Testimony before the United States Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 
Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, 
and International Security 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Harnessing Technology and Innovation to Cut Waste  
and Curb Fraud in Federal Health Programs 
Testimony of Lewis Morris 
Chief Counsel 
Office of Inspector General 
U.S, Department of Health and Human Services 
 
 
July 12, 2011 
2:30 P.M. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building 
 
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U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security (July 12, 2011) 
  Testimony of:  
Lewis Morris 
Chief Counsel 
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Good afternoon, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Brown, and other distinguished Members 
of the Subcommittee.  I am Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel to the Inspector General of the U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services (HHS or the Department).  Thank you for the 
opportunity to testify about the role new technologies can play in cutting waste and fraud in the 
Federal health care programs.   
 
Program integrity efforts are enhanced by new information technologies and benefit from 
collaboration with the private sector, especially health insurers with whom we share investigative 
techniques and intelligence.  My testimony provides several examples of how advanced data 
analytics are helping us conduct risk assessments, more effectively pinpoint our oversight efforts, 
and significantly reduce the time and resources required for audits, investigations, and other 
program integrity activities.   
 
However, technology is not a silver bullet, and now more than ever, experienced professionals 
are integral to protecting Medicare and Medicaid.  It is also important to be mindful that as 
program integrity efforts become more technology driven, so will health care fraud and we must 
adapt to this evolving environment.  Additionally even the best fraud prevention technologies 
will be of little value if not effectively implemented and appropriately overseen.   
 
New Technologies Hold Tremendous Potential for Enhancing Our Fraud Fighting Efforts 
 
OIG is using information technologies and analytics, including data mining, trend evaluation, 
and modeling, to better identify fraud vulnerabilities and target our oversight efforts.  OIG is 
leveraging an analytical foundation that provides an enterprise view of questionable activities, 
suspected fraud trends, and prevention opportunities.  When united with the expertise of our 
agents, auditors, and program evaluators, OIG brings a formidable combination of cutting edge 
techniques and traditional investigative skills to the fight against fraud, waste, and abuse.   
 
OIGs data warehouse is a key component of our strategic use of information technologies.  
Among other things, the warehouse integrates data from Medicare Parts A, B, and D so we can 
develop a more comprehensive picture of beneficiaries histories of medical care and providers 
billing patterns.  For example, we can flag Part D prescription drug claims where there is not a 
related physician or hospital claim under Parts A or B, the absence of which suggests possible 
fraud.     
 
In addition to adding powerful analytic tools, the data warehouse has the potential for 
dramatically improving the timeliness and impact of our work.  Prior to developing the 
warehouse, OIG analysts and auditors often waited months to access a data extract from 
 
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U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
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  Medicare=s National Claims History.  Further delays resulted from writing and running the many 
mainframe-based applications needed to complete an analysis or data match.  Having the claims 
data in-house also means that we no longer compete for time on the CMS mainframe servers and 
can introduce new data mining tools and other related databases tailored to OIGs oversight and 
enforcement work.  Data matches that used to take weeks or months to complete are now 
performed in-house in a matter of hours.   
 
Information technology enables OIG to expand our analysis of questionable billing patterns.  For 
example, through data mining and analytics we found that Medicare was spending about $4,400 
for inhalation drugs per beneficiary in south Florida compared to $815 per beneficiary in the rest 
of the country.  Combining data from the manufacturer and wholesalers of a particularly 
expensive inhalation drug, we found that south Florida suppliers billed Medicare for 17 times 
more than the total amount of that drug sold to those providers.  We can also more efficiently 
identify fraudulent claims for services provided to deceased beneficiaries, bills submitted by 
deceased providers, and health care providers who are using beneficiary numbers we know have 
been compromised. 
 
OIG=s Use of Information Technology To Support Audits  
 
OIGs new hospital compliance initiative illustrates the impact of technology on our ability to 
identify suspect claims and non-compliant billing practices.   Payments for inpatient and 
outpatient hospital services account for roughly 30 percent of the $515 billion spent on 
Medicare.  Given these significant program outlays, OIG has deployed resources toward testing 
and ensuring the 3,600 acute care hospitals= compliance with program requirements.   
 
In the past, OIGs hospital audits typically focused on a specific area of risk (e.g., unbundling of 
services, inpatient same-day discharges and readmissions, and credits for medical devices), and 
we audited claims exclusively related to that issue.  In part, we had narrowly focused our audits 
due to limits on our capacity to store and match data.  As a consequence of increased data 
storage, computer matching, and data analytic capabilities, we are now more quickly and 
efficiently analyzing a vast array of hospital data to simultaneously identify multiple compliance 
risks.   
 
As part of our ongoing hospital audit initiative, we test hospitals against 27 risk areas that our 
prior audit and enforcement experience indicate are error-prone.  To better focus our testing, we 
also analyze other hospital information, such as provider overpayment, Medicare exclusions, and 
law enforcement databases.  Collectively, these data provide a comprehensive picture of how a 
hospital is performing and where compliance problems may exist.  Using computer matching and 
data mining techniques, we then identify potential problem areas, select claims for testing, and 
conduct hospital site visits to perform comprehensive reviews of billing and medical record 
documentation.  Hospitals must return any identified overpayments and are expected to 
implement necessary internal controls to prevent future improper billing.  We have completed 
several such audits and have 40 more planned or underway.  Two years ago, the data analytics 
would have taken weeks or months to execute.  Now, it takes approximately 20 minutes to run 
the computer program for each hospital. 
 
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U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
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  It is important to note that while the use of data analytics allows for a more efficient and targeted 
audit process, the expertise and insight of auditors, coding professionals, and medical consultants 
remain an essential part of this and any technology-assisted review.  Medicine and the health 
care system are extremely complex.  A data run, even if derived from sophisticated metrics and 
powerful computers, cannot replace the role of professionals who bring experience and insight to 
the analysis of that data.  In short, technology can be a powerful tool in the fight against waste, 
fraud, and abuse, but it is not a stand-alone solution.    
  
Given the magnitude of hospital expenditures, we believe this innovative use of information 
technology is essential to identifying and recovering improper Medicare payments.  We plan to 
integrate this Part A hospital data with Parts B and D data to better understand relationships 
between provider groups and identify payment vulnerabilities in other areas of the Medicare 
Program.  We will partner with CMS and hospitals as this initiative moves forward.    
 
In addition to dramatically increasing the efficiency of our audits, this data-driven approach 
yields additional benefits.  Adopting these types of data analytics, hospitals should be able to 
identify and correct compliance problems early before claim submission. We also have received 
feedback from the hospital community that these targeted audits enabled them to strengthen their 
compliance programs and address compliance more comprehensively instead of focusing on only 
singular issues.   
 
OIG Use of Information Technology in Support of Fraud Investigations 
 
As exemplified by the Medicare Fraud Strike Forces, sophisticated data analysis, combined with 
field intelligence and traditional law enforcement techniques, have enabled us to more quickly 
identify fraud schemes and trends.  The data-driven approach of the Strike Forces pinpoints fraud 
hot spots through the identification of suspicious billing patterns and targets criminal behavior as 
it occurs.  The Strike Force model has proven highly successful and has accelerated the 
Governments response to criminal fraud, decreasing by roughly half the average time from an 
investigations start to the cases prosecution.  Since their inception in 2007, Strike Force teams 
have charged over 1,000 individuals with seeking to defraud Medicare of more than $2.4 billion.    
 
Advanced data analytics are enhancing not only our Strike Force cases but also our traditional 
investigative work.  For example, in the recent investigation of Clinical Home Care, innovative 
data analysis, coupled with inter-departmental information sharing and agent field work, 
identified over $1.1 million in fraudulent claims.  The efforts of OIG Special Agents, working in 
conjunction with other law enforcement partners and CMSs program integrity contractors, led to 
the arrest of those responsible for the submission of the fraudulent claims.   
 
Relying on State corporation records and field intelligence, OIG identified a suspicious change in 
ownership of Clinical Home Care, a durable medical equipment company (DME) in Palm Beach, 
Florida.  Using recently available data sources, including CMSs Next Generation Desktop 
database, OIG agents compared records of Medicare beneficiaries with compromised 
identification numbers with known fraudulent DME suppliers associated with Clinical Home 
Care and then identified thousands of suspect claims.  OIG agents worked quickly with CMSs 
 
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U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
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  Zone Program Integrity Contractor (ZPIC) to ensure that Medicare did not pay these claims 
pending the investigation.  OIG arrested its first subject in this case only 30 days after the first 
fraudulent claim was submitted to Medicare.  That subject, along with another individual, has 
since pled guilty.  Thanks to a combination of technology, interagency collaboration and hard 
work, not a single dollar was lost due to these fraudulent claims.  
 
While successful conclusion of a health care fraud investigation in 30 days is not the norm, this 
case exemplifies the exceptional results we can achieve by using technology, combined with 
agents instincts and knowledge of evolving health care fraud schemes, interagency 
collaboration, and tips from citizens, in the investigation and prosecution of health care fraud.    
 
Use of Information Technology To Strengthen Program Integrity  
 
OIGs use of technology in support of its mission extends far beyond its audit, evaluative, and 
investigative work.  We also will be using information technologies to better utilize one of the 
most powerful tools in our arsenal against fraud, abuse, and substandard care:  the exclusion of 
individuals and entities from participating in Federal health care programs.  Medicare and other 
Federal health care programs will not pay for services or products provided by excluded 
individuals or entities.  If excluded from these programs, a dishonest health care provider is 
effectively out of business. 
 
To notify health care programs and providers and prevent inappropriate payments to excluded 
parties, OIG posts its List of Excluded Individuals and Entities (LEIE) on the OIG Web site.1  
The list is updated monthly and is available in both on-line searchable and downloadable 
formats.  To ensure that health care programs and patients are protected from all fraudulent, 
abusive, incompetent, or otherwise unfit providers, we work with our external partners in State 
Governments and other Federal agencies to receive referrals of individuals and entities that meet 
the criteria for exclusion.     
 
To ensure the continued success of OIGs exclusion program in the 21st century, OIG is 
revamping our processes with a two-pronged approach:  (1) improving coordination:  we will 
improve the completeness of the LEIE by making it easier for external stakeholders to provide 
exclusion-related information to OIG, and (2) increasing communication:  we will improve the 
accessibility of the database to health care providers and other users.  In our efforts to meet both 
of these goals, we are examining new methods to deploy information systems and information 
technology that will promote better integration between existing OIG resources and those of our 
external stakeholders.  The result of this effort will be a system that capitalizes on coordination 
and communication to effectively protect the programs and beneficiaries from untrustworthy 
providers of health care.  
 
Increasing the streams of referrals from our external partners is also vital to our exclusion 
program improvement efforts.  For instance, we receive important information from State 
licensing boards notices of adverse actions that allows us to identify numerous individuals who 
                                                 
1 http://www.oig.hhs.gov/exclusions/index.asp.   
 
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U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
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  are subject to exclusion.  However, we do not receive reports of all adverse actions from all 
States.  State licensing boards are not statutorily required to refer adverse actions against 
providers to OIG.  We currently receive this information on a voluntary basis from the State 
boards, general public notices of board actions in various States, or connections developed by 
OIG exclusions analysts.  Furthermore, the manner and timing of the notices is entirely 
dependent on each State licensing board.   
 
A legislative requirement for State licensure boards to provide notice of adverse actions to OIG 
would increase our ability to identify individuals subject to exclusion.  Further, regular and 
standardized reporting of adverse actions from State licensing boards would allow for more 
timely identification of individuals subject to exclusion and could help prevent providers with 
significant adverse actions against their licenses from moving from State to State to continue 
providing care.  
 
Sharing Intelligence With Private Health Care Insurers  
 
OIG recognizes that private health care insurers have developed a tremendous wealth of 
experience and technological expertise in addressing our common goal of stopping health care 
fraud.  It is axiomatic that most of the criminals who prey on the Nations health care system are 
equal opportunity thieves  they defraud private health care insurance as well as the Federal 
health care programs.      
 
Recognizing this fundamental principle, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996 (HIPAA) established and funds a program to combat fraud and abuse committed against 
all health plans, both public and private.  This legislation required the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of Health & Human Services to establish a Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control 
(HCFAC) Program under the joint direction of the Attorney General and the Secretary (acting 
through the Inspector General).  In furtherance of the goals of the HCFAC program, the Attorney 
General and Secretary issued a Program Statement and detailed set of Guidelines for joint 
HHS/Department of Justice (DOJ) activities to fulfill the dictates of HIPAA.  One of the core 
concepts of the Statement and Guidelines is that DOJ, HHS and other enforcement and program 
agencies will work together with the private sector to pursue a comprehensive enforcement 
approach to health care fraud.  The foundation of this approach is coordinating and exchanging 
information in a regularized manner.    
 
In furtherance of that core concept, the Program Statement and Guidelines outlines a rich menu 
of possible health care anti-fraud, program integrity, and information sharing activities between 
the Federal Government and the private sector.  Among the contemplated activities are:  1) the 
establishment of working groups to examine particular areas of the health care industry in order 
to develop recommendations on enforcement policy; 2) the creation of mechanisms for 
government to alert the public, service providers, and consumers to fraud schemes; and 3) the 
development of mechanisms for identifying information concerning payment or record keeping 
policies, structures, or practices that make public or private health plans vulnerable to fraud, with 
OIG to compile and transmit reports on such vulnerabilities to the health plans so corrective 
action can be taken.   
 
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U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
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  Since the creation of the HCFAC program, OIG, DOJ, and other law enforcement and program 
agencies have worked to carry out the objectives of the program.  As part of that effort, United 
States Attorneys Offices established Health Care Fraud Working Groups, which brought 
together government agencies and private sector insurers united in the common goal of 
combating health care fraud.  These work groups have proven highly effective in promoting 
collaboration.  Our agents report receiving significant field intelligence on ongoing fraud 
schemes and many have engaged in joint public/private investigations in which their private 
sector counterparts provided active assistance or staffing for the case.    
 
Among the private sector organizations participating in this effort is the National Health Care 
Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA).  NHCAA is a national organization focused exclusively on 
the fight against health care fraud, whose members represent more than 100 private health 
insurers.  Its mission is to protect and serve the public interest by increasing awareness and 
improving the detection, investigation, civil and criminal prosecution, and prevention of health 
care fraud.  OIG takes an active role in training conferences and conducts regular liaison 
meetings with NHCAA in order to share information about significant areas of health care fraud 
exposure and emerging trends.  In addition, an OIG investigator sits on the NHCAA board as the 
law enforcement liaison.   
 
Efforts currently are underway to further enhance collaboration with the private sector.  For 
example, the recent Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Team (HEAT) fraud summit 
in Philadelphia emphasized the critical importance of public-private collaboration in the fight 
against health care fraud.2  Because useful information sharing often occurs between 
investigators at a case level, we are working with our law enforcement partners to provide best 
practices guidelines that can promote appropriate information sharing with the private sector.   
 
Anticipating Vulnerabilities and Challenges Presented by the Use of Information 
Technology 
 
As the Committee continues to explore ways in which new technology and private sector 
business practices can enhance program integrity efforts, it is important to be mindful of the 
ways in which fraud will evolve in response to new technologies, as well as the vulnerabilities 
associated with the electronic environment.  It is also important to note some of the 
distinguishing characteristics of the Federal health care programs vis-a-vis private industry. 
 
As program integrity efforts become more technology driven, so will fraud 
 
For example, electronic health records (EHR) may not only facilitate more accurate billing and 
increased quality of care, but also fraudulent billing.  The very aspects of EHRs that make a 
physicians job easiercut-and-paste features and templatescan also be used to fabricate 
information that results in improper payments and leaves inaccurate, and therefore potentially 
dangerous, information in the patient record.  And because the evidence of such improper 
behavior may be in entirely electronic form, law enforcement will have to develop new 
                                                 
2 http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/.   
 
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U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
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  investigation techniques to supplement the traditional methods used to examine the authenticity 
and accuracy of paper records.   
 
Compounding this concern, OIG reports have identified significant vulnerabilities relating to the 
security of electronic patient health information. This work reveals inadequate protection of 
patients health data at hospitals throughout the country and that existing Federal standards and 
certification criteria fail to address important information technology (IT) security controls. 3  
These reports found, among other things, that many hospitals had inadequately safeguarded their 
wireless networks, leaving sensitive health information vulnerable to hacking.  In addition, the 
Department has not promulgated policies that would help ensure that adequate general IT 
controls exist to protect networks and computer systems that contain EHRs.  We recommended 
that the Department conduct compliance reviews to ensure that Security Rule controls are in 
place and operating as intended to protect personal health information. 
 
The concerns about data security extend far beyond EHRs, and apply equally to our efforts to 
enhance program integrity through predictive analytics, integrated data repositories, and other 
new technologies.  As we do so, we must be mindful that in an increasingly electronic 
environment, the ability for data to be compromised and subsequently used for fraud, waste, and 
abuse can quickly and quietly materialize.  
 
For example, CMS and State government data centers process hundreds of terabytes of data each 
month.  To put this in perspective, a terabyte is equal to 220 million pages of text.  This vast 
amount of data is transmitted with varying degrees of control and oversight.  Trends show that 
health care data, including beneficiary and provider information, is stolen and sold by organized 
crime rings or individuals.  Provider and/or beneficiary information is being compromised by 
social engineering schemes such as phishing emails.  Data breaches of public and private entities 
have been occurring worldwide at an alarming rate.  And the attacks are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated and stealthy.  In its August 2010 report, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 
estimated that since 2005, over 533.4 million records have been compromised in thousands of 
publicly disclosed breaches.  The incidents involved breached consumer information, such as 
personal medical records, credit card numbers, and Social Security numbers.    
 
Detecting health care fraud is more complex than detecting credit card fraud 
 
While predictive analytics and other techniques have proven effective in identifying potential 
fraud in credit card transactions, there are distinguishing characteristics of the Federal health care 
programs that should be kept in mind.  For example, CMS has launched a new predictive 
modeling tool that will eventually allow for improved fraud screening before claims are paid.  
OIG will be able to utilize the data derived from the predictive modeling to identify emerging 
                                                 
3 Nationwide Rollup Review of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 Oversight; Audit of Information Technology Security Included in Health Information 
Technology Standards, available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/newsroom/news-releases/2011/security.asp.  
 
 
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  fraud trends.  But there are key differences between the use of data analytic tools in the health 
care environment and the use of these tools by credit card companies.   
 
Credit card transactions are typically submitted immediately at the place and time of service, so 
not only can the data be monitored in real time, but the transaction hits the credit card companys 
database in real time.  One challenge in importing the retail industrys data analytics into the 
health care environment is that a health care provider can bill for a service months after the date 
of service.  Further complicating matters, the claim for a service may initially meet all the 
conditions for payment but subsequently be revealed as improper.  For example, an outpatient 
laboratory test may appear payable when initially submitted by the hospital.  But under Medicare 
rules, separate payments for nonphysician outpatient services rendered within 72 hours of the 
day of an inpatient admission are not permitted.   When the hospital later submits a claim for an 
inpatient stay that began within that 72-hour window, the claim for that laboratory test is 
improper.  This is a very different scenario from a credit card company stopping someone who 
attempts to buy a jet ski in Galveston with a credit card issued to a long-time resident of New 
York City.  
  
Moreover, the health care payor must assess not only whether an item or service was provided as 
claimed, but also determine whether it is medically necessary.  The determination of medical 
necessity often requires information that is not apparent on the face of the claim.  For example, 
in our recently released report on power wheel chairs, we found that sixty percent of power 
wheel chairs provided to Medicare beneficiaries in the first half of 2007 were medically 
unnecessary or had claims that lacked sufficient documentation to determine medical necessity.4  
Medicare paid $95 million for these claims, which on their face appeared legitimate.  In short, 
health care is very complex and it is difficult to predict and prevent health care fraud relying 
solely on data analytics. 
 
Notwithstanding some inherent limitations in applying credit card technologies to health care 
fraud, our law enforcement efforts are enhanced by new data analysis techniques.  The results of 
the health care fraud Strike Forces demonstrate conclusively that data analytics can be 
successfully used to identify geographic fraud hot spots and program areas vulnerable to fraud, 
waste, and abuse.  We are continuing to explore how best to expand the use of information 
technologies to other areas of health care fraud detection. 
 
Effective Contractor Oversight is Critical to the Successful Implementation of Program 
Integrity Efforts  
 
Although new information technologies hold promise for enhancing program integrity efforts, 
even the best fraud prevention techniques will be of no value if not effectively implemented and 
appropriately overseen.  OIG work spanning over a decade has revealed persistent problems with 
the performance of CMSs program integrity contractors and ongoing vulnerabilities in CMSs 
oversight.  
                                                 
4 Most Power Wheelchairs in the Medicare Program Did Not Meet Medical Necessity Guidelines, available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-09-00260.asp.  
 
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U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security (July 12, 2011) 
  These concerns are relevant across the spectrum of program integrity contractors we have 
reviewed, dating back to our 1998 findings of inconsistent performance among the Fiscal 
Intermediaries fraud units that preceded Program Safeguard Contractors (PSC) and Zone 
Program Integrity Contractors.5  Almost a decade later, in 2007, we found that PSCs also 
performed inconsistently, varying substantially in the number of new investigations initiated and 
cases referred to law enforcement, and producing minimal results in key areas such as proactive 
data analysis.6  In a separate review, we found that CMS oversight of PSCs was lacking:  
evaluations of PSCs performance did not include sufficient information and were not completed 
in time for evaluation results to be used in determining whether PSCs contracts should be 
renewed.7  More recently, a 2010 review of overpayments referred by PSCs found that just 2 of 
the 18 PSCs were responsible for 62 percent of the total amount of overpayments referred to 
claims processors for collection.8  In the same 2010 review, we found that millions in 
overpayments identified by the PSCs 9 
 
We have identified similar problems with the performance and oversight of Medicare Drug 
Integrity Contractors (MEDIC) and Recovery Audit Contractors (RAC).  We found that 
MEDICs experienced significant problems accessing and using data, which hindered their ability 
to identify and investigate potential fraud and abuse using proactive methods such as data 
analysis.  Furthermore, CMS failed to give MEDICs the necessary approval to conduct audits of 
Part D plan sponsors compliance plans, an important oversight function.10  In our 2010 
assessment of the RACs, we found that over the 3 years of the demonstration program, they 
made only two fraud referrals and received no formal training from CMS regarding identification 
and referral of potential fraud.11  Over the next year, we will issue additional reports on 
vulnerabilities related to ZPICs and MEDICs.  As CMS moves forward with new efforts that rely 
on contractors to perform data-driven program integrity functions, it is important to be mindful 
of the need for meaningful performance evaluation and adequate oversight. 
 
Conclusion 
 
New technologies, advanced data analytics, and collaboration with the private sector are 
extremely valuable in the ongoing efforts to curb fraud and abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs.  Although these developments are encouraging, we must be mindful that the growth of 
                                                 
5 Fiscal Intermediary Fraud Units, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-97-00350.pdf.  
6 Medicares Program Safeguard Contractors: Activities to Detect and Deter Fraud and Abuse, available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-06-00010.pdf.   
7 Medicares Program Safeguard Contractors: Performance Evaluation Reports, available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-04-00050.pdf.   
8 Medicare Overpayments Identified by Program Safeguard Contractors, available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-08-00031.pdf.   
9 Collection Status of Medicare Overpayments Identified by Program Safeguard Contractors, available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-08-00030.pdf.   
10 Medicare Drug Integrity Contractors Identification of Potential Part D Fraud and Abuse, available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-08-00420.pdf.   
11 Recovery Audit Contractors Fraud Referrals, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-09-00130.pdf.   
  
 
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U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
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  information technologies and the increased access to sensitive data will be accompanied by new 
and evolving fraud risks.  The challenge for OIG is to continue to ensure appropriate 
implementation and provide vigorous oversight of these new technologies.  
 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. 
 
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U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
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