Secure connector with integrated tamper sensors

A secure connector is provided. The secure connector comprises a casing; a tamper sensor disposed inside the casing and configured to detect unauthorized tamper events; and one or more conductors configured to carry signals, the one or more conductors passing through the tamper sensor.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is related to co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/565,376, filed on Nov. 30, 2006 and Published on Jun. 5, 2008 as U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2008/0129501, entitled “SECURE CHASSIS WITH INTEGRATED TAMPER DETECTION SENSOR,” hereby incorporated herein by reference, and referred to herein as the “'12756 Application”.

This application is related to co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/565,361, filed on Nov. 30, 2006 and Published on Jun. 5, 2008 as U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2008/0134349, entitled “CARD SLOT ANTI-TAMPER PROTECTION,” hereby incorporated herein by reference, and referred to herein as the “'13121 Application”.

BACKGROUND

Electronics systems and products containing proprietary information are subject to the risk of unauthorized examination at all levels of assembly including a closed chassis. A broad range of reverse engineering methods can be applied to obtaining unauthorized access to the confidential internal workings, data, etc. inside such a chassis. Such methods include removing access panels, drilling, or other means of gaining access to the proprietary information residing inside the chassis.

Protective methods and apparatus are used to delay the success of such reverse engineering attempts. However, given the necessary resources and time, these methods can be defeated. A known, successful reverse engineering attack renders the protective method or apparatus vulnerable to future attacks, and thereby ends the usefulness. New methods and apparatus are, therefore, needed to detect and/or thwart reverse engineering attacks on systems with proprietary property.

SUMMARY

The present invention described in the following specification provides a protective apparatus that addresses the need for improved anti-tamper protection in chassis-level systems.

In one embodiment, a secure connector is provided. The secure connector comprises a casing; a tamper sensor disposed inside the casing and configured to detect unauthorized tamper events; and one or more conductors configured to carry signals, the one or more conductors passing through the tamper sensor.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Embodiments of the present invention provide secure connectors configured to detect unauthorized tamper events. Conventional connectors often provide a way for reverse engineers to gain access to a chassis that is otherwise protected. Embodiments of the present invention, however, detect attempts to gain access through a secure connector. Secure connectors according to embodiments of the present invention are configured to fit the footprint of conventional connectors which enables a low cost method of increasing protection of a system without replacing the entire system.

FIGS. 1A and 1Bdepict a secure connector100according to one embodiment of the present invention. Secure connector100includes a housing102, a tamper sensor104, and a plurality of conductors106configured to conduct signals. In the embodiment shown inFIG. 1, conductors106comprise pins configured to carry electrical signals. However, it is to be understood that in other embodiments, conductors106can be configured to conduct optical signals. In addition, the term “pin” as used herein refers to any electrically conductive terminal.

In this example, casing102comprises a plurality of sides108which are configured to form an enclosure110. As shown inFIG. 1B, tamper sensor104is disposed within enclosure110such that an unauthorized tamper event is detected by tamper sensor104. In this way, tamper sensor104provides a detection barrier substantially throughout enclosure110of connector100. Notably, although a plurality of conductors106are shown inFIG. 1, it is to be understood that in other embodiments, one conductor can be used.

Tamper sensor104is configured to detect unauthorized tamper events. Unauthorized tamper events include, but are not limited to, removing access panels, drilling, or other means of gaining access to sensitive equipment or electronic components. For example, in some embodiments, tamper sensor104is a fiber optic matrix which is configured to detect interference with the light traveling through the fiber optic matrix. In such embodiments, drilling through the fiber optic matrix, for example, will disrupt the light in the fiber optic matrix. The disruption will trigger a detected tamper event. In other embodiments, tamper sensor104is an electrical sensor configured to detect changes in electrical properties, e.g. resistance, due to unauthorized tamper events such as excessive pressure on tamper sensor104. It is to be understood that tamper sensor104can be implemented as any appropriate type of sensor configured to detect unauthorized tamper events.

As shown inFIG. 1B, conductors106pass through tamper sensor104. As stated above, conductors106, in this example, comprise pins configured to carry electrical signals (including power in some embodiments). Conductors106, therefore, electrically couple two devices together in this example, as known to one of skill in the art. Notably, although conductors106are shown as round (cylindrical) in this example, other embodiments of the present invention are not so limited. In particular, it is to be understood that any appropriate pin configuration and shape can be used in various embodiments of the present invention. For example, pins106can be flat or replaced with female socket contacts, etc., in other embodiments. Similarly, it is to be understood that any appropriate connector configuration can be used. For example, connector100can be implemented as, but not limited to, a modular connector (e.g. 8P8C, 6P6C, etc.), universal serial bus (USB) connector, D-subminiature connector, DIN connector, optical connector configurations, Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) connectors, etc.

Passing through tamper sensor104enables conductors106to couple two devices together as in conventional connectors. However, connector100, although appearing to be a conventional connector in some embodiments, includes tamper sensor104which detects tamper events including attempts to tamper with conductors106. For example, as shown inFIG. 1B, conductors106are bent inside tamper sensor104. An attempt to remove one of conductors106, such as by drilling or pulling out the conductor, will be detected by tamper sensor104due to the bend in conductors106. In addition, casing102is configured, in some embodiments, to crack or break under excessive pressure applied to conductors106, thereby causing the tamper event to be detected by tamper sensor104.

In operation, conductors106carry electrical signals (or optical signals in other embodiments) as in conventional connectors. However, when an attempt is made to gain unauthorized access to sensitive components or data by tampering with connector100, tamper sensor104detects the unauthorized tamper event and signals its detection to a monitoring device (shown inFIG. 2) that is coupled to tamper sensor104. The monitoring device then takes protective measures. For example, the monitoring device can erase data, encrypt data, physically destroy components, etc. The protective response initiated by the monitoring device can vary and depends on the data or components being protected and the system in which connector100is used.

As described above, connector100can be implemented with any appropriate connector configuration. As can be seen inFIG. 1A, connector100appears to be a conventional non-secure connector (e.g. a conventional USB connector, modular connector, etc. without a tamper sensor). In fact, casing102of connector100is configured to fit the footprint of a similar conventional connector. Connector100can be used, therefore, to replace non-secure conventional connectors without requiring additional adaptations to systems currently using the non-secure connectors.

Due to the conventional appearance, a reverse engineer is unlikely to be aware of tamper sensor104located on the inside of connector100. Hence, the conventional appearance of embodiments of the present invention is an added benefit because reverse engineers are also less likely to attempt to circumvent tamper sensor104which increases the probability that tamper sensor104will detect an unauthorized tamper event.

FIG. 2is an elevated perspective view depicting secure connectors200used in a chassis212according to one embodiment of the present invention. As can be seen inFIG. 2, connectors200appear to be conventional connectors as discussed above. However, each of connectors200includes a tamper sensor (e.g. tamper sensor104) inside an enclosure formed by the sides of connectors200, as described above. Connectors200couple one or more devices located inside chassis212to one or more devices located outside chassis212. For example, connector200-1is coupled to device214inside chassis212via cable216. A device coupled to connector200-1outside chassis212is, therefore, coupled to device214by connector200-1. Connector200-1is also coupled to monitoring device218. In particular, the tamper sensor in connector200-1is coupled to monitoring device218.

It is to be understood that although connector200-1is coupled to device214in this example, other embodiments of the present invention are not so limited. In particular, connector200-1can be connected to monitoring device218only. Similarly monitoring device218can be coupled to device214using any appropriate technique known to one of skill in the art. In addition, in some embodiments, connectors200-1and200-2are each configured with a connection point (shown inFIG. 3) which is configured to coupled connectors200-1and200-2together. For example, in this embodiment, a wire runs through a wall of chassis212and connects to the connection point of each of connectors200-1and200-2. Alternatively, a wire can be run along an inside surface of chassis212to couple connectors200-1and200-2together.

If the tamper sensor detects an unauthorized tamper event, it signals the detection of the tamper event to monitoring device218. Monitoring device218is configured to initiate protective measures in response to a detected tamper event. For example, in some embodiments, monitoring device218erases or encrypts data on device214. In other embodiments, monitoring device218physically destroys device214. As described above, the protective measures initiated depend on the device to be protected and the application in which connectors200are being used.

FIG. 3is a cross-sectional side view depicting a secure connector300coupled to a secure chassis312according to another embodiment of the present invention. A description of a secure chassis is provided in co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/565,376, filed on Nov. 30, 2006 and incorporated herein by reference. Connector300is configured with connection point320which couples tamper sensor304to a tamper sensor in a second component. In this example, the second component is secure chassis312having tamper sensor322. In such embodiments, continuity is provided between tamper sensors322and304. For example, connection point320can include, but is not limited to, a mechanical optocoupler or a fusion of the termini of two optical fibers extending from tamper sensors304and322. This continuity increases the security provided by connector300and chassis312by eliminating a potential gap in detection which could be exploited by a reverse engineer. In other embodiments, the second component can be a second secure connector or other secure device.

It is to be understood that connector300can be used with any type of chassis and is not required to be used with secure chassis312. In particular, connector300can be used in a non-secure chassis to provide increased protection by simply replacing non-secure connectors in the non-secure chassis. For some systems, it is cost prohibitive to replace the chassis. However, by replacing the non-secure connectors with secure connector300, security of the system is still increased at a lower cost.