Pre-filtering detection of an injected script on a webpage accessed by a computing device

Pre-filtering detection of an injected script on a webpage accessed by a computing device. The method may include receiving an indication of access to the webpage at a web browser of the computing device; identifying a web form associated with the webpage; determining that the webpage has been previously visited by the computing device; recording at least one current domain associated with at least one current object request made by the web form; determining a difference of a count of the at least one current domain associated with the at least one current object request and a count of at least one historical domain associated with at least one historical object request previously made by the webpage; identifying the webpage as suspicious based on determining that the difference is greater than zero and less than a domain threshold; and initiating a security action on the webpage based on the identifying.

BACKGROUND

Malicious attacks online in the form of formjacking are becoming increasingly common and prolific. With formjacking, attackers may inject malicious scripts (e.g., JavaScript) into webpages using web forms to gather personal and sensitive user information. Without the user being aware of the attack, the attacker may steal private and sensitive information, including personal identification information, financial information, passwords, etc.

Some current estimates put the number of webpages infected with formjacking at over 5000 a month, with millions of potential web forms being compromised each month. Thus, an efficient, fast, and cost-effective solution is needed to mitigate and/or prevent formjacking attacks. The subject matter claimed herein is not limited to embodiments that solve any disadvantages or that operate only in environments such as those described above; rather, this background is only provided to illustrate one example technology area where some embodiments described herein may be practiced.

SUMMARY

In some embodiments, a computer-implemented method for pre-filtering detection of an injected script on a webpage accessed by a computing device may be performed, at least in part, by the computing device including one or more processors. The method may include receiving an indication of access to the webpage at a web browser of the computing device; identifying a web form associated with the webpage; determining that the webpage has been previously visited by the computing device; recording at least one current network domain associated with at least one current object request made by the web form; determining a difference of a count of the at least one current network domain associated with the at least one current object request and a count of at least one historical network domain associated with at least one historical object request previously made by the webpage; identifying the webpage as suspicious based on determining that the difference is greater than zero and less than a network domain threshold; and initiating a security action on the webpage based on the identifying.

In some embodiments, the security action may include one or more of adding the webpage to a blacklist, isolating the webpage, blocking network access to the webpage, or transmitting a message to an administrator regarding the webpage.

In some embodiments, receiving of the indication of access to the webpage at the web browser of the computing device may further include receiving the indication of access by way of a browser extension executing in the web browser.

In some embodiments, receiving of the indication of access to the webpage at the web browser of the computing device may further include dynamically executing a security scanning application within the web browser.

In some embodiments, receiving of the indication of access to the webpage at the web browser of the computing device may further include monitoring the web traffic occurring in the web browser with a kernel module.

In some embodiments, receiving of the indication of access to the webpage at the web browser of the computing device may further include receiving a communication from a remote web proxy, the remote web proxy monitoring web traffic between the computing device and a web server associated with the webpage.

In some embodiments, the identifying of the web form associated with the webpage may further include disregarding any webpage not identified as being associated with a web form.

In some embodiments, the method may further include establishing the network domain threshold using a machine learning algorithm.

In some embodiments, after the identifying of the webpage as suspicious, determining that the webpage is malicious by at least one of: visiting the at least one current network domain, passing the at least one current network domain to a sandbox for an automatic malware check, evaluating a digital signature of the at least one current network domain; and determining that the at least one current network domain is on a blacklist.

In some embodiments, a computer device may include a processor, a memory in electronic communication with the processor, and instructions stored in the memory, with the instructions being executable by the processor to perform a method for pre-filtering detection of an injected script on a webpage accessed by a computing device.

In some embodiments, one or more non-transitory computer-readable media may include one or more computer-readable instructions that, when executed by one or more computing devices, cause the one or more computing devices to perform a method for pre-filtering detection of an injected script on a webpage accessed by a computing device.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Formjacking attacks are becoming a more common and more prolific way for attackers to obtain personally identifiable information (e.g., Social Security numbers, addresses, phone numbers, passwords, etc.) and other sensitive and/or private information (e.g., financial information, credit card numbers, bank account numbers, etc.). Attackers may inject malicious script onto webpages that contain web forms (e.g., a HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP)-based form), where the web forms may be HyperText Markup Language (HMTL) forms into which users enter the personally identifiable and/or sensitive information. In this situation, users likely believe that the entered info is protected by security methods protecting the webpage and/or that the transmission of the entered data is secure. For users, it may be nearly impossible to determine that their critical information is being obtained, copied, and/or sent to an attacker due to the fact that the injected script (e.g., JavaScript) may be very small (e.g., only a few lines of script) and easily obfuscated. Attackers may make small changes in the script, making it difficult to block the scripts using signatures or patterns. In addition, users entering information into web forms do not have a way to know where their entered data is being sent, who is receiving the data, or how or where the data is being stored.

In formjacking attacks, a script may be uploaded as a new script to a server, attackers may modify a script already existing on the server, or attackers may attack a remotely-loaded script called by a webpage. The malicious script may be triggered by one of multiple mechanisms. For example, the script may be triggered when the user clicks on a “submit” button on the web form, or at pre-determined time intervals, such as every five seconds or after a “timeout” timer has expired. At the time the malicious script is triggered, some or all of the form field values into which a user has entered data may be collected and concatenated. The concatenated string may be a long string that includes personally identifiable information, passwords, credit card data, etc. The string may then be obfuscated using encryption techniques, and transmitted to a remote server (e.g., using a GET or POST request, using an invisible form, using a one-to-one pixel image graphic to receive and encode data from the user, etc.).

The server may be owned and controlled by an attacker (e.g., typo-squatting), or may be a domain with a historically good reputation that has been hacked. In some embodiments the obtained data may be stored locally on the compromised computing device (e.g., in a local cache, in a database in memory, etc.). In an embodiment where the data is stored locally, the attacker may need to retrieve the data again at the later time, making it more likely that the attacker will be detected.

Previous solutions may include programs that crawl all available webpages, or scan all of the scripts on a server. Other solutions may include the use of domain (e.g., universal resource locator (URL)) blacklists and whitelists, or other data loss prevention techniques to detect a pattern of data exfiltration. However, these solutions may require large amounts of processing power. In addition, it may take hours or days to lookup domains on a blacklist, or to add domains to a blacklist.

The methods and systems described herein may solve the above and other related problems by comparing web request sequences made by a web browser to previously recorded web request sequences for the same webpage during a previous visit. The number of domains that need to be analyzed may be reduced to only those webpages having web form resources and where only one or two new additional requests (or some other number below a threshold) to new domains are made. This solution may result in the identifying of suspicious domains, but may do so by reducing the number of suspicious domains that need to be analyzed by pre-filtering the domains before analysis is done. By pre-filtering, and thus saving resources and time at the front end, a faster and more thorough analysis can be done on domains marked as suspicious.

Turning to the figures,FIG. 1illustrates an example system configured for pre-filtering detection of an injected script on a webpage116accessed by a computing device (where webpage116may be one of many webpages that make up website114). The system100may include a network102, a client device104, a server device106, and a formjacking module108. In some embodiments, the formjacking module108may execute on a standalone device that communicates with the client device104and the server device106. In other embodiments, however, the formjacking module108may be part of the client device104and/or the server device106.

In some embodiments, the network102may be configured to communicatively couple the client device104, the server device106, and the formjacking module108by way of communication links110. Although not specifically shown inFIG. 1, the client device104may directly communicate with the server device106by way of the communication links110. In some embodiments, the network102may be any wired or wireless network, or combination of multiple networks, configured to send and receive communications between systems and devices. In some embodiments, the network102may include a Personal Area Network (PAN), a Local Area Network (LAN), a Metropolitan Area Network (MAN), a Wide Area Network (WAN), a Storage Area Network (SAN), the Internet, or some combination thereof. In some embodiments, the network102may also be coupled to, or may include, portions of a telecommunications network, including telephone lines, for sending data in a variety of different communication protocols, such as a cellular network or a Voice over IP (VoIP) network.

In some embodiments, the client device104may be any computer system capable of communicating over the network102and capable of pre-filtering the detection of maliciously injected or modified scripts into webpages, examples of which are disclosed herein in connection with the computer system400ofFIG. 4. Similarly, in some embodiments, the server device106may be any computer system capable of communicating over the network102and capable of determining the injection or modification of scripts, comparing new data with historical data, analyzing scripts for malicious intent and action, and taking security actions to prevent or mitigate formjacking attacks disclosed herein in connection with the computer system400ofFIG. 4.

Modifications, additions, or omissions may be made to the system100without departing from the scope of the present disclosure. For example, in some embodiments, the system100may include additional components similar to the components illustrated inFIG. 1that each may be configured similarly to the components illustrated inFIG. 1. Also, the formjacking module108may execute on the client device104, the server device106, or may execute on another device not illustrated inFIG. 1.

FIG. 2illustrates a block diagram of the formjacking module108described with reference toFIG. 1. In one embodiment, the formjacking module108may further comprise a monitoring module202, a lookup module204, an analysis module206, and/or a verdict module208. In one embodiment, the monitoring module202may be an entity running in a web browser112. For example, the monitoring module202may be a browser extension, or a module of a security scanner running dynamically within the browser, a dynamic link library file, or a kernel module that monitors all web traffic occurring in the web browser112. In an additional or alternative embodiment, the monitoring module202may be a module that does not exist on the end system itself (e.g., not on the client device104or the server device106), but rather may be operating as a remote web proxy observing the web traffic between the end user and the webpage116.

In one embodiment, the monitoring module202may monitor visits made by client device104to webpage116. The monitoring module202may determine whether each visited webpage116contains a web form. For every webpage116that contains a web form, the monitoring module202notes the domains of the URLs of each of the different objects being requested by webpage116. The objects may include image files, JavaScript libraries, iFrames, etc.; however, the formjacking module108is not interested in all of the documents, media, etc. on each of the webpages116, but rather is only interested in webpages166that contain web forms where a user may enter data. Thus, monitoring module202may pass the traffic data to the lookup module204only where the traffic data associated with a web form.

In some embodiments, ignoring all web traffic that is not related to webpages16having web forms may improve performance and processing speed, as the number of requests that will need to be processed by the lookup module204and analyzed by the analysis module206is reduced. Furthermore, due to the reduced number of webpages16to be considered by the lookup module204and analysis module206, the analysis to determine malicious scripts may be more aggressive, increasing the likelihood of detecting malicious attacks, and subsequently decreasing the false positive rate.

Whenever the monitoring module202determines a web form within the webpage116, the monitoring module202then passes the webpage116and web form information and/or the execution load to the lookup module204. In one embodiment, the lookup module204receives the information regarding the web form from the monitoring module and checks the domain on which the web form is hosted. For each webpage116received by the lookup module204from the monitoring module202, the lookup module determines whether the webpage116has been visited.

The lookup module204may record the domains associated with each of the object requests and compare the domains with historical data related to previous visits to the webpage116. In one embodiment, the comparison may be done offline using a local cache on the client device104. In an additional or alternative embodiment, the lookup module204may do the comparison on the back end on the server device106, or in the cloud. In an additional or alternative embodiment, the lookup module204may use a hybrid method to do the comparison, using both the local cache, and the back end or cloud databases.

If the lookup module204determines that the webpage116(associated with a web form) has not been visited before, then the lookup module204may add the webpage116to a list for future comparisons. The list may be stored in a local cache on the client device104, on the server device106, and/or on the cloud. In addition, the lookup module204may determine that the received webpage116contains scripts (e.g., PHP scripts, JavaScript, etc.) as well as other requests for other sources and/or objects from at least one domain. Thus, the lookup module204may determine associations between the web form on the webpage116and each of the domains associated from the scripts, sources, and/or objects. For example, the web form may communicate with domains associated with Google Analytics, Amazon Web Services, Facebook, Instagram, Wells Fargo Bank, etc., each which may be expected and benign domains associated with, for example, a web form for a user to enter credit card information to purchase an item or a service.

If the lookup module204determines that the webpage116(associated with a web form) has been visited before, then the lookup module204does a comparison between the current instance of the webpage and a historical instance of the webpage116. If the lookup module204determines that the webpage116has been visited before, the server device106will return a list of expected domains associated with the webpage116. For example, if the webpage previous visited is the webpage116described above, then the expected domains may include Google Analytics, Amazon Web Services, Facebook, Instagram, and Wells Fargo Bank.

The lookup module204will determine whether the number of domains associated with the current webpage116is the same, fewer than, or greater than the number of domains expected to be associated with the current webpage116based on historical data. If the difference in the number of new domains obtained is zero or fewer than the number of expected domains, then the lookup module204will make a determination that there is no suspicious activity, and the execution of the web form is passed through the regular chain. Because the number of domains is as expected or fewer than expected, it would be statistically less likely that there has been any injected or modified scripts.

However, if the difference in the number of new domains obtained compared the number of expected domains is greater than one but fewer than a predetermined threshold, then the lookup module204marks the webpage116as suspicious and passes the webpage116domain to the analysis module206for further analysis and/or security actions (e.g., isolation). When the increase in the number of domains is just one or two (or a few), makes it statistically more likely that there is a malicious attack occurring.

In one embodiment, the predetermined threshold is established in order to filter out complete redesigns of a webpage116that might potentially lead to false positives. During a complete redesign, webpages116may add, delete, or change functionality, resulting in the need to make or change requests. Thus, multiple domains could be replaced, removed, added, and/or changed, which may result in the lookup module204incorrectly assuming suspicious formjacking. Thus, if the difference in the number of domains is higher than one or a couple (e.g., such as four or five or more), then it is more likely a webpage redesign than formjacking. In one example embodiment, the threshold may be set at four, where if the difference in the number of domains between the historical instance of the webpage116and the current webpage is greater than zero but fewer than or equal to the threshold of four, the lookup module204may determine the webpage116is suspicious.

In one embodiment, the threshold may be defined by way of analysis over time. For example, the formjacking module108may analyze the change of domains associated with a webpage116over a time period, such as a day, a week, a month, a year, etc., and determine what number of domains is more likely expected. In an additional or alternative embodiment, machine learning algorithms may be used to automatically determine and implement a reasonable threshold. In an additional or alternative embodiment, an administrator may manually set a threshold, or a user may manually set a threshold.

After marking the webpage116as suspicious, the lookup module204may send the webpage116data and associated domain information to the analysis module206. The analysis module206may observe which new objects are being loaded by the webpage116, and compare the new objects to the historical objects, scripts, domains, etc. associated with the webpage116. The analysis module206may then do an analysis on the new objects, scripts, domains, etc. and determine if there is suspicious activity associated with the new objects, scripts, domains, etc. Thus, the analysis module206may make further confirmation that the webpage116is suspicious, and subsequently pass the webpage116data to the verdict module208.

In some embodiments, the verdict module208may be a domain reputation service, where the verdict module208determines the reputation of the received domains, determines the age of the received domains, determines if there are digital signatures associated with the domains, and the like. The verdict module208, may thus receive the analysis from the analysis module206and make a determination that the domain is malicious or benign. In one embodiment, the verdict module208may visit each domain to determine if there is suspicious activity. In an additional or alternative embodiment, the verdict module208may use machine learning to visit and “test” each domain. In an additional or alternative embodiment, the verdict module may pass the domain to a sandbox to do automatic checks on the domain for suspicious activity.

In an additional or alternative embodiment, verdict module208may also initiate a security action upon the determination that a domain is determined to be malicious. For example, the security action may include adding the domain to a blacklist (or a whitelist, if the domain is deemed benign), blocking access to the domain, setting up a firewall, setting up a proxy, sending an alert to the user or an administrator, and the like.

Two example embodiments are described. In one example embodiment, monitoring module202may receive a request to visit www.domain-A.com/form.html. In this example, the requested URL contains a web form, so the monitoring module202passes the domain www.domain-A.com/form.html to the lookup module204. In one embodiment, the lookup module204is running on the server device106. Thus, in one embodiment, the lookup module may send to the analysis module206a list of third-party domains historically associated with the web form (e.g., domain-1.com, domain-2.com, domain-3.com).

Analysis module206may then determine which objects are requested by the current session of www.domain-A.com/form.html. During this determination, analysis module206determines that www.domain-A.com/form.html requests objects from domain-1.com, domain-2.com, and domain-XX.com. Because domain-XX.com is new and unexpected, the analysis module206may pass domain-XX.com to the verdict module208for further analysis, to determine that domain-XX.com is malicious, or for verdict module208to take a security action. For example, the security action may be to place domain-XX.com on a blacklist, to block domain-XX.com, etc.

In one example embodiment, monitoring module202may receive a request to visit www.domain-A.com/form.html. In this example, the requested URL contains a web form, so the monitoring module202passes the domain www.domain-A.com/form.html to the lookup module204. In one embodiment, the lookup module204is running on the server device106. Thus, in one embodiment, the lookup module may send to the analysis module206a list of third-party domains historically associated with the web form (e.g., domain-1.com, domain-2.com, domain-3.com).

Analysis module206may then determine which objects are requested by the current session of www.domain-A.com/form.html. However, during this determination, analysis module206determines that www.domain-A.com/form.html requests objects from only domain-1.com, domain-3.com, and thus there is one fewer domain (e.g., domain-2.com) associated with www.domain-A.com/form.html. In this embodiment, the difference of having one fewer domain may be a result of dynamic calling, or may have been purposefully removed. Because the change in the number of domains is zero or fewer than the historically-expected number of domains, the formjacking module108does nothing further and resumes normal execution.

Although multiple modules108,202,204,206, and208are described as performing certain functions, any of the modules may be interchangeable, with each module performing any or all of the actions described. In one embodiment, the modules may perform the tasks on a single computing device, such as the client device104or the server device106; however, in an additional or alternative embodiment, the modules may perform the tasks on multiple computing devices.

FIG. 3illustrates an example method300for pre-filtering detection of injected scripts on webpages accessed by a computing device. The method300may be performed, in some embodiments, by a device or system, such as by the client device104, the server device106, and/or the formjacking module108. In these and other embodiments, the method300may be performed by one or more processors based on one or more computer-readable instructions stored on one or more non-transitory computer-readable media. The method300will now be described in connection withFIG. 1andFIG. 2.

Method300may include, at action302, receiving an indication of access to the webpage at a web browser of the computing device. For example, the monitoring module202may receive an indication that the web browser has received a request to access a specific webpage (e.g., a user navigating to a webpage, clicking on a link returned from a search query).

Method300may include, at action304, identifying a web form associated with the webpage. For example, the monitoring module202may identify that the requested webpage116contains a web form into which a user may enter potentially private and security information such as personally identifiable information, financial information, etc. In the embodiment where the requested webpage116does not contain a web form, the formjacking module108may not take any further steps.

Method300may include, at action306, determining that the webpage has been previously visited by the computing device. For example, the monitoring module202may determine whether the user (or another user) has previous visited the requested webpage116, such that there may be a history of domains associated with the requested webpage116from a previous visit.

Method300may include, at action308, recording at least one current network domain associated with at least one current object request made by the web form. For example, the monitoring module202may determine that the web form is associated with at least one object request, and that the at least one object request is associated with at least one network domain.

Method300may include, at action310, determining a difference of a count of the at least one current network domain associated with the at least one current object request and a count of at least one historical network domain associated with at least one historical object request previously made by the webpage. For example, the lookup module204may compare at least one network domain determined at action308with a list of network domains historically associated with a previous visit to the web page.

Method300may include, at action312, identifying the webpage as suspicious based on determining that the difference in the number of network domains greater than zero and less than a network domain threshold. For example, the analysis module206may determine that the difference in the number of domains is greater than zero (no change between access versions) but less than the network domain threshold (indicating a likely redesign of the webpage and not suspicious activity). Thus, if the difference in the number of domains falls is greater than zero but less than the network domain threshold, the webpage116may be marked as suspicious by the analysis module206.

Method300may include, at action314, initiating a security action on the webpage based on the identifying. For example, verdict module208initiating a security action such as adding the domain to a blacklist (or a whitelist, if the domain is deemed benign), blocking access to the domain, setting up a firewall, setting up a proxy, sending an alert to the user or an administrator, and the like.

Although the actions of the method300are illustrated inFIG. 3as discrete actions, various actions may be divided into additional actions, combined into fewer actions, reordered, expanded, or eliminated, depending on the desired implementation.

The systems and methods described herein may provide a plurality of benefits and technological improvements, and may result in the practical application of identifying malicious formjacking attacks, minimizing the number of domains to analyze in identifying such attacks, and thus increasing the speed of detection and the speed of mitigation, while minimizing the processing costs. Furthermore, the systems and methods described herein provide a practical application of mitigating or preventing a malicious attack. In addition, mitigation of and prevention of security attacks serves the practical application of protecting personal, economic, financial, and other sensitive data.

Further, it is understood that the method300may improve the functioning of a computer system itself. For example, the functioning of the client device104itself may be improved by the method300by reducing or eliminating the opportunity for an attacker to take control of the client device. Also, the method300may improve the technological field of personal and business privacy and security stopping an attack before the attack occurs.

FIG. 4illustrates an example computer system that may be employed in pre-filtering detection of an injected script on a webpage116accessed by a computing device. In some embodiments, the computer system400may be part of any of the systems or devices described in this disclosure. For example, the computer system400may be part of the client device103, the server device106, the formjacking module108ofFIGS. 1 and 2, and any or all of the modules202,204,206, and208.

The computer system400may include a processor402, a memory404, a file system406, a communication unit408, an operating system410, a user interface412, and a module414, which all may be communicatively coupled. In some embodiments, the computer system may be, for example, a desktop computer, a client computer, a server computer, a mobile phone, a laptop computer, a smartphone, a wearable device (e.g., a smartwatch, heart rate monitor, oxygen detector, thermometer), a tablet computer, a portable music player, a networking device, or any other computer system.

Generally, the processor402may include any suitable special-purpose or general-purpose computer, computing entity, or processing device including various computer hardware or software modules and may be configured to execute instructions stored on any applicable computer-readable storage media. For example, the processor402may include a microprocessor, a microcontroller, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), or any other digital or analog circuitry configured to interpret and/or to execute program instructions and/or to process data, or any combination thereof. In some embodiments, the processor402may interpret and/or execute program instructions and/or process data stored in the memory404and/or the file system406. In some embodiments, the processor402may fetch program instructions from the file system406and load the program instructions into the memory404. After the program instructions are loaded into the memory404, the processor402may execute the program instructions. In some embodiments, the instructions may include the processor402performing one or more of the actions of the method300ofFIG. 3.

The memory404and the file system406may include computer-readable storage media for carrying or having stored thereon computer-executable instructions or data structures. Such computer-readable storage media may be any available non-transitory media that may be accessed by a general-purpose or special-purpose computer, such as the processor402. By way of example, and not limitation, such computer-readable storage media may include non-transitory computer-readable storage media including Read-Only Memory (ROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM), Compact Disc Read-Only Memory (CD-ROM) or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, flash memory devices (e.g., solid state memory devices), or any other storage media which may be used to carry or store desired program code in the form of computer-executable instructions or data structures and which may be accessed by a general-purpose or special-purpose computer. Combinations of the above may also be included within the scope of computer-readable storage media. Computer-executable instructions may include, for example, instructions and data configured to cause the processor402to perform a certain operation or group of operations, such as one or more of the actions of the method300ofFIG. 3. These computer-executable instructions may be included, for example, in the operating system410, in one or more applications, such as the formjacking module108ofFIG. 1, or in some combination thereof.

The communication unit408may include any component, device, system, or combination thereof configured to transmit or receive information over a network, such as the network102ofFIG. 1. In some embodiments, the communication unit408may communicate with other devices at other locations, the same location, or even other components within the same system. For example, the communication unit408may include a modem, a network card (wireless or wired), an infrared communication device, a wireless communication device (such as an antenna), and/or chipset (such as a Bluetooth device, an 802.6 device (e.g., Metropolitan Area Network (MAN)), a WiFi device, a WiMax device, a cellular communication device, etc.), and/or the like. The communication unit408may permit data to be exchanged with a network and/or any other devices or systems, such as those described in the present disclosure.

The operating system410may be configured to manage hardware and software resources of the computer system400and configured to provide common services for the computer system400.

The user interface412may include any device configured to allow a user to interface with the computer system400. For example, the user interface412may include a display, such as an LCD, LED, or other display, that is configured to present video, text, application user interfaces, and other data as directed by the processor402. The user interface412may further include a mouse, a track pad, a keyboard, a touchscreen, volume controls, other buttons, a speaker, a microphone, a camera, any peripheral device, or other input or output device. The user interface412may receive input from a user and provide the input to the processor402. Similarly, the user interface412may present output to a user.

The module414may be one or more computer-readable instructions stored on one or more non-transitory computer-readable media, such as the memory404or the file system406, that, when executed by the processor402, is configured to perform one or more of the actions of the method300ofFIG. 3. In some embodiments, the module414may be part of the operating system410or may be part of an application of the computer system400, or may be some combination thereof. In some embodiments, the module414may function as the formjacking module108ofFIG. 1and/orFIG. 2.

Modifications, additions, or omissions may be made to the computer system400without departing from the scope of the present disclosure. For example, although each is illustrated as a single component inFIG. 4, any of the components402-414of the computer system400may include multiple similar components that function collectively and are communicatively coupled. Further, although illustrated as a single computer system, it is understood that the computer system400may include multiple physical or virtual computer systems that are networked together, such as in a cloud computing environment, a multitenancy environment, or a virtualization environment.

As indicated above, the embodiments described herein may include the use of a special purpose or general purpose computer (e.g., the processor402ofFIG. 4) including various computer hardware or software modules, as discussed in greater detail below. Further, as indicated above, embodiments described herein may be implemented using computer-readable media (e.g., the memory404or file system406ofFIG. 4) for carrying or having computer-executable instructions or data structures stored thereon.

In some embodiments, the different components and modules described herein may be implemented as objects or processes that execute on a computing system (e.g., as separate threads). While some of the methods described herein are generally described as being implemented in software (stored on and/or executed by general purpose hardware), specific hardware implementations or a combination of software and specific hardware implementations are also possible and contemplated.

The foregoing description, for purpose of explanation, has been described with reference to specific embodiments. However, the illustrative discussions above are not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention as claimed to the precise forms disclosed. Many modifications and variations are possible in view of the above teachings. The embodiments were chosen and described to explain practical applications, to thereby enable others skilled in the art to utilize the invention as claimed and various embodiments with various modifications as may be suited to the particular use contemplated.