Using one-time passwords with single sign-on authentication

A method, computer program product, authentication proxy server, and system for enabling a user to use a one-time password in conjunction with single sign-on authentication and external authentication, such as provided by the Kerberos protocol, are provided.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

This invention relates to authentication mechanisms, and more particularly to a mechanism for using one-time passwords (OTPs) in conjunction with single sign-on (SSO) authentication.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Single sign-on (SSO) is a specialized form of software authentication that enables a user to authenticate once and gain access to the resources of multiple software systems. In other words, SSO refers to a user's ability to log into a particular system, e.g., Windows 2000, and have that login information (i.e., username and password) be leveraged to all applications subsequently accessed during the login session, e.g., Microsoft Outlook.

Kerberos, which is a computer network authentication protocol originally developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and which is described in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)Network Working Group Request for Comment:1510, September 1993, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety, is a popular mechanism for applications to externalize authentication entirely. In general, under the Kerberos protocol, a user signs into a Kerberos server, which acts as a trusted third party, and is issued a ticket. The user's client applications can then present the ticket to various application servers that they wish to access.

More specifically, Kerberos, which uses a Key Distribution Center (KDC) consisting of an Authentication Server (AS) and a Ticket Granting Server (TGS), maintains a database including a shared secret key for each of the entities on a network (i.e., clients and servers). Each key in the database is known only to the network entity and Kerberos. When a client wishes to communicate with an application server, Kerberos will generate a session key that the entities can use to secure their interactions, encrypt the session key using the client's secret key, and transmit it to the client. The client can then use its secret key (i.e., its unique password) to decrypt the session key. Knowledge of the secret key, therefore, serves to prove the identity of the client.

Kerberos will also transmit a “ticket” to the client that contains the client's identity, the same session key, a timestamp, and other information, all encrypted using the application server's secret key. The client transmits this ticket to the application server it wishes to access, which decrypts the session key using its secret key. The server and client will then use the session key, which is now known to each of them, to communicate with one another. The combination of the ticket and the encrypted session key transmitted to the client by the Kerberos server is referred to as a “credential.”

In order to enable SSO authentication, the ticket gathering process involves two separate phases. In the first phase, the client requests a master ticket from the Kerberos Authentication Server (AS), and uses its password to complete the process. In particular, the client sends an authentication request to the AS, and in return receives a session key encrypted with the client's secret key/password along with a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). At this point the client will decrypt the session key using its password, and save the decrypted key and TGT. In the second phase, the client presents the master ticket (or TGT) to the Ticket Granting Server (TGS) and asks for a new ticket that can be used to access a particular application server. Specifically, the client sends a ticket request (or in essence a second authentication request) including the TGT and an identification of the application server to the TGS, and in response receives a Session, or Service, Ticket (ST). The ticket (i.e., the ST) that is returned to the client is encrypted; first with the secret key of the application server and then with the session key (received after the first ticket request and decrypted using the password). The client then uses the session key to decrypt one level of authentication, leaving the ticket encrypted only with the application server's secret key. The client can then send this ticket to the application server which can decrypt the ticket using its secret key to obtain the session key which will thereafter be utilized to support encrypted communications between the client and the server.

The first phase discussed above is only performed once—upon first logging into the system. The second phase is then repeated each time the user wishes to access a different application. Because the second ticket is encrypted with the session key, rather than the client's secret key/password, this enables the user to sign on using his or her password once, and then subsequently access various applications without having to re-sign on using a password—i.e., SSO authentication.

As illustrated, the typical Kerberos authentication system relies on a database that has a mapping of usernames to respective passwords, or secret keys. Kerberos, therefore, works only where the user has a static, or permanent, password. However, many organizations, for security reasons, now require the use of one-time passwords (OTPs) for any user authentication. An OTP is a password that repeatedly changes over time at various intervals. Using OTPs, rather than static passwords, increases the security of the communication since each password is only valid for a specified period of time. If an intruder becomes aware of a user's password at one point in time, therefore, the intruder would likely not be able to use that password at some later point in time.

As stated above, however, Kerberos would fail to work in conjunction with OTPs, since Kerberos relies on a permanent (or semi-permanent, since the user can change his or her password) password being mapped to the username in a database that is accessible by the AS. A need, therefore, exists for a means by which a user can use OTPs, yet still have the benefit of single sign-on authentication provided by Kerberos.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Generally described, various exemplary embodiments of the present invention provide an improvement over the known prior art by providing a mechanism that allows a user to use a one-time password (OTP) in conjunction with single sign-on (SSO) authentication. In particular, exemplary embodiments of the present invention introduce an Authentication Proxy Server that sits in front of the Kerberos infrastructure and handles all traffic between the client and Kerberos. The Proxy Server authenticates the OTP received from the client, and then updates the Kerberos database with the authenticated OTP. The latest OTP can thereafter be used as the “permanent” password for authenticating the user to an Authentication Server (AS).

According to one aspect of the present invention a method of enabling a user to use a one-time password (OTP) in conjunction with single sign-on (SSO) authentication is provided. In one exemplary embodiment, the method includes: (1) receiving an authentication request, wherein the authentication request includes a username and an OTP associated with the user; (2) authenticating the OTP using a password authentication server (PAS); and (3) updating a database, which includes a plurality of usernames associated with a plurality of users mapped to a respective password, with the authenticated OTP, such that the password mapped to the username associated with the user in the database is the authenticated OTP. According to exemplary embodiments of the invention, an authentication server has access to the database and uses the password (in this case the OTP) mapped to the user's username in the database to provide the user with SSO authentication.

In one exemplary embodiment, the authentication server provides SSO authentication by using the OTP mapped to the user's username in the database to encrypt a session key and to generate a master ticket. The authentication server transmits the encrypted session key and generated master ticket to the user, by way of the authentication proxy server. The user can then use the master ticket to request one or more service tickets to be used to access a respective application server. To that end, various exemplary embodiments of the method further include: (1) receiving a service ticket request including the master ticket; (2) transmitting the service ticket request to a ticket granting server; (3) receiving a service ticket in response, wherein the service ticket has been encrypted using a secret key of a respective application server; and (4) transmitting the service ticket received to the user. In exemplary embodiments of the present invention the preceding steps are repeated each time the user wishes to access a different application server.

According to another aspect of the invention, an Authentication Proxy Server for enabling a user to use a one-time password (OTP) in conjunction with single sign-on (SSO) authentication is provided. In various exemplary embodiments, the Authentication Proxy Server comprising means for performing the respective steps of the methods discussed above.

According to yet another aspect of the present invention, a computer program product for enabling a user to use a one-time password (OTP) in conjunction with single sign-on (SSO) authentication is provided. In one exemplary embodiment, the computer program product includes at least one computer-readable storage medium having computer-readable program code portions stored therein. These computer-readable program code portions may include: (1) a first executable portion for receiving an authentication request, wherein the authentication request includes a username and an OTP associated with the user; (2) a second executable means for authenticating the OTP using a password authentication server (PAS); and (3) a third executable means for updating a database, which includes a plurality of usernames associated with a plurality of users mapped to a respective password, with the authenticated OTP, such that the password mapped to the username associated with the user in the database is the authenticated OTP. According to exemplary embodiments of the invention, an authentication server has access to the database and uses the password (in this case the OTP) mapped to the user's username in the database to provide the user with SSO authentication.

According to yet another aspect of the invention a system for enabling a user to use a one-time password in conjunction with single sign-on (SSO) authentication is provided. In one exemplary embodiment the system includes a client application, an authentication proxy server, a password authentication server (PAS), a database, and an authentication server. According to exemplary embodiments, the authentication proxy server is configured to receive an authentication request from the client application including a username and OTP associated with the user, and to authenticate the OTP using the PAS. The authentication proxy server is further configured to update the database with the authenticated OTP and to transmit the authentication request to the authentication server. The authentication server is thereby configured to access the database in order to retrieve the authenticated OTP mapped to the username associated with the user, and then use the authenticated OTP to provide SSO.

In one exemplary embodiment, the system further includes a ticket granting server configured to receive service ticket requests sent by the client application via the authentication proxy server, wherein service ticket requests include the respective master ticket previously generated by the authentication server. The ticket granting server is further configured to encrypt a service ticket using a secret key of a respective application server and transmit the encrypted service ticket to the user by way of the authentication proxy server. In one exemplary embodiment the authentication server is a Kerberos Authentication Server (AS) and the ticket granting server is a Kerberos Ticket Granting Server (TGS).

DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

Exemplary embodiments of the present invention provide a mechanism by which a user can use an OTP in conjunction with SSO authentication and the Kerberos protocol. In particular, according to exemplary embodiments of the present invention, a user can log into a particular system using an ever-changing password, and thereafter access additional application servers during that login session without having to re-enter his or her password. In general, this is accomplished by the introduction of an Authentication Proxy Server that handles communications between a client application and the Kerberos infrastructure, in order to authenticate the client's OTP prior to updating the Kerberos database with the authenticated OTP. While embodiments of the present invention will be described in conjunction with the Kerberos protocol for purposes of example, other embodiments of the present invention may be employed in conjunction with other external authentication techniques which utilize a trusted third party that issues tickets or the like to a client for facilitating authentication with various application servers.

In particular, when a client wishes to access a particular application server, it first sends a username and password, in this case an OTP, to the Proxy Server. The Proxy Server can be means, such as a processing device, e.g., a processor, controller, computing device or the like, for performing the various functions described below. In this regard, the Proxy Server authenticates the user to a password authentication server, such as a Third Party Authentication Server (TPAS), using the username and OTP provided. If the authentication is successful, the Proxy Server updates the Kerberos database with the user's new, or latest, password. As discussed above, the Kerberos protocol relies on a mapping of usernames to passwords or secret keys. The Kerberos Authentication Server (AS) uses this password to encrypt tickets sent to the client for use in accessing various application servers. In order for OTPs to be used, this database must be updated with the latest OTP each time the user seeks authentication. According to various exemplary embodiments of the present invention, the Proxy Server performs this updating step.

Once the password has been updated, the Proxy Server requests a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) (i.e., the master ticket) from the AS. The AS uses the updated password to encrypt a session key, which it transmits with the TGT to the client via the Proxy Server. To obtain a ticket that includes the information necessary to access an application server, the client subsequently uses the TGT received to request a service ticket from the Ticket Granting Server (TGS). This request, like the original request, goes through the Proxy Server, and is repeated each time the user wishes to access a different application server.

System and Terminal Architecture:

Referring toFIG. 1, an illustration of one type of system that would benefit from the present invention is provided. As shown, the system may include a user device100, such as, a cellular telephone, portable digital assistant (PDA), pager, personal computer (PC), laptop, or tablet, or any other similar device. The device100may be connected to an Authentication Proxy Server120via a data network130, such as, for example, a local area network (LAN), wireless local area network (WLAN), metropolitan area network (MAN), and/or wide area network (WAN). The Proxy Server120, in turn, may be in communication, via the network130, with a Third-Party Authentication Server (TPAS)140, for the purposes of authenticating the user using the username and OTP provided to the Proxy Server120by the user device100. The Proxy Server120is further in communication, via the network130, with a Key Distribution Center (KDC)150, such as a Kerberos Key Distribution Center, for the purposes of updating the user's password and requesting, and receiving, Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) and Service Tickets (STs). In the exemplary embodiment shown, the KDC150has at least two components, the Authentication Server (AS)152, such as the Kerberos Authentication Server, and the Ticket Granting Server (TGS)154. Finally, one or more application servers160are capable of being communicated with by the user device100via the data network130using the ST issued by the TGS154.

While in exemplary embodiments illustrated and discussed herein, the KDC150, TPAS140, Application Server160and Authentication Proxy Server120are separate interacting entities, it will be understood by those of skill in the art that these elements may physically reside in or be co-located as one network entity or, in contrast, they may be distributed over multiple interconnected entities.

In one exemplary embodiment, the digital device100may be a mobile terminal, or mobile station, shown in detail inFIG. 2. The mobile terminal, or other digital device, includes various means for performing one or more functions in accordance with exemplary embodiments of the present invention, including those more particularly shown and described herein. It should be understood, however, that one or more of the entities may include alternative means for performing one or more like functions, without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. More particularly, for example, as shown inFIG. 2, the entity can include an antenna202, a transmitter204, a receiver206, and means, such as a processing device208, e.g., a processor, controller or the like, that provides signals to and receives signals from the transmitter204and receiver206, respectively. These signals include signaling information in accordance with the air interface standard of the applicable cellular system and also user speech and/or user generated data. In this regard, the mobile station can be capable of operating with one or more air interface standards, communication protocols, modulation types, and access types. More particularly, the mobile station can be capable of operating in accordance with any of a number of second-generation (2G), 2.5G and/or third-generation (3G) communication protocols or the like. Further, for example, the mobile station can be capable of operating in accordance with any of a number of different wireless networking techniques, including Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11 WLAN (or Wi-Fi®), IEEE 802.16 WiMAX, ultra wideband (UWB), and the like.

It is understood that the processing device208, such as a processor, controller or other computing device, includes the circuitry required for implementing the video, audio, and logic functions of the mobile station and is capable of executing application programs for implementing the functionality discussed herein. For example, the processing device may be comprised of various means including a digital signal processor device, a microprocessor device, and various analog to digital converters, digital to analog converters, and other support circuits. The control and signal processing functions of the mobile device are allocated between these devices according to their respective capabilities. The processing device208thus also includes the functionality to convolutionally encode and interleave message and data prior to modulation and transmission. The processing device can additionally include an internal voice coder (VC)208A, and may include an internal data modem (DM)208B. Further, the processing device208may include the functionality to operate one or more software applications, which may be stored in memory. For example, the controller may be capable of operating a connectivity program, such as a conventional Web browser. The connectivity program may then allow the mobile station to transmit and receive Web content, such as according to HTTP and/or the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP), for example.

The mobile station may also comprise means such as a user interface including, for example, a conventional earphone or speaker210, a ringer212, a microphone214, a display216, all of which are coupled to the controller208. The user input interface, which allows the mobile device to receive data, can comprise any of a number of devices allowing the mobile device to receive data, such as a keypad218, a touch display (not shown), a microphone214, or other input device. In embodiments including a keypad, the keypad can include the conventional numeric (0-9) and related keys (#, *), and other keys used for operating the mobile station and may include a full set of alphanumeric keys or set of keys that may be activated to provide a full set of alphanumeric keys. Although not shown, the mobile station may include a battery, such as a vibrating battery pack, for powering the various circuits that are required to operate the mobile station, as well as optionally providing mechanical vibration as a detectable output.

The mobile station can also include means, such as memory including, for example, a subscriber identity module (SIM)220, a removable user identity module (R-UIM) (not shown), or the like, which typically stores information elements related to a mobile subscriber. In addition to the SIM, the mobile device can include other memory. In this regard, the mobile station can include volatile memory222, as well as other non-volatile memory224, which can be embedded and/or may be removable. For example, the other non-volatile memory may be embedded or removable multimedia memory cards (MMCs), Memory Sticks as manufactured by Sony Corporation, EEPROM, flash memory, hard disk, or the like. The memory can store any of a number of pieces or amount of information and data used by the mobile device to implement the functions of the mobile station. For example, the memory can store an identifier, such as an international mobile equipment identification (IMEI) code, international mobile subscriber identification (IMSI) code, mobile device integrated services digital network (MSISDN) code, or the like, capable of uniquely identifying the mobile device. The memory can also store content. The memory may, for example, store computer program code for an application and other computer programs. For example, in one embodiment of the present invention, the memory may store computer program code for enabling the mobile station to generate and send a request for a TGT, and subsequently one or more STs, to a Key Distribution Center (KDC) by way of an Authentication Proxy Server using a OTP. The memory may further store computer program code for enabling the mobile station to decrypt a session key received from the KDC, by way of the Proxy Server, for use in subsequent communications with one or more application servers.

The system, method, device and computer program product of exemplary embodiments of the present invention are primarily described in conjunction with mobile communications applications. It should be understood, however, that the system, method, device and computer program product of embodiments of the present invention can be utilized in conjunction with a variety of other applications, both in the mobile communications industries and outside of the mobile communications industries. For example, the system, method, device and computer program product of exemplary embodiments of the present invention can be utilized in conjunction with wireline and/or wireless network (e.g., Internet) applications.

Also, it should be understood that while the terminal was illustrated and described as comprising a mobile telephone, mobile telephones are merely illustrative of one type of terminal that would benefit from the present invention and, therefore, should not be taken to limit the scope of the present invention. While several embodiments of the terminal are illustrated and described for purposes of example, other types of terminals, such as portable digital assistants (PDAs), pagers, laptop computers, tablets, and other types of electronic systems including both mobile, wireless devices and fixed, wireline devices, can readily employ embodiments of the present invention.

Component Level

FIG. 3provides a component level view of an authentication service in accordance with exemplary embodiments of the present invention. As shown, the authentication service is comprised of three layers of components that are invisible to the client applications: an Application Interface layer, a layer for Native Libraries in Binary, and a layer of Databases. The Authentication Proxy Server305, which is designated as KAuthProxy, is the only component of the service that is visible to the client applications. The functionality of this component is discussed in detail below.

In one exemplary embodiment, the Application Interface layer may include the Kerberos Application Programming Interface (API) (KrbAPI)310, the Kerberos Administration API (KrbAdminAPI)320and the Authentication Library (AuthLib)330. The KrbAPI310is used by the KAuthProxy305to interact with the KDC150for retrieving TGTs and STs, verifying tickets, and getting the local time on the KDC server, discussed below. The KrbAdminAPI320is used by the KAuthProxy305primarily to change the user's password in the KDC150once the OTP has been authenticated. The KrbAdminAPI320further implements the methods used to create, delete and list users in the KDC150. Finally, the AuthLib330is used by KAuthProxy305to authenticate users to the configured authentication mechanism. This could be either an all-purpose application database, or a supported preexisting Third-Party Authentication Server (TPAS), such as RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service), or LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol).

The Native Libraries in Binary layer of the illustrated embodiment includes the Kerberos Native Library (LibKrb5Nok)340, the Kerberos Administration Native Library (LibKrb5AdminNok)350, and the TPAS360libraries. These libraries are shared object/dynamic libraries that are tied to the operating system and serve the language specific Application Interface calls from above.

Finally, the Database layer includes the KDC150, and the TPAS Database370, which is used to authenticate the user's OTP.

Method of Enabling Use of One-Time Passwords with Single Sign-On:

FIG. 4is a signal flow diagram illustrating an exemplary signaling sequence for the first phase of the ticket granting sequence according to one embodiment of the present invention. The components involved in the sequence illustrated may include the client application, an Authentication Proxy Server (AuthProxy), a password authentication server, such as a Third-Party Authentication Server/Remote Access Server (TPAS/RAS), and the Kerberos infrastructure, which includes KAdmind, which is a daemon process that runs on the Kerberos Server and listens to any Kerberos administration request originating from a client (e.g., a request to change the password) and executes that request, and the Key Distribution Center (KRB5KDC) (i.e., the Kerberos Authentication Server (AS) and Ticket Granting Server (TGS) discussed above). An Application Database (Application DB), which is accessible by the Authentication Proxy Server, may also be involved in the signaling sequence.

As discussed above, according to exemplary embodiments of the present invention, an Authentication Proxy Server sits in between the client application and the Kerberos infrastructure in order to authenticate one-time passwords (OTPs) used by the client application and to update the Kerberos database with the authenticated passwords. The channel between the client and the Proxy Server may be over SSL, while the channel between the Proxy Server and the Kerberos infrastructure is generally encrypted using shared secret keys. As shown, the process begins where the client sends a request for authentication to the Proxy Server (AuthProxy). According to exemplary embodiments, this request includes the client's username, OTP, and the identity of the application server the client wishes to access. The Proxy Server authenticates the OTP to a TPAS (signals (2) and (3)), i.e., the Proxy Server provides the TPAS with the client's name and the OTP and the TPAS responds by indicating whether or not the OTP is now associated with and properly authenticates the client, and (if properly authenticated) then changes the password in the Kerberos database to the OTP using KAdmind (signal (4)). By utilizing the TPAS or other password authentication server to authenticate the OTP, the client can still utilize the external authentication provided by the Kerberos infrastructure even though the password utilized by the client is repeatedly changed since the TPAS tracks the current password associated with the client.

Signals (5) and (6) are optional signals wherein the Proxy Server verifies that the device ID associated with the device sending the authentication request corresponds with the device ID mapped to the username provided by the Application DB. This may be useful, for example, where an organization specifies that only devices that have been issued by the organization can access certain resources—e.g., an employee can only use his or her company-issued laptop to access the company's network, and not his or her personal computer.

Once the OTP has been authenticated and updated in the Kerberos database, the Authentication Proxy Server sends the request for a TGT to the Key Distribution Center (KDC), and more particularly, to the Authentication Server (AS) (signal (7)). In response, the KDC uses the password stored in its database to return an encrypted session key (i.e., encrypted with the OTP) and TGT to the Proxy Server (signal (8)), which in turn transmits the encrypted session key and TGT to the client application (signal (9)).

The second phase of the ticket granting sequence is illustrated inFIG. 5in which a ticket for use with a respective application server is requested. Similar to the first phase, the Authentication Proxy Server communicates a request from the client application for a ticket to the KDC. In this instance, however, the client is requesting a service ticket (ST), discussed above, and the request goes to the Ticket Granting Server (TGS), rather than the AS, within the KDC. As discussed above, the request sent by the client application, and relayed by the Proxy Server, includes the TGT received in the first phase and the identification of the application server. In response, the KDC/TGS returns the ST encrypted both with the session key (rather than the OTP) and the secret key of the application server to the client application, typically via the Proxy Server. The client application may then decrypt the ST with the session key that has been previously provided. The ST, however, generally remains encrypted with the secret key of the application server. The client application can then provide the ST to the application server, which can decrypt the ST with its secret key to obtain the session key and other information noted above. Further communication during the session between the application server and the client application can then be encrypted with the session key. The second phase is repeated each time the user wishes to access a different application server.

The Authentication Proxy Server can also be used to synchronize the time referenced by the client application with that of the Kerberos infrastructure.FIG. 6is a signal flow diagram illustrating an exemplary set of signals to achieve this synchronization. In general, synchronization is needed in order for the Kerberos protocol to work successfully. In particular, the client and the KDC should be synchronized at all times in order to prevent replay attacks. Replay attacks occur where an attacker captures data sent over the network in the course of legitimate business and sends (or “replays”) the captured data to a server. This can serve to trick the server by, perhaps, attempting to impersonate a legitimate client. In order to prevent replay attacks, Kerberos messages sent over the network include an encrypted time stamp. Where the time stamp of a message received is outside of an allowed range (e.g., not within a five minute interval of the current time), the Kerberos server will ignore the message assuming that a replay attack is in progress. It is therefore necessary for the client and the server to be time synchronized at all times.

As will be appreciated by one skilled in the art, the embodiments of the present invention described above may be embodied as a system, method, proxy server or other apparatus, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention, such as the Authenication Proxy Server, the password authentication server and/or the authentication server may take the form of a computer program product on a computer-readable storage medium having computer-readable program instructions (e.g., computer software) embodied in the storage medium. More particularly, the present invention may take the form of web-implemented computer software. Any suitable computer-readable storage medium may be utilized including hard disks, CD-ROMs, optical storage devices, or magnetic storage devices.

The present invention is described above with reference to block diagrams and signal flow illustrations of methods, apparatuses (i.e., systems) and computer program products according to an embodiment of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the block diagrams and signal flow illustrations, and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and signal flow illustrations, respectively, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be loaded onto a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus create a means for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart block or blocks, although other means for implementing the functions including various combinations of hardware, firmware and software as described herein may also be employed.