OpenRaiser/Intern-Atlas huggingface dataset:
Equilibrium Characterization for Data Acquisition Games
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

We study a game between two firms in which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their products. The firms can decide whether or not they want to buy the data, as well as which learning model to build with that data. We demonstrate a reduction from this potentially complicated action space to a one-shot, two-action game in which each firm only decides whether or not to buy the data. The game admits several regimes which depend on the relative strength of the two firms at the outset and the price at which the data is being offered. We analyze the game's Nash equilibria in all parameter regimes and demonstrate that, in expectation, the outcome of the game is that the initially stronger firm's market position weakens whereas the initially weaker firm's market position becomes stronger. Finally, we consider the perspective of the users of the service and demonstrate that the expected outcome at equilibrium is not the one which maximizes the welfare of the consumers.
Protecting Elections by Recounting Ballots
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker) attempts to manipulate the election outcome in favor of a preferred candidate by changing the vote counts in some of the voting districts. Afterwards, another party (a defender), which cares about the voters' wishes, demands a recount in a subset of the manipulated districts, restoring their vote counts to their original values. We investigate the resulting Stackelberg game for the case where votes are aggregated using two variants of the Plurality rule, and obtain an almost complete picture of the complexity landscape, both from the attacker's and from the defender's perspective.
Schelling Games on Graphs
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation. In our model, the agents are partitioned into k types and need to select locations on an undirected graph. Agents can be either stubborn, in which case they will always choose their preferred location, or strategic, in which case they aim to maximize the fraction of agents of their own type in their neighborhood. We investigate the existence of equilibria in these games, study the complexity of finding an equilibrium outcome or an outcome with high social welfare, and also provide upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy and stability. Some of our results extend to the setting where the preferences of the agents over their neighbors are defined by a social network rather than a partition into types.
Reallocating Multiple Facilities on the Line
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

We study the multistage $K$-facility reallocation problem on the real line, where we maintain $K$ facility locations over $T$ stages, based on the stage-dependent locations of $n$ agents. Each agent is connected to the nearest facility at each stage, and the facilities may move from one stage to another, to accommodate different agent locations. The objective is to minimize the connection cost of the agents plus the total moving cost of the facilities, over all stages. $K$-facility reallocation was introduced by de Keijzer and Wojtczak, where they mostly focused on the special case of a single facility. Using an LP-based approach, we present a polynomial time algorithm that computes the optimal solution for any number of facilities. We also consider online $K$-facility reallocation, where the algorithm becomes aware of agent locations in a stage-by-stage fashion. By exploiting an interesting connection to the classical $K$-server problem, we present a constant-competitive algorithm for $K = 2$ facilities.
Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Goods
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

In fair division, equitability dictates that each participant receives the same level of utility. In this work, we study equitable allocations of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. While prior work has studied (approximate) equitability in isolation, we consider equitability in conjunction with other well-studied notions of fairness and economic efficiency. We show that the Leximin algorithm produces an allocation that satisfies equitability up to any good and Pareto optimality. We also give a novel algorithm that guarantees Pareto optimality and equitability up to one good in pseudopolynomial time. Our experiments on real-world preference data reveal that approximate envy-freeness, approximate equitability, and Pareto optimality can often be achieved simultaneously.
Average-case Analysis of the Assignment Problem with Independent Preferences
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

The fundamental assignment problem is in search of welfare maximization mechanisms to allocate items to agents when the private preferences over indivisible items are provided by self-interested agents. The mainstream mechanism \textit{Random Priority} is asymptotically the best mechanism for this purpose, when comparing its welfare to the optimal social welfare using the canonical \textit{worst-case approximation ratio}. Despite its popularity, the efficiency loss indicated by the worst-case ratio does not have a constant bound. Recently, [Deng, Gao, Zhang 2017] show that when the agents' preferences are drawn from a uniform distribution, its \textit{average-case approximation ratio} is upper bounded by 3.718. They left it as an open question of whether a constant ratio holds for general scenarios. In this paper, we offer an affirmative answer to this question by showing that the ratio is bounded by $1/μ$ when the preference values are independent and identically distributed random variables, where $μ$ is the expectation of the value distribution. This upper bound also improves the upper bound of 3.718 in [Deng, Gao, Zhang 2017] for the Uniform distribution. Moreover, under mild conditions, the ratio has a \textit{constant} bound for any independent random values. En route to these results, we develop powerful tools to show the insights that in most instances the efficiency loss is small.
Swarm Engineering Through Quantitative Measurement of Swarm Robotic Principles in a 10,000 Robot Swarm
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

When designing swarm-robotic systems, systematic comparison of algorithms from different domains is necessary to determine which is capable of scaling up to handle the target problem size and target operating conditions. We propose a set of quantitative metrics for scalability, flexibility, and emergence which are capable of addressing these needs during the system design process. We demonstrate the applicability of our proposed metrics as a design tool by solving a large object gathering problem in temporally varying operating conditions using iterative hypothesis evaluation. We provide experimental results obtained in simulation for swarms of over 10,000 robots.
Compact Representation of Value Function in Partially Observable Stochastic Games
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

Value methods for solving stochastic games with partial observability model the uncertainty about states of the game as a probability distribution over possible states. The dimension of this belief space is the number of states. For many practical problems, for example in security, there are exponentially many possible states which causes an insufficient scalability of algorithms for real-world problems. To this end, we propose an abstraction technique that addresses this issue of the curse of dimensionality by projecting high-dimensional beliefs to characteristic vectors of significantly lower dimension (e.g., marginal probabilities). Our two main contributions are (1) novel compact representation of the uncertainty in partially observable stochastic games and (2) novel algorithm based on this compact representation that is based on existing state-of-the-art algorithms for solving stochastic games with partial observability. Experimental evaluation confirms that the new algorithm over the compact representation dramatically increases the scalability compared to the state of the art.
Robustness against Agent Failure in Hedonic Games
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

We study how stability can be maintained even after any set of at most k players leave their groups, in the context of hedonic games. While stability properties ensure an outcome to be robust against players' deviations, it has not been considered how an unexpected change caused by a sudden deletion of players affects stable outcomes. In this paper, we propose a novel criterion that reshapes stability form robustness aspect. We observe that some stability properties can be no longer preserved even when a single agent is removed. However, we obtain positive results by focusing on symmetric friend-oriented hedonic games. We prove that we can efficiently decide the existence of robust outcomes with respect to Nash stability under deletion of any number of players or contractual individual stability under deletion of a single player. We also show that symmetric additively separable games always admit an individual stable outcome that is robust with respect to individual rationality.
Neural Networks for Predicting Human Interactions in Repeated Games
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

We consider the problem of predicting human players' actions in repeated strategic interactions. Our goal is to predict the dynamic step-by-step behavior of individual players in previously unseen games. We study the ability of neural networks to perform such predictions and the information that they require. We show on a dataset of normal-form games from experiments with human participants that standard neural networks are able to learn functions that provide more accurate predictions of the players' actions than established models from behavioral economics. The networks outperform the other models in terms of prediction accuracy and cross-entropy, and yield higher economic value. We show that if the available input is only of a short sequence of play, economic information about the game is important for predicting behavior of human agents. However, interestingly, we find that when the networks are trained with long enough sequences of history of play, action-based networks do well and additional economic details about the game do not improve their performance, indicating that the sequence of actions encode sufficient information for the success in the prediction task.
Diffusion and Auction on Graphs
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.
Computational Aspects of Equilibria in Discrete Preference Games
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

We study the complexity of equilibrium computation in discrete preference games. These games were introduced by Chierichetti, Kleinberg, and Oren (EC '13, JCSS '18) to model decision-making by agents in a social network that choose a strategy from a finite, discrete set, balancing between their intrinsic preferences for the strategies and their desire to choose a strategy that is `similar' to their neighbours. There are thus two components: a social network with the agents as vertices, and a metric space of strategies. These games are potential games, and hence pure Nash equilibria exist. Since their introduction, a number of papers have studied various aspects of this model, including the social cost at equilibria, and arrival at a consensus. We show that in general, equilibrium computation in discrete preference games is PLS-complete, even in the simple case where each agent has a constant number of neighbours. If the edges in the social network are weighted, then the problem is PLS-complete even if each agent has a constant number of neighbours, the metric space has constant size, and every pair of strategies is at distance 1 or 2. Further, if the social network is directed, modelling asymmetric influence, an equilibrium may not even exist. On the positive side, we show that if the metric space is a tree metric, or is the product of path metrics, then the equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Graphical One-Sided Markets
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of rational agents where each agent's final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the allocated item as well as the allocation within the agent's local neighbourhood. We specify agents' local neighbourhood in terms of a weighted graph. This extends the model of one-sided markets to incorporate neighbourhood externalities. We consider the solution concept of stability and show that, unlike in the case of one-sided markets, stable allocations may not always exist. When the underlying local neighbourhood graph is symmetric, a 2-stable allocation is guaranteed to exist and any decentralised mechanism where pairs of rational players agree to exchange objects terminates in such an allocation. We show that computing a 2-stable allocation is PLS-complete and further identify subclasses which are tractable. In the case of asymmetric neighbourhood structures, we show that it is NP-complete to check if a 2-stable allocation exists. We then identify structural restrictions where stable allocations always exist and can be computed efficiently. Finally, we study the notion of envy-freeness in this framework.
Reachability Games in Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

We define reachability games based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), where the players' actions are finely described as DEL action models. We first consider the setting where an external controller with perfect information interacts with an environment and aims at reaching some epistemic goal state regarding the passive agents of the system. We study the problem of strategy existence for the controller, which generalises the classic epistemic planning problem, and we solve it for several types of actions such as public announcements and public actions. We then consider a yet richer setting where agents themselves are players, whose strategies must be based on their observations. We establish several (un)decidability results for the problem of existence of a distributed strategy, depending on the type of actions the players can use, and relate them to results from the literature on multiplayer games with imperfect information.
Approval-Based Elections and Distortion of Voting Rules
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away. It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one that minimizes the total distance to the voters. Yet, the voting rules often do not have access to the metric space $M$ and only see preference rankings induced by $M$.Consequently, they often are incapable of selecting the optimal candidate. The distortion of a voting rule measures the worst-case loss of the quality being the result of having access only to preference rankings. We extend the idea of distortion to approval-based preferences. First, we compute the distortion of Approval Voting. Second, we introduce the concept of acceptability-based distortion---the main idea behind is that the optimal candidate is the one that is acceptable to most voters. We determine acceptability-distortion for a number of rules, including Plurality, Borda, $k$-Approval, Veto, the Copeland's rule, Ranked Pairs, the Schulze's method, and STV.
Ridesharing with  Driver Location Preferences
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

We study revenue-optimal pricing and driver compensation in ridesharing platforms when drivers have heterogeneous preferences over locations. If a platform ignores drivers' location preferences, it may make inefficient trip dispatches; moreover, drivers may strategize so as to route towards their preferred locations. In a model with stationary and continuous demand and supply, we present a mechanism that incentivizes drivers to both (i) report their location preferences truthfully and (ii) always provide service. In settings with unconstrained driver supply or symmetric demand patterns, our mechanism achieves (full-information) first-best revenue. Under supply constraints and unbalanced demand, we show via simulation that our mechanism improves over existing mechanisms and has performance close to the first-best.
Sybil-Resilient Reality-Aware Social Choice
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

Sybil attacks, in which fake or duplicate identities (\emph{sybils}) infiltrate an online community, pose a serious threat to such communities, as they might tilt community-wide decisions in their favor. While the extensive research on sybil identification may help keep the fraction of sybils in such communities low, it cannot however ensure their complete eradication. Thus, our goal is to enhance social choice theory with effective group decision mechanisms for communities with bounded sybil penetration. Inspired by Reality-Aware Social Choice, we use the status quo as the anchor of \emph{sybil resilience}, characterized by \emph{sybil safety} -- the inability of sybils to change the status quo against the will of the genuine agents, and \emph{sybil liveness} -- the ability of the genuine agents to change the status quo against the will of the sybils. We consider the social choice settings of deciding on a single proposal, on multiple proposals, and on updating a parameter. For each, we present social choice rules that are sybil-safe and, under certain conditions, satisfy sybil-liveness.
Model-Free Model Reconciliation
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

Designing agents capable of explaining complex sequential decisions remain a significant open problem in automated decision-making. Recently, there has been a lot of interest in developing approaches for generating such explanations for various decision-making paradigms. One such approach has been the idea of {\em explanation as model-reconciliation}. The framework hypothesizes that one of the common reasons for the user's confusion could be the mismatch between the user's model of the task and the one used by the system to generate the decisions. While this is a general framework, most works that have been explicitly built on this explanatory philosophy have focused on settings where the model of user's knowledge is available in a declarative form. Our goal in this paper is to adapt the model reconciliation approach to the cases where such user models are no longer explicitly provided. We present a simple and easy to learn labeling model that can help an explainer decide what information could help achieve model reconciliation between the user and the agent.
A Regularized Opponent Model with Maximum Entropy Objective
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

In a single-agent setting, reinforcement learning (RL) tasks can be cast into an inference problem by introducing a binary random variable o, which stands for the "optimality". In this paper, we redefine the binary random variable o in multi-agent setting and formalize multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) as probabilistic inference. We derive a variational lower bound of the likelihood of achieving the optimality and name it as Regularized Opponent Model with Maximum Entropy Objective (ROMMEO). From ROMMEO, we present a novel perspective on opponent modeling and show how it can improve the performance of training agents theoretically and empirically in cooperative games. To optimize ROMMEO, we first introduce a tabular Q-iteration method ROMMEO-Q with proof of convergence. We extend the exact algorithm to complex environments by proposing an approximate version, ROMMEO-AC. We evaluate these two algorithms on the challenging iterated matrix game and differential game respectively and show that they can outperform strong MARL baselines.
Towards Efficient Detection and Optimal Response against Sophisticated Opponents
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

Multiagent algorithms often aim to accurately predict the behaviors of other agents and find a best response accordingly. Previous works usually assume an opponent uses a stationary strategy or randomly switches among several stationary ones. However, an opponent may exhibit more sophisticated behaviors by adopting more advanced reasoning strategies, e.g., using a Bayesian reasoning strategy. This paper proposes a novel approach called Bayes-ToMoP which can efficiently detect the strategy of opponents using either stationary or higher-level reasoning strategies. Bayes-ToMoP also supports the detection of previously unseen policies and learning a best-response policy accordingly. We provide a theoretical guarantee of the optimality on detecting the opponent's strategies. We also propose a deep version of Bayes-ToMoP by extending Bayes-ToMoP with DRL techniques. Experimental results show both Bayes-ToMoP and deep Bayes-ToMoP outperform the state-of-the-art approaches when faced with different types of opponents in two-agent competitive games.
Structure-Aware Residual Pyramid Network for Monocular Depth Estimation
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2019
Year: 2019

Monocular depth estimation is an essential task for scene understanding. The underlying structure of objects and stuff in a complex scene is critical to recovering accurate and visually-pleasing depth maps. Global structure conveys scene layouts, while local structure reflects shape details. Recently developed approaches based on convolutional neural networks (CNNs) significantly improve the performance of depth estimation. However, few of them take into account multi-scale structures in complex scenes. In this paper, we propose a Structure-Aware Residual Pyramid Network (SARPN) to exploit multi-scale structures for accurate depth prediction. We propose a Residual Pyramid Decoder (RPD) which expresses global scene structure in upper levels to represent layouts, and local structure in lower levels to present shape details. At each level, we propose Residual Refinement Modules (RRM) that predict residual maps to progressively add finer structures on the coarser structure predicted at the upper level. In order to fully exploit multi-scale image features, an Adaptive Dense Feature Fusion (ADFF) module, which adaptively fuses effective features from all scales for inferring structures of each scale, is introduced. Experiment results on the challenging NYU-Depth v2 dataset demonstrate that our proposed approach achieves state-of-the-art performance in both qualitative and quantitative evaluation. The code is available at https://github.com/Xt-Chen/SARPN.