Department of Health and Human Services
 
OFFICE OF 

 
INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S U D
T  ATE   SE OF  EBT 

 
C T R C
OMPROMISE  O  EDUCE  HILD 

 
S   A  
UPPORT  RREARAGES 

 
 
 
 
 
Daniel R. Levinson 
  
Inspector General 

 
October 2007 
 
OEI-06-06-00070 
 
     
  
Office of Inspector General 

 
 
http://oig.hhs.gov 
 
 
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  E X E C U T I V E   S U M M A R Y
OBJECTIVE 
To determine the prevalence, characteristics, and outcomes  of debt 
compromise  programs used by State child support enforcement (CSE) 
agencies to  reduce child support arrearages. 
BACKGROUND 
The Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) estimates that      
$100 billion in unpaid child support has accumulated since the inception 
of a national CSE program in 1972. In an effort to reduce or eliminate 
possibly uncollectible debt, some States use debt compromise, a process 
whereby a State settles a portion or all of the child support debt owed to  
the State by a noncustodial parent.  For this evaluation, we identified  
debt compromise practices among all States based on responses to a 
survey, evaluated program outcomes through site visits to five States, 
and examined a sample of 259 cases that underwent debt compromise.  
FINDINGS 
CSE agencies in 20 States operate fully implemented or pilot debt 
compromise programs, and another 23 States settle arrearage debt 
on a case-by-case basis. Of the 20 States that have debt compromise 
programs, 12 are fully implemented and 8 are pilot programs.  Twenty-
three other States compromise arrearages on a case-by-case basis, and 
the remaining eight States do not allow compromise of arrearages.   
Debt compromise resulted in an average of $9,383 settled per case 
in selected States, with lump sum payments made in 45 percent of 
cases and averaging $5,515.  In the five States, the estimated average 
arrearage per case was $22,029, of which $9,383 was settled.  
Noncustodial parents in 45 percent of cases paid lump sums at the time 
of the agreements averaging $5,515, which was disbursed to States for 
reimbursement of public assistance  and/or to custodial parents for 
payment of  past due child support. 
Forty-one percent of sample cases closed following debt 
compromise, either  after lump sum payments or with all debt 
settled.   In all closed cases in our sample, the noncustodial parent owed  
only an arrearage. Noncustodial parents in 65 percent of cases that 
closed paid lump sums as part of the debt compromise agreements. In 
OEI-06-06-00070     STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   i 
   
   
E X E C U T I V E   S U M M A R Y   
the remaining 35 percent of cases that closed, the full amount of the 
arrearage was settled because CSE officials determined that the 
noncustodial parents were unable to pay any amount or that the 
families were best served by settling all of the debt.   
When sample cases remained open following debt compromise, 
four  of  five States did not routinely follow  up when noncustodial  
parents paid irregularly.  Fifty-nine percent of cases in our sample 
remained open following compromise.  Although  all five selected States 
conduct general reviews of all child  support cases, only California 
reported routinely monitoring debt compromise cases that remain open 
to determine whether noncustodial parents meet their agreements.  We 
found that noncustodial parents in 60 of the 154 sample cases paid 
irregularly or not at all following debt compromise but found evidence of 
rescission in only 2 of these 60 sample cases.    
Cases are eligible for debt compromise based on a number of 
factors, including large arrearages,  and local managers typically  
negotiate agreements.   Eighteen of the twenty States with programs 
consider the amount of the arrearage in determining eligibility.  Other 
factors included whether dependents are emancipated and how long the  
arrearage has been in the caseload.  After determining eligibility, local 
managers most often make the determination to allow debt compromise.   
CSE officials in States  with programs report a largely positive view  
of debt compromise, although a few express concern that settling 
debt is contrary to the enforcement  process.   Officials in 17 of the        
20 States with programs reported advantages, including receiving debt 
payments previously considered uncollectible.  Officials from three 
States noted drawbacks to debt compromise, including the belief that it 
conflicts with the agencys mission to enforce and collect child support.   
RECOMMENDATION 
We recommend that OCSE issue guidance encouraging States to 
routinely monitor cases that remain  open following debt compromise  
agreements to ensure that noncustodial parents meet their agreements.   
Because of the high level of interest in debt compromise, we suggest 
that OCSE also consider issuing guidance regarding the administration  
of debt compromise programs to assist States that are considering new 
programs or revising current practices.  Topics could include the criteria 
used for determining eligibility, the proportion of the debt to be settled, 
OEI-06-06-00070     STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   ii 
   
   
E X E C U T I V E   S U M M A R Y   
suggestions for training staff in making determinations, and use of debt 
compromise to close child support cases only owing arrearages.   
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
RESPONSE 
The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and the Assistant 
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) jointly provided  
comments in response to our draft report.  ACF concurred with our  
recommendation and suggestion and outlined current and planned 
guidance activities. In describing this current and proposed guidance, 
ACF did not explicitly address providing guidance to States regarding 
monitoring of open cases following debt compromise agreements.  
Because the lack of monitoring of debt compromise cases poses a 
vulnerability to the integrity of State debt compromise programs, we  
recommend  that ACF provide guidance to States specific to this issue.  
ASPE commented that the report was useful in providing information 
regarding a policy area in which little research exists.   
OEI-06-06-00070     STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   iii 
   
   
  T A B L E   O F   C O N T E N T S  
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
  
 
 
   
I N T RO DUC T IO N  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
  
 
 
   
F I N D IN G S  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5 
  
 
  CSE agencies in 20 States operate debt compromise programs . . .  5 

 
  Compromise resulted in an average of $9,383 settled per case. . . .  6 
  
  Forty-one percent of cases closed following debt compromise. . . . .  7 
  
  States did not routinely follow up on irregular payers  . . . . . . . . . .  7 
  
  Cases are eligible for compromise based on a number of factors . .  8 
 
  CSE officials report a largely positive view of compromise. . . . . .  10 
  
 
 
R E C O MMEN D A T ION  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 
  
  Agency Comments and Office of Inspector General Response . . .  13 

 
 
APPENDIXES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14 
  
  A: Descriptions of Child Support Programs in Selected States . .  14 

  B:  Detailed Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17 
  
  C:  Status of Debt Compromise for All States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
  
  D:  Estimates and Confidence Intervals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22 

  E:   Agency Comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23 
  
 
 
A C K NO WL E D G M E N T S  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26 
  
   
   
  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
OBJECTIVE 
To determine the prevalence, characteristics, and outcomes  of debt 
compromise  programs used by State child support enforcement (CSE) 
agencies to  reduce child support arrearages. 
BACKGROUND 
The Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) estimates that just 
over $100 billion in unpaid child support (referred to as arrearages) has 
accumulated since the inception of a national CSE program in 1975.1   
State CSE agencies collect payments  toward both current child support 
orders for children still living in the custodial parents home, and 
arrearage debt that accumulates when noncustodial parents do not pay 
all of the current support owed.  The collection of current child support 
has risen considerably in recent years, but arrearage debt remains high.  
In fiscal year (FY) 2005, State CSE agencies overall collected 60 percent 
of the $29 billion due in current support and 7 percent of the $107 
billion due in arrearages.  However, 40 percent  of noncustodial parents 
with arrearages paid nothing toward their arrearages in 2005. 2 State 
collection rates for both current support and arrearages are among the 
criteria OCSE considers in determining incentive funding to States.3   
States have implemented a number of strategies to reduce arrearages,  
including the use of debt compromise. 
Debt Compromise Programs 
Debt compromise is a process of reducing or eliminating child support 
debt owed to the State by settling a portion or all of arrearages that are 
owed from a prior outlay of public assistance, referred to as assigned 
debt. Custodial parents may allow noncustodial parents to also settle 
 
1 Office of Child Support Enforcement, Administration for Children and Families, 
Department of Health and Human Services, FY 2002 and FY 2003 Annual Report to 
Congress. Available online at  
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2005/reports/annual_report/table_64.html. 
Accessed August 1, 2007. 
 
2 Office of Child Support Enforcement FY 2005 Preliminary Report to Congress, May 

2006. Available online at  

www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2006/reports/preliminary_report. Accessed May 9, 

2007. 

3 Social Security Act  458(b)(6).   The Social Security Act was amended by the Child 

Support Performance Incentive Act of 1998, to determine incentive payments to States 

based on performance in five areas:  paternity establishment, order establishment, 

current collections, arrearage collections, and cost-effectiveness.   

  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   1     
   
I N T R O D U C T I O N   
debt that is owed to them from unpaid support, referred to as  
unassigned debt, either at the time of the debt compromise  agreement 
or at another time.  However, debt owed to custodial parents is settled 
only at the discretion of the custodial parent and is generally not subject 
to State-determined debt compromise criteria.  States often require that 
noncustodial parents pay lump sums toward the arrearages and/or 
improve payments of current support.  In a 1999 memorandum to State 
CSE agencies, OCSE acknowledged debt compromise as an option under 
State law to negotiate arrearages in  cases where parents marry or 
remarry and are faced with large child support arrearage payments.4   
OCSEs policy allows State legislatures and CSE agencies to design 
their own debt compromise programs and determine eligibility.  
However, OCSE has not issued guidelines regarding the administration  
of State debt compromise programs and does not track or monitor those  
States that have implemented such programs.  In its annual 
Compendium of Best Practices, OCSE has several times included 
information about State programs for addressing child support arrears,  
including references to debt compromise.5   
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act made child support payments a 
judgment with the full force, effect  and attributes of a State 
judgment.6   Although child support debt cannot be retroactively 
modified, this provision allows States to settle assigned arrearages if 
State law allows. This provision means that States may reduce 
arrearages in the same  manner they might settle any other  debt owed  
the State.  Depending on the policies of individual States, reductions in 
child support debt are determined by State or local courts, by State CSE 
agencies, or by a combination of the two.  OCSE estimates that about 
half of arrearages are owed to State governments  as reimbursement for  
public assistance benefits paid to families, and the remaining 
arrearages constitute outstanding obligations to custodial parents 
(settled only at the discretion of the  custodial parent).7  Although a 
 
4 Office of Child Support Enforcement PIQ-99-03 Memorandum, Public Policy 

Supporting Compromise of  Arrearages, March 22, 1999.  Available online at 

www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/PIQ/1999/piq-9903.htm. Accessed May 9, 2007. 

5 Office of Child  Support Enforcement, Compendium of State Best Practices and Good 
 
Ideas in Child Support Enforcement, 2003, 2005, and 2007.  

6 Social Security Act  466(a)(9). 

7 Office of Child Support Enforcement FY 2003 Report to Congress, June 2004.  Available 

online at 

www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2004/reports/preliminary_data/index.html#_ftn1. 

Accessed May 9, 2007. 

  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   2     
   
I N T R O D U C T I O N   
portion of any reimbursement for public assistance is ultimately owed to  
the Federal Government,8 Federal distribution laws require States to 
reimburse the Federal portion only  when child support is actually 
collected.9  Therefore, States are allowed to settle public assistance debt 
when deemed appropriate without remaining obligated to reimburse the 
Federal portion.   
The concept of debt compromise has gained popularity among State 
CSE agencies and child advocacy groups.  Advocates contend that the 
burden of large arrearages may reduce noncustodial parents ability or 
willingness to make current support payments and may discourage 
family unity. A July 2000 Office of Inspector General report concerning 
low-income noncustodial parents found that many methods used by 
States for child support enforcement  did not generate child support 
payments by low-income noncustodial parents.10    
Debt compromise is one of several strategies used by States to meet the 
challenge of reducing arrearages.  Other strategies include reducing or  
eliminating interest, establishing orders appropriate to the noncustodial 
parents income, reviewing and adjusting orders  as circumstances 
change, limiting retroactive support, and notifying parents at the first 
missed payment to address arrearages before they are unmanageable.  
METHODOLOGY 
Data Collection and Analysis 
To determine the prevalence and characteristics of debt compromise 
practices among States, we surveyed all States and the District of 
Columbia (hereafter referred to as States).  From States with some  
experience with debt compromise, we requested documentation 
regarding their practices, including relevant State laws or policies, 
eligibility requirements, and participation levels in 2005.  To evaluate 
the outcomes of debt compromise programs relative to current child 
support collections, we  purposively selected five States (California, 
Massachusetts, New Mexico, Texas,  and Washington) for a detailed 
review of child support cases with debt compromise agreements.  We  
 
8 Social Security Act  1905(b) and 1101(a)(8)(B).  
9 Social Security Act  457(a)(1)(2)(3). 
10 Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, 
Establishment of Child Support Orders for Low  Income Non-custodial Parents, OEI-05-
99-00390, July 2000.  Available online at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-99-
00390.pdf. Accessed May 9, 2007. 
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   3     
   
I N T R O D U C T I O N   
selected States that represented a diverse mix in regard to program 
characteristics such as how large the caseload was, whether the State 
relied primarily on judicial or administrative procedures, and how long  
debt compromise had been used.  (See Appendix A for descriptions of the 
child support programs in these States.)   
From the five States, we randomly selected a total of 259 sample cases 
for review from a list of all cases involved in debt compromise 
agreements since each programs inception.  We conducted case reviews 
during site visits to the  State CSE office in each  of the five States.  The 
case reviews entailed collecting data regarding amounts of arrearages, 
amounts compromised, payment histories, case characteristics, and 
additional requirements imposed on  noncustodial parents as a part of  
the debt compromise agreements.  We projected our findings to the 
population of debt compromise cases  in the five selected States.   
We also interviewed State child support agency officials about staff 
involvement in developing and implementing debt compromise  
programs, their experiences, and their perceptions of program results. 
To determine the outcomes of debt compromise  in cases with current 
payment obligations, we analyzed payment data for each sample case 
for 12 months prior to the compromise agreement and 12 months after.  
We compared the payment frequency to determine whether these 
measures changed following debt compromise.  Additionally, for the 
same periods before and after debt compromise, we differentiated cases 
with current support orders from those with only arrearage obligations.  
We also categorized payment behavior in each case into two groups  
based on regularity of payment.  Cases that had no more than 3 missed 
payments on a biweekly payment schedule (26 payments) or  no more  
than 1 missed payment on a monthly schedule (12 payments) were 
categorized as Regular Payment.   All other cases were categorized as 
Irregular Payment.  These measures were used to identify changes in  
the noncustodial parents behavior after a compromise agreement.   
See Appendix B for a detailed description of the methodology. 
Standards 
This study was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for 
Inspections issued by the Presidents Council on Integrity and 
Efficiency and the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   4     
   
F I N D I N G S  
  F I N D I N G S  
Twelve States have fully 
CSE agencies in 20 States operate fully  
implemented debt compromise  
implemented or pilot debt compromise 
programs,  meaning that the 
programs, and another 23 States settle 
programs are based on State 
arrearage debt on a case-by-case basis   policy and have established 
procedures (see Table 1).  Eight 
additional States have pilot programs, five of which operate only in 
selected counties.  In return for settling arrearages, States negotiate 
with the noncustodial parent to make a lump sum payment toward the  
arrearage (19 States), make regular payments on the arrearages and 
any current support orders (19 States), take steps toward involvement 
with the dependent child (8 States), participate in a fatherhood program 
(7 States), attend a parenting program (5 States), or maintain 
employment (4 States) or impose a combination of these requirements.    
Table 1:  
State Use of Debt Compromise 
Debt Compromise Use  Number of States 
Operate debt compromise programs  20 
Fully implemented (12)    
Pilot programs  (8)    
Use debt compromise on a case-by-case basis  23 
Debt compromise not offered  8 
Source: Office of Inspector General analysis of responses from 51 States, 2006. 
Twenty-three States allow compromise of arrearages on a case-by-case 
basis, determining amounts, criteria, and conditions for individual cases 
and without formal policies.  For example, one State agency reported  
compromising arrearages in rare cases if the debt is considered 
uncollectible or if it is determined to be in the best interest of the child.  
Officials from 15 of the 23 States reported that their agencies are  
considering  implementing formal debt compromise programs.  The 
remaining eight States reported that they do not  allow compromise of 
arrearages owed to the State.  Six of these eight States have laws that 
specifically prohibit the compromise of any debt owed to the State.  (See  
Appendix C for a list of all States and their debt compromise status.)  
All States reported that they will negotiate reductions in unassigned 
debt owed to custodial parents if requested by either party.    
 
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F I N D I N G S  

 
The estimated average arrearage  
Debt compromise agreements resulted in an 
per case of cases involved in debt 
average of $9,383 settled per case in selected 
compromise  agreements in the five  
States, with lump sum payments made in     
selected States was $22,029. This 
45 percent of cases and averaging $5,515 
arrearage amount was reduced 
through debt compromise  
agreements by an average of $9,383 per case (see Table 2).  
Noncustodial parents in 45 percent of cases made lump sum payments 
at the time  of the debt compromise agreements.  The average lump sum 
paid was $5,515, disbursed to States for reimbursement of public 
assistance provided to the custodial parent and family and/or to 
custodial parents for payment of past-due child support.   
Table 2: 
Averages of Arrearages Owed and Settled and Lump Sum Payments  Made For 
Debt Compromise Cases in Five Selected States 
Selected State   Average  Average Arrearage    Average 
  Arrearage Owed   Settled  Lump Sum Paid 
at Compromise* 
n = 259  n = 259 
  n = 117 
California  $21,009  $16,324  $4,061 
Massachusetts  $11,029  $3,544  $8,108 
New Mexico  $16,514  $11,000  $2,617 
Texas  $19,349  $13,824  $1,139 
Washington  $24,446  $7,828  $5,838 
All 5 States   $22,029  $9,383  $5,515 
Source: Office of Inspector General analysis of a sample of 259 cases in five States, 2006.  
See Appendix D for confidence intervals. 
*Average lump sum paid may  be greater than average arrearage owed because cases with 
lump sums were  a subset (45 percent) of total cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   6     
   
FF II NN DD II NN GG SS  

Among the 41 percent of sample
Forty-one percent of sample cases closed  
cases that closed following debt
following debt compromise, either after lump 
compromise (105 cases), 
sum payments or with all debt settled  noncustodial parents in            
65 percent of cases (68 cases) 
paid a lump sum to close their cases.11  In all of these cases, there was 
no current support due and the parents owed only an arrearage.  
Officials in all five States reported  case closure was a benefit of debt 
compromise. In New Mexico, the State with the  highest proportion of 
closures (68 percent), officials reported that their debt compromise 
program targets older cases with no  current support due.   
In the remaining 35 percent of cases that closed  at compromise          
(37 cases), the noncustodial parent did not make a lump sum payment 
and the full amount of the arrearage was settled. In these cases, CSE  
officials determined that the noncustodial parent was unable to pay any 
amount toward the arrearage (because parents were receiving disability  
benefits, were being incarcerated for long periods, or were gravely ill) or 
that the families were best served by  settling all of the debt.  Examples 
include cases in which the parents reconciled and cases in which the 
children were emancipated and the noncustodial parent had another, 
newer case with dependent children in need of current support.   
Fifty-nine percent of cases in our  
When sample cases remained open following debt 
sample remained open following 
compromise, four of five States did not routinely  
compromise, because noncustodial 
follow up when noncustodial parents paid irregularly    parents were either still obligated 
to pay toward current child 
support and any arrearage still owed (62 percent) or obligated to pay 
only toward remaining arrearages (38 percent).   CSE agency officials in 
the five States reported that they would rescind  agreements and  
reinstate debt if noncustodial parents with cases that remained open 
did not fulfill the conditions of their debt compromise agreements. 
However, although all five selected States conduct routine general 
reviews of child support cases, only  California reported routinely 
monitoring debt compromise cases that remain open to determine  
 
11  Although the data presented in Table 2 on page 6 are statistical projections to all debt 
compromise cases in the five selected States, data for the subsets of open and  closed cases 
reflect only the cases in our sample. Projecting  estimates for these smaller populations 
would result in a low level of precision. 
OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   7     
   
FFF	 III NNN DDD III NNN GGG SSS  
whether noncustodial parents meet their agreements.12 In reviewing 
payment records, we found that noncustodial parents in 60 of the       
154 sample cases paid irregularly (44 cases) or not at all (16 cases) 
following debt compromise. However, we found  evidence of rescission in 
only 2 of the 60 cases with irregular or no payments and no other 
evidence of corrective action toward irregular payers in these cases.   
Officials in 18 of the 20 States 
Cases are eligible for debt compromise based on a 
with programs considered the 
number of factors, including large arrearages, and 
amount of the arrearage in 
local managers typically negotiate agreements  determining eligibility for debt 
compromise, allowing for 
settlement if the arrearage was so large that they considered repayment 
unlikely. Other factors States considered include: 
 	  children are emancipated and the custodial parent is not owed 
current support (13 States); 
 	  the case and resulting arrearage have been in the caseload for a 
lengthy period, typically more than 5 years (11 States);13     
 	  a lengthy period has passed since the last payment, typically more 
than 1 year (11 States);  
 	  there has been a significant change in the circumstances of the case; 
e.g., the noncustodial parent has been incarcerated (11 States); 
 	  the noncustodial parent has incurred a new child support case with 
current support owed and the existing case had  only an arrearage 
owed to the State (11 States); and  
 	  most or all of the arrearage is attributable to interest and/or 
penalties (7 States). 
Large arrearages accumulated in part because States charged interest on  
the principal and established orders with retroactive balances   
Four of the five States we reviewed charged noncustodial parents 
interest on arrearages owed to the State.14 Interest rates ranged from   
 
12  Although California has no formal policy or procedure for monitoring  debt compromise 
cases, CSE officials report that local offices follow open cases closely and that the State 
has rescinded 11 agreements since the debt compromise programs inception in  2005. 
13 In contrast, California eligibility requires a recent history of regular payment. 

Available online at www.childsup.cahwnet.gov/pub/policy/css/2004/css04-07.pdf. 

Accessed May 9, 2007. 

14 Washington  does not charge interest on arrearages. Available online at 

http://apps.leg.wa.gov/WAC/default.aspx?cite=388-14A-7110. Accessed May 9, 2007. 

OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   8     
   
F I N D I N G S  
4 percent to 18 percent and comprised 21 percent of the arrearages owed  
in the cases that we reviewed from these four States.15  CSE agency 
officials in three of these States reported that they believe interest and  
penalties serve as incentives for noncustodial parents to pay arrearages 
and/or deter accumulation of arrearages.  The fourth State, New Mexico, 
reduced its interest rate from 14 percent to 4 percent after CSE officials 
came to view interest as too punitive and counterproductive.16  They 
reported their belief that high interest rates increased debt to an 
amount that becomes unpayable and discouraged parents from 
attempting to pay. The Texas CSE agency also lowered its interest rate 
from 12 percent to 6 percent, effective in 2002.17    
Of the five States reviewed, arrearages in Massachusetts and Texas 
may be attributed in part to retroactive balances imposed when  
creating the child support order.  In these cases,  time had elapsed 
between the birth and the time the child support orders were put in 
place, and States established the orders with arrearages equal to what 
the noncustodial parent would have paid from the dependents births 
and, in some cases,  medical costs incurred at birth.  Both States have 
stopped retroactive accumulation of arrearages.18   
For cases that meet eligibility requirements, local managers commonly  
make the final determination to allow  debt compromise agreements 
All 20 States with debt compromise  programs conduct a negotiation 
process with noncustodial parents to determine the amount of arrearage 
to be settled.  In 12 of the 20 States, this amount is largely 
predetermined based on State policies (such as in Massachusetts, where  
the amount settled is usually equal to the amount of interest and 
penalty). In the remaining eight States, managers and caseworkers 
 
15 For example, Massachusetts charges 12-percent  interest and an additional penalty of   
6 percent on the principal owed.  As State policy,  the debt settled through its compromise 
program  was always the amount of the interest and penalty owed.  Available online at  
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=dorterminal&L=6&L0=Home&L1=Businesses&L2=Help+ 
%26+Resources&L3=Legal+Library&L4=Regulations+(CMRs)&L5=18%2c+119A%2c+175 
%3a+Child+Support+Enforcement&sid=Ador&b=terminalcontent&f=dor_rul_reg_reg_83 
0_cmr_119a_6_1&. Accessed May 9, 2007. 
16 Reference to reduction in policy is available online at 
http://legis.state.nm.us/lcs/lfc/lfcdocs/budget/2007RecommendVolI.pdf. Accessed May 9, 
2007. 
17 Texas Statutes Family Code 157.265, Accrual of Interest on Child Support.  Available 
online at http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/fa.toc.htm. Accessed May 9, 2007. 
18 The Massachusetts CSE agency stopped retroactive accumulation of arrearages in  
1998 and the Texas CSE agency  stopped in 2002.  
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   9     
   
FFF III NNN DDD III NNN GGG SSS  
have discretion to determine amounts settled based on the 
circumstances of individual cases. Additionally, 12 of the 20 States offer 
to negotiate compromise  of debt owed to custodial parents in 
conjunction with the negotiations regarding debt owed to the State. 
Ten of the twenty States with programs reported that managers in their  
local CSE offices make final decisions regarding debt compromise. In 
another eight States, decisions are made by individual caseworkers or 
staff specifically assigned to arrearages management or debt 
compromise programs.   These caseworkers are typically given prior 
training in debt compromise criteria and negotiation procedures, then  
largely given autonomy to make decisions after reviewing case 
information and communicating with the noncustodial parent. In the 
remaining two States, judges approve debt compromise agreements,  
often with input from CSE agency staff. 
 
CSE officials in States with programs report a   State CSE officials in 17 of the      
20 States with debt compromise 
largely positive view  of debt compromise, 
programs expressed positive views 
although a few express concern that settling 
of debt compromise practices, citing 
debt is contrary to the enforcement  process  
a number of advantages to reducing 
debt in carefully selected cases. Officials in the remaining three States 
and in the eight States without programs reported concerns about using 
debt compromise. 
The officials who were positive most often mentioned the advantage of 
receiving at least a portion of arrearages previously considered  
uncollectible and the benefit of more  regular subsequent payment. One 
official indicated that all parties benefitthe custodial parent and 
dependents receive more  consistent support, the noncustodial parent is 
released from the burden of overwhelming debt, and the State 
government  collects at least a portion of what was previously owed.   
Other advantages included reduced caseloads because of case closure 
and improved family involvement by noncustodial parents.  
CSE agency officials in the remaining three States with programs and  
in the eight States without programs raised concerns about debt 
compromise, reporting that negotiating agreements can take staff time 
away from managing and enforcing more active cases. They also 
expressed a belief that debt compromise conflicts with the CSE agencys 
primary mission of collecting child support for families. These officials 
reported that debt compromise could appear to reward poor payers and 
OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   10     
   
F I N D I N G S  
send a signal to noncustodial parents that they are not responsible for 
child support debt and that the settlement of debt in selected cases is 
unfair to other parents who pay all that is owed.   
Officials in the 31 States that compromise debt on only a case-by-case 
basis (23 States) or not at all (8 States) reported a number of reasons for 
not implementing programs, including reluctance of State legislatures 
to approve settlement of State debt and negative public opinion toward  
settling debt incurred through public assistance programs.   
Additionally, officials in all of these  31 States reported that they prefer  
to address potential problems by attempting to prevent arrearages, 
listing methods such as establishing orders appropriate to the 
noncustodial parents income and adjusting orders as circumstances 
change.  Even given these concerns and practices, 17 of these 31 States 
reported that they are considering implementing debt compromise  
programs and are in the process of weighing the costs and  benefits.   
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   11     
   
  R E C O M M E N D A T I O N  
Twenty States have implemented debt compromise programs, 23 other 
States use debt compromise on a case-by-case basis, and many of these 
States are considering full programs.  We found that States were often  
able to close cases following debt compromise and that debt compromise  
resulted in lump sums payments to States and families.  Additionally, 
officials in States with programs reported a largely positive view of debt 
compromise.  However, four of the five States did not routinely follow up 
with noncustodial parents who paid irregularly or not at all following 
debt compromise to ensure that they meet their agreements.  To 
enhance the effectiveness of State use of debt compromise, we 
recommend that OCSE:   
Issue Guidance Encouraging States To Routinely Monitor Cases that  
Remain Open Following Debt Compromise Agreements  
We recommend that OCSE issue program guidance to States  
emphasizing the need to routinely  monitor cases that remain open 
following debt compromise to ensure  that noncustodial parents meet 
their agreements, such  as regular payment of current support and 
arrearages, and develop standards and alternatives for corrective 
action.  
Because of the high level of interest in and use of debt compromise, we  
suggest that OCSE also consider issuing guidance regarding the 
administration of debt compromise programs to assist States that are 
considering new programs or revising current practices.  This guidance 
could be based on information and insights from States with mature 
programs, and topics could include the criteria used for determining 
which cases  are eligible for debt compromise, the proportion  or nature  of 
the debt to be settled, suggestions for training staff in making case 
determinations, and use of debt compromise to close child support cases 
in which only arrearages are owed.  Such guidance would need to make 
clear that States are not required to implement debt compromise 
programs and that States may use discretion in implementing the 
guidance. 
 
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   12     
   
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N
   
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
RESPONSE 
The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and the Assistant 
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) jointly provided  
comments in response to our draft report. 
ACF concurred with our recommendation to issue guidance encouraging 
States to routinely monitor cases that remain open following debt 
compromise agreements and with our suggestion to issue guidance to 
States regarding administration of debt compromise programs to assist 
States that are considering new programs or revising current practices.   
ACF outlined current and planned guidance activities, including hosting 
teleconferences focused  on debt compromise for interested States and 
establishing an electronic workplace for States to share documents and  
information on arrears issues, including debt compromise.  ACF also 
plans to develop guidance materials addressing arrears management 
issues as part of the implementation of a new initiative, Project to Avoid  
Increasing Delinquencies (PAID).  ACF indicates that the PAID 
Steering Committee will review this report and determine the type  of  
guidance that the States desire on the subject of debt compromise.      
In describing this current and proposed guidance, ACF did not explicitly 
address providing guidance to States regarding monitoring  of open cases 
following debt compromise agreements.  Because the lack of monitoring 
of debt compromise cases poses a vulnerability to the integrity of State 
debt compromise programs, we recommend that ACF provide guidance 
to States specific to this issue.     
ASPE commented that the report was useful in providing information 
regarding a policy area in which little research exists.  ACF and ASPE 
also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 
appropriate, and ACF submitted a number of questions and 
observations regarding debt compromise programs that cannot be 
answered by this study but could be considered in future work.   
ACFs and ASPEs comments are included in Appendix E.  
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   13     
   
    AA PP PP DE ENN DD II XX    AB  
 
DESCRIPTIONS OF CHILD SUPPORT PROGRAMS IN 
SELECTED STATES 
We selected 5 States for site visits (California, Massachusetts, New 
Mexico, Texas, and Washington) from among the 12 States with fully 
implemented Statewide programs that had at least 1 year of experience  
with debt compromise.  We also considered geographic location and  
child support program characteristics, such as how large the caseload 
was and whether the States relied primarily on judicial or 
administrative procedures (see Table A).  The selected States all review  
and adjust child support cases every 3 years and review any case upon 
request.  These States use similar enforcement measures for collections 
and dealing with arrearages, including license revocation, property or 
asset seizure, and tax intercepts.   
Table A:  
Program Characteristics for Selected States 
Procedures 
Caseload Size  Calculation 
State 
FY 2005  Model  Order  Order 
Establishment  Enforcement 
Income  Judicial and 
California  1,762,996  Judicial 
Shares  Administrative 
Primarily 
Percentage 
Massachusetts    268,640  Judicial  Administrative 
of Income 
(some judicial)  
Income  Judicial and 
New Mexico   70,217  Judicial 
Shares  Administrative 
Primarily 
Percentage  Judicial and  
Texas    913,551  Administrative 
of Income  Administrative 
(some judicial)  
Income  Judicial and 
Washington    341,069  Administrative 
Shares  Administrative 
Source: Office of Child Support Enforcement Preliminary Data Report, FY 2005. 
  
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   14     
   
A P P E N D I X   A  
California.  California was the only State selected for review with a 
county-administered program.  The Department of Child Support 
Services is a component  of the California Health and Human Services  
Agency and comprises 52 local child support agencies, including  
11 counties that have combined to form 6 regional agencies. The State 
relies solely on judicial procedures for child support order  
establishment. Support amounts are determined using an income 
shares calculation model, calculating a percentage of each parents net 
disposable income and adjusting the amount based on the percentage of 
time each parent has primary physical responsibility for the child.  
Californias interest rate for missed payments and adjudicated 
arrearages as well as retroactive support is 10 percent per year.  
Interest accrues from the date of the missed payment or a judgment 
establishing either an arrearage or retroactive support resulting from  
paternity establishment. 
Massachusetts.  Massachusetts program is administered by the States 
Department of Revenue through five regional offices, two satellite 
offices, and a customer service call center.  Child support and custody 
orders are established through the courts and support amounts are 
calculated as a percentage of parents income.  Massachusetts imposes 
12-percent interest and an additional penalty of  6 percent on delinquent 
payments and arrearges. Some noncustodial parents may not be 
required to pay interest or may be  eligible to apply for a waiver. 
New Mexico.   New Mexico has a State-administered program of seven 
offices overseen by the CSE Division of the New  Mexico Human Services  
Department.  The courts establish paternity and finalize child support 
orders.  Support amounts are determined by an income shares 
calculation model, which considers the income of both parents.  
Noncustodial parents with delinquent payments and arrearage balances 
currently face an interest rate of 4 percent.  
Texas.  The Texas Child Support Division operates a State-administered  
program within the Office of the Attorney General.  Sixty-eight offices 
(regional and local) report to the State CSE.  Texas uses a quasi-
administrative process to establish support obligations, referring cases 
to the courts in situations involving paternity establishment and 
retroactive support, a minor parent, an incarcerated parent, histories of 
family violence, foster care, or interstate child support cases. Child 
support amounts in Texas are calculated as a fixed percentage of the 
noncustodial parents net resources with adjustments for multiple 
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   15     
   
A P P E N D I X   A  
family obligations. However, courts  have discretion to deviate from 
these general guidelines.  Interest accrues on the delinquent child 
support at 6-percent simple interest  annually.  Payments are considered 
delinquent if not received before the 31st day after payment is due.  For 
court-imposed retroactive support, interest accrues from the date the 
order is rendered.   
Washington.  Washington operates a State-administered program.  
Washingtons Division of Child Support includes 10 field offices and is 
part of the States Department of Social and Health Services. In 
establishing support orders, Washington uses the administrative 
process if no court order specifically establishes or relieves a parent of 
support obligation.  Custody issues and paternity establishment are 
handled through the judicial process.  Support amounts are set under 
an income shares calculation model  based on the income of both 
parents. Interest is imposed only in cases for which retroactive 
arrearages are imposed by the courts. 
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   16     
   
  A P P E N D I X   B
 
 
DETAILED METHODOLOGY  
Data used in this evaluation were collected through a survey of all 
States and a review of a  sample of 259 debt compromise cases from five 
States with debt compromise programs.  
Data Collection and Analysis 
Survey of All States.  To determine the prevalence and characteristics of 
debt compromise practices among States, we surveyed all States and  
the District of Columbia (hereafter referred to as States).  Respondents 
were CSE program directors or managers directly involved with 
administering the debt compromise  program in their States.  Survey 
questions included whether States had any experience with debt 
compromise  programs recently or in  the past, whether they actively 
pursued debt compromise, and what the current status of their 
programs was.  We asked States with operating programs to provide 
additional details related to eligibility, compromise requirements, 
policies for making determinations, caseloads, and participation levels. 
Site Visits to Selected States.   To determine the outcomes of debt 
compromise  programs on cases, we purposively selected five States 
(California, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington) to 
review child support cases with compromise agreements.  We selected  
these from among the 12 States with at least 1 year of experience with a 
Statewide debt compromise program.  We also considered geographic 
location and child support program characteristics, such as how large 
the caseload was and whether a State relied primarily on judicial or 
administrative procedures.  
We conducted site visits and interviewed State CSE agency staff and 
managers in each of the five States.  State officials provided information  
about staff involvement in developing and implementing debt 
compromise programs, their experiences in identifying and working 
with cases, and their perceptions of debt compromise program results. 
From each of the five States, we requested a list of all cases involved in 
debt compromise agreements since the inception of their programs.  The 
resultant population was a total of 6,719 cases.  We selected a random 
sample of 55 debt compromise cases  from each State for further review.  
Upon review, 16 cases sent by States did not meet our criteria, resulting 
in a final sample of 259 cases (see Table B on next page).   
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   17     
   
A P P E N D I X   B  

Table B:  
Distribution of Debt Compromise Sample Cases by Selected State  
Final 
Original  
Number of  Calculated  
Selected State   Total Cases  Number of 
Cases  Weights  
Cases Sampled  
Sampled 
California  992  55  51  18.04 
Massachusetts  530  55  54  9.64 
New Mexico   325  55  50  5.91 
Texas  589  55  52  10.71 
Washington  4,283  55  52  77.81 
Total  6,719  275  259  N/A  
Source: Office of Inspector General analysis of debt compromise cases in five States, 2006.  
Case Reviews.  For each  sample case, we collected the amounts of 
arrearages, amounts compromised, and remaining arrearages. We 
reviewed case files to determine whether any additional requirements 
had been imposed on  noncustodial parents in exchange for the debt 
reduction, whether CSE agencies followed up, and whether the cases  
had current support orders or only arrearages.   
We also obtained payment records for each sample case, including all 
payments made for the 12-month period before a compromise  agreement 
and 12 months after compromise.19 For the 154 cases that remained 
open after debt compromise, we compared these measures  to determine 
whether the regularity of payments changed following debt compromise.   
Cases closed as a result  of a compromise agreement had no further  
payment history and were not included in this analysis.  We categorized 
the payment behavior of noncustodial parents during each 12-month 
period into three groups:    
 	  Regular Paymentpayments were  made with no more than  
3 missed payments on a biweekly payment schedule (26) or no more  
than 1 missed payment on a monthly schedule (12);  
 
19 Seven cases in our California sample were so recent that only 6 months of  payment 
data was available, rather than 12 months. 
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   18     
   
A P P E N D I X   B  
 	  Irregular Paymentpayments were  made, but there were more 
than three missed payments on a biweekly payment schedule or  
more than one missed payment on a monthly schedule;  
 	  No Paymentno record  of payments for the 12-month period.   
Cases classified as having irregular payment or no payment were 
combined for final analysis, leaving two groups:  regular payment and 
irregular payment.  Because of the small number of cases that remained  
open following debt compromise (154), we did not project the findings of  
this analysis to the population of debt compromise cases in the five 
selected States.   
We also identified lump sum payments from case notes, compromise 
agreements, and payment histories and verified that all anticipated  
lump sums were ultimately paid.  We calculated average lump sum 
amounts based on verified payment amounts.   
Statistical Projections.   We analyzed arrearage and payment data for the 
259 cases in the sample and projected our findings to the population of 
debt compromise cases in the five selected States.  Table B on the prior 
page presents the weights used to address the differing proportions of 
all debt compromise cases in each State to the number of cases in our  
sample. Appendix D includes estimates, standard errors, and 
confidence intervals for  dollar amounts reported as arrearages owed, 
arrearages settled, and lump sums paid.   
Data Limitations.  Because we purposively selected States, we do not  
project our findings beyond the population of debt compromise cases in  
the five selected States.  Outcomes observed in the five sample States 
are not intended as a measure of the effectiveness of the debt  
compromise  programs in those States. 
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   19     
   
  A P P E N D I X   C
 
 STATUS OF DEBT COMPROMISE FOR ALL STATES 
 
 
Table C:  
 
Status of Debt Compromise for All States  
 
State  Program Status   Start Date  
Alabama  Case-by-Case    
Alaska  Pilot Program  2005 
Arizona  Case-by-Case*    
Arkansas  No Program   
California  Fully Implemented Program  2003 
Colorado  Case-by-Case    
Connecticut  Pilot Program  2006 
Delaware  Case-by-Case    
District of Columbia  Case-by-Case    
Florida  Case-by-Case    
Georgia  Case-by-Case    
Hawaii  Case-by-Case    
Idaho  No Program   
Illinois  Case-by-Case    
Indiana  No Program   
Iowa  Pilot Program  2001 
1985      
Kansas  Pilot Program 
(limited basis) 
Kentucky  Case-by-Case    
Louisiana  Case-by-Case    
Maine  Case-by-Case    
Maryland  Pilot Program  2000-2003 
Massachusetts  Pilot Program  2000 
Michigan  Fully Implemented Program  2005 
Minnesota  Case-by-Case    
Mississippi  No Program   
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   20    
   
A P P E N D I X   C  

State  Program Status   Start Date  
Missouri  No Program   
Montana  Fully Implemented Program  1998 
1993 
Nebraska  Fully Implemented Program 
(approximately) 
Nevada  Case-by-Case    
New Hampshire  Case-by-Case    
New Jersey   Case-by-Case    
New Mexico   Pilot Program  2005 
New York  No Program   
North Carolina   Fully Implemented Program  2005 
North Dakota   Fully Implemented Program  2005 
Ohio  Case-by-Case    
Oklahoma  Case-by-Case    
Oregon  Fully Implemented Program  None listed 
Pennsylvania  Case-by-Case    
Rhode Island  Case-by-Case    
South Carolina   Case-by-Case    
South Dakota   Case-by-Case    
Tennessee  No Program   
Texas  Fully Implemented Program  2001 
Utah  Fully Implemented Program  None listed 
Vermont  Fully Implemented Program  None listed 
Virginia  No Program   
1977 
Washington   Fully Implemented Program 
(approximately) 
West Virginia  Fully Implemented Program  None listed 
Wisconsin  Pilot Program  None listed 
Wyoming  Case-by-Case    
Source: Office of Inspector General, Debt Compromise State Survey, 2006. 

*Arizona CSE officials reported plans to implement a full debt compromise program in 2007 or 2008. 

 
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   21     
   
  A P P E N D I X   D
 
ESTIMATES AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS  
 
  Table D:  
Estimates and 95-Percent Confidence Intervals for Arrearage and Payment Data  
 
  Mean   Standard  Lower Limit  Upper Limit 
  Estimate  Error 
 
Average Arrearage    
$22,029  1,852.0  $18,381  $25,676 
(n=259)  
 
California 
  $21,009  2,151.0  $16,771  $25,247 
Massachusetts  
$11,029  1,385.0  $8,300  $13,757 
  New Mexico 
$16,514  1,851.0  $12,868  $20,159 
Texas 
  $19,349  3,273.0  $12,902  $25,795 
Washington 
$24,446  2,815.0  $18,902  $29,989 
 
Average Settled  
$9,383  1,013.0  $7,388  $11,378 
(n = 259)  
 
  California  $16,324  1,868.0  $12,646  $20,002 
Massachusetts   530.0  $2,499  $4,588 
$3,544 
 
New Mexico  1,363.0  $8,315  $13,685 
$11,000 
  Texas  $13,824  2,88.0  $8,194  $19,453 
Washington  1,472.0  $4,928  $10,727 
$7,828 
 
Average Lump Sum Paid   
$5,515  664.4  $4,207  $6,823 
at Compromise (n  = 117)  
  California  1,107.0  $1,882  $6,241 
$4,061 
Massachusetts   991.3  $6,156  $10,061 
  $8,108 
New Mexico  813.4  $1,016  $4,219 
$2,617 
  Texas  151.2  $841  $1,436 
$1,139 
Washington  1,596.0  $1,596  $8,981 
  $5,838 
Source: Office of Inspector General analysis of 259 cases in five States, 2006.  
 
 
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   22     
   
 A P P E N D I X   E  
 
Agency Comments
  OEI-06-06-00070  STATE USE OF DEBT COMPROMISE TO REDUCE CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES  23    
   
A P P E N D I X   ~   E  
 
  OEI-06-06-00070  STATE USE OF DEBT COMPROMISE TO REDUCE CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES  24    
   
A P P E N D I X   ~   E  
 
  OEI-06-06-00070  STATE USE OF DEBT COMPROMISE TO REDUCE CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES  25    
   
  A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
 
 
This report was prepared under the direction of Kevin K. Golladay, 
Regional Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections and A.  
Blaine Collins, Deputy Regional Inspector General for Evaluation and 
Inspections in the Dallas regional office.   
Ruth Ann Dorrill served as the team leader for this study and Scott 
Whitaker served as the  project leader.  Other principal Office of 
Evaluation and Inspections staff from the Dallas regional office who 
contributed to this report include Dana McClellen; central office staff 
who contributed to this report include Ayana Everett and Barbara 
Tedesco.    
  OEI-06-06-00070   STATE  USE OF  DEBT  COMPROMISE TO  REDUCE  CHILD SUPPORT  ARREARAGES   26