Title: Once more, without feeling
Domain: philosophy

Question: Why both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status, and what's the relationship between them?

Background: 1. there is a debate about whether the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is necessary for having moral understanding. 2.there is a debate about whether being a welfare subject is sufficient and necessary for moral standing. 3. The distinction between two dimensions of morality, the morality of respect and the morality of humanity, calls for the reinterpretation the relationship between moral standing and consciousness. |

Definitions: 1.moral standing/moral status:The status of an entity that makes it morally considerable, meaning its interests or well-being must be taken into account in moral decision-making.An entity has moral standing if and only if it is the kind of being to whom moral obligations can be owed, or whose interests make a moral difference in how others ought to act.2.welfare subjectivity:the capacity of an entity to have a welfare—that is, to be the subject of experiences, conditions, or states that can affect its well-being positively or negatively.3.autonomy:A psychological capacity for self-government in virtue of which an individual can be credited as the author of her own thoughts and actions, but which is vulnerable (at least in beings like us) to subversion by internal impediments like addiction, mania, and the like.4.phenomenal consciousness:The property of mental states that have qualitative, experiential character—often described as “what it is like” to undergo them.5.affective states:a class of psychological states of which emotions are the paradigm instance. Other commonly recognized affective states include moods and valent bodily sensations, like itches and pains. I assume that affective states are defined at least in part by their degree of positive or negative valence and their constituent level of arousal | .

Methodology: 1.By pointing out that a very wide range of theories of welfare all indicate that affective states are necessary for the ability to accrue welfare goods, and challenging the objective welfare goods that have no necessary connection with affect, to claim that a capacity for affect is necessary for accruing welfare goods.2. Refutes the view that a capacity to be benefited or harmed is necessary for moral standing by presenting an argument by analogy based on widely shared assumptions about what we owe to other human beings and a more direct argument that appeals to intuitions about the ethics of killing agents like Artemis. 3.dvocats that there is some necessary connection between phenomenal consciousness and autonomy, by reviewing global workspace theories and higher-order theories. | |

Answer: 1.Point out the key issue | Are there metaphysically and/or nomologically possible beings who fall outside the scope of the morality of humanity and are protected only by the morality of respect – individuals whose autonomy merits respect but who are not welfare subjects? If so, what does this imply about the relationship between moral standing and consciousness? | 2.The collection of conditions that to be jointly sufficient for an agent to be autonomous. | 2.1 What is the conception of 'autonomy'? | The term 'autonomy' be used here to denote a psychological capacity for self-government in virtue of which an individual can be credited as the author of her own thoughts and actions. | 2.2 What conditions would suffice to make the individual, like “Artemis”, autonomous? | First, she is in a position to determine her behaviour based on rational reflection. Rational reflection involves forming normative and/or evaluative judgements that can guide behaviour. Second, an autonomous individual may be required to be substantively rational to the point of being at least moderately reasons-responsive. Third, autonomy is a property that does not supervene on an individual's current state of mind and instead requires the absence of certain forms of manipulation in her past. Artemis has the right kind of history. | 3.Being a welfare subject is not necessary to satisfy those conditions | 3.1 A capacity for affective states is necessary for welfare subjectivity | (1) What is the conception of 'affective state' | Affective states are a class of psychological states of which emotions are the paradigm instance. Other commonly recognized affective states include moods and valent bodily sensations, like itches and pains. Affective states are defined at least in part by their degree of positive or negative valence and their constituent level of arousal. | (2) A very wide range of theories of welfare tell us affective states are necessary for the ability to accrue welfare goods | The hedonism,happiness, desire-fulfilment theory,Value-fulfilment theories, objective list theories all support that a capacity for affective states is necessary for the ability to accrue welfare goods. | (3)The general reason why a theory of welfare ought to impose a capacity for affective experience as a necessary condition for accruing welfare goods | There is a popular idea that what is good for someone has got to resonate with them and cannot simply leave them cold. | (4)Opposing Dorsey's denial that "valuing" possesses an essential affective dimension. | In Dorsey's example of Sant valuing living in a small town, Stan's belief about the prudential value for him of small-town living is simply in error. Small-town life just does not resonate with him. | Conclusion: A capacity for affective states is necessary for accruing welfare goods (and bads). | 3.2 A capacity for affective states is unnecessary for autonomy | (1)The hypothesis that autonomous agents need not have affective states ought to be acceptable in principle to actual Humeans | Humean theory of motivation might reject that the conditions sufficient to make a person autonomous do not entail a capacity for affective states: Humeans believe that any motivating reason consists of a desire and an appropriately related means-end belief. Not every kind of state we call a 'desire' can serve as a motivating reason when paired with a corresponding means-end belief. | We can render the hypothesis that some possible motivating reasons have evaluative beliefs as constituents consistent with the core of the Humean theory of motivation via the claim that it is possible for one and the same token mental state to be both a desire and an evaluative belief, and so to play the role of a desire in constituting some possible agent's motivating reason. | Conclusion: The hypothesis that autonomous agents need not have affective states ought to be acceptable in principle to actual Humeans. | (2)The hypothesis that autonomous agents need not have affective states is not incompatible with non-cognitivist and purely cognitivist views. | For non-cognitivism, normative or evaluative judgements are not robustly representational states. When it comes to giving a positive characterization of normative or evaluative judgements, it may be thought that non-cognitivists are committed to analysing them as affective states. But “non-cognitive” need not mean “affective”. | According to pure cognitivism, emotions just are normative and/or evaluative judgements. So it may be thought to follow from pure cognitivism that Artemis must be able to exhibit emotions, since emotions are nothing over and above normative or evaluative judgements of a certain kind. But pure cognitivism is not the view that all normative or evaluative judgements are emotions. | Conclusion: Philosophical positions such as the Humean theory of motivation, non-cognitivism, and pure cognitivism might lead one to reject the premise that autonomous agents need not have affective states. However, such rejections are misguided. | 3.3 The objective welfare goods cannot refute the hypothesis that a capacity for affective states is necessary for accruing welfare goods (and bads). | (1) Three putative welfare goods: nature fulfilment, knowledge and autonomy. | (2) nature fulfilment means the development and exercise of those capacities central to an individual's nature. But not every property that serves to characterize an individual's essence is a plausible candidate for the kind of property whose full development is a welfare good. | (3) knowledge. Knowledge requires belief. | (4) autonomy. Some authors who assert that autonomy is a welfare good seem to have in mind a different conception of autonomy – one involving a suitably high degree of independence of mind, for example. | Conclusion: Three putative welfare goods cannot refute the hypothesis that a capacity for affective states is necessary for accruing welfare goods (and bads). | | Conclusion: A capacity for affective states is necessary for welfare subjectivity. A capacity for affective states is unnecessary for autonomy. | | 4.Moral Standing Without Welfare Subjectivity | 4.1 The Argument from Humanity | At least some of the obligations we owe to our fellow human beings do not seem to be grounded in concern for their welfare. Instead, they seem to be grounded in respect for their autonomy and their status as separate, self-governing agents with their own lives to lead. | 4.2 The Argument from Vulcanity | Chalmers' poses about the ethics of killing Vulcans: Chalmers appeals to the possibility of Vulcans in arguing against the view that affective consciousness or sentience is necessary for moral standing. | Vulcans are autonomous beings who are not welfare subjects, the intuition that killing Vulcans is wrong suggests that welfare subjectivity is also unnecessary for someone's autonomy to merit respect. | | Conclusion: Welfare subjectivity is also unnecessary for someone's autonomy to merit respect. | | 5.The relationship between autonomy and phenomenal consciousness | 5.1 Autonomy without consciousness | The view that autonomy confers moral standing only in the presence of consciousness resembles a form of prejudice against the unconscious. | 5.2 Appealing to Reductive Theories of Consciousness | A posteriori physicalism, the view that the mental reduces without remainder to the physical based on identity statements that are not knowable a priori, may suggest a necessary connection between autonomy and phenomenal consciousness. | global workspace theories and higher order theories are most likely to vindicate this approach, but are both hardly immune to doubt. | The overall approach — namely, accepting a posteriori physicalism — is itself open to doubt. | 5.3 Linking Consciousness and Autonomy Without Reductionism | An argument that links consciousness and rationality may provide a way to link consciousness and autonomy without presupposing a reductive theory of consciousness. Multiple arguments for that claim can be made. | A bottom-up approach that directly interrogates the different sources of knowledge and their relationship to phenomenal consciousness may also link consciousness and autonomy without reductionism. | The conclusion that justified perceptual belief requires phenomenal consciousness in and of itself gets us a big part of the way to the conclusion that all autonomous agents must exhibit phenomenal consciousness. | Conclusion: There is a way of linking consciousness and autonomy that doesn't presuppose a reductive theory of consciousness. | | Conclusion: Autonomy entails phenomenal consciousness. | | 6.Conclusion | Conclusion1: Both welfare subjectivity and autonomy are able to confer moral status, and that autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity. | Conclusion2: Autonomy entails phenomenal consciousness.2

Checklist: 1.Does the answer discuss what conditions would suffice to make the individual autonomous? | 2.Does the answer include the view that a capacity for affective states is necessary for welfare subjectivity? | 3.Does the answer include the view that a capacity for affective states is unnecessary for autonomy? | 4.Does the answer discuss the relationship between autonomy and phenomenal consciousness? | 5.Does the answer include the view that autonomy entails phenomenal consciousness?