager250also includes a user interface manager252. Responsive to a user input, the simulated phishing campaign manager250generates a campaign for a simulated phishing attack, including one or more selected phishing email templates, one or more selected landing page templates, and one or more selected targeted user groups, in addition to other user input.

In an implementation, system200includes a server106. The server106may be a part of a cluster of servers106. In some embodiments, tasks performed by the server106may be performed by a plurality of servers. These tasks may be allocated among the cluster of servers by an application, service, daemon, routine, or other executable logic for task allocation. The server106may include a processor and memory.

The simulated phishing campaign manager250may manage various aspects of a simulated phishing attack campaign. For example, the simulated phishing campaign manager250may process input from the server106and/or may provide access as needed to various applications, modules, and other software components of the server106to other various applications, modules, and other software components of the server106. The simulated phishing campaign manager250may monitor and control timing of various aspects of a simulated attack campaign, may process requests for access to simulated attack campaign results, and/or may perform other tasks related to the management of a simulated attack campaign.

In some embodiments, the simulated phishing campaign module250may be integrated with or coupled to main memory122. In some embodiments, the main memory122may include any type and form of storage, such as a database or file system. The main memory122may store data such as parameters and scripts associated with a particular simulated phishing campaign. In an example, the main memory122may store a set of parameters and scripts corresponding to the choices made by a server106through a simulated phishing campaign manager250, e.g. as described above for a particular simulated phishing attack.

In an implementation, the simulated phishing campaign manager250includes a simulated phishing email generator254. The simulated phishing email generator254may be integrated with or coupled to the main memory122so as to provide the simulated phishing email generator254accesses to parameters associated with messaging choices made for a particular simulated campaign by e.g. the server106. The simulated phishing email generator254may be integrated with or coupled to memory or a memory store or otherwise a storage, such as a database, containing trusted domains230A. The simulated phishing email generator254may be integrated with or coupled to memory or a memory store or otherwise a storage, such as a database, containing untrusted domains232A. The simulated phishing email generator254may be integrated with or coupled to memory or a memory store or otherwise a storage, such as a database, containing simulated phishing emails244. The simulated phishing email generator254may be an application, service, daemon, routine, or other executable logic for generating messages. The messages generated by the simulated phishing email generator254may be of any appropriate format. For example, they may be email messages, text messages, messages used by particular messaging applications such as, e.g., WhatsApp™, or any other type of message. The message type to be used in a particular attack may be selected by e.g. a server106using a simulated phishing campaign manager250. The messages may be generated in any appropriate manner, e.g. by running an instance of an application that generates the desired message type, such as running e.g. a Gmail™ application, Microsoft Outlook™, WhatsApp™, a text messaging application, or any other appropriate application. The messages may be generated by running a messaging application on e.g. a virtual machine256, or may simply be run on an operating system of the server106, or may be run in any other appropriate environment. The messages may be generated to be formatted consistent with specific messaging platforms, for example Outlook365, Outlook Web Access (OWA), Webmail, iOS, Gmail client, and so on.

In some embodiments, the simulated phishing email generator254can be configured to generate messages having the ability to traverse users who interact with the messages to a specific landing page.

In some embodiments, the simulated phishing email generator254can be configured to generate a simulated phishing email. The email can appear to be delivered from a trusted email address, such as the email address of an executive of the company at which the target is employed. In addition, the email can have a “Subject:” field that is intended to cause the user to take an action, such as initiating a wire transfer. In some embodiments, the simulated phishing email generator254can generate one or more simulated phishing emails which are stored in the simulated phishing emails storage244. In some embodiments, the simulated phishing email generator254can generate multiple instances of the email which may be delivered to the clients102via a network104. For example, the server106can select any number of employees who should be targeted by a simulated attack. The simulated phishing email generator254can generate a set of emails similar to the email, each addressed to a respective target identified in the information stored in the memory122. That is, the simulated phishing email generator254can generate the emails such that the “From:” and “Subject:” fields of each email are identical, while the “To:” field is adjusted according to the desired targets.

The second chance manager246generally manages the process of sending/receiving data and information between the client102and the server106. For example, the client102sends the URL clicked on by the user to server106for trusted/untrusted/unknown determination with the results returned to the client102.

In an implementation, a simulated phishing campaign manager250may be e.g., another name for a system administrator, such as a security manager, a third-party security consultant, a risk assessor, or any other party that uses the simulated phishing campaign manager250installed on a server106. The server106may wish to direct a simulated phishing attack by interacting with the simulated phishing campaign manager250installed on the server106. The simulated phishing campaign manager212may be, for example, a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a mobile device, or any other suitable computing device. The simulated phishing campaign manager250may be e.g., an application on a device that allows for a user of the device to interact with the server106for e.g. purposes of creating, configuring, tailoring and/or executing a simulated phishing attack and/or viewing and/or processing and/or analyzing the results of a phishing attack.

In an implementation, the simulated phishing campaign manager250, when executed, causes a graphical user interface to be displayed to the server106. In other embodiments, the simulated phishing campaign manager250allows for user input through a non-graphical user interface, such as a user interface that accepts text or vocal input without displaying an interactive image. A graphical user interface may be displayed on a screen of a mobile phone, or a monitor connected to a desktop or laptop computer, or may be displayed on any other display. The user may interact with e.g. the graphical user interface on the device by typing, clicking a mouse, tapping, speaking, or any other method of interacting with a user interface. The graphical user interface on the device may be a web-based user interface provided by a web browser (e.g. GOOGLE CHROME, Microsoft INTERNET EXPLORER, or Mozilla Firefox provided by Mozilla Foundation of Mountain View, Calif.), or may be an application installed on a user device capable of opening a network connection to simulated phishing campaign manager250, or may be any other type of interface.

In an implementation, the simulated phishing campaign manager250and/or server106may make choices concerning how a simulated phishing attack is to be carried out. For example, a graphical user interface run by the simulated phishing campaign manager250may be displayed to the server106. A user via the server106may input parameters for the attack that affect how it will be carried out. For example, via the server106a user may make choices as to which users to include as potential targets in the attack, the method of determining which users are to be selected as targets of the attack, the timing of various aspects of the attack, whether to use an attack template that includes values for one or a plurality of failure indicators, how responses from targeted users should be uniquely identified, and other choices. These choices may be made by selecting options displayed on a graphical user interface from dropdown menus, being presented with choices through a simulated attack wizard, or in any other appropriate manner.

In an implementation, the simulated phishing campaign manager250may allow the server106, such as via application programming interfaces (APIs), to access and/or change settings of an account maintained with any party involved with the attack, such as, for example, a third party security service provider, or may allow the user group management function212to access and/or change settings of an account maintained with a third party security service provider, such as one that e.g. manages an exploit server, view bills and/or make payments to a third party security service provider, to perform these functions with other third parties involved in the attack, or provide any other functions that would be appropriate for facilitating communications between the server106and any other parties involved in the attack.

The system200includes also the client102. A client102may be a target of any simulated phishing attack or actual phishing attack. For example, the client may be an employee, member, or independent contractor working for an organization that is performing a security checkup or conducts ongoing simulated phishing attacks to maintain security. The client102may be any device used by the client. The client need not own the device for it to be considered a client device102. The client102may be any computing device, such as a desktop computer, a laptop, a mobile device, or any other computing device. In some embodiments, the client102may be a server or set of servers accessed by the client. For example, the client may be the employee or a member of an organization. The client may access a server that is e.g. owned or managed or otherwise associated with the organization. Such a server may be a client102.

In some embodiments, the client102may further include a user interface266such as a keyboard, a mouse, a touch screen, or any other appropriate user interface. This may be a user interface that is e.g. connected directly to a client102, such as, for example, a keyboard connected to a mobile device, or may be connected indirectly to a client102, such as, for example, a user interface of a client device102used to access a server client102. The client102may include a display268, such as a screen, a monitor connected to the device in any manner, or any other appropriate display.

In an implementation, the client102may include a messaging application270. The messaging application270may be any application capable of viewing, editing, and/or sending messages. For example, the messaging application270may be an instance of an application that allows viewing of a desired message type, such as any web browser, a Gmail™ application, Microsoft Outlook™, WhatsApp™, a text messaging application, or any other appropriate application. In some embodiments, the messaging application270can be configured to display simulated phishing attack emails. Furthermore, the messaging application270can be configured to allow the target to generate reply messages or forwarded messages in response to the messages displayed by the messaging application270.

In some embodiments, the client102may include a communications module264. This may be a library, application programming interface (API), set of scripts, or any other code that may facilitate communications between the client102and any of the server106, a third-party server, or any other server. In some embodiments, the communications module264determines when to transmit information from the client102to external servers106via a network104. In some embodiments, the information transmitted by the communications module264may correspond to a message, such as an email, generated by the messaging application270. In some embodiments, the communications module264may send request for updated trusted domains230A and untrusted domains232A from the server106via the network104.

The client102includes the watch dog service210and an executing application212. The watch dog service210starts and monitors the client service214. The watch dog service210is launched as a delayed service. Several minutes after all the services start, the delayed services start running. When the watch dog service210starts up, it checks to see if the client service214is running. If this service is not running, then the watch dog service210starts this service. In another aspect, if an end user has advanced privileges and tries to kill the client services214, the watch dog service210will see that the service is not running and it will start it up again. In this way, the watch dog service210is a failsafe to ensure that the client service214is always running. The watch dog service210can also stop the client service214or stop and restart the client service214.

FIG. 2Bshows a detailed view of the architecture of the client device102with respect to the server106via the network104. Everything shown is configurable.

The client service214registers a client driver215into the operating system's kernel217. The client driver is designed to monitor the creation and termination of applications within the operating system. The client service ensures that client driver is installed properly into the operating system. Once the client driver is registered, the client service waits for other critical startup programs to start (like winlogon.exe or explorer.exe in Windows), and then it starts a user console216. The client service214also restarts the user console216should it crash or be terminated forcefully.

The user console216, on its creation, loads the core library220. Via the core library220, the user console216receives messages from client driver215whenever a process is created or terminated. Each time the user console216receives a message from the client driver215, it immediately inquires several data from the OS such as the name of the executing application212, its parameters and its architecture. With these inquired data, the user console216then judges whether the executing application212is significant or not. If it is insignificant, the user console216will ignore it and let it run. Should the executing application212be significant (for example messaging applications270such as email clients like Outlook and executing applications212such as word processors like MS-WORD), the user console216spawns the appropriate injector process222, to inject the monitor library224into the messaging application270or the executing application212. Once the new process loads the monitor library224, it will now gain access to and use the shared memory map219and communications module264.

The client service starts an attribute data writer280. The attribute data write280is in communication with the client driver215to receive notifications from the driver of processes started on the client device102. The attribute data writer280receives from the client driver215one or more process IDs for one or more executing applications212detected by the client driver215as starting on the client device102. In some embodiments, the attribute data writer280receives from the client driver215a second process ID which corresponds to a parent process of the executing application212. In some applications, the attribute data writer280resolves the process ID into one of a path or a name of file corresponding to the application. In some embodiments, the attribute data writer280determines if one of the path or name of the file is in a list of applications to be monitored by the attribute data writer280.

The attribute data writer280launches an injector process222. In some embodiments, the attribute data writer280launches a version of the injector process222corresponding to the type of architecture. The attribute data injector process222injects an attribute data library281into the process of the application corresponding to the process ID for the executing application212. In some embodiment, the injector process222injects a version of the attribute data writer library282corresponding to the type of architecture. The attribute data writer library282classifies the application into a class of a plurality of classes and causes the executing application212to create attribute data corresponding to the class of the executing application212responsive to a file be one of opened, created, or received by the application. In some embodiments, the attribute data writer library282obtains information on the injected executing application212and classifies it based on the information into a class of a plurality of classes comprising an email client, a word processor, a web browser, a portable document format reader or writer, and a presentation processor. In some embodiments, the attribute data created by the executing application212is non-class specific attribute data comprising one or more of the following: author application, original file name, logged in name, domain name, source tag, location data, machine ID, local internet protocol address, host name, and a first non-system initiator application.

In some embodiments, the attribute data writer280is executed by the client service214responsive to a user being logged in to the computer system. In some embodiments, an attribute data library281retrieves the attribute data from one of a master file table storage284or an alternate data stream storage286. In some embodiments, the attribute data library281retrieves the attribute data that has been stored using one or more of the previously described methods or mechanisms for storing a data file on the computer system.

Client102includes attribute data analysis module288. The attribute data analysis module communicates288with the attribute data library281and identifies an attribute data file of a file that is being opened, created, or received by an application. The attribute data analysis module communicates288identifies from one or more attribute data values a class of the application and a non-system initiator application of the application and in some embodiments, determines that the file is suspicious based on the one or more attribute data values.

Client102includes a process filter service289. The process filter service289comprises a document filter library (DLL)283. In some embodiments, the document filter library is injected into an application executing on a client device by an injector process222. The document filter library283is configured to intercept a call of the application to open a file. In some embodiments, the document filter library283is configured to access a set of attribute data from a master file table storage284or an alternate data streams storage286. The document filter library283is configured to identify one or more rules to be applied to the set of attribute data to determine whether or not to open the file or the application. In some embodiments, the process filter service289is configured to resolve the name of an executable file of an application based on the process ID of a launched application.

The user console216tracks the process chain as it runs. For example, in some configurations, it tracks if an instance of MS-WORD (one of the significant executing applications212) was launched because an end user opened a “.DOC” attachment from a messaging application270. Since the executing application212MS-WORD was directly launched by a messaging application270, the monitor library224injected inside the executing application212MS-WORD will be activated to start monitoring, reporting and suspending any URL launches. On the other hand, if none of the MS-WORD processes were launched by a messaging application270, the e monitor library224residing in the executing application212MS-WORD will not be activated and MS-WORD will not monitor and report URL launches.

In some embodiments, the user console216tracks the messaging application270to determine the class of the messaging application and the architecture of the application.

If any of the injected processes report events such as URL launches, the user console216receives the message and reacts according to its configuration. The user console216may query the URL against its local cache of untrusted domains. If no definitive answer is gained from the local cache, it may connect to the server106and query about the URL. If the URL is found to not to be trusted, the user console216might display a prompt for the user to either continue the URL launch or discard the launch. The user console216may or may not report the user decision to a server106. This record of user behavior may be used later on to improve training and education. Communication of messages and reporting of events amongst all parts are done via the communications module264and the shared memory map219.

The client102also includes a user console216. The user console216runs in the user space and is responsible for raising a user dialog box to the user. The monitor library224pauses execution resulting from the user's action such that the client service214temporarily blocks execution of the executing application212(i.e., pauses execution of application212until the user decides they want to proceed or do not want to proceed) such as temporarily blocking execution of a web browser.

In some embodiments, the client102can optionally include a local cached memory218and a shared memory map219. The shared memory map219allows communication between the monitor library224within the executing application212and/or the messaging application270, the client driver215, the user console216, and the client service214, all of which have access to the shared memory map219. The shared memory map219can include copies of a storage230B for the trusted domains230B and a storage232B for untrusted domains. These storages230B and232B can include domains from the server106as well as domains identified locally by a client administrator. The cached memory218provides storage for trusted domains230B and untrusted domains232B, which can be copied into the shared memory map219for use during runtime.

When the client service214detects a URL, via the client driver215or via the monitor library224that is monitoring the messaging application270, it writes this URL into shared memory map219, the user console216wakes up and grabs that data and queries, via the lists of trusted and untrusted domains on the shared memory map219and on the server106to find out if it is a known trusted domain or a known untrusted domain. As described above, the server106incorporates two pre-determined domain lists: the trusted domain list230A and the untrusted domain list232A. Domain lists are pulled from the server106via an API and stored locally to the client102in the shared memory map219and/or the cached memory218. For example, the lists stored locally may include trusted domains230B.

The client service214can access the lists stored at the server106, (i.e. the trusted domain list230A and the untrusted domain list232A) using an application programming interface (API). The user console216can display trusted domains (i.e., websites having domains that are known to be safe—not phishing) and untrusted domains (i.e., websites having domains that are known to be phishing) received from the server106(i.e., received from storages230A and232A) and can also display trusted domains and untrusted domains from the client administrator locally (i.e., from the cached memory218or shared memory map219). The domains can be viewed and installed on client102by way of a web console.

In some embodiments, the server106includes a simulated phishing campaign manager250. This simulated phishing campaign manager250analyzes which phishing email templates are most effective in generating user failures when the template is used in a simulated phishing attack. The simulated phishing campaign manager250additionally determines what the most common failure types are for a given template. The simulated phishing campaign manager250may perform additional analysis across many different templates used to determine which failure indicators lead to the highest rate of failures.

For example, the simulated phishing campaign manager250may include data collected from targets, records of failures such as a listing of which targets replied to a simulated phishing email, systemic or other security measures in place during the simulated phishing attacks, time or date logs, user identifiers, data detailing the results or analysis of attack results including data that indicates associations between attack results, and any other appropriate data. The server106may view, save, share, print, or perform any other appropriate action with the attack results. The simulated phishing campaign manager250may perform analysis on the attack results, possibly upon request of the server106. For example, this analysis may include determining which users are a security risk based on having a number of failures above a predetermined threshold, whether certain security systems in place are effective by e.g. correlating the presence of such security systems with a lower than average incidence of failures. The simulated phishing campaign manager250may allow an attack manager to view, on a graphical user interface run by the second chance manager246, such as for example a timeline of overall failure rates, which may be useful in helping to determine whether a security policy that was instituted at a particular time was effective in improving security.

In some embodiments, reply emails sent from the client102to the server106can be processed by the simulated phishing campaign manager250. For example, simulated phishing campaign manager250can be configured to process reply emails received from one or more target clients102to determine the identities of the targets who sent the reply emails. In some embodiments, the identities of the targets may be determined based in part on the unique identifiers included within each reply email received by the server106.

The system200may include a network104. The network104may be any type and/or form of network. The geographical scope of the network104may vary widely and the network104can be a body area network (BAN), a personal area network (PAN), a local-area network (LAN), e.g. Intranet, a metropolitan area network (MAN), a wide area network (WAN), or the Internet. The topology of the network104may be of any form and may include, e.g., any of the following: point-to-point, bus, star, ring, mesh, or tree. The network104may be an overlay network which is virtual and sits on top of one or more layers of other networks104′. The network104may be of any such network topology as known to those ordinarily skilled in the art capable of supporting the operations described herein. The network104may utilize different techniques and layers or stacks of protocols, including, e.g., the Ethernet protocol, the internet protocol suite (TCP/IP), the ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) technique, the SONET (Synchronous Optical Networking) protocol, or the SDH (Synchronous Digital Hierarchy) protocol. The TCP/IP internet protocol suite may include application layer, transport layer, internet layer (including, e.g., IPv6), or the link layer. The network104may be a type of a broadcast network, a telecommunications network, a data communication network, or a computer network. The network104connects the server106and a client102. The client102comprises a communications module264, a user interface266, a display268, a messaging application270, and a memory such as any embodiments of main memory122described herein or any type and form of storage, such as a database or file system. The client102receives the email sent by the server106based upon the campaign created and executed by the simulated phishing campaign manager250. The client102is able to receive the simulated phishing email via the messaging application270, display the received email for the user using the display268, and is able to accept user interaction via the user interface266responsive to the displayed email. If the user interacts with the simulated phishing email, the client102traverses to a landing page or display used by the simulated phishing campaign manager250in the phishing campaign.

As shown inFIG. 2B, the watch dog service210starts and monitors the client service214. The client service214obtains licensing information from the server106via the network104. The client service214and the user console216both communicate to the network via an API. The API is a private API, and a license key is required to use the API. The license key is included in each request in order to identify the party responsible for service requests. The API is a REST API that uses a simple key based authentication. For the purpose of the API, the license key may be referred to as “authentication_token” or “auth_token” and must be provided with all requests. The “Return Values” table shows different parameters returned from the server. For example, “Admin known status”—customer account lists known good, known bad, or unknown. As shown in the following tables, “KB4_known_status” can return the same three statuses: known good, known bad, or unknown. If the client returns unknown for a domain and the server returns known (good or bad) for the same domain, the server can decide whether or not to prompt the client. However, where there is a conflict between the client returning an untrusted domain blacklisted and the server returning the same domain as trusted, the client overrides the server such that the domain is blacklisted.

Various factors such as box text, box colors, etc. are all customizable so that the end user is provided a client system that is customized for their company.

There are several parameters that may be set or established to use the API in addition to the license key or authentication token as follows:

ParameterDescriptionsc_versionThe version of the currently installed secondchance systemos_nameOperating system nameos_versionOperating system versionos_architectureOperating system architecture x32/x64os_localeOperating system locale (numeric format)outlook_versionMessaging application/email client versionmachine_guidUnique machine ID generated by the secondchance system

There are several available APIs as follows:

Installed

This API is used to indicate the fact that second chance was installed. This should be called every time second chance is installed on an individual computer.Method: POSTPath: /v1/sc/installedParameters: Only the required parameters aboveResponse Code: 201Response Body: JSON response echoing required parameters

This API is used to indicate the fact that second chance was uninstalled. This should be called every time second chance is uninstalled on an individual computer.Method: POSTPath: /v1/sc/uninstalledParameters: Only the required parameters aboveResponse Code: 201Response Body: JSON response echoing required parameters

This API is used to indicate the fact that second chance was started on a computer. This should be called every time second chance starts on an individual computer.

Return Values

{“data”:{“linktitlebar_text”:”1”,“linkmessageheader_text”:”1”,“info_link”:”1”,“info_link_text”:”1”,“info_link_visible”:”1”,“allow_button_text”:”1”,“allow_button_fgcolor”:”1”,“allow_button_bgcolor”:”1”,“allow_button_visible”:”1”,“tbt_button_text”:”1”,“tbt_button_fgcolor”:”1”,“tbt_button_bgcolor”:”1”,“remember_cb_visible”:”1”,“show_prompt_enum”:”1”,}}
Validate URL

This API is used to validate a URL against the administrator defined list and the database. This should be called every time second chance raises an event that a ShellExecEX( ) is opening a URL.

Additional Outgoing Values

ParameterDescriptionURLFull URL user is attempting to open
Return Values

ParameterDescriptionDomainDomain parsed from original URLAdmin_known_status0 = Unknown1 = Known Trusted2 = Known UntrustedService_known_status0 = Unknown1 = Known Trusted2 = Known Untrustedinfo_linkCurrently left empty, later will return a URLto make available on prompt to help educateuserInfo_link_textText for link end user will see if visibleinfo_link_visibleBoolean: is info link visible. Default is falselinktitlebar_textText to use in prompt title bar for link clickedLinkmessageheader_textMessage header for prompt for link clickedallow_button_textText for allow buttonallow_button_fgcolorFore color for allow buttonallow_button_bgcolorBack color for allow buttonallow_button_visibleBoolean: is allow button visible. Default istruetbt_button_textText for turn back time buttontbt_button_fgcolorFore color for turn back time buttontbt_button_bgcolorBack color for turn back time buttonremember_cb_visibleBoolean: is the “Remember” checkbox visible.This will only appear if the allow button isvisible. Default is falseshow_prompt_enumValue that determines if prompts are raised0 = Do not show prompts, record data only1 = Show prompts for known untrusted only2 = Show prompts for both known untrustedand unknown3 = Show prompts for all links clicked
Method: POSTPath: /v1/sc/validate URLParameters: Only the required parameters aboveResponse Code: 201Response Body: JSON response containing the current second chance settings.

{“data”:{“domain”:”1”,“admin_known_status”:”1”,“service_known_status”:”1”,“info_link”:”1”,“info_link_text”:”1”,“info_link_visible”:”1”,“linktitlebar_text”:”1”,“linkmessageheader_text”:”1”,“allow_button_text”:”1”,“allow_button_fgcolor”:”1”,“allow_button_bgcolor”:”1”,“allow_button_visible”:”1”,“tbt_button_text”:”1”,“tbt_button_fgcolor”:”1”,“tbt_button_bgcolor”:”1”,“remember_cb_visible”:”1”,“show_prompt_enum”:”1”,}}
Action Taken

This API is used to validate a URL against the administrator defined list and the database. This should be called every time second chance raises an event that a ShellExecEX( ) is opening a URL.

Additional Outgoing Values

ParameterDescriptionURLFull URL user is attempting to openDomainDomain parsed from the original URLAdmin_known_statusValue stating AUK status from lookup ofdomain0 = Unknown1 = Known trusted2 = Known untrustedService_known_status0 = Unknown1 = Known trusted2 = Known untrustedUser_known_status0 = Unknown1 = Known trusted2 = Known untrustedAction_taken_enumAction taken enum values0 = Unknown1 = Admin known trusted URL (Autoallowed)2 = User known trusted URL (Auto allowed,can only happen if URL is admin unknown)3 = Service known trusted URL (Autoallowed, can only happen if URL is both userand admin unknown)4 = Admin known untrusted URL (prompted)5 = Service known untrusted URL (prompted,can only happen if URL is both user andadmin unknown)6 = Manually continued to site7 = Manually aborted navigation to siteInfo_linkCurrently left empty, later will return a URLto make available on prompt to help educateuserInfo_link_textText for link end user will see if visibleInfo_link_visibleBoolean: is info link visible. Default is falseLinkmessageheader_textMessage header for prompt for link clickedViewed_info_linkBoolean: did the user view the informationlink returned? Default is False
Return Values

The server106stores lists of domains. One example is a domain list of domains that are known to be problematic or risky and are therefore untrusted domains232A. One example is a domain list of domains that are considered to be safe and are therefore trusted domains230A. There may be lists of both trusted and untrusted domains as part of230A and232A that are specific to the service provider. There may be lists of both trusted and untrusted domains that are specific to the client and which are sent via the API from the client service214to the server106via the network104. The trusted domains230A and untrusted domains232A may be sent to the client in order to be stored in the cached memory218as trusted domains230B and untrusted domains232B, as well as in the shared memory map219. Lists of trusted domains and untrusted domains that are set up by the client administrator take precedence over lists of trusted domains and untrusted domains that are specific to the server106. Domains which are unknown, that is domains that are not in any lists, are considered potentially problematic and the user may be prompted by the user console216. The messaging in the prompt sent to the user via the user console216may be different for an unknown domain than for an untrusted domain.

The client service214is not associated with the user but is running in the background on the client all the time when started by the watch dog service210. The client service214interacts with the user console216which runs in the user space allowing the service to pop up messages that target the user with dialogs. The client service214ensures that the second chance product is licensed, which enables the service to identify the end user and what company they belong to. This knowledge may enable the server106to control the configuration data that the client service214receives and how the user console216behaves, for example with regards to messaging the user.

The client service214also starts a user console216for every user that logs into a user profile. There may be several instances of the user console216for every logged in user. The client service214is a separate component that monitors and can in some instances control the user console216when initiated (e.g., initiate pop up messages that temporary pause execution of an application, such as pausing execution of a web browser).

The user console216runs in the user space of the operating system. It raises prompts, get replies, and takes care of everything that needs to be done interactively with the user. The user console216is equipped with an internal library, the core library220, which allows it to detect processes being created or terminated by the operating system. Whenever the OS creates a process, the user console detects it and determines if it is significant or not. Should it be significant, the user console invokes the injector process222to inject the monitor library224on the detected process. Using the monitor library224, the user console216also gains access to a communication module264, one or more shared memory maps219, event flags and queues. The user console216receives messages like a request for URL access from the processes injected with the monitor library224. Depending on the message from injected processes, the user console216displays a prompt on the display268and waits for user response. It then forwards the user response to the monitor library224waiting for permission to open a URL or an attachment. To determine whether a URL is trusted or not, the user console216can interact with either the client service214, the server106or can query a shared memory map219list of domains. Also, the user console216can connect with the client service214for its settings.

A monitor library224writes data or information to the shared memory map219. The monitor library224also monitors the messaging application270(e.g., email service such as Outlook).

If the user console216determines that the messaging application270or the executing application212needs to be injected with a process in order to monitor for user activity, then the user console216spawns an injector process222. The user console may spawn either a 32 bit or a 64-bit injector process222. The injector process222then injects a monitor library224, again either 32 bit or 64 bit, into processes of the executing application212or the messaging application270. The injected monitor library224monitors processes of messaging application270(e.g., Outlook) and/or executing application212(e.g., Word, Adobe pdf). For example, the injector process222can inject the monitor library224into executing application212(e.g., MS word) to detect if the executing application212opens a website link.

In one implementation, the system200uses process tree monitoring. This type of process includes modules that monitor and track user actions such as clicking on links in emails as well as opening files attached to emails and then clicking on links in the attached files from the email. For example, tracking the messaging application270can include tracking opening of a file explorer e.g., track a user that opens a zip file then opens a word document in zip file and then clicks on the link in the word document.

When the monitor library224detects that a URL is being accessed, it writes the name of the URL into a shared memory map219, and raises a flag or an event. The user console216being linked with the core library220, detects the raised flag or event and grabs information written on the shared memory map219(e.g. the URL). When the user console216detects the flag or event, it uses the uniform resource locator translator221to resolve any URL in Punycode, tinyURL and/or other formats into their true form. It may or may not query the shared memory map219to determine if the URL is part of the local known trusted domains230B or known untrusted domains232B. If the URL is not part of either of these lists, the user console216may make a query to the server106via the API, to see if the URL is part of the server known trusted domains230A or the server known untrusted domains232A, or whether the URL represents an unknown domain.

As appreciated by one of skill in the art, other methods may be used to track clicking links and other search methods may be used for finding phishing related documents. For example, the system200may look to metadata for determining whether domains and/or documents are suspect (e.g., where domains are within documents attached to emails). The metadata provides the document's heritage which can be used for determining whether document is suspect.

The “Action Taken” table shows what the server records regarding actions taken by user as recorded by “action_taken_enum” (e.g., user continued to website or user aborted navigation to website). The server records and uses this information later (e.g., to track the user's performance). In one example, the system200only triggers a pop up box when there is an internet connection about to occur (e.g., opening website link).

In other implementations, the system200can also monitor common messaging platforms (e.g., skype links, jabber, google hangout). Other possible triggers could be: open file, reply to phishing email, etc.

Referring toFIG. 3in a general overview,FIG. 3depicts an implementation of a method300for creating and saving attribute data. In step310, the client service214registers, into the operating system of the device102to monitor processes, a client driver215configured to receive notifications from the operating system of processes started or terminated on the device. In step320, the client driver215executes an attribute data writer280on the device102, the attribute data writer280in communication with the client driver215to receive notifications from the client driver215of processes started on the device. In some embodiments, responsive to a user being logged in, the client driver215executes an attribute data writer280on the device102. In step330, the attribute data writer280receives a process ID from the client driver215for a process of an executing application212detected by the client driver215as starting on the device102. In step340, the attribute data writer launches an injector process222. The injector process222injects an attribute data writer library282into the process of the executing application212corresponding to the process ID. In step350, the attribute data writer library282classifies the application into a class of a plurality of classes. In step360, the attribute data writer library282causes the executing application212to create attribute data corresponding to the class of the executing application212, responsive to a file being one of created or opened or received by the executing application212.

Referring toFIG. 3in more detail, in some embodiments, step330comprises receiving, by the attribute data writer, a second process ID corresponding to a parent process. In some embodiments, the attribute data writer resolves a process ID into one path or name of file corresponding to the application. In some embodiments, the attribute data writer determines if one of the path or name of the file is in a list of applications to be monitored by the attribute data writer. In some embodiments, responsive to the file being in the list of applications to be monitored, the attribute data writer determines a type of architecture of the application. In some embodiments, the attribute data writer, launches an injector program corresponding to the type of architecture.

Referring toFIG. 4in a general overview,FIG. 4depicts an implementation of a method400for identifying and reading attribute data to determine that a file is suspicious. In step410, the attribute data library281that has been injected into an application identifies an attribute data file of a file being one of opened, created or received by an application, wherein the attribute data file comprises one of a master file table or an alternate data stream. In step420, the attribute data library281identifies, from one or more attribute data values in the attribute data file a class of the application. In step430, the attribute data library281identifies, from one or more attribute data values in the attribute data file a non-system initiator application of the application. In step432, the attribute data library281identifies, from one or more attribute data values in the attribute data file, an executable file extension of an original file name. In step434, the attribute data library281identifies, from one or more attribute data values in the attribute data file, whether the application is an email attachment. In step436, the attribute data library281identifies, from one or more attribute data values in the attribute data file, a location from which the file was one of created, stored or received. In step438, the attribute data library281identifies, from one or more attribute data values in the attribute data file, a uniform resource location from which the file was downloaded. In step440, the attribute data library281determines that the file is suspicious based on the one or more attribute data values. In step450, responsive to the determination, the user console216displays prompt that the file is suspicious.

Referring toFIG. 5Ain a general overview,FIG. 5Adepicts an implementation of a method500for alerting of access of files based on attribute data. In step510, the document filter library283which is injected into an application executing on a client device, intercepts a call of the application to open a file. In step520, the document filter library283identifies, using a name of the file, an attribute data file of the file. In step530, the document filter library283accesses a set of attribute data and corresponding values from the attribute data file. In step522, the document filter library283identifies, using a name of the file, an attribute data file of the file, wherein the attribute data comprises one of a master file table or an alternate data stream. In step530, the document filter library283accesses a set of attribute data and corresponding values from the attribute data file. In step540, the document filter library283identifies one or more rules to be applied to the set of attribute data to determine whether or not to open the file. In step550, the document filter library283applies the one or more rules to values of the set of attribute data. In step552, the document filter library283applies the one or more rules to values of the set of attribute data, wherein the application of the one or more rules determines that the user logged into the client device is different than the user identified in the set of attribute data. In step554, the document filter library283applies the one or more rules to values of the set of attribute data, wherein the application of the one or more rules determines that the domain of the client device is different than the domain identified in the set of attribute data. In step560, the document filter library283determines, responsive to the application of the one or more rules, not to open the file. In step562, the process filter service289prevents the opening of the file. In step570, the user console216displays a prompt to the user, identifying one or more reasons for not opening the file.

Referring toFIG. 5Bin a general overview,FIG. 5Bdepicts an implementation of a method for alerting of a launch of a suspicious application. In step580, the process filter service289resolves the name of an executable file of the application based on a process ID of a launched application. In step582, the process filter service289identifies, using a name of the file, an attribute data file of the application. In step584, the process filter service289accesses a set of attribute data and corresponding values from the attribute data file. In step585, the process filter service289identifies, from the attribute data file of the application, one or more of the following attribute data: domain name, user name, subnet, machine unique ID, time zone, and a source tag marking if copied from an external storage. In step586, the process filter service289identifies one or more rules to be applied to the set of attribute data to determine whether or not the launched application is suspicious. In step588, the process filter service289applies the one or more rules to values of the set of attribute data. In step590, responsive to the application of the one or more rules, the process filter service289determines that the launched application is suspicious. In step591, responsive to the determination, the document filter library283prevents the launched application from continuing to execute. In step592, responsive to the determination the user console216displays a prompt identifying that the launched application is suspicious. In step594, the user console216displays with the prompt a user interface element for a user to select whether to terminate or continue to execute the launched application. In step596, responsive to the user selection, the document filter library283one or terminates or continues to allow the launched application to execute.

Referring toFIG. 6Ain a general overview,FIG. 6Adepicts an implementation of a method600for determining access to an application or document is not permitted based on geographical location. In step610, one of a service executing on a client device or a library injected into an application executing on the client device determines that a user has taken action to one or open a document or launch the application that is suspicious. In step620, one of the service of the library identifies an attribute data file corresponding to one of the launched application or the file. In step622, one of the service of the library identifies an attribute data file corresponding to one of the launched application or the file, wherein the attribute data file comprises one of a master file table or an alternate data stream. In step630, one of the service or the library identifies an attribute data value identifying an originating geographical location of one of the file or the launched application. In step632, one of the service or the library identifies an attribute data value identifying an originating geographical location of one of the file or the launched application, wherein the originating geographical location is different than a geographical location of the client device. In step634, one of the service or the library identifies an attribute data value identifying an originating geographical location of one of the file or the launched application, wherein the originating geographical location is different than a geographical location of a user corresponding to one of the client device, the launched application or the file. In step636, one of the service or the library identifies an attribute data value identifying an originating geographical location of one of the file or the launched application, wherein the originating geographical location is a location where the file was created. In step638, one of the service or the library identifies an attribute data value identifying an originating geographical location of one of the file or the launched application, wherein the originating geographical location is a location where the application was downloaded. In step640, one of the service or the library determines that the original geographical location does not correspond to a geographical location permitted by the client device. In step650, one of the service or the library displays a prompt identifying that the action is not permitted.

Referring toFIG. 6Bin a general overview,FIG. 6Bdepicts an implementation of a method650for not permitting access to a document obtained from an external drive. In step660, one of a service executing on a client device or a library injected into an application executing on the client device determines that a user has taken action to one or open a document or launch the application that is suspicious. In step665, one of the service of the library identifies an attribute data file corresponding to one of the launched application or the file. In step666, one of the service of the library identifies an attribute data file corresponding to one of the launched application or the file, wherein the attribute data file comprises one of a master file table or an alternate data stream. In step670, one of the service or the library identifies an attribute data value identifying a source tag that identifies the file or launched application as coming from one of a local network, and external network, or an external drive. In step675, one of the service or the library determines that accessing the file or launched application from the source is not permitted on the client device. In step676, one of the service or the library determines that accessing the file or launched application from the source is not permitted on the client device, wherein the source is the external drive comprising a USB drive. In step680, one of the service or the library displays a prompt identifying that the action is not permitted.

Referring toFIG. 7in a general overview,FIG. 7depicts an implementation of a method700for recording user behavior on reactions to suspicious applications or documents. In step710, one of a service executing on a client device or a library injected into an application executing on the client device determines that a user has one of opened a document or has launched the application that is suspicious. In step720, one of the service or the library obtains a set of attribute data in an attribute data file corresponding to one of the application or the file. In step722, one of the service or the library obtains a set of attribute data in an attribute data file corresponding to one of the application or the file, wherein the attribute data file comprises one of a master file table or an alternate data stream. In step724, one of the service or the library obtains a set of attribute data in an attribute data file corresponding to one of the application or the file, wherein the set of attribute data comprises one or more of the following: suspicious application/process name, application name that was filtered, name of document that was blocked, encrypted copy of the file's attribute data, software certificate, hash of the suspicious application, user response to the alert, warning or alert details, machine IP address, currently logged in user name, and machine unique ID. In step730, one of the service or the library transmits at least the values of the set of attribute data to a server for recording behavior of the user and information on one of the suspicious file or launched application.

Referring toFIG. 8Ain a general overview,FIG. 8Adepicts an implementation of method800for displaying a user interface to receive input from the user to confirm whether to take a user action or revert back to allow the user to review the action. In step810, the user console216receives notification of an application process creating indicating an application was launched. In step812, the user console216determines if the application process is of significance. If the application process is not of significance, for example if the application is not known to ever have propagated any security threats, then in step814the user console216ignores the process and lets it run. If the application process is of significance, then in step816the user console spawns an injector process222to inject a monitor library224into the application process. In step818, the user console216receives notification of an action of a user with respect to an email to access a domain that is not identified as trusted. In some embodiments, the user is access the domain from within a non-executable document that was downloaded from a phishing email and stored on the computer system. In step820, the user console216makes queries to determine if the URL for the domain is trusted, untrusted, or unknown. In some embodiments, the user console216makes queries to the server106. In some embodiments, the user console216makes queries to local storage of trusted and untrusted domains. In step822, responsive to the results of the query, the user console displays a user interface to receive input from the user to confirm whether to take the action or revert back to review the action. In step824, responsive to the user input, the user console216passes the user input to the monitor library224which either unpauses the URL request or discards it.

Referring toFIG. 8Bin a general overview,FIG. 8Bdepicts an implementation of method850for pausing a user action to access a domain that is not identified as trusted. In step860, the monitor library224detects an action of a user with respect to an email to access a domain that is not identified as trusted. In step862, responsive to detecting the user action, the monitor library pauses the user's URL request to access the domain. In step864, the monitor library notifies the user console of the user's URL access request. In step866, the monitor library receives user input from the user console. In step868, responsive to receiving the user input, the monitor library either unpauses the URL request or discards it.

Referring toFIG. 9A, the information flow diagram shows a user console monitoring processes. In the user's operating system, the user opens a messaging application270(for example, an email client). The user console216is equipped with an internal library, the core library220. Via the core library220the user console216receives messages from the client driver215each time the operating system creates a new process for a messaging application270. In some configurations, the user console216tracks if an instance of a default internet browser has been spawned, as would be the case if the user clicks on a URL or hyperlink in an email. The user console216detects the creation of this new process, and knows that the HTTP client is a child of the messaging application. In other words, the user console216knows that the URL was launched by a message (for example, an email) through the action of the user clicking on a URL or hyperlink. This is called detection by inheritance. When the user console216is notified by the core library220that the HTTP client has started, the user console216queries the shared memory map219to learn the URL that is to be opened in the process and the HTTP client is put into a suspended state. The user console216then makes a local query to the shared memory map219and checks the trusted domains list and the untrusted domains list to see if it can find the URL that is to be opened by the HTTP client. If the local query does not recognize the URL in either the trusted domains list or the untrusted domains list, then the client service214uses an API to send a query to the server106. The server106responds with information that is has on the URL, based on the server106trusted domains storage230A and untrusted domains storage232A. If the domain is unknown, the server returns this result to the client service214.

In the example flow shown inFIG. 9A, without getting into the messaging application270, the second chance system can detect that an HTTP client has been launched from a messaging application270.FIG. 9Adescribes the process of the invention for operating systems that have a very restricted process context, such as IOS, BSD, Unix and Linux.

Referring toFIG. 9B, the information flow diagram shows the user console216to monitor processes external to a messaging application270(e.g., email client) and a monitor library224that monitors processes within the messaging application270. In some operating systems, it is possible that when a URL is clicked within a messaging application270, it does not spawn a new process. In this case, the user console216would not detect the inheritance of the link, as there is no process that would be the parent of the parent-child relationship as described inFIG. 9A. When the user opens a messaging application270, a process is started and the user console216detects this process. Because the process is a messaging application, the user console knows that this is a program that it needs to monitor. At this point, the client service216spawns an injector process222to injects some of its own code (the monitor library224) into the messaging application270(e.g. the email client) so that its behavior can be monitored. This is the primary distinction fromFIG. 9A, where no code is injected. Many operating systems (e.g. Linux) do not allow for the injecting of code into a messaging client, however versions of the Windows operating system allow this. This injected code monitors the URLs that the user clicks. In this way, the system can detect the URL and the opening of the browser is suspended while the system makes a query to determine if the URL is known trusted or known untrusted or unknown.

The system also works the same for message attachments that may include a link, for example Microsoft Word or Adobe PDF attachments. In this case, the user console216spawns an injector process222to inject code into the executing application212so that if there is a link in a Word document that was attached to a message such as an email, or a link in a pdf document that was attached to a message such as an email, the system will monitor the users' actions with respect to that link. Specifically, in the case of Word, when the Word application is opened, Microsoft creates a server-type process that has child Word document processes living off it. The user console216monitors the spawning of a child Word document process that is related to the messaging application process and then directs an injector process222to inject a monitor library224into that Word process. This in effect monitors links in all Word documents that are opened until all Word documents are closed and the server-type original process is also closed.

ForFIGS. 9A-9B, special actions take place on determining the result of the query. Several special actions are available to the user console216at this point. The user may be informed of danger. The user may choose whether to proceed or not. The user administrator may be informed of danger. The remote administrator may block the HTTP client from opening the URL or the file. The user may be reminded of anti-phishing training that they have received. The HTTP client may be traversed to different URL in order to execute user training at that time. The client's computer may be locked until they complete a training module. The HTTP client may be allowed to continue to the URL whether the URL is an untrusted domain or a trusted domain. The HTTP client may be terminated. The HTTP client may be traversed to a different landing page or to a blank page. The system may track the user's action in response to the prompt given in order to perform further analysis.

FIG. 9Cshows an information flow for detecting and prompting users about documents embedded with executable code like macros. Without opening the file, a user cannot determine if an email attachment is embedded with executable code like macros. Some macros are executed as soon as the attachment is opened by the user. Other are not auto-activated but have content that can lure users to enable macros in applications like Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel. InFIG. 8C, the information flow diagram shows the user console216to monitor processes external to a messaging application270(e.g., email client) and a monitor library224that monitors processes within the messaging application270. When the user opens a messaging application270, a process is started and the user console216detects this process. Because the process is a messaging application, the user console knows that this is a program that it needs to monitor. At this point, the client service216spawns an injector process222to injects some of its own code (the monitor library224) into the messaging application270(e.g. the email client) so that its behavior can be monitored. When the user clicks on an email attachment, such as RTF, TXT, DOC, XLS files and others, the monitor library224detects the request to open or save a document attachment. The monitor library224analyzes the document to determine if it has macros content in it. If the document is analyzed and found not to have any executable macro in it, then the messaging application270is allowed access to the file. If the attachment was found to contain an executable macro, the monitor library224notifies the user console216that a suspicious document is about to be opened. The user console216may report the user behavior to the server106, and the user prompts the user for a decision. The user console216informs the monitor library224of the user decision and the monitor library224subsequently takes an action responsive to the user decision. In one embodiment, the email client is allowed to open the potentially harmful document. In one embodiment, the email client is not allowed to open the potentially harmful document. AlthoughFIG. 8Cillustrates the system operating in response to an email client, it will be obvious to those skilled in the art that the email client is not necessary, and any other application may be used to prompt users just before they open macro-capable documents.

FIG. 9Dshows an information flow for detecting and prompting users about executable binaries or script email attachments. Often, malicious executable email attachments use well known icons like “pdf”, “doc”, or “jpg” to lure users to open them. They also use dubious names like “sample.pdf.exe” to make them look like legitimate pdf files when the operating system does not display the file extension. In this case, “sample.pdf.exe” is displayed as “sample.pdf”. Other email attachments are shell scripts or java scripts that usually end up downloading more executable code to harm or gather data on the user. InFIG. 9D, the information flow diagram shows the user console216to monitor processes external to a messaging application270(e.g., email client) and a monitor library224that monitors processes within the messaging application270. When the user opens a messaging application270, a process is started and the user console216detects this process. Because the process is a messaging application, the user console knows that this is a program that it needs to monitor. At this point, the client service216spawns an injector process222to injects some of its own code (the monitor library224) into the messaging application270(e.g. the email client) so that its behavior can be monitored. When the user clicks on an email attachment, such as EXE, COM, JS, VBS, BAT and others, the monitor library224detects the request to open or save a script or executable attachment. The monitor library224analyzes the attachment name and checks the application handling the file type. If the attachment is analyzed and found that the attachment will not launch and executable, the attachment will not run any script loader or running, the attachment will not open shell or power shell windows, and the attachment will not run a dll loader, then the messaging application270is allowed access to the file. If the attachment was found to contain an executable or script attachment, the monitor library224notifies the user console216that a suspicious document is about to be opened. The user console216may report the user behavior to the server106, and the user prompts the user for a decision. The user console216informs the monitor library224of the user decision and the monitor library224subsequently takes an action responsive to the user decision. In one embodiment, the email client is allowed to launch the suspicious executable/script attachment. In one embodiment, the email client is not allowed to launch the suspicious executable/script attachment. AlthoughFIG. 8Dillustrates the system operating in response to an email client, it will be obvious to those skilled in the art that the email client is not necessary, and any other application may be used to prompt users just before they open macro-capable documents.

FIG. 10Aillustrates a screen shot of the system providing notifications when a user opens untrusted domains in attached pdf files of untrusted emails.FIG. 10Ashows how the second chance system can appear to users via a user interface. The second chance system tracks when user opens an attachment (e.g., pdf) in an email. The system tracks opening of the attachment and monitors the executing application (e.g., Adobe Acrobat Reader) regarding future actions by the user with respect to this pdf. In this pdf document, there is a link that the system monitors in case the user clicks on the link. The system monitors the executing application and intercepts the user clicking in the pdf document. The system pops up a message (as shown inFIG. 10A). This example shows two buttons (e.g., “Yes” or “No”).

FIG. 10Billustrates another screen shot of the system providing notifications when the user opens untrusted domains in attached pdf files of untrusted emails.FIG. 10Bshows another pdf reader.FIG. 10Bis the same asFIG. 10Abut shows use of a different executing application (e.g., Sumatra) to show that the system can work with other applications. As appreciated by one of skill in the art, other applications can be monitored such as Foxit.

FIG. 10Cillustrates another screen shot providing a notification when a user opens an untrusted domain in an attached word document file of an untrusted email.FIG. 10Cis basically the same thing asFIGS. 10A-10Bbut uses a word document (e.g., docx) as the attachment to the email instead of the pdf file. When the user opens the word document and then clicks on link in word document, the second chance system intercepts the action of going to the website. The system is able to intercept this action by monitoring processes of Microsoft Word in this example.

FIG. 10Dillustrates another screen shot providing a notification when a user opens an untrusted domain in an untrusted email.FIG. 10Dshows a simple link in an email. In this example, the system is monitoring Outlook in order to intercept the user's actions with respect to opening the link.FIG. 10Dalso shows how training can be provided to the user in the pop up message, in this case offering a chance for the user to review their training related to phishing emails before making a decision.

FIG. 10EandFIG. 10Fillustrate other screen shots showing the use of the uniform resource location translator221, in this case showing Punycode URLs which are pretending to be familiar URLs, such as www.apple.com and www.yahoo.com.

As appreciated by one of skill in the art, the system may be implemented with other messaging applications270such as Gmail. The system is going to follow whatever browser the client is using to look at Gmail. For example, the system may need a browser plug-in to track Gmail. In some embodiments, an email client is not needed at all, and the system can follow domains embedded directly in applications that are not associated with an email client.

While various embodiments of the methods and systems have been described, these embodiments are exemplary and in no way limit the scope of the described methods or systems. Those having skill in the relevant art can effect changes to form and details of the described methods and systems without departing from the broadest scope of the described methods and systems. Thus, the scope of the methods and systems described herein should not be limited by any of the exemplary embodiments and should be defined in accordance with the accompanying claims and their equivalents.