Title: The Law and Lawlessness of U.S. Immigration Detention
Domain: Law

Question: Why is it difficult for detainees in the US immigration detention system to obtain substantive rights protection through judicial procedures? How should judicial review be based on the reconstruction of legislative and administrative history to determine the criteria for 'civil detention interests'?

Background: 1. Difficulties in judicial practice. At the constitutional level, the review of "punitive conditions" by courts is constrained by the principles of "plenari power" and "penal power doctrine", equating detention standards with criminal imprisonment, as seen in Hope v. Warden and Fraihat v. ICE cases. At the level of written law, the provision in Section 1231 (g) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act regarding "appropriate places of detention" has been misinterpreted as an administrative discretionary authorization rather than a binding obligation. At the administrative law level, ICE detention standards are considered as' non mandatory guidelines'. | 2. History and policy evolution. During the federalization period, congressional federalization of detention aimed to improve the harsh conditions of private dock detention facilities and establish the dual goal of "humane detention". In the era of national security (1950s): The "appropriate place" clause in the Internal Security Act aimed to avoid "concentration camps" and required differentiation from punitive facilities. Since the 1980s, Congress has strengthened the enforcement of ICE standards through the "Two Strikes Mandate" and the Office of Inspection and Control (OIDO), gradually losing trust in the discretion of administrative agencies.

Definitions: 1. Civil Detention Interest: a composite intention reflected in federal legislation and administrative history: (1) to ensure non punitive and humane detention conditions; (2) The demand for congressional supervision arising from the negligence of administrative agencies. | 2. Lawlessness: Refers to a state where detainees lack foreseeable and enforceable substantive rights standards, and judicial remedies are systematically ineffective.

Methodology: 1. Historical analysis method: Vertically review legislative debates, hearing records, and administrative documents from three periods (such as the 1944 federal regulations on detention restrictions for women and children). | 2. Case study method: By comparing immigration detention cases (A.S.M. v. Warden) with ordinary civil detention rights standards (Kingsley v. Hendrickson) through case studies. | 3. Research methods of legal doctrine: reinterpret the legislative intent of INA § 1231 (g) (1) and 1103 (a) (11), and argue that "appropriate places" and "acceptable conditions" are legal sources of rights.

Answer: 1. Three reasons for the current predicament | Firstly, there is a fallacy in judicial cognition, where courts confuse the government interests of "deportation procedure assistance" and "detention condition management", while ignoring the independent "civil detention interests" of Congress. The Fraitat case refused to apply the Bell standard. Secondly, there is a misinterpretation of written law, where INA provisions are interpreted as expanding administrative power, but history has shown that they aim to establish minimum standards of humanity. Thirdly, administrative guidelines are virtually non-existent, and ICE standards, which should have been Congress' response to administrative failures, are seen as voluntary guidelines. Therefore, the focus of reconstruction is on the reconstruction basis: recognizing the "civil detention interest" as an independent government interest, separating it from the goal of expulsion law enforcement, and returning judicial review to the Bell case's "purpose means" proportional analysis framework. | 2. Historical reinterpretation of legislative authorization and reconstruction of written legal rules | The history of congressional intervention in the detention system reflects the legislative intent. This is manifested in two points. The first is the republican commitment to "appropriate places". In the legislative debate of the 1950 Internal Security Act, the controversy over "concentration camps" prompted Congress to emphasize that detention facilities must be immigration checkpoints (such as Ellis Island) and distinguished from criminal facilities (Lehlbach interrogation records). Accordingly, § 1231 (g) (1) should be interpreted as a restrictive authorization for the category of detention facilities, prohibiting the use of prison templates. Secondly, regarding the contractual implementation of "acceptable conditions," the "cooperation agreement" clause in § 1103 (a) (11) requires funds to be paid to improve local prison conditions, reflecting the intention of Congress to promote the classification of detention facilities. A three-tier mechanism should be constructed based on this: detainees can file lawsuits against local facilities that do not meet ICE standards; The federal court froze financial payments on the grounds of "explicit violation of funding conditions"; The OIDO monitoring report shall be given priority for acceptance as evidence of systematic violations. | 3. Enhancing the effectiveness of administrative standards and empowering the judiciary | The soft law attributes of ICE standards have undergone a qualitative change due to congressional intervention, and the enforcement mechanism needs to be restructured. Firstly, the normative extension of the Accardi principle: ICE standards comply with the "impact on private rights" standard (Morton v. Ruiz) and have quasi statutory effect due to their integration into the "two strike clause" of Congress. Refusing to enforce such rules is equivalent to allowing the abuse of administrative discretion. Enforcement should be carried out through two judicial channels. Firstly, in the procedural pathway, detainees can sue ICE for violating APA § 706 (1) administrative inaction (Innovation Law Lab pathway); Secondly, in the physical path, the standard is regarded as a contractual requirement, granting the detained person the right of execution as a third-party beneficiary, imitating California private law remedies. | 4. Legitimacy basis for institutional restructuring | (1) Judicial role correction. The court only enforces the civil detention benefits established by Congress (such as checkpoint standards and non punitive places of isolation), and does not create new policies. | (2) Strengthen administrative accountability. By enforcing standards through Accardi, ICE is forced to develop an internal regulatory culture (such as transparency in medical isolation procedures). | (3) Implement the legislative intent. Integrate the Congress' rejection of concentration camps in 1950 and the stringent design of the two strike clause after 2000 into operational judicial review standards. | 5. Backup Plan: Restructuring Failure and Institutional Abolition | If the judiciary continues to refuse to recognize the benefits of civil detention, it can confirm that the immigration detention system is essentially a "legal vacuum" and can instead support its abolition. Judicial evasion of the civil interests explicitly stated by Congress exposes the incompatibility of the detention system with the constitutional framework. The failure of judicialization of detainees' rights, such as death reports, will provide moral impetus for the abolition movement. | By combining the excavation of historical meanings, the updating of legal doctrine, and institutional design, a feasible path for judicial intervention has been constructed, while anchored in the legislative history of Congress to dispel doubts about the "anti majority problem". Always take "civil detention interests" as the axis to run through legal interpretation and institutional reconstruction.

Checklist: 1. Reveal three root causes for detainees’ lack of substantive rights protection: judicial cognitive errors, misinterpretation of statutes, and virtualization of administrative guidelines.  
2. Restructure constitutional review: adopt objective rationality, extend Kingsley and Jones v. Blanas logic, and introduce rebuttable presumption against punitive detention.  
3. Update statutory interpretation: redefine INA §1231(g)(1) as “appropriate place” (non-punitive facilities) and activate INA §1103(a)(11) “Acceptable Conditions” as a statutory cause of action.  
4. Enforce administrative guidelines: treat ICE standards as binding under the Accardi principle, and allow detainees to enforce contracts as third-party beneficiaries.