Department of Health and Human Servces 
OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL 
THE REFUGEE MATCHING GRANT PROGRAM: 
BALANCING FLEXIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
. SERVlq' 
JU 
GffBS BROWN 
Inspector General 
AUGUST 1994 
Ya3a  OEI-Q9-92- OFFICE OF INSPECfOR GENERA 
The mission of the Offce of Inspector General (OIG), as mandated by Public 
Law 95-452, as 
amended, is to protect the integrity of the Department of Health and Human Servces 
' (HHS)
programs as well as the health and welfare of beneficiaries served by those programs. This 
statutory mission is carred out through a nationwide network of audits, investigations, and 
inspections conducted by three OIG operating components: the Offce of Audit Servces, the 
Offce of Investigations, and the Offce of Evaluation and Inspections. The OIG also inform 
the Secretary of HHS of program and management problems and recommends courses to 
correct them. 
OFFICE OF AUDIT SERVICE 
The OIG's Offce of Audit Servces (OAS) provides all auditing servces for HHS, either by
conducting audits with its own audit resources or by overseeing audit work done by others. 
Audits examine the performance of HHS programs and/or its grantees and contractors in 
carrng out their respective responsibilties and are intended to provide independent 
asesments of HHS programs and operations in order to reduce. waste, abuse, and
mismanagement and to promote economy and effciency throughout the Department. 
OFFICE OF INTIGATIONS 
The OIG's Offce of Investigations (OI) conducts criminal, civil, and administrative. 
investigations of allegations of wrongdoing in HHS programs or to HHS beneficiaries and of 
unjust enrichment by providers. The investigative efforts of OI lead to criminal convictions 
administrative sanctions, or civil money penalties. The OI also oversees State Medicaid fraud 
control units which investigate and prosecute fraud and patient abuse in the Medicaid program. 
AN 
OFFICE OF EVALUATION  INSPECTONS 
The OIG's Offce of Evaluation and Inspections (OEI) conducts short-term management and
program evaluations (called inspections) that focus on issues of concern to the Department 
the Congres, and the public. The findings and recommendations contained in these inspection 
report generate rapid, accurate, and up-to-date information on the effciency, vulnerabilty, 
and effectivenes of departmental programs. This report was prepared in the San Francisco 
regional offce under the direction of Kaye D. Kidwell, Regional Inspector General, and
Paul A Gottlober, Deputy Regional Inspector General. Project staff included: 
REGION IX  HEQUARTES 
Elizabeth Celniker 
Alan Levine

Robert Gibbons

Catherine King 
Ellen Kotler 
Donald Loeb 
Brian Pattison 
Thomas Purvs 
Brad Rollin 
For additional copies of this report, please contact the San Francisco offce at (415) 556-6830.  Departent of 
Servces 
Health and Human 
OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERA 
THE REFUGEE MATCHING GRANT PROGRAM: 
BALANCING FLEXIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
t'SERYlCES. 
JU 
(4-
GffBS BROWN 
Inspector General 
AUGUST 1994 
d3a  OEI-09-92-00060  EXECUTIVE 
SUMMAR Y

PUROSE 
Ths inspection assessed (1) how voluntary agencies -and their 
affates deliver and 
(2) how the Offce of Refugee Resettlement monitors servces to refugees 
parcipating in the Voluntary Agency Matchig Grant Program. 
BACKGROUN 
The Voluntary Agency Matchig Grant Program was established in 1979 as an 
alternative to State-admistered refugee 
resettlement programs. The program s goal
is to help refugees attain economic self-sufciency without accessing welfare. The
Offce of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), within the Administration for Children and 
Famies, fuds the 
program through matching grants to priate, national voluntary 
agencies (volags). Volags  based social servce 
tyicaly subcontract with community-
agencies (afates) to provide direct servces. In 1992, Federal fudig was 
approxiately $39.2 milion. Volags and affates provide servces for refugees durig
their second though fourh months in United 
States. In 1992, the matching grant
program served about one-third of all refugees arrving in the United States. 
The ORR requies that affates place employable refugees in "appropriate" jobs as
soon as possible. It has established a gudelie-but does not requie-
that at least 
60 percent of cases (a single individual or famly) be economically self-sufcient 
at the 
end of 4 months. 
For background puroses, we reviewed program gudelies, performance report, and
volag self-sufciency outcome data for the last 3 program years. From September 
though November 1993, we conducted on-site visits or telephone intervews with the 
6 parcipatig and 6 nonparcipating volags and 159 of the 165 parcipatig affiates. 
We asked volags and afates to descnbe their history, the refugees that they serve 
the servces they provide, and how the program is monitored. We obtained their 
opinons about the program s gudelines, performance goals, and how the program
could be improved. We also intervewed ORR offcials. 
FIINGS 
flil 
Prgr 
alws ajtes to tailr seres to a diere refgee popultin 
Afates 
serve refugees (1) from many different countries, (2) with a range of skils
needs, and characteristics, and (3) whose needs have changed since the program 
inception. Flexibility has allowed affates to taior specific servces, such as case 
management, Englsh-language training, maintenance assistance, and acculturation to 
the refugees they serve.  bar  att self-su 
Refgees and ajte 11t overome muple  to 
When asked about the barrers that afect refugees' self-suffciency, volags and 
affiates noted multiple problems including (1) refugees' Englsh and job skils 
(2) poor local economies, (3) lack of adequate medical coverage, and (4) disincentives 
caused by high welfare payments and easy access in some States. Some 
affates have 
developed unque methods to overcome these barrers. 
Apprly 
ea emplo 
haf of th afte bele th ORR overempha 
Approxiately hal of the afates believe that at least some refugees would be better 
served by an extended traig and resettlement approach. In general, these afates 
believe that the decision to emphasize extended trainng instead of early employment 
should be made on a cae-by-cae basis.
Pr 
inte 
efecten meases are 
Alost 
half of the affates believe that job placement at 4 months is not, by itself, an 
appropriate measure of the program s success. Furthermore, ORR has no long-term 
effectiveness measures. 
dog 
Gentig an  th nuer an 
machig fu li 
type of refgees
sered 
Afiates are requied to match Federal grants with cash and/or donated goods and 
servces. Generatig and documenting the match takes away from affates' abilty to
provide servces and has had some unforeseen consequences. These include afliates 
litig 
(1)  the number of refugees they serve, (2) refusing to serve certain tyes 
refugees, (3) delayig the donations of goods and servces, and (4) refusing to 
partcipate in the program.

RECOMMATIONS 
mOeRR  slwuJ deelp peotermhen i natrs  reg an exg it cuen
Th  by 
an data collctn 
Whe 4-month self-sufciency could contiue to be one performance measurement 
ORR should routiely collect longer-term refugee self-sufciency data. Many affiates 
aleady collect longer-term data or would experience miimal dicuty collectig it. 
Both long-term and 4-month self-suffciency measures should take into account (1) the 
health of the local economy, (2) servces available in the 
community, (3) tyes of 
refugees served, and (4) affliate enrollment policies.  req 
cons  bur 
rede th 
ORR shoul  optins to  of th match 
Th 
The ORR should conduct a study to 
determe how the match requiement could be 
revised to reduce the paperwork burden on grantees without compromising Federal 
grant admistration audit requirements. 
COMM 
AGENCY 
The ORR provided co=ents on the draf report. In response, we added and
modied tex in the body of the report and revied our 
reco=endations. The fu 
text of ORR's co=ents appears in the appendi.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  ..  . ..  ..  ..  ..  ....  
. . . . ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ..  ..  ..  ..  . . . . . . . . . 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
SUY 
EXCU 
INODUCI0N . 
. . . . . . . . . . . .. 1
FIINGS. . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
. Program flexibilty .............................................. 6
barers. . . 
. Refugees and affates face  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
. Overemphasis on early employment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Effectiveness measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Match requiements pose problems. . . . . . . . 
FUCX  i\TIONS ..... 
. .. 15
APPENIX  INTRODUCTION

PUROSE 
Ths inspection assessed (1) how voluntary agencies and their 
affates deliver and 
(2) how the Offce of Refugee Resettement monitors servces to refugees 
parcipatig in the Voluntary Agency Matchig Grant Program. 
BACKGROUN 
The Volunta Agency Matching Grant Program (MGP) was establihed in 1979 as an 
alternative to State-admstered refugee resettement programs. The program s goal
is to help refugees attai economic self-suffciency without accessing welfare. The 
Offce of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), with the Admstration for Chdren and 
Fames, fuds the program though matchig grants to 
private, national voluntary 
agencies (volags). Volags tyicay subcontract with co=unty-based social servce 
agencies (afates) to 
provide diect servces. In 1992, Federal MGP fudig was 
2 mion. 
approxiately $39.
Though contracts with the State Deparent and ORR, volags provide servces to 
refugees durig their fist 4 months in the United States. The State Deparent
provides overseas orientation and fuds 12 volags to provide reception and placement 
durg 
servces for al refugees  their fit 30 days in ths countr. These servces 
include sponsorship assignent, co=unty orientation, and intial food, clothg, and
shelter. Afer providig 
reception and placement servces-and if refugees are not 
employed and are in need of support-volags may either refer refugees to State 
welfare agencies or enroll them in the MGP. Of the 12 
volags that provide reception 
and placement servces, 6 participate in the MGP. The following chart lists the 
volags
and the number of refugees they served in the MGP in 
1992: 
Refugees Served  MGP Fun 
Volag 
Number  Percntage  Millons  Percentage 
Council of Jewb  Federations  852  86.  $33.  865 
Unite States Calbnlic Conference  754  3.8 
Lutberan Immigrtinn and Refugee Servce  670  1.8 
Rese 
International  Committee 
0.3 
American Council for Nationalities Servce  458  1.2 
TOTAL 
336  100.  $39.  100. 
A six volag, Ibe Epispal Ministries pacipates as a subgrtee of the Council of Jewh Federatinns 
.. The total percentage is grter than 100.0 percent because nf rounding  Reee eligiil an selectin
The volags select refugees to participate in the MGP from those who participated in
the State Department's reception and placement program. Refugees generally are
eligIole to participate as long as one famiy member is employable. Aged and disabled 
refugees, who are eligible to receive Supplemental Security Income shorty after their 
arval, are automaticay 
aexrclgud ed from the program. In 1992, the MGP served about 
one-thd of all refugees 
in the United States. The Council of Jewish 
Federations serves more than 85 percent of the MGP refugees. Its New York City
afate 
alone serves approxiately half of al Counci of Jewish Federation refugees
and more than one-third of al refugees in the MGP.
Aurig lelan
Although Congress never specifcally established the MGP, authorition for the MGP
is found in subpart (c) of 8 U.  C. 1522. Subpart (c) authories ORR to make grants 
and contracts with public or private non-profit agencies "priarly for the purose of 
faciltating refugee employment and achievement of self-suffciency." The law states
that these grants essentially are designed to 
assist refugees in obtaining the 
skis which are necessary for economic
self-sufciency, includig projects for job training, employment servces
day care, professional refresher traing, and other recertcation 
traig 
servces....to provide  in Englsh where necessar...(and) to 
provide where specifc needs have been shown...health (includig mental 
health) servces, social servces, educational and other servces. 
Pr guli 
The ORR has not promulgated reguations to implement the law 
authorig the 
MGP. Instead, ORR developed and distributed gudelies that set fort the MGP' 
goals, requiements, and reco=endations concerng how 
volags and affates should 
provide MGP servces. Volags and 
afates have great fleXibilty to design programs
that best meet the needs of their refugees as long as they meet ORR's mium
requiements.
The gudelies requie volags and their 
affates to provide refugees with case 
management, job counselig and placement, and cah or other maitenance assistance 
from their second through at least their fourth month in the countr. 
In addition 
ORR requies that volags and affates continua11y work to develop new job 
opportunities. They must fo11ow up with employers or refugees within 2 weeks after a 
refugee has been hired in order to identify any adjustment 
problems. Volags and 
traig,
afates must be able to provide other servces as necessary including job 
Englsh language training, and acculturation servces, either diectly or through
referral. The guidelines refer to other social servces that are available to 
refugees. Refugees
may receive food stamps and either Medicaid or refugee medical assistance for up to 
8 months. Federal regulations state that if a refugee becomes ineligible for Medicaid 
or refugee medical assistance solely because of increased earnings from employment 
the refugee s eligibilty should be extended for an additional 4 months or until the 
refugee has been receivig assistance for 8 months, whichever comes first. The volags 
must ensure that refugees do not accept public cash assistance while enrolled in the 
MGP. . 
Volags may contiue to provide MGP servces to refugees 
beyond the 4-month period.
They must ensure, however, that overall costs for Federal reimbursement do not 
exceed the total alowable 
lit of $1 000 per refugee. 
selfsu guli 
Ea emp/o 
objecties  en 
an th 4-mont 60 
According to Federal regulations and the MGP gudelies, afates 
should place
employable refugees in "appropriate" jobs as soon as possible, and refugees must 
accept entry-level jobs. In general, ORR believes that an appropriate job is one that 
matches a refugee s physica skis and abilties. Refugees are supposed to maintain a
good-faith" effort to attain employment whie acquig 
enough competency in Englsh
to secure and retain employment. The early employment approach is 
intended to
minimi"e the chance that a refugee wi require welfare 
assistance after the MGP. 
Afates may provide additional job 
traing, Englsh classes, and acculturation 
servces to help the employed refugee rise above the entry level. 
The ORR has established a guideline-but does not requie-that at least 60 
percent of
caes (a single individual or family) be economically self-suffcient at the end of 
4 months. Accordig to the gudelines
, refugees are deemed self-sufcient when they 
no longer need public, matching grant or other fiancial assistance 
because they are
employed." The ORR does not attempt to measure "social adjustment," although it is
a priar 
goal of the MGP. Overall, volags and afliates are not meeting the 
60 percent self-sufciency goal, primariy because the Counci of Jewish Federations 
the largest volag, is far below the goal. 
Reqem 
Math 
The MGP gudelines state that volags and affiates are required to match Federal 
fuds dollar-for-doIJar. The Federal government matches affate 
contributions up to
000 per refugee resettled. As much as 80 percent of the match may be obtained 
through in-kind donations, but at least 20 percent of the affliates
' contribution must 
be cash. Because the first 30 days that refugees spend in this country are covered by
the State Departent 
s reception and placement program, goods and servces donated
durig this period cannot be counted towards the MGP'
s match requirement.  Reportg an Monirig
Volags have the priary responsibility of ensurg that their affiates provide quality
MGP servces. The ORR does not routinely conduct on-site monitorig of afiates.
Volags submit quarterly statistical reports to ORR showing the number of refugees 
served and their self-suffciency status at the end of 4 months. At 7 months
, volags
report on the employment status of 
refugees who were self-sufcient at 4 months in 
order to assess their job retention. V olags are supposed to veri the accuracy of
afates
' reports, the quality of their servces, and their compliance with Federal
gudelines. The ORR does not have requirements for how frequently volags must
monitor their affates and does not routinely receive copies of the volags ' site visit 
report. 
astae 
Sta refgee  progrms 
Refugees who do not partcipate in the MGP, plus some refugees who complete the
MGP, receive servces through State-admistered refugee resettlement programs that
ORR fuds. In contrast to the MGP, extensive reguations govern the admnistration
of the State programs. The regulations require States to enroH all refugees and
provide servces that are simlar to those received by MGP refugees. The ORR does
not requie States to provide case management, however. The MGP refugees who are
not self-suffcient at the end of 4 months may receive support from Aid to Famies
with Dependent Chdren, if eligible, or they may apply to State welfare agencies for
an additional 4 months of cash assistance in States where such assistance is available.
Deelopm 
Recen Poli 
In early 1992, the Bush Adminstration proposed replacing the State-admstered
refugee cash and medical assistance programs with a "Private Resettlement Program 
that would have used volags to deliver servces to al refugees. In Februar 1993, a 
U.S. District Court blocked implementation of the proposal because ORR had not 
alowed sufcient public notice and comment. In the next 2 years, Congress
consider reauthorig the MGP and other ORR programs. The ORR is currently
holding a series of town-hal forums throughout the country to obtai views concerng
futue directions of refugee resettlement programs, including the MGP.
Stu
Rete 
The Inspector General's Offce of Audit Servces is currently reviewing the adequacy
of eligibility controls and the appropriateness of job training in the State-administered
programs. The Offce of Audit Servces also recently completed an audit that
examines ORR's oversight of the entire refugee resettlement program, includig the
MGP. In a November 1993 draft report on refugee resettlement, the United States
General Accounting Offce found that the MGP had substantial fiancial surpluses in
1991 and 1992. The surluses primariy resulted from fewer refugees arrving from the former Soviet Union. Ths caused the Council of Jewish Federations to settle fewer
refugees than it had anticipated.
MEODOLOY
For background purposes, we reviewed MGP program gudelines, performance
report, and volag self-sufciency outcome data for the last 3 program years. From
September through November 1993, we conducted on-site visits or telephone
intervews with the 6 parcipatig and 6 nonparcipatig volags and 159 of the
165 parcipatig afates. We asked volags and afates to descnbe their history, the
refugees that they serve, the servces they provide, and how the program is monitored.
We obtaed their opinions about the program s gudelies, performance goal, and
how the program could be improved. We did not attempt to 
veri the inormation

and data that they provided to us. We also intervewed ORR offcials.
Sll 
Qu 
Insctns
We conducted ths inspecton in accordance with the 
 for 
issued by the President's Counci on Integrty and Effciency. FINDINGS

The Voluntary Agency Matching Grant Program allows volags and affliates to provide a
valuable range of integrated services to refugees who have recently entered the United 
States. Program monitoring is largely the responsibility of the volags; the Federal
government's oversight is minimaL The ke to success may be the program 
s abilty to 
respond timely to changing conditions and fluctutions in the number and natue of
refgees it serves. 
Volags and affliates have taken advantage of the MGP's inate flexbility by altering and
adpting their services to assit a diverse popultion of refg es whose needs have changed 
and intensifed over tie. As evidenced by the following specific findings and 
recommendations (which incate the need for some ''fne-tuning' ), this flexbility, in 
tandem with appropriate accountabilty measures, needs to be supported and strengthened
to assure the success of the MGP. 
FLIL 
AFTE 
PROGRA  ALWS  TAIR 
TO  SERVICE TO A
DIVE REGEE 
POPULTION 
Both as wrtten and in their implementation, the MGP gudelines neither mandate nor 
advocate a single model for achievig refugee self-sufciency. While the gudelies
focu on the goal of assistig refugees to attain self-sufciency, they specify few 
program requiements or means to achieve ths goal. These decisions are left up to 
the individual affliates. 
Afates 
believe that flexibilty is necessar because of the refugees
' diversity.
Afates 
serve refugees from countries rangig from the former Soviet Union to 
Somala and Vietnam, and almost all must 
wide 
tr to find jobs for refugees with a 
range of skis, from farers and laborers to doctors and scientists. 
tie. 
Afates have needed the MGP's flexibilty to alter their servces over 
Accordig to at least one-thd of the afates, refugees parcipatig in the MGP 
when it was initiated were signcantly easier to 
serve than today s refugees. They 
believe that today s refugees are older, less healthy, less employable, and not as 
motivated, although this contradicts irormation that ORR has co1Jected on refugees 
enterig the United States. Some afates are fidig that fames are becoming "top
heavy as older refugees between the ages of 50 and 65 join their relatives. These 
refugees were already retired in their former countres and often are less motivated to 
lear new customs and skills. The followig char ilustrates some of the changes that 
afates have experienced in trng to adapt.  prent 
Changes in the refuge population  challenges
acrding to MGP affiltes 
Irne tfhue  efaaym  aInf fcioltme praen,  ath nu mrbeenr ot f
regee fames tend to be 
older 
educ 
ll-educaed  les 
high-skied les higbkiled 
heiy
les heathy
generll Englh lackig Englh
proficient  proficincy 
The MGP's fleXIbilty has al10wed afates to 
address these refugee changes. 
Afates have been able to refocus from providing fewer and less intensive servces 
such as simple job placement, to providig a wider range of more intensive servces, 
such as Englsh-language training, health servces, job traig, and case management. 
Because of the flexible gudelies, afates can tailor various servces such as case 
management, Englsh-language traig, and maitenance assistance to the refugees 
they serve. For example, whie some refugees might requie intensive case 
management, others might requie very little assistance. Because the MGP gudelies
do not requie cae managers to meet with refugees a specifc number of ties 
afates have the flexibilty to devote cae management resources to the refugees who 
need them most. Similarly, afates var the amount and extent of English-language 
traig and maintenance acssoista=nceu bansedt oyn in.d ividual refugees' needs as well as the 
resources available in the 
The MGP gudelines specifcally encourage affates to use their resources to provide 
servces beyond those specified in the MGP gudelines. The 
gudelies state that
agencies are encouraged to develop special programs which take into account client 
characteristics and the agency s experience." More than two-thds of afates provide 
additional servces such as job trainig, medical servces, chid care, and, after 
4 months, food and rent assistance and interest-free loans. Some of these affliates go 
beyond these servces in offerig semiars on various subjects includig: American 
holidays and customs, automated teller machines and the bankig system, health  insurance, hygiene, and American work ethics. Some affliates noted that they provide 
mental health counseling and social servces to help refugees manage the trauma of 
relocation. By providing additional servces, affates believe that refugees have a
better chance of attaining self-suffciency rather than entering the welfare system. 
AFTE  BAR 
REGEE AN  MiTILE 
MUST OVECOME 
ATTAI SEL-SUFCICY 
When asked about the barers that affect refugees' self-sufciency, volags and 
afates noted multiple problems includig (1) refugees' Englsh and job skis 
(2) poor local economies, (3) lack of adequate medica coverage, and (4) disincentives 
caused by high welfare payments and easy access in some States. Approxiately
60 percent of affliates and 5 of the 6 volags said that they face thee or more barrers. 
Despite encounterig multiple barers, some afates descnbed unque methods 
overcome these obstacles. 
. Lack of English and appropriate job 
skis are the top two barers to refugee self
sufciency, accordig to affiates. More than two-thirds of all affates indicated that
refugees ' lack of English skis is a major problem, makig it the most frequently 
mentioned barrer to self-sufciency. Afates also have problems fidig
employment for refugees because some refugees lack the basic skills required by 
American employers. Others are  Afates 
well-educated but lack appropriate skils. 
cited examples of engieers sti using draftg equipment rather than Computer-Aided 
Design and computer programmers unskil1ed in the use of English computer 
languages. 
Five of the six volags and many affates believe that the downtu in the American 
economy has led to fewer job opportties for refugees. In many communties, jobs 
traditionally fied by refugees have become scace, and refugees now must compete 
with Americans for these jobs. In areas with large layoffs and plant closures, afates 
mentioned that competition with skied America workers is overwhelmng for 
refugees who have few transferable job skis, cannot speak Englsh, and have no job
history. Alost hal of all affates mentioned the economy as a major barer, and 
afates 
82 percent of the  that reported recent declines in self-sufciency indicated 
that the economy is the major reason. 
afates 
Alost one-third of the  described diculties obtainig Medicaid or other 
medical assistance for refugees. In some cases, State agencies do not understand 
refugees' eligibilty for medical programs. For example , affliates described instances 
where States confused refugees with immigrants and did not give them the medical 
servces to which they were entitled. In addition, more than half of all affiates 
reported that some refugees who have famy members that may need medical 
attention do not take jobs because they fear losing Medicaid or other medical 
assistance, a fear that is sometimes unfounded. Ths problem is compounded by some 
States that do not provide extended medical coverage although Federal governent 
reguations indicate that eligibilty should continue for a short time after employment. " .
By workig directly with the State agencies or with ORR'  , some affliates 
s assistance
noted that they have been able to resolve this issue. 
The availability and amount of State welfare and social servces can have a diect 
impact on refugees' abilty and wiingness to become self-sufcient. More than one 
thd of afiates
, includig many in Caliornia
, New York, Ilois, and Michigan
experience diculty with refugees who appear less motivated because welfare benefits 
in their State are generous. In fact, networks of refugees exist in some of these States 
that educate refugees about the welfare system before they enter the countr.
Conversely, other afates mentioned that because their States offered litte or no 
general assistance, nearly al refugees are self-sufcient at the end of 4 months. For
exaple, one affate hypothesized that the lack of welfare in their State explais why
their self-sufciency rate was 98 percent compared to New 
York's 5 percent. 
Afates 
volunteered unique methods to overcome these barers. These include 
developing new traing and job opportties for refugees, fiding unque solutions to 
lack of health coverage, workig to change some refugees' atttudes about welfare, and 
fidig ways to provide more intensive servces than other affliates. Some examples
include: 
one afiate that 
links professional1y-trained refugees to local unversity 
professors who act as mentors 
one affate that has agreements with local companes to employ and provide 
Englsh classes for refugees with very poor English 
one affiliate that has developed on-going referral relationships with more than 
120 local companes and corporations, and 
afates 
a few  that have devoted tremendous tie and resources to develop 
relationships with local hospitals and health care providers to provide free or 
low-cost medical servces. 
APPROXITEY HA OF TI AFTE BELVE TIT ORR
OVEHAIZ EAY 
EMLOYM 
Although ORR, most volags, and many affiates believe that early employment is the 
most effective approach to refugee resettlement, approxiately hal of the afates 
believe that an extended training and resettlement approach would better serve al 
some of their refugees. Alost al1 affliates attempt to obtai early employment for 
refugees; however, more than half of the affliates indicated that they would prepare 
refugees for other tyes of employment if ORR did not emphasize early employment. 
The ORR, however, believes that this approach confcts with Section  the 
412  of 
Imgration and Nationalty Act, which states that Congress intended refugee 
resettement funds to be used to place employable refugees "on jobs as soon as
possible after their arrval in the United States.  Afiates agree that the overall goal of the MGP is to help refugees obtain economic
self-sufciency, but they disagree on the defiition of "economic self-sufciency" and
how to achieve it. Some affliates believe that refugees are best served if they find
employment quicldy and learn English and acculturate through workig. 
Other
afates 
believe that early employment is not synonymous with "economic self
sufciency." They believe that the emphasis on early employment frequently results in 
inappropriate job placements. For example
, affates felt pressured to place refugees 
in such poor matches as mathematicians takng piza 
delivery jobs and electrcal 
engieers workig as janitors. Accordig to these afiates, when refugees are placed 
in inappropriate jobs, they do not retain them and, because they are no longer eligible 
for refugee assistance, they enter the welfare system. Afates assert that, in these 
caes, refugees become more entrenched in the welfare system because they no longer
have access to the servces, training, and support that the 
affates provide. 
Approximately half of the affates believe that at least some refugees would be better 
served if they could concentrate on learng English, overcomig cuture shock, 
undergoing intensive job training, and havig their social servce needs met while 
enrolled in the MGP. Ths approach would result in a more appropriate, higher-level 
job placement and long-term economic self-suffciency, accordig to its advocates. 
They contend that long-term economic self-sufciency is better achieved by takg
tie-up to 
a year, according to some--to fuJly acculturate and train refugees rather 
than placing them in inappropriate entry-level jobs. For example, one affliate 
believes that ths extended approach would allow many of their refugees who become
mancursts to forego these entr-level jobs and instead concentrate on adapting their 
computer or medical skils to United States' standards. 
In general, afliates that would like the flexibilty to provide extended traing believe
that the decision should be made on a case-by-case basis. Ths would allow them to
design effective resettlement plans for each refugee based on that refugee s skils
needs, and desires. The foJlowig chart ilustrates how dierences among 
refugees
warrant diferent strategies to 
serve them.  EFCI 
PROGRA  MEUR AR 
INADEQUATE 
ajte 
Mmane    belie tJ job  moll  an appropri
suce placem at  is not, by itelf 
of th MGP's 
Although volags report the employment status of all refugees at 4 months
, these data 
alone do not effectively measure volag performance. Alost half of al affates 
disagree with or have reservations about the 4-month
, 60 percent employment goal. 
Accordig to affiates, the 4-month data do not reflect their different enronment
policies, variations in their local economies, or the diversity of the refugees they serve.
Diferent affate enrollment policies affect volags' 4-month employment rates. Some
afates, 
especially those workig with the Council of Jewish Federations
, make it a 
policy to place an eligible refugees into the MGP while others select refugees they
believe make the best candidates for achievig early employment. When asked about
its afates' enrollment policies 
, the Council of Jewish Federations stated that its 
national policy is to enroll aU eligible refugees. In contrast, less than 14 percent of the 
other volags ' affliates enroll all eligible refugees. These affates select only refugees 
whose motivation, health, and famiy size and composition make them more easily
employable. Of those affliates that disagree with the 4-month
, 60 percent employment goal
38 percent believe it is not appropriate because it does not take into account the local 
economy. Downturns in the American economy have reduced job opportties in 
many communities. For example, one volag had an agreement with a major hotel to 
place its refugees as soon as they arrved in the United States. When the hotel was 
forced to eliminate jobs, the first jobs to go were the ones refugees had filled. 
Because of this, the volag has had to search for new job opportities for its MGP 
refugees. Therefore, even if refugees are willing to accept any employment 
opportty, 
they may be forced to wait unti jobs become available or they must 
relocate. 
Another factor that the 4-month, 60 percent employment goal does not address is the
fact that some affiates serve refugees who have greater needs, fewer skis, and are
more chalenging to serve in general than refugees served by other affiates. 
Refugees
from the former Soviet Union tend to be more skilled than refugees from other part
of the world, but they may be more diffcult to serve because they prefer, and perform 
better, in jobs that utilize their ski1ls. Other refugees may come from an agraran 
society where many people are pre-literate farmers, shepherds, and fisherman who
have received mimal 
health servces. These refugees require more intensive servces 
and often are less attractive to potential 
employers. 
Afates 
offered suggestions to improve how ORR measures their performance. 
Some afliates reco=ended that ORR be more flexible and adjust the goal based on 
such factors as local economies and refugee characteristics. Whle they do not 
necessarily advocate a scorig system for individual refugees, they would like to see
ORR adjust the goal to take into consideration 
special circumstances that are obvious 
afates 
and ca be documented. Other  contend that 4 months is not long enough to 
accately measure self-sufciency. These afliates would lie ORR to 
lengthen the
program or measure self-sufciency at a later date. 
Th ORR ha no long-te efectiene mees 
The ORR cannot measure and compare the success of the afliates' dierent 
resetlteimt ent approaches because it lacks long-term effectiveness measures. Afates 
that  enrollment and focus on early employment tyica1ly have high 4-month self 
sufciency rates. Afiates that do 
not limit enrollment and emphasize longer-term 
intensive training and resettlement servces tyically have lower self-suffciency 
rates at 
4 months. Many of these afates assert that if ORR measured self-suffciency afer a 
year or more, it would find that they have higher self-suffciency rates and that 
refugees have found higher-level employment. The ORR does not believe that long-
term effectiveness measures can be developed or would be appropriate for a 4-month 
program. 
Although ORR co1lects 7-month refugee data, these data are problematic. At
7 months, ORR requires affliates to report the employment status of refugees who
. were employed at 4 months. While these data may be usefu to assess the refugees  job retention, some affliates clearly do not understand the purpose of the 7-month 
report and submit incorrect data. These affliates simply report the 
percentage of a1
refugees who are self-sufcient at 7 months. The ORR does not validate these data. 
Most affIliates could track refugees for a longer period of tie if 
required.
Approxiately 83 
percent of affiates indicated that they already track refugees afer 
7 months or that they would have minor or no 
diculties trackig them for 
at least 
another year. The remaining 17 percent of afates 
indicated that they would have 
major diculties trackig refugees after 7 months, maiy because they serve large 
numbers of refugees or their refugees move frequently and do not stay in contact. 
pro 
imle 
Compg th 
dier efeMcOPt tioe Stante reefg eem  eahsa ebees    becaue th hae
Although ORR has attempted to compare the effectiveness of the MGP and State
admstered 
refugee programs, no successfu comparison has been completed. In 
1991 , ORR co=issioned a study that would have compared the self-sufciency 
outcomes of comparable refugees enrolled in the MGP and State programs. The 
ORR cancelled the study because of problems with the contractor. 
Furhermore, according to ORR, any comparison between the programs would be 
dicult for two reasons. First, affliates ca choose which refugees to enroll in the 
MGP. States, on the other hand, must enroll and serve an or some of the remaing
refugees. Second, not al volags partcipate in the MGP, and those that do may only
allow afliates in good job opportunity areas to partcipate. Therefore
, their self 
sufciency rates would be signficantly higher than State agencies 
DOCUG 
GENTIG AN  FUS LI TI
MATCHG 
NUER AN  REGEE 
TYES OF  SERVE 
Generatig and documenting the match takes away from afates' abilty to provide
servces and has had some unoreseen consequences on the operation of the MGP. 
These include affliates (1) limiting the number of refugees they serve, (2) refusing to 
serve certain tyes of refugees, (3) delayig the donations of goods and servces, and
(4) refusing to participate in the MGP. 
The match policy causes some affiates to limt the number of 
refugees that they
serve. When asked what factors limt the number of refugees that they 
could serve 
approxiately 40 percent of afliates mentioned concerns about the match 
requiement. Concerns included generating the match, documenting in-kid servces 
and unwillngness of volunteers to complete burdensome paperwork. For example 
one afliate noted that volunteers refused to help when told of the accountabilty and 
paperwork involved. 
Approximately 16 percent of affliates have restricted the tyes 
of refugee they will 
serve mainly because of the match. In most instances, these affiates refuse "free  cases " or restrict enro11ment to refugees who are being reunited with their famies. 
By requiring the families to pay for their relatives
' entr into this country, these 
affates have a much easier time generating and documenting the match. In addition 
many of these refugees need fewer servces, and affliates can more easily generate the 
match as frends and family assist refugees with English tutoring, transportation to job 
sites and health servces, and informal acculturation. 
More than one-third of the afiates have had problems with ORR' s requiement that
goods and servces donated durig the refugees' fist 30 days in the country not count 
towards the MGP match. Afliates utie many donated resources durg refugees 
fist month in the country. They may not count these resources as par of the MGP 
match, because these goods and servces techncally are provided to refugees under 
the State Departent 
s reception and placement program
. To get around ths 
approxiately 22 percent of al afates have delayed the donation of nonessential 
afate 
items or have "loaned" items for the first 30 days. For example, one 
acknowledged that, in certain circumstances, it has asked refugees to sleep in sleeping 
bags unti it could count donated beds towards the MGP match. Other 
afates have 
avoided delaying the donation of items, but still believe that ORR should count some 
or al of these items toward the match. 
The ORR states that loaning goods is not appropriate and stresses that employment-
related servces donated during the fist 30 
days may be counted towards the match.
Afates 
clearly are more concerned with durable items such as future not countig
towards the matCh. The ORR also states that it has asked 
volags to determe what 
mimum requirements" refugees should receive durg the first 30 days so that it can 
count any extra servces towards the MGP match, but ORR asserts that volags have 
rejected this idea. 
Six volags provide reception and placement servces but do not partcipate in the 
MGP. Thee of these volags indicated that the match and burdensome paperwork 
requiements are the major reasons that they do not partcipate. As a result, refugees
who enter the country under their auspices do not have access to MGP servces and 
must partcipate in State-admstered resettlement programs if they requie servces
afer intial reception and placement.  , "

RECOMMENDATIONS
TI ORR SHOUI DECVEUP P ERORMCE INICATORS BY REVIING
MEUR AN
AN EXANING IT 
. DATA COlLCTON
TECHQUE 
The ORR should col1ect appropriate data in order to establish comprehensive 
performance indicators for all volags and affates partcipatig in the MGP. Whe 
4-month self-sufciency could continue to be one performance measurement
, ORR
should routinely collect longer-term refugee self-sufciency data. Many afates 
aleady collect longer-
term data or would experience minimal difculty collectig it. 
Both long-term and 4-month self-sufciency measures should take into account (1) the 
health of the local economy, (2) servces available in the community, (3) 
tyes of
refugees served, and (4) affate enrollment policies. Besides economic self 
sufciency, other performance indicators could include the quality and integration of 
servces provided by volags, the extent to which the entire family 
receives servces, and
socia! adjustment measures such as refugees' English improvement and partcipation in
accutuation activities. 
The ORR should examine the performance indicators for other Federal and State job 
traing programs and consider coordinatig with these programs in developing these 
standards. The HHS' Job Opportnities and Basic 
Skills Traing program and the 
Deparent of Labor s adult trainirg program under the Job Traing Partership Act
have established performance indicators to measure their programs
' success. 
TI ORR SHROUEI CQONUSIDJE R OPTONS TO REUCE TI BUREN OF 
TI MATCH 
Most afates make extensive use of in-kind servces, but many do not count some or
al of it towards the match due to the burdensome nature of the 
paperwork. Ths has 
a negative impact on the numbers and tyes of refugees that they serve and the
qualty of the servces that they provide. We recommend that ORR conduct a study
requiements. 
to determine how the match requirement could be revised to reduce the paperwork 
burden on grantees without compromising Federal grant administration audit
COMM 
AGENCY 
The ORR concurred with the recommendation on the match requiement. It did not 
state if it concurred with the recommendation on developing performance 
indicators. 
The ORR stated that "the data currently col1ected measures employment, the 
cornerstone of the Refugee Act" and that, beyond 4 months  it would be diffcult to 
discern outcomes that would be attnbutable to the Matching Grant Program.  Given the flexibilty that ORR allows for volags and afates to provide longer-term
servces to meet refugees needs to attain self-sufciency, the curent measures are not 
adequate to determe the program s success or to provide inormation on ways the 
program could be improved. The mandate for Federal agencies to develop 
comprehensive and appropriate performance indicators is found thoughout 
effort to 
reform and improve governent. The  Report of the Administration for Childen and 
Families  and the National Performance Review both 
Monitorig Team  contai strong
endorsements of appropriate and adequate 
effectiveness measures, includig long-term
performance indicators. The General Performance and Results Act of 
1993 requies 
that al Federal agencies develop comprehensive performance indicators and review 
their performance based on these indicators 
starg no later than 1999. 
A fu copy of ORR's co=ents appear in the appendi.  APPENDIX
DRA REORT

ORR  ON 
COMM  TI 
The ORR provided co=ents on a draf of ths report. In response, we revised the 
report to address most of its concerns. The draf report contaied thee 
reco=endations. Based on ORR's co=ents, we eliated 
the fist

reco=endation which suggested that ORR revise its program gudelies to clari the
goal of the MGP and address affates' concern that ORR overemphasizes early 
fu 
employment. The  text of ORR's co=ents begis on. the next page.  ~~~~
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH.. HUMAN SERVICES 
II" 
ANlIU 
.a 2  /994	 ADMINISTRATION FOA ScHelfcfRliENN Sult8-
Ofles 0' the Asalata"1 
370 L'Enfant PromeCnad.e ,2 S0frG4-E7I  DIG-I 
TO:  June Gibbs Brown  Washington. C.
Inspector General 
AIGCAA 
Nary Jo Bane ,-
FRON:	 AlGM 
Assistant Secretary 
for Children and Families
 oEeclle XC "' 
NatJT1 
SUBCT:  Reaponse to OIG Draft Report: "Tbe Rafugee 
Grant pragraia: Balancinq Flexibility and
Accountability,  OEI-09-9Z-00060 
This respond. to the draft report resulting from a recent review 
of the rafuqee Voluntary Aqency Progam (Katch!nq Grant). 
General Comments

Tahg- erenpocrti eresfl ectt hreastpo nsrese ceive fYndng foto  r ltochale a ffHilaitatcesh ing Granat t tPhreo gnaamti onal 
(KGP) to question" posed bY the OIG. Th.. r..port'
recoendations are 
based largely on the8e responses. 
Information which is impressionistic i. often presented as fact
e..9., 1:1i -changes in retugQII population" char on page 7 that 
compares demogaphic characteristics of refugees who arrived in 
the early 1980'S with .ore recent arrivals. The report would be 
strenqtened if it included hard data. 

Tbe Matching Grant program is a discretionary proqram.
opeates within basic paraJeter8 and specified reqired services 
and assistance to retugee5 that have ben developed based on 
extensive consultations with the participating agencies in the

contex of the 
Refuge. Act and available appropriations. wi thin 
the Matching Grant guidelines, grant888 exercise considerable 
moals to serve refugees 
discretion in developinq  accordinq to 
the needs of the refugees in the c01unities in which they 
the different 
raegsieden, canide wshi chn caontfiorom ntoa tlhel yca paacintide s locally. Grantlili8 aot pply for funding and
participate in that contex. 
They are not required to
participata or to enroll all of their clients i. e., they are free 
to chao.. which refugees are best served by thia proqa1l.

o Recoma8ndation8 
aespD.. 
OYS Recommendation

While the KGP's guidelines stat. that three goals of the progam 
are to help refuge.. (1) achieve econoaic self-sufficiency, (2) 
obtain early employment, and (3) achieve social adjustment, many 
affiliates believa that the.. goals conflict. For this reason 
a guidelines should be revised to more clearly define and

encourage program flexibility. 
a I :S \.:.: 7.. 

-;"i 
OlJ3dS  I:l0  :i:f:: 
031\13::30 
A - 2
 ...
Paqe Two - June Gibbs Brown
ACF RO&DOnSg
the program. The Refuq.. Act
Trheesqe aurei riandesed  tth.ea gota las ll - resourc.. ota  ppropriated to the progaa be 
... in order to 
expended N achieve economic selt-sufficiency among
rafugees aa quickly a8 possible..." and that "  employable 
refugees should be placed on jOb8 a. 800n as possible after their 
N The Hatchinq Grant proqam'
arrival in the United State8. 
goal. are broad, but consistent with the Retuges- Act.
As the report notes, wa have been flexible in how the goals are
to be achieved in the program. Grantees are able to tailor
.erlc.8 to a diverse refugee population.
G Recomendation 
The ORR should cdueveenlot p performnca indicators by retevicshiinqgu aensd...
exanding its  l1i!sUre and data collection  tae
self-sut 
Both long-ter and 4-month  iciBncy measures should 
(2) services
into account (1) the health of the locl economy, 
available in the community, (3) typ. of refugees se  ed, and (4) 
affiliate enrollment policies. Besides economic selt 
sufficiency, other performnce indicatora could include the
quality and inteqation ot services provided by volags, the
extent to which the entire family receives serices, and social
adjustment measure. such as refuqeea' English improvement and
paricipation in 
acculturation activities. 
ACF ReSDonSB
cuently 
The data  beinq collected aeasure8 employaent, the
cornerstone of the Refuqee Act. W. have revise measures to
perit the aqencies to report as successful outcomes refugees
the
epmprlooyedq ora .a.If.- sufficient two months beyond the end  ot 
Beyond that, it would be difficult to discern outco.es
tht would be attributable to the Matching Grant program.
OTG R eommend8tion
the match
Trhee qORai rsehomuld econnstid.e r.  o-pt.i ons to reduce the burden  ot 
We reco  end that ORR conduct a study to
determine how the match requirement could be revised to reduce
the paperwork burden on grantees without compromisinq Federal
grant administration audit requirements.
ACF Comment
w. agree and have been working with the agencies in this regard.
A - 3 Page Three - June Gibbs Brown 
.ahDioa1 COma.D 
aTG S  emBnt  (p. 3) 
Acording to the guidelines, sffiliates should place amp lay able
refugees in -
appropriate" jobs as 800n aa po..1ble, and retugees 
t an 
must accept entry-level jobs. The ORR believes 
appropriate job is one that match.. a refuqe.l s physical .kill.
an abiH ties. 
ACP Comment 
The guidelines actually state. "Federal policy requires that 
rather than resorting to public cash assistance. refugees must 
accept entry level employment. tI The intent ot the policy is to 
indicate that work at any level i8 preterable to welfare. 
ORR statee ite understandinq of appropriats employ.ent at 45 CFR
400.  appropriate employability serica. and 
. "criteria  tor 
employment. " These criteria .nco.pa.. broader parameters than 
physical skills and limitations and apply to all recipients of
refugee cash assistance. not just the Hatching Grant Progam. 
OIG S atement (c. 21 
Authorization for the HGP ie found in subpart (c) of 8 O. 
1522. .. The law states that the MGP es..ntially is designed to... 
ACF Comment 
The law does not specifically refer to the MGP in the referenced
subart. The law qivee general authority to the Director, ORR. 
to .aka grants and contracts with public or private nonprofit
agencies. 
G statement tD. 31 
Refuqe8s who tind employment are eligible  tor  Medicaid or refug.. 
lIecical assistance for an additional 4 months even it their 
income exceeds a prograa s eligibility guidelines. 
ACP C mmf!nt 
8458 CleFRa l4 00. 1.04  statRe. N If a  refugee vbo is receiving refugee
assistance becomes ineligible 80lely by reason of 
increased earnings  tro.  employment. the refug..' s medical 
aeeistance eliqibility shall be extended by a period of four 
months or until the refugee reaches the and  ot  his or her time 
eligibility period for refuqee .adical assistance... whichever 
irs
comes 
A - 4