In a computer-implemented method of facilitating detection of document-related fraud, fraudulent document detection rules may be generated or updated by training a machine learning program using image data corresponding to physical documents, and fraud determinations corresponding to the documents. The documents and fraudulent document detection rules may correspond to a first type of document. Image data corresponding to an image of one of the physical documents may be received, where the physical document corresponds to the first type of document. By applying the fraudulent document detection rules to the image data, it may be determined that the physical document is, or may be, fraudulent. An indication of whether the physical document is, or may be, fraudulent may be displayed to one or more people via one or more respective computing device user interfaces.

FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE

The present disclosure generally relates to financial fraud and, more specifically, to processing techniques for automatically detecting document-related fraud.

BACKGROUND

Financial fraud, in its many forms, is a problem of enormous magnitude and scope, causing billions of dollars in economic losses and impacting many millions of people. Types of financial fraud include use of a lost or stolen card, account takeover, skimming, chargeback (“friendly”) fraud, counterfeiting, forgeries and application (e.g., loan application) fraud, to name just a few. The problem only continues to grow as various technological advances, intended to improve convenience and efficiency in the marketplace, provide new opportunities for bad actors. For example, an ever-increasing amount of fraud may be linked to online transactions made via the Internet.

Various software applications have been developed to detect potentially fraudulent transactions. For example, dollar amounts and geographic locations have generally been used to flag particular credit or debit card transactions, with cardholders then being contacted by employees of the card issuer to determine whether the transactions were indeed fraudulent. To ensure that most instances of fraud are captured, however, such techniques generally have a low threshold for triggering a fraud alert. As a result, numerous fraud alerts are false positives. The prevalence of false positives leads to a large cost in terms of the drain on human resources (e.g., calling customers to discuss each suspect transaction, and/or other manual investigation techniques), and considerable distraction or annoyance for cardholders. To provide a solution to these shortcomings in the field of automated fraud detection, innovative processing techniques capable of reducing false positives are needed.

Other conventional processes relating to financial fraud are likewise resource-intensive. For example, efforts to combat counterfeiting of financial or other documents (e.g., personal checks, identification cards used to obtain loans, etc.) may be typically limited to time-consuming and error-prone human review (i.e., the “eye test”).

BRIEF SUMMARY

The present embodiments may, inter alia, use new processing techniques to determine whether physical documents relating to a financial transaction (e.g., personal checks, identification cards, etc.) are fraudulent (e.g., counterfeit and/or forged) and/or should be flagged for further review.

In one embodiment, a computer-implemented method of facilitating detection of document-related fraud is implemented in one or more servers. The method may include: (1) generating or updating, by one or more processors of the one or more servers, fraudulent document detection rules at least by training a machine learning program using at least (i) image data corresponding to a plurality of physical documents, and (ii) fraud determinations each corresponding to a respective one of the plurality of physical documents, the plurality of physical documents and the fraudulent document detection rules corresponding to a first type of document; (2) receiving, by the one or more processors, first image data corresponding to an image of a first physical document, the first physical document corresponding to the first type of document; (3) determining, by the one or more processors applying the fraudulent document detection rules to the first image data, that the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent; and/or (4) causing, by the one or more processors, an indication of whether the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent to be displayed to one or more people via one or more respective computing device user interfaces. The method may include additional, less, or alternate actions, including those discussed elsewhere herein.

In another embodiment, a computer system for facilitating detection of document-related fraud includes a rules database configured to store fraudulent document detection rules, one or more processors, and a non-transitory memory. The memory stores instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to: (1) generate or update the fraudulent document detection rules at least by training a machine learning program using at least (i) image data corresponding to a plurality of physical documents, and (ii) fraud determinations each corresponding to a respective one of the plurality of physical documents, the plurality of physical documents and the fraudulent document detection rules corresponding to a first type of document; (2) receive first image data corresponding to an image of a first physical document, the first physical document corresponding to the first type of document; (3) determine, by applying the fraudulent document detection rules stored in the rules database to the first image data, that the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent; and/or (4) cause an indication of whether the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent to be displayed to one or more people via one or more respective computing device user interfaces. The computer system may include additional, less, or alternate functionality, including that discussed elsewhere herein.

In another embodiment, a non-transitory, computer-readable medium stores instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to: (1) generate or update fraudulent document detection rules at least by training a machine learning program using at least (i) image data corresponding to a plurality of physical documents, and (ii) fraud determinations each corresponding to a respective one of the plurality of physical documents, the plurality of physical documents and the fraudulent document detection rules corresponding to a first type of document; (2) receive first image data corresponding to an image of a first physical document, the first physical document corresponding to the first type of document; (3) determine, by applying the fraudulent document detection rules to the first physical document, that the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent; and/or (4) cause an indication of whether the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent to be displayed to one or more people via one or more respective computing device user interfaces.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The embodiments described herein relate to, inter alia, wholly or partially automated detection, verification and/or classification of financial fraud. For ease of explanation, and unless otherwise clearly indicated by the context of usage, “detecting” or “determining” fraud may be used herein to refer to initially flagging fraudulent (or potentially fraudulent) activity, to verifying/confirming that suspect/flagged activity was indeed fraudulent, or generally to both. The systems and techniques described herein may be used, for example, to identify, prevent and/or quantify/measure instances of lost or stolen card use, account takeover, counterfeiting, skimming, chargeback (“friendly”) fraud, collusive merchant fraud, application (e.g., loan application) fraud, mortgage fraud, and/or one or more other types of fraud relating to existing and/or potential financial transactions and/or accounts. Moreover, those skilled in the art will appreciate that at least some of the technical advancements described below (and/or shown in the accompanying figures) are not necessarily restricted to the financial field.

In some embodiments, a fraud detection and/or classification system may analyze data relating to a number of existing or potential financial accounts. The analysis/processing may be performed in batch processing operations, or substantially in real-time (e.g., as the data is generated and/or as financial transactions occur, etc.), and the data may be obtained from a variety of sources based upon the particular embodiment and/or scenario. In one embodiment, for example, data from financial account records may be analyzed, along with data indicating online activity of an account holder, location data (e.g., global positioning satellite (GPS) data from a smartphone or vehicle of the account holder) and/or other data, to determine whether a particular financial transaction was fraudulent or likely fraudulent. The analysis may be performed automatically after the transaction has been made, or may be performed in response to a person or algorithm flagging the transaction as a potentially fraudulent one, for example.

The analysis may include determining whether the account holder has expressed interest in the object (e.g., product or service) of the transaction or the merchant, and/or determining whether the transaction is consistent with spending patterns associated with the account holder (e.g., spending patterns identified using the account holder's transaction records), for example. In the case of multiple account holders (e.g. multiple credit or debit card holders), accuracy may be improved by identifying spending patterns at the individual level rather than, or in addition to, at the aggregate account level. For example, a maximum amount of money typically spent in a single transaction (e.g., over the course of a one-month window, etc.) may be determined for each of two cardholders listed on a single account, and the maximum amount for the cardholder who purportedly made a particular purchase may be compared to the purchase amount to determine whether fraud is suspected.

In another exemplary embodiment, financial transaction data may be analyzed to determine whether a chargeback payment from the merchant or acquiring bank to a card issuer may be appropriate in connection with a particular fraudulent transaction. For example, the card information entry mode (e.g., collecting card information by inserting the card in a chip reader, swiping the card, manually entering the card information, etc.), the transaction amount, the similarity to other transaction(s), and/or other information may be used to identify which fraudulent transactions are relatively strong chargeback candidates. The analysis may be performed in response to a cardholder reporting the transaction as fraudulent, or after a card issuer has confirmed that the transaction was fraudulent, for example. For the subset of instances where a fraudulent transaction has been identified as a chargeback candidate, a full set of chargeback rules (e.g., devised by a card network entity such as VISA®, Mastercard®, American Express®, Discover®, etc.) may be manually or automatically applied to determine whether a chargeback process should be initiated (or continued).

In another exemplary embodiment, application data (e.g., information entered in fields of an online application) may be analyzed in conjunction with search terms entered by a user at a computing device (e.g., the device from which the user submitted the application information) to determine whether the person proffering the application is not the person that he or she purports to be. For example, if the person submitting an application had previously used an Internet-based search engine to search for results associated with the purported applicant's name (e.g., by using the name as a search term, possibly in addition to other terms such as “address” and/or “employer,” etc.), the application may be flagged for suspected fraud, and subjected to additional steps of manual and/or automated review.

In another exemplary embodiment, a fraud dispute resolution process (e.g., after a customer has reported a fraudulent or unrecognized transaction associated with his or her account) may be facilitated using machine learning techniques. For example, a machine learning program may be trained, using past dispute resolution interactions with customers and the associated outcomes (fraud determinations), to identify various types of information that, if elicited from customers, tend to be indicative of fraud or the absence thereof. When fraud is suspected for a particular transaction, one or more queries for the individual purportedly making the transaction may be automatically generated using the types of information identified by the machine learning program, as well as information about the suspect transaction and/or related transactions (e.g., dates, locations, amounts, etc.). In some embodiments and/or scenarios, responses to the queries may be collected and analyzed to automatically generate additional queries, with the end goal of discerning whether the transaction was authorized. For example, queries may include asking whether a cardholder recalls particular other transactions that appear on the cardholder's account and were made around the same time as the suspect transaction (and/or from the same merchant), asking whether the cardholder recalls being in a particular location at a particular time (e.g., a location associated with another transaction appearing on the cardholder's account), whether the cardholder is aware of a particular billing alias used by a merchant, and so on.

In another exemplary embodiment, image data corresponding to a particular physical document (e.g., a personal or cashier's check, a driver's license or other identification card, etc.) may be analyzed, using rules generated by a machine learning program, to determine whether the document is, or may be, fraudulent (e.g., a counterfeit document, and/or a document that includes forged contents). For example, the machine learning program may be trained using images of multiple other documents, and fraud determinations made in connection with those other documents. The machine learning program may learn which ranges and/or tolerances for dimensions, fonts, colors, patterns, etc., tend to be most indicative of counterfeiting, for example. A forgery may be detected based upon factors relating to the contents of various fields in a document, such as whether handwriting, a signature, and/or a date format (e.g., “January 1, 2016,” “1/1/16,” etc.) matches that used for other personal checks from a particular account holder, for example. The fraud determination may be made substantially in real-time to provide a warning, if needed, to a merchant making a sale, for example, or may be used to flag a relatively small number of documents for physical review at a later time, etc.

In another exemplary embodiment, machine learning techniques may be used to analyze financial transactions for purposes of classifying potentially fraudulent behavior (e.g., “counterfeiting,” “skimming,” “lost or stolen card,” etc.). For example, the machine learning program may be trained using fraud classifications made in connection with multiple other financial accounts. The machine learning program may learn which types of data tend to be indicative of different classifications (e.g., transaction amount, credit card information entry mode, particular types of online activity data, etc.), and/or which data values tend to be indicative of different classifications (e.g., transactions over $10,000, manual card number entry, etc.), for example. Once a class of potential fraud has been identified for a particular transaction, the classification may be used to facilitate or guide a further, more in-depth analysis or investigation. Alternatively, or in addition, the classification may be used to calculate one or more metrics indicating the prevalence of that type of fraud.

By replacing conventional processing techniques with one or more of the processing techniques described herein, problems that have beset the field of fraud detection, classification and/or prevention in the past may be greatly mitigated or eliminated. For example, information that has conventionally been overlooked or ignored may be used to more accurately detect, prevent and/or classify fraud, and/or to reduce false positive fraud alerts. As another example, a significant amount of time may be saved by removing the need for manual investigations, or by reducing the number of instances where manual investigations are required.

II. Exemplary Environment for Implementing Fraud Detection and/or Classification Processing Techniques

FIG. 1depicts an exemplary environment10in which techniques for fraud detection and/or classification may be implemented, according to one embodiment. The environment10may include an anti-fraud services system (AFSS)12, a financial account management system (FAMS)14, a card network computing system16, a number of cardholder computing devices20, a number of merchant computing systems22, a number of other sources24, and a network26. It is noted that, in other embodiments and/or scenarios, the environment10may include more, fewer and/or different components than those shown inFIG. 1, such as any of those discussed elsewhere herein. For example, the environment10may include one or more additional financial account management systems and/or card network computing systems, and/or one or more of the cardholder computing devices20may instead be a computing device of a holder of a non-card account (e.g., a checking, savings or loan account) or an applicant for a new account (e.g., a new loan account). As another example, the environment10may include a computing system of one or more acquiring/merchant banks, and some or all of the communications with merchant computing systems22described below may instead be with the acquiring bank(s).

FAMS14may be associated with (e.g., owned and/or maintained by) a bank or other financial entity. For example, FAMS14may be a bank that acts as a card issuer associated with a particular type of card network (e.g., VISA®, Mastercard®, etc.), and/or an entity that provides loans (e.g., mortgage, home equity, vehicle, etc.), saving/checking account services, and/or other financial services to customers. FAMS14may maintain an account records database30that stores various kinds of account information, including account holder information (e.g., names, addresses, etc.) and data indicative of financial transactions made in connection with each account (e.g., dates, amounts and merchants for credit or debit card transactions, dates and amounts for customer deposits and withdrawals, etc.). Account records database30may store account information for some or all of the cardholders associated with cardholder computing devices20, for example. While shown inFIG. 1as a single entity within FAMS14, it is understood that account records database30may, in some embodiments, be distributed across multiple databases and/or multiple physical/hardware memories, and/or may be wholly or partially external to (e.g., remote from) FAMS14.

AFSS12may generally provide services that help to detect and/or classify fraudulent activity in connection with existing and/or potential (e.g., applied for) financial accounts, such as the accounts managed by FAMS14. In some embodiments, AFSS12is included within FAMS14. As seen inFIG. 1, AFSS12may include a network interface32, a memory34, and a fraud detection/classification unit36.

Network interface32may include hardware, firmware and/or software configured to enable AFSS12to wirelessly exchange electronic data with one or more other components of environment10via network26. For example, network interface32may include an Ethernet port, a modem, a router, and/or one or more other ports and/or transceivers for one or more other wired and/or wireless communication technologies.

Memory34may be a computer-readable, non-transitory storage unit or device, or collection of units/devices, and may include persistent (e.g., hard disk) and/or non-persistent memory components. Memory34may store instructions that are executable on one or more processors of AFSS12(not shown inFIG. 1) to perform various operations, including the instructions of various software applications and data generated and/or used by such applications.

Card network computing system16may be a computing system (e.g., one or more servers) of a credit and/or debit card network entity, such as VISA® or Mastercard®, for example. In some embodiments and/or scenarios where the card network entity also acts as the issuer (e.g., American Express® or Discover®), card network computing system16may include FAMS14. Card network computing system16may provide various services to FAMS14and/or AFSS12. For example, card network computing system16may provide electronic updates to chargeback rules, fraud scores for particular customers and/or transactions, and so on.

Each of cardholder computing devices20may be a computing device of a respective holder of a credit or debit card account managed by FAMS14. For example, one or more of cardholder computing devices20may be desktop computers, laptop computers, tablet computers, smartphones, smart watches, and so on. The cardholders (e.g., credit or debit card account holders) may use cardholder computing devices20to access (e.g., view, modify, etc.) their account information stored in account records database30online via network26. In some embodiments where AFSS12detects and/or classifies activity not related to credit or debit card fraud (e.g., a fraudulent application for a home equity loan, etc.), cardholder computing devices20may instead be computing devices of other types of customers or potential customers, such as holders of non-card-based accounts, or individuals who have submitted an online application for a loan, etc., as discussed further below. In some of these embodiments, the environment10may omit card network computing system16.

Each of merchant computing systems22may include one or more computing devices associated with a particular provider of products and/or services. For example, some or all of merchant computing systems22may include servers associated with online retailers. Alternatively, or additionally, some or all of merchant computing systems22may include point-of-sale terminal devices providing credit and/or debit card payment processing features for “card present” transactions. In some embodiments where AFSS12detects and/or classifies activity not related to customer purchases (e.g., if AFSS12only detects loan application fraud, etc.), the environment10may omit merchant computing systems22.

The other sources24may include computing devices and/or systems associated with sources of one or more other types of information. For example, other sources24may include vehicle telematics systems (e.g., installed in vehicles of cardholders associated with cardholder computing devices20), one or more Internet service providers (ISPs) (e.g., ISPs providing Internet access to some or all cardholders), “smart home” system devices (e.g., installed in homes of some or all cardholders), and/or other systems/devices. In some embodiments, the environment10does not include the other sources24.

Network26may communicatively couple some or all of the components shown inFIG. 1. For example, FAMS14may use network26to communicate with AFSS12, card network computing system16, cardholder computing devices20and/or merchant computing systems22. As another example, AFSS12may use network26to communicate with FAMS14, card network computing system16, cardholder computing devices20, merchant computing systems22and/or one or more of the other sources24. While shown as a single entity inFIG. 1, network26may include multiple communication networks of one or more types (e.g., one or more wired and/or wireless local area networks (LANs), and/or one or more wired and/or wireless wide area networks (WANs) such as the Internet). Moreover, network26may use partially or entirely distinct network components to support communications between different endpoints or computing devices, such as wireless communication or data transmission over one or more radio frequency links and/or wireless communication channels. For example, the portion(s) of network26used for communications between FAMS14and AFSS12may be the same as, or different than, the portion(s) of network26used for communications between FAMS14and one or more of cardholder computing devices20over one or more radio links or wireless communication channels, or between AFSS12and one or more of the other sources24, etc. Those skilled in the art will appreciate different types of networks that are appropriate for network26, depending upon, for example, how AFSS12, FAMS14and/or other components of environment10are localized or distributed across a relatively large geographic area.

Generally, fraud detection/classification unit36of AFSS12may detect fraudulent activity, confirm whether suspected or reported fraudulent activity is truly fraudulent, and/or classify fraudulent or suspected fraudulent activity. For example, fraud detection/classification unit36may analyze each transaction stored in account records database30to determine whether that transaction is, or potentially is, fraudulent. Alternatively, fraud detection/classification unit36may analyze only those transactions that were flagged as possibly being fraudulent (e.g., by a cardholder calling in to report an unauthorized and/or unrecognized transaction, or by FAMS14or AFSS12generating a preliminary fraud alert after applying an initial set of rules to a transaction, etc.). Fraud detection/classification unit36may also, or instead, support additional functionality, such as that described below in connection with the various components of fraud detection/classification unit36shown inFIG. 1.

As seen inFIG. 1, fraud detection/classification unit36may include a machine learning (ML) rule generator40, an external data collection unit42, a behavior analysis unit44, a dispute resolution unit46, a chargeback analysis unit50, an image analysis unit52, a classification unit54, and/or a notification unit56. In other embodiments, fraud detection/classification unit36may include more, fewer and/or different components/units than those shown inFIG. 1. In some embodiments, each of ML rule generator40, external data collection unit42, behavior analysis unit44, dispute resolution unit46, chargeback analysis unit50, image analysis unit52, classification unit54, notification unit56, and/or other units or components of fraud detection/classification unit36may be a software component stored in memory34and implemented by one or more processors of one or more computing devices (e.g., servers) included in AFSS12.

ML rule generator40may generally analyze various types of data to generate and/or update fraud detection and/or classification rules to be applied by fraud detection/classification unit36and stored in an ML rules database58. As discussed in further detail below, the rules may be used to detect and/or classify a single type or category of fraudulent activity, or may be used broadly in connection with multiple types or categories of fraudulent activity. ML rule generator40may implement any suitable type or types of machine learning. For example, ML rule generator40may implement supervised learning techniques, such as decision trees, regression-based models, support vector machines (SVMs) and/or neural networks, and/or unsupervised learning techniques such as Dirichlet process mixture models and/or k-means clustering. Other machine learning techniques are also possible, such as techniques utilizing Bayesian networks, “deep learning” techniques, and so on. While shown inFIG. 1as a single entity within AFSS12, it is understood that ML rules database58may, in some embodiments, be distributed across multiple databases and/or multiple physical/hardware memories, and/or may be wholly or partially external to (e.g., remote from) AFSS12.

External data collection unit42may generally collect, via network interface32and/or from sources internal to AFSS12, information from various sources (e.g., FAMS14, cardholder computing devices20, other sources24, etc.), and provide that data to other portions of AFSS12as needed (e.g., to ML rule generator40to generate and/or update rules, and/or to behavior analysis unit44, dispute resolution unit46, chargeback analysis unit50, image analysis unit52and/or classification unit54to detect and/or classify fraudulent activity). Some data may be collected indirectly. For example, FAMS14may collect transaction data from merchant computing systems22(and/or from acquiring banks associated with one or more of merchant computing systems22), and external data collection unit42may then collect that data from the account records database30of FAMS14.

Once an initial set of rules has been generated and stored in ML rules database58, those rules may dictate some or all of the types of data gathered by external data collection unit42. In some embodiments, however, external data collection unit42collects a broad set of data types that may or may not be relevant to fraud determination or classification, and ML rule generator40continually analyzes that data to determine which data types are most predictive of fraud and/or fraud type/class.

Behavior analysis unit44may generally analyze cardholder-related (or other customer-related) information to identify patterns of behavior, which may then be used by fraud detection/classification unit36to detect and/or classify fraudulent activity. For example, behavior analysis unit44may analyze information obtained from account records database30to identify spending patterns associated with different cardholders. The operation of behavior analysis unit44, including the types of information analyzed and the ways in which that information is used to arrive at a result (e.g., a pattern of behavior), may be dictated by the rules stored in ML rules database58.

Data indicative of the behavior patterns identified by behavior analysis unit44may be stored in an account holder behaviors database60, for example. While shown inFIG. 1as a single entity within AFSS12, it is understood that account holder behaviors database60may, in some embodiments, be distributed across multiple databases and/or multiple physical/hardware memories, and/or may be wholly or partially external to (e.g., remote from) AFSS12. In one embodiment, for example, account holder behaviors database60may be included within account records database30. In still other embodiments, the environment10may not include account holder behaviors database60, and behavior patterns may be only identified by behavior analysis unit44“on the fly” as needed by fraud detection/classification unit36(e.g., when needed to analyze a transaction in view of past spending patterns of a particular cardholder, etc.).

In some embodiments, behavior analysis unit44may separately analyze the transactions associated with each account holder, even if more than one account holder exists for a particular account. For example, behavior analysis unit44may independently analyze the transactions of each cardholder for a credit or debit card account in which each spouse has been issued a credit or debit card in his or her name. Fraud detection/classification unit36may then utilize the individual spending patterns when detecting and/or classifying fraud. In one embodiment where fraud detection/classification unit36utilizes a dollar amount threshold to detect likely fraudulent transactions, for example, a first threshold may be used for transactions made by a first cardholder listed on an account, and a higher, second threshold may be used for transactions made by a second cardholder listed on the account. Further examples are provided below in connection withFIG. 6, according to various embodiments. In this manner, fraud detection and/or classification may be made more precise than would be the case if spending patterns were only identified at the aggregate level (e.g., using a single dollar amount threshold, regardless of which cardholder made a particular transaction).

Dispute resolution unit46may generally analyze financial transaction data and/or other information to automatically generate queries for cardholders or other customers. For example, dispute resolution unit46may analyze information obtained from account records database30. The generated queries may be designed to help fraud detection/classification unit36determine whether a particular transaction was fraudulent, or estimate a probability that the transaction was fraudulent, etc. Dispute resolution unit46may also process responses from cardholders/customers, and automatically generate additional queries based upon those responses. Examples of the operation of dispute resolution unit46are provided below in connection withFIGS. 4E and 9, according to various embodiments.

Chargeback analysis unit50may generally analyze financial transaction and/or other information to identify transactions that are good candidates for chargeback payments. For example, chargeback analysis unit50may analyze information obtained from account records database30to determine whether there is a relatively high probability that the merchant (or an acquiring bank) should be responsible for a chargeback payment to a card issuer associated with FAMS14. The operation of chargeback analysis unit50, including the types of information analyzed and the ways in which that information is used to arrive at a result (e.g., flagging a transaction as a chargeback candidate), may be dictated by the rules stored in ML rules database58. ML rule generator40may make use of chargeback rules obtained from a card network entity (e.g., from card network computing system16), and stored in chargeback rules database62, to generate and/or update the rules applied by chargeback analysis unit50. Examples of the operation of chargeback analysis unit50are provided below in connection withFIGS. 4B and 7, according to various embodiments.

In some embodiments, transactions flagged by chargeback analysis unit50are subject to further, manual review using the chargeback rules stored in chargeback rules database62. In other embodiments, chargeback analysis unit50(or another component of fraud detection/classification unit not shown inFIG. 1) automatically, with little or no manual input/assistance, applies the chargeback rules from chargeback rules database62for each flagged transaction. While shown inFIG. 1as a single entity within AFSS12, it is understood that chargeback rules database62may, in some embodiments, be distributed across multiple databases and/or multiple physical/hardware memories, and/or may be wholly or partially external to (e.g., remote from) AFSS12.

Image analysis unit52may generally analyze image data corresponding to physical documents to identify fraudulent (e.g., counterfeit and/or forged) documents, and/or to flag potentially fraudulent documents for further (e.g., manual) review. For example, image analysis unit52may analyze information obtained from merchant computing systems22to determine whether there is a relatively high probability that documents presented to the merchants (e.g., personal checks, identification cards, etc.) are fraudulent. Image analysis unit52may be configured to analyze only a single type of document, or multiple types of documents. The operation of image analysis unit52, including the image characteristics analyzed and the ways in which the characteristics may be used to arrive at a result (e.g., flagging a document as potentially fraudulent), may be dictated by the rules stored in ML rules database58. Examples of the operation of image analysis unit52are provided below in connection withFIGS. 4F and 10, according to various embodiments.

Classification unit54may generally analyze broad categories of data from various sources (e.g., account records database30, cardholder computing devices20, merchant computing systems22, and/or other sources24) to categorize/classify types of suspected fraudulent financial activity. Classification unit54may classify fraudulent activity only within a particular subset of fraudulent financial activity (e.g., classifying debit and/or credit card transactions as involving a potential case of counterfeiting, skimming, lost/stolen card use, chargeback fraud, etc.), or may classify fraudulent financial activity across a broader spectrum (e.g., including types of identity theft not necessarily tied to a single financial transaction, such as application fraud). In some embodiments, classification unit54classifies suspected fraudulent activity in connection with a particular account or transaction in response to being notified of suspect activity (e.g., notified by another component of fraud detection/classification unit36, or by a manual user input, etc.). In other embodiments, classification unit54itself (or another component of fraud detection/classification unit36) identifies suspect activity before classification unit54classifies that activity. Examples of the operation of classification unit54are provided below in connection withFIGS. 4C and 11, according to various embodiments.

Notification unit56may generally provide alerts, confirmations, and/or other notifications to various individuals (e.g., customers, bank employees associated with FAMS14, third party employees associated with AFSS12, etc.). For example, notification unit56may generate a notification message stating that a fraud alert associated with a particular transaction is a false positive, and cause network interface32to send the message to a computer terminal or to FAMS14for display to a system user. As another example, notification unit56may cause network interface32to send other flagged transactions and/or documents (e.g., chargeback candidates identified by chargeback analysis unit50, documents that image analysis unit52has identified as potentially fraudulent, etc.) to a computer terminal or FAMS14for display to a system user. As yet another example, notification unit56may cause network interface32to send queries generated by dispute resolution unit46to various ones of cardholder computing devices20for display to cardholders.

The operation of various components of the environment10shown inFIG. 1, according to different embodiments and/or scenarios, will be described further below in connection with the remaining figures.

III. Exemplary Process Flows for Machine Learning of Fraud Detection and/or Classification Rules

As discussed above, ML rule generator40may generate and/or update rules that are used for one or more of a variety of different purposes relating to fraud detection and/or classification.FIG. 2depicts one generalized, example process flow80for machine learning that may be implemented by ML rule generator40, and possibly one or more other components of fraud detection/classification unit36.

In the process flow80, multi-account data82may represent data associated with multiple financial accounts, each with one or more account holders. The financial accounts may be existing or potential accounts, and the account holders may include holders of accounts and/or potential holders of potential accounts. For example, the multi-account data82may include existing and/or applied-for credit card accounts, debit card accounts, savings accounts, checking accounts, investment accounts, loan accounts, etc.

Depending upon the embodiment, the multi-account data82may include one or more different types of information obtained (e.g., by external data collection unit42ofFIG. 1) from one or more of FAMS14, cardholder computing devices20, merchant computing systems22, and/or other sources24. For example, the multi-account data82may include transaction data (e.g., transaction dates, amounts, locations, etc.) from account records database30of FAMS14, data indicative of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of cardholder computing devices20and/or devices in merchant computing systems22, Internet browsing and/or search history data from cardholder computing devices20(or from an ISP computer system included in other sources24, etc.), vehicle telematics data from telematics systems of cardholder vehicles, home occupancy and/or usage data (e.g., smart appliance data) from smart home systems of cardholders, autonomous or smart vehicle data, vehicle navigation system data, mobile device data, mobile device and/or vehicle GPS data, and/or one or more other types of data. In some embodiments, the multi-account data82only includes data that account holders or potential account holders have expressly consented to share with an entity associated with FAMS14and/or AFSS12(e.g., in exchange for fraud protection services). In certain other embodiments, however, express consent is only needed for certain types of information, such as browsing history information, vehicle telematics data, etc.

The multi-account data82may be associated with multiple fraud determination labels. The labels may simply reflect whether or not fraud existed (e.g., “fraud” or “no fraud”), or may also indicate a type or class of fraud (e.g., “counterfeiting,” “lost or stolen card use,” etc.), for example. In one embodiment, each of a number of data sets in the multi-account data82is associated with such a label, and includes data relating to a particular financial transaction, financial account, loan application, etc., for which the fraud determination was made (e.g., after a manual and/or automated fraud investigation). The labels may include final fraud determinations that were made via earlier iterations of the process flow80, and/or external to the process flow80.

To provide a more detailed example, a first data set associated with a “card present” credit card transaction may include data describing that transaction (e.g., from account records database30) and data indicative of the cardholder's online browsing activity (e.g., from one of cardholder computing devices20) for the 15 days immediately preceding the transaction, and be labeled “confirmed fraud.” A second data set, associated with another “card present” transaction (for the same account, or for a different account), may include the same general types of data but be labeled “no fraud,” and so on. In some embodiments and/or scenarios, the same data may appear in, or be used by, two or more of the data sets. If the two “card present” transactions described above are both associated with the same account, for example, and if the second transaction occurred less than 15 days after the first transaction, some of the same online activity data may be shared by the first and second data sets.

At a process stage84, the multi-account data82may be analyzed to generate fraud detection and/or classification rules (e.g., to be stored in ML rules database58). Any suitable type of supervised machine learning program/technique(s) may be used, such as SVMs, neural networks, logistic regression, etc. Generally, process stage84may serve to identify which type(s) of data is/are probative of whether fraud has occurred (and/or the type/category of fraud that may have occurred), and to determine the data values and/or combinations that are probative of whether fraud has occurred (and/or the type/category of fraud that may have occurred). By analyzing many (e.g., thousands) of positively and negatively labeled data sets in the multi-account data82, for example, process stage84may learn that certain spending patterns within a threshold time of a transaction tend to indicate that the cardholder made the transaction (e.g., thereby indicating that fraud has not occurred, or that a fraud report is itself fraudulent or mistaken, etc.), that certain types of online searches by a cardholder (e.g., including a descriptor of a product purchased in the transaction, or a name of the merchant, etc.) tend to indicate that the cardholder made the transaction, that the cardholder's distance from the site of a “card present” transaction (e.g., as determined from GPS information provided by the cardholder's smartphone, wearable electronics, or vehicle) relates to the probability of fraudulent activity according to a particular equation, and so on. Other specific examples of such rules, and how those rules may be generated, are discussed below in connection withFIGS. 3A-3F and 4A-4F, according to various embodiments.

At process stage86, the rules generated or updated at process stage84may be applied to first account data90associated with a particular account and customer(s) (e.g., a customer associated with a particular one of computing devices20). The types of data included in first account data90may depend upon which types of data were determined, by process stage84, to be relevant to a fraud determination. For example, if the rules give weight to the amount and date of a financial transaction when determining whether the transaction is fraudulent, and also give weight to whether the account holder visits a particular type of website, then the first account data90may include the amount and date of one or more transactions, as well as data indicative of visited web sites (e.g., Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) and/or content of visited websites, etc.). The first account data90may include information obtained (e.g., by external data collection unit42) from one or more of FAMS14, one of cardholder computing devices20associated with the customer holding the first account, one or more of merchant computing systems22, and/or one or more of other sources24, for example.

Process stage86may output various different types of information, depending upon the embodiment and/or scenario. For example, depending upon the content of first account data90and the rules generated or updated at process stage84, process stage86may generate data indicating that a particular financial transaction associated with first account data90is, or is not, fraudulent or potentially fraudulent. Alternatively, or additionally, process stage86may generate data indicating a particular classification for fraudulent or suspected fraudulent activity (e.g., a fraudulent transaction) associated with first account data90.

In some embodiments, further analysis (e.g., a manual review, or further automated review using additional data sources, etc.) may be performed at an additional stage, shown in dashed lines inFIG. 2as process stage92. The additional analysis may then be used to make a final fraud determination (e.g., a final decision on whether fraud occurred, and/or on the type of fraud that occurred) at process stage94. In other embodiments, process stage92is omitted from process flow80, and process stage94merely represents the output of process stage86. The final determination made at process stage94, along with the first account data90used to make that determination, may be fed back into process stage84to provide additional labeled data for purposes of updating the rules.

In some embodiments, the process flow80includes more, fewer and/or different stages, such as any of those discussed elsewhere herein (e.g., in connection withFIGS. 3A-3F). In one alternative embodiment, process stages84and86may be combined. For example, the multi-account data82may be unlabeled rather than labeled (or the labels may be ignored), and the combined process stage84,86may use unsupervised learning techniques (e.g., clustering techniques) to classify anomalous/outlier financial transactions, accounts, applications, etc., as “suspect” and needing further analysis.

More specific, machine learning-based process flows generally corresponding to process flow80ofFIG. 2will now be described with reference toFIGS. 3A-3F. It is noted, however, that other process flows are also within the scope of the invention described herein. Moreover, whileFIGS. 3A-3Fgenerally correspond to embodiments in which supervised machine learning techniques are used, other embodiments may instead use unsupervised machine learning techniques, as noted above. In various different embodiments, fraud detection/classification unit36may be configured to implement only one of the process flows ofFIGS. 3A-3F, or may be configured to implement two or more (e.g., all) of the process flows shown inFIGS. 3A-3F.

A. Exemplary Process Flow for Machine Learning of Fraud Detection Rules Using Online Activity Data

Referring first toFIG. 3A, an exemplary process flow100may generally be used to detect fraud using customer online activity data. In the process flow100, multi-customer online activity data102may represent data associated with the online activities of a number (e.g., thousands) of customers (e.g., credit or debit cardholders, checking or saving account holders, etc.). The multi-customer online activity data102may include data indicating actions that the customers took, and/or web sites visited by the customers, while the customers were connected to the Internet via web browsers (e.g., executing on respective ones of cardholder computing devices20). For example, the multi-customer online activity data102may include URLs of, and/or content (e.g., text) within, web sites visited by customers, search terms entered by customers using search engine tools, search results presented to customers by search engine tools, indications of interactive controls (e.g., virtual buttons) selected by customers on various web pages, and so on.

The multi-customer online activity data102may include data obtained (e.g., by external data collection unit42ofFIG. 1) from cardholder computing devices20, from one or more ISPs of other sources24, and/or from a third party aggregator of such information, for example. In some embodiments, the multi-customer online activity data102may only include data that customers have expressly consented to share with an entity associated with FAMS14and/or AFSS12(e.g., in exchange for fraud protection services or other benefits, such as discounts).

As described above in connection with multi-account data82of process flow80, the multi-customer online account data102may be associated with multiple fraud determination labels. In some embodiments, each label may be associated with a data set that includes not only the corresponding portion of multi-customer online activity data102, but also one or more other types of data, such as transaction data (e.g., transaction dates, amounts, locations, etc.) for each customer from account records database30of FAMS14, data indicative of IP addresses of cardholder computing devices20and/or devices in merchant computing systems22, Internet browsing and/or search history data from cardholder computing devices20(or from an ISP computer system included in other sources24, etc.), vehicle telematics data from telematics systems of other sources24, home occupancy and/or usage data (e.g., smart appliance data) from smart home systems of other sources24, and so on. The labels may include final fraud determinations that were made via earlier iterations of the process flow100, and/or external to the process flow100. Multi-customer online account data102may include many (e.g., thousands) of positively and negatively labeled data sets.

At a process stage104, the multi-customer online activity data102may be analyzed to generate fraud detection rules (e.g., to be stored in ML rules database58). As described above in connection with process stage84of process flow80, any suitable type of supervised machine learning program/technique(s) may be used. Generally, process stage104may serve to identify which type(s) of online activity data is/are probative of whether fraud has occurred, and to determine the data values and/or combinations that are probative of whether fraud has occurred. While not shown inFIG. 3A, the fraud detection rules may not only detect fraud, but also classify fraud (e.g., as described below in connection withFIG. 3C), in some embodiments.

At process stage106, the rules generated or updated at process stage104may be applied to first customer online activity data110. The first customer online activity data110may be associated with a particular customer, such as a customer associated with a particular one of computing devices20, for example. The types of data included in first customer online activity data110may depend upon which types of online activity data were determined, by process stage104, to be relevant to a fraud determination. For example, the first customer online activity data110may include information obtained (e.g., by external data collection unit42) from one of cardholder computing devices20(i.e., the device associated with the first customer), and/or from an ISP of other sources24. Some specific examples of rules that may be generated by process stage104, and applied at process stage106, are described below in connection withFIG. 4A.

Process stage106may output various different types of information, depending upon the embodiment and/or scenario. For example, depending upon the content of first customer online activity data110and the rules, process stage106may generate data indicating that a particular financial transaction associated with the first customer is, or is not, fraudulent or potentially fraudulent. Alternatively, or additionally, process stage106may generate data indicating a particular classification of fraudulent or potentially fraudulent activity associated with first customer online activity data110.

In some embodiments, further analysis (e.g., a manual review, or further automated review using additional data sources, etc.) is performed at an additional stage, shown in dashed lines inFIG. 3Aas process stage112. The additional analysis may then be used to make a final fraud determination (e.g., a final decision on whether fraud occurred, and/or on the type of fraud that occurred) at process stage114. In other embodiments, process stage112is omitted from process flow100, and process stage114merely represents the output of process stage106.

The final determination made at process stage114, along with the first customer online activity data110(and any other data) used to make that determination, may be fed back into process stage104to provide additional labeled data for purposes of updating the rules. In some embodiments, a preliminary fraud determination made at process stage106is also fed back into process stage104, to allow the machine learning program to determine and improve upon past performance/accuracy.

B. Exemplary Process Flow for Machine Learning of Chargeback Candidate Detection Rules

Referring next toFIG. 3B, an exemplary process flow120may generally be used to identify the financial transactions for which chargebacks (e.g., post-transaction payments from merchants, or acquiring/merchant banks, back to the issuer to return proceeds from transactions) are appropriate. In the process flow120, multi-account transaction data122may represent data associated with the financial transactions involving the accounts of a number (e.g., thousands) of credit or debit cardholders. The multi-account transaction data122may include information such as transaction dates, transaction amounts, merchant names (and/or aliases) associated with the transaction, information relating to how the card information was collected by the merchant (e.g., by swiping, an EMV chip reader, manual entry of the card number, etc.), geographic locations of “card present” transactions, and so on. The multi-account transaction data122may include data obtained (e.g., by external data collection unit42ofFIG. 1) from merchant computing systems22and/or from acquiring/merchant banks associated with those merchants, for example.

Similar to the labels described above in connection with multi-account data82of process flow80, the multi-account transaction data122may be associated with multiple chargeback outcome labels. For example, each label may be associated with a data set that includes the corresponding portion of multi-account transaction data122. The outcome labels may include final chargeback determinations that were made (in connection with the transactions represented in multi-account transaction data122) via earlier iterations of the process flow120, and/or external to the process flow120. Multi-account transaction data122may include many (e.g., thousands) of positively and negatively labeled data sets.

At a process stage124, the multi-account transaction data122may be analyzed to generate chargeback candidate detection rules (e.g., to be stored in ML rules database58). As described above in connection with process stage84of process flow80, any suitable type of supervised machine learning program/technique(s) may be used. Generally, process stage124may serve to identify which type(s) of transaction data is/are probative of whether, under the full chargeback rules of the card network entity, a chargeback is appropriate for a given transaction. Process stage124may also determine the transaction data values and/or combinations that are probative of whether a chargeback is appropriate for the transaction.

At a process stage126, the rules generated or updated at process stage124may be applied to first account transaction data130to determine whether a transaction associated with the first account is a “good” chargeback candidate. Put differently, process stage126may, instead of applying the full chargeback rules of the card network entity (which may be quite lengthy and complex) to the facts surrounding the transaction, use various factors and algorithms developed at process stage124to determine whether there exists a relatively high probability that a chargeback would be appropriate for the transaction if the full chargeback rules were applied. The process stage126may calculate a percentage probability that the transaction is one in which a chargeback is appropriate, for example.

The first account transaction data130may be associated with the account of a particular cardholder or cardholders, such as a cardholder associated with a particular one of cardholder computing devices20, for example. The types of data included in first account transaction data130may depend upon which types of transaction-related data were determined, by process stage124, to be relevant to a chargeback candidate determination. For example, the first account transaction data130may include information obtained (e.g., by external data collection unit42) from one of merchant computing systems22(e.g., the computing system of the merchant involved in the transaction being analyzed) and/or from an acquiring/merchant bank associated with that merchant. The first account transaction data130may also include information about one or more other transactions associated with the first account (e.g., data pertaining to other transactions occurring shortly before and/or after the transaction at issue). Some specific examples of rules that may be generated by process stage124, and applied at process stage126, are described below in connection withFIG. 4B.

Process stage126may output information indicating whether the particular transaction represented by first account transaction data130is a “good” candidate for chargeback detection. For example, process stage126may output a percentage probability, calculated according to the rules generated or updated at process stage124, that the transaction is one in which a chargeback is appropriate. As another example, process stage126may output a binary indicator of whether the transaction is, or is not, a strong/likely chargeback candidate (e.g., by comparing the percentage probability to a threshold probability).

If the transaction is identified as a chargeback candidate at process stage126, the full chargeback rules of the card network entity may be applied at a process stage132. Process stage132may include manual application of the full chargeback rules, and/or automated application of the full chargeback rules, in various different embodiments. Based upon the analysis at process stage132, a final chargeback determination may be made at a process stage134. The final determination made at process stage134, along with the first account transaction data130(and any other data) used to make that determination, may be fed back into process stage124to provide additional labeled data for purposes of updating the rules. In some embodiments, the indication of whether the transaction is a good chargeback candidate generated at process stage126may also be fed back into process stage124, to allow the machine learning program to determine and improve upon past performance/accuracy.

C. Exemplary Process Flow for Machine Learning of Fraud Classification Rules

Referring now toFIG. 3C, an exemplary process flow140may generally be used to classify instances of suspected or potential fraud. For example, the process flow140may represent ongoing, real-time or batch processing of a large amount of data associated with a large number of potential and/or existing financial accounts (e.g., all accounts associated with a particular bank, or all accounts opting in to a fraud protection program, etc.). In this manner, the process flow140may be used to initially flag situations for closer investigation, and provide one or more classifications of the type(s) of fraud potentially at issue in order to narrow or otherwise facilitate the investigation. In other embodiments, the process flow140may be used to provide a narrower classification (e.g., “skimming”) when a broader class of fraud (e.g., credit card fraud) is already suspected.

In the process flow140, multi-account data142may represent data associated with financial accounts of a number (e.g., thousands) of account holders. The financial accounts may be existing or potential accounts, and the account holders may include holders of accounts and/or potential holders of potential accounts. For example, the multi-account data142may include existing and/or applied-for credit card accounts, debit card accounts, savings accounts, checking accounts, investment accounts, loan accounts, etc.

Depending upon the embodiment, the multi-account data142may include one or more different types of information obtained (e.g., by external data collection unit42ofFIG. 1) from one or more of FAMS14, cardholder computing devices20, merchant computing systems22, and/or other sources24. For example, the multi-account data142may include transaction data (e.g., transaction dates, amounts, locations, etc.) from account records database30of FAMS14, data indicative of IP addresses of cardholder computing devices20and/or devices in merchant computing systems22, Internet browsing and/or search history data from cardholder computing devices20(or from an ISP computer system included in other sources24, etc.), vehicle telematics data from telematics systems of cardholder vehicles, home occupancy and/or usage data (e.g., smart appliance data) from smart home systems of cardholders, and/or one or more other types of data. Some or all data within multi-account data142may be information that account holders or potential account holders have expressly consented to share with an entity associated with FAMS14and/or AFSS12(e.g., in exchange for fraud protection services).

The multi-account data142may be associated with multiple fraud determination labels, each indicating a type or class of fraud (e.g., “counterfeiting,” “lost or stolen card use,” “skimming,” “chargeback fraud,” “application fraud,” etc.), or indicating a lack of fraud, for example. In one embodiment, each of a number of data sets in the multi-account data142is associated with at least one such classification/label, and includes data relating to a particular financial transaction, financial account, loan application, etc., for which the fraud classification or classifications was/were made (e.g., after a previous iteration of process flow140, or after another manual and/or automated fraud investigation). Multi-account data142may include many (e.g., thousands) of data sets labeled with various known fraud classifications.

At a process stage144, the multi-account data142may be analyzed to generate fraud classification rules (e.g., to be stored in ML rules database58). As described above in connection with process stage84of process flow80, any suitable type of supervised machine learning program/technique(s) may be used. Generally, process stage144may serve to identify which type(s) of transaction data is/are probative of the particular type of fraud (if any) that has occurred. Process stage144may also determine the data values and/or combinations that are probative of the particular type of fraud (if any) that has occurred.

At a process stage146, the rules generated or updated at process stage144may be applied to first account data150. The first account data150may be associated with a particular account and a particular customer (e.g., a cardholder associated with a particular one of computing devices20). The types of data included in first account data150may depend upon which types of data were determined, by process stage144, to be relevant to fraud classification. For example, the first account data150may include information obtained (e.g., by external data collection unit42) from one or more of FAMS14, one of cardholder computing devices20(i.e., the device associated with the customer holding or applying for the first account), one or more of merchant computing systems22, and/or one or more of other sources24. Some specific examples of rules that may be generated by process stage144, and applied at process stage146, are described below in connection withFIG. 4C.

Process stage146may output data (e.g., a message or code) that is used to classify suspected fraudulent activity (in connection with the account associated with first account data150) at a process stage152. For example, process stage152may assign a classification of “counterfeiting” if process stage146determined that the first account data150indicated a number of circumstances that, according to the rules generated at process stage144, are known to be correlated with counterfeiting activity (e.g., two “card present” transactions occurring in different states within the same one-hour time period, etc.). In some embodiments and/or scenarios, two or more classifications may concurrently be assigned to first account data150. For example, process stage146may determine a set of probabilities for a set of two or more potential types of fraud, and process stage152may assign each classification, with each respective probability, to first account data150. Moreover, in some embodiments and scenarios, process stage152may assign a classification that corresponds to an absence of any suspected fraud (e.g., “no fraud”).

At a process stage154, if process stage152assigned a classification other than one indicating the absence of suspected fraud, the first account data150, and/or other information associated with the account and the suspected class of fraud, may be analyzed in depth to make a final fraud determination at a process stage156. Generally, the fraud classification may be used to facilitate the analysis at process stage154, with process stage154including manual and/or automated fraud detection techniques. For example, personnel associated with AFSS12may use the fraud classification(s) to inform their strategy and/or focus with respect to conducting an in-depth fraud investigation.

The additional analysis at process stage154may then result in a final fraud determination at process stage156. The final determination may indicate both whether fraud occurred and, if so, the class(es)/type(s) of fraud that occurred. The final determination made at process stage156, and information used to make that determination (e.g., the first account data150and potentially other data), may be fed back into process stage144to provide additional labeled data for purposes of updating the rules. In some embodiments, the (preliminary) fraud classification made at process stage152may also be fed back into process stage144to help the machine learning program identify instances in which the preliminary classifications at process stage152were incorrect. Process stage144may then update the fraud classification rules in ways that seek to prevent or reduce such instances in the future.

D. Exemplary Process Flow for Machine Learning of Application Fraud Detection Rules

Referring now toFIG. 3D, an exemplary process flow160may generally be used to detect application fraud. “Application fraud” may generally refer to fraud in connection with the application for any type of financial account, loan and/or line of credit (e.g., mortgage loan, vehicle loan, small business loan, payday loan, home equity line of credit, credit card account, debit card account, checking account, savings account, investment account, etc.). In some embodiments and/or scenarios, however, the application may be for non-financial purposes, such as an application for membership in a particular group or institution, for example.

In the process flow160, multi-applicant search history data162may represent data associated with the Internet search history of a number (e.g., thousands) of applicants. The multi-applicant search history data162may include search terms entered by the applicants using online search engine tools, for example, and/or the results of such searches (e.g., URLs, titles and/or contents of search results), for example.

The multi-applicant search history data162may include data obtained (e.g., by external data collection unit42ofFIG. 1) from cardholder computing devices20, from one or more ISPs of other sources24, and/or from a third party aggregator of such information, for example. In some embodiments, the multi-applicant search history data162only includes data that the applicants have expressly consented to share with an entity associated with FAMS14and/or AFSS12(e.g., in exchange for consideration of their applications).

As described above in connection with multi-account data82of process flow80, the multi-applicant search history data162may be associated with multiple fraud determination labels. In some embodiments, each label may be associated with a data set that corresponds to an application submitted by a particular applicant, where the data set includes the corresponding portion of multi-applicant search history data162(e.g., the search terms and/or results associated with the particular application). The labels may include final fraud determinations that were made via earlier iterations of the process flow160, and/or external to the process flow160. Multi-applicant search history data162may include many (e.g., thousands) of positively and negatively labeled data sets.

At a process stage164, the multi-applicant search history data162may be analyzed to generate application fraud detection rules (e.g., to be stored in ML rules database58). As described above in connection with process stage84of process flow80, any suitable type of supervised machine learning program/technique(s) may be used. Generally, process stage164may serve to identify which type(s) of Internet search-related data is/are probative of whether application fraud has occurred, and to determine the data values and/or combinations that are probative of whether application fraud has occurred.

At process stage166, the rules generated or updated at process stage164may be applied to first applicant search history data170. The first applicant search history data170may be associated with a particular application and a particular applicant (e.g., a person associated with a particular one of computing devices20), for example. The types of data included in first applicant search history data170may depend upon which types of Internet search-related data were determined, by process stage164, to be relevant to a fraud determination. The first applicant search history data170may include information obtained (e.g., by external data collection unit42) from one of computing devices20(i.e., the device associated with the first applicant), and/or from an ISP of other sources24, for example. Some specific examples of rules that may be generated by process stage164, and applied at process stage166, are described below in connection withFIG. 4D.

Process stage166may output information indicating whether fraud is suspected in connection with the application corresponding to first applicant search history data170. For example, process stage166may output a percentage probability, calculated according to the rules generated or updated at process stage164, that the application was fraudulently made (e.g., by someone other than the purported applicant or an authorized representative thereof). As another example, process stage166may output a binary indicator of whether the application likely was, or likely was not, fraudulently made (e.g., by comparing a percentage probability to a threshold probability).

In some embodiments, further analysis (e.g., a manual review, or further automated review using additional data sources, etc.) is performed at an additional stage, shown in dashed lines inFIG. 3Das process stage172. The additional analysis may then be used to make a final fraud determination (e.g., a final decision on whether application fraud occurred) at process stage174. In other embodiments, process stage172is omitted from process flow160, and process stage174merely represents the output of process stage166. The final determination made at process stage174, along with the first applicant search history data170(and any other data) used to make that determination, may be fed back into process stage164to provide additional labeled data for purposes of updating the rules. In some embodiments, a preliminary fraud determination made at process stage166is also fed back into process stage164, to allow the machine learning program to determine and improve upon past performance/accuracy.

E. Exemplary Process Flow for Machine Learning of Fraud Dispute Resolution Rules

Referring now toFIG. 3E, an exemplary process flow180may generally be used to facilitate the resolution of fraud disputes (or potential disputes) with customers/account holders. For example, the process flow180may be used to determine whether a reportedly unauthorized or fraudulent transaction (e.g., one that the account holder reported as such when looking at his or her account statement) was indeed unauthorized or fraudulent. In some embodiments, the process flow180may also, or instead, be used to determine whether an “unrecognized” transaction (i.e., one that the account holder does not recall, but does not necessarily report as fraudulent) was unauthorized or fraudulent.

In the process flow180, multi-account data182may represent data associated with financial accounts of a number (e.g., thousands) of account holders. For example, the multi-account data182may include data associated with financial transactions relating to credit card accounts, debit card accounts, savings accounts, checking accounts, etc. For ease of explanation,FIG. 3Ewill be described with reference to an embodiment in which the accounts are credit card accounts.

In one embodiment, the multi-account data182may include transaction data (e.g., transaction dates, amounts, locations, etc.) obtained from FAMS14(e.g., by external data collection unit42ofFIG. 1). In some embodiments, however, the multi-account data182also includes information obtained from cardholder computing devices20, merchant computing systems22, and/or other sources24. For example, the multi-account data182may include, in addition to transaction data from account records database30of FAMS14, data indicative of IP addresses of cardholder computing devices20and/or devices in merchant computing systems22, Internet browsing and/or search history data from cardholder computing devices20(or from an ISP computer system included in other sources24, etc.), vehicle telematics data from telematics systems of cardholder vehicles, home occupancy and/or usage data (e.g., smart appliance data) from smart home systems of cardholders, autonomous vehicle data, smart vehicle data, mobile device data, vehicle or mobile device GPS data, and/or one or more other types of data. Some or all data within multi-account data182may be information that account holders or potential account holders have expressly consented to share with an entity associated with FAMS14and/or AFSS12(e.g., in exchange for fraud protection services).

As described above in connection with multi-account data82of process flow80, the multi-account data182may be associated with multiple fraud determination labels (e.g., “fraud” and “no fraud,” and/or more complex labels that indicate type/class, such as “lost/stolen card use,” etc.). In some embodiments, each label may be associated with a data set that includes the corresponding portion of multi-account data182. The labels may include final fraud determinations that were made via earlier iterations of the process flow180, and/or external to the process flow180. Multi-account data182may include many (e.g., thousands) of positively and negatively labeled data sets.

At a process stage184, the multi-account data182may be analyzed to generate query generation rules (e.g., to be stored in ML rules database58). As described above in connection with process stage84of process flow80, any suitable type of supervised machine learning program/technique(s) may be used. Generally, process stage184may serve to identify which types of information are probative of whether fraud has occurred, and to craft rules that formulate queries to ascertain such information based upon account data.

For example, process stage184may determine that, for a suspect “card present” transaction, a verified, non-fraudulent “card present” transaction within 10 miles and 3 hours of the suspect transaction is probative of whether the suspect transaction was fraudulent. Based upon this finding, process stage184may also generate a rule specifying that a cardholder should be queried as to whether he/she can confirm making each “card present” transaction within 10 miles and 3 hours of the suspect transaction. As another example, process stage184may determine that a merchant using a billing alias different from its legal and/or commonly-known name (e.g., by at least some threshold level of similarity, as measured by number of similar characters, order of characters, etc.) is probative of whether the cardholder authorized a transaction associated with that billing alias. Based upon this finding, process stage184may generate a rule specifying that a cardholder should be queried as to whether he/she is aware of a billing alias used for a suspect transaction if that billing alias is sufficiently different from the legal/common name of the merchant.

At process stage186, the rules generated or updated at process stage184may be applied to first account data190. The first account data190may be associated with a particular cardholder, such as a cardholder associated with a particular one of cardholder computing devices20, for example. The types of data included in first account data190may depend upon which types of data were determined, by process stage184, to be relevant to developing dispute resolution queries. Process stage186may generate a set of one or more queries in accordance with the rules and the contents of first account data. Some specific examples of rules that may be generated by process stage184and applied at process stage186, and the queries that may be generated as a result, are described below in connection withFIG. 4E.

At a process stage192, the generated queries may be sent to the cardholder in one or more of various ways, such as sending the queries via SMS text message and/or email, and/or via a web browser or dedicated application executing on the one of cardholder computing devices20that is associated with the cardholder, for example. At a process stage194, responses to the queries are received from the cardholder (e.g., via inputs made by the cardholder via the web browser or application, or a responsive SMS text message or email, etc.). In some embodiments, the rules generated or updated at process stage184specify the manner in which follow-up queries should be generated based upon the responses received at process stage194, and process stages192and194may be repeated multiple times.

In some embodiments, further analysis (e.g., a manual review, or further automated review using additional data sources, etc.) that makes use of the received responses is performed at an additional stage, shown in dashed lines inFIG. 3Eas process stage196. The additional analysis may then be used to make a final fraud determination (e.g., a final decision on whether fraud occurred, and/or on the type of fraud that occurred) at process stage198. In other embodiments, process stage196is omitted from process flow180, and process stage198is based upon information from the cardholder. For example, the questions generated at process stage192may “jog” the cardholder's memory, and cause him or her to indicate that the transaction at issue was authorized. The final determination made at process stage198, along with the first account data110(and any other data used at process stage196), the queries generated at process stage186and/or the responses received at process stage194, may be fed back into process stage184to provide additional labeled data for purposes of updating the rules.

F. Exemplary Process Flow for Machine Learning of Document Fraud Detection Rules

Referring now toFIG. 3F, an exemplary process flow200may generally be used to detect fraud relating to documents, such as counterfeit and/or forged documents. The process flow200may be used in connection with various kinds of documents, such as checks (e.g., personal checks, cashier's checks, etc.), money orders, treasury bills, identification documents (e.g., social security cards, driver's licenses, passports, birth certificates, etc.), certification documents, and so on.

In the process flow200, multi-document image data202may represent digital images of a number (e.g., thousands) of physical documents of one or more types. The multi-document image data202may include images in one or more formats, such as raster formats (e.g., JPEG, TIFF, GIF, BMP, PNG, etc.) and/or vector formats (e.g., CGM, SVG, etc.), for example. The multi-document image data202may include data obtained (e.g., by external data collection unit42ofFIG. 1) from merchant computing systems22(e.g., point-of-sale devices with cameras for document identification) and/or from FAMS14(e.g., images of personal checks), for example. In some embodiments, the multi-document image data202may only include data representing images that customers (or other individuals associated with the documents) have expressly consented to share (e.g., as a prerequisite to making a purchase, or in exchange for fraud protection services, etc.).

As described above in connection with multi-account data82of process flow80, the multi-document image data202may be associated with multiple fraud determination labels. In some embodiments, each label may be associated with data representing a digital image of a particular document. The labels may include final fraud determinations (e.g., “fraud” or “no fraud,” or more complex labels such as “forgery,” “counterfeit,” “forgery—signature,” “counterfeit—angular line offset(s) outside tolerance,” etc.) that were made via earlier iterations of the process flow200, and/or external to the process flow200. Multi-document image data202may include many (e.g., thousands) of positively and negatively labeled data sets.

At a process stage204, the multi-document image data202may be analyzed to generate document fraud detection rules (e.g., to be stored in ML rules database58). As described above in connection with process stage84of process flow80, any suitable type of supervised machine learning program/technique(s) may be used. Generally, process stage204may serve to identify which characteristics of a document are probative of whether the document is counterfeit, and to determine the ranges, tolerances, etc., that are probative of whether the document is counterfeit. In some embodiments, process stage204also, or instead, identifies which characteristics of information entered in document fields are probative of whether the document was forged (e.g., drafted or populated by someone other than the person purported to have drafted or populated the document).

At process stage206, the rules generated or updated at process stage204may be applied to first document image data210. The first document image data210may be digital image data corresponding to a particular, physical document. The first document image data210may include information obtained (e.g., by external data collection unit42) from one of merchant computing systems22(e.g., for real-time verification of an identification or other document presented during or prior to a sale), or from FAMS14(e.g., for real-time or batch-processing verification of a personal check prior to clearing the check), for example. Some specific examples of rules that may be generated by process stage204, and applied at process stage206, are described below in connection withFIG. 4F.

Process stage206may output information indicating whether fraud is suspected in connection with the document corresponding to first document image data210. For example, process stage206may output two percentage probabilities calculated according to the rules generated or updated at process stage204, with the first indicating the likelihood that the document is counterfeit and the second indicating the likelihood that the document includes forged content. As another example, process stage206may output binary indicators of whether the document likely is, or likely is not, counterfeit and/or includes forged content (e.g., by comparing percentage probabilities to threshold probabilities).

In some embodiments, further analysis (e.g., a manual review, or further automated review using additional data sources, etc.) may be performed at a process stage212. The additional analysis may then be used to make a final fraud determination (e.g., a final decision on whether the document is fraudulent) at process stage214. For example, the process stage206may act as a filter, and flag only those documents having a relatively high probability of being fraudulent. In this manner, a considerably smaller amount of human and/or processing resources may be consumed at process stage212.

The final determination made at process stage214, along with the first document image data210used to make that determination, may be fed back into process stage204to provide additional labeled data for purposes of updating the rules. In some embodiments, a preliminary fraud determination made at process stage206may also be fed back into process stage204, to allow the machine learning program to determine and improve upon past performance/accuracy.

IV. Exemplary Rules for Fraud Detection and/or Classification

FIGS. 4A-4Fdepict exemplary factors and algorithms that may be used in connection with various fraud detection and/or classification rules, according to different embodiments. It is noted that the rule sets corresponding toFIGS. 4A-4Fare purely for purposes of illustration and are not limiting. Particularly in embodiments where machine learning is utilized, for example, the algorithms and/or factors may be far more complex, and/or less intuitive, than some or all of the examples shown inFIGS. 4A-4F.

A. Exemplary Fraud Detection Rule Set Using Online Activity

Referring first toFIG. 4A, an exemplary rule set220(e.g., generated at process stage104ofFIG. 3A) may use various factors relating to online activity of a cardholder to detect fraud in connection with a particular credit or debit card transaction. The rule set220may correspond to a particular embodiment and scenario in which the transaction at issue is a “card present” transaction, and in which the rule set220seeks to determine whether the cardholder made or otherwise authorized the transaction. The rule set220may be incorporated into a review process that is generally applied to all transactions, a review process applied only to those transactions that were flagged by a preliminary fraud alert, or a review process applied only after a cardholder reports the transaction as unauthorized, for example.

The factors considered under the rule set220may include a number of interest-based factors222and a number of location-based factors224. The interest-based factors222may relate to the cardholder's interest (or non-interest) in a product or service purchased via the transaction, and/or the merchant providing the product or service, while the location-based factors224may relate to the cardholder's location or probable location.

As seen inFIG. 4A, the interest-based factors222may include: (1) whether the cardholder searched online for the specific product or service purchased via the transaction at issue (e.g., by determining whether search terms entered by the cardholder included the name of the product or service involved in the transaction, or included a description of the product or service, etc.); (2) whether the cardholder visited a website associated with the merchant (e.g., by comparing URLs of web sites visited by the cardholder to a known URL of the merchant's website, or by searching the contents of websites visited by the cardholder for the merchant's name, etc.); (3) whether the cardholder endorsed the merchant, or the product or service provided by the merchant, via a social media account of the cardholder (e.g., by determining whether the cardholder “liked” the merchant, product or service via his or her Facebook® account, etc.); (4) whether the cardholder visited a website associated with a competitor of the merchant (e.g., by comparing URLs of web sites visited by the cardholder to known URLs of known competitors' websites, or by searching the contents of websites visited by the cardholder for the competitors' names, etc.); (5) whether the cardholder searched online for a different product or service in the same price range as the transaction amount (e.g., by analyzing search terms and/or results, and/or by analyzing URLs or contents of websites visited by the cardholder and comparing prices of products/services, etc.); and/or (6) whether the cardholder entered search terms indicative of the cardholder's need for the product or service (e.g., by determining that the cardholder entered search terms including “pipe leak” prior to the purchase of new plumbing hardware, or “computer repair” prior to the purchase of a new hard drive, etc.). In other embodiments, the interest-based factors222may include more, fewer and/or different factors than those shown inFIG. 4A.

As is also seen inFIG. 4A, the location-based factors224may include: (1) whether the cardholder “checked in” to a flight having a destination near the location where the transaction was initiated (e.g., by determining whether the cardholder checked in to a flight having a destination at the city in which the transaction occurred, or within a threshold number of miles of the city in which the transaction occurred, etc.); (2) whether the cardholder visited a website associated with a place near (or in) which the transaction was initiated (e.g., by comparing URLs of web sites visited by the cardholder to URLs of websites known to be associated with particular areas, and/or by searching the contents of websites visited by the cardholder for location or area names, etc.); and/or (3) whether the cardholder endorsed a place near (or in) which the transaction was initiated via a social media account of the cardholder (e.g., by determining whether the cardholder “liked” the geographic area, attraction or other place via his or her Facebook® account, etc.). In other embodiments, the location-based factors224may include more, fewer and/or different factors than those shown inFIG. 4A.

Generally, the data indicative of whether the circumstance corresponding to each of interest-based factors222and/or location-based factors224is present/true for a particular cardholder may be included in the first customer online activity data110described above in connection withFIG. 3A. For example, external data collection unit42ofFIG. 1may obtain the search terms, URLs, user online selections, etc., needed to determine whether the various factors exist, from the cardholder's computing device (e.g., one of cardholder computing devices20) and/or from an ISP of other sources24.

As is also seen inFIG. 4A, each of the interest-based factors222and location-based factors224may be associated with a particular score or weighting value. In the rule set220shown inFIG. 4A, a total score may be calculated based upon which factors are, or are not, present (e.g., add 94 points if it is determined that the cardholder searched for the particular lawnmower model that was purchased, add another 80 points if the transaction was a “card present” transaction in the Chicago suburb of Joliet and the cardholder checked in to a flight to Chicago just prior to the transaction, etc.).

In some embodiments, certain factors may instead be associated with negative scores (e.g., minus 80 if the cardholder checked in to a flight with a destination at least 200 miles from the site of the transaction and within one day of the transaction, etc.). Moreover, certain factors may be associated with metrics or algorithms that determine how heavily those factors are weighed. As indicated inFIG. 4A, for example, search terms entered by the cardholder may be used to calculate a “need score” X (e.g., where X is based upon frequency of certain search terms being used, the amount of time spent clicking through search results, the magnitude and/or urgency of a problem indicated by the search terms, etc.), with X then being used to calculate a score equal to 0.2X.

The rule set220may then output the total score (e.g., 94+80=+174), a normalized total score, an indication of whether the total score exceeded a threshold (e.g., a threshold of +100), a probability calculated based upon the total score, and/or some other indicator or measure of the existence or likelihood of fraud. In the example shown inFIG. 4A, it can be seen that larger scores generally correspond to a greater probability that the transaction was made or authorized by the cardholder. If the transaction is being automatically reviewed (e.g., to determine whether a fraud alert is appropriate, without any initial input from the cardholder), this may mean that a lower score corresponds to a higher probability of fraud. Conversely, if the cardholder had reported the transaction as being fraudulent, a higher score may correspond to a higher probability of fraud (i.e., fraud on the part of the cardholder).

In some embodiments, the rule set220may also include one or more other types of factors not necessarily based upon online activities of the cardholder (e.g., whether GPS of the cardholder's smartphone or vehicle indicates that he or she was in that area shortly before or after the transaction, etc.), and/or may omit either interest-based factors222or location-based factors224.

B. Exemplary Chargeback Candidate Detection Rule Set

Referring next toFIG. 4B, an exemplary rule set230(e.g., generated at process stage124ofFIG. 3B) may use various factors relating to a transaction between a cardholder and a merchant to determine whether the transaction should be flagged as a candidate for a chargeback (e.g., to determine whether the transaction should be reviewed under a full set of chargeback rules associated with the appropriate card network entity). The rule set230may correspond to a particular embodiment and scenario in which the transaction at issue is a “card present” transaction.

As seen inFIG. 4B, the factors considered under the rule set230may include: (1) whether an EMV chip card was not inserted in a point-of-sale EMV chip reader device of the merchant; (2) whether a non-EMV card was not swiped in a point-of-sale device of the merchant; (3) whether the card is past its expiration date; (4) whether the transaction is for the same amount and/or date as another transaction involving the same card and merchant (e.g., by analyzing other transactions involving the same account and merchant within a particular time span); and/or (2) whether the transaction is for greater than a threshold amount. For example, one of merchant computing systems22ofFIG. 1(or an acquiring/merchant bank) may provide transaction details that include the amounts, dates, etc., to FAMS14for storage in account records database30, and external data collection unit42may then retrieve that information from account records database30. Generally, the data indicative of whether the circumstance corresponding to each of the factors is present/true for a particular transaction may be included in the first account transaction data130described above in connection withFIG. 3B. In other embodiments, the factors considered under rule set230may include more, fewer and/or different factors than those shown inFIG. 4B. It is noted that, in some embodiments, one or more factors may simply relate to the desirability (e.g., from a card issuer perspective) of further reviewing whether a chargeback is appropriate, without necessarily relating to the likelihood that a chargeback is appropriate.

As is also seen inFIG. 4B, each of the factors may be associated with a particular score or weighting value. A total score may be calculated based upon which factors are, or are not, present (e.g., add 62 points if it is determined that the transaction has the same amount and date as another transaction occurring close in time and involving the same card and merchant). In some embodiments, certain factors may instead be associated with negative scores, and/or certain factors may be associated with metrics or algorithms that determine how heavily those factors are weighed.

The rule set230may then output the total score, a normalized total score, an indication of whether the total score exceeded a threshold, a probability calculated based upon the total score, and/or some other indicator or measure of the likelihood that a chargeback is appropriate for the transaction. In the example shown inFIG. 4B, it can be seen that larger scores generally correspond to a greater probability that a chargeback is appropriate.

C. Exemplary Fraud Classification Rule Set

Referring now toFIG. 4C, an exemplary rule set240(e.g., generated at process stage144ofFIG. 3C) may use a diverse array of factors to classify the type(s) of fraudulent activity, if any, that is/are suspected to be associated with an event or series of events. The rule set240may correspond to a particular embodiment and scenario in which the event at issue is a financial transaction involving a debit or credit card. In other embodiments and/or scenarios, however, the rule set240may classify fraudulent activity with respect to specific other types of events (e.g., loan applications), or may detect a variety of different event types (e.g., various types of financial transactions, loan or credit applications, etc.) and broadly classify fraudulent activity in connection with the detected event types (e.g., lost/stolen card use, application fraud, etc.).

In one embodiment, each potential classification (with the possible exception of “no fraud”) may be associated with a number of factors probative of whether that type/class of fraud has occurred. As seen inFIG. 4C, for example, the rule set240may include counterfeit factors242(e.g., factors indicating that a counterfeit card was used for the transaction), account takeover factors244(e.g., factors indicating that the transaction resulted from an unauthorized person gaining online access to the credit or debit card account itself, via phishing, malware or other means), chargeback fraud factors246(e.g., factors indicating that the cardholder made or otherwise authorized a purchase that the cardholder later contested) and skimming factors248(e.g., factors indicating that the card information used for the transaction was obtained via a skimming card reader device illegally installed in an ATM, gas station pump or other location). In other embodiments, the rule set240may also, or instead, include factors corresponding to one or more other fraud classifications (e.g., forgery, lost/stolen card use, etc.).

As seen inFIG. 4C, the counterfeit factors242may include: (1) whether the suspect transaction and another, contemporaneous transaction (e.g., occurring within one hour, etc.) in another state are both “card present” transactions; and/or (2) if the suspect transaction is a “card present” transaction, whether the card (if an EMV chip card) was not inserted in an EMV chip card reader. For example, one or more of merchant computing systems22ofFIG. 1(or one or more acquiring/merchant banks) may provide transaction details that include whether the transaction was “card present,” whether the card was inserted in an EMV chip card reader, etc., to FAMS14for storage in account records database30, and external data collection unit42may then retrieve that information from account records database30. In other embodiments, the counterfeit factors242may include more, fewer and/or different factors than those shown inFIG. 4C.

The account takeover factors244may include: (1) whether the debit or credit card account password was changed within the 10 days prior to the transaction; and/or (2) whether the transaction was originated from an IP address not associated with the cardholder. For example, external data collection unit42may retrieve password change information from account records database30ofFIG. 1, which may log all password update activity, and/or may retrieve IP address information from one of merchant computing systems22(e.g., the computing system of the merchant involved in the transaction). In other embodiments, the account takeover factors244may include more, fewer and/or different factors than those shown inFIG. 4C.

The chargeback fraud factors246may include: (1) whether the cardholder had searched online for the product or service purchased via the transaction; and/or (2) whether the cardholder had visited a website associated with the merchant involved in the transaction. For example, external data collection unit42ofFIG. 1may retrieve online search information (e.g., search terms and/or results) and/or URLs from the one of cardholder computing devices20that is associated with the cardholder, and/or from an ISP (of other sources24) used by the cardholder. In other embodiments, the chargeback fraud factors246may include more, fewer and/or different factors than those shown inFIG. 4C.

The skimming factors248may include: (1) the number (X) of earlier transactions in which the card used for the transaction at issue was used at an ATM machine or a gas station pump within the 10 days prior to the transaction at issue; and/or (2) whether the transaction at issue originated from an IP address not associated with the cardholder. For example, external data collection unit42ofFIG. 1may retrieve transaction data indicating that certain past purchases were made using gas station pump card readers, and/or indicating that the card was used for one or more ATM withdrawals, from account records database30, and/or may retrieve the originating IP address from the one of merchant computing systems22associated with the merchant involved in the transaction at issue. In other embodiments, the skimming factors248may include more, fewer and/or different factors than those shown inFIG. 4C.

Generally, the data indicative of whether the circumstance corresponding to each of counterfeit factors242, account takeover factors244, chargeback fraud factors246and/or skimming factors248is present/true for a particular transaction may be included in the first account data150described above in connection withFIG. 3C, for example.

As is also seen inFIG. 4C, each of the counterfeit factors242, account takeover factors244, chargeback fraud factors246and skimming factors248may be associated with a particular score or weighting value. The factors for each classification (counterfeit, account takeover, chargeback fraud, skimming) may be used to calculate a total score specific to that classification. In the rule set240shown inFIG. 4C, for example, a counterfeit score may be calculated based upon which of factors242are, or are not, present, an account takeover score may be calculated based upon which of factors244are, or are not, present, and so on. In some embodiments, certain factors may instead be associated with negative scores, and/or certain factors (e.g., the first of skimming factors248shown inFIG. 4C) may be associated with metrics or algorithms that determine how heavily those factors are weighed.

For each classification/category, the rule set240may output the total score, a normalized total score, an indication of whether the total score exceeded a threshold, a probability calculated based upon the total score, and/or some other indicator or measure of the likelihood that fraud of that particular type/class occurred in connection with the transaction. In the example shown inFIG. 4C, it can be seen that larger scores generally correspond to a greater probability that the respective classification is accurate. Referring back toFIG. 3C, the classification at process stage152may be the classification having the highest score and/or probability under rule set240, or may include the score and/or probability for each classification, the top three classifications, etc.

D. Exemplary Application Fraud Detection Rule Set

Referring now toFIG. 4D, an exemplary rule set260may use online search information (e.g., search terms, search results, clicked/selected search results, etc.) to detect whether an application was fraudulent (e.g., not populated and/or submitted by the purported applicant). The rule set260may have been generated at process stage164ofFIG. 3D, for example. The rule set260may be incorporated into a review process that is generally applied to all applications received by a particular entity or anti-fraud service, or a review process applied only to those applications that were flagged by a preliminary fraud alert, for example.

The factors considered under the rule set260may generally be probative of whether the person that submitted the application (e.g., via a web browser, a dedicated application, as an email attachment, by snail mail, etc.) had performed one or more online searches indicating that he or she was trying to learn more about the purported applicant in order to populate particular fields of the application (e.g., a “home address” field, “employment history” fields, etc.). The “purported applicant” may be a person whose name appears in a name and/or signature field of the application, for example.

As seen inFIG. 4D, the factors of exemplary rule set260may include: (1) whether the applicant used search terms that included the name of the purported applicant; (2) whether the search terms also included the words “address” or “residence” (and possibly other synonyms or near-synonyms); and/or (3) whether the search terms also included the words “employer,” “job” and/or “career” (and possibly other synonyms or near-synonyms). In other embodiments, the rule set260may include more, fewer and/or different factors than those shown inFIG. 4D. For example, the rule set260may include one or more factors relating to which search results appeared and/or were selected (e.g., “clicked” on after appearing on a user interface) by the applicant.

Generally, the data indicative of whether the circumstances corresponding to the factors of rule set260are present/true for a particular applicant may be included in the first applicant search history data170described above in connection withFIG. 3D. For example, external data collection unit42ofFIG. 1may obtain the search terms, search results, search result user selections, etc., needed to determine whether the various factors exist, from the applicant's computing device (e.g., similar to one of cardholder computing devices20) and/or from an ISP of other sources24. Access to such information may be made a condition of having the application be considered, for example.

As is also seen inFIG. 4D, each of the factors of rule set260may be associated with a particular score or weighting value. A total score may then be calculated based upon which factors are, or are not, present. In some embodiments, certain factors may instead be associated with negative scores, and/or certain factors may be associated with metrics or algorithms that determine how heavily those factors are weighed.

The rule set260may then output the total score, a normalized total score, an indication of whether the total score exceeded a threshold, a probability calculated based upon the total score, and/or some other indicator or measure of the existence or likelihood of application fraud. In the example shown inFIG. 4D, it can be seen that larger scores may generally correspond to a greater probability that the application was not populated and/or submitted by the purported applicant.

E. Exemplary Fraud Dispute Resolution Rule Set

Referring now toFIG. 4E, a flow diagram illustrates at least a portion of a process flow270implementing an exemplary rule set for fraud dispute, or potential fraud dispute, resolution (e.g., a rule set generated at process stage184ofFIG. 3E). The process flow270may be used to help resolve a dispute over a contested transaction, or to help a customer recall an unrecognized transaction, for example.FIG. 4Eillustrates a process flow, rather than just a set of factors, in order to better illustrate an example process for generating queries based upon the generated rules, according to one embodiment. The process flow270may correspond to a particular embodiment and scenario in which the transaction subject to dispute or potential dispute is a credit or debit card transaction.

In the exemplary process flow270, the rule set may specify that a process stage272determines whether the transaction was a “card present” transaction. If not, the rule set may specify that the flow proceed directly to a process stage280. If so, however, the rule set may specify that the flow instead proceeds to a process stage274.

The rule set may also specify that process stage274determines whether at least one other transaction associated with the cardholder's account occurred within some threshold number of hours (X) of the transaction at issue. If not, the rule set may specify that the flow proceeds directly to process stage280. If so, however, the rule set may specify that the flow instead proceeds to a process stage276.

Process stage276may generate one or more location-related queries using transaction data associated with the cardholder's account. The queries may ask, for example, whether the cardholder was in (or near) one or more particular geographic areas or locations at various times. If the transaction at issue occurred in San Francisco, for example, with a first other “card present” transaction occurring in Santa Rosa four hours earlier and a second other “card present” transaction occurring in San Jose two hours later, process stage276may generate one or more queries asking whether the cardholder made or authorized the earlier and/or later transactions, and/or whether the cardholder traveled on a route from Santa Rosa to San Jose that passed through San Francisco, etc.

In some embodiments, the location-related queries are generated based upon data associated with events or circumstances other than transactions. For example, if the transaction at issue occurred in Sarasota, Fla., and the data considered under the rule set indicates that the cardholder checked in to a flight to Tampa, process stage276may generate one or more queries asking whether the cardholder completed the flight, where the cardholder went after landing in Tampa, etc.

The rule set may also specify that process stage280determines whether the transaction at issue is associated with a billing alias that is dissimilar to the name of the merchant involved in the transaction. For example, the computing system of the merchant (e.g., one of merchant computing systems22ofFIG. 1) may have sent to FAMS14a transaction record that identified the merchant by the alias, and was presented to the cardholder as an online or paper account statement. The determination at process stage280may use the billing alias to identify a legal and/or common name of the merchant (e.g., using a relational database stored in AFSS12or FAMS14), and determine that there is at least some threshold level of dissimilarity (e.g., based upon difference of characters, character ordering, etc.) between the billing alias and the merchant name.

If the billing alias and merchant name are not sufficiently dissimilar, the rule set may specify that the flow proceeds directly to a process stage284. If sufficiently dissimilar, however, the rule set may specify that the flow instead proceeds to a process stage282. Process stage282may generate a query relating to the billing alias that was presented to the cardholder. For example, the query may ask whether the cardholder is aware that the billing alias is used by that particular merchant. In some embodiments, process stage282may instead generate a message that simply informs the cardholder that the billing alias corresponds to the merchant, without posing a question.

The rule set may specify that process stage284generates one or more default queries. For example, one default query may ask whether the cardholder lent his or her card to a friend or family member around the time of the transaction. In some embodiments and/or scenarios, process stage284may be omitted from process flow270. Generally, the queries (and possibly non-query messages) generated in process flow270may serve to help the cardholder recall whether the transaction was made or authorized, and/or process flow270may prompt the cardholder for responses that are considered by others (e.g., personnel of an entity associated with FAMS14ofFIG. 1) to determine whether the transaction was likely fraudulent.

Although not shown inFIG. 4E, in some embodiments process flow270may include a number of iterative stages in which responses are received from the cardholder (e.g., from the respective one of cardholder computing devices20inFIG. 1) and used to generate additional, more detailed questions for the cardholder. For example, if a first query asks whether the cardholder recalls personally making another “card present” transaction that occurred at a nearby time and place, and the cardholder responds “no,” a new query may be generated asking whether the cardholder recalls personally making the next closest transaction (in terms of time and/or location).

F. Exemplary Document Fraud Detection Rule Set

Referring next toFIG. 4F, an exemplary rule set290(e.g., generated at process stage204ofFIG. 3F) may use various factors relating to an imaged (e.g., photographed or scanned) physical document to determine whether the document should be flagged as a candidate for a more in-depth (e.g., manual) analysis/review for fraud purposes. The rule set290may correspond to a particular embodiment and scenario in which the document is one that includes at least a signature field (e.g., a personal check, a driver's license, etc.).

The factors considered under the rule set290may include a number of counterfeit factors292and a number of forgery factors294, each of which may be evaluated by image analysis unit52ofFIG. 1using one or more image processing techniques. The counterfeit factors292may relate to the look, presentation, format and/or structure of the document, while the forgery factors294may relate to the substance, style or format of information entered in one or more fields of the document.

As seen inFIG. 4F, the counterfeit factors292may include: (1) whether one or more absolute or relative dimensions and/or angles of the document, or of lines, illustrations, patterns, etc. shown on the document (excluding user-entered contents in fields such as the signature line), are outside one or more predetermined tolerances; (2) whether one or more colors on the document are outside a predetermined tolerance (e.g., color/frequency range); (3) whether one or more line thicknesses of the document (excluding user-entered field contents) are outside one or more predetermined tolerances; and/or (4) whether one or more fonts on the document (excluding user-entered field contents) are outside one or more predetermined tolerances. For example, image analysis unit52may determine whether the ratio of the document length to the document width is within 0.1% of an expected value. As another example, image analysis unit52may determine whether horizontal and vertical lines on the document are within 0.3 degrees of the horizontal and vertical edges of the document, respectively. As yet another example, image analysis unit52may determine whether a font used for a field descriptor or other text on the document matches an expected font (e.g., by meeting a similarity threshold measured in any suitable manner). In other embodiments, the counterfeit factors292may include more, fewer and/or different factors than those shown inFIG. 4F.

The forgery factors294may include: (1) whether a signature entered in a signature field of the document match is outside a predetermined tolerance (e.g., using any suitable signature recognition technique); (2) whether handwriting entered in one or more fields of the document is outside a predetermined tolerance (e.g., by applying a suitable handwriting recognition technique); and/or (3) whether the format of information entered by a user in one or more fields does not match an expected format (e.g., using “9.12.16” rather than the expected “9/12/2016,” as established based upon other documents known to have been populated and/or submitted by the purported applicant). In other embodiments, the forgery factors294may include more, fewer and/or different factors than those shown inFIG. 4F.

Generally, the data indicative of whether the circumstances corresponding to counterfeit factors292and/or forgery factors294are present/true for a particular document may be included in the first document image data210described above in connection withFIG. 3F.

As is also seen inFIG. 4F, each of the counterfeit factors292and forgery factors294may be associated with a particular score or weighting value. In the rule set290shown inFIG. 4F, a total score may be calculated based upon which factors are, or are not, present. In some embodiments, certain factors may instead be associated with negative scores, and/or certain factors may be associated with metrics or algorithms that determine how heavily those factors are weighed.

The rule set290may then output the total score, a normalized total score, an indication of whether the total score exceeded a threshold, a probability calculated based upon the total score, and/or some other indicator or measure of the likelihood that the document is fraudulent. Alternatively, the rule set290may output a separate total score, normalized score, probability, or other metric, for each of counterfeit factors292and forgery factors294, with the counterfeit metric indicating the likelihood that the document is a counterfeit and the forgery metric indicating the likelihood that the document was fraudulently populated by someone other than the purported person (e.g., by someone other than the person corresponding to the name, signature, address, etc. on the document). In the example shown inFIG. 4F, it can be seen that larger scores generally correspond to a greater probability that the document is fraudulent. In some embodiments, the rule set290also includes one or more other types of factors not shown inFIG. 4F, and/or omits either counterfeit factors292or forgery factors294.

V. Exemplary Methods for Fraud Detection & Classification

FIGS. 5-7depict flow diagrams of various exemplary computer-implemented methods that may be implemented by one or more components of AFSS12ofFIG. 1. In one embodiment, AFSS12implements all of the methods corresponding toFIGS. 5-7. In other embodiments, AFSS12implements only a subset (e.g., one, two, etc.) of the methods corresponding toFIGS. 5-7. Each of the methods described below may be implemented by fraud detection/classification unit36ofFIG. 1, for example.

A. Exemplary Methods for Facilitating Document-Related Fraud Detection

Referring now toFIG. 5, an exemplary computer-implemented method300may be used to facilitate the detection of document-related fraud, e.g., by winnowing the field of documents needing a more thorough (e.g., manual) review or investigation. In the method300, fraudulent document detection rules may be generated or updated at least by training a machine learning program (block302), such as any of the types of machine learning programs discussed above in connection with ML rule generator40ofFIG. 1or process stage84ofFIG. 2, for example. The machine learning program may be trained using image data corresponding to a plurality of physical documents, and fraud determinations/labels each corresponding to a respective one of those documents.

The physical documents and the fraudulent document detection rules may correspond to a first type of document, which may be a fairly general type (e.g., a personal check or other general type of financial instrument, or a driver's license or other general type of identification document, etc.), or a more specific type (e.g., a personal check associated with a particular bank, or a driver's license from a particular state, etc.).

The rules generated or updated at block302may specify, for example, an acceptable tolerance for an absolute or relative measurement pertaining to a document (e.g., ratio of overall length to width, of various decorative or functional features depicted on the document, etc.). As other examples, the rules may specify an acceptable font or set of fonts, an acceptable pattern or set of patterns, an acceptable color or set (e.g., range) of colors, and so on. As yet another example, the rules may specify one or more acceptable field locations (e.g., placement of a signature line within the document, etc.).

First image data corresponding to an image of a first physical document may be received (block304). The first physical document may be of the same specific or general type as the documents used to train the machine learning program at block302(e.g., a personal check, or a personal check associated with a particular bank, etc.). In some embodiments where fraud, or potential fraud, is detected substantially in real-time, the first image data is received from a point-of-sale computing device associated with a merchant. For example, the merchant may, during or before a transaction, scan or photograph an identification card of a customer, and the point-of-sale computing device (or another computing device of the merchant) may send the image of the identification card to a server implementing the method300.

It may be determined, by applying the fraudulent document detection rules to the first image data, that the first physical document is, or may be (e.g., according to some probability level), fraudulent (block306). For example, the first physical document may be flagged as requiring a more in-depth review of its authenticity. In other scenarios, not represented byFIG. 5, it may instead be determined that the first physical document is not, or likely is not, fraudulent, (e.g., such that it is not necessary to flag the application for further review). In one embodiment, block306may occur substantially in real-time upon receiving the first image data (e.g., from a merchant point-of-sale device).

An indication of whether the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent may be caused to be displayed to one or more people via one or more respective computing device user interfaces (block308). The indication may also specify additional information, such as a reason why the document is suspect (e.g., the document is or may be counterfeit, and/or the contents in one or more fields of the document have been or may have been forged, etc.). The indication may be sent to a point-of-sale computing device of a merchant that provided the first image data, for example, to cause the device to display the indication to the merchant or an employee of the merchant. Alternatively, or in addition, the indication may be provided to a computing device of a card issuer or other entity (e.g., to AFSS12ofFIG. 1) to prompt a full review of the document (e.g., a manual investigation). In one embodiment, block308may occur substantially in real-time upon receiving the first image data. Block308may be implemented by notification unit56ofFIG. 1, for example.

In some embodiments, the method300may include one or more additional blocks not shown inFIG. 5. For example, the method300may include an additional block in which it is determined that the first physical document corresponds to the same type as the documents used to train the machine learning program at block302(e.g., by using image processing to recognize various document features, such as locations and/or types of different fields in the document, etc.). In one embodiment, block306occurs in response to such a determination.

FIG. 6illustrates a computer-implemented method320of identifying fraudulent transactions, or financial instruments or identification cards. The method320may include, via one or more processors and/or transceivers (via wireless communication or data transmission over one or more radio frequency links or wireless communication channels), (1) receiving a digital image of a signed financial instrument or identification card (block322); (2) analyzing the digital image using optical character recognition or other techniques to identify (i) a type of financial instrument or identification card; and (ii) an originating entity of the financial instrument or identification card (block324); (3) determine the expected fields of the financial instrument or identification card based upon the (i) type, and (ii) originating entity, and/or allowable content, or an allowable range of content or characters (letters, numbers, etc.), for the expected field (block326); (4) analyzing the digital image using optical character recognition or other techniques to identify actual fields on the financial instrument or identification card (block328); (5) determining if the expected fields match the actual fields on the financial instrument or identification card to determine if a fraudulent field exists on the financial instrument or identification card (block330); and/or (6) if a fraudulent field exists, then halting the transaction, and/or generating and transmitting an electronic notification detailing that a fraudulent or unexpected field exists (block332).

The method320may also include, (7) if a fraudulent field does not exist, then analyzing the digital image using optical character recognition or other techniques to identify actual characters or content within the actual fields on the financial instrument or identification card (block334); (8) comparing the actual characters or content within the actual fields with the allowable content, or the allowable range of content or characters, for the corresponding expected field to determine if fraudulent characters or content are in an expected field (block336); and/or (9) if fraudulent content in an expected field exists, generating an electronic notification detailing the fraud or a why the financial instrument or identification card is suspicious, and/or transmitting the electronic notification to a computing device of a financial institution at which the financial instrument or identification card is being presented (block338) to facilitate halting a transaction, flagging a financial instrument or identification card for further review, and/or identifying and reducing fraud.

In one embodiment, a computer-implemented method of identifying fraudulent transactions, or financial instruments or identification cards may be provided. The method may include (1) receiving, via one or more processors and/or transceivers, a digital image of a signed financial instrument or identification card from a financial institution or merchant computing terminal, such as via wireless communication or data transmission over one or more radio links or wireless communication channels; (2) analyzing, via the one or more processors, the digital image using optical character recognition or other techniques to identify (i) a type of financial instrument or identification card; and (ii) an originating entity of the financial instrument or identification card; (3) determine, via the one or more processors, the expected fields of the financial instrument or identification card based upon the (i) type, and (ii) originating entity; (4) analyzing, via the one or more processors, the digital image using optical character recognition (OCR) or other techniques to identify actual fields on the financial instrument or identification card; (5) determining, via the one or more processors, if the expected fields match the actual fields on the financial instrument or identification card to determine if a fraudulent field exists on the financial instrument or identification card (for instance, an actual field may not match a size, height, or width of an expected field, or an actual field may be at an angle or slant, as compared to perfectly horizontal); (6) if a fraudulent field does exist, then generating, via the one or more processors, an electronic notification indicating that a fraudulent field exists; and/or (7) transmitting, via the one or more processors and/or transceivers, the electronic notification to the merchant computing terminal to provide notice of the fraudulent field.

The method may further include if a fraudulent field does not exist, then (i) determining or retrieving, allowable content, or an allowable range of content or characters, for the expected fields; (ii) analyzing, via the one or more processors, the digital image using optical character recognition or other techniques to identify actual characters or content within the actual fields on the financial instrument or identification card; (iii) comparing, via the one or more processors, the actual characters or content within an actual field with the allowable content, or the allowable range of content or characters, for the corresponding expected field to determine if fraudulent characters or content are in an expected field (for instance, the font or size of characters, letters, or number be incorrect, such as too large or too small in font size, or color of characters may be incorrect); (iv) if fraudulent content in an expected field exists, generating, via the one or more processors, an electronic notification detailing the fraud or a why the financial instrument or identification card is suspicious; and/or (v) transmitting, via the one or more processors and/or transceivers, the electronic notification to a computing device of a financial institution or merchant at which the financial instrument or identification card is being presented to facilitate halting a transaction, and/or identifying and reducing fraud.

The identification card may be a social security card, and an expected field may be associated with a location of where a social security number is printed, and the allowable content may be 9 numbers that comprise a social security number. The financial instrument may be a personal check, and an expected field may be associated with a location of where a bank routing number is printed, and the allowable content may be a bank routing number. Additionally or alternatively, the financial instrument may be a personal check, and an expected field may be associated with a location of where a checking account is printed, and the allowable content may be a checking account number.

The identification card may be a driver's license, and an expected field may be associated with a location of where a driver license number is printed, and the allowable content may be a driver's license number. Additionally or alternatively, the identification card may be a passport, and expected fields may be associated with a name, date of birth, and expiration date, and the allowable content may include characters or letters for a name field, and numbers for the date of birth and expiration date fields. The identification card may be a social security card, and the allowable content may be a range of possible social security numbers available to an individual based upon a location and date of their birth.

In one embodiment, a computer system configured to identify fraudulent transactions, or financial instruments or identification cards may be provided. The computer system may include one or more processors and/or transceivers configured to: (1) receive, via wireless communication or data transmission over one or more radio links or wireless communication channels, a digital image of a signed financial instrument or identification card from a financial institution or merchant computing terminal; (2) analyze the digital image using optical character recognition or other techniques to identify (i) a type of financial instrument or identification card; and (ii) an originating entity of the financial instrument or identification card; (3) determine the expected fields of the financial instrument or identification card based upon the (i) type, and (ii) originating entity; (4) analyze the digital image using optical character recognition or other techniques to identify actual fields on the financial instrument or identification card; (5) determine if the expected fields match the actual fields on the financial instrument or identification card to determine if a fraudulent field exists on the financial instrument or identification card; (6) if a fraudulent field does exist, then generate an electronic notification indicating that a fraudulent field exists; and/or (7) transmit, via wireless communication or data transmission over one or more radio links or wireless communication channels, the electronic notification to the merchant computing terminal to provide notice of the fraudulent field.

The one or more processors and/or transceivers may be further configured to, if a fraudulent field does not exist, then determine or retrieve allowable content, or an allowable range of content or characters (such as size of font or color, and type of characters, for allowable content), for the expected fields; analyze the digital image using optical character recognition or other techniques to identify actual characters or content within the actual fields on the financial instrument or identification card; compare the actual characters or content within an actual field with the allowable content, or the allowable range of content or characters, for the corresponding expected field to determine if fraudulent characters or content are in an expected field; if fraudulent content in an expected field exists (such as letters in a numeric field, or incorrect font size or color for characters), generate an electronic notification detailing the fraud or a why the financial instrument or identification card is suspicious; and/or transmit, via wireless communication or data transmission over one or more radio links or wireless communication channels, the electronic notification to a computing device of a financial institution or merchant at which the financial instrument or identification card is being presented to facilitate halting a transaction, and/or identifying and reducing fraud.

The identification card may be a passport, and expected fields may be associated with a name, date of birth, and expiration date, and the allowable content may include characters or letters for a name field, and numbers for the date of birth and expiration date fields. The identification card may be a social security card, and the allowable content may be a range of possible social security numbers available to an individual based upon where and when they were born.

FIG. 7illustrates a computer-implemented method340of identifying fraudulent transactions and/or fraudulent signatures on financial instruments or identification cards. The method340may include, via one or more processors and/or transceivers (such as via wireless communication or data transmission over one or more radio frequency links and/or wireless communication channels), (1) receiving a digital image of a signed financial instrument or identification card (block342); (2) analyzing the digital image using optical character recognition or other techniques to identify a name printed in font or set typeface on the financial instrument or identification card (block344); (3) analyzing the digital image using optical character recognition or other techniques to identify a current handwritten signature on the financial instrument or identification card (block346); (4) retrieving a past known or trusted digital signature of person associated with the name printed in font or set typeface on the financial instrument or identification card from a local or remote memory, or a third party database (block348); (5) comparing the current handwritten signature with the past known or trusted digital signature to determine a mismatch, or otherwise inputting the current handwritten signature and/or trusted digital signature into a machine learning program trained to identify fraudulent signatures (block350); (6) if a mismatch is identified, generating an electronic notification detailing the fraud or why the signature is suspicious, and/or transmitting the electronic notification to a computing device of a financial institution at which the financial instrument or identification card is being presented (block352) to facilitate halting a transaction, and/or identifying and reducing fraud.

VI. Exemplary System for Fraud Detection & Classification

FIG. 8depicts an exemplary computer system500in which the techniques described herein may be implemented, according to one embodiment. The computer system500ofFIG. 8may include a computing device in the form of a computer510. Components of the computer510may include, but are not limited to, a processing unit520, a system memory530, and a system bus521that couples various system components including the system memory530to the processing unit520. The system bus521may be any of several types of bus structures including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, or a local bus, and may use any suitable bus architecture. By way of example, and not limitation, such architectures include the Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, Micro Channel Architecture (MCA) bus, Enhanced ISA (EISA) bus, Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) local bus, and Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus (also known as Mezzanine bus).

Computer510may include a variety of computer-readable media. Computer-readable media may be any available media that can be accessed by computer510and may include both volatile and nonvolatile media, and both removable and non-removable media. By way of example, and not limitation, computer-readable media may comprise computer storage media and communication media. Computer storage media may include volatile and nonvolatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storage of information such as computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data. Computer storage media may include, but is not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, FLASH memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical disk storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium which can be used to store the desired information and which can accessed by computer510.

The system memory530may include computer storage media in the form of volatile and/or nonvolatile memory such as read only memory (ROM)531and random access memory (RAM)532. A basic input/output system533(BIOS), containing the basic routines that help to transfer information between elements within computer510, such as during start-up, is typically stored in ROM531. RAM532typically contains data and/or program modules that are immediately accessible to, and/or presently being operated on, by processing unit520. By way of example, and not limitation,FIG. 8illustrates operating system534, application programs535, other program modules536, and program data537.

The computer510may also include other removable/non-removable, volatile/nonvolatile computer storage media. By way of example only,FIG. 8illustrates a hard disk drive541that reads from or writes to non-removable, nonvolatile magnetic media, a magnetic disk drive551that reads from or writes to a removable, nonvolatile magnetic disk552, and an optical disk drive555that reads from or writes to a removable, nonvolatile optical disk556such as a CD ROM or other optical media. Other removable/non-removable, volatile/nonvolatile computer storage media that can be used in the exemplary operating environment include, but are not limited to, magnetic tape cassettes, flash memory cards, digital versatile disks, digital video tape, solid state RAM, solid state ROM, and the like. The hard disk drive541may be connected to the system bus521through a non-removable memory interface such as interface540, and magnetic disk drive551and optical disk drive555may be connected to the system bus521by a removable memory interface, such as interface550.

The drives and their associated computer storage media discussed above and illustrated inFIG. 8provide storage of computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules and other data for the computer510. InFIG. 8, for example, hard disk drive541is illustrated as storing operating system544, application programs545, other program modules546, and program data547. Note that these components can either be the same as or different from operating system534, application programs535, other program modules536, and program data537. Operating system544, application programs545, other program modules546, and program data547are given different numbers here to illustrate that, at a minimum, they are different copies. A user may enter commands and information into the computer510through input devices such as cursor control device561(e.g., a mouse, trackball, touch pad, etc.) and keyboard562. A monitor591or other type of display device is also connected to the system bus521via an interface, such as a video interface590. In addition to the monitor, computers may also include other peripheral output devices such as printer596, which may be connected through an output peripheral interface595.

The computer510may operate in a networked environment using logical connections to one or more remote computers, such as a remote computer580. The remote computer580may be a personal computer, a server, a router, a network PC, a peer device or other common network node, and may include many or all of the elements described above relative to the computer510, although only a memory storage device581has been illustrated inFIG. 8. The logical connections depicted inFIG. 8include a local area network (LAN)571and a wide area network (WAN)573, but may also include other networks. Such networking environments are commonplace in hospitals, offices, enterprise-wide computer networks, intranets and the Internet.

When used in a LAN networking environment, the computer510is connected to the LAN571through a network interface or adapter570. When used in a WAN networking environment, the computer510may include a modem572or other means for establishing communications over the WAN573, such as the Internet. The modem572, which may be internal or external, may be connected to the system bus521via the input interface560, or other appropriate mechanism. The communications connections570,572, which allow the device to communicate with other devices, are an example of communication media, as discussed above. In a networked environment, program modules depicted relative to the computer510, or portions thereof, may be stored in the remote memory storage device581. By way of example, and not limitation,FIG. 8illustrates remote application programs585as residing on memory device581.

The techniques for detecting and/or classifying fraud described above may be implemented in part or in their entirety within a computer system such as the computer system500illustrated inFIG. 8. The computer510may be included in AFSS12ofFIG. 1, for example, and/or the remote application programs585may include one or more applications of either FAMS14, one of cardholder computing device20, one of merchant computing systems22, or a computing device of other sources24. Moreover, the functionality of fraud detection/classification unit36ofFIG. 1may be implemented by one or more of application programs535and/or other program modules536. As another example, ML rules database58, account holder behaviors database60and/or chargeback rules database62ofFIG. 1may be stored in hard disk drive541(e.g., as program data547), magnetic disk552and/or optical disk drive555, and/or the data retrieved by fraud detection/classification unit36ofFIG. 1may be stored in hard disk drive541(e.g., as program data547) and/or RAM532(e.g., as program data537).

In another aspect, a computer-implemented method, implemented in one or more servers or other computing devices, of facilitating detection of document-related fraud may include (1) generating or updating, by one or more processors of the one or more servers, fraudulent document detection rules at least by training a machine learning program using at least (i) image data corresponding to a plurality of physical documents, and (ii) fraud determinations each corresponding to a respective one of the plurality of physical documents, wherein the plurality of physical documents and the fraudulent document detection rules may correspond to a first type of document; (2) receiving, by the one or more processors, first image data corresponding to an image of a first physical document, wherein the first physical document may correspond to the first type of document; (3) determining, by the one or more processors applying the fraudulent document detection rules to the first image data, that the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent; and/or (4) causing, by the one or more processors, an indication of whether the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent to be displayed to one or more people via one or more respective computing device user interfaces. The method may include additional, fewer or alternative actions, such as any of those discussed elsewhere herein.

For instance, the method may further include determining, by the one or more processors, that the first physical document corresponds to the first type of document, and/or the one or more processors may apply the fraudulent document detection rules to the first physical document in response to determining that the first physical document corresponds to the first type of document.

Additionally or alternatively, generating fraudulent document detection rules may include determining an acceptable tolerance for an absolute or relative measurement. Additionally or alternatively, generating fraudulent document detection rules may include determining (i) an acceptable font or set of fonts, (ii) an acceptable pattern or set of patterns, and/or (iii) an acceptable color or set of colors.

Additionally or alternatively, generating fraudulent document detection rules may include determining an acceptable field location. Additionally or alternatively, the first type of document may be a financial instrument or an identification card.

Additionally or alternatively, both (i) determining that the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent, and (ii) causing the indication of whether the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent to be displayed, may occur substantially in real-time upon receiving the first image data. Additionally or alternatively, causing the indication of whether the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent to be displayed may include causing a point-of-sale computing device associated with a merchant to display the indication.

VIII. Exemplary System Embodiments

In another aspect, a computer system for facilitating detection of document-related fraud may include (1) a rules database configured to store fraudulent document detection rules; (2) one or more processors; and/or (3) a non-transitory memory. The non-transitory memory stores instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, may cause the one or more processors to (1) generate or update the fraudulent document detection rules at least by training a machine learning program using at least (i) image data corresponding to a plurality of physical documents, and (ii) fraud determinations each corresponding to a respective one of the plurality of physical documents, wherein the plurality of physical documents and the fraudulent document detection rules may correspond to a first type of document; (2) receive first image data corresponding to an image of a first physical document, wherein the first physical document may correspond to the first type of document; (3) determine, by applying the fraudulent document detection rules stored in the rules database to the first image data, that the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent; and/or (4) cause an indication of whether the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent to be displayed to one or more people via one or more respective computing device user interfaces. The system may include additional, fewer or alternative components, features and/or functionality, such as any of those discussed elsewhere herein.

For instance, the instructions may further cause the one or more processors to determine that the first physical document corresponds to the first type of document, and/or the instructions may cause the one or more processors to apply the fraudulent document detection rules to the first physical document in response to determining that the first physical document corresponds to the first type of document. Additionally or alternatively, the fraudulent document detection rules may specify an acceptable tolerance for an absolute or relative measurement. Additionally or alternatively, the fraudulent document detection rules may specify (i) an acceptable font or set of fonts, (ii) an acceptable pattern or set of patterns, and/or (iii) an acceptable color or set of colors. Additionally or alternatively, the fraudulent document detection rules may specify an acceptable field location.

Additionally or alternatively, the first type of document may be a financial instrument or an identification card. Additionally or alternatively, the instructions may cause the one or more processors to both (i) determine that the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent, and (ii) cause the indication of whether the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent to be displayed, substantially in real-time upon receiving the first image data.

In another aspect, a non-transitory, computer-readable medium stores instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, may cause the one or more processors to (1) generate or update fraudulent document detection rules at least by training a machine learning program using at least (i) image data corresponding to a plurality of physical documents, and (ii) fraud determinations each corresponding to a respective one of the plurality of physical documents, wherein the plurality of physical documents and the fraudulent document detection rules may correspond to a first type of document; (2) receive first image data corresponding to an image of a first physical document, the first physical document corresponding to the first type of document; (3) determine, by applying the fraudulent document detection rules to the first physical document, that the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent; and/or (4) cause an indication of whether the first physical document is, or may be, fraudulent to be displayed to one or more people via one or more respective computing device user interfaces. The computer-readable medium may store instructions that include additional, fewer or alternative actions, such as any of those discussed elsewhere herein.

For instance, the instructions may further cause the one or more processors to determine that the first physical document corresponds to the first type of document, and/or the instructions cause the one or more processors to apply the fraudulent document detection rules to the first physical document in response to determining that the first physical document corresponds to the first type of document. Additionally or alternatively, the fraudulent document detection rules may specify an acceptable tolerance for an absolute or relative measurement. Additionally or alternatively, the fraudulent document detection rules may specify (i) an acceptable font or set of fonts, (ii) an acceptable pattern or set of patterns, and/or (iii) an acceptable color or set of colors. Additionally or alternatively, the fraudulent document detection rules may specify an acceptable field location.

X. Additional Considerations

The following additional considerations apply to the foregoing discussion. Throughout this specification, plural instances may implement operations or structures described as a single instance. Although individual operations of one or more methods are illustrated and described as separate operations, one or more of the individual operations may be performed concurrently, and nothing requires that the operations be performed in the order illustrated. These and other variations, modifications, additions, and improvements fall within the scope of the subject matter herein.