Mice alternate between discrete strategies during perceptual decision-making
Authors: Zoe C Ashwood
Jonathan W Pillow
Anne E Urai
Nicholas A Roy
Anne K Churchland
International Brain Laboratory
Iris R Stone
Alexandre Pouget
Journal: Nature neuroscience (2022)
Discipline: NEUROSCIENCE & BEHAVIOR
Keywords: Perceptual decision-making; Strategies; Hidden Markov model; Mouse; Human
Affiliations: Deptartment of Computer Science, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA. ., Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton, NJ, USA., Cognitive Psychology Unit, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands., David Geffen School of Medicine, The University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, USA., Faculty of Medicine & Deptartment of Basic Neurosciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland., Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton, NJ, USA. .

Abstract:  Classical models of perceptual decision-making assume that subjects use a single, consistent strategy to form decisions, or that decision-making strategies evolve slowly over time. Here we present new analyses suggesting that this common view is incorrect. We analyzed data from mouse and human decision-making experiments and found that choice behavior relies on an interplay among multiple interleaved strategies. These strategies, characterized by states in a hidden Markov model, persist for tens to hundreds of trials before switching, and often switch multiple times within a session. The identified decision-making strategies were highly consistent across mice and comprised a single 'engaged' state, in which decisions relied heavily on the sensory stimulus, and several biased states in which errors frequently occurred. These results provide a powerful alternate explanation for 'lapses' often observed in rodent behavioral experiments, and suggest that standard measures of performance mask the presence of major changes in strategy across trials. 

Retracted: No

PubPeer comments:
 I am puzzled by the fact that a paper published after this one s original publication date does not cite it, even though this one seems to show that the premises - even the definition of the phenomenon under study - of the former are false, and even though the two papers share a co-author. In other words, a single author is more or less simultaneously making claims and contradicting them. Why not at least cite Ashwood et al in the later paper? Specifically, Ashwood et al write that,  recent work has argued that they [lapses] reflect an active process of uncertainty-guided exploration [17]. However, a common thread to these explanations is that lapses arise independently across trials, in a way that does not depend on the time course of other lapses. Ashwood et al conclude that this assumption is at odds with their results. Reference #17, which, again, shares a coauthor with Ashwood et al and which was published (in January, 2021) after the original pub date of this one, reports results premised on the assumption the present paper claims to contradict, and improperly, in my opinion, fails to cite it. Does the common coauthor have a view on the contradictory accounts they present? If these results don t affect the views and published claims of the authors themselves, how should readers interpret them? ,