OpenRaiser/Intern-Atlas huggingface dataset:
Non-Obvious Manipulability in Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

In this work, we consider the design of Non-Obviously Manipulable (NOM) mechanisms, mechanisms that bounded rational agents may fail to recognize as manipulable, for two relevant classes of succinctly representable Hedonic Games: Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games. In these classes, agents have cardinal scores towards other agents, and their preferences over coalitions are determined by aggregating such scores. This aggregation results in a utility function for each agent, which enables the evaluation of outcomes via the utilitarian social welfare. We first prove that, when scores can be arbitrary, every optimal mechanism is NOM; moreover, when scores are limited in a continuous interval, there exists an optimal mechanism that is NOM. Given the hardness of computing optimal outcomes in these settings, we turn our attention to efficient and NOM mechanisms. To this aim, we first prove a characterization of NOM mechanisms that simplifies the class of mechanisms of interest. Then, we design a NOM mechanism returning approximations that asymptotically match the best-known approximation achievable in polynomial time. Finally, we focus on discrete scores, where the compatibility of NOM with optimality depends on the specific values. Therefore, we initiate a systematic analysis to identify which discrete values support this compatibility and which do not.
Optimal Metric Distortion for Matching on the Line
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

We study the distortion of one-sided and two-sided matching problems on the line. In the one-sided case, $n$ agents need to be matched to $n$ items, and each agent's cost in a matching is their distance from the item they were matched to. We propose an algorithm that is provided only with ordinal information regarding the agents' preferences (each agent's ranking of the items from most- to least-preferred) and returns a matching aiming to minimize the social cost with respect to the agents' true (cardinal) costs. We prove that our algorithm simultaneously achieves the best-possible approximation of $3$ (known as distortion) with respect to a variety of social cost measures which include the utilitarian and egalitarian social cost. In the two-sided case, where the agents need be matched to $n$ other agents and both sides report their ordinal preferences over each other, we show that it is always possible to compute an optimal matching. In fact, we show that this optimal matching can be achieved using even less information, and we provide bounds regarding the sufficient number of queries.
Beyond Symmetry in Repeated Games with Restarts
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

Infinitely repeated games support equilibrium concepts beyond those present in one-shot games (e.g., cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma). Nonetheless, repeated games fail to capture our real-world intuition for settings with many anonymous agents interacting in pairs. Repeated games with restarts, introduced by Berker and Conitzer [IJCAI '24], address this concern by giving players the option to restart the game with someone new whenever their partner deviates from an agreed-upon sequence of actions. In their work, they studied symmetric games with symmetric strategies. We significantly extend these results, introducing and analyzing more general notions of equilibria in asymmetric games with restarts. We characterize which goal strategies players can be incentivized to play in equilibrium, and we consider the computational problem of finding such sequences of actions with minimal cost for the agents. We show that this problem is NP-hard in general. However, when the goal sequence maximizes social welfare, we give a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm.
Strategyproofness and Monotone Allocation of Auction  in Social Networks
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

Strategyproofness in network auctions requires that bidders not only report their valuations truthfully, but also do their best to invite neighbours from the social network. In contrast to canonical auctions, where the value-monotone allocation in Myerson's Lemma is a cornerstone, a general principle of allocation rules for strategyproof network auctions is still missing. We show that, due to the absence of such a principle, even extensions to multi-unit network auctions with single-unit demand present unexpected difficulties, and all pioneering researches fail to be strategyproof. For the first time in this field, we identify two categories of monotone allocation rules on networks: Invitation-Depressed Monotonicity (ID-MON) and Invitation-Promoted Monotonicity (IP-MON). They encompass all existing allocation rules of network auctions as specific instances. For any given ID-MON or IP-MON allocation rule, we characterize the existence and sufficient conditions for the strategyproof payment rules, and show that among all such payment rules, the revenue-maximizing one exists and is computationally feasible. With these results, the obstacle of combinatorial network auction with single-minded bidders is now resolved.
More Efforts Towards Fixed-Parameter Approximability of Multiwinner Rules
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

Multiwinner Elections have emerged as a prominent area of research with numerous practical applications. We contribute to this area by designing parameterized approximation algorithms and also resolving an open question by Yang and Wang [AAMAS'18]. More formally, given a set of candidates, \mathcal{C}, a set of voters,\mathcal{V}, approving a subset of candidates (called approval set of a voter), and an integer $k$, we consider the problem of selecting a ``good'' committee using Thiele rules. This problem is computationally challenging for most Thiele rules with monotone submodular satisfaction functions, as there is no (1-\frac{1}{e}-ε)\footnote{Here, $e$ denotes the base of the natural logarithm.}-approximation algorithm in f(k)(|\mathcal{C}| + |\mathcal{V}|)^{o(k)} time for any fixed $ε> 0$ and any computable function $f$, and no {\sf PTAS} even when the length of approval set is two. Skowron [WINE'16] designed an approximation scheme running in FPT time parameterized by the combined parameter, size of the approval set and $k$. In this paper, we consider a parameter $d+k$ (no $d$ voters approve the same set of $d$ candidates), where $d$ is upper bounded by the size of the approval set (thus, can be much smaller). With respect to this parameter, we design parameterized approximation schemes, a lossy polynomial-time preprocessing method, and show that an extra committee member suffices to achieve the desired score (i.e., $1$-additive approximation). Additionally, we resolve an open question by Yang and Wang~[AAMAS'18] regarding the fixed-parameter tractability of the problem under the PAV rule with the total score as the parameter, demonstrating that it admits an FPT algorithm.
The Proportional Veto Principle for Approval Ballots
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

The proportional veto principle, which captures the idea that a candidate vetoed by a large group of voters should not be chosen, has been studied for ranked ballots in single-winner voting. We introduce a version of this principle for approval ballots, which we call flexible-voter representation (FVR). We show that while the approval voting rule and other natural scoring rules provide the optimal FVR guarantee only for some flexibility threshold, there exists a scoring rule that is FVR-optimal for all thresholds simultaneously. We also extend our results to multi-winner voting.
Dividing Conflicting Items Fairly
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

We study the allocation of indivisible goods under conflicting constraints, represented by a graph. In this framework, vertices correspond to goods and edges correspond to conflicts between a pair of goods. Each agent is allocated an independent set in the graph. In a recent work of Kumar et al. (2024), it was shown that a maximal EF1 allocation exists for interval graphs and two agents with monotone valuations. We significantly extend this result by establishing that a maximal EF1 allocation exists for \emph{any graph} when the two agents have monotone valuations. To compute such an allocation, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for additive valuations, as well as a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for monotone valuations. Moreover, we complement our findings by providing a counterexample demonstrating a maximal EF1 allocation may not exist for three agents with monotone valuations; further, we establish NP-hardness of determining the existence of such allocations for every fixed number $n \geq 3$ of agents. All of our results for goods also apply to the allocation of chores.
Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

In a recently introduced model of successive committee elections (Bredereck et al., AAAI-20) for a given set of ordinal or approval preferences one aims to find a sequence of a given length of "best" same-size committees such that each candidate is a member of a limited number of consecutive committees. However, the practical usability of this model remains limited, as the described task turns out to be NP-hard for most selection criteria already for seeking committees of size three. Non-trivial or somewhat efficient algorithms for these cases are lacking too. Motivated by a desire to unlock the full potential of the described temporal model of committee elections, we devise (parameterized) algorithms that effectively solve the mentioned hard cases in realistic scenarios of a moderate number of candidates or of a limited time horizon.
Fair Submodular Maximization over a Knapsack Constraint
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

We consider fairness in submodular maximization subject to a knapsack constraint, a fundamental problem with various applications in economics, machine learning, and data mining. In the model, we are given a set of ground elements, each associated with a weight and a color, and a monotone submodular function defined over them. The goal is to maximize the submodular function while guaranteeing that the total weight does not exceed a specified budget (the knapsack constraint) and that the number of elements selected for each color falls within a designated range (the fairness constraint). While there exists some recent literature on this topic, the existence of a non-trivial approximation for the problem -- without relaxing either the knapsack or fairness constraints -- remains a challenging open question. This paper makes progress in this direction. We demonstrate that when the number of colors is constant, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that achieves a constant approximation with high probability. Additionally, we show that if either the knapsack or fairness constraint is relaxed only to require expected satisfaction, a tight approximation ratio of $(1-1/e-ε)$ can be obtained in expectation for any $ε>0$.
Logarithmic Approximations for Fair k-Set Selection
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

We study the fair k-set selection problem where we aim to select $k$ sets from a given set system such that the (weighted) occurrence times that each element appears in these $k$ selected sets are balanced, i.e., the maximum (weighted) occurrence times are minimized. By observing that a set system can be formulated into a bipartite graph $G:=(L\cup R, E)$, our problem is equivalent to selecting $k$ vertices from $R$ such that the maximum total weight of selected neighbors of vertices in $L$ is minimized. The problem arises in a wide range of applications in various fields, such as machine learning, artificial intelligence, and operations research. We first prove that the problem is NP-hard even if the maximum degree $Δ$ of the input bipartite graph is $3$, and the problem is in P when $Δ=2$. We then show that the problem is also in P when the input set system forms a laminar family. Based on intuitive linear programming, we show that a dependent rounding algorithm achieves $O(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n})$-approximation on general bipartite graphs, and an independent rounding algorithm achieves $O(\logΔ)$-approximation on bipartite graphs with a maximum degree $Δ$. We demonstrate that our analysis is almost tight by providing a hard instance for this linear programming. Finally, we extend all our algorithms to the weighted case and prove that all approximations are preserved.
Stackelberg vs. Nash in the Lottery Colonel Blotto Game
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these dynamics, we represent the Lottery Colonel Blotto game as a Stackelberg game, in which one player, the leader, commits to a strategy first, and the other player, the follower, responds. We derive the Stackelberg equilibrium for this game, formulating the leader's strategy as a bi-level optimization problem. To solve this, we develop a constructive method based on iterative game reductions, which allows us to efficiently compute the leader's optimal commitment strategy in polynomial time. Additionally, we identify the conditions under which the Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the Nash equilibrium. Specifically, this occurs when the budget ratio between the leader and the follower equals a certain threshold, which we can calculate in closed form. In some instances, we observe that when the leader's budget exceeds this threshold, both players achieve higher utilities in the Stackelberg equilibrium compared to the Nash equilibrium. Lastly, we show that, in the best case, the leader can achieve an infinite utility improvement by making an optimal first move compared to the Nash equilibrium.
Asymptotic Analysis of Weighted Fair Division
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

Several resource allocation settings involve agents with unequal entitlements represented by weights. We analyze weighted fair division from an asymptotic perspective: if $m$ items are divided among $n$ agents whose utilities are independently sampled from a probability distribution, when is it likely that a fair allocation exist? We show that if the ratio between the weights is bounded, a weighted envy-free allocation exists with high probability provided that $m = Ω(n\log n/\log\log n)$, generalizing a prior unweighted result. For weighted proportionality, we establish a sharp threshold of $m = n/(1-μ)$ for the transition from non-existence to existence, where $μ\in (0,1)$ denotes the mean of the distribution. In addition, we prove that for two agents, a weighted envy-free (and weighted proportional) allocation is likely to exist if $m = ω(\sqrt{r})$, where $r$ denotes the ratio between the two weights.
Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

When dividing items among agents, two of the most widely studied fairness notions are envy-freeness and proportionality. We consider a setting where $m$ chores are allocated to $n$ agents and the disutility of each chore for each agent is drawn from a probability distribution. We show that an envy-free allocation exists with high probability provided that $m \ge 2n$, and moreover, $m$ must be at least $n+Θ(n)$ in order for the existence to hold. On the other hand, we prove that a proportional allocation is likely to exist as long as $m = ω(1)$, and this threshold is asymptotically tight. Our results reveal a clear contrast with the allocation of goods, where a larger number of items is necessary to ensure existence for both notions.
Variety-Seeking Jump Games on Graphs
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

We consider a class of jump games in which agents of different types occupy the nodes of a graph aiming to maximize the variety of types in their neighborhood. In particular, each agent derives a utility equal to the number of types different from its own in its neighborhood. We show that the jump game induced by the strategic behavior of the agents (who aim to maximize their utility) may in general have improving response cycles, but is a potential game under any of the following four conditions: there are only two types of agents; or exactly one empty node; or the graph is of degree at most 2; or the graph is 3-regular and there are two empty nodes. Additionally, we show that on trees, cylinder graphs, and tori, there is always an equilibrium. Finally, we show tight bounds on the price of anarchy with respect to two different measures of diversity: the social welfare (the total utility of the agents) and the number of colorful edges (that connect agents of different types).
The Core of Approval-Based Committee Elections with Few Seats
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

In an approval-based committee election, the goal is to select a committee consisting of $k$ out of $m$ candidates, based on $n$ voters who each approve an arbitrary number of the candidates. The core of such an election consists of all committees that satisfy a certain stability property which implies proportional representation. In particular, committees in the core cannot be "objected to" by a coalition of voters who is underrepresented. The notion of the core was proposed in 2016, but it has remained an open problem whether it is always non-empty. We prove that core committees always exist when $k \le 8$, for any number of candidates $m$ and any number of voters $n$, by showing that the Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule due to Thiele [1895] always satisfies the core when $k \le 7$ and always selects at least one committee in the core when $k = 8$. We also develop an artificial rule based on recursive application of PAV, and use it to show that the core is non-empty whenever there are $m \le 15$ candidates, for any committee size $k \le m$ and any number of voters $n$. These results are obtained with the help of computer search using linear programs.
Optimal Capacity Modification for Stable Matchings with Ties
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

We consider the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem in the presence of ties in preference lists. Among the three notions of stability, viz. weak, strong, and super stability, we focus on the notion of strong stability. Strong stability has many desirable properties, both theoretically and practically; however, its existence is not guaranteed. In this paper, our objective is to optimally increase the quotas of hospitals to ensure that a strongly stable matching exists in the modified instance. First, we show that if ties are allowed in residents' preference lists, it may not be possible to augment the hospital quotas to obtain an instance that admits a strongly stable matching. When residents' preference lists are strict, we explore two natural optimization criteria: (i) minimizing the total capacity increase across all hospitals (MINSUM) and (ii) minimizing the maximum capacity increase for any hospital (MINMAX). We show that the MINSUM problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm, whereas the MINMAX problem is NP-hard. We prove an analogue of the Rural Hospitals theorem for the MINSUM problem. When each hospital incurs a cost for a unit increase in its quota, the MINSUM problem becomes NP-hard, even for 0/1 costs. In fact, we show that the problem cannot be approximated to any multiplicative factor. We also present a polynomial-time algorithm for optimal MINSUM augmentation when a specified subset of edges is required to be included in the matching. We show that the MINMAX problem is NP-hard in general. When hospital preference lists have ties of length at most $\ell+1$, we give a polynomial-time algorithm that increases each hospital's quota by at most $\ell$. Amongst all instances obtained by at most $\ell$ augmentations per hospital, our algorithm produces a strongly stable matching that is best for residents.
Improved Approximation Ratio for Strategyproof Facility Location on a Cycle
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

We study the problem of design of strategyproof in expectation (SP) mechanisms for facility location on a cycle, with the objective of minimizing the sum of costs of $n$ agents. We show that there exists an SP mechanism that attains an approximation ratio of $7/4$ with respect to the sum of costs of the agents, thus improving the best known upper bound of $2-2/n$ in the cases of $n \geq 5$. The mechanism obtaining the bound randomizes between two mechanisms known in the literature: the Random Dictator (RD) and the Proportional Circle Distance (PCD) mechanism of Meir (arXiv:1902.08070). To prove the result, we propose a cycle-cutting technique that allows for estimating the problem on a cycle by a problem on a line.
Discrete Budget Aggregation: Truthfulness and Proportionality
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

We study a budget aggregation setting where voters express their preferred allocation of a fixed budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these preferences into a single output allocation. Motivated by scenarios in which the budget is not perfectly divisible, we depart from the prevailing literature by restricting the mechanism to output allocations that assign integral amounts. This seemingly minor deviation has significant implications for the existence of truthful mechanisms. Specifically, when voters can propose fractional allocations, we demonstrate that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can be extended to our setting. In contrast, when voters are restricted to integral ballots, we identify a class of truthful mechanisms by adapting moving-phantom mechanisms to our context. Moreover, we show that while a weak form of proportionality can be achieved alongside truthfulness, (stronger) proportionality notions derived from approval-based committee voting are incompatible with truthfulness.
Finding Possible Winners in Spatial Voting with Incomplete Information
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2025
Year: 2025

We consider a spatial voting model where both candidates and voters are positioned in the $d$-dimensional Euclidean space, and each voter ranks candidates based on their proximity to the voter's ideal point. We focus on the scenario where the given information about the locations of the voters' ideal points is incomplete; for each dimension, only an interval of possible values is known. In this context, we investigate the computational complexity of determining the possible winners under positional scoring rules. Our results show that the possible winner problem in one dimension is solvable in polynomial time for all $k$-truncated voting rules with constant $k$. Moreover, for some scoring rules for which the possible winner problem is NP-complete, such as approval voting for any dimension or $k$-approval for $d \geq 2$ dimensions, we give an FPT algorithm parameterized by the number of candidates. Finally, we classify tractable and intractable settings of the weighted possible winner problem in one dimension, and resolve the computational complexity of the weighted case for all two-valued positional scoring rules when $d=1$.