diff --git "a/C014/Y01366.json" "b/C014/Y01366.json" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/C014/Y01366.json" @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +[ +{"source_document": "", "creation_year": 1366, "culture": " English\n", "content": "Produced by Sankar Viswanathan, Brownfox, and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This\nfile was produced from images generously made available\nby The Internet Archive)\n The Diacritical marks in this book are not consistent throughout\n the book. The original Diacritical marks have been retained.\n SARVA-DAR\u015aANA-SA\u1e42GRAHA\n _REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY._\n PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT AND FELLOW OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE\n IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, AND HONORARY LL.D. OF THE\n UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.\n PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, AND\n PRINCIPAL OF THE MADRASA, CALCUTTA.\n TR\u00dcBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL.\nPREFACE.\nI well remember the interest excited among the learned Hindus of\nCalcutta by the publication of the Sarva-dar\u015bana-sa\u1e43graha of M\u00e1dhava\n\u00c1ch\u00e1rya in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858. It was originally edited by\nPa\u1e47\u1e0dit \u00cd\u015bvarachandra Vidy\u00e1s\u00e1gara, but a subsequent edition, with no\nimportant alterations, was published in 1872 by Pa\u1e47\u1e0dit T\u00e1r\u00e1n\u00e1tha\nTarkav\u00e1chaspati. The work had been used by Wilson in his \"Sketch of\nthe Religious Sects of the Hindus\" (first published in the Asiatic\nResearches, vol. xvi., Calcutta, 1828); but it does not appear to have\nbeen ever much known in India. MS. copies of it are very scarce; and\nthose found in the North of India, as far as I have had an opportunity\nof examining them, seem to be all derived from one copy, brought\noriginally from the South, and therefore written in the Telugu\ncharacter. Certain mistakes are found in all alike, and probably arose\nfrom some illegible readings in the old Telugu original. I have\nnoticed the same thing in the N\u00e1gar\u00ed copies of M\u00e1dhava's Commentary on\nthe Black Yajur Veda, which are current in the North of India.\nAs I was at that time the Oriental Secretary of the Bengal Asiatic\nSociety, I was naturally attracted to the book; and I subsequently\nread it with my friend Pa\u1e47\u1e0dit Mahe\u015bachandra Ny\u00e1yaratna, the present\nPrincipal of the Sanskrit College at Calcutta. I always hoped to\ntranslate it into English; but I was continually prevented by other\nengagements while I remained in India. Soon after my return to\nEngland, I tried to carry out my intention; but I found that several\nchapters, to which I had not paid the same attention as to the rest,\nwere too difficult to be translated in England, where I could no\nlonger enjoy the advantage of reference to my old friends the Pa\u1e47\u1e0dits\nof the Sanskrit College. In despair I laid my translation aside for\nyears, until I happened to learn that my friend, Mr. A. E. Gough, at\nthat time a Professor in the Sanskrit College at Benares, was thinking\nof translating the book. I at once proposed to him that we should do\nit together, and he kindly consented to my proposal; and we\naccordingly each undertook certain chapters of the work. He had the\nadvantage of the help of some of the Pa\u1e47\u1e0dits of Benares, especially of\nPa\u1e47\u1e0dit R\u00e1ma Mi\u015bra, the assistant Professor of S\u00e1\u1e45khya, who was himself\na R\u00e1m\u00e1nuja; and I trust that, though we have doubtless left some\nthings unexplained or explained wrongly, we may have been able to\nthrow light on many of the dark sayings with which the original\nabounds. Our translations were originally published at intervals in\nthe Benares Pa\u1e47\u1e0dit between 1874 and 1878; but they have been carefully\nrevised for their present republication.\nThe work itself is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability.\nThe author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical\nsystems current in the fourteenth century in the South of India, and\ngives what appeared to him to be their most important tenets, and the\nprincipal arguments by which their followers endeavoured to maintain\nthem; and he often displays some quaint humour as he throws himself\nfor the time into the position of their advocate, and holds, as it\nwere, a temporary brief in behalf of opinions entirely at variance\nwith his own.[1] We may sometimes differ from him in his judgment of\nthe relative importance of their doctrines, but it is always\ninteresting to see the point of view of an acute native critic. In the\ncourse of his sketches he frequently explains at some length obscure\ndetails in the different systems; and I can hardly imagine a better\nguide for the European reader who wishes to study any one of these\nDar\u015banas in its native authorities. In one or two cases (as notably in\nthe Bauddha, and perhaps in the Jaina system) he could only draw his\nmaterials second-hand from the discussions in the works of Brahmanical\ncontroversialists; but in the great majority he quotes directly from\nthe works of their founders or leading exponents, and he is\ncontinually following in their track even where he does not quote\ntheir exact words.[2]\nThe systems are arranged from the Ved\u00e1nta point of view,--our author\nhaving been elected, in A.D. 1331, the head of the Sm\u00e1rta order in\nthe Ma\u1e6dh of \u015a\u1e5bingeri in the Mysore territory, founded by \u015aa\u1e43kara\n\u00c1ch\u00e1rya, the great Ved\u00e1ntist teacher of the eighth century, through\nwhose efforts the Ved\u00e1nta became what it is at present--the\nacknowledged view of Hindu orthodoxy. The systems form a gradually\nascending scale,--the first, the Ch\u00e1rv\u00e1ka and Bauddha, being the\nlowest as the furthest removed from the Ved\u00e1nta, and the last, the\nS\u00e1\u1e45khya and Yoga, being the highest as approaching most nearly to it.\nThe sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their study the noblest\nminds in India throughout the medi\u00e6val period of its history. Hiouen\nThsang says of the schools in his day: \"Les \u00e9coles philosophiques sont\nconstamment en lutte, et le bruit de leurs discussions passionn\u00e9es s'\u00e9l\u00e8ve\ncomme les flots de la mer. Les h\u00e9r\u00e9tiques des diverses sectes s'attachent\n\u00e0 des ma\u00eetres particuliers, et, par des voies diff\u00e9rentes, marchent tous\nau m\u00eame but.\" We can still catch some faint echo of the din as we read the\nmedi\u00e6val literature. Thus, for instance, when King Harsha wanders among\nthe Vindhya forests, he finds \"seated on the rocks and reclining under the\ntrees \u00c1rhata begging monks, \u015avetapadas, Mah\u00e1p\u00e1\u015bupatas, P\u00e1\u1e47\u1e0darabhikshus,\nBh\u00e1gavatas, Var\u1e47ins, Ke\u015balu\u00f1chanas, Lok\u00e1yatikas, K\u00e1pilas, K\u00e1\u1e47\u00e1das,\nAupanishadas, \u00cdsvarak\u00e1rins, Dharma\u015b\u00e1strins, Paur\u00e1\u1e47ikas, S\u00e1ptatantavas,\n\u015a\u00e1bdas, P\u00e1\u00f1char\u00e1trikas, &c., all listening to their own accepted tenets\nand zealously defending them.\"[3] Many of these sects will occupy us in\nthe ensuing pages; many of them also are found in M\u00e1dhava's poem on the\ncontroversial triumphs of \u015aa\u1e43kara \u00c1ch\u00e1rya, and in the spurious prose work\non the same subject, ascribed to Anant\u00e1nandagiri. Well may some old poet\nhave put into the mouth of Yudhish\u1e6dhira the lines which one so often hears\nfrom the lips of modern pa\u1e47\u1e0dits--\n Ved\u00e1 vibhinn\u00e1\u1e25 sm\u1e5bitayo vibhinn\u00e1,\n N\u00e1sau munir yasya mata\u1e43 na bhinnam,\n Dharmasya tattva\u1e43 nihita\u1e43 guh\u00e1y\u00e1\u1e43,\n Mah\u00e1jano yena gata\u1e25 sa panth\u00e1\u1e25.[4]\nAnd may we not also say with Clement of Alexandria,\n\u03bc\u03b9\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f77\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1f77\u03b1\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03c5\u03c1\u1f77\u03b1\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1f71\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b2\u1f71\u03ba\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03a0\u03b5\u03bd\u03b8\u1f73\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f75\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03bc\u1f73\u03bb\u03b7 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u1f77\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b2\u03b1\u03c1\u03b2\u1f71\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\n\u1f19\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u1f73\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f11\u03ba\u1f71\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7 \u1f45\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f14\u03bb\u03b1\u03c7\u03b5\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\n\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u1f75\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4', \u03bf\u1f36\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u1fc7 \u03c0\u1f71\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u1f77\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 1: The most remarkable instance of this philosophical\nequanimity is that of V\u00e1chaspati Mi\u015bra, who wrote standard treatises\non each of the six systems except the Vai\u015beshika, adopting, of course,\nthe peculiar point of view of each, and excluding for the time every\nalien tenet.]\n[Footnote 2: An index of the names of authors and works quoted is\ngiven in Dr. Hall's Bibliographical Catalogue, pp. 162-164, and also\nin Professor Aufrecht's Bodleian Catalogue, p. 247.]\n[Footnote 3: \u015ar\u00edharsha-charita, p. 204 (Calcutta ed.)]\n[Footnote 4: Found in the Mah\u00e1bh. iii. 17402, with some variations. I\ngive them as I have heard them from Pa\u1e47\u1e0dit R\u00e1man\u00e1r\u00e1ya\u1e47a Vidy\u00e1ratna.]\nCONTENTS.\n III. The \u00c1rhata or Jaina System (E. B. C.) 36\n VI. The Nakul\u00ed\u015ba-P\u00e1\u015bupata System (A. E. G.) 103\n VIII. The Pratyabhij\u00f1\u00e1 or Recognitive System (A. E. G.) 128\n IX. The Rase\u015bvara or Mercurial System (A. E. G.) 137\n X. The Vai\u015beshika or Aul\u00fakya System (E. B. C.) 145\n XI. The Akshap\u00e1da or Ny\u00e1ya System (E. B. C.) 161\n XV. The P\u00e1ta\u00f1jala or Yoga System (E. B. C.) 231\n XVI. The Ved\u00e1nta or System of Sa\u1e43kara \u00c1ch\u00e1rya 273\nTHE SARVA-DAR\u015aANA-SA\u1e44GRAHA.\nTHE PROLOGUE.\n1. I worship \u015aiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of\nsupreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest were produced, in\n_him_ only has this all a maker.\n2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvaj\u00f1a-Vish\u1e47u, who knows all the \u00c1gamas,\nthe son of \u015a\u00e1r\u1e45gap\u00e1\u1e47i, who has gone to the further shore of the seas\nof all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the\nproper meaning of the term Soul.\n3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable M\u00e1dhava\nmighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk-ocean of the\nfortunate S\u00e1ya\u1e47a.\n4. Having thoroughly searched the \u015a\u00e1stras of former teachers, very\nhard to be crossed, the fortunate S\u00e1ya\u1e47a-M\u00e1dhava[5] the lord has\nexpounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen\nwith a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not\ndelight in a garland strung of various flowers?\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 5: Dr. A. C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the\nVa\u1e43\u015ba-Br\u00e1hma\u1e47a, has solved the riddle of the relation of M\u00e1dhava and\nS\u00e1ya\u1e47a. S\u00e1ya\u1e47a is a pure Dravi\u1e0dian name given to a child who is born\nafter all the elder children have died. M\u00e1dhava elsewhere calls S\u00e1ya\u1e47a\nhis \"younger brother,\" as an allegorical description of his body,\nhimself being the eternal soul. His use of the term S\u00e1ya\u1e47a-M\u00e1dhava\u1e25\nhere (not the dual) seems to prove that the two names represent the\nsame person. The body seems meant by the S\u00e1ya\u1e47a of the third \u015bloka.\nM\u00e1ya\u1e47a was the father of M\u00e1dhava, and the true reading may be\n_\u015br\u00edman-m\u00e1ya\u1e47a_.]\nCHAPTER I.\nTHE CH\u00c1RV\u00c1KA SYSTEM.\n[We have said in our preliminary invocation \"salutation to \u015aiva, the\nabode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity,\"] but\nhow can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme\nfelicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Ch\u00e1rv\u00e1ka,\nthe crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine\nof B\u1e5bihaspati? The efforts of Ch\u00e1rv\u00e1ka are indeed hard to be\neradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current\nrefrain--\n While life is yours, live joyously;\n None can escape Death's searching eye:\n When once this frame of ours they burn,\n How shall it e'er again return?\nThe mass of men, in accordance with the \u015a\u00e1stras of policy and\nenjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and\ndenying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are\nfound to follow only the doctrine of Ch\u00e1rv\u00e1ka. Hence another name for\nthat school is Lok\u00e1yata,--a name well accordant with the thing\nsignified.[6]\nIn this school the four elements, earth, &c., are the original\nprinciples; from these alone, when transformed into the body,\nintelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed\nfrom the mixing of certain ingredients;[7] and when these are\ndestroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the \u015aruti\nfor this [B\u1e5bihad \u00c1ra\u1e47y. Up. ii. 4, 12], \"Springing forth from these\nelements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are\ndestroyed,--after death no intelligence remains.\"[8] Therefore the\nsoul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence,\nsince there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as\nsuch cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the\nonly source of knowledge and does not allow inference, &c.\nThe only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor\nmay you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are\nalways mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy\nthe pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which\ninevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the\nfish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he\nwants, desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice,\nstraw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is\nnot therefore for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure\nwhich our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not\nrefrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to\ndevour it; nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire,\nbecause forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the\ncontents. If any one were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure,\nhe would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the\npoet--\n The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects,\n Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain,--such is the reasoning\n of fools;\n The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,\n What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered\n with husk and dust?[9]\nIf you object that, if there be no such thing as happiness in a future\nworld, then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the\nagnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great\nexpenditure of money and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be\naccepted as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, &c., are\nonly useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the\nthree faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;[10] then\nagain the impostors who call themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually\ndestructive, as the authority of the j\u00f1\u00e1na-k\u00e1\u1e47\u1e0da is overthrown by\nthose who maintain that of the karma-k\u00e1\u1e47\u1e0da, while those who maintain\nthe authority of the j\u00f1\u00e1na-k\u00e1\u1e47\u1e0da reject that of the karma-k\u00e1\u1e47\u1e0da; and\nlastly, the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies\nof knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying--\n The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves,\n and smearing oneself with ashes,--\n B\u1e5bihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those\n who have no manliness nor sense.\nHence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain\nproduced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, &c.; the only Supreme is\nthe earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's\neyesight; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By\nholding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, such\nphrases as \"I am thin,\" \"I am black,\" &c., are at once intelligible,\nas the attributes of thinness, &c., and self-consciousness will reside\nin the same subject [the body]; like and the use of the phrase \"my\nbody\" is metaphorical \"the head of R\u00e1hu\" [R\u00e1hu being really _all\nhead_].\nAll this has been thus summed up--\n In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire, and air;\n And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,--\n Just like the intoxicating power from ki\u1e47wa, &c., mixed together;\n Since in \"I am fat,\" \"I am lean,\" these attributes[11] abide in the\n same subject,\n And since fatness, &c., reside only in the body,[12] it alone is the\n soul and no other,\n And such phrases as \"my body\" are only significant metaphorically.\n\"Be it so,\" says the opponent; \"your wish would be gained if\ninference, &c., had no force of proof; but then they have this force;\nelse, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the\nthoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on\nhearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do\nthose who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?\"\nAll this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy.\nThose who maintain the authority of inference accept the _sign_ or\nmiddle term as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must be\nfound in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the\nmajor.[13] Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute\nof any condition accepted or disputed;[14] and this connection does\nnot possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its\n_existence_, as the eye, &c., are the cause of perception, but by\nvirtue of its being _known_. What then is the means of this\nconnection's being known?\nWe will first show that it is not _perception_. Now perception is\nheld to be of two kinds, external and internal [_i.e._, as produced by\nthe external senses, or by the inner sense, mind]. The former is not\nthe required means; for although it is possible that the actual\ncontact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the\nparticular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be\nsuch contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal\nproposition[15] which was to embrace the invariable connection of the\nmiddle and major terms in every case becomes impossible to be known.\nNor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition\nhas the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise\na doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this\nparticular case[16] [as, for instance, in this particular smoke as\nimplying fire].\nNor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that\nthe mind has any power to act independently towards an external\nobject, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses,\nas has been said by one of the logicians, \"The eye, &c., have their\nobjects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others.\"\nNor can _inference_ be the means of the knowledge of the universal\nproposition, since in the case of this inference we should also\nrequire another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would\narise the fallacy of an _ad infinitum_ retrogression.\nNor can _testimony_ be the means thereof, since we may either allege\nin reply, in accordance with the Vai\u015beshika doctrine of Ka\u1e47\u00e1da, that\nthis is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that\nthis fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier\nthat stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on\nthe recognition of a _sign_ in the form of the language used in the\nchild's presence by the old man;[17] and, moreover, there is no more\nreason for our believing on another's word that smoke and fire are\ninvariably connected, than for our receiving the _ipse dixit_ of Manu,\n&c. [which, of course, we Ch\u00e1rv\u00e1kas reject].\nAnd again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the\nknowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to\nwhom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and\nmajor terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be\nno inference of one thing [as fire] on seeing another thing [as\nsmoke]; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for\noneself[18] would have to end in mere idle words.\nThen again _comparison_,[19] &c., must be utterly rejected as the\nmeans of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is\nimpossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned\nconnection [_i.e._, the universal proposition], because their end is\nto produce the knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the\nrelation of a name to something so named.\nAgain, this same absence of a condition,[20] which has been given as\nthe definition of an invariable connection [_i.e._, a universal\nproposition], can itself never be known; since it is impossible to\nestablish that all conditions must be objects of perception; and\ntherefore, although the absence of perceptible things may be itself\nperceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself\nnon-perceptible; and thus, since we must here too have recourse to\ninference, &c., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already\nbeen planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of\nthe condition, \"it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in\nextension[21] with the major term though not constantly accompanying\nthe middle.\" These three distinguishing clauses, \"not constantly\naccompanying the middle term,\" \"constantly accompanying the major\nterm,\" and \"being constantly accompanied by it\" [_i.e._, reciprocal],\nare needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such\nfallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of\nsound, as \"being produced,\" \"the nature of a jar,\" and \"the not\ncausing audition;\"[22] wherefore the definition holds,--and again it\nis established by the \u015bloka of the great Doctor beginning\n_sam\u00e1sama_.[23]\nBut since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the\nknowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the\nknowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of\nthe proposition is possible, _i.e._, a knowledge in the form of such a\nconnection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished\nby the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the\nknowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the\ninvariable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with\nadamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle.\nHence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a\nproposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, &c.[24]\nThe step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the\nknowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a\nformer perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases\nthis step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the\ncoincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms,\ndrugs, &c.\nFrom this it follows that fate, &c.,[25] do not exist, since these can\nonly be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do\nnot allow ad\u1e5bish\u1e6da, the various phenomena of the world become\ndestitute of any cause.\nBut we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena\ncan all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.\nThus it has been said--\n The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;\n By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born.\nAnd all this has been also said by B\u1e5bihaspati--\n There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,\n Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, &c., produce any real\n effect.\n The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and\n smearing one's self with ashes,\n Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge\n and manliness.\n If a beast slain in the Jyotish\u1e6doma rite will itself go to heaven,\n Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?[26]\n If the \u015ar\u00e1ddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,\n Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is\n needless to give provisions for the journey.\n If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the \u015ar\u00e1ddha here,\n Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the\n housetop?\n While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even\n though he runs in debt;\n When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?\n If he who departs from the body goes to another world,\n How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his\n kindred?\n Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have\n established here\n All these ceremonies for the dead,--there is no other fruit anywhere.\n The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.\n All the well-known formul\u00e6 of the pandits, jarphar\u00ed, turphar\u00ed, &c.[27]\n And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the A\u015bwamedha,\n These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of\n presents to the priests,[28]\n While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling\n demons.\nHence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge\nto the doctrine of Ch\u00e1rv\u00e1ka. Such is the pleasant consummation.\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 6: \"\u015aa\u1e45kara, Bh\u00e1skara, and other commentators name the\nLok\u00e1yatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Ch\u00e1rv\u00e1ka\"\n(Colebrooke). Lok\u00e1yata may be etymologically analysed as \"prevalent in\nthe world\" (_loka_ and _\u00e1yata_). Lauk\u00e1yatika occurs in P\u00e1\u1e47ini's\nukthaga\u1e47a.]\n[Footnote 7: _Ki\u1e47wa_ is explained as \"drug or seed used to produce\nfermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, &c.\"\nColebrooke quotes from \u015aa\u1e45kara: \"The faculty of thought results from a\nmodification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a\nferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as\nbetel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an\nexhilarating property not found in those substances severally.\"]\n[Footnote 8: Of course \u015aa\u1e45kara, in his commentary, gives a very\ndifferent interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual\nexistence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf.\n\u015aabara's Comm. Jaimini S\u00fat., i. i. 5.]\n[Footnote 9: I take _ka\u1e47a_ as here equal to the Bengali _kun\u1e5b_. Cf.\nAtharva-V., xi. 3, 5. _A\u015bv\u00e1\u1e25 ka\u1e47\u00e1 g\u00e1vas ta\u1e47\u1e0dul\u00e1 ma\u015bak\u00e1s tush\u00e1\u1e25._]\n[Footnote 10: See Ny\u00e1ya S\u00fatras, ii. 57.]\n[Footnote 11: _I.e._, personality and fatness, &c.]\n[Footnote 12: I read _dehe_ for _deha\u1e25_.]\n[Footnote 13: Literally, \"must be an attribute of the subject and have\ninvariable concomitance (_vy\u00e1pti_).\"]\n[Footnote 14: For the _sandigdha_ and _ni\u015bchita up\u00e1dhi_ see Siddh\u00e1nta\nMukt\u00e1vali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.]\n[Footnote 15: Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance\n(as of smoke by fire).]\n[Footnote 16: The attributes of the class are not always found in\nevery member,--thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal;\nand again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some\nother place.]\n[Footnote 17: See S\u00e1hitya Darpa\u1e47a (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and\nSiddh\u00e1nta-M., p. 80.]\n[Footnote 18: The properly logical, as distinguished from the\nrhetorical, argument.]\n[Footnote 19: \"_Upam\u00e1na_ or the knowledge of a similarity is the\ninstrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This\nparticular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a\nname to something so named.\" Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha.]\n[Footnote 20: The up\u00e1dhi is the condition which must be supplied to\nrestrict a too general middle term, as in the inference \"the mountain\nhas smoke because it has fire,\" if we add wet fuel as the condition of\nthe fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case\nof a true vy\u00e1pti, there is, of course, no up\u00e1dhi.]\n[Footnote 21: '\u0391\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u1f11\u03c6\u03b5\u03b9 (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). We have here our A\nwith distributed predicate.]\n[Footnote 22: If we omitted the first clause, and only made the up\u00e1dhi\n\"that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly\naccompanied by it,\" then in the Naiy\u00e1yika argument \"sound is\nnon-eternal, because it has the nature of sound,\" \"being produced\"\nwould serve as a M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43saka up\u00e1dhi, to establish the _vyabhich\u00e1ra_\nfallacy, as it is reciprocal with \"non-eternal;\" but the omitted\nclause excludes it, as an up\u00e1dhi must be consistent with _either_\nparty's opinions, and, of course, the Naiy\u00e1yika maintains that \"being\nproduced\" _always_ accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we\ndefined the up\u00e1dhi as \"not constantly accompanying the middle term and\nconstantly accompanied by the major,\" we might have as an up\u00e1dhi \"the\nnature of a jar,\" as this is never found with the middle term (the\nclass or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar\nonly in a jar), while, at the same time, wherever the class of jar is\nfound there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the\nup\u00e1dhi as \"not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly\naccompanying the major,\" we might have as a M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43saka up\u00e1dhi \"the not\ncausing audition,\" _i.e._, the not being apprehended by the organs of\nhearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found\nwhere this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.]\n[Footnote 23: This refers to an obscure \u015bloka of Udayan\u00e1ch\u00e1rya, \"where\na reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (_i.e._,\nuniversal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their\npredicates) relate to the same argument (as _e.g._, to prove the\nexistence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second\nwill be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by\nthe other reciprocal of the first.\" Thus \"the mountain has smoke\nbecause it has fire\" (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as\nfire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by\nfire), or \"because it has fire from wet fuel\" (smoke and fire from wet\nfuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the\nnon-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious\ninference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied\nby the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this\nwill not be the case where the non-reciprocating term _is_ thus\ninvariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as \"the mountain has\nfire because it has smoke;\" here, though fire and smoke do not\nreciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably\naccompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add\nhere, once for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many\nanother, difficulty in the Sarva-dar\u015bana-\u015ba\u1e45graha to my old friend and\nteacher, Pa\u1e47\u1e0dit Mahe\u015ba Chandra Ny\u00e1yaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit\nCollege.]\n[Footnote 24: Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii. In the chapter on the\nBuddhist system _infra_, we have an attempt to establish the authority\nof the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or\ngenus and species.]\n[Footnote 25: _Ad\u1e5bish\u1e6da_, _i.e._, the merit and demerit in our actions\nwhich produce their effects in future births.]\n[Footnote 26: This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p.\n[Footnote 27: Rig-Veda, x. 106. For the A\u015bwamedha rites, see Wilson's\nRig-Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.]\n[Footnote 28: Or this may mean \"and all the various other things to be\nhandled in the rites.\"]\nCHAPTER II.\nTHE BAUDDHA SYSTEM.\nAt this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Ch\u00e1rv\u00e1kas) laid\ndown as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance,\nyour position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is\neasily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has\naccordingly been said--\n \"From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as\n a determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance--not\n through the mere observation of the desired result in\n similar cases, nor through the non-observation of it in\n dissimilar cases.\"[29]\nOn the hypothesis (of the Naiy\u00e1yikas) that it is concomitance and\nnon-concomitance (_e.g._, A is where B is, A is not where B is not)\nthat determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance\nof the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being\nimpossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and\nfuture, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiy\u00e1yika) rejoin that\nuncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our\nsystem, we reply: Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect\nmay be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a\nstop to activity of any kind; for such doubts alone are to be\nentertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in\npractical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, \"Doubt\nterminates where there is a practical absurdity.\"[30]\n1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz., of the\ndesignate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable concomitance\n(of the major); and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise\nfrom the well-known series of five causes, in the perceptive cognition\nor non-cognition of cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for\ninstance, stand in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by\nfive indications, viz., (1.) That an effect is not cognised prior to\nits effectuation, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.) the effect\nis perceived, and that after the effect is cognised (4.) there is its\nnon-cognition, (5.) when the (material) cause is no longer cognised.\n2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the\nascertainment of identity (_e.g._, a sisu-tree is a tree, or wherever\nwe observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute\narboreity), an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion, inasmuch\nas if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own\nself. But, on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and\nwhere a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, who can\nexclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance? An ascertainment of\nthe identity of sisu and tree is competent in virtue of the reference\nto the same object (_i.e._, predication),--This tree is a sisu. For\nreference to the same object (predication) is not competent where\nthere is no difference whatever (_e.g._, to say, \"A jar is a jar,\" is\nno combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), because the\ntwo terms cannot, as being synonymous, be simultaneously employed; nor\ncan reference to the same object take place where there is a\nreciprocal exclusion (of the two terms), inasmuch as we never find,\nfor instance, horse and cow predicated the one of the other.\nIt has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same supposes a\ncause or a self-same (as invariable concomitants).\nIf a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence,\n_pram\u00e1\u1e47a_, one may reply: You merely assert thus much, that inference\nis not a form of evidence: do you allege no proof of this, or do you\nallege any? The former alternative is not allowable according to the\nmaxim that bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is\nthe latter alternative any better, for if while you assert that\ninference is no form of evidence, you produce some truncated argument\n(to prove, _i.e._, infer, that it is none), you will be involved in an\nabsurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren.\nBesides, when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence\nand of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their\nhomogeneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, when you\naffirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of\nwords, you yourself allow induction by causality. When you deny the\nexistence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived, you\nyourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle\nterm. Conformably it has been said by Tath\u00e1gata--\n \"The admission of a form of evidence in general results from\n its being present to the understanding of others.\n \"The existence of a form of evidence also follows from its\n negation by a certain person.\"\nAll this has been fully handled by great authorities; and we desist\nfor fear of an undue enlargement of our treatise.\nThese same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man from four\nstandpoints. Celebrated under the designations of M\u00e1dhyamika,\nYog\u00e1ch\u00e1ra, Sautr\u00e1ntika, and Vaibh\u00e1shika, these Buddhists adopt\nrespectively the doctrines of a universal void (nihilism), an external\nvoid (subjective idealism), the inferribility of external objects\n(representationism), and the perceptibility of external objects\n(presentationism).[31] Though the venerated Buddha be the only one\nteacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of this diversity\nof views; just as when one has said, \"The sun has set,\" the adulterer,\nthe thief, the divinity student, and others understand that it is time\nto set about their assignations, their theft, their religious duties,\nand so forth, according to their several inclinations.\nIt is to be borne in mind that four points of view have been laid out,\nviz., (1.) All is momentary, momentary; (2.) all is pain, pain; (3.)\nall is like itself alone; (4.) all is void, void.\nOf these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue\nand so forth (_i.e._, whatever be their quality), is to be inferred\nfrom their existence; thus, whatever _is_ is momentary (or fluxional)\nlike a bank of clouds, and all these things _are_.[32] Nor may any one\nobject that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an\nexistence consisting of practical efficiency is established by\nperception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the\nexclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is\nestablished, provided that we exclude from it the non-momentary\nsuccession and simultaneity, according to the rule that exclusion of\nthe continent is exclusion of the contained. Now this practical\nefficiency (here identified with existence) is contained under\nsuccession and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between\nsuccession and non-succession (or simultaneity); there being a\nmanifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, according to the rule--\n \"In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior\n alternative;\n \"Nor is their unity in contradictories, there being a\n repugnance in the very statement.\"[33]\nAnd this succession and simultaneity being excluded from the permanent,\nand also excluding from the permanent all practical efficiency, determine\nexistence of the alternative of momentariness.--Q.E.D.\nPerhaps some one may ask: Why may not practical efficiency reside in\nthe non-fluxional (or permanent)? If so, this is wrong, as obnoxious\nto the following dilemma. Has your \"permanent\" a power of past and\nfuture practical efficiency during its exertion of present practical\nefficiency or no? On the former alternative (if it has such power), it\ncannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because we cannot\ndeny that it has power, and because we infer the consequence, that\nwhich can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that\ntime, as, for instance, a complement of causes, and this entity is\nthus powerful. On the latter alternative (if the permanent has no such\npower of past and future agency), it will never do anything, because\npractical efficiency results from power only; what at any time does\nnot do anything, that at that time is unable to do it, as, for\ninstance, a piece of stone does not produce a germ; and this entity\nwhile exerting its present practical efficiency, does not exert its\npast and future practical efficiency. Such is the contradiction.\nYou will perhaps rejoin: By assuming successive subsidiaries, there\nis competent to the permanent entity a successive exertion of past and\nfuture practical efficiency. If so, we would ask you to explain: Do\nthe subsidiaries assist the entity or not? If they do not, they are\nnot required; for if they do nothing, they can have nothing to do with\nthe successive exertion. If they do assist the thing, is this\nassistance (or supplementation) other than the thing or not? If it is\nother than the thing, then this adscititious (assistance) is the\ncause, and the non-momentary entity is not the cause: for the effect\nwill then follow, by concomitance and non-concomitance, the\nadventitious supplementation. Thus it has been said:\n \"What have rain and shine to do with the soul? Their effect\n is on the skin of man;\n \"If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-permanent;\n and if the skin were like the soul, there could be no effect\n produced upon it.\"\nPerhaps you will say: The entity produces its effect, _together with_\nits subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let the entity not give up\nits subsidiaries, but rather tie them lest they fly with a rope round\ntheir neck, and so produce the effect which it has to produce, and\nwithout forfeiting its own proper nature. Besides (we continue), does\nthe additament (or supplementation) constituted by the subsidiaries\ngive rise to another additament or not? In either case the\nafore-mentioned objections will come down upon you like a shower of\nstones. On the alternative that the additament takes on another\nadditament, you will be embarrassed by a many-sided regress _in\ninfinitum_. If when the additament is to be generated another\nauxiliary (or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless\nseries of such additaments: this must be confessed to be one infinite\nregress. For example, let a seed be granted to be productive when an\nadditament is given, consisting of a complement of objects such as\nwater, wind, and the like, as subsidiaries; otherwise an additament\nwould be manifested without subsidiaries. Now the seed in taking on\nthe additament takes it on with the need of (ulterior) subsidiaries;\notherwise, as there would always be subsidiaries, it would follow that\na germ would always be arising from the seed. We shall now have to add\nto the seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves\nrequiring an additament. If when this additament is given, the seed be\nproductive only on condition of subsidiaries as before, there will be\nestablished an infinite regression of additaments to (or\nsupplementations of) the seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries.\nAgain, we ask, does the supplementation required for the production of\nthe effect produce its effect independently of the seed and the like,\nor does it require the seed and the like? On the first alternative (if\nthe supplementation works independently), it would ensue that the seed\nis in no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation require\nthe seed), the seed, or whatever it may be that is thus required, must\ntake on a supplementation or additament, and thus there will be over\nand over again an endless series of additaments added to the\nadditament constituted by the seed; and thus a second infinite\nregression is firmly set up.\nIn like manner the subsidiary which is required will add another\nsubsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be that is the subject of\nthe additions, and thus there will be an endless succession of\nadditaments added to the additaments to the seed which is supplemented\nby the subsidiaries; and so a third infinite regression will add to\nyour embarrassment.\nNow (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted that a\nsupplementation identical with the entity (the seed, or whatever it\nmay be) is taken on. If so, the former entity, that _minus_ the\nsupplementation, is no more, and a new entity identical with the\nsupplementation, and designated (in the technology of Buddhism)\n_kurvad r\u00fapa_ (or effect-producing object), comes into being: and thus\nthe tree of my desires (my doctrine of a universal flux) has borne\nits fruit.\nPractical efficiency, therefore, in the non-momentary is inadmissible.\nNor is practical efficiency possible apart from succession in time;\nfor such a possibility is redargued by the following dilemma. Is this\n(permanent) entity (which you contend for) able to produce all its\neffects simultaneously, or does it continue to exist after production\nof effects? On the former alternative, it will result that the entity\nwill produce its effects just as much at one time as at another; on\nthe second alternative, the expectation of its permanency is as\nreasonable as expecting seed eaten by a mouse to germinate.\nThat to which contrary determinations are attributed is diverse, as\nheat and cold; but this thing is determined by contrary attributions.\nSuch is the argumentation applied to the cloud (to prove that it has\nnot a permanent but a fluxional existence). Nor is the middle term\ndisallowable, for possession and privation of power and impotence are\nallowed in regard to the permanent (which you assert) at different\ntimes. The concomitance and non-concomitance already described (viz.,\nThat which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at\nthat time, and What at any time does not do anything, that at that\ntime is unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence\nof such power. The negative rule is: What at any time is unable to\nproduce anything, that at that time does not produce it, as a piece of\nstone, for example, does not produce a germ; and this entity (the\nseed, or whatever it may be), while exerting a present practical\nefficiency, is incapable of past and future practical efficiencies.\nThe contradiction violating this rule is: What at any time does\nanything, that at that time is able to do that thing, as a complement\nof causes is able to produce its effect; and this (permanent) entity\nexerts at time past and time future the practical efficiencies proper\nto those times.\n(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the momentary; there\nbeing observed in regard to existence a negative rule, that in regard\nto permanent succession and simultaneity being excluded, existence\nwhich contains succession and simultaneity is not cognisable; and\nthere being observed in regard to existence a positive rule, in virtue\nof a concomitance observed (viz., that the existent is accompanied or\n\"pervaded\" by the momentary), and in virtue of a non-concomitance\nobserved (viz., that the non-momentary is accompanied or \"pervaded\" by\nthe non-existent). Therefore it has been said by J\u00f1\u00e1na-\u015br\u00ed--\n \"What is is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent\n things;\n \"The power of existence is relative to practical efficiency,\n and belongs to the ideal; but this power exists not as\n eternal in things eternal (ether, &c.);\n \"Nor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could do\n the work of another;\n \"For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and\n simultaneity), a momentary flux is congruous and remains\n true in regard to that which we have to prove.\"\nNor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis of the\nVai\u015beshikas and Naiy\u00e1yikas, that existence is a participation in the\nuniversal form existence; for were this the case, universality,\nparticularity, and co-inhesion (which do not participate in the\nuniversal) could have no existence.\nNor is the ascription of existence to universality, particularity, and\nco-inhesion dependent on any _sui generis_ existence of their own; for\nsuch an hypothesis is operose, requiring too many _sui generis_\nexistences. Moreover, the existence of any universal is disproved by a\ndilemma regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the\nmany); and there is not presented to us any one form running through\nall the diverse momentary things, mustard-seeds, mountains, and so\nforth, like the string running through the gems strung upon it.\nMoreover (we would ask), is the universal omnipresent or present\neverywhere in its subjicible subjects? If it is everywhere, all things\nin the universe will be confounded together (chaos will be eternal),\nand you will be involved in a tenet you reject, since Pra\u015basta-p\u00e1da\nhas said, \"Present in all its subjects.\" Again (if the universal is\npresent only in its proper subjects), does the universal (the nature\nof a jar) residing in an already existing jar, on being attached to\nanother jar now in making, come from the one to attach itself to the\nother, or not come from it? On the first alternative (if it comes),\nthe universal must be a substance (for substances alone underlie\nqualities and motions); whereas, if it does not come, it cannot attach\nitself to the new jar. Again (we ask), when the jar ceases to exist,\ndoes the universal outlast it, or cease to exist, or go to another\nplace? On the first supposition it will exist without a subject to\ninhere in; on the second, it will be improper to call it eternal (as\nyou do); on the third, it will follow that it is a substance (or base\nof qualities and motions). Destroyed as it is by the malign influence\nof these and the like objections, the universal is unauthenticated.\nConformably it has been said--\n \"Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one\n place, engages without moving from that place in producing\n itself in another place.\n \"This entity (universality) is not connected with that\n wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which occupies\n that place: great is this miracle.\n \"It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subsequently\n divided, it quits not its former repository: what a series\n of difficulties!\"\nIf you ask: On what does the assurance that the one exists in the many\nrest? You must be satisfied with the reply that we concede it to\nrepose on difference from that which is different (or exclusion of\nheterogeneity). We dismiss further prolixity.\nThat all transmigratory existence is identical with pain is the common\nverdict of all the founders of institutes, else they would not be\nfound desirous to put a stop to it and engaging in the method for\nbringing it to an end. We must, therefore, bear in mind that all is\npain, and pain alone.\nIf you object: When it is asked, like what? you must quote an\ninstance,--we reply: Not so, for momentary objects self-characterised\nbeing momentary, have no common characters, and therefore it is\nimpossible to say that this is like that. We must therefore hold that\nall is like itself alone, like itself alone.\nIn like manner we must hold that all is void, and void alone. For we\nare conscious of a determinate negation. This silver or the like has\nnot been seen by me in sleeping or waking. If what is seen were\n(really) existent, then reality would pertain to the corresponding act\nof vision, to the (nacre, &c.), which is the basis of its particular\nnature (or haecceity), to the silver, &c., illusorily superposed upon\nthat basis, to the connection between them, to the co-inherence, and\nso forth: a supposition not entertained by any disputant. Nor is a\nsemi-effete existence admissible. No one imagines that one-half of a\nfowl may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying eggs.\nThe venerated Buddha, then, having taught that of the illusorily\nsuperposed (silver, &c.), the basis (nacre, &c.), the connection\nbetween them, the act of vision, and the _videns_, if one or more be\nunreal it will perforce ensue that all are unreal, all being equally\nobjects of the negation; the M\u00e1dhyamikas excellently wise explain as\nfollows, viz., that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a\ntotal void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow progression\nlike the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through the position of a\nmomentary flux, and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory\nassurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of\nreality.\nThe ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from four\nalternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from both (reality\nand unreality), and from neither (reality nor unreality). To exemplify\nthis: If real existence were the nature of a water-pot and the like,\nthe activity of its maker (the potter) would be superfluous.\nIf non-existence be its nature the same objection will accrue; as it\nis said--\n \"Necessity of a cause befits not the existent, ether and the\n like, for instance;\n \"No cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect, flowers\n of the sky and the like, for instance.\"\nThe two remaining alternatives, as self-contradictory, are\ninadmissible. It has accordingly been laid down by the venerated\nBuddha in the Ala\u1e45k\u00e1r\u00e1vat\u00e1ra[34]--\n \"Of things discriminated by intellect, no nature is\n ascertained;[35]\n \"Those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable and\n natureless.\"\nAnd again--\n \"This matter perforce results, which the wise declare, No\n sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated.\"\nThat is to say, the objects are not determined by any one of the four\nalternatives. Hence it is that it has been said--\n \"A religious mendicant, an amorous man, and a dog have three\n views of a woman's person, respectively that it is a\n carcass, that it is a mistress, and that it is a prey.\"\nIn consequence, then, of these four points of view, when all ideas are\ncome to an end, final extinction, which is a void, will result.\nAccordingly we have overtaken our end, and there is nothing to be\ntaught to us. There consequently remain only two duties to the\nstudent--interrogation and acceptance. Of these, interrogation is the\nputting of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained.\nAcceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred teacher.\nThese (Bauddha nihilists) are excellent in assenting to that which the\nreligious teacher enounces, and defective in interrogation, whence\ntheir conventional designation of M\u00e1dhyamikas (or mediocre).\nCertain other Buddhists are styled Yog\u00e1ch\u00e1ras, because while they\naccept the four points of view proclaimed by the spiritual guide, and\nthe void of external things, they make the interrogation: Why has a\nvoid of the internal (or baselessness of mental phenomena) been\nadmitted? For their technology is as follows:--Self-subsistent\ncognition must be allowed, or it will follow that the whole universe\nis blind. It has conformably been proclaimed by Dharmak\u00edrti: \"To one\nwho disallows perception the vision of objects is not competent.\"\nAn external _percipibile_ is not admissible in consequence of the\nfollowing dilemma. Does the object cognitively apprehensible arise\nfrom an entity or not? It does not result from an entity, for that\nwhich is generated has no permanence. Nor is it non-resultant, for\nwhat has not come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do\nyou hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible, as begetting\ncognition? If so, this is childish nonsense, because it conflicts with\nthe apparent presentness of the object, and because on such a\nsupposition the sense organs (and other imperceptible things) might be\napprehended. Further (we ask), Is the _percipibile_ a simple atom or a\ncomplex body? The latter it cannot be, this alternative being ejected\nby the dilemma as to whether part or whole is perceived. The former\nalternative is equally impossible, an atom being supersensible, and it\nnot being able to combine simultaneously with six others; as it has\nbeen said--\n \"If an atom could simultaneously combine with six, it would\n have six surfaces;\n \"And each of these being taken separately, there would be a\n body of atomic dimension.\"\nIntellect, therefore, as having no other _percipibile_ but itself, is\nshown to be itself its own _percipibile_, self-subsistent, luminous\nwith its own light, like light. Therefore it has been said--\n \"There is naught to be objectified by intellect; there is no\n cognition ulterior thereto;\n \"There being no distinction between percept and percipient,\n intellect shines forth of itself alone.\"\nThe identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, thus: That which\nis cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition, as\nsoul, for instance, is not other than the cognition of soul; and blue\nand other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there\nwere a difference (between percept and percipient), the object could\nnot now have any connection with the cognition, there being no\nidentity to determine a constancy of connection, and nothing to\ndetermine the rise of such a connection. As for the appearance of an\ninterval between the object and subject consciousnesses, this is an\nillusion, like the appearance of two moons when there is only one. The\ncause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without\nbeginning and without interruption; as it has been said--\n \"As invariably cognised together, the blue object and the\n cognition thereof are identical;\n \"And the difference should be accounted for by illusory\n cognitions, as in the example of the single moon.\"\nAnd again--\n \"Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by\n reason of illusory perceptions,\n \"Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts and\n of percipient.\"\nNor must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the juice, the\nenergy, and the digestion derivable from an imaginary and an actual\nsweetmeat will be the same; for it cannot be questioned that though\nthe intellect be in strictness exempt from the modes of object and\nsubject, yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in\nvirtue of the succession of illusory ideas without beginning, by\nreason of its possessing diverse modes percept and percipient,\nconformably to its illusory supposition of practical agency, just as\nto those whose eyes are dim with some morbid affection a hair and\nanother minute object may appear either diverse or identical; as it\nhas been said--\n \"As the intellect, not having object and subject modes,\n appears, by reason of illusory cognitions,\n \"Illuded with the diverse forms of perception, percept and\n percipient;\n \"So when the intellect has posited a diversity, as in the\n example of the differences of the cognition of a hair and\n the like,\n \"Then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as\n percipient and percept.\"\nThus it has been evinced that intellect, as affected by beginningless\nideation, manifests itself under diverse forms.\nWhen, therefore, by constancy of reflection (on the four points of\nview) aforesaid, all ideation has been interrupted, there arises\nknowledge purged from the illusions which take the form of objects,\nsuch illusions being now melted away; and this is technically called\n_Mahodaya_ (the grand exaltation, emancipation).\nOthers again (the Sautr\u00e1ntikas) hold that the position that there is\nno external world is untenable, as wanting evidence. Nor (they\ncontend) can it be maintained that invariability of simultaneous\ncognition is an evidence, for this simultaneous cognition which you\naccept as proof of the identity of subject and object is indecisive,\nbeing found in dubious and in contrary instances. If you rejoin (they\nproceed): Let there be a proof of this identity, and let this proof be\ninvariability of simultaneous cognition,--we refuse this, because\ninasmuch as cognition must ultimately have some object, it is\nmanifested in duality, and because such invariability of simultaneity\nas to time and place is impossible. Moreover (they continue), if the\nobject, blue or whatever it be, were only a form of cognition, it\nshould be presented as _Ego_, not as _Hoc aliquid_, because the\ncognition and the object would be identical. Perhaps you will say: A\nblue form consisting of cognition is illusorily presented as external\nand as other than self, and consequently the Ego is not suggested; and\nso it has been said--\n \"This side of knowledge which appears external to the other\n portion,\n \"This appearance of duality in the unity of cognition is an\n illusion.\"\nAnd again--\n \"The principle to be known as internal also manifests itself\n as if it were external.\"\nTo this we reply (say the Sautr\u00e1ntikas): This is untenable, for if\nthere be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the\ncomparison \"as if they were external\" is illegitimate. No man in his\nsenses would say, \"Vasumitra looks like the son of a childless\nmother.\" Again, if the manifestation of identity be proved by the\nillusoriness of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of\nduality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity, you are\ninvolved in a logical circle. Without controversy we observe that\ncognitions take external things, blue or whatever they may be, as\ntheir objects, and do not take merely internal modifications as such,\nand we see that men in their everyday life overlook their internal\nstates. Thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there is\ndifference between subject and object, turns out a mere absurdity,\nlike milky food made of cow-dung. When then you say \"as if it were\nexternal,\" you must already suppose an external _percipibile_, and\nyour own arrow will return upon you and wound you.\nIf any one object that the externality of an object synchronous with\nthe cognition is inadmissible, we (Sautr\u00e1ntikas) reply that this\nobjection is inadmissible, inasmuch as the subject in juxtaposition to\nthe sensory imposes its form upon the cognition then in production,\nand the object is inferrible from the form thus imposed. The\ninterrogation and response on this point have been thus summarised--\n \"If it be asked, How can there be a past _percipibile_? They\n recognise perceptibility,\n \"And a competent inferribility of the individual thing is\n its imposition of its form.\"\nTo exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a thriving look, as\nnationality is inferred from language, and as affection is inferred\nfrom flurried movements, so from the form of knowledge a knowable may\nbe inferred. Therefore it has been said--\n \"With half (of itself) the object moulds (the cognition)\n without losing the nature of a half;\n \"The evidence, therefore, of the recognition of a knowable\n is the nature of the knowable.\"\nFor consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the\ncognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, and if\nindifference were to attach itself to this, it would reduce all things\nto indifference. Accordingly the formal argument for the existence of\nexternal things: Those things which while a thing exists appear only\nat times, all depend upon something else than that thing; as, for\ninstance, if I do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of\nspeaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or\nwalking; and in like manner the presentments of activity under\ndiscussion, while there exists the recognition of a subject of them,\nare only at times manifested as blue and so forth. Of these, the\nrecognition of a subject is the presentation of the Ego, the\nmanifestation as blue and so forth is a presentment of activity, as\nit has been said--\n \"That is a recognition of a subject which is conversant\n about the Ego:\n \"That is a presentment of activity which manifests blue and\n the rest.\"\nOver and above, therefore, the complement of subject-recognitions, let\nit be understood that there is an external object world perceptible,\nwhich is the cause of presentments of activity; and that this external\nworld does not rise into being only from time to time on occasion of\npresentments resulting from ideation.\nAccording to the view of the Sensationalists (_vij\u00f1\u00e1nav\u00e1din_),\nideation is a power of generating such and such sensations (or\npresentments of activity) in subject-recognitions which exist as a\nsingle stream. The maturescence of this power is its readiness to\nproduce its effect; of this the result is a presentment (or\nsensation); the antecedent momentary object (sensation) in the mental\ntrain is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being admitted\nto exercise such causality. It must therefore be stated that all\nmomentary objects (fleeting sensations) in the subject-consciousness\nare alike able to bring about that maturescence of ideation in the\nsubject-consciousness, which maturescence is productive of\npresentments of activity. If any one (of these fleeting sensations)\nhad not this power, none would possess it, all existing alike in the\nstream of subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all have\nthis power, the effects cannot be diversified, and therefore any\nintelligent man, however unwilling, if he has a clear understanding,\nmust decide, without putting out of sight the testimony of his\nconsciousness, that to account for the occasional nature (of sense\npercepts) the six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and\nsmell, of pleasure, and so forth, are produced on occasion of four\nconditions. These four conditions are known as (1.) the data, (2.) the\nsuggestion, (3.) the medium, and (4.) the dominant (organ). Of these,\nthe form of blue or the like arises from the condition of blue data in\nthe understanding in which there is a manifestation of blue or the\nlike, which manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of\nforms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition. The\nrestriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the\nmedium, light, for instance, as a condition, and from the dominant,\nthe eye, for example, as another condition. The eye, as determinant of\none particular cognition (form) where taste, &c., might have been\nequally cognised, is able to become dominant; for in everyday life he\nwho determines is regarded as dominant. We must thus recognise four\ncauses of pleasure and the rest which constitute the understanding and\nits modifications.\nSo also the universe, which consists of mind and its modifications, is\nof five kinds, entitled (1.) the sensational, (2.) the perceptional,\n(3.) the affectional, (4.) the verbal, and (5.) the impressional. Of\nthese, the sensible world (_r\u00fapa-skandha_) is the sense organs and\ntheir objects, according to the etymology, viz., that objects are\ndiscriminated (_r\u00fapyante_) by these. The perceptional world is the\nstream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of activity. The\naffectional world is the stream of feelings of pleasure and pain\ngenerated by the two aforesaid worlds. The verbal (or symbolical)\nworld is the stream of cognitions conversant about words--the words\n\"cow,\" and so forth. The impressional world is the miseries, as\ndesire, aversion, &c., caused by the affectional world, the lesser\nmiseries, as conceit, pride, &c., and merit and demerit.\nReflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode of pain,\nand an instrument of pain, a man should acquire a knowledge of the\nprinciples, the method of suppressing this pain. Hence it has been\nsaid--\n \"The principles sanctioned by Buddha are to the saint the\n four methods of suppressing the aggregate of pain.\"[36]\nIn these words the sense of pain is known to every one; the\n\"aggregate\" means the cause of pain. This aggregate is twofold, as\n(1.) determined by concurrence; or (2.) determined by causation. Of\nthese, there is an aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by\nconcurrence, \"which other causes resort to this effect;\" the condition\nof these causes thus proceeding is concurrence; the concurrence of\ncauses is the result of this only, and not of any conscious\nbeing,--such is the meaning of the aphorism. To exemplify this. A\ngerm, caused by a seed, is generated by the concurrence of six\nelements. Of these, earth as an element produces hardness and smell in\nthe germ; water as an element produces viscidity and moisture; light\nas an element produces colour and warmth; air as an element produces\ntouch and motion; ether as an element produces expansion and sound;\nthe season as an element produces a fitting soil, &c. The aphorism\ncomprising the aggregate determined by causation is: \"With the\nTath\u00e1gatas the nature of these conditions is fixed by production, or\nby non-production; there is continuance as a condition, and\ndetermination by a condition, and conformity of the production to the\ncause;\" that is to say, according to the doctrine of the Tath\u00e1gata\nBuddhas, the nature of these conditions, that is, the causal relation\nbetween the cause and effect, results from production or from\nnon-production. That which comes into being, provided that something\nexists, is the effect of that as its cause; such is the explanation of\nthe nature (or causal relation). Continuance as a condition is where\nthe effect is not found without its cause. The (abstract) affix _tal_\n(in the word _sthitit\u0101_) has the sense of the concrete. Determination\nby a condition is the determination of the effect by the cause. Here\nsome one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause and\neffect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent. For this reason\nit is added that there existing a cause, conformity of the genesis to\nthat cause is the nature which is fixed in conditions (that is, in\ncauses and effects); and in all this no intelligent designer is\nobserved.[37] To illustrate this, the causal determination of a\ngenesis to be gone through is as follows:--From the seed the germ,\nfrom the germ the stalk, from the stalk the hollow stem, from the\nhollow stem the bud, from the bud the spicules, from the spicules the\nblossom, from the blossom the fruit. In this external aggregate\nneither the cause, the seed and the rest, nor the effect, the germ and\nthe rest, has any consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of\nbeing brought into being by the seed. In like manner in mental facts\ntwo causes are to be recognised. There is a whole ocean of scientific\nmatter before us, but we desist, apprehensive of making our treatise\nunduly prolix.\nEmancipation is the suppression of these two causal aggregates, or the\nrise of pure cognition subsequent to such suppression. The method\n(path, road) is the mode of suppressing them. And this method is the\nknowledge of the principles, and this knowledge accrues from former\nideas. Such is the highest mystery. The name Sautr\u00e1ntika arose from\nthe fact that the venerated Buddha said to certain of his disciples\nwho asked what was the ultimate purport (_anta_) of the aphorism\n(_s\u00fatra_), \"As you have inquired the final purport of the aphorism, be\nSautr\u00e1ntikas.\"\nCertain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world, consisting of\nodours, &c., and the internal, consisting of colours, &c., in order to\nproduce unbelief in these, declared the universe to be a void. These the\nvenerated Buddha styled Pr\u00e1thamika (primary) disciples. A second school,\nattached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain that sensation\nis the only reality. A third school, who contend that both are true (the\ninternal and the external), and maintain that sensible objects are\ninferrible. Others hold all this to be absurd language (_viruddh\u00e1\nbh\u00e1sh\u00e1_), and are known under the designation of Vaibh\u00e1shikas. Their\ntechnical language springs up as follows:--According to the doctrine of\ninferrible sensibles, there being no perceptible object, and consequently\nno object from which a universal rule can be attained, it will be\nimpossible that any illation should take place, and therefore a\ncontradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects,\ntherefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these apprehension\nis a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere\nrepresentation; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of\nevidence, as being a merely ideal cognition. Therefore it has been said--\n \"Apprehension, exempt from ideality and not illusory, is\n non-discriminative. Discrimination, as resulting from the\n appearances of things, is without controversy an illusion.\n \"The perceptible evidence of things is perception: if it\n were aught else,\n \"There could neither be things, nor evidence of things\n derived from verbal communication, inference, or sense.\"\nHere some one may say: If discriminative cognition be unauthentic, how\nis the apprehension of real objects by one energising thereon and the\nuniversal consentiency of mankind to be accounted for? Let it be\nreplied: This question does not concern us, for these may be accounted\nfor by the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just as\nif we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem (we may yet handle the\ngem, because it underlies the light, while if we were to take nacre\nfor silver, we could not lay hold of any silver). The rest has been\nfully discussed in describing the Sautr\u00e1ntikas (cf. p. 27), and\ntherefore need not here be further detailed.\nIt should not be contended that a diversity of instruction according\nto the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional (or orthodox);\nfor it is said in the gloss on the Bodha-chitta--\n \"The instructions of the leader of mankind (Buddha)\n accommodating themselves to the character and disposition\n (of those who are to be taught),\n \"Are said to be diverse in many ways, according to a\n plurality of methods.\n \"For as deep or superficial, and sometimes both deep and\n superficial,\n \"Instructions are diverse, and diverse is the doctrine of a\n universal void which is a negation of duality.\"\nIt is well known in Buddhist doctrine that the worship of the twelve\ninner seats (_\u00e1yatana_) is conducive to felicity.\n \"After acquiring wealth in abundance, the twelve inner seats\n \"Are to be thoroughly reverenced; what use of reverencing\n aught else below?\n \"The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action,\n \"The common sensory and the intellect have been described by\n the wise as the twelve inner seats.\"\nThe system of the Buddhists is described as follows in the\nViveka-vil\u00e1sa:--\n \"Of the Bauddhas Sugata (Buddha) is the deity, and the\n universe is momentarily fluxional;\n \"The following four principles in order are to be known by\n the name of the noble truths:--\n \"Pain, the inner seats, and from them an aggregate is\n \"And the path (method); of all this let the explication be\n heard in order.\n \"Pain, and the _skandhas_ of the embodied one, which are\n declared to be five,--\n \"Sensation, consciousness, name, impression, and form.\n \"The five organs of sense, the five objects of sense, sound\n and the rest, the common sensory,\n \"And (the intellect) the abode of merit,--these are the\n twelve inner seats.\n \"This should be the complement of desire and so forth, when\n it arises in the heart of man.\n \"Under the name of soul's own nature, it should be the\n aggregate.\n \"The fixed idea that all impressions are momentary,\n \"This is to be known as the path, and is also styled\n emancipation.\n \"Furthermore, there are two instruments of science,\n perception and inference.\n \"The Bauddhas are well known to be divided into four sects,\n the Vaibh\u00e1shikas and the rest.\n \"The Vaibh\u00e1shika highly esteems an object concomitant to the\n cognition;\n \"The Sautr\u00e1ntika allows no external object apprehensible by\n perception;\n \"The Yog\u00e1ch\u00e1ra admits only intellect accompanied with forms;\n \"The M\u00e1dhyamikas hold mere consciousness self-subsistent.\n \"All the four (sects of) Bauddhas proclaim the same\n emancipation,\n \"Arising from the extirpation of desire, &c., the stream of\n cognitions and impressions.\n \"The skin garment, the water-pot, the tonsure, the rags, the\n single meal in the forenoon,\n \"The congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by the\n Bauddha mendicants.\"[39]\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 29: This \u015bloka is quoted in the \"Benares Pandit,\" vol. i. p.\n89, with a commentary, and the latter part of the second line is there\nread more correctly, _'dar\u015ban\u00e1n na na dar\u015ban\u00e1t_.]\n[Footnote 30: Kusum\u00e1njali, iii. 7.]\n[Footnote 31: The Bauddhas are thus divided into--\n(1.) M\u00e1dhyamikas or Nihilists.\n(2.) Yog\u00e1ch\u00e1ras or Subjective Idealists.\n(3.) Sautr\u00e1ntikas or Representationists.\n(4.) Vaibh\u00e1shikas or Presentationists.]\n[Footnote 32: Cf. Ferrier's Lectures and Remains, vol. i. p. 119.\n\"Suppose yourself gazing on a gorgeous sunset. The whole western\nheavens are glowing with roseate hues, but you are aware that within\nhalf an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull\nashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes,\nalthough your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your\nreason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you\nnever, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see\nany abiding colour, any colour which truly _is_. Within the millionth\npart of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone\nan incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by\nanother with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance, but\nbecause the process is one to which no measurement applies,... reason\nrefuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scene, or to\ndeclare that it is, because in the very act of being it is not; it has\ngiven place to something else. It is a series of fleeting colours, no\none of which _is_, because each of them continually vanishes in\nanother.\"]\n[Footnote 33: Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.]\n[Footnote 34: Query, La\u1e45k\u00e1vat\u00e1ra?]\n[Footnote 35: Cf. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 213. \"If\nevery _completed_ object of cognition must consist of object _plus_\nthe subject, the object without the subject must be incomplete, that\nis, inchoate--that is, no possible object of knowledge at all. This is\nthe distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics\nof speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by\ncalling it a _flux_--or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps\nmore philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into\nsense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense.\"]\n[Footnote 36: Cf. Burnouf, _Lotus_, p. 520.--Should we read\n_samudaya_?]\n[Footnote 37: Cf. G. H. Lewes' History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 85.\n\"We not only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement\nof materials in the house, but we see why it must have done so,\nbecause the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves\ninto houses; that not being a recognised property of bricks, mortar,\nwood, and glass. But what we know of organic materials is that they\n_have_ this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite\nforms; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in\ndefinite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical\nagency.\"]\n[Footnote 38: These are not the usual four 'sublime truths;' cf. p.\n[Footnote 39: M\u00e1dhava probably derived most of his knowledge of\nBuddhist doctrines from Brahmanical works; consequently some of his\nexplanations (as, _e.g._, that of _samud\u00e1ya_ or _samudaya_, &c.) seem\nto be at variance with those given in Buddhist works.]\nCHAPTER III.\nTHE \u00c1RHATA SYSTEM.\nThe Gymnosophists[40] (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the\nMuktakachchhas,[41] and maintaining continued existence to a certain\nextent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything.\n(They say): If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the\narrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will\nbe useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible--that\none should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this\nconviction, \"I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap\nits consequences,\" establishes undoubtedly the existence of a\ncontinuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the\nsubsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable\nthe doctrine of momentary existence, _i.e._, an existence which lasts\nonly an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.\nBut the opponent may maintain, \"The unbroken stream (of momentary\nsensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it?\nIn this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument,\n'whatever is, is momentary, &c.,' it follows that in each parallel\nline of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent\nand the subsequent one reaps the fruit. Nor may you object that, 'if\nthis were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds'--[_i.e._, A\nmight act, and B receive the punishment]--because there is an\nessentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and\neffect. Thus we see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in\nsweet juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite\ncertainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the stalk, the\nstem, the branches, the peduncle, &c., and so on by an unbroken series\nto the fruit itself; or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled\nwith lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding, through\nthe same series of shoot, &c., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As\nit has been said--\n \"'In whatever series of successive states the original\n impression of the action was produced,\n \"'There verily accrues the result, just like the redness\n produced in cotton.\n \"'When lac juice, &c., are poured on the flower of the\n citron, &c.,\n \"'A certain capacity is produced in it,--do you not see\nBut all this is only a drowning man's catching at a straw, for it is\noverthrown by the following dilemma:--\nIn the example of the \"cloud,\" &c. [_supra_, p. 15], was your\nfavourite \"momentariness\" proved by this very proof or by some other?\nIt could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not\nalways directly visible in the cloud, and consequently, as your\nexample is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to\nthe ground. Nor can it be the latter--because you might always prove\nyour doctrine of momentariness by this new proof (if you had it), and\nconsequently your argument regarding all existence [\"whatever is, is\nmomentary,\" &c.] would become needless. If you take as your definition\nof \"existence\" \"that which produces an effect,\" this will not hold, as\nit would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since\nthis undoubtedly produces the effect [of fear]. Hence it has been\nsaid that the definition of an existence is \"that which possesses an\norigin, an end, and an [intermediate] duration.\"\nAs for what was said [in p. 16] that \"the momentariness of objects is\nproved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory\nattributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously,\"\n_that_ also is wrong--for the alleged contradiction is not proved, as the\nholders of the Sy\u00e1d-v\u00e1da[42] doctrine [_vide infra_] willingly admit the\nindeterminateness of the action of causes. As for what was said of the\nexample of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given,\nand we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction [at each\nmoment]. And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated\nwithout some subject to give it coherence, as has been said, \"In\nindividual things which are of the same class or successively produced or\nin mutual contact, there may be a continued series; and this series is\nheld to be one [throughout all\"].\nNor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation\nbetween causes and effects. For even on your own admission it would\nfollow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be\nremembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter\nmight experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired;\nand thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed\naway without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was\nenjoyed. This has been said by the author of the Siddhasen\u00e1v\u00e1kya--\n\"The loss of the thing done,--the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing\nnot done,--the dissolution of all existence,--and the abolition of\nmemory,--bold indeed is the Buddhist antagonist, when, in the teeth of\nthese four objections, he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary\ndestruction!\"\nMoreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), as at the time\nof the perception (the second moment) the object (of the first moment)\ndoes not exist, and similarly at the time of the object's existence\nthe perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a\nperceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of\nthe world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose that the object\nand the perception are simultaneous, because this would imply that,\nlike the two horns of an animal, they did not stand in the relation of\ncause and effect [as this relation necessarily involves succession],\nand consequently the _\u00c1lambana_, or the object's data [_supra_, p.\n29], would be abolished as one of the four concurrent causes\n(_pratyaya_).[43]\nIf you say that \"the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it\nwill impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have\nexisted in a different moment from the other,\" this too will not hold.\nFor if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a\ncertain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of\nexplaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of\nimpressing a form; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon\nit, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid\nincongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the\nperception and knowledge in each several case. Thus by perception the\nabstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced by the\nexternal object, becomes modified under the form of a jar, &c., with a\ndefinite reference to each man's personality [_i.e._, I see the jar],\nand it is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a\nmirror. Moreover, if the perception only reproduced the form of the\nobject, there would be an end of using such words as \"far,\" \"near,\"\n&c., of the objects.[44] Nor can you accept this conclusion, \"as\nexactly in accordance with your own views,\" because, in spite of all\nour logic, the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as\n\"the mountain is nearer\" or \"further,\" \"long\" or \"large.\" Nor may you\nsay that \"it is the object (which supplies the form) that really\npossesses these qualities of being 'further,' &c., and they are\napplied by a fashion of speech to the perception [though not really\nbelonging to it]\"--because we do not find that this is the case in a\nmirror [_i.e._, it does not become a _far_ reflection because it\nrepresents a far object.] And again, as the perception produced by an\nobject follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if the object\nbe insentient, it ought equally to assume its form and so become\nitself insentient. And thus, according to the proverb, \"wishing to\ngrow, you have destroyed your root,\" and your cause has fallen into\nhopeless difficulties.\nIf, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that \"the\nperception does not follow the object in being insentient,\" then there\nwould be no perception that the object is insentient,[45] and so it is\na case of the proverb, \"While he looks for one thing which he has\nlost, another drops.\" \"But what harm will it be if there is no\nperception of a thing's being insentient?\" [We reply], that if its\nbeing insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived,\nthe two may be quite distinct [and as different from each other as a\njar and cloth], or it may be a case of \"indeterminateness\" [so that\nthe two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire].\nAnd again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the\nblue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that\nboth the blue and the insentience should together constitute the\ncharacter of the thing?] We might just as well maintain that, on\nperceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also\nconstituting its character.[46]\nAll this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full\nlength by the Jaina authors, Prat\u00e1pachandra and others, in the\n_Prameyakamalam\u00e1rta\u1e47\u1e0da_, &c., and is here omitted for fear of swelling\nthe book too much.\nTherefore those who wish for the _summum bonum_ of man must not accept\nthe doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the \u00c1rhata doctrine.\nThe Arhat's nature has been thus described by Arhachchandra-s\u00fari,[47]\nin his _\u00c1ptani\u015bchay\u00e1la\u1e45k\u00e1ra_.\n\"The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has\novercome all faults, desire, &c.,--adored by the three worlds, the\ndeclarer of things as they are.\"\nBut may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the\npath of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found\nto apply, as has been declared by Taut\u00e1tita [Bha\u1e6d\u1e6da Kum\u00e1rila[48]]?\n1. \"No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by\nourselves or others; nor is there any part of him seen which might\nhelp us as a sign to infer his existence.\n2. \"Nor is there any injunction (_vidhi_) of scripture which reveals\nan eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory\npassages (_arthav\u00e1da_) be applied here.\n3. \"His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to\nquite other topics; and it cannot be contained in any emphatic\nrepetitions (_anuv\u00e1da_), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere\nbefore.\n4. \"An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject\nof the eternal Veda; and how can he be established by a made and\nspurious Veda?\n5. \"Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on his own word?\nHow can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal\nsupport?\n6. \"[If you say,] 'The saying is true because it was uttered by one\nomniscient, and this proves the Arhat's existence;' how can either\npoint be established without some previously established foundation?\n7. \"But they who accept a [supposed] omniscient on the baseless word\nof a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient's\nwords.\n8. \"And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being,\nwe might have a chance of recognising him by the [well-known fourth]\nproof, comparison (_upam\u00e1na_).\n9. \"And the teaching of Buddha [as well as that of Jina], which\nembraces virtue, vice, &c., would not be established as authoritative,\nif there were not in him the attribute of omniscience,[49] and so on.\"\nWe reply as follows:--As for the supposed contradiction of an Arhat's\nexistence, derived from the failure of the five affirmative\nproofs,--this is untenable, because there _are_ proofs, as inference,\n&c., which _do_ establish[50] his existence. Thus any soul will become\nomniscient when, (its natural capacity for grasping all objects\nremaining the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done away.\nWhatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object, will,\nwhen its hindrances to such knowledge are done away, actually know it,\njust as the sense of vision cognises form, directly the hindrances of\ndarkness, &c., are removed. Now there _is_ such a soul, which has its\nhindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping all things\nremaining unchanged; therefore there is an omniscient being. Nor is\nthe assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for\ngrasping all things; for otherwise the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43sist could not maintain\nthat a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the\nauthoritative injunction of a text,[51]--nor could there otherwise be\nthe knowledge of universal propositions, such as that in our favourite\nargument, \"All things are indeterminate from the very fact of their\nexistence\" [and, of course, a follower of the Ny\u00e1ya will grant that\nuniversal propositions can be known, though he will dispute the truth\nof this particular one]. Now it is clear that the teachers of the\nP\u00farva M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity\nfor grasping all things; since they allow that a knowledge embracing\nall things can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and\nprohibitions, as is said [by \u015aabara in his commentary on the S\u00fatras,\ni. 1, 2], \"A precept makes known the past, the present, the future,\nthe minute, the obstructed, the distant, &c.\" Nor can you say that \"it\nis impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul's\nknowing all things,\" because we [Jainas] are convinced that there are\ncertain special means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three\n[\"gems\"], right intuition, &c. By this charm also, all inferior\nassaults of argument can be put to flight.\nBut the Naiy\u00e1yika may interpose, \"You talk of the pure intelligence,\nwhich, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having\nsense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there\ncan be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has\nbeen always liberated.\" We reply that there is no proof of your\neternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is\neternally \"liberated,\" from the very fact of his being \"liberated,\"\nlike other liberated persons,--since the use of the term \"liberated\"\nnecessarily implies the having been previously bound; and if the\nlatter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of\nthe ether. \"But is not this being's existence definitely proved by his\nbeing the maker of that eternal series of effects, the earth, &c.?\naccording to the well-known argument, 'the earth, &c., must have had a\nmaker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar.'\" This\nargument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they\nhave the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of\ntheir being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the\nhorns of a dilemma. Does this \"being composed of parts\" mean (i.) the\nbeing in contact with the parts; or (ii.) \"the being in intimate\nrelation to the parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;\" or\n(iv.) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v.) the being\nthe object of an idea involving the notion of parts?\nNot _the first_, because it would apply too widely, as it would\ninclude ether [since this, though not itself composed of parts, is in\ncontact with the parts of other things;] nor _the second_, because it\nwould similarly include genus, &c. [as this resides in a substance by\nintimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts;] nor _the\nthird_, because this involves a term (\"produced\") just as much\ndisputed as the one directly in question;[52] nor _the fourth_,\nbecause its neck is caught in the pillory of the following\nalternative:--Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a\nsubstance, and to have something else in intimate relation to\nitself,--or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to\nsomething else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the\nformer, it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and\nhas its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the\nlatter, your new position involves as much dispute as the original\npoint, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate\nrelation in the parts, or the so-called \"intimate causes,\" which you\nmean by \"something else.\" We use these terms in compliance with your\nterminology; but, of course, from our point of view, we do not allow\nsuch a thing as \"intimate relation,\" as there is no proof of its\nexistence.\nNor can _the fifth_ alternative be allowed, because this would reach\ntoo far, as it would include soul, &c., since soul can be the object\nof an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged\nto be not an effect.[53] Nor can you maintain that the soul may still\nbe indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with\nsomething possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object\nof an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual\ncontradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is\nall-pervading, just as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not\nall-pervading].\nAnd, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent?\nIn the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend\nerroneously to palaces, &c., where we see for ourselves the work of\nmany different men, as carpenters, &c., and [in the second case] if\nall the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would\nbe superfluous. As it has been said in the _V\u00edtar\u00e1gastuti_, or \"Praise\nof Jina\"--\n1. \"There is one eternal maker for the world, all-pervading,\nindependent, and true; they have none of these inextricable delusions,\nwhose teacher art _thou_.\"\nAnd again--\n2. \"There is here no maker acting by his own free will, else his\ninfluence would extend to the making of a mat. What would be the use\nof yourself or all the artisans, if \u00cd\u015bwara fabricates the three\nworlds?\"\nTherefore it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience is produced\nwhen the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to.\nNor need the objection be made that \"right intuition,\" &c., are\nimpossible, as there is no other teacher to go to,--because this\nuniversal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former\nomniscient Jinas. Nor is our doctrine liable to the imputation of such\nfaults as _Anyony\u00e1\u015brayat\u00e1_,[54] &c., because we accept an eternal\nsuccession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the\nendless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed. So\nmuch for this preliminary discussion.\nThe well-known triad called the three gems, right intuition, &c., are\nthus described in the _Param\u00e1gamas\u00e1ra_ (which is devoted to the\nexposition of the doctrines of the Arhats)--\"Right intuition, right\nknowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation.\" This has been\nthus explained by Yogadeva:--\n(_a._) When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, &c., has been\ndeclared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute\nfaith in the teaching, _i.e._, the entire absence of any contrary\nidea, is \"right intuition.\" And to this effect runs the\n_Tattv\u00e1rtha-s\u00fatra_, \"Faith in the predicaments[55] is right\n'intuition.'\" Or, as another definition gives it, \"Acquiescence in the\npredicaments declared by a Jina is called 'right faith;' it is\nproduced either by natural character or by the guru's instruction.\"\n\"Natural character\" means the soul's own nature, independent of\nanother's teaching; \"instruction\" is the knowledge produced by the\nteaching of another in the form of explanation, &c.\n(_b._) \"Right knowledge\" is a knowledge of the predicaments, soul,\n&c., according to their real nature, undisturbed by any illusion or\ndoubt; as it has been said--\n\"That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the\npredicaments as they actually are, is called 'right knowledge' by the\nwise.\"\nThis knowledge is fivefold as divided into _mati_, _\u015bruta_, _avadhi_,\n_manas-pary\u00e1ya_, and _kevala_; as it has been said, \"_Mati_, _\u015b_ruta,\n_avadhi_, _manas-pary\u00e1ya_, and _kevala_, these are knowledge.\" The\nmeaning of this is as follows:--\n1. _Mati_ is that by which one cognises an object through the\noperation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge\nbeing abolished.\n2. _\u015aruta_ is the clear knowledge produced by _mati_, all the\nobstructions of knowledge being abolished.\n3. _Avadhi_ is the knowledge of special objects caused by the\nabolition of hindrances, which is effected by \"right intuition,\"\n4. _Manas-pary\u00e1ya_ is the clear definite knowledge of another's\nthoughts, produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of\nknowledge caused by the veil of envy.\n5. _Kevala_ is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which\nascetics practise various kinds of penance.\nThe first of these (_mati_) is not self-cognised, the other four are.\nThus it has been said--\n\"True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which\nmanifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and\nitself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two\nways.\"\nBut the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from\nthe authoritative treatise above-mentioned.\n(_c._) \"Right conduct\" is the abstaining from all actions tending to\nevil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is\ndiligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which\nconstitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by\nthe Arhat--\n1. \"Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment of\nblamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as\nthe 'five vows,' _ahi\u1e43s\u00e1_, _s\u00fan\u1e5bita_, _asteya_, _brahmachary\u00e1_, and\n_aparigraha_.[57]\n2. \"The 'vow' of _ahi\u1e43s\u00e1_ is the avoidance of injuring life by any act\nof thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing.\n3. \"A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of\n_s\u00fan\u1e5bita_. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to\nothers and prejudicial.\n4. \"The not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of\n_asteya_; the external life is a man's property, and, when it is\nkilled, it is killed by some one who seizes it.\n5. \"The 'vow' of _brahmachary\u00e1_ (chastity) is eighteen-fold, viz., the\nabandonment of all desires,[58] heavenly or earthly, in thought, word,\nand deed, and whether by one's own action or by one's consent, or by\none's causing another to act.\n6. \"The 'vow' of _aparigraha_ is the renouncing of all delusive\ninterest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought\nmay arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal.\n7. \"When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order,\nthese great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode.\"\nThe full account of the five states of mind (_bh\u00e1van\u00e1_) has been given\nin the following passage [of which we only quote one \u015bloka]--\n\"Let him carry out the 'vow' of _s\u00fan\u1e5bita_ uninterruptedly by the\nabstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and by the\ndeliberate avoidance of speech,\"[59]--and so forth.\nThese three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when\nunited, produce liberation, but not severally; just as, in the case of\nan elixir, it is the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues,\nand the actual application of the medicine,[60] united, which produce\nthe elixir's effect, but not severally.\nHere we may say concisely that the _tattvas_ or predicaments are two,\n_j\u00edva_ and _aj\u00edva_; the soul, _j\u00edva_, is pure intelligence; the\nnon-soul, _aj\u00edva_, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus\nsaid--\n\"The two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul;'\n'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two, in one who\npursues what is to be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected. The\naffection, &c., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for\nthe non-discriminating; the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone to\nbe pursued, which is defined as _upayoga_.\"\n_Upayoga_ [or \"the true employment of the soul's activities\"] takes\nplace when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation\nof the soul's innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of\n_prade\u015ba_ and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces\n[between the soul and the body], considers itself as identified with\nits actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge should rather\nbe defined as \"the cause of its recognising that it is other than\nthese.\"[61]\nIntelligence (_chaitanya_) is common to all souls, and is the real\nnature of the soul viewed as _pari\u1e47ata_ [_i.e._, as it is in itself];\nbut by the influence of _upa\u015bamakshaya_ and _kshayopa\u015bama_ it appears\nin the \"mixed\" form as possessing both,[62] or again, by the influence\nof actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness,\n&c.[63] As has been said by V\u00e1chak\u00e1ch\u00e1rya [in a s\u00fatra]--\n\"The _aupa\u015bamika_, the _Ksh\u00e1yika_, and the 'mixed' states are the\nnature of the soul, and also the _audayika_ and the _P\u00e1ri\u1e47\u00e1mika_.\"\n1. The _aupa\u015bamika_ state of the soul arises when all the effects of\npast actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the\nfuture], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling\nmud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing\nnut-plant,[64] &c.\n2. The _Ksh\u00e1yika_ state arises when there is the absolute abolition of\nactions and their effects, as in final liberation.\n3. The \"mixed\" (_mi\u015bra_) state combines both these, as when water is\npartly pure.\n4. The _audayika_ state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent\ninfluence on the future]. The _P\u00e1ri\u1e47\u00e1mika_ state is the soul's innate\ncondition, as pure intelligence, &c., and disregarding its apparent\nstates, as (1), (2), (3), (4).[65] This nature, in one of the\nabove-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether\nhappy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the s\u00fatra quoted above.\nThis has been explained in the _Svar\u00fapa-sambodhana_--\n\"Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it,--in some\nway both different and the same,--knowledge is its first and last;\nsuch is the soul described to be.\"\nIf you say that, \"As difference and identity are mutually exclusive,\nwe must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being\nequally both is absurd,\" we reply, that there is no evidence to\nsupport you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid\nnon-perception[66] can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this\nis not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the\nadvocates of the _Sy\u00e1d-v\u00e1da_) it is perfectly notorious that all\nthings present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes.\nOthers lay down a different set of _tattvas_ from the two mentioned\nabove, _j\u00edva_ and _aj\u00edva_; they hold that there are five _astik\u00e1yas_\nor categories,--_j\u00edva_, _\u00e1k\u00e1\u015ba_, _dharma_, _adharma_, and _pudgala_.\nTo all these five we can apply the idea of \"existence\" (_asti_),[67]\nas connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly\napply the idea of \"body\" (_k\u00e1ya_),[68] from their occupying several\nparts of space.\nThe _j\u00edvas_ (souls) are divided into two, the \"mundane\" and the\n\"released.\" The \"mundane\" pass from birth to birth; and these are also\ndivided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (_samanaska_),\nand those destitute of it (_amanaska_). The former possesses _sa\u1e43j\u00f1\u00e1_,\n_i.e._, the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving\ninstruction; the latter are those without this power. These latter are\nalso divided into two, as \"locomotive\" (_trasa_), or \"immovable\"\n(_sth\u00e1vara_).\nThe \"locomotive\" are those possessing at least two senses [touch and\ntaste], as shell-fish, worms, &c., and are thus of four kinds [as\npossessing two, three, four, or five senses]; the \"immovable\" are\nearth, water, fire, air, and trees.[69] But here a distinction must be\nmade. The dust of the road is properly \"earth,\" but bricks, &c., are\naggregated \"bodies of earth,\" and that soul by whom this body is\nappropriated becomes \"earthen-bodied,\" and that soul which will\nhereafter appropriate it is the \"earth-soul.\" The same four divisions\nmust also be applied to the others, water, &c. Now the souls which\nhave appropriated or will appropriate the earth, &c., as their bodies,\nare reckoned as \"immovable;\" but earth, &c., and the \"bodies of\nearth,\" &c., are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.[70]\nThese other immovable things, and such as only possess the one sense\nof touch, are considered as \"released,\" since they are incapable of\npassing into any other state of existence.\n_Dharma_, _adharma_, and _\u00e1k\u00e1\u015ba_ are singular categories [and not\ngeneric], and they have not the attribute of \"action,\" but they are\nthe causes of a substance's change of place.\n_Dharma_, \"merit,\" and _adharma_, \"demerit,\" are well known. They\nassist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally\nextended[71] sky [or ether] characterised by light, and also called\nLok\u00e1k\u00e1\u015ba; hence the presence of the category \"merit\" is to be inferred\nfrom progress, that of \"demerit\" from stationariness. The effect of\n_\u00e1k\u00e1\u015ba_ is seen when one thing enters into the space previously\noccupied by another.\n_Pudgala_, \"body,\" possesses touch, taste, and colour. Bodies are of\ntwo kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed;[72] the\ncompounds are the binary and other combinations. Atoms are produced by\nthe separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise\nfrom the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from\nseparation and conjunction [combined]; hence they are called\n_pudgalas_, because they \"fill\" (_p\u00far_), and \"dissolve\" (_gal_).\nAlthough \"time\" is not properly an _astik\u00e1ya_, because it does not\noccupy many separate parts of space [as mentioned in the definition],\nstill it is a _dravya_ [or _tattva_], as the definition will hold;\n\"substance\" (_dravya_) possesses \"qualities and action.\"[73] Qualities\nreside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the\ngeneral qualities, knowledge, &c., of the _j\u00edva_, form, &c., of the\nbody, and the power of causing progress, stationariness, and motion\ninto a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of \"merit,\"\n\"demerit,\" and _\u00e1k\u00e1\u015ba_. \"Action\" (_pary\u00e1ya_) has thus been defined;\nthe actions (_pary\u00e1y\u00e1\u1e25_) of a substance are, as has been said, its\nexistence, its production, its being what it is, its development, its\ncourse to the end, as, _e.g._, in the _j\u00edva_, the knowledge of\nobjects, as of a jar, &c., happiness, pain, &c.; in the _pudgala_, the\nlump of clay, the jar, &c.; in merit and demerit, the special\nfunctions of progress, &c. Thus there are six substances or _tattvas_\n[_i.e._, the five above mentioned and \"time\"].\nOthers reckon the _tattvas_ as seven, as has been said--\n\"The _tattvas_ are _j\u00edva_, _aj\u00edva_, _\u00e1srava_, _bandha_, _sa\u1e43vara_,\n_nirjar\u00e1_, and _moksha_.\" _J\u00edva_ and _aj\u00edva_ have been already described.\n_\u00c1srava_ is described as the movement of the soul called _yoga_,[74]\nthrough its participation in the movement of its various bodies,\n_aud\u00e1rika_, &c. As a door opening into the water is called _\u00e1srava_,\nbecause it causes the stream to descend through it,[75] so this _yoga_ is\ncalled _\u00e1srava_, because by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences\nflow in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the dust brought to\nit from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins,\ncollects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions\nwhich are brought to it by _yoga_. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated\nlump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the _j\u00edva_, heated\nby previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought\nby _yoga_. _Kash\u00e1ya_ (\"sin,\" \"defilement\") is so called because it \"hurts\"\n(_kash_) the soul by leading it into evil states; it comprises anger,\npride, delusion, and lust. _\u00c1srava_ is twofold, as good or evil. Thus\nabstaining from doing injury is a good _yoga_ of the body; speaking what\nis true, measured, and profitable is a good _yoga_ of the speech.\nThese various subdivisions of _\u00e1srava_ have been described at length\nin several _S\u00fatras_. \"_\u00c1srava_ is the impulse to action with body,\nspeech, or mind, and it is good or evil as it produces merit or\ndemerit,\" &c. Others, however, explain it thus:--\"_\u00c1srava_ is the\naction of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects;\nthe light of the soul, coming in contact with external objects by\nmeans of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge of form,\n_Bandha_, \"bondage,\" is when the soul, by the influence of \"false\nintuition,\" \"non-indifference,\" \"carelessness,\" and \"sin\" (_kash\u00e1ya_),\nand also by the force of _yoga_, assumes various bodies occupying many\nparts of space, which enter into its own subtile body, and which are\nsuited to the bond of its previous actions. As has been said--\n \"Through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes\n bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, 'bondage.'\"\nIn this quotation the word \"sin\" (_kash\u00e1ya_) is used to include the\nother three causes of bondage as well as that properly so termed.\nV\u00e1chak\u00e1ch\u00e1rya has thus enumerated the causes of bondage: \"The causes\nof bondage are false intuition, non-indifference, carelessness, and\nsin.\"\n(_a_) \"False intuition\" is twofold,--either innate from one's natural\ncharacter, as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines from the influence\nof former evil actions, irrespectively of another's teaching,--or\nderived, when learned by another's teaching.\n(_b_) \"Non-indifference\" is the non-restraint of the five senses, and\nthe internal organ from the set of six, earth, &c.\n(_c_) \"Carelessness\" (_pram\u00e1da_) is a want of effort to practise the\nfive kinds of _samiti_, _gupti_, &c.\n(_d_) \"Sin\" consists of anger, &c. Here we must make the distinction\nthat the four things, false intuition, &c., cause those kinds of\nbondage called _sthiti_ and _anubh\u00e1va_; _yoga_ [or _\u00e1srava_] causes\nthose kinds called _prak\u1e5biti_ and _prade\u015ba_.\n\"Bondage\" is fourfold, as has been said: \"_Prak\u1e5biti_, _sthiti_,\n_anubh\u00e1va_, and _prade\u015ba_ are its four kinds.\"\n1. _Prak\u1e5biti_ means \"the natural qualities,\" as bitterness or\nsweetness in the vimba plant or molasses. This may be subdivided into\neight _m\u00fala-prak\u1e5bitis_.[77]\nThus obstructions (_\u00e1vara\u1e47a_)[78] cloud the knowledge and intuition,\nas a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. This is (_a_)\n_jn\u00e1n\u00e1vara\u1e47a_, or (_b_) _dar\u015ban\u00e1vara\u1e47a_. (_c_) An object recognised as\nsimultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and\npain, as licking honey from a sword's edge,--this is _vedan\u00edya_. (_d_)\nA delusion (_mohan\u00edya_) in intuition produces want of faith in the\nJaina categories, like association with the wicked; delusion in\nconduct produces want of self-restraint, like intoxication. (_e_)\n_\u00c1yus_ produces the bond of body, like a snare.[79] (_f_) _N\u00e1man_, or\n\"the name,\" produces various individual appellations, as a painter\npaints his different pictures. (_g_) _Gotra_ produces the idea of\nnoble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his pots. (_h_) _Antar\u00e1ya_\nproduces obstacles to liberality, &c., as the treasurer hinders the\nking by considerations of economy.\nThus is the _prak\u1e5biti-bandha_ eightfold, being denominated as the\neight _m\u00fala-prak\u1e5bitis_, with subdivisions according to the different\nactions of the various subject-matter.\nAnd thus has Um\u00e1sw\u00e1ti-v\u00e1chak\u00e1ch\u00e1rya[80] declared: \"The first kind of\n_bandha_ consists of obstructions of the knowledge and the intuition,\n_vedan\u00edya_, _mohan\u00edya_, _\u00e1yus_, _n\u00e1man_, _gotra_, and _antar\u00e1ya_;\" and he\nhas also reckoned up the respective subdivisions of each as five, nine,\ntwenty-eight, four, two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been\nexplained at full length in the _Vidy\u00e1nanda_ and other works, and here is\nomitted through fear of prolixity.\n2. _Sthiti._ As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, &c., have continued\nunswerving from their sweet nature for so long a period, so the first\nthree _m\u00fala-prak\u1e5bitis_, _jn\u00e1n\u00e1vara\u1e47a_, &c., and the last, _antar\u00e1ya_, have\nnot swerved from their respective natures even through the period\ndescribed in the words, \"_sthiti_ lasts beyonds crores of crores of\nperiods of time measured by thirty _s\u00e1garopamas_.\"[81] This continuance is\n_sthiti_.\n3. _Anubh\u00e1va._ As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, &c., there\nexists, by its rich or poor nature, a special capacity for\nproducing[82] its several effects, so in the different material bodies\nproduced by our actions there exists a special capacity (_anubh\u00e1va_)\nfor producing their respective effects.\n4. _Prade\u015ba._ The _bandha_ called _prade\u015ba_ is the entrance into the\ndifferent parts of the soul by the masses, made up of an endless\nnumber of parts, of the various bodies which are developed by the\nconsequences of actions.\n_Sa\u1e43vara_ is the stopping of _\u00e1srava_--that by which the influence of\npast actions (_karman_) is stopped from entering into the soul. It is\ndivided into _gupti_, _samiti_, &c. _Gupti_ is the withdrawal of the\nsoul from that \"impulse\" (_yoga_) which causes mundane existence,--it\nis threefold, as relating to body, speech, or mind. _Samiti_ is the\nacting so as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided\ninto five kinds, as _\u00edry\u00e1_,[83] _bh\u00e1sh\u00e1_, &c., as has been explained\nby Hemachandra.\n1. \"In a public highway, kissed by the sun's rays, to walk\ncircumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings, this the good\ncall _\u00edry\u00e1_.\n2. \"Let him practise[84] a measured utterance in his intercourse with\nall people; this is called _bh\u00e1sh\u00e1-samiti_, dear to the restrainers of\nspeech.\n3. \"The food which the sage takes, ever free from the forty-two faults\nwhich may accrue to alms, is called the _esha\u1e47\u00e1-samiti_.[85]\n4. \"Carefully looking at it and carefully seating himself upon it, let\nhim take a seat, &c., set it down, and meditate,--this is called the\n_\u00e1d\u00e1na-samiti_.\n5. \"That the good man should carefully perform his bodily evacuations\nin a spot free from all living creatures,[86]--this is the\n_utsarga-samiti_.[87] Hence _samvara_ has been etymologically analysed\nas that which closes (_sam_ + _v\u1e5bi\u1e47oti_) the door of the stream of\n_\u00e1srava_,[88] as has been said by the learned, '_\u00c1srava_ is the cause\nof mundane existence, _sa\u1e43vara_ is the cause of liberation;[89] this\nis the \u00c1rhat doctrine in a handful; all else is only the amplification\nof this.'\"\n_Nirjar\u00e1_ is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay by\nself-mortification, &c.; it destroys by the body the merit and demerit\nof all the previously performed actions, and the resulting happiness\nand misery; \"self-mortification\" means the plucking out of the hair,\n&c. This _nirjar\u00e1_ is twofold,[90] \"temporary\" (_yath\u00e1k\u00e1la_) and\nancillary (_aupakrama\u1e47ika_). It is \"temporary\" as when a desire is\ndormant in consequence of the action having produced its fruit, and at\nthat particular time, from this completion of the object aimed at,\n_nirjar\u00e1_ arises, being caused by the consumption of the desire, &c.\nBut when, by the force of asceticism, the sage turns all actions into\nmeans for attaining his end (liberation), this is the _nirjar\u00e1_ of\nactions. Thus it has been said: \"From the decaying of the actions\nwhich are the seeds of mundane existence, _nirjar\u00e1_ arises, which is\ntwofold, _sak\u00e1m\u00e1_ and _ak\u00e1m\u00e1_. That called _sak\u00e1m\u00e1_ belongs to\nascetics, the _ak\u00e1m\u00e1_ to other embodied spirits.\"[91]\n_Moksha._ Since at the moment of its attainment there is an entire\nabsence of all future actions, as all the causes of bondage (false\nperception, &c.) are stopped,[92] and since all past actions are\nabolished in the presence of the causes of _nirjar\u00e1_, there arises the\nabsolute release from all actions,--this is _moksha_; as it has been\nsaid: \"_Moksha_ is the absolute release from all actions by the decay\n(_nirjar\u00e1_) of the causes of bondage and of existence.\"\nThen the soul rises upward to the end of the world. As a potter's\nwheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves on even after these have\nstopped, until the impulse is exhausted, so the previous repeated\ncontemplations of the embodied soul for the attainment of _moksha_\nexert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul\nonward to the end of the world; or, as the gourd, encased with clay,\nsinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its\nencumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by its\nisolation,[93] from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of\nthe castor-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame.\n\"Bondage\" is the condition of being unseparated, with a mutual\ninterpenetration of parts [between the soul and the body]; _sa\u1e45ga_ is\nmerely mutual contact. This has been declared as follows:--\n\"[Liberation] is unhindered, from the continuance of former impulses,\nfrom the absence of _sa\u1e45ga_, from the cutting of all bonds, and from\nthe natural development of the soul's own powers of motion, like the\npotter's wheel, the gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the\ncastor-oil plant, or the flame of fire.\"\nHence they recite a \u015bloka:--\n \"However often they go away, the planets return, the sun,\n moon, and the rest;\n \"But never to this day have returned any who have gone to\n \u00c1lok\u00e1k\u00e1\u015ba.\"\nOthers hold _moksha_ to be the abiding in the highest regions, the\nsoul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself\nuntainted by any pain or impression thereof.\nOthers hold nine _tattwas_, adding \"merit\" and \"demerit\" to the\nforegoing seven,--these two being the causes of pleasure and pain.\nThis has been declared in the _Siddh\u00e1nta_, \"_J\u00edva_, _aj\u00edva_, _pu\u1e47ya_,\n_p\u00e1pa_, _\u00e1srava_, _sa\u1e43vara_, _nirjara\u1e47a_, _bandha_, and _moksha_, are\nthe nine _tattwas_.\" As our object is only a summary, we desist here.\nHere the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the\n_sapta-bha\u1e45g\u00ed-naya_,[94] or the system of the seven paralogisms, \"may\nbe, it is,\" \"may be, it is not,\" \"may be, it is and it is not,\" \"may\nbe, it is not predicable,\" \"may be, it is, and yet not predicable,\"\n\"may be, it is not, and not predicable,\" \"may be, it is and it is not,\nand not predicable.\" All this Anantav\u00edrya has thus laid down:--\n1. \"When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say\n'may be, it is;' when you wish to deny it, 'may be, it is not.'\n2. \"When you desire to establish each in turn, let your procedure\nlikewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it\nbe declared 'indescribable' from the impossibility to describe it.\n3. \"The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first\nas well as its indescribableness; when the second as well as its\nindescribableness, the occasion for the sixth process arises.\n4. \"The seventh is required when all three characters are to be\nemployed simultaneously.\"\n_Sy\u00e1t_, \"may be,\" is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a\npart of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it\nhas been said--\n \"This particle _sy\u00e1t_ is in the form of a verb, but, from\n its being connected with the sense, it denotes\n indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect\n on the implied meaning.\"\nIf, again, the word _sy\u00e1t_ denoted determinateness, then it would be\nneedless in the phrase, \"may be, it is;\" but since it really denotes\nindeterminateness, \"may be, it is,\" means \"it is somehow;\" _sy\u00e1t_,\n\"may be,\" conveys the meaning of \"somehow,\" _katha\u1e43chit_; and so it is\nnot really useless. As one has said--\n\"The doctrine of the _sy\u00e1d-v\u00e1da_ arises from our everywhere rejecting\nthe idea of the absolute;[95] it depends on the _sapta-bha\u1e45g\u00ed-naya_,\nand it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to\nbe accepted.\"\nIf a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always,\neverywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would\never make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to\ntreat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided.\nBut if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at\ncertain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it.\nMoreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this: \"Is _being_\nor _non-being_ the real nature of the thing?\" The real nature of the\nthing cannot be _being_, for then you could not properly use the\nphrase, \"It is a pot\" (_gha\u1e6d\u00f3sti_), as the two words \"is\" and \"pot\"\nwould be tautological; nor ought you to say, \"It is not a pot,\" as the\nwords thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same\nargument is to be used in other questions.[96] As it has been\ndeclared--\n \"It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot'\n implies 'is;'\n \"Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and\n non-existence are mutually exclusive,\" &c.\nThe whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents\nseverally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and\nnon-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is\ninexplicable (_anirvachan\u00edyat\u00e1_);[97] three other classes hold one or\nother of the three first theories combined with the fourth.[98] Now,\nwhen they meet us with the scornful questions, \"Does the thing exist?\"\n&c., we have an answer always possible, \"It exists in a certain way,\"\n&c., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues\nto the holder of the _Sy\u00e1d-v\u00e1da_, which ascertains the entire meaning\nof all things. Thus said the teacher in the _Sy\u00e1dv\u00e1da-ma\u00f1jar\u00ed_--\n\"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the\nomniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of\nscientific investigation.[99] When our reasonings based on one point\nproceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed _Sy\u00e1d-v\u00e1da_,\nwhich ascertains the entire meaning of all things.\"\n\"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions\nand counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which\nwith no partiality equally favours all sects.\"\nThe Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta-s\u00fari--\n\"The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure,\ngiving and receiving,--sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter,\nliking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow,\ndeceit, these are the eighteen 'faults' (_dosha_) according to our\nsystem.[100] The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true\nknowledge of the _tattwas_. The path[101] of emancipation consists of\nknowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof\n(_pram\u00e1\u1e47a_) in the _Sy\u00e1d-v\u00e1da_ doctrine,--sense-perception and\ninference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are\nnine or seven _tattwas_. The _j\u00edva_, the _aj\u00edva_, merit and demerit,\n_\u00e1srava_, _sa\u1e43vara_, _bandha_, _nirjar\u00e1_, _mukti_,--we will now\nexplain each. _J\u00edva_ is defined as intelligence; _aj\u00edva_ is all other\nthan it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the\nopposite; _\u00e1srava_ is the bondage of actions,[102] _nirjar\u00e1_ is the\nunloosing thereof; _moksha_ arises from the destruction of the eight\nforms of _karman_ or \"action\". But by some teachers \"merit\" is\nincluded in _sa\u1e43vara_,[103] and \"demerit\" in _\u00e1srava_.\n\"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things[104] and is\nhidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute\nliberation is declared by Jina. The \u015awet\u00e1mbaras are the destroyers of\nall defilement, they live by alms,[105] they pluck out their hair,\nthey practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the\nJaina _S\u00e1dhus_. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they carry\npeacocks' tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they\neat upright in the giver's house,--these are the second class of the\nJaina \u1e5aishis.\n\"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,--so\nsay the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point\nbetween them and the \u015awet\u00e1mbaras.\"[106]\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 40: _Vivasanas_, \"without garments.\"]\n[Footnote 41: \"The Buddhists are also called _Muktakachchhas_,\nalluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the\nhem of the lower garment untucked.\"--_Colebrooke._]\n[Footnote 42: In p. 26, line 3, read _Sy\u00e1d-v\u00e1din\u00e1m_.]\n[Footnote 43: I propose to read in p. 26, line 5, _infra_, _gr\u00e1hyasya_\nfor _agr\u00e1hyasya_.]\n[Footnote 44: As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.]\n[Footnote 45: I correct the reading _tasy\u00e1graha\u1e47a\u1e43_ to _tasy\u00e1\ngraha\u1e47a\u1e43_ (_tasy\u00e1_ being _ja\u1e0dat\u00e1y\u00e1\u1e25_).]\n[Footnote 46: _I.e._, if you say that the _avayava_ may be not seen\nthough the _avayavin_ is seen, then I may say that the post is the\n_avayavin_, and the unperceived three worlds its _avayava_!]\n[Footnote 47: I read _arhatsvar\u00fapam arhachchandra_ in p. 27, line 3,\n_infra_.]\n[Footnote 48: The following passage occurs in some part of Kum\u00e1rila's\nwritings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the\nS\u00e1\u1e45kara-digvijaya, chap. lv., it is mentioned that Kum\u00e1rila had a\nlittle relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He\nrepented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that\nthere was some truth in their teaching. _Jainagurumukh\u00e1t ka\u015bchid\nvidy\u00e1le\u015bo j\u00e1ta\u1e25._]\n[Footnote 49: Kum\u00e1rila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as\nhis existence is not established by any one of the five recognised\nproofs,--the sixth, _abh\u00e1va_, being negative, is, of course, not\napplicable. I understand the last \u015bloka as showing the inapplicability\nof \"presumption\" or _arth\u00e1-patti_. A Jaina would say, \"If the Arhat\nwere not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative,\nbut we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient.\" He answers by\nretorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a\nBuddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it\ncannot be convincing in his own.]\n[Footnote 50: In p. 29, line 2, read _tatsadbh\u00e1v\u00e1vedakasya_ for\n_tatsadbh\u00e1v\u00e1dekasya_.]\n[Footnote 51: In p. 29, line 9, for _nikhil\u00e1rthaj\u00f1an\u00e1t notpatty_, I\npropose to read _nikhil\u00e1rthaj\u00f1\u00e1notpatty_.]\n[Footnote 52: _Janya_ is included in _K\u00e1rya_ and equally disputed.]\n[Footnote 53: Thus \"I am possessed of a body\" (_aham \u015aar\u00edr\u00ed_), \"my\nhand,\" &c., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the\nnotion of parts is applied to the soul \"I.\"]\n[Footnote 54: Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the &c. includes the\n_Anavasth\u00e1dosha_ or reasoning _ad infinitum_. He accepts the supposed\nfault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before\neverybody's eyes.]\n[Footnote 55: In p. 31, line 5, _infra_, read _tattv\u00e1rthe_ for\n_tattv\u00e1rtham_.]\n[Footnote 56: I read in p. 32, line 9, _Samyagdar\u015ban\u00e1di_ for\n_asamyagdar\u015ban\u00e1di_; but the old text may mean \"caused by the abolition\nof hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition,\" &c.]\n[Footnote 57: Cf. the five _yamas_ in the _Yoga-s\u00fatras_, ii. 30.\nHemachandra (_Abhidh_ 81) calls them _yamas_.]\n[Footnote 58: I read _k\u00e1m\u00e1n\u00e1m_ for _k\u00e1m\u00e1\u1e47\u00e1m_ in p. 33, line 7 (2 \u00d7 3 \u00d7 3 =\n[Footnote 59: For _abh\u00e1sha\u1e47a_, see Hemach. 16.]\n[Footnote 60: I propose in p. 33, line 17,\n_ra\u015bayanaj\u00f1\u00e1na\u015braddh\u00e1vach\u00e1ra\u1e47\u00e1ni_ for _ras\u00e1ya\u1e47aj\u00f1ana\u1e43\n\u015braddh\u00e1n\u00e1vara\u1e47\u00e1ni_. For _avach\u00e1ra\u1e47a_, see _Su\u015bruta_, vol. ii. p. 157,\n&c. If _an\u00e1vara\u1e47a_ be the true reading, I suppose it must mean \"the\nabsence of obstructions.\"]\n[Footnote 61: This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it\nby the scholiast to Hemachandra, _Abhidh_. 79.]\n[Footnote 62: Or this may mean \"by the influence of _upa\u015bamakshaya_ or\n_kshayopa\u015bama_, it appears characterised by one or the other.\"]\n[Footnote 63: I read in p. 34, line 7, _kalush\u00e1dy\u00e1k\u00e1re\u1e47a_ for\n_kalush\u00e1ny\u00e1k\u00e1re\u1e47a_. The _upa\u015bamakshaya_ and _kshayopa\u015bama_ seem to\ncorrespond to the _aupa\u015bamika_ and _ksh\u00e1yika_ states about to be\ndescribed.]\n[Footnote 64: _Strychnos potatorum._]\n[Footnote 65: Just as in the S\u00e1nkhya philosophy, the soul is not\nreally bound though it seems to itself to be so.]\n[Footnote 66: A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen,\nand yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as\nthe eye, light, &c.]\n[Footnote 67: I read in p. 35, line 5, _'st\u00edti_ for _sthiti_.]\n[Footnote 68: Hence the term here used for \"category\"--_astik\u00e1ya_.]\n[Footnote 69: These (by Hemach. _Abhidh._ 21), possess only one\nsense--touch. In p. 35, line 10, I read _\u015ba\u1e45khaga\u1e47\u1e0dolakaprabh\u1e5bitayas\ntras\u00e1\u015b chaturvidh\u00e1\u1e25 p\u1e5bithivyaptejo_.]\n[Footnote 70: In p. 35, line 16, I read _tesh\u00e1m aj\u00edvatv\u00e1t_ for _tesh\u00e1\u1e43\nj\u00edvatv\u00e1t_. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, \"because\nthe former only are animate.\"]\n[Footnote 71: In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I read _sarvatr\u00e1vasthite_ for\n_sarvatr\u00e1vasthiti_. In the preceding line I read _\u00e1loken\u00e1vachchhinne_ for\n_\u00e1loken\u00e1vichchhinne_.]\n[Footnote 72: Cf. Siddh\u00e1nta-mukt\u00e1vali, p. 27. The _vishaya_ is\n_upabhoga-s\u00e1dhanam_, but it begins with the _dvya\u1e47uka_. This category\ntakes up the forms of _sth\u00e1vara_ which were excluded from _j\u00edva_.]\n[Footnote 73: It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly M\u00e1dhava\nfor the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is\nanalysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this\ndefinition of _dravya_,--cf. _Vai\u015besh. S\u00fatra_, i. 1, 15. _Pary\u00e1ya_ is\nexplained as _karman_ in Hemach. _Anek_. _Pary\u00e1ya_, in p. 36, line 11\n(_infra_, p. 53, line 9), seems used in a different sense from that\nwhich it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach.\n_Abhidh_. 1503, _pary\u00e1yo 'nukrama\u1e25 krama\u1e25_.]\n[Footnote 74: _Yoga_ seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul\nto act.]\n[Footnote 75: In line 18, read _\u00e1srava\u1e47ak\u00e1ra\u1e47atv\u00e1d_.]\n[Footnote 76: The _jn\u00e1na_ is one, but it becomes apparently manifold\nby its connection with the senses and external objects.]\n[Footnote 77: These are also called the eight _karmans_ in\nGovind\u00e1nanda's gloss, _Ved. S\u00fat._, ii. 2, 33.]\n[Footnote 78: The Calcutta MS. reads _\u00e1dara\u1e47\u00edyasya_ for\n_\u00e1vara\u1e47\u00edyasya_, in p. 37, last line. But _\u00e1vara\u1e47\u00edya_ may be used for\n_\u00e1varana_ (_P\u00e1\u1e47._ iii. 4, 68). Cf. _Yoga S\u00fat._, ii. 52, where Vy\u00e1sa's\nComm. has _\u00e1vara\u1e47\u00edya_.]\n[Footnote 79: _J\u00e1lavat_? The printed text has _jalavat_.]\n[Footnote 80: Um\u00e1sv\u00e1mi-?]\n[Footnote 81: For the _s\u00e1garopama_, see Wilson's _Essays_, vol. i. p.\n309. In p. 38, line 16, I read _ity\u00e1dyuktak\u00e1l\u00e1d \u00fardhvam api_ for the\nobscure _ity\u00e1dyukta\u1e43 k\u00e1ladurddh\u00e1navat_. I also read at the end of the\nline _prachyuti\u1e25 sthiti\u1e25_ for _prachyutisthiti\u1e25_.]\n[Footnote 82: In p. 38, line 18, read _svak\u00e1ryakara\u1e47e_.]\n[Footnote 83: In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, for _\u00edrshy\u00e1_ read\n_\u00edry\u00e1_,--a bad misreading.]\n[Footnote 84: In p. 39, line 6, I read _\u00e1padyet\u00e1_ for _\u00e1padyat\u00e1_.]\n[Footnote 85: In p. 39, line 9, for _sesha\u1e47\u00e1_ read _saisha\u1e47\u00e1_.]\n[Footnote 86: In p. 39, line 12, join _nirjantu_ and _jagat\u00edtale_.]\n[Footnote 87: M\u00e1dhava omits the remaining divisions of _sa\u1e43vara_.\nWilson, _Essays_, vol. i. p. 311, gives them as _parishah\u00e1_,\n\"endurance,\" as of a vow; _yatidharma_, \"the ten duties of an ascetic,\npatience, gentleness,\" &c.; _bh\u00e1van\u00e1_, \"conviction,\" such as that\nworldly existences are not eternal, &c.; _ch\u00e1ritra_, \"virtuous\nobservance.\"]\n[Footnote 88: In p. 39, line 14, read _\u00e1sravasrotaso_.]\n[Footnote 89: For _moha_, in line 16, read _moksha_.]\n[Footnote 90: In p. 39, line 2 _infra_, I read _yath\u00e1k\u00e1la-_ for _yath\u00e1\nk\u00e1la-_.]\n[Footnote 91: This passage is very difficult and not improbably\ncorrupt, and my interpretation of it is only conjectural. The ordinary\n_nirjar\u00e1_ is when an action attains its end (like the lulling of a\npassion by the gratification), this lull is temporary. That _nirjar\u00e1_\nis \"ancillary\" which is rendered by asceticism a means to the\nattainment of the highest good. The former is _ak\u00e1m\u00e1_, \"desireless,\"\nbecause at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant; the\nlatter is _sak\u00e1m\u00e1_, because the ascetic conquers the lower desire\nunder the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation.]\n[Footnote 92: I read _nirodhe_ for _nirodhah_ in p. 40, line 6; cf. p.\n37, line 13. The causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in\nwhich future actions are to be performed.]\n[Footnote 93: Literally \"absence of _sanga_.\"]\n[Footnote 94: In p. 41, line 7, read _sapta-bha\u1e45g\u00ed-naya_, see Ved. S.\n[Footnote 95: I cannot understand the words at the end of the first\nline, _kim v\u1e5bitatadvidhe\u1e25_, and therefore leave them untranslated.]\n[Footnote 96: Thus Govind\u00e1nanda applies it (_Ved. S\u00fat._, ii. 2, 33) to\n\"may be it is one,\" \"may be it is many,\" &c.]\n[Footnote 97: '\u0391\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u1f31\u03b1. This is \u015ariharsha's tenet in the\n_Kha\u1e47\u1e0dana-kha\u1e47\u1e0da-kh\u00e1dya_.]\n[Footnote 98: In p. 42, line 17, for _maten\u00e1mi\u015brit\u00e1ni_ read _matena\nmi\u015brit\u00e1ni_.]\n[Footnote 99: In p. 43, line 2, for _na yasya_ read _nayasya_.]\n[Footnote 100: This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is\nreally identical with that given in Hemachandra's _Abhidh\u00e1na-chint\u00e1ma\u1e47i_,\n72, 73; but we must correct the readings to _antar\u00e1y\u00e1s_, _r\u00e1gadwesh\u00e1v\navirati\u1e25 smara\u1e25_, and _h\u00e1so_ for _hims\u00e1_. The order of the eighteen\n_doshas_ in the Calcutta edition is given by Hemachandra as 4, 5, 1, 2, 3,\n[Footnote 101: In p. 43, line 13, for _vartini_ read _vartini\u1e25_.]\n[Footnote 102: This seems corrupt,--a line is probably lost.]\n[Footnote 103: In last line, for _sa\u1e43srave_ read _sa\u1e43vare_.]\n[Footnote 104: Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul,\nthe liberated and liberation? These are called _ananta_. See Weber's\n[Footnote 105: _Sarajohara\u1e47\u00e1h_ is explained by the _rajohara\u1e47adh\u00e1rin_\n(= _vratin_) of Hal\u00e1yudha, ii. 189.]\n[Footnote 106: Cf. Wilson, _Essays_, i. 340. For _str\u00edm_ read _str\u00ed_.]\nCHAPTER IV.\nTHE R\u00c1M\u00c1NUJA SYSTEM.\nThis doctrine of the \u00c1rhatas deserves a rational condemnation, for\nwhereas there is only one thing really existent, the simultaneous\nco-existence of existence, non-existence and other modes in a\nplurality of really existing things is an impossibility. Nor should\nany one say: Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of\nexistence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why\nshould there not be an alternation between existence and\nnon-existence? there being the rule that it is action, not _Ens_, that\nalternates. Nor let it be supposed that the whole universe is\nmultiform, in reliance upon the examples of the elephant-headed Ga\u1e47e\u015ba\nand of the incarnation of Vish\u1e47u as half man, half lion; for the\nelephantine and the leonine nature existing in one part, and the human\nin another, and consequently there being no contradiction, those parts\nbeing different, these examples are inapplicable to the maintenance of\na nature multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and the\nsame part (or place). Again, if any one urge: Let there be existence\nin one form, and non-existence in another, and thus both will be\ncompatible; we rejoin: Not so, for if you had said that at different\ntimes existence and non-existence may be the nature of anything, then\nindeed there would have been no vice in your procedure. Nor is it to\nbe contended: Let the multiformity of the universe be like the length\nand shortness which pertain to the same thing (in different\nrelations); for in these (in this length and shortness) there is no\ncontrariety, inasmuch as they are contrasted with different objects.\nTherefore, for want of evidence, existence and non-existence as\nreciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the same time in the same\nthing. In a like manner may be understood the refutation of the other\n_bha\u1e45gas_ (\u00c1rhata tenets).\nAgain, we ask, is this doctrine of the seven _bha\u1e45gas_, which lies at\nthe base of all this, itself uniform (as excluding one contradictory),\nor multiform (as conciliating contradictories). If it is uniform,\nthere will emerge a contradiction to your thesis that all things are\nmultiform; if it is multiform, you have not proved what you wished to\nprove, a multiform statement (as both existent and non-existent)\nproving nothing.[107] In either case, there is rope for a noose for\nthe neck of the Sy\u00e1d-V\u00e1din.\nAn admirable author of institutes has the founder of the \u00c1rhata\nsystem, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist), proved himself to be,\nwhen he has not ascertained whether his result is the settling of nine\nor of seven principles, nor the investigator who settles them, nor his\norganon, the modes of evidence, nor the matter to be evidenced,\nwhether it be ninefold or not!\nIn like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as the \u00c1rhatas\nsay), an extension equal to that of the body, it will follow that in\nthe case of the souls of ascetics, who by the efficacy of asceticism\nassume a plurality of bodies, there is a differentiation of the soul\nfor each of those bodies. A soul of the size of a human body would not\n(in the course of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the whole\nbody of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its elephantine\nbody to enter into that of an ant, it would lose its capacity of\nfilling its former frame. And it cannot be supposed that the soul\nresides successively in the human, elephantine, and other bodies, like\nthe light of a lamp which is capable of contraction and expansion,\naccording as it occupies the interior of a little station on the\nroad-side in which travellers are supplied with water, or the interior\nof a stately mansion; for it would follow (from such a supposition)\nthat the soul being susceptible of modifications and consequently\nnon-eternal, there would be a loss of merits and a fruition of good\nand evil unmerited.\nAs if then we had thrown their best wrestler, the redargution of the\nrest of their categories may be anticipated from this exposition of\nthe manner in which their treatment of the soul has been vitiated.\nTheir doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the eternal, infallible\nrevelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated Vy\u00e1sa accordingly\npropounded the aphorism (ii. 2, 33), \"Nay, because it is impossible in\none;\" and this same aphorism has been analysed by R\u00e1m\u00e1nuja with the\nexpress purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas. The tenets\nof R\u00e1m\u00e1nuja are as follows:--Three categories are established, as\nsoul, not-soul, and Lord; or as subject, object, and supreme disposer.\nThus it has been said--\n \"Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles: Hari\n (Vish\u1e47u)\n \"Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible\n world is not-soul.\"\nOthers, again (the followers of \u015aa\u1e45kar\u00e1ch\u00e1rya), maintain that pure\nintelligence, exempt from all differences, the absolute, alone is\nreally existent; and that this absolute whose essence is eternal,\npure, intelligent, and free, the identity of which with the\nindividuated spirit is learnt from the \"reference to the same object\"\n(predication), \"That art thou,\" undergoes bondage and emancipation.\nThe universe of differences (or conditions) such as that of subject\nand object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as in that (one\nreality), as is attested by a number of texts: Existent only, fair\nsir, was this in the beginning, One only without a second, and so\nforth. Maintaining this, and acknowledging a suppression of this\nbeginningless illusion by knowledge of the unity (and identity) of\nindividuated spirits and the undifferenced absolute, in conformity\nwith hundreds of texts from the Upanishads, such as He that knows\nspirit passes beyond sorrow; rejecting also any real plurality of\nthings, in conformity with the text condemnatory of duality, viz.,\nDeath after death he undergoes who looks upon this as manifold; and\nthinking themselves very wise, the \u015a\u00e1\u1e45karas will not tolerate this\ndivision (viz., the distribution of things into soul, not-soul, and\nLord). To all this the following counterposition is laid down:--This\nmight be all well enough if there were any proof of such illusion. But\nthere is no such ignorance (or illusion), an unbeginning entity,\nsuppressible by knowledge, testified in the perceptions, I am\nignorant, I know not myself and other things. Thus it has been said\n(to explain the views of the \u015a\u00e1\u1e45kara)--\n \"Entitative from everlasting, which is dissolved by\n knowledge,\n \"Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate.\"\nThis perception (they would further contend) is not conversant about\nthe absence of knowledge. For who can maintain this, and to whom? One\nwho leans on the arm of Prabh\u00e1kara, or one to whom Kum\u00e1rila-bha\u1e6d\u1e6da\ngives his hand? Not the former, for in the words--\n \"By means of its own and of another's form, eternal in the\n existent and non-existent,\n \"Thing is recognised something by some at certain times.\n \"Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation.\n Non-entity is but another entity, naught else, for naught\n else is observed.\"\nThey deny any non-entity ulterior to entity. Non-entity being\ncognisable by the sixth instrument of knowledge (_anupalabdhi_), and\nknowledge being always an object of inference, the absence of\nknowledge cannot be an object of perception. If, again, any one who\nmaintains non-entity to be perceptible should employ the above\nargument (from the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself, and\nother things); it may be replied: \"Is there, or is there not, in the\nconsciousness, I am ignorant, an apprehension of self as characterised\nby an absence, and of knowledge as the thing absent or non-existent?\nIf there is such apprehension, consciousness of the absence of\nknowledge will be impossible, as involving a contradiction. If there\nis not, consciousness of the absence of knowledge, which consciousness\npresupposes a knowledge of the subject and of the thing absent, will\nnot readily become possible.\" Inasmuch (the \u015a\u00e1\u1e45karas continue) as the\nforegoing difficulties do not occur if ignorance (or illusion) be\nentitative, this consciousness (I am ignorant, I know not myself, and\nother things) must be admitted to be conversant about an entitative\nignorance.\nAll this (the R\u00e1m\u00e1nuja replies) is about as profitable as it would be\nfor a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether; for an entitative\nignorance is not more supposable than an absence of knowledge. For (we\nwould ask), is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and\nas a subject (of ignorance) as distinct from cognition? If it is\npresented, how, since ignorance of a thing is terminable by knowledge\nof its essence, can the ignorance continue? If none such is presented,\nhow can we be conscious of an ignorance which has no subject and no\nobject? If you say: A pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is\nrevealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance (or illusion), and\nthus there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignorance\naccompanied with a consciousness of its subject and object; then we\nrejoin:--Unfortunately for you, this (consciousness of subject) must\narise equally in the absence of knowledge (for such we define illusion\nto be), notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary. It must,\ntherefore, be acknowledged that the cognition, I am ignorant, I know\nnot myself and other things, is conversant about an absence of\ncognition allowed by us both.\nWell, then (the \u015a\u00e1\u1e45karas may contend), let the form of cognition\nevidentiary of illusion, which is under disputation, be inference, as\nfollows:--Right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another\nentity (_sc._ illusion), an entity different from mere prior\nnon-existence of knowledge, which envelops the objects of knowledge,\nwhich is terminable by knowledge, which occupies the place of\nknowledge, inasmuch as it (the right knowledge) illuminates an object\nnot before illuminated, like the light of a lamp springing up for the\nfirst time in the darkness. This argument (we reply) will not stand\ngrinding (in the dialectic mill); for to prove the (antecedent)\nillusion, you will require an ulterior illusion which you do not\nadmit, and a violation of your own tenets will ensue, while if you do\nnot so prove it, it may or may not exist; and, moreover, the example\nis incompatible with the argument, for it cannot be the lamp that\nillumines the hitherto unillumined object, since it is knowledge only\nthat illumines; and an illumination of objects may be effected by\nknowledge even without the lamp, while the light of the lamp is only\nancillary to the visual organ which effectuates the cognition,\nancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the obstruent darkness.\nWe dismiss further prolixity.\nThe counterposition (of the R\u00e1m\u00e1nujas) is as follows:--The illusion\nunder dispute does not reside in Brahman, who is pure knowledge,\nbecause it is an illusion, like the illusion about nacre, &c. If any\none ask: Has not the self-conscious entity that underlies the illusion\nabout nacre, &c., knowledge only for its nature? they reply: Do not\nstart such difficulties; for we suppose that consciousness by its bare\nexistence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about\n(_i.e._, the name and notion of) some object; and such consciousness,\nalso called knowledge, apprehension, comprehension, intelligence, &c.,\nconstitutes the soul, or knowledge, of that which acts and knows. If\nany one ask: How can the soul, if it consists of cognition, have\ncognition as a quality? they reply: This question is futile; for as a\ngem, the sun, and other luminous things, existing in the form of\nlight, are substances in which light as a quality inheres--for light,\nas existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle, and as being a\nmode of things though a substance, is still styled and accounted a\nquality derived from determination by that substance,--so this soul,\nwhile it exists as a self-luminous intelligence, has also intelligence\nas its quality. Accordingly the Vedic texts: A lump of salt is always\nwithin and without one entire mass of taste, so also this soul is\nwithin and without an entire mass of knowledge; Herein this person is\nitself a light; Of the knowledge of that which knows there is no\nsuspension; He who knows, smells this; and so also, This is the soul\nwhich, consisting of knowledge, is the light within the heart; For\nthis person is the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the\nthinker, the understander, the doer; The person is knowledge, and the\nlike texts.\nIt is not to be supposed that the Veda also affords evidence of the\nexistence of the cosmical illusion, in the text, Enveloped in untruth\n(_an\u1e5bita_); for the word untruth (_an\u1e5bita_) denotes that which is\nother than truth (_\u1e5bita_). The word _\u1e5bita_ has a passive sense, as\nappears from the words, Drinking _\u1e5bita_. _\u1e5aita_ means works done\nwithout desire of fruit; having as its reward the attainment of the\nbliss of the Supreme Spirit through his propitiation. In the text in\nquestion, untruth (_an\u1e5bita_) designates the scanty fruit enjoyed\nduring transmigratory existence as opposed to that (which results from\npropitiation of the Supreme Spirit), which temporal fruit is\nobstructive to the attainment of supreme existence (_brahman_); the\nentire text (when the context is supplied) being: They who find not\nthis supreme sphere (_brahma-loka_) are enveloped in untruth. In such\ntexts, again, as Let him know illusion (_m\u00e1y\u00e1_) to be the primary\nemanative cause (_prak\u1e5biti_), the term (_m\u00e1y\u00e1_) designates the\nemanative cause, consisting of the three \"cords\" (_gu\u1e47a_), and\ncreative of the diversified universe. It does not designate the\ninexplicable illusion (for which the \u015a\u00e1\u1e45karas contend).\nIn such passages as, By him the defender of the body of the child,\nmoving rapidly, the thousand illusions (_m\u00e1y\u00e1_) of the barbarian were\nswooped upon as by a hawk, we observe that the word \"illusion\"\n(_m\u00e1y\u00e1_) designates the really existent weapon of a Titan, capable of\nprojective diversified creation. The Veda, then, never sets out an\ninexplicable illusion. Nor (is the cosmical illusion to be inferred\nfrom the \"grand text,\" That art thou), inasmuch as the words, That art\nthou, being incompetent to teach unity, and indicating a conditionate\nSupreme Spirit, we cannot understand by them the essential unity of\nthe mutually exclusive supreme and individual spirits; for such a\nsupposition (as that they are identical) would violate the law of\nexcluded middle. To explain this. The term That denotes the Supreme\nSpirit exempt from all imperfections, of illimitable excellence, a\nrepository of innumerable auspicious attributes, to whom the\nemanation, sustentation, retractation of the universe is a\npastime;[108] such being the Supreme Spirit, spoken of in such texts\nas, That desired, let me be many, let me bring forth. Perhaps the word\nThou, referring to the same object (as the word That), denotes the\nSupreme Spirit characterised by consciousness, having all individual\nspirits as his body; for a \"reference to the same object\" designates\none thing determined by two modes. Here, perhaps, an Advaita-v\u00e1din may\nreply: Why may not the purport of the reference to the same object in\nthe words, That art thou, be undifferenced essence, the unity of\nsouls, these words (That and thou) having a (reciprocally) implicate\npower by abandonment of opposite portions of their meaning; as is the\ncase in the phrase, This is that Devadatta. In the words, This is that\nDevadatta, we understand by the word That, a person in relation to a\ndifferent time and place, and by the word This, a person in relation\nto the present time and place. That both are one and the same is\nunderstood by the form of predication (\"reference to the same\nobject\"). Now as one and the same thing cannot at the same time be\nknown as in different times and places, the two words (This and That)\nmust refer to the essence (and not to the accidents of time and\nplace), and unity of essence can be understood. Similarly in the text,\nThat art thou, there is implicated an indivisible essence by\nabandonment of the contradictory portions (of the denotation), viz.,\nfinite cognition (which belongs to the individual soul or Thou), and\ninfinite cognition (which belongs to the real or unindividual soul).\nThis suggestion (the R\u00e1m\u00e1nujas reply) is unsatisfactory, for there is\nno opposition (between This and That) in the example (This is that\nDevadatta), and consequently not the smallest particle of\n\"implication\" (_laksha\u1e47\u00e1_, both This and That being used in their\ndenotative capacity). The connection of one object with two times past\nand present involves no contradiction. And any contradiction supposed\nto arise from relation to different places may be avoided by a\nsupposed difference of time, the existence in the distant place being\npast, and the existence in the near being present. Even if we concede\nto you the \"implication,\" the (supposed) contradiction being avoidable\nby supposing one term (either That or Thou) to be implicative, it is\nunnecessary to admit that both words are implicative. Otherwise (if we\nadmit that both words are implicative), if it be granted that the one\nthing may be recognised, with the concomitant assurance that it\ndiffers as this and as that, permanence in things will be\ninadmissible, and the Buddhist assertor of a momentary flux of things\nwill be triumphant.\nWe have, therefore (the R\u00e1m\u00e1nujas continue), laid it down in this\nquestion that there is no contradiction in the identity of the\nindividual and the Supreme Spirit, the individual spirits being the\nbody and the Supreme Spirit the soul. For the individual spirit as the\nbody, and therefore a form, of the Supreme Spirit, is identical with\nthe Supreme Spirit, according to another text, Who abiding in the\nsoul, is the controller of the soul, who knows the soul, of whom soul\nis the body.\nYour statement of the matter, therefore, is too narrow. ALL words are\ndesignatory of the Supreme Spirit. They are not all synonymous, a\nvariety of media being possible; thus as all organised bodies, divine,\nhuman, &c., are forms of individual spirits, so all things (are the\nbody of Supreme Spirit), all things are identical with Supreme Spirit.\nHence--\nGod, Man, Yaksha, Pi\u015b\u00e1cha, serpent, R\u00e1kshasa, bird, tree, creeper,\nwood, stone, grass, jar, cloth,--these and all other words, be they\nwhat they may, which are current among mankind as denotative by means\nof their base and its suffixes, as denoting those things, in denoting\nthings of this or that apparent constitution, really denote the\nindividual souls which assumed to them such body, and the whole\ncomplexus of things terminating in the Supreme Spirit ruling within.\nThat God and all other words whatsoever ultimately denote the Supreme\nSpirit is stated in the Tattva-mukt\u00e1val\u00ed and in the Chaturantara--\n \"God, and all other words, designate the soul, none else\n than That, called the established entity,\n \"Of this there is much significant and undoubted\n exemplification in common speech and in the Veda;\n \"Existence when dissociated from spirit is unknown; in the\n form of gods, mortals, and the rest\n \"When pervading the individual spirit, the infinite has made\n a diversity of names and forms in the world.\"\nIn these words the author, setting forth that all words, God, and the\nrest, designate the body, and showing in the words, \"No unity in\nsystems,\" &c., the characteristic of body, and showing in the words,\n\"By words which are substitutes for the essence of things,\" &c., that\nit is established that nothing is different from the universal Lord,\nlays down in the verses, Significant of the essence, &c., that all\nwords ultimately designate the Supreme Spirit. All this may be\nascertained from that work. The same matter has been enforced by\nR\u00e1m\u00e1nuja in the Ved\u00e1rtha-sa\u1e45graha, when analysing the Vedic text about\nnames and forms.\nMoreover, every form of evidence having some determinate object, there\ncan be no evidence of an undetermined (unconditionate) reality. Even\nin non-discriminative perception it is a determinate (or conditioned)\nthing that is cognised. Else in discriminative perception there could\nnot be shown to be a cognition characterised by an already presented\nform. Again, that text, That art thou, is not sublative of the\nuniverse as rooted in illusion, like a sentence declaratory that what\nwas illusorily presented, as a snake is a piece of rope; nor does\nknowledge of the unity of the absolute and the soul bring (this\nillusory universe) to an end; for we have already demonstrated that\nthere is no proof of these positions.\nNor is there an absurdity (as the \u015a\u00e1\u1e45karas would say), on the\nhypothesis enunciatory of the reality of the universe, in affirming\nthat by a cognition of one there is a cognition of all things: for it\nis easily evinced that the mundane egg, consisting of the primary\ncause (_prak\u1e5biti_), intellect, self-position, the rudimentary\nelements, the gross elements, the organs (of sense and of action), and\nthe fourteen worlds, and the gods, animals, men, immovable things, and\nso forth, that exist within it, constituting a complex of all forms,\nis all an effect, and that from the single cognition of absolute\nspirit as its (emanative) cause, when we recognise that all this is\nabsolute spirit (there being a tautology between cause and effect),\nthere arises cognition of all things, and thus by cognition of one\ncognition of all. Besides, if all else than absolute spirit were\nunreal, then all being non-existent, it would follow that by one\ncognition all cognition would be sublated.\nIt is laid down (by the R\u00e1m\u00e1nujas) that retractation into the universe\n(_pralaya_) is when the universe, the body whereof consists of souls\nand the originant (_prak\u1e5biti_), returns to its imperceptible state,\nunsusceptible of division by names and forms, existing as absolute\nspirit the emanative cause; and that creation (or emanation) is the\ngross or perceptible condition of absolute spirit, the body whereof is\nsoul and not soul divided by diversity of names and forms, in the\ncondition of the (emanative) effect of absolute spirit. In this way\nthe identity of cause and effect laid down in the aphorism (of Vy\u00e1sa)\ntreating of origination, is easily explicable. The statements that the\nSupreme Spirit is void of attributes, are intended (it is shown) to\ndeny thereof phenomenal qualities which are to be escaped from by\nthose that desire emancipation. The texts which deny plurality are\nexplained as allowed to be employed for the denial of the real\nexistence of things apart from the Supreme Spirit, which is identical\nwith all things, it being Supreme Spirit which subsists under all\nforms as the soul of all, all things sentient and unsentient being\nforms as being the body of absolute Spirit.[109]\nWhat is the principle here involved, pluralism or monism, or a\nuniverse both one and more than one? Of these alternatives monism is\nadmitted in saying that Supreme Spirit alone subsists in all forms as\nall is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that\none only Supreme Spirit subsists under a plurality of forms diverse as\nsoul and not-soul; and plurality is admitted in saying that the\nessential natures of soul, not-soul, and the Lord, are different, and\nnot to be confounded.\nOf these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, or souls,\nconsisting of uncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge, but enveloped\nin illusion, that is, in works from all eternity, undergo contraction\nand expansion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits.\nSoul experiences fruition, and after reaping pleasures and pains\nproportionate to merits and demerits, there ensues knowledge of the\nLord, or attainment of the sphere of the Lord. Of things which are\nnot-soul, and which are objects of fruition (or experience of pleasure\nand pain), unconsciousness, unconduciveness to the end of man,\nsusceptibility of modification, and the like, are the properties. Of\nthe Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as the internal\ncontroller (or animator) of both the subjects and the objects of\nfruition; the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge, dominion,\nmajesty, power, brightness, and the like, the countless multitude of\nauspicious qualities; the generation at will of all things other than\nhimself, whether spiritual or non-spiritual; various and infinite\nadornment with unsurpassable excellence, singular, uniform, and\ndivine.\nVe\u1e45ka\u1e6da-n\u00e1tha has given the following distribution of things:--\n \"Those who know it have declared the principle to be\n twofold, substance and non-substance;\n \"Substance is dichotomised as unsentient and sentient; the\n former being the unevolved (_avyakta_), and time.\n \"The latter is the 'near' (_pratyak_) and the 'distant'\n (_par\u00e1k_); the 'near' being twofold, as either soul or the\n Lord;\n \"The 'distant' is eternal glory and intelligence; the other\n principle some have called the unsentient primary.\"\nOf these--\n \"Substance undergoes a plurality of conditions; the\n originant is possessed of goodness and the other cords;\n \"Time has the form of years, &c.; soul is atomic and\n cognisant; the other spirit is the Lord;\n \"Eternal bliss has been declared as transcending the three\n cords (or modes of phenomenal existence), and also as\n characterised by goodness;\n \"The cognisable manifestation of the cognisant is\n intelligence; thus are the characteristics of substance\n summarily recounted.\"\nOf these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, called\nsouls, are different from the Supreme Spirit and eternal. Thus the\ntext: Two birds, companions, friends, &c. (Rig-Veda, i. 164, 20).\nAccordingly it is stated (in the aphorisms of Ka\u1e47\u00e1da, iii. 2, 20),\nSouls are diverse by reason of diversity of conditions. The eternity\nof souls is often spoken of in revelation--\n \"The soul is neither born, nor dies, nor having been shall\n it again cease to be;\n \"Unborn, unchanging, eternal, this ancient of days is not\n killed when the body is killed\" (Bhagavad-g\u00edt\u00e1, ii. 20).\nOtherwise (were the soul not eternal) there would follow a failure of\nrequital and a fruition (of pleasures and pains) unmerited. It has\naccordingly been said (in the aphorisms of Gauta\u1e43a, iii. 25): Because\nno birth is seen of one who is devoid of desire. That the soul is\natomic is well known from revelation--\n \"If the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be divided a\n hundred times,\n \"The soul may be supposed a part of that, and yet it is\n capable of infinity.\"\nAnd again--\n \"Soul is of the size of the extremity of the spoke of a\n wheel. Spirit is to be recognised by the intelligence as\n atomic.\"\nThe visible, unsentient world, designated by the term not-soul, is\ndivided into three, as the object, the instrument, or the site of\nfruition. Of this world the efficient and substantial cause is the\nDeity, known under the names Purushottama (best of spirits), V\u00e1sudeva\n(a patronymic of K\u1e5bish\u1e47a), and the like.\n \"V\u00e1sudeva is the supreme absolute spirit, endowed with\n auspicious attributes,\n \"The substantial cause, the efficient of the worlds, the\n animator of spirits.\"\nThis same V\u00e1sudeva, infinitely compassionate, tender to those devoted\nto him, the Supreme Spirit, with the purpose of bestowing various\nrewards apportioned to the deserts of his votaries in consequence of\npastime, exists under five modes, distinguished as \"adoration\"\n(_arch\u00e1_), \"emanation\" (_vibhava_), \"manifestation\" (_vy\u00faha_), \"the\nsubtile\" (_s\u00fakshma_), and the \"internal controller.\" (1.) \"Adoration\"\nis images, and so forth. (2.) \"Emanation\" is his incarnation, as R\u00e1ma,\nand so forth. (3.) His \"manifestation\" is fourfold, as V\u00e1sudeva,\nSa\u1e45karsha\u1e47a, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. (4.) \"The subtile\" is the\nentire Supreme Spirit, with six attributes, called V\u00e1sudeva. His\nattributes are exemption from sin, and the rest. That he is exempt\nfrom sin is attested in the Vedic text: Passionless, deathless,\nwithout sorrow, without hunger, desiring truth, true in purpose. (5.)\nThe \"internal controller,\" the actuator of all spirits, according to\nthe text: Who abiding in the soul, rules the soul within. When by\nworshipping each former embodiment a mass of sins inimical to the end\nof the soul (_i.e._, emancipation) have been destroyed, the votary\nbecomes entitled to practise the worship of each latter embodiment. It\nhas, therefore, been said--\n \"V\u00e1sudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries, gives, as\n desired by each,\n \"According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, large\n recompense.\n \"For that end, in pastime he makes to himself his five\n embodiments;\n \"Images and the like are 'adoration;' his incarnations are\n 'emanations;'\n \"As Sa\u1e45karsha\u1e45a, V\u00e1sudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, his\n manifestation is to be known to be fourfold; 'the subtile'\n is the entire six attributes;\n \"That self-same called V\u00e1sudeva is styled the Supreme\n Spirit;\n \"The internal controller is declared as residing in the\n soul, the actuator of the soul,\n \"Described in a multitude of texts of the Upanishads, such\n as 'Who abiding in the soul.'\n \"By the worship of 'adoration,' a man casting off his\n defilement becomes a qualified votary;\n \"By the subsequent worship of 'emanation,' he becomes\n qualified for the worship of 'manifestation;' next,\n \"By the worship thereafter of 'the subtile,' he becomes able\n to behold the 'internal controller.'\"\nThe worship of the Deity is described in the Pa\u00f1cha-r\u00e1tra as\nconsisting of five elements, viz., (1.) the access, (2.) the\npreparation, (3.) oblation, (4.) recitation, (5.) devotion. Of these,\naccess is the sweeping, smearing, and so forth, of the way to the\ntemple. The preparation is the provision of perfumes, flowers, and the\nlike appliances of worship. Oblation is worship of the deities.\nRecitation is the muttered ejaculation of sacred texts, with attention\nto what they mean, the rehearsal of hymns and lauds of Vish\u1e47u, the\ncommemoration of his names, and study of institutes which set forth\nthe truth. Devotion is meditation on the Deity. When the vision of the\nvisible world has been brought to a close by knowledge accumulated by\nthe merit of such worship, the infinitely compassionate Supreme\nSpirit, tender to his votaries, bestows upon the votary devoted to his\nlord and absorbed in his lord, his own sphere infinite and endless,\nmarked by consciousness of being like him, from which there is no\nfuture return (to the sorrows of transmigratory existence). So the\ntraditionary text--\n \"When they have come to me, the high-souled no longer\n undergo future birth, a receptacle of pain, transitory,\n having attained to the supreme consummation.\n \"V\u00e1sudeva, having found his votary, bestows upon him his own\n mansion, blissful, undecaying, from whence there is no more\n return.\"\nAfter laying up all this in his heart, leaning upon the teaching of\nthe great Upanishad, and finding the gloss on the Ved\u00e1nta aphorisms by\nthe venerated Bodh\u00e1yanach\u00e1rya too prolix, R\u00e1m\u00e1nuja composed a\ncommentary on the \u015a\u00e1r\u00edrakam\u00edm\u00e1ns\u00e1 (or Ved\u00e1nta theosophy). In this the\nsense of the first aphorism, \"Then hence the absolute must be desired\nto be known,\" is given as follows:--The word _then_ in this aphorism\nmeans, after understanding the hitherto-current sacred rites. Thus the\nglossator writes: \"After learning the sacred rites,\" he desires to\nknow the absolute. The word _hence_ states the reason, viz., because\none who has read the Veda and its appendages and understands its\nmeaning is averse from sacred rites, their recompense being\nperishable. The wish to know the absolute springs up in one who longs\nfor permanent liberation, as being the means of such liberation. By\nthe word _absolute_ is designated the Supreme Spirit, from whom are\nessentially excluded all imperfections, who is of illimitable\nexcellence, and of innumerable auspicious attributes. Since then the\nknowledge of sacred rites and the performance of those rites is\nmediately through engendering dispassionateness, and through putting\naway the defilement of the understanding, an instrument of the\nknowledge of the absolute; and knowledge of sacred rites and knowledge\nof the absolute being consequently cause and effect, the former and\nthe latter M\u00edm\u00e1ns\u00e1 constitute one system of institutes. On this\naccount the glossator has described this system as one with the\nsixteenfold system of Jaimini. That the fruit of sacred rites is\nperishable, and that of the knowledge of the absolute imperishable,\nhas been laid down in virtue of Vedic texts, such as: Scanning the\nspheres gained by rites, let him become passionless; Not wrought by\nthe rite performed, accompanied with inference and disjunctive\nreasoning. Revelation, by censuring each when unaccompanied by the\nother, shows that it is knowledge together with works that is\nefficacious of emancipation, in the words: Blind darkness they enter\nwho prefer illusion, and a greater darkness still do they enter who\ndelight in knowledge only; knowledge and illusion, he who knows these\nboth, he passing beyond death together with illusion, tastes\nimmortality by knowledge. Conformably it is said in the\nPa\u00f1char\u00e1tra-rahasya--\n \"That ocean of compassion, the Lord, tender to his votaries,\n \"For his worshipper's sake takes five embodiments upon him.\n \"These are styled Adoration, Emanation, Manifestation, the\n Subtile, the Internal Controller,\n \"Resorting whereto souls attain to successive stages of\n knowledge.\n \"As a man's sins are worn away by each successive worship,\n \"He becomes qualified for the worship of each next\n embodiment.\n \"Thus day by day, according to religion, revealed and\n traditional,\n \"By the aforesaid worship V\u00e1sudeva becomes propitious to\n mankind.\n \"Hari, when propitiated by devotion in the form of\n meditation,\n \"At once brings to a close that illusion which is the\n aggregate of works.\n \"Then in souls the essential attributes, from which\n transmigration has vanished,\n \"Are manifested, auspicious, omniscience, and the rest.\n \"These qualities are common to the emancipated spirits and\n the Lord,\n \"Universal efficiency alone among them is peculiar to the\n Deity.\n \"Emancipated spirits are ulterior to the infinite absolute,\n which is unsusceptible of aught ulterior;\n \"They enjoy all beatitudes together with that Spirit.\"\nIt is therefore stated that those who suffer the three kinds of pain\nmust, for the attainment of immortality, investigate the absolute\nspirit known under such appellations as the Highest Being. According\nto the maxim: The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly,\nand of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead, the notion of\ndesire is predominant (in the word _jij\u00f1\u00e1sitavya_), and desired\nknowledge is the predicate (in the aphorism, Then hence the absolute\nmust be desired to be known). Knowledge is cognition designated by\nsuch terms as meditation, devotion; not the merely superficial\nknowledge derived from verbal communication, such being competent to\nany one who hears a number of words and understands the force of each,\neven without any predication; in conformity with such Vedic texts as:\nSelf indeed it is that is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to\nbe pondered; He should meditate that it is self alone; Having known,\nlet him acquire excellent wisdom; He should know that which is beyond\nknowledge. In these texts \"to be heard\" is explanatory, hearing being\nunderstood (but not enounced) in the text about sacred study (viz.,\n_sha\u1e0da\u1e45gena vedo'dhyeyo j\u00f1eya\u015bcha_, the Veda, with its six appendages,\nis to be studied and known); so that a man who has studied the Veda\nmust of his own accord, in acquiring the Veda and its appendages,\nengage in \"hearing,\" in order to ascertain the sense by examining it\nand the occasion of its enouncement. The term \"to be thought\" (or \"to\nbe inferred\") is also explanatory, cogitation (or inference) being\nunderstood as the complementary meaning of hearing, according to the\naphorism: Before its signification is attained the system is\nsignificant. Meditation is a reminiscence consisting of an unbroken\nsuccession of reminiscences like a stream of oil, it being revealed in\nthe text, in continuity of reminiscence there is a solution of all\nknots,--that it is unintermittent reminiscence that is the means of\nemancipation. And this reminiscence is tantamount to intuition.\n \"Cut is his heart's knot, solved are all his doubts,\n \"And exhausted are all his works, when he has seen the\n Highest and Lowest,\"\nbecause he becomes one with that Supreme. So also in the words, Self\nindeed is to be seen, it is predicated of this reminiscence that it is\nan intuition. Reminiscence becomes intuitional through the vivacity of\nthe representations. The author of the V\u00e1kya has treated of all this\nin detail in the passage beginning Cognition is meditation. The\ncharacters of this meditation are laid out in the text: This soul is\nnot attainable by exposition, nor by wisdom, nor by much learning;\nWhom God chooses by him God may be attained. To him this self unfolds\nits own nature. For it is that which is dearest which is\nchoice-worthy, and as the soul finds itself most dear, so the Lord is\nof Himself most dear, as was declared by the Lord Himself--\n \"To them always devoted, who worship me with love,\n \"I give the devotion of understanding whereby they come to\nAnd again--\n \"That Supreme Spirit, Arjuna, is attainable by faith\n unwavering.\"\nBut devotion (or faith) is a kind of cognition which admits no other\nmotive than the illimitable beatitude, and is free from all other\ndesires; and the attainment of this devotion is by discrimination and\nother means. As is said by the author of the V\u00e1kya: Attainment\nthereof results from discrimination (_viveka_), exemption (_vimoka_),\npractice (_abhy\u00e1sa_), observance (_kriy\u00e1_), excellence (_kaly\u00e1\u1e47a_),\nfreedom from despondency (_anavas\u00e1da_), satisfaction (_anuddharsha_),\naccording to the equivalence (of the definition), and the explication\n(of these terms). Of these means, discrimination is purity of nature,\nresultant from eating undefiled food, and the explication (of\ndiscrimination) is From purity of diet, purity of understanding, and\nby purity of understanding the unintermittent reminiscence. Exemption\nis non-attachment to sensuous desires; the explication being, Let the\nquietist meditate. Practice is reiteration; and of this a traditionary\nexplication is quoted (from the Bhagavad-g\u00edt\u00e1) by (R\u00e1m\u00e1nuja) the\nauthor of the commentary: For ever modified by the modes thereof.\nObservance is the performance of rites enjoined in revelation and\ntradition according to one's ability; the explication being (the Vedic\ntext), He who has performed rites is the best of those that know the\nsupreme. The excellences are veracity, integrity, clemency, charity\n(alms-giving), and the like; the explication being, It is attained by\nveracity. Freedom from despondency is the contrary of dejection; the\nexplication being, This soul is not attained by the faint-hearted.\nSatisfaction is the contentment which arises from the contrary of\ndejection; the explication being, Quiescent, self-subdued. It has thus\nbeen shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness has been\ndispelled by the grace of the Supreme Spirit, propitiated by certain\nrites and observances, which devotion is meditation transformed into a\npresentative manifestation of soul, without ulterior motive, as\nincessantly and illimitably desired, the sphere of the Supreme Spirit\n(Vaiku\u1e47\u1e6dha) is attained. Thus Y\u00e1muna says: Attainable by the final and\nabsolute devotion of faith in one internally purified by both (works\nand knowledge); that is, in one whose internal organ is rectified by\nthe devotion of works and knowledge.\nIn anticipation of the inquiry, But what absolute is to be desired to\nbe known? the definition is given (in the second aphorism). From which\nthe genesis, and so forth, of this. The genesis, and so forth, the\ncreation (emanation), sustentation, and retractation (of the\nuniverse). The purport of the aphorism is that the emanation,\nsustentation, and retractation of this universe, inconceivably\nmultiform in its structure, and interspersed with souls, from Brahm\u00e1\nto a tuft of grass, of determinate place, time, and fruition, is from\nthis same universal Lord, whose essence is contrary to all qualities\nwhich should be escaped from, of illimitable excellences, such as\nindefeasible volition, and of innumerable auspicious attributes,\nomniscient, and omnipotent.\nIn anticipation of the further inquiry, What proof is there of an\nabsolute of this nature? It is stated that the system of institutes\nitself is the evidence (in the third aphorism): Because it has its\nsource from the system. To have its source from the system is to be\nthat whereof the cause or evidence is the system. The system, then, is\nthe source (or evidence) of the absolute, as being the cause of\nknowing the self, which is the cause of knowing the absolute. Nor is\nthe suspicion possible that the absolute may be reached by some other\nform of evidence. For perception can have no conversancy about the\nabsolute since it is supersensible. Nor can inference, for the\nillation, the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, because it is an\neffect like a water-pot, is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin.\nIt is evinced that it is such texts as, Whence also these elements,\nthat prove the existence of the absolute thus described.\nThough the absolute (it may be objected) be unsusceptible of any other\nkind of proof, the system, did it not refer to activity and cessation\nof activity, could not posit the absolute aforesaid. To avoid by\nanticipation any queries on this point, it is stated (in the fourth\naphorism): But that is from the construction. This is intended to\nexclude the doubt anticipated. The evidence, then, of the system is\nthe only evidence that can be given of the absolute. Why? Because of\nthe construction, that is because the absolute, that is, the highest\nend for man, is construed as the subject (of the first aphorism, viz.,\nThen thence the absolute is to be desired to be known). Moreover, a\nsentence which has nothing to do either with activity or with\ncessation of activity is not therefore void of purpose, for we observe\nthat sentences merely declaratory of the nature of things, such as, A\nson is born to you, This is not a snake, convey a purpose, viz., the\ncessation of joy or of fear. Thus there is nothing unaccounted for. We\nhave here given only a general indication. The details may be learnt\nfrom the original (viz., R\u00e1m\u00e1nuja's Bh\u00e1shya on the Ved\u00e1nta aphorisms);\nwe therefore decline a further treatment, apprehensive of prolixity;\nand thus all is clear.[110]\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 107: Cf. \"The argument in defence of the Maxim of\nContradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular\nstatements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands\nand acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that,\nif you deny it, no speech is either significant or trustworthy to\ninform and guide those who hear it. You may cite innumerable examples\nboth of speech and action in the detail of life, which the\nHerakleitean must go through like other persons, and when, if he\nproceeded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive\ninformation by speech, nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he\ndeclares to co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly the Herakleitean\nKratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech,\nand simply pointed with his finger.\"--Grote's Aristotle, vol. ii. pp.\n[Footnote 108: Cf. the dictum of Herakleitus: Making worlds is Zeus's\npastime; and that of Plato (Laws, Book vii. p. 803): Man is made to be\nthe plaything of God.]\n[Footnote 109: \"Whose body nature is, and God the soul.\"--_Pope._]\n[Footnote 110: For further details respecting R\u00e1m\u00e1nuja and his system,\nsee Wilson's Works, vol. i. pp. 34-46; and Banerjea's Dialogues, ix.\nThe _Tattva-mukt\u00e1val\u00ed_ was printed in the _Pandit_ for September 1871;\nbut the lines quoted in p. 73 are not found there.]\nCHAPTER V.\nTHE SYSTEM OF PURNA-PRAJNA.\n\u00c1nanda-t\u00edrtha (P\u00far\u1e47a-praj\u00f1a, or Madhva) rejected this same R\u00e1m\u00e1nuja\nsystem, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size\nof the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda\nwithout any personal author, the authenticity of the Veda, the\nself-evidence of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences,\ndependency upon the Pa\u00f1cha-r\u00e1tra, the reality of plurality in the\nuniverse, and so forth,--yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to\nreciprocally contradictory divisions, &c., it coincides with the\ntenets of the Jainas. Showing that He is soul, That art thou, and a\nnumber of other texts of the Upanishads bear a different import under\na different explanation, he set up a new system under the guise of a\nnew explication of the Brahma-M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e47s\u00e1 (or Ved\u00e1nta).\nFor in his doctrine ultimate principles are dichotomised into\nindependent and dependent; as it is stated in the Tattva-viveka:--\n \"Independent and dependent, two principles are received;\n \"The independent is Vish\u1e47u the Lord, exempt from\n imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences.\"\nHere it will be urged (by the Advaita-v\u00e1dins): Why predicate of the\nabsolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the Upanishads,\nwhich lay down that the absolute principle is void of homogeneity and\nheterogeneity, and of all plurality in itself? To this be it replied: Not\nso, for these texts of the Upanishads, as contradictory of many proofs\npositive of duality, cannot afford proof of universal unity; perception,\nfor example, in the consciousness, This is different from that, pronounces\na difference between things, blue and yellow, and so forth. The opponent\nwill rejoin: Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional\ndifference, or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite?\nThe former alternative will not hold: for without a cognition of the thing\nand its opposite, the recognition of the difference, which presupposes\nsuch a cognition, will be impossible. On the latter alternative it must be\nasked, Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension\nof the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, its\ncontrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended? It cannot be\nthus preceded, for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or\nwithout successive steps), and there would also result a logical seesaw\n(apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and\nits contrary, and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing\napprehension of the difference). Nor can there be a simultaneous\napprehension (of the thing, its contrary, and the difference); for\ncognitions related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the\ncognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference;\nthe causal relation between the two being recognised by a concomitance and\nnon-concomitance (mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised\neven when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent\ncontrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the opponent\nconcludes), is not easily admissible. To this let the reply be as\nfollows:--Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a\ndifference identical with the things themselves, or against one who\nmaintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes? In\nthe former case, you will be, as the saying runs, punishing a respectable\nBr\u00e1hman for the offence of a thief, the objections you adduce being\nirrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is\nthe difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart; but\nif difference presuppose a contrary counterpart, it will exist everywhere;\nthis statement must be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing is\nfirst known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name\nand notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart; for\nexample, the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is\nfirst cognised, and afterwards it becomes the object of some determinate\njudgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or\ncontrasted object). Accordingly, it is said in the Vish\u1e47u-tattva-nir\u1e47aya:\n\"Difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and\ndeterminate; for this relation of determinant and determinate (or\npredicate and subject) presupposes difference; and if difference were\nproved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart, and the thing and its\ncounterpart to presuppose difference, difference as involving a logical\ncircle could not be accounted for; but difference is itself a real\npredicament (or ultimate entity). For this reason (viz., because\ndifference is a _thing_) it is that men in quest of a cow do not act (as\nif they had found her) when they see a gayal, and do not recall the word\n_cow_. Nor let it be objected that (if difference be a real entity and as\nsuch perceived) on seeing a mixture of milk and water, there would be a\npresentation of difference; for the absence of any manifestation of, and\njudgment about, the difference, may be accounted for by the force of (the\nsame) obstructives (as hinder the perception of other things), viz.,\naggregation of similars and the rest.\" Thus it has been said (in the\nS\u00e1\u1e45khya-k\u00e1rik\u00e1, v. vii.)--\n \"From too great remoteness, from too great nearness, from\n defect in the organs, from instability of the common\n sensory,\n \"From subtilty, from interposition, from being overpowered,\n and from aggregation of similars.\"\nThere is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak\nof a mountain, because of its too great remoteness; of collyrium\napplied to the eyes, and so forth, because of too great proximity; of\nlightning and the like, because of a defect in the organs; of a jar or\nthe like in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is bewildered\nby lust and other passions, because of instability of the common\nsensory; of an atom and the like, because of their subtility; of\nthings behind a wall, and so forth, because of interposition; of the\nlight of a lamp and the like, in the day-time, because of its being\noverpowered; of milk and water, because of the aggregation of\nsimilars.\nOr let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted, and no\nharm is done; for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes\nand of its contrary, the presentation of difference in their modes is\npossible. Nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference\nin the modes of things, as each difference must be different from some\nulterior difference, there will result an embarrassing progression to\ninfinity, there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said\nulterior difference, inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and\nsay that two things are different as differenced from the different.\nNor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference,\nfor there being no difference to serve as the example in such\ninference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference. And thus\nit must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a\nlittle oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil. If there be\nno difference for the example the inference cannot emerge. The bride\nis not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There being,\nthen, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite progression presents no\ntrouble.\nDifference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. Thus the\nSupreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its\nobedience; and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that\nperson, a king, for instance, from his attendant. For men, desiring\nas they do the end of man, Let me have pleasure, let me not have the\nslightest pain, if they covet the position of their lord, do not\nbecome objects of his favour, nay, rather, they become recipients of\nall kinds of evil. He who asserts his own inferiority and the\nexcellence of his superior, he it is who is to be commended; and the\ngratified superior grants his eulogist his desire. Therefore it has\nbeen said:--\n \"Kings destroy those who assert themselves to be kings,\n \"And grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre-eminence\n all that they desire.\"\nThus the statement of those (Advaita-v\u00e1dins) in their thirst to be one\nwith the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vish\u1e47u is like a\nmirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a\nfine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme Vish\u1e47u\nthey must enter into the hell of blind darkness (_andha-tamasa_). The same\nthing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the\nMah\u00e1bh\u00e1rata-t\u00e1tparya-nir\u1e47aya:--\n \"O Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Vish\u1e47u's anger is waxed\n great;\n \"He hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because they\n decide blindly.\"\nThis service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is trichotomised\ninto (1.) stigmatisation, (2.) imposition of names, (3.) worship.\nOf these, (1.) stigmatisation is (the branding upon oneself) of the\nweapons of N\u00e1r\u00e1ya\u1e47a (or Vish\u1e47u) as a memorial of him, and as a means\nof attaining the end which is needful (emancipation). Thus the sequel\nof the S\u00e1kalya-samhit\u00e1:--\n \"The man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal\n Vish\u1e47u, which is the might of the gods,\n \"He, shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven (Vaiku\u1e47\u1e6dha)\n which ascetics, whose desires are passed away, enter into:\n \"The discus Sudar\u015bana by which, uplifted in his arm, the\n gods entered that heaven;\n \"Marked wherewith the Manus projected the emanation of the\n world, that weapon Br\u00e1hmans wear (stamped upon them);\n \"Stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of\n Vish\u1e47u;\n \"Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Vish\u1e47u), let\n us become beatified.\"\nAgain, the Taittir\u00edyaka Upanishad says: \"He whose body is not branded,\nis raw, and tastes it not: votaries bearing it attain thereto.\" The\nparticular parts to be branded are specified in the \u00c1gneya-pur\u00e1\u1e47a:--\n \"On his right hand let the Br\u00e1hman wear Sudar\u015bana,\n \"On his left the conch-shell: thus have those who know the\n Veda declared.\"\nIn another passage is given the invocation to be recited on being\nbranded with the discus:--\n \"Sudar\u015bana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million suns,\n \"Show unto me, blind with ignorance, the everlasting way of\n Vish\u1e47u.\n \"Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in the\n hand of Vish\u1e47u,\n \"Adored by all the gods; O P\u00e1\u1e45chajanya, to thee be\n adoration.\"\n(2.) Imposition of names is the appellation of sons and others by such\nnames as Ke\u015bava, as a continual memorial of the name of the Supreme\nLord.\n(3.) Worship is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1.) veracity,\n(2.) usefulness, (3.) kindliness, (4.) sacred study; with the body,\n(5.) alms-giving, (6.) defence, (7.) protection; with the common\nsensory, (8.) mercy, (9.) longing, and (10.) faith. Worship is the\ndedication to N\u00e1r\u00e1ya\u1e47a of each of these as it is realised. Thus it has\nbeen said:--\n \"Stigmatisation, imposition of names, worship; the last is\n of ten kinds.\"\nDifference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the universe) may\nalso be inferred from cognisability and other marks. So also\ndifference (or duality) may be understood from revelation, from texts\nsetting out duality in emancipation and beatitude, such as: \"All\nrejoice over truth attained; truthful, and celebrating the gift of the\ndivine Indra, they recount his glory;\" \"Sarva, among those that know\nthe truth, O Br\u00e1hman, is in the universe, true spirit; true is\nindividual spirit; truth is duality, truth is duality, in me is\nillusion, in me illusion, in me illusion.\"\nAgain:--\n \"After attaining this knowledge, becoming like unto me,\n \"In creation they are not born again, in retractation they\n perish not\" (Bhagavad-g\u00edt\u00e1, xiv. 2).\nAccording also to such aphorisms as, \"Excepting cosmical operation\nbecause of occasion, and because of non-proximity.\"\nNor should suggestion be made that individual spirit is God in virtue\nof the text, He that knows the absolute becomes the absolute; for this\ntext is hyperbolically eulogistic, like the text, Worshipping a\nBr\u00e1hman devoutly a \u015a\u00fadra becomes a Br\u00e1hman, _i.e._, becomes exalted.\nIf any one urge that according to the text:--\n \"If the universe existed it would doubtless come to an end,\"\nthis duality is merely illusory, and in reality a unity, and that\nduality is learnt to be illusorily imagined; it may be replied: What\nyou say is true, but you do not understand its meaning; for the real\nmeaning is, If this world had been produced, it would, without doubt,\ncome to an end; therefore this universe is from everlasting, a\nfivefold dual universe; and it is not non-existent, because it is mere\nillusion. Illusion is defined to be the will of the Lord, in virtue\nof the testimony of many such passages as:--\n \"The great illusion, ignorance, necessity, the bewilderment,\n \"The originant, ideation,--thus is thy will called, O\n Infinite.\n \"The originant, because it originates greatly; ideation,\n because it produces ideas;\n \"The illusion of Hari, who is called _a_, is termed\n (_avidy\u00e1_) ignorance:\n \"Styled (_m\u00e1y\u00e1_) illusion, because it is pre-eminent, for\n the name _m\u00e1y\u00e1_ is used of the pre-eminent;\n \"The excellent knowledge of Vish\u1e47u is called, though one\n only, by these names;\n \"For Hari is excellent knowledge, and this is characterised\n by spontaneous beatitude.\"\nThat in which this excellent knowledge produces knowledge and effects\nsustentation thereof, that is pure illusion, as known and sustained,\ntherefore by the Supreme Lord duality is not illusorily imagined. For\nin the Lord illusory imagination of the universe is not possible,\nillusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences (which\nas an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine nature).\nIf it be asked how then that (illusory duality) is predicated, the\nanswer is that in reality there is a non-duality, that is in reality,\nVish\u1e47u being better than all else, has no equal and no superior.\nAccordingly, the grand revelation:--\n \"A difference between soul and the Lord, a difference\n between the unsentient and the Lord,\n \"A difference among souls, and a difference of the\n unsentient and the soul each from the other.\n \"Also the difference of unsentient things from one another,\n the world with its five divisions.\n \"This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had a\n beginning it would have an end:\n \"Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not\n illusorily imagined:\n \"For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never\n ceases.\n \"That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those\n that lack knowledge;\n \"For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known\n and sustained by Vish\u1e47u.\"\nThe purpose, then, of all revelations is to set out the supreme\nexcellence of Vish\u1e47u. With this in view the Lord declared:--\n \"Two are these persons in the universe, the perishable and\n the imperishable;\n \"The perishable is all the elements, the imperishable is the\n unmodified.\n \"The other, the most excellent person, called the Supreme\n Spirit,\n \"Is the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the three\n worlds.\n \"Since transcending the perishable, I am more excellent than\n the imperishable (soul),\n \"Hence I am celebrated among men and in the Veda as the best\n of persons (_Purushottama_);\n \"He who uninfatuated knows me thus the best of persons, he\n all-knowing worships me in every wise.\n \"Thus this most mysterious institute is declared, blameless\n (Arjuna):\n \"Knowing this a man may be wise, and may have done what he\n has to do, O Bh\u00e1rata\" (Bhagavad-g\u00edt\u00e1, xv. 16-20).\nSo in the Mah\u00e1-var\u00e1ha--\n \"The primary purport of all the Vedas relates to the supreme\n spouse of \u015ar\u012b;\n \"Its purport regarding the excellence of any other deity\n must be subordinate.\"\nIt is reasonable that the primary purport should regard the supreme\nexcellence of Vish\u1e47u. For emancipation is the highest end of all men,\naccording to the text of the Bh\u00e1llaveya Upanishad: While merit,\nwealth, and enjoyment are transitory, emancipation is eternal;\ntherefore a wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto. And\nemancipation is not won without the grace of Vish\u1e47u, according to the\ntext of the N\u00e1r\u00e1ya\u1e47a Upanishad: Through whose grace is the highest\nstate, through whose essence he is liberated from transmigration,\nwhile inferior men propitiating the divinities are not emancipated;\nthe supreme object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated\nfrom this snare of works. According also to the words of the\nVish\u1e47u-pur\u00e1\u1e47a--\n\"If he be propitiated, what may not here be won? Enough of all wealth\nand enjoyments. These are scanty enough. On climbing the tree of the\nsupreme essence, without doubt a man attains to the fruit of\nemancipation.\"\nAnd it is declared that the grace of Vish\u1e47u is won only through the\nknowledge of his excellence, not through the knowledge of non-duality.\nNor is there in this doctrine any confliction with texts declaratory\nof the identity (of personal and impersonal spirit) such as, That art\nthou (for this pretended identity) is mere babbling from ignorance of\nthe real purport.\n \"The word That, when undetermined, designates the eternally\n unknown,\n \"The word Thou designates a knowable entity; how can these\nAnd this text (That art thou) indicates similarity (not identity) like\nthe text, The sun is the sacrificial post. Thus the grand\nrevelation:--\n \"The ultimate unity of the individual soul is either\n similarity of cognition,\n \"Or entrance into the same place, or in relation to the\n place of the individual;\n \"Not essential unity, for even when it is emancipated it is\n different,\n \"The difference being independence and completeness (in the\n Supreme Spirit), and smallness and dependence (in the\n individual spirit).\"\nOr to propose another explanation of the text, _\u00c1tm\u00e1 tat tvam asi_,\nThat art thou, it may be divided, _\u00e1tm\u00e1 tat tvam asi_. He alone is\nsoul as possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art\nnot-that (_atat_) as wanting those attributes; and thus the doctrine\nof unity is utterly expelled. Thus it has been said:--\n \"Or the division may be _Atat tvam_, and thus unity will be\n well got rid of.\"\nAccording, therefore, to the Tattva-v\u00e1da-rahasya, the words in the\nnine examples (in the Chh\u00e1ndogya Upanishad), He like a bird tied with\na string, &c., teach unity with the view of giving an example of\nnon-duality. Accordingly the Mahopanishad:--\n \"Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various\n trees;\n \"Like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water;\n \"Like a robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy;\n \"So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different.\n \"Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of form,\n the supreme Hari\n \"Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the\n individual spirit, though he is its actuator;\n \"On knowing their diversity a man is emancipated: otherwise\n he is bound.\"\nAnd again--\n \"Brahm\u00e1, \u015aiva, and the greatest of the gods decay with the\n decay of their bodies;\n \"Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is\n for the sustentation of Lakshm\u00ed.\n \"By reason of all his attributes, independence, power,\n knowledge, pleasure, and the rest,\n \"All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to\nAnd again:--\n \"Knowing Vish\u1e47u, full of all excellences, the soul, exempted\n from transmigration,\n \"Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss.\n \"Vish\u1e47u is the refuge of liberated souls, and their supreme\n ruler.\n \"Obedient to him are they for ever; he is the Lord.\"\nThat by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be\nevinced from its supremacy and causality, not from the falsity of all\nthings. For knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by\nknowledge of real existence. As we see the current assurance and\nexpression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is\nknown or not known; and as when the father the cause is known, a man\nknows the son; (so by knowing the supreme and the cause, the inferior\nand the effect is known). Otherwise (on the doctrine of the\nAdvaita-v\u00e1dins that the world is false and illusory) the words _one_\nand _lump_ in the text, By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is\nmade of clay is recognised, would be used to no purpose, for the text\nmust be completed by supplying the words, By reason of clay\nrecognised. For the text, Utterance with the voice, modification,\nname, clay (or other determinate object),--these alone are real,\ncannot be assumed to impart the falsity of things made; the reality of\nthese being admitted, for what is meant is, that of which utterance\nwith the voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name\nsuch as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise it would result that the\nwords _name_ and _alone_ would be otiose. There is no proof anywhere,\nthen, that the world is unreal. Besides (we would ask) is the\nstatement that the world is false itself true or false. If the\nstatement is true, there is a violation of a real non-duality. If the\nstatement is untrue, it follows that the world is true.\nPerhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious\nreasoning, like the dilemma: Is transitoriness permanent or\ntransitory? There is a difficulty in either case. As it is said by the\nauthor of the Ny\u00e1ya-nirv\u00e1\u1e47a: The proof of the permanence of the\ntransitory, as being both permanent and transitory, is a paralogism.\nAnd in the T\u00e1rkika-raksh\u00e1--\n \"When a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such,\n or not such and such,\n \"The denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is\n called Nitya-sama.\"\nWith the implied mention of this same technical expression it is\nstated in the Prabodha-siddhi: Equality of characteristic modes\nresults from significancy. If it be said, This then is a valid\nrejoinder, we reply, This is a mere scaring of the uninstructed, for\nthe source of fallacy has not been pointed out. This is twofold,\ngeneral and particular: of these, the former is self-destructive, and\nthe latter is of three kinds, defect of a requisite element, excess of\nan element not requisite, and residence in that which is not the\nsubjicible subject. Of these (two forms of the fallacy), the general\nform is not suspected, no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma\nin question (viz., Is the statement that the world is unreal itself\ntrue or false? &c.) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar be\nsaid to be non-existent, the affirmation of its non-existence is\nequally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence.\nIf you reply: We accept the unreality (or falsity) of the world, not\nits non-existence; this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the\ncarter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of\nmoney, but will at once give five score; for falsity and non-existence\nare synonymous. We dismiss further prolixity.\nThe meaning of the first aphorism, viz., Then hence the absolute is to\nbe desired to be known, is as follows:--The word _then_ is allowed to\npurport auspiciousness, and to designate subsequency to the\nqualification (of the aspirant). The word _hence_ indicates a reason.\nAccordingly it is stated in the G\u00e1ru\u1e0da-pur\u00e1\u1e47a:--\n \"All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and Hence\n regularly; what then is the reason of this?\n \"And what is the sense of those words, O sage? Why are those\n the most excellent?\n \"Tell me this, Brahm\u00e1, that I may know it truly.\"\nThus addressed by N\u00e1rada, the most excellent Brahm\u00e1 replied:--\n \"The word Then is used of subsequency and of competency, and\n in an auspicious sense,\n \"And the word Thence is employed to indicate the reason.\"\nIt is laid down that we must institute inquiries about the absolute,\nbecause emancipation is not attained without the grace of N\u00e1r\u00e1yana,\nand his grace is not attained without knowledge. The absolute, about\nwhich the inquiry is to be instituted, is described in the words (of\nthe second aphorism): From which the genesis, and so forth, of this.\nThe meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which\nresult emanation, sustentation, and retractation; according to the\nwords of the Skanda-pur\u00e1\u1e47a--\n \"He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are\n emanation, sustentation, retractation, necessity, knowledge,\n involution (in illusion), and bondage and liberation;\"\nand according to such Vedic texts, From which are these. The evidence\nadducible for this is described (in the third aphorism): Because it\nhas its source from the system. That the absolute should be reached by\nway of inference is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the\nVeda cogitates not that mighty one; Him described in the Upanishads.\nInference, moreover, is not by itself authoritative, as is said in the\nKaurma-pur\u00e1\u1e47a--\n \"Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case\n \"Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form of\n evidence;\n \"Whatsoever other form of evidence, companioned by\n revelation and tradition,\n \"Acquires the rank of probation, about this there can be no\n hesitation.\"\nWhat a \u015a\u00e1stra (or system of sacred institutes) is, has been stated in\nthe Skanda-pur\u00e1\u1e47a:--\n \"The Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the S\u00e1ma-veda, the\n Atharva-veda, the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1rata, the Pa\u00f1cha-r\u00e1tra, and the\n original R\u00e1m\u00e1ya\u1e47a, are called \u015a\u00e1stras.\n \"That also which is conformable to these is called \u015a\u00e1stra.\n \"Any aggregate of composition other than this is a\n heterodoxy.\"\nAccording, then, to the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes\nis not to be taken from other sources than these, the Monist view,\nviz., that the purport of the texts of the Veda relates not to the\nduality learnt from those but to non-duality, is rejected: for as\nthere is no proof of a God from inference, so there is no proof of the\nduality between God and other things from inference. Therefore there\ncan be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, and the\ntexts must be understood to indicate the duality. Hence it is that it\nhas said:--\n \"I ever laud N\u00e1r\u00e1ya\u1e47a, the one being to be known from\n genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable and the\n imperishable, without imperfections, and of inexhaustible\n excellences.\"\nIt has thus been evinced that the sacred institutes are the evidence\nof (the existence of) this (ultimate reality, _Brahman_). (The fourth\naphorism is): But that is from the construction. In regard to this,\nthe commencement and other elements are stated to be the marks of the\nconstruction, in the B\u1e5bihat-sa\u1e43hit\u00e1:--\n \"Commencement, conclusion, reiteration, novelty, profit,\n eulogy, and demonstration, are the marks by which the\n purport is ascertained.\"\nIt is thus stated that in accordance with the purport of the\nUpanishads the absolute is to be apprehended only from the sacred\ninstitutes. We have here given merely a general indication. What\nremains may be sought from the \u00c1nandat\u00edrtha-bh\u00e1shya-vy\u00e1khy\u00e1na (or\nexposition of the Commentary of \u00c1nanda-t\u00edrtha). We desist for fear of\ngiving an undue prolixity to our treatise. This mystery was\npromulgated by P\u00far\u1e47a-praj\u00f1a Madhya-mandira, who esteemed himself the\nthird incarnation of V\u00e1yu:--\n \"The first was Hanumat, the second Bh\u00edma,\n \"The third P\u00far\u1e47a-praj\u00f1a, the worker of the work of the\nAfter expressing the same idea in various passages, he has written the\nfollowing stanza at the conclusion of his work:--\n \"That whereof the three divine forms are declared in the\n text of the Veda, sufficiently\n \"Has that been set forth; this is the whole majesty in the\n splendour of the Veda;\n \"The first incarnation of the Wind-god was he that bowed to\n the words of R\u00e1ma (Hanumat); the second was Bh\u00edma;\n \"By this Madhva, who is the third, this book has been\n composed in regard to Ke\u015bava.\"\nThe import of this stanza may be learnt by considering various Vedic\ntexts.\nThe purport of this is that Vish\u1e47u is the principle above all others\nin every system of sacred institutes. Thus all is clear.[111]\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 111: For a further account of \u00c1nanda-t\u00edrtha or Madhva see\nWilson, Works, vol. i. pp. 138-150. His Commentary on the\nBrahma-s\u00fatras has been printed in Calcutta.]\nCHAPTER VI.\nTHE P\u00c1\u015aUPATA SYSTEM OF NAKUL\u00cd\u015aA.\nCertain M\u00e1he\u015bvaras disapprove of this doctrine of the Vaish\u1e47avas known\nby its technicalities of the servitude of souls and the like, inasmuch\nas bringing with it the pains of dependence upon another, it cannot be\na means of cessation of pain and other desired ends. They recognise as\nstringent such arguments as, Those depending on another and longing\nfor independence do not become emancipated, because they still depend\nupon another, being destitute of independence like ourselves and\nothers; and, Liberated spirits possess the attributes of the Supreme\nDeity, because at the same time, that they are spirits they are free\nfrom the germ of every pain as the Supreme Deity is. Recognising these\narguments, these M\u00e1he\u015bvaras adopt the P\u00e1\u015bupata system, which is\nconversant about the exposition of five categories, as the means to\nthe highest end of man. In this system the first aphorism is: Now then\nwe shall expound the P\u00e1\u015bupata union and rites of Pa\u015bupati. The meaning\nis as follows:--The word _now_ refers to something antecedent, and\nthis something antecedent is the disciple's interrogation of the\nspiritual teacher. The nature of a spiritual teacher is explicated in\nthe Ga\u1e47ak\u00e1rik\u00e1:--\n \"But there are eight pentads to be known, and a group, one\n with three factors;\n \"He that knows this ninefold aggregate is a self-purifier, a\n spiritual guide.\n \"The acquisitions, the impurities, the expedients, the\n localities, the perseverance, the purifications,\n \"The initiations, and the powers, are the eight pentads; and\n there are three functions.\"\nThe employment in the above line of the neuter numeral three\n(_tr\u00ed\u1e47i_), instead of the feminine three (_tisra\u1e25_), is a Vedic\nconstruction.\n(_a._) Acquisition is the fruit of an expedient while realising, and\nis divided into five members, viz., knowledge, penance, permanence of\nthe body, constancy, and purity. Thus Haradatt\u00e1ch\u00e1rya says: Knowledge,\npenance, permanence, constancy, and purity as the fifth.\n(_b._) Impurity is an evil condition pertaining to the soul. This is\nof five kinds, false conception and the rest. Thus Haradatta also\nsays:--\n \"False conception, demerit, attachment, interestedness, and\n falling,\n \"These five, the root of bondage, are in this system\n especially to be shunned.\"\n(_c._) An expedient is a means of purifying the aspirant to\nliberation.\nThese expedients are of five kinds, use of habitation, and the rest.\nThus he also says:--\n \"Use of habitation, pious muttering, meditation, constant\n recollection of Rudra,\n \"And apprehension, are determined to be the five expedients\n of acquirements.\"\n(_d._) Locality is that by which, after studying the categories, the\naspirant attains increase of knowledge and austerity, viz., spiritual\nteachers and the rest. Thus he says:--\n \"The spiritual teachers, a cavern, a special place, the\n burning-ground, and Rudra only.\"\n(_e._) Perseverance is the endurance in one or other of these pentads\nuntil the attainment of the desired end, and is distributed into the\ndifferenced and the rest. Thus it is said:--\n \"The differenced, the undifferenced, muttering, acceptance,\n and devotion as the fifth.\"\n(_f._) Purification is the putting away, once for all, of false\nconception and the other four impurities. It is distributed into five\nspecies according to the five things to be put away. Thus it is said--\n \"The loss of ignorance, of demerit, of attachment, of\n interestedness,\n \"And of falling, is declared to be the fivefold purification\n of the state of bondage.\"\n(_g._) The five initiations are thus enumerated:--\n \"The material, the proper time, the rite, the image, and the\n spiritual guide as the fifth.\"\n(_h._) The five powers are as follow:--\n \"Devotion to the spiritual guide, clearness of intellect,\n conquest of pleasure and pain,\n \"Merit and carefulness, are declared the five heads of\n power.\"\nThe three functions are the modes of earning daily food consistent\nwith propriety, for the diminution of the five impurities, viz.,\nmendicancy, living upon alms, and living upon what chance supplies.\nAll the rest is to be found in the standard words of this sect.\nIn the first aphorism above recited, the word _now_ serves to\nintroduce the exposition of the termination of pain (or emancipation),\nthat being the object of the interrogation about the putting away of\npain personal, physical, and hyperphysical. By the word _pa\u015bu_ we are\nto understand the effect (or created world), the word designating that\nwhich is dependent on something ulterior. By the word _pati_ we are to\nunderstand the cause (or _principium_), the word designating the Lord,\nwho is the cause of the universe, the _pati_, or ruler. The meaning of\nthe words sacrifices and rites every one knows.\nIn this system the cessation of pain is of two kinds, impersonal and\npersonal. Of these, the impersonal consists in the absolute\nextirpation of all pains; the personal in supremacy consisting of the\nvisual and active powers. Of these two powers the visual, while only\none power, is, according to its diversity of objects, indirectly\ndescribable as of five kinds, vision, audition, cogitation,\ndiscrimination, and omniscience. Of these five, vision is cognition of\nevery kind of visual, tactual, and other sensible objects, though\nimperceptible, intercepted, or remote. Audition is cognition of\nprinciples, conversant about all articulate sounds. Cogitation is\ncognition of principles, conversant about all kinds of thoughts.\nDiscrimination is cognition of principles conversant about the whole\nsystem of institutes, according to the text and according to its\nsignificance. Omniscience is cognition of principles ever arising and\npervaded by truth, relative to all matters declared or not declared,\nsummary or in detail, classified and specialised. Such is this\nintellectual power.\nThe active power, though one only, is indirectly describable as of\nthree kinds, the possession of the swiftness of thought, the power of\nassuming forms at will, and the faculty of expatiation. Of these, the\npossession of the swiftness of thought is ability to act with\nunsurpassable celerity. The power of assuming forms at will is the\nfaculty of employing at pleasure, and irrespective of the efficacy of\nworks, the organs similar and dissimilar of an infinity of organisms.\nThe faculty of expatiation is the possession of transcendent supremacy\neven when such organs are not employed. Such is this active power.\nAll that is effected or educed, depending on something ulterior, it is\nthreefold, sentiency, the insentient, and the sentient. Of these,\nsentiency is the attribute of the sentients. It is of two degrees\naccording to its nature as cognitive or incognitive. Cognitive\nsentiency is dichotomised as proceeding discriminately and as\nproceeding indiscriminately. The discriminate procedure, manifestable\nby the instruments of knowledge, is called the cogitative. For by the\ncogitant organ every sentient being is cognisant of objects in\ngeneral, discriminated or not discriminated, when irradiated by the\nlight which is identical with the external things. The incognitive\nsentiency, again, is either characterised or not characterised by the\nobjects of the sentient soul.\nThe insentient, which while unconscious is dependent on the conscious,\nis of two kinds, as styled the effect and as styled the cause. The\ninsentient, styled the effect, is of ten kinds, viz., the earth and\nthe other four elements, and their qualities, colour, and the rest.\nThe insentient, called the causal insentient, is of thirteen kinds,\nviz., the five organs of cognition, the five organs of action, and the\nthree internal organs, intellect, the egoising principle, and the\ncogitant principle, which have for their respective functions\nascertainment, the illusive identification of self with not-self, and\ndetermination.\nThe sentient spirit, that to which transmigratory conditions pertain,\nis also of two kinds, the appetent and non-appetent. The appetent is\nthe spirit associated with an organism and organs; the non-appetent is\nthe spirit apart from organism and organs. The details of all this are\nto be found in the Pa\u00f1ch\u00e1rtha-bh\u00e1shyad\u00edpik\u00e1 and other works. The cause\nis that which retracts into itself and evolves the whole creation.\nThis though one is said to be divided according to a difference of\nattributes and actions (into Mahe\u015bvara, Vish\u1e47u, &c.) The Lord is the\npossessor of infinite, visual, and active power. He is absolutely\nfirst as connected eternally with this lordship or supremacy, as\npossessing a supremacy not adventitious or contingent. This is\nexpounded by the author of the \u00c1dar\u015ba, and other institutional\nauthorities.\nUnion is a conjunction of the soul with God through the intellect, and\nis of two degrees, that characterised by action, and that\ncharacterised by cessation of action. Of these, union characterised by\naction consists of pious muttering, meditation, and so forth; union\ncharacterised by cessation of action is called consciousness, &c.\nRite or ritual is activity efficacious of merit as its end. It is of\ntwo orders, the principal and the subsidiary. Of these, the principal\nis the direct means of merit, religious exercise. Religious exercise\nis of two kinds, acts of piety and postures. The acts of piety are\nbathing with sand, lying upon sand, oblations, mutterings, and\ndevotional perambulation. Thus the revered Nakul\u00ed\u015ba says:--\n \"He should bathe thrice a day, he should lie upon the dust.\n Oblation is an observance divided into six members.\"\nThus the author of the aphorisms says:--\n \"He should worship with the six kinds of oblations, viz.,\n laughter, song, dance, muttering _hum_, adoration, and pious\n ejaculation.\"\nLaughter is a loud laugh, Aha, Aha, by dilatation of the throat and\nlips. Song is a celebration of the qualities, glories, &c., of\nMahe\u015bvara, according to the conventions of the Gandharva-\u015b\u00e1stra, or\nart of music. The dance also is to be employed according to the _ars\nsaltatoria_, accompanied with gesticulations with hands and feet, and\nwith motions of the limbs, and with outward indications of internal\nsentiment. The ejaculation _hum_ is a sacred utterance, like the\nbellowing of a bull, accomplished by a contact of the tongue with the\npalate, an imitation of the sound _hudung_, ascribed to a bull, like\nthe exclamation Vashat. Where the uninitiated are, all this should be\ngone through in secret. Other details are too familiar to require\nexposition.\nThe postures are snoring, trembling, limping, wooing, acting absurdly,\ntalking nonsensically. Snoring is showing all the signs of being\nasleep while really awake. Trembling is a convulsive movement of the\njoints as if under an attack of rheumatism. Limping is walking as if\nthe legs were disabled. Wooing is simulating the gestures of an\n_innamorato_ on seeing a young and pretty woman. Acting absurdly is\ndoing acts which every one dislikes, as if bereft of all sense of what\nshould and what should not be done. Talking nonsensically is the\nutterance of words which contradict each other, or which have no\nmeaning, and the like.\nThe subsidiary religious exercise is purificatory subsequent ablution\nfor putting an end to the sense of unfitness from begging, living on\nbroken food, &c. Thus it is said by the author of the aphorisms:\nBearing the marks of purity by after-bathing.\n(It has been stated above that omniscience, a form of the cognitive\npower, is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth,\nrelative to all matters declared or not declared, summary, or in\ndetail). The summary is the enouncement of the subjects of attributes\ngenerally. This is accomplished in the first aphorism: (Now then we\nshall expound the P\u00e1\u015bupata union and rites of Pa\u015bupati). Detail is the\nfivefold enouncement of the five categories according to the\ninstruments of true knowledge. This is to be found in the\nR\u00e1\u015b\u00edkara-bh\u00e1shya. Distribution is the distinct enouncement of these\ncategories, as far as possible according to definitions. It is an\nenumeration of these according to their prevailing characters,\ndifferent from that of other recognised systems. For example, the\ncessation of pain (or emancipation) is in other systems (as in the\nS\u0101nkhya) the mere termination of miseries, but in this system it is\nthe attainment of supremacy or of the divine perfections. In other\nsystems the create is that which has become, and that which shall\nbecome, but in this system it is eternal, the spirits, and so forth,\nthe sentient and insentient. In other systems the _principium_ is\ndetermined in its evolution or creative activity by the efficacy of\nworks, whereas in this system the _principium_ is the Lord not thus\ndetermined. In other institutes union results in isolation, &c., while\nin these institutes it results in cessation of pains by attainment of\nthe divine perfections. In other systems paradise and similar spheres\ninvolve a return to metempsychosis, but in this system they result in\nnearness to the Supreme Being, either followed or not followed by\nsuch return to transmigratory experiences.\nGreat, indeed, an opponent may say, is this aggregate of illusions,\nsince if God's causality be irrespective of the efficacy of works,\nthen merits will be fruitless, and all created things will be\nsimultaneously evolved (there being no reason why this should be\ncreated at one time, and that at another), and thus there will emerge\ntwo difficulties. Think not so, replies the P\u00e1\u015bupata, for your\nsupposition is baseless. If the Lord, irrespective of the efficacy of\nworks, be the cause of all, and thus the efficacy of works be without\nresults, what follows? If you rejoin that an absence of motives will\nfollow, in whom, we ask, will this absence of motives follow? If the\nefficacy of works be without result, will causality belong to the doer\nof the works as to the Lord? It cannot belong to the doer of the\nworks, for it is allowed that the efficacy of works is fruitful only\nwhen furthered by the will of the creator, and the efficacy so\nfurthered may sometimes be fruitless, as in the case of the works of\nYay\u00e1ti, and others. From this it will by no means follow that no one\nwill engage in works, for they will engage in them as the husbandman\nengages in husbandry, though the crop be uncertain. Again, sentient\ncreatures engage in works because they depend on the will of the\ncreator. Nor does the causality pertain to the Lord alone, for as all\nhis desires are already satisfied, he cannot be actuated by motives to\nbe realised by works. As for your statement, continues the P\u00e1\u015bupata,\nthat all things will be simultaneously evolved, this is unreasonable,\ninasmuch as we hold that causal efficiency resides in the unobstructed\nactive power which conforms itself to the will of the Lord, whose\npower is inconceivable. It has accordingly been said by those versed\nin sacred tradition:--\n \"Since he, acting according to his will, is not actuated by\n the efficacy of works,\n \"For this reason is he in this system the cause of all\n causes.\"\nSome one may urge: In another system emancipation is attained through\na knowledge of God, where does the difference lie? Say not so, replies\nthe P\u00e1\u015bupata, for you will be caught in a trilemma. Is the mere\nknowledge of God the cause of emancipation, or the presentation, or\nthe accurate characterisation, of God? Not the mere knowledge, for\nthen it would follow that the study of any system would be\nsuperfluous, inasmuch as without any institutional system one might,\nlike the uninstructed, attain emancipation by the bare cognition that\nMah\u00e1deva is the lord of the gods. Nor is presentation or intuition of\nthe deity the cause of emancipation, for no intuition of the deity is\ncompetent to sentient creatures burdened with an accumulation of\nvarious impurities, and able to see only with the eyes of the flesh.\nOn the third alternative, viz., that the cause of emancipation is an\naccurate characterisation of the deity, you will be obliged to consent\nto our doctrine, inasmuch as such accurate characterisation cannot be\nrealised apart from the system of the P\u00e1\u015bupatas. Therefore it is that\nour great teacher has said:--\n \"If by mere knowledge, it is not according to any system,\n but intuition is unattainable;\n \"There is no accurate characterisation of principles\n otherwise than by the five categories.\"\nTherefore those excellent persons who aspire to the highest end of man\nmust adopt the system of the P\u00e1\u015bupatas, which undertakes the\nexposition of the five categories.\nCHAPTER VII.\nTHE \u015aAIVA-DAR\u015aANA.\n[The seventh system in M\u00e1dhava's Sarva-dar\u015bana-sa\u1e45graha is the\n\u015aaiva-dar\u015bana. This sect is very prevalent in the South of India,\nespecially in the Tamil country; it is said to have arisen there about\nthe eleventh century A.D. Several valuable contributions have been\nlately made to our knowledge of its tenets in the publications of the\nRev. H. R. Hoisington and the Rev. T. Foulkes. The former especially,\nby his excellent articles in the American Oriental Society's Journal,\nhas performed a great service to the students of Hindu philosophy. He\nhas there translated the Tattuva-Ka\u1e6d\u1e6dalei, or law of the Tattwas, the\n\u015aiva-Gn\u00e1napotham, or instruction in the knowledge of God, and the\n\u015aiva-Pirak\u00e1sam, or light of \u015aiva, and the three works shed immense\nlight on the outline as given by M\u00e1dhava. One great use of the latter\nis to enable us to recognise the original Sanskrit names in their\nTamil disguise, no easy matter occasionally, as _a\u1e5bul_ for _anugraha_\nand _t\u00ed\u1e0dchei_ for _d\u00edksh\u00e1_ may testify.\nThe \u015aaivas have considerable resemblance to the Theistic S\u00e1nkhya; they\nhold that God, souls, and matter are from eternity distinct entities,\nand the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and\ngradually to unite it to God. \u015aiva is the chief deity of the system,\nand the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the\nallegory of a beast, its fetters, and its owner. Pa\u015bupati is a\nwell-known name of \u015aiva, as the master or creator of all things.\nThere seem to be three different sets of so-called Saiva s\u00fatras. One is in\nfive books, called by Colebrooke the Pa\u015bupati-\u015b\u00e1stra, which is probably\nthe work quoted by M\u00e1dhava in his account of the Nakul\u00ed\u015ba P\u00e1\u015bupatas;\nanother is in three books, with a commentary by Kshemar\u00e1ja, with its first\ns\u00fatra, _cha\u00edtanyam \u00e1tm\u00e1_. The third was commented on by Abhinava-gupta,\nand opens with the \u015bloka given in the Sarva-Dar\u015bana-Sa\u1e45graha, p. 91, lines\n1-4. The MS. which I consulted in Calcutta read the first words--\n _Katha\u00f1chid \u00e1s\u00e1dya Mahe\u015bvarasya d\u00e1syam._\nNone of these works, however, appear to be the authority of the\npresent sect. They seem chiefly to have relied on the twenty-eight\n\u00c1gamas and some of the Pur\u00e1\u1e47as. A list of the \u00c1gamas is given in Mr.\nFoulkes' \"Catechism of the \u015aaiva Religion;\" and of these the Kira\u1e47a\nand Kara\u1e47a are quoted in the following treatise.]\nTHE \u015aAIVA-DAR\u015aANA.\nCertain, however, of the M\u00e1he\u015bvara sect receiving the system of truth\nauthoritatively laid down in the \u015aaiva \u00c1gama,[112] reject the\nforegoing opinion that \"the Supreme Being is a cause as independent of\nour actions, &c.,\" on the ground of its being liable to the imputation\nof partiality and cruelty. They, on the contrary, hold the opinion\nthat \"the Supreme Being is a cause in dependence on our actions, &c.;\"\nand they maintain that there are three categories distinguished as the\nLord, the soul, and the world (or literally \"the master,\" \"the\ncattle,\" and \"the fetter\"). As has been said by those well versed in\nthe Tantra doctrines--\n \"The Guru of the world, having first condensed in one s\u00fatra\n the great tantra, possessed of three categories and four\n feet, has again declared the same at full length.\"\nThe meaning of this is as follows:--Its three categories are the three\nbefore mentioned; its four feet are learning, ceremonial action,\nmeditation, and morality, hence it is called the great Tantra,\npossessed of three categories and four feet. Now the \"souls\" are not\nindependent, and the \"fetters\" are unintelligent, hence the Lord, as\nbeing different from these, is first declared; next follows the\naccount of the souls as they agree with him in possessing\nintelligence; lastly follow the \"fetters\" or matter, such is the order\nof the arrangement.[113] Since the ceremony of initiation is the means\nto the highest human end, and this cannot be accomplished without\nknowledge which establishes the undoubted greatness of the hymns, the\nLords of the hymns, &c., and is a means for the ascertainment of the\nreal nature of the \"cattle,\" the \"fetter,\" and the \"master,\" we place\nas first the \"foot\" of _knowledge_ (_j\u00f1\u00e1na_) which makes known all\nthis unto us.[114] Next follows the \"foot\" of _ceremonial action_\n(_kriy\u00e1_) which declares the various rules of initiation with the\ndivers component parts thereof. Without meditation the end cannot be\nattained, hence the \"foot\" of _meditation_ (_yoga_) follows next,\nwhich declares the various kinds of _yoga_ with their several parts.\nAnd as meditation is worthless without practice, _i.e._, the\nfulfilling what is enjoined and the abstaining from what is\nforbidden, lastly follows the fourth \"foot\" of practical duty\n(_chary\u00e1_), which includes all this.\nNow \u015aiva is held to be the Lord (or master). Although participation in\nthe divine nature of \u015aiva belongs to liberated souls and to such\nbeings as Vidye\u015bvara, &c., yet these are not independent, since they\ndepend on the Supreme Being; and the nature of an effect is recognised\nto belong to the worlds, &c., which resemble him, from the very fact\nof the orderly arrangement of their parts. And from their thus being\neffects we infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent\nbeing. By the strength of this inference is the universal\nacknowledgment of a Supreme Being confirmed.\n\"But may we not object that it is not proved that the body is thus an\neffect? for certainly none has ever, at any time or place, seen a body\nbeing made by any one.\" We grant it: yet it is not proper to deny that\na body has some maker on the ground that its being made has not been\nseen by any one, since this can be established from inference [if not\nfrom actual perception]. Bodies, &c., must be effects, because they\npossess an orderly arrangement of parts, or because they are\ndestructible, as jars, &c.; and from their being effects it is easy to\ninfer that they must have been caused by an intelligent being. Thus\nthe subject in the argument [sc. bodies, &c.] must have had a maker,\nfrom the fact that it is an effect, like jars, &c.; that which has the\nafore-mentioned middle term (_s\u00e1dhana_) must have the afore-mentioned\nmajor (_s\u00e1dhya_); and that which has not the former will not have the\nlatter, as the soul, &c.[115] The argument which establishes the\nauthority of the original inference to prove a Supreme Being has been\ngiven elsewhere, so we refrain from giving it at length here. In fact,\nthat God is the universal agent, but not irrespective of the actions\ndone by living beings, is proved by the current verse[116]--\n \"This ignorant _j\u00edv\u00e1tman_, incapable of its own true\n pleasures or pains, if it were only under God's direction\n [and its own merits not taken into account], would always go\n to heaven or always to hell.\"[117]\nNor can you object that this opinion violates God's independence,\nsince it does not really violate an agent's independence to allow that\nhe does not act irrespectively of means; just as we say that the\nking's bounty shows itself in gifts, but these are not irrespective of\nhis treasurer. As has been said by the Siddha Guru--\n \"It belongs to independence to be uncontrolled and itself to\n employ means, &c.;\n \"This is an agent's true independence, and not the acting\n irrespectively of works, &c.\"\nAnd thus we conclude that inference (as well as \u015aruti) establishes the\nexistence of an agent who knows the various fruits [of action], their\nmeans, material causes, &c., according to the laws of the various\nindividual merits. This has been thus declared by the venerable\nB\u1e5bihaspati--\n \"He who knows the fruits to be enjoyed, their means and\n material causes,--\n \"Apart from him this world knows not how the desert that\n resides in accumulated actions should ripen.\"--\n \"The universe is the subject of our argument, and it must\n have had an intelligent maker,\n \"This we maintain from its being an effect, just as we see\n in any other effect, as jars, &c.\"\nGod's omniscience also is proved from his being identical with\neverything, and also from the fact that an ignorant being cannot\nproduce a thing.[118] This has been said by the illustrious\nM\u1e5bigendra[119]--\n \"He is omniscient from his being the maker of all things:\n for it is an established principle\n \"That he only can make a thing who knows it with its means,\n parts, and end.\"\n\"Well,\" our opponents may say, \"we concede that God is an independent\nmaker, but then he has no body.[120] Now experience shows that all\neffects, as jars, &c., are produced by beings possessed of bodies, as\npotters, &c.; but if God were possessed of a body, then he would be\nlike us subject to trouble, and no longer be omniscient or\nomnipotent.\" We, however, deny this, for we see that the incorporeal\nsoul does still produce motion, &c., in its associated body; moreover,\neven though we conceded that God _did_ possess a body, we should still\nmaintain that the alleged defects would not necessarily ensue. The\nSupreme Being, as he has no possible connection with the fetters of\nmatter, such as _mala_,[121] action, &c., cannot have a material body,\nbut only a body of pure energy (S\u00e1kta),[122] since we know that his\nbody is composed of the five hymns which are forms of \u015aakti, according\nto the well-known text: \"The Supreme has the _I\u015b\u00e1na_ as his head, the\n_Tatpurusha_ as his mouth, the _Aghora_ as his heart, the _V\u00e1medeva_\nas his secret parts, and the _Sadyoj\u00e1ta_ as his feet.\"[123] And this\nbody, created according to his own will, is not like our bodies, but\nis the cause of the five operations of the Supreme, which are\nrespectively grace, obscuration, destruction, preservation, and\nproduction.[124] This has been said in the \u015ar\u00edmat M\u1e5bigendra--\n \"From the impossibility of its possessing _mala_, &c., the\n body of the Supreme is of pure energy, and not like ours.\"\nAnd it has also been said elsewhere--\n \"His body is composed of the five mantras which are\n subservient to the five operations,\n \"And his head, &c., are formed out of the \u00cdsa, Tatpurusha,\n Aghora, V\u00e1ma, and other hymns.\"\nIf you object to this view that \"such passages in the \u00c1gamas as 'He is\nfive-faced and fifteen-eyed,' assert prominently the fact that the\nSupreme Being is endowed with a body, organs, &c.,\" we concede what\nyou say, but we maintain that there is no contradiction in his\nassuming such forms to show his mercy to his devoted servants, since\nmeditation, worship, &c., are impossible towards a Being entirely\ndestitute of form. This has been said in the Paushkara--\n \"This form of his is mentioned for the preservation of the\n devotee.\"\nAnd similarly elsewhere--\n \"Thou art to be worshipped according to rule as possessed of\n form;\n \"For the understanding cannot reach to a formless object.\"\nBhojar\u00e1ja[125] has thus detailed the five operations--\n \"Fivefold are his operations, creation, preservation,\n destruction, and obscuration,\n \"And to these must be added the active grace of him who is\n eternally exalted.\"\nNow these five operations, in the view of the pure Path, are held to\nbe performed directly by \u015aiva, but in that of the toilsome Path they\nare ascribed to Ananta,[126] as is declared in the \u015ar\u00edmat\nKara\u1e47a[127]--\n \"In the Pure Path \u015aiva is declared to be the only agent, but\n Ananta in that which is opposed to the One Supreme.\"\nIt must here be understood that the word \u015aiva includes in its proper\nmeaning \"the Lord,\" all those who have attained to the state of \u015aiva,\nas the Lords of the Mantras, Mahe\u015bwara, the emancipated souls who have\nbecome \u015aivas, and the inspired teachers (_v\u00e1chakas_), together with\nall the various means, as initiation, &c., for obtaining the state of\n\u015aiva. Thus has been explained the first category, the Lord (_pati_).\nWe now proceed to explain the second category, the soul (_pa\u015bu_). The\nindividual soul which is also known by such synonyms as the\nnon-atomic,[128] the _Kshetraj\u00f1a_, or knower of the body,[129] &c., is\nthe _Pa\u015bu_. For we must not say with the Ch\u00e1rv\u00e1kas that it is the same\nas the body, since on this view we could not account for memory, as\nthere is a proverb that one man cannot remember what another has seen.\nNor may we say with the Naiy\u00e1yikas that it is cognisable by\nperception,[130] as this would involve an _ad infinitum_ regressus. As\nhas been said--\n \"If the soul were cognisable, there would need to be again a\n second knower;[131]\n \"And this would require another still, if the second were\n itself to be known.\"\nNor must we hold it non-pervading with the Jainas, nor momentary with\nthe Bauddhas, since it is not limited by space or time. As has been\nsaid--\n \"That object which is unlimited in its nature by space or\n time,\n \"They hold to be eternal and pervading,--hence the soul's\n all-pervadingness and eternity.\"\nNor may we say with the Ved\u00e1ntin that it is only one, since the\napportionment of different fruits proves that there are many\nindividual souls; nor with the S\u00e1nkhyas that it is devoid of action,\nsince, when all the various \"fetters\" are removed, \u015aruti informs us of\na state of identity with \u015aiva, which consists in intelligence in the\nform of an eternal and infinite vision and action.[132] This has been\ndeclared in the \u015ar\u00edmat M\u1e5bigendra--\n \"It is revealed that identity with \u015aiva results when all\n fetters are removed.\"\nAnd again--\n \"Intelligence consists in vision and action, and since in\n his soul\n \"This exists always and on every side, therefore, after\n liberation, \u015aruti calls it that which faces every way.\"\nIt is also said in the Tattva-prak\u00e1\u015ba--\n \"The liberated souls are themselves \u015aivas, but these are\n liberated by his favour;\n \"He is to be known as the one eternally liberated, whose\n body is the five Mantras.\"\nNow the souls are threefold, as denominated _vij\u00f1\u00e1n\u00e1kal\u00e1\u1e25_,\n_pralay\u00e1kal\u00e1\u1e25_, and _sakal\u00e1\u1e25_.[133] (_a._) The first are those who are\nunder the influence of _mala_ only, since their actions are cancelled by\nreceiving their proper fruits, or by abstraction, contemplation, and\nknowledge, and since they have no \"fetters\" in the form of enjoyments,\nsuch as _kal\u00e1_, &c. (which fetters would, however, be the cause of\ncancelling actions by bringing about their proper fruit). (_b._) The\nsecond are those who are under the influence of _mala_ and _karman_, since\nin their case _kal\u00e1_, &c., are destroyed by mundane destructions, hence\ntheir name _pralay\u00e1kala_. (_c._) The third are those who are bound in the\nthree fetters of _mala_, _m\u00e1y\u00e1_, and _karman_, hence their name _sakala_.\nThe first class are again subdivided into _sam\u00e1pta-kalush\u00e1\u1e25_ and\n_asam\u00e1pta-kalush\u00e1\u1e25_, according as their inherent corruption is perfectly\nexhausted or not. The former,--having received the mature penalties of\ntheir corruptions,--are now, as foremost of men and worthy of the\nprivilege, raised by \u015aiva's favour to the rank of the Lords of Knowledge\n(the Vidye\u015bvaras), Ananta, and the rest. This ogdoad of the Lords of\nKnowledge is described in the Bahudaivatya--\n \"Ananta, and S\u00fakshma, and \u015aivottama,\n \"Ekanetra, and again Ekarudra and Trim\u00farttika,\n \"\u015ar\u00edka\u1e47\u1e6dha and \u015aikha\u1e47\u1e0din,--these are declared to be the\n Vidye\u015bvaras.\"\nThe latter \u015aiva, in his mercy, raises to the rank of the seventy million\nMantras.[134] All this is explained in the Tattva-prak\u00e1\u015ba.[135] Similarly\nSoma-\u015aambhu has said--\n \"One class is named _vij\u00f1\u00e1n\u00e1kala_, the second _pralay\u00e1kala_,\n \"The third _sakala_,--these are the three whom the \u015a\u00e1stra\n regards as objects of mercy.\n \"The first is united to _mala_ alone, the second to _mala_\n and _karma_,\n \"The third are united to all the tattvas beginning with\n _kal\u00e1_ and ending with 'earth.'\"[136]\nThe _Pralay\u00e1kal\u00e1\u1e25_ are also twofold, as being _pakvap\u00e1\u015badvaya_ or not,\n_i.e._, those in whom the two remaining fetters are matured, and those in\nwhom they are not. The former attain liberation, but the latter, by the\npower of _karman_, are endowed with the _puryash\u1e6daka_[137] body, and pass\nthrough various births. As has been said in the Tattva-prak\u00e1\u015ba--\n \"Those among the Pralay\u00e1kalas whose _karman_ and _mala_ are\n immature,\n \"Go, united with the _puryash\u1e6daka_ body, into many births by\n the power of _karman_.\"\nThe _puryash\u1e6daka_ is also thus described in the same work--\n \"The _puryash\u1e6daka_ is composed of the internal organ,\n thought (_dh\u00ed_), _karman_, and the instruments.\"\nThis is thus explained by Aghora \u015aiva \u00c1ch\u00e1rya, \"the _puryash\u1e6daka_ is a\nsubtile body apportioned to each individual soul, which continues from\nthe creation until the close of the kalpa, or until liberation: it is\ncomposed of the thirty[138] tattvas beginning with 'earth' and ending\nwith _kal\u00e1_.\" As has been said in the Tattva-sangraha--\n \"This set of tattvas, commencing with 'earth' and ending\n with _kal\u00e1_, is assigned to each soul,\n \"And wanders by the law of _karman_ through all the bodies\n produced by the world.\"\nThe following is the full meaning of this passage:--The word\n\"_internal organ_,\" which properly includes \"mind,\" \"intelligence,\"\n\"egoism,\" and \"reason,\"[139] includes also the seven tattvas which\nenter into the production of enjoyment [or experience], viz., those\ncalled _kal\u00e1_, time, fate, knowledge, concupiscence, nature, and\nquality;[140] the words \"_thought_\" (_dh\u00ed_) and _karman_ signify the\nfive cognisable gross elements, and their originators, the subtile\nrudiments. By the word \"_instruments_\" are comprehended the ten organs\nof sense and action.\n\"But is it not declared in the \u015ar\u00edmat K\u00e1lottara that 'The set of five,\nsound, touch, form, taste and smell, intelligence, mind and egoism,\nthese constitute the _puryash\u1e6daka_?'\"\nHow, then, can any different account be maintained? We grant this, and\nhence the venerable R\u00e1ma Ka\u1e47\u1e6dha has explained that s\u00fatra in its\nliteral meaning [_i. e_., as _puryash\u1e6daka_, is derived from _ash\u1e6da_,\n\"eight\"], so why should we be prolix in the discussion? Still, if you\nask how we can reconcile our account with the strict nominal\ndefinition of _puryash\u1e6daka_, we reply that there is really no\ncontradiction, as we maintain that it is composed of a set of eight in\nthe following manner:--(1.) The five elements; (2.) the five\nrudiments; (3.) the five organs of knowledge; (4.) those of action;\n(5.) the fourfold internal organ; (6.) their instrument;[141] (7.)\nnature [prak\u1e5biti]; and (8.) the class composed of the five, beginning\nwith _kal\u00e1_, which form a kind of case.[142]\nNow in the case of some of those souls who are joined to the\n_puryash\u1e6daka_ body, Mahe\u015bvara Ananta having compassionated them as\npossessed of peculiar merit, constitutes them here as lords of the\nworld; as has been said--\n \"Mahe\u015bvara pities some and grants them to be lords of the\n world.\"\nThe class called _sakala_ is also divided into two, as _pakvakalusha_\nand _apakvakalusha_. As for the former, the Supreme Being, in\nconformity with their maturity (_parip\u00e1ka_), puts forth a power\nagreeable thereto, and transfers them to the position of the hundred\nand eighteen Lords of the Mantras, signified by the words Ma\u1e47\u1e0dal\u00ed,\n&c., as has been said--\n \"The rest are denominated _sakala_, from their connection\n with _Kal\u00e1_, &c., seized by time whose mouths are days;\n \"The Supreme of his own will makes one hundred and eighteen\n of these the Lords of the Mantras.\n \"Eight of these are called _Ma\u1e47\u1e0dalins_; eight again are\n Krodha, &c.;\n \"V\u00edre\u015ba, \u015ar\u00edka\u1e47\u1e6dha, and the hundred Rudras,--these together\n are the hundred and eighteen.\"\nIn their case again, the Supreme, having assumed the form of a\nteacher, stops the continued accession of maturity and contracts his\nmanifested power, and ultimately grants to them liberation by the\nprocess of initiation; as has been said--\n \"These creatures whose _mala_ is matured, by putting forth a\n healing power,\n \"He, assuming the form of a teacher, unites by initiation to\n the highest principle.\"\nIt is also said in the Sr\u00edmad M\u1e5bigendra--\n \"He removes from that infinitesimal soul all the bonds which\n previously exerted a contrary influence over it.\"[143]\nAll this has been explained at great length by N\u00e1r\u00e1ya\u1e47a-Ka\u1e47\u1e6dha, and\nthere it is to be studied; but we are obliged to pass on through fear\nof prolixity.\nBut as for the second class, or those called _apakvakalusha_, the\nSupreme Being, as impelled by the desert of their respective actions,\nappoints them, as bound and endued with infinitesimal bodies, to enjoy\nthe rewards of their previous actions.[144] As has been said--\n \"The other souls, bound [in their material bonds] he\n appoints to enjoy their various deserts,\n \"According to their respective actions: such are the various\n kinds of souls.\"\nWe now proceed to describe the third category, matter (or _p\u00e1\u015ba_).\nThis is fourfold, _mala_,[1] _karman_, _m\u00e1y\u00e1_, and _rodha-\u015bakti_.[145]\nBut it may be objected, \"Is it not said in the \u015aaiva \u00c1gamas that the\nchief things are the Lord, souls, and matter? Now the Lord has been\nshown to mean \u015aiva, 'souls' mean atoms (or beings endowed with atomic\nbodies), and matter (or 'bond') is said to be the pentad,[146] hence\nmatter will be fivefold. How then is it now reckoned to be only\nfourfold?\" To this we reply as follows:--Although the _vindu_ or nasal\ndot, which is the germinal atom of _m\u00e1y\u00e1_, and is called a\n\u015aiva-tattva, may be well regarded as material in comparison with the\nhighest liberation as defined by the attainment of the state of \u015aiva,\nstill it cannot really be considered as matter when we remember that\nit is a secondary kind of liberation as causing the attainment of the\nstate of such deities as Vidye\u015bvara, &c. Thus we see there is no\ncontradiction. Hence it has been said in the Tattva-prak\u00e1\u015ba--\n \"The bonds of matter will be fourfold.\"\nAnd again in the Sr\u00edmad M\u1e5bigendra--\n \"The enveloper-controller (_mala_), the overpowerer\n (_rodha_), action, and the work of M\u00e1y\u00e1,\n \"These are the four 'bonds,' and they are collectively\n called by the name of 'merit.'\"\nThe following is the meaning of this couplet:--\n(1.) \"Enveloping,\" because _mala_ exceedingly obscures and veils the\nsoul's powers of vision and action; \"controlling,\" because _mala_, a\nnatural impurity, controls the soul by its independent influence. As\nhas been said--\n \"_Mala_, though itself one, by manifold influence interrupts\n the soul's vision and action;\n \"It is to be regarded as the husk in rice or rust on\n(2.) The \"overpowerer\" is the obscuring power; this is called a \"bond\"\n[or matter] in a metaphorical sense, since this energy of \u015aiva\nobscures the soul by superintending matter [rather than by itself\npartaking of the nature of matter].\nThus it has been said--\n \"Of these I am the chief energy, and the gracious friend of\n \"I am metaphorically called _p\u00e1\u015ba_,[148] because I follow\n desert.\"\n(3.) Action [or rather its consequences, _karman_] as being performed\nby those who desire the fruit. It is in the form of merit or demerit,\nlike the seed and shoot, and it is eternal in a never-beginning\nseries. As has been said in the \u015ar\u00edmat Kira\u1e47a--\n \"As _Mala_ has no beginning, its least actions are\n beginningless:\n \"If an eternal character is thus established, then what\n cause could produce any change therein?\"\n(4.) \"_M\u00e1y\u00e1_,\" because herein as an energy of the Divine Being all\nthe world is potentially contained (_m\u00e1ti_) at a mundane destruction,\nand again at a creation it all comes (_y\u00e1ti_) into manifestation,\nhence the derivation of the name. This has been said in the \u015ar\u00edmat\nSaurabheya--\n \"The effects, as a form of the Divine energy, are absorbed\n therein at a mundane destruction,\n \"And again at a renovation it is manifested anew in the form\n of effects as _kal\u00e1_, &c.\"[149]\nAlthough much more might be added on this topic, yet we stop here\nthrough fear of extending this treatise too far. Thus have the three\ncategories been declared,--the Lord, the soul, and matter.\nA different mode of treating the subject is found in the\nJ\u00f1\u00e1naratn\u00e1val\u00ed, &c., in such lines as--\n \"The Lord, knowledge, ignorance, the soul, matter, and the\n cause\n \"Of the cessation thereof,--these are collectively the six\n categories.\"\nBut our readers must seek for full information from the work itself.\nThus our account of the system is complete.\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 112: Colebrooke speaks of the _Pa\u015bupati-s\u00e1stra_\n(_Mahe\u015bvara-siddh\u00e1nta or Siv\u00e1gama_), as the text-book of the P\u00e1\u015bupata\nsect. The \u00c1gamas are said to be twenty-eight (see their names in the\nRev. T. Foulkes' \"Catechism of the \u015aaiva Religion\").]\n[Footnote 113: \"There must be three eternal entities, Deity, soul,\nmatter;\" \"as the water is co-eternal with the sea and the salt with\nthe water, so soul is co-eternal with the Deity, and _p\u00e1\u015ba_ is\neternally co-existent with soul\" (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 67, 85). In p.\n58 we find the _advaita_ of the Ved\u00e1nta attacked. In p. 62 it is said\nthat the soul is eternally entangled in matter, and God carries on his\nfive operations (see _infra_) to disentangle it, bringing out all that\nis required for previous desert.]\n[Footnote 114: These four feet are the four stages of religious life\n(see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 135, 180), called in Tamil _sarithei_,\n_kirikei_, _yokam_, and _gn\u00e1nam_. The first is the stage of practical\npiety and performance of the prescribed duties and rites; the second\nis that of the \"confirmatory sacrament\" and the five purifications\ninvolved in true _p\u00faj\u00e1_; the third is that of the eight observances of\nthe yogin; the fourth is that of knowledge which prepares the soul for\nintimate union with God.]\n[Footnote 115: Cf. Colebrooke, _Essays_ (2d ed.), vol. i. p. 315.]\n[Footnote 116: _Ny\u00e1yena_ may here mean \"argument.\"]\n[Footnote 117: _Scil._ if there were only one cause there would be\nonly one invariable effect. The very existence of various effects\nproves that there must be other concurrent causes (as human actions)\nnecessary. The argument seems to me to require here this unnatural\nstress to be laid on _eva_, but this is certainly not the original\nmeaning of the passage; it occurs Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1rata, iii. 1144 (cf.\nGau\u1e0dap\u00e1da, S. K\u00e1r. 61).]\n[Footnote 118: In p. 82, line 3, _infra_, I read\n_Kara\u1e47\u00e1sambhav\u00e1chcha_.]\n[Footnote 119: This may be the same with the Meyk\u00e1\u1e47\u1e0da of the Tamil\nwork in J. A. O. S. His poem was called the _M\u1e5bigendra_(?).]\n[Footnote 120: Should we read _t\u00e1vad ana\u015bar\u00edra\u1e25_ in p. 83, line 2?]\n[Footnote 121: I retain this word, see _infra._]\n[Footnote 122: \"_M\u00e1y\u00e1_ (or Prak\u1e5biti) is the material, \u015aakti the\ninstrumental, and Deity the efficient cause\" (J. A. O. S. iv. p. 55).]\n[Footnote 123: These are the five first names of the eleven mantras\nwhich are included in the five _kal\u00e1s_ (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 238-243).\nThe \u015aivalinga (the visible object of worship for the enlightened) is\ncomposed of mantras, and is to be regarded as the body of \u015aiva (see J.\nA. O. S. iv. p. 101). These five mantras are given in the inverse\norder in Taitt. \u00c1ra\u1e47yaka, x. 43-47 (cf. _Ny\u00e1y\u00e1-m\u00e1l\u00e1vist._ p. 3).]\n[Footnote 124: These are the operations of the five manifestations of\n\u015aiva (see J. A. O. S. iv. 8, 18) which in their descending order are\n_S\u00e1th\u00e1kkiyam_ (_i.e._, _Sad\u00e1kshaya?_) or _Sad\u00e1-\u015aiva_, who is \u015aiva and\n\u015aakti combined, and the source of grace to all souls; _Ichchuran_ or\n_Mayesuran_, the obscure; _Sutta-vittei_ (_\u015auddhavidy\u00e1_) which is\nproperly the Hindu triad, _Rudra_, _Vish\u1e47u_, and _Brahma_. They are\nrespectively symbolised by the _n\u00e1da_, _vindu_, _m_, _u_, and _a_ of\nOm.]\n[Footnote 125: In Wilson's Mackenzie Cat. i. p. 138, we find a T\u00e1ntrik\nwork, the _Narapati-jaya-chary\u00e1_, ascribed to Bhoja the king of Dh\u00e1r.]\n[Footnote 126: Ananta is a name of \u015aiva in the Atharva-\u015biras Upanishad\n(see Indische Stud. i. 385).]\n[Footnote 127: This is the fourth of the twenty-eight \u00c1gamas (see\nFoulkes' Catechism).]\n[Footnote 128: _A\u1e47u?_ \"The soul, when clothed with these primary\nthings (desire, knowledge, action, &c.), is an exceedingly small body\"\n(Foulkes). Ana\u1e47u is used as an epithet of Brahman in B\u1e5bihad Ar. Up.\n[Footnote 129: See Ind. Studien, i. 301.]\n[Footnote 130: The mind or internal sense perceives soul (see Bh\u00e1sh\u00e1\nParichchheda, \u015bloka 49).]\n[Footnote 131: Delete the _iti_ in p. 84, line 5, _infra_.]\n[Footnote 132: Cf. the Nakul\u00ed\u015ba P\u00e1\u015bupatas, p. 76, 4 (_supra_, p.\n[Footnote 133: For these three classes see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 87,\n137. They are there described as being respectively under the\ninfluence of _\u00e1\u1e47avam malam_ only, or this with _kanmam malam_, or\nthese with _mayei malam_. The _\u00e1\u1e47avam_ is described as original sin,\nor that source of evil which was always attached to the soul; _kanmam_\nis that fate which inheres in the soul's organism and metes out its\ndeserts; _mayei_ is matter in its obscuring or entangling power, the\nsource of the senses. M\u00e1dhava uses \"_kal\u00e1_,\" &c., for _m\u00e1y\u00e1_. The\nreason is to be found in J. A. O. S. p. 70, where it is said that the\nfive _vidy\u00e1tattvas_ (_kal\u00e1_, _vidy\u00e1_, _r\u00e1ga_, _niyati_, and _kal\u00e1_)\nand the twenty-four _\u00e1tmatattvas_ (_sc._ the gross and subtile\nelements, and organs of sense and action, with the intellectual\nfaculties _manas_, _buddhi_, _aha\u1e43k\u00e1ra_, and _chitta_), are all\ndeveloped from _m\u00e1y\u00e1_. This exactly agrees with the quotation from\nSoma \u015aambhu, _infra_. We may compare with it what M\u00e1dhava says, p. 77,\nin his account of the Nakul\u00ed\u015ba P\u00e1\u015bupatas, where he describes _kal\u00e1_ as\nunintelligent, and composed of the five elements, the five\n_tanm\u00e1tras_, and the ten organs, with _buddhi_, _aha\u1e43k\u00e1ra_ and\n_manas_.]\n[Footnote 134: See J. A. O. S. iv. p. 137. I read _anugrahakara\u1e47\u00e1t_ in\n[Footnote 135: I omit the quotation, as it only repeats the preceding.\nIt, however, names the three classes as _vij\u00f1\u00e1na-kevala_,\n_pralaya-kevala_, and _sakala_.]\n[Footnote 136: _I.e._, thus including five of the _vidy\u00e1tattvas_ and\nall the twenty-four _\u00e1tmatattvas_.]\n[Footnote 137: This term seems to be derived from _pur\u00ed_, \"body\" (cf.\n_puri\u015baya_ for _purusha_, B\u1e5bihad \u00c1r. Up. ii. 5, 18), and _ash\u1e6daka_\n(cf. also the S\u00e1nkhya Pravachana Bh\u00e1shya, p. 135).]\n[Footnote 138: Or rather thirty-one?]\n[Footnote 139: _Manas_, _buddhi_, _aha\u1e43k\u00e1ra_, _chitta_.]\n[Footnote 140: These are the seven _vi\u1e0dy\u00e1-tattvas_, _kal\u00e1_, _k\u00e1la_,\n_niyati_ (fate), _vidy\u00e1_, _r\u00e1ga_, _prak\u1e5biti_, and _gu\u1e47a_. Hoisington,\nhowever, puts _purushan_ \"the principle of life,\" instead of _gu\u1e47a_,\nwhich seems better, as the three _gu\u1e47as_ are included in _prak\u1e5biti_.\nHe translates _kal\u00e1_ by \"continency,\" and describes it as \"the power\nby which the senses are subdued and the carnal self brought into\nsubjection.\"]\n[Footnote 141: This \"instrument\" (_kara\u1e47a_) seems to mean what\nHoisington calls _purushan_ or \"the principle of life which\nestablishes or supports the whole system in its operation;\" he makes\nit one of the seven _vidy\u00e1tattvas_. According to M\u00e1dhava, it should be\nwhat he calls _gu\u1e47a_.]\n[Footnote 142: The thirty-one _tattvas_ are as follow:--Twenty-four\n_\u00e1tmatattvas_, five elements, five _tanm\u00e1tras_, ten organs of sense\nand action, four organs of the _anta\u1e25kara\u1e47a_, and seven _vidy\u00e1tattvas_\nas enumerated above. (See J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 16-17.)]\n[Footnote 143: I take _a\u1e47u_ in this verse as the soul, but it may mean\nthe second kind of _mala_ mentioned by Hoisington. The first kind of\n_mala_ is the _m\u00e1y\u00e1-mala_, the second _\u00e1\u1e47ava-mala_, the third\n_kanma-mala_ (_karman_).]\n[Footnote 144: \"The soul, when clothed with these primary things\n(desire, knowledge, action, the _kal\u00e1dipanchaka_, &c.), is an\nexceedingly small body\" (Foulkes). One of the three _malas_ is called\n_\u00e1\u1e47ava_, and is described as the source of sin and suffering to\nsouls.]\n[Footnote 145: The first three are the three kinds of _mala_ in the J.\nA. O. S., viz., _\u00e1\u1e47avam_, _kanmam_, and _m\u00e1yei_, the last is the\n\"obscuring\" power of M\u00e1yesuran (cf. vol. iv. pp. 13, 14). The \u015aaivas\nhold that P\u00e1\u015ba, like the S\u00e1nkhya Prak\u1e5biti, is in itself eternal,\nalthough its connection with any particular soul is temporary (see J.\n[Footnote 146: These are the five, _vindu_, _mala_, _karman_, _m\u00e1y\u00e1_,\nand _rodha\u015bakti_. _Vindu_ is described in Foulkes' translation of the\n\u015aiva-prak\u00e1\u015ba-patalai: \"A sound proceeds out of the mystical syllable\n_om_;... and in that sound a rudimentary atom of matter is developed.\nFrom this atom are developed the four sounds, the fifty-one Sanskrit\nletters, the Vedas, Mantras, &c., the bodily, intellectual, and\nexternal enjoyments of the soul that have not attained to spiritual\nknowledge at the end of each period of the world's existence, and have\nbeen swept away by the waters of the world-destroying deluge; after\nthese the three stages of heavenly happiness are developed, to be\nenjoyed by the souls that have a favourable balance of meritorious\ndeeds, or have devoted themselves to the service of God or the\nabstract contemplation of the Deity, viz., (1.) the enjoyment of the\nabode of \u015aiva; (2.) that of near approach to him; (3.) that of union\nwith him.\" _Vindu_ is similarly described, J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 152,\n153 (cf. also Weber, _R\u00e1mat\u00e1pany\u00eda Up_. pp. 312-315).]\n[Footnote 147: See the same illustrations in J. A. O. S. iv. p. 150.]\n[Footnote 148: Some forced derivation seems here intended as of _p\u00e1\u015ba_\nfrom _pa\u015bch\u00e1t_.]\n[Footnote 149: In p. 90, line 2, read _s\u00e1 k\u00e1rye\u1e47a_.]\nCHAPTER VIII.\nTHE PRATYABHIJNA-DARSANA, OR RECOGNITIVE SYSTEM.\nOther M\u00e1he\u015bvaras are dissatisfied with the views set out in the \u015aaiva\nsystem as erroneous in attributing to motiveless and insentient things\ncausality (in regard to the bondage and liberation of transmigrating\nspirits). They therefore seek another system, and proclaim that the\nconstruction of the world (or series of environments of those spirits)\nis by the mere will of the Supreme Lord. They pronounce that this\nSupreme Lord, who is at once other than and the same with the several\ncognitions and _cognita_, who is identical with the transcendent self\nposited by one's own consciousness, by rational proof, and by\nrevelation, and who possesses independence, that is, the power of\nwitnessing all things without reference to aught ulterior, gives\nmanifestation, in the mirror of one's own soul, to all entities[150]\nas if they were images reflected upon it. Thus looking upon\nrecognition as a new method for the attainment of ends and of the\nhighest end, available to all men alike, without any the slightest\ntrouble and exertion, such as external and internal worship,\nsuppression of the breath, and the like, these M\u00e1he\u015bvaras set forth\nthe system of recognition (_pratyabhij\u00f1\u00e1_). The extent of this system\nis thus described by one of their authorities--\n \"The aphorisms, the commentary, the gloss, the two\n explications, the greater and the less,\n \"The five topics, and the expositions,--such is the system\n of recognition.\"\nThe first aphorism in their text-book is as follows[151]:--\n \"Having reached somehow or other the condition of a slave of\n Mahe\u015bvara, and wishing also to help mankind,\n \"I set forth the recognition of Mahe\u015bvara, as the method of\n attaining all felicity.\"\n[This aphorism may be developed as follows]:--\n\"Somehow or other,\" by a propitiation, effected by God, of the lotus\nfeet of a spiritual director identical with God, \"having reached,\"\nhaving fully attained, this condition, having made it the\nunintercepted object of fruition to myself. Thus knowing that which\nhas to be known, he is qualified to construct a system for others:\notherwise the system would be a mere imposture.\nMahe\u015bvara is the reality of unintermitted self-luminousness,\nbeatitude, and independence, by portions of whose divine essence\nVish\u1e47u, Viri\u00f1chi, and other deities are deities, who, though they\ntranscend the fictitious world, are yet implicated in the infinite\nillusion.\nThe condition of being a slave to Mahe\u015bvara is the being a recipient\nof that independence or absoluteness which is the essence of the\ndivine nature, a slave being one to whom his lord grants all things\naccording to his will and pleasure (_i.e._, _d\u00e1sya_, from _d\u00e1_).\nThe word _mankind_ imports that there is no restriction of the\ndoctrine to previously qualified students. Whoever he may be to whom\nthis exposition of the divine nature is made, he reaps its highest\nreward, the emanatory _principium_ itself operating to the highest end\nof the transmigrating souls. It has been accordingly laid down in the\n\u015aiva-d\u1e5bish\u1e6di by that supreme guide the revered Som\u00e1nandan\u00e1tha--\n \"When once the nature of \u015aiva that resides in all things\n has been known with tenacious recognition, whether by proof\n or by instruction in the words of a spiritual director,\n \"There is no further need of doing aught, or of any further\n reflection. When he knows Suvar\u1e47a (or \u015aiva) a man may cease\n to act and to reflect.\"\nThe word _also_ excludes the supposition that there is room in self\nwhich has recognised the nature of Mahe\u015bvara, and which manifests to\nitself its own identity with him, and is therefore fully satisfied,\nfor any other motive than felicity for others. The well-being of\nothers is a motive, whatever may be said, for the definition of a\nmotive applies to it: for there is no such divine curse laid upon man\nthat self-regard should be his sole motive to the exclusion of a\nregard for others. Thus Akshap\u00e1da (i. 24) defines a motive: A motive\nis that object towards which a man energises.\nThe preposition _upa_ in _upap\u00e1dayami_ (I set forth) indicates\nproximity: the result is the bringing of mankind near unto God.\nHence the word _all_ in the phrase _the method of attaining all\nfelicities_. For when the nature of the Supreme Being is attained, all\nfelicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are overtaken, as if a\nman acquired the mountain Roha\u1e47a (Adam's Peak), he would acquire all\nthe treasures it contains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what\nelse is there that he can ask for? Accordingly Utpal\u00e1ch\u00e1rya says--\n \"What more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of\n devotion? What else can they ask who are poor in this?\"\nWe have thus explained the motive expressed in the words _the method\nof attaining all felicities_, on the supposition that the compound\nterm is a Tatpurusha genitively constructed. Let it be taken as a\nBahuvr\u00edhi or relative compound. Then the recognition of Mahe\u015bvara, the\nknowing him through vicarious idols, has for its motive the full\nattainment, the manifestation, of all felicities, of every external\nand internal permanent happiness in their proper nature. In the\nlanguage of everyday life, recognition is a cognition relative to an\nobject represented in memory: for example, This (perceived) is the\nsame (as the remembered) Chaitra. In the recognition propounded in\nthis system,--there being a God whose omnipotence is learnt from the\naccredited legendaries, from accepted revelation, and from\nargumentation,--there arises in relation to my presented personal self\nthe cognition that I am that very God,--in virtue of my recollection\nof the powers of that God.\nThis same recognition I set forth. To set forth is to enforce. I\nestablish this recognition by a stringent process which renders it\nconvincing. [Such is the articulate development of the first aphorism\nof the Recognitive Institutes.]\nHere it may be asked: If soul is manifested only as consubstantial\nwith God, why this laboured effort to exhibit the recognition? The\nanswer is this:--The recognition is thus exhibited, because though the\nsoul is, as you contend, continually manifested as self-luminous (and\ntherefore identical with God), it is nevertheless under the influence\nof the cosmothetic illusion manifested as partial, and therefore the\nrecognition must be exhibited by an expansion of the cognitive and\nactive powers in order to achieve the manifestation of the soul as\ntotal (the self being to the natural man a part, to the man of insight\nthe whole, of the divine pleroma). Thus, then, the syllogism: This\nself must be God, because it possesses cognitive and active powers;\nfor so far forth as any one is cognitive and active, to that extent he\nis a lord, like a lord in the world of everyday life, or like a king,\ntherefore the soul is God. The five-membered syllogism is here\nemployed, because so long as we deal with the illusory order of\nthings, the teaching of the Naiy\u00e1yikas may be accepted. It has thus\nbeen said by the son of Uday\u00e1kara--\n \"What self-luminous self can affirm or deny that\n self-active and cognitive is Mahe\u015bvara the primal being?\n \"Such recognition must be effected by an expansion of the\n powers, the self being cognised under illusion, and\n imperfectly discerned.\"\nAnd again--\n \"The continuance of all living creatures in this\n transmigratory world lasts as long as their respiratory\n _involucrum_; knowledge and action are accounted the life of\n living creatures.\n \"Of these, knowledge is spontaneously developed, and action\n (or ritual), which is best at K\u00e1\u015bi,\n \"Is indicated by others also: different from these is real\n knowledge.\"\nAnd also--\n \"The knowledge of these things follows the sequence of those\n things:\n \"The knower, whose essence is beatitude and knowledge\n without succession, is Mahe\u015bvara.\"\nSom\u00e1nandan\u00e1tha also says--\n \"He always knows by identity with \u015aiva: he always knows by\n identity with the real.\"\nAgain at the end of the section on knowledge--\n \"Unless there were this unity with \u015aiva, cognitions could\n not exist as facts of daily life:\n \"Unity with God is proved by the unity of light. He is the\n one knower (or illuminator of cognitions).\n \"He is Mahe\u015bvara, the great Lord, by reason of the unbroken\n continuity of objects:\n \"Pure knowledge and action are the playful activity of the\n deity.\"\nThe following is an explanation of Abhinava-gupta:--The text, \"After\nthat as it shines shines the all of things, by the light of that\nshines diversely this ALL,\" teaches that God illumines the whole round\nof things by the glory of His luminous intelligence, and that the\ndiversity or plurality of the object world, whereby the light which\nirradiates objects is a blue, a yellow light, and the like, arises\nfrom diversity of tint cast upon the light by the object. In reality,\nGod is without plurality or difference, as transcending all\nlimitations of space, time, and figure. He is pure intelligence,\nself-luminousness, the manifester; and thus we may read in the \u015aaiva\naphorisms, \"Self is intelligence.\" His synonymous titles are\nIntelligential Essence, Unintermitted Cognition, Irrespective\nIntuition, Existence as a mass of Beatitude, Supreme Domination. This\nself-same existing self is knowledge.\nBy pure knowledge and action (in the passage of Som\u00e1nandan\u00e1tha cited\nabove) are meant real or transcendent cognition and activity. Of\nthese, the cognition is self-luminousness, the activity is energy\nconstructive of the world or series of spheres of transmigratory\nexperience. This is described in the section on activity--\n \"He by his power of bliss gives light unto these objects,\n through the efficacy of his will: this activity is\n creativeness.\"\nAnd at the close of the same section--\n \"The mere will of God, when he wills to become the world\n under its forms of jar, of cloth, and other objects, is his\n activity worked out by motive and agent.\n \"This process of essence into emanation, whereby if this be\n that comes to be, cannot be attributed to motiveless,\n insentient things.\"\nAccording to these principles, causality not pertaining either to the\ninsentient or to the non-divine intelligence, the mere will of\nMahe\u015bvara, the absolute Lord, when he wills to emanate into thousands\nof forms, as this or that difference, this or that action, this or\nthat modification of entity, of birth, continuance, and the like, in\nthe series of transmigratory environments,--his mere will is his\nprogressively higher and higher activity, that is to say, his\nuniversal creativeness.\nHow he creates the world by his will alone is clearly exhibited in the\nfollowing illustration--\n \"The tree or jar produced by the mere will of\n thaumaturgists, without clay, without seed, continues to\n serve its proper purpose as tree or jar.\"\nIf clay and similar materials were really the substantial cause of the\njar and the rest, how could they be produced by the mere volition of\nthe thaumaturgist? If you say: Some jars and some plants are made of\nclay, and spring from seeds, while others arise from the bare volition\nof the thaumaturgist; then we should inform you that it is a fact\nnotorious to all the world that _different_ things must emanate from\ndifferent materials.\nAs for those who say that a jar or the like cannot be made without\nmaterials to make it of, and that when a thaumaturgist makes one he\ndoes so by putting atoms in motion by his will, and so composing it:\nthey may be informed that unless there is to be a palpable violation\nof the causal relation, _all_ the co-efficients, without exception,\nmust be desiderated; to make the jar there must be the clay, the\npotter's staff, the potter's wheel, and all the rest of it; to make a\nbody there must be the congress of the male and female, and the\nsuccessive results of that congress. Now, if that be the case, the\ngenesis of a jar, a body, or the like, upon the mere volition of the\nthaumaturgist, would be hardly possible.\nOn the other hand, there is no difficulty in supposing that Mah\u00e1deva,\namply free to remain within or to over-step any limit whatever, the\nLord, manifold in his operancy, the intelligent principle, thus\noperates. Thus it is that Vasugupt\u00e1ch\u00e1rya says--\n\"To him that painted this world-picture without materials, without\nappliances, without a wall to paint it on,--to him be glory, to him\nresplendent with the lunar digit, to him that bears the trident.\"\nIt may be asked: If the supersensible self be no other than God, how\ncomes this implication in successive transmigratory conditions? The\nanswer is given in the section treating of accredited institution--\n \"This agent of cognition, blinded by illusion, transmigrates\n through the fatality of works:\n \"Taught his divine nature by science, as pure intelligence,\n he is enfranchised.\"\nIt may be asked: If the subject and the object are identical, what\ndifference can there be between the self bound and the self liberated\nin regard to the objects cognisable by each? The answer to this\nquestion is given in a section of the Tattv\u00e1rtha-Sa\u1e45graha--\n \"Self liberated cognises all that is cognisable as identical\n with itself, like Mahe\u015bvara free from bondage: the other (or\n unliberated) self has in it infinite plurality.\"\nAn objection may be raised: If the divine nature is essential to the\nsoul, there can be no occasion to seek for this recognition; for if\nall requisites be supplied, the seed does not fail to germinate\nbecause it is unrecognised. Why, then, this toilsome effort for the\nrecognition of the soul? To such an objection we reply: Only listen to\nthe secret we shall tell you. All activity about objects is of two\ndegrees, being either external, as the activity of the seed in\ndeveloping the plant, or internal, as the activity which determines\nfelicity, which consists in an intuition which terminates in the\nconscious self. The first degree of activity presupposes no such\nrecognition as the system proposes, the second does presuppose it. In\nthe Recognitive System the peculiar activity is the exertion of the\npower of unifying personal and impersonal spirit, a power which is the\nattainment of the highest and of mediate ends, the activity consisting\nin the intuition I am God. To this activity a recognition of the\nessential nature of the soul is a pre-requisite.\nIt may be urged that peculiar activity terminating in the conscious\nself is observed independent of recognition. To this it is replied: A\ncertain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular\ngallant, fell in love with him before she had seen him, and agitated\nby her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing him, wrote\nto him a love-letter descriptive of her condition. He at once came to\nher, but when she saw him she did not recognise in him the qualities\nshe had heard about; he appeared much the same as any other man, and\nshe found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she\nrecognised those qualities in him as her companions now pointed them\nout, she was fully gratified. In like manner, though the personal self\nbe manifested as identical with the universal soul, its manifestation\neffects no complete satisfaction so long as there is no recognition of\nthose attributes; but as soon as it is taught by a spiritual director\nto recognise in itself the perfections of Mahe\u015bvara, his omniscience,\nomnipotence, and other attributes, it attains the whole pleroma of\nbeing.\nIt is therefore said in the fourth section--\n \"As the gallant standing before the damsel is disdained as\n like all other men, so long as he is unrecognised, though he\n humble himself before her with all manner of importunities:\n In like manner the personal self of mankind, though it be\n the universal soul, in which there is no perfection\n unrealised, attains not its own glorious nature; and\n therefore this recognition thereof must come into play.\"\nThis system has been treated in detail by Abhinava-gupta and other\nteachers, but as we have in hand a summary exposition of systems, we\ncannot extend the discussion of it any further lest our work become\ntoo prolix. This then may suffice.[152]\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 150: Read _bh\u00e1v\u00e1n_ for _bh\u00e1v\u00e1t_.]\n[Footnote 151: Cf. _supra_, p. 113. M\u00e1dhava here condenses Abhinava\nGupta's commentary. Abhinava Gupta lived in the beginning of the\neleventh century (see B\u00fchler's Tour in Cashmere, pp. 66, 80).]\n[Footnote 152: I have seen in Calcutta a short Comm. on the \u015aiva\ns\u00fatras by Utpala, the son of Uday\u00e1kara (cf. pp. 130, 131).--E. B. C.]\nCHAPTER IX.\nTHE RASE\u015aVARA-DAR\u015aANA OR MERCURIAL SYSTEM.[153]\nOther M\u00e1he\u015bvaras there are who, while they hold the identity of self\nwith God, insist upon the tenet that the liberation in this life\ntaught in all the systems depends upon the stability of the bodily\nframe, and therefore celebrate the virtues of mercury or quicksilver\nas a means of strengthening the system. Mercury is called _p\u00e1rada_,\nbecause it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of\ntransmigratory states. Thus it has been said--\n \"It gives the farther shore of metempsychosis: it is called\n _p\u00e1rada_.\"\nAnd again in the Ras\u00e1r\u1e47ava--\n \"It is styled _p\u00e1rada_ because it is employed for the\n highest end by the best votaries.\n \"Since this in sleep identical with me, goddess, arises from\n my members, and is the exudation of my body, it is called\nIt may be urged that the literal interpretation of these words is\nincorrect, the liberation in this life being explicable in another\nmanner. This objection is not allowable, liberation being set out in\nthe six systems as subsequent to the death of the body, and upon this\nthere can be no reliance, and consequently no activity to attain to it\nfree from misgivings. This is also laid down in the same treatise--\n \"Liberation is declared in the six systems to follow the\n death of the body.\n \"Such liberation is not cognised in perception like an\n emblic myrobalan fruit in the hand.\n \"Therefore a man should preserve that body by means of\n mercury and of medicaments.\"\nGovinda-bhagavat also says--\n \"Holding that the enjoyments of wealth and of the body are\n not permanent, one should strive\n \"After emancipation; but emancipation results from\n knowledge, knowledge from study, and study is only possible\n in a healthy body.\"\nThe body, some one may say, is seen to be perishable, how can its\npermanency be effected? Think not so, it is replied, for though the\nbody, as a complexus of six sheaths or wrappers of the soul, is\ndissoluble, yet the body, as created by Hara and Gaur\u00ed under the names\nof mercury and mica, may be perdurable. Thus it is said in the\nRasah\u1e5bidaya--\n \"They who, without quitting the body, have attained to a new\n body, the creation of Hara and Gaur\u00ed,\n \"They are to be lauded, perfected by mercury, at whose\n service is the aggregate of magic texts.\"\nThe ascetic, therefore, who aspires to liberation in this life should\nfirst make to himself a glorified body. And inasmuch as mercury is\nproduced by the creative conjunction of Hara and Gaur\u00ed, and mica is\nproduced from Gaur\u00ed, mercury and mica are severally identified with\nHara and Gaur\u00ed in the verse--\n \"Mica is thy seed, and mercury is my seed;\n \"The combination of the two, O goddess, is destructive of\n death and poverty.\"\nThis is very little to say about the matter. In the\nRase\u015bvara-siddh\u00e1nta many among the gods, the Daityas, the Munis, and\nmankind, are declared to have attained to liberation in this life by\nacquiring a divine body through the efficacy of quicksilver.\n \"Certain of the gods, Mahe\u015ba and others; certain Daityas,\n \u015aukra and others;\n \"Certain Munis, the B\u00e1lakhilyas and others; certain kings,\n Some\u015bvara and others;\n \"Govinda-bhagavat, Govinda-n\u00e1yaka,\n \"Charva\u1e6di, Kapila, Vy\u00e1li, K\u00e1p\u00e1li, Kandal\u00e1yana,\n \"These and many others proceed perfected, liberated while\n alive,\n \"Having attained to a mercurial body, and therewith\n identified.\"\nThe meaning of this, as explicated by Parame\u015bvara to Parame\u015bvar\u00ed, is\nas follows:--\n \"By the method of works is attained, O supreme of goddesses,\n the preservation of the body;\n \"And the method of works is said to be twofold, mercury and\n \"Mercury and air swooning carry off diseases, dead they\n restore to life,\n \"Bound they give the power of flying about.\"\nThe swooning state of mercury is thus described--\n \"They say quicksilver to be swooning when it is perceived,\n as characterised thus--\n \"Of various colours, and free from excessive volatility.\n \"A man should regard that quicksilver as dead, in which the\n following marks are seen--\n \"Wetness, thickness, brightness, heaviness, mobility.\"\nThe bound condition is described in another place as follows:--\n \"The character of bound quicksilver is that it is--\n \"Continuous, fluent, luminous, pure, heavy, and that it\n parts asunder under friction.\"\nSome one may urge: If the creation of mercury by Hara and Gaur\u00ed were\nproved, it might be allowed that the body could be made permanent; but\nhow can that be proved? The objection is not allowable, inasmuch as\nthat _can_ be proved by the eighteen modes of elaboration. Thus it is\nstated by the authorities--\n \"Eighteen modes of elaboration are to be carefully\n discriminated,\n \"In the first place, as pure in every process, for\n perfecting the adepts.\"\nAnd these modes of elaboration are enumerated thus--\n \"Sweating, rubbing, swooning, fixing, dropping, coercion,\n restraining,\n \"Kindling, going, falling into globules, pulverising,\n covering,\n \"Internal flux, external flux, burning, colouring, and\n pouring,\n \"And eating it by parting and piercing it,--are the eighteen\n modes of treating quicksilver.\"\nThese treatments have been described at length by Govinda-bhagavat,\nSarvaj\u00f1a-r\u00e1me\u015bvara and the other ancient authorities, and are here\nomitted to avoid prolixity.\nThe mercurial system is not to be looked upon as merely eulogistic of\nthe metal, it being immediately, through the conservation of the body,\na means to the highest end, liberation. Thus it is said in the\nRas\u00e1r\u1e47ava--\n\"Declare to me, O god, that supremely efficacious destruction of the\nblood, that destruction of the body, imparted by thee, whereby it\nattained the power of flying about in the sky. Goddess (he replied),\nquicksilver is to be applied both to the blood and to the body. This\nmakes the appearance of body and blood alike. A man should first try\nit upon the blood, and then apply it to the body.\"\nIt will be asked: Why should we make this effort to acquire a\ncelestial body, seeing that liberation is effected by the\nself-manifestation of the supreme principle, existence, intelligence,\nand beatitude? We reply: This is no objection, such liberation being\ninaccessible unless we acquire a healthy body. Thus it is said in the\nRasah\u1e5bidaya--\n \"That intelligence and bliss set forth in all the systems\n in which a multitude of uncertainties are melted away,\n \"Though it manifest itself, what can it effect for beings\n whose bodies are unglorified?\n \"He who is worn out with decrepitude, though he be free from\n cough, from asthma, and similar infirmities,\n \"He is not qualified for meditation in whom the activities\n of the cognitive organs are obstructed.\n \"A youth of sixteen addicted to the last degree to the\n enjoyment of sensual pleasures,\n \"An old man in his dotage, how should either of these attain\n to emancipation?\"\nSome one will object: It is the nature of the personal soul to pass\nthrough a series of embodiments, and to be liberated is to be\nextricated from that series of embodiments; how, then, can these two\nmutually exclusive conditions pertain to the same bodily tenement? The\nobjection is invalid, as unable to stand before the following\ndilemmatic argument:--Is this extrication, as to the nature of which\nall the founders of institutes are at one, to be held as cognisable or\nas incognisable? If it is incognisable, it is a pure chimera; if it is\ncognisable, we cannot dispense with life, for that which is not alive\ncannot be cognisant of it. Thus it is said in the Rasasiddh\u00e1nta--\n \"The liberation of the personal soul is declared in the\n mercurial system, O subtile thinker.\n \"In the tenets of other schools which repose on a diversity\n of argument,\n \"Know that this knowledge and knowable is allowed in all\n sacred texts;\n \"One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore\n there is and must be life.\"\nAnd this is not to be supposed to be unprecedented, for the adherents\nof the doctrine of Vish\u1e47u-sv\u00e1min maintain the eternity of the body of\nVish\u1e47u half-man and half-lion. Thus it is said in the S\u00e1k\u00e1ra-siddhi--\n \"I glorify the man-lion set forth by Vish\u1e47u-sv\u00e1min,\n \"Whose only body is existence, intelligence, and eternal and\n inconceivably perfect beatitude.\"\nIf the objection be raised that the body of the man-lion, which\nappears as composite and as coloured, is incompatible with real\nexistence, it may be replied: How can the body of the man-lion be\notherwise than really existent, proved as it is by three kinds of\nproof: (1.) by the intuition of \u015aanaka and others; (2.) by Vedic texts\nsuch as, A thousand heads has Purusha; and (3.) by Pur\u00e1\u1e47ic texts such\nas, That wondrous child, lotus-eyed, four-armed, armed with the\nconch-shell, the club, and other weapons? Real existence and other\nlike predicates are affirmed also by \u015ar\u00edk\u00e1nta-mi\u015bra, the devoted\nadherent of Vish\u1e47u-sv\u00e1min. Let, then, those who aspire to the highest\nend of personal souls be assured that the eternity of the body which\nwe are setting forth is by no means a mere innovation. It has thus\nbeen said--\n \"What higher beatitude is there than a body undecaying,\n immortal,\n \"The repository of sciences, the root of merit, riches,\n pleasure, liberation?\"\nIt is mercury alone that can make the body undecaying and immortal, as\nit is said--\n \"Only this supreme medicament can make the body undecaying\n and imperishable.\"\nWhy describe the efficacy of this metal? Its value is proved even by\nseeing it, and by touching it, as it is said in the Ras\u00e1r\u1e47ava--\n \"From seeing it, from touching it, from eating it, from\n merely remembering it,\n \"From worshipping it, from tasting it, from imparting it,\n appear its six virtues.\n \"Equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues from\n seeing all the phallic emblems\n \"On earth, those at Ked\u00e1ra, and all others whatsoever.\"\nIn another place we read--\n \"The adoration of the sacred quicksilver is more beatific\n than the worship of all the phallic emblems at K\u00e1\u015bi and\n elsewhere,\n \"Inasmuch as there is attained thereby enjoyment, health,\n exemption from decay, and immortality.\"\nThe sin of disparaging mercury is also set out--\n \"The adept on hearing quicksilver heedlessly disparaged\n should recall quicksilver to mind.\n \"He should at once shun the blasphemer, who is by his\n blasphemy for ever filled with sin.\"\nThe attainment, then, of the highest end of the personal soul takes\nplace by an intuition of the highest principle by means of the\npractice of union (\u1f15\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) after the acquisition of a divine body in\nthe manner we have described. Thereafter--\n \"The light of pure intelligence shines forth unto certain\n men of holy vision,\n \"Which, seated between the two eyebrows, illumines the\n universe, like fire, or lightning, or the sun:\n \"Perfect beatitude, unalloyed, absolute, the essence whereof\n is luminousness, undifferenced,\n \"From which all troubles are fallen away, knowable,\n tranquil, self-recognised:\n \"Fixing the internal organ upon that, seeing the whole\n universe manifested, made of pure intelligence,\n \"The aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute, his\n bondage to works annulled.\"\nA Vedic text also declares: That is Rasa (mercury), having obtained\nthis he becomes beatitude.\nThus, then, it has been shown that mercury alone is the means of\npassing beyond the burden of transmigratory pains. And conformably we\nhave a verse which sets forth the identity between mercury and the\nsupreme self--\n \"May that mercury, which is the very self, preserve us from\n dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis,\n \"Which is naturally to be applied again and again by those\n that aspire to liberation from the enveloping illusion,\n \"Which perfected endures, which plays not again when the\n soul awakes,\n \"Which, when it arises, pains no other soul, which shines\n forth by itself from itself.\"\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 153: Cf. Marco Polo's account of the Indian yog\u00eds in Colonel\nYule's edit. vol. ii. p. 300. _P\u00e1rada-p\u00e1na_ is one of the practices of\nthe Siddhop\u00e1sakas in the \u015aa\u1e45kara-digvijaya, \u00a7 49, to obviate\n_apam\u1e5bityu_, _ak\u00e1lam\u1e5bityu_, &c.]\nCHAPTER X.\nTHE VAI\u015aESHIKA OR AUL\u00daKYA DAR\u015aANA.[154]\nWhoso wishes to escape the reality of pain, which is established by\nthe consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be\nessentially contrary to every rational being, and wishes therefore to\nknow the means of such escape,--learns that the knowledge of the\nSupreme Being is the true means thereof, from the authority of such\npassages as these (_\u015avet\u00e1\u015bvatara Upan_. vi. 20)--\n \"When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather,\n \"Then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of\nNow the knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by hearing\n(_\u015brava\u1e47a_), thought (_manana_), and reflection (_bh\u00e1van\u00e1_), as it has\nbeen said--\n \"By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated\n meditation,--\n \"By these three methods producing knowledge, he gains the\n highest union (_yoga_).\"\nHere thought depends on inference, and inference depends on the\nknowledge of the _vy\u00e1pti_ (or universal proposition), and the\nknowledge of the _vy\u00e1pti_ follows the right understanding of the\ncategories,--hence the saint Ka\u1e47\u00e1da[155] establishes the six\ncategories in his tenfold treatise, commencing with the words, \"Now,\ntherefore, we shall explain duty.\"\nIn the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he describes all\nthe categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first\n_\u00e1hnika_ he defines those which possess \"genus\" (_j\u00e1ti_), in the\nsecond \"genus\" (or \"generality\") itself and \"particularity.\" In the\nsimilarly divided second book he discusses \"substance,\" giving in the\nfirst _\u00e1hnika_ the characteristics of the five elements, and in the\nsecond he establishes the existence of space and time. In the third\nbook he defines the soul and the internal sense, the former in the\nfirst _\u00e1hnika_, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he\ndiscusses the body and its adjuncts, the latter in the first _\u00e1hnika_,\nand the former in the second. In the fifth book he investigates\naction; in the first _\u00e1hnika_ he considers action as connected with\nthe body, in the second as belonging to the mind. In the sixth book he\nexamines merit and demerit as revealed in \u015aruti; in the first _\u00e1hnika_\nhe discusses the merit of giving, receiving gifts, &c., in the second\nthe duties of the four periods of religious life. In the seventh book\nhe discusses quality and intimate relation; in the first _\u00e1hnika_ he\nconsiders the qualities independent of thought, in the second those\nqualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In the\neighth book he examines \"indeterminate\" and \"determinate\" perception,\nand means of proof. In the ninth book he discusses the characteristics\nof intellect. In the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of\ninference.[156]\nThe method of this system is said to be threefold, \"enunciation,\"\n\"definition,\" and \"investigation.\"[157] \"But,\" it may be objected,\n\"ought we not to include 'division,' and so make the method fourfold,\nnot threefold?\" We demur to this, because \"division\" is really\nincluded in a particular kind of enunciation. Thus when we declare\nthat substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and\nintimate relation are the only six positive categories,--this is an\nexample of enunciation. If you ask \"What is the reason for this\ndefinite order of the categories?\" we answer as follows:--Since\n\"substance\" is the chief, as being the substratum of all the\ncategories, we enounce this first; next \"quality,\" since it resides in\nits generic character in all substances [though different substances\nhave different qualities]; then \"action,\" as it agrees with\n\"substance\" and \"quality\" in possessing \"generality;\"[158] then\n\"generality,\" as residing in these three; then \"particularity,\"\ninasmuch as it possesses \"intimate relation;\"[159] lastly, \"intimate\nrelation\" itself; such is the principle of arrangement.\nIf you ask, \"Why do you say that there are only six categories since\n'non-existence' is also one?\" we answer: Because we wish to speak of\nthe six as positive categories, _i.e._, as being the objects of\nconceptions which do not involve a negative idea. \"Still,\" the\nobjector may retort, \"how do you establish this definite number 'only\nsix'? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the\nthing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not? If it\nis thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it? and still more so,\nif it is not thoroughly ascertained? What sensible man, pray, spends\nhis strength in denying that a mouse has horns? Thus your definite\nnumber 'only six' fails as being inapplicable.\" This, however, we\ncannot admit; if darkness, &c., are allowed to form certainly a\nseventh category (as \"non-existence\"), we thus (by our definite\nnumber) deny it to be one of the six _positive_ categories,--and if\nothers attempt to include \"capacity,\" \"number,\" &c., which we allow\nto be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a\n_seventh_ category. But enough of this long discussion.\nSubstantiality, &c. (_dravyatv\u00e1di_), _i.e._, the genera of substance,\nquality, and action, are the definition of the triad substance,\nquality, and action respectively. The genus of substance (_dravyatva_)\nis that which, while it alike exists with intimate relation in the\n(eternal) sky and the (transitory) lotus, is itself eternal,[160] and\ndoes not exist with intimate relation in smell.[161]\nThe genus of quality (_gu\u1e47atva_) is that which is immediately\nsubordinate to the genus existence, and exists with intimate relation\nin whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause.[162] The genus of\naction (_karmatva_) is that which is immediately subordinate to the\ngenus existence, and is not found with intimate relation in anything\neternal.[163] Generality (or genus, _s\u00e1m\u00e1nya_) is that which is found\nin many things with intimate relation, and can never be the\ncounter-entity to emergent non-existence.[164] Particularity[165]\n(_vi\u015besha_) exists with intimate relation, but it is destitute of\ngenerality, which stops mutual non-existence.[166] Intimate relation\n(_samav\u00e1ya_) is that connection which itself has not intimate\nrelation.[167] Such are the definitions of the six categories.\nSubstance is ninefold,--earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space,\nsoul, and mind. The genera of earth, &c. (_p\u1e5bithiv\u00edtva_), are the\ndefinitions of the first four. The genus of earth is that generality\nwhich is immediately subordinate to substance, and resides in the same\nsubject with colour produced by baking.[168]\nThe genus of water is that generality which is found with intimate\nrelation in water, being also found in intimate relation in river and\nsea. The genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate\nrelation in fire, being also found with intimate relation in the moon\nand gold. The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to\nsubstance, and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the\nskin.[169]\nAs ether, space, and time, from their being single, cannot be\nsubordinate genera, their several names stand respectively for their\ntechnical appellations. Ether is the abode of particularity, and is\nfound in the same subject with the non-eternal (_janya_) special\nquality which is not produced by contact.[170]\nTime is that which, being a pervading substance, is the abode of the\nmediate cause[171] of that idea of remoteness (_paratva_) which is\nnot found with intimate relation in space;[172] while space is that\npervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is\nnot time.[173] The general terms _\u00e1tmatva_ and _manastva_ are the\nrespective definitions of soul (_\u00e1tman_) and mind (_manas_). The\ngeneral idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being\nalso found with intimate relation in that which is without form[174]\n(_am\u00fartta_). The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to\nsubstance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an\natom, but [unlike other atoms] not the intimate cause of any\nsubstance. There are twenty-four qualities; seventeen are mentioned\ndirectly in Ka\u1e47\u00e1da's S\u00fatras (i. 1, 6), \"colour, taste, smell, touch,\nnumber, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness,\nproximity, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and\neffort;\" and, besides these, seven others are understood in the word\n\"_and_,\" viz., gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit,\nand sound. Their respective genera (_r\u00fapatva_, &c.) are their several\ndefinitions. The class or genus of \"colour\" is that which is\nsubordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue. In\nthe same way may be formed the definitions of the rest.\n\"Action\" is fivefold, according to the distinction of throwing\nupwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going:\nrevolution, evacuating, &c., being included under \"going.\" The genus\nof throwing upwards, &c., will be their respective definitions. The\ngenus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it exists\nwith intimate relation, and is to be known as the mediate cause of\nconjunction with a higher place. In the same manner are to be made the\ndefinitions of throwing downwards, &c. Generality (or genus) is\ntwofold, extensive and non-extensive; existence is extensive as found\nwith intimate connection in substance and quality, or in quality and\naction; substance, &c., are non-extensive. The definition of\ngenerality has been given before. Particularity and intimate relation\ncannot be divided,--in the former case in consequence of the infinite\nnumber of separate particularities, in the latter from intimate\nrelation being but one; their definitions have been given before.\nThere is a popular proverb--\n\"Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction produced by\ndisjunction,--he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true\nVai\u015beshika;\" and therefore we will now show the manner of the\nproduction of duality, &c.\nThere is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object;\nthence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the\ndistinguishing perception _apeksh\u00e1buddhi_ [by which we apprehend \"this\nis one,\" \"this is one,\" &c.]; then the production of duality, _dvitva_\n(in the object);[175] then the knowledge of the abstract genus of\nduality (_dvitvatva_); then the knowledge of the quality duality as it\nexists in the two things; then imagination[176] (_sa\u1e43sk\u00e1ra_).[177]\nBut it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, &c., being thus\nproduced from _apeksh\u00e1buddhi_? The great doctor (Udayana) maintained\nthat _apeksh\u00e1buddhi_ must be the producer of duality, &c., because\nduality is never found separated from it, while, at the same time, we\ncannot hold _apeksh\u00e1buddhi_ as the cause only of its being known [and\ntherefore it follows that it must be the cause of its being\nproduced[178]], just as contact is with regard to sound. We, however,\nmaintain the same opinion by a different argument; duality, &c.,\ncannot be held to be made known (_j\u00f1\u00e1pya_) by that non-eternal\napprehension whose object is two or more individual unities (_i.e._,\n_apeksh\u00e1buddhi_), because these are qualities which reside in a\nplurality of subjects [and not in any one individual[179]] just as\n\"severalty\" does [and, therefore, as _apeksh\u00e1buddhi_ is not their\n_j\u00f1\u00e1paka_, it must be their _janaka_].\nNext we will describe the order of the successive destructions. From\n_apeksh\u00e1buddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the production of duality\n(_dvitva_), the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity;\nnext from the knowledge of the genus of duality (_dvitvatva_) arises,\nsimultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality, the\ndestruction of _apeksh\u00e1buddhi_; next from the destruction of\n_apeksh\u00e1buddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two\nsubstances, the destruction of the duality; next from the knowledge of\nthe two substances arises, simultaneously with the production of\nimagination (_sa\u1e43sk\u00e1ra_), the destruction of the knowledge of the\nquality; and next from imagination arises the destruction of the\nknowledge of the substances.\nThe evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another,\nand for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination, is to be\nfound in the following argument; these knowledges themselves which are\nthe subjects of the discussion _are_ successively destroyed by the\nrise of others produced from them, because knowledge, like sound, is a\nspecial quality of an all-pervading substance, and of momentary\nduration.[180] I may briefly add, that when you have the knowledge of\nthe genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two\nthings themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite to\nthe conjunction that produced the whole, in that case you have the\nsubsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its\nabiding-place (the two things); but where you have this separate\naction taking place simultaneously with the rise of _apeksh\u00e1buddhi_,\nthere you have the destruction of duality produced by the united\ninfluence of both.[181]\n_Apeksh\u00e1buddhi_ is to be considered as that operation of the mind\nwhich is the counter-entity to that emergent non-existence (_i.e._,\ndestruction) which itself causes a subsequent destruction.[182]\nNext we will inquire in how many moments, commencing with the\ndestruction of the compound of two atoms (the _dvya\u1e47uka_), another\ncompound of two atoms is produced, having colour, &c. In the course of\nthis investigation the mode of production will be explained. First,\nthe compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of\nsteps commencing with the contact of fire;[183] secondly, from the\nconjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black,\n&c., in the single atom; thirdly, from another conjunction of fire\narises the production of red, &c., in the atom; fourthly, from\nconjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action[184] in the\natom for the production of a substance; fifthly, by that action is\nproduced a separation of that atom from its former place; sixthly,\nthere is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that\nformer place; seventhly, is produced the conjunction with another\natom; eighthly, from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms;\nninthly, from the qualities, &c., of the causes (_i.e._, the atoms)\nare produced colour, &c., the qualities of the effect (_i.e._, the\n_dvya\u1e47uka_). Such is the order of the series of nine moments. The\nother two series,[185] that of the ten and that of the eleven moments,\nare omitted for fear of prolixity. Such is the mode of production, if\nwe hold (with the Vai\u015beshikas) that the baking process takes place in\nthe atoms of the jar.[186] The Naiy\u00e1yikas, however, maintain that the\nbaking process takes place in the jar.\n\"Disjunction produced by disjunction\" is twofold,--that produced by\nthe disjunction of the intimate [or material] causes only, and that\nproduced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause\n[_i.e._, the place]. We will first describe the former kind.\nIt is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the\n[material] cause which is inseparably connected with the effect\n[_i.e._, in one of the two halves of the pot], and produces a\ndisjunction from the other half, there is not produced at that time a\ndisjunction from the place or point of space occupied by the pot; and,\nagain, when there is a disjunction from that point of space occupied\nby the pot, the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary\nwith it, but has already taken place. For just as we never see smoke\nwithout its cause, fire, so we never see that effect of the breaking\nin the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of space,[187]\nwithout there having previously been the origination of that\ndisjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot\nwas brought into being. Therefore the action of breaking in the parts\nproduces the disjunction of one part from another, but not the\ndisjunction from the point of space; next, this disjunction of one\npart from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which\nhad brought the pot into existence; and thence arises the destruction\nof the pot, according to the principle, _cessante caus\u00e2 cessat\neffectus_. The pot being thus destroyed, that disjunction, which\nresides in both the halves (which are the material or intimate causes\nof the pot) during the time that is marked by the destruction of the\npot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half,\ninitiates, in the case of that half where the breaking began, a\ndisjunction from the point of space which had been connected with the\npot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no cause to\nproduce it.[188]\nBut the second kind is as follows:--As action which arises in the\nhand, and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact,\ninitiates a disjunction[189] from the points of space in which the\noriginal conjunction took place; and this is \"the disjunction of the\nintimate cause and the non-cause.\" When the action in the hand\nproduces an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates\nalso in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect and\nthe non-effect; thus the disjunction of the body [the intimate effect]\nand the points of space arises from the disjunction of the hand and\nthe points of space [the hand being an intimate or material cause of\nthe body, but the points of space being not a cause]. This second\ndisjunction is not produced by the action of the body, because the\nbody is supposed to be at the time inactive; nor is it produced by the\naction of the hand, because it is impossible that an action residing\nin some other place [as the hand] should produce the effect of\ndisjunction [in the body]. Therefore we conclude by exhaustion that we\nmust accept the view--that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause\nand the non-cause[190] which causes the second disjunction of the\nbody and the points of space.\nBut an opponent may here object that \"what you formerly stated (p.\n147) as to existence being denied of darkness, &c., is surely\nunreasonable; for, in fact, there are no less than four different\nopinions maintained on this point,--thus (_a._) the Bh\u00e1\u1e6d\u1e6da M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43sakas\nand the Ved\u00e1ntins hold that darkness is a substance; (_b._) \u015ar\u00eddhara\n\u00c1ch\u00e1rya[191] holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thus\ndarkness will be a quality]; (_c._) some of the Pr\u00e1bh\u00e1kara M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43sakas\nhold that it is the absence of the cognition of light; (_d._) the\nNaiy\u00e1yikas, &c., hold that it is the absence of light.\" In reply, we\nassert that as for the first alleged opinion (_a._) it is quite out of\nthe question, as it is consistent with neither of the two possible\nalternatives; for if darkness is a substance, it must either be one of\nthe nine well-known substances, earth, &c.,[192] or some different\none. But it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever one\nyou would place it, all the qualities of that substance should\ncertainly be found in it; nor can you, on the other hand, assert that\nit is some substance different from these nine, since, being in itself\ndestitute of qualities, it cannot properly be a substance at all [the\nvery definition of substance being \"that which is the substratum of\nqualities\"], and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different\nsubstance from the nine. But you may ask, \"How can you say that\ndarkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as possessed\nof the dark blue of the tam\u00e1la blossom?\" We reply, that this is merely\nan error, as when men say that the [colourless] sky is blue. But\nenough of this onslaught on ancient sages.[193] (_b._) Hence it\nfollows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it, since\nyou cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some\nsubstratum to receive it;[194] and again, we cannot conceive the eye\nas capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause,\nthe external light. Nor can we accept that it is an impression\nindependent of the eye [_i.e._, produced by the internal sense, mind],\nbecause the concurrence of the eye is not a superfluous but an\nindispensable condition to its being produced. Nor can you maintain\nthat \"absence or non-existence (_abh\u00e1va_[195]) is incapable of being\nexpressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we _do_ use\nsuch phrases as _tenebr\u00e6 oriuntur_, darkness cannot be a mere\nnon-existence\"]; because your assertion is too broad, as it would\ninclude such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse,\ndestruction, inattention,[196] &c. [and yet we all know that men do\nspeak of any of these things as past, present, or future, and yet all\nare cases of _abh\u00e1va_]. (_c._) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of\nthe cognition of light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ\nwhich perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it\nwould follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind [since it is\nthe mind which perceives cognitions].[197] Hence we conclude that the\nfourth or remaining opinion must be the true one, viz., that darkness\nis only the absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is\nvery difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the\nqualities of existence, for we all see that the quality happiness _is_\nattributed to the absence of pain, and the idea of separation is\nconnected with the absence of conjunction. And you need not assert\nthat \"this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced\nby the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an\nobject possessing colour,[198] as we see in the case of a jar's\nabsence,\" because by the very rule on which you rely, viz., that that\non which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on\nto perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no\ndependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend\nthereon to perceive this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort\nthat \"the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light] necessitates\nthe cognition of the place where the absence resides [and _this_ will\nrequire light],\" as such an assertion is quite untenable, for we\ncannot admit that in order to have a conception of absence it is\nnecessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides,\nelse we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, as is\nimplied in such an expression as \"the tumult has ceased.\"[199] Hence,\nhaving all these difficulties in his mind, the venerable Ka\u1e47\u00e1da\nuttered his aphorism [as an _ipse dixit_ to settle the question]:\n\"_Dravya-gu\u1e47a-karma-nish-patti-vaidharmy\u00e1d abh\u00e1vas tamas_\" (_Vai\u015b.\nS\u00fat._ v. 2, 19), \"Darkness is really non-existence, since it is\ndissimilar to the production of substances, qualities, or actions.\"\nThe same thing has been also established by the argument that darkness\nis perceived by the eye[200] [without light, whereas all substances,\nif perceptible at all, require the presence of light as well as of the\neye to be visible].\nNon-existence (_abh\u00e1va_) is considered to be the seventh category, as\nestablished by negative proofs. It may be concisely defined as that\nwhich, itself not having intimate relation, is _not_ intimate\nrelation;[201] and this is twofold, \"relative non-existence\"[202] and\n\"reciprocal non-existence.\"\nThe former is again divided into \"antecedent,\" \"emergent,\" and\n\"absolute.\" \"Antecedent\" is that non-existence which, though without\nany beginning, is not everlasting; \"emergent\" is that which, though\nhaving a beginning, is everlasting; \"absolute\" is that non-existence\nwhich abides in its own counter-entity;[203] \"reciprocal\nnon-existence\" is that which, being different from \"absolute,\" has yet\nno defined limit [_i.e._, no _terminus ad quem_ nor _terminus a quo_,\nas \"antecedent\" and \"emergent\" have].\nIf you raise the objection that \"'reciprocal non-existence' is really\nthe same as 'absolute non-existence,'\" we reply that this is indeed to\nlose one's way in the king's highroad; for \"reciprocal non-existence\"\nis that negation whose opposite is held to be identity, as \"a jar is\nnot cloth;\" but \"absolute non-existence\" is that negation whose\nopposite is connection, as \"there is no colour in the air.\"[204] Nor\nneed you here raise the objection that \"_abh\u00e1va_ can never be a means\nof producing any good to man,\" for we maintain that it is his _summum\nbonum_, in the form of final beatitude, which is only another term for\nthe absolute abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the\ncategory of _abh\u00e1va_].\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 154: The Vai\u015beshikas are called Aul\u00faky\u00e1\u1e25 in Hemachandra's\n_Abhidh\u00e1na-chint\u00e1ma\u1e47i_; in the V\u00e1yu-pur\u00e1\u1e47a (quoted in Aufrecht's\n_Catal_. p. 53 b, l. 23), Akshap\u00e1da, Ka\u1e47\u00e1da, Ul\u00faka, and Vatsa are\ncalled the sons of \u015aiva.]\n[Footnote 155: He is here called by his synonym Ka\u1e47abhaksha.]\n[Footnote 156: It is singular that this is inaccurate. The ninth book\ntreats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact,\n&c., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the\nqualities of the soul, and the three causes.]\n[Footnote 157: For this extract from the old _bh\u00e1shya_ of V\u00e1tsy\u00e1yana,\nsee Colebrooke's _Essays_ (new edition), vol. i. p. 285.]\n[Footnote 158: Cf. _Bh\u00e1sh\u00e1-parichchheda_, \u015bloka 14.]\n[Footnote 159: \"Particularity\" (_vi\u015besha_) resides by \"intimate\nrelation\" in the eternal atoms, &c.]\n[Footnote 160: This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would\napply to \"duality\" and \"conjunction.\"]\n[Footnote 161: This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply\nto \"existence\" (_satt\u00e1_), which is the _summum genus_, to which\nsubstance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.]\n[Footnote 162: Existence (_satt\u00e1_) is the genus of _dravya_, _gu\u1e47a_,\nand _kriy\u00e2_. _Dravya_ alone can be the intimate cause of anything; and\nall actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction and\ndisjunction. _Some_ qualities (as _sa\u1e43yoga_, _r\u00fapa_, &c.) may be\nmediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the\nessence of _gu\u1e47a_, as many gunas can never be mediate causes.]\n[Footnote 163: As all karmas are transitory, _karmatva_ is only found\nin the _anitya_. I correct in p. 105, line 20, _nity\u00e1-samavetatva_;\nthis is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College\nLibrary.]\n[Footnote 164: _I.e._, it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility,\nhowever, is found in time, space, &c.; to exclude these, therefore,\nthe former clause of the definition is added.]\n[Footnote 165: \"Particularity\" (whence the name Vai\u015beshika) is not\n\"individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning,\"--but it is\nthe individuality either of those eternal substances which, being\nsingle, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different\natomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth,\nwater, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be the _ne plus\nultra_, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own\nindivisible nature. Ballantyne translated _vi\u015besha_ as \"ultimate\ndifference.\" I am not sure whether the individual soul has _vi\u015besha_.]\n[Footnote 166: Mutual non-existence (_anyony\u00e1bh\u00e1va_) exists between\ntwo notions which have no property in common, as a \"pot is not cloth;\"\nbut the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.]\n[Footnote 167: \"_Samav\u00e1yasamband\u00e1bh\u00e1v\u00e1t samav\u00e1yo na j\u00e1ti\u1e25_,\" Siddh.\nMukt. (_Sa\u1e43yoga_ being a _gu\u1e47a_ has _gu\u1e47atva_ existing in it with\nintimate relation).]\n[Footnote 168: The feel or touch of earth is said to be \"neither hot\nnor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union\nwith fire\" (Bh\u00e1sh\u00e1-parichchheda, _sl._ 103, 104).]\n[Footnote 169: The organ of touch is an a\u00ebrial\nintegument.--_Colebrooke._]\n[Footnote 170: Sound is twofold,--\"produced from contact,\" as the\n_first_ sound, and \"produced from sound,\" as the _second_. _Janya_ is\nadded to exclude God's knowledge, while _sa\u1e43yog\u00e1janya_ excludes the\nsoul's, which is produced by contact, as of the soul and mind, mind\nand the senses, &c.]\n[Footnote 171: The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time\nwith some body, &c., existing in time,--this latter is the intimate\ncause, while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the\ninstrumental cause. In p. 106, line 12, read _adhikara\u1e47a\u1e43_.]\n[Footnote 172: _Paratva_ being of two kinds, _dai\u015bika_ and _k\u00e1lika_.]\n[Footnote 173: Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the\nlast, however, is not pervading but atomic.]\n[Footnote 174: The three other _pad\u00e1rthas_, beside soul, which are\n_am\u00fartta_,--time, ether, and space,--are not genera.]\n[Footnote 175: All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial,\n_i.e._, they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things\nthemselves--each being _one_; and they only become two, &c., by our\nchoosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.]\n[Footnote 176: _Sa\u1e43sk\u00e1ra_ is here the idea conceived by the\nmind--created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material\npreviously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or\nmind. (Cf. the tables in p. 153.)]\n[Footnote 177: Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the\noriginal, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.]\n[Footnote 178: Every cause must be either _j\u00f1\u00e1paka_ or _janaka_;\n_apeksh\u00e1buddhi_, not being the former, must be the latter.]\n[Footnote 179: _Apeksh\u00e1buddhi_ apprehends \"this is one,\" \"this is\none,\" &c.; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of\nthese, but in _both_ together.]\n[Footnote 180: The Vai\u015beshikas held that the j\u00edv\u00e1tman and space are\neach an all-pervading substance, but the individual portions of each\nhave different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is\nignorant of, and one portion of ether has sound when another portion\nhas not. Dr. R\u00f6er, in his version of the Bh\u00e1sh\u00e1-Parichchheda, has\nmistranslated an important S\u00fatra which bears on this point. It is said\nin S\u00fatra 26--\n _----ath\u00e1k\u00e1\u015ba\u015bar\u00edri\u1e47am, avy\u00e1pyav\u1e5bitti\u1e25 ksha\u1e47iko vi\u015besha-gu\u1e47a\n ishyate,_\nwhich does not mean \"the special qualities of ether and soul are\nlimitation to space and momentary duration,\" but \"the special\nqualities of ether and soul (_i.e._, sound, knowledge, &c.) are\nlimited to different portions and of momentary duration.\"]\n[Footnote 181: The author here mentions two other causes of the\ndestruction of _dvitva_ besides that already given in p. 152, l. 14\n(_apeksh\u00e1buddhi-n\u00e1\u015ba_), viz., _\u00e1\u015brayan\u00e1\u015ba_, and the united action of\n_both_:--\n2. Apeksh\u00e1buddhi |Avayava-vibh\u00e1ga |Avayava-kriy\u00e1.\n3. Dvitvotpatti and |Avayava-sa\u1e43yoga-n\u00e1\u015ba |Avayava-vibh\u00e1ga.\n4. Dvitvatvaj\u00f1\u00e1na |Dvitv\u00e1dh\u00e1rasya |Avayava-sa\u1e43yoga-n\u00e1\u015ba.\n5. Dvitvagu\u1e47a-buddhi|Dvitva-n\u00e1\u015ba |\u00c1dh\u00e1ra-n\u00e1\u015ba\n apeksh\u00e1buddhi-n\u00e1\u015ba |(of avayavin). |\nThe second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the\ncourse of the six steps of _ekatvaj\u00f1\u00e1na_, &c., one of the two parts is\nitself divided either at the _first_ or the _second_ moment. In the\nfirst case, the _dvitva_ of the whole is destroyed in the fifth\nmoment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately preceding\n_dvitv\u00e1dh\u00e1ra-n\u00e1\u015ba_, or, as M\u00e1dhava calls it, _\u00e1\u015brayaniv\u1e5bitti_. In the\nsecond case, the _n\u00e1\u015ba_ arrives at the same moment simultaneously by\nboth columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united\naction of two causes, _apeksh\u00e1buddhi-n\u00e1\u015ba_ and _\u00e1dh\u00e1ra-n\u00e1\u015ba_. Any\n_kriy\u00e1_ which arose in one of the parts after the second moment would\nbe unimportant, as the _n\u00e1\u015ba_ of the _dvitva_ of the whole would take\nplace by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and\nin this way it would be too late to affect that result.]\n[Footnote 182: _I.e._, from the destruction of _apeksh\u00e1buddhi_ follows\nthe destruction of _dvitva_; but the other destructions previously\ndescribed were followed by some production,--thus the knowledge of\n_dvitvatva_ arose from the destruction of _ekatvaj\u00f1\u00e1na_, &c. (cf.\nSiddh. Mukt., p. 107). I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the\ncounter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.]\n[Footnote 183: From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in\nthe atoms of the jar; thence a separation of one atom from another;\nthence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black\n(or unbaked) jar; thence the destruction of the compound of two\natoms.]\n[Footnote 184: _I.e._, a kind of initiative tendency.]\n[Footnote 185: These are explained at full length in the Siddh\u00e1nta\nMukt\u00e1val\u00ed, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have--1. the\ndestruction of the _dvya\u1e47uka_ and simultaneously a disjunction from\nthe old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts); 2. the\ndestruction of the black colour in the _dvya\u1e47uka_, and the\nsimultaneous destruction of the conjunction of the _dvya\u1e47uka_ with\nthat place; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the\nsimultaneous conjunction with another place; 4. the cessation of the\naction in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The\nremaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.]\n[Footnote 186: The Vai\u015beshikas hold that when a jar is baked, the old\nblack jar is _destroyed_, its several compounds of two atoms, &c.,\nbeing destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour\nin the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds,\neventually produces a new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps\nprevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of\nthe Ny\u00e1ya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different\ncompounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the\nold jar, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes\nnot the jar but its colour, &c.,--it is still the same jar, only it is\nred, not black.]\n[Footnote 187: In p. 109, line 14, I read\n_gaga\u1e47avibh\u00e1gakart\u1e5bitvasya_.]\n[Footnote 188: The Siddh\u00e1nta Mukt\u00e1val\u00ed, p. 112, describes the series\nof steps:--1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves; 2. the\ndisjunction of the two halves; 3. the destruction of the conjunction\nwhich originally produced the pot; 4. the destruction of the pot; 5.\nby the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the\nsevered half from the old place; 6. the destruction of the conjunction\nwith that old place; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the\ncessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the second\ndisjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced\nby the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the\npot.]\n[Footnote 189: The original has a plural _vibh\u00e1g\u00e1n_, _i.e._,\ndisjunctions from the several points.]\n[Footnote 190: _I.e._, the disjunction of the hand and the points of\nspace.]\n[Footnote 191: The author of a commentary on the Bhagavad G\u00edt\u00e1.]\n[Footnote 192: For _dravy\u00e1di_ read _p\u1e5bithivy\u00e1di_.]\n[Footnote 193: I am not sure that it would not be better to read\n_viddhavevidhay\u00e1_, rewounding the wounded, instead of _v\u1e5biddhav\u00edvadhay\u00e1_.]\n[Footnote 194: Unless you _see_ the rope you cannot mistake it for a\nserpent.]\n[Footnote 195: In p. 110, last line, read _'bh\u00e1ve_.]\n[Footnote 196: Read in p. 110, last line, _anavadh\u00e1n\u00e1dishu_.\n_Vidhipratyaya_ properly means an imperative or potential affix implying\n\"command;\" but the pandit takes _vidhi_ here as _bh\u00e1vabodhaka-kriy\u00e1_. It\nhas that meaning in K\u00e1vya-prak\u00e1\u015ba, V. (p. 114, l. 1).]\n[Footnote 197: The mind perceives _\u00e1loka-j\u00f1\u00e1na_, therefore it would\nperceive its absence, _i.e._, darkness, but this last is perceived by\nthe _eye_.]\n[Footnote 198: _I.e._, light possesses colour, and we cannot see a\njar's absence in the dark.]\n[Footnote 199: Sound resides in the imperceptible ether, and cessation\nis the _dhva\u1e43s\u00e1bh\u00e1va_, or \"emergent non-existence.\"]\n[Footnote 200: The reading _pratyayavedyatvena_ seems supported by p.\n110, last line, but it is difficult to trace the argument; I have,\ntherefore, ventured hesitatingly to read _pratyakshavedyatvena_, and\nwould refer to the commentary (Vai\u015b. S\u00fat. p. 250), \"_yadi hi\nn\u00edla-r\u00fapavan n\u00edla\u1e43 r\u00fapam eva v\u00e1 tama\u1e25 sy\u00e1t, v\u00e1hy\u00e1lokapragraham\nantare\u1e47a chakshush\u00e1 na g\u1e5bihyeta_.\"]\n[Footnote 201: Intimate relation has also no intimate relation.]\n[Footnote 202: \"Relative non-existence\" (_sa\u1e43sarg\u00e1bh\u00e1va_) is the\nnegation of a relation; thus \"the jar is not in the house\" is\n\"absolute non-existence,\" \"it was not in the house\" is \"antecedent,\"\nand \"it will not be in the house\" is \"emergent,\" non-existence.]\n[Footnote 203: _I.e._, the absolute absence of the jar is found in the\njar, as, of course, the jar does not reside in the jar, but in the\nspot of ground,--it is the _j\u00e1ti gha\u1e6datva_ which resides in the jar.]\n[Footnote 204: The opposite is \"there _is_ colour in the air.\"]\nCHAPTER XI.\nTHE AKSHAP\u00c1DA (OR NY\u00c1YA) DAR\u015aANA.\nThe principle that final bliss, _i.e._, the absolute abolition of\npain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a certain\nsense universally accepted], is established in a special sense as a\nparticular tenet[205] of the Ny\u00e1ya school, as is declared by the\nauthor of the aphorisms in the words \"proof, that which is to be\nproved, &c.,--from knowledge of the truth as to these things there is\nthe attainment of final bliss.\" This is the first aphorism of the\nNy\u00e1ya \u015a\u00e1stra. Now the Ny\u00e1ya \u015a\u00e1stra consists of five books, and each\nbook contains two \"daily portions.\" In the first daily portion of the\nfirst book the venerable Gotama discusses the definitions of nine\ncategories, beginning with \"proof,\" and in the second those of the\nremaining seven, beginning with \"discussion\" (_v\u00e1da_). In the first\ndaily portion of the second book he examines \"doubt,\" discusses the\nfour kinds of \"proof,\" and refutes the suggested objections to their\nbeing instruments of right knowledge; and in the second he shows that\n\"presumption,\" &c., are really included in the four kinds of \"proof\"\nalready given [and therefore need not be added by the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43sakas as\nseparate ones]. In the first daily portion of the third book he\nexamines the soul, the body, the senses, and their objects; in the\nsecond, \"understanding\" (_buddhi_), and \"mind\" (_manas_). In the first\ndaily portion of the fourth book he examines \"volition\" (_prav\u1e5bitti_),\nthe \"faults,\" \"transmigration,\" \"fruit\" [of actions], \"pain,\" and\n\"final liberation;\" in the second he investigates the truth[206] as to\nthe causes of the \"faults,\" and also \"wholes\" and \"parts.\" In the\nfirst daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds\nof futility (_j\u00e1ti_), and in the second the various kinds of \"occasion\nfor rebuke\" (_nigrahasth\u00e1na_, or \"unfitness to be argued with\").\nIn accordance with the principle that \"to know the thing to be\nmeasured you must first know the measure,\" \"proof\" (_pram\u00e1\u1e47a_) is\nfirst enunciated, and as this must be done by defining it, we have\nfirst a definition of \"proof.\" \"Proof\" is that which is always\naccompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined\nfrom the proper instruments [as the eye, &c.], and from the site of\nknowledge [_i.e._, the soul];[207] and this definition thus includes\nthe peculiar tenet of the Ny\u00e1ya School that God is a source of right\nknowledge,[208] as the author of the aphorisms has expressly declared\n(ii. 68), \"and the fact of the Veda's being a cause of right\nknowledge, like spells and the medical science, follows from the fact\nthat the fit one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge.\"\nAnd thus too hath the universally renowned teacher Udayana, who saw to\nthe farthest shore of the ocean of logic, declared in the fourth\nchapter of the Kusum\u00e1\u00f1jali:\n\"Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right knowing is the\npossession thereof; authoritativeness is, according to Gotama's\nschool, the being separated from all absence thereof.\n\"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to Him\nand dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various\nexisting objects is contained,--all the chaff of our suspicion being\nswept away by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the\nslightest want of observation in Him,--He, \u015aiva, is my authority; what\nhave I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be\nwith rising doubts?\"\n\"Proof\" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, inference,\nanalogy, and testimony. The \"thing to be proved\" [or the \"object of\nright notion\"] is of twelve kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their\nobjects, understanding, mind, volition, faults, transmigrations,\nfruit, pain, and final liberation. \"Doubt\" is a knowledge whose nature\nis uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being caused by the object's\npossessing only qualities which are common to other things also, and\ntherefore not distinctive,--or by its possessing only irrelevant\nqualities of its own, which do not help us in determining the\nparticular point in question,[209]--or by conflicting testimony. The\nthing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is \"a\nmotive\" (_prayojana_); this is twofold, _i.e._, visible and invisible.\n\"An example\" is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a\ngeneral principle, and it may be either affirmative or negative.[210]\nA \"tenet\" (_siddh\u00e1nta_) is something which is accepted as being\nauthoritatively settled as true; it is of four kinds, as being \"common\nto all the schools,\" \"peculiar to one school,\" \"a pregnant assumption\"\n[leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion], and \"an implied\ndogma\" (i. 26-31). The \"member\" (of a demonstration) is a part of the\nsentence containing an inference for the sake of another; and these\nare five, the proposition, the reason, the example, the application,\nand the conclusion (i. 32-38). \"Confutation\" (_tarka_, i. 39) is the\nshowing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission\nof a false major[211] (cf. S\u00fat. i. 39, and iv. 3); and this is of\neleven kinds, as _vy\u00e1gh\u00e1ta_, _\u00e1tm\u00e1\u015braya_, _itaretar\u00e1\u015braya_, &c.\n\"Ascertainment\" (_nir\u1e47aya_, i. 40) is right knowledge or a perception\nof the real state of the case. It is of four kinds as produced by\nperception, inference, analogy, or testimony. \"Discussion\" (_v\u00e1da_) is\na particular kind of conversation, having as its end the ascertainment\nof truth (i. 41). \"Wrangling\" (_jalpa_) is the talk of a man only\nwishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments for either side\nof the question (i. 42). \"Cavilling\" (_vita\u1e47d\u00e1_) is the talk of a man\nwho does not attempt to establish his own side of the question (i.\n43). \"Dialogue\" (_kath\u00e1_) is the taking of two opposite sides by two\ndisputants. A \"fallacy\" is an inconclusive reason which is supposed to\nprove something, and this may be of five kinds, the \"erratic,\" the\n\"contradictory,\" the \"uncertain,\" the \"unproved,\" and the \"precluded\"\nor \"mistimed\" (S\u00fat. i. 44-49). \"Unfairness\" (_chhala_) is the bringing\nforward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous\nsense; this is of three kinds, as there may be fraud in respect of a\nterm, the meaning, or a metaphorical phrase (i. 50-54). \"Futility\"\n(_j\u00e1ti_) is a self-destructive argument (i. 58). This is of\ntwenty-four kinds (as described in the fifth book of the Ny\u00e1ya\naphorisms) (1-38). \"Occasion for rebuke\" is where the disputant loses\nhis cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two kinds (as\ndescribed in the fifth book of the aphorisms, 44-67). We do not insert\nhere all the minute subdivisions through fear of being too\nprolix,--they are fully explained in the aphorisms.\nBut here an objector may say, \"If these sixteen topics, proof, &c.,\nare all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name\nof the Ny\u00e1ya \u015a\u00e1stra, [as reasoning, _i.e._, _Ny\u00e1ya_, or logic,\nproperly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?]\"\nWe allow the force of the objection; still as names are proverbially\nsaid to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name\nNy\u00e1ya was rightly applied to Gotama's system, since \"reasoning,\" or\ninference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant\nfeature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its\nbeing a necessary means for every kind of pursuit. So it has been said\nby Sarvaj\u00f1a, \"This is the pre-eminent science of Ny\u00e1ya from its\nestablishing our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing\naction;\"[212] and by Pakshila Sw\u00e1min, \"This is the science of\nreasoning (_\u00e1nv\u00edkshik\u00ed_) divided into the different categories,\n'proof,' &c.; the lamp of all sciences, the means for aiding all\nactions, the ultimate appeal of all religious duties, well proved in\nthe declarations of science.\"[213]\nBut here an objector may say, \"When you declare that final liberation\narises from the knowledge of the truth, do you mean that liberation\nensues immediately upon this knowledge being attained?\" We reply,\n\"No,\" for it is said in the second Ny\u00e1ya aphorism, \"Pain, birth,\nactivity, faults, false notions,--on the successive annihilation of\nthese in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it,\"\nby means of this knowledge of the truth. Now false notions are the\nthinking the body, &c., which are not the soul, to be the soul;\n\"faults\" are a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the\nsoul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to\nit,[214] though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable\nto the soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different\n\"faults\" the stupid man desires and the desiring man is stupid; the\nstupid man is angry, and the angry man is stupid. Moreover the man,\nimpelled by these faults, does those things which are forbidden: thus\nby the body he does injury, theft, &c.; by the voice, falsehood, &c.;\nby the mind, malevolence, &c.; and this same sinful \"activity\"\nproduces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by his body,\nas alms, saving others, &c., truthful speaking, upright counsel, &c.,\nby his voice, and guilelessness, &c., by his mind; and this same right\nactivity produces merit. But both are forms of activity, and each\nleads to a similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation;\nand while this birth lasts there arises the impression of \"pain,\"\nwhich we are conscious of as of something that jars against us. Now\nthis series, beginning with \"false notions\" and ending with \"pain,\" is\ncontinually going on, and is what we mean by the words \"mundane\nexistence,\" which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And\nwhenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his previous good\ndeeds, obtains through the teaching of a great teacher the knowledge\nthat all this present life is only a scene of pain and bound up with\npain, he recognises that it is all to be avoided, and desires to\nabolish the ignorance, &c., which are the causes that produced\nit.[215] Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the\nknowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on the objects of right\nknowledge divided into the four sciences,[216] there arises in his\nmind the knowledge of the truth, or, in other words, a right view of\nthings as they are; and from this knowledge of the truth false notions\ndisappear. When false notions disappear, the \"faults\" pass away; with\nthem ceases \"activity;\" and with it ceases \"birth;\" and with the\ncessation of \"birth\" comes the entire abolition of \"pain,\" and this\nabsolute abolition is final bliss. Its absoluteness consists in this,\nthat nothing similar to that which is thus abolished can ever revive,\nas is expressly said in the second aphorism of the Ny\u00e1ya S\u00fatras:\n\"Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,--since, on the\nsuccessive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of\nthe one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of\nthem] final beatitude.\"\n\"But is not your definition of the _summum bonum_, liberation, _i.e._,\n'the absolute abolition of pain,' after all as much beyond our reach\nas treacle on the elbow is to the tongue;[217] why then is this\ncontinually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute?\"\nWe reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do\ninclude therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition, as\nbeing thus a tenet accepted in all the schools, may well be called the\nroyal highway[218] of philosophy. No one, in fact, maintains that pain\nis possible without the individual's activity. Thus even the\nM\u00e1dhyamika's opinion that \"liberation consists in the abolition of\nsoul,\" does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it is\nthe abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that the soul, as\nbeing the cause of pain, is to be abolished just like the body, &c.,\nwe reply that this does not hold, since it fails under either\nalternative. For do you mean by \"the soul,\" (_a._) the continued\nsuccession of cognitions, or (_b._) something different therefrom?\n(_a._) If the former, we make no objection, [since we Naiy\u00e1yikas allow\nthat cognition is evanescent,[219] and we do desire to abolish\ncognition as a cause of _prav\u1e5bitti_ or action[220]], for who would\noppose a view which makes for his own side? (_b._) But if the latter,\nthen, since it must be eternal,[221] its abolition is impossible; and,\nagain, a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your\nsupposed \"_summum bonum_;\" for surely no sensible person would strive\nto annihilate the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the\nprinciple that \"everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;\"\nand, again, everybody uses such a phrase as \"liberated,\" [and this\nvery term refutes the idea of annihilation or abolition].\n\"But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the doctrine of pure\nintelligence [_i.e._, the Yog\u00e1ch\u00e1ras and the Sautr\u00e1ntikas[222]], that\n'the _summum bonum_' is the rising of pure intelligence consequent on\nthe cessation of the conscious subject?\" To this view we object that\nthere is an absence of means; and also it cannot be established that\nthe locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For the former,\nif it is replied that the well-known fourfold set of Bauddha\ncontemplations[223] are to be accepted as the cause, we answer that,\nas [according to the Bauddha tenet of the momentary existence of all\nthings] there cannot be one abiding subject of these contemplations,\nthey will necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued at\nirregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce any distinct\nrecognition of the real nature of things.\nAnd for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions when\naccompanied by the natural obstacles[224] is said to be \"bound,\" and\nwhen freed from those obstacles is said to be \"liberated,\" you cannot\nestablish an identity of the subject in the two states so as to be\nable to say that the very same being which _was_ bound _is_ now\nliberated.\nNor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that \"Liberation is the\nreleasing from all 'obstructions,'\" a path entirely free from bars to\nimpede the wayfarer. Pray, will our Jaina friend kindly inform us what\nhe means by \"obstruction\"?[225] If he answers \"merit, demerit, and\nerror,\" we readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that \"the\nbody is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is the continual\nupspringing of the soul consequent on the body's annihilation, as of\na parrot released from its cage,\" then we must inquire whether this\nsaid soul possesses form or not. If it possesses form, then has it\nparts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the well-known\ndefinition of an atom will apply here as \"that which has form without\nparts,\" it will follow that the attributes of the soul are, like those\nof an atom, imperceptible to the senses.[226] If you say that it has\nparts, then the general maxim that \"whatever has parts is\nnon-eternal,\" would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal; and if\nthis were conceded, then two grand difficulties [against the\nProvidential course of the world] would burst in unopposed, viz., that\nwhat the soul has done would, at its cessation, perish with it [and\nthus fail of producing the proper fruit], while it would have reaped\nduring life the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil\nwhich happened to it would not be the consequences of its actions in a\nformer birth]. If, on the other hand, the Jaina maintains that the\nsoul does not possess form at all, then how can he talk of the soul's\n\"upspringing,\" since all such actions as motion necessarily involve an\nagent possessing form?[227]\nAgain, if we take the Ch\u00e1rv\u00e1ka's view \"that the only bondage is\ndependence on another, and therefore independence is the true\nliberation,\"--if by \"independence\" he means the cessation of pain, we\nhave no need to controvert it. But if he means autocratic power, then\nno sensible man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power\ninvolves the idea of a capability of being increased and of being\nequalled.[228]\nAgain, the S\u00e1nkhya opinion, which first lays down that nature and soul\nare utterly distinct, and then holds that \"liberation is the soul's\nremaining as it is in itself after nature [on being known] has\nwithdrawn,\"--even this opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of\npain; but there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of\nthe distinction between nature and soul resides in the soul or in\nnature. It is not consistent to say that it resides in the soul, since\nthe soul is held to be unchangeable, and this would seem to involve\nthat previously it had been hampered by ignorance; nor can we say that\nit resides in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent.\nMoreover, is nature spontaneously active or inactive? If the former,\nthen it follows that there can be no liberation at all, since the\nspontaneous actions of things cannot be set aside; and if the latter,\nthe course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on.\nAgain, we have the same recognition of our \"abolition of pain\" in the\ndoctrine of Bha\u1e6d\u1e6da Sarvaj\u00f1a and his followers, that \"Liberation is the\nmanifestation of an eternal happiness incapable of being increased;\"\nbut here we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not\ncome within the range of definite proof. If you allege \u015aruti as the\nproof, we reply that \u015aruti has no place when the thing itself is\nprecluded by a valid non-perception;[229] or if you allow its\nauthority, then you will have to concede the existence of such things\nas floating stones.[230]\n\"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the manifestation of\nhappiness,' and then accept such a view as that which holds it to be\nonly the cessation of pain, does not your conduct resemble that of the\ndyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour\nrice-gruel?\" Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter for some\nspeech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical argument]. The\ntruth is that all happiness must be included under the category of\npain, since, like honey mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by\npain, either as admitting of increase,[231] or as being an object of\nperception, or as being exposed to many hostile influences, or as\ninvolving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds of instruments for\nits production. Nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the\nproverb of \"seeking one thing and dropping another in the search,\"\nsince we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some\nincidental pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite alternative\nis one which no one can consider desirable. For the truth is that any\nattempt to establish happiness as the _summum bonum_, since it is\ninevitably accompanied by various causes of pain, is only like the man\nwho would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that\nit was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got together by\nrightful means, we may find many firefly-like pleasures; but then how\nmany are the rainy days to drown them? And in the case of those got\ntogether by wrong means, the mind cannot even conceive the future\nissue which will be brought about. Let our intelligent readers\nconsider all this, and not attempt to disguise their own conscious\nexperience. Therefore it is that we hold it as indisputable that for\nhim, pre-eminent among his fellows, who, through the favour of the\nSupreme Being, has, by the regular method of listening to the revealed\n\u015aruti, &c., attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the\nsoul, for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation.\nBut it may be objected, \"Is there any proof at all for the existence\nof a Supreme Being, _i.e._, perception, inference, or \u015aruti? Certainly\nperception cannot apply here, since the Deity, as devoid of form, &c.,\nmust be beyond the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no\nuniversal proposition or true middle term which can apply.[232] Nor\ncan \u015aruti, since neither of the resulting alternatives can be\nsustained; for is it supposed to reveal, as being itself eternal, or\nas non-eternal? Under the former view an established tenet of our\nschool would be contradicted [viz., that the Veda is non-eternal];\nunder the latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.[233] As for\ncomparison and any other proof which might be adduced [as that\nsometimes called presumption, &c.], they need not be thought of for a\nmoment, as their object matter is definitely limited, and cannot apply\nto the present case.[234] Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as\nunreal as a hare's horn.\" But all this elaborate disputation need\nexcite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at\nonce met by the old argument, \"The mountain, seas, &c., must have had\na maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar.\"\n(_a._) Nor can our middle term [possessing the nature of effects] be\nrejected as unproved (_asiddha_), since it can be established beyond a\ndoubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts. \"But what are we\nto understand by this 'possessing parts'? Is it 'existing in contact\nwith parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? It cannot be the\nfirst, since this would equally apply to such eternal things as\nether,[235] &c.; nor can it be the second, since this would prove too\nmuch, as applying to such cases as the [eternal] species, thread,\nwhich abides in intimate relation with the individual threads. It\ntherefore fails as a middle term for your argument.\" We reply, that it\nholds if we explain the \"possessing parts\" as \"belonging to the class\nof those substances which exist in intimate relation.\"[236] Or we may\nadopt another view and maintain that it is easy to infer the\n\"possessing the nature of effects\" from the consideration of their\npossessing intermediate magnitude.[237]\n(_b._) Nor can our middle term be rejected as \"contradictory\"\n(_viruddha_),[238] since there is no such acknowledged universal\nproposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term\nto that in our syllogism [_i.e._, that they must have had no maker].\n(_c._) Nor is our middle term too general (_anaik\u00e1nta_), since it is never\nfound in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is the _vipaksha_ in\nthe argument, \"The mountain has fire because it has smoke\"]. (_d._) Nor\nagain is it precluded (_b\u00e1dhita_ or _k\u00e1l\u00e1tyayopadish\u1e6da_), for there is no\nsuperior evidence to exercise such a precluding power. (_e._) Nor is it\ncounter-balanced (_sat-pratipakshita_), for there does not appear to be\nany such equally valid antagonist.\nIf you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism, \"The mountains,\n&c., cannot have had a maker, from the fact that they were not\nproduced by a body, just as is the case with the eternal ether,\"--this\npretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn\ncan stand the attack of the full-grown lion; for the additional words\n\"by a body\" are useless, since \"from the fact that they were not\nproduced\" would be a sufficient middle term by itself [and the\nargument thus involves the fallacy called _vy\u00e1pyatv\u00e1siddhi_].[239] Nor\ncan you retort, \"Well, let this then be our middle term;\" for you\ncannot establish it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise\nthe smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable\nto limitation by any suggested condition (_up\u00e1dhi_),[240] [such as\n\"the being produced by a corporeal agent,\" to limit our old reason\n\"from having the nature of effects\"], because we have on our side a\nvalid line of argument to establish our view, viz., \"If the mountains,\n&c., had no maker, then they would not be effects\" [but all do\nacknowledge that they have the nature of effects], for in this world\nthat is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently\nof any series of concurrent causes. And this series inevitably\ninvolves the idea of some sort of maker; and I mean by \"being a maker\"\nthe being possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act,\nand knowledge of the proper means, which sets in motion all other\ncauses, but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold that if\nthe necessity of a maker were overthrown, the necessity of the action\nof all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown, since\nthese are dependent thereon; and this would lead to the monstrous\ndoctrine that effects could be produced without any cause at all.\nThere is a rule laid down by \u015aa\u1e45kara-ki\u1e45kara which applies directly to\nthe present case--\n \"When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to\n establish its validity,\n \"Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on\n account of the [supposed] non-invariable concomitance of the\n major term.\"\nIf you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments, such as\n\"If the Supreme Being were a maker, He would be possessed of a body,\"\n&c., we reply, that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent,\nwhether we allow that Supreme Being's existence to be established or\nAs has been said by Udayana \u00c1ch\u00e1rya [in the Kusum\u00e1\u00f1jali, iii. 5]--\n \"If \u015aruti, &c., have any authority, your negative argument\n fails from being precluded; if they are fallacious, our old\n objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than\nNor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our\nargument, since it would be overthrown by either alternative of God's\nbeing known or unknown.[242]\n\"Well, let all this be granted; but the activity of God in creating\nthe world, what end did it have in view? His own advantage or some\nother being's? If it was for the former end, was it in order to attain\nsomething desired, or to avoid something not desired? It could not be\nthe first, because this would be quite incongruous in a being who\npossesses every possible desire gratified; and for the same reason too\nit could not be the second. If it was for the latter end [the\nadvantage of another] it would be equally incongruous; for who would\ncall that being \"wise\" who busied himself in acting for another? If\nyou replied that His activity was justified by compassion, any one\nwould at once retort that this feeling of compassion should have\nrather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and not\ncheckered with misery, since this militates against His compassion;\nfor we define compassion as the disinterested wish to avoid causing\nanother pain. Hence we conclude that it is not befitting for God to\ncreate the world.\" This has been said by Bha\u1e6d\u1e6d\u00e1ch\u00e1rya--\n \"Not even a fool acts without some object in view;\n \"Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would\n be left undone by Him?\"--\nWe reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be pleased for\na moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following\nsuggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by\ncompassion; but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of\nhappiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there\ncannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which\nwill ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be\ncreated. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own\nindependence [as He would thus seem to depend on others' actions],\nsince there is the well-known saying, \"One's own body does not hinder\none;\" nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims;[243] and for this\nthere is authority in such passages of the Veda as that (in the\n\u015avet\u00e1\u015bvatara Upanishad, iii. 2), \"There is one Rudra only; he\nadmits[244] not of a second,\" &c. \"But then how will you remedy your\ndeadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? [for you have to prove the\nVeda by the authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's\nexistence by the Veda\"]. We reply, that we defy you to point out any\nreasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this \"reciprocal\ndependence of each,\" which you call \"reasoning in a circle,\" in regard\nto their being produced or in regard to their being known?[245] It\ncannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is\ndependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no\npossibility of _His_ being produced; nor can it be in regard to their\nbeing known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the\nVeda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again,\ncan it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda,\nfor the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any _yogin_\nendowed with the transcendent faculties (_t\u00edvra_,[246] &c.)\nTherefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of\nduties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is\nobtained; thus everything is clear.\nNOTE ON PAGES 172, 173.\nWe have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or _hetv\u00e1bh\u00e1sas_\nof the modern Hindu logic (cf. _Siddh\u00e1ntamukt._, \u00a7 71, _Tarkasa\u1e43gr._,\n55-67), viz., _anaik\u00e1nta_, _viruddha_, _asiddha_, _k\u00e1l\u00e1tyayopadish\u1e6da_\nor _b\u00e1dhita_, and _pratipakshita_ or _sat-pratipaksha_. The four first\nof these generally correspond to the _savyabhich\u00e1ra_ or \"erratic,\"\n_viruddha_ or \"contradictory,\" _s\u00e1dhyasama_ or \"unproved,\" and\n_at\u00edtak\u00e1la_ or \"mistimed,\" _i.e._, \"precluded,\" as given in the list\nof fallacies of the older logic in p. 164; but _pratipakshita_\ncorresponds imperfectly to _prakara\u1e47asama_. The _prakara\u1e47asama_ or\n\"uncertain\" reason is properly that reason which is equally available\nfor both sides, as, _e.g._, the argument, \"Sound is eternal because it\nis audible,\" which could be met by the equally plausible argument,\n\"Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;\" or, according to other\nauthorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same\ndifficulties as the original question, as, _e.g._, \"sound is\nnon-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;\" here\nthis alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old\nquestion, \"Is sound eternal?\" But the _pratipakshita_ reason is one\nwhich is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as \"Sound is\neternal because it is audible,\" and \"Sound is non-eternal because it\nis a product.\"\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 205: Cf. Ny\u00e1ya S\u00fatras, i. 29.]\n[Footnote 206: In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I read\n_doshanimitta-tattva_ for _doshanimittakatva_ (compare Ny\u00e1ya S\u00fat. iv.\n[Footnote 207: Without this last clause the definition might include\nthe objects (_vishaya_), as these are, of course, connected with right\nknowledge.]\n[Footnote 208: \u00cd\u015bvara is a cause of right knowledge (_pram\u00e1\u1e47a_)\naccording to the definition, because he is _pram\u00e1y\u00e1 \u00e1\u015braya\u1e25_.]\n[Footnote 209: On this compare Siddh\u00e1nta-Mukt\u00e1vali, p. 115.]\n[Footnote 210: On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol.\n[Footnote 211: \"Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no\nsmoke in the hill if there be no fire, while we _see_ the smoke, is\nthe confutation of there being no fire in the hill\" (_Ballantyne_).\nOr, in other words, \"the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke\n(_vy\u00e1paka_) if it has the absence-of-fire (the false _vy\u00e1pya_\").]\n[Footnote 212: Action (_prav\u1e5bitti_) follows after the ascertainment of\nthe truth by _ny\u00e1ya_.]\n[Footnote 213: Cp. V\u00e1tsy\u00e1yana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition\nreads _prak\u00edrtit\u00e1_ for _par\u00edkshit\u00e1_.]\n[Footnote 214: The printed text omits the third fault, \"a stupid\nindifference, _moha_,\" which is however referred to presently.]\n[Footnote 215: In p. 116, line 3, I would read _tannirvartakam_ for\n_tannivartakam_.]\n[Footnote 216: This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu\nauthors, \"Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the\neternal doctrine of polity,--these four sciences are the causes of the\nstability of the world\" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It occurs in K\u00e1mandaki's\n_N\u00edtis\u00e1ra_, ii. 2, and seems to be referred to in V\u00e1tsy\u00e1yana's Com. p.\n3, from which M\u00e1dhava is here borrowing.]\n[Footnote 217: Compare the English proverb, \"As soon as the cat can\nlick her ear.\"]\n[Footnote 218: Literally the \"bell-road,\" _i.e._, \"the chief road\nthrough a village, or that by which elephants, &c., decorated with\ntinkling ornaments, proceed.\"--_Wilson's Dict._]\n[Footnote 219: The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains\nduring the second, and ceases in the third.]\n[Footnote 220: See Ny\u00e1ya S\u00fat. i. 2.]\n[Footnote 221: As otherwise why should we require liberation at all?\nOr rather the author probably assumes that other Naiy\u00e1yikas have\nsufficiently established this point against its opponents, cf. p. 167,\nline 11.]\n[Footnote 222: See _supra_, pp. 24-32.]\n[Footnote 223: All is momentary, all is pain, all is _sui generis_,\nall is unreal.]\n[Footnote 224: In the form of the various _kle\u015bas_ or \"afflictions.\"]\n[Footnote 225: _\u00c1vara\u1e47a_, cf. pp. 55, 58.]\n[Footnote 226: But the Ny\u00e1ya holds that the attributes of the soul, as\nhappiness, desire, aversion, &c., are perceived by the internal sense,\nmind (Bh\u00e1sh\u00e1 P. \u00a7 83).]\n[Footnote 227: The reading _m\u00fartapratibandh\u00e1t_ is difficult, but I\nbelieve that _pratibandha_ means here _vy\u00e1pti_, as it does in S\u00e1nkhya\nS\u00fatras, i. 100.]\n[Footnote 228: The true _summum bonum_ must be\n_nirati\u015baya_,--incapable of being added to.]\n[Footnote 229: _Yogy\u00e1nupalabdhi_ is when an object is not seen, and\nyet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye,\nlight, &c.]\n[Footnote 230: Alluding to the Vedic phrase, \"_gr\u00e1v\u00e1na\u1e25 plavanti_,\"\nsee Uttara Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phrase _a\u015bm\u00e1na\u1e25 plavanti_ occurs\nin Sha\u1e0dv. Br. 5, 12.]\n[Footnote 231: Or perhaps \"capable of being surpassed.\"]\n[Footnote 232: Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.]\n[Footnote 233: Since the Veda, if non-eternal, must [to be\nauthoritative] have been created by God, and yet it is brought forward\nto reveal the existence of God.]\n[Footnote 234: The Ny\u00e1ya holds presumption to be included under\ninference, and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the\nrelation of a name to the thing named.]\n[Footnote 235: Since ether is connected by contact with the parts of\neverything, as _e.g._, a jar.]\n[Footnote 236: The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in\nits parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances,\nether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and\nair, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the category\n_vi\u015besha_ does reside in them by intimate relation. The word\n\"substances\" excludes _tantutva_, and \"existing in intimate relation\"\nexcludes ether, &c.]\n[Footnote 237: Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all\neternal substances being the one or the other.]\n[Footnote 238: The _viruddha-hetu_ is that which is never found where\nthe major term is.]\n[Footnote 239: This and much more of the whole discussion is taken\nfrom the Kusum\u00e1\u00f1jali, v. 2, and I extract my note on the passage\nthere. \"The older Naiy\u00e1yikas maintained that the argument 'the\nmountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of\nvy\u00e1pyatv\u00e1siddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily\nrestricted (see Siddh\u00e1nta Mukt\u00e1v. p. 77). The moderns, however, more\nwisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the\nobjection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the\nvalidity of the assumed middle term.\"]\n[Footnote 240: For the _up\u00e1dhi_ cf. pp. 7, 8.]\n[Footnote 241: As in the former case it would be clear that it is a\nsubject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable\nto the fault of _\u00e1\u015bray\u00e1siddhi_, a \"baseless inference,\" since your\nsubject (or minor term), being itself non-existent, cannot be the\nlocus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusum\u00e1\u00f1jali, iii. 2). \"Just as\nthat subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be\nunreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation.\"]\n[Footnote 242: If God is known, then His existence must be granted; if\nHe is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15, 16, in\np. 120 of the Calcutta edition, _vikalpapar\u00e1hatatv\u00e1t_, and then begin\nthe next clause with _sy\u00e1d etat_. The printed text, _vikalpapar\u00e1hata\u1e25\nsy\u00e1t tad etat_, seems unintelligible.]\n[Footnote 243: The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes\nHira\u1e47yagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world\nas creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly\nconstitutes his gross body (vir\u00e1j).]\n[Footnote 244: The usual reading is _tasthur_ for _tasthe_.]\n[Footnote 245: For these divisions of the _anyony\u00e1\u015braya_ fallacy, see\n_Ny\u00e1yas\u00fatra v\u1e5bitti_, i. 39 (p. 33).]\n[Footnote 246: For _t\u00edvra_ cf. _Yoga s\u00fatras_, i. 21, 22.]\nCHAPTER XII.\nTHE JAIMINI-DAR\u015aANA.\nAn objector may here ask, \"Are you not continually repeating that\nmerit (_dharma_) comes from the practice of duty (_dharma_), but how\nis duty to be defined or proved?\" Listen attentively to my answer. A\nreply to this question has been given in the older[247] M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 by the\nholy sage Jaimini. Now the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 consists of twelve books.[248] In\nthe first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections\nof words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (_vidhi_),\n\"explanatory passage\" (_arthav\u00e1da_), hymn (_mantra_), tradition\n(_sm\u1e5biti_), and \"name.\" In the second, certain subsidiary discussions\n[as _e.g._, on _ap\u00farva_] relating to the difference of various rites,\nrefutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of\nperformance [as in \"constant\" and \"voluntary\" offerings]. In the\nthird, _\u015aruti_, \"sign\" or \"sense of the passage\" (_li\u1e45ga_), \"context\"\n(_v\u00e1kya_), &c., and their respective weight when in apparent\nopposition to one another, the ceremonies called _pratipatti-karm\u00e1\u1e47i_,\nthings mentioned incidentally (_an\u00e1rabhy\u00e1dh\u00edta_), things accessory to\nseveral main objects, as _pray\u00e1jas_, &c., and the duties of the\nsacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the\nprincipal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the _juh\u00fa_ being\nmade of the _butea frondosa_, &c., and the dice-playing, &c., which\nform subordinate parts of the _r\u00e1jas\u00faya_ sacrifice. In the fifth, the\nrelative order of different passages of _\u015aruti_, &c., the order of\ndifferent parts of a sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at the\n_v\u00e1japeya_], the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and\nthe respective force of the words of _\u015aruti_, order of mention, &c.,\nin determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons\nqualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for\nenjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory\nrites, the _sattra_ offerings, things proper to be given, and the\ndifferent sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the\nceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic\ntext, and then as inferred by \"name\" or \"sign.\" In the eighth,\ntransference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed\n\"sign,\" or by the predominant \"sign,\" and cases where no transference\ntakes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the\nadaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (_\u00faha_), the\nadaptation of _s\u00e1mans_ and _mantras_, and collateral questions\nconnected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where\nthe non-performance of the primary rite involves the \"preclusion\" and\nnon-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites\nare precluded because other rites produce their special result,\ndiscussions connected with the _graha_ offerings, certain _s\u00e1mans_,\nand various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of\nnegation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the\nfuller discussion of _tantra_[249] [where several acts are combined\ninto one], and _\u00e1v\u00e1pa_ [or the performing an act more than once]. In\nthe twelfth, a discussion on _prasa\u1e45ga_ [where the rite is performed\nfor one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference],\n_tantra_, cumulation of concurrent rites (_samuchchaya_) and option.\nNow the first topic which introduces the discussions of the\nP\u00farva-M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 arises from the aphorism, \"Now therefore a desire to\nknow duty [is to be entertained by thee\"]. Now the learned describe a\n\"topic\" as consisting of five members, and these are (_a._) the\nsubject, (_b._) the doubt, (_c._) the _prim\u00e2 facie_ argument, (_d._)\nthe demonstrated conclusion, and (_e._) the connection (_sa\u1e45gati_).\nThe topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great\nteachers of the system. Thus the \"subject\" to be discussed is the\nsentence, \"The Veda is to be read.\" Now the \"doubt\" which arises is\nwhether the study of Jaimini's _\u015b\u00e1stra_ concerning duty, beginning\nwith the aphorism, \"Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an\ninstigatory passage,\" and ending with \"and from seeing it in the\n_anv\u00e1h\u00e1rya_,\" is to be commenced or not. The _prim\u00e2 facie_ argument is\nthat it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the\nVeda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future\nfruit. (_a._) If you say that this injunction must have a visible\nfruit, and this can be no other[250] than the knowledge of the meaning\nof what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is\nenjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of,\nor whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as\nwe see in the rule for shelling rice.[251] It cannot be the former,\nfor the reading of the Veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof\nfrom its very nature as reading, just as in the parallel instance of\nreading the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1rata; and we see by this argument that it would\npresent itself as an obvious means quite independently of the\ninjunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative; just as the\nbaked flour cake called _puro\u1e0d\u00e1sa_ is made only of rice prepared by\nbeing unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might\nhave been unhusked by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon\nand full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is\nthe principal _ap\u00farva_, by means of the various minor effects or\nsubordinate _ap\u00farvas_, produced by the various subordinate parts of\nthe whole ceremony; and consequently the minor _ap\u00farva_ of the\nunhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in\nthe case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such\nrestriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the\nknowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by\nstudying under an authorised teacher. Hence we conclude that there is\nno injunction to study the P\u00farva M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 as a means of knowing the\nsense of the Veda. (_b._) \"What, then, becomes of the Vedic\ninjunction, 'The Veda is to be read'?\" Well, you must be content with\nthe fact that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit,\nalthough it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal\nwords of the Vedic text [without any care to understand the meaning\nwhich they may convey], since heaven, though not expressly mentioned,\nis to be assumed as the fruit, according to the analogy of the\nVi\u015bvajit offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15), \"Let\nthat fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all,\" establishes\nthat those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to\noffer the Vi\u015bvajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its\ncharacteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be in the\npresent case also. As it has been said--\n\"Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the\ninjunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose\nheaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance, after the\nanalogy of the Vi\u015bvajit, &c.\"\nThus, too, we shall keep the Sm\u1e5biti rule from being violated: \"Having\nread the Veda, let him bathe.\" For this rule clearly implies that no\nlong interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the\nstudent's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after\nhe had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's\nhouse to read the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 discussions, and thus the idea of no\ninterval between would be contradicted. Therefore for these three\nreasons, (_a._) that the study of M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 is not enjoined, (_b._) that\nheaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (_c._)\nthat the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled,\nwe maintain that the study of the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 discussions on duty is not\nto be commenced.\nThe \"authoritative conclusion\" (_siddh\u00e1nta_), however, is as\nfollows:--\nWe grant that it cannot be a case of _vidhi_, for it might have been\nadopted on other grounds; but not even Indra with his thunderbolt\ncould make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case\nof _niyama_. In the sentence, \"The Veda is to be read,\" the affix\n_tavya_ expresses an enforcing power in the word,[252] which is to be\nrendered visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain\neffect into existence; and this enforcing power seeks some\ncorresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort.\nNow it cannot be the act itself of reading, as suggested by the whole\nword _adhyetavya_, which it thus seeks as an end; for this act of\nreading, thus expressed by the word, could never be regarded as an\nend, since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind,\nconsisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could\nthe portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be regarded as\nthe end. For the mass of words called \"Veda,\" which is what we really\nmean by the words \"portion read,\" being eternal and omnipresent, could\nnever fulfil the conditions of the four \"fruits of action,\"\nproduction, &c.[253] Therefore the only true end which remains to us\nis the knowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the\nsense of the words of the injunction. According to the old rule, \"He\nhas the right who has the want, the power, and the wit,\" those who are\naiming to understand certain things, as the new and full moon\nsacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them. And\nthe injunction for reading, since it virtually excludes the reading of\nwritten books, &c. [from the well-known technical sense of the word\n\"read\" when used in this connection], conveys the idea that the\nreading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated character [as taught by a\nduly authorised teacher]. Therefore, as the principal _ap\u00farva_,\nproduced by the great new and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and\nestablishes the subordinate _ap\u00farvas_ produced by the inferior\nsacrificial acts, as unhusking the rice, &c., so the mass of _ap\u00farva_\nproduced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previous\n_ap\u00farva_ produced by the restricting injunction (_niyama_), which\nprescribes reading the Veda as the means to know how to perform these\nsacrifices. If you hesitate to concede that a _niyama_ could have this\nfuture influence called _ap\u00farva_, the same doubt might equally\ninvalidate the efficacy of a _vidhi_ [as the two stand on the same\nlevel as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the supposition a valid one\nthat heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy of the _Vi\u015bvajit_\noffering, since, if there is a present and visible fruit in the form\nof a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text, it is improper to\nsuppose any other future and unseen fruit. Thus it has been said--\n \"Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose an\n unseen one; but if a _vidhi_ has the restricting meaning of\n a _niyama_, it does not thereby become meaningless.\"\nBut an objector may say, \"Although a man who reads the simple text of\nthe Veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning, still, as he\nwho reads the Veda with its _a\u1e45gas_, grammar, &c., may attain to this\nknowledge, the study of M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 will be useless.\" But this is not\ntrue: for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of the\nliteral meaning, all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of\ndiscussion. For instance, when it is said, \"He offers anointed\ngravel,\" neither grammar nor _nigama_[254] nor _nirukta_ will\ndetermine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not\nwith oil, &c.; it is only by a M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 discussion that the true\nmeaning is unravelled from the rest of the passage, \"Verily, ghee is\nbrightness.\"[255] It is therefore established that the study of\nM\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 is enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the\npassage of Sm\u1e5biti, \"Having read the Veda, let him bathe,\" which\nimplies that he should now leave his teacher's house, and prohibits\nany further delay; as the words do not necessarily imply that the\nreturn to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having\nread the Veda, but only that it is to follow it at some time, and that\nboth actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see in the\ncommon phrase, \"Having bathed, he eats.\" Therefore from the purport of\nthe injunction we conclude that the study of the P\u00farva M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 \u015a\u00e1stra,\nconsisting of a thousand \"topics,\"[256] is to be commenced. This topic\nis connected with the main subject of the \u015a\u00e1stra as being a subsidiary\ndigression, as it is said, \"They call that a subsidiary digression\nwhich helps to establish the main subject.\"[257]\nI now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same \"topic\"\nin accordance with the teaching of the Guru Prabh\u00e1kara.\nIn the Sm\u1e5biti rule,[258] \"Let him admit as a pupil the Brahman lad when\neight years old (by investing him with the sacred cord), let him instruct\nhim,\" the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction.\nNow a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if you\nask who is here to be directed, I reply, \"He who desires to be a teacher,\"\nsince, by P\u00e1\u1e47ini's rule (i. 3, 36), the root _n\u00ed_ is used in the\n_\u00e1tmanepada_ when honour, &c., are implied, _i.e._, here the duty which a\nteacher performs to his pupils. He who is to be directed as to admitting a\npupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since\nboth are the object of one and the same command. Hence the inspired sage\nManu has said (ii. 140), \"The Br\u00e1hman who girds his pupil with the\nsacrificial cord and then instructs him in the Veda, with its subsidiary\n_a\u1e45gas_ and mystic doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (_\u00e1ch\u00e1rya_).\"\nNow the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot be fulfilled\nwithout the learning which is the function of the pupil, and therefore the\nvery injunction to teach implies and establishes a corresponding\nobligation to learn, since the influencer's efforts fail without those of\none to be influenced. If you object that this view does not make reading\nthe Veda the object of definite injunction, I reply, What matters it to us\nif it is not? For even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate\ninjunction for reading the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined\nas a duty, because the passage which mentions it is a perpetual _anuv\u00e1da_\nor \"supplementary repetition.\"[259] Therefore the former _prim\u00e2 facie_\nargument and its answer, which were given before under the idea that there\nwas a definite injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in\nanother way to suit this new view.\nNow the _prim\u00e2 facie_ argument was that the study of M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1, not\nbeing authoritatively enjoined, is not to be commenced; the\n\"conclusion\" was that it is to be commenced as being thus\nauthoritatively enjoined.\nNow the upholders of the former or _prim\u00e2 facie_ view argue as\nfollows:--\"We put to the advocates of the conclusion the following\ndilemma: Does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to\nunderstand the meaning of what is read, or does it only refer to the\nbare reading? It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of\nteaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding\nwhat is taught [as this will depend on his ability as a recipient];\nand the latter will not help you, as, if the bare reading is\nsufficient, the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 discussions in question will have no subject\nor use. For their proper subject is a point in the Veda, which is\ndoubted about from having been only looked at in a rough and impromptu\nway; now if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all, why\nshould we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining\nthe true meaning by means of laborious discussion? And therefore in\naccordance with the well-known principle, 'That which is a thing of\nuse and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an\nintelligent man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and\nin contact with the external and internal senses,' as there is in the\npresent case no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon, or a\nuseful end to be attained by it, we maintain that the study of M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1\nis not to be commenced.\"\nWe grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does not imply a\ncorresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning;\nstill when a man has read the Veda with its subsidiary _a\u1e45gas_, and\nhas comprehended the general connection of the words with their\nrespective meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning\nof the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human compositions. \"But\nmay we not say that, just as in the case of the mother who said to her\nson, 'Eat poison,' the meaning literally expressed by the words was\nnot what she wished to convey, since she really intended to forbid his\neating anything at all in such and such a house; so if the literal\nmeaning of the Veda does not express its real purport, the old\nobjection will recur with full force that the study of M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 will\nhave neither subject nor end [as there will be no use in understanding\nthe literal meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead\nastray, and so common sense must be the ultimate judge\"]. We reply,\nthat your supposed illustration and the case in question are not\nreally parallel. In the supposed illustration the primary meaning of\nthe words would be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat\npoison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and\ntrustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would know at once that\nthis could not be what she wished to say; but in the case of the Veda,\nwhich is underived from any personal author, why should not the\nliteral meaning be the one actually intended? And it is just the\ndoubts that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this\nintended meaning, which will be the proper \"subject\" of M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1\ndiscussion; and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper\n\"end.\" Therefore, whenever the true meaning of the Veda is not\nobtained[260] by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the\nauthoritative injunction to a Brahman to teach, it will be a proper\nsubject for systematic discussion; and hence we hold that the study of\nM\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 _is_ enjoined, and should be commenced.\n\"Well,[261] be it so\" [say the followers of the Ny\u00e1ya], \"but how can\nthe Vedas be said to be underived from any personal author, when there\nis no evidence to establish this? Would you maintain that they have no\npersonal author because, although there is an unbroken line of\ntradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case\nwith the soul\"?[262] This argument is weak, because the alleged\ncharacteristics [unbroken tradition, &c.] are not proved; for those\nwho hold the human origin of the Vedas maintain that the line of\ntradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the\nuniverse. And, again, what is meant by this assertion that the author\nis not remembered? Is it (1.) that no author is believed, or (2.) that\nno author is remembered? The first alternative cannot be accepted,\nsince we hold that God is proved to have been the author. Nor can the\nsecond, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma,\nviz., is it meant (_a._) that no author of the Veda is remembered by\nsome one person, or (_b._) by any person whatever? The former\nsupposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would\napply to such an isolated stanza as \"He who is religious and has\novercome pride and anger,\" &c.[263] And the latter supposition is\ninadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not\nomniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any\nperson whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a\npersonal author, for we argue as follows:--The sentences of the Veda\nmust have originated from a personal author, since they have the\ncharacter of sentences like those of K\u00e1lid\u00e1sa and other writers. And,\nagain, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent\nperson, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same\ntime, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.\nBut [ask the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43sakas] may it not be assumed that \"all study of the\nVeda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor,\nsince the study of the Veda must always have had one common character\nwhich was the same in former times as now;\" and therefore this\nuninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the Veda?\nThis reasoning, however [the Naiy\u00e1yikas answer], cannot rise to the\nheight of proof, for it has no more validity than such obviously\nillusory reasoning, as \"All study of the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1rata was preceded by\nan earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study\nof the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1rata, which must have been the same in former times as\nnow.\" But [the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43sakas will ask whether there is not a difference\nbetween these two cases, since] the Sm\u1e5biti declares that [Vish\u1e47u\nincarnate as] Vy\u00e1sa was the author of the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1rata, in accordance\nwith the line, \"Who else than the lotus-eyed Vish\u1e47u could be the maker\nof the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1rata?\" [while nothing of this sort is recorded in any\nSm\u1e5biti in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is pithless,\nsince those words of the Purushas\u00fakta (Rig V., x. 90), \"From him\nsprang the \u1e5aich and S\u00e1man verses; from him sprang the Metres; from\nhim the Yajus arose;\" prove that the Veda had a maker.\nFurther [proceed the Naiy\u00e1yikas] we hold that sound is\nnon-eternal[264] because it has genus, and is also perceptible to the\nexternal organs of beings such as ourselves, just as a jar is.[265]\n\"But,\" you may object, \"is not this argument refuted by the proof\narising from the fact that we recognise the letter _g_ (for example)\nas the same we have heard before?\" This objection, however, is\nextremely weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute\nour argument, since it has reference only to identity of _species_, as\nin the case of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again, or\nof a jasmine which has blossomed afresh. \"But [asks the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43saka] how\ncan the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Parame\u015bvara, who has\nno palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot have\npronounced the letters?\" \"This objection [answers the Naiy\u00e1yika] is\nnot happy, because, though Parame\u015bvara is by nature incorporeal, he\ncan yet assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his\nworshippers. Consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that\nthe Veda had no personal author are inconclusive.\"\nI shall now [says the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43saka] clear up the whole question. What is\nmeant by this _paurusheyatva_ [\"derivation from a personal author\"]\nwhich it is sought to prove? Is it (1.) mere procession (_utpannatva_)\nfrom a person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such as\nourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2.) is it the arrangement--with\na view to its manifestation--of knowledge acquired by other modes of\nproof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves?\nIf the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between\nus.[266] If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established\n(_a._) by inference,[267] or (_b._) by supernatural testimony? (_a._)\nThe former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would\nequally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the M\u00e1lat\u00edm\u00e1dhava\n[which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative\ncharacter]. If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving\nclause, \"while they possess authority,\"[268] [as supra, p. 188, line\n21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the\nsentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which\nprove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could\nestablish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by\nother evidence, this definition would be at once contradicted, just\nas if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even\nif we granted that Parame\u015bvara might assume a body in sport, in order\nto show kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow that\nhe would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want\nof any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in\ntime, and in nature.[269] Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and\nother senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge,\nfor we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past\nexperience. This has been declared by the Guru [Prabh\u00e1kara] when he\nrefutes the supposition of an omniscient author--\n \"Wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified,[270]\n it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects;\n thus it may appear in the power of seeing the very distant\n or the very minute, but not in the ear's becoming cognisant\n of form.\"\nHence (_b._) we also maintain that your position cannot be established\nby any supposed supernatural testimony [as that quoted above from the\nRig-Veda, \"from him sprang the \u1e5aich and S\u00e1man verses\"]. For the\nrule of P\u00e1\u1e47ini (iv. 3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the\ngrammatical affixes with which such names as K\u00e1\u1e6dhaka, K\u00e1l\u00e1pa, and\nTaittir\u00edya are formed, impart to those derivatives the sense of\n\"uttered by\" Ka\u1e6dha, Kal\u00e1pin, &c., though we maintain that these names\nhave reference [not to those parts of the Veda as first composed by\nthese sages, but] to the fact that these sages instituted certain\nschools of traditional study. And in the same way we hold [in\nreference to this verse from the Rig-Veda] that it only refers to the\ninstitution of certain schools of traditional study of these Vedas.\nNor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternity of sound,\nbecause [as we said before] it is opposed to the evidence of our\nconsciousness, [since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as\nthe one heard before]. Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although\nthe letters are not the same, they seem to be so on account of their\nidentity of species. For here we ask our opponents a question--Is this\nidea that \"the apparent sameness arises from identity of species\" put\nforward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being\nthe same, or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experience\nshows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous [as in the\ncases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above]? (_a._) If it arises\nfrom the latter reason, we M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43sakas, who hold that the Veda is its\nown evidence, have said in reference to this timid imagination--\n \"He who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to\n him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion, will\n go to utter ruin in every transaction of life, his mind a\n mass of doubts.\"\n(_b._) \"But [the Naiy\u00e1yikas will ask] does not this recognition of _g_\nand other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the\nspecies which exists the same in each, and not to the several\nindividual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are\ndifferent as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make\nsuch distinctions as we do when we say 'Soma\u015barman is reading'?\" This\nobjection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for\nas there is no proof of any distinction between the individual _g_'s,\nthere is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species\n_g_; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand\n[the Naiy\u00e1yika doctrine of] the species _g_, the one species [in the\nNaiy\u00e1yika view] will by the influence of distinction of place,\nmagnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously\nmodified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as\nshort; so to the man who does not understand our [M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43saka doctrine\nof] one individual _g_, the one _g_ (in our view) will by the\ndiversity of \"manifesters,\"[271] appear to him associated with their\nrespective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way\nascribed [to the letter _g_], there is a fallacious appearance of\ndistinction [between different _g_'s]. But does this ascription of\ncontrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference\n[between the _g_'s], result (1.) from the nature of the thing, or (2.)\nfrom our imagination? There is no proof of the former alternative;\nfor, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be\nadmitted between different _g_'s, we should have to say, \"Chaitra has\nuttered ten _g's_,\" and not \"Chaitra has uttered the same _g_ ten\ntimes.\" On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent\ndistinction between _g_'s, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a\ndifference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the\napparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, &c.,\nthat there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one\nindivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [_i.e._,\n\"different\" as applied to the _g_'s] is really caused by the _noise_,\nwhich in each case is different. This has been said by the great\nteacher--\n \"The object which the Naiy\u00e1yikas seek by supposing a species\n is, in fact, gained from the letter itself; and the object\n which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters,\n is attained from audible noises;[272] so that the assumption\n of species is useless.\"\nAnd again--\n \"Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of\n recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its\n superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's\n non-eternity.\"\nThis at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiy\u00e1yika] treatise\nby V\u00e1g\u00ed\u015bwara, entitled _M\u00e1na-manohara_, \"sound is non-eternal from the\nfact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of\nsense[273] (_sc._ the ear), just as colour is to the eye.\"\nWe can also refute it in the following ways: (_a._) If we follow the\n[S\u00e1\u1e45khya and Ved\u00e1nta] view that sound is a substance, it is evidently\noverthrown[274] [as in that case sound cannot be a quality]; (_b._) if\nwe take it as referring to the _noise_, not the _sound_, we have no\ndispute, as it only establishes what we ourselves allow; and (_c._)\nthe inference is overthrown by the \"limiting condition\" [_up\u00e1dhi_] of\n_a\u015br\u00e1va\u1e47atva_, or \"the not causing audition.\"[275] So Udayana tries at\ngreat length to establish that, although ether, the site of sound, is\nimperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is\nperceptible; and he then brings forward as an evidence for the\nnon-eternity of sound, that sense perception which causes the use of\nsuch common expressions as \"The tumult is stopped,\" \"The sound has\narisen.\"[276] But he is sufficiently answered[277] by our old reply\n[in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance of distinction arises\nfrom contrary characters being erroneously ascribed, just as, in the\nstory, the demon T\u00e1la went away [as well as Bet\u00e1la] when the offering\nof blood was given to the latter.[278] And as for the objection raised\nby the author of the _Ny\u00e1yabh\u00fasha\u1e47a_,[279] that, if sound were\neternal, the conclusion must follow that it would be either always\nperceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated by our\nallowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our\narticulate noise.[280] And as for the (Naiy\u00e1yika) argument against the\nexistence[281] of such a constant relation as this which is supposed\nbetween the manifested \"sound\" and the manifesting \"noise,\" since they\nboth come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing, this is\ninvalid, as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of\nthe soul.[282]\nTherefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not originated from any\npersonal author, and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is\nthus absolutely destroyed, we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated\nthat it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to\nduty.\n\"Well\"[283] [say our opponents], \"let this question rest; but how\nabout another well-known controversy? It is said--\n\"'The S\u00e1\u1e45khyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness\nare self-proved; the followers of the Ny\u00e1ya hold that both are proved by\nsomething else [as inference, &c.]; the Buddhists hold that the latter is\nself-proved and the former proved by something else; the teachers of the\nVeda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and\nnon-authoritativeness proved by something else.' Now we ask, amidst all\nthis discussion, how do the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43sakas accept as established their tenet\nthat the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved? And what is the meaning\nof this so-called self-proved authoritativeness? Is it (_a._) that\nauthoritativeness springs from itself? or (_b._) that it springs from the\nright knowledge in which it resides? or (_c._) that it springs from the\ninstrumental causes [as the eye, &c.] which produced the right knowledge\nin which it resides? or (_d._) that it resides in a particular knowledge\nproduced by the instrumental causes which produced the right\nknowledge?[284] or (_e._) that it resides in a particular knowledge\nproduced by the instrumental causes _only_ which produced the right\nknowledge?\n\"(_a._) It cannot be the _first_, because wherever the relation of\ncause and effect is found there must be a difference, and therefore\nthese two cannot reside in the same subject [_i.e._, authoritativeness\ncannot cause itself]. (_b._) It cannot be the _second_, because if\nknowledge, which is a quality, were the cause of authoritativeness, it\nwould have to be a substance, as being an intimate cause.[285] (_c._)\nIt cannot be the _third_, because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly\nbe 'produced' at all,[286] whether we call it a general\ncharacteristic (_up\u00e1dhi_) or a species (_j\u00e1ti_);[287] for if we call\nit an _up\u00e1dhi_, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any\ncontradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does not possess\nthe nature of recollection;[288] and this cannot be produced, for we\nall allow that absolute non-existence is eternal; and still less can\nwe speak of its being produced, if we regard it as a species. (_d._)\nNor can it be the _fourth_, for wrong knowledge [as well as right\nknowledge] is a particular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental\ncauses which produce the general are included in those which produce\nthe particular,[289] just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied to\n'tree,' is included in the particular seed of any special tree, as,\n_e.g._, the Dalbergia Sisu; otherwise we might suppose that the\nparticular had no instrumental cause at all. Your definition would\ntherefore extend too far [and include erroneous as well as true\nknowledge]; for non-authoritativeness, which Vedantists and most\nM\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43sakas allow to be produced by something external, must also be\nconsidered as residing in a particular knowledge [_i.e._, a wrong\nknowledge] produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which\nproduced the right knowledge. (_e._) As for your _fifth_ view, we ask\nwhether by being produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which\nproduced right knowledge, you mean to include or exclude the absence\nof a 'defect'? It cannot be the former alternative; because the\nfollowers of the Ny\u00e1ya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by\nsomething external [as inference, &c.], would at once grant that\nauthoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge\ncombined with the absence of a 'defect.' Neither can it be the latter\nalternative; for, inasmuch as it is certain that the absence of a\n'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes, this\nabsence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of\nright knowledge, since right knowledge will always accompany its\npresence, and be absent if it is absent,[290] and it will at the same\ntime be not an unimportant condition.[291] If you object that\nnon-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you\nwhether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we\nshould have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its \"emergent\nnon-existence\" or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an\neffect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you\nat both ends. This has also been said by Udayana [in his Kusum\u00e1\u00f1jali,\n \"'As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause\n as well as an effect.'\n\"The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows:--Right knowledge\ndepends on some cause[292] other than the common causes of knowledge,\nfrom the very fact that, while it is an effect, it is also knowledge,\njust as wrong knowledge does.[293] Authoritativeness is known through\nsomething external to itself [_e.g._, inference], because doubt arises\nin regard to it in an unfamiliar case, as we also see in\nnon-authoritativeness.\n\"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced\nand recognised by means of something external, the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 tenet that\n'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and\nrotten.\"\nThis long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to\nstrike the sky with his fist; for (_a._) we mean by our phrase\n\"self-proved\" that while right knowledge is produced by the\ninstrumental causes of knowledge, it is not produced by any other\ncause (as \"defect,\" &c.) The following is our argument as drawn out in\nfull:--Right knowledge is not produced by any other instrumental\ncauses than those of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is\nproduced by these, because it is not the site of wrongness of\nknowledge,--just like a jar.[294] Nor can Udayana's[295] argument be\nbrought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on\nsomething external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the\nequally potent contradictory argument. \"Right knowledge is not\nproduced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and\nis also other than 'defect,'[296] from the very fact of its being\nknowledge--like wrong knowledge.\" Again, since right knowledge can\narise from the causes of knowledge _per se_, it would be a needless\ncomplexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether you call\nit a _gu\u1e47a_ or the absence of a \"defect\" (_dosha_).[297]\n\"But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong\nknowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of\nright knowledge?\" We meet this, however, by maintaining that the\nabsence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause, as it only\nacts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said--\n \"Therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence of\n _gu\u1e47as_ the absence of 'defects,'[298] from their absence\n the non-existence of the two kinds of\n non-authoritativeness,[299] and from this the general\n conclusion.\"[300]\n(_b._) We maintain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced\nby the same causes only which make us perceive the first\nknowledge[301] [_sc._ the eye, mind, &c.] Nor can you object that this\nview is precluded, because it would imply that there could be no such\nthing as doubt; for we answer that doubt arises in cases where,\nalthough all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there is\nalso the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, as a \"defect,\"\nAs for your argument [O Naiy\u00e1yika! given _supra_, in p. 198, lines\n17-24], I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself\nor not? If it is, it proves too much [for it would properly apply to\nitself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof,\nwhereas you hold it to be independent of such]; and if it is not, we\nshould have a case of _regressus in infinitum_, for it will want some\nother proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its turn\nwill want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.\nAs for the argument urged by Udayana[302] in the Kusum\u00e1\u00f1jali, when he\ntries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend\non the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech\nwhich sets him acting: \"Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that\nof the wish,[303] wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is\na means to attain some wished-for end, and this is only ascertained by\nan inference based on some 'sign' which proves that the thing is\nclosely connected with the wished-for end, and this inference depends\non the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses; but\nthroughout the whole series of antecedent steps the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 idea of\nthe perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of\naction.\" All this appears to us simple bluster, like that of the thief\nwho ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had\nactually found the gold under his armpit. It is only the knowledge\nthat the thing is a means to attain the desired end, and this\nknowledge recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which\ncauses the definite volition to arise at all; and in this we can\ndistinctly trace the influence of that very perception of\nauthoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently pretended to\ndeny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt, then,\nas it might always arise so in every given case, all ascertainment of\nauthoritativeness would be useless; and as the very existence of what\nis unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness would\nhave to be considered as dead and buried! But enough of this prolix\ncontroversy; since it has been said--\n \"Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which\n (authoritativeness) presented itself as representing a real\n fact, may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect,'\n which perception is produced by some sign that proves the\n discrepancy between the cognition and the fact.\"[304]\nNow with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved and\nauthoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the following\ndivergency between the two great M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 schools]:--The Veda is\ncomposed of three portions, respectively called \"hymns\" (_mantra_),\n\"explanatory passages\" (_arthav\u00e1da_), and \"injunctions\" (_vidhi_); and\nby \"injunction\" we mean such sentences as \"Let him who desires heaven\nsacrifice with the jyotish\u1e6doma.\" Here _ta_, the affix of the third\nperson singular, denotes an enjoining power, which is \"coloured\" [or\nrendered definite] by the meaning of the root, according to the\nopinion of the followers of Bha\u1e6d\u1e6da Kum\u00e1rila, who maintain that words\nsignify[305] something definite by themselves [apart from the\nsentence]. The followers of Guru Prabh\u00e1kara, on the contrary, hold\nthat the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as\nthey maintain that words only signify an action or something to be\ndone.[306] Thus all has been made plain.\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 247: M\u00e1dhava here calls it the _pr\u00e1ch\u00ed M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1_.]\n[Footnote 248: Cf. _J. Ny\u00e1yam\u00e1l\u00e1vist_, pp. 5-9.]\n[Footnote 249: Thus it is said that he who desires to be a family\npriest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured\none to Soma, and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case for\n_tantra_ or not? By _tantra_ one offering to Agni would do for both;\nbut as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and\nthus it must be a case of _\u00e1v\u00e1pa_, _i.e._, offering the two separately\n(_J. Ny\u00e1yam\u00e1l\u00e1_, xi. 1, 13).]\n[Footnote 250: In p. 123, line 4, I read _vilaksha\u1e47a-d\u1e5bish\u1e6daphala_.]\n[Footnote 251: In the former case it would be a _vidhi_, in the latter\na _niyama_. Cf. the lines _vidhir atyantam apr\u00e1pto niyama\u1e25 p\u00e1kshike\nsati, tatra ch\u00e1nyatra cha pr\u00e1ptau parisa\u1e43khy\u00e1 vidh\u00edyate_.]\n[Footnote 252: The M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 holds that the potential and similar\naffixes, which constitute a _vidhi_, have a twofold power; by the one\nthey express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the\nroot-meaning (_artha-bh\u00e1van\u00e1_); by the other an enforcing power in the\nword (_\u015babda-bh\u00e1van\u00e1_). Thus in _svargak\u00e1mo yajeta_, the _eta_ implies\n\"let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make\nup a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence;\" next it implies\nan enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the\nself-existent Veda and not of God) which sets the hearer upon this\ncourse of action.]\n[Footnote 253: These four \"fruits of action\" are obscure, and I do not\nremember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India\nthat they were a thing's coming into being, growing, declining, and\nperishing. If so, they are the second, third, fifth, and sixth of the\nsix _vik\u00e1ras_ mentioned in \u015aa\u1e45kara's Vajras\u00fachi, 2, _i.e._, _asti_,\n_j\u00e1yate_, _vardhate_, _vipari\u1e47amate_, _apaksh\u00edyate_, _na\u015byati_. I do\nnot see how there could be any reference to the four kinds of\n_ap\u00farva_, sc. _phala_, _samud\u00e1ya_, _utpatti_, and _a\u1e45ga_, described in\nNy\u00e1ya M. V. ii. 1, 2.]\n[Footnote 254: The _nigamas_ are the Vedic quotations in Y\u00e1ska's\n_nirukta_.]\n[Footnote 255: See Ny\u00e1ya-m\u00e1l\u00e1-vistara, i. 4, 19.]\n[Footnote 256: The exact number is 915.]\n[Footnote 257: This is to explain the last of the five members, the\n_sa\u1e43gati_.]\n[Footnote 258: Cf. A\u015bval\u00e1yana's G\u1e5bihya S\u00fatras, i. 19, 1.]\n[Footnote 259: The _anuv\u00e1da_, of course, implies a previous _vidhi_,\nwhich it thus repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal\nauthority. The _anuv\u00e1da_ in the present case is the passage which\nmentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the previous\n_vidhi_ as to teaching.]\n[Footnote 260: I read in p. 127, line 12, _anava-gamyam\u00e1nasya_, and so\nthe recension given in the Ny\u00e1ya M. V. p. 14, _na budhyam\u00e1nasya_.]\n[Footnote 261: In the next two or three pages I have frequently\nborrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in his _Sanskrit Texts_, vol.\n[Footnote 262: The soul may be traced back through successive\ntransmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.]\n[Footnote 263: M\u00e1dhava means that the author of this stanza, though\nunknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his\ncontemporaries, no doubt, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might\nperhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have\nan instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the\norigin, but which, nevertheless, had a human author. The stanza in\nquestion is quoted in full in B\u00f6htlingk's Indische Spr\u00fcche, No. 5598,\nfrom the MS. anthology called the _Subh\u00e1shit\u00e1r\u1e47ava_. For _muktaka_,\nsee _S\u00e1h. Darp._, \u00a7 558.]\n[Footnote 264: The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the\nM\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 that sound is eternal.]\n[Footnote 265: Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water, and\nair, minds, time, space, ether, and soul) have _vi\u015besha_, not\n_s\u00e1m\u00e1nya_ or genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses.\nGenera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they\nreside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these\narguments belong rather to the Ny\u00e1ya-vai\u015beshika school than to the\nNy\u00e1ya.]\n[Footnote 266: The M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43saka allows that the _uchch\u00e1ra\u1e47a_ or utterance\nis non-eternal.]\n[Footnote 267: The inference will be as follows: \"The Vedas were\narranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to\ntheir manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of\nsentences, just like the compositions of Manu, &c.\"]\n[Footnote 268: The argument will now run, \"The Vedas were arranged\nafter being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they\npossess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the\ncomposition of Manu, &c.\"]\n[Footnote 269: In assuming a material body, he would be subject to\nmaterial limitations.]\n[Footnote 270: The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman\ndevelopments (_ati\u015bay\u00e1\u1e25_) in their saints.]\n[Footnote 271: Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air\n\"manifest\" the always existing sound.]\n[Footnote 272: \"What is meant by 'noise' (_n\u00e1da_) is these\n'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the\nair.\"--_Ballantyne_, _M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 Aphorisms_, i. 17.]\n[Footnote 273: The Ny\u00e1ya holds that colour and sound are respectively\nspecial qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs\nof seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of\ncourse, have its corresponding special quality.]\n[Footnote 274: In p. 131, line 7, I read _pratyaksh\u00e1siddhe\u1e25_.]\n[Footnote 275: Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Ch\u00e1rv\u00e1ka-dar\u015bana) for the\n_up\u00e1dhi_. The _up\u00e1dhi_ or \"condition\" limits a too general middle\nterm; it is defined as \"that which always accompanies the major term,\nbut does not always accompany the middle.\" Thus if the condition\n\"produced from wet fuel\" is added to \"fire,\" the argument \"the\nmountain has smoke because it has fire\" is no longer a false one.\nHere, in answer to the Ny\u00e1ya argument in the text, our author objects\nthat its middle term (\"from the fact of its being a special quality\nbelonging to an organ of sense\") is too wide, _i.e._, it is sometimes\nfound where the major term \"non-eternal\" is not found, as, _e.g._, in\n_sound_ itself, according to the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 doctrine. To obviate this he\nproposes to add the \"condition,\" \"not causing audition,\" as he will\nreadily concede that all those things are non-eternal which, _while\nnot causing audition_, are special qualities belonging to an organ of\nsense, as, _e.g._, colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition\nwould make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the P\u00farva M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 and\nthe Ny\u00e1ya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of\nsound, as their points of view are so totally different.]\n[Footnote 276: In the former case we have the _dhwa\u1e43sa_ of sound, in\nthe latter its _pr\u00e1gabh\u00e1va_.]\n[Footnote 277: In p. 131, line 12, I read _samapauhi_ for _sam\u00e1pohi_,\n_i.e._, the passive aorist of _sam_ + _apa_ + _\u00fah_.]\n[Footnote 278: I do not know this legend. T\u00e1la and Bet\u00e1la are the two\ndemons who carry Vikram\u00e1ditya on their shoulders in the\nSi\u1e43h\u00e1san-batt\u00eds\u00ed. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating\nhow one answer can suffice for two opponents.]\n[Footnote 279: This is probably a work by Bh\u00e1sarvaj\u00f1a (see Dr. Hall's\n[Footnote 280: _Dhvani_, or our \"articulate noise,\" produces the\nvibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There\nis always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into\na definite speech by our various articulations. I take _sa\u1e43sk\u1e5bita_\nhere as equivalent to _abhivyakta_.]\n[Footnote 281: I read in p. 131, line 15,\n_sa\u1e43sk\u00e1rakasa\u1e43sk\u00e1ryabh\u00e1v\u00e1bh\u00e1v\u00e1num\u00e1nam_.]\n[Footnote 282: It would be a case of _vyabhich\u00e1ra_. The Naiy\u00e1yika\nargument would seem to be something as follows:--Sound is not thus\nmanifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the\nsenses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its\nspecies; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not\nmanifested by the species. But the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 rejoins that this would\nequally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense\nperceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be\nmanifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not\nsure that I rightly understand the argument.]\n[Footnote 283: Here begins a long _p\u00farva-paksha_, from p. 131, line\n18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198 _infra_.]\n[Footnote 284: This is Prabh\u00e1kara's view (see Siddh. Mukt\u00e1v., p. 118).\nThe first knowledge is in the form \"This is a jar;\" the second\nknowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form \"I perceive\nthe jar;\" and this latter produces authoritativeness (_pr\u00e1m\u00e1\u1e47ya_),\nwhich resides in it as its characteristic.]\n[Footnote 285: Substances are \"intimate causes\" to their qualities,\nand only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is\na characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a\nquality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause\nand therefore a substance.]\n[Footnote 286: The eye, &c., would be its instrumental causes.]\n[Footnote 287: The first three categories \"substance,\" \"quality,\" and\n\"action,\" are called _j\u00e1tis_ or species; the last four, \"genus,\"\n\"_vi\u015besha_,\" \"intimate relation,\" and \"non-existence,\" are called\n_up\u00e1dhis_ or \"general characteristics.\"]\n[Footnote 288: The P\u00farva M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 denies that recollection is right\nknowledge.]\n[Footnote 289: Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental\ncauses (as the eye, &c.) which produced right knowledge, but by these\n_together with a \"defect,\"_ as biliousness, distance &c.]\n[Footnote 290: _Scil._ if there be _dosh\u00e1bh\u00e1va_ there is _pram\u00e1_; if\nnot, not. In p. 132, line 20, I read _dosh\u00e1bh\u00e1vatvena_ for\n_dosh\u00e1bh\u00e1vasahak\u1e5bitatvena_.]\n[Footnote 291: _Anyath\u00e1siddhatvam_ means _niyatap\u00farvavartitve sati\nan\u00e1va\u015byakatvam_.]\n[Footnote 292: _Scil._ or the absence of \"defect,\" _dosh\u00e1bh\u00e1va_.]\n[Footnote 293: Wrong knowledge has _dosh\u00e1bh\u00e1va_ or the presence of a\n\"defect\" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.]\n[Footnote 294: Wrongness of knowledge (_apram\u00e1tva_) can only reside in\nknowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in\na jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes\nthan those of knowledge (as, _e.g._, the potter's stick, &c.), but it\nis not produced by these other causes _in combination_ with being also\nproduced by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has\nnothing directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in\nSanskrit than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass\nmuster. The jar is not\nproduced-by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while-\nat-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.]\n[Footnote 295: I suppose this is the argument given at the close of\nthe previous long p\u00farva-paksha.]\n[Footnote 296: These words \"and is other than defect\"\n(_dosha-vyatirikta_) are, of course, meaningless as far as right\nknowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to\nbring in \"wrong knowledge\" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by\nthe causes of knowledge _plus_ \"defect;\" right knowledge by the former\nalone.]\n[Footnote 297: The Ny\u00e1ya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a\n\"defect,\" as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and right knowledge by a\n_gu\u1e47a_ or \"virtue\" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a\ntrue object), or by the absence of a \"defect.\"]\n[Footnote 298: The _gu\u1e47a_ (or \u03b2\u03b5\u03bb\u03c4\u1f31\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7 \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2) of an organ is not\nproperly a cause of _pram\u00e1_ but rather _dosh\u00e1bh\u00e1va-bodhaka_.]\n[Footnote 299: _Scil._ \"doubtful\" (_sandigdha_) and \"ascertained\nnon-authoritativeness\" (_ni\u015bchit\u00e1pr\u00e1m\u00e1\u1e47ya_).]\n[Footnote 300: _Utsarga_ is a general conclusion which is not\nnecessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the\nconclusion that \"right knowledge has no special causes but the common\ncauses of knowledge, the eye,\" &c.]\n[Footnote 301: The first knowledge is \"This is a jar,\" the second\nknowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form \"I perceive\nthe jar;\" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth\nof the perception, _i.e._, its authoritativeness or _pr\u00e1m\u00e1\u1e47ya_.]\n[Footnote 302: This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words,\nand no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the\nKusum\u00e1\u00f1jali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my\nedition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).]\n[Footnote 303: I read _tat-pr\u00e1churyam_ for _tatpr\u00e1churye_ in p. 134,\nline 7.]\n[Footnote 304: This stanza affirms that according to the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1\nschool, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness\nis proved from something else (as inference, &c.)]\n[Footnote 305: I take _vyutpatti_ here as used for _\u015bakti_; _siddhe_\nmeans _gha\u1e6d\u00e1dau_.]\n[Footnote 306: These are the two great M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 schools. The former, called\n_abhihit\u00e1nvaya-v\u00e1dina\u1e25_, hold (like the Naiy\u00e1yika school) that words by\nthemselves can express their separate meaning by the function _abhidh\u00e1_ or\n\"denotation;\" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing\none connected idea. The latter, called _anvit\u00e1bhidh\u00e1na-v\u00e1dina\u1e25_, hold that\nwords only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically\nconnected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected\nwith an action. In _g\u00e1m \u00e1naya_, _g\u00e1m_ does not properly mean _gotva_, but\n_\u00e1nayan\u00e1nvita-gotva_, _i.e._, the bovine genus as connected with\n\"bringing.\" We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb,\nand _vice vers\u00e2_. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (_Comparative\nPhilology_, page 136): \"We do not think in words but in sentences; hence\nwe may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words.\nBut a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words\nwhich refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding\nthought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such\nas, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually.\"]\nCHAPTER XIII.\nTHE P\u00c1\u1e46INI-DAR\u015aANA.[307]\nIf any one asks, \"Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an\naffix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and\nthis is an affix,'\" may we not reply that to those who have drunk the\nwaters of Pata\u00f1jali this question produces no confusion, since it is\nnotorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point\nof the separation of the original roots and affixes? Thus the very\nfirst sentence of the venerable Pata\u00f1jali, the author of the \"Great\nCommentary,\" is \"_atha \u015babd\u00e1nu\u015b\u00e1sanam_,\" \"Now comes the exposition of\nwords.\" The particle _atha_ (\"now\") is used here as implying a new\ntopic or a commencement; and by the phrase, \"exposition of words,\" is\nmeant the system of grammar put forth by P\u00e1\u1e47ini. Now a doubt might\nhere arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of\nwords is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such\ndoubt that he employed the particle _atha_, since this particle\nimplies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the\nexclusion of everything else.\nThe word \"exposition\" (_anu\u015b\u00e1sana_), as here used, implies that thereby\nVaidic words, such as those in the line _\u015ba\u1e43 no dev\u00edr abhish\u1e6daye_,[308]\n&c., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for\n\"cow,\" \"horse,\" \"man,\" \"elephant,\" \"bird,\" &c., are made the subject of\nthe exposition, _i.e._, are deduced from their original roots and properly\nformed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix.\nWe must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of\nthe object [_\u015babd\u00e1nu\u015b\u00e1sanam_ standing for _\u015babdasy\u00e1nu\u015b\u00e1sanam_], and as\nthere is a rule of P\u00e1\u1e47ini (_karma\u1e47i cha_, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits\ncomposition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the\nphrase _\u015babd\u00e1nu\u015b\u00e1sanam_ does not come before us as a duly authorised\ncompound.\nHere, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the\nalleged rule of P\u00e1\u1e47ini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an\nobject and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in\nconnection with a word ending with a _k\u1e5bit_ affix, there the object\nalone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;[309] this\nlimitation arising from our taking _ubhayapr\u00e1pti_ in the s\u00fatra as a\n_bahuvr\u00edhi_ compound.[310] Thus we must say, \"Wonderful is the milking\nof cows by an unpractised cowherd.\" We may, however, remark in passing\nthat some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put\nin the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in\nthe K\u00e1\u015bik\u00e1 Commentary: \"Some authors maintain that there should be an\noption in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would\nequally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words _of_ the\nteacher' or '_by_ the teacher.'\" Inasmuch, however, as the words of\nthe phrase in question really mean that the \"exposition\" intended\nrelates to _words_ and not to _things_, and since this can be at once\nunderstood without any mention of the agent, _i.e._, the teacher, any\nsuch mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object\nand the agent are _not_ both expressed in one and the same sentence,\nthis is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under\nii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another\nrule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in\nconnection with a word ending with a k\u1e5bit affix, is to be put in the\ngenitive [which in this instance is expressed by the _tatpurusha_\ncompound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to\nsuch recognised forms as _idhma-pravra\u015bchana_, _pal\u00e1\u015ba-\u015b\u00e1tana_,\n&c.[311] Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this\n_shash\u1e6dh\u00edtatpurusha_ is one of the class called \"residual,\" in\naccordance with P\u00e1\u1e47ini's rule (ii. 3, 50), \"Let the genitive be used\nin the residuum,\" [_i.e._, in the other constructions not provided for\nby special rules];[312] and in this way we might defend the phrase\nagainst the opponent's attack. \"But,\" it might be replied, \"your\nalleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should\nthus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a\ngenitive case rendered utterly nugatory.\" This we readily grant, and\nhence Bhart\u1e5bihari in his _V\u00e1kyapad\u00edya_ has shown that these rules are\nmainly useful where the question relates to the _accent_.[313] To this\neffect are the words of the great doctor Vardham\u00e1na--\n \"In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,\n \"But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be\n employed.\n \"Thus have they explained the meaning of P\u00e1\u1e47ini's s\u00fatras,\n since\n \"He himself uses such phrases as _janikartu\u1e25_ and\n _tatprayojaka\u1e25_.\"[314]\nHence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question\n(of the _Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1shya_) is that \"it is to be understood that the rules\nof grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition\nconcerning words' are now commenced.\"\n\"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended\nmeaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,'\nas the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless\nexcess of letters.\" This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since\nthe employment of such a word as _\u015babd\u00e1nu\u015b\u00e1sanam_, the sense of which\ncan be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author\nintends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a\nsubordinate study (_a\u1e45ga_) to the Veda.[315] Otherwise, if there were\nno such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the\nreaders to the study of grammar. Nor may you say that this application\nwill be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, \"the Veda\nwith its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any\n(special) end,\"[316] because, even though there be such an injunction,\nit will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end\nis mentioned which will establish that it is an _a\u1e45ga_ of the Veda.\nThus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in\nhaste to say--\n \"Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by\n common life,\n \"And therefore grammar is useless?\"\nTherefore it was only when they understood it to be an _a\u1e45ga_ of the\nVeda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the\nstudents of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to\nit either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to\nset forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish that\ngrammar is an _a\u1e45ga_ of the Veda. If, when the end is explained, they\nshould still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all\nknowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become\ninvolved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would\nconsequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of\nsacrifice read, \"One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an\nincorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Saraswat\u00ed.\" Now\nit is to declare this end which establishes that it is an _a\u1e45ga_ of\nthe Veda that he uses the words _atha \u015babd\u00e1nu\u015b\u00e1sanam_ and not _atha\nvy\u00e1kara\u1e47am_. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's\nend is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as\nin a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in\nthe same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction\nconcerning words, _i.e._, propriety of speech. \"But,\" an objector may\nsay, \"will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the\ntrue means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by\nword is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the\nunderstanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided\ninto proper and improper words.[317] Thus there is a tradition that\nB\u1e5bihaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of\nwords as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by\nword,[318] and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was\nB\u1e5bihaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand\nyears of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,--how much\nless, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is\nrendered efficient by four appropriate means,--reading, understanding,\npractising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life\nwould only suffice for the bare time of reading; therefore the reading\nword by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and\nconsequently, as we said at first, the desired end is not\nestablished.\" We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the\nknowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word.\nAnd again, since general and special rules apply at once to many\nexamples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called\nroots, &c. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in\nthis way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus,\nfor instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1), _karma\u1e47i_, the affix\n_a\u1e47_ is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with\nit; and by this rule we learn many words, as _kumbhak\u00e1ra_, \"a potter,\"\n_k\u00e1\u1e47\u1e0dal\u00e1va_, \"a cutter of stems,\" &c. But the supplementary special\nrule (iii. 2, 3), _\u00e1to 'nupasarge ka\u1e25_, directing that the affix _ka_\nis to be used after a root that ends in long _\u00e1_ when there is no\n_upasarga_, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be\n[since it would never teach us how to distinguish an _upasarga_]. \"But\nsince there are other _a\u1e45gas_, why do you single out grammar as the\none object of honour?\" We reply, that among the six _a\u1e45gas_ the\nprincipal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal\nis sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said--\n \"Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious\n austerities,\n \"The wise have called grammar the first _a\u1e45ga_ of the Veda.\"\nHence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of\nthe rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &c.,\nof the Veda. Hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the\ngreat Commentary [quoting a V\u00e1rttika], \"the end (or motive) is\npreservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance.\"[319]\nMoreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus\nK\u00e1ty\u00e1yana has said, \"There is prosperity in the employment of a word\naccording to the _\u015b\u00e1stra_; it is equal to the words of the Veda\nitself.\" Others also have said that \"a single word thoroughly\nunderstood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow.\"\nThus (they say)--\n \"They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in\n well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;\n \"But those who use such false forms as _ach\u00edkramata_ must\n trudge thither on foot.\"[320]\nNor need you ask \"how can an irrational word possess such power?\"\nsince we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god.\nFor the \u015aruti says, \"Four are its horns, three its feet, two its\nheads, and seven its hands,--roars loudly the threefold-bound bull,\nthe great god enters mortals\" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great\ncommentator thus explains it:--The \"four horns\" are the four kinds of\nwords--nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its \"three feet\"\nmean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the\ntense-affixes, _la\u1e6d_, &c.; the \"two heads,\" the eternal and temporary\n(or produced) words, distinguished as the \"manifested\" and the\n\"manifester;\" its \"seven hands\" are the seven case affixes, including\nthe conjugational terminations; \"threefold bound,\" as enclosed in the\nthree organs--the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor \"bull\"\n(_v\u1e5bishabha_) is applied from its pouring forth (_varsha\u1e47a_), _i.e._,\nfrom its giving fruit when used with knowledge. \"Loudly roars,\"\n_i.e._, utters sound, for the root _ru_ means \"sound;\" here by the\nword \"sound\" developed speech (or language)[321] is implied; \"the\ngreat god enters mortals,\"--the \"great god,\" _i.e._, speech,--enters\nmortals, _i.e._, men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is\ndeclared the likeness [of speech][322] to the supreme Brahman.\nThe eternal word, called _spho\u1e6da_, without parts, and the cause of the\nworld, is verily Brahman; thus it has been declared by Bhart\u1e5bihari in\nthe part of his book called the Brahmak\u00e1\u1e47\u1e0da--\n \"Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible\n essence of speech,\n \"Which is developed in the form of things, and whence\n springs the creation of the world.\"\n\"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns\nand verbs, how comes this fourfold division?\" We reply, because this,\ntoo, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prak\u00edr\u1e47aka--\n \"Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a\n fivefold,\n \"Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the\nHel\u00e1r\u00e1ja interprets the fivefold division as including\n_karmapravachan\u00edyas_.[323] But the fourfold division, mentioned by the\ngreat commentator, is proper, since _karmapravachan\u00edyas_ distinguish a\nconnection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking\nout a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular\nkind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions\n(_upasargas_).[324]\n\"But,\" say some, \"why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called\n_spho\u1e6da_? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there\nis such a thing.\" We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus\nthere is one word \"cow,\" since all men have the cognition of a word\ndistinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the\nabsence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the\nword is a false perception.\nHence you must concede that there is such a thing as _spho\u1e6da_, as\notherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the\nword. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot\nbear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the\nfollowing dilemma:--Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition\nof the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the\nfirst, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore\ncannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the\nsingle letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning\n[which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative\nother than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows\n(say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the\ncognition of the meaning, there must be a _spho\u1e6da_ by means of which\narises the knowledge of the meaning; and this _spho\u1e6da_ is an eternal\nsound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes\nthe cognition of the meaning. \"It is disclosed (_sphu\u1e6dyate_) or\nrevealed by the letters,\" hence it is called _spho\u1e6da_, as revealed by\nthe letters; or \"from it is disclosed the meaning,\" hence it is called\n_spho\u1e6da_ as causing the knowledge of the meaning,--these are the two\netymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been\nsaid by the worshipful Pata\u00f1jali in the great Commentary, \"Now what is\nthe word '_cow_' _gau\u1e25_? It is that word by which, when pronounced,\nthere is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump,\nhoofs, and horns.\" This is expounded by Kaiya\u1e6da in the passage\ncommencing, \"Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct\nfrom the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters\nexpressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and\nfollowing ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we\nwished],\" and ending, \"The _V\u00e1kyapad\u00edya_ has established at length\nthat it is the _spho\u1e6da_ which, distinct from the letters and revealed\nby the sound, expresses the meaning.\"[325]\nHere, however, an objector may urge, \"But should we not rather say\nthat the _spho\u1e6da_ has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails\nunder either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to\nconvey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the\nlatter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of\nconveying the meaning always produced, since, as _spho\u1e6da_ is supposed\nto be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause\nindependent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail\nto appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other\nalternative, viz., that _spho\u1e6da_ conveys the meaning when it is itself\nmanifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this\nmanifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you\nadopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis\nof the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your\nhypothesis that they have this power to manifest _spho\u1e6da_.\" This has\nbeen said by Bha\u1e6d\u1e6da in his M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1-\u015bloka-v\u00e1rttika--\n \"The grammarian who holds that _spho\u1e6da_ is manifested by the\n letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one\n and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single\n difficulty.\"\nThe truth is, that, as P\u00e1\u1e47ini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (S\u00fat. ii. 123) both\nlay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at\nthe end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the\napprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they\nhelp.[326] If you object that as there are the same letters in _rasa_ as\nin _sara_, in _nava_ as in _vana_, in _d\u00edn\u00e1_ as in _nad\u00ed_, in _m\u00e1ra_ as in\n_r\u00e1ma_, in _r\u00e1ja_ as in _j\u00e1ra_, &c., these several pairs of words would\nnot convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order\nof the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been\nsaid by Taut\u00e1tita--\n \"As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is\n perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will\n be the meaning which they convey.\"\nTherefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault\nattaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one\nalone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate\nthing called _spho\u1e6da_ is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the\nletters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our\nview having been shown to be irrelevant].\nAll this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at\na straw;[327] for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether\nyou hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which\nconveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a\ncollection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,[328]\ncould never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of\nseparate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be\nthe latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done\nwith, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term\n\"aggregate\" where a number of objects are perceived to be united\ntogether in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an\nAcacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant, a man, a\nhorse, &c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not\nperceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and\npass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a \"manifesting\"\npower, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only\nmanifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you\nimagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would\ninvolve a \"mutual dependence\" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the\none hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to\nconvey one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand,\ntheir power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of\ntheir being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that\nletters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of\n_spho\u1e6da_. \"But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain\nthing called _spho\u1e6da_ which expresses the meaning, the same untenable\nalternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it\nwill only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler\nwith the revenue-officer's house close by.'\"[329] This, however, is\nonly the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference\nbetween the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power,\nreveals the invisible _spho\u1e6da_, and each successive letter makes this\n_spho\u1e6da_ more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading,\nis not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature\nof a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely\nmanifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the\nauthoritative saying (of the teacher): \"The seed is implanted by the\nsounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition,\nthe word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered\nletter.\" Therefore, since Bhart\u1e5bihari has shown in his first book that\nthe _letters_ of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest\nthe meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, \"We gain\nsuch and such a meaning from such and such a _word_,\" we are forced to\nassume the existence[330] of an indivisible _spho\u1e6da_ as a distinct\ncategory, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this\nhas been established in the discussion (in the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1shya) on \"genus\"\n(_j\u00e1ti_), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is\nultimately that _summum genus_, _i.e._, that existence whose\ncharacteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality[331]\n(Brahman).\n\"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words\nwill be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical\ningenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the\nuselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no\npurpose at the same time!\" Thus it has been said--\n \"The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to\n be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn\n and not by combination.\"\n \"Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the\n trouble of refuting.\"\nAll this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the\ncolourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as\nblue, red, yellow, &c., so, since the _summum genus_, Brahman, is\nvariously cognised through its connection with different things, as\nseverally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the\nvarious conventional words which arise from the different\nspecies,[332] as cow, &c., these being \"existence\" (the _summum\ngenus_) as found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we have\nthe following authoritative testimony--\n \"Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally\n joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as\n possessing that colour.\"\nAnd so it has been said by Hari, \"Existence [pure and simple] being\ndivided, when found in cows, &c., by reason of its connection with\ndifferent subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all\nwords depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root.\nThis is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the\naffixed _tva_, _tal_, &c., express\" (P\u00e1\u1e47ini v. 1, 119).\n\"Existence\" is that great _summum genus_ which is found in cows,\nhorses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it\nresides; and the inferior species, \"cow,\" \"horse,\" &c., are not really\ndifferent from it; for the species \"cow\" and \"horse\" (_gotva_ and\n_a\u015bvatva_) are not really new subjects, but each is \"existence\" as\nresiding in the subject \"cow\" and \"horse.\" Therefore all words, as\nexpressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one _summum\ngenus_ existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects,\ncows, &c., in which it resides; and hence \"existence\" is the meaning\nof the stem-word (_pr\u00e1tipadika_). A \"root\" is sometimes defined as\nthat which expresses _bh\u00e1va_;[333] now, as _bh\u00e1va_ is \"existence,\" the\nmeaning of a root is really existence.[334] Others say that a root\nshould be defined as that which expresses \"action\" (_kriy\u00e1_); but here\nagain the meaning of a root will really be \"existence,\" since this\n\"action\" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many\nsubjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the\nline--\n \"Others say that action (_kriy\u00e1_) is a genus, residing in\n many individuals.\"\nSo, too, if we accept P\u00e1\u1e47ini's definition (v. 1, 119), \"Let the\naffixes _tva_ and _tal_ come after a word [denoting anything], when we\nspeak of the nature (_bh\u00e1va_) thereof,\" it is clear from the very fact\nthat abstract terms ending in _tva_ or _t\u00e1_ [as _a\u015bvatva_ and\n_a\u015bvat\u00e1_] are used in the sense of _bh\u00e1va_, that they do express\n\"existence.\" \"This is pure existence\" from its being free from all\ncoming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all\nphenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in\nspace, time, or substance: this existence is called \"the great soul.\"\nSuch is the meaning of Hari's two _k\u00e1rik\u00e1s_ quoted above. So, too, it\nis laid down in the discussion on _sambandha_ [in Hari's verses] that\nthe ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose\ncharacteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word\nSubstance.\n\"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true\nsubstance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the\nobject, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of\ndiscrimination,[335] but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea\n[without owners] is expressed.\"[336]\nSo, too, the author of the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1shya, when explaining the\nV\u00e1rttika,[337] \"a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed,\"\nin the passage beginning \"substance is eternal,\" has shown that the\nmeaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word \"substance\" and\ndetermined by various unreal[338] conditions [as \"the nature of\nhorse,\" &c.]\nAccording to the opinion of V\u00e1japy\u00e1yana, who maintains that all words\nmean a genus, words like \"cow,\" &c.,[339] denote a genus which resides\nby intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is\napprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the\nparticular substance in which it resides. Words like \"white,\" &c.,\ndenote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the\nconnection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the\nconnection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So\nin the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of\nthe recognition that \"this is the same person from his first coming\ninto existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference\nproduced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &c.,\"\nwe must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,[340] &c. [as directly\ndenoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing \"action\" a genus is\ndenoted; this is the root-meaning, as in _pa\u1e6dhati_, \"he reads,\" &c.,\nsince we find here a meaning common to all who read.\nIn the doctrine of Vy\u00e1\u1e0di, who maintained that words meant individual\nthings [and not classes or genera], the individual thing is put\nforward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied\n[as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of\n\"indefiniteness,\" and \"wandering away from its proper subject.\"[341]\nBoth views are allowed by the great teacher P\u00e1\u1e47ini; since in i. 2, 58,\nhe accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that\n\"when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be\noptionally used\" [as in the sentence, \"A Br\u00e1hman is to be honoured,\"\nwhich may equally run, \"Br\u00e1hmans are to be honoured\"]; while in i. 2,\n64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing,\nwhere he says, \"In any individual case there is but one retained of\nthings similar in form\" [_i.e._, the dual means R\u00e1ma and R\u00e1ma, and the\nplural means R\u00e1ma, and R\u00e1ma and R\u00e1ma; but we retain only one, adding a\ndual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all\nassemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised.\nTherefore both theories are in a sense true;[342] but the real fact is\nthat all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.\nAs it has been said--\n \"Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one\n true universal meaning, identical with the one existent,\n shines out in many forms as the thing denoted.\"\nHari also, in his chapter discussing _sambandha_, thus describes the\nnature of this true meaning--\n \"That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the\n perception [which unites them] are insusceptible of\n doubt,[343] _that_ only is called the truth by those who\n know the end of the three Vedas.\"\nSo too in his description of substance, he says--\n \"_That_ which remains as the Real during the presence of\n modification, as the gold remains under the form of the\n earring,--_that_ wherein change comes and goes, _that_ they\n call the Supreme Nature.\"\nThe essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order\nto preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a\ncardinal doctrine of our philosophy.\n\"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is\nidentical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are\nthus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two\nsouls.\"[344]\nThe meaning of this K\u00e1rik\u00e1 is that Brahman is the one object denoted\nby all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon\nit according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of\nthe differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the\nresult of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the\npower of \"concealment\"[345] [exercised by illusion] at the time of the\nconventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is\nthe case during sleep. Thus those skilled in Ved\u00e1nta lore tell us--\n \"As all the extended world of dreams is only the development\n of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a\n development of illusion likewise.\"\nWhen the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent\njoy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval\nignorance is abolished, final bliss is accomplished, which is best\ndefined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the\ntext, \"He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the\nSupreme Brahman.\"[346] And thus we establish the fact that the\n\"exposition of words\" is the means to final bliss.\nThus it has been said--\n \"They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the\n diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the\n science of sciences.\"[347]\nAnd so again--\n \"This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of\n final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the\n travellers to emancipation.\"\nTherefore our final conclusion is that the \u015a\u00e1stra of grammar should be\nstudied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man.\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 307: M\u00e1dhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians\nadopted and fully developed the idea of the P\u00farva-M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 school that\nsound is eternal. He therefore treats of _spho\u1e6da_ here, and not in his\nJaimini chapter.]\n[Footnote 308: Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.]\n[Footnote 309: _\u015aabd\u00e1nu\u015b\u00e1sana_, if judged by the apparent sense of\nP\u00e1\u1e47ini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so,\nbecause ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66,\nwhence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were\nan agent expressed _as well as_ an object, _i.e._, if such a word as\n_\u00e1ch\u00e1rye\u1e47a_ followed. In the example given, we cannot say _\u00e1\u015bcharyo\ngodoho \u015bikshitena gop\u00e1lena_ (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither\ncan we say _\u00e1\u015bcharyo gav\u00e1\u1e43 doho' \u015bikshitasya gop\u00e1lasya_ (as it would\nviolate ii. 3, 66).]\n[Footnote 310: That is, the _ubhayapr\u00e1pti_ of ii. 3, 66, is a\n_bahuvr\u00edhi_ agreeing with _k\u1e5biti_ in ii. 3, 65. These points are all\ndiscussed at some length in the Commentaries on P\u00e1\u1e47ini.]\n[Footnote 311: These actually occur in the Commentaries to P\u00e1\u1e47ini, ii.\n[Footnote 312: This takes in all cases of relation, _sambandha_\n(_i.e._, _shash\u1e6dh\u00ed-sambandha_).]\n[Footnote 313: As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.]\n[Footnote 314: These compounds occur in P\u00e1\u1e47ini's own s\u00fatras (i. 4, 30,\nand i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were\nto interpret the latter without some such saving modification as\n_shash\u1e6dh\u00ed \u015beshe_.]\n[Footnote 315: The very word _\u015babda_ in _\u015babd\u00e1nu\u015b\u00e1sanam_ implies the\nVeda, since this is pre-eminently _\u015babda_.]\n[Footnote 316: Compare Max M\u00fcller, _Sansk. Liter._, p. 113. It is\nquoted as from the Veda in the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1shya.]\n[Footnote 317: In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele _da\u1e47\u1e0da_ in line 3\nafter _bhavet_, and insert it in line 4 after _\u015babd\u00e1n\u00e1m_.]\n[Footnote 318: As in the so-called _pada_ text.]\n[Footnote 319: See Ballantyne's _Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1shya_, pp. 12, 64.]\n[Footnote 320: _Ach\u00edkramata_ seems put here as a purposely false form\nof the frequentative of _kram_ for _acha\u1e45kramyata_.]\n[Footnote 321: Or it may mean \"the developed universe.\" Compare the\nlines of Bhart\u1e5bihari which immediately follow.]\n[Footnote 322: One would naturally supply _\u015babdasya_ after _s\u00e1myam_,\nbut the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1shya has _na\u1e25 s\u00e1myam_ (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).]\n[Footnote 323: _I.e._, prepositions used separately as governing cases\nof their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.]\n[Footnote 324: The _karmapravachan\u00edyas_ imply a verb other than the one\nexpressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced\nby this understood verb. Thus in the example, _\u015a\u00e1kalyasa\u1e43hit\u00e1m anu\npr\u00e1varshat_, \"he rained after the \u015a\u00e1kalya hymns,\" _anu_ implies an\nunderstood verb _ni\u015bamya_, \"having heard,\" and this verb shows that there\nis a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This\n_anu_ is said to determine this relation.]\n[Footnote 325: See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.]\n[Footnote 326: This is not very clear, the _anu_ in _anugraha_ might\nmean _krame\u1e47a_, and so imply the successive order of the letters.]\n[Footnote 327: In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read\n_kalpam_ for _kalpanam_.]\n[Footnote 328: In p. 142, line 3, I add _vin\u00e1_ after _nimittam_.]\n[Footnote 329: The gha\u1e6d\u1e6da is the place where dues and taxes are\ncollected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way\nby night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day\ndawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb means _udde\u015by\u00e1siddhi_.]\n[Footnote 330: In p. 143, line 13, I read _spho\u1e6dakabh\u00e1vam_ for\n_spho\u1e6d\u00e1bh\u00e1vam_.]\n[Footnote 331: Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1shya, pp. 9,\n[Footnote 332: The M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e2 holds that a word means the genus (_j\u00e1ti_)\nand not the individual (_vyakti_); the Ny\u00e1ya holds that a word means\nan individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).]\n[Footnote 333: Cf. Rig-Veda Pr\u00e1ti\u015b. xii. 5.]\n[Footnote 334: He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by\nthe commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.]\n[Footnote 335: Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.]\n[Footnote 336: So by the words \"horse,\" \"cow,\" &c., Brahman is really\nmeant, the one abiding existence.]\n[Footnote 337: Cf. Ballantyne's Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1shya, pp. 44, 50.]\n[Footnote 338: In p. 145, line 8, read _asatya_ for _a\u015bvattha_.]\n[Footnote 339: We have here the well-known four grammatical\ncategories, _j\u00e1ti_, _guna_, _dravya_ or _sa\u1e45jn\u00e1_, and _kriy\u00e1_.]\n[Footnote 340: But cf. Siddh. Mukt\u00e1v., p. 6, line 12.]\n[Footnote 341: Thus we read in the Siddh\u00e1nta Mukt\u00e1vali, p. 82, that\nthe M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 holds that a word means the genus and not the individual,\nsince otherwise there would be _vyabhich\u00e1ra_ and _\u00e1nantya_ (cf. also\nMahe\u015bachandra Ny\u00e1yaratna's note, K\u00e1vya-prak\u00e1\u015ba, p. 10). If a word is\nheld to mean only _one_ individual, there will be the first fault, as\nit will \"wander away\" and equally express others which it should not\ninclude; if it is held to mean _many_ individuals, it will have an\nendless variety of meanings and be \"indefinite.\"]\n[Footnote 342: This seems the meaning of the text as printed _tasm\u00e1t\ndvaya\u1e43 satyam_, but I should prefer to read conjecturally _tasm\u00e1d\nadvaya\u1e43 satyam_, \"therefore non-duality is the truth.\"]\n[Footnote 343: _Scil._ they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone\nexists.]\n[Footnote 344: _Scil._ the individual soul (_j\u00edva_) and Brahman.]\n[Footnote 345: The _Sa\u1e43v\u1e5biti_ of the text seems to correspond to the\n_\u00e1vara\u1e47a_ so frequent in Ved\u00e1nta books.]\n[Footnote 346: This passage is quoted in the Maitr\u00ed Upanishad, vi.\n[Footnote 347: _Adhividyam_ occurs in Taitt. Upanishad, i. 3, 1, where\nit is explained by [']Sa\u1e43kara as _vidy\u00e1sv adhi yad dar[']sana\u1e43 tad\nadhividyam_.]\nCHAPTER XIV.\nTHE S\u00c1NKHYA-DAR\u015aANA.\n\"But how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation [thus held\nby the grammarians, following the guidance of the _p\u00farva_ and _uttara_\nM\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 schools], when the system of development propounded by the\nS\u00e1\u1e45khyas is still alive to oppose it?\" Such is their loud vaunt. Now\nthe \u015a\u00e1stra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four\nseveral kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent[348] only,\nthat which is evolute only, that which is both evolute and evolvent,\nand that which is neither. (_a._) Of these the first is that which is\nonly evolvent, called the root-evolvent or the primary; it is not\nitself the evolute of anything else. It evolves, hence it is called\nthe evolvent (_prak\u1e5biti_) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium\nof the three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness. This is\nexpressed [in the S\u00e1\u1e45khya K\u00e1rik\u00e1], \"the root-evolvent is no evolute.\"\nIt is called the root-evolvent, as being both root and evolvent; it is\nthe root of all the various effects, as the so-called \"great one,\"\n&c., but of it, as the primary, there is no root, as otherwise we\nshould have a _regressus ad infinitum_. Nor can you reply that such a\n_regressus ad infinitum_ is no objection, if, like the continued\nseries of seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evidence of our\nsenses,[349]--because here there is no evidence to establish the\nhypothesis. (_b._) The \"evolutes and evolvents\" are the great one,\negoism, and the subtile elements,--thus the S\u00e1\u1e45khya K\u00e1rik\u00e1 (\u00a7 3),\n\"the seven, the great one, &c., are evolute-evolvents.\" The seven are\nthe seven principles, called the great one, &c. Among these the great\nprinciple, called also the intellect,[350] &c., is itself the evolute\nof nature and the evolvent of egoism; in the same manner the principle\negoism, called also \"self-consciousness\" (_abhim\u00e1na_), is the evolute\nof the great one, intellect; but this same principle, as affected by\nthe quality of darkness, is the evolvent of the five rudiments called\nsubtile elements; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it is\nthe evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs of\nperception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the five organs of\naction, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and generative organ; and the\nmind, partaking of the character of both; nor can you object that in\nour arrangement the third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a\ncause by producing action in the others. This has been thus declared\nby \u00cd\u015bvara K\u1e5bish\u1e47a in his K\u00e1rik\u00e1s[351] (\u00a7 24-27), \"Self-consciousness\nis egoism. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, the elevenfold set and\nthe five elemental rudiments. From modified[352] egoism originates the\nclass of eleven imbued with goodness; from egoism as the source of the\nelements originate the rudimentary elements, and these are affected by\ndarkness; but it is only from egoism as affected by activity that the\none and the other rise. The intellectual organs are the eyes, the\nears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; those of action are the\nvoice, feet, hands, anus, and organ of generation. In this set is\nmind, which has the character of each; it determines, and it is an\norgan (like the other ten) from having a common property with\nthem.\"[353] All this has been explained at length by the teacher\nV\u00e1chaspati Mi\u015bra in the S\u00e1\u1e45khya-tattva-kaumud\u00ed.\n(_c._) The \"evolute only\" means the five gross elements, ether, &c.,\nand the eleven organs, as said in the K\u00e1rik\u00e1, \"The evolute consists of\nsixteen;\" that is, the set of sixteen is evolute only, and not\nevolvent. Although it may be said that earth, &c., are the evolvents\nof such productions as cows, jars, &c., yet these are not a different\n\"principle\" (_tattva_) from earth, &c., and therefore earth, &c., are\nnot what we term \"evolvents;\" as the accepted idea of an evolvent is\nthat which is the material cause of a separate principle; and in cows,\njars, &c., there is the absence of being any such first principle, in\nconsequence of their being all alike gross [_i.e._, possessed of\ndimensions] and perceptible to the senses. The five gross elements,\nether, &c., are respectively produced from sound, touch, form, taste,\nand smell, each subtile element being accompanied by all those which\nprecede it, and thus the gross elements will have respectively one,\ntwo, three, four, and five qualities.[354] The creation of the organs\nhas been previously described. This is thus propounded in the S\u00e1\u1e45khya\nK\u00e1rik\u00e1 (\u00a7 22)--\n \"From nature springs the great one, from this egoism, from\n this the set of sixteen, and from five among the sixteen\n proceed the five gross elements.\"\n(_d._) The soul is neither,--as is said in the K\u00e1rik\u00e1, \"The soul is\nneither evolvent nor evolute.\" That is, the soul, being absolute,\neternal, and subject to no development, is itself neither the evolvent\nnor the evolute of aught beside. Three kinds of proof are accepted as\nestablishing these twenty-five principles; and thus the K\u00e1rik\u00e1 (\u00a7 4).\n\"Perception, inference, and the testimony of worthy persons are\nacknowledged to be the threefold proof, for they comprise every mode\nof demonstration. It is from proof that there results belief of that\nwhich is to be proven.\"\nHere a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature of cause and\neffect. The Saugatas[355] maintain that the existent is produced from\nthe non-existent; the Naiy\u00e1yikas, &c., that the (as yet) non-existent\nis produced from the existent; the Ved\u00e1ntins, that all effects are an\nillusory emanation from the existent and not themselves really\nexistent; while the S\u00e1\u1e45khyas hold that the existent is produced from\nthe existent.\n(_a._) Now the first opinion is clearly untenable, since that which is\nitself non-existent and unsubstantial can never be a cause any more\nthan the hare's horn; and, again, the real and unreal can never be\nidentical.\n(_b._) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the existent; since\nit is impossible that that which, previous to the operation of the\noriginating cause, was as non-existent as a hare's horn should ever be\nproduced, _i.e._, become connected with existence; for not even the\ncleverest man living can make blue yellow.[356] If you say, \"But are\nnot existence and non-existence attributes of the same jar?\" this is\nincorrect, since we cannot use such an expression as \"its quality\" in\nregard to a non-existent subject, for it would certainly imply that\nthe subject itself did exist. Hence we conclude that the effect is\nexistent even previously to the operation of the cause, which only\nproduces the manifestation of this already existent thing, just like\nthe manifestation of the oil in sesame seed by pressing, or of the\nmilk in cows by milking. Again, there is no example whatever to prove\nthe production of a thing previously non-existent.\nMoreover, the cause must produce its effect as being either connected\nwith it or not connected; in the former alternative the effect's\nexistence is settled by the rule that connection can only be between\ntwo existent things; in the latter, any and every effect might arise\nfrom any and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the action\nof an unconnected thing. This has been thus put by the S\u00e1\u1e45khya\nteacher:--\"From the supposed non-existence of the effect, it can have\nno connection with causes which always accompany existence; and to him\nwho holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises an\nutter want of determinateness.\" If you rejoin that \"the cause, though\nnot connected with its effect, can yet produce it, where it has a\ncapacity of so doing, and this capacity of producing is to be inferred\nfrom seeing the effect actually produced,\" still this cannot be\nallowed, since in such a case as \"there is a capacity for producing\noil in sesame seeds,\" you cannot determine, while the oil is\nnon-existent, that there is this capacity in the sesame seeds,\nwhichever alternative you may accept as to their being connected or\nnot with the oil [since our before-mentioned dilemma will equally\napply here].\nFrom our tenet that the cause and effect are identical, it follows\nthat the effect does not exist distinct from the cause; thus the cloth\nis not something distinct from the threads, as it abides in the latter\n[as its material cause]; but where this identity is not found, there\nwe do not find the relation of cause and effect; thus a horse and a\ncow are distinct from each other [for one is not produced from the\nother, and therefore their qualities are not the same]; but the cloth\nis an acknowledged effect, and therefore not anything different from\nits cause.[357] If you object that, if this were true, the separate\nthreads ought to fulfil the office of clothing, we reply, that the\noffice of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature\nof cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement. As the\nlimbs of a tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed,\nand, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular effects,\nas cloth, &c., of a cause, as threads, &c., when they come forth and\nare revealed, are said to be produced; and when they retire and are\nconcealed, they are said to be destroyed; but there is no such thing\nas the production of the non-existent or the destruction of the\nexistent. As has been said in the Bhagavad G\u00edt\u00e1 (ii. 16)--\n \"There is no existence for the non-existent, nor\n non-existence for the existent.\"\nAnd, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we establish\nthe existence of the great evolvent, Nature (_prak\u1e5biti_). This has\nbeen said [in the K\u00e1rik\u00e1, \u00a7 9]--\n \"Effect exists, for what exists not can by no operation of\n cause be brought into existence; materials, too, are\n selected which are fit for the purpose; everything is not by\n every means possible; what is capable does that to which it\n is competent; and like is produced from like.\"[358]\nNor can we say [with the Ved\u00e1ntin] that the world is an illusory\nemanation from the one existent Brahman, because we have no\ncontradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity the _prim\u00e2\nfacie_ belief that the external world is real [as we have in the case\nof mistaking a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will\ndiscover the error]; and again, where the subject and the attributed\nnature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman and the\nunintelligent creation, we can no more allow the supposed attribution\nto be possible than in the case of gold and silver [which no one\nmistakes for each other]. Hence we conclude that an effect which is\ncomposed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause\nsimilarly composed; and our argument is as follows:--The subject of\nthe argument, viz., the external world, must have a material cause\ncomposed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, because it is itself\nendued therewith; whatever is endued with certain attributes must have\na cause endued with the same,--thus a ring has gold for its material\ncause, because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a similar\ncase, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion. What we call \"being\ncomposed of happiness\" in the external world is the quality of\ngoodness; the \"being composed of misery\" is the quality of\nactivity;[359] the \"being composed of stupidity\" is the quality of\ndarkness; hence we establish our cause composed of the three qualities\n(_i.e._, _prak\u1e5biti_, Nature). And we see that individual objects are\nfound by experience to have these three qualities; thus Maitra's\nhappiness is found in his wife Satyavat\u00ed, because the quality of\n\"goodness\" in her is manifested towards him; but she is the misery of\nher fellow-wives, because the quality of \"activity\" is manifested\ntowards them; while she causes indifference to Chaitra who does not\npossess her, because towards him the quality of \"darkness\" is\nmanifested. So, too, in other cases also; thus a jar, when obtained,\ncauses us pleasure; when seized by others it causes us pain; but it is\nviewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it. Now this\nbeing regarded with no interest is what we mean by \"stupidity,\" since\nthe word _moha_ is derived from the root _muh_, \"to be confused,\"\nsince no direct action of the mind arises towards those objects to\nwhich it is indifferent. Therefore we hold that all things, being\ncomposed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as their cause\nNature, which consists of the three qualities. And so it is declared\nin the \u015avet\u00e1\u015bvatara Upanishad (iv. 5)--\n \"The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one\n unborn (Nature) which is red, white, and black, and produces\n a manifold and similar offspring; the other unborn abandons\n her when once she has been enjoyed.\"\nHere the words \"red,\" \"white,\" and \"black,\" express the qualities\n\"activity,\" \"goodness,\" and \"darkness,\" from their severally\npossessing the same attributes of colouring, manifesting, and\nconcealing.\nHere, however, it may be objected, \"But will not your unintelligent\nNature, without the superintendence of something intelligent, fail to\nproduce these effects, intellect, &c.? therefore there must be some\nintelligent superintendent; and hence we must assume an all-seeing,\nsupreme Lord.\" We reply that this does not follow, since even\nunintelligent Nature will act under the force of an impulse; and\nexperience shows us that an unintelligent thing, without any\nintelligent superintendent, does act for the good of the soul, just as\nthe unintelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf, or just as the\nunintelligent rain acts for the welfare of living creatures; and so\nunintelligent Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it\nhas been said in the K\u00e1rik\u00e1 (\u00a7 57)--\n \"As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of the\n calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul.\"\nBut as for the doctrine of \"a Supreme Being who acts from compassion,\"\nwhich has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his\nexistence, this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing, since the\nhypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does he\nact thus _before_ or _after_ creation? If you say \"before,\" we reply\nthat as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &c., there will be\nno need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to free\nliving beings from pain [which is the main characteristic of\ncompassion]; and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be\nreasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God\ncreated the world through compassion [as this is His motive in acting\nat all], and on the other hand[360] that He compassionated after He\nhad created. Therefore we hold that the development of unintelligent\nNature [even without any intelligent superintendent]--in the order of\nthe series intellect, self-consciousness, &c.,--is caused by the union\nof Nature and Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just\nas there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the\nunmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the\nproximity of the unmoved Soul; and this union of Nature and Soul is\ncaused by mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and the\nblind man. Nature, as the thing to be experienced, depends on Soul the\nexperiencer; and Soul looks to final bliss, as it seeks to throw off\nthe three kinds of pain, which, though really apart from it, have\nfallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not\nrecognising its own distinction therefrom.[361] This final bliss [or\nabsolute isolation] is produced by the discrimination of Nature and\nSoul, nor is this end possible without it; therefore Soul depends on\nNature for its final bliss. Just as a lame man and a blind man,[362]\ntravelling along with a caravan, by some accident having become\nseparated from their companions, wandered slowly about in great\ndismay, till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame man\nmounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path\nindicated by the lame man, reached his desired goal, as did the lame\nman also, mounted on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is\neffected by Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually\ndependent. This has been said in the K\u00e1rik\u00e1 (\u00a7 21)--\n \"For the soul's contemplation of Nature and for its final\n separation the union of both takes place, as of the lame man\n and the blind man. By that union a creation is formed.\"\n\"Well, I grant that Nature's activity may take place for the good of\nthe soul, but how do you account for its ceasing to act?\" I reply,\nthat as a wilful woman whose faults have once been seen by her husband\ndoes not return to him, or as an actress, having performed her part,\nretires from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus it is said in\nthe K\u00e1rik\u00e1 (\u00a7 59)--\n \"As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spectators,\n desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, having\n manifested herself to Soul.\"\nFor this end has the doctrine of those who follow Kapila, the founder\nof the atheistic S\u00e1\u1e45khya School, been propounded.\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 348: I borrow this term from Dr. Hall.]\n[Footnote 349: Compare Kusum\u00e1\u00f1jali, i. 4.]\n[Footnote 350: One great defect in the S\u00e1\u1e45khya nomenclature is the\nambiguity between the terms for intellect (_buddh\u00ed_) and those for\nmind (_manas_). M\u00e1dhava here applies to the former the term\n_anta\u1e25kara\u1e47a_ or \"internal organ,\" the proper term for the latter. I\nhave ventured to alter it in the translation.]\n[Footnote 351: It is singular that this is M\u00e1dhava's principal S\u00e1\u1e45khya\nauthority, and not the S\u00e1\u1e45khya S\u00fatras.]\n[Footnote 352: _Vaik\u1e5bita_ is here a technical term meaning that\ngoodness predominates over darkness and activity. On this K\u00e1rik\u00e1,\ncomp. Dr. Hall's preface to the S\u00e1\u1e45khya-s\u00e1ra, pp. 30-35.]\n[Footnote 353: As produced, like them, from modified egoism. The\nreading _sa\u1e43kalpavikalp\u00e1tmakam_ must be corrected by the S\u00e1\u1e45khya\nK\u00e1rik\u00e1.]\n[Footnote 354: Cf. Colebrooke Essays, vol. i. p. 256. The _tanm\u00e1tras_\nwill reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross\nelements.]\n[Footnote 355: A name of the Buddhists.]\n[Footnote 356: _I.e._, the nature of a thing (_Svabh\u00e1va_) cannot be\naltered--a man cannot be made a cow, nor a woman a man.]\n[Footnote 357: I take _arth\u00e1ntaram_ here as simply _bhinnam_ (cf.\nT\u00e1r\u00e1n\u00e1tha Tarkav\u00e1chaspati's note, _Tattva Kaumud\u00ed_, p. 47).]\n[Footnote 358: Colebrooke's translation.]\n[Footnote 359: Or \"passion,\" _rajas_.]\n[Footnote 360: In other words--on the one hand the existing misery of\nbeings induced God to create a world in order to relieve their misery,\nand on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which\ncaused their misery at all.]\n[Footnote 361: Bondage, &c., reside in the intellect, and are only\n_reflected_ upon soul through its proximity (cf.\n_S\u00e1\u1e45khyapravachanabh\u00e1shya_, i. 58).]\n[Footnote 362: This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It\nis found in the Babylonian Talmud, _Sanhedrim_, fol. 91, _b_, and in\nthe Gesta Romanorum.]\nCHAPTER XV.\nTHE PATANJALI-DARS\u00c1NA.\nWe now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the\nopinions of such Munis as Pata\u00f1jali and others, who originated the\nsystem of the Theistic S\u00e1\u1e45khya philosophy. This school follows the\nso-called Yoga \u015a\u00e1stra promulgated by Pata\u00f1jali, and consisting of four\nchapters, which also bears the name of the \"S\u00e1\u1e45khya Pravachana,\" or\ndetailed explanation of the S\u00e1\u1e45khya.[363] In the first chapter thereof\nthe venerable Pata\u00f1jali, having in the opening aphorism, \"Now is the\nexposition of Concentration\" (_yoga_), avowed his commencement of the\nYoga \u015a\u00e1stra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of\nhis subject, \"Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of\nthe thinking principle,\" and then he expounds at length the nature of\nMeditation (_sam\u00e1dhi_). In the second chapter, in the series of\naphorisms commencing, \"The practical part of Concentration is\nmortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme,\" he expounds\nthe practical part of _yoga_ proper to him whose mind is not yet\nthoroughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients\nor means, \"forbearance,\" and the rest. In the third chapter, in the\nseries commencing \"Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some\nspot,\" he expounds the three internal subservients--attention,\ncontemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name\n\"subjugation\" (_sa\u1e43yama_), and also the various superhuman powers\nwhich are their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the\nseries commencing, \"Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells,\nmortification, and meditation,\" he expounds the highest end,\nEmancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called\n\"perfections\" (_siddhis_). This school accepts the old twenty-five\nprinciples [of the S\u00e1\u1e45khya], \"Nature,\" &c.; only adding the Supreme\nBeing as the twenty-sixth--a Soul untouched by affliction, action,\nfruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order\nto create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,[364] and\nis gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal\nof mundane existence.\n\"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf\nof a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any\nSupreme Being as gracious to it?\" To this we reply, that the quality\nGoodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which\nis, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the\ninfluence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering\nquality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have\ndeclared--\n \"It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the\n understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which\n And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly\n identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering.\"\nIt has been also said by Pata\u00f1jali,[366] \"The power of the enjoyer,\nwhich is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an\nobject which is developed and transferred experiences the\nmodifications thereof.\"\nNow the \"power of the enjoyer\" is the power of intelligence, and this is\nthe soul; and in an object which is \"developed\" and \"transferred,\" or\nreflected,--_i.e._, in the thinking principle or the understanding,--it\nexperiences the modifications thereof, _i.e._, the power of intelligence,\nbeing reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the\nunderstanding, and imitates the modifications of it. Thus the soul, though\nin itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding;\nand, while thus seeing at second-hand, though really it is different from\nthe understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is\nthus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means,\nforbearance, religious observance, &c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and\nfor a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at\nlength there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction\nbetween the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five \"afflictions,\"\nignorance, &c., are radically destroyed, and the various \"stocks of\ndesert,\" fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the\nundefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished.\nThe words of the first aphorism, \"Now is the exposition of\nconcentration,\" establish the four preliminaries which lead to the\nintelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the\nobject-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise\nand the object], and the person properly qualified to study it. The\nword \"now\" (_atha_) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning,\n[as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. \"But,\" it may\nbe objected, \"there are several possible significations of this word\n_atha_; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this\nparticular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their\ngender [the Amara Kosha Dictionary] gives many such meanings. '_Atha_\nis used in the sense of an auspicious particle,--after,--now\n(inceptive),--what? (interrogatively),--and all (comprehensively).'\nNow we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or\ncomprehensiveness; but since there are four senses certainly\nsuitable, _i.e._, 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a\nprevious topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for\nsingling out the _last_.\" This objection, however, will not stand, for\nit cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of\n\"after,\" then do you hold that it implies following after anything\nwhatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the\ngeneral definition of causation,[367] _i.e._, \"previous existence\n[relatively to the effect]\"? It cannot be the former, for, in\naccordance with the proverb that \"No one stands for a single moment\ninactive,\" everybody must always do everything after previously doing\nsomething else; and since this is at once understood without any\ndirect mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle\n_atha_ to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative;\nbecause, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration\ndoes in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, &c., yet\nthese are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of\nexposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance\n[which the presumed _cause_ should have]. \"But why should we not hold\nthat the word _atha_ implies that this very exposition is avowedly the\npredominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of\nmind, &c.?\" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term \"exposition\"\n(_anu\u015b\u00e1sana_), and this word, etymologically analysed, implies that by\nwhich the _yoga_ is explained, accompanied with definitions,\ndivisions, and detailed means and results; and there is no rule that\nsuch an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, &c., the\nrule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must\nfollow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to\nothers; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived\nknowledge, which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precursors,\nin accordance with the words of \u015aruti: \"Therefore having become\ntranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith\nand intent, let him see the soul in the soul.\"[368] Nor can the word\n_atha_ imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound\nknowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because,\neven granting that both these are present, they need not to be\nmentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to\nproduce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student. Still\n[however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the\nexposition of the _yoga_ ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude\nor not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain\npresupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it\nmust be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.[369] But it\nis clear that the exposition in question _is_ such a cause, since we\nhave such a passage of the \u015aruti as that [in the Ka\u1e6dha Upanishad, ii.\n12]: \"By the acquirement of _yoga_ or intense concentration on the\nSupreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and\nsorrow;\" and again, such a passage of the Sm\u1e5biti as that [in the\nBhagavad G\u00edt\u00e1, ii. 53]: \"The intellect unwavering in contemplation\nwill then attain _yoga_.\" Hence we conclude that it is untenable to\ninterpret _atha_ as implying that the exposition must follow \"after\" a\nprevious inquiry on the part of the student, or \"after\" a previous\ncourse of ascetic training and use of elixirs, &c. [to render the body\nstrong].\nBut in the case of the Ved\u00e1nta S\u00fatras, which open with the aphorism,\n\"Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman,\" \u015aa\u1e45kara \u00c1ch\u00e1rya\nhas declared that the inceptive meaning of _atha_ must be left out of\nthe question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at\nwill]; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean \"after,\"\n_i.e._, that this desire must follow a previous course of\ntranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins\nthe practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance,\ncontemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching\nto a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four\nso-called \"means.\"[370]\n\"Well, then, let us grant that _atha_ cannot mean 'after;' but why\nshould it not be simply an auspicious particle?\" But this it cannot\nbe, from the absence of any connection between the context and such\nauspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an\nunimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as\nbeing the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this\nauspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of _yoga_, since it is\nin itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.[371] Therefore\nit cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is\nthat \"the exposition of the _yoga_ is auspicious;\" for auspiciousness\ncannot be either the primary meaning of _atha_ or its secondary\nmeaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself\nauspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a\ndrum. \"But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into\nthe direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of\nauspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally\nunexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?\"[372] We reply,\nthat in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the\nmeaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty\nof breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that\n\"verbal expectancy[373] can be fulfilled by _words_ alone.\"\n\"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at\nthe beginning of a \u015a\u00e1stra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that\nwould hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to\nbegin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since\nit has been said by the wise, 'Those \u015b\u00e1stras become widely famous\nwhich have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and\nauspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are\ninvincible in disputation'?[374] Now the word _atha_ implies\n'auspiciousness,' since there is a Sm\u1e5biti which says,\n \"'The word _Om_ and the word _atha_,--these two in the\n ancient time,\n \"'Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they\n are both auspicious.'\n\"Therefore let the word _atha_ stand here as signifying\n'auspiciousness,' like the word '_v\u1e5biddhi_' used by P\u00e1\u1e47ini in his\nopening s\u00fatra '_v\u1e5biddhir \u00e1d aich_.'\"[375] This view, however, is\nuntenable; since the very word _atha_, when heard, has an auspicious\ninfluence, even though it be employed to convey some other special\nsignification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &c. [is\nauspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, \"How\ncan the particle _atha_ have any other effect, if it is specially used\nhere to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a\nnew topic is commenced?\" we reply that it certainly _can_ have such\nother additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for\nsome other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a\njourney.[376] Nor does this contradict the sm\u1e5biti, since the sm\u1e5biti\nwill still hold good, as the words \"they are both auspicious\" mean\nonly that they produce an auspicious effect.\nNor can the particle _atha_ have here the meaning of \"reference to a\nprevious topic,\" since the previously mentioned faults will all equally\napply here, as this meaning really involves that of \"after\" [which we have\nalready discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this,\nas to whether this particular _atha_ means \"the inceptive now\" or \"after,\"\nif another topic had been previously suggested, then \"reference thereto\"\nwould be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic\nhas been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore, by\nexhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the _atha_ of the s\u00fatra,\nthe remaining meaning of \"the inceptive now.\" So, when it is said [in the\nT\u00e1\u1e47\u1e0dya Br\u00e1hma\u1e47a, xvi. 8, 1; xvi. 10, 1], \"Now this is the Jyotis,\" \"Now\nthis is the Vi\u015bvajyotis,\"[377] the particle _atha_ is accepted as\nsignifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice,\njust as the _atha_ in the commencement of the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1shya, \"now comes the\nexposition of words,\" signifies the commencement of the Institutes of\nGrammar. This has been declared by Vy\u00e1sa in his Commentary on the Yoga\nAphorisms, \"the _atha_ in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;\"\nand V\u00e1chaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore it may\nbe considered as settled that the _atha_ here indicates a commencement and\nalso signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view that this\n_atha_ implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive\nafter a successful understanding of the \u015b\u00e1stra through the attainment of\nthe _yoga_, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's\nexplanation of its entire purport. But here some one may say, \"Does not\nthe sm\u1e5biti of Y\u00e1j\u00f1avalkya say, 'Hira\u1e47yagarbha is the promulgator of the\nYoga, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Pata\u00f1jali the teacher\nthereof?\" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable\nPata\u00f1jali,[378] that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was\nto grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the\nPur\u00e1\u1e47as, &c., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his\n_anu\u015b\u00e1sana_,--the preposition _anu_ implying that it was a teaching which\nfollowed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of\nthe system.\nSince this _atha_ in the aphorism signifies \"commencement,\" the full\nmeaning of the sentence comes out as follows: \"be it known that the\ninstitute for the exposition of the _yoga_ is now commenced.\" In this\ninstitute the \"object-matter,\" as being that which is produced by it,\nis _yoga_ [or the \"concentration of the mind\"], with its means and its\nfruit; the producing this is its inferior \"end;\" supreme absorption\n(_kaivalya_) is the highest \"end\" of the _yoga_ when it is produced.\nThe \"connection\" between the institute and _yoga_ is that of the\nproducer and the thing to be produced; the \"connection\" between _yoga_\nand supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is\nwell known from \u015aruti and Sm\u1e5biti, as I have before shown. And it is\nestablished by the general context that those who aim at liberation\nare the duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need any\none be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the\nopening aphorism of the Ved\u00e1nta s\u00fatras, \"Now, therefore, there is a\nwish to know Brahman;\" and lest here, too, we should seek to\nestablish by the general context that all persons who aim at\nliberation are duly qualified students of the Ved\u00e1nta. For the word\n_atha_, as there used, signifies \"succession\" [or \"after\"]; and it is\na settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a\nregular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the\nquestion cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by\nthe context. Hence it has been said, \"When \u015aruti comes [as the\ndetermining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no\nplace.\"[379] The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is\nnot apprehended from the Veda itself, there the \"subject-matter\" and\nthe rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever\nwe can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of\ninterpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text\nof the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the\n\"subject-matter\" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion\nor one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which\nwould establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of\n\"_\u015bruti_\"] already precluded from having any force; and in the latter\nit is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3,\n14]; \"A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,'\nthe 'relative position,' or 'the title,'--when any of these come into\ncollision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is\nmore remote\"[380] [and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus\nsummed up--\n \"A text always precludes the rest; the 'title' is always\n precluded by any of the preceding modes;\n \"But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself\n precludes, depends on circumstances.\"\nTherefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now considered as\nsettled that, since it has an \"object,\" as well as the other\npreliminaries, the study of the \u015a\u00e1stra, which teaches the Yoga, is to\nbe commenced like that of the Ved\u00e1nta, which discusses the nature of\nBrahman. \"But,\" it may be objected, \"it is the Yoga which was said to\nbe the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not\nthe \u015a\u00e1stra.\" We grant that the Yoga is the principal object, as that\nwhich is to be produced; but since it is produced by the \u015a\u00e1stra,\nespecially directed thereto, this \u015a\u00e1stra is the means for its\nproduction, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly\nconcerned with the means rather than with the end. Just as the\noperations of Devadatta the woodcutter, _i.e._, his lifting his arm up\nand down, &c., relate rather to the instrument, _i.e._, the axe, than\nto the object, _i.e._, the tree, so here the speaker, Pata\u00f1jali, in\nhis immediate action of speaking, means the Yoga-\u015a\u00e1stra as his primary\nobject, while he intends the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of\n\"denotation.\" In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is\nthat the commencing the Yoga\u015b\u00e1stra is that which primarily claims our\nattention; while the \"yoga,\" or the restraint of the modifications of\nthe mind, is what is to be expounded in this S\u00e1\u015btra. \"But as we read\nin the lists of roots that the root _yuj_ is used in the sense of\n'joining,' should not the word _yoga_, its derivative, mean\n'conjunction,' and not 'restraint'? And indeed this has been said by\nY\u00e1j\u00f1avalkya:[381]--\n 'The conjunction of the individual and the supreme souls is\n called _yoga_.'\"\nThis, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such\naction,[382] &c., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two\nsouls. [Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the\nopposition of other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the\nconjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the\nVai\u015beshika and Ny\u00e1ya schools [and therefore they would still oppose our\ntheory]. And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the\nM\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 [or Ved\u00e1nta], our Yoga\u015b\u00e1stra would be rendered nugatory by this\nconcession [and the very ground cut from under our feet]; because the\nidentity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school\nsomething already accomplished, it could not be regarded as something to\nbe produced by our \u015a\u00e1stra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are\nused in many different senses, the root _yuj_ may very well be used here\nin the sense of \"contemplation.\"[383] Thus it has been said--\n \"Particles, prepositions, and roots--these three are all\n held to be of manifold meaning; instances found in reading\n are their evidence.\"\nTherefore some authors expressly give _yuj_ in this sense, and insert\nin their lists \"_yuj_ in the sense of _sam\u00e1dhi_.\" Nor does this\ncontradict Y\u00e1j\u00f1avalkya's declaration, as the word _yoga_, used by him,\nmay bear this meaning; and he has himself said--\n \"_Sam\u00e1dhi_ is the state of identity of the individual and\n supreme souls; this abiding absolutely in Brahman is the\n _sam\u00e1dhi_ of the individual soul.\"\nIt has been also said by the venerable Vy\u00e1sa [in his Commentary on the\nYoga-s\u00fatras, i. 1], \"_Yoga is sam\u00e1dhi_.\"\nAn objection however, may be here raised that \"the term _sam\u00e1dhi_ is\nused by Pata\u00f1jali [in ii. 29] in the sense of one of the eight\nancillary parts[384] of the eightfold concentration (or _yoga_); and\nthe whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the\nprincipal and the ancillary must be completely different from each\nother, as all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as\nwe see in the _dar\u015bap\u00far\u1e47am\u00e1sa_ sacrifices and their ancillary rites\nthe _pray\u00e1jas_, and therefore _sam\u00e1dhi_ cannot be the meaning of\n_yoga_.\" We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for\nalthough the term _sam\u00e1dhi_ is used for etymological reasons[385] to\nexpress the ancillary part which is really defined [in iii. 3] as \"the\ncontemplation which assumes the form of the object, and is apparently\ndevoid of any nature of its own;\" still the further use of this term\nto describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to\ndeclare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as the inferior\nultimately merges into the superior]. Nor can you hold that etymology\nalone can decide where a word can be used; because if so, as the word\n_go_, \"a bull,\" is derived by all grammarians from the root _gam_, \"to\ngo,\" we ought never to use the phrase \"a standing bull\" [as the two\nwords would be contradictory], and the man Devadatta, when going,\nwould properly be called _go_, \"a bull;\" and, moreover, the S\u00fatra, i.\n2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word\nin this sense when it declares that \"concentration (_yoga_) is the\nsuppression of the modifications of the thinking principle.\" [The\nsecond or principal sense of _sam\u00e1dhi_ will therefore be quite\ndistinct from the first or inferior.]\n\"But surely if _yoga_ is held to be the suppression of the\nmodifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications\nabide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge,\ntheir suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also\nabide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the\nantecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as\nthe counter-entity to these negations;[386] and consequently in\naccordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect\nthe subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the\nsoul itself would be destroyed.\" This, however, we do not allow;\nbecause we maintain that these various modifications which are to be\nhindered,[387] such as \"right notion,\" \"misconception,\" \"fancy,\"\n\"sleep,\" and \"memory\" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ\n(_chitta_), since the power of pure intelligence, which is\nunchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative\nperception. Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the\nintelligent soul[388] has not been proved, since there is an argument\nto establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from\nthe fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing\nis not unchangeable, as the internal organ, &c. And so again, if this\nsoul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be\noccasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these\nmodifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul\nalways remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially\npure substance[389] which abides always the same; and as it is this\nwhich is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible\nsubstance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces\nan impression;[390] and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own\nproper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing,\nand no suspicion of change alights upon it. That object by which the\nunderstanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is\nnot affected is not known; for the understanding is called\n\"susceptible of change,\" because it resembles the iron, as it is\nsusceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of\ninfluence of the object which resembles the magnet,--this influence or\nwant of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of\nknowledge. \"But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which\nspring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected\nwith all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a\nknowledge everywhere and always of all things?\" We reply that even\nalthough we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a\ngiven understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and\ncertain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge\nof these objects only, and none other, is produced to that\nunderstanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold\nthat objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just\nas these do iron,--coming in contact with it through the channels of\nthe senses. Therefore, the \"modifications\" belong to the\nunderstanding, not to the soul; and so says the \u015aruti, \"Desire,\nvolition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of\nfirmness,--all this is only the mind.\" Moreover, the sage Pa\u00f1cha\u015bikha\ndeclared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, \"The power\nthat enjoys is unchangeable;\" and so Pata\u00f1jali also (iv. 18), \"The\nmodifications of the understanding are always known,--this arises from\nthe unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul.\" The following is the\nargument drawn out formally to establish the changeableness of the\nunderstanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its\nvarious objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ\nof hearing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is\nnotoriously threefold, _i.e._, a change of \"property,\" of\n\"aspect,\"[391] and of \"condition.\" When the subject, the\nunderstanding, perceives the colour \"blue,\" &c., there is a change of\n\"property\" just as when the substance \"gold\" becomes a bracelet, a\ndiadem, or an armlet; there is a change of \"aspect\" when the property\nbecomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of \"condition\"\nwhen there is a manifestation or non-manifestation[392] of the\nperception, as of blue, &c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative]\nnewness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of\ncondition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the\nreader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that\nthere is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since \"right notion\"\nand the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their\n\"suppression\" will also have its site in the same organ.\n[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have\nsaid above.] \"But if we accept your definition that '_yoga_ is the\nsuppression of the modifications of the _chitta_,' this will apply\nalso to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or\nsuspension] of the modifications found in _kshipta_, _vikshipta_,\n_m\u00fa\u1e0dha_,[393] &c.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible\nfor the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called\n_kshipta_, &c., remain at all, and because they only hinder the\nattainment of the _summum bonum_. Let us examine this more closely.\nFor the understanding is called _kshipta_, 'restless,' when it is\nrestless [with an excess of the quality _rajas_], as being tossed\nabout amidst various objects which engage it. It is called _m\u00fa\u1e0dha_,\n'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is\nsunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the quality _tamas_].\nIt is called _vikshipta_, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the\nfirst state[394] [as filled with the quality _sattva_].\" We must here,\nhowever, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the\nBhagavad G\u00edt\u00e1 (vi. 34), 'The mind, O K\u1e5bish\u1e47a, is fickle, turbulent,\nviolent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may\noccasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects;\nbut restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness,\n&c., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the\nYoga S\u00fatras, i. 30], 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness,\nlaziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to\nattain some stage, and instability,--these distractions of the mind\nare called \"obstacles\".' Here 'sickness' means fever, &c., caused by\nthe want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the\nmind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces\ntwo opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the\nmeans for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from\nheaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an\nattachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken\nnotion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the\nfailing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract\nmeditation; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there,\neven when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore\nwe maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be\nlaid down as the definition of _yoga_.\nWe reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the\nthree conditions of the mind called _kshipta_, _m\u00fa\u1e0dha_, and\n_vikshipta_, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are\nall to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the\nmodifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided\n[and so cannot be called _yoga_], this does not apply to the other two\nconditions called _ek\u00e1gra_ and _niruddha_, which are to be pursued and\nattained; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these\ntwo praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as _yoga_. Now\nby _ek\u00e1gra_ we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the\n_sattva_ quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by\n_niruddha_ we mean that state when all its developments are stopped,\nand only their latent impressions [or potentialities] remain.\nNow this _sam\u00e1dhi_, \"meditation\" [in the highest sense], is twofold: \"that\nin which there is distinct recognition\" (_sa\u1e43praj\u00f1\u00e1ta_), and \"that in\nwhich distinct recognition is lost\" (_asa\u1e43praj\u00f1\u00e1ta_) [Yoga S., i. 17,\n18].[395] The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is\nintent on its own object, and all the \"modifications,\" such as \"right\nnotion,\" &c., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed,\nor, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect[396]\nis thoroughly recognised (_samyak praj\u00f1\u00e1yate_) as distinct from Nature. It\nhas a fourfold division, as _savitarka_, _savich\u00e1ra_, _s\u00e1nanda_, and\n_s\u00e1smita_. Now this \"meditation\" is a kind of \"pondering\" (_bh\u00e1van\u00e1_),\nwhich is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all\nother objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be\npondered is of two kinds, being either \u00cd\u015bwara or the twenty-five\nprinciples. And these principles also are of two kinds--senseless and not\nsenseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, &c., are\nsenseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects\nwhich are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross\nelements, as earth, &c., pondering is pursued in the form of an\ninvestigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,[397] or in\nthe form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be\nproduced [cf. i. 42]; then the meditation is called \"argumentative\"\n(_savitarka_). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the\nfive subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in\nrelation to space, time, &c., then the meditation is called \"deliberative\"\n(_savich\u00e1ra_). When the mind, commingled with some \"passion\" and\n\"darkness,\" is pondered, then the meditation is called \"beatific\"\n(_s\u00e1nanda_), because \"goodness\" is then predominant, which consists in the\nmanifestation of joy.[398] When pondering is pursued, having as its object\nthe pure element of \"goodness,\" unaffected by even a little of \"passion\"\nor \"darkness,\" then that meditation is called \"egoistical\" (_s\u00e1smita_),\nbecause here personal existence[399] only remains, since the intellectual\nfaculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of \"goodness\" has become\nquite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things].\nBut the \"meditation, where distinct recognition is lost,\" consists in\nthe suppression of all \"modifications\" whatever.\n\"But\" [it may be asked] \"was not 'concentration' defined as the\nsuppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation\nwhere there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since\nwe still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the\nquality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality\nof goodness as distinct from each other?\" This, however, is untenable,\nbecause we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the\n\"modifications\" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the\noperation of the \"afflictions,\" the \"actions,\" the \"fructifications,\"\nand the \"stock of deserts.\"[400]\nThe \"afflictions\" (_kle\u015ba_) are well known as five, viz., ignorance,\negoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here\na question is at once raised, In what sense is the word _avidy\u00e1_,\n\"ignorance,\" used here? Is it to be considered as an _avyay\u00edbh\u00e1va_\ncompound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word\n\"above-board\"?[401] or is it a _tatpurusha_ [or _karmadh\u00e1raya_]\ncompound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word\n\"town-clerk\"? or is it a _bahuvr\u00edhi_ compound, where both portions are\ndependent on something external to the compound, as \"blue-eyed\"? It\ncannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were\npredominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in\n_avidy\u00e1_ (_i.e._, it would be an instance of what is called the\nexpress negation, or _prasajya-pratishedha_);[402] and consequently,\nas _avidy\u00e1_ would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable\nto produce positive results, as the \"afflictions,\" &c., and the very\nform of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the\nsecond; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be\ncharacterised by (_a_ + _vidy\u00e1_), opposes the \"afflictions,\" &c., and\ncannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for\nthen,--in accordance with the words of the author of the V\u1e5bitti,[403]\n\"there is a _bahuvr\u00edhi_ compound which is formed with some word\nmeaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of\nthis subsequent word\"[404]--we must explain this supposed _bahuvr\u00edhi_\ncompound _avidy\u00e1_ as follows: \"That _buddhi_ is to be characterised as\n_avidy\u00e1_ (_sc._ an adjective), of which there is not a _vidy\u00e1_\nexisting.\" But this explanation is untenable; for such an _avidy\u00e1_\ncould not become the source of the \"afflictions;\"[405] and yet, on the\nother hand, it ought to be their source,[406] even though it were\nassociated with the suppression of all the \"modifications,\"[407] and\nwere also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and\nthe quality of goodness [which is found in the _s\u00e1smita_ meditation].\nNow it is said [in the Yoga S\u00fatras, ii. 4], \"Ignorance is the field\n[or place of origin, _i.e._, source] of the others, whether they be\ndormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple.\" They are said to be\n\"dormant\" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake\nthem up; they are called \"extenuated\" when, through one's meditating\non something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they\nare called \"intercepted\" when they are overpowered by some other\nstrong \"affliction;\" they are called \"simple\" when they produce their\nseveral effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them.\nThis has been expressed by V\u00e1chaspati Mi\u015bra, in his Gloss on Vy\u00e1sa's\nCommentary, in the following memorial stanza:--\n \"The dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which\n are absorbed in the _tattvas_ [_i.e._, not embodied, but\n existing in an interval of mundane destruction]; the\n 'extenuated'[408] are found in _yogins_; but the\n 'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact\n with worldly objects.\"\n\"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound _avidy\u00e1_ as a\n_dvandva_ compound,[409] where both portions are equally predominant,\nbecause we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects.\nTherefore under any one of these three admissible alternatives[410]\nthe common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions'\nwould be overthrown.\"\n[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], because we may\nhave recourse to the other kind of negation called _paryud\u00e1sa_ [where\nthe affirmative part is emphatic], and maintain that _avidy\u00e1_ means a\ncontradictory [or _wrong_] kind of knowledge, the reverse of _vidy\u00e1_;\nand so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has been\nsaid--\n \"The particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence'\n [or 'non-existence'] when connected with a noun or a root;\n thus the words _abr\u00e1hma\u1e47a_ and _adharma_ respectively\n signify, 'what is other than a Br\u00e1hman' and 'what is\n contrary to justice.'\"\nAnd again--\n \"We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom of\n the ancient writers; therefore a word must not be wrested\n from the use in which it has been already employed.\"\nV\u00e1chaspati also says,[411] \"The connection of words and their meanings\ndepends on general consent for its certainty; and since we\noccasionally see that a _tatpurusha_ negation, where the latter\nportion is properly predominant, may overpower the direct meaning of\nthis latter portion by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even\nhere too [in _avidy\u00e1_] the real meaning is something contrary to\n_vidy\u00e1_\" [_i.e._, the negative \"non-knowledge\" becomes ultimately the\npositive \"ignorance\"[412]]. It is with a view to this that it is said\nin the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5], \"Ignorance is the notion that the\nnon-eternal, the impure, pain, and the non-soul are (severally)\neternal, pure, pleasure, and soul.\" _Viparyaya_, \"misconception,\" is\ndefined as \"the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing,\"[413]\n[_i.e._, in its opposite]; as, for instance, the imagining the\n\"eternal\" in a \"non-eternal\" thing, _i.e._, a jar, or the imagining\nthe \"pure\" in the \"impure\" body,[414] when it has been declared by a\nproverbial couplet[415]--\n \"The wise recognise the body as impure, from its original\n place [the womb],--from its primal seed,--from its\n composition [of humours, &c.],--from perspiration,--from\n death [as even a Br\u00e1hman's body defiles],--and from the fact\n that it has to be made pure by rites.\"\nSo,--in accordance with the principle enounced in the aphorism (ii.\n15), \"To the discriminating everything is simply pain, through the\npain which arises in the ultimate issue of everything,[416] or through\nthe anxiety to secure it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent\nimpressions which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual\nopposition of the influences of the three qualities\" [in the form of\npleasure, pain, and stupid indifference],--ignorance transfers the\nidea of \"pleasure\" to what is really \"pain,\" as, _e.g._, garlands,\nsandal-wood, women, &c.; and similarly it conceives the \"non-soul,\"\n_e.g._, the body, &c., as the \"soul.\" As it has been said--\n \"But ignorance is when living beings transfer the notion of\n 'soul' to the 'non-soul,' as the body, &c.;\n \"This causes bondage; but in the abolition thereof is\n liberation.\"\nThus this ignorance consists of four kinds.[417]\nBut [it may be objected] in these four special kinds of ignorance\nshould there not be given some general definition applying to them\nall, as otherwise their special characteristics cannot be\nestablished? For thus it has been said by Bha\u1e6d\u1e6da Kum\u00e1rila--\n \"'Without some general definition, a more special definition\n cannot be given by itself; therefore it must not be even\n mentioned here.'\"\nThis, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently met by\nthe general definition of misconception, already adduced above, as\n\"the imagining of a thing in its opposite.\"\n\"Egoism\" (_asmit\u00e1_) is the notion that the two separate things, the\nsoul and the quality of purity,[418] are one and the same, as is said\n(ii. 6), \"Egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of\nsight.\" \"Desire\" (_r\u00e1ga_) is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for\nthe means of enjoyment, preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on\nthe part of one who has known joy. \"Aversion\" (_dvesha_) is the\nfeeling of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded by\nthe remembrance of pain, on the part of one who has known it. This is\nexpressed in the two aphorisms, \"Desire is what dwells on pleasure;\"\n\"Aversion is what dwells on pain\" (ii. 7, 8).\nHere a grammatical question may be raised, \"Are we to consider this\nword _anu\u015bayin_ ('dwelling') as formed by the _k\u1e5bit_ affix _\u1e47ini_ in\nthe sense of 'what is habitual,' or the _taddhita_ affix _ini_ in the\nsense of _matup_? It cannot be the former, since the affix _\u1e47ini_\ncannot be used after a root compounded with a preposition as _anu\u015b\u00ed_;\nfor, as the word _supi_ has already occurred in the S\u00fatra, iii. 2, 4,\nand has been exerting its influence in the following s\u00fatras, this word\nmust have been introduced a second time in the S\u00fatra, iii. 2, 78,\n_supy aj\u00e1tau \u1e47inis t\u00e1chchh\u00edlye_,[419] on purpose to exclude\nprepositions, as these have no case terminations; and even if we did\nstrain a point to allow them, still it would follow by the S\u00fatra, vii.\n2, 115, _acho \u00f1\u1e47iti_,[420] that the radical vowel must be subject to\n_v\u1e5biddhi_, and so the word must be _anu\u015b\u00e1yin_, in accordance with the\nanalogy of such words as _ati\u015b\u00e1yin_, &c. Nor is the latter view\ntenable (_i.e._, that it is the _taddhita_ affix _ini_[421]), since\n_ini_ is forbidden by the technical verse--\n 'These two affixes[422] are not used after a monosyllable\n nor a _k\u1e5bit_ formation, nor a word meaning 'genus,' nor with\n a word in the locative case;'\nand the word _anu\u015baya_ is clearly a _k\u1e5bit_ formation as it ends with\nthe affix _ach_[423] [which brings it under this prohibition, and so\nrenders it insusceptible of the affix _ini_]. Consequently, the word\n_anu\u015bayin_ in the Yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is\nvery hard to justify.\"[424] This cavil, however, is not to be\nadmitted; since the rule is only to be understood as applying\ngenerally, not absolutely, as it does not refer to something of\nessential importance. Hence the author of the V\u1e5bitti has said--\n \"The word _iti_, as implying the idea of popular\n acceptation, is everywhere connected with the examples of\n this rule[425] [_i.e._, it is not an absolute law].\"\nTherefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as _k\u00e1ryin_,\n_k\u00e1ryika_ [where the affixes are added after a _k\u1e5bit_ formation],\n_ta\u1e47\u1e0dulin_, _ta\u1e47\u1e0dulika_ [where they are added after a word meaning\n\"genus\"]. Hence the prohibition is only general, not absolute, after\n_k\u1e5bit_ formations and words meaning \"genus,\" and therefore the use of\nthe affix _ini_ is justified, although the word _anu\u015baya_ is formed by\na _k\u1e5bit_ affix. This doubt therefore is settled.\nThe fifth \"affliction,\" called \"tenacity of mundane existence\"\n(_abhinive\u015ba_), is what prevails in the case of all living beings,\nfrom the worm up to the philosopher, springing up daily, without any\nimmediate cause, in the form of a dread, \"May I not be separated from\nthe body, things sensible, &c.,\" through the force of the impression\nleft by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered\nin previous lives, this is proved by universal experience, since every\nindividual has the wish, \"May I not cease to be,\" \"May I be.\" This is\ndeclared in the aphorism, \"Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing on\nthrough its own nature, is notorious even in the case of the\nphilosopher\" [ii. 9]. These five, \"ignorance,\" &c., are well known as\nthe \"afflictions\" (_kle\u015ba_), since they afflict the soul, as bringing\nupon it various mundane troubles.\n[We next describe the _karm\u00e1\u015baya_ of ii. 12, the \"stock of works\" or\n\"merits\" in the mind.] \"Works\" (_karman_) consist of enjoined or\nforbidden actions, as the _jyotish\u1e6doma_ sacrifice, br\u00e1hmanicide, &c.\n\"Stock\" (_\u00e1\u015baya_) is the balance of the fruits of previous works,\nwhich lie stored up in the mind in the form of \"mental deposits\" of\nmerit or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own\nexperience as \"rank,\" \"years,\" and \"enjoyment\" [ii. 13].\nNow \"concentration\" [_yoga_] consists [by i. 2] in \"the suppression of\nthe modifications of the thinking principle,\" which stops the\noperation of the \"afflictions,\" &c.; and this \"suppression\" is not\nconsidered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications\n[_i.e._, a mere negation], because, if it were a mere negation, it\ncould not produce positive impressions on the mind; but it is rather\nthe site of this non-existence,[426]--a particular state of the\nthinking principle, called by the four names [which will be fully\ndescribed hereafter], _madhumat\u00ed_, _madhuprat\u00edk\u00e1_, _vi\u015bok\u00e1_, and\n_sa\u1e43sk\u00e1ra\u015beshat\u00e1_. The word _nirodha_ thus corresponds to its\netymological explanation as \"that in which the modifications of the\nthinking principle, right notion, misconception, &c., are suppressed\n(_nirudhyante_). This suppression of the modifications is produced by\n\"exercise\" and \"dispassion\" [i. 12]. \"Exercise is the repeated effort\nthat the internal organ shall remain in its proper state\" [i. 13].\nThis \"remaining in its proper state\" is a particular kind of\ndevelopment, whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural\nstate, unaffected by those modifications which at different times\nassume the form of revealing, energising, and controlling.[427]\n\"Exercise\" is an effort directed to this, an endeavour again and again\nto reduce the internal organ to such a condition. The locative case,\n_sthitau_, in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim,\nas in the well-known phrase, \"He kills the elephant for its\nskin.\"[428] \"Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire\nin him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those\nthat are heard of in revelation\" [i. 15]. \"Dispassion\" is thus the\nreflection, \"These objects are subject to me, not I to them,\" in one\nwho feels no interest in the things of this world or the next, from\nperceiving the imperfections attached to them.\nNow, in order to reduce the \"afflictions\" which hinder meditation and\nto attain meditation, the _yogin_ must first direct his attention to\npractical concentration, and \"exercise\" and \"dispassion\" are of\nespecial use in its attainment. This has been said by K\u1e5bish\u1e47a in the\nBhagavad G\u00edt\u00e1 [vi. 3]--\n \"Action is the means to the sage who wishes to rise to\n But to him who has risen to it, tranquillity is said to be\n the means.\"\nPata\u00f1jali has thus defined the practical _yoga_: \"Practical\nconcentration is mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation\nto the Lord\" [ii. 1]. Y\u00e1j\u00f1avalkya has described \"mortification\"--\n \"By the way prescribed in sacred rule, by the difficult\n ch\u00e1ndr\u00e1ya\u1e47a fast, &c.,\n \"Thus to dry up the body they call the highest of all\n mortifications.\"[429]\n\"Recitation of texts\" is the repetition of the syllable Om, the\n_g\u00e1yatr\u00ed_, &c. Now these _mantras_ are of two kinds, Vaidik and\nT\u00e1ntrik. The Vaidik are also of two kinds, those chanted and those not\nchanted. Those chanted are the _s\u00e1mans_; those not chanted are either\nin metre, _i.e._, the _\u1e5bichas_, or in prose, _i.e._, the _yaj\u00fa\u1e43shi_,\nas has been said by Jaimini,[430] \"Of these, that is a _\u1e5bich_ in which\nby the force of the sense there is a definite division into _p\u00e1das_\n[or portions of a verse]; the name _s\u00e1man_ is applied to chanted\nportions; the word _yajus_ is applied to the rest.\" Those _mantras_\nare called T\u00e1ntrik which are set forth in sacred books that are\ndirected to topics of voluntary devotion;[431] and these are again\nthreefold, as female, male, and neuter; as it has been said--\n \"The _mantras_ are of three kinds, as female, male, and\n neuter:\n \"The female are those which end in the wife of fire (_i.e._,\n the exclamation _sv\u00e1h\u00e1_); the neuter those which end in\n \"The rest are male, and considered the best. They are\n all-powerful in mesmerising another's will, &c.\"\nThey are called \"all-powerful\" (_siddha_) because they counteract all\ndefects in their performance, and produce their effect even when the\nordinary consecrating ceremonies, as bathing, &c., have been omitted.\nNow the peculiar \"consecrating ceremonies\" (_sa\u1e43sk\u00e1ra_) are ten, and\nthey have been thus described in the _\u015a\u00e1rad\u00e1-tilaka_--\n \"There are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which give\n to _mantras_ efficacy:\n \"These mantras are thus made complete; they are thoroughly\n consecrated.\n \"The 'begetting,' the 'vivifying,' the 'smiting,' the\n 'awakening,'\n \"The 'sprinkling,' the 'purifying,' the 'fattening,'\n \"The 'satisfying,' the 'illumining,' the\n 'concealing,'--these are the ten consecrations of _mantras_.\n \"The 'begetting' (_janana_) is the extracting of the\n _mantra_ from its vowels and consonants.\n \"The wise man should mutter the several letters of the\n _mantra_, each united to Om,\n \"According to the number of the letters. This they call the\n 'vivifying' (_j\u00edvana_).\n \"Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him smite\n each with sandal-water,\n \"Uttering at each the mystic 'seed' of air.[432] This is\n called the 'smiting' (_t\u00e1\u1e0dana_).\n \"Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him strike\n them with oleander flowers,\n \"Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the\n 'awakening' (_bodhana_).\n \"Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his\n own special _tantra_,\n \"Sprinkle the letters, according to their number, with\n leaves of the Ficus religiosa. This is the 'sprinkling'\n (_abhisheka_).\n \"Having meditated on the _mantra_ in his mind, let him\n consume by the _jyotir-mantra_\n \"The threefold impurity of the _mantra_. This is the\n 'purification' (_vimal\u00ed-kara\u1e47a_).\n \"The utterance of the _jyotir-mantra_, together with Om, and\n the _mantras_ of Vyoman and Agni,\n \"And the sprinkling of every letter with water from a bunch\n of ku\u015ba grass,\n \"With the mystical seed of water[433] duly muttered,--this\n is held to be the 'fattening' (_\u00e1py\u00e1yana_).\n \"The satiating libation over the _mantra_ with\n _mantra_-hallowed water is the 'satisfying' (_tarpa\u1e47a_).\n \"The joining of the _mantra_ with Om and the 'seeds' of\n M\u00e1y\u00e1[434] and Ram\u00e1[435] is called its 'illumining'\n \"The non-publication of the _mantra_ which is being\n muttered--this is its 'concealing' (_gopana_).\n \"These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in all\n _tantras_;\n \"And the adept who practises them according to the tradition\n obtains his desire;\n \"And _ruddha_, _k\u00edlita_, _vichhinna_, _supta_, _\u015bapta_, and\n the rest,\n \"All these faults in the _mantra_ rites are abolished by\n these excellent consecrations.\"\nBut enough of this venturing to make public the _tantra_ mysteries\nconnected with _mantras_, which has suddenly led us astray like an\nunexpected Bacchanalian dance.[436]\nThe third form of practical _yoga_, \"resignation to the Lord\"\n(_\u00ed\u015bvara-pra\u1e47idh\u00e1na_), is the consigning all one's works, whether\nmentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the Supreme Lord, the\nSupremely Venerable. As it has been said--\n \"Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary,\n \"That is all made over to thee; I act as impelled by thee.\"\nThis self-resignation is also sometimes defined as \"the surrender of\nthe fruits of one's actions,\" and is thus a peculiar kind of faith,\nsince most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is\nsung in the Bhagavad G\u00edt\u00e1 [ii. 47]--\n \"Let thy sole concern be with action and never with the\n fruits;\n \"Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou\n attached to inaction.\"\nThe harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared\nby the venerable N\u00edlaka\u1e47\u1e6dha-bh\u00e1rat\u00ed--\n \"Even a penance accomplished by great effort, but vitiated\n by desire,\n \"Produces only disgust in the Great Lord, like milk which\n has been licked by a dog.\"\nNow this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation, and\nresignation is itself called _yoga_, because it is a means for\nproducing _yoga_, this being an instance of the function of words\ncalled \"superimponent pure Indication,\" as in the well-known example,\n\"Butter is longevity.\" \"Indication\" is the establishing of another\nmeaning of a word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning\nwith the rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new\nmeaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on notoriety or on\na motive. This has been declared in the _K\u00e1vya-prak\u00e1\u015ba_ [ii. 9]--\n \"When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the\n principal meaning of a word, and yet in connection with it,\n another meaning is indicated through notoriety or a motive,\n this is 'Indication,' the superadded function of the word.\"\nNow the word \"this\" [_i.e._, _tat_ in the neuter, which the neuter\n_yat_ in the extract would have naturally led us to expect instead of\nthe feminine _s\u00e1_] would have signified some neuter word, like\n\"implying,\" which is involved as a subordinate part of the verb \"is\nindicated.\" But _s\u00e1_ is used in the feminine [by attraction to agree\nwith _laksha\u1e47\u00e1_], \"this is indication,\" _i.e._, the neuter \"this\" is\nput in the feminine through its dependence on the predicate. This has\nbeen explained by Kaiya\u1e6da, \"Of those pronouns which imply the identity\nof the subject and the predicate, the former takes the gender of the\nformer, the latter of the latter.\"[437] Now \"expert (_ku\u015bala_) in\nbusiness\" is an example of Indication from notoriety; for the word\n_ku\u015bala_, which is significant in its parts by being analysed\netymologically as _ku\u015ba\u1e43_ + _l\u00e1ti_, \"one who gathers ku\u015ba grass for\nthe sacrifice,\" is here employed to mean \"expert\" through the relation\nof a similarity in character, as both are persons of discernment; and\nthis does not need a motive any more than Denotation does, since each\nis the using a word in its recognised conventional sense in accordance\nwith the immemorial tradition of the elders. Hence it has been said--\n \"Some instances of 'indication' are known by notoriety from\n their immediate significance, just as is the case in\n 'denotation' [the primary power of a word].\"\nTherefore indication based on notoriety has no regard to any motive.\nAlthough a word, when it is employed, first establishes its principal\nmeaning, and then by that meaning a second meaning is subsequently\nindicated, and so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning\nand not to the word; still, since it is superadded to the word which\noriginally established the primary meaning, it is called [improperly\nby metonymy] a function of the word. It was with a view to this that\nthe author of the K\u00e1vya-prak\u00e1\u015ba used the expression, \"This is\n'Indication,' the superadded function of the word.\" But the indication\nbased on a motive is of six kinds: 1. inclusive indication,[438] as\n\"the lances enter\" [where we really mean \"men _with_ the lances\"]; 2.\nindicative indication, as \"the benches shout\" [where the spectators\nare meant _without_ the benches]; 3. qualified[439] superimponent\nindication, as \"the man of the Panj\u00e1b is an ox\" [here the object is\nnot swallowed up in the simile]; 4. qualified introsusceptive\nindication, as \"that ox\" [here the man is swallowed up in the simile];\n5. pure superimponent indication, as \"_gh\u00ed_ is life;\" 6. pure\nintrosusceptive indication, as \"verily this is life.\" This has been\nall explained in the K\u00e1vya-prak\u00e1\u015ba [ii. 10-12]. But enough of this\nchurning of the depths of rhetorical discussions.\nThis _yoga_ has been declared to have eight things ancillary to it\n(_a\u1e45ga_); these are the forbearances, religious observances, postures,\nsuppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and\nmeditation [ii. 29]. Pata\u00f1jali says, \"Forbearance consists in not\nwishing to kill, veracity, not stealing, continence, not coveting\"\n[ii. 30]. \"Religious observances are purifications, contentment,\nmortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord\" [ii.\n32]; and these are described in the Vish\u1e47u Pur\u00e1\u1e47a [vi. 7, 36-38]--\n \"The sage who brings his mind into a fit state for attaining\n Brahman, practises, void of all desire,\n \"Continence, abstinence from injury, truth, non-stealing,\n and non-coveting;\n \"Self-controlled, he should practise recitation of texts,\n purification, contentment, and austerity,\n \"And then he should make his mind intent on the Supreme\n Brahman.\n \"These are respectively called the five 'forbearances' and\n the five 'religious observances;'\n \"They bestow excellent rewards when done through desire of\n reward, and eternal liberation to those void of desire.\"\n\"A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant\" [ii. 46]; it is of ten\nkinds, as the _padma_, _bhadra_, _v\u00edra_, _svastika_, _da\u1e47\u1e0daka_,\n_sop\u00e1\u015braya_, _parya\u1e45ka_, _krau\u00f1chanishadana_, _ush\u1e6dranishadana_,\n_samasa\u1e43sth\u00e1na_. Y\u00e1j\u00f1avalkya has described each of them in the passage\nwhich commences--\n \"Let him hold fast his two great toes with his two hands,\n but in reverse order,\n \"Having placed the soles of his feet, O chief of Br\u00e1hmans,\n on his thighs;\n \"This will be the _padma_ posture, held in honour by all.\"\nThe descriptions of the others must be sought in that work.--When this\nsteadiness of posture has been attained, \"regulation of the breath\" is\npractised, and this consists in \"a cutting short of the motion of\ninspiration and expiration\" [ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of\nthe external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within the\nbody; and \"regulation of the breath\" is the cessation of activity in\nboth movements. \"But [it may be objected] this cannot be accepted as a\ngeneral definition of 'regulation of breath,' since it fails to apply\nto the special kinds, as _rechaka_, _p\u00faraka_, and _kumbhaka_.\" We\nreply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the\n\"cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration\" is found\nin all these special kinds. Thus _rechaka_, which is the expulsion of\nthe air within the body, is only that regulation of the breath, which\nhas been mentioned before as \"expiration;\" and _p\u00faraka_, which is the\n[regulated] retention of the external air within the body, is the\n\"inspiration;\" and _kumbhaka_ is the internal suspension of breathing,\nwhen the vital air, called _pr\u00e1\u1e47a_, remains motionless like water in a\njar (_kumbha_). Thus the \"cutting short of the motion of inspiration\nand expiration\" applies to all, and consequently the objector's doubt\nis needless.\nNow this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two _gha\u1e6dik\u00e1s_ and a\nhalf[440] in each artery[441] (_n\u00e1\u1e0di_), like the revolving buckets on\na waterwheel.[442] Thus in the course of a day and night there are\nproduced 21,600 inspirations and expirations. Hence it has been said\nby those who know the secret of transmitting the _mantras_, concerning\nthe transmission of the _ajap\u00e1mantra_[443]--\n \"Six hundred to Ga\u1e47e\u015ba, six thousand to the self-existent\n Brahman,\n \"Six thousand to Vish\u1e47u, six thousand to \u015aiva,\n \"One thousand to the Guru (B\u1e5bihaspati), one thousand to the\n Supreme Soul,\n \"And one thousand to the soul: thus I make over the\n performed muttering.\"\nSo at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries, the\nelements, earth, &c., must be understood, according to their different\ncolours, by those who wish to obtain the highest good. This has been\nthus explained by the wise--\n \"Let each artery convey the air two _gha\u1e6d\u00eds_ and a half from\n sunrise.\n \"There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries[444]\n to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel.\n \"Nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air take\n place [in the hour],\n \"And all combined produce the total of twenty-one thousand\n six hundred in a day and night.\n \"The time that is spent in uttering thirty-six _gu\u1e47a_\n \"That time elapses while the air passes along in the\n interval between two arteries.\n \"There are five elements in each of the two conducting\n arteries,--\n \"They bear it along day and night; these are to be known by\n the self-restrained.\n \"Fire bears above, water below; air moves across;\n \"Earth in the half-hollow; ether moves everywhere.\n \"They bear along in order,--air, fire, water, earth, ether;\n \"This is to be known in its due order in the two conducting\n arteries.\n \"The _palas_[446] of earth are fifty, of water forty,\n \"Of fire thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten.\n \"This is the amount of time taken for the bearing; but the\n reason that the two arteries are so disturbed\n \"Is that earth has five properties,[447] water four,\n \"Fire has three, air two, and ether one.\n \"There are ten _palas_ for each property; hence earth has\n fifty _palas_,\n \"And each, from water downwards, loses successively. Now the\n five properties of earth\n \"Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness;\n and these decrease one by one.\n \"The two elements, earth and water, produce their fruit by\n the influence of 'quiet,'\n \"But fire, air, and ether by the influence of 'brightness,'\n 'restlessness,' and 'immensity.'[448]\n \"The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and\n ether are now declared;--\n \"Of the first steadfastness of mind; through the coldness of\n the second arises desire;\n \"From the third anger and grief; from the fourth fickleness\n of mind;\n \"From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental\n impressions of latent merit.\n \"Let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears, and a middle\n finger in each nostril,\n \"And the little finger and the one next to it in the corners\n of his mouth, and the two remaining fingers in the corners\n of his eyes,\n \"Then there will arise in due order the knowledge of the\n earth and the other elements within him,\n \"The first four by yellow, white, dark red, and dark blue\n spots,[449]--the ether has no symbol.\"\nWhen the element air is thus comprehended and its restraint is\naccomplished, the evil influence of works which concealed\ndiscriminating knowledge is destroyed [ii. 52]; hence it has been\nsaid--\n \"There is no austerity superior to regulation of the\nAnd again--\n \"As the dross of metals, when they are melted, is consumed,\n \"So the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of\n the breath.\"[451]\nNow in this way, having his mind purified by the \"forbearances\" and\nthe other things subservient to concentration, the devotee is to\nattain \"self-mastery\" (_sa\u1e43yama_)[452] and \"restraint\" (_praty\u00e1h\u00e1ra_).\n\"Restraint\" is the accommodation of the senses, as the eye, &c., to\nthe nature of the mind,[453] which is intent on the soul's unaltered\nnature, while they abandon all concernment with their own several\nobjects, which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference.\nThis is expressed by the etymology of the word; the senses are drawn\nto it (_\u00e1_ + _h\u1e5bi_), away from them (_prat\u00edpa_).\n\"But is it not the mind which is then intent upon the soul and not the\nsenses, since these are only adapted for external objects, and\ntherefore have no power for this supposed action? How, therefore,\ncould they be accommodated to the nature of the mind?\" What you say\nis quite true; and therefore the author of the aphorisms, having an\neye to their want of power for this, introduced the words \"as it\nwere,\" to express \"resemblance.\" \"Restraint is, as it were, the\naccommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence\nof concernment with each one's own object\" [ii. 54]. Their absence of\nconcernment with their several objects for the sake of being\naccommodated to the nature of the mind is this \"resemblance\" which we\nmean. Since, when the mind is restrained, the eye, &c., are\nrestrained, no fresh effort is to be expected from them, and they\nfollow the mind as bees follow their king. This has been declared in\nthe Vish\u1e47u-pur\u00e1\u1e47a [vi. 7, 43, 44]--\n \"Let the devotee, restraining his organs of sense, which\n ever tend to pursue external objects,\n \"Himself intent on restraint, make them conformable to the\n mind;\n \"By this is effected the entire subjugation of the unsteady\n senses;\n \"If they are not controlled, the _yogin_ will not accomplish\n\"Attention\" (_dh\u00e1ra\u1e47\u00e1_) is the fixing the mind, by withdrawing it from\nall other objects, on some place, whether connected with the internal\nself, as the circle of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of\nthe _sushum\u1e47\u00e1_ artery, &c., or something external, as Praj\u00e1pati,\nV\u00e1sava, Hira\u1e47yagarbha, &c. This is declared by the aphorism,\n\"'Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place\" [iii. 1]; and so, too,\nsay the followers of the Pur\u00e1\u1e47as--\n \"By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and by\n restraint the senses,\n \"Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling-place of\nThe continual flow of thought in this place, resting on the object to\nbe contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous thoughts, is\n\"contemplation\" (_dhy\u00e1na_); thus it is said, \"A course of uniform\nthought there, is 'contemplation'\" [iii. 2]. Others also have said--\n \"A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects of\n that kind and desiring no other,\n \"This is 'contemplation,'--it is thus effected by the first\n six of the ancillary things.\"\nWe incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed the\nremaining eighth ancillary thing, \"meditation\" (_sam\u00e1dhi_, see p.\n243). By this practice of the ancillary means of _yoga_, pursued for a\nlong time with uninterrupted earnestness, the \"afflictions\" which\nhinder meditation are abolished, and through \"exercise\" and\n\"dispassion\" the devotee attains to the perfections designated by the\nnames Madhumat\u00ed and the rest.\n\"But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous\nwords from the dialects of Kar\u1e47\u00e1\u1e6da, Gau\u1e0da,[456] and L\u00e1\u1e6da?\"[457] We do\nnot want to frighten you, but rather to gratify you by explaining the\nmeaning of these strange words; therefore let the reader who is so\nneedlessly alarmed listen to us with attention.\ni. The _Madhumat\u00ed_ perfection,--this is the perfection of meditation,\ncalled \"the knowledge which holds to the truth,\" consisting in the\nillumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of\n\"goodness,\" composed of the manifestation of joy, with every trace of\n\"passion\" or \"darkness\" abolished by \"exercise,\" \"dispassion,\" &c.\nThus it is said in the aphorisms, \"In that case there is the knowledge\nwhich holds to the truth\" [i. 48]. It holds \"to the truth,\" _i.e._, to\nthe real; it is never overshadowed by error. \"In that case,\" _i.e._,\nwhen firmly established, there arises this knowledge to the second\nyogin. For the _yogins_ or devotees to the practice of _yoga_ are\nwell known to be of four kinds, viz.,--\ni. The _pr\u00e1thamakalpika_, in whom the light has just entered,[458]\nbut, as it has been said, \"he has not won the light which consists in\nthe power of knowing another's thoughts, &c.;\" 2. The _madhubh\u00famika_,\nwho possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3. The\n_praj\u00f1\u00e1jyotis_, who has subdued the elements and the senses; 4. The\n_atikr\u00e1nta-bh\u00e1van\u00edya_, who has attained the highest dispassion.\nii. The _Madhuprat\u00edk\u00e1_ perfections are swiftness like thought, &c.\nThese are declared to be \"swiftness like thought, the being without\norgans, and the conquest of nature\" [iii. 49]. \"Swiftness like\nthought\" is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of\nmotion, like thought; \"the being without bodily organs\"[459] is the\nattainment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers directed\nto objects in any desired place or time; \"the conquest of nature\" is\nthe power of controlling all the manifestations of nature. These\nperfections appear to the full in the third kind of yogin, from the\nsubjugation by him of the five senses and their essential\nconditions.[460] These perfections are severally sweet, each one by\nitself, as even a particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second\nstate is called _Madhuprat\u00edk\u00e1_ [_i.e._, that whose parts are sweet].\niii. The _Vi\u015bok\u00e1_ perfection consists in the supremacy over all\nexistences, &c. This is said in the aphorisms, \"To him who possesses,\nto the exclusion of all other ideas, the discriminative knowledge of\nthe quality of goodness and the soul, arises omniscience and the\nsupremacy over all existences\" [iii. 50]. The \"supremacy over all\nexistences\" is the overcoming like a master all entities, as these are\nbut the developments of the quality of \"goodness\" in the mind [the\nother qualities of \"passion\" and \"darkness\" being already abolished],\nand exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be energised\nupon.[461] The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the\nmodes \"subsided,\" \"emerged,\" or \"not to be named,\"[462] is\n\"omniscience.\" This is said in the aphorisms [i. 36], \"Or a luminous\nimmediate cognition, free from sorrow[463] [may produce steadiness of\nmind].\"\niv. The _Sa\u1e43sk\u00e1ra\u015beshat\u00e1_ state is also called _asa\u1e43praj\u00f1\u00e1ta_, _i.e._,\n\"that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost;\"\nit is that meditation \"without a seed\" [_i.e._, without any object]\nwhich is able to stop the \"afflictions\" that produce fruits to be\nafterwards experienced in the shape of rank, length of life, and\nenjoyment; and this meditation belongs to him who, in the cessation of\nall modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest\n\"dispassion.\" \"The other kind of meditation [_i.e._, that in which\ndistinct recognition of an object is lost] is preceded by that\nexercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of\nmodifications; it has nothing left but the latent impressions\" [of\nthought after the departure of all objects] [_i.e._, _sa\u1e43sk\u00e1ra\u015besha_,\ni. 18]. Thus this foremost of men, being utterly passionless towards\neverything, finds that the seeds of the \"afflictions,\" like burned\nrice-grains, are bereft of the power to germinate, and they are\nabolished together with the internal organ. When these are destroyed,\nthere ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded\n\"discriminative knowledge,\" an absorption of all causes and effects\ninto the primal _prak\u1e5biti_; and the soul, which is the power of pure\nintelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and escaped from all\nconnection with the phenomenal understanding (_buddhi_), or with\nexistence, reaches \"absolute isolation\" (_kaivalya_). Final liberation\nis described by Pata\u00f1jali as two perfections: \"Absolute isolation is\nthe repressive absorption[464] of the 'qualities' which have\nconsummated the ends of the soul, _i.e._, enjoyment and liberation,\nor the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature\" [iv.\n33]. Nor should any one object, \"Why, however, should not the\nindividual be born again even though this should have been attained?\"\nfor that is settled by the well-known principle that \"with the\ncessation of the cause the effect ceases,\" and therefore this\nobjection is utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor\ndecision; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the absence\nof the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and such like\nabsurdities; and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a\npossibility. And so, too, says the \u015aruti, \"A blind man found a jewel;\none without fingers seized it; one without a neck put it on; and a\ndumb man praised it.\"[465]\nThus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on medicine, the\nYoga-\u015b\u00e1stra consists of four divisions; as those on medicine treat of\ndisease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the Yoga-\u015b\u00e1stra also\ntreats of phenomenal existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause.\nThis existence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from;\nthe connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to\nexperience this existence; the absolute abolition of this connection\nis the escape; and right insight is the cause thereof.[466] The same\nfourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in\nother \u015a\u00e1stras also. Thus all has been made clear.\nThe system of \u015aa\u1e45kara, which comes next in succession, and which is\nthe crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere; it\nis therefore left untouched here.[467]\nNOTE ON THE YOGA.\nThere is an interesting description of the Yogins on the Mountain\nRaivataka in M\u00e1gha (iv. 55):--\n\"There the votaries of meditation, well skilled in benevolence\n(_maitr\u00ed_) and those other purifiers of the mind,--having successfully\nabolished the 'afflictions' and obtained the 'meditation possessed of\na seed,' and having reached that knowledge which recognises the\nessential difference between the quality Goodness and the\nSoul,--desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation.\"\nIt is curious to notice that _maitr\u00ed_, which plays such a prominent\npart in Buddhism, is counted in the Yoga as only a preliminary\ncondition from which the votary is to take, as it were, his first\nstart towards his final goal. It is called a _parikarman_ (=\n_pras\u00e1dhaka_) in Vy\u00e1sa's Comm. i. 33 (cf. iii. 22), whence the term is\nborrowed by M\u00e1gha. Bhoja expressly says that this purifying process is\nan external one, and not an intimate portion of yoga itself; just as\nin arithmetic the operations of addition, &c., are valuable, not in\nthemselves, but as aids in effecting the more important calculations\nwhich arise subsequently. The Yoga seems directly to allude to\nBuddhism in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue.\nNOTE ON P. 237, LAST LINE.\nFor the word _vy\u00e1kopa_ in the original here (see also p. 242, l. 3\n_infra_), cf. Kusum\u00e1\u00f1jali, p. 6, l. 7.\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 363: On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to S\u00e1\u1e45khya Pr. Bh\u00e1sh., p.\n[Footnote 364: _I.e._, he revealed the Veda, and also originated the\nmeanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind\nin the arts of life.]\n[Footnote 365: I read _ye_ for _te_ with Dr. Hall's MS. _Tapya_ means\nrather \"susceptible of suffering.\"]\n[Footnote 366: This is really Vy\u00e1sa's comm. on S\u00fat., iv. 21.]\n[Footnote 367: Cf. _Bh\u00e1sh\u00e1-parichchheda_, 15, _a_.]\n[Footnote 368: \u015aatapatha Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28.]\n[Footnote 369: I read in the second clause _tadbh\u00e1ve'pi_,\nunderstanding by _tad_ the different conditions which _atha_ is\nsupposed to assume as being necessarily present.]\n[Footnote 370: These are, i., the discrimination of the eternal from\nthe phenomenal; ii., the rejection of the fruit of actions here or\nhereafter; iii., the possession of the six qualities, tranquillity,\n&c.; and, iv., the desire for liberation.]\n[Footnote 371: It may be _sukha-janaka_, but it is not itself\n_sukha_.]\n[Footnote 372: Granting that _atha_ does not here mean \"auspicious,\"\nwhy should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the\nparticle _atha_ does produce an auspicious influence?]\n[Footnote 373: _i.e._, a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without\nsome other word to complete the construction.]\n[Footnote 374: This is found with some variations in the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1shya\n(p. 7, Kielhorn's ed.)]\n[Footnote 375: The commentators hold that the word _v\u1e5biddhi\u1e25_ is\nplaced at the beginning of the first s\u00fatra, while _gu\u1e47a\u1e25_ in the\nsecond is placed at the end (_ad e\u1e45 gu\u1e47a\u1e25_), in order to ensure an\nauspicious opening, _v\u1e5biddhi_ meaning \"increase,\" \"prosperity,\" as\nwell as \"the second strengthening of a vowel.\"]\n[Footnote 376: In the old Bengali poem Cha\u1e47\u1e0d\u00ed, we have an interesting\nlist of these omens. The hero Chandraketu, starting on a journey, has\nthe following good omens: On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Br\u00e1hman,\na full-blown lotus; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He\nhears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling\n\"milk\" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling \"jaya,\"\n_d\u00farv\u00e1_ grass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls,\ncorals; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals, and\nmen dancing and singing \"Hari.\" It is, however, all spoiled by seeing\na guana (_godhik\u00e1_). The author adds, \"This is a bad omen according to\nall \u015b\u00e1stras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous root of\nthe water-lily, and a hare.\" Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard,\nand a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.]\n[Footnote 377: These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices\nlasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the\nofficiating Br\u00e1hmans.]\n[Footnote 378: He is here called _pha\u1e47ipati_, \"lord of\nsnakes,\"--Pata\u00f1jali, the author of the Mah\u00e1bh\u00e1shya, being represented\nas a snake in mythology.]\n[Footnote 379: Cf. \u015aa\u1e45kara, Ved\u00e1nta-S\u00fat., iii. 3, 49.]\n[Footnote 380: This is the M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 rule for settling the relative\nvalue of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another. 1.\n_\u015aruti_, \"a definite text,\" as \"let him offer with curds,\" where curds\nare clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2. _Li\u1e45ga_, \"a sign,\"\nor \"the sense of the words,\" as leading to an inference, as in the\ntext \"he divides by the ladle;\" here we infer that the thing to be\ndivided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide\nsolid things like the baked flour cakes. 3. _V\u00e1kya_, \"the being\nmentioned in one sentence,\" _i.e._, the context, as in the text \"'(I\ncut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch;\" here the words\n\"(I cut) thee for food\" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in\nthe text, \"I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni,\" the words \"the\nwelcome (oblation) to Agni,\" as they form one sentence with the words\n\"I offer,\" are ancillary to the act of offering. 4. _Prakara\u1e47a_, \"the\nsubject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its\nparts,\" as in the _dar\u015ba-p\u00far\u1e47am\u00e1sa_ sacrifice, where the _pray\u00e1ja_\nceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts,\na mystic influence (_ap\u00farva_) which helps forward that influence of\nthe whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here the _prakara\u1e47a_\nproves them to be ancillary. 5. _Sth\u00e1na_ (or _krama_), \"relative\nposition\" or \"order,\" as the recital of the hymn _\u015aundhadhvam_, &c.,\n\"Be ye purified for the divine work,\" in connection with the mention\nof the _s\u00e1nn\u00e1yya_ vessels, where this position proves that the hymn is\nancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6. _Sam\u00e1khy\u00e1_,\n\"title;\" thus the Yajur-veda is called the special book for the\n_adhvaryu_ priests; hence in any rite mentioned in it they are _prima\nfacie_ to be considered as the priests employed. The order in the\naphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each; the\nfirst, _\u015bruti_, being the most important; the last, _sam\u00e1khy\u00e1_, the\nleast. Cf. Jaimini's S\u00fatras, iii. 3, 14; _M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1paribh\u00e1sh\u00e1_, pp. 8,\n[Footnote 381: _I.e._, Yogi-Y\u00e1j\u00f1avalkya, the author of the\n[Footnote 382: _Karman_ seems here used for _kriy\u00e2_, which properly\nbelongs only to the body, as the soul is _drash\u1e6d\u1e5bi_.]\n[Footnote 383: _Scil. sam\u00e1dhi_, or the restraining the mind and senses\nto profound contemplation.]\n[Footnote 384: _Scil._ \"forbearance, religious observance, postures,\nsuppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and\nmeditation (_sam\u00e1dhi_).\"]\n[Footnote 385: See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3, _samyag \u00e1dh\u00edyate mano yatra sa\nsam\u00e1dhi\u1e25_.]\n[Footnote 386: Thus, _e.g._, the antecedent non-existence and the\ndestruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot\nitself (the counter-entity to its own non-existence) resides by\nintimate relation (_samav\u00e1ya-sambandha_).]\n[Footnote 387: I read _niroddhavy\u00e1n\u00e1m_ for _nirodh\u00e1n\u00e1m_.]\n[Footnote 388: _Chit-\u015bakti_ and _chiti-\u015bakti_ = soul.]\n[Footnote 389: The _sattva_ of the _buddhi_ or the internal organ.]\n[Footnote 390: This second substance, \"mind\" or \"understanding\"\n(_buddhi_, _chitta_), is like a looking-glass, which reflects the\nimage of the object on a second looking-glass (_sc._ soul).]\n[Footnote 391: V\u00e1chaspati explains _laksha\u1e47a_ as _k\u00e1labheda_.]\n[Footnote 392: I take _\u00e1di_ as meaning _asphu\u1e6datva_. The change of state\ntakes place between the several moments of the _laksha\u1e47a-pari\u1e47\u00e1ma_. Cf.\nthe Commentaries on iii. 13.]\n[Footnote 393: These are generally called the five states of the\nthinking principle, _chittabh\u00famayas_ or _avasth\u00e1s_. Cf. Commentary, i.\n[Footnote 394: These three conditions respectively characterise men,\ndemons, and gods.]\n[Footnote 395: Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I\nhave borrowed Ballantyne's translation.]\n[Footnote 396: Can _chitta_ mean \"soul\" here?]\n[Footnote 397: _I.e._, as, _e.g._, whether the senses produce the\nelements or the elements the senses, &c.]\n[Footnote 398: In p. 164, line 4 _infra_, read _sukhaprak\u00e1\u015bamayasya_.]\n[Footnote 399: In p. 164, line 2 _infra_, read _satt\u00e1m\u00e1tra_ for\n_sattva-_. Bhoja well distinguishes _asmit\u00e1_ from _aha\u1e43k\u00e1ra_.]\n[Footnote 400: For these see _infra_, and cf. Yoga S., ii. 3, 12, 13.]\n[Footnote 401: I have ventured to alter the examples, to suit the\nEnglish translation.]\n[Footnote 402: Where the negation is prominent it is called\n_prasajya-pratishedha_; but where it is not prominent, we have the\n_paryud\u00e1sa_ negation. In the former the negative is connected with the\nverb; in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word,\n(a.) \"Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note.\"\n(b.) \"Unwatched the garden bough shall sway.\"\nThe former corresponds to the logician's _atyant\u00e1bh\u00e1va_, the latter to\n_anyony\u00e1bh\u00e1va_ or _bheda_.]\n[Footnote 403: Cf. the _v\u00e1rttika_ in Siddh\u00e1nta Kaum., i. 401.]\n[Footnote 404: Thus _adhana_ stands for _avidya-m\u00e1nadhana_, with\n_vidyam\u00e1na_ omitted in the compound.]\n[Footnote 405: As its subject would confessedly be _buddhi_.]\n[Footnote 406: As it is _avidy\u00e1_ after all.]\n[Footnote 407: In p. 165, lines 16, 17, read (with my MS. of V\u00e1chaspati's\nGloss), _sarvav\u1e5bittinirodhasampann\u00e1y\u00e1 api tath\u00e1tvaprasa\u1e45g\u00e1t_.]\n[Footnote 408: I read _tanvavasth\u00e1\u015bcha_ with the printed edition of\nV\u00e1chaspati's Gloss. If _tanudagdh\u00e1\u015bcha_ is correct, it must mean\n_tanutvena dagdh\u00e1h_.]\n[Footnote 409: As in _r\u00e1malakshma\u1e47au_, R\u00e1ma and Lakshma\u1e47a.]\n[Footnote 410: I read _pakshatraye_ for _pakshadvaye_.]\n[Footnote 411: In his Comm. on S\u00fat., ii. 5.]\n[Footnote 412: Thus _inimicus_ is not a \"friend,\" nor, on the other\nhand, a \"non-friend,\" but something positive, an \"enemy.\" So\n_agoshpada_ is said to mean \"a forest.\"]\n[Footnote 413: Cf. Yoga S\u00fat., i. 8.]\n[Footnote 414: In p. 166, line 4 _infra_, read _k\u00e1y\u00e1dau_ for\n_k\u00e1ry\u00e1dau_.]\n[Footnote 415: This couplet is quoted by Vy\u00e1sa in his Comm. on Yoga\nS\u00fatras, ii. 5, and I have followed V\u00e1chaspati in his explanation of\nit; he calls it _vaiy\u00e1sak\u00ed g\u00e1th\u00e1_.]\n[Footnote 416: Since the continued enjoyment of an object only\nincreases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret\n(cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).]\n[Footnote 417: Literally, \"it has four feet.\"]\n[Footnote 418: Thus \"sight,\" or the power of seeing, is a modification\nof the quality of _sattva_ unobstructed by _rajas_ and _tamas_.]\n[Footnote 419: \"Let the affix _\u1e47ini_ be used after a root in the sense\nof what is habitual, when the _upapada_, or subordinate word, is not a\nword meaning 'genus' and ends in a case.\"]\n[Footnote 420: \"Let _v\u1e5biddhi_ be the substitute of a base ending in a\nvowel, when that which has an indicatory _\u00f1_ or _\u1e47_ follows;\" _\u1e47ini_\nhas an indicatory _\u1e47_.]\n[Footnote 421: Sc. _anu\u015baya_ + _ini_ = _anu\u015bayin_.]\n[Footnote 422: _Ini_ and _\u1e6dhan_, which respectively leave _in_ and\n_ika_; thus _da\u1e47\u1e0da_ gives _da\u1e47\u1e0din_ and _da\u1e47\u1e0dika_. The line is quoted\nby Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on P\u00e1\u1e47. v. 2, 115, and is explained in\nthe _K\u00e1\u015bik\u00e1_, _ad loc_. The different prohibitions are illustrated by\nthe examples:--(1.) _svav\u00e1n_, _khav\u00e1n_; (2.) _k\u00e1rakav\u00e1n_; (3.)\n_vy\u00e1ghrav\u00e1n_, _si\u1e43hav\u00e1n_; (4.) _da\u1e47\u1e0davat\u00ed \u015b\u00e1l\u00e1_ (_i.e._, _da\u1e47\u1e0d\u00e1 asy\u00e1\u1e43\nsanti_).]\n[Footnote 423: By iii. 3, 56.]\n[Footnote 424: It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite\nstudy obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.]\n[Footnote 425: See the _K\u00e1\u015bik\u00e1_ on P\u00e1\u1e47. v. 2, 115. For _vivaksh\u00e1rtha_\n(meaning \"general currency\"), compare Commentary on P\u00e1\u1e47. ii. 2, 27.\nThe edition in the Benares _Pandit_ reads _vishayaniyam\u00e1rtha_.]\n[Footnote 426: _i.e._, Thus _nirodha_ is not _v\u1e5bitter abh\u00e1va\u1e25_, but\n_abh\u00e1vasy\u00e1\u015brya\u1e25_.]\n[Footnote 427: I read in p. 168, last line,\n_prak\u00e1\u015baprav\u1e5bittiniyamar\u00fapa_, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.]\n[Footnote 428: See K\u00e1\u015bik\u00e1, ii. 3, 36.]\n[Footnote 429: This passage probably occurs in the _Y\u00e1j\u00f1avalkya-g\u00edt\u00e1_\nof Yogi-y\u00e1j\u00f1avalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145,\nnote.]\n[Footnote 430: M\u00edm\u00e1\u1e43s\u00e1 S\u00fatras, ii. 1, 35-37.]\n[Footnote 431: The tantras are not properly concerned with what is\n_nitya_ or _naimittika_; they are _k\u00e1mya_.]\n[Footnote 432: The _v\u00edja_ of air is the syllable _ja\u1e43_.]\n[Footnote 433: The _v\u00edja_ of water is the syllable _ba\u1e43_.]\n[Footnote 434: _Hr\u00ed\u1e43._]\n[Footnote 435: _\u015ar\u00ed\u1e43._]\n[Footnote 436: _T\u00e1\u1e47\u1e0dava_ is the frantic dance of the god. \u015aiva and his\nvotaries.]\n[Footnote 437: Literally \"they take severally in order the gender of\none of the two.\" Cf. \"Theb\u00e6 ips\u00e6 quod B\u0153oti\u00e6 caput est,\" _Livy_, xlii.\n44; \"Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem\nvocamus hominem,\" _Cic._, _Legg_, i. 7.]\n[Footnote 438: I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's\ntranslation of the S\u00e1hitya-darpa\u1e47a.]\n[Footnote 439: Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man\nis like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other\nrelation, as cause and effect, &c., thus butter is the cause of\nlongevity.]\n[Footnote 440: _I.e._, an hour, a _gha\u1e6dik\u00e1_ being twenty-four\nminutes.]\n[Footnote 441: The _n\u00e1\u1e0d\u00eds_ or tubular vessels are generally reckoned\nto be 101, with ten principal ones; others make sixteen principal\n_n\u00e1\u1e0d\u00eds_. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.]\n[Footnote 442: M\u00e1dhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the\npassage in the Aitareya Br\u00e1hma\u1e47a (iii. 29), where the relation of the\nvital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to\nthe seasons, is discussed. \"The seasons never stand still; following each\nother in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold\nand the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting\nthe year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a\nwaterwheel (_gha\u1e6d\u00edyantravat_); hence the seasons never pause in their\ncourse.\"]\n[Footnote 443: This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism,\nthat each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra,\nas their sound expresses the word _so'ha\u1e43_ (i.e., _ha\u1e43sa\u1e25_), \"I am\nhe.\" This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours;\nit is called the _ajap\u00e1mantra_, _i.e._, the mantra uttered without\nvoluntary muttering.]\n[Footnote 444: _I.e._, that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled\nbreath.]\n[Footnote 445: I cannot explain this. We might read _guruvar\u1e47\u00e1n\u00e1m_ for\n_gu\u1e47avar\u1e47\u00e1n\u00e1\u1e43_, as the time spent in uttering a _guruvar\u1e47a_ is a\n_vipala_, sixty of which make a _pala_, and two and a half _palas_\nmake a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical\ndetails. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the\nfifth act of the _M\u00e1lat\u00edm\u00e1dhava_.]\n[Footnote 446: Sixty _palas_ make a _gha\u1e6dik\u00e1_ (50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10\n= 150, _i.e._, the _palas_ in two and a half _gha\u1e6dik\u00e1s_ or one hour).]\n[Footnote 447: Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.]\n[Footnote 448: Literally \"the being ever more.\"]\n[Footnote 449: For these colours cf. _Chh\u00e1ndogya Up._, viii. 6;\n_Maitri Up._, vi. 30.]\n[Footnote 450: This is an anonymous quotation in Vy\u00e1sa's Comm.]\n[Footnote 451: This seems a variation of \u015aloka 7 of the _Am\u1e5bita-n\u00e1da\nUp._ See Weber, _Indische Stud._, ix. 26.]\n[Footnote 452: This is defined in the Yoga S\u00fat., iii. 4, as consisting\nof the united operation towards one object of contemplation,\nattention, and meditation.]\n[Footnote 453: _I.e._, the internal organ (_chitta_).]\n[Footnote 454: This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the\nreading of the Bombay edition of the Pur\u00e1\u1e47a (only reading in line 3\n_chal\u00e1tman\u00e1m_).]\n[Footnote 455: Vish\u1e47u-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The\n\"perfect asylum\" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.]\n[Footnote 456: The old name for the central part of Bengal.]\n[Footnote 457: A country comprising Khandesh and part of Guzerat; it\nis the \u039b\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1f21 of Ptolemy.]\n[Footnote 458: In p. 178, l. 2, _infra_, read _prav\u1e5bitta_ for\n_prav\u1e5bitti_. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vy\u00e1sa's\nComm.)]\n[Footnote 459: Read _vikara\u1e47abh\u00e1va\u1e25_; V\u00e1chaspati explains it as\n\"_videh\u00e1n\u00e1m indriy\u00e1\u1e47\u00e1\u1e43 kara\u1e47abh\u00e1va\u1e25_.\"]\n[Footnote 460: Vy\u00e1sa has _kara\u1e47apa\u00f1chakar\u00fapajaya_; V\u00e1chaspati explains\n_r\u00fapa_ by _graha\u1e47\u00e1di_ (cf. iii. 47).]\n[Footnote 461: I read in p. 179, l. 11, _vyava-s\u00e1yavyavasey\u00e1tmak\u00e1n\u00e1m_,\nfrom Vy\u00e1sa's Comm.]\n[Footnote 462: _I.e._, as past, present, or future.]\n[Footnote 463: _Vi\u015bok\u00e1._]\n[Footnote 464: This is explained by V\u00e1chaspati, \"The latent\nimpressions produced by the states of the internal organ called\n_vyutth\u00e1na_ (when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or\n'darkness,' iii. 9) and _nirodha_ (when it is chiefly characterised by\nthe quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself;\nthis in 'egoism' (_asmit\u00e1_); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable'\n(_i.e._, _buddhi_); and _buddhi_ into the 'irresolvable' (_i.e._,\n_prak\u1e5biti_).\" _Prak\u1e5biti_ consists of the three 'qualities' in\nequilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and\neffects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another\nbecomes predominant.]\n[Footnote 465: This curious passage occurs in the Taittir\u00edya-\u00c1ra\u1e47yaka\ni. 11, 5. M\u00e1dhava in his Comment, there explains it of the soul, and\nquotes the \u015avet\u00e1\u015bv. Up., iii. 19. M\u00e1dhava here takes _avindat_ as \"he\npierced the jewel,\" but I have followed his correct explanation in the\nComm.]\n[Footnote 466: This is taken from V\u00e1chaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii.\n15. Cf. the \"four truths\" of Buddhism.]\n[Footnote 467: This probably refers to the Pa\u00f1chada\u015b\u00ed. A Calcutta\nPandit told me that it referred to the Prameya-vivara\u1e47a-sa\u1e45graha (cf.\nDr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Devat\u00e1dhy\u00e1ya-br\u00e1hma\u1e47a, p.\nx), but, if this is the same as the vivara\u1e47a-prameya-sa\u1e45graha, it is\nby Bh\u00e1rat\u00edt\u00edrthavidy\u00e1ra\u1e47ya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat of Tanjore MSS. p.\nAPPENDIX.\nON THE UP\u00c1DHI (cf. _supra_, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194).\n[As the _up\u00e1dhi_ or \"condition\" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which\nis little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of\nthe sections in the Bh\u00e1sh\u00e1-parichchheda and the Siddh\u00e1nta-mukt\u00e1val\u00ed,\nwhich treat of it.]\n cxxxvii. _That which always accompanies the major term\n (s\u00e1dhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu),\n is called the Condition (up\u00e1dhi); its examination is now set\n forth._\nOur author now proceeds to define the _up\u00e1dhi_ or condition,[468]\nwhich is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as\nlaid down by another person;--\"that which always accompanies,\" &c. The\nmeaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably\naccompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus\ninvariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his\nmiddle term. [Thus in the false argument, \"The mountain has smoke\nbecause it has fire,\" we may advance \"wet fuel,\" or rather \"the being\nproduced from wet fuel,\" as an _up\u00e1dhi_, since \"wet fuel\" is\nnecessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as\n_e.g._, in a red-hot iron ball.]\n\"But,\" the opponent may suggest, \"if this were true, would it not\nfollow that (_a_) in the case of the too wide middle term in the\nargument, 'This [second] son of Mitr\u00e1's, whom I have not seen, must be\ndark because he is Mitr\u00e1's son,' we could not allege 'the being\nproduced from feeding on vegetables'[469] as a 'condition,'--inasmuch\nas it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour\ndoes also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which have\nnothing to do with feeding on vegetables? (_b_) Again, in the\nargument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense[470] because it is the\nsite of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate\nform' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense]\nis found in the soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and\ntherefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably\naccompany perceptibility]. (_c_) Again, in the argument,'Destruction\nis itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as\na 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of\nexistence'[471] [destruction being a form of non-existence, called\n\"emergent,\" _dva\u1e43\u015b\u00e1bh\u00e1va_], inasmuch as perishability is found in\nantecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be\nincluded in any positive category of existence.\"\nWe, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the\ndefinition is simply this,--that whatever fact or mark we take to\ndetermine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which\nour condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must\nbe equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition\nis not invariably to accompany. Thus (_a_) the \"being produced from\nfeeding on vegetables\" invariably accompanies \"a dark colour,\" as\ndetermined by the fact that it is Mitr\u00e1's son, whose dark colour is\ndiscussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the\nargument; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is\nnot in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (_b_) Again,\n\"possessing proportionate form\" invariably accompanies perceptibility\nas determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external\nobject; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term\n\"the being the site of touch,\" which is equally to be determined by\nthe fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.[472]\n(_c_) Again, in the argument \"destruction is perishable from its being\nproduced,\" the \"being included in some positive category of existence\"\ninvariably accompanies the major term \"perishable,\" when determined by\nthe attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term\nadvanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance,\n\"antecedent non-existence,\" is not in point, since nobody pretends\nthat this is produced at all.]\nBut it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid\nmiddle terms, _i.e._, there is nothing _there_ which invariably\naccompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark,\nand does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined.\nThis is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the reader object\nthat \"in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate\ndetermining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the\ncases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general\nrule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any\nparticular given case?\" We reply that] in the case of any middle term\nwhich is too general, the required general rule consists in the\nconstant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz.,\nthat the subjects thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged\nsite of the major term, and also the site of the condition,[473] or\nelse (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but\nexcluding the said condition;[474] and it will be when the case is\ndetermined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that\nthe condition will be considered as \"always accompanying the major\nterm, and not always accompanying the middle term.\"[475]\n cxxxviii. _All true Conditions reside in the same subjects\n with their major terms;[476] and, their subjects being thus\n common, the (erring) middle term will be equally too general\n in regard to the Condition and the major term._[477]\n cxxxix. _It is in order to prove faulty generality in a\n middle term that the Condition has to be employed._\nThe meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term\nbeing found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that\nit is too general in regard to the major term; and hence the use of\nhaving a condition at all. (_a._) Thus, where the condition invariably\naccompanies an unlimited[478] major term, we infer that the middle\nterm is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact\nthat it is too general in regard to the condition; as, for example, in\nthe instance \"the mountain has smoke because it has fire,\" where we\ninfer that the \"fire\" is too general in regard to \"smoke,\" since it is\ntoo general in regard to \"wet fuel;\" for there is a rule that what is\ntoo general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too\ngeneral for that which is invariably accompanied. (_b._) But where we\ntake some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which\nthe condition is invariably to accompany,--there it is from the middle\nterm's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases\npossessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is\nequally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument,\n\"B is dark because he is Mitr\u00e1's son,\" the middle term \"the fact of\nbeing Mitr\u00e1's son\" is too general in regard to the _s\u00e1dhya_, \"dark\ncolour,\" because it is too general in regard to the _up\u00e1dhi_, \"feeding\non vegetables,\" as seen in the case of Mitr\u00e1's second son [Mitr\u00e1's\nparentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitr\u00e1 herself not having\nfed on vegetables previous to his birth].\n[But an objector might here interpose, \"If your definition of a\ncondition be correct, surely a pretended condition which fulfils your\ndefinition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle\nterm. For instance, in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire\nbecause it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the\nbeing always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this\ncertainly does not always 'accompany the middle term,' inasmuch as it\nis not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to\nbe; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,'\nsince in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as\nfor the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in\nthis mountain is the very point in dispute.\" To this we reply] You\nnever may take such a condition as \"the being always found elsewhere\nthan in the subject or minor term\" (unless this can be proved by some\ndirect sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the\nfirst place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your\nantagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major\nterm [since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly\none in point against you]; and, secondly, because it is\nself-contradictory [as the same nugatory condition may be equally\nemployed to overthrow the contrary argument].\nBut if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the \"being\nalways found elsewhere than in the subject\" becomes a true condition,\n[and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant\ntries to establish]. Thus in the illusory argument \"the fire must be\nnon-hot because it is artificial,\" we can have a valid condition in\n\"the being always found elsewhere than in fire,\" since we can prove by\nsense-evidence that fire is hot,[479] [thus the _up\u00e1dhi_ here is a\nmeans of overthrowing the false argument].\nWhere the fact of its always accompanying the major term, &c., is\ndisputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.[480] But\n\"the being found elsewhere than in the subject\" can never be employed\neven as a disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules\nof logical controversy.[481]\nFOOTNOTES:\n[Footnote 468: The _up\u00e1dhi_ is the \"condition\" which must be supplied\nto restrict a too general middle term. If the middle term, as thus\nrestricted, is still found in the minor term, the argument is valid;\nif not, it fails. Thus, in \"The mountain has smoke because it has\nfire\" (which rests on the false premise that \"all fire is accompanied\nby smoke\"), we must add \"wet fuel\" as the condition of \"fire;\" and if\nthe mountain _has_ wet fuel as well as fire, of course it will have\nsmoke. Similarly, the alleged argument that \"B is dark because he is\nMitr\u00e1's son\" fails, if we can establish that the dark colour of her\nformer offspring A depended not on his being her son, but on her\nhappening to have fed on vegetables instead of ghee. If we can prove\nthat she still keeps to her old diet, of course our amended middle\nterm will still prove B to be dark, but not otherwise.]\n[Footnote 469: The Hindus think that a child's dark colour comes from\nthe mother's living on vegetables, while its fair colour comes from\nher living on ghee.]\n[Footnote 470: By Bh\u00e1sh\u00e1-parich. \u015bl. 25, the four elements, earth,\nwater, air, and fire, are _spar\u015bavat_, but by \u015bl. 27 of these air is\nneither _pratyaksha_ nor _r\u00fapavat_.]\n[Footnote 471: This condition would imply that we could only argue\nfrom this middle term \"the being produced\" in cases of positive\nexistence, not non-existence.]\n[Footnote 472: \"Soul,\" of course, is not external; but our topic was\nnot _soul_, but _air_.]\n[Footnote 473: As, _e.g._, the mountain and Mitr\u00e1's first son in the\ntwo false arguments, \"The mountain has smoke because it has fire\"\n(when the fire-possessing red-hot iron ball has no smoke), and\n\"Mitr\u00e1's first son A is dark because he is Mitr\u00e1's offspring\" (when\nher second son B is fair). These two subjects possess the respective\n_s\u00e1dhyas_ or major terms \"smoke\" and \"dark colour,\" and therefore are\nrespectively the subjects where the conditions \"wet fuel\" and \"the\nmother's feeding on vegetables\" are to be respectively applied.]\n[Footnote 474: As, _e.g._, the red-hot ball of iron and Mitr\u00e1's second\nson; as these, though possessing the respective middle terms \"fire\"\nand \"the being Mitr\u00e1's offspring\" do not possess the respective\nconditions \"wet fuel\" or \"the mother's feeding on vegetables,\" nor,\nconsequently, the respective major terms (_s\u00e1dhya_) \"smoke\" and \"dark\ncolour.\"]\n[Footnote 475: This will exclude the objected case of \"dark jars\" in\n(_a_), as it falls under neither of these two alternatives; for,\nthough they are the sites of the _s\u00e1dhya_ \"dark colour,\" they do not\nadmit the condition \"the feeding on vegetables,\" nor the middle term\n\"the being Mitr\u00e1's son.\"]\n[Footnote 476: _I.e._, wherever there is fire produced by wet fuel\nthere is smoke. The condition and the major term are \"equipollent\" in\ntheir extension.]\n[Footnote 477: Where the _hetu_ is found and not the _s\u00e1dhya_ (as in\nthe red-hot ball of iron), there the _up\u00e1dhi_ also is not applicable.]\n[Footnote 478: _I.e._, one which requires no determining fact or mark,\nsuch as the three objected arguments required in \u00a7 137.]\n[Footnote 479: The disputant says, \"Fire must be non-hot because it is\nartificial.\" \"Well,\" you rejoin, \"then it must only be an\nartificiality which is always found elsewhere than in fire,--_i.e._,\none which will not answer your purpose in trying to prove your point.\"\nHere the proposed _up\u00e1dhi_ \"the being always found elsewhere than in\nfire\" answers to the definition, as it does not always accompany the\n_hetu_ \"possessing artificiality,\" but it does always accompany the\n_s\u00e1dhya_ \"non-hot,\" as fire is proved by sense-evidence to be hot.]\n[Footnote 480: As in the argument, \"The earth, &c., must have had a\nmaker because they have the nature of effects,\" where the Theist\ndisputes the Atheistic condition \"the being produced by one possessing\na body.\" See Kusum\u00e1\u00f1jali, v. 2.]\n[Footnote 481: In fact, it would abolish all disputation at the\noutset, as each party would produce a condition which from his own\npoint of view would reduce his opponent to silence. In other words, a\ntrue condition must be consistent with _either_ party's opinions.]\nTHE END.\nTR\u00dcBNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES.\n \"A knowledge of the commonplace, at least, of Oriental\n literature, philosophy, and religion is as necessary to the\n general reader of the present day as an acquaintance with the\n Latin and Greek classics was a generation or so ago. Immense\n strides have been made within the present century in these\n branches of learning; Sanskrit has been brought within the\n range of accurate philology, and its invaluable ancient\n literature thoroughly investigated; the language and sacred\n books of the Zoroastrians have been laid bare; Egyptian,\n Assyrian, and other records of the remote past have been\n deciphered, and a group of scholars speak of still more\n recondite Accadian and Hittite monuments; but the results of\n all the scholarship that has been devoted to these subjects\n have been almost inaccessible to the public because they were\n contained for the most part in learned or expensive works, or\n scattered throughout the numbers of scientific periodicals.\n Messrs. Tr\u00fcbner & Co., in a spirit of enterprise which does\n them infinite credit, have determined to supply the\n constantly-increasing want, and to give in a popular, or, at\n least, a comprehensive form, all this mass of knowledge to\n the world.\"--_Times._\nSecond Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-748, with Map, cloth, price 21s.\nTHE INDIAN EMPIRE: ITS PEOPLE, HISTORY, AND PRODUCTS.\nBy the HON. SIR W. W. HUNTER, K.C.S.I., C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D.,\nMember of the Viceroy's Legislative Council,\nDirector-General of Statistics to the Government of India.\nBeing a Revised Edition, brought up to date, and incorporating the\ngeneral results of the Census of 1881.\n \"It forms a volume of more than 700 pages, and is a\n marvellous combination of literary condensation and\n research. It gives a complete account of the Indian Empire,\n its history, peoples, and products, and forms the worthy\n outcome of seventeen years of labour with exceptional\n opportunities for rendering that labour fruitful. Nothing\n could be more lucid than Sir William Hunter's expositions of\n the economic and political condition of India at the present\n time, or more interesting than his scholarly history of the\n India of the past.\"--_The Times._\n_THE FOLLOWING WORKS HAVE ALREADY APPEARED_:--\nThird Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xvi.-428, price 16s.\nESSAYS ON THE SACRED LANGUAGE, WRITINGS, AND RELIGION OF THE PARSIS.\nBY MARTIN HAUG, PH.D.,\nLate of the Universities of T\u00fcbingen, G\u00f6ttingen, and Bonn;\nSuperintendent of Sanskrit Studies, and Professor of Sanskrit in the\nPoona College.\nEDITED AND ENLARGED BY DR. E. W. WEST.\nTo which is added a Biographical Memoir of the late Dr. HAUG by Prof.\nE. P. EVANS.\nI. History of the Researches into the Sacred Writings and Religion of\nthe Parsis, from the Earliest Times down to the Present.\nII. Languages of the Parsi Scriptures.\nIII. The Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the Parsis.\nIV. The Zoroastrian Religion, as to its Origin and Development.\n \"'Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of\n the Parsis,' by the late Dr. Martin Haug, edited by Dr. E.\n W. West. The author intended, on his return from India, to\n expand the materials contained in this work into a\n comprehensive account of the Zoroastrian religion, but the\n design was frustrated by his untimely death. We have,\n however, in a concise and readable form, a history of the\n researches into the sacred writings and religion of the\n Parsis from the earliest times down to the present--a\n dissertation on the languages of the Parsi Scriptures, a\n translation of the Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the\n Parsis, and a dissertation on the Zoroastrian religion, with\n especial reference to its origin and development.\"--_Times._\nPost 8vo, cloth, pp. viii.-176, price 7s. 6d.\nTEXTS FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON\nCOMMONLY KNOWN AS \"DHAMMAPADA.\"\n_With Accompanying Narratives._\nTranslated from the Chinese by S. BEAL, B.A., Professor of Chinese,\nUniversity College, London.\n The Dhammapada, as hitherto known by the Pali Text Edition,\n as edited by Fausb\u00f6ll, by Max M\u00fcller's English, and Albrecht\n Weber's German translations, consists only of twenty-six\n chapters or sections, whilst the Chinese version, or rather\n recension, as now translated by Mr. Beal, consists of\n thirty-nine sections. The students of Pali who possess\n Fausb\u00f6ll's text, or either of the above-named translations,\n will therefore needs want Mr. Beal's English rendering of the\n Chinese version; the thirteen above-named additional sections\n not being accessible to them in any other form; for, even if\n they understand Chinese, the Chinese original would be\n unobtainable by them.\n \"Mr. Beal's rendering of the Chinese translation is a most\n valuable aid to the critical study of the work. It contains\n authentic texts gathered from ancient canonical books, and\n generally connected with some incident in the history of\n Buddha. Their great interest, however, consists in the light\n which they throw upon everyday life in India at the remote\n period at which they were written, and upon the method of\n teaching adopted by the founder of the religion. The method\n employed was principally parable, and the simplicity of the\n tales and the excellence of the morals inculcated, as well\n as the strange hold which they have retained upon the minds\n of millions of people, make them a very remarkable\n study.\"--_Times._\n \"Mr. Beal, by making it accessible in an English dress, has\n added to the great services he has already rendered to the\n comparative study of religious history.\"--_Academy._\n \"Valuable as exhibiting the doctrine of the Buddhists in its\n purest, least adulterated form, it brings the modern reader\n face to face with that simple creed and rule of conduct\n which won its way over the minds of myriads, and which is\n now nominally professed by 145 millions, who have overlaid\n its austere simplicity with innumerable ceremonies,\n forgotten its maxims, perverted its teaching, and so\n inverted its leading principle that a religion whose founder\n denied a God, now worships that founder as a god\n himself.\"--_Scotsman._\nSecond Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xxiv.-360, price 10s. 6d.\nTHE HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE.\nBY ALBRECHT WEBER.\nTranslated from the Second German Edition by JOHN MANN, M.A., and\nTH\u00c9ODOR ZACHARIAE, Ph.D., with the sanction of the Author.\n Dr. BUHLER, Inspector of Schools in India, writes:--\"When I\n was Professor of Oriental Languages in Elphinstone College, I\n frequently felt the want of such a work to which I could\n refer the students.\"\n Professor COWELL, of Cambridge, writes:--\"It will be\n especially useful to the students in our Indian colleges and\n universities. I used to long for such a book when I was\n teaching in Calcutta. Hindu students are intensely interested\n in the history of Sanskrit literature, and this volume will\n supply them with all they want on the subject.\"\n Professor WHITNEY, Yale College, New Haven, Conn., U.S.A.,\n writes:--\"I was one of the class to whom the work was\n originally given in the form of academic lectures. At their\n first appearance they were by far the most learned and able\n treatment of their subject; and with their recent additions\n they still maintain decidedly the same rank.\"\n \"Is perhaps the most comprehensive and lucid survey of\n Sanskrit literature extant. The essays contained in the\n volume were originally delivered as academic lectures, and\n at the time of their first publication were acknowledged to\n be by far the most learned and able treatment of the\n subject. They have now been brought up to date by the\n addition of all the most important results of recent\n research.\"--_Times._\nPost 8vo, cloth, pp. xii.-198, accompanied by Two Language Maps, price\nA SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF THE EAST INDIES.\nBY ROBERT N. CUST.\nThe Author has attempted to fill up a vacuum, the inconvenience of\nwhich pressed itself on his notice. Much had been written about the\nlanguages of the East Indies, but the extent of our present knowledge\nhad not even been brought to a focus. It occurred to him that it might\nbe of use to others to publish in an arranged form the notes which he\nhad collected for his own edification.\n \"Supplies a deficiency which has long been felt.\"--_Times._\n \"The book before us is then a valuable contribution to\n philological science. It passes under review a vast number\n of languages, and it gives, or professes to give, in every\n case the sum and substance of the opinions and judgments of\n the best-informed writers.\"--_Saturday Review._\nSecond Corrected Edition, post 8vo, pp. xii.-116, cloth, price 5s.\nTHE BIRTH OF THE WAR-GOD.\nA Poem. BY KALIDASA.\nTranslated from the Sanskrit into English Verse by RALPH T. H.\nGRIFFITH, M.A.\n \"A very spirited rendering of the _Kum\u00e1rasambhava_, which\n was first published twenty-six years ago, and which we are\n glad to see made once more accessible.\"--_Times._\n \"Mr. Griffith's very spirited rendering is well known to\n most who are at all interested in Indian literature, or\n enjoy the tenderness of feeling and rich creative\n imagination of its author.\"--_Indian Antiquary._\n \"We are very glad to welcome a second edition of Professor\n Griffith's admirable translation. Few translations deserve a\n second edition better.\"--_Athen\u00e6um._\nPost 8vo, pp. 432, cloth, price 16s.\nA CLASSICAL DICTIONARY OF HINDU MYTHOLOGY AND RELIGION, GEOGRAPHY,\nHISTORY, AND LITERATURE.\nBY JOHN DOWSON, M.R.A.S., Late Professor of Hindustani, Staff College.\n \"This not only forms an indispensable book of reference to\n students of Indian literature, but is also of great general\n interest, as it gives in a concise and easily accessible\n form all that need be known about the personages of Hindu\n mythology whose names are so familiar, but of whom so little\n is known outside the limited circle of _savants_.\"--_Times._\n \"It is no slight gain when such subjects are treated fairly\n and fully in a moderate space; and we need only add that the\n few wants which we may hope to see supplied in new editions\n detract but little from the general excellence of Mr.\n Dowson's work.\"--_Saturday Review._\nPost 8vo, with View of Mecca, pp. cxii.-172, cloth, price 9s.\nSELECTIONS FROM THE KORAN.\nBY EDWARD WILLIAM LANE,\nTranslator of \"The Thousand and One Nights;\" &c, &c.\nA New Edition, Revised and Enlarged, with an Introduction by STANLEY\nLANE POOLE.\n \"... Has been long esteemed in this country as the\n compilation of one of the greatest Arabic scholars of the\n time, the late Mr. Lane, the well-known translator of the\n 'Arabian Nights.'... The present editor has enhanced the\n value of his relative's work by divesting the text of a\n great deal of extraneous matter introduced by way of\n comment, and prefixing an introduction.\"--_Times._\n \"Mr. Poole is both a generous and a learned biographer....\n Mr. Poole tells us the facts ... so far as it is possible\n for industry and criticism to ascertain them, and for\n literary skill to present them in a condensed and readable\n form.\"--_Englishman, Calcutta._\nPost 8vo, pp. vi.-368, cloth, price 14s.\nMODERN INDIA AND THE INDIANS,\nBEING A SERIES OF IMPRESSIONS, NOTES, AND ESSAYS.\nBY MONIER WILLIAMS, D.C.L.,\nHon. LL.D. of the University of Calcutta, Hon. Member of the Bombay\nAsiatic Society, Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of\nOxford.\nThird Edition, revised and augmented by considerable Additions, with\nIllustrations and a Map.\n \"In this volume we have the thoughtful impressions of a\n thoughtful man on some of the most important questions\n connected with our Indian Empire.... An enlightened\n observant man, travelling among an enlightened observant\n people, Professor Monier Williams has brought before the\n public in a pleasant form more of the manners and customs of\n the Queen's Indian subjects than we ever remember to have\n seen in any one work. He not only deserves the thanks of\n every Englishman for this able contribution to the study of\n Modern India--a subject with which we should be specially\n familiar--but he deserves the thanks of every Indian, Parsee\n or Hindu, Buddhist and Moslem, for his clear exposition of\n their manners, their creeds, and their\n necessities.\"--_Times._\nPost 8vo, pp. xliv.-376, cloth, price 14s.\nMETRICAL TRANSLATIONS FROM SANSKRIT WRITERS.\nWith an Introduction, many Prose Versions, and Parallel Passages from\nClassical Authors.\nBY J. MUIR, C.I.E., D.C.L., LL.D., Ph.D.\n \"... An agreeable introduction to Hindu poetry.\"--_Times._\n \"... A volume which may be taken as a fair illustration\n alike of the religions and moral sentiments and of the\n legendary lore of the best Sanskrit writers.\"--_Edinburgh\n Daily Review._\nSecond Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxvi.-244, cloth, price 10s. 6d.\nTHE GULISTAN;\nOR, ROSE GARDEN OF SHEKH MUSHLIU'D-DIN SADI OF SHIRAZ.\nTranslated for the First Time into Prose and Verse, with an\nIntroductory Preface, and a Life of the Author, from the Atish Kadah,\nBY EDWARD B. EASTWICK, C.B., M.A., F.R.S., M.R.A.S.\n \"It is a very fair rendering of the original.\"--_Times._\n \"The new edition has long been desired, and will be welcomed\n by all who take any interest in Oriental poetry. The\n _Gulistan_ is a typical Persian verse-book of the highest\n order. Mr. Eastwick's rhymed translation ... has long\n established itself in a secure position as the best version\n of Sadi's finest work.\"--_Academy._\n \"It is both faithfully and gracefully executed.\"--_Tablet._\nIn Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. viii.-408 and viii.-348, cloth, price\nMISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS RELATING TO INDIAN SUBJECTS.\nBY BRIAN HOUGHTON HODGSON, ESQ., F.R.S.,\nLate of the Bengal Civil Service; Corresponding Member of the\nInstitute; Chevalier of the Legion of Honour; late British Minister at\nthe Court of Nepal, &c, &c.\n_CONTENTS OF VOL. I._\n SECTION I.--On the Kocch, B\u00f3d\u00f3, and Dhim\u00e1l Tribes.--Part I.\n Vocabulary.--Part II. Grammar.--Part III. Their Origin,\n Location, Numbers, Creed, Customs, Character, and Condition,\n with a General Description of the Climate they dwell\n in--Appendix.\n SECTION II.--On Himalayan Ethnology.--I. Comparative\n Vocabulary of the Languages of the Broken Tribes of\n N\u00e9p\u00e1l.--II. Vocabulary of the Dialects of the Kiranti\n Language.--III. Grammatical Analysis of the V\u00e1yu Language.\n The V\u00e1yu Grammar.--IV. Analysis of the B\u00e1hing Dialect of the\n Kiranti language. The B\u00e1hing Grammar.--V. On the V\u00e1yu or\n H\u00e1yu Tribe of the Central Himal\u00e1ya.--VI. On the Kiranti\n Tribe of the Central Himal\u00e1ya.\n_CONTENTS OF VOL. II._\n SECTION III.--On the Aborigines of North-Eastern India.\n Comparative Vocabulary of the Tibetan, B\u00f3d\u00f3, and G\u00e1r\u00f3\n Tongues.\n SECTION IV.--Aborigines of the North-Eastern Frontier.\n SECTION V.--Aborigines of the Eastern Frontier.\n SECTION VI.--The Indo-Chinese Borderers, and their\n connection with the Himalayans and Tibetans. Comparative\n Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Arakan. Comparative\n Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Tenasserim.\n SECTION VII.--The Mongolian Affinities of the\n Caucasians.--Comparison and Analysis of Caucasian and\n Mongolian Words.\n SECTION VIII.--Physical Type of Tibetans.\n SECTION IX.--The Aborigines of Central India.--Comparative\n Vocabulary of the Aboriginal Languages of Central\n India.--Aborigines of the Eastern Ghats.--Vocabulary of some\n of the Dialects of the Hill and Wandering Tribes in the\n Northern Sircars.--Aborigines of the Nilgiris, with Remarks\n on their Affinities.--Supplement to the Nilgirian\n Vocabularies.--The Aborigines of Southern India and Ceylon.\n SECTION X.--Route of Nepalese Mission to Pekin, with Remarks\n on the Water-Shed and Plateau of Tibet.\n SECTION XI.--Route from K\u00e1thm\u00e1nd\u00fa, the Capital of Nep\u00e2l, to\n Darjeeling in Sikim.--Memorandum relative to the Seven Cosis\n of Nep\u00e2l.\n SECTION XII.--Some Accounts of the Systems of Law and Police\n as recognised in the State of Nep\u00e2l.\n SECTION XIII.--The Native Method of making the Paper\n denominated Hindustan, N\u00e9p\u00e1lese.\n SECTION XIV.--Pre-eminence of the Vernaculars; or, the\n Anglicists Answered; Being Letters on the Education of the\n People of India.\n \"For the study of the less-known races of India Mr. Brian\n Hodgson's 'Miscellaneous Essays' will be found very valuable\n both to the philologist and the ethnologist.\"\nThird Edition, Two Vols., post 8vo, pp. viii.-268 and viii.-326,\ncloth, price 21s.\nTHE LIFE OR LEGEND OF GAUDAMA,\nTHE BUDDHA OF THE BURMESE. With Annotations.\nThe Ways to Neibban, and Notice on the Phongyies or Burmese Monks.\nBY THE RIGHT REV. P. BIGANDET,\nBishop of Ramatha, Vicar-Apostolic of Ava and Pegu.\n \"The work is furnished with copious notes, which not only\n illustrate the subject-matter, but form a perfect\n encyclop\u00e6dia of Buddhist lore.\"--_Times._\n \"A work which will furnish European students of Buddhism\n with a most valuable help in the prosecution of their\n investigations.\"--_Edinburgh Daily Review._\n \"Bishop Bigandet's invaluable work.\"--_Indian Antiquary._\n \"Viewed in this light, its importance is sufficient to place\n students of the subject under a deep obligation to its\n author.\"--_Calcutta Review._\n \"This work is one of the greatest authorities upon\n Buddhism.\"--_Dublin Review._\nPost 8vo, pp. xxiv.-420, cloth, price 18s.\nCHINESE BUDDHISM.\nA VOLUME OF SKETCHES, HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.\nBY J. EDKINS, D.D.\nAuthor of \"China's Place in Philology,\" \"Religion in China,\" &c., &c.\n \"It contains a vast deal of important information on the\n subject, such as is only to be gained by long-continued\n study on the spot.\"--_Athen\u00e6um._\n \"Upon the whole, we know of no work comparable to it for the\n extent of its original research, and the simplicity with\n which this complicated system of philosophy, religion,\n literature, and ritual is set forth.\"--_British Quarterly\n Review._\n \"The whole volume is replete with learning.... It deserves\n most careful study from all interested in the history of the\n religions of the world, and expressly of those who are\n concerned in the propagation of Christianity. Dr. Edkins\n notices in terms of just condemnation the exaggerated praise\n bestowed upon Buddhism by recent English\n writers.\"--_Record._\nPost 8vo, pp. 496, cloth, price 10s. 6d.\nLINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.\nWRITTEN FROM THE YEAR 1846 TO 1878.\nBY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST,\nLate Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service; Hon. Secretary to\nthe Royal Asiatic Society; and Author of \"The Modern Languages of the\nEast Indies.\"\n \"We know none who has described Indian life, especially the\n life of the natives, with so much learning, sympathy, and\n literary talent.\"--_Academy._\n \"They seem to us to be full of suggestive and original\n remarks.\"--_St. James's Gazette._\n \"His book contains a vast amount of information. The result\n of thirty-five years of inquiry, reflection, and\n speculation, and that on subjects as full of fascination as\n of food for thought.\"--_Tablet._\n \"Exhibit such a thorough acquaintance with the history and\n antiquities of India as to entitle him to speak as one\n having authority.\"--_Edinburgh Daily Review._\n \"The author speaks with the authority of personal\n experience.... It is this constant association with the\n country and the people which gives such a vividness to many\n of the pages.\"--_Athen\u00e6um._\nPost 8vo, pp. civ.-348, cloth, price 18s.\nBUDDHIST BIRTH STORIES; or, Jataka Tales.\nThe Oldest Collection of Folk-lore Extant:\nBEING THE JATAKATTHAVANNANA,\nFor the first time Edited in the original P\u0101li.\nBY V. FAUSBOLL;\nAnd Translated by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.\nTranslation. Volume I.\n \"These are tales supposed to have been told by the Buddha of\n what he had seen and heard in his previous births. They are\n probably the nearest representatives of the original Aryan\n stories from which sprang the folk-lore of Europe as well as\n India. The introduction contains a most interesting\n disquisition on the migrations of these fables, tracing\n their reappearance in the various groups of folk-lore\n legends. Among other old friends, we meet with a version of\n the Judgment of Solomon.\"--_Times._\n \"It is now some years since Mr. Rhys Davids asserted his\n right to be heard on this subject by his able article on\n Buddhism in the new edition of the 'Encyclop\u00e6dia\n Britannica.'\"--_Leeds Mercury._\n \"All who are interested in Buddhist literature ought to feel\n deeply indebted to Mr. Rhys Davids. His well-established\n reputation as a Pali scholar is a sufficient guarantee for\n the fidelity of his version, and the style of his\n translations is deserving of high praise.\"--_Academy._\n \"No more competent expositor of Buddhism could be found than\n Mr. Rhys Davids. In the J\u0101taka book we have, then, a\n priceless record of the earliest imaginative literature of\n our race; and ... it presents to us a nearly complete\n picture of the social life and customs and popular beliefs\n of the common people of Aryan tribes, closely related to\n ourselves, just as they were passing through the first\n stages of civilisation.\"--_St. James's Gazette._\nPost 8vo, pp. xxviii.-362, cloth, price 14s.\nA TALMUDIC MISCELLANY;\nOR, A THOUSAND AND ONE EXTRACTS FROM THE TALMUD, THE MIDRASHIM, AND\nTHE KABBALAH.\nCompiled and Translated by PAUL ISAAC HERSHON, Author of \"Genesis\nAccording to the Talmud,\" &c.\n \"To obtain in so concise and handy a form as this volume a\n general idea of the Talmud is a boon to Christians at\n least.\"--_Times._\n \"Its peculiar and popular character will make it attractive\n to general readers. Mr. Hershon is a very competent\n scholar.... Contains samples of the good, bad, and\n indifferent, and especially extracts that throw light upon\n the Scriptures.\"--_British Quarterly Review._\n \"Will convey to English readers a more complete and truthful\n notion of the Talmud than any other work that has yet\n appeared.\"--_Daily News._\n \"Without overlooking in the slightest the several\n attractions of the previous volumes of the 'Oriental\n Series.' we have no hesitation in saying that this surpasses\n them all in interest.\"--_Edinburgh Daily Review._\n \"Mr. Hershon has ... thus given English readers what is, we\n believe, a fair set of specimens which they can test for\n themselves.\"--_The Record._\n \"This book is by far the best fitted in the present state of\n knowledge to enable the general reader to gain a fair and\n unbiased conception of the multifarious contents of the\n wonderful miscellany which can only be truly understood--so\n Jewish pride asserts--by the life-long devotion of scholars\n of the Chosen People.\"--_Inquirer._\n \"The value and importance of this volume consist in the fact\n that scarcely a single extract is given in its pages but\n throws some light, direct or refracted, upon those\n Scriptures which are the common heritage of Jew and\n Christian alike.\"--_John Bull._\n \"It is a capital specimen of Hebrew scholarship; a monument\n of learned, loving, light-giving labour.\"--_Jewish Herald._\nPost 8vo, pp. xii.-228, cloth, price 7s. 6d.\nTHE CLASSICAL POETRY OF THE JAPANESE.\nBY BASIL HALL CHAMBERLAIN, Author of \"Yeigo He\u00f1kaku Shira\u00f1.\"\n \"A very curious volume. The author has manifestly devoted\n much labour to the task of studying the poetical literature\n of the Japanese, and rendering characteristic specimens into\n English verse.\"--_Daily News._\n \"Mr. Chamberlain's volume is, so far as we are aware, the\n first attempt which has been made to interpret the\n literature of the Japanese to the Western world. It is to\n the classical poetry of Old Japan that we must turn for\n indigenous Japanese thought, and in the volume before us we\n have a selection from that poetry rendered into graceful\n English verse.\"--_Tablet._\n \"It is undoubtedly one of the best translations of lyric\n literature which has appeared during the close of the last\n year.\"--_Celestial Empire._\n \"Mr. Chamberlain set himself a difficult task when he\n undertook to reproduce Japanese poetry in an English form.\n But he has evidently laboured _con amore_, and his efforts\n are successful to a degree.\"--_London and China Express._\nPost 8vo, pp. xii.-164, cloth, price 10s. 6d.\nTHE HISTORY OF ESARHADDON (Son of Sennacherib), KING OF ASSYRIA, B.C.\n Translated from the Cuneiform Inscriptions upon Cylinders\n and Tablets in the British Museum Collection; together with\n a Grammatical Analysis of each Word, Explanations of the\n Ideographs by Extracts from the Bi-Lingual Syllabaries, and\n List of Eponyms, &c.\nBY ERNEST A. BUDGE, B.A., M.R.A.S., Assyrian Exhibitioner, Christ's\nCollege, Cambridge.\n \"Students of scriptural arch\u00e6ology will also appreciate the\n 'History of Esarhaddon.'\"--_Times._\n \"There is much to attract the scholar in this volume. It\n does not pretend to popularise studies which are yet in\n their infancy. Its primary object is to translate, but it\n does not assume to be more than tentative, and it offers\n both to the professed Assyriologist and to the ordinary\n non-Assyriological Semitic scholar the means of controlling\n its results.\"--_Academy._\n \"Mr. Budge's book is, of course, mainly addressed to\n Assyrian scholars and students. They are not, it is to be\n feared, a very numerous class. But the more thanks are due\n to him on that account for the way in which he has acquitted\n himself in his laborious task.\"--_Tablet._\nPost 8vo, pp. 448, cloth, price 21s.\nTHE MESNEVI\n(Usually known as THE MESNEVIYI SHERIF, or HOLY MESNEVI) OF MEVLANA\n(OUR LORD) JELALU 'D-DIN MUHAMMED ER-RUMI.\nBook the First.\n_Together with some Account of the Life and Acts of the Author, of his\nAncestors, and of his Descendants._\nIllustrated by a Selection of Characteristic Anecdotes, as Collected\nby their Historian,\nMEVLANA SHEMSU-'D-DIN AHMED, EL EFLAKI, EL 'ARIFI.\nTranslated, and the Poetry Versified, in English,\nBY JAMES W. REDHOUSE, M.R.A.S., &c.\n \"A complete treasury of occult Oriental lore.\"--_Saturday\n Review._\n \"This book will be a very valuable help to the reader\n ignorant of Persia, who is desirous of obtaining an insight\n into a very important department of the literature extant in\n that language.\"--_Tablet._\nPost 8vo, pp. xvi.-280, cloth, price 6s.\nEASTERN PROVERBS AND EMBLEMS\nILLUSTRATING OLD TRUTHS.\nBY REV. J. LONG,\nMember of the Bengal Asiatic Society, F.R.G.S.\n \"We regard the book as valuable, and wish for it a wide\n circulation and attentive reading.\"--_Record._\n \"Altogether, it is quite a feast of good things.\"--_Globe._\n \"It is full of interesting matter.\"--_Antiquary._\nPost 8vo, pp. viii.-270, cloth, price 7s. 6d.\nINDIAN POETRY;\n Containing a New Edition of the \"Indian Song of Songs,\" from\n the Sanscrit of the \"Gita Govinda\" of Jayadeva; Two Books\n from \"The Iliad of India\" (Mahabharata), \"Proverbial Wisdom\"\n from the Shlokas of the Hitopadesa, and other Oriental\n Poems.\nBY EDWIN ARNOLD, C.S.I., Author of \"The Light of Asia.\"\n \"In this new volume of Messrs. Tr\u00fcbner's Oriental Series,\n Mr. Edwin Arnold does good service by illustrating, through\n the medium of his musical English melodies, the power of\n Indian poetry to stir European emotions. The 'Indian Song of\n Songs' is not unknown to scholars. Mr. Arnold will have\n introduced it among popular English poems. Nothing could be\n more graceful and delicate than the shades by which Krishna\n is portrayed in the gradual process of being weaned by the\n love of\n 'Beautiful Radha, jasmine-bosomed Radha,'\n from the allurements of the forest nymphs, in whom the five\n senses are typified.\"--_Times._\n \"No other English poet has ever thrown his genius and his\n art so thoroughly into the work of translating Eastern ideas\n as Mr. Arnold has done in his splendid paraphrases of\n language contained in these mighty epics.\"--_Daily\n Telegraph._\n \"The poem abounds with imagery of Eastern luxuriousness and\n sensuousness; the air seems laden with the spicy odours of\n the tropics, and the verse has a richness and a melody\n sufficient to captivate the senses of the\n dullest.\"--_Standard._\n \"The translator, while producing a very enjoyable poem, has\n adhered with tolerable fidelity to the original\n text.\"--_Overland Mail._\n \"We certainly wish Mr. Arnold success in his attempt 'to\n popularise Indian classics,' that being, as his preface\n tells us, the goal towards which he bends his\n efforts.\"--_Allen's Indian Mail._\nPost 8vo, pp. xvi.-296, cloth, price 10s. 6d.\nTHE MIND OF MENCIUS;\nOR, POLITICAL ECONOMY FOUNDED UPON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.\nA SYSTEMATIC DIGEST OF THE DOCTRINES OF THE CHINESE PHILOSOPHER\nMENCIUS.\nTranslated from the Original Text and Classified, with Comments and\nExplanations,\nBy the REV. ERNST FABER, Rhenish Mission Society.\nTranslated from the German, with Additional Notes,\nBy the REV. A. B. HUTCHINSON, C.M.S., Church Mission, Hong Kong.\n \"Mr. Faber is already well known in the field of Chinese\n studies by his digest of the doctrines of Confucius. The\n value of this work will be perceived when it is remembered\n that at no time since relations commenced between China and\n the West has the former been so powerful--we had almost said\n aggressive--as now. For those who will give it careful\n study, Mr. Faber's work is one of the most valuable of the\n excellent series to which it belongs.\"--_Nature._\nPost 8vo, pp. 336, cloth, price 16s.\nTHE RELIGIONS OF INDIA.\nBY A. BARTH.\nTranslated from the French with the authority and assistance of the\nAuthor.\nThe author has, at the request of the publishers, considerably\nenlarged the work for the translator, and has added the literature of\nthe subject to date; the translation may, therefore, be looked upon as\nan equivalent of a new and improved edition of the original.\n \"Is not only a valuable manual of the religions of India,\n which marks a distinct step in the treatment of the subject,\n but also a useful work of reference.\"--_Academy._\n \"This volume is a reproduction, with corrections and\n additions, of an article contributed by the learned author\n two years ago to the 'Encyclop\u00e9die des Sciences\n Religieuses.' It attracted much notice when it first\n appeared, and is generally admitted to present the best\n summary extant of the vast subject with which it\n deals.\"--_Tablet._\n \"This is not only on the whole the best but the only manual\n of the religions of India, apart from Buddhism, which we\n have in English. The present work ... shows not only great\n knowledge of the facts and power of clear exposition, but\n also great insight into the inner history and the deeper\n meaning of the great religion, for it is in reality only\n one, which it proposes to describe.\"--_Modern Review._\n \"The merit of the work has been emphatically recognised by\n the most authoritative Orientalists, both in this country\n and on the continent of Europe. But probably there are few\n Indianists (if we may use the word) who would not derive a\n good deal of information from it, and especially from the\n extensive bibliography provided in the notes.\"--_Dublin\n Review._\n \"Such a sketch M. Barth has drawn with a\n master-hand.\"--_Critic (New York)._\nPost 8vo, pp. viii.-152, cloth, price 6s.\nHINDU PHILOSOPHY.\nTHE S\u0100NKHYA K\u0100RIKA OF IS'WARA KRISHNA.\nAn Exposition of the System of Kapila, with an Appendix on the Ny\u0101ya\nand Vais'eshika Systems.\nBY JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.), M.R.A.S.\nThe system of Kapila contains nearly all that India has produced in\nthe department of pure philosophy.\n \"The non-Orientalist ... finds in Mr. Davies a patient and\n learned guide who leads him into the intricacies of the\n philosophy of India, and supplies him with a clue, that he\n may not be lost in them. In the preface he states that the\n system of Kapila is the 'earliest attempt on record to give\n an answer, from reason alone, to the mysterious questions\n which arise in every thoughtful mind about the origin of the\n world, the nature and relations of man and his future\n destiny,' and in his learned and able notes he exhibits 'the\n connection of the S\u0101nkhya system with the philosophy of\n Spinoza,' and 'the connection of the system of Kapila with\n that of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann.'\"--_Foreign Church\n Chronicle._\n \"Mr. Davies's volume on Hindu Philosophy is an undoubted\n gain to all students of the development of thought. The\n system of Kapila, which is here given in a translation from\n the S\u0101nkhya K\u0101rik\u0101, is the only contribution of India to\n pure philosophy.... Presents many points of deep interest to\n the student of comparative philosophy, and without Mr.\n Davies's lucid interpretation it would be difficult to\n appreciate these points in any adequate manner.\"--_Saturday\n Review._\n \"We welcome Mr. Davies's book as a valuable addition to our\n philosophical library.\"--_Notes and Queries._\nSecond Edition. Post 8vo, pp. x.-130, cloth, price 6s.\nA MANUAL OF HINDU PANTHEISM. VED\u00c2NTAS\u00c2RA.\nTranslated, with copious Annotations,\nBY MAJOR G. A. JACOB,\nBombay Staff Corps; Inspector of Army Schools.\nThe design of this little work is to provide for missionaries, and for\nothers who, like them, have little leisure for original research, an\naccurate summary of the doctrines of the Ved\u00e2nta.\n \"The modest title of Major Jacob's work conveys but an\n inadequate idea of the vast amount of research embodied in\n his notes to the text of the Vedantasara. So copious,\n indeed, are these, and so much collateral matter do they\n bring to bear on the subject, that the diligent student will\n rise from their perusal with a fairly adequate view of Hind\u00fb\n philosophy generally. His work ... is one of the best of its\n kind that we have seen.\"--_Calcutta Review._\nPost 8vo, pp. xii.-154, cloth, price 7s. 6d.\nTSUNI--||GOAM:\nTHE SUPREME BEING OF THE KHOI-KHOI.\nBY THEOPHILUS HAHN, Ph.D.,\nCustodian of the Grey Collection, Cape Town; Corresponding Member of the\nGeogr. Society, Dresden; Corresponding Member of the Anthropological\nSociety, Vienna, &c., &c.\n \"The first instalment of Dr. Hahn's labours will be of\n interest, not at the Cape only, but in every University of\n Europe. It is, in fact, a most valuable contribution to the\n comparative study of religion and mythology. Accounts of\n their religion and mythology were scattered about in various\n books; these have been carefully collected by Dr. Hahn and\n printed in his second chapter, enriched and improved by what\n he has been able to collect himself.\"--_Prof. Max M\u00fcller in\n the Nineteenth Century._\n \"It is full of good things.\"--_St. James's Gazette._\nIn Four Volumes. Post 8vo, Vol. I., pp. xii.-392, cloth, price 12s. 6d.,\nVol. II., pp. vi.-408, cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. III., pp. viii.-414,\ncloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. IV., pp. viii.-340, cloth, price 10s. 6d.\nA COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY TO THE QURAN.\nTO WHICH IS PREFIXED SALE'S PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE, WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES\nAND EMENDATIONS.\nNotes.\nBy Rev. E. M. WHERRY, M.A., Lodiana.\n \"As Mr. Wherry's book is intended for missionaries in India,\n it is no doubt well that they should be prepared to meet, if\n they can, the ordinary arguments and interpretations, and\n for this purpose Mr. Wherry's additions will prove\n useful.\"--_Saturday Review._\nSecond Edition. Post 8vo, pp. vi.-208, cloth, price 8s. 6d.\nTHE BHAGAVAD-G\u00ceT\u00c2.\nTranslated, with Introduction and Notes.\nBY JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.)\n \"Let us add that his translation of the Bhagavad G\u00eet\u00e2 is, as\n we judge, the best that has as yet appeared in English, and\n that his Philological Notes are of quite peculiar\n value.\"--_Dublin Review._\nPost 8vo, pp. 96, cloth, price 5s.\nTHE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.\nTranslated by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Barrister-at-Law, late H.M.\nBengal Civil Service.\nPost 8vo, pp. xxxii.-336, cloth, price 10s. 6d.\nTHE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.\nThe Persian Text, with an English Verse Translation.\nBy E. H. WHINFIELD, late of the Bengal Civil Service.\n \"Mr. Whinfield has executed a difficult task with\n considerable success, and his version contains much that\n will be new to those who only know Mr. Fitzgerald's\n delightful selection.\"--_Academy._\n \"The most prominent features in the Quatrains are their\n profound agnosticism, combined with a fatalism based more on\n philosophic than religious grounds, their Epicureanism and\n the spirit of universal tolerance and charity which animates\n them.\"--_Calcutta Review._\nPost 8vo, pp. xxiv.-268, cloth, price 9s.\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS AND ANCIENT INDIAN METAPHYSICS.\nAs exhibited in a series of Articles contributed to the _Calcutta\nReview_.\nBy ARCHIBALD EDWARD GOUGH, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford; Principal of\nthe Calcutta Madrasa.\n \"For practical purposes this is perhaps the most important\n of the works that have thus far appeared in 'Tr\u00fcbner's\n Oriental Series.'... We cannot doubt that for all who may\n take it up the work must be one of profound\n interest.\"--_Saturday Review._\nIn Two Volumes. Vol. I., post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-230, cloth, price 7s. 6d.\nA COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN AND MESOPOTAMIAN RELIGIONS.\nBy DR. C. P. TIELE.\nVol. I.--HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN RELIGION.\nTranslated from the Dutch with the Assistance of the Author.\nBy JAMES BALLINGAL.\n \"It places in the hands of the English readers a history of\n Egyptian Religion which is very complete, which is based on\n the best materials, and which has been illustrated by the\n latest results of research. In this volume there is a great\n deal of information, as well as independent investigation,\n for the trustworthiness of which Dr. Tiele's name is in\n itself a guarantee; and the description of the successive\n religions under the Old Kingdom, the Middle Kingdom, and the\n New Kingdom, is given in a manner which is scholarly and\n minute.\"--_Scotsman._\nPost 8vo, pp. xii.-302, cloth, price 8s. 6d.\nYUSUF AND ZULAIKHA.\nA POEM BY JAMI.\nTranslated from the Persian into English Verse.\nBY RALPH T. H. GRIFFITH.\n \"Mr. Griffith, who has done already good service as\n translator into verse from the Sanskrit, has done further\n good work in this translation from the Persian, and he has\n evidently shown not a little skill in his rendering the\n quaint and very oriental style of his author into our more\n prosaic, less figurative, language.... The work, besides its\n intrinsic merits, is of importance as being one of the most\n popular and famous poems of Persia, and that which is read\n in all the independent native schools of India where Persian\n is taught.\"--_Scotsman._\nPost 8vo, pp. viii.-266, cloth, price 9s.\nLINGUISTIC ESSAYS.\nBY CARL ABEL.\n \"An entirely novel method of dealing with philosophical\n questions and impart a real human interest to the otherwise\n dry technicalities of the science.\"--_Standard._\n \"Dr. Abel is an opponent from whom it is pleasant to differ,\n for he writes with enthusiasm and temper, and his mastery\n over the English language fits him to be a champion of\n unpopular doctrines.\"--_Athen\u00e6um._\nPost 8vo, pp. ix.-281, cloth, price 10s. 6d.\nTHE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA;\nOR, REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.\nBY MADHAVA ACHARYA.\nTranslated by E. B. COWELL, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit in the\nUniversity of Cambridge, and A. E. GOUGH, M.A., Professor of\nPhilosophy in the Presidency College, Calcutta.\nThis work is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability. The\nauthor successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical systems\ncurrent in the fourteenth century in the South of India; and he gives\nwhat appears to him to be their most important tenets.\n \"The translation is trustworthy throughout. A protracted\n sojourn in India, where there is a living tradition, has\n familiarised the translators with Indian\n thought.\"--_Athen\u00e6um._\nPost 8vo, pp. lxv.-368, cloth, price 14s.\nTIBETAN TALES DERIVED FROM INDIAN SOURCES.\nTranslated from the Tibetan of the KAH-GYUR.\nBY F. ANTON VON SCHIEFNER.\nDone into English from the German, with an Introduction,\nBY W. R. S. RALSTON, M.A.\n \"Mr. Ralston, whose name is so familiar to all lovers of\n Russian folk-lore, has supplied some interesting Western\n analogies and parallels, drawn, for the most part, from\n Slavonic sources, to the Eastern folk-tales, culled from the\n Kahgyur, one of the divisions of the Tibetan sacred\n books.\"--_Academy._\n \"The translation ... could scarcely have fallen into better\n hands. An Introduction ... gives the leading facts in the\n lives of those scholars who have given their attention to\n gaining a knowledge of the Tibetan literature and\n language.\"--_Calcutta Review._\n \"Ought to interest all who care for the East, for amusing\n stories, or for comparative folk-lore.\"--_Pall Mall\n Gazette._\nPost 8vo, pp. xvi.-224, cloth, price 9s.\nUD\u00c2NAVARGA.\nA COLLECTION OF VERSES FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON.\nCompiled by DHARMATR\u00c2TA.\nBEING THE NORTHERN BUDDHIST VERSION OF DHAMMAPADA.\nTranslated from the Tibetan of Bkah-hgyur, with Notes, and Extracts\nfrom the Commentary of Pradjnavarman,\nBY W. WOODVILLE ROCKHILL.\n \"Mr. Rockhill's present work is the first from which\n assistance will be gained for a more accurate understanding\n of the Pali text; it is, in fact, as yet the only term of\n comparison available to us. The 'Udanavarga,' the Thibetan\n version, was originally discovered by the late M. Schiefner,\n who published the Tibetan text, and had intended adding a\n translation, an intention frustrated by his death, but which\n has been carried out by Mr. Rockhill.... Mr. Rockhill may be\n congratulated for having well accomplished a difficult\n task.\"--_Saturday Review._\nIn Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-566, cloth, accompanied by a\nLanguage Map, price 18s.\nA SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF AFRICA.\nBY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST,\nBarrister-at-Law, and late of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.\n \"Any one at all interested in African languages cannot do\n better than get Mr. Cust's book. It is encyclop\u00e6dic in its\n scope, and the reader gets a start clear away in any\n particular language, and is left free to add to the initial\n sum of knowledge there collected.\"--_Natal Mercury._\n \"Mr. Cust has contrived to produce a work of value to\n linguistic students.\"--_Nature._\nThird Edition. Post 8vo, pp. xv.-250, cloth, price 7s. 6d.\nOUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGION TO THE SPREAD OF THE UNIVERSAL\nRELIGIONS.\nBY C. P. TIELE,\nDoctor of Theology, Professor of the History of Religions in the\nUniversity of Leyden.\nTranslated from the Dutch by J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, M.A.\n \"Few books of its size contain the result of so much wide\n thinking, able and laborious study, or enable the reader to\n gain a better bird's-eye view of the latest results of\n investigations into the religious history of nations. As\n Professor Tiele modestly says, 'In this little book are\n outlines--pencil sketches, I might say--nothing more.' But\n there are some men whose sketches from a thumb-nail are of\n far more worth than an enormous canvas covered with the\n crude painting of others, and it is easy to see that these\n pages, full of information, these sentences, cut and perhaps\n also dry, short and clear, condense the fruits of long and\n thorough research.\"--_Scotsman._\nPost 8vo, pp. xii.-312, with Maps and Plan, cloth, price 14s.\nA HISTORY OF BURMA.\nIncluding Burma Proper, Pegu, Taungu, Tenasserim, and Arakan. From the\nEarliest Time to the End of the First War with British India.\nBY LIEUT.-GEN. SIR ARTHUR P. PHAYRE, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., and C.B.,\nMembre Correspondant de la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Acad\u00e9mique Indo-Chinoise de France.\n \"Sir Arthur Phayre's contribution to Tr\u00fcbner's Oriental\n Series supplies a recognised want, and its appearance has\n been looked forward to for many years.... General Phayre\n deserves great credit for the patience and industry which\n has resulted in this History of Burma.\"--_Saturday Review._\nThird Edition. Post 8vo, pp. 276, cloth, price 7s. 6d.\nRELIGION IN CHINA.\nBy JOSEPH EDKINS, D.D., PEKING.\nContaining a Brief Account of the Three Religions of the Chinese, with\nObservations on the Prospects of Christian Conversion amongst that People.\n \"Dr. Edkins has been most careful in noting the varied and\n often complex phases of opinion, so as to give an account of\n considerable value of the subject.\"--_Scotsman._\n \"As a missionary, it has been part of Dr. Edkins' duty to\n study the existing religions in China, and his long\n residence in the country has enabled him to acquire an\n intimate knowledge of them as they at present\n exist.\"--_Saturday Review._\n \"Dr. Edkins' valuable work, of which this is a second and\n revised edition, has, from the time that it was published,\n been the standard authority upon the subject of which it\n treats.\"--_Nonconformist._\n \"Dr. Edkins ... may now be fairly regarded as among the\n first authorities on Chinese religion and\n language.\"--_British Quarterly Review._\nPost 8vo, pp. x.-274, cloth, price 9s.\nTHE LIFE OF THE BUDDHA AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF HIS ORDER.\nDerived from Tibetan Works in the Bkah-hgyur and Bstan-hgyur. Followed\nby notices on the Early History of Tibet and Khoten.\nTranslated by W. W. ROCKHILL, Second Secretary U.S. Legation in China.\n \"The volume bears testimony to the diligence and fulness\n with which the author has consulted and tested the ancient\n documents bearing upon his remarkable subject.\"--_Times._\n \"Will be appreciated by those who devote themselves to those\n Buddhist studies which have of late years taken in these\n Western regions so remarkable a development. Its matter\n possesses a special interest as being derived from ancient\n Tibetan works, some portions of which, here analysed and\n translated, have not yet attracted the attention of\n scholars. The volume is rich in ancient stories bearing upon\n the world's renovation and the origin of castes, as recorded\n in these venerable authorities.\"--_Daily News._\nThird Edition. Post 8vo, pp. viii.-464, cloth, price 16s.\nTHE SANKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA.\nWith Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries.\nTranslated by J. R. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., late Principal of the Benares\nCollege.\nEdited by FITZEDWARD HALL.\n \"The work displays a vast expenditure of labour and\n scholarship, for which students of Hindoo philosophy have\n every reason to be grateful to Dr. Hall and the\n publishers.\"--_Calcutta Review._\nIn Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. cviii.-242, and viii.-370, cloth, price\n24s. Dedicated by permission to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales.\nBUDDHIST RECORDS OF THE WESTERN WORLD,\nTranslated from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang (A.D. 629).\nBY SAMUEL BEAL, B.A.,\n(Trin. Coll., Camb.); R.N. (Retired Chaplain and N.I.); Professor of\nChinese, University College, London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland,\nAn eminent Indian authority writes respecting this work:--\"Nothing\nmore can be done in elucidating the History of India until Mr. Beal's\ntranslation of the 'Si-yu-ki' appears.\"\n \"It is a strange freak of historical preservation that the\n best account of the condition of India at that ancient\n period has come down to us in the books of travel written by\n the Chinese pilgrims, of whom Hwen Thsang is the best\n known.\"--_Times._\nPost 8vo, pp. xlviii.-398, cloth, price 12s.\nTHE ORDINANCES OF MANU.\nTranslated from the Sanskrit, with an Introduction.\nBy the late A.C. BURNELL, Ph.D., C.I.E.\nCompleted and Edited by E.W. HOPKINS, Ph.D., of Columbia College, N.Y.\n \"This work is full of interest; while for the student of\n sociology and the science of religion it is full of\n importance. It is a great boon to get so notable a work in\n so accessible a form, admirably edited, and competently\n translated.\"--_Scotsman._\n \"Few men were more competent than Burnell to give us a\n really good translation of this well-known law book, first\n rendered into English by Sir William Jones. Burnell was not\n only an independent Sanskrit scholar, but an experienced\n lawyer, and he joined to these two important qualifications\n the rare faculty of being able to express his thoughts in\n clear and trenchant English.... We ought to feel very\n grateful to Dr. Hopkins for having given us all that could\n be published of the translation left by Burnell.\"--F. MAX\n M\u00dcLLER in the _Academy._\nPost 8vo, pp. xii.-234, cloth, price 9s.\nTHE LIFE AND WORKS OF ALEXANDER CSOMA DE KOROS,\n Between 1819 and 1842. With a Short Notice of all his\n Published and Unpublished Works and Essays. From Original\n and for most part Unpublished Documents.\nBy THEODORE DUKA, M.D., F.R.C.S. (Eng.), Surgeon-Major H.M.'s Bengal\nMedical Service, Retired, &c.\n \"Not too soon have Messrs. Tr\u00fcbner added to their valuable\n Oriental Series a history of the life and works of one of\n the most gifted and devoted of Oriental students, Alexander\n Csoma de Koros. It is forty-three years since his death, and\n though an account of his career was demanded soon after his\n decease, it has only now appeared in the important memoir of\n his compatriot, Dr. Duka.\"--_Bookseller._\nIn Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-318 and vi.-312, cloth, price 21s.\nMISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.\nReprinted from \"Dalrymple's Oriental Repertory,\" \"Asiatic Researches,\"\nand the \"Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.\"\n_CONTENTS OF VOL. I._\nI.--Some Accounts of Quedah. By Michael Topping.\nII.--Report made to the Chief and Council of Balambangan, by Lieut. James\nBarton, of his several Surveys.\nIII.--Substance of a Letter to the Court of Directors from Mr. John Jesse,\ndated July 20, 1775, at Borneo Proper.\nIV.--Formation of the Establishment of Poolo Peenang.\nV.--The Gold of Limong. By John Macdonald.\nVI.--On Three Natural Productions of Sumatra. By John Macdonald.\nVII.--On the Traces of the Hindu Language and Literature extant amongst\nthe Malays. By William Marsden.\nVIII.--Some Account of the Elastic Gum Vine of Prince-Wales Island. By\nJames Howison.\nIX.--A Botanical Description of Urceola Elastica, or Caoutchouc Vine of\nSumatra and Pulo-Pinang. By William Roxburgh, M.D.\nX.--An Account of the Inhabitants of the Poggy, or Nassau Islands, lying\noff Sumatra. By John Crisp.\nXI.--Remarks on the Species of Pepper which are found on Prince-Wales\nIsland. By William Hunter, M.D.\nXII.--On the Languages and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations. By J.\nLeyden, M.D.\nXIII.--Some Account of an Orang-Outang of remarkable height found on the\nIsland of Sumatra. By Clarke Abel, M.D.\nXIV.--Observations on the Geological Appearances and General Features of\nPortions of the Malayan Peninsula. By Captain James Low.\nXV.--Short Sketch of the Geology of Pulo-Pinang and the Neighbouring\nIslands. By T. Ware.\nXVI.--Climate of Singapore.\nXVII.--Inscription on the Jetty at Singapore.\nXVIII.--Extract of a Letter from Colonel J. Low.\nXIX.--Inscription at Singapore.\nXX--An Account of Several Inscriptions found in Province Wellesley. By\nLieut.-Col. James Low.\nXXI.--Note on the Inscriptions from Singapore and Province Wellesley. By\nJ. W. Laidlay.\nXXII.--On an Inscription from Keddah. By Lieut.-Col. Low.\nXXIII.--A Notice of the Alphabets of the Philippine Islands.\nXXIV.--Succinct Review of the Observations of the Tides in the Indian\nArchipelago.\nXXV.--Report on the Tin of the Province of Mergui. By Capt. G. B\nTremenheere.\nXXVI.--Report on the Manganese of Mergui Province. By Capt. G. B.\nTremenheere.\nXXVII.--Paragraphs to be added to Capt. G. B. Tremenheere's Report.\nXXVIII.--Second Report on the Tin of Mergui. By Capt. G. B. Tremenheere.\nXXIX.--Analysis of Iron Ores from Tavoy and Mergui, and of Limestone from\nMergui. By Dr. A. Ure.\nXXX.--Report of a Visit to the Pakchan River, and of some Tin Localities\nin the Southern Portion of the Tenasserim Provinces. By Capt. G. B.\nTremenheere.\nXXXI.--Report on a Route from the Mouth of the Pakchan to Krau, and thence\nacross the Isthmus of Krau to the Gulf of Siam. By Capt. Al. Fraser and\nCapt. J. G. Forlong.\nXXXII.--Report, &c., from Capt. G. B. Tremenheere on the Price of Mergui\nTin Ore.\nXXXIII.--Remarks on the Different Species of Orang-utan. By E. Blyth.\nXXXIV.--Further Remarks. By E. Blyth.\n_CONTENTS OF VOL. II._\nXXXV.--Catalogue of Mammalia inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and Islands.\nBy Theodore Cantor, M.D.\nXXXVI.--On the Local and Relative Geology of Singapore. By J. R. Logan.\nXXXVII.--Catalogue of Reptiles inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and\nIslands. By Theodore Cantor, M.D.\nXXXVIII.--Some Account of the Botanical Collection brought from the\nEastward, in 1841, by Dr. Cantor. By the late W. Griffith.\nXXXIX.--On the Flat-Horned Taurine Cattle of S.E. Asia. By E. Blyth.\nXL.--Note, by Major-General G. B. Tremenheere.\n \"The papers treat of almost every aspect of Indo-China--its\n philology, economy, geography, geology--and constitute a\n very material and important contribution to our accessible\n information regarding that country and its\n people.\"--_Contemporary Review._\nPost 8vo, pp. xii.-72, cloth, price 5s.\nTHE SATAKAS OF BHARTRIHARI.\nTranslated from the Sanskrit\nBy the REV. B. HALE WORTHAM, M.R.A.S.,\nRector of Eggesford, North Devon.\n \"A very interesting addition to Tr\u00fcbner's Oriental\n Series.\"--_Saturday Review._\n \"Many of the Maxims in the book have a Biblical ring and\n beauty of expression.\"--_St. James' Gazette._\nPost 8vo, pp. xii.-180, cloth, price 6s.\nANCIENT PROVERBS AND MAXIMS FROM BURMESE SOURCES;\nOr, THE NITI LITERATURE OF BURMA.\nBY JAMES GRAY,\nAuthor of \"Elements of Pali Grammar,\" \"Translation of the Dhammapada,\" &c.\nThe Sanscrit-P\u00e2li word N\u00eeti is equivalent to \"conduct\" in its abstract,\nand \"guide\" in its concrete signification. As applied to books, it is a\ngeneral term for a treatise which includes maxims, pithy sayings, and\ndidactic stories, intended as a guide to such matters of everyday life as\nform the character of an individual and influence him in his relations to\nhis fellow-men. Treatises of this kind have been popular in all ages, and\nhave served as a most effective medium of instruction.\nPost 8vo, pp. xxxii. and 330, cloth, price 7s. 6d.\nMASNAVI I MA' NAVI:\nTHE SPIRITUAL COUPLETS OF MAULANA JALALU-'D-DIN MUHAMMAD I RUMI.\nTranslated and Abridged by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Late of H.M. Bengal\nCivil Service.\nPost 8vo, pp. viii. and 346, cloth, price 10s. 6d.\nMANAVA-DHARMA-CASTRA: THE CODE OF MANU.\nORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXT, WITH CRITICAL NOTES. BY J. JOLLY, Ph.D.,\nProfessor of Sanskrit in the University of Wurzburg; late Tagore Professor\nof Law in the University of Calcutta.\nThe date assigned by Sir William Jones to this Code--the well-known Great\nLaw Book of the Hindus--is 1250-500 B.C., although the rules and precepts\ncontained in it had probably existed as tradition for countless ages\nbefore. There has been no reliable edition of the Text for Students for\nmany years past, and it is believed, therefore, that Prof. Jolly's work\nwill supply a want long felt.\nPost 8vo, pp. 215, cloth, price 7s. 6d.\nLEAVES FROM MY CHINESE SCRAP-BOOK.\nBY FREDERIC HENRY BALFOUR.\nAuthor of \"Waifs and Strays from the Far East,\" \"Taoist Texts,\" \"Idiomatic\nPhrases in the Peking Colloquial,\" &c. &c.\nPost 8vo, pp. xvi.-548, with Six Maps, cloth, price 21s.\nLINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.\nWRITTEN FROM THE YEAR 1847 TO 1887. _Second Series._\nBY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST, LL.D.,\nBarrister-at-Law; Honorary Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society; Late\nMember of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.\nIn Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. x.-308 and vi.-314, cloth, price 25s.\nMISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.\nEdited by R. ROST, Ph.D., &c. &c., Librarian to the India Office.\nSECOND SERIES.\nReprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from the\nMalayan \"Miscellanies,\" the \"Transactions and Journal\" of the Batavian\nSociety, and the \"Journals\" of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and the\nRoyal Geographical and Royal Asiatic Societies.\nPost 8vo, pp. xii.-512, price 16s.\nFOLK-TALES OF KASHMIR.\nBy the REV. J. HINTON KNOWLES, F.R.G.S., M.R.A.S., &c.\n(C.M.S.) Missionary to the Kashmiris.\nIn Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-336 and X.-352, cloth, price 21s.\nMEDI\u00c6VAL RESEARCHES FROM EASTERN ASIATIC SOURCES.\n FRAGMENTS TOWARDS THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY\n OF CENTRAL AND WESTERN ASIA FROM THE THIRTEENTH TO THE\n SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.\nBY E. BRETSCHNEIDER, M.D.,\nFormerly Physician of the Russian Legation at Pekin.\nIn Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. l.-408 and 431, cloth, price 36s.\nALBERUNI'S INDIA:\n AN ACCOUNT OF ITS RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE,\n GEOGRAPHY, CHRONOLOGY, ASTRONOMY, CUSTOMS, LAW, AND\n ASTROLOGY (ABOUT A.D. 1031).\nTRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH.\nWith Notes and Indices by Prof. EDWARD SACHAU, University of Berlin.\nProfessor SACHAU, is in the press.\nPost 8vo, pp. xxxvii.-218, cloth, price 10s.\nTHE LIFE OF HIUEN TSIANG.\nBY THE SHAMANS HWUI LI AND YEN-TSUNG.\nWith a Preface containing an account of the Works of I-TSING.\nBY SAMUEL BEAL, B.A.\n(Trin. Coll., Camb.); Professor of Chinese, University College,\nLondon; Rector of Wark, Northumberland, &c.\nAuthor of \"Buddhist Records of the Western World,\" \"The Romantic\nLegend of Sakya Buddha,\" &c.\nWhen the Pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang returned from his travels in India, he\ntook up his abode in the Temple of \"Great Benevolence;\" this convent\nhad been constructed by the Emperor in honour of the Empress,\nWen-te-hau. After Hiuen Tsiang's death, his disciple, Hwui Li,\ncomposed a work which gave an account of his illustrious Master's\ntravels; this work when he completed he buried, and refused to\ndiscover its place of concealment. But previous to his death he\nrevealed its whereabouts to Yen-tsung, by whom it was finally revised\nand published. This is \"The Life of Hiuen Tsiang.\" It is a valuable\nsequel to the Si-yu-ki, correcting and illustrating it in many\nparticulars.\n_IN PREPARATION:--_\nPost 8vo.\nA SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF OCEANIA.\nBY R. N. CUST, LL. D.\nAuthor of \"Modern Languages of the East,\" \"Modern Languages of\nAfrica,\" &c.\nLONDON: TR\u00dcBNER & CO., 57 AND 59 LUDGATE HILL.\nEnd of Project Gutenberg's The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha, by Madhava Acharya\n*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA ***\n***** This file should be named 34125-0.txt or 34125-0.zip *****\nThis and all associated files of various formats will be found in:\n https://www.gutenberg.org/3/4/1/2/34125/\nProduced by Sankar Viswanathan, Brownfox, and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This\nfile was produced from images generously made available\nby The Internet Archive)\nUpdated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions\nwill be renamed.\nCreating the works from public domain print editions means that no\none owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation\n(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without\npermission and without paying copyright royalties. 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