OpenRaiser/Intern-Atlas huggingface dataset:
On Automating the Doctrine of Double Effect
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2017
Year: 2017

The doctrine of double effect ($\mathcal{DDE}$) is a long-studied ethical principle that governs when actions that have both positive and negative effects are to be allowed. The goal in this paper is to automate $\mathcal{DDE}$. We briefly present $\mathcal{DDE}$, and use a first-order modal logic, the deontic cognitive event calculus, as our framework to formalize the doctrine. We present formalizations of increasingly stronger versions of the principle, including what is known as the doctrine of triple effect. We then use our framework to simulate successfully scenarios that have been used to test for the presence of the principle in human subjects. Our framework can be used in two different modes: One can use it to build $\mathcal{DDE}$-compliant autonomous systems from scratch, or one can use it to verify that a given AI system is $\mathcal{DDE}$-compliant, by applying a $\mathcal{DDE}$ layer on an existing system or model. For the latter mode, the underlying AI system can be built using any architecture (planners, deep neural networks, bayesian networks, knowledge-representation systems, or a hybrid); as long as the system exposes a few parameters in its model, such verification is possible. The role of the $\mathcal{DDE}$ layer here is akin to a (dynamic or static) software verifier that examines existing software modules. Finally, we end by presenting initial work on how one can apply our $\mathcal{DDE}$ layer to the STRIPS-style planning model, and to a modified POMDP model.This is preliminary work to illustrate the feasibility of the second mode, and we hope that our initial sketches can be useful for other researchers in incorporating DDE in their own frameworks.
Should Robots be Obedient?
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2017
Year: 2017

Intuitively, obedience -- following the order that a human gives -- seems like a good property for a robot to have. But, we humans are not perfect and we may give orders that are not best aligned to our preferences. We show that when a human is not perfectly rational then a robot that tries to infer and act according to the human's underlying preferences can always perform better than a robot that simply follows the human's literal order. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the obedience of a robot and the value it can attain for its owner. We investigate how this tradeoff is impacted by the way the robot infers the human's preferences, showing that some methods err more on the side of obedience than others. We then analyze how performance degrades when the robot has a misspecified model of the features that the human cares about or the level of rationality of the human. Finally, we study how robots can start detecting such model misspecification. Overall, our work suggests that there might be a middle ground in which robots intelligently decide when to obey human orders, but err on the side of obedience.
Model-free, Model-based, and General Intelligence
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

During the 60s and 70s, AI researchers explored intuitions about intelligence by writing programs that displayed intelligent behavior. Many good ideas came out from this work but programs written by hand were not robust or general. After the 80s, research increasingly shifted to the development of learners capable of inferring behavior and functions from experience and data, and solvers capable of tackling well-defined but intractable models like SAT, classical planning, Bayesian networks, and POMDPs. The learning approach has achieved considerable success but results in black boxes that do not have the flexibility, transparency, and generality of their model-based counterparts. Model-based approaches, on the other hand, require models and scalable algorithms. Model-free learners and model-based solvers have close parallels with Systems 1 and 2 in current theories of the human mind: the first, a fast, opaque, and inflexible intuitive mind; the second, a slow, transparent, and flexible analytical mind. In this paper, I review developments in AI and draw on these theories to discuss the gap between model-free learners and model-based solvers, a gap that needs to be bridged in order to have intelligent systems that are robust and general.
Comparing Approximate Relaxations of Envy-Freeness
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

In fair division problems with indivisible goods it is well known that one cannot have any guarantees for the classic fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality. As a result, several relaxations have been introduced, most of which in quite recent works. We focus on four such notions, namely envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), maximin share fairness (MMS), and pairwise maximin share fairness (PMMS). Since obtaining these relaxations also turns out to be problematic in several scenarios, approximate versions of them have been considered. In this work, we investigate further the connections between the four notions mentioned above and their approximate versions. We establish several tight, or almost tight, results concerning the approximation quality that any of these notions guarantees for the others, providing an almost complete picture of this landscape. Some of our findings reveal interesting and surprising consequences regarding the power of these notions, e.g., PMMS and EFX provide the same worst-case guarantee for MMS, despite PMMS being a strictly stronger notion than EFX. We believe such implications provide further insight on the quality of approximately fair solutions.
Multiwinner Voting with Fairness Constraints
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

Multiwinner voting rules are used to select a small representative subset of candidates or items from a larger set given the preferences of voters. However, if candidates have sensitive attributes such as gender or ethnicity (when selecting a committee), or specified types such as political leaning (when selecting a subset of news items), an algorithm that chooses a subset by optimizing a multiwinner voting rule may be unbalanced in its selection -- it may under or over represent a particular gender or political orientation in the examples above. We introduce an algorithmic framework for multiwinner voting problems when there is an additional requirement that the selected subset should be "fair" with respect to a given set of attributes. Our framework provides the flexibility to (1) specify fairness with respect to multiple, non-disjoint attributes (e.g., ethnicity and gender) and (2) specify a score function. We study the computational complexity of this constrained multiwinner voting problem for monotone and submodular score functions and present several approximation algorithms and matching hardness of approximation results for various attribute group structure and types of score functions. We also present simulations that suggest that adding fairness constraints may not affect the scores significantly when compared to the unconstrained case.
Negotiation Strategies for Agents with Ordinal Preferences
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work we concentrate on negotiation with ordinal preferences over a finite set of outcomes. We study an intuitive protocol for bilateral negotiation, where the two parties make offers alternately. We analyze the negotiation protocol under different settings. First, we assume that each party has full information about the other party's preference order. We provide elegant strategies that specify a sub-game perfect equilibrium for the agents. We further show how the studied negotiation protocol almost completely implements a known bargaining rule. Finally, we analyze the no information setting. We study several solution concepts that are distribution-free, and analyze both the case where neither party knows the preference order of the other party, and the case where only one party is uninformed.
On the Complexity of Chore Division
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

We study the proportional chore division problem where a protocol wants to divide an undesirable object, called chore, among $n$ different players. The goal is to find an allocation such that the cost of the chore assigned to each player be at most $1/n$ of the total cost. This problem is the dual variant of the cake cutting problem in which we want to allocate a desirable object. Edmonds and Pruhs showed that any protocol for the proportional cake cutting must use at least $Ω(n \log n)$ queries in the worst case, however, finding a lower bound for the proportional chore division remained an interesting open problem. We show that chore division and cake cutting problems are closely related to each other and provide an $Ω(n \log n)$ lower bound for chore division.
Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in [Ferraioli&Ventre, AAAI 2017], is to find a small (possibly, the smallest) set of conditions allowing to implement an OSP mechanism. To this aim, we define a model of probabilistic verification wherein agents are caught misbehaving with a certain probability, and show how OSP mechanisms can implement every social choice function at the cost of either imposing very large fines for lies or verifying a linear number of agents.
Payoff Control in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly determined by all participants. This work discovers that the scale of a player's capability to unilaterally influence the payoffs may have been much underestimated. Under the conventional iterated prisoner's dilemma, we develop a general framework for controlling the feasible region where the players' payoff pairs lie. A control strategy player is able to confine the payoff pairs in her objective region, as long as this region has feasible linear boundaries. With this framework, many well-known existing strategies can be categorized and various new strategies with nice properties can be further identified. We show that the control strategies perform well either in a tournament or against a human-like opponent.
Computational Social Choice Meets Databases
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

We develop a novel framework that aims to create bridges between the computational social choice and the database management communities. This framework enriches the tasks currently supported in computational social choice with relational database context, thus making it possible to formulate sophisticated queries about voting rules, candidates, voters, issues, and positions. At the conceptual level, we give rigorous semantics to queries in this framework by introducing the notions of necessary answers and possible answers to queries. At the technical level, we embark on an investigation of the computational complexity of the necessary answers. We establish a number of results about the complexity of the necessary answers of conjunctive queries involving positional scoring rules that contrast sharply with earlier results about the complexity of the necessary winners.
Customer Sharing in Economic Networks with Costs
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

In an economic market, sellers, infomediaries and customers constitute an economic network. Each seller has her own customer group and the seller's private customers are unobservable to other sellers. Therefore, a seller can only sell commodities among her own customers unless other sellers or infomediaries share her sale information to their customer groups. However, a seller is not incentivized to share others' sale information by default, which leads to inefficient resource allocation and limited revenue for the sale. To tackle this problem, we develop a novel mechanism called customer sharing mechanism (CSM) which incentivizes all sellers to share each other's sale information to their private customer groups. Furthermore, CSM also incentivizes all customers to truthfully participate in the sale. In the end, CSM not only allocates the commodities efficiently but also optimizes the seller's revenue.
Dynamic Fair Division Problem with General Valuations
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

In this paper, we focus on how to dynamically allocate a divisible resource fairly among n players who arrive and depart over time. The players may have general heterogeneous valuations over the resource. It is known that the exact envy-free and proportional allocations may not exist in the dynamic setting [Walsh, 2011]. Thus, we will study to what extent we can guarantee the fairness in the dynamic setting. We first design two algorithms which are O(log n)-proportional and O(n)-envy-free for the setting with general valuations, and by constructing the adversary instances such that all dynamic algorithms must be at least Omega(1)-proportional and Omega(n/log n)-envy-free, we show that the bounds are tight up to a logarithmic factor. Moreover, we introduce the setting where the players' valuations are uniform on the resource but with different demands, which generalize the setting of [Friedman et al., 2015]. We prove an O(log n) upper bound and a tight lower bound for this case.
What Game Are We Playing?  End-to-end Learning in Normal and Extensive Form Games
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

Although recent work in AI has made great progress in solving large, zero-sum, extensive-form games, the underlying assumption in most past work is that the parameters of the game itself are known to the agents. This paper deals with the relatively under-explored but equally important "inverse" setting, where the parameters of the underlying game are not known to all agents, but must be learned through observations. We propose a differentiable, end-to-end learning framework for addressing this task. In particular, we consider a regularized version of the game, equivalent to a particular form of quantal response equilibrium, and develop 1) a primal-dual Newton method for finding such equilibrium points in both normal and extensive form games; and 2) a backpropagation method that lets us analytically compute gradients of all relevant game parameters through the solution itself. This ultimately lets us learn the game by training in an end-to-end fashion, effectively by integrating a "differentiable game solver" into the loop of larger deep network architectures. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the learning method in several settings including poker and security game tasks.
Multi-Agent Path Finding with Deadlines
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

We formalize Multi-Agent Path Finding with Deadlines (MAPF-DL). The objective is to maximize the number of agents that can reach their given goal vertices from their given start vertices within the deadline, without colliding with each other. We first show that MAPF-DL is NP-hard to solve optimally. We then present two classes of optimal algorithms, one based on a reduction of MAPF-DL to a flow problem and a subsequent compact integer linear programming formulation of the resulting reduced abstracted multi-commodity flow network and the other one based on novel combinatorial search algorithms. Our empirical results demonstrate that these MAPF-DL solvers scale well and each one dominates the other ones in different scenarios.
Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. Existing mechanisms are either not truthful, or do not guarantee an asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade, or rely on a prior on the traders' valuations, or operate in limited settings such as a single kind of good. We extend the random market-halving technique used in earlier works to markets with multiple kinds of goods, where traders have gross-substitute valuations. We present MIDA: a Multi Item-kind Double-Auction mechanism. It is prior-free, truthful, strongly-budget-balanced, and guarantees near-optimal gain from trade when market sizes of all goods grow to $\infty$ at a similar rate.
Designing the Game to Play: Optimizing Payoff Structure in Security Games
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

Effective game-theoretic modeling of defender-attacker behavior is becoming increasingly important. In many domains, the defender functions not only as a player but also the designer of the game's payoff structure. We study Stackelberg Security Games where the defender, in addition to allocating defensive resources to protect targets from the attacker, can strategically manipulate the attacker's payoff under budget constraints in weighted L^p-norm form regarding the amount of change. Focusing on problems with weighted L^1-norm form constraint, we present (i) a mixed integer linear program-based algorithm with approximation guarantee; (ii) a branch-and-bound based algorithm with improved efficiency achieved by effective pruning; (iii) a polynomial time approximation scheme for a special but practical class of problems. In addition, we show that problems under budget constraints in L^0-norm form and weighted L^\infty-norm form can be solved in polynomial time. We provide an extensive experimental evaluation of our proposed algorithms.
Knowledge-Embedded Representation Learning for Fine-Grained Image Recognition
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

Humans can naturally understand an image in depth with the aid of rich knowledge accumulated from daily lives or professions. For example, to achieve fine-grained image recognition (e.g., categorizing hundreds of subordinate categories of birds) usually requires a comprehensive visual concept organization including category labels and part-level attributes. In this work, we investigate how to unify rich professional knowledge with deep neural network architectures and propose a Knowledge-Embedded Representation Learning (KERL) framework for handling the problem of fine-grained image recognition. Specifically, we organize the rich visual concepts in the form of knowledge graph and employ a Gated Graph Neural Network to propagate node message through the graph for generating the knowledge representation. By introducing a novel gated mechanism, our KERL framework incorporates this knowledge representation into the discriminative image feature learning, i.e., implicitly associating the specific attributes with the feature maps. Compared with existing methods of fine-grained image classification, our KERL framework has several appealing properties: i) The embedded high-level knowledge enhances the feature representation, thus facilitating distinguishing the subtle differences among subordinate categories. ii) Our framework can learn feature maps with a meaningful configuration that the highlighted regions finely accord with the nodes (specific attributes) of the knowledge graph. Extensive experiments on the widely used Caltech-UCSD bird dataset demonstrate the superiority of our KERL framework over existing state-of-the-art methods.
Anonymizing k Facial Attributes via Adversarial Perturbations
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

A face image not only provides details about the identity of a subject but also reveals several attributes such as gender, race, sexual orientation, and age. Advancements in machine learning algorithms and popularity of sharing images on the World Wide Web, including social media websites, have increased the scope of data analytics and information profiling from photo collections. This poses a serious privacy threat for individuals who do not want to be profiled. This research presents a novel algorithm for anonymizing selective attributes which an individual does not want to share without affecting the visual quality of images. Using the proposed algorithm, a user can select single or multiple attributes to be surpassed while preserving identity information and visual content. The proposed adversarial perturbation based algorithm embeds imperceptible noise in an image such that attribute prediction algorithm for the selected attribute yields incorrect classification result, thereby preserving the information according to user's choice. Experiments on three popular databases i.e. MUCT, LFWcrop, and CelebA show that the proposed algorithm not only anonymizes k-attributes, but also preserves image quality and identity information.
Unsupervised Cross-Modality Domain Adaptation of ConvNets for Biomedical Image Segmentations with Adversarial Loss
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

Convolutional networks (ConvNets) have achieved great successes in various challenging vision tasks. However, the performance of ConvNets would degrade when encountering the domain shift. The domain adaptation is more significant while challenging in the field of biomedical image analysis, where cross-modality data have largely different distributions. Given that annotating the medical data is especially expensive, the supervised transfer learning approaches are not quite optimal. In this paper, we propose an unsupervised domain adaptation framework with adversarial learning for cross-modality biomedical image segmentations. Specifically, our model is based on a dilated fully convolutional network for pixel-wise prediction. Moreover, we build a plug-and-play domain adaptation module (DAM) to map the target input to features which are aligned with source domain feature space. A domain critic module (DCM) is set up for discriminating the feature space of both domains. We optimize the DAM and DCM via an adversarial loss without using any target domain label. Our proposed method is validated by adapting a ConvNet trained with MRI images to unpaired CT data for cardiac structures segmentations, and achieved very promising results.
Enhanced-alignment Measure for Binary Foreground Map Evaluation
Venue: Conference IJCAI 2018
Year: 2018

The existing binary foreground map (FM) measures to address various types of errors in either pixel-wise or structural ways. These measures consider pixel-level match or image-level information independently, while cognitive vision studies have shown that human vision is highly sensitive to both global information and local details in scenes. In this paper, we take a detailed look at current binary FM evaluation measures and propose a novel and effective E-measure (Enhanced-alignment measure). Our measure combines local pixel values with the image-level mean value in one term, jointly capturing image-level statistics and local pixel matching information. We demonstrate the superiority of our measure over the available measures on 4 popular datasets via 5 meta-measures, including ranking models for applications, demoting generic, random Gaussian noise maps, ground-truth switch, as well as human judgments. We find large improvements in almost all the meta-measures. For instance, in terms of application ranking, we observe improvementrangingfrom9.08% to 19.65% compared with other popular measures.