Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
Postmarket Management of 
Cybersecurity in Medical Devices 
 
 
Guidance for Industry and Food and 
Drug Administration Staff  
Document issued on December 28, 2016. 
The draft of this document was issued on January 22, 2016. 
 
 
For questions regarding this document, contact Suzanne Schwartz, Center for Devices and 
Radiological Health, Food and Drug Administration, 10903 New Hampshire Ave., Bldg. 66, 
rm. 5434, Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002, 301-796-6937. For questions regarding this 
document as applied to devices regulated by CBER, contact the Office of Communication, 
Outreach and Development in CBER at 1-800-835-4709 or 240-402-8010 or 
ocod@fda.hhs.gov. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Food and Drug Administration 
Center for Devices and Radiological Health 
Office of the Center Director 
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research 
 
 
  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
   
Preface 
 
Public Comment 
You may submit electronic comments and suggestions at any time for Agency consideration to 
http://www.regulations.gov . Submit written comments to the Division of Dockets 
Management, Food and Drug Administration, 5630 Fishers Lane, Room 1061, (HFA-305), 
Rockville, MD 20852. Identify all comments with the docket number FDA-2015-D-5105.  
Comments may not be acted upon by the Agency until the document is next revised or updated. 
Additional Copies 
CDRH 
Additional copies are available from the Internet.  You may also send an e-mail request to 
CDRH-Guidance@fda.hhs.gov to receive an electronic copy of the guidance.  Please use the 
document number 1400044 to identify the guidance you are requesting. 
 
CBER 
Additional copies are available from the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research 
(CBER), by written request, Office of Communication, Outreach, and Development 
(OCOD), 10903 New Hampshire Ave., Bldg. 71, Room 3128, Silver Spring, MD 20993-
0002, or by calling 1-800-835-4709 or 240-402-8010, by email, ocod@fda.hhs.gov or from 
the Internet at 
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/G
uidances/default.htm.
 
2  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
   
Table of Contents 
I.  INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................4
II.  BACKGROUND.................................................................................................................................5
III.  SCOPE..............................................................................................................................................8
IV.  DEFINITIONS ....................................................................................................................................9
A.  COMPENSATING CONTROLS..............................................................................................................................9
B.  CONTROLLED RISK ...........................................................................................................................................9
C.  CYBERSECURITY ROUTINE UPDATES AND PATCHES .................................................................................................9
D.  CYBERSECURITY SIGNAL ..................................................................................................................................10
E.  EXPLOIT ......................................................................................................................................................10
F.  PATIENT HARM ............................................................................................................................................10
G.  REMEDIATION ..............................................................................................................................................11
H.  THREAT .......................................................................................................................................................11
I.  THREAT MODELING .......................................................................................................................................11
J.  UNCONTROLLED RISK .....................................................................................................................................12
K.  VULNERABILITY .............................................................................................................................................12
V.  GENERAL PRINCIPLES ......................................................................................................................12
A.  PREMARKET CONSIDERATIONS .........................................................................................................................12
B.  POSTMARKET CONSIDERATIONS .......................................................................................................................13
C.  MAINTAINING SAFETY AND ESSENTIAL PERFORMANCE .........................................................................................14
VI.  MEDICAL DEVICE CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT ...................................................................15
A.  ASSESSING EXPLOITABILITY OF THE CYBERSECURITY VULNERABILITY ........................................................................15
B.  ASSESSING SEVERITY OF PATIENT HARM ............................................................................................................17
C.  EVALUATION OF RISK OF PATIENT HARM ...........................................................................................................17
VII.  REMEDIATING AND REPORTING CYBERSECURITY VULNERABILITIES .................................................18
A.  CONTROLLED RISK OF PATIENT HARM ...............................................................................................................19
B.  UNCONTROLLED RISK TO SAFETY AND ESSENTIAL PERFORMANCE ...........................................................................21
VIII.  RECOMMENDED CONTENT TO INCLUDE IN PMA PERIODIC REPORTS ...............................................25
IX.  CRITERIA FOR DEFINING ACTIVE PARTICIPATION BY A MANUFACTURER IN AN ISAO .......................25
X.  APPENDIX: ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE POSTMARKET CYBERSECURITY PROGRAM.........................27
A.  IDENTIFY .....................................................................................................................................................27
I.  MAINTAINING SAFETY AND ESSENTIAL PERFORMANCE .........................................................................................27
B.  PROTECT/DETECT .........................................................................................................................................28
I.  VULNERABILITY CHARACTERIZATION AND ASSESSMENT .........................................................................................28
III.  ANALYSIS OF THREAT SOURCES ........................................................................................................................29
IV.  INCORPORATION OF THREAT DETECTION CAPABILITIES .........................................................................................29
V.  IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON ALL DEVICES ..............................................................................................................29
C.  PROTECT/RESPOND/RECOVER .........................................................................................................................29
D.  RISK MITIGATION OF SAFETY AND ESSENTIAL PERFORMANCE ................................................................................30
 
3  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
Postmarket Management of 
Cybersecurity in Medical Devices  
Guidance for Industry and  
Food and Drug Administration Staff  
This guidance represents the current thinking of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or 
Agency) on this topic.  It does not establish any rights for any person and is not binding on 
FDA or the public.  You can use an alternative approach if it satisfies the requirements of the 
applicable statutes and regulations.  To discuss an alternative approach, contact the FDA staff 
or Office responsible for this guidance as listed on the title page.  
I.  Introduction  
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is issuing this guidance to inform industry and FDA 
staff of the Agencys recommendations for managing postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities for 
marketed and distributed medical devices. In addition to the specific recommendations contained 
in this guidance, manufacturers are encouraged to address cybersecurity throughout the product 
lifecycle, including during the design, development, production, distribution, deployment and 
maintenance of the device1. A growing number of medical devices are designed to be networked 
to facilitate patient care. Networked medical devices, like other networked computer systems, 
incorporate software that may be vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. The exploitation of 
vulnerabilities may represent a risk to health and typically requires continual maintenance 
throughout the product life cycle to assure an adequate degree of protection against such exploits. 
Proactively addressing cybersecurity risks in medical devices reduces the overall risk to health. 
 
This guidance clarifies FDAs postmarket recommendations and emphasizes that manufacturers 
should monitor, identify, and address cybersecurity vulnerabilities and exploits as part of their 
postmarket management of medical devices. This guidance establishes a risk-based framework for 
assessing when changes to medical devices for cybersecurity vulnerabilities require reporting to 
the Agency and outlines circumstances in which FDA does not intend to enforce reporting 
requirements under 21 CFR part 806.  21 CFR part 806 requires device manufacturers or 
importers to report promptly to FDA certain actions concerning device corrections and removals. 
However, the majority of actions taken by manufacturers to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
and exploits, referred to as cybersecurity routine updates and patches, are generally considered 
                                                 
1 See FDA Guidance titled Content of Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical 
Devices (http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM356190)
 
4  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
to be a type of device enhancement2 for which the FDA does not require advance notification or 
reporting under 21 CFR part 806. For a small subset of actions taken by manufacturers to correct 
device cybersecurity vulnerabilities and exploits that may pose a risk to health, the FDA would 
require medical device manufacturers to notify the Agency.3 Risks to health posed by the device 
may result in patient harm. This guidance recommends how to assess whether the risk4 of patient 
harm is sufficiently controlled or uncontrolled. This assessment is based on an evaluation of the 
likelihood of exploit, the impact of exploitation on the devices safety and essential performance,5 
and the severity of patient harm if exploited. 
This document is not intended to provide guidance on reporting to FDA when a device has or may 
have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury as required by section 519 of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) and the Medical Device Reporting (MDR) 
Regulation in 21 CFR part 803. For an explanation of the current reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements applicable to manufacturers of medical devices, please refer to the Medical Device 
Reporting for Manufacturers Guidance 
(http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM
359566).  
For the current edition of the FDA-recognized standard(s) referenced in this document, see the 
FDA Recognized Consensus Standards Database Web site at  
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfStandards/search.cfm . 
FDA's guidance documents, including this final guidance, do not establish legally enforceable 
responsibilities. Instead, guidances describe the Agency's current thinking on a topic and should 
be viewed only as recommendations, unless specific regulatory or statutory requirements are 
cited. The use of the word should in Agency guidance means that something is suggested or 
recommended, but not required.  
II.  Background 
On February 19, 2013, the President issued Executive Order 13636  Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity (EO 13636; https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-
19/pdf/2013-03915.pdf), which recognized that resilient infrastructure is essential to preserving 
national security, economic stability, and public health and safety in the United States. EO 13636 
                                                 
2 See FDA Guidance titled: Distinguishing Medical Device Recalls from Medical Device Enhancements 
(http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM418469.
pdf). 
3 See 21 CFR 806.10.  
4 ANSI/AAMI/ISO 14971: 2007/(R)2010: Medical Devices  Application of Risk Management to Medical Devices, 
section 2.16  definition of risk. 
5 ANSI/AAMI ES60601-1:2005/(R)2012 and A1:2012, C1:2009/(R)2012 and A2:2010/(R)2012 (Consolidated Text) 
Medical electrical equipment Part 1: General requirements for basic safety and essential performance (IEC 
60601-1:2005, MOD), section 3.27 defines Essential Performance as performance of a clinical function, other than 
that related to basic safety, where loss or degradation beyond the limits specified by the manufacturer results in an 
unacceptable risk. 
 
5  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
states that cyber threats to national security are among the most serious, and that stakeholders 
must enhance the cybersecurity and resilience of critical infrastructure. This includes the 
Healthcare and Public Health Critical Infrastructure Sector (HPH Sector). Furthermore, 
Presidential Policy Directive 21  Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (PPD-21; 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-
infrastructure-security-and-resil) issued on February 12, 2013 tasks Federal Government entities 
to strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure against physical and cyber threats 
such that these efforts reduce vulnerabilities, minimize consequences, and identify and disrupt 
threats. PPD-21 encourages all public and private stakeholders to share responsibility in achieving 
these outcomes. 
In recognition of the shared responsibility for cybersecurity, the security industry has established 
resources including standards, guidelines, best practices and frameworks for stakeholders to adopt 
a culture of cybersecurity risk management. Best practices include collaboratively assessing 
cybersecurity intelligence information for risks to device functionality and clinical risk. FDA 
believes that, in alignment with EO 13636 and PPD-21, public and private stakeholders should 
collaborate to leverage available resources and tools to establish a common understanding that 
assesses risks for identified vulnerabilities in medical devices among the information technology 
community, healthcare delivery organizations (HDOs), the clinical user community, and the 
medical device community. These collaborations can lead to the consistent assessment and 
mitigation of cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities, and their impact on medical devices, 
ultimately reducing potential risk of patient harm.   
Cybersecurity risk management is a shared responsibility among stakeholders including the 
medical device manufacturer, the user, the Information Technology (IT) system integrator, Health 
IT developers, and an array of IT vendors that provide products that are not regulated by the FDA. 
FDA seeks to encourage collaboration among stakeholders by clarifying, for those stakeholders it 
regulates, recommendations associated with mitigating cybersecurity threats to device 
functionality and device users.  
As stated in the FDA guidance document titled Content of Premarket Submissions for 
Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices 
(http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM
356190), when manufacturers consider cybersecurity during the design phases of the medical 
device lifecycle, the resulting impact is a more proactive and robust mitigation of cybersecurity 
risks. Similarly, a proactive and risk-based approach to the postmarket phase for medical devices, 
through engaging in cybersecurity information sharing and monitoring, promoting good cyber 
hygiene through routine device cyber maintenance, assessing postmarket information, employing 
a risk-based approach to characterizing vulnerabilities, and timely implementation of necessary 
actions can further mitigate emerging cybersecurity risks and reduce the impact to patients.  
To further aid manufacturers in managing their cybersecurity risk, the Agency encourages the use 
and adoption of the voluntary Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
(https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-
021214.pdf) that has been developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) with collective input from other government agencies and the private sector.  
 
6  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
Critical to the adoption of a proactive, rather than reactive, postmarket cybersecurity approach is 
the sharing of cyber risk information and intelligence within the medical device community. This 
information sharing can enhance management of individual cybersecurity vulnerabilities and 
provide advance cyber threat information to additional relevant stakeholders to manage and 
enhance cybersecurity in the medical device community and HPH Sector.  
Executive Order 13691  Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing (EO 
13691; https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-promoting-
private-sector-cybersecurity-information-shari), released on February 13, 2015, encourages the 
development of Information Sharing Analysis Organizations (ISAOs), to serve as focal points for 
cybersecurity information sharing and collaboration within the private sector as well as between 
the private sector and government. EO 13691 also mandates that the ISAO ...protects the 
privacy and civil liberties of individuals, that preserves business confidentiality, [and] that 
safeguards the information being shared....  ISAOs gather and analyze critical infrastructure 
information in order to better understand cybersecurity problems and interdependencies, 
communicate or disclose critical infrastructure information to help prevent, detect, mitigate, or 
recover from the effects of cyber threats, or voluntarily disseminate critical infrastructure 
information to its members or others involved in the detection and response to cybersecurity 
issues.6  
The ISAOs (https://www.dhs.gov/isao) are intended to be: Inclusive (groups from any and all 
sectors, both non-profit and for-profit, expert or novice, should be able to participate in an ISAO); 
Actionable (groups will receive useful and practical cybersecurity risk, threat indicator, and 
incident information via automated, real-time mechanisms if they choose to participate in an 
ISAO); Transparent (groups interested in an ISAO model will have adequate understanding of 
how that model operates and if it meets their needs); and Trusted (participants in an ISAO can 
request that their information be treated as Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
(https://www.dhs.gov/pcii-program). Such information is shielded from any release otherwise 
required by the Freedom of Information Act or State Sunshine Laws and is exempt from 
regulatory use and civil litigation if the information satisfies the requirements of the Critical 
Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.  131 et seq.)). 
The FDA Center for Devices and Radiological Health has entered into a Memorandum of 
Understanding with one such ISAO, the National Health Information Sharing & Analysis Center, 
(NH-ISAC)7 in order to assist in the creation of an environment that fosters stakeholder 
collaboration and communication, and encourages the sharing of information about cybersecurity 
threats and vulnerabilities that may affect the safety, effectiveness, integrity, and security of the 
medical devices and the surrounding Health IT infrastructure.  
                                                 
6 See Homeland Security Act (https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf), 6 U.S.C.  212 (2002).  
7 See Memorandum of Understanding between the National Health Information Sharing & Analysis Center, Inc. 
(NH-ISAC), The Medical Device Innovation, Safety and Security Consortium (MDISS), and the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration Center for Devices and Radiological Health 
(http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/MemorandaofUnderstandingMOUs/DomesticMOUs/uc
m524376.htm).     
 
7  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
The Agency wishes to promote collaboration among the medical device and Health IT community 
to develop a shared understanding of the risks posed by cybersecurity vulnerabilities to medical 
devices and foster the development of a shared understanding of risk assessment to enable 
stakeholders to consistently and efficiently assess patient safety and public health risks associated 
with identified cybersecurity vulnerabilities and take timely, appropriate action to mitigate the 
risks. This approach will also enable stakeholders to provide timely situational awareness to the 
HPH community and take efforts to preemptively address the cybersecurity vulnerability through 
appropriate mitigation and/or remediation before it impacts the safety, effectiveness, integrity or 
security of medical devices and the Health IT infrastructure. 
The Agency considers voluntary participation in an ISAO a critical component of a medical 
device manufacturers comprehensive proactive approach to management of postmarket 
cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities and a significant step towards assuring the ongoing safety 
and effectiveness of marketed medical devices. For companies that actively participate in such a 
program, and follow other recommendations in this guidance, the Agency does not intend to 
enforce certain reporting requirements of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) 
(see Section VII).  
More information about active participation in an ISAO can be found in Section IX. 
III.  Scope 
This guidance applies to any marketed and distributed medical device including: 1) medical 
devices that contain software (including firmware) or programmable logic; and 2) software that is 
a medical device, 8 including mobile medical applications.9 In addition, this guidance applies to 
medical devices that are considered part of an interoperable10 system and to legacy devices, i.e., 
devices that are already on the market or in use.  
 
This guidance supplements the information addressed in the FDA guidance document titled 
Cybersecurity for Networked Medical Devices Containing Off-the-Shelf (OTS) Software 
                                                 
8 Under section 201(h) of the FD&C Act, device is defined as an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, 
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar related article, including a component part or accessory which 
is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man 
or other animals, and which does not achieve any of its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or 
on the body of man or other animals. In addition,  please note that the International Medical Device Regulators 
Forum (IMDRF) Software as a Medical Device (SaMD) December 9, 2013, section 5.1 defines Software as a 
Medical Device as software intended to be used for one or more medical purposes that perform these purposes 
without being part of a hardware medical device (http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/technical/imdrf-tech-
131209-samd-key-definitions-140901.pdf). 
9 See FDA Guidance:  Mobile Medical Applications 
(http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/.../UCM263366.pdf).    
10 See FDA Guidance Design Considerations and Pre-market Submission Recommendations for Interoperable 
Medical Devices 
(http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM482649).
 
8  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
(http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm0
77812.htm).   
This guidance does not apply to investigational devices.11  
IV.  Definitions 
For the purposes of this guidance, the following definitions are used: 
A.   Compensating Controls 
A cybersecurity compensating control is a safeguard or countermeasure deployed, in lieu of, or in 
the absence of controls designed in by a device manufacturer. These controls are external to the 
device design, configurable in the field, employed by a user, and provide supplementary or 
comparable cyber protection for a medical device12. For example, a manufacturers assessment of 
a cybersecurity vulnerability determines that unauthorized access to a networked medical device 
will most likely impact the devices safety or essential performance. However, the manufacturer 
determines that the device can safely and effectively operate without access to the host network, 
in this case the hospital network. The manufacturer instructs users to configure the network to 
remove the ability of unauthorized/unintended access to the device from the hospital network. 
This type of counter measure is an example of a compensating control. 
  
B.  Controlled Risk 
Controlled risk is present when there is sufficiently low (acceptable) residual risk of patient harm 
due to a devices particular cybersecurity vulnerability. 
C.  Cybersecurity Routine Updates and Patches 
Cybersecurity routine updates and patches are changes to a device to increase device security 
and/or remediate only those vulnerabilities associated with controlled risk of patient harm. These 
types of changes are not to reduce uncontrolled risk of patient harm, and therefore not to reduce a 
risk to health or to correct a violation of the FD&C Act. They include any regularly scheduled 
security updates or patches to a device, including upgrades to the software, firmware, 
programmable logic, hardware, or security of a device to increase device security, as well as 
updates or patches to address vulnerabilities associated with controlled risk performed earlier than 
their regularly scheduled deployment cycle even if they are distributed to multiple units. 
Cybersecurity routine updates and patches are generally considered to be a type of device 
enhancement that may be applied to vulnerabilities associated with controlled risk and is not 
considered a repair. Cybersecurity routine updates and patches may also include changes to 
                                                 
11 Manufacturers may also consider applying the cybersecurity principles described in this guidance as appropriate to 
Investigational Device Exemption submissions and to devices exempt from premarket review.  
12 This definition is adapted from NIST Special Publication Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal 
Information Systems and Organizations, NIST SP 800-53A Rev. 4.   
 
9  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
product labeling, including the instructions for use, to strengthen cybersecurity through increased 
end-user education and use of best practices. Because cybersecurity routine updates and patches 
are generally considered to be device enhancements, manufacturers are generally not required to 
report these updates and patches as corrections under 21 CFR part 806. See Section VII for more 
details on reporting requirements for vulnerabilities with controlled risk. Security updates made to 
remediate vulnerabilities associated with a reasonable probability that use of, or exposure to, the 
product will cause serious adverse health consequences or death are not considered to be 
cybersecurity routine updates or patches.   
D.  Cybersecurity Signal 
A cybersecurity signal is any information which indicates the potential for, or confirmation of, a 
cybersecurity vulnerability or exploit that affects, or could affect a medical device. A 
cybersecurity signal could originate from traditional information sources such as internal 
investigations, postmarket surveillance, or complaints, and/or security-centric sources such as 
CERTS (Computer/Cyber, Emergency Response/Readiness Teams), such as ICS-CERT13, 
ISAOs14, threat indicators, and security researchers. Signals may be identified within the HPH 
Sector. They may also originate in another critical infrastructure sector (e.g., defense, financial) 
but have the potential to impact medical device cybersecurity.   
E.  Exploit  
An exploit is an instance where a vulnerability or vulnerabilities have been exercised (accidently 
or intentionally) by a threat and could impact the safety or essential performance of a medical 
device or use a medical device as a vector to compromise a connected device or system. 
F.  Patient Harm 
Harm15 is the physical injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the 
environment. Patient harm is defined as physical injury or damage to the health of patients, 
including death. Risks to health posed by the device may result in patient harm. This guidance 
outlines the assessment of whether the risk16 of patient harm is sufficiently controlled or 
uncontrolled. This assessment is based on an evaluation of the likelihood of exploit, the impact of 
exploitation on the devices safety and essential performance, and the severity of patient harm if 
exploited (see section VI).   
Other harms, such as loss of confidential information, including compromise of protected health 
information (PHI), are not considered patient harms for the purposes of this guidance.  
                                                 
13 ICS-CERT - Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team 
14 See Department of Homeland Security, Frequently Asked Questions about Information Sharing and Analysis 
Organizations (ISAOs).   
15 ANSI/AAMI/ISO 14971: 2007/(R)2010: Medical Devices  Application of Risk Management to Medical Devices, 
section 2.2  definition of harm. 
16 ANSI/AAMI/ISO 14971: 2007/(R)2010: Medical Devices  Application of Risk Management to Medical Devices, 
section 2.16  definition of risk. 
 
10  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
Nevertheless, the FDA recommends that manufacturers consider protecting the confidentiality of 
such information as part of their overall comprehensive risk management program. Although 
protecting the confidentiality of PHI is beyond the scope of this document, it should be noted that 
manufacturers and/or other entities, depending on the facts and circumstances, may be obligated 
to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of PHI throughout the product life cycle, 
including disposal, in accordance with applicable federal and state laws, including the Health 
Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 17 Changes to a device that are made 
 
solely to address loss of confidentiality are typically considered to be device enhancements. 
G.  Remediation 
Remediation is any action(s) taken to reduce an uncontrolled risk of patient harm posed by a 
device cybersecurity vulnerability to an acceptable level. Remediation actions may include 
complete solutions to remove a cybersecurity vulnerability from a medical device or 
compensating controls that adequately mitigate the risk (e.g., notification to customers and the 
user community identifying a control the user can implement). An example of remediation is a 
notification to the customers and the user community that discloses the vulnerability, the impact 
to the device, the potential for patient harm, and provides a strategy to reduce the risk of patient 
harm to an acceptable and controlled level. If the customer notification does not provide a strategy 
to reduce the risk of patient harm to an acceptable and controlled level, then the remediation is 
considered incomplete. 
H.  Threat 
Threat is any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact the device, 
organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational 
assets, individuals, or other organizations through an information system via unauthorized access, 
destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service.18 Threats exercise 
vulnerabilities, which may impact the safety or essential performance of the device. 
I.  Threat Modeling 
Threat modeling is a methodology for optimizing Network/Application/Internet Security by 
identifying objectives and vulnerabilities, and then defining countermeasures to prevent, or 
                                                 
17 The HHS Office for Civil Rights enforces the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
Privacy Rule, which protects the privacy of individually identifiable health information that covered entities or their 
business associates create, receive, maintain, or transmit; the HIPAA Security Rule, which sets national standards for 
the security of electronic protected health information; the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, which requires covered 
entities and business associates to provide notification following a breach of unsecured protected health information; 
and the confidentiality provisions of the Patient Safety Rule, which protect identifiable information being used to 
analyze patient safety events and improve patient safety. See Health information Privacy at: 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/index.html.  
18 NIST SP 800-53; SP 800-53A; SP 800-27; SP 800-60; SP 800-37; CNSSI-4009. Note:  Adapted from NIST 
definition (SP 800-53). 
 
11  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
mitigate the effects of, threats to the system.19 For medical devices, threat modeling can be used 
to strengthen security by identifying vulnerabilities and threats to a particular product, products in 
a product line, or from the organizations supply chain that can cause patient harm. 
 
J.  Uncontrolled Risk 
Uncontrolled risk is present when there is unacceptable residual risk of patient harm due to 
inadequate compensating controls and risk mitigations. 
K.  Vulnerability  
A vulnerability is a weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal 
controls, human behavior, or implementation that could be exploited by a threat.  
V.  General Principles 
FDA recognizes that medical device cybersecurity is a shared responsibility among stakeholders 
including health care facilities, patients, providers, and manufacturers of medical devices. Failure 
to maintain cybersecurity can result in compromised device functionality, loss of data (medical or 
personal) availability or integrity, or exposure of other connected devices or networks to security 
threats. This in turn may have the potential to result in patient illness, injury or death.   
Effective cybersecurity risk management is intended to reduce the risk to patients by decreasing 
the likelihood that device functionality is intentionally or unintentionally compromised by 
inadequate cybersecurity. An effective cybersecurity risk management program should 
incorporate both premarket and postmarket lifecycle phases and address cybersecurity from 
medical device conception to obsolescence It is recommended that manufacturers apply the NIST 
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (i.e., Identify, Protect, Detect, 
Respond and Recover; 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-
021214.pdf in the development and implementation of their comprehensive cybersecurity 
programs. Alignment of the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
five core functions to management of cybersecurity in medical devices is discussed in the 
Appendix in greater detail. 
A.  Premarket Considerations 
The FDA guidance document titled Content of Premarket Submissions for Management of 
Cybersecurity in Medical Devices 
(http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocu
ments/UCM356190.pdf) clarifies recommendations for manufacturers to address cybersecurity 
                                                 
19 See Threat Modeling as defined in the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP; 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:Threat_Modeling).  
 
12  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
during the design and development of the medical device, as this can result in more robust and 
efficient mitigation of patient risks. Manufacturers should establish design inputs for their device 
related to cybersecurity, and establish a cybersecurity vulnerability and management approach as 
part of the software validation and risk analysis that is required by 21 CFR 820.30(g). The 
approach should appropriately address the following elements: 
  Identification of assets, threats, and vulnerabilities; 
  Assessment of the impact of threats and vulnerabilities on device functionality and end 
users/patients; 
  Assessment of the likelihood of a threat and of a vulnerability being exploited; 
  Determination of risk levels and suitable mitigation strategies; 
  Assessment of residual risk and risk acceptance criteria. 
 
B.  Postmarket Considerations 
Because cybersecurity risks to medical devices are continually evolving, it is not possible to 
completely mitigate risks through premarket controls alone. Therefore, it is essential that 
manufacturers implement comprehensive cybersecurity risk management programs and 
documentation consistent with the Quality System Regulation (21 CFR part 820), including but 
not limited to complaint handling (21 CFR 820.198), quality audit (21 CFR 820.22), corrective 
and preventive action (21 CFR 820.100), software validation and risk analysis (21 CFR 
820.30(g)) and servicing (21 CFR 820.200). 
     
Cybersecurity risk management programs should emphasize addressing vulnerabilities which may 
permit the unauthorized access, modification, misuse or denial of use, or the unauthorized use of 
information that is stored, accessed, or transferred from a medical device to an external recipient, 
and may result in patient harm. Manufacturers should respond in a timely fashion to address 
identified vulnerabilities. Critical components of such a program include: 
  Monitoring cybersecurity information sources for identification and detection of 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities and risk; 
  Maintaining robust software lifecycle processes that include mechanisms for:  
o  monitoring third party software components for new vulnerabilities throughout the 
devices total product lifecycle;  
o  design verification and validation for software updates and patches that are used to 
remediate vulnerabilities, including those related to Off-the-shelf software;    
  Understanding, assessing and detecting presence and impact of a vulnerability; 
  Establishing and communicating processes for vulnerability intake and handling 
  Note: The FDA has recognized ISO/IEC 30111:2013: Information Technology  Security 
Techniques  Vulnerability Handling Processes; 
  Using threat modeling to clearly define how to maintain safety and essential performance 
of a device by developing mitigations that protect, respond and recover from the 
cybersecurity risk;  
 
13  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
  Adopting a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy and practice. The FDA has 
recognized ISO/IEC 29147:2014: Information Technology  Security Techniques  
Vulnerability Disclosure which may be a useful resource for manufacturers; and 
  Deploying mitigations that address cybersecurity risk early and prior to exploitation. 
Postmarket cybersecurity information may originate from an array of sources including 
independent security researchers, in-house testing, suppliers of software or hardware technology, 
health care facilities, and information sharing and analysis organizations. It is strongly 
recommended that manufacturers participate in an ISAO that shares vulnerabilities and threats 
that impact medical devices. Sharing and dissemination of cybersecurity information and 
intelligence pertaining to vulnerabilities and threats across multiple sectors is integral to a 
successful postmarket cybersecurity surveillance program. 
To manage postmarket cybersecurity risks for medical devices, a company should have a 
structured and systematic approach to risk management and quality management systems 
consistent with 21 CFR part 820. For example, such a program should include: 
  Methods to identify, characterize, and assess a cybersecurity vulnerability.  
  Methods to analyze, detect, and assess threat sources.  For example: 
o  A cybersecurity vulnerability might impact all of the medical devices in a 
manufacturers portfolio based on how their products are developed; or 
o  A cybersecurity vulnerability could exist vertically (i.e., within the 
components of a device) which can be introduced at any point in the supply 
chain for a medical device manufacturing process. 
It is recommended as part of a manufacturers cybersecurity risk management program 
that the manufacturer incorporate elements consistent with the NIST Framework for 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (i.e., Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, 
and Recover; 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-
framework-021214.pdf ).   
FDA recognizes that medical devices and the surrounding network infrastructure cannot be 
completely secured. Design, architecture, technology, and software development environment 
choices may result in the inadvertent incorporation of vulnerabilities. The presence of a 
vulnerability does not necessarily trigger patient harm concerns. Rather it is the impact of the 
vulnerability on the safety and essential performance of the device which may present a risk of 
patient harm. Vulnerabilities that do not appear to currently present a risk of patient harm should 
be assessed by the manufacturer for future impact.  
C. Maintaining Safety and Essential Performance 
Compromise of safety or essential performance of a device can result in patient harm and may 
require intervention to prevent patient harm.   
 
14  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
Manufacturers should define, as part of the comprehensive cybersecurity risk management, the 
safety and essential performance of their device, the resulting severity of patient harm if 
compromised, and the risk acceptance criteria. These steps allow manufacturers to triage 
vulnerabilities for remediation (see Section VI for additional information on risk assessments).   
Threat modeling is important in understanding and assessing the exploitability of a device 
vulnerability and potential for patient harm. Threat modeling can also be used in determining 
whether a proposed or implemented remediation can provide assurance that the risk of patient 
harm due to a cybersecurity vulnerability is reasonably controlled. Importantly, acceptable 
mitigations will vary depending upon the severity of patient harm that may result from 
exploitation of a vulnerability affecting the device. For example, a cybersecurity vulnerability 
affecting the temperature reading of a thermometer may have different risks than a cybersecurity 
vulnerability affecting the dosage of an insulin infusion pump because of the severity of patient 
harm.   
VI.  Medical Device Cybersecurity Risk Management 
As part of their risk management process consistent with 21 CFR part 820, a manufacturer should 
establish, document, and maintain throughout the medical device lifecycle an ongoing process for 
identifying hazards associated with the cybersecurity of a medical device, estimating and 
evaluating the associated risks, controlling these risks, and monitoring the effectiveness of the 
controls. This process should include risk analysis, risk evaluation, risk control, and incorporation 
of production and post-production information. Elements identified in the Appendix of this 
guidance should be included as part of the manufacturers cybersecurity risk management 
program to support an effective risk management process. Manufacturers should have a defined 
process to systematically conduct a risk evaluation and determine whether a cybersecurity 
vulnerability affecting a medical device presents an acceptable or unacceptable risk. It is not 
possible to describe all hazards, associated risks, and/or controls associated with medical device 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in this guidance. It is also not possible to describe all scenarios 
where risk is controlled or uncontrolled. Rather, FDA recommends that manufacturers define and 
document their process for objectively assessing the cybersecurity risk for their device(s).   
As outlined below, it is recommended that such a process focus on assessing the risk of patient 
harm by considering:  
1) The exploitability of the cybersecurity vulnerability, and  
2) The severity of patient harm if the vulnerability were to be exploited.   
Such analysis should also incorporate consideration of compensating controls and risk 
mitigations. 
A.  Assessing Exploitability of the Cybersecurity 
Vulnerability 
 
15  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
Manufacturers should have a process for assessing the exploitability of a cybersecurity 
vulnerability. In many cases, estimating the probability of a cybersecurity exploit is very difficult 
due to factors such as; complexity of exploitation, availability of exploits, and exploit toolkits.  In 
the absence of data on the probability of the occurrence of harm, conventional medical device risk 
management approaches suggest using a reasonable worst-case estimate or setting the default 
value of the probability to one. While these approaches are acceptable, FDA suggests that 
manufacturers instead consider using a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tool or similar 
scoring system for rating vulnerabilities and determining the need for and urgency of the 
response. 
One such tool, the Common Vulnerability Scoring System, Version 3.0, for example, provides 
numerical ratings corresponding to high, medium and low by incorporating a number of factors in 
assessing exploitability including:20 
  Attack Vector (physical, local, adjacent, network) 
  Attack Complexity (high, low) 
  Privileges Required (none, low, high) 
  User Interaction (none, required) 
  Scope (changed, unchanged) 
  Confidentiality Impact (high, low, none) 
  Integrity Impact (none, low, high) 
  Availability Impact (high, low, none) 
  Exploit Code Maturity (high, functional, proof-of-concept, unproven) 
  Remediation Level (unavailable, work-around, temporary fix, official fix, not defined) 
  Report Confidence (confirmed, reasonable, unknown, not defined) 
In using any vulnerability scoring system (or tool), weighting of the individual factors that 
contribute to the composite score should be carefully considered. 
Other resources that may aid in the triage of vulnerabilities are:  AAMI TIR57:  Principles for 
medical device security  Risk management21, IEC 80001: Application of risk management for IT 
Networks incorporating medical devices22, the National Vulnerability Database23 (NVD), the 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures24 (CVE), Common Weakness Enumeration25 (CWE), 
Common Weakness Scoring System26 (CWSS), Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and 
                                                 
20 For a full description of each factor, see Common Vulnerability Scoring System, Version 3.0: Specification 
Document (https://www.first.org/cvss/specification-document). 
21 AAMI TIR57: Principles for medical device securityRisk management - See more at: 
http://www.aami.org/productspublications/ProductDetail.aspx?ItemNumber=3729#sthash.CqfSLyu9.dpuf
22 IEC/TR 80001-2-1:2012 Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices 
23 National Vulnerability Database (NVD; https://nvd.nist.gov/).
24 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE; https://cve.mitre.org/). 
25 Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE; http://cwe.mitre.org/index.html).
26 Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS; http://cwe.mitre.org/cwss/cwss_v1.0.1.html).
 
16  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
Classification27 (CAPEC), Common Configuration Enumeration28 (CCE) Common Platform 
Enumeration29 (CPE). 
B.  Assessing Severity of Patient Harm  
Manufacturers should also have a process for assessing the severity of patient harm, if the 
cybersecurity vulnerability were to be exploited. While there are many potentially acceptable 
approaches for conducting this type of analysis, one such approach may be based on qualitative 
severity levels as described in ANSI/AAMI/ISO 14971: 2007/(R)2010: Medical Devices  
Application of Risk Management to Medical Devices:  
Common Term  Possible Description 
Negligible:     Inconvenience or temporary discomfort 
Minor:   Results in temporary injury or impairment not requiring professional 
medical intervention 
Serious:   Results in injury or impairment requiring professional medical intervention 
Critical:     Results in permanent impairment or life-threatening injury  
Catastrophic:    Results in patient death 
C.  Evaluation of Risk of Patient Harm 
A key purpose of conducting the cyber-vulnerability risk assessment is to evaluate whether the 
risk of patient harm is controlled (acceptable) or uncontrolled (unacceptable). One method of 
assessing the acceptability of risk involves using a matrix with combinations of exploitability 
and severity of patient harm to determine whether the risk of patient harm is controlled or 
uncontrolled. A manufacturer can then conduct assessments of the exploitability and severity of 
patient harm and then use such a matrix to assess the risk of patient harm for the identified 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities. 
For risks that remain uncontrolled, additional remediation should be implemented. 
The following figure is an example matrix that shows a possible approach to evaluate the 
relationship between exploitability and patient harm. It can be used to assess the risk of patient 
harm from a cybersecurity vulnerability as controlled or uncontrolled. While in some cases the 
evaluation will yield a definite determination that the situation is controlled or uncontrolled, it is 
possible that in other situations this determination may not be as distinct. Nevertheless, in all 
cases, FDA recommends that manufacturers make a binary determination that a vulnerability is 
either controlled or uncontrolled using an established process that is tailored to the product, its 
safety and essential performance, and the situation. Risk mitigations, including compensating 
controls, should be implemented when necessary to bring the residual risk to an acceptable level. 
                                                 
27 Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC; http://capec.mitre.org/). 
28 Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE; https://nvd.nist.gov/cce/index.cfm).
29 Common Platform Enumeration (CPE; https://nvd.nist.gov/cpe.cfm).
 
17  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
Figure  Evaluation of Risk of Patient Harm. The figure shows the relationship between 
exploitability and severity of patient harm, and can be used to assess the risk of patient harm from 
a cybersecurity vulnerability. The figure can be used to categorize the risk of patient harm as 
controlled or uncontrolled.  
 
VII.  Remediating and Reporting Cybersecurity 
Vulnerabilities 
Based on the vulnerability assessment described in the previous section, the exploitability of an 
identified vulnerability and its severity of patient harm can help determine the risk of patient harm 
and can be categorized as either controlled (acceptable residual risk) or uncontrolled 
(unacceptable residual risk). When determining how to manage a cybersecurity vulnerability, 
manufacturers should incorporate already implemented compensating controls and risk 
mitigations into their risk assessment. 
FDA encourages efficient, timely and ongoing cybersecurity risk management for marketed 
devices by manufacturers. For cybersecurity routine updates and patches, the FDA will, typically, 
not need to conduct premarket review to clear or approve the medical device software changes.30  
In addition, manufacturers should: 
  Adopt a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy and practice that includes 
acknowledging receipt of the initial vulnerability report to the vulnerability submitter31,32; 
                                                 
30 Premarket notification (510(k)) would be required for countermeasures that would be considered significant 
changes or modifications to a devices design, components, method of manufacture or intended use (See 21 CFR 
807.81(a)(3)). 
31 ISO/IEC 29147:2014: Information Technology  Security Techniques  Vulnerability Disclosure which may be a 
useful resource for manufacturers. 
 
18  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
  Proactively practice good cyber hygiene, reassess risk assessments regularly, and seek 
opportunities to reduce cybersecurity risks even when residual risk is acceptable; 
  Remediate cybersecurity vulnerabilities to reduce the risk of patient harm to an acceptable 
level; 
  Conduct appropriate software validation under 21 CFR 820.30(g) to assure that any 
implemented remediation effectively mitigates the target vulnerability without 
unintentionally creating exposure to other risks;  
  Properly document the methods and controls used in the design, manufacture, packaging, 
labeling, storage, installation and servicing of all finished devices as required by 21 CFR 
part 820; 
  Identify and implement compensating controls to adequately mitigate the cybersecurity 
vulnerability risk, especially when new device design controls33 may not be feasible or 
immediately practicable. In addition, manufacturers should consider the level of 
knowledge and expertise needed to properly implement the recommended control;  
  Provide users with relevant information on recommended device and compensating 
controls and residual cybersecurity risks so that they can take appropriate steps to mitigate 
the risk and make informed decisions regarding device use; and  
  Recognize that some changes made to strengthen device security might also significantly 
affect other device functionality (e.g., use of a different operating system) and assess the 
scope of change to determine if additional premarket or postmarket regulatory actions are 
appropriate. 
In addition to the general recommendations described above, Sections VII.A and VII.B. below 
clarify specific recommendations for managing controlled and uncontrolled risks of patient 
harm.34 While FDA recognizes that multi-stakeholder engagement is necessary to fully address 
cybersecurity risks, the examples provided in the controlled risk and uncontrolled risk sections 
below clarify FDAs regulatory expectations for medical device manufacturers. 
A. Controlled Risk of Patient Harm 
Controlled risk is present when there is sufficiently low (acceptable) residual risk of patient harm 
due to the vulnerability. 
Manufacturers are encouraged to proactively promote good cyber hygiene and reduce 
cybersecurity risks even when residual risk is acceptable. The following are recommendations for 
changes or compensating control actions taken to address vulnerabilities associated with 
controlled risk: 
                                                                                                                                                               
32 ISO/IEC 30111:2013: Information Technology  Security Techniques  Vulnerability Handling Processes. 
33 See 21 CFR part 820.30(g)  Design controls 
34 Please note that manufacturers and user facilities may have additional reporting requirements from sources other 
than FDA.  
 
19  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
  Changes to a device that are made solely to strengthen cybersecurity are typically 
considered device enhancements35, which may include cybersecurity routine updates and 
patches, and are generally not required to be reported, under 21 CFR part 806.  
  Even when risks are controlled, manufacturers may wish to deploy an additional control(s) 
as part of a defense-in-depth strategy. Typically, these changes would be considered a 
cybersecurity routine update or patch, a type of device enhancement;  
  Device changes made solely to address a vulnerability that, if exploited, could lead to 
compromise of PHI, would typically be considered a cybersecurity routine update or 
patch; 
  For premarket approval (PMA) devices with periodic reporting requirements under 21 
CFR 814.84, newly acquired information concerning cybersecurity vulnerabilities and 
device changes made as part of cybersecurity routine updates and patches should be 
reported to FDA in a periodic (annual) report.  See Section VIII for recommended content 
to include in the periodic report.  
Examples of Vulnerabilities Associated with Controlled Risk and their Management: 
  A device manufacturer receives a user complaint that a gas blood analyzer has been 
infected with malware and there was concern that the malware may alter the data on the 
device. The outcome of a manufacturer investigation and impact assessment confirms the 
presence of malware and finds that the malware does not result in the manipulation of 
unencrypted data stored and flowing through the device. The devices safety and essential 
performance is not impacted by the malware and the manufacturers risk assessment 
determines that the risk of patient harm due to the vulnerability is controlled. The device 
manufacturer communicates to users on how to remove the malware and decides to 
develop a defense-in-depth strategy; these changes would be considered a cybersecurity 
routine update and patch, a type of device enhancement. 
  A researcher publicly discloses exploit code for a four year old vulnerability in 
commercial off-the-shelf database software. The vulnerable version of the software is in a 
percentage of the manufacturers installed base and in two separate product lines including 
a multi-analyte chemistry analyzer. The manufacturer determines that the vulnerability is 
the result of a misconfigured database setting and could allow an unauthorized user to 
view patient health information in the database. The vulnerability does not permit the 
unauthorized user the ability to edit data in the database. Thus, the manufacturer 
determines the vulnerability has acceptable and controlled risk of patient harm. The 
manufacturer notifies their customers and the user community of the issue, details the 
secure configuration setting, and documents the effectiveness of the cybersecurity routine 
update for the configuration setting. 
                                                 
35 See FDA guidance titled Distinguishing Medical Device Recalls from Medical Device Enhancements 
(http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM418469.
pdf)  
 
20  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
  A device manufacturer is notified of an open, unused communication port by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems-Cyber Emergency 
Response Team (ICS-CERT). Subsequent analyses show that a design feature of the 
device prevents unauthorized remote firmware download onto the device. The threat is 
mitigated substantially by the need for physical access due to this device feature and the 
residual risk of patient harm is considered acceptable. The manufacturer takes steps to 
further enhance the devices security by taking steps to close the unused communication 
port(s) and provide adequate communication to device users (e.g., user facilities) to 
facilitate the patch. If the manufacturer closes the open communication ports, the change 
would be considered a cybersecurity routine update or patch, a type of device 
enhancement.  The change does not require reporting under 21 CFR part 806 (see the 
Distinguishing Medical Device Recalls from Medical Enhancements Guidance 
[http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedo
cuments/ucm418469.pdf] for additional clarity of reporting requirements and 
recommendations for device enhancements).  
  A device manufacturer receives a user complaint that a recent security software scan of the 
PC component of a class III medical device has indicated that the PC is infected with 
malware. The outcome of a manufacturer investigation and impact assessment confirms 
the presence of malware and that the primary purpose of the malware is to collect internet 
browsing information. The manufacturer also determines that the malware has actively 
collected browsing information, but that the devices safety and essential performance is 
not and would not be impacted by such collection. The manufacturers risk assessment 
determines that the risk of patient harm due to the vulnerability is controlled. Since the 
risk of patient harm is controlled, the manufacturer can update the product and it will be 
considered a cybersecurity routine update or patch. In this case, the manufacturer does not 
need to report this software update to the FDA in accordance with 21 CFR 806.10. 
Because the device is a class III device, the manufacturer should report the changes to the 
FDA in its periodic (annual) report required for holders of an approved PMA under 21 
CFR 814.84.     
B.  Uncontrolled Risk to Safety and Essential Performance 
Uncontrolled risk is present when there is unacceptable residual risk of patient harm due to 
insufficient risk mitigations and compensating controls. In assessing risk, manufacturers should 
consider the exploitability of the vulnerability and the severity of patient harm if exploited. If the 
risk of patient harm is assessed as uncontrolled, additional risk control measures should be 
applied.   
Manufacturers should remediate uncontrolled risks as quickly as possible.  The following are 
recommendations for changes or compensating control actions to address vulnerabilities 
associated with uncontrolled risk: 
  Manufacturers should remediate the vulnerabilities to reduce the risk of patient harm to an 
acceptable level;  
 
21  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
  While fixing the vulnerability may not be feasible or immediately practicable, 
manufacturers should identify and implement risk mitigations and compensating controls 
to adequately mitigate the risk; 
  Customers and the user community should be provided with relevant information on 
recommended controls and residual cybersecurity risks so that they can take appropriate 
steps to mitigate the risk and make informed decisions regarding device use; 
  Manufacturers must report these vulnerabilities to the FDA according to 21 CFR part 806, 
unless reported under 21 CFR parts 803 or 100436. However, the FDA does not intend to 
enforce reporting requirements under 21 CFR part 806 for specific vulnerabilities with 
uncontrolled risk when the following circumstances are met:  
1)  There are no known serious adverse events or deaths associated with the 
vulnerability;  
2)  As soon as possible but no later than 30 days after learning of the vulnerability, the 
manufacturer communicates with its customers and user community regarding the 
vulnerability, identifies interim compensating controls, and develops a remediation 
plan to bring the residual risk to an acceptable level. Controls should not introduce 
more risk to the devices safety and essential performance than the original 
vulnerability. The manufacturer must document37 the timeline rationale for its 
remediation plan.38 The customer communication should, at minimum:   
a.  Describe the vulnerability including an impact assessment based on the 
manufacturers current understanding, 
b.  State that manufacturers efforts are underway to address the risk of patient 
harm as expeditiously as possible,  
c.  Describe compensating controls, if any, and  
d.  State that the manufacturer is working to fix the vulnerability, or provide a 
defense-in-depth strategy to reduce the probability of exploit and/or 
severity of harm, and will communicate regarding the availability of a fix 
in the future. 
3)  As soon as possible but no later than 60 days after learning of the vulnerability, the 
manufacturer fixes the vulnerability, validates the change, and distributes the 
deployable fix to its customers and user community such that the residual risk is 
brought down to an acceptable level. In some circumstances, a compensating 
control could produce a long-term solution provided the risk of patient harm is 
brought to an acceptable level. Controls should not introduce more risk to the 
devices safety and essential performance than the original vulnerability. 
Additionally, the manufacturer should follow-up with end-users as needed beyond 
the initial 60 day period;39  
                                                 
36 See 21 CFR 806.10(f). 
37 See 21 CFR 820.100 Corrective action and preventive action. 
38 See 21 CFR 7.42 Recall strategy for elements of a remediation plan 
39 See 21 CFR 7 (b)(3)  Effectiveness checks. 
 
22  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
4)  The manufacturer actively participates as a member of an ISAO that shares 
vulnerabilities and threats that impact medical devices, such as NH-ISAC (see 
section IX) and provides the ISAO with any customer communications upon 
notification of its customers; 
  Remediation of devices with annual reporting requirements (e.g., class III devices) should 
be included in the annual report;  
  The manufacturer should evaluate the device changes to assess the need to submit a 
premarket submission (e.g., PMA supplement40, 510(k), etc.) to the FDA;  
  For PMA devices with periodic reporting requirements under 21 CFR 814.84, information 
concerning cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and the device changes and compensating 
controls implemented in response to this information should be reported to FDA in a 
periodic (annual) report.  See Section VIII for recommended content to include in the 
periodic report. 
In the absence of remediation, a device with uncontrolled risk of patient harm may be considered 
to have a reasonable probability that use of, or exposure to, the product will cause serious adverse 
health consequences or death. The product may be considered in violation of the FD&C Act and 
subject to enforcement or other action. 
Examples of Vulnerabilities Associated with Uncontrolled Risk of Patient Harm That Must Be 
Remediated and Response Actions: 
  A manufacturer is made aware of open, unused communication ports. The manufacturer 
acknowledges receipt of the vulnerability report to the submitter/identifier and subsequent 
analysis determines that the devices designed-in features do not prevent a threat from 
downloading unauthorized firmware onto the device, which could be used to compromise 
the devices safety and essential performance. Although there are no reported serious 
adverse events or deaths associated with the vulnerability, the risk assessment concludes 
the risk of patient harm is uncontrolled. The manufacturer communicates with its 
customers, the ISAO, and user community regarding the vulnerability, identifies and 
implements interim compensating controls, develops a remediation plan, and notifies users 
within 30 days of becoming aware of the vulnerability. Furthermore, within 60 days of 
becoming aware of the vulnerability, the manufacturer develops a more permanent 
solution/fix (in this case a software update to close the unused communication port(s)), 
validates the change, distributes the deployable fix or work around to its customers, and 
implements all other aspects of its remediation plan. If the manufacturer actively 
participates as a member of an ISAO and shares information about the vulnerability within 
the ISAO, FDA does not intend to enforce compliance with the reporting requirements in 
21 CFR part 806. For class III devices, the manufacturer does submit a summary of the 
remediation as part of its periodic (annual) report to FDA.  
                                                 
40 See 21 CFR 814.39, see also FDA webpage titled, PMA Supplements and Amendments 
(http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissio
ns/PremarketApprovalPMA/ucm050467.htm). 
 
23  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
  A manufacturer becomes aware of a vulnerability via a researcher that its class III medical 
device (e.g., implantable defibrillator, pacemaker, etc.) can be reprogrammed by an 
unauthorized user. If exploited, this vulnerability could result in permanent impairment, a 
life-threatening injury, or death. The manufacturer is not aware that the vulnerability has 
been exploited and determines that the vulnerability is related to a hardcoded password. 
The risk assessment concludes that the exploitability of the vulnerability is moderate and 
the risk of patient harm is uncontrolled. The manufacturer notifies appropriate 
stakeholders, and distributes a validated emergency patch within 60 days. The 
manufacturer does not actively participate as a member of an ISAO and therefore reports 
this action to the FDA under 21 CFR 806.10.   
  A vulnerability known to the security community, yet unknown to a medical device 
manufacturer, is incorporated into a class II device during development. Following 
clearance, the manufacturer becomes aware of the vulnerability and determines that the 
device continues to meet its specifications, and that no device malfunctions or patient 
injuries have been reported. There is no evidence that the identified vulnerability has been 
exploited. However, it was determined that the vulnerability introduced a new failure 
mode to the device that impacts its essential performance, and the devices design controls 
do not mitigate the risk. The manufacturer conducts a risk assessment and determines that 
without additional mitigations, the risk of patient harm is uncontrolled. Since the 
manufacturer does not currently have a software update to mitigate the impact of this 
vulnerability on the devices essential performance, within 30 days of learning of the 
vulnerability the manufacturer notifies its customers, the ISAO, and user community of 
the cybersecurity risk and instructs them to disconnect the device from the hospital 
network to prevent unauthorized access to the device. The companys risk assessment 
concludes that the risk of patient harm is controlled with this additional mitigation. The 
manufacturer determines that removal of the device from the network is not a viable long-
term solution and distributes a patch within 60 days of learning of the vulnerability. If the 
company is an active participating member of an ISAO, FDA does not intend to enforce 
compliance with the reporting requirement under 21 CFR part 806.   
  A hospital reports that a patient was harmed after a medical device failed to perform as 
intended. A manufacturer investigation determines that the medical device malfunctioned 
as a result of exploitation of a previously unknown vulnerability in its proprietary 
software. The outcome of the manufacturers investigation and impact assessment 
determines that the exploit indirectly impacts the devices safety and essential 
performance and may have contributed to a patient death. The manufacturer files a report 
in accordance with reporting requirements under 21 CFR part 803. The manufacturer also 
determines the device would be likely to cause or contribute to a serious injury or death if 
the malfunction were to recur; therefore, the manufacturer notifies its customers and user 
community, develops a validated emergency patch and files a report in accordance with 21 
CFR 806.10 to notify FDA. 
 
24  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
VIII. Recommended Content to Include in PMA Periodic 
Reports 
For PMA devices with periodic reporting requirements under 21 CFR 814.84, information 
concerning cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and device changes and compensating controls 
implemented in response to this information should be reported to FDA in a periodic (annual) 
report.   
It is recommended that the following information be provided for changes and compensating 
controls implemented for the device: 
  A brief description of the vulnerability prompting the change including how the 
firm became aware of the vulnerability; 
  A summary of the conclusions of the firms risk assessment including whether the 
risk of patient harm was controlled or uncontrolled; 
  A description of the change(s) made, including a comparison to the previously 
approved version of the device; 
  The rationale for making the change; 
  Reference to other submissions/devices that were modified in response to this 
same vulnerability; 
  Identification of event(s) related to the rationale/reason for the change (e.g., MDR 
number(s), recall number); 
  Unique Device Identification (UDI)41 should be included, if available; 
  A link to an ICS-CERT advisory or other government or ISAO alert (https://ics-
cert.us-cert.gov/advisories), if applicable; 
  All distributed customer notifications; 
  The date and name of the ISAO to which the vulnerability was reported, if any; 
and 
  Reference to other relevant submission (PMA Supplement42, 30-Day Notice, 806 
report, etc.), if any, or the scientific and/or regulatory basis for concluding that the 
change did not require a submission/report. 
IX.  Criteria for Defining Active Participation by a 
Manufacturer in an ISAO 
Active participation by a manufacturer in an ISAO can assist the company, the medical device 
community and the HPH Sector by proactively addressing cybersecurity vulnerabilities and 
minimizing exploits through the timely deployment of risk control measures including 
communication and coordination with patients and users.   
                                                 
41 See the web page titled Unique Device Identification  UDI 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/UniqueDeviceIdentification/ for more 
information 
42 See 21 CFR 814.39. 
 
25  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
FDA intends to consider the following in determining whether a manufacturer is an active 
participant in an ISAO: 
1.  The manufacturer is a member of an ISAO that shares vulnerabilities and threats that 
impact medical devices; 
2.  The ISAO has documented policies pertaining to participant agreements, business 
processes, operating procedures, and privacy protections; 
3.  The manufacturer shares vulnerability information with the ISAO, including any 
customer communications pertaining to cybersecurity vulnerabilities; and  
4.  The manufacturer has documented processes for assessing and responding to 
vulnerability and threat intelligence information received from the ISAO.  This 
information should be traceable to medical device risk assessments, countermeasure 
solutions, and mitigations. 
Manufacturers that wish to be considered by FDA to be active participants in an ISAO are 
recommended to maintain objective evidence documenting that they meet the four criteria above. 
 
 
 
26  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
X.  Appendix: Elements of an Effective Postmarket 
Cybersecurity Program 
It is recommended that the following elements, consistent with the NIST Framework for 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (i.e., Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, 
and Recover; 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-
framework-021214.pdf ), be included as part of a manufacturers cybersecurity risk 
management program.   
A. Identify  
i.  Maintaining Safety and Essential Performance  
Compromise of safety or essential performance of a device can result in patient harm and 
may require intervention to prevent patient harm.   
Manufacturers should define, as part of their comprehensive cybersecurity risk 
management plan, the safety and essential performance of their device, the resulting 
severity of patient harm if compromised, and the risk acceptance criteria. These steps 
allow manufacturers to triage vulnerabilities for remediation (see Section VI for additional 
information on risk assessments).   
Threat modeling is important to understanding and assessing the exploitability of a device 
vulnerability and its potential for patient harm. Threat modeling can also be used in 
determining whether a proposed or implemented remediation can provide assurance that 
the risk of patient harm due to a cybersecurity vulnerability is reasonably controlled. 
Importantly, acceptable mitigations will vary depending upon the severity of patient harm 
that may result from exploitation of a vulnerability affecting the device. For example, a 
cybersecurity vulnerability affecting the temperature reading of a thermometer may have 
different risks than a cybersecurity vulnerability affecting the dosage of an insulin infusion 
pump because of the severity of patient harm. 
 
ii.  Identification of Cybersecurity Signals  
Manufacturers are required to analyze complaints, returned product, service records, and 
other sources of quality data to identify existing and potential causes of nonconforming 
product or other quality problems (21 CFR 820.100). Manufacturers are encouraged to 
actively identify cybersecurity signals that might affect their product, and engage with the 
sources that report them.  It is important to recognize that signals can originate from 
sources familiar to the medical device workspace such as internal investigations, post 
market surveillance and or/complaints. It is also important to recognize that cybersecurity 
signals may originate from cybersecurity-centric sources such as Cyber Emergency 
 
27  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
Response Teams (CERTS), ISAOs, security researchers, or from other critical 
infrastructure sectors such as the Defense or Financial Sectors.  Irrespective of the 
originating source, a clear, consistent and reproducible process for intake and handling of 
vulnerability information should be established and implemented by the manufacturer. 
FDA has recognized ISO/IEC 29147:2014, Information Technology - Security Techniques 
- Vulnerability Disclosure and ISO/IEC 30111:2013: Information Technology  Security 
Techniques  Vulnerability Handling Processes that may be useful resources for 
manufacturers. Manufacturers should develop strategies to enhance their ability to detect 
signals (e.g., participating in an ISAO for medical devices). Manufacturers can also 
enhance their postmarket detection of cybersecurity risks by incorporating detection 
mechanisms into their device design and device features to increase the detectability of 
attacks and permit forensically sound evidence capture. 
B. Protect/Detect 
i.  Vulnerability Characterization and Assessment 
The FDA recommends that manufacturers characterize and assess identified 
vulnerabilities because it will provide information that will aid manufacturers to triage 
remediation activities. When characterizing the exploitability of a vulnerability, the 
manufacturer should consider factors such as remote exploitability, attack complexity, 
threat privileges, actions required by the user, exploit code maturity, and report 
confidence.  Scoring systems such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS)43 provide a consistent framework for assessing exploitability by quantifying the 
impact of the factors that influence exploitability. See Section VI for additional guidance 
on vulnerability risk assessment. 
ii.  Risk Analysis and Threat Modeling 
The FDA recommends that manufacturers conduct cybersecurity risk analyses that include 
threat modeling for each of their devices and to update those analyses over time.  Risk 
analyses and threat modeling should aim to triage vulnerabilities for timely remediation.  
Threat modeling is a procedure for optimizing Network/Application/Internet Security by 
identifying objectives and vulnerabilities, and then defining countermeasures to prevent, 
or mitigate the effects of, threats to the system.  Threat modeling provides traditional risk 
management and failure mode analysis paradigms, and a framework to assess threats from 
active adversaries/malicious use. For each vulnerability, a summary report should be 
produced that concisely summarizes the risk analysis and threat modeling information. 
Due to the cyclical nature of the analyses, the information should be traceable to related 
documentation. 
 
                                                 
43 Common Vulnerability Scoring System, Version 3.0, Scoring Calculator 
(https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0).  
 
28  Contains Nonbinding Recommendations 
 
 
44
iii.  Analysis of Threat Sources  
The FDA recommends manufacturers to analyze possible threat sources. A threat source is 
defined as the intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a vulnerability 
or a situation and method that may accidentally trigger a vulnerability.45 Analysis of threat 
sources, as part of risk analysis and threat modeling provides a framework for risk 
introduced by an active adversary. Therefore, characterization of threat sources will be 
advantageous to manufacturers in accessing risks not covered by traditional failure mode 
analysis methods. 
iv.  Incorporation of Threat Detection Capabilities   
Medical devices may not be capable of detecting threat activity and may be reliant on 
network monitoring. Manufacturers should consider the incorporation of design features 
that establish or enhance the ability of the device to detect and produce forensically sound 
postmarket evidence capture in the event of an attack. This information may assist the 
manufacturer in assessing and remediating identified risks. 
v.  Impact Assessment on All Devices 
The FDA recommends that manufacturers have a process to assess the impact of a 
cybersecurity signal horizontally (i.e., across all medical devices within the 
manufacturers product portfolio and sometimes referred to as variant analyses) and 
vertically (i.e., determine if there is an impact on specific components within the device). 
A signal may identify a vulnerability in one device, and that same vulnerability may 
impact other devices including those in development, or those not yet cleared, approved or 
marketed. Therefore, it will be advantageous to manufacturers to conduct analyses for 
cybersecurity signals such that expended detection resources have the widest impact.   
C.  Protect/Respond/Recover 
i.  Compensating Controls Assessment (Detect/Respond) 
  The FDA recommends that manufacturers implement device-based features, i.e. device 
design controls46, as a primary mechanism to mitigate the risk of patient harm.  
Manufacturers should assess and provide users with compensating controls such that the 
risk of patient harm is further mitigated. In total, these efforts represent a defense-in-depth 
strategy for medical device cybersecurity.  Section VII describes recommendations for 
                                                 
44 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, NIST Special 
Publication 800-30 Revision 1 (http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-30r1.pdf).
45 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems 
and Organizations, NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4, Appendix B 
(http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf).  
46 See 21 CFR 820.30(g).  
 
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remediating and reporting identified cybersecurity vulnerabilities, including the 
development, implementation and user notification concerning fixes. Manufacturers 
should also adopt a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy and practice that includes 
acknowledging receipt of the vulnerability to the vulnerability submitter within a 
specified time frame.47,48  The FDA has recognized ISO/IEC 29147:2014: Information 
Technology  Security Techniques  Vulnerability Disclosure that may be a useful 
resource for manufacturers.  
D.  Risk Mitigation of Safety and Essential Performance  
Once the preceding information has been assessed and characterized, manufacturers 
should determine if the risk of patient harm presented by the vulnerability are adequately 
controlled by existing device features and/or manufacturer defined compensating controls 
(i.e., residual risk levels are acceptable). Actions taken should reflect the magnitude of the 
problem and align with the risks encountered. Manufacturers should also include an 
evaluation of residual risk, benefit/risk, and risk introduced by the remediation. 
Manufacturers should design their devices to ensure that risks inherent in remediation are 
properly mitigated including ensuring that the remediation is adequate and validated, that 
the device designs incorporate mechanisms for secure and timely updates. 
Changes made for vulnerabilities of controlled risk are generally considered device 
enhancements, not recalls. Cybersecurity routine updates and patches are generally 
considered a type of device enhancement. 
                                                 
47  The FDA has recognized ISO/IEC 29147:2014: Information Technology  Security Techniques  Vulnerability 
Disclosure 
48 ISO/IEC 30111:2013: Information Technology  Security Techniques  Vulnerability Handling Processes 
 
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