OpenLLM-France/wikimedia huggingface dataset:
# Cyberculture/Social Media/Twitter

* CEO: Jack Dorsey
* Most active audience on Twitter is between age 18 to 29.
* Minimum age to be on Twitter: 13
* 126 million daily users
* Originally a microblogging site, Twitter is now popularly known as a social networking site.
* Twitter is available in 61 languages.
* 80% of 193 UN member countries have a Twitter presence.
* It has a unique interface that allows open access, which enables a faster and more efficient way to spread information.
* Hybrid media source: forum, news outlet, personal communication portal, concise information, can post pictures and videos, etc.
* Hashtag culture: first social media platform where hashtags were popularised.
Twitter can be utilised for learning, research, and teaching, if one desires. Learning on Twitter is quite possible if one has the intention to do so.
# BCP/Tulipa/Logs

This page contains recent bloom logs for Tulipa (Tulip). If you saw this plant blooming today (or sometime within the last 3 days), you can help improve the bloom clock by logging it. Just click on "edit" next to the Recent Logs heading, add *~~~~ (an asterisk followed by four tildes) on a new line just below the last signature, and then click "save page". This will add your signature and the date to log the plant.
Please make sure you've signed up on the contributors' page so that we can know the location of the plant you saw blooming and use your contribution to create a flora for your region! When you're done, you can go back to one of the main pages and find logs of other flowers you might have seen today.

### Logs
#### 2007 Logs

* SB_Johnny-LM 27 April, 2007 (from photographic log)
* SB_Johnny-LM May 13 2007 (from photographs)

#### 2008 Logs

* --Juan 16:23, 24 March 2008 (UTC)
* SB Johnny-LM 00:00, 9 April 2008 (UTC)
* SB Johnny-LM 17:21, 16 April 2008 (UTC)
* --Luai lashire 21:32, 17 April 2008 (UTC)
* Ngravagna 19:59, 18 April 2008 (UTC)
* --Chemgym 20:24, 22 April 2008 (UTC)
* SBJ 10:27, 26 April 2008 (UTC)
* --SB_Johnny | 10:43, 27 April 2008 (UTC)
* --Luai lashire 21:05, 3 May 2008 (UTC)
* --Juan 10:40, 5 May 2008 (UTC)
* SB Johnny-LM 11:42, 9 May 2008 (UTC)
* Chemgym 12:51, 10 May 2008 (UTC)

#### 2009 Logs

* Anna gdf 13 April 2009
* Ngravagna 07:04, 14 April 2009 (UTC)
* Jomegat 22:39, 24 April 2009 (UTC)
* Jomegat 22:52, 6 May 2009 (UTC)
* Jomegat 00:38, 12 May 2009 (UTC)
* Jomegat 00:26, 21 May 2009 (UTC)

##### Recent Logs

* Anna gdf 17:22, 20 April 2011 (UTC)
* Anna reg 15:15, 25 March 2011 (UTC)
* Anna reg 11:48, 12 April 2010 (UTC)
# BCP/Trillium undulatum

Trillium undulatum
| Wikipedia • Commons • Wikibooks (horticulture) • Wikibooks (subject) • Wikispecies • Fruit and seed clock | Profile for Trillium undulatum (Painted Trillium) Identifying Characteristics Habit:Herbaceous/forbFlowers:Three white petals with a crimson blaze at the center, offset by three sepals.Foliage:Three leaves cradle the blossom.Growing Conditions:Acidic woods, typically in the shade of Abies balsamea (Balsam Fir), Acer rubrum, or Pinus strobus (Eastern White Pine).Life Cycle: perennial Recent Logs Jomegat 12:14, 4 May 2010 (UTC) (view all logs) |
Global data:
Regional data: New Hampshire: May
Additional images:
# BCP/Trillium undulatum/Logs

This page contains recent bloom logs for Trillium undulatum (Painted Trillium). If you saw this plant blooming today (or sometime within the last 3 days), you can help improve the bloom clock by logging it. Just click on "edit" next to the Recent Logs heading, add *~~~~ (an asterisk followed by four tildes) on a new line just below the last signature, and then click "save page". This will add your signature and the date to log the plant.
Please make sure you've signed up on the contributors' page so that we can know the location of the plant you saw blooming and use your contribution to create a flora for your region! When you're done, you can go back to one of the main pages and find logs of other flowers you might have seen today.

### Logs
#### 2008 Logs

* --Jomegat 18:40, 18 May 2008 (UTC)

#### 2009 Logs

* Jomegat 00:46, 12 May 2009 (UTC)
* Jomegat 00:22, 19 May 2009 (UTC)

##### Recent Logs

* Jomegat 12:14, 4 May 2010 (UTC)
# BCP/Tropaeolum majus/Logs

This page contains recent bloom logs for the plant Tropaeolum majus (Nasturtium). If you saw this plant blooming today (or sometime within the last 3 days), you can help improve the bloom clock by logging it. Just click on "edit" next to the Recent Logs heading, add *~~~~ (an asterisk followed by four tildes) on a new line just below the last signature, and then click "save page". This will add your signature and the date to log the plant.
Please make sure you've signed up on the contributors' page so that we can know the location of the plant you saw blooming and use your contribution to create a flora for your region! When you're done, you can go back to one of the main pages and find logs of other flowers you might have seen today.

##### Recent Logs

* --Juan Pisek 18:34, 11 October 2007 (UTC)
* Cormaggio 15:09, 5 November 2007 (UTC)

##### Archived Logs

(If there are more than 5 signatures under the recent logs heading, move the oldest logs to under this heading (generally leave the 3 most recent).
* (no archived logs yet)
# BCP/Tussilago farfara/Logs

This page contains recent bloom logs for Tussilago farfara (Coltsfoot). If you saw this plant blooming today (or sometime within the last 3 days), you can help improve the bloom clock by logging it. Just click on "edit" next to the Recent Logs heading, add *~~~~ (an asterisk followed by four tildes) on a new line just below the last signature, and then click "save page". This will add your signature and the date to log the plant.
Please make sure you've signed up on the contributors' page so that we can know the location of the plant you saw blooming and use your contribution to create a flora for your region! When you're done, you can go back to one of the main pages and find logs of other flowers you might have seen today.

### Logs
#### 2008 Logs

* --Jomegat 14:20, 26 Apr 2008 (from photo)
* --Jomegat 23:58, 10 May 2008 (UTC

#### 2009 Logs

* Jomegat 00:59, 22 April 2009 (UTC)
* Jomegat 22:30, 4 May 2009 (UTC)
* Jomegat 12:34, 10 May 2009 (UTC)

##### Recent Logs

* Jomegat 02:18, 7 April 2010 (UTC)
# BCP/Trillium stamineum/Logs

This page contains recent bloom logs for the plant Trillium stamineum (Trillium). If you saw this plant blooming today (or sometime within the last 3 days), you can help improve the bloom clock by logging it. Just click on "edit" next to the Recent Logs heading, add *~~~~ (an asterisk followed by four tildes) on a new line just below the last signature, and then click "save page". This will add your signature and the date to log the plant.
Please make sure you've signed up on the contributors' page so that we can know the location of the plant you saw blooming and use your contribution to create a flora for your region! When you're done, you can go back to one of the main pages and find logs of other flowers you might have seen today.

##### Recent Logs

* SB_Johnny-LM 27 April, 2007 (from photographic log)
* SB Johnny-LM 11:36, 4 April 2008 (UTC)

##### Archived Logs

(If there are more than 5 signatures under the recent logs heading, move the oldest logs to under this heading (generally leave the 3 most recent).
* (no archived logs yet)
# BCP/Tropaeolum majus

Tropaeolum majus
| Flower and foliage Wikipedia • Commons • Wikibooks (horticulture) • Wikibooks (subject) • Wikispecies • Fruit and seed clock | Profile for Tropaeolum majus (Nasturtium) Identifying Characteristics Recent Logs --Juan Pisek 18:34, 11 October 2007 (UTC) Cormaggio 15:09, 5 November 2007 (UTC) (view all logs) |
Global data:
Regional data: South Bohemia, Czech Republic: October Manchester, England: November
Additional images:
# BCP/Tulipa

Tulipa
| flowering plants Wikipedia • Commons • Wikibooks (horticulture) • Wikibooks (subject) • Wikispecies • Fruit and seed clock | Profile for Tulipa (Tulip) Identifying Characteristics Recent Logs Anna gdf 17:22, 20 April 2011 (UTC) Anna reg 15:15, 25 March 2011 (UTC) Anna reg 11:48, 12 April 2010 (UTC) (view all logs) |
Global data: Temperate zone season(s): Mid Spring, Late Spring
Regional data: Southeastern Pennsylvania: April, May New Hampshire: April, May Central Pennsylvania: April May Prague, Czech Republic: (cultivated) March, May Moravia-Silesia, Czech Republic: (cultivated) April, May Aurora, Colorado area: April
Additional images:
# BCP/Tussilago farfara

Tussilago farfara
| Wikipedia • Commons • Wikibooks (horticulture) • Wikibooks (subject) • Wikispecies • Fruit and seed clock | Profile for Tussilago farfara (Coltsfoot) Identifying Characteristics Flowers:Yellow aster-like rays, very reminiscent of the common dandelion.Foliage:The large, heart-shaped, dentate leaves appear after the flowers.Stem:10-30cm in height and covered with reddish scales resembling an asparagus.Growing Conditions:Roadsides, waste placesLife Cycle: PerennialSimilar Plants:Taraxacum officinale Recent Logs Jomegat 02:18, 7 April 2010 (UTC) (view all logs) |
Global data:
Regional data: New Hampshire: (invasive or naturalized) April, May
Additional images:
# BCP/Ulex europaeus

Ulex europaeus
| flowers Wikipedia • Commons • Wikibooks (horticulture) • Wikibooks (subject) • Wikispecies • Fruit and seed clock | Profile for Ulex europaeus (Gorse) Identifying Characteristics Recent Logs SortaQuiet 04:53, 17 June 2007 (UTC) (view all logs) |
Global data:
Regional data:
Additional images:
# Economic Classroom Experiments/Hold-Up Problem

A buyer is unwilling to make an investment that would be useful only in conjunction with a single supplier because of a fear that the supplier will demand a share of the profits from the investment.

## Overview
### Level

Any level

### Prerequisite knowledge

None

### Suitable modules

Any

### Intended learning outcomes

* Origin of the hold-up problem.
* Vertical integration as a solution to the hold-up problem.

## Computerized Version

There is a computerized version of this experiment available on the Exeter games site.
You may find the sample instructions helpful. There are also extended form diagrams for the Part 1 payoffs and Part 2 payoffs.

### Abstract

Students play together in pairs as a buyer and a supplier who are engaged in an ongoing business relationship. The buyer has an opportunity to invest in some specialist equipment that will increase his/her profits but only if the relationship continues with the same supplier. If the investment is made, the supplier, in turn, has an opportunity to take a share of the increased profits by raising his/her prices. If the supplier raises prices, the buyer can either accept the situation or change suppliers but the latter action damages both parties: the buyer has made a wasted investment and the supplier loses the buyer's business.
The hold-up problem arises when the buyer is reluctant to make the investment because of a fear that the supplier will exploit the extra bargaining power.

### Discussion of Likely Results

If the investment is not made, the utility payoffs are 0 to both buyer and supplier. If the buyer makes an investment of V and gains increased profits of P, the payoffs are P-V to the buyer and 0 to the supplier, provided the supplier does not raise prices. If the supplier raises prices by R, the payoffs are now P-V-R to the buyer and R to the supplier, provided the buyer does not change suppliers. If the buyer changes suppliers, the payoffs are -V to the buyer and -B to the supplier, where B is an amount reflecting the loss of business.
Students play two consecutive games which differ only in the cost to the buyer of the investment. In both games, P is £1500, R is £750 and B is £1000. In the first game V is £500 whereas in the second game it is £1000. In the first game, if the buyer makes the investment and allows the supplier to raise prices, both parties benefit, with payoffs of £250 to the buyer and £750 to the supplier. In the second game in the same scenario, the payoff to the buyer is £-250, so the buyer should not make the investment.
# Economic Classroom Experiments/Kiyotaki Wright Hazlett Experiment

Traders in a barter economy suffer a double coincidence of wants problem, which is solved when the good with the lowest storage cost emerges as a common medium of exchange, i.e. money.

## Overview
### Level

Any level

### Prerequisite knowledge

None

### Suitable modules

Any

### Intended learning outcomes

* Origin of money.

## Computerized Version

There is a computerized version of this experiment available on the Exeter games site.
You may find the sample instructions helpful.

### Abstract

Students play together in a single large group as agents who meet randomly in pairs over the course of a number of rounds. There are 3 types of agents and 3 goods and each agent produces a different good from what they consume, so they must trade in order to consume. The experiment is designed so that trading can only occur if at least one agent in each pair is willing to accept a good that is not his/her own consumption good. Consequently the good with the lowest storage cost spontaneously emerges as the generally accepted medium of exchange.

### Discussion of Likely Results

There are roughly equal numbers of Type 1, 2 and 3 agents and each starts round 1 with 40 points and one unit of the good that they produce.
| Agent | Consumes | Consumption Bonus | Produces | Storage Cost | Net Payoff |
| Type 1 | Good 1 | 20 points | Good 2 | 4 points | 16 points |
| Type 2 | Good 2 | 20 points | Good 3 | 9 points | 11 points |
| Type 3 | Good 3 | 20 points | Good 1 | 1 point | 19 points |
Agents earn the net payoff shown above when they trade for their own consumption good, otherwise they must pay the storage cost of whatever good they hold, whether they have traded in that round or not.
Good 1 is the least expensive to store and therefore emerges as 'money'.
Type 2 agents are at a disadvantage because they produce Good 3 which is the most costly to store and will usually only be accepted by a Type 3 agent. If Good 3 were less expensive to store, some Type 1 agents might accept it speculatively in the hope of quickly offloading it to a Type 3 agent holding Good 1.

### Further Discussion Points

* The inefficiency of a barter economy.
* Money helps solve the problem of double coincidence of wants.
* Fun discussion: some people may do quite well in a barter economy, see Kyle MacDonald: One Red Paperclip.
# Economic Classroom Experiments/Monty Hall Paradox

The Monty Hall Paradox is a compelling fallacy in probability where the disclosure of some apparently irrelevant information causes the relative likelihood of two events to change from 1:1 to 2:1. The Wikipedia page has much more information.

## Overview
### Level

Any level

### Prerequisite knowledge

n/a

### Suitable modules

Any

### Intended learning outcomes

* Gain an improved understanding of probability and Bayes' rule.
* Understand the origins of the paradox.

## Computerized version

A computerized version of this experiment is available on the Exeter games site.
You can quickly log in as a subject to try out this individual progress experiment. You may also find the sample instructions helpful.

### Abstract

Students play multiple rounds individually against the computer and in each round try to locate a prize that has been hidden at random in one of three closed boxes. The student starts by guessing where the prize is, after which the computer opens one of the other two boxes that is empty and gives the student the option of sticking with his/her original choice or changing to the remaining unopened box. This game is the well-known Monty Hall game show paradox where the student is the contestant and the computer is Monty.
Changing is twice as likely to be successful as sticking. Because this is so counter-intuitive, the instructor may also configure a repeat-play 'strategy' version of the game, where the student plays the game once in each round as before but then the computer plays the game a further large number of times using the student's choice of initial box and 'strategy' of 'stick' or 'change'. The computer displays the results of the individual games plus a summary.
There are also versions of the game with four and five boxes.

### Discussion of how the paradox arises in the three-box game

The original guess plainly has a 1/3 probability of being correct. The paradox arises principally because it does not seem as if the computer is imparting any useful information by opening an empty box. However there is a 2/3 probability of the prize being in one of the two boxes that were not guessed, so after the computer helpfully eliminates one of them, the 2/3 probability remains attached to the remaining unopened box, which is therefore twice as likely to contain the prize.
# Economic Classroom Experiments/Network Externalities

Consumers with different private valuations enter a market with positive externality, where the value of the commodity to each is increasing in the number of others who buy it; the predicted equilibrium is reached where consumers buy when their private valuations exceed a common threshold.

## Overview
### Level

Any level

### Prerequisite knowledge

None

### Suitable modules

Any

### Intended learning outcomes

* Network externalities.

## Computerized Version

There is a computerized version of this experiment available on the Exeter games site.
You can quickly log in as a subject to try out this group participation experiment, by pretending to be one of the original participants in a real session. You may also find the sample instructions helpful.

### Abstract

Students play together in a single large group as consumers who must simultaneously decide whether or not to buy a commodity. The price of the commodity is the same for all and is common knowledge. The value of the commodity to each consumer is equal to that consumer's private value multiplied by the proportion of other consumers who decide to buy. Private values are uniformly distributed across a known interval.
This is an example of a positive network externality, where the entry of additional consumers into a market has a beneficial effect on those who already possess the commodity, e.g. the market for fax machines, which are only useful if there are enough other people you can send a fax to.

### Discussion of Likely Results

One should only buy the good if the expected value is above the price E[n*V]>=p (where n is the proportion of others buying the good). There are multiple equilibria. One equilibrium has no one buying the good. For instance, if no one buys a fax a machine, then you shouldn't buy a fax machine E[0*V]<p.
In the default setup, the price is £2.40 and the private values are uniformly distributed in the interval [£0.00, £10.00]. Here there is another equilibrium with a positive n. Those deciding to buy the good have should have V such that E[n]V>p. In words, they each decide to buy when for private values above a common threshold value V=p/E[n]. What should that value be? The proportion of others who buy is approximately (10-V)/10, so each consumer is indifferent between buying and not buying when V(10-V)/10=2.4, which has solutions for V=4 and V=6. When V=4, this is the success equilibrium where 60% of the consumers buy the good. When V=6, it is in an unstable equilibria, which one can call the "tipping point". If people with values of 5.9 start buying it then, the object would be a hit, that is, it will go to the equilibrium with V=4. This is because the proportion of those buying it is now (10-5.9)/10=0.41 and p/0.41=2.4/0.41=5.85. So those with values above 5.85 will start buying the good. Repeating this calculation (an infinite number of times) one will arrive at V=4.

### Further Reading

Bergstrom and Miller, Experimental Handbook.
Varian, Hal, Intermediate Microeconomics
Malcolm Gladwell, 'The Tipping Point'
# Economic Classroom Experiments/Lemon Game

An optimistic buyer, who values an object more than its owner but knows less about its quality, finds out through repeat play that he or she is in a market for lemons and would be better off not to buy at all.

## Overview
### Level

Any level

### Prerequisite knowledge

None

### Suitable modules

Any

### Intended learning outcomes

* Concept of a lemon market and criteria for one to exist.
* Preventative measures: lemon laws.

## Computerized Version

A computerized version of this experiment is available on the Exeter games site.
You can quickly log in as a subject to try out this individual progress experiment. You may also find the sample instructions helpful.

### Abstract

Students play individually as a buyer who bids to purchase an object from the computer in the role of seller. The seller knows the value of the object and will not sell it if the buyer bids less than it is worth. The buyer does not know the value of the object, knowing only the interval over which the value is uniformly distributed. The buyer values the object more than the seller and is willing to pay up to 1.5 times its value. Should the buyer bid and if so how much?

### Discussion of Likely Results

In the default setup, values are uniformly distributed over the interval £0 to £1. If the buyer makes a bid of b, the seller will only sell the object if the value to the seller is less than b. Thus, if it is sold it will on average have a value of b/2. The object is worth 1.5(b/2) = 3b/4 to the buyer, so the buyer's profit is -b/4 and the conclusion is that the buyer should not bid at all (bid 0).
The market for second hand cars is an example of a lemon market. There is asymmetry of information because the seller knows more about the quality of the car than the buyer. The seller of a bad car has a strong incentive to sell it at a much higher price than it is worth and the buyer is insufficiently protected by regulation or warranties in this case. Conversely, it is difficult for the seller of a good car to demonstrate its quality to the buyer. The result is that bad cars tend to out-number good ones in the market. This is an explanation as to why the price of a new car drops so rapidly once it leaves the showroom; see The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism by Akerlof (1970).
# English-Chinese/Headache is the symptom of pain anywhere in the region of the head or neck

Headache is the symptom of pain anywhere in the region of the head or neck.
头痛是头部或颈部任何部位疼痛的症状。
# English-Chinese/Hearing loss may be either partial or total

Hearing loss may be either partial or total. This may be a result of injury, congenital disease, or physiological causes.
听力损失可能是部分或全部。 这可能是受伤，先天性疾病或生理原因造成的。
# English-Chinese/Heart

The heart is the organ of every vertebrate. It is a very strong muscle that is about the size of a fist. It pumps blood throughout the body. It has regular contractions which squeeze the blood out into other parts of the body.
心脏 是 每个 脊椎动物的 器官。它是 一个 非常 强壮的 肌肉，与 拳头 大小 相当。它 泵 血液 到 身体 各处。它 有规律地 收缩，将 血液 挤出 到 身体的 其他 部位。
# English-Chinese/Healthy diet

A healthy diet is a diet that helps to maintain or improve overall health. A healthy diet provides the body with essential nutrition: fluid, macronutrients, micronutrients, and adequate calories.
健康饮食 是 一种 有助于 维持 或 改善 整体 健康的 饮食。健康的 饮食 为 身体 提供 必需的 营养：液体，常量营养素，微量营养素 和 足够的 卡路里。
# English-Chinese/Healthy lifestyle

A healthy lifestyle is one which helps to keep and improve people's health and well-being. Many governments and non-governmental organizations work at promoting healthy lifestyles. They measure the benefits with critical health numbers, including weight, blood sugar, blood pressure, and blood cholesterol. Healthy living is a lifelong effect. The ways to being healthy include healthy eating, physical activities, weight management, and stress management.
健康的 生活方式 是 有助于 保持 和 改善 人们的 健康 和 福祉。许多 政府 和 非政府 组织 在 促进 健康的 生活方式上 工作。他们 衡量 关键 卫生 数据的 益处，包括 体重，血糖，血压 和 血液 胆固醇。健康生活 影响 终身。健康的 方法 包括 健康饮食，身体活动，体重管理 和 压力管理。
# English-Chinese/Headache is common discomfort

A headache is one of the most commonly experienced of all physical discomforts.
头痛是所有身体不适中最常见的一种。