An investigation into the impact and implications of published papers from retracted research: systematic search of affected literature
Authors: Mark Bolland
Alison Avenell
Greg Gamble
Fiona Stewart
Andrew Grey
Journal: BMJ Open (2019)
Discipline: CLINICAL MEDICINE
Keywords: hip fractures; impact; randomised controlled trials; scientific misconduct.
Affiliations: Health Services Research Unit, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK ., Health Services Research Unit, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK., Department of Medicine, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand.

Abstract:  Objective: Analyses of the impact of a body of clinical trial reports subject to research misconduct have been few. Our objective was to examine the impact on clinically relevant research of a group of researchers' trial reports ('affected trial reports') affected by research misconduct, and whether identification of misconduct invoked a reappraisal. Design: In 2016, we used five databases and search engines to identify 'citing publications', that is, guidelines, systematic and other reviews, and clinical trials citing any of 12 affected trial reports, published 1998-2011, eventually retracted for research misconduct. The affected trial reports were assessed more likely to have had impact because they had hip fracture outcomes and were in journals with impact factor &gt;4. Two authors assessed whether findings of the citing publications would change if the affected trial reports were removed. In 2018, we searched for evidence that the citing publications had undertaken a reassessment as a result of the potential influence of the affected trial reports. Results: By 2016 the affected trial reports were cited in 1158 publications, including 68 systematic reviews, meta-analyses, narrative reviews, guidelines and clinical trials. We judged that 13 guidelines, systematic or other reviews would likely change their findings if the affected trial reports were removed, and in another eight it was unclear if findings would change. By 2018, only one of the 68 citing publications, a systematic review, appeared to have undertaken a reassessment, which led to a correction. Conclusions: We found evidence that this group of affected trial reports distorted the evidence base. Correction of these distortions is slow, uncoordinated and inconsistent. Unless there is a rapid, systematic, coordinated approach by bibliographic databases, authors, journals and publishers to mitigate the impact of known cases of research misconduct, patients, other researchers and their funders may continue to be adversely affected. 

Retracted: No

PubPeer comments:
 Paying pharmaceutical firms for capacity is problematic Castillo et al. 2021 (doi:10.1126 science.abg0889) make many valid points, e.g., vaccine production should be greatly expanded using taxpayer money because the quicker recovery from the pandemic more than pays for the expansion. Castillo et al. also suggest paying pharmaceutical manufacturers for the capacity they install instead of the quantity they produce. The reasoning of the authors is that producers are delaying installing capacity and the delivery of their promised vaccine quantities to save costs and to supply higher-paying buyers first, because the penalties for delaying are small. Producers refuse to sign contracts with larger penalties. What the authors do not mention is that the same problems occur when paying for capacity. In addition, the capacity needs to be monitored, which is more difficult than checking the delivered quantity. Before large-scale production, how to detect the u201ePotemkin capacityu201d of installing cheap production lines unsuitable for large quantities? The manufacturer may later simply claim technical glitches when the production line does not work. Effective penalties are needed, which in turn requires motivating the producer to sign a contract containing these, just like for a quantity contract. Paying in advance for capacity before the vaccine is proven to work insures firms against the risk of failure, as Castillo et al. say. The problem is that such advance payment also attracts swindlers who promise a miracle cure and then run with the money - there is adverse selection in who enters the governmentu2019s capacity contract scheme. Thus capacity contracts should be restricted to firms with a good established reputation. However, vaccines from innovative entrants may also be needed, which suggests continuing to use quantity contracts at least for some firms. If the law requires treating firms equally, then they should all be offered a similar contract. ,