Autonomous and federated sensory subsystems and networks for security systems

Security systems may include sensing, networked communications, stealth, alarms, and countermeasures, any or all of which may adapt to threats. These systems may also include armor and barriers of concrete and/or steel. They can adapt to severity of threats, weather, and/or other situational aspects. They can anticipate at least some threats in order to obtain early warning and react more quickly to those threats. They can adapt by altering their configurations, including alterations in communication networking structures and methods, and changes in data-storage and processing duties at processing nodes. Defensive and/or offensive countermeasures can be employed to deter, confuse, trap, and/or disable terrorists. The systems are capable of self-maintenance, self-healing, and self-restoration as threats subside. The systems can include subsystems capable of autonomous operation. At least some of the systems and/or their subsystems are capable of allocating power among subsystems, and of regulating bandwidth utilizations.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This Non-provisional patent application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional application No. 61/325,157, filed Apr. 16, 2010, hereby incorporated by reference. This application also relates to co-pending and co-owned Non-provisional patent applications simultaneously-filed on Sep. 8, 2010 along with the present application and titled “Security Systems Having Communication Paths in Tunnels of Barrier Modules and Armored Building Modules”, having application Ser. No. 12/877,670; “Security Systems with Adaptive Subsystems Networked through Barrier Modules and Armored Building Modules”, having application Ser. No. 12/877,728; “Diversity Networks and Methods for Secure Communications”, having application Ser. No. 12/877,754; and “Global Positioning Systems and Methods for Asset and Infrastructure Protection”, having application Ser. No. 12/877,816; the disclosures of which are hereby incorporated by reference in their entireties.

Not Applicable

THE NAMES OF THE PARTIES TO A JOINT RESEARCH AGREEMENT

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BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention

The invention relates to security systems for protecting facilities, personnel, and communications in a defined area from military or terrorist threats such as hostile forces, fire arms, mortars, explosives, and/or attack vehicles.

2. Description of the Related Art

Security zones for protecting groups of people and facilities be they private, public, diplomatic, military, or other, can be dangerous environments for people and property if threatened by military acts or acts of terrorism. The prior arts in security systems and armored protection provide some solutions but fall far short of being synergistically integrated.

In the prior art, automated security systems sense disturbances to an ambient condition and cause alarms to be activated, but these systems fall short of being able to identify many cause(s) of a disturbance. U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2006/0031934 by Kevin Kriegel titled “Monitoring System”, incorporated herein by reference in its entirety, discloses a system that monitors and controls devices that may sense and report a location's physical characteristics through a distributed network. Based on sensed characteristics, the system may determine and/or change a security level at a location. The system may include a sensor, an access device, and a data center. The sensor detects or measures a condition at a location. The access device communicates with the sensor and the data center. The data center communicates with devices in the system, manages data received from the access device, and may transmit data to the access device.

Rows of concrete barrier blocks (i.e. rows of concrete barrier modules) that can slide across the ground can stop and destroy terrorist vehicles that collide with them, and can protect against blast waves and blast debris, but they offer no earlier warning signals of threats. U.S. Pat. No. 7,144,186 to Roger Allen Nolte titled “Massive Security Barrier”, U.S. Pat. No. 7,144,187 to Roger Allen Nolte and Barclay J. Tullis titled “Cabled Massive Security Barrier”, and U.S. Pat. No. 7,654,768 to Barclay J. Tullis, Roger Allen Nolte, and Charles Merrill titled “Massive Security Barriers Having Tie-Bars in Tunnels”, all incorporated herein by reference in their entireties, disclose barrier modules and barriers constructed of barrier modules. U.S. Pat. No. 7,144,186 discloses barrier modules, each with at least one rectangular tie-bar of steel cast permanently within concrete or other solid material and extending longitudinally between opposite sides of the barrier module, wherein adjacent barrier modules are coupled side-against-side by means of strong coupling devices between adjacent tie-bars, and wherein no ground penetrating anchoring means is involved. But since the tie-bars are cast within the barrier modules, they cannot be changed out or upgraded without removing and replacing the solid material as well. However, U.S. Pat. No. 7,144,187 discloses barrier modules of solid material with tunnels extending between opposite sides, wherein adjacent barrier modules are coupled side-against-side with cables passing through the tunnels and anchored to sides of at least some of the barrier modules by anchoring devices. And U.S. Pat. No. 7,654,768 discloses barrier modules that have tie-bars in tunnels that extend longitudinally between opposite sides of a barrier module.

Armored steel guard houses and other armored structures for buildings provide some protections to their occupants, but also do not integrate conveniently with communication infrastructure needed to support an electronic security system. However, U.S. Pat. No. 7,661,228 to Roger Allen Nolte and Donald L. Selke titled “Armored building modules and panels”, incorporated herein by reference in its entirety, discloses armored building elements that not only have open channels running throughout their length, but also create an open channel between any two that are abutted side-by-side to one-another, and it is these channels that afford much of the structures resistance to mortar and ballistic weaponry.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention exploits properties of the inventions disclosed in the above-mentioned four patents and one patent application publication in ways not previously discovered to advance convergence of physical and cyber security. Given the present disclosure, it can be realized that what was needed and what is provided by the inventions disclosed by the present disclosure are security systems that synergistically integrate and exploit these prior arts to realize the following:a) use of tunnels to protect communications and power lines within security barriers that comprise strongly interconnected barrier modules that don't penetrate the ground and that will slide over the ground rather than break loose and become disconnected from one-another when challenged by a terrorist vehicle or explosive blast,b) use of these same barriers modules to house sensors and equipment,c) use of channels within armored steel building modules to protect communications lines and to house sensors and equipment,d) use of meaningful information derived from combinations of these and other sensors,e) use of redundant and dynamically alterable communications networks of various forms and types,f) use of countermeasures,g) use of power and bandwidth conservation techniques,h) use of electronic subsystems capable of autonomous operation,i) use of stealth, andj) use of system-level management including tie-ins to Tactical Operations Centers and Network Operations Centers.

The inventions are pointed out with particularity in the appended claims. However, some aspects of the invention are summarized herein.

The inventions include security systems that can include sensing, networked communications, alarms, countermeasures, and stealth, any or all of which may adapt to threats. These systems may also include and be physically and synergistically integrated with barrier modules, with armored building modules, and with other security structures of concrete, steel, or more exotic materials. They can adapt to severity of threats, weather, and/or other situational aspects. They can anticipate at least some threats in order to obtain early warning and react more quickly to those threats. They can adapt by altering their configurations, including alterations in communication networking structures and methods, and changes in data-storage and processing duties within subsystems and processing nodes. Defensive and/or offensive countermeasures can be part of such security systems and be employed to deter, confuse, trap, and/or disable terrorists. Countermeasures may include defensive or offensive weapons as well as emitters of other disturbances (i.e. disturbance emitters) such as loud noises or bright flashes of light. Examples of non-lethal weapons include water canons, emitters of loud sounds or shock waves, microwave emitters that inflict discomfort, automated guns that shoot stunning pellets, emitters of noxious gases, emitters of bright light, and more. Examples of lethal weapons include automatic guns with real ammunition, canons, blinding laser emitters, destructive shock-wave emitters, high-voltage surfaces, high-voltage projected barbs, missiles, deployable tanks, vehicle rams, and more. The systems and/or their subsystems can be capable of self-maintenance, self-healing, and self-restoration as threats subside. The systems can include subsystems that are capable of autonomous operation and/or capable of operating as cooperating members in a federation of subsystems that are in communication with one-another. Such autonomous and/or federated subsystems are able to operate without communication with a main monitor and control subsystem when desirable for reason of stealth or in response to being cut-off from the main monitor and control center (at least until reconnected to a monitor and control subsystem). At least some of the systems and/or their subsystems are capable of allocating and/or conserving power among subsystems, and of regulating and/or reducing bandwidth utilizations, both particularly in response to a terrorist threat or other constraint placed on the system.

Other aspects of the invention as demonstrated in the disclosed example embodiments include the following. Security barriers with tunnels and cavities can be used to a) protect and route communication and power cables, b) house and protect sensors and other equipment including power sources and transceivers, and c) enhance an electronic security system by extending coverage to the security barrier and its surrounding environment. Armored building modules can be used to provide these same advantages, but in addition can be used to a) protect cables along the outside surfaces of security barriers and/or barrier modules and b) hide and protect cables beneath the ground. Security sensors can be used that a) adjust their own detection thresholds after requesting authority to do so, b) seek corroboration of threshold-crossing events by analyzing data and/or information from other sensors for correlations, c) purposefully induce changes to a sensor's environment by controlling use of countermeasures or other disturbance emitters, d) use one or more deduction and inference engines, e) work in groups to derive additional sensory information, and f) derive information from combinations of sensor signals. Secure sensors can use a) sensor ID's, b) encryption of data, c) scheduled or un-scheduled times for communication, and d) diversity communications. Security systems can a) use and exploit communication diversities, b) use overlapping networks, c) transform themselves in defense and offense, and d) exploit barrier modules and armored building modules (and security barriers and paneling modules in general) and even use them as continuity sensors. Security systems can include a) autonomous subsystems, b) autonomous subsystems that can federate into a mutually supporting and synergistic group, and c) federated methods of deception, stealth, robustness, and power and bandwidth conservation. Security Systems can take countermeasures (lethal and/or non-lethal). Security systems can use conservation means to conserve power and/or bandwidth. Security systems can geo-track sensors and other assets (other personnel or equipment).

OBJECTS AND ADVANTAGES OF THE INVENTION

Objects and advantages of the present invention include security systems that significantly out-perform those of the prior art by synergistically integrating electronic security systems with physical security systems, and/or by synergistically adding: collective analyses of signals from multiple and/or dissimilar sensors; dynamic adaptations in sensor utilizations; and dynamic adaptations in communication structures and methods, countermeasures, and stealth. The objects and advantages are also to achieve security systems that are armored and pro-active in the use of response tactics and in the use of sensors and artificial intelligence to improve responses to conditions indicative of potential threats.

Further advantages of the present invention will become apparent to ones skilled in the art upon examination of the accompanying drawings and the following detailed description. It is intended that any additional advantages be incorporated herein.

The various features of the present invention and its preferred embodiments and implementations may also be better understood by referring to the accompanying drawings and the following detailed description. The contents of the following description and of the drawings are set forth as examples only and should not be understood to represent limitations upon the scope of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

The following is a detailed description of the invention and its preferred embodiments as illustrated in the drawings. While the invention will be described in connection with these drawings, there is no intent to limit it to the embodiment or embodiments disclosed. On the contrary, the intent is to cover all alternatives, modifications and equivalents included within the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.

FIG. 1shows a perspective view of a security site101protected by an armored security system11. The location of a centralized monitoring and control subsystem103is in a secure region105separated physically from an unsecure region107by a security barrier109(which may or may not be at least partly camouflaged or decorated with images to fool a viewer) shown here as a row or series of barrier modules. Within this disclosure and claims, the terms “barrier module” and “barrier block” are defined to mean one of those patented by the following patents: a) U.S. Pat. No. 7,144,186 to Roger Allen Nolte titled “Massive Security Barrier”, b) U.S. Pat. No. 7,144,187 to Roger Allen Nolte and Barclay J. Tullis titled “Cabled Massive Security Barrier”, and c) U.S. Pat. No. 7,654,768 to Barclay J. Tullis, Roger Allen Nolte, and Charles Merrill titled “Massive Security Barriers Having Tie-Bars in Tunnels”, all incorporated herein by reference in their entireties. Also within this disclosure and claims, the terms “security barrier” and “blocks” (i.e. without the modifier “barrier” immediately preceding them) are used more generally to mean a barrier that provides security, however when a security barrier comprises barrier modules (also called barrier blocks), then at least some of the adjacent barrier modules within such a security barrier will be defined to be coupled together (i.e. interconnected) according to at least one of the aforementioned three patented inventions. An access roadway111runs through an access gateway113providing access between the two areas105,107. A guard house115stands porter at the access gateway113. A first gateway extension barrier module117and a second gateway extension barrier module119together provide additional length to the access gateway113along the access roadway111. A first gateway-opening barrier module121and a second gateway-opening barrier module123border the opening in the security barrier109. One or more additional parts of the current invention can be hidden beneath the roadway111at a location illustrated as a rectangle just outside the access gateway113.

FIG. 1also shows a barrier module with camera125. On the side of this barrier module125that faces the unsecure region107are shown a first access hole131and a second access hole133in the barrier module125. These access holes131,133(which may be of any shape and not just circular as shown) run into the barrier module125to at least one cavity within the barrier module125and can be used as an airway to that cavity as well as a path along which to extend a sensor probe, such as a small camera, outside the barrier module125. Such a camera can hide within the barrier module125and be automatically extended and manipulated to look outward from the barrier module125or back and forth along the length of the security barrier109, as when searching for a person attempting to hide along the security barrier109. Another camera is shown as pop-out camera135, shown sticking out of a camera portal137on the non-secure side of the barrier modules125. Such access holes131,133(and camera portals137with pop-out cameras135) may also be located on the secure side and/or the top of the barrier module125to achieve other views outside the barrier module125. In some embodiments of the invention, image sensors such as the pop-out camera135can be controlled from a sensor subsystem within the barrier to pop out and capture still images and/or video of environment surrounding the security barrier109. If such cameras are made to briefly pop out and back into the barrier again at unpredictable times, it would be difficult for a terrorist to anticipate their presence and defeat them. Furthermore given the significant quantity of barrier modules used in a security barrier109, it would be difficult to defeat all of them at once. On a side of the barrier module119that faces the secure region105are shown at least a cavity149within the barrier module119and a door151to a sensor or device within the barrier module119. A surveillance camera153is shown supported by an extendable arm155. On top of the camera153is shown a door panel157that covers a camera cavity159within the barrier module125when the camera153is refracted into the barrier module125.

FIG. 1also shows a barrier module with a gun161, where the gun163is mounted on an extendable gun mount165that is normally housed within a gun cavity167in the barrier module161. A door169to the gun cavity167is also shown.

FIG. 1also shows a door171on top of barrier module123, where the door171can be to a sensor or device housed within the barrier module123. Alongside the door171is shown a solar panel173that can collect power that can be used in charging batteries within the barrier modules for powering communications subsystems, sensors, cameras, guns, and other barrier accessories normally housed within one or more barrier modules.

FIG. 1also shows a securing cable183across the access gateway113. The securing cable183is anchored at both the first and second gateway-opening barrier modules121,123, and it is show hidden within a slot181within the access roadway111. By way of a take-up mechanism within at least one of the gateway-opening barrier modules121,123, this securing cable183can be lifted out of the slot181and pulled tightly across the access gateway113as a countermeasure for physically blocking the access gateway113when needed to deter or stop entry of a threatening vehicle.

FIG. 1also shows underground sensor devices201placed outside the security barrier109in numerous locations within the unsecure region107. These sensor devices201may be ground vibration sensors or weight sensors such as to sense a person walking or a vehicle traveling nearby, gas sensors, proximity sensors, or any other type of sensor that could give early warning to a monitoring and control subsystem of the presence or activity of a potential terrorist or of other threatening disturbances in the environment outside the secure region105.

FIG. 1also shows a first sensor211hidden in a plant or disguised as a plant. In the foreground of the view, and in the unsecure region107, is shown a sensing device213or subsystem that may be real, a decoy, a device that provides misinformation, or a countermeasure device. An RFID (radio-frequency identification device)219is shown on the sensing system213. Such RFID devices can be attached to any or all of the objects comprised by the security system11. And a person223is shown wearing a GPS (global positioning device)221. Such GPS devices could also be made part of any or all of the objects and/or subsystems comprised by the security system11, and alarms conditions could be set by movement of any of them outside their respective predefined boundaries. Also shown is the surface of the ground215. A friendly person known not to be a terrorist can be given a GPS by which he/she could be tracked, and by which the sensor and higher-level subsystems of the security system11could be made to assure that person's presence and activities don't set off any alarms. In the distance, and in the secure region105, is shown another sensor217hidden in a tree (or disguised as a tree).

FIG. 1also shows an antenna301at the location of a centralized monitoring and control subsystem103. The centralized monitoring and control subsystem103is shown here as located within a building. Not shown, and maybe located at the same location as the centralized monitoring and control subsystem103, would be a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and perhaps also a Network Operations Center (NOC) both of which would be in communication with the armored security system11. Another antenna303is shown on the guard house115. Another antenna305is shown on a barrier module. Another antenna307is shown on the real or decoy sensing (or other) device213. Signals309via a wireless medium are depicted being transmitted or received from the antenna301at the centralized monitoring and control subsystem103.

FIG. 1also shows the roof401of the guard house where the antenna303is mounted. The walls403and the roof401of the guard house may be constructed of armored steel building modules having side-lap overhangs. Within this disclosure and claims, the terms “armored building module” and “building module” are defined to mean one of those patented by U.S. Pat. No. 7,661,228 to Roger Allen Nolte and Donald L. Selke titled “Armored building modules and panels”, incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. A first window405is shown on the guard house along with a second window407. Within the second window407is shown an opaque armor filling the window but having a peep hole409. This window armor with the peep hole409can be taken away or replaced automatically in response to perceived threats.

FIG. 1also shows an airplane501in flight which may provide additional sensory and observational inputs along with the other sensors mentioned above, as well as countermeasure options, to the armored security system11. A horizon503is also shown.

All of the objects shown inFIG. 1, with the possible exception of perhaps the horizon503and the ground215, are comprised by at least some of the embodiments of the invention.

FIG. 2shows a longitudinal cross-section of the barrier module125(also called a barrier block) having a barrier tunnel603through the barrier module125, wherein the barrier tunnel603is used to house and protect a communication medium601(e.g. a communications cable). The cross-section taken is that indicated by the arrows numbered2inFIG. 1on the barrier module125with the camera125. The communications medium601is shown here as a cable which may or may not have an armored outer jacket such as made of braided metal or ceramic fibers perhaps bound with a non-metallic resin, epoxy, or other glue. This communications cable601continues beyond this barrier module125in both directions as, for example, into and perhaps through similar tunnels in adjacent barrier modules forming the security barrier109(shown inFIG. 1as a row of barrier modules). This barrier tunnel603can be one of the same one or more tunnels used to contain chain, steel cable, and/or one or more tie-bar(s) used to link adjacent barrier modules to one another securely (but in that case, the chain, steel cable, and/or one or more tie-bar(s) are not shown in this view in order to permit an unobstructed view of the communications medium601), or it can be another tunnel made in the barrier module125. The ground215that supports the barrier module125is shown, as are the previously described extendable arm155(that holds a camera that is retractable within a cavity inside the barrier module125) and the antenna305on the barrier module125. First and second connection tunnels605,607are also shown, whereas these provide access paths between the barrier tunnel603and cavities within the barrier module125. The cavities house, hide, and protect equipment such as sensor units, power supplies, countermeasure systems, sensor data concentrators, and communications equipment within the barrier module125, but they are not shown in this view. It should be noted that the communication medium601routed through the barrier module125can serve as both an event sensor and as a location sensor should it become damaged or severed when the barrier module125is damaged or destroyed by a terrorist. When a barrier module is damaged or destroyed, it is also possible for the security system11to determine where along the security barrier109such an event has taken place. This is because subsystems within a barrier module that becomes damaged or destroyed may become inoperative or operate improperly and will thus be indicators to the security system11that those subsystems are located near a region of significant disturbance and are likely the result of a security threat. Power cables, if they are routed through and between tunnels of barrier modules, also serve as continuity sensors and therefore event-location sensors in the same manner as communication media and cables do.

FIG. 3shows an adjacent pair of armored building modules615having side-lap overhangs and being used to route and protect communications and/or power cables. This pair comprises first and second building modules621A,621B located side-against-side to create at least part of an armored building panel. The first building module621A has a first overhanging flange623A and an opposite second overhanging flange625A as well as a channel627A running the length of the building module621A. (Within this disclosure, a channel is a tunnel unless it is filled with something other than a gas or liquid.) The second building module6212B has a first overhanging flange623B and an opposite second overhanging flange625B as well as a channel627B running the length of the building module621B. Placing the two building modules621A,621B adjacent and touching one-another such that the first overhanging flange623B of the second building module621B overhangs the second overhanging flange625A creates a channel629AB. Any such channels as the channel627A, the channel627B, or the channel629AB can be used to route and protect cables, such as communications and/or power cables. For example,FIG. 3shows a cable631routed through channel627A in the first building module621A, shows a cable635routed along a surface of overhanging flange625B of the second building module621B, and shows a cable633routed through channel629AB. The cables631,633,635may or may not each include an outer protective jacket (as described above for the jacket described in the description ofFIG. 2) that provides additional armored protection to that afforded by the building modules621A and621B. It should be noted that the first cable631, second cable633, and third cable635routed through the building modules621A,621B can serve as both event sensors and as location sensors should they become damaged or severed when either of the building modules621A,621B is damaged or destroyed by a terrorist. When a building module housing a cable becomes damaged or destroyed by an event, it is also possible, if the cable becomes damaged too, for the security system11to determine the location of such an event. This is because subsystems connected to the cable may become inoperative or operate improperly and will thus be indicators to the security system11that those subsystems are located near a region of significant disturbance and are likely the result of a security threat. Power cables, if they are routed through building modules, also serve as continuity sensors and therefore event-location sensors in the same manner as communication cables do.

One aspect of some of the embodiments of the invention is shown inFIG. 3. It is that building modules of the type shown lend themselves, by way of their channels being useful for power and communication wiring, to being instrumented with sensors such as a camera that could be installed as a fixed view camera or a pop-out camera that can be secreted or otherwise hidden within a camera portal637such as shown in the first building modules621A.

FIG. 4shows one possible embodiment of a subsystem641such as could be housed within a security barrier109. A sensor unit643is shown having a sensor probe645and an antenna651. The sensor unit643is connected to a power supply647. A communication cable649connects into and out of the sensor unit643and extends beyond the view both the left and the right of the view. The sensor unit643is in communication with other subsystems of the armored security system11, and this might be automatically and/or remotely selected to be by way of wireless communication using the antenna651, or by way of communication that uses conductive wire or even wave-guides. In the case of waveguides, the cable649could be a fiber-optic cable, or it could represent a microwave wave-guide.FIG. 4can also be used to illustrate a concentrator subsystem (e.g. such as concentrator subsystem661inFIG. 5) instead of the sensor subsystem641, but without the attached sensor645. The types of sensors used in various embodiments of this invention can include any that could be used to aid the detection, identification, location, or threat assessment of things and events that could threaten the security of the secure region105. Examples include gas sensors, spectrophotometers, acoustic and/or ultrasonically based sensors (e.g. microphones), shot locators, cameras, motion detectors, Doppler sensors, radar, weight sensors, touch sensors, vibration sensors, cable-continuity sensors, optical sensors, electro-magnetic based sensors, capacitance based sensors, resistivity sensors, tension or compression sensors, contact sensors, liquid sensors, level sensors, distance sensors, position sensors, attitude sensors, elevation sensors, rotation sensors, impact sensors, humidity sensors, smoke sensors, fire sensors, heat sensors, temperature sensors, wind sensors, ambient light sensors, GPS sensors, RFID sensors, proximity sensors, trip sensors, laser or microwave beam-break sensors, voltage sensors, current sensors, power sensors, and charge sensors, to name only some. Either or both the sensor unit643and/or the sensor probe645can include a signal processor. Use of GPS information and the reading of RFID tags by an RFID sensor can of course be used to track and monitor for unexpected situations and movements of known personnel and of assets such as barrier blocks or any components and subsystems of the security system11and what it is protecting. Terrestrial triangulation sensors can also be used in addition to GPS sensors, or instead of GPS sensors. If a sensor system (or networked group of sensor subsystems) is deemed failing it can be masked out to avoid its causing false alarms. A sensor subsystem can be put in various modes discreetly. Example modes include repair mode, maintenance mode, test mode, off-line mode, and active mode. In other than active mode, a sensor would not report measurements as real and would not effect (i.e. not make happen) real alarms. When a sensor is put into test mode, engineers can perform end to end testing, and they can enable such a sensor to be marked on a GIS (geographical information system display) that they are in test mode. When a sensor is put into off-line mode, it is caused to be ignored by the rest of the security system11entirely. In active mode, a sensor subsystem is deemed to be in proper working order, have passed routine automated or manual validation tests, and will pass alarms and properly interact with active countermeasures in the rest of the security system11.

FIG. 5shows multiple subsystems interconnected (i.e. in communication with one another) by a network comprising branches off of a main shared branch655. Sensor subsystems661,663, and665connect to and share a first branch655A of the network. Concentrator subsystems671,673, and675connect to and share a second branch655B. Monitor and Control subsystems681,683, and685connect to and share a third branch655C. And alarm subsystems691,693, and695connect to and share a fourth branch655D. The four branches655A-D each connect to and share a main branch655which is also in communication with (and shared with) other systems or subsystem(s)657such as a Network Operations Center (NOC) or even a Tactical Control Center (TOC). Each of the systems (or subsystems) is shown with its own antenna for use in a wireless communication network.

FIG. 6shows a hierarchical communication network701of interconnected sensor subsystems, signal concentrator subsystems, a security monitor and control subsystem, and an alarm subsystem, whereby all subsystems are able to communicate with one-another by way of the network701. Sensor subsystems703,705, and707are interconnected with sensor-to-sensor links1001and1003, and they also connect to first-level concentrator subsystems801by means of sensor-to-concentrator links1015,1017, and1019respectively. Sensor subsystems709,711, and713are interconnected with sensor-to-sensor links1005and1007, and they also connect to first-level concentrator subsystems801by means of sensor-to-concentrator links1015,1017, and1019respectively. Sensor subsystems715,717,719, and721are interconnected with sensor-to-sensor links1009,1011, and1013, and they also connect to first-level concentrator subsystems805by means of sensor-to-concentrator links1027,1029,1031, and1033respectively. First-level linked concentrator subsystems801,803, and805are interconnected by concentrator-to-concentrator links1035and1037, and they also connect to second-level concentrator subsystem823by means of first-level-concentrator-to-second-level-concentrator links1039,1041, and1043respectively. Second-level concentrator subsystems821and825may have links to other first-level-concentrator subsystems which may have links to other sensor subsystems. Third-level concentrator subsystem877connects to second-level concentrator subsystems821,823, and825by means of second-level-concentrator-to-third-level concentrator links1045,1047, and1049respectively. Monitor and control subsystem891connects to third-level concentrator877by means of link1053, but may also connect to other third-level concentrators such as875and879by means of links1051and1055respectively. Third-level concentrators875and879may have a hierarchical network below them much as does third-level concentrator877. Such networks may connect hundreds of sensors to the monitor and control subsystem891, and they may have fewer or more concentrator levels as shown in this figure. Ultimately, the monitor and control subsystem891connects via a link1057to other subsystems such as an alarm subsystem899. The interconnections shown can be by fixed hard-wiring or by fixed wireless channel assignments, or they can be logical and variable through either fixed or dynamic programming.

FIG. 7shows a high-level view of security components networked together by a private intranet connected to the Internet via a firewall. In this disclosure, each of the rectangles (i.e. each “box”) shown inFIG. 7is to be considered a “component” of the armored security system11, as is each group member of a box if that box comprises a group of components. Each of the lines that are shown interconnecting components represents one or more communication links between the components found at the two ends of that line. Any two member components of a group of components may also be interconnected by way of one or more communication links. The sensor network(s)1523, in particular, may comprise multiple sensors interlinked communicatively to form one or more networks.FIG. 6depicts a portion of one possible network of sensors linked into a hierarchy network of concentrators. Each of the components comprises one or more “subsystems”.

FIG. 7also shows that various servers and browsers (and other computers and computer-controlled apparatuses and devices) are connected to a private network1501operating as an intranet. The private network1501is connected to the Intranet1701by way of a firewall1503. The Internet1701is of course connected to various external servers1801and external browsers1803, all external to the private intranet1501. Some of the external servers1801are connected to external devices1805. Connected to the private network1501are one or more sensor servers1521, one or more monitor and control servers1541, one or more alarm servers1551, one or more countermeasure servers1561, one or more Network Operation Center (NOC) servers1511, one or more Tactical Operations Center (TOC) servers1601, one or more security database servers1581, one or more other database servers1591, and one or more other servers1571. Also connected within the private network1501are one or more NOC browsers1513(which may also be connected directly to one or more NOC servers1511), one or more TOC browsers1603(which may also be connected directly to one or more TOC servers1601), and one or more other browsers1573. One or more other devices1575may be connected to the one or more other servers1571. One or more monitor and control subsystem(s) are connected to the one or more monitor and control servers1541. One or more alarms1553are connected to the one or more alarm servers1551. One or more countermeasure controllers1563are connected to the one or more countermeasure servers1561. One or more sensor networks1523are connected to the one or more Sensor Servers1521. One or more autonomous sensors1533and/or one or more autonomous sensor networks1531may also be connected to the one or more sensor servers1521. Any of the one or more autonomous sensors1533and any of the one or more autonomous sensor networks1531may be connected directly to the one or more alarm servers1551.

An individual one of the one or more sensor networks1523may comprise concentrators such as first concentrator subsystem671shown inFIG. 5or first first-level linked concentrator801shown inFIG. 6used for converging data and information from many sensors into integrated data and/or information for transmission to one of more of the sensor servers1521.

An individual one of the one or more autonomous sensors1533may be called “autonomous” for any of at least three reasons. It may be self-powered by an associated power source such as by a battery and/or solar cells or by one or more power-generating device(s) such as those that derive power from a piezoelectric transducer, a thermoelectric transducer, a fuel-cell, or a device that converts ambient electro-magnetic waves into voltage and current. It may be linked without the private network1501to one or more alarm servers1551and able to use such a link when sensor servers1521(or a concentrator such as801inFIG. 6) are not functioning properly. And/or it may include sufficient means to judge when to communicate data and/or information derived from the data. Autonomous sensor networks1531can be either networks of autonomous sensors or networks that each collectively has any of the attributes that make an individual sensor autonomous. At least some of the subsystems in embodiments of the invention can work autonomously as a federated group. An example of a federated group would be a group of subsystems that have at least temporarily been cut off from communications with any monitor and control subsystem but are able to recognize that situation and work together to continue their functions and to archive data and information they generate so that it can be later transmitted to a higher-level system (such as a monitor and control subsystem) when it is re-connected. Not all of the subsystems need to be fully on all of the time as some are not first-warning devices, so they can hibernate some of the time. Subsystems in hibernation can be awakened by internal watch-dog timers, or by signals received through a communication interface that remains awake during the hibernation of the rest of the subsystem. Also, with low-level analysis, not all of the sensor data need be transferred to higher-level subsystems.

The one or more monitor and control subsystems1543use information obtained through the one or more monitor and control servers1541from the one or more sensor servers1521, and they use programmed logic and rules to decide when to activate one or more of the alarms1553via one or more of the alarm servers1551via the private network1501.

The one or more NOC browsers1513permit user configuration and supervision of the private network1501and any of its networked components, some even of which may lie external to the private network1501and accessible via the firewall1503and the Internet1701, but not including any of the TOC browsers1603or TOC servers1601. The one or more NOC browsers1513may have both a direct link to the one or more NOC servers1511as well as a link directly to the private network1501; this is to enable user control of the NOC servers1511even when the private network1501is not fully functioning. Under one mode of the invention, user control by way of the NOC browsers1513and/or the NOC servers1511is provided of sensors in the sensor networks1523, the sensor networks1523themselves, sensor servers1521, autonomous sensors1533, autonomous sensor networks1531, concentrators (such as671inFIGS. 5 and 801inFIG. 6), alarms1553, alarm servers1551, monitor and control subsystems1543, monitor and control servers1541, countermeasure controllers1563, countermeasure servers1561, security database servers1581, other database servers1591, other browsers1573, other servers1571, other devices1573, and even some of the external devices1805.

The one or more TOC browsers1603permit user configuration and supervision of the one or more TOC servers1601, and a direct link to the one or more TOC servers1601enables user control of the TOC servers1601even when the private network1501is not fully functioning. The one or more TOC browsers1503and the one or more NOC browsers1513enable human communications between the NOC and the TOC. The one or more TOC browsers1503also enable access to supervise and even control the one or more countermeasure controllers1563by way of the one or more countermeasure servers1561, under conditions that would require overriding the NOC.

One aspect of the invention is to provide in its embodiments means to assure that subsystems are all synchronized to the same clock-time. The one or more NOC servers1511would each include their own clock as a master reference and would keep their respective clocks synchronized to one another. Each NOC server1511can use the Internet, when it is available, to synchronize its own clock to a reliable standard. The one or more NOC servers1511can also use NTP (network time protocol) and/or other methods to enable sensor data and recorded information to be accurately time-stamped with times that are synchronized to the master clock of the controlling NOC. This enables accurate time records to be associated with recorded data and information useful, for example, in forensic evaluation, such as when the presence of a noxious gas was detected or when high vibrations by certain barrier modules were experienced. GPS typically provides time stamps, but these time-stamps, if recorded, would be flagged as “suspect event time”. The controlling NOC in some implementations constantly looks at all subsystems generating time data to assure that their respective clocks are synchronized to the clock of the controlling NOC, and resets them (i.e. “slams” them) as needed. If a subsystem wakes up or restarts its clock, any data and information it generates before the controlling NOC can slam it, would be flagged with “suspect time”, “no time sync verification”, or an equivalent flag.

One aspect of the invention is to provide in some of its embodiments one or more duplicated components and/or subsystems which can be activated to provide redundancy and/or backup capabilities. Sufficient automatic control programs and/or alternate human intervention, by way of the NOC browsers1513and TOC browsers1603, would be included to switch over from the use of a failed or failing component to a duplicate one that is working. This implies that constant checks are made by the NOC servers1511, the TOC servers1601, the monitor and control servers1541, the alarm servers1551, the countermeasure servers1561, the sensor servers1521, the autonomous networks1531, the autonomous sensors1533, the other servers1571, the security database servers1581, and the other database servers that their duplicates and connected subsystems are functioning properly or ready to function properly when needed. One aspect of the invention is that subsystems within a group of similar subsystems are made capable of taking over the duties of any of any inoperable or dysfunctional member of the group; this taking over of extra duty can be made to commence or cease by way of commands from a higher-level subsystem (e.g. a monitor and control subsystem, a network operations center subsystem, and/or a tactical operations center subsystem). It can also be made to commence or cease by way of a subsystem checking on the health of other subsystems, and when recognizing another subsystem is inoperable or dysfunctional (i.e. unhealthy), to take over duties that back-up or cover for the unhealthy subsystem. An example of this would be a camera aiming toward a location of an inoperable microphone to ascertain whether there is noticeable any unusual activity going on at that location.

Security databases servers1581along with their attached memory devices (not shown) maintain records of the configuration parameters and settings of the armored security system11, as well as of historical and current information about system status and sensor information, updated and/or archived routinely at regular intervals as well as asynchronously when event driven. Duplicate security databases1581are maintained with copies of the stored information for backup purposes in each member security database. The duplicate members of the security databases1581may be located in different geographical locations for security purposes, one of which may be the location103of a centralized monitor and control subsystem. Historical data and event records are kept not only as potential evidence for later use in proving those data and events, but also for engineering use to analyze for in improving the responsiveness an accuracy of the automated functions within the security system11.

Other database servers1591along with their attached memory devices (not shown) maintain records managed by the Tactical Operations Center and/or a site facilities team. Duplicates of the other databases1591are maintained with copies of the stored information for backup purposes in each member security database. The duplicate members of the security databases1591may be located in different geographical locations for security purposes.

Other browsers1573, other servers1571, and other devices1575that are connected to the other servers1571might for example be used by a site maintenance team to monitor and control facilities sensors and equipment, even those not having to do with security. Data and configurations important to those activities are stored in the other database servers1591where they can also be accessed by the personnel and systems of the NOC and the TOC.

External browsers1803, external servers1801, and external devices1805, all situated outside the private network1501and made available to the private network1501by way of the Internet1701and its connection to the private network1501by way of a firewall1503may be used to extend the reach of the armored security system to locations both in the secure area105and the unsecure area107. The external devices1805may include networks of sensors, individual sensors, autonomous sensors, as well as devices such as cell-phones, personal digital assistants, personal computers, or personal appliances.

Another aspect of the invention is that any of the communications connections between component groups, between members of the component groups, and between subsystems within members of the component groups of the armored security system11may comprise serial and/or parallel path segments each of which may be provisioned with a different communications medium, a different communication technology, or in some cases even a different service provider. This particularly includes connections shown inFIG. 7as outside the private network1501portion that is represented as a cloud, but also those not shown inFIG. 7but within the private network1501portion that is represented as a cloud. The use of parallel paths (e.g. redundant paths) using different media results in overlapping networks (i.e. networks with logically-overlapping, redundant, paths) and adds much to the robustness of the security system. Examples of various communications media include airwaves, fiber-optics, and conductive wire or cables. Fiber-optics and conductive wire or cables are examples of “wired” communications media that are referred to herein as “guiding media”, whereas airwaves are used for wireless communications. Examples of various communications link technologies include dedicated lines, shared lines, automatically switched lines, satellite links, telephone communication, cell-phone communication, wireless networking, short-range wireless communication, long-range wireless communication, medium-range wireless communication, laser-beam communication, acoustic communication, ultrasound communication, long-wave communication, short-wave communication, microwave communication, millimeter-wave communication, broadcast communication, and power-line communication. Some of these communication link technologies may provide multiple channels. Examples of various communications technology attributes include analog modulations, pulse modulations, digital modulations, synchronous clocking, asynchronous clocking, handshaking, packet switching, CDMA, TDMA, FDMA, error detection and/or correction methods, physical and electrical interfacing standards, encryption, and methods of secure identification of sender and/or recipient.

Another aspect of the invention is that any of the messaging accomplished over the connections between component groups, between members of the component groups, and between subsystems within members of the component groups of the armored security system11may be by way of dynamically changed paths, channels, and/or other communications technologies including communications link technologies and communications technology attributes. This particularly includes connections shown inFIG. 7as outside the private network1501portion that is represented as a cloud, but also those not shown inFIG. 7but within the private network1501portion that is represented as a cloud. The switching between various selected channels, paths, and/or other provisioned communications technology may be made according to systematic rules or selected randomly among those provisioned. For example packet communication could include and use within a packet header notification with information regarding which channel, path, or other communications technology attributes will be used for the next packet. Duplicated versions of a message may be sent using distinctly different channels, paths, and/or communications technology attributes, and the received versions with the most matches at a common destination could be accepted as best representing the original message. Or a message with no match at a common destination could be resent using different selections of paths, channels, and/or communications technology attributes until redundantly transmitted and received messages match. These techniques amount to what may be referred to in this disclosure as “diversity messaging” (or “diversity signaling”), diverse in paths, channels, and/or communication technology attributes. Combination of diversity messaging with dynamic changes of channels, paths, and/or communications technology attributes may be referred to in this disclosure as “dynamic diversity messaging” (or “dynamic diversity signaling”). Some of the motivations for using diversity messaging (or dynamic diversity messaging) in communication include: a) reducing the possibility of an interruption in communication caused by terrorist activities, b) increasing the difficulty of preventing messaging and signals from reaching their intended targets correctly, c) providing alternative choices for a connection when conditions may degrade some choices but not others, d) enable continued communications when some communication choices are unavailable due to maintenance activities, and e) enable message comparisons between redundant connections to detect and correct communication errors which simple parity checks can not accomplish. When some communication paths become inoperable, others that remain operable can maintain needed communications. As is described in the next paragraph, provisioned communications paths, channels, and/or communications technology attributes not being used for needed communications can be used in the meantime to carry misinformation in order to confuse eavesdroppers.

FIG. 8shows an example of multiply diverse communication connections between a small set of subsystems. The subsystems include three sensor subsystems703,705, and715along with two concentrators801,823and a monitor and control subsystem891creating a hierarchical structure somewhat similar to that shown inFIG. 6. Communication connections which might otherwise have been shown as a single line drawn between any two of these subsystems are instead drawn here as multiple lines each indicating an available communication medium, path, and communication technology for use in carrying data, information, and/or other messages from one subsystem at one end of the line to the subsystem at the opposite end of the line. In this drawing, the communication connections comprise the following: balanced twisted pair1901,1905,1911,1915, and1935through tunnels within concrete barrier modules; Ethernet on Cat-5 cable1903,1909,1929, and1937through tunnels within concrete barrier modules; short-range wireless1907,1927, and1939; fiber-optic cable1913,1925,1933, and1943through tunnels within concrete barrier modules; fiber-optic cable1917and1949NOT through tunnels within concrete barrier modules; satellite link1921; and cellular phone link1945. The other communications connections1919,1923,1931, and1947can be additional ones of these previous combinations of available communication media, paths, and communication technologies. Not illustrated in the drawing, but implicit in the use of diversity messaging in this invention, is the choice within some transmission technologies of choosing channels such as among available frequencies, time slots, and/or CDMA codes. Communication paths and channels that are not being used at any one time can be used to transmit misinformation so as to fool any eavesdropper(s), or even to provide information that would help to entrap such eavesdropper(s). With coordination and/or secure identification of messages containing real information (i.e. information that is not misinformation), communications of real information and misinformation can be interleaved on any given path or channel available to the armored security system.

FIG. 9shows a flow chart of a method of sensor data collection2001used by a sensor subsystem to receive and store2005new data from its sensor device, to analyze2011the data for information, and to communicate (i.e. transmit2013,2015) information to a working targeted recipient or an alternate target. The method2001would be carried out by a processor executing a stored program (stored on a computer readable medium) and in communication with at least one sensor unit (e.g. the sensor unit643shown inFIG. 4, the sensor subsystem661shown inFIG. 5, or the sensor subsystem703inFIG. 6) and with a targeted receiver of sensor information such as another sensor (e.g. the sensor subsystem663shown inFIG. 5or the sensor subsystem705inFIG. 6), a concentrator (e.g. the concentrator671inFIG. 5, or801inFIG. 6), or a monitor and control system (e.g. the monitor and control subsystem1543inFIG. 7,891inFIG. 6, or681inFIG. 5). The processor and stored program might be part of a sensor unit (i.e. sensor subsystem). Following a start2003of the method2001, data from at least one sensor (e.g. the sensor unit643inFIG. 4) would be received and stored2005. Part of the receive and store step2005might include changing the rate at which sensor data is acquired, as for example when a threat has been detected and a higher rate for more information is desirable, a lower rate for energy conservation, a lower data-rate for bandwidth conservation, or greater stealth is desirable. It also might include a decision to archive data in the data storage memory5007when it may be called upon for forensic purposes or for evidence following a terrorist incident that might have cut-off the sensor subsystem from the rest of the security system. Such archived data, archived on a local basis, can enable uploads of the data on an as-required basis by higher-level subsystems. A first test2051would be made to check whether it is time to calculate short-term statistics2007, and if so to do so. If it is not time to calculate short-term statistics, or if such statistics have just been calculated, then a second test2053would be made to check whether it is time to calculate long-term statistics2009, and if so to do so. If it is not time to calculate long-term statistics, or if such statistics have just been calculated, then the stored data (including real data and/or any recently calculated statistics are analyzed2011for indications that there may be a threat indicated in the data or its statistics. This analysis2011may include trend analysis to discover meaningful deviations from expected norms, and it may include looking for unexpected deviations or deviations having a low probability of expectation. After this analysis is made, a third test2055would be made to check whether it is advisable to communicate (e.g. transmit) discovery of meaningful deviations in the sensor data and/or statistics to a concentrator of sensor information, and if not to return to step2005to receive and store more new data. Meaningful deviations could be anything outside of expected limits, for example two-sigma statistical limits about a mean of purely random behavior. The test2055would also check the priority of the sensor's information compared to that of other sensors attempting to utilize the same communication bandwidth(s), because priorities can change, and would give communications priority to those other sensors when they have a higher priority. And if an advisory is under effect from a higher-level subsystem or NOC to reduce bandwidth utilization, as when under a heightened terrorist alert, the test2055may use a rule to decide upon the frequency of information reporting. If it is time to transmit the data and/or statistics, then a fourth test2057is made to check whether a preferred concentrator subsystem is working properly2015, and if so to do so. Such a preferred concentrator subsystem is normally one that is at a next higher level in a hierarchy of data and information collection, the hierarchy starting with sensor subsystems at the lowest level, followed by concentrator subsystems at one or more higher level(s), and reaching to a monitor and control subsystem at an even higher level. If the preferred (i.e. targeted) higher-level subsystem is not working properly, then the data and/or information is transmitted2013instead to an alternative recipient. However, as disclosed farther below the preferred or targeted recipient, under conditions of a detected or possible threat, or of a detected or otherwise known inability to operate properly, may be made another sensor, a different concentrator, or a different monitor and control subsystem.

FIG. 10shows a flow chart of a method3001used by a concentrator subsystem to receive3005information and data from sensor subsystems, to analyze3007the information and data collectively for threat information, and to communicate3009,3011that threat information to another working concentrator subsystem or to a monitor and control subsystem. The method3001would be carried out by a processor executing a stored program (stored on a computer readable medium) and in communication with at least one sensor unit (e.g. the sensor unit643shown inFIG. 4, the sensor subsystem661shown inFIG. 5, or the sensor subsystem703inFIG. 6), and with at least a monitor and control system (e.g. the monitor and control subsystem1543inFIG. 7,891inFIG. 6, or681inFIG. 5) or another concentrator subsystem (e.g. the concentrator subsystem673shown inFIG. 5or the concentrator subsystem823inFIG. 6). The processor and stored program might be part of a concentrator subsystem. Following a start3003of the method3001, information from one or more sensors (e.g. the sensor unit643inFIG. 4, the sensor subsystems661,663,665shown inFIG. 5, or the sensor subsystems703,705,707inFIG. 6) or from one or more concentrator subsystems (e.g. inFIG. 6, concentrator823could receive from concentrators801,803,805) would be received and stored3005. Following the receipt of that information, it would be analyzed3007for threats. Concentrators have an advantage over single sensor subsystems in that they can analyze sensor information received from more than a single sensor, and can thereby inspect for trends and unexpected behaviors with a greater sensitivity for detecting actual threats as well as a greater ability to infer new information. For example, if a concentrator detects that multiple sensors in a given physical location are all revealing unexpected behavior, it becomes more probable that there is a real cause to that behavior, and may also infer that the threat is affecting more than a single location. Also for example, if a succession of sensors separated distances from one another reveals a succession of unexpected behavior displaced in time differently from one another, that data may be analyzed to reveal a direction and speed of movement of a threat, be it movement of an object or a cloud of gas. After this analysis is made, a first test3051would be made to check whether it is advisable to communicate discovery of meaningful analysis results to another concentrator subsystem or monitor and control subsystem, and if not to return to step3005to receive and store more new information. Meaningful deviations could be anything outside of expected limits, for example two-sigma statistical limits about a mean of purely random behavior. The test3051would also check the priority of the sensor's information compared to that of other sensors attempting to utilize the same communication bandwidth(s), because priorities can change, and would give communications priority to those other sensors when they have a higher priority. And if an advisory is under effect from a higher-level subsystem or NOC to reduce bandwidth utilization, as when under a heightened terrorist alert, the test3051may use a rule to decide upon the frequency of information reporting. If it is time to transmit the analysis results, then a second test3053is made to check3053whether a preferred targeted recipient (e.g. a concentrator subsystem at a higher level) is working properly, and if so to transmit3011the information to the targeted recipient. Such a preferred concentrator subsystem is normally one that is at a next higher level in a hierarchy of data and information collection starting just above sensor subsystems at the lowest level, to concentrator subsystems at one or more higher level(s), and reaching to a monitor and control subsystem at an even higher level. If the preferred concentrator subsystem or monitor-and-control system is not working properly, then the analysis results are transmitted3009instead to an alternative concentrator subsystem or monitor and control subsystem. The alternative concentrator subsystem could be at the same level in a hierarchy. However, as disclosed farther below the preferred or targeted recipient, under conditions of a detected or possible threat, or of a detected or otherwise known inability to operate properly, may be made a different concentrator or a different monitor and control subsystem.

FIG. 11shows a flow chart of a method4001used by a monitor and control subsystem to receive information from concentrator subsystems, to analyze that information for threats, to control alarms, and to take countermeasures. The method4001would be carried out by a processor executing a stored program (stored on a computer readable medium) and in communication with at least one sensor unit (e.g. the sensor unit643shown inFIG. 4, the sensor subsystem661shown inFIG. 5, or the sensor subsystem703inFIG. 6) by way of zero or more concentrator subsystems (e.g. the concentrator subsystem671shown inFIG. 5or the concentrator subsystem823inFIG. 6), and with at least a monitor and control system (e.g. the monitor and control subsystem1543inFIG. 7,891inFIG. 6, or681inFIG. 5). The processor and stored program might be part of the monitor and control subsystem. Following a start4003of the method4001, information from at least one sensor (e.g. the sensor unit643inFIG. 4, the sensor subsystem661shown inFIG. 5, or the sensor subsystem703inFIG. 6) or from at least one concentrator subsystem would be received and stored4005. Following the receipt of that information, it would be analyzed4007for threats. After this analysis is made, a first test4051would be made to check whether alarm conditions are present in the information, and if not to reset alarms and return to step4005to receive and store more new information. If alarm conditions are met, then alarms are activated (ON)4011, after which a second test4053is made to check whether countermeasures are justified, and if so to activate the appropriate countermeasures4015and return to step4005to receive and store more new information, or if not to reset (turn OFF)4013the countermeasure(s). Typically countermeasures would be taken by one or more subsystems which have the capability to control themselves once activated to ON, and can turn themselves off once the threat condition that warranted their use was no longer a threat.

FIG. 12shows a computer subsystem5001in block diagram form representing a computing engine and associated components, various combinations of which can be used for various components and subsystems in embodiments of the invention. The computer subsystem5001shown comprises a central processing unit (CPU)5003in communication connection with program memory5005, data storage memory5007, a user interface5009, any number of communication interfaces5011, any number of security system components and/or subsystems5013, a power supply5015, one or more RF Transceivers5017, a Global Positioning System (GPS) device5019, a radio-frequency identification device (RFID device)5021, and any number of other devices5023. The program memory (which is a non-transitory, tangible computer readable storage device) can contain program instructions which the processor can use to execute such routines as a signal processor, a sensor tester, a sensor calibrator, a sensor tuner, a driver, a message sender, a message receiver, a communication stack protocol, an encrypter, a decrypter, an authenticator, a threshold comparer, an inference engine, a statistical analyzer, and other instructions by which to execute rules and other routines necessary to carry out the functions described for various subsystems. The user interface5009can comprise a graphical user interface (GUI) or other human interface devices such as a keypad or keyboard, a touch-screen, one or more knobs, one or more pushbuttons, and any of a variety of one or more LED's, numeric displays, and/or other display devices. Such a user interface may permit maintenance, service personnel, and/or others to access the workings of a subsystem by requiring entry of a security code, user name, and/or password. Such use and entry may also be required to correlate in time within a pre-scheduled event period entered at a higher-level subsystem such as a NOC. Any use and entry made in this fashion, in some embodiments, is logged and transmitted to the controlling NOC for creating an audit trail, and this trail would include any failure messages and acknowledgements from message recipients. The user interface5009may also serve as a mini-NOC user interface, in some embodiments, on one or more of the possible subsystem in the security system11. A minimum set of subsystem elements comprised by a computer subsystem5001would include at least the CPU5003, the program memory5005, the data storage memory5007, the power supply5015, and at least one of the communication interfaces5011. One notable use for the data storage memory5007is for archiving data that can thereafter be made available for forensic purposes or evidence following a terrorist incident that might have cut-off the sensor subsystem from the rest of the security system. The one or more communications interfaces can be of any kind. The security system components and subsystems5013can be any one or more of sensor subsystems (autonomous or not), concentrator subsystems (autonomous or not), monitor and control servers, alarm servers, countermeasure servers, network operations center servers, tactical operations center servers, or other servers or devices. Any or all of the communications interfaces5011can be used to communicate data and/or control signals, and any or all of the communications made over these interfaces can be encrypted and require the exchange security identification signatures and/or codes. The power supply5015can be a dedicated one or can be a shared source of power as from a power distribution system, or from a back-up power system. The power supply5015could be solely or partly comprised of a solar cell, a fuel cell, a chemical battery, or a generator of power operating off of wind, thermal differences, mechanical vibrations, or ambient electro-magnetic waves. Any energy storage component of the power supply5015could be rechargeable by way of inductive coupling to a charging source. The RF transceiver5017can be of any type and can even be a transceiver of other than radio-frequency electro-magnetic signals, for example of light or sound signals. A GPS device5019can provide location information which the CPU5003can communicate by way of the transceiver5017or the communication interfaces5011to other security components. GPS information can be used to keep track of the location of the computer subsystem5001, and can be used to provide location information useful in locating a security threat. Falsified GPS information can also be used as purposeful misinformation for stealth and deception as when advantageous to protect the security of the secure region105. An RFID device5021can provide identification information of the computer subsystem5001independently of identification information stored within the data storage memory5007or program memory5005, and can provide identification information directly to external devices that come within the proximity of the RFID device. Other devices5023can include such devices as a sensor probe, a watch-dog timer, a snooze or sleep timer, a disturbance emitter, a signal processor, or a weapon. RFID devices can also be controlled to provide deceptive information when advantageous to the security of the secure region105.

Various embodiments of the invention include means that are sensory, adaptive, stealthy, and/or autonomous. For example, withinFIG. 9andFIG. 10, the steps2015and3011to “transmit information to a targeted recipient” can have the targeted recipient changed to other than a default preferred targeted recipient. Reasons for such a change may include that a first preferred targeted recipient is temporarily under maintenance or being repaired, is damaged, or is suspected to be compromised by terrorist activity. Other reasons for such a change may be that by doing so may confound eavesdroppers by effectively re-routing information from normal routes. But such changes in the routing of information (e.g. messages) aren't limited to routings between sensors, concentrators, and monitor and control systems. Such changes can extend to changing from otherwise expected routes used between any of the other component subsystems comprised by the security system11or shown inFIG. 1or any of FIG.'s5-7. With the help ofFIG. 8, it can also be appreciated that embodiments of the invention may involve the purposeful changing of media, communication link technologies, and/or communications technology attributes dynamically in order to make eavesdropping more difficult. If a localized threat is perceived (correctly or not) by the security system11, routings can be changed in order to route as much communication away from the location of the perceived threat. As mentioned above, misinformation may also be purposefully transmitted on any of the communication connections for deceiving eavesdroppers, and especially may be utilized and focused to communication routes in the vicinity of a perceived threat that may appear localized. Also as mentioned above, subsystems of the security system11may be given autonomous means to enable them to continue operating to collect, analyze, and act independently of other system components which may be temporarily inoperative. As mentioned above in the description ofFIG. 1, embodiments of the invention may include the use of decoys (e.g. mis-information honey-pots) to lure and/or trap those who attempt to breach security of the security system11. Examples of decoys that can be part of an embodiment of the invention include a sensor211hidden in a plant or disguised as a plant, a sensing subsystem or device213that is real or masquerading as real, and a sensor subsystem217hidden in a tree (or disguised as a tree). Any sensor, device, or event that purposely provides or causes misinformation (or that is a purposefully inoperable countermeasure subsystem) may serve as a decoy in the present invention. Some decoys of the current invention may be a device, communication, or event that can distract in order to conceal what is desired to be kept secure, or in order to distract terrorists or other potential assailants) away from the secure area105. Such decoys can be completely passive or they can be active and even autonomous. A decoy within an embodiment of the invention can also be more than a single subsystem or device; for example, a decoy can be two or more sensors and/or countermeasure subsystems (and/or communications) coordinated in their locations and actions. For example, a surveillance camera153can be made to observe activity near to the decoy subsystem213(seeFIG. 1), and a countermeasure subsystem (such as gun163) may in reaction be automatically aiming toward the decoy subsystem213, all while communicating audible warnings to the potential terror suspect. An example of stealth within an embodiment of the invention is that of dynamically changing the routing and/or normal sequence of successive messages (or information) being transmitted from one system component to another.

FIG. 13shows a flow chart of process steps within a method used by some embodiments of the invention to make inferences. These inferences may be based on sensor data or on other data or information available to an embodiment of the invention. The software to execute the analysis steps described under the descriptions of FIG.'s9,10, and11above are stored in program memory5005available to a processor (CPU)5003as depicted inFIG. 12above.FIG. 13shows some steps that may be included in these analysis steps for analysis of sensor data and information through to deducing and inferring new information useful in detecting a terrorist threat, or other threats on the security site101. Such analyses and deductions might include the use of deduction and inference rules stored within program memory5005or within data storage memory5007. A typical deduction and inference method6001(or process) is shown inFIG. 13to begin with a start6003followed by a step6005to gather a collection of sensor data with its associated data and information. This is followed by a step6007to apply deduction and inference rules to the collection. This is followed by a step6009to draw inferences. This is followed by a step6011to communicate inferences to other subsystems, most typically a higher-level subsystem in a hierarchy, or directly to a monitoring subsystem (which may be a monitoring and control subsystem). Finally the method can end6013. One example of such a deduction and inference would be that an object is moving along the length of the barrier wall if sensors within a succession of barrier modules displaced from one another along a common direction pick up a respective succession of disturbance signals with increasing time from one barrier module to the next along the succession of barrier modules. Other examples of a deduction and inference would be a) that a potential threat exists at a specific barrier module having a specific barrier module identification value or GPS-reported location if a sensor within that barrier module detects a disturbance from a norm, but no other nearby sensors detects any disturbances from their respective norms; b) that a vehicle is close to a given barrier module if a spectrophotometer within that barrier module detects one or more above-average signals of the type of gas component(s) expected from a vehicle; c) that a noxious or lethal gas is moving in a given direction if a spectrophotometer detects the gas and a wind indicator detects wind blowing in that given direction; d) that someone is attempting to eavesdrop on communication from a given sensor subsystem, if that communication produces different data being received by any recipient of that data from different communication paths or channels; e) that a terrorist is moving a sensor (or decoy sensor) if the GPS position information coming from it is changing while no prescheduled maintenance is due at the time for that decoy; f) that at least one barrier module has been displaced (given an indication that its GPS coordinates have changed) by a terrorist's attempt to break through the barrier, but that the attempt was apparently unsuccessful because communication by way of a cable running through the tunnels of the barrier modules is still operative, and g) that an attacker has disabled sensors and/or security components (or their subsystems) by damaging or disconnecting one or more sources of electrical power. On a simpler note, sensor subsystems on, within, nearby, or otherwise near enough to have a range that reaches barrier modules of the security barrier109, collectively provide the security system11(i.e. its NOC and TOC centers) with a constant forensic heartbeat on status of its health and alarms, on maintenance issues, moisture detection, unusual power usage, loss of subsystems, etc., any and all of which can be graphically displayed in an organized manner (e.g. utilizing a geographical information system or GIS) at least on NOC browsers1513and TOC browsers1603.

FIG. 14shows a flow chart of a method7001used by a sensor subsystem to actively participate in learning improved analysis and decision rules for use in detecting disturbances that could indicate a threat condition, as well as to obtain corroboration(s) from other sensors when potentially meaningful disturbances are detected). The method7001could be included within the analysis step2011of the method described inFIG. 9, but wherein the collect new data step7005, and the send alarm notice step7025, would no longer be needed in this method7001. The method7001begins at a start7003, followed by the step to collect new data7005. The collect new data step7005is followed by a test7007which checks whether the sensor subsystem has received authority to change threshold(s) to be used in the analyze step7011. The analyze step7011follows step7007immediately if the authority has not been received. If the authority has been received, a step7009is taken to set new threshold(s) before going to the analyze step7011. The granting or denial of authority which may or may not be received is that coming from a higher-level subsystem to which the sensor has previously made a request for authorization. The analysis step7011checks whether the currently obtained or received data exceeds normal thresholds for normal ambient conditions or not. The method6001previously described can be at least part of this analysis step7011but wherein its final step6011to communicate inferences to other subsystems may or may not be performed depending upon secondary objectives of the analysis in step7011. After this analysis step7011, a test7013is made of whether the new data indicates new behavior not previously recorded. If such behavior is noticed, then characterizing parameters (and even the raw data such as images from a camera) are saved in the step7015to save behavior parameters, and to request authority from a Monitoring and Control subsystem to use these parameters next time in its analyze step7011. Whether new behavior is experienced or not, these steps are followed by a test step7017to check whether the new data has crossed critical thresholds. The method7001emends7027if no threshold has been crossed, but continues to a step7019to request corroboration from other subsystems if at least one threshold has been crossed. Of particular note, the request corroboration step7019can not only request reports from one or more other sensors, but can effect induced disturbances which may add to the strength of a sensor's signals. These induced disturbances can be caused by directives from the sensor (or a concentrator, or an NOC) to activate certain countermeasures (or emissions from other subsystems such as incidences of a boundary sentry8017described with respect toFIG. 15below). The induced disturbances may be purposefully timed to be before or during the one or more other sensors' collection of that new data. If the induced disturbance(s) is/are unexpected in an absence of an intruder, then the validity of the original sensor data is confirmed as indicating a potential threat, or otherwise as not indicating a potential threat. Step7009is followed by a test step7021to check whether or not corroboration has been received from another subsystem. If corroboration has not been received, then step7023adds a condition to an alarm notice to that effect. In either regard, the following step7025is that of sending the alarm notice to a higher-level subsystem. Following step7025, the method7001ends at7027.

Step7009is followed by a test step7021to check whether or not corroboration has been received from another subsystem. If corroboration has not been received, then step7023adds a condition to an alarm notice to that effect. In either regard, the following step7025is that of sending the alarm notice to a higher-level subsystem.

FIG. 15shows a diagrammatic plan-view representation of a security site8001, a portion of the site8001of which was more fully shown in perspective inFIG. 1as security site101. An outer zone8003is unprotected by the site8001. A buffer zone8005is situated between the outer zone8003and a protected zone8009. An entry gate zone8007shows a place of secured access for people and vehicles moving between the buffer zone8007and the protected zone8009. Within the protected zone8009and representing portions of the protected zone8009, are three other zones: a first special zone8011, a second special zone8013, and a third special zone8015. At one or more locations at the boundaries between zones, a border sentry8017(represented as a circle) and/or a check station8019(represented as a square) is/are shown. A first security center8021is located within the second special zone8013. A second security center8023is shown located outside the buffer zone8005. A first boundary8025is shown separating the outer zone8003from the buffer zone8005. A second boundary8027is shown separating the buffer zone from the protected zone8009, however a gap in the boundary between the buffer zone8025and the protected zone8009is occupied by an entry gate zone8007which is itself partially bounded by a third boundary8029. This second boundary8027would be defined by placement of a row of armored barrier modules and is depicted withinFIG. 15as a thicker line than used elsewhere in the drawing. Side boundaries of the entry gate zone8007may also comprise armored barrier modules, so those (such as third boundary8029) are drawn with the same thicker line. The first special zone8011within the protected zone8009is bordered by a fourth boundary8031and a fifth boundary8033, wherein the fifth boundary8033is a gap within the fourth boundary8031and serves as an entrance and exit gateway to and from the first special zone. The fourth boundary8031may, for example, comprise a high-voltage fence or a high armored wall on a high embankment around the first special zone8011. The second special zone8013within the protected zone8009is bordered by a sixth boundary8035which may comprise, for example, a high reinforced concrete wall, as well as one or more security-guard guarded entrance and exit door(s). The third special zone8015within the protected zone8009is bordered partially by a seventh boundary8037and partially by a portion of the second boundary8027, wherein the seventh boundary8037may be, for example, a chain-link fence with locked entrance and exit gates. A person223is shown standing in the buffer zone8005not far from the entry gate zone8007. The person is shown carrying one or more personal device(s)8039. The First Security Center8021and the second security center8023are each shown with a radar antenna8041.

In some embodiments of the invention, no level of security clearance may be required for a person, vehicle, or other equipment to be within the outer zone8003shown inFIG. 15. The level of security clearance required to be in the buffer zone8005may be low but requiring at least some minimum show of credentials. The level of security clearance required to be within the entry gate zone8007can be higher than that of the buffer zone8005, but a still higher level of security clearance is normally required within the protected zone8009. A still higher level of security clearance could be required within the first special zone8011. Between the levels of security clearance required to be within the protected zone8009and also within the first special zone8011, can be intermediate levels of security clearance to be within other special zones such as the second special zone8013and the third special zone8015. This example might be appropriate for a nuclear power plant where the power generation facility is within the first special zone, the management and staff offices within the second special zone8013, and the maintenance yard within the third special zone8015.

FIG. 15shows multiple incidences of the use of a border sentry8017(represented as a circle) and/or a check station8019(represented as a square) at the boundaries between zones. Numerous incidences of a border sentry8017are shown on each boundary, with those on each boundary somewhat uniformly distributed apart from one another along the entire length of that boundary. Not far from each incidence of a border sentry8017can be found an incidence of a check station8019. A border sentry8017is a type of disturbance emitter and can emit some form of communication (such as one or more audible voice announcements and/or warnings, distractingly loud noises, or bright flashes of light) that would normally be noticed by an intruder or by a non-hostile person detected by one or more of the sensor subsystems of the security system11. Depending upon the situation of how much the security system11may be able to determine about a suspected intruder, the security system11has the option to activate any given incidence of a border sentry8017; the option to reveal to a suspected intruder that he has been discovered (in certain locations) may be important especially if lethal countermeasures may be employed. Announcements, warnings, or instructions, when given would be given in multiple languages depending on the region. The announcements may provide instructions to check-in at a specific incidence of a check station8019or just a nearby incidence of a check station8019. In some situations where foul play is suspected, the information given out by an incidence of a border sentry could be purposefully false information designed to confuse an intruder. An incidence of a check station8019is a means for a person receiving such a communication to check in with the security system11that they have the appropriate security clearance to be within the zone they are currently, or that they have the appropriate security clearance to approach and enter the next zone requiring the next higher level security clearance. The check-in process may involve a series of challenges for correct responses such as for a password, for an iris scan, for the person's weight, for the person's name, or other shows of identity and/or credentials. These incidences of a check station8019may utilize the same diversities in communication with the rest of the security systems networks as other subsystems within the security system11. Just inside the entry gate zone8007is shown an incidence of a check station8019that would be associated with two incidences of a border sentry8017found one on each side of the entry gate zone8007; it is usual that this incidence of a check station8019would be attended by one or more security guards to double-check and assist persons entering or leaving the protected zone8009. The person223shown standing in the boundary zone8005is shown carrying one or more personal devices8039; these personal devices may, for example, be one or more of the following: a GPS device, an RFID device, a cell-phone, a secure-ID card, or any wireless device that can help to identify the person to the security system11. Any one or more of these devices may be required, or may just serve to help the person223, to check in or register with any given incidence of a check station8019, and some may aid in permitting the security system11to physically and/or logically track the movement of the person about the security site8001. These personal devices8039, in addition to a person's registering with the incidences of a check station8019, can permit a person223to safely cross into a zone of next higher security, but their entry may still be cautionary and produce accorded alarms as relating to a person with assumed adequate credentials, but not fully assured as being legitimate. Within this disclosure, the aforementioned boundary system utilizing incidences of a boundary sentry8017and a check station8019to afford a person's safe passage through both hard and soft boundaries to zones of increased security level can be referred to as a “MOATS” system, where “MOATS” is an acronym for “monitored-offensive-automated-threat-system.

As seen inFIG. 15, radar and any other sensor device and subsystem for monitoring air-space above and around the security site8001may be made a part of the security system11. The first security center8021, within the second special zone8013, is shown to include a radar antenna8041, as is the second security center8023shown outside the buffer zone8005. A radar subsystem using one or more incidences of a radar antenna8041can give the security system11the capability of detecting and tracking the location and motion of one or more ground targets as well as targets in the air, and wherein the target may be a suspected terrorist perhaps in a vehicle or airplane or even on foot.

The security system11protecting the security site8001shown inFIG. 15may include failsafe features. Sensor and countermeasure subsystems that fail can be made to automatically become inoperative should self-checking of their operating health fail to reset a hold on a respective automatic shut-down function. In addition subsystems such as sensor subsystems, concentrator subsystems, countermeasure subsystems, and network operation centers, can check the health of one-another through back-and-forth messaging to request transmissions of information that would be sufficient to guarantee that the other subsystem is continuing to be operational and in good health. (Within this disclosure, what is meant by a subsystem's health is that its software and hardware operate as they were designed to operate.) Other examples of fail-safe design within embodiments of the invention may include the ability of one or more security centers (like the second security center8023) situated outside the security site8001to continually check on the health of the security site8001and security system11by means of communications with the first security center8021(that would include an NOC and perhaps a TOC), and to back-up or take over the full or partial roll of the first security center8021when necessary, or even to control the security system11to shut it and its subsystems down completely (even its autonomously operating subsystems) should it be found that no human operators are present and responsive at the security site8001. Automatic weapons controlled by the security system11(and autonomous weapons which are part of the security system11) can be made to shut down and become locked by respective fail-safe watch-dog timing functions and their associated apparatuses if the weapon subsystems don't continue to generate signals required to keep themselves alive, and the weapon subsystems don't continue to receive keep-alive signals from higher-level subsystems in the security system11. Such a situation could result, for example, if no human security persons are alive on the security site8001and/or no external security center (such as the second security center8023) are/is controlling the security system11. Another fail-safe feature of some of the embodiments of the security system11is that of being able to shut down the security of the system by boundaries, for example starting first with subsystems at the first boundary8025, then the second boundary8027, then the third boundary8029, the seventh boundary8035, the sixth boundary8033, and the fifth boundary8031in succession.

Although the methods for collecting and analyzing sensor data for information meaningful in detecting a terrorist threat to a secure region105at a secure site101(and8001) are described as being comprised of various steps (e.g. method of sensor data collection2001, method3001used by a concentrator subsystem, method4001used by a monitor and control subsystem, method6001used in making deductions and inferences, and method7001used by a sensor subsystem to actively participate in learning improved analysis and decision rules as well as to obtain corroboration(s) from other sensors when potentially meaningful disturbances are detected), fewer or more steps may comprise the process and still fall within the scope of various embodiments.

Several embodiments are specifically illustrated and/or described herein. However, it will be appreciated that modifications and variations are covered by the above teachings and within the scope of the appended claims without departing from the spirit and intended scope thereof. For example, communications links between various subsystems can use any of various interfacing methods and protocols (and/or various encryption methods) and be arranged in various other networking architectures; communications networks may overlap one-another; analysis steps can reset data and information memory; and monitor and control subsystems can report to higher level systems such as a Tactical Operations Center and a Network Operations Center at the same site or at sites different from the site hosting the armored security system. Method steps described herein may be performed in alternative orders. Various embodiments of the invention include programs and/or program logic stored on non-transitory, tangible computer readable media of any kind (e.g. optical discs, magnetic discs, semiconductor memory). System structures and organizations described herein may be rearranged. Various embodiments of the invention can include interconnections of various types between various numbers of various subsystems and sub-components. The examples provided herein are exemplary and are not meant to be exclusive.

Although specific embodiments of the invention have been illustrated and described herein, those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that any arrangement configured to achieve the same purpose may be substituted for the specific embodiments shown. This disclosure is intended to cover any and all adaptations or variations of various embodiments of the invention. It is to be understood that the above description has been made in an illustrative fashion, and not a restrictive one. Combinations of the above embodiments, and other embodiments not specifically described herein will be apparent to those of skill in the art upon reviewing the above description. The scope of various embodiments of the invention includes any other applications in which the above structures and methods are used. Some aspects of the invention are listed in the following paragraph.