Testimony of:  
Omar Perez  
Special Agent 
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Good afternoon Chairman Obey, Ranking Member Tiahrt and distinguished Members of 
the Subcommittee.  I am Omar Perez, Special Agent with the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG).  I am stationed in the 
Miami Regional Office, and I am a member of one of the Medicare Fraud Strike Force 
teams.  I am honored for the opportunity and invitation to discuss OIGs efforts in 
combating Medicare and Medicaid fraud. 
 
I am here this afternoon to tell you what I experience as a criminal investigator who is on 
the front-line in the fight against criminal health care fraud.  Although the vast majority 
of Medicare providers are honest, my job is to focus on the ones who steal from the 
program.  I am actively engaged in criminal health care fraud investigations, executing 
search and arrest warrants, seizing bank accounts, and providing Grand Jury testimony in 
the pursuit of criminal indictments. 
 
In Miami, Medicare fraud is not only perpetrated by independent, scattered groups, but 
also by competitive, organized businesses complete with hierarchies and opportunities for 
advancement.  Medicare fraud is discussed openly on the streets and is accepted as a safe 
and easy way to get rich quick.     
 
Who commits this fraud?  People from all walks of life  they say its easy money and 
its safer than dealing drugs.  I see people who never finished high school living lavish 
lifestyles, making anywhere from $100,000 to millions of dollars a year by committing 
Medicare fraud.  The money involved is staggering.   We see business owners, health 
care providers and suppliers, doctors, and Medicare beneficiaries participate in the 
fraud.   We see drug dealers and organized criminal enterprises participate in the fraud. 
 
How much money is involved?  Too much.  As an example, I will tell you a little later 
about one of my cases  in which $1.8 million was billed to Medicare in a two and a half 
week time period.   
 
In my testimony today, I will describe a typical Medicare fraud scheme that we 
investigate in Miami.  I will then provide an overview of the Miami Strike Force 
investigative approach from an agents perspective.  I will share examples of Miami 
Strike Force success stories.  Finally, I will discuss the evolution of fraud in South 
Florida.   
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
House Appropriations Committee    Page 1 of 6 
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies 
March 4, 2010                                                                                                  
  COMMON DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT FRAUD SCHEMES PRE-STRIKE FORCE  
 
Prior to the start of the Strike Force, South Florida was riddled with sham durable 
medical equipment (DME) companies.  Some of these companies started out as 
legitimate operations with a Medicare billing number; however, they were unsuccessful 
as the market was saturated with illegitimate DME suppliers.  As a result, these 
companies were sold all too often and their new owner(s) had one idea in mind:  steal 
from Medicare. 
 
Once in the hands of these criminals, these companies no longer provided legitimate 
services.  In order to perpetrate the fraud, nominee owners1 were recruited.  The names 
of these nominee owners were placed on corporate documents, lease agreements, and 
corporate bank accounts.  Those perpetrating the fraud then obtained lists of stolen 
Medicare beneficiary information which were compiled by individuals with access to 
patient information, such as employees of hospitals, clinics, and physicians offices.  The 
criminals also obtain lists of stolen physician Unique Physician Identification Numbers 
(UPIN), assigned to physicians by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 
which are essential to the completion of a Medicare claim for reimbursement.  With these 
two key pieces of information, the nominee owners would submit fraudulent claims to 
Medicare for DME that was never provided.  The types of equipment ranged from 
nebulizers and corresponding medications, to incontinence supplies to motorized 
wheelchairs. 
 
Once CMS paid the claims and deposited money into the companys bank account, it was 
withdrawn within days using multiple check cashers. T he idea was to deplete the account 
so that once Medicare discovered the fraudulent billing, which could take 6 months to 
1 year, there would be no money in the account.  
 
MIAMI STRIKE FORCE APPROACH TO COMBATING FRAUD 
 
The DME fraud schemes described above were executed within a matter of months.  
After billing Medicare for millions of dollars, companies would change ownership, bill 
Medicare again for millions of dollars, close and simply take over another company and 
repeat the process in another location.  By the time traditional investigative referral 
methods came to fruition, criminals had absconded with millions of tax payer dollars.    
 
A streamlined investigative approach was created for Strike Force investigations.  The 
Strike Force model is a collaboration between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and HHS.  
Each Strike Force team includes agents from HHS OIG and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, as well as attorneys from DOJ.  The teams are supported by investigative 
analysts as well as CMS program experts and contractors.  Miami has five Strike Force 
teams dedicated to investigating HIV infusion therapy fraud, physical 
                                                 
1 A nominee owner is an individual who is recruited and paid by the true owner to be the owner of record 
for a DME company.  This process occurs to protect the identity of the true owner. 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
House Appropriations Committee    Page 2 of 6 
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies 
March 4, 2010                                                                                                  
  therapy/occupational therapy fraud, DME fraud, and pharmacy fraud.  There are also 
three teams in Miami dedicated to investigating Medicare Part A Home Health Agency 
fraud. 
 
The individual investigations generally follow a model that has proved highly successful 
in these fraud schemes.  The model includes the following steps: (1) analyze and evaluate 
claims data; (2) obtain the Medicare enrollment application; (3) identify the medical 
biller; (4) identify and obtain bank information; and (5) identify the true owner of the 
clinic and/or DME company that is under investigation. 
 
Analyze and evaluate claims data 
 
Strike Force team members receive Medicare billing data gleaned from a wide variety of 
CMS data systems.  We analyze the data to identify aberrant billing patterns.  Before 
Strike Force teams were initiated, the referrals we received contained billing data that 
was typically between 6 months and 1 year old.  Today, the data we receive provides 
billing information that is only 2 to 3 weeks old.  In South Florida, criminals can receive 
several hundred thousand dollars in fraudulent payments within a matter of weeks.  The 
ability to retrieve real-time data, meaning being able to access claims data within hours of 
the claims being submitted, would allow us to potentially obtain evidence immediately to 
substantiate fraudulent activity, thus stopping the payment of a significant amount of 
money and catching the criminals before they and the money disappear. What we have 
now is progress and better than what we had even a year ago, but with new resources I 
am hopeful for even more improvement. 
 
The claims information can help us identify important information in assessing whether a 
fraudulent scheme is underway, including: 
  total amount paid  
  dates of service  
  referring/ordering physicians  
  beneficiaries  
  claim dates  
  types of procedures billed   
  place of service  
  provider banking information  
  ownership status.   
 
This process is called developing an investigative snapshot2 of the suspected fraudulent 
activity. 
 
Obtain the Medicare enrollment application and other data 
                                                 
2 Snapshot refers to an excerpt of a providers or suppliers billing history that includes total amount 
billed, claims denied, patient name, referring physicians, procedural codes billed, dates of service and place 
of service. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
House Appropriations Committee    Page 3 of 6 
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies 
March 4, 2010                                                                                                  
   
Obtaining the Medicare enrollment application is extremely important because it 
identifies the registered owner, his or her financial institution, and the authorized medical 
billing representative.  For investigators, this information can generate countless leads to 
other co-conspirators involved in the fraudulent activity. 
 
Identify the Medicare medical biller 
 
The Medicare billing process begins when the medical biller electronically submits the 
patients information to a Medicare claims contractor for processing and reimbursement.  
The medical biller could be an employee of the fraudulent company and/or a contracted 
third party.  It is important for investigators to interview the medical biller to determine 
his or her level of complicity, if any, and identify who provided the billing information. 
 
Identify the bank account and financial institution of the fraudulent business 
 
A critical investigative step is determining the true owner of the fraudulent providers 
bank account.  In many instances, the true owner is not the individual who opened the 
bank account, withdrew or transferred funds, and/or cashed the Medicare checks.  It is a 
significant investigative step for investigators to identify and interview all individuals 
with signatory control over these accounts. 
 
Identify the true owner of the clinic and/or DME company 
 
Strike Force members utilize commercial databases, bank account data, and informants in 
an effort to identify the true owners of the company.  Once the true owner is identified, 
Strike Force members will attempt to interview the true owner in furtherance of the 
investigation. 
 
Typically, a nominee owner is paid $10,000 to $20,000 for his or her role.  Our sources 
have told us that nominee owners have been recruited in other countries and travel to 
South Florida solely for this purpose. After being paid, they return to their native 
countries. 
 
MIAMI STRIKE FORCE SUCCESS STORIES 
 
To highlight the successes of our streamlined investigative strategy, I offer the following 
examples:  
 
My Strike Force team discovered, through data analysis, an aberrant billing pattern for 
City Wide M.S. Corp (City Wide), a DME company.  City Wide had just been purchased 
by Rodolfo Gonzalez . In that month alone, Gonzalez had caused approximately $1.8 
million in fraudulent claims to be submitted to Medicare.  (Prior to the change of 
ownership, City Wide was submitting claims of nominal value.) The Strike Force team 
members contacted the bank where City Wide received its electronic deposits and learned 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
House Appropriations Committee    Page 4 of 6 
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies 
March 4, 2010                                                                                                  
  that over $100,000 was in the account. One day later, agents were advised that someone 
was trying to deplete the account. We rushed to the bank but did not find the individual 
there.  Immediately, we went to Gonzalezs home to interview him.  Prior investigative 
steps had revealed that the highest referring physician identified in City Wides claims 
data attested he did not know the patients billed under his UPIN nor had the physician 
ordered the type of equipment for which City Wide was billing. When confronted, 
Gonzalez admitted he owned the company and was an authorized signer on the account. 
In an attempt to minimize his involvement in the fraud, he voluntarily forfeited the funds 
in the account to the Government that day. Immediately after we interviewed Gonzalez, 
City Wide Medicare claims ceased.  Gonzalez was indicted and charged with conspiracy, 
healthcare fraud, and aggravated identity theft. He was found guilty by a trial jury of 
conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, sentenced to 48 months incarceration, and 
ordered to pay $325,442 in restitution. 
 
In a second illustrative case, my Strike Force team received a phone call from a financial 
institution advising that Reinel Pulido was inquiring about a hold placed on his 
companys corporate bank account. Soroa Medical was a DME company that Pulido 
claimed he was operating for a friend. The company submitted over $15.6 million in 
fraudulent claims and was reimbursed $1,565,410.  Pulido was interviewed at the bank 
and admitted to being recruited to place his name on all the documents related to Soroa 
Medical.  He was paid approximately $50,000 for becoming the nominee owner. Strike 
Force agents confronted Pulido with the evidence and he voluntarily forfeited the 
$75,910 in his companys bank account.  Pulido was arrested immediately.  He was 
sentenced to 36 months incarceration and was ordered to pay $1,565,410 in restitution. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF FRAUD IN SOUTH FLORIDA 
 
In many instances, criminals have shifted their schemes from purchasing legitimate DME 
companies to instead establishing storefront shams. The storefronts are set up by 
criminals who have the required equipment to pass Medicare onsite inspections.  Once 
the Medicare provider number has been issued, the individuals pick up their equipment 
and all that remains is an empty storefront.  
 
Some criminals create additional layers to shield the true owners to counter Strike Force 
tactics.  Prior to Strike Force operations, the true owner was most likely an associate of 
the nominee owner.  Now there are many levels to a criminal enterprise; each level 
operating independently of the others but controlled by the same person. 
 
We have also found that criminals are now often migrating to other services within the 
Medicare program to perpetrate their fraud.  Other services impacted include:  home 
health, community mental health, and physical therapy/occupational therapy.  
Historically, Medicare beneficiaries and physicians were not involved in criminal 
enterprise. Now we are finding that in many cases both are getting paid to participate in 
fraud.  
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
House Appropriations Committee    Page 5 of 6 
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies 
March 4, 2010                                                                                                  
  CONCLUSION 
 
The investigative approach and success stories referenced today represent the dedication 
and commitment of all OIG special agents and their collaborative partners in the fight 
against criminal fraud within the Medicare and Medicaid insurance programs.  The 
HEAT initiative is an example of how combined resources, technology and collaboration 
can be synthesized to combat healthcare fraud in an effort to protect one of the most 
vulnerable segments in our society.   
 
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss Strike Force operations in South Florida and the 
strategies and investigative methods utilized to protect the interest of all taxpayers.  I 
would be happy to answer any questions that the Subcommittee may have. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
House Appropriations Committee    Page 6 of 6 
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies 
March 4, 2010